Concerning Peace : New Perspectives on Utopia [1 ed.] 9781443823555, 9781443823241

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Concerning Peace

Concerning Peace: New Perspectives on Utopia

Edited by

Kai Gregor and Sergueï Spetschinsky

Concerning Peace: New Perspectives on Utopia, Edited by Kai Gregor and Sergueï Spetschinsky This book first published 2010 Cambridge Scholars Publishing 12 Back Chapman Street, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE6 2XX, UK British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Copyright © 2010 by Kai Gregor and Sergueï Spetschinsky and contributors All rights for this book reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without the prior permission of the copyright owner. ISBN (10): 1-4438-2324-4, ISBN (13): 978-1-4438-2324-1

To Tatjana Fell and Christoph Asmuth

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction ................................................................................................. 1 Sergueï Spetschinsky and Kai Gregor Concept of Peace For a Dynamic Concept of Peace .............................................................. 14 Cristiana Senigaglia The Concept of Peace in Indian Philosophy .............................................. 38 Raghunath Ghosh Music and Emotions: A Dynamic Concept of Peace................................. 46 Manos Perrakis The Possibility of Genuine Peace .............................................................. 55 Sandra Pinardi Peaceful Agreement: Some Thoughts about the Practice of Peace............ 64 Lars Leeten Why Nobody Wants to Live in Utopia ...................................................... 75 Arthur Kok Politics Illegitimate Peace: Remarks on the Idea of Democracy ............................ 92 Sergueï Spetschinsky Hospitality and the Politics of Peace ....................................................... 102 Sharon Anderson-Gold Peace, Hospitality and the Free Movement of Labour ............................ 112 Harry Lesser

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Table of Contents

A Discussion of Integration from a Nietzschean Perspective .................. 119 Abdullah Onur Aktaú Sexing-up the Weltbeamter ..................................................................... 128 Rachael Sotos History The Flag of Maria: Religion and Public Space in Europe ....................... 140 Egidius Berns 'Germania': The Presentation of Utopia in Art and Literature ................. 152 Kenichi Onodera Culture Intercultural Dialogue as a Way to Reach Peace ..................................... 168 Julián Pacho and Paula Restrepo A Cosmocultural Model of Identity and its Implications for Peace ......... 183 Fulya Özlem Can Literary Translation Help Societies Transcend Integration Problems? ................................................................................................ 193 Sinem Meral Fethullah Gülen's Schools of Love: A Muslim Model for the Future? .... 200 David Tittensor Contributors ............................................................................................. 213

INTRODUCTION

The Story This book is the result of the stories of individuals. In early spring 2008 we were contacted by Tatjana Fell, co-director of arttransponder1, a wellknown non-profit art gallery in Berlin. She was looking for philosophers working with her on what she called the "peace project". She wanted to create a platform open to artists and academics willing to collaborate with each other in the exploration of the idea of peace. Her interest in this topic came from what she saw as a contradiction in the way artists relate to peace. Her gallery regularly features and supports a lot of politically and socially engaged artists whose work often deals with the ideal of peace. But strangely, almost always artists only addressed peace through its opposite, speaking about war and not about peace alone. Why was it that those who dedicate their life to peace could only do so through speaking about war? This contradiction led us to broader questions: Is it possible to address peace alone? Is a complete and authentic peace possible? What should such a peace look like? At the core of these interrogations lay the question of the conditions of possibility for a true peace. True peace can seem elusive in our contemporary world where the omnipresence of war throws doubt on such an ambition. Although many industrialized countries achieved an enormous increase of wealth and technical power during the 19th and 20th centuries, they caused more violence, suffering and injustice than ever before in human history. Despite the rise of ideals of freedom and equality – translating into new and supposedly better ways for citizens' participation in political power – the world was led to imperialism, colonisation, racist ideologies, genocides, totalitarianisms, world wars and post-colonial domination. History seems yet again to be the product of struggles rather than a series of harmonious developments. But, is it not necessary to think peace outside of the terms of Realpolitik? Is not such a negative understanding of peace very narrow? Just as health is not the mere absence of sickness, peace should be more than the 1

For more information, see: www.arttransponder.net.

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Introduction

mere absence of war. Peace is an ideal and, in this sense, it seems impossible to address it alone because if it is an absolutely necessary dream of harmony and perfection, it is also empty and immaterial, having nothing to do with reality. Peace is a utopia: it is an unreal possibility or impossible reality. It is a beautiful and tautological fiction, an unworkable fantasy that does not seem realizable in our finite world. In this sense, peace always appears as a failed attempt, as the corruption of an ideal by reality. Peace is a dystopia, the real impossibility of our ideals. It is the embodied ideal and, in this sense, the ideal becoming non-ideal: the ideal which lost its self and became its other. The phenomenal thing called peace in our reality necessarily entails something un-peaceful, contradicting its very definition as peaceful. Between the two figures of ideal utopia and non-ideal dystopia an intermediary shall be found to reunify these two opposites. This would be a place where peace is omnipresent, absolutely accomplished and, nevertheless, does not suffer from this reality it has gained. Peace is also seen as a pantopia: a real and actual possibility for living peace that opens onto a perspective where peace does not find its location in the success or failure of actions toward an ideal, but rather in the persistent hope with which human beings systematically nourish it. From such a point of view, peace is not caught in a dualistic opposition between sensible and supersensible worlds, but is the expression of their synthesis. It expresses itself in phenomena like ethics, love, religion or wisdom, which are areas of pure ideals, yet still belong to concrete human life. The two of us decided to take up the challenge and participate in this experimental project Tatjana Fell was proposing to us. For many months, we shaped it together with Tatjana, culminating in a series of events in October 2008. In the gallery, a documentary exhibition, along with numerous lectures, work presentations and performances, took place over the course of a month.2 As academic members of the project, we organised two conferences at the Technische Universität Berlin. To frame these conferences, we chose the triangular conceptual structure between utopia, dystopia and pantopia; between the unreal possibility, the real impossibility and the real possibility of peace. The first conference, entitled Concerning Peace: Utopia or Pantopia?, from the 2nd to the 4th of October, was perhaps the most ambitious in the sense that artistic interventions such as performances, installations, exhibitions, screenings, theatre and dance pieces were simultaneously featured in addition to the philosophical lectures. For the occasion, along with several 2

For more information, see: www.peace-realspace.net.

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experimented artists, a dozen of young artists from a.pt3, a Belgian postgraduate art program, came to Berlin for a week and participated in the project. In three days, we had more than 20 international scholars and artists contributing to the workshop and a broad public attending the sessions. In contrast, the second workshop, Philosophical Perspectives on Peace: Turkey, Germany, Europe, on the 24th and 25th of October, gathered exclusively scholars, but with the specific goal of using the tools of philosophy in order to think through concrete cases relating to the complex relationship between the three entities Turkey, Germany and Europe. During the two events, we tried to emphasize the importance of dialogue between fields, ideas and individuals. Our central idea was that, in order to approach the unstable idea of peace, we had to force ourselves to cross the borders usually delimitating our spaces of praxis and thinking. Putting ourselves in danger, through going out of our usual fields of comfort, was meant to allow us to perceive the ideal of peace from renewed perspectives. During the first workshop, for example, this ambition translated into the maxim that scholars should speak in a way that could be understood and criticized by non-specialists, and that artists should be ready to open their work to questions and critiques. The challenge this presented for all of us facilitated dialogues during and after the sessions and allowed the questioning of everyone's own praxis from new standpoints. For us, transdisciplinarity was not simply a theoretical meeting of different fields of knowledge, but rather an encounter that had to be materialised through performative experiences of the others. The city of Berlin itself played a great role in this ambition to render alive the question of peace, for Berlin palpably embodies the fact that peace is not a purely abstract question, but always directly concerns the reality of dreaming and suffering human beings. In Berlin, every street, every house, every monument or public building carries the living memory of people struggling in their daily lives with the ideal of peace. Peace is something that Berliners starved for desperately, seeing their people massacred in wars and their city crushed under Allied bombings. Peace was the lost dream of Jews, antifascists, pacifists, and all those who died under the Nazi regime. Peace was the city's hope during the Cold War, when the wall was suddenly constructed through the city, separating families, friends and neighbours. But peace was also the scandalous name given to states of injustice and unspoken wars and therefore became an object of hatred for Berliners. After World War I, the so-called "peace" brought the submission of the German people, producing an apocalyptic economic crisis that in turn finally led to the seizure of power by the Nazis. The 3

«Advanced Performance Training». For more information, see: www.apass.be.

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Introduction

former peace became partly responsible for the atrocities of World War II and, finally, the destruction and the occupation of the country by American and Soviet forces. This brought about another illusory peace, dividing the country in two and starting forty years of the Cold War. Finally, the reunification of Germany, which was presented as the final triumph of peace, simultaneously meant a victory for capitalism, transforming large segments of the East German population into second-class citizens, excluding them from the city's new economic, social and cultural life. For Berliners, peace was a burning need to be fulfilled, not a comfortable reality which could be calmly discussed as an abstract idea. Peace was a matter of life and death and its cruel absence as well as the simulacra of its presence profoundly marked the city and its inhabitants. In this sense, Berlin framed our discussions as the living example of peace's material and bodily condition. The two events we organised were alternative philosophical venues in the sense that they tried to bring philosophy into what is usually considered its complete opposite. The goal was to try to unify philosophy and life: make philosophy alive and make life philosophical. If modesty prevents us from judging the success of such an attempt, still we must mention that the whole project was driven by a remarkable degree of enthusiasm. Some of the former participants helped us to organise a third venue in Istanbul, called Toward Perpetual Peace, at the Bosphorus University in late June 20094. Referring to Kant, it attempted to see what relevance an idealist conception of peace could yet have in our contemporary world. The present book brings together a selection of the lecturers of the two first conferences who accepted to write an essay inspired by their original contribution to the peace project.

The dynamic The present book resembles its many authors and, to a large extent, its two editors, as we were the ones who initiated the whole project. The overall conception of peace it defends is to be found in a dynamic that demonstrates both the philosophical message resulting from the project and, at the same time, the process that made it possible. This dynamic expresses the dreams, inquiries, doubts and discoveries that animated both the participants and organizers during the preparation and course of the peace project. Such a dynamic can probably be best characterized by the idea of 4 Workshop co-organised at the Bosphorus University by: Sun Demirli, Kai Gregor, Zübeyde Karada÷, Sergueï Spetschinsky and Lucas Thorpe.

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idealism, in the sense that it was conducted with a deep confidence that beliefs can become true, that ideals are not doomed to stay abstract wishes, but can and must be realised. This idealism is a belief in philosophy, a belief that philosophy's purpose to understand the infinitely complex world is necessary and that such an understanding can and must change the world for the better. Addressing peace for itself and in itself, positively, and not negatively as the mere shadow of war's omnipresence, is an idealist scheme. Peace, as a moral concept of perfection and harmony, is a utopia, a pure dream. To pretend to even speak about peace itself is already a contradiction. Peace may be the most important thing for human beings, it nevertheless has to stay empty, because as soon as it is filled with discourses or actions it looses the purity and absoluteness nevertheless that precisely defines it as peaceful. To think peace is idealist in a radical sense because it means trying to achieve it in knowing perfectly well that one will necessarily fail. And despite this tragic reality of peace, idealism tells us we must try to achieve it. Idealism brings with it the idea that to think peace is already to achieve peace, that to philosophize is already a kind a militant action. Thinking is not limited to academic circles: it must be made public and realised in concrete political, social, historical and cultural realities. All the contributions to this book are written by people who believe that to think peace is not only a theoretical question, but a practical one as well and that, in order to address the question of peace fully and consistently one must also fight for its realisation. Such understanding of both peace and philosophy professes its own naivety. At the origin of our attempt lies indeed a radically naive statement: one refuses the world as it is for the belief that it must be shaped as it should be. The conviction that our perspectives should always be shifted from a "is" to a "must" constitutes the very condition of possibility of any authentic attempt to philosophize about peace: behind such an attempt one always finds a power to say "no!" to the structural inertia of reality. Without this fundamental anti-fatalism, thinking peace is contradictory: it is like pretending to think an idea without believing that there are ideas. As both a starting point and conclusion of the peace-project, we had the certainty that the utopia of peace could never become real, always affected by its dystopian reality. Nevertheless, the pantopian ideal of peace seems to play an essential role as a condition of possibility for human action. Despite our innumerable non-ideal limitations as material beings, our ideals of peace play a grounding role in human condition as counter-factual criteria or regulative ideas for the evaluation of factual reality. Without a

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Introduction

doubt, human beings are constitutively finite. But their hope of overcoming finitude is only to be found in their capacity to long for utopian ideals. Naivety is not only the collateral damage of philosophers trying to think peace, but their very ability to do so. Idealism's naivety transforms the abstract thinking of peace into a duty to embody philosophy in the world. Admittedly, such a self-proclaimed naivety cannot be the only path to approach peace. Insofar peace alone is an empty concept about which nothing really proper can be said, one has to develop material strategies in order to get a glimpse of it, that is to say, one must talk of non-ideal war in order to get a grasp of ideal peace. A contradiction is at the origin of idealistic philosophical attempts: the supersensible peace always demands a sensible occasion to make itself approachable. And for philosophers, to attempt writing about peace means to attempt overcoming this contradiction. Such a contradiction finds its concrete form in the unwinding of the peace-project itself. Editing this book, we noticed that it contains an unusual diversity, at least compared to what is common within European academia in philosophy: the contributors to the present book are 45 percent women and 45 percent non-European people. As a sign of our own limitations, reaching such a (relative) diversity was never part of our agenda. Editing this book and central parts of the peace project, we are still two white European men working in Western academic institutions whose research projects are mostly centred on 18th and 19th century transcendental philosophy and German Idealism. But despite our particular identities, the dynamic produced by the project allowed an unusual openness that was able to shake off some of the illegitimate rules structuring our reality. Everything happened as if setting the project as idealistic served as a self-fulfilling prophecy: understanding peace as an ideal allowed the overcoming of some of our own particularities and the emergence of something bigger than us, something we never conceived of at the outset of the project. All the contributions to this book take account of idealism's inherent contradiction and challenge it by taking some kind of phenomenal pretext in order to think peace. Taking a radically naïve stance, their authors create opportunities for ideals and reality to meet by addressing personal and concrete concerns of theirs, making clear that philosophy is at first the expression of one's engagement toward ideals long before it is a purely theoretical praxis. In focusing on their personal engagement, the authors all acknowledge peace's absolute ideality and, in doing so, enable utopian peace to gain some reality. Courage and enthusiasm are the starting points of such a venture. Nothing, indeed, guaranties its success and it may very

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well result in failure or risible progress. But what could be worse than not having had the audacity to try?

The book Four chapters structure the present book in representing one possible philosophical perspective on peace. Each of these perspectives groups essays more by their method than their content. In other words, it represents more a possible approach to peace by philosophy, rather than a specific view on peace. Addressing successively the concepts of peace, politics, history and culture, each chapter offers a different kind of pretext for philosophers to speak about peace. The first chapter focuses on an abstract reflection on the concept of peace. It approaches peace in its most theoretical sense, using abstract ideas rather than concrete empirical examples and investigates peace's relation – or absence of relation – to things like the very nature of human being, morality and truth. Cristiana Senigaglia introduces the collection of essays with a general reflection on peace, situating it in both its conceptual and historical framework. She outlines the signification, status and conditions of possibility of utopian ideals through laying out some of the main past and contemporary debates on peace. Drawing on these debates, she refutes an indulgent understanding of war as a necessary evil and constructs a positive concept of peace as a dynamic that must be embodied in life and society by concrete practices of mediation. Proceeding with the attempt to produce a positive concept of peace, Raghunath Ghosh relies on multiple Indian philosophical traditions. Based on Sanskrit language and the Upanisadic tradition, he demonstrates how peace can be thought in connection with the human body as a way to control our sense organs through practices like yoga in order to avoid pain and inner disequilibrium. From the Buddhist tradition, he shows how such an ascetic practice can translate into an ethics when applied to principles of action and thereby allows for the realisation of peace inside as well as outside oneself. Manos Perrakis uses a similar method of taking a particular historical practice as a model to positively think the very concept of peace. He considers how instrumental music, seen as the best example of a non-representational art made of pure aesthetical forms, can serve as a figure for understanding peace. According to him, music reminds us of peace in the sense that it succeeds in conveying to us a sense of freedom and harmony, although it is caught in a contradiction between, on the one hand, its mathematical and rational structure and, on the other hand, the purely emotional response it produces inside us. Taking an opposite stance to that of these first essays,

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Introduction

Sandra Pinardi interrogates the possibility for a radically non-idealistic understanding of peace. Aiming to see in which sense utopia can be understood as an always already present rather than a non-existing space, she presents human being as fundamentally characterized by powerlessness and fragility. Doing so, she turns ethics into the task of postponing the moment of inhumanity, rather than the accomplishment of an absent ideal. From this standpoint, peace is always genuine and utopia always an elusive place in the sense that it does not aim at the achievement of a perpetual peace but rather at a perpetual search for peace. Lars Leeten continues in this endeavour to get rid of a teleological framework in order to define peace positively. Unlike Sandra Pinardi, he refuses to enter into metaphysical considerations on the nature of human being, but concentrates his attention on the matter of the communicative processes leading to peace. For Lars Leeten, the very core of peace does not reside in a moral norm or ideal but in a communal practice. He sees this practice functioning as a non-codified harmony that shows itself in the course of action and cannot be definitively fixed through rational speech. True peace is to be found in the social interaction and the multiple interactions with special forms of life aiming at peace rather than in a fixed norm of what peace should be. Arthur Kok is also interested in revealing the underlying non-utopian structure characterizing human desires. Basing his argument on the analysis of Paolo Pasolini's movie Teorema, he shows how this desire is always fated to the frustrating pursuit of a never-ending quest for selfaccomplishment if it does not acknowledge itself as fundamentally connected to love. For Arthur Kok, utopian desires must dare to be truly idealistic and avoid focusing on material realisations. The second chapter reflects on the way peace is most often talked about, namely, as a matter of politics. Peace indeed exists foremost for communities of human beings interacting with each other on the national or international political sphere, not as a mere abstract concept. Studying several cases of the manifestation of peace within politics, this second chapter interrogates the relationship between the idea of peace and politics, showing how the former is in fact constitutive of the very nature of the latter. Sergueï Spetschinsky, drawing on some of Kant's remarks, attempts to think this consubstantial origin of peace and politics. He presents what he identifies as the fundamental contradiction of this relationship: peaceful utopias are never matched by concrete political reality, which therefore systematically appears as an illegitimate form of peace. For him, it is only if this paradox is acknowledged that there is a chance for political utopia to be revived and then to be realised through human beings' democratic struggle for truth in the face of arbitrary political powers. Sharon

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Anderson-Gold demonstrates how an in-depth analysis of Kant's concept of hospitality provides a powerful ground for a ruling of international relations that would authentically aim at world peace. She shows how hospitality, in contrast to its use by 19th century imperial powers, does not simply mean the opening of borders to a free commerce of goods and labour, but is a principle demanding fair and equal relationships between all states and implies the creation of impartial international organisations representing all nations equally. Harry Lesser, also inspired by Kant's views on hospitality, lays out an interpretation that is, to an extent, the obverse of Sharon Anderson-Gold's. Considering both the grounds for restricting and the grounds for supporting such a right for individuals to be welcomed everywhere in the world in order to offer one's labour for sale and not as a principle ruling directly international relations between states, Harry Lesser discusses how a movement of free labour may or not be a condition supporting world peace. Questioning the restrictions and support to be given such a right, he concludes his argument by defending the idea of world citizenship. Reflecting on the results of policies of free labour that encouraged Turkish people to come to Germany after World War II as "guest workers”, Abdullah Onur Aktaú uses Nietzsche's thought in order to think migration and integration. The concept of "ascetic ideals", describing a country as inhabited by ideals of pure social unity translating into fear of change and difference, serves to diagnose the causes of integration's failure. The concept of "tragic wisdom”, in seeing difference and change as beneficial and necessary parts of life, proposes a solution to such failure in suggesting a double understanding of integration, where the existing society must adapt to its newly arrived members just as those new members must adapt to the existing society. Rachael Sotos interrogates Sharon Anderson-Gold's advocacy for fair international institutions in discussing some of the issues inherent to their existence. She uses Slavoj Žižek's thought on morals, ethics and politics to highlight the figure of Sergio Vieira de Mello, the United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights who was killed in Iraq in August 2003 – a man who devoted his life to peace – to show how analysing Vieira de Mello's utopian practice with Žižek's dystopian critical thinking generates, in fact, an inspiring model for understanding the task of international institutions. The third chapter, in considering the idea of peace from the perspective of history, demonstrates the importance of context for the kind of relationship human beings were able to entertain with peace. Putting peace into a context, such an historical standpoint, relativizes utopian ideals in uncovering the ways they were often exploited for manipulating people's aspirations to peace. Doing so, history also offers the critical power to enable a

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Introduction

renewed idealistic attempt to make peace happen in avoiding the mistakes of the past. Egidius Berns reflects on the meaning of Europe's construction, which is usually counted among the main contemporary examples of a realised utopia, through tracing the genealogy of its flag. Although the European flag can be interpreted in rational terms as reflecting only political concerns, one can also see it as secretly carrying Catholic symbols. Furthermore, history reveals that major actors in its creation intended such similarities, trying to make the Catholic faith a central part of European construction. Through this case study, Egidius Berns interrogates the opposition between reason and faith, thinking through the relationship between utopian realisation of peace, supposedly creating a public space for the universal to overcome the particular, and its contrary, the particular interest of individuals understood as a dystopian force working against such a universally shared public space. Kenichi Onodera takes up this strategy of questioning peace with the tools of genealogy of representations and proposes a renewed understanding of "Germania", the major female mythological figure representing the German people. He retraces the history of Germania from antiquity, where she is pictured as a weak and sorrowful goddess representing the lack of autonomy of the Germanspeaking territories, to the 19th century, where she becomes the symbol of the newly born German nationalism. Kenichi Onodera shows the progressive transformation of Germania as a martial figure along with the anticipation and constitution of the Prussian nation state, of which Kleist's depiction serves as paradigmatic example. He nuances such ideological use by Hölderlin's poetic description of Germania as an attempt to question imperialism and make German nationalism an ideal of peaceful unity. The fourth and last chapter studies the importance of cultures in pacifying the world. As some are announcing a clash of civilisations, one can ask oneself if, instead of being menacing, cultural identities of individuals and communities cannot rather be counted among the main factors for bringing peace in many of the current and future conflicts affecting humankind. Paula Restrepo and Julián Pacho provide us with a general presentation of these possible roles for culture within a worldwide pacification process. They argue that rather than being cause of future conflicts, a diversity of cultures is a major factor for achieving higher levels of union and common understanding. Presenting as desirable a future "clash of civilizations", redefined as a global dialogue and interaction between cultures, they present knowledge of other cultures as the main means for a pacifying intercultural dialogue. Fulya Ozlem considers concrete ways to achieve such intercultural dialogue within contemporary liberal democracies. Going along with liberalism's presupposition that the states must be

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neutral in terms of moral choices and must maximize the individual freedom of their citizens to make such choices, she argues that the subsequent duty of political institutions, in order to create truly free and autonomous individuals, is to secure their access to other cultures through travelling and learning the language and culture of others. She calls "cosmocultural" such an understanding of liberalism, in the sense that it combines the advantages of both cosmopolitanist and muticulturalist theories. Fitting into this frame for which the state should support intercultural dialogue in order to make individuals more free, Sinem Meral presents the strength of literary translation for helping to solve problems of cultural conflicts. Focusing on the case of the role of translation of both German and Turkish literary works to help solve issues of integration of Turkish communities in Germany, she considers the translator as an intercultural mediator. She presents several authors and their works and advocates for policies of state support to the translation of quality literary works facilitating intercultural understanding. David Tittensor makes a strong argument against the idea of a clash of civilizations in presenting the movement of "Schools of Love" created by the Turkish Sufi Fethullah Güllen. Taking this movement as an example of a strong cultural identity, he shows how it can lead to an educational system strongly promoting humanism, ethics and mutual understanding. In describing Gülen's legacy, David Tittensor closes this collection of essays by offering us a concrete reason to have faith in the fact that utopia is not doomed to fail, but, in fact, can become real. —Sergueï Spetschinsky and Kai Gregor Berlin, Spring 2010

CONCEPT OF PEACE

FOR A DYNAMIC CONCEPT OF PEACE CRISTIANA SENIGAGLIA

Peace as an Ideal That peace is to be considered as a utopian concept belonging to the realm of irreality, seems to be either misleading or acceptable only to a very limited extent. If we agree on the statement, that peace and war are understood as opposites, excluding each other at least from an ideal point of view, we should also conclude that the utopia of peace would entail the "pantopia" of war, that is, its universal presence. However, this can be refuted even by considering the arguments justifying the necessity or inevitability of war itself. When people adduce that there is always (or there has always been) war in the world, they make reference to a globally calculated phenomenon. They should more precisely say: "There is always war in some part of the world". But this means strongly reducing the range of their affirmation or alternatively to reckon with odd or absurd consequences. Using an analogous inference, we could then namely claim that there is no life on earth, because there are always people (or animals, or plants) that somewhere die. Considering this, if it is possible to speak of the "utopia" of peace, it has to be related to the absolute ideal of the "perpetual peace", which lays claim to being universal and generally shared. On the other hand, that we do not put up with the state of war as a normal, and prevailing condition, can be deduced from the fact that the language and conceptualization of war often and constitutively refer to a "state of exception". Even the theoreticians of the natural right, who proceed from the description of an initial and generalized state of war, are firmly convinced that we have to abandon it, as we could not endure it nor permanently live with it.1 In other words, they exclude the possibility that living in a continuous condition of war would be bearable, desirable, or profitable. The French sociologist Raymond Aron remarks to this respect in his book Peace and War: I have chosen war as a starting-point, because the strategical-diplomatical behaviour relates to the potential case of an armed conflict. [...] This time

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we will consider peace as the starting-point, because peace is reasonably the aim, societies strive after.2

If war is taken as a condition brought about by organized, armed forces, then it has to be treated as a concrete possibility which can become real and becomes real, but not as a permanent characteristic forming political relations. Nevertheless, also by considering peace as an absolute ideal, it is possible to adduce reasons which allow for sound arguments and concrete applications. We can take as example Max Scheler's reply to Spengler who on his part had assumed that the ideal of perpetual peace is meaningless. Scheler namely said: Firstly, the good ought to be, even if it never happened. Secondly: it works proportionally to its empowering capacity, even if it is not accomplished. Thirdly: there are thousand counter-examples taken from history, in which ideas and ideals were despised and derided for centuries and millennia, were called "empty utopias" and "dreams", and nevertheless they became true; this happened not only in the fields of science and technology (railway, aircraft, etc. [...]), but also in the political and moral world (for instance the abolition of torture and of [...] death-penalty, of slavery and bondage).3

In this way it is possible to revalue the meaning of ideals and their weight on concrete life. First of all, the value of an ideal cannot be directly deduced by its potentiality of realization; then, the ideal has a regulative function and a real effectivity, as it conditions human action; finally, as human beings are historical, nobody can exclude that things which were thought of as impossible, soon or later become real. These arguments are sound and emphasize the potential of ideals. Nevertheless, they need some complementary assumptions, in order to prove that the ideal itself is worth being pursued. The form of the ideal is namely not sufficient to justify its desirability and its value. The mere assumption that "something is not realized yet" says nothing about the condition of possibility to realize it nor about the value and the consequences included in its realization. Therefore, in order to define an ideal, it is necessary to make reference to the content, even if this is understood in a formal way, for instance as something "good" or positive. For those reasons, complementary assumptions have to imply a reference to the content of the ideal and to the connected declaration of value. Especially two conditions have to be satisfied and play a guarantee role in the definition of ideals:

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Cristiana Senigaglia

An ideal has a positive meaning or a meaning at all, if it corresponds to some disposition provable in reality. In case the ideal were totally extraneous or in contradiction with human nature and life, it would be not only questionable, but also neither clearly understandable nor conveyable. This does not mean that an ideal satisfying this condition is in consequence universally accepted and shared. There can be many different reasons for not subscribing to an ideal. For instance, some people do not agree with the pattern of life it proposes, or maybe it implies some consequences which are, at least for someone, negative or disagreable, and prejudice the value of the ideal itself. By contrast, the condition mentioned above refers to a more radical issue of the value, that is, a minimal connection to human condition (and life) making it intelligible even for people not sharing it, but showing a general attitude of accessibility to comprehension. On the other hand, the relation to life seems to guarantee a minimal degree of value and desirability, which makes an ideal worth considering. The meaning and positive value of an ideal, even if it appears evident to intuition, has to be (and must be able to be) sustained by grounds or, alternatively, by the refutation of opposite statements. If the ideal is defined as a not yet realized condition which is worth achieving, there must be some explicable and argumentable reasons to justify it. Maybe these reasons do not convince all people and can lead to raising objections, but they have to contain some arguments which appear consistent at least to people affirming that ideal. Also in ideals related to faith, for example, their affirmation is always connected with a claim of truth, of better understanding of things, or of an alternative vision of the world corresponding to one's own needs and expectations. All these elements are intelligible and can be conveyed to others, although the other may see things differently and not be persuaded. And even if some people are not ready to call their ideals in question, they implicitly admit that the ideal they pursue can give a better answer or a compensating solution. This should decisively contribute, and it normally does, to strengthening the will to adduce reasons for justifying the value of an ideal and for implementing it. According to these conditions, and with the above mentioned precautions about the difference between the effective realization and its possibility (which never can, as a matter of principle, be totally denied in relation to the future), it is not meaningless to inquire into the reasons underpinning an ideal. On the contrary, they can help to understand better its content and to furnish convincing proofs of it. With respect to this, the theoretical and argumentative relevance of grounds has to be able to be

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separated from historical contingencies, without negating, on the other hand, the importance of the context in order to understand the ideal itself. Historical aspects namely contribute to making clear when a specific ideal is more strongly claimed, although they do not say the last word about its validity.

The theoretical roots of the ideal of peace In the modern history of European thought many philosophers and thinkers have stressed the value of peace. The relevance of this ideal can be connected with a reality often conditioned by the destructive effects of war and the awareness of the advantages offered by the relatively short periods of peace. In addition to this, these authors were also influenced by the awareness that human nature is not exclusively characterized by belligerent instincts and that many other capacities and qualities are deeply inhibited or damaged by a persistent situation of conflict. Already in 1515 Erasmus of Rotterdam emphasized that human beings present certain characteristics which induce them to friendship and peaceful togetherness.4 Beside physical weakness and an unequal distribution of capacities, which make for cooperation among them, Erasmus mentions the faculties of language and reason, which allow for human interweaving and are able to avoid violence or to successfully reduce its extent. According to Erasmus, language enables us to communicate and to explain to one another the different points of view. In doing so, human beings find a valid alternative to seeking a solution by means of conflict and of a supremacy of force. From this perspective, reason results to be a very effective instrument to improve reciprocal understanding, because it not only permits discussions with other people making use of arguments instead of weapons, but also helps to convince people of the inutility of war in order to solve problems. As a mixture of a faculty of reckoning and of common sense, reason raises the question: "Are you really able to damage the enemy without endangering your people?" While language makes contacts easier and mediates in the process of comprehension, reason adduces arguments demonstrating the disadvantages of war. At the same time, they develop the capacity of discussion and mediation by searching for compromise and agreement on the basis of explicable grounds as well as practicable solutions. In today's theory of the ethics of discourse (Diskursethik), the faculties of language and rationality have been founded either on the everyday speech or on the transcendental level. This approach leads to an immediate intersubjective understanding and includes from the very beginning

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individuals in the universal community of communication. Habermas explicitly starts from the usual experiences which are made every time when one person encounters and addresses the others (especially the unknown ones) in the street. These experiences point to a general openness and readiness to answer questions and to give information that has the connotations of truth, intelligibility, veracity, and correctness.5 Apel has traced back these forms of everyday intercourse to a transcendental, that is, to an inner constitutive condition of the human being and of his or her way of thinking. Indeed, the transcendental subject has been transformed from the abstract generality of the "I think" into the concrete multiplicity of the "We speak". In other words, the transcendental level is performed by a plural subject, namely the "We" of the communication and of the talk to one another. This allows to immediately comprehend the individual as an active participant in an intersubjective process. From this perspective, according to Apel, the isolation of the internal thinking process occurring to individuals can be avoided, as they are required to make themselves understandable by means of speech-act performances and to found their assertions through argumentation.6 This procedure of foundation, although it does not exclude the possibility of conflicts, is based on an immediate attitude of accessibility and communication with the others. In particular, it sets against the view that human intercourse is primarily characterized by hostility and, as Hobbes had said, by a universal condition of war of everyone against everyone else. In doing so, it also transforms the rational faculty from an instrumental and egoistic capacity of calculation into a socially connoted function sustaining dialogue, balance, and fair consideration of possible reasons and counter-reasons. Starting from a substantial and ontological point of view, Charles Taylor has confirmed this perspective and supplied it with further argumentation. In his view, the human being is fundamentally an expressive entity, since he or she expresses him- or herself through language and this is the essential characteristic determining their nature. Language is naturally to be understood not only as the spoken or written one, but extensively as all forms of gesture, expression, artistic and work production. In consequence of this, a person can for Taylor fundamentally be defined as a dialogical being, not only because he or she communicates by using expressive forms addressed to someone else, but also because language can be comprehended only in performative relation to others. This does not exclude the capacity of the individual to be original and creative, but it signals from the very beginning the importance of contact to others in order to appropriate the necessary instruments and frames to express their own originality. Furthermore, the fundamental dialogical

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dimension extends its range also beyond the initial phase, because it constantly permits the continuous exchange of opinions, statements, theses, and objections. For Taylor even the work of art, in spite of the widespread idea concerning its absolute uniqueness and individuality, cannot in reality be considered as fully separated from social intercourse. In fact, it is conceived of in relation to an at least potential public and it strives after the discovery of new forms of communication. The dialogical structures of our being are then so deeply rooted in our attitudes and in our way of thinking, that even interior and isolated reflection includes the presence and the view-points of the others. Imaginary interlocutors are created, potential objections proceeding from alternative perspectives are taken into consideration, and possible reactions or answers are anticipated. In doing so, human beings confirm the impossibility on the one hand to avoid the dialogical intercourse and on the other hand to prevent themselves from seriously and fundamentally taking it into account.7 These philosophical considerations about human beings' nature permit us to make some relevant conclusions concerning the topic of peace. If we namely admit that all these fundamental processes of learning and education as well as their results are determined in the frame of intersubjective and dialogical structures, then it is possible to infer that numerous ways of contacting and building relations to the others are not characterized through conflict, aggressivity, and war. Fear and distrust surely belong to the fundamental instincts and feelings of human beings, but they are neither exclusive nor all-embracing. The ideal of peace is in consequence not a mere utopia, but it can be anchored in some fundamental traits of human nature. The term utopia can therefore relate to the extension and exclusivity of peace, but not to something being understood in absolute opposition to humans and to their way of living. Concretely, conditions of peace can be found in manifold conducts and attitudes concerning social, familiar, and community life, which legitimate the pursuit of an ideal of peace as well as the striving for its affirmation. On the other hand, this does not exclude the possibility of confrontation or conflict, as it sometimes also happens in the realm of talk, dialogue, and communication. Therefore, it is not possible to refrain from considering the situations which originate conflict in an initially pacific context, nor to bracket all arguments underpinning the inevitability or even utility of war. The value of peace has to be confirmed by means of demonstration of its positive meaning as well as by refuting the counter-theses. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that the existence of fundamental structures of life and intersubjective relationships inspired by contexts of peace already points to alternative forms of overcoming conflicts, which not necessarily depend

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on the use of (organized) violence. They lead an analysis of the reasons which support their recognition of value and legitimate the necessity of their development.

Aspects of the peace debate The reasons for sustaining the value of peace are numerous and have been repeatedly adduced in course of history. First of all, the high loss of human lives in war is pointed out, especially because it very often concerns people who are not responsible for it and do not directly and actively participate in the conflict. Generally, cruelty and distruction are seen as the features characterizing war. This does not only imply negative consequences in the objective conditions of life, but also a worsening regarding the moral and psychological attitude of people, progressively losing their sense of respect and justice and passing into a mentality of hate and prevarication.8 In addition, the high loss of human lives and the destruction provoked turn out to heavily encumber the whole society, as many capacities and potentials destined to its development are irretrievably lost and need a very long time to be (if at all) compensated. It suffices to think of all activities converted on the strength of war and of all human energies and qualities inhibited or constrained, in order to make clear what kind of pressure is exerted on society and how possibilities of free development are drastically reduced.9 Besides this, in time of war goods and resources are distributed in a much more unjust way. While in periods of peace the processes of the expansion of welfare are at least made possible and easier, the advantages and the profits of war are very limited and concentrated in the hands of very few persons (and usually not the most deserving ones). In general, peace promotes the development of business and trade and contributes in an essential way to setting up social and economic life.10 Similarly, arts and knowledge take advantage of peace, because they can dispose of more expenditure, energies, subsidies, and public appreciation. In the meantime, social, cultural, and economic long-term projects as well as the setting up of infrastructures and public works can be undertaken, since peace guarantees those conditions of stability and security that are necessary, in order to program complex and ambitious development processes. Furthermore, two more aspects of public life are massively favoured in periods of peace: (1) the respect of law, and (2) the democratic process through the participation of citizens.11

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With respect to the first point, it can be remarked that war facilitates illegal procedures and activities. It reduces the ethical consciousness and obscures the border between legality and illegality. Moreover, as a lot of crimes are committed and many exceptions to law are tolerated, this makes it more difficult to ensure the respect of justice. As already mentioned, war is constantly connected with the idea of exception, while justice always refers to the universality and equality of people before the law. War also stresses the value of obedience and the sense of hierarchy, which allow for an order often contrasting with the equalizing effect of law. Finally, the scarcity of indispensable goods, the irregularity of supply, and the condition of general insecurity make for the implicit acceptance and tolerance of extra-legal means in order to remedy the shortfall. With respect to the second point, the condition of war requires the concentration of political power in the hands of few people, the maintaining of secrecy, the rapid decision making, and the necessity of prompt action. All these requirements contrast with the procedure of democratic life. They inhibit the possibility of free and open debate, since this would mean making it public, slower, and less dependent on the experts' opinion. They reduce the possibility of voting, because this would imply more complicated and long-time proceedings. The conditions created by war also restrain the making of compromises, since this requires long bargaining and a readiness to relax the hierarchy, which openly contrast with the tendency to concentrate decisional power. Ultimately, the basic processes of democratic decision and formation of consensus are hindered, because the information available to the public is inadequate, reduced, and delayed in comparison with the urgency for decisions. The reasons supporting the value of peace and the goodness of the condition ensured by its permanence appear to be overwhelming. Nevertheless, some objections against its possibility and its positive evaluation have been formulated, which have to be taken seriously, especially because they do not rest on an indiscriminate enthusiasm for war as such, but rather they try to justify why war is unavoidable. Some of these objections were expressed for instance by Rousseau12 by commenting the project of perpetual peace outlined by the Abbé de SaintPierre,13 and they were further articulated and argumented by Hegel,14 who objected on his part to Kant's work also pleading for a project of permanent peace.15 Aiming at the achievement of a stable peace, the Abbé de Saint-Pierre had proposed the creation of a confederation of States and the constitution of a Congress or Parliament, which had to be figured out by means of a

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precise definition of rules, institutions, and tasks. The supranational organization could be enabled to settle all conflicts and to find a compromise or a pacific solution to them. Rousseau praised this project because of the incontestable advantages it granted for the coexistence of nations. Nevertheless, he called in question its possibility of realization for three reasons: (1) it implied for the States a strong limitation of their power and sovereignty, which was very difficult to obtain; (2) it required that the States renounced their particular interests in favour of the general well-being, and (3) the confederation did not dispose of the suitable measures of constraint in order to obtain the necessary agreement.

To obviate these objections, Kant had thought of a confederation where the States participating were not compelled to submit to a superior power and could nevertheless unit their efforts in order to maintain peace. For Kant the conservation of a peaceful order was warranted only by the prevailing of a legal constitution in every single federated State. In his opinion, the guarantee of freedom, reciprocity, and equality of treatment to all citizens originated from the expression of a collective that will sought the welfare of its members and was therefore unwilling to make war. Moreover, Kant reckoned with the increase of international trade and with a consequent globalization of the negative effects of war, seeing them as motives destined to provide an incentive to peace. By contrast, Hegel argued much more radically than Rousseau against the possibility of such a project, since he maintained that the States are the highest organizations of political power in the realm of the objective Spirit and of its historical development. The overriding argument resided in stating that there was neither a power nor a judicial institution enabled "to decide against the State what is the right in itself and to implement this decision", so that the federation for peace was destined to remain an "ought to" claim. The question to which Hegel draws the attention is the absence of institutions guaranteeing peace and disposing of the necessary power maintaining it. Furthermore, Hegel stresses the difficulty of building a consensus among the States, since their interests are always led by their particular sovereign will and cannot be unified into a common and persisting aim. The precariousness surrounding the reaching of international agreements as well as the instability concerning their maintenance render

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the alliances among States temporary and always susceptible to new conflicts. Rousseau's and Hegel's objections are nowadays partially overcome, because in the meantime international organizations and supranational communities have been founded. Because of them, States have given up a part of their sovereignty and accepted the existence of a higher decisional power especially for some relevant questions regarding respect for persons and their integrity. Moreover, international assemblies and courts can dispose of legal means to call to account persons and States violating generally acknowledged rights and are enabled to take decisions on an internationally recognized level. Nevertheless, the process of the formation of consensus remains in many situations difficult to achieve, particular interests often prevail over the consideration of the general good and cannot be harmonized. The question of the use of force through international legitimization cannot often be easily solved, even if the regulation and institutionalization of the international relations have undoubtedly contributed to bringing the problems to discussion and to looking for pacific and legal solutions. At least, it can be affirmed that negotiations have become more usual than wars and that the single States are not the highest instances any longer, in which the ultimate decisions are taken. The perspective of a supranational commitment is considered less and less as an intrusion into State sovereignty, and supranational institutions as well as uninvolved personalities and States obtain more chances to operate a successful mediation. Efforts to achieve peace appear to be more concrete and practicable, even if much still has to be done.

War as a factor of change and progress? However, there are also other arguments which have seriously to be taken into account. A typical reason adduced in favour of war bases on considering it as a factor of dynamism and renovation. This opinion was already expressed in ancient Greek philosophy. In a fragment About nature, Heraclitus affirms: "War is the father of all things and the king of all (people). It makes the ones gods, the others human, the ones slaves, the others freemen".16 Through this stance two aspects are stressed: firstly, war is characterized by a fundamental creative component and is therefore the real motor of life and history; secondly, war implies an upheaval of class order and determines the internal dynamics of social condition. In other words: war could be the principal cause of transformation and progress. This idea has been sustained also in modern time, especially by authors who consider the State as the ultimate level of political power and the

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highest instance of sovereignty. Their way of justifying it is sometimes subtle and sophisticated. They do not deny that there can be friendship between States, and in consequence they do not depict international relations as a continuous state of war, which would impede in the long run every form of stability and development. Rather, their conviction is that a too long period of stability and peace provokes a kind of stagnation which affects some components of society, some procedures, and some institutions. From this perspective, they share the statement that war is to be considered as an exceptional condition invalidating many expressions of normal life and challenging the democratic and legal organization. In doing so, they try to maintain the thesis of the positivity or necessity of war by reformulating the conception that the end justifies the means. According to them, war could be an indisputably destructive occurrence, but after all it would offer by reason of this destruction the most radical possibility to make things change and to open the way to the new. This thesis hides the tacit assumption that there is an "invisible hand"17 regulating transformations, taking the form of a natural law and creating through destruction a new (and better) state of equilibrium. Also the reference to history is a very selective one and not corresponding to the whole truth. If it is namely true that in some cases the end of one civilization offered the possibility to other ones to develop themselves and to innovate life, art, science, and customs, it cannot be denied, by contrast, that some wars and the consequent destructions were often followed by periods of deep crisis and trouble. Similarly, from a structural point of view, the change of social and economic internal balance did not always produce an immediate progress, especially if it was combined with the loss of independence or with corruption. Nevertheless, the idea of war as a necessary evil in name of improvement and progress has often been taken into consideration. The Italian political philosopher Norberto Bobbio, in his book The problem of war and the ways of peace (Il problema della guerra e le vie della pace) has distinguished among three different kinds of progress, which are normally mentioned in order to justify war. (1) "War is of use to ethical progress".18 The reason adduced is that war, just because of the enormous sacrifices, losses, and constraints engenders a higher sense of solidarity, readiness to help, and unity. In time of war, it is said, people have to practise and to strengthen their civic virtues, which decisively contribute to improving the sentiment of being a community. Bobbio notices that this argument is used in relation to single individuals as well as to whole nations, with the additional remark that war promotes activity and commitment, while peace tends to laziness and decay.

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(2) "War is of use to cultural progress".19 From this point of view, war is appreciated for its capacity to allow for communication and exchange among different cultures. The argument is taken to have had some validity especially in the past, when contacts between cultures were much more rare. The idea is that war would provoke not only the clash of cultures, but also some forms of fusion and reciprocal influence. The most quoted example refers to ancient time and calls to memory the war between Rome and Greece, ending in the defeat of the latter, but bringing about a noticeable enrichment in Roman culture and civilization. (3) "War is of use to technical progress".20 From this point of view, war is seen as an important factor in order to stimulate scientific research and experimentation as well as to increase the number of technical inventions. Historically, it bases on the concrete experience that the necessity to defeat the enemy acts as an incentive to have new ideas and to make discoveries which turn out to be useful also in normal life. The especial needs of war and the urgency connected to it essentially contribute to intensively and purposefully expanding the technical potential. In addition to this, it enhances a compulsive cooperation between research and industry which makes for a rapid and simplified procedure of application.

Bobbio objects to all three arguments that the risk of nuclear war makes them senseless, because it radically questions the possibility of development and, even more radically, the possibility of a society existing afterwards at all.21 But it is also demonstrable that today's society disposes of alternative and more effective instruments in order to obtain comparable or even better results in all three domains. The demonstration procedure can make use both of negative (a) and positive (b) arguments. The negative ones are calling in question the issue that war is truly capable of attaining such results. The positive arguments, instead, are thought of as making reference to present situations and proving that there are specific constellations and urgencies provoking the same pressure and clearly refraining from war. Moreover, all of them can be applied preliminarily, that is, before taking the alternative between conventional and nuclear war into consideration. (1a) In relation to the ethical development, war does not produce that moral improvement which is taken for granted by its advocates. Even if we admit that some practices of solidarity take place or increase in the course of war, the solidarity which is produced bases on very conflictual and highly accentuated sentiments. As a general law, it can be affirmed that violence leads to violence, and that the prolonged and accustomed use of violence deeply (and sometimes irremediably) corrupts the sensibility and the habits of people. Moreover, the injustices produced by war cannot be quickly cancelled: they open profound sores which can be, at least for the

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habits, and ways of thinking. The reduction of distances, the huge intensification of travel, the widespread use of media and high technology allow for a wide range of possibilities of communication. Conversely, every society is increasingly confronted with foreigners visiting or dwelling in their country. That this automatically helps to undermine prejudices and to improve cultural understanding, it surely cannot be affirmed. Nevertheless, it creates optimal conditions for people looking for contact, without necessarily stressing ethnical background as a preliminary reason for seclusion and discrimination, as war does. (3a) With reference to the technical progress, if it is true that wars promote purposeful experimentation and close cooperation between science and industry, they also occasion a weakening of rules and control systems. The general condition of urgency, pressure to success, and the diminishing of moral restraint make for annulling cautions and time for counterexperiments. The more dangerous these proceedings are in a highly developed technical society, the less it is possible to calculate in advance, as Hans Jonas pointed out, the risks of enduring and irreversible consequences.23 Moreover, not all discoveries and materials used for the purpose of war are convertible for use in normal life; not all of them are to be unlimitedly recycled, and the waste they produce easily destructible. (3b) In addition to this, war is not to be considered any longer as a decisive factor giving impulse to science, investigation, and economy. Today's globalized societies and the risks of modern technology entail vital challenges which require peace from a rational point of view. Climatic change, famine, water shortage, environment pollution, financial and economic crises affect with their direct or indirect consequences the whole planet and pose therefore utmost urgent questions which demand, to their solutions, much more international or even global projects than armed conflicts. The fact that technical deficiencies or charges in one part of the earth provoke negative effects on other parts inevitably leads to overlapping measures and to the necessity of a comprehensive planning of energy and resources utilization. They contemporarily represent a remarkable challenge to science and technology, provided that they are sustained by a reasonable economic and political commitment. By contrast, conflicts turn out to be a burden for the environment, not only because they cause too much destruction and waste of energy, but also because they hinder the organization and implementation of continuous and extensive common projects, which represent the unique practicable solution.

Dynamics of peace In consideration of today's situation, but also with regard to the past, it is possible then to affirm that progress is not promoted by wars nor does it

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require them. Nevertheless, not all arguments in its favour are therefore refuted. In particular, reference to movement can lead back to the ancient idea that war transmits a dynamic input to society and, in doing so, points out an essential characteristic of life. The ancient theory of war as a dynamic, creative, and innovating factor could even find further support in the fact that all processes concluding peace and establishing a legal order necessitate an increment of organization warranting for it. Stability, it could be argued, has a price: it can easily lead to forms of stiffness concerning politics as well as society, and it may have, as a consequence, a reduction of the potential of democracy in favour of fixed power-relations and immovable hierarchies. The advantages of peace, according to this point of view, would be reduced by an internal paralysis affecting society. The party sociologist and political thinker Robert Michels has depicted this phenomenon and defined it as the "iron law of oligarchy". Whoever says organization, says tendency to oligarchy. A deep aristocratic character can be ascertained in the nature of organization. The machinery of organization provokes grave changes in the organized mass, as it produces a solid structure. [...] The basis of organization is the equality of rights for all its members. [...] But the technical specialization, which is the necessary consequence of every widespread organization, creates the necessity of the so-called businesslike management [...]. The organization decisively accomplishes the division into two groups [...]: a leading minority and a commanded majority.24

Moreover, this process runs the risk that all innovative energies and ideal contents are sacrificed in the name of the conservation of stability and organization: "In doing so, the organization is transformed from into an end in itself. The organ wins over the organization".25 Summing up: the risk of societies in time of peace could be the general congealing of power-relations, which leads to the setting of steady hierarchies and changes the apparatus providing the necessary organization into a selfreproducing and self-centred machine. This objection cannot be played down. If peace has to be ensured, these possibly occurring difficulties have to be overcome. In general, this implies the capacity to discover devices within the society itself, which are accredited to render society more flexible and dynamic by making an internal innovation constantly possible. The condition of peace can show the whole range of its positive effects, only if it is enabled to include the significant qualities ascribed to war and to transform them into an internal dialectic. Nevertheless, as the tendency to stiffening particularly applies to apparatus and institutions, the enlivening process cannot exclusively be

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concerned with them, as they can be previewed to lead to the same repetitive mechanical deficiencies. Aiming at introducing the element of life, change, and intrinsic dynamics, stiffening is in particular to be avoided, which is brought about by passivity and habituation. This means to yield a form of processuality which can be granted only by means of the active participation and inclusion of citizens in the political proceedings, starting a circular movement of integration between public opinion and institutions. Formal acts are doubtless essential, but they have to be inserted into a dynamic process appealing to life. They cannot be considered as detached products of autonomous activity, even if this activity is motivated by the commendable aim of reaching a stable agreement. In consideration of their not only establishing, but also configuring function, formal acts can represent nothing but moments internal to a comprehensive development, which for its part has to be carried out through constant new projects, pursuing concrete and practicable aims. How can this perspective directly take effect on peace? In the field of the technico-juridical language some theoreticians make a distinction between "negative" and "positive" peace.26 The negative idea of peace implies the mere absence of war. From this point of view, "peace" is reduced to a concept only derived from the state of war, as if, so to say, war were the original and significant state of things. Furthermore, the connotation here ascribed to peace is only generic, and neither for the content nor for the form bound to fixed conditions or rules. By contrast, the positive idea of peace depicts a specific condition, in which the juridical end of a conflict means at the same time outlining the modality of their future relations. By means of its positive characterization, the maintaining of the peace itself gains in significance, includes definite formal procedures, and depends upon the definition of contents.27 The positive understanding of peace gives rise to an essential enrichment and emphasizes the meaning of the concept of peace itself. Yet, it still has to do with a too static and formal conception. Herewith, rules which render peace juridically effective are taken into consideration, but without actively including the processes and the persons that keep it alive. In order to enliven them, a comprehension and a culture of peace are required, which consider it as a starting-point for a social, economic, and politically successful coexistence, underlining its relevance in everyday life and gradually constructing it. This can only be reached, if peace is conceived of as an extensive process, to which formal acts also belong, but concrete action always takes the lead.

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This modification of perspective is not to be simply understood as a symbolic expression of alternative thinking, but entails an "architecture of peace" which is made by significant and concerted long-run activities. From this point of view, the central issue consists of cooperation projects taking place in all important spheres of public, cultural, and civil life, which, aiming at determinate and concretely attainable ends, performatively demonstrate the relevance of peaceful intercourse and at the same time allow for strengthening it. On the one hand, they can essentially contribute to revalorizing the possibilities of collaboration, so that they obtain the chance of extending this potential also to further fields. On the other hand, this can produce an integration between political decisions and everyday togetherness. In doing so, the process of peace can be empowered, endowed with evident contents and ends, and constantly and constructively translated into action. A fundamental, connected result is moreover the setting in motion of recognition processes which are not only performed by formal acts, but are also rooted in the progressive getting to know of the other and of their culture.28 The cooperation projects should not only help people to find common and unifying objectives, but also bring to bear the specific characteristics, capacities, and acquisitions of the respective cultures and of the concrete individuals representing them. Peace processes are so to be understood, that they cannot be limited to an acquisition of meaning on an official international level, as necessary as this may be. Their integrative and indispensable performance entails an accomplishment through different initiatives and activities coming from below. The formal peace agreements contain official statements of reciprocal recognition, that surely become valid and are fundamental for building international relations; nevertheless, they could rather be considered more as stages of a process than as a fixed frame. It cannot namely be denied, that agreement often recur to foregoing initiatives, intercourse, to the activity and the voluntary commitment of individuals and groups. They open the way to an easier bridging of difficulties and incomprehension, and furnish a qualified preliminary knowledge about possible friction points.

The dynamics of mediation This does not diminish the significant role political efforts can make in order to afford peace, especially when a rapid escalation of tension takes place. Diplomatic mediation remains one of the most successful devices, when conflicts are to be avoided or settled with an acceptable solution for

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both sides. Nevertheless, if this is to be integrated in the general dynamics of peace, it has to lose its appearance of sophisticated and artificial action. In order to become a more shared and a more accepted practice, mediation has first of all to refrain from the semblance of an external imposition from above. This only can happen if the practice of mediation is not considered any longer as an exclusive and extraordinary action taking place on a high level, but it becomes a common and widespread form of intercourse. In other words, mediation has to turn into a habit which takes place in consequence of commitment to peaceful coexistence and unencumbered social interaction, and not as an expression of superior ability or power. This implies, first, a basic attitude of admission of the existence of conflicts, then the awareness that nobody can guarantee in advance for not reacting in a violent form, if he or she is particularly sensitive to a question, and lastly the inclusion of the neutral "third" party as a usual and useful social pattern for these occasions. A reciprocal action granting for pacific solution and including the extension to the "third" party, who every time changes and can be identified with a different person or group, by-passes the idea of a fixed hierarchy. Moreover, it develops a mechanism of role interchange, which ensures a system of complex, but effective reciprocity. Positively, it entails a civic education to mediation, which can be learnt already at school and accustoms people to exerting an active function by settling conflicts and trying to avoid violence. If the function of mediation or intervention in order to solve a conflict has to be exercised by an official power, it can be furthermore figured out as a form of active cooperation with the parts concerned, aiming at finding an alternative and equilibrated solution. The introduction of a dynamics of peace cannot take up the form of domination, which would create new resentment (contradicting peace) and represent a rigid form of imposition (contrasting with dynamics). If an intervention takes place, it has to be as unobtrusive as possible, and guarantee fairness and equal treatment. To reduce the impact of the intervention, a principle could be followed, which aims at avoiding the interference into customs, cultural expressions, religion, and political convictions of the people, and nevertheless tries to establish an overlapping order. This could be attained through the concrete attempt to impede fights and activities which would increase the potential of hate and violence (the negative form of intervention). On the other hand, the possibility of cooperation or at least peaceful coexistence should be demonstrated by stressing the project dimension that a life without war would permit (the positive function of intervention). The utopia of the global solution should be substituted by the concrete policy of "step by

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step" improvement, including a commitment to supporting all little initiatives and activities contributing to figuring a "normal" (without war) and peaceful social and economic life. Especially in extreme situations of conflict, in fact, all segments of "normal life" calling to mind contexts of ordinary activities have a peace promoting effect, even if they do not explicitly have peace as a central issue. Re-establishing everyday life is a not clamorous way to accustom people to constructive practices and activities and to remove them from enhanced hostile sentiments. It makes for a possibily imperceptible, but surely occurring dynamic movement towards peace, as it deeply acts in the mentality of people by drawing their attention to needs and expectations which are concrete, attainable, and effectively in process. In order to avoid the uneasy sentiment of domination from above and of a too strong unified sovereignty dictating its will and imposing its laws, it is better on an international level to maintain or to consolidate democratic supervising structures. That is, they have to express a plurality in the modality of their composition and in their decision processes. Already Kant had called in question the validity of a World State, which would possibly better respond to the need of stability and organization, but would be exposed to the risk of uncontrolled domination and stiffness of hierarchies. Kant had justified his reluctance to a universal State by means of two arguments. On the one hand, he said, the creation of a World State would call for a too extended renunciation of autonomy on the part of the single States. As they are based on a legal system and on a right to legislation awarded by the people, they are not entitled to completely give them up. On the other hand, Kant called in question the capacity of such a big and unified structure to survey all the planet and to do it in a constant and efficient way, and he opposed a structure maintaining the separation and creating a federation (or, more exactly, a confederation) among the States: According to the rational idea, this is better than their fusion [...] into a universal monarchy, since the laws, because of the wide extension of the Government, progressively lose power, and the soulless despotism [which takes place] finally indeed falls into anarchy.29

Supervising structures, maintaining a plurality of voices and of reference powers, seem to be more acceptable to the different nations. This increases the possibility to deal with more propositions, to take the idea of compromise into account, and to find a well-poised solution. On its part, the decision gains in neutrality and credibility, all the better it loses the

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character of expressing only particular interests, prejudices, and specific power-relations, and it turns into the canons of a democratic procedure. This does not impede seeking solutions and forms of mediation also on a lower level, if they are available. The principle of subsidiarity could be utilized also in the efforts avoiding conflicts or attaining peace. Nothing speaks against the possibility to look for the nearest political organization which can be considered at the same time (1) neutral in relation to the opposed parts, and (2) seriously committed to find a pacific solution.

As subsidiarity previews the intervention of a subordinate level and its autonomy of action, as long as a higher instance is not explicitly required, the principle could prove to be successful also in this context. Surely, its application is complicated by the awareness that it is often difficult to find an institution, a nation or a federation of nations which are considered as equidistant from both antagonists. Nevertheless, there are tense situations which can successfully be managed by persons and structures that dispose of inside information and are felt as better understanding the specificity of the questions at stake. Cultural, ethnical, and linguistic affinity can be a considerable advantage in order not to offend the sensibility of people, and in order to minder the impression of intrusion, which external interventions always tend to provoke. Moreover, the extension of the habit of mediation among the different authorities and institutions can also actively contribute to diffusing a culture of peace, as it enhances the commitment and the will to a successful outcome also in the official structures of power. Being involved in a process of mediation searching for peace will strengthen the tendency to consequently act in the same way, also when someone is directly concerned. Asking for a more indulgent and ready-to-compromise attitude to other groups or nations will imply showing the same readiness to agreement, also when conflicts affect their own territory. In addition, the habit of mediation will make more aware of the huge damage and of the domino effects caused by wars. If mediation is conceived of to give peace a real chance, it has to be perceived as an action of justice, correctness, and equity. As complete neutrality is very difficult to reach, it is better that a plurality of mediators is involved, who represent different points of view, but are united by the common purpose of attaining an equilibrated and fair solution. What must be avoided is a prejudicial attitude immediately deciding on the good and the evil, the right and the wrong. The democratic procedure should offer the concrete possibility to all different voices to be heard and taken into

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account. Apel's and Habermas's pattern of the ideal community of communication can furnish the regulative idea, provided that all subjects concerned (groups, regions, etc.) are actively involved and can express to all extent their positions, their needs, and their claims. Surely it is an illusion, that relation of power and the consequent forms of pressure can disappear or be ignored. But it is necessary to make people aware that power and pressure cannot alone bring about acceptable and durable solutions. Additionally, they are immediately felt as a form of disregard and imposition. In case of conflict, it is nearly impossible to find a solution which satisfies all groups involved. Nevertheless, it is always conceivable to outline a project of peace responding to two (one negative, one positive) main conditions: (1) The subjects and groups concerned should freely and argumentatively come to the conclusion that all of them have been charged with equivalent and comparable sacrifices and renunciations. (2) They should have the impression that all their claims have been taken seriously, have been fully discussed and weighed out, and have been included as much as possible as a part of the solution.

These fundamental conditions have to be included once more into a dynamically conceived process.30 Conflicts have many reasons and motives, but two issues are often felt as highly controversial: (1) the socio-economic condition and (2) the question of cultural identities.

Referring to the first source of conflicts, Gandhi said that disarmament is really thinkable, only when exploitation ceases.31 An active policy trying to re-equilibrate disparities is an effective means of preventing wars, especially if it is intended to act in the long run and to make people in the regions concerned more independent, self-acting, and providing for their living.32 With reference to the cultural issues (which entail different habits, ethnicities, languages, and religions), a policy sensitive to differences can reasonably reduce the reasons of conflicts, provided that it is able to find an acceptable balance between promoting the development of the existing cultures and increasing intercultural understanding and exchange. Peaceful coexistence can be attained on a minimal level, when people and groups

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tolerate one another, but the premises for a stable peace and a productive togetherness would also include the creation of civic platforms open to discussion and striving for common aims. In this context, action groups promoting initiatives for peace and trying to exert influence on public opinion can substantially contribute to favouring the development of a dynamic and comprehensive peace process.33 The wide diffusion of a pacific mental attitude is essential to peace, because it accustoms people to thinking of alternative and constructive solutions. The habit of considering peace not only as an end, but also as a means of performatively demonstrating its value, helps to strengthen peaceful intercourse. It also induces the public to mobilize for it and to exert a control function on the political decisions taken on the high level. Making civic pressure on politics induces politicians to act more carefully, since they become aware of the echo and the weight of public opinion with reference to this issue. Conversely, the tendency to look for pacific solutions in political and official processes guarantees more chances for peace also for the future. The idea that policies promoting peace can prove to be successful is a real incentive to support them, because it makes peace more credible and people (and Governments) more trusting. Peace turns into a strong motive to action, if people believe in its power of realization. Successful results in one conflict situation exponentially enhance the possibility of future results in other contexts, just because peace is mainly a question of belief. Therefore, only the cooperative interaction between political processes and civic action in this sense is able to constantly provide for new élan and potential. Among the general characteristics of utopia, we can number the description of an imaginary space, the invention of alternative life conditions, but also a certain fixity and immobility concerning the picture of the imagined world.34 If some elements of utopia have to be taken into account by referring to peace, then it would auspicious to take on the idea of imagination and invention, without seeking an immutable condition. Then the utopia of peace could be a "non-space" in the sense, that the commitment to peace does not accept to be encaged in a closed and limited place, where only rigid and unchangeable rules are supposed to be valid.

Notes 1

See especially: Hobbes, Th., "De Cive", in: Philosophical Works, vol. 3, Clarendon, Oxford, 1983; Leviathan, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991. 2 Aron, R., Frieden und Krieg (Paix et guerre entre les nations), Fischer, Frankfurt/M., 1963, p. 182.

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Scheler, M., Die Idee des Friedens und der Pazifismus, Francke, 1974, BernMünchen, 1974, p. 10. 4 See: Erasmus, The Adages, University Press, Cambridge, 1964; The Complaint of Peace, Scholars' Facsimiles & Reprint, Ann Arbor, 1999. 5 See: Habermas, J., Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, 2 vol., Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M., 1988; Moralbewusstsein und kommunikatives Handeln, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M., 1983; Die Einbeziehung des Anderen, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M., 1999. 6 See: Apel, K.-O., Diskurs und Verantwortung, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M., 1988; Prinzip Mitverantwortung, Königshausen & Neumann, Würzburg, 2001; Diskursethik und Diskursanthropologie, Alber, München, 2002. 7 See: Taylor, Ch., The ethics of authenticity, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1992, and also Sources of the Self, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1989. 8 See for example: Crucé, É., Le Nouveau Cynée, Villery, Paris, 1623; Penn, W., Essay toward the Present and Future Peace of Europe, Taylor, London, 1693; Bellers, J., Some Reasons for an European State, London, 1710. 9 See: Nietzsche, F., "Menschliches, Allzumenschliches", in: Sämtliche Werke, Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, de Gruyter, München, Berlin/New York, 1980, vol. I, aph. 481. 10 See for example: Bentham, J., "Principles of international law" (1789), in: Works, Edinburgh, Tait, 1843, vol. 11. 11 These two aspects were already stressed by Erasmus. 12 See: J.-J. Rousseau, Extrait du projet de paix perpétuelle de M. l'Abbé de SaintPierre, Rey, Amsterdam, 1761. 13 See: Castel, Ch. I., (Abbé de Saint-Pierre), Projet pour rendre la paix perpetuelle, Garnier, Paris, 1981. 14 See: Hegel, G.W.F., Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Werke 7, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt/M., 1986. 15 See: Kant, I., Zum ewigen Frieden, Meiner, Hamburg, 1992. 16 Heraclitus, Fragments, New York, Viking, 2001, p. 28, Fr. 44. 17 The principle had been originally formulated by: Smith, A., An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations, Modern Libr., New York, 1994. 18 Bobbio, N., Il problema della guerra e le vie della pace, Il Mulino, Bologna, 1979, p. 67. 19 Ibid., p. 68. 20 Ibid., p. 69. 21 Ibid., p. 70 ff. 22 See: Wright, Q., The causes of war and the conditions of peace, Longmans, Green, London, 1935, and also A study of war, 2 vol., The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1947. 23 See: Jonas, H., Das Prinzip Verantwortung, Insel, Frankfurt/M., 1982. 24 Michels, R., Soziale Bewegungen zwischen Dynamik und Erstarrung, Akademie Verlag, Berlin, 2008, p. 201 f. 25 Michels, R., Zur Soziologie des Parteiwesens, Kröner, Stuttgart, 1958, S. 348.

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About this difference, see: Bobbio, N., Il problema della guerra e le vie della pace, p. 159 ff. 27 See: Brücher, G., Pazifismus als Diskurs, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden, 2008, p. 87 ff. 28 To this topic, see: Taylor, Ch., Multiculturalism, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1994. 29 Kant, I., Zum ewigen Frieden, p. 80. 30 These conditions define the idea of a just (or fair) peace. See: Allan, P., Der gerechte Friede in vergleichender Perspektive, in: J.-D. Strub, S. Grotefeld, Der gerechte Friede zwischen Pazifismus und gerechtem Krieg, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, 2007, pp. 145-173. 31 Gandhi, M., "The Voice of Truth", in: The Selected Works of Mahatma Gandhi, vol. 6, Navajivan-Stiftung, Ahmedabad, 1968. 32 To this topic, see: Kesselring, Th., Ethik der Entwicklungspolitik. Gerechtigkeit im Zeitalter der Globalisierung, Beck, München, 2003. 33 To this subject, see for instance: Kobler, F., (ed.), Gewalt und Gewaltlosigkeit, Rotapfel-Verlag, Zürich-Leipzig, 1928. 34 See: Maffey, A., "Utopia", in: N. Bobbio (ed.), Il dizionario di politica, Torino, UTET, 2004, pp. 1028-1033, and B. Bongiovanni, G.M. Bravo (ed.), Dall'Utopia all'Ucronia, Firenze, Olschki, 2001.

THE CONCEPT OF PEACE IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY RAGHUNATH GHOSH

Introduction The present paper deals with the concept of 'peace' in Indian Philosophy, which gives a different type of interpretation. I would like to give an account of the concept of peace in a very unique manner and hence I believe it is worth-pondering in the world perspective in general and in Indian perspective in particular. An attempt has been made to detrminate the causes of peace and the impediments for its attainment, which is followed by some remedial measures suggested in the present context.

Derivative Meaning of the term 'Santi' ('peace' in English) and its root causes: The Sanskrit rendering of the term 'peace' is 'santi', which is derived from the root 'sam' meaning 'restrain of the sense-organs' In fact, in Buddhism and Hindu tradition the root cause of the absence of peace from our mind is excessive 'thirst' or 'tanha', which causes cravings for more and more consumable or enjoyable objects. Such thirst can never be quenched with the fulfilment of a particular desire and hence it is an unending phenomenon. It is a fact that the fulfilment of a particular desire gives rise to the subsequent ones leading to an unending process. In order to get rid of such unending process an attitude of self-satisfaction is to be promoted, which ultimately leads us to the world of peace. In order to arrive at such stage it is essential to go through some rigorous meditative training so that we can control our sense-organs including the inner one (antah-karana or mind). An object generates sometimes pleasure and sometimes pain within us. In other words, the object which seems to be pleasant in certain time may seem to be painful in other situation. It is also true that an object which is pleasant to some one may be unpleasant to others. An object may create pleasure in one aspect and pain in another aspect depending on the attitude

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of the enjoyer. Hence it is very difficult to get a clear criterion of describing something as pleasant and/or painful. In the same manner, it is also very difficult to determine the criterion of peace. However, peace has got some connection with happiness and hence a painful situation cannot give an individual peace in the true sense of the term. That is why; in the Upanisads the mantra invoking 'peace' (santi) is often found. One of the functions of chanting such mantra of peace is to pray for the eradication of sufferings or miseries. Through the removal of such suffering pleasure which is taken as opposed to suffering is to be achieved.

The Upanisadic Concepts of 'pleasure' (sukha) and 'pain' (duhkha): In order to understand 'peace' in a better manner it is necessary to understand what 'pleasure' (sukha) and 'pain' (duhkha) are. To the Naiyayikas (a school of Indian Logicians) something experienced as favourable generates happiness in an individual being (anukula-vedaniyam sukham) while something experienced as non-favourable generates pain (pratikula-vedaniyam duhkham) in a man. In other words, if something is experienced as conducive to what is favourable to us; it is pleasant while something conducive to what is not favourable to us is called unpleasant. The 'favourability' (anukulata) and 'non-favourability' (pratikulata) of an experience is very much subjective, as it depends on a particular situation or environment. There is no fixed rule under what situation an experience would be favourable and non-favourable. In the Katha-Upanisad there is a principle through which an experience is judged as favourable or not and thereby determines its pleasantness or peacefulness. If the construction of the terms 'sukha' ('happiness') and 'duhkha' ('pain') is carefully looked into, a common term 'kha' is found in both the terms, which are prefixed by two particles- 'su' ('favourable') and 'duh' ('non-favourable'). The term 'kha' literally means the 'hearing sense-organ' ('srotra') by which all sense-organs may be taken into account as its meaning by secondary implication (laksana).1 In other words, though the term 'kha' means 'hearing sense-organ' primarily, it may mean all the sense-organs metaphorically. This is the intrinsic nature of sense-organ that it always rushes towards the external objects to fulfil one's thirst, which is the cause of pain. Hence in order to achieve peace in mind it is essential to control the rush of the external sense-organs towards objects and to draw them back towards an opposite direction i.e., self. Just as the flow of the river can be brought to the opposite direction through some technological method, the nature of the sense-organs which rush to the

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external objects can be brought back towards the opposite direction, i.e., the internal side through some yogic method. An individual tries to withdraw his sense-organs from the external world and makes them directed towards his own self2, which is technically called 'sama' ('the restrain of the sense-organs from the external world' i.e., 'the internalisation of the sense-organs') from which the word 'santi' meaning 'peace' is originated as told earlier. If the sense-organs rush to the external objects without any internal control over it, mind of a human being becomes polluted and troubled through its excessive attraction towards the object of enjoyment. Such a polluted and non-tranquilised mind cannot give us peace or happiness. For this reason the sense-organs are said to be 'non-favourable' ('duh').3 On the other hand, if an individual, after withdrawing it from the external object, puts the sense-organs towards his inner self, the mind becomes calm, nonpolluted or tranquilised. Hence the 'sense-organs' ('kha') become 'su' or favourable by virtue of their efficacy in providing calmness in a man. Moreover, in order to keep our mind balanced, it is necessary to keep sense-organs within our control.4 It is possible if their flow is turned towards our own self or inward direction. At this stage mind becomes calm and tranquillised producing 'peace' or 'santi'. It confirms the famous saying that whatever is one's own control can generate peace to him while that which is not under one's control can provide only misery (sarvam atmavasam sukham, sarvam paravasam duhkham). One story supporting this is found in Buddhist literature. One day some Buddhist monks were returning to their own monasteries in the evening, but on the way they faced some foul weather with storms and rains. On account of this they had to take shelter in a cowherd's place and to spend the night. The cowherd boys, after seeing the monks, started irritating them by saying: "We are well-protected in a shelter. We have a lot of reserved food for ourselves and cattle. Hence, O rain, you go on showering the whole night." On hearing these irritating words the monks also started giving a befitting reply without being annoyed with the children -"Our sense-organs are well-controlled. Our mind is meditated towards a particular object. Hence, O rain, you go on showering during the whole night." The second one is the result of a self-restrained mind (atma-vasam manah). The monk was in a position to retain a calm as well as forceful mind due to having senseorgans under his control.

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Buddha as an Embodiment of Peace: Buddhism in general represents the way of compassion. The Buddha is an embodiment of compassion and hence he is regarded as the compassionate protector of all beings. As 'thirst' has been taken as the root cause of all 'worldly diseases' ('bhava-roga'), the path as shown by Buddha is to be resorted to and hence he is called a 'physician of all worldly diseases' ('bhava-roga-vaidya'). To him the individuals following his path should practice loving kindness, which implies not to harm the life of all beings. It is advised always to protect mankind as well as animals and vegetations. It is his wisdom through which one can see all human beings in the universe as equal in nature. The well being of all human and non-human being is inter-related and mutual. To ignore such instructions is to invite our mental and environmental crisis. In the modern time we find that human beings have misused their power and destroyed the animals, forests and mountains resulting in environmental crisis. The greedy minds due to the excessive 'thirst' of mankind lead to such changes and the destructions of the ecological balance. The 'thirst' ('tanha') in human mind does not pollute his mind alone but the whole environment. So mental unrest due to the nonfulfillment of desire can affect the whole environment. The external environment is seriously polluted because of the pollution of the internal environment in the mind having the lack of peace. The excessive greed is one of the reasons for the internal pollution, which is the impediment of peace. This disease may be eradicated if an individual finds some satisfaction and contentment through the Buddha's teaching. That the external pollution is related to our internal one is evidenced in the Dhammapada. It is said that just as the maker of an arrows makes the end of it straight, so an individual should simplify his mind, which is wavering, fickle, uncontrolled and unprotected.5 The contentment in the context of Buddhism does not mean the eradication of all desires but to live in harmony with all beings and nature. It is said in the Dhammapada that a pure and developed mind alone can understand others mind (Panditavagga, verse no. 3). It is further emphasized that when the world is burning (prajjalite) there is no opportunity for adopting laughter (haso) and joy (ananda). In the like manner, if our mind is covered with darkness, would we not seek for light? (Jaravagga, verse no. 1).Those who believe in the teaching of Buddha will control their desire and live in harmony with nature keeping the environment in healthy condition. It is rightly mentioned in the Dhammapada that one who sees only the apparent beauty, who is not self-restraint in enjoying consumable

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things, who is lazy and weak is always attacked by one's enemies just like a weak tree. On the other hand, an individual refraining from seeing apparent beauty becomes self-controlled and respectful and hence he is not overpowered by the enemies just like a firm and stony mountain.6 The historical account of Buddhism shows that for thousand years the Buddhist monasteries have developed a harmonious living with nature and hence they are established in the mountains and forests. The calm and cool atmosphere of the forest and mountain helps the Buddhist practitioners to develop their inner mind, which ultimately makes them 'feel' for the protection of animals. With loving and tolerant heart the Buddhists live with natural vegetation, wild animals in the forest in harmony and for mutual survival. In the Sutta-nipata we find a deep appreciation of nature's beauty and diversity. Buddha says: Know ye the grasses and the trees … Then know ye the worms, and the moths and the different sort of ants … Know yet also the four-footed animals small and great … the serpents … the fish which range in the water … the birds that are borne along with on wings and move through the air …

The consideration for other individuals as a matter of moral obligation is not limited to other human beings alone but to other species. Buddhism seeks to transform in the way through which an individual conceives himself. The environmental ethics in Buddhism is not totally a matter of identifying and securing rights, but it is a matter of undertaking a practice of affirming and realizing the trans-human potential for enlightenment as an effect. The deeper insight in an individual is generated through the cultivation of it in human and trans-human species and hence it can become potential for enlightenment. This can express itself as a compassionate environmental sustaining altruism. Such an idea has been expressed by Shantideva in the following manner: Just as the body which is constituted with hands and other limbs should be protected as a single entity, the whole world divided into so many parts should be treated as undivided one so far as its nature is concerned. If it is taken as divided, it would suffer no doubt. I should remove suffering of others because it is suffering like my own. I should help others too because they exist as I exist.

Shantideva adds that if someone is reluctant to remove sufferings of others, it would like refusing to use one's hand to remove the thorn of one's foot, because the pain of the foot is not the pain of the hand.7

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To get an ecological balance we should develop an ecological sensibility and actualize that sensibility in practice. So in Buddhism the phenomenon of inter-relatedness is deeply felt and hence a comprehensive developmental path leading to 'peace' is sought. Though the Buddhism talks about the protection of the environment and mental peace, it gives emphasis on the three-fold training of human mind and seven factors of the enlightenment, which are the basis ethical sensibility to the environment. The Mahaparinibbanasutta of the Dighanikaya discusses about the three-fold course of training like cultivation of ethical conduct (sila) meditation (samƗdhi) and wisdom (pañña). These three are inter-connected in the sense that the first is left behind when the second is undertaken. Without the development of these it is possible for one to lead happy and peaceful life. Wisdom (prajna) goes beyond knowledge attained through reading books or hearing the tales. The practice of morality (sila) and mental development (samadhi) develops a penetrative insight and realization into the nature of everything in its proper perspective. When the realization (wisdom) appears, the trained mind becomes an unshakable dynamic force that can handle any human problem without anxiety and thereby can remove the worldly problems. When the ethical conduct is firmly established, the meditation becomes effective. Through effect of meditation the transformative power of wisdom becomes possible.8 From the above discussion we may draw the following conclusions. Only advice to protect environment or to adopt ahimsƗ will fall flat upon others until and unless they are enlightened with wisdom. The true solution of the environmental crisis will be neither technological nor legal. It must be stereological. It must involve the evolution of a significant number of human beings to a higher level of awareness, to a higher ethical sensibility. It does not mean that the technological and legal efforts to safeguard the environment are pointless, but we think there is at least a stopgap measure but not the ultimate solution. To Buddhism there is a potentiality in human being to evolve into a higher ethical sensibility. This will happen through the concerted practice and discipline. The whole Buddhist tradition consists precisely in a sustained effort to devise effective methods for undertaking this transformation. The tradition says that we have our own resources though the task is very difficult. If we can master over the method, the energy in pursuit of the good, patience, the living kindness, the concentration and the wisdom to bring these substantial resources to bear evolve automatically in a man. With this inner tranquillity alone outer tranquillity, free from pollution, may come into being.

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Some Prescriptions to obtain 'Peace' How can this flow of sense-organs be brought towards the opposite direction or inner self? The Indian thinkers have prescribed various ways of achieving this. First, in order to arrive at such stage it is essential to go through some rigorous meditative training so that we can control our sense-organs including the inner one (antah-karana) or mind. To the Buddhists the Eight -fold path (astangika-marga) is the correct path to know the right knowledge of reality, which ultimately leads to the control of sense-organs. If it is realized that each and every object is transitory or momentary, essenceless (sunya), our mind, being controlled, can reduce the thirst for enjoyment. An individual, being free from mental pollution, can achieve peace. That is why; Buddha himself is called an embodiment of peace and an aesthetic pleasure called santarasa. By virtue of worthy of it he is called santatma and santa-manas. Sri Aurobindo adopted the method of yogic meditation, which can transform our body from the natural one to a Divine one (bhagavati tanu). Yoga has got the power to transform the position of different cells (kosas) of the body. In natural body the first outer cell is called physical self (annamaya kosa), which is encircled by vital self (pranamaya kosa) and mental self (manomaya kosa). These three circles cover the nucleus of the body called rtacit (main divine power existing in a human being). If yoga is practised as per the given instructions, the given order of the selves is changed due to the awakening of the power remaining as nucleus of the body. At this stage a human being receives a new enlightened body, which is called a Divine one leading to the transformation of mind and senseorgans also. Under such a situation a man can attain the real peace being free from mental pollutions Moreover, the Indian culture has prescribed some qualities which are advised to be practised by the human being for the attainment of peace. Among these sama (meaning 'the restraint of outer sense-organs') is the most fundamental, because, if they are restraint, the inner-organ is automatically controlled, which is called dama ('the restraint of the inner organ'). Under these circumstances the other qualities like forbearance', tolerance etc. (titiksa) etc will easily follow. An individual having all these qualities really can claim that he is having peace of mind. Secondly, proper counselling is an alternative way through which a man can made free from the clutch of thirst. Human beings can be convinced through arguments and examples that no one in this world is found happy through his wish-fulfilment. Because the fulfillment of one desire gives rise to another one leading us to the path of Infinite Regress.

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The logic of counselling (sravana) has been admitted by Sankara also who advised an individual not to boast of wealth, man-power and youth, because all might be taken away within a moment by the Time. Our life is as transitory as the water in the lotus-leaf ("Ma kuru dhana-jana-yauvanagarvam/ harati nimesat kalah sarvam// Nalini-dala-gata-jalavat-taralam/ tadvajjivanamatisayacapalam//"). If a human being is convinced with these, he will start minimizing his cravings or thirst, which ultimately leads him to the world of mental balance. The last method of reducing one's thirst is to encourage him to engage in the enjoyment of fine arts like film, drama, music, dance paintings etc. It is a well-known fact that while enjoying aesthetic pleasure a human being can bracket his day to day problems and engross himself in some non-pathological enjoyment. It is non-pathological in the sense that this type of enjoyment has got no connection with the fulfilment of our thisworldly matter. Through such non-pathological enjoyment one can easily reduce one's this-worldly interested pathological desires arising out of cravings. These causes of such peaceless state as told earlier and the methods of their removal has no barrier in certain space and time, These are applicable to human being in general whether he has taken birth in India, or Germany or other countries in the world. If peace is needed, I believe, these are the only means for availing this without considering the geographical boundaries and racial matters.

Notes 1

"Paranci paragancanti gacchantiti, khani tadupalaksitani srotradini-indriyani, khani-ityuncyante. Tani parancyaivasabdadi-visaya-prakasanaya pravartante." Sankara-bhasya on Katha-upanisad, 2/1. 2 Ibid. 3 "Paranci khani vyatrnat svayambhustasmat paranpasyati nantaratman/ kasciddhirah pratyagatmanamaiksadavrttacaksuramrtatvamicchan//" Katha-upanisad, 2/1. 4 Sankara-bhasya on Kena-Upanisad, 2/1. 5 "Phandanam capalam cittam durakkham durnivƗrayam ujum karoti medhƗvƯ usukƗro'va tejanam." Dhammapada 3/1. 6 "SubhƗnupassing viharantam indriyesu asambutam bhojanam hi ca amattaññum kusƯta hƯnavƯriyam tam ve pasahati mƗro vƗco rukkham'va dubbalam/"; "Asubhanupassing viharantam indriyesu susamvutam bhojanam hi ca mattaññum saddham ƗrabdhavƯriyam tam ve napasahƗli mƗro vƗto selam'va pabbatam/" Dhammapada 1/7-8. 7 Kata Crosby and Andrew Skilton (Ed): BodhicaryƗvatƗra, V 2i :91-99, Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 96. 8 MahƗparinibbanasutta of Diighanikaya– V 67-68.

MUSIC AND EMOTIONS: A DYNAMIC CONCEPT OF PEACE MANOS PERRAKIS

Introduction Peace is usually defined as the absence of war and conflict. Against this negative definition I shall try to introduce a positive concept of peace as life-stimulant, a concept inspired by aesthetics of music combined with philosophy of life. The musical paradigm I will refer to is that of pure instrumental music, so-called "absolute music", which marks a paradigmshift from vocal to instrumental music.1 My aim is to extract a positive sense of freedom from the "negative", non-representational character of instrumental music in order to demonstrate how we can think peace through music.

The "vivid contradiction" of music However welcome a negative definition of peace may be, since we are still inhabiting a world full of conflicts and wars, it is yet not sufficient. It needs to be supported by an affirmative definition. A negative definition of peace has the disadvantage of suggesting that war is the normal state and peace a utopia. Therefore it undermines the idea that peace is a value in itself, apart from being seen as absence of war. So, considering the classic definition of war as the "father" of all things, I think we also need a supplementary metaphor according to which peace is the "mother" of all things. Peace should be a state which is bound to last, and not just a break from a rotten reality of a warlike state or a state of passivity. On the contrary, a state of passivity should be largely considered an endangerment of peace. The modern discussion of music has its origins in the ClassicRomantic era and the new paradigm of instrumental music, "absolute music". Since the emancipation of music from words at the end of the 18th century and the dominance of instrumental music in 19th century, music is considered to provide the finest example of what is called an aesthetic

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state, a state of freedom combined with a joyful activity, but also with very specific rules. I will focus now on two perspectives I consider crucial for our issue: the perspective of the listener and the perspective of the musical work. (I take here the perspective of the performer as the perspective of mediation between these two, since the performer is a "listener" who communicates the work, and does justice to it only by giving himself to it). It is a common intuition that music goes beyond words. We just need to think of our everyday life. We listen to a piece of music, and then we are asked to describe it. After a couple of words we begin to stumble, in case we have not already found ourselves at a loss for words. The difficulty to describe music is due to its non-representational, nonreferential character. Music does not represent something, or at least not in an evident way as figurative arts and literature do, and yet it moves us in an unusually intimate and distinctive way; in the words of Nick Cave: "Music has the potential other arts don't have, which is to utterly change you within three minutes. Your whole body chemistry can change, your mood, your perspective…"2

As a non-representational, non-referential art, music is not submitted to the boundaries of a linguistic paradigm; it appeals directly to our emotions, to this very own part of us which is identical with the hard core of our individuality. Therefore music cannot be expressed adequately with words, but for the very same reason it provides us with a greater sense of freedom than any other art.3 This is, in short, the perspective of the listener. I think that listening to music provides a more intensive feeling of freedom than a novel or a painting, because it moves us deeply, without telling us why. We can identify ourselves with the hero of a novel or recall some familiar landscape in the view of a painting, but we cannot identify ourselves in the same way with a melody. Of course, we do this as well, when we are whistling or imagining music during a walk, but I don't think we could really explain why. Yet this identification can go even deeper. To give an example: While I was writing these lines, I read an interview of Carice van Houten, the actress starring as Nina von Stauffenberg in "Operation Valkyrie". When she was asked where she would like to live, she gave the astonishing reply: in the "Second Piano Concerto" of Dmitri Shostakovich!4 The power of music lies in the absence of an evident reason. It is exactly this absence that intensifies the liberating effect of music. In this respect music proves to be exemplary for all art. For the most successful works in every art always maintain a certain secret. And in music, maintaining secrets seems to be the rule and not the exception.

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The perspective of the listener is inseparable from the concept of music as expression or language of emotions, which is a manifest idea of modern humanism. In other words: to focus on emotions means to focus on the subject. Both emotions and sounds exist in time. But time is also something abstract; and emotions' life takes place in time. To anticipate what we shall come to claim later on: music and emotions share a dynamic character which is unfixed and unpredictable, and therefore accompanied by a feeling of freedom. Things change radically if we approach music from the perspective of the musical work. There can be indeed a very deep contrast between the effect of music on the listener and the musical work itself. A musical work is something very strict and rule-governed because it is a complex organisation of sounds. It is like mathematics in sound, an "unconscious exercise in arithmetic in which the mind does not know it is counting". This famous assertion of Leibniz implies that music is an unconscious paradigm of rationality. "Musical systems", as D.T. Bailey writes, "exhibit some of the properties we find in good theories. That is, they are complex, well integrated systems whose elements (propositions in one case, pitches in the other) agree with one another in some important sense, while also starting in significant and determinate relations to one another."5

And indeed, in the history of philosophy there are plenty of examples in which philosophers, from the Pythagoreans and Plato to Habermas and Rawls, employ musical metaphors to describe politics.6 The complexity of music arises from the fact that music is rationality that has to be performed. In order to become aware of the complex nature of a musical piece, let us reflect on our experience. We perceive a mistake in classical music much more immediately than we do in other arts. This is due to the fact that music is a very strict organisation existing in time. Each sound is so solidly bound to the others that a single mistake may be fatal for the whole, since in every single sound we anticipate the whole piece. To sum up: The unique character of music is based in an inner contradiction. Music is a very rational system, as the metaphor of sounding mathematics implies, but it evokes an emotional response which is absolutely free of explanation, not to say irrational. This contradiction has concerned more or less directly many great thinkers such as Kant, Hegel, Schopenhauer and Nietzsche, to refer only to the most eminent of them. Indeed, it wouldn't be an exaggeration to claim that the attraction of music for philosophers derives from this contradiction. In the following paragraphs I will try to show how fruitful this inner contradiction may be.

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But first it is important to discuss the question as to whether there is an affinity between melodies and concepts, because only such an affinity could legitimate this inner contradiction.

Are melodies like concepts? Concepts appeal primarily to reason and not to emotions. But if music appeals to emotions, how can we apply concepts to music? If emotions are strictly individual and almost impossible to communicate, they should rather stand outside of reason. Emotions are individual, concepts raise above the individual. But both emotions and concepts are abstract, though in a different way. Emotions are in an individual way abstract, since they cannot be fully expressed with words. When I am saying how happy or sad I am, only a very small part of my affective state comes into words, if any at all. Concepts are abstract the other way round, since they cannot be fully individualised. Truth, for example, can be thought of as an individual truth, but the general concept of truth is very hard to be reduced to strictly individual terms. To separate emotions from reason would be, however, a fatal prejudice. Emotions always include reasons and judgements. They arise from vital concerns or interests, sometimes so deep inside us that we are not aware of them. Concepts, on the other hand, are not free from an affective background. They are not self-generated but created by other humans under certain circumstances to cover actual needs, often dictated by the spirit of time. So, what is the conclusion? Each concept should have an affective background and every emotion could be translated as a concept or lead to a concept. The sound of music is closer to emotion because of the resemblance to the voice. Voice is pure sound. This is the reason why, as Lawrence Kramer writes, there is a "pre-established intimacy between the music and your voice, no matter who you are".7 If there is also an anthropological affinity between emotion and sound, then an analogy between concepts and melodies should be permitted. Concepts are built upon isolation and repetition of individual features. If we would like to think something analogous in music, melody would be the best candidate, since a melody is recognised upon the repetition of individual sounds. In this respect, a melody is like a concept, and a melody appealing to us is like a concept appealing to us. So, a successful concept should have an elevating influence on us, like a melody by which we are attracted. In other words: To observe concepts from the perspective of music is to ask if concepts are dynamic, if they are of vital importance for us, if they move us as a likable melody does. So vitality is the criterion. Vitality, though, if

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not connected with values, is an empty word. Both Schopenhauer's and Nietzsche's great concern is to specify the relationship between music and vitality. This relationship is a question of values. And each of them brings his own values in this issue.

Schopenhauer's and Nietzsche's evaluation of life-dynamics through art Schopenhauer brings a revolution in the philosophical aesthetics of music, since he is the first in the history of philosophy who considers absolute music to be the highest among the arts. Earlier philosophers, from Plato to Hegel, were very reluctant to give instrumental music a high position in the hierarchy of the fine arts because of its non-representational, non-referential character. They took the absence of image to be an absence of terms. Therefore they saw a flux of blind affects instead of knowledge. So it is no surprise that they felt more familiar with vocal music, where they could see music subordinated to words. The first ones who considered instrumental music, music without words, to be the finest of the arts were German Romantic writers, perhaps the first dramatic individuals of modernity. Schopenhauer's theory is considered to be the philosophical expression of the romantic aesthetics of music. For Schopenhauer, music is the immediate expression of the will, his main principle of the world. The will is a metaphysical entity which is identical with the element of life. Everything that exists is an embodiment of the will. Since the will is located in the inner life, the concept of the will results from an abstraction from all emotions: it is the general form of emotion, one that moves everything. The vital force behind every appearance is its will. To claim that music represents the will is like saying that music imitates the dynamic character of life. The important thing, however, is how one evaluates life. Since Schopenhauer interprets the dynamic character of life as a negative struggle without reason, music offers us a powerful relief, making us forget, as long as it lasts, the pains of life. Is this the moment of peace in a world that is, according to Schopenhauer, in every respect an unmerciful and non-peaceful one? Perhaps, but this is not the notion of peace I am interested in, because this kind of peace is not bound to last. It leads to escapism, which by no means is to be identified with peace. That is the main objection forwarded by

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Nietzsche, who is neither a pacifist nor a bellicist, but nevertheless very aware of the importance of avoiding unnecessary suffering. For Nietzsche, too, music expresses the dynamics of life. But since he rejects Schopenhauer's pessimism and affirms life as a joyful aesthetical activity (in a very broad sense from the very first sensuous immediacy of every human organism to the artistic production), he comes to the opposite conclusion. Music functions as a life-stimulant and by no means as a palliative. By listening to music we should not forget life with all its pains, but rather ought to want more of it. For the above reasons Nietzsche's insight brings us closer to a dynamic concept of peace from the point of view of the philosophy of life. For peace should be the very state in which we are able to demand more of life. The experience of music puts us in an affective state in which we feel united with the world, forgetting all the boundaries between us and it. This experience is described by Nietzsche in a famous passage from the Birth of the Tragedy where he refers to the most prominent work of absolute music, and perhaps the most widely discussed musical work of all times, Beethoven's Ninth Symphony: Now, hearing this gospel of universal harmony, each person feels himself to be not simply united, reconciled or merged with his neighbour, but quite literally one with him, as if the veil of Maya had been torn apart, so that mere shreds of it flutter before the mysterious primordial unity (das UrEine). Singing and dancing, man expresses his sense of belonging to a higher community; he has forgotten how to walk and talk and is on the brink of flying and dancing, up and away into the air above.8

I think this picture is a perfect allegory for a dynamic concept of peace, and indeed Beethoven's Ninth Symphony ends with Schiller's Ode to Joy, a vision of a united humanity which incorporates the profound message of music. Let us now see how Nietzsche describes the effect of music upon those who take part in it. It is like a huge painting whose figures are all dancing, united beyond social class, age and gender (it is important here to add nation, for the tradition of Viennese Classicism to which Beethoven belongs has a proclaimed cosmopolitan character). They are in a state of universal harmony, interacting in the joint activities of singing and dancing. This configuration reminds us of Rousseau, and indeed it should be mentioned here that according to the Romantic genealogies of language, the first form of language in the ideal, the paradise state before human split was a sung one. Adam and Eve should have rather been

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singing than speaking. Of course, such genealogies are all about a projection of an ideal future, and by no means an historical reality. Nietzsche's description gives a notion of utopia which means abolition of the differences that split humanity and universal harmony through oneness. So music works here like a projection of a free condition transcending all kinds of social boundaries, and provides a model for a positive relationship of the individual to a larger whole. Is this moment of peace a reality, or a utopia? In the very first place we encounter a projection of a real utopia because this scene is taken from the Dionysian festivities, and a festivity, being a break from linear time, is the exact opposite of everyday life or everyday experience. That is of course true, but we should rather focus on the metaphorical potential here. Singing and dancing as highly intense activities could be used as prototypes for every human activity, if we consider the Aristotelian view that intrinsically fulfilling activities are of greater value than instrumental ones. But we act in intercourse with the world; that means we act together with others. So it is for everybody's benefit if our activities are made with the biggest possible joy and harmony, as if our work were like a game or the performance of a musical work. In order to reach such a joyful spirit we have to focus on things that unite us and try to forget the things that split us, as we do when we take part in a musical performance or a game. To see every form of activity as an aesthetic activity sounds too good to be true. Our everyday activities are far from being harmonious or joyful. They are often dictated by hard necessity and various contradictory interests. If we take a look around us we see nothing but a world full of conflict and growing complexity. How can the image of a festivity be taken as an example? Let's see first what an example means. Is it more a notion of what something is, or rather a notion of what something should be? What we call an example is more of a promise than a reality. Every activity, in order to be really successful, must be seen as an aesthetic activity, not because of its beauty alone but because of the moral state beauty enables.9 Here one could recall Kant's sublime view of the stars in the sky that gives us a notion of a higher harmony and oneness with the universe, and read Nietzsche's passage as a more intense attempt to underline the engagement within the world. The main difference is that in Kant's example we have a single individual in accordance with the universe, while in Nietzsche's example everyone becomes united with his neighbour. In an aesthetic activity we are urged to leave our egoisms aside and concentrate on it, since it has a liberating effect on us. I have already

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explained why music has a great advantage here. It is neither representational, nor referential; therefore we feel more free with it than with the other arts. But since music is a tonally mathematical organisation in which every sound anticipates the whole of the music piece, it provides also an example of how complex a thing can be in order to have a great liberating effect. This should by no means suggest that the more complex music is, the more liberating effect will have. Such a claim would be, without doubt, absurd. At this point we could draw an interesting parallel with peace. Peace is a state of liberty; we want to be free in a dynamic, in an energetic, perhaps in an "uneasy" way. But in order to reach such a state, we have to create more theories and more institutions, complex systems that have to be tested in an equally complicated context of communicative practice. It may sound paradoxical, but complexity seems to be the only solid way to achieve simplicity. The achievement of peace demands the combination of feeling and mathematics, the two extreme poles of music, which constitute the "vivid contradiction" of music.

Conclusion In the previous paragraphs I implied that the "vivid contradiction" of music should rather be seen as a fruitful dialectic. That means, on the one hand, that there is a hidden dynamic in this contradiction and, on the other hand, that it is exactly this dynamic that allows us to create a concept out of the non-conceptual nature of music. This non-conceptual character of music is based on two antithetical but interdependent poles or perspectives: emotion and mathematics. I think nobody would disagree that these two parameters stand for vitality and rationality, without which peace is unthinkable. We defined peace as a state in which individual vitality enjoys its full manifestation, in other words: a state of life-stimulating freedom. But to achieve such a state we need a constant feedback from complex rational systems, theories and institutions which have to be legitimated by individual wills. Peace is a state of certain openness; we can hardly imagine peace as a closed system, no matter how perfect it is. It needs the critical voice of an engaged listener. It is based on an interaction of systemic and individual factors in various constellations. That is why music can provide an adequate model for peace. It is a symbolic system that gives us a great sense of freedom and vitality, and yet it reminds us how essential complexity is. I think this should be a sufficient reason why we should follow the instruction given to Socrates to "compose and practise music." (Phaedo 60d-61b) Then we can be quite sure that we have

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taken a step from the spheres' harmony of the past towards a modern society of musicians.10

Notes 1

For a detailed account on this category see: Chua, D.K.L., Absolute Music and the Construction of Meaning, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999. 2 Interview in MOJO, January, 2005. 3 Compare: Kivy, P., Introduction to a Philosophy of Music, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2002, 251-263. 4 Interview in the German Vanity Fair, January 22ndF, 2009. 5 Bailey, D.T.J., "Logic and Music in Plato's Phaedo", in: Phronesis 2, 2005, 104-105. 6 For this issue, see: Love, N. S., Musical Democracy, State University of New York, New York, 2006 7 Kramer, L., Why Classical Music Still Matters, California Univ. Press, Berkeley, 2007, 113 8 Nietzsche, F., The Birth of Tragedy And Other Writings, edited by Raymond Geuss and Ronald Speirs; translated by Ronald Speirs, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, 18. 9 One could mention here recent projects like the "West-Eastern Divan Orchestra", a common project of Israelis and Arab musicians initiated by Daniel Barenboim and Edward W. Said as an engagement for peace in the Middle East, or "Venezuela's National System of Children's Orchestras", a social project for street kids. 10 In the discussion of this paper Uwe Petersen asked me if I was suggesting a move from a spheres' harmony towards a society of musicians. I could have never found better words for the contention of this paper. So I would like to thank him by closing with this suggestion.

Bibliography Bailey, D.T.J., "Logic and Music in Plato's Phaedo", in: Phronesis 2, 2005, 95-115. Chua, D.K.L., Absolute Music and the Construction of Meaning, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999. Kivy, P., Introduction to a Philosophy of Music, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2002 Kramer, L., Why Classical Music Still Matters, California University Press, Berkeley, 2007. Love, N. S., Musical Democracy, State University of New York, New York, 2006. Nietzsche, F., The Birth of Tragedy and Other Writings, edited by Raymond Geuss and Ronald Speirs; translated by Ronald Speirs, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999.

THE POSSIBILITY OF GENUINE PEACE SANDRA PINARDI

Near the beginning of Totality and Infinity, Emmanuel Levinas states that the fundamental ethical act is to "avoid and prevent (postpone) the moment of inhumanity". He explains this saying: The acute experience of the human in the twentieth century teaches us that the thoughts of men are borne by needs that explain society and history, that hunger and fear can prevail over every human resistance and freedom. There is no question of doubting this human misery – this dominion that things and the wicked exercise over man, this animality. But to be a man is to know that this is so. Freedom consists in knowing that freedom is in peril. But to know or to be conscious is to have time to avoid and prevent the instant of inhumanity. This perpetual postponing of the hour of treason –infinitesimal difference between the human and the non-human – implies the disinterestedness of goodness, the desire of the absolutely other or nobility, the dimension of metaphysics.1

There are two things in this text that I wish to emphasize, since they seem to me to be basic for considering the problem of peace. The first is the implicit idea that ethics in concrete human behavior (and probably politics too) are not achievements or acquisitions, but rather attitudes of permanent attention and alertness, understanding and lucidity, and vigilance against danger and injustice. Thus, Levinas maintains that freedom and justice are to be found in the "perpetual postponing of the hour of treason", and in "avoiding and preventing the moment of inhumanity". Therefore, what we do in the fields of ethics and politics is—and should be—a continuous task in which we declare some kinds of behaviors and actions to be impossible, place limits on what can be tolerated, and curb all actions that cannot be permitted. The second thing I wish to emphasize is the understanding that what is human is always in danger, because the frontier that separates the "human" from the "non-human" is fragile and difficult. As Levinas says, the difference between them is "infinitesmal". The "human" is neither essence nor nature, but is to be found in the way we behave and understand and in our capacity to go beyond ourselves and accept the Other. He proposes

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that that "infinitesimal difference" has to do with to human beings' disposition to transcend themselves, understanding "transcendence" to refer to all that goes beyond or exists outside the unity and identity of the Self, and all that places the Self's possessions and appropriations at risk. The transcendental dimension (metaphysics) is the "place" that mediates between every man and the Other; it is the only place where our connections, alliances and affections are truly established and where a common language emerges. This metaphysical dimension is what allows man to be open to others without protecting himself. These ideas lead us to propose that peace cannot be thought of as something that must be reached, but as a political potentiality that continuously has to be realized in concrete human behavior and experience. Being a potentiality, it is not something that can be achieved or conquered; it is an aim and a desire, and, like all desires, it is a vital impulse that requires no previous imagining or conceptualization. At the same time, the possibility of peace ought to guide and direct all our political actions. Peace is a potentiality in the political actions of men and communities, and is to be found in the "perpetual postponing of the hour of treason", and the permanent task of "avoiding and preventing the moment of inhumanity", injustice and conflict. To think of peace as a potentiality, and not as an idea or concept, implies that we have to revise our understanding or vision of the world, and change the search for perpetual peace into the perpetual search for peace. In principle, this revision requires trying to think and say in reference to concrete human experience; not only in reference to what men possess or are capable of, but to their weaknesses, powerlessness, and what they don't have. It means thinking, saying and proposing ways to prevent, postpone and delay "inhumanity" and injustice, instead of ways to achieve complete peace (since history has shown that all completeness is authoritarian and excluding ). Thus, it would be better to abandon the idea that peace is a "thing" or state that can be possessed or reached once and for all, or as an achievement or acquisition. Instead it should be understood as a promise and a possibility that has to be constantly worked on, recreated and reproduced by asserting that some things, situations, states, and acts must not happen and cannot be allowed. When we pay attention to concrete human experience, it leads us to a non-idealized understanding of what is human, an understanding that recognizes its fragility and powerlessness. Communities and men show their potentialities precisely by revealing where they are powerless, since it only when absences and failures are recognized that it is possible to create a future where peace can come into being. From this point of view,

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the possibility of a genuine peace is linked to the understanding that a utopia is not a place that is "no-place", but on the contrary, is an elusive "place" we have to pursue and find a place for among us. A "place" that doesn't yet exist, a "place" that will always be different from what has come before.

Displacement In order to think of peace as a potentiality, it is necessary to get away from the type of thought and language that is based on carefully differentiated concepts and images, essential representations and definitions. We must separate ourselves from the modes of thought and language which approach the world and experience by idealizing them and conceiving them exclusively in rational terms. Such modes are hostile to the uncertainty of life and to our basic concrete experience - the everyday life that makes us human, links us into communities and turns us into nations. Such separation does not mean we should abandon thinking or saying, stop reasoning or making proposals; instead, it means finding an alternative way of thinking and saying, in which what is absent, difficult or unrealized can be given words. This leads to the question: What kind of thought, what kind of saying, what kind of language would let make this separation? According to several different philosophers, such as Levinas, Foucault, Derrida or Agamben, it would have to be a kind of thought and saying stretched to their limits, to the very edge of what is traditionally considered to be thought and saying. They would have to be at the margin of traditional thought and transcend its frontiers. Without being mystical, they would have to be able to confront mysteries, pay attention to what is hidden and what escapes them, and extend to what is beyond them. They would require the invention of other forms of speech, other words. Such thinking and saying would have to be drastically separate from the ideal if they are to produce concrete actions that organize experience in new ways with different meanings. They would have to begin by reaching out to the world: to others, their languages and histories, their thoughts, their saying. Gaining access this kind of thought means pushing conceptual and abstract thought to its limits; it means thought based on discomfort, desire and openness. There, at the margins, what we take to be certain, agreedupon and convincing becomes disturbing. Abstract and conceptual definitions become contaminated by imprecision and absences. In this kind of thought, to speak of peace, its promise and possibility, would have to be an exercise in reaching an understanding rather than a referral to a defined

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figure or agreement. For example, we would have to reach the understanding that peace implies resolving conflicts and injustice, and this requires forgiveness (which for Hanna Arendt is a new beginning). It would mean arriving at a consensus that represented real co-existence, in which all parties would take part, stand up and assume their responsibilities. Levinas would say that it would always be my responsibility to protect the existence of the Other, our differences and disagreements. It is my responsibility because it is my duty to do him justice. Thus a genuine peace could come about only when everyone understands that co-existence is not tolerance, but acceptance. Recognizing the existence of the other is not just knowing he is there, but understanding and affirming that his place, vision, and point of view are just as true and valuable as my own, even though I cannot understand them. Political agreements and treaties cannot be understood as negotiations for mutual tolerance, but as the establishment of another place. This place must be different from the places where each participant stands. It must be a "middle-ground" that mediates between them, without oppression or exclusion. A utopia, a wish, a meeting place for both. The first thing we have to accept is that it is impossible to depend on idealizations, since they always imply exclusion. With idealizations, what is excluded and destroyed is what we are looking for: a "place" for peace. There can be no place for peace in a world with exclusions. Peace requires that we open ourselves up to the Other. It is an active creation, it is a new way of attending to and understanding experience and reality. Giorgio Agamben2 has found a formula for this kind of thinking – a metaphoric formula. He proposes a type of thinking based on the profane, i.e., on the concrete conditions of human experience. For this author, human life is continuously understood through the profane; it is a sphere free from ideas and concepts, and resists efforts to objectify it. It is to be found in "doing", in work and in the "festivals" (happy or tragic) of everyday life. It is related to all that has no presence and is not present; to what has no objective representation and cannot be indicated by the use of referential language. It refers to what has been obliterated and is hidden or forgotten. Genuine peace can only come about when it is based on the profane, on an understanding, thought and saying that are profane. In the sphere of the profane, man is always ready to surrender to, and fuse with, all that is outside himself. In this context, thinking about the possibility of genuine peace implies thinking anew of what is common to the lives of all men, and what it means. That which is common to all human beings, the possibility of existence in community, is neither an abstraction nor an idealization. Rather, it is the very essence of the human

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condition. And other people are an integral part of that condition. Existence-in-community means being linked to, and interconnected with the world and other people. Thus, genuine peace, instead of being a truce arrived at rationally, must be a concrete experience of acceptance, of stretching forth to what is common to both parties, i.e., to a shared, inbetween place that belongs to neither, a place where people can meet and communicate effectively, a place that belongs to no one in particular, and for that reason, is a place for everyone. If the "common" place is where mediation takes place, if it links and joins, it is pure communication; in other words, it is a way of speaking, a sort of language that initiates genuine contact between people. It eliminates the difference between what is transmitted and the mode of transmission. Thus, thinking based on the profane makes a place for what Agamben calls experimentum linguae3, an experience of experimentation with language, an experience which gives rise to a "new language" and a new saying between people. In this saying, neither party has to use preestablished words, but together they find new words to build bridges between one another and connect. For Agamben, this saying we create with others is radically different from ideologies (thought that uses the logic of ideas). In ideologies, what is said obliterates the saying (the vocalization, the time, the experience). With experimentum linguae Agamben wishes to avoid those aspects of the human sciences (ideas, principles and objects) and human institutions (such as peace) which establish rules and segregations. The experience proposed in the experimentum is different. It is a productive experience of recreating meaning inside the "common" place. What he proposes is not an experience that is complete and final. Instead, he proposes that we must understand experience, inevitably fractured and fragile as it is, to be an "experiment" for existing humanely, a search, an attempt to give a place to what has been obliterated and annulled in our dominant and violent tradition. Experimentum linguae does not solve the problem of withdrawal or exile, but tries to postpone them and keep them in check. It is the possibility of forgiving without forgetting, of beginning anew without erasing the past. This experimentum linguae is work-to-be-done, and is related to what Agamben, following Benjamin, calls infancy (a concrete and experimental form of understanding the beginning). Infancy is related to "impotence", in the sense that a child, since he is not yet competent in language, constructs his world and his relationships at the same time as he creates names for them. Infancy is pure desire for communication, and in it language is only a potentiality, something to come. In infancy, language is not yet a

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structure of domination, it is babble – an assignation of names– where meaning is immediate and occurs in those names which point directly to experience. In infancy, what has never been said can be said. This conceptualization of infancy refers to a condition of experience which precedes language and continues to exist during its appropriation. Thus experimentum linguae and the saying of Levinas both seek for a new kind of subjectivity (of immanence), a shared subjectivity where we connect with others and come out of ourselves in what is "common", between or in the middle. For both of these authors, this immediate expression of significations offers the possibility of liberation, a freedom in which humanity arises from ethics and from politics (polys). Even if it is true that human beings are impotent, their potentiality is precisely this: to bring about justice by making a place for what is absent, what does not yet exist or is not there in the middle ground, in the "common" place which puts us in contact with others and where we can truly find them. Human potentiality is not to be found in knowledge, but in mystery and desire. It is based on absences, questions and uncertainties. It arises as a recognition of what is absent and of our debts. It is an experience in which our actions stem from what affects us and from our feelings, such as affection and acceptance, as happens, for example, in love, where there is a decision to be for the Other. It is a transitive experience: the world affects us, the Other forces us, requires us. The desire present in potentiality is related not so much to what we can conceptualize or recognize, but to what we know but cannot say, to what escapes proper signification. What is not impossible is possible. Potentiality (rooted in im-potence) is the passage from desire to a reality that is always "to come". This realization does not end impotence, or mean that conflicts are fully resolved. Potentiality is the recognition of a permanent debt to what is yet to come.

Not "perpetual peace", but a perpetual search for peace There is no "place" or "time" where potentiality is actuality, or is fully realized. There is nothing there but a "future" which we always have to go towards, a future we have to construct rather than wait for. And that future is not constructed with concepts or ideas, but with discursive functions, utterances, responsible practice and dreams (desires). Agamben observes that the basis of politics, understood as the practice and exercise of power, is exclusion and removal. The logic of power is

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exception and exclusion, and, as he indicates in his analysis of the "state of exception", to point out that something is "other" or outwith the established order is also to affirm its non-existence. He maintains that exception has become the rule in the contemporary world. The "concentration camp" is the "place" we give to everyone and everything that is foreign to us, all that seems different from us, all we cannot control. Thus, western politics creates a new type of life, a life that is null, that is neither life nor death. This type of life, which is not the life of the rest of mortals and yet is not death, this null life is the really terrible condition to which modern politics assigns the other man, the other culture, or the other community. What is excluded does not exist. The logic of exception requires what is excluded to be non-existent, and condemns it to nullity. Therefore, the Palestinian refugee camps, detention centers for illegal immigrants and all such things we have seen in recent decades, can all be seen as occuring in a space where people are stripped of their human rights by a "sovereign power" that proceeds by exclusion. It is a deaf sovereign power with absolute power to decide over life and death, either for understandable reasons, such as security, or for totally unjust reasons, such as conflicts or wars. This situation of exclusion is constantly repeated in the name of the common good (to be understood as an Idea deriving from the order announcing it) and in the name of combating universal evils, such as terrorism. As Agamben says: "For some years, there has been an effort to convince us that we should accept as part of the normal, human dimension of our existence, control practices that had always been considered exceptional and genuinely inhuman (….). States, which should be the places where political life is established, have turned the citizen, and even the human being as such, into the suspect par excellence, to the point of transforming humanity itself into a danger class".4 People who can testify to the limits between life and death and between humanity and inhumanity, are those who are able to indicate the ethics appropriate for times like these, when contemporary politics are the continuation of the Nazi biopolitical experiment. To counter this situation, Agamben maintains that politics can only be restored to its role as active creator of community if a space in the middle is set up, a real "common" ground where, as experimentum linguae, communities can be re-named. Political action must build a "polys" where all others may be encountered. It must not be the practice and exercise of power, but action in an intermediate place, a "between" place that has neither an outside (the excluded) nor an inside (the proper order), but instead, has always the potentiality of being action-with-others.

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Potentiality is the "silent power of the possible". It is an opening-up without exclusion. It is not a representation of the possible, it is a place of "vertigo", of "uncertainty". For peace to be possible, exclusion needs to be eliminated and the existence of the other has to be fully recognized; other men as men, and other cultures as cultures. It requires opening up to plurality, not only as a theoretical principle, but as a concrete, effective way of combating totalization, fanaticism and violence. Logically, the important thing to emphasize about potentiality is that all potentialities were formerly impotence. Therefore, impotence and incapacity are the original bases of potentiality. "To be potential means to be fractured, to relate to one's own incapacity". In effect, peace is a potentiality in the relations between communities, cultures and nations, and it depends on the possibility of permanently creating – and recreating – a shared language, a language which is "common", in-between, a language that can only arise in that place which mediates between-all. Violence, fanaticism, war, and terrorism find support and are based upon the extinction of the word, or upon an extinct word – mine or the other's – that is capable only of naming, thinking and saying what it already possesses. Such a word cannot name that external though intimate place that is between-all. Violence and non-peace erupt in a world of silence, a world where there is a vast difference between the language possessed and the experience being lived. For example, we should always remember that concentration camps and refugee camps are silent places, little Babels where no words can be said or heard, places where there is no communication. The absence of words, and the imposition of names, always leads to violence, because blows are the only language possible in Babel. Peace as a potentiality, peace "to come", is tied to a new word, a word that must be shouted aloud; a word in "common" that finds a place for everyone, and can destroy those silent worlds that not only exclude the other, but exclude all people, exclude thought, and exclude saying.

Notes 1 Agamben, G., Infancy and History: On the Destruction of Experience, (London, Verso, 2007). 2 Agamben, G., Profanations, New York, Zone Books, 2007 and Giorgio Agamben, G., Homo Sacer III: Quel che resta di Auschwitz: L'archivo e il testimone, Bollati Boringhieri, Toronto, 1998. 3 Agamben, G., Infancy and History: On the Destruction of Experience, London, Verso, 2007. 4 Agamben, G., Mezzi senza fine, Bollati Boringhieri, Torino, 1996.

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Bibliography Levinas, Emmanuel, Totality and Infinity, Duquesne University Press, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. 2002, pp. 307 Agamben, Giorgio, Homo Sacer I: Sovereign Power and Bare Life, Standford University Press, Standford, California, 1998, pp. 228 —. Homo Sacer II: State of Exception, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2005, pp. 104 —. Homo Sacer III: Quel che resta di Auschwitz: L'archivo e il testimone, Bollati Boringhieri, Torino, 1998, pp. 178 —. Mezzi senza fine, Bollati Boringhieri, Torino, 1996, pp. 140 Foucault, Michel, Society must be Defended, Lectures at the Collège de France 1975-1976, Picador, New York, 2003, pp. 310

PEACEFUL AGREEMENT: SOME THOUGHTS 1 ABOUT THE PRACTICE OF PEACE LARS LEETEN

How is the notion of peace to be understood if it is supposed to include more than the mere absence of war? In what sense could it include "more"? – Let us first make sure that at least in some sense peace must be more than an absence of war. A famous simile by Thomas Hobbes can show this: Hobbes compares war to weather. Just like the weather can be bad even though it is not raining at the moment, a war can be going on without battles presently taking place. "For as the nature of Foule weather, lyeth not in a showre or two of rain; but in an inclination thereto of many dayes together: So the nature of War, consisteth not in actuall fighting; but in the known disposition thereto, during all the time there is no assurance to the contrary."2 Thus peace must be more than an absence of fighting if only in the sense that nice weather is more than the absence of rain. The question what more, however, is not so easy to answer. Hobbes' comparison leads us to assume that as long as there is an "inclination" or a "disposition" to fight we will not have reached peace. But let us suppose that there is no such inclination and no reason to think of war. There have been no battles recently and there are no signs of a battle to come. Is it justified then to say that we are "living in peace"? Obviously we would still ask for more, namely, for positive signs of peace. We need some reason to trust in peace. What could give us a reason to do so? Usually, our confidence in this matter depends on political structures. We do not have to be Hobbesian positivists to be convinced that there cannot be a stable state of peace in a world of political disorder. More precisely peace has to be secured by positive law. Therefore a first answer to the question "in what sense" peace is more than the absence of war will be this: Peace must be entrenched in a political and legal system. Only then will it be justified to say that peace will last. – However, the notion of "peace" implied here still seems to be minimalistic, if not rudimentary. So far one might think that all it takes to establish peace are persons who leave each other in peace. But what we should be asking is what it takes

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for them to live together in peace. The communitarian critiques of the idea of liberalism remind us of what is in play here.3 The external peace of individual "spheres of freedom" (to use a Kantian term4) falls short of social peace. The former may be a necessary condition of peace; the latter, though, includes more. It is this "more" I want to discuss. Sometimes human beings live together in a certain way forming a peaceful community; they live, as is sometimes said, in "full harmony". But what exactly does this mean? Unless we understand this special kind of togetherness that needs no enforcement by law our notion of peace will remain incomplete.5 Let me put the question in the following way: What characterizes a communal practice of peace as opposed to a mere "state of peace"? I will begin by discussing a too simple answer (1) and then try to pave the way for an alternative approach (2). The central idea will be the idea of a "peaceful agreement" which is introduced (3) and then explained in three steps (4–6). I will conclude with reflections on the relation between the discursive and non-discursive dimensions of normative communication (7).

1 It seems safe to say that we live in full harmony with those who have very much "in common with us" or who are "like us" in many respects. Human beings who are "of the same kind" will live together in a way that goes beyond a mere accordance of interests. We could now be tempted to assume that human beings will live together in peace in a full and rich sense if they share an idea of how they want to live their lives in a more than formal or contractualistic sense. Such a common idea of life or of the "good" will be the basis of a peaceful practice in the sense demanded, as people sharing such an idea will not only leave each other unharmed but will follow the same track. Communitarian writers usually bring in Hegelian or Aristotelian descriptions as this point, and rightly so. I want to use Aristotle's reflections on "friendship" – or philía – in this context.6 The central idea could be that for a positive togetherness it takes accordance in ends and aims that is not just strategic but entrenched in character. A truly peaceful community in this sense would be a community in "second nature".7 It would be built on a sameness of character, or êthos. Friendship is the paradigm of this kind of "ethical" harmony. A friend is not only accidently engaged in the same sort of practice; rather is his personality such that he or she acts in the same way. This is why Aristotle describes a friend as "another self".8

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Friends do not only "cooperate" but "act as one". They are of the same kind and this is why they share a practice. But the concept of peace that comes within reach at this point is not very attractive. At first it may seem somehow convincing to say that the idea of "true peace" agrees with the idea of people living together not only as citizens but as friends. But if we apply the idea of friendship to the general problem of peace we get something that we surely do not want. The problem is this: Friends find each other; friendship, as Aristotle points out, is essentially a matter of choice.9 Members of society – or more general: inhabitants of the world – were never asked if they wanted to live together. So, if it is right that a practice of peace can only take place if people are "of the same kind" then peaceful practice depends on a unified normative idea of life or, more precisely, on a normative idea of who to be. I think most of us will get an uncomfortable feeling here: This description of togetherness obviously ignores that human beings are different in character and that there is a variety of life plans and ethical values. So if it is true that the missing element must be a common idea of who to be, then a practice of peace will not be possible unless persons have adapted to the scheme. They would have to modify their characters in the way demanded and change who they are. – Here we are reminded of classic versions of utopia (that we probably do not want to get back to) or even of religious ideas of spiritual renewal.10 At any rate, we are in a fix. The attempt to explicate the possibility of a practice of peace by reference to a shared idea of life seems to lead into a dead end. Peaceful practice, like friendship, has to remain a matter of choice. Otherwise "true peace" would best be reached by brain wash.

2 So does this mean that we have to abandon the search for an adequate concept of positive togetherness? Is it senseless to ask for more than formally respectful interaction? – Maybe we can try another way. So far I have argued as if we had to capture the idea of a peaceful practice then to be introduced into reality as a sort of "rule". Roughly in this sense the normative idea of life seems to work: It specifies certain norms that determine a practice to be communal. But is it not far more likely that what we are looking for is of quite a different nature? Ultimately we want to specify a general type of practice. There is no reason to think that this must be done by reference to norms prior to practice.11 In order to avoid introducing norms of "who to be" we maybe should try to specify the practice of peace as a practice or, to be more precise, as a practice that goes

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without normative regulation. For the sake of argument, we assumed that the public peace of external "spheres of freedom" is secured – and such a situation can also be characterized as one in which normative discourse has already fulfilled its function. That we have begun to ask "for more", i. e., for a more-than-formal togetherness, indicates exactly that we are not asking for general norms any longer. Rather are we on the level of concrete forms now. The Aristotelian conception of "ethical" habits hints at the fact that practice always implies "more" than can be specified by rules. We might put it like this: Practice in general implies the reality of certain forms of living the logic of which cannot be captured "from above".12 And what we try to spell out is how these life forms can come together on their own level. – Consequently, this is what our task looks like: The practice of peace in the sense demanded cannot be explained by specifying norms that are supposed to govern this practice. Rather have we to explain the possibility of a communal practice that does not have to be established by norms. The togetherness we are asking for is a practical agreement that needs no normative regulation. More generally, this agreement will be one that "shows itself" in the course of action; it does not manifest itself in what persons say. Therefore, one could say that we have to look for a sort of "speechless" or "quiet" togetherness, a togetherness that is "peaceful" in a double sense. In the following I will make an attempt to develop such a conception. It is not, however, my aim to devalue normative discourse or verbal communication. The quiet togetherness I have in mind is rather an additional notion without which the concept of peace remains incomplete. The notion of peace cannot do without an element of non-codified harmony. Let me now introduce this idea.

3 To begin with, I want to argue that in a certain sense togetherness is always presupposed. There are always some basic practices that we share and that do not have to be introduced by rules. Consequently, in some respects at least, we need no normative ideas of "who to be" in order to accord in character as there is always something that we already have in common. Here, I am not alluding to the somewhat desperate hint that "we are all human" but at concrete human practices so deeply entrenched in our lives that we never make them a subject. A remarkable passage in Wittgenstein's Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics can help us clarify:

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Lars Leeten It is of the greatest importance that a dispute hardly ever arises between people about whether the colour of this object is the same as the colour of that; the length of this rod the same as the length of that etc. This peaceful agreement is the characteristic surrounding of the use of the word ‚same'. […] No dispute breaks out over the question whether a proceeding was according to the rule or not. It doesn't come to blows, for example.13

What Wittgenstein describes here, is as trivial as it could be but at the same time utterly amazing if we think about it.14 In all our thinking and acting there are general presupposed practices to be found which we hardly ever spell out. Every single step is based on some general way of conduct, and human beings always share customs in advance. We always share our "life form" in some respects even with the most unknown stranger. It is important, though, that this is a logical point and that Wittgenstein does not appeal to "universals". He only underlines that we cannot imagine what it would be like not to share anything at all. In the first place Wittgenstein is thinking of language. It would be impossible to communicate in, say, English if we could not take a general practice for granted. This includes much more than the application of a system of "rules"; it includes that speakers have made a communal practice a part of their individual understanding and concur in concrete forms of speaking. Without an agreement of this sort, we could not even dispute in English. Similar, if there is no language that we share we have to rely on a more "general way of human acting"15 – and, e. g., communicate by pointing or imitating. Such habits seem to constitute the human life form as such and determine what "we" are in this broad sense. Surely there are sometimes differences even on this level and the strategy fails. But we could not even try to get in touch would we know that the assumption of some sort of community was unjustified. In this case, there could be no communication at all, not even a communication of quarrels. Let me give another example of what is meant by this. Suppose that two teams are having a football match. Suppose further that every player is familiar with the practice of football, i. e., they do not only "know the rules" from a book or from watching TV but they have played this game ever since they were young. Thus to be a football player has become a part of their personality. Now the players of the two teams may be opponents in the ongoing match but there is, of course, a practice that they share. So in this respect they do not only somehow "behave" in the same way but they really are alike, namely, they are all football players. Now suppose that there is an occurrence in the penalty area that is very much disputed between the teams. One of the players had a fall and it is not quite clear if a player of the other team has played foul. In such a case

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we can imagine all sorts of quarrels and disputes but there will be some things that will on no account be subject of this dispute – e. g., they will never dispute the general concept of penalty. Since in this case they would begin to dispute what sort of game they are playing – and as football players they never do this. Otherwise, they would have ceased to be the persons they were. Now what exactly does the idea of peaceful agreement contribute to the problem of peace? – In my opinion the following points are of importance: Firstly humans can be "of the same kind" in some respects without being of the same kind in other respects. Secondly an agreement that is entrenched in "second nature" or êthos is characteristically no subject of dispute or normative discourse. And thirdly general rules will not pave the way for a practice of peace in the sense described; a work on concrete forms is needed. –I now want to comment on these three points.

4 The first point: Human beings can be of the same kind in some respects without being of the same kind in other respects. – We started off with the assumption that unless the practice of peace is entrenched in the life-form and personality of human beings it will not be viable. But soon this thought got us into trouble because it seemed to call for a general normative idea of who to be. We ended up with "enforced friendship", so to speak. However, as soon as we take into account that there is always some common ground that cannot be explicated by reference to rules or conventions things look a little different. We easily tend to interpret communal practice as merely "conventional" (like linguistic practice) or as something that can not at all be different (like perceptions). From this perspective we are inclined to consider all our actions and behaviours, our customs and conduct as something that is happening "outside" and not really part of what we are. But in fact our ways of speaking reflect how we think, our habits reflect how we live; our character becomes manifest in how we act. Our culture is not only some "condition of life" but part of our identity. In other words, the practice I adopt constitutes what I am. – But a practice cannot be some private peculiarity. It is something essentially shared by a community. Thus to be engaged in a practice is to act how "we" act. Accordingly, to share a practice with another person is not just some coincidence. It implies that in a certain respect we – i. e., you und I – really are the same; or, more precisely, it implies that in a certain respect a "we" is presupposed.16

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Of course, this does not imply that "we" (in the sense of "you und I") do not differ at all. This is why we can be of the same kind in certain respects without having to share one special idea of who to be. The agreement does not depend on a given scheme. Rather, we can "act as one" while being the individual persons we are. – So the concept of peaceful agreement principally allows for the bypassing of the abovementioned dilemma: We do not have to make normative claims of "who to be" to establish a practice of peace. Instead, human beings will "act as one" and be "of the same kind" in some respects from the beginning. Only the agreement is taken for granted. Acting as one as if it was the most natural thing in the world is an element of the practice of peace.

5 This leads to the second aspect I want to point out. An agreement entrenched in the êthos of a community is characteristically no subject of discourse, normative or not. This is why expressions like "peaceful" or "quiet" are suitable here. The given basis we assume is not some kind of verbal consensus but an agreement that shows itself. As the background of our doings it is not under consideration on a special occasion. There are no doubts how to proceed – and this is why we usually do not make these customs a subject of our thinking. Very often this leads to the idea that there have to be "implicit rules". Robert Brandom, e. g., suggests that Wittgenstein hints at some "primitive correctness of performance implicit in practice that precede and are presupposed by their explicit formulation in rules and principles".17 What has been said, however, points into a different direction: An agreement so deeply entrenched that it is presupposed cannot depend on rules at all. It has to be entrenched in practice itself. A rule in this sense could only be descriptive, not normative. So the notion of "implicit rules" can be regarded as a failed attempt to capture the phenomenon of peaceful agreement. In actual fact, we have to assume that human beings can act "in the same way" without being governed by norms. They can spontaneously act in the same way or from within. – Of course, if customs inform our whole life we never ever think about them and they are hard to notice. It is even hard to see that these customs are customs at all. But still these customs cannot be explicated by reference to "conventions", at least not in a literal sense. They have to be explained by reference to forms of practice that we cannot go beyond. At the same time, what Wittgenstein calls "peaceful agreement" is something that we are naturally inclined to overlook. We do not find it

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notable to judge an elephant to be bigger than a mouse. It seems strange to say that such a habit is an inherent part of what "we" are as it seems to be no matter of human practice at all. However, if Wittgenstein is right habits of this kind are elements of what "we" are – only that we have to learn to see.

6 Now the interesting question is, of course: How do we proceed from here? How can we, if at all, "advance peace" in this way? – This leads me to the third point: The premise was that general rules alone will not pave the way for a practice of peace in the sense demanded. A work on concrete forms is needed. I think this idea is now accessible. After what has just been said it makes no sense to introduce common features from somewhere outside our life. The first task is to make perceivable the general customs that form the basis of our coexistence. A peaceful agreement, I argued, cannot be defined in terms of concepts meant to instruct a practice but only be understood by specifying practice itself. On actual occasions the task will, of course, be to spell out – or more precisely, to make visible and accessible – what we share. We have just seen how this requires a somewhat unusual perspective as we are concerned with learning to see what we normally tend to overlook. So at this point we have possibly found an approach to broaden the common ground. What we can do is develop our capabilities of perception and train our senses – ideas that have been central to virtue ethics from its Aristotelian beginnings. The element of peace that we were aiming at has not to do with "rule following" but with the building of character.18 This is something that cannot be attained through debating about "what is right" or by deducing normative constraints. We cannot voluntarily introduce an idea of who we are as if we were able to exchange one life for another. We can only invent new forms of community in the course of practice itself. In a nutshell, the advancement of the practice of peace is not a matter of regulation but of training. At this point, of course, aesthetics begins to play an essential role. The work on concrete forms can adequately be imagined as a work on artistic forms. If the "training" that I mentioned is predominantly a training of perception – of learning to see things in a new light – then art is surely the most important paradigm. But here the term "aesthetics" has to be understood in a wide sense that refers to human perception in general (as the Greek term "aisthêsis" does) and, if you like, to the non-discursive elements of our thinking. Aristotle's assertion that "the judgment is in

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perception"19 reminds us of exactly this. If, as I tried to bring out, the "ethical" aspect of interaction cannot be captured by explicit codes or rules of behaviour then thinking about perception becomes indispensable. What is asked for, as matters stand, is a reflected and responsible sort of perception.

7 At this point I want to come to and end. My aim was to show that we do not understand what peaceful togetherness implies if we just keep specifying concepts that are taken to be norms and implicitly meant to instruct all practice. Wherever we demand "more" than physical security and morally correct behaviour we are already on a different field, where we have to experiment with special forms of life, practice our ways of seeing and train senses and perception. What we asked for cannot be found in theory but has to be developed in the course of social interaction itself. To philosophers the interesting question arising now will be how nondiscursive practice relates to normative discourse. What role does the work on concrete forms really play, e. g., in moral argumentation? How can finding a consensus be conceived in the light of what has been said? Here, I am leaving this question almost untouched. But one might guess that, at this point, we are led to the aesthetic dimension of language or to the aspect of rhetoric – a dimension that has been excluded from philosophy ever since Plato condemned the sophists. But bringing up this issue does not consequently result in an abandonment of the idea of communicative – or "dialogical" – agreement. That human beings do not only have to be told but also have to be shown what a practice of peace might look like does not imply that we should stop talking. The conclusion could rather be: If the mere formulation of norms or rules is not as sufficient as we thought, we have to intensify our efforts and keep both dimensions in mind. The gap between words and actions cannot be bridged by logical concepts alone. Thus, if we want to put peace into practice we cannot rely on logical concepts alone.20 The practice of peace needs to have an eye for the "peaceful agreement" that is always presupposed beforehand.

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Notes 1

I am indepted to Stephanie Krah for sprucing up my English. Hobbes, Leviathan, 62. 3 Cf. e. g. Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice. 4 Kant develops this concept in the first part of his Metaphysics of Morals. Cf. Kant, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, 229–32. 5 In fact, we might assume that without a social peace-practice no political peace could survive in the long run – just as there is good reason to say that liberalism cannot be viable without any communal "practice of liberalism". This subject is central in the liberalism-communitarism-debate: Cf. Taylor, "Legitimation Crisis?" or Walzer, "The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism". 6 Cf. Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, VIII and IX. 7 This term has become wide-spread since McDowell's interpretation of Aristotle. Cf. McDowell, "Two Sorts of Naturalism". Of course, the term has been used before, e. g. in Ryle, The Concept of Mind, II, 6. 8 Cf. Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, IX, 4, especially 1166a. 9 Cf. Ibid., XIII, 7 and IX, 3 10 Cf. Sternberger, "Über die verschiedenen Begriffe des Friedens", 13ff. 11 Indeed, this view of "rule following", if strictly interpreted, implies a fundamental mistake. Cf. Ryle, The Concept of Mind, II, 6 or Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §§ 201ff. 12 In this respect, Wittgenstein's term "life form" has been much discussed lately. Cf. Thompson, "The Representation of Life". Unfortunately, I cannot enter into this debate here. 13 Wittgenstein, Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, VI, 21. 14 Stanley Cavell emphasizes this point in: Cavell, The Claim of Reason. 15 Cf. Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, § 206. 16 This generic "we" cannot be translated as "you und I". Cf. Cavell, "Must we mean what we say?". 17 Brandom, Making It Explicit, 22. 18 Rule following is necessarily grounded on acquired skills. Therefore, the Aristotelian term "habitus" plays an important role in the rule following debate. Cf. Bourdieu, "Le Sens pratique" and Taylor "To Follow a Rule". 19 Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, 1109b 24: "en tê aisthêsei hê krísis". 20 In the terminology of classic rhetoric one might say: Reflection has to account for the dimensions of êthos and páthos as well. 2

Bibliography Aristotle, The Nicomachian Ethics. With an English translation by H. Rackham, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, Mass./London, 1990. Bourdieu, Pierre, Le Sens pratique, Édition de Minuit, Paris, 1980.

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Brandom, Robert, Making It Explicit. Reasoning, Representing, and Discursive Commitment, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994. Cavell, Stanley, "Must we mean what we say?", in: Must We Mean What We Say? A Book of Essays, 1–43., Mass, Cambridge, 2000. —. The Claim of Reason. Wittgenstein, Skepticism, Morality, and Tragedy, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1979. Hobbes, Thomas, Leviathan, or the Matter, Forme, & Power of a Common-Wealth, ecclesiasticall and civill, Andrew Crooke, London, 1651. Kant, Immanuel, Die Metaphysik der Sitten, Kant's Gesammelte Schriften Vol. VI., Georg Reimer, subsequently Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, 1900–. McDowell, John, "Two Sorts of Naturalism", in: Virtues and Reasons. Philippa Foot and Moral Theory, edited by R. Hursthouse, G. Lawrence and W. Quinn, 149–79, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996. Ryle, Gilbert, The Concept of Mind, With an introduction by Daniel C. Dennett, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 2002. Sandel, Michael, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice: Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1982. Sternberger, Dolf, "Über die verschiedenen Begriffe des Friedens", in: Die Politik und der Friede, 8–68, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 1986. Taylor, Charles, "Legitimation crisis?", in: Philosophy and the Human Sciences (Philosophical Papers 2), 248–88: Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1985. —. "To Follow a Rule", in: Philosophical Arguments, 165–180, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, Mass./London, 1995. Thompson, Michael, "The Representation of Life", in Virtues and Reasons. Philippa Foot and Moral Theory, edited by R. Hursthouse, G. Lawrence and W. Quinn, 247–96, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996. Walzer, Michael, "The Communitarian Critique of Liberalism", in: Political Theory 3, 1990, 339–60. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophical Investigations, Edited by G.E.M. Anscombe and R. Rhees, translated by G.E.M. Anscombe, 2nd Edition, Blackwell, Oxford, 1958. —. Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics, Edited by G. H. von Wright, R. Rhees, G.E.M. Anscombe, translated by G.E.M. Anscombe, revised edition, Blackwell, Cambridge, Mass., 1978.

WHY NOBODY WANTS TO LIVE IN UTOPIA ARTHUR KOK

Introduction Utopia is a place in which perfect harmony exists. This perfect harmony is partly constituted by the fact that everyone has everything he or she desires. In other words, all of our needs are being taken care of. In this respect, the following text is nothing more than a casual remark on the notso-utopian origin of Utopia. Without much concern for why some people like to think about Utopia, I limit myself to exposing why Utopia cannot possibly be a desirable place in which to live. Without understanding these not-so-utopian origins of utopian thinking, no interesting things can be said about Utopia. Therefore, an article about Utopia should not be about what Utopia should be like, but about its possibility or impossibility. Considering this, it becomes clear in the first place that this article has to be about desire; about what it means to have a desire, what it means to satisfy it, and about the unavoidable human drama that comes with satisfaction.

Pasolini's Teorema In his movie Teorema, the Italian filmmaker Paolo Pasolini confronts a family, apparently bourgeois, with the visit of a beautiful male stranger. The visitor, who appears to be of a divine and otherworldly origin, engages in a sexual relationship with each family member, including the older housemaid. Pretty directly, with neither much need for intrigue or seduction, nor discrimination in age or gender, the visitor spellbinds all family members, including a father, a mother, a daughter and a son. He resides with the family only for a short period of time and then, quite suddenly, goes away, leaving the family members behind with a craving for the sexual intimacy they once shared with the beautiful visitor. In his film, Pasolini not only focuses on the true experience of heavenly intimacy, but also, especially, on its inevitable temporality and the

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tendency to avoid the experience of desolate emptiness that naturally comes after an intense, but momentary enactment of shared togetherness. In Teorema, Pasolini expresses a dim view of how most people deal with the experience of the loss of intimacy. The family members do not simply return to their normal lives but instead dedicate their entire being to hunting for traces of this apparently onceinalifetime experience in order to retrieve some of that original feeling. However, all of them, except maybe the father (so Pasolini speculates in an interview), fail to do so. The father runs naked into the desert after undressing in a train station at the end of the film: an image that has a strong biblical connotation.1 The father does not succeed, but still has some hope for redemption because he chooses to leave his material possessions behind, Pasolini clarifies, thus making an interesting link between the religious virtue of poverty and Marx' denunciation of the right of possession. The daughter's attempt ends in disaster. She becomes so obsessed with keeping the experience captured within her body that she, after losing her communicative skills, starts to fixate on her body and becomes catatonic. The son begins to make senseless art, helpless in finding appropriate images that could give an expression to the original shared togetherness. The mother becomes a nymphomaniac, searching the streets for young boys with an appearance similar to that of the beautiful stranger. However, when Teorema focuses on the whereabouts of the housemaid, Pasolini's tone changes. The sexual engagement with the beautiful visitor also has a disruptive influence on the timid housemaid. Being equally incapable of returning to her usual, divinely unbiased life, she seeks existential refuge in a small village, which just might be the one she originally came from. In the village, an old woman recognises that the housemaid is in an unusual state of being, and soon the housemaid has the attention of the village's inhabitants. She starts floating above a house. Later, towards the end of the movie, the old woman buries the housemaid in the earth. The image of the burial is ambiguous. On the one hand, it could symbolise the burial of a tradition. On the other, however, it could be that the burial of the housemaid fertilises the earth, enabling new growth to take place. Although Pasolini has an explicit preference for the story of the housemaid, he ends the movie with the father running naked into the desert, disrupting the one bearable response to the disturbing encounter with the beautiful visitor. In choosing a picture of desolation, Pasolini gives Teorema two endings, which do not seem equally satisfactory. The two consolable options Pasolini presents, the way of the housemaid and, though less satisfactory, that of the father, are not original. They are

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commonly known as, respectively, traditional religiosity and as a form of mysticism, in this case one that involves renouncing all earthly possession. Teorema's creative achievement is that it seems to successfully connect these classical elements of religious thought with a critique of modernity, which wants to point out that a modern lifestyle inevitably brings about certain spiritual problems. Strongly embedded in its time, the film situates this problem in the ongoing transformation from a traditional society to a modern one, as it starts to manifest itself (especially in the sixties and seventies of the last century), namely as an involuntary confrontation of the rural countryside with modern urban lifestyle, which is a sign of the advancement of a globalising world. If we try to read Teorema as a cinematic critique of modernity, Pasolini's message could be that the modern and, say, urban family life has a problem dealing with certain religious experience that is closely related to sexuality. From this perspective, one could say that the film consists of three elements. Firstly, there is a sexual arousal, apparently evoked by something or someone divine. This is, so to say, the driving force of the narrative. The arrival of the beautiful stranger is a divine intervention that crosses the path of profanity, the natural course of things, and brings it into disturbance. In a sense, using a little depth psychology, Teorema begins like a classic fairytale: a normal life is disturbed, and the main characters lose the certainty of who they are, and consequently, face a task (for example: fulfilling some daring challenge), whose fulfilment brings them to a higher level of consciousness and self-understanding. Secondly, the setting in which the divine intervention occurs has to be taken into account. The family that was not capable of dealing with the religious experience is made exemplary for the response of modern individual society to such occurrences. Rather than re-experiencing it in a community, they all start trying to trace down divinity as individuals. It is remarkable to see how in Teorema the family falls apart immediately after the divine intervention has taken place, as if no bond between the family members has ever existed. There is no point in the film where the family members come together, or seek refuge in any kind of community. Notice that this does not necessarily indicate a problem typical for modernity, and that, considering the nature of the problem, it is possible that the isolation of the characters stems imminently from the force that intervenes in the path of profanity they walk. Even the isolation of the housemaid is only partially elevated because the community is receptive to her state of being; not because the housemaid willfully allows the community to abrogate her isolation. A community can offer redemption because it is capable of the

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recognition that a single person stands oblivious in the face of a particular religious sexual experience. Then, thirdly, the solutions Pasolini offers us are, namely, the rural tradition and the way of poverty, whereas with regard to the latter, it should be noted that the virtue of poverty is not about poverty as an end in itself but about its contribution to self-denunciation. Though Teorema remains an ambiguous movie in many respects, Pasolini expresses a strong preference for the rural tradition. In contrast to the family members, the housemaid still finds a ground to stand on, and literally, lie in, and she is still part of a collective that recognises her. In an interview, Pasolini addresses this sort of collective as the 'peasant religion', admittedly negotiating between its easily romanticised attractiveness and his awareness that he is actually not living the 'peasant life'.2 Pasolini finds no consensus or reconciliation to end this negotiation, a dichotomy that deeply characterises Teorema. The movie breathes distance.

The critical message of Teorema Pasolini uses a classical picture of a family, but suggests that he is not at all interested in the psychological particulars of this household. Rather, it seems to be the case that an archetypical narrative is constructed, which does not want to tell us about our joys and distresses as a particular unique individual, but about the deepest stirrings of the soul. That means that the psychology of the characters cannot be analysed as behaviour that originates from individual motivation, but that in Teorema, Pasolini wants to dramatise a desire that resides directly in the human soul. At the same time, the way in which he deals with the family as a concept has a critical sub layer. Of course, relations between father and son, father and daughter, mother and son, etc. are archetypical structures. However, depicting the family as father – mother – son – daughter also depicts the familiar cultural ideal of a good family life. It is the ideal of the family in which men, women and children have fixed and predetermined places. Whereas modern life is the first to seriously contest this ideal of family life, also the bourgeois ideal of family life seems to be a modern response. This might be the reason why Pasolini, therefore, situates the modern lifestyle in a bourgeois family. However, insofar as Pasolini wants to criticise the ideal of the bourgeois family, he does not in any way address role patterns. His preoccupation with the family has to be another one. In fact, the family members don't fulfil any role pattern at all. If it were not for the fact that they were living in the same house and dining at the same table, we have

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no reason to believe that they are family. It is as if, in the film, the family members have no relation to one another. As I mentioned before, distance seems to be a catchword for Teorema. Rather than living their lives as family members, they are depicted as a group of people, randomly put together, all following a strictly individual path. Maybe it is Pasolini's aim to expose that the harmonious ideal of the bourgeois family is nothing more than an empty fiction, one which holds a lingering individualism that undermines any substantial form of community. A systematic philosophical elaboration of the family, and how it is to be situated within modern society, can be found in Hegel's Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts.3 In this book, Hegel conceptualises the institutions which are necessary for a modern society. Institutions are, in the broadest sense of the word, human-made places that have a communal function. Traditionally, they are divided into public and private institutions. Dating back as far as Aristotle, private institutions are ones that have no direct political function, such as family and the economy of the family, whereas public institutions are the places were people come together to do politics. This is, however, a problematic distinction because, in a modern society, the sphere of economy has attained a relative independence from both private and public institutions. Hegel connects this development of economics into a relatively independent institution with the rise of individualism, or subjective freedom as he calls it, in the Enlightenment. The individual subject is neither private nor public, but in the words of the liberal philosopher, Adam Smith, satisfies his private needs in a public sphere.4 Therefore, Hegel comes to another differentiation of the fundamental institutions of modern society: the family, the civil society, and the state. Teorema only focuses on the first two institutions; therefore, we will do the same. Hegel's idea of the family bears resemblance to the Aristotelian idea of the private sphere, but adds that in modern society the family as an institution becomes the most important safe-keeper of traditional values. In modern society, tradition is no longer the way in which humans should live their lives. To make room for individual freedom, tradition has to be broken. In the civil society, tradition is reduced to an economic factor, one amongst many, freeing the subject from its boundaries which tradition has imposed on him. The restraints of tradition are not necessarily suppressive. Living out one's individual freedom means to care about one's personal wellbeing in the first place, which is essentially an egoistic position. Individual preferences cannot be developed within the institution of the family because the common end of the family does not allow for egoistic behaviour. In the light of ethics, egoism usually bears a negative

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connotation, but in the light of self-conscious existence it is rather healthy to care for one's personal wellbeing. However, it is precisely this unethical stance of egoism that makes the development of individual freedom irreconcilable with the ethically responsible attitude of taking part in a traditional community life. Therefore, in the words of Hegel, the civil society is characterised by a Verlust der Sittlichkeit, a loss of morals. These morals are nothing more than the morals that have been inherited by growing up in a community or particular tradition. They are not lost in the sense that they cease to motivate us, but in the civil society, these traditional morals are no longer considered to be an evident decisive ground for what is to be done. A subject in the civil society is cut loose from his traditional background, and is bound to have egoistic motives for everything he does. Even if he decides to become a person of principles, be a vegetarian, help the needy, etc., he remains a member of civil society; therefore, even his most elevated virtuous principles are nothing more than subjective preferences. These subjective preferences are necessarily not subjected to moral principles, but to economic principles which unconditionally put the selfcentred preference in the first place. Please let us keep moral principles and those of self-centred preference strictly separated. As philosophers, we do not want to look like politicians, because principles cannot be negotiated. In this sense, the civil society is what we nowadays describe as the free market. Also, in the free market it is the strict laws of economics that count in the end. That means that all things, even the most wellfounded claims about what is just, appear as mere subjectivism, and count only insofar as they survive on the market. Even consensus and majority rule are means of the free market, subjected not to tradition or morality, but to economic laws under the principle of self-centred subjective orientation. In civil society, justification can only be constituted along the lines of convincing selfcentred subjects. That inevitably has the consequence that ideas or convictions that do not meet these free market criteria do not fit in civil society, and will be excluded from it. This exclusion is not some act of vile politicians, it is not hidden indoctrination or a conspiracy of ideologists: It is a simple logic that everything that does not meet the criteria of civil society cannot be part of civil society. The harshness of the free market consists of the fact that everyone can have his subjective preferences, but that these preferences have to survive in a sphere that might not be the subjectively desired one. So, there is a point where the free market or civil society starts to work against our subjective preferences, namely when subjective preferences do

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not meet the economical criteria and, consequently, cannot survive in the free market space. It seems as if Pasolini has found one of those subjective preferences to which the civil society stands oblivious, namely a religious sexual experience. Apparently, this experience cannot find its place in an individualised civil society because free market as a totality of economic laws does not seem to be receptive to this experience. Consequently, the experience cannot be communicated in this individualised domain. On the other hand, tradition seems to be responsive to this religious experience and communication can take place, hence the acknowledgment of the housemaid. Thus, the odd thing about Teorema is that Pasolini situates this civil society of self-centred subjects within the bourgeois family, whereas it seems more likely to regard the family as the safe-keeper of tradition. Maybe it is not Pasolini's aim to criticise the individualised society in the sense of a free market as such, but rather, the influence that the free market has on other domains of society. We have seen that in Hegel, civil society is only a part of modern society, and that especially the family has to be distinguished from this. It is possible that Pasolini did not recognise that family and civil society are coexisting institutions. This is very well possible, because Pasolini was influenced by Marxist theory, which maintains that there is a linear historical development from the institution of the family, or traditional community, to a civil society with free market. Consequently, the family within modern individual society becomes a family subjected to the laws of individualism rather than tradition. Marx' tendency to analyse institutions merely genealogically as the result of a linear historical development is the flaw of his methodology of materialistic dialectics, which over-exaggerates the constitutive role of material conditions of institutions and, therefore, has a conceptual blind spot for the factual co-existence of different fundamental institutions that constitute one and the same society. Nevertheless, although Marx might have led Pasolini astray in his theorising, the idea that one institution can invade the other, and that, for example, the civil society can undermine the family, is not at all farfetched. However, to understand what such an invasion could mean, it is necessary to understand more about the family as an institution of modern society. When Hegel discusses the family as one of the three institutions of modern society, he begins by saying that the family is constituted through marriage, and that marriage is constituted by the equally shared decision of two persons to unite themselves in love and matrimony and start a family. Precisely because the decision constitutes the institution of a family, its inner substance is determined by the nature of this decision. A decision

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can never be random, according to Hegel, but is the free self-conscious act of an autonomous being. Therefore, two people's decision to marry should not be based on affectionate feelings, which are passionate but temporal. Also, it is unthinkable that anyone else could make the decision for them. Since their love can only be acknowledged as self-conscious love if it is based on free will, a decision to marry has to be the one in which two persons express free and unconditional love for one another. Solely two individuals who subject themselves to such an unconditional commitment can create the foundation of the family as an institution. Following logic, the inner substance of the family thus indubitably has to be unconditional love. In this respect, Hegel holds the view that bearing children in marriage is not, in the first place, biological reproduction, but is the objectification of the unconditional love between the partners. This unconditional love expresses itself in the single family members in the sense that they have to give up their individual preferences, and have to live their lives entirely in the face of one single end: the survival and wealth of the family. Love, as the inner substance of the family, is not only its secure and firm fundament, it is, for example, also the unconditional demand of a child that his parents cannot care about themselves without caring about the child at the same time. The love within the family is intrinsically hostile towards any sign of individualism because this undermines the family's unity. Nevertheless, there are two ways in which the civil society, or individualism, challenges the inner substance of unconditional love of the family. The first, which Hegel notices, too, is the necessity that a child has to be brought up to become an individual. Hegel shows that, in the end, the upbringing of a child dissolves the family, enabling the grownup child to start a new family, thus securing the continuity of human life on a basic level. This is a necessary, and therefore also a normal, step in the selfconscious development of a human being. There is, however, a second way which Hegel does not conceptualise, in which the civil society can undermine the unity of the family, and this influence does not contribute to a normal development such as upbringing does. Whereas upbringing is part of the intrinsic purpose of a family, it is also possible that family members start to follow individual paths which have no clear value for the development of a child's individual self-consciousness. In such cases, the family does not dissolve to make new families possible, but the individual desires of the family members replace their substantially shared purpose, resulting in a sudden loss of the inner substance of unconditional love. It seems to be the case that in Teorema, the family lacks the inner substance of unconditional love for one another, which becomes visible in

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the complete absence of any shared togetherness of the family members. Could it be that Pasolini wants to tell that the absence of the inner substance of love in the family is the consequence of a modern, free market, individualised society? If that were the case, Teorema is indeed a critique of modern society. Then the modern family, as Pasolini depicts it, is in such a way under the influence of subjective individual freedom, and its members have been alienated from the original substance that constitutes their cohesion. Consequently, the family members are only capable of finding individual solutions, and are lost in the face of a religious sexual experience which, in itself, does not allow a strictly individual solution. The fact that the central happening in the film is a religious sexual experience seems to support this reading. The religious sexual experience the family members have with the beautiful visitor can be described as an experience of love. In a way, the family members 'fall in love' with the visitor. Even so, if we interpret their encounter with the visitor as falling in love, it is also the only love they experience. Between the members there is no love, no inner substance that holds them together. However, if Pasolini wanted to criticise modern individual society in showing its devastating effect on family life, then why did he not create a narrative that showed the gradual undermining of the initial inner substance of a united family life? Quite the opposite, there is not a single moment where we have the impression that there has been any inner cohesion between the family members. If we consider the absence of substantial love to be a subject in Teorema, then it is only an omnipresent layer that stretches out over the entire length of the movie, from the beginning until the end. Therefore, if Pasolini wants to expound the problems of modern society's individualistic handling with experiences that cannot be dealt with on a purely individual basis, it seems that he wants to do this on an even deeper level. Not the influence of individualism on the inner substance of love, but the problem of the very constitution of this substance has Pasolini's full attention. The religious sexual experience, which seems to be an experience of falling in love if we follow Hegel's analysis of the family, lies on the basis of a substantial love. Pasolini is not able to show any substantial love in Teorema, not because an existing substantial love is undermined, but because its very constitution is undermined.

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Love and desire Let us consider Plato's ıȣȝʌóıȚȠȞ or Symposium.5 In the book Symposium, a symposium (which originally was a drinking party), is organised to celebrate the first public success of the young and talented Agathon, for whom Socrates barely hides his affectionate feelings. The party is being dedicated to Eros, a mythical figure that represents love. Several wellknown public figures from Plato's Greece give lectures on Eros, praising his beauty and his love for beauty in an attempt to impress others with their rhetorical skills. Socrates is the last speaker, in advance considered to be the best one even though he politely counters every compliment, and theatrically hesitates to give a last appraisal of Eros. Although eloquently masked behind high appraisal for the previous speakers, Socrates' hesitation to give a speech is not that he genuinely fears he cannot honour Eros just as well as the others can. He wants to break the game of rhetorical bidding and the masculine display of wellphrased and clever analyses, because they do not seem to get to the core of the question at stake: What honour has to be paid to Eros? In dialogue with Agathon, Socrates points out that to be able to honour someone, you have to know who he is. Explicitly criticising the other speakers, who apparently had no idea what they were actually talking about, he asks Agathon whether it is possible that Eros is beautiful and at the same time desires beauty. Taking the dialogue to a conceptual level, interrogating the conceptual content of 'to strive for beauty', Socrates argues that if Eros is indeed beautiful, he cannot really aspire to beauty. His possession of beauty nullifies his aspiration to have it. Therefore, since Eros essentially has an aspiration to beauty, he is not beautiful. On the other hand, neither can Eros be the mere opposite of beauty, i.e., ugliness. Then how can someone who is ugly aspire to beauty? It is impossible to equate the desire for beauty with ugliness. Also, it seems strange, certainly for a Greek, to honour someone who is ugly. Explaining this paradox, Socrates remembers a myth about the birth of Eros that he heard from Diotima, a high priestess Socrates once visited as a young man. The myth reveals that Eros, who has the aspiration to beauty, is always poor and filthy. Yet he is born on Aphrodite's birthday, making him a natural lover of the beautiful. He has a restless character with an appetite for intrigue, is rough and enterprising, with no consideration for what is fair and just. His existence is in between mortality and immortality, alive and flourishing at one moment and dead at another.6

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The myth of the birth of Eros reveals that the nature of Eros is always 'in between' two opposites, not in the sense that he is indecisive, but in the sense that he is never what he wants to be. As Socrates has explained earlier, namely that the aspiration to beauty is not itself beautiful, but nonetheless intrinsically directed towards it, he now reveals that Eros, in his very nature, is in between beauty and the aspiration to beauty. It is the mythological articulation of what can conceptually be described as the relational structure of intentionality. He relates to beauty precisely as aspiration, which means that Eros is a desire. In a way, one could say that Eros presents to us the paradox of desire: he 'is' that he 'is not what he wants to be'. This paradox does not stand on itself, but is a conceptual articulation of every desire in the sense that all desires are essentially intentional. Therefore, in Symposium, Plato forcefully turns against the idea that it would make sense to speak about good and bad desires as a fundamental distinction. A more fundamental analysis is possible and, therefore, philosophically more desirable. It is the intentional nature of desire itself that has to be brought to our attention. Referring back to the introduction, we now see that in order to understand more about the visions of Utopia, we need to understand the intentional structure of desire. Whereas Utopia is the land where all of our desires will be fulfilled, it makes sense to wonder what it means to have desires. Regarding the paradoxical nature of desire, namely not to be what you want to be, it becomes highly questionable whether Utopia is capable of satisfying desires, even in principle.

The drama of love If we take this paradox of desire seriously, is it at all possible that desire can be satisfied? Since desire will always be measured according to the paradox of not being what it wants to be, the possession of a thing will necessarily devaluate its worthiness. If we consider that satisfaction means possession, satisfying a desire will inevitably make the object of desire no longer desirable. Therefore, a desire has to consist of desiring mostly that which it can never possess. Things of which we can be sure we will never possess, are things that by nature cannot be possessed. Consequently, those will be the most desirable objects for us to desire. That means that either we can never be satisfied, or that satisfaction is in the end, by definition, not the possession of something. Let us now return to the family's inner substance of love. Following the logic of the paradox of desire, desire will, without a doubt, spring to life most vividly as soon as we are confronted with something which we are

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sure cannot be possessed, regardless of the fact whether this desire can be satisfied. In this sense, the ungraspable beautiful visitor from Teorema seems to be a perfect object of desire. Also, it seems to be that this desire conditions the very constitution of the family's inner substance of love. Finally, it seems to be the case that the civil society is not able to satisfy what people desire most because, economically speaking, satisfaction means to possess something. Either this means that subjective preferences are not the same as desires, or it means that the free market is, in the end, not meant to satisfy subjective preferences, but has another purpose. Hegel would indeed argue that the highest end of the free market is not consumerism, or the simple satisfaction of subjective preferences. The free market space enables its participants to become self-conscious about their subjective preferences, rather than to satisfy them. In the light of the paradox of desire, it now becomes clear that it is not the satisfaction but the occurrence of a never-ending desire that is essential for civil society, which makes taking part in the free market a learning experience.7 Therefore, an individual following his subjective preferences is at some point, in a way, bound to experience that what he wants is the most unattainable in the sense of a consumable product. And this is precisely what happens in Teorema. The family members become aware of a desire within them, awoken by a religious sexual experience, and necessarily have to transgress the merely economical logic of civil society. They enter a sphere in which the logic of possession has no control. Desire urges us to enter this sphere because it always wants what it cannot possess, and we can become conscious of this urge insofar as we are confronted with an object of desire which essentially cannot be possessed. Here, the configuration of the subjective preferences changes. Whereas an individual in civil society is a subject who needs to satisfy his subjective preferences by trying to possess or consume something, he now experiences that satisfaction can be neither possession nor consumption. In terms of economic maximization, the best an individual can do is try to be in the presence of his ungraspable object of desire. Against the craving and desire of the individual, let us think about the nature of an object that cannot be possessed. In Teorema this object is a beautiful young man, whose absence in the rest of film drives everybody insane. The sexual experience with this young man has been called religious, because it did not merely satisfy feelings of lust, but also awoke a much stronger feeling which I earlier described as 'falling in love'. This 'falling in love', in the sense of the religious sexual experience as Pasolini pictures it, is also a condition for the constitution of the inner substance of love which, Hegel points out, underlies the institution of the family.

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Whereas the film is characterised by the absence of such inner substance, it becomes ever more clear that the real focus of Pasolini is a problem in between 'falling in love' and the constitution of the inner substance of love. The family bond is constituted if two persons express unconditional love for one another in marriage. The constitution of the bond in marriage has to be a free decision. It is precisely this freedom to decide that connects falling in love and the constitution of the inner substance of love. Obviously, this means that it is not enough to fall in love with someone; the other person has to love you in return. To love someone is not a free decision in the sense that one can freely choose whom to fall in love with. The freedom of love lies in the possibility of every human being to be in a relationship, which is not the determinate achievement of a single person, but originates from an equally shared desire. For example, if you want to invite a friend to go to the movies, there is no way that you are going to figure out on your own whether or not your friend wants to come with you. To satisfy this subjective preference, you will have to ask your friend whether he wants to go to the movies with you. You can deduce the possible answers (yes, no, maybe), but you can never deduce which answer he is going to give you. This means that in the case of a desire to spend some time with a friend, you necessarily have to make yourself radically dependent from this friend. Not you, but your friend is going to decide whether or not your desire is going to be satisfied. Of course, you can try to convince or manipulate your friend. However, the one thing you cannot do is to decide for him. In other words, the question you put to your friend asks for decision, which is not transferable. Therefore, if you ask a friend whether he wants something, you address him as an autonomous being, precisely because by asking, you put him in charge of the decision. If we take this to a more fundamental level, say, wanting to be in a friendship in the first place, the autonomous decision of the other is not merely decisive for a nice evening out, but also for the constitution of the relationship itself. In the case of the constitution of the inner substance of love, the decision that is demanded from the other person is on this fundamental level. The constitution of the inner substance depends on it entirely. In this sense, the freedom of the other person becomes a condition for the satisfaction of your desire, even to the extent that you could not wish it any other way. Since we desire mostly that which we cannot possess, desire climaxes when confronted with another human being. Thus, we experience that our desire is inseparably connected with the choice of other persons, which now becomes the sole possible satisfaction for desire.

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This unavoidable moment of radical dependency from an uncontrollable factor to satisfy one's deepest desire, builds a second paradox. Namely, if you ask someone to respond to your 'falling in love', your desire is that the other person returns the love. On the other hand, without the other person's possibility to refuse, the possibility to return the love would not mean anything. Insofar as the desire is only satisfied when the love is returned, and returning the love is only possible when it is also possible that the love is not returned, therefore, it is possible that the desire is not satisfied, and that the inner substance of love is not constituted. This we call 'unrequited love', which forces the desire to remain in between falling in love and the inner substance of love, or 'in between' wanting but not getting a relationship with another person.

Conclusion It seems that the setting of Pasolini's Teorema is precisely this being 'in between'. There is 'falling in love' but no inner substance of love, no actual relationship. As I said, Teorema breathes emptiness and distance. In a sense, Pasolini's Teorema is not post-dramatic; it might just as well be predramatic. It contains an invitation for drama, an invitation for a relationship, which is not accepted. The characters want nothing else than to enter a relationship with the beautiful visitor, but the visitor does not allow them to. He remains a stranger throughout the film because, although he is the only one who is invited to enter a relationship, which would lend itself for drama, he rejects that invitation, making 'absence' the key feature of the movie. Notwithstanding the religious and philosophical connotations that enrich the film and produce most of its narrative, the infinite distance between the appearing characters can only be constituted by the refusal of an autonomous being to enter the drama. The beautiful visitor simply vanishes and is to remain a stranger forever. Pasolini recreates this experience of refusal as a religious event, which a true encounter with another human being indeed is, in a setting of the transgression from traditional to modern life. In a way, this is irrelevant to the initial problem: the absence of someone we desire. Pasolini's brilliance lies in the astonishing consistence with which he depicts the irretraceable possibility of the impossibility of a relationship. The drama of the absence of love has seldom been presented in such an impressive manner, pointing out its ultimate consequence to us. In the end, the real object of Teorema does not seem to be a cinematic critique of modernity's inadequacy to deal with a certain religious sexual experience. Rather, the film shows a problem that belongs to the human condition itself, namely that of unrequited love.

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The fact that the film is ultimately about unrequited love, however, does not mean that we should underestimate its critical message. Indeed, I believe that modern society has a serious problem with reflecting on the nature and necessity of love in relationships, mainly in the sense that many theories neglect the paradox of desire, as already pointed out by Plato. This results in a misjudgement of possible satisfactions of desire, which can have a negative influence on decision-making that requires theoretical understanding, like politics. Nowadays, many theoreticians have been led astray, believing that desires are, in the end, only economical factors. Also, it is precisely the mistake that defenders of Utopia make. The fact that desire is never satisfied in consumption and possession, but only in love for other human beings, undermines the very ideological basis of all utopian thinking. The foundation of a love relationship is freedom, which is not calculable. There is no way that any theoretician, no matter how smart, is going to come up with a Utopia in which everyone will certainly be satisfied. Oppositely, if he is really smart, he will give up this senseless activity, and respect the uncontrollable depths of human autonomy and authenticity.

Notes 1

'Places in the Bible' has to be replaced for the following text: Cf. Exodus 13:18 "So God led the people around by the desert road toward the Red Sea." To go into dessert symbolizes, mostly, a (temporal) retreat from worldly affairs. 2 I refer to Guy Flatley's interview with Pasolini in the New York Times in 1969. (http://www.moviecrazed.com/outpast/pasolini.html) 3 Hegel, G.W.F., Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, Frankfurt a.M., 1986. English translation: Hegel, G.W.F., A. Wood (ed.), Elements of the Philosophy of Right, Cambridge, 1991. 4 Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of Nations, London 1776 (New York/Toronto 2000). 5 Platon, O. Apelt (transl.), Sämtliche Dialoge, Bd 3, Leipzig, 1922. I have also used the English translation of Benjamin Jowett (http://classics.mit.edu/ Plato/symposium.html) 6 Here, I paraphrase Platon, Sämtliche Dialoge, 203ff. 7 Of course, economy is an essential part of survival, yet this does not prove that the free market is essential to survival. Although I am aware that nowadays the free market has become the most important manifestation of economic life, and is essential for the survival of individuals, I think it also has to be noted that mankind has survived without it for a long time. Also, I am not discussing normative issues of the market – I try to understand its role within the larger picture of man's selfconscious being. Whereas, philosophically speaking, the factual presence of the free market remains contingent from an economic perspective, understanding its necessity can never be explained in merely economic terms.

POLITICS

ILLEGITIMATE PEACE: REMARKS ON THE IDEA OF DEMOCRACY SERGUEÏ SPETSCHINSKY

That kings should philosophise, or philosophers become kings, is not to be expected, but neither is it to be desired, because the possession of power inevitably corrupts the free judgment of reason. —Immanuel Kant, Toward Perpetual Peace

In his essay Toward Perpetual Peace, Kant considers that the authentic peace which humankind must reach is not only "the end of all hostilities", which would be a simple truce, but a "perpetual peace" (ewiger Frieden), meaning a state of peace which does not include any possibility of future hostilities. Perpetual peace is a state including the conditions of possibility for an everlasting peace. For Kant, such a peace signifies the perfect realisation of the rational ideal of morality on earth; it is the embodiment of reason and freedom in our concrete reality through human action. It is in this sense that Kant considers the "state of peace" (Friedenzustand) to be necessarily "instituted", "created" (geschtiftet) by human beings, as opposed to the "state of war" (Zustand des Krieges), which is described as the "state of nature" (Naturstand, status naturalis). Perpetual peace is the perfect institutionalisation of morality on earth and is therefore tied to the domain of human action, culture and freedom, as opposed to nature and determinism. Peace belongs to the field of politics, understood as the field of united human action. At the origin of politics, Kant sees the notion of "prudence" (Klugheit). Indeed, he defines politics as the "doctrine of prudence" (Klugheitslehre) that tells us how to choose the best means in order to realise a given purpose. Prudence alone does not say anything about the nature of the purpose it attempts to realise; it is an instrumental activity striving for mere efficiency. Nothing in the nature of politics itself will ensure its responsibility to realise the moral purpose of perpetual peace. On the contrary, if politics is left alone, it will almost certainly defend only the particular interest of politicians, meaning, of the individuals who hold political power. Kant describes politicians as "professional lawyers" (Juristen vom Handwerke) or as sophists, in the sense that the value systems

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they defend are always constructed ad hoc, in order to justify political decisions supporting their own interest. The sophistic politician "fashions himself a system of morals which is profitable to the interest of the statesman", that is to say, of himself. The behaviour of politicians is not ruled by an authentic moral concern for the common good, but rather by pure selfinterest. This is why, in itself, politics does not bear any moral value. It is only a mechanism enabling human beings to realise some purpose in common. Left alone, it cannot find any goal other than to defend its own interest of becoming more efficient, meaning, of becoming more powerful. Politics is only the tool, the techne, for realising purposes. For politics to be anything other than a mere technology of politicians' domination, its purposes must be found outside of politics. For Kant, morality, or reason, is this extra-political faculty of purposes – it sets the ends that politics has to realise. Peace is situated in an ambiguous space between morality and politics. On the one hand, it is a moral ideal, but on the other hand, it can only be realised by politics. Peace is like the connecting point between morality and politics: to realise peace is to realise the "harmony between politics and morals" (die Einheilligkeit der Politik mit der Moral). Such harmony is personified by the figure of the "moral politician" (moralischer Politiker), who thinks that "the principles of prudence can coexist together with morals". The moral politician is a heroic figure who realises moral ideals by always refusing to compromise moral principles for the sake of political efficiency. This primacy of morality over politics is further explained in the difference Kant makes between the "form of government" and the "form of sovereignty". Kant maintains that the legitimacy of a policy depends on the "form of government" (Form der Regierung, forma regimis), which is both the principle underlying a state's action and the concrete result caused by this action. What one can call the moral identity of the state, defined as the moral quality of both the intention preceding action and the result succeeding action, constitutes the only legitimate criterion in order to judge and evaluate political power. In contrast, what Kant calls the "form of sovereignty" (Form der Beherrschung, forma imperii), meaning the identity of the person(s) occupying political power – the factual or political identity of the state – does not matter for evaluating power's legitimacy. In this sense, says Kant, it does not matter if power is occupied by one (autocracy), several (oligarchy) or all (democracy); only the moral record of political power constitutes a stable and legitimate criterion in order to judge it. This primacy of the moral form of a state over its political form finds a fitting example in Kant's remarks on democracy. Although he does not

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take a clear side between the three different political forms of state (autocracy, oligarchy and democracy), he notes that democracy bears a necessary tendency to become despotic, in the sense that, more than any other system, it tends to automatically be involved in policies where the majority takes decisions at the expense of a minority. Democracy, defined as a concrete political system (political form) where all citizens are supposed to take part equally in decision-making, entails the permanent threat that the majority's interest takes precedence over the general interest of the society as a whole. In a so-called democracy, the state systematically becomes the commodity of the majority rather than the embodiment of the common good. The core of Kant's insight was to understand that the interest of the majority is identical neither with the general interest of a society understood as a whole, including its many minorities, nor – even less – with the moral law. For Kant, the scandal of democratic systems is not really that they result in some people dominating others – after all, autocracy and oligarchy exclude a much larger proportion of their citizens – but rather that such domination is done under the pretence that all its citizens are equal. In autocratic and oligarchic systems, it is well known by the masses that they do not have any word in the rule of the country and that those in power will attempt to manipulate them. The perversity of democratic systems is that they produce the domination of an oligarchy (the majority) through the intention of breaking inequalities down by allowing all citizens to participate equally in politics. The lie of democracies is systemic: it comes from the system's foundational principle of equality. Unlike authoritarian systems, where the ruler manipulates the ruled, democracies manipulate themselves through the belief that their laws express the will of all, when in fact they only represent the will of some. They blur power relationships, making it much harder for individuals to identify the origin of domination. The difficulty for a harmony between morality and politics, that is to say, for a truly moral politician to exist and therefore for perpetual peace to be realised, relates to what Kant calls, in the Ideas For A Universal History With A Cosmopolitan Purpose, 6th proposition, "the most difficult problem, and at the same time the one that humankind will solve last". This is the problem of what I would like to call the "antinomy of mastery". The problem of the antinomy of mastery finds the following formulation: "(…) human being is an animal who, if he lives among others of his kind, needs a master (…), but then this master is in turn an animal who needs a master." In other words, if peace is the ruling of humankind by the moral laws of reason, the difficulty becomes to identify who or what will

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concretely incarnate this law in our human world. Who or what will be the master of humankind? The search for humankind's master seems endless: in order to perfectly apply the law of reason, this master has to be perfect; and yet, no human being as well as no human-made law is perfect. Therefore, the kind of peace that this concrete human or institutional master will be able to realise in the world will perpetually fail to match the ideal of peace. What the antinomy of mastery shows us is that, as soon as one tries to be rational, meaning, to act morally in order to bring justice into the world, one also begins to dominate, which means, to misuse our power following our particular and sensible interests, such as our identity, culture, gender, class or social background. Peace poses an antinomy in the sense that it lays out a radical contradiction between two laws (nomos). On the one hand, peace appears as a universal goal that we cannot help but idealistically attempt to achieve. On the other hand, the achievement of this ideal is continuously postponed and each attempt to reach peace ends in a new disappointment. As soon as one tries to attain peace by embodying reason and justice, one also lapses into some kind of illegitimate domination. The failures of our ideals are not the chance consequences of attempts that sometimes fully reach their aims – they are necessarily tied up with the very act of trying. Illegitimacy is consubstantial with the pursuit of legitimacy and should be regarded as its necessary result rather than as regrettable collateral damage. Because the only truly legitimate peace is the perpetual one, illegitimacy is the only mode under which peace can be encountered in the sphere of human politics. In other words, there is no peace in politics, only approximate truces. This structural illegitimacy of peace within politics, reducing every peaceful attempt to a truce, enters the consciousness of human agents when encountered in real-life contexts. The compromise appears as such, in its full impurity, through the concrete information about its very context and history. Information about particular examples of the discrepancy between ideals of peace and the actual truce makes us aware of peace's illegitimate nature. Such information serves both as a detoxification of ideals, in permitting a nuanced understanding of the ideal of peace as being also embedded in an non-ideal world, and as a reconnection to ideals, by reminding us how imperfect the world is and in which sense it should be changed. Information is an in-formare; it reveals to us the internal form of something. Information tells us at first how things are, displaying their many flaws, only later providing us with insight about how they should become. Authentic information is extremely unpleasant, because it confronts us with the failure of human action, with the tragic character of history and

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with the limitless evil present on earth. But at the same time, it is only if information is presented without any reservation – going deep into stories made out of blood and tears – that it can open onto something like hope. The renewal of ideals arises from the ashes of our illusions. The description of how the world is opens to a prescription of how it must be; the ontological understanding of reality enables deontological guidelines for human action. As Kant says in Perpetual Peace, the conflict between politics and morality "exists and may always stay, because it serves as a whetstone to virtue", in the sense that virtue "lies not so much in resisting the evil and self-sacrifices" as in "looking the evil principle in us straight in the eyes". In other words, the condition of possibility for authentic moral action that moves toward peace is the acknowledgment of the evil in us as well as around us. Self-knowledge and self-critique are the starting points of morality. Critical information, in revealing the illegitimacy of political compromises, opens the possibility for human freedom to attempt pursuing ideals anew. In The Conflict of Faculties (Der Streit der Fakültäten), Kant presents more directly what it means for human beings to stand up to power. If the fight of freedom against oppressive political power is the main topic of Kant's essay, it is nevertheless not directly addressed in order to pass the censorship of the time against anyone who would openly criticize the political authority of the Prussian monarchic government. Also, in this text, Kant pretends only to present and solve the conflict that could occur between the fields of competence of the two different kinds of faculties existing at the time in universities, namely, the so-called "superior faculties", grouping the faculties of theology, law and medicine, and the "inferior faculty", the faculty of philosophy. But, through this metaphor of an institutional conflict, it is in fact a much deeper opposition between two perspectives on human existence that Kant addresses: the struggle between deterministic political domination and human Thefreedom. superior faculties, especially in the case of law and theology, because they teach and protect a knowledge that is dogmatically imposed by the state, represent the interests of the government. Their sole goal is not to research and teach truth, but to be the instruments of political domination. They are the tools imposing upon us the status quo expressed in the rules and worldviews of the state. They are the voices of power, aiming to reproduce power as it is, not to transform it into what it should be. In this sense, they are deeply ambiguous, because, if they reproduce on many levels the unfair domination of political power, they also make possible the subsistence of the freedom society has already achieved by transmit-

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ting the necessity to protect the current rights of citizens. The superior faculties can be understood as the limits of political freedom: limits as a limitation, disabling us to be more free, but in the same time, limits as a safety net, stopping our current freedom from being eroded. On the one hand, they are attempts to bring about peace by contributing to the existence of some spaces of truce, avoiding the so-called "state of nature". But on the other hand, they always produce domination, because they cannot be anything other than an illegitimate compromise. Faculties of law and theology embody the conflicted illegitimacy of political power in teaching us the very nature of our current institutions in how they oppress us as well as how they secure for us some spaces of freedom. This political status quo is always a product of domination and, in this sense, can never be completely legitimate. There is no fair political decision. Speaking about the nature of political domination, Kant goes deep into understanding the mechanism at its origin. He remarks that political power has a tendency to transform into a "thaumaturge", a "miracle worker" (a Wundermann; speaking also of a Wahrsager and a Sauberer), meaning, to promise to its people much more than it can really give in promising the perfect realisation of the ideal, the accomplishment of perfect peace. And, indeed, those ideologies that Kant anticipates are believed and followed by the people, because, as he says, "the people want to be led" (Das Volk will geleitet (…) sein), meaning, "want to be deceived" (will betrogen sein). It is in the nature of human beings to want to reach ideals like happiness and justice with as little effort as possible and therefore they will tend to follow the holders of power if promised an easy path to such ideals. In stating the potential of ideology as a part of the very nature of political power it is in fact already the nature of philosophy that Kant defines. The inferior faculty of philosophy has as its one and only purpose to research and teach truth. The faculty of philosophy represents the concept of Wissenschaft, which means the pursuit of knowledge in general, including, in contemporary terms, both the Naturwissenschaften (sciences) and the Geisteswissenschaften (humanities). The voice of philosophy is the one of reason, meaning, the one of the ideals endlessly pushing the search for absolute truth. Philosophy is a thirst for freedom and therefore it radically opposes the status quo defended by the superior faculties. If political power has a fundamental tendency to lie to and manipulate the people through propaganda, the people has then to always assume that its government lies, or at least, tries to lie. In the face of power one should not carry a presumption of innocence, but a presumption of guilt. Philosophy, as a search for truth, is therefore the people's fundamental faculty to op-

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pose its government. For Kant, in front of any action of political power, innocence has to be proved and guilt assumed. Philosophy is the power of democracy in its authentic meaning. As a demo-kratos, philosophy is people's power to oppose domination; it is the way people really get into power through fighting established systems of power, including Kant's definition of "democracies" as existing political systems. Philosophy, as the democratic faculty, is the real meaning of freedom. It is the freedom to look for truth, which is the signification of reason in each of us: reason not as a completely realised power, or as a sure and certain way to reach truth, but as a potential to know what should be, instead of what currently is. Philosophy is the force of ideals; it constantly has in mind the idea of peace and compares it to the concrete and ambiguous current reality of truce. In the face of political power, philosophy is the democratic faculty of critique: it constantly compares what has already been accomplished with what should be accomplished. It compares the supposedly deceitful speeches of governments with the idea of truth. This critical character of philosophy means, at first, a negative critique: it says what is wrong with the current reality. But at the same time, in order to be such a negative critique, it must also be a positive one: it has to affirm what should be before articulating what is wrong with what already is. Philosophy is both constructive and destructive: it is first constructive, because it has to know what should be the criterion of judgement and it is, in the second place, destructive, because it has to judge, following this criterion, what is unsatisfactory within reality. Philosophy is therefore anything but a disembodied theoretical activity. It is the beating heart of democracy. It is in this sense that Kant, in Toward Perpetual Peace, Second Supplement, identifying "philosophers" with the subjects (Untertanen) of the state, asserts that the condition of possibility for perpetual peace is that philosophers should be able to speak freely and publicly about the state's business. This freedom to criticize the state should be protected by the state itself – power "should not allow the class of philosophers to disappear or to fall silent, but should allow them to speak openly". Indeed, in the sphere of politics, rational critique is the only counterweight able to evade the influence of the private interest of the individuals holding power and to ensure that power will only be used in order to fulfil common moral interests. State, understood as the political sphere of common good, has to ensure that it will not be jeopardized by private interests – it has to make sure that the decisions taken by people in power will be discussed publicly by a strong, independent, rational and critical opposition. States, in their own interest, must authorise and finance the existence of institutions hav-

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ing as their only purpose the rational analysis and critique of their actions – or the lack thereof. This protection and support of the philosopher's freedom is the very condition of possibility of what Kant calls the principle of "publicity" (Publizität), which is itself the condition of possibility for perpetual peace. The principle of publicity states that each political decision, in order to be legitimate, must necessarily be public: laws must seek instituted rational public critique in order to be defined as legitimate. This principle of publicity is, following Kant, alone able to ensure the harmony between politics and morality, the alignment of politics toward perpetual peace, because it is only through such principle that the decisions of political power will possibly align with the truth defended by the democratic power of philosophy. Interestingly, Kant describes this necessary condition for perpetual peace as having to stay a "secret article" (geheimer Artikel), meaning that the state may want to keep secret its support of a strong opposition, since this goes directly against its "dignity" (Würde), meaning that it endangers the private interest of the statesmen. It is therefore in being aware that this decision to defend public good will endanger their own private good that the power-holders should take this decision. Establishing an opposition is an act of heroism on the part of the statesmen. It is why it will always be only "tacitly" (stillschweigend) that politicians will let philosophers discuss politics' business. Creating an opposition is a cause of deep discomfort for any power, because it directly limits its faculty to rule. In the second part of the Conflict of the Faculties, speaking about the conflict between law and philosophy, sixth paragraph, Kant presents the feeling of enthusiasm (Enthusiasm) as being that which animates human being toward ideals. This notion of enthusiasm allows us to better understand the relationship between democracy and philosophy. Indeed, how can the abstract idea of philosophy as Wissenschaft be incarnated into the body of a people (demos) in order to give it the power (kratos) to oppose the perpetually oppressive and illegitimate power of any kind of peace? The people have in themselves philosophy as a potential. Truth is not in us as such, but only as an always-renewed possibility; as a thirst for truth. In this sense, what defines most philosophy is not that it delivers well-delimited pieces of truth slowly advancing our struggle for peace, but that it is a feeling (Gefühl). As a feeling, philosophy is not a precise and determined activity but a way of being which does not know any borders. Wissenschaft is not the job of a certain social group of knowledge specialists, but a universal way for human beings to face the perpetual and ille-

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gitimate ambiguity of power. In this frame, the feeling of enthusiasm, which is, following Kant, the "universal" and "disinterested" interest towards ideas, is the necessary medium of philosophy. Through the feeling of enthusiasm, philosophy is no longer a simple commandment to look for truth, but a permanent, lively and positive activity that finds its roots in pleasure (Lust). The interest in ideals that enthusiasm gives fills us with the actual energy to stand for truth against any kind of established power. Enthusiasm gives a body to philosophy. Enthusiasm literally embodies philosophy in people; it provides us with the energy to discover the illegitimacy of the status quo. Enthusiasm is what makes us stand up for what should be instead of accepting what already is. In placing this moral duty into a concrete body, enthusiasm blurs the easy dualism between must and be, Sollen and Sein, and creates a space for philosophy to enter human life. It is interesting to link this understanding of enthusiasm with the notion of the "faculty of desire" (Begehrungsvermögen) developed by Kant in the Critique of the Power of Judgment in order to characterize the practical reason as the origin of morality. This marks an important change compared to what Kant writes in the Critique of Practical Reason, his main book about morality, where morality is presented more as an abstract and purely supersensible principle, radically disconnected from any kind of sensible empirical reality. In the third Critique, calling practical reason a Begehrungsvermögen, Kant presents morality not only as the principleoriented voice of duty, but also as an embodied, concrete and sensible feeling. Indeed, "Vermögen" has to be understood more as a potential than as a fixed and well-delimited faculty. "Begehrung" means "desire", which is a feeling, an emotion, and is very different from the abstract principle of "will". Reason is now understood as the potential to desire for which sensible feelings and pleasures take an important place for moral practice. Joined with the feeling of enthusiasm, morality is no longer only a problem of a priori principles, but as well a question of concrete, daily, living practice of struggling against illegitimate determinism. To conclude, I would like to summarize my remarks on Kant's views on politics in highlighting who was implicitly at their centre: human being as the subject of politics. Politics, as the public space for common human action, takes place within a state and is enacted by citizens, members of the state and subjects of politics. The citizens are not defined as such by their membership to a state and citizenship is not fulfilled by the obedience to the current state allowing us some rights and duties. Citizenship is not a fact, but a duty. Human beings appear as authentic citizens through their struggle against the constitutive illegitimacy of political institutions. This

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struggle takes the form of philosophy as a fundamentally democratic faculty that searches and fights for truth animated by the feeling of enthusiasm. Facing the constitutively oppressive structure of political reality, peace, as a perfect union between morality and politics, remains a utopian ideal.

HOSPITALITY AND THE POLITICS OF PEACE SHARON ANDERSON-GOLD

Is the human race as a whole to be loved or are we to save our good will for our close friends and allies? Kant thought that our ability to work for the good of humanity required that we have reason to believe that the species as a whole is able to constantly progress toward peace. To watch the human race falling back constantly into conflict and violence constituted for Kant a "farce; and even if the actors do not tire of it, because they are fools, the spectator does," (TP 8:308).1 But peace for Kant is not simply a cessation of hostilities. It is not a truce, nor a balance of power. Peace, Kant argues in his famous essay "Towards Perpetual Peace", depends upon a formally instituted condition of public law based upon three definite articles that will redefine the right of nations and that all states must accept. These articles are: a republican constitution, a federation of free states, and a universal right of hospitality. Other peace theorists before Kant had recommended defensive leagues and the idea of a league specifically formed around republican governments has become the foundation for contemporary theories concerning a "democratic peace".2 But Kant's addition of a cosmopolitan right of hospitality, belonging to all individuals as citizens of the world, was a genuine innovation that has not been well understood by his interpreters. Given the continued existence of states how could individuals also be "citizens of the world"? And what did Kant mean when he stated that cosmopolitan right was the "only" condition under which we can "flatter ourselves that we are constantly approaching perpetual peace?" (EF 8:360) Genuine right for Kant is always a matter of public law. But any level of law operating above the state would be incompatible with the sovereign right of nations to unilaterally determine their own policies. Cosmopolitan right then, if accepted, modifies the traditional conception of sovereignty by requiring national policies to be in accordance with its requirements. But this is precisely what Kant held would be necessary to make possible a continuous approach to peace. Cosmopolitan right, Kant tells us:

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is no fantastic and exaggerated way of representing right; it is, instead, a supplement to the unwritten code of the right of a state and the right of nations necessary for the sake of any public rights of human beings and so for perpetual peace; only under this condition can we flatter ourselves that we are constantly approaching peace. (EF 8:360, author's emphasis)

Kant did not expect that his proposal for states to unite under certain binding public laws, even those of their own making, would meet with the immediate approval of heads of state. He envisioned a long historical process within which the increasing burdens of war would provide a large measure of the push that nations would require to reconsider their "rights", especially the right to make war, and to institute a condition of public law among them. The burden of war was not the only historical force that Kant saw operating to produce a continuous advance toward peace. Even prior to the formal institution of cosmopolitan right, Kant believed that commerce would bring the peoples of the world into a vital contact producing a shard sense of right such that " a violation of right on one place of the earth is felt in all" (EF 8:360, Kant's emphasis). Commerce between nations, Kant maintains is incompatible with war and leads states "to promote honorable peace and, whenever war threatens to break out anywhere in the world to prevent it by mediations." (EF 8:368) But this empirical generalization that commerce is conducive to peace, is not just another arbitrary feature of human history. Inter-state commerce is supported by Kant's general theory of right. This "right, to present oneself for society, belongs to all human beings" (EF 8:358) Kant argues, is a consequence of the fact that originally no one had more right than another to settle any of the parts of the globe. Therefore, all possession of the land prior to ratification by a universal association of states in a true condition of peace is provisional. The third definitive article of a "true condition of peace" (MM 6:350, EF 8:357) is of course precisely the right of hospitality that provides legal protection to what is for Kant a fundamental human right. Thus, even after states mutually ratify their borders, as one of the conditions of their peaceable association, commerce must be recognized as a universal right now regulated by public law. Kant's peace is based upon "open societies". Another reason it is necessary to think of the community of nations as a community of open societies (of potential physical interaction) is that the spherical shape of the earth makes infinite dispersal impossible. The uninhabitable parts of the earth or "commons", such as the oceans, serve as conduits for possible interactions. Everyone has a right to move through these spaces, and individuals do no wrong to use them to 'present

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themselves for society'. The offer cannot be a "wrong" since no one has the "authority" to prohibit such an offer. This right of "offering to engage in commerce with any other, … without the other being authorized to behave toward it as an enemy because it has made this attempt." (EF 6:352, Kant's emphasis) is invested in individuals as 'citizens of the world' in their private relations with other individuals and states. One may refuse an offer of interaction as long as the refusal does not place the other in danger and is not attended with hostility.3 To accept interaction, then is to commit oneself to the principle of hospitality. But how have states, simply by permitting commerce put themselves under an obligation to conduct their relations in accordance with public law? What does the principle of hospitality require beyond simple peaceable exchanges? Commerce requires societies to be relatively peaceable and open. However to be rightful, Kant argues, interaction between individuals situated within different civil societies, must be regulated by public law. In the Metaphysics of Morals Kant defines public right as "a system of laws for a people, that is, a multitude of human beings, or for a multitude of peoples, which, because they affect one another, need a rightful condition under a will uniting them, a constitution." (MS 6:311) Our obligation to form civil societies so that we may determine right locally does not satisfy the need for a universal condition of right. Once formed states must also interact in a rightful manner. But it is not enough that states simply assert their rightful independence and pledge themselves to desist from war, they must also abide by norms of hospitality or cosmopolitan right in the manner in which they conduct their commerce with others. It is only the later, cosmopolitan right, that produces "a right for a state of nations" (MS 6:311) and secures the foundation for the system of laws as a whole. Kant states: So if the principle of outer freedom limited by law is lacking in any one of these three possible forms of rightful condition, the framework of all the others is unavoidably undermined and must finally collapse. (MS 6:311)

The cosmopolitan right of hospitality by providing for the public rights of human beings provides a normative framework for the system of law as a whole. It might be objected that this principle is too limited to bear any normative burden since it only requires that individuals not be treated with hostility when making an attempt to enter into community with others. It does not require the acceptance of the offer of interaction nor guarantee any permanent right of residence within a foreign community. Minimally cosmopolitan right requires that all individuals be accorded a fundamental degree of respectful treatment in all interactions, prohibiting interactions

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based on force or fraud. Beyond this, all specific forms of social, cultural or economic interaction or exchanges must be negotiated.4 Relations between peoples clearly have to flow from perceived mutual benefits. To ensure fairness such interactions must be regulated by public law under the aegis of a public or transnational authority. The right of hospitality then has another side that prohibits injustice in interactions. Hospitality prohibits the use of force, superior power, or fraud to achieve cultural and commercial ends. Kant's harsh criticisms of the tactics of imperialist nations in their attempts to "open up" the markets of China and Japan make it clear that nations have a right (even a duty) to protect themselves from such exploitation. Kant's criticisms of colonialist practices extend this principle of decent interactions, respectful of the rights of others to their ways of life, to non -state peoples. In discussing the right of settlement upon lands already occupied Kant states that such settlements may not encroach on those whose use of the land, like shepherds or herders (many of the indigenous peoples of the New World), requires extensive open regions. He states that: …this settlement may not take place by force but only by contract, and indeed by a contract that does not take advantage of the ignorance of those inhabitants with respect to ceding their lands. (MS 6:353).

Hospitality then is not just something that the one visited extends to the visitor. It is a duty that one who visits owes to those visited. Kant recognized and condemned the exploitation that accompanied European colonialism. It was the behavior of the commercial states in particular that received his harshest criticism as "inhospitable" and unjust because they utilized visitation as a means for exploitation that was equivalent in its effects to conquering (ED 8:358). Kant projected that as commercial interactions among nations developed, states would create transnational institutions to regulate these interactions. The creation of transnational or cosmopolitan law presupposes that those who co-legislate are on equal terms.5 But our current international system, divided into powerful and weak states, does not meet this criterion. Our current system is in effect the historical product of an unjust imperialist and colonial system. Colonialism created "states" that have had dubious legitimacy among their peoples and that even after "liberation," continued in a state of economic dependence on their prior "rulers". The post-colonial condition of many contemporary states calls into question the independence and equality that Kant presupposes in members of any law-making community. Public law regulating commercial relations in our contemporary world has been

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developed and administered by international organizations, the founding members of which have been powerful and economically "developed" states. Although the original purpose of the International Monetary Fund had been to promote economic stability and economic development on a global scale by providing the financial capital for particular projects, specific economic policies were from the beginning designed by the more developed and powerful western states, particularly the US and used as conditions of participation in the global financial system.6 The superior financial power of the developed nations has often been used to coerce weaker states into adopting internal economic policies harmful to their poorer citizens but favorable to economic elites. Exploitation clearly can and does occur in modern state- to -state relationships particularly between highly developed and underdeveloped states and often with the complicity of the rulers of the underdeveloped nations. These rulers do not uniformly represent the interests of their people/s and within the state the interests of different groups are often given differential weight. In World Poverty and Human Rights, Thomas Pogge claims that in underdeveloped states, a rich store of natural resources is systematically correlated with dictatorships and poverty. He argues that within underdeveloped states the lure of personal power and wealth corrupts political leadership and that this corruption is supported by the current terms of the international recognition of sovereignty.7 The right of nations in this international context provides no disincentives to the development of dictators and is therefore not conducive to peace. This alliance of international recognition of dictatorial power with the internal underdevelopment of weak states is no mere accident of history. Given the manner in which developed nations have used their superior military and economic power to gain advantages in all international forums it is to the advantage of developed nations to continue to support regimes willing to provide access to natural resources on terms favorable to themselves regardless of the "representative" character of the government in power. The economic gap between developed and underdeveloped countries has grown despite the efforts of some international organizations, such as the World Bank, to provide funds for "development". These organizations are not constituted in a manner to offset the effects of the dominance of developed nations and therefore cannot genuinely affect the type of internal development that would systematically reduce global poverty.8 Because current international organizations are not representative of and accountable to individuals as "citizens of the world" they are not constituted as legitimate transnational "cosmopolitan" authorities.

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Given the negative impacts of the policies of these organizations on the ost vulnerable, global theorists such as David Held have argued that in addition to international law founded on state based organizations, cosmopolitan law must be founded directly upon international democratic institutions whose representatives would be accountable to individuals as "world citizens".9 Such institutions would provide a forum within which ordinary citizens could critique the policies of their governments and could form alliances with the citizens of other states to address issues of global concern particularly in the areas of peace, poverty and environmental degradation.10 Power politics, Held argues in Kantian fashion, affect the capacity of any and all states to develop their internal values. The commitment to just dealings necessary for the stability of democratic societies is diminished when the foreign policies of democratic states suppresses economic development within other states. Internal democracy has little chance to develop where autocrats have the power to offer natural resources on favorable terms to developed nations. Power elites within underdeveloped states thus reflect the overall power differentials between states. While Kant stressed universal republicanism and the equality of states under international law as necessary conditions for the evolution of cosmopolitan law, Held adds to these two conditions the need to establish international democratic institutions to offset the historical reality of inequalities in economic power at the level of the states. Who then is to establish the public law that guarantees the "public rights" of human beings? If we are assuming that the right of commerce is the foundation of the public rights of citizens of the world, and that commerce should proceed according to public laws that guarantee that human beings will be protected from exploitation as a consequence of their engagement in commercial undertakings, then it can be argued that all human beings have as 'citizens of the world' the right to have their basic needs and interests taken as the basis of the public laws that regulate such commerce. There is good reason to argue that under the current conditions of international inequality, states cannot be the sole source or final arbiters of these laws. A level of cosmopolitan democratic law is required if cosmopolitan right is ultimately to be achieved because commerce under the conditions of global capitalist markets tends to have differential effects across states with respect to individuals/groups that undermines the ability of those adversely affected to have equal standing (as republicanism requires) in their respective political communities. Although Kant accepted some degree of economically based political inequality (active v. passive citizen) within even a justly constituted state he maintained that it must be

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possible to work one's way out of dependence. Permanent structural economic inequality among nations violates this principle.11 In discussing the agreement of politics with morals in accord with the transcendental concept of public right, Kant argues that the public agreements made by states to assist others cannot be waived on the grounds of national interests without frustrating the very end for which public agreements are made. Thus, the maxim of the politician who would establish transnational laws with the secret reservation that nationalist interests should always trump fair consideration of the needs and interests of others is not feasible as a form of cosmopolitan public law. A transnational public authority must be impartial and based on the public rights of human beings as "citizens of the world". But if a state (or its head) divulged this maxim of his, then every other would naturally either shun him or unite with others in order to oppose his pretensions, and this proves that politics, with all its cunning, would have to frustrate its own end on this footing (of openness), so that that maxim would have to be wrong. (EF 8:384)

Is our current international system that has its historical foundations in relations of inequality and economic dependence capable of progressing toward peace? A system based on unjust foundations, is not likely to produce loyalty and commitment on the part of those whose aspirations for equality, freedom and independence are thwarted by economic and cultural domination. The transformation of a merely legal structure into a "moral whole" that Kant projected would be a consequence of the interaction of peoples over time requires that states reconstitute their foreign and economic-trade policies in accordance with principles that serve the best interests of the peoples of the world. In effect states would have to align their national interests with the principle of cosmopolitan right. Recognizing that peoples would continue to be divided by cultural differences (particularly those of language and religion) Kant maintained that cultural interaction would nonetheless be necessary to bring those of different cultural heritages "to greater agreement in principles." (EF 8:367) Apparently Kant believes that cultural differences are not in themselves a barrier to reaching agreement on principles and this without "weakening of all forces, but by means of their, equilibrium in liveliest of competition." (EF 8:367). But this "increasing culture" within and between states and peoples depends upon not only commercial contact in the narrow economic sense but also an open public sphere of discourse within which the full

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impacts of commerce in the social and cultural realms could also be discussed and critiqued. Principles to regulate transnational interactions cannot be formulated by a simple extrapolation from the interests and values of developed nations but must work from an understanding of the interests and values of differently developed societies. International development then cannot reduce all social formations to a common measure in order to extract maximum economic "efficiency" but must look to the development of human potential and capacities in their cultural contexts. Much of the contemporary resistance within parts of the "underdeveloped" world to the economic domination of the developed countries comes from this sense that the "development" model is another form of cultural and social imperialism. In the early years of post-colonial development, many formerly colonial states attempted to defend a right to develop in a manner not aligned with either of the then dominant models (capitalism/ communism). Unfortunately, the dominant states saw nonalignment and talk of "third ways" threatening to their own interests and generally worked to undermine such possibilities. In rejecting the conditions of economic and cultural domination some groups now also reject the international system and international law as such. With the rejection of international law, the conditions for peace as Kant understood them are lost. While Kant argued for a right to reject an offer of association, opening up the possibility of disassociated peoples living amidst an otherwise legally organized federation, a condition of disassociation would fail to achieve the minimal conditions that Kant proposes for a continuous approach to peace. These conditions require that there be agreement on the principles of association among "peoples" of the most different cultures (languages and religions) who come to the negotiations as "free, equal and independent" under the right of hospitality prohibiting the use of superior power for the purposes of any form of exploitation (economic or cultural). Clearly, a world divided over the terms of association cannot meet the minimal conditions of perpetual peace. According to Kant there can be no right of nations that is not based upon a rightful condition defined by public law. The condition under which a right of nations as such is possible is that a rightful conditions already exists. For without this there is no public right, and any right that one may think of outside it (in a state of nature) is instead merely private right. (EF 8:385 Kant's emphasis)

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No condition is rightful that has not been universally established upon cosmopolitan right and the legal and political principles that follow from a free and open agreement among peoples. All else is war.

Notes 1

All references to the works of Immanuel Kant use the Akademie numbering from The Cambridge Edition of the Works of Immanuel Kant, Practical Philosophy, translated and edited by Mary J. Gregor. 2 J.J.Rousseau, Abbe St. Pierre, et. al. 3 One must offer aide to those who arrive in distress because refusal here in effect endangers the other. Kant's example is shipwrecked sailors but this principle has also been used to support the right of refugees fleeing violence to temporary sojourn. 4 It can be asked who negotiates with whom? The representative of the receiving state would appear to be the head of state, ideally acting in the best interests of his people. But the assumption that the head of state always acts in the best interests of his people is clearly challengeable. Heads of state can violate the principle of cosmopolitan right not only by exploiting foreign citizens but also by permitting foreign interests to exploit their own people. 5 While Kant clearly condemns colonialist practices, one of the historical legacies of these practices has been the difficulty of establishing legitimate, stable and representative states among the various peoples that had been subject to colonial exploitation and oppression. An international community divided into developed and underdeveloped nations, whose relative positions correspond to a history of exploitation, creates particular problems for the application of cosmopolitan principles that are discussed in this paper. 6 Anderson-Gold, Sharon, Cosmopolitanism and Human Rights, University of Wales Press, 2001, Chapter 7. 7 Pogge, Thomas, World Poverty and Human Rights, Polity Press, New York City, 2002. 8 Anderson-Gold, Sharon, Cosmopolitanism and Human Rights, Chapter 7: Globalization and Development traces the negative impact of the neo-liberal economic policies of the 1980's on the development policies of the IMF and World Bank. 9 Held, David, "Cosmopolitan Democracy and the Global Order: A New Agenda", in: James Bohman and Matthias Lutz-Bachmann (eds.), Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant's Cosmopolitan Ideal, The MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass., 1997; also see Held, David, Democracy and the Global Order, Stanford University Press, Stanford, 1995. 10 It is controversial just how such 'citizen of the world' forums should relate to other international bodies and authorities. Some, including Held, recommend redesigning the General Assembly to become the representative body of such citizens. Would these representatives have a "cosmopolitan" charge or remain tied to the interests of the nations from which the citizens are chosen? Whatever the

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formula, the very attempt to introduce a political body representative of citizens and not states would be a cosmopolitan innovation. 11 Lea Yi puts it this way "From a cosmopolitan perspective, prioritizing national interests in foreign policy would contradict the moral principles of impartiality and equal concern for all relevant subjects. It would ultimately lead to hypocrisy in the international arena and unfairness in the conduct of world affairs. "Cosmopolitanism, Sovereignty, and the Ethics of European Foreign Policy"', European Journal of Political Theory, 2008, 7, 349.

PEACE, HOSPITALITY AND THE FREE MOVEMENT OF LABOUR HARRY LESSER

In Perpetual Peace Kant considers the necessary conditions for genuine lasting peace between nations, as opposed to the actual situation in his day, which he thought involved merely "truces" and "suspensions of hostilities": no doubt he would consider the present situation as in that respect still unchanged. Thus, in the first section of the work he says that "Peace means an end to all hostilities, and to attach the adjective 'perpetual' to it is already suspiciously close to pleonasm". With regard to these conditions, he distinguishes between 'Preliminary' and 'Definitive' articles. The third definitive article concerns the cosmopolitan right to conditions of universal hospitality. This is hospitality in a very limited sense: it is merely the right to arrive on foreign territory without being treated with hostility. It is emphatically not a right to remain there: "He can indeed be turned away, if this can be done without causing his death, but he must not be treated with hostility, so long as he behaves in a peaceable manner in the place he happens to be in". Indeed, Kant specifically says that, given the appalling behaviour of European colonists in many parts of the world, of which he gives a number of examples, it is very wise for China and Japan to place restrictions on them, and either not to admit them at all, or to admit only limited numbers and under specific conditions and restrictions. So the right to hospitality, put forward by Kant as a condition of permanent peace, is simply a right to go to any country in the world and ask for admission, and, even if the answer is "no", to be sent away, provided one has not oneself been aggressive, with no damage to life, limb or property. This raises a very important question: does peace require a stronger right, namely a right to offer one's labour and one's skills for sale anywhere in the world? This would not be a right to be employed anywhere in the world, but a right to seek employment, and to take up any offer of employment. In theory, it might include a right actually to be employed if one was the best candidate for the post; but in practice this might often be too hard to establish.

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The main argument for establishing such a right, apart from its effects on long-term peace, which will be considered later, is the argument from ownership. A person's skills, and a person's labour, it might plausibly be argued, always belong to that person. That being so, the person is morally entitled to hire them out wherever they please, provided there is someone willing to pay for them. Hence, everyone should have the legal right to work anywhere in the world, provided there is someone willing to employ them, or to sell or lease them business premises, if they are looking to be self-employed. Moreover, it is also argued that, apart from this being a right that people ought to have on moral grounds, it will be economically beneficial, since it will enable people to go where they can get the best reward for their labour, and also result in people taking their labour and skills to where they are most needed. But, first of all, do people own their skills in this sense? Many skills require training, some requiring many years of training. Very often this training is carried out, not at the person's own expense, but at the expense of the country to which they belong, or at the expense of their family. Even the unskilled labourer has acquired the necessary physical strength thanks to their family, or to the people who have fed them, looked after them and kept them healthy. This suggests that, although one might not want to say that anyone other than the person themselves actually owns a person's skills or labour, this ownership is not an absolute property right, but one where other people have a claim that it should not be used in ways which will harm them. There are two ways in which taking one's labour from one country to another may do harm. First, it may harm the country one has left, by depriving them of skills in short supply. For example, doctors and nurses trained in the developing world may take their skills to the developed world, where pay and conditions are much better, and leave the country that has trained them short of well-trained medical personnel. Given this fact, and given what we have suggested above, that the property right in one's labour is not absolute, countries where this is the case—and there are several—may therefore be within their rights in requiring the doctors and nurses they have trained to remain there for a certain number of years after training. It might be held that this is legitimate only if it is made part of the contract from the beginning, eg by making it an explicit condition of being admitted to medical school that a person remain in the country for a specified number of years after qualifying. But, even if these conditions have to be made explicit early on, in order to be fair, it may nevertheless be both just and desirable to make them.

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Secondly, the movement of labour may harm the country, or some citizens of the country, to which workers go, either because competition from foreign workers makes it harder for native workers to find jobs, or because, though there are jobs for all, the level of wages has fallen, or risen by less than would otherwise be the case, because the foreign workers are willing to take lower wages—the reason being that they are still better off than they would be in their own country. The first question is: does this really happen, and how often? There is no doubt that many people are afraid of it happening, and that when unemployment rises there are demands that the jobs of native workers be protected. But there is also no doubt that sometimes, or even often, these fears are in fact groundless. There is also no doubt that they are exploited by people with a very ugly political agenda, that of deliberately stirring up hatred of foreigners. So can the fears be dismissed, as mere "bogeys", used by the unscrupulous to stir up fear and hatred? I think they cannot. No doubt sometimes they are groundless, and no doubt they are exploited by evil men. But sometimes they are justified, and native workers are genuinely suffering. Moreover, the official trades unions, as opposed to unofficial "wildcat" groups, often see themselves as acting to protect not only their own nationals but also foreign workers who are already established: they are not trying to send people "back home" or force them out of employment, but only to limit further immigration. If and when further immigration is a genuine threat to the jobs or wages of those already in a country, whether "native" or "immigrant", and references to this threat are not simply political rhetoric, a government surely has the right to protect its own citizens, and those who have already been working in their country, even at some cost to foreign nationals who also wish to come. Indeed this may be more than a right, and actually amount to a duty, just as one can have, within limits and in certain, though not all, areas of life, a duty to put one's own family first and others second.. It is true that these occasions should be regarded as exceptional: a situation of systematic protection by all nations, putting an end to the movement of labour at all, would be both unjust and to everyone's economic disadvantage. But it is hard to maintain that there are no circumstances under which it is right for a government to protect the jobs of its own workers, even at a cost to people from elsewhere. This, as many unions have recognised, would be an argument only for limiting immigration, not an argument for discriminating against people already admitted to a country. Also, it is an argument for being prepared to limit immigration temporarily and under particular circumstances, not an argument for a general limitation of the free movement of labour.

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If all this is correct, there is thus still a good argument for a right to sell one's labour wherever one chooses, with the proviso that this is not an absolute right and under some circumstances may legitimately be limited, either by the country one wishes to leave or by the country one wishes to join. But what are the likely consequences for peace, if such a right were generally recognised? Is it, like Kant's "right to hospitality", as he at any rate thought, a necessary condition for peace? Is it at least something that would in the long term encourage peace? Or is it something that could actually work against peace among nations? There is certainly evidence that in many places immigration has been followed by violence rather than peace. Very often, perhaps even always, there is evidence that it is not the immigrants that are to blame for the violence, or for the generally bad relationships between communities; but this has been the consequence. Admittedly, this has quite often been a short-term rather than a long-term consequence, as communities cease to be composed of immigrants and become accepted by the "host" community: this applies not only to actual violence, but to discrimination and prejudice as well. There is some evidence, for example, that in the UK in recent years, if people are asked about race relations in their own area they will say they are improving, even if when asked about the more general picture they are more doubtful; and there are valid reasons for considering the answer to the first question as being more important, since it is more likely to be based on experience rather than impressions from what happens to be reported in the media. But the phenomenon is not always short-term. There are instances of a community, such as the Jews in Poland, being welcomed at first and then being turned against. There are other instances, such as the American South, where, although discrimination against the Black community has been short-term in a historical sense, it has nevertheless lasted for several generations. (America is obviously in one way different, because those discriminating were also immigrants, and quite often had been in the country for less time than those discriminated against, but the principle is the same). However, when this happens there are at least two special features. First, the immigrants are from one particular place, or at any rate are perceived as a distinctive ethnic or racial group. Secondly, the "host" or majority community has particularly strong reasons for not allowing, or trying not to allow, the group to assimilate or integrate. In the case of Black Americans, there were factors such as sexual jealousy; but the main reason would seem to be the wish to continue exploiting Black labour: it was the "uppity" or supposedly uppity Black person who induced rage,

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and the one who appeared to know their place could receive positive affection, even while being exploited. The discrimination at one time against Chinese Americans may have been similarly motivated: they came voluntarily and not as slaves, but with the same effect—that they were acceptable as underpaid labourers but not as equals. Other reasons can operate equally powerfully: with the Jews in Poland it was presumably the religious differences. Moreover, these factors can be exacerbated by a resistance to integration on the part of the immigrant community. However, though this is certainly in evidence, it usually seems to involve only a small, though sometimes very vocal, minority. Thus in the UK while many Jews and Muslims have quite rightly resisted assimilation (ie the abandonment of their culture in favour of the host culture), most have accepted integration (or the adaptation of the one to the other) and many have done so with enthusiasm: the noise made by the minorities in these communities should not be allowed to obscure this fact. But the crucial point is that hostility to immigrants that is more than temporary seems to arise when there is a resistance to integration and an immigrant community that forms a distinctive group of people. Neither of these is a necessary feature of immigration. Indeed, it is now more characteristic to find small groups, or individuals, from many different countries rather than a large group from one country: the recent Eastern European immigration to the UK is of this type, and similar things are said to be happening in the USA. And all this might well be further encouraged if there were free movement of labour, even with the occasional limitations that seem necessary. Ghettoisation seems to have been a stage rather than a permanency, and big cities, one may suggest, are becoming places where a mixture of people is taken for granted and the sense of "us and the others" is diminishing. This gives one hope that in the long term, or by now, even in the medium term, free movement of labour may be a force for peace, as co-operation between different sorts of people is more and more taken for granted. There is, however, one more factor to be considered. Not only must there be mixing, if the free movement of labour is to make a contribution to long term peace: there must also, as said above, a willingness at least to allow integration and preferably to encourage it—to repeat, integration is not to be confused with assimilation. This requires an acceptance that working in a country for a reasonable length of time can, if other conditions are fulfilled, lead to the granting of full citizenship, so that there is not a permanent group of non-citizen labourers. There are two reasons for this. The first is that there is an injustice in taking a person's labour and skills for many years and denying them citizenship. There is obviously no

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exact point in time at which this becomes an injustice, but nevertheless there should be some limit to how long a person operates as a non-citizen (assuming they wish to become one). This applies, I think, even if they have received a fair wage or salary: their contribution should be seen as earning them the right to citizenship. More accurately, it should be seen as in conjunction with other conditions earning them this right. More than just having worked in the country is needed. In particular, evidence is needed of a willingness to keep the law and to be a satisfactory neighbour, and of a sufficient knowledge and understanding of the language and culture of the society one wishes to join—enough to enable a person not to assimilate but to integrate. This is to suggest, in fact, that a condition of peace is that citizenship be seen not as a matter of descent and "blood", so that immigrants and their descendants can never become citizens, but as something that can be learnt: one might perhaps call this the French model, since it has perhaps been adopted most explicitly in French speaking countries, although it is found in many others, and indeed is replacing the "blood" model almost everywhere. What still needs to be thought out is, in each country, exactly what the intending citizen needs to learn. So, I suggest, or put up for consideration the suggestion, that one of the requirements of long term peace is a general commitment to the free movement of labour (though the needs both of countries people want to leave and countries they want to join will require some, hopefully temporary, limitations). This in its turn, if it is to serve the cause of peace, requires a willingness to see citizenship as something that can be learnt, and to grant it to those who have earned it, and also a willingness to expect people to understand and respect the culture they are joining but not to expect them to abandon their own. The hope is then that the increase in mutual cooperation and mutual respect will also lead to the replacement of "truces" by peace. One final point. It may be that the whole notion of citizenship needs revision, and the notion of being a world citizen as well as a citizen of a particular state needs to become a reality. Kant seems to hold this himself; and he may well be right. But at least citizenship as we know it could take forms which encourage cooperation between people from different societies, rather than encouraging each society to see itself as pitted against the rest. The free movement of labour would be a step in this direction.

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Bibliography Kant, I., Perpetual Peace, in: Kant, I., Political Writings, ed. H. S. Reiss, 2nd edition, Cambridge University Press, 1991, pp 93-130. References are to p. 93 and pp 105-7.

WHAT IS INTEGRATION? A DISCUSSION ON INTEGRATION FROM A NIETZSCHEAN PERSPECTIVE ABDULLAH ONUR AKTAù

Germany is home to nearly 7.5 million people from other ethnic and religious origins than Germans themselves.1 This simple demographic picture clearly shows that Germany is an immigrant receiving country and has a heterogeneous composition. And Germany is still in need of new immigrants, since Germans themselves are getting older and having less than enough children for the vitality needed for the economical aims. Germany received so many immigrants, asylum seekers and refugees and still in need of new immigrants that, as a policy response, an immigration law was accepted in 2005. This law was important since Germany accepted itself as an immigrant receiving country politically for the first time. But still the very basic tendency between the idea of a homogeneous unified culture of Germany and the idea of a multicultural heterogeneous Germany remains unsolved.2 Overcoming this tendency and finding a satisfying solution constitute a great challenge for Germany. The heterogeneous composition of Germany and its needs for new immigrants create many points of tension and challenges related with its identity. Germany did not accept itself as an immigrant receiving country for a long time and the basic idea behind the reluctance of this affirmation was the idea of Germany as a homogeneous nation consisting of similar people from the same race, culture, language and history.3 In this paper, I want to shed light on the integration problem of Germany from a philosophical perspective and try to discuss what Nietzsche might offer to develop our perspectives on the integration problem. I think combining the philosophy of Nietzsche with the integration problem of Germany is a fertile idea since one can find invaluable point of views on our basic values, life views, identities and cultures in his philosophy. In order to achieve this goal, first of all, I will give a short history of integration problem of Germany and then question what integration might mean from a Nietzschean perspective.

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A Short History of Integration Problem of Germany Integration problem of Germany is basically related with how Germany defined its identity. In this sense, firstly, it is important to examine the development of integration problem historically. We may start the story with the first citizenship law of 1913 where citizenship was based on ius sanguinis principle. This principle is based on the idea of an ethnic homogeneous Germany, and defines citizenship at birth. This principle was broken in 2000 and the citizenship of those who were born in territorial limits of Germany was also accepted. So till that time, it is possible to say that for Germany there were no immigrants but non-nationals and many politicians of Germany ignored the very simple fact that Germany was an immigrant receiving country.4 The need for immigrants from other countries started basically after World War II. After World War II, Germany achieved an economical growth, which is called German miracle. But Germany had to provide labor that was to be proportionate to the rapid expansion of the economy. Therefore Germany invited workers from other nations like Italy, Turkey, and Greece etc. It was the so-called Gastarbeiter programme. This programme was ceased in 1973. Till that time, it is guessed that 14 million guest workers came to Germany and nearly 11 million left and 3 million guest workers remained and there were nearly 1 million other non-Germans.5 The remaining guest workers did not want to go back to their homelands since they were aware that if they go back they would not be able to turn back to West Germany.6 At the beginning of the 80s, Germany changed its foreign policy and started restrictions for those who want to come to Germany. During these decades, immigrants enjoyed many social and economical rights but they did not get any political participation rights.7 But at the end of Cold War, a second wave of mass immigration occurred. This recent flow of new immigrants forced governments of Europe to take new steps in their immigration laws, but still Germany received the largest number of asylum seekers.8 As aforementioned, in the year 2000, Germany broke its ius sanguinis principle and in 2005 accepted the new immigration law as a response to the challenges regarding integration issue. These are the two important but recent initiatives. The number of immigrants was always clear but until these recent political responses to the growing challenges of integration, Germany remained ignorant of its multicultural composition. It is also argued that actually immigrants resisted integration of themselves into the German society; but, basically, it was Germany being

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late and unwilling for the necessary acceptance of them. Even the young people, that are now third generation from the descendants of Gastarbeiter, were perceived as guests and they could not really belong to Germany. This attitude gave rise to some other problems. For example, many young Turkish people in Germany experience identity problems. They don't feel that they belong to the culture where their parents are coming from and they don't feel that they belong to German culture either. This creates problematic social relations and these people experience alienation from the societies around them.9 In order to solve such kinds of problems, it is really important that Germany now accepts its multicultural composition. It is a very important step, but still integration process stands as a challenge for Germany. The new integration law is something that the immigrants are suspicious of; since, they still don't have a secure position to guarantee their residence. They still cannot really get a feeling of belonging to Germany. To sum up, Germany, even though, having defined itself as an immigrant receiving country, has still hesitations to accept itself as a heterogeneous country. Conservative perspective claimed for many years that those who accommodate in Germany from different cultural, ethnic and religious origins are in Germany for the economical growth of Germany and they have to turn back. In that sense, they were and have remained as "others" for many years being deprived of political participation rights. The conservative parties of Germany still resist the idea of multicultural composition of the nation. They should share the same culture, history, race and language in order to preserve the identity of Germany. In this sense, for them, immigrants should be assimilated in the homogeneous character of Germany and they should accept and respect the values of this German identity.10 As to the opposite parties, Germany should give up engaging in politics depending on homogeneous identity and accept its heterogeneous character and give political rights to the immigrants as well. Therefore, Germany is now facing a big challenge of its understanding of integration or its understanding of German identity. What is integration? And how should the process continue? In order to shed some light on the possible outcomes of this integration problem of Germany, now I want to discuss possible integration models depending on Nietzsche's philosophy.

Two Faces of Nietzsche's Philosophy Nietzsche, a 19th century philosopher, actually wrote nothing on integration problem of Germany. His basic problem can be formulized as our attitudes

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towards life and how we perceive it and since integration problem can also be considered as an attitude problem, it is possible to find invaluable material in his philosophy. I think integration politics depending on the fear of the other or integration politics depending on the acceptance of the other as an enriching possibility are potential outcomes. But, before discussing these two attitudes, it will be illuminating to give a brief picture of his philosophy. Nietzsche's philosophy has basic critical points. He rejected Christian morality and Platonism and challenged common understandings of truth. He philosophized with a hammer in order to break these old tables of truth.11 But at the same time he tried to defend life-affirming attitude, which means being open to change and difference. According to the perspective of Nietzsche, there is no divine order, no aim, goal of the universe or no real world that has the properties of regularity and stability. These are just human impositions. Traditional metaphysics despises apparent world because reality should be divine and stable. A "chaotic" world of ever lasting contradictions, change and flux cannot be real. But for Nietzsche just the opposite is true. Becoming and flux are the nature of universe and there is nothing beyond or apart from God that will redeem us from the pains of contradictions, changes and flowing nature of everything. When we get rid of our wishful thoughts for something stable – beyond, being, god, objective unchangeable truth, etc. – a world of change and perishing will be revealed in front of us. In other words, we can have no fixed meanings and static truths any more for Nietzsche. This leads to facing the anxiety of meaninglessness. What Nietzsche offers is courage to face the change and flux of life, which will mean affirmation of life. Nietzsche also questioned why we want to cling on eternal, universal, safe, comfortable ideals. For him, clinging on any idea that cannot affirm the flowing nature of life is nothing but a resignation from life. And the reason for this resignation is anxiety of meaninglessness. Actually, this anxiety of meaninglessness is the source that creates all unifying ideals,12 and Nietzsche tries to point out this source with his genealogy and he tries to show the relation between fear and any belief that is "universally" defined. But at the same time he wanted to foster the courage to affirm life, which is being open to change and difference. In other words, Nietzsche teaches facing the life of becoming without escaping from a comforting stable ideal that gives our souls comfort.13 This is "tragic wisdom."14 Nietzsche criticized everything absolute as ascetic ideals and defended affirmation of change and becoming of life as tragic wisdom. In his

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philosophy, the contrast between "ascetic ideals" emerging from the fear of change and difference and "tragic wisdom" that affirms the changes and becoming in life lies at a central point. To sum up, a real "yes" to life is reached through the full realization of the "negative" elements in life. In order to reach "amor fati", in other words, affirmation of life, one has to welcome change and difference. In this sense, Nietzsche tried to show that we cling on wishful ideals since we fear unknown and different and want to find something that does not change. And at the same time he wanted to construct the affirmation of this world of change and becoming. This brief picture of Nietzsche's philosophy gives us clues about integration problem. The anxiety of change and difference might lead to the ideal of stable identity of Germany that cannot welcome "other". Or being open to differences might be seen as an enriching possibility for Germany. In this sense, now I will try to investigate two faces of the story one by one by relating them to integration problem of Germany and try to present two models of integration models by relating them to Nietzsche's aforementioned ascetic ideals and tragic wisdom difference.

Integration Model resulting from ascetic ideals Nietzsche's worldview does not let anyone speak of absolute truths since, for Nietzsche, these are just "our" truths and they do not have any quality like absoluteness. If one clings on absolute truths and values, it can be claimed that there exists a kind of human narcissism since one ignores any other perspectives, and values. Nietzsche asks simply the genealogical roots of such beliefs. Answer lies in the fearful void.15 The man who suffers from his meaning in the world creates such ideals and then despises the life of becoming. A search for a meaning that supplies salvation from all the change and pain in existence leads people to imaginary worlds of metaphysics. In this case, man does not want life anymore, but just a metaphysical comfort. Basically Nietzsche attacks the Platonic world of "being" and Christian "God" as ascetic ideals but for him anything that resists changing nature of life can be named as ascetic as well. Integration of people from different race, culture, religion and language to so called mainstream German culture can also be an example of clinging on ascetic ideals if this mainstream of German culture perceives itself as a singular, stable and ideal unity. And if state also accepts this view strictly, then, state will function as a protector of this unity. In this

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case, state assumes itself to be a homogeneous unity and forces others from different cultural origins to fit in. In this case, state forces minority groups and individuals to be in the way that it wants. For such a state there is no room for the deviations from the so-called "normal" values that it posits. And generally those who are into such a state are the ones who need order and unity. One cannot choose the life style that s/he wants and his /her value freely since there is an ideal unity posited. In this case, we can think of the state as "the coldest of all cold monsters"16 for Nietzsche and only when such a state ceases there begins the life of the autonomous individual. In such a state, if there are minority groups that are different than the dominant group, then state forces minority groups to fit into the customs of the mainstream group in order to demolish any bias between these two groups. Conservation of the unity of the culture can be seen in the attitudes of conservative parties of Germany; because, they clearly assume this aforementioned one, homogeneous cultural identity of Germany. They resist to the differences in the society. In that sense, at least their conservative attitude against differences may be labeled as falling into the category of Nietzsche's ascetic ideal. Nietzsche's definition of ascetic ideals basically grounded on resistance to change and difference for an ideal unity17 and these parties are not quite open to difference and change even though Germany is still in need of immigrants. To sum up, the integration based on resistance to what is different and other falls into what Nietzsche calls as ascetic ideals because in that case conservative groups force minorities or individuals to fit into an ideal unity. Since there is an assumed homogeneity of the German culture, the "other" remains as a threat or something to be feared of. It can be Muslims, Turks or anything other than the standard German. And even if minority groups commit themselves to the values of German society they remain or will remain as others.

Integration Model Resulting from Tragic Wisdom Very basically, all idealizations and fear of change are decadent forms of life; but the opposite position is wisdom, which Nietzsche calls as tragic.18 Welcoming change and difference is a saying yes to life. For Nietzsche, the most valuable attitude towards life is being open to flowing and changing nature of life. This necessitates overcoming fear of the dynamism and indeterminacy of life. It is possible to say that

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Nietzsche's basic problem in his philosophy is constructing the value of life without offering any idealization. He says: Man seeks "the truth": a world that is not self-contradictory, not deceptive, does not change, a true world--a world in which one does not suffer; contradiction, deception, change--causes of suffering! He does not doubt that a world as it ought to be exists; he would like to seek out the road to it.[…] Contempt, hatred for all that perishes, changes, varies- whence comes this valuation of that which remains constant? Obviously, the will to truth is here merely the desire for a world of the constant.19

Actually here, Nietzsche criticizes metaphysical search for comfort; but I think, it fits to the integration problem of immigrants in Germany as well. Nietzsche emphasizes differences rather than similarities. As it is mentioned, Germany has an undeniable heterogeneous character. But the problem is "Is it something to be afraid of?" or "Is it something that enriches the overall society?" With regard to Nietzsche's understanding of life, I think, he would be against a stable ideal Germany that cannot accept others from different values, cultures or ethnic origins. Public should be free of discrimination of different identities. It should be possible to interact with other perspectives on life since there is no one ideal truth. So, in that sense, what Nietzsche would offer as an integration model would be fostering pluralist atmosphere and developing rights of expression for the minority groups. If we accept Nietzsche's life affirming attitude, than the integration model would be in a pluralist atmosphere where different groups are included to the main stream German culture without being imposed to give up their identities.

Conclusion In this paper, my aim was trying to bring a different perspective on the integration problem of Germany from Nietzsche's philosophy. I tried to give a brief account of Nietzsche's philosophy focusing on the standard of life-affirming values and a short history of integration problem of Germany. In this sense, I separated Nietzsche's philosophical project; the first one as trying to destroy the ascetic ideals and the second one as an attempt for cultivating openness for change and difference, which he labels as tragic wisdom. Then I tried to combine these two attitudes to integration problem of Germany. In the first type of integration model, the state strictly assumes that it is homogeneous in terms of race, culture, language and history that form the nation's identity. It is of course true that the main

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stream German culture shares these similarities; but, if the state forces the foreigners to accept and fit into this mainstream peculiarities of Germany, minority groups won't really adopt the mainstream culture of Germany. In the second integration model, the state tries to remain open to all different groups inside it. Plurality is respected and different identities find also rights to express their point of views. The state remains as a balancing power between different groups and in that sense it is just the guarantor of peaceful coexistence. State agrees that it consists of many other identities and sees it as positive and enriching. In this sense I want to finish my words with a quotation from Nietzsche: This is how all states now confront one another: they presuppose an evil disposition in their neighbor and a benevolent disposition in themselves. This presupposition, however, is a piece of inhumanity as bad as, if no worse than, a war would be; indeed, fundamentally it already constitutes an invitation to an cause of wars, because, as aforesaid, it imputes immorality to one's neighbor and thereby seems to provoke hostility and hostile acts on his part. […]Better to perish than to hate and fear, and twofold better to perish than to make oneself hated and feared—this must one day become the supreme maxim of every individual state!20

Notes 1

See http://www.statistik-portal.de/Statistik-Portal/de_jb01_jahrtab2.asp There are still discussions on the New Immigration Law of Germany if it is the "adequate policy response." See Green, S.; Hough, D.; Miskimmon, A.; Timmins, G. The Politics of the New Germany, Routledge, London and New York, 2008, p. 107. 3 Ibid., p. 93 4 Ibid., p. 98 5 Ibid., p. 95 6 Ibid., p. 95 7 Alladdino÷lu, Y., The Challenge of Becoming a Multicultural Society: The Case of Germany, MS.Thesis, Middle East Technical University, 2005, p. 13. 8 See: Green, S.; Hough, D.; Miskimmon, A.; Timmins, G. The Politics ofthe New Germany, Routledge, London and New York, 2008, p. 95. 9 It can even be claimed that unemployment, alienation and experiencing xenophobic or even racist attitudes towards them lead these youth to crime. 10 Even though the new political laws cannot be determined as assimilationist, some immigrant groups claim that it is actually so since, they don't feel that they have secure political position. 11 Nietzsche's one of the most important book name is Twillight of the Idols or How to Philosophize with a Hammer 2

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12

GM III:28. Here are the abbreviations to Nietzsche's books employed in this paper: BT = The Birth of Tragedy (1872); HAH = Human, All-Too-Human (1878-9); GS = The Gay Science (1882); Z = Thus Spoke Zarathustra (1883); BGE = Beyond Good and Evil (1886); GM = Genealogy of Morals (1887); TI = Twilight of the Idols (1889); EH = Ecce Homo (1908); WP = Will to Power (notes from 1883-8). 13 GS P:3 14 EH IV: 3 15 GM III: 28 16 Z I:XI 17 GM III: 28 18 EH IV: 3 19 WP 585 20 HAH II:II 284

Bibliography Nietzsche, Friedrich, The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings, transl. Judith Norman, Cambridge University Press, 2005. —. Beyond Good and Evil, transl. Judith Norman, Cambridge University Press, 2002. —. The Birth of Tragedy and The Genealogy of Morals, transl. Francis Golffing, Doubleday & Company, New York, 1956. —. Ecce Homo, transl. R. J. Hollingdale, Penguin Books, 1979. —. The Gay Science, transl. Josefine Nauckhoff and Adrian Del Caro, Cambridge University Press, 2001. —. Human, All Too Human, transl. R. J. Hollingdale, Cambridge University Press, 1996. —. Thus Spoke Zarathustra, trans. R. J. Hollingdale, Penguin Books, 1969. —. The Will to Power, transl. R. J. Hollingdale and W. Kaufmann, Random House, 1967.

Other References Alladdino÷lu, Y., The Challenge of Becoming a Multicultural Society: The Case of Germany, MS.Thesis, Middle East Technical University, 2005. Green, S.; Hough, D.; Miskimmon, A.; Timmins, G., The Politics of the New Germany, Routledge, London and New York, 2008. Stattistische Amter des Bundes und der Laender, Ausländische Bevölkerung, http://www.statistik-portal.de/Statistik-Portal/de_jb01_jahrtab2.asp

SEXING-UP THE WELTBEAMTER RACHAEL SOTOS

Goethe once wished that all good people were poets. In this way seemingly prosaic deeds worthy of praise might appear attractive, glamorous, even sexy. A poetry of the good would counter the demonic appeal of danger, transgression and perhaps, of evil. Though lacking in poetic capacity, I do however possess a kind of faith in two parts: on the one hand that the best hope for world peace lies in the development of international institutions such as the United Nations, and, on the other, that there is meaning in politically-conscious cultural intervention, in the stories we tell, in our modes of artistic engagement, etc. Samantha Power's recent biography of the late Sergio Vieira de Mello, the United Nation High Commissioner on Human Rights likely headed for the position of Secretary General, before he was killed in Iraq in August 2003, is a case in point.1 If ever there was a man with the claim to exemplify the impossible, to make the seemingly mundane tasks of the international bureaucrat sexy, it was certainly Sergio. As Power recounts the assessment of a journalist colleague in 1994, "'He's like a cross between James Bond and Bobby Kennedy'."2 Given the Obama Administration's respectful posture toward international institutions, e.g. the affirmation of nuclear non-proliferation treaties and the essential role of international supervision, there is some room for optimism regarding the role international institutions may play in the future press for peace. But those who put their faith in international institutions must keep in mind that since the end of the Cold War we have seen travesties in Bosnia, Rwanda, Sudan, Congo and Iraq. The Security Council is perhaps not as divided as it has been, but it is far from clear that the UN–although it is the only truly global political forum–will successfully confront the transnational challenges confronting peaceful coexistence: poverty, over-population, global warming, disease, geopolitical insecurity. With the gravity of our situation in mind, I would like to consider Sergio, man of peace, in conversation with another sexy international superstar: Slavoj Zizek. Zizek, the "Elvis of cultural theory," is sexy in a different sense than Sergio. This is not simply because Zizek is

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a philosopher and Sergio a Weltbeamter. Zizek, we recall, once ran for president of Slovenia. Sergio was himself a philosopher, a graduate of the Sorbonne, who, while working full time for the UN, not only completed his masters, but two doctorates. The difference between Zizek and Sergio is that Sergio represents the quintessence of the sexiness of an international civil servant, while Zizek embodies the sexiness of radical theory, the particular eros characteristic of an "orthodox Lacanian Stalinist." This epithet (Zizek's own) is of course comical, for Zizek does not shy away from appearing ridiculous, precisely because he wants to challenge our dearest assumptions, including our commitments to peace, to democracy, to tolerance and to an anti-totalitarian politics. As Zizek explains in a relatively recent interview, while he does not advocate the horrors of the past, he questions the commitment to peace itself: hence his fascination with Lenin: "What I like in Lenin is precisely what scares people about him—the ruthless will to discard all prejudices. Why not violence? Horrible as it may sound, I think it's a useful antidote to all the aseptic, frustrating, politically correct pacifism."3 If I had the poetic genius of a Plato, I might attempt to construct a dialogue between Sergio and Zizek: two sexy beasts debating peace, violence, revolution, and the prospects of achieving peace through the difficult, incremental labor of developing international institutions. In fact, I entertain a fantasy that for all their differences, they would have adored each other. They certainly would have much to discuss. At first approach we might imagine a harmonious conversation as Sergio, a former Marxist whose radical credentials were validated in May 1968, in Paris, would agree with many of the arguments of Zizek's provocative 2008 book, On Violence; he would certainly affirm that systemic violence is everywhere, albeit often hidden from the view of the privileged.4 Indeed Sergio himself often argued that much of what we do in the realm of humanitarian intervention simply puts a happy face on global capitalism, and may even be counterproductive. But while we can imagine Sergio and Zizek enjoying each other's company, and finding concord on a variety of topics—from the horrors of bureaucracy to the shortcomings of political correctness—Sergio, a man who devoted himself to the onerous task of strengthening and legitimizing international institutions, presents a challenge to Zizek. Thus, I imagine, at the end of their dialogue, Zizek, perhaps a bit tipsy, is compelled to agree that Sergio exemplifies his own (Zizek's) best thought. To anticipate the prose that follows: In In Defense of Lost Causes, a work appearing simultaneously with On Violence, Zizek affirms his faith in "the proletariat" and the possibility of violent revolution. He offers an untimely if not simply improbable series of

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reevaluations: of Stalin, Mao, but also Foucault's flirtation with the Iranian Revolution and Heidegger's Naziism. In the latter two cases, Zizek does not censure the intellectual's romance with totalitarianism, but rather is troubled by the failure to really think through genuine alternatives to modern liberal democracy.5 In the following I will counter several of the key arguments from On Violence and In Defense of Lost Causes with the sexy Sergio, masterfully eulogized by Samantha Power. Without succumbing to Zizek's provocative claims, but taking his often illuminating arguments to heart, we find that Sergio too is worthy of a defense. The UN is not quite "a lost cause" such as those Zizek chooses to think through, but it is certainly not so firmly established that it does not require passionate advocates to ensure its viability. Lacking the poetic genius of a Plato, I will limit my discussion of Zizek and Sergio to three topics essential to the project of "sexing up the international civil servant:" the relation between theory and practice, democracy and, finally, ethics.

Theory and Practice Perhaps the question of the relation between theory and practice does not appear at first blush to pertain to sexiness, but in fact one's passion for theory and the manner in which one engages it (or fails to) is of the utmost political importance. Zizek, attuned to this truth no less than were Socrates and Plato, is intent to offer romantic advice. But perhaps, you, dear reader, are like me, wary of taking romantic advice from a Lacanian; whatever the claims, "woman does not exist," "there is no sexual relation," "we must give up the desire for the desire of the other" mean, they do not seem to bode well for romance. Zizek however, we may be sure, is a great romantic, and is quite intent to advise the contemporary left on its true commitments. In both On Violence and In Defense of Lost Causes he explains that while it might seem safer to fall in love with those who advocate only non-violent, peaceful approaches in politics, or those who retreat into some kind of post-modern relativism, the safer approach is the cowardly approach. Although we do not want to blindly repeat the horrors of the past, Zizek insists that we must acknowledge that it is difficult to have a Revolution without some Terror. Moreover, when we consider violence in historically, many times we find it justified, as Benjamin has taught us so beautifully with the angel of history and the notion of divine violence, violence ultimately judged apart from the traditional standards of good and evil. Above all, Zizek argues, we should not allow ourselves to be tricked by what the "common sense" of "enlightened conservative

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liberalism" allows, the so-called third way that identifies "global capitalism with a happy face" as the only political option. I will not attempt to refute the horrors Zizek rightly identifies in contemporary global capitalism, nor do I take issue with his acute analyses of moral hypocrisy. Yet, I am not willing to give up my common sense or put my allegiance in with the new "dictatorship of the proletariat." Still, Zizek, ever the romantic, offers some worthwhile advice. Above all Zizek affirms passion: first we must be lovers with faith in our causes, a faith strong enough to counter even skepticism grounded in empirical reality. Here Zizek celebrates the functionary of state socialism who has faith in socialism, even as he is confronted with the corruption of "existing socialism."6 Zizek celebrates John Brown as the only American in the nineteenth century radically committed to racial equality.7 Even the abolitionists, we recall, typically accepted "the fact" of racial inferiority. But Zizek also celebrates Anne Frank, who in the face of the Nazi horror, proclaimed a faith in the essential goodness of humankind. Zizek's second point of advice is just as important. Not only an advocate of passion, he is charmingly, "a bit old-fashioned." For Zizek merely "hooking up" is not an option in matters of theory and practice. He does not want "friends with benefits," but a love relation over the longterm. And here communication is of the utmost importance, indeed we must understand the relationship between theory and practice dialectically, with an "engaged," "open" relation to truth. In In Defense of Lost Causes he claims that only "Marxism and psychoanalysis" meet these qualifications: [They are] struggling theories, not only theories about struggle, but theories which are themselves engaged in a struggle; their histories do not consist in an accumulation of neutral knowledge, for they are marked by schisms, heresies, expulsions…theory is not just the conceptual grounding of practice, it simultaneously accounts for why practice is ultimately doomed to failure.8

Zizek is surely right to affirm both Marxism and psychoanalysis as ongoing theoretical frameworks which passionately and continually, dialectically engage the question of practice. But Sergio and his long career as a Weltbeamter are no less exemplary for those wishing to think through the relation between theory and practice in "open" and "engaged" terms. First we must affirm Sergio's love for the UN according to Zizek's first criterion: passion. Although he joined the organization rather by chance in 1969, when he was still a Marxist radical, he truly fell in love. He not only was famous for reciting UN ideals with "near-romantic reverence," as Power reports, but he proved his allegiance by traveling

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anywhere, at any time, often at great cost to his family life.9 Indeed, until the last years of his life, it seems the UN was the only thing to which he was faithful; he "offset his seeming priggishness about UN principles by flamboyantly playing up his love of women."10 Still, it would be wrong to think Sergio's fidelity a blind loyalty, a thoughtless application of rules. He became famous for a rather ruthless brand of pragmatism and the ability to bend the system to his will. To give one vivid example of Sergio's necessarily "dialectical" approach to theory and practice: when he was charged with repatriating Cambodian refugees in 1991, he found the official maps provided to him neither matched the actual geography of Cambodia, nor took account of the deathly landmines pocketing nearly every square meter.11 Taking to heart Zizek's criterion of theory at its most radical as the theory of failed practice, we must acknowledge that few have endured the harsh reality of theory foiled in practice as did Sergio. Among all of his work in war-torn regions around the world, from Bangladesh, Sudan, Cyprus, Mozambique, Lebanon, Cambodia, Bosnia, Rwanda, Congo, Kosovo, East Timor and Iraq, he had few lasting or unquestioned successes. Success certainly in numerous humanitarian achievements, and political successes in East Timor and Cambodia, but humiliation for the UN peacekeepers who stepped aside when the Israelis went into the Lebanon in 1983, humiliation in the nineties in Bosnia, when Sergio himself spent much wasted effort wooing Milosevic and Karadivic (a time when, as Bernard Henri-Levy puts it, "the UN was passing out sandwiches at the gates of Auschwitz"), and of course the disaster and humiliation when Sergio failed to convince Paul Bremer to keep the Iraqi army intact and to give the Iraqis authority over their own constitution, events which led him to describe himself as "a Victorian parlor maid, seduced and discarded."12 But if wisdom comes through suffering, Sergio is a candidate for tragic edification indeed. Let us recall that throughout the diverse incarnations of Sergio's career, arranging food deliveries, organizing refugee returns, negotiating with warlords, he was continually engaged with the question of truth and the problematic application of theory. As Power recounts in detail, Sergio was continually questioning the United Nations itself, pondering the application of principles, suffering with the questions of when impartiality fails and military action proves necessary, when humanitarian aid is counterproductive, how to balance the abstract principle of human rights against humanitarian concerns. Let us not forget his two major scholarly works: the first, The Role of Philosophy in Contemporary Society (1974), explored the prospects of dialogue and

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intersubjectivity through a Marxist-Hegelian lens. The second, his 1985 Civitatas Maximus, articulates his conception of a utopian egalitarian society and, among other things, offers a meditation on the prospects of Kant's notion of Perpetual Peace. One of the most memorable points in Power's biography is her depiction of Sergio reading Kant's moral philosophy in his few leisure moments while negotiating with the Khmer Rouge.12 It is an unexpected picture of a Weltbeamter perhaps, but it certainly speaks to the notion of engaged truth which Zizek advises. Moreover, when we reflect on the tenuous condition of international institutions presently, we find we should pause before we dismiss the patient labor of a man like Sergio, passionate about his cause, but no less a man of reflection. As Sergio himself expressed it in an essay entitled "The World's Conscience: the UN Facing the Irrational in History," "the transition from the ideal to the real is often extremely long, hard, costly and cruel."14

Democracy To repeat: for all their differences, Sergio and Zizek agree on much. Zizek thinks radically, but strategically. He is a skeptic, but not absolutely opposed to international institutions. He did not oppose Nato's action against the Milosevic, and he has spoken favorably for the ICC, the International Criminal Court. Still, Zizek never lends his critical acumen to the project of developing and strengthening international institutions. Rather, Zizek's particular brand of Lacanian political theory is emphatically directed against the passion of the Weltbeamter. In the terms of the present discussion, Zizek insists that democracy is not sexy. Or: to speak Lacanian, there is no jouissance in democracy. In an illuminating argument, Zizek, drawing on Claude Lefort's discussion of Lacan and democracy, claims that because democracy is by definition procedural and formal, it does not in and of itself sustain ideological commitment.15 For Zizek, the (alleged) absence of jouissance has two profound structural implications. First it means that the much bemoaned enervation of the left is not due to any deficit of democratic participation, but is simply a feature of modern liberal democracy: democracy is "ultimately a project of administration, not of ideological commitment." It is for this reason, Zizek asserts, that all leftist attempts to imbue the notion of "a united Europe with political passion (such as the Habermas-Derrida initiative in the summer of 2003) fail to gain momentum." And secondly, fundamentalist reactions within democracy are likewise structural necessities: Fundamentalism is not an accidental feature of the modern state, rather its necessary complement, all

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the more vicious the larger and more abstract the state becomes: "the 'fundamentalist' attachment to jouissance is the obverse, the fantasmatic supplement to democracy itself."16 On this ground, Zizek asserts that we should re-invigorate our ideological commitment apart from the vacuity of democratic procedure, investing our hope and faith in the "dictatorship of the proletariat." I do not intend to offer a highly spirited defense of the contemporary institutions of liberal democracy. A wise man once noted that the word "democracy" is the second most prostituted word in the English language. But Zizek's cynical insistence that democracy is unsexy must be corrected. Thankfully Sergio and the UN come to the rescue. First, we might fix our mind on Sergio the man of action, the man who abhorred bureaucratic responsibilities, preferring almost always to be "in the field." Secondly, we may call to mind Habermas' more prosaic notion of constitutional patriotism, noting that Sergio was not only famous for "near-romantic reverence" regarding UN ideals, but specifically his affirmation of the egalitarian nature of these UN ideals. Sergio, by all accounts had what Montesquieu deemed the premier virtue of democracy, a love of equality, that is, in his life-practice he did not live merely by formally equality, but he treated people equally. Sergio did not manifest the radicality of a John Brown of course, but there are innumerable anecdotes in his biography which speak to the fact that throughout his life he demonstrated an unusual respect and report with all those he engaged, from cafeteria workers at the UN to drivers in the field, in countries all over the world. Notably part of his adherence to UN ideals was the rigor with which he adhered to the UN principles of staffing, always selecting a multinational team reflecting the principles of excellence and global representation rather than his own political agenda. Political appointees at the UN, by contrast, notoriously reject this aspect of the UN egalitarian ethos, viewing such commitment to multi-national staffing as "romantic." But to truly understand the way in which the life of Sergio refutes Zizek's claim that there is no jouissance in democracy, we have to call to mind how his colleagues experienced him: It was Sergio who seemingly miraculously made one feel safe and confident in the most dangerous places. It was Sergio's unflappability that allowed him to woo the most resistant on the most unappealing missions. As Samantha Power reports, his colleagues felt as if he were the UN itself embodied. As one official put it reflecting on the ill-fated UN resolution that sent a humanitarian mission to Iraq in 2003, "At the end of the day everyone was hoping that 1483, with all of its absurdities [e.g. recognizing the legitimacy of the US

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occupation], would be salvaged by Sergio himself…that was the whole plan: Sergio will fix it."17

Ethics Finally, let us consider our sexy Weltbeamter in relation to contemporary ethical theory. Zizek, a Lacanian, is intent to dissuade us from the most predominant academic approaches to political ethics: including both the "fascination" with unfathomable otherness, alterity, as we have with Levinas and Derrida; and the trust in dialogue, recognition and universal reason or "reasonableness," as we have with Kant and the Habermasians. For Zizek, as for Lacan and others, ethics should be based on a hardheaded recognition of "the inhuman core" in human beings, not on the human in humanity itself. The "other", Zizek warns us, is an "other", a frightening thing, frightening in the same way that our own unconscious is frightening. Zizek's maxim is: "fear thy neighbor as thyself." He ridicules "the naïve ethical consciousness" which is continually surprised that "the very same people who commit acts of violence toward their enemies can display warm humanity and gentle care toward members of their own group." The fact is, he claims, we do not wish to have much to do with this "other," we tolerate him or her, but only at a distance; "the neighbor" is " "a traumatic intruder, someone whose different way of life (or rather, way of jouissance materialized in its social practices and rituals) disturbs us, throws the balance of our way of life off the rails: when it comes too close, this can give rise to an aggressive reaction aimed at getting rid of this disturbance."18 In Zizek's "realistic view," the lack of identification with universal humanity is no accident, but a feature of our linguistic being. All too simply put, for Lacanians language (and by implication culture and ethics) divide us; "Language itself is violence;" and more communication means first and foremost more conflict. As is no doubt obvious, the implications for politics and the pursuit of peace are significant. Again and again, Zizek ridicules the multicultural quest for tolerance and recognition, attempts which he thinks often misguidedly put their hope in overcoming the demonization/dehumanization of the Other. Likewise, in many places he scorns the advocates of dialogue. Ridiculous to Zizek are the words of an advocate of dialogue in the Middle East who says: "An enemy is someone whose story you have not heard."19 For better or worse Sergio makes for a fascinating contrast, for perhaps he more than any other person in the twentieth century, stretched the limits of "the procedure" of dialogue. While he never gave up his faith in the potential transformation of the dialogical encounter, we might recall

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that it was Sergio who, having spent so much time buttering up evil-doers, joked that his autobiography might be called My Friends the War Criminals. This was, as I have hinted, for better and worse. It is lovely to envision Sergio reading Kant while wooing the Khmer Rouge, for he did successfully repatriate the Cambodian refugees. It is less delightful to picture him enduring the diatribes of Karadzic and shopping for gifts for Milosevic, for there is no doubt that the UN commitment to impartiality in the early nineties was ill-fated. Nevertheless, while Sergio may have at times in his career overly-accommodated those in power in pursuit of UN ends, he was never completely naïve. He never gave up on the ideals of dialogue and open engagement because at the minimum it is politically wiser. As he himself put it after having met Mukta al Sadr in Iraq in 2003, "the last thing we should do is ostracize him;" "its always useful to have an enfant terrible if you can control him."20 Given this simple political imperative we should pause before we embrace a Lacanian ethics grounded only in the inhuman core of the other. In seeking peace we should pause at least with the very human virtues Sergio exhibited. He was, as is reported countless times, a seducer, one who made both his friends and his enemies feel recognized and loved. As Carina Perelli, the head of the UN electoral assistance division, expresses it in Spanish, Sergio was an "encantador de serpientes, a mesmerizing charmer of even the most poisonous snakes."21 Significantly, he not only possessed a remarkable talent for languages (he was one of the UN's greatest linguists), he had a remarkable imaginative capacity in relation to others. According to Cambodian Prince Norodom Sihanouk, Sergio did not simply learn the words of a language: he gave the impression that he understood one's world view.22 It is such talent, which, we might surmise, pace Zizek's psychoanalytic wariness, actually enters the unconscious of the other. With such talent the Weltbeamter is both sexy and essential to peace.

Notes 1 Samantha Power, Chasing the Flame: Sergio Vieira de Mello and the Fight to Save the World, Penguin, New York, 2008. 2 Ibid., 4. 3 "I am a fighting atheist, interview with Slavoj Zizek," interview with Doug Henwood Zizek, introduction by Charlie Bertsch, in Bad Subjects, Issue #59 Crusing, February 2002. Retrieved on April 18, 2009; http://bad.eserver.org/issues/2002/59/ zizek.html 4 Slavoj Zizek, On Violence, Picador, New York, 2008. 5 In Defense of Lost Causes, 107.

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Ibid., 31. Ibid., 173. 8 Ibid., 33. 9 Chasing the Flame, 324. 10 Ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 Ibid., 422. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid., 518. 15 In Defence of Lost Causes, 173. 16 Ibid.,101. 17 Chasing the Flame, 392. 18 On Violence, 59. 19 In Defense of Lost Causes, 11. 20 Chasing the Flame, 448. 21 Ibid., 404. 22 Ibid. 7

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HISTORY

THE FLAG OF MARIA: RELIGION AND PUBLIC SPACE IN EUROPE EGIDIUS BERNS

Most people that voted against the European Constitution during the referendum in the Netherlands – now three years ago – were living in the 'bible belt'. In the region that runs diagonally from the Northeast of the Netherlands to the Southwest, more than 70% of the voters rejected the constitution, which constitutes 10% more than in the rest of the Netherlands. Protestant regions in Europe have always been more reluctant with regard to the European Union than the Catholic regions. Several reasons can be given for this, such as the low degree of organization of the Protestant churches, their strong bonding with the forming of the national states in Europe and, finally, the continuous suspicion that the process of the European Union is a Vatican combine, which is also suggested by the crusade of Rome against Soviet atheism.1 Has it not been said that the three founding fathers of Europe, Schuman, Adenauer and De Gasperi, were the "three tonsures under one skull-cap"? The resistance against the euro of the Free Reformed Parish in IJsselmuiden is a beautiful example of this suspicion.2 Their members refuse to use the euro coins and bank notes, even for their daily transactions, since these were introduced on 1 January 2002. We recognize the symbol of Europe on them: a circlet of twelve stars. According to this church, this is a biblical symbol. "The use of biblical symbols is plagiarism. People have to keep off these symbols", says minister G. Taverne of this parish that filed a complaint against the use of this symbol to the Dutch government in 2003. For this, he refers to Apocalypse 12.1: "A great sign was seen in the sky: a woman clothed with the sun, with the moon under her feet, and on her head a crown of twelve stars. She was with child and wailed aloud in pain as she labored to give birth". The Roman Catholic tradition recognizes Virgin Mary in this woman. The image of her crown of stars on the European flag, coins and bills demonstrates, according to the people from IJsselmuiden, that the Vatican "deviously saturates" the European Union "with papist symbolism". "Every well-reformed Dutchman sees what is coming to him, is it not?",

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says a member of the church. He subsequently refers to the constitution of Europe in which the Christian roots are concealed and to the Islamic Turkey as a new member state. Later we will be, as it were, decapitated. You see that our little country is a matter of minor importance. In everything we will be handed over to the mercy of Germany, France and England.

In these utterances, one discovers all the problems of the European Union presented in a nutshell and all of this because the crown of twelve stars is supposedly deviously papist symbolism. However, living without euros is very much possible. The members of the parish consistently arrange all their financial transactions by way of the ATM card, the smart card or in guilders. "When it became known that the Dutch guilder would be replaced by the euro, we kept as many of the guilders as possible. We will be able to continue until 2032 when the Dutch money becomes worthless. We trust that before this date people in the Netherlands will realize that they went into the wrong direction with the euro." It is not surprising that precisely the euro was the cause for people in IJsselmuiden to raise the question whether we are not going "into the wrong direction". After all, money demands a certain trust and this trust cannot be fully substantiated. Money, therefore, implies faith. Then, apparently, it is only a small step towards religion. Just to make sure, Americans have indeed written 'In God we trust' on their dollar. In IJsselmuiden the crown of stars needs to be replaced with the 'God be with us/God zij met ons' to make of a little piece of metal real money again. That a religious symbol is presented on the euro should rather have been a consolation for the people from IJsselmuiden. The problem, however, is that they claim to know with their faith who the real God is and to see in Mary merely superstition. To what extent is the suspicion that the European flag is papist symbolism justifiable, and, if this were the case, how could this have happened? In this article, the story of the European flag, with all the coincidences involved, becomes a sort of case study. However, I am interested in what this story tells us about the way in which, more generally, the relation to religion in our Western culture functions within the public sphere, not only for Europe but also for a 'small country' such as the Netherlands that does not know what to do with its multicultural diversity on the waves of globalization. After all, we presumed that, as from the Enlightenment, in our culture reason can ground itself and does not need faith to do this. When reason can install its own conditions of possibility, it is free of everything that still "chained"3 it and it can, as a

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consequence, only be understood as also being separated from faith. This means that for matters that concern society and for which the practical, that is to say, 'reasonable' part of reason counts, the church and the state, religion and politics, religious motives and arguments that are accepted in a public debate should be separated. The story of the European flag seems to contradict these presumptions, which signifies, however, by no means that faith and knowledge therefore belong together. The relation precisely appears to be in this story more complex than we previously assumed; and this way of dealing with the complexity characterizes it as typically European. For this reason, the different social forms adopting the relation between reason and faith, such as the (degree of the) disestablishment of state and church, the role of confessional parties and the use of religious arguments in the political debate, can differ from one country to an other. In this contribution, however, these forms do not come into prominence, but, rather, the presumed way in which the European deals with reason, with faith and with the relation between them and the way he gives content to these forms. Then, although, this contribution mainly searches for the presumed relations, this in no way means that they are not empirically visible. A glance on the Source Book of the 1999/2000 European Values Study Surveys4 suffices to see that Europe is secular, but not unbelieving;5 but, at the same time, this does not lead, in the opinion of the European, to the necessary consequences in the public debate. Accordingly, he – in a large majority – does not want anything to have to do with the clear-cut directives regarding the distinction between good and evil,6 and 73% thinks that the leader of a party should be willing to work together with other groups, "even if this means compromising some important beliefs".7 .

The Story8 In the first years following World War II, a great pro-European state of mind dominated Western Europe. A united Europe seemed the best way to free itself from new wars. This development resulted in the founding of the Council of Europe in Strasbourg in 1949, which especially took on the task of the protection of the human rights in Europe. It is here in the Council of Europe that the European flag was completed in 1955. The main issue of the Council was to gather the many initiatives presented in those days in favor of a united Europe under one single emblem. Different European movements that were quite often of conservative, catholic cut have already existed before the war and now saw their chance; they each

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stepped forward with their own flag. The Council wanted to avoid that the European thought would incur detriment by these circumstances. It took more than 30 years before they succeeded in letting the flag from Strasbourg wave on the buildings of the institutions of the European Union – mostly in Brussels – in 1986. One should not forget, in relation to this, that "Europe" exists of an accumulation of institutions, because it is itself not a state, that is to say, it is not a well-defined territory with its own sovereignty. Every institution arises from an international treaty, independent of previous treaties, and, therefore, each one of them comes forth with its own institutionalization. Because of this, every institution has its own bureaucracy and tries to distinguish itself in competition with another, for example with its own symbols and logo. One of the objectives of the European constitution was precisely to set things straight in this accumulation.

Some of the Players The question of one European flag was on the agenda as from the establishment of the Council of Europe in 1949. Mainly officials from the Council took the initiative for this. The official apparatus of the Council mainly consists of idealists, resistance fighters, intellectuals who had become politicians or politicians who read books. I will name three of them: Léon Marchal, the secretary general of the Council, son-in-law of the eminent French catholic author Paul Claudel and who was characterized by his colleagues as an "essentially religious mind". Paul Lévy, the energetic but also skillful director of information of the Council, one of the Belgian Jews that converted to Catholicism, resistance fighter, journalist looking for adventure, professor at the universities of Louvain and Strasbourg, ennobled, at ease both with the big names of the then European political world (Adenauer, Mollet, Hallstein) and with artists and intellectuals. Not irrelevant for our subject is that he said of himself that he could not draw. Arsène Heitz, an insignificant messenger at the Council and a pious person that could draw with precision. Heitz had a mother that liked to pray in the chapel of Blessed Virgin Mary of the Miraculous Medallion at the Rue du Bac in Paris. Virgin Mary had appeared to Saint Catherina Labouré in this chapel in 1830. Mary showed to this sister of Love of St. Vincentius a Paulo a model of a medallion on which, among other things, twelve stars are presented, and she told her that the one who would wear this medallion could count on much grace, which would be good for the

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welfare of the world and of France in particular. These events took place in an oppressive and very conservative environment while, at the same time, Paris was ablazed by a revolution against the restoration and the Catholic Church. Not long after, on 8 December 1854, Pope Pius IX defined the dogma of the Immaculate Conception, according to which Mary was conceived without original sin. This Mary was mainly represented against a blue background, standing on globe with a snake or half moon on her feet and a crown of twelve golden stars around her head. The medallion, mostly also in the blue color of Mary, was for a long time immensely popular among the Catholics. Heitz also wore it. The appearances of Mary were in those times the order of the day. One can think of Lourdes where Mary appeared in 1858. In 1950, Marchal started the proceedings of the European flag in the Office of the Assembly of the members of parliament of the member states. The president of the Office, that is, the dyed-in-the-wool Paul-Henri Spaak from Belgium, resisted: "That is a question that seems simple, but in reality it is extremely sensitive; it is the kind of problem that will cause quite some complications. You are in a hurry? You are right, but this matter demands to be slowly in a hurry." However, the Assembly consents with the proposal of the secretary general and requested one of its prominent committees to come up with a proposal for an emblem. However, this committee, assisted by the officials of the Council, needs 5 years to come to a complete proposal. Spaak saw it correctly. In December 1955 the delegates of the ministers of the member states decide that the emblem of the Council of Europe consists of "a circle of twelve golden stars of which the ends do not touch each other, on an azure field". The decision also gives the following symbolic description of the emblem: "In the blue sky of the Western world the stars that represent the peoples of Europe form a circle as a sign of unity. The number of stars is invariably twelve, twelve being the symbol of perfection and fullness." As said, it takes another 30 years before this emblem was taken up by the European Union. This Union comprises, besides the other institutions, of the European Community that originally consisted of 6 members and because of this carried a blue flag with 6 stars. However, this Community slowly expanded itself. When the twelfth member entered in 1986, the then chairman of the European Commission , Jacques Delors, used this opportunity to apply the emblem of the Council of Europe also for the institutions of the European Union, and, therefore, to limit the number of stars invariably to twelve, no matter how many new members were about to enter.

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It is impossible to describe all the vicissitudes of the realization of the emblem as from 1950 in a short article. I limit myself to 3 moments that were decisive for the structure of the flag.

Cross or stars? In the first proposals that the committee discussed, the emblem consisted of a cross. Different proposals were made by Heitz who unconcernedly referred to the Crusaders, Charles the Great and the yellow colors of the Vatican. The socialistic and Turkish members of the committee – Turkey was by then already member of the Council of Europe – resisted these proposals. What is remarkable, however, is a double play that dominated the proceedings of the committee as from the beginning. The cross was namely defended on the basis of the fact that it already appeared in a majority of the flags of the member states, namely 7 of the 15 members. Moreover, Lévy has no problems defending the cross by saying: "Well, these are roads, North – South and East – West, that cross in Strasbourg." It seems that rational motives can replace religious ones even though this does not affect the religiosity. The cross, however, does not make it. Many proposals reach the committee from the outside. By way of the elimination of rings and points, they finally end up with stars.

How Many Stars and What Color? The Council of Europe consisted of 15 members. One of these members is Saarland that, based on international agreements that arose from the German defeat in WWII, no longer came under the then German Federal Republic; but Saarland was accepted by the Council of Europe as associated member. However, this state of affairs was very painful for Germany. Saarland was not recognized by Germany as a state. Once the stars were given preference, the committee proposed a circle of 15 golden stars on a sky-blue field, as the color of serenity and peacefulness. Why sky-blue? Preference was originally given to green, the color of hope and already the color of the flag of the Pan-European movement. However, just as Asia had seized the yellow color, America the red, Africa the black, the green color was already allocated to Australia. Therefore, of the primary colors only the blue color remained for Europe. It is as simple as that. The Assembly approved the 15 stars against the sky-blue background despite the opposition of the German members of parliament. Nevertheless, the council of ministers, chaired by Adenauer, rejects the 15 stars and hands the case again over to the committee. It can, however,

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not choose for 14 stars for the same political reason. 13 is not an option, since that brings bad luck, as the Italian member of the committee tells. Thereupon Marchal and Lévy propose to let go of the idea to associate the number of stars to the number of member states, and they choose an invariable number. They plead for 12 because this number expresses perfection, it lets itself to be divided into 4 quadrants and it refers to the 12 hours and the 12 months. Heitz recounts this course of business in his own way in the French edition of the Osservatore Romano of 1989: "They have asked me to draw the Flag of Europe. Suddenly I had a flash of inspiration to incorporate the twelve stars of the Miraculous Medallion of the rue du Bac, against a blue background, the color of the Holy Virgin."9 Lévy minimalizes the role of Heitz to that of a simple executioner because he himself could not draw. However, Heitz did, for sure, play a role during the proceedings of the committee. He took initiatives. Of the more than 100 designs that the committee discussed, Heitz made at least 20. For the twentieth birthday of the European flag the French post office releases a special stamp that was accompanied on the first day with a portrait of Heitz, described as "coauthor and draftsman of the model of the European flag." Lévy and probably even more so Marchal completely support the proposal of Heitz, and they openly talk among each other about the religious implications. Furthermore, it is said that Lévy appreciated the blue color because it was the color of the Star of David on the flag of Israel and, also, because the 12 stars could refer to the 12 tribes of Israel.

The Date: 8th December, Catholic Holiday of Maria's Immaculate Conception The council of ministers that had to approve of the flag met from 7 December until 9 December 1955. Usually the decisions are dated on the last day. The resolution that concerns us here is indeed dated on 9 December. However, on the official report and in the press release the date of 8 December is mentioned, when the subject matter was actually discussed, for Marchal considers it "a beautiful case" if it could be dated on 8 December, that is to say, on the day that the Catholic church celebrates Maria's Immaculate Conception. In the correspondence with the chairman of the committee, Lévy tries to account for this irregularity. One year later the Council of Europe donates an immense glasswork to the choir of the cathedral of Strasbourg, representing Maria in blue garment, with the circle of twelve golden stars high above her head against an azure background.

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Reason and Faith The realization of the flag of Europe can be fully reconstructed based on rational considerations, as these are customary in a public and secular debate. There are stars on it because the Turkish and socialist representatives reject the cross. There are 12 stars because Saarland makes 15 impossible. The color is blue because Australia already has green. A religious mind will see the hand of God in this string of rational reaction to contingent events. The actors are more or less aware of this. Their role is very Catholic to cooperate with this mercy. However, each time, their reactions adjust to what the rational course of events demands. When a religious reading seems possible, so much for the good and "a beautiful case", but their faith would not have been shattered if Australia already had blue and Europe had to become green.

…cannot be separated Hence, the 'story' teaches us what, in a certain sense, the flag of Maria can just as well be called the fruit of a rational course of events. The religious order accepts, then, the rational that explains the religious contents beside itself. However, the explanation does not touch upon the faith of the faithful. This points out a difference between what one believes and faith, which cannot be expressed in the Dutch language that has only one word for both (geloof), but this is possible in, for example, English or French: belief or croyance versus faith or foi. This difference, however, was already made in theology as from the Middle Ages. One speaks there respectively of fides quae creditur, the believed content that is believed, versus fides qua creditur, the act of faith with which one believes. Fides is for that matter the Latin translation of pistis from the Gospel that means 'trust and promise' and not 'to hold true'. The act of faith cannot be posed without referring to a believed content, but still, the believed content does not exhaust the act of faith. Therefore, religion cannot do without all kinds of dogmas but, at the same time, not one dogma seems to fully represent the religion, and a rational unmasking of the dogma does not suffice to disconcert the faithful. The French philosopher Jacques Derrida, who was much occupied with the relation of reason and faith, defines religion then as two opposed movements that cannot be united. On the one hand, religion produces all sorts of contents against the abstract forms of society that shape the identity of the communities. In this sense, religion is reactive and it resists the uprooting of the contemporary technological and global society by way

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of a return to all kinds of forms of community life, such as religious feasts. On the other hand, it is the peak of a transcending movement and it abstracts from every content; not one content is elevated enough to do justice to the God to whom they give their trust.11 All believed contents are, therefore, in the light of the act of faith inherently conceivable as superstition. In this transcending quality, religion can be expected to have a forceful impulse to abstraction and, hence, to the development of theory. It is therefore nonsense to identify religion with irrationality and it gives evidence to a lack of historical insight to maintain that theology, besides a reactive, if not reactionary role, would not have contributed to the development of the sciences and could itself not be an academic and scientific discipline. Precisely because the believed content does not exhaust the act of faith, a rational purification of the content is from the perspective of the act of faith necessary. Faith always aimed for pure faith and, because of that, to the elimination of superstition. However, reversely, does reason tolerate the religious order next to it? What is new in our time possibly hides in this question. One often speaks about our time of fundamentalism and restoration in terms of the 'return of religion'. The twelve stars on our euro also seem to remind us of such a return where we least of all expect it: on a bank note that lacks every reference to national communities and appears to be a mere product of economical rationality. However, religion has probably never been gone. It seemed to be gone for 70 years in the Soviet Union, but when that collapsed it turned out to be one of the few social forces that still worked. As enlightened civilians, convinced of the self-sufficient force of reason, we only did not consider religion worthwhile; we considered it an archaism or something of which the destination has to prepare secularization and morality in order to finally merge with these. However, we are no longer convinced of that self-sufficient force. Precisely because we have discovered that reason is also a matter of conviction that presupposes an act of faith. The English philosopher of language John Austin already explained, more than 50 years ago, that with words one can not only say something but also act. The difference between these constatives, to which knowing appeals itself, and performatives, such as a promise, is itself however a performative. A promise that we will be rational, then, always precedes rational knowing.11 In the same manner, rational arguments, as commonly used in a public debate, are not detachable from the faith in the promise to be rational. Reason cannot be immunized for faith, just as the twelve stars can always also refer to Mary. Even if we merely attribute a secular content to the flag, then it is, as we saw, a promise of unity and perfection, of serenity and peacefulness. The so-called 'return of religion'

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does not have to do with the return of something or someone absent but with the limitation of reason. Reason does not comprehend everything, but it does have an exterior. Hence, it does not only determine but also undergoes. It is established and does not have everything under control. The integration of the so-called foreigners does not fail because they do not want our culture, but because we – I would say with good reasons – have begun doubting the self-certainty of our own culture. This does not appear to us any longer as complacent. The disintegration is within us, in our culture and this takes away the power to accomplish the integration. The project of the European Union has also to do with the fact that national cultures have become fragile. Complacency leads within Europe to inverted results. Sovereignty is no longer independence but interdependence.

…but they are also not reducible to each other. However, that reason and faith are no longer separable does not mean that they can be reduced to each other. One cannot turn faith into knowing. This is precisely what dogmatic religion does. With that, it passes over the fact that faith cannot be affected when there is a rational version given of the believed content as we have seen happening in the story of the European flag. We saw this dogmatic point of view in the people of IJsselmuiden, whose faith furnishes true knowledge, because of which other religions can be marked as superstition. In addition, knowing cannot turn every faith into knowledge. This is precisely what scientism does. With that, it passes over the fact that knowing itself implies an act of faith and that the flag, no matter how secular, entails a promise. This is then the way in which the relation to religion functions in the public space in Europe. On the one hand, one is reserved to claim pure rationality for this space: the flag of Europe also shows the flag of Mary. However, on the other hand, religions submit themselves to the demands of a rational exchange in that space. The admirers of Mary agreed to the twelve stars and the blue color, because the day has 12 hours and the year 12 months and blue is the color of peace, which the European project aims for. This reservation-and-submission does not solve the tension between faith and knowledge, between religious motives and public debate. The reason for this is that the act of faith cannot be posed without content of faith, and this content is, as we previously said with Derrida, reactive. The act of faith is not exhaustively represented by it, but the act can also not be affirmed without representation. It is true that it concerns a content of faith, but, because of that, it is no less a content to which the faithful can

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appeal in the public debate. For, else, he would no longer have faith. His submission to a rational exchange in the debate is, therefore, from his point of view, always a compromise and not a solution. However, this demands that he has in his own faithful position some room to negotiate at his disposal, and this is given to him by the fact that the act of faith does not coincide with the believed content and no believed content can be elevated enough to do justice to God. In this sense, religion is intrinsically tolerant. A dogmatic religion, on the other hand, that confuses faith and knowledge and fixes the act of faith on the believed content does not have such a room for negotiation at its disposal. There, one can theoretically find the lower limit of a 'European' way in which religions find themselves in the public space. However, practically, this limit cannot be drawn, because a faithful person cannot avoid forming his faith in believed contents. The room for negotiation, that is at the disposal of the faithful on the basis of the fact that the act of faith does not coincide with the believed content, is handed over to him by reason as well, because reason finds in its own non-sufficiency a reason to be tolerant and to show respect for that which lies outside its domain. Here one should also take into account that this tolerance is in principal only related to the act of faith. However, because this act cannot be released from a believed content, tolerance, with regard to the act of faith, cannot pass over the content of the latter. This tolerance of reason is, however, not an indifference or neutrality towards religious points of view. From the understanding of its own limitation this tolerance, precisely, opens a public space in which these perspectives become negotiable.

Notes 1

The most important protestant church, the best organized and most inclined to give up the nationalism in a European frame, was that of the West-German Federal Republic. However, this church also remained precautious with regard to the European Union that was too much marked by an anti-sovietism, in order not to endanger the relations with the East German sister churches. Cf. Fornerod, S., Les protestants face aux institutions européennes, Working paper IDHEAP, Chavannes-près-Renens, 10/2001. 2 I base this information on the Nederlands Dagblad of 16 April 2003 and of 26 January 2004. 3 Heidegger, M., Nietzsche II, Phüllingen, Neske, 1961, pp. 229-230. 4 Halman, L., The European Values Study: A Third Wave, EVS, Worc, Tilburg University, 2001. I refer in the text directly to the pages of this book. I thank Loek Halman and Jacques Hagenaars for their critical remarks to a previous version of this section. Obviously, I alone am responsible for the eventual editing of this section.

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67 % of the Europeans considers himself a religious person (L. Halman, o.c., p.81), but, at the same time, the church-attendance (32 %, p. 78) and the trust in the churches (54%, p. 185) is lower and only 20 % calls himself a member of a denomination (p. 76). Explicit atheism is low (5 %, p.81). 77 % of the Europeans believes in God (p. 86) and 61 % spends time on praying and meditation (p. 97). The data differs a lot from one country to another. It is however not possible to descry differences that can be traced back on the borderline between Northern or Southern, Eastern or Western Europe, or between originally Catholic and Protestant regions. Neither is it the case that variables within countries systematically point into the same direction. France has for that matter 15 % explicit atheists and Great Britain, in accordance with the European average, only 5 %, but the English call themselves for 53 % not a religious person while this is only 39 % in France (p. 81). 6 62 % regards this as completely depending on the circumstances. This is also the case in countries that show a high number of religious variables, such as Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece and Ireland. Even only half of the Polish think that there are strict rules for determining good and evil (p.73). Denmark, that shows a high percentage of 77 % with regard to the question of considering oneself religious, does not want anything to do with a strict distinction (85%, p.73). Furthermore, 48 % of the Europeans think that it will not be an improvement for their country when it was governed by persons with "strong religious beliefs", as the questionnaires stated. 28 % considers this preferable and 24 % does not make a decision with regard to this. The four Eastern European countries (Croatia, Belarus, Ukraine and Russia), that are not a member of the EU, show, just as Greece, Malta, Slovakia and Romania for that matter, a reversed image. If we leave these countries aside, then an outspoken majority does not consider it an improvement when governors have strong religious beliefs (p.106). Apart from the people of Greece, Malta and Rumania, all other Europeans are dead against the suggestion that someone who does not believe in God is unsuitable for a public function (p. 104). Everyone, hence even the people of Greece, Malta and Rumania, think with a great majority that religious leaders should not influence the voting behavior of the voters (p. 105) and the decisions of the government (p. 107). Only in the Netherlands and Sweden is such an involvement still supported by one quarter. 7 Halman, L., o.c., p.215. 8 All data and quotations of this 'story' are derived from the archives of the Council of Europe and that of the European Union. They are to a large extent available on the websites of these two institutions, especially: http://info.coe.int/archives/hist/flag/default.asp. 9 See: https://membres.lycos.fr/pierreval 10 Derrida, J., "Foi et savoir. Les deux sources de la « religion » aux limites de la simple raison", in: J. Derrida et G. Vattimo, La religion, Paris, Seuil, 1996, p. 10. 11 This turns rational knowing into a practice that can no longer exclude other practices, such as the religious. These practices are indeed different, but because of that they are just as the sciences still likewise practices. See Stengers, I., La vierge et le neutrino. Les scientifiques dans la tourmante, Les Empêcheurs de penser en rond, Paris, 2006, p. 187.

'GERMANIA': THE PRESENTATION OF UTOPIA 1 IN ART AND LITERATURE KENICHI ONODERA

Introduction Since the end of the 18th Century, Germania has been one of the most important national symbols in the visual arts.2 In the second half of the 19th Century, her form became fixed as a symbolic figure for the unified German Nation and so remained until the beginning of the 20th Century.3 The goddess has always embodied a utopia of an imaginary sphere of peace. Yet a further characteristic is also remarkable: the more Germania was established as a national symbol, the stronger the emphasis was placed on her militaristic side.4 Germania was often presented in the form of a Valkyrie,5 which was consistent with national discourse of the 19th Century in which the achievement of a utopian, national peace first required some kind of military action. In this context, the concept of peace is closely connected with a perceived unassailability of the state's sovereignty and its political and military independence from other powers. Accordingly, this sphere of peace is firmly limited to the 'Fatherland,' and may even appear as a threatening power to those excluded from it. In this paper, the presentation of utopia will be discussed in relation to how the form of Germania was adopted as a symbol of national identity. Depictions of Germania in art and literature have often been mutually influential, thus references to Germania in German poetry will also be considered alongside examples of her appearances in painting and sculpture. The analysis will focus on Heinrich von Kleist's aggressively patriotic poem Germania an ihre Kinder: Eine Ode (1809). It will also explore an interpretation of Friedrich Hölderlin's hymnic 'Song of the Fatherland' entitled Germanien (1801) as well as his theoretical text Das Werden im Vergehen (1799) as counterpoints to the depiction of a chauvinistic utopia.

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The 'sorrowful Germania' from antiquity to the 18th Century Germania appeared with increasing frequency as the figure of a national tutelary goddess during the 19th Century. She symbolised the identity of the German nation and found her way into various areas of daily life.6 Her representation as 'the German maid from Orleans' was a modern reinterpretation, however. Originally, 'Germania' was simply the term used by the Romans to describe the German-populated territory East of the Rhine that had no clearly defined ethnic or geographical borders. The image of Germania was first and foremost conveyed via Roman coins, upon which the Goddess appeared as a sorrowful prisoner in chains.7 Despite changes to her external appearance over the course of history, two of her characteristics survived from antiquity to the end of the 1800s. Firstly, she remained an embodiment of German-populated territory, and secondly, she was generally presented as a weak figure, kneeling or sorrowful due to her lack of autonomy and subordination at the hands of another power. During the 16th Century, Germania represented both the Germanpopulated territory under the rule of the Habsburg Emperor,8 as well as the powerlessness of the German people in the face of war and plague.9 In the 17th and 18th Centuries, the image of the goddess was transformed into a symbol not only for the territories of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, but also for the German subjects of the monarchic empire. Germania was at this time also represented as a passive figure. Abraham Aubry's 1663/4 copper engraving (Fig. 1) shows Germania seated at the feet of the Kaiser, supporting his hands in which he holds the sceptre and orb. The Emperor and Germania are surrounded by princeelectors who had been called to the 1663 Regensburg Diet in response to the threat from Turkey.10 Beneath the goddess is the figure of Mars, whose discarded weapons and armour can be interpreted as an allegory of peace. Two figures holding swords at the top left hand side of the picture represent the potential threat from Turkey, which jeopardises the peace finally reached after the end of the Thirty Years' War (1618-48). In this engraving, which portrays a future politically, militarily and territorially integrated 'Teutschland,' Germania's depiction as a subject of the Emperor and Princes is an allegory for the "entire population" and their subjugation, however any depiction of the German nation remains vague.11 Passive and weak aspects of Germania can also be seen in Anna Mana Wermer's illustrations from 1751 (Fig. 2), in which the goddess features in the Battle of the Teutoburg Forest. Hermann frees Germania from the clutches of Ancient Rome, which is allegorical of a German nation that is

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unable to save itself alone and must rely on the help of higher powers.12 The etching entitled Das zwischen Furcht und Hoffnung schwebende Teutschland [Teutschland wavering between fear and hope] printed in about 1760 (Fig. 3), presents the impotency of the German nation and its dependence upon aristocratic powers. The enthroned goddess with two symbols of the Empire, the sceptre and orb, resting in her lap, represents the territory of the German nation, ravaged by the Seven Years' War (1756-63). This war is depicted in the top right hand corner by the fight between the three eagles, symbolising Austria, Russia and Prussia. Surrounded by the allegories of fear, hope, peace and war, Germania is pictured with her hands pressed together in prayer which represents her powerlessness in the face of war. It can therefore be said that Germania is a reflection of the political situation in Germany at this time.13 It was only after the dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806 that Germania was slowly transformed into a symbolic figure of the German people's growing desire for a politically, militarily and territorially integrated nation state that could defend itself against external threat.

Depiction of Germania as a national symbol in the 19th Century Towards the end of the 18th Century, Germania continued to appear as a sorrowful, subjugated woman. The chains of the ruling power that bound her are no longer those of Ancient Rome but of Napoleonic France. As the Germans attempted to differentiate themselves territorially and mentally from neighbouring states, they started to become aware of their own identity as a part of a nation state.14 In his 1814 work, "Idee zu einem Teutschen National-Denkmal des entschiedenen Sieges bey Leipzig" [Concept for a national German memorial to commemorate the decisive battle in Leipzig], Friedrich Weinbrenner presents a Germania free from French subjugation.15 According to Weinbrenner, Germania is on the point of casting off her veil, revealing the orb and rising to her full stature. It is also worthy of note that Weinbrenner applies this notion not only to the German nation but also "its liberators, the strong allied powers."16 In the figure of Germania, the German nation appears united with the powers of the old monarchical order to which it owes its freedom. Weinbrenner's concept for a memorial reveals a self-image gradually acquired by the Germans from dealing with threat from rival powers, the break-up of the 'Fatherland,' and finally in reaching a state of peace. The activity and autonomy of the 'German nation' accord-

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ingly found expression in the form of the goddess who liberates herself from shameful foreign domination. In Philipp Veit's 1836 painting (Fig. 4), Germania holds in her left hand a shield decorated with the image of the two-headed eagle crest of the Empire. Below and to her right sits a faithful reproduction of the Ottonian Emperor's crown on a cushion. The seven crests on the front of the marble plinth represent the electorates of the dissolved Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation. In her right hand the goddess holds the undrawn imperial sword and the Golden Bull in her lap, both "symbols of truth and justice."17 The German Confederation (1815–66), created by the Congress of Vienna (1814-15), was a loose collection of territories with no unified political power. It is clear therefore why Veit presents Germania as a symbolic rendering of the lost royal Empire. The then still incomplete Cologne Cathedral in the background is "a clear and metaphorical expression for the not yet fully developed German Empire."18 The cathedral's location on the River Rhine illustrates the desire for military security that continued to stir after France's mortifying occupation of the territories to the left of the Rhine. Also emblematic is the crown of oak leaves upon her head, representing victory.19 The sword, which remains undrawn and still in its sheath, symbolises the peace reached after the 1814 Battle of Leipzig. These various symbols are also associated with the military and political unity that protected the 'Fatherland' from external threat. This allegorical illustration which embodies the hope of restoration, depicts the goddess as no longer separated from aristocratic powers but in harmony with them. Her transformation into a protagonist in German history is now complete. In the following phase of Germania's development, her physicality takes on a more aggressive form. As the Germans' national collective selfawareness develops, the modern form of Germania as a martial tutelary goddess becomes more common. Twelve years later, Veit painted Germania (Fig. 5) this time together with fellow painter Edward von Steinle for the Paulskirche, the then seat of the Frankfurt Parliament (1848–49). Befitting of the liberal democratic orientation of the Frankfurt Parliament, Germania does not possess any other attributes associated with the Holy Roman Empire apart from the national emblem on her chest. Although the sword and crown of oak leaves are still present in the 1848 painting, the sword is no longer a symbol of the Empire; it represents military strength only. Carrying the tricolour German flag in her left hand, Veit and Steinle's Germania represents a new politically and territorially unified Germany. With the naked sword she holds an olive branch as a "symbol of a propen-

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sity for peace." This is however a sign that military power is the precondition for maintaining a nation's peace. The Germania in Paulskirche is no longer a sorrowful prisoner, rather she is pictured raising her face upwards and facing the future with confidence. Before the backdrop of a rising sun, her upright position and drawn sword reveal her inner strength and determination. The transformation of Germania from a vanquished, kneeling, weak or sorrowful creature into a self-confident, radiant tutelary goddess of the planned new democratic German nation is now complete. Although the goddess no longer represents the fallen Empire, she is also not representative of an existing state power. Rather she possesses characteristics that the future 'Fatherland' should have and personifies a utopian Germany. During the period of the Frankfurt Parliament and even after its dissolution, this picture of Germania achieved wide circulation through copies, engravings, etchings and lithographs,20 and remained an original model for subsequent works that included similar motifs. From this point on, the most important messages that the utopian Germania conveys as a representation of a unified Germany are a state of peace and military readiness. By 1849, Germania had already appeared as a goddess of protection in Christian Köhler's painting Erwachende Germania [Awakening Germania] (Fig. 6). Holding the Emperor's crown in her left hand, the goddess symbolises the constitutional monarchy; she reaches with her right hand for the sword in order to defend herself against the "demons of slavery and conflict," finding justification in the allegory of justice. Again, Köhler's Germania does not represent an actual geographical area but the "hope for an imminent strengthening of Germany" indicated by the young oak plant on the right hand side of the painting.21 The body language of the goddess also points to a strengthening. She is about to raise herself up and grasp the sword but is not yet fully upright. The national desire to be a strong military power echoes Viet and Köhler's republican Germania and also features in Max Schneckenburger's 1840 song Die Wacht am Rhein [The Guard on the Rhine] written in response to the Rhine Crisis. Lorenz Clasen applies the same motif in his famous painting from 1860 Germania auf der Wacht am Rhein [Germania on Guard at the Rhine] (Fig. 7). Germania, in the form of a martial young woman with a drawn sword and a laurel wreath on her head, stands in a field on the banks of the Rhine directing a blazing look towards France. The inclusion, for the first time, of a breast plate and chain mail underscores the "militarily aggressive tendency" that was increasingly overlaying the democratic and liberal nature of German nationalism.22

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Germania as the martial goddess of the German Empire Germania was increasingly depicted with military connotations over the course of the 19th century, which expressed the Germans' heightening awareness of their national identity. In my opinion, the term 'peace' referred to a socially and politically stable state in which the Germans' collective national identity should have been inviolably preserved.23 After the Franco-Prussian War (1870–71), Germania was exploited by the Prussian state propaganda as a symbol for a nation with a constitutional monarchy. This is how Germania found her place atop the Niederwalddenkmal near Rüdesheim am Rhein (Fig. 8) which was inaugurated in 1883 to commemorate the "unanimous revolt of the German people" and "the resurrection of the German Empire" 1870/71.24 She appears here as a victor with a crown of oak leaves upon her head and the tip of a sword entwined with laurel touching the ground, symbolic of the conclusion of the war and a safeguarded peace. Although the intention of the planners was to make the Niederwalddenkmal into a monument for peace, internal strife and France's growing strength meant that the statue was increasingly identified by the nobility as a symbol of hunger for military action and desire for a unified national military.25 According to Botho Graf zu Eulenberg in his 1877 speech, the Niederwalddenkmal is both a "emblem of peace" and a "symbol of unity" as well as being a "appeal to later generations to stand firmly and faithfully by the side of the Emperor and Empire."26 The unity of the German Empire seemed so threatened by sectionalism, social democratic movements and cultural strife that the national monument was reinterpreted in an attempt to encourage loyalty to the Emperor and Empire under the principle of the constitutional monarchy.27 The Niederwalddenkmal, with Germania as its central figure, thus became not only a symbol for large-scale national co-operation but also functioned as an illusion through which the ruling classes could propagate their ideal of a unified German nation. Germania as a representation of peace and war, whose form was to be read as a "compromise between national monarchical and national democratic principles,"28 fulfilled this role perfectly.29 Entitled Deutschland—August 1914 (Fig. 9), Friedrich August von Kaulbach depicted his Germania standing before a fiery background in full armour; a scene that is highly representative of the First World War, not just because of the date. Wearing the emperor's crown, holding a sword in her right hand and a shield with the Empire's crest upon it in her left, she is

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more a martial deity than a defensive tutelary goddess, leading the entire German people into battle under the leadership of the Emperor. She embodies the unity of the Emperor and the German people in response to an external threat. This representation is far from the aforementioned etching Das zwischen Furcht und Hoffnung schwebende Teutschland from around 1760, in which Germania as the nation is separated from the power of the Emperor and the Princes and can only pray helplessly in the face of war. In Kaulbach's Germania, however, we see the simmering aggression coupled with an awareness of national identity that has become too strong, a characteristic that pre-empts the Third Reich's racial concept of the nation that is yet to come. Adolf Hitler's plan to turn Berlin into 'Germania' alluded not to the national symbol itself but to the racial concept she represented both implicitly and explicitly.30 The Germania who in antiquity was merely a personification of the 'German populated territories' for which no clear ethnic or geographic boundaries existed, and the Germania who in the 19th Century represented a Germany organized along liberal republican lines, finally lent her name to a utopian city that was only open to those regarded as 'German people.' For all those who were excluded from this national identity, the imagined city functioned as a dystopia.

Kleist's Germania as a Precursor to the Aggressive Image Up until now the process of modern Germania's development in the visual arts and within the literary tradition had been reciprocal. In the texts of 15th and 16th Century German humanists, Germania appears increasingly as an embodiment of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation. The goddess warns of the French King's attempts to take the Emperor's crown and lament the disloyalty of the Imperial Princes to the Emperor; one can clearly see in her depiction a chauvinistic, propagandistic attitude towards France.31 It was on the basis of this literary tradition that Kleist wrote his ode, Germania an ihre Kinder [Germania to her Children].32 In the poem, which he first attempted to publish at the start of the French-Austrian War of 1809, the cautionary and plaintive nature of Germania's character recedes and is replaced instead with aggression and a propagandistic call to arms. Kleist's Germania features as a propagandistic leader of the German people in war. In the first stanza her naming of rivers and mountains outlines the failed 'Deutschland' of the fallen Holy Roman Empire.33 Now that the "day of revenge" has arrived it means "Your weapons! Your weapons! / Grab what you can / With a club or a staff / Swarm into the valley of

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battle" (first and second stanza). This is a clear propagandistic call to arms against Napoleonic France. In the fourth stanza Germania calls for the Rhine to be dammed with the "corpses" of Germany's enemies in order to create a frontier with France. This means that in Kleist's ode, the War of the Fifth Coalition is not simply an act of revenge but a necessary step in the construction of a unified nation.34 Evidence of this can be found in the final stanza in which Germania evokes "freedom," "language" and "science" as the intellectual elements that bind the Germans together and the Kleist, through the voice of the choir, states that the "pyramid," the failed 'Deutschland,' should be rebuilt upon these spiritual foundations. In order to goad the Germans into embarking on a war against France, the second stanza sees Germania making reference to the great actions of their German forefathers and the legacy they thus assume as a descendent of this shared lineage: "The Germans, [...] Unvanquished blood of the Mars / Grandchildren of cohort attackers, / Brood of vanquishers of the Romans!" Kleist aligns himself with the humanists, who, dating back to Tacitus' work, construct a historical continuity from the Germanic peoples to the contemporary German population. Thus, contemporary Germans are said to have assumed the Germanic peoples' legacy of "distinguished military capabilities" and belligerence.35 These two humanist discourses regarding Germania and the Germanic peoples converge in this poem. Kleist's 'Song of Hate' thus anticipates the later trend in painting, sculpture and literature to adopt the figure of Germania as the 'mother' of a shared identity to encourage militaristic and patriotic fervour.36

Hölderlin's Germanien as an Antithesis to the Chauvinist Utopia Kleist's aggressive poetry is a likely response to the disintegration of the 'Fatherland' and a strengthened demand for a German independence that is linked to a more intensified national collective self-awareness.37 It is however more difficult to construe Hölderlin's response in the song Germanien (1801), in which the goddess is presented as an unarmed female priest who is disengaged from any military and political context. The Treaty of Lunéville (1801) may appear an obvious motive for the writing of the poem but it can actually be traced back to the poet's visit to the Congress of Rastatt (1797–99) from mid November to early December, 1798. Here, Hölderlin would have seen for himself that the old organisational structure of his 'Fatherland' would soon break-down.38 France attempted to gain control of territory up to the left bank of the Rhine which belonged to Austria, as well as other German states. His contact with South German

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republicans and representatives from cities in Württemberg would nevertheless have given him hope about the future of his 'Fatherland.' Hölderlin's 1799 theoretical essay Das Werden im Vergehen [Becoming in Dissolution] is deeply affected by this crucial moment and later influenced his particular way of depicting Germania.39 Hölderlin viewed the historical overthrow of the "Fatherland" as a moment of pure transition in which that which existed was dissolved and the possible became reality. The reality of the coming future is indeed envisaged in this "ideal dissolution" of the old, but is not yet in existence. One can remember the past but the past is no longer existent in the present reality. The pure transition therefore creates a state between being and non-being in which only the possible exists and will only become real in the future.40 This, on the other hand, means that in the present nothing really exists. Because in the present all relationships are possible, the potential realities of the future and past appear restrictive. Hölderlin therefore calls the moment of the dissolution, in which the "world of all worlds" is found, and in which "everything in everything" is presented, "all time". (StA 4, 1, 282–283) Naturally a relationship must be chosen from all the possible relationships so that the process of history can advance and a new reality can be created. The fundamental difference between the other artists that thematise Germania and Hölderlin, is that while they try to define a future relationship and express their ideal through the form of the goddess, Hölderlin thematises only the transition itself as the object of his "free artistic mimesis" (StA 4, 1, 283). He presents a utopian Germany, Germanien, not as a reality in the past or future but in the state of pure transition in which all of the realities are dissolved in the present.41 In his poem Germanien, Hölderlin presents the consciousness of the lyrical "I" which oscillates between the past and the future.42 In the first stanza it resolves not to retreat to the past but to remain in the "Fatherland" that lies beneath a simultaneously hopeful and threatening sky. In the second stanza it recognises that the period of the godly antiquity must be viewed as lost to the past and therefore must focus on the future. In the third stanza, an eagle appears as a messenger that is flying from Indus over Mount Parnassus to the Alps "in the prelude of a rougher age" – that is, in the present. From there he then sees "the diverse countries" of the German nation and searches for a priestess by the name of Germania (third stanza). She is "the quietest daughter of God" "too fond of keeping silent in deep ingenuousness" despite giving a name to her "concealed" mother earth, of which she is also herself a symbol (fourth and fifth stanza).

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She is presented as so mute that she can only watch with wide eyes as the recent "storm" of the French Revolution "threatening death, rang out above her head" (fourth stanza). As this description contradicts the historical fact that the German states did actually defend themselves, Hölderlin's Germania does not represent the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation.43 Neither does she represent Hölderlin's own ideal of the future Germany, as she has not been imbued here with any socio-political principles. She alone is a symbol of the "ideal" "perishing Fatherland" (StA 4, 1, 282), which is caught in transition between being and non-being or rather, she is the embodiment of all possible relations. The eagle says that he has known her since antiquity and that since their first meeting she has possessed the ability to give the 'Holy Earth' a name. Therefore he demands that Germania should look from the present to the future so that finally from infinite possibilities, a new reality will come into existence: "No longer now the unspoken / May remain a mystery / Though long it has been veiled." That is, "between Day and Night," between the future and present, once a "truth [must] be made manifest" and yet the still unspoken "truth" may not be articulated. Because the potential in its entirety cannot be realised, it may only appear in a limited form. The "truth" —or rather, the divine—cannot appear in reality without distortion. Only the entity which exists in the past, present and in view of the future can thereby illustrate the potential in its whole by circumscribing it not in any one fixed form, but "threefold," in three states of time: past, present and future (sixth stanza). This distinction between the symbol of the "truth" and the portrayed godly, original "truth" is revealed through the connection between Germania and her mother earth. In the seventh stanza, the eagle requests that the priestess naming the "hallowed" "virginal Earth" in the present "centre of Time" between the "divine things past" and "things yet to come." The "holidays" in the poem refer to this moment of naming in which Germania acts as a priestess. She has this status because she mediates between potentiality and reality in the act of naming the mother earth. Since the number of possibilities in a fixed future or past reality is limited, the 'Holy Earth' is only considered to be integral for all the possible relationships in the present. Therefore the moment of naming characterises this present as a pure transition from potentiality to reality. The real name of the secret holy Mother Earth is never actually mentioned to in the poem. Instead it takes her name, Germanien. This utopian Germany must remain unspoken.44 That is, if it were to appear in a fixed form that conveys a particular socio-political message, it would be immediately relegated to a single reality. It would thus cease to be a utopian

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sphere of universal peace. In light of this, Hölderlin, despite his own republican stance, allows both "the kings and the peoples"—representing the ruling powers of the past and the future respectively—to take part in the "holidays" together (seventh stanza). Together, they surround the priestess who "defenceless" and yet "full of presentiments" and "peace" gives them "advice" (fifth and seventh stanza).

Conclusion In summary, it can be said that it was the common historical background of witnessing the collapse of prior socio-political values and structures that motivated German artists to use the form of Germania to depict national identity. Germans were developing a greater awareness of a national identity due to increasing threats from external powers. Depictions of Germania mirrored this trend, reflecting the policies of various internal socio-political powers. This national identity was largely insubstantial and little more than a construct that was created afterwards by delineating a border between the self and the other. Most depictions of Germania therefore represent an ideal of a politically unified German nation. The emphasis on a constructed identity in any depiction of Germania carries with it the risk of confining itself hermetically from all that is 'different' so as to make the 'inherency' a reality. Hölderlin succeeds in averting this danger by depicting the moment of the overthrow and rebuilding of the 'Fatherland' (an equivalent to national identity) as the only sphere for peace. In this utopia, awareness of identity oscillates between the being and the non-being. At this moment, the self is on the verge of separating itself from the other, but because the other is required to compose the self, this cannot lead to an unnatural shift in balance. In this structure of consciousness a sphere for universal peace is recognised as a state in which all the possible relationships between different elements oscillate in their potentiality and achieve a state of equilibrium.

Notes 1

This essay was translated from German to English by Erica Callery. See: Hoffmann, D., "Germania: Die vieldeutige Personifikation einer deutschen Nation," in: Freiheit—Gleichheit—Brüderlichkeit: 200 Jahre Französische Revolution in Deutschland; Ausstellung im Germanischen Nationalmuseum, catalogue compiled by Rainer Schoch and ed. Gerhard Bott, Germanisches Nationalmuseum, Nürnberg, 1989, 137–51. 3 See: Brunn, G., "Germania und die Entstehung des deutschen Nationalstaates: Zum Zusammenhang von Symbolen und Wir-Gefühl," in: Symbole der Politik, 2

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Politik der Symbole, ed. Rüdiger Voigt, Leske + Budrich, Opladen, 1989, 101–22; Gall, L., Die Germania als Symbol nationaler Identität im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 1993; and idem, Germania: Eine deutsche Marianne? Une Marianne allemande?, Bouvier, Bonn, 1993. 4 Cf. Brunn, "Entstehung des deutschen Nationalstaates," 113–16. 5 Cf. Wünschel, H. J., "Die Wacht am Rhein: Ein Fluß als Politikum", in, Mythos Rhein: Ein Fluß—Bild und Bedeutung, ed. Richard W. Gassen and Bernhard Holeczek, Ludwigshafen am Rhein, 1992, 297–320, here 315–16; and Gall, L., "Christian Köhlers ›Erwachende Germania‹ von 1848–1849", in: Jenseits der Grenzen: Französische und deutsche Kunst vom Ancien Régime bis zur Gegenwart; Thomas W. Gaehtgens zum 60. Geburtstag, vol 2, Kunst der Nationen, ed. Uwe Fleckner, Martin Schieder and Michael F. Zimmermann, DuMont, Cologne, 2000, 182–90, here 188–89. 6 See: Gall, Symbol nationaler Identität, 12–22. 7 See: Trzinski, E., Studien zur Ikonographie der Germania, Ph. D. diss., University of Münster, 1990, 34–36. 8 For examples of depictions of Germania under the rule of the Habsburg Emperor, see: Trzinski, Ikonographie der Germania, 188–203. Cf. also von Hagenow, E., Bildniskommentare: Allegorisch gerahmte Herrscherbildnisse in der Graphik des Barock; Entstehung und Bedeutung, Olms, Hildesheim et al., 1999, 15–21. 9 Germania as an embodiment of the German people can be seen in some religious xylographs. See: Beyer, F.-H., Eigenart und Wirkung des reformatorischpolemischen Flugblatts im Zusammenhang der Publizistik der Reformationszeit, Lang, Frankfurt am Main et al., 1994, 153; and Koch, E. U., "Germania—eine facettenreiche Nationalfigur im Dienst des politischen Meinungsstreits: Selbst- und Fremdbild in der deutschen und französischen Pressenkarikatur im Wandel der Jahrhunderte; Ein Forschungsbericht", in: Politische Karikatur: Zwischen Journalismus und Kunst, ed. Dietrich Grünewald, VDG, Weimar, 2002, 45–68, here 46. 10 See: Deutsche illustrierte Flugblätter des 16. und 17. Jahrhunderts, vol. 2, Die Sammlung der Herzog-August-Bibliothek in Wolfenbüttel, bk. 2, Historica, ed. Wolfgang Harms with Michael Schilling und Andreas Wang, Kraus, Munich, 1980, 578–79. 11 Hofmann, "Germania", 137. 12 See: Hofmann, "Germania", 139–40. 13 A further example can be seen in a depiction from 1790, in which Germania kneels before Leopold II and presents him with the heart of the people. See: Gall, Symbol nationaler Identität, 8. 14 This notion of a national identity is based on Otto Dann's analysis which considers the creation of the 'nation' as an artificial construct in the socio-political modernisation process. Dann, O., Nation und Nationalismus in Deutschland, 1770–1990, Beck, Munich, 1993. 15 See: Friedrich Weinbrenner, 1766–1826: Eine Ausstellung des Instituts für Baugeschichte an der Universität Karlsruhe, exhibition and catalogue compiled by Wulf Schirmer and others, Karlsruhe, 1977, 79–80. 16 See: Gall, Germania, 12.

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Brunn, "Entstehung des deutschen Nationalstaates", 108. Suhr, N., Philipp Veit (1793–1877): Leben und Werk eines Nazareners; Monographie und Werkverzeichnis, VCH, Acta Humaniora, Weinheim, 1991, 101. 19 See: Brunn, "Entstehung des deutschen Nationalstaates," 108. 20 Gall, Symbol nationaler Identität, 11. 21 1848—Aufbruch zur Freiheit: Eine Ausstellung des Deutschen Historischen Museums und der Schirn Kunsthalle Frankfurt zum 150 jährigen Jubiläum der Revolution von 1848/49, ed. Lothar Gall, Nicolai, Berlin, 1998, 82. Cf. also Gall, "Christian Köhlers ›Erwachende Germania‹," 185–89. 22 1848—Aufbruch zur Freiheit, 437. 23 For details of the concept of collective identity, see: Giesen, B., "Codes kollektiver Identität," in: Religion und Identität: Im Horizont des Pluralismus, ed. Werner Gephart and Hans Waldenfels, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 1999, 13– 43. 24 Sartorius, O., Nationaldenkmal auf dem Niederwald: Geschichte und Beschreibung desselben, Hilsdorf, Bingen am Rhein, 1888, 71. For details of the Niederwalddenkmal, see Tittel, L., Das Niederwalddenkmal, 1871–1883, Gerstenberg, Hildesheim, 1979. 25 See: Tittel, Das Niederwalddenkmal, 1871–1883, 86–91. 26 Sartorius, Nationaldenkmal auf dem Niederwald, 117. 27 See: Tittel, Das Niederwalddenkmal, 1871–1883, 86–87. 28 Nipperdey, Th., "Nationalidee und Nationaldenkmal in Deutschland im 19. Jahrhundert," in: idem, Gesellschaft, Kultur, Theorie: Gesammelte Aufsätze zur neueren Geschichte, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Göttingen, 1976, 133–73, here 159. 29 A similar motif can be seen in Hermann Wislicenus' Die Wacht am Rhein oder Germania (1873). See Gehrecke, S., Hermann Wislicenus, 1825-1899, Goltze, Göttingen, 1987, 43. 30 See: Picker, H., Hitlers Tischgespräche im Führerhauptquartier, Goldmann, Munich, 1979, 366. Cf. also Reichhardt, H. J., and Schäche, W., Von Berlin nach Germania: Über die Zerstörungen der »Reichshauptstadt« durch Albert Speers Neugestaltungsplanungen, 11th ed., Transit, Berlin, 2008. 31 For more information about personifications of Germania by the humanists, see Trzinski, Ikonographie der Germania, 165–75. 32 von Kleist, H., Germania an ihre Kinder, in: Sämtliche Werke und Briefe, vol. 3, Erzählungen, Anekdoten, Gedichte, Schriften, ed. Klaus Müller-Salget, Deutscher Klassiker, Frankfurt am Main, 1990, 426–32. First published in 1813, thanks to its extensive republication in various anthologies, paperbacks and magazines, the ode was in distribution for a long period of time (see also 1001–3). Although ten versions of the ode are in existence, due to limited space, only the first edition will be referred to. Cf. von Kleist, H., Sämtliche Werke, Brandenburger Ausgabe, vol. 3, Sämtliche Gedichte, ed. Peter Staengle with Roland Reuß, Stroemfeld, Basel & Frankfurt am Main, 2005, 77–82. For further political and historical background about Kleist's text modifications over the course of the war, see: Samuel, R. H., Heinrich von Kleists Teilnahme an den politischen Bewegungen der Jahre 1805– 1809, Ph. D. diss., University of Cambridge, 1938, trans. Wolfgang Barthel 18

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(Frankfurt an der Oder: Förderkreis Kleist-Gedenk- und Forschungsstätte, KleistMuseum, 1995), 191–209. 33 Cf. Reichenbach, J., Die nationale Stimme Heinrich von Kleists: Sein politisches Wirken im Dienst der deutschen Nation (1808/09), VDM, Dr. Müller, Saarbrücken, 2007, 88. 34 Compare this Kleist's notion of the reasons for the war against Napoleonic France with Reichenbach's similar interpretation of Kleist's Drama Hermannschlacht (Reichenbach, Nationale Stimme, 53–57). 35 Krapf, L., Germanenmythus und Reichsideologie: Frühhumanistische Rezeptions weisen der taciteischen "Germania", Niemeyer, Tübingen, 1979, 58. 36 Cf. Hermand, J., "Braut, Mutter oder Hure?: Heiner Müllers "Germania" und ihre Vorgeschichte", in: idem, Sieben Arten an Deutschland zu leiden, Athenäum, Königstein, 1979, 127–41, here 128–30. 37 Kleist's anger in his ode Germania an ihre Kinder is no greater than that of contemporary public opinion. See Schulz, G., "Von der Verfassung der Deutschen. Kleist und der literarische Patriotismus nach 1806," Kleist-Jahrbuch (1993): 56– 74, here 70–71. 38 For details of the vital importance of the Congress for German followers of the French revolutionary concept, such as Hölderlin and his friend Sinclair, see von Aretin, K. O. F., "Reichstag, Rastatter Kongreß und Revolution: Das Wirken Isaaks von Sinclair und seine Freunde am Ende des Heiligen Römischen Reichs" in: Hölderlin-Jahrbuch 22 (1981): 4–16. Cf. also Lefebvre, J.-P., "Der Rastatter Kongreß," in: Hölderlin Texturen, vol. 4, »Wo sind jetzt Dichter?«: Homburg, Stuttgart, 1798–1800, ed. Hölderlin-Gesellschaft Tübingen with die deutsche Schillergesellschaft Marbach, Hölderlin-Gesellschaft, Tübingen, 2002, 99–132. 39 Hölderlin, F., Das Werden im Vergehen, in: idem, Sämtliche Werke, Stuttgarter Hölderlin-Ausgabe, Große Stuttgarter Ausgabe, vol. 4, bk. 1, Der Tod des Empedokles, ed. Friedrich Beißner, Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, 1961, 282–87. Citations from this edition will hereafter be followed by StA then volume, book and page number. Using Hölderlin's theoretical work Das Werden im Vergehen, Stephan Wackwitz analyses the consciousness of the dichotomy between ideal and reality in Hölderlin's elegiac poetry, as the source of the enthusiastic upswing in his hymns. Wackwitz, S., Trauer und Utopie um 1800: Studien zu Hölderlins Elegienwerk, Heinz, Stuttgart, 1982, 7–16, 144–51. In light of Wakwitz's analysis, this work interprets the fragment Das Werden im Vergehen in order to analyse Hölderlin's specific way of expressing the concept of an ideal in his hymnic work Germanien. 40 Hölderlin's theoretically-formulated utopian concept, in which the ideal future follows a chaotic and destructive process, also appears in some of his poems written during his time in Tübingen. See: Prignitz, Ch., Friedrich Hölderlin: Ideal und Wirklichkeit in seiner Lyrik, Bis, Oldenburg, 1990, 15–16. 41 Cf. Gadamer, H.-G., "Über leere und erfüllte Zeit", in: idem, Gesammelte Werke, vol. 4, Neuere Philosophie, bk. 2, Probleme · Gestalten, Mohr, Tübingen, 1987, 137–53, here 149–53; and Kurz, G., "Das Fragment Werden im Vergehen als Theorie der Dichtung in revolutionärer Zeit," in: idem, Mittelbarkeit und

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Vereinigung: Zum Verhältnis von Poesie, Reflexion und Revolution bei Hölderlin, Metzler, Stuttgart, 1975, 163–70. 42 Hölderlin, F., Germanien, in StA 2, 1, 149–52. The English translation of the original text in this paper is taken from Michael Hamburger's Work. Hölderlin, F., Germanien, in Selected Poems and Fragments, trans. and ed. with an Introduction by Michael Hamburger, with a new preface by Michael Hamburger, selected by Jeremy Adler, Penguin Books, London et al., 2007, 188–95. In contrast to Kleist's Ode, this song, before the 'rediscovery' of the poet at the beginning of the 20th Century, received only limited recognition. For details of the connection between the specific consciousness of time presented in Germanien and Hölderlin's thoughts regarding a utopian ideal, see: Nägele, R., Literatur und Utopie: Versuche zu Hölderlin, Stiehm, Heidelberg, 1978, 143–45, 187–89; and Prignitz, Friedrich Hölderlin, 32–34. 43 For a deeper understanding of the meaning of the Germans' 'silence' in the revolution, see Hölderlin's letter to Johan Gottfried Ebel from January 10th 1797 (StA 6, 1, 228–230). Cf. also Prignitz, Friedrich Hölderlin, 24, 33. 44 Cf. Binder, W., "Hölderlins Namenssymbolik", in: idem, Hölderlin-Aufsätze, Insel, Frankfurt am Main, 1970, 134–260, here 147–53, 158–60.

Figure 1. Abraham Aubry after Johann Toußin, Teutschlands fröhliches Zurufen, 1663/64. Paper, copper engraving, 23,2 × 37,1 cm. Nürnberg, Germanisches Nationalmuseum.

Figure 2. Joh. Christoph Sysang after Anna Maria Werner, no title, 1751. Paper, copper engraving, 18,6 × 11,8 cm. Oldenburg, Landesbibliothek.

Figure 3. Anonym, Das zwischen Furcht und Hoffnung schwebende Teutschland, about 1760. Paper, copper engraving, etching, 36,4 × 33,7 cm. Nürnberg, Germanisches Nationalmuseum.

Figure 4. Philipp Veit, Germania, 1834/36. Oil on canvas, 285 × 192 cm. Frankfurt am Main, Historisches Museum.

Figure 5. Philipp Veit, Germania, 1848. Oil on cotton fabric. 484 × 319 cm. Nürnberg, Germanisches Nationalmuseum.

Figure 6. Christian Köhler, Erwachende Germania, 1849. Oil on canvas, 220 × 280 cm. Berlin, Deutsches Historisches Museum.

Figure 7. Lorenz Clasen, Germania auf der Wacht am Rhein, 1860. Oil on canvas, 200 × 159 cm. Krefeld, Kaiser Wilhelm Museum.

Figure 8. Johannes Schilling, Niederwalddenkmal, 1877-1883. 38.12 m. Rüdesheim am Rhein. Photo by Masaki Saito. The central figure is the Germania figure (10.5 m.). The war statue is located on the right side of the monument. On the other side is located the peace statue.

Figure 9. Friedrich August von Kaulbach, Deutschland—August 1914, 1914. Oil on canvas, 192 × 147 cm. Berlin, Deutsches Historisches Museum.

CULTURE

INTERCULTURAL DIALOGUE AS A WAY TO REACH PEACE PAULA ANDREA RESTREPO1 AND JULIÁN PACHO2

The reality is that, no matter where you look, certainly in this society, everything is mixed. The power of the society is diversity, and we really haven't learned to accept that as a given, rather than something you try to forget and then go around and try to find some simpler form of unity. —Edward Said3 A world where many worlds fit. —EZLN4

Introduction In the war film Letters from Iwo Jima (2006), Clint Eastwood portrays the well-known battle from the perspective of the Japanese soldiers. The events took place in the Pacific Ocean during the Second World War. Lieutenant General Tadamichi Kuribayashi and Lieutenant Colonel Baron Takeichi Nishi are both portrayed as being understanding towards their U.S. enemy. Nishi's men capture a wounded U.S. Marine, Nishi talks with him and orders his medic to give him aid, despite the Japanese's dwindling medical supplies. Despite their efforts, the Marine dies. Nishi translates to his soldiers a letter the U.S. man had received from his mother. Then, Nishi's men are reminded that the U.S. soldiers are men like themselves, with families, hopes, and fears. This example from cinema shows a meeting of two different cultures that mistrust one another. However, Eastwood shows us how communication between them is possible. This scene has the same deep structure as Herodotus' account of the meeting between the Greeks and the Galatians narrated by Popper, as we will explain later. Human history shows that communication between cultures is, without any doubt, possible. However, at the same time, apparently, such communication is neither always pacific nor desirable for everyone. Contempo-

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rary discussion about intercultural conflict has highlighted, especially since Huntington's Clash of Civilizations (1993), the idea that there is no consensus of opinion about basic assumptions, procedures and limits concerning intercultural dialogue. Nowadays we face the risk of an intercultural war. According to one of the most common interpretations, deep and irreconcilable differences between civilizations make war unavoidable. Differences are a fact, but the question remains: can we ņ or will we ņ find another way to overcome them? The main thesis of this paper is that by means of dialogue we can deal with diversity. In doing so, cultures can critically reflect on themselves and on other cultures, and develop new ways of thinking. Thereby, the clash would remain at the level of ideas. Nevertheless, this kind of clash can only be possible in a different world, a world where all ideas are given an equal chance to succeed. A real intercultural clash of ideas is impossible if there is not a transformation of the relationship between North and South; between West and East. "An intercultural North-South dialogue is impossible without the decolonization of the power in the modern/colonial World System. A horizontal liberating dialogue in opposition to the vertical monologue of the West requires a transformation in the global power relations".5 In other words, if people change their own preconceptions and build a world where many worlds fit, where many lives fit, peace becomes possible. Otherwise, we will only have repression and domination instead of peace. Nevertheless, the kind of peace reached by means of dialogue will always be unstable, because of the controversies generated by different cultures, as they attempt to fit together and live in the same world. As in the scene from Eastwood's film mentioned above, the premise of this paper is that it is possible to have intercultural dialogue. The path we must tread to reach such a dialogue is long and difficult because our world is full of inequalities and injustices which have increased mutual mistrust and opened great distances between societies. As a consequence of this situation, people have been presented with the image of a world in pieces; pieces that are mutually exclusive and bound to lead to violent confrontation. However, the history of our world is not only one of war and bloody clashes, it is also one of fruitful interchange, cross-fertilization and coexistence. In this context, promoting dialogue between cultures is an essential task. This paper aims to provide some key elements to help achieve such dialogue. Any proposal aimed at building such intercultural dialogue should at least comply with the following requirements. (1) Knowledge of "others" is not only possible but necessary.

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(2) Knowledge of commonalities between different cultures is as necessary as knowledge of human diversity. (3) A clash between cultures does not necessary imply a violent confrontation; it could bring instead critical reflection. People should feel their own preconceptions challenged by other cultures in order to make a better world for everybody, not only for some people. A clash between cultures should be a tool that can be used to improve the quality of life. (4) The preceding three requirements make a revised conception of culture and knowledge necessary.

An intercultural dialogue requires knowledge, understanding and transformation. It happens when one culture comprehends another culture, learns something in the process and changes its own culture through what it has learned. In this context, it cannot be said that one culture is not commensurable with the criteria developed for a different culture. In the same sense, it is not possible to say that only one culture has the power to exert an influence on and understand others. Every culture could and should exercise such an influence and try to understand others. Differences between cultures are not a reason for them to struggle against each other. Understanding such differences could help us to build bridges and to communicate with each other. Differences could be opportunities for making a better tomorrow and not the seeds of war. Notwithstanding, everybody should renounce something to reach an agreement; not only at the level of ideas, but at the level of facts. We should, for example, renounce part of our well-being in order to improve the well-being of others. We are not saying that ideas and facts are different or unrelated things, but sometimes they follow different paths.

A Theory of Culture The model of culture underlying the idea of unavoidable war is a closed one, and it implies deep divisions between cultures. This idea contrasts with Paul Feyerabend's proposal (1996, 1995, 1999a, 1999b) that cultures cannot be described as abstractions with static performances. To him, cultures are a mix of improvisation and structures, but he highlights the importance of improvisation. Feyerabend's proposal is guided by his conception of both the history of humanity in general and the history of science in particular. He does not

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think that either should be described by abstraction, but rather case by case and by enumeration. Theories, he says, impoverish reality (1995, 1999a, 1999b). Feyerabend took the idea for his theory of culture from the anthropologist Renato Rosaldo.6 When Rosaldo described the way of life of the Ilongots from the Philippines, he concluded that he could not describe them in terms of structures, but in terms of improvisation.7 Both authors understand culture as a process. To them, change is the permanent condition of societies. Permanent change is caused by constant improvisation and people have to improvise because society does not have structures that are sufficiently coercive to force their behaviour. According to Feyerabend, cultures are open to interchange. The openness and freedom produced by ambiguity is what gives rise to the malleability of culture. As culture is not a straitjacket, individuals can find fractures, ambiguities and a wide range of conduct. Notwithstanding, ambiguity is different from one culture to another, because every culture appraises, achieves and performs freedom in a different way. For example, in Colombia, a democratic society that supports human rights, sometimes one cannot criticize certain people or institutions, at least if one does not want to be killed, kidnapped or threatened. So, from time to time, Colombia is not an ambiguous society. Nevertheless, some people take risks in spite of the fact that their culture is factually coercive. Fornet-Betancourt's proposal contains a concept of culture that is close to Feyerabend's, but based on the freedom of individuals, their capability to interpret culture and on making decisions.8 In Feyerabend's concept of culture, the freedom of the individuals depends on the leeway culture gives them. Fornet-Betancourt regards culture as a point of support on the path towards an individual or a collective free identity. Assuming freedom, human beings construct their membership of a culture by means of: "a discomforting hermeneutic task for which it is necessary to take into account the conflictive internal process according to which that culture of origin transmits, for example, one particular system of moral norms rather than any other as 'obvious' or 'proper.' Consequently, it is necessary to assume responsibility for deciding whether the appropriation of one's 'own' must take the form of affirmation or of overcoming".9 "What is important to emphasize in this context is that in cultures, however coherently they may present themselves, there is always practical space for the development of that which we usually call personal biography, i.e., the history of a unique and unrepresentable life seeking to realize itself."10

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We have mentioned both authors because we understand culture as ambiguous in the sense of Feyerabend, but we think that the freedom of individuals not only depends on the ambiguity of culture, but also on their own decisions, in the sense of Fornet-Betancourt. In some cases, even if culture does not give enough leeway to allow disagreement, change and dissidence, the freedom to desire a different world can emerge. If a conception of culture defined by ambiguity and individual freedom is adopted, it is necessary to accept that the division between "them" and "us" is not a good option for thinking about intercultural relationships. Cultures are not closed, but open to interchange. Relationships between cultures are not a case of fighting, assimilation or isolation. Considering cultures with their ambiguities, oppositions, inconsistencies, discrepancies and dissidences is a richer and more convenient perspective. Embracing this kind of theory not only overcomes narrow-minded visions, but also gives rise to dialogue and intercultural comprehension.

Is Knowledge a Useful Tool for Implementing a Proposal of Intercultural Communication? Our assumption here is that knowledge about other cultures is possible. However, ours is a pragmatic assumption, illustrated by examples such as the successful insertion of anthropologists and other social scientists by the U.S. army in the Afghan and Iraqi military campaigns. In this way, it can be said that knowledge is useful to understand other cultures and to enter into dialogue with them. The spread of misinformation about other cultures creates and increases hatred and misunderstanding. In line with such a situation, the Palestinian American author Edward Said complains about the fact that neither Palestine nor Israel has university courses which give a real knowledge of "the other". These cultures are unaware of each other.11 Taking into account the fact that 130 million children around the world have no access to education, we would have to create other strategies as well in order to spread knowledge about other cultures. It is then indispensable to learn about other cultures in order to deal with cultural diversity. However, if knowledge is unidirectional and seeks dominance, says Said, it is worse than ignorance.12 So we want to give some examples of knowledge that does not give rise to understanding and dialogue. Each example shows a problem in the field of knowledge about other cultures and at the same time proposes alternatives. One case of "inappropriate" knowledge is that sometimes adopted by western people about Muslims. Ignorance and simplified knowledge re-

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garding Muslim people have made their everyday life sheer hell. Many people have complained about some oversimplified images the Western world has built and maintains about Muslim people. One interesting example appears in Persepolis (2007), a graphic novel by the Iranian and French graphic novelist Marjane Satrapi. Persepolis describes Satrapi's childhood and adolescence between Iran and Europe. As an epilogue to the one volume version (2007) there are two pages which are especially useful to illustrate our point. There, Satrapi shows the ignorance of some western people towards Iranian people: In the first illustration someone asks Satrapi: - Is everybody a terrorist in Iran? - I have seen the movie "Not Without my Daughter". It must be terrible to live in those circumstances. Poor girl! - If, as you say, all Iranians are like you or like me, how was the Islamic revolution possible? - What is the difference between Shiite and Sunni? - Do Iranian women always wear a veil? - Have you ever listened to pop music? - Is it true that women may not work there? - Do you travel by camel? - Is it possible to go skiing in Iran? I thought that there were only deserts there.

In the second illustration Satrapi answers: - The same questions have been asked of me since I was 13. - I thought that thanks to Iranian movies it was known that it snows in Iran. - And we live in the information era thanks to the Internet and cable television. We have access to everything. - It is as if the more information you have the less you know. It is logical, when I see too many pictures in a gallery; I forget them as soon as I see them. - Too much information blocks the brain, too little makes us ignorant. - But the worst thing is unidirectional information. (Our translation)13

The preceding example portrays a failed communication attempt between different cultures. By means of such unsuitable knowledge cultures will only reach misunderstanding. On the contrary, Persepolis ņboth the film and the graphic novelņ is a good tool against such unsuitable knowledge. Persepolis is about Muslim people, but we could say the same about Latin-Americans, all kinds of indigenous people or Africans.

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Another case of inappropriate construction of knowledge can be found in academic and allegedly aseptic works, in which the people described do not recognize themselves. In this vein, Body ritual among the Nacirema by Horace Miner (1956) criticizes the anthropological practices of his time. Reading Miner's paper to a group of people and then asking them to illustrate it with pictures is an interesting exercise. At the end of the exercise, pictures of furious aboriginal people, subject to everyday sufferings will be obtained. As well as a criticism against anthropological writings describing other cultures, Miner's paper is also a social satire of the American lifestyle of his time. The aboriginal group studied by Miner is none other than the American people. Reading "Nacirema" back to front reveals the word American, and their cultural hero, Notgnihsaw, is Washington. Prominent elements of that exotic community are corporal and dental hygiene. Teeth are cleaned by means of a stick crowned with animal fibres. Experts, such as pharmacists, physicians and dentists are in charge of caring for the body which is corrupting itself all the time. What underlies the extreme body care is, according to Miner, the native aesthetics which depends on their aversion to the natural body and its functions. The conclusion by Miner is particularily useful for our discussion: Our review of the ritual life of the Nacirema has certainly shown them to be a magic-ridden people. It is hard to understand how they have managed to exist so long under the burdens which they have imposed upon themselves. But even such exotic customs as these take on real meaning when they are viewed with the insight provided by Malinowski when he wrote:14 'Looking from far and above, from our high places of safety in the developed civilization, it is easy to see all the crudity and irrelevance of magic. But without its power and guidance early man could not have mastered his practical difficulties as he has done, nor could man have advanced to the higher stages of civilization.' 15

It is worth mentioning that although Miner wrote his text on Nacirema in the Fifties, his criticism could be just as well levelled at some contemporary anthropologists. This paragraph gives rise to the question: is the detailed knowledge of "others" a tool that can be used to understand and communicate with them? In our opinion it may be, but only on the condition that it does not take the other as an incomprehensible stranger. In this sense, Miner's text has two morals. First, with such a description, even contemporary western people could be seen as strange and irrational savages by other cultures. Second, many academic descriptions would be totally useless for establishing contact with people from different cultures.

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However, an oversimplified representation of other cultures is not the only problem that must be solved. Another problem is how this knowledge should be used. Its use should be ethically discussed. Knowledge is not enough, because it could be obtained and used in many ways; to control people's behaviour, for example. Following in this line, anthropology has a long history, including its colonial origins or the counterinsurgent campaign in Vietnam for example. One of the most recent examples was made globally known on 5th October 2007 through a New York Times press article.16That article explains the aforementioned case of anthropologists and social scientists helping U.S. troops in their campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. This application of knowledge has its defenders and its detractors. Some US army personnel say that using anthropological knowledge allows them to understand the Afghan perspective and, consequently, to reduce armed combat. Some members of the scientific community denounce the experimental project "as 'mercenary anthropology' that exploits social science for political gain".17 is Pentagon programme is a clear example that knowledge about others is possible. What is not so clear is that knowledge of others by itself can build intercultural bridges. Is the Pentagon programme a project that aims to reach an intercultural dialogue? We do not think so; it is a project which is probably aiming at controlling the population. So, it is necessary to decide how we want to use knowledge. It is essential to take ethical decisions. Therefore, knowledge about others is not enough to guarantee dialogue between cultures. We need to consider that just as ignorance is no way to reach intercultural dialogue, neither are incorrect knowledge, oversimplified knowledge, or knowledge used to control. With regard to knowledge, another observation is necessary: even if knowledge overcomes the aforementioned problems, intercultural dialogue would not be possible unless self-knowledge and self-criticism are implemented. In this line, critical knowledge about our own culture is essential in the project of intercultural dialogue. In order to have a dialogue between cultures, we need two kinds of knowledge: knowledge of others and also the understanding that all human beings share a common, partial approach to reality or partial understanding of the world. By this we mean that reality gives rise to many interpretations; science, western philosophy and western culture in general are only some of them. According to Jingjing Zhao and Nelson Edmondson (2004), what makes us members of the same species is not reason, nor culture, but "the inclusive human condition of inconclusive understanding".18Beyond the attraction or repulsion some people may experience towards various doc-

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trines, the inclusive human condition of inconclusive understanding prevails from a global standpoint, and the study of world cultures should expressly elucidate this condition. Such study would also thereby establish a common platform for intercultural communication; only on the basis of such a platform can different cultures cease talking past one another.19 Along the same lines as Zhao and Edmondson, Feyerabend thinks that all human knowledge is inseparable from the contexts in which it is formulated and that it is supported by contemporary ways of life. According to Feyerabend's point of view Reason has a context and date of birth. He does not conclude, however, that it is not valuable, just that its value depends on conditions of contexts. He defends a contextualized Reason. This does not mean he is against Reason, but only against the tyranny of some of its versions. What he hopes to achieve with his criticism is not the suppression of Reason, but a better understanding among individuals and a better understanding of science.20is proposal is an invitation to take the other into account. Comparing and understanding different cultures can make us aware that our own culture is only one option. This perspective could make us see our culture in a critical way. As a summary, thus far we have said that knowledge is very important for building bridges between cultures, but knowledge by itself is not enough. We cannot oversimplify our perception of other cultures and we must take ethical decisions in our application of knowledge. Furthermore, every culture should have a critical knowledge of itself. Finally, we should be aware that the way each community behaves and thinks comes from a partial understanding of the world.

Commonalities and Diversity The issue about knowledge of others gives rise to a question: what aspects of cultures is it worth knowing about; what they have in common or their differences? The short answer would be both; common and unique features are both worth knowing about, and diversity should be recognized and connected by means of detailed research. Common features connect different cultures and the awareness of these connections brings cultures closer together. On the other hand, unique features of cultures are manifestations of diversity and our being aware of this diversity allows us to interact better with people from other cultures. To make intercultural dialogue possible, we need to bring out commonalities and human diversity.

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The problem is that many theorists feel awkward with the complexity of the world and make their theories so abstract that they deny such complexity. From Geertz' point of view, global understanding can only be a good approach when we take the details into consideration. There is no opposition between detailed works which seek for and find variety, and general characterizations which seek for and find affinities.21 Along this line, Edward Said analyzes the September 11th tragedy. This was one of the events that contributed most to making the "clash of civilizations"22 an unquestionable paradigm. However, to Said, the only explanation for that sad event was that a small group of fanatic people used Islamic ideas to destabilize and to commit crimes.23 Therefore, the "clash of civilizations" paradigm does not predict such an event. Despite the appearance of having a great explanatory power and a great power of prediction, it only simplifies the world by means of an unsophisticated analysis. To support his position, Said brings up some articles by Eqbal Ahmad, his friend and mentor. Such a series of three articles was published between January and March 1999 in Dawn, Pakistan's most respected weekly. Ahmad, writing to his Muslin audience, severely criticizes the mutilations of Islam made by absolutists and fanatical tyrants, and states that their obsession with the regulation of personal life promotes: An Islamic order reduced to a penal code, stripped of its humanism, aesthetics, intellectual quests, and spiritual devotion. [And this] entails an absolute assertion of one, generally de-contextualized, aspect of religion and a total disregard of another. The phenomenon distorts religion, debases tradition, and twists the political process wherever it unfolds. [The modern Islamists, Ahmad concludes], are concerned with power, not with the soul; with the mobilization of people for political purposes rather than with sharing and alleviating their sufferings and aspirations. Theirs is a very limited and time-bound political agenda. What has made matters worse is that similar distortions and zealotry occur in the 'Jewish' and 'Christian' universes of discourse.24

As well as Said and Geertz, Chomsky is against the "clash of civilizations" theory. For him, the clash is not the consequence of a conflict between different ways of understanding and accepting human rights, family or God. To support this, Chomsky gives us details about relationships between the United States and Islamic countries. For example, there are good relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia, the most fundamentalist Muslim country or Indonesia, the biggest Muslim state. Thus, it could be asked: if the "clash of civilizations" is a correct point of view,

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why does the United States maintain good relations with those Muslim countries?25 Saying that a whole "civilization", whatever the word civilization means, is behind the September 11th events is to ignore the complexity of cultures. Not taking into consideration the details in this area implies undertaking brutal actions against innocent people. This situation will surely become the real intercultural clash that leads to more violence and conflict. As a summary of this section, in order to build bridges between cultures it is as important to talk about human diversity as to synthesise that diversity. It is not good practice to synthesise without knowledge of local problems and unique practices. Only when we carry out detailed research, as anthropologists do, can we propose conclusions. Those conclusions will have particular and general features, both of which are useful for building intercultural comprehension and an intercultural peace.

A Desirable Clash We have said that we are against a clash between cultures in the sense of Huntington, but now we have to say that we agree with another kind of intercultural clash. In a Story by Herodotus, narrated and commented by Popper in The Myth of the Framework (1994), the Persian king Darius I brought together Greeks and Galatians. The Greeks used to bury their dead and Darius asked them how much money it would take for them to eat their dead parents. The Greeks answered that they would not do it under any circumstance. The Galatians used to eat their dead and Darius asked them if they could burn their dead parents. The Galatians told him not to utter such blasphemy.26 According to Popper, by means of this story, Herodotus wants to teach us that a discussion between Galatians and Greeks would be impossible, because an extreme confrontation is seldom a fruitful discussion. However, in Popper's view, the most important thing in this story is that both Galatians and Greeks were shaken and learned something new. Even without discussion, he says, a fruitful confrontation can take place. From this point of view, the "clash of cultures" does not refer to threat or war, but to an opportunity provided for reflection, criticism and self-criticism. So, rather than causing destruction and violent clashes, the "clash of cultures" could give rise to a confrontation of ideas.27 In keeping with this, it is not a good position to say that we cannot have a rational discussion about customs and laws because they are local patterns of morality. The suggestion is "researching who has the best prac-

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tices and institutions and learning from them."28In this way, Popper rejects cultural incommensurability and defends communication and the clash as a tool for learning from other cultures, and for promoting criticism and self-criticism. Nevertheless, another example shows that fruitful confrontation is not so easy. We are going to use an example from cinema, although we think that the director, an Israeli woman, is not completely neutral in her portrayal of the conflict. In To Die in Jerusalem (2007) by Hilla Medalia, two mothers, one from Israel and one from Palestine, want to talk to each other because of the deaths of their daughters. The Palestinian girl, 17 years old, was a suicide bomber who attacked a supermarket in Jerusalem. The Israeli girl, almost the same age, was at that supermarket and was the only person killed by the bomb. The Israeli mother looks for an answer. Why did her daughter die? She would like to hear the Palestinian mother answer her: "Excuse us, it was our fault". Four or five years after the terrorist attack, the mothers finally speak to each other via teleconference. At the end of the conversation, they both, though especially the Israeli mother, feel that the other one did not understand. They have almost completely opposite points of view; the word "peace" does not have the same meaning to them. Peace to the Palestinian is freedom, whereas peace to the Israeli is security. At the end of the conversation, the audience may feel that dialogue between cultures is almost impossible. What we could ask is: should it be concluded that people from different cultures, in this case from Israel and Palestine, cannot have a fruitful dialogue? They can, as Popper implies, but the process is not easy. Such conversations could end with the different parties just talking past each other. Not all discussions have the capacity to change people. At this point we would like to quote professor Grosfogel again: An intercultural North-South [or West-East] dialogue is impossible without decolonization of the power in the modern/colonial World System. A horizontal liberating dialogue in opposition to the vertical monologue of the West requires a transformation in global power relations (our translation).29

A real dialogue between a person from an occupied country and a person from an occupying one is impossible. So, we firmly believe that this kind of clash may be a tool for learning from cultures if the participants have good knowledge of each other; if they have previously learned that their own culture is only a partial approach to the world; if both sides are willing to enter into dialogue and are

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open to the other's point of view. Sometimes, however, as Popper implies, a meeting between different cultures may form the beginning of such a process.

Conclusion From the "clash of civilizations" point of view, the cause of conflict is that differences between cultures are irreconcilable and communication between them is not possible. These differences are the result of a long history and, as a consequence, it is difficult to make them disappear. So the question would be: is the disappearance of differences really necessary? Is it necessary to eliminate intercultural opposition to make intercultural aggression disappear? It is not only unnecessary, but undesirable. Understanding differences and learning from them is not only essential to reach an intercultural dialogue and peace, but also to have a better future. The kind of intercultural dialogue we suggest looks forward to addressing widening disagreements between societies by reaffirming critical knowledge between people from different cultures. The kind of peace we promote is one that includes differences and makes differences possible: a critical peace. If we do not look for peace in diversity, we are only looking for repression and the criminal silencing of other voices.

Notes 1

This work has partially been possible thanks to the help and funds that University of Antioquia has given to Paula Restrepo to do her PhD project. 2 This work has also been made possible thanks to the research project EHU09/03 which is funded by the University of the Basque Country. 3 Chance, Mishmash of Civilizations: Interview with Edward Said, 83. 4 This is one of the main Zapatista mottos. 5 Grosfogel, "Actualidad del pensamiento de Césaire: redefinición del sistema mundo y producción de utopía desde la diferencia colonial", 164. 6 Feyerabend, Conquest of Abundance: A Tale of Abstraction versus the Richness of Being, 57. 7 Rosaldo, Culture & Truth: The Remaking of Social Analysis. 8 Fornet-Betancourt, "Philosophical Presuppositions of Intercultural Dialogue". 9 Ibid., Paragraph 17. 10 Ibid., Paragraph 18. 11 Chance, Op. cit., 84. 12 Said, "Islam Through Western Eyes". 13 Satrapi, Persépolis, 361-362.

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Miner, "Body Ritual among the Nacirema", 507 Malinowsky in Miner, "Body Ritual among the Nacirema", 507 16 Rohde, "Army Enlists Anthropology in War Zones" 17 Ibid. 18 Zhao & Edmonson, "Conscious recognition of the limitations of human knowledge as the foundation of effective intercultural communication". 19 Ibid. 20 Feyerabend, Killing Time: The Autobiography of Paul Feyerabend, 129. 21 Geertz, Reflexiones antropológicas sobre temas filosóficos, 223. 22 This paradigm suggests that conflicts between big cultural blocks, called civilizations, that cannot be solved by means of peaceful strategies will be the primary characteristic of foreign affairs in the post-Cold War world. 23 Said, "The Clash of Ignorance", 2. 24 Said, "The Clash of Ignorance", 2. 25 Chomsky, "Clash of civilizations?". 26 Popper, The Myth of the Framework: In Defence of Science and Rationality, 3364. 27 Popper, In Search of a Better World. Lectures and Essays from Thirty Years and The Myth of the Framework: In Defence of Science and Rationality. 28 Popper, The Myth of the Framework: In Defence of Science and Rationality, 60. 29 Grosfogel, "Actualidad del pensamiento de Césaire: redefinición del sistema mundo y producción de utopía desde la diferencia colonial", 164. 15

Bibliography Chomsky, N., "Militarism, Democracy and People's Right to Information", 2001. http://www.india-seminar.com/2002/509/509%20noam%20cho msky.htm Feyerabend, P., Killing Time: The Autobiography of Paul Feyerabend, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1995. —. "Contra la inefabilidad cultural. Objetivismo, relativismo y otras quimeras", in: Universalidad y diferencia, Alianza, Madrid, 1996. —. Conquest of abundance: A Tale of Abstraction versus the Richness of Being, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1999a. —. Ambigüedad y armonía, Paidós, Barcelona, 1999b. Fornet-Betancourt, R., "Philosophical Presuppositions of Intercultural Dialogue", in Polylog, 2000. http://them.polylog.org/1/ffr-en.htm Geertz, C., Reflexiones antropológicas sobre temas filosóficos, Paidós, Barcelona, 2002. Grosfogel, R., "Actualidad del pensamiento de Césaire. Redefinición del sistema-mundo y producción de utopía desde la diferencia colonial", in: Discurso sobre el colonialismo, 2006, 147-172.

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Huntington, S., "Clash of civilizations?", in: Foreing Affairs, 72 (3), 1993, 22-49. Chance, K., "Mishmash of Civilizations. Interview with Edward Said", in Bardpolitik 1, 2001, 82-84. Malinowski, B., Magic, Science, and Religion, The Free Press, Glencoe, 1984. Miner, H., "Body Ritual among the Nacirema", in: American Anthroplogist. New Series, 58 (3), 1956, 503-507. Popper, K., In Search of a Better World. Lectures and Essays from Thirty Years, Routledge, London, 1992. —. The Myth of the Framework: In Defence of Science and Rationality, Routledge, London, 1994. Rohde, D., "Army Enlists Anthropology in War Zones", in: The New York Times, 2007. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/05/world/asia/05afghan. html?ex=1349323200&en=a13ee15e97920f0f&ei=5124&partner=per malink&exprod=permalink Rosaldo, R., Culture & Truth: The Remaking of Social Analysis, Beacon Press, Boston, 1989. Said, E., "Islam Through Western Eyes", in: The Nation, April 26, 1980. —. "The Clash of Ignorance", in The Nation, October 22, 2001. Satrapi, M., Persépolis, Norma, Barcelona, 2007. Zhao, J. & Edmondson, N., "Conscious recognition of the limitations of human knowledge as the foundation of effective intercultural communication", in: Journal of intercultural communication, 2005. http://www.-immi.se/intercultural/

A COSMOCULTURAL MODEL OF IDENTITY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR PEACE FULYA ÖZLEM

In an era of cultural fluidity between even the remotest cultures, the question of ethno-cultural heterogeneity, which was formerly excluded as irrelevant from the political sphere, became an issue awaiting resolution on the agenda of almost all liberal states both on the national and international level. This is an era when the historical narratives about what defines a liberal state as well as what defines "culture", "cultural identity" or indeed "individual" are rapidly eroding and being replaced by a mist of confusion. In the midst of this confusion, we find ourselves asking: How can a liberal state continue to be neutral towards ethno-cultural differences while meeting the demand for group-specific rights, i.e., minority rights? This balance between neutrality, which is the basis of egalitarianism, and the wish to accommodate differences within the political system, as an act of fulfilment of the newly defined needs of the individual, seems to be that which more or less defines the scope of the conditions of the possibility of peace in the contemporary world. The unjustified practices of states and their consequent undermining of the possibility of peace in the contemporary world are not philosophical conditions, and I will therefore exclude them from my discussion, which will focus solely on the philosophical conditions and statements which increase or diminish the possibilities of peace in our era. The ultimate duty of states and the international governing institutions which circumscribe the actions of national governments, is to endow their subjects, i.e citizens, with the autonomy, with the freedom to choose their constitutive ends, and act according to achieve those constitutive ends in such a way that does not violate the rights and liberties of other individuals. In other words, Liberalism is defined as the political theory that aims to furnish each individual with equal rights to achieve his/her ends so long as their achievement does not in some way violate the rights of another individual or a group of individuals. Liberalism, thus, does not interfere with the goals of the individuals regardless of whether they are

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good or evil. Since individuals are seen as capable of free choice and freely discarding their goals for better ones, i.e. revising their ends, this very capability of evaluating their choices in the light of an identity, a person, a 'whom' which they want to attain, by putting some of their desires in practice while subordinating others considered less worthy of realising within the hierarchy of desires, is understood to be the very mark of the autonomy of the individual. It is however, because of this very idea of the 'autonomy of the individual' that Liberalism has been criticized for being an 'individualistic' or 'atomist' system that disregards the value of cultural membership. There are several ways in which culture and cultural determinations such as the cultural identity that one is born into and embedded in obstructs this picture of the perfectly self-governing individual who chooses his/her constitutive ends and acts accordingly. In fact, as Charles Taylor states in "Multiculturalism and the Politics of Recognition"1, "Culture is the context of choice for an individual". The interplay between culture and choice is that which forms the basis of autonomy: the defining of choices, the evaluation of these very choices and finally the actual deciding between them is a rule-governed practice which is not an abstract quality of the will. For, to be able to predicate of a person that s/he is choosing, s/he needs to be acting in a context that is not alien to him/her within which every choice can be interpreted as following a rule in a language game, in the Wittgensteinian sense of the term, with an understanding of the possible, already meaningful consequences on the basis of which that particular choice becomes meaningful. Hence, a choice outside a cultural context, in other words, a rule that makes sense only to its ruler, is not something we can imagine. There is a social, societal pattern through which a rule becomes a rule, or a choice becomes a choice which is dependent on the forms of life and practices of a society in which the genesis of every rule lies. Hence, securing the conditions of freedom of each individual, amounts to "letting be" the cultural context of each individual. However, cultures or cultural identities are not essential entities. They are rather to be viewed as "a complicated network of similarities crisscrossing and overlapping"2, just like a set of family resemblances in a family picture. There are no essences instantiated in every particular of a cultural identity; however, a network of similarities can be traced as a matter of a shared form of life between the individual members of a cultural group or identity, so to speak. However, since there are no absolute boundaries or essential limits between cultural identities, a choice can be common practice in more than one context, just as a rule in a given language game can apply to very many other language games, and

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there might be intermediary rules that would have suited the game we are playing were we to incorporate them into its rules. Once the governing liberal body is committed to attaining the well being of the individuals whom it represents, then its commitment and duty to accomodate the ethno-cultural differences is part of its obligation to secure the freedom of choice of each individual. Culture here becomes the framework of choices within which one recognizes one's options and in which realizes one's freedom by making choices, and as such, needs to be considered at its face value. It is exactly at this point that conflict and confusion arises, since the question is: "How to accomodate ethno-cultural differences within and among liberal states and still maintain neutrality towards each individual regardless of his/her ethno-cultural origins?" There are hardly any strictly difference-blind nation states today and the need to answer the question of how to be difference-sensitive but libertarian and egalitarian at the same time, results in ever increasing political positions being introduced in the neo-liberal era in order to offer new solutions to the problem of political recognition.

The New "-isms" of the Neo-Liberal Era The new "-isms" that are concerned with accommodating a pluralism or a culturalism of sorts within the political system are fairly numerous. Among them multiculturalism, and cosmopolitanism can primarily be counted and their juxtaposition against Globalism with its emphasis on a Universalism of values should not be disregarded when disputing the outcomes of accomodating cultural differences within the political system. Multiculturalism, as put forward by Will Kymlicka in his "Multicultural Citizenship" (1995) and later in "Politics in the Vernacular" (2001) conceives of the nation state as an outcome of the nation-building policies of one nation, or rather its majority, in most cases, as democracy dictates.3 Hence, the plea for multiculturalism is justified on the grounds that every nation has a right to self-govern, and a minority group identifying itself as culturally homogenous might be seen as engaged in a justified alternative nation-building. That identifying oneself as "culturally homogenous" is controversial in the light of the anti-essentialism concerning identities we have posited when discussing autonomy should be borne in mind at this point. Yet, when we look at the "multiculturalist" policies that multiculturalism demands of pre-existing nation states, we see that these involve certain group-specific rights and regulations. The group-specific (of group-differentiated) rights which are taken up at face value in the political agendas of many current states with ethno-culturally heterogeneous

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societies are subsumed under 3 general categories by Kymlicka in his 1995 work: (1) Self-Government Rights (the delegation of powers to national minorities, often through some form of federalism); (2) Polyethnic rights (financial support and legal protection for certain practices associated with particular ethnic or religious groups); and (3) Special Representation Rights (guaranteed seats for ethnic or national groups within the central institutions of the larger state).4

When closely examined, all these group-specific rights and regulations that are seemingly aimed at enhancing pluralism, in fact only emphasize one aspect of culturalism. This is, one's right to access one's own culture within a liberal political system. However, as stated before, if culture is the context of choices of an individual, and if these choices can be seen as the moves one becomes cognizant of in a language game, one's right and need to access others' culture as forming the horizon of his/her scope of choices seems to be ignored or disregarded in Multiculturalism. Multiculturalism, in this regard, seems to be a hub of alternative nationalisms coexisting "peacefully", so long as the specified groups do not interfere with each other's "right to access one's own culture", or with the practices which a particular culture dictates that the individual should perform, and so long as the group in question is represented in the governing body as much as the other ethno-cultural groups. At this point, as the emphasis falls on the need to access other cultures as much as one's own, and to be able to encounter new choices, and moves that one can learn and appropriate to one's own context or language game, we turn our gaze to cosmopolitanism. Cosmopolitanism underlines the arbitrariness of cultural identity in order to put forward the statement that "Although culture is the context of freedom of an individual, the cultures in question are not essences, but areas with vague boundaries that simultaneously shape one's choices and identity in polyphony. In such a polyphony of cultures which shapes one's constitutive ends, it is important to be able to access the culture of the other as much as one's own in order for each individual to lead the good life s/he strives for." Cosmopolitanism, as opposed to universalism, does not state that, "were people to speak one language and communicate perfectly, they would all unite in one truth, the universally true one", since even between people of the same community, or the same family who speak the same language and have been brought up with more or less the same systems of value, disagreements and

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conflicts are bound to occur and this is only natural and a mark of the plurality of voices where free individuals reign. Hence, according to cosmopolitanism, people learn about each other's culture so that they can get used to each other and manage to live with one another on the basis of the principle that we are all human and that the minimum commonality that is shared, as a form of life is, let us say, the cognitive and emotive capabilities that shape the human life we all share. Denying totally the possibility of understanding an alien culture would, in principle, be thought of as tantamount to denying the very possibility of understanding the culture that one is born into, in line with Davidson's "principle of charity".5 That brings about a cosmopolitan concern for the cultural heritage of the entire world without the need to make a stronger emphasis on the requirement of one's access to one's own culture only. In short, according to multiculturalism, access to one's own culture, and according to cosmopolitanism, access to culture in general, seen as a World Heritage, are the aspects of culture that matter. As a matter of fact, multiculturalism seems to favour a body politic of alternative nationalisms whilst cosmopolitanism supports nation states as the political systems within which the demands of respective political positions will be met. However, although there is mention of access to other cultures being equally important as access to one's own culture in cosmopolitanist discourse, when the proposed system within which this access is supposed to be achieved, becomes that of the nation state, several questions come to the fore concerning whether the full magnitude of the requirement to access other cultures on the part of every individual regardless of his/her origins and hence to access other choices for an individual to fully realize his/her freedom and autonomy is conceived and appreciated by the theoreticians of cosmopolitanism. The disadvantages of arguing in favour of liberal nation states where this access will be rendered actual are numerous, such as: (1) In the cosmopolitanist discourse, the powerful, i.e the financially and politically and historically powerful, seem to be privileged. When no ammendment in the difference-blind neutrality of the state nation is made, on the grounds that "culture is everybody's anyway and failing to track down the origins or limits of a particular culture justifies us in doing away with the demands for group-specific rights", then, basically, no change is made in the pre-existing liberal system where imbalanced distribution of power reigns in terms of cultural representation. (2) In line with cosmopolitanist discourse, only those who already have the financial means and the freedom to travel gain access to the culture of others. The access to others' culture is not viewed as a necessity that the

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I argue that there needs to be a third position which neither underestimates the value of access to one's own culture and at the same time others' culture nor only emphasizes one's access to one's own culture as a necessary condition of the good life of each individual that neo-liberal systems are said to be aiming at. I call this third position "cosmo-culturalism": it requires access to others' cultures as a necessary condition of one's fulfilment of one's own freedom as an autonomous individual living in a Liberal system.

Cosmo-culturalism: an attempt to set down the paradigm of the "Philosophy of Travelling" Cosmoculturalism can be said to be the position which takes both multiculturalism's and cosmopolitanism's claims to culture and inverts them to fit a new culturalist model where the societal cultural identity is formed through learning about the culture of the other. The rationale behind cosmo-culturalism is the following: We have redefined autonomy to be one's ability to choose between rules to follow in a language game. A necessary presupposition is the existence of more than one rule to be followed in a language game, since one can only choose when there are more than one alternative to choose from. When culture is taken to be not an essence but "a network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing"6, then the more contexts or "language games" one becomes cognizant of, the more autonomous one becomes in one's very own paradigm. The individual, without exiting his or her own context – actually you can not exit your context since this is where you learn how to live and how to become a human being – introduces the possibility of his autonomy into this context through learning the cultural context of the other. Let us say, if X, through travelling or through learning the language, culture, etc. of the other, comes across new choices, new options, applicable to his own context, the next time he plays the same language game, he will follow a new rule that will be introduced to the one he is playing . Hence he will have enlarged the scope of choices, the scope of moves to be made in his very own language game. At times, by introducing a new rule to his language game,

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he will have introduced the very condition of the possibility of autonomy to his own context. To maintain this possibility, cosmo-culturalism posits that in order to exercise one's very own mode of being an autonomous human being, one should be in a position to learn about the cultural context of the other either through personal immersion of oneself in the specified culture's territory, i.e. through "travelling", or through elements of the culture of the other being rendered accessible to him by the authority of the governing body. Hence, cosmo-culturalism is the political position that could be explained by the motto: "Learn the culture of the other, in order to be freer in your own context, in order to exercise your autonomy fully in your own context". In cosmo-culturalism, the demands of political recognition by minority groups within the body politic become the demands of the majority to politically recognize the cultural options potentially accessible to every individual in the given context. Hence, political recognition of the heterogeneity within society becomes a pragmatic measure to be taken in order to pluralize the forms of life in a society where the utmost liberty to choose and fulfil one's capacity to autonomy will be rendered possible. The cosmo-culturalist rights that are demanded at the institutional level are: The right of freedom to travel: One of the least emphasized articles of the Human Rights treaty is one's fundamental human right to travel freely. If this is not supplied as a basic right respecting human dignity which benefits every individual equally regardless of their racial, ethnic or national backgrounds, their financial status or political status (i.e. a citizen, refugee, a diplomat or a resident of disputed territories) liberalism will not have completed its duty towards every individual in helping them realize their chosen constitutive ends as autonomous individuals. Hence, liberalism is not actually possible until the day when the freedom to travel is accessible to every individual equally at the utmost level. The right to access the culture of the other through public and educational institutions: In order to learn the culture of the other and hence multiply one's choices in his or her own life form, the languages of all the cultural groups within

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a society should be taught at the educational institutions starting from primary schools to institutions of higher education. However, the difference in the cosmo-culturalist model from multiculturalism is that groups are not endowed with the right to learn their native language on nationalist grounds, but with the right to learn both their native language and that of the cultural group that they are most in contact with. Once every individual has a mastery of the language and cultural practices of a neighbouring group or a minority, the culture of the other will become an element in shaping the identity of one's own so that it will be much easier to maintain a peaceful state of mutual correspondence, i.e. " peace" in that society. Hence, liberalism's commitment to autonomous individuals presupposes that the right to access the neighbouring minority's culture institutionally is supplied to every individual.

Conclusion Throughout the course of this paper, I have considered peace as an actual possibility that is available to us within the given liberal socio-political system in which we happen to live and discuss the conditions of possibility of peace both in academic circles and in political discourse at the point of resolving political conflict situations. Hence, seeing the question of identity and the recognition of identity as central to the political conflicts that have emerged in the past few decades in the somewhat post-global and post-state-nation era, I have concentrated on the conditions of possibility of resolving these very identity conflicts which tremendously disable the actual possibility of peace. My method has been one which offers the conditions of possibility of identity and the liberty of fulfilling these very conditions for each individual as the necessary pre-conditions of actual peace in the global world, which the governing bodies, i.e. states and transnational institutions are bound to provide. In this regard, I have argued that the conditions of possibility of peace within the given liberal socio-political system presupposes free and autonomous individuals who live in a state of communication which enables them to resolve conflicts and who are able to fulfil and realize their constitutive ends which might include those that have to do with their self-identification. Thus, I have put forward that recognition of identity and the requisites of the formation of identity are among the conditions of possibility of peace.

A Cosmocultural Model of Identity and its Implications for Peace

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In order to set down the conditions of the possibility of a liberal state that aims at free, autonomous individuals as its citizens, it is to be seen that the very conditions of possibility of autonomy need to be fulfilled. As far as liberal theories went, we have observed that only willing and intentions were regarded as requisites to the autonomy of an individual. However, when the fact that "autonomy involves choice and that there can be no choice that does not have a meaning, a cultural context which renders it a part of human life", is considered, then it is easy to see culture as the "context of choice" for an individual. A context of choice, when reinterpreted into Wittgensteinian terminology means a "language game" whose moves are rules followed as countless cases of "what we did before in the same situation and hence are used to perform, accordingly". Thus, language games are the concrete life situations which form the possible scenarios belonging to the life forms of the societies in which they are embedded. Hence, autonomy, within this picture, comes down to an individual's ability to choose between the rules accessible to him in a language game. When autonomy is understood in this way, an individual's playing more than one language game, and knowing of more rules which might apply to the one he is embedded in, will make him a freer or veridical autonomous person even within his own context which it is almost impossible for him to transcend. This automatically will bring about the result that, for liberalism, the ultimate commitment to maintain free and autonomous individuals can only be done through securing each individual's possibility of accessing other cultures. Since, primarily travelling and secondly, learning the language and culture of the other are the most basic ways that we come to know of other cultures in the form of life shared on earth now, it will be seen that a liberal state committed to the autonomy of individuals will enforce the regulations and institutional and constitutional changes in its body politic in such a way as to allow access to other cultures to be available to every citizen in an egalitarian fashion. Such a form of liberalism which is founded on the principle of "rendering communication between cultures a practical necessity for the well-being of individuals" can be called: "cosmo-culturalism"

Notes 1 Taylor, Charles, Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition, Edited by Amy Gutmann, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1994 (1990).

2

Fulya Özlem

2

Sbisá, Marina. "Against Cultural Identity: a Family Resemblance Perspective on Intercultural Relations", In: Kulturen: Konflikt-Analyse-Dialog: Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenststein Gesellschaft, edited Georg Gasser, Christian Kanzian and Edmund Runggaldier, Österreichische Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft, Kirchberg am Wechsel, 2006, 295-298. 3 See: Chapter 1, part 3: "The Third Stage: Minority Rights as a Response to Nation Building", in: Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular, 2001. 4 Kymlicka, Will, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995. 5 Davidson, Donald, "Chapter 13: On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme", in: Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984 (1974). 6 Sbisa, 2006.

Bibliography Appiah, Kwame Antony, Cosmopolitanism: Ethics in a World of Strangers, W. W. Norton & Company, New York, 2006. Coeckelbergh, Mark, The Metaphysics of Autonomy: the Reconciliation of Ancient and Modern Ideals of the Person, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2004. Davidson, Donald, "Chapter 13: On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme", in: Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984 (1974). Kymlicka, Will, Liberalism, Community, and Culture, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, 1989. —. Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights, Clarendon Press, Oxford. —. Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, 2001. Sbisá, Marina, "Against Cultural Identity: a Family Resemblance Perspective on Intercultural Relations." In: Kulturen: Konflikt-AnalyseDialog: Beiträge der Österreichischen Ludwig Wittgenststein Gesellschaft, edited Georg Gasser, Christian Kanzian and Edmund Runggaldier, Österreichische Ludwig Wittgenstein Gesellschaft, Kirchberg am Wechsel, 2006, 295-298. Taylor, Charles, Multiculturalism:Examining the Politics of Recognition, Edited by Amy Gutmann, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1994 (1990). Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Philosophical Investigations, translated by G.E.M. Anscombe, Blackwell, Oxford, 2001.

CAN LITERARY TRANSLATION HELP SOCIETIES TRANSCEND INTEGRATION PROBLEMS? SINEM MERAL

Wenn wir jedoch irgendetwas, das das Leben des Zeichens ausmacht, benennen sollten, so würden wir sagen müssen, daß es sein Gebrauch ist. —Ludwig Wittgenstein, Das Blaue Buch

If we are sensitive to Wittgenstein's analysis of language games, then we will conclude that the meaning of a word is nothing more or less than its use. And since translation as a word is taken up in sundry contexts it makes sense to point toward that use of translation that is meant here. For the purpose of this essay, translation is the act of interpreting the meaning of the source text and subsequently producting an equivalent text that communicates the same message in another language. But the simplicity of this definition clearly belies both the complexity of the task as well as our conceptualization of it. That the act of translation is fundamentally involved with more than "mere words" was already more than apparent to the ancient Greeks as personified in the figure of Hermes. This winged messenger god was given the unenviable task of translating between the Olympian gods and the mere mortals below, between the divine and the mundane, between two mutually incomprehensible worlds. The translator is thus always already one who occupies a liminal space and who strives to create an opening that allows for mutual recognition. A common conception holds that languages are inseparable parts of cultures. Over the course of human history, one can speculate about how language has evolved from a simple tool enabling the communication between two people to an all-encompassing medium through which nations, societies, political bodies and religions understand themselves. This conception treats language as the offspring of culture that has become independent over the years. But philosophers as diverse as Dewey, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and Davidson have fundamentally disagreed with this subordination of language to our experience of the world. As Gadamer puts it, "Language is not just one of man's possessions in the world; rather on it depends the fact that man has a world at all." (Truth and Method, p. 443) Thus, regardless of how far we extend the ontic depth

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of linguistic constructivism, it remains clear that we do not expect from translators a "word-for-word translation" but to show readers the cultural background of the text, the horizon of meaning from which it stems. This extension of translation from words to language and finally to culture is not without its difficulties. As the translation scholar Aiwei Shi notes, culture is not easily defined, nor is there a consensus among scholars, philosophers and politicians (nor, probably, among the rest of us) as to what exactly the concept should include. Culture means all kinds of things. Culture can mean the arts collectively: art, music, literature, and related intellectual activities; knowledge and sophistication: enlightenment and sophistication acquired through education and exposure to the arts; shared beliefs and values of a group: the beliefs, customs, practices, and social behavior of a particular nation or people; shared attitudes: a particular set of attitudes that characterizes a group of people.1

It is a limitless task to classify and qualify a culture because of the infinite contextual modalities in which a language "lives". For example, in Turkey, when we see someone doing something difficult like cleaning a house or carrying a heavy box, we say "kolay gelsin". Literally it means, "May it come easy to you", but this tells us nothing of its true use and therefore meaning. The enlightened translator must know that this phrase is, "more power to you" something that you say to praise someone and to say that you hope he/she continues to have success. In the Turkish idiom, the speaker wishes the difficult activity to end as quickly as possible while the speaker simultaneously detects a feeling of guilt hidden behind the words for not being more helpful. The English translations most ready to hand – "More power to you" or "Don't work too hard" – simply lack the specificity of context and of emotional content. This simple example demonstrates that a successful translation would require far more than an understanding of the words. Translators are thus not mere 'bookworms'. Searching for new words in the target language and learning figurative meanings of the words, idioms or phrasal verbs are only the outward aspects of their work. The ideal translator is omniscient. Literature draws its language and content from real life and life includes "everything except nothing". As Heidegger writes in his essay Hölderlin and the Essence of Poetry: Language serves to give information. As a fit instrument for this, it is a 'possession'. But the essence of language does not consist entirely in being a means of giving information. This definition does not touch its essential essence, but merely indicates an effect of its essence. Language is not a

Can Literary Translation Help Societies Transcend Integration Problems? 5 mere tool, one of the many which man possesses; on the contrary, it is only language that affords the very possibility of standing in the openness of the existent. (1949, p. 295)

Therefore, a literary translator cannot choose to be blind to any of the various disciplines and practices that bear upon the translated work or those in the rendered language. Everything that concerns the culture of the text and that of the target language – from history, sociology, and psychology to ethnic, regional, and local matters – must be open to the translator in the process of interpretation. But this characterization of the task of translation, as difficult as it may sound, is still based on the relative boundedness of cultures and languages that predominated before the 20th century. Today, increasing cultural globalization, borderless digital communication, advanced industrialization, professional mobility and emigration are but major factors in reducing the distances between languages, and when languages live together it means different cultures live together. This inevitably changes the meaning and the function of the translator. The translator is no longer a person who knows a language very well but a person who is eligible to translate the attitudes, beliefs and customs. The new translator has to be an intercultural mediator. The translator has to be a professional in charge of taking a text from one language to another following the traditional principles of fidelity and adequacy and an intercultural mediator filling the breach between two cultures and languages and whose role is to favor the understanding of the different groups involved at the same time.2

His/her role consists in interpreting the expressions, intentions and perceptions of one group for the other in order to establish balanced communication among them. It must therefore be a person who possesses, apart from an intimate knowledge of both languages, a depth of cultural sensibility that allows him/her to negotiate the meaning between both cultures and be able to transmit it to the members of the other community. It will come as little surprise that this type of translator is even more crucial in the translation of the literary works treating delicate issues such as ethnic problems, religious differences and gender conflicts – issues that divide societies and that often operate on the basis of intolerance and ignorance. "The Turks in Germany" is one of these fragile issues that has been touched on by many writers and it is my straightforward and powerful conviction that literary translation has a significant role to play in overcoming these obstacles. In this framework, five literary works are presented to contribute to the process of transcending integration problems.

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Four of them are in Turkish, one in German. Moreover, I supply a list of well-known, known and barely-known books written on this subject for those who are interested. The first two books, New Visitors and The Pomegranate of Berlin, were written by a famous Turkish writer, Füruzan, in 1977 and 1988 respectively, after her trip to Germany as a scholar of the DAAD (Deutscher Akademische Austausch Dienst or German Academic Exchange Service) in 1975. At that time Turkish laborers had already settled in Germany. A minority was integrating into the German society, but the majority was unaware of the fact that they would not return to Turkey in the near future. In their eyes and those of the German people they were "visitors" in Germany who had come to make money and fill a gap in the labor market. They were "not living" in Germany but just working there receiving their salary. The perceptions of the both German and Turkish states were in line with this attitude as well. They did not expect integration for it was merely a "labor exchange program". The truth, as we now all know, was different and it is this truth that Füruzan deals with in her works. While in Germany, she interviewed Turkish laborers, intellectuals, ordinary German people and "New Visitors" showing us the hopeless and dark psychology of Turks, the latent or openly racist attitude of German people against Turks, the reluctance and insensitivity of both Turkish and German states in this matter, the burdensome and inhuman working conditions, the "invasion" of the biggest metropolises in Germany such as Berlin and Hamburg by "alien" Turks and the German people's discomfort with living with their "new neighbors". Füruzan's books are suffused with alienation. Yet this alienation is not only that which occurs among the peoples of two different cultures but also alienation from, "life and the human condition." In The Pomegranate of Berlin the main character is an old German lady who experienced Hitler's period, the Second World War, the division of Berlin, the Soviet regime, and the arrival of neo-capitalism. During these radical political changes, the life and relationships of this German lady, Frau Lemmer, change as well. For example, her daughter prefers living in West Berlin obeying capitalist rules, her son goes after the "American dream," while her weakened relations with her friends takes on quite another aspect. Lastly, her modest life completely shifts as a result of the emigration of the Turkish laborers to Berlin. At first, she refuses to communicate with them because she hears "some disgusting myths" about them. But one day she goes to one of her Turkish neighbors' house and her view changes. She finds a "human relation" in the little baby girl of this Turkish family and simultaneously finds the innocence she has longed for. Yes, they are

Can Literary Translation Help Societies Transcend Integration Problems? 7

different from her in appearance, language and religion, but they are friendly, hospitable and keep their customs. The third work belongs to a very successful but thankless story teller, Nursel Duruel. Her seven-paged story The Deers, My Mother, and Germany is one of the most unforgettable stories written on the sorrow of leaving one's homeland. The main character is a little girl's mother about to leave Turkey for her father's place in Germany in order to work and make money there to sustain the family. The story uses a very naïve language and we, the readers, find out the psychological fragilities behind this childlike innocence. The little girl emerges in the story as the symbol of the trauma felt by migrant children. Those who are left by their parents in Turkey have to fight against the absence of parents and how this experience traumatizes their soul and affects their behavior. Some of them are taken away to Germany by their parents in the following years, but they never forget having grown up far away from "warm arms of the family". Except for those who are German by birth, these children cannot set aside the feeling of discomfort, because they are conscious of not belonging to the territory to which "they are brought". In the story, the blissful dream of the little girl is to return to the village they came from. Village – the loss of happiness and the leave-taking of childhood – is symbolized by motifs such as deer, birds, and flowers on kilim (the traditional Turkish carpet), blue creeks, green grass and the smell of land. For her, Germany is the reason for the end of family unity, an irreversible and uncertain future, conflicts between mother and father, the unhappiness of the mother, the ceaseless tears and an empty feeling deep inside. Neúe Karel is another interesting Turkish writer focusing on the life of Turkish laborers and migrants in Germany. Her perspective is feminist at root. The main characters of her stories are women who face up to the difficulty of surviving abroad as female migrant laborers. Clashes with the cultural customs, integrating into the new culture, working with men, the very harsh working conditions in factories or small workshops and missing children left in Turkey are some of the principle topics in Ms. Karel's work. In her stories, each woman has a different reason for coming to Germany: making money for children, escaping from customs, hoping to get a better life abroad, the impossibility of living in Turkey as a lesbian, etc. Her stories are not yet published in Turkey but the translated versions of Ms. Karel's stories will certainly enrich the integration process in Germany by their challenging concepts and smooth language. Finally we look at Günter Wallraff's 1986 book originally called Ganz Unten ("At the Bottom"). It can be considered both a journalistic success as well as a literary masterpiece since the writer disguised himself to look

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like a Turkish laborer, Ali, and worked under harsh conditions like a Turkish laborer to expose the realities of this life. The book was translated and published in Turkey in 1986. (Unfortunately, the Turkish readers are not very empathetic towards the daily life and social difficulties that Turks in Germany have encountered, which is why convincing Turkish publishers to handle this issue in depth is not an easy task.) This work is a real challenge to the taboos and unspoken subjects such as racism, xenophobia, and confirmed discrimination in German society. This revelatory book lays bare how the nationalism of Germany's middle classes, administrative bodies, and religious organizations are pervaded by racism and xenophobia. In my view, the writer is of particular help in showing us that the feelings and consciousness that must be fought against to transcend integration problems are particular to a racist mindset, but not to the German society at large. It is essential to distinguish between them in Germany as in Turkey. Ganz Unten provides us an honest platform to judge the racist behaviors penetrating into our social genes and discuss the ways of integration. To conclude, it is my claim that the European Union has an obvious moral and financial responsibility in utilizing literary translation as a valuable tool for integration purposes. As is known, Germany is a member state and Turkey is a candidate state of the European Union. This means the integration problem in Germany cannot solely be regarded as a "national issue" but is also a "union question". The European Commission's Directorate General for Translation must show an interest in literary translations that contribute to integration solutions. To this end, I enclose an alternative list of literary books to be translated into German hoping this will inspire action to help transcend the integration problems of Turks in Germany.3

Notes 1

Shi, Aiwei, "Causes of Failure in Translation and Strategies", http://www.translationdirectory.com/article129.htm 2 Valero-Garces, Carmen, "Mediation as Translation or Translation as Mediation? Widening the Translator's Role in a new Multicultural Society", http://www.translationdirectory.com/article324.htm 3 I provide here below an alternative list of books (the translation of book titles is a literal translation but has to be changed in the course of a future publication): Duruel, Nursel, Annem, Geyikler ve Almanya ("My Mother, Deers and Germany") Füruzan, Yeni Konuklar ("New Visitors") Livaneli, Zülfü, Arafta Bir Çocuk ("A boy on Purgatory") Tosuner, Necati, Sancı Sancı ("Ache Ache")

Can Literary Translation Help Societies Transcend Integration Problems? 9 Çalıúkan, øncila, Yaúamdan Seviç Yaratanlar ("Creators of Bliss from Life") Çalıúkan, øncila, Babamın Kitap Sandı÷ı ("The Book Box of My Father") Çalıúkan, øncila, Yaúam Umutla Büyür ("Life Grows With Hope") Pazarkaya, Yüksel, Güz Rengi ("The Fall Colour") Ergin, Özgen, Fırdöndü ("The Switvelà") Yıldız, Bekir, Demir Bebek ("Iron Baby") Engin, Gülseren, Kurutulmuú Çiçek Bahçesi ("Dried Flower Garden") and various unpublished stories Karel, Neúe, - various unpublished stories

Bibliography Çalıúkan, øncila, Life Grows With Hope, Crea Yayinlari, østanbul, 2008. Duruel, Nursel, My Mother, Deers and Germany, Alkim Yayinlari, Istanbul, 2003. Fürüzan, The Pomegranate of Berlin, Yapi Kredi Yayinlari, Istanbul, 1995. —. The New Visitors, Yapi Kredi Yayinlari, østanbul, 1995 Gadamer, Hans Georg, Truth and Method, trans. by Garret Barden and John Cumming, Crossroad Publishing, New York, 1975 [1960]. Heidegger, Martin, Existence and Being, ed. Werner Broch, Regnery Company, Chicago, 1949. Karel, Neúe, several unpublished stories, Ankara. Shi, Aiwei, Causes of Failure in Translation and Strategies, http://www.translationdirectory.com/article129.htm Valero-Garces, Carmen, Mediation as Translation or Translation as Mediation? Widening the Translator's Role in a new Multicultural Society, http://www.translationdirectory.com/article324.htm Wallraff, Günter, Ganz Unten, Milliyet Yayinlari, Cologne, 1986. Wittgenstein, Ludwig, Das Blaue Buch, Suhrkamp, Frankfurt am Main, 1984 [1958].

FETHULLAH GÜLEN'S SCHOOLS OF LOVE: A MUSLIM MODEL FOR THE FUTURE?1 DAVID TITTENSOR

Fethullah Gülen is a Turkish Sufi inspired preacher and intellectual who, in response to both modernity and globalisation, has developed his own philosophy with regards to what constitutes a true Muslim. As a "Sufi in his own way" (Saritoprak 2003), Gülen has built on a tradition of philanthropy that emphasises worldly engagement, as opposed to retreat from the world, an approach pursued by some tarikatlar (Sufi Orders).2 He advocates a pious activism, wherein individuals need to provide hizmet (service) to their local communities. In particular, Gülen stresses the importance of secular education arguing that "education is the best way to serve humanity and to establish dialogue with other civilisations" (2006: 198). In essence, Gülen has sought to carve out a 'middle way' for Islam and his teachings have inspired the development of what is now a unique Muslim global education movement, with more than 500 schools established worldwide in countries as diverse as Indonesia, South Africa and Germany. To begin, the paper will provide some background about Gülen and his intellectual development and highlight how his humanism echoes that of Kant's. The following section will then, firstly, explore Gülen's key philosophical ideas in more detail and, secondly, through drawing on interviews with teachers and students, will illustrate his humanist philosophy in action, and suggest that the movement appears to be authentic in its aim of providing high quality secular education for the betterment of humanity.

The Gülen Movement: From Local to Glocal Gülen was born in the Erzurum province of eastern Turkey in 1938 and had a classical religious upbringing. He was educated in the ways of Islam first by his parents who taught him Arabic, and later at the local mosque school by Sir Sadi where he stayed with around five or six students. Also, as there was no formal elementary school in Erzurum, he took those grades by exam. A precocious student, Gülen in 1958 passed the preaching

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exam of the Ministry of Religious Affairs in first place and was assigned as the second Imam to Serefeli Mosque in Edirne and was quickly promoted to a government position in Izmir. In 1957 he was introduced to Said Nursi's3 ideas which had a profound influence on him. Subsequently, he became an active member of his community in Izmir and strove towards the classical Nurcu ideal of education: the marriage of theology with scientific knowledge (Agai 2003: 53). However, Gülen did not confine himself to Nursi's writings, but read the works of conservative and politically national-Islamist intellectuals, such as Nurrettin Topçu and Sezai Karakoç (Yavuz 2003c: 181). He was also strongly influenced by the Sufi poet Rumi and his message of love of humanity that pervaded his whole opus. The Gülen movement's development can be broken into three distinct stages: religious community building, community expansion, and lastly, a global vision, each of which is to a large extent shaped by the intellectual influences outlined above in situ. Gülen while working in Izmir became concerned about the state of Islam in the Turkey, particularly the plight of the country's countries youth, as the Islam taught in the schools was both limited and optional for students except for those in years four and five.4 He was afraid that they would grow up have lose all but the most rudimentary knowledge of their religion. As a result, in the 1960s and 70s, Gülen put Nursi's ideas into practice and organised religious summer camps in Izmir, where he read and discussed Nursi's writings, alongside secular subjects, such as biology and history with the goal of building an exclusive religious community (Yavuz 2003b: 31). Those young people that attended the camps were typically from high school or university. The camps functioned as a space for these spiritually and intellectually inclined students to grapple with both religious and secular ideas and practice debating together. They would discuss ethical and social issues according to the writings of Said Nursi, with the view to helping them develop an Islamic consciousness as well as a shared sense of morality and identity in a secular society (Yavuz 2003c: 181-2). During his time at the camp Gülen also developed his own theology of religious activism, encouraging students to engage in what Ozdalga (2000: 88) dubbed as "activist pietism", as he had become disenchanted both with conventional Islam and with traditional Sufism; the former, in his view had become overly concerned with the legal aspects of Islam, while neglecting the inner spiritual quest, whereas, the latter had become too detached from the outside world with its insistence on aestheticism, passivism and inner worldly spirituality and had failed to confront the challenges posed by modernity (Vicini 2007: 433). Thus, he wanted to

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provide a new kind of Sufism that presented a middle way that at once allowed people to maintain their spirituality and engage with the community at large rather that withdraw from it. He found his answer in a redefinition of the concept of hizmet. His concept of providing service to God was not through the traditional means, such as giving zekat (alms) and building mosques, but through everyday actions that help others and serve society. He argued that religious life in modernity should not be confined to mosques or other religious institutions but has to be taken out to the wider community, which could be achieved through individuals providing good examples as teachers, journalists and businessmen. He argued that Muslims need to show that they can be modern in an Islamic way and integrate with ordinary people in Turkey (Agai 2003: 58; Ozdalga 2000: 89-92). Thus, he urged his students to realise their potential, participate in society, work hard and be a beacon for Islam. In particular he stressed the ideal that "This life has to be lived to its utmost limits" which can be achieved through work. He called this ideal aksiyon insani (man of action) (Ozdalga 2000: 89). In many respects his approach is akin to Weber's (1930) protestant ethic which regards constant labour in a person's chosen profession as a means of obtaining personal salvation. From the 1970s onwards, Gülen through his revamped religious outlook and emphasis on education attracted people who were able to support his ideas with money and labour. They built dershanes (study centres), also known as ısık evleri (houses of light), where Islamic education was taught in the light of Nursi's writings and his teachings (Agai 2003: 54). The study centres also helped students to prepare for the central entrance examination to the university, and were instrumental in helping Gülen develop his movement. In these houses five or six same sex students would live and study together in an "atmosphere of sincerity and develop a powerful sense of religious brotherhood or sisterhood" (Yavuz 2003b: 33). Through these houses he forged strong networks of loyal followers that enabled him to accumulate new resources and social capital that allowed the movement to continue expanding. In particular, the movement appealed to the doctors, academics and professionals who were able to provide financial assistance (Aras & Caha 2000). Typically, many of these supporters, after graduation from university, would return to become teachers for the movement in their respective fields, becoming both the movement's fulcrum and embodiment of Gülen's redefinition of how to be a "good Muslim" – a point which will be returned in the following section. As the movement grew, Gülen was keen to keep the movement out of the public eye be eschewing politics, stressing that religion is purely a

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private matter and maintaining this position even after the movement's phenomenal success: Politicisation of religion is dangerous, but it's even more dangerous for religion than for the regime. Actually, it darkens religion's spirit, for religion belongs to everyone. Those who make a claim for religion with political intentions for religion with political considerations want to make everything an instrument of their politics, political considerations, and political goals. (Gülen, as cited in Ünal & Williams 2000: 168)

However, despite his cautious approach, he was arrested during the military 'coup by memorandum' of 1971 and was jailed for seven months before being acquitted for his involvement in the Nur movement in Izmir. His involvement was deemed a violation of article 163, which criminalises unwanted religious expression and association (Yaviuz 2003b: 21; 2003c: 182-3). Thus, it was not until 1979 that he made his first tentative step into the public domain. Marshalling the social capital garnered through his ever expanding networks, Gülen started to publish the journal Sizinti which promoted a synthesis of scientific knowledge and Islam. The journal, initially intended for circulation amongst the movement, did not remain limited to the Gülen/Nurcu circles5 and attracted a wide readership. This unexpected success sparked a change in his thinking and he began to move away from Nursi's "individual-oriented approach" to Islamisation to a "society-oriented approach" (Agai 2003: 54). His goals shifted from simply building a religious community to the development of a yeni nesil (new generation) of pious yet modern Turkish elite that would be able to reform the character of the nation. Fortuitously for Gülen, just as his outlook changed so too did the political climate in Turkey and he was quick to seize on it. In 1980 the military undertook a coup that resulted in the banning of all political parties and embarked on a conservative re-Islamisation in an attempt to counteract both escalating tensions between the Sunnis and Alevis, and the perceived threat to the state from leftist Kurdish and Alevi activist groups aligned with Marxist movements.6 Gülen supported the coup and embraced a very statist posture, and re-positioned the movement's understanding of Islam as a brand of "Turkish Islam" and nationalised it (Yavuz 2003a: 16). As a result of this nationalist and pro-state discourse, the then Prime Minster Turgut Özal placed his support behind the Gülen movement, as he wanted to use their ideas and activities as a hedge against extremist Islamist groups. Subsequently, the movement developed close ties with the state7 and engaged in economic, cultural and media ventures. They, with government support, purchased the newspaper Zaman, and

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launched a national television channel called Samanyolu. These gave the movement a powerful country-wide platform to promote the influence of Gülen followers (Yavuz 2003c: 183, 190-1). Though, the most significant development which precipitated the rapid expansion of the movement came in the field of education. In 1983 the education system was opened up by the government, paving the way for privately run schools that utilised the state curricula, and Gülen capitalised on this to deliver his education ideals beyond Islamic circles. He saw elite secular schools that provided high quality tutelage in non-religious subjects that were run by religiously motivated teachers who stressed Turkish Islamic values as the chief means of achieving his "new generation". Gülen believed that such institutions would develop well integrated, devout Muslims that who would come to positions of authority and be able to mould society through their everyday activities. Thus, he urged his followers, drawing on his reinterpretation of hizmet, to build such institutions. Diligently, the movement, gathering the resources of its networks, set about establishing many private schools, dormitories, more dershanes and even some colleges (Agai 2003: 54-5). These schools, once they began to function, routinely outperformed their state counterparts and became increasingly popular amongst the bourgeoisie and as such were able to garner more funding that allowed for continued expansion. Currently, the movement owns and runs around in excess of more than 150 schools in Turkey. This considerable educational network, with its aim of producing the next generation of religiously oriented elite became the chief focus of the movement, and has been instrumental in consolidating its position as the dominant Islamic Muslim activist group in Turkey. It is speculated that the movement in Turkey, on the back of its schools and dershanes has acquired approximately 200,000 followers and influenced over 4 million people with its ideas (Aras & Çaha 2000). Towards the end of the 1980s as the discourse of globalisation became popular, Gülen's outlook altered again. As he became more aware of the outside world and could see that the Turks and the Europeans were not so different, in the sense that they were dealing with similar issues, such as the place and role of religion within society, his "teaching concept" began to shift away from the "new generation" simply being a Turkish based Islamic ideal to a means of saving the world at large (Agai 2003: 58); he saw that perhaps religious morally upright teachers providing secular education who act as examples of how to live a "good life" as a means to rejuvenate what he has come to perceive as general moral/spiritual decline responsible for many of the worlds ills.8 Thus a more universal and

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humanistic element emerged in his thinking centred on the concepts of altruism and love: Altruism is an exalted human feeling and its source is love. Whoever has the greatest share of love is the greatest hero of humanity; these people have been able to shake off and uproot any feeling of hatred and rancour in themselves...These lofty souls who, by each day kindling the torch of their inner world and by making their hearts a source of love and altruism, are welcomed and loved by people...individuals who dedicate their lives to the happiness of others are entitled "valiant devotees", but those who live and die for all of humanity are commemorated as monuments of immortality who deserve to be enthroned in the hearts of humanity. In the hands of these heroes, love becomes a magic elixir to overcome every obstacle and a key to every door. Those who possess such an elixir and key will sooner or later open the gates to all parts of the world and spread the fragrance of peace everywhere, using the "censers" of love in their hands (Gülen 2006: 2).9

As can be seen above, Gülen appears to de-emphasise the role of Islam and reduces it to a purely personal matter, as he locates it simply as the 'inner source' from which Muslims need to draw on and channel into good deeds. Thereby, shifting the goal of the movement from the development of an Islamically inspired generation, who will mould society according to religious practice, to a desire to furnish the world with both quality education, which combined with their examples of tolerance and service borne out of love for humanity, will create an intellectually and spiritually enlightened generation, thereby safeguarding humanity, with the service itself functioning as one's own spiritual reward. In other words, Gülen sees humanity as being the greatest gift from God and that humans, the bedrock of humanity, have a duty to protect God's gift. Here, Gülen's thinking begins to resemble that of Kant's concept of humanity in his Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, wherein he developed the Categorical Imperative: "Act in such a way that you treat humanity...always at the same time as an end and never simply as a means" (Kant 1993: 36). This resemblance is even stronger if we accept Richard Dean's interpretation of Kantian humanity to mean "good will" (see Dean 2006). As Kant states that reason's purpose is to develop good will10, and in turn, defines good will in human beings as the capacity to act from a sense of duty alone and not in accordance with circumstances or feelings (Carroll 2007: 11). Therefore, Gülen's approach to humanity is not far removed from Kant's with only one fundamental difference, being that his frame of reference is not that of reason, but religion. However, as Carroll points out, Kant, despite regarding religion as an unsatisfactory

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basis to establish a moral order, would no doubt be satisfied with the outcome (Carroll 2007: 19). For Gülen's approach fits Kant's imperative, in that it asks that the believer simply do good deeds out a sense of duty to God, with no regard for the self, with the ultimate goal being the raising up of humanity. To put it more simply, "good will" which constitutes humanity is the means with which to achieve the end, which is the betterment of humanity, and as will be seen, teachers in the movement seek to live this ideal through their charitable educational work in over 50 countries.11

Aksiyon Insani: Teachers looking to live the ideal As has been touched on briefly above, there are fundamentally two ways in which the individual can serve the movement, either through the donation of money to help build schools or through commitment as a teacher. Certainly, Gülen advocates that one seeks to excel and be an exemplary ethical example in their chosen profession whatever that may be. However, in his teleology the teacher holds a revered position; indeed the teacher is likened to a "holy man" and the school a "place of worship" where the student is to receive a holistic education that focuses not only on the teaching of the sciences but also good values: A school is a place of learning about everything related to this life and the next. It can shed light on vital ideas and events, and enable students to understand their natural and human environment. It can also quickly open the way to unveiling the meaning of things and events, thereby leading a student to a wholeness of thought and contemplation. In essence the school is a kind of place of worship whose "holy people" are teachers. Real teachers sow the pure seed and preserve it. They occupy themselves with what is good and wholesome and lead and guide the children in life and whatever events they encounter. For a school to be a true institution of education, students first should be equipped with an ideal, a love of their language and how to use it most effectively, good morals, and perennial human values (Gülen, as cited in Ünal & Williams 2000: 312).

For Gülen the teacher above all needs to illustrate how to live in a moral and upright way, as he is of the view that humans come into the world as a tabula rasa, and without guidance can easily fall onto the path that leads to degradation. To this end, Gülen exhorts his teachers to follow and not deviate from the principle of temsil (representation), which he sees as the best form of preaching. Indeed, in Gülen's view, temsil when conducted properly renders tebli÷ (proselytism) unnecessary (Atay 2007: 469-70).

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The practice of temsil means living according to Islam wherever you are and representing it through your daily actions, but never mentioning the word Islam. According to Gülen "those who lead the way must set a good example for their followers. Just as they are imitated in their virtues and good morals so to do their bad and improper actions and attitudes leave indelible marks upon those who follow them" (Gülen 2005: 104). Representation is of the utmost importance, and based on my research interviews with some of the movement's teachers thus far, it appears that they really seek to live up to the ideals of living through their vocation. In one interview, a Turkish English teacher explained that the director of his school in Kyrgyzstan explicitly "told the teachers not to read to students about prayers and other such things but rather lead by example" and related the following story: Once two inspectors came to our school and asked about 'ahlak ders' [morality classes]. They asked 'how do you teach students not to smoke, drink and be respectful to their parents? And the school director answered: 'we live all of these things ourselves and they see us and follow our example and do the same things sometime later.'

Likewise, a Turkish mathematics teacher, when asked what role Islam played at his former school in Uzbekistan, stated that Islam was rarely talked about and was largely expressed through his day to day actions as a Muslim: The discussions are not generally about this one [religion]. They may know you, they may know us. I am a Muslim and I am trying to live my religion. This is my view of life. They saw this....but the discussion [is] not always around this topic, because we have a lot of things to discuss: American history, relations from the social life.... but they know us, and we do not hide this from them, because, if it is time for prayer we go for prayer.

Further to this, during the course of the interviews12, he also made it very clear that both his and his colleague's primary mission was not to teach religion but rather to teach the sciences as the "schools are not religious, they are science schools": You know there we were teaching, I was a mathematics teacher, we were teaching the science subjects: mathematics, chemistry, biology and English language. The main objective was not to show our sources just to educate.13

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Indeed, one former director of a school in Uzbekistan stated that the schools should be thought of as "schools of love", a direct reference to Gülen's redefined global outlook, indicating that the teachers perhaps see themselves as his "heroes of humanity" who through both their virtuous behaviour and general good works will both raise up humankind and achieve salvation. Similarly, a Turkish English teacher who worked for a year in Pakistan, when asked about his motivation for going abroad for the movement, expressed that it was opportunity to ply his trade as a direct extension of his faith, in the form of a substitute for zekat: I want[ed] to do something for my belief, for my religion. In terms of education...I wanted to have different experiences in my job too, and I wanted also to practice my subject, English. So I thought it would be a bit flat, a bit monotonous and routine to go to a State school and work there you know and have a comfortable life; from morning to afternoon, from afternoon to let's say evening, I would have much more free time. But, it was the easy path. I wanted to be a bit different... the main purpose is, let's say, to be a part of you know such kind of 'charity life', NGO like, to do my best, to feel something there, some spaces, like a stone, like a brick in a wall, and I enjoyed it a lot. It was very, very different for me, it was an enjoyable time for me, and was also a good time for my vocation too.

Here, one really starts to get the sense on face value that these travelling educators are genuine in their desire to bring both 'no strings attached' education to the world and set a universal moral standard through representation to illustrate that Islam can be both modern and tolerant. This sense of genuineness is bolstered by the reflections of past graduates from both Turkey and abroad: The teachers don't say anything about religion... pray, read the Quran, they don't say such things (Turkey). All of the students at my class were poor children [with] under average grades, and if they weren't [there] most of them couldn't study in universities, and lots of us are thankful for that action, because they helped us to study English, Turkish, and other natural sciences. If they weren't [there] maybe we [would have] stayed as agricultural workers, or herders. So we were thankful for that (Turkmensitan).

Concluding Remarks As has been shown above, the Gülen movement has developed into a unique global force. What began as a small religious community-based project designed to help educate Muslims, in both the sciences and the

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spirit, and enable them to engage in a secular society without losing their sense of Muslim identity, has blossomed into an Islamically inspired, humanitarian movement, wherein Muslims are content to simply represent their religion through their day to activities rather than seek to convert people to their way of thinking like so many others. The movement's adherents seek to follow a middle path between tradition and modernity through the provision of secular educational services as a means of both worship and ultimately salvation, and thus far Gülen's 'heroes of love' appear to be succeeding in walking the fraught tightrope that is the third way. Thus, although still early days with much research to be done, the Gülen movement appears to represent an enlightened Kantianesque model for the future that members of all faiths could note and reflect upon.

Notes 1

This is a revised version of a paper presented at the 'Philosophical Perspectives on Peace: Tukey, Germany, Europe' Conference at the Technische Univesität Berlin, 23-25 October, 2008. My thanks go to Professor Greg Barton and Associate Professor Jeremy Salt for their insightful critical comments. 2 It is important to note here that Gülen is not a Sheik and the movement does not constitute a tarikat. There is no initiation process to become a member of the movement. Rather, those involved are simply inspired by Gülen's teachings on Islam. 3 Said Nursi (b.1873-1960) was born into a Sufi family in the village of Nurs, also in Eastern Anatolia, and grew up during the last years of the Ottoman Empire. He had a traditional religious upbringing and throughout his life he was concerned with the diminishing importance of Islam in Ottoman Empire caused by rapid modernisation underpinned by positivism. In an attempt to save the both the Ottoman state and Islam from the ever expanding influence of positivist epistemology Nursi hungrily devoured whatever texts he could find on scientific and philosophical teachings of the time, which lead him to the realisation that traditional Islamic teaching was insufficient and needed to be updated to account for modernity. Ultimately, he rejected philosophy, but sought to illustrate the compatibility of science and religion; he argued that science simply uncovers the sings of God in the universe, and that through a better understanding of God's creation we can become closer to God. Nursi articulated these ideas in his treatise the Risale-i-Nur (Epistles of the Light) which became extremely popular in the early years of the new republic, particularly in religious communities that rejected the new secular institutions, and became the basis for the Nurculuk movement (see Mermer & Ameur 2004). 4 The Government in 1949 reintroduced religious education to Turkish schools. The program consisted of two hours a week on Saturdays afternoons for the children of parents who requested religious education. Initially, the course was optional for all, but in the following year was made compulsory for grades four and five. For the rest it continued to remain optional. According to Bernard Lewis,

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the textbooks that were used, prepared by the Ministry of Education, were such that Muslims in other countries, like Saudi Arabia and Syria, would have had difficulty in recognizing that the religion being taught was Islam (Lewis 2002). 5 After the death of Said Nursi in 1960 the Nurculuk movement fragmented into a number of competing groups of which the Gülen Movement has been the most successful. Although these movements have their differences, there is still interaction between them. 6 Leading the co-option of Islam by the State was a network called the TurkishIslamic Synthesis (TIS), a cultural program in which religious intellectuals argued against those who supported an Islamic state, and advocated for a depoliticized, nationalist understanding of Islam. In this revised understanding they sort to present the frontier Sufi Dervishes as the archetypal Muslim; individuals that fought in the name of Islam, but always remained subordinate to the authority of the State (see Özdalga 2006). The TIS agenda, through these narratives, was to prevent state from falling into a fragmented politics of difference, and to provide the nation, via Islam, with a powerful element of historical legitimacy and continuity (Howe 2000: 27). 7 Here the state refers specifically to the incumbent government and does not include the military, which remained hostile towards the movement. 8 Gülen sees a lack of spirituality as the central problem behind many of the world's disasters stemming from what he regards as the Enlightenment fallacy that man is reason alone: "Enlightenment movements beginning in the eighteenth century saw human beings as mind only. Following that, positivist and materialist movements saw them as material or corporeal entities only. As a result, spiritual crises have followed one after another. It is no exaggeration to say that these crises and the absence of spiritual satisfaction were the major factors behind the conflict of interests that enveloped the last two centuries and reached its apex in the two world wars" (as cited in Ünal 2000: 314). 9 This was originally written in 1987 and published in Yitirilmiú Cennete Do÷ru, Nil, Izmir, in 1988. 10 Kant clearly states this in his Groundings for the Metaphysics of Morals that "Reason recognizes as its highest practical function the establishment of a good will" (Kant, 1993: 9). 11 In 1991 the Soviet Union collapsed and six new Turkic republics emerged. This unexpected event provided fertile ground for Gülen to expand, for the new republics, were initially keen to engage with Turkey and follow its model, and the move from local to glocal was an unmitigated success. The movement opened its first Central Asian schools in 1992-93, and totalled 77 by 1997 teaching over 15,000 students. Since then the movement has continued to expand with now more than 500 schools in 50 countries across Europe, Asia, America, Africa and Australia, and many of these schools reflect Gülen's inclusive and tolerant outlook. For example, in Cambodia Cham Muslims and Khmer children study side by side, as do Muslim, Christian and Hindu children in the movement's schools in South Africa (see Bruckmayr, 2007; Mohamed, 2007). 12 This interview was conducted in two parts. 13 By sources he meant the dissemination of both Gülen's and Said Nursi's literature.

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Bibliography Agai, Bekim, "Islamic Ethic of Education", in: Turkish Islam and the secular state: the Gülen Movement, eds. H. M. Yavuz and J. L. Esposito, Syracuse University Press, New York, 2003. Aras, Bulent & Çaha, Omer, "Fethullah Gulen and His Liberal 'Turkish Islam' Movement", in: MERIA: Middle East Review of International Affairs, 2000, 4(4):30-43. Atay, Rifat, "Reviving the Suffa Tradition", in: Muslim World in Transition - Contributions of the Gülen Movement, Conference Proceedings October 25-27, Leeds Metropolitan University Press, London, 2007. Bruckmayr, Philipp, "Phnom Penh's Fethullah Gülen School as an Alternative to Prevalent Forms of Education for Cambodia's Muslim Minority", in: Muslim World in Transition: Contributions of the Gülen Movement, Conference Proceedings October 25-27, Leeds Metropolitan University Press, London, 2007. Carroll, B. Jill, A Dialogue of Civilizations: Gülen's Islamic Ideals and Humanistic Discourse, The Light Inc, Somerset, 2007. Dean, Richard, The Value of Humanity in Kant's Moral Theory, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2006. Gülen, Fethullah, Pearls of Wisdom, The Light Inc. & Isik Yayinlari, New Jersey, 2005. —. Toward a Global Civilization of Love and Tolerance, The Light Inc., New Jersey, 2006. Howe, Marvine, Turkey today: a nation divided over Islam's revival, CO: Westview Press, Boulder, 2000. Kant, Immanuel, Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals (3rd Edition), translated by James W. Ellington, Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis, 1993. Lewis, Bernard, The Emergence of Modern Turkey (3rd Edition), Oxford University Press, New York, 2002. Mermer, Yamine & Ameur, Redha, "Beyond the 'modern': Sa id al-Nursi's view of Science", in: Islam and Science, 2004, 2(2):119(142). Mohamed, Yasien, "The Educational Theory of Fethullah Gülen and its Practice in South Africa", in: Muslim World in Transition: Contributions of the Gülen Movement, Leeds Metropolitan University Press, London, 2007. Ozdalga, Elisabeth, "Worldly Asceticism in Islamic Casting: Fetullah Gülen's Inspired Piety and Activism", in: Critique, 2000, 17:83-104.

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—. "The Hidden Arab: A Critical Reading of the Notion of 'Turkish Islam'", in: Middle Eastern Studies, 2006, 42(4):551-570. Saritoprak, Zeki, "Fethullah Gülen: A Sufi in His Own Way", in: Turkish Islam and the Secular State: The Gülen Movement, eds. H. M. Yavuz and J. Esposito, Syracuse University Press, New York, 2003. Ünal, Ali & Williams, Alphonse, Advocate of Dialogue: Fethullah Gülen, The Fountain, Virginia, 2000. Vicini, Fabio, "Gülen's Rethinking of Islamic Patterns and its SocioPolitical Effects", in: Muslim World in Transition: Contributions of the Gülen Movement, Conference Proceedings October 25-27, Leeds Metropolitan University Press, London, 2007. Weber, Max, The Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism, Unwin, London, 1930. Yavuz, Hakan M, "Islam in the Public Sphere", in: Turkish Islam and the secular state: the Gülen Movement, eds. H. M. Yavuz & J. L. Esposito, Syracuse University Press, New York, 2003a. —. "The Gülen Movement: The Turkish Puritans", in: Turkish Islam and the Secular State: The Gülen Movement, eds. H. M. Yavuz & J. L. Esposito, Syracuse University Press, New York 2003b. —. Islamic political identity in Turkey, Oxford University Press, New York, 2003c.

CONTRIBUTORS

Abdullah Onur Aktaú is research assistant in the Philosophy Department at Middle East Technical University of Turkey. He is writing his Doctorate Thesis on "Schopenhauer's Musical Aesthetics". Prior to his current position, he completed his Master's degree at the Philosophy Department and Bachelor's degree in the Statistics Department at Middle East Technical University of Turkey. Recently he was awarded a grant by the Scientific and Technological Research Council of Turkey for developing his Doctorate Thesis at the Schopenhauer Research Center at Mainz-Germany. Sharon Anderson-Gold is Professor of Philosophy at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute where she teaches social and political theory. She is the author of Unnecessary Evil: History and Moral Progress in the Philosophy of Immanuel Kant (State University of New York Press, 2001) and Cosmopolitanism and Human Rights (University of Wales Press, 2001), and co-editor (with Pablo Muchnik) of Kant's Anatomy of Evil (Cambridge University Press, 2010). She has written numerous articles on Kant's moral, social, political philosophy and philosophy of history and was President of the North American Kant Society. Egidius Berns (1939) is professor emeritus of social philosophy and social ethics at Tilburg University, Netherlands. He published on history and philosophy of economic thought, on European integration and on contemporary French philosophers such as Derrida and Foucault. His most recent books are: Kringloop en Woekering. Een deconstructieve filosofie van de economie, Amsterdam, Boom, 1998, and Wij, Europeanen. Ethiek, politiek en globalisering, Budel, Damon, 2005. His book Porosity. Essay on the relationship between economy and politics is forthcoming. Raghunath Ghosh is Professor of Philosophy at the University of North Bengal (Dist. Darjeeling-734 013, West Bengal, India). Professor Ghosh, who is specialised in Classical and Modern Indian Philosophy, is the author of ten books and one hundred thirty articles in different National and International Journals and a recipient of the Best Book Award in Philosophy by the Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi. He was invited as a Visiting Professor in Germany, France, England, Poland, Japan, United States, Finland, Netherlands, Singapore and Malaysia.

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Concerning Peace: New Perspectives on Utopia

Kai Gregor studied philosophy, modern history and political science at OFU Bamberg, HU Berlin and TU Berlin. In 2002, he was awarded the Humboldt-Preis. From 2005 to 2006, he worked as a consultant for the Expertenkommission Schaffung eines Geschichtsverbundes zur Aufarbeitung des SED-Unrechts in Potsdam. Since 2007, he is a doctoral canditdat at TU Berlin. From 2007 to 2009, he was a scholarship holder from the Gerda-Henkel-Stiftung. Since 2009, he is co-founder and chairman of the Internationale Gesellschaft für Transzendentalphilosophie, and a scientific collaborator for the project "Translating Doping - Doping übersetzen" at TU Berlin. Kai Gregor is as well a coordinator of the International network Transcendental Philosophy/German Idealism. Arthur Kok is a Phd-student at Tilburg University since August 2008. He is writing a dissertation on the possibility, actuality and necessity of a system of philosophy, comparing Kant's thought to Hegel's. Furthermore, he is the co-founder and vice-chair of the Internationale Gesellschaft für Transzendentalphilosophie, a newly founded organisation that endorses the merits of strong science-based philosophy in the spirit of Immanuel Kant. Lars Leeten has studied philosophy, literature and semiotics in Osnabrueck and Berlin. He earned his Ph.D. in philosophy from the Technische Universität Berlin, where he taught philosophy from 2007 to 2009. Since 2008 he is an assistant professor of philosophy at the University of Hildesheim, Germany. In 2009 he has been a visiting professor at the UFPA in Belém, Brasil. His current fields of interest include philosophy of language, philosophy of mind, ethics, argumentation theory and rhetoric. Harry Lesser is a retired Senior Lecturer and honorary Fellow in the Centre for Philosophy, University of Manchester, UK. His work has been mainly in Ethics, especially Medical Ethics, Social Philosophy, especially Philosophy of Law, and Philosophy of Mind. His forthcoming publications include an edited collection, Justice for older people, and an article on whether assisted suicide should be legalised, and he is currently organising a small conference on non-violence. Sinem Meral is an independent researcher living in Izmir (Turkey). Meral deals mainly with gender issues, identity conflicts and legal notions in an interdisciplinary approach. She does as well literary translation from English and French into Turkish. She is currently interested in comparative

Contributors

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and interdisciplinary literature. Her stories and essays are published in numerous Turkish journals and magazines. Kenichi Onodera is a doctoral candidate and research associate at the Institute of German Literature at Waseda University in Tokyo, Japan. His research is on literary theories with an emphasis on German literature. Currently he focuses on the usage of neurological theories of emotions and feelings in the interpretation of Friedrich Hölderlin's poetical and theoretical works. From 2005 to 2007 he held a fellowship from the Japan Society of Promotion of Science while studying at Waseda University. From 2007 to 2009, he studied at the Freie Universität Berlin and was awarded a DAAD (German Academic Exchange Service) Scholarship. Fulya Özlem was born in Istanbul. She has received her B.A and M.A degree from the department of Philosophy at Bogazici University, Istanbul. She is the author of Liberal Culturalism and the Individual: An Alternative Account of Cultural Identities released in 2010 by LAP Publishing. She has written Urban Legends, a column at Today's Zaman since 2008 and occasionally writes articles on multiculturalism in Berlin for the same paper. Currently she is doing her PhD degree at the Institute of Philosophy at Technische Universität Berlin, where she works on "Wittgenstein and the Philosophy of Travelling". Julián Pacho is Professor of Philosophy at the University of the Basque Country and member of the Research Center for Innovation and Extraordinary Research of the Vienna University. Besides several publications in philosophical journals, he is the author, among other works, of Ontologie und Erkenntnistheorie (1980), Reason, Science Evolution (1990), Naturalize Reason? Scope and Limits of Evolutionary Naturalism (1995), The Names of Reason (1997), Positivism and Darwinism (2005), Epistemological Pluralism and Trans-culturality: A Contribution to Intercultural Epistemology (2010). Manos Perrakis received his Ph.D. in Philosophy from Humboldt Universität, Berlin in 2009. His main research interests include History of Philosophy, Aesthetics and Modern European Philosophy. He has published articles on Nietzsche and the Philosophy of Music. His current research focuses on the relation between Aesthetics of Music and Philosophical Anthropology.

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Concerning Peace: New Perspectives on Utopia

Sandra Pinardi received her PhD from the Universidad Simón Bolívar (2000) in Venezuela. She worked at the Department of Philosophy (magister and doctoral programs) in the same University. She is currently Professor of Contemporary Philosophy at the Universidad Católica Andrés Bello, Caracas, Venezuela. She has published three books: Espacio de ceguera, espacio no presencial, La Comprensión del Arte de fin de Siglo and La noción moderna de obra de Arte. She has a contribution in a book about Venezuelan art published at the Museum of Modern Art called Alfredo Boulton and his contemporaries: a Critical Dialogue, and many publications in international academic journals. Paula Restrepo is Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Communication of the University of Antioquia, Colombia. She is an anthropologist and PhD student in the Philosophy Department at the University of the Basque Country. In her dissertation, she examines the conditions and possibilities of interculturality from the sixteenth century to the present days. Concurrently, she is investigating problems of communication and lack of humanist values in contemporary universities in collaboration with the group Seminario Beta. She has also written on the relationship between Paul Feyerabend's epistemology and intercultural communication. Cristiana Senigaglia studied philosophy in Trieste (Italy), where she received the prize "Mocchino-Foà". She was awarded numerous scholarships from the Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Filosofici and an Alpe-Adria scholarship from the University of Regensburg (Germany). She received her PhD thanks to a scholarship from the University of Trieste including a research period at the Ludwig-Maximilian University in Munich. She later obtained a post-doctorate scholarship at the University of Padova and a four years research contract at the University of Trieste, where she taught History of Philosophy from 2006 to 2009. She published Il gioco delle assonanze (Firenze 1992), Razionalità e Politica (Milano 1996), La Comunità a più Voci (Milano 2005), as well as numerous articles, communications, and book reviews. Rachael Sotos studied political theory at the University of California at Santa Cruz and received her PhD in Philosophy from the New School for Social Research in New York with a dissertation entitled Arendtian Freedom in Greek Antiquity. She is the author of Agnes Heller: Philosophin der Kontingenz, in Philosophinnen des 20. Jahrnhunderts, edited by Regina Munz (Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft), as well as several arti-

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cles concerning American political culture. She is presently pursuing a second doctorate in Classics at Fordham University in New York City. Sergueï Spetschinsky is a doctoral candidate at the Technische Universität Berlin and the Université Libre de Bruxelles. His dissertation focuses on the problem of the transition between theory and praxis in Kant's transcendental philosophy. Since 2008, he is a fellowship holder from Belgium's Fond National de la Recherche Scientifique (FRS-FNRS). He is as well co-founder and member of the International Society for Transcendental Philosophy. David Tittensor is a Doctoral Candidate at Monash University (Australia) undertaking his PhD on the Turkish Muslim Educational organisation known as the Gülen Movement. In 2008 he spent a year in Turkey, where he observed and interviewed both members of the movement and graduates of their schools from across the globe. The working title for his thesis is: New Islamic Philanthropy – A Study of the Gülen Movement's Investment in Colleges in Turkey and Abroad. His other interests include Turkey and the EU, Middle East politics and world religions.