Conducting Socially Responsible Research : Critical Theory, Neo-Pragmatism, and Rhetorical Inquiry [1 ed.] 9781452249117, 9780761904984

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Conducting Socially Responsible Research

For Rui Zhao, my pearl

Conducting Socially Responsible Research Critical Theory, Neo-Pragmatism, and Rhetorical Inquiry

Omar Swartz

SAGE Publications International Educational and Professional Thousand Oaks London New Delhi

Publisher

Copyright © 1997 by Sage Publications, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, irKludir»g photocopyir\g, recording, or by any itrfonnadon storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. For infomjation address: S A G E Publications, Inc.

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Swartz, O m a r . C o n d u c t i n g socially responsible research / author, O m a r Swartz. p. c m .

Includes bibliographical references a n d index.

I S B N 0 - 7 6 1 9 - 0 4 9 8 - 0 (cloth: alk. p a p e r ) . — I S B N 0 - 7 6 1 9 - 0 4 9 9 - 9

( p b k . : alk. p a p e r ) 1. R h e t o r i c — P h i l o s o p h y . 2. Criticism. 3. Philosophy,

M o d e r n — 2 0 t h century. 4. Pragmatics. 5. C o m m u n i c a t i o n — S t u d y a n d

teaching. I. Title.

P301.S93 1997

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Μ argaret Seawell Jewica Crawford Sherrise M. Purdum Denite Santoyo Danielle Dillahunt Juniee Oneida Candice Harman Anna Chin

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If I am not for myself, then who will be for me? If I am only for myself, then what am I? If not now, when? Talmu^itst wisdom "Ethics of the Fathers," p . 482

There are times in life when the question of knowing if one can think differently than one thirxks, and perceive differently than one sees, is absolutely necessary if one is to go on looking and reflecting at all. People will say, perhaps, that these games with oneself would properly form part of those preliminary exercises that are forgotten once they have served their purpose. But, then, what is philosophy today—philosophical activity, I mean—if it is not the critical work that thought bears to mind on itself? In what does it consist, if not in the endeavor to know how and to what extent it might be possible to think differendy, instead of legitimating what is already known? Michel Foucault The Use of Pleasure, p . 9

Contents

FOREWORD

xiii

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

xvii

1. T O W A R D P R A X I S IN

DISCIPLINARY SCHOLARSHIP Rhetoric, Critical Theory, and the

Possibility for Social Change The Contnhution of Critical Theory to

Rhetoncal Studies The Need for Critical Resporues to Western

or Amencan Social Practices The Need for Localized Resistance Qualifyir^ the Positions of My

NeO'Pragmatist Assumptions Methodological/Theoretical Assumptions Rhetorical Praxis as Teleological Study

1

5

5

11

15

19

21

21

Critical Teleology as a Neo-Pragmatist Activity Orgatuzation o f Study 2. R E D E S C R I B I N G DISCIPLINARY PRACTICE Historicizing the Assumptions o f O u r Disciplinary Knowledge The Social Limitations of Philosophical Language Finding Linguistic Meanitig Without Metaphysical Certainty The "End" of Philosophy and the "Task" of Rhetoric T h e Influence of Neo-Pragmatism on Rhetorical Studies Rhetorical Studies, Ironism, and Leftist Political Practice Exploririg the Three Conditions of Rorty's Ironism T h e Social Implications o f a Redefined Critical Scholarship Redescribing the Tensions Between Academia and Society Restructuring Theory to Meet the Needs of Praxis Foucault's Contribution to Disciplinary Praxis Summary 3. T O W A R D A N E O - P R A G M A T C APPROACH T O RHETORICAL THEORY Resisting the "Methodological Injunctions" of the Dichotomy Between "Ephemeral" and "Enduring" Scholarship Deconstructing Traditional Accounts of "Ephemeral" and "Enduring" Rhetorical Theory and Criticism

25 27

32 33 34 38 40 42 42 45 47 47 50 53 55

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58

62

Scholarship, and the Scientizing of Criticism Emphasizing the Rhetorical Dimensions of All Scholarship Criticism and the Issue of "Reality" Challenging the Metaphysical Readings of Kenneth Burke Burke's Obhiscation of the Enduring/Ephemeral Dichotomy Learning to Resist the Reification of Burkean Theory Analyzing Contemporary Reifications of Burkean Philosophy Theory as Equipment for Social Action: Ketmeth Burke, Rhetoric, and Ideological Critique Burke's Commitment to Social Criticism The Ideological QuaUties of Burke's Rhetoric of Form Historicizing the Socid Contnbutions of Counter-Statement Toward á Neo-Pragmatic Praxis of Form 4. FACING T H E SOCIAL LIMITATIONS OF D I S C I P L I N A R Y R H E T O R I C A L CRmCISM A n Analysis o f Four Disciplinary Views of Nixon's " T h e War in Vietnam" Address Analysis of Robert R Newman's Criticism of Nixon's Address Explorirxg the Teruion Between Social and Disciplinary Critique in Newman's Essay Kendall's Response to Newman and Its Implications for Ideobgical Criticism Analysis of Hermann G. Stelzner's Mythic Criticism of Nixon's Address Challenging the Socid Dutance in Stelzner's Anal;ysis

62 64 66 68 69 74 77

80 81 83 84 87

91 92 93 93 98 103 J 03

Analysis of Karlyn Kohrs Campbell's Intrinsic Criticism of Nixon's Address CL·Uenging the Limited Application of Campbell's Analysis Analysis o f Forbes Hill's Neo-Aristotelian Criticism of Nixon's Address Challenging the Limiud Claims of Hill's Scholarship A Neo-Pragmatic Analysis of Nixon's "The War in Vietnam" Address Justifyitig an Ideological Reading of Nixon's Address in 1997 The Rhetorical Function of Nixon's Misuse of History Campbell and the Moral Suspicion of Nixon Extending Nixon's Historical Narrative Nixon's Argument and the Intensification of Hostilities Summary 5. T H E P E D A G O G I C A L IMPLICATIONS OF A CRmCAL R H E T O R I C Dimensions of a Redescribed Critical Pedagogy in Communication Studies The Definition and Parameters of a Critical Pedagogy in the Basic Communication Course Redescribing "Authority" in the Classroom and in Society English Composition, Cultural Critique, and the Basic Communication Course Critical Pedagogy in English Composition Examitung the Similariries Between Public Speaking Instruction in Departments of Communication and Composition Instruction in Departments of English Examining the Differences Between the Public Speaking Course in

109 109 114 115 119 119 121 121 125 129 134

135 136

137 143 147 148

150

Communication and the Composition Course in EngUsh An Analysis of the Supporting Literature in Communication Supplementing the Instruction of the Basic Course Two Ways to Redescribe a Critical Pedagogy Institutional Contributions to a Critical Pedagogy in the Basic Communication Course Individual Contributions to a Critical Pedagogy in the Basic Communication Course Summary 6. C O N C L U S I O N

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155 162

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164 168 169

REFERENCES

175

INDEX

187

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

198

(^reword

RECONSIDERING WHAT

S C H O L A R S H I P IS A N D S H O U L D B E

In recent years, criticism of scholarship as usual has become increasingly insistent, radical, and persuasive. Challenges to traditional scholarship have come from postmodern scholars of communication, critical studies, feminism, philosophy, cultural studies, and other fields. DiscipUriary loca­ tions notwithstanding, critics of conventional scholarship disparage it for falsely claiming objectivity and distance between researchers and research participants and for assuming capital-T Truth exists and can be discovered and proven. Most especially, critics disparage traditional research's claim to be value free, apolitical and they insist, in contrast, that all knowledge and all scholarship is inherently, inevitably value laden. Like many others, I have read the criticisms and found myself increas­ ingly incUned to accept them. Yet, I have been frustrated by the absence of efforts to integrate the ideas and vocabularies of diverse fields. Thus, I welcome this book in which Omar Swartz thoughtfully reviews and inte­ grates critical discussions of conventional scholarship and alternatives to it. Swartz offers a sustained and convincing challenge to established

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CONDUCTING SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE RESEARCH

assumptions and practices in rhetorical study and criticism. In exploring these issues, he provides a stunning integration o f the ideas and implica­ tions of thinkers such as Foucault, Rorty, Jacoby, and Burke. The result is a devastating challenge to scholarship as usual and a compelling call for more socially aware and engaged scholarship. Swaru is especially convincing in his challenge to the conventional assumption that scholarship is and should be removed from the social world. Extending previous discussions o f this issue by feminists (e.g., Harding, 1991) and other critical scholars, Swartz demonstrates that scholars and the work they do are necessarily situated in a social world that informs—even infuses—their ideas and interpretations. Following Donna Haraway's (1988) argument that all knowledge is situated, Swartz recognizes that there are multiple ways of living and multiple paths to knowledge. Awareness of diverse locations from which knowledge arises erodes belief in transcendent truths. In its place, we recognize multiple perspectives that operate simultaneously in the social world. All truth, all knowledge, all scholarship become perspectival and emergent, rather than singular and fixed. In calling for socially engaged and self-reflexive research Omar Swartz joins a strong and well established tradition in the discipline of communi­ cation. As early as 1973 Karlyn Campbell noted that women's voices have historically been silenced by cultural practices that deemed it iiwppropri­ ate for women to speak in public. Her article is a classic example of scholarship that engages real issues of social inequity. More recently, Campbell has published work that criticizes exclusionary scholarly prac­ tices (1995b) and that enacts her advocacy of scholarship that gives voice to previously muted voices (1995a, 1989a,b). A year before Campbell published her now-classic article, Philip Wander and Steven Jenkins (1972) published an essay, both impassioned and scholarly, urging rhetoricians to make critical responses to the social world and the problems inherent in it. A decade later. Wander extended his ideas in "The Ideological Turn in Modern Criticism" (1983). In the 1983 statement Wander argued for criticism that "recognizes the existence of powerful vested interests benefiting from and consistently urging politics and technology that threaten life on this planet" (p. 18). Swartz builds on and extends the arguments of Wander and others who have urged scholars to move out of the ivory tower and engage real world problems and issues. Scholarship of this sort makes no claim to be neutral and disinterested. Instead, it is passionate and unapologetically political.

XV

Foreword

and it aims to make a positive difference in the world. Scholars, in other words, acknowledge that they are part of and responsible to the world within which they operate. Swartz embodies his theoretical arguments through concrete examples and applications within this book. His discussion of specific projects demonstrates that there is no necessary conflict between vigorous engage­ ment with social issues and rigorous, high quality scholarship. 1 call readers' attention especially to the fifth chapter in this volume. In it, Swartz addresses what may be a sedimented and destructive dichotomy between teaching and scholarship. He demonstrates that scholarship and teaching inform each other in mutually productive ways. This chapter is original and important. Swartz writes clearly about sophisticated theories that necessitate a fair amount of jargon and "academese." He has done a marvelous job of making the writing accessible without diluting the complexity of the ideas he considers. The result is a book that invites readers to reconsider what it means to be a scholar and to engage in scholarship. With Swartz, 1 believe that egregious inequities and intolerable oppres­ sion still poison social life and that these should not be ignored by responsible scholars. Thus, I welcome this book which continues the communication field's long-standii\g commitment to topics of social jus­ tice. The historical and current work by communication scholars on social [in]justice is impressive in both quality and quantity. Swartz's compeUitig analysis of and advocacy for socially engaged scholarship ftirthers the goal embraced by many scholars and teachers: contributing to the goal of creating a more kind, more fair world for all who participate in it. JULIA T . W O O D

Hairston Professor of Communicatioii Studies University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

REFERENCES

Campbell, K. K. ( 1 9 7 3 ) . T h e Rhetoric of women's liberation: A n oxymoron. Quarteriy Jourrxal of Speech, 59, 74-86.

Campbell, K. K . (1989b). Man cannot speak for her I; A cnticd study of early /eminist speakers, ^ s t p o r t , CT: Praeger.

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CONDUCTING SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE RESEARCH

Campbell, K. K. (1995a). Gender and genre; Loci of invention and contradiction in the earliest speeches by U. S. women. Quarteriy Journal of Spetch, 81, 479-495. Campbell, K. K. (1995b). Insilence we oppress. InJ. Τ Wood & R. B. Gregg (Eds.), Tou«rd the 21st century: The future of speech communication (pp. 137-149). Cresskill, NJ: Hampton Press. Haraway, D. (1988). Situated knowledges: The science question in feminism and the privilege of partial perspective. Signs, 14, 575-599. Harding, S. (1991). Whose science^ Whose knovAedge^ Thinking from uemen's lives. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Wander, R (Guest Editor). (1993). Special issue on ideology. Western Jounml of Commu­ nication, 57. Wander, R, & Jenkins, S. (1972). Rhetoric, society and the critical response. Quarteny Joumaio/Si>eich, 58, 441-450.

Q^knoivledgments

I

would like to thai\k professor Edward Schiappa at the University o f Minnesota for reading earHer drafts of this book. Graduate students Deborah Epperson at Purdue University and Chris Bachelder at the University of North Carolina, Greensboro, also provided valuable feed­ back on these pages as the text evolved from doctoral research into its present form. I would also like to thank Charles Stewart and Don Burks at Purdue University for their mentoring and support. All of the above people, through their prodding questions, have greatly aided in the construction of this book. To them I am grateful. The strengths o f this book are due to these people and to what they have taught me; its limitations are my own. This book, however, is more than just a document of my intellectual growth. It is also a monument to the love and support that my family—Sue Swartz, Robert Swartz, Bubby Rose, and Rui Zhao—has given me over the years. Small portions of this book were published elsewhere in a slightly different form. Part of chapter five appeared as "The Interdisciplinary and Pedagogical Implications of Rhetorical Theory," Commurucation Studies,

xvii

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CONDUCTING SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE RESEARCH

46, (1995): 130-139. The pedagogical exercises at the end of chapter five appeared as "Exercises in Critical Pedagogy for the Basic Communication Course," Speech ΟοπχηΜηΐωύοη Teacher, 10 (1996): 11-13. I am grateful for their permission to reproduce the material here.

1

(^ward Praxis in Disciplinary Scholarship

A

crisis has appeared among members of the leftist academic community, one disruptive of the traditional social concern for liberal or radical democratic politics. As documented by Ernesto Ladau and Chantal Mouffe (1985) and Russell Jacoby (1987), this crisis reflects the failure of tradi' tional leftist theorists to engage in localized social resistance and has stemmed from, in part, a bifurcation between academic and nonacademic research, a dichotomy rejected in this book. In rejecting this conceptu­ ahzation as anachronistic for contemporary scholarship in the Speech Communication Association (SCA), I advocate a more "irorust" view of disciplinary practice that approaches academic discourse as an inter­ change between a society's needs and our professional expertise. Al­ though I have limited my discussion in this project to specific claims and examples focusing on the Speech Communication Association, my study, nevertheless, has wider implications for all disciplines in the humanities. Specifically, I argue that sά\oL·rs in our disctpiine havt both the obligaticn ana the ahiUcj to work touiara the conMtim of a radical democracy in the United States. As Frank Lentricchia (1985) explains, "Ruling culture does not define the whole of culture, though it tries to, and it is the task of the oppositional critic to re-read culture so as to amplify and strategically position the marginalized voices of the ruled, exploited, oppressed, and excluded" (p. 15). In particular, by critiquing the discourse and cultural practices normalizing human suffering and alienation, scholars can con­

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CONDUCTING SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE RESEARCH

tribute to the formation of a wider democratic consciousness in American society. The basis for such a critique derives from the assumption that the inequities and limitations of our current democracy are mystified through rhetorical and ideological strategies (McGee, 1980). To the extent that this assumption is valid, it logically follows that a critique of this mystifi­ cation can open up possible avenues of change. Moreover, our training as rhetorical scholars places us in instrumental positions to illustrate how the symbolic constructions of our society are reified in ways interfering with the establishment of a socially pervasive democracy. As a professional in our discipline, I personally accept responsibility for this type of social critique and offer this book as evidence that such a critique is feasible within our scholarship. However, in order for such a perspective to be effective on a larger scale, I further contend that an increased space in our discipline needs to be set aside for the academic practice I encourage. In supplementing our scholarship, rhetoricians can learn to question and critique the antidemocratic beliefs, assumptions, and practices interfering with a more liberal and compassionate society. Prac­ tically speaking, such scholarship de-emphasizes "theory construction" as the normative goal for our professional practices and places a greater emphasis on disseminating a sociopolitical critique in outlets designed to reach an audience wider in scope than that of our current journals. As Philip Wander and Steven Jenkins (1972) explain, "If the critic is willing to speak of things outside the language of his [or her] essay and beyond the academic boundaries of criticism, he [or she] becomes less a role player and more of a human being" (p. 446). Thus my argument for a disciplinary praxis is situated in my desire to expand our professional horimns, encom­ passing a wider view of what qualifies as "acceptable" scholarship.' The object of resistance I articulate involves a localized response to conformity, fear, alienation, and similar problems associated with what I call "epistemological totalitarianism." I define epistemological totalitari­ anism as the practice of professionalization in which intellectuals use assumptions of "power" and "knowledge" to centralize truth in a priori postulates and defend those postulates by marginalizing opposing or con­ trary ideas. For example, the belief that scholarship is only "valid" if it produces value-free statements describing a mind-independent empirical world involves an instance of epistemological totalitarianism. Another example is the belief that the primary audience for academic research is a body of like-minded peers; both of these beliefs marginalize to the frir\ges of academia any research failing to honor the above two disciplinary

Praxis in Disciplinary Schohrship

norms. Within the conditions of the broader and larger social realm, epistemological totalitarianism involves cultural practices commodifing experience and creating a caste system in which human beings are assigned different worth based upon their relative proximity to ahistorical assump­ tions of "truth." I advocate resistance to the nascent tendencies in all disciplinary practices to promote and practice a totalitarian control of knowledge. Key characteristics of this intellectual hegemony are foundationalism and antihistoricism. Toward the "end" of my resistance and redescription, I question the desirability of maintaining what is recognized as systemically constructed disciplinary assumptions. I define "systemic" scholarship in this book as any intellectual or professional inquiry grounding its appeal or claims of validity in a project of transcendence or universal commensuration. In other words, systemic scholarship in our field involves a type of writing requiring as its goal "closed-" rather than "open-" ended statements about human communi­ cation. Such approaches to knowledge ignore the issue of human contin­ gency and plurahty in our assumptions of "knowledge" (Rorty, 1979). For instance, a reliance on disciplinary professionalism, absolutism, essential­ ism, and philosophical objectivism downplays the implications that "power" and "knowledge" have for human beings. Within an academic community such as ours, systemic inquiry generates governing first principles delineating the parameters of our scholarship. In its most functional sense, systemic scholarship provides a discipline with both boundaries and a stock set of axioms by which to "ground" disciplinary assumptions of "knowledge." Though necessary and functional at one level, systemic categories and assumptions frequently, on another level, become reified as ontological phenomena. When systemic categories be­ come dogma, as in the traditional neo-Aristotelian preoccupation with "effect" (Black, 1965), inflexible foundations are established that stymie scholarship. In other words, by postulating truth in claims of "fact," rather than in claims of "value," much systemic knowledge appeals to a justifi­ cation within metaphysics. T h e problem with ontological approaches to knowledge is that such approaches prescribe "reality" in terms limiting the potential for human beings to modify their world. Thus, systemic knowledge frequently champions the conditions of the status quo (Kuhn, 1970). In challenging systemic knowledge to be more sensitive to the needs of a larger society, I encourage rhetoricians to adopt the following claim:

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CONDUCTING SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE RESEARCH

Scholarship should serve as a revolutionary "tool" and seek as its "end" a cultural condition reducing marginality and human suffering. In asserting this claim, I recognize that it can only be warranted through an appeal to the "foundational" belief that human solidarity is an unqualified virtue. In light of the paradox existing between my antifoundationalist position in this book and my necessary use of foundations to justify my liberal persona, I offer the foUowiiig stipulation: When given a choice between two actions, the one better promoting human solidarity is the valued act. I cannot further argue for this position, it is an axiomatic condition of my research. As such, I "ground" this assertion in my belief that the role of knowledge in human culture serves the utilitarian interests of society. These beliefs underlie all of my subsequent argumentation. In this book, I do not suggest that all the limitations o f our discipline or of society can be solved through a critique of totalitarian knowledge assumptions. Rather, by arguing for a greater social vitality among schol­ ars of rhetorical studies, I provide a rationale for politicizing intellec­ tuals who desire to introduce liberal and political concerns into aca­ demic scholarship. In response to Russell Jacoby's (1987) study of the faltering American academic and political "Left," I refocus my professional life so as to escape from the confines of self-centered concerns. According to Jacoby, liberal American intellectuals are disengaged from practical politics, having substituted disciplinary politics and professional advance­ ment for social change: That it is difficult for an educated adult American to name a single political scientist or sociologist or philosopher is not wholly his or her fault; the professionals have abandoned the public arena. The influx of left scholars has not changed the picture; reluctantly or enthusiastically they gained respectability at the cost of identity. (1987, p. 190) Specifically, Jacoby explains how radical politics and social critique have regressed into "careerism" and "the fetishism of theory" (p. 173). With Jacoby, I lament this condition and offer an alternative critical persona, one directing the work of leftist academicians back into the public sphere. My argument in this chapter on behalf of an increased leftist persona in disciplinary scholarship is organized in the following fashion. First, I maintain that critical theory provides a rich literature by which the cultural processes of mystification and reification can be interpreted in a rhetorical light. Second, after situating rhetorical studies within the frame­

Praxis in Disciplinary

Schohrship

work of critical theory, I broaden my methodological approach to include the perspectives of Richard Rorty. Because critical theory, itself, suffers from the limitations of essentializing thought, a neo'pragmatist perspec­ tive serves as a "correctional device." Specifically, I maintain that critical theory, when approached from an "ironist" perspective, can be tempered from its tendency to overextend itself with an essentialist, philosophical, and academic language. Rhetoric, Critical Theory, and the Possibility for Social Change In this section, I argue that the struggle against totalitarian thought in the daily activities of American life should not remain separate from the struggle in academia to produce socially meaningful scholarship. Specifi­ cally, the study of rhetoric invites the opportunity for social change. In the following sections, I further develop the above claim by arguing: (a) the contribution of critical theory to rhetorical studies bridges the gap between "theory" and "practice" in our discipline, (b) the potential for critical response to Western or American social practices is clear when knowledge is approached sociologically, and (c) the need for localized resistance exists on a pragmatic and human level. In addition to these arguments, I develop and qualify the assumptions of my neo-pragmatic "foundations" and submit that these assumptions are necessary (even in light of my larger, antifoundationalist positions). The Contribution of Critical Theory to Rhetorical Studies Critical theory can contribute to rhetorical studies in the following two ways. First, critical theory is a heuristic for aiding disciplines such as ours in the struggle for social influence. Second, critical theory helps rhetorical scholars to consider alternatives to the contemporary manifestations of society. As per my first argument, the struggle of the humanities is the struggle for cultural influence and social redescription (Wander, 1983, 1993). For example, Philip Wander (1990) charges rhetorical scholars with discover­ ing ways to "sustain political activity when traditional politics becomes irrelevant, dominated by economic interests, or otherwise unresponsive to long term, life-and-death issues" (p. 278). The precedent for this assertion

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CONDUCTING SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE RESEARCH

comes from critical theory. More than 60 years ago, a group of scholars gathered in Germany to study and formulate a response to the social challenges of the 20th century Qay, 1973). Their response, and the tradition established through the succeeding three generations, has a special relationship to the perspectives, goals, and values of contemporary rhetorical scholarship. As Stanley Aronowitz (1992) explains, "[C]ritical theory proceeds from the theorist's awareness of his [or her] own partiality. Thus theory is neither neutral nor objective. Its partisanship consists in its goals" (p. xiv). Scholars who adopt the disciplinary assumptions I am promoting work from the same perspectives as the critical theorists: Ideas are not neutral— as ideas permeate society, they engage in ideological work. In tracing these ideas, scholars can explore the symbiotic relationship among values, discourse, and culture. For example, an area of rhetorical analysis that may be considered "ripe" for an increased critical and disciplinary scholarship involves the American political and economic system. While this system has great value as a 20th-century ideology and practice, it should not be considered the "final" word concerning the "reasonableness" of our social institutions; there remains room for alternative thirJcing to improve the quality of American life. A critical analysis, one informed by our disciplinary attention, has much to offer the liberal attempt to promote ways in which more people in this country can enjoy the promises and privileges of American society. By remaining sensitive to the way social influence is constructed through lan­ guage, scholars of rhetoric can chart the contemporary articulations of modem "power" and "knowledge" that have the deleterious effect of making people alienated and afraid. In particular, scholars of rhetoric can describe the discursive regimes calling alienation and fear into existence and granting such phenomena a resonance and significance in our cultural practices. However, this critical work is not best accomplished by a few scholars working in relative isolation from each other and from the larger needs of society. In other words, I believe that the rhetorical and critical analysis o f American culture is a project requiring an involved disciplinary commit­ ment and program of action, one breaking from the false dichotomy between academic ("serious") and nonacademic ("popular") intellectual activity. In short, many of the problems facing our disciplinary work as rhetoricians are not "merely" academic; they are cultural, political, and social and demand cultural, political, and social responses. These re­ sponses can be pragmatically generated when a sustained and collective

Praxis in Disciplinary

Scholarship

critical effort, like the original effort of the Frankfurt School, is commis­ sioned by the political and financial interests underwriting our professional practices. In other words, for scholars to occupy the space in which to engage in poUtical work, a larger cultural commitment on behalf of our professional organization would make our social obligations all the more easier to meet. Formally speaking, critical theory involves a type of Marxist critique— one, historically, opposing the excesses of "fascist" and "capitalist" cultural practices. More specifically, from their early writings in the 1920s, critical theorists have concerned themselves with the phenomenon that I have termed in this book as "epistemological totalitarianism." Yet because epistemological totalitarianism is an amorphous concept, it cannot be unqualifiedly situated in global concepts such as fascism, capitalism, and certain forms of Marxism. For instance, in the later writings of the critical theorists, overt condemnations of capitalism (as well as their generalized support for Soviet Marxism) gave way to a more localized critique of the media and of other cultural industries promoting the limitations of thought and the virtues of conformity (for a collection of readings that range the breadth of critical theory, see Bronner & Kellner, 1989a). In short, critical theory, in both its "vulgar" and more sophisticated forms, has always been applied to attack the ideology and values supporting and promoting the inequities of the status quo. As Bronner and Kellner (1989b) explain, " [CJritical theory is not a single doctrine or unified worldview. Instead, it is a set of basic insights and perspectives which undermine existing 'truths' even as they foster the need for a theory of society that remains to be completed" (p. 3 ) . From my point of view, for professional rhetorical theorists to politicize their work and gain influence in nonacademic circles, the work of critical theorists represents a valuable literature. Critical theory, however, has its limitations. For instance, the language of critical theory is suspect for its essentializations and over-generalizations—particularly in light o f a more sophisticated, poststructuralist vocabulary and corresponding critique of Marxist essentialism (Best & Kellner, 1991, pp. 215-255). This valuable criticism remains an issue in any utilization of critical theory. I believe, however, it is also the case that the fundamental concepts and arguments of critical theory, far from being "anachronistic" and "sloganeering," can still be considered heuristic perspectives. In adopting such perspectives, rhetorical scholars can engage in a larger social critique of cultural and ideological practices.

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CONDUCTING SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE RESEARCH

Thus, rhetorical scholars may still find it beneficial for their research, if not culturally pressing, to discuss the abuses o f "capitalism" (or o f an American ideology) in its relationship to wider cultural, linguistic, and epistemological practices. Furthermore, a critique of capitalism as a reso­ nant, hegemonic meta-narrative, one sanctioning undesirable power/ knowledge relationships through its various manifestatioiu, can be accom­ plished in meaningful ways that do not unnecessarily essentialize the concept (an example of this is Gitlin, 1986). In addition, such a position does not force scholars to embrace an extreme Marxist orientation. More specifically, I recognize that capitalism, itself, has no essence, and I, likewise, recognize that political tensions in the West have necessitated the modification of the "free" market economy to be more or less sensitive to certain portions o f the human population. It is because o f this modifi­ cation that the subsequent Marxist response to capitalism must also be modified—made to be more dialectical and rhetorical. However, while there is no "pure" or singular form of capitalism for Marxist scholars to resist, and while the First World bourgeois nations all engage in different economic relationships with each other and with their citizens, there is, nevertheless, still the practice of privileging "private property" at the expense of individual liberty and the practice of a wage slavery that physically and spiritually impoverishes the vast majority of the working class in this country, as well as their dependents. The above practices are exemplified to various degrees in the legal infrastructures of the many different First World bourgeois governments. As Walter Benjamin (1978) explains, "Lawmakiivg is power making and, to that extent, an immediate manifestation of violence" (p. 295). In short, capitalist societies, though each individual and unique, are structured on a system of legal relationships punishing the propertyless and the socially weak (cf. Marcuse, 1969, pp. 70-72). Such relationships are, in my opinion, deplorable. Furthermore, such cultural practices are not conducive to an increased social solidarity in the United States. However, I recognize that this privileging of the rich, and the margitutlization of the poor, is not unique to American society. What is more or less original to the contemporary political contit\gencies of Western, and particularly of American, culture is the fact that institutional practices of social inequity are supported in large part by rhetorical, rather than military, means. I do not suggest that physical repression is not a reaUty in American life as it is elsewhere; rather, I only intend to indicate that the potential for peaceful redescription and change is greater in American society than in many

Praxis in Disciplinary

Schohrship

non-Western societies. America, unlike a country such as contemporary Iran, has a legal and political infrastructure and a social tradition in place that could enable a radically democratic experience to emerge if the people of this country committed themselves toward this end. In this sense, rhetorical scholars have a special responsibility for illustrating to others how rhetorical tensions mediate the way people think, feel, and interact within society. This responsibility is situated in the neO'pragmatist chal­ lenge for intellectuals to lead society in exploring new avenues of self-re­ description. As per my second argument in this section, the literature of critical theory helps scholars in our discipline to historicize the cultural manifes­ tations of "capitalism" and "epistemological totalitarianism" and to ex­ plore the material relationships between the two. For instance, while totalitarian thinking may not be limited to the conditions of a 20th-century economic realm, there are certainly enough conceptual and historical relationships between economics and oppressive behavior to speak of them together (Beaud, 1983). Furthermore, although the "evils" of the world cannot be reduced to the problems exemplified by totalitarian and capi­ talist thinking, it might constitute a productive cultural activity to con­ sider other ways of describing a Western existence. This is one area in which various dimensions of rhetorical theory and criticism have utility in enabling people to redescribe their lives; such themes and critical practices repeatedly appear among a diverse range of socially concerned writers, including, but not limited to, Kenneth Burke (1935/1984b), Herbert Marcuse (1964), Laclau and Mouffe (1985), Noam Chomsky (1989), and Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari (1983). As an example of how the above sentiments relate to our contemporary existence as American citizens, consider the following passage from Marcuse (1964). In his discussion of contemporary capitalist society, a discerning critic can begin to appreciate some of the ideological conditions that may have existed in militaristic and anti-Semitic Nazi Germany: [T]he risk of avoidable, man-made destruction has become normal equip­ ment in the mental as well as material household of the people, so that it can no longer serve to indict or refute the established social system. Moreover, as part of their daily household, it may even tie them to this system. The economic and political connection between the absolute enemy and the high standard of living . . . is transparent enough, but also rational enough to be accepted, (p. 79)

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CONDUCTING SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE RESEARCH

Thus, while there is a tendency to overgeneralize between systems of totalizing thought and the practice of a capitalist economy, and while there is a tendency among critical theorists to be overly negative toward capi­ talism (nowhere, to my knowledge, in the Hterature of critical theory do theorists refer to the "benefits" of capitalism), a continuing critique of a capitalist ideology is worthy of further contemplation (especially by schol­ ars who, themselves, may actually be benefiting firom our current socio­ economic hierarchy). In freeing ourselves to examine our own practices and privileges critically, we can contribute our expertise and skill to the larger struggle for a politics extending the privileges we enjoy as professors through a larger and more diverse range of the American population. More substantially, even if the critical theorists are only half correct in their denunciation of American totalitarian thinking and hegemonic cultural practice—even if I am only partially accurate in suggesting that contemporary articulations of epistemological totalitarianism are a "threat" to human solidarity—then a critical "spin" on capitalism as a rationality is justified for practitioners of rhetorical theory. In short, as long as the cultural dialogue and socio-practices known as "capitalism" exist in their more or less contemporary manifestations, that is, as long as this nation and others continue to privilege "private property" over the basic needs of people, then rhetorical processes will be utilized to maintain cooperation and "order" among the disenfranchised. Writing from the point of view of "identification," Burke (1969b) explains, "Over and above all the qualifi­ cations, mysury is equated with class distinctions" (p. 122). Because the disenfranchised do not necessarily see their interests as being met by the national government, they must be "persuaded" to support governmental policies perpetuating their social and economic inequity. By critiquing the mystification of the status quo, our work can be situated in popular treatises and publications explaining in easy-to-follow terms how the rhetoric of marginalization and the dogma of placation work to subvert the experience of a socialist society. Found in the literature of critical theory is a standing critique of totalitarian thought, articulated in light of its bourgeois and capitalist manifestations (to this we can add a similar critique of Soviet articulatiotis, e.g., Marcuse, 1958). This condemnation of totalitarian thought gives the Frankfurt School its distinguishing characteristics and separates it from all other research institutions in Europe and America; this critique also gives the Frankfurt School its lasting cultural and social significance. As critical

Praxis in Disciplinary Schohrship

11

theorists have pointed out, there are subtle as well as obvious similarities existing between totalitarian societies, such as Nazi Germany and fascist Italy, on the one hand, and bourgeois societies, such as the United States and Great Britain, on the other. The relationship is most obvious with regard to U.S. imperialism and to its foreign policy generally (Beaud, 1983; Chomsky, 1987), yet it is no less evident with regard to the condition o f minorities and the working class in this country (Zinn, 1980). In sum, the critical theorists have concluded that, contrary to the official propaganda of bourgeois societies, the differences between totali­ tarian culture and capitalist culture are but differences in degree, not in kind Oay, 1973, p. 70). Specifically, Horkheimer (1938/1989) argues, " [T]he totalitarian order differs from its bourgeois predecessor only in that it has lost its inhibitions" (p. 78). Recognizing the similarities between the two societies is a perspective that can enhance rhetorical studies by infusing our theoretical maturity with a political setisitivity. Although capitalism has proven itself, until now, to be more resilient than many Marxist theorists in the 1920s and 1930s had anticipated, and although it has adapted to various critiques and weaknesses, capitalist governments continue to undermine democratic consciousness around the globe (Chomsky, 1992). On a general level, this can be seen in the U.S. support for right-wing fascist dictatorships in South and Central America, as well as in Asia (Chomsky, 1986, 1993a). More specifically, however, within American society itself the tensions between democracy and capitalism are disconcerting and threaten the domestic population with increased oppression (Gross, 1980). As reflected in our national policies and myths, the lit^uistic residues of these tetisions can be traced and situated in American behavior. Once isolated in social behavior, strategic resistance—informed by theory, compassion, and solidarity—can be offered in response. The Need for Critical Responses to Western or American Social Practices In this section, I develop two positions. First, as a result of certain cultural manifestations of totalitarian and oppressive practices, I maintain there is a clear need for intellectual and rhetorical resistance. From the practice of private property to the popular linguistic strategies denying or downplaying historical reasoning, totalitarian thought is pervasive in our

12

CONDUCTING SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE RESEARCH

society. Second, I argue that even though some critical theorists have overextended their analysis of certain cultural phenomena, such as the Western Enlightenment, critical theory constitutes a viable literature. As per my first argument, an excellent illustration of how rhetorical scholars can critically engage in the textual and totalitarian functions of capitalism derives from their colleagues in legal studies. In particular, the undemocratic experiences of a capitalist society creating victim/victimizing social and political relationships are documented by critical legal theorist Roberto Unger (1986). As part of his larger indictment of capitalism and capitalist legal consciousness, Unger argues that market economies threaten democratic experience in two ways. First, capitalism represents a microthreat to democracy by giving "the occupants of some fixed social stations the power to reduce the occupants of other social stations to dependence" (p. 33). Such power differentiae between the land-owning and the prop­ ertyless classes, coupled with increasingly higher rents and punitive lease arrangements, subjugate people by forcing them daily to confront a poten­ tial homelessness as well as a complete social and economic marginaliza­ tion. Second, capitalism poses a macro-threat to democracy "by allowing relatively small groups, in control of investment decisions, to have a decisive say over the conditions of collective prosperity or impoverish­ ment" (Unger, 1986, p. 33). In short, in the name of "democracy," people in this country become separated from their ability to control their lives. I believe that such marginalization is unfair, if only because it runs counter to America's commitment to the normative ideology of equality. Rhetorical scholars have much to learn from theorists such as Hork­ heimer and Unger. In particular, by addressing contemporary political issues, the manifestations of epistemological totalitarianism in Ameri­ can society can be mediated and perhaps "purified" of some of their more detrimental effects (Burke, 1945/1969a, p. 319). For example, the textu­ ality of the phenomenon known as "fascism" is derived through the solidification of class hostility, a hostility—grounded in the privilege of private property—producing a bourgeois stratification and social hierar­ chy. This hierarchy accentuates the privileges and deprivations already present in bourgeois society. Likewise, the textuality of other pressing cultural issues, such as sexual identity, abortion, drug legalization, health care, and Social Security, can be traced and presented in a public forum, one competing with the propaganda of the media industry for the imaginations of all Americans.

Praxis in Disciplinary Schohrship

13

As illustrated, the precedent for the "social" turn in rhetorical studies is found in critical theory. For example, Horkheimer (1938/1989) provides an interpretation of our bourgeois society, revealing the contours of a totalitarian and stifling consciousness. He explains how, under capitalism, "The masses, like children, are deluded: they believe that as independent subjects they have the freedom to choose the goods for themselves" (p. 79). Without evoking a discussion of "ideology" or getting into the issue of "true" versus "false" consciousness (see Eagleton, 1991), I feel that this is an important point that Horkheimer is making, one raising our attention with regard to the function of rhetoric in society. In short, Horkheimer illustrates how people in capitalist societies are taught that they are free and are encouraged to conceive of "freedom" in very specific, limited terms. Moreover, these terms are frequently defined in relationship to an elite segment of the American population. Specifically, the citizens of the United States are given the language, rather than the substance of freedom. The material substance behind their linguistic categories is frequently undefined and shifts to reflect the idi­ osyncrasies of American domestic and foreign policies. In Marcuse's words, Americans are heir to a functional language, one that is antihistorical and nondialectical; according to Marcuse (1964), "[OJperational rationality has little room and little use for historical reason" (p. 98). Because of this "rationality," Americans experience an unreflexive freedom, not a "false" consciousness. Within the condition of their pacified existence, Ameri­ cans frequently confuse "freedom" with "consumption." In failing to distinguish between "false consciousness" and an unre­ flexive existence, some critical theorists, especially Horkheimer, overex­ tend their analysis. Thus, as my second argument in this section, I believe that this overextension, while posing a serious limitation to critical analy­ sis, can be mediated against by the careful scholar. For example, a clearer example of this problem with critical theory derives from the tendency among critical theorists to engage in an essentialized language when critiquing the Western "Enlightenment." In their extreme analysis of the Enlightenment epistemology, Horkheimer and Adorno (1944/1993) ar­ gue, "Enlightenment is totalitarian" (p. 6 ) . In other words, Horkheimer and Adorno maintain that the knowledge and values of the "modern" age is somehow biased toward a renewed "barbarism." Douglas Kellner (1989) explains this basic hypothesis of critical theory in more detail:

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CONDUCTING SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE RESEARCH

Horkheimer and Adorno suggest that enlightenment thought moves natu­ rally firom being an instrument for the domination of nature to becoming an instrument for the domination of human beings, and that therefore there is a logical progression from the factory to the prisons to the concentration camps of the totally admiivistered society, (p. 99)

In other words, Horkheimer and Adorno see a "logic" in our social relationships, one leading away from the beneficence and solidarity of the original tribal community and toward a rationale for an increased aliena­ tion and destruction. More specifically, they maintain that, "{I]n the service of the present age, enlightenment becomes wholesale deception of the masses" (p. 42). Taken within the context of German National-Socialism to which Horkheimer and Adorno were responding with this claim, such a position is understandable. However, within the scope of my current project, I do not feel it necessary to defend such an extreme position (indeed, Hork­ heimer and Adorno's Marxism is also dependent upon the Enlightenment "project"). Horkheimer and Adorno unnecessarily essentialize the En­ lightenment and condemn it as if it were a single target that could be assessed and attacked for the abuses of the 20th century. Such a response, though perhaps inherently gratifying, is not productive of a rationale for mediating a more humanistic vocabulary with which to redescribe our current working political and professional relationships. Thus, in keepitig with the social goals of this project, as well as in honoring the practice of a localized resistance, the area of my analysis involves a critique of the professionalism associated with academic schol­ arship (for a similar study that focuses specifically on gender issues, see Blair, Brown, & Baxter, 1994). This professionalism, defined as a preoccu­ pation with the internal standards of a linguistic and ideological commu­ nity existing at the expense of other more pluralistic communities, assumes exclusive presumptions of "knowledge" and "truth" and positions private interests in relationship to those presumptions. Professionalism privileges the knowledge of a small, inclusive community of like-minded ideologues over the knowledge of a larger, more popularly based and democratic social community. In short, any strategic and successful resistance to epistemo­ logical totalitarianism (in this case, the institutional dogma implicit in traditional academic conceptions of knowledge) must be empowered to undermine certain detrimental assumptions characterizing the condition of our professional identities.

Praxis in Disciplinary Schohrship

15

By employing resistance to the above beliefs, rhetorical critics and theorists can be free to operate in accordance with more socially situated systems of disciplinary rationales and behaviors. Rather than guiding our academic work toward the interests of self-contained disciplinary agendas, these newly defined rationales can help direct some scholars to work toward the interest of relieving human suffering in the everyday world. This statement is another example of my axiomatic values: At its core, a redescribed disciplinary practice honors human solidarity as the ultiniiate goal of responsible scholarship. The above discussion is important for situating my study of current disciplinary practices in two ways. First, by recognizing the historical and definitional contingency of all contemporary manifestations of capitalism, I have de-essentialized the object of my study and have situated it and my subsequent response in a disciplinary rationale for localized mediation. Second, by recognizing the oppressive tensions permeating bourgeois society and pressuring human relationships, I encourage disciplinary in­ terest in critical and social perspectives. Once our perceptions of society grow to include a recognition that aggregations of interrelated ideological conditions position certain power relationships upon the social body in significantly harmful ways, then localized strategies of resistance to these relationships can be formulated. Just as the perspectives of Rorty can be used to temper the essentialist claims of critical theory, the perspectives of Michel Foucault can likewise be used to help critical theorists refocus their often grand analyses into more specific areas of critique.

The Need for Localized

Resistance

Although the need for response to Western and American cultural practices is clear, it is equally clear that the application of resistance can be most effective at the localized level. As Foucault (1980) explains:

One needs to investigate historically, and beginning from the lowest level, how mechanisms of power have been able to function. In regard to the confinement of the insane, for example, of the repression and interdiction of sexuality, we need to see the manner in which, at the effective level of the family, of the immediate environment, of the cells and most basic units of society, these phenomena of repression or exclusion possessed their instruments and their logic, in response to a certain number of needs, (p. 100)

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CONDUCTING SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE RESEARCH

Specifically, I advocate in this section that schokrs embrace Foucauk's rwtion and practice of "localized resistance." In so doing scholars can develop a social critique that is both socialistic and value-orientated. Foucauk's notion of "localized resistance," a function of praxis-informed critique exemplified repeatedly throughout the corpus of his work as a theorist and political activist, is a central and practical concern in this book. As a result, my argument for a socially engaged program of rhetorical studies takes seriously Foucault's (1980) statement of a strategic and praxis-informed critique of society: The role of theory today seems to me to be just this: not to formulate the global systematic theory which holds everything in place, but to analyse the specificity of mechatusms of power, to locate the connections and exten­ sions, to build little by little a strategic knowledge, (p. 145) The knowledge built with a critical scholarship is not politically innocent or ideologically neutral. This critique is "leftist" in value-orientation. It extends from the premise that power needs to be resisted where it is most productive of antisocial conditions. In other words, as Foucault (1984) explains, "Knowledge is not made for understanding, it is made for cutting" (p. 8 8 ) ; it is at once purposeful and strategic. In this sense, the critical theorist is a social surgeon, a doctor of the authoritarian disease afflicting the modern polls. By taking critical theory, Foucault, and Rorty as models for my theo­ retical apparatus, I can approach the neo-pragmatic critique of "power" and "knowledge" as a means for overcoming the limitations of our disci­ plinary systemic discourses. Thus, by encouraging people to adopt more edifying descriptions of human communities, ones that exist in peace and prosperity, a newly redescribed collectivity of rhetorical scholars can assist the academy in disengaging professionalism from its grounding rationale in "philosophical objectivity" (Megill, 1991) and resituate professional academic practices more concretely within the wider human social com­ munity. More specifically, my study explores how, within our contempo­ rary society, the threat of epistemological totalitarianism, at least at some level, has been internalized within the practices of the educated class—the doctors, the lawyers, the professors—the individuals who generate and validate knowledge in American society. These intellectuals, particularly those identified as "rhetorical scholars," are the target audience of this book.

Praxis in Discipliruiry SchoL·rship

17

Two major events from recent history illustrate how educated people in modern society could have taken great responsibility for the social prac­ tices and discourses of their culture. In both historical instances, scholars of rhetorical theory and criticism, by paying special attention to the language of justification and margiruilization, could have taught others to resist the totalizing thought encouraging the destruction of entire nations. In particular, the historical instances of the German Holocaust of the Jews and the American genocide of the Vietnamese people provide telling examples of how epistemological totalitarianism permeates the thinking of many intellectuals and professionals, people who, through action or inaction, make tangible differences in the lives of others. In the first example, the German extermination policy, leading to the murder of six million Jews, was explicitly articulated on January 20, 1942, in a small Wannsee villa outside of Berlin. A dozen high-ranking Nazi officials convened at this location to work through the significant techni­ cal problems of implementing genocide. Minutes from this meeting, re­ corded in the War\r\see ProtoL·ll (reprinted in United States, 1992), reveal that the Holocaust was authored by a small number of German intellec­ tuals, eight of whom held doctorates. In addition, a significantly larger number of intellectuals and professionals played important roles in the actualization of the Holocaust and in its day-to-day bureaucratic and financial existence. In the Nazi extermirution camps, for example, doc­ tors, trained at the best medical universities of the world, supervised the experimentation and extermination practices against the Jews (Lifton, 1986). With reference to the Nazi system of slavery and medical experimenta­ tion, Peter Padfield (1991) observes how, far from being skeptical and questioning of the Nazi extermination polic^, thousands of German intel­ lectuals and professionals embraced the opportunity to gain a personal advantage: When established there had been no lack of professors and medical doctors eager to take advantage of the facilities [the camps] offered, no lack of industrialists wishing to employ his slave labor. The list of factories estab­ lished close by concentration camps reads like a roll call of big business, (p. 552)

As the above example suggests, a significant portion of the German people were guilty of authorizing the death camps, thereby placing their personal and national interests in direct opposition to the existence of the Jewish

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people. T h e mechanics and economics of the death camps, alone, not to mention the slave labor and industry associated with the camps, made knowledge of the Holocaust pervasive throughout German society. Thus, while all acquiescing Germans must bear responsibility for the crime and destruction of Hirier's regime, I believe that the educated and professional Germans, as a class, deserve special condemnation for their failure to respond more critically and selflessly to the threat of National-Socialism. Although the Nazis relied on force and coercion, they also relied on their intellectuals to internalize Nazi dogma and sanction it as knowledge (see, e.g., Heidegger, 1965, and Sluga's, 1993, response to German philosophy during this era). In a similar way, our professional class is charged with internalizing the values and norms of our society and translating them into statements of "knowledge" and "truth." Within the arena of this profes­ sional activity, rhetorical scholars can learn to embody a viable critical persona, one questioning the contemporary reification of a society's beliefs and the oppressive policies to which such beliefs often contribute. In the second example, the American defense industry is also managed, at the level of policy, by professionally educated and intellectual people— that is, people formally trained according to the standards of disciplinary thought, people who have gone through a primary and secondary educa­ tional system, not to mention a university system encouraging them to read, write, and think critically. These intellectuals, individual men and women who ought to know the difference between the constructive and destructive uses of technology, have authorized and constructed an amaz­ ing array of weapons and policies instrumental for the murder of nullions of Vietnamese men, women, and children (see Chapter 4 ) . Using his typically poignant skills of observation, Kenneth Burke (1982) aptly sums up this phenomenon: An overwhelming amount of the damage done by our ingenious, spendthrift modern weaponry in Vietnam was made possible by humble, orderly, obe­ dient, peacefully behaving job-holders, who raise their families in the quiet suburbs, and perhaps do not even spank their children, (p. 41) Such moral cowardice (as the above) will not disappear merely because Speech Communication professors engage in its critique. However, the question of a redefined approach to rhetorical studies has great potential in helping more people become aware of the discrepancy existing between, on the one hand, the seemingly moral arguments of our bureaucrats.

Praxis in Disciplinary Scholarship

19

technicians, and administrators, and, on the other, the deleterious and immoral effects of their actions. What U.S. president, for example, appears immoral to the American people when he argues in defetue of a military invasion? (cf. Ivie, 1974). This is the level at which rhetorical studies can be most socially applicable to the daily lives of other people; rhetorical studies can be used, in the words of Foucault (1983), to chart and resist "all varieties of fascism, firom the enormous ones that surround and crush us to the petty ones that constitute the tyrannical bitterness of our everyday lives" (p. xiv). Thus, a redefined disciplinary practice can be a way of reminding ourselves that a resistance to systemic discourse func­ tions as a primary defense against a stultifying and oppressive world, one that, in the words of both Rorty and Burke, needs to be "poeticized" rather than "rationalized" or "scientized." The implications of what I have identified as the "social turn" in higher education should be clear for any nation, like the United States, hoping to retain its domestic social and poUtical vitaUty in the turbulent century to come. Specifically, the United States should be especially forewarned and careful as it continues to make the transition from a "cold war" to a "post-cold war" rationale and political stance. From the perspective of rhetorical theory, the United States is in danger of "losing" the cold war if the people of this nation view its victory over the Soviet Union as a confirmation of bourgeois liberalism and free market economics. In a sense, the Russian people are ascending to a higher moral ground in the global conflict of ideologies. To the extent that Russia is about to experi­ ment with more avenues of epistemological flexibility and redescription, the Russian peoples will continue to mature and develop. That a signifi­ cant number of intellectuals in the United States have not taken a similar initiative in articulating new avenues for national and individual selfdescription is the impetus for my study and the "foundation" of my concern.

Qualifyir\g the Positicms of My NeO'Pragmatist Assumptions Although I consider myself an antifoundationalist, certain of my beliefs are so important to this project that I consider them as "temporary foundations." Although these beliefs are contingent and open to redescrip­ tion, I find such revision difficult to imagine at this time. Specifically, the following neo-pragmatist assumptions guide my call for a redescribed

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disciplinary practice: (a) All knowledge is socially constructed and ideo­ logically mediated (Gergen, 1985). Under this assumption, knowledge can be remade and reorganized based upon the redefinition of some of our disciplinary work and the redescription of our professional identities, (b) In whatever capacity they work, scholars, self-consciously or not, argue for a particular worldview that becomes reified within the specificity of their working assumptions of "truth" (Burke, 1935/1984b). As examples in the previous paragraphs illustrate, intellectuals are often spokespersons or apologists for a political order; the knowledge they espouse serves some particular interests, and not others. Their speech confirms, or resists, the dominant political epistemology of their time. In particular, I personally believe in and advocate socialism as a way to actualize a radical democracy in the United States. My passionate, yet contingent belief in the virtues of a socialist community underscores many of the arguments I defend in this project, (c) With an increased "ironism," the constraints and limitations of all "truth" claims can become a text upon which strategies of renego­ tiation and redescription can be situated (Rorty, 1989). In privileging the condition of ironism in this book, I do not mean to imply that ironism necessarily leads to social redescription and kindness, nor do I intend to imply that human kindness and social solidarity are dependent upon the condition of an increased ironism. As Rorty (1989) admits, ironists can be tyrants. The point, however, is that whereas an increased ironism may not be enough in itself to open our discipline to the possibility of a larger social impact, such ironism is a precious start in that direction. By viewing "truth" ironically, scholars in our field may recognize that society itself constitutes an interestitvg "text" we can help author. Although an ironist redescription of rhetorical studies cannot make the disinterested scholar care about the social implications of his or her research, it can empower the more socially conscious among us by supply­ ing a rationale for social action as well as further conceptual, academic, and political space in which to work. For example, what Foucault has done for psychology, crimiial justice, and health care, what Rorty has done for philosophy and literature, what Unger has done for law, and what Giroux has done for education is to break from the traditional restraints prevent­ ing practitioners of each profession from engaging in more meaningful selfand social redescription. In each instance of the above, the writers men­ tioned have greatly opened a wider field of social practices to professional response, critique and redescription.

Praxis in Disciplinary SchoL·rship

21

METHODOLOGICAL/

THEORETICAL ASSUMPTIONS

In this section I develop in greater detail the methodological and theoretical assumptions underlying my critical rhetoric Specifically, I explain that the methodological issues I raise in this study involve a "critical teleology." In developing this argument, in the following sections, I expand on the social and practical implications of this "methodology" for rhetorical studies and illustrate its relationship to critical theory, Foucault, and neo-pragmatism. Specifically, I maintain that a teleological approach to scholarship applies Marxist, Rortian, and Foucaultian perspectives to the analysis of hegemonic social discourses at the level of their past, present, and potentially future contingencies. Rhetorical Praxis as Teleological Study A teleological approach to rhetorical studies engages in society at the level of potentialities. For instance, present-day discourses are potentially dangerous in the fiiture and present-day resistances are potentially effec­ tive in mediating the deleterious effects of future contingencies. In devel­ oping the claim that rhetorical scholars can engage in the potentialities of hegemonic discourses and its resistance, I argue there is an important relationship between a critical teleology and Foucault's archeological and genealogical "methods." In addition, I submit that a teleological scholar­ ship challenges the calcification of our social institutions. By engaging in this analysis, I take the opportunity to compare the "methods" of my teleological praxis with those of traditional and social scientific methods and validate my concern for a revolutionary political and professional agenda. The disciplinary practice I urge others to consider fijnctions as a teleological scholarship in the sense that it reflects the methodological inverse of Foucault's archeological and genealogical "methods." For exam­ ple, Foucault (1972) explains his approach to interpreting a text as a way of uncovering "the principles and consequences of an autochthonous transformation that is taking place in the field of historical knowledge" (p. 1 5 ) . Utilizing this perspective, Foucault traces the formations of a cultural episteme in an effort to better understand the conditions of

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contemporary textuality. A teleology, as opposed to an archeology, traces the tentacles of power implicitly stemming from a cultural episteme and projects this power into the future where, after all, criticism seeks its influence. While critical scholars cannot predict the friture, they can read the narrative of the past in light of present contingencies. Based on these contingencies, and in accordance with certain logological tendencies located within a particular text, scholars can anticipate future circum­ stance. In this way, scholars are positioned to trace the rhetorical and ideological appeals of the present into the future and mediate against their potential deleterious effects. These teleological studies are all the more easy to produce because, based on Foucault's work and the work of others in this area of inquiry, scholars have demonstrated that the great bulk of the beliefs people hold with regard to knowledge have linguistic, rather than ontological, origins (e.g., Rorty, 1967). According to this position, traditional assumptions of "truth" are constructive of the thoughts and beUefs guiding the institutions and culture of Western civilization, and these assumptions are in the process o f being hisioricized (e.g., Foucault, 1965, 1973a, 1973b, 1978, 1979). By historicizing the ideas of the present, we can learn to understand the contingencies calling them into existence and project their future resilience based upon this analysis. In short, ideas have histories, and Foucault's practice of archeological and genealogical scholarship is a way of tracing the curves and ruptures of those histories. By introducing the above historical perspectives into the academic community, Foucault has provided a great service, one helping scholars to understand the present contingencies structuring current institutional "knowledge" as well as social "belief." As present ideas become histo­ ricized, contemporary knowledge and belief liquify. In this context, rather than becoming foundations of stone upon which to situate behavior, "knowledge" and "belief are gelatinous substances shaped by behavior. In other words, the person who controls societal behavior, controls that society's knowledge; the person who controls the language of a society controls societal behavior. As this control is calcified by social institutiotu, "domination" potentially becomes tyrannical. Resistance to this tyranny is an option because Foucault, as well as others, has helped scholars gain awareness of the axiological dimensions of "truth." Expanding on this idea, a teleological method of criticism encourages scholars in our discipline to engage in the struggle for the control of language by challenging corner­

Praxis in Disciplinary Scholarship

23

vative contingencies and textualities and by offering, instead, ones more responsive to a liberal social ideology. Toward the goal of a more socially beneficial scholarship, willing pro­ fessionals in our field can learn to apply theory, in this case a Marxistinformed critical neo-pragmatism, toward action. This new disciplinary practice is, itself, a rhetorical and critical response informed by a dialectical method of resistance to litiguistic social/political cues. Tangibly, I equate this redescribed aspect of traditional rhetorical scholarship with "method" because a critical turn in disciplinary practice involves the active process of systematically reclaiming the concept of "knowledge" for edifying use in the human community. Through a reconceptualized disciplinary praxis, involving revolutionary and socialized action, some of the problems plagu­ ing modern society can be attacked on the level of their rhetorical manifestations. To better understand the parameters of my study it is beneficial to maintain a less formalized and "modern" view of "method." For example, the method of my critically articulated professional scholarship involves the day-to-day activities in which concerned professionals help construct a world in which our social institutions are more sensitive to the needs of individuals. These activities, though directing scholars to question the reification of social "truth" and behavior marginalizing others, can be coordinated through a national program of concerted critical scholarship, contributing to extra-disciplinary social resistance. In other words, aspects of our new professional scholarship may include the traditional methods of rhetorical criticism and disciplinary theory, but our refocused scholar­ ship should remain flexible and not limited to these traditional methods and perspectives. In addition, a redefined disciplinary approach to schol­ arship utilizes the methods of cultural studies, but, again, it involves more than these perspectives (Turner, 1990). A critical turn in rhetorical studies offers a broader scope than those available under the traditional practices of our discipline because a "critical turn" utilizes the best insights from the once influential Marxist and neo-Marxist traditiot\s. In short, a rede­ scribed disciplinary scholarship involves neo-pragmatism in action—it keeps the cutting edge of Marxism without foundationalizing or over theorizing the objects of its critique or the avenues of its resistance. Having explicated the relationship between a critical teleology and Foucault and having commented upon how a critical teleology attacks the reification of social belief, I turn now to the relationship between the method of a teleological analysis and other, more traditional methods.

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CONDUCTING SOCIALLY RESPONSIBLE RESEARCH

The teleological view of a critical disciplinary method can be contrasted with the methods of traditional science and social science; the ends of the scientific methodology are different than what I have described above (Chaffee & Berger, 1987). Science seeks what it considers to be an "objective" knowledge, one removed from axiological or ideological di­ mensions. The methods of scientists are precise because their definition of knowledge is precise; "precision," however, is not always necessary for some claims. Thus, a critical perspective seeks to broaden the category of knowledge to make it more responsive to human values. Adding a social and neo-pragmatist perspective to our disciplinary practices (as tradition­ ally defined in relationship to the scientific model) helps scholars to recognize that "knowledge" also exists in the axiological and social realms. The methods of a redefined critical scholarship in our discipline are substantive in the sense that they are both an act and a way of acting, a policy as well as its implementation. These methods involve a commitment to social development and recognize that these assumptions are suspect for the contingent belief that a social solidarity has unqualified benefits. More specifically, a critical turn in disciplinary methodology is poised to answer the following professional question: How do we as scholars and teachers inco^orate a revolutionary agenda into our day-to-day research and teaching activities? In other words, when the distinction between theory and practice ceases to have the political resonance it currently holds, the question of "scholarship" becomes a question of "criticism," the "how" suggesting avenues for redescription and change. Toward the actualization of a critical rhetorical scholarship, one playing an important role in freeing human knowledge from the cot«traints of foundationalist thought, scholars in our discipline are encouraged to approach "theory," itself, as an instrumental tool for the increased liber­ alization of society. For instance, by challenging the traditional discourses limiting individuals to specific social roles, such as the traditions refraining professors from the public sphere (Aronowitz, 1992), a redefined discipli­ nary scholarship helps encourage our society to fijlftU its stated objectives of "openness," "fair play," and "equality." While the social world is fraught with an inequity deriving from the hierarchical structuring of symbol-use, and while critics cannot banish such hierarchy from society, criticism can challenge the explicit norms and assumptions of our national ideology to make more widespread its promises of human equality in law, employment, and housing (to name only a few examples).

Praxis in Disciplinary Scholarship

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Critical Teleology as a NeO'Pragmatist Activity 1 argue as my thesis in this section that the praxis of a critical teleology serves as an important neo-pragmatist activity in rhetorical scholarship. This claim is based on the assumption that a teleological turn in rhetorical studies serves as an affirmation of a democratic consciousness, one radi­ cally reconceptualizing the notion of "knowledge," and helping scholars to de-emphasize the importance of terms heavily associated with essen­ tialist notions. Last, the practice of a critical teleology serves as a neo­ pragmatist activity by providing rhetorical scholars with a "gaze" to cri­ tique the socially constructed institutions of our cultural knowledge. Seen from the point of view of the above thesis, the formation of a critical disciplirmry teleology offers pragmatic ways of encouraging scholars in our field to develop a program for critiquing the obstacles preventing others from participating democratically in the construction of their lives. Thus, in many important aspects, my goal for the critical and teleological turn in rhetorical studies coincides with the neo-pragmatist project Rorty (1989) develops in C(mtir\gency, Irony, and Solidarity. Similar to Rorty, I believe that, with an increased ironism throughout the sphere of profes­ sional and popular culture, "[T]he humiliation of human beings by other human beings may cease" (p. xv). Although I cannot speak for the disciplinary practices of communities outside of rhetorical studies, I do believe that members of our discipline can serve as a positive example of ironist scholarship and practice. In ways similar to Rorty's discussion of the discipline of philosophy, my idea of a redescribed discipUnary rhetorical practice questions the meta­ physical justifications of "knowledge" currently authorizing professional scholarly activity. Unlike Rorty, however, I do not replace the metaphysi­ cal justification of knowledge with bourgeois sentimentalities and ideal­ ism. More specifically, though I believe that Rorty's work is beneficial in illustrating to scholars how to change the subject of metaphysics, I also realize that Rorty's privileging of bourgeois culture represents a serious limitation of neo-pragmatism (West, 1989, pp. 204-210). As I mentioned earlier in this chapter, neo-pragmatism is used to help temper the overex­ tensions of critical theory. Yet here is an example in which critical theory can be used to temper the limitations of neo-pragmatism. For instance, when metaphysical discussions no longer maintain human interests, Intel­

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lectuaU in this country should, if they are to keep their scholarship free of contradictory or incompatible theoretical beliefs, also lose interest in privileging the primacy of democracy, iifceraiism, capitaUsm, and the free market. Antimetaphysical critical intellectuals should lose interest in privileg' ing the above terms because these words cannot be easily separated from the essentialist assertions that gave them cultural resonance. While the words themselves do not have any inherent meaning, they are situated, after nearly three centuries of use, in a particular reified web of metaphysi­ cal belief. Even though these words can be redefined in the interest of a critical rhetoric, it simply may not be worth the effort; it may be easier to develop a new language to describe more edifying social institutions encouraging solidarity and compassion. Such a language can best be constructed when scholars in our field gather and collectively challenge the popular usage of words, like those above, influenced by totalitarian social reasoning. Unfortunately, there is a sense in which Rorty still privileges terms that have not been sufficiently redefined, terms like those mentioned above, that mire his heuristic social critique. This is a fault frequently raised by Rorty's critics on the left (most notably by, Lentricchia, 1985, and Ross, 1992). As an example of the difficulties involved in keeping much of the language with which Rorty continues to work, consider the following dilemma scholars face when redefining old vocabularies to serve new conceptual and ideological tasks. On one level, the words democracy and liberalism represent the type of concepts that socially oriented intellectuals have tended to champion in the past. Indeed, on the most obvious level of my project, a critical approach to disciplinary scholarship seeks as its goal a more democratic and liberal society, one in which these words do not serve to champion a capitalist and free market ideology. With this end in mind I find that the words capitaUsm and free market ecorvmy represent cultural contingencies working against the interest of democratic and liberal articulations of human relationships and should, therefore, be resisted on both the macro- and micro-levels. In locating avenues for the increased democratization and liberalization of society, a socially viable approach to rhetorical studies can help inform these conditions through logological reflection. Such reflection, after all, is what rhetorical scholars are most effective at accomplishing. For exam­ ple, in the above four concepts—democracy, liberalism, capitalism, and free market economy—two represent the language of an increased solidar­

Praxis in Disciplinary Schohrship

27

ity, and two represent a threat to the cultivation of a society based on human solidarity. By distinguishirvg between vocabularies increasing the potential for human solidarity and vocabularies hindering our chances of being more culturally sensitive as a society, rhetorical theorists can con­ tribute much to the growing cultural concern for ethics and values in our society (Klumpp & HoUihan, 1989). In the above sense, a newly defined disciplinary practice involves the scholarship of influence and change. This scholarship is an affirmation of social responsibility and concern among rhetorical theorists who find themselves in positions to critique social manifestations of poUtical and economic discourse. As recent research by social constructionist scholars indicates, a diverse range of phenomenon, including sex, race, time, and space, can be historicized in light of social contingencies (JoneSi 1981; Latour & Woolgar, 1977; Tiefer, 1992). Until recently, the questioning of foundational discipUnary values has been precariously difficult under the political demands of the modern research institution. As Jacoby (1987) poignantly argues, "ProfessionaU­ zation has served as a refuge; it has also entailed a privatization that eviscerates academic freedom" (p. 126). Yet in recent years these condi­ tions have changed, somewhat, as the Marxist "threat" diminished and as an influx of leftists—in the absence of any other available occupational opportunity—^joined university faculties. Now, more than ever, research arguments critical of modern metaphysical assumptions have made it possible for scholars to question publicly the axiologies of the academy itself Although such perspectives have not always gone unpunished (Jacoby, 1987, pp. 136-139), an increased diversity of feminist and critical thought has leveled a suspicious gaze at an array of various social institu­ tions, leading scholars to engage in micro-level resistance at the level of the academy (e.g., Langland & Gore, 1983). Both Foucault and Rorty (as well as leading feminist theorists, in particular Carol Gilligan and Gerda Lerner) are among the most visible of scholars who encourage academi­ cians to continue with such work.

ORGANIZATION OF STUDY In this first chapter, I introduced the terrain of my study. I provided a broad review of the conceptual and theoretical materials I explicate later in more detail. More specifically, this first chapter clarifies the pursuit and

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parameters of a critical disciplinary scholarship in rhetorical studies. As a strategic response to epistemological totalitarianism—defined as the cen­ tralizing of power and knowledge in a priori postulates defended through oppression and marginalization—a critical turn in our scholarship works toward the socialization of knowledge and the situating of our professional "truths" within the context of a cultural critique. Similar to Rorty's appeal to philosophers, I encourage a collectivity of rhetorical scholars to form and redescribe their disciplinary work so as to positively effect the condi­ tions of society as best they can. Furthermore, I contend that, as part of their official academic identities, rhetorical theorists can work toward the actualization of a discourse and scholarship questioning the reification o f social norms, particularly those norms constructing oppression and injus­ tice in American society. Stressed are the interdisciplinary elements of a critical scholarship. In Chapter 2, I discuss more specifically how disciplinary practice in rhetorical studies can be redescribed. In so doing, I argue that by histo­ ricizing the subjects of our traditional discipliruiry knowledge, we can contribute to a new critical space. Here, I explicitly illustrate how the relatiotiship between neo-pragmatism and rhetorical studies aids in the creation of a critical persona; my specific argument in the second chapter is for rhetorical scholars to abdicate their dependence on a philosophical language and approach to research. Instead of the philosophical inquiry into the "nature" of language and persuasion, I maintain that scholars well versed in a rhetorical perspective can become local agents of criticism and social change. In more specific terms, I urge rhetoricians to embody a more active presence in the analysis of cultural discourse and to assume greater stature in their public images as instigators of localized resistance. In the third and fourth chapters, I present two extended case studies. In Chapter 3, I explore how some of the theoretical issues of a socially concerned disciplirury practice become fleshed out in the utilization of Kenneth Burke, arguably the most important contemporary theoretician to influence our discipline. This chapter illustrates how, at the level of disciplinary rhetorical theory and scholarship, a praxis-oriented perspec­ tive, rather than a metaphysically oriented perspective, is desirable in terms of invigorating our field with social and political significance. More specifically, in Chapter 3,1 problematize the traditional accounts of "ephemeral" versus "enduring" theory, a false dichotomy that has a continued salience in our field, contributing to the iruiccessibility of much

Praxis in Disciplinary Scholarship

29

of our scholarship. As Watider (1993) recently noted, "[M]ost articles (whether research report or essay) in our field cannot be read by bright undergraduates or well-informed literate citizens" (p. 108). The salience of this binary is further emphasized by Owen and Ehrenhaus (1993). As they explain, "Critical discourse perpetuates the status quo to the extent that it relegates itself to the margins of society, and it does this by chronically speaking only to itself (p. 175). Professional scholarship, in short, is often a monologue, a closed conversation, a discourse without rhetorical sensitivity for an audience that reaches beyond a handful of similarly minded people. In order to analyze the disciplinary tension that results from the sepa­ ration of social and professional concerns in rhetorical scholarship, I take as my starting point a position that was clearly articulated by Karlyn Kohrs Campbell (1974). Campbell's essay, while more than 20 years old, is one prominent articulation and representation of a reified position historically held in our discipline that continues to shape our conceptualization of scholarship and prevent it from becoming more socially meaningful (Schiappa, 1995b). In discussing Campbell's position, I recognize that her historical essay reflects the tensions of its day (as in Campbell, 1970), and that Campbell, herself, does not necessarily hold the same position cur­ rently (see, Campbell, 1995, for an example of her recent, socially informed scholarship). Nevertheless, her essay lends itself to analysis for the clear argument it made at the time for two distinct and separate types of scholarship. Her essay, in short, has become part of the narrative in our field (cf Foss, 1996; Nothstine, Blair, & Copeland, 1994). T h e position Campbell describes, but did not invent, has a disciplinary significance outside of her particular writing. The dualism between "public" and "professional" scholarship has been critiqued by many scholars. For example, Terry Eagleton (1984) argues that criticism has a responsibility to humanity as a whole, rather than to the accreditation of a critic's professional status. Wander (1990) directly takes up this issue when he challenges criticism to satisfy a professional audi­ ence, comprised of referees and editors, while at the same time addressing public issues (p. 279). It is clear from these examples, and from others in the Spring 1993 special issue on ideology in the Western Journal of Com­ munication, that a tension continues to exist in our field, centered on a reified dichotomy between a traditional scholarship of disattachment, and a new scholarship that affirms the need for social engagement.

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Moving beyond the Umitatioiu of a reified distinction between "ephem­ eral" and "enduring" rhetorical scholarship, my chapter challenges the metaphysical readings of Burke, readings de-emphasizing his social impor­ tance as well as the social significance of criticism. Vrom here. Chapter 3 argues that theory can be utilized as praxis and equipment for social action. At this point, I offer my own praxis-informed reading of Burke, one blurring the distinction between rhetorical and ideological critique (and between "enduring" and "ephemeral" criticism) and further establishing the terrain upon which a redescribed disciplinary practice is articulated. In Chapter 4, I present a second case study. This chapter consists of two sectiot«, both of which focus upon Richard Nixon's "The War in Vietnam" address. In the first section, I review the four primary disciplinary studies of Nixon's speech, paying special attention to the strengths and weaknesses of each. In so doing, I highlight some of the common objections to ideological criticism and defend ideological criticism against those critiques. More centrally, I illustrate how, from the social position called for in this book, each of the studies of Nixon was limited in ways detracting from its potentially larger social importance. In pointing out these iimita­ tioru, I suggest areas in our critical practices where a social emphasis could have informed the critic's observations and improved the social vitality of his or her critique. In the second, I follow my critique of the four discipU­ nary authors with my own neo-pragmatic analysis of Nixon's address; in this way, I illustrate the type of disciplinary analysis I urge scholars in our discipUne to engage more readily. In Chapter 5,1 develop the pedagogical implications of a neo-pragmatic rhetorical theory. This chapter rounds out my redescription of our disci­ pline by challenging the dichotomy between theory and teaching. I main­ tain that a gap exists in the basic Communication course between our sophistication with "theory" and the content of our course material. To correct for this, I argue that the dimensions of a redescribed pedagogical practice in Communication involve expositvg students to the language and history of critical theory, as well as increasing the course concern with cultural analysis. In order to illustrate the feasibility of a neo-pragmatic pedagogy, I turn to the example of English composition and argue that their concern with cultural studies serves as a productive integration of rhetoric, poUtics, and education.

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NOTE 1. One immediate example of how scholarship norms can change to make our research more accessible involves a self-conscious use of jargon. There is no question that the language scholars use often serves a mystifying function (Cowley, 1956). Jargon, however, also makes clear a specialized knowledge (Schiappa, 1992). Because I advocate a socially engaged and accessible scholarship, it is important for me to recognize ways in which my readers may be encumbered by my vocabulary. Technical language will be defined in the text and kept to a bare minimum. Where jargon is used, it is so to accentuate a perspective that I could not otherwise achieve.

^describing Disciplinary Practice

I

n Chapter 1,1 enumerated the presuppositions upon which my under­ standing of a redescribed discipUnary practice is based. I argued that a reconceptuaUzed approach to the study of rhetorical theory and criticism enables scholars to become more politically engaged with their work. In particular, I challenged rhetorical scholars to critique the activities of our political and economic elites and to open that critique for a wider audience. My emphasis on a critical rhetoric draws attention to the influence and responsibility that we have in redescribing our disciplinary pursuits.

In the present chapter, I assert as my major thesis that by approaching the objectives of our disciplinary knowledge from an "ironist" perspective, rhetoricians can become better attuned to how they conceptualize their work and to the role their work plays in the functioning of a liberal and democratic society. In addition, I urge rhetorical scholars to give up their dependence on a philosophical language preoccupied with the pursuit of transcendence and the articulation of first principles (as described by Rorty, 1979). Instead of pursuing a philosophic inquiry into the "nature" of language and persuasion, intellectuals, well versed in a rhetorical perspective, can assume a more active presence in the analysis of cultural discourse and can embody a greater stature in their public image as commentators on social policy. 32

Redescribing Discipliruxry Practice

33

This chapter consists of three sections. In the first, I argue that by historicizing their disciplinary beliefs with regard to the norms and expec­ tations of "research," scholars can redescribe the academic distinctions sanctioning their work. In the second, I assert that by substitutit^ a neo-pragmatist for a traditional or foundationalist approach to rhetorical studies, rhetoricians can contribute to both the "timing" and "strategy" of leftist democratic politics. In the third, I maintain that a critical approach to scholarship, both ironist and liberalized, allows scholars to refocus their energy on the critique of social practice rather than on the construction of theory. In this sense, I urge scholars to redefine themselves as Rorty's strong "journalists" and "poets"—as cultural preceptors of critique and ideas. My argument in this chapter is best summed up by Lentricchia (1985): " [ 0 ] u r potentially most powerful political work as university humanists must be carried out in what we do, what we are trained f o r . . . . We have at our disposal an intimate understanding of the expressive mechanisms of culture" (p. 7).

HISTORICIZING THE ASSUMPTIONS

OF O U R D I S C I P L I N A R Y K N O W L E D G E

It is socially and politically advantageous for rhetoricians to historicize the assumptions of our disciplinary knowledge (i.e., our canonized beliefs). In order to be more persuasive in my claim that the historicizing of rhetorical knowledge is a viable alternative to traditional knowledge, I assert three arguments. First, I review recent developments in the study of epistemology and suggest, along with Foucault, Rorty, and Calvin Schrag, that "reason" and "rationality" by themselves have limited social applications and can no longer serve as authorities directing the moral signincance of our work. Second, I argue, without the authority of the above metaphysical appeals, that "meaning" can be created through various linguistic commitments and rhetorical rationalities. Even though no outside agency exists granting a moral significance to human beings, such significance can be built on the premise that people, working together, author their own moralities. Third, I contend that the "end" of philosophy and the historization of ideas repre­ sents a "task" for rhetoric in which the certainty lost by a rejection of metaphysics is rearticulated through rhetorical means by a democratic and egalitarian social community.

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More specifically, by makit^ less of a distinction between "natural" and "given" categories, on the one hand, and what Rorty (as well as Nelson Goodman) call "relevant," or human-made categories, on the other, schol­ ars may stop asking questions differentiating between a "human" meaning added to nature and a more "real" meaning found in nature. A more pragmatic and effective conception of our scholarship explores, through our professional research, answers to the followiirg question: Given how we behave toward objects in the world, how do we maximize the benefits of these objects (such as food, medicine, and iron ore) and minimize their disadvantage (such as the politics of hunger, biological weapons, and guiw)? The Socicd Limitations of Philosophical Language The disciplinary dependence on philosophical language places limita­ tions on social/critical work. In an effort to overcome these limitations, we can: (a) historicize our various assumptions of "knowledge" and "truth," (b) join with Schrag in viewing our postmodern scholarship as a "think­ ing beyond" to imagine new potentialities and possibilities, and (c) enact the "Unguistic" turn Rorty urges throughout his coφu s of writ­ ings. Examples and illustrations rounding out these arguments are drawn from Foucault. To begin, the idea of historicizing knowledge is not new to this book and reflects a larger body of literature in the humanities. In the past 25 years of research, for example, the implications of recent movements in epistemology have indicated an increased awareness of the role language and discourse play in the construction of "truth" and "knowledge" (two dominant examples are Foucault, 1973b, and Rorty, 1979). According to Schrag (1985, 1986), the pressures of continental philosophy, neo­ pragmatism, and critical theory, as well as of other areas of hermeneutics, should bring the practice of systemic philosophy (as well as the practice of rhetoric "as a technique of disputation") to an "end" (1986, p. 189). No longer can professional philosophers maintain their claim to "reason" as the justification of "truth," and no longer can the promise of philosophy, alone, guide visionaries, as it once guided the Marxists, to build a better world (cf Lenin, 1917/1943). According to Schrag, Rorty, and others, the tradition of modern philosophy is "spent"; it is time to change the issues and to redirect our inquiry into other areas of culture.

Redescribing Disciplinary Practice

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For Schrag (1985), the condition of postmodernity is a condition he calls a "thinking beyond," a reassessment of traditional disciplinary boundaries and limitations. A closer examination of our linguistic prac­ tices and the axiological baggage such practices entail has led to the formulation of a new conceptual space in which to situate our work as critical scholars. In this new space, edifying approaches to "knowledge" and "truth" can be articulated and actualized by linguistically sensitive scholars. In this sense, the "end" of philosophy promises a new conversa­ tion, an opening of "knowledge" and "truth" to new articulations of "power" and "resistance." As Rorty suggests, once scholars stop discussing "philosophy" or "sci­ ence" (I add "rhetoric" to Rorty's list) as if they were "natural kinds" and recognize, iitstead, that they are linguistic distinctioris—no less important, only more flexible—then narratives such as "human rationality" or "rhe­ torical theory" are exposed as communal contingencies created to serve particular ends. For example, Rorty (1991c) elaborates how "[pjragmatism treats every such division of the world into 'subject matters' as an experi­ ment, designed to see if we can get what we want at a certain historical moment by using a certain language" (p. 91). In short, the linguistic turn in philosophy, like the political turn in our disciplinary scholarship, is based on redescribed professional norms and expectations promising a move toward a radicalized democracy. With this in mind, Schrag (1985) elaborates on "philosophy's end": It defines a task rather than a state of affairs, the task of thinking beyond pure theory—theory of reality, theory of knowledge . . . so as to reclaim the space of praxis in which the manifold expressions of thought and action are situated, (p. 166)

Schrag recognizes that, in the absence of first or generating meta­ principles, the goal of human inquiry can be resituated in the "rhetorical" and the "social." In other words, the appeal of "knowledge" and "truth" can be resituated and redescribed in the needs, desires, wants, and expec­ tations of the community and must satisfy the conditions o f compassion and solidarity. In the postmodern world, as Schrag remitids us, knowledge cannot be created in the image of "truth"; rather, truth is created in the image of "knowledge" and "power." Needless to say, the end of "philosophy" can be a difficult concept for scholars who continue to maintain that "philosophy," "rhetoric," or "truth"

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refer to unchanging essences that exist in the world (see, e.g., Ayer, 1952; Wilson, 1980). By historicizing each of these concepts, however, scholars can locate the point in time at which each concept was given the cultural significance it now has (an excellent example o f this process can be found in Foucault's 1972 description of method). By studying each concept within the historical context, its ideological significance becomes appar­ ent—each is privileged to the extent that it serves a political or cultural function in society. Specific instances of the tensions creating the cultural conveniences societies learn to read as "truth" are frequently found throughout the corpus of Foucault's work. One example is especially illustrative of this phenomenon. Foucault (1978) explains how the concept of "sexuality" should not be taken for granted as an a priori phenomenon having a cultural substance outside of a linguistic existence. In discussing sexuality, Foucault explains how it, as any other reified concept or "truth," is nothing more than the constellation of particular power/knowledge rituals consti­ tuting its cultural terrain and constructing its significance: Sexuality must not be thought of as a kind of natural given which power tries to hold in check, or as an obscure domain which knowledge tries gradually to uncover. It is the name that can be given to a historical construct: not a furtive reality that is difficult to grasp, but a great surface network in which the stimulation of bodies, the intensification of pleasure, the incitement to discourse, the formation of special knowledges, the strengthening of controls and resistances, are linked to one another, in accordance with a few major strategies of knowledge and power, (p. 106)

Foucault's analysis illustrates how a critical scholarship can succeed in contextualizitig the philosophical and normative practices perpetuating society. By contextualizing the societal practices appearing "normal" and "true," the histories of these practices can be written. These histories illustrate the social construction and temporality of cultural belief, thus opening the potential for redescription and change. In other words, Foucault's texts, along with the works of others, help to turn societal thinkers away from metaphysics and to reopen the question of a socialized human inquiry within the issue of "knowledge." By contextualizirtg our societal institutions, assumptions, and practices, Foucault provides a basic literacy for reading culture by which redescrip­ tion and change can occur. Although Foucault's program for reading culture, based on his tracing of power and knowledge assumptions, is not

Redescribing Disciplinary Practice

37

the only way of approaching a critique of "knowledge," his is one of the more successful systems for drafting a strategy of popular resistance. More specifically, Foucault's archeologies are designed to docwnent, and antid­ pate, ruptures in thought and experience. However, my idea of a critical scholarship is intended to go one step further. Although we should con­ tinue with Foucault's practice of documentation and anticipation, we should also erKOurage ruptures in deleterious societal thinking by accen­ tuating the contradictions between the promises and failures of our scKiety (cf. Marcuse, 1972). Such a perspective is not wholly aUen to the beliefs and values already held by practitioners in our field. As Barbara Biesecker (1992) explains, this sense of social engagement is implicit in some of our disciplinary assumptions: "Rhetorical Studies is a discipline animated by a profoundly Utopian yearning" (p. 351), one viewing human beings as agents empow­ ered by language to describe and redescribe their world. Biesecker, how­ ever, does not develop the point that this symbolic intervention is, itself, a materiality, a positivity, a praxis mediating on behalf of redescription and change. The source of this materiaUty becomes clearer inBiesecker's essay when she addresses Raymie McKerrow (1989) and Foucault's critical perspectives. As she explains," [T] he task [of rhetoric] is to trace new lines of making sense by taking hold of the sign whose reference had been destabilized by and through those practices of resistance, lines that cut diagonally across and, thus disrupt, the social weave" (p. 3 6 1 ) . In the practical world mediated by rhetorical pressures, our symbolic interven­ tions, coupled with a higher visibiUty in academia and in culture, carry both a constructive weight and an influence. Embracing a critical affirmation, scholars participate in the critique of historical assumptions on the level of historicity, rather than on the level of reification. Because contemporary problems have histories, and because these histories resonate through time and through the linguistic practices and ideological assumptions of future generations, a historiographical attempt to confront contemporary problems has important social reper­ cussions. When engaged through a rhetorical perspective, our reified and calcified social and political "establishment" becomes highlighted as a series of power and knowledge relations directing and ordering society according to the material interests of the ruling elites. Thus, when scholars take seriously the contingency of this society and its narrative temporality, the social order becomes a redescribable "text" in which the power of elite interests can be reasonably challenged.

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Finding Linguistic Meaning Without Metaphysical Certainty In the absence of metaphysical certainty, linguistic social meanings and systems of cooperation can be established between people. In other words, communication, rather than metaphysics, can become a base for collec­ tively designing our social communities. In developing this claim, I argue: (a) the spiritual void in traditional understandings of "truth" can be filled with an increased reliance on human compassion, (b) metaphors are a way for defining our social perceptions, and (c) "resistance" replaces "emanci­ pation" as a way for challenging society to be more flexible in the types of metaphors it allows to circulate throughout culture. As the metaphysical underpirmings of human knowledge become ques­ tioned, human beings are faced with a material silence, a void in the traditional postulations of "truth," "faith," and "meaning" supporting human inquiry until present times. In other words, by historicizing our assumptions as intellectuals, those originating from Jesus through Marx and from Thales through Einstein, scholars may acknowledge that nothing, no source of agency outside of human potential, directs our inquiry and our scholarship. Breaking from a reliance on the primacy of a redemptive deity or from a narrative called "progress" and "civilization" ordering our lives and our society, we, as human beings and as professionals, can establish our own priorities and privileges as well as recognize our own sanctions and responsibihties toward one another. In asserting my intellectual position in this book, I maintain that the need for cultivating human solidarity through our scholarship is pressing. For instance, in the metaphysical emptiness of a foundationless existence human beings can expect nothing more, and should accept nothing less, than the warmth of a neighbor's embrace or the kind words of a new-found friend; to achieve this state is to accept a condition of ironism. By internalizing ironism as a way of formulating a disciplinary respotise to the rhetorically supported inequities of the contemporary social order, scholars acknowledge that the primacy of the human will is the most central force exerting pressure on society. The ironist fiirther recognizes that this "will" is nothing other than a collection of historical processes endowing human beings with the means to manipulate the material world. Cognizant of the linguistic power to define reality, armed with an array of new metaphors for life, and mentally equipped with a desire to promote human equality, proponents of a critically committed disciplinary schol­

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arship strive to redescribe themselves, their relationships with others, and their relationships with their objects of knowledge. Scholars who engage in this practice are, in a sense, the "strong poets" that Rorty (1989) describes as the people who "truly appreciate contingency" (p. 28), those who realize that there is no total policy to draw, no program for justice to complete, no picture of reality to represent, no end to human drama, no state of perfect human existence. There is, according to Rorty (1989), " [ 0 ] n l y a web of relations [and belief] to be rewoven, a web which time lengthens every day" (p. 43). To this end, rhetorical scholars may learn to employ novel language and metaphors to confront the guns, poverty, and bureau­ cratization of our modern technological and antihistoricist existence. In an attempt to redescribe society in more humane ways, and to encourage society to engage in a greater extension of its metaphorical possibilities, rhetoricians can more overtly engage with the apparatus of power than they have in previous disciplinary practices. We can take for granted neither our own relative positions and privileges within a depart­ mental and university hierarchy nor the internal struggles that define "knowledge" and "scholarship." Extending from our relatiotvship with this system of administrative and knowledge production, we begin to map the regimes of "truth" having reciprocal relationships with ourselves and with our professional/institutional identities. As Foucault (1977) points out, "Intellectuals are themselves agents of this system of power—the idea of their responsibility for 'consciousness' and discourse forms part of the system" (p. 207). A similar critique can be leveled at the 20th-century Marxist attempts to redescribe state power. For example, the failure of Bolshevism to fulfill the promises of the Russian Revolution is, in many ways, the failure to recognize how the power to "liberate" and to "oppress" are similar (cf Trotsky, 1932/1959). However, as we learn from Foucault's description, power, per se, does not "oppress"; rather, power produces certain social relationships within the practices of a society and upon the bodies of people within that community. Furthermore, for Foucault, resistance does not "liberate"; it simply rearranges and reorganizes cultural practices. Resistance, in this sense, helps to reframe the context under which certain cultural practices become privileged. More specifically, for Foucault, power articulates ave­ nues for thought and action, while resistance helps to redirect power and knowledge in ways producing different social configurations. These con­ figurations are only "better" when, approached from a neo-pragmatic vantage point, they reduce suffering and socialize the world's resources. It

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is precisely for this reason that Foucault (particularly in 1977 and in 1991) sternly cautiotis against constructing our power and knowledge norms on the assumption of emancipation. In the absence of emancipation, there is only resistance, redescription, and the continual extension of compassion into newly articulated areas. For instance, we can progressively build from the socialization of knowl­ edge to the socialization o f wealth, and from the enfranchisement of women and minorities in this country to the enfranchisement of the Third World. We are only limited by our imaginations and the challenges we accept for ourselves as a culture. Although much of this work extends beyond our influence and responsibility as rhetorical scholars, we can, as a discipline, through our overt political practices and teaching, do much to contribute to the establishment of the cultural space necessary for imaginatiotis to blossom and metaphors to proliferate. Primarily, this involves empowering education to stress the social construction of knowl­ edge, rather than the traditional view of knowledge contained in ocular metaphors (cf Rorty, 1979). When this move in education occurs, an increasingly creative society can develop in which people are free to experiment with new personal descriptions of truth and self-fulfillment (see Chapter 5 ) . The "End-O/Philosophy and the "Task" of Wietoric The rejection of a metaphysical language enables scholars to view rhetoric as an agency for the construction of a radical democratic con­ sciousness. In developing this claim, I maintain the following two assump­ tions. First, the socialization of academic knowledge is an important primary step in the larger move toward democratizing our social existence. Second, and relatedly, as the philosophical rationales for objectivity be­ come less important, the distinction between "subject" and "object" evapo­ rates. When this occurs, intellectual activity becomes a "performance" in which the drama and metaphors of human creativity assume an important democratic presence in society. When engaging in the new pedagogy that a critical rhetoric constructs, we must continually keep in mind that the practice of a radical democracy begins at home; before it can appear in our journals, popular critiques, and classrooms, it must appear first within our disciplinary and personal relationships to power and knowledge. A radical democracy has its origins

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in our thinking and behaviors as individuah in this society; in short, the quest for a radical democracy is situated within a democratization of the objects of our natioiuil production. In the specific case of our discipline, we produce "knowledge" with regard to rhetoric and society; analogous to the instance of workers producing on the assembly line, the production of our disciplinary efforts must also be socialized. In this way, the ideology and values defining our relationship to the oppressive machinery of the state and system are made obvious and taken into account. Such pressures, when recognized and mediated, help us to avoid recreating the biases and beliefs of our old scholarship within the conditions of a new critical practice. For example, when the traditional constraints producing and limititig disciplinary knowledge are overcome, and when rhetorical scholars closely examine the persona of a professional identity, the results can be transfor­ mative. As our disciplinary practice currently stands, we find ourselves positioned as cogs in an academic machinery—one having little concern for our revolutionary potential to redescribe society. Furthermore, rhetori­ cal scholars often contribute to a system of alienation and marginalization by depositing both research and students into an unreceptive world. Disciplinary "truth" and disciplirwry "knowledge," under traditional as­ sumptions, are channeled into a system privileging the quantity of research and of students over the quality of a general society cultivated to receive the fruits of our professional labor. In short, our disciplinary obligations, and not our social obligations, lead to an excess of systemic practices feeding into a closed circle. As a result of such norms, the goal of scholarship becomes the claim to "professionalism" rather than the claim to "utility." Thus, in a historicized and rhetorical sense, the "end" of philosophy removes the pretext for professional objectivity and disciplinary aloofness. In place of the traditional, scholarly distance existing between "subject" and "object," or between "professional" and "layperson," a new disciplinary practice can be cultivated placing us face-to-face with our social obliga­ tions. As McKerrow (1989) suggests, "[CJriticism is performance" (p. 108), an action wherein a "specific individual" struggles against the forces of reification to question and requestion her or his disciplinary practices. By questioning the reification of such practices, those corwtituting the de facto laws regulating our careers, the parameters of these careers change. In recognizing the cultural contingencies surrounding the relationship between "knowledge" and "power," disciplinary scholars can begin to recognize the importance research has for serving the ends of human

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necessity. For Rorty (1989), such academic or professional commitment to society is associated with "moral progress" among the intelligentsia of this country. As he explains, "[TJhis progress is indeed in the direction of greater human solidarity" (p. 192). Thus the "end" of philosophy is, like the "end" of rhetoric, simultaneously the begitming of something better. Potentially, at least, the end of these disciplinary assumptions free scholars to direct their inquiry toward the moral articulation of a historically informed and rhetorically sensitive social order. Appropriated through critical scholarship, the "end" of traditional disciplinary practice in the humanities represents a "task" in which the voids of our critical judgments under the traditional epistemology become filled with the goals and values of human solidarity. Here, with a renewed and reaffirmed disciplinary commitment, thought and action unite through a concerted disciplinary effort. In short, scholars redefine their cultural and political institutions so that they better meet the needs of a 21st-, and not an 18th-, century social contingency.

T H E I N F L U E N C E OF N E O - P R A G M A T I S M

ON RHETORICAL STUDIES

Neo-pragmatism can have an important influence on disciplinary rhe­ torical studies. More specifically, by embodyirig the "ironist" persona described by Rorty, disciplinary practitioners of rhetorical studies can embrace a stronger position of cultural praxis. In this section I develop two claims. First, in redescribing the traditional heuristics of rhetorical studies, I argue that the study of rhetoric becomes meaningful in another, more localized sense, reflecting new contit\gencies in the social environment. Seen neo-pragmatically, our scholarship be­ comes directional for leftist poUtics and political resistance. Second, I present the three conditions of Rorty's ironism and argue that scholars can improve their potential for expanding our personas as cultural resources by recognizing its compatibility with rhetorical perspectives. Rhetorical Studies, Ironism, and Leftist Political Practice I defend the claim that our discipline can offer specific help in revital­ izing the political Left. By providing leadership through a critique of leftist

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ideology, rhetoricians contribute to the formation of a more sociaUzed cultural environment. I further argue that an ironist approach to theory and criticism sharpens our leftist political sensitivities and reduces the distance between our political and professional identities. I believe that one of the greatest setbacks to leftist politics, particularly by the humanist and Marxist movements, has been the Left's traditional reliance on essentialist argument, its lack of flexibility, and its frequent reduction to dogmatism and idolatry. Rorty (1992a) accentuates this point most clearly when he writes: We can no longer use the term capitalism to mean both "a market economy" and "source of all contemporary injustice." We can no longer tolerate the ambiguity between capitalism as a name for a way of financing industrial production and technological innovation and as a name for The Great Bad Thing that accounts for most contemporary human misery, (p. 9)

In short, the polirical Left needs a more flexible and localized ideology and terminology, one uniting and strengthening ties among the various com­ munities of its diverse interests whose uniqueness must be preserved at the same lime it is brought together in coalition against the forces of the political Right. This Left requires the power to act in a concerted and unified fashion; it needs kairos, and it needs strategy to be successful. In many ways, the political Left needs what we, as trained rhetorical scholars, are in the best position to offer. More specifically, when the study of rhetoric ceases to be the study of its philosophical implications and metaphysical boundaries, moving, iristead, to a critique of oppressive discourse practices, then rhetoricians, like ourselves, can utilize the criti­ calAiberalizing biases offered by a rhetorical perspective to question the social assumptions creating oppression and alienation in our culture. Alienation and oppression are generated from the poUtics and ideology of the Left—as well as from those of the Right, and a move toward a radical democracy involves a sensitivity to these delicate issues of our own potentially oppressive discourse. In redescribing the role and function of rhetoric in our scholarship, a critical modification of traditional pursuits empowers scholars to transform society in ways leading to the reorganiza­ tion of leftist poUtics. A more specific goal for the field of rhetorical studies is to continue the historization of ideas origir\ating within Rorty's (1979) redescription of philosophy. In Phihsophy and the Mirror of Nature, Rorty illustrates that

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philosophy must be historicized to have critical importance; philosophy, for Rorty, becomes "rhetoricized" in the same way that I encourage rhetorical scholars to politicize their understanding of rhetoric In so doing, I recognize with Rorty that the practice of philosophy (and the practice of rhetorical studies) is no more than a genre of literature. As literature, all discourse constitutes a moral assertion on behalf of its author and repre­ sents a slanted description of the world—one serving ideological and axiological interests (cf. White, 1978, 1987). Thus, in an effort to make their scholarship serve disciplinary interests, each community of scholars relates differing stories of "knowledge" and "truth." In contributing to an improved discourse, the "story" of rhetorical studies can be the story of intellectual and professional "citizens" in a democracy, struggling against the forces of ignorance, reification, and oppression. Basic to Rorty's neo-pragmatist approach to social theory and my call for a critical scholarship is his notion of the ironist perspective. In order to reach an ironist state, theorists acknowledge the contingent nature of their beliefs concerning all subjects, such as rhetoric, as well as their own professional positions in their community and nation. According to Rorty (1989), ironist scholars should be "sufficiently historicist and nominalist to have abandoned the idea that [their] central beliefs and desires refer back to something beyond the reach of time and chance" (p. xv). The ironist recognizes, in other words, that the assuinptions she or he makes of the world are the result of contingent, historical, and linguistic forces shaping and peφetuating certain ideological formations of "poweii" "truth," and "knowledge." For instance, Rorty (and scholars similarly motivated by antifounda­ tional attempts to redescribe knowledge) questions the self-imposed iso­ lation and idolization of the academic community and of academic dis­ course. Rorty's ironist persona recognizes, along with Foucault and the first generation of critical theorists, that, outside of traditional and suspect rationales, there are no reasons why academicians must maintain a selfimposed separation between "theory" and "practice." Although the causes for this isolation are not entirely philosophical (they may be the result of political or economic conditions), a large part of the problem results from the biases cultivated within a philosophical language interfering with a historicist view of knowledge. By rejecting this language, the traditional noimative assumptions, and the biases preventing our work from assuming a greater historicity, the artificially created space between theory and practice can be reduced.

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Rorty (1991b) develops a similar theme in his critique of the misplaced intellectual activity of his colleagues on the Left; he offers a narrative in which college professors spend their day reading Dissent and refuse to take responsibility for the deteriorating social conditions around them. His specific example is of economists and professors of banking and business who have failed to act in a concerted effort to prevent the recent savings and loan crises. More generally, however, Rorty (1991b) explains how scholars "assume that if the schools were better and if the media were forced to provide us with free print space and television time, we could do a lot to make democracy work" (p. 483). Exploring the Three Conditions of Rorty's Ironism Rorty's concept of ironism enables rhetorical scholars to engage in leftist political practices more actively. By emphasizing the contingency of all beliefs, ironism undercuts the rationality of conservative, reactionary, and totalitarian positions and emphasizes the need for human agency in construction of cultural institutions. In his writing, Rorty (1989) presents three conditions leading to the creation of an ironist perspective. In the first condition, ironists doubt the permanence of their "final vocabulary." Ironists suspect that the language they use to create their assumptions of the world is nothing more substan­ tive than a set of contingent assumptions operationalized at any given point in time. More specifically, the final vocabulary of a person or of a culture involves a collection of nonreducible terms upon which the ax­ iological infrastructure of consciousness is based. Rorty (1989) explains: AH human beings carry about a set of words which they employ to justify their actions, their beliefs, and their lives. These are the words in which we formulate praise of our friends and contempt for our enemies, our long-term projects, our deepest self-doubts and our highest hopes. They are the words in which we tell, sometimes prospectively and sometimes retrospectively, the story of our lives. I shall call these words a person's "final vocabulary." (P- 73) Similar to Rorty, I believe that this vocabulary is "final" because, if challenged, the "user has no noncircular argumentative recourse. Those words are as far as he [or she] can go with language; beyond them there is only helpless passivity or a resort to force" (Rorty, 1989, p. 73).

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On the individual level, the final vocabulary a person adopts involves the construction and articulation of a personal identity: This conceptuali­ zation is actualized in the "calculus" that a set of final terms provides for an individual. A person who defines himself or herself as a "liberal-ironist," for example, utiUzes a certain construction of vocabulary in a way that someone who identifies as a "fascist" does rrat. On the cultural level, the final vocabulary of a society represents the reified values guiding discourse in that society. When certain societal assumptions become calcified, such as, in this country, when "democracy" becomes identified as a respect for private property and the privileged autonomy of business, I find little argument: The reified position becomes "ultimate" and the terms describ­ ing that position tautologically justify themselves while, at the same time, they preclude the questioning of that justification. In short, these terms simply "are" for the vast majority of people who adopt them. Any media­ tion of these terms involves a fiindamental reconstruction of relational and institutional belief. In the second condition, according to Rorty, ironists realize that their doubts cannot be abdicated through the vocabulary they currently employ and, therefore, begin to question the limitations of this vocabulary. At this point, the ironist realizes that any given set of terminologies provides a certain perspective by which to understand the world. In a discipliruiry ironist condition, rhetorical scholars recognize that these terminologies guiding our research and structuring society are historically con­ structed. The ironist scholar realizes that any given terminology is as necessarily limited as it is historical; simply, ironists recognize that certain perspectives exist at the expense of other perspectives. As Burke (1935/ 1984b) aptly points out, "A way of seeit\g is also a way of not seeing—a focus upon object A involves a neglect of object B" (p. 49). An apprecia­ tion for this phenomenon, when applied to a critical scholarship, provides rhetorical theorists with a locality in which to instigate change as every instance of cultural discourse is, simultaneously, a potential site for rede­ scription. More specifically, in the act of questioning what is excluded from a certain perspective, Rorty's third condition of the ironist is actualized. In particular, by incorporating the vocabulary and beliefs of others, ironists redefine themselves and realize that this refined vocabulary and identity is just as contingent, though perhaps more useful. Ironists realize that their "selves" and their language are always susceptible to change; everything about them has the potential to be different. The only constant force in

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their hfe is their dedication to compassion, to the beUef that the worst thing in the world is human suffering—Rorty's (1989) definition o f liberal-irony. Liberal ironists, self-redescribing as they will, engage in actions that always strive toward the condition of compassion. In exem­ plifyitig the ironist position, given the choice, acting with social responsi­ bihty is, in the long run, preferable to acting selfishly for inunediate short-term gain.

THE SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS OF

A REDEFINED CRITICAL SCHOLARSHIP

I argue, along with Rorty, that academic battles over disciplinary goals cannot be substituted for political poUtics in the world outside of our departmental existences. In so doing, I maintain that a critical commit­ ment with our scholarship encourages professionals in our discipline to engage in a meaningful discourse with the community entrusting them with the task of expanding the freedoms and opportunities of our culture. Rather than construct theory distancing scholars from society, I urge rhetoricians to consider as their professional goals a disciplinary practice replacing a dependence on theory with a commitment toward praxis and social struggle. This thesis is central to my arguments in this section. I structure this section according to two claims. First, extending Rorty's argument, I maintain that the distinction between disciplinary "knowl­ edge" and cultural "value" is not a valid distinction to maintain. Such distinctions create a tension between academia and society that can be redescribed; such redescription democratizes scholarship and positions professors centrally in cultural debates. Second, following Foucault, I argue that the issue of "power" and "knowledge" can be redescribed so that theory can better meet the needs of praxis and contribute to the estab­ lishment of a more socialistic culture. Redescribing the Tensions Between Academia and Society A critical scholarship redescribes the tensions existing between acade­ mia and society (see "Traditional and Critical Theory" and "The Social Function of Philosophy," in Horkheimer, 1992). Though I recognize that a critical scholarship is not always welcomed by society, a critical perspec­

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tive encourages flexibility and resists calcification at the level of social belief. Such resistance views the tensions between "academic" and "social" knowledge as superfluous to political advocacy. More specifically, critical scholarship begins at the point of recognizing the historical contingency of knowledge-claims and the responsibility of intellectuals to situate human knowledge within the social realm. When knowledge becomes socialized, scholars are freed from attempts to under­ stand the world outside of its human implications and are directed, instead, toward a more pragmatic understanding of how human beings interpret the world for various purposes. As Rorty (1991c) states, in so doing " [w]e put aside such distinctions as 'scientific knowledge vs. cultural bias,' and 'question of fact vs. question of value' " (p. 208). When socially and rhetorically approached, the academic study of knowledge assumes an ideological and axiological, rather than an onto­ logical, importance. As Horkheimer (1992) explains, "Every pattern of thought, every philosophical or other cultural work, belongs to a specific social group, with which it originates and with whose existence it is bound up" (p. 263). Furthermore, with this recognition of the contingency of our social and cultural institutions, rhetorical scholars understand how knowl­ edge affects human beings in ways that can be socially mediated. In utiUzing this knowledge, and in developing a specific analysis designed to undermine oppressive, dominant assumptions, cultural critics can serve as the impetus for a revolution in societal assumptions of "truth" and for the promotion of democratic thirJcing. In other words, the position critical scholarship attempts to attain for society is exemplified by Rorty (1989) as that point "where we no longer worship anything, where we treat nothir^ as quasi divinity, where we treat everything—our language, our conscious, our community—as a product of time and chance" (p. 22). A paradox exists, however, with regard to our role and fiinction in the maintenance and support of culture. On the one hand, it is our job as critical scholars to provide society with a critique of its practices. I acknowledge that our society, unique in its commitment to diversity and to a democratic pledge of equality, is better than many societies for allowing its citizens the opportunity to perfect their lives in peace; how­ ever, I maintain, our society needs more than a little "nudging" every now and then to honor its liberal commitments. In an important sense, our charter and our paychecks reflect the needs of society for an intellectual class to engage in a continuing reassessment of our cultural beliefs; if our society is to survive for long, it must remain open to critique. The reason

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for our existence as a discipline and for our practice as members of the humanities can be found in this charter. On the other hand, academia, as well as popular culture, continues to remain relatively hostile to redescription and to change. While both cultures benefit from our evaluation, both frequently are resistant to our analysis challenging the systemic comfort of a metaphysical certainty. Vested power, economic interests, and the established authority often are not appreciative of our socialist perspectives. Thus, in this and in more subtle ways, the hegemony of traditional knowledge-belief makes it diffi­ cult for those outside our discipline to recognize the importance and significance of our analysis. As a way of insulating itself against our critique, societal power and knowledge has created certain professional norma distancing our work from its potential larger effects. In moving beyond the traditional academic constraints limiting the ii\fluence of a rhetorical perspective, 1 argue that a critical scholarship recognizes the rhetorical tradition in Western culture as a convenient structure for theorists throughout history to conceptualize the human process of communication. In the past, these conceptualized approaches demarcated the boundaries of an aristocratic ideology, as exemplified in its historical Aristotelian and Ciceronian emphases. However, even within these traditions, as well as in other rhetorical traditions, what rhetoric "is" and what rhetoric "means" has been redefined from text to text and from theorist to theorist. With this in mind, I have found there is nothing, no essential "strands" or quahties, preventing our field from redefining rheto­ ric as well as academic practice in novel, critical ways. With this redescrip­ tion, moving our disciplinary concerns from a preoccupation with conser­ vative theory to a revolutionary concern for social influence, scholars find, as their professional determinant, Wander's (1983, p. 18) desire to offer alternatives to the destructive forces of greed and capital threatening to disrupt human existence. Although a redefined critical scholarship presents a utopian-like con­ ception of a society fully ironist and liberalized, 1 recognize that, in many cases, the practice of a viable social critique may be difficult. With few exceptions, the traditional disciplinary paradigms and assumptions char­ acterizing academia since Dewey's failure to radicalize higher education (cf West, 1989) still exert their systemic influence. Essentialist, not to mention elitist, racist, and misogynist, perspectives remain dominant forces—pervadit\g and polluting human social and academic communi­ ties, including our own (Rodden, 1993). Practitioners of a redefined and

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critical scholarship struggle against these systemic influences where they can but, more often than not, try to bypass academic issues to focus on social critique and political action. 1 argue along with Rorty (1991b) that academic battles, while important within in their own right, must not be substituted for political battles, a politics that is "likely to redress the balance of power between the rich and the poor" (p. 489). Restructuring Theory to Meet the Needs of Praxis Theory can be restructured to meet the needs of praxis. In recognizing the limitations of traditional approaches to theory, and in recognizing the contributions to socialist thought by activists engaged in popular struggles, I provide avenues for refiguring rhetoiical theory. After this discussion, I end this chapter with a specific examination of Foucault's contribution to disciplinary practice in the form of his thesis on power. By comparing both Foucault and Rorty on the question of power, I create the space in which to situate the parameters of my critical rhetoric. In refiguring rhetorical theory, a redefined critical scholarship closely evaluates its own presuppositions and the presuppositions of the academy sustaining its claims. As a cultural practice, scholarship partakes in the system of power, and a critical perspective makes that involvement felt on the human level—the level of struggle and resistance. Marcuse (1969), in particular, is sensitive to the larger terrain that a critical scholarship embraces as it directs itself toward praxis: To the degree to which the university becomes dependent on the financial and political goodwill of the community and of the government, the struggle for a free and critical education becomes a vital part in the larger struggle for change, (p. 61)

Productive change, in this case, is brought about when edifying approaches to the language of oppression and the rhetoric of democracy allow people to think about their practices and desires in radically new ways. In short, a newly defined professional practice focuses on our discipliruiry behaviors within the academy as well as upon the way we act in the day-to-day interactions of our lives.

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A redescribed critical scholarship recognizes that an emphasis on social practice, rather than on theory, allows intellectuals to engage in an important site of struggle, one actualizing significant social change. Fou­ cault, himself, distances his program of political resistance from depend­ ence upon a heavy theoretical apparatus; as he explains, "This need for theory is still part of the system we reject" (1977, p. 231). Rorty, for his part, concurs with Foucault, as Rorty's writings continually accentuate the limitations of theory and its inabiUty to engage in the substantive problems of the world. More specifically, Rorty argues against the insulation of theory and the subsequent marginalization of intellectuals from the politi­ cal realm. In my redescription of a critical scholarship, I take heed of the concern expressed by both Foucault and Rorty; in particular, I am persuaded by Rorty's characterization of theory's limitation. As Rorty explains, in hu­ man intellectual history, both social theorists and social novelists have attempted to redescribe the world to make it more compassionate; in this context, Rorty points to the social novelists as having the greater cultural utility and political influence. For instance, he emphasizes that Charles Dickens, as one example, has done more for the cause of human solidarity and compassion than have most of the social theorists. Rorty (1991a) concludes, "[W]hen you weigh the good and the bad the social novelists have done against the good and the bad the social theorists have done, you find yourself wishing that there had been more novels and fewer theories" (p. 8 0 ) . For Rorty, the "poet" and the "journalist," not the ivory tower acade­ mician, have the power to redescribe society in a language appealing to a wider audience. Historical examples of nonacademic poUtical and moral leadership of this include Marx, who forsook academia to publish in popular journals and newspapers, and Gandhi, who rejected his legal practice to engage in poUtical work for Indian independence. In both cases, these two intellectuals turned from theory to praxis, from ideas to action to create a world that is immeasurably better as a result of their work. Certainly, each was guided by "theory," but their theories were directed toward the world of daily human affairs. Marx and Gandhi illustrate how theory becomes praxis. This transformation occurs when the social be­ comes factored into the theoretical. More specifically, this lesson of a critical scholarship, like Rorty's lessons in neo-pragmatism, can be suc­ cinctly stated: Rhetorical scholars can theorize all they want, but their

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tangible influence comes only with their critique of behavior that begins with an analysis of self'imposed limitations. As Foucault (1988) writes, the structure of the modern world and its system of rationality are situated "on a base of human practice and human history and that since these things have been made, they can be remade, as long as we know how it was that they were made" (p. 37). Ideas have histories—but ideas are only impor­ tant when applied to meet the demands of a localized contingency, like our own, calling for a radical restructuring of society and the articulation of an increasingly viable democracy. Such restructuring demands a healthy balance between theory and action—the traditional realm of praxis. In particular, critical scholars must tread a carefully mediated path. In practicing a critical approach to knowledge, we seek to avoid a heavy dependence on theory, on miring ourselves in an intellectual swamp of jargon. Simultaneously, however, we recognize that a strong command of theory is crucial for the manifestation of our critical sensitivities and our behavior as scholars. One advantage rhetoricians have over other people for redescribing the world, besides having been exposed to more arguments actively questioning the reifica­ tion of "truth," is that our observations are informed by a carefiil study of language and discourse. Arguably, these observations are accentuated by the enigma as well as the force of theory. The enigma of theory can be redescribed by the careful formulation of a "new" professional practice, both within the humanities and within the larger popular community. This critical scholarship, however, is not "new" in a historical sense. It started with intellectuals such as Marx and Freud, on the theoretical levels, and extended through the writings of Nietzsche, Foucault, and Rorty, to name but a few of its more illustrative sources. More important, this new critical scholarship had, as its many forerunners in the practical realm, countless, and mostly forgotten, organizers, radicals, communists, anarchists, and labor agitators who, in cities around the globe, challenged the authority of the Church, the State, and the Capital­ ists to subjugate their lives. Thus, in recognizing the above people who contributed to the develop­ ment of a socialist consciousness, I suggest that this approach to discipli­ nary scholarship cannot be corisidered "new" in the sense that it is without an important historical precedent. A critical disciplinary scholarship may be corisidered "new," however, in another sense, one in relationship to

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contemporary professional practices. To the extent that the academic community has distanced itself from the struggles of labor and of humanity against slavery and imperialism, as well as from concerted struggles for a cleaner environment and a safer community, a redescribed critical schol­ arship may be viewed as different—such scholarship is both directed at change and defined by the necessity to change. It focuses and redirects our professional concerns away from a senseless proliferation of self-centered disciplinary interests and emphasizes, instead, our concerns and talents as practiced interlocutors within the great debate of culture. Foucault's Contribution to DiscipUrviTy Praxis As a final example of how theory can be redescribed in more praxisoriented terms, I argue that Foucault's discussion of "power" contributes to my understanding of a critical rhetoric. More specifically, the example of Foucault, and Foucault's relationship to Rorty on the issue of power, illustrates how the enigma of theory can be transformed into a societal outlook and method for localized resistance. In many ways, the arguments found in Rorty's writing involve the issue of power and the cultural implications of a critically informed social theoty; indeed, Rorty's equivocal and cautious support for Foucault's ideas hovers in radius around this point. On the one hand, Rorty celebrates Foucault's work in bringing to our attention "a new set of dangers to democratic societies" while, on the other, Rorty (1992a) condemns Foucault for promoting "a crippling ambiguity between 'power' as a pejorative term and as a neutral, descriptive term" (1992b, p. 330).' The specific issue between Foucault and Rorty questions whether power has moral, immoral, or nonmoral implications. Although both theorists have clear and incommen­ surable views on the issue, their respective positions help to situate my analysis. Although Rorty recognizes that power, when wielded unwisely, leads to oppression, he does not have a clearly articulated theory of power; it is obvious that power is a subject not emphasized in his social writings. At best, power is a neutral term for Rorty, one describing certain social relationships. At worst, power is a pejorative concept; an instrument for oppressing people. To counter what he considers to be the deleterious

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effects of power, Rorty (1989) turns to bourgeois politics and literature for sensitizing social policy to the problems and abuses of power. According to Rorty, the important issue is: How can bourgeois liberal politics produce a more compassionate society? In such a society, the theoretical issue of power is not important—it is an enigma, a curiosity supplied by writers, such as Foucault, who present an "amazing one-sidedness" with regard to the power/knowledge narrative. What matters, for Rorty, is a literature that increases our chances for social redescription. In differing from Rorty, Foucault attempts to break the enigma of power and turn it into a useful tool, one documenting the forces causing certain undesirable behaviors. In this sense, Foucault (1988) is closely aligned with critical theory—a relationship he freely admits. For Foucault, power is nonmoral; it is a material force in society. Furthermore, power is not theoretical in the sense that thinking about it creates a debilitating space between the scholar and the mechanisms of culture; rather, Foucault's focus on power squarely situates the "gaze" of the scholar upon the maze of relationships constructing "knowledge" and "truth." For the Foucaul­ tian scholar, as for Foucault himself, the study of power involves iirmiersing oneself fully into the social practices constituting that power and creating "bodies" within its terrain of significance. To be a scholar, in Foucault's sense, is to allow one's self to be redescribed by the phenomenon one is studying. For Foucault, power is not an enigma. It is something inevitable and as socially pervasive as communication; it is not something that can be legislated against or purified: It is something to be engaged.^ The flow of power is simply a force directed toward productive ends. Power, for Foucault, is corutructive; it produces knowledge, but the knowledge it produces may be tyrannical. The "truth," in this case, does not set one free; rather, it establishes the conditions of a particular servitude. Foucault thus observes localized tyrannies as pervasively taking place, and he sees these tyrannies as inevita­ ble. Because of this, Foucault (1980) writes that localized resistance can help alleviate the pain of certain oppressions; in this sense, theory becomes praxis. A critical integration of theory and practice arises in Foucault when he articulates power as a description of relationships making, supporting, and promoting a regime of "truth." Although Foucault wrote that theory was part of the system he was trying to undermine, he was referring more to systemic theory, contained at the expense of action. All of Foucault's political work—in the prisons, in the sexual arena, in the realm of social­

Redescribing Disciplinar) Practice

55

ism—can be considered clear examples of socially responsible, theorydriven praxis (Miller, 1993). Power, in other words, is neither "good" nor "bad," and Foucault's theory of power is not designed for liberation; instead, it is a construct intended for contemplation and resistance. Rather than seeing power as a force to be wielded, Foucault sees it as a force to be resisted, and in his insistence on this point, Foucault bridges the gap between "theory" and "practice." In proclaiming power to be "dangerous," Foucault leaves be­ hind the limitations of theory and transforms his critical perspective into social critique. Following Foucault's lead, I maintain that disciplinary scholarship in rhetorical studies can, likewise, leave behind the limitations of theory and situate the scholar's knowledge of rhetoric directly within the contingencies of society.

SUMMARY A critical approach to disciplinary knowledge, one situated in praxis, involves the scholarship of influence; such scholarship takes "theory" and infuses it with "practice" to mediate a better world. Better has been defined in this book as a world that is less cruel and more compassionate, a world in which knowledge is created to meet human needs and not the economic interests of the professional, business, and intellectual classes. It is my position in this book that knowledge should affirm life and cultivate human happiness. The assumption behind any liberalization process and, ultimately, the assumption behind the idea of a critical discipliiiary prac­ tice involves an understanding that there is no inherent reason why one linguistic, political, and knowledge community should have privilege and priority over another. Thus, in finding political solutions to the challenges and strains being made on our liberal society, the expertise of scholars in the S C A can be redesigned to play a crucial role in actualizing a critical and socially viable scholarship.

NOTES 1. M o r e extended and further encompassing discussions of how Rorty contrasts his brand of neo-pragmatism with Foucauh and similar poststructuralist writers can be found in Rorty ( 1 9 8 2 , p p . 9 0 - 1 0 9 and 1 3 9 - 1 5 9 ; 1991a, p p . 8 5 - 1 0 5 , 1 0 7 - 1 1 8 , and 1 1 9 - 1 2 8 ) .

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2. Readers of Foucault will find the curious quote: "The question of power remains a total enigma" ( 1 9 7 7 , p. 2 1 3 ) . Although this may appear to contradict my point, it does not. In the context that Foucault wrote this, he was referring to the fact that questions of power raise many more issues than they resolve. Foucault admits that our conceptual vocabulary is not developed sufficiently to enable us to tackle the problem in a more sophisticated fashion than is currently possible. T h e phenomenon, itself, exists for Foucault as a positivity directing his observations.

(^ward a Neo-Pragmatic Approach to Rhetorical Theory

H

aving delineated the theoretical concerns of a redescribed and critical discipliiiary practice in the two previous chapters of this book, I offer, in Chapter 3, a more applied and specific analysis of Speech Communication scholarship. My central thesis is that a neo-pragmatic approach to rhetorical theory involves a rejection of the dichotomy between "academic" and "social" research. Throughout this chapter I review and respond to central academic assumptions highlighted in Karlyn Kohrs Campbell's (1974) influential essay, "Criticism: Ephemeral and Enduring." Although her essay was written more than 20 years ago, it is indicative of a larger narrative in our field, one that tends to limit our choices and options for scholarship (Schiappa, 1991, pp. 4 1 - 4 2 ) . In widening the field of scholarship, I argue against the claim that "a sharper distinction must be made between critical acts designed to perform a social function and those intended to make enduring contributions to rhetorical theory" (Campbell, 1974, p. 10). First, I maintain that the codification of a dichotomy between "aca­ demic" and "social" criticism is symptomatic of a widespread disciplinary practice. To substantiate my position, it is necessary to review Campbell's essay in detail and to explicate its ramifications for disciplinary scholarship. Second, 1 argue that the dichotomy between "academic" and "social" criticism can be redescribed or otherwise deconstructed in order to widen our scholarship to include a greater critical and praxis-oriented edge. 57

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Third, as a way of exemphfying the Umitations of a dichotomous view of theory and criticism, I argue against the essentiaUzing of Kenneth Burke by some professionals in our field and resist the systemic implications of such a tendency as reflected in our literature. Fourth, I end this chapter by arguing for a renewed disciplinary reading of Burke, one reaffirming him as a social critic whose theories and methods of rhetorical analysis are designed to place the critic into a dialectical engagement with language and popular culture. By the end of this chapter, I defend the position that Burke's larger theory of rhetoric must be viewed primarily as a "social" theory and not as a "metaphysical" theory or a "philosophy" of language. Resisting the "Methodological Injunctions" of the Dichotomy Betwen "Ephemeral" and "Enduring" Scholarship Campbell's essay draws our attention to certain theoretical practices that margitialize our social potential as scholars. As a discipline, we tend to reward criticism that succeeds in contributiivg to theory (for the cen­ trality of theory building in the act of criticism, see Hart, 1976, and Gregg, 1985). To some extent, my book is also working off of this same assumption, even though 1 am working to avoid being influenced by the dichotomy I am trying to redescribe. My project in this book is criticism; by analyzing disciplinary practices 1 am trying to contribute to theory—in this case, I am arguing that theory can be reconceptualized as "social." Thus, in many ways, the way that I write this book has been conditioned by assumptioris in our field as to what constitutes scholarship. Even though I am resisting the pull of traditional scholarship, the fact that I continue to think in terms of certain conceptualizations, like my desire to write this book and to conceptualize it in terms of certain accepted practices (i.e., theory build­ ing), indicates the extent to which disciplinary assumptions affect disci­ plinary practice. Specifically, I chose Campbell's article for analysis because, though historically situated, it is indicative of trends in our current disciplinary critical practice and exempUfies many of the concerns this book engages. For instance, Campbell's essay is a well-known example of a foundation­ alist approach to rhetorical theory and criticism. As she explains, "What all of us in this discipline seek to discover—whatever our special interests and competencies—are the processes that characterize human communi­ cation" (Campbell, 1974, p. 12; emphasis added). In Campbell's descrip­

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tion of a foundationalist position, and in her historically situated argu­ ments, ones that are indicative of a larger, contemporary disciplinary practice, I find space in which to propose an alternative view. In articu­ lating this view, my point is not to reify her essay as the instance of an unproductive disciplinary binary or even to imply that her essay is neces­ sarily "wrong" or "bad." At the time Campbell wrote her essay, it i^as a useful article that helped to clarify many assumptions under which scholars in our discipline operated. Rather, my intention is to illustrate how her contribution, while historically important, has contributed to a larger discourse that can be redescribed to make our discipline more responsive to the social realm. To borrow a metaphor from Rorty, the distinction between "ephemeral" and "enduring" criticism is a "ladder" that we discard once we have successfully climbed to the next level of our conceptualization. Specifically, the position that Campbell presents in her essay asserts that academic scholars in the Speech Communication Association should be committed to what is identified as the "professional" analysis of texts. Under this view, professional scholarship leads to an ontological descrip­ tion or understanding of some human communication process or phenom­ ena. The function of professional scholarship is contrasted with what is identified as "social" criticism, an activity practiced by journalists and other professionals of the mass media. This position claims to help mediate the "confusion between critical acts serving social fiinctions and critical acts capable of making significant contributions to rhetorical theory" (Campbell, 1974, p. 9 ) . In so doing, this distinction attempts to articulate the proper role of criticism for scholars in our field. In effect, it sets up a hierarchy, one privileging theory over criticism. This role, however, is unnecessarily limiting of rhetorical scholarship. Theory and criticism are the flip sides of the same coin. One cannot exist without the other. The fact that we distinguish between the two is indicative of a modern, binary way of thinking, one that seeks to erect, rather than erase boundaries. Thus, what has historically been recognized as a dichotomy between "enduiing" and "ephemeral" criticism is a larger phenomenon that must be redescribed if disciplinary criticism is to be freed for social, rather than for purely theoretical, ends. Such a move frees criticism from the shadow of theory and moves both theory and criticism into the realm of praxis. As represented in Campbell's essay, the act of criticism is conceptual­ ized as embodying two distinct and, from the point of view of traditional disciplinary practice, unequal, functions. There is little "in between"— disciplinary criticism cannot serve two masters, one public and the other

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professional. The two types of criticism are, by defirution, separate; critics who practice either criticism "nearly always" serve the standards of one critical ideal at the expense of the other (Campbell, 1974, p. 11). More specifically, "[S]ocial criticism may be defined as criticism that evaluates the ways in which issues are formulated and policies justified, and the effects of both on society at a particular historical moment" (Campbell, 1974, p. 11). Although rhetorical scholars can participate in such cultural discourse, to do so they are obligated to take off their professional "hats" and engage as citizens in the cultural dialectic; those scholars can brit\g their expertise into this forum, but their individual critical acts within the social sphere are extrinsic to their professional responsibilities. "Ephemeral" criticism, by its linguistic determination, has been placed in opposition to "academic" or "professional" criticism, criticism with enduring substance in the form of theory. Historically, the job of the "professional" critic in our discipline is to identify "the factors that consti­ tute critical excellence and the critical outcomes or objectives that con­ tribute to rhetorical theory" (Campbell, 1974, p. 11). Critical activity that does not contribute to this traditional understanding of knowledge does not count as "true" knowledge in the disciplinary sense; it constitutes a different kind of knowledge, a lesser kind, than that found as the result o f professional criticism. Professional criticism leads to permanent knowl­ edge. The assumption is that knowledge, to be True, must be permanent. While social criticism is necessary, it is not "really" knowledge because it is impermanent. Thus it has taken place within a different context than that of the academic environment. According to the position described by Campbell, arguments in the public sphere are less persuasive as objects of knowledge for the policy makers who are or should be the beneficiaries of our critical efforts. This popular and cultural type of criticism has been identified as "ephemeral" because of its dependence on particular temporal and cultural contingencies contextu­ alizing the rhetorical transaction. Unlike "social" criticism, "professional" criticism is free from temporal concerns and limitations and has the power to explicate in detail the phenomenon of human communication. In other words, "professional" criticism has the power to make "enduring" state­ ments about the "nature" of rhetorical theory. Because knowledge is something we build upon, according to this epistemology, it must be permanent to be useful. The point of professional criticism has involved establishing a "foundation" upon which fiiture scholars can stand and view

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the edifice of rhetoric previous scholars have created. In Campbell's (1974) words: The objects and objectives of "academic" or "professional" rhetorical criti­ cism may be expressed in a paraphrase of Wichelns' familiar statement: "Rhetorical criticism is not concerned with permanence or with beauty or with effects as such. It regards rhetorical acts as symbolic acts and holds its business to be the discovery and explication of the symbolic processes available to human beings as revealed and illustrated in these acts." Such criticism is, in my opinion, the very foundation of rhetorical theory, (p. 13)

In my antifoundationalist argument for a redescription of the theoreti­ cal position that Campbell has identified, the importance of her article and its implications for subsequent rhetorical scholarship should not be under­ estimated. In the words of Edward Schiappa (1991), "Campbell's position is widely shared in our field (whether specifically acknowledged in indi­ vidual essays or not), and functions as a sort of methodological injunction" (p. 41) discouraging critics from making value judgments with regard to the artifacts of their analysis. As Schiappa argues, due in part to Campbell's distinctions, "The predominant trend [in our discipline] is to examine texts as demonstrating enduring rhetorical strategies rather than as good or bad arguments" (1991, p. 42). In extending Schiappa's point (see also Schiappa, 1995b), I believe that a bifurcation between professional and public criticism exemplifies the type of traditional thinking limiting us to a narrowly defined, and socially elusive, professionalism. More specifically, this bifiircation redirects our critical efforts from the process of an ongoing dialectic with society. As William L. Nothstine, Carole Blair, and Gary A. Copeland (1994) explain, "Professionalism, as it is currently practiced in academia, causes criticism to be transformed—or, more precisely, reduced—from a process to a product" (p. 18). As these scholars suggest, criticism involves the dynamic practice of inventing alternative and creative perceptions to the given arrangements of a particular symbolic reality (here is an example where criticism becomes theory and theory becomes praxis). Thus, when scholars work under the distinctions serving as "methodological injunctions," coloring the scholar's approach to the practice of rhetorical studies, criticism becomes a method for building professional and disciplinary competence, rather than a process for developing and defending a ration­ ale for social influence. For this reason, the dichotomy described in

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Campbell's essay can be deconstructed and redescribed in ways to further our critical opportunities as rhetorical scholars.

DECONSTRUCTING TRADITIONAL

A C C O U N T S OF "EPHEMERAL"

AND "ENDURING" RHETORICAL

THEORY AND CRITICISM

By deconstructing traditional accounts of "ephemeral" and "enduring" rhetorical theory and criticism, scholars are placed in a stronger position to socialize their inquiry and politicize their institutionalized beliefs. Spe­ cifically, in the first part of this section I maintain that the "scientizing of criticism" is an unhealthy practice. In the second part of this section, I argue against the position that "professional" criticism is ahistorical and nonpolitical. In so doing, I emphasize the temporal and rhetorical dimen­ sions of all scholarship and encourage an increased space for a disciplinary redescription. In the third part of this section, I contend that criticism serves a definitional role in the social construction of "reality." In this sense, "professional" criticism is necessarily social and the "reality" it defines becomes the "reaUty" of our cultural experience. Scholarship, and the Scientizing of Criticism The problem of scientism in our field must be resolved if our social identities as partisan and cultural scholars are to achieve fruition in the coming decades. Specifically, the norms and expectations of our discipline can be expanded to embrace a greater range of critical methodologies. Campbell is only one important scholar among many in our field who engage in what Nothstine et al. (1994) identify as the "Scientizing of Criticism" (p. 31). For example, in their survey of our literature, Nothstine et al. describe disciplinary critics in Speech Communication as being preoccupied with theory building, objectivity, confirmation and falsifica­ tion, and progress. As these writers explain, "Critics have embraced the goals of science perhaps from political necessity, given the prestige science has enjoyed and its installation as the premier, if not the sole, epistemology of modernity" (p. 32). As evidence for their position, Nothstine et al. cite the work of a wide range of scholars: John Bowers, Rodrick Hart, Sonja Foss, Richard Gregg,

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and Karlyn Kohrs Campbell, as well as the Committee on the Advance­ ment and Refinement of Rhetorical Criticism. For example, Nothstine et al. (1994) quote Hart as writing, "It is in their role as pre-scientists that rhetorical critics can add substantially to the development and refinement of synthetic, inclusive, and predictive theoretical statements about human persuasion" (p. 3 3 ) . The example of these critics illustrates how, within the professional epistemology of modern rhetorical criticism, the demands of theory construction have dominated and thus supplanted the need for social judgment as the goal and fiinction of recent criticism (cf James Darsey, 1994, and Wander & Jenkins, 1972, p. 442). Much of this practice derives from Black's (1965) use of the analogy of the critic and the scientist (p. 4 ) . With this analogy. Black introduces his treatise on method by explaining that the role of the critic is "to see a thing clearly and to record what [she or he has] seen precisely" (1965, p. 4 ) . The concerns that Nothstine et al. raise with regard to the scientizing of professional disciplinary criticism are exemplified in Campbell's essay. Implicitly or explicitly, Campbell's description of the dichotomy between "enduring" and "ephemeral" criticism exempUfies a rationality informed by the methodology and presuppositions of science. For instance, in her article, Campbell (1974) presents a narrative in which two "discrete forms" of criticism vie for the attention of scholars. In distinguishing between the two, Campbell reifies them both and positions them in a dichotomous relationship with one another. Although she admits that the two "are never entirely separated" (p. 13), she claims that the social implications of "professional" criticism "will [only] be apparent primarily to serious students of language and communication" (p. 13). Thus, in the conceptualization of disciplinary rhetorical practice sug­ gested by Campbell's essay, criticism is reduced to two fiinctions and is entrusted to two different sets of practitioners. For instance, "social" criticism, described as "ephemeral," is relegated to journalism "where much of it now appears, and the audience it needs to reach is the general public" (p. 10). Though the general public needs to be informed by our disciplinary attempts to make society a better place in which to live, Campbell does not specifically delineate who in the mass media engages in this social critique of culture. More specifically, who in the mass media approaches our society's problems from a critical, rhetorical, or ideological point of view? By and large, the mass media, rather than serving as a medium for edification and critique, function, instead, to increase the reification of

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commercialism as a way of life, promoting the ideological and economic interests of capitalist elites and redefining the needs of citizens in terms of specific commercial interests (Chomsky, 1989; Herman & Chomsky, 1988). As Adorno (1954) argues, both the mass media and the culture industry attempt "to ensnare the consumer as completely as possible . . . in order to engage him [or her] psychodynamically in the service of premeditated effects" (p. 223). Assuming that the audience for a popular critique exists within the mass media, Campbell (1974) writes, "[T]he discipline of speech communica­ tion needs to honor and encourage the trained critics who enter the public arena to critique contemporary persuasive acts" (p. 11). However, this popular critique rarely happens, nor is it likely to happen as long as the dichotomy existing between an "ephemeral" and "enduring" criticism continues to exert pressure on scholars in our field. Because the endur­ ing/ephemeral dichotomy discourages scholars from participating in the cultural dialectic, it is unhealthy. In particular, one reason why scholars do not feel encouraged to enter the "public arena" is that thete is a bias in academia against such scholarship, a bias supported, in part, by the following assumption: "Social critics nearly always produce statements that are bound to particular times, issues, and situations" and the signifi­ cance of social criticism fades "as the issues they treat fade from public concern" (Campbell, 1974, p. 11). Therefore, from the perspective of critical rhetoric, scholars can best feel professionally secure in producing socially meaningful work when this inquiry is accepted, in part, as one disciplinary norm of our profession. Emphasiring the Rhetorical Dimeruions of All Scholarship In response to Campbell's argument that only the "social" criticisms of popular culture and poUtics are time-bound, I argue that all criticism, "social" as well as "academic," is similarly contained. More specifically, the idea of "enduring" criticism is only enduring in a professionalized and short-sighted sense: "Professional" scholarship does not transcend the ideological and the rhetorical. By deconstructing the dichotomy between "ephemeral" and "enduring" analysis, we learn that all scholarship, critical as weU as theoretical, scientific as well as Uterary, is contextualized by certain normative and disciplinary assumptions that change over time. With time, the cognitive

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categories that we reify today as being important, if not crucial, disciplinary assumptions, fluctuate and call into existence new assumptions. As those assumptions change, disciplinary practices likewise change. Thus the concept of "enduring" criticism is as contextualized and as "time-bound and situational" as is the criticism Campbell describes as "social." On one level, Campbell freely admits that "social" criticism is "vital" for the protection and continuation of our hard-earned social privileges as citizens and participants in a lindted American democracy. Such criticism, however, on a more relevant level, is not perceived as "enduring" and thus does not have academic significance or sanction. Even though Campbell (1974) maintains that the popular situation of "social" criticism is func­ tional, she asserts that it does not lead to the construction of disciplinary theory; thus, "[I]ts functions are immediate and ephemeral" (p. 11) and are secondary to the performance of our academic hves. In arguing that rhetorical criticism is either "social" or "professional," Campbell's position does not provide rhetorical scholars with enough space in which to work. Under such a position, scholars as "social" critics become journalists and as "professional" critics become philosophers. Either way, there is httle or no room for a "rhetorical" perspective in the criticism of oral discourse. In deconstructing the binary between "ephem­ eral" and "enduring" scholarship, I maintain that the rhetorical perspec­ tive (i.e., the temporal and ideological perspective) is not tangential to criticism, but, rather, is central to understanding the critical act. In other words, the dichotomy between "enduring" and "ephemeral" criticism provides no room for the study of discourse as the study of conflict and hegemonic ideology between unequal social participants. Although social criticism does occur, as Campbell admits that it can within the context of a professional analysis, this type of criticism is secondary ("expendable," in the words of Nothstine et al., 1994) and limited to texts lending themselves to clear statements about "theory" and "foundations." Real-world examples of persuasion are simply "illustrations or means through which the reader apprehends the nature of symbolic processes themselves" (Campbell, 1974, p. 12). Campbell clearly describes this sentiment when she writes, "In some cases, social criticism suggests directions for academic criticism by focusing attention on areas and acts in which fiindamental symbolic processes exist or may be most evident" (p. 13). In other words, the main criterion for professional criticism is its applicability to human communication processes and not to more localized social statements; those rhetorical phenomena that do not have a dis­

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tinctly theoretical bent are marginaUzed and ignored by the practicing traditional disciplinary scholar. In addition, "professional" criticism ex­ cludes nonprofessionals from its audience and thus forfeits the larger social force of the critic's observations. The above view of rhetorical scholarship concretely distinguishes be­ tween "theory" and "praxis"; theory is intended to be disengaged from the popular world. As Campbell (1974) explains, "I take it as self-evident that a methodology . . . confining itself to explaining immediate, instrumental effects cannot have enduring rhetorical significance unless rhetoric is to be defined as the art of successfiil manipulation" (p. 10). Theory, in short, does not lead to praxis; rather, theory leads to a knowledge of definitions and of boundaries. Instead of viewiivg rhetoric as giving shape to the contours of society, a binary view of "social" and "professional" scholarship limits theory to givir\g shape to the contours of "rhetoric." "Academic" rhetorical theory and criticism, from Campbell's position, do not change the world; they create the norms of disciplinary behavior and practice. In an important sense, the theoretical position represented by Campbell's essay squarely contrasts with the biases and concerns of my version of a redescribed and critical disciplinary scholarship, one taking seriously Marx's explicit injunction in his "Thesis on Feuerbach" that the point of philosophy is to change the world (reprinted in Marx & Engels, 1970, p. 123). Criticism and the Issue of "Reality" The concept of "reality" is an important axis underlying the criterion of "enduring" criticism, as in Campbell's (1974) statement, professional criticism is "enduring because rhetorical theory deals with symbolic pro­ cesses that are inherent in the human condition" (p. 12). Accordingly, "reality" involves an ontological description of rhetoric in relationship to an ahistorical human existence. As a precariously difficult concept, how­ ever, "reality" means different things to different theorists. For example, as John Dewey explains, " '[R]eality' is a term of value or choice" (quoted in Rorty, 1991d, p. 73). In our current discussion, the term reality, within a "professional" conception of rhetoric, is found in those "masterpiece" essays creating "touchstones" or "exemplars" of criticism. Here, theory is empowered to separate the "false" from the "real" through an "economical and forceful method for specifying significant outcomes and describing critical excel­ lence" (Campbell, 1974, p. 11). The point of criticism, as deUneated by

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this position, involves distitiguishing between the essential qualities of rhetoric, on the one hand, and the ephemeral conditions of its effects, on the other. For Campbell, certain "touchstone" writings, such as Burke's essay on Adolf Hitler's book, Mein Kampf, are not marked by the sigruficance of their social critique; rather, they are marked by the specific way they emphasize the contours of rhetoric's a priori boundaries. These "touch­ stone" essays "become illustrations or means through which the reader apprehends the nature of symbolic processes themselves" (Campbell, 1974, p. 12):

The enduring contributions of criticism to rhetorical theory are the discov­ ery of forms that permit and evoke participation, of processes that transcend argumentative controversies and immediate situations, of transformations that restructure perception and create new perceptions, of syntheses of substantive stylistic stratagems that form genres of rhetoric, and of arche­ typal forms of interaction, (p. 12)

As opposed to a critical and postmodern rhetoric, one focused upon the unique struggles of resistance to particular practices and oppressions, a professionalized rhetoric celebrates as important that which is fundamen­ tal to "rhetoric" across time and culture. Disciplinary rhetorical studies, in the above view, are something larger than a study of the cultural articulations of particular rhetorical acts, the analysis of which Campbell relegates to the reporting of journalism. For this reason, such a position is unacceptable from the critical perspective I forward in this book. In contrast to the concept of "professional" criticism, a neo-pragmatist approach to rhetorical criticism is necessarily social, as well as disciplinary; it involves breaking down "particular" individual barriers to human soli­ darity. More specifically, Rorty (1979) explains, "[T]he cultural role of the edifying philosopher [1 substitute the word critic] is to help us avoid the self-deception which comes from believing that we know ourselves by knowing a set of objective facts" (p. 3 7 3 ) . Easily, we can apply Rorty's description of the critic's persona to the phenomenon of a redescribed disciplinary rhetorical criticism. Thus, although rhetorical criticism is "social" in the sense it applies to contingent, real-world situatioris, it cannot be reduced to "journalism"—a cultural practice purporting to depict "facts," but typically contributing to the reification of the status quo (cf Herman & Chomsky, 1988; Parenti, 1986). My idea of rhetorical criticism differs from Campbell's sense of "journalism" in that social

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analysis cultivates an increased resistance to the status quo, one aimed at deconstructing the cult of commercialization and commodification bind­ ing members of American society to the source of their material and spiritual oppression. In a sense, the portrayal of rhetoric as exclusively "professional" is a classic example of what Marx means by "alienation." As C. J. Arthur (1970) explains, in its traditional Marxist sense, alienation is "a process whereby a subject suffers from dependence upon an apparently external agency that was originally his [or her] own product" (p. 15; for an extended discussion of alienation in Marx, see Arthur, 1986, pp. 5-44; and Fromm, 1961/1992, pp. 43-58). In seeking to define the metaphysical nature of rhetoric, Campbell's position "alienated" her from her "labor" because she reified a concept that she, herself, helped to create. Because rhetoric, independent of human beings, does not have any boundaries or "essence," it does not exist except from within the conceptualizations of scholars. Similar to the worker who does not realize that she or he has been alienated from the wealth of her or his labor, Campbell limited her critical powers by approaching rhetoric as a phenomenon to be documented empirically rather than as a critical empowerment for the reconceptualization of society.

CHALLENGING THE METAPHYSICAL

READINGS OF KENNETH BURKE

The essentializing of Kenneth Burke de-emphasizes his example of a critic able to produce both "professional" and "social" criticism. More specifically, although Burke is a "professional" critic in the ser\se that he constructs theories describing rhetoric's "boundaries," the parameters of these boundaries are rather fluid, indicating social, rather than metaphysi­ cal, concerns in Burke's "philosophy" of rhetoric. Such features in Burkean theory are de-emphasized when scholars maintain a rigid distinction between "professional" and "social" criticism. In developing the above claims, I contend that the "disciplinary" and "philosophical" view of Burke is the dominant view held by scholars in Speech Communication. Evidence for this position can be found in a recent series of colloquies in The Quarterly Journal of Speech (Brock, 1992; Chesebro, 1992, 1994; Condit, 1992; Tomkins & Cheney, 1993). In extending this claim, I fiirther maintain that many scholars, by ignoring

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the relevance of Burke's Marxism, downplay his corpus of time-bound social criticisms, reify his ideas in light of a metaphysical language and professional assumptions, and represent Burke as a systemic philosopher of language (cf. Schiappa SiKeehner, 1991). This section is organized along the following lines. First, I maintain that the positioning of Burke in relationship to the dichotomy between "ephem­ eral" and "enduring" criticism blurs or obfuscates the distinction between "social" and "academic" scholarship. In so doing, I document the specific social implications of Burke's essay, "The Rhetoric of Hitler's 'Battle,' " (see Burke, 1941/1973) as well as the social implications of Permanence and Change (Burke, 1984b). Second, I argue that there is a general tendency to reify Burke's critical observations as theoretical constructs, a tendency that can be resisted through a more careful historization. Third, I argue that some of the specific and contemporary appropriations of Burke by scholars in our literature are foundationalist and counterproductive to Burke's larger social agenda.

Burke's Obfuscation of the Enduring/Ephevneral Dichotomy Burke's example as an extra-disciplinary scholar obfuscates the distinc­ tion between "professional" and "academic" scholarship. More specifi­ cally, Burke's identity as a "professional" theorist cannot be separated from his larger identity as a "social" critic. As I illustrate, scholarship for Burke is a study of society and its motivations, values, and "logological" relation­ ships. In this important sense, Burkean scholarship is sociological and rhetorical. Joseph R. Gusfield (1989) emphasizes this point particularly well:

For Burke . . . society is best studied through the symbolic content of its culture. This includes examining not only language in the narrow sense of conveying information but the ceremonies and rituals through which that common culture is created and perpetuated. An analysis of society is thus an analysis of its linguistic frameworks, its vocabularies, and of the symbols with which it describes itself, (p. 29)

In formulating his methods of criticism. Burke was workitig toward a theory of language that could recognize the human propensity for violence

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and war, while, at the same time, offer a "purification" for those violent tendencies (see, e.g.. Burke, 1976). As he writes in A Grammar of Motives: (Hjuman thought may be directed towards "the purification of wai;" not perhaps in the hope that war can be eliminated from any organism that, like [the human), has the motives of combat in [its] very essence, but in the sense that war can be refined to the point where it would be much more peaceful than the conditions we would now call peace. (Burke, 1969a, p. 3 0 5 ) Burke is not loyal t o disciplinary assumptions of "truth" nor t o the poUtics of a disciplinary practice, but rather to his own public vision o f a better social world. As the above suggests. Burke offers a clear example of a critic who cannot be characterized within the conditions o f Campbell's "ephemeral" and "social" dichotomy. Nevertheless, Campbell transforms Burke's essay, "The Rhetoric of Hitler's 'Battle,' " from a praxis-oriented study o f the appeal o f fascism and anti-Semitism into a study that has "identified" an important ontological condition or status within the canon o f rhetorical theory: In the hands of Burke, Mein Kampf becomes an illustration through which the reader experiences and understands the processes of symbolically trans­ forming the mythic principles of one universal thought, in this case, Chris­ tianity, into a potent ideology, in this case, Nazism. (Campbell, 1974, p. 12) Burke's importance as a critic in his essay on Mein Kampf is his descrip­ tion o f what Campbell considers the transcendent "forms" and arguments of discourse. In a sense, proponents of a critical rhetoric, like myself, would agree with Campbell's argument in that, armed with Burke's study, critics may find it easier to write a similar study of a more culturally resonant and contemporary discourse. The issue I raise with this characterization o f Burke, however, is that it implies that he "discovered" some itJierent rhetorical processes taking place ahistorically and informing the human condition. I disagree with this view and assert that the importance o f Burke's criricism o f Hitler is located in its historical context. For its day, Burke's essay was an attempt t o warn American intellectuals o f Hitler and Hitler's brand o f fascism and to help prevent "the concocring o f similar medicine in America" (Burke, 1941/1973, p. 191). Whether or not Burke's

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essay, when originally published in The Southern Review during the summer of 1939, had any tangible social significance in fighting Hitler's fascism is beside the point. At issue is my argument that, with an increased visibility and cultural ethos, professional critics could improve the quality of Ameri­ can life by disseminating critiques, similar to Burke's in tone, through a wider contemporary poUtical and intellectual audience. From a discipliriary point of view, the importance of Burke's essay can be found less in its construction or contribution to the "canon" of rhetori­ cal theory, and more in the direction it pointed, and in the precedent it set, for further disciplinary scholarship. Burke's essay may not have pro­ tected us against Hitler in 1939, because Hitler had already attained the power necessary to wage war, but it may help protect us against some future "Hitler" by encouraging rhetorical scholars to pay more careful and critical attention to the propaganda of our leaders. As Rorty (1994) explains, the practice of contemporary criticism in a democracy "is a matter of spelling out the consequences of the choices [people] face (between, for example, American or Australian counterparts of Hitler and the opposing candi­ dates) in ever more imaginative, detailed, concrete ways" (p. 122). Although Burke's famous critique of fascism stands out as exemplary criticism, we can also learn to appreciate Burke's downplayed or ignored, but equally scathing, critique of capitalism. Burke's critique of capitaUsm, while spelling out the consequences of oppressive linguistic practices, comprises a larger portion of his writings in his early years (i.e., through the essays collected and published as The Phihsophy of Uterary Form, Burke, 1941/1973) than does his critique of fascism. By embracing one, Burke's critique of fascism, but neglecting the other, Burke's critique of capitalism, we do Burke's memory a great disservice. More specifically, by reading Burke as constructing an essentialist theory of rhetoric rather than as a critic responding to capitalist hegemony and consumerism, Burke's work, for us, becomes less of a heuristic for cultural response and more of an academic reification to be resisted. The point of contention between the heuristic uses of Burke and the professional reifications of his theoretical positions becomes accentuated in the example of Burke's analysis of Hitler's text, Mein Kampf. In his essay. Burke anticipated much of the aggression implicit in Hider's diatribes against the Jews. For example, on the basis of Hitler's discourse and its success in uniting Germany, Burke (1941/1973) was able to conclude, "Men [and women] who can unite on nothing else can unite on the basis

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of a foe shared by all" (p. 193). This important observation, later codified as "identification by antithesis" (Burke, 1972, p. 28), is arguably a more socially beneficial observation than is the creation or articulation of a rhetorical "truism" in the sense of Campbell's "permanent" criticism. Rather than appealing to this transcendent quality, Burke's specific obser­ vation in his essay helps to explicate much of the rationales and motiva­ tions as well as the specific appeal of Hitler's discourse. Although, coinci­ dentally, Burke's observation can be beneficial in understanding human motivation within a larger and more general rhetorical environment, the fact still remains that within the context of his original essay. Burke produced a practical and applied piece of localized criticism. Even though Hitler has been dead for 50 years, an understanditig of how he worked and why he was successful is no less important today in an age of an increased social and economic turmoil. No doubt, even in 1997, new "Hitlers" are waiting in the wings to prey on our weaknesses and our failure to monitor closely the symbolic cues affecting human motivation. Russia and Italy, for instance, now have established fascist parties that must be closely watched (cf Harris, 1994). Contrary to the way Burke has been systemically appropriated, he was not constructing a rhetorical edifice upon which to situate a later, more developed, theory when he wrote "The Rhetoric o f Hitler's 'Battle.' " Rather, Burke viewed himself as raising a flag of caution to "business as usual" among the intelligentsia of this country. For example, as Burke (1941/1973) keenly points out in a message as relevant to America today as it was in 1939, "Already, in many quarters of our country, we are 'beyond' the stage where we are being saved from Nazism by our virtues. And fascist integration is being staved off, rather, by the εοηβα$ among our vices" (p. 192). Burke, writing after Munich and before Germany's invasion of Poland, was sensitive to Hitler's "promise" of greatness to Germany, and to the volatile rhetoric of that promise, which he saw through the devious facade of Hider's national and international manipulations. For Burke, the student of language, Munich could not be the "end" of Hitler's threat to Europe or the "end" of the threat of an internal fascism rising from the sewers of this country. In short, as a self-styled "Word-man" (Burke, 1968a, p. 256), Burke is suspicious of Hitler's promise of "peace." As Burke enjoins us, "Let us watch [Hitler] carefully..." (1941/1973, p. 191); indeed, even though Hitler, himself, is dead, we should continue closely to watch him and his contemporary associates wherever they may be found.

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Burke is distrustful of Hitler because Burke is serisitive to the dangerous motivations implicit in Hitler's discourse. Burke, however, is interested in more than just a critique of Hitler's rantings; he is more interested in Hitler's appeal and successful ethos in a nation as cultured as Germany. He is worried that Hitler's appeal might also take hold in a less cultured society, an American society already seething with xenophobia, national­ ism, demagoguery, racism, bigotry, and anticommunism. Thus, as Burke (1941/1973) defined the critic's job, as related to the resistance of fascism in 1939, " [ 0 ] u r anti-Hitler B a t t l e . . . is to find all available ways of making the Hiderite distortions of religion apparent, in order that politicians of his kind in America be unable to perform a similar swindle" (p. 2 1 9 ) . Burke's main observation in his essay is "that Hider appeals by relying upon a bastardization of fundamentally religious patterns of thought" (p. 2 1 9 ) . Burke argues that "it is the corrupters of religion who are a major menace to the world today, in giving the profound patterns of religious thought a crude and sinister distortion" (p. 219). With his essay. Burke presents what could be considered an exemplary piece of praxis-informed criticism. In an important sense, his study of Hitler is prototypical in that it represents the type of scholarship advocated in this book. Burke's study can be considered a prototype or paradigm of a praxis-informed rhetorical criticism that scholars in our field have readily available to draw upon. Until some "better" work supplants it—better from the point of view of a more effective critical engagement—^Burke's essay remains one of the standards, a human standard, by which ideological criticism can be measured. Burke's standard of excellence as a theorist and critic remains a human standard, because, as Rorty (1994) explains," [T] he cash value o f a claim to truth is the claim to be able to justify what one says, because justification is always justification to a particular audience in this world rather than to a culture-transcendent tribunal of reason" (p. 125). Thus the "truthfulness" of Burke's essay involves its localized critical contribu­ tions, emphasizing the pragmatic and temporal importance of its claims. In this way, Burke may be viewed as more than a writer of the 1930s. His analysis of capitalism and of culture supersedes the conditions of that period by "naming" a historical situation, one remaining within the parameters of our contemporary social contingencies. In this important sense, Burke's past is our present; his criticisms are a way for us to help change our future.

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Learning to Resist the Reification of Burkean Theory Scholars should learn to resist the reification of Burkean theory, chang­ ing Burke from an edifying social critic to a systemic philosopher of language. Though inevitable at some level, the reification of Burkean critical perspectives in the form of systemic rhetorical theory contributes to our disciplinary dependency on Burke as an agent sanctioning or codifying our discipUnary scholarship. In questioning this dependency, I explain some of the causes for the changes in Burke's audience and encourage an appropriation of Burke highlighting his exemplary moral and social interventions with popular culture. .

The reification of Burkean perspectives is a phenomenon that has been noted by other scholars. In particular, Berr\ard Brock (1992) best places his finger on the phenomenon when he warns, "Kenneth Burke is in danger of becoming the modern day Aristotle" (p. 347). According to Brock, Aristotle has frequently been viewed by scholars in our discipline as writing the "first" and "last" book on rhetorical theory. Similarly, the tendency to be resisted at all times is to view Burke as finishing Aristotle's project for rhetoric. In other words, our habit of essentializing Burke and tuinitig him into an archetype can be resisted in order for our Burkean-informed scholarship to be utilized in ever more effective areas of cultural, rather than foundationalist, analysis. The prevalent tendency among some scholars to turn Burke from a radical social critic into an institutionalized systemic philosopher of lan­ guage has been recognized and cautioned against by Edward Schiappa and Mary Keehner (1991). As these writers explain, much of Burke's earlier writings have become decontextualized from their critical, historical, and political circumstances and have become, instead, refigured as theoretical texts. When considering the traditional bias against historicism in the academy, the decontextualization of Burke is not surprising. The example that Schiappa and Keehner develop in great detail involves the history of Burke's (1984b) socialist tract. Permanence and Change. Origii\ally titled, "A Treatise on Communication," Permanence and Change explores the communicative relationships between people in society as manifested through motives, ethics, and politics. By focusing on the different "per­ spectives" de-emphasized within the context of a capitalist hegemony. Burke offers alternative rationales for augmenting society with a socialistic agenda.

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In their article, Schiappa and Keehner (1991) illustrate that Burke's book was offered to a nonacademic and socially engaged reading public as a tool designed to contribute strategically to a popular critique of society. As these scholars report, the original 1935 announcement for Perrmtnence and Change hailed the book as a tract intended "to work out a usohle attitude toward the present" (p. 196). Over the years, however, the public receiving Burke's book has changed, as have the parameters of the book itself. With these modifications in the book and changes in society, the audience for Burke's book is no longer popular, it is academic. The above point is explicitly developed by Schiappa and Keehner. In tracing the alterations to this text through a series of reprints and editions, these scholars conclude that Burke's book has lost its "timely" and critical, as well as its cultural, implications—its socialist bent. As they explain. Burke, like other socialists or socialist sympathizers in this country, was caught in the anticommunist demands of a nationalist hysteria in the 1950s. In the 1953 prologue to Permanence and Change, Burke alludes to "present conditions," making his overt references in support of commu­ nism impossible (p. xlix). Reflecting formidable and reactionary pressures, Burke's book was modified to de-emphasize its overtly socialist and critical tones. Still, even with these significant modifications, the book maintains its critical persona; thus a fuller explanation as to why scholars no longer read it as a book on criticism must be expanded. Schiappa and Keehner provide this rationale and argue that Burke's book on socialism has, in effect, been refigured so that its critical and praxis-orientated edges have lost their historicity and have been viewed more timelessly and theoretically. This condition is lamentable, because, as Schiappa and Keehner explain, Burke's writings reflect a great period in this nation's history in which intellectuals were working to enact the promises of a socialist revolution and the reformation of our national, social, and cultural infrastructures (see Aaron, 1961/1992; Jacoby, 1987). In theii struggles to make America a more congenial place to live, these patriot authors had an important symbolic, if not material, influence in liberalizing American politics and cultural Ufe following the Great Depres­ sion. In a paradigm-establishing (according to Wald, 1992) history of the American Uterary left, Daniel Aaron (1961/1992) concludes: We who precariously survive in the sixties can regret [the] inadequacies and failures [of the socialist authors], their romanticism, their capacity for self-deception, their shrillness, their self-righteousnesses. It is less easy to scorn

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their efforts, however blundering and ineffective, to change the world, (p. 396) Due to the above concerns involving theoretical as well as cultural issues, Schiappa and Keehner suggest caution by disciplinary practitioners of rhetorical theory when refiguring Burke as an ahistorical theorist of language. Whereas Burke certainly can be read as contributing to a set of postulates defiiung a larger and more transcendent theory of discourse, another productive utilization of Burkean perspectives involves a greater disciplinary commitment to social scholarship. As Schiappa and Keehner (1991) illustrate in their study of Permanence and Change, Burke's early writings "can be called rhetorical in the most conventional sense of being aimed at moving the reader toward a specific course of action, namely socialism" (p. 196). According to these authors, the transformation of Burke from a cultural to an academic writer place along the following lines: The cumulative effect of the specific syntactic changes, in word choice, and deletions and the addition of introduction and concluding discussions is to transform PC from a rhetorical treatise into a more purely contemplative (theoretical) text. As a result, the current text resembles a late-twentieth century Ivory Tower Marxism more than the "revolutionary" Marxism found in the 1935 text. (Schiappa & Keehner, 1991, p. 196) While observing how the current appropriation of Burke's work has focused on academic or philosophical readings, we may recall that Campbell isolates Burke's study of Hitler as a special exemplar of criticism giving theory a "foundation" in the a priori conditions of communication. These conditions are portrayed as necessary; they delineate the realm of commu­ nication as common to oli human experience. As Campbell (1974) explains, the importance of Burke's study derives from its ability to aid "the reader [in] apprehend [ing] the nature of symbolic processes themselves" (p. 12). Although such a move is indicative of a larger scholarly direction toward professional values and philosophical objectivity, such epistemo­ logical predispositions within our discipline have turned Burke from the social activist he was, into the disciplinary theorist he has become. Burke, himself however, must take some of the blame for this essentializing tendency with regard to his work. As his writings progressed and developed, he, himself de-emphasized his praxis orientations (or at least couched them in a more overtly metaphysical language). In many ways, the "older" Burke

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Strove to be recognized as a philosopher; his writings, from A Grammar of Motives (1945/1969a) onward, appear to represent this effort. Analyzing Contemporary Reifications of Burkean Philosophy In the previous section, I argued that a strong tendency exists in our field reifying Burke in systemic ways. In this section, I turn to a more specific analysis of actual instances of this reification in our scholarship and argue that this practice is foundationalist and counterproductive to the social potential of Burkean scholarship. A scholar sensitive to the subtle shift in tone between "epistemological" and "ontological" concerns in Burke's writing is James Chesebro, a promi­ nent writer in our discipline (see also Rueckert, 1982, p. 129; and Over­ ington, 1977, p. 134). In a number of places, Chesebro maintains that Burke transformed himself from his earlier social concern with epistemol­ ogy and moved toward a greater concern with the ontology and philosophy of symbol-use. Specifically, Chesebro (1989) argues that Burke, by his later years, developed an ontology of language, a system known as "Dramatism." For Chesebro, this becomes particularly evident in Burke's assertion, "Dramatism is literal" (Burke, 1968c, p. 448). With his own synthesizing narrative of Burke's development on this issue, Chesebro (1989) explains how this transformation occurred: In 1968, Kenneth Burke posited a fundamental change in his conception of symbol-using. . . . Burke's conception of symbol-using was to be expanded to prove, not only a method for explication of symbol-using in practice, but also a foundation for identifying basic literal or phenomenal distinctions which determined how and why human beings communicate, (p. 180)

In addition to developing the above theme in numerous journal articles and at recent convention panels devoted to the disciplinization of Burke, Chesebro (1993) also introduces his recently edited book on the Burkean "system" with the terms of an essentialist, philosophical language. As Chesebro (1993) explains his goal for "extending" Burke's philosophical system, "I want to establish a foundation from which the Burkean system is viewed" (p. xiii). In light of Burke's tremendous appeal to many scholars in our field and the subsequent need to systematize this appeal, Chesebro's

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edited collection attempts to canonize Burke as a philosopher so as to build, strengthen, and unify a "Burkean" theoretical disciplinary appara­ tus. Yet by viewitig Burke's theoretical and critical perspectives as a "system," Chesebro, as well as other scholars who contributed to his book, attributes to Burke much more intellectual coherence and systematization than is consistent with the tone of Burke's more iconoclastically written texts. Burke is, at his best, a perspectivist, a thinker finding that the language of a critical or a theoretical "system" interferes with the task of producing practical, social insight. Bernard Brock (1993), an important Burkean scholar who contributed to Chesebro's collection of essays, extends the ontological theme of Chese­ bro's argument when he documents Burke's shift from a study of episte­ mology to a study of ontology, a "final" intellectual move making Burke "postcritical, as Burke's concern is now with human symbol using itself (p. 318). As Brock explains, "Essentially, the evolution of Burke's philoso­ phy of rhetoric is the increased centrality of symbol using" (p. 3 2 7 ) . Although "correct" in the sense that Burke's later writings do emphasize the importance of symbol-use within the conditions of the human experi­ ence. Brock's characterization is somewhat misleading. Burke's "shift" from an "epistemological" to an "ontological" condition cannot be char­ acterized as "postcritical" or as a rejection of the "social" in Burke's thought. Although it is the case that Burke's later writings are more "theoretical" than "critical," this is a distinction I actively question. For instance, Burke's emphasis on the centrality of symbol-use in humans, while ostensibly theoretical, also involves the study of its practical (criti­ cal) implications. Burke's later writings are intensely critical and social, as well as theoretical. In other words, Burke's "ontology" of language is his effort to illustrate how our axiological beliefs are dependent upon linguis­ tic, thus material and social, conditions. With the goal of systematizing Burke's contributions to disciplinary rhetorical theory, both Chesebro and Brock claim that Burke's thought was "evolving" and developing through various stages. Considering that Burke published for nearly 70 years, it is inevitable that change occurred in his thinking. However, there is an important difference between postu­ lating a "change" and postulating an "evolution" in Burke's thought. To write that Burke "changed" throughout his career is simply to state, in as neutral terms as possible, that Burke's interests were diverse, reflecting the great dimensions of his complex and comprehending mind.

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However, the "evolutionary" metaphor adopted by both Chesebro and Brock embodies certain assumptions my critical reading of Burke resists. The evolutionary metaphor implies that Burke was only coming into his own as a thinker by his "final," most "mature," stage—the state privileged by both Chesebro and Brock; the evolutionary model of Burke's work measures the worth of Burke's corpus by the standard of its terminal ideas. More specifically, the metaphor of "evolution" privileges ends rather than beginnings or middles, themselves metaphors designating different changes in a writer's development (cf Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, pp. 14-21). In effect, Chesebro's and Brock's assumption of a Burkean "evolution," acting as a metonymic positioning of Burke into a disciplinary agenda privileging theory over criticism, reifies Burke in ways creating more distance between him and the society he desired to change. As a neo-pragmatist, 1 do not find the positions of Chesebro and Brock to be "wrong." In fact, their ideas and arguments are sophisticated and are effective within the context of their research agendas and disciplinary practice; each does an excellent job at documenting Burke's strengths as a metaphysician. In light of Chesebro's and Brock's competent scholarship, my stance is that, whereas Burke can be read as a metaphysician, there are more direct ways of utilizing Burke as an active agent of social critique. In short. Burke was too stimulating a social thinker, too much engaged in trying to expand the cultural dialectic against the encroachment of totali­ tarian thought, too iconoclastic a writer to be reduced to a disciplinary icon. As much as Burke may have enjoyed the professional attention he was awarded by the SCA and similar organizations in other fields, and as much as he earned that attention, I am convinced that Burke would have been more satisfied with less emphasis on "Burkean" scholarship and with more emphasis on a social criticism and influence informed by his writings. As suggested in the above passages, the tendency to essentialize Burke and to view his work as contributing to a systemic philosophy of commu­ nication is strong. Illustrating this tendency, the writings or reflections of Campbell, Chesebro, Brock, and Schiappa and Keehner exemplify many of the pressures, disciplinary as well as historical, tending to position Burke into philosophical categories. Furthermore, as mentioned earlier. Burke himself contributes to this reading by embracing, with his language, certain essen­ tialist or metaphysical assumptions. For example, in the opening pages of A Grammar of Motives, originally published in 1945, Burke explains, "The book is concerned with the basic forms of thought which, in accordance

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with the nature of the world as all men [and women] necessarily experience it, are exemplified in the attributing of motives" (1945/1969a, p. xv, emphases added). From the point of view of a redescribed disciplinary practice, Burke's use of essentialized and philosophical language, manifested throughout his later writings, should not be considered a crippling critique of Burke's larger project. For instance, as his writings were not seiisitive to the gender issues of language raised in later years (Condit, 1992), Burke, likewise, was not sensitive to the poststructuralist and neo-pragmatic critique of philo­ sophical language. Because it is anachronistic to impose our contemporary expectations on a historical text, we have to judge Burke by the language used in his time (cf Rorty, 1984). In this sense, we read Burke's critical perspectives through the lens of his metaphysical language, "discounting" for that language, but recognizing it as an inseparable part of Burke's larger corpus.

THEORY AS E Q U I P M E N T

FOR SOCIAL ACTION:

KENNETH BURKE, RHETORIC,

AND IDEOLOGICAL CRITIQUE

As a means of rounding out my analysis of the use of Burke by theorists in rhetorical studies, I turn to my own interpretation of Burke. I specifically argue that Burke is best utilized as an ideological social critic, one encour­ aging scholars to engage in an increased social praxis. In order to substan­ tiate this claim, I present the following two arguments. First, while the breadth of Burke's writitvgs resists classification. Burke can be ftinctionally appropriated as a social critic. In conjunction with his reading of European and American social theory, and in concert with the contemporary intel­ lectual life of his time. Burke was engaged in cultivating a popular resis­ tance to the totalitarian pressures of scientism, commodification, and commercialism. Second, I argue that Burke's praxis-oriented scholarship was informed by his rhetoric of form. In exploring this concept, I historicize Counter-Stoianent (1931/1968b) and discuss Burke's successful effort to merge the "aesthetic" with the "political." After engaging in this histori­ zation, I relocate Burke's theory of form as a neo-pragmatic praxis for contemporary scholarship.

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Burke's Commitment to Social Criticism In asserting the above positions, I reaUze that Burke's career as a writer spanned nearly seven decades and included millions of printed words, not all of which emphasized political concerns. In addition, I recognize, along with Stanley Edgar Hyman, that Burke resists all attempts at classification. As Hyman explains, Burke's writing is so original and challenging to traditional explorations of language and literature, so eclectic and expan­ sive in the breadth of its sources, that Hyman (1947/1955) assigns Burke his own discipline: "Burkology" (p. 3 5 9 ) . Indeed, Burke, throughout his professional life, his incredible span o f production and intellectual achievement, continued to grow in relationship to the contingencies of his time and the ideas that matured with and through him during the 20th century. As Samuel B. Southwell (1987) explains: Most of what has occurred in the explosive development of critical theory in recent decades has been anticipated and often quite fully developed in the work of one man, Kenneth Burke. A revised Marxism, a revised Freudianism, hermeneutics, structuralism, semiotics, reader-response the­ ory, theory of ritual, speech-act theory, even a kind of decoi«tructionism, and much else that is called postmodernism—it is all to be found in Burke, however improbable such an accomplishment may seem. (p. 1)

As Southwell suggests. Burke, in many ways, anticipated the intellec­ tual and national trends directing and giving shape to contemporary academia. Burke played an important part in helping to conceptualize and expand the larger, contemporary humanistic research agenda and meth­ odology contributing to the disciplinary practices of Speech Communica­ tion. Although Burke's ideas grew and matured into wider areas of inquiry, like those suggested above by Southwell, we also, as a discipline, developed alongside of Burke. For instance, at the time of his death in 1993 at the age of 96, Burke was, after all, older than our discipline that, over the weekend of Burke's death, celebrated its 79th anniversary. To place this point within a historical/intellectual perspective: when Burke's important essay, "Psychology and Form," was first published by The Dial in July 1925, our own disciplinary organ. The Quarterly Journal of Speech (QJS), was only 10 years old. SampUng Volume 11 of QJS reveals that rhetoricians in our discipline were ideologically unsophisticated as critics and preoccupied with neo-Aristotelian and classical paradigms for theory and criticism (see, e.g., Bauer, 1925; Hannah, 1925; Utterback, 1925).

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Although the above diversity and complexity of Burke's thought chal­ lenges my primary conceptualization of him as a social critic, I maintain that as a thinker Burke has a greater social applicability than his appro­ priation and utilization by disciplinary rhetorical theorists, who only turned to Burke in 1952 after Marie Hochmuth Nichols promoted him as "the most profound student of rhetoric now writing in America" (p. 144). For Burke, however, rhetoric was never a disciplinized activity, as it has been perceived by scholars in our field; rather, rhetoric was a perspective, one among many, that could be utilized toward certain critical or theoreti­ cal ends. As Burke (1950/1969b) explains, "Something of the rhetorical motive comes to lurk in every 'meaning,' however purely 'scientific' its pretensions. Wherever there is persuasion, there is rhetoric. And wherever there is 'meaning,' there is 'persuasion' " (p. 172). The key, for Burke, was to focus on specific rhetorical motives and specific rhetorical acts—in a sense, to read culture through a road map of strategic meaning. As a writer. Burke was never formally disciplinized within the con­ straints of a particular professional community; indeed. Burke eschewed the limitations of disciplinary thought. Rather, Burke ventured on his own to carve new paths inspired by his burning moral and social imperatives. As Aaron (1961/1992) and Jacoby (1987) illustrate in their respective works, such a practice was not unusual for intellectuals of Burke's time. To be a "modern" intellectual in the 1920s and 1930s did not mean to be an academician; then, as in the present, academic discourse supported bourgeois culture and politics. In rejecting a formal university education for himself. Burke rejected a bourgeois life and joined a long tradition of thinkers—theorists and activists who never benefited from a college degree, yet managed to make important contributions to national and world culture. Unlike scholars currently writing in our field, however, Burke's under­ standing of rhetoric derived from this interaction with "society" and with the dominant critics of culture whose ideas Burke made his own. In a sense. Burke did not approach rhetoric as an object of study; rather. Burke learned to appreciate rhetorical processes as the inevitable result of his cultural analysis. Thus, Burke's "discovery" of rhetoric within his own critical and social pursuits derived, in part, from his specific questioning of society's self-justifications (Brown, 1969, p. 7 ) . Further evidence for this claim is found when Burke (1950/1969b) explains, "[W]ith [idemificarion] as [an] instrument, we seek to mark off the areas of rhetoric, by showing how a

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rhetorical motive is often present where it is not usually recognized, or thought to belong" (p. xiii). Thus, while Burke's idea of rhetoric was certairJy informed by his classical education, I assert that the significance of rhetoric for Burke, its distinctly "Burkean" originality, was deduced from his study of Marx, Freud, and Nietzsche, as well as from other writers within the traditions of European continental philosophy and American pragmatism (see, e.g., Abbott, 1974; Desilet, 1989; Pettigrew, 1977). In short, by historicizing knowledge and thereby humanizing it, writers such as Marx, Freud, Nietzsche, James, and Dewey helped produce the conditions necessary for Burke to develop a cultural, as opposed to a classical, understanding of rhetoric Immersing himself in the above Euro­ pean and American intellectual traditions. Burke pieced together the strands of a 20th-century rhetorical theory. Through Freud, for example, as Lentricchia (1985) explains. Burke gave rhetoric an "uncon­ scious" (p. 1 6 0 ) . Through Marx, as a second example, Burke learned to appreciate the etymological relationship between community, commu­ nism, and communication, a relationship commented upon by Don M. Burks (1991). As Burks explains, "Burke's 'communism' thus appears to have been his own creation, a personal idea related particularly to certain of the basic ideas he was then developing about the nature of communication" (p. 220). As a last point, however, I must mention that Burke was also interested in and influenced by Shakespeare (Brown, 1969, pp. 17-18). Through Shakespeare, Burke learned to appreciate rhetoric as a force pervasive in the "drama" of human relationships. By considering the above influences on Burke's theory of rhetoric and language, I am led to where much of Burke's social consciousness began—to the study of form. The Ideological Qualities of Burke's Rhetoric of Form Burke's voice as a theotist and his persona as a cultural/social critic begins with his theory of form. Furthermore, as a social theorist, Burke's concept of "form," although originally an aesthetic issue and a response to the scientism of "modern" criticism, is also representative of his intellec­ tual shift toward the rhetoric of cultural artifacts. Thus, I suggest that a closer analysis of Burke's theory of "form" sheds light on the social utility of Burke's contribution to an ideological disciplinary scholarship.

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With his theory of form, Burke bridges the traditional gap in Western culture between "rhetoric" and "poetics," thus introducing ideological as well as rhetorical dimensions into the analysis of cultural phenomena. According to Don M. Burks (1985), in a discussion of Burke's theory of form, "Poets, playwrights, performers, and speakers all are trying to bring about collaboration, trying to induce audiences to work together with them" (p. 256). As Burke realizes, this collaboration does not exist as an end in itself. For Burke (1941/1973), "Literature," as is all art, "is equip­ ment for living" (p. 293). While Burke writes specifically about proverbs in the above text, he extrapolates, throughout his other arguments, to the position that art is "medicine," a tonic "designed for cotuolation or vengeance, for admonition or exhortation, for foretelling" (p. 2 9 3 ) . By recognizing that rhetorical elements underlie artistic and cultural expression. Burke, in his early work, establishes some of the social, or, as he calls them, "sociological," conditions that his more explicitly developed "rhetorical" theory extends. Thus Burke's theory of "rhetoric" must be understood as a social inquiry into the diffiision and reification of ideology, rather than as an ontological codification of metaphysical first principles. In particular. Counter-Statement (1931/1968b), Burke's first book of criti­ cism, especially his essay, "Psychology and Form," anticipates and accen­ tuates much that is found in Burke's later and more-developed analysis of rhetoric and cultural practice. Historicizing the Social Contributions o/Counter-Statement Before delving into "Psychology and Form," 1 contextualize CounterStatement in its historical environment. In so doing, I argue that the book served an important social function at the time of its publication and that, relocated in the present, this social function can be reaffirmed. Placed in its original environment, Counter-Statement highlights an important shift in Burke's early writing; in many ways, the text documents Burke's transformation from an aesthetician to a rhetorician, with a wider view of art as a social economy. As William H. Rueckert (1982) argues, "[T]he whole aesthetic theory developed [in Counter-Statement] turns upon the idea that the norms of psycho-physical experience are the materials of art, that these norms link poet and audience and make possible the triple function of poetry as revelation, ritual, and rhetoric" (p. 4 1 ) , Burke (1931/1968b), himself, recognizes this broadening of aesthetics

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when he argues that his theory of form is a "logical" exteivsion of his concern for "the varied ways in which men [and women] seek by symbolic means to make themselves at home in social teiisions" (p. xi). In historicizing Counter-Statement, I suggest that its collection of essays were intended by Burke to be a response to the conditions of his era. For example, in a 1934 letter to Malcolm Cowley, Burke explains. I think that everything in [PC] was implicit in my essay on "Psychology and Form" . . . 1 have simply extended a criticism of art until it included areas of production which do not happen, in the language of common sense, to be called art. [PC] is an elaborate plea for the poetic metaphor, as against the mechanistic metaphor, in the interpretation of human purpose. (Burke & Cowley, 1990, p. 209) More specifically, as Rueckert (1982) explains, Burke's "poetic orientation" was "conceived of as a solution to the historical situation in which he found himself and his society. He proposed the poetic orientation as a counterstatement for the scientific orientation" (p. 50). Further examples of how Counter-Statement was intended to serve a social and political function in society date back to actual reviews of this work, two of which are particu­ larly illustrative. First, in 1931, Isidor Schneider wrote that Burke offers his view of the artist "as a prescription for our own times, which he views with distaste" (reprinted in Rueckert, 1969, p. 25). Second, in 1932, Harold Rosenberg recognizes that at its time of publication, the author of Counter'Statement "carries his attitude on art into its political and eco­ nomic implications" (reprinted in Rueckert, 1969, p. 28). As the above paragraph illustrates, Burke's concern with the social and political environment of this time, as best reflected in the experience of World War I and the conditions of the Great Depression, is manifested in his theoretical and critical explorations of literature. For example, in his 1952 preface to Counter-Statement, Burke (1931/1968b) distinguishes be­ tween two principles describing the relatior«hip between art and society: the "censorship principle" and the "lightning rod principle" (p. xii). Burke overtly identifies his theory of art with the latter principle and argues that art purifies society "by draining-off dangerous charges, as lightning rods are designed, not to 'suppress' danger, but to draw it into harmless chan­ nels" (p. xii). In this sense. Burke recognizes that art is a sociological practice serving ideological functions—what 1 identify as praxis functions. Because the literature on praxis reflects both a conservative and a progres­

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sive social tendency, it becomes necessary to distii\guish between the "Aristotelian" and "critical" senses of praxis in Burke's theory of form. On one level, the Burkean praxis of form has Aristotelian traits; Burke writes that the lightning rod principle origiiwted with Aristotle's Poetics. In this Aristotelian sense of praxis, art serves the conservative and norma­ tive needs of a social community (as, e.g., in Aristotle's discussion of classical Greek drama). However, the point I emphasize in this section (supported by sources quoted above) is that a stronger sense of praxis exists in Burke's writing in which the praxis of form is associated with critical schools of thought. For instance, in Counter-Statement Burke presents an essay he calls "Program." In this essay, he argues as his central theme that art has historical properties serving in the interest of the status quo; art, under this view, is "a particular mode of adjustment to a particular set of conditions" (1931/1968b, p. 107). According to Burke, art serves as a persuasive tool to adjust for the variance between the desires of individual people and the needs of the social elite who control the language and discourse practices of society. In this context, "Program" is an essay well situated in the temporal conditions of the 1920s and was intended by Burke to address the contitigencies of that time (i.e., the pressures of the Great Depression and the resulting clash between socialist and capitalist epistemologies). As he writes, "The present Program speculates as to which motives and attitudes should be stressed, and which slighted, in the aesthetic adjustment to the particular conditions of today" (1931/1968b, p. 107). In other words, Burke's writings stressed the necessity in the 1920s and 1930s for communal and social interpretations of the scientistic culture of the times. The above temporal theme of merging the aesthetic with the political is not tangential to Burke's writing (for similar connections in critical theory, see Benjamin, 1936/1973). Burke (1941/1973) repeatedly illus­ trates throughout The Philosophy of Uterary Form that capitalist society uses art and communicative practices as a lightning rod to render impotent the central issues around which an organized social dissent pivots. Because Burke's writing on this issue took place during a time in American history when the pressures and contradictions of our capitalist economy had created a degenerative and inhospitable social environment, I argue that Burke's theory of art and form—which had explicit social implications for its day—has relocalized implications for understanding the mystification and identification practices of contemporary cultural appeals.

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Toward a Neo-Pragnuitic Praxis of Form Burke's theory of form can be rehistoricized as a neo-pragmatic praxis. In addition, I argue that Burke's theory of form helps sanction the reinter­ pretation of rhetorical studies as cultural studies. In order to develop both claims, I review in detail Burke's theory of form and highlight its implica­ tions for a social praxis. In Counter-Statement, Burke (1931/1968b) explains how "form is the creation of an appetite in the mind of the auditor, and the adequate satisfying of that appetite" (p. 3 1 ) . For successful art, form is an important consideration with critical overtones and implications for cultural and disciplinary praxis. In a discussion of Shakespeare, for example, Burke explains how form involves a "communicative relationship between writer and audience, with both parties actively participating" ( 1 9 4 1 / 1 9 7 3 , p. 3 2 9 ) . In more specific terms. Burke continues his discussion of this communication by explaining how form in literature, as well as in life, involves a momentary frustration between the promise of an event and its fulfillment. He offers the condition of music as a good example o f this perspective: [Music is] fitted less than any other art for imparting information, deals minutely in frustration and fulfillments of desire, and for that reason more often gives us those curves of emotion which, because they are natural, can bear repetition without loss. (1931/1968b, p. 36) In short. Burke argues, "A work [of art] has form in so far as one part of it leads a reader to anticipate another part, to be gratified by the sequence" (1931/1968b, p. 124). For Burke, form is, broadly speaking, co-constructive of an experience within a particular artistic or communicative context. Because of its socially interactive qualities, form constitutes a rhetorical element having an ideological and critical importance for the disciplinary scholar. Form is situated in cultural communication, such as in art, because, within the specific expression of an aesthetic or social norm, the audience is led to participate according to a persuader's bias. More specifically. Burke (1931/ 1968b) explains, "A form is a way of experiencing; and such a form is made available in art when, by the use of specific subject-matter, it enables us to experience in [a particular] way" (p. 143). Seen from Burke's perspective, culture constructs its social order through various media—by studying

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these media, political institutions can be understood as constitutive of our social experiences. Because of its power to direct and color human experience, form becomes an important rhetorical consideration for scholars in the analysis and critique of popular culture. As Burke suggests, through the process of constructing and analyzing form, psychological arousal is deliberatively cultivated and translated into axiological norms that can be evaluated by the carehil critic of language. By studying these norms, scholars are directed to the source of the psychological arousal supporting societal belief. In recognizing that the process of psychological arousal is neither accidental nor inconsequential. Burke invites scholars to understand how cultural practices are deliberatively cultivated by social persuaders in their effort to influence personal and national values. In this sense, Burke's contribution to social theory involves his observation that cultural appeal and manipulation frequently occut as "arguments" within all spheres of human ideological endeavors, representing an instance in which the traditional boundaries between "art" and "life" and between "poetry" and "rhetoric" become blurred. In effect. Burke, with his theory of form, has politicized societal expressions, facilitating the analysis and critique of popular culture. As Burke explains, artistic or communicative expression often creates an expectation that must be fijlfdled outside the context of the artist's or communicator's explicit appeal. Thus, "art" and/or "communication" have meaning and significance in a social realm outside their own inmiediate manifestations and, as such, can never be separated from their contextu­ alization within the larger society. Building upon this principle, rhetorical scholars, as ideological critics, learn to interact with culture at the level of its everyday manifestations. As cultural and neo-pragmatic critics, we can use Burke's rhetoric and praxis of form to study how the audience for cultural manifestations of art and politics is brought into the "logic" of their structures. By adopting this critical persona, scholars are in a position to analyze the narrative logic of society and the status quo, to test it for internal inconsistencies and ethical considerations, and to illustrate ways to adjust for its social inequities. More specifically, because the logic of a piece of art or of some cultural artifact must appeal to and, in some fiindamental way, contribute to the larger social ideology of the culture producing it, scholars can interfere with the normative tensions of society and help the citizens of this country to "repossess" their world. In Burke's (1941/1973) words:

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Art works, owing to their high degree of articulateness, are Uke "meter readings." Here all the implicit social processes become explicit. By studying them, you will discern what forms "alienation" takes as a factor in human experience, and what forms likewise arise in the attempt to combat aliena­ tion (to "repossess" one's world), (p. 308)

Another way for critics to explore the phenomenon of ideology, as articulated in culture (according to Burke's theory of form), is to under­ stand that art—both in its literal sense and as a broadly extrapolated art of culture—is a "translation" and that "every translation is a compromise" (1931/1968b, p. 54). Simply, art, the technique of hterature, painting, and sculpture, or the more general creation of cultural values, does not repre­ sent "life" nor depict an a priori aesthetic or normative condition with regard to the way human beit^s behave in society. Rather, Burke recog­ nizes that cultural expressions, such as art, economics, or politics, negotiate the conditions under which aesthetic or normative values become articu­ lated within a society. In the same sense that Foucault describes power as a constructive, rather than a repressive, force imposed upon people in a culture. Burke views society as participating in the negotiation of its political and ethical norms. It is for this reason that the attempt to control language is an important task for any government or status quo (Orwell, 1946/1995); language is the means by which people contribute to the con­ struction of their social worlds. A conscioumess of form is an important tool for critical schohrs to challenge the authority of government to control its citizens through a control ofhnguage. In other words, societal manifestations repre­ sent human perspectives as informed by those ideologues who use language to reify the domitiant normative values upon which society is constructed. In an important sense, Burke recognizes that culture functions, both through art and through communication, on an enthymematic and ideo­ logical level. As Don M. Burks (1985) explains, "Although Burke rarely uses the term enthymeme, he is preoccupied in Counter-Statcmeru as well as in A Rhetoric of Motives with what might loosely be called a theory of enthymematic collaboration" (p. 261). Furthermore, as Burke points out, culture functions rhetorically and ideologically because the mutual in­ volvement between a social structure and its citizetis is directed toward particular interests and values. These values are also implicit, as well, within the personal needs and cultural manipulatiotu of citizens who privately benefit from societal privileges, such as the privilege of private property.

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The point of my discussion is that Burke, through his analysis of form, illustrates how the people of a culture contribute to their own alienation. In combating this alienation, rhetorical scholars can illustrate to a popular culture how motivations are frequently hidden within language. Unfottu­ nately, because people often do not closely inspect for bias in the language they use or consume, they are discouraged from utilizing their linguistic powers for redescribing society. Yet when encouraged to view themselves as having the power to contribute to the articulation of their culture, people can act to change society fundamentally. This is the most basic assumption of my redefined critical scholarship; it is an assumption deeply rooted within the liberatory ideology of Marxist and critical theory, yet one recognizing the limitations of "liberation." In review, I have briefly illustrated one way of reading Burke, empha­ sizing the social importance of his critical theorizing. Specifically, Burke's early study of form anticipates much of the rhetorical theory delineated in his later writings and reinforces his commitment to social analysis. As the above discussion makes evident, "identification" and "persuasion" result, in part, from the integration of form and content within a communicative context. This is an integration to which cultural critics should be sensitive when explaining how people collaborate to create the social assumptions hindering, rather than encouraging, human solidarity.

facing the Social

Limitations of Disciplinary

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I

n Chapter 3,1 reviewed and critiqued some of the theoretical practices of discipUnary rhetorical scholars. In so doing, I offered a critical perspective that redescribes disciplinary approaches to rhetorical theory to encourage scholars to escape our dualistic thinking with regard to rhetoric, as well as our disciplinary and theoretical appropriations of Kenneth Burke. As a way of rounding out my larger argument in this book, caUing for scholars in our discipline to practice a more socially engaged research, I turn in this chapter toward exemplifying my redescribed vision for the practice of rhetorical criticism. Specifically, I argue that current critical practices in our discipline de-emphasize a socid tone and can be redescribed to engage in practical, neo-pragmatist politics. In order to support the above claim, this chapter is organized as follows. First, I review, in the order they appeared in print, four disciplinary analyses of Richard Nixon's "The War in Vietnam" address: Robert P. Newman (1970b), Hermann G. Stelzner (1971), Karlyn Kohrs Campbell (1972a), and Forbes Hill (1972a). In reviewing each study, I maintain that each perpetuates disciplinary assumptions with regard to systemic rhetori­ cal criticism. In addition, each of the above four essays can be informed by a neo-pragmatist critical perspective. Second, this chapter ends with 91

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my own neo-pragmatist criticism of Nixon's speech exemplifying the critical and ideological perspectives of my redescribed disciplinary practice.

AN A N A L Y S I S OF F O U R D I S C I P L I N A R Y

VIEWS OF NIXON'S " T H E WAR

IN V I E T N A M " A D D R E S S

The critical practices of rhetorical scholars can be informed by a greater social perspective. In particular, I have chosen these four studies for analysis because, aside from the advantage of being able to compare four perspectives of a single speech, the issues raised by these critics have had important implications for the practice of disciplinary rhetorical criticism. In addition, each of the studies is recent enough to exhibit a relatively diverse range of methodological approaches to the study of rhetorical and cultural discourse. This diversity enables my critique to be more compre­ hensive, as I am able to illustrate how a greater range of contempoiary critical methods are limited with regard to a variety of social and political impHcations. The point of this analysis is not to refute the arguments made within the four prior critiques of Nixon's address, but to emphasize their points of divergence from that of a redescribed disciplinary scholarship. More specifically, I do not disagree with the methods of the above studies—after all, the "method" I privilege, ideological criticism, is not a "method," but a perspective, a situating of critical observations in the realm of the social. My main concern with these essays is that, although two of them go as far as to suggest that Nixon was manipulatitig the American public, none explicitly condemns the war, denounces Nixon, or demands an immediate withdrawal of U.S. troops from Vietnam, as I do in my illustration of socially informed ideological rhetorical criticism. Nixon's speech was broadcast live from Washington by the three major networks on November 3,1969; the audience for this address was recorded at 72 million people (Minow, Martin, & Mitchell, 1973, p. 6 0 ) . At the time the speech took place, Nixon had been in office for 10 months and was facitig pressure to articulate his administration's policy on the Vietnam War. For instance, as part of his campaign promises, Nixon had pledged to end the war, and the American public, weary and frustrated with the previous admitustration's handling of the war, was aiuciously awaiting Nixon's "plan." Within this context, Nixon's November 3rd address was

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anticipated as a major policy statement on Vietnam. Indeed, Nixon's speech developed and defended his administration's policy on Vietnam and received strong support both in Congress and among segments of the American population (Karnow, 1991, p. 615). As Nixon (1978) explains in his memoirs, "Very few speeches actually influence the course of history. The November 3[rd] speech was one of them" (p. 410). The speech was, according to Nixon, "both a milestone and a turning point for my admini' stration" (p. 410). Specifically, Nixon introduces the government's policy for reducing American combat deaths by "Vietnamizing" the war, while at the same time he neutralizes the political impact of the antiwar protests. Analysis of Robert P. Netvman's Criticism of Nixon's Address Robert R Newman's (1970b) criticism of Nixon's address, though sus­ picious of the President, fails to press the overt condemnation of Nixon that Newman's observations enable him to assert. More specifically, the potential forcefiilness of Newman's critique is mitigated by his traditional disciplinary obligations and observations. In other words, a tension exists in Newman's essay between his private desire to condemn Nixon and his professional obligations to scholarly objectivity (for contrast, see Newman, 1987). In my analysis of Newman's essay, I illustrate the specific points where Newman substitutes an edifying critical position for a systemic disciplinary position, thus compromising the social and political implica­ tions of his scholarship. Following this section, I review Richard H. Kendall's (1970) response to Newman's essay and submit that Kendall's polemic against Newman further substantiates my claim that a tension runs through Newman's analysis and our discipline preventing many scholars from engaging in a social/political disciplinary praxis. Exploring the Tension Between Social and Disciplinary Critique in Newman's Essay Newman's (1970b) analysis of Nixon's speech is situated in a discussion of the following categories: Background, Argument, and Consequences. Through an exploration of each category, Newman describes Nixon's rhetorical appeal as interpreted through the lens of the situational con­ straints contextualizing Nixon's persuasive efforts. In exploring these situational constraints, specifically the influence of the October 15th War

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Moratorium, Newman explicates the circumstances behind the speech and the pressures dictating its funcrion, style, and effect. Although Newman does not have a clearly articulated thesis or a specifically stated methodology, the title for his essay, "Under the Veneer," suggests that he is critical of Nixon and this tone pervades throughout Newman's analysis. In more traditional terms, Newman's essay can be characterized as a study of Nixon's rhetorical situation. While Newman does not judge Nixon on how well Nixon meets the demands of the situational constraints, it is clear from Newman's analysis that the situational injunctions of the larger political context serve as criteria by which Newman structures his nascent ideological analysis. Throughout his essay, as suggested in the above synopsis, Newman struggles with the tensions of objectivity in scholarship that my book tiies to redescribe. For example, in studying Nixon's audience, Newman argues, "There were at least three domestic audiences of consequence" (1970b, p. 171). As he explains, "One vital task of criticism is to decide which audience, and which message was paramount" (p. 171). In this sense, Newman's study is not much different than Hill's more overt brand of neo-Aristotelianism. At the same time, however, Newman struggles with an implicit desire to articulate a nonobjective, personal denunciation of Nixon's address. This tension is clear in Newman's essay and represents an ambiguity prevalent among critics in our field when asserting moral judgments as professional members of our disciplinary community. As further evidence for this ter\sion, consider the difference in Newman's observations between his above comment on "audience" and his more sophisticated observation on "reasoning." Newman writes, "Careful scru­ tiny of Nixon's text will provide support for the thesis that he sought confrontation. He made numerous references to humiliation, disaster, and defeat, all of which outcomes he projects on to his opponents" (p. 172). More specifically, Newman brings to our attention Nixon's rather obvious use of bifurcation: "Here it is, all over again, the false dilemma, the black or white position, the collapse of all alternative strategies into the one most offensive and easiest to ridicule" (p. 176). Once he has made the above observations, Newman is in an excellent position to further his argument by developing a narrative "accounting" for Nixon's faulty use of reasoning. Newman, however, critically pulls his punches by pinpointing Nixon on some discrepancy between "image" and "ideology," but then releases Nixon, turning instead toward assertions of traditional rhetorical observations—as when Newman argues near the end

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of his analysis, "The candid conclusion must be that the President cheered his friends and disheartened his enemies" (1970b, p. 177). Another example of Newman's "punch-pulling" is particularly illustra­ tive of the tension between edifying and systemic scholarship evident in Newman's essay. Newman (like Campbell) is especially sensitive to the way that Nixon misrepresents the history of Vietnam. Though Newman critiques Nixon on his misuse of history, Newman does not do so as thoroughly as the circumstances warranted. In calling our attention to this issue, Newman makes a special point to demonstrate that it is problematic for the context of Nixon's larger argument. Yet once Newman makes this observation, he treats it as if it were superfluous to his analysis. He writes, "How and to what extent [history] is distorted is an interesting subject, but not our major concern here" (p. 173). His rationale for discarding this important critical insight is that" [t]his was a deliberative speech, and the President is arguing for a specific policy" (p. 173). Another example of how Newman's analysis reaches a socially signifi­ cant critical level and then permits the moral punch of these observations to dissipate harmlessly involves the section in which Nixon discusses the "failure" of the North Vietnamese to negotiate. Here, Newman argues that Nixon distorted the question of "trust" between the U.S. and Vietnamese peace negotiating teams. As Newman explains, "For those who can remove the distorting lenses of national self-righteousness, which of course always reveal the other party as culprit in scuttling international agreements, the evidence points overwhelmingly to a justification o f Hanoi's attitude" (p. 1 7 4 ) . Instead of extending this observation in an effort to destroy Nixon's credibility to wage war, Newman relegates this observation to a position of insignificance. In the very next line, Newman writes, "But this need not concern us here" (p. 174). Yet where will this concern us as critics? More important, if it does not concern us, why did Newman bother to make the observation in the first place? Clearly, the above point is important to Newman; otherwise he would not have made the observa­ tion, and, having made the observation, he would not have bothered to document his claim with an important footnote on the American viola­ tions of its Geneva Agreements (p. 174). As the above examples suggest, Newman has failed to grapple success­ fully with a disciplinary tension. On the one hand, Newman's analysis has isolated an ideological dimension operatitig in Nixon's speech. On the other hand, Newman is forced to maintain standards of scholarly "objec­ tivity" with regard to the conclusions he can draw from his analysis. It was

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not until a later essay, rejected from the Quarterly Journal of Speech "as too hostile toward President Nixon" (Newman, 1987, p. 255), that Newman successfully challenges disciplinary pressures of objectivity. Consider a final example of the tension in Newman's writing. Near the end of his essay, Newman offers the following observation: But a presidential address must meet higher standards than campaign oratory or the speeches of lesser figures. Nixon's speech did not meet them. Neither his rhetorical strategies nor his substantive arguments are sound. (1970b, p. 178) Once again, Newman asserts a potentially important point with regard to Nixon's political appeal. As such, Newman has positioned himself to launch an attack on Nixon's policies. From this position, Newman may encourage others to realize that unsound arguments from a man responsi­ ble for the deaths of tens of thousands of Americans and hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese should raise the moral suspicions of his audience. Newman, however, does not pursue the issue. In his next sentence he writes, "Yet the most likely time for healing and realistic rhetoric has passed" (p. 178). From these observations, and from others appearing in the concluding paragraph of his analysis, Newman appears to be in a quandary. He understands that the point of the critical act is to make evident what the rhetor is implicitly arguing, especially when the speech of an authority figure threatens to reify an unwarranted and socially detrimental belief as in Nixon's attempt to paint the U S . leadership as morally superior to the Vietnamese leadership. In this sense, Newman's crucial claim helps under­ mine Nixon's credibility as an agent capable of making war. By arguing along these lines, Newman's analysis may expedite an end to the war or help prevent another war from occurring. As a literal statement, however, no one critic can stop some phenomenon like the Vietnam War from occurring. The point of criticism is to direct dissent into areas where it can have the most effect—to point out avenues of resistance (Kristeva, 1986). The centrality of Nixon's responsibility and his contribution to the war in Vietnam makes his discourse important for popular resistance. Overall, Newman seems unwilling to extend his critique, to assert a larger statement on the immoraUty of Nixon's address, and to criticize overtly the political agenda Nixon's discourse represents. More specifi­ cally, Newman implies that he nurtures a moral indignation toward the

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war, although he does so in a way maintaining his stance of professional objectivity. Thus, I argue, once we learn as critics to reject the pretense of objectivity and engage, instead, in the specific condemnations we can make, we will not have to import our biases, as Newman does at the end of his essay. He does this in two ways. The first involves his use of evidence. Citing a secondary source (Anthony Lewis), Newman utilizes the following quote as "[a] fitting summary of the whole business" (p. 178): Part of the process must be to help the American people know, and accept, the unpleasant truths about the war: that we got into it by stealth and for reasons at best uncertain; that the Government we defend inSouth Vietnam is corrupt and unrepresentative; that in the course offightingwe have killed people and ravaged a country to an extent utterly out of proportion to our cause, (p. 178) Had Newman himself made the above observation, his essay would have been that much more poignant. This is exactly the type of prose and critical attitude beneficial for critics to adopt in order to question the systemic discourse of our national policy makers and iiulustry leaders who create and perpetrate events, like Vietnam, for their own interests. Such a statement is in direct contrast to Nixon's "truths" about the government's involvement in Vietnam. Newman, himself, does not directly employ this sort of language. To do so would be to court a response similar to the one that Hill (1972b) offered Campbell: What is at work in her analysis compelling the conclusion that the United States is responsible for what has happened in Vietnam is the revisionist theory of the cold war, so popular now in New Left circles. The theory isolates America's militant support of the statia quo ante as the key element disrupting world peace, in contrast to Communist reaction, which is largely defensive If a critic will write of Nixon's address from any such point of view, [she or] he has the choice of two ways to treat his [or her] theme. IShe or] he can carefully sift the evidence for the revisionist view as it relates to the war in Vietnam, or [she or] he can simply assume statements reflecting this view . . . are to be accepted by his [or her] reader. In either case [she or] he is not writing rhetorical criticism, (p. 457) Instead, the moral indignation escaping from Newman's pen is much more constrained, much more limited to textual claims in Nixon's speech than is Campbell's (1972b) claim, for instance, that "America supports totali­ tarian governments all over the world" (p. 5 6 ) . ' From a strictly textual

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point of view, Campbell's claim, as Hill argues above, is unwarranted. To avoid this problem, Newman (1970b) limits his critique to what he can deduce from Nixon's text: It was not just the speech that was a political tragedy: the speech merely made visible tragic policy decisions—to maintain the goals and propaganda of the cold wai; to seek confrontation with those who want to change, to go with a power base confined to white, nonurban uptight voters, (p. 178) With the exception of the adjective upti^t, Newman attempts to avoid subjectivity in his analysis. Sticking to the literal text of Nixon's speech, Newman's observations are as much a powerful condemnation o f Nixon as can be derived. According to Newman, Nixon's rhetoric becomes "shoddy" and Newman opens the door to a more "searching exploration" (p. 178) of Nixon's propositions, although Newman does not, himself, offer directions for such "exploration." To the extent that Newman constrained himself by limiting his analysis to purely textual and "objective" evidence, I applaud his conclusions. Still, I sense the urgency for extending his critique; Hill's argument, after all, is not persuasive. Rhetorical texts do not exist in isolation from a larger rhetorical environment. Nixon's "text" on Vietnam does not start and stop with the first and last words of his speech. Because of the office he held, because of the influence he wielded, and because of an extensive U.S. relationship to Vietnam and to a long-standing anticommunist ideol­ ogy, Nixon, the rhetor, embodied a walking rhetorical argument. His discourse must be situated in the larger international play of ideas and events, which is what Campbell does when she, in the absence of direct textual evidence, claims that America supports dictatorial regimes in the Third World. In this light, her argument, contrary to Hill's position, may be regarded as rhetorical criticism. Kendall's Response to Newman and

Its Implications for Ideological Criticism

Historian Richard H. Kendall's (1970) response to Newman substanti­ ates my claim of a disciplinary tension in the previous section and raises issues central to the practice of ideological criticism. In particular, I discuss in this section the issue of "truth" in criticism and argue that the criterion of "certainty" with regard to the truthfulness of a claim should not be a

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stringent criterion for rhetorical criticism. Rather, I argue that ideological critics more often engage in "probable" arguments sanctioned by plausi­ bility, arguments with a different but equally valid criterion of " p r o o f than that warranted in traditional criticism. In his essay, Kendall locates many of the same poUtical assumptions that I found in Newman's text. Kendall, however, uses this discovery as a pretext to castigate Newman for what Kendall considers to be Newman's uncon­ trolled bias and his unprofessionalism. Whereas my criticism of Newman was his corutraint in pursuing his subjective opposition to Nixon's policies, Kendall's criticism involves Newman's lack of restraint in making subjec­ tive claims about Nixon and the war. Kendall, in short, responds to Newman's essay in the way that substantiates the assumptiotu I attribute to Newman. More specifically, the interchange between Kendall and Newman informs my critical position and substantiates the larger thesis of this book as well as anticipating the more publicized interchange between Forbes Hill (1972b) and Karlyn Kohrs Campbell (1972b, 1983), and Hill (1983) and Wander. KendaU (1970) takes issue with the "polemical" tone of Newman's essay. He writes, "Robert R Newman makes several statements of doubtfiil value or appropriateness in a scholarly, as opposed to a polemical, essay" (p. 4 3 2 ) . In positioning this distinction between academic and political writing, as if the two are mutually exclusive, KendaU takes issue with Newman for his subjective analysis of the Vietnam War. Kendall asserts that the "moral" issue of Vietnam has not been "solved"; thus Newman has no business making axiological claims in his essay. Kendall accuses Newman of passing a slanted judgment on the moral worth of Vietnam that, from Newman's position as a rhetorical critic (as opposed to a political analyst), Newman is in no position to make. Such a position is "partisan" and has no business in "scholarly" writitig. Specifically, Kendall reacts to the following line inNewman's essay. Newman (1970b) compares Nixon to Eisenhower with relationship to foreign policy and refers to Korea as "that much more defensible war" (p. 173). In response to this, KendaU (1970) writes:

Professor Newman has already settled in his own mind the question of Vietnam He is opposed to the war and he brings that predisposition to his essay. However much he pretends to an analysis of President Nixon's rhetoric, he is in fact engaging in a political argument about the Vietnam war. His confusion of purpose in imbuing an article for a scholarly journal

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with partisan statements on a contemporary political question—if confusion it be—leads him to a series of accusations, judgements, and assertions, which bring no credit to the Quarterly Journal of Speech as a journal of scholarly inquiry and analysis, (p. 433) One of these "partisan" statements that Newman makes in his essay involves President Johnson. In reference to some federal judges, Newman (1970b) writes, "After five years of dealing with LBJ, they can be counted on to smell a fraud" (p. 169). To this, Kendall demands " p r o o f of Johnson's fraudulence. Without proof, Kendall maintaitis, such comments are "gra­ tuitous." Kendall (1970) extends this critique of Newman by demanding evidence for Newman's assumption that the U.S. role as world policeman is "functionally related to our Vietnam policy, that a reason for Vietnam is our belief that we should police the world" (p. 134). Kendall raises an important issue, one with which this book must grapple, as the issue of "proof and "truth" is central to the critique against ideological criticism. Kendall's (1970) challenge, "[B]ut how does [New­ man] know?" (p. 134) is the same challenge that Hill (1972a, 1972b, 1983) poses to Campbell and to Phillip Wander. With reference to both Campbell's and Wander's essays. Hill (1983) critiques their desire "[t]o unmask the specific deceptions and debunk the myths" (p. 122) with regard to a rhetor's argument. Such attempts are misdirected. Hill argues, because "[t]his purpose demands that rhetorical critics discover the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth about a situation as complicated as the war in Vietnam" (p. 122). With regard to Wander's (1989) reference to Viettwm as a "dripping, laughing death-face" (p. 9 ) , Hill responds, "How does one verify that? It is difficult to get one's sights on what there is to verify" (1983, p. 123). Hill (1972b) concludes, "To assess the truth of a contemporary speaker's claims is to take either the scholarly way or the partisan way out of the area of rhetorical criticism" (p. 458). This theme involves a recurrent issue in the literature, and, therefore, becomes raised several times in this chapter, particularly in my own analysis of Nixon's address. For now, however, it suffices to write that establishing "truth" claims, in the absolute sense that both Kendall and Hill demand, is an unreasonable standard for rhetorical criticism. More realis­ tically, rhetorical critics are in the position to assert probable claims of truth. In other words, the issue in criticism is not, "How does a critic know?" but, rather, "What reasons does she or he give to suspect that other alternatives are plausible?" Seen neo-pragmatically, the "ends" of criticism

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are not certainty, but pkuisibility. In situating his or her analysis within the web of contingency accepted as "truth" by a certain community, the critic aims at redescribing asfcestshe or he can a specific belief by using standards acceptable to the larger axiological commitments of that community (cf. Hollihan, 1994). 1 am raising the issue of "truth" in critical argument because Newman does not have a satisfying defense to Kendall's demand for evidence. Newman (1970a) remarks that his supporting documentation was cut by the editors in the interest of space and that "1 could clearly use 150 pages to fully justify my analysis" (p. 435). For example, he goes on to argue that Johnson did lie about the Gulf of Tonkin incident; Newman cites the evidence he could not within the context of his original essay. As Newman explains, "I would like nothing better" (p. 435) than to develop the evidence for these critiques in more explicit detail. "It is not lack o f evidence but space limitations" (p. 435) that prevent him from "proving" his assertions. O n one level, both Kendall and Newman are being reasonable. T h e more documentation and evidence that a critic offers for his or her claims, generally speaking, the more persuasive that critic. Criticism, after all, is intended to be persuasive, a point missed by both Kendall and Hill. On the other hand, Newman's dilemma is easy to appreciate. A critic fre­ quently does not have all the space available that is necessary to document his or her claims. In responding to this dilemma, I contend that critics require fiirther flexibility for their assertions and for the space needed to defend those assertions with nonconclusive, traditional evidence. As 1 have attempted to illustrate, a tension exists in Newman's writing between his unconven­ tional claims and his conventional justifications for those claims. This tension rendered his critical observations less scathing, as Newman himself confesses. He writes, "I am indeed bitterly opposed to that war and bring my predisposition to the essay" (1970a, p. 435). Had he stated such in his original criticism, his ultimate critique of Nixon, that Nixon was uirong for supportir\g and encouraging a terrible war, would have been emphasized in Newman's essay and made straightforwardly clear to his readers, the people Newman was attempting to influence. O f course, given the disciplinary environment in which Newman's essay was received, a more concerted condemnation of Nixon based on subjec­ tive and qualitative arguments would have raised more substantial objec­

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tion in our scholarly community. As it was, Kendall's rejoinder was much more hostile than 1 have already demonstrated. For instance, Kendall attacks the heart of ideological criticism when he castigates Newman for a use of "text" that does not appear within the literal script of Nixon's speech. In other words, Kendall (1970) takes a limited view of text and demands that Newman remain within that constraint: He analyzes what his own analysis shows President Nixon did not in fact say. Clearly, by the final page of the essay. Professor Newman has abandoned any pretense of scholarly activity—the middle pages of moderately informa­ tive and analytical statements about the speech have been overcome by the weight of antiwar politics. He has passed beyond asserting the meaning of what is, to asserting the meaning of wiiat is not. (p. 434) Kendall concludes his critique of Newman by associating Newman with the "outraged sensibilities o f the 'anti-war' faction o f this country" (p. 4 3 4 ) . He accuses Newman's essay of offerirvg nothing new on the "Vietnam question" (p. 434) and maintains that Newman is being selfrighteous. The most important aspect o f Newman's short reply to Kendall has tremendous implications for my overall argument directii\g rhetorical scholars toward a central and professional engagement with the critique of popular culture. In the sentences appearii^g immediately after his statement against the war, Newman (1970a) claims expertise as a scholar of argumentation. In this capacity, he has "inspected the full range of [Nixon's] arguments, the goals we have claimed to be seekii^ [with regard to the war], the intelligence delineating our success or failure, and the probable long-range outcome of our efforts" (p. 436). As a result, Newman draws the followit^ conclusion: "I made a pro/essioruil judgment: there is no adequate defetwe of the war" (p. 436, emphasis his). Had Newman made that statement in his original criticism of Nixon's speech, his entire analysis would have exempHfied a more direct realm of social significance. The theoretical implications of the above discussion can be rephrased as the following axiom for rhetorical criticism: Within the context of our analyses, our personal observations are our professional statements. We have the authority to state our professional opinions, even in the absence of uncontroversial data to sustain those opinions. We can, in short, assert our various claims by appealing to other systems of verification and interpretation that involve alternative methodological practices informing

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our critical perspectives and leading to substantial arguments. However, as our professional claims only remain valid to the extent that our audi­ ences continue to recognize our arguments as valid, a shift must be encouraged in our academic journals and within the reception of our scholarship in the popular intellectual community. Analysis of Hermann G. Stelzner's Mythic Criticism of Nixon's Address Stelzner's (1971) analysis of Nixon's address is a clear example of how disciplinary scholarship often exists at the expense of social critique. 1 further argue that this weakness contributes to a social distance between critical knowledge and the needs of society. Challenging the Socicd Distance in Stelzner's Analysis Stelzner presents his criticism of Nixon's address as an analysis of a Quest story. He writes that the world of politics is thematically similar to fiction and that rhetorical criticism has failed to appreciate this dimension of culture as it is reflected in political oratory. To rectify this lacuna in the disciplinary literature, Stelzner systematically delineates the major themes of the Quest genre and illustrates, with Nixon as an extended example, their importance to political discourse. Stelzner concludes that Nixon's narrative failed as a Quest, yet succeeded in preparing Nixon for a greater public command of his war policy. 1 argue that Stelzner's disciplinary scholarship can be redescribed so that Nixon becomes an object of study rather than an example to explicate rhetorical processes. For instance, Newman views Nixon as contributing to public discourse. In this sense, Nixon is seen as an agent capable of making moral choices and these choices are evaluated by Newman. Al­ though Newman does not go far enough with his social analysis, he at least recognizes that moral issues are relevant to Nixon's use of rhetoric. Implicit in this recognition is the belief that a critique of Nixon's ideological positions and their dire social implications are more socially important than the construction of a metaphysical disciplinary apparatus. Unlike Newman's essay, Stelzner's critique reduces Nixon to an exam­ ple. The fact that the President of the United States is speaking on a major foreign policy issue does not seem to inform Stelzner's essay. Rather, in

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Stelzner's work, Nixon becomes a "means" by which the "ends" of our disciplinary criticism can be advanced. Stelzner explicitly develops his new method and proficiently illustrates how it works. In some respects, this action constitutes valuable work, as, from time to time, we need to challenge the borders of our critical assumptions and introduce new methodologies. From the standards of a mythic and narrative analysis, for example, Stelzner's is an important study. Moreover, there are times where the significance of a particular rhetori­ cal transaction is not great and our moral indignations as critics do not necessarily have to be raised. Thus, the fact that Stelzner refrains from raising his critical concerns firom a position of moral indignation does not necessarily render his critique irrelevant. As many fine criticisms in our discipline exemplify, there are times when a critical act may be more interestitig than the rhetorical phenomenon the critic is attempting to analyze. For example, a fantasy theme or narrative analysis of a small group meeting of some local and relatively benign organization might be very usefiil in developing the parameters of those methods, or for developing an appreciation for how rhetorical and psychological processes shape our communicative relationships (Ford, 1989). In addition, a critical analysis of some group or organization might help that collectivity to function better (Hollihan & Riley, 1987). Thus, in this sense, Stelzner is not "wrong" to use Nixon as a means for illustrating the new metbsdology he is attempting to develop. In another sense, however, Stelzner commits a critical "error" by the standards of a redefined disciplinary rhetorical scholarship. When we redefine our disciplinary assumptions with regard to rhetorical criticism, the strengths of Stelzner's essay become weaknesses. Nixon is President of the United States and not president of a local chapter of Alcoholics Anonymous. Nixon's discourse evokes a scope and a significance taking it out of the realm of daily discourse and placing it into a historically important context that should be recognized by the critic Unlike the president of a local chapter of Alcoholics Anonymous, Nixon adminis­ trates an organization that is anything but "benign." Nixon's policies are significant in that they create human suffering and morally implicate every citizen hvitig in the United States (Chomsky, 1981, pp. 219-231). To ignore the implications of these policies by anesthetizitig our criticism is to risk losing the critical edge of our scholarship. From this perspective, the rhetorical environment of Nixon's address is more important than the sum total of the criticism of that environment.

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Stelzner's criticism is insignificant, as is Newman's, Campbell's, Hill's, and my own, in relationship to the bulk of American foreign policy. This is not surprisii\g; few voices, acting alone, have been powerful enough to affect the vast machineries of the state war apparatus. I do not suggest that the individual critic has no power to make a difference or that she or he should stop trying to effect change. Rather, in the face of such marginalization, the only reasonable line of defense is our struggle for a voice. With this in mind, the role of criticism, in relatiotuhip to the larger environment, one including the Vietnam War as well as subsequent U.S. military interven­ tions, involves affecting those policies in some small but morally significant way, pointing out possible avenues of resistance, delaying the reification of harmfiil beliefs, registering, at the very least, dissent (as in Sontag, 1969). Certainly, the task of criticism is open to differing interpretations, such as Stelzner's. However, while these interpretations have their place, they must not be substituted for resistance when resistance is clearly an option. As Stelzner's essay illustrates, different methodologies can find varying significances to discuss in Nixon's discourse. In this sense, both Hill's and Stelzner's analyses are effective in accomplishitig the types of criticisms that their methodologies enable them to make. In this light, their criticisms enrich our discipUne. It should be clear that the confrontational and ideological approach I advocate for rhetorical criticism is not the only way of analyzing Nixon's discourse. It does, however, enable critics in our discipline to live up to their potential for exerting a positive influence on American society. In addition, ideological criticism helps members of our discipline to break from their traditionally self-inclusive concerns, as exemplified in both the works of Hill and Stelzner. Because Nixon's speech has important impli­ cations for the lives of millions of people, a social commitment to its analysis is a better use of our time and resources as critics than is a traditional analysis. Because Stelzner focuses criticism on the development of a critical method and not on the critical analysis of Nixon's speech, a speech with tremendous social and political significance, his analysis suffers on ideo­ logical and pragmatic grounds. What Stelzner (1971) presents is a precur­ sor to narrative or mythic criticism. As he argues, "The practical world of political affairs shares many themes with the imaginative world of fiction. . . . Thus far, however, the rhetorical criticism of speeches has not pro­ ceeded from this perspective" (p. 163). Stelzner's method would be fine as

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both itiythic and narrative analyses can produce ideological and critical work (see, e.g, Bennett, 1980). Stelzner, however, does not engage in such an ideological critique with his analysis. As a result, his conclusions have hollow poUtical and ideo­ logical implications. Stelzner's observations are so limited to the narrative of the Quest story that the flesh and bones of the daily political reality masked by that narrative are lost. The form of his narrative lens structures his observations and distances his analysis from the conditioiw of the war. Thus, his narrative logic becomes a substitute for his critical experience of the war. A reader of Stelzner's analysis would never guess that Nixon was waging a war of oppression and liquidation against an entire Third World nation. In genetal, Stelzner's use of the mythic perspective distances Nixon's discourse from the situation of the war. For example, Stelzner (1971) makes the following argument with regard to Nixon's political resilience: "Affairs in the world of individual men are reversible. In affairs of the state they are not" (p. 168). Stelzner offers the observation that Nixon suffered from political defeat in previous years but was able to reverse this condition and turn defeat into glory. While Nixon maintains individuals can turn such defeat into victory, nations cannot, according to Stelzner. American defeat in Vietnam will lead to an immediate failure that cannot be turned into a future victory. This indeed may have been Nixon's concern, but is it a valid assumption? Can Nixon legitimately assume that the affairs of the state are as constrained as he portrays them? As these questions fall outside of Stelzner's mythic perspective, no effort is made in his essay to elucidate them. In short, the intrinsic concerns of Stelzner's methodology prevail in his analysis: He is more interested in the coherence of Nixon's narrative and its manifestation in Nixon's discourse than he is with the implications of that narrative in the political realm. For example, Stelzner takes note of what Campbell identifies and condemns as Nixon's "mythic" portiayal of Amer­ ica. As Nixon (1969) explains: Two hundred years ago this Nation was weak and poor. But even then, America was the hope of millions in the world. Today we have become the strongest and richest Nation in the world. The wheel of destiny has turned so that any hope the world has for the survival of peace and freedom will be determined by whether the American people have the moral stamina and the courage to meet the challenge of free world leadership, (p. 1554)

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Far from denouncing this passage on historical, ideological, nationalist, or essentialist grounds that fallaciously warrant much of Nixon's argumenta­ tion, Stelzner acts as if this was simply part and parcel of the mythic narrative, just another harmless manifestation of the "silent majority." With this passage, Stelzner (1971) claims, "Nixon gives added meaning to patriotism and destiny by commenting on their [the silent majority's] history and heritage" (p. 171). Yes, Stelzner is correct in his description of Nixon; this conclusion stems logically from his narrative analysis. I am relatively certain that Stelzner does not intend his comment to be a value judgment; he may not personally agree with Nixon's characterization. However, Stelzner reaches his conclusion as an extension of his method and refrains from making a larger value judgment. Indeed, Nixon does do what Stelzner claims, but the fact that such action both misleads and endangers the broader public is not commented upon by Stelzner. What Campbell calls a "mythical" reading of American history, what 1 call a fallacious attempt to circumvent critical thought, and what Stelzner implies is simply another step in Nixon's great Quest narrative, a person in Nixon's audience may call "Truth." Stelzner, unfortunately, writes as if that person did not exist. Thus, based on his narrative analysis, Stelzner (1971) concludes, "Nixon's policy for Viettiam is disciplined, cautious, and pragmatic" (p. 168); In relationship to the criteria of the Quest metaphor, Nixon's speech, as defined by Nixon himself, exhibits those qualities. This was the image that Nixon wanted to portray of himself in his address, and Stelzner is astute in illustrating a rationale that could have led to such a decision on the part of Nixon. As Stelzner explains, "He will not go straight up the path. He has provided for options" (p. 168). In effect, Stelzner has taken Nixon at face value, his analysis is limited to what Nixon claimed to be doing. But as I illustrate in my criticism, a different reading can be obtained on this issue. Nixon did not provide options in his speech; rather, he attempted to structure our perceptiotu of the war and the optiotis available for the country in such a way that the war would be intetisified until communism was destroyed in Viettiam. By taking Nixon too literally, as does Hill, Stelzner maintains the integrity of his analysis while, at the same time, he ignores the more important issue that the American people were being manipulated. In addition, Stelzner's methodical biases lead to a preoccupation with style. Although a focus on style can be useful in explicating the axiological

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presuppositions of a speaker, as illustrated by Black (1970), Stelzner does not utilize his stylistic analysis in this way; he does not make an overt connection between Nixon's style and ideology. Rather, he connects Nixon's use of style with the structural framework of Nixon's narrative. In other words, the study of Nixon's style, for Stelzner, is a way to connect Nixon to the metaphor of the Quest. Stelzner (1971) writes, "[T]he language that displays [Nixon's policies] is hard, rigid, and barren. Word choices are both familiar and unpretentious. Images are absent; the texture is flat" (p. 168). These observations have resonance for Stelzner because they support the central assumption of his method: Heroes must have certain characteristics and traits identifying them as heroes. In this light, Stelzner concludes, "Nixon's policy, language, and behavior reveal him as a Hero whose omnipotence and omniscience are limited" (p. 169). Fur­ thermore, for Stelzner, Nixon's "quest" has been thwarted. In traditional liteiature, the temporary thwarting of a hero's plans constitutes a tension in plot development that is utilized to increase support for the hero and gratification for the plot's successfiil conclusion. This tension has impor­ tant rhetorical implications for Nixon's speech as it helps to cultivate our goodwill for Nixon. Yet this is a rhetorical goodwill that must be resisted for it is not a goodwill that Nixon has earned. Stelzner, however, provides avenues for no such resistance. The only interesting ideological work that Stelzner's study provides is his brief passage on the absence of a religious style in Nixon's speech. For example, he observes, "Noticeably lacking are Biblical images. Yet the speech is directed largely to a silent majority, the generation nurtured on war and Bibhcal imagery" (1971, p. 168). Stelzner concludes, "Biblical images connote ethical and moral values. Keeping the war secular, and justifying it with poUtical, military, and economic values, deprives the opposition of a potential issue" (p. 168). With this statement, Stelzner hints at the possibility that there are larger moral issues implied within Nixon's speech that Stelzner otherwise does not allow himself to explore. The remainder of Stelzner's analysis is uninteresting from a discipUnary perspective concerned with the social implications of rhetorical criticism; the bulk of Stelzner's analysis is filled with superficial observations of basic rhetorical phenomena. This is exemplified by comments such as, "[Nixon's] rhetorical strategy emerges slowly and develops late" (1971, p. 170) and by Stelzner's conclusion that Nixon's political narrative "fails as a quest" (p. 171):

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Evaluated in literary terms Nixon's political narrative is obviously not a good Quest story. It is not altogether convincing. There are too many loose ends and too many unanswered questions. It is peopled by flat characters and its language is dull and unimaginative, (p. 172) However, Stelzner (1971) points out that Nixon's speech, as a practical piece of deliberative oratory, "accomplishes some objectives" (p. 172) and thus must be judged as successful. Stelzner continues, "Although divisive­ ness in the political community remains, Nixon gains an audience and time" (p. 172), which was, after all, one of Nixon's main objectives, positioning the speech as he did between what turned out to be two war moratoriums. In the face of a growing rebelliousness within American society, Nixon "finds listeners who will respond to his words and images. He gains a firmer possession of the policy he lays out before them and makes hin^elf ready for the next series of events he must deal with in Vietnam" (Stelzner, 1971, p. 172). On this note, Stelzner ends his rhetori­ cal reading o f Nixon in a manner that fails to appreciate the severity of the historical situation. Analysis of Karlyn Kohrs Campbell's Intrinsic Criticism of Nixon's Address Campbell's essay comes closest to my vision of a redescribed disciplinary practice. Unlike the previous two criticisms analyzed, Campbell's critique of Nixon was composed and presented within the forum of a wider, more popular audience. Due to this change in audience, her criticism avoids not only the distance and objectification separating Newman from his implicit condemnation of Nixon, but also the objectification that binds Stelzner slavishly to the limitations of his methodology. Within the context of her analysis, Campbell is freer to comment upon the social and political implications of Nixon's address. While I honor and support Campbell's analysis, it nevertheless has limitations, particularly in her analysis of Nixon's use of history. Challenging the Umited Application of Campbell's Aruilysis Campbell's analysis does not extend far enough into the calcified logological and ideological implications of U.S. aggression. Furthermore,

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her condemnatiotis, though effective at times, refrain from the larger, more pressing act of condemning the war. Campbell broadcast her critique of Nixon's "The War in Vietnam" address on KPFK-FM, Pacifica, I-os Angeles, as the editorial segment of a nightly newscast. This analysis can be characterized as "intrinsic criti­ cism." In her words, "This criticism is an attempt to appraise this discourse primarily in terms of criteria suggested within the address by the President himself (1972b, p. 5 0 ) . More specifically, her criticism "contests the speaker's p r o m i s e s . . . which uses criteria set up by the speaker" (1983, p. 126). In this manner, Campbell documents the inconsistencies of Nixon's address that call into question the integrity of the speaker. Using this method, Campbell isolates three criteria by which Nixon vaUdated the standards of his speech: truth, credibility, and unity (and an implied fourth criterion, ethical principles). According to Campbell (1972b), "Nixon tells us that the address is intended to relate the truth, increase the credibility of Administrative statements about the war, unify the nation, and remind us of our duties as Americans" (p. 50). The reason for this rhetorical transaction, according to Nixon, was because America was suffering from a loss of confidence in the policies of the Nixon administra­ tion. In particular, the government's war effort in Southeast Asia was compromised as a result of popular discontent. Public denunciatiot« of the war were forcing a presidential response, and Nixon chose the above criteria as a way to help mediate popular tensions. By a close examination of each of Nixon's criteria, in relationship to the claims he offers in the speech, Campbell (1972b) documents how Nixon's address fails to satisfy the conditions "promised" by each of his stated (or implied) standards. According to her analysis, Nixon "misrepresents his opposition by treating them as a homogeneous group" (p. 5 1 ) . More specifically, Nixon characterizes the national resistance to the war by presenting it in terms of its most extreme and margitialized fringe, the fringe that says, "Lose in Vietnam; bring the boys home." By misrepresent­ ing the various viewpoints and criticisms of his policy, Nixon renders ineffective the less extreme criticism of the war; thus, "[H]e also misrep­ resents the policy options available to him" (p. 5 1 ) . Based on these arguments, Campbell concludes, "This strategy may gull the audience, and it may make his speech more persuasive for some listeners, but the technique violates his earlier promise to tell the truth" (p. 51). Campbell identifies another misrepresentation in the speech, the use of history by Nixon to situate his policy. As she explair^, Nixon's description

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of the war's origins is "dubious" (1972b, p. 5 1 ) . In this section of her criticism, Campbell begins what could be her most damaging attack on Nixon's credibility; indeed, Campbell offers a truncated historical analysis of the war. In so doing, she helps her audience to resist Nixon's describing the war as a communist provocation. Campbell challenges Nixon's por­ trayal of the war's origins and resituates it within the 1954 American betrayal of the Geneva Agreements. Because Nixon's moral justifications for the war reside in his control of history, Campbell's questioning of Nixon's portrayal of history constitutes a critical move. This observation can be extended, both historically and argumentatively, in questioning the assumptions behind Nixon's ethical appeals. In my analysis of Nixon's critique, for example, I date the war much earlier than America's rejection of the Geneva Agreements. Consequently, my analysis emphasizes more strongly America's responsibility in starting the war, a respwiisibility further invalidating Nixon's credibihty, as well as the moral position for his argument. Whereas Nixon had claimed that the war began with an unwarranted invasion from the North, Campbell points out that the Geneva Agree­ ments had stipulated free electiotis to unify the Vietnamese people under popular, national rule after the French had left Vietnam from their strong­ holds in the southern region. Yet as Campbell (1972b) explains, "Those elections never occurred because the United States supported Diem, who refused elections and attempted to destroy all internal political opposition. Communist and otherwise" (p. 5 2 ) . The United States did not simply "support" Diem and his regime; it created him and, in the process, it created "South Vietnam" as a political entity (Chomsky, 1987, p. 225). As historian Howard Zirm (1980) explains, "Diem again and again blocked the elections requested by the Vietminh, and with American money and arms his government became more and more firmly established" (p. 4 6 3 ) . Indeed, when the incompetence of Diem's regime became an embarrass­ ment to the United States, he was removed by an American-backed coup. The point of Campbell's analysis is that Vietnamese aid from China and the Soviet Union did not arrive until 5 years following the date Nixon claims and was the result—not of the desire of these two countries to expand their territory—but of an effort to help the Viettamese to unite their country. In short, Sino-Soviet aid was offered to North Vietnam in an attempt to force out an unwanted American influence from the South after a long series of diplomatic solutions were rejected by the United States (Chomsky, 1987, p. 6 2 ) .

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This emphasis on history is a central concern in understanding the significance of Nixon's argument and the apparent willingness of the American people to support the federal war policy. As Campbell (1972b) explains, "The President's attempt to perpetuate the now largely discred­ ited justifications for the United States intervention serves at least two functior«" (p. 52). The first function "allows Nixon to appeal to history and historical values. . . . Nixon's policy becomes the logical outcome of the decisions and values of his predecessors, and Nixon's way becomes the American way" (p. 52). The second function of Nixon's narrative account focuses attention on the "ethical" (ideological) dimensions of America's political commitments and downplays the pragmatic (and deadly) impli­ cations of Nixon's war policy. In other words, Nixon rewrites history so as to place America in a morally superior position to North Vietnam. In the process, the American people are not given the information they need about the war so as to become intelligently involved in its progress. Such misrepresentation of history, according to Campbell (1972b), "[IJs not consistent with the President's promise to tell the truth" (p. 52). Campbell, however, then drops the subject in order to move to her next important point. She briefly returns, indirectly, to this critique at the end of her essay when she writes, "Nonmythical America supports totalitarian govern­ ments all over the world. Nonmythical America is engaged in a war in South Vietnam in which it is systematically destroying the civilian popu­ lation and agricultural capacity of the country it is ostensibly defending" (p. 5 6 ) . Even though Campbell has made these claims, the obvious connection between Nixon's attenipt to redefine history and her critique of nonmythical America is not commented upon as explicitly as possible, even within the limitations of her brief study. Leaving the issue of history behind, Campbell quickly moves to a discussion of contradictions found in Nixon's argument. In so doing, she makes Nixon look foolish and disreputable, but not criminal. Indeed, if the implications of her historical analysis are correct, and if Campbell can be read as a spokesperson for "nonmythical" America, then Nixon is to be faulted for far more than his rhetorical transgressions. However, Campbell does not go this far; her attack on Nixon is an indictment of the man as a speaker, not an indictment of his crimes or of the crimes of the political system creating and perpetuating the war in Vietnam. Granted, Campbell need not extrapolate from the speech to a larger condemnation of the speaker or of the "establishment," but she already makes similar claims in her discussion of nonmythical America. Thus, like Newman, Campbell

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pulls her punches on precisely the issues that propel rhetorical critics into the political limelight. Consider the foUowii^ example from Campbell's (1972b) analysis: Early in the speech [Nixon] tells the audience that immediate withdrawal would be the popular and easy course, enhancing the prestige of the Administration and increasing its chances of reelection. Yet at the end of the speech it is clear that the President believes his opposition is a "vocal minority" and that his policy represents the will of the "great, silent major­

ity." If so, isn't his policy the popular and easy one with the best chances of returning him to the White House? (p. 52)

This observation, astute and sensitive to the rhetorical phenomenon Campbell is observing, does not advance a larger moral condemnation of the war still being waged in Southeast Asia. Yes, the President is inconsis­ tent, but "consistency" was not one of Nixon's criteria in the speech. Although Campbell's observation does hurt Nixon's credibility, it is less damaging a critique than is Campbell's earlier review of the history issue. Elsewhere in her analysis, Campbell makes important critical points that illustrate the strength of her commitment to an ideological and social critique. For example, she explains how "the address played an important part in exacerbating the bitter conflict between what the President termed the 'silent majority' and a 'vocal minority' fervently seekitig to prevail 'over reason and the will of the majority' " (1972b, p. 53). She documents how Nixon characterized dissent as unpatriotic and implied that war dissenters and protestors had, by giving Hanoi justification to avoid negotiations, significant responsibiUty for the continuation of the conflict. With good ideological form, Campbell concludes, "These statements belie the theme of unity and contradict his earlier assertion that 'honest and patriotic Americans have reached different conclusions as to how peace should be achieved'" (p. 5 4 ) . Based upon Campbell's observation, the obvious conclusion for the critic to draw is that Nixon does not want peace, because peace does not derive from different "conclusions"; it derives, in this case, from a U.S. commitment to honor the Geneva Agreements. Campbell, however, does not push this point. Instead of drawing this conclusion, Campbell gener­ alizes from the example of Nixon's speech and extrapolates to a larger cultural level. As she warns, "(Ujnless we become careful, discriminating critics, questioning and evaluating, we shall be constrained to make poor decisions and supporting policies destructive of ourselves, our society, and

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the world" (1972b, p. 5 6 ) . Here, Campbell's debunking of Nixon's por­ trayal of mythical America is significant and important. She concludes, "[Nixon's] rhetorical act perpetuates the myths about America, which must be debunked and shattered if we are to find solutions to the problems that threaten imminently to destroy us" (p. 57). More important, Campbell offers what is lacking in the other two critical analyses; she offers us a way out of our present condition. Campbell explains, " l b avoid Vietnams of the future we must make a concerted effort to discover and scrutinize nonmythical America" (p. 5 7 ) : If in that scrutiny we pay particular attention to the rhetorical discourses that thresh out and formulate ideas of ourselves and our society, we may begin to solve the problems of the real America and of this shrinking world, (p. 57) As this quote illustrates, Campbell's critique of Nixon serves an important cultural fiinction that exceeds the experience of Nixon's particular speech. Analysis of Forbes Hill's Neo-Aristotelian Criticism of Nixon's Address Hill's analysis of Nixon's address has a limited social importance and represents a perspective antagonistic to ideological analyses. Hill's (1972a) essay "juxtaposes" the three previous analyses of Nixon's address with what he identifies as a "strict neo-Aristotelian analysis" (p. 373). Hill argues that his notion of neo-Aristotelian criticism differs in slight but important ways firom the method as traditionally articulated by Herbert W. Wichelns (1925/1972) and Marie Hochumth Nichols (1954). Hill argues that his analysis follows the spirit, if not the letter of Aristotle's Rhetoric (1991). Following what he understands to be Aristotle's rhetorical principles. Hill specifically delineates his method and proceeds to analyze the situation, the auditors, the decisions expected from Nixon's audience, the logical and psychological persuasive factors at work in the speech, and the "characterological" and stylistic factors of Nixon's address. In many respects. Hill's essay is a reactionary response to Campbell's and an attempt to move the practice of rhetorical criticism toward a more traditional perspective. In this sense. Hill is much more systematic than is Kendall—not only in critiquing the ideological claims of SCA scholars, but also in stipulating the boundaries of what could be considered a

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"correct" methodology. In lesisting Hill's positions, I urge scholars to consider the following proposition: Rhetorical scholarship does not have a "correct" or "incorrect" methodology. Rather, it has "better" or "worse" methodologies for particular tasks. Challenging the Limited Claims of Hill's Scholarship Hill's commitment to a neo-Aristotelian methodology limits the types of claims a criric can offer with his or her analysis. As Stelzner does in his narrative/mythic analysis. Hill succinctly lays down his critical parameters with a discussion of neo-Aristotelian criticism and follows its directives. After developing this methodology in detail. Hill describes the rhetorical environment surrounding the speech, but he does so from the point of view of the Nixon administration. In contextualizing the speech in light of a particularly limited perspective, Hill assumes Nixon's persona and situates his criticism in relationship to that perspective. Thus, Hill limits the scope of his rhetorical analysis to a highly selective series of events leading to Nixon's address. Sitiular to Nixon's behavior in the speech, Hill does not take into account that Nixon's discourse has a historical relationship to events outside of the immediate context; Hill treats the speech as a singular item of discourse independent of a larger rhetorical trend in U.S. foreign policy. In the above fashion. Hill (1972a) inteφrets the address in limited and specific terms: Nixon's counterattack aimed at rallying the mass of the people to disregard the vocal minority and oppose immediate withdrawal; it aimed to get support for a modified version of the old strategy: limited war followed by negotiated peace, (p. 375) This observation is central in Hill's essay, for the neo-Aristotelian critic must ascertain the speaker's "purpose" in order to set the standards by which the speech is to be judged. In this case. Hill's observation does not differ from that of the other three critics in their analyses of Nixon's address. Indeed, Hill's observation is astute, and most careful listeners of Nixon's speech would have reached a similar conclusion. Yet the critic's task must not stop here; while Nixon's "purpose" may be relatively obvious, it cannot be the only standard by which the speech is judged. For example, Nixon's "purpose" is rich with ideological assumptiotw that must be

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unpacked if we are to understand the social and ethical implications of a "limited" war or of a "negotiated" peace. However, the above is not an option that Hill views as available foi the rhetorical critic. For Hill, it is enough to argue that such "purpose" or "intent" exists. Once Hill defines the purpose of the speech, he attempts to determine the auditors involved in the audience. Hill argues that Nixon clearly was not speaking to the entire nation; for example, Nixon was not speaking to the most ideologically sensitive population of this country. Thus, according to Hill, to critique the speech from the point of view of those listeners is not appropriate. In effect. Hill is more interested in finding the target audience so that he can measure its reaction to Nixon's persuasion. As Hill (1972b) explains, "In the broadest sense rhetorical criticism of any kind primarily assesses how a message relates to some group of auditors" (p. 457). Toward this end. Hill delineates different audiences and determines the appropriateness of their response to Nixon's appeal. He concludes, "The primary target was those Americans not driven by a clearly defined ideological commitment to oppose or support the war at any cost" (1972a, p. 375). The assumption behind Hill's effort to locate the target audience of Nixon's appeal involves certain assumptions regarding the American political process. For example, according to Hill, Nixon's address must be classified as a "deliberative speech." That is, it is a speech of policy, dealing with war and peace, advocating future action. It assumes a more or less homogeneous audience that has the power to decide public policy through voting. As Hill maintains, "Those who receive the message are decisionmakers" (1972a, p. 375). In other words, a deliberative address implies an audience entrusted with the ability to decide on a policy and it also implies that the same policy is open to debate by the audience. Hill is correct in asserting that Nixon was selective in his appeal, a point that Campbell also makes clear. Moreover, Hill is correct in arguing that Nixon was building popular support for his policies, a point that all three of the above discussed critics have highlighted. However, Nixon's was not a deliberative speech, strictly speakitig. Nixon's audience had no power to vote on issues of war and peace: They were not being asked what to do, they were being told the parameters o f government policy. The decisions of the war were in the hands of a few elite policy makers, and the only role that most of the public played in Vietnam was in their quiet acquiescence to authority. As Carole Blair and Davis W. Houck (1994) explain:

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[Nixon] did ask for support of his decisions and actions, but he described such support as if it were a necessary condition of success. That is, Nixon made decisions, took action, and then told the American people that they were responsible for the outcome. Certainly a clever rhetorical ploy, such an evasion of responsibility cannot be classed as ethically legitimate by any standard except the most misanthropic utilitarianism. Nixon rhetorically refused responsibility for the action he took, shifting the burden to an audience that had had no part in choosing the actions. . . . [Nixon] was essentially offering the nation a means of de-authorizing and silencing dissent, (p. 112)

To the extent that most American people did not see their interests as similar to the governmental policy in Vietnam, Nixon's speech had to mystify the issues and generate a culture of passivity. In a sense, the U.S. public had to be "pacified" as the Viettiamese peasants, likewise, had to be pacified. The difference between the two populations is that the Nixon administration found it more expedient to lie and mislead the American public than to send military troops to quell domestic unrest forcefully in the United States. Not surprisingly. Hill reaches a different conclusion than does Camp­ bell on the issue of Nixon's integrity. Whereas Campbell offers textual evidence for Nixon's manipulation. Hill (1972a) shifts his analysis in an opposite direction by arguing, "The address begins with an enthymeme that attacks the credibiUty gap" (p. 375). By assuming that Nixon's address is deliberative and that Nixon speaks as a member of the polls to equal members of the polls. Hill concludes, "Those who decide on war and peace must know the truth about these policies, and the conclusion is implied that the President is going to tell the truth" (p. 3 7 6 ) . Such argument naturally follows from a fortnalistic and Uteral reading of Aristotle's (1991) Rhetoric, a text assuming that "truth" tends to prevail over falsehood, and if it fails to do so, it is considered the fault of a poorly formulated rhetorical argument (p. 3 4 ) . As discussed above in my analysis of Newman's essay and in Kendall's objections to that essay, the question of "truth" is sensitive; Hill agrees that "truth" questions are difficult to answer and argues that rhetorical critics should not even attempt to engage in claims based on such posi­ tions. For Hill (1983), any attempt to setde the question of "truth" leads the critic "away from the art of rhetoric" (p. 122). Accordingly, it is enough that Nixon "promises to tell the truth before he asks the American people

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to support a policy which involves the overriding issues of war and peace" (Hill, 1972a, p. 383); if the target audience believes that Nixon is telling the "truth," then the integrity or structure of the rhetorical act remains intact. Specifically, Hill (1972a) writes, "[N]eo-Aristotelian criticism does not warrant us to establish the truth of Nixon's statement or the reality of the values he assumes as aspects of American life" (p. 385). Hill interprets the critic's role as judgii^; the integrity of the speech's rhetorical efficacy, rather than the integrity of the speaker's ideas; after all, the "end" of persuasion is e//ect, according to Hill. Because Hill does not permit the rhetorical critic to pass judgment on the subjective validity of a speaker's claims, he limits the critic to a purely structural analysis of a rhetorical text. As he maintains, "Neo-Aristotelian criticism tells a great deal about Nixon's message. It reveals the speech writer as a superior technician" (1972a, p. 3 8 4 ) . By focusing on the technical aspects of Nixon's address. Hill (1972a) limits his analysis to a surface-level review of Nixon's appearance: [Nixon] has the courage to make a tasteful appeal to patriotism even when it's unpopular. Such is the character portrait drawn for us by Richard Nixon: restrained not hawkish, hardworking and active, flexible, yet firm when he needs to be. (p. 383) Such a reading is consistent with Hill's critical stance, one itiformed by Aristotle's concept of "ethos." Specifically, Hill (1983) argues that what is important to criticism is an understanding of "the traditional topoi drawn on, the unique or unusual strategies developed, the pathe employed, or the kinds of audience it creates or seeks to persuade" (p. 122). In this sense, Nixon's "appearance" assumes a greater significance in Hill's analysis than it does in the other three analyses reviewed. Once again, though it is difficult to "prove" that Nixon intended to lie in his public statements about the war and that the American war in Vietnam was unjust, it is not difficult to debate the moral significance of Nixon's rhetorical claims. Questions of "justice" are always contingent upon human values and cultural beliefs and, thus, cannot be determined to be absolutely "true" or "false" Oames, 1907/1965, p. 158). Specifically, critics must accept these limitations and work within the confines of their argumentative appeals. Ideological critics realize that claims of "right" and "wrong" must be situated in the examples of behavior found within a speaker's text that highlight the disparity between a speaker's claims and

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its logological implications. The critic's job is to emphasize motives within the text, create areas of resistance to instances of dominant, oppressive discourse, to suggest possibilities for alternative readings, and to confront the calcification of one ideological "truth."

A NEO-PRAGMATIC ANALYSIS OF

N I X O N ' S " T H E W A R IN V I E T N A M " A D D R E S S

A neo-pragmatic analysis of Nixon's address should be setisitive to the ideological and axiological dimensions of that text as well as to the social needs of the community receiving the speech. In short, Nixon's speech must be approached with trepidation for its implicatioiis in creating and perpetuating human suffering. This section is organized according to three areas. First, I argue in justification of my neo-pragmatic analysis that it illustrates the commit­ ment to praxis I call for in this book, and that Nixon's speech is repre­ sentative of larger ideological practices in American society. Second, in my analysis of the speech, I argue that Nixon's misuse o f history and his arguments from faulty historical premises constitute a sophisticated use of persuasion and were intended to conceal American crimes and business interests in Vietnam. In short, Nixon was attempting to manipulate the U.S. public in support of a murderous and tyrannical foreign policy. Third, I argue that Nixon's speech encourages an increased slaughter and terror against Vietnam at the same time it ostensibly advocates "justice" and "peace." I further argue, throughout my analysis, that the responsibility of the rhetorical critic writing in the 1970s was to denounce Nixon and his speech, condemn the war, and advocate government reparations to the Vietnamese people. Justifying an Ideological Reading of Nixon's Address in 1997 In offering my analysis of Nixon's address, 1 contend that such analysis is appropriate in 1997 for two reasons. First, this analysis serves as an illustration of my call for an increased disciplinary praxis in Speech Communication. Second, the discourse itself is indicative of persistent political practices in the United States that can be challenged through the analysis of rhetorical action (Ivie, 1974, 1980; Wander, 1984a). Nixon's

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speech was delivered 28 years ago, on November 3,1969. By the standards of the 20th century, 28 years is a long period of time; people, politics, and circumstances change in only a fraction as many years. In some ways, my contemporary analysis of Nixon's speech may seem anachronistic Nixon has died, the cold war has "ended," and communism has ceased to be a substantial ideological, economic, and military threat to the United States. In short, the distinct political environment of the 1960s surrounding Nixon's address has long since dissipated. This country faces new tensions and new challenges as its citizetis court the opportunities of the 21st century. Why, then, belabor an old speech that has been analyzed four times previously by disciplinary scholars? In order to answer this important question, I turn to the rationale of a larger historical perspective. In light of this broader view, contemporary events unfolding around us do not appear in a decontextualized environ­ ment. Specifically, the recent American crisis with North Korea, the continuing crises withCuba, and the U.S. military involvement in Panama, Kuwait, Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti have not occurred independent of history and historical processes. Rather, they occur as an extension of history, a continuation of past policies and events (Hunt, 1987). These events appear as part of larger narratives in American politics that can be "read" and understood through various narrative methodologies (e.g.. Fisher, 1987). One such narrative "lens" to explain U.S. history is ideological. An ideological perspective explicates the unstated, and often unrecognized, assumptions that contextualize presidential oratory and helps us to eluci­ date the "meaning" of rhetorical events (Medhurst, Ivie, Wander, & Scott, 1990). While Nixon's speech is merely one rhetorical event in history, and while its lesser or greater significance is relative to a whole host of other rhetorical and poUtical events, it is indicative of larger themes (narratives) in American society. Indeed, Nixon's speech is representative of a phe­ nomenon of deceit and manipulation in American poUtics, one stretching from our colonial administrations through the current administration (cf. Chomsky, 1993b; Zinn, 1980). Within the above ideological Ught, Nixon "speaks" to a contemporary audience, and within this light the critic must answer. Thus, in an impor­ tant and pressing sense, the indictment of Nixon in this criticism is more centrally an indictment of American foreign policy and of the business community such policy serves. More centrally, I argue that Nixon had no intention of de-escalating the war and, in spite of popular resistance to the American invasion of Vietnam, the U.S. government had plai\s to intetisify

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the conflict (Finney, 1969). Thus, my criticism faults Nixon for ostensibly promoting peace while pursuing a policy of aggression. The Rhetorical Function of Nixon's Misuse of History The most central path to the ideological heart of Nixon's address is located in his selective use of history. I argue that Nixon's misuse of history influences his subsequent argumentation and thus demands the full atten­ tion of rhetorical scholars. In order to develop my position more fully, this section is structured according to two arguments. Because Campbell writes about the issue of history in Nixon's speech, I begin with her analysis and, with the aid of Noam Chomsky, argue for a more developed critique of Nixon's moral argument. After merging Campbell's positions into my own neo-pragmatic perspective, and situating this perspective in Chomsky's elaborate analysis of the Vietnam War, I offer an extended account of Nixon's history and maintain that the account Nixon provided of the war is filled with gaps in both the historical and moral records.

Campbell and the Moral Suspicion of Nixon With Campbell, I argue that Nixon's rhetorical practices must be approached with moral suspicion. For example, in her analysis of Nixon's speech, Campbell illustrates how Nixon's main thesis involves various claims of "truth" and "unity" with regard to the Vietnam war and to governmental policy, but fails to maintain the dignity of those promises. She concludes, based upon his historical misrepresentatiotu, "Nixon's policy becomes the logical outcome of the decisions and values of his predecessors, and Nixon's way becomes the American way" (Campbell, 1972b, p. 52). In addition, as Campbell illustrates, Nixon attempts to make the war "ethical" by restructuring history to solicit the ideological sanction of the American public Nixon's misuse of history, however, has fiirther rhetorical implications. While Nixon positions current poUcy to reflect the ethical and political sanctions of the prior administration, he is committing the United States to a policy of aggression in the region. This represents a tension in the speech because Nixon's (1969) stated purpose is, "How can we win America's peace?" (p. 1547).

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As Campbell's essay suggests, Nixon's credibility is suspect. One reason for our suspicion comes from a closer examination of Nixon's fraudulent attempt to gain the goodwill of his audience. According to Nixon (1969), "The American people cannot and should not be asked to support a policy which involves the overriding issues of war and peace until they know the truth about that policy" (p. 1546). Within this context, Nixon purports to tell the American people "[w]hat has really happened in the negotiations in Paris and on the battleground in Vietnam" (p. 1546) as well as to explain how we got "involved in Vietnam in the first place" (p. 1546). Nixon's assumption is that the American people have not been told the "truth" before, that their hostilities to the war are misdirected because of this, and that the "truth" would be enough to justify the aggressive policies of his administration. In particular, Nixon's narrative stresses the importance of how Amer­ ica's involvement in Vietnam began. In a sense, Nixon purports to include the American people, a citizenry that has been excluded systemically from governmental decisions, into a discussion of Vietnam (for a discussion of secrecy and the role that it played in the executive privilege of the Nixon administration, see Rozell, 1992). The American invasion of Vietnam involved a slow buildup of military commitments, neglecting to utilize democratic or popular channels of deliberation; even at the level of Congressional involvement, democratic representation and commitment to a free flow of information were not a part of the Vietnam War for a majority of the American people (Chomsky, 1993a). As Stanley Karnow (1991) explains, "The growing U.S. mUitary investment in Vietnam was kept secret, particularly because it violated the Geneva agreement, and partly to deceive the American public" (p. 270). The importance of this deception in American politics is also com­ mented upon by Chomsky (1987), who explains how "a healthy democracy would impede imperial planners" by resisting the "social cost" of American aggression (p. 2 4 9 ) . For instance, the war in Vietnam involved a great material cost for the United States. According to Karnow (1991), the cost of the war between 1965 and 1973 alone was $120 billion dollars (p. 239). This "cost," which includes tens of biUions more when military aid to the French and South Vietnamese is considered, translated into profits for certain industries and business conglomerations and was paid for in Ameri­ can lives and taxes—a phenomenon Burke (1941/1973) calls the "sociali­ zation of losses" (p. 5 0 ) . In addition, Chomsky (1987) explains how "a functioning democracy might foster other values beyond domiriation and

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power—solidarity, sympathy, cooperative impulses, a concern for creative and useful work, and so on" (p. 249). Thus, in an important sense, the American brutality in Vietnam reflected the gap in our own country between the high ideals of our government propaganda and the reality of our everyday political alienation. Compounding this alienation is the fact that most of the American people had little or no idea of the issues surrounding the war with Vietnam; most of the information available to the American public was derived from governmental or other "establishment" channels. Even later in the war when the media "turned" against the U.S. involvement, this was more a reflection of a public fatigue with American casualties and did not take into consideration the wider implications of our imperialist policies. Ac­ cording to Karnow (1991), "Many Americaixs wanted the United States to get out of Vietnam, but at the same time they did not want to lose a war for the first time in their country's history" (p. 463). Thus, by directing his audience toward certain understandings of the past, Nixon's review o f history setves an important function in sanctioning the premises o f his larger argument: His historical rationales ground the moral positions pervading Nixon's reasoning. But what kind of history does Nixon present to the American people? According to Nixon (1969): Fifteen years ago North Vietnam, with the logistical support of Communist China and the Soviet Union, launched a campaign to impose a Communist government on South Vietnam by instigating and supporting a revolution, {p. 1547) Nixon elaborates that military aid, advisors, and intervention were "re­ quested" by "the Government of South Vietnam" (p. 1547), a government that, as it turns out, was created and supported by the United States (Chomsky, 1987, p. 225; Zinn, 1980, p. 463). The importance of Nixon's claims demands a fiirther discussion of this issue. Nixon's narrative takes his audience back to 1954; during this year, the United States, through the cover of a puppet government headed by Ngo Dinh Diem, prevented the unification and nationalization of Vietnam under northern leadership. This was a unification already guaranteed by international treaty. However, since a popular unification of the nation would not be in America's interest, the American government conspired to keep Vietnam divided. In order to do so, the United States established South Vietnam as an independent political state and used it as a base from

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which to battle insurgencies initiated by a disgruntled indigenous popula­ tion. Because of an extended American presence and pressure, North Vietnam was forced to solicit tactical help firom China and Russia and to attempt its liberation. "Liberation," in this sense, is not an empty rhetorical flourish used to justify communist military aggression. The Vietnamese were first and foremost fighting a war o f liberation; they were not fighting as the result of a planned policy itutiated in either China or the Soviet Union. This war of liberation becomes obvious to anyone who challenges the propaganda of the United States. For example, before waging war with the North, the United States had systemically destroyed the southern region of Vietnam in an effort to subject southern Vietnam to American control. Tens of thousands of South Vietnamese citizens where killed because they repre­ sented an active threat to the stability of the American government in Saigon, and millions more were incarcerated. As Chomsky (1987) sums up the rationale behind the U.S. govern­ ment's policy with regard to the indigenous population o f South Vietnam, "(T]o crush the people's war, we must exterminate the people" (p. 260). According to Chomsky's documentation, there were 66,000 Vietnamese casualties between 1957 and 1961, the years "before" the United States intensified the war. Subsequently, 89,000 died between 1961 and April 1965. In the next year, an additional 60,000 were killed (Chomsky, 1987, p. 274). As Chomsky concludes, "It is important to understand that the massacre o f the rural population of Vietnam and their forced evacuation [to mass holding centers] is not an accidental by-product of the war. Rather it is of the very essence of American strategy" (p. 259; see also Karnow, 1991, p. 454) to "pacify" the indigenous people of Vietnam. According to Karnow, more than four million Vietnamese peasants were imprisoned by September of 1962 (1991, p. 273). Thus it is only on a trivial and Eurocentric level that Nixon's narrative is "accurate." North Vietnam, armed by China and Russia, was attempting to topple the "government" of South Vietnam and to unify the country under a northern, communist leadership. However, because this is the only characterization that Nixon leaves with his audience, it is somewhat misleading; by any standards Nixon's narrative is not the most compre­ hensive narrative of the war. Given that Nixon was selective in his portrayal of events leading to the war, the important critical question becomes: For what "ends" does he develop his narrative? Was Nixon's narrative synoptic because his information was representative of the larger

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picture, thus untiecessary to recount for his audience? More specifically, given the possibility that Nixon's narrative was intended to justify his ethical arguments, and given the historical fact that a more encompassing narrative might make those moral arguments impossible, could Nixon have had another reason for misrepresenting history? 1 argue that Nixon presented a sanitized version of history in order to direct the attention of the American people away from a more compre­ hensive appreciation of the war in Vietnam, one further incrinunating American foreign policy and the Nixon administration. Nixon is attempt­ ing to hide the United States' responsibility in creating an imperialist and aggressive war. More specifically, a fuller appreciation of the history of Vietnam in relationship to its war with America suggests that the conflict has more significant roots than a world-communist "conspiracy." Yet to retain the facade of an American moral superiority, it is imperative for Nixon's rhetorical stance that his particular interpretation of the war remains the dominant view. Extending Nixon's Historical

Narrative

Nixon's historical narrative can be extended to include a more detailed description of American imperialism, hegemony, colonialism, and geno­ cide. Furthermore, 1 contend that when such a narrative is drawn, Nixon's argumentative claims can be seen as frauds and his rhetorical appeals collapse into base demagoguery. The history of American aggression in the Third World is pervasive. According to a State Department document, America intervened in the affairs of other countries 103 times between the years of 1798 and 1895 (cited in Zinn, 1980, p. 290). This number has continued to grow. For example, Zinn (1980) reports that between 1945 and 1977, "[T]he United States had deployed its military forces abroad for poUtical impact on 215 occasions" (p. 559). Since 1977, obvious instances of American interven­ tion abroad include military actions in East Timor, Grenada, Iraq, Panama, Lebanon, Nicaragua, Somalia, and Haiti (see, e.g., Beaud, 1983; Chomsky, 1987,1989, 1993a, 1993b). In an important sense, the American government has systemically excluded the wishes, desires, bodies, and sufferings of people in the Third World. To the United States, the people of Vietnam, like the American Indians before them, were savages to subjugate and control (cf Drinnon, 1980). To this end, the happiness and well-being of these people were

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never considered by policy makers in the United States. This margiiuiliza­ tion is made evident at the level of Nixon's discourse. Consider the following section from Nixon's speech, in which he describes the situation of the Vietnam War at the time of his inauguration to the presidency: The war had been going on for 4 years. 31,000 Americans had been killed in action. The training program for the South Vietnamese was behind schedule. 540,000 Americarw were in Vietnam with no plans to reduce the number. No progress had been made at the negotiations in Paris and the United States had not put forth a comprehensive peace proposal. The war was causing deep division at home and criticism from many of our friends as well as our enemies abroad, (p. 1546) Excluded from Nixon's Eurocentric description of the Vietnam War is the apparently "minor" fact that hundreds of thousands of Vietnamese had been killed and many more maimed by American soldiers and pilots. The magnitude of this destruction is multiplied when we factor in the casualties from starvation, slavery, and disease, resulting from the French occupation (lasting from 1859 to 1954). According to Karnow (1991), the Vietnamese workers were, under French rule, "so blighted by malaria, dysentery and malnutrition that at one Michelin company plantation, twelve thousand out of the forty-five thousand [workers] died between 1917 and 1944" (p. 129). Furthermore, Nixon, in his analysis of the situation, fails to mention that the social, political, and agricultural infrastructures of Viet­ nam had been completely destroyed, and Nixon ignores the inevitable conclusion that mass starvation and sickness will follow and result in the deaths of countless more Vietnamese. By marginalizirig the Vietnamese in his narrative, Nixon excludes an entire dimension of the war relevant to the formations of his moral argument. For instance, the war in Vietnam had been continuing for a considerably longer period of time than the president indicates. In a literal sei«e, the war started in the aftermath of World War 1 when the Allied natioiu agreed to reestablish their traditional colonial empires. For exam­ ple, at the treaty of Versailles, a young Vietnamese communist, later to be named Ho Chi Minh, was astonished when Woodrow Wilson, the man credited in Nixon's speech with "dreaming" to "end all wars," awarded France control of Vietnam. Minh's party of Vietnamese and French com­ munists protested and were excluded from the "peace" conference. This was the start of Ho Chi Minh's Vietnamese-led resistance against the French occupation, an occupation that was supplemented in 1940 by a

Rhetorical Criticism

12 7

Japanese invasion. When French influence was expelled by the Japanese, Ho Chi Minh's nationalists turned their resistance against the Japanese occupation untU Japan was defeated by Allied forces in 1945 ("Viet-Nam," 1993). Once again, Minh expected that the successful resolution of a war that was fought for "democracy" would enable democracy to flourish in his own country (Karnow, 1991, p. 138). However, such beliefs, encouraged in part by the Ariantic Charter, were squelched when the French returned in 1946 (Karnow, 1991, p. 147). Popular Vietnamese resistance to the French was fierce and so success­ ful that France become dependent on the United States to support, equip, and fund its occupational forces. According to Zinn (1980), 8 0 % of the French war effort was subsidized by the United States (p. 462; Karnow, 1991, pp. 148, 185). In response to a popular Vietnamese resistance, the French instigated a policy of starvation; as a result of this policy, in the first years after the French returned, two million Vietnamese, mostly children, died (Zinn, 1980, p. 4 6 1 ) . Karnow also reports a two million starvation figure, but attributes the famine to Japanese policies. Between the two conflicting accounts of this atrocity, I privilege Zinn's account. Evidence for Zirm's claim is provided by a letter from Ho Chi Minh to President Truman. In this letter, Minh explicitly incriminates the French for hoarding and destroying rice reserves amidst natural plagues that eviscerated five sixths of Vietnam's rice production (Ziim, 1980, p. 4 6 1 ) . Until 1954, the Vietnam War was fought by the French at the cost of ninety thousand French and four hundred thousand Vietnamese battle casualties (Karnow, 1991, pp. 203, 221). After 1954, the French, in spite of American aid, were forced to resign their claims to Vietnam and withdraw to the south, where an international committee helped to negotiate a peace setdement. With the communists controlling the north, and the French in the south, an agreement was reached whereby the French would slowly remove their troops and elec­ tions could be held to unify the country (Karnow, 1991, pp. 218-220, 235). These elections were never held because America, afi-aid of the popularity of communism in Vietnam and in the neighboring states of Laos and Cambodia, intervened and created an unpopular political dictatorship in the South. As Chomsky (1987) writes, "The United States openly recog­ nized throughout that a political setdement [with North Vietnam] was impossible, for the simple reason that the 'enemy' could win handily in a political competition, which was therefore unacceptable" (p. 2 2 4 ) . Karnow (1991) makes a similar point when he writes, "[The U.S.] knew

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that the Saigon regime was too weak to survive a compromise settlement" (p. 394). The "4 years" to which Nixon refers in his speech is in reference to the Gulf of Tonkin incident. In August 1964, President Johnson provoked a communist attack on the American navy, providing a rationale for sending more than half a million American soldiers to Vietnam (Karnow, 1991, p. 383). In addition, Johnson ordered the U.S. Air Force to begin the carpet bombing of the North "at a rate unequaled in history" (Zinn, 1980, p. 467). According to Karnow (1991), in a single 31/i-year period of time between March 1965 and November 1968, the United States bombed North Viet­ nam at the rate of "roughly eight hundred tons per day" (p. 469). The above actions occurred without a formal declaration of war and without the knowledgeable consent of the American people. So when Nixon claims that the "war had been going on for 4 years," he is deliberately misleading his audience which may have been incredulous to find that the Vietnamese had been resisting a brutal Western military onslaught for more than 20 years of continuous warfare. The American people might have also thought twice about their government's ability to defeat a nation that was deter­ mined to fight for as long as it took to remain firee. According to Karnow (1991), "[The Communists] saw the struggle against America and its South Vietnamese allies as another chapter in their nation's thousands of years of resistance to Chinese, and later, French rule. And they were prepared to accept unlimited losses to achieve their sacred objective" (p. 2 0 ) . This brief review of Vietnamese history has important implications for an analysis of Nixon's discourse. For instance, there is an obvious contrast between Nixon's characterization of the war, marginaUzing the Vietnamese people on the one hand, and a characterization of the war, taking into consideration Vietnamese interests, on the other. This contrast serves ideological and rhetorical functions in Nixon's speech. Specifically, rhe­ torical discourses exclude as much as they include; each accentuates as much as it deflects (Burke, 1966, pp. 44-62). More important, rhetorical discourses do so for a reason—that is, to influence the way people think about a certain phenomenon and to limit their choices for action (Black, 1970). Unless the intent of war is the complete annihilation of a nation, combatants have a practical/tactical responsibility to consider the interests of the enemy for negotiation and bargaining purposes. Nixon's refusal to do so indicates his logological commitment to total war, a commitment exemplified by his subsequent actions in Laos and Cambodia. Thus, what

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does not appear in the body of a speech is in many ways more interesting than what does appear textualized in a discourse (Wander, 1984b). The fact that Nixon does not give a full account of the Vietnam War is significant and suggests that he is engaged in the rhetoric of control (Bowers, Ochs, & Jensen, 1993). In other words, Nixon is not simply inviting the American people to deliberate about the war; he is fundamen­ tally shaping their experiences of that war as much as he is shaping the Vietnamese experience with American bombs. With this in mind, rhetori­ cal critics have an important moral and political obligation to pierce the screen of deceit, projected by American politicians, that keeps the majority of the American people in line with the dominant policies of our nation's elite (Klumpp & Hollihan, 1989). To this end, a critical analysis of Nixon's use of history must be seen in the light of an extended resistance that works toward the ends of human solidarity and compassion. Nixon's Argument and the Intensification of Hostilities Nixon's argument for the Vietnamization of the war served as a mis­ leading gesture to justify his intensification of American aggression. Fur­ thermore, while Nixon talks of "justice" and "peace," the implications o f his policy imply the opposite. Similar to his misuse of history for argumentative purposes, Nixon employs a second major rhetorical strategy in his speech. This strategy can be characterized as a form of "doublespeak" (see Lutz, 1989) by which Nixon justifies an intensification in hostilities with Vietnam while, at the same time, tempering criticism of such policy by appearing beneficent. As Nixon (1969) explains, "I, therefore, put into effect another plan to bring peace—a plan which will bring the war to an end regardless of what happetis on the negotiating front" (p. 1550). In order to illustrate his sincerity on this point, Nixon begins his rhetorical appeal by observing, "The obstacle [to peace] is the other side's absolute rehisal to show the least willingness to join us in seeking a just peace" (p. 1550). Nixon's above statement can be argued to be resolutely false. For example, "[I] η 1958, Hanoi made another of its many attempts—rebuffed once again by Saigon and the United States—to establish diplomatic and commercial relationships with the Saigon government on the basis o f the status quo" (Chomsky, 1987, p. 62; see also Karnow, 1991, pp. 307-308). In other words, what Nixon had in mind is something quite different than

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the type of justice in which the Vietnamese people were interested; a "just" peace, for Nixon, meant the end to American combat deaths, not the end of American brutality in the region. Yet the phrase "a just peace" sounds so magnanimous and fair. How could the North Vietnamese find anything wrong with such "justice"? Thus, in his appeal, Nixon structures his audience's experience of the war by presenting himself and his administra' tion as the instigators of peace. This " peace," however, according to Nixon, has been constantly rebuffed by the unwillingness of the North Vietnamese to negotiate. The conditions of a "just" peace are difficult, as Nixon admits, and for this reason it appears as if his administration is delaying action on this issue. Thus, Nixon makes it seem that while millions of Americans are visibly protesting the war and compromising America's position in the region, he is working behind the scenes to actualize a plan for ending the war on America's terms. As Nixon makes clear time and again in his speech, immediate withdrawal is the wrong answer. Such an option, as a sign of weakness, would only lead to further communist aggression and the loss of American respect. According to Nixon (1969), "I want to end [the war] in a way which will increase the chance that (the soldier's] younger brothers and . . . sons will not have to fight in some fiiture Vietnam someplace in the world" (p. 1553). The period of secrecy was over and Nixon led his audience to believe that he is in an unique position to take "the unprecedented step of disclosing . . . some of our . . . initiatives for peace" (p. 1549). Thus, Nixon extends the illusion of democracy developed in his earlier appeal by making it appear as if the American people were included in their government's decisions. Yes, everyone should agree, "the defense of freedom . . . is particularly the responsibility of the people whose freedom is threatened" (p. 1551). Therefore, "In this administration, we are Vietnamizing the search for peace" (p. 1551). In other words, Nixon is authorizing the increased militarization of the South and the further inscription of Viet­ namese peasants to fight against the forces of their own liberation. While U.S. casualties will diminish, Vietnamese casualties should be expected to rise. Such casualties suggest that "peace" and "justice" are not the inevi­ table resolution of Nixon's plan. However, these considerations are not raised in Nixon's speech. Indeed, Nixon's claims appear to be appealing to a democratic consensus; as discussed earlier, resistance to the war was not situated so much in a moral argument or a rejection of U.S. imperialism, but in remorse for the loss of

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American lives and the quagmiring of U.S. objectives. As Philip E. Con­ verse and Howard Schuman (1970) report, "Most disenchantment with the war seems pragmatic and can be summed up in the attitude that 'we have not won and have litde prospect of doing so' " (p. 24). To a population frustrated with the increasingly obvious gap between the government's commitment to a war that seemed unwitmable and the people's desires to resolve the conflict and end the loss of American lives, a great many people felt relief that the president was addressing their concerns; for these people, the Vietnamization of the war was a "reasonable" option. The above point is further substantiated by Converse and Schuman (1970), who write, "[T]he reaction to President Nixon's speech of last November may chiefly reflect satisfaction that some kind of effort was being made to move the situation off dead center" (p. 2 2 ) . Sadly, this observation explains the fact that a majority of the people who opposed the war were not calling for immediate withdrawal. This will also explain why, to our moral discredit, the United States never felt sufficiently guilty for its slaughter to pay war reparations to Vietnam or to help that country with humanitarian loans or international aid. Indeed, through the Reagan administration, the United States has used all of its political clout to prevent the international community from helping to rebuild Vietrwm and to reduce postwar suffering and starvation (Chomsky, 1987, p. 300). Although Nixon's speech may have had the effect of stimulating sup­ port for his policy among some of the American population, it is clear from the evidence supplied by the text of Nixon's address that the American people were being misled. Nixon is not asking for their support, but, rather, he is demanding their acquiescence. Nixon does not offer the American people a "peace" in Vietnam; he offers the public a less visible and more costly war in terms of Vietnamese lives and American monetary support. This manipulation is central to Nixon's use of narrative. As Nixon (1969) opens this section of his speech, "1 did not wait for my inauguration to begin my quest for peace" (p. 1549). In fact, Nixon pressed for war with Vietnam many years earlier. As Newman (1970b) explains, "It was, after all, Nixon who as early as 1954 did his best to launch an American expeditionary force against Ho Chi Minh and in support of the French" (p. 170). From a neo-pragmatic position that demands equality, democracy, justice, and solidarity for all citizens of the world, the "peace" Nixon desires is an "American" peace and is thus no peace at all. "American" peace, like the myth of America's destiny that Nixon evokes later in his speech, is a

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dangerous rhetorical flourish. From the point of view of social justice and equality, a "just" peace can only result from an immediate American withdrawal from hostilities and a paying of war reparatiotu. In short, America was wrong to invade Vietiiam and systematically destroy that country. This much was clear to the policy planners of the war; evidence published in the Pentagon Papers (Zinn, 1971) illustrates that our govern­ ment, from the beginning, was aware that aggression in Vietnam was imperialist and against both domestic and international law. Evoking the ruse of communism was simply a handy way for these policy-elites to justify the war to the international, as well as the American, public (Chomsky, 1987, p. 255). Such treachery in misleading the American public is evident in the text of Nixon's speech. For example, while Nixon calls for a "just" peace, it is clear that, by his own standards, such a peace is impossible for two reasons. First, a "just" peace—as in the immediate withdrawal of American troops and aid for a united Vietnam—is unacceptable for Nixon and is rejected outright. In this sense, Nixon's policy resembles the feelings of a majority of the American people. Even among Americans who were critical of the war, few favored a total abdication to North Vietnam (Converse & Schuman, 1970; Karnow, 1991, pp. 559, 572). Second, a "just" peace is impossible for Nixon because, by 1969, the people of Vietnam would never accept anything short of a complete expulsion of American influence from their country. As American atrocities multiplied against the Vietnamese people, it was evident to the communists that no settlement with the United States would ever stop their suffering. In short, neither side in the conflict was prepared to sacrifice their goals. Thus Nixon's quest for "peace" is moot: Peace will not be negotiated when his basic assumption is that South Vietnam must forcibly remain a noncommunist state. To maintain the effectiveness of the U.S. puppet regime in South Vietnam, Nixon is absolutely committed to a military presence and to open hostilities with the North, even if American ground-forces were to be removed. These troops, however, will not be removed, because, as Nixon (1969) threatens the North Vietnamese, "If I conclude that increased enemy action jeopardizes our remaining forces in Vietnam, I shall not hesitate to take strong and effective measures to deal with that situation" (p. 1552). As Nixon implies, he plans to mihtarize and equip South Vietnam and to entrust that region with the fight against the North, but promises to bring back the American troops if North Vietnam continues to resist the South. But how does Nixon expect North Vietnam to react?

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O f course, North Vietriam is going to increase its violence in response to an increased military threat in the South. With this cotisideration in mind, what possible plans for "peace" is Nixon promoting? Seen in this light, Nixon's promise of peace through the Vietnamization of the war is an attempt to escalate the war, while at the same time blaming the enemy for such escalation. The speech is Nixon's way of justifying and cultivating a more concerted American war effort, one supported by a broader base of the American public Rather than presenting a plan that takes into consideration the needs of North Vietnam, Nixon's policy continues to subvert the struggles of the North Vietnamese—an odd policy when the conditions of peace usually call for some concessions to the enemy and some commitment to its security. As the Vietnamization of the war is understandably unacceptable from the point of view of the North Vietnamese, they are increasingly deter­ mined to reject negotiations, thus perpetuatitig the illusion of American righteousness. As Nixon (1969) argues, "The obstacle is the other side's absolute refusal to show the least willingness to join us in seeking a just peace" (p. 1550). The question raised by the ideological critic is: What claim does Nixon have to "justice" in terms of a "reasonable" peace settlement? In short, what right does the United States have to assert terms of peace? In response to such a call for "justice," Ho Chi Minh wrote to Nixon, "For [a "just" peace] the United States must cease the war of aggression and withdraw their troops from South Vietnam, respect the right of the population of the South and of the Vietnamese nation to dispose of themselves, without foreign influence" (Minh, 1969, p. 1555). Yet Nixon's plan is different. To enact his governmental agenda, the American people must be led to believe that the roadblocks to peace lie within the control of the North Vietnamese negotiating delegation. For Nixon, a "just" peace derives from North Vietnamese concessions. More realisti­ cally, however, the condition of peace is dependent upon an American withdrawal from hostility and a commitment to Vietnamese nationalism. In other words, "Nixon was not ending the war; he was ending the most unpopular aspect of it, the involvement of American soldiers on the soil of a faraway country" (Zinn, 1980, p. 474). While Nixon speaks of "peace," his actions suggest otherwise. As Karnow (1991) explains, "Vietnamiza­ tion" meant that "by shifting the human burden to local surrogates, the United States could project its global power at a coast tolerable to Ameri­ cans" (p. 6 0 9 ) . In fact, one of the first statements Nixon (1969) makes after announcing his plan to Vietnamize the war is "I ordered first a

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substantial increase in the training and equipment of South Vietnamese forces" (p. 1551). In effect, Nixon's administration counted on Americans to be appeased by Nixon's plan, as if the death of American soldiers were the only injustice to result from U.S. imperialist aggression in Southeast Asia.

SUMMARY As I have argued, traditional accounts attempting to delineate what criticism is and the academic disputes surrounding such assertions are relatively uninteresting when confronted with the extra-disciplinary con­ ditions of human suffering. From the point of view of the neo-pragmatic perspective I advocate, all criticism is equally beneficial so long as it is directed toward social response and responsibility, the reduction of human marginalization and alienation, and the advancement of our social, politi­ cal, and economic lives. In this sense, criticism points a way toward the "purification" of our social order and the increased beneficence of our contemporary society. Functionally, I have argued that criticism is both a pragmatic and a political act that is much too important to be contained solely within the parameters of our traditional disciplinary practices. As exemplified in my analysis of Nixon's "The War in Vietnam" address, and of the four disci­ plinary studies that have engaged Nixon's discourse, efforts by scholars in our discipline should be directed toward a redescribed social and political vision that erodes the authority of the American government to wage imperialist war in the Third World and to undermine American liberties and prosperity at home.

NOTE 1. Passages from "An Exercise in the Rhetoric of Mythical America," by K. K. Campbell,

in Critiques of contemporary rhetoric (pp. 50-58) by K. K. Campbell, 1972, Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, copyright 1 9 7 2 by Wadsworth Publishing, are reprinted with permission.

(^})e Pedagogical Implications

of a Critical Rhetoric

I

n the preceding chapters, I argued that a social and neo-pragmatist emphasis in our disciplinary scholarship politicizes and vitalizes our work as rhetorical scholars. By focusing our scholarship on how ideology influences society and contributes to detrimental social relationships, we are empowered as scholars to engage in praxis. Now that I have explained the theoretical and practical implications of a social "turn" for our discipline in terms of "theory" and "criticism," I develop a critique and redescription of our pedagogical practices. Specifi­ cally, 1 argue that the teaching of rhetorical studies can be reconceptualized as the teaching of cultural critique. In other words, students in our classes can be encouraged to engage the cultural, strategic, and ideological influences of language and to react intelligently to the influence of discourse on social "knowledge." In order to substantiate my thesis, this chapter is composed of three parts. In the first, I argue that the dimensions of a redescribed pedagogical practice in rhetorical studies involve exposing students to the language and history of critical theory. I believe the language and history of critical theory can be translated into pedagogical approaches to the classroom experience. More specifically, I explain the dimensions of a "critical pedagogy" in relationship to the basic Communication course. Second, after defining the dimensions of a redescribed critical pedagogy in Communication studies, I argue that this perspective is lacking in our 135

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current disciplirury practices. In relationship to the basic Communication course, a gap exists between our theoretical insights and our pedagogical practices. Drawing analogically from the experience of composition pro­ grams in departments of English, 1 argue that the isolation and "feminiza­ tion" of the basic course can be refigured to reflect a more representative array of theoretical communication constructs. In so doing, I hope to reconstruct the basic course to serve more functionally the intellectual health of the communication discipline. Third, in the final part to this chapter I offer specific and tangible suggestions for improving the pedagogical practices of the basic course in Communication. In so doing, I advocate efforts to bridge the chasm between "theory" and "pedagogy." Specifically, I argue that there are two approaches for redescribing the pedagogical limitations of the basic course in Communication education: institutional and individual. As an instance of an institutional approach, I turn to the example of the Department of Communication at Loyola University and contend that its restructuring of the communication curriculum ought to serve as an example for the larger reconceptualization of the Communication discipline throughout departments nationwide. As an example of an individual solution, I maintain that changes in attitude at the level of the instructor are neces­ sary. In this part, 1 draw from my own experience teaching the basic Communication course and offer six examples of critical exercises/assign­ ments that can be incorporated into the pedagogy of the basic course.

DIMENSIONS OF A

REDESCRIBED CRITICAL PEDAGOGY

IN C O M M U N I C A T I O N S T U D I E S

In exploring the dimensions of a redescribed critical pedagogy in Com­ munication Studies, I argue for two positions. First, by engaging in a critical pedagogy, I illustrate how the basic course in Communication can be reconceptualized as cultural critique. In so doing, I review Paulo Freire's distinction between "banking" and "problem-posing" models of education and argue that the problem-posing model of education is supportive of the goals of cultural critique and should be adopted as a pedagogical practice in the basic course. Second, I question the traditional notion of "authority" as manifested in the classroom under banking models of education. I submit that the traditional notion of authority creates problems in the

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relationship between the teacher and the student and further mystifies the notion of "knowledge," thereby alienating the student from the socio­ epistemic qualities of discourse. A "turn" in our classroom pedagogy, away from traditional notions of authority, helps teachers to embrace a more pluralistic notion of "responsibiUty" in sanctionitig pedagogic as well as social discourse. The Definition and Parameters of a Critical Pedagogy in the Basic Communication Course A critical pedagogy in the basic Communication course stems from our commitment both to research and to a widening of {xjpular involvement in the public sphere. Specifically, a critical pedagogy approaches education as a "dialogue" and as a "rhetoric." A critical pedagogy, in short, is a strategic cultural intervention by scholars, one empowering students to disseminate the results of a critical education throughout the wider non­ academic community. When accepting a neo-pragmatic challenge to our disciplinary practices. Communication scholars should also commit them­ selves to redescribing their classroom pedagogies. By accepting a greater critical and neo-pragmatic perspective, and by questioning their own pedagogical assumptions, scholars are positioned toward a radical change in their attitude toward teaching. For the purpose of this book, I define the practice of a critical pedagogy in departments of Communication as: The process of helping students to idej\tify and critique the ways language reifies and structures human social reality for the purpose of empowering students to engage more actively in both the construction and the critique of society. My definition of a critical pedagogy in Communication Studies is compatible with the articulation of a critical agenda in cultural studies. For example, as Richard Johnson (1987) ex­ plains, one project of scholars of cultural studies "is to abstract, describe, and reconstitute in concrete studies the social forms through which human beings 'live,' become conscious, sustain themselves subjectively" (p. 4 5 ) . Because the critical and scholarly attention of cultural studies at the level of our research can only go so far in reforming society, its practical effectiveness derives from the efforts of nonscholars informed by its prin­ ciples. In short, whereas teachers cannot expect all of their students to become critical theorists per se, they can expect individual students in their classes to grow more aware of a personal potential to act critically. As Henry Giroux (1988) explains, "Developing a cultural poUtics of Uteracy

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and pedagogy becomes an important starting point for enabling those who have been silenced or marginaUzed by the schools, mass media, cultural industiy, and video culture to reclaim the authorship of their own lives" (p. 152, emphasis added). As I argued in the previous chapters of this book, critical scholars in our field, in order to have a greater impact in mediating important social tensions, can extend the audience for their analysis of culture beyond the limitations of traditional publications. Although I continue to advocate the popular diffusion of critical communication scholarship, I also believe it is important to recognize that the reason for engaging in research is, ultimately, to improve our effectiveness as "teachers" in the public sphere. As Giroux (1988) concludes: Fundamental to a pedagogy of critical literacy would be the opportunity for students to interrogate how knowledge is constituted as both a historical and social construction. In addition, students can be given the opportunity to address the question of how knowledge and power come together in often contradictory ways to sustain and legitimate particular discourses that define a notion of public good. (p. 33) Seen from this point of view, we, as scholars, produce research informing others about the effects and influences of communication and ideas in society. Implicit in this critical notion of scholarship is an emphasis on "advocacy." By informing and teaching with our research, we act as persuaders in the public arena; through our writings, we advocate for a position. In this way, "scholarship," "pedagogy," and "advocacy" are inter­ related concepts. Working together, each contributes to a critical con­ sciousness. Furthermore, being politically active with our research entails being more pedagogically active in applying OUT research. Specifically, a political sensitivity is, simultaneously, an educational sensitivity. Our political persona is educational because, by adopting a reformist political stance, we, as critical scholars, shoulder the burden of proof in persuading others to change their attitudes and behaviors. Thus, "persuasion," in many ways, is "education"; to be effective in our cultural poUtics, we must be effective pedagogues. When pedagogy is approached from the position of "persuasion" and cultural politics, the dichotomy between "teaching" and "research" dissipates. In illustrating this point, I turn to an extended example.

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In 1989, this country was plunged into controversy when a national movement rose to "protect" the American flag from desecration. Sparking this controversy was an important case being heard before the Supreme Court of the United States. In Texas v. Johnson, the Court decided to protect flag desecration as "speech" (Van Alstyne, 1991). However, while the Court ruled in favor of free speech, there were, at the time, many conservative forces in this nation threatening to undermine such a ruling. For instance, as Texas v. Johnson was being heard, a broad bipartisan coalition formed in Washington to push for a Cotistitutional amendment to make flag desecration illegal. While national debate was raging on this issue. Communication scholar Edward Schiappa (1989a) submitted testimony to a Congressional sub­ committee on civil and Congressional rights. In his report, Schiappa argued against any proposed legislation to limit the rights of Americans to express dissatisfaction with the federal government. In so doing, Schiappa exemplifles the critical turn in scholarship and teaching that I am arguing for in this chapter and throughout this book. More specifically, the example of Schiappa's testimony illustrates how critical scholarship refig­ ures the persona of the researcher and the study of persuasion, as well as illustrating the importance of rhetoric as a liberal ideology and pedagogy. In short, Schiappa's testimony helps blur the traditional distinction be­ tween teaching, research, and criticism, offering a new perspective by which to reconceptualize the relationships between scholarship and cul­ tural debate. From his position as a scholar, Schiappa attempted to educate the Congressional committee; he illustrated how "truth," in an "open" society, is contingent and dependent upon debate and discussion. He argued that to silence any discussion, even the most "unorthodox," is to move steadily toward the condition of cultural absolutism and a "closed" society. For Schiappa, one important distinction between an "open" and a "closed" society involves the process of interpretitig communicative action. Open societies privilege words as ideas and recognize that all ideas, even distaste­ ful ones, belong within the realm of public debate. Closed societies, on the other hand, interpret "words as deeds" and punish impious words as if they were physical affronts to the social stability of the ruling regime. Thus, in advocating an open society, Schiappa (1989a) concludes, "[F]lag burning enhances the democratic process more than flag-waving" (p. 534). In making his above claim, Schiappa is being socially responsible with his scholarship. I assert that Schiappa's testimony is scholarship because

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his argument, though directed to a "popular" audience, is generated by his professional practices. As a scholar of rhetoric, Schiappa was more persua­ sive with members of Congress than he might otherwise have been by positioning the debate on flag burning in terms of an open or closed society and by associating the closed society with Iran. In addition, his "popular" conclusion that flag burning contributes to a healthy debate and a demo­ cratic consciousness flows from his professional involvement with the intricate ways in which language, culture, and ideology interact (see Schiappa, 1989c). In effect, Schiappa is being socially responsible with his scholarship by reconceptualizing the issues of "dissent," "flag-desecration," and "censorship" in novel ways, empowering more people to have an intelligent and critical opinion. Due in part to his professional experiences, Schiappa positioned himself to assert his important claims before Congress. However, while Schiappa presented himself as a scholar ("[I am] a university professor who re­ searches and teaches about Freedom of Speech," 1989b, p. 530), he was, simultaneously, approaching Congress as a pedagogue and as a persuader. For instance, in his letter of introduction, also included in the Congres­ sional hearings, Schiappa wrote, "I strongly oppose the calls for a constitu­ tional amendment to 'protect the flag' " (1989b, p. 530). In other words, Schiappa's testimony to Congress was intended to have political repercus­ sions; he was attempting to persuade his audience to support the condi­ tions of an "open" society. In so doing, Schiappa attempted to influence the larger public by illustrating, through education, how the issue of "flag protection" involves larger issues of social "truth," "representation," and political legitimization. Readers of Schiappa's essay learn that symbols represent values and societal assumptions of "knowledge." When any one symbol increasingly represents a culture's social values, as does the Ameri­ can flag, it becomes imperative in an open society for citizens to maintain their ability to challenge that social symbol. After all, Schiappa (1989a) reasons, "In a democracy today's truth can easily become tomorrow's false opinion, thus freedom of expression must afford the same level of passion and vehemence to those who challenge the status quo as is afforded to those who defend it" (p. 531). Schiappa's essay is one example of how Communication scholars can interact with cultural debates in the public sphere. On this level, Schiappa's essay serves as an example of the scholarship and critical activity I have encouraged in previous chapters in this book. Yet, on another level, Schiappa's testimony before Congress serves as an important

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example for the pedagogical arguments I am forwarding in this chapter. If we cannot adapt our analysis to meet the needs of a Congressional or student audience, then we have lost the notion that some vitality is always at stake in our research; we have lost the important sei«e of scholarship as "strategy" in responding to present cultural contingencies (Grossberg, 1992, p. 18). I contend that the fiinction of education is not only to aid students in gaining knowledge for life; it is, more substantially, strategic knowledge about how to live. Education, as a rhetorical strategy for coping, is the critical assertion of the mind as it seeks a method to preserve and extend the existence of the individual human organism. In other words, education allows for our successful grappling with "reality." In this sense, education is knowledge (ώοΜ knowledge, about teaching students what it means to "know." "Knowledge" entails "responsibility," and part of the agenda in education within the practice of a critical pedagogy is to revitalize the human being as a responsible moral agent within the sphere of a specific knowledge institution. As Giroux (1988) explains, "[A] critical educator can demonstrate his/her moral courage through a context that ties real meaning to ethical action while allowing students to read, debate, and align themselves with moral discourse on the issues that become a legiti­ mate object of discussion" (p. 67). In more specific terms, the practice of critical theory refigures pedagogy; in a literal sense, critical theory is, itself, pedagogical. For instance, in Paulo Freire's (1970/1994) sense of the term, pedagogy is the method for actual­ izing praxis by activating the "human" or "subjectness" of the individual person through dialogical discourse (p. 109). Moreover, as pedagogical practices reflect the ideological assumptions of a discipline, the change in our pedagogy should follow from a change in our theoretical commitments. One such redescription involves adopting the critical problem-posing model of education and rejecting the traditional banking model. More specifically, in making the change from a banking to a problem-posing model of education, teachers can engage in a practical pedagogy that simultaneously satisfies the skills-orientation of the basic course, the wider general education requirements of the university, and the disciplinary need to anchor "theory" with "pedagogy." According to Freire, the "banking" model of education is antidialectical and it stultifies the thoughts and experiences students need to engage actively with their construction of social reality. The banking model perpetuates the narrative of subject and object in education (the "subject"

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being the teacher and the "object" being the student). Within this narra­ tive, the teacher as subject, that is, as actor and agent, /ills "the students with the contents of his [or her] narration—contents which are detached from reaUty, disconnected from the totality which engendered them and could give them significance" (1970/1994, p. 52). Such pedagogy creates passive and uninspired citizens: The more students work at storing the deposits entrusted to them, the less they develop the critical consciousness which would result from their intervention in the world as transformers of that world. The more com­ pletely they accept the passive role imposed on them, the more they tend simply to adapt to the world as it is and to the fragmented view of reality deposited in them. (Freire, 1970/1994 p. 54) In short, the major problem with the bankitig model of education for a discipline such as ours, striving to socialize and historicize "knowledge," is that the banking model "fail[s] to acknowledge men and women as historical beings" (Freire, 1970/1994, p. 6 5 ) . In place of the bankitig model that objectifies students as "containers" and "receptacles," according to Freire, the problem-posing model of edu­ cation encourages a dialogue between teacher and pupil, where both instruct and release each other, through questions and answers, from the biases of reified thought. As Freire (1970/1994) explains, "In problem-posing education, people develop their powers to perceive critically the way they exist in the world with which and in which they find themselves; they come to see the world not as a static reaUty, but as a reaUty in process, in transformation" (p. 65). In other words, the advantage of the problem-posing model of education for our discipline and for the basic Gjmmunication course is that it takes "the people's historicity as their starting point" (p. 65). More specifically, "Problem-posing education affirms men and women as beings in the process of becoming—as unfirushed, uncompleted beings in and with a likewise unfinished reality" (p. 65). The importance of the problem-posing model of education is its empha­ sis on the perpetual struggle of the individual to construct one's "self" Under this view, people are constantly reminded that they are "incom­ plete" and they will always be incomplete—that there is, in Rorty's (1989) terms, no "big picture" to comprehend, no absolute " s e l f to perfect, "there is only a web of relationships to be rewoven, a web which time lengthens every day" (p. 43). As a result, students who participate in problem-posing

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education learn that they must take nothing for granted. Their identities, their culture, their world—these are not "givetis" to be contemplated, nor are they "constants" with absolute stability. Rather, in Dewey's (1929) sense, these are "takens," specific internalizations of a world, not the world that people often misrepresent as "natural" (p. 178). With Freire's problem-posing approach to education, students learn that the world becomes conceptualized and "known" as a set of potentials to be engaged by the critical mind. The act of education, therefore, is the act of this engagement or, rather, the process of knowing that one is enabled to actualize his or her potential in transforming the world. "Complete­ ness," under this view of critical education, is not "total" completeness or the end state of "certainty," but a "localized" completeness in relationship to a specific historical task. When new demands and contingencies place pressure on the "completeness" of an individual's self-mastery of a particu­ lar moment, as they inevitably do, the "completed" mind realizes that it is "incomplete" and struggles once again in an unending dialectic to achieve self mastery and self-awareness. In short, education under Freire's problemposing model is a "method" for experiencing life as a self-conscious and historical human being. Redescribing "Aiithority" in the Classroom and in Society Classroom "authority" can be redescribed in such a way that an instruc­ tor's claim to knowledge becomes situated in a critical competency and ability to share that awareness with a wider student population. Specifi­ cally, "authority" can be reconceptualized as "responsibility." T h e respon­ sible teacher is able to establish a dialogical classroom in which students are encouraged to explore, as a group, the relationship between knowledge and ideology. Under such pedagogical practices, the teacher achieves "authority" in the classroom in the sense that he or she earns student respect for drawing into focus the cultural forces constrainitig the students' ability to articulate their own senses of "self" By rejecting the "banking" model of education in the basic course of the Communication discipline, instructors are encouraged to move be­ yond what Freire identifies as the "traditional" notion of teacher as "authority" in the classroom. According to Freire, the traditional manifes­ tation of classroom "authority" involves the right and sanction of the teacher to control the student's relationship with knowledge. Similarly, I

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argue, the traditional concept of "authority" in society involves the right and the sanction of social elites to control the citizens' relationship with community resources. In both cases people become reduced to spectators who receive information about their lives without being given the oppor­ tunity to question that information or consider alternative ways of thinkit\g and being. The sanction to teach under the "banking" model of "authority" derives from the irutructor's internalization of a body of "objective" knowledge, codified through the assent of a community of "experts." In other words, the instructor, as "authority," has been "invested" by a "discipline" with a certain amount of intellectual "currency" that the instructor offers, in increments, to his or her students as compensation for their labor at memorization or for their quiet acquiescence. More specifically, as Freire explains, knowledge, under this paradigm, is viewed as a "gift" offered by one regime of "authority," that has defined itself as "knowing," to a second, marginalized group, defined by the first as "subordinate" or "ignorant." By economizirvg "knowledge" as a commodity to be regulated, the dialogic and interactive characteristics of pedagogy are repressed; knowledge becomes conceptualized as a linear process in which students are encouraged to progress toward an objective or transcendent "truth" and away from human subjectivity. Rather than positioning "truth" in a circular model, where knowledge always returns to the human community in which it is situated, the banking model of education positions "truth" hierarchically and oppressively. In redescribing this traditional notion of classroom "authority," it can be reconceptualized as "responsibility." Under this view, teachers have "authority" in their classrooms to the extent that they, as intellectuals, claim a responsibility for the "influence" of their pedagogies. Actualizing this redefinition of "authority," as Giroux (1988) conceives it, "provides the basis for raising questions about the kinds of teachitig and pedagogy that can be developed and legitimated within a view of schooling that takes democracy and critical citizenship seriously" (p. 79). More specifically, by accepting respot«ibility for the curriculum and the effects of power and knowledge as these are implied by a curriculum, teachers grow more aware of the implications of their pedagogical practices on students and make this awareness a strategic part of the course content. Furthermore, this critique of "authority" in education can be extended to a more general critique o f "authority" in society. A dialogical approach and a democratication of the legal, political, and economic realms may

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contribute to more humane social practices in our society. By constantly questioning and redescribing the legal and political assumptions guiding the construction and perpetuation of societal itistitutions, teachers and scholars accentuate the contingent and human characteristics of "govern­ ment." According to critical legal scholar Roberto Unger (1986), "We cannot commit ourselves to a particular value without committing our­ selves to a particular form of life that gives this value its specific meaning and to the conditions that enable this form of Ufe to emerge" (p. 9 5 ) . In this context, through debate and democratic participation, law and gov­ ernmental bureaucracies are reconceptualized as "negotiations" and "prac­ tices" among consenting citizetis and are thus reflective of the subjective and constantly fluctuating needs of that localized community. As Unger argues, a less "alien" social world is one that "can always violate the generative rules of its own mental or social constructs and put other rules and other constructs in their place" (1986, p. 4 1 ) . My critical view of "authority" emphasizes Unger's concern for a more reflexive program of law and culture in our social institutions by overcoming the foundation­ alist limitations of traditional "civic" reasoning. Based on this redescribed sense of a critical "authority," a state or federal legislator only has "power" to enact a legal apparatus to the extent that he or she takes personal responsibiUty for the implications of that apparatus. If that lawmaker reneges on his or her responsibility, that law becomes insensitive to the needs of people and invalid; in an important sense, the law becomes "unjust." More specifically, a critical citizenry is one demanding responsibility from the "law"; yet because laws, them­ selves, cannot be "responsible" or "irresponsible," it is up to the "authors" of the law to monitor the law closely and make sure it is utiUzed "justly." As Giroux (1988) explains, "Justice in this perspective is not merely the application of procedural rules to varying contexts; it is an attempt to understand how moral sensibilities are formed amid human suffering and the struggle for liberation and freedom" (p. 9 3 ) . In other words, "Justice in this sense is not organized around an appeal to abstract principles but is rooted in a substantive project of transforming those concrete social and political stiuctures that deny dignity, hope, and power to vast numbers of people" (p. 93). Likewise, the teacher who has "authority" in the classroom is the one who can illustrate that he or she is responsible for the implica­ tions of the classroom instruction. Specifically, the teacher's claim to "authority" is situated in her or his ability to illustrate cormections between classroom knowledge, on the one hand, and the student's self-redescription.

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hope, and societal transformation, on the other. The teacher, or any other professional, cannot demand "authority" without participating in the dialectic between knowledge and society or, as in the case of the classroom, between the lessons and the students. One implication of the above sense of "authority" is that all knowl­ edge—legal, social, and academic—is nothing more than a contingent model for describing one form of human activity and identity. When knowledge becomes a "mold" rather than a "model" for human behavior, however, forcing human beings into passive vessels conforming to the contours of an established "truth," then knowledge no longer serves the interest of a healthy human community. When this occurs, people lose their creativity and become, instead, creations of knowledge rather than creaωrs o f knowledge. Thus, if citizens are to maintain a moral commit­ ment to upholding their social identities and institutions, knowledge must be resituated in the human community; the reified knowledge in question must be redescribed to maintain its social resonance. In Unger's (1986) words, "To live in history means, among other things, to be an active and conscious participant in the conflict over the terms of collective life" (p. 113). In recognizing this historicity, scholars realize that questioning the notion of "authority" in the classroom and in society is important for any critical project of education. As Giroux (1988) explains, "The concept of emancipatory authority suggests that teachers are bearers of critical knowl­ edge, rules, and values through which they consciously articulate and problematize their relationship to each other, to students, to subject matter, and to the wider community" (p. 9 0 ) . More importantly, Giroux argues that the critical project of "authority" in education and society "challenges the dominant view of teachers as primarily technicians or public servants, whose role is primarily to implement rather than concep­ tualize pedagogical practice" (p. 90). To help students question the sources of "authority" in their lives, I encourage a disciplinary commitment, one theoretical as well as pedagogi­ cal, toward the exploration of how "authority," as a concept, exists in our society. Classroom questions arising from this line of reasoning include variations of the following: What constitutes "knowledge"? Who has the right to know? What justifications for that "right" exist? Why is some "knowledge" privileged? Is "ignorance" the opposite of "knowledge"? To what extent are "knowledge" and "ignorance" cultural? Who defines these concepts? Is "education" synonymous with "knowing"? In atwwering these questions, students should be encouraged to start at the level of the

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classroom and the student/teacher relationship, and then extrapolate to encompass a wider and more comprehensive analysis of authority as it influences their bodies, beliefs, and behaviors.

ENGLISH COMPOSITION,

CULTURAL CRITIQUE, AND

THE BASIC COMMUNICATION COURSE

The basic course in Communication can embrace a critical pedagogy that prepares students for an increased cultural engagement. Yet the debate on the issue of postmodernism and politics in education is con­ spicuously absent among teachers of public speaking. Addressing this silence in our disciplinary approaches to the basic course, an increased pedagogical sensitivity to historicism by scholars in our field would benefit our discipline by preparing students to engage in cultural criticism. This move will make the basic course more representative of the critical persona 1 have been urging our discipline to assume in this book. In developitig the above arguments, I maintain that the basic composi­ tion course in departments of English can serve as a model for a redescribed basic course in departments of Communication. By arguing analogically between the basic courses in Communication and English, I draw com­ parisons between their pedagogical practices and maintain that Commu­ nication scholars have a great deal to learn from composition instructors in the areas of cultural analysis and classroom practice. In addition, as part of my overall argument in this section, I illustrate how public speaking courses typically differentiate between "theory" and "pedagogy," whereas composition courses often strive for an interactive synthesis. This section is organized along the following lines. First, the composi­ tion course in English frequently employs a critical pedagogy that makes it an effective medium for teaching its students about cultural analysis. Educators in Communication have much to learn firom the practice of a critical pedagogy as it is exemplified in many composition courses. Second, I argue that there are significant similarities existing between public speaking instruction in departments of Communication and composition instruction in departments of English. Due to these similarities, a critical pedagogy is feasible in our Communication basic course. Third, while there are important similarities between the basic course in both Communica­ tion and English, I argue that there are significant differences between the

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way the two courses are currently pedagogically conceptualized. For in­ stance, pedagogy in Communication and English differ in terms of reflexive and ideological sensitivity, historical consciousness, and the ways in which supporting materials integrate theory with pedagogy. Fourth, I argue that the Communication discipline should redesign its pedagogical practices to make them more similar to those of English and, therefore, commit itself more strongly to integrating theoretical and pedagogical perspectives in its journals, textbooks, and its book-length scholarly treatises. In short, the similarities and differences between the two courses comprise the evidence supporting my overall thesis. Specifically, the critical pedagogy in departments of English has not been reproduced in departments of Communication. This state of affairs is both unfortunate and unnecessary, as the two courses are similar enough to warrant a common critical pedagogy and a greater symbiosis between theory and practice. Critical Pedagogy in English

Composition

The composition course in departments of English is, in many ways, at the forefront of a critical pedagogy in the humanities (cf Berlin, 1991, 1992a, 1992b). In learning from composition instructors, pubUc speaking instructors can recognize, as does James Berlin (1987), that "in teaching writing [or communication] we are providing students with guidance in seeing and structuring their experience, with a set of tacit rules about distinguishing truth from falsity, reality from illusion" (p. 7 ) . In other words, courses in composition often enact an epistemology that helps students become critically engaged with their life experiences. According to Berlin, composition encourages students to confront the different cultural pressures exertitig influence on their manners of thinking; com­ position studies, via a rhetorical perspective, explores the relationships between classroom experience and the larger society. More specifically, "[T]he way in which students ate taught to use language—the way they are taught rhetoric—arises out of a comprehensive version of reality, bearing important consequences for human behavior" (Berlin, 1984, p. 85). In short, "[l]t is impossible to deny that in teaching students about the way they ought to use language we are teaching them something about how to conduct their lives" (Berlin, 1984, p. 92). Berlin's observation is as usehil for instructors of the basic course in Communication as it is for instructors of the basic course in English.

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By no means can the field of composition be characterized as havirig a unanimous commitment toward a critical pedagogy—for instance, Maxine Hairston (1990,1992) and Peter Elbow (1991) represent a reaction against a politicized writing curriculum. Reminiscent of Hill's polemic against ideological analysis in rhetorical criticism, Hairston (1992) argues: We have no business getting into areas where we may have passion and conviction but no scholarly base from which to operate. When classes focus on complex issues such as racial discrimination, economic injustices, and inequities of class and gender, they should be taught by qualified faculty who have the depth of information and historical competence that such critical social issues warrant, (p. 186) As Hairston's objections indicate, there is, in many composition courses, an open debate on the issue of the role of postmodernism and politics in education. This debate has not been articulated among teachers of public speaking. More important, critical pedagogy, in many departments of English, is not simply the object of debate; it is the substance of a classr(X)m composition practice throughout the United States. As Berlin (1992b) explains, "[T]he merger of theory and classroom practice in a uniquely new relation is one of the results o f . . . postmodern rhetorical theory" (p. 17). Consciousness of a postmodern rhetorical theory and its integration into classroom practice is necessary, Berlin (1984) argues, because some form of rhetoric is always evoked in the classroom: [Rhetoric] has important consequences for the way people behave. When freshmen learn to write or speak, they are learning more than how to perform an instrumental task, useful in getting through college and in preparing for professional life. They are learrung assumptions about what is real and what is illusory, how to know one from the other, how to commu­ nicate the real, given the strengths and limitations of human nature, and finally, how language works. In the composition or communication class, the student is being indoctrinated in a basic epistemology, usually the one held by society's dominant class, the group with the most power, (p. 2) Most forms of rhetoric, what Berlin calls "objective" or "subjective" theories, do not recognize the dialogical and historical relationships under which learning frequently occurs. These dominant or traditional theories of rhetorical pedagogy are similar to the bankir\g model of education—they assert positive and conservative notions of knowledge. "Objective" and "subjective" theories of rhetoric posit "truth" in ahistorical circumstances

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and reduce language to representation and style. For example, as Berlin (1987) explains, "Objective rhetorics are based on a positivistic epistemol­ ogy, assertitig that the real is located in the material world" (p. 7). In explaining "subjective" rhetorics, Berlin (1987) writes, "Rhetorics that are grounded in philosophical idealism commonly present a subjectivist stance. The most frequently cited example is in Plato. Truth here transcends the mutable material world, being located in an unchanging realm of ideas" (p. 12). For Berlin, a consciousness of rhetoric, a consciousness that all educa­ tion serves as a strategic structuring of a student's relationship with "reality," is the first step in developitig a critical pedagogy. By calling attention to the rhetoric of education, especially in developing a postmod­ ern and critical rhetoric, the instructor engages in important maneuvers that help vitalize a critical classroom pedagogy. As he explains, "Our decision . . . about the kind of rhetoric we are to call upon in teaching writitig has important implications for the behavior of our students— behavior that includes the personal, social, and political" (Berlin, 1987, p. 7). More specifically, "[L]ooking at theories of writing instruction in this [historicized] way unlocks their implications for behavior. When we teach students to write, we are teaching more than an instrumental skill. We are teaching a mode of conduct, a way of reasoning to experience" (Berlin, 1984, p. 8 6 ) . Based on Berlin's sentiment and on the similarities between the com­ position course in English and the public speaking course in Communica­ tion (as discussed below), 1 maintain that the example of a critical per­ spective in the composition course aids in our pedagogical redescriptions and in the creation of a similar awareness in our classrooms. Examining the Similarities Between Public Speaking Instruction in Departments of Communication and Composition Instruction in Departments of English There are substantial similarities between public speaking instruction in departments of Communication and composition instruction in depart­ ments of English. These similarities can be conceived in the following fashion. First, there are what I call "genetic" similarities resulting from the genealogical relationships between Communication and English in the 19th and early 20th centuries. Second, both basic courses have strong

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conceptual ties to classical rhetorical traditions in Western culture. Third, both basic courses struggle with outside forces questionitig humanistic and rhetorical knowledge, thus calling into suspicion the value of the basic Communication and EngUsh courses. Fourth, both courses are frequently viewed by the larger academic community as "service" courses. Fifth, both courses generate a significant amount of the revenue upon which their respective departments depend for survival. Sixth, both courses are fre­ quently feminized and marginalized by the Communication and English faculties. Most obviously, there are "genetic" similarities between the two courses due to the fact that Communication, as a modern discipline, grew out of English early in the 20th century (Cohen, 1994). Included among these broadly defined similarities is a commitment to language analysis as the capstone of humanistic study and to education as a classical means for self-improvement—in short, the cultivation of virtue and the develop­ ment of a personal and civic democratic ethic. As Berlin (1987) explains, "\l^iting courses prepare students for citizenship in a democracy, for assuming their political responsibilities, whether as leaders or simply as active participants" (p. 189). The rationales for both basic courses derive, in part, from long rhetori­ cal and pedagogical traditions in Western culture. Both involve "rhetorical education" in its two traditional senses: techne and civic arete. As techne, the two courses cultivate competency in basic rhetorical precepts, as applied to writing or speaking. As an exercise of civic arete, they are ideologically interwoven with "democratic" rationales, as manifested in the educational doctrines of post-Enlightenment European and American society. As illustrated in James J. Murphy's (1990b) edited history of writing instruction, modern courses in public speaking and composition extend from the pedagogical contributions of Isocrates, Aristotle, Cicero, and Quintilian (Murphy, 1990a; Welch, 1990). These traditions have developed through time and through the ars dictamirus, an poetriae, and ars praedicarxdi of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance (Abbott, 1990; Woods, 1990). In more recent epochs, the rhetorical tradition underlying contemporary techne in speech and composition training matured through the psychological theories of George Campbell, the rationalistic theories of Richard Whately, and the belles lettres theories of Hugh Blair (Horner, 1990). In addition to their common history and commitment to a pedagogy in the Western rhetorical tradition, the two basic courses are similar in their

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Struggle against outside forces questioning, late in the 20th century, the legitimacy of that tradition. For instance, departments of both Communi­ cation and English are threatened by a national environment privileging "scientism," "positivism," and "professionalism"—at the expense of a liberal arts and rhetorical education (for an example of this "threat" in Communication, see Burgoon, 1 9 8 8 , 1 9 8 9 , 1 9 9 5 ) . As a result of the above threats, there are three additional and important similarities between the two courses. In reviewing these similarities, 1 maintain that the exigencies calling them into existence necessitate resistance and redescription at the level of "theory," as well as at the level of classroom pedagogy. Both courses are viewed by the university as "service" courses, stressing "skills" acquisition rather than "substantive" knowledge (Gray, 1989, p. 18; Schell, 1992, p. 55). This structure implies two conditions: (a) the course perpetuates the notion that "practice" is different from, and subordinate to, "theory"; and (b) the "service" distinction popularizes the course, further de-emphasizing its knowledge content under the elitist and "bank­ ing" models of education governing the modern university. In both cases, the courses become, in the absence of a critical pedagogy, formalized, mechanistic, and antidialectical. In addition, the courses are considered "service" because they allegedly instruct first-year students in "fundamen­ tal" skills that are necessary for the student's continued success in more "sophisticated" and "substantive" courses. Both courses generate the revenue that the respective departments require in order to offer advanced upper-division and graduate-level instruction; in an unfortunate sense, both courses are market-driven. Ac­ cording to Judy C. Pearson and Paul E. Nebon (1990), in a statement equally true of many English departments, the Communication "department's existence is justified by a big service course that teaches a relatively large number of students cheaply, especially when teaching assistants or parttime faculty are available instead of regular faculty" (p. 4 ) . In response to this financial condition, both departments have "packaged," "institution­ alized," and "sold" their basic courses to the larger university community. Although both basic courses serve important roles in generating the revenue upon which the departments of Communication and English depend, the courses are, nevertheless, frequently marginalized by the faculty and instructional staffs. In an important sense, both courses have historically been "feminized." While the feminization of public speaking has not been discussed in our literature, the feminization of the English composition course has been well documented in the Rhetoric and Com­

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position literatiire (Holbrock, 1991; Miller, 1991; Schell, 1992). As women in our society are unfairly expected to be nurturers and care-givers, and as they are underpaid for their services and overworked with expectations of "career," "child rearing," and "housework," the instructional staffs of the basic courses are likewise subordinated—they are burdened by extra sections and capacity-bursting enrollments. Reflecting this feminization, both courses are taught predominantly by graduate students or lecturers, people with little control over how the courses are structured and who are the least experienced and least paid instructors in their departments (Pearson & Nelson, 1990, p. 3 ) . Examining the Differences Between the Public Speaking Course in Communication and the Composition Course in English Despite similarities, there are substantial differences in the manner in which the Communication public speaking course and the English composi­ tion course are conceptualized. Although both courses focus on "rhetoric," the self consciousness of rhetorical inquiry is accentuated in English composition and is largely ignored or minimized in the basic Communica­ tion course. Even though the historical similarities between the two courses are significant, the two courses could not be more different in the ways they are conceptualized and taught. Specifically, these can be gener­ alized as differences in: (a) reflexivity and ideological sophistication, (b) historical consciousness, and (c) degrees to which supporting materials, such as textbooks and journals, integrate theory with pedagogy to aid the instructor in the classroom. At the most obvious level of difference, the increased reflexivity of the English composition course has helped that course to become an area of specialization with a series of disciplinary jourruls devoted to development and synthesis in theory and pedagogy (Berlin, 1987, p. 183). For example, Coiiege Composition and Communication, Composition Studies, Journal of Advanced Composition, Pre/Text, Rhetoric Revieu;, and Writing instructor all publish articles integrating theory and pedagogy within the context of the composition classroom (Conners, 1984). In other words, instructors of the basic course in English have struggled with their marginalized conditions in ways that instructors of the basic course in Communication have not. As a result of such struggUng and questioning of the limitations of their basic course (as well as of the pedagogical practices enforcing many of

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those limitations), English scholars have traced the historical-ideological influences affecting how composition has been conceptuaUzed and taught. The scholar largely responsible for this inquiry is James Berlin (1984, 1987). In two volumes tracing the history of composition in the 19th and 20th centuries, BerUn situates the various discourses contextualizing the basic course in English. Thus, in an important sense, the basic course in English has its own written history, while the history of the basic course in Communication is limited to a short discussion in Herman Cohen's (1994, pp. 85-109) larger history of the field. As Donald C. Stewart (1987) explains, "Berlin has drawn a map of the territory we call E n g l i s h . . . . He has told us who we are and why we thitik the way we do about the field of English" (p. xi). With this history, Berlin helps composition instructors to take control of their present and to reconceptualize their fiiture; Berlin redescribes the practice of composition in light of its historicity and its potential to fulfill a greater social function. The need for similar reflexivity and histoiicization among Communica­ tion educators is pressing. After all. Communication, as a discipline, is frequently concerned with producing theory at the expense of refining its pedagogical practices. Evidence for this claim is suggested by Pearson and Nelson (1990), who explain, "[LJittle change has been reported in the basic course even though dramatic [theoretical and conceptual] changes have occurred in other avenues of the field" (p. 4 ) . Michael Leff (1992) concurs with this sentiment and elaborates: During the past two decades, the academic study of rhetoric has passed through profound and revolutionary changes, and both theory and criticism now appear much different than they once were. In fact, what graduate students in rhetoric are now taught at the top of curriculum bears only a generic resemblance to what I was taught as a graduate student. Yet, they . . . teach public speaking [today] very much as I taught it [20 years ago], (p. 116)

As composition instructors historicize their assumptions of scholarship and pedagogy. Communication instructors can also historicize their pro­ fessional assumptions and make the basic course more responsive to the theoretical developments of the field. Such a "turn" in our disciplinary understandings of pedagogy is an important part of the critical persona I have been attempting to develop in the previous four chapters of this book. As things currently stand, however, pedagogy in the field of Communi­ cation is not comparable to the specialization of pedagogy in composition

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as an area of inquiry. While conferences in our field exist on pedagogy, for instance, the annual Midwest Basic Course Directors' Conference, these conferences are treated as distinct from the main activities of the larger discipUne (unlike the Conference on College Communication and Composi­ tion in English). Consequently, there is an important sense in which the basic course in both departments cannot be compared. Compounding the problem is the lamentable fact that few publicatioiu in our discipline discuss issues of pedagogy. As evidence for this condition I turn, in the following section, to an analysis of the disciplinary literatures in Commu­ nication. Generally, a lack of reflexivity in the discipline and a bifurcation between theory and teaching exists, a condition that can be redescribed in order to make room for an increased critical pedagogy. An Aruilysis of the Supporting Literature in Communication Supplementing the Instruction of the Basic Course Contributors to the Communication literature can more effectively serve the pedagogical needs of our discipline by integrating theory and teaching. In support of this claim, 1 review the past 10 years of Communi­ cation Education and the entire corpus of two more recent publications, The Speech Communication Teacher and the Basic Communication Course Annual. In addition, I explore the relationships between theory and pedagogy in five Communication basic course textbooks published during the past 5 years, as well as in two recent theoretical books in our field. In the six journals of English composition mentioned in the above section, teachers and scholars find a plethora of essays, published regularly, with well-integrated theoretical and pedagogical perspectives. In compari­ son, the Communication discipline has only three journals devoted to pedagogy. Moreover, in these Communication publications, litde sensitiv­ ity is shown to larger instructionalAdeological issues, such as those fire­ quently raised in the English composition literature. O f these three publications, the first journal. Communication Education, is the only one that can be considered an influential pubUcation in our field. In terms of its large circulation, the professionalism of the peer review process, and its conferred status for contributors. Communication Education singularly represents the Speech Communication Association's sanctioned statement on pedagogical issues. More specifically, as one o f the six journals published by our professional organization {Quarterly Journal of

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Speech, Communication Monographs, Critical Studies in Mass Communica­ tion. Text and Performance Quarurly, and Journal of Applied Commurucation Research are the others), Communication Education sets the standards for communication instruction in our discipline. The second journal, the Basic Communication Course Annual, is not published under the auspices of the Speech Communication Association and is limited in circulation and readership appeal. Its peer review process is less rigorous than that of Communication Education and, subsequently, it confers less professional status upon its contributors. In addition to the above limitations, the Basic Communication Course Annual produces only a short volume of essays yearly. The third journal. The Speech Communication Teacher, is published by the SCA. It is a minor publication, however—a newsletter in terms of its format, submission policy, and the professional status it confers upon its contributors. Unlike the previous two journals. The Speech Commumcation Teacher is devoted specifically to instructional suggestions for classroom exercises and assignments. Although each of the above three journals serves particular needs and functions in our discipline, I argue that, in terms of helping to foster a greater disciplinary reflexivity and integration of scholarship and peda­ gogy, these journals do not compare with English composition journals in sophistication, ideology, or critical sensitivity. For instance, I have discov­ ered that few published essays involve critical issues or themes that apply the major theoretical developments in our scholarship to the basic course teaching curriculum. Based on my interpretation of the articles appearing in the above journals, I have condensed this literature and characterized it by purpose and method. Although I recognize that such informal categorization has certain subjective limitations, my analysis establishes a usefiil terrain upon which to conceptualize the relevant literature. In my review of these three pubUcations, I have generalized two distinct conceptual categories and have defined these as "critical/historical" and "systemic." An article belonging to the critical/historical category either integrates rhetorical theory and pedagogy or takes a historical or nontraditional approach to conceptualizing Communication classroom practices. Arti­ cles that fall into the category I have identified as systemic are socialscientific essays concerned with arguments endemic to the study of what I call "instructional communication." For example, studies that are in­ cluded in this category focus upon such phenomena as: classroom imme­

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diacy, nonverbal communication, the use of humor, and the study of communication appreheiision. In addition, I labeled as systemic those articles advancing traditional pedagogical concerns, such as speaking and listening skills. I found that many of the studies 1 labeled as systemic are largely empirical and ignore the ideological and axiological dimetisioiu of classroom pedagogy. These studies tend to quantify classroom variables rather than introduce an increased epistemological and ideological reflex­ ivity into pedagogical practices. More specifically, in my review of Communication Education, I found that, of the more than 300 articles reviewed, 65 (including special issues), or 22%, of the total publications involve what I have defined as a criti­ cal/historical perspective or a critical pedagogy. In comparison, 227 arti­ cles, or 76%, of the total sample, involve what I defined as systemic themes. The additional 32 articles, or 11%, are uncategorizable based upon my criteria and were removed from the sample. Examples of articles that involve critical/historical perspectives in­ clude: Roderick Hart (1985, 1993), Barry Brummett (1986), Todd Fry (1986), W. Charles Redding (1988), and Frank J. Macke (1991). Hart (1985) discusses the politics of Communication Studies in an address directed toward an undergraduate audience. He identifies Com­ munication majors as "liberals of the first order" and argues that" [c]ourses in communication teach us to accept boat-rocking, protest, and free speech as a necessary and desirable part of the American condition" (p. 163). Hart discusses the politics of teaching. In his essay he explains "why teaching communication skills is a fundamentally poUtical matter, and why the implicit politics of Communication as a field attracts detractors" (Hart, 1993, p. 9 8 ) . Brummett's (1986) essay is devoted to the idea that one function for Communication educators is to ward against absolutism, particularly in the form of religious fiindamentalism in the public speaking classroom. Fry develops the framework for what he calls "peace education" within the context of Speech Communication at the high school level. He writes, "What I propose is teaching communication and peace at the same time. The best way to effect this change is simply to become conscious of the value content of our teaching, and its implicatioiu on social and global scales" (1986, p. 77). Redding defends what he calls "boat-rockers" and "whistle-blowers" in the corporate environment and explains how ethical values and critical thinking skills should become intimate parts of peda­ gogy in organizational communication. Macke's (1991) article "explores several taken-for-granted assumptions in the evolution of speech commu­

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nication as an academic discipline" (p. 125). His article is included here because of its historical approach. In addition to these individual articles, three special journal issues are particularly relevant to this discussion. In the first, Martin Medhurst (1989) edited half an issue devoted to the teaching of rhetorical criticism. Three of the essays specifically discuss critical themes in education: James R. Andrews (1989), Bruce E. Gronbeck (1989), and Sonja K. Foss (1989). Both Andrews and Foss deal in their individual articles with the themes of skepticism and questioning as values in a critical education, and Gronbeck explores more broadly the role rhetorical criticism plays in the fiinctioning of a liberal arts education. In the second, edited by Lawrence B. Rosenfeld (1993), the entire issue is devoted to a sharing of pedagogical experiences among prominent scholars in our field. These "stories" are followed by critical responses. One in particular, Mary S. Strine (1993), is noteworthy for its integration of theory and pedagogy. Strine discusses teaching in terms of "marking" and "extending boundaries," of "crossing" and "dissolving borders," and of "encountering" and "negotiating contact zones." In the third, a special issue on communication and gender was published that includes many critical essays such as Karlyn Kohrs Campbell's (1991) essay, "Hearing Women's Voices" and Julia T. Wood and Lisa Firing Lenze's (1991) essay, "Strategies to Enhance Gender Sensitivity in Communica­ tion Education." The significance of these limited numbers is that relatively few authors of Communication articles in the past 10 years have practiced the merging of theory and pedagogy that is routine in the journals of English composi­ tion. For instance, in the same 10-year period of time as my above review, there were scores of essays published that integrate theory and pedagogy in the discipline of English composition. The critical/historical essays cited above from Communication Education mark an increased pedagogical awareness for members of our field. Yet in relationship to both the field of Composition and in relationship to the 227 systemic articles on pedagogy in Communication Education, more effort needs to be spent by Communi­ cation scholar/teachers in developing a wider literature base to inform classroom pedagogy. In my review of the Basic Communication Course Annual, I found a similar "systemic" approach to pedagogy. For instance, of the 53 articles comprising the journal through 1993, only 5 articles, or roughly 10% of the total publication, involve what I defined above as a critical/historical

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perspective. Forty-eight articles, or nearly 9 0 % of the total sample, are concerned with systemic themes. The most noteworthy critical article in the sample is by Michael Leff (1992). Leff argues, similar to what 1 argue in this chapter, that the basic course in Communication has undergone little conceptual change in the past 20 years, even though rhetorical scholarship has developed signifi­ cantly. Leff compares this phenomenon with the development of the basic course in departments of English and argues that the composition course has undergone a conceptual change that is commensurable with its theo­ retical developments. Leff writes, "[T]he rhetorical revolution has made a firm imprint on the basic composition course" (p. 116). More specifically, "[T]he English Composition course reflects what is happening in the scholarship, and it presents itself as a scene of intetise activity, heated controversy, and constant experimentation. So far as I can tell, nothing of the sort has happened in our domain" (p. 117). Finally, in my review of T/ie Speech Commumcation Teacher, a publication devoted to pedagogical tips, 1 found that only 16 pages of print appeared four times a year. (Compare this number with the more than 500 pages of journal space the Communication discipline commits solely to the (^�ατ' terly Journal of Speech). In this limited literature, which began in 1986,1 found less than a dozen activities attempting to apply critical theory, rhetorical theory, or a historicist approach to knowledge and communica­ tion within the Communication classroom. Most of these activities deal with perception in interracial contexts (Hochel, 1994; Jensen, 1993; Rozema, 1987). O f the articles meeting my criteria, however, only two, authored by Virginia Kidd (1989) and Sharon Downey and Karen Ras­ mussen (1990), provide activities that encouraged student empowerment and reflect the integration of theory and pedagogy. Kidd (1989) presents an exercise designed to make students "aware of how many dimensions of potential influence operate in apparently insig­ nificant messages" (p. 1). In this exercise, Kidd has her students analyze cereal boxes and instructs them to find the logical and emotional claims being presented by the advertisers. This is an example of a cultural critique that can play an increasingly greater role in the undergraduate Communi­ cation curriculum. Downey and Rasmussen (1990) present an activity that faciUtates "student's success in rhetorical criticism and critical thitikitig through training in the fundamentals of rhetorical'claim-making' " (p. 10). In their exercise, students practice identifying rhetorical claims and learn to con­

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textualize these claims in terms of value, pattern, fiinction, strategy, and effect. Once again, as in Kldd's exercise, the activity suggested by Downey and Rasmussen introduces a critical perspective into the Communication basic course curriculum. As my brief analysis suggests, scholars in the Speech Communication discipline pay little attention to pedagogy, and, when they do, the atten­ tion they pay is frequently divorced from theory. When this fact is compared with the reflexivity of those composition instructors in English who enrich pedagogy through their theoretical practices, the lacuna in our discipline becomes accentuated. Our basic course is typically alienated from our recent theoretical and professional work, and this is reflected through all stages of our publications. For example, professors of English composition regularly publish books on rhetorical theory that, in turn, inform classroom pedagogy. Repre­ sentative of this large trend in composition scholarship is Karen Burke LeFevre (1987), Susan Jarratt (1991), and Doug Brent (1992). In their book-length monographs, these composition scholars develop significant historical and theoretical arguments while, at the same time, they con­ clude their projects with discussions of how their studies refigure pedagogi­ cal practice in the composition classroom. For example, LeFevre argues that rhetorical invention is influenced by social contingencies and illus­ trates how a notion of knowledge as collaborative impacts university teaching. Jarratt argues that historical work on the sophists has implica­ tions for contemporary teaching; specifically, a critical pedagogy and feminist awareness constitute what she calls a "contemporary sophistic." Brent argues that his study highlights the process by which rhetorical forces shape classroom assignments and activities. He illustrates how teachers play an important role in structuring their student's relationship with knowledge. Unlike the examples of these English scholars. Communication scholars are reluctant to engage with pedagogy at the level of their extended research projects. Two recent books of rhetorical theory in the Communi­ cation discipline highlight this reluctance (Black, 1992; Farrell, 1994). Though both Farrell and Black advance the field in "theory" and "criti­ cism," neither includes chaptets on pedagogy nor develops pedagogical implications to their findings. These scholars, in short, approach rhetorical theory and criticism as concepts distinct from pedagogy and do not encourage their readers, most likely Communication instructors, to inte­

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grate the published theoretical and critical positions into the classroom environment. Arguably, the relationship between texts of rhetorical theory and class­ room pedagogy, as emphasized in the research of composition scholars, contributes to the increased reflexivity of the composition course. How­ ever, the lack of integration between theory and pedagogy in Communi­ cation impoverishes our teaching. Unlike pedagogy in the composition classroom that is often kept up-to-date with contemporary theory, peda­ gogy in the basic Communication course is "theoretically inert" (Leff, 1992, p. 119). There is, according to Leff, a "failure to make an organic connection between [pedagogy] and our scholarship" (p. 119). In the English composition course, many instructors actively bring to the class their knowledge of critical theory, postmodernism, and social-epistemic rhetoric. Yet when we turn to the basic communication course, we find that central post-1967 theoretical developments in the humanities and in our field appear to be making little impact on our pedagogical behaviors. The following theoretical developments in our field have dramatically refigured rhetorical and communication scholarship: the litiguistic turn in philosophy (Rorty, 1967), the rhetoric-as-epistemic and rhetoric of in­ quiry literatures (Nelson, Megill, & McClosky, 1987; Scott, 1967), ideo­ logical criticism (Black, 1970; Wander, 1983, 1984a, 1984b, 1993), cul­ tural theory and Women's Studies (Spitzack & Carter, 1987), and postmodern theory (Blair, Jepperson, &Pucci, 1991). By positionitig many of our disciplinary assumptions and beliefs in relationship to new under­ standings of ideology and knowledge, scholars in each of the above areas have contributed to the dramatic refiguring of Communication. However, while these exciting developments are contributing to the wealth and con­ ceptual diversity of our field, there is little or no application of these or of similar studies to the pedagogy of the basic course.' In developing the above claim, I reviewed five recent introductory textbooks in our field (Beebe &Beebe, 1991; Brilhart, Bourhis, Miley, & Berquist, 1992; Gronbeck, McKerrow, Ehninger, &. Monroe, 1994; Lane, 1991; Smith, 1995). In these texts, I found no substantive discussion of any post-1967 theoretical or critical development in our field. In addition, I found no reflexivity in the texts to suggest the rhetoricity of their own material. What I found instead was a traditional and skUls-oriented approach to public speaking that takes little notice of the role that ideology, history, or culture play in constructing rhetorical values and in contextualizing the communication environment.

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Three examples illustrate my argument. First, each of the texts posits a relatively rigid and positivist distinction between "informative" and "per­ suasive" speaking. In so doing, each treats discourse as if discourse had an essence that could be either correctly or incorrectly learned. In effect, the public speech is promoted as an object to be knoum rather than as an idea to be explored. Second, and more important, each of the texts forwards a limited assumption of the "public." None of the texts takes into consid­ eration that "public" discourse involves a greater cultural arena and social commitment than what the purview of the classroom podium allows. Third, and relatedly, by focusing on the mechanics of speaking, rather than on the pragmatics of citizen empowerment, each of the texts severely limits the scope of classroom instruction and student participation in a critical education. In short, despite the fact that "rhetoric" is a broad rubric under which many approaches to communication and culture can be viewed, each book is uniform and systemic, signifying a lack of conceptual diversity in the classroom and a rejection of rhetorical and cultural plurality. Havitig now reviewed the differences and similarities between the basic course as it is conceptualized in departments of Communication and in departments of English, and having argued for the use of James Berlin's work as a model for the empowerment of our basic course, I maintain, in the final section, that there are two further conceptual ways to redescribe a critical pedagogy.

T W O WAYS T O R E D E S C R I B E

A CRITICAL PEDAGOGY

I offer two practical solutions to bridge the gap between theory and pedagogy in the basic Communication course. Specifically, there are two paths by which the basic course in Communication can be redescribed: institutional and individual. Institutional Contnbutions to a Critical Pedagogy in the Basic Communication Course As an example of an institutional solution, I turn to the Department of Communication at Loyola University and argue that its proposed restruc­ turing of the Communication curriculum serves as a prototype for the

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larger reconceptualizatior\ of the Commumcation discipline. The example of Loyola is worth greater attention in our field for the following reasons. In proposing the restructuring of its traditional undergraduate curricu­ lum, the Communication department at Loyola University in Chicago has shifted Communication pedagogy from a "medium-oriented" perspective toward an emphasis on the "processes" or "means" by which communica­ tive knowledge is produced, disseminated, and accepted in society. In other words, rather than viewing communication in the traditional terms of "sender," "receiver," "message," and "channel," the proposed new cur­ riculum at Loyola emphasizes that communicative processes and practices permeate human intellectual activity (Pearce, 1993). As Pearce explains, the course is " [a] η introduction to communication as a practical discipline. Beginning with a relatively simple model of the communication process, students explore the complexities involved in producing, reproducing, and consuming communication practices." According to Pearce, the course focuses on how language interacts with culture to produce "norms," "meaning," and "self." The readings for this class are intended to direct students away from canonical or classical "speech" texts, rejecting a message-centered pedagogy. In a related course at the University of Loyola at Chicago, titled "Communication and Social Justice," students are encouraged "to dis­ cover how communication might help secure the political goal of social justice by activating and organizing those social interests which aspire to a society free from poverty, misery, and inequality" (Artz, 1994). In the course syllabus, Artz makes an important move in terms of critical theory: He writes, "We. will address the difficult questions of wealth, resources, power and democracy." By posing each of these phenomena as questions to be addressed, rather than as objects in themselves to be appropriated, Artz's class exemplifies the "problem-posing" model of education. When posed as questions, social phenomena become open to interaction; their "truth" does not become known through contemplation, but rather through dialogics. In a final example from Loyola University in Chicago, Lawrence Frey (1994) explains that his department has a certificate program in "Social Justice and Communication." His criteria for courses within this program include those that encourage "active engagement with an advocacy on behalf of the underrepresented in society" (p. 11). In addition, Frey privileges those courses that challenge the "norms, practices, relations, and structures that underwrite inequality and injustice" and he advocates

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help for the "underresourced" (p. 11). In short, by switching from a medium-centered approach to communication to a processes-based cur­ riculum, the Department of Communication at Loyola University has opened the field to a range of critical perspectives that are usually margi­ nalized from traditional Communication classrooms. By viewing commu­ nication as a process, the Communication department at Loyola Univer­ sity maintains that it has mediated the interdepartmental tetuions between the various units of Communication. As Frey (1994) argues, "A processbased curriculum will. . . serve to build bridges between those who focus on different communication mediums [sic] and contexts rather than construct walls around them" (p. 12). Individual Contributions to α Critical Pedagogy in the Basic Communication Course As an example of an individual solution, changes in instructor attitude are necessary at the level of classroom experience. In this section, I draw from my own experience teachitig the basic Communication course and describe specific pedagogical innovations. As a pedagogue and scholar in our discipline, I find that a socialized approach to knowledge and a commitment to praxis affect my personal teaching practices in the following manner: As I encourage students to recognize the historicity and rhetoricity of their value assumptioris, 1 also realize that I must have my students refigure these structures on more contingent terrains. Yet, in unsettling my students' experiences with their dominant assumptions, I realize that I cannot replace them with my own vision of a better society. I recognize that my vision of a redefined social reality is not necessarily couched in a language that my students' past experiences allow them to accept. Specifically, it is not my job as a teacher to inculcate my students with a socialist agenda. To do so would be to re-create the excesses of past historical attempts to force a new epistemol­ ogy and vision of liberation on a population without considering the actual wants and needs of those people who are "liberated." In an important sense, then, education as "liberation" is an unattainable concept. Rather, education should be increasingly seen as the process of helping students to realize that all their actions have social inplications. As agents in society, students need to be encouraged to question and redescribe the constraints placed by other people on their happiness.

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In more specific terms, I believe that students are not in my class to be told what to know. Rather, they ate in my class in order to gain support and encouragement as they learn how to learn and, as the result of my class, they will learn how to question for themselves the type of "reality" they want to coconstruct with others. In keeping with an antifoundation­ alist pedagogy, I realize that students cannot be told what "liberation" and "reality" are in absolute terms; I can only encourage them to imagine alternative ways for redefining our cultute to enfranchise an increasingly larger number of people. Thus, Rorty's (1989) principle of solidarity is an important part of a critical education. In this sense, my job as an instructor is to encourage students to imagine for themselves what "liberation" could be if they were to engage actively in enactitig their own freedoms. Rather than telling my students what is or is not "true" with regard to human communication, my job is to help them understand the criteria under which "power" and "knowledge" contribute to the articulations of social belief and desire. Toward the above end, I have ptovided a list of six critical exercises/ assignments that can be used in the basic Communication course. These exercises/assignments exemplify possible content areas of a critical peda­ gogy that a Communication class, at the level of the basic course, could embrace. 1. Speech of Dissent. For this assignment, students research and present an extended argument against some aspect of the status quo. The crux of this assignment involves the students' ability to isolate problems within society affectitig them on a personal level. In short, the speech should be designed to resist some localized manifestation of power at the point at which the student is directly involved. For example, students can argue against paying taxes in a military-industrial state, argue for unrestricted access to their medical records at the university health center, or argue against the construction of a new building on their campus. 2. Speech in Support of a Marginalized Position. For this assignment, students research and present an extended argument in support of some silenced or marginalized position. For example, students can speak on behalf of illegal immigrants in California, African American welfare recipients, or Third World nationalism and anti-Americanism. Unlike the "Speech of Dissent," students, in general, do not position themselves in relationship

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to a localized manifestation of power; rather, they explore how power works to marginalize and silence other positions in the construction of dominant American beliefs. The point of this exercise is to illustrate that what most Americans take for granted, the conditions of the status quo, only exist and thrive in relationship to some marginalized position. In other words, students learn to see how, for instance, that the abundance and relative low cost of American products is the result of both U.S. sponsored oppression within the Third World and rabid antiunionism within our own country. By supporting various marginalized positions (such as Third World peasant co-ops and American trade unionism), students may realize that all public policy serves the interests of some people at the expense of many others. 3. Speech of Self-Criticism. Building from the students' experiences in the prior two speeches, this speech is designed for students to explore how their privileged life habits impact the lives of others. For example, if students are omnivores, then they could give a speech illustrating how their meat consumption contributes to world starvation. In this speech, students should be able to demonstrate a degree of self-reflexivity and historicism. For instance, while confessing publicly to eating meat and, simultaneously, acknowledging the detrimental effect of this behavior on the environment, students historicize their actions and confront the inconsistences between their positive self-concept, on the one hand, and their negative social behaviors, on the other. In this way, student speakers, along with the classroom audience, recognize the contradictions in our behaviors, attitudes, and desires as individuals living in this society. Simultaneously, these students confront the cultural forces of advertising, religion, and business that contribute to their oppressive habits. A less confrontational way to conceptualize this assignment is to have students pick a popular belief or value and imagine how that belief or value might change over the course of time. For instance, students can give a speech on their homophobia and then explore how this feeling might change in 50 years as sexual norms change in society. Before engaging in this assignment, students write a paper exploring historical analogies, like that of slavery in the United States. In these papers, students examine how norms and beliefs about the acceptability of slavery changed as American society developed. Students are encouraged to make connectioru between the permeability of these historical values and the potential permeabiUty of their currently held values and beliefs.

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4. Journal Assignment. On a daily basis, students may be required to apply critical class concepts to a continuing analysis of popular culture. For example, students can examine advertising, medical practices, specific laws, the price of tuition or required texts, or the quality of shows on television from a critical perspective. In particular, students should report how these power formations influence their lives and affect their relation­ ships with others. 5. Letter to the Editor. For this exercise, students are required to take a position on a cultural issue that directly affects their lives (i.e., sexism, racism, the state of the economy, foreign affairs, etc.). In preparing for their own positions, students must collect and read a wide variety of letters and discussions in the national media, as well as in alternative media sources. After collecting, reading, and analyzing this material, students must compose responses that strategically position them within the larger popular discussion. This assignment is intended to teach students that, in order to contribute to a larger discussion, they must explore for themselves the parameters of the issues and appreciate how media opinions are often conditioned by the type of publication in which they are housed. In particular, students are taught to explore the alternative media and to compare these viewpoints with those of the domitunt media. 6. Book Review. Each student in the basic Communication course should be required to complete one review of a book critical of traditional American beliefs, culture, or social institutions. For example, Peter Singer's Animal Liberation (1975), Howard Zirm's A People's History of the Uniud States (1980), Neil Postman's Amusing Ourselves to Death (1985), Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky's Manufacturing Consent (1988), and George Ritzer's The McDonaldization of Society (1993) all serve important functions in illustrating that alternative paradigms and values exist in contrast to those privileged in the domitiant American ideology. In review­ ing any one of these, or similar books, students learn that manifestations of culture and politics are the result of vested interests that influence the way they think, feel, and communicate. In particular, students should be encouraged to draw connections between language and oppression, and to position their own behaviors and beliefs within the larger context of controversy and debate.

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RESEARCH

SUMMARY As the above discussion of itistitutional and individual solutions to a lack of critical perspectives in the basic Communication course suggest, a critical pedagogy is easily attainable once we make a neo-pragmatic commitment toward redescribing our understandings of theory, criticism, and pedagogy. More specifically, a critical pedagogy becomes a realistic option in our basic course when our larger disciplinary attitudes toward knowledge and scholarship change.

NOTE 1. There are some encouraging trends. Three new public speaking textbooks move in the direction of reshaping the basic public speaking course along the lines recommended in this chapter. Foss and Foss (1994) discuss public speaking as invitation for transformation. Their short book deemphasizes the distinction between "persuasion" and "information" and argues that public communication involves the interchange of perspectives. Accentuated in their b o o k are feminist and other critical concerns, jaffe ( 1 9 9 5 ) takes a cultural perspective to public communication and includes a chapter on narrative. Kearney and Flax ( 1 9 9 5 ) address intercultural issues and reshape the basic public speaking course to corre­ spond with recent developments in rhetorical theory and criticism.

Conclusion

' ι 'he preceding five chapters articulate a vision of a redescribed critical JL scholarship within Speech Communication. Although not limiting claims to rhetorical scholarship in Communication Studies, I drew upon the examples and experiences of Communication scholars in order to exemplify one type of scholarship that can be adapted throughout the humanities. Theodor Adorno (1990) explains this vision for a critical scholarship in more detail: [T]he task of criticism must be not so much to search for the particular interest-groups to which cultural phenomena are to be assigned, but rather to decipher the general social tendencies which are expressed in these phenomena and through which the most powerfiil interests realize them­ selves. Cultural criticism must become social physiognomy, (p. 30) Adorno emphasizes the necessity to see culture as a "face," a manifes­ tation of "being" that has a complex character. In studying the constitution of society, it is necessary to break down disciplinary assumptions and to develop a scholarship that is more encompassing of a diverse range of interests and resistances. In short, the complexity of culture demands a complex system of analysis, one that necessarily seeks to encompass many critical and conceptual paths. For instance, the authors of Liberating Theory suggest, " l b be liberatory, concepts need to counter tendencies to ignore, devalue, or oversimplify important social dynamics such as race, sex, class, or authority. This point cannot be emphasized enough: activist 169

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theory must help its advocates overcome their own oppressive socializa­ tions" (Albert et al., 1986, p. 5), includitvg the rivalry and segmentation of the humanistic disciplines. Builditig upon the ideas and inquiries of a diverse range of writers— including Richard Rorty, Michel Foucault, Kenneth Burke, Max Horkheimer, Russell Jacoby, and others—scholars are urged to commit themselves to reconceptualizing the practice of theory, criticism, and pedagogy in neo­ pragmatic and social terms. My argument has been that when human knowledge becomes socialized, the distinctions between the public, aca­ demic, and instructional personae of scholars fade. By "socialized," this book argues that the norm of "truth" in our scholarship is a pragmatic norm, one that can be greatly served by recognizing that the needs of people must first and foremost be met through all possible means—includ­ ing an active tesistance to capitalist modes of production and oppression. In place of traditional personae, ones privileging a socially disengaged scholarship, a new identity has been encouraged for scholars. Both ironist and socialist, the critical rhetorician assumes a cultural importance in society, one that used to be served by people such as Lewis Mumford, Michael Goldman, and C. Wright Mills. Perhaps the best example of a scholar writing in contemporary times whose work exemplifies the tone for scholarship advocated in this book is Noam Chomsky, Institute Professor of Linguistics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Since the mid- 1960s, Chomsky has, through more than 30 political books, served as a critical observer of U.S. foreign and domestic policy (for an overview of Chomsky's political work, see Rai, 1995). In 1966, Chomsky gained national recognition for his political resistance to the Vietnam War with an essay, "The Responsibility of Intellectuals." Published in the New York Review of Boohs, Chomsky's essay helped establish him as the leading social critic of his day. Chomsky argued that by protesting and sabotaging the efforts of goveriunent and industry to subjugate the Third World, intellectuals in the United States had the unique oppoitunity to reduce U.S. inflicted violence abroad. Specifically, Chomsky argued:

Intellectuals are in a position to expose the lies of government, to analyze actions according to their causes and motives and often hidden intentions. In the Western world at least, they have the power that comes from political liberty, from access to information and freedom of expression. For a privi­ leged minority. Western democracy provides the leisure, the facilities, and

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the training to seek the truth lying hidden behind the veil of distortion . . . misrepresentation... and class interest through which the events of current history are presented to us. (reprinted in Chomsky, 1987, p. 60) As Burke before him, Chomsky's critical writings are driven from a socialist background, one recognizing the need for individual responsibility. Similar to Burke's writing during the 1930s, Chomsky appeals to an educated, though not a strictly professional audience, one interested in practical analysis. Chomsky is the best known contemporary American intellectual dissident—he has an international stature and a wide popular appeal among people in the United States. With little hyperbole, James Peck (1987) argues, "In all American history, no one's writings are more unsettling than Noam Chomsky's. He is among our greatest dissenters Few have so carefully dissected how America's acclaimed freedoms mask its irresponsible power and unjustified privilege" (p. viii). Chomsky is, in short, an inspitation for scholars in the Ametican academy. As Jacoby (1989) explains, "Chomsky conjures up an era when intellectuals walked tall and talked straight. Before they became managers, technocrats and professors, intellectuals challenged the state and its apologists. They were writers and thinkers—not specialists—devoted to the truth and a better world" (p. 187). Chomsky, however, has two careers, and here is where his example becomes less relevant as a model for the social scholarship advocated in this book. For Chomsky, politics is what he does as a private citizen, one who happens also to be a world renowned linguist; Chomsky uses his credentials as a scientist and philosopher only to the extent that it gives him a forum from which to speak. His thoroughly documented political books are fdled with evidence and sources accessible to anyone with access to a university library. In other words, he assumes no qualifications to speak out as a social critic and he has no special access to materials to inform his analysis. Chomsky's political responsibility is driven by his conscience and by his belief that he does make a difference. The position of this book diverges from Chomsky's in some important ways. Though applauding his criticism and urging more scholars in our discipline to engage with Chomsky's political project, one involving a study of language, ideology, and propaganda (e.g., Lester, 1992), this book urges an extended critical position, one merging the professional and personal, the political and the academic, the scientific and the social. Our profes­ sional identities themselves are political and "scholarship" best has mean­

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ing and significance when it has social utility. As such, Chomsky can only go so far in helping us to understand our role as rhetoricians. For instance, he argues in the preceding quote that the role of the intellectual is to discover the "truth" and expose "lies." While lies are relatively easy to uncover, truth is more difficult to discover. However, Chomsky's view can be turned around by asserting that "truth" can be that which builds solidarity and compassion and reduces pain and destruction. Thus, a neo-pragmatic interpretation of Chomsky tempers his realist assumptiorw. Broadening my own neo-pragmatic definition of truth, I have argued that the critical act is, itself, an epistemological act and I have situated that epistemology in socialism as an axiological ideal. Socialism is a critical position, one that constantly turns back on itself and questions its own beliefs and practices (Bernstein, 1899/1961). By "socialism" I have meant "the assortment of social practices leading to the transformation of con­ sciousness and reaUty on every level: political and social, historical and everyday, conscious and unconscious" (Guattari & Negri, 1990, p. 10). This transformation does not lead to an ideal end state or Utopia, but to a series of temporary conditions in which, through trial and error, new and more healthy and egalitarian social relations are formed and reformed. The point of socialism is to increase social consciousness among people to believe in themselves as responsible and moral agents of redescription and change. This transformation can be aided by an increased rhetorical sensitivity among socialists, as well as by an increased social set«itivity among rhetoricians (see Aune, 1994, for a further discussion of this dialectic). To make conceptual room for an increased social commitment by rhetorical scholars, a shift in our consciousness at the level of discipli­ nary knowledge needs to be enacted. Accorditigly, knowledge of rhetoric and of society can be seen as rhetorical and social. When this change in vision occurs, rhetorical studies, like all disciplines, can be approached as an invention that serves some function in society. Because the parameters of rhetorical action involve the social, the ethical, and the poUtical, rhetorical studies is especially sanctioned with moral significance; further­ more, rhetorical scholars are particularly astute at explaining to others how the social, ethical, and political overlap in rhetorical discourse helps to create structures of meaning and influence. In short, a shift and a widening in our disciplinary identities enlivens our discussions and broadens our appeal and our audience. In order to recognize the moral significance of our work and to develop our wider audience, the discipline, as it has traditionally been conceptu­

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alized, must be redescribed. To do so raises central questions of belief and practice. For instance, theorists have been challenged to consider the implications of their metaphysical reasoning, particularly those that dis­ tinguish between social and professional types of questions. Critics have been charged with reconceptualizing their analysis to explore the con­ struction of "meaning" within a text and to engage with that meaning as if it had moral and political significance. Teachers have been encouraged to identify themselves as the most effective representatives of our disci­ pline and the expositors of disciplinary knowledge. By dissemitating a critical education, teachers embody the unity of praxis—the merging of theory and action. By reducing the distance between our theoretical work and our classroom experiences, we bring a rhetorical perspective into the lives of thousands of students each year and prepare them to be critical citizens. In shott, theorists, critics, and teachers have been challenged to consider themselves as contributors to the cultural dialectic, thus blurring the distinctions between each category. In challenging ourselves to resist traditional categorizations, we challenge others to learn and grow as well. Schiappa (1995a) accentuates this point by wtititig, "[T]o the extent that we do not share our insights and abilities, public discourse is correspond­ ingly impoverished" (p. 26). This book is the search for "meaning" within our poUtical, professional, and personal lives—lives that are not as separate and distinct as we sometimes pretend. In challenging some of the domitiant assumptions and practices in Speech Communication, social confirmation is sought for my ideas and beliefs. To be successful, this book cannot be a lone voice in the wilderness—as the community envisioned in this book grows, the strength of its voice grows. On the other hand, this book must not be read as offering a definitive statement of what scholarship is—to do so would be to reify another set of beliefs for the ones that this book has attempted to unsettle. Rather, through this book, a popular perspective is advanced, one that can be socially useful if adopted. In order to be successful, however, the support of others must be enlisted—other citizen/scholars—people who happen to be thinking, caring, considerate, and hopeful. Numbered among this book's potential supporters are those who perhaps, as with the Zeitgeist of the times, have similar thoughts and seek a voice with which to express themselves. In focusing attention on a renewed need for disciplinary praxis, social scholarship can enjoy a new life and vitality. By placing a concern for socialist and critical reasoning at the center of our disciplinary identity.

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other scholars should be persuaded that our scholarship can take on a critical importance in helping to mediate change in society. In this way, the quest for "meaning" that motivates this text has a double significance: As scholars, we need to create meaning in our lives and meaning in our discipline. Between the two, meaning overlaps. This meaning is strategic. As strategy, meanitig implies a rhetoric—a system of influences and ideologies. Meaning, therefore, is a method as well as a content, a purpose as well as a message, an abstraction as well as a form. Disciplinary/rhetorical meaning is an invitation to see our lives and our scholarship as an evocation of practical justice and popular liberty—of interactive and economic democracy. The conditions of the world—the tensions, the pollution, the state violence, the propaganda of the mass media—demand a critical scholarship, one affirming the principles of intervention. Our lust for knowledge as scholars is a lust for the good—a localized good, one with implication for the lives of everyday people.

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