Conflict and Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific: New Geopolitical Realities [1 ed.] 0367423502, 9780367423506

Table of contents :
Cover
Half Title
Series Page
Title Page
Copyright Page
Table of Contents
List of Illustrations
List of Contributors
Acknowledgments
List of Abbreviations
List of Key terms
Chapter 1: Conflict and cooperation in the Indo-Pacific: New geopolitical realities
New geopolitical realities in the Indo-Pacific
China’s swelling regional influence and involvement
Choices and conundrums for the Indo-Pacific powers
Debating the Indo-Pacific
Conflict and cooperation across the Indo-Pacific
Notes
Chapter 2: India's approach to the "Quad" and the salience of China
Arrival and return of the Quad
Why does India endorse the Quad?
Post-Cold War Sino-US rivalry and the Quad
India–China relations vis-à-vis the Quad
Summing up: the Quad disorder
Notes
Chapter 3: Decoding Japan's "Free and Open Indo-Pacific" concept
Introduction
Origins of a so-called “strategy”
Decoding the FOIP through policy statements
Three pillars: The security angle
FOIP as a maritime security policy
Peace and stability
The FOIP and China
Conclusion
Notes
Chapter 4: US strategic re-positioning to the "Indo-Pacific": A paradigm shift
Presence (actorness)
Rhetoric
Diplomacy
Conclusions
Notes
Chapter 5: Australia and the construction of the Indo-Pacific
Introduction
(Re-)Constructing the region: from Asia-Pacific to the Indo-Pacific
Australia in the Indo-Pacific: position, behavior, identity and agency
Australia’s strategy towards the Indo-Pacific
Conclusions
Notes
Chapter 6: Competing regional visions: China's Belt and Road Initiative versus the Indo-Pacific Partnership
Defining regions and regional cooperation in Asia
Integrating Asia with Chinese characteristics: the Belt and Road Initiative
Chinese foreign policy under Xi Jinping
The Belt and Road Initiative: a new way of organizing Asia?
The Indo-Pacific Partnership: hub-and-spoke system 2.0?
US foreign policy under Donald Trump
Attitudes of Australia, India and Japan
Conclusion
Notes
Chapter 7: Japan's Indo-Pacific: Operationalizing Tokyo's vision in eastern Africa
The Indo-Pacific and the international relations of eastern Africa
Competing state interests
The political economy of ports and natural resources
Eastern Africa and China
Creating Japan’s Indo-Pacific vision
Eastern Africa and Japan
Contextualizing Japan’s and China’s approaches to the region
Conclusion
Notes
Chapter 8: China and India: Nautical games in the Indian Ocean
Introduction
Caught in the middle
Sri Lanka: the fulcrum of rivalry
To lease or not to lease: from 199 years to 99 years
Tug-of-war over the Maldives
Move over, India—here comes China
Move over, China—here comes India
The Seychelles saga
Mauritian maneuvers
Chinese checkers
New Delhi dilemmas
A clash of values and visions: BRI versus the FOIP
The geometry of geopolitics
Notes
Chapter 9: Indo-Pacific geopolitics and foreign policy: The case of the Philippines, 2010–2018
Introduction
Responding to Indo-Pacific geopolitics
From China’s naval expansion to US strategic rebalancing
Fear over the loss of territorial rights
Thwarting the strategic rebalancing: the Belt and Road Initiative
Fear over the loss of economic benefits
Twenty-first century US–China strategic competition
The fear of entanglement
The power of fear
Notes
Index

Citation preview

Conflict and Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific

This book explores the most important strategic questions about the emerging Indo-Pacific region by offering an incisive analysis on the current and future patterns of competition and cooperation of key nations in the region. Examining emerging policies of cooperation and conflict adopted by IndoPacific states in response to a rising China, the book offers insights into the evolving Indo-Pacific visions and strategies being developed in Japan, India, Australia and the US in reaction to shifting geopolitical realities. The book provides evidence of geopolitical developments in what some see as a spatially coherent maritime zone stretching from the eastern Pacific to the western Indian Ocean, including small island states and countries that line its littoral. It also analyzes the development and operationalization of Indo-Pacific policies and strategies of various key nations. Contributors provide both macro and micro perspectives to this critically significant topic, offering insights into the grand strategies of great powers as well as case studies ranging from the Philippines to the Maldives to Kenya. The book suggests that new rivalries, shifting alliances and economic ebbs and flows in the Indo-Pacific will generate new geopolitical realities and shape much else beyond in the twenty-first century. A timely contribution to the rapidly expanding policy and scholarly discussions about what is likely to be the defining region for international politics for coming generations, the book will be of interest to policymakers as well as students and academics in the fields of International Relations, Foreign Policy, Security Studies, Diplomacy and International Law, East and South Asian Studies, East African Studies, Middle East Studies and Australian Studies. Ash Rossiter is Assistant Professor of International Security at the Institute of International and Civil Security (IICS) at Khalifa University of Science and Technology, Abu Dhabi, UAE. Brendon J. Cannon is Assistant Professor of International Security at the Institute of International and Civil Security (IICS) at Khalifa University of Science and Technology, Abu Dhabi, UAE.

Routledge Studies on Think Asia Edited by Jagannath P. Panda

This series addresses the current strategic complexities of Asia and forecasts how these current complexities will shape Asia’s future. Bringing together empirical and conceptual analysis, the series examines critical aspects of Asian politics, with a particular focus on the current security and strategic complexities. The series includes academic studies from universities, research institutes and think-tanks and policy oriented studies. Focusing on security and strategic analysis on Asia’s current and future trajectory, this series welcomes submissions on relationship patterns (bilateral, trilateral and multilateral) in IndoPacific, regional and sub-regional institutions and mechanisms, corridors and connectivity, maritime security, infrastructure politics, trade and economic models and critical frontiers (boundaries, borders, bordering provinces) that are crucial to Asia’s future. URL: www.routledge.com/Routledge-Studies-on-Think-Asia/book-series/TA 1.  India and China in Asia Between Equations and Equilibrium Jagannath P. Panda 2.  Northeast India and India’s Act East Policy Identifying the Priorities Edited by M. Amarjeet Singh 3.  The Korean Peninsula and Indo-Pacific Power Politics Status Security at Stake Edited by Jagannath P. Panda 4.  Conflict and Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific New Geopolitical Realities Edited by Ash Rossiter and Brendon J. Cannon

Conflict and Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific New Geopolitical Realities

Edited by Ash Rossiter and Brendon J. Cannon

First published 2020 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2020 selection and editorial matter, Ash Rossiter and Brendon J. Cannon; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Ash Rossiter and Brendon J. Cannon to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record has been requested for this book ISBN: 978-0-367-42350-6 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-00926-9 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear

Contents

List of illustrations vii List of contributors viii Acknowledgmentsx List of abbreviationsxi List of key termsxiii 1

Conflict and cooperation in the Indo-Pacific: new geopolitical realities

1

ASH ROSSITER AND BRENDON J. CANNON

2

India’s approach to the “Quad” and the salience of China

12

JAGANNATH P. PANDA

3

Decoding Japan’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” concept

39

TERUAKI AIZAWA AND ASH ROSSITER

4 US strategic re-positioning to the “Indo-Pacific”: a paradigm shift55 DAVID SCOTT

5

Australia and the construction of the Indo-Pacific

78

MIGUEL ALEJANDRO HÍJAR-CHIAPA

6

Competing regional visions: China’s Belt and Road Initiative versus the Indo-Pacific Partnership

94

EMRE DEMIR

7

Japan’s Indo-Pacific: operationalizing Tokyo’s vision in eastern Africa BRENDON J. CANNON

115

vi   Contents 8

China and India: nautical games in the Indian Ocean

133

MOHAN MALIK

9

Indo-Pacific geopolitics and foreign policy: the case of the Philippines, 2010–2018

156

RENATO CRUZ DE CASTRO

Index

179

Illustrations

Figures 2.1  2.2  2.3  2.4 

Comparison of QUAD and China total bilateral trade with IORA China’s GDP per capita, PPP (Current international US$) Military expenditure of China in constant (2018), US$ bn China’s bilateral trade with QUAD countries

21 24 25 30

Maps 0.1  0.2  0.3  0.4  2.1 

Japan’s Indo-Pacific India’s Indo-Pacific Australia’s Indo-Pacific The United States’ Indo-Pacific China’s ports and bases in IORA

xv xvi xvii xviii 20

Tables 2.1  Exercise ‘MALABAR’ 2.2  Quad official consultation meetings 2.3  China, major chokepoints and key IORA members

14 18 22

Contributors

Teruaki Aizawa is Senior Program Advisor at the Ocean Policy Research Institute, Sasakawa Peace Foundation (SPF) in Tokyo. He is Captain (ret) of the JMSDF and previously a specialist at Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA), Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau. His current research focuses on Japan’s maritime security policy, including the FOIP. Brendon J. Cannon is Assistant Professor of International Security at Khalifa University, Abu Dhabi, UAE. He specializes in the international relations of eastern Africa as well as regional security in the western Indian Ocean. His publications have appeared in African Security, Terrorism and Political Violence, Third World Quarterly, African Security Review and Defence Studies. Renato Cruz De Castro is a Professor in the International Studies Department, De La Salle University, Manila, the Philippines. He is the chair-holder of the Dr. Aurelio Calderon Chair in Philippine-American Relation. He has over 100 publications including articles in top-ranked journals, monographs and chapters in edited volumes. Miguel Alejandro Híjar-Chiapa is Associate Professor of International Relations at the University of Guadalajara, Mexico and incumbent President of the Australian and New Zealand Studies Association of North America (ANZSANA). His teaching and research focus on the foreign and defense policies of the Anglosphere countries. Emre Demir is an Assistant Professor of International Relations at TED University in Ankara, Turkey. His research interests include theories of hegemony, the political economy of knowledge production, East Asian politics, China’s political economy and Chinese foreign policy. Mohan Malik is Professor of Strategic Studies at the UAE’s National Defense College. He specializes in great power politics, maritime security and the geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific region. His most recent books include Maritime Security in the Indo-Pacific (2014) and China and India: Great Power Rivals (2011).

Contributors  ix Jagannath P. Panda is a Research Fellow and Centre Head for East Asia at the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi, India. He is an expert on India–China Relations, China, Indo-Pacific security and Indian Foreign Policy as well as the author of India–China Relations: Politics of Resources, Identity and Authority in a Multipolar World Order (Routledge, 2017) and China’s Path to Power: Party, Military and the Politics of State Transition (2010). Dr. Panda is the Series Editor for Routledge Studies on Think Asia. Ash Rossiter is Assistant Professor of International Security at Khalifa University, Abu Dhabi, UAE. His academic specializations are at the nexus of technology and international security, the changing character of war and conflict, and the shifting geopolitics of the Indo-Pacific Region. David Scott is an Analyst at the NATO Defense College Foundation based in Rome. His academic specializations are the emerging “Indo-Pacific” strategic discourse, maritime geopolitics in the Indo-Pacific, and roles of China and India in the international system—all reflected in his prolific writing.

Acknowledgments

We would like to thank each of the contributing authors for their excellent research, analysis, time and efforts. A particular note of thanks is needed for our friend, colleague and contributing author, Miguel Alejandro Híjar-Chiapa who kindly produced the maps of the competing Indo-Pacific regions of Japan, India, Australia and the US. We would be remiss if we did not offer words of gratitude for the editorial team at Routledge for their assistance, patience and efforts on our behalf. Relatedly, we would like to thank our friend, colleague and the Routledge Think Asia series editor, Jagannath P. Panda.

Abbreviations

A2/AD Anti-Access/Area Denial AAGC Asia–Africa Growth Corridor AFRICOM US Africa Command AIIB Asian Investment Infrastructure Bank AFP Armed Forces of the Philippines APEC Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations BRI Belt and Road Initiative BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa CENTCOM US Central Command COD Concert of Democracies CPC Communist Party of China CPEC China–Pakistan Economic Corridor CPTPP Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership DSG Defense Strategic Guidance EDCA Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement EEZ Exclusive Economic Zone FOIP Free and Open Indo-Pacific FON Freedom of Navigation HA/DR Humanitarian assistance/disaster relief IDFC International Development Finance Corporation INDOPACOM US Indo-Pacific Command IOR Indian Ocean Region IORA Indian Ocean Rim Association IPP Indo-Pacific Partnership IR International Relations JBIC Japan Bank of International Cooperation JETRO Japan External Trade Organization JICA Japan International Cooperation Agency JMSDF Japan Maritime Self-Defense Force JPC Japan Ports Consulting LIO Liberal International Order

xii  Abbreviations MDB MDP MDT METI MOFA MOD MSR NDPG NDS NSS OBOR ODA OPIC PAF PCA PCG PLA PLAN PN PRC RBO RCEP RMB Quad SCO SAGAR SARIC SDF SEB SEZ SGR SLOC SREB TICAD TPP UNCLOS US VFA

Mutual Defense Board Maldivian Democratic Party Mutual Defense Treaty Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry Ministry of Foreign Affairs Ministry of Defense Maritime Silk Road National Defense Program Guidelines National Defense Strategy of the US National Security Strategy of the US One Belt, One Road Official Development Assistance Overseas Private Investment Corporation Philippine Air Force Permanent Court of Arbitration Philippine Coast Guard People’s Liberation Army People’s Liberation Army’s Navy Philippine Navy People’s Republic of China Rules-based Order Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Resources, Markets and Bases Quadrilateral Security Dialogue Shanghai Cooperation Organization Security and Growth for All in the Region South Asia Regional Infrastructure Connectivity Japan’s Self-Defense Forces Security Engagement Board special economic zone standard gauge railroad sea lines of communication Silk Road Economic Belt Tokyo International Conference of African Development Trans-Pacific Partnership United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea United States of America Visiting Forces Agreement

Key terms

Alignment Alliance Australia Australian Foreign Policy Balancing Balance of Power Balance of Threat Berbera Border Disputes Borders BRI China Chinese Foreign Policy Command of the Commons Constructivism Debt-Trap Diplomacy Defense Indigenization Defense Policy Defense Procurement Diplomacy Djibouti Doctrine Equi-balancing Ethiopia Exclusive Economic Zone Free and Open Indo-Pacific Foreign Policy France Grand Strategy

Hedging India Indian Foreign Policy Indian Ocean Indo-Pacific Region Influence Infrastructure Interests International Order International Security Japan Japanese Foreign Policy Kenya Liberal International Order Maldives Maritime Maritime Regional Security Order Maritime Security Mauritius Middle Powers Military Mombasa Mozambique Nacala Naval Competition National Security Pacific Ocean Philippines

xiv   Key terms Policy Ports Port Visit Power Transition Theory Prime Minister Power Projection Prospect Theory Quad or Quadrilateral Dialogue Regions Regional Security Complex Realism Realpolitik Security Security Assistance Security Interaction Security Studies

Seychelles Sino-Indian Rivalry Small Island States South China Sea Standard Gauge Railway Strategic Posture Strategy String of Pearls Territorial Dispute United States US–Australia Alliance US–Japan Alliance US Foreign Policy US Pivot White Paper

Map 0.1 The Indo-Pacific region, stretching from the eastern coast of Africa to the west coasts of North and South America, as delineated and defined by the Government of Japan. The French island of Reunion with its naval assets as well as Japanese-funded infrastructure projects in Kenya, Madagascar and Mozambique officially comprise part of Japan’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP).”

Map 0.2 The Indo-Pacific region, stretching from the western coasts of the American continents to the Middle East and eastern Africa, as delineated and defined by Indian policymakers and government officials. New Delhi strategically views critical hydrocarbon reserves in the Middle East and the entire Indian Ocean as forming a key part of its Indo-Pacific strategy and related efforts such as the ­Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC).

Map 0.3 The Indo-Pacific region, stretching from the western coast of India due south and then east to the North and South American continents, as delineated and defined by the Government of Australia. Eastern Africa and the Middle East as well as the strategic island of Reunion are not officially part of Australia’s Indo-Pacific.

Map 0.4 “Hollywood to Bollywood.” The Indo-Pacific region, centered on Hawaii and US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM). The Indo-Pacific according to US policymakers and government stretches west from the Pacific to Mumbai and the western coast of India as well as the US military base at Diego Garcia. It pointedly does not include the Middle East or eastern Africa.

1 Conflict and cooperation in the Indo-Pacific New geopolitical realities Ash Rossiter and Brendon J. Cannon

New geopolitical realities in the Indo-Pacific Despite being Cold War ideological and geostrategic foes, the United States (US) and the Soviet Union attempted to define an international system that included structures, institutions and laws, which formed the basis of the post-World War II system of global governance. This bipolar world passed when the Soviet Union and its satellite states collapsed, replaced by an era of American unipolarity which some heralded a second “American century.”1 US unipolarity and hegemony—­ underpinned, according to some, by a liberal international and rules-based order— went largely unchallenged for a decade or so; the longevity of this US-led system of global governance, however, has been increasingly called into question from about the mid-2000s onwards.2 The meteoric economic and political crash of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) onto the world stage has done more than anything else to signal for many the end of unipolarity and a return to a multipolar world. There is a growing belief among scholars and policymakers, especially those from the West, that the world is entering a period of intense major power rivalry, and that the epicenter of this heightened competition will be the maritime region spanning the Indian and Pacific Oceans—i.e., the Indo-Pacific. For many of those in foreign policy circles using the term Indo-Pacific, the combination of these oceans denotes a new spatially coherent zone. An intensification of economic activity and the heightening of geopolitical competition within this vast maritime area are thought to provide the raison d’être for conceptualizing the Indo-Pacific as a distinct (albeit yet-to-be delineated) region. Under this view, the new geopolitical realities of the twenty-first century—especially the rise of India and China—are best captured by thinking of these two oceans, the islands they contain and the countries that line their littoral, in the whole.3 This interpretation, however, is far from universally accepted. Indeed, some academics make the claim that this neologism (the Indo-Pacific) is little more than a discursive construction, the roots of which lie in anxieties in some capitals about China’s growing power and influence.4 Rather than a natural byproduct of global power and wealth shifting from the Atlantic zone eastward, the term Indo-Pacific, they argue, has been imagined and subsequently evoked to provide a concept around which a strategic response to China’s rise can be organized.5

2   Ash Rossiter and Brendon J. Cannon Debates around the utility or even the ontological basis of the Indo-Pacific as a geopolitical concept will no doubt continue for some time; the Indo-Pacific means and will mean different things to different people. Nonetheless, policies taken by the main actors in the region—states and elite decision-makers in these states—will have a powerful constitutive effect in shaping what the Indo-Pacific comes to mean. The dynamism of the region, specifically the aggregated rate of economic growth taking place and the concomitant share of world power that comes with this, means the Indo-Pacific is undergoing rapid transformation. The most important factor shaping and reordering the region is undoubtedly the expansion of the Chinese economic, political and, to a lesser extent—for now, at least— military involvement and the response to this activity by the established regional powers.

China’s swelling regional influence and involvement China is an economic juggernaut that shed its Deng Xiaoping-era resolve to tread quietly for Xi Jinping’s highly public and arguably globe-spanning Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). What was once a trickle of Chinese money has turned into a flood, and now covers capitals and worksites from Dakar, Senegal on the Atlantic coast to Duqm, Oman on the Indian Ocean’s Arabian littoral to the Solomon Islands in the Pacific. According to many observers, Chinese money and infrastructure projects—railways in East Africa, ports in the Bay of Bengal, pipelines and roads in Central Asia, to give a few examples—are the clearest manifestation of China’s ambition to extend its influence and take its place as the premier power in the Indo-Pacific, if not beyond. To be sure, much of this Chinese-built and -funded infrastructure has filled critical needs in some places and connected China more tightly to the outside world than any time in its history. But with pipelines and ports has come skyrocketing debt to Beijing—and the prospect that China will take control of ­infrastructure assets as forfeited collateral when loans are defaulted, Kenya, for example, may default on its loans totalling close to $7 billion and, in the process, be pressured to hand over control of port operations in Mombasa to Beijing. Pakistan now owes China $6.56 billion for the building of pipelines, development of the port of Gwadar, and the construction of railroads and bridges. But it is Angola, a major oil producer, who owes China over three times as much: a whopping $25 billion. Concern about states succumbing to what some call “debt-trap” diplomacy now extends to the tiny island statelets in the Pacific, such as the Solomon Islands. Nevertheless, poor infrastructure is regularly identified by developing countries as their biggest obstacle. For this reason, a multitude of states, from Ethiopia to Myanmar, have warmly welcomed this influx of Chinese aid, investment and soft loans for infrastructure. Against the background of the BRI, the dominant narrative unfolding in earnest in global affairs over the past few years is one of a rising China and a faltering United States. Thus, Chinese influence, fuelled by infrastructure projects,

Conflict and cooperation in Indo-Pacific   3 massive loans and legions of Chinese workers, seems omnipresent throughout much of the developing world with little to no answer from the US or key allies, such as Japan. After all, what is the US building in the Horn of Africa or the Bay of Bengal region? Nothing at all. Or, if it is, the projects are of such low visibility as to be considered nonexistent by most observers. This is not to say, however, that established powers of the Indo-Pacific have not reacted to the monumental changes taking place.

Choices and conundrums for the Indo-Pacific powers Watching their own perceived influence and that of their great power ally slip, stalwarts of the liberal international order such as Japan and Australia are attempting to rise to the occasion, developing and energizing the notion of a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) with policies and white papers aimed at rolling back Chinese influence and maintaining their own. Deep doubts have surfaced in Tokyo as well as Washington regarding the latter’s titular place in the world in the face of a rising China. Australia sees malign Chinese influence and power manifest itself in the form of real estate sales, university funding and its own overreliance on mineral exports to China. India, with a lethal set of geopolitical conundrums on both of its northern borders, perceives an increasingly worrisome challenge from China coming not just via Arunachal Pradesh, but also via China’s ally, Pakistan, in places like Jammu and Kashmir. As damningly, New Delhi now fears encirclement via the sea in the form of China’s String of Pearls, reported by some to be coherent network of Chinese military, commercial facilities and relationships along its sea lines of communication (SLOCs), which extend across the Indian Ocean from east to west. Accordingly, India’s hedging and liaising with the nascent Indo-Pacific Partnership (IPP) of Japan, the US and Australia was a decision informed by realpolitik. India fears its destiny as one of the world’s great powers is in jeopardy. The only truly rising power in any IPP, India, presents a nuanced, practical and Janus-faced approach to its Indo-Pacific partners as well as China. In this, it is mirrored by Japan and Australia, both of which have incredibly strong trade relationships with China but find themselves increasingly at odds with Beijing’s increasingly assertive and threatening actions in the maritime realms bordering each state. An influx of Chinese infrastructure, workers and money across the region has led some to further question the post-World War II status quo. This has been bolstered by the emergence over the past two decades of a gradual but robust shift in economic power and resources from West to East with a much more modest shift towards the Global South.6 Does all this mean a definitive end to the post-World War II global governance system and American hegemony? ­Certainly the headlines, maps replete with Chinese flags across the Indo-Pacific, and analyses give this impression and seem to drive a sense that this new multipolar world—for all of its inconsistencies and unknowns—is forming into distinct constellations of power: Indo-Pacific states that support the current global governance structure versus states such as China that wish to upend or at least

4   Ash Rossiter and Brendon J. Cannon refashion the post-War structure with its perceived or real inequalities and ­inequities that favor status-quo powers over rising powers.7 This may be a neat typology, but it hardly addresses the complexity of what we are experiencing. This book makes many novel contributions to the field of international relations (IR) and geopolitics, but perhaps foremost among its attributes is that it explicitly questions the narrative of increasing, unstoppable Chinese ascendancy and the decline of the US and its partners. Indeed, some authors see strengths and weaknesses in the US or Chinese approaches to structural change in the international system. Their research findings also demonstrate the limited resource arrays and importance of domestic politics to all states involved—whether authoritarian China or liberal democratic Japan or Australia. The analyses offered in the book’s chapters demonstrate not just a resurgence in US power in certain theatres but an attempt to strengthen an alliance system that is over seven decades’ old. In addition, the strengths of China’s BRI approach—ostensibly emanating from a unitary actor—are contrasted with ­questions about the causal connection between Beijing’s infrastructure projects and its ability to aggregate influence and power, whether this in eastern Africa or the islands of the Pacific. One thing seems certain: the Indo-Pacific is here to stay. The Indo-Pacific is now official policy in both Japan and the US.8 Naval exercises, institutional renaming and military redeployments, coupled with pugnacious analyses and language, appear to demonstrate an unmistakable backlash against China. The beginnings of a new or at least post-US global order—as embodied by a rising China—has had the arguable effect of increasing the salience of the status quo and a buttressing of partnerships among those states who fear or mistrust (or both) a China-dominated region.9 It is under this general “threat” from China that the position of state actors has arguably begun to visibly shift from casual adherence or outright disinterest in upholding of the US-led post-War global governance structure to one of increasing support. This shift is apparent in normative statements made by leaders about “rule of law” or “sea lane safety,” and has led increasingly to a constellation of hard and soft power and thereby the beginnings of strategy that includes one great power (the United States), one economic power (Japan), one rising power (India) and one lynchpin power (Australia). These four states, spread across the globe with very different sources of, and outlooks on, power now form the nucleus of those states invested in ­pursuing what Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has nominated a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) vision.10

Debating the Indo-Pacific To date, much of the burgeoning literature and political commentary on the Indo-Pacific has focused overwhelmingly on the shifting balance of power between Washington and Beijing and what this means for the region.11 Indeed, this book was, in part, stimulated by the ever-increasing use of this nomenclature in opposition to China, its actions and its policies. The idea of the Indo-Pacific

Conflict and cooperation in Indo-Pacific  5 zone did not begin this way, and certainly Japan’s PM Abe has made it abundantly clear that Japan’s own Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) vision is not anti-China but pro-Japan and pro a peaceful, responsible China. Chinese actions—most notably its infrastructure projects and the accompanying massive debt to Beijing—however, are often viewed as net negatives rather than positives. Some of our authors disagree, arguing that China is playing a positive role in places such as Ethiopia or Cambodia—regardless of the negative realities and potential implications for sovereignty of the massive debt. These states, some argue, need the critical infrastructure that Chinese ­companies and workers provide, as funded by Chinese banks. Yet, there seems an ineluctable shift over the past two years to something bordering on outright hostility, even paranoia gripping Tokyo, Canberra, Washington and, to a lesser extent, New Delhi. This is geopolitically ironic because India is the only IndoPacific Partners (IPP) country that actually shares a land border with China, yet the language of its leaders, academics and think tanks—perhaps with the exception of Brahma Chellaney and a few others—is less provocative and fear-­ inducing than that emanating from other IPP capitals. To read the latest analyses and op-eds, ­evidence of Chinese aggression and influence blanket the entire Indo-Pacific. “Australia must prepare for a Chinese military base in the Pacific” reads one recent article in a leading newspaper.12 “China is Leasing an Entire Pacific Island,” reads another from the New York Times.13 The Wall Street Journal argues “Deal for Naval Outpost in Cambodia Furthers China’s Quest for Military Network.”14 As an editorial in The Hindu claims “Beijing needs the cooperation of the regional political elites to allow the People’s Liberation Army Navy [PLAN] access to critical Indian Ocean littorals to protect Chinese investments.”15 Some of the authors in this edited volume argue persuasively that certain actions by China do pose specific threats to rivals. Indeed, Chinese scholars and analysts have contradicted President Xi and others by making it clear that at least some in China do see the efficacy in running networks of overseas bases. Analysts at the Institute of Military Transportation of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Ground Forces have reportedly argued, to protect our ever-growing overseas interests, we will progressively establish in Pakistan, United Arab Emirates, Sri Lanka, Myanmar, Singapore, Indonesia, Kenya and other countries a logistical network (后勤保障的网 络体系) based on various means, buying, renting, cooperating, to construct our overseas bases or overseas protection hubs (海外保障支掌点).16 Yet, evidence of China’s military base-building spree—Djibouti is most often cited—appears thin for the time being. China, like the IPP states, possesses core interests and limited resources, regardless of the aspirations of its military think tanks or politicians. It increasingly fields a capable blue water navy but, to date, lacks the capacity to base naval, air and military assets like the US does in Bahrain and Qatar in the Gulf. It is perhaps in the steadily growing military

6   Ash Rossiter and Brendon J. Cannon might of China, nevertheless, that policymakers should place their worry. To what end will it be used? To protect overseas investments? This oft-mentioned “threat” sounds like something from the seventeenth-century era of gunboat diplomacy rather than today’s interconnected, globalized world. Rather, it is in the intelligence gathering and logistical supply chains that Beijing could someday exploit to sever Australia’s strategic bridge with the US that IPP analysts, policymakers and military professionals should find most worrisome. This contrasts with the political economy of China’s BRI and increasingly incoherent reaction to Beijing’s rail, pipeline, road and port building spree across the region. Not all Chinese investment or presence is bad. Indeed, it fills a critical need that neither the US nor its Indo-Pacific partners can or should fill. In other words, specific threats need to be defined, analyzed and prioritized rather than lumped together and acted upon by the IPPs. Whilst these great power dynamics are a key feature of the Indo-Pacific, they are far from the full story. Less attention has been given over, for example, to how other states in the Indo-Pacific are responding to the opportunities and challenges brought about by seismic transformations occurring in the region. A central objective of this co-edited volume is to widen the debate about the IndoPacific by injecting a much broader set of perspectives and approaches into current discussions. To that end, it has sought to include a wide set of geographically and thematically diverse contributions.

Conflict and cooperation across the Indo-Pacific Themes of conflict and cooperation abound throughout this book. They are explored in depth beginning with Jagannath P. Panda’s chapter on India’s approach to the Quadrilateral consultative forum, or the “Quad,” comprised of Australia, India, Japan and the US. Panda demonstrates that India’s engagement with this grouping is a direct reflection of New Delhi’s plural foreign policy arc in an evolving Indo-Pacific construct. According to Panda, this means that India’s outreach to its Quad partners should not be viewed as a China-containment strategy. Rather, New Delhi’s new-found interest in the Quad is meant to balance China’s strategic ambitions in the Indian Ocean. It is also possibly a means of ensuring a power equilibrium in the Indo-Pacific region. As such, India’s perspective on the Quad should be understood in light of four critical characteristics. First, India’s currently sees the Quad as a strategic proposition more than a platform to address the rising power asymmetry in Asia. Through its participation in the Quad, India is bolstered in its demand that China endorse a multipolar Asian structure. Second, Beijing’s militarization of the South China Sea, its provocative approach to Japan in the East China Sea and its bellicosity vis-à-vis the India–China boundary dispute have further pushed New Delhi to find strategic consonance with the Quad members. Third, while India uses the Quad to push back against an assertive China, particularly Beijing’s attempts to overthrow India’s hegemony in the Indian Ocean, New Delhi is cognizant of the Quad’s severe limitations. In short, the 2017 Doklam crisis pitting China against

Conflict and cooperation in Indo-Pacific   7 India made it clear that none of the Quad states would intervene substantially on India’s behalf to affect the outcome in New Delhi’s favor. Fourth, India’s approach to the liberal-order framework led by the US versus the unilateral global discourse propelled by China’s BRI attempts to emphasize a consultative nature as well as a viable growth environment across the Indo-Pacific. In short, India’s development of policies with certain Quad partners such as Japan are an attempt to enhance the spirit of inclusivity in the region and maintain a balance with the power structures led by the US, on the one hand, and China on the other. Teruaki Aizawa and Ash Rossiter shed light on Japan’s “Free and Open IndoPacific” (FOIP) strategy or “vision,” as it is increasingly referred to in Tokyo. Through a close reading of government policy statements and recent analyses by Japanese experts, they argue it is now possible to infer with greater accuracy the FOIP’s main goals, how it fits in with Japan’s evolving foreign and national security posture, and how it relates to Tokyo’s relationship with Beijing. They show that although the FOIP is officially explained as a set of initiatives designed to improve economic prosperity in the Indo-Pacific, it has not stopped many analysts from viewing the FOIP as Tokyo’s attempt to play a more muscular foreign policy role in the region, especially in terms of securing the maritime environment on which and through which Japan’s prosperity rests. Their analysis indicates, however, that there are few signs that the FOIP will result in a major change in Japan’s overall strategic posture. For one thing, many of the FOIP’s key elements already reflect policies that Japan has been pursuing for some time, such as security assistance to select ASEAN countries. David Scott’s chapter offers a thorough and comprehensive account of US balancing actions in the Indo-Pacific. A paradigm shift has taken place in US strategic discourse in which a previous emphasis by the US on the Pacific using “Asia-Pacific” formulations has given way to an emphasis on the Pacific and Indian Oceans using “Indo-Pacific” formulations. This has fed directly into policy and military actions and policies that demonstrate the vitality and reality of US power from the Persian Gulf to the South Pacific. Indeed, Scott’s catalogue of US geo-economic and geopolitical strategies and accompanying actions such as troop and naval redeployments may offer the best corrective, to date, of the near-omnipresent narrative of the unstoppable decline of US power and influence. This US repositioning, according to Scott, is being driven to a significant extent by China’s own drive across the Indo-Pacific, and that bringing India into the US strategic networking to help constrain China is an important development in this shift from Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific strategic formulations. To detail this US repositioning, Scott uses US presence (actorness), ­official rhetoric and diplomacy in relation to the Indo-Pacific. Concerns about China among key US allies such as Australia and Japan have pushed the US under successive administrations to further position and reposition US hard power in the western Pacific and eastern Indian Oceans. These actions, accompanied by forceful US rhetoric have been relatively effective in constraining China. However, Scott’s evaluation of overall US effectiveness in both the

8   Ash Rossiter and Brendon J. Cannon g­ eopolitical and geo-economic dimensions indicates that the US has delivered less on the geo-economic front and more on the geopolitical front through a strategy of internal and external balancing. Miguel A. Híjar-Chiapa explores the ontological change taking place in the Pacific and Indian Oceans and its ramifications for Australia as well as the other IPP states. Using constructivist theory, he analyzes Australia’s role, interests and behavior in this new imagined community and how Canberra may take advantage of this novel construct in order to provide responses to the serious threats and opportunities that these transformations may bring. According to Híjar-Chiapa, ideas can become policy, and once they do, they have the ability to shape reality. It is in this core message that the usefulness and importance of the idea of a region such as the Indo-Pacific lies. How achievable an Indo-Pacific vision free from great power intimidation and open to attractive economic opportunities is depends mostly on how the idea of the region is constructed and how this, in turn, can construct the identities, interests and behaviors of all the powers in the region. This is at the heart of Australia’s approach to the Quad and the IPP: medium states like Australia are not powerful enough to dictate the shape of the region, but possess sufficient power to influence the course that this shaping process may take. This is evidenced by the author’s in-depth analysis of Canberra’s 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, which highlighted Australia’s pursuit of an opportunity, security and strength agenda that promotes cooperation on strategic, political and economic issues, reinforces peace and international law, encourages the full and active engagement of the US in regional affairs, commits to strong and constructive ties with China and ensures that all regional countries, large and small, have a voice on regional issues. The efficacy of the competing Indo-Pacific vision of the IPP versus China’s BRI form the subject of Emre Demir’s insightful chapter. Framing his argument with various IR theories, particularly constructivism, Demir posits that regions such as the Indo-Pacific are not natural realities nor are they obvious geographical manifestations. In contrast, regions are socially constructed through political processes. Accordingly, any discussions on and attempts to redefine or rescale Asia by the leading powers of the region—whether by the US, China or other states—need to be considered in this context. After an instructive and critical theoretical section defining regions, conceptualizing regionalism and reviewing regionalization in Asia, Demir applies these theories by exploring official policy documents and speeches of Chinese and IPP countries’ leaders. In doing so, he provides cogent insights into the competing regional institutional arrangements proposed by the BRI and the IPP. Demir maintains that the Chinese-led ­initiative, at least in rhetoric and in terms of membership, is inclusive. That is, the BRI and related projects are based on economic connectivity and cooperation among countries. This contrasts sharply with the security related and exclusionary IPP concept—regardless of its increasing economic focus via initiatives such as the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC). Most tellingly, China’s BRI demonstrates distinct advantages over the IPP according to Demir. This is due to the latter’s lack of clear leadership, difficulties in matching diverging

Conflict and cooperation in Indo-Pacific   9 priorities and the fractured approach taken by Japan, Australia, the US and India to not only the IPP but also to China. Brendon J. Cannon’s chapter explores the western geopolitical bookend of the Indo-Pacific region: eastern Africa. An outlier in any Indo-Pacific strategy or vision, the western Indian Ocean region and particularly the states of eastern Africa will, Cannon argues, nonetheless play an increasingly important role in the minds of policymakers because of exaggerated perceptions about Beijing’s influence in the region. Indeed, it is here in the vast region stretching north from Mozambique to Djibouti that the collision of Japan’s FOIP vision and China’s BRI is most apparent. Yet Cannon also highlights that this often ignored and misunderstood region is also a zone of high contestation between medium and small powers. It is within this contextual setting that the chapter describes, defines and analyzes Japan’s FOIP vision as it relates to this complex region. Cannon demonstrates that Tokyo’s perception of a zero-sum game of influence with China informs its renewed interest in eastern Africa. Indeed, he strongly critiques one of the fundamental assumptions by analysts and policymakers alike about the BRI: that China actually gains political or economic influence from states such as Kenya or Ethiopia when it invests and builds in them. According to Cannon, these ignore the ad hoc nature of engagement by Chinese individuals and businesses and, more damningly, fail to actually explain why Beijing, broadly speaking, is supportive of such expensive and risky projects. What Tokyo should understand, according to the author, is that Japan simply possesses neither the rationale nor the resources to compete on the same scale as China in eastern Africa—or anywhere else. Indeed, no other country, to include Japan’s FOIP partners, is currently working within the same political-economy context as China. Thus, the urge to somehow compete with China in terms of scale or, for the more simpleminded reason of “follow the leader,” makes little fiscal, political or strategic sense. Interestingly, in researching Japan’s renewed engagement with the region Cannon uncovered a possible, inadvertent way for Japan to maintain visibility in the face of what, at first glance, appears to be an unstoppable Chinese juggernaut. That is, Japanese foreign policy in the region is largely driven by Japanese businesses and consulting firms rather than Tokyo’s government ministries. This is a commonsensical, fiscally sound and politically safe pathway for Tokyo to maintain its prominence and presence in the region. But all is not rosy. While an increased appetite for risk is apparent among Japanese multinational conglomerates they continue to rely on the Japanese government for funding and loans, thus hampering their effectiveness as agents of Japanese power in the region. In the penultimate contribution, Mohan Malik reveals how the intense ­jockeying for influence and forward presence between China, India, and others in the Indian Ocean over control of ports, airports and other pieces of critical infrastructure and for influence over small island states has made the vast ­Indo-Pacific region from East Asia to East Africa a major arena of competition amongst major powers. The domestic political dynamics in the littoral states such as Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Mauritius, and the Seychelles are examined as

10   Ash Rossiter and Brendon J. Cannon they maneuver to gain from the geopolitical power play underway in this vast region. One of the chapter’s main arguments through examining these case studies is that new strategic balances are emerging as partnerships and allegiances among states shift. Though one-on-one “Cold War-like” bilateral alliances currently may seem old-fashioned, the crystallization of fluid relationships into rigid alignments could occur in the event of a major rupture in US–Chinese or Indian–Chinese relations. Finally, Renato Cruz De Castro compares how two Philippine presidents have approached the evolving geostrategic competition between the US and China in the Indo-Pacific region. He demonstrates that from 2011 to 2016, then President Benigno Aquino III maintained that China’s maritime expansion threatened the Philippines’ territorial rights over its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). In reaction to Chinese maritime expansion, he adopted a balancing policy on China’s maritime expansion in the South China Sea. Which jibed with the Obama Administration’s strategic rebalancing to Asia. In contrast, President Rodrigo Duterte unravelled the previous president’s foreign policy agenda. Not wanting to upset Chinese security concerns and jeopardize the Philippines’ ­economic stakes in the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the chapter argues that Duterte opted initially for a rapprochement policy. Nevertheless, the Duterte Administration eventually adopted the policy of equibalancing the US and China to avoid entanglement in great power competition. Overall, the two presidents, in formulating their respective foreign policies, had reckoned with the ­geostrategic developments in the Indo-Pacific region and the prospects of the Philippines losing either territorial rights or economic gains or autonomy as they designed their respective foreign policies.

Notes   1 Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs, 70, no. 1 (1990), pp.  23–33; Mohamed M. El-Doufani, “Regional Revisionist Client States under ­Unipolarity,” Third World Quarterly, 13, no. 2 (1992), pp. 255–265; Mortimer B. Zuckerman, “A Second American Century,” Foreign Affairs, 77, no. 3 (1998), pp. 18–31.   2 Christopher Layne, “This Time it’s Real: The End of Unipolarity and the Pax Americana,” International Studies Quarterly, 56, no. 1 (2012), pp. 203–213.   3 C. Raja Mohan, Samudra Manthan: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Indo-Pacific ­(Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2012).   4 Cheng-Chwee Kuik, “The Essence of Hedging: Malaysia and Singapore’s Response to a Rising China,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, 30, no. 2 (2008), pp. 159–185; James Manicom and Andrew O’Neil, “Accommodation, Realignment, or Business as Usual? Australia’s Response to a Rising China,” The Pacific Review, 23, no. 1 (2010), pp. 23–44; and Chengxin Pan, “The ‘Indo-Pacific’ and Geopolitical Anxieties about China’s Rise in the Asian Regional Order,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, 68, no. 4 (2014), pp. 453–469.   5 Renato Cruz De Castro, “21st Century Japan–Philippines Strategic Partnership: Constraining China’s Expansion in the South China Sea,” Asian Affairs: An American Review, 44, no. 2 (2017), pp. 31–51; Harsh V. Pant and Abhijnan Rej, “Is India Ready for the Indo-Pacific?” The Washington Quarterly, 41, no. 2 (2018), pp. 47–61; Michael J. Green, China’s Maritime Silk Road, Strategic and Economic Implications

Conflict and cooperation in Indo-Pacific   11

  6   7

  8   9

10 11 12 13 14

15 16

for the Indo-Pacific Region (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic & International Studies, 2018); and Rory Medcalf, “Reimagining Asia: From Asia-Pacific to IndoPacific,” in Gilbert Rozman and Joseph Chinyong Liow (eds.), International Relations and Asia’s Southern Tier (Asan-Palgrave Macmillan Series, 2018), pp. 9–28. Barry R, Posen, “Emerging Multipolarity: Why Should We Care?” Current History, 108, no. 721 (2009), pp. 347–352. Ann Florini, “Rising Asian Powers and Changing Global Governance,” International Studies Review, 13, no. 1 (2011), pp. 24–33; Maximilian Terhalle, “Reciprocal Socialization: Rising Powers and the West,” International Studies Perspectives, 12, no. 4 (2011), pp. 341–361; Mathew D. Stephen, “Rising Regional Powers and International Institutions: The Foreign Policy Orientations of India, Brazil and South Africa,” Global Society, 26, no. 3 (2012), pp. 289–309; Shaun Breslin, “China’s Emerging Global Role: Dissatisfied Responsible Great Power,” Politics, 30, no. 1 (2010), pp. 52–62; Emel Parlar Dal and Gonca Oguz Gök, “Locating Turkey as a ‘Rising Power’ in the Changing International Order: An Introduction,” Perceptions, 19, no. 4 (2014), pp. 1–18; and Edward Newman and Benjamin Zala, “Rising Powers and Order Contestation: Disaggregating the Normative from the Representational,” Third World Quarterly, 39, no. 5 (2018), pp. 871–888. Kuni Miyake, “What does the ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’ Mean?” The Japan Times, 11 March 2019, www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2019/03/11/commentary/japan-commentary/ indo-pacific-strategy-mean/#.Xb_VJVUzaUk. Pan, “The ‘Indo-Pacific’ and Geopolitical Anxieties”; Shaun Breslin, “Still Rising or Risen (or both)? Why and how China Matters,” The Pacific Review, 30, no. 6 (2017), pp. 870–884; and Graham Allison, “China vs. America: Managing the Next Clash of Civilizations,” Foreign Affairs, 96, no. 5 (2017), pp. 80–89. Shinzo Abe, Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Opening Session of the Sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD VI), August 27, 2016, Japan Ministry of Foreign Affairs, www.mofa.go.jp/afr/af2/page4e_000496.html. Xie Tao, “China–US Relations during the Trump Administration: Mixed Signals, Increased Risks,” Asia Policy, 24, no. 1 (2017), pp. 5–12; and Susan Shirk, “Trump and China: Getting to Yes with Beijing,” Foreign Affairs, 96, no. 2 (2017), pp. 20–27. Hugh White, “Australia must prepare for a Chinese military base in the Pacific,” Guardian, July 15, 2019, www.theguardian.com/world/commentisfree/2019/jul/15/ australia-must-prepare-for-a-chinese-military-base-in-the-pacific. Damien Cave, “China Is Leasing an Entire Pacific Island. Its Residents Are Shocked,” New York Times, October 16, 2019, www.nytimes.com/2019/10/16/world/ australia/china-tulagi-solomon-islands-pacific.html. Jeremy Page, Gordon Lubold, and Rob Taylor, “Deal for Naval Outpost in Cambodia Furthers China’s Quest for Military Network,” Wall Street Journal, July 22 2019, www.wsj.com/articles/secret-deal-for-chinese-naval-outpost-in-cambodia-raises-u-sfears-of-beijings-ambitions-1156373248. Bidanda Chegappa, “Strategy behind China’s foreign military bases,” The Hindu, August 14, 2019, www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/columns/strategy-behindchinas-foreign-military-bases/article29093793.ece Mathieu Duchâtel, “China Trends #2 – Naval Bases: From Djibouti to a Global Network?” Institut Montaigne, Blog 22, June 26, 2019, www.institutmontaigne.org/ en/blog/china-trends-2-naval-bases-djibouti-global-network.

2 India’s approach to the “Quad” and the salience of China Jagannath P. Panda

If pluralism is the arc of Indian foreign policy, then New Delhi’s adherence to the “Quad”1 needs to be understood within a plural and compound context of India’s evolving relationship architecture, with major powers while protecting its strategic interests in the Indo-Pacific region. Taking advantage of its ­geographical centrality in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), India’s approach to the Quad has been an evolutionary experience in the emerging Indo-Pacific construct where India’s interdependent but complex relationship with China is a strong factor. Aligning with “likeminded” countries without making a formal alliance or discounting its relationship with countries outside the Quad framework is the hallmark of India’s evolving foreign policy strategy. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue on June 1, 2018 in Singapore explained this narrative. As eloquently stated by Modi, “India’s strategic partnership with the United States is a new pillar of our shared vision of an open, stable, secure and prosperous Indo-Pacific region.”2 At the same time, Modi expressed that India’s relationship with China has “many layers,” making it important for global peace and progress.3 Likewise, as the Indian Prime Minister stated, India’s relationship with Russia constitutes a crucial part in the shared understanding of a “multipolar world order.”4 As India tailors its approach towards the Quad consultative forum in the Indo-Pacific, this chapter seeks to identify the bearing of any anti-China tendencies. It essentially argues that New Delhi’s Quad stance is not an explicit move against China but rather is a calculated strategic move to protect its interests, including maritime interests and ambitions, in view of a “revisionist” China in the Indo-Pacific.5 India’s rendezvous with the Quad is to strengthen its foreign policy outreach against China’s strategic non-equilibrium stance that poses multiple challenges to India’s strategic ambitions. The Quad can therefore signify New Delhi’s plural foreign policy strategy to engage more intently with a prevailing power structure, otherwise known as the liberal power structure, led by the United States to eventually gain ascendancy over the alternative structure, known as the revisionist power structure, led by China. Concurrently, India has been nurturing its relationship with China, seeking to manage the age-old boundary disputes and engage in better economic relations.

India’s approach to the “Quad”   13 The chapter is structured into five parts. The first part examines the arrival and return of the Quad. The second part examines the Indian rationality behind the endorsement of the Quad proposition. The third part examines how the Quad is a proposition of the post-Cold War rivalry legacy between the US and China and how India witnesses this unfolding US–China rivalry. The fourth part examines how India–China relations act as a balancer to ensure that the Quad does not emerge as an anti-China proposition, even though it does intend to negate China’s growing unilateralism in the IOR. The concluding section analyzes the undertones of the Quad’s prospects from an Indian perspective.

Arrival and return of the Quad The Quad’s growth trajectory is roughly a decade-and-a-half-old affair, beginning in 2004. After a brief discussion over its merit, the proposition died down in 2007 to return again in 2017, to be popularly called in public discourse as Quad 2.0.6 Arriving initially as an “ad-hoc coordinating mechanism” after the tsunami in December 2004 at the foreign secretary level, Quad 1.0 was primarily stimulated by an American suggestion in 2006 that the four democratic countries had substantial naval capabilities and hence must have a consultative regional forum to deal with “maritime emergencies and security threats such as piracy.”7 As Shyam Saran puts it, Quad 1.0 was formed with an understanding that it would not take a “military dimension” but instead be a regional consultative forum. China nevertheless called it an emerging “Asian NATO.”8 The Chinese strategic community soon followed suit.9 Both China and Russia see the Quad proposition as a military and security coalition in-the-making in the IOR. It should be noted that though Beijing is familiar with India’s independent foreign policy thinking, it has yet to shelve its prejudice of seeing India as a pro-American country. As a former Indian diplomat aptly argues, “China has often viewed India as following a foreign policy subservient to Western interests. This is a mistake.”10 In December 2006, during the former Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh’s visit to Tokyo, India and Japan had a formal discussion to further the idea of the Quad. They attempted to initiate a dialogue mechanism by establishing modalities with “likeminded” countries in Asia-Pacific.11 Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s speech at the Indian Parliament on August 22, 2007, ­entitled “Confluence of the Two Seas,” called for a “broader Asia” with the cooperation of Japan and India along with the United States and Australia in the entirety of the Pacific Ocean.12 This strengthened the Chinese-Russian assertion that the Quad is an anti-China formulation. The Malabar naval exercises involving the US, Japan, Australia and Singapore in September 2007 also confirmed an Indian interest in pursuing the Quad forum further (see Table 2.1). There was a general view that the Malabar exercises were a regional consensus in response to China’s continuous naval expansion in the Indian Ocean and ever-expanding military cooperation with the Central Asian states within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).13 Meanwhile, China exerted pressure on ­3Australia to go easy on the Quad formulation. Australian Foreign Minister

Malabar-V

Malabar-04

Malabar-05

Malabar-06

Malabar CY-07/1

5.

6.

7.

8.

9.

14.

13.

12.

11.

10.

Malabar-I Malabar-II Malabar-III Malabar-IV

1. 2. 3. 4.

USA and India

USA and India

USA and India

USA and India

USA and India USA and India USA and India USA and India

Countries involved May 1992 1995 1996 Sept 26–Oct 03, 2002 Oct 06–Oct 08, 2003 Oct 01–Oct 09, 2004 Sept 25–Oct 04, 2005 Oct 25–Nov 05, 2006 April 06–April 11, 2007

Period

USA, India, Japan, Australia and Singapore Malabar USA, India, Japan, Sept 04–Sept 09, CY-07/2 Australia and 2007 Singapore Malabar-08 USA and India Oct 15–Oct 28, 2008 Malabar-09 USA, India and April 26–May 03, Japan 2009 Malabar-10 USA and India April 23–April 30, 2010 Malabar 2011 USA, India and April 03–April 10, Japan 2011

Name

SL. No.

Table 2.1 Exercise ‘MALABAR’

Focused on functional skills like ASW operations, VBSS techniques, etc. Featured execution of functional skills

To increase interoperability and develop common understanding and procedures for maritime operations.

To enhance mutual understanding of the two navies and increase regional cooperation To increase interoperability and enhance cooperative security relationship between India and the US Towards greater interaction, greater interoperability and building bridges of friendship To develop functional skills and go beyond tactical exercises. To increase interoperability and enhance cooperative security relationship between India and the US.

Introductory and exploratory in nature To jointly conduct military exercises at a modest scale To jointly conduct military exercises at a modest scale To increase interoperability between the two navies

Objectives

Fundamental coordination and communication to more advanced and complex strategic naval operations Western Pacific Ocean, near To enhance military-to-military coordination and help the Luzon Strait, strategize and execute tactical operations in a Philippines multinational environment

Bay of Bengal, off Visakhapatnam coast, India Arabian Sea, off the coast of Goa, India Off the coast of Okinawa, Japan Near Goa, India

Pacific Ocean, off the Japanese island of Okinawa

Southwest coast near Goa, India Southwest coast off Goa, India Southwest coast of India

Near Kochi, India

Off the coast of Goa, India Indian Ocean Indian Ocean Near Kochi, India

Venue

14   Jagannath P. Panda

Malabar 2013

Malabar 2014

Malabar 2015

Malabar 2016

Malabar 2017

Malabar 2018

Malabar 2019

16.

17.

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

USA, India and Japan

USA, India and Japan

USA, India and Japan

USA, India and Japan

USA, India and Japan USA, India and Japan

USA and India

USA and India

September 26– October 4, 2019

June 7–June 15, 2018

July 10–July 17, 2017

June 10–June 17, 2016

April 09–April 16, 2012 Nov 05–Nov 11, 2013 July 24–July 30, 2014 Oct 14–Oct 19, 2015

Off the coast of Guam, Philippine Sea Harbour phase: Naval Base Guam Sea phase: Philippine Sea Off the coast of Japan

Harbour phase: Sasebo, Japan Sea phase: Pacific Ocean Bay of Bengal, India.

Bay of Bengal, Chennai, India Bay of Bengal and Chennai, India Port Sasebo and the Western Pacific Ocean, Japan Chennai, India

To advance multinational maritime relationships and mutual security issues To advance multinational maritime relationships and mutual security issues To enhance maritime cooperation among the navies of the participating nations To enhance naval cooperation among important navies of the Indo-Pacific region which helps in enhancing mutual understanding To increase interoperability amongst the three navies and develop common understanding of procedures for Maritime Security Operations To promote common understanding and demonstrate their shared commitment to enhance maritime security and stability in the region To achieve greater inter-operability between the three navies to have a better strategic holding in the IndoPacific region. It also seeks to develop the working relationships between the countries’ maritime forces more To achieve greater inter-operability between the three navies to have a better strategic holding in the Indo-Pacific region. It also seeks to develop the working relationships between the countries’ maritime forces more

Note What started as a bilateral naval exercise between India and the United States in 1992 became an annual exercise the two countries conduct, known as the Malabar exercises, so as to improve regional security cooperation. While Canada, Australia and Singapore were non-permanent participants for some years, Japan was included as a permanent partner in 2015. These exercises have always been very diverse in nature, becoming more complex and broad-ranging as time went by. So far, there have been 21 such exercises, of which three were conducted before India acquired the status of a de-facto nuclear power in 1998. Following those nuclear tests, ­Washington, D.C. imposed economic sanctions on New Delhi and also suspended the naval military exercises. It was only after 9/11 that the military contacts were reinitiated.

(Sources: From various open sources, such as Rediff.com, The Quint, The Hindu, The Indian Express, Asia Times, The Diplomat, The Times of India, The Economic Times, Press Information Bureau: Government of India, Ministry of Defence: Government of India. Also, Sumit Ganguly, Andrew Scobell and Brian Shoup (eds.), US-Indian Strategic Cooperation into the 21st Century: More Than Words, Routledge: 2006).

Malabar 2012

15.

India’s approach to the “Quad”   15

16   Jagannath P. Panda Stephen Smith publicly assured the Chinese foreign minister that “Australia would not be proposing to have a dialogue of that nature.”14 Kevin Rudd’s arrival in power in 2007 signalled how Australia considered China as a key partner and would not like to support interests seemingly detrimental to China. Hence, Australia retracted from the Quad proposition and the Quad formulation was shelved in 2007–08. The Quad idea resurfaced strongly in December 2012 when Shinzo Abe, upon his return to power, talked about “Asia’s democratic security diamond.” He explicitly argued, “I envisage a strategy whereby Australia, India, Japan and the US state of Hawaii form a diamond to safeguard the maritime commons stretching from the Indian Ocean Region to the western Pacific.”15 Even though a progressive trend was noticed in Japan’s relationship with India and with the other two Quad countries over the next few years, India was hesitant to endorse the Quad proposal publicly. Yet Japan continued to push the concept further through Abe’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) foreign policy advocacy. It also tried to establish strategic consonance with Barack Obama’s “Pivot to Asia” strategy and India’s “Act East” policy, in particular. A number of trilateral frameworks, such as US–India– Japan and India–Australia–Japan, have equally been nurtured to strengthen the Quad proposition further, endorsing the essence of the liberal spirit such as “rule of law” and “freedom of navigation.” The Quad proposition received a new thrust when Harry B. Harris, Commander of the US Pacific Command, acknowledged India’s importance and contextualized the term “Indo-Asia-Pacific” at an event in India in 2016. He stated that the United States would like to join the India–Japan– Australia trilateral cooperation since it provided an opportunity for “likeminded” nations to become ambitious in the high seas and air space.16 On November 12, 2017, the Quad framework—now dubbed Quad 2.0— returned with the officials of the four countries formally meeting in Manila. Instead of releasing a joint statement, the countries had four different press releases, indicating how their strategic objectives and preferences in the region differ from each other. The release of these four separate press releases was indicative of Quad 2.0 being simply a consultative forum among the four countries. A commonality in agenda was missing in action even though all four press releases reflected upon the security challenges posed by terrorism and North Korea’s nuclear and missile program. There was also a collective endorsement of upholding “rule based order” and promoting a FOIP, but in varied tones and languages. For example, the Indian perspective endorsed a FOIP and emphasized the necessity of an “inclusive” character to achieve it. The US press release emphasized the enhancement of connectivity, “freedom of navigation and overflight” and “maritime security” consistent with international law and standards.17 Japan, as an alliance partner of the US, echoed the American spirit and stressed “rule based order,” “freedom of navigation” and “maritime security” in the IndoPacific region.18 The Australian press release stressed “rule based order” and “freedom of navigation and overflight,” apart from enhancing connectivity.19 The Indian press release, it may be noted, was somewhat more cautious than the other three partners. It expressed concerns on terrorism, North Korea’s

India’s approach to the “Quad”   17 p­ roliferation linkages and also stressed promoting connectivity. It reiterated the centrality of the Act East policy in the Indo-Pacific and advocated a “free, open, prosperous and inclusive Indo-Pacific.”20 The significance of “inclusiveness” in the Indian narrative indicates that the Indian perspective on the Quad does not necessarily run into the Chinese wall, even though New Delhi maintains a strategic consonance with Australia, Japan and the United States in the Indo-Pacific. The term “inclusive” points to India’s advocacy of a “Free and Open” Indo-Pacific and does not exclude China’s presence in the region, despite New Delhi’s concerns about a stronger Chinese maritime presence in the IOR. This perspective became stronger after Modi’s 2018 speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue when he stated that “India does not see the Indo-Pacific as a strategy or as a club of limited members.... And by no means do we consider it as directed against any country.”21 In fact, Modi’s speech not only clearly articulated India’s IndoPacific vision but also endorsed China and Russia as prospective partners in the Indo-Pacific configuration. As a former Indian diplomat opined, Modi, through his Shangri-La Dialogue speech, had “indirectly invited China and Russia to be part of the Indo-Pacific, which he said was not directed against any country.”22 Strengthening this testimony was India’s recent decision not to be a direct part of the US-led trilateral initiative involving Japan and Australia in the IndoPacific Business Forum that will theoretically act as a counterweight to China’s infrastructure projects.23 Nevertheless, several rounds of Quad official level meetings have been held since November 12, 2017 (see Table 2.2). With an overarching emphasis on “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” and the centrality of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the consultation meetings of the Quad officials have taken place regularly, almost twice a year. And in September 2019, after nearly two years, Quad 2.0 witnessed a lift to its strategic profile with the foreign ministers meeting on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in New York.24 This event was hosted by Mike Pompeo, the US Secretary of State. Alice Wells, the Acting Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs of the United States, stated after the foreign ministers’ meeting that such an elevation signifies the “leadership” motive of all four countries, by “institutionalizing this gathering of the like-minded Indo-Pacific partners.”25 It is, however, important to note that while the earlier official consultation did not release any joint statement and each side only released a press statement, the latest foreign ministers’ meeting in New York also did not release any joint statement.

Why does India endorse the Quad? The debate continues over the prospects of Quad 2.0 in India and elsewhere. The second official consultation meeting of Quad 2.0 was held on the sidelines of the ASEAN Summit on June 7, 2018 to express stronger cooperative resolve towards a FOIP. A forwarding approach is visible on India’s part when the Quad, with the 2019 foreign ministers’ meeting, is becoming increasingly institutionalized. Endorsing the meeting, Dr. S. Jaishankar, the External Affairs Minister of India,

June 7, 2018

November 15, 2018 Singapore

2.

3.

Singapore, sidelines of East Asia Summit

November 13, 2017 Philippines, Manila. Sidelines of the ASEAN summit.

1.

Venue/Sidelines of the meeting

Date

S. No.

Table 2.2 Quad official consultation meetings Major issues discussed

To achieve common goals and address shared challenges Officials from India’s in the region. Uphold the rules-based order in the IndoMinistry of External Pacific and respect for international law, freedom of Affairs, Australia’s navigation and overflight; increase connectivity; Department of Foreign coordinate on efforts to address the challenges of Affairs, Japan’s Ministry countering terrorism and upholding maritime security of Foreign Affairs and in the Indo-Pacific. United States’ Department of State Foreign Ministry officials To pursue shared objectives in the areas of connectivity from India, Australia, and development; regional security, including counterJapan and the US terrorism and non-proliferation; HA-DR and maritime cooperation. To reaffirmed their support for a free, open, prosperous and inclusive Indo-Pacific Region. They also confirmed their common commitment, based on shared values and principles, to promote a rulesbased order in the Indo-Pacific. The discussions focused on cooperation in areas such as Officials from Ministry of connectivity, sustainable development, counterExternal Affairs of India, terrorism, non-proliferation and maritime and cyber Department of Foreign security, with a view to promoting peace, stability and Affairs and Trade of prosperity in an increasingly inter-connected IndoAustralia, Ministry of Pacific region that the four countries share with each Foreign Affairs of Japan other and with other partners. and Department of State of the United States of America

Official representatives

18   Jagannath P. Panda

Source: Ministry of External Affairs (www.mea.gov.in).

September 27, 2019 New York, 1st Ministerial level meeting of Quad, sidelines of UNGA

5.

Bangkok

May 31, 2019

4.

To cooperate in the areas of connectivity and Officials from Ministry of infrastructure development; regional security, including External Affairs of India, counterterrorism, Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Department of Foreign Relief; maritime cooperation; and cyber security issues, Affairs & Trade of with a view to promoting peace, stability and prosperity Australia, Ministry of in the Indo-Pacific region. To reaffirm the commitment Foreign Affairs of Japan towards a free, open, prosperous and inclusive Indoand Department of State of Pacific Region based on shared values and principles. the United States of America US Secretary of State Mike To discuss the collective efforts to advance a free and open Indo-Pacific. Focussing on counterterrorism, Pompeo, Indian External humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, maritime Affairs Minister S. security cooperation, development finance, and Jaishankar, and Foreign cybersecurity. Ministers Toshimitsu Motegi of Japan and Marise Payne of Australia.

India’s approach to the “Quad”   19

20   Jagannath P. Panda

Map 2.1 China’s ports and bases in the IORA. Source: GIS Lab, IDSA.

himself had stated that such a meeting was a “productive” one.26 He further stated that issues of common interests and concerns such as maritime security and counterterrorism binds the Quad grouping.27 However, in a wider strategic circuit, the Indian endorsement of Quad 2.0 has led to a debate about whether India has abandoned its traditional non-aligned foreign policy in order to embrace a strategic formulation such as the Quad that explicitly endorses a US-led liberal order.28 India certainly foresees Quad 2.0 as a strategic pivot against China, but the Indian perspective is more open as well as opaque than it appears to be. The puzzling element in this regard is New Delhi’s changing relationship discourse with China as an immediate neighbor, both within and without the context of the Indo-Pacific region. Their relationship has improved and has become more institutionalized from 2004 onwards—at about the same time as the commencement of the Quad. India too, has been simultaneously increasing its association with the other Quad countries, bilaterally, trilaterally and multilaterally. India’s importance to Quad 2.0 appears unquestioned and it has been termed the “strategic fulcrum” of the Indo-Pacific. Australia sees India as a “significant strategic partner” in the IOR.29 Japan views India as a key strategic partner in Shinzo Abe’s FOIP strategy.30 The US acknowledges India as a “leading global power” in the making in the region.31 It recently renamed the US Pacific Command as US Indo-Pacific Command, factoring India’s centrality in its Indian Ocean

India’s approach to the “Quad”   21 strategy. The intent is unequivocal: all the three countries want India to play a constructive and crucial role in shaping the Quad. However, Beijing’s emergence as a stronger “maritime power” has endangered the Quad members’ strategic interests. The prime context behind Quad 2.0 is Beijing’s Maritime Silk Road (MSR), which is an integral part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) under Xi Jinping. What coerces India to endorse the Quad as a strategic proposition is the need to protect its own maritime interests that are being threatened by the rising Chinese presence in the IOR. Since Hu Jintao’s ascendancy to power in 2003–04, China has been focusing more on ­critical maritime infrastructure, emphasizing key maritime zones, investment in port construction, protection of maritime zones and finding alternative routes in the Indo-Pacific region (see Map 2.1). Beijing’s blunt statement that the “Indian Ocean is not India’s Ocean”33 has come as a challenging portent to India’s maritime superiority in the region for some time now. The Indian Ocean along with the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, the Strait of Malacca and the Arabian Sea are seen as being the “maritime lifeline” for Beijing because of China’s increasing demand for energy resources in order to sustain its economic growth. However, analysts and strategists in Beijing ­realized early on that China had never had an overarching Indian Ocean strategy. To overcome this deficiency, China has worked hard over the years to strengthen its contacts with key countries in the region, including the most important multilateral institution, the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA).34 China’s collective bilateral trade contacts with the IORA countries at present are much higher than those of the other Quad-associated countries (see Figure 2.1). Special commercial and strategic contacts have been established with some of the IORA members since they are central to China’s energy transportation in the  Indian Ocean, particularly in the three chokepoints: Strait of Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb, and Strait of Malacca (see Table 2.1: China, Major Chokepoints and 32

Year 2018

Australia Japan India USA China 0

100

200

300

400 500 600 Trade (bn $) Imports Exports

700

Figure 2.1 Comparison of QUAD and China total bilateral trade with IORA. Source: Trade Map (https://www.trademap.org/).

800

900

22   Jagannath P. Panda Table 2.3 China, major chokepoints and key IORA members Major chokepoints

Significance in China’s energy transport

IORA countries

Strait of Hormuz

Almost 40 percent of China’s crude oil transport from three IORA countries pass through it China is dependent on oil transport from South of Sudan on the Red Sea Almost 37 percent of China’s LNG imports, 46 percent of gas imports and 59 percent of oil imports pass through IOR and enter this strait

Iran, UAE, Oman

Bab el-Mandeb Strait of Malacca

Yemen Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore

Key IORA Members). Beijing’s approach has not only been how to overcome the challenges it faces in the Malacca Strait but also to find a new alternative medium of routes in the IOR and to combine it with an emerging maritime strategy. Additionally, under Xi Jinping’s leadership, more autonomy, authority and power have been offered to the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), where PLAN is emerging as one of the most powerful blue-water navies in the world. Indeed, the first-ever bluebook by Beijing, released in 2013, signaled how India’s Act East policy is a key challenging portent to China’s maritime interests in the IOR.35 Another pressing reason behind the return of Quad 2.0 and India’s embrace of it is the Chinese Silk Road initiative. Beijing has used the Silk Road concept traditionally to expand its overseas business and expand commercial interests in the IOR. If the Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) is the key initiative behind China’s land corridor connectivity routes, the Maritime Silk Road (MSR) is attached to protect its ever-growing security interests in the IOR and enhance critical infrastructure in the region.36 Underlying China’s MSR strategy is an orderly diplomatic, economic and maritime quest for power. Xi Jinping’s speech at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) reflected this ambition. Xi explicitly stated that “China will coordinate land and maritime development, and step up efforts to build the country into a strong maritime country.”37 A core aim behind this strategy is to rebrand China as an economic, political and maritime power in the IOR as well as in the neighboring region. Accordingly, China’s relationship with the IOR countries—including the South Asian countries—has been given the utmost importance. This however, brings Indian maritime interests into direct conflict with Chinese interests. For instance, China’s relationships with the Maldives, Nepal, Bhutan and Sri Lanka are all on the ascendancy, challenging not only India’s influence and investment interests in its immediate neighborhood but the other Quad countries’ interests in the IOR. New Delhi has tried to revitalize its maritime strategy in recent years. Initiatives such as Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR), the Cotton Routes, the Spice Routes, Project Mausam and an inter-continental consultative framework like the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) are intended to protect

India’s approach to the “Quad”   23 India’s commercial and maritime interests in the IOR. These initiatives aim at empowering India’s coastal provinces through the upgrading of infrastructure and by linking them strategically with the IOR countries. In order to restrict rising Chinese influence, India has been attempting to concede as little strategic depth as possible to China in the IOR and therefore finds strategic consonance as a local power with the other Quad countries.38 The Quad countries’ strategic and maritime interests are constantly challenged by Beijing as it signs new contracts, agreements and memoranda of understanding with various IOR states along with building strategic infrastructure such as ports and bases (see Map 2.1). Countries like the Maldives, Sri  Lanka and Djibouti have shown significant interest in China’s maritime investment projects under the MSR, with China possessing a military base operated by the PLAN in Djibouti in the Horn of Africa.39 These Chinese actions encourage India to participate in a consultative forum like the Quad. But will India ever nurture the Quad as a strategic proposition, primarily against China? Answering this fundamental question requires an understanding of how India has positioned itself and responded to China’s rise in the two contrasting power structures: the liberalist power coalition led or dominated by the United States, and an alternative power coalition that is still emerging and is centered on and around China.

Post-Cold War Sino-US rivalry and the Quad Fundamentally, the Quad’s arrival was an anticipated contest about ideas and interests. The Quad’s development explains a gradual evolution of the post-Cold War economic model and growth story rivalries that the two competing models of the “Washington consensus” and the “Beijing consensus” offer to world politics.40 The disintegration of the Soviet system in the 1990s and the Gulf War offered a new context for the United States to construct a “new world order.” For China, it was the beginning of a “new international system.”41 Deng Xiaoping stated, “I recommend that the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, which were formulated by us Asians in the 1950s, should serve as the norms for the New International Order for a very long period of time to come.”42 Accordingly, Beijing has been trying to establish a systemic order in Asia to keep Western powers out of the region, and India has been seen as a prospective partner despite China’s range of growing conflicts with it, including the boundary dispute. If the Washington consensus was about protecting liberal political tenets, including rule of law, respect for human rights and enhancing democratic ideals in the world, the Beijing consensus emerged as an alternative to build a consensus principally on the establishment of an international system “without the West.” Importantly, it aimed to do so by avoiding the rule of law and rigid ­political and economic standards imposed by the Bretton Woods system.43 China’s advocacy of a Beijing consensus was linked to its “New Security Concept,” preparing a foreign policy platform to envision an alternative order.44

24   Jagannath P. Panda

GDP per capita (in bilions)

China’s emergence as a stronger power was viewed with concern in Washington and hence, the United States has tried different approaches over the years to curb China’s influence and rise. The Quad is a reflection of this evolving post-Cold War contest between the US and China. Japan, as a strategic ally of the US, has contributed a great deal to enhancing the formulation of the Quad through Abe’s FOIP strategy. Australia and India have further enhanced it by participating in this proposition. This comes as a virtual acknowledgement of the Washington consensus and the essence of the Quad can be said to protect democratic ideas and the interests of likeminded countries in the Indo-Pacific. This is particularly the case in the maritime domain, where the unilateral adventures of China appear to precipitously challenge the systemic configuration in the region. The Quad’s growth trajectory from 1.0 to 2.0 corresponds to China’s rapid rise as a military and economic power. The beginning of this century witnessed China not only maintaining a stable economic growth but equally increasing its military expenditure (see Figures 2.2 and 2.3), causing concern in India and elsewhere. The course of China’s rise has not only posed serious consequences for Asia’s structure of relations but also the overall economic and political landscape.45 China’s impressive economic growth and simultaneous rise in military budget was a key factor behind the Indian perception of the Quad vis-à-vis China. In particular, China’s assertive claim over the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh has intensified, complicating the India–China boundary dispute. The American debate on China has also undergone some changes in the current century. The United States’ official National Security Strategy (NSS) offers a synopsis of the United States’ trajectory of concerns over China in the last one and a half decades. For example, in September 2002, the NSS under President George W. Bush welcomed the “emergence of a strong China” while

20,000 18,000 16,000 14,000 12,000 10,000 8,000 6,000 4,000 2,000 0

2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018

Year China’s GDP per capita, PPP (Current international $) Linear (China’s GDP per capita, PPP (Current international $))

Figure 2.2 China’s GDP per capita, PPP (Current international US$). Source: The World Bank Data (https://data.worldbank.org/).

  

















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India’s approach to the “Quad”   25

. 26 See, “EAM’s remarks at Center for Strategic and International Studies,” Washington D.C., October 1, 2019, www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/31899/EAMs+ remarks+at+Center+for+Strategic+and+International+Studies+Washington+DC+on+ 01+October+2019. 27 Ibid. 28 C. Raja Mohan, “India and the Resurrection of the Quad,” ISAS Brief, no. 525, November 17, 2017, p. 2.

India’s approach to the “Quad”   35 29 Mukund Padmanavan, “We are very interested in joining Exercise Malabar: Australian foreign minister Julie Bishop,” The Hindu, May 23, 2018, www.thehindu.com/opinion/ interview/we-are-very-interested-in-joining-exercise-malabar/article23962368.​ece. 30 Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), “Towards a Free, Open and Prosperous IndoPacific,” India–Japan Joint Statement during visit of Prime Minister of Japan to India, September 14, 2017, Government of India, www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents. htm?dtl/28946/IndiaJapan+Joint+Statement+during+visit+of+Prime+Minister+of+Japan+ to+India+September+14+2017. 31 The White House, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” December 2017, www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12– 18–2017–0905.pdf. 32 The Economic Times, “US Pacific Command Renamed as US Indo-Pacific Command,” May 31, 2018, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/uspacific-command-renamed-as-us-indo-pacific-command/articleshow/64398189.cms. 33 Wang Xianglin, “On China’s Marine Safety,” Contemporary International Relations, 20, no. 1, (2010), p. 97. 34 Jagannath P. Panda, “China’s Tryst with the IORA: Factoring India and the Indian Ocean,” Strategic Analysis, 38, no. 5, (2014), pp. 668–687. 35 WantChinaTimes, “China Issues First Indian Ocean Regional Development Blue Book,” June 10, 2013, www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?id=201306 10000043&cid=1101. 36 Jagannath P. Panda, “Beijing’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ Diplomacy and India,” in India–China Relations: Politics of Resources, Identity and Authority in a Multipolar World Order (London: Routledge, 2017), pp. 79–97. 37 Xinhua, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era,” Report delivered at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, October 18, 2017, www.xinhuanet.com/english/download/Xi_Jinping’s_ report_at_19th_CPC_National_Congress.pdf. 38 Panda, “China’s Tryst with the IORA,” p. 84. 39 Sachin Parasar, “China in South China Sea and Indian Ocean: A Quest for Pre-eminence in Asia,” Times of India, May 24, 2015; and Panda, “China’s Tryst with the IORA.” 40 John Williamson in 1989 prescribed a few economic reform guidelines targeting the developing countries for policymakers in Washington, which came to be popularly known as “Washington Consensus.” Williamson’s three main prescriptions were: (a) macroeconomic discipline, (b) promoting a market economy, and (c) openness and transparency to the world. See, John Williamson, “The Washington Consensus as Policy Prescription for Development,” Institute for International Economics, https://piie.com/ publications/papers/williamson0204.pdf; Jason D. Symoniak, “The ­Washington Consensus,” New Voices in Public Policy, 2010–11, V, Winter, https://journals.gmu.edu/new voices/article/viewFile/14/14. The “Beijing Consensus” has been seen in contrasting perspective to “Washington Consensus” even though there is very little in common between them. The lead story behind the “Beijing consensus” is the success of the Chinese economy. The “Beijing consensus” emphasizes flexibility, innovation and “peaceful rise,” citing China’s success as a model of growth in international experience. The “Beijing Consensus” is portrayed as an alternative discourse of development in the developing world, opposing the Western-dominated developmental experience and model of growth. See also, Dustin R. Turin, “The Beijing Consensus: China’s Alternative Development Model, Inquiries Journal, 2, no. 1 (2010), www.inquiriesjournal.com/ articles/134/the-beijing-consensus-chinas-alternative-development-model; and Joshua Kurlantzick, “China’s Model of Development and the ‘Beijing Consensus’,” China & US Focus, April 29, 2013, www.chinausfocus.com/finance-economy/chinas-model-ofdevelopment-and-the-beijing-consensus.

36   Jagannath P. Panda 41 Mel Gurtov “Changing Perspectives and Policies,” in Lowell Dittmer and George T. Yu (eds.), China, the Developing World, and the New Global Dynamic (Boulder, CO: Lynne Reiner, 2010), p. 20. 42 Ibid.; and Sheng Hu “On the Establishment of a New International Order on the Basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,” Social Sciences in China, 13, no. 1, (2013), pp. 5–12. 43 Ibid. 44 Ibid. 45 Doug Guthrie, China and Globalization: The Social, Economic and Political Transformation of Chinese Society (New York: Routledge, 2009), pp. 1–26; and Carolina G. Hernandez, “The Rise of China: Responses from Southeast Asia and Japan,” in Jun Tsunekawa (ed.), The Rise of China: Responses from Southeast Asia and Japan (NIDS Joint Research Series, No.4, The National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan, 2009), pp. 1–7. 46 The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2002. 47 The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2006. 48 The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2010. 49 The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2015. 50 The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2017. 51 Unlike the United States, India does not strictly see China as a revisionist power. Some of China’s initiatives and strategic tendencies might indicate shades of revisionism. Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli of the JNU suggests that the CICA conference in May 2014 indicates the revisionist attitude that China holds since its ambition is to emerge as a leader of Asia. This assertion from China holds utmost strategic importance for India. Based on the author’s interview with Prof. Srikanth Kondapalli of the JNU. A similar line of confirmation is also offered by Prof. Alka Acharya when she states that China is not a revisionist power in the strict sense of the term – it has no intention to bring about a wholesale transformation of the current world order. However, it is under no illusion that the contemporary international political and financial architecture is governed by the rules laid down by the Western powers and has, therefore, begun to take a proactive approach in shaping alternative approaches to security and economic frameworks.” Author’s interview with Prof. Alka Acharya of JNU 52 Hongying Wang and XueYing Hu, “China’s ‘Going-Out’ Strategy and Corporate Social Responsibility: Preliminary evidence of a ‘Boomerang Effect’,” Journal of Contemporary China, 26, no. 108 (2017), pp. 820–833. 53 Zheng Bijian, “A New Path for China’s Peaceful Rise and the Future of Asia,” Bo-am forum for Asia, 2003, www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/20050616biji anlunch.pdf; and Zheng, Bijian, “China’s Peaceful Rise and Opportunities for the Asia-Pacific Region,” Roundtable Meeting between the Boáo Forum for Asia and the China Reform Forum, April 18, 2004, www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2012/ 04/20050616bijianlunch.pdf; also, Li Qingsi, “The International Conditions of China’s Peaceful Rise: Challenges and Opportunities,” in Sujian Guo (ed.), China’s “Peaceful Rise” in the 21st Century: Domestic and International Conditions (Farnham: Ashgate, 2006), p. 142. 54 Hiroko Okuda, “China’s ‘peaceful rise/peaceful development’: A case study of media frames of the rise of China,” Global Media and China, 1, no. 1–2 (2016), p. 125. 55 Masayuki Masuda, “China’s Policy toward the United States,” NIDS China Security Report 2018, The China–US Relationship at a Crossroads, Chapter 1, National Institute for Defense Studies (NIDS), Japan, 2018, pp. 6–7. 56 Ming Xia, “‘China Threat’ of a ‘Peaceful China’?”, New York Times, October 22, 2009, https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/ref/college/coll-china-politics-007.html? mcubz=2.

India’s approach to the “Quad”   37 57 Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), “Joint Statement of the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China,” Government of India, April 11, 2005, www.mea.gov.in/ bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/6577/Joint+Statement+of+the+Republic+of+India+and+ the+Peoples+Republic+of+China. 58 Shanglin Luan, “Hu makes five-point proposal for promoting Sino-Indian ties,” Xinhua, November 23, 2006, www.gov.cn/misc/2006–11/23/content_450966.htm. 59 Jagannath P. Panda, “Hu Jintao’s India Visit Boosts Sino-Indian Relations,” IDSA Strategic Comment, November 30, 2006, https://idsa.in/idsastrategiccomments/ HuJintaosIndiaVisitBoostsSinoIndianRelations_JPPanda_301106. 60 Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), “A Shared Vision for the 21st Century of the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China,” Media Release, Government of India, January 14, 2008, http://mea.gov.in/outoging-visit-detail.htm?5145/A+Share d+Vision+for+the+21st+Century+of+the+Republic+of+India+and+the+Peoples+Rep ublic+of+China. 61 An association of five major emerging national economies composed of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. 62 A bloc of four large newly industrialized countries composed of Brazil, South Africa, India and China. 63 Jagannath P. Panda, “India, the Quad and the China Question,” Asia Global Online, April 12, 2018, www.asiaglobalonline.hku.hk/india-china-quad/. 64 The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s answers to media questions on the sidelines of President Vladimir Putin’s meeting with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Sochi, May 21, 2018, www.mid. ru/en/press_service/minister_speeches/-/asset_publisher/7OvQR5KJWVmR/content/id/ 3230199. 65 Jagannath P. Panda, “The Import of Russia–India–China: Still a valid entity?,” Russia Beyond, April 16, 2012, www.rbth.com/articles/2012/04/16/the_import_of_russiaindia-china_still_a_valid_entity_15484 (accessed June 4, 2018). 66 Author’s interview with Jayant Prasad, Director General of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA), New Delhi. 67 “The Road Ahead Is Long and Winding Though, A Start Will Bring an Arrival,” State Councilor and Foreign Minister Wang Yi on President Xi Jinping’s Attendance at the Second Informal Meeting Between Chinese and Indian Leaders in India and His State Visit to Nepal, October 14, 2019, at www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_ 662805/t1707868.shtml. 68 Zheng Wang, ‘China’s Institutions Building: Leading the Way to Asian Integration’, Georgetown Journal of Asian Affairs, 2, no. 1 (2015), p. 17. 69 Xia, “‘China Threat’ of a ‘Peaceful China’?” 70 Robert Kagan, “Ambition and Anxiety: America’s competition with China,” in Gary J. Schmitt (ed.), The Rise of China: Essays on the Future Competition (New York: Encounter Books, 2009), p. 2. 71 Experts argue that China’s rise has been the main factor why Japanese interests have been challenged, both regionally and globally. But there are additional factors that have also contributed to Japan’s declining influence. Among several other factors, Japan’s indecisive foreign policy and lack of a resolute Japanese policy to address the territorial disputes are equally strong factors that have allowed countries like Russia and South Korea to take advantage to some extent in Northeast Asia. For instance, Japan’s territorial claims were challenged by Russian President Dmitry Medvedev’s visit to the disputed Northern Territories in November 2010 and South Korean President Lee Myung-Bak’s visit to Takeshima in August 2012. See, Iokibe, Makoto and Fumiaki Kubo, “US–Japan Leadership in the Post-9/11 World,” in Makoto Iokibe and Tosh Minohara (eds.), The History of US–Japan Relations: From Perry to the Present (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), pp. 235–256.

38   Jagannath P. Panda 72 Emma Chanlett-Avery, “Japan, the Indo-Pacific and the ‘Quad’,” Issue Brief, The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, February 2018, www.thechicagocouncil.org/ sites/default/files/brief-japan-and-the-quad_chanlettavery_20180214.pdf. 73 Australian Government, “2016 Defence White Paper,” Department of Defence, www. defence.gov.au/WhitePaper/Docs/2016-Defence-White-Paper.pdf. 74 Lavina Lee, “Australia’s FPWP: it’s time to revisit the Quad,” The Strategist, February 17, 2017, www.aspistrategist.org.au/australias-fpwp-time-revisit-quad/. 75 Australian Government, “2017 Foreign Policy White Paper,” www.fpwhitepaper.gov. au/foreign-policy-in-action. 76 Jagannath P. Panda, “India, the Quad and the China Question,” Asia Global Online, April 12, 2018, www.asiaglobalonline.hku.hk/india-china-quad/. 77 Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), “A Shared Vision for the 21st Century of the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China,” Media Release, January 14, 2008, Government of India, http://mea.gov.in/outoging-visit-detail.htm?5145/A+ Shared+Vision+for+the+21st+Century+of+the+Republic+of+India+and+the+Peoples+ Republic+of+China; Ministry of External Affairs (MEA), “Speech by Prime Minister Dr. Manmohan Singh at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences,” Beijing, January 15, 2008, Government of India, http://mea.gov.in/outoging-visit-detail.htm?1445/Speech+ by+Prime+Minister+Dr+Manmohan+Singh+at+the+Chinese+Academy+of+Social+ Sciences+Beijing. 78 Ibid. 79 Panda, “India, the Quad and the China Question.” 80 Financial Express, “Doklam standoff: US urges India, China to resolve issue through diplomatic talk,” August 11, 2017, www.financialexpress.com/world-news/doklamstandoff-we-have-relationships-with-both-indian-and-chinese-governments-both-partiesto-sit-down-and-have-conversations-says-us-state-department/803430/. 81 Indrani Baghchi, “Australia raises Doklam standoff with India,” The Times of India, July 19, 2017, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/australia-raises-doklam-standoffwith-india/articleshow/59657072.cms. 82 Jagannath P. Panda, “Why Japan supports India and not China on Doklam,” World in One News, August 18, 2017, www.wionews.com/south-asia/why-japan-supportsindia-and-not-china-on-doklam-19186.

3 Decoding Japan’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” concept Teruaki Aizawa and Ash Rossiter

Introduction Japan’s turn towards a more robust defense posture and proactive approach to regional security affairs has received considerable attention from scholars, policymakers, and pundits.1 From a significant loosening of a decades-old ban on arms exports to a landmark decision allowing for the limited exercise of collective self-defense, Japan’s evolving posture under the current administration of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has both captured international attention and remains a source of intense debate within the country.2 Whilst considerable scholarly ink has been spilt on this major reorientation, less attention has been given over to a more recent policy initiative launched by Abe in August 2016—the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” concept (hereafter simplified as FOIP).3 Nonetheless, many in Japan see the FOIP as one of the most important organizing ideas in the country’s contemporary foreign policy. Yet, as it stands, there has been very little consensus as to what the FOIP actually entails—let alone the ways by which it may influence future Japanese policy—until very recently at least. As the concept’s name makes clear, the FOIP is married to a geographical space: the “Indo-Pacific,” a nomenclature increasingly used by world leaders, diplomats and scholars to denote a spatially coherent zone that combines much of the Pacific and Indian Oceans.4 Beyond this, analysts have struggled, arguably until recently, to ascertain what the FOIP is in policy terms. Whilst the government has released details regarding some elements of the FOIP’s agenda since 2016—including, in the overseas development realm, specific initiatives for large-scale infrastructure projects in various locations stretching from the Pacific to East Africa—for many the FOIP remained in its early years a rather amorphous concept. As one Japanese academic notes: “The reality remains that many people have only a vague idea about what the [FOIP] strategy actually means.”5 Sharing this sentiment, Mitsuru Okada, a well-connected Japanese journalist, lamented in August 2018 that, “even people working in the government cannot clearly explain its objectives and content.”6 Blurriness about Japan’s FOIP concept, and as a corollary a poor appreciation of the potential implications resulting from its implementation, has been a major weak spot in attempts to anticipate the future strategic landscape of the Indo-Pacific.

40   Teruaki Aizawa and Ash Rossiter Possessing the world’s third largest economy and one of the region’s most capable militaries, the policies Japan adopts have a major bearing on what is the most populous and economically dynamic part of the world. Furthermore, Japan’s emerging strategic posture impacts US thinking toward and its own role within the Indo-Pacific. Domestically, a more activist security role in region brought about by the FOIP could also have significant implications for Japanese political scene, where critics vehemently oppose any departure from Japan’s post-war “pacifism.” This chapter builds upon and updates recent attempts to better understand the FOIP.7 We argue that as a consequence of the policy’s maturation alongside regional geopolitical developments—not least an improvement in relations between Tokyo and Beijing—it is now possible to better discern the main ­elements of the FOIP and its current place in Japanese foreign policy.

Origins of a so-called “strategy” From its origins until today, the FOIP concept has followed a non-linear trajectory. Its genesis can be traced primarily to Shinzo Abe; its progression from idea to government policy has been indelibly linked to the up-and-down fortunes of his political career. Though it was not until the sixth Tokyo International Conference on African Development (TICAD) held in Nairobi in August 2016 that Abe delivered his first major speech on the FOIP, the concept’s origins can be traced much further back, as can the conceptualization of the Indo-Pacific as a geographically coherent area. Following on from the Japan–India strategic dialogue initiated in 2006, Abe, in his first, short-lived tenure as prime minister, unveiled for the first time in a speech delivered at the Indian Parliament in August 2007 a way of thinking that would later lead to the Indo-Pacific concept, although the term of “Indo-Pacific” was not used. The speech entitled “Confluence of the Two Seas,” introduced Japan’s vision for the area, which was only later called the Indo-Pacific, as a region built on common values, such as democracy, freedom, and respect for human rights. Links can be made between this value-orientated proclamation about the region and the “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity” concept, which was first laid out in a speech by Abe’s foreign minister, Taro Aso, in 2006 and was subsequently clarified by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) as centered on “expanding the ring of freedom along the Eurasian continent to form a rich and stable region based on universal values.”8 Elaborating on these ideas further, Abe spoke in the New Delhi speech of an “immense network spanning the entirety of the Pacific Ocean, incorporating the US and Australia. Open and transparent, this network will allow people, goods, capital, and knowledge to flow freely.”9 Evoking the term “broader Asia (kakudai Asia),” Abe’s speech reflected a growing perception that economic and strategic linkages between Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean had increased to such a level that Japan’s security and prosperity were now influenced by events in both places.10 Though Abe’s vision for Japan’s role in the Indo-Pacific was

Decoding Japan’s FOIP concept   41 not at this stage clearly articulated, the foundations of what was to emerge later were starting to become visible. When Abe’s short stint as prime minister came to an end in September 2007, the drive for Japan to develop a holistic policy agenda towards the Indo-Pacific fizzled out. The idea of the Indo-Pacific as a strategic zone, however, continued to gather momentum among Japanese policymakers. On returning to power in 2012, and after the successful passage of landmark security legislation in 2015, Abe revived his nascent Indo-Pacific concept. In official statements and unofficial commentary following TICAD, the FOIP was typically accompanied by the word senryaku (strategy in English). Notwithstanding a dilution in the meaning of the word strategy through overuse and misuse,11 it means at a minimum a plan with concomitant policy actions. Additionally, a “national strategy”—and this perhaps speaks to the core meaning of senryaku—is ultimately about the choices that states make to secure their future in an uncertain world where war is a possibility. The extent to which the FOIP can be viewed in this way, as a national strategy intended to guide Japan’s approach to the Indo-Pacific, is highly debatable. Though publicly the government led by Prime Minister Abe presented the FOIP primarily as a set of initiatives designed to promote Japan’s economic prosperity through maintaining a rules-based order and improving connectivity across this vast expanse of water, islands and rim countries, many others honed in on the strategy suffix, framing it in the context of heightened geo­ political rivalry in the region.12 In a recent in-depth study of Japan’s emerging national security policy, for example, Adam Liff posits that the FOIP strategy was formulated in response to China’s growing assertiveness.13 It is unsurprising that some analysts would view the FOIP, especially when it was referred to a “strategy,” as something analogous to Washington’s own Indo-Pacific strategy which is more overtly a containment policy towards China, at least from the point of view of many commenters.14 Moreover, commentary in Japanese elite media, has routinely framed the FOIP in terms of two issues that are central to nearly all debates about Japan’s security: China’s rising power and the US security commitment.15 To be sure, many of the FOIP’s declared objectives cannot be fully decoupled from national security concerns in this strategically important maritime area. Nevertheless, the FOIP is not—and this is particularly true today—intended as a geopolitical strategy to counter China. The FOIP has never been presented officially as an attempt to counter China’s growing influence and power in the region. Indeed, senior politicians have gone out of their way to give the opposite message. In fact, pronouncements in recent years, including a speech delivered by Prime Minister Abe on 22 January 2018 to the Japanese parliament, describe the FOIP as complimentary to Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Abe spoke of the necessity of cooperating with China in the implementation of the FOIP’s initiatives.16 In order to develop this argument further, the next section of this chapter seeks to draw out from policy statements the main features of the FOIP concept.

42   Teruaki Aizawa and Ash Rossiter

Decoding the FOIP through policy statements So how then can we move beyond opacity towards a firmer appreciation of how the FOIP fits into Japan’s evolving foreign policy? First, it is important to note that the FOIP was launched at a time when Japanese government policy was arguably shifting towards protecting the country’s material and security interests, and, as such, de-emphasized the propagation of norms and values. Providing an opportunity to explain to a number of potential African recipient countries how they could benefit from Tokyo’s plans, TICAD seemed the perfect venue to unveil a new regional strategy for Japan that was seemingly built around the promotion of free trade, infrastructure investment and economic development. Though the FOIP continued earlier talk of spreading values in the Indo-Pacific, many of the normative elements present in Abe’s early statements about Japan’s priorities towards the region, such as in his speech to the Indian Parliament in 2007, were either relegated in importance or eradicated altogether.17 Indeed, much of the substance of the FOIP, as expressed in the TICAD speech and policy statements since, focused on Japan’s role in promoting economic connectivity between Asia, the Middle East and Africa through the expansion of trade ties and by investing in major infrastructure projects. These ideas were presented as both an international “public good” but perhaps more importantly as intrinsic to the Japan’s economic future. Inextricably linked to these aims was the overarching need for an open and secure maritime environment. For trading nations like Japan that depend on open sea lanes, the economic agenda of a maritime strategy cannot be decoupled from security concerns. It is on such matters as free movement across international seas where the economic health and national security interests for a country like Japan intersect. Seen from Japan, the ­Indo-Pacific region is essentially a maritime domain where economic and security interests collide.18 There is little surprise that a foreign policy such as the FOIP would be ­orientated towards maritime issues, including upholding fundamental principles such as freedom of navigation as well as countering specific threats to Japanese shipping. (Japan’s counter-piracy operation in the Gulf of Aden and off the coast of Somalia can be understood in this context.) Security of the sea-lines-of-­ communications have been critical to the success of Japan’s export-led model of development; there is nothing to suggest that this will change in the future. That Japanese policymakers view the intertwining of economic and security interests as being at the heart of any approach to the Indo-Pacific was made clear at the Japan–US Summit in November 2017. The Japanese delegation explained to their American counterparts that the FOIP’s goals were (and remain so): (a)  the establishment and maintenance of the rule of law and the freedom of navigation; (b) the promotion of economic prosperity; and (c) a commitment to promoting peace and stability in the region, especially through capacity-building and security assistance.19 Since 2016, the FOIP concept has transitioned from a largely personal initiative of Prime Minister Abe to becoming integrated into actual foreign policy.

Decoding Japan’s FOIP concept   43 Indeed, the FOIP featured very visibly in the agenda and annual budget of the Ministry of Foreign Affair (MOFA) from 2018 onwards. A new high-level foreign policy document published in 2018, for example, includes a new chapter specifically for the FOIP. As the FOIP moves from concept to a more substantive policy, with specific objectives and deliverables, it is becoming increasingly possible to decode the concept. Indeed, MOFA’s Diplomatic Bluebook 2018, provides such an opportunity. Published in May of that year, Diplomatic Bluebook 2018 set out that ministry’s interpretation of the FOIP concept. After a preamble about the various challenges facing the maritime order in the Indo-Pacific, such as piracy, ­terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, natural disasters and illegal fishing, it went on to explain that Japan has adopted the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy” to help bring stability and prosperity to the region as an international public good.20 The publication states that the “strategy”—­ significantly it is still called a strategy—involves: maintaining and strengthening a free and open maritime order based on the rule of law across the region through addressing those challenges, as well as through enhancing connectivity within the region by developing quality infrastructure in accordance with international standards.21 Mirroring comments made at the 2017 Japan–US Summit, the document goes on to state that Japan is specifically advancing: 1. The promotion and establishment of fundamental principles, such as the rule of law and freedom of navigation; 2. The pursuit of economic prosperity through enhancing connectivity, including through quality infrastructure development in accordance with international standards; 3. Initiatives for ensuring peace and stability that include assistance for capacitybuilding on maritime law enforcement, disaster reduction and nonproliferation.22 By 2018, then, we can see the FOIP increasingly expressed in these so-called “Three Pillars” (outlined earlier). But whether these pillars should be viewed as objectives or means to achieve objectives remained unclear. Updates put out by MOFA in early 2019 described the FOIP more as a means of achieving objectives than an objective in and of itself. In this respect, the new explanation of the FOIP’s value to Japan’s foreign policy agenda is that the “strategy”: (1) “maintains” the basic principles of international order; (2) “improves” ­connectivity; and (3) and enhances capacity-building and supports humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts.23 Arguably, this action-orientated interpretation makes it easier to discern the FOIP’s place in Japan’s foreign policy. Nonetheless, how the FOIP strategy fitted into—or, indeed, the degree that it should be disentangled from—the country’s evolving nation security agenda remained unclear.

44   Teruaki Aizawa and Ash Rossiter

Three pillars: The security angle Under the Abe administration, Japan’s national security posture has gone through its most significant transformation since the end of World War II. At the center of this change is the passage of ambitious “peace and security legislation” that included revisions to ten existing laws as well as a new International Peace Support bill.24 Among other things, it provided the legal foundation for the controversial 2014 Cabinet decision to reinterpret the Article 9 “peace clause,” allowing Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defense under specific conditions. In pursuing these controversial reforms, Abe claimed to be responding to Japan’s deteriorating security landscape, including an increasingly powerful and assertive China and the growing North Korean nuclear threat.25 In January 2018, Abe summarized his view of regional affairs by stating that “the security environment surrounding Japan is its most severe since World War II.”26 Given this pessimistic outlook, it stands to reason that many analysts would tie the FOIP to national security priorities. Yet it would entirely misleading to see the development of the FOIP as a national security initiative masked as something else. The main focus of FOIP, we argue, has been and remains primarily ­development cooperation. But security and stability in the region nonetheless underpins much of what the FOIP hopes to achieve. FOIP as a maritime security policy First and foremost, all FOIP statements mention the importance of freedom of navigation in what can be described as the “global commons,” i.e., international waters and airspace.27 Given the FOIP’s focus on open seas and the freedom of navigation, it is possible to draw links between the strategy and wider efforts to promote a maritime-based security architecture in the Indo-Pacific. Should then ongoing efforts to strengthen naval ties with India, Australia and the US— members of the Quadrilateral Dialogue (the so-called “Quad”) set up in 2007 but disbanded soon thereafter—be considered a central plank in this agenda?28 Abe’s desire for such a quartet to safeguard existing rules and norms of behavior in the maritime commons was embedded in his thinking before the FOIP was launched in Kenya at TICAD in 2016. It is clearly expressed, for example, in his essay titled “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond,” which was uploaded to the international NPO Project Syndicate website the day after the launch of his second administration on December 27, 2012.29 Not all the so-called Quad members see eye to eye on how the principle of freedom of navigation should be upheld. Japan, Australia, and India, for example, are unwilling to join the US in conducting freedom of navigation (FON) operations through the South China Sea.30 Even if a grand maritime alliance of this quartet of democracies remains part of Abe’s strategic outlook, the Quad is far from moving towards a kind of Indo-Pacific NATO.31 It is difficult to see how a critical part of the FOIP—maintaining open seas—can be fully realized

Decoding Japan’s FOIP concept   45 over the long-run without greater willingness of the Quad members to devote greater naval resources. But this matter is not explicitly dealt with in official pronouncements about the FOIP. Yet Abe has gone out of his way to convince the US how the FOIP contributes to American strategic priorities in the region. Japan’s increasing propensity to take greater initiative in the security sphere is in part a response to deep concern over the US’s long-term commitment to Japan’s defense and the role it plays in freedom of navigation of the seas. Although the first major Abe-Trump alliance joint statement in 2017 included a US “commitment to the security of Japan through the full range of capabilities, including US nuclear forces,”32 Tokyo is nonetheless concerned about American willingness to defend the very maritime system that underpins Japan’s national prosperity. Japan has recently attempted to buttress US–Japan ties in part by demonstrating to Washington that it intends to perform a more proactive role in regional security. In this vein it is telling that soon after his election victory at the end of 2012, Abe declared his administration’s intention to make Japan a “firsttier” power again.33 This was in part motivated by the need to demonstrate to its ally, as he told a Washington D.C. think tank audience, that “Japan is back.”34 Although Japan’s 2017 defense white paper devotes more than 50 pages to the topic of “strengthening the U.S.–Japan alliance,” it says little about how the allies will actually cooperate in the Indo-Pacific. Moreover, the strict, selfimposed prohibitions on the conditions under which the “use of force” (buryoku koshi) is permitted, as well as restrictions on the acquisition of offensive ­platforms that exceed the “minimum necessary” threshold for territorial defense (e.g., aircraft carriers and strategic bombers), limits the extent to which Japan can play a role an enhanced direct security role in the maintenance of open seas should such a principle be contested. Tokyo’s perception that Washington’s interest in Asia-Pacific security is weakening has encouraged Japan to show its ally that it is willing to do more itself.35 In this context, there are signs that the FOIP is being used as an alliance-enhancing mechanism.36 By taking a more active role in the region, in part by pushing out the FOIP “strategy,” the Abe administration hopes to keep Washington engaged. As one analyst observes: Abe has been selling the strategic idea [the FOIP] to Washington since the early days of the Trump administration. To Abe’s pleasure, Trump called Vietnam the ‘heart of the Indo-Pacific’ when he arrived in Danang last November for the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum, seeming to embrace an Asia strategy that Abe conceptualized.37 The Prime Minister’s office has dispatched envoys with close ties to the US military establishment to America to explain Japan’s FOIP concept in the context of US–Japan strategic partnership.38 At a time when the US is berating allies for not shouldering enough of the security responsibility, Japan may see an opportunity to show, through the FOIP, that it is carrying more of the regional security burden. In this way, the FOIP “strategy” is as much about keeping the

46   Teruaki Aizawa and Ash Rossiter US engaged in Japan’s security environment as it is a plan of action for Japan to work more closely militarily with the US in the Indo-Pacific. In reality, there are few indications that Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) will play a significantly more robust role in maintaining open seas as imagined in the FOIP. Although the MSDF has been deployed in recent years near the Korean Peninsula to forestall attempts by North Korea to bypass international sanctions,39 it is highly unlikely Japan will allow its naval forces to participate in provocative FON operations. For one thing, FON operations hold out the potential for breaching constitutional constraints on the use of kinetic force by the SDF against threats that do not put Japan’s survival (kuni no sonritsu kiki) directly at risk. The SDF is still prohibited from using military force outside very narrow conditions of self-defense and cannot, strictly speaking, possess or project offensive power. There remain strong domestic headwinds against the SDF performing more tasks outside of the defense of Japan. The country is still bounded by highly normative ideas about the use of military force.40 A 2015 poll revealed that less than a quarter of Japanese feel the SDF should be more active “helping to maintain peace and stability in the Asia Pacific region.”41 Also, there is a large question mark against what Tokyo can possibly commit to the Indo-Pacific in terms of security assets and resources. It is not clear whether the MSDF has sufficient vessels in the coming years to increase its presence in Indian Ocean joint naval exercises or contribute to more maritime security operations. Indicative of these constraints, Japanese participation in the Malabar and other exercises has to date been very modest. An expanded contribution to maritime security brought about by the FOIP would require a greater share of the defense budget going to the MSDF. Senior Japanese naval officers have already pressed home the point that, in light of the FOIP “strategy” they need greater funds to meet new requirements.42 In addition, it is important to keep in mind changes in the declared role of the MOD and the SDF in the FOIP’s agenda. As mentioned earlier, when it comes to the FOIP the “national security” aspect is often invoked, but this disguises the fact that “development cooperation” has been of much greater focus. As such, no entities from the MOD or SDF have been earmarked to play a so-called frontline role in its implementation. Actually, at first there was no description about the role of MOD or the SDF in official documents about FOIP. However, in September 2017 in a speech at Columbia University, Foreign Minister Kono maintained it was indispensable to retain a free and open maritime order based on the rule of law, giving the following concrete examples of what was needed to achieve this goal: 1. Strong support for the “Freedom of Navigation Operations” by the US Navy. 2. The importance of strategic port visits. 3. Continuation of conducting joint maritime exercises in the Indo-Pacific. Points (2) and (3) are the areas that seemingly created commitments for Japan’s Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF). Yet there still remained some uncertainty as to how entwined Japanese defense resources would be with the FOIP in practice.

Decoding Japan’s FOIP concept   47 However, greater clarity was bought to this issue by decisions made as part of the National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2019 and Beyond (hereafter shortened to NDPG) released into the public domain in December 2018.43 ­Specifically, at the beginning of Section 3 in part III of the NDPG, a section entitled “Strengthening Security Cooperation,” the following was stated: “In line with the vision of free and open Indo-Pacific, Japan will strategically promote multifaceted and multilayered security cooperation, taking into account characteristics and situation specific to each region and country.”44 Though such an idea of defense cooperation itself has been used in the past, this time these activities were inexplicably bound up with the term of “Free and Open Indo-Pacific vision,” a term now used in the NDPG. Furthermore, in this item, specific defense cooperation and exchange policies were detailed for each target country, including China. This provided clear guidelines based on government policy for various future activities in this broad area of defense cooperation. Therefore, the aforementioned activities such as strategic port visits and conducting joint maritime exercises in the Indo-Pacific will be conducted more actively. In addition, it will be possible to more effectively implement information dissemination from the viewpoint of strategic communication as well. Peace and stability In multiple official pronouncements on the FOIP, the third pillar is the aim of achieving peace and stability through capacity-building in areas related to maritime law enforcement, disaster response and non-proliferation. Unlike “the rule of law and the freedom of navigation,” this pillar is an area of participation where the JSDF could play a more significant role. Because even if there is an expansion of activities which were spelled out in the 2018 NDPG, there remain political restrictions on participation in more robust military activities, such as FON. Security assistance and defense diplomacy measures among ASEAN nations dovetail with a major focus of the FOIP and Japan’s national security strategy more broadly under Abe, which has been to build on the outreach of previous administrations and significantly expand Japan’s security ties with these countries. As an indication of the importance the current government places in relations with ASEAN nations, Abe visited all ten member countries in his first year in office in his second term.45 Moreover, in 2015, Tokyo signed strategic partnerships with Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. Efforts in security assistance linked to the FOIP would clearly chime with these broader changes in Japan’s approach to its role in regional security affairs. For instance, one of the main aims of the security legislation passed under Abe was to allow Japan to better contribute to peace and stability. As Adam Liff notes, the first-ever National Security Strategy issued by the newly established National Security Council (NSC) set out Japan’s intention to make “Proactive Contributions to Peace” (sekkyokuteki heiwashugi).46 The November 2016 Japan–ASEAN Vientiane Vision represented a further declaration of intent to intensify defense relations with Southeast Asian states as well as ASEAN as a

48   Teruaki Aizawa and Ash Rossiter whole. Following on from these changes, Japan has recently sold six maritime patrol vessels to Vietnam, three to Indonesia and loaned Manila the money to purchase ten. Military-to-military assistance, however, is still firmly anchored to  established institutional patterns that tilt towards non-military approaches to security. The issuance of the Development Cooperation Charter (DCC) in ­February 2015, an important revision of the Overseas Development Assistance (ODA) Charter, provided the framework for Japan to provide assistance to foreign militaries, but only for nontraditional security missions, such as disaster relief and anti-piracy measures.47 But these defense diplomacy measures and security assistance to ASEAN nations are nothing new for Japan.48 For decades ASEAN military personnel have attended extensive training and career courses at Japanese military schools. Yet there is evidence that Japan has stepped up its defense diplomacy efforts among the ASEAN states and has reportedly been looking at how other countries have been orchestrating defense diplomacy activities. These measures are perhaps ideal for Japan as they are on the whole uncontroversial—at least in principle. On the home front, capacity-building and technical assistance can be packaged as “development.” It can even be de-securitized in the budget by placing it under development and not defense. Furthermore, assisting ASEAN allies to better police and surveil their own territorial waters and exclusive ­economic zones (EEZ) is politically easier than say conducting FON operations, but it still advances the fundamental goals of the FOIP. Humanitarian assistance/ disaster relief (HA/DR), which is emphasized in the third pillar of the FOIP, is also an area that the JSDF can play an expanded role. For one thing, HA/DR missions are short, visible, and safe (politically and in terms of safety of personnel).

The FOIP and China There are clearly linkages that can be drawn between the FOIP “strategy” and Japan’s broader national security agenda. Given the growing role of the prime minister’s office in the formulation of national security policy and Abe’s central involvement in developing the concept of the FOIP, there is an understandable temptation to conflate the two.49 But, as we have shown earlier, there are as yet few observable details about actions that the FOIP calls for in the national security space. As one of the authors pointed out early in the debates about Japan’s FOIP: “We cannot see what the Japanese cabinet (or MOFA) is actually doing for the ‘Indo-Pacific strategy’ ... the ‘overall picture’ of Indo-Pacific is still under veil.”50 Echoing this sentiment, Tsuruoka states that, “there does not seem to be a consensus on the extent to which Japan needs to allocate additional security assets and resources to the Indian Ocean.”51 In fact, statements about the FOIP related to maintaining “freedom of navigation” or of “promoting peace and stability” do not reveal specific initiatives or measures Japan will undertake, leaving aside the NDPG’s overall implications for the MSDF future deployment (port visits, joint exercises, etc.). However, the FOIP is attracting more and more

Decoding Japan’s FOIP concept   49 attention from many experts, including government officials and analysts. It seems reasonable to say that the practical implications of Japan’s FOIP are gradually becoming clearer through recent analysis, discussions and the publication of additional government documents concerning FOIP.52 Whether or not at the conceptual level the FOIP cannot be decoupled from Japan’s wider national security posture, the Japanese government has sought to play down any suggestions that it is a strategic gambit to counter China’s growing influence in the region. Prior pronouncements, including a speech delivered by Prime Minister Abe on 22 January 2018 to the Japanese Diet (parliament), have described the FOIP as complimentary to Beijing’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Indeed, Abe spoke of the necessity of cooperating with China in the implementation of the FOIP’s initiatives. Significantly, this was made conditional on the ­complementarity of Beijing following the rules of the international community. Given domestic politics and Japan’s national role conception as a peaceful member of the international community, it is unsurprising that official explanations of the FOIP avoid depicting the strategy as one of competition with Beijing. But how the FOIP relates to China is arguably the aspect of the overall policy which is hardest to discern. Recent analysis by a number of scholars and foreign policy analysts in Japan argue that the FOIP does not compete with China and especially the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—a viewpoint consistent with the Japanese government’s official statements. Nonetheless, they all point to the relationship with China as a central focus of the FOIP. Two recent articles by Japanese experts are especially suggestive on this point. Matake Kamiya, a professor at Japan’s National Defense Academy, for example, recently authored an article titled “ ‘Cooperative strategy’ to realize ‘competitive strategy’: The composite structure of Japan’s ‘Free and Open IndoPacific’ strategy (vision).” In it, Kamiya puts forward a two-sided explanation for the FOIP’s relationship with China.53 Kamiya points out that FOIP is essentially, on one level, a “competitive strategy” against China but “it has come to assume the aspect of [a] ‘cooperative strategy’ toward China.” Rather than interpreting this dual nature as simply inconsistent, Kamiya argues that there are “inevitable reasons” for the “coexistence of the two directions.” “It is impossible,” Kamiya writes, “for Japan’s Indo-Pacific strategy to lose its direction to the ‘competitive strategy’.” But he goes on to emphasize that the reason why the Japanese government intends to promote a “cooperation strategy” is first and foremost because Prime Minister Abe has set out to improve Japan–China ­relations. Another important reason is that it is necessary to avoid giving the impression to other countries that Japan’s Indo-Pacific “strategy” is excessively confrontational towards China. Kamiya concludes that: “Since it involves these two opposite policy directions, Japan’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” strategy (vision) is not easy to pursue. Whether it succeeds depends on whether Japanese diplomacy can discover measures to solve this challenge.” Kamiya does not offer a specific prescription for overcoming this hurdle. In relation to prescribing policy options for connecting two planks of strategy that seem to led in opposite directions vis-à-vis China, Shinichi Kitaoka, President

50   Teruaki Aizawa and Ash Rossiter of Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) argues, in an article titled “Insight into the World: Make the Indo-Pacific Freer, More Open,” in the leading newspaper Yomiuri Shimbun,54 that the FOIP is not a means of responding to China’s BRI. Instead he points out that it is far more important that the international community reacts to China’s unfavorable behavior with the “rule of law” and waits for its change. Not discounting China as a long-term rival of Japan, Kitaoka views cooperating with China’s BRI through the FOIP as a means of “detoxifying” Beijing’s often heavy-handed diplomacy with states in the region. In this way, Japan can avoid confrontation with China whilst supporting the independence and development of neighboring and nearby countries. There is evidence that the government has attempted to rebrand the FOIP so that it is perceived in the region—and especially with China—as less confrontational and more collaborative. This dovetails with recent commentary from ­Japanese experts mentioned earlier. For example, the debate in the first years of the FOIP’s existence as a concept seemed to be premised on a “Quad vs China” narrative. This is somewhat unsurprising given that the first appearance of the term of FOIP in the MOFA’s Diplomatic Bluebook 2017 put the Quad front and center: To realize this strategy, Japan intends to further strengthen its strategic cooperation with countries such as India, which has a historical relationship with East Africa, and the U.S. and Australia, with which it has alliances.55 However, the situation surrounding FOIP—and in particular the place of the Quad therein—seems to have changed due to a series of developments since the publication of the Diplomatic Bluebook 2017, such as the commitments of ASEAN countries, Pacific island countries, or countries other than Indo-Pacific such as United Kingdom and France.56 This means that the composition of the FOIP is changing from what was originally assumed, as placing the Quad at the core, to something with wider multilateral coordination in mind. In fact, the importance of the Quad may not have changed, but is less visible due to the Japanese government’s attempts to portray the FOIP as less confrontational. Indeed, in November 2018, the reason why the name was changed from “strategy” to “vision” may be understood within this context. Although there was no explanation for this change on the Prime Minister’s Office or MOFA website, it is likely it was done in part to make it easier for countries closely related to China, for example the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), to discuss a “FOIP vision” with Japan than one using the term “strategy.”57 At the summit meeting between Prime Minister Abe and Prime Minister of Malaysia, Mahathir, on November 6, the interpreter translated the prime minister’s statement as “Indo-Pacific strategy.” Staff of the prime minister’s office took time to make the point that the word “strategy” was wrong and that “vision” is correct. This episode suggests that the name change was carried out with the strong will of the government. It is customary for MOFA to use prime ministerial interpreters with selected expertise, and in particular, since the

Decoding Japan’s FOIP concept   51 summit talks also carry out careful pre-meetings, it is difficult to believe that important keywords would be mistranslated. It is more likely that this was an intentional signal. Efforts to recast the FOIP as cooperative rather than competitive may serve to add to confusion of what the concept seeks to achieve and add to what many see as inherent contradictions between all the strategy’s (or vision’s) various strands.

Conclusion The FOIP is most often depicted publically and officially as a set of initiatives designed to improve economic prosperity in the Indo-Pacific. But this has not stopped many analysts from viewing the FOIP as Tokyo’s attempt to play a more muscular foreign policy role in the region, especially in terms of securing the maritime environment on which and through which Japan’s prosperity rests. The debate about what the FOIP is and what its potential consequences might be is inescapably caught up in these much larger issues. The earlier analysis indicates, however, that there are few signs that the FOIP will result in a major change in Japan’s overall strategic posture. For one thing, many of the FOIP’s key elements already reflect policies that Japan has been pursuing for some time, such as security assistance to select ASEAN countries. On the surface, it is very challenging to understand the how the FOIP relates to the Tokyo’s changing relationship with China. What is clear is that the key point is finding the right prescription for connecting the two strands of strategy that appear to propose moving in opposite directions vis-à-vis China. How Japan is able to move between a cooperative strategy and a competitive one, as mentioned earlier, will be the real test. Understanding the FOIP in the future will depend on the continual efforts of experts of Japanese foreign policy; the concept has already moved from strategy to a vision and will likely change and grow as an idea moving forward.

Notes   1 Michael Green, Japan is Back: Unbundling Abe’s Grand Strategy (Sydney: Lowy Institute, 2013); Sheila A. Smith, Japan’s New Politics and the U.S.–Japan Alliance (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2014); Andrew L. Oros, Japan’s Security Renaissance (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017); and Adam P. Liff, “Japan’s Security Policy in the ‘Abe era’: Radical Transformation or Evolutionary Shift?,” Texas National Security Review, 1, no. 3, (2018): 8–34.   2 Adam P. Liff, “Japan’s Defense Policy: Abe the Evolutionary,” Washington Quarterly, 38, no. 2, (2015): 79–99; and Brendon J. Cannon and Ash Rossiter, “Offensive or Defensive: The Debate over Japan’s ‘Aircraft Carrier’ Upgrade,” East Asia Military Monitor, 2, no. 2 (2019).   3 In this chapter, the author will use the term of concept in relation to FOIP, as it encompasses both the “strategy” and “vision” suffixes that have been used by the Japanese government, as well the “concept” suffix used by commentators.   4 See Brendon J. Cannon and Ash Rossiter, “The ‘Indo-Pacific’: Regional Dynamics in the 21st Century’s New Geopolitical Center of Gravity,” Rising Powers Quarterly, 3 no. 2 (2018): 7–18.

52   Teruaki Aizawa and Ash Rossiter   5 Michito Tsuruoka, “Japan’s Indo-Pacific Engagement: The Rationale and Challenges,” June 4, 2018, Commentary, Italian Institute for International Political Studies, July 29, 2018, www.ispionline.it/en/pubblicazione/japans-indo-pacific-engagement-rationaleand-challenges-20691   6 Mitsuru Okada, “Kinoufuzen ni ochiiru Abe ‘Indo-Taiheiyou’ Senryaku – reitan na Indo to iu gosan, Beichu no Itabasami ni [Abe’s ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’ is not working – India’s attitude isn’t amenable, Japan is between the U.S. and China],” Business Insider (Japanese language edition), August 21, 2018, www.businessinsider. jp/post-173539   7 Teruaki Aizawa, “The Philosophy and Practice of the ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)’: Decoded from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Website,” From the Oceans Intelligence Analysis, special edition (Tokyo: Ocean Policy Research Institute, Sasakawa Peace Foundation, July 30, 2018), www.spf.org/oceans/global-data/2018 11161181023949.pdf.   8 Tarou Asou, (Speech delivered to the Japan Institute of International Affairs), “Arc of Freedom and Prosperity: Japan’s Expanding Diplomatic Horizons,” November 30, 2006, www.mofa.go.jp/announce/fm/aso/speech0611.html   9 Shinzou Abe, (Speech delivered at Indian Parliament, New Delhi), “Confluence of the Two Seas,” August 22, 2007, www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/ speech-2.html 10 Takuya Matsuda, “Making Sense of the Indo-Pacific Strategy: An Inheritance from the Past,” Asia Pacific Bulletin, no. 423, May 9, 2018. 11 Lawrence Freedman, Strategy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013, pp. x–xi). 12 See for example, Ash Rossiter, “The ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ Strategy and Japan’s Emerging Security Posture,” Rising Powers Quarterly, 3 no. 2 (2018): 133–156. 13 Liff, “Japan’s Security Policy,” p. 18. 14 Matsuda, “Making sense of the Indo-Pacific Strategy.” 15 Initial findings from author’s forthcoming research paper that employs text-mining methods to establish co-occurrence networks in Japanese-language elite media commentary between the term FOIP and other key security-related terms. 16 Shinzou Abe, “Policy speech by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe to the 196th Session of the Diet,” January 22, 2018, https://japan.kantei.go.jp/98_abe/statement/201801/_ 00002.html 17 James D.J. Brown, “Japan’s Values-Free and Token Indo-Pacific Strategy,” The Diplomat, March 30, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/…/japans-values-free-and-tokenindo-pacific-strategy/ 18 In making this argument, the article adds to previous work on Tokyo’s changing defense posture and foreign policy since the end of the Cold War. See Michael J. Green, Japan’s Reluctant Realism: Foreign Policy Challenges in an Era of Uncertain Power (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001); Jennifer M. Lind, “Pacifism or Passing the Buck?: Testing Theories of Japanese Security Policy,” International Security, 29, no. 1, (2014): 92–121; Richard J. Samuels, Securing Japan: Tokyo’s Grand Strategy and the Future of East Asia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2007); and Andrew L. Oros, Normalizing Japan: Politics, Identity, and the Evolution of Security Practice (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008). 19 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan), “The Working Lunch and Japan–U.S. Summit Meeting on November 6, 2017,” November 6, 2017, www.mofa.go.jp/na/na1/us/ page4e_000699.html 20 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan), Diplomatic Bluebook 2018, chapter 1, “Special Feature: Free and Open Indo Pacific Strategy,” pp. 20–21, www.mofa.go.jp/ files/000401241.pdf. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid.

Decoding Japan’s FOIP concept   53 23 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan) statement, “Towards Free and Open IndoPacific,” January 2019, www.mofa.go.jp/files/000407643.pdf. 24 Ministry of Defense (Japan), “Outline of the Legislation for Peace and Security,” Defense of Japan 2017, www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/pdf/2017/DOJ2017_2–3-2_ web.pdf 25 Sheila A. Smith, Intimate Rivals: Japanese Domestic Politics and a Rising China (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015). 26 Shusho Kantei [Office of Prime Minister and the Cabinet], “Abe naikaku sori daijin nento kisha kaiken [Prime Minister Abe’s New Year Address],” January 4, 2018, www.kantei.go.jp/jp/98_abe/statement/2018/0104kaiken.html 27 Barry R. Posen, “Command of the Commons: The Military Foundation of US Hegemony,” International Security, 28, no. 1 (2003): 5–46. 28 Takashi Okada, “Kinoufuzen ni ochiiru Abe ‘Indo-Taiheiyou’ Senryaku – reitan na Indo to iu gosan, Beichu no Itabasamini [Abe’s ‘Indo-Pacific Strategy’ is not working – India’s attitude isn’t amenable, Japan is between the U.S. and China],” Business Insider (Japanese language edition), August 21, 2018, www.businessinsider. jp/post-173539 29 Shinzou Abe, “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond,” Project Syndicate, December 27, 2012, www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/a-strategic-alliance-for-japan-andindia-by-shinzo-abe?barrier=accessreg 30 NIDS (National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan), East Asian Strategic Review (Tokyo: Japan Times, 2018). 31 Stephen F. Burgess and Janet Beilstein, “Multilateral Defense Cooperation in the Indo-Asia-Pacific Region: Tentative Steps Towards a Regional NATO,” Contemporary Security Policy, 39, no. 2, (2018): 258–279. 32 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan) 2017a, “Joint statement of the security consultative committee,” August 17, retrieved July 17, 2018, www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ ps/2017/08/273504.htm 33 Liff, “Japan’s defense policy,” 79–99. 34 Shinzo Abe, 2013 (Speech delivered at Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, DC), “Japan is back,” February 22, 2013, www.mofa.go.jp/announce/ pm/abe/us_20130222en.html 35 Brown, “Japan’s Values-Free and Token.” 36 This in some respects is analogous to efforts by Australia after 1951 to play the reliable, burden-sharing ally. The authors are grateful to Professor Tsutomu Kikuchi of Aoyama Gakuin University for sharing this analogy. 37 Satohiro Akimoto, “How Japan can save the Indo-Pacific strategy,” Japan Times, July 24, 2018, www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2018/07/24/commentary/japan-commentary/ japan-can-save-indo-pacific-strategy/#.W3lJWy2B21s 38 Authors’ interview with retired MSDF admiral and former professor of national security strategy, Tokyo, July 2018. 39 Japan Times, “In New Role, MSDF Patrolling Waters around Koreas to Foil Oil Smuggling,” Japan Times, 13 January 2018. 40 Peter J. Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, “Japan’s National Security: Structures, Norms, and Policies,” International Security, 17, no. 4 (2013): 84–118. 41 “Poll: Americans Divided over Japan’s Military role in Asia,” Associated Press, 7 April 2015, https://news.yahoo.com/poll-americans-divided-over-Japans-military-roleasia-133731881.html 42 Comments made by retired high-ranking MSDF officer and current think tank expert on Japan’s naval policy. Authors’ Interview, Tokyo, July 2018. 43 (Japan) National Security Council decision, Cabinet decision, “National Defense Program Guidelines for FY 2019 and beyond,” December 18, 2018, www.mod.go. jp/j/approach/agenda/guideline/2019/pdf/20181218_e.pdf 44 Ibid.

54   Teruaki Aizawa and Ash Rossiter 45 John Lee, “In Defense of the East Asian Regional Order: Explaining Japan’s Newfound Interest in Southeast Asia,” Geopolitics, History, and International Relations, 8, no. 1 (2016), p. 31. 46 Liff, “Japan’s Defense Policy,” 84. 47 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Japan), “Development Cooperation Charter,” 12 June 2015, www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/page_000138.html 48 Ken Jimbo, “Anchoring Diversified Security Cooperation in the ADMM-Plus: A Japanese Perspective,” Asia Policy, 22, no. 1 (2016): 102–106. 49 The National Security Council (NSC) was stood up early in Abe’s second term to coordinate strategic, defense and foreign affairs under the prime minister’s office’s direction. As the centralizing national security decision-making body, it has emerged as an important mechanism for advancing the prime minister’s national security agenda across different parts of government. At the NSC’s heart is a bi-weekly “Four Minister Meeting” bringing together the prime minister, foreign minister, defense minister, and chief cabinet secretary for regular consultations on security affairs. Shusho Kantei [Office of Prime Minister and the Cabinet], Kokka anzen hosho kaigi no sosetsu ni kansuru yushikisha kaigi [Meeting of experts concerning NSC establishment], February 15, 2013, www.kantei.go.jp/jp/96_abe/actions/201302/1.5ka_ yusiki.html 50 Aizawa, “The Philosophy and Practice.” 51 Tsuruoka, “Japan’s Indo-Pacific Engagement.” 52 The reason why government officials are considered along with experts here is that FOIP is a developing concept that is continuously changing, and that the policymakers themselves are constantly forced to examine and consider this issue. 53 Matake Kamiya, “ ‘Cooperative strategy’ to Realize ‘Competitive Strategy’: The Composite Structure of Japan’s ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ Strategy (Vision),” Tokyo, Akiyama Associates SSDP, February (2019), http://ssdpaki.la.coocan.jp/en/ proposals/26.html 54 Shinichi Kitaoka, “Insight into the World: Make the Indo-Pacific Freer, More Open,” The Japan News/Special to Yomiuri-Shimbun, December 17, 2018. Unfortunately, English version of this articles on the Japan News website are no longer available for viewing, only the original Japanese articles can be read in the Yomiuri-Shimbun reduced-size edition book. 55 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Diplomatic Bluebook. 56 For example, Nazia Hussain, “Indo-Pacific Concept: Juggling for Clarity,” RSIS Commentary, December 27, 2018, www.rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/rsis/indo-pacificconcept-juggling-for-clarity/#.XX64xeR7mF5 This differs region by region. For ASEAN see Shang-su Wu, “Competition and Neutrality of Southeast Asian States in Indo-Pacific Strategy,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), August 22, 2018, http://cimsec.org/competitionand-neutrality-of-southeast-asian-states-in-indo-pacific-strategy/37334. For the Pacific Islands see Sandra Tarte, “Putting the ‘Pacific’ into Japan’s Indo-Pacific strategy,” East Asia Forum, February 15, 2018, www.eastasiaforum.org/2018/02/15/putting-thepacific-into-japans-indo-pacific-strategy/. Finally, for Europe, see Matthew Lillehaugen, “The ‘Free and Open’ Indo-Pacific: A Call for European Partnership,” The Asia Dialogue, June 18, 2018, https://theasiadialogue.com/2018/06/22/the-free-and-open-indo-pacifica-call-for-european-partnership/. 57 The Nihon Keizai Shimbun, November 13, 2018 (in Japanese).

4 US strategic re-positioning to the “Indo-Pacific” A paradigm shift David Scott

In the 1950s–1970s, the dominant regional narrative in United States (US) strategic thinking was the Pacific as an “American Lake.”1 Then in the 1980s the dominant regional narrative in US strategic thinking shifted to the “AsiaPacific,” the so-called Rimspeak, in which the economic dynamism of the Pacific Rim and related talk of the “Pacific Century” knitted together California, Japan and the Asian Tigers of South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and ­Singapore.2 This was reflected in US prominence in the setting up of the ­Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) mechanism. However, the dominance of this Asia-Pacific strategic narrative in US strategic thinking is now weakening. The “Indo-Pacific” emerged in 2010 as a regional framework for US strategic discourse under the Obama administration, a paradigm shift which became a key regional term for official US discourse by 2017 for the Trump administration, driving policies and military dispositions to realize this US Indo-Pacific repositioning. Geopolitics and geo-economics are both involved in this shift in US thinking. At the structural level, the geo-economics is to do with the general volume of trade, including particularly significant energy flows, across the Indian and Pacific oceans.3 In addition, at the regional level, China’s Maritime Silk Road (MSR) is a geo-economic instrument to extend China’s economic power across the Indo-Pacific, at the expense of the US. From a US perspective the geopolitics is primarily to do with a rising China’s threefold maritime push, through what China calls the “first island chain” (di yi dao lian) and what the US called its forward defense perimeter into the Western Pacific, down into the South China Sea and across into the Indian Ocean.4 As of August 2019, Washington remained scathing in its warnings about Beijing, noting “the Department of Defense is greatly concerned by China’s continued efforts to violate the rulesbased international order throughout the Indo-Pacific.”5 In the face of this Chinese challenge, the US has crafted an Indo-Pacific response. This response is both geopolitical and geo-economic in nature, and is analyzed, explained and assessed in this chapter through three sections dealing with the presence (actorness), rhetoric (official discourse) and diplomacy in play for the US. The chapter concludes by summarizing the degree of geopolitical and geo-economic success in US strategy for the Indo-Pacific.

56   David Scott

Presence (actorness) The US is a well-established Indo-Pacific actor, with a wide-ranging presence. Washington argues that it is part of the Indo-Pacific region not an outsider. As an Indo-Pacific nation ourselves [...] when we speak about the Indo-Pacific region, we are defining it as stretching from the US West Coast through the Bay of Bengal [...] From a security standpoint, the Indo-Pacific is the region in which the United States has our longest maritime border, several longstanding treaty allies, as well as being home to our Pacific fleet.6 This combination of assets was why the State Department emphasized that “the United States is and will continue to be an Indo-Pacific power.”7 The US status as a resident power is through territorial possessions across the Pacific (where it is a sovereign power of the first order), as well as bases and facilities across the Indian Ocean. First, its eastern littoral, comprising California, Oregon, Washington and Alaska (including the Aleutian chain), swings around much of the eastern rim of the Pacific. San Diego is the resident homeport of the US Pacific Fleet; consisting of over 50 ships, including permanent aircraft carrier basing and over 20,000 personnel. Second, and of particular significance, was Hawaii’s incorporation into the US in 1898, becoming a fully fledged state in 1959. It houses US military forces, which were appropriately enough renamed in May 2018 from the US Pacific Command (PACOM) to the US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM). Naval leaders have considered that “Hawaii remains the gateway to the Indo-Pacific.”8 In the southern Pacific, Samoa became a US territory in 1899, complete with ongoing naval facilities. Third, following the Spanish–US war of 1898, Guam, in the Western Pacific, became a US possession and remains so to the present day. Guam sits in the “second island chain” which runs from Japan’s Bonin Island holdings, through the Marianas (including US military facilities at Tinian) to Guam. This sovereign power status is why the US is a member of the West Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS). Guam’s significance has been raised by the pivot/rebalance from the Atlantic to the Pacific announced by the Obama administration and the subsequent decision to build the island up as the “tip of the spear” for US power. In addition, Guam is the receptacle of military reinforcements redeployed from South Korea and Japan as well as for “forward deployment” from the eastern sectors of the Pacific.9 Deep water facilities able to handle aircraft carriers are complemented with the long airstrip at Andersen airbase that is able to house heavy strategic B-52 bombers. Guam is the site of the biennial large scale Valiant Shield exercises, held by the US military since 2006. It is also the home for the Cope North air force exercises, run between the US and Japanese air forces since 1999, but now expanded to include the Australian air force since 2012. Finally, in 2018, Guam was the host site for the trilateral Malabar

US re-positioning to the Indo-Pacific   57 e­ xercises between the US, India and Japan, complete with the presence of the USS Ronald Reagan, the lead US nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. Fourth, a US presence is also found along the so-called “first island chain” running from Japan (complete with US Carrier Strike Group Five based at Yokosuka) and its Ryukyu chain of islands (including the US 3rd Marine Expeditionary Force based at Okinawa), through Taiwan to the Philippines. A striking feature of this first island chain is Taiwan’s recent re-emergence in US strategic thinking. For example, according to the Indo-Pacific Strategy Report released in June 2019, Taiwan should be maintained as a checkpoint on the People’s Republic of China (PRC).10 Accordingly, US naval deployments into the Taiwan Strait markedly accelerated in 2018 and 2019. Fifth, US deployments into the South China Sea have increased in strength and frequency since 2018, with deliberate Freedom of Navigation (FON) exercises carried out within 12 miles of China’s artificial islands. US basing facilities at Palawan in the Philippines facing the South China Sea were re-established in 2016. The dispatch of the USS Ronald Reagan carrier strike group to Manila in August 2019 was explicitly made to show US “commitment to a Free and Open Indo-Pacific region” and implicitly to send a message to Beijing.11 In turn, de facto berthing facilities have been established at Da Nang amid growing US– Vietnam cooperation. The USS Carl Vinson carrier strike group made a particularly significant historic visit to Da Nang in March 2018, with US officials explaining that “it demonstrates our commitment to Vietnam, to a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.”12 With regard to Indonesia, another significant rising power, a “strategic partnership” was declared in 2015; alongside the Cope West exercises between the Indonesian and US air forces which have run annually since 2012, at times in Indonesia and at other times at Tinian in the Western Pacific. The US has expressed support for Indonesian claims to the waters surrounding the Natuna Archipelago, waters in some dispute with China. Sixth, the US stationed an ongoing Logistic Group West Pacific that resulted from defense links with Singapore being established under the 2005 Strategic Framework Agreement and further strengthened under 2015 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement. Special aircraft carrier berthing facilities, ongoing deployment of littoral combat warships and regular aircraft deployments at ­Singapore further enable US projection into the Eastern Indian Ocean and South China Sea. In this vein, the US–Singapore Strategic Security Policy Dialogue meeting in April 2018 stressed their “mutual defense cooperation” focussing on “maritime security” in the region so as to “uphold a free and open Indo-Pacific.”13 Seventh, similar Indo-Pacific projection is enabled with the Marine Rotational Force agreed on with Australia at Darwin in November 2011. Rotational troop strength has been built up, rising from 200 in 2012 to 2,500 in July 2019. By then the US was moving to build new naval facilities northeast of Darwin at Glyde Point, which would be big enough to accommodate visiting forward deployed US amphibious warships and carriers. Eighth, in the Indian Ocean, the British Indian Ocean Territory island of Diego Garcia, in the Chagos archipelago, has been the site of a significant US

58   David Scott base for over half a century, embedding US maritime power in the middle of the Indian Ocean, and “anchoring America’s future presence in the Indo-Pacific.”14 The 50 year basing lease made in 1966 was renewed for another 20 years in November 2016. However, it remains to be seen how far continuing US use of Diego Garcia is affected by the advisory opinion in February 2019 by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) that the UK should end its administration of the Chagos archipelago. It was asked to transfer the territory over to Mauritius, which the United Nations (UN) General Assembly welcomed in a 116–6 vote in May 2019. The UK, US and Australia voted against the measure. Ninth, in the eastern Indian Ocean, the Logistics Support Agreement (LSA) with India in 2016 enables the further operational reach of US naval forces into the Bay of Bengal. Further outreach is enabled by the Acquisition and Cross Servicing Agreement (ACSA) signed with Sri Lanka in 2007, strengthened by the logistics hub arrangement signed in August 2018, operationalized with the arrival of the USS Anchorage at Trincomalee, and the arrival of the aircraft carrier the USS John C. Stennis in December 2018. Tenth, in the northwest Indian Ocean, the Arabian Sea lies under the field of operations of the Central Command (CENTCOM), based at Bahrain along with the 5th Fleet. Since 2001, the US has well-established base facilities in Djibouti at Camp Lemonnier, the US naval expeditionary base overlooking the Bab-elMandeb Strait choke point and the Gulf of Aden. The US military is an extremely important actor, in particular the aforementioned INDOPACOM based at Hawaii. Its area of responsibility stretches from San Diego to Diego Garcia, from the Pacific to the Eastern Indian Ocean (68 degrees east), including India. The 7th Fleet, based in the Western Pacific, is its most powerful forward-deployed naval component. The decision by US Defense Secretary James Mattis on May 31, 2018 to rename PACOM to INDOPACOM reflected the geographic and geopolitical reality of “the increasing connectivity of the Indian and Pacific Oceans.”15 However, there is still some confusion in the western Indian Ocean, which is divided between the north-west jurisdiction of the Central Command (CENTCOM) and the 5th Fleet based at Bahrain and the south-west jurisdiction of the Africa Command (AFRICOM). It remains to be seen how far such split operational jurisdictions may hamper US operations across and within the Indian Ocean. This “Indo-Pacific” scope of their mission has been explicitly recognized by successive US naval leaders since 2012. This was first shown when the then head of PACOM, Admiral Samuel Locklear, invoked the “Indo-Pacific” 19 times in one particularly extended speech on “American commitment to the IndoPacific.” He emphasized two themes. First, with regard to US strength (internal balancing): We will put our most capable forces forward in the Indo-Pacific [...] Through the tumultuous years of the last century, America’s military served as a key stabilizing factor in the Indo-Pacific security environment—this will continue.16

US re-positioning to the Indo-Pacific   59 Second, he drew out bilateral relationships with Indo-Pacific allies and partners (external balancing): Our alliance with Australia [and Japan] will continue to underpin US security objectives in the Indo-Pacific for decades to come. We are also developing and expanding our bilateral partnerships with nations throughout the Indo-Pacific with whom we have shared security interests. Nations such as Indonesia [are] a critical partner to a successful rebalance to the Indo-Pacific. And we will pursue a long-term partnership with India.17 Although, the term “Indo-Asia-Pacific” became the standard term used at PACOM during 2013–2017 for its deployments, defense partnerships and general strategic encapsulations entwining the Pacific and Indian Oceans, the term “Indo-Pacific” was then re-adopted in 2018. Consequently, in his last testimony to the US Senate Armed Forces Committee, PACOM’s next commander Admiral Harry Harris repeated that “the US has an enduring national interest in the Indo-Pacific,” but was faced with challenges from Beijing, “China’s ongoing military build-up, advancement, and modernization are core elements of their strategy to supplant the United States [...] in the Indo-Pacific.”18 His answer was to highlight that “allies and partners join us in addressing these global challenges to defend freedom, deter war, and maintain the rules which underwrite a free and open Indo-Pacific.”19 Finally, Admiral Phillip Davidson, the incoming commander of the newly renamed INDOPACOM continued to deliver prognosis and remedy. Three examples may suffice. First, in his review of the Indo-Pacific security challenges facing the US, delivered at the Halifax Security Forum in November 2018, he made a point of denouncing China’s “debt diplomacy” represented in its MSR initiative; Chinese coercion, militarization and intimidation in the South China Sea and East China Sea; and welcomed the “general convergence around the idea of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific across the region. Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and India have all put forth similar concepts.”20 Second, in his report on the Indo-Pacific Command Posture made to the Senate Armed Forces Committee in February 2019, Davidson concluded that China “represents the greatest long-term strategic threat to a Free and Open Indo-Pacific and to the United States.”21 Third, in his speech On Ensuring a Free and Open Indo-Pacific made in March 2019, Davidson emphasized that the “combat power” of INDOPACCOM, coupled with supportive alliances and partnerships would overcome China’s challenge to regional order, and that “the long arc of history will bend towards a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.”22 INDOPACOM strategy is twofold. First, it involves active forward deployments of US strength. Second, it includes exercises with other likeminded partners across the vast region. Such exercises are important for the range of participants across the Indo-Pacific, and for the Indo-Pacific rationale advanced by INDOPACOM.

60   David Scott Within INDOPACOM, the Pacific Air Force (PACAF) has developed various Indo-Pacific programmes. This is partly through the bilateral Cope North exercises held with India, and partly through the Pacific Air Chiefs Symposium (PACS), which now includes members from the Indian Ocean (India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh) as well as around the South China Sea and Pacific. The Red Flag air exercises held in Alaska, attracting participation from other countries like Japan and India, are considered by PACAF to ensure “US forces are ready to face evolving challenges in the Indo-Pacific region and maintain a free and open ­Indo-Pacific.”23 Like his naval counterparts, the current PACAF commander, Charles Brown, stresses US “commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific region” and warnings of China threat, as in his visit to Indonesia in December 2018.24 Within INDOPACOM the naval aspects of US Indo-Pacific projection are particularly prominent, as exemplified with the Rimpac, Carat, Seacat and Palm exercises. The biggest exercise is Rimpac, involving an increasing range of Pacific Rim countries and held every other year since 1971. A significant addition to Rimpac has been the participation of India since 2012. In contrast, China, which was finally invited in 2014 and 2016, was dis-invited in 2018 (and will probably remain uninvited in 2020). This was reportedly on account of China’s worrisome actions in the South China Sea. Admiral Aquilino, Commander of the Pacific Fleet, argued in 2018 that Rimpac “shows that like-minded nations who value a free and open Indo-Pacific want this opportunity to improve our cooperation with each other.”25 Another long running US initiative are the annual Carat exercises held since 1995 with various partners in South Asia and Southeast Asia. For example, the 2019 exercises were held in Sri Lanka, Indonesia and Thailand, with the US navy organizing them to strengthen “maritime security cooperation throughout the IndoPacific.”26 Similar dynamics are present with the US-led Seacat exercises, running since 2002, which involve navies and coastguards from around the South China Sea and the Bay of Bengal, to include those of Bangladesh, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam.27 The Pacific Amphibious Leaders Symposium (PALS) set up in 2015, involves US allies and partners from the Pacific, the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean (including India). China, however, is notably absent. Admiral Davidson naturally threw his weight behind the “powerful vision of a Free and Open IndoPacific with the release of our new Indo-Pacific Strategy report” in his address at the 2019 symposium.28 His argument was simple: “a Free and Open Indo-Pacific must consist of a constellation of like-minded allies and partners, united by mutual security, interests, and values,” on which there was “convergence around the idea of a free and open Indo-Pacific, as Japan, Australia, India, New Zealand, and France have all released similar visions, and Indonesia is leading an effort within ASEAN to elaborate one as well.”29 Similarly INDOPACOM’s Chiefs of Defense (CHOD) conference, running since 2016, now involves India but not China. The official theme at the September 2019 conference was ­“Collaboration in a Free and Open Indo-Pacific.”

US re-positioning to the Indo-Pacific   61

Rhetoric The earliest explicit official use of “Indo-Pacific” rhetoric by the US was during the second half of President Barack Obama’s first administration (2010–2012) when Secretary of State Hillary Clinton argued that “the Indo-Pacific region is crucial to our future.”30 Strategic rethinking around the Indo-Pacific regional conceptualization generated practical imperatives in Clinton’s mind in order to “translate the growing connection between the Indian and Pacific oceans into an operational concept.”31 Alliance dynamics were a tacit part of her utilization of Indo-Pacific formulations. She first used the term “Indo-Pacific” in 2010 to reflect closer naval cooperation with India, stating “we are expanding our work with the Indian navy in the Pacific, because we understand how important the Indo-Pacific basin is.”32 Whereas US relations with Australia had previously been described and conducted within an “Asia-Pacific” framework, Clinton extended this with Indo-Pacific references. For example, she noted “we are also expanding our alliance with Australia from a Pacific partnership to an Indo-Pacific one.”33 Chuck Hagel, the US Defense Secretary from 2013–15, was ready to invoke Indo-Pacific frameworks, like Clinton, with regard to India. “Our interests across the full span of the Indo-Pacific region are aligning more closely than ever” with “shared interest in maritime security across the region, including at the global crossroads of the South China Sea.”34 He envisaged still wider cooperation with ASEAN, Australia, India, Japan and South Korea “to work together to build a security system across this Indo-Pacific region.”35 Alongside the Obama administration’s espousal of a political and military pivot/ rebalance to the Western Pacific and Southeast Asia was the Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor (IPEC) initiative, aimed at “shaping the future of trade and connectivity in the Indo-Pacific.”36 It was made with explicit reference to links between South Asia and Southeast Asia, did not involve China, and was implicitly a counter to China’s espousal of an MSR that Xi Jinping made in autumn 2013, and of which the Obama administration remained wary. In addition, official US aid was earmarked for IPEC schemes. Obama also adopted the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a multilateral trade framework with US allies and partners around the Pacific Rim which did not involve China. However, US involvement in the TPP proved short-lived. On taking presidential office in January 2017, Donald Trump took the immediate decision to pull the US out of the TPP. This reflected Trump’s distrust of multilateral approaches and of state-led overseas economic initiatives. After nine months of little clear foreign policy formulation by the Trump administration, explicit Indo-Pacific directions re-emerged in late 2017. Secretary of Defense James Mattis, having spent the previous part of 2017 talking about the “Asia-Pacific” and the “Pacific,” used the “Indo-Pacific” term for the first time in September 2017: A peaceful and prosperous future in the Indo-Pacific region is based on a strong rules-based international order and a shared commitment to international law, to peaceful resolution of disputes and respect for territorial

62   David Scott integrity. US–India defense cooperation has steadily expanded in recent years, underpinned by a strategic convergence between our two countries based on common objectives and goals in the region.37 The linkage to India was significant, the venue being his joint press conference with India’s Minister of Defence, Nirmala Sitharaman, and carried out during Mattis’ official visit to India. Mattis pointed out the trilateral Malabar exercises between India, Japan and the US as illustrating Indo-Pacific strategic convergence between the US and India. Whereas his warning about Chinese activities in the South China Sea were couched in specific “Asia-Pacific” frameworks at the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2017, similar warnings about China were couched in Mattis’ delivery at the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2018 on US leadership and the challenges of Indo-Pacific security.38 An extended Indo-Pacific frame of reference was deployed in Secretary of State Rex Tillerson’s speech to the Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, DC in October 2017, which included 18 mentions of the “Indo-Pacific.” He argued that “the world’s center of gravity is shifting to the  heart of the Indo-Pacific,” and that “the Indo-Pacific—including the entire Indian Ocean, the Western Pacific, and the nations that surround them—will be the most consequential part of the globe in the 21st century.”39 Tillerson emphasized that the US sought “a free and open Indo-Pacific.”40 Bilateral partnership was highlighted where “the US and India—with our shared goals of peace, security, freedom of navigation, and a free and open architecture—must serve as the eastern and western beacons of the Indo-Pacific.”41 Tillerson made an important distinction between China and India: China, while rising alongside India, has done so less responsibly, at times undermining the international, rules-based order [...]. It makes perfect sense that the United States [...] should seek to build on the strong foundation of our years of cooperation with India. It is indeed time to double down on a democratic partner that is still rising—and rising responsibly—for the next 100 years [...]. The Indo-Pacific in particular—needs the United States and India to have a strong partnership. 42 Bilateral cooperation with India was also again entwined with trilateral cooperation with Japan, with the 2017 Malabar naval exercise described by ­Tillerson as “a clear example of the combined strength of the three Indo-Pacific democracies.”43 This embrace of the Indo-Pacific was signalled at the highest level during President Trump’s visit to Pacific Asia in November 2017. The highlight of the visit was his remarks in Vietnam, where the “Indo-Pacific” was referred to ten times and the “Asia-Pacific” no times, despite this being an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit. These included comments about “our vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific,” about reaching out to “friends, partners, and allies in the Indo-Pacific,” and, with China in mind, stressing “we must

US re-positioning to the Indo-Pacific   63 uphold principles that have benefited all of us, like respect for the rule of law, individual rights, and freedom of navigation and overflight, including open shipping lanes.”44 The National Security Strategy of the United States (NSS), released in December 2017, showed a shift from Asia-Pacific to Indo-Pacific frames of ­reference. Whereas the National Security Strategy (NSS) mentioned the ­“Indo-Pacific” 11 times as a point of strategic reference, the “Asia-Pacific” was unmentioned save for one passing reference to the APEC mechanism. The NSS even contained a specific section on “The Indo-Pacific.” It warned that “geopolitical competition between free and repressive visions of world order is taking place in the Indo-Pacific region, which stretches from the west coast of India to the western shores of the United States”; in which “China seeks to displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region,” but for which “the United States must marshal the will and capabilities to compete and prevent unfavorable shifts in the Indo-Pacific.”45 The NSS argued that this was to be achieved through the forward deployment of US forces complemented by quadrilateral arrangements with Australia, India and Japan, together with other bilateral arrangements with countries like Indonesia, Singapore and Vietnam. Similarly, the 2018 National Defense Strategy (NDS) released in January 2018 was damning on China in the Indo-Pacific: China is leveraging military modernization, influence operations, and predatory economics to coerce neighboring countries to reorder the Indo-Pacific region to their advantage. As China continues its economic and military ascendance, asserting power [...] it will continue to pursue a military modernization program that seeks Indo-Pacific regional hegemony in the nearterm and displacement of the United States.46 The NDS remedy proposed was again a mixture of US forward positioning, continuing robust Freedom of Navigation (FON) exercises in the South China Sea and strengthening security ties with like-minded China-concerned nations. A synthesis of US administration thinking on the Indo-Pacific was provided in April 2018 by Alex Wong, the Deputy Assistant Secretary in the East Asian and Pacific Affairs Bureau at the US State Department. In Wong’s explanation of the US Indo-Pacific strategy, he spent much of his focus on establishing goals related to its two aspects: “free” and “open.” With regards to the qualifier “free,” Wong used it at the international and the national levels: First of all, the international plane. We want the nations of the Indo-Pacific to be free from coercion, that they can pursue in a sovereign manner the paths they choose in the region. Secondly, we mean at the national level, we want the societies of the various Indo-Pacific countries to become progressively more free—free in terms of good governance, in terms of fundamental rights, in terms of transparency and anti-corruption.47

64   David Scott This was an implicit challenge to China’s coercive actions in the South China Sea, and indeed to its domestic policies in terms of human rights. With regards to the qualifier “open,” Wong pinpointed four applications, in the shape of open sea lanes, open logistics-infrastructure, open investments and open trade. References to open trade and open investment were meant as an implicit criticism of the Chinese internal market, while open infrastructure was a criticism of China’s MSR initiative saddling participants like Sri Lanka with debts to China. Within this qualifier of “open,” Wong prioritized open sea lines of communication and open airways, where “with 50 percent of trade going through the Indo-Pacific along the sea routes, particularly through the South China Sea, open sea lanes and open airways in the Indo-Pacific are increasingly vital and important to the world.”48 This again was an implied criticism of Chinese assertiveness in the sea lines and airways of the East China Sea and particularly of the South China Sea. Wong also gave some indications on US strategy to achieve those “free” and “open” goals; “turn your attention to the term “Indo-Pacific. It’s significant that we use this term. Before, people used the term Asia Pacific [...] but we’ve adopted this phrase for two reasons, and it’s significant for two reasons.”49 Both his reasons were India-related. Number one, it acknowledges the [...] current-day reality that South Asia, and in particular India, plays a key role in the Pacific and in East Asia and in Southeast Asia. [...] Secondly, it is in our interest, the US interest, as well as the interests of the region, that India play an increasingly weighty role in the region. India is a nation that is invested in a free and open order. It is a democracy. It is a nation that can bookend and anchor the free and open order in the Indo-Pacific region, and it’s our policy to ensure that India does play that role.50 For Wong, the “Indo” part of the “Indo-Pacific” pointed not just geographically to the Indian Ocean, but also and more importantly, geopolitically to India. India was identified as a player across the entire Indo-Pacific region, with India and the US forming the two bookends (India in the west and the US in the east) of regional order. Implicit balancing undertones were present with this fellow democracy India, with China the non-democracy seen as the main challenge to a Free and Open Indo-Pacific order. A further twist on US thinking was provided at the Indo-Pacific Business Forum in July 2018 when US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo gave the keynote speech and announced seed funding of $113 million dollars “in immediate new funds to expand economic engagement in the Indo-Pacific.”51 The unstated message, immediately criticized in Beijing, was that this would provide a US alternative to China’s MSR initiative.52 Wilbur Ross the Secretary of Commerce also attended the Forum, where he announced programs for increasing US commercial presence in the region, including the Discover Global Markets (DGM): Indo-Pacific event to be held in December 2018.53 The third US figure to appear

US re-positioning to the Indo-Pacific   65 at the Forum was Mark Green, head of United States Agency for International Development (USAID), complete with warnings about “it is impossible to talk about the future of the Indo-Pacific region, and America’s role there, without acknowledging the proverbial elephant in the room” China, which was “looking to buy influence and lock up access to strategic resources,” but where “America’s Indo-Pacific strategy offers our partners an enterprise-driven future.”54 The appointment in early January 2018 of Randall Schriver as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs, a renaming of the post from “Asia-Pacific” to “Indo-Pacific,” was a significant and indicative institutional moment. In his confirmation hearing before the US Senate Armed Services Committee, Schriver had already affirmed that “for this Administration’s vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific to be realized, we must position ourselves to prevail in the long term strategic competition we face vis-à-vis the People’s Republic of China.”55 Such competition was global, but also regional, where he later argued that “Chinese strategy is to supplant the United States and become the pre-eminent power in the Indo-Pacific.”56 As to regional remedies, in Schriver’s eyes these included greater support for Taiwan based on explicit geopolitical grounds. “Taiwan is part of a sort of frontline activity for the whole Indo-Pacific first island chain that China may be presenting challenges to.”57 The US became vociferous in its Indo-Pacific approach in regional forums during 2018 and 2019. Vice President Mike Pence took the US message to the East Asia Summit (EAS) in November 2018. His expansive rhetoric asserted that “the United States is an Indo-Pacific nation, and this is where our future lies.”58 With China in mind he announced “we hold that empire and aggression have no place in the Indo-Pacific.” More specifically, Pence noted “China’s ­militarization and territorial expansion in the South China Sea is illegal and ­dangerous,” and announced ongoing freedom of navigation operations under which “for our part, the United States will continue to fly and sail wherever international law allows and our national interests demand.”59 The following day, at the APEC summit during Pence’s reiteration of the US Free and Open Indo-Pacific policy, he denounced China’s MSR initiative as being unsustainable, poor quality and debt inducing.60 A similarly specific Indo-Pacific message, replete with references to a robust US presence and cooperation with others to deal with China, was taken by Harry Harris at the Indian Ocean Conference in September 2019.61 Continuity of China-concerned Indo-Pacific emphasis was provided by the robust military profiling from US Secretary of Defense Patrick Shanahan in his speech at the Shangri-La dialogue in June 2019 entitled The US Vision for IndoPacific Security. Shanahan also followed-up on warnings about “a tool kit of coercion [...] throughout the Indo-Pacific” being used by China.62 Simultaneously, strong China-warnings were contained the same day in the release of the US Department of Defense Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, a substantive 60-page report. Its opening sentence affirmed that “the Indo-Pacific is the Defense Department’s priority theatre.”63 The report was immediately denounced in China.64 Finally, US legislation passed during 2018 and 2019 has been shaped by a ­specific Indo-Pacific focus, replete with blunt alarms raised over Chinese activities

66   David Scott in the South China Sea and the MSR initiative. The bipartisan National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for 2019, signed off in August 2018, included a battery of provisions in Subtitle E – Sections 1251–1266 on “Matters Relating to the IndoPacific Region.” Not surprisingly, China noted these with palpable concern.65 Section 1263 announced an Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative (IPMSI), enlarging the focus of the 2016 Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative into the Indian Ocean to now include Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and above all, India. The Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA), signed into law by Trump on December 31, 2018, had the “Indo-Pacific” mentioned 56 times, “Asia” five times and the “Asia-Pacific” three times, amid a program of “countering China’s influence” (section 101) in the region. China denounced the evident China-centric focus of the Act.66 The Taiwan Assurance Act, passed unanimously 414–0 in the House of Representatives in May 2019, emphasized how “Taiwan is a vital part of the United States Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy” (section 3) and ­welcomed the increased US military sales to and official contacts with the island. It was also immediately denounced in China.67

Diplomacy At the start of 2018, Susan Thornton, the Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, stressed the importance of “strengthening US partnerships in the Indo-Pacific.”68 US diplomacy has long operated a network of bilateral alliances across the Pacific, most importantly with Japan and ­Australia. These bilateral alliances reflected Cold War concerns about the Soviet Union but have been strengthened still further with the rise of China. Such traditional Pacific alliances have been complemented by US Indo-Pacific cooperation with France. Further security partnerships have also been established recently with Vietnam, Singapore, Indonesia, and most significantly with India. In addition, the US has also moved to shore up its strategic position in the Western Pacific. This was the context for the visits to Washington in May 2019 by the leaders of the Federated States of Micronesia, the Marshall Islands and Palau— rare joint state visit for such small countries straddling the “second island chain.” This was reinforced by the return visit of Mike Pompeo in August 2019, the first such visit by a US Secretary of State. His visit saw a renewal of their security arrangements with the US and embedded in their Compact of Free Association. Importantly, Pompeo was pleased that the small island states also “share our vision for an open and free Indo-Pacific [...] in the face of Chinese attempts to redraw the Pacific in its authoritarian image.”69 Strong bilateral military cooperation with Japan continues to be strengthened in the Ryukyu chain along the “first island chain,” and around Guam in the Western Pacific along the “second island chain.” It is significant that US–Japanese military cooperation is now being extended further across the Indo-Pacific. Bilateral drills in June 2019 were held between the USS Ronald Reagan aircraft carrier group and Japan’s Indo-Pacific Deployment 2019 (IPD19) group consisting of the helicopter carrier JS Izumo and two support destroyers. This came on

US re-positioning to the Indo-Pacific   67 the heels of the USS William P. Lawrence exercising with the Japanese carrier group in the Strait of Malacca in May 2019. It is also significant that President Trump’s specific adoption of the Free and Open Indo-Pacific framework in autumn 2017 followed on from Japan’s initiation of the concept in 2016. Their common focus remains on China’s growing presence across the Indo-Pacific. Hence, Mattis’ welcome to the Japanese Foreign Minister at the Pentagon in April 2018 was aimed at China. “Together, we stand for a free and open IndoPacific region, reinforced by the international rule of law. And we oppose the use of predatory economics by those seeking to impose their will on others in the region.”70 China was again in their sights at their Security Consultative ­Committee meeting in April 2019, involving Pompeo and Shanahan along with their Japanese counterparts, The ministers voiced “their shared concern that geopolitical competition and coercive attempts to undermine international rules, norms, and institutions present challenges to the [US–Japan] Alliance and to the shared vision of a free and open Indo-Pacific.”71 Further cooperation was signaled in the Advancing a Free and Open Pacific through Energy, Infrastructure and Digital Connectivity Cooperation agreement signed in November 2018 as an implicit response to China’s MSR initiative as well as related Belt and Road (BRI) initiatives. Traditional US security links with Australia have also been strengthened. The most obvious sign of this was the agreement for the deployment of US marines to Darwin in November 2011 with deployment potential into the Western Pacific, South China Sea and Eastern Indian Ocean. Their numbers have steadily increased. The Talisman Saber exercises in Northern Australia and the Coral Sea, running since 2005, have also steadily increased in scope and numbers. A significant extension of US–Australian cooperation was on display in May 2019 when the guided-missile destroyer USS Preble was joined by the Australian guided missile frigate HMAS Melbourne, for a freedom of navigation operation (FONOP) near the Scarborough Shoal, in the South China Sea. Since 2011, the annual Australia-US Ministerial (AUSMIN) meetings, between US secretary of state and defense secretaries along with their Australian counterparts have made a point of considering the Indian Ocean along with their traditional focus on the Pacific, and have included repeated concerns over Chinese actions in the South China Sea. An Indo-Pacific orientation has become explicit since 2017, with AUSMIN pledges “to increase bilateral collaboration in relation to the Indo-Pacific.”72 The 2018 summit between Donald Trump and Australian Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull cast the relationship in suitable Indo-Pacific anchoring: Across the Indo-Pacific, our two nations are committed to deepening our engagement with our allies and all partners [...]. A free, open, and prosperous rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific region is in both our nations’ enduring national interests.73 The key word was “across” the Indo-Pacific; i.e., US cooperation with Australia not only in the Pacific but also in the Indian Ocean. It was also significant that

68   David Scott other “allies and partners” in the Indo-Pacific were noted, in other words Japan as an ally and India as a partner. The AUSMIN Joint Declarations in July 2018 and August 2019 were particularly noticeable for their numerous “Indo-Pacific” references. India is the key element in the US shift from an Asia-Pacific to an Indo-Pacific strategic frame of reference. Specific regional underpinnings were apparent in the Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region drawn up in January 2015 between Obama and Modi. The Joint Statement drawn up between Trump and Modi in June 2017 defined their two countries as “democratic stalwarts of the Indo-Pacific” ready to cooperate together as “responsible stewards of the India-Pacific,” which was an implicit criticism of an undemocratic China as being “irresponsible” in the South China Sea.74 Typical of ongoing US priorities with India was the Maritime Security Dialogue held in April–May 2018, which “discussed developments in the maritime domain of the Indo-Pacific.”75 The maritime domain involves the US being faced with a growing Chinese maritime push in the Western Pacific, and India being faced with a growing Chinese maritime push in the Indian Ocean. Assistant Secretary of State John Sullivan’s visit to India in August 2019 occurred because it was felt that India was “critical to preserving the rules-based order in the Indo-Pacific region” that was under threat from China. Sullivan argued that “the US–India partnership is such an important factor in determining whether China ultimately succeeds in reshaping Asia to its purposes.”76 Common concerns continue to be expressed by US and Indian officials over maintaining freedom of navigation and airspace in the South China Sea, and for the United Nations Convention for the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) tribunal findings to be upheld. Tangible military links have been underpinned by various organizational agreements. The New Framework for Defense Cooperation (NFDC) established in 2005, and strengthened further in 2015, has been followed by increasingly significant naval and air force bilateral exercises in the Indian and Pacific Oceans between the two countries. The US and India are now clearly strategic partners if not formal allies. Their Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), signed in August 2016, opens the way for mutual use of each other’s bases in both oceans. Finally, the Communications, Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) signed in September 2018 enables closer inter-operation between US and Indian military assets. Their COMCASA agreement was on show with the anti-submarine drills carried out by the USS Spruance with Indian Navy P8I Poseidon aircraft over the Indian Ocean in April 2019. Defense sales have also accelerated. The US rationale for this was clear from Pompeo in his speech The US and India: An Economic Foundation for a Free and Open IndoPacific: “Lockheed Martin’s F-21 and Boeing’s F/A-18 are state-of-the-art fighters that could give India the capabilities it needs to become a full-fledged security provider throughout the Indo-Pacific [...] to maintain our shared vision throughout the Indo-Pacific.”77 On the geo-economic front, moves towards greater cooperation on infrastructure projects was signaled by USAID signing in March 2019 an extension till 2021 of the Triangular Cooperation for Global

US re-positioning to the Indo-Pacific   69 Development (TCGD) programme, with India with a deliberate focus on infrastructure and connectivity in Asia and Africa. At the bilateral level, US cooperation with France has also developed an Indo-Pacific character, facilitated by France being a resident sovereign power in both the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Naval exercises have been held between the US and French navies in both oceans. In December 2015, the French frigate FNS Provence was embedded in the Carrier Strike Group headed by USS Truman in the Arabian Sea, before sailing further eastwards across the Indian Ocean. The then PACOM chief Admiral Harry Harris was enthusiastic about these widening links in February 2018. France has significant equities in the Indo-Pacific, and I welcome France’s growing involvement in the region [...] France aims to become more involved across the Indo-Pacific [...] I am very excited about France’s increased willingness to stand by the US as we confront revisionist state [i.e., China] and non-state actors [ISIS] across the region.78 He gave as an example the then deployment of the French frigate FNS Vendémiaire in the East China Sea, operating there with the US Pacific Fleet. During its extended deployment across the Indian Ocean in Spring 2019, the French carrier Task Force 473 exercised with the USS John C. Stennis Carrier Strike Group in the Red Sea in April, with the USS John Lawrence in the Bay of Bengal in May and with the USS Boxer in the Andaman Sea in June. This US–French bilateral cooperation also led to US-led trilateral exercises with the  French and Japanese navies in the Western Pacific in May 2017; and the French and Australian navies in the Arabian Sea in anti-submarine Sharem exercises in December 2018. The strategic trilateral between the US, Australia and Japan (USAJ) is a particularly well-established format.79 This was initiated in 2002, was then upgraded to ministerial status from 2006, with an extra Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF) added in 2007. Their trilateral military cooperation has included naval exercises in the South China Sea in 2011 and 2016, submarine exercises in the Sea of Japan in 2017, Cope North air force exercises at Guam from 2012 onwards, and Talisman Sabre naval exercises in the Coral Sea in 2019. Typical of the shared concerns of the USAJ trilateral was the US Secretary of Defense Mattis’ discussions with his Australian and Japanese counterparts in 2017 which highlighted their “strong opposition to coercion” posed by Chinese militarization in the South China Sea,” and where they “reaffirmed the importance of further increasing cooperation among countries with shared interests in the peace and stability of the Indo-AsiaPacific region, including India.”80 A significant development was their agreement in August 2018 which “underscored their commitment to working together to maintain and promote a free, open, prosperous and inclusive IndoPacific region,” recorded their “serious concerns” over Chinese actions in the South China Sea, and announced that the  United States Overseas Private

70   David Scott Investment Corporation (OPIC) would be working with the Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and the Japanese Bank for International Cooperation on “significant infrastructure investment needs in the Indo-Pacific.”81 Initiated in 2011 and upgraded to ministerial level in 2015, the US trilateral with India and Japan (USIJ) is Indo-Pacific in membership. The US ambassador to India announced that “by establishing a permanent US–India–Japan ministerial mechanism, we have institutionalized a conversation among the three pillars of the Indo-Pacific community of democracies.”82 The USIJ meeting in April 2018 “agreed to remain engaged and strengthen cooperation in support of a free, open, prosperous, peaceful, and inclusive Indo-Pacific region.”83 Following their successful Trilateral Infrastructure Working Group (TIWG) meeting in Washington in February 2018, the USIJ trilateral in April 2018 also “agreed to continue to collaborate to promote increased connectivity in the Indo-Pacific,” as an overt alternative to China’s MSR initiative.84 The three countries agreed to share information on their current Indo-Pacific ­projects, with joint loans and joint ventures also up for consideration. A further notch in its profile was the heads of government meeting between Trump, Modi and Abe held in November 2018. While this was more symbolic than substantial, it nevertheless was a sign of the trilateral format’s steady institutional consolidation. The security side of this USIJ format was initiated when Japan permanently joined the annual US–India Malabar exercises in 2015. Chinese criticism immediately followed.85 A significant further development in their trilateral venture was the exercising of the USS William P. Lawrence in the South China Sea in combination with Indian and Japanese vessels, and joined by the Philippine navy in May 2019. In the light of these bilateral and trilateral links, the strategic logic was straightforward—renewal of the quadrilateral format between the US, Australia, India and Japan in the “Quad.” This quadrilateral format had first surfaced in 2007 but had been halted following Chinese criticisms and subsequent Australian and Indian hesitations. A decade later, US officials met their Quad counterparts in November 2017 for Consultations on the Indo-Pacific To discuss their shared vision for increased prosperity and security in a free and open Indo-Pacific region [...] increasing connectivity consistent with international law and standards [...] and maritime security efforts in the Indo-Pacific [...] to further strengthen the rules-based order in the IndoPacific region.86 China was not mentioned, but it was China’s maritime assertiveness especially in the South China Sea but also elsewhere in the Indo-Pacific as well as its MSR initiative that was in mind with the re-formation of the Quad. Further Quad meetings were held in June 2018, November 2018, and May 2019—all with

US re-positioning to the Indo-Pacific   71 similar China-related Indo-Pacific maritime issues under discussion. China has continued to criticize the Quad.87

Conclusions In May 2018, US Admiral John Aquilino, on taking up command of the Pacific Fleet, warned his audience that “great-power competition has re-emerged as the central challenge to security and prosperity. Nowhere are the stakes of that great-power competition higher than here in the Indo-Pacific.”88 A year later he was clear on US naval policy, “there is no better signal of our desire to maintain a free and open Indo-Pacific than US naval operations in the region [...] combined with a robust constellation of allies and partners;” in which “we are all operating towards that same end—continued security and stability that results in a free and open Indo-Pacific.”89 Certainly, US naval power projection across the Indo-Pacific remains high, and is being further leveraged through greater willingness to forward deploy. Nevertheless, Washington’s need for allies and partners is all the more necessary since the so-called US unipolar moment—pinpointed by Krauthammer for the post-Cold War 1990s decade—is now giving way to multipolarity, several centers of power in which China and India are new factors. What is clear is that US Indo-Pacific policy involves co-opting one rising power (India) to help restrain another rising power (China), at a time when the US, and indeed Japan, are facing relative power decline in the Indo-Pacific vis-à-vis China. This ­particular Indian weight is why US officials already talked in 2012 of the partnership with India being “indispensable” for the US in maintaining an effective tacit balance of power against China in the Indo-Pacific.90 India is central in US strategy for averting such a regional power transition in favor of China. The geo-economics of US strategy has some successes but also limitations. Mike Pompeo may have announced in July 2018 that the US would allocate $113 million dollars in immediate new funds to expand economic engagement in the Indo-Pacific, but that was still tiny compared to the billions of dollars being poured into China’s MSR and BRI initiatives. One observer somewhat dismissed Pompeo’s pledges as “geo-economics on a shoestring.”91 While the US under President Trump continued to cut the budget of USAID, it has also tried to build up private enterprise alternatives. In such a vein, the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development (BUILD) Act in October 2018 established the International Development Finance Corporation (IDFC), which expands and repurposes the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) via a doubling of its capital lending ceiling to $60 billion. This is potential rather than actual lending. It remains to be seen how far it can leverage follow-on private sector investment from US companies. On the one hand, the US (and Sri Lanka) boycotted China’s 2019 Belt and Road Forum (BRF). India did so too after also boycotting the 2017 Forum. On the other hand, the US has shaped trilateral infrastructure

72   David Scott initiatives with Japan and Australia, and renewed its bilateral infrastructure partnership with India. The geopolitics of US strategy has been more clearly effective. In terms of internal balancing, US naval forces have been forwardly and more actively deployed over from the Atlantic into the Pacific, amid Chinese concerns.92 Guam continues to be built up as the US forward point in the Western Pacific. The US has made accelerated ongoing deployments into the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait an uncomfortable fact of life for China in 2019. These have attracted numerous Chinese complaints.93 In terms of external balancing, the US has strengthened security links in both the Indian and Pacific Oceans with France, Japan, Australia and India—with the US able to operate in various bilateral, trilateral and quadrilateral formats with them. In Southeast Asia, Vietnam, Singapore, and even the Philippines and Indonesia have also strengthened their security links with the US. In the Pacific, US security links have been strengthened with New Zealand. China’s continuing denouncements of US Indo-Pacific strategy indicates the US security repositioning is proving reasonably effective in the geopolitical arena.94

Notes   1 Eleanor Lattimore, “Pacific Ocean or American Lake?” Far Eastern Survey 14, no. 22 (1945): 313–316.   2 Bruce Cummings, “Rimspeak; or, the Discourse of the ‘Pacific Rim’,” in Arif Dirlik (ed). What Is In a Rim? Critical Perspectives on the Pacific Region Idea (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997), pp. 53–72.   3 Robert Blackwill, “Indo-Pacific Strategy in an Era of Geoeconomics,” Speech (Japan Forum on International Relations conference), July 31, 2018, https://cfrd8-files.cfr. org/sites/default/files/pdf/8–20%20Tokyo%20Presentation.pdf.   4 Randall Doyle, The Geopolitical Power Shift in the Indo-Pacific Region (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2014).   5 “China Escalates Coercion against Vietnam’s Longstanding Oil and Gas Activity in the South China Sea,” August 26, 2019, www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Releases/ Release/Article/1943953/.   6 Daniel Rosenblum, “Remarks on the US and the Indo-Pacific Region,” January 30, 2018,https://bd.usembassy.gov/wp-content/uploads/sites/70/Remarks-by-Deputy-AssistantSecretary-of-State-Dan-Rosenblum-on-the-United-State-and-the-Indo-Pacific-RegionEnglish-January-30–2018.pdf.   7 Alice Wells, “Remarks on Indo-Pacific Regional Architecture,” (Indian Ocean Conference), September 1, 2017, https://lk.usembassy.gov/remarks-acting-assistant-secretarystate-south-central-asian-affairs-alice-g-wells-indo-pacific-regional-architecture/.   8 Harry Harris, “Speech” (Hawaii Military Council), January 12, 2018, www.pacom. mil/Media/Speeches-Testimony/Article/1418846/   9 Andrew Erickson and Justin Mikolay, “Guam and American Security in the Pacific,” in Andrew S. Erickson and Carnes Lord (eds). Rebalancing US Forces: Basing and Forward Presence in the Asia-Pacific (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, Annapolis, 2014), pp. 15–36. 10 “Taiwan’s Security Role in the US Indo-Pacific Strategy,” The Diplomat, June 2, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/06/taiwans-security-role-in-the-u-s-indo-pacificstrategy/.

US re-positioning to the Indo-Pacific   73 11 “Ronald Reagan Carrier Strike Group arrives in Philippines,” Task Force 70 Public Affairs, August 7, 2019, www.pacom.mil/Media/News/News-Article-View/Article/ 1928899/ronald-reagan-carrier-strike-group-arrives-in-philippines/. 12 Mary Tarnowka, “Telephonic Press Briefing,” March 6, 2018, www.state.gov/ telephonic-press-briefing-with-u-s-consul-general-mary-tarnowka-and-commander-u-s-7thfleet-vice-adm-phillip-g-sawyer-and-rear-admiral-john-fuller/. 13 John Rood, “Readout of Under Secretary of Defense for Policy John C Rood’s meeting with Singaporean Permanent Secretary Chan Yeng Kit,” News Release (Department of Defense), April 23, 2018, www.defense.gov/News/News-Releases/ News-Release-View/Article/1501275/. 14 Erickson, Walter Ladwig, and Mikolay, “Diego Garcia. Anchoring America’s future presence in the Indo-Pacific,” Harvard Asia Quarterly 25, no. 2 (2013): 20–28. 15 James Mattis, “Remarks at US Indo-Pacific Command Change of Command Ceremony,” May 30, 2018, www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/ 1535689/. 16 Samuel Locklear, “The Complex Security Challenges we face in the Indo-Pacific” (Kokoda Foundation), November 15, 2012, www.pacom.mil/Media/Speeches-Testimony/ Article/565149/kokoda-foundation-australia/. 17 Ibid. 18 Harry Harris, “Opening Statement” (Senate Armed Services Committee), March 20, 2018, www.pacom.mil/Media/Speeches-Testimony/Article/1470271/. 19 Ibid. 20 Phil Davidson, “Indo-Pacific Security Challenges,” November 17, 2018, www. pacom.mil/Media/Speeches-Testimony/Article/1693325/ (accessed September 5, 2019). Also Davidson, “China Power,” November 30, 2018, www.pacom.mil/Media/SpeechesTestimony/Article/1702301/. 21 Davidson, “Indo-Pacific Command Posture” (Senate Armed Forces Committee testimony), February 12, 2019, www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Davidson_​ 02–12–19.pdf. 22 Davidson, “On Ensuring a Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” March 7, 2019, www.pacom. mil/Media/Speeches-Testimony/Article/1779396/. 23 51st Fighter Wing Public Affairs, “RED FLAG-Alaska 19–2: Indo-Pacific ‘One Team’ Mentality,” June 24, 2019, www.osan.af.mil/News/Article-Display/Article/ 1885902/. 24 Pacific Air Forces Public Affairs, “COMPACAF Visit Highlights 70 years of US– Indonesia Relationship,” December 19, 2018, www.pacom.mil/Media/News/NewsArticle-View/Article/1718161/. 25 “US Navy Kicks of 26th RIMPAC Exercise,” June 29, 2018, www.navy.mil/submit/ display.asp?story_id=106173. Also, Du Tran, “Integrating Diplomacy and Defense in the Indo-Pacific,” Dipnote (State Department), March 1, 2018, https://blogs.state.gov/ stories/2018/03/01/en/integrating-diplomacy-and-defense-indo-pacific. 26 Task Force 73 Public Affairs, “CARAT Exercise,” NNS190419–04, April 19, 2019, www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_id=109311. 27 Pacific Fleet Public Affairs, “Indo-Pacific Maritime Forces Kick off 18th SEACAT Exercise,” NNS190820–12, August 20, 2019, www.navy.mil/submit/display.asp?story_ id=110623. 28 Davidson, “Remarks” (Pacific Amphibious Leaders Symposium), June 4, 2019 www.pacom.mil/Media/Speeches-Testimony/Article/1866293/pacific-amphibious-leaderssymposium-humanitarian-assistance-and-disaster-relief/. 29 Davidson, “Remarks” (Pacific Amphibious Leaders Symposium), June 4, 2019. 30 Hillary Clinton, “Delivering on the Promise of Economic Statecraft,” November 17, 2012, https://2009–2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/11/200 664.htm.

74   David Scott 31 Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” October 11, 2011, https://2009–2017.state.gov/ secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2011/10/175215.htm. 32 Clinton, “America’s Engagement in the Asia-Pacific,” October 28, 2010, https:// 2009–2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/10/150141.htm. 33 Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century.” 34 Chuck Hagel, “Remarks to the Observer Research Foundation,” August 9, 2014, www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/606907/. 35 Hagel, “Remarks with Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel,” August 12, 2014, https:// 2009–2017.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2014/08/230525.htm. 36 Fatema Sumar, “Shaping the Future of Trade and Connectivity in the Indo-Pacific,” May 8, 2014, https://2009–2017.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rmks/2014/226364.htm. Also, Nisha Biswal, “Indo-Pacific Regional Connectivity, Commerce, and Cooperation,” September 2, 2016, retrieved https://2009–2017.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rmks/2016/261 598.htm. 37 Mattis, “Joint Press Conference’ (with Minister of Defence Nirmala Sitharaman), September 26, 2017, www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/Article/ 1325283/. 38 Mattis, “Remarks” (“US leadership and the Challenges of Indo-Pacific Security”), IISS Shangri-La Dialogue, June 2, 2018, www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/TranscriptView/Article/1538599/remarks-by-secretary-mattis-at-plenary-session-of-the-2018-shangrila-dialogue/. 39 Rex Tillerson, “Defining our Relationship with India for the Next Century,” October 18, 2017, https://translations.state.gov/2017/10/18/secretary-of-state-rex-tillerson-on-definingour-relationship-with-india-for-the-next-century/. 40 Ibid. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid. 43 Ibid. 44 Donald Trump, “Remarks” (APEC Summit), November 10, 2017, www.whitehouse. gov/the-press-office/2017/11/10/remarks-president-trump-apec-ceo-summit-da-nangvietnam. 45 National Security Strategy of the United States (Washington, DC: The White House, 2017), 45–46, 25, 45. 46 National Defense Strategy Summary (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2018), 1–2. 47 Alex Wong, “Briefing on the Indo-Pacific Strategy,” April 2, 2018, www.state.gov/ briefing-on-the-indo-pacific-strategy/. 48 Ibid. 49 Ibid. 50 Ibid. 51 Mike Pompeo, “America’s Indo-Pacific Economic Vision,” June 30, 2018, www. state.gov/remarks-on-americas-indo-pacific-economic-vision/. 52 “Washington’s Investment in Indo-Pacific Won’t Cripple Belt and Road,” Global Times, June 31, 2018, www.globaltimes.cn/content/1113199.shtml. 53 “US Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross Announces Programs to Increase US Commercial Engagement in the Indo-Pacific Region,” July 30, 2018, www.commerce.gov/ news/press-releases/2018/07/us-secretary-commerce-wilbur-ross-announces-programsincrease-us. 54 Mark Green, “Remarks” (Indo-Pacific Business Forum), July 30, 2018, www.usaid. gov/news-information/press-releases/jul-30–2018-administrator-mark-green-remarksindo-pacific-business-forum. Also, “USAID’s Role in Advancing the US Vision for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” June 26, 2019, www.usaid.gov/indo-pacific-vision. 55 Randall Schriver, “Opening Statement” (Senate Armed Services Committee), November 16, 2017, www.armed-services.senate.gov/download/schriver_11–16–17.

US re-positioning to the Indo-Pacific   75 56 Schriver, “Press Briefing” (2019 Report on Military and Security Developments in China), May 3, 2019, https://dod.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/ Article/1837011/. 57 “Interview. Randall Schriver,” Japan Forward, December 13, 2018, https://japan-­ forward.com/interview-randall-schriver-not-much-distinction-between-chinas-navy-andmilitia-fishing-boats/. 58 Mike Pence, “Remarks” (East Asia Summit), November 15, 2018, www.whitehouse. gov/briefings-statements/prepared-remarks-vice-president-pence-east-asia-summit-plenarysession/. 59 Ibid. 60 Pence, “Remarks” (APEC Summit), November 16, 2018, www.whitehouse.gov/briefingsstatements/remarks-vice-president-pence-2018-apec-ceo-summit-port-moresby-papuanew-guinea/. Also Pence, “US Seeks Collaboration, not Control, in Indo-Pacific,” Washington Post, November 9, 2018, www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/mikepence-the-united-states-seeks-collaboration-not-control-in-the-indo-pacific/2018/11/ 09/1a0c330a-e45a-11e8-b759–3d88a5ce9e19_story.html. 61 Harris, “Working Together for the Future of the Indo-Pacific Region,” (Indian Ocean Conference), September 3–4, 2019, https://kr.usembassy.gov/090419-workingtogether-for-the-future-of-the-indo-pacific-region/. 62 Patrick Shanahan, “Remarks” (“The US Vision for Indo-Pacific Security,” ShangriLa Dialogue), June 1, 2019, www.defense.gov/Newsroom/Transcripts/Transcript/ Article/1871584/. 63 Indo-Pacific Strategy Report (Washington: Department of Defense, 2019), i. 64 Zhao Minghao, “With Stepped-up Plan, US Takes Aim at China,” Global Times, June 10, 2018, p. 15. 65 “New Defense Bill Underscores US Shift to ‘Indo-Pacific’ Strategy,” Xinhua, May 8, 2018, www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018–05/08/c_137163670.htm. 66 Wang Yiwei, “Can US’ Asia Reassurance Initiative Act Contain China?” Global Times, January 21, 2019, www.globaltimes.cn/content/1136474.shtml. 67 Yang Sheng, “China Slams US bills on Taiwan,” Global Times, May 8, 2019, www. globaltimes.cn/content/1149092.shtml. 68 Susan Thornton, “Strengthening US Partnerships in the Indo-Pacific for a More Secure and Prosperous Future,” Dipnote (State Department), January 8, 2018, https:// blogs.state.gov/stories/2018/01/08/en/strengthening-us-partnerships-indo-pacific-moresecure-and-prosperous-future. 69 Pompeo, “Remarks” (Palikir, Federated States of Micronesia), August 5, 2019, www. state.gov/secretary-of-state-michael-r-pompeo-federated-states-of-micronesia-presidentdavid-w-panuelo-republic-of-the-marshall-islands-president-hilda-c-heine-and-republicof-palau-vice-president-and-min/. 70 Mattis, “Remarks” (Welcoming Japan Minister of Defense Itsunori Onodera to the Pentagon), April 20, 2018, www.defense.gov/News/Transcripts/Transcript-View/ Article/1499963/. 71 “Joint Statement of the Security Consultative Committee,” April 19, 2019, www. mod.go.jp/e/d_act/us/201904_ js.html. 72 US–Australia, “Joint Statement” (AUSMIN), 5 June, 2017, www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ ps/2017/06/271560.htm. 73 US–Australia, “Joint Statement” (Donald Trump and Malcolm Turnbull), February 23, 2018, https://au.usembassy.gov/joint-statement-united-states-president-donald-jtrump-australian-prime-minister-malcolm-turnbull/. 74 US–India, “Joint Statement (“United States and India: Prosperity Through Partnership”),” June 27, 2017, www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/united-states-indiaprosperity-partnership/.

76   David Scott 75 Department of Defense, “3rd India–US Maritime Strategic Dialogue,” May 1, 2018, https://media.defense.gov/2018/May/04/2001912429/-1/-1/0/3RD%20INDIA%20US%2 0MARITIME%20DIALOGUE.PDF. 76 Morgan Ortagus, “Department Press Briefing,” August 8, 2019, www.state.gov/briefings/ department-press-briefing-august-8–2019/; and John Sullivan, “Remarks” (India–US Forum), August 16, 2019, www.state.gov/remarks-at-india-u-s-forum/. 77 Pompeo, “The US and India: An Economic Foundation for a Free and Open Indo-Pacific,” June 12, 2019, www.state.gov/secretary-of-state-michael-r-pompeo-at-theindia-ideas-summit-and-44th-annual-meeting-of-the-u-s-india-business-council/. 78 Harris, “Opening Statement” (Senate Armed Services Committee), March 15, 2018, www.pacom.mil/Media/Speeches-Testimony/Article/1470271/. 79 Andrew Shearer, “US–Japan–Australia Strategic Cooperation in the Trump Era,” Southeast Asian Affairs, no. 1 (2017): 83–99. 80 “Joint Statement Australia-US–Japan Defence Ministers Meeting,” June 3, 2017, www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Australia-US-Japan-Defense-MinistersMeeting-June-2017.pdf. 81 “Australia–Japan–United States Trilateral Strategic Dialogue Joint Ministerial Statement,” August 5, 2018, www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2018/08/284940.htm. 82 Richard Verma, “India, US and a Year of Togetherness,” Indian Express, ­December 26, 2015, http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/india-us-barack-obama-richardverma/. 83 “Joint Statement on the US–India–Japan Trilateral Meeting,” Press Release (Department of State), April 5, 2018, https://translations.state.gov/2018/04/05/joint-statementon-the-u-s-india-japan-trilateral-meeting/. 84 “Joint Statement on the US–India–Japan Trilateral Meeting,” April 5, 2018. 85 Li Chen, “Malabar Exercise More Bluster than Real Deterrence in East China Sea,” Global Times, December 26, 2016, www.globaltimes.cn/content/1025722. shtml. 86 “Australia–India–Japan–US Consultations on the Indo-Pacific,” Press Statement (Department of State), November 12, 2017, www.state.gov/australia-india-japan-u-sconsultations-on-the-indo-pacific/. 87 Ai Jun, “Quad Offers no Substitute for BRI in Indo-Pacific,” Global Times, November 15, 2018, www.globaltimes.cn/content/1127645.shtml; Long Xingchun, “US–Japan– India–Australia Alliance Stillborn,” Global Times, March 18, 2019, www.globaltimes. cn/content/1142495.shtml. 88 John Aquilino, “Speech” (Change of Command Ceremony), May 17, 2018, www.cpf. navy.mil/leaders/john-aquilino/speeches/2018/05/change-of-command.pdf. 89 Aquilino, “Speech” (Langkawi International Maritime and Aerospace Exhibition), March 26, 2019, www.cpf.navy.mil/leaders/john-aquilino/speeches/2019/03/lima2019.pdf. 90 Wendy Sherman, “The United States and India: An Indispensable Partnership for the 21st Century,” April 2, 2012, https://2009–2017.state.gov/p/us/rm/2012/187401. htm. 91 Ankit Panda, “Pompeo’s Indo-Pacific Speech: Geoeconomics on a Shoestring,” The Diplomat, July 31, 2018, https://thediplomat.com/2018/07/pompeos-indo-pacific-speechgeoeconomics-on-a-shoestring/. 92 Han Xudong, “US Intensifies Military Presence in Indo-Pacific,” Global Times, 24 July, 2018, www.globaltimes.cn/content/1112119.shtml. 93 Yue Liu, “US Should Desist from Roiling South China Sea,” Global Times, February 17, 2019, www.globaltimes.cn/content/1139119.shtml; “US Warships’ Futile Geopolitical Provocation in Taiwan Straits,” Global Times, January 25, 2019, www.globaltimes.​ cn/content/1137038.shtml.

US re-positioning to the Indo-Pacific   77 94 Long Xingchun, “Trump Promotes Indo-Pacific for US Benefits,” Global Times, ­November 15, 2017, www.globaltimes.cn/content/1075383.shtml; “Indo-Pacific Strategy a Trap by Washington,” Global Times, 31 May, 2018, www.globaltimes.cn/ content/1105064.shtml.

5 Australia and the construction of the Indo-Pacific1 Miguel Alejandro Híjar-Chiapa

Introduction Since the turn of the century, a number of transformations in the political landscape of the world have occurred. Among these fundamental changes, the rise of China has emerged as the most significant challenge to the post-War status quo given the implications of the country’s new role as a power with global reach. Its rise, naturally, has been felt most in its immediate neighborhood. Consequently, the region known as the Asia-Pacific is being reshaped by the shifting balance of power. This restructuring is both material and ideational. Indeed, the very idea of the region is being altered, even to the point of being called by the relatively novel name of “Indo-Pacific.” Given that the potential consequences of the fluctuating security environment are a matter of grave concern for Australia, it has been one of the most relevant actors involved in the process of constructing a new idea of the region. As such, it has developed innovative and comprehensive defense and foreign policies to support it in an uncertain future that will likely prove difficult to navigate. This chapter aims to explore the nature of the ontological change taking place in the Pacific Rim and its ramifications; Australia’s place, role and interests in this imagined community,2 that is, the limited political amalgamation distinguished by the style in which it is being imagined; and how can Australia take advantage of this new construct in order to provide meaningful responses to the serious threats and buoyant opportunities that these transformations may bring.

(Re-)Constructing the region: from Asia-Pacific to the Indo-Pacific The demise of the bipolar system after the end of the Cold War altered the world and the ways we see it. Peter Katzenstein argued, “Power politics is now occurring in complex regional contexts that undercut the stark assumption of the international system as unmitigated anarchy.”3 We therefore now live in a world of regions, shaped by a varied assortment of economic and social processes. But regions are not determined solely by geographical or material issues. They are also, if not mostly, shaped by ideas. In other words, “Regions are, among other

Australia and the Indo-Pacific   79 things, social constructions created through politics.”4 Consequently, the understanding of how ideational forces work is vital to “trace the ways in which ­interests and identities change over time and new forms of cooperation and community can emerge.”5 According to this constructivist approach—since there are no given regions and no given regional interests either—identities and interests must be “shaped in the process of interaction and intersubjective understanding.”6 The question here is how the idea of the Asia-Pacific was initially constructed and how that informs the new conceptualizations and concept of the Indo-Pacific. According to Arturo Santa-Cruz, the idea of a Pacific Era has been mentioned by thinkers and politicians for many decades, turning the so-called Century of the Pacific into a sort of zeitgeist. But plasticity and lack of clarity by scholars as to which countries should be included in these classifications have led ­geographers to eschew them as standard concepts. Nonetheless, in the fields of journalism and the social sciences, as well as in political discourse, they have gained wide currency. However, as Santa-Cruz noted, the assumption that a discourse is capable of creating a region is questionable, as is the utility of these concepts as regional constructs.7 This matter becomes more evident when we consider the fact that regional identity depends on the basis of shared norms and values.8 Furthermore, given the presence of multiple actors with very diverse identities that champion both Western and Asian values, it might seem that the idea of the region is perhaps shallow and useless. As Manuel Castells noted, “there will be no Pacific institutions of political integration.”9 He went on to argue that, given developments in the Pacific have been and still are fostered by strong parallel nationalisms, and countries in the region have been unwilling to downplay their identities for the sake of the common good,10 no Pacific region exists as a distinct or integrated entity and, therefore, there neither has been nor will there be a Pacific Era.11 For even when “there is a growing economic interdependence in the Asian Pacific [...] the very institutions that propelled Japan, and the other Asian Pacific countries, toward the global economy and the information society are the main obstacles for further cooperation beyond the tense sharing of economic interests.”12 Nevertheless, the idea of the Pacific as a community has prospered, and there are good reasons for it. Identities and interests have been built via an intersubjective process and elites in countries on both sides of the Pacific have found that much-needed starting point for economic integration. For this reason, since the late 1970s, the arguably imprecise definition of Asia-Pacific has been the dominant concept that delineates the wider Pacific region in commerce and international politics, giving way to an Asia-Pacific identity that is not based on a strong sense of collectiveness and is open to multiple interpretations. This has been extensively motivated by countries such as Japan and Australia in order not just to promote the idea of a community of interests especially based on economic integration, but also to justify the indispensable, continued US involvement in the region—controversial as it may be. However, regions, as political creations not fixed by geography and are subject to reconstruction

80   Miguel Alejandro Híjar-Chiapo attempts. These attempts “can tell us a great deal about the shape and shaping of international politics.”13 As such, and aptly illustrating this point, the last decade has seen the emergence of a new construct that aims not just to illustrate the shifting balance of power in the Pacific Rim, but also to reshape the ways in which actors behave and interact: the Indo-Pacific. Although the precise origins of the term are uncertain, it has been argued that  Australian scholars and politicians were the first to utilize it. In the 1950s the concept was used to discuss the decolonization of dominions surrounding ­Australia and was used again in the following decade at two seminars held by the Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA) and the Australian National University (ANU) discussing nuclear proliferation and Commonwealth responsibilities within the region. In the 1970s the term resurfaced and formed part of the Australian security discourse.14 Yet for the next 30 years or so, the term was not prominent until its re-emergence in 2005 in Michael Richardson’s article “Australia-Southeast Asia Relations and the East Asian Summit.”15 A more concise, and certainly more famous, definition of the Indo-Pacific was formally introduced in 2007 by Capt. Dr. Gurpreet S. Khurana, an Indian Navy maritime strategist, in his article “Security of Sea Lines: Prospects for India–Japan Cooperation.” Khurana described the region as “The maritime space comprising the Indian Ocean and the western Pacific. Littoral to it are the states of Asia (including West Asia/Middle East) and eastern Africa.”16 ­Moreover, that same year, the concept was endorsed and used for the first time in political discourse by the Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in his speech to the Indian Parliament. Abe described how a “new ‘broader Asia’ ” was being formed at the confluence of the Indian and Pacific Ocean, “an immense network spanning the entirety of the Pacific Ocean, incorporating the United States of America and Australia ... [allowing] people, goods, capital and knowledge to flow freely.”17 Additionally, India, Japan, Australia and the United States (US) held their first joint naval exercises in the Indian Ocean and initiated the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue or “Quad,” an informal strategic forum ostensibly materializing the concept. Nevertheless, the nascent initiative did not prosper as the then recently elected Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd decided to withdraw from it—ostensibly for Australia to avoid incurring the wrath of its biggest trading partner, China. However, the idea “has gained increasing prevalence in the geopolitical and strategic discourse since then and is now being used increasingly by policymakers, analysts and academics in Asia and beyond.”18 Both Khurana and Abe originally conceived the idea of the Indo-Pacific as a geopolitical amalgamation capable of bringing about freedom and prosperity as well as coexistence between different peoples with the ultimate goal of achieving global and regional stability. Nonetheless, Khurana has subsequently argued that the meaning has drifted away from its original proposition and has evolved into “a new configuration in which India and America, along with the other major democratic nations in Asia—Japan and Australia especially—join to contain China’s growing influence in an updated version of the Cold War.”19 It has

Australia and the Indo-Pacific   81 thereby deepened divisions across the region and created opposing camps.20 This assessment, however, has been questioned by Abhijit Singh, Senior Fellow and Head of Maritime Policy at the Observer Research Foundation (ORF) in New Delhi. He argued that the Indo-Pacific has always been about balancing the rise of China, thereby avoiding unwelcome Chinese expansionism in the form of a permanent presence in both the Indian Ocean and the South China Sea. Singh implied that using the term to describe the “emerging India–Japan–US–Australia alliance as a balance against Beijing is not a distortion of the term’s original meaning; it is the fulfilment of it.”21 In a subsequent rejoinder, Khurana retorted that even though the Indo-Pacific has always been about China and its meteoric rise, nuanced and different views should be allowed to exist about China and the scope of its role across the Indo-Pacific.22 This Indo-Pacific as an idea has been criticized from the outset by China. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi dismissed all versions of the concept as merely “headline-grabbing ideas” that resemble “the sea foam in the Pacific or Indian Ocean: they may get some attention, but soon will dissipate.”23 Viewing Chinese criticisms of the mere use of the words Indo-Pacific contextually leads to the conclusion that Beijing is duly concerned that something substantive will result as a consequence of the use of this new construct by policymakers, ­journalists, and scholars alike. Rory Medcalf, like Singh, has highlighted the centrality of China to the ongoing debate about the Indo-Pacific. Indeed, he argued that the Indo-Pacific is evolving as the chief conceptual challenge to the idea of One Belt and One Road—a China-centric vision of the extended region. It is also reducing the salience of the late 20th century idea of the Asia-Pacific, essentially an East Asiacentric order that had come to suit China because it tended to exclude China’s emerging rival, India.24 Regardless of the interpretation of the term, the core idea of the region has been championed in the last ten years by the leaders of several countries—not just in political discourse, but also as policy, thereby putting proverbial flesh on IndoPacific bones. In the case of Australia, the most remarkable examples of this are the Defence White Papers of 2013 and 2016 as well as the critically instructive and important 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper. The first official mention of the Indo-Pacific concept appeared in the 2013 Defence White Paper. It stated that Australia was going through an “economic strategic and military shift to the Indo-Pacific,” which was defined as the logical extension of the concept of the Asia-Pacific region. In addition, it noted that a strategic arc was “beginning to emerge, connecting the Indian and Pacific Oceans through Southeast Asia”25 as a response to the US continued commitment to the region, China’s sustained rise as a global power and the emergence of India as an important strategic, diplomatic and economic actor. This view was reiterated in the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper’s crystal-clear definition of the Indo-Pacific: “the region ranging from the eastern Indian Ocean to the

82   Miguel Alejandro Híjar-Chiapo Pacific Ocean connected by Southeast Asia, including India, North Asia and the United States.”26 In sum, Australia’s understanding of the concept is that of an emerging Asian strategic system that encompasses both the Pacific and Indian Oceans, defined in part by the geographically expanding interests and reach of China and India, and the continued strategic role and presence of the United States in both.27 It could thus be argued that the Indo-Pacific idea is nothing else than an effort to create a common vision about the threats to peace and prosperity in the region, and therefore an attempt to build an agenda around shared interests, namely concerns about a powerful and aggressive China. The menace of the not-so-peaceful rise of China, Australia’s main trading partner, coupled with the loose cannon that is the US under President Donald, Australia’s most important strategic ally, both represent a dangerous combination that might exacerbate an already tense environment and thereby place Australia in a very compromising position. Hence, the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper is the logical response to the shifts currently taking place in the international politics of the region. Prior to discussing the strategy that may allow Australia to navigate these tempestuous waters as well as the role it can play in order to secure a stable region, it is important to understand its place in the imagined community of the Indo-Pacific. Indeed, whether the new idea of the Indo-Pacific region can be embraced or not as a useful construct is an open question. As Barry Buzan warned, “if we are to consider this huge expanse as a [Indo-Pacific] region, then we must identify what ties it together sufficiently to justify differentiating it from the rest of the international system.”28

Australia in the Indo-Pacific: position, behavior, identity and agency Constructivism in international relations (IR) claims that the identity of a state shapes its interests and therefore its actions and behaviors on the international stage. Nevertheless, this should not be understood as if ideas are the only relevant factors to understand international phenomena. Alexander Wendt argued that even when international politics are socially constructed these structures include material resources.29 Therefore, Australia’s need to advocate for the Indo-Pacific as the new regional construct should be considered as residing in both its material and ideational realities. Regarding material capabilities, Australia’s place in the regional—and arguably in the international—hierarchy is immediately below the established and emerging great powers. Australia is the sixth-largest country in the world with a land area of 7,692,024 square kilometers spanning a whole continent and several other islands.30 Although this vast continent is sparsely populated, with only 24.6 million inhabitants, the country’s GDP amounts to $1.32 trillion, placing it thirteenth in the world.31 In addition, Australia ranks seventh in the region—and thirteenth in the world—in

Australia and the Indo-Pacific   83 military expenditure, below the US, China, India, Japan, Russia, and South Korea.32 Furthermore, with 57,800 active military ­personnel and 21,100 estimated reservists, Australia possesses capable, well-trained and well-equipped armed forces, with strong doctrine, logistical support and the capacity for deployment over long distances.33 The possession and projection of such capabilities place Australia near to the top of the international structure, making it a serious strategic actor. But, what’s in a number? Given that these quantifiable elements only reveal the material nature of Australia, and “material resources only acquire meaning for human action through the structure of shared knowledge in which they are embedded,”34 it is necessary to have a glimpse at the other side of the coin: ­Australia’s behavior and identity in the region. “Since the end of World War II,” Carl Ungerer writes, “Australian foreign policy practitioners and policy-makers […] have framed most diplomatic activity within the broad rubric of Australia’s middle power status and role in international affairs.”35 It was actually at the San Francisco Conference, which would lead to the creation of the United Nations Charter, that the then Foreign Minister, Herbert V. Evatt, used the term to advance Australia’s interests and advocate for a more prominent role in the new order that was being built, given the important contributions made by his country to the allied victory. This approach established “three defining characteristics of the middle power tradition in Australian foreign policy from there on: nationalism, internationalism, and activism.”36 But what does being a middle power mean? Different conceptualizations of middle powers have emerged from different theoretical perspectives of IR. As Manicom and Reeves suggested, realist and liberalist traditions fail to treat middle powers as independent actors in the international system and rather define them in comparison to great powers and by their role in international politics.37 On the other hand, constructivism offers a different assessment. That is, by virtue of their agency at both the international and regional levels, middle powers have effectively created a precise identity that serves as the basis to explain their behavior; such behavior entails a tendency toward multilateralism, the embrace of mediation or peace-building activities and the pursuit of niche diplomacy. In addition, it entails a predisposition to good international citizenship often reflected in the building of norms and institutions and following and protecting these rules as healthily informed by their own self-interest. This appraisal is identifiable with the argument advanced by Andrew Cooper, Richard Higgot and Kim Nossal who noted in their classic opus that middle powers are recognizable by their diplomacy and the manners in which they seek to achieve their foreign policy goals.38 Drawing on the works of Cooper, Higgot and Nossal, Bruce Grant and the former Australian Foreign Minister Gareth Evans, John Ravenhill identified a definition of middle power status that includes five features: 1. Capacity, that is, a highly skilled foreign ministry and diplomatic service and a sufficient number of diplomatic missions that can effectively disseminate ideas and convince others of their utility;

84   Miguel Alejandro Híjar-Chiapo 2. Concentration, or what Evans summed up as niche diplomacy; 3. Creativity, meaning the provision of intellectual leadership and brokerage; 4. Coalition-building, which means cooperating with like-minded states to advance certain agendas; 5. Credibility, which rests upon the consistency in the policies advocated and pursued by middle powers and their ability to avoid being perceived as stalking horses for a weightier actor by acting in pursuit of their own interests but also those of the international community as a whole.39 Yet, as Adam Chapnick suggested, “middlepowerhood” is still a very ambiguous concept. It can be defined by the functional capabilities of the states (functional approach), their interests in multilateralism and peacekeeping (behavioral approach), or merely by their medium size and moderate international influence (hierarchical approach). It may therefore be regarded as mere rhetoric aimed to promote national self-worth and maintain at least the illusion of international influence.40 Despite this criticism, many scholars have found the concept—and its commonly associated features—useful. Manicom and Reeves, for example, insist that the archetypical middle power “possesses three characteristics: the material capability, the behavioral element, and the ideational component.”41 But even when the three main approaches based on these elements (position, behavior and identity) are consistent in identifying Australia as a middle power there is a highly contentious debate over which of them is most appropriate. That is why Andrew Carr proposed a fourth approach to analyze middle powers perhaps more suited for our times: systemic impact. Systematic impact “defines middle powers through their ability to alter or affect specific elements of the international system in which they find themselves […] through the outcome, rather than the intention, of their actions.” That is, as “states that can protect their core interests and initiate or lead a change in a specific aspect of the existing international order.”42 In this sense, Australia, being the archetype of a traditional middle power, has conceived its long-standing identity in a way that has shaped a specific set of interests that aims for a secure and resilient Australia; a secure nearer region; a stable, open, inclusive and prosperous Indo-Pacific region; and a rules-based global order.43 These interests, in turn, are shaping Australia’s behavior as a power that advocates for and seeks “to protect an international order in which relations between states are governed by international law and other rules and norms,”44 an order that seems under threat by the sustained rise of China. Given the above, understanding Australia’s position, behavior and identity in the regional scenario is crucial. But it is also critical to appreciate its capacity to impact the international system of states—including great powers like China. Australia, as a middle power, can do so because as influential agents in international politics, middle powers have the potential to reshape and redirect the way in which China’s ascent evolves […]

Australia and the Indo-Pacific   85 More able because of their material power capabilities to take issue with China’s preferences, but less able than great powers to balance China’s influence unilaterally, middle powers rely on adept diplomatic means, with an emphasis on building coalitions with like-minded powers.45 This ability to influence the ways and directions in which these structural changes take shape confers on Australia a significant role in constructing—or rather reconstructing—the regional landscape. For this reason, Australia has the opportunity to strategically exploit its condition to further the idea of the ­Indo-Pacific as a way to maintain the rules-based order that has served its interests so well—even when that could mean hedging against a rising China. However, for an understanding of when middle powers use their capacity for activist diplomacy, we must to turn to context, content and choice. It is the latter that matters most, for “it is choice that explains the cycles of middle power activism observed in the foreign policies of Australia.”46 Whether Australia uses its status as a middle power in a positive and constructive way depends ultimately on Canberra’s mandarins and their decisions.47

Australia’s strategy towards the Indo-Pacific Australia’s 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper is a response to events that have transformed and continue to shape international politics. It is, accordingly, a robust document that aims to chart a course for the country at a time of rapid change in a more interconnected, interdependent, competitive and contested world. Importantly, the document tacitly recognizes the need for Australia to have a more independent foreign policy, one that is less uncritical and reliant on the US and actively engaged with other powers in the region—from China to Vietnam, from India to Japan, from Korea to Indonesia, thereby constructively building on the foundation of the Indo-Pacific. Underscoring this point, the first mention of the Indo-Pacific concept demonstrates the authors’ stark recognition of how globalization has brought economic growth to the region and has changed, in turn, the balance of power, placing China as the main competitor of the US and thereby challenging its position as the dominant power in the Pacific Rim. For Australia, this forms the impetus to advance the new concept further, not because it fears abandonment by its main strategic ally, but because an active, determined and innovative foreign policy is required in order to guarantee a strong, secure, stable and prosperous environment in both the Pacific and Indian Oceans. Yet, as the shadow of the apparent power struggle between China and the US looms over the whole document, Australia’s relations with both powers are given deep thought. The alliance with the US remains central to Australia’s security and to its strategic and defense planning. As a result, the Commonwealth Government has vowed to broaden and deepen the alliance cooperation by increasing defense expenditure to two percent of its gross domestic product (GDP) and contributing to coalition operations that aim to maintain global and regional security. Given

86   Miguel Alejandro Híjar-Chiapo that the US “will, for the foreseeable future, retain its significant global lead in military and soft power,”48 its long-term interests and stabilizing influence will anchor Australia’s economic and security engagement in the Indo-Pacific. Nevertheless, without making a clear mention of it, the white paper also recognizes the shifts taking place in US foreign policy due to President Trump’s America First agenda. It warns that US retrenchment will engender conflict, making the entire region a more unpredictable and dangerous place. By making this statement, Australia aims to reaffirm its support of the US leadership and policies across the Indo-Pacific, while at the same time underscoring the importance of Australia’s own unique interests and critical role in the region. Australia will continue strongly to support US global leadership. The ­ overnment recognizes there is greater debate and uncertainty in the United G States about the costs and benefits of its leadership in parts of the ­international system. We believe that the United States’ engagement to support a rules-based order is in its own interests and in the interests of wider international stability and prosperity. Without sustained US support, the effectiveness and liberal character of the rules-based order will decline.49 However, the stability and prosperity of the Indo-Pacific and the currently reigning rules-based order depends not just on the US, but on its actions toward and relations with China, the other most important partner for Australia. For the last 26 years, Australia has experienced continuous economic growth, and this bonanza has been mostly fueled by the unrelenting commercial rise of China. China is by now the most important trading partner not just for Australia but for many other states on both sides of the Indian and Pacific Oceans. It is also a major investor in infrastructure projects, a large aid donor and a leader in many economic integration schemes. Adding to that, China’s ongoing military modernization is rapidly improving its material capabilities with the aim of projecting a stronger influence that might reshape the region to suit its own interests. Beijing’s economic power is increasingly harnessed to achieve its strategic goal of spreading China’s growing power and influence across the Indo-Pacific. It is precisely because interests are partially the result of identities that Australia is growing anxious about China’s role as a major geopolitical player with a correspondingly strong capacity of influence from Canberra and its near abroad. Australia’s identity as a liberal middle-power clashes with that of China as an authoritarian great power whose intentions are to reshape the region in its own image and likeness, an assumption that can be drawn from recent declarations by President Xi Jinping at the 2018 National People’s Congress about the exemplarity of the Chinese political system and its potential contributions to the world.50 This is why Australia instinctively recognizes that the more it engages with China the more frictions may arise from their different identities, interests, values and political-legal systems. Notwithstanding, this narrative of fear and greed—as Australia’s policy towards China was described by former Prime Minister Tony Abbott—arguably

Australia and the Indo-Pacific   87 cannot and should not completely lead the bilateral relationship. Hence a closer, positive and active engagement is needed.51 Strengthening Australia’s Comprehensive Strategic Partnership with China is certainly paramount for the Commonwealth Government’s strategy to encourage China “to exercise its power in a way that enhances stability, reinforces international law and respects the interests of smaller countries and their right to pursue them peacefully.”52 The rise of China has naturally and profoundly affected Australia’s economic, security, and diplomatic environment due to its geographic proximity to China and its traditionally close alliance with the US. But at the same time, by virtue of this proximity, Australia has retained a strong global significance that might well live longer if Australia takes the right steps. Moreover, Australia has already demonstrated a certain impact on China’s foreign policy. It has done so by contributing to Beijing’s tacit acceptance of the inevitability of the continued US presence in the region as well as through its efforts in leading multilateral initiatives in different fora. Canberra can continue to do so through a complex blend of traditional middle power diplomacy and peacebuilding initiatives and a more realist exercise of power balancing.53 However, this exercise might prove ­difficult, for, as Nick Bisley claimed, the main “problem for policy thinking is how to reconcile Australian values and principles practically with a nuanced engagement with a polity such as China.”54 Nonetheless, the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper is not only about China and the US. Beyond these two essential relationships, “cooperation with likeminded partners is also increasingly important to collective efforts to limit the exercise of coercive power and support an open global economy and a rulesbased international order”55 given that Australia’s ability to shape events outside its borders and to impact the international system is limited. This is arguably where the extreme importance of the Indo-Pacific idea lies: as the US proceeds with its shift to the Indo-Pacific, and China continues to defy the established order, cooperation among Indo-Pacific democracies seems a logical measure in order to cope with the challenges that are emerging from the competition between two major powers. Given that shared identities build shared interests and in turn shared actions, the 2017 document places priority on positive and active bilateral and multilateral engagements with four major democracies that are able to influence the shape of the emerging Indo-Pacific regional order: Japan, India, Indonesia and South Korea. To these countries are added the states of South East Asia and New Zealand. The primary emphasis, however, is clearly on Japan and India. India and Japan are second in terms of economic and strategic capabilities to the US and China, giving them a strong position in the regional structure and, hence, strong agency. That—along with the values they share—is the reason for which both countries sit in the front rank of Australia’s international partnerships. The rationale is that it is only through extensive and deep engagement and cooperation that maritime security can be assured, allowing for a stable present and a prosperous future for the states of the Indo-Pacific. That is why the 2017 White Paper insisted that Australia should remain strongly committed to the trilateral

88   Miguel Alejandro Híjar-Chiapo dialogue with the US and Japan and, separately, with India and Japan. Given this admission, “it appears that the paper’s drafters sought to emphasize the Quad.”56 Just a few days before its release in November 2017, and after a decade waiting in the wings, the US, Japan, India and Australia decided to reconvene and reestablish the Quad. The promise of the meeting was welcomed in ­Canberra, particularly given the previous failed attempts by Australian governments to recover Indian trust after Australia’s withdrawal from the dialogue in 2007. The likelihood of a revival of the Quad seemed even more probable due to an auspicious alignment of the stars. This included the reelection of Abe as Japan’s Prime Minister, himself one of the most ardent proponents of the ­Indo-Pacific idea. In addition, China had recently been labeled as the US strategic rival by the Trump administration and a more pro-US stance was in the offing by the government of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Lastly, ­Australia was at odds with China due to scandals that rapidly revealed the true scope of Chinese influence in Australian politics. However, ambitions fell short and Barker Gale and Andrew Shearer subsequently argued: While the official meeting included key issues like freedom of navigation, maritime security, and respect for international law, official readouts of the meeting differed, suggesting that strategic geography, threat perceptions, and dynamics vis-à-vis China vary among the parties. Notwithstanding these challenges, the interests of the Quad countries are converging, and this underlying structural dynamic provides a strong foundation on which the member countries can build an agenda for regional cooperation.57 Even so, as Australia aims to reinforce an open global economy and to integrate the major economies of the Indo-Pacific—whether through the Asia Pacific ­Economic Cooperation (APEC) Forum, the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), or China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—in order to serve both its economic and strategic interests, the Quad may yet prove a useful tool to achieve these objectives and limit China’s assertiveness. This is especially true in regards to some of the fault lines of conflict pointed out by the 2017 document. These include maritime and land border disputes in the South China Sea, the East China Sea and continental Asia. But the strength of the 2017 White Paper that outlines Australia’s current Indo-Pacific vision and strategy is that it recognized the challenges ahead and acknowledged the positive prospects that may arise from the idea of the IndoPacific as an open, inclusive and prosperous region in which the rights of all states are respected. In essence, the more opportunities for business that are created the more the dynamism of the region will increase, thus maximizing the complementarity between economies in the digital era. In this sense, the Trump administration’s new Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) strategy may prove useful in reigniting the idea of an Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor. This was ­previously proposed by the US, because, as Secretary of State Michael Pompeo

Australia and the Indo-Pacific   89 put it, the FOIP vision of the US aspires to be a regional order in which ­“independent nations […] can defend their people and compete fairly in the international marketplace.”58 How achievable an Indo-Pacific vision free from great power intimidation and open to attractive economic opportunities is depends mostly on how the idea of the region is constructed and how this, in turn, can construct the identities, interests and behaviors of all the powers in the region. In this regard, both the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and a potential economic corridor might be a start.

Conclusions The multiple transformations that the world has experienced over the previous two decades are being reflected in the shifting balances of power—with the Pacific Rim the clearest example—as the rise of China to the first rank of international politics has altered not just the material structure of its immediate neighborhood, but also its ideational nature—going from Asia Pacific to the Indo-Pacific. This ideational restructuring has naturally been largely motivated by those countries that can take advantage of this shared idea by bringing as many powers—with different amounts of material capabilities and influence—as possible on board. Some of these states, like Australia, are not powerful enough to dictate the shape of the region, but are powerful enough to influence the course that this shaping process may take. In that sense, this chapter has attempted to explore, first and foremost, the nature of this ontological change and its potential consequences: Australia’s position, behavior, identity, interests and its possibilities of systemic impact on this imagined community. In addition, the chapter has attempted to answer how Australia’s foreign policy has been informed and how Canberra may use this new construct as a tool to advance its interests and those of the region as a whole. As the 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper pointed out, Australia is pursuing an opportunity, security and strength agenda that promotes cooperation on strategic, political and economic issues, reinforces peace and international law, encourages the full and active engagement of the US in regional affairs, commits to strong and constructive ties with China and ensures that all regional countries, large and small, have a voice on regional issues. If Australia wants a stable region, where peace can help to sustain the growth that has brought it to the center of the global economy and in which all countries can freely pursue their interests without fearing the exercise of coercive power, as well as to maximize the opportunities brought by an increasingly globalized and interdependent world, then working with partners on a shared agenda for security and prosperity is not only necessary but vital. Collective action and a shared agenda, however, cannot come from nowhere. They must be built on the basis of shared interests that, in turn, must be constructed on the basis of ­like-mindedness, that is, of shared values and shared identities. In addition, shared agendas and actions should be motivated by a sense of belonging and

90   Miguel Alejandro Híjar-Chiapo relationship across the region by the majority of its constituent parts; an idea like that of the Indo-Pacific. In the last decade many attempts to conceptualize the Indo-Pacific have been attempted. Whether this idea has its origins as a clear effort to contain China and limit its power projection in the Indo-Pacific or not, there is a spirit that is common to all the different interpretations of the concept: the idea of the Indo-Pacific as a geopolitical amalgamation capable of bringing about freedom and prosperity as well as coexistence between different peoples with the ultimate goal of achieving global and regional stability. As the strategic rivalry between the US—the dominant power—and China—the rising power—unfolds, Australia has the opportunity to impact the idea of the region in a progressively contested and complex world. As David Scott argued, ultimately and quite simply, in the long term and whatever the domestic political pressures, Australia will be unable to escape the dictates of this new strategic geography that makes the “Indo-Pacific concept an increasingly influential framework, a compelling strategic logic for Australia to shape its military strategy and strategic partnerships.”59 Echoing this argument, Rory Medcalf stated: The debate about how to define a region may seem largely about words, maps and history. But words, maps and history can have material potency when it comes to the decisions, behavior and interests of states in international relations. The maps in the minds of political leaders have real-world consequences for matters of diplomacy, economics, strategic competition, peace and war.60 Ideas can become policy, and once they do, they have the ability to shape reality. It is in that core message that the usefulness and importance of the idea of a region such as the Indo-Pacific lies. If the majority of powers—whether great, middle or small—commit to these shared values and interests then, ­borrowing Winston Churchill’s appraisal of the English-Speaking World, “there will be no quivering, precarious balance of power to offer its temptation to ambition or adventure. On the contrary, there will be an overwhelming assurance of security.”61 By constructing and socializing this idea of the region, state actors might refrain from abusing power and commit instead to achieving shared goals. We shape our regions; thereafter they shape us.

Notes   1 I am very grateful to Kim Richard Nossal, Arturo Santa-Cruz, Andrew Cooper, Rory Medcalf, John Blaxland, Laura Neack, Alan Tidwell and an anonymous reviewer for their comments on an earlier manuscript.   2 Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities. Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism (London: Verso, 2006), p. 6.   3 Peter Katzenstein, “Regionalism in Asia,” in Shaun Breslin et al (eds), New Regionalisms in the Global Political Economy (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 104.   4 Ibid., p. 105.

Australia and the Indo-Pacific   91   5 Björn Hettne and Fredrik Söderbaum, “Theorising the Rise of Regionness,” in Shaun Breslin et al (eds), New Regionalisms in the Global Political Economy (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 36.   6 Ibid., 36.   7 Arturo Santa-Cruz, “Out of the Blue: The Pacific Rim as a Region,” Portal Journal of Multidisciplinary International Studies 2, no. 2 (2005), p. 3, https://doi.org/10.5130/ portal.v2i2.107.   8 Amitav Acharya, “Regionalism and the Emerging World Order: Sovereignty, Autonomy, Identity,” in Shaun Breslin et al. (eds), New Regionalisms in the Global Political Economy (London: Routledge, 2002), p. 27.   9 Manuel Castells, The Information Age: Economy, Society, and Culture. Volume III: End of Millennium (Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), p. 259. 10 Markku Wilenius, “A New Globe in the Making: Manuel Castells on the Information Age,” Acta Sociologica 41, no. 3 (1998), p. 275. 11 Manuel Castells, La Era de la Información: Economía, Sociedad y Cultura. Volumen III: Fin de Milenio (Mexico City: Siglo XXI, 1999), p. 339. 12 Castells, End of Millennium, p. 259. 13 Christopher M. Hemmer and Peter Katzenstein, “Why there is no NATO in Asia? Collective Identity, Regionalism, and the Origins of Multilateralism,” International Organization 56, no. 3 (2002), p. 575. 14 Rajiv K. Bhatia and Vijay Sakhuja, Indo Pacific Region: Political and Strategic Prospects (New Delhi: Vij Books India, 2014), p. 42. 15 Michael Richardson, “Australia-Southeast Asia relations and the East Asian Summit,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 59, no. 3 (2005): 351–365. 16 Gurpreet S. Khurana, “Security of Sea Lines: Prospects for India–Japan Cooperation,” Strategic Analysis 31, no. 1 (2007), p. 150, https://doi.org/10.1080/​097001607013 55485. 17 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Confluence of the Two Seas Speech by H.E. Mr. Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan at the Parliament of the Republic of India,” August 22, 2007, www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/speech-2.html. 18 Gurpreet S. Khurana, The “Indo-Pacific” Concept: Retrospect and Prospect (New Delhi: National Maritime Foundation, 2017), p. 1. 19 Gurpreet S. Khurana, “Trump’s New Cold War alliance in Asia is Dangerous,” The Washington Post, November 14, 2017, www.washingtonpost.com/news/theworldpost/ wp/2017/11/14/trump-asia-trip/?utm_term=.e9c0e7ab3c71. 20 Gurpreet S. Khurana, “Indo-Pacific” was Always About China? Yes, But Let’s Not Cross the “Red Line” (New Delhi: National Maritime Foundation, 2017), p. 1. 21 Abhijit Singh, “The ‘Indo-Pacific’ has always been about containing the rise of China,” South China Morning Post, November 28, 2017, www.scmp.com/comment/insightopinion/article/2121907/indo-pacific-has-always-been-about-​containing-rise-china. 22 Khurana, “Indo-Pacific” was Always About China? Yes, But Let’s Not Cross the “Red Line,” p. 2. 23 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People’s Republic of China, “Foreign Minister Wang Yi Meets the Press,” March 9, 2018, www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_ 662805/t1540928.shtml. 24 Rory Medcalf, “China and the Indo-Pacific: Multipolarity, Solidarity and Strategic Patience” (Lecture, Grands enjeux stratégiques contemporains–Chaire en Sorbonne, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, Paris, France, March 12, 2018). 25 Commonwealth of Australia. Department of Defence, 2013 Defence White Paper (Canberra: Department of Defence, 2013), p. ix. 26 Commonwealth of Australia. Australian Government, 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper (Canberra: Australian Government, 2017), p. 7. 27 Rory Medcalf, Raoul Heinrichs and Justin Jones, Crisis and Confidence: Major Powers and Maritime Security in Indo-Pacific Asia (Sydney: Lowy Institute, 2011), p. 56.

92   Miguel Alejandro Híjar-Chiapo 28 Barry Buzan, “The Asia-Pacific: What Sort of Region in What Sort of World,” in Christopher Brook and Anthony McGrew (eds), Asia-Pacific in the New World Order (London: Routledge, 1998), p. 69. 29 Alexander Wendt, “Constructing International Politics,” International Security 20, no. 1 (1995), p. 73. 30 Australian Government, “National Local Information,” accessed August 2, 2018, www.ga.gov.au/scientific-topics/national-location-information. 31 World Bank, World Bank Open Data, accessed August 2, 2018, https://data. worldbank.org/. 32 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, accessed August 2, 2018, www.sipri.org/databases/milex. 33 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2017 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2017), pp. 270–271. 34 Alexander Wendt, “Constructing International Politics,” p. 73. 35 Carl Ungerer, “The ‘Middle Power’ Concept in Australian Foreign Policy,” Australian Journal of Politics and History 53, no. 4 (2007), p. 539, https://doi.org/10.1111/ j.1467–8497.2007.00473.x. 36 Ibid., p. 542. 37 James Manicom and Jeffrey Reeves, “Locating Middle Powers in International Relations Theory and Power Transitions,” in Bruce Gilley and Andrew O’Neil (eds), Middle Powers and the Rise of China (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014), pp. 25–26. 38 Andrew Cooper, Richard Higgot and Kim Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1993). 39 John Ravenhill, “Cycles of middle power activism: Constraint and choice in Australian and Canadian foreign policies,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, 52, no. 3 (1998): 310–313, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10357719808445259. 40 Adam Chapnick, “The Middle Power,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal, 7, no. 2 (1999): 73–79, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/11926422.1999.9673212; Adam Chapnick, “The Canadian Middle Power Myth,” International Journal, 55, no. 2 (2000), p. 206. 41 Manicom and Reeves, Locating Middle Powers, p. 33. 42 Andrew Carr, “Is Australia a middle power? A systemic impact approach,” Australian Journal of International Affairs, 68, no. 1 (2014), p. 79, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/103 57718.2013.840264. 43 Commonwealth of Australia, Department of Defence. 2016 Defence White Paper (Canberra: Department of Defence, 2016). 44 Commonwealth of Australia, 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, p. 11. 45 Bruce Gilley and Andrew O’Neil, “China’s Rise through the Prism of Middle Powers,” in Bruce Gilley and Andrew O’Neil (eds), Middle Powers and the Rise of China (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014), p. 3. 46 Ravenhill, “Cycles of middle power activism,” p. 321. 47 Ungerer, “The ‘Middle Power’ Concept,” p. 551. 48 Commonwealth of Australia, 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, p. 26. 49 Ibid., p. 7. 50 China Daily, “Speech delivered by President Xi at the NPC closing meeting,” accessed August 2, 2018, www.chinadaily.com.cn/hkedition/2018–03/22/content_35894512.htm. 51 Allan Patience, Australian Foreign Policy in Asia. Middle Power or Awkward Partner? (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), p. 183. 52 Commonwealth of Australia, 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, p. 39. 53 Thomas S. Wilkins, “Australia: A Traditional Middle Power Faces the Asian Century,” in Bruce Gilley and Andrew O’Neil (ed.), Middle Powers and the Rise of China (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2014), p. 163.

Australia and the Indo-Pacific   93 54 Nick Bisley, “Australia’s engagement with China: From fear to greed and back again,” International Journal 73, no. 3 (2018), p. 398, https://doi.org/10.1177/002 0702018792918. 55 Commonwealth of Australia, 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper, p. 7. 56 John Blaxland, “Plan B: Australia’s Foreign Policy White Paper,” The Strategist, February 10, 2018, www.aspistrategist.org.au/plan-b-australias-foreign-policy-whitepaper/. 57 Jesse Barker Gale and Andrew Shearer, “The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue and the Maritime Silk Road Initiative,” in Nicholas Szechenyi (ed.), China’s Maritime Silk Road. Strategic and Economic Implications for the Indo-Pacific Region (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2018), pp. 30–34. 58 U.S. Department of State, “Remarks on America’s Indo-Pacific Economic Vision,” August 2, 2018, www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2018/07/284722.htm. 59 David Scott, “Australia’s embrace of the ‘Indo-Pacific’: new term, new region, new strategy?” International Relations of the Asia-Pacific 13, no. 2 (2013), p. 443, https:// doi.org/10.1093/irap/lct009. 60 Medcalf, China and the Indo-Pacific. 61 Winston Churchill, “Sinews of Peace,” March 5, 1946, www.nationalchurchillmuseum. org/sinews-of-peace-iron-curtain-speech.html.

6 Competing regional visions

China’s Belt and Road Initiative versus the Indo-Pacific Partnership Emre Demir

Since the beginning of the 1970s, success stories of expeditiously developing Asian economies have increasingly received the attention of the world; the ­“Japanese miracle,” the “Four Asian Tigers”1 and finally, the “rise of China” have all captured the headlines. This enormous development and regional cooperation were achieved under a US-dominated world order and the economic leadership of Japan. However, things started to change in the 1990s, especially when Japan entered the era of the Lost 20 Years (失われた二十年) and many Asian economies were faced with the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–1998. Before the crisis, Asian regional cooperation was driven mainly by non-state, especially market forces. After the crisis, to boost the slowing regional cooperation, states got involved more in the process and implemented policies that supported the cooperation attempts of non-state actors.2 Furthermore, as the Japanese economy experienced its two decades-long economic crisis, China, with its huge potential and dynamic economy, emerged as the driving force in regional cooperation. As China climbs the steps towards leadership in world political economy, and especially since the introduction of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), finding ways of dealing with its new place in the world order has been a top priority both for the US and for China’s neighbours in the wider Asia-Pacific region. To counter China’s growing influence, in 2011, US President Barack Obama initiated the “Pivot to Asia” strategy as an attempt to change the focus of US foreign policy from the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific. However, shortly after taking office, the administration of US President Donald Trump abandoned this strategy and withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), a multilateral trade deal unprecedented in scope and content, and started following the “America First” vision. This, according to Trump, aims at putting the security and interests of the US people first.3 Such a sharp shift in US policy vis-à-vis Asia-Pacific aroused anxiety among US allies in the region. However, since Trump’s trip to Asia in November 2017, his administration’s attitude towards the region has started to change once again. While arguing that he would still be pursuing the America First strategy and favoring bilateral trade agreements that are “mutually beneficial,” Trump also espoused the idea of a Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) region. In the following months, the US 2017 National Security Strategy (NSS) and the summary of the 2018 National Defense

China’s Belt and Road Initiative   95 Strategy (NDS) clarified a FOIP policy that aims to bring Australia, India, Japan and the US together under the Indo-Pacific Partnership (IPP) with the intention of preventing China from dominating the region. While first proposed by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe in 2006, and adopted by Australian and Indian governments in the early 2010s, as the most powerful player among the four, the US eventually became the leading power of the grouping. As socially constructed political projects, the Chinese-led BRI and the US-led IPP represent competing visions for how political-economic and security structures of the Asia-Indo-Pacific region should evolve in the coming decades. This study, based on official policy documents and speeches of Chinese and IPP countries’ leaders, aims to provide insights into competing regional institutional arrangements proposed by the BRI and the IPP. It argues that the Chinese-led initiative, at least in rhetoric and in terms of membership, is an inclusive project based on economic connectivity and cooperation among countries. In contrast, the Indo-Pacific, despite its increasing economic focus, is mainly a security related and exclusionary concept. Furthermore, due to lack of leadership, difficulties in matching the diverging priorities and the fractured approach of the IPP countries, the BRI seems to have an advantage over the IPP. The first section of this chapter discusses questions of how to define regions and how to conceptualize regionalism. It also reviews the regionalization process in Asia. The second part explores the changing features of Chinese foreign policy under the leadership of President Xi Jinping and how his signature project, the BRI, reshapes the Asian region with Chinese characteristics in the widest sense. The third section examines the US FOIP policy and the divergent approaches of Australia, India and Japan to the idea of IPP. Finally, the chapter ends with a discussion on the strengths and weaknesses of these regional rescaling attempts and the likelihood of their successes.

Defining regions and regional cooperation in Asia Defining regions and conceptualizing regional cooperation and integration has been a matter of debate among scholars from various disciplines. Rather than being natural realities that are obvious geographical manifestations, regions are socially constructed through political processes. A region, which encompasses several interdependent countries, can be defined in a number of ways according to varied material, social and cognitive dimensions. These constructions all have their roots in political practices.4 Since these processes involve different aspects of life from economics to politics and different sectors of society from governments to social movements, an eclectic approach that combines several different disciplines and theories is needed to analyze the complexity of “a world of regions.”5 Politics can be defined as “competition between competing interest groups or individuals for power and leadership.”6 That is to say, political processes are biased processes in which a group of people aims to favor their own interests over those of others. Since regions cannot be defined without any reference to

96   Emre Demir politics, they are not neutral processes but rather reflect the competing views and interests of different claimants. In other words, defining regions is a type of political struggle for creating a space that favors the gains of a group of states over the gains of other states.7 Against this backdrop, this study defines regions as “social constructs that make references to territorial location and to geographical or normative contiguity.”8 Regions are spaces that cover three or more countries. In other words, they lie in between national and global levels and can be sub-continental, continental and transcontinental.9 Regionalism, in the widest scope, is defined as “the structures, processes and arrangements that are working towards greater coherence within a specific international region in terms of economic, political, security, socio-cultural and other kinds of linkages.”10 Within this scope, regions result from two main processes that go hand in hand, namely from regionalism, which is “more of a policy-driven, top-down” state-led process and regionalization, which is “more of a societal-driven, bottom-up” non-state-led process. In case of an insufficient level of regionalization, state-driven efforts of regionalism may take place in the first instance to realize regional cooperation and integration.11 Thus, state- and non-state-regionalisms and the actors involved in these processes do not act autonomously but act together in mixed-actor coalitions.12 While regionalism does not necessarily include only formal inter-governmental regional arrangements, regionalization is not an entirely apolitical process in which states and politics have no place.13 Regionalism can exist without the existence of formal institutions14 and states can play a role in regionalization efforts. Another important distinction is between regional integration and cooperation. Regional integration requires transfer of sovereignty rights and authority, either voluntarily or through pressure, of states to regional organizations as in the case of the European Union (EU), whereas in regional cooperation inter-governmental relations do not require a loss of sovereignty.15 This difference reflects the divergence of the regionalism debate in the literature. While old regionalism was based on regional integration through state-led initiatives that focused on and were influenced by the European experience, with the end of the Cold War, new regionalism approaches that take into account the multiplicity of regional integration and cooperation and the importance of nonstate actors came to the surface. Currently, the field is strongly influenced by comparative regionalism studies that both build upon previous studies but also aim to transcend them by moving beyond their EU-centrism through considering the distinctiveness of different regions and their cooperation types and designs. To achieve this, comparative regionalism studies are both eclectic and inclusive in their approaches to regionalism.16 In this sense, the initiation of the concept of Indo-Pacific and the BRI are examples more of state-driven regional cooperation efforts without the existence of a formal regional organization. Furthermore, like all regional projects, as discussed by Wilson, they are an example of “rescaling” the scale of governance practices, which “refers to the process where social, economic and political systems are reconstructed to operate at different spatial scales.”17 Rescaling is

China’s Belt and Road Initiative   97 composed of two types of transitions: institutional rescaling and functional rescaling. The former is about defining the scale of a region. In other words, institutional rescaling is important in determining who is included in or excluded from the scope of a region and thus, in designating the distribution of power and the relations among the members.18 Since regions are social constructs and contingent upon processes of affiliation, identification and recognition, the degree of institutionalization is important for a newly proposed conception of a region to be successful.19 Functional rescaling, on the other hand, is about the motivations and justifications of a regional project. As the scale of region changes, to accommodate with the new scale, forms and purpose of underlying governance practices also change.20 The success of an institutionalization process, either through the creation of social realities or of organizations, plays an important part in defining a region. In the Asian context, regionalism through institution-building has been a rather challenging process when compared with other parts of the world, especially Europe. The ultimate aim of regionalism in Asia was not integration as in the case of Europe, but autonomy and cooperation. In other words, regional organizations in the region are examples of regional cooperation rather than integration. One of the reasons for that is the sensitivity of Asian nations, due to their colonial experiences, when it comes to renouncing their sovereignties to other institutional settings such as regional or international organizations. Because of that, Asian-based regional institutions function either as discussion forums with non-legally binding obligations as in the case of Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation or on the basis of unanimous verdict as in the case of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). One other related feature of Asian regional organizations is the existence of weak and/or ineffective secretariats, which automatically affects the capacity of these institutions to function efficiently.21 In such a case, the power distribution in the international and regional system has an important role to play for regional arrangements. An effective regional leadership can have a significant impact on building efficient regional institutions. However, both due to animosities and mistrust created by historical legacies such as World War II Japanese invasions, the US bilateral hub-and-spoke system and the SinoIndian War as well as the high number of powerful countries, the region lacks effective leadership. Hence, in the post-World War II period, the US played the role of an offshore balancer to “stabilize” the region. But especially since the Global Financial Crisis of 2008–09, its previously dominant position has been eroding due to the relative decline of its power and China’s rising status in the region.22 Today, the Asia-Indo-Pacific region contains five strong countries: China, India, Japan, Russia and the US. Each have the capacity and desire to lead regional cooperation efforts. While this situation complicates such attempts in the region, it also gives weaker states and institutions like ASEAN the chance to play an important role in mediation.23 These characteristics of regional cooperation in Asia contribute to the fragmented regionalism and under-institutionalization in the

98   Emre Demir region and the complexity of the competition among different visions and ideas of region building efforts of leading powers, including the BRI and the IPP. For all these reasons, the IPP states’ intention of shifting the focus of attention from the Asia-Pacific to the Indo-Pacific is not just a neutral geographical expansion of existing regional institutions in the region by including Indian Ocean countries in the picture. Rather it is a way of improving both their own particular ­positions and the interests of “likeminded countries” against a rejuvenating China, which has been in the last decade slowly but steadily re-forming the regional landscape to its own favor, especially through the BRI. In other words, redefining the region as Indo-Pacific and forming a partnership based on this definition should be seen as the IPP’s response to China’s ambitious Silk Road initiatives.

Integrating Asia with Chinese characteristics: the Belt and Road Initiative President Xi is an aspiring leader aiming to rejuvenate his country by the middle of the twenty-first century under the firm leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC) with a two-stage development plan. This is called the Two Centenary Goals (两个一百年目标). According to these, by the centenary of the founding of the CPC in 2021, China will complete the building of a moderately prosperous society. After this first achievement, the country will continue its efforts of modernizing itself until the goal of transforming China into “a great modern socialist country” is achieved by 2049, the centenary of the founding of the PRC.24 To accomplish this Chinese Dream (中国梦), Xi has adjusted some parts of the post-Mao era Chinese foreign policy and followed a combination of proactive, assertive and offensive but simultaneously at times defensive, restrained and cautious foreign policy strategies. This resembles multiple identities as both a developing and major country.25

Chinese foreign policy under Xi Jinping As was clear from the messages delivered by Xi during the 19th National Congress of the CPC, defined as the CPC’s first global congress,26 China has emerged as one of the major regional powers in Asia and aspires to become a worldwide one. During his three-and-a-half-hour-long speech at the congress, Xi declared his desire of transforming China, by the mid-century into “a great modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, harmonious, and beautiful.”27 Xi names this goal as realizing the “Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation”28 (中华民族伟大复兴中国梦), which means, in international relations (IR) terminology, achieving superpower status. To reach this objective, Xi started changing the course of Chinese foreign policy beginning in early 2013. While some of the features of China’s foreign policy show continuity with the era of former President Hu Jintao, Xi has managed to make substantial changes by placing more emphasis on neighborhood diplomacy and closely linking domestic objectives to foreign policy goals.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative   99 The ten years-long leadership of Hu has often been regarded as “the lost decade” by many Chinese and foreign observers because of increased inequality within Chinese society, high levels of corruption, environmental pollution and an uncoordinated and fragmented foreign policy approach.29 Hu, as his predecessor Jiang Zemin, followed the foreign policy strategy of keeping a low profile (韬光养晦) that was formulated by Deng Xiaoping in the aftermath of the ­Tiananmen incidents of 1989. Even though he raised his voice for demanding a more democratic and multilateral world order by proposing the concept of a “Harmonious World,”30 engaged with international institutions and norms and joined other states in establishing new international initiatives such as the BRICS,31 Hu’s focus was mainly on economic growth. In line with this domestic orientation, under his presidency China continued its policy of staying noncommittal to requests for action and providing leadership.32 One other reason for this passivity in China’s relations with the outside world was the lack of a concrete and holistic foreign policy.33 Upon taking office, Xi set about changing the fragmented and noncommittal foreign policy of the Hu era by initiating a two-tiered approach. First, he reformed decision-making structures by creating new institutions such as the National Security Commission of the CPC to coordinate domestic and foreign policymaking and by centralizing power in decision-making through positioning himself at the center of CPC Central Leading Groups related to domestic and foreign affairs.34 Second, in order to convey and coordinate major foreign policy principles and directions, Xi gathered all important actors who contributed to China’s foreign policymaking and implementation processes at the Conference on the Diplomatic Work on Neighboring Countries in October 2013. Subsequently, they were gathered together at the Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs in November 2014. These two conferences were useful in providing a general view of the regional and international system and in developing an integrated strategy to regional and global issues. In this context, the CPC determined a foreign policy strategy that focuses on four related areas of neighborhood diplomacy: major country relations, developing country relations and multilateral diplomacy.35 Some features of this four-layered strategy are a continuation of previous era foreign policy strategies whereas some others are new. These new features represent a departure for Chinese foreign policy from the strategy of keeping a low profile to what Yan Xuetong named the strategy of “striving for achievement” (奋发有为); i.e. one that is more efficient in creating favorable conditions for national rejuvenation. The importance of this change comes from the different approaches these two strategies feature. While the former is oriented towards the economy, aims to stay noncommittal to leadership demands in international issues and favors economic gains in its relation with other countries, the latter is politically oriented, open to undertaking responsibility by focusing on strategic relations rather than economic gains—especially in relations with neighboring countries—and favors political morality over profits.36 Thus, all the aforementioned four areas of Chinese foreign policy essentially aim to link China’s domestic

100   Emre Demir objectives of realizing the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation to the ­international objectives of establishing a stable and peaceful regional and ­international order that is favorable to the stability and development of China.37 In other words, the goal of the Xi era Chinese foreign policy has been to deepen economic and trade ties as well as security relations, especially with neighboring countries and regions by linking them to China’s development trajectory. Xi’s signature project, the BRI, was primarily designed to achieve this goal by turning the Chinese Dream into the world’s, or at least Asia’s “dream.”38

The Belt and Road Initiative: a new way of organizing Asia? The BRI, which was first proposed by Xi during his state visit to Kazakhstan in September 2013 and then announced again in Indonesia in October, aims to build two sets of grand initiatives, the Silk Road Economic Belt (hereinafter Belt) and the twenty-first-century Maritime Silk Road (hereinafter Road), to connect the two edges of Eurasia from East Asia to Europe by linking the Asian, European and African continents with a network of land, sea and air passages.39 While the principal aim of the initiative is to achieve regional economic development by furthering trade and investment through increased connectivity, ­official documents and declarations of Chinese officials also point to the need and desire to maintain closer ties among the peoples of a variety of countries with diverse cultures by creating the environment to learn and understand different civilizations, and in this way to promote friendship and peace in the wider region.40 Therefore, although it is a Chinese state-led initiative, the BRI aims to integrate Asia through the twin processes of regionalism and regionalization, or state-led and non-state-led regionalisms that include mixed-actor coalitions of governments, market actors and other non-governmental players. The BRI is an ambitious project that intends to cover and connect all of Asia through six land corridors: the Eurasian Land Bridge, China–Mongolia–Russia Economic Corridor, China–Central Asia–West Asia Economic Corridor, China– Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor, China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar Economic Corridor. In addition, two maritime transport routes will link major sea ports through the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean route and the South China Sea and the South Pacific route.41 Even though these projects are not new, and many predate the BRI, the importance of this initiative is in Beijing’s desire and ability to coordinate and combine all these projects via a holistic approach.42 The BRI is a political-economic project and hence driven by economic, political and security motivations. China is eager to highlight the economic motivations of exporting excess labor and capacity in industries such as steel and cement, relocating some of the overcapacity in production, furthering the strategy of “Going Out,” ensuring the development of inland south and western regions like Yunnan and Xinjiang by continuing the “Develop the West” policy as well as lowering the excessive exchange reserves and internationalization of the renminbi.43 However, the BRI is informed by several Chinese security concerns.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative   101 For example, China is dependent on imported energy, and uninterrupted energy flows are vital for the Chinese economy to function smoothly. This means that energy security is a top priority for the CPC. Around 80 percent of China’s Middle Eastern energy imports flow through the Strait of Malacca, where security is mainly provided by the US and Indian navies. Beijing is wary of a possible blockade by these two powers. Therefore, under the BRI, China follows a two-tiered strategy of constructing pipelines to bypass the Strait of Malacca as well as diversifying its energy supply and building-up ports and refueling stations in the Indian Ocean.44 This second policy, which has been labelled China’s “String of Pearls” strategy by many Indian commentators, causes anxiety in both India and the US and can be regarded as one of the reasons for the initiation of the IPP.45 The aforementioned underdevelopment of western regions, especially Xinjiang, is another major security matter for China. Xinjiang is home to a large ethnically Turkic, Muslim population of Uyghurs. The region has been a cause of perennial concern for China due to the proliferation of separatist movements. Through linking this region via pipelines, highways and economic zones to Central Asia, Beijing aims to modernize and develop the economy of Xinjiang and in this way, decrease the tendency for ethnic separatism, religious extremism and terrorism.46 The BRI should also be viewed, to some extent, as a response to the US Pivot to Asia, which was regarded by many Chinese scholars and political elites as a US strategy aimed at containing China’s rise.47 In an article written in 2012, a prominent Chinese IR scholar, Wang Jisi, recommended Chinese leaders “march westward” to Europe through Central Asia, South Asia and the Middle East rather than focusing on the East and South China Seas and a possible confrontation with the US. In this way China would find a breathing space and avoid direct confrontation with the US as Washington began its rebalancing to the Pacific region.48 While it appears the leaders of the CPC heeded Wang’s advice, they also went further by making China an ever-more active player in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean region despite an increased US presence with its Pivot and the IPP. Financial backing forms a critical part of this ambitious initiative replete with lofty economic, political and security aims. As its initiator, China is the main financier of the BRI with a declared contribution of over $1 trillion. To fund infrastructure investments and other projects that are under the BRI banner, China established new unilateral and multilateral funds and institutions like the Silk Road Fund and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). It also channeled funds from existing institutions such as policy banks, the China Development Bank, the Export-Import Bank of China and state-owned banks to the BRI. Furthermore, China intends to link other multilateral funding institutions like the BRICS’ New Development Bank (NDB) and possible future institutions like the SCO Bank to the initiative.49 In the coming decades, these financial institutions may be a vehicle for China in challenging the established neoliberal funding strategies of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank

102   Emre Demir (WB), and may be used for promoting what some see as the unorthodox funding practices of China.50 Furthermore, they may help China in reshaping the current international financial institutional landscape.51 An important feature of the BRI is its all-inclusive approach to membership. In other words, it is, in theory, open to all countries and international and regional organizations that wish to become a part of this megaproject.52 By April 2019, the BRI has been endorsed by 126 countries and 29 international organizations, including European states such as Italy, Switzerland and Luxemburg.53 Therefore, it is fairly safe to say that Chinese attitudes to Euro-Asian cooperation—at least in terms of membership—are an example of inclusive regionalism. Yet despite its inclusivity, the BRI aims to favor the interests of China by positioning the country at the center or starting point of Asian connectivity and cooperation. All roads lead to Beijing, in other words. As with all past efforts to (re)define a region, this initiative is a politically and socially constructive process that combines institutional and functional rescaling processes via the process of proposing a new scale, new ideas, new institutions and new policies to reshape the wider Asia region. Due to its broad scope and focus on both hard and soft infrastructure and the connecting of ideas and institutions, Callahan has defined Xi’s grand strategy as an attempt for building a Sino-centric regional order and even promote a particular Chinese style of global governance.54 However, despite the magnitude and ambition of the BRI, neither Xi nor other Chinese officials have proposed a new term to redefine the mainstream Asia-Pacific concept at the discourse level. The BRI in this regard is very unlike the “Indo-Pacific” proposal of the IPP. Indeed, China has no intention and little impetus to jettison the Asia-Pacific concept and embrace the Indo-Pacific definition. The reason for this may be found in the BRI’s economy-centric approach to international relations. The terms “Pacific community” and “Asia-Pacific” were coined by Japan and the US in the 1970s and 1980s and supported keenly by Australia until the early 2010s.55 This was mainly due to their concerns about managing the increased economic connectivity of the developing and developed Asia-Pacific countries via deepening trade and investment ties.56 Likewise, and notwithstanding its explicit security logic, since the BRI is essentially an “international economic cooperation project,”57 China’s choice of continuing to use the term Asia-Pacific adheres to the same logic as that previously followed by the US, Japan and ­Australia. This, despite the BRI’s ambitious goal of integrating all of Asia across both territorial and maritime domains. The BRI admittedly has some inherent problems. First and foremost, China cannot seem to overcome the perception of some states that it poses a threat. This is especially true for the majority of states in the Asia-Pacific region. While some of its neighbors like the Philippines and Vietnam worry about sovereignty issues and border disputes with China, others are afraid of their own economies being subsumed by China’s massive economy. Furthermore, some of the BRI projects—the CPEC is one example—are financially or strategically risky. In

China’s Belt and Road Initiative   103 addition, an increased fear of China’s debt trap diplomacy surfaced after Beijing took over the Hambantota Port for 99 years due to the inability of the Sri Lankan government to repay its loans to China.58 To overcome rising anxiety about the perceived debt trap, President Xi and China’s Finance Minister Liu Kun tried to persuade the world community at the Second Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in April 2019 that China is responsive to the needs of its partners and therefore the BRI should not be construed as a debt trap. Liu said that to help developing countries in ­analyzing their BRI projects’ financial sustainability, China’s Ministry of Finance would now issue a Debt Sustainability Framework for low income BRI partner countries that could also be aided by the IMF and other international financial institutions.59 Xi also aimed to appease fears and answer criticisms over the initiative by promising to improve the transparency of projects and to take necessary steps for avoiding the risk of unpaid loans.60 However, in order to ­persuade the world community of the sustainability of BRI projects, China must do more than just promise to tackle issues of bad loans and port takeovers. In short, to accomplish its objectives China needs to find solutions to the multiplicity of problems seeming to emanate from the BRI. Beijing appears to be doing just that and recently dealt with the reported financial problems related to the BRI’s East Coast Rail Link in Malaysia.61

The Indo-Pacific Partnership: hub-and-spoke system 2.0? The idea of FOIP is first and foremost an attempt to politically redefine the region. The proponents of this new conceptualization deliberately aim to replace the Asia-Pacific with the Indo-Pacific through a political process that favors their own interests versus those of other states, particularly China. Indeed, some have argued China is the main target of the IPP.62 As in all politically oriented social constructions, this is not a neutral rescaling process where only the definition of the region is changed by enlarging the geographical scale. In other words, the Indo-Pacific idea encapsulates both institutional and functional rescaling processes. Some commentators and official documents of IPP governments, for example, base the need to redefine the ­Asia-Pacific region as the Indo-Pacific on economic grounds such as the rising importance of the Indian Ocean sea lanes to world trade and strengthening ties among the Pacific and Indian Ocean economies.63 However, as Wilson demonstrated, economic motivations are not strong enough to support this rescaling.64 Thus, the Indo-Pacific neither is a “natural” economic region nor does it possess the necessary economic institutional architecture. On the contrary, due to the lack of a strong economic basis, this attempt carries the risk of undermining the sound economic connectivity of the Asia-Pacific by diminishing the existing spatial fit between regionalization and regionalism. Therefore, rather than economic motivations, the primary reason for IPP must be understood as security— especially the need felt by IPP states for preserving maritime security supremacy in the face of a strengthening China.65

104   Emre Demir

US foreign policy under Donald Trump Due to the rising importance of South and East Asia in political-economic and security issues, in 2011, the Obama administration initiated the policy of Pivot to Asia, which was composed of four main features: geographical scope, security, diplomacy and economics. With the Pivot, in line with the rising importance of the Indian Ocean in the world political economy, the US expanded its focus from Northeast to Southeast and South Asia by strengthening security relations with its regional allies and partners and by following a ­“forward-deployed diplomacy” to improve bilateral and multilateral ties with regional actors. The US also increased its economic presence by leading the negotiations for the Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement in order to benefit more from the dynamic economies of the region and to set the rules of the global political economy.66 In short, the US interest in the Indo-Pacific region started long before the initiation of the FOIP strategy in late 2017. US policy under President Trump changed significantly. The US immediately began the process of going from being the leader of multilateralism to adopting an inward-looking nationalistic strategy. This shift inherently strengthened changing attitudes towards China in the US. While Obama pursued a largely cooperative and cautious engagement policy towards Beijing,67 Trump changed this liberal pragmatist approach and began following a “principled” realist line based on power calculations among states.68 Evidence of Trump’s zero-sum foreign policy vision can be clearly seen both from the 2017 NSS and the 2018 NDS as well as from his threats and actions instigating a trade war with China. Both strategy documents specified inter-state strategic competition as the primary concern for the US and subsequently defined China as a “strategic competitor” and a “revisionist power” that is “actively competing” against the US and its allies. In essence, the US now perceives China as seeking “To displace the United States in the Indo-Pacific region, expand the reaches of its statedriven economic model, and reorder the region in its favor.”69 Therefore, maintaining the status quo power balance in Indo-Pacific is the principal priority of the US in order to win what it views as a long-term strategic competition with China. To reach this goal, Washington has defined its regional priority policy in order to create a networked security structure that will bring together multilateral and bilateral security alliances and partnerships such as the IPP.70 Even though the 2017 NSS claimed that the US vision for Indo-Pacific excludes no country, it also argued that a geopolitical rivalry is ongoing between repressive and free world order visions. In addition, Washington claimed Beijing is using all necessary means—from economic “inducements” to military threats—to achieve its political and security agendas and, if successful, would result in the diminishing sovereignty of regional states. An enduring US leadership for collective action to contain China’s dominance was accordingly required. In order to resist the threats emanating from China and other states like North Korea, and to keep the Indo-Pacific free and open, the US welcomes both the

China’s Belt and Road Initiative   105 increased role of its long-term allies like Japan and Australia and emerging powers like India as strategic and defense partners. Moreover, it also welcomes the intensified multilateral cooperation with the three countries under a quadrilateral partnership.71 In line with this program, the US has been following a policy to strengthen its strategic and security partnership with India and economic collaboration with ­Australia and Japan. In August 2016, Washington and New Delhi signed the Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement that allows the military forces of each country to use the other’s facilities. In 2017, the two countries were joined by Japan as they again participated in the annual Malabar naval exercises. Moreover, ever since the US recognized New Delhi as a major defense partner in 2005, India has purportedly become an important military hardware market for the US defense industry. Apart from security, the two countries are also reportedly deepening their energy cooperation and strengthening economic ties. Finally, the US supports the Indian refusal to join the BRI due to sovereignty issues regarding the Kashmir region as well as India’s ongoing border disputes with China.72 Since the second half of 2018, the US has also been working on ways of providing alternative funding opportunities to Asian countries for their infrastructure investment—either by its own institutions or in partnership with Australia and Japan. To offer an alternative to China in development financing, Washington created the International Development Finance Corporation (IDFC) in October 2018, with a declared fund of $60 billion to finance development projects in energy, ports and water infrastructure in developing countries. Unlike China’s emphasis on government-to-government loans and state company investments, the IDFC’s main aim is to support private sector projects.73 Furthermore, the US recently formed a partnership with Australia and Japan to pool resources for infrastructure investment projects in the Indo-Pacific region. In this way, the three countries aim to promote their security partnership in safeguarding a free, inclusive, open and prosperous Indo-Pacific. However, when its declared goal of financing infrastructure investment projects in energy, technology, tourism and transportation sectors and its goal of challenging China’s BRI are taken into account, the announced US contribution to the trilateral partnership of only $113 million fell far short of expectations.74 Nevertheless, these two initiatives still show signs of diversification of what was previously only a security-oriented Indo-Pacific strategy by the US. Notwithstanding the deepening ties among the US and India and the increasing cooperation between the US, Australia and Japan and their shared interest in limiting China’s rise, a critical question needs to be answered: Are India, Australia and Japan willing to fully accept and bear the costs of what appears to be an exclusive Indo-Pacific vision of the US?

Attitudes of Australia, India and Japan Among the three junior partners of the IPP, Japan is the country that most closely embraces the US definition of the FOIP. Indeed, the Trump administration

106   Emre Demir readily borrowed the term “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” from the Japanese ­government of Prime Minister Abe who first proposed the idea of connecting the Pacific and Indian Oceans in a 2007 speech to the Indian Parliament.75 In Abe’s bid for a “democratic security diamond” in Asia, his adminstration believes India, with the US and Australia, should play a greater role in balancing an assertive China in order to preserve “the common goods” in the Indo-Pacific region.76 Japan’s interest in moving ever-closer to India is to gain important support from a “like-minded” country, but also for diverting some of China’s attention and resources away from Japan and the East China Sea to India and the Indian Ocean.77 In a joint statement issued by Japan and India in 2016, Abe together with Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi mentioned the importance of “improving connectivity between Asia and Africa through realizing a free and open IndoPacific.”78 This preceded a declaration that Japan’s FOIP strategy would aim to “improve ‘connectivity’ between Asia and Africa through free and open IndoPacific, and promote stability and prosperity of the region as a whole.”79 When compared to US priorities and strategies, Japan’s FOIP strategy is more comprehensive and wider in scope. While the US and Japan will continue to primarily focus on the security dimension, Japan also underlines its FOIP vision with development and infrastructure investment aimed at improving connectivity. In this manner, Japan aims to become an important player in quality infrastructure construction. This perhaps is something that many in the wider Indo-Pacific region may be more interested in than politically and militarily challenging China, a country that, after all, is already a prominent source of investment and financial aid for many developing and developed countries of the region.80 In 2017, India joined hands with Japan to initiate a development project, the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC), reportedly to increase connectivity and cooperation between Asia and Africa. Similar to the BRI, the AAGC provides a mechanism for Japan and India to invest in infrastructure projects in the wider Indo-Pacific region from East Asia to Africa.81 This appears to be the response of the so-called “Japan–India Arc” to China’s BRI. However, for the moment and for three primary reasons, the AAGC falls well short of the BRI. First, India is still in the initial stages of developing its own infrastructure and itself in need of huge amounts of outside investment. Second, it lacks the financing capacity to support other countries’ infrastructure investments. This makes Japan the only viable source of investment for the AAGC. Third, the AAGC, like the IndoPacific concept, covers only maritime regions and excludes territorial Asia, thereby excluding vast amounts of energy resources. Nevertheless, it should be viewed as an important attempt to contribute to the needs of the region and, if managed well, the competition between China and the Japan–India arc could prove beneficial in fulfilling the entire region’s critical infrastructure deficit. Given the fact that India and Japan share a similar geopolitical and geo-economic logic in redefining the region and safeguarding the freedom of navigation in international waters, it should not necessarily be concluded that their motivations and the policies they follow towards China are completely compatible with

China’s Belt and Road Initiative   107 each other. Above all, India regards the Indian Ocean as part of its sphere of influence; this is the major issue of concern for New Delhi. In short, unless India protects its political dominance in the Indian Ocean, it cannot extend its influence beyond South Asia. This is why India is so worried about China’s intrusion into its backyard.82 Yet India is also wary of its IPP partners’ increasing influence in the Indian Ocean region. This may hinder future efforts to further the IPP’s security partnership.83 In addition, Indian officials are less eager to challenge Beijing directly than their Japanese and US partners. Unlike the Trump government that defines China as a revisionist power and Abe who calls for the creation of a “security diamond” against China, India’s official policy towards the Indo-Pacific has been moderate and focused more on ASEAN’s role in regional economic and security structures for forming “an open, balanced, inclusive and transparent regional architecture.”84 Moreover, since the early 1990s, in order to develop its economy, India has followed policies to deepen its economic ties with East Asia through its “Look East” policies. These were followed by New Delhi’s “Act East” policies. As the most dynamic country in the region, China naturally has an important role to play in India’s policies towards the region. Therefore, the likelihood of India playing a balancing role against China as the “lynchpin” power of the Indo-Pacific is not a viable option, at least for the time being.85 For all these reasons, New Delhi’s attitude towards the Indo-Pacific can be characterized as a nationalist-pragmatist hybrid approach that has combined the need for an inclusive region-building that does not alienate China while forming closer partnerships with the US, Japan, Australia and ASEAN countries.86 Australia’s Indo-Pacific approach also differs from its IPP partners. Canberra was the second capital, after Tokyo, to embrace the Indo-Pacific term into its official use. Indeed, the Indo-Pacific reflects Australia’s identity and favors its geopolitical place much better than the Asia-Pacific. After all, Australia straddles both the Indian and Pacific Oceans. In other words, Australia is “at the center of the action” in the Indo-Pacific.87 Yet Australia’s stance is still very much different than that of other IPP states. On the one hand, it is quite clear from its 2016 Defence White Paper and 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper that Canberra’s main objective is to convince Washington to support the Indo-Pacific idea, to continue being Australia’s main ally and security guarantor and for the US to continue leading the like-minded democracies of the IPP against a rising and assertive China. In return, Australia is ready to share the costs of the US engagement with the region by increasing its defense spending to two percent of its GDP by 2020 and supporting the US leadership in the world, much as it has done since World War II. On the other hand, notwithstanding the underlying fear of a rising China, and due to its strong trade and investment ties with Beijing, Canberra does not want to antagonize its largest trade partner by directly challenging its position in the region.88 Furthermore, as Medcalf noted, China is an indispensable part of the region and the main reason for redefining it as the Indo-Pacific. In addition, rather than India, China is the quintessential power of the region.89 Due to this “China-dilemma” it faces, Australia is against

108   Emre Demir an exclusionary Indo-Pacific vision that ostracizes China. Therefore, Australia plays a delicate balancing game in which it tries to hedge against a rising China by including India and Japan in its partnership with the US while at the same time trying to avoid antagonizing China.90 The IPP lacks many of the BRI’s strengths. First, there is no single country to lead the process and design the general features of the Indo-Pacific region. Due to its historically dominant position in the Asia-Pacific region and the world, the US would be expected to lead. This is precisely why Australia, Japan, and to a lesser degree India, have all been trying to convince Washington to stay committed to the region and lead the IPP. Yet, even if its allies convince Washington to lead, it is questionable how consistent US policies will be given the current record of the Trump presidency. Second, there is no consensus on the scope of the region among the partner states. While Australia and the US prefer a narrow Indo-Pacific definition that includes the area from the eastern Indian Ocean to the west coast of the North American continent, Japan and India include the western Indian Ocean along with the east coast of Africa and the Middle East. Third, the Indo-Pacific idea is arguably a discursive construct lacking the necessary economic basis. A successful regionalization needs a combination of ­bottom-up and top-down integration processes. However, the Indo-Pacific lacks both an economic basis and strong political backing. Finally, there is a lack of consensus as to the nature of the IPP’s regional cooperation. The US and Japan prefer—in terms of either security or economy—an exclusive region in which they can exclude China. Even more importantly, they wish to challenge or contain China’s rise. India is concerned with the Chinese intrusion into its sphere of influence. Yet at the same time New Delhi does not wish to challenge China directly and indeed, to a certain extent, arguably welcomes its economic presence. Australia, on the other hand, is in favor of an inclusive regionalism in which China can take its place as one of the leading actors in the region. What IPP states all have in common is their fragmented approach to Asia. Even the most inclusive and broad-in-scope approach to the Indo-Pacific covers only the maritime territories of Asia and excludes territorial areas. This exclusionary characteristic of the IPP reflects the Cold War era US hub-and-spoke system of bilateral alliances which has arguably been harmful for Asian regional cooperation and integration by creating a fractured region. In other words, it can be argued that the US wants to be sure that the rules of the game will not be altered by China. It will use the IPP to make this happen.

Conclusion The Indo-Asia-Pacific region is now faced with two distinct attempts at regional rescaling. One is China’s BRI, the other is the IPP of Japan, Australia, India and the US. They differ markedly from another. The main driver of the BRI, for example, is achieving regional economic cooperation and development. It is through BRI-associated projects that China hopes to overcome current and future problems facing the Chinese economy. However, security-related concerns have

China’s Belt and Road Initiative   109 prompted Beijing to initiate and finance BRI projects on a massive scale across multiple continents. In contrast, the IPP appears to be an attempt to hinder growing Chinese influence in the region and, correspondingly, to safeguard the freedom of navigation in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. In other words, IPP states arguably place priority on keeping things as they are in the region. Furthermore, while the BRI involves a combination of political economic and societal cooperation of both state and non-state actors, the IPP is basically a politics and security-driven approach among states. In terms of institutionalization and despite China’s and the Asian states’ attitude towards informal and soft approaches to regional cooperation, under the BRI institutionalization has already begun. This is exemplified by the AIIB. The IPP states, in contrast, have yet to undertake any steps for such institutionalization other than irregular meetings between government officials and military exercises. The BRI has the backing of the Chinese political leadership and China’s financial institutions. This provides clear direction and a vision to the project. The IPP lacks such political leadership or financial backing. Finally, the BRI offers an inclusive vision for Asian cooperation. It is open to all countries and multilateral institutions that wish to take part. It has even been endorsed by prominent Western states like Switzerland and Italy. The IPP states have failed to articulate a common vision as to regional cooperation and related projects. In addition, the IPP states have implicitly limited the membership of the grouping by excluding both China and huge territories in mainland Asia. To put it another way, in terms of the issue of institutional rescaling, the BRI offers an integrative regional vision to Asia whereas the IPP proposes the continuation of a fragmented Asian region.

Notes   1 Hong Kong, Singapore, Republic of Korea and Taiwan.   2 Christopher M. Dent, East Asian Regionalism (New York: Taylor & Francis Routledge, 2008), p. 7.   3 The White House, “President Donald J. Trump’s Foreign Policy Puts America First,” The White House, 2018, accessed May 19, 2018, www.whitehouse.gov/briefingsstatements/president-donald-j-trumps-foreign-policy-puts-america-first/.   4 Amitav Acharya, “Comparative Regionalism: A Field Whose Time Has Come?,” International Spectator 47, no. 1 (2012), https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2012.655004; Mark Beeson, “Institutionalizing the Indo-Pacific: The Challenges of Regional Cooperation,” East Asia, 2018, https://doi.org/10.1007/s12140–018–9288–3; Dent, East Asian Regionalism, p. 6; Björn Hettne, “Beyond the ‘New’ Regionalism,” New Political Economy 10, no. 4 (2005): 544, https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203965450; and Peter J. Katzenstein, “Regionalism and Asia,” in Shaun Breslin et al. (eds), New Regionalism in the Global Political Economy (London & New York: Routledge, 2002), p. 105.   5 Katzenstein, 105; Fredrick Söderbaum, “Old, New, and Comparative Regionalism,” in Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism, ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 32–33, https://doi. org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199682300.013.2.   6 “Definition of Politics,” in Merriam-Webster, 2018, www.merriam-webster.com/­ dictionary/politics.

110   Emre Demir   7 Jeffrey D. Wilson, “Rescaling to the Indo-Pacific: From Economic to Security-Driven Regionalism in Asia,” East Asia, 2018, https://doi.org/10.1007/s12140–018–9285–6.   8 Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse, “Introduction,” in Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism, ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 7.   9 Börzel and Risse, pp. 6–7. 10 Dent, East Asian Regionalism, p. 7. 11 Ibid., p. 7. 12 Fredrik Söderbaum and Timothy M. Shaw, “Conclusion: What Futures for New Regionalism?,” in Fredrik Söderbaum and Timothy M. Shaw (eds), Theories of New Regionalism (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), p. 222, https://doi.org/10.1057/ 9781403938794_12. 13 Acharya, “Comparative Regionalism: A Field Whose Time Has Come?,” p. 12. 14 Amitav Acharya, Whose Ideas Matter? Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009); Anja Jetschke and Saori N. Katada, “Asia,” in Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism (New York: Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 232. 15 Acharya, Whose Ideas Matter? Agency and Power in Asian Regionalism, 12; Börzel and Risse, “Introduction,” p. 8. 16 Amitav Acharya, “Regionalism Beyond EU-Centrism,” in Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism, 2016, 110, https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199682300. 013.7; Söderbaum, “Old, New, and Comparative Regionalism,” pp. 30–33. 17 Wilson, “Rescaling to the Indo-Pacific: From Economic to Security-Driven Regionalism in Asia.” 18 Ibid. 19 Beeson, “Institutionalizing the Indo-Pacific: The Challenges of Regional Cooperation.” 20 Wilson, “Rescaling to the Indo-Pacific: From Economic to Security-Driven Regionalism in Asia.” 21 Acharya, “Regionalism Beyond EU-Centrism,” p. 110, Beeson, “Institutionalizing the Indo-Pacific: The Challenges of Regional Cooperation”; Jetschke and Katada, “Asia,” 238; Thomas Risse, “The Diffusion of Regionalism,” in Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse (eds), The Oxford Handbook of Comparative Regionalism, 2016, p. 96. 22 Mark Beeson, “Multilateralism in East Asia: Less than the Sum of Its Parts?,” Global Summitry 2, no. 1 (2016), https://doi.org/10.1093/global/guw007; Mark Beeson, “Trump and the Asia-Pacific: Do the Ties Still Bind?,” Current History, (2017), p. 236; Mark Beeson, “Why Has Leadership in the Asia–Pacific Proved So Elusive?,” Chinese Political Science Review 2, no. 4 (2017), https://doi.org/10.1007/s41111–017–0074-y. 23 Suisheng Zhao, “China and East Asian Regional Cooperation: Institution-Building Efforts, Strategic Calculations, and Preference for Informal Approach,” in Dongmin Lee and Mingjiang Li (eds), China and East Asian Strategic Dynamics: The Shaping of a New Regional Order (Maryland: Lexington Books, 2011), pp. 167–68. 24 Xi Jinping, Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era: Report to the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, 18 October 2017 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2018), pp. 32–34. 25 Peter Ferdinand, “Westward Ho—the China Dream and ‘One Belt, One Road’: Chinese Foreign Policy under Xi Jinping,” International Affairs 92, no. 4 (2016): p.  949, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468–2346.12660; Hong Yu, “Motivation behind China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ Initiatives and Establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank,” Journal of Contemporary China 26, no. 105 (2017): p. 356, https:// doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2016.1245894; Veysel Tekdal, “China’s Belt and Road Initiative: At the Crossroads of Challenges and Ambitions,” Pacific Review 31, no. 3 (2018): p. 374, https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2017.1391864; Wang Yong, “Offensive for

China’s Belt and Road Initiative   111 26 27

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Defensive: The Belt and Road Initiative and China’s New Grand Strategy,” Pacific Review 29, no. 3 (2016): p. 461, https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2016.1154690. Kerry Brown, “The Real Message For the World in China’s First Global Congress,” South China Morning Post, October 21, 2017, www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/ article/2115953/real-message-world-chinas-first-global-congress%3E. Xi, Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era: Report to the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, 18 October 2017, p. 10. Ibid., p. 1. Cheng Li and Eve Cary, “The Last Year of Hu’s Leadership: Hu’s to Blame,” China Brief 11, no. 23 (2011), https://jamestown.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/12/ cb_11_73.pdf?x87069. Hu Jintao, “Build Towards a Harmonious World of Lasting Peace and Common Prosperity,” Statement by H. E. Hu Jintao President of the People’s Republic of China at the United Nations Summit, 2005, www.un.org/webcast/summit2005/statements15/ china050915eng.pdf. BRICS is the acronym coined for an association of five major emerging national economies: Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. Ferdinand, “Westward Ho—the China Dream and ‘One Belt, One Road’: Chinese Foreign Policy under Xi Jinping,” p. 942. Shaun Breslin, “China and the Global Order: Signalling Threat or Friendship?,” International Affairs 89, no. 3 (2013): 633, https://doi.org/10.1111/1468–2346.12036. Beeson, “Why Has Leadership in the Asia–Pacific Proved So Elusive?”; Shichen Wang, “Xi Jinping’s Centralisation of Chinese Foreign Policy Decision-Making Power,” East Asian Policy 9, no. 2 (2017): 34–42, https://doi.org/10.1142/S1793930517000149; Zhang Qingmin, “Bureaucratic Politics and Chinese Foreign Policy-Making,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 9, no. 4 (2016): 452–56, https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/ pow007. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, “The Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs Was Held in Beijing,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the PRC, accessed April 30, 2019, www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1215680.shtml. Yan Xeutong, “From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement,” Chinese Journal of International Politics 7, no. 2 (2014), https://doi.org/10.1093/cjip/pou027. Xi Jinping, “Diplomacy with Neighboring Countries Characterized by Friendship, Sincerity, Reciprocity and Inclusiveness,” in The Governance of China (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2014), pp. 328–29, Xi, Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era: Report to the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, 18 October 2017, p. 22. Ferdinand, “Westward Ho—the China Dream and ‘One Belt, One Road’: Chinese Foreign Policy under Xi Jinping,” p. 957. National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road,” 2015, http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t20150330_669367.html. National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC); Xi Jinping, “Full Text of President’s Xi’s Speech at Opening of Belt and Road Forum,” Xinhua.net, 2017, www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017–05/14/c_136282982.htm. National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road.” Tim Summers, “China’s ‘New Silk Roads’: Sub-National Regions and Networks of Global Political Economy,” Third World Quarterly 37, no. 9 (2016): pp. 1632–34, https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2016.1153415.

112   Emre Demir 43 Chien peng (C P.). Chung, “What Are the Strategic and Economic Implications for South Asia of China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative?,” Pacific Review 31, no. 3 (2018): p. 316, https://doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2017.1375000; Hong, “Motivation behind China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ Initiatives and Establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank,” pp. 355–58, Xiao Ren, “China as an InstitutionBuilder: The Case of the AIIB,” Pacific Review 29, no. 3 (2016): pp. 440–41, https:// doi.org/10.1080/09512748.2016.1154678; Summers, “China’s ‘New Silk Roads’: Sub-National Regions and Networks of Global Political Economy,” 1636–1637; Tekdal, “China’s Belt and Road Initiative: At the Crossroads of Challenges and Ambitions,” pp. 378–384, Wang, “Offensive for Defensive: The Belt and Road Initiative and China’s New Grand Strategy,” p. 457; Xin Zhang, “Chinese Capitalism and the Maritime Silk Road: A World-Systems Perspective,” Geopolitics 22, no. 2 (2017): p. 320, https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2017.1289371. 44 Chung, “What Are the Strategic and Economic Implications for South Asia of China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative?,” p. 316; Marc Lanteigne, “China’s Maritime Security and the ‘Malacca Dilemma,’ ” Asian Security 4, no. 2 (2008), https:// doi.org/10.1080/14799850802006555; Tekdal, “China’s Belt and Road Initiative: At the Crossroads of Challenges and Ambitions,” 380–81; Melissa H. Conley Tyler and Aakriti Bhutoria, “Diverging Australian and Indian Views on the Indo-Pacific,” Strategic Analysis 39, no. 3 (2015): p. 229, https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2015. 1022314 45 Chung, “What Are the Strategic and Economic Implications for South Asia of China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative?,” p. 317. 46 Tom Miller, China’s Asian Dream: Empire Building Along the New Silk Road (London: Zed Books, 2017); Wang Jisi, “‘Marching Westwards’: The Rebalancing of China’s Geostrategy,” in The World in 2020 According to China: Chinese Foreign Policy Elites Discuss Emerging Trends in International Politics, ed. Binhong Shao (Leiden: Brill, 2014), p. 131. 47 Wang, “Offensive for Defensive: The Belt and Road Initiative and China’s New Grand Strategy,” p. 461. 48 Wang, “‘Marching Westwards’: The Rebalancing of China’s Geostrategy.” 49 National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road”; Qinqin Peng and Denise Jia, “China State Banks Provide Over $400 Bln Credits to Belt and Road Projects,” Caixin, May 12, 2017, www.caixinglobal.com/2017–05–12/ china-state-banks-provide-over-400-bln-of-credits-to-belt-and-road-projects-101089361. html. 50 Hong, “Motivation behind China’s ‘One Belt, One Road’ Initiatives and Establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank,” pp. 359–60; Tekdal, “China’s Belt and Road Initiative: At the Crossroads of Challenges and Ambitions,” p. 385. 51 Ren, “China as an Institution-Builder: The Case of the AIIB,” p. 441. 52 National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC), “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road”; Xi, “Full Text of President’s Xi’s Speech at Opening of Belt and Road Forum.” 53 Catherine Wong, “‘Cooperate or Stop Criticising’, China’s Foreign Minister Wang Yi Says as Belt and Road Summit Nears,” South China Morning Post, 2019, www.scmp. com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3006893/cooperate-or-stop-criticising-chinas-foreignminister-wang-yi. 54 William A. Callahan, “China’s ‘Asia Dream’: The Belt Road Initiative and the New Regional Order,” Asian Journal of Comparative Politics 1, no. 3 (2016), https://doi. org/10.1177/2057891116647806. 55 Arif Dirlik, “Introduction: Pacific Contradictions,” in Arif Dirlik (ed.), What Is In a Rim? Critical Perspectives on the Pacific Region Idea (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1998), p. 7.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative   113 56 Wilson, “Rescaling to the Indo-Pacific: From Economic to Security-Driven Regionalism in Asia.” 57 Wang, “Offensive for Defensive: The Belt and Road Initiative and China’s New Grand Strategy, ” p. 461. 58 John Pomfret, “No TitleChina’s Debt Traps around the World Are a Trademark of Its Imperialist Ambitions,” The Washington Post, 2018, www.washingtonpost.com/ news/global-opinions/wp/2018/08/27/chinas-debt-traps-around-the-world-are-a-trademark-of-its-imperialist-ambitions/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.36068e0a4fad. Despite the rising fear over China’s debt trap diplomacy, a research done by the Rhodium Group suggests that Beijing is keen on renegotiating or writing off its partners’ debts and there is no other evidence than the Sri Lankan case to show that China aims to seize assets in return for unpaid loans. See Agatha Kratz, Allen Feng, and Logan Wright, “New Data on the ‘Debt Trap’ Question,” Rhodium Group, 2019, https://rhg. com/research/new-data-on-the-debt-trap-question/. 59 Asia Times Staff, “BRI Is Not Debt a Trap, Says Finance Minister,” Asia Times, 2019, www.asiatimes.com/2019/04/article/bri-is-not-debt-trap-says-finance-ministerliu-kun/. 60 Shi Jiangtao et al., “Chinese President Xi Jinping Tries to Stem Rising Chorus of Doubts over Belt and Road Initiative,” South China Morning Post, 2019, www.scmp. com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3007892/chinese-president-xi-jinping-tries-stem-risingchorus-doubts. 61 Bhavan Jaipragas, “Malaysia to Go Ahead with China-Backed East Coast Rail Link,” South China Morning Post, 2019, www.scmp.com/week-asia/geopolitics/ article/3005831/malaysia-decide-today-stalled-china-backed-east-coast-rail. 62 Chengxin Pan, “The ‘Indo-Pacific’ and Geopolitical Anxieties about China’s Rise in the Asian Regional Order,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 68, no. 4 (2014): p. 454, https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2014.884054. 63 Rory Medcalf, “In Defence of the Indo-Pacific: Australia’s New Strategic Map,” ­Australian Journal of International Affairs 68, no. 4 (2014): p. 472, https://doi.org/10. 1080/10357718.2014.911814; Commonwealth of Australia, “Defence White Paper 2013,” 2013, p. 8. 64 Wilson, “Rescaling to the Indo-Pacific: From Economic to Security-Driven Regionalism in Asia.” 65 Beeson, “Institutionalizing the Indo-Pacific: The Challenges of Regional Cooperation”; Wilson, “Rescaling to the Indo-Pacific: From Economic to Security-Driven Regionalism in Asia.” 66 Martin Indyk, Kenneth Lieberthal, and Michael E. O’Hanlon, “Scoring Obama’s Foreign Policy: A Progressive Pragmatist Tries to Bend History,” Foreign Affairs 91, no. 3 (2012), www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2012–04–20/scoring-obamas-foreignpolicy. 67 Tsuneo Watanabe, “US Engagement Policy toward China: Realism, Liberalism, and Pragmatism,” Journal of Contemporary East Asia Studies 2, no. 2 (2017): p. 6, https://doi.org/10.1080/24761028.2013.11869060. 68 The White House, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” 2017, 1, www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12–18–2017– 0905.pdf; Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy the United States of America,” 2018. 69 The White House, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” 25–27; Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy the United States of America,” pp. 1–2. 70 Department of Defense, “Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy the United States of America,” pp. 4, 9. 71 The White House, “National Security Strategy of the United States of America,” pp. 45–47

114   Emre Demir 72 Rupakjyoti Borah, “India and Trump: A New Symphony in Play,” Global Asia 13, no. 1 (2018), pp. 86-87. 73 Chetra Chap, “New US Agency Offers Asian Countries Development Finance Alternative to China: Experts,” Voice of America Cambodia, October 8, 2018, www. voacambodia.com/a/new-us-agency-offers-asian-countries-development-finance-alternativeto-china-experts/4604486.html. 74 Sonali Paul, “Australia, Japan Join U.S. Infrastructure Push in Asia,” Reuters, July 31, 2018, www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-australia-pacific/australia-japan-join-u-sinfrastructure-push-in-asia-idUSKBN1KK2KZ. 75 Shinzo Abe, “Confluence of the Two Seas – Speech by H. E. Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan at the Parliament of the Republic of India,” 2007, www.mofa.go.jp/ region/asia-paci/pmv0708/speech-2.html. 76 Shinzo Abe, “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond,” Project Syndicate, 2012, www. project-syndicate.org/commentary/a-strategic-alliance-for-japan-and-india-by-shinzo-abe? barrier=accesspaylog. 77 Emma Chanlett-Avery, “Japan, the Indo-Pacific, and the ‘Quad,’ ” The Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2018, www.thechicagocouncil.org/publication/japanindo-pacific-and-quad. 78 Government of India Ministry of External Affairs, “India–Japan Joint Statement during the Visit of Prime Minister to Japan,” 2016. 79 Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Priority Policy for Development Cooperation FY 2017,” 2017, p. 9, www.mofa.go.jp/files/000259285.pdf. 80 Michael J. Green, “Japan’s ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy’ as Grand Strategy,” 2018, 29 www.japan.go.jp/tomodachi/_userdata/pdf/2018/spring2018/28_29.pdf; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, “Priority Policy for Development Cooperation FY 2017,” p. 2. Shahana Thankachan, “Japan’s ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy’: Reality before the Rhetoric?,” Maritime Affairs 13, no. 2 (2017), https:// doi.org/10.1080/09733159.2017.1414831. 81 Thankachan, pp. 85–87. 82 John Hemmings and Genevieve Hull, “The New Great Game in the Indo-Pacific,” E-International Relations, 2018, www.e-ir.info/2018/04/20/the-new-great-game-in-theindo-pacific/. 83 Xue Li and Liu Tianyi, “How Will the Indo-Pacific Strategy Impact the Belt and Road Initiative,” China File, 2018, www.chinausfocus.com/finance-economy/ how-will-the-indo-pacific-strategy-impact-the-belt-and-road-initiative. 84 Priya Chacko, “The Rise of the Indo-Pacific: Understanding Ideational Change and Continuity in India’s Foreign Policy,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 68, no. 4 (2014): pp. 447, https://doi.org/10.1080/10357718.2014.891565. 85 Chacko, pp. 441–443, Kai He, “Three Faces of the Indo-Pacific: Understanding the ‘Indo-Pacific’ from an IR Theory Perspective,” East Asia, 2018, https://doi. org/10.1007/s12140–018–9286–5; Pan, “The ‘Indo-Pacific’ and Geopolitical Anxieties about China’s Rise in the Asian Regional Order, ” 461. 86 Chacko, “The Rise of the Indo-Pacific: Understanding Ideational Change and Continuity in India’s Foreign Policy,” p. 449. 87 Brendan Taylor, “The ‘Indo-Pacific’ Places Australia at the Centre of the Action,” Australian Strategic Policy Institute, 2013, www.aspistrategist.org.au/the-indo-pacificplaces-australia-at-the-centre-of-the-action/. 88 Commonwealth of Australia, “2016 Defence White Paper,” 2016, www.defence.gov. au/whitepaper/docs/2016-defence-white-paper.pdf; Commonwealth of Australia, “2017 Foreign Policy White Paper,” 2017, www.fpwhitepaper.gov.au/foreign-policywhite-paper. 89 Medcalf, “In Defence of the Indo-Pacific: Australia’s New Strategic Map,” 472. 90 Pan, “The ‘Indo-Pacific’ and Geopolitical Anxieties about China’s Rise in the Asian Regional Order,” p. 459.

7 Japan’s Indo-Pacific Operationalizing Tokyo’s vision in eastern Africa Brendon J. Cannon

The Indo-Pacific and the international relations of eastern Africa Given its strategic geography as the western bookend of the Indo-Pacific regional construct, eastern Africa and the western Indian Ocean should arguably form a key part of any vision or strategy developed by the Indo-Pacific Partnership (IPP) of Japan, India, Australia and the United States (US). While the lengthy coastline of eastern Africa—including the Horn of Africa—may be shown on maps produced by Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs1 and be an integral part of New Delhi’s overall efforts to counter the rise of China in what it views as its “own” Indian Ocean, the importance of the continent to the others IPP members remains imprecise.2 For example, Canberra seems more concerned about its relationship with China, Japan and other Pacific states to the north even though it also possesses a lengthy Indian Ocean coastline. Australia, accordingly, sees its Indo-Pacific as stretching from the west coast of India south to Diego Garcia and then east to the Pacific.3 Eastern African certainly does not figure in Washington’s Indo-Pacific strategies and policies either, which clearly delineate the maritime realm as stretching from San Francisco westward to Mumbai on the west coast of India.4 However, this may simply be a way for Washington to demarcate the newly named United States Indo-Pacific Command’s (INDOPACOM) area of operation versus that of US Africa Command (AFRICOM), which is responsible for military operations and military relations with 53 African states, and US Central Command (CENTCOM), with its bailiwick stretching across the Middle East to Pakistan’s border with India.

Competing state interests Whether or not US engagement in the western Indian Ocean and eastern Africa occurs under the auspices of the IPP or not, it is abundantly clear that the US will continue to operate in this theater given its global reach and tactical assets already housed in the wider region. As such, from a strategic point of view, the US, India and to a lesser extent Australia and Japan may work quite well to foster coherent security policies vis-à-vis this maritime region.5 However, it is

116   Brendon J. Cannon on land where any IPP engagement with eastern Africa may prove more difficult— even should consensus be reached as to what actually constitutes the Indo-Pacific’s operational theater. In addition, opportunities for engagement are further hampered by the sheer geographic size and scale of the region as well its vastly different topographies, political situations, economies and the interests of at least seven sovereign states (Eritrea, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania and Mozambique) and two de-facto independent or largely autonomous states (Somaliland and Puntland). Eastern Africa, particularly the Horn of Africa, is also an increasingly contested space. In Somalia alone, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Italy, the United Kingdom (UK), the US, China, the United Nations (UN), Kenya, Ethiopia, Egypt, the African Union (AU) and the European Union (EU) all have major stakes in the political and economic direction of the country. The fact that Somalia is ruled by a weak Federal Government of Somalia (FGS) whose writ of power barely extends throughout the capital city means influence and attempts to control the outcome of elections or relations with largely autonomous regions are that much more enticing and potentially lucrative to outside states.6 In addition, efforts at keeping the peace, security sector reform (SSR) and capacity building—watchwords of the international community and sacred to multilateralists—often become crude instruments in the hands of state and non-state actors.7 Here they attempt to influence political outcomes or extend influence and earn money in a place that is written about often but rarely understood and even less visited, allowing for graft and corruption to flourish ala Afghanistan, Iraq and other ­conflict stabilization zones.

The political economy of ports and natural resources Eastern Africa, like much of the continent, contains a variety of natural resources, to include critically important carbon resources such as oil, coal and natural gas.8 While these resources are plentiful, if rather difficult to extract and export, natural deep-water ports and navigable rivers are in short supply. As such, critical infrastructure nodes like ports are of increased value given the outsized role they play as both entry and exit points to the continent. Mombasa, in Kenya, is by far the largest and most critically important port in eastern Africa. It is also the only natural deep-water port of significant size along the entire coast of eastern Africa until Djibouti, at the southern entrance of the Red Sea. Other ports, of course, do exist but these are generally much smaller and cannot accept the largest container vessels and other cargo ships.9 Ports and port politics are an interesting field of research and offer a window into the interests and domestic political dynamics of host countries as well as those of external states.10 Along the coast of eastern Africa, for example, Mogadishu’s port is operated by a Turkish company, Albayrak, as part of a 20-year concession.11 Berbera port in the de-facto independent but internationally unrecognized Republic of Somaliland is in the process of being refurbished and expanded by DP World of Dubai under a 30-year concessionary agreement signed between

Japan’s Indo-Pacific   117 DP World, Somaliland and the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia.12 To the south, Chinese Harbour Engineering Company was contracted by the World Bank and the government of Tanzania to expand the port of Dar es Salaam, the closest rival to Kenya’s Mombasa.13 Bagomoyo, a moribund port on the coast of Tanzania is reportedly owned by China Merchants Holdings International (CMHI) after the Tanzanian government forfeited its share in the port project.14 Djibouti offers perhaps the best example of states attempting to jockey for influence and real estate in the region.15 Strategically located, Djibouti sits astride major sea lanes and one of the world’s major maritime choke holds.16 It hosts French, US, Chinese, Japanese and Italian military bases with German and Spanish troops hosted at the French base. Saudi Arabia is also interested in building its own military base in Djibouti.17 Much of Djibouti’s port infrastructure is currently contested, both legally and geopolitically. Beginning in 2008, DP World was in charge of operating Djibouti’s most critical port infrastructure, the Doraleh Container Terminal (DCT). However, in February 2018, the government of Djibouti unilaterally terminated DP World’s concession and promptly moved to replace it with a Chinese ports operator.18 Even though the US and France expressed deep concern over a potential Chinese stranglehold of the country’s infrastructure, China Merchants Port Holdings (CM Port) has reportedly been granted control of operations at DCT. In addition, the state-owned China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation and China State Construction Engineering Corporation have reportedly built a multipurpose cargo facility next door to DCT.19 Coupled with the Chinese base, the US is reportedly considering moving its decades-old military presence from Camp Lemmonier to elsewhere in the Horn, possibly Somalia.20 Ports—besides being bases for the handling of cargo—are often the locus of military bases, as exemplified by Djibouti. Since 2015, military facilities of extra-regional states have proliferated across the region.21 For example, Somalia hosts a Turkish base just outside Mogadishu. More of a training facility than a proper military base, the Turks have reportedly been training officers and soldiers of a Somali National Army (SNA) in order for them to take over security operations in the country after the planned departure of African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) troops.22 In Somaliland, to the north of Mogadishu and next door to Djibouti, the UAE was reportedly planning to build a military base and use the airport—previously built by the Soviets and expanded by the ­Americans—at Berbera, next to DP World’s port concession. The UAE continues to maintain a military facility at Assab, in Eritrea, even though its military efforts in Yemen were curtailed.23 The UK was reportedly also interested in building a military facility at Berbera, following the unannounced visit of British Defense Secretary Gavin Williamson in early 2019.24 This, in turn, was preceded by rumors that Russia wanted a military base at Zeyla (Zaylac) on the Somaliland coast. Should the base be built, it would mark a Russian return to the Indian Ocean for the first time since the Cold War.25

118   Brendon J. Cannon North of Djibouti, in 2018, Qatar reportedly agreed to finance a deal signed by Turkey with Sudan’s now-deposed president, Omar Al-Bashir, to rebuild the port of Suakin on the Red Sea, angering both Egypt and Saudi Arabia in the process.26 The US reportedly maintains a small naval presence in Kenya at Manda Bay near Lamu and has been building a large military facility in the interior of Somalia at Baledogle.27 In addition to this activity, an Indian naval vessel, INS Sarkevshak, visited Dar es Salaam in late 2017, where the ship and crew formed part of a survey mission and participated in joint exercises with the ­Tanzanian Navy.28 Tanzanian naval personnel have also been trained in India at the National Institute of Hydrography.29 Chinese naval visits have also occurred up and down the coast of eastern Africa. In 2017, a fleet comprised of a destroyer, guided-missile frigate and a supply vessel visited Dar es Salaam for a friendly visit including cultural events and sports competitions between the two naval forces.30 Subsequent Chinese naval visits occurred in 2018 to Mozambique. This marked the second time that Chinese naval vessels have visited Mozambique since 2012.31 Yet China’s interests in the region go far beyond ports of call visits.

Eastern Africa and China China recently built a standard gauge railroad (SGR) in Ethiopia connecting Addis Ababa to the port of Djibouti for a reported $3.6 billion.32 Chinese companies are also prospecting for oil and gas in eastern Ethiopia close to the Somali border, the object of past and perhaps future Somali irredentism.33 In late June 2018, Chinese firm Poly-GCL Petroleum Group Holdings Limited (PolyGCL) and the government of Ethiopia began test production of the first barrel of Ethiopian crude oil after striking oil in March 2018.34 Further south, China has completed the first and arguably most critical section of the SGR that runs from the port of Mombasa to Kenya’s capital, Nairobi. This $3.4 billion railroad has reportedly revolutionized travel between Nairobi and the coast, bringing a domestic tourism boom to Kenya’s north and south coast beaches.35 But Kenya is also massively in debt to China—reportedly owing over $7 billion—thus raising concerns of Chinese political meddling in internal Kenyan affairs.36 In Tanzania, railroads are again being built by China.37 Tanzania will also host an oil pipeline stretching from Uganda’s oil fields to the port of Tanga on the Indian Ocean. This route will bypass Kenya entirely and contradicts a previous feasibility study by Japan’s Toyota Tsusho that advocated a northern route across Kenya to the port of Lamu.38 France’s Total, which has major stakes in Uganda’s oil fields and throughout East Africa’s Rift Valley, was opposed to the northern route and pushed Uganda to fund the southern route through Tanga. However, China, the biggest player in Uganda’s oil sector, reportedly swayed the vote because it was unhappy with the proposed pipeline connection through Kenya.39 Given massive Chinese investment across the region, Beijing’s influence and visibility is reportedly unrivalled—despite the region being home to hundreds of

Japan’s Indo-Pacific   119 infrastructure projects developed locally or with the assistance of other external states. For example, in Ethiopia, Italy is constructing what will become Africa’s largest dam on the Blue Nile. It is also Turkey’s biggest investment destination in Africa with over 160 investment projects owned by Turkish companies and $2.5 billion invested thus far.40 Far to the south, in Mozambique with its massive gas reserves, Japanese companies have worked with a Brazilian mining company and the government of Mozambique to develop the Nacala port and land corridor for the export of coal. Indeed, places like Nacala and the port of Mombasa offer an interesting perspective on Japan’s strengths and staying power in the region, a counterpoint to China’s aggressive Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects and an illustration of the complications of operating in such a contested region.

Creating Japan’s Indo-Pacific vision At present, no concrete policy or institutional body has emerged within the IPP that would take the lead on defining policy and strategy for a “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP). There is much evidence that the Indo-Pacific concept has rapidly strengthened existing military and defense cooperation between the US, Australia and Japan.41 It is also proceeding apace with India.42 Yet other strategic elements remain uncharted.43 How the IPP will engage with eastern Africa, the Middle East or the South Pacific is unclear. As such, gaining an understanding of what the FOIP means to Japan and Japanese foreign policy is critical. It is important to note that Tokyo’s FOIP vision is currently official policy in Japan.44 It is largely defined and driven by Prime Minister (PM) Shinzo Abe, the National Security Council (NSC), as well as National Security Advisor Shotaro Yachi and former Prime Minister and current Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance, Taro Aso. They are assisted in the development of policies and strategy by the National Security Secretariat (NSS). Established in 2014 and staffed primarily with career civil servants from the ministries of foreign affairs and defense, the NSS also includes officers from Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF).45 The FOIP vision as developed by Tokyo is reportedly informed by three fundamental points.46 1. Any FOIP vision and supporting policies must expand Japan’s relationships and partnerships with emerging powers such as India, not just strengthen Japan’s relationship with the US. Additionally, Tokyo must convince ­Washington as well as New Delhi and Canberra that it remains the indispensable partner for peace and prosperity not just in northeast Asia but in the wider Indo-Pacific realm. 2. Engagement with China is an overriding and constant concern to Japan. Tokyo wishes to engage Beijing on substantive and sustainable terms that will lead to a long-term, mutually beneficial relationship. This type of relationship would be underpinned by Japan’s acceptance of China’s power and

120   Brendon J. Cannon central role in northeast Asia. It would, however, also be founded on China’s acceptance of Japan’s territorial claims, to include the Senkaku Islands. This is a tall order and Beijing has made it clear, time and again, that it is unwilling to agree to Japan’s current claims of sovereignty in the East China Sea. This explains why, during the summer of 2018, Japan’s leaders felt that engagement with China was futile. The view was that China possessed polar opposite political and economic values that made engagement counterproductive.47 However, by the summer 2019, even as Japan’s FOIP vision became official policy and ties continued to be strengthened with IPP states, Tokyo again opened the door to better relations through negotiations with Beijing, to include outright cooperation with Chinese companies involved in BRI projects—as long as they were conducted transparently and offered debt sustainability. PM Abe made it clear that Japan, for the near future, was “Switching from competition to collaboration, I want to lift Japan–China relations to a new era ... Japan and China are neighbors and partners. We will not become a threat to each other.”48 3. Domestically, Japan’s FOIP vision has seen a slow but steady revision of the post-War Japanese spirit with its previous emphasis on apology for the past.49 In contradistinction, Japan’s FOIP seeks to imbue an equally powerful sense of pride and affirmation in Japan’s past to complement what has perhaps been an undue emphasis on the culture of the sorry state.50 Japan’s FOIP is also a vision that offers a direct answer to China’s BRI and a means of addressing the IPP states’ shared concerns about China’s “inconsiderate” actions, particularly in Japan’s near abroad.51 Yet, these concerns about Chinese actions and influence stretch much further than the western Pacific; Tokyo’s increased activity and funding for projects in Southeast Asia, South Asia and eastern Africa underscore this concern. Yet there is a conundrum inherent in Japan’s FOIP that involves the normative post-War consensus that has been fundamental to shaping multi-generational views of Japan’s role in the world.52 The FOIP, while certainly a means of containing Chinese influence and territorial grabs, is also an attempt to shift domestic dialogue in Japan away from this consensus. Operationalizing policies and strategies that would energize Japan’s political role across the Indo-Pacific are therefore fraught with difficulty, considerably weighty and of such a magnitude that they cannot be discussed at any length here. However, it is within this cauldron that Tokyo operationalizes its FOIP vision. It does so via an almost ­categorical reliance on Japan’s businesses, banks, government lending institutions, development ministries and consulting firms. These foster, expand and maintain Japan’s influence, global reputation and relevance. This is because Japan’s businesses and lending institutions represent Japan in a way that they do not for most other states. They play the role of primary influencer and overtly represent Japanese power given Japan’s unique post-War political situation. In addition, Japanese businesses and firms engaged in the planning and building of projects across the Indo-Pacific are also difficult to criticize in Japan’s domestic

Japan’s Indo-Pacific   121 setting. In other words, few political points are scored if Japan’s opposition parties choose to criticize the investments and influence of Japan’s multinationals. The actions of Japanese businesses across the Indo-Pacific likewise do little to antagonize a prickly China. Moreover, when Japanese businesses perform work in eastern Africa or South Asia the government in Tokyo avoids having criticism leveled at it by voters who may see projects far from Japan as taking resources away from more pressing domestic concerns or as being peripheral to Japan’s core interests. Many in Japan, for example, were highly critical of the deployment of Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force (JGSDF) civil engineering units to South Sudan as part of the UN force (UNMSS). There was a chasm between what the Abe government was attempting to do—demonstrate to Washington Japan’s commitment to peacekeeping missions around the world—and what many Japanese perceived: the deployment was an ill-advised and dangerous mission on a continent thousands of kilometers away yielding few benefits to Japan.53 The power of public opinion was such that Tokyo eventually reversed its decision and removed the JGSDF engineers from South Sudan in 2017.

Eastern Africa and Japan The political and economic engagement of the Abe administration vis-à-vis eastern Africa shows some marked differences with those of its predecessors. The NSC, for example, has attempted to develop, coordinate and guide strategy by identifying projects in certain countries and attempting to make them investment destinations by highlighting their potential to Japanese businesses, construction and consulting firms.54 This has been coupled with what some report as a more fulsome engagement on the political front.55 Japanese business delegations regularly accompany PM Abe on foreign trips—a marked departure from previous administrations. Additionally, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) and the Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) have all reportedly cooperated in identifying and supporting projects in eastern Africa.56 As noted previously, Tokyo relies almost completely on big consulting firms as well as the acumen of Japanese businesses—particularly the powerful multinationals and trading houses known colloquially and collectively as “Keidanren”—to make inroads across the Indo-Pacific. Yet even as Tokyo attempts to re-engage the region, Japanese businesses and consulting firms still rarely, if ever, take direct work in eastern Africa. Rather they continue to rely on Japanese government guarantees of payment via funding from various government institutions such as JICA and the Japan Bank of International Cooperation (JBIC).57 In terms of projects and investment in eastern Africa, certain countries— namely Kenya, Tanzania and Mozambique—figure more prominently in Tokyo’s mind. Relations with them have accordingly been prioritized.58 Kenya is already the location of major Japanese investment and commercial interest.59,60 Japan Ports Consulting (JPC), for example, is in the midst of a $247 million overhaul and expansion of the port of Mombasa.61 Nippon Koei is responsible

122   Brendon J. Cannon for the larger development and building of special economic zones (SEZs), berths, bridges and bypasses associated with the Dongo Kundu Port Area and maintains an office in Nairobi.62 Importantly, JPC and Nippon Koei are not shareholders in the port.63 Nor do they have concessionary agreements with Kenya as DP World of Dubai does in Berbera and Albayrak of Turkey does in Mogadishu.64 In the case of JPC, it has been working in Mombasa since 2006, and the port expansion has now been extended to five phases, thus leading to work for potentially the next 40 years. Japanese businesses correspondingly continue to build major roads such as Nairobi’s Ngong Road, and have assisted Kenya in becoming a renewable energy leader by developing its geothermal resources.65 To Kenya’s south, in Mozambique, Japanese industrial giant Mitsui is working with Vale of Brazil to export coal via a newly-constructed railway to port facilities at Nacala on what is arguably the best natural harbor in southeastern Africa.66 This multibillion-yen project was partially funded by JBIC with Mitsui directly funding the remainder. Beyond Nacala, Mitsui has demonstrated its commitment to eastern and southern Africa by purchasing a 20 percent stake in Export Trade Group (ETG), an agricultural conglomerate with operations across more than 40 countries and a strong presence in eastern Africa. Mitsui’s investment in ETG is reportedly about making a return on its investments at Nacala. Food security and the export of food are critical to livelihoods around Nacala and northern Mozambique as well as neighboring countries. This region has suffered from civil conflicts and resultant famine conditions for decades. In short, Mitsui views the development of a sustainable and reliable food growing, food selling populace with the resultant income as holding the key to stability in the region and its investments.67

Contextualizing Japan’s and China’s approaches to the region Much has been written about Japan’s role in eastern Africa since the 1960s.68 More recently, scholars have focused on a perceived competition between China and Japan on the continent.69 The rise of China certainly does seem to pose obstacles for Japan as well as other states wishing to engage with the region.70 However, in the case of China and Japan, their strategic competition on a global level and sharp disagreements on international values and norms mean that the stakes are arguably higher. Chinese engagement in Africa is driven by the need to acquire resources, secure diplomatic support, access markets, expand investment to sustain its rapid economic growth and contain or eliminate competition from adversaries operating in the region.71 It is arguably for these reasons that China has been so aggressive in acquiring major projects.72 In doing so, China has filled a major gap in infrastructure, to include airports, ports, roads and railways that have often been neglected since colonial times.73 Additionally, these projects reportedly come with fewer strings attached than those of traditional Western and Japanese ­partners.74

Japan’s Indo-Pacific   123 China is little concerned about human rights, nor does it see its mission as one of promoting transparency or fostering good governance. Instead Beijing emphasizes its non-interference in domestic affairs and the promotion of a culturally relativist notion of human rights.75 But Chinese projects also come with significant price tags and the percentage of interest on Chinese loans is often triple those of Japanese projects.76,77 Though the popular discourse may be more hyperbole than a reflection of reality, China’s initiatives and development—including its expanding interests and influence in Africa—have reportedly been a priority for the Japanese public and government and attracted much media coverage.78 Tokyo’s political class, media outlets and many analysts perceive an acute loss of Japanese influence across the Indo-Pacific. This has galvanized PM Abe’s cadre to more vigorously engage the states of eastern Africa diplomatically and economically under the rubric of FOIP.79 Yet influence and, relatedly, power are notoriously difficult to measure.80 A look at China’s BRI and related policies in eastern Africa demonstrate what appears to be causality between Beijing’s engagement, investment and infrastructure project-building on the one hand, and China’s economic and political influence in the region on the other.81 This popular narrative—presupposing a unitary actor with a coherent strategy and related policies in Beijing—is deeply flawed for a number of reasons. Foremost because it fails to take into account the ad hoc nature of engagement by Chinese individuals and businesses.82 In addition, and more damningly, it fails to actually explain why Beijing, broadly speaking, is supportive of such expensive and risky projects. The BRI supposedly promises to integrate China’s internal markets with those across the Indo-Pacific region. The BRI will therefore bring states closer to China geopolitically and, one assumes, strategically. Underpinning most analyses of BRI is the fundamental assumption that China actually gains political or economic influence from states such as Kenya or Ethiopia when it invests and builds in them. However, a few questions rapidly call these analyses into question. Do BRI recipient states such as Kenya now use the Chinese renminbi? Do they vote with China at the UN? Do they provide an outlet for Chinese goods? The answers to the first is a resounding “No.” The answer to the second is “It depends.”83 The answer to the third is “Yes,” but this would have occurred in some form or another—given China’s massive economic clout—with or without colossal infrastructure investment. I would argue that the billions invested around the Indian Ocean basin only bolsters the perception—in Beijing as well as IPP capitals—that Chinese influence and power are growing, regardless of whether President Xi and the Communist Party are able to make this perception into a geopolitical reality. In other words, operationalizing this perceived influence for concrete political and security ends may prove highly difficult for Beijing. It comes as little surprise that China does wish to shape international norms and institutions as befits what Beijing sees as its rightful great power status.84 But, economic rather than geopolitical motivations such as a surplus of domestic labor, excess industrial capacity and slowing domestic growth offer better explanations

124   Brendon J. Cannon for China’s BRI.85 In other words, the BRI is “an outlet for too much investment capital and Chinese firms desperate to keep the economic engines of China revved up.”86 What the Abe administration must understand, however, is that Japan simply possesses neither the rationale nor the resources to compete on the same scale as China in eastern Africa—or anywhere else. Indeed, no other country, to include Japan’s IPP partners, is currently working within the same political-economy context as China. Thus, the urge to somehow compete with China in terms of scale of investment or, for the more simpleminded reason of “follow the leader,” makes little fiscal, political or strategic sense. It is within this context that ­Japanese leaders may have inadvertently stumbled on a solution to upholding Japanese visibility across the FOIP, albeit on a far smaller scale than China. Quietly and with little fanfare, Japanese multinationals have continued to utilize their inherent strengths—strengths that have made them profitable and powerful for decades—and capitalized on many of the weaknesses inherent in the cookie cutter Chinese approach to engagement via the BRI. Thus, despite competition from China with concomitant reductions in the share of Japan’s overall engagement with eastern Africa, there are a number of opportunities that have been grasped and will remain ripe for the plucking for Japan. A possible FOIP path for Tokyo to follow would involve first, its capitalization of criticisms about Chinese investments and projects, including allegations of Chinese activities resulting in unfair trade and labor practices as well as harming the environment.87 Second, Tokyo should understand that China’s growing involvement in Africa is not a zero-sum game. Chinese involvement does not necessarily mean or result in fewer contracts for Japan, even though China’s economic power may give it a diplomatic/political edge over Japan. Third, Japan could continue to distinguish itself from China by highlighting the quality of its work and products that offer a foundation for more sustainable and desirable development than China’s emphasis on speed and cost.88 The Tokyo International Conference of African Development (TICAD) VI in Nairobi (2016) and TICAD VII (2019) in Yokohama, Japan sought to emphasize precisely this—and to explain away the generally higher price tags associated with Japanese projects by highlighting their commensurately low interest rates.89 ­Japanese minister Shinsuke Suematsu, for example, blatantly argued Japan did offer high quality products but at higher prices. However, unlike China, Japan has a strong record in the transfer of technology and skills to locals, particularly through gainful employment.90 Fourth, Japan must realize it is jockeying for influence, projects and resources not only with China but a host of non-traditional and increasingly influential states such as Brazil and Turkey.91 As such, Tokyo could shift its focus from traditional development projects such as civil works and infrastructure to consulting, logistical and equipment supply, where ­Japanese firms such as Toyota Tsusho, Mitsui and Nippon Koei can go toe-to-toe not just with their Chinese competitors, but also with those from Turkey, the UAE and Brazil. Companies like Toyo Construction, currently engaged in building sections of the Mombasa port, now possess equipment, logistical knowledge and

Japan’s Indo-Pacific   125 supply chains across eastern Africa. This is no longer terra incognita for them and means that Toyo and other Japanese companies now operating in the region not only plan to continue bidding for projects but will likely be more successful in doing so given their understanding of eastern Africa’s complex political-economic contexts.92 Additionally, Japan could adopt a strategy used by China and issue loans in phases for larger projects.93 This, coupled with low interest rates could pave the way for further projects such as the Mombasa port. Where Japanese firms are at a distinct disadvantage, however, is in the realm of direct business ventures in eastern Africa given the reported disconnect between the government in Tokyo and Japanese businesses. Based on my research in Tokyo during 2018–2019, Japanese government entities are reportedly so vigilant in avoiding even the whiff of favoritism vis-à-vis particular corporations or consulting firms that they tend to lean in the opposite direction. In doing so, they have failed to overtly and substantively support Japanese business ventures in more risk-prone regions such as eastern Africa and South Asia. This is a far cry from Beijing’s reported approach to the hundreds of Chinese projects associated with the BRI across the Indo-Pacific. Indeed, the perception in Tokyo that Beijing has been overtly supportive of Chinese business ventures overseas, and that Tokyo has been incredibly wary of doing so for Japanese projects, was a refrain I heard over and over again. A final factor may also hamper Tokyo’s efforts to maintain its visibility and viability across the Indo-Pacific. The number of memoranda of understanding (MOUs) signed and potential business deals brokered during PM Abe’s many state visits appear most encouraging on paper. But the reality is that many of these never materialize.94 This reportedly occurs for three reasons. First, funding never becomes available from various government lending bodies such as JICA. Second, the bids submitted for the earmarked projects either remain unaccepted by the Japanese government or by the host state government. Third, because of perceived or experienced risks involving payment (or lack thereof), changing timelines and project scope as well as the nature of goods and services provided, Japanese businesses continue to demonstrate their reticence to perform direct work in many regions across the Indo-Pacific.

Conclusion Eastern African states have experienced a huge windfall in the building of critical and transportation infrastructure over the past decade. Much of this can be chalked up to increased competition between extra-regional states. Despite allegations of debt trap diplomacy, Japan’s and China’s rivalry is yielding direct investment on a massive scale and potentially revolutionizing economies across the region. This contradicts the Swahili saying wapiganapo fahali wawili, ­ziumiazo ni nyasi (when two bulls fight, the grass suffers). If anything, the grass is growing greener as the bulls continue to tussle over contracts and influence. As significantly, African political elites have taken notice of the rivalry and are capitalizing on it. In the run up to the 2016 TICAD VI summit in Nairobi, then-Kenyan Foreign Affairs

126   Brendon J. Cannon Cabinet Secretary Amina Mohamed, referring to the Japan–China rivalry, quipped “there is competition between everybody. It is a small market place.” It is ­therefore only natural that the states of eastern Africa take advantage of this competition and the related infrastructure projects on offer. Japan should continue to engage this contested and complicated region consistently with the tools befitting its unique geopolitical and economic contexts. It should capitalize on changes made during the Abe administration to include pursuing its foreign policy objectives via the agility and relatively high appetite for risk of major Japanese multinationals. The streamlining of decision-making in Tokyo, the development of the NSC and NSS as well as the stability of the Abe government have all contributed positively to Tokyo’s reengagement with eastern Africa and the Indo-Pacific. Yet, Tokyo runs the risk of predicating its moves based on the actions of an economically and politically powerful China. It must understand that its engagement and influence across the FOIP are not zero-sum. Relatedly, it should not fall into the trap of attempting to compete with China using Chinese strategies and tools. Japan possesses neither the same resources nor rationale to do so.

Notes   1 MOFA Japan, “Priority Policy for Development Cooperation: FY2017,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018, www.mofa.go.jp/files/000259285.pdf   2 Xiaoping Yang, “When India’s Strategic Backyard Meets China’s Strategic Periphery: The View from Beijing,” War on the Rocks, April 20, 2018, https://warontherocks. com/2018/04/when-indias-strategic-backyard-meets-chinas-strategic-periphery-the-viewfrom-beijing/   3 Miguel Alejandro Híjar-Chiapa, “Navigating Dangerous Waters: Australia and the Indo Pacific,” Rising Powers Quarterly 3, no. 2 (2018): 157–173; 161.   4 Neeta Lal, “India Wary of US Embrace on ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ Policy,” Asia Sentinel, April 9, 2018, www.asiasentinel.com/politics/india-wary-us-embracefree-open-indo-pacific-policy/   5 Ash Rossiter, “The ‘Free and Open Indo-Pacific’ Strategy and Japan’s Emerging Security Posture,” Rising Powers Quarterly 3, no. 2 (2018): 133–156.   6 Brendon J. Cannon, “Foreign State Influence and Somalia’s 2017 Presidential Election: An Analysis,” Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies 18, no. 1 (2019): 20–49.   7 Alice Hills, “Security Sector or Security Arena? The Evidence from Somalia,” International Peacekeeping 21, no. 2 (2014): 165–180. See also Abdirazak Fartaag, Their Own Worst Enemy: How Successive Governments Plundered Somalia’s Public Resources and Why the World Looked On (Nairobi: Fartaag Consulting, 2014). See also Abdirazak Fartaag, Breaking Point in Somalia: How State Failure was Financed and by Whom (Nairobi: Fartaag Consulting, 2016). See also Brendon J. Cannon, “Deconstructing Turkey’s Efforts in Somalia.” Bildhaan: An International Journal of Somali Studies 16, no. 14 (2016): 98–123.   8 Peter Purcell, “Oil and Gas Exploration in East Africa: A Brief History,” Search and Discovery Article 30388, (2014).   9 Usman Gidado, “Consequences of Port Congestion on Logistics and Supply Chains in African Ports,” Developing Country Studies 5, no. 6 (2015): 160–167. 10 Peter W. de Langen, “The Economic Performance of Seaport Regions,” In International Workshop on Ports, Cities and Global Supply Chains (2005: Hong Kong,

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China), 2007. See also John Humphrey and Hubert Schmitz, “How does Insertion in Global Value Chains Affect Upgrading in Industrial Clusters?” Regional Studies 36, no. 9 (2002): 1017–1027; 1018. Feisal Omar and Abdi Sheikh, “Somali Port Poised for Facelift with Turkish Help,” Reuters, October 23, 2014, www.reuters.com/article/us-somalia-ports/somali-port-poisedfor-facelift-with-turkish-help-idUSKCN0IC1DW20141023 Brendon J. Cannon and Ash Rossiter, “Ethiopia, Berbera port and the Shifting Balance of Power in the Horn of Africa,” Rising Powers Quarterly 2, no. 4 (2017): 7–29. “Tanzania Announces $421m Project to Strengthen Port of Dar es Salaam Infrastructure.” Oxford Business Group, August 31, 2017, https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/ news/tanzania-announces-421m-project-strengthen-port-dar-es-salaam-infrastructure Apolinari Tairo, “Tanzania Surrenders Bagamoyo Port Project to Chinese Firm,” The East African, April 3, 2017, www.theeastafrican.co.ke/business/Tanzania-Bagamoyoport-project-to-Chinese/2560–4122244-rxa9wtz/index.html Matina Stevis-Gridneff, “Middle East Power Struggle Plays Out on New Stage,” Wall Street Journal, June 1, 2018, www.wsj.com/articles/global-powers-race-for-positionin-horn-of-africa-1527861768 Djibouti is reportedly one of the major connection points on Huawei’s Pakistan East Africa Cable Express (PEACE) submarine cable, which aims to connect South Asia (and China) with Eastern Africa. Huawei began Desk Study and Marine Survey works in 2017 and the project linking the Chinese-built, Pakistani port of Gwadar with Djibouti, Somalia and Kenya is slated for completion in 2019. James Wamathai, “New PEACE Submarine Fibre Optic Cable to Land in Kenya in 2019,” Hapa Kenya, May 14, 2018, https://hapakenya.com/2018/05/14/new-peace-submarine-fibre-opticcable-to-land-in-kenya-in-2019/ Ra Mason, “Djibouti and Beyond: Japan’s First Post-War Overseas Base and the Recalibration of Risk in Securing Enhanced Military Capabilities,” Asian Security 14, no. 3 (2018): 339–357. See also John Aglionby and Simon Kerr, “Djibouti Finalising Deal for Saudi Arabian Military Base,” Financial Times. (January 17, 2017). www. ft.com/content/c8f63492-dc14–11e6–9d7c-be108f1c1dce Nizar Manek, “Djibouti Sees China Involvement in Port as No Threat to U.S.,” Bloomberg, March 14, 2018, www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018–03–14/ djibouti-sees-chinese-involvement-in-port-as-no-threat-to-u-s Costas Paris, “China Tightens Grip on East African Port,” Wall Street Journal, ­February 21, 2019, www.wsj.com/articles/china-tightens-grip-on-east-african-port11550746800 Author’s interview with Mogadishu-based businessperson, May 6, 2019. See also Amanda Sperber, “U.S. Developing Supply Route Along Dangerous Stretch from Djibouti to Somalia,” Foreign Policy, January 26, 2019, https://foreignpolicy. com/2019/01/26/u-s-developing-supply-route-along-dangerous-stretch-from-djiboutito-somalia/ Federico Donelli and Brendon J. Cannon, “Middle Eastern States in the Horn of Africa: Security Interactions and Power Projection,” Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale (ISPI), 2019, www.ispionline.it/it/pubblicazione/middle-eastern-stateshorn-africa-security-interactions-and-power-projection-22943 Ash Rossiter and Brendon J. Cannon, “Re-examining the ‘Base’: The Political and Security Dimensions of Turkey’s Military Presence in Somalia,” Insight Turkey 21, no. 1 (2019): 167–188. DOI: https://doi.org/10.25253/99.2019211.09 Author’s interview with Hargeisa-based former Somaliland government official, May 11, 2018. Addis Getachew, “Somaliland Seeks Recognition by Hosting Naval Bases,” AA, January 11, 2019, www.aa.com.tr/en/africa/somaliland-seeks-recognition-by-hostingnaval-bases/1361649

128   Brendon J. Cannon 25 Author’s interview with a Republic of Somaliland government official. May 12, 2018 in Berbera, Somaliland. 26 James M. Dorsey, “A Game of Chess: Gulf Crisis Expands into the Horn of Africa,” Huffington Post, March 1, 2018, www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/a-game-of-chess-gulfcrisis-expands-into-the-horn_us_5a4c62e7e4b0df0de8b06e14 27 Christina Goldbaum, “Massive US Military Buildup Suggests the US Shadow War in Somalia is Only Getting Bigger,” Vice News, May 4, 2018. https://news.vice.com/en_ ca/article/xw7nw3/somalia-is-looking-like-another-full-blown-us-war. See also Tom O’Connor, “Suicide Bomber Kills Civilians and Soldier near largest U.S. Military Base in Somalia,” Newsweek, May 9, 2018, www.newsweek.com/suicide-bomberkills-civilians-soldier-near-largest-us-military-base-somalia-917849 28 Africa Times Editor, “Indian Navy Ship arrives in Tanzania for Joint Exercises, Survey Mission.” Africa Times, November 17, 2017, https://africatimes.com/ 2017/11/17/indian-navy-ship-arrives-in-tanzania-for-joint-exercises-survey-mission/ 29 Rupali Pruthi, “INS Sarvekshak reaches Dar-Es-Salaam to conduct Joint Hydrographic Survey with Tanzanian Navy,” Jagran Josh, November 17, 2017, www.jagranjosh. com/current-affairs/ins-sarvekshak-reaches-daressalaam-to-conduct-joint-hydrographicsurvey-with-tanzanian-navy-1510892592–1 30 Xinhua, “Chinese Naval Fleet arrives in Tanzania for Friendly Visit,” China Daily, August 8, 2017, www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2017–08/18/content_30780566.htm 31 Xinhua, “Chinese Naval Hospital Ship ‘Peace Ark’ arrives in Mozambique,” Xinhua, October 1, 2019, www.coastweek.com/4045-Chinese-naval-hospital-ship-PeaceArk-arrives-in-Mozambique.htm 32 Nancy Kacungira, “Will Kenya get Value for Money from its new Railway?,” BBC, June 8, 2017, www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-40171095 33 Former Somalia president Mohamed Siad Barre (1969–1991), fielded an invasion of Ethiopia during the Ogaden War (1977–1978) that conquered large parts of eastern Ethiopia. The advance of Somalia National Army (SNA) troops and those of the West Somali Liberation Front (WSLF)—composed of ethnic Somalis living in the Ogaden in eastern Ethiopia—were only repulsed after the Soviet Union and Cuba intervened on the side of the embattled Marxist regime in Addis Ababa. The memory of this near-defeat has informed Ethiopian foreign policy since then and Ethiopia can be said to have taken advantage of the disintegration of Somalia that has occurred as a result of the Somali Civil War. James Mayall, “The Battle for the Horn: Somali Irredentism and International Diplomacy,” The World Today 34, no. 9 (1978): 336–345. 34 Xinhua Staff, “Ethiopia starts Test Crude Oil Extraction,” Xinhua, June 29, 2018, www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018–06/29/c_137288024.htm 35 Kacungira. 36 Brendon J. Cannon, “Is China Undermining Its Own Success in Africa?,” The Diplomat, February 8, 2019, https://thediplomat.com/2019/02/is-china-underminingits-own-success-in-africa/. See also Jonathan Kaiman, “ ‘China has conquered Kenya’: Inside Beijing’s New Strategy to Win African Hearts and Minds,” LA Times, August 7, 2017, www.latimes.com/world/asia/la-fg-china-africa-kenya-20170807htmlstory.html 37 China helped build the Tanzania-Zambia Railway (TAZARA) in the 1970s. The railway was also built with the cooperation of Tanzania and Zambia to eliminate landlocked Zambia’s economic dependence on Rhodesia (today’s Zimbawbwe) and South Africa, both of which were ruled by white-minority governments at the time. 38 Frederick Musisi and Mark K. Muhumuza, “The Route to Tanga: How Big Oil Deal slipped from Kenya’s Hands,” Daily Nation, April 25, 2016, www.nation.co.ke/lifestyle/ DN2/How-Kenya-lost-Uganda-pipeline-deal/-/957860/3174748/-/uxk0vez/-/index.html. See also Brendon J. Cannon, “Drive for Oil Exports pushes East Africa Pipeline

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52 53

Development,” Oil & Gas Journal, March 7, 2016, www.ogj.com/pipelines-transportation/ article/17210000/drive-for-oil-exports-pushes-east-africa-pipeline-development Halima Abdallah, “Tanga is still our Choice Route for Oil Pipeline—Total,” The East African, January 9, 2016, www.theeastafrican.co.ke/business/Tanga-is-still-ourchoice-route-for-oil-pipeline–-Total-/2560–3026912–148srgkz/index.html Bilal Derso, “Ethiopia tops Turkish Investment Destinations of Africa,” Ethiopian Herald, January 31, 2018, https://allafrica.com/stories/201801310663.html David Scott, “The Indo-Pacific in US Strategy: Responding to Power Shifts,” Rising Powers Quarterly 3, no. 2 (2018): 19–43. Rahul Roy-Chaudhury and Kate Sullivan de Estrada, “India, the Indo-Pacific and the Quad,” Survival 60, no. 3 (2018): 181–194. Walter Lohman, Ravi K. Sawhney, Andrew Davies, and Ippeita Nishida, The Quad Plus: Towards a Shared Strategic Vision for the Indo-Pacific. (Wisdom Tree, 2015). See also Sourina Bej, “How will the Quad Impact India’s Maritime Security Policy?,” The Diplomat, December 2, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/12/how-will-thequad-impact-indias-maritime-security-policy/. See also Bruce Weinrod, “Indo-Pacific Quad Security Cooperation should be a Permanent System,” Japan Forward, March 30, 2018, https://japan-forward.com/indo-pacific-quad-security-cooperation-shouldbe-a-permanent-system. See also Elbridge A. Colby, “The National Defense Strategy and the Indo-Pacific,” The Tokyo Foundation for Policy Research, May 15, 2018, www.tokyofoundation.org/en/articles/2018/nds-and-indo-pacific Kuni Miyake, “The ‘Indo-Pacific’ is Nothing New,” The Japan Times, June 4, 2018, www.japantimes.co.jp/opinion/2018/06/04/commentary/world-commentary/indo-pacificnothing-new/#.W4JuJc4zaUk Adam P. Liff, “Japan’s National Security Council at Five,” Brookings, December 4, 2018, www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2018/12/04/japans-national-securitycouncil-at-five/ Author’s interview with a Japanese Member of Parliament, June 12, 2019 in Tokyo, Japan. Jeffrey A. Bader, “China’s Role in East Asia: Now and the Future,” Brookings, September 6, 2005, www.brookings.edu/on-the-record/chinas-role-in-east-asia-now-andthe-future/. See also Julian Ryall, “Asian Arms Race is on, stoked by China’s Booming Defence Budget, Japanese Analysts say,” South China Morning Post, March 5, 2018, www.scmp.com/news/asia/east-asia/article/2135802/asian-arms-racestoked-chinas-booming-defence-budget-analysts Press Trust of India, “Japan pledges to back BRI Project, Promote Economic Cooperation with China,” October 26, 2018, www.business-standard.com/article/ international/japan-pledges-to-back-bri-project-promote-economic-cooperation-withchina-118102601194_1.html Author’s interview with Kuni Miyake, June 11, 2019 at the Canon Institute, Tokyo, Japan. Darryl Lupton, “Can the ‘Apology Standoff’ between China and Japan be Resolved?,” Culture Mandala 11, no. 2 (2015): 5913. See also Obrad Savić, “European Guilt: The Rhetoric of Apology,” Belgrade Journal of Media and Communications 2, no. 04 (2013): 129–146. See also Peter J. Seybolt, “China, Korea and Japan: Forgiveness and Mourning.” Asia Society, 2018, https://asiasociety.org/china-korea-and-japanforgiveness-and-mourning Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating famously noted in 2007 that China would be a “considerate” power. Peter Hartcher, “China a Peaceful Powerhouse: Keating,” The Sydney Morning Herald, April 11, 2007, www.smh.com.au/national/china-a-peacefulpowerhouse-keating-20070411-gdpvt0.html Sheila A. Smith, Intimate Rivals: Japanese Domestic Politics and a Rising China, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015). Author’s interview with Japanese think tank analyst, June 12, 2019 in Tokyo, Japan.

130   Brendon J. Cannon 54 The NSC does so by informal and formal means. In particular, it utilizes the multiple agencies and individuals that form part of the NSC—the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), for example—to host meetings and arrange events as part of the recent and increasingly important drive to encourage Japanese businesses to invest outside of Japan, to include eastern Africa. Author’s interview with a senior adviser at JICA, June 20, 2019 at JICA Headquarters, Tokyo, Japan. 55 Author’s interview with Dr. Katsumi Hirano, Executive Vice President, Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO), June 18, 2019 at the Institute of Developing Economies (IDE), Kaihim Makuhari, Tokyo, Japan. 56 Author’s interview with Yu Teraoka, Deputy Director of the Middle East and Africa Division, June 26, 2019 at METI Headquarters, Tokyo, Japan. 57 Author’s interview with former senior JICA official and ­academic, June 4, 2019, Tokyo, Japan. 58 Toyota Tsusho, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Mitsui and Marubeni are just some of the ­Japanese Keidanren operating in eastern Africa. 59 Author’s interview with a Japanese Member of Parliament, June 20, 2018 in Tokyo, Japan. 60 Author’s interview with Professor Tsutomu Kikuchi, June 27, 2018 at the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), Tokyo, Japan. 61 Mwaniki Wahome, “Kenya signs Sh25 billion deal with Japan for Mombasa port expansion,” Daily Nation, January 15, 2015, www.nation.co.ke/business/KenyaJapan-Agreement-Mombasa-Port-Expansion/996–2590674-qd1guwz/index.html 62 Nippon Koei, “About Us,” 2018, www.n-koei.co.jp/english/profile/global/ 63 Author’s interview with representatives of JPC, July 3, 2018 in Tokyo, Japan. 64 Cannon and Rossiter. 65 Brendon J. Cannon and Hirotaka Fujibayashi, “The Political Economy of Japan’s Relationship with East Africa: A Case Study of Kenya,” conference paper presented at The Pacific Century: International Studies Association Asia Conference, June 15–17, 2017, http://web.isanet.org/Web/Conferences/HKU2017-s/Archive/a0cd0ea2– 06f6–4bc5-af88–2a7f9bd6fdce.pdf 66 Naturally blessed with a depth of 14 meters, Nacala Port is the best natural harbor in southeastern Africa. Currently, it serves as a pivotal port for exports and imports in northern Mozambique. It is expected that the port will grow as the gateway to the Nacala Corridor, which has a population of approximately 45 million people. 67 Author’s interview with representatives of Mitsui, May 16, 2019 in Dubai, United Arab Emirates (UAE). 68 Scarlett Cornelissen, “Japan–Africa relations: Patterns and Prospects,” in Africa in International Politics: External Involvement on the Continent, eds. Ian Taylor and Paul Williams (Routledge, 2004), 128–147. See also Jun Morikawa, “Japan and Africa after the Cold War,” African and Asian Studies 4, no. 4 (2005): 485–508. See also Howard P. Lehman, Japan and Africa: Globalization and Foreign Aid in the 21st Century (Routledge, 2010). See also Mitsugi Endo, “From ‘Reactive’ to ‘Principled’: Japan’s Foreign Policy Stance toward Africa,” Japan’s Diplomacy Series, Japan Digital Library, 2013. www2.jiia.or.jp/en/digital_library/japan_s_diplomacy. php 69 Miria Pigato and Wenxia Tang, “China and Africa: Expanding Economic Ties in an evolving Global Context. Investing in Africa Forum,” World Bank Working Paper 95161, 2015. See also Suisheng Zhao, ed. China in Africa: Strategic motives and economic interests, (Routledge, 2017). 70 Thompson Ayodele and Olusegun Sotola, “China in Africa: An evaluation of Chinese investment,” Initiative for Public Policy Analysis, 2014: 1–20. See also Scarlett Cornelissen, Fantu Cheru, and Timothy M. Shaw, “Introduction: Africa and International Relations in the 21st Century: Still Challenging Theory?,” in Africa and international relations in the 21st century, eds. Scarlett Cornelissen, Fantu Cheru, and Timothy M. Shaw

Japan’s Indo-Pacific   131

71

72 73 74

75 76 77 78

79 80

81 82

83

(London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 1–17. See also Severine M. Rugumamu, “SinoAfrica Relations: The Dynamics of Seized and Squandered Opportunities,” The African Review 41, no. 2 (2017): 1–32. Courage Mlambo, Audrey Kushamba, and More Blessing Simawu, “China–Africa Relations: What Lies Beneath?,” The Chinese Economy 49, no. 4 (2016): 257–276. See also Hany Baseda and Ben O’Bright, “Maturing Sino-African relations,” Third World Quarterly, 38, no. 3 (2016): 655–677, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597. 2016.1191343. See also Robert Mason, “China’s Impact on the Landscape of African International Relations: Implications for Dependency Theory,” Third World Quarterly 38, no. 1 (2017): 84–96. Janet Eom, “‘China Inc.’ Becomes China the Builder in Africa,” The Diplomat, ­September 29, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/09/china-inc-becomes-china-thebuilder-in-africa/ Deborah Brautigam, The Dragon’s Gift: The Real Story of China in Africa (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009). Suisheng Zhao, “A Neo-colonialist Predator or Development Partner? China’s engagement and rebalance in Africa,” Journal of Contemporary China 23, no. 90 (2014): 1033–1052. See also Christine Hackenesch, “Not as bad as it seems: EU and US democracy promotion faces China in Africa,” Democratization 22, no. 3 (2015): 419–437. Scarlett Cornelissen and Ian Taylor, “The Political Economy of China and Japan’s Relationship with Africa: A Comparative Perspective,” The Pacific Review 13, no. 4 (2000): 615–633. See also Mlambo, Kushamba and Simawu. Ben Heubl, “The Numbers Behind China’s Overseas Development Loan Risks,” Nikkei Asian Review, 2018, https://asia.nikkei.com/Spotlight/Datawatch/The-numbersbehind-China-s-overseas-development-loan-risks Author’s interview with representatives of JPC, July 3, 2018 in Tokyo, Japan. Caroline Rose, “Discourses on Japan and China in Africa: Mutual Misalignment and the Prospects for Cooperation,” Japanese Studies 32, no. 2 (2012): 219–236. See also Nihon Keizai Shimbun, “Afurika ni Nobiru “Ittai-Ichiro”: Chugoku, Tetsudou Seibi wo Kasoku [“One Belt, One Road” Extending to Africa: China to Accelerate the Railway Development],” Nihon Keizai Shimbun, August 1, 2017, www.nikkei.com/ article/DGXLASGM25H2P_R00C17A8FF1000/ Lehman. Kelly Kadera and Gerald Sorokin, “Measuring National Power.” International Interactions 30, no. 3 (2004): 211–230. doi:10.1080/03050620490492097. See also Ashley J. Tellis, Measuring National Power in the Postindustrial Age, 1110 (Rand Corporation, 2001). Zhiqun Zhu, China’s New Diplomacy: Rationale, Strategies and Significance (Routledge, 2016). See also Joshua Eisenman and Eric Heginbotham, China and the Developing World: A New Global Dynamic (Routledge, 2018). The ad hoc nature of BRI projects is manifest from attempts to actually identify which projects are synonymous with Beijing’s BRI versus those labeled “BRI” simply because they are funded, built or planned by Chinese organizations and/or businesses. See John Hurley, Scott Morris, and Gailyn Portelance, “Examining the Debt Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative from a Policy Perspective,” Journal of Infrastructure, Policy and Development 3, no. 1 (2019): 139–175; 146–147. doi:10.24294/jipd.v3i1.1123. See also Tanner Greer, “One Belt, One Road, One Big Mistake,” Foreign Policy, December 6, 2018, https://foreignpolicy.com/2018/12/06/ bri-china-belt-road-initiative-blunder/ Panos Mourdoukoutas, “Japan Cannot Stop China from Owning Africa – It’s Too Late,” Forbes, September 5, 2019, www.forbes.com/sites/panosmourdoukoutas/ 2019/09/05/japan-cannot-stop-china-from-owning-africa-its-too-late/#79fddbe42c09

132   Brendon J. Cannon 84 Andrew Chatzky and James McBride, “China’s Massive Belt and Road Initiative,” Council on Foreign Relations, March 21, 2019, www.cfr.org/backgrounder/ chinas-massive-belt-and-road-initiative 85 Numerous complaints were aired when Kenyan workers learned that jobs building the new railroad would go to the thousands of unskilled Chinese workers entering the country. Paul Wafula, “Revealed: The 5000- strong Chinese army powering the SGR,” The Standard, July 15, 2018, www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2001288060/ exclusive-5000-strong-chinese-army-behind-sgr-walls. See also Lily Kuo, “Kenyan rail workers are protesting against their Chinese employer for a raise—to $5 a day,” Quartz Africa, August 3, 2016. https://qz.com/africa/749177/kenyan-rail-workers-areprotesting-against-their-chinese-employer-for-a-raise-to-5-a-day/ 86 Richard Boucher, “China’s Belt and Road: A Reality Check,” The Diplomat, March 29, 2019. https://thediplomat.com/2019/03/chinas-belt-and-road-a-reality-check/ 87 Paul Tiyambe Zeleza, “Dancing with the Dragon Africa’s Courtship with China,” The Global South 2, no. 2 (2008): 171–187; 183. See also May Tan-Mullins, “Successes and Failures of Corporate Social Responsibility Mechanisms in Chinese Extractive Industries,” Journal of Current Chinese Affairs 43, no. 4 (2014): 19–39. See also May Tan-Mullins, Frauke Urban, and Grace Mang, “Evaluating the Behaviour of Chinese Stakeholders Engaged in Large Hydropower Projects in Asia and Africa,” The China Quarterly 230 (2017): 464–488. 88 John Aglionby. “Tokyo takes on Beijing in Africa, claiming quality over speed,” Financial Times, January 11, 2016, www.ft.com/content/564df09e-824a-11e5-a01c8650859a4767 89 Reiji Yoshida, “TICAD closes with Effort by Japan to differentiate its African Investment Projects from China’s,” The Japan Times, August 30, 2019, www.japantimes. co.jp/news/2019/08/30/national/politics-diplomacy/ticad-closes-effort-japan-differentiateafrican-investment-projects-chinas/#.XZW5xlUzaUk. See also Julie Yu-Wen Chen and Obert Hodzi, “Japan and China court Africa,” China Policy Institute, September 15, 2016, https://cpianalysis.org/2016/09/15/japan-africa-china-triangular-relation-asrevealed-in-tokyo-international-conference-on-african-development/ 90 See also Moses Michira, and Dominic Omondi, “Kenya now battlefront for Asian rivals in economic and territorial wars,” The Standard, August 27, 2016, www.standardmedia. co.ke/business/article/2000213589/kenya-now-battlefront-for-china-and-japan 91 Brendon J. Cannon, “Turkey in Kenya and Kenya in Turkey: Alternatives to the East/ West paradigm in diplomacy, trade and security,” African Journal of Political Science and International Relations 10, no. 5 (2016): 56–65. See also Christina Stolte, “Brazil in Africa: Seeking International Status, not Resources,” Harvard International Review 34, no. 4 (2013): 63–67. See also Lyal White, “Emerging owers in Africa: Is Brazil any different?,” South African Journal of International Affairs 20, no. 1 (2013): 117–136. 92 Author’s interview with senior executives at Toyo Construction, Ltd., June 24, 2019 in Tokyo, Japan. 93 Eom. 94 Author’s interview with a Japanese academic, June 19, 2018 in Tokyo, Japan.

8 China and India Nautical games in the Indian Ocean Mohan Malik

Introduction Asia’s old rivals, China and India—each a rising power in its own right with a distinct vision of regional order—are now competing furiously to win over the allegiance of small island states in the Indian Ocean in order to establish bases for the forward deployment of their naval assets and to gain relative advantage and leverage over each other. During his official visit to Indonesia in 2013, China’s President Xi Jinping unveiled his vision for the twenty-first century Maritime Silk Road (MSR)—the maritime component of China’s One Belt One Road (OBOR, now renamed the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in English)1 initiative—that would see Chinese investments in port development along the Indian Ocean, from Southeast Asia all the way to East Africa. In India, the MSR was widely perceived as an updated version of China’s previous “String of Pearls 2.0” maritime strategy whereby China creates economic dependencies for smaller Indian Ocean states and potentially takes control of ports along regional chokepoints. Speaking at the annual Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in June 2018, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi—in a veiled criticism of China— called for the Indo-Pacific region to embrace freedom of navigation and overflight, territorial integrity and respect for all nations, regardless of their size: “We will promote a democratic and rules-based international order in which all nations, small and large, count as equal and sovereign. We will work with others to keep our seas, space and airways free and open.”2 For his part, former US Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, in far more pointed terms, called out China for its intimidation and coercion of smaller nations in the region. Both Modi and Mattis were expressing concern over China’s military buildup on the artificial islands in the South China Sea and Beijing’s “debt-trap diplomacy” whereby China establishes its naval presence through a string of bases along the Indian Ocean maritime chokepoints by bankrupting its trading partners.3 From Beijing’s perspective, however, China’s military expansion is natural and commensurate with its status as the world’s largest trading nation and supports its strategic imperative of protecting its vital sea-lanes and ever-growing economic assets, including large numbers of Chinese nationals across the region. Beijing, therefore, sees any criticism of its maritime expansion or adoption of countermeasures by India, Japan

134   Mohan Malik and the United States as containment. Evidently, China, India and the United States each has a distinct vision of the region based on their respective geostrategic interests whose success hinges on enlisting the support of small island states and middle powers. To illustrate the maritime maneuvers and ongoing shifts in geopolitical alignments, this chapter focuses on the growing Sino-Indian rivalry over small island states in the Indian Ocean which bears remarkable resemblance to the naval competition to acquire access to resources, markets and bases (RMB) amongst rising industrializing powers of earlier periods in history. This analysis is grounded in “Power Transitions” theory, which argues that shifts in the balance of economic and military power are often a sufficient trigger for a rivalry where previously none had existed.4 Rising powers compete for power and influence to impose their will on the global order. In this endeavor, they seek the support of small and middle powers which, in turn, generates tensions and rivalries with both competing and established powers. For example, tensions have erupted between China and India over Sri Lanka and the Maldives as China has sought to leverage its economic heft to acquire exclusive control over ports on those island nations. Due to an exponential growth in Chinese power over the last four decades, the Indo-Pacific region today is home to both sub-regional and pan-regional rivalries, most of which involve China. Many regional conflicts are prolonged by territorial disputes and complicated by interstate competition for predominance within their spheres of influence, for example, Sino-Japanese clashes in the East China Sea, Sino-Vietnamese confrontations in the South China Sea, and Sino-Indian frictions in the Himalayas and the Indian Ocean.5 Needless to say, Asian rivals see fit to cooperate when their interests converge but compete when their interests and visions diverge. In reality, cooperation in economic, environmental and other transnational challenges helps moderate rivalries rooted in history, territorial disputes, competition for forward military presence and preeminence in their spheres of influence, as well as in multilateral institutions.

Caught in the middle The Indian Ocean region (IOR), through which flows 80 percent of the world’s oil, is home to economically weak countries with tiny islands and small populations that encompass large maritime territories. This is emerging as a major arena of great power maritime competition between China and its proxies on one side and India, Japan and the United States on the other side. Small island states and middle powers along the rims of the Indian and Western Pacific oceans thus find themselves caught in the middle as the two emerging rival blocs strive to extend their influence. Most small and middle powers are reluctant to be pawns of the great powers or get drawn into power rivalries which negatively influence domestic politics and constrain their foreign policy options. Concerned with economic growth and domestic security issues, most small and middle powers seek to play off both sides against each other instead of relying on an exclusive

China and India   135 major power patron. Maneuvering between major powers allows the small states to extract benefits from both sides while maintaining their autonomy.6 This is the so-called “non-alignment” strategy that India and many other states pursued visà-vis the United States and the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Smaller states are now adopting the same strategy vis-à-vis India and China—albeit with slight variations and differing degrees of success. In the “Great Game” stakes, small and middle powers play a big role. They often determine the nature and outcome of major power competition as major powers become great powers with the support of small and middle powers. Put simply, a major power is not great, it cannot be a leader if it does not have followers, i.e., the support of small and middle powers that serve to magnify its power. The support of small and middle powers, or lack of it, makes all the difference between great power dominance and defeat. That is why small and middle powers are often called “pivotal states” or “swing states.” For example, during the Cold War, China and Egypt were two middle powers or “swing states.” When China and Egypt shifted their support from the Soviet Union to the United States, they became pivotal players and brought about a decisive shift in the Asian and Middle Eastern balances of power respectively. This tilted the scales against the Soviet Union and the rest is history. In a geopolitical replay of strategic competition with China, Washington is now courting the new “swing states”—Vietnam, Indonesia, Myanmar and India—to counter-balance China in the Indo-Pacific. China’s focus on the Indian Ocean region is relatively new, dating back to the early 1990s to secure energy resources for its growing economy, to expand trade and commercial links. Much of China’s energy supplies (nearly 80 percent) and trade routes are vulnerable as they transit the Indian Ocean maritime chokepoints—the Strait of Malacca, the Strait of Hormuz and the narrow Bab-el-Mandab Strait—under the watchful of eye of American and Indian navies. The last two decades have seen a steady transformation of the formerly Pacific Ocean-­ oriented power into one that straddles both Pacific and Indian Oceans. Unlike its land grab at breakneck speed in the South China Sea, the Chinese naval advances in the IOR are subtle, gradual and mostly under the veneer of (dualuse) commercial projects. Beijing’s MSR or two-ocean (Pacific and Indian Oceans) strategy is quintessentially an Indo-Pacific strategy by another name. However, China’s expansion into the Indian Ocean challenges India’s regional dominance. The tankers that move through the Indian Ocean carry 65 percent of India’s oil and 60 percent of Japan’s, making those sea-lanes critically important to Asia’s three largest economies. However, from the perspective of India’s neighbors, China’s infrastructure megaproject dovetails with their goal of attracting development finance for economic growth and connectivity and Chinese presence provides a useful counterweight to India’s power. As their need for resources, markets, and bases grows, Asian giants are increasingly running into each other in third countries. New Delhi has watched warily as Beijing, through its ambitious MSR, has made deep inroads into what India once considered its natural sphere of influence. China’s growing economic

136   Mohan Malik presence in small states from the Seychelles to the Solomon Islands provides Beijing with significant leverage and latitude to enlist their support for China’s broader strategic objectives. Relatively small investments and aid can go a long way in making friends and influencing elites in a number of states—thereby allowing China to access or even deny vast waters of vital strategic importance to India, Japan and the United States. For both China and India, “forward presence” has acquired greater salience in their national security strategies to achieve “situational awareness” in areas of strategic interest.7 For Beijing, this means having a presence in the Indian Ocean; for New Delhi, having a naval presence in the Pacific Ocean becomes critical for its strategic deterrence against Beijing especially since $66 billion worth of exports and about 33 percent of India’s trade passes through the South China Sea. Having consolidated its hold over the South China Sea by militarizing artificial islands, China’s navy has now set its sights on the Indian Ocean. Chinese strategists argue that it is a question of when, not if, a Chinese aircraft carrier battle group is deployed in the Indian Ocean to protect Chinese interests and assets there.8 Chinese media reports suggest that of six planned aircraft carriers, two will be deployed in the Indian Ocean. Beijing’s stance is that the South China Sea is China’s sea, but the Indian Ocean cannot be treated as India’s ocean, which draws New Delhi’s ire and derision. The informal Modi-Xi summit in Wuhan, in May 2018, was aimed at ensuring that the ever-growing divide between China and India over a range of issues (e.g., the boundary dispute, the Belt and Road Initiative, the Nuclear Suppliers Group membership and China’s growing naval presence in the Indian Ocean region) does not lead to disputes and conflicts either in the Himalayan region or in the Indian Ocean. Notwithstanding the “Wuhan spirit,” there has been little or no let-up in China’s penetration of India’s periphery. Historically, small states are the first to experience major geopolitical shifts. Usually “the bit players” on the periphery of rising powers play a disproportionate role in triggering major crises, which prove to be turning points during power transitions. Sri Lanka, Bhutan, the Maldives, Mauritius, the Seychelles and Djibouti all fit the bill. As discussed later, the changing geopolitical configurations in Asia—China’s growing power and presence and India’s response to it—have also sharpened their domestic political divisions. The intense jockeying for influence and forward presence between India, China and others in the Indian Ocean over control of ports, airports and other pieces of critical infrastructure and for influence over governments have made the vast Indo-Pacific region from East Asia to East Africa a major arena of competition amongst major powers.

Sri Lanka: the fulcrum of rivalry Sri Lanka has become the poster child of China’s BRI modus operandi and a case study on how not to fall into the debt trap and lose sovereignty over ­strategic assets such as ports and airports. Sri Lanka’s 26-year-long civil war,

China and India   137 international sanctions for gross human rights violations, widespread corruption and strongman politics, and more importantly, Colombo’s strategic imperative to balance against a much larger power, India, drove it into China’s embrace. Sri Lankans have not forgiven India for its military intervention in Sri Lanka’s ethnic conflict during 1987–1989. In the last stages of the conflict against the separatist Tamil Tigers, China provided steadfast military and diplomatic support to the Sri Lankan government. After the civil war ended in 2009, Sri  Lanka was faced with international isolation for gross human rights violations. As India and the West shied away, Beijing stepped in to extend its helping hand with economic reconstruction and became Colombo’s largest investor, lender and trading partner. Beijing landed contracts to build highways, ports and an airport: one big-ticket Chinese project was a port in Hambantota at Sri Lanka’s southern tip, built at a cost of around $360 million, with 85 percent Chinese funding, and another was a $1.4 billion port city in Colombo. The growing Chinese influence and presence in Sri Lanka during the reign of former pro-China President Mahinda Rajapaksa made India uneasy. The docking of a Chinese ­submarine in 2014 in Sri Lanka showed the country had moved too close to China for India’s comfort.9 In the 2014 presidential elections, New Delhi threw its support behind Maithripala Sirisena, the common opposition candidate against Rajapaksa, who campaigned against the widespread corruption and railed against the “neo-­ colonial” nature of Chinese investments. If elected, Sirisena promised to pursue a more balanced foreign policy and put economically unsustainable projects such as the Colombo Port City on hold. The defeat of Rajapaksa and Sirisena’s surprise victory raised hopes of a “new beginning” in Sri Lankan-Indian relations but these turned out to be short-lived. A combative Beijing dismissed ­allegations of corruption in the awarding of contracts to Chinese firms worth ­billions of dollars. Asking Sirisena’s foreign minister to stop criticizing the “expensive Chinese loans,” Chinese ambassador Yi Xianliang demanded that “[The]Sri Lankan people and government should have some gratitude for the things given.”10 The Sirisena government was keen to reorient Sri Lanka toward India, Japan and the West. President Maithripala Sirisena visited India on his first overseas trip invoking cultural and religious links and Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi reciprocated, promising India would develop an oil tank “farm,” offered $318 million in credit for rail works and a $1.5 billion ­currency swap between their central banks.11 To lease or not to lease: from 199 years to 99 years However, faced with a sinking economy, mounting debt, and a balance of payments crisis, the newly elected President Sirisena abandoned campaign promises to block Chinese plans for a $1.4 billion Colombo Port City and green-lighted it, paying a fine to the Chinese for its initial cancellation. Within a year, Sri Lanka was again wooing Chinese investments, renegotiating old and negotiating new loans. In December 2017, unable to pay its loans and under heavy Chinese

138   Mohan Malik p­ ressure, Colombo entered into a debt-for-equity swap and handed over the Hambantota port and 15,000 acres of land around it to China on a 99-year lease. In addition, China Merchants Holdings International, which built a $500 million container terminal at Colombo Port, also owns 85 percent of Colombo Port as well with 270 acres on a 99-year lease. Despite concerns about Chinese loans, Sri Lanka’s dysfunctional coalition government borrowed a further $1 billion loan from China Development Bank in May 2018 to meet debt repayments, and in March 2019 secured a $989 million loan to build a highway connecting ­Hambantota to the central region of Kandy.12 Huawei’s Smart City project in Colombo Port City also faced criticism for being overly ambitious and debtladen. Sri Lanka reportedly owes more than $13 billion to Chinese companies and banks. Although Colombo has repeatedly assured New Delhi that these ports would not be used for anti-India activities, doubts persist owing to Sri Lanka’s growing indebtedness to Beijing, the election of Rajapaksa’s brother as president late 2019 and increasing Chinese influence with its political elite. The Hambantota port lease is a good example of China’s hardball diplomacy and use of loans and aid to gain a strategic foothold in the Indian Ocean. According to Sri Lankan Minister of Ports and Shipping, Arjuna Ranatunga, “the Chinese initially asked for a 199 lease [on Hambantota] and we said we will give only on a 51-year lease. Later they came down to 99 years from 199.”13 The 99-year lease may have erased roughly $1 billion in debt for the port project but Colombo soon found itself mired in more debt to Beijing than ever. Nearly 95.4 percent of all government revenue is currently going toward paying back its loans. Since India is no match for China’s economic largesse, New Delhi has teamed up with Japan and the United States to counter Chinese influence by providing aid and finance infrastructure development. India is partnering with Japan to facilitate a change in direction by offering to develop Trincomalee port on Sri Lanka’s eastern coastline, and invest in Mattala airport which would also allow New Delhi to keep a close watch on the nearby Hambantota port. A Chennai-based firm has also won a stake in a multibillion-dollar oil refinery that Sri Lanka plans to construct along its southern shores in Hambantota. In short, Beijing has been on the lookout for allies to shore up its naval presence in the Indian Ocean, offering billions of dollars to build port facilities and infrastructure development as part of its MSR initiative. Along the way, countries such as Sri Lanka, Cambodia, and the Maldives have found themselves saddled with debts they cannot pay and end up signing over territory to China. As discussed later, Chinese interests have also bought into other port projects in the Maldives, Myanmar, Cambodia, Pakistan Kenya and the Sudan, raising speculation that Beijing aims to establish a series of bases, or a “string of pearls,” from the Middle East to China.14

Tug-of-war over the Maldives An idyllic archipelagic nation of 390,000 people, the Maldives has emerged as the latest arena for the intensifying geostrategic rivalry between two Asian

China and India   139 giants vying for influence in the Indian Ocean. The small island state of the ­Maldives, much like Sri Lanka, has an outsized importance for India, given its location astride the sea-lanes in the central Indian Ocean through which much of India’s shipping cargo passes. Although the Maldives has long been within India’s orbit, relations frayed after 2012, when the Maldives’ first democratically elected president, Mohamed Nasheed, was overthrown in a coup by the old ruling establishment which brought autocratic Abdulla Yameen into power. Since becoming president in 2013 after a controversy-marred election, Yameen systematically weakened democratic institutions, crushed all dissent, curbed civil liberties and actively courted Beijing. The docking of three Chinese warships at a Maldivian port in August 2017 crossed India’s “red line,” and led New Delhi to step up its support for the Maldivian opposition and demand free and fair elections to resolve the deepening political crisis. Traditional ties with India deteriorated progressively following a Beijing-backed “self-coup” by President Abdulla Yameen in February 2018 who declared a state of emergency in response to a Supreme Court order for the release of political opponents, including his rival and former president Mohamed Nasheed, sacked police chiefs and imprisoned chief justices and prominent parliamentarians. This “all-out assault on democracy” by President Yameen drew widespread condemnation, including from the UN human rights chief. While India and the United States deplored the move and called for the restoration of the constitutional order and release of opponents, President Yameen dispatched envoys to “friendly nations” China, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to shore up support. In response, former President Nasheed, living in exile, appealed for India’s military intervention to resolve the crisis. He accused China of “buying up the Maldives,” fearing that the next presidential election could be “the last chance to extricate the Maldives from increasing Chinese influence.”15 Beijing, naturally, dismissed Nasheed’s accusations, claiming that “China offered selfless assistance” for social development. Amidst reports of India putting its special forces on alert, Beijing voiced its opposition to external interference, saying that “China did not want the Maldives to become another ‘flashpoint’ in bilateral relations.”16 While a Foreign Ministry spokesperson invoked the “principles enshrined in UN Charter,” the Global Times reported that China had threatened to “take action to stop” an Indian intervention in the Maldives.17 China’s deeds matched its words. To deter Indian intervention and to show solidarity with the beleaguered autocrat a Chinese naval flotilla of eleven warships, centered on a Type 071 amphibious assault ship, entered the Andaman Sea through the Sunda Straits, emboldening Yameen to extend the state of emergency despite India’s strong opposition.18 Chinese diplomats made it known that Beijing was ready to help Yameen if India tried to unseat him.19 Thus, six months after the mid-2017 military standoff over ­Bhutan’s disputed Doklam territory in the Himalayas, China and India found themselves watching each other warily, this time in the Indian Ocean. Despite a growing chorus for military intervention, the Modi government, working in

140   Mohan Malik concert with the United States, Japan, and Australia, chose a diplomatic pathway to pressure the Yameen government to restore democracy. The United States, with its own base south of the Maldives in Diego Garcia, shared India’s ­concerns about an autocratic regime heavily indebted to Beijing being manipulated to provide access to Chinese naval vessels. Move over, India—here comes China Until the ouster of President Nasheed in 2012, the Maldives was tied closely to India economically and militarily under its “India First policy.” In 1988, when a group of mercenaries tried to seize power, India intervened militarily in support of then President Maumoon Abdul Gayoom, who ruled for three decades, and later aided the Maldives’ transition to democracy. Up until 2012, China did not even have an embassy in Malé. However, between 2013 and 2018, Beijing made significant inroads into the Maldivian economy and politics. The shift began with the abrupt termination of a contract to an Indian company to develop the Malé international airport in 2012 and its subsequent award to a Chinese company. Following Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to the Maldives in 2014, the Yameen government amended the Constitution to allow foreign ownership of land, thereby paving the way for leasing the island of Feydhoo Finolhu to China for 50 years. Faced with the possibility of extinction due to rising sea levels, the Maldives also sought to leverage Chinese technical prowess in land reclamation and in creating artificial islands via dredging. Since 2013, large Chinese investments in infrastructure, housing projects and tourism have drawn the tourist paradise in the Indian Ocean into Beijing’s tight embrace. Days before President Yameen’s meeting with President Xi in Beijing in December 2017, a hurriedly convened parliamentary session rammed through a 1,000-page free trade agreement (FTA) with China in less than an hour, leading to sharp criticism from the opposition. As in Sri Lanka, the Maldives’ fledgling democracy became a casualty of President Xi’s megaproject. The growing perception of President Yameen as “Beijing’s man in Malé” prompted Foreign Policy news magazine to ask: “Is Abdulla Yameen Handing over the Maldives to China?”20 Meanwhile, ties with New Delhi plunged to an all-time low as the Yameen government adopted a “go-slow” policy on India-backed economic and defense projects and stopped renewing or issuing visas for an estimated 25,000 Indian professionals in the country.21 While India boycotted China’s Belt and Road Forum held in May 2017, the Maldives enthusiastically signed up for it.22 Malé’s no-show in India’s premier multinational MILAN naval exercise and the DefExpo2018 further signaled China’s growing clout in India’s front yard.23 Having bought into the Chinese dream of turning his island nation into the “Singapore of the Indian Ocean,” President Yameen became increasingly hostile to India. The secrecy surrounding the financing terms of various development projects at inflated costs aroused further suspicions about a hidden political agenda. An International Monetary Fund report projected the Maldives’ external debt will

China and India   141 hit 51.2 percent of GDP in 2021, up from 34.7 percent in 2016. The Maldives also had a $286 million trade deficit with China.24 Former President Nasheed claimed that 80 percent of the Maldives’ foreign debt (approximately $1.5 to $2.6 billion) was owed to Beijing and that inability to repay the debt would “force the Maldives to cede territory to China as early as 2019.” Alleging that China had “already taken over 16 islands,” he claimed that “[w]ithout firing a single shot, China has grabbed more land than the East India Company at the height of the 19th century.”25 As India and the United States became concerned over a Chinese foothold in the Maldives, Nasheed promised to review deals signed with Beijing if returned to power. Beijing, of course, denied any ulterior motives. Nonetheless, the deluge of Chinese money left the fledgling democracy in tatters and its future mortgaged to the Middle Kingdom. As reports came in that Yameen received $1.5 million weeks before the September 2018 presidential elections, there was little hope that the presidential elections were going to be free and fair. Move over, China—here comes India With China providing him protection from rival India, and confident of his grip over domestic politics, Yameen called elections in September 2018 believing that he would retain power. However, the victory of the opposition candidate Ibrahim Mohamed Solih in presidential elections that saw a 90 percent voter turnout stunned Yameen and his backers. Solih’s Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) had adopted an anti-China stance, with MDP founder Mohamed Nasheed accusing China of dragging his country into a “debt trap.” Yameen ­initially toyed with the idea of staying on in power but India, the US, Britain and others warned him against sabotaging the popular verdict.26 The strong-arm tactics ultimately backfired culminating in the defeat of a Beijing-backed tyrant in what one analyst called “a fairytale ending” to the Maldivians’ ordeal.27 Strongman Yameen—who gained power through a coup, was dogged by corruption, surreptitiously amended the Constitution to lease his country’s islands for a few millions of dollars; presided over a repressive regime that jailed or exiled parliamentarians and judges; stifled free speech; aligned his country with China, abandoning decades-old ties with India and alienating Western governments, and trapped his country in massive debt—was gone, finally.28 The surprising victory of opposition leader Solih was seen as a strategic victory for India which had resisted calls from exiled Maldivian opposition leaders—and hawks at home—to intervene militarily after Yameen imposed a state of emergency and imprisoned his political rivals in February 2018. India’s Prime Minister Modi flew to Malé for Solih’s inauguration. In a sharp rebuke to Beijing, Solih declared that India was the Maldives’ “closest ally” while his defense and finance ministers pledged to pursue a “neighbors-first” foreign policy. Their joint statement emphasized “the importance of maintaining peace and security in the Indian Ocean and being mindful of each other’s concerns and aspirations for the stability of the region.”29 Drawing attention to “the dire

142   Mohan Malik e­ conomic situation facing the country,” President Solih sought Indian help in building houses and establishing water and sewerage systems in the outlying islands, thus signaling a shift from the grandiose projects favored by Beijing. The new foreign minister visited India to ask for $300 million in immediate financial support to tide over a budgetary crunch. Given the murky nature of deals under President Yameen, confusion prevailed over the exact size of the country’s total debt to China. The country’s foreign loans and sovereign guarantees totaled about $2.65 billion, equal to 60 percent of gross domestic product. India offered financial assistance of $1.4 billion. In March 2019, the Export Import Bank of India signed an agreement with Maldives to make available credit worth $800 million for a variety of development projects. Many of the anti-India decisions taken by former President Yameen were either reversed (such as the law on foreign ownership of land, and the return of India helicopters) or put on hold (e.g., the “one-sided FTA” with China).30 The Maldives also abstained from the second Belt and Road Forum held in April 2019, indicating a reorientation of its policy on China’s BRI. Despite the Solih government’s promise to review contracts with China, Malé may find it hard to wriggle out of unfavorable deals made by the previous government in the same way as Sri Lanka’s President Sirisena over the Hambantota and Colombo port projects. Since Malé owes Beijing 80 percent of its total debt—equivalent to about 25 percent of GDP—Beijing will continue to enjoy significant economic leverage over Malé.31 In short, a peaceful regime change checked Malé’s slide into China’s orbit. The ouster of Beijing’s man in Malé gives India a second chance to build bridges and regain influence. Over the long term though, the strategic imperative of balancing between two rising powers will make China an important part of the Maldivian calculus, similarly for other smaller countries in the region. National interests and India’s size and power will continue to drive the smaller nations on its periphery to look to China as a counterweight. On balance, Malé’s relationship with Beijing is unlikely to diminish considerably. In addition to the Maldives and Sri Lanka, India has also been a security provider to other Indian Ocean island states such as the Seychelles and Mauritius. India’s privileged access and influence in many of the Indian Ocean island states has long been a source of concern for China.

The Seychelles saga In 2011, when Chinese defense minister General Liang Guanglie visited the Western Indian Ocean island state of the Seychelles, the Seychelles reportedly offered China a port to supply ships fighting piracy in the Gulf of Aden. Beijing welcomed the offer saying it would consider seeking supply facilities at appropriate harbors in the Seychelles or other countries. This prompted India to step up its naval collaboration with the island country to keep it within its orbit by offering to build a coastguard facility and airstrip on Assumption Island. As part of India’s riposte to China’s expanding naval footprint, Indian Prime Minister Modi visited the Seychelles and Mauritius in 2015 and signed

China and India   143 agreements for developing infrastructure on Seychelles’ Assumption Island and Mauritius’ Agalega Island. However, the Assumption project (i.e., the construction of an airstrip and a jetty for the Seychelles Coast Guard and Indian Navy) could not proceed as the Seychelles government failed to get the opposition’s support for the agreement. Then, days before the Maldivian crisis erupted, India succeeded in inking a revised version of the agreement on January 27, 2018 during Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar’s visit to the Seychelles. The revised pact sought to allay domestic concerns about its impact on the environment and infringement of Seychellois sovereignty. The Indian government also committed in the new pact that no vessels or aircraft carrying nuclear weapons would be allowed to “land, dock or use the facilities.” It further promised not to use the facilities “in any way whatsoever for the purposes of war.”32 Still, those opposed to the pact continued to hold protests against the project, and on March 6, 2018 the bilateral agreement to build military facilities and station Indian naval ­personnel on Seychelles’ Assumption Island was leaked online alleging that “the Seychelles government had ‘sold off’ the island to India to build a ‘military base’.”33 The online leakage of a classified pact is said to be the handiwork of elements seeking to wean the Seychelles away from India’s orbit. More often than not, small and weak states’ attempts to extract benefits by playing one great power off against another boomerang as they fall prey to intervention by external forces to influence and shape domestic political outcomes to advance their own vested interests. The Seychelles’ decision to revoke an offer that would have allowed India to construct and operate a military base on Assumption Island is a case in point. On June 4, 2018, the president of ­Seychelles, Danny Faure, told a press conference that the January 27 agreement signed with India to develop a base would “not move forward. In next year’s budget we will put funds for us to build a coastguard facility on Assumption [Island] ourselves.” Some attributed it to China’s discomfiture, others to domestic political opposition. While New Delhi’s plans for greater presence on the Seychelles islands remain in limbo, Chinese plans for “strategic supply bases” for warship berthing and logistics facilities in the Western Indian Ocean, including in the Seychelles, are moving forward.34

Mauritian maneuvers Mauritius, a stable democracy of 1.3 million people, has around 2.3 million square kilometers of maritime exclusive economic zone that is potentially rich in oil and minerals. India has long dominated investment flows to Mauritius and is funding the development of Metro Express, a light rail service linking Port Louis with Curepipe, the island nation’s second largest town. The island country relies on India for security. Indian Navy vessels dock frequently at ports. Having suffered a setback in its efforts to build a naval base in the Seychelles, India plans to extend the runway on Mauritius’s outlying Agalega Island and build a jetty. As in the Seychelles, there have been some murmurs of protest from opposition.

144   Mohan Malik Beijing has also begun its proactive courtship of the island state, selling it the dream of becoming “the Singapore of Africa.” In 2015, China replaced India to become the biggest exporter to Mauritius, and in 2017, China was the secondlargest foreign investor at $70 million. Major China-funded infrastructure ­projects include a new terminal at Mauritius’ international airport with a $260 million loan, a sports complex and stadium, a fishing port and Jin Fei Smart City for Chinese companies on the coast a few miles west of Port Louis. Huawei has its African headquarters on the island.35 During his visit to Mauritius in July 2018, Chinese President Xi Jinping stressed the need for a free trade agreement to “leverage [Mauritius’] unique geographical location in the Belt and Road Initiative and align … with China in a wide range of areas.”36 As the “Chindia” naval rivalry intensifies, Mauritius must navigate the shifting waters skillfully, avoiding the pitfalls of the Maldives and the Seychelles. Given the Chinese shipping giant COSCO’s bid to run the Port Louis port, the South China Morning Post quoted one observer as saying that “India will have the runway and China will get the port.”37 More importantly, the recent decision by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) that the Chagos Islands—with its huge US military base at Diego Garcia— were cleaved illegally from Mauritius by Britain at the time of independence has the potential to escalate strategic competition between the United States and China and place India in the middle.38 Given India’s long-standing stance on decolonization and historic relationship with Mauritius, New Delhi supports Port Louis’ claim against Britain to the Chagos archipelago. However New Delhi no longer wants to see the US navy withdraw from Diego Garcia haphazardly, which would allow the Chinese navy to fill in the vacuum. Moreover, under the logistics exchange agreement with Washington, India’s navy has acquired access rights to the US base at Diego Garcia. For the US military, Diego Garcia is immensely important given “[i]ts strategic location between Africa and ­Indonesia and 1,000 miles south of India gives the U.S. access to the Middle East, Central and South Asia, and the vast Indian Ocean.”39 Even though China trashed the international court’s verdict on the South China Sea as “mere waste paper,”40 it would be uncharacteristic of Beijing to let go of the opportunity to drive a wedge between Mauritius and India and the United States and India. Beijing could fish in troubled waters by encouraging the political parties in ­Mauritius to insist on the early implementation of the ICJ’s ruling on the Chagos Islands in return for greater investment, aid and trade. As the Maldives has shown, small bucks deliver big bang in small island states. Should this happen, India’s fear of China may ironically find New Delhi on Washington’s side in opposing the implementation of the court’s ruling. Most likely, the complexity of nautical games would make Mauritius go slow in return for a bigger rent check and recognition of its sovereignty over the island group.41 Summing it all up, for small states, economic engagement with big powers like China has strategic consequences. External and internal power dynamics provide an opportunity for the Chinese to entrench their naval presence among the islands strung along the south of India and coerce countries to endorse its

China and India   145 economic and foreign policy goals. As China and India seek to checkmate each other and secure their growing trade routes, the competition over island countries such as Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Mauritius and the Seychelles is heightening. In each country, Beijing embarked on a long-term courtship premised on generous loans and aid packages, while building dual-use projects. High-interest Chinese loans worth hundreds of billions of dollars are saddling small littoral states with unsustainable debts and giving the Chinese military access to ­strategic infrastructure such as ports and airstrips near international waterways. Xi’s BRI has generated awe in small states but envy and angst in big powers. While Chinese infrastructure projects do promote growth and meet the needs of developing countries, the growing Chinese economic footprint, debt, and ­business practices often provoke a backlash among locals, leading to political instability. Easily available Chinese loans seem to have become the new opium for the corrupt ruling elites in small states with dysfunctional political systems and fragile economies along the MSR. Beijing is adept at currying favor with the political elites by rolling out red-carpet treatment, all-expense paid trips and high visibility projects. Not surprisingly, Chinese companies have been accused of corruption and collusion with local politicians in Cambodia, Malaysia, ­Bangladesh, Kenya, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and the Maldives. Beijing seemingly prefers nothing less than 99-year leases on ports and infrastructure projects in developing countries. For example, one Chinese company, United Development Group, owns a 99-year lease in Koh Kong province on 20 percent of Cambodia’s total coastline. Hence, the growing criticism is that Xi’s China is now doing to small and weak countries what former European colonial powers did to China in the nineteenth century. Pervasive Chinese influence, corruption and cronyism have contributed to the victory of opposition parties in Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, the Maldives and Sierra Leone. Those countries that enthusiastically signed up for BRI are now either questioning aspects of the mega-project or renegotiating deals (e.g., Malaysia, Myanmar and Pakistan) or they are ­distancing themselves from China by inviting other major powers.42 After all, even small and poor countries are sensitive about sovereignty. Faced with the backlash, Beijing has promised to modify its approach to ease resistance.

Chinese checkers Spellbound by the grandeur of sea power, Chinese strategic thinkers wax lyrical about resurrecting China’s fifteenth-century naval expeditions to the “Western Ocean” (the old Chinese name for the Indian Ocean). China’s cultivation of friendly, pliant regimes via economic inducements and strategic coercion all along the maritime chokepoints in the Indian Ocean sea-lanes is similar to the Ming dynasty’s past attempts to control the maritime lanes by changing political regimes in Malacca, Sumatra and Sri Lanka so as to facilitate commercial and maritime dominance. Imperial Japan’s slogans such as “Asia for Asians,” “rich country, strong military” and “common destiny under Belt and Road” (aka “Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere”) are now China’s slogans. Whereas the collapse of the

146   Mohan Malik Soviet empire led the West to declare victory and “the end of history,” the East has been witness to Beijing’s resurrection of China’s imperial past. Debts, 99-year leases, economic dependencies, buffer states, naval deployments, gunboat diplomacy, ports, railroads and pipelines construction for resource extraction and meddling in domestic politics to prop up pliant regimes for secure access to RMBs—are all the ingredients of empire-building. Now that the old buffer states of Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia have been forcibly assimilated and declared an “inalienable part of China since ancient times,” new buffer states are being established on the periphery via BRI to protect the core. Being avid students of history, the Chinese know that “[s]trategic islands played a key role in establishing the British Empire’s dominance over the Indian Ocean region. Through a ring of bases and naval presence on islands, the British essentially controlled the entry points into this crucial area.”43 Distant countries and regions have now become part of China’s critical ­interests as Beijing invests heavily in those countries. Beijing is indeed on a base-buying spree. Nearly two-thirds of the world’s 50 major ports are either owned by China or have received some Chinese investment.44 According to China’s Ministry of Transport, Chinese companies have participated in the construction and operation of 42 ports in 34 countries under its Belt and Road ­Initiative. The Institute for International Strategic Studies estimates that, since 2014, the People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) has “launched more submarines, warships, principal amphibious vessels and auxiliaries than the total number of ships currently serving in the navies of Germany, India, Spain, Taiwan and the United Kingdom.”45 The PLAN is militarizing the First Island Chain, which stretches from the Japanese archipelago to parts of the Philippines and Malaysia and encompasses the South China Sea. Furthermore, Beijing is busy expanding into the Second Island Chain further into the Pacific Ocean. ­Projections are that within a decade, China will have the largest naval and submarine fleets in the world. Despite China’s propensity to conceal its naval ambitions, and despite the rhetoric of mutually beneficial “win-win” relationships, the strategic approach dominates in the Indian Ocean. There is invariably a strategic element attached to enterprises that begin with commercial port construction or management and end with naval deployments, naval presence and long-term ownership rights, as in Myanmar, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Pakistan and ­Djibouti. Sooner rather than later, financial investments turn into geostrategic returns. China’s investments in littorals are as much about development as about Beijing’s desire to establish itself as a “resident power” in the Indian Ocean— much as the United States, Britain, and France have done. The incorporation of smaller states into a Sino-centric economic and trading hub-and-spokes system also lays the foundation for a China-led security system in the future. China’s strategy of fusing its maritime expansion with regional economic development and multilateral integration is yielding rich dividends. Countries that possess deep-water ports are being courted to secure Chinese shipping routes, project power and countervail American and Indian naval power in the Pacific and Indian Oceans.46 Having acquired leasing rights to Pakistan’s

China and India   147 Gwadar port for 40 years, Greece’s Piraeus port for 35 years, Djibouti port for ten years, Sri Lanka’s Hambantota port for 99 years, 20 percent of Cambodia’s total coastline for 99 years, and the Maldivian island of Feydhoo Finolhu for 50 years, Beijing is pressuring Myanmar to raise China’s stake from 50 percent to 75 to 85 percent in the Kyaukpyu port on the Bay of Bengal, and to lease it for 99 years as well—unless Myanmar pays a penalty for reneging on the $3  billion Myitsone energy dam deal.47 A Chinese base in Myanmar would further threaten India’s naval dominance of the Bay of Bengal and heighten its sense of encirclement. In the Western Indian Ocean, Beijing is eyeing Mombasa in Kenya, the gateway to East Africa, as 55 percent of Kenyan foreign debt is owned by China. A military base in Djibouti, along with major port development projects in Pakistan, Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Malaysia, and ­Cambodia define the contours of China’s MSR—an oceanic connectivity project that is part of the Belt and Road Initiative centered on the Indian Ocean.48 The assumption underlying this strategy is that China’s rivals, finding themselves encircled or obstructed by countries aligned with Beijing, will be sufficiently deterred from threatening China’s economic and security interests. Plagued with bureaucratic and budgetary constraints, India is no match for China’s economic and military expansion. Chinese strategic writings constantly remind India of China’s overall technological, economic and military superiority should a combination of disputes—related to Tibet, Pakistan, disputed Himalayan borders, India’s energy exploration in the South China Sea or the elbow-bashing in the Indian Ocean—escalate into an armed confrontation. Should India back off or acquiesce during any confrontation with Beijing, the small and weak states will quietly slide into China’s orbit and a new Sino-centric order will then emerge in the Indo-Pacific. As corrupt, weak regimes addicted to cheap Chinese loans keep falling into Beijing’s strategic “debt traps,” New Delhi’s traditional influence is now under serious challenge. China’s economic weight has already replaced India as the most significant player in South Asia.

New Delhi dilemmas Uneasy with China’s maritime forays, India has of late stepped up its game of countering China’s outreach in countries such as the Seychelles, Mauritius, the Maldives, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Myanmar and Cambodia, among others in the Indian Ocean region. China’s MSR has prompted the Indian navy to unveil a three-pronged strategy to ensure a stable balance of power in littoral Asia: fortify its defenses in the Indian Ocean by acquiring privileged access to bases in Indonesia, Mauritius, the Seychelles, Madagascar, Oman and Iran; conduct joint naval exercises in the East and South China Seas; sign logistics exchange agreements with the United States, Singapore and France to gain access to naval bases in the Indo-Pacific and launch an ambitious naval expansion program. India has also established a coastal surveillance radar network to monitor Chinese naval activities in the northern Indian Ocean. Furthermore, India has

148   Mohan Malik stepped up aid to littorals and has offered an alternative vision to China’s MSR with “Project SAGAR” (Security and Growth for All in the Region)—a countermove designed to revive India’s ancient trade routes and cultural linkages around the Indian Ocean. India has also begun a round-the-year deployment of mission-ready warship near chokepoints, and conducted joint naval exercises with Japan, the United States, Australia and France focusing on anti-submarine warfare aimed at detecting Chinese submarines moving from the Western Pacific into the Western Indian Ocean. Common security concerns regarding China’s MSR have led Indonesia to grant India economic and military access to the strategic island of Sabang at the northern tip of Sumatra and close to the Malacca Strait, through which almost 40 percent of India’s trade passes. Beijing also fell foul of Jakarta when it claimed Natuna Island—long recognized as Indonesian sovereign territory—as part of its “nine-dash line,” delineating its claims in the South China Sea. In a bid to reassert its sovereignty, Jakarta renamed that maritime zone the North Natuna Sea. India’s attempts to place itself at the center of regional relationships with Japan, the United States, Vietnam, Australia and Indonesia as part of a regional security architecture to balance China has drawn Beijing’s fury. The state-owned Global Times warned in an editorial: “If India really seeks military access to the strategic island of Sabang, it might wrongfully entrap itself into a strategic competition with China and eventually burn its own fingers.”49 Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Mauritius and the Seychelles are clearly caught in a tug-of-war between China and India. The frequency of Chinese and Indian navies brushing past each other in the Indian Ocean is increasing. Both have strategic interests to protect. Both are jostling to gain the upper hand, but only one can emerge victorious. Seeing the Maldives as a critical component of its MSR, China made huge investments in the Indian Ocean microstate. Likewise, Beijing is reportedly backing forces opposed to the Indian naval project on the Seychelles’ Assumption Island. The contest over small states such as the ­Maldives and the Seychelles is part of a bigger geopolitical game. China’s military and commercial links with Indian Ocean littoral states weave a coercive power web around India, making it politically costly for New Delhi to take action detrimental to Chinese interests in the Indian Ocean.

A clash of values and visions: BRI versus the FOIP Beijing’s nod to the military coup in Zimbabwe in 2017 and tacit support for the suppression of democracy by the Maldives’ Yameen and Cambodia’s Hun Sen reveal China’s willingness to intervene in the domestic affairs of other states if it perceives vital Chinese interests are at stake and if the costs of intervention are relatively low. China sees itself as being engaged in a long, protracted competition with India, Japan and the United States, and would want Laos, Cambodia, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Pakistan to remain within its orbit. Beijing also wants to send a strong message that countries along the BRI—which envisages a network of ports, railways, roads, and industrial parks

China and India   149 linking China with Africa, Asia, and Europe—can look to China for both ­economic growth and military security, and that challenges to its expanding sphere of influence will no longer be tolerated. At the normative level, the Sri Lankan and Maldivian crises challenged the resurrected Quad (comprising the United States, India, Japan and Australia) and its quest for a rules-based “free and open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP). Evidence from Cambodia, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Myanmar, Pakistan, Djibouti and the Maldives suggests that BRI-related investments undermine democratic institutions, increase corruption, restrict civil liberties, and favor autocratic and military rulers. Let us call it the “BRI collateral.”50 The political crises in both Sri Lanka and the Maldives were a direct fallout of the Sino-Indian nautical games. Both highlighted the need for a coordinated Quad response to the retreat of democracy. In the end, it was not the Quad’s response but public outrage expressed through the ballot box that tilted the scales against Beijing. In fact, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi dismissed the Quad and the “Indo-Pacific” concept as a “headline grabbing” idea which will “dissipate like sea foam.51 As long as Asians and Europeans are divided and divisible and the United States is distracted, the Chinese juggernaut will continue to advance. Since Beijing’s ­economic expansion tends to weaken democracies, the Quad in the Indo-Pacific may well be reinforced by a Concert of Democracies (COD) comprising Canada, New Zealand, and the European Union at the global level to uphold a liberal rules-based international order. Obviously, a broader contest of clashing values and visions between the Quad and BRI is going on, which requires a multilateral response at different levels to prevent democracy from falling like dominoes under the march of authoritarianism. One country’s response alone cannot deal with the ideological and strategic challenge from China. Hyper-nationalism, a belief in Han exceptionalism, and certainty about the inevitability of a post-American Sino-centric world now shape Beijing’s Asia policy. The Trump administration’s transactional foreign policy and vacillating stance on US commitment to its allies and friends have emboldened Xi’s China to spread its wings diplomatically, economically and militarily.52 Economically, the US “FOIP” strategy, Japan’s “Asia-Africa Growth Corridor,” India’s “SAGAR,” Indonesia’s “global maritime fulcrum,” Australia’s “South Asia Regional Infrastructure Connectivity” (SARIC) initiative, the ­European Union’s “Europe-Asia Sustainable Connectivity” plan and the Quad’s connectivity offer viable alternatives to China’s BRI. The infrastructure competition between Japanese and Chinese firms now extends throughout the IndoPacific. Tokyo is developing ports in at least four Indian Ocean nations—Dawei in southeast Myanmar, Mombasa in Kenya, Trincomalee in northern Sri Lanka and Matarbari in southeast Bangladesh.53 The Quad countries are now coordinating on tactics and strategy to offer an alternative vision of development finance to ensure that the end of China’s century of humiliation does not usher in a century of humiliation for poor developing counties led by corrupt, unsavory regimes. As US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo remarked: “We are banding

150   Mohan Malik together with the likeminded nations like Australia, India, Japan, and South Korea to make sure that each Indo-Pacific nation can protect its sovereignty from coercion. It’s part of a greater commitment to a free and open order.”54 While Washington has renamed its Pacific Command to the Indo-Pacific Command, New Delhi has set up an Indo-Pacific division in the foreign ministry which will integrate the Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), ASEAN, the Quad and various trilateral groupings for greater policy coherence and coordination. Washington’s trade and tech wars, the spotlight on China’s gross human rights violations in Xinjiang, intellectual property theft, cyber espionage—all seek to maintain what I call “maximum pressure at multiple points” vis-à-vis China so as to persuade Beijing to abandon its predatory and mercantilist policies. Militarily, regional concerns about Chinese behavior regarding maritime disputes coupled with the PLA’s acquisition of expeditionary capabilities worsen the security dilemma and result in balancing behavior from China’s neighbors. The military posturing by China provides an important impetus for India to strengthen its relations with “China-wary” nations under its “Act East” policy. As noted earlier, common concerns about Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean have led the Indian and Indonesian governments to take up the Sabang port development project.55 As part of “balancing without provoking” posture, India is steadily cranking up defense cooperation with ASEAN countries like Singapore, Vietnam, Myanmar, Malaysia and ­Indonesia by providing military facilities and training as well as conducting regular exercises with them. It helps that Japanese and American plans for military and economic capacity building dovetail with India’s similar efforts in its neighborhood. One of the goals identified for the Quad is to foil China’s attempts to set up logistics and intelligence sites along the MSR.56 The prospect of a bigger Chinese footprint in the Indian Ocean is prompting Japan, the United States, France and Australia to expand their own maritime operations. After years of neglect, the US has turned its attention to small island states in its intensifying security competition with China. The US Congress has passed the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act which reaffirms alliances with Australia, Japan and South Korea, while calling for deeper military and economic ties with India and Taiwan. Australia has launched the “Indo-Pacific Endeavor,” a naval deployment with India, Indonesia, Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam and ­Singapore. Trilateral naval drills involving Australia–India–Indonesia, India– Sri  Lanka–Maldives, India–Singapore–Thailand are likely to become more routine. Canberra is not only building security ties with fellow democracies in the ­Indo-Pacific but also re-engaging European powers in the Pacific to act as a bulwark against China’s growing power.57

The geometry of geopolitics Ironically, China’s quest for resources, markets and bases following the direction taken by previous imperial powers and attempts to establish an empire of

China and India   151 “exclusive economic enclaves” run by Chinese conglomerates to usher in the age of Pax Sinica have brought former European imperial powers back to Asia. French and British navies, backed by South and Southeast Asian countries, are now operating naval task forces in the Indo-Pacific to maintain a rules-based international order.58 In other words, China’s power-and-hierarchy-based BRI vision is now pitted against the Quad’s law-and-rule-based FOIP vision. China’s attempts to establish a Sinocentric order via BRI are thus being frustrated by fluid, shortterm, purpose-specific partnerships and alignments. The Indo-Pacific is inherently multipolar—simply too big for one power to dominate. The interests of India, Japan, Australia, Indonesia and others lie in keeping it multipolar where Chinese power is balanced by a continued US presence and other Asian powers. The next 15 to 20 years in the Indo-Pacific are fraught with risks—this is where some of the world’s most powerful states are forging new alliances, indulging in arms races, pursuing mercantilist policies, extracting resources, viewing competitors with growing distrust and engaging in containment of peer competitors. New strategic balances will emerge as partnerships and allegiances among states shift. Faced with an aggressive China, Asia’s major maritime powers—Japan, Australia and India—are working in a more synchronized manner in a quadrilateral grouping with the United States. They are backed by middle powers (e.g., Vietnam, Singapore, the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia) whose cooperation with each other aims to defend a rules-based order that does not advantage big and powerful nations at the expense of small and weak states. A complex web of security relationships is thus beginning to emerge amongst “China-wary” nations. The future of regional security cooperation is likely to be in the trilateral or triangular, quadrilateral and multilateral formats. As Prime Minister Modi told the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN): “We will work with them, individually or in formats of three or more, for a stable and peaceful region,”59 Flexible, issue-specific threesome, foursome balancing games are popular these days. Having multiple partners is in vogue. Over time, various trilateral (e.g., Japan–Vietnam–the Philippines, the US–Japan–India, Australia–Indonesia–India, India–Japan–Vietnam, France–Australia–India, India–Japan–US, India–Australia–Indonesia and India–Australia–Japan) and informal multilateral efforts to constrain China could coalesce into a maritime coalition or the “Indo-Pacific Maritime Partnership.” Though one-on-one “Cold War-like” bilateral alliances currently may seem old-fashioned, the crystallization of fluid relationships into rigid alignments could occur in the event of a major rupture in US–Chinese or Indian–Chinese relations. Whoever prevails in this geopolitical poker game will ultimately determine the future of the world order.60 In the meantime, the risk of miscalculation lies with the Chinese military overestimating its strength, and the rest of the world underestimating Beijing’s ambitions, power, and purpose. In the absence of a rules-based order, Asian giants will continue to jostle over the territory, resources and allegiance of small states from the Himalayas to the Indian and Pacific Oceans, and the so-called “Pacific Century” may then turn out to be just another bloody century for Asia.

152   Mohan Malik

Notes   1 OBOR and BRI are used interchangeably in this paper because the Chinese-language phrase yi dai yi lu (一带一路 literal translation: One Belt One Road) remains unchanged. Following criticism of the OBOR as too exclusive for others’ comfort, it was later renamed in English as the “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) to placate nonChinese audience.   2 William Gallo, “Eyeing China, India’s PM Calls for Indo-Pacific ‘Rule-Based Order’,” VOAnews.com, June 1, 2018 www.voanews.com/a/eyeing-china-india-s-pmcalls-for-indo-pacific-rule-based-order-/4419373.html   3 Mohan Malik, “One Belt One Road: Detours, Fissures and Fault Lines,” The American Interest, 13, no. 5, February, 19, 2018 www.the-american-interest.com/2018/02/19/ dimensions-detours-fissures-fault-lines/   4 James Lacey, “Great Strategic Rivalries: The Return of Geopolitics,” The Strategy Bridge, August 22, 2018 https://thestrategybridge-org.cdn.ampproject.org/c/s/thestrategybridge. org/the-bridge/2018/8/22/great-strategic-rivalries-the-return-of-geopolitics?format= amp   5 See Sumit Ganguly and William Thompson (eds), Asian Rivalries (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), pp. 1–25; Gary Goertz and Paul F. Diehl, “Enduring Rivalries: Theoretical Constructs and Empirical Patterns,” International Studies Quarterly, 37, no. 2. (June 1993).   6 See Evan Rees, “In China’s Backyard, Charting the Course of Most Advantage,” Stratfor.com, March 7, 2019 https://worldview.stratfor.com/article/chinas-backyardcharting-course-most-advantage   7 See David Brewster, “The Indian Ocean Base Race,” The Lowy Interpreter, February 14, 2018 www.maritime-executive.com/editorials/the-indian-ocean-base-race#gs.k0FTdsY; and Nyshka Chandran, “Indian military scrambles to keep up after China moves to put forces in Africa,” CNBC, February 28, 2018 www.cnbc.com/2018/02/28/militarychina-and-india-compete-over-bases-around-indian-ocean.html   8 Zhou Bo, “China and India need to talk, navy to navy, to prevent Indian Ocean hostilities,” South China Morning Post (SCMP), August 13, 2018 www.scmp.com/comment/​ insight-opinion/asia/article/2158776/china-and-india-need-talk-navy-navy-preventindian   9 Eshan Jayawardena, “Balancing Chinese presence in Sri Lanka: India and Japan’s game of stag hunt,” Daily Mirror, June 21, 2018 www.dailymirror.lk/article/BalancingChinese-presence-in-Sri-Lanka-India-and-Japan-s-game-of-stag-hunt-151589.html 10 Shihar Aneez, “Chinese query Sri Lanka allegations of corruption in contracts,” Reuters, November 1, 2016, www.reuters.com/article/sri-lanka-china/chinese-querysri-lanka-allegations-of-corruption-in-contracts-idUSL4N1D256S 11 Maria Abi-Habib, “How China Got Sri Lanka to Cough Up a Port,” New York Times, June 25, 2018 www.nytimes.com/2018/06/25/world/asia/china-sri-lanka-port.html 12 Kai Schultz, “Sri Lanka, Struggling with Debt, Hands a Major Port to China,” New York Times, December 12, 2017 www.nytimes.com/2017/12/12/world/asia/sri-lankachina-port.html; Marcello Rossi, “Next Hambantota? Welcome to the Chinese-funded US$1.4 billion Port City Colombo in Sri Lanka,” SCMP, May 12, 2019 www.scmp. com/week-asia/geopolitics/article/3009731/next-hambantota-welcome-​chinese-fundedus14-billion-port-city 13 “Shipping insurance companies dub Hambantota port in Sri Lanka as ‘High Risk’,” New Indian Express, December 14, 2016 www.newindianexpress.com/world/2016/ dec/14/shipping-insurance-companies-dub-hambantota-port-in-sri-lanka-as-high-risk1548984.html 14 “China will build string of military bases around world, says Pentagon,” Guardian, May 2, 2019 www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/03/china-will-build-string-ofmilitary-bases-around-world-says-pentagon?CMP=share_btn_tw

China and India   153 15 “China dismisses accusations from former Maldives leader,” Associated Press, ­February 8, 2018 https://newsok.com/article/feed/1726164/china-dismisses-accusationsfrom-former-maldives-leader 16 PTI, “Don’t want Maldives to be another flashpoint, in talks with India: China,” Times of India, February 9, 2018 https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/dont-wantmaldives-to-be-another-flashpoint-in-talks-with-india-china/articleshow/62849986.cms 17 Ai Jun, “Unauthorized military intervention in Malé must be stopped,” Global Times, February 12, 2018 www.globaltimes.cn/content/1089435.shtml 18 “PLA fleet returns to homeport from far-sea training,” China Military Online, ­February 26, 2018 http://eng.chinamil.com.cn/view/2018–02/26/content_7952635. htm 19 Sanjeev Miglani, “Asian giants China and India flex muscles over tiny Maldives,” Reuters, March 6, 2018 www.reuters.com/article/us-maldives-politics/asian-giantschina-and-india-flex-muscles-over-tiny-maldives-idUSKCN1GJ12X 20 Robert A. Manning, Bharath Gopalaswamy, “Is Abdulla Yameen Handing Over the Maldives to China?” Foreign Policy, March 21, 2018 https://foreignpolicy. com/2018/03/21/is-abdulla-yameen-handing-over-the-maldives-to-china/ 21 Indrani Bagchi, “How ‘India First’ turned into ‘China First’ for Maldives,” Times of India, February 10, 2018 https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/how-did-indiafirst-turn-into-china-first-in-the-maldives/articleshow/62864889.cms 22 Mark Maginer, “Beijing Spins a Web of Chinese Infrastructure,” Wall Street Journal, January 16, 2017, www.wsj.com/articles/beijing-spins-a-web-of-chinese-infrastructure1484560801?mod=article_inline 23 Yin Han, “India naval exercises inflame tensions with China, expand potential conflict from land to sea: observers,” Global Times, February 26, 2018 www.globaltimes. cn/content/1090807.shtml 24 Kinling Lo, “China seeks ‘healthy’ ties with troubled Maldives amid India rivalry,” SCMP, February 9, 2018 www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/ article/2132757/china-seeks-healthy-ties-troubled-maldives-amid-india 25 Yuji Kuronuma, “Maldives faces Chinese ‘land grab’ over unpayable debts, ex-leader warns,” Nikkei Asian Review, February 13, 2018 https://asia.nikkei.com/PoliticsEconomy/International-Relations/Maldives-faces-Chinese-land-grab-over-unpayabledebts-ex-leader-warns 26 Indrani Bagchi “Maldives: Abdullah Yameen tries to stay in power, discredits poll result,” Times of India, October 3, 2018 https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/ south-asia/abdullah-yameen-tries-to-stay-in-power-discredit-poll-results/articleshow/ 66059812.cms 27 Nitin Pai, “After Abdulla Yameen, Maldives must now untangle the web of Chinese contracts,” The Print, September 25, 2018 https://theprint.in/opinion/after-abdulla-yameenmaldives-must-now-untangle-the-web-of-chinese-contracts/124107/ 28 Pai, “After Abdulla Yameen, Maldives must now untangle the web of Chinese contracts.” 29 Amy Kazmin, “Advantage India in struggle with China over Maldives,” Financial Times, September 27, 2018 www.ft.com/content/24b0bb54-c22d-11e8–95b1-d36d fef1b89a 30 Rajiv Bhatia, “A power change in Maldives,” Gateway House, April 25, 2019, www. gatewayhouse.in/power-change-maldives/ 31 Niharika Mandhana, “Maldives’ New Leaders Confront a Chinese-Funded Building Binge,” WSJ, November 28, 2018 www.wsj.com/articles/maldives-new-leadersconfront-a-chinese-funded-building-binge-1543401005 32 See Devirupa Mitra, “Exclusive: Details of Top Secret India–Seychelles Military Agreement Leaked Online,” The Wire, March 8, 2018 https://thewire.in/externalaffairs/in-embarrassing-leak-details-of-top-secret-india-seychelles-military-agreementmade-public

154   Mohan Malik 33 Mitra, “Exclusive: Details of Top Secret India–Seychelles Military Agreement Leaked Online.” 34 Email exchange with a senior official from the Seychelles. Also see Rahul Bedi, “Seychelles withdraws offer to India for military base,” IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, June 18, 2018 www.reuters.com/article/us-australia-china-diplomacy-explainer/frayingaustralia-and-china-relations-face-testing-times-in-canberra-idUSKBN1JD12G 35 Hilary Clarke, “In ‘Asia’s gateway to Africa’ Mauritius, rivals China and India compete for the upper hand,” SCMP, December 8, 2018 www.scmp.com/news/world/ africa/article/2176883/asias-gateway-africa-mauritius-rivals-china-and-india-compete 36 “Xi meets Mauritian PM on bilateral ties,” Xinhua, July 29, 2018 www.xinhuanet. com/english/2018–07/29/c_137354426.htm. Italics mine. 37 Clarke, “In ‘Asia’s gateway to Africa’ Mauritius, rivals China and India compete for the upper hand.” 38 Conn Hallinan, “Diego Garcia: The ‘Unsinkable Carrier’ Springs A Leak,” Eurasia Review.com, April 16, 2019, www.eurasiareview.com/16042019-diego-garcia-theunsinkable-carrier-springs-a-leak-oped/ 39 Hallinan, “Diego Garcia: The ‘Unsinkable Carrier’ Springs A Leak.” 40 See China’s official response in Jeremy Page, “Tribunal Rejects Beijing’s Claims to South China Sea,” Wall Street Journal, July 12, 2016 www.wsj.com/articles/chinas-​ claim-to-most-of-south-china-sea-has-no-legal-basis-court-says-1468315137 41 Hallinan, “Diego Garcia: The ‘Unsinkable Carrier’ Springs A Leak.” 42 For example, Myanmar has scaled back China-funded Kyauk Pyu port project in Rakhine state due to debt concerns while Malaysia has significantly reduced the cost of East Coast Rail Link. Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir has warned the Philippines about becoming too indebted to China as Manila draws down Chinese funds to build much-needed infrastructure. 43 Darshana Baruah “Sister Islands in the Indian Ocean Region: Linking the Andaman and Nicobar Islands to La Réunion,” War on the Rocks, March 20, 2019 https:// warontherocks.com/2019/03/sister-islands-in-the-indian-ocean-region-linking-the-andamanand-nicobar-islands-to-la-reunion/ 44 James Kynge, Chris Campbell, Amy Kazmin and Farhan Bokhari, “Beijing’s global power play: How China rules the waves,” Financial Times, January 12, 2017, https:// ig.ft.com/sites/china-ports/ 45 Nick Childs, “China’s naval shipbuilding: delivering on its ambition in a big way,” IISS, May 1, 2018 www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2018/05/china-navalshipbuilding 46 China will build string of military bases around world, says Pentagon,” Guardian, May 2, 2019 www.theguardian.com/world/2019/may/03/china-will-build-string-​of-​ military-bases-around-world-says-pentagon?CMP=share_btn_tw 47 Based on various open sources, media reports, interviews and conversations with senior officials and diplomats. 48 Yin Han, “China should enhance presence in Indian Ocean to counter India’s missile tests: experts,” Global Times, January 18, 2018 www.globaltimes.cn/content/ 1085585.shtml 49 Hu Weijia, “Investment in Indonesia’s Sabang port will be test of India’s diplomatic wisdom,” Global Times, May 28, 2018 www.globaltimes.cn/content/1104493.shtml 50 Malik, “One Belt One Road: Detours, Fissures and Fault Lines.” 51 PTI, “‘Quad’ move will dissipate like sea foam: China,” Times of India, March 8, 2018 https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/china/quad-move-will-dissipate-likesea-foam-china/articleshow/63221055.cms 52 Ashley Townshend, “Donald Trump has a mission in Asia, but it’s not the one his allies want,” ABC, November 9, 2017 www.abc.net.au/news/2017–11–08/donaldtrump-mission-in-asia-not-what-allies-want/9123782

China and India   155 53 “Japan to offer aid for Indian Ocean ports,” The Jakarta Post, May 26, 2018 www. thejakartapost.com/amp/news/2018/05/25/japan-to-offer-aid-for-indian-ocean-ports. html?__twitter_impression=true 54 www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2019/05/291593.htm 55 Pramit Pal Chaudhuri, “Indonesia gives India access to strategic port of Sabang,” Hindustan Times, May 17, 2018 www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/indonesiagives-india-access-to-strategic-port-of-sabang/story-KPXWKy7PGAHFUi0jCL26yJ. html 56 PTI, “Quad should oppose permanent Chinese military bases in IOR: 4 think tanks,” Business Standard, August 22 2018 www.business-standard.com/article/currentaffairs/quad-should-oppose-permanent-chinese-military-bases-in-ior-4-think-tanks-1180 82200560_1.html 57 Jamie Smyth, “Macron pledges to counter China power in Pacific,” Financial Times, May 2, 2018 www.ft.com/content/9b1947be-4de0–11e8–8a8e-22951a2d8493 58 Deng Xiaoci, “Macron savors role in Indo-Pacific: analysts,” Global Times, May 3, 2018 www.globaltimes.cn/content/1100667.shtml 59 Raju Gopalakrishnan, “With ports, ships and promises, India asserts role in Southeast Asia,” Reuters, June 3, 2018 www.reuters.com/article/us-asia-security-modi-analysis/ with-ports-ships-and-promises-india-asserts-role-in-southeast-asia-idUSKCN1IZ0B3 60 Mohan Malik, “America and China’s Dangerous Game of Geopolitical Poker,” The National Interest, June 18, 2014 http://nationalinterest.org/feature/america-chinasdangerous-game-geopolitical-poker-10690

9 Indo-Pacific geopolitics and foreign policy The case of the Philippines, 2010–2018 Renato Cruz De Castro

Introduction In early 2011, former President Benigno Aquino III pursued a balancing policy on China’s expansive maritime claim in the South China Sea. He ­challenged this Chinese territorial maritime expansion by shifting the Armed Forces of the ­Philippines’ (AFP) focus away from domestic security to external defense, bolstering closer Philippine-US security relations; acquiring more American military equipment; seeking from Washington an explicit security guarantee under the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT); and promoting a strategic partnership with Japan. In late April 2014, the Philippines signed the 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) with the US, its strategic ally. Designed to constrain Chinese aggressive behavior in the South China Sea, the agreement allowed American forces a strategic footprint in Southeast Asia through rotational presence in Philippine territory. By strengthening the country’s security relations with the US and Japan, the Philippines was involved once again in a traditional geopolitical game among the great powers in East Asia. Despite having the weakest military in Southeast Asia, the Philippines stood up to the China challenge in the South China Sea. President Aquino took into account his country’s alliance with the US and, more significantly, the Obama administration’s declaration of a strategic rebalancing to Asia in mid-November 2011. This ­so-called US pivot to Asia entailed a gradual shift from the US military counterinsurgency campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan to a deeper strategic involvement in the Asia-Pacific region. The move was prompted by the fact that the Asia-Pacific has become “a key driver of global politics” and “the rebalancing is a means for a sustained and coherent US long-term strategy toward the region.”1 The rebalancing policy was forceful rhetoric that signified the reassertion of America’s leadership in Asia and determination to counter-balance China’s pervasive regional influence.2 It also reflected the Obama administration’s decision to follow the middle road between containment and appeasement after the “constrainment” policy on China via the diplomatic route failed. It signaled as well a drastic policy change of constructive engagement to an outright commitment to constrain this emergent power.3 President Rodrigo Roa Duterte has undone former President Aquino’s ­geopolitical agenda in the South China Sea. Less than three months in office and

The case of the Philippines   157 after the Permanent Court of Arbitration’s (PCA) landmark award to the Philippines in its territorial counterclaim against China in the South China Sea, President Duterte launched a charm offensive to earn Chinese goodwill. He downplayed the maritime row in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit meeting in Laos. He also declared that he wanted to distance the Philippines from the US, a move that would not only alter the region’s ­strategic balance but also indicated a dramatic break from his country’s longstanding policy of maintaining close security ties with a treaty ally. President Duterte believed that the US would not go into war against China to protect the Philippines. Moreover, he thought that the only option for the Philippines was to foster economic interdependence with China. This move would likely reduce the chances of an armed confrontation between these two claimant states in the South China Sea dispute. At the beginning of his term in mid-2016, President Duterte was determined to take advantage of China’s economic largesse under its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Lured by the BRI, President Duterte actively sought Chinese financial assistance for the construction of drug-rehabilitation centers for Filipino drug dependents and soft loans for the building of railways and roads in Mindanao and in other parts of the country. This chapter argues that the two Philippine presidents examined the geopolitical dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region in terms of possible losses in either territorial rights or autonomy or economic gains. It then explores answers to this main question: how did the two Filipino presidents factor in key geopolitical developments in the Indo-Pacific in coming up with their own foreign policies? It also addresses these corollary questions: 1) What are the major geopolitical developments in the Indo-Pacific region since 2010? 2) How did the two Filipino chief executives view these geopolitical developments? 3) How important are these external developments in the formulation of twenty-first-century Philippine foreign policy?

Responding to Indo-Pacific geopolitics How do decision-makers factor in geopolitical developments in designing their country’s foreign policy? Relative to the challenges emanating from the external environment, how do they choose their course of actions? The issue of how significant political actors view their external environment and pursue certain courses of action to address challenges emanating from the international system is a conundrum of interest not just to foreign policy analysts but also to all social scientists.4 Far-ranging problems confront key decisionmakers on an everyday basis as they examine the global society beyond their national borders, pursue their country’s interests and project power abroad. This is made more difficult because the global society is a complex social system composed of state and non-state actors—each with their own set of self-interests, objectives, priorities and capabilities—that more often than not, compete or clash with one another. Moreover, decision-makers are mostly aware that they are bound to encounter strong resistance as they pursue their state’s interests. They also accept the reality that their state will face more powerful state actors

158   Renato Cruz De Castro that can manipulate the environment and engage them in a disadvantageous asymmetric situation in the international system. This is especially true for a small power whose range of opportunities for independent, dynamic and self-interested behavior is more limited than that of the more powerful states.5 Consequently, the capabilities of a small power to pursue its goals are contingent on the opportunities present in the international system and the willingness of major decision-makers to take advantage of these opportunities.6 A small power is boxed in by virtue of its relative weakness visà-vis other powerful states. Thus, key decision-makers in a small state make choices not based primarily on rationality, but on the utility of gains differently than losses.7 This is called “Prospect Theory,” which argues that in evaluating the utility of gains and losses, leaders tend to give more weight to losses than comparable gains. Often, the loss itself is more important than the actual magnitude of the loss.8 The theory can be summarized into three main points: a) In evaluating the utility of gains and losses, decision-makers tend to be more risk-averse with respect to gains, whereas they are more risk-acceptant with respect to losses. b) Once gains are made, they are accepted as a new status quo very quickly, creating what is termed as endowment effect. c) Losses are not accepted as quickly. Thus, actors will often cling to the old status quo (prior to loss) as the reference point. The Aquino and the Duterte administrations had different vantage points. Nevertheless, both gave greater weight to possible losses than comparable gains as they examined the competition between China and the US in the Indo-Pacific region. On the one hand, confronted by Chinese maritime expansion and encouraged by the Obama administration’s strategic rebalancing to Asia, the Aquino administration adopted a balancing policy towards China when it became apprehensive about the reduction of the country’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and strategic advantages as a maritime state. Conscious of the Obama administration’s ambiguous position in the South China Sea dispute and enticed by the BRI, the Duterte administration pursued an appeasement policy to prevent possible economic losses because of strained relations with China. However, it is currently fearful that the Philippines might be caught in the middle of the US–China strategic competition. Consequently, President Duterte has opted for policy of equi-balancing, hoping to prevent the Philippines from getting entangled in a dangerous great power competition in the Indo-Pacific region.

From China’s naval expansion to US strategic rebalancing The emergence of China as the manufacturing hub of the global economy and as a major power in world politics is the most significant strategic development in

The case of the Philippines   159 the second decade of the twenty-first century. China’s phenomenal economic prosperity during the first decade of the twenty-first century transformed it into an engine of growth in East Asia and, indeed, the wider world. With its gross domestic product (GDP) surpassing Japan in 2010, it has become the second largest economy in the world next only to the US. Its rapid economic progress has not only made the country more confident and assertive in foreign affairs but also heightened its military prowess.9 China has had an annual double-digit increase in defense spending since 2006. At the advent of the twenty-first century, the Chinese government increased its defense budget by 13 percent to boost the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) capability to accomplish a wide range of military functions including winning local wars under information-age conditions. During the first decade of the new millennium, the People’s Liberation Army’s Navy (PLAN) has acquired a fleet of Russian-made diesel-electric Kilo-class submarines and Sovremenny-class destroyers, along with several types of indigenously built destroyers, frigates and nuclear-powered attack submarines. It also continues to upgrade its operational capabilities across the waters surrounding Taiwan and has deployed two new classes of ballistic and attack submarines. Arguably, China’s aggressive pursuit of its territorial claim over the South China Sea has increased in tandem with the expansion of its navy and maritime services.10 Its regular naval exercises utilize modern surface combatants and even submarines.11 These actions concretize China’s intention to unilaterally and militarily resolve the South China Sea imbroglio, flaunt its naval capabilities and impress upon the other claimant states its “de facto” ownership of the disputed territories.12 In the end, China’s naval capabilities will be directed not only to expand its maritime domain, but also to deny foreign navies—especially that of the US—access to the South China and East China Seas. In time, it will be capable of depriving the US Seventh Fleet access to the Western Pacific inside of the so-called “first island chain.”13 China’s aspiration to project its naval power not only to the near seas but also to the far seas—the sea adjacent to the outer rim of the first island chain and those of the north Pacific—is no longer a remote possibility.14 In 2015, China fortified its expansive maritime claim in the South China Sea by constructing artificial islands over the eight reefs it occupied in the Spratlys. Based on satellite images provided by the IHS Janes Defence Weekly, it is clear that China has created new artificial islands at Hughes, Johnson, Gaven, Fiery Cross and Mischief Reefs.15 On April 9, 2015, the Chinese foreign ministry acknowledged China’s massive artificial island constructions in the Spratlys, justifying this effort as a means of “satisfying necessary military defense requirements.” In addition, it noted, these facilities would also provide “civilian facilities such as typhoon shelters, fishing services, and civil administration offices” for China, its neighbors, and international vessels sailing in the South China Sea.16 Despite President Xi Jinping’s statement to then President Barack Obama that China “does not intend to pursue militarization” of the Spratly Islands, China continued building airstrips and other facilities for military purposes in the disputed land features.

160   Renato Cruz De Castro In November and December 2015, the PLAN conducted two massive naval exercises in the South China Sea involving guided missile destroyers, frigates, submarines, early warning aircraft and fighter jets.17 These military maneuvers have enabled China to possess the strategic advantage during conflicts over territorial sovereignty and maritime rights and interests in the South and East China Seas. Clearly, the PLAN is expected to develop naval capabilities needed to gain control of both sea and air in wartime while strengthening its presence in peacetime.18 With its rapid economic development and consequent increase in defense spending particularly in the domains that America is most concerned about—air, sea, and space—China has become an unprecedented and present security challenge for the US.19 On November 16, 2011, speaking before the Australian Parliament in ­Canberra apropos American presence in Asia, then President Barack Obama declared: “Reduction in US spending will not—I repeat, will not—come at the expense of the Asia-Pacific. We will preserve our unique ability to project power and preserve peace (in East Asia).”20 He affirmed that maintaining US forward deployed forces in the Asia-Pacific had remained his top priority despite cuts in US defense spending. The rebalancing strategy, which sought to rectify the high cost and wanton use of US resources and troops in Iraq and Afghanistan, gave some leeway for the Obama administration to end its military commitments in these countries.21 It also acknowledged that that the previous Bush administration wasted enormous resources, attention and precious time on the War on Terror in the Middle East. In effect, the rebalancing allowed the Obama administration to formulate a comprehensive strategy in the Asia-Pacific. Without pressing commitments in other parts of the world, the US could reposition additional naval and air forces in East Asia and fortify its alliance system to confront the China challenge, preserve the freedom of navigation and ensure American primacy in the Western Pacific. This represented a significant change in American strategic priorities in the twenty-first century as the US reduced its focus on continental (low-intensity) conflicts to level up its air and naval power in East Asia while simultaneously helping small and militarily weak countries to secure their territorial integrity.22 Fundamentally, the rebalancing required reinforcing the US Seventh Fleet to expand the American strategic footprint from Northeast Asia to Southeast Asia and to build-up the capacities of the small states around China to protect their maritime and air spaces. The first component involved shifting 60 percent of the US Navy’s ships to the Asia-Pacific, primarily its six aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers and submarines. As part of this effort, the Pentagon replaced the USS George Washington with the newer USS Ronald Reagan. It would also position its most modern air operations-oriented amphibious assault ship, the USS America to the region by 2020; deploy two additional Aegis-capable destroyers to Japan; and home-port all three of its newest class of stealth destroyers, the DDG-1000, with the Pacific Fleet.23 The Pentagon also plans to station the latest F-35 aircraft and two additional Virginia-class attack submarines in the Pacific.24 Likewise, it will utilize the

The case of the Philippines   161 F-22, P-8A Poseidon maritime reconnaissance planes, V-22 Ospreys, B-2 bombers, advanced undersea drones, the new B-21 long-range strike bomber and state-of-the-art tools for cyberspace and electronic warfare.25 This massive deployment of air and naval assets in the Western Pacific is intended to enable the US forces to “offset advanced anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) weapon systems proliferating in maritime Asia.”26 It will also ensure US military dominance in the Western Pacific by reducing the effectiveness of the PLAN’s A2/AD. This thrust clearly pursues the deterrent/defensive role of US forward deployed forces in East Asia since the beginning of the twentieth century—to prevent the rise of a hegemon that could threaten America’s political, economic and security interests in the Pacific.27

Fear over the loss of territorial rights On March 2, 2011, two Chinese patrol boats harassed a survey ship commissioned by the Philippine Department of Energy (DOE) to conduct natural gas exploration in the Reed Bank (also called Recto Bank). The Reed Bank lies 150 kilometers east of the Spratly Islands and 250 kilometers west of the Philippine island of Palawan. Stunned by a maritime encounter that happened within the Philippines’ EEZ, the Aquino administration filed a protest before the Chinese embassy in Manila. A Department of Foreign Affairs spokesperson commented that, “the Philippines is (simply) seeking an explanation for the incident.” ­Brushing aside the Philippine complaint, a Chinese embassy official insisted that China has indisputable sovereignty over the Nansha (Spratlys) Islands and their adjacent territory. Beijing then went on to demand that Manila first seek Chinese permission before it could conduct oil exploration activities even within the ­Philippines’ own EEZ. Furthermore, China badgered the Philippines and other claimant states into recognizing China’s sovereign claim over the South China Sea. With these incidents, the Aquino administration hastened to develop the AFP’s territorial defense capabilities. The Philippines’ territorial defense objective is to establish a modest but “comprehensive border protection program.” This task is anchored on the surveillance, deterrence and border patrol capabilities of the Philippine Air Force (PAF), the Philippines Navy (PN) and the Philippine Coast Guard (PSG) that extend from the country’s territorial waters to its EEZ.28 This immediate plan entailed enhancing the AFP’s capabilities, prioritizing its needs and gradually restructuring its forces for territorial defense. The long-term goal, according to the 2011 AFP: Strategic Intent, is to maintain a “credible deterrent posture against foreign intrusion or external aggression, and other illegal activities while allowing free navigation to prosper.”29 By building up the Philippines’ territorial defense capabilities, the Aquino administration sank its teeth into challenging China’s expansive claims in the South China Sea, which directly encroach into the country’s EEZ. The Philippines aspired to build a credible and sizeable force capable of defending the country’s interests and the land features it occupies in the South China Sea.30

162   Renato Cruz De Castro Because the AFP is militarily weak and underfunded, Manila has persistently asked for unequivocal US commitment to Philippine defense and security as provided for in the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT). Since June 2011 and thereafter, the Philippines has sought American naval/air support in the Spratlys. Philippine officials contend that an armed attack on Philippine metropolitan ­territory and forces anywhere in the Pacific, including the South China Sea, should trigger a US armed response. However, the 1951 MDT does not entail any automatic response from either the Philippines or the US. It merely obligates the allies to consult each other and determine what military action, if any, both would take. In January 2012, Philippine foreign and defense officials discussed an expanded US military presence in the country during the Philippine-US. Bilateral Dialogue that was held in Washington, DC.31 The idea was proposed particularly in conjunction with China’s heightened naval activities in East Asia, and the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) issued by the Obama administration. The DSG provided for a rebalancing of the US force structure and investments to meet persistent and potential threats in the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East, and to advance capabilities for maintaining access and projecting power globally.32 Dubbed as the “U.S. pivot to the Asia-Pacific,” it also called for stronger US military presence in the region that is “geographically distributed, operationally resilient, and politically sustainable.”33 In contrast to prevailing practices during the Cold War era, the Pentagon, this time, did not want any permanent bases in relocating its air and naval assets to the Asia-Pacific region. Rather, it proffers access arrangements and rotational deployments enabling American forces to conduct military exercises and operations demonstrative of US commitment to assist its allies and security partners.34 On April 28, 2014, former Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin and US Ambassador to the Philippines Philip Goldberg signed the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) a few hours before then President Barack Obama arrived in Manila for his first state visit to the Philippines. Actually, EDCA is not a new security pact; it is merely an updated version of the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty.35 This executive agreement serves as a framework by which the Philippines and the US can develop their individual and collective (defense) capabilities. This goal would be accomplished through the rotational deployment of American forces to Philippine bases.36 Although EDCA allows American forces to utilize AFP-owned and-controlled facilities, the Philippine base commander has unhampered access to these locations. Likewise, the AFP can use American-built or improved infrastructure inside these installations. Furthermore, any construction and other activities within the bases require the consent of the host country through the Mutual Defense Board (MDB) and Security Engagement Board (SEB). To manage domestic opposition to US military presence in the country, EDCA has explicitly affirmed Philippine sovereignty and provided a legal framework for increased American rotational presence rather than the maintenance of permanent bases.37 It aims to facilitate the deployment of American

The case of the Philippines   163 troops and equipment while skirting the sensitive issue of re-establishing US bases in the country. At the time it was signed in 2014, the Philippines hedged on the notion that an effective yet rotational US deterrent force in its territory can minimize the potential for armed confrontation in the South China Sea.

Thwarting the strategic rebalancing: the Belt and Road Initiative The deployment of more American forward-deployed forces so far has not deterred China from its expansionist moves. From China’s perspective, this course of action is worth taking since the US is not willing to risk war despite the growing Chinese strategic challenge to the US Seventh Fleet and American allies. Territorial expansion is vital to China’s interests—even to the extent of its use of force. For the US, the credibility of its defense commitments to its allies is important but not necessarily crucial since Chinese aggression does not directly threaten American interests. Though building up its forces in East Asia, the US has not convinced China that it is serious in waging a war with ­determined Chinese leaders who seem bent on chasing their strategic goal of maritime expansion. China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea is based on its assessment of its growing military capacity, along with a strong conviction among its key decision-makers that the US will not use its hard power to counter Chinese actions.38 This stems from the fact that China is one of America’s most important trading partners. In the past two decades, the US and China have established deeply rooted economic interdependence because of trade and investment. Applying an outright deterrence strategy on China became extremely difficult for the Obama administration. An American academic observed: The high level of bilateral economic interdependence will complicate the decision-making calculus in Washington in the event that the People’s Liberation Army threatens the security or sovereignty of an American ally or strategic partner in East Asia. Washington’s motivation to come to the defense of a threatened ally or partner will be attenuated to the degree that the prospective intervention places the health of the U.S. economy in serious jeopardy.39 More significantly, as the world’s traditional and leading practitioner of economic statecraft or geo-economics, China used its massive wealth to advance its geopolitical goal of outflanking the Obama administration’s rebalancing strategy to Asia.40 China’s rapid economic growth and massive foreign exchange reserves have enabled it to reshape regional trade and investment patterns, and to influence geostrategic developments in East Asia. China relies on its economic power as assurance measures and inducements to neighboring states to cooperate with it, but also resorts to coercive economic measures like trade sanctions to punish countries opposing its policies.41 Confronted by the growing

164   Renato Cruz De Castro American naval presence in the Western Pacific, China persists on its maritime expansion by outmaneuvering the US rebalancing policy in the Asia-Pacific region through its huge foreign aid disbursements and several infrastructure projects under the BRI umbrella. The BRI involves the building of comprehensive connectivity of geographical regions through various forms infrastructure, such as roads, railways, and ports as well as communications and energy projects.42 It aims to connect certain countries via these planned roadways: (1) a route stretching from Central Asia west through Russia to the Baltic; (2) a historical route starting from Central Asia turning towards Western Asia, passing through the Persian Gulf on its way to the Mediterranean Ocean; and (3) a route that passes through Southern China into Southeast Asia then leads through South Asia into the Indian Ocean.43 To realize the BRI’s goal of greater connectivity, President Xi promised the following: (1) China will provide more international public goods to its Asian neighbors; (2) economic cooperation will be extended to both land and maritime projects; (3) cooperation will be promoted in all infrastructure development undertakings; and (4) China will commit $40 billion to establish a Silk Road Fund.44 The BRI is a double-edged geopolitical sword. One the one hand, it expands China’s influence into the Eurasian sub-continent away from the Pacific. On the other hand, it projects Chinese influence into the east to become China’s twentyfirst century Marshall Plan to thwart the US rebalancing to the Western Pacific.45 Additionally, it serves as an effective wedge that China can drive between or within countries that it sees as having impact on its core interests such as Taiwan, Tibet and the South China Sea. Alternatively, the BRI is used against any coalition of states that challenges its expansionist agenda in East Asia. More significantly, it strengthens China’s hand in undermining existing military ­alliances and the current regional order while empowering it to create new power relationships and arrangements that exclude the US. Apropos the South China Sea dispute, the BRI has enabled China to develop and extend its ­influence in the disputant countries. As a case in point, China was able to develop and exert its influence on Philippine domestic politics in 2016, to sway the country away from the US, and to alter its balancing policy on China’s expansionist agenda in the South China Sea.

Fear over the loss of economic benefits Upon assuming office in mid-2016, the Duterte administration declared its plan to change the Philippines’ confrontational foreign policy on China. Cabinet officials observed with envy how China had helped build infrastructure in the poor regions of Southeast Asia when it committed $6 billion to finance Laos’s railway system and Cambodia’s first oil refinery. The Philippines had been struggling against its more prosperous Southeast Asian neighbors in competing for foreign investments primarily because of the country’s lack of infrastructure. President Duterte and his economic advisers noted how Chinese investments

The case of the Philippines   165 boosted infrastructure development in Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia.46 They were equally enticed by the BRI plans for increased connectivity among Southeast Asian countries through roads, railways, sea routes, airways and the internet to promote unimpeded trade, policy-coordination and financial integration.47 President Duterte remarked: […] developing countries like the Philippines need connectivity with other nations in the region to develop a healthy economy and inclusive growth. I understand that the Belt and Road Initiative is primarily an economic undertaking that will build these connections among countries, and result in mutual benefits that includes trade and market access.48 The Duterte administration’s plan to effect a rapprochement policy with China became apparent during its handling of the July 2016 Permanent Court of ­Arbitration (PCA) ruling on the South China Sea dispute. In January 2013, the Philippines directly confronted Chinese expansive claim in the South China Sea by filing a statement of claim against China in the Arbitral Tribunal of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). In its Notification and Statement of Claim, the Philippines asked the arbitral tribunal to determine the country’s legal entitlements under the UNCLOS to the Spratly Islands, Scarborough Shoal, Mischief Reef and other land features within its 200-mile EEZ. These entitlements are based on the provisions of the UNCLOS specifically to its rights to a Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone under Part II, to an Exclusive Economic Zone under Part V, and to a Continental Shelf under Part VI.49 After a three-year wait, the PCA at The Hague in the Netherlands decided on the maritime dispute between the Philippines and China on July 12, 2016. The five-judge PCA unanimously ruled in favor of the Philippines on almost all of its claims against China. It determined that China’s claim to historic rights through its nine-dash line in the South China Sea is contrary to international law.50 The court noted that none of the Spratlys is legally islands because they cannot sustain a stable human community or independent economic life.51 Finally, it found China guilty of damaging the marine environment by building artificial islands, and of illegally preventing Filipinos from fishing and conducting oil explorations in the Philippines’ EEZ.52 Surprisingly, despite the Philippines’ overwhelming legal triumph over China, the Duterte administration met the eagerly anticipated decision with a sober, cautious and even muted reaction. Its response was ultra-low key as it neither flaunted the victory nor taunted China with the favorable ruling. Although the domestic reaction was overwhelmingly positive and jubilant, then Foreign Secretary Perfecto Yasay Jr. merely said that he welcomed the ruling and called on the Filipinos to exercise restraint and sobriety. During the ASEAN Foreign Ministers Meeting in Laos, Secretary Yasay withdrew the country’s motion to include the PCA decision in the ASEAN Joint Communique after Cambodia objected to its inclusion. Designated as the country’s special envoy to

166   Renato Cruz De Castro China, former President Fidel Ramos suggested that the PCA award be set aside as the Duterte administration pursued bilateral negotiations with China. It is now clear that the government chose to adopt a policy of appeasement towards China despite the PCA’s ruling favorable to the Philippines. In September 2016, President Duterte veered away from the country’s traditional ally, the US, toward China in an effort to generate a windfall of Chinese economic assistance for the development of the country’s infrastructure. On September 12, 2016, he suddenly announced that US Special Operations Forces in Mindanao must leave the country. He argued that there could be no peace in this southern Philippine island as long as American troops were operating there.53 The following day, he revealed that the PN would terminate joint patrols with the US Navy in the Philippines’ EEZ to avoid upsetting China.54 Toeing the line, Foreign Secretary Yasay explained: “The inadequately armed Philippine military cannot fight China in any battle, thus, President Duterte ordered the Navy not to conduct joint patrols in the South China Sea with the US Navy.”55 He added that China could perceive ­Philippine-US. patrols in the South China Sea as a provocative act, making it more difficult to peacefully resolve the two countries’ territorial dispute.56 While creating a wide diplomatic and strategic cleavage between the Philippines and the US, President Duterte conducted a calibrated foreign policy characterized by cozying up to China. He declared that he was open to direct bilateral negotiations with China. In contrast, former President Aquino brought the South China Sea dispute to the PCA for international arbitration. To earn China’s confidence, President Duterte commented that the PCA award to the Philippines was purely a bilateral issue between the Philippines and China, and was not a concern of the ASEAN.57 Foreign Secretary Yasay shared the same sentiment as he echoed: “The relationship between the two countries (China and the Philippines) was not limited to the maritime dispute. There were other areas of concern in such fields as investment, trade, and tourism and discussing them could open the doors for talks on the maritime issues.”58 Accompanied by 250 Filipino businesspersons, President Duterte visited China on October 20–21, 2016 to seek a new partnership at a time when tension between the Philippines and the US, was mounting.59 His foreign policy agenda involved developing and maintaining an independent and pro-active posture so he could adroitly balance the major powers in East Asia. This was aimed to create a more positive and conducive atmosphere in Philippine-China bilateral relations that would allow both sides to embark on major infrastructure and investment projects, as well as other forms of cooperation to restore mutual trust and confidence.60 During the first meeting, President Xi stressed to President Duterte the need for practical bilateral cooperation between the two disputing countries. He suggested that the Philippines and China must thoroughly coordinate their development strategies and cooperate with each other within the framework of the BRI.61 Both leaders issued a joint communique that laid down 13 areas for comprehensive cooperation and signed memorandums of cooperation in economics and trade, investment, financing and construction of infrastructure.62 Accordingly,

The case of the Philippines   167 the total amount of money committed by China to boost economic cooperation between the two countries amounted to $13.5 billion, of which $9 billion was allocated for infrastructure development in the Philippines.63 Consequently, instead of rectifying the perceived imbalance in the Philippines’ relations with the two major powers, President Duterte replaced the US with China as the ­Philippines’ most important bilateral partner. Not surprisingly, President Duterte has become apathetic to increased Chinese island-building activities in the South China Sea. Apparently, he has been lured by the Chinese promise of trade concessions, grants, loans and investments. Consequently, his administration adopted Beijing’s official line “that after several years of disruption caused mainly by ‘non-regional countries (Japan and the U.S.),’ the South China Sea has calmed with China and Southeast Asian countries agreeing to peacefully resolve [their] disputes.”64 In mid-May 2017, President Duterte and his cabinet went to China for the second time in less than a year to attend the BRI Forum for International Cooperation. They all recited the mantra “that the BRI initiative complements the Philippine government’s Build-Build-Build Infrastructure Plan.”65 The plan provides for the building of a nationwide infrastructure network that will connect the Philippines’ seven thousand, one hundred islands into one cohesive and dynamic economy that will become one of Asia’s tiger economies.66 Ranking Philippine officials believed that BRI could provide the necessary capital for the Philippines to improve its infrastructure and connectivity, and thus provide the international context for the infrastructure plan of the Duterte administration.67 They accepted without question Beijing’s official line that China has a surplus of capital, as well as the expertise and experience in infrastructure construction. This means that China has the resources (financial and engineering) to assist developing countries, like the Philippines, in their infrastructure development. They also deemed that the BRI is more than just an infrastructural integration connectivity scheme as it will also expand the regional market, diversify the financing scheme and reinforce people-to-people connectedness.

Twenty-first century US–China strategic competition The Obama administration’s rebalancing policy was congruent with the constant US strategic agenda in East Asia since the beginning of the twentieth century— to prevent the rise of a regional hegemon that could threaten American political, economic and security interests. It is incumbent upon the current Trump administration to formulate a new grand strategy, bereft of buzzwords like “pivot” or “rebalancing,” to make China aware that challenges to the US role—as East Asia’s offshore balancer—will have grave strategic and diplomatic consequences despite the two countries’ interdependent economic relations. This strategy must enable the US to deal with China from the position of strength based on American forward-deployed forces, regional alliances, partnerships and participation in regional multilateral organizations.

168   Renato Cruz De Castro In the first months of the Trump administration, White House officials examined in depth America’s strategic interests and involvement in East Asia—including some policies it inherited from the Obama administration. Conscious that certain strategic developments in the region could threaten US security interests, the Trump administration found it prudent not only to continue but also to strengthen US strategic engagement in the region. Key administration officials agreed with the Obama administration’s calculation that the Asia-Pacific had become “a key driver of global politics” and “the rebalancing is a means for a sustained and coherent U.S. long-term strategy toward the region.”68 This assessment demands asserting America’s leadership role in Asia and projecting its naval power to counter-balance China’s pervasive regional influence.69 The Trump administration observed that Asia’s economic dynamism generated by China’s emergence as a great power in East Asia co-exists with a number of specific security challenges. These include flashpoints such as Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula, the thorny China–Taiwan relationship, and the tense South China Sea imbroglio that involves unresolved territorial disputes, competition to secure marine resources, and freedom of navigation issues threatening regional stability and American security interests.70 It became aware that the prudent conduct of US foreign policy in Asia must consider the broad trends of the region’s economic dynamism, China’s rising power and its predecessor’s rebalancing strategy. Consequently, the Trump administration reworked the Obama administration’s constrainment policy by treating China as a strategic competitor rather than a potentially responsible stakeholder. It eventually abandoned any delusion of power sharing with China. This was because it saw China expanding its comprehensive capabilities in terms of: a) undermining America’s role as the offshore strategic balancer in the Asia-Pacific region; b) exacerbating old territorial disputes and contested historical issues; and c) claiming to Washington that unchallenged US military dominance in the region was about to end because of China’s emergence as a great power in East Asia. The Trump administration, moreover, currently regards China’s actions and goals as the major destabilizing element in the Indo-Pacific region. From this administration’s perspective, ensuring American primacy in the Indo-Pacific region comes with recognizing the futility of integrating China into the liberal world order. For several American national security and foreign policy experts, the old strategy of accommodation and engagement with China has simply failed.71 From their point of view, US engagement with China has not stopped Beijing from persistently bending the rules of international trade in service to voracious Chinese mercantilism, imposing steep tariffs, and forcing American corporations to their surrender intellectual property rights through cyber espionage. Instead, the Communist Party of China (CCP) uses its rapidly growing comprehensive power to crack down on domestic dissent, bully its neighbors and challenge American leadership in Asia and other parts of the world.72 The failure of the engagement policy with China leaves “the U.S. no choice but to compete, deter, and win in this competitive environment.”73 Prominent

The case of the Philippines   169 American Sinologist Professor Robert Sutter described the Trump administration’s emerging strategy as a shift away from America’s long-standing “strategy of engagement plus hedging” on China to a more forceful whole of government (US) pushback versus China.74 The Trump administration replaced the Obama administration’s carrot-and-stick approach with an outright balancing strategy that involves: a) challenging China’s assertive behavior as an emergent power in the Indo-Pacific region; b) maintaining the regional balance of power that tilts towards the US; c) supporting countries that have competing territorial claims with Beijing as a means of confronting the geostrategic challenge poised by a more assertive and powerful China; and d) preparing a strategic response to defeat China’s growing anti-access and area-denial (A2/A2) capabilities. ­Consequently, it has involved the US in a head-on and protracted competition for power and influence with China in the Indo-Pacific region.75

The fear of entanglement On May 16, 2018, President Duterte signed the first National Security Strategy (NSS) since the Philippines became an independent republic in 1946. The NSS paints a realist picture of the country’s external environment.76 It notes that the Philippines has not been confronted by any direct threat of foreign aggression since the end of World War II. However, it warns that the current regional security environment has become increasingly uncertain and dangerous.77 The NSS observes that Pax Americana is about to end because of the geostrategic competition among the great powers in the South China Sea and the Pacific Ocean, and the transformation of international order from a unipolar into a multipolar one. The 2018 NSS presents three important issues concerning the country’s external security environment.78 1) The perils of traditional geostrategic threats—competing interests of great powers and other countries—will converge, requiring the Philippines to chart its role in an increasingly multi-polar system. 2) The need for the Philippines to be fully equipped not only to deter potential aggressors but also to protect the archipelago from international terrorists, pandemics, transnational crimes and natural disasters. 3) The necessity for the Philippines to develop a credible defense capability and to strengthen its comprehensive strategic alliances or cooperation with its security partners in the international community. Summing up, the NSS calls for the Philippines to adopt a more nuanced approach in its foreign policy by implementing a flexible approach in dealing with the great powers in the region. It demands as well that the Philippines chart its own foreign policy in a fast-changing global society and actively create cooperative and strategic alliances with the Philippines’ traditional friends and partners in the international community.79

170   Renato Cruz De Castro After two years of experimenting with an appeasement policy on China, the Duterte administration, incrementally and reluctantly, has shifted to a policy of equi-balancing. In pursuing this strategy, a minor power fosters its diplomatic linkages and economic activities with two major competing powers to a level whereby it is able to influence their policies yet insulate itself from their undue external influence. It is a form of “soft-balancing” as it is a non-strategic/nonmilitary means to circumvent an emerging power’s revisionist policies by indirectly harnessing the presence and influence of the other major competing powers. This gives the small state not only the ability to maneuver and survive, but also the chance to use the situation to advance its own political and strategic interest. In the case of the Philippines, the application of equi-balancing entails maintaining its alliance with the US, fostering security partnerships with Japan and Australia and challenging (albeit unenthusiastically and incrementally) China’s expansion into the South China Sea. Despite President Duterte’s efforts to distance the Philippines from its only security ally, Philippine-US security cooperation was effectively managed notwithstanding a changed agenda that concentrated on counter-terrorism and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR). Through its continuous global campaign against terrorism, and conduct of HADR, the US military was able to strengthen the pro-American elements in the Philippines government and the AFP, providing them the opportunities to mitigate President Duterte’s efforts to separate from Washington and to gravitate closer to China. Fortunately, the 2017 siege of Marawi City underscored the need for the alliance to adjust to the operational requirement of the threats confronting the Philippines. It also brought and kept President Duterte onside the US, rather than pushing him to the arms of China. Current Philippine-US security cooperation is characterized by regular engagements but with a refocused agenda, rather than a total break-up that became a possibility after President Duterte’s announcement of crossing the Rubicon in October 2016. Since 2012, the Philippines has regarded as indispensable its security partnerships with Japan and Australia. The country has sought security materiel and technical assistance from these middle powers to build up the AFP’s limited military capabilities. Essentially, the Duterte administration is more amenable to closer and more intense security partnerships with these two middle powers. On the one hand, Japan and Australia find it necessary to fill the diplomatic/strategic void created by President Duterte’s efforts to distance the Philippines from the US. The Philippines under President Duterte’s watch considers Japan and Australia as “middle powers that have undertaken soft power outreach in the region through military personnel exchanges, information-sharing, capacity-building, and peopleto-people exchanges.”80 These middle powers just need to turn up the volume one notch or two to fill in where the US comes short.81 On the other hand, by strengthening security cooperation with Japan and Australia, the Philippines avoids being pulled completely into China’s orbit of interests and preferences.82 The stabilization of the Philippine-US relations and the enhancement of the country’s security partnerships with Japan and Australia coincide with the

The case of the Philippines   171 growing crisis resulting from the Duterte administration’s appeasement policy towards China. This appeasement policy is based on a quid pro quo with China, specifically these two important conditions: 1) A massive infusion of Chinese investment and aid for the Duterte administration’s five-year massive infrastructure building program; and 2) The moderation of Chinese behavior towards the Philippines regarding the South China Sea dispute. Developments, however, indicate that China is not keeping its end of the bargain. Despite the 2016 Philippine-China rapprochement, a large portion of the funds that China promised to the Duterte administration has never seen the light of day. This was caused by the cancellation of or delay in the disbursements of Chinese-funded infrastructure projects.83 After his 2016 visit to Beijing, President Duterte reported that he collected $24 billion in investment pledges to finance his ambitious five-year infrastructure building program. Prior to President Xi’s visit to Manila in November 2018, however, Philippine Secretary of Finance Carlos Dominguez complained about the slow flow of Chinese public sector investments. He observed that there had been “roadblocks” in China’s Official Development Assistance (ODA), particularly Beijing’s hesitation to ­co-finance certain projects with other lenders and to use dollars instead of ­renminbi in ODA disbursement.84 Another delaying factor was the reorganization of the Chinese government in early 2018.85 Alvin A. Cambia of Johns Hopkins University in Washington D.C. confirmed the fact that of the $24 billion in pledges made in 2016, $15 billion were negotiated between private businessmen that were eventually modified or cancelled.86 The rest of the projects were stalled because they were difficult to implement such as rail networks and irrigation dams.87 In late July 2018, the Philippine government expressed concerns over the increase in offensive radio warnings against Philippine aircraft and ships flying and sailing respectively near Chinese reclaimed and fortified islands in the South China Sea. An internal AFP report leaked to the Associated Press, revealed that PAF planes patrolling the South China Sea had received at least 46 warnings from Chinese naval outposts in the artificial islands, where more powerful communication and surveillance equipment have been installed along with weapons such as anti-aircraft guns and surface-to-air missiles. On August 15, 2018, President Duterte publicly rebuked China for its islandbuilding activities and called on it to temper its behavior in the South China Sea.88 Several analysts agreed that his statement was the strongest one made on China since his dramatic 2016 pivot toward Beijing and away from Washington.89 In December 2018, the AFP reported the presence of at least 275 Chinese fishing vessels surrounding the Philippine-held Thitu (Pag-asa) Island and adjacent three sandbars after it began rehabilitating a dilapidated runway on the said land feature. Clearly, this action is directed at dissuading Manila from continuing its modest infrastructure upgrades on Thitu. In reaction, Manila lodged diplomatic protests and issued public recriminations against Beijing over that deployment of its fishing vessels.90 In April 2019, the Department of Foreign

172   Renato Cruz De Castro Affairs (DFA) filed a diplomatic protest against China. The DFA, in its protest, questioned the presence of a large number of Chinese fishing vessels around the island and accused Beijing of applying a swarming tactic that was aimed to support its coercive objectives against the Philippines.91 Consequently, in December 2018, Philippine Defense Secretary Delfin ­Lorenzana, during a press briefing, announced that the Department of National Defense (DND) was reviewing the 1951 Philippine-US Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) as he questioned its relevance in the second decade of the twenty-first century.92 He stated that the time had arrived for the MDT “to be revisited, given that its provisions were formulated in the early 1950s.”93 He explained: “We believed it is time to sit down with our US counterparts and revisit the terms of our alliance. We are partners. We have deep historical ties. We must clearly define our roles and responsibilities when the need arises to be joined in arms.”94 The defense secretary admitted that the Philippines has benefited from its ­alliance with the US because of the MDT and its side agreements like the 1997 Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) and the 2014 EDCA. However, he was looking into “how the treaty is helping the Philippines position itself in a rapidly changing regional security environment marked by deepening U.S.–China geopolitical rivalry and brewing tension in the Taiwan Straits.”95 He further raised the question on whether or not the MDT served Philippine national interests and if the treaty was still valid or relevant in the face of changing security dynamics all over the world. He added that the DND was looking into whether it should be maintained or strengthened or scrapped.96 During his March 2019 visit to Manila, US Secretary of State Michael Pompeo declared: “As the South China Sea is part of the Pacific; any armed attack on Philippine forces, aircraft or public vessels in the South China Sea will trigger mutual defense obligations under Article 4 of our mutual defense treaty.”97 His comment was aimed to reassure the Philippines that the US would assist its ally in the light of Chinese island-building activities and the militarization of these land features in the South China Sea. In a separate conversation, he told President Duterte: “Our commitments under the treaty are clear. Our obligations are real. The South China Sea is certainly part of an important body of water for freedom of navigation.”98 He also pointed out that the Trump Administration “is making sure that the South China Sea remains open for the security of the countries in the region, of the world, and for commercial transit.”99 The stabilization of the Philippine–US alliance, the enhancement of the ­Philippines’ security partnerships with Japan and Australia, Secretary Lorenzana’s call for a review of the MDT, the increasing tension between the Philippines and China over the slow flow of Chinese public investment and the PLA’s continuing coercive behavior in the South China Sea as well as Secretary Pompeo’s reassurance of US commitment to honor its treaty obligations to the country are signs of the Duterte administration’s gradual shift from appeasement to a more nuanced approach in dealing with the great powers engaged in a strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific region.

The case of the Philippines   173

The power of fear From 2011 to 2016, the Aquino administration pursued a balancing policy on China as it promoted closer security cooperation with the US. This policy could be traced back to 2011 when President Aquino stood up to China’s expansive claim and heavy-handed behavior in the South China Sea. He redirected the AFP’s focus from domestic security to territorial defense; fostered deeper ­Philippine-US security arrangements; acquired American military equipment; and sought from Washington an unequivocal security guarantee under the 1951 MDT. President Duterte, however, unraveled President Aquino’s geopolitical agenda of balancing China’s expansive claims in the South China Sea. He distanced his country from its long-standing treaty ally and gravitated toward a regional power bent on effecting a territorial revision in the East Asia. He has also set aside the 2016 UNCLOS decision on the South China Sea dispute. His maritime security policy is aimed at appeasing China, in contrast to then President Aquino’s balancing strategy. The Duterte administration believes that its appeasement policy toward China is worth taking because it makes the country a beneficiary of the latter’s emergence as a global economic power. The difference between these two administrations’ foreign policies lies in how President Aquino and President Duterte examined the major geopolitical developments in the Indo-Pacific region. The two presidents started from two distinct reference points. On the one hand, then President Aquino was concerned about the Chinese naval threat to the country’s EEZ and strategic leverage as a maritime nation vis-à-vis China’s maritime expansion. The Obama administration’s strategic rebalancing to Asia encouraged him to pursue a balancing policy on China based on the build-up of the Philippine military’s territorial defense capabilities and enhanced security ties with the US. On the other hand, President Duterte took note that despite the strategic rebalancing to Asia, the Obama administration maintained an ambiguous position in the South China Sea dispute, in particular, and China’s emergence as a major power in general. He also considered the launching of China’s BRI. He dreaded the fact that if the Philippines continued to pursue a balancing policy toward China, the country would not be able to avail itself of Chinese investments and aid under the BRI. This prompted him to adopt an appeasement policy characterized by strategically distancing the Philippines from the US and cozying up to China. Nevertheless, confronted by the US–China strategic competition, the Duterte administration has eventually adopted a policy of equi-balancing. The goal is to prevent the Philippines from being trapped in the middle of dangerous great powers’ competition in the Indo-Pacific region. This diplomatic maneuver is a form of “soft-balancing” as it is a non-strategic/non-military means to thwart an emerging power’s revisionist policies by indirectly harnessing the presence and influence of other major competing powers. The Duterte administration implements this policy by maintaining its alliance with the US, fostering security partnerships with Japan and Australia and reluctantly challenging China’s expansion

174   Renato Cruz De Castro into the South China Sea. As a weak and small power bereft of any credible defense capabilities, the Philippines is able “to chart its destiny in an increasingly multi-polar global order as it strengthens and pursues a comprehensive and strategic alliance or cooperation with its friends and partners in the Indo-Pacific region.”100

Notes    1 Julianne Smith, Erik Brattberg, and Rachel Rizzo, Transatlantic Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific: Recommendations for the Next Administration (Washington, DC: Center for New American Security, October 2016), p. 2.    2 Martin S. Indyk, Kenneth G. Lieberthal, and Michael E. O’ Hanlon, “Scoring Obama’s Foreign Policy: A Progressive Pragmatist Tries to Bend History,” Foreign Affairs 91, no. 3, May/June (2012), p. 33.    3 Aaron Friedberg, “Buckling Beijing: An Alternative U.S. China Policy,” Foreign Affairs 91, no. 5, September/October (2012): 2. http://search.proquest.com/docview/ 1034967488/13955C9B22EE29    4 Elisabetta Brighi and Christopher Hill, “Implementation and Behavior,” in Steve Smith, Amelia Hadfield and Tim Dunne (eds), Foreign Policy: Theories, Actors, Cases (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 148.    5 Laura Neack, The New Foreign Policy: U.S. and Comparative Foreign Policy in the 21st Century (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2003), p. 158.    6 Ibid., p. 158.    7 Derek Beach, Analyzing Foreign Policy (Basingstoke, Hampshire, UK; New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), p. 121.    8 Ibid., p. 121.    9 National Institute for Defense Studies, NIDS China Security 2014: Diversification of Roles of the People’s Liberation Army and the People’s Armed Police (Tokyo, Japan: National Institute for Defense Studies, 2015), p. 2.   10 Peter Dutton, “Three Disputes and Three Objectives: China and the South China Sea,” Naval War College Review 54, no. 4 (Autumn 2011), p. 6.   11 For details on China’s Training Exercises in its surrounding waters, see National Institute for Defense Studies, NIDS China Security Report (Tokyo: National Institute for Defense Studies, 2011), p. 14–21.   12 The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2011: The Annual Assessment of Global Military Capabilities and Defence Economics (London: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2011), p. 196.   13 Yoichi Kato, “China’s Naval Expansion in the Western Pacific,” Global Asia 5, no. 4 (Winter 2010): p. 19.   14 Christopher H. Sharman, China Moves Out: Stepping Stones toward a New Maritime Strategy (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 2015), p. 6.   15 Bonnie Glasser and Jacqueline Vitello, “China Makes Strides with AIIB and A Great Wall of Sand,” Comparative Connections: A Triannual E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations 17, no. 2 (May 2015), p. 5.   16 Ibid., p. 7.   17 Robert Sutter and Chin-hao Huang, “Limited Moderation amid Pressure and Complaints” Comparative Connections: A Triannual E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations 18, no. 1 (January 2016), p. 4.

The case of the Philippines   175   18 National Institute for Defense Studies, NIDS China Security Report 2016 (Tokyo, Japan: National Institute for Defense Studies, 2016), p. 16.   19 Eliot A. Cohen, The Big Stick: The Limits of Soft Power and the Necessity of Military Force (New York: Basic Books, 2016), p. 102.   20 Sheldon Simon, “U.S.–Southeast Relations: Rebalancing,” Comparative Connections: A Triannual E-Journal on East Asia Bilateral Relations 14, no. 1 (January 2012): p. 1.   21 T.J. Pempel, “The 2012 United States Election and the Implications for East Asia,” The Pacific Review 26, no. 2 (2013), p. 120.   22 Simon, “U.S.–Southeast Asian Relations: Rebalancing,” pp. 7–8.   23 Department of Defense, Asia-Pacific Maritime Security Strategy (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2015), p. 20.   24 Ibid., p. 20.   25 Ash Carter, “The Rebalancing and Asia-Pacific: Building a Principled Security Network,” Foreign Affair 95, no. 6 (November/December 2016): p. 68.   26 Department of Defense, “Asia-Pacific Maritime Strategy,” p. 22.   27 Sheldon Simon, “The U.S. Rebalance and Southeast Asia,” Asian Survey 55, 3, (November–December 2015), p. 772.   28 National Security Council, National Security Policy 2011–2016 (Quezon City: National Security Council, April 2011), p. 39.   29 Office of the Deputy Chief-of-Staff, Armed Forces of the Philippines: Strategic Intent (Quezon City: Camp Aguinaldo, 2011), p. 27.   30 Ibid., p. 4.   31 Floyd Whaley, “Philippines in Talk to Expand U.S. Military Ties,” The International Herald Tribune, January 27, 2012, 1 and 3.   32 Cheryl Pellerin, “Carter: Strategic Guidance is Compass for 2013,” American Forces Press Service, 2-13-20012, 2. www.defense.gov/News/NewsArticle.aspx?ID= 66705   33 Phillip C. Saunders, “The Rebalance to Asia: U.S.–China and Relations and regional Security,” Strategic Forum No. 281 (August 2013), p. 7.   34 Ibid., p. 9.   35 Philippine News Agency, “New Defense Agreement Enhances Philippine, U.S. Alliance on Security Challenges—DND Chief,” The Philippines News Agency, April 28, 2014, 1. http://search.proquest.com/docview/1519443096?accoun tid=28547   36 Jim Garamone, “U.S.–Philippine Pact Expands Defense Cooperation,” Targeted News Service, 28 April 28, 2014, 1 http://search.proquest.com/docview/1519453450 /17CC0F621D4441CBPQ/55?accountid=...   37 S.C. Greitens, “The U.S. Alliance with the Philippines: Challenges and Opportunities,” U.S. Alliances and Partnership at the Center of Global Power, Eds. Ashley J. Tellis, Abraham M. Denmark, and Greg Chaffin. (Seattle and Washington, DC: The National Bureau of Asian Research, 2014), p. 134.   38 Forum Staff, “Rising Tensions: Chinese Actions in the South China Sea Remain Under Scrutiny,” Indo-Pacific Defense Forum 41, no. 1 (2016), p. 55.   39 Evan Resnik, “The Obama Rebalance and US Policy towards China,” United States Engagement in the Asia Pacific Perspectives from Asia, Eds. Yoichiro Sato and Tan See Seng (Amherst, NY: Cambria Press, 2015), p. 28.   40 See Robert D. Blackwell and Jennifer M. Harris, War by Other Means: Geoeconomics and Statecraft (Harvard, MA: Belknap Press, 2016), p. 128.   41 See ibid., pp. 129–151.

176   Renato Cruz De Castro   42 The National Institute for Defense Studies, East Asian Strategic Review 2017 (Tokyo, Japan: The Japan Times Press, 2017), p. 79.   43 East Asian Strategic Review 2016, East Asian Strategic Review 2016 (Tokyo, Japan: The Japan Times Press, 2016), pp. 119–120.   44 The National Institute for Defense Studies, “East Asian Strategic Review 2017,” p. 77.   45 Ibid., p. 18.   46 Ibid., p. 2.   47 Michael Delizo, “China Sees Key Role for Philippines in Belt and Road Initiative,” TCA Regional News December 2016, 2. https://search.proquest.com/docview/1845 008451/fulltext/220E06A5...   48 Catherine Valente, “Philippines Eyes Gains from China’s Infra Buildup,” TCA Regional News, May 3, 2017, 1. http://search.proquest.com/docview/1898438866/ fulltext/220E06A5...   49 Department of Foreign Affairs, “Notification and Statement of Claim to the United Nations Convention of Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) Arbitral Tribunal,” Manila (January 22, 2013): 12–14.   50 Permanent Court of Arbitration, “The South China Sea Arbitration (The Republic of the Philippines versus the People’s Republic of China)” Press Release (The Hague, 12 July 2016): p. 1.   51 Ibid., p. 1.   52 Ibid., p. 1.   53 David Cagahastian, “Malacanang Clarifies Duterte Statement on Kick out of U.S. Troops in Mindanao,” BM News, (September 13, 2016), p. 3.   54 Trefor Moss. “Philippine President’s Shift on U.S. Alliance Worries Military: His Willingness to Upend Alliance with the U.S. has Dumbfounded even those in His Inner Circle,” The Wall Street Journal. September 16, 2016, 1 www.wsj.com/ articles/philippine-presidents-shift-on-u-s-alliance-worries-military-1474058666   55 Jose Katigbak, “Philippines Eyes Talks with China Sans Preconditions,” The Philippine Star, September 18, 2016, 1 www.philstar.com/headlines/2016/09/18/1624973/ philippines-eyes-talks-china-sans-preconditions?utm_source=Arangkada+News+Clips& utm-campaign...   56 Ibid., p. 1.   57 Oxford Daily Brief Service 2016, “Philippines: New Foreign Policy May be Destabilizing.” Oxford Daily Brief Service, 16, no. 2.   58 Katigbak, “Philippine President’s Shift,” 2.   59 Neil Jerome Morales and Karen Lema, “The Philippines is Preparing a Major Pivot toward China amid Tension with the U.S., Business Insider, October 11, 2016, 1 www.businessinsider.com/the-philippines-is-preparing-a-major-pivot-toward-china2016-10?source=Arangkada+News+Clips&utm_campaign=2df...   60 Aileen Baviera, “President Duterte’s Foreign Policy Challenges,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 38, no. 2., 2016: 205.   61 National Institute for Defense Studies, “East Asian Strategic Review 2017,” 87.   62 Ibid., 88.   63 Ibid., 88.   64 Robert G. Sutter and Chin-Hao Huang, “Beijing Presses Its Advantages,” Comparative Connections 13, no. 3 (September–December 2017): 43.   65 Asia News Monitor, “China/Philippines: China’s Belt and Road Initiative Complements Build-Build-Build,” Asia News Monitor, May 16, 2017, 1–2. https://search. proquest.com/docview/1898666508/fultext/220E)6A5.

The case of the Philippines   177   66 MENA Report, “Philippines’ DuterteNomics in China Launched,” MENA Report, May 16, 2017, 1. https://search.proquest.com/docview/1899178166/fulltext/220E06A5...   67 Xinhua News Agency, “Philippines Lauds China’s Hosting of Belt and Road Forum,” Xinhua News Agency, May 15, 2017, 1 https://search.proquest.com/printviewfile?acco untid=190474   68 Julianne Smith, Erik Brattberg, and Rachel Rizzo, Transatlantic Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific: Recommendations for the Next Administration (Washington, DC: Center for New American Security, October 2016), p. 2.   69 Martin S. Indyk, Kenneth G. Lieberthal, and Michael E. O’ Hanlon, “Scoring Obama’s Foreign Policy: A Progressive Pragmatist Tries to Bend History,” Foreign Affairs 91, no. 3 (May/June 2012), p. 33.   70 James J. Przystup and Phillip C. Saunders, Asia and the Trump Administration: Challenges, Opportunities, and a Road Ahead (Washington DC: National Defense University Press, June 2017), pp. 12–13.   71 James Kitfield, “The U.S. and China: A Colder Peace or Thucydides Trap?” Air Intel and Cyber, Sea, Strategy and Policy (December 12, 2018), p. 2.   72 Ibid., p. 3.   73 Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2017), p. 1.   74 John S. Van Oudenaren, “What Does Growing U.S.–China Rivalry Mean for America’s Allies in Asia? Could They End Up Having to Choose Sides?” National Interests (December 13, 2018), p. 1.   75 David Shambaugh, “U.S. Relations with Southeast Asia* More Continuing than Change,” Trends in Southeast Asia 2018, 18 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2018), p. 4.   76 National Security Council, National Security Strategy: Security and Development for Transformational Change and Well-Being of the Filipino People (Quezon City: National Security Council, 2018), p. 7.   77 Ibid., p. 7.   78 Ibid., pp. 7–8.   79 Ibid., pp. 7–8.   80 For an interesting discussion on why Japan and Australia should pursue a more activist foreign policy in Southeast Asia see Thitinan Pongsudhirak, “Southeast Asia and the Trump Administration: Between a Rock and A Hard Place,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 39, 1 (April 2017), p. 10.   81 Ibid., p. 10.   82 William Tow, “President Trump and the Implications for the Australia-U.S. Alliance and Australia’s Role in Southeast Asia,” Contemporary Southeast Asia, 3, no. 9 (April 2017): p. 2. https://search.proquest.com/printviewfile?accountid= 47510   83 Sarah Zheng, “Philippines Must Strike a Balance when China’s XI Jinping Comes to Visit, Analysts Say,” South China Morning Post, November 1, 2018, p. 2.   84 Ian Nicolas Cigaral, “Diokno: Xi Jinping’s Manila Visit to Pressure China’s Bureaucracy to Hasten Infra Projects,” Philippine Star, November 14, 2018, 1–2.   85 Ibid., 1.   86 Alvin Camba, “China’s Infrastructure Investments in the Philippines,” Presentation at the U.S.–Philippines Society, Washington, DC. July 26, 2018, 1.   87 Ibid., 1.

178   Renato Cruz De Castro   88 Center for Media Freedom and Responsibility, “From Friend to Foe? Duterte Criticizing China on Treatment of PH Military,” CMFR, August 24, 2018, 1. https://cmfr-phil. org/media-ethics-responsibility/journalism-review/from-friend-to-foe-duterte-criticizingchina-on-treatment-of-ph-military/   89 Jim Gomez, “Duterte: China Should Temper its Behavior in Disputed Waters,” Bloomberg, August 14, 2018, 1. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/201808-14/duterte-china-should-temper-i   90 Asian Maritime Transparency Brief, “Still Under Pressure: Manila versus the Militia,” Asian Maritime Transparency Initiative, April 16, 2019, 1.   91 Donna Z. Pazzibugan, Frances Mangosing, Jeannette I. Andrade, and Leile B. Salaverria, “Chinese Vessels Enter 2 More PH Island Waters,” Philippine Daily Inquirer, April 18, 2019, 2.   92 Asia News Monitor, “Philippines/United States: Lorenzana Orders Review of 67-Year-Old U.S.–Ph Military Pact,” Asia News Monitor, January 2, 2019, 1. https://search.proquest.com/docview/2161379801?accountid=190474   93 Manila Bulletin, “DND Considering Review of Ph-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty,” Asia Pulse, December 2018, 1.   94 Raissa Robles, “Philippine Defense Chief Urges Review of U.S. Treaty amid South China Sea Tensions,” South China Morning Post, January 17, 2019, p. 1.   95 Ibid., p. 1.   96 Asia News Monitor, “Philippines/United States: Lorenzana Orders Review of 67-Year Old U.S.–Philippine Military Pact,” Asia News Monitor, January 2, 2019, 1. https://search.proquest.com/docview/2161379801?accountid=190474   97 Ankit Panda, “In Philippines, Pompeo Offers Major Alliance Assurance on South China Sea,” The Diplomat, March 4, 2019, 1. https://search.proquest.com/docview/2 187567015?accountid=190474   98 Manila Bulletin, “Lorenzana Says 67-yr Old MDT Could Become Cause, Not Deterrent, for Chaos,” Manila Bulletin, March 5, 2019, 2. https://search.proquest. com/docvie/2188186454?accountid=190474   99 Ibid., p. 2. 100 The National Security Council, “National Security Strategy,” pp. 7–8.

Index

Page numbers in bold denote tables. 2005 Strategic Framework Agreement 57 2011 AFP: Strategic Intent 161 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) 162 2013 Defence White Paper 81 2015 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement 57 2016 Defence White Paper 31, 107 2016 Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative 66 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper 8, 81–2, 85, 87, 89, 107 2017 White Paper 83, 84 A2/AD see Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) AAGC see Asia–Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) Abbott, Tony, former Australia’s Prime Minister 86 Abe, Shinzo, Japanese Prime Minister 4, 13–18, 20, 24, 39–42, 44–5, 47–50, 70, 80, 88, 95, 106–7, 119–21, 123–6; Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond 44; democratic security diamond 20, 106; FOIP strategy 20, 24; security legislation in 2015 41; strategic outlook 44 Act East policy 16–17, 22, 107 Afghanistan 116, 156, 160 AFP see Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) Africa 2–4, 8–9, 22–3, 39, 42, 50, 58, 69, 80, 106, 108, 115–16, 120–2, 133, 136, 144, 147, 149 African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) 117

AFRICOM see US Africa Command (AFRICOM) Agalega Island 143 AIIA see Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA) AIIB see Asian Investment Infrastructure Bank (AIIB) aircraft 45, 56–8, 66, 68, 136, 143, 158, 171–2; early warning 160 aircraft carrier (s) 45, 56–8, 66, 136, 160 air force exercises 56, 69 airports 9, 122, 136 air space 44, 68, 160 airways 64, 133, 165; open 64 alignment (s) 10, 27–9, 88, 134–5, 151; auspicious 88; economic development strategies 29; rigid 10, 151 alliance (s) 4, 10, 12, 16, 30–1, 44–5, 50, 59, 61, 66–7, 81, 85, 87, 104, 108, 150–61, 156, 160, 164, 167, 169–70, 172–4; Abe-Trump 45; bilateral 10, 66, 108, 151; cooperation 85; cooperative 169; formal 12; India–Japan–US– Australia 81; maritime 44; military 164; Pacific 66; Philippine–US 172; regional 167; security 31, 104; strategic 169, 174; supportive 59; US–Japan 30, 45, 67 ally (ies) 3, 7, 24, 45, 48, 56, 59–62, 67–8, 71, 82, 85, 94, 104–5, 107–8, 138, 141, 149, 156–7, 162–3, 166, 170, 172–3; American 163; long-term 104; power 3; regional 104; security 170; strategic 24, 82, 85, 156 America 45, 58, 65, 80, 86, 94, 156, 160–1, 163, 168–9; see also United States of America (US) America First 86, 94; strategy 94

180   Index American ally (ies) 163; military 58; military equipment 156, 173 American Lake 55 American security interests 168 AMISOM see African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) anarchy, unmitigated 78 Andaman Sea 69, 139 Annual Australia-US Ministerial (AUSMIN) 67 Anti-Access/Area Denial (A2/AD) 161 ANU see Australian National University (ANU) APEC see Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Aquilino, John, US Admiral 60, 71 Aquino administration 158, 161, 173 Aquino III, Benigno, former President of Philippines 10, 156, 158, 161, 166, 173; balancing strategy 173; geopolitical agenda in the South China Sea 156 Arabian Sea 21, 58, 69 ARIA see Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA) armed confrontation 147, 157, 163 Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) 156, 161–2, 170–1, 173 artificial island 159 artificial islands 57, 133, 136, 140, 159, 165, 171 Arunachal Pradesh 3, 24 ASEAN see Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Asia: economic dynamism 168; power asymmetry in 6, 31; regional cooperation in 95, 97 Asia–Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) 8, 22, 32, 106, 149 Asian Investment Infrastructure Bank (AIIB) 27, 29, 101, 109 Asia-Pacific 7, 13–16, 26, 28, 31, 40, 45, 55, 59, 61–3, 65–6, 68–9, 78–9, 81, 94, 97–8, 102–3, 107–8, 156, 160, 162, 164, 168; security 45 Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean linkages 40, 68 Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 55, 62–3, 65, 88 Asia-Pacific strategic narrative 55 Asia Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA) 66, 150 Asia’s democratic security diamond 18 Assab 117

Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 7, 17, 47–8, 50–1, 60–1, 97, 107, 150–1, 157, 165–6 Assumption Island 142, 143, 148 Australia’s 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper 8 AUSMIN see Australia-US Ministerial (AUSMIN) meetings Australia 3–9, 13–21, 24, 27–32, 40, 44, 50, 57–61, 63, 66–7, 69–72, 78–90, 95, 102, 105–8, 115, 119, 140, 148–51, 170, 172–3, 2016 Defence White Paper 30; as a middle power 84; economic, security, and diplomatic environment 87; foreign policy 85, 89; middle power status 83; policy towards China 86; security 85; South Asia Regional Infrastructure Connectivity” 149; strategic and defense planning 85; strategy towards the Indo-Pacific 85 Australia and China Comprehensive Strategic Partnership 87 Australia and Philippines security partnerships 172 Australia and US 3, 40, 58, 106; relations 61 Australia–Indonesia–India 151 Australian; foreign policy 83, 85; politics 88; security discourse 80 Australian foreign policy 83 Australian Institute of International Affairs (AIIA) 80 Australian National University (ANU) 80 Australia’s 2016 Defence White Paper 31 Australia’s 2017 Foreign Policy White Paper 85, 88 Australia-US Ministerial (AUSMIN) meetings 67–8 Autonomy 10, 20, 97, 135, 157 Bagomoyo port 117 Bab el-Mandeb 21, 22, 58 balance of power 4, 71, 78, 80, 85, 90, 147, 169; precarious 90; regional 169; shifting 4, 78, 80; stable 147; tacit 71 balancing 7–8, 10, 28, 31, 58–9, 64, 71–2, 81, 87, 106–8, 142, 150–1, 156, 158, 164, 169–70, 173; actions 7; behavior 150; external 8, 59, 72; games 151; implicit 64; internal 8, 58, 71; policy 10, 156, 158, 164, 173; power 87; strategic imperative of 142; without provoking 150 Bangladesh 60, 66, 100, 145, 147, 149

Index   181 Bay of Bengal 2–3, 56, 58, 60, 69, 147 Belt and Road Forum (BRF) 71, 103, 140, 142 Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) 2, 4, 6–10, 21, 25, 31–2, 41, 49–50, 67, 71, 88, 94–6, 98, 100–3, 105–6, 108–9, 119–20, 123–5, 133, 136, 142, 144–9, 151, 157–8, 163–7, 173; economy-centric approach 102; economy of 6 Berbera port 116–17, 122 Bhutan 18, 136, 139 bilateral: alliances 10, 66, 108, 151; collaboration 67; Cope North exercises 60; dialogue 27, 32, 162; exercises 68; military cooperation 66; partnership 59, 62; relations 26–7, 59, 87, 139, 166; security alliances 104; trade 21, 29–30, 94 Bisley, Nick 87 border/boundary 3, 5–6, 12, 23–4, 27–8, 32, 56, 87–8, 102, 105, 115, 118, 136, 147, 157, 161; capabilities 161; disputes 6, 12, 23–4, 27, 32, 88, 102, 105, 136; Himalayan 147; land 5, 88; Somali 118; stand-off 32 Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) 27–9, 99, 101 BRF see Belt and Road Forum (BRF) BRI see Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) BRICS see Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (BRICS) Britain 141, 144, 146 Build-Build-Build Infrastructure Plan 167 Buzan, Barry 82 Cambodia 5, 138, 145, 147–9, 164–5 capacity-building 42, 43, 47, 48, 170 carat exercises 60 Carr, Andrew 84 CENTCOM see US Central Command (CENTCOM) Central Asia 144 Central Conference on Work Relating to Foreign Affairs 99 Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 62 Chagos Islands 144 China: as a strategic competitor 104, 168; as a strategic threat to the American global interest 25; as an economic, political and maritime power in IOR 22; Asia policy 149; assertiveness in South China Sea 163; BRI 4, 6–9, 32, 50, 105–6, 108, 120, 123–4, 136, 142, 149,

173; BRI modus operandi 136; broader strategic objectives 136; coercive actions in the South China Sea 64; “debt diplomacy” 59, 103; development trajectory 100; diplomatic protest against 172; economic growth 22, 163; economy 102; expansive maritime claim in the South China Sea 156, 159; foreign exchange reserves 163; foreign policy 25, 28, 87, 98; foreign policy objective 28; foreign policy strategy 25; hardball diplomacy 138; India’s security against 32; infrastructure projects 17; leadership role in global affairs 25; maritime assertiveness in South China Sea 70; maritime expansion in South China Sea 10, 173; maritime forays 147; maritime interests in the IOR 22; maritime investment 23; militarization and territorial expansion in South China Sea 65; military base building spree 5; military buildup 133; military expansion 133; military expenditure of 25; military modernization 25; military posture 26; MSR strategy 22; naval expansion 158; new security concept 23; regional influence 2; rise 1, 23–4, 26, 29–31, 101, 105, 108; rising influence 25; rising power 41, 168; Silk Road strategy 31; sovereign claim over South China Sea 161; strategic ambitions in Indian Ocean. 6; strategic non-equilibrium stance 12; strategic pivot against 20; strategy 146; “String of Pearls 3; “String of Pearls 2.0” maritime strategy 101, 133; see also People’s Republic of China (PRC) China and Bhutan relationship 22 China and India 1, 6, 12–13, 24, 26–8, 31–2, 97, 134–5, 149; border disputes 105; boundary dispute 6, 24, 32; frictions in the Himalayas 134; multilateral contacts 27–8; relations 10, 12–13, 26–8, 32, 151; rivalry 134 China and India/Sino-Indian rivalry 134; small island states 134 China and IOR relationship 22 China and Japan 49, 120, 122, 125–6, 134; clashes in the East China Sea 134; relations 40, 49, 120; rivalry 125, 126 China and Maldives relationships 22 China and Nepal relationships 22 China and Philippines 165–6, 172; bilateral issue 166; maritime dispute 165; tension 172

182   Index China and Sri Lanka relationship 22 China and Taiwan relationship 168 China and US 10, 13, 25, 29, 87, 151, 158, 163, 167, 172–3; competition 10; geostrategic competition 10; power struggle 85; relations 10, 151; strategic competition 158, 167, 173 China and US rivalry 13, 19, 172; geopolitical 172; military 24; Post-Cold War 23; strategic 90 China and Vietnam confrontations in the South China Sea 134 China Merchants Holdings International (CMHI) 117, 138 China Merchants Port Holdings (CM Port) 117 China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) 100, 102 “China-wary” nations 150, 151 Chinese: aggressive behavior in the South China Sea 156; aid 2, 171; assertiveness in the South China Sea 150; Chinesefunded infrastructure 171; economy 101, 108; foreign policy 95, 98–100; infrastructure 3, 145; investment 6, 118, 146, 171; island-building activities in the South China Sea 167; maritime expansion 10, 158; maritime presence in the IOR 17; maritime push 68; military 3, 5, 145, 151; naval visits Mozambique 118; security concerns 10, 100; strategic community 13; strategies 65, 126 civil war 136–7 CMHI see China Merchants Holdings International (CMHI) CM Port see China Merchants Port Holdings (CM Port) COD see Concert of Democracies (COD) Cold War 1, 10, 13, 23–4, 66, 71, 78, 80, 96, 108, 117, 135, 151, 162 Colombo Port 137–8, 142 COMCASA see Communications, Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) commercial contacts 21 communications, Compatibility and Security Agreement (COMCASA) 68 Communist Party of China (CPC) 22, 26, 29, 31, 98–9, 101 National Security Commission 99 Compact of Free Association 66 competition 1, 9–10, 49, 63, 65, 67, 71, 87, 90, 95, 99, 104, 106, 120, 122, 124–6, 134–6, 144–5, 148–50, 158, 167–9,

172–3; China and US 10; geostrategic 10, 169; naval 134; power 10, 71, 135, 158; strategic 65, 90, 104, 122, 135, 144, 148, 158, 167, 172–3 competitive strategy 49 Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) 88 comprehensive border protection program 161 Concert of Democracies (COD) 149 Conference on the Diplomatic Work on Neighboring Countries 99 conflict (s) 1, 6, 22–3, 30, 32, 86, 88, 116, 122, 134, 136–7, 160 conflict stabilization zones 116 confrontation 26, 50, 101, 147, 157, 163 connectivity 8, 31, 42, 95, 102–3, 149; economic 8, 42, 95, 102–3; railway 31; road 31 constructivism 8, 82–3 Continental Shelf 165 cooperation 1, 5–6, 8, 13–16, 27, 29, 31–2, 44, 46–7, 49–50, 57, 60–2, 65–70, 79, 85, 87–9, 94–7, 102, 105–6, 108–9, 119–20, 134, 150–1, 164, 166–7, 169–70, 173–4; alliance 85; defense 47, 57, 62, 119, 150; India–Japan 80; maritime security 60; military 13, 66, 69; regional 88, 94–7, 108–9; security 47, 60, 151, 170, 173; strategic 169, 174; strategy 49 cooperative: alliances 169; strategy 49 Cope North exercises 56, 60, 69; air force 56, 69 Cope West exercises 57 corruption 63, 99, 116, 137, 141, 145, 149 counterinsurgency, military 156 counterterrorism 20, 170 CPC see Communist Party of China (CPC) CPEC see China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) CPTPP see Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) CSIS see Centre for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Dar es Salaam Port 117–18 DCC see Development Cooperation Charter (DCC) DCT see Doraleh Container Terminal (DCT) debt-for-equity swap 138 debt (s) 2, 5, 59, 64–5, 103, 118, 120, 125, 133, 136–40, 140–2, 145–7; diplomacy

Index   183 59; external 140; foreign 140, 147; repayments 138; sky-rocketing 2; sustainability 120; trap 103, 125, 136, 140, 147; unsustainable 145 Debt Sustainability Framework 103 debt-trap 2, 103, 125, 133, 136, 141, 147; diplomacy 2, 103, 125 decolonization 80, 144 Defence and Security Dialogues 27 defense 39, 44–8, 55, 57, 59, 62, 67, 78, 85, 105, 107, 119, 140–2, 150, 156, 159–60, 169, 172–4; capabilities 161, 173–4; cooperation 47, 57, 62, 119, 150; diplomacy 47–8; external 156; partners/ partnerships 59, 105; planning 85; relations 47; requirements 159; resources 46; territorial 45, 161, 173 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) 162 DefExpo2018 140 democracy 40, 64, 139–41, 143, 148–9 Deng Xiaoping, Chinese President 2, 23, 99 deterrence 132, 157, 159; strategy 163 Development Cooperation Charter (DCC) 48 development (s): economic 29, 42, 100, 146, 160; export-led model of 42; geostrategic 10, 163; infrastructure 43, 138, 164–5, 167; maritime 22; port 133, 147, 150; strategic 158, 168; strategies 29, 166 “Develop the West” policy 100 Diego Garcia 57–8, 115, 140, 144 diplomacy 2, 6–7, 28, 47–50, 55, 59, 66, 83–5, 87, 90, 98–9, 103–4, 125, 133, 138, 146; debt 59; debt trap 2, 103, 125; defense 47–8; economic 28; forwarddeployed 104; gunboat 6, 146; hardball 138; heavy-handed 50; Japanese 49; middle power 87; multilateral 99; neighborhood 99–100; niche 83–4; power 87; US 66 diplomatic: activity 83; cleavage 166; consequences 167; environment 87; linkages 170; maneuver 173; means 85; missions 83; pathway 140; protests 171–2; support 122, 137; void 170 Diplomatic Bluebook 2017 50 Diplomatic Bluebook 2018 43 disaster reduction 43 dispute (s) 6, 12, 23–4, 27–8, 32, 57, 61, 88, 102, 105, 134, 136, 147, 150, 157–8, 164–8, 171, 173; border 88, 102, 105; boundary 6, 12, 23–4, 27, 32, 136; East China Sea 32; land border 88; maritime

88, 150, 165–6; South China Sea 157–8, 164–6, 171, 173; territorial 134, 166, 168 Djibouti Port 5, 9, 23, 57, 116–18, 136, 146–7, 149 Doklam crisis 6, 32, 139 Dongo Kundu Port 122 Doraleh Container Terminal (DCT) 117 DSG see 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance (DSG) Duterte, Rodrigo Roa, President of Philippines 10, 156–60, 164–7, 169–73; administration 158, 164–7, 170–4; appeasement policy 171 early warning aircraft 160 East Africa 2, 9, 39, 50, 118, 133, 136, 147 East Asia 9, 64–5, 81, 87, 100, 104, 106–7, 136, 156, 159–64, 166–70, 173; US strategic agenda in 167 East Asian Summit 80 East China Sea 6, 32, 59, 64, 69, 88, 101, 106, 120, 134, 147, 159–60; dispute 32; Sino-Japanese clashes in 134 Eastern Africa 4, 9, 80, 115–16, 118–26 Eastern Indian Ocean 57, 58, 67 economic: access 148; activities 170; ascendance 63; capacity building 150; connectivity 8, 42, 95, 102–3; development 29, 42, 100, 146, 160; diplomacy 28; dynamism 55, 168; engagement 31; expansion 147; gains 10, 99, 157; growth 2, 21, 24, 26, 85–6, 99, 122, 134–5, 149, 163; interdependence 31, 79, 157, 163; interests 42, 88, 147, 161, 167; issues 8, 29, 89; linkages 40; motivations 100; power 3–4, 22, 24, 31, 54, 86, 124, 134, 163, 173; processes 78; relations 12, 167; strategic shift 81; structures 95, 107; ties 31, 105, 107, 150 economy 6, 9, 29–30, 32, 40, 79, 87–9, 94, 99, 101–2, 104, 107–8, 116, 124, 135, 137, 140, 158–9, 163, 165, 167; Chinese 101, 108; developed 29; developing 29; global 79, 87–9, 158; growing 135; healthy 165; Japanese 30, 94; Maldivian 140; political 9, 1224; sinking 137; US 163 EDCA see Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) EEZ see Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) energy resources 21, 106, 135 energy security 100

184   Index Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) 156, 162, 172 equi-balancing 10, 158, 170, 173 Eritrea 116–17 Ethiopia, Federal Democratic Republic of 2, 5, 9, 116–19, 123 EU see European Union (EU) European Union (EU) 96, 116, 149; Europe-Asia Sustainable Connectivity 149 Europe-Asia Sustainable Connectivity 149 Evatt, Herbert V., the then Australian Foreign Minister 83 Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) 10, 48, 143, 158, 161, 165–6, 173; maritime 143 Export Import Bank of India 142 Faure, Danny, President of Seychelles 143 Financial Dialogue 27 First Island Chain 146 FOIP see Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FIOP) FONOP see Freedom of navigation operation (FONOP) food security 122 foreign debt 141, 147 foreign policy (ies) 1, 6–7, 9–10, 12–14, 20, 23, 25–6, 28–9, 31, 39–40, 42–3, 49, 51, 61, 78, 83, 85–7, 89, 94–5, 98–100, 104, 119, 126, 134, 137, 141, 145, 149, 156–7, 164, 166, 168–9, 173; active 85; advocacy 16; agenda 10, 43, 166; approach 99; arc 6; circles 1; concrete 99; confrontational 164; contemporary 39; determined 85; fragmented 99; goals 83, 98, 145; holistic 99; independent 13, 85; innovative 85; “neighbors-first” 141; “new era” 28, 31; non-aligned 20; noncommittal 99; objectives 28, 126; options 134; outreach 12; Philippine 157; platform 23; principles 99; proposition 26; strategy (ies) 12, 25, 29, 98–9; thinking 13; transactional 149; uncoordinated 99; zero-sum 104 foreign policy strategy 12, 23, 25, 28, 40, 43, 51, 83, 85–7, 89, 94–5, 98–100, 104, 119, 168; Australian 83, 85, 89; Chinese 25, 28, 87, 95, 98–100; Indian 12; Japanese 9, 40, 43, 51, 119; plural 12; US 86, 94, 104, 168 France 50, 60, 66, 69, 72, 117–18, 146–50, 150–1 France and US cooperation 69 France–Australia–India 151

Free and Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP) 3–4, 7, 9, 16–20, 24, 39–51, 57, 59–60, 64–8, 88–9, 94–5, 103–6, 119–20, 123–4, 126, 148–9, 151; as a maritime security policy 44; as a national security initiative 44; initiatives 41, 49; policy 65, 95, 44; strategy 7, 20, 24, 69, 41, 43, 45–6, 48–9, 104, 106 Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy 43, 66 Free and Open Pacific through Energy, Infrastructure and Digital Connectivity Cooperation 67 Freedom of Navigation (FON) 16, 42–6, 57, 62–3, 65, 67–8, 88, 106, 109, 133, 160, 168, 172 Freedom of Navigation Operation (FONOP) 46, 67 Free Trade Agreement (FTA) 140, 142, 144 Friendly nations 139 Frigates 159–60 FTA see Free trade agreement (FTA) gas reserves 119 Gayoom, Maumoon Abdul, Maldivian president 140 Gazmin, Voltaire, former Philippines Defense Secretary 162 geo-economics 55, 71, 163; US strategy 71 geographic proximity 87 eopolitical: power 10; realities 1; rivalry 41, 104, 172; strategy (ies) 7, 41 geopolitics 4, 55, 71, 150, 156–7; geometry of 150; Indo-Pacific 156–7; US strategy 71 geostrategic: challenge 169; competition 10, 169; developments 10, 163; interests 134; returns 146; rivalry 138; threats 169 Germany 146 global financial crisis 26 global maritime fulcrum 149 Global Times 139, 148 “Going Out” strategy 100 Goldberg, Philip, US Ambassador to the Philippines 162 “Go-slow” policy 140 Grand strategy 102, 167 guided missile destroyers 160 Gwadar Port 2, 147 HADR see Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) Halifax Security Forum 59 Hambantota port 103, 137–8, 142, 147 Harris, Harry, Admiral 16, 59, 65, 69

Index   185 hedging 3, 85, 169; India’s 3; strategy of engagement plus 169 Himalayas, The, Sino-Indian frictions in 134 Hu Jintao, Chinese Premier 21, 26–7, 98–9 Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) 48, 170 Human rights 23, 25, 40, 64, 123, 137, 139, 150 humiliation 149 ICJ see International Court of Justice (ICJ) IDFC see International Development Finance Corporation (IDFC) India 1, 3–7, 9, 12–24, 26–32, 40, 44, 50, 57–64, 66, 68–72, 80–3, 85, 87–8, 95, 97, 100–1, 105–8, 115, 118–19, 133–41; “Act East” policy 16, 22; approach to Quad 12; as strategic and defense partners 105; energy exploration 147; energy exploration in South China Sea 147; foreign policy strategy 12; foreign policy thinking 13; hedging 3; importance to Quad 2.0, 20; Indian Ocean strategy 20; maritime superiority in IOR 21, 32; military intervention 139; military intervention to Maldives 139; multiple challenges to strategic ambitions 12; official policy towards the Indo-Pacific 107; policies 107; policies towards IOR 107; SAGAR 149; security against China 32; strategic interests 31; strategic partnership 12 India and Japan 13–14, 28, 32, 57, 63, 70, 80–1, 87–8, 95, 105–6, 108, 151; cooperation 80; relationship 16; strategic dialogue 40 India and Russia relations 12, 28 India and Seychelles relations 143 India and Sri Lanka relations 137 India and US 16, 62, 68, 70; defense cooperation 62; Indo-Pacific strategic convergence 62; Maritime Security Dialogue 68; strategic partnership 12 India–Australia–Indonesia 151 India–Australia–Japan 16, 151 India First policy 140 India–Japan–Australia 28 India–Japan–US 28, 81, 151 India–Japan–US–Australia alliance 81 India–Japan–Vietnam 151 Indian; endorsement of Quad 2.0, 20; foreign policy 12; maritime interests 22; strategic outlook 27

Indian Navy 68, 80, 143 Indian Navy P8I Poseidon aircraft 68 Indian Ocean/Indian Ocean Region (IOR) 1–3, 5–6, 9, 12–23, 26, 31–2, 40, 46, 48, 55–8, 60–2, 64–9, 72, 80–1, 86, 98, 100–1, 103–4, 106–9, 115, 117–18, 123, 133–6, 138–41, 164; China as an economic, political and maritime power in 22; China’s maritime interests in 22; China’s strategic ambitions in 6; Chinese maritime presence in 17; foreign policy role in 7, 51; India’s maritime superiority in 21; India’s policies towards 107; strategy 20–1; US military dominance in 168; US presence in 87 Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) 20–2, 150 Indonesia 5, 22, 47–8, 57, 59–60, 63, 66, 72, 85, 87, 100, 133, 135, 144, 147–51; global maritime fulcrum 149 Indo-Pacific and Japan strategy 49 Indo-Pacific Business Forum 17, 64 Indo-Pacific Deployment 2019 (IPD19) 66 Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor (IPEC) 61, 88 Indo-Pacific Endeavor 150 Indo-Pacific/Indo-Pacific Region 1–10, 12, 16–21, 24, 26–9, 31–42, 39–51, 55–72, 78–82, 84–90, 94–8, 102–8, 115–16, 119–21, 123, 125–6, 133–6, 147, 149–51, 156–60, 168–9, 172–4; as a strategic zone 41; as a strategy 17; challenges of security 62; conflict across 6; cooperation across 6; free and open 47, 57, 59–60, 62, 65, 67, 70–1, 106, 149; geopolitical realities in 1; geopolitics 156–7; geostrategic developments in 10; India’s official policy towards 107; Japan’s and China’s approaches 122; policies 115; power equilibrium in 6; powers 3; security challenges 59; security engagement in 86; strategic formulations 7; strategic frame of reference 68; strategic fulcrum of 20; strategic interests in 12; strategic landscape of 69; strategy (ies) 9, 41, 48–50, 63, 65, 72, 105, 115, 135 Indo-Pacific Maritime Partnership 151 Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative (IPMSI) 66 Indo-Pacific Partnership (IPP) 3, 5–6, 8–9, 95, 98, 101–5, 107–9, 115–16, 119–20, 123–4; security partnership 107 Indo-Pacific Strategy Report 57, 60, 65

186   Index INDOPACOM see US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) information-sharing 170 infrastructure 2–5, 9, 17, 21–3, 31–2, 39, 42–3, 64, 68–71, 86, 101–2, 105–6, 116–17, 119, 122–6, 135–6, 138, 140, 143–5, 149, 162, 164–7, 171; building 32, 171; China-funded 2, 144, 171; Chinese 3, 145; construction 106, 167; critical 5, 9, 22, 106, 116, 136; deficit 106; development 43, 138, 164–5, 167; hard and soft 102; initiatives 71; investments 31, 42, 70, 101, 105–6, 123; loans for 2; logistics- 64; maritime 21; network 167; open 64; partnership 71; poor 2; port 117; projects 2, 4–5, 17, 39, 42, 68, 86, 106, 119, 126, 144–5, 164, 171; quality 43, 106; strategic 23, 145; upgrading of 23 Institute for International Strategic Studies (IISS) 146 Institute of Military Transportation of the People’s Liberation Army 5 international affairs 83 International Court of Justice (ICJ) 58, 144 International Development Finance Corporation (IDFC) 71, 105 International Order 3, 23, 43, 55, 61, 84, 87, 100, 133, 149, 151, 169; existing 84; liberal 3; new 23; principles of 43; protect an 84; rules-based 55, 61, 87, 133, 149, 151; transformation of 169 International Relations (IR) 4, 8, 82–3, 98, 101 investment 2, 6, 21–3, 31–2, 42, 64, 70–1, 100, 102, 105–7, 118–19, 121–5, 143–4, 146, 163, 166, 171–2; Chinese 6, 118, 146, 171 IOR see Indian Ocean/Indian Ocean Region (IOR) IORA see Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA) IPD19 see Indo-Pacific Deployment 2019 (IPD19) IPEC see Indo-Pacific Economic Corridor (IPEC) IPMSI see Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative (IPMSI) IPP see Indo-Pacific Partnership (IPP) IR see International Relations (IR) Iran 22, 147 Iraq 116, 156, 160 Island of Feydhoo Finolhu 140, 147

Island of Sabang 148 Island states 9, 66, 133–4, 139, 142, 144, 150 Jaishankar, S., Indian Foreign Secretary 17, 143; visit to the Seychelles 1443 Japan 3–4, 6–7, 9, 13–21, 24, 26–32, 39–51, 55–7, 59–63, 66–72, 79–81, 83, 85, 87–8, 94–5, 97, 102, 105–8, 115, 118–22, 124–6, 133–8, 140, 145, 148–51, 156, 159–60, 167, 170, 172–3, 2017 defense White Paper 45; AsiaAfrica Growth Corridor 149; broader national security agenda 48; economy 30; export-led model of development 42; foreign policy agenda 43; “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) strategy 7, 49; national security agenda 48; national security policy 41; national security posture 44; national security strategy 47; prosperity 40; regional strategy 42; security 40, 41, 45–7; security ties 47; strategic posture 40 Japan and Philippines security partnerships 172 Japan and US 30, 45, 66–7, 88, 106, 108, 151, 156; alliance 30, 45, 67; guaranteed alliance 30; military cooperation 66; relationship 119; strategic partnership 45 Japan Bank of International Cooperation (JBIC) 121–2 Japanese; defense resources 46; diplomacy 49; economy 94; foreign policy 9, 40, 51, 119; maritime interests 30; military schools 48; policy 35; power 9, 120; security interests 30; strategy 106 Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) 121 Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) 50, 121, 125 Japan Ports Consulting (JPC) 121–2 Japan’s 2017 defense White Paper 45 Japan’s Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) 46, 48 Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) 46, 119 Japan–Vietnam–Philippines 151 JBIC see Japan Bank of International Cooperation (JBIC) JETRO see Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) Jiang Zemin, Chinese President 99 JICA see Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA)

Index   187 joint exercises 46–8, 68, 80, 118, 147–8; air force 56, 68–8; maritime 46–7; naval 46, 68, 80, 147–8 Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region 68 JPC see Japan Ports Consulting (JPC) Kamiya, Matake 49 Kashmir 3, 105 Kenya 2, 5, 9, 44, 116–18, 121–3, 137, 145, 147, 149; naval presence in 118 Khurana, Capt. Dr. Gurpreet S., Indian Navy maritime strategist 80–1; “Security of Sea Lines: Prospects for India–Japan Cooperation” 80 Kyaukpyu port 147 Lamu Port 118 LEMOA see Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) Liberal international order 3 liberal order 20, 26, 31 Littoral Asia 147 Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA) 68, 104 Logistics Support Agreement (LSA) 58 “Look East” policies 107 Lorenzana, Delfin, Philippine Defense Secretary 172 LSA see Logistics Support Agreement (LSA) Madagascar 147 Malabar naval exercises 13, 46, 62, 70, 105 Malaysia 22, 47, 50, 60, 103, 145–51 Maldives 9, 22–3, 134, 136, 138–42, 144–50; external debt 140; foreign debt 141; Indian intervention in 139; India’s military intervention to 139; port projects in 138; tug-of-war over 138; Xi Jinping’s visit to 140 Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) 141 Malé 140–2 maritime 1, 3, 7, 10, 12–26, 28, 30, 32, 41–8, 51, 55–8, 60–3, 68, 70, 80, 87–8, 100, 102–3, 106, 108, 115, 117, 133–5, 143, 145–51, 156–61, 163–6, 173; alliance 44; ambitions 12; assertiveness 70; choke 117; chokepoints 133, 135, 145; coalition 151; commons 16, 44; development 22; disputes 88, 150, 165–6; emergencies 13; environment 7, 42, 51; Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) 143; infrastructure 21; interests 12,

21–3, 30, 160; investment 23; issues 25, 42, 70, 166; lanes 145; law enforcement 43, 47; lifeline 21; maneuvers 134; order 43, 46; outreach 26; power 21–2, 58; push 55, 68; rights 160; security 16, 20, 28, 44, 46, 57, 60–1, 66, 68, 70, 87–8, 103, 173; security policy 44, 173; security threats 13; strategic interests 30; strategy 22, 42, 133; superiority 21, 32; territories 108, 134; transport routes 100; zones 21, 148 Maritime Affairs dialogue 27 Maritime Asia 161 maritime expansion 10, 133, 146, 156, 158, 163–4, 173; Chinese 10, 158 maritime security 16, 20, 28, 44, 46, 57, 60–1, 70, 87–8, 103, 173; cooperation 60; operations 46; policy 44, 173; supremacy 103 Maritime Security Dialogue 68 Maritime Silk Road (MSR) 21–3, 32, 55, 59, 61, 64–7, 70–1, 100, 133, 1335 138, 145, 147–8, 150; strategy 22 Mattis, James, US Defense Secretary 58, 61–2, 67, 69 Marshall Islands 66 Mauritius 9, 56, 136, 142–5, 147–8; maritime exclusive economic zone 143 MDB see Mutual Defense Board (MDB) MDP see Maldivian Democratic Party (MDP) MDT see Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) Medcalf, Rory 81, 90 METI see Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) Middle East 42, 80, 94, 101, 108, 115, 119, 138, 144, 160, 162 middle power (s) 83–5, 87, 134–5, 151, 170; activism 85; archetypical 84; as independent actors 83; conceptualizations of 83; diplomacy 87; traditional 84, 87 MILAN naval exercise 140 militarization 6, 32, 59, 65, 69, 159, 172 military 2–7, 13, 23–6, 30, 31, 45–8, 55–6, 58–9, 61, 63, 64–6, 68–9, 81, 93, 86, 90, 104–5, 109, 115, 117–19, 133–4, 137, 139, 143–5, 147–51, 156, 159–64, 166, 168, 170, 173; access 145, 148; actions 7; activities 47; alliances 164; America’s 58; ascendance 63; assets 5, 68; base (s) 5, 23, 117, 143–4, 147; budgets 24, 26; build-up 59; capabilities 170; capacity building 150; Chinese 3, 5, 145, 151;

188   Index military continued coalition 13; commitments 160; cooperation 13, 66, 69; counterinsurgency 156; coup 148; defense requirements 159; dispositions 55; dominance 161, 168; efforts 117; equipment 156, 173; establishment 45; exercises 109, 162; expansion 133, 147; expenditure 24, 83; facilities 56, 117–18, 143, 150; forces 56, 105; functions 159; hardware market 105; intervention 139, 139; involvement 2; links 68, 148; maneuvers 160; modernization 25, 63, 86; operations 115; overestimating 151; personnel exchanges 170; Philippine 166, 173; pivot/rebalance 61; posture/posturing 26, 150; power 24, 31, 134; professionals 6; profiling 65; prowess 159; purposes 159; redeployments 4; reinforcements 56; relations 115; rivalry 26; sales 66; shift 81; standoff 139; superiority 147; think tanks 5; threats 104; ties 150; US 26, 45, 56, 58, 66, 144, 156, 161–2, 168, 170 military cooperation 13, 66, 69; trilateral 69 military equipment 156, 173 military exercises 109, 162 military-to-military assistance 48 Ministry of Defense (MOD) 46 Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) 121 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) 40, 43, 48, 50 Mischief Reef 165 MOD see Ministry of Defense (MOD) Modi, Narendra, Indian Prime Minister 12, 17, 28, 68, 70, 88, 106, 133, 136–7, 139, 141–2, 151; Joint Statement with President Trump 68; speech at the Shangri-La Dialogue 12; visited the Mauritius 142; visited the Seychelles 142 MOFA’s Diplomatic Bluebook 2018 43 Mogadishu Port 116 Mombasa Port 2, 116–19, 121–2, 124–5, 147, 149 Mozambique 9, 116, 118–19, 121–2; Chinese naval visits 118 MSDF see Japan’s Maritime Self Defense Force (MSDF) multilateralism 83–4, 104 multi-lateral security alliances 104 Mutual Defense Board (MDB) 162

Mutual Defense Treaty (MDT) 156, 162, 172–3 Myanmar 2, 5, 100, 135, 138, 145–50, 165 Nacala Port 119, 122 Nasheed, Mohamed, Maldivian president 139–41 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) 47–8 National Defense Strategy of the US (NDS) 63, 95, 104 national security 7, 24, 41–2, 44, 46–9, 63, 94, 99, 119, 136, 168–9; agenda 48; concerns 41; formulation of 48; initiative 44; interests 42; policy 41, 48; posture 7, 44, 49; priorities 44; strategy (ies) 47, 136 National Security Commission 99 National Security Council (NSC) 47, 119, 121, 126 National Security Strategy of the US (NSS) 24–5, 47, 63, 94, 104, 119, 126, 169 national strategy 41 Natuna Sea 148 naval: competition 134; deployment 150; exercises 4, 69; expansion 13, 147, 158; facilities 56–7; operations 71; policy 71; rivalry 144 naval drills/exercise (s) 13, 46, 62, 69, 80, 105, 140, 147–8, 150, 159–60; MILAN 140; South China Sea 69, 160 NDPG see National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) NDS see National Defense Strategy of the US (NDS) neologism 1 Nepal 22, 148 New Framework for Defense Cooperation (NFDC) 68 New York Times 5 New Zealand 59–60, 72, 87, 149 NFDC see New Framework for Defense Cooperation (NFDC) nine-dash line 148, 165 non-alignment 28, 135 non-proliferation 43, 47 North Asia 82 North Korea; nuclear threat 44 NSC see National Security Council (NSC) NSS see National Security Strategy of the US (NSS) nuclear threat 44; North Korean 44

Index   189 Obama administration 55–6, 61, 104, 156, 158, 160, 162–3, 167–9, 173; ambiguous position in the South China Sea dispute 158; constrainment policy 168; rebalancing policy 167; strategic rebalancing 158, 173; strategic rebalancing to Asia 10 Obama, Barack, US President 10, 16, 25, 55–6, 61, 68, 94, 104, 156, 158–60, 162–3, 167–9, 173; “Pivot to Asia” strategy 16; visit to the Philippines 162 OBOR see One Belt, One Road (OBOR) Observer Research Foundation (ORF) 81 ODA see Official Development Assistance (ODA) Official Development Assistance (ODA) 48, 171 Oil fields 117 Oman 2, 22, 147 One Belt, One Road (OBOR) 133 OPIC see Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) order: international 3, 43, 55, 61, 84, 87, 100, 133, 149, 151, 169; liberal 20, 26, 31; liberal international 3; maritime 43, 46; regional 59, 64, 87, 89, 102, 133, 164; Sinocentric 151 ORF see Observer Research Foundation (ORF) Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC) 69, 71 PACAF see Pacific Air Force (PACAF) Pacific Air Chiefs Symposium (PACS) 60 Pacific Air Force (PACAF) 60 Pacific Ocean/Sea 1, 13, 40, 55, 58, 60–1, 68–9, 72, 80–2, 86, 107, 109, 134–6, 146, 151, 169; alliances 66; military base in 5; partnership 61 PACOM see US Pacific Command (PACOM) PACS see Pacific Air Chiefs Symposium (PACS) PAF see Philippine Air Force (PAF) Pakistan 2–3, 5, 100, 115, 138–9, 145–9 Palau 66 Palm exercises 60 partnerships and allegiances: bilateral 59, 62; buttressing of 4; defense 59; India and US 68; Indo-Pacific 3, 94–5, 103, 115; infrastructure 71; international 87; manufacturing 29; Pacific 61; purposespecific 151; quadrilateral 105; security

66, 170, 172–3; strategic 12, 45, 57, 156; Trans-Pacific 61, 88, 94, 104; US 66 PCA see Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) peace 8, 12, 32, 42–3, 44, 46–8, 62, 69, 82–3, 89–90, 100, 116, 119, 141, 160, 166 People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) 5, 22–3, 146, 159–61 People’s Liberation Army (PLA) 5, 22, 146, 150, 159, 163, 172 People’s Republic of China (PRC) 1–10, 12–32, 41, 44, 47–51, 55, 57, 59–72, 78, 80–90, 94–5, 97–109, 115–26, 133–51, 156–74 people-to-people 31, 32, 167, 170 people-to-people contacts 31, 32 people-to-people exchanges 170 Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) 157, 165–6 Persian Gulf 7, 164 Philippine Air Force (PAF) 161, 171 Philippine Coast Guard (PSG) 161 Philippines and US 156, 162, 166, 170, 172–3, 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA) 156; alliance 172; security arrangements 173; security cooperation 170; security relations 156, 170 Philippines Navy (PN) 70, 161, 166 Philippines 10, 47, 57, 60, 70, 72, 102, 146, 151, 156–8, 161–7, 169–74; confrontational foreign policy 164; confronted Chinese expansive claim 165; Department of National Defense (DND) 172; domestic politics 164; economic stakes 10; foreign policy 157; military 166, 173; Notification and Statement of Claim 165; territorial counterclaim against China in the South China Sea 157; territorial defense capabilities 161; territorial defense objective 161; territorial rights 10; US military presence in 162 Piraeus port 147 Pivot to Asia 16, 94, 101, 104; policy of 104; strategy 16, 94 PLA see People’s Liberation Army (PLA) PLAN see People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN) planning 85, 117, 120; defense 85; strategic 85 PN see Philippines Navy (PN)

190   Index policy (ies) 1–4, 6–10, 12–20, 22–3, 25–6, 28–9, 31, 39–44, 47–9, 51, 55, 57, 61, 64–5, 71, 78, 81–7, 89–90, 94–6, 98–102, 104–8, 115, 119–20, 123, 126, 134, 137, 140–2, 145, 149–51, 156–8, 163–71, 173; “Act East” 16, 17, 22, 107, 150; actions 41; advocacy 16; agenda 10, 41, 43, 166; appeasement 158, 166, 170–1, 173; arc 6; balancing 10, 156, 158, 164, 173; banks 101; China’s BRI 142; circles 1; coherence and coordination 150; constrainment 156, 168; containment 41; cooperation and exchange 47; “Develop the West” 100; directions 49; documents 8, 95; domestic 64; engagement 104, 168; equi-balancing 10, 158, 170, 173; FOIP 95; foreign 10, 78, 85, 157, 173; Free and Open IndoPacific 65; “go-slow” 140; government 7, 40, 42, 47; India First 140; India’s 107; Indo-Pacific 115; initiative 39; Japanese 39; “Look East” 107; maritime security 44, 173; mercantilist 150, 151; national security 41, 48; naval 71; objective 28; official 4, 8, 95, 107, 119–20; options 49, 134; outreach 12; Pivot to Asia 104; predatory 150; principles 99; rapprochement 10, 165; rebalancing 156, 164, 167; regional priority 104; revisionist 170, 173; security 41, 44, 48, 115, 168, 173; statements 7, 41, 42; strategies 29, 98–9; substantive 43; US 108 political: agendas 104; dynamics 9, 116; economy 6, 9, 94, 104, 116, 124; interests 161, 167; issues 8, 89; pivot/ rebalance 61; power 22; sense 9, 124 politics 4, 23, 26, 28, 49, 78–80, 82–5, 88–9, 95–6, 109, 116, 134, 137, 140–1, 146, 156, 158, 164, 168; Australian 88; domestic 4, 49, 134, 141, 146, 164; global 156, 168; international 79–80, 82–5, 89; port 116; power 78; regional 28; world 23, 26, 158 Pompeo, Mike, US Secretary of State 17, 64, 66–8, 71, 88, 149, 172 port (s) 2, 9, 20, 23, 100–1, 103, 105, 116–18, 121–2, 133–4, 136–8, 143–6, 148–9, 164; building spree 6; concession 117; construction 21, 146; deep-water 116; development 133, 147, 150; expansion 122; facilities 122, 138; fishing 144; infrastructure 117; lease

138; moribund 117; operations 2; politics 116; projects 117, 138, 142; takeovers 103; visits 46–8 Port Louis 143–4 power (s) 2–4, 8–9, 12, 23, 26, 31, 78, 82–5, 87, 89–90, 98, 101, 105, 119, 134–6, 142, 144–5, 150–1, 156, 166–7, 169–70, 172–3; ally 3; asserting 63; asymmetry 6, 31; balance of 4, 71, 78, 80, 85, 90, 147, 169; balancing 87; capabilities 85; competition 10, 71, 135, 158; constellations of 3; diplomacy 87; dynamics 6, 144; economic 3–4, 22, 24, 31, 55, 86, 124, 134, 163, 173; emerging 105, 119, 170, 173; equilibrium 6, 31; geopolitical 10; global 1, 20, 29, 81; great 3–4, 6, 8, 10, 82–6, 89, 123, 134–5, 143, 156, 158, 168–9, 172–3; growing 1, 86, 136, 150; hard 4, 7, 163; Indo-Pacific 3; Japanese 9, 120; lynchpin 4; major 1, 9, 12, 87, 135–6, 145, 158, 166–7, 173; maritime 21, 22, 58; material 85; military 24, 31, 134; play 10; political 22; politics 78; premier 2; regional 2, 98; relationships 164; revisionist 12, 25, 31, 104, 107; rising 3–4, 6, 28, 31, 41, 57, 71, 90, 133, 136, 142, 168; rivalry 1; sea 145; soft 4, 86, 170; structures 7, 12, 23, 29, 32; struggle 85; US 4, 7, 56; world 2 Prasad, Jayant 28 PRC see People’s Republic of China (PRC) Prospect Theory 158 PSG see Philippine Coast Guard (PSG) Putin, Vladimir, Russian President 28 Quad see Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) Quad 1.0, 13, 25, 27 Quad 2.0, 13–22, 25, 28–30; Indian endorsement of 20; India’s importance to 20; prospects of 19 Quad countries 16, 20, 22–3, 26, 31–2, 88, 149; connectivity 149; maritime interests 23; strategic interests 23 Quadrilateral consultative forum 6, 12, 26 Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) 6–8, 12–32, 44–5, 50, 70, 80, 88–9, 149–51; American perspective of 29; arrival and return of 13; as a strategic proposition 6, 21, 23; commencement of 20; comparison of 21; concept 29; connectivity 149; development 23; disorder 29; endurance 29; formulation

Index   191 of 13–16, 24, 27; framework 12, 14; grouping 20; growth trajectory 13, 24; India–China relations vis-à-vis 26; Indian perception of 24; India’s approach to 12; India’s perspective on 6, 31; limitations 6; meetings 70; official consultation meeting of 17; official level meetings 17; partners 6, 7; proposal 16; proposition 13–16, 27; response 149; Sino-US rivalry and 23 Quad vs China 50 railway (s) 2, 31, 122, 148, 157, 164–5; connectivity 31 Rajapaksa, Mahinda, Sri Lankan President 137–8; defeat of 137 RBO see Rules-based Order (RBO) RCEP see Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) Realpolitik 3 reconnaissance planes 161 Red Flag air exercises 60 regional: alliances 167; allies 104; balance of power 169; concerns 150; cooperation 88, 94–7, 108–9; economic structures 107; influence 2, 156, 168; order 59, 64, 87, 89, 102, 133, 164; politics 28; powers 2, 98; priority policy 104; relationships 148; security 39, 45, 47, 85, 148, 151, 169, 172; security structures 107; strategy 42 Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) 88 relation/relationship 3–4, 7, 10, 12–16, 20, 22, 24, 26–8, 32, 40, 47, 49–51, 59, 61, 67, 82, 84–7, 90, 96–9, 100, 102, 104, 115–16, 119–20, 137, 139, 142, 144, 146, 148, 150–1, 156, 158, 164, 166–8, 170; architecture 12, 27; Australia and US 61; bilateral 27, 59, 139, 166; China and India 10, 12–13, 26–8, 151; China and Japan 40, 49, 120; China and Taiwan 168; economic 12, 167; India and Japan 14; India and Russia 12, 28; India and Sri Lanka 137; international 4, 27, 82, 90, 98, 102, 115; Philippine and US 170; power 164; regional 148; security 151; structure of 24; trade 3; “win-win” 146 resources 3, 5, 9, 21, 45–6, 48, 65, 82–3, 105–6, 116, 121–2, 124, 126, 134–5, 150–1, 160, 167–8; defense 46; energy 21, 106, 135

Resources, Markets and Bases (RMB) 134 Richardson, Michael 80; AustraliaSoutheast Asia Relations and the East Asian Summit 80 Rimpac exercises 60 rivalry 1, 13, 23, 26, 41, 90, 104, 125–6, 134, 136, 138, 144, 172; geopolitical 41, 104, 172; geostrategic 138; Japan–China 125–6; military 26; naval 144; postCold War 13; power 1; Sino-India 134; Sino-US 13, 23; strategic 90 RMB see Resources, Markets and Bases (RMB) roads 2, 102, 122, 148, 157, 164–5; connectivity 21 Rudd, Kevin, Australian prime minister 16, 80 rule of law 4, 16, 23, 42–3, 46–7, 50, 63, 67 Rules-Based Order (RBO) 1, 31, 41, 62, 67–8, 70, 85–6, 151 Russia 12–13, 17, 27–8, 93, 97, 100, 117, 164 Sabang port 150 SAGAR see Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) San Francisco Conference 83 SARIC see South Asia Regional Infrastructure Connectivity (SARIC) Saudi Arabia 116–20, 139 Scarborough Shoal 67, 165 SCO see Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) SDCF see Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF) SDF see Japan’s Self-Defense Forces (SDF) Seacat exercises 60 sea lane (s): open 42, 64; safety 4 sea lines of communication (SLOC) 3, 30, 64 Sea of Japan 69 sea power 145 sea routes 64, 165 SEB see Security Engagement Board (SEB) Second Island Chain 56, 66, 146 security 7–8, 10, 13–16, 20, 22–8, 30–2, 39–49, 51, 56–63, 65–72, 78, 80, 85–90, 94–6, 99–109, 115–17, 119, 122–3, 134, 136, 141–3, 146–51, 156–7, 160–3, 167–70, 172–3; affairs 39, 47; agenda for 8, 43, 48, 89, 104; aims 101; alliances 31, 104; ally 170; angle 44; architecture 28, 44, 148; arrangements

192   Index security continued 66, 173; Asia-Pacific 45; assets and resources 46, 48; assistance 7, 42, 47–8, 51; assurance of 90; Australian 80, 85; burden 45; challenge to 16, 59, 71, 160, 168; China-led system 146; Chinese 10, 100; coalition 13; commitment 41; common 148; concerns 10, 25, 41–2, 100, 108, 148; cooperation 47, 60, 151, 170, 173; dilemma 150; domestic 134, 156, 173; energy 101; engagement 86; environment 44, 46, 58, 78, 169, 172; external 169; food 122; guarantee 156, 173; guarantor 107; initiative 44, 66; interests 22, 30, 32, 42, 59, 147, 161, 167–8; issues 26, 104, 134; Japan’s 40–1, 46–7; legislation 41, 44, 47; links 67, 72; logic 102; maritime 16, 20, 28, 44, 46, 57, 60–1, 66, 68, 70, 87–8, 103, 173; missions 48; motivations 100; multifaceted 47; multilayered 47; mutual 60; national 7, 41–2, 44, 46–9, 136, 168; non-military approaches to 48; nontraditional 48; objectives 59; operations 46, 117; pact 162; partners 162, 169; partnerships 66, 105, 107, 170, 172–3; policy (ies) 41, 44, 48, 115, 168, 173; priorities 44; provider 68, 142; regional 39, 44, 47, 85, 148, 151, 169, 172; relations/relationships 100, 104, 151, 156; repositioning 72; responsibility 45; role 40, 45; shared 31, 59; strategy (ies) 47, 136; structures 95, 104, 107; supremacy 103; threats 13; ties 47, 63, 150, 157, 173 Security and Defense Cooperation Forum (SDCF) 69 Security and Growth for All in the Region (SAGAR) 22, 32, 148–9 security and prosperity 40, 71, 89 security concerns 10, 41–2, 100, 148; Chinese 10, 100 Security Consultative Committee 67 Security Engagement Board (SEB) 162 security posture 7, 44, 49; foreign 7; national 7, 44, 49 security sector reform (SSR) 116 SED see Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED) Seychelles 9, 136, 142–5, 147–8 SEZ see Special economic zone (SEZ) SGR see Standard gauge railroad (SGR) Shanahan, Patrick, US Secretary of Defense 65, 67

Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) 13, 27–8, 97, 101 Shangri-La Dialogue 12, 17, 62, 133; Narendra Modi’s speech at 12 Sharem exercises 69 Sierra Leone 145 Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) 22 Silk Road strategy 31 Singapore 5, 12–13, 22, 55, 57, 60, 63, 66, 72, 133, 140, 144, 147, 150–1 Singh, Abhijit 81 sinocentric order 151 Sirisena, Maithripala, Sri Lankan President 137, 142 SLOCs see Sea lines of communication (SLOC) Small Island States 9, 66, 133–4, 144, 150; allegiance of 133; influence over 9; support of 134 SNA see Somali National Army (SNA) Solomon Islands 2, 136 Somalia 42, 116–18 Somaliland 116–17 Somali National Army (SNA) 117 South Asia 60–1, 64, 101, 104, 107, 120–1, 125, 144, 147, 149, 164 South Asia Regional Infrastructure Connectivity (SARIC) 149 South China Sea 6, 10, 21, 26, 32, 44, 55, 57, 59–70, 72, 81, 88, 100–1, 133–6, 144, 146–8, 150, 156–74; artificial islands in 133; China challenge in 156; China’s maritime assertiveness in 70; China’s sovereign claim over 161; China’s worrisome actions in 60; Chinese activities in 62; Chinese aggressive behavior in 156; Chinese assertiveness in 150, 163; Chinese militarization in 69; claims in 148, 161, 173; coercive actions in 64; deployments into 57, 72; dispute 157, 158, 164, 165, 166, 171, 173; Freedom of Navigation (FON) exercises in 63; geopolitical agenda in 156; global crossroads of 61; India’s energy exploration in 147; international court’s verdict on 144; maritime and land border disputes in 88; maritime claim in 156, 159; maritime expansion in 10; militarization of 6, 32, 65; military rivalry in 26; naval exercises in 69, 160; Sino-Vietnamese confrontations in 134; territorial claim over 159; territorial expansion in 65; US deployments into 57

Index   193 Southeast Asia 60–1, 64, 66, 72, 80–2, 101, 120, 133, 156, 160, 164 South Korea 55, 56, 61, 83, 86, 150 South Pacific 7, 100, 119 sovereignty 5, 96, 102, 104–5, 120, 136, 143–5, 148, 150, 160–3; issues 102, 105; Seychellois 143 Soviet Union 1, 66, 135 Spain 146 Special Economic Zone (SEZ) 122 Special Representatives (SRs) dialogue 27 Spratly Islands 159, 161–2, 165 SREB see Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) Sri Lanka 5, 9, 22–3, 58, 60, 64, 66, 71, 134, 136–40, 142, 145–50 SSR see Security sector reform (SSR) Standard Gauge Railroad (SGR) 118 stealth destroyers 160 Strait of Hormuz 21, 22, 135 Strait of Malacca 21, 22, 30, 67, 101, 135, 148 strategic: advantages 158, 160; agenda 167; alliances 169, 174; ally 24, 82, 85, 156; ambitions 6, 12; approach 146; arc 81; assets 136; B-52 bombers 56; balances 10, 151, 157; bombers 45; bridge 6; capabilities 87; challenge 149, 163; circuit 20; cleavage 166; coalitions 29; coercion 145; communication 47; community 13; competition 65, 90, 104, 122, 135, 144, 148, 158, 167, 172–3; competitor 104, 168; concerns 29; concession 29; confluence 27; congruity 29, 30; consequences 144, 167; consonance 6, 16–17, 23, 31–2; contacts 21; convergence 62; cooperation 50, 169, 174; debt traps 147; depth 23; deterrence 136; developments 158, 168; dialogue 40; discourse 7, 27, 55, 80; encapsulations 59; engagement 31, 168; formulations 7, 20; forum 80; frame of reference 68; fulcrum 20; gambit 49; geography 88, 90, 115; goal 86, 163; imperative 133, 137, 142; importance 26, 136; inequity 26; infrastructure 23, 145; interests 12, 21, 23, 30–1, 88, 136, 148, 168, 170; involvement 156; island 148; issues 8, 29, 89; landscape 39; leverage 173; linkages 40; location 144; logic 70, 90; move 12; narrative 55; networking 7; non-equilibrium 12; objectives 16, 136; outlook 27, 44; partners 20, 68, 105, 163; pivot 20;

planning 85; port visits 46–7; position 66; posture 7, 40, 51; preferences 16; presence 31; priority (ies) 45, 160; profile 17; proposition 6, 21, 23, 29, 31; rebalancing 10, 156, 158, 163, 173; reference 63; relations 99; re-positioning 55; resources 65; response 1, 19; rethinking 61; rival/ rivalry 88, 90; role 82; sense 9, 124; shift 81; space 28; supply bases 143; system 82; thinking 55, 57; threat 25, 59; trilateral 69; zone 41 Strategic and Cooperative Partnership of Peace and Prosperity 27 Strategic Economic Dialogue (SED) 27 strategic partnership (s) 12, 45, 47, 57, 90, 105, 156; US–Japan 12, 45 strategy (ies) 4, 6–9, 12, 16–22, 24–6, 29, 31, 39–51, 55, 57, 59–60, 63–6, 71–2, 82, 85, 87–8, 90, 94–5, 98–102, 104–6, 115, 119–21, 123, 125–6, 133, 135–6, 146–7, 149, 156, 160, 163, 166–70, 173; accommodation and engagement 168; America First 94; balancing 169, 173; beginnings of 4; China-containment 6; Chinese 65, 126; coherent 123; competitive 49; comprehensive 160; containment 6; cooperation 49; cooperative 49, 51; deterrence 163; development 29, 166; economic development 29; foreign policy 12, 25, 29, 98–9; four-layered 99; “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” (FOIP) 7, 20, 24, 39, 41, 43, 55–6, 48–9, 66, 104, 106; geopolitical 7, 41; Going Out 25–6, 100; Indian Ocean 20–1; Indo-Pacific 9, 41, 48–50, 63, 65, 72, 105, 115, 135; internal and external balancing 8; Japan’s Indo-Pacific 49; long-term 156, 168; maritime 22, 42, 133; Maritime Silk Road (MSR) 22; national 41; nationalistic 104; national security 47, 136; non-alignment 135; Pivot to Asia 16, 94; rebalancing 160, 163, 168; regional 42; security 47, 136; “String of Pearls” 101; “String of Pearls 2.0” 133; three-pronged 147; two-ocean (Pacific and Indian Oceans) 135; two-tiered 101; US 55, 64, 71, 101 “String of Pearls” strategy 3, 101 “String of Pearls 2.0” maritime strategy 133 Suakin Port 118 submarine exercises 69

194   Index submarines 148, 159–60 Sudan 22, 118, 121, 138 Taiwan 21, 26, 55, 57, 65–6, 72, 146, 150, 159, 164, 168, 172 Taiwan Strait 21, 57, 72 Talisman Saber exercises 67 Talisman Sabre naval exercises 69 Tanga Port 118 Tanzania 116–18, 121 Territorial; defense 45, 161, 173; disputes 134, 166, 168; rights 10, 157, 161 Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone 165 terrorism 16, 43, 101, 170 Thailand 60, 150 Thornton, Susan, Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs 66 threat (s) 4–6, 8, 13, 25–6, 42, 44, 46, 59–60, 68, 78, 82, 84, 88, 102, 104, 120, 162, 169–70, 173; geostrategic 169; military 104; nuclear 44; perceptions 88; security 13 Tiananmen, incidents of 1989 99 Tibet 146–7, 164 TICAD see Tokyo International Conference of African Development (TICAD) ties 8, 31, 42, 44–5, 47, 63, 82, 89, 100, 102–5, 107, 120, 139–41, 150, 157, 172–3; economic 31, 105, 107, 150; military 150 TIWG see Trilateral Infrastructure Working Group (TIWG) Tokyo International Conference of African Development (TICAD) 40–2, 44, 124–5 TPP see Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) trade 3, 21, 25, 28–30, 42, 55, 61, 64, 94, 100, 102–4, 107, 124, 135–6, 140–1, 144–5, 148, 150, 163, 165–8; bilateral 21, 29, 30, 94; relationships 3; sea‑based 30 Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) 61, 94, 104 Trilateral 16, 17, 27–8, 30, 56, 62, 69–72, 87, 105, 150–1 Trilateral infrastructure initiatives 71 Trilateral Infrastructure Working Group (TIWG) 70 Trincomalee port 138 Trump, Donald, US President 25, 28, 45, 55, 61–2, 66–8, 70–1, 86, 88, 94, 104–5, 107–8, 149, 167–9, 172; administration 45, 55, 61, 88, 105, 149, 167–9; US

foreign policy 104; zero-sum foreign policy 104 Turkey 116, 116–19, 122, 124 Turnbull, Malcolm, Australian Prime Minister 67 UAE see United Arab Emirates (UAE) Uganda 118 UK see United Kingdom (UK) UN see United Nations (UN) UNCLOS see United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) UN General Assembly 17 Ungerer, Carl 83 United Arab Emirates (UAE) 22, 116–17, 124 United Kingdom (UK) 50, 58, 116–17, 146 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) 68, 165, 173 United Nations (UN) 17, 58, 68, 83, 116, 121, 123, 139, 165 United Nations (UN) Charter 83, 139 United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 65, 68, 71 United States Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy 66 United States of America (US) 1–10, 12–20, 23–32, 40–6, 50, 55–72, 79–83, 85–90, 94–5, 97, 101–2, 104–8, 115–19, 133–6, 138–41, 144, 146–51, 156–64, 166–70, 170–3; as East Asia’s offshore balancer 167; commitment to Japan’s defense 45; deployments into the South China Sea 57; diplomacy 66; economy 163; foreign policy 86, 94, 104, 168; Free and Open Indo-Pacific policy 65; geopolitics of 71; Indo-Pacific policy 71; Indo-Pacific strategy 41, 55, 63, 65, 72; interest in Asia-Pacific security 45; military 26, 45, 56, 58, 66, 144, 156, 161–2, 168, 170; military counterinsurgency 156; military dominance 161, 168; military establishment 45; military facilities 56; military forces 56; military presence in Philippine 162; military sales 66; naval operations 71; naval policy 71; power and influence 7; priorities 68, 106; rebalancing policy 164; security challenge for 160; security commitment 41; security concern 25; security links 67, 72; security objectives 59; security objectives in the Indo-Pacific 59; security repositioning 72; strategic

Index   195 agenda 167; strategic agenda in East Asia 167; strategic discourse 7, 55; strategic networking 7; strategic priorities 45; strategic priority 160; strategic rebalancing 158; strategic re-positioning 55; strategic rival 88; strategic thinking 55, 57; strategy 55, 64, 71, 101 US see United States of America (US) US Africa Command (AFRICOM) 58, 115 USAID see United States Agency for International Development (USAID) USAJ see US, Australia and Japan (USAJ) US, Australia and Japan (USAJ) 69, 105, 119 US Central Command (CENTCOM) 58, 115 US Department of Defense Indo-Pacific Strategy Report 65 US foreign policy 82, 90, 100, 164; under Donald Trump 104 USIJ see US trilateral with India and Japan (USIJ) US–India– Japan 16 US Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) 56, 58–60, 115 US–Japan–India 151 US military 26, 45, 56, 58, 66, 144, 156, 161–2, 167, 170 US Navy 46, 160, 166 US Pacific Command (PACOM) 56, 58–9, 69 US Pivot to Asia 101 US Senate Armed Forces Committee 59 US Seventh Fleet 159–60, 163 US–Singapore Strategic Security Policy Dialogue 57 USS Spruance 68 US strategy 55, 64, 71, 101; geoeconomics of 71; geopolitics of 71; Indo-Pacific 63, 72 USS William P. Lawrence 67, 70 US trilateral with India and Japan (USIJ) 70 US Vision for Indo-Pacific Security 65

Valiant Shield exercises 56 VFA see Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) Vietnam 45, 47–8, 57, 60, 62–3, 66, 72, 85, 102, 135, 148, 150–1 Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) 172 Wall Street Journal 5 Wang Yi, Chinese state councilor and foreign minister 29, 81, 149 Warfare 148, 161; anti-submarine 148 Western Indian Ocean 142–3, 147–8 Western Ocean 145 Western Pacific 55–8, 61–2, 66–9, 72, 134, 148, 159–61, 164; US military dominance in 161 White Paper (s) 3, 8, 31, 45, 81–2, 85, 87–9, 107 Williamson, Gavin, British Defense Secretary 117 Working Mechanism for Consultation on India–China Border Affairs 27 world order 12, 23, 63, 94, 99, 104, 151, 168; democratic 99; multilateral 99 World War II 3, 44, 83, 97, 107, 169 Xi Jinping, Chinese President 2, 5, 21–2, 28–9, 31, 61, 86, 95, 98–100, 102–3, 123, 133, 136, 140, 144–5, 149, 159, 164, 166, 171; Chinese foreign policy 100; grand strategy 102; speech at the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC) 22; visit to India 28; visit to Maldives 140; visit to Mauritius 144 Yachi, Shotaro, Japanese National Security Advisor 119 Yameen, Abdulla, Maldivian President 139–42, 148 Yan Xuetong 99 Yemen 22, 117 Zimbabwe 148