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Configuring identity in the modern Arab East
 9953901961

Table of contents :
Contents
Preface
Note on Transliteration and Referencing
Appropriating the Past: Twentieth-Century Reconstruction of Pre-Modern Islamic Thought
Notes
The Resiliency of Empire: Political Identities in Late Ottoman Syria
Notes
The Syro-Lebanese Emigration to Egypt: From Traditional Allegiances to National Identity?
Notes
Inventing Arab Secularism: The Early Years
Notes
Anti-Zionism, Arabism and Palestinian Identity: Isa al-‘Isa and Filastin
Notes
Consolidating Westphalian Sovereignty in Iraq
Notes
History, Arab Nationalism and Secularism: Constantine Zurayk in Counterpoint
Notes
The Middle Eastern National Economy: Imagined, Constructed, Protected
Notes
Political Identity and Economic Interest
Notes
Index of Select Names and Concepts

Citation preview

Configuring Identity in the M odern Arab East

Configuring Identity in the M odem Arab East

E dited by Sam ir M* S eikaly

© 2009 American University o f Beirut Fine Edition

Published by the American University o f Beirut Press American University o f Beirut Beirut, Lebanon

AO rights reserved* N o part o f this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, or otherwise, without the prior permission o f the American University o f Beirut Press*

The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this book are entirely those o f the authors and should not be attributed in any manner to the American University o f Beirut, to its affiliated organizations, or to members o f its Board o f Trustees*

For permission to reprint a page or m ore o f this publication, please contact the American University o f Beirut Press by fax at 961-1-361-091 or by email at [email protected]

Printed in Beirut, Lebanon ISBN 9953-9019-6-1

Designed and produced by the O ffice o f University Publications Layout and design by PenguinCube Printed by 53 D ots (D ar El K otob), Beirut, Lebanon

Contents vii

P reface

ix

N ote o n T ran sliteration

1

A ppropriating the Past: T w entieth-C entury R econstruction o f P re-M odem Islam ic T hought A h m ad D allai

35

T he R esiliency o f Em pire: Political Identities in Late O ttom an Syria D avid C om m in s

57

T he Syro-Lebanese Em igration to A llegiances to N ational Identity?

E gypt: From T raditional

T hom as P h ilip p 71

Inventing A rab Secularism : T he Early Years S am ir M* S eikaly

83

A n ti-Z ion ism , A rabism and Palestinian Identity: 'Isa al-Tsa and

Filastin R ash id L K h alid i

97

C onsolidating W estphalian Sovereignty in Iraq F red H « L aw son

121

H istory, A rab N ationalism and Secularism : C onstantine Zurayk in C ounterpoint A z iz A l'A z m e h

139

T he M iddle Eastern N ational E conom y: Im agined, C onstructed, P rotected R og er O w en

153

P olitical Identity and E conom ic Interest H azem E l-B eblaw i

162

Index o f S elect N am es and C oncepts

Preface A ll the papers published in this volum e em anated from a conference sponsored som e years back by the C enter fo r A rab and M iddle Eastern Studies (C A M E S ) at the A m erican U niversity o f B eirut (A U B ) and m ade possible by the generosity o f the Ford Foundation. A t the tim e, the A U B was at the p oin t o f inaugurating a m ajor program o f infrastructural and academ ic renewal in an effort to shed the destructive consequences o f a lon g civil war, as evidenced by the w anton destruction o f C ollege H all, its oldest bu ilding and the birth place o f m any early m ovem ents and ideas that were destined to decisively influence the em erging M iddle East. That program was intended as w ell to regain fo r d ie U niversity its position o f prom inence as the forem ost agency fo r the spread o f m odem education and overall enlightenm ent across the region. T he conference, in a way, was a first step in that direction . In addition to the contributors to this volum e, the conference was also attended by a distinguished bod y o f scholars hailing both from ou r region and from overseas, w ho delivered papers or chaired panels and general discussion sessions. A m ong them were H asan H anafi, Uliya H arik, M ichael H u dson, Paul Salem , Yazid Sayigh, R obert Springborg and Sam i Zu baida. A lthough this m ay n ot always be reflected in their tides, all the contributions published here deal direcdy o r by im plication w ith issues pertaining to identity and identity form ation. T he approach is fundam entally historical, grounded in em pirical investigation and verification. In adopting this m ethodology, in conceiving identity as a dynam ic process evolving in tim e, all the contributors are either explicidy o r im plicidy involved in the dem ystification o f the con cept. By dragging identity back in to tim e, by h istoricizin g it, they deprive it o f its m etaphysical inviolability, and reduce it to an unsettling, com plex and com posite entity that is constructed,

Preface

deconstructed o r reconstructed as the need arises; an entity that is, above all, am enable both to analysis and com prehension and, on that account, m anipulation as w ell. W hen the conference convened, A m in M aalou f s, Les Identités meurtrières (translated in to English as In the Name of Identity: Violence and the Need to Belong) had yet to appear. It seem s to m e, however, that m ost o f the contributors to this volum e w ould subscribe to his view that identity is n ot a preordained con dition , but a process or project that is form ed and evolves by m eans o f a dialogue involving interaction betw een s e lf and others and betw een past, present and future. A s perhaps the studies reproduced in this volum e confirm , this is as true fo r the M iddle East as fo r other parts o f the world* S am ir M , S eikaly

N ote on Transliteration and Referencing A part from ayn (‘ ) and Hamza ( ’ ), diacritical marks have n ot been included. T ransliteration, w hen it occu rs, generally accords w ith d ie convention adopted by the International Journal of Middle East Studies (IJMES). D espite an attem pt to introduce a sem blance o f uniform ity, referencing m ethods em ployed by d ie various contributors have been largely retained. A rabic b ook tides are reproduced in the form adopted by each contributor.

Appropriating the Past: Twentieth-Century Reconstruction o f Pre-M odern Islamic Thought* A h m ad D allai D epartm ent o f A rabic Language, Literature and Linguistics, G eorgetow n University, W ashington D C

In this essay I w ill exam ine w ritings by the fam ous tw entieth-century

salafi R ashid R ida in w hich he discusses and reconstructs the view s o f the eighteenth and nineteenth century thinker al-Shaw kani on the subject o f legal analogy ( qiyas). R idas close association w ith his teacher M uham m ad A bdu , his career as the ch ie f editor o f the influential jou rn al, al-Manar, and the strong social and political character o f his evolving ideas place him at the center o f intellectual debates at the turn o f the tw entieth century. There is m uch scholarly debate and disagreem ent over the developm ent o f the salafiyya m ovem ent and the various m eanings it acquired. By focusin g on specific texts by a recognized salafi and a m em ber o f the m ost celebrated circle o f M uslim reform ers o f the m odem period , I h ope to avoid undue generalization regarding d ie evolving content o f salafi thought. T he use o f the w ord “recon struction” is n ot intended to carry any negative or pejorative connotation , since som e level o f reconstruction is inevitably involved in any endeavor that invokes past traditions. I say this to avoid the equation o f reconstruction and distortion that is based on a positivistic dich otom y betw een a "real," fixed and finally defined tradition and a later, less authentic interpretation o f it. T his is n ot to advocate, * A version o f this essay was published in Islamic Law and Society 7 /3 (2000).

Ahmad Dallai

how ever, an indeterm inate and com pletely subjective n otion o f tradition, w hich is bou n d only by current im aginings, bu t sim ply to shift the focu s o f exam ination from the assum ed absolute origins o f this tradition to the continuous process through w hich it is regenerated. R ather than pursuing the m etaphysical task o f identifying these absolute origins, it is m ore useful, in m y view, to identify the m echanism s through w hich a tradition is endow ed w ith different m eanings at different historical m om ents. T he texts that I w ill study in this essay have m ultiple connections to earlier authoritative textual traditions as w ell as to contem porary pow er structures, and an assessm ent o f these texts w ou ld be justifiable i f both sets o f com plex relations are taken in to consideration. B efore I m ove to R idas w ritings, I w ill say a few w ords about qiyas, the subject o f the present discussion, and al-Shaw kani, the subject o f Rida's com m entary. A s on e o f the principles o f Islam ic jurisprudence, qiyas1 is perhaps the m ain m echanism through w hich the purview o f Islam ic law has expanded to deal w ith new situations o r to provide answers to new questions. For this reason, the discussion o f qiyas has been central to m odem Islam ic conceptions o f the relationship betw een state and religion, and particularly o f the role o f Islam ic law in the em erging state. A related interest in qiyas is rooted in the attention given by M uslim reform ers to ijtihad, the independent legal reasoning deem ed necessary fo r reviving Islam in the m odem w orld. T o m any M uslim reform ers as w ell as students o f Islam , ijtihad is the landm ark o f m odem Islam ic reform , and qiyas is the kernel and essential to o l o f ijtihad. T he nineteenth and tw entieth century focu s on ijtihad is best illustrated in the num erous w orks that attem pted to identify the mujtahids (independent legal thinkers) and mujaddids (renew ers) o f Islam . Particular attention is often given to the mujtahids o f the pre-m odem period ; for exam ple, a nineteenth century Indian author2 lists am ong the reform ers o f the end o f the eighteenth century and beginning o f the nineteenth, Shah W ali A llah and his son M uham m ad Ism a'il o f India, M uham m ad Ibn Ism ail al-A m ir al-Sanani and M uham m ad Ib n A li al-Shaw kani o f Yem en, Salih Ibn Um ar al-Fulani o f W est A frica, and M uham m ad H ayat al-Sindi o f M edina. These and other names appear in m any other biographical sources. R ashid R ida repeats m any o f the sam e nam es bu t also provides a general rule for identifying his reform ers. H e argues that, in addition to com bining solid scholarly reputation and aura o f leadership, reform ers should be identified on d ie basis o f their ability to m eet the requisites o f renewal.’ Yet, in m ost instances, including that o f R ida him self, such needs or requisites have

been defined retrospectively: as such, they are better representations o f the perceived needs o f the age o f the exam iner than o f the p eriod under «a m in a tion . Through the first few decades o f the tw entieth century, on e o f the m ost qu oted traditional authors o f the pre-m odem p eriod was M uham m ad Ibn A li al-Shaw kani.4 R eferences to al-Shaw kani appear in the w orks o f m any o f the leading M uslim scholars o f this p eriod .5 There are several reasons w hy al-Shaw kani was an appealing (o r rather unavoidable) figure: at one level, al-Shaw kani appeared as a traditional scholar w ith broad encyclopedic know ledge. H e w rote on all the traditional disciplines including, am ong oth er things, tafsir (Q u ranic exegesis), usul aUfiqh (legal th eory), hadith (tradition s o f M uham m ad), and fiqh (applied law ).6 A t another level, al-Shaw kani was perceived as a radical reform er or, at least as a prelude to the real m odem reform : in addition to his awareness o f European aggression against M uslim lands,7 he w rote on such subjects as the perils o f political oppression and the need fo r social ju stice, the religious obligation o f ijtihad, and the proh ibition o f taqlid.* U pon closer «a m in a tion , how ever, it becom es evident that m uch o f al-Shaw kanis independent thinking is in his traditional w ork, such as his w ritings on hadith and law ; what at first sight seem s to fell under the rubric o f reform is in feet very conventional. For exam ple, w hen he w rote on ijtihad, al-Shaw kani continued a local Yem eni scholarly tradition and was in n o way unprecedented o r unique in his rejection o f taqlid and his call fo r ijtihad. Beginning at least in the fifteenth century, m ost o f the leading scholars o f the Z a yd i sch ool o f law in Yem en w rote on ijtihad, and m any com piled book s and held view s alm ost identical to those o f al-Shaw kani. A l-Shaw kani, then, is universally recognized by posterity as on e o f the leading thinkers o f the early m odem period . T ogether w ith this recogn ition, how ever, som e o f the subsequent interpretations o f al-Shaw kanis thought reflect a discrepancy betw een the historical al-Shaw kani and the way he has been read by later reform ers. I w ill try to explain this discrepancy betw een the al-Shaw kani o f the eighteenth century and that o f the tw entieth and to speculate on the tw entieth-century c o n t « t fo r this difference. But before addressing the tw entieth century context o f the reconstruction o f al-Shaw kani, I shall first say a few w ords about current perceptions o f the eighteenth century in m odem scholarship. Studies o f early m odem Islam ic thought have been dom inated by tw o opposin g view points: at on e extrem e there is the earlier and w idely

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accepted view that the eighteenth century is a century o f political and econom ic decline and o f intellectual stagnation. A t the other, there is the view that nineteenth century Islam ic reform s as w ell as tw entieth century fundam entalism are both rooted in d ie legacy o f the eighteenth century. A ccordin g to the first view, an era o f political and intellectual revival and reform ensues in the nineteenth century prim arily as a result o f the grow th o f European influence in, and the resulting intellectual challenges to, the M uslim w orld. T he reaction o r response to E urope becam e d ie central criterion fo r defining Islam ic reform , as is clearly stated, fo r «cam ple, in A lbert H ou ranis in trodu ction to his Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age, 1798-1939. There, H ourani tells us that the thinkers studied in his b ook are n ot chosen on account o f their intellectual excellence, for, in his w ords, their w ork was n ot o f the highest caliber.' Instead, H ou ranis b ook deals on ly w ith the thought o f those w ho responded to the European challenge by changing their societies "through the acceptance o f som e o f the ideas and institutions o f m odem Europe.”9 There is o f course n o dou bt that the w ork o f H ourani and his m any students has been im portant fo r understanding developm ents that started in the nineteenth century. It is dear, how ever, that this sch ool has privileged one particular m ode o f intellectual activity, namely, that w hich responded to the "E uropean challenge" by adapting itse lf to it. A s a result, on ly a few eighteenth century political and intellectual developm ents were considered seriously, and even then, these developm ents have been alm ost always exam ined from d ie vantage p oin t o f the "reform ing elites." Later historians have refined H ourani s paradigm by look in g at ways in w hich traditional sectors o f M uslim society did in fact participate in the m odernization efforts.10 O ther kinds o f intellectual activity, how ever, were deem ed"traditional"and, it w ould seem , n ot w orthy o f study.Today, although m any o f the w ritings o f eighteenth century thinkers have been published, we often get the im pression that these w ere exceptional achievem ents in an age characterized by intellectual stagnation, and that they are im portant chiefly because they laid the foundation fo r later serious reform s. S o, fo r «cam ple, in a lon g in trodu ction to on e o f al-Shaw kanis w orks, the editor asserts that al'Shaw kani was an "intellectual sum m it in an age void o f sum m its,” and that he laid the foundation fo r al-A fghani and A bd u .11 There have been som e revisionist studies o f the eighteenth century; the m ost fam ous o f these are the m uch qu oted review by R oger O w en o f G ibb and B ow ens hlamk Society and the West12and the study edited by O w en and N a ff on the eighteenth century.19 W h ile these w orks convincingly criticize

Appropriating die Pasts Twentieth-Century Reconstruction o f Pre-M odern IiU m k Thought

n otion s o f social and econom ic decline in the eighteenth century, they suffer, in m y view, from tw o related shortcom ings. F irst, in advocating that historians "leave w hat is still basically the intellectual w orld o f culture history (w ith its typical concern for the transm ission o f ideas) fo r the w orld o f political econom y,”14 they p osit a problem atic dich otom y betw een the "unreal” ideas and the "real” m aterial forces at w ork in society. Such a dich otom y seriously underestim ates the role o f Islam ic discursive culture and id eology in society. S econ d, the invitation to shift the focu s o f research presum ably im plies that though there was cultural stagnation in the eighteenth century, w e are likely to reach different conclusions i f w e focu s ou r attention on political econom y. W h ile this im plication is m eant as a critique o f the orientalist n otion that equates "the high p oin t o f Islam ic creativity” w ith Islam ic "high culture,” it in effect concedes the lon gstan d in g orientalist assum ption that the eighteenth century is, nevertheless, a low p oin t in Islam ic culture. T his assum ption, it m ust be added, is central to the orientalist schem e o f periodization that n ot on ly asserts essentialist distin ction s betw een the Islam ic w orld and the W est, but also posits a European m onopoly over hum anistic cultural produ ction since the beginnings o f European awakenings in the eleventh century. A bandoning the study o f ideas in the M uslim w orld, w hen our know ledge o f the w orld o f culture o r even ideas is so im poverished, can only reinforce this flaw ed orientalist paradigm .15 T he gap in the understanding o f m odem Islam ic thought has been recogn ized after the recent revival o f Islam ic p olitical activism . T his recogn ition in turn has given rise to the oth er extrem e (and m ore recent) hypothesis that nineteenth century Islam ic reform s w ere rooted in the intellectual legacy o f eighteenth century M uslim reform ers, w ho developed their innovative ideas w ithin the Islam ic tradition and independent o f European influence. Several studies on eighteenth century Islam ic thought have already been produced w ith the explicit intention o f establishing its con n ection to later developm ents in Islam ic thought. T his view argues that an eighteenth century reform m ovem ent anticipated in m any ways nineteenth century reform as w ell as tw entieth century fundam entalism .16 In addition to these tw o serious scholarly trends, m any studies represent the eighteenth century as a prelude to the revolutions o f the 1960s (th e post-N asser, socialist m ilitary cou ps). For exam ple, in a b ook on eighteenth century Yem en entitled Ibn aUAmir wa ‘Asruhu,17Sanani is anachronistically portrayed as on e in a series o f rebels against the corruption o f rulers, a rebel w ho m anifested the ever living free spirit o f the Yem eni nation and

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anticipated d ie Yem eni socialist and nationalist revolutions. A contem porary author w ho has edited several o f al-Shaw kanis book s is H ilal Ibrahim H ilal. T he m ost im portant o f these w orks is Wilayat Allah waUTariq Hayha,1*w hich is an edition o f al'Shaw kanis Qatr aUWali ala Hadith al-Wali in w hich H ilal provides a lon g study o f al'Shaw kanis thought* O n the dust jack et o f the b ook w e read: T he reform m ovem ent o f the m odem period started in the Arabian Peninsula, and in particular in Yem en. Thus im am Shawkani appeared in the last quarter o f the eighteenth century A D , o r the tw elfth A H ; he rebelled against rigidity and im itation, preached the principles o f ijtihad, attacked tyranny, laxity and negligence o f religion and its values, and called fo r the need to un ify the A rab and M uslim nation in the face o f waves o f colon ial European invasions. Thereafter, this m ovem ent spread horn Yemen to the countries o f the East, then to Egypt, Syria, and the rest o f d ie Islam ic and A rab w orld. Thereafter appeared Jamal al-D in al-A fghani, A b d al-Rahm an al'K aw akibi, M uham m ad A bdu , and so on ... Exaggerated as this statem ent m ay be, it echoes m ost o f d ie view s that p osit a continuity o f reform from the eighteenth century up to the m odem period . O ften in its zeal to provide a m odem reading o f eighteenth century thinkers, contem porary scholarship verges on the absurd; fo r exam ple, H ilal takes issue w ith al-Shaw kani and Ibn Taym iyya for com m ending a num ber o f sufis. H ilal argues that the "true" thought o f these tw o scholars w ould rule ou t any respect o r recogn ition fo r sufis; he then proceeds to disprove Ibn Taym iyya and al~Shawkani by qu oting their ow n ideas against them . In other w ords, H ilal assum es that he know s w hat they thought (o r w hat they should have thought) better than they d o. In on e instance o f such extrem e se lf confidence, H ilal says: "...b efore I provide Ibn Taym iyyas response to him self...”19 T his crude attem pt to constru ct a genealogy o f dissent that roots d ie m odem regim e in d ie past o f the nation is n ot com pletely divorced from the m ore subde n otion o f an uninterrupted tradition o f reform and activism that starts in the eighteenth century and continues today. B oth these notion s foil to recognize that the problem s that in form ed the reform ideas o f the eighteenth century bear n o resem blance w hatsoever to those that inspired and drove later reform s. T he m ost noticeable absence from the thought o f

Appropriating the P**C Ttrentiedi'Ccntiity Reconstruction o f Pre-M odern Ulamir Thought

all the m ajor thinkers o f the eighteenth century is E urope. Even w hen som e o f these thinkers w ere aware o f infringem ents on M uslim lands, they d id n ot appreciate d ie extent o f the threat these infringem ents presented, nor d id such events influence their thought: E urope was com pletely absent. O f course, the exact opp osite is true o f later Islam ic thought, w here the challenge o f E urope drove all the fam ous thinkers o f the late nineteenth and early tw entieth centuries. T he responses to E urope echoed in the ideas o f these thinkers ranged from rejecting E urope in all o f its political and intellectual dim ensions, to striking a com prom ise and adopting som e o f the European in stitutions, all the way to em bracing these institutions wholeheartedly. In all cases, they w ere responses o r reactions to what becam e the ever present reality o f European hegem ony. E urope was n ot part o f the eighteenth century sense o f anxiety. T he dangers that the thinkers o f the eighteenth century w anted to w ard o ff were regional and internal, though the traditions they invoked w ere n ot lim ited to any on e region. T he intellectual outside’ o f the eighteenth century was n ot European bu t Islam ic, and it was n ot threatening but redeem ing. For m ost eighteenth century thinkers, the Islam ic past was still a continuous reality, despite its m any m utations, and it was w ithin the fram ew ork o f this herm etic Islam ic past that these thinkers proceeded to propose their reform s. T he m ajor reform ers o f the eighteenth century w ere thus inform ed by Islam ic history, n ot by the encounter w ith E urope. A series o f local, se lf contained encounters, in addition to encounters w ith the different, though fam iliar, Islam ic outsides’ provided the context fo r eighteenth century thought. M any o f the later reform ers had a European blueprint fo r reform and sim ply put it in Islam ic garb. In contrast, fo r eighteenth century reform ers the Islam ic past was still alive, a continuous history, n ot a com pleted and closed chapter, on e w hich was n ot yet replaced in the collective consciousness o f M uslim elites w ith a new ly constructed n otion o f the past. T o pu t it differently, for eighteenth-century thinkers, the Islam ic past was the ever-present reality. F or the thinkers o f late nineteenth and early tw entieth centuries, on the oth er hand, this past had to be rediscovered and reconstructed. W ith these distin ction s in m ind, I w ill now exam ine the m anner in w hich R ashid R ida reconstructed the theories o f al-Shaw kani on the im portant question o f qiyas. I w ill then venture som e general conclusions on the nature o f Islam ic reform in the late nineteenth and early tw entieth century, on its relation to the rising nationalism at the tim e, and its influence on later Islam ic activism . D espite extrem ely im portant transform ations in Islam ic reform ist

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thought in the period , as w ell as significant differences betw een A bdu and R ida,20 certain general ideas perm eate the thought o f both the teacher and the student and are retained w ithout undergoing m ajor changes. It is on these recurrent ideas that I w ill focu s in the rem aining part o f this essay. T he reform project associated w ith the names o f al'A fgh an i, A bdu, and Rida21 was an interpretative undertaking w hich aim ed at reviving M uslim societies through an intellectual revival. D uring its early optim istic days, this project also aspired to establish solidarity am ong M uslim s to enable them to deal w ith the challenges o f the colon ial pow ers. T his attem pt, how ever, faded gradually, and the focu s gradually shifted to the w orld o f ideas. In a fundam ental way, these (and oth er) reform ers recognized the dangers o f European political, as w ell as cultural, hegem ony, but also w anted to be part o f the European age rather than break away from it. M uch, i f n ot m ost, o f their w ritings argued that Islam is capable o f accom m odating European institutions and social patterns. T hey also were influenced by European thinking about the essential characteristics o f oriental culture and the nature o f the M uslim m ind. M any o f their w ritings attem pted to com pare the essence o f Islam (ruh aUIslam) w ith that o f m odem , W estern civilization ; however, unlike the orientalists w ho insisted on the utter difference betw een the tw o,22these reform ers tried to draw parallels betw een them and to argue that the tw o essences are in fact sim ilar. In other w ords, the M uslim reform ers accepted the orientalist essentialization, bu t then proceeded to provide their ow n counter definitions o f what constitutes the Islam ic essence. D espite the differences, how ever, the focu s on essences (ruhtjawhar)23m eant that m uch o f d ie discussion was outside history: rather than attem pting to change the m aterial con dition s that resulted in the decline and stagnation o f M uslim societies, these reform ers (w ith the exception o f al-A fghani, w ho continued to be involved in political activism ) devoted great energies to the search for precedents in the Islam ic past that w ould ju stify European institutions and give them an Islam ic flavor.24 It is im portant to note here the extent to w hich Islam was essentialized in the thought o f these reform ers; the m ost extrem e «cam ple o f this trend is A bdu , w ho insisted on the distin ction betw een M uslim s and Islam , and m aintained that the nature o f Islam rem ains unchanged, whereas stagnation o r ossification (jumud) afflicts M uslim s because o f p olitics. For exam ple, after a lon g diatribe against politics, A bdu asserted that on ce M uslim s awaken, presum ably by giving up political activity, they w ill find the pristine Islam w aiting fo r them to guide them back in to glory.20 O n the one hand, A bdu

associated decline w ith d ie social and political con dition s o f M uslim s, but on the other hand he enjoined them n ot to m eddle w ith p olitics, and to focu s instead on a m etaphysical purification that w ou ld som ehow qualify them to becom e the appropriate receptacles o f d ie redeem ing spirit o f Islam . T o be sure, despite his view s on the evils o f p olitics, A bdu h im self was n ot apolitical.36 W h ile the masses ought to avoid p olitics, A bdu s self­ consciously reform ist ideas w ere always conceived in connection w ith, and in the service o f, specific political agendas. Yet there is an iron ic tw ist in this reform tradition. W hat anim ates m uch o f the thought o f the reform ers is the desire to reconcile traditional and m odem institutions, to give secular, E uropean institutions Islam ic legitim acy by providing new interpretations o f the Islam ic tradition. In so doing, how ever, the reform ers had to expand the functional dom ain o f religion in to areas that were n ot previously covered b y it. S o w hile the initial purpose was to bypass religion,27 o r at least to loosen the rigid understandings o f Islam , the insistence on providing Islam ic legitim ation fo r each and every institution o f the m odem , European nation­ state in effect produced a pervasive and all encom passing Islam ic discourse that claim s, w ithout historical ju stification , to cover all aspects o f life.2* Like his teacher before him , R idas discussion o f qiyas in the context o f ijtihad is on e o f the exam ples that best illustrate the desire to expand religion to cover all aspects o f life. O n e o f the m ain declared objectives o f the jou rn al al'Manar was to introduce to contem porary M uslim readers the mujtahids o f Islam especially in the pre-m odem o r early m odem period (eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries). H ow ever, in the course o f introducing the ideas o f som e o f these mujtahids, R ida reoriented their thought in the interest o f his ow n reform program . In on e o f several articles on the subject, R ida provided a standard genealogy o f mujtahids. F ollow ing a b rie f biography o f Ibn H azm , he says: “after Ibn H azm , the only other person w ho parallels him in stature o r w ho is equal to him in his breadth o f know ledge, strength o f argum ent, his strong com m and and m astery o f the Sunna, and his ability to deduce (th e causes for rulings), is the mujaddid o f the seventh century A H , A hm ad Taqi al D in Ibn Taym iyya.”29 R ida m aintains that Ibn Taym iyya, in contrast to Ibn H azm , d id n ot reject qiyas w holesale; rather, he distinguished betw een sound qiyas, w hich conform s w ith the scripture (Q uran and hadith), and invalid qiyas, w hich contradicts it. R ida then continued w ith his genealogy and m oved on to Ibn al-Q ayyim , w ho “inherited and explicated the know ledge o f his teacher."

A ccordin g to R ida, T he m ost useful o f what has been w ritten after these [scholars, i.e., Ibn H azm , Ibn Taym iyya, and Ibn al-Q ayyim ] by the supporters o f Sunna is the b o o k Fath al-Bari, w hich is the com m entary on Sahih at Bukhari, by Ibn H ajar al'A sqalani, the m aster o f the [Q uran] m em orize» ( huffaz) and ju rists o f E gypt in the ninth century; this is the alm ost indispensable b o o k fo r any scholar w ho serves hadith in this age [o f ours]..» A m ong the m ost useful book s [o f hadith] is Nayl al Awtarfi Shark Muntaqa al-Akhbar, and o f the book s o f principles o f jurisprudence is Irshad aUFuhulfi Tahqiq al-Haqq min ‘Um al-Usul, both by the em inent scholar, the mujtahid o f Yemen in the tw elfth century, M uham m ad Ibn A li al'Shaw kani. H e further asserted that "these are the m ost fam ous scholars o f hadith and law am ong the celebrated reform ers o f Islam ; their book s are considered the greatest substance fo r reform in the subjects that concern u s..."50 R ida d id n ot restrict the list o f sources he quotes to these five scholars; am ong the ju rists he often invokes is al-Shatibi, w hose articulations o f the theory o f maqasid alsharia (objectives o r intentions o f the law ) and aUmasalih al-mursala (ben efit independent o f scripture) was a favorite for A bdu and R ida, m ainly because o f the flexibility w ith w hich it cou ld be used in the reform project undertaken by both .11 Yet the reference to Ibn H azm , Ibn Taym iyya and Ibn al-Q ayyiim , as w ell as to al'Shaw kani, w ho was a distinguished com m entator on these three, is recurrent in al-Manar.i2 R ida also referred to al'Shaw kani in his frequent reviews o f the latest publications o f im portant w orks by other Yem eni mujtahids. R ida referred, fo r exam ple, to al'Shaw kanis Al-Sayl al-Jarrar on the occasion o f the publishing (in C airo in 1922) o f a com m entary by Ibn M iftah (d . 1472) on Kitab al-Azhar by al'M ah di A hm ad Ibn Yahya al'M urtada (d . 8 4 0 /1 4 3 7 ). T his later w ork is considered the foundational w ork on Z a yd i law, and the m ost distinguished scholars o f Yemen have w ritten som e o f their m ost im portant w orks in the form o f com m entaries on it. C om paring the com m entaries o f al'Shaw kani and Ibn M iftah, R ida calls the latter a follow er ( muqattid) w ho w rote a useful and w ell-annotated reference w ork, whereas al'Shaw kani provided the causes fo r the various rulings o f al-Azhar, com pared them w ith rulings by other ju rists, and chose from these on the basis o f the strength o f the supporting evidence. ”

Appropriating the Puts Tworàedi'-Ce&tiuy Reconstruction o f Pte'M odcm Islamic Thought

A s noted, R idas know ledge ofY em eni scholars is n ot accidental, and seem s to derive from a w idespread reputation o f these scholars, w hich was still alive at the beginning o f the tw entieth century. Al-Manar n ot on ly introduced a num ber ofY em en i w orks to its readers, bu t also published som e o f these w orks in its printing house. These book s include, am ong others, M aqbalis al-Alam al-Shamikh (originally published 1 3 2 9 /1 9 1 1 ) and Ibn Ism ail alA m irs Subul al-Salam, Shark Bulugh al-Maram (published 1 3 4 4 /1 9 2 6 ).* h i oth er w ords, the self-con sciou s reform ative program adopted by R ida (and A bd u before him ) com pelled him to reflect on these im portant reform ers (in ways that m odem scholars n o longer feel they need to d o ). H ow ever, there is a significant gap in R idas discussion o f al-Shawkani betw een, on d ie one hand, the latter's recognized status as an independent and suprem ely erudite scholar, and his actual ideas and conceptions o f reform , on the other. It is here that w e discern the dynam ics o f the subde reconstruction by R ida o f the thought o f al-Shaw kani in the interest o f a reform program com pletely foreign to the eighteenth century scholar. In a lon g article in w hich he reiterated his long-standing approval o f, and support for, W ahhabism as w ell as Ibn Sa'ud, R ida states that “since its in ception , al-Manar has been preaching the pure oneness [o f G od ] and the view s o f the early pious generation (madhhab al-salaf) in m atters [related to] th e dogm as and guidance o f Islam . A s fo r m atters relating to governance and pow er, it [i.e., aUManar, has been advocating] the arts o f the age and the laws o f nature (funun al-asr wa sunan al-khalq)."** M ore generally, R ida defined renewal and reform in term s o f the role played by reform ers. "Renew ers,” he says, "are sent [by G od ] in accordance w ith the need fo r renewal."36T his renewal is needed because, over the course o f tim e, people erode their religion and underm ine its "edifice o f justice". R ida provided a list o f the m ain, general reform ers in the course o f Islam ic h istory; these are: Um ar Ibn A bd a l-A ziz (secon d century A H ), A hm ad Ibn H anbal (th ird century A H ), al-A shari (fou rth century A H ), al-G hazali (fifth century A H ), Ibn H azm (sixth century A H ), and Ibn Taym iyya and Ibn al-Q ayyim (seventh and eighth centuries A H ). O ther reform ers w ho cam e after these, according to R ida, were restricted in their reform s to on e particular region; th is second type o f local reform er includes al-Shatibi (eighth century A H ) in al-A ndalus, W ali A llah (tw elfth century A H ) and M uham m ad S iddiq K han (thirteenth century A H ) in India, Ibn A b d al-W ahhab (tw elfth century A H ) in N ajd, and al-M aqbali (eleventh century A H ), al-Shawkani (thirteenth century A H ) and Ibn al-W azir (ninth century A H ) in Yem en.

For R ida, therefore, reform was n ot a fon ction of the quality of the thought of the reform er, nor the extent of reception of the reform ers ideas; rather, a reform ers sphere of influence m ight be any "large o r sm all locality" and the criterion forju d g in g his view s is solely the extent to w hich diese ideas are needed at a particular poin t in tim e. N o w onder, then, that the m iserly little that Ibn A b d al-W ahhab has to offer stands on the sam e footin g (and in the same paragraph) w ith that of al-Shaw kani.37It n o longer m atters, according to this definition of renewal, w hether the ideas of a certain reform er have universal significance beyond their parochial origin s; the intellectual value o f these ideas is also o f litd e concern. T he on ly thing that m atters is the relative contextual significance o f these ideas in a particular situation. T he ultim ate values, then, are utility and expediency, beyond w hich anything goes. D espite this relativistic criterion , how ever, there is a persistent tension in R idas form ulations betw een the contradictory m odels set by his various reform ers. M ore im portant, there is a basic tension betw een R idas celebration o f these reform ers and his ow n ideas and program o f reform . R idas general assertions regarding the standing o f his reform ers inevitably run in to problem s as soon as he proceeds to discuss their ideas in greater detail and specificity. Such was the case w ith al'Shaw kani, w hose actual ideas often contradicted those o f R ida. It is com m only agreed that R idas ideas w ent through tw o radier distin ct phases o f developm ent.3* In the initial stage o f his intellectual career, R ida, like his teacher A bdu , was m ore open tow ard w estern ideas and institutions. In this stage, he prom oted a loose and liberal understanding o f Islam and Islam ic identity, on e that cou ld easily benefit from the cultural achievem ents o f non-M uslim s. Like his teacher before him , R ida also celebrated the so-called “rationalist” tendencies in Islam . A s tim e w ent on , how ever, Rida's hopes were frustrated by successive defeats in flicted on M uslim s by the European colon ial pow ers. A s M uslim s gradually lost their p olitical independence, and as the unity and integrity o f their culture and religion were seriously challenged, R ida w ithdrew to a kind o f salafiyya (traditionalism ), w hich em phasized cultural and religious purity in the face o f the im m inent political and cultural threats o f C hristian E urope. D espite this change o f heart, how ever, R ida continued to advocate m any o f the view s that he had borrow ed earlier in his career from European orientalists as w ell as from apologetic M uslim s seeking to reconcile Islam and m odem life. O n ce again, Rida's w ritings on al'Shaw kani illustrate the tensions in h is thought betw een his older convictions and later inclinations.

Appropriating A c Ptoti Twcnrieth-Ccntmy Reconstroctkm o f Pre-M odern lalamk Thought

In on e o f his articles in al-Manar,” R ida published afatwa by al'Shaw kani in w hich the latter sum m ed up w hat he considered to be the stand o f the earlier generations o f piou s M uslim s regarding the attributes o f G o d . In this fatwa, al'Shaw kani argued strongly in favor o f the p osition that does n ot assert o r deny, w ith regard to G o d s traits, anything beyond what is clearly stated in the scripture. al'Shaw kani criticised in n o uncertain term s the view s o f the M u tazila w ho claim ed certain kinds o f know ledge to w hich on ly G od is privy, and w ho tried to engage in activities that G o d does n ot allow . By taking an extrem e stand on m onotheism , al'Shaw kani m aintained, the M u tazila contradicted unam biguous and definite statem ents m ade in the Q uran and the Sunna. A l-Shaw kani also criticized the other extrem e view, w hich denies any kind o f free w ill am ong hum ans, thus rendering the m essages o f prophets pointless. Betw een these tw o extrem es, al'Shaw kani added, are the A sharis, w hose view s are m oderate, bu t w ho are also m istaken in trying to resolve through hum an reason issues that are n ot w ithin the hum an realm o f perception. O n such issues, al'Shaw kani argued, the true p osition is one in accord w ith the letter o f the scripture; thus the truth o f G o d s description o f h im self is accepted even w hen the exact m anner in w hich this description w orks cann ot be visualized o r perceived by hum ans. U nder n o con dition , a l' Shawkani added, should hum an reason be upheld as the final authority on G o d . R epublished in al-Manar, al'Shaw kanisfatwa spans twelve pages, bu t on e has to w ait fo r a footn ote on the penultim ate page to get a sense o f R idas view s on the subject. In reference to a theological issue that has been the subject o f a lon g controversy am ong m any M uslim s o f various regions and periods, ah Shaw kani took issue w ith those w ho provide m etaphorical interpretation o f d ie Q uranic statem ent: “T he M erciful assum ed the throne" (aURahman ala al-arsh istawa),* Som e scholars, al'Shaw kani m aintained, argue that istiwa m eans seizing con trol; others argue that it m eans going forw ard; and others argue that it stands for kingship and authority. In contrast to these interpretations, al'Shaw kani asserted that the safe op tion was to concede, in accordance w ith the statem ents o f the Q uran and the Sunna, the general n otion that G od assum es a throne, or that G od is above, w ithout attem pting to specify the m anner o f assum ption o r elevation, and w ithout trying to explain away these verses as allegories. R ida, w ho m anaged to refrain from com m enting throughout the article, asserted in a lon g footn ote at the end o f the article41that the view s opp osed by al'Shaw kani d o n ot contradict the

Ahmad Dallai

literal m eaning o f the various verses in w hich the w ord istiwa is used; the Q uranic usage o f the w ord, R ida added, im plies governance and m anagem ent, in addition to having exclusive authority in diese m atters. Such a reading, according to R ida, neither involves interpretation, nor does it entail a departure from the sch ool o f the early generations o f pious M uslim s. R idas interest in al-Shawkani was n ot ju st on account o f the latter s reputation as a reform er. H ad this been R idas sole criterion , then it w ould have sufficed fo r him to account for the social reform s that derive from al'Shaw kanis view s irrespective o f their actual content. R ather than inferring the social significance o f al'Shaw kanis view s, R ida provided a fu ll account o f the theological content o f these view s; therein lies R idas m ain dilem m a: al'Shaw kani as an idealized icon o f reform serves to legitim ize R idas ow n program o f reform , w hile al'Shaw kanis actual view s often underm ine the rationale behind this program . In a dear »p re ssio n o f his continuing adherence to the m utazili m odel o f "free thinking" and in contrast to al'Shaw kanis professed criticism s,42 R ida asserted in an earlier article in « /Manat4' that, follow in g the exam ple o f anthropom orphist hadith scholars, m any people have settled on accusing the M u tazila and other sim ilar groups o f deviance and heresy. R ida proceeded to exclaim : H ow can this be true w hen the upholders o f the M u tazili sch ool w ere the caliphs o f Islam during the A bbasid era, the judges [o f these ca lip h s], and a large portion o f their scholars. M oreover, they [i.e., d ie M u tazila] provide evidence for what they claim , and prove what they m aintain; thus, even i f they make m istakes, they are mujtahids... It is dear that w hoever provides evidence fo r his opin ion and proves his daim , then he is entitled to exercise ijtihad. Such a person is com m itted to the truth in w hat he seeks and pursues. Even i f his dem onstration is contradicted, and his p ro o f is rebutted, the m ost that can be said about such a person is that he is a m istaken mujtahid as such he is n ot only excusable bu t also w orthy o f rew ard, since he only sought the truth.44 Elsewhere, R ida was m ore forthright in advocating m u tazili inspired view s. It is dear from R idas num erous references that the real m otivation behind his defense o f the M u tazila was the attem pt to redeem their "rational" criteria o f interpreting the scripture. Such is the case in R idas advocacy o f the n otion o f naturalju stice.45Like his teacher before him ,46R ida m aintained that G o d s religious law is in conform ity w ith d ie laws o f nature, w hich are

Appropriating the Pa*tt Twentieth-Century Recom troction o f Pre-M odern IeUmk Thought

also created by G o d . A ccordin g to R ida, because d ie laws o f creation d o n ot change, they should override religious laws whenever there is a contradiction betw een the tw o.47 Clearly, then, R ida d id n ot agree w ith al-Shaw kanis critical stance tow ard d ie M u tazila, although he was som ew hat indirect in expressing his disagreem ent. T he evasive nature o f R idas exposition o f al-Shaw kani is even m ore acute in the discussion o f legal analogy ( qiyas). A s in his discussion o f th e M u tazila, R ida discussed the subject o f qiyas and fu lly articulated his view s on it before turning to al-Shaw kanis view on the subject. In this case, al-Shaw kani also held view s radically different horn R ida; how ever, having identified al'Shaw kani as on e o f the latest reform ers, it seem s that, here to o , R ida was n ot com fortable in glossing over the view s o f this prom inent scholar. Instead, R ida presented al'Shaw kanis view s w ith ju st enough com m entary to give the im pression that there was n o radical disagreem ent betw een his ow n opin ion s and those o f the eighteenth century reform er.4* B efore he discussed al'Shaw kani, R ida expressed his ow n view s on the subject o f qiyas in an article49 in w hich he sum m arized the view s o f al'Shaw kani s precursors, Ibn H azm - w ho categorically rejected qiyas - and Ibn Q ayyim al-Jawziyya - w hom R ida presented as a m oderate voice on the subject. T his discussion laid the foundation for R idas creative appropriation o f al'Shaw kani. A ccordin g to R ida, Ibn al-Q ayyim presented the argum ents o f those w ho either reject o r accept qiyas, and then m oved on to "ascertain legal analogy, w hich conform s w ith the scriptures."50 R idas actual stand on qiyas was spelled ou t in several in trodu ctory remarks - w hich he inserted together w ith his ow n headings - to the different sections qu oted from Ibn al'Q ayyim . Yet these interventions by R ida d id n ot always correspond to the quotations that follow them* R ida continued the discussion o f the subject o f qiyas in the follow in g issue o f al'Manar.** H ere to o , he highlighted what he thought were the essential view s o f Ibn al-Q ayyim by inserting such headings as "N oth in g in the law opposes proper qiyas " follow ed by the explanation: "Then Ibn a l' Q ayyim proceeded to illustrate that all the rulings o f the D ivine Law are in agreem ent w ith proper qiyas, w hich conform s to ju stice and reason (muwafiq lil'odl wal-aql)♦"** In the lon g quotation that follow s, Ibn al'Q ayyim does in fa ct m aintain that there is nothing in the D ivine Law that contradicts proper qiyas, bu t he does n ot use d ie w ords adl and aql;54instead, Ibn al-Q ayyim states that the valid qiyas is one in w hich the effective cause fo r the ruling (‘illat al-hukm) is explicitly specified in the scripture (Q uran and hadith).

Ahmad Dallai

T he purpose o f this discussion is n ot to dem onstrate d ie possible m isrepresentation by R ida o f Ibn al-Q ayyim s view s on qiyas. W hat is im portant, how ever, is to try to understand R idas peculiar ch oice o f ideas and the reason fo r presenting them in this particular manner. R ida, in fact, alluded to som e o f his m otives at d ie end o f his sum m ary o f the view s o f Ibn al-Q ayyim . "T he purpose o f everything that we have sum m arized here,” R ida m aintained, "is to illustrate the virtue o f the m iddle opin ion [w hich stands] betw een those w ho com pletely reject all kinds o f qiyas, and those w ho apply it loosely by inferring far-fetched causes ('ifa /).”*1 R ida provided further clarification in the conclusion o f his b ook Yusr al­ lslam wa-Usul al-Tashrt al-Am. A s already indicated, R ida collected there his Manor articles on qiyas, including d ie ones on Ibn H azm , Ibn al-Q ayyim , and al-Shaw kani. T o these and other relevant essays, R ida also added an in trodu ction and a conclusion w here he spelled ou t his ow n views m ore clearly. A fter presenting the critical views o f Ibn H azm and Ibn al-Q ayyim on the subject o f qiyas, R ida pursued the flow o f this crid d sm , w hile skillfully redirecting it in the process. R ida asserted that the expositions o f these great thinkers categorically established that pure religious m atters, w hich are creeds, acts o f w orship, and religious perm issions and prohibition s are taken from the explicit texts o f the Q uran and the clear S u n n a... It is n ot perm issible, under any circum stances, to introduce ( ihdath) a new act o f w orsh ip ... neither by the use o f qiyas, n or by the claim o f consensus ( ijma*) am ong later generations, n or [on the basis o f] pu blic benefit ( maslaha).K T his categorical rejection o f the use o f qiyas in purely religious m atters is then follow ed by an equally categorical assertion o f the legitim acy o f using these sam e tools (qiyas, ijma, maslaha) to derive new laws o f social transactions (muamalat). R idas seem ingly strong op p osition to the use o f legal analogy in m atters o f creed and ritual observances and his deliberate efforts to identify h im self w ith som e o f the m ost radical thinkers o f Islam fell w ell w ithin the fram ew ork o f salafi thought. In feet, R ida is often identified as on e o f the m ain ideologues, i f n ot the father o f, m odem salafis. T he Salafiyya, how ever, is better understood as a m ethod o f thinking about, or approach to, authoritative sources than a distin ct sch ool o f thought. Central to this

approach is the em phasis on the authority o f d ie established tactual sources o f Islam ic law, the Q uran and the authenticated traditions o f M uham m ad, over and above the opin ion s o f later ju rists and scholars. A s such, the ultim ate authority in all religious m atters is always located in the scripture itse lf and n ot in d ie various principles by w hich it is interpreted. Thus, the rejection o f qiyas, though n ot necessarily universally recognized by all s e lf' proclaim ed salafis, seem s to accord w ith the salafi approach. In this sense, then, R idas rejection o f qiyas in religion serves to authenticate his salafi credentials. U pon closer exam ination, how ever, this salafi stand appears m ore an ideological posture than a real epistem ological com m itm ent. In fact, d ie salafi tradition invoked by R ida, w ith its categorical rejection o f qiyas, d oes n ot inform his approach to scripture o r law ; w hile appropriating the sym bolic authority o f this salafi tradition, R ida radically curtails its purview and endow s it w ith m eanings alien to it. W hether w e ch oose to call him a salafi o r otherw ise, R idas peculiar brand o f thought cannot be explained sim ply by reference to the traditions h e invokes. M ost studies o f the subject have generally attem pted to evaluate m odem Islam ic thought by positin g a dich otom y betw een the pre-m odem Islam ic tradition and m odem w estern ideas and practices, each w ith its set characteristics and traits. These tw o traditions are contrasted to establish the essential features that distinguish them from each other. Islam ic reform ist thought is then assessed on the basis o f its ability to recognize such fundam ental differences and to face up to them . T he inability to recognize such differences is considered a sign o f failure; in fact, the failure is often attributed to the nature o f the project itself: the attem pt to reconcile tw o essentially incom patible system s o f thought. T o a great extent, the prim e representatives o f m odem Islam ic reform , al-A fghani, A bdu , and R ida, have been subjected to this kind o f analysis and, invariably, have been dism issed - even as they are celebrated — as either apologetic thinkers o r outright hypocrites.56 M y purpose here is n ot to speculate on the possible intentions o f R ida; rather, I am suggesting that the fixed legal and political Islam ic tradition so essentialized in orientalist scholarship is n ot what R ida actually presents as the authoritative tradition o f Islam . H is is a new "tradition" forged ou t o f the inherited legacies o f Islam as w ell as the prevalent, new ly im ported w estern theories and practices o f p olitics and social organization. N either are these tw o poles sym m etrical w ithin the political realities o f R idas tim e. T he prevalent political institutions o f the em erging nation states o f the

M uslim w orld w ere either installed by colon ial pow ers o r m odeled after European exam ples. These constituted present realities, whereas the Islam ic p olitical m odels were increasingly becom ing part o f the past. Therefore, R idas particular reconstruction o f the past Islam ic tradition is n ot intrinsic to the tradition itself, nor was it foreordained to take the specific form it d id . Rather, it is an outcom e o f his present realities, the W est included. T o illustrate this poin t, I w ill now com pare R idas view s on qiyas w ith those o f al-Shaw kani, the last o f the great reform ers o f the pre-m odem p eriod . R ida starts his exposition o f al-Shaw kanis view s on qiyas by stating that d ie eighteenth-century reform er had clarified the legal differences am ong scholars over several related issues, and had accounted fo r the rational and textual proofs that each side provides in support o f its argum ents. R ida then sum m arizes al-Shaw kanis exposition o f these different view s. H ere, as in his exposition o f his precursors, the form at in w hich R ida presents al-Shaw kanis view s is slighdy m isleading; the m anner o f presentation gives the im pression that al-Shawkani was providing a dispassionate account o f the view s o f all sides o f the debate, w hen in fact he clearly outlined all the possible argum ents in favor o f qiyas only to provide system atic rebuttals to each and every on e o f them.*7 In fact, al-Shaw kani expressed his outright rejection o f qiyas in great detail In several o f his w orks.5* In one o f m any crystal clear statem ents o f his view on this subject, al-Shaw kani held that "analogical investigations are m osdy m ere speculations, w hich relate to nothing through w hich a definitive p r o o f can be established.”59In an interesting tw ist on qiyas, he m aintained that " if a person claim s that on e o f those [com panions, successors, im am s o f sch ools, o r even prophets] were to introduce in to G o d s law things w hich d o n ot belon g to it, o r charge the w orshippers o f G od w ith obligations that d id n ot com e from H im , then this person w ould have fabricated a big lie about G o d , and attributed to H im things H e does n ot say...."60T he in trodu ction o f legal responsibilities, added al-Shaw kani, M is a privilege that belongs exclusively to G od , and a status w hich no on e else m ay rightly attain or claim .” W h ile arguing that partisanship to a particular scholar am ounts to a betrayal o f the D ivine Law, w hich has been entrusted by G od to hum ans, al-Shaw kani m aintained that on e should n ot turn scholars from ju rists to law -givers, from w orshippers to objects o f w orship.61 H e then asserted that: There is n o authority other than G od , n o ruling bu t from H im , and n o D ivine Law other than what H e sent forth . T he judgm ents

o f mujtahids h old n o authority over anyone^ and are in n o way an integral part o f the D ivine Law ; rather, they are (relevant) on ly to the specific person w ho issues them , and they d o n ot m e n d beyond him to any other person. N either is it law ful fo r him (th e mujtahid) to m ake them (h is judgm ents) binding on any o f G o d s w orshippers; it is also n ot law ful fo r som eone else to accept these judgm ents and m ake them an authority over h im self such that he w orships G o d through th em .62 A ccord in g to al-Shaw kani, anyone w ho claim s that other pious M uslim s — w hether prophets, ju rists, o r learned scholars - are using qiyas o r other m eans to introduce new laws, is, in effect, slandering them . T his is so because a person w ho introduces new laws in effect fabricates them and arrogates to h im self w hat he know s is the exclusive right o f G o d . Through th is argum ent, al'Shaw kani invests the prerogative to legislate exclusively in G od and asserts, at the sam e tim e, the absolute authority o f G o d . T his seem ingly theocratic n otion , how ever, in effect serves to lim it the purview o f the D ivine Law and to restrict the range o f hum an behavior and actions that are regulated by this law. A s a result, m ost hum an behaviors and social transactions w ou ld be regulated by laws w hose provenance is decidedly hum an. These laws, in m y reading o f al'Shaw kani, are at on ce relative, changing and changeable, and legitim ate. It should also be noted that he sustains this argum ent w ithout diluting the D ivine Law o r com prom ising its strict application. A l'S haw kani also insisted that there is no valid textual indicant ( dalil) fo r the authoritativeness o f qiyas; he added that the concurrence o f m any scholars does n ot constitute valid evidence, w hich is binding on other M uslim s. T he analogy rejected by al'Shaw kani is on e in w hich the effective cause (‘ilia, ratio legis) o f a certain law is deduced by ju rists and then applied to other cases fo r w hich the sam e ‘ilia applies. A l-Shaw kani argued that as lon g as there is n o explicit text from the Q uran o r the Sunna stating th e effective cause for a certain ruling, one cannot posit that this ruling is in troduced by the Law -G iver on account o f that particular cause, let alone consider it to be a general cause and subsum e other cases w ith seem ingly sim ilar causes under it. I f the effective cause is clearly stated o r identified in a text, then its application to another case is on the basis o f the textual indicant and n ot on the basis o f legal analogy; it is as i f the Law -G iver is tellin g us that this particular effective cause has a general applicability and is to be applied whenever it obtains.64

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Aw are chat the textual evidence adduced in support o f qiyas in fact provides evidence fo r ijtihad,** al'Shaw kani m aintained that ijtihad has m any possible m eanings, including the presum ption that d ie general principle o f the law is the absence o f restrictions o r regulations as lon g as there is n o clear statem ent to the opposite.** T o al'Shaw kani, therefore, rather than being a way o f introducing new laws, ijtihad can be used to argue for the absence o f such laws. T his is the exact opp osite o f qiyas w hose application invariably leads to the creation o f new laws. In fact, al'Shaw kani rejected the general argum ent in favor o f qiyas, w hich holds that the explicit rulings are lim ited whereas events are endless and that there is always need fo r m ore rulings. In response, al'Shaw kani asserted that the Q uran clearly states that religion has been com pleted and that, therefore, the laws that are m eant to be follow ed have already been introduced and clearly stated.66 A s a last quotation from al'Shaw kani, R ida chooses a statem ent in w hich al'Shaw kani m aintained that i f the indicant fo r a particular law is stated ( aUiUa mansusa), and if this indicant is then used as a basis fo r extracting other laws, then it does n ot m atter w hether people call this qiyas o r a straight forw ard application o f the textual injunction, for the difference here is over sem antics (khilaf lafzi).67R ida then asserts that there is in fact a real difference betw een, on the on e hand, those "w ho d o n ot consider every extracted indicant (kutt talil fi aUnusus) as part o f d ie general [principles] and thus treat each case w here this indicant is operative as an individual application o f the general rule, and those w ho connect rulings to stated indicants (‘ilal mansusa).,. w hether they name this [procedure] follow in g the textual injunction o r legal analogy. T he sem antic difference is only betw een the tw o groups w ho agree over the use o f stated indicants as a basis for extracting laws.”6* O n ce again, R idas b rie f in teijection has the effect o f diluting ah Shaw kani s argum ent and even m isrepresenting it. R ida in fa ct collapses the central distin ction that al'Shaw kani m ade betw een extracting indicants from the textual injunctions (ta'lilfi aUnusus) and indicants, w hich the text o f the scripture (Q uran and hadith) defines as reasons underlying particular rulings (‘ilal mansusa). R idas language suggests that he is taking a m ore radical stand than al'Shaw kani by opposin g those w ho accept the use o f all extracted indicants fo r deriving laws. T his view, how ever, is m isleadingly posed in opp osition to those w ho, like al'Shaw kani, accepted textually designated indicants as a basis fo r deriving the law. T he truth, how ever, is that al'Shaw kani, like this hypothetical group, d id n ot consider every

Appropriating the Puts Twentieth-Century Reconstruction o f Pre-M odern Islamic Thought

extracted indicant as a general principle, w hich autom atically applies to individual instances o f the general rule. In fact, al-Shaw kani rejected the use o f ‘ilia unless a specific text clearly states that a certain indicant is the cause fo r a ruling. In other w ords, n o m atter how rigorous a m ethod one uses to in fer the cause fo r a particular ruling, n o additional rulings can be based on th is cause unless it is designated as an ‘Ma in the Q uran o r hadith. R ida, therefore, gives the false im pression that al-Shawkani occu pied a m iddle ground, and that he accepted qiyas under certain con dition s. There is, how ever, m ore purpose to these b rie f remarks by R ida than the desire to ton e dow n al'Shaw kanis stand. A fter inserting his suggestive remarks, R ida m aintains that both Ibn Taym iyya and Ibn al-Q ayyim join ed the m ajority o f scholars in approving o f the use o f the w ord qiyas as the application o f stated indicants (al-ilal aUmansusa) and that they subsum ed this kind o f qiyas under the concepts o f ju stice and balance (aVadl wal-mizan). R ida then asserts that this kind o f qiyas is applicable only to the laws o f contracts and social transactions (‘uqud wa muamalat), to the exclusion o f w orship and ritual practices ibadat); the latter have been "exhausted by the scripture and explicated by the practical Sunna, and there is n o p oin t in adding or subtracting from them .”69 In this b rie f conclusion , therefore, R ida gives d ie im pression that alShawkani advocated a separation betw een ‘ibadat and muamalat, w hen in fa ct he m ade n o such separation and was fu lly opposed to qiyas in every shape and form .70 M ore im portant, R ida asserts that in social transactions there are general principles, w hich he calls stated or designated principles, bu t w hich include all d ie indicants extracted from textual injunctions. T hese principles can then be applied w ithout the need to adhere to form al procedures such as legal analogy. H e asserts that these general principles also have the effect o f direct textual injunctions, and certain and binding rulings are derived from them (th e prin ciples). These and other view s are dearly spelled ou t in d ie conducting section o f Yusr al-Islam, w hich indudes R idas collected articles on d ie subject o f qiyas. R ida states that the custom o f ascribing som e sort o f im plirit o r hidden qiyas to every ruling was originally intended to discourage tyrannical rulers from m anipulating the principle o f pu blic benefit (maslaha) and from using it as a pretext for introducing m ore laws that only serve their ow n w him s and reinforce their despotic tendencies. R ida then asserts that the true con trol o f such rulers should n ot be through restricting the process through w hich laws can be derived, but by plaring the ultim ate authority in the hands o f a legislative bod y that appoints and directs the ruler.71

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R ida then affirm s his categorical rejection o f qiyas in m atters o f pure religion72 and proceeds to state his view w ith regard to social transactions: “A s fo r w orldly affairs, including perm issible and forbidden acts, politics, ju risd iction and p rotocol, these are classified according to their indicants in to six categories.”73 T he first type o f indicant is the m ost certain kind, and it is based on an unam biguous tact w ith certain transm ission and m eaning. A ccordin g to R ida, a ruling deriving from such an indicant is binding; it allow s n o independent reasoning unless it is contradicted by a stronger textual injunction relating to its specific subject o r by a stronger, general in jun ction. Thus, general principles such as pu blic interest ( maslaha) override the textual injunctions. T o be sure, there is nothing new in the desire to bestow religious legitim acy on maslahaA>ased legislation pertaining to w orldly affairs.75W hat is new, how ever, is R idas argum ent that such legislation is part o f the D ivine Law and com prises som e o f the m ost certain rulings o f this law. Thus R ida states: That w hich G o d com m ands us to observe in regard to obeying the people in charge (awlia al-amr) am ongst us relates to m atters o f the w orld and its pu blic interests, w ith d ie added con dition that this [observance] does n ot entail disobedience to G o d ... A s fo r m atters o f religion, it has been com pleted, and H e [G o d ], may H e be exalted, is the legislator o f religion {short al-din)...T h e people in charge am ongst M uslim s have n o authority over anyone in m atters o f pure religion, neither in adding o r subtracting from it.75 T o R ida, therefore, the political elites o r the sovereign pow er, how ever defined, have n o authority over M uslim s in m atters o f ritual observances

{‘ibadat). T he other face o f this sam e assertion is that these elites have authority in the sphere o f political and social transactions (muamalat), and this authority is claim ed in the name o f religion. Thus R ida typically m aintains that a person in pu blic office is n ot bou nd by the literal m eaning o f the w ords o f the L aw -G iver regarding particular issues w hen this m eaning does n ot coin cid e w ith the pu blic interest. Rather, "the rulings that con form w ith pu blic interest are the ones that truly conform w ith the fundam ental principles, w hich are determ ined by definitive texts (