Compulsory Labor Arbitration in France, 1936-1939 9780231880114

Table of contents :
Preface
Contents
Tables
Chronology
Part I. The Introduction of Compulsory Arbitration in France
Part II. The System in Operation: Problems and Results
Notes
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

COMPULSORY LABOR ARBITRATION IN FRANCE, 1936-1939

COMPULSORY LABOR ARBITRATION IN FRANCE, 1930-1939 JOEL

COLTON

DEPARTMENT DUKE

KING'S COLUMBIA

OF HISTORY

UNIVERSITY

CROWN

UNIVERSITY,

NEW

PRESS YORK,

19 51

Copyright Published

1951

1950

b y JOEL

COLTON

b y KING'S CROWN PRESS

King's Crown Press is an imprint established by Columbia University Press for the purpose of making certain scholarly material available at minimum cost. Toward that end, the publishers have used standardized formats incorporating every reasonable economy that does not interfere with legibility. The author has assumed complete responsibility for editorial style and for proofreading.

Published in Great Britain, Canada, and India by Geoffrey Cumberlege, Oxford University Press London, Toronto, and Bombay

M A N U F A C T U R E D IN T H E UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA

to my wife SHIRLEY BARON COLTON

with affection and gratitude

Preface IN 1942 the Vichy regime placed Leon Blum and other prewar leaders of the Third Republic on trial, charging them with responsibility for France's defeat in 1940. T h e Vichy government alleged that the labor reforms of the Popular Front and Blum's failure to enforce law and order in the sitdown strikes of 1936 had so weakened France that defeat was inevitable when war came. At the trial, Blum vigorously defended the reforms introduced by his administration and insisted, furthermore, that he had effectively restored order without bloodshed in the great strike movement of the spring of 1936. Besides emphasizing the extent of the mediation which his government had undertaken in that critical period, he noted also the following: W e saw to it [in December, 1936] that both houses passed a compulsory conciliation and arbitration law that prohibited strikes and lockouts before attempts at conciliation and arbitration had run their coursc. . . . A legal system of arbitration was gradually introduced into public life. 1 This statement by Blum at the Riom trial, which, incidentally, was abruptly suspended after several weeks of hearings, calls attention to a relatively little known aspect of French economic life in the years 1936 to 1939. An experiment in the compulsory arbitration of labor disputes was initiated by the original Popular Front government in 1936 and remained in operation under succeeding ministries until the coming of the war in September, 1939. Overshadowed by other, more publicized measures of the Popular Front, such as the forty hour week, it has not received the attention it merits as one of the most significant social reforms attempted in

viii

PREFACE

the last years of the Third Republic. T h e French experience with compulsory arbitration takes on added interest, moreover, because of the limited number of countries in which this controversial method of settling labor disputes has been tried. T h e present study is a history of the French experiment from its origins in the sitdown strikes of June, 1936, until its wartime suspension. It attempts first to describe the circumstances under which the labor-sponsored Popular Front government introduced compulsory arbitration despite labor's traditional hostility to all such proposals. It attempts, further, to examine the nature of the system that was adopted; to explore the problems that arose in the operation of the system; and, as far as possible, to evaluate the results. As appropriate to a study in economic history, an effort has been made to emphasize the relationship of the experiment to the changing political scene, to public opinion, to the labor movement and to the general framework of industrial relations in France. O n the other hand, even though the arbitration system is viewed against the background of the Popular Front economic experiment, full consideration of the latter has been excluded as beyond the scope of this work. It must be emphasized, finally, that the primary purpose has been to provide a history of the experiment tried in France in the prewar years, not to make a purely technical evaluation of the French experience nor to draw any lessons for other countries from this experience. T h e book is divided into two parts. Part I describes how compulsory arbitration came to be introduced in France and the kind of system that was adopted. Part II treats the problems that arose in the operation of the system and the general results. T h e introductory chapter of Part I surveys the mediation machinery that existed in France before 1936 and provides the political and economic setting for the Popular Front election victory of 1936. T h e two following chapters sketch as background to the introduction of compulsory arbitration the great sitdown strikes of May-June, 1936, and the continued labor unrest of the autumn of that same year. T h e original temporar)' arbitration machinery, established by the A c t of December 31, 1936, is then described and the circumstances under which the temporary system was twice renewed. T h e last

PREFACE

ix

chapter of Part I examines the important reforms instituted when the system received permanent status under the Act of March 4, 1938. Part II, except for the final chapter, is arranged topically. It is concerned with a selected number of problems that emerged in the operation of the arbitration system. Many phases of the legislation establishing the original system had been left obscure and the permanent act, moreover, served to introduce a number of additional problems. W h i l e under the 1936 Act no reviewing agency existed, under the permanent act, a Higher Court of Arbitration exercised appellate jurisdiction over the system. This court guaranteed greater homogeneity in the body of arbitral decisions and clarified several points left ambiguous by the lawmakers. Chapters 6-10 reveal the manner in which these ambiguities were handled in arbitration practice and how they were settled by the rulings of the Higher Court. Part II, in addition, analyzes the results of the system under a number of special headings. It examines such aspects as the adjustment of wages to rising prices through arbitration; the effect of compulsory arbitration on "the right to strike" as well as on the strike record; the applicability of the system to the negotiation of initial contracts; and the enforcement of awards before and after the introduction of special legal sanctions in November, 1938. T h e final chapter describes the nationwide general strike of November 30, 1938, and the role played by the arbitration system in the aftermath of that strike. This last chapter indicates, too, the changing attitude of the labor movement as the restrictive implications of the system became clear, especially after the passing of the Popular Front. It indicates also the reforms that were being considered in government circles when the war interrupted the experiment. A concluding section discusses the status of the system from its wartime suspension to 1950. The publications of the French government have been of prime importance in preparing this study. Communication with the French Ministry of Labor has confirmed the fact that all relevant information still existing after the war and the occupation has been published through official channels. Much of the statistical data

χ

PREFACE

used has been published by the French government only recently and has not been used elsewhere. T h e inadequacy, however, of French statistical data, particularly in regard to such matters as strikes and wages, has been an unfortunate handicap. A number of monographs and articles on the compulsory arbitration experiment appeared before the war, while the system was still in operation. Although necessarily limited in perspective, many of these studies provide valuable technical information and have been used to advantage. The press—in particular, Le Temps and Le Peuple—the parliamentary annals (the Debats Parlementaires and the Documents Parlementaires), and a number of legal and economic periodicals have been found useful. Among the latter, one must be mentioned particularly: Droit Social, which, since its inception in 1938, has been a rich source of information on labor law and related problems. T h e arbitration decisions handed down in the course of the experiment and the rulings of the Higher Court of Arbitration have been invaluable. Furthermore, many of the eminent individuals who were called upon to serve as arbitrators have set down their experiences in a number of articles that afford an additional insight into the operation of the system. It would be impossible to conclude without acknowledging a special debt of gratitude to Professor Shepard B. Clough, of Columbia University, under whose guidance this study was originally initiated as a doctoral dissertation. A number of fruitful suggestions have been made by Professors John H. Wuorinen, Jacques Barzun, Paul F. Brissenden, Leo Wolman and Ralph H. Bowen, all of Columbia University; and by my colleague, Professor Harry R . Stevens, of Duke University. The author, of course, assumes full responsibility for the contents of the volume and for any errors it may contain. Finally, it would be futile to attempt to convey adequately the special debt owed to my wife, Shirley B. Colton, who has been a constant source of encouragement and active assistance at every stage of this work. JOEL COLTON

Durham, North

Carolina

Contents Chronology

xv

ι.

I: T H E I N T R O D U C T I O N OF C O M P U L S O R Y A R B I T R A T I O N IN F R A N C E The Background: Before the Popular Front

2.

Prelude: the "Great Fear" of May-June, 1936

3.

The Autumn of 1936: the Dilemma of the Popular Front and the C G T Proposals The Introduction of Compulsory Arbitration: the Act of December 31, 1936

PART

4. 5.

The Permanent System: the Act of March 4, 1938

ι 12 26 39 53

II: T H E S Y S T E M IN O P E R A T I O N : P R O B L E M S AND RESULTS Wage Adjustments under the 1936 Act 71

PART

6. 7. 8.

Wage Adjustments under the 1938 Act Strikes under the Compulsory Arbitration System: Theory and Practice 9. The Arbitration System and the Negotiation of Initial Contracts ίο. The Enforcement of Arbitration Decisions: Before and after the Decree Laws of November, 1938 1 1 . The Last Phase: the General Strike of November 30, 1938, and After Notes Bibliography Index

87 104 119 128 138 157 199 213

Tables ι. 2. 3.

4. 5. 6.

7. 8. 9.

Strikes and Strikers in France, Monthly Totals, JanuaryDecember, 1936 Strikes and Strikers in France, Annual Totals, 1919-36

13 14

Strikes Settled through Mediation of Government Officials in France, June-December, 1936, Compared with Previous High Years, 1919 and 1920 23 Cost of Living Indexes, France, Seine Department and Paris, January, 1935-August, 1939 30 Retail Price Indexes, Paris and 300 Other Cities, January, 1935-August, 1939 31 Adjustment through Arbitration of Minimum Hourly Wages, Paris Metallurgical Workers, Selected Categories, June, 1936-December, 1937 83 Strikes and Strikers in France, Monthly Figures and Annual Totals, 1936-39 110 Comparison of Strikes and Strikers in France, 1921-30 Average and 1936-38 111 Settlement of Disputes in France by Independent and by Official Procedures, January, 1937-July, 1939 114

Chronology FIRST B L U M C A B I N E T ( J u n e 4 , 1 9 3 6 - J u n e 2 1 ,

1937)

1936 June 8 June

20-24

July 3 October 1

December

31

'93 7 January 1 6

M a t i g n o n agreement P a i d vacations act Forty hour week act Collective bargaining act Decree simplifying machinery of arbitration system Boards C u r r e n c y act (Article 1 5 ) authorizing establishment of compulsory arbitration procedures by decrce (never put into e f f e c t ) C o m p u l s o r y arbitration act authorizing arbitration system on temporary basis for six months D e c r e e setting up detailed machinery of arbitration system

FIRST CHAUTEMPS C A B I N E T ® ( J u n e 2 2 , 1 9 3 7 - J a n u a r y 1 4 , 1

1938)

937

July 1 8 September 1 8

A c t extending arbitration system and all collective contracts for six months Decrce simplifying machinery of arbitration svstem

1938

January 1 1 a

A c t extending arbitration system and all collectivc contracts for two months

Refers to cabinets formed under the 16th Legislature (elected in April-May, 1 9 3 6 ) ; actually, there were two previous Chautemps cabinets before 1936.

XVI

CHRONOLOGY

SECOND CHAUTEMPS CABINET · ( J a n u a r y 1 8 , 1 9 3 8 - M a r c h 1 0 , 1 9 3 8 )

1938 March 4

Act establishing permanent arbitration system (Article 10 on wage adjustments)

SF.COND B L U M CABINET ( M a r c h 1 3 , 1 9 3 8 - A p r i l 8, 1 9 3 8 )

1938 April 3

Decree establishing Higher Court of Arbitration

DALADIER CABINET ( A p r i l 1 0 , 1 9 3 8 - M a r c h 2 1 ,

1940)

1938 April 20 May 16 November 12

November 30 *939 January 1 4 April 21 September 1

Decree setting up detailed machinery of permanent arbitration system First decisions handed down by Higher Court of Arbitration Daladier-Reynaud decree laws modifying forty hour week; one decree law providing penalties to enforce arbitration awards General strike Sέgogne decision on reinstatement of workers dismissed after general strike Decree law adding restrictions on wage adjustments obtained through arbitration Decree law suspending arbitration system for duration of the war

» Refers to cabinets formed under the 16th Legislature (elected in A p r i l - M a y , 1 9 3 6 ) ; actually, there were two previous Chautemps cabinets before 1 9 3 6 .

Part I THE INTRODUCTION OF COMPULSORY ARBITRATION IN FRANCE ι. The Background: Before the Popular Front The

Settlement

of Labor

Disputes:

Some

Definitions

FRANCE'S experience between 1936 and 1939 marks one of the rare instances in which compulsory arbitration has been tried during peacetime by a major industrial nation with democratic institutions. Of all the techniques designed to promote industrial peace, governmental systems that legally compel the submission of labor disputes to arbitration are the boldest. They are at the farthest end of the spectrum from the commonly accepted democratic ideal— the independent settlement of disputes by industry and labor through voluntary agreement or through voluntary recourse to adjustment procedures. Barring only totalitarian systems that suppress collective bargaining entirely, systems of compulsory arbitration represent the strongest form of government intervention so far evolved in the settlement of labor disputes. 1 T h e most common forms of government intervention are of a considerably more limited nature. T h e provision of official conciliation and arbitration services, to be used at the option of the parties, is perhaps most typical. Under such systems, the parties may request the assistance of government mediators in settling their differences or the latter may take the initiative in bringing the principals together in conferences to encourage the peaceful settlement of the dispute. If the conciliation efforts fail, the parties are invited on a voluntary basis to submit their dispute to the decision of an arbitrator or an arbitration board. These voluntary conciliation and arbitration systems, which have found favor in English-speaking countries, are well illustrated by the existing Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service in the United States.

2

THE BACKGROUND: BEFORE THE POPULAR FRONT

Other forms of government intervention are characterized by increasing degrees of compulsion. The first such method is compulsory investigation. It requires the submission of disputes to a government-appointed fact-finding board, which collects information and then, generally, makes recommendations based on its findings. T h e principals are usually required to abstain from strikes or lockouts prior to the publication of the findings, but are under no compulsion to accept the board's recommendations. Sometimes such systems apply only to disputes in public utilities or in essential industries; in other cases they apply to disputes in all industries. As a generalized procedure affecting all disputes, it has been tried notably in Canada with considerable success. In more limited form, it comprises one of the procedures authorized under the TaftHartley Act in the United States. A second method involving a degree of compulsion requires the submission of disputes to compulsory conciliation procedures. In such systems, the parties are required by law to participate in a conference, or a series of conferences, designed to settle their dispute. Only the agreement of the parties, however, can end the dispute. This procedure has been tried in Sweden and was one of the mandatory phases of the compulsory arbitration system established in France after 1936. Finally, the extreme type of government intervention, compulsory arbitration, requires the submission of unsettled disputes to the decision of an impartial person or board. It may take a variety of forms. It may be the result of a voluntary agreement between labor and management reached under government auspices, as was the case in the United States in World W a r II, or it may be established by law, as was the case in France in 1936. It may be "with voluntary award," which means that the government cannot legally compel the acceptance of decisions; or "with compulsory award," in which case the law provides penalties for violations. In both varieties the parties are required to abstain from strikes and lockouts pending the award. However, the effect of compulsory arbitration laws on the right to engage in strikes and lockouts is a controversial point not easy to settle, as the French discovered.

THE BACKGROUND: BEFORE THE POPULAR FRONT

3

T w o other distinctions in compulsory arbitration must be mentioned. Some forms, such as those in the Scandinavian countries, are restricted to disputes arising out of the legal interpretation of existing contracts—sometimes called disputes over "rights" as opposed to disputes over "interests" (economic disputes). In other forms, compulsory arbitration extends to the latter as well and covers disputes involving the modification of working conditions, especially wage schedules. T h e French system belonged to the more inclusive category and applied both to disputes over "rights" and to disputes over "interests." A final distinction is based on whether a compulsory arbitration system is permitted jurisdiction over the preparation of initial contracts—the most extreme form of compulsory arbitration. This problem the French settled only after considerable difficulty, on a compromise basis. Although the complexities of modern industrial life have rendered some form of mediation service essential to the administrative apparatus of every state, compulsory arbitration in generalized form has remained rare. New Zealand in 1894 was the first to adopt it, with Australia following shortly thereafter. In both nations it has had a varied career, being abolished and reestablished intermittently. Weimar Germany, the Scandinavian countries, several Latin American countries and the state of Kansas have also tried it. T h e reasons why compulsory arbitration has remained exceptional and a subject of recurrent controversy in many parts of the world are not difficult to understand. 2 Although the "public"—and politicians—are often strongly attracted to it as a panacea for industrial troubles, the two parties principally involved—labor and industry—have been almost universally opposed. Employer groups have fought it as an intolerable form of government interference with industrial autonomy. W i t h just as much conviction, the labor unions have regarded it with repugnance, principally because of the potential threat to their right to strike. Among the theoretical objections raised by students of industrial relations is the argument that compulsory arbitration tends to lessen reliance on voluntary processes and makes for increased state control over industrial relations. T h e tendency to "split the difference" in arbitration deci-

4

THE BACKGROUND: BEFORE THE POPULAR FRONT

sions, it is also argued, provides an incentive to continued labor demands and unrest. Finally, the need to invest the official arbitrators with exorbitant administrative and judicial powers is viewed with apprehension. T h e French experience provided an opportunity for a presentation of many of these arguments and in a number of cases for a practical testing of their validity. Mediation

in France before 1936: the 1892 Act and Substitute Proposals

Like other industrial nations, France before 1936 had some official machinery for the settlement of labor disputes, although it was very ineffective. 3 Established by the Act of December 27, 1892, the system was completely voluntary and utilized as official mediator the justice of the peace (juge de paix), the lowest ranking member of the French judiciary. T h e procedure may be briefly summarized. In the event of a labor dispute that had not yet become a strike or lockout, either party might request the justice of the peace to arrange a joint conference over which he would preside. Once a strike or lockout had occurred, the justice of the peace might convoke such a conference on his own initiative. If conciliation conferences failed to result in an agreement, the magistrate was empowered to invite the parties to submit their dispute to arbitration. They were each to choose an arbitrator or, alternatively, a common umpire. If the arbitrators chosen by the respective parties failed to agree, they were to name a third arbitrator to cast the deciding vote. When they could not agree on such an umpire, the presiding magistrate of the Tribunal Civil in the area made the selection. Publicity was the only sanction connected with these procedures. T h e justice of the peace was to make public all requests by either of the parties for a conciliation conference, all refusals to participate and the results of such conciliation and arbitration as did take place. T h e results of the 1892 Act, both in settling and in preventing strikes, were long a subject for complaint in France. In 1924 an official report summarized the meager fruits of the system between 1893 and 1920. 4 During those years the machinery was called into use to help settle strikes in only 18 per cent of all strikes that oc-

THE BACKGROUND: BEFORE THE POPULAR FRONT

5

curred. This proportion, moreover, was in steady decline and by 1920 the figure had dropped to 10 per cent. Even when the system was used, it only rarely succeeded in settling a strike that had broken out. In preventing strikes the system was even less effective. In a period during which 23,711 strikes were reported, there were only 232 instances of recourse to the system before a work stoppage; in only slightly over half of these instances were strikes prevented. As the official report noted, the results were even more limited if one examined the more important disputes, that is, those of a national or regional scope, or those involving over 2,000 workers. In such cases the use of the procedures was "extremely rare." 5 The system was ineffective principally because it had become anachronistic. It had not been designed for strikes extending over large geographical areas and certainly not for those of nationwide scope. Rare at the time of the law's adoption, such strikes had become more and more frequent as industry grew and as employers and labor became more widely organized on a regional and national basis. In these strikes the humble rural magistrate employed as prime mover could hardly be effective. Thus, the system was illsuited to handle the very disputes that were most crucial to the national economy in more recent times. There were other reasons for its weakness as well. Recourse to the system was entirely voluntary and the failure of either party to cooperate could result in the collapse of the procedures at any point. Moreover, only ad hoc conciliation and arbitration boards were authorized. W i t h the passing of the years the usefulness of the 1892 Act declined steadily. A relic of the horse and buggy days, it had fallen into desuetude by 1936. O n the eve of the Popular Front electoral victor}', the country had no effective official mediation machinery. As a result of the inadequacy of the official system, informal government intervention in labor disputes had become common. Mediation by such officials as prefects, sub-prefects, mayors, labor inspectors, the Minister of Labor and other cabinet officers tended to overshadow the statutory procedures." In the year 1919, for example, there were 457 instances of mediation by these other authorities in contrast to only 187 instances of intervention by the

6

THE BACKGROUND: BEFORE THE POPULAR FRONT

justice of the peace under the 1892 Act. 7 This type of intervention, furthermore, generally occurred in the more important disputes. Almost from the time of its inception, efforts were made to amend or replace the inadequate 1892 Act. By 1936, some thirty bills had been introduced for that express purpose, none of which ever passed. Among the more important proposals was a measure sponsored by the Waldeck-Rousseau ministry in 1900, which provided for a form of compulsory arbitration with an added provision requiring a secret strike vote of the workers in any plant. A second important proposal, the Millerand bill of 1920, called for compulsory recourse to conciliation procedures in all disputes and compulsory arbitration for disputes in public utilities. T h e Durafour bill, introduced in 1925, advocated a combination of compulsory conciliation and optional recourse to arbitration. T h e last attempt before 1936 to amend the existing system was a government bill introduced in 1929 by Minister of Labor Loucheur. It provided for compulsory conciliation, with the prefects and the Minister of Labor serving as mediators, and for voluntary recourse to arbitration. This bill passed the Chamber of Deputies in 1929, was amended by the Senate in 1935, and awaited Chamber approval. It became lost, however, in the tumultuous events of 1936 and did not even enter into the discussion when the compulsory arbitration act was passed.8 T h e 1892 Act was not repealed in 1936 when the compulsory arbitration system was introduced. Moreover, unlike the latter, it was not suspended in September, 1939, for the duration of the war. It remained on the books, therefore, in the first years after World W a r II, but was of no practical importance. Today, like the prewar compulsory arbitration system, it has been superseded completely by the Act of February 1 1 , 1950. The latter combines compulsory conciliation procedures with provision for voluntary recourse to arbitration. 9 T o complete the record of legislation affecting labor disputes before 1936, two other items ought to be noted. First, during World W a r I, in 1917, compulsory arbitration was introduced, but solely on a wartime basis. 10 Secondly, over the vears special arbitration

THE BACKGROUND: BEFORE THE POPULAR FRONT

7

procedures were established for limited jurisdictions—for the merchant marine, the maritime fisheries and the railroads. In the case of the railroads, these special procedures provided for compulsory arbitration. 11 Finally, one cannot omit mention of the celebrated French labor courts known as the conseils de prucThommes, which have jurisdiction over a special category of labor disputes. These courts, still in existence, date back legally to Napoleonic times, although their deepest roots are found in thirteenth century Paris. T h e primary function of these courts is the settlement of labor disputes arising out of the contract of employment between the individual worker and his employer. 12 T h e disputes over which they have jurisdiction must be sharply differentiated from collective labor disputes, which involve groups of workers and their mutual interests. It is with the latter that the forms of government mediation described above are concerned. The distinction in specific cases, however, is not always easy to draw, as the French discovered when jurisdictional problems arose after the introduction of compulsory arbitration. Labor and Industry in France before 1936: Attitudes toward Compulsory Arbitration and the Status of Collective Bargaining It is paradoxical that the French labor movement should have been responsible for the introduction of compulsory arbitration in France. French labor has had a distinctly revolutionary tradition, with syndicalist and socialist influences competing for leadership. By the turn of the ccntury the former had triumphed. 13 United in 1895 into the Confederation Generale du Travail (known thereafter as the C G T ) , the organized labor movement dedicated itself to the goal of abolishing capitalist society through the syndicalist weapon of the "general strike." 14 In the years immediately following World W a r I, important changes occurred in the labor movement. In the aftermath of the Russian Revolution, a large section of the labor movement fell under Communist influence. At the same time, the non-Communist section adopted a more reformist program. In 1922 a schism—not

8

THE BACKGROUND: BEFORE THE POPULAR FRONT

unlike that which has taken place in the period after World War II —split the C G T into two groups: a reformist, non-Communist confederation that continued to be known as the C G T headed by the veteran leader of the French labor movement, L£on Jouhaux; and a revolutionary, Communist confederation, the Confederation Generale du Travail Unitaire, or C G T U . 1 5 Alongside these two major organizations in the years between the two world wars there existed a smaller Catholic trade union confederation, the Confederation Franqaise des Travailleurs Chretiens, or C F T C , organized in 1919 and inspired by such papal doctrines of social Catholicism as Kerum Novarum and Quadragesimo Anno. A number of unimportant splinter organizations were also in existence.19 In the 1920's and ^o's the split in labor's ranks and the coming of the depression weakened the labor movement. In 1935 only slightly more than one million of the approximately eight million workers in France were organized. The C G T claimed 775,000 members; the C G T U , 230,000; and the C F T C , 150,000. If civil servants are excluded, and only the six and a half million workers in private industry are counted, the proportion of organized workers was indeed small—about 6.3 per cent.17 That French labor shared the almost universal labor antipathy to compulsory arbitration is not surprising. In the years before World War I, because of its revolutionary orientation, the C G T was especially hostile to what it considered a curtailment of its freedom of action. In 1906 the ninth congress of the C G T specifically denounced compulsory arbitration as a weapon designed "to hinder the development of syndicalism and to destroy the right to strike." 18 In that same period, however, principally because of the weakness of labor, some working class leaders, including Jean Jaur£s, favored the introduction of compulsory conciliation as a means of enlisting the aid of the state against the more powerful employers.19 The switch to reformism in the C G T after World War I did not lead to any fundamental change in attitude toward compulsory arbitration, although the organization now actively espoused compulsory conciliation proposals. In contrast, the Communist confederation was unreceptive even to compulsory conciliation. Of all

THE BACKGROUND: BEFORE THE POPULAR

FRONT

9

French organized labor, the Christian trade unions alone in those years favored compulsory arbitration.20 Hostile as the overwhelming section of French labor was to compulsory arbitration, French industry was even less favorably disposed. French employers, among the strongest exponents of the laissez-faire tradition to be found anywhere, opposed all forms of governmental compulsion in settling labor disputes as an unwarranted intervention by the state in industrial relations. Their opposition extended to the compulsory conciliation plans that were proposed in the 1920's. 21 Strongly individualistic, employers in France were only loosely organized into a number of trade organizations, the most powerful of which was the Comite des Forges in the steel and armament industry. After World War I a national organization, consisting principally of large-scale industry, was formed, known as the C G P F (Confederation Generale de la Production Franqaise). The latter, after the Popular Front came into power, changed its name to the Confederation Generale du Patronat Frangais. The opposition of the C G P F to state intervention in the matter of labor disputes was exceeded only by its hostility to trade unionism and to collective bargaining.22 Collective bargaining, it must be emphasized, was in a very primitive state in France before 1936." For this there were a number of reasons: the opposition of employers; the cautious and even hostile attitude of most of French labor, especially before World War I; the disunity, decentralization and relative weakness of the labor movement; and, finally, the absence of active encouragement by the government. Although sanctioned by law under the Act of March 25, 1919, collective bargaining did not flourish except in a very few industries. It progressively lost ground in France in the years after World War I, the number of collective agreements annually reported declining from 55-7 in 1919 to 29 in 1935. 24 Prior to 1936, it has been estimated, only 7.5 per cent of all wage earners were covered by collective agreements, with coverage high only in the coal mining, printing, building and leather industries. By contrast, of the 1,300,00 workers employed in the important metallurgical industries, a scant 1.4 per cent worked under a col-

10

THE BACKGROUND:

BEFORE THE POPULAR

FRONT

lective contract; in the textile industry, the figure was 2 per cent. 25 It required the impetus of the 1936 strikes and Popular Front legislation for collective bargaining to make its appearance in France on a large scale. With it, conciliation and arbitration practices assumed greater practical significance than ever before. The Depression and the Popular Front T h e far reaching social innovations of 1936, such as the forty hour week, a new collective bargaining law and paid vacations, were the work of the Popular Front, a coalition that first took shape in France between 1934 and 1936 to meet the dual challenge of the economic depression and the threat of a fascist overthrow of the Republic. 26 Although the depression came to France later than to other industrial countries, the slump in production lasted longer. In the first half of 1935, when the curve of industrial production was rising elsewhere, the French curve reached its trough—72.5 per cent of the 1929 average. From August, 1935, on, it slowly began to rise. Although the maximum number of totally unemployed during the depression years was not relatively high—about 850,000, or about 8 per cent of all employable workers—there was a great deal of partial unemployment: almost half of those employed worked less than the legal forty-eight hour week.27 T h e major solution advocated by the governments in power before 1936—deflation and reduction of government expenses—accomplished little toward alleviating distress and restoring prosperity.28 In the midst of the depression several fascist-type organizations took advantage of growing dissatisfaction and unrest to spread dissension and prepare for a possible coup d'etat. Their activities culminated in the riots of February 6, 1934. The threat of the fascist organizations frightened labor and middle class groups into taking defensive steps. First, the Socialist and Communist parties, and then the predominantly middle class Radical Socialist party, gave support to a common minimum program designed to ensure resistance to any attempted coup by the rightist groups and to bring about recovery from the depression. At approximately the same time, an equally important event occurred: the healing of the schism

THE BACKGROUND: BEFORE T H E POPULAR FRONT

11

in the labor movement. In March, 1936, the C G T and the C G T U formally submerged their differences to form a united C G T . T h e ending of the rift that had divided the two largest sectors of organized labor through the postwar years gave a tremendous impetus to the growth of trade unionism and ensured the success of the developing Popular Front. 29 In January, 1936, the Popular Front announced its program, in large part inspired by a " P l a n " of the C G T . It promised to combat unemployment and to raise the purchasing power of the population through a public works program and a shortened work week. It pledged a number of social reforms—legal protection to union organizing and to collective bargaining, shop representation and vacations with pay. T h e fascist organizations were to be suppressed, the armaments industry and the Bank of France nationalized, and a central wheat board created to aid the farmers. 30 As might have been expected, nothing in the original Popular Front program called for compulsory arbitration. W h a t led to its adoption was a series of unanticipated events that followed immediately after the Popular Front election victory.

2. Prelude: the "Great Fear" of May-June, 1936 The Popular Front Election Victory and the Sitdown Strikes IN the elections that took place on April 26 and May 3, 1936, the Popular Front coalition received an overwhelming endorsement and was assured of majority control of the Chamber. For the first time in the history of the Republic the Socialists were the party with the strongest representation. Leon Blum was named Premierdesignate and proceeded at once to form a cabinet. But before that could be accomplished, pandemonium broke loose over the nation in the form of the now famous sitdown strikes of the spring of 1936. 1 T h e strikes, gathering momentum in the interim following the elections, spread like wildfire after June 4, when Blum took office. Close to two million workers, or almost a fourth of all French workingmen, occupied the factories in June and demanded collective contracts, paid vacations, wage increases, shop representation and the forty hour week. T h e spring strikes of 1936 easily represented the largest strike movement in the history of the Third Republic. In the single month of June, 1936, the number of workers on strike (1,830,938) exceeded the highest annual total recorded previously (1,316,559 —in 1920). Of the 12,142 strikes reported in June, over threefourths were sitdown strikes, a form of strike which hitherto had been relatively unknown in France. 2 The monthly index of industrial production dropped to 80 in June—eight points below the figures for March and April, which were the highest recorded since the beginning of partial recovery in the summer of 1935. 3 T h e full fury of the initial upheaval abated by July, but unrest reappeared in the autumn and lasted until the end of the year.

P R E L U D E : THE " G R E A T FEAR*' OF M A Y - J U N E ,

1936

T h e extent of the strike movement between June and December, 1936, can be best appreciated by comparing the monthly number of strikes and strikers in 1936 before June and after (Table 1 ) , as well as by comparing the 1936 annual total with that for previous years (Table 2 ) . Unfortunately, because of the inadequacy of the official records, no statistics exist on the number of working days lost in the 1936 strikes and no comparison is possible on that basis. Like the "Great Fear" of 1789/ the spring sitdown strikes of 1936 grew out of pent-up grievances, the explosion ignited by a combination of exultation and impatience. After a long period of demoralization, labor had suddenly won two intoxicating triumphs: the C G T and the C G T U had reunited and the Popular Front coalition had gained a sweeping victory at the polls. Exhilarated by these events, workers were too impatient to await the orderly processes of government. TABLE

1

STRIKES AND STRIKERS IN F R A N C E , M O N T H L Y T O T A L S , JANUARY-DECEMBER, Month

January February March April May June July August September October November December Total

Strikes

5° 39 38 32 6;

1936

Strikers

Sitdown

Strikes

8.739

9,142 12,127

12,784

i3.727

12,142

1,830,938

1

J-75 54 2

181,471

974 363

66,814

128

51,501

56,861

789

8,941 6

39

199

39 1

302

43.589

>33 79

17,087

2,422,844

10,510

Source: Bulletin du Mimstöre du Travail, X L I I I ( 1 9 3 6 ) , 2 3 6 , 354, 3 5 7 51g; X L I V ( 1 9 3 7 ) , 81.

512

14

PRF.LUDF.: THE "CREAT FEAR" OF M A Y - J U N E , TABLE

1936

2

S T R I K E S AND S T R I K E R S IN F R A N C E , A N N U A L

TOTALS,

1919-36

Year

Strikes

Strikers

1919

2,026 1,832

1,150,718

1920 1921 1922

47 > 663

I.3i6>559 4° 2-377 290,326

1923 1924

1,068 1,083

33°-954 274,86;

1925

93» 1,660

249,19s 349.3°9 110,458 204,116

1926 1927

396

1928 1929

816 1,213

1930 1931 1932

1,093

1

933 >934 J 935 1936

261 33°

239.878 581,927 35>723 54,088

331 361 420

84,391

17,087

2,422,844

6

M45 89,726

Sources: For 1 9 1 9 - 3 5 : Institut Scientifique de Recherclies F.eonomiqucs et Sociales, L'Evolution de l'Economie Franqaise, 1 9 1 0 - 1 9 5 7 (Paris, 1 9 3 7 ) , Planche 36, "Mouvcment des Greves en France." For 1936: Bulletin du Ministere du Travail, X L I I I ( 1 9 3 6 ) , 236, 354, 357, 512, 519; X L I V ( 1 9 3 7 ) , 81.

T h e critical situation threatened to make impossible the reforms planned by the Popular Front. T h e political leaders of the L e f t , as well as labor officials, did what they could to check the movement, but they were powerless. In these days the prelude to the compulsory arbitration experiment may be found—in the mediation role assumed by the government, in the signing of the famous Matignon agreement under Blum's auspices and in the introduction of collective bargaining on a large scale under the active sponsorship of the government.

P R E L U D E : T H E " G R E A T F E A R " OF M A Y - J U N E ,

1936

»5

The Matignon Agreement, the Collective Bargaining Act and Other Labor Legislation Blum's first step after taking office was to pledge that bills incorporating the principal reforms demanded by the strikers—collective bargaining protection, vacations with pay and the forty hour week—would be introduced into Parliament for immediate consideration. Appealing for cooperation, he warned that the Popular Front government could not hope to accomplish anything unless industrial peace were restored.5 In a speech to the Chamber of Deputies he conceded the illegality of the sitdown strikes, but emphasized that the Popular Front government could not be expected to use force against the strikers and be responsible for bloodshed, and perhaps civil war. He promised three immediate steps: emergency measures to ensure the functioning of certain vital services, quick legislative action on the promised labor bills, and a continuation and enlargement of the government mediation efforts already begun by his predecessor, Albert Sarraut.® On the mediation role planned for the government, Blum was explicit. First, wherever possible, he announced, his government would serve as mediator—and arbitrator—and would insist that labor and management undertake immediate discussions everywhere. Secondly, the collective bargaining bill being prepared for legislative consideration planned a large role for the government in the new procedures. The government was to take the initiative in arranging contract negotiation conferences between labor and industry representatives, and what was more, in the event of disagreement during negotiations, the government was to settle any matters in dispute by arbitration. Blum's announcement sounded as though the path to compulsory arbitration was already being taken, although such was not the case and the collective bargaining law that eventually passed did not give the government the arbitral powers described. Blum next undertook the leading role in one of the great dramatic events in the social history of the Third Republic—the signing of the Matignon agreement on June 8, 1936. 7 At his offices in the

i6

PRELUDE: THE "GREAT F E A R " OF M A Y - J U N E ,

1936

Matignon Palace Blum brought together representatives of the C G P F as the spokesmen for organized industry and officers of the C G T as the spokesmen for organized labor. It was the first meeting of its kind between the two groups in their history. The struggle raging in the factories was temporarily transferred to the conference table. Frightened by the gravity of the situation, the representatives of industry were willing to make concessions which they had stubbornly refused for years. They agreed to bargain collectively, to permit shop representation and to refrain in the future from interference with union organizing. They promised also to carry out faithfully all labor reforms passed by Parliament. After agreement was reached on these points at the conference, a snag was struck over the issue of a general wage increase. T h e Popular Front economic program was predicated on the theory that the depression could be met only by raising the purchasing power of the masses. T h e C G T representatives at the conference cited the low wages being paid in many industries and demanded a 10 to 15 per cent blanket increase for all of the nation's industrial workers. The employer representatives rejected the C G T demand as excessive. They protested the heavy burden that it would impose on business, especially when added to the expenses of the projected forty hour week and paid vacations. Agreement being impossible, there was no alternative but to let Blum decide on the wage increase to be granted. Blum announced his decision within a few hours. All existing wages were to be adjusted upward under a diminishing scale ranging from 15 per cent for the lowest paid workers to 7 per cent for the highest, with the average wage increase in any one plant not to exceed 12 per cent. A special effort was to be made, furthermore, to raise "abnormally low" wages in collective contracts to be negotiated. The Premier's decision was incorporated into the agreement.8 Affecting the entire national economy, it was one of the most sweeping arbitration awards ever rendered by the head of a government. T h e Matignon agreement, which was signed on June 8, 1936, portended a new era in French industrial relations—the beginning

P R E L U D E : T H E " G R E A T FEAR*' OF M A Y - J U N E ,

I936

17

of collective bargaining on a large scale. Aptly described as "the broadest collective bargaining agreement ever recorded," 9 it held the promise, which was soon fulfilled, that the vast majority of French workers would be protected by collective bargaining agreements. Like Article 7A of the National Industrial Recovery Act in the United States, it was a prelude to the widespread adoption of collective bargaining and, similarly, to a concomitant multiplication of the strength and numbers of organized labor. In France, as in the United States, collective bargaining came late and was introduced practically overnight. 10 T h e Matignon agreement was the result of compulsory conciliation on a grand scale and in some ways the result of compulsory arbitration. Despite the formal resemblance to an agreement freely arrived at, it was in reality an arbitration decision handed down by the government. 11 This may be said not only of the general wage increase but of the entire agreement. The introduction to the document itself announced that it had been concluded "after arbitration by the Premier." In the Chamber Blum described it as an agreement based on government arbitration that had been "imposed when necessary," and he assumed responsibility for enforcing its terms. 12 Jouhaux hailed the government's role of arbitrator at the conference as part of a new formula in industrial relations. 13 That compulsion was present is undeniable. It was the government that summoned labor and employers to the conference table, decided the wage provision and supervised the writing of the entire document. Industry, in particular, had little freedom of choice, since refusal to cooperate meant continued occupation of their factories and unforeseeable consequences. Labor, on the other hand, realized that the strike movement, which was out of hand, threatened to make impossible the carrying out of the Popular Front program. On both sides the penalty for failure to accept government arbitration would have meant the continuation of a state of near anarchy. An augur of future trouble existed in that the Matignon agreement was not accepted by the political opposition or by industry as the fruit of successful government conciliation, but rather as an

I8

PRELUDE: THE "GREAT F E A R " OF M A Y - J U N E ,

1936

arbitration decision they were compelled to accept. This attitude was quickly revealed. W h e n Blum in the Senate a few days after the event described the document as "an agreement, freely consented to, between the representatives of the employers and those of the workers," he was greeted with cries of protest from the opposition. One Senator termed it "the Diktat of the Matignon Palace." 14 Several of the management representatives who had signed the agreement, along with their organizations, expressed the same feelings on the very morrow of the conference. 15 The employers' association in the Paris metallurgical industry drew up a resolution that deliberately referred, not to "the agreement," but to "the arbitration" of June 8. 1β A representative of the same industry some months later told a reporter that he considered the phrase "the Matignon arbitration" more accurate than the more common term, "the Matignon agreement." 17 Some time later, when compulsory arbitration was being debated, an opposition deputy announced: " T h e Matignon agreement—it is too often forgotten— represented the first of the arbitration decisions rendered in collective labor disputes. . . . " 1 S These attitudes were pointedly summed up by C . J. Gignoux, who shortly after the Matignon conference became the new president of the C G P F . "Employers and workers," he wrote, "were summoned impromptu to the Matignon and were not released the following day until they agreed to support the views of the government." 19 Such comments were designed to dispel any illusion that industry had voluntarily accepted the new order.20 Within three weeks after Matignon the principal reforms promised by Blum were on the statute books. One measure provided for the gradual introduction of a forty hour week without any reduction in wages; a second instituted an annual two weeks paid vacation for all employed workers; a third, writing into law the promise of the Matignon agreement, facilitated the establishment of collective bargaining agreements. 21 For the new organization of industrial relations on a collective basis, the collective bargaining act of June 24, 1936, was of paramount importance. 22 T h e earlier collective bargaining law of March

P R E L U D E : T H E " G R E A T F E A R " OF M A Y — J U N E ,

1936

19

25, 1919, had been ineffective partly because it failed to provide for governmental assistance in negotiations. This deficiency was remedied under the new act by enlarging the scope of government activity. T h e Minister of Labor or his representative was now to initiate collective bargaining conferences between labor and management and, in addition, was to attempt conciliation if differences arose. Another feature was also important. Under the old law, a collective contract applied only to those labor organizations and employers in an industry who were signatories to the contract. Under the new law, if the "most representative" labor and management organizations in the industry in a given area signed the contract, the Minister of Labor was empowered to extend its terms by administrative decree throughout the entire industry in that area. This provision was intended to guarantee uniformity of working conditions and to prevent any employers in the area from taking unfair advantage by paying lower wages. T h e act specified that each contract was to guarantee freedom of trade union activities, provide for the election of shop stewards and fix minimum wage rates for the various categories of workers. T h e parties were to establish conciliation and arbitration machinery for settling differences in interpreting, as well as in revising, the contract. T h e details of these procedures were left to their discretion. One feature of the collective bargaining act evoked the first explicit mention of compulsory arbitration at this time and, incidentally, revealed the hostility that still prevailed toward it, both in Popular Front and in opposition circles. When disagreements arose in negotiating an original contract, the law, as passed, specified that the Minister of Labor was to intervene and offer his assistance as mediator. Under the original government bill, however, as Blum had indicated, the Minister of Labor was to settle such disputes byarbitration. But this proposal aroused heated opposition from organized labor and from political spokesmen of the Left when it was discussed in Parliament in June. Although they viewed the Minister of Labor with favor as a conciliator, they flatly rejected the compulsory arbitration proposal as dangerous. 23 The govern-

20

PRELUDE: THE "GREAT F E A R " OF M A Y - J U N E ,

1936

ment quickly yielded to their objections, and the offensive clause was amended to restrict the government's role to mediation. The removal of the contentious provision was approved not only by labor but by groups unfriendly to the Popular Front as well. The latter felt that even without this feature the bill represented an alarming increase in state intervention.24 The episode emphasized particularly that labor's traditional opposition to compulsory arbitration was still as strong as ever. On the day after the original government bill had been amended, L'Humanite, lauding the contribution of the Communist deputies toward the achievement, ran a bold front page headline: "Monmousseau and Croizat Win Removal From Collective Bargaining Bill of Dangerous 'Compulsory Arbitration.' " 25 A short while later, an article in the C G T newspaper, Le Peuple, expressed similar satisfaction, stating: "Compulsory arbitration transforms the nature of collective contracts completely by removing responsibility from employer organizations and labor unions." 29 Actually, the plan proposed by the original collective bargaining bill was an extreme form of compulsory arbitration—more extreme than anything later introduced—for it was a system in which the government would have had the right to decide upon the terms of an initial contract and to impose them upon the parties. The government bill, however, had been no deliberate attempt to introduce compulsory arbitration, but derived rather from an overzealous desire to facilitate collective bargaining negotiations and provide for anticipated disputes. The measure had been drawn up without full recognition of its implications and without anticipating the opposition it provoked.27 The new collective bargaining law was applied immediately. Negotiations were undertaken everywhere and the number of collective agreements mounted. Measured against the average number of collective agreements reported annually between 1930 and 1935, which was 22,29 the number reported in the months after Matignon is striking. Between June and September, 1936, over 700 were reported; by December, 1936, the cumulative total rose to 2,336; by September, 1939, this total was 5,62ο.29 Although the statistics do

PRELUDE: THE "GREAT FEAR" OF M A Y - J U N E , 1 9 3 6

21

not give the number of workers covered by these agreements, the contracts did cover the largest and most important industries in the country. From June, 1936, on, collective bargaining supplanted individual bargaining and became firmly established as the basis for industrial relations. Government

Mediation

in the Spring

Strikes

Matignon represented merely a blanket agreement—a framework within which disputes were to be settled. It did not end the multitude of strikes still raging. After the agreement, government officials, C G T leaders and Popular Front political chieftains appealed to labor to return to work. But their appeals were without immediate effect despite the labor victories that had been achieved. T h e upheaval continued in full swing for many weeks after Matignon. Throughout June and July, employer representatives besieged the government with protests over the continuation of the sitdown strikes. They charged that the Matignon agreement carried no authority and that vigorous government action was still needed to evacuate the factories. The government's answer, however, was the application of the mediation program announced earlier. Order was to be restored, as Blum had announced, not by force, but by government conciliation and arbitration. T h e implementation of this policy in the months of June and July proved to be the heaviest effort the government of the Third Republic had ever undertaken in the settlement of industrial disputes. Conciliation and arbitration by government representatives was the order of the day, and every official seemed to have two jobs, his own and that of labor mediator. Close to one-half of all strikes settled in these two months were ended after mediation by government officials, including ministers, mayors, prefects, sub-prefects and labor inspectors. Members of the cabinet alone helped to settle 260 disputes. 30 The extent of this mediation, which continued throughout the autumn of 1936, may be appreciated by a comparison with mediation figures for 1919 and 1920, the highest figures for previous years (see Table 3). Government intervention of all kinds assumed a quasi-official

22

PRELUDE: THE "GREAT F E A R " OF M A Y - J U N E ,

1936

status. T h e Minister of the Interior, Roger Salengro, appealed to workers not to stop work when disputes arose, but to request the mediation of the public authorities. H e reminded the prefects of their responsibility to take the initiative in conciliation. 3 1 Paul Faure, Minister of State without portfolio, urged that all new disputes be settled by labor-management boards, but if they failed, by appealing for assistance to the Ministry of Labor. 3 2 T h e C G T echoed these appeals and advised prompt recourse to government aid in preventing new strikes. 33 Out of this wholesale government intervention a pattern appeared. A large number of the most important disputes were settled, not by the parties themselves or by the parties with the assistance of government conciliators, but by government arbitration, still of course on a voluntary basis. In that way, to cite only a few instances, the Minister of Finance settled the strike of the Paris bank employees; the Minister of Labor, the dispute of the insurance employees and the strike of the Dunkirk dockers; and the Minister of the Interior, the dispute in the large Paris department stores. A host of additional strikes were arbitrated by other cabinet members, prefects, labor inspectors and lesser officials. 34 Far from being satisfied with this trend, the government was actually displeased. T h e dependence upon arbitration, it was felt, would interfere with the healthy growth of independent industrial relations. In late June the Minister of Labor ordered the prefects to caution everyone to use arbitration procedures sparingly. Conciliation was to be given priority, the instructions noted, because "if one effort fails, the possibility of a fresh attempt remains open." If in exceptional cases arbitration was employed, both parties were to be warned in advance of its true nature. T h e parties were to define clearly the issues to be settled by arbitration and were to pledge themselves in advance to accept the award, no matter what it might be. 3 5 T h e government's instructions afford proof of how remote any thought of compulsory arbitration still was. N o one could have predicted that six months later a compulsory arbitration law would be on the statute books. T h e mediation of these days was on an informal, quasi-official

PRELUDE: THE "CREAT F E A R " OF M A Y - J U N E ,

2

1936

3

TABLE 3 S T R I K E S S E T T L E D THROUGH M E D I A T I O N OF G O V E R N M E N T IN F R A N C E , J U N E - D E C F . M B E R , HIGH

OFFICIALS

1 9 3 6 , C O M P A R E D WITH P R E V I O U S

YEARS,

1 9 1 9 AND 1 9 2 0

Mediated by

Year !9»9

1920

1 9 3 6 , June to Dccembcr . . June

July

August . . . September October . . November December a

Total Strikes

Prefects and SubPrefects

2,026 1,831 16,863 12,142 ^75! a

21

88

47

87

4'9°5

1,011

679 472 140 18

161 2

33

37

73

2,687 1,728 X1

974 363

107 68 68

302

Ministers

181

2

54 2

789

Labor InMayors spectors

3 »34

599

264 22 66 7

l

16 7

z

8 3 5

58 31 339 99

12 16 12

Includes strikes begun in June.

Sourccs: For 1 9 1 9 - 2 0 : Ministere du Travail, Reglement amiable des conRits collectifs du travail (Paris, 1 9 2 4 ) , p. 20. For June-December, 1 9 3 6 : Bulletin du Ministere du Travaü, X L I I I ( 1 9 3 6 ) , 357, 5 1 2 ; X L I V ( 1 9 3 7 ) , 8 1 .

basis, resembling the governmental mediation familiar in France before 1936, although never hitherto practiced on so large a scale. Of the existing official system, provided by the 1892 Act, no use was made. It had fallen into such disuse before 1936 that no one even mentioned it in this labor crisis. But the need for more regularized procedures and for new official machinery increasingly made itself felt. In July the first action was taken to set up new mediation machinery. The Minister of Labor found it physically impossible to meet the requests for mediation that flooded his office. Convinced that disputes were dragging on because of the absence of formal mediation machinery, the government took a preliminary step to-

24

PRELUDE: THE "GREAT F E A R " OF M A Y - J U N E ,

1936

ward filling this need. On July 3, it created a Joint Departmental Conciliation Board (commission mixte departementale de conciliation) for each Department in France.3" These boards, which were modeled after one established in June by the prefect of the Rhone for his Department, were later incorporated intact into the compulsory arbitration system. They were from the start one of the most successful components of the mediation machinery introduced in 1936-39. The new boards, composed of representatives of industry and labor, were presided over by the prefect. The employer members were nominated by the Chamber (or Chambers) of Commerce in the Department, and the labor members by the Departmental organizational unit (Union departementale) of the C G T . The Christian trade unions, which resented the monopoly on representation given to the C G T , were not given seats until a later date, and then only in a few areas on a proportional basis.37 Besides intervening in response to voluntary requests, the boards were empowered also to take the initiative in disputes where no such request had been made. The exclusive purpose of the boards was conciliation. The instructions carefully specified that they were not arbitration agencies and might not render any decisions to be imposed upon the parties. The new boards began operations at once and were able to ease somewhat the heavy burden upon the Minister of Labor, but they were far from adequate for the labor unrest of this and the subsequent period. In July evidence appeared that the government's patience with the strikers was growing short. The strikes had taxed its resources to the utmost and diverted its energies from other important tasks. At the same time relentless pressure was being exerted by opposition groups for a stronger policy. Minister of the Interior Salengro, in answer to an insistent Senate interpellation on the government's policy toward future sitdown strikes, stated that if they were to recur, the government "by all appropriate means would put an end to them." 38 The statement came as a surprise from the Socialist minister who had been foremost in executing the government's conciliation policy, although it was plain that the words had been wrung

PRELUDE: THE "GREAT FEAR" OF M A Y - J U N E ,

1936

25

from him by the parliamentary opposition. Later, in order to quiet labor uneasiness over the statement, Salengro explained that only after all possible mediation measures had been exhausted would force ever be employed. H e sketched a system of formal procedures — o f which nothing further was ever heard—which was intended to help prevent future sitdown strikes. 39 His plan was an indication, however, that the Popular Front government was now thinking of more elaborate mediation machinery. By the early summer, the first phase of the labor difficulties of t h e Popular Front came to an end. Blum and Salengro boasted that through the government's mediation policies the greatest social upheaval in the history of the Third Republic had subsided without the spilling of a drop of blood. 4 0 True as that was, the Premier and his cabinet had been forced to divert much needed energies to the task of settling the strikes. A recurrence of labor unrest might make stronger measures inevitable.

3· The Autumn of 1936: the Dilemma of the Popular Front and the C G T Proposals ALTIIOUGU the unprecedented strike movement of the spring of 1936 subsided by the summer, it was shortly followed by a second period of labor unrest. Sitdown strikes reappeared in September and the number of strikes remained high until the end of the year. All through the autumn, relations between labor and industry were severely strained and the Popular Front government was beset with labor problems. Rising prices, as well as other causes, were behind the new labor unrest. It was the developments of this period that were directly responsible for the introduction of compulsory arbitration in France. The New Sitdown

Strikes: Price Rises and other

Causes

Some labor unrest might have been expected immediately after the summer of 1936 under any circumstances, for a momentous upheaval like that of June, 1936, naturally subsides slowly. But a number of special factors, psychological, political and economic, increased the tension in industrial relations at this time. 1 Disregarding for the moment the important price rise that was the major reason for the strikes, some of these other elements may be considered. T h e continued exhilaration of the workers over their triumphs of the spring must first be taken into account. With so much accomplished in so short a time under the pressure of the sitdown strikes, labor persisted in feeling that new strikes might yield additional gains. Secondly, the ranks of the C G T were rapidly swelling. Its membership multiplied almost five-fold after June—from 1,024,000 in March, 1936, to 4,738,000 a year later. 2 Many of the

THE AUTUMN OF 1936

2

7

new union members and labor leaders were young, impetuous, inexperienced and less conscientious than the older members about trade union discipline, with the result that a number of unauthorized strikes were called. In general, the C G T leadership was not behind the autumn strikes but tried instead to control them. 3 T h e outbreak of the Spanish Civil W a r in July, 1936, also played a part in the new labor unrest. While the Communists and the C G T pressed the government for greater assistance to the Spanish Loyalists, Blum and his party, although sympathetic to the Popular Front government beyond the Pyrenees, resisted any steps that might lead to war, a position in which he had the full support of the Radical Socialists. W i t h the Communist elements in the Popular Front using their influence in the trade unions to exert pressure on the government, agitation for aid to Spain became a side issue in many strikes. 1 Major difficulties arose too out of the introduction of collective bargaining on a large scale throughout the country. Contract negotiations were being undertaken in many places for the first time. Elsewhere, provisional agreements, arranged during the summer, were being made final. Disagreements developed, for example, in working out the 12 per cent wage increase sanctioned by the Matignon agreement and in deciding what constituted "abnormally low" wages. Conferences and negotiations dragged on for weeks and months. T h e inexperience of the delegates was undoubtedly in part responsible for the delays, for, as Jouhaux admitted, 80 per cent of the C G T membership did not even know the meaning of a collective agreement. 5 But in addition, the unwillingness of management to cooperate also contributed, as a result of which the unions on several occasions lost patience and struck in the midst of negotiations. Disputes arose not only in preparing initial contracts but also in interpreting contracts already signed and in applying the new social legislation, especially in connection with the duties and privileges of shop stewards. In this period, too, employers stepped up anti-union activities. Despite the guarantee of the Matignon agreement, workers were dismissed because of union activities, and even because of union

28

ΤΙ IE AUTUMN OF 1936

membership. T o counteract the mounting influence of the C G T , some employers were favoring the Christian trade unions; others, company unions ("syndicats jaunes"), a number of which had the backing of fascist organizations.® These anti-labor activities were traceable in part to the change that had taken place in employer circles since their crushing defeat in June. On the theory that they had lost a battle but not the war, the employers had regrouped their forces and launched a counteroffensive. A reorganization of the C G P F took place in the summer involving a change in leadership and a tightening of structural lines. Even a new name was provided for their organization when the Confederation Generale de la Production Frangaise significantly became the Confederation Generale des Patrons Frangais, or General Confederation of French Employers. A palace revolution took place in the leadership. Rene Duchemin, who was accused of having been too conciliatory at the time of Matignon, was replaced as president by C . J. Gignoux, an anti-labor publicist and editor. By December, almost every industrial leader who had taken part in the original Matignon conference had been replaced in management organizations by a more militant figure.7 T h e new leaders urged staunch resistance to further concessions. Patrons, soyez des patrons! was the title of a brochure circulated by Gignoux. 8 The president of the trade association in the electrical industry announced: " W e have to decide whether an employer is master in his own house in France—whether there still are employers left. . . . I prefer death to surrender!" 9 There is no doubt that the calculated intransigence of the employers made the prevention and settlement of the new sitdown strikes more difficult, especially when they resolutely rejected government mediation efforts and refused to enter into any negotiations so long as their plants were occupied. 10 T h e new attitude of the employers was well illustrated in the most important strike of the early fall, in which 30,000 textile workers engaged in a sitdown strike in the Lille area. It dramatized the growing trend of employer refusals to submit to arbitration and for the first time brought the government and the union involved to the point of supporting compulsory arbitration in a specific case.

THE AUTUMN OF 1936

2

9

N o arbitration decision was rendered, however, and continued mediation efforts eventually succeeded in bringing the strike to a compromise settlement. At the conclusion of the strike, the employers' spokesman denounced the government's efforts to impose arbitration upon them. They and other employers, he warned, had no intention of cooperating in any kind of negotiations until the government and the C G T ended the anarchy that had prevailed in the country since the beginning of the sitdown strikes. 11 Important as all these factors were, the single outstanding cause of the autumn strikes was undoubtedly the steady climb in prices beginning in June that sent the cost of living soaring. It was bread and butter—or, more aptly in the case of the French workingman, bread and wine—that occasioned the new unrest. T h e rise in the cost of living threatened to consume the wage increases and social benefits obtained in June—and even go further. Prices in France, which had been rising slowly out of the trough of the depression since the summer of 1935, showed startling gains after June, 1936. As indicated in Tables 4 and 5, all price and cost of living indexes from that time on continued to rise steadily. 12 T h e Departmental cost of living indexes rose from 80.3 in May to 91.1 in November, an increase of over 1 3 per cent. In June it had been generally agreed that the general Matignon wage boost and the benefits of the new social legislation would correspond to a 35 per cent increase in labor costs. This estimate was based on the average 12 per cent blanket wage rise, a 20 per cent hourly wage increase in order to reduce the legal work week from 48 to 40 hours without change in compensation, and a 4 per cent increase to account for a two weeks vacation with pay for each worker. 13 W h e n opponents of the Popular Front predicted that these wage increases would be followed by equivalent price rises,14 Blum and his supporters disagreed. T h e Popular Front theorists based their position on two premises: first, that the labor factor represented only a small portion of total costs; and secondly, that greater purchasing power and increased demand would lead to higher production and a decline in average costs, which would make price

THE AUTUMN OF

1936

TABLE 4 COST OF LIVING INDEXES, FRANCE, SEINE DEPARTMENT AND PARIS, JANUARY, 193 5-AUGUST, 1939 J935

r--

00

Cost of living, France, 1 9 3 0 = 100: a February May 78.7 August November Cost of living, Seine, 1930 = 100: b February 82.2 May August November 81.1 Cost of living, Paris, 1914 = 100:c February 494 May 490 469 August November 478

'937

1938

1939

96.5

113.2

122.3

99-4

115.3

122.6

103.8

117.2

124.4

91.1

110.0

120.3

98.5

118.4

128.2

82.6

102.2

119.1

128.7

106.9

ll8.6

129.0

114.2

124.3

1936

80.3

91.9

486

CO **

Index

688

497

606

692

504

630

689

540

658

722

* An official arithmetic average of cost of living indexes calculatcd by the Departmental cost of living commissions. T h e indexes are based on a uniform budget for a working class family of four, using an average of prices in the first two weeks of the month in which they arc computed. By 1 9 3 9 there were commissions functioning in all but one of the Departments. Before January, 1 9 3 7 , the index was reported semiannually; after that date, it was reported quarterly. b Calculated by Seine Department cost of living commission. See note a. c Based on a quarterly average. After January, 1 9 3 9 , these older-type quarterly indexes ceased publication. Until then, they appeared for Paris, Bordeaux and Marseilles. Sources: Periodic reports in Bulletin de la Statistique Generale de la France et du Sen-ice d'Observation des Prix, Supplement Mensuel. Vols. X X V I X X V I I I , 1 9 3 6 - 3 9 ; Statistique Generale de la France, Les indices du coüt de la vie (Paris, 1 9 4 1 ) ; A. Sauvy, "Mecanisme ct niveau des prix," in Charles Rist et Gaetan Pirou (cds.), De la France d'avant-guerre a la France d'aujourd'hui (Paris, 1 9 3 9 ) , pp. 2 9 1 - 3 2 8 .

THE AUTUMN OF 1 9 3 6 TABLE

5

R E T A I L P R I C E INDEXES, PARIS AND 3 0 0 O T H E R C I T I E S ,

JANUARY, 1 9 3 5 - A u c u s T , ( 1 9 1 4 = 100)

Index Retail prices, 300 cities: a February May August November Retail prices, Paris: b January February March April May June July August September October November December

1939

1935

1936

1937

1938

1939

436

425

540

549 579

709 698

543

641 646 657 690

691 692 690 691 698 698 690 695 708 727

761

4*3

409

429

4!5

506

621

460

454 454

567

454 447 435 439 438 430 420 424 438 446

449

452

451 459 461 461

477 494 5*5 534 55°

577

576 580 586 590 600 615 642

657 664 676

755 75 2 748 756

758 759 764

739 754

a A weighted index based on 34 articles of general consumption, published quarterly for cities of over 10,000 population. b A weighted index based on 34 articles of general consumption, published monthly for Paris. Sources: Periodic reports in Bulletin de Id Statistique Generale de la France et du Service d'Observation des Prix, Supplement Mensuel, Vols. X X V - X X V I I I , 1935—39; a n d R· Rivet, "Le mouvement des prix," Revue d'Economie Politique, LIII (1939), 925-42.

increases unnecessary. Only if industry tried to pass on to the consumer all the added expenses of the new social legislation, they maintained, would wage increases lead to equivalent price rises.15

γ.

T H E A U T U M N OF

I936

W h e n prices rose in this period, therefore, complaints were immediately heard from labor that industry was directly and solely responsible. 1 8 T h e r e is no doubt that industrialists were passing on their increased production costs to the public. M a n y exaggerated the importance of labor costs in their total expenses. Others anticipated in advance the added burden of the forty hour week even before it was introduced in their respective industries. On the other hand, expenses had become heavier since June, even apart from the forty hour week. T h e proportion of the increase that justifiably might be passed on to the consumer was not easy to determine. It was hardly fair to maintain, however, as did the Popular Front supporters, that the rise in prices was solely the result of a deliberate attempt by industry to pass on its increased costs to the public. A m o n g other factors at work, for example, was a partial business recovery, stimulated by orders to fill depleted inventories. Once the spring strikes and summer vacations were over, the monthly index of industrial production began to rise. It climbed from 80 in June to 93.6 in March, 1937, the highest point since the depression had set in. From then on, however, it began to decline. Full economic recovery, incidentally, which might have facilitated the absorption of increased labor costs, never did take place as anticipated by the Popular Front. N o t until the defense preparations of 1939—after the passing of the Popular Front—did the index again reach and then exceed the figure for March, 1 9 3 7 · 1 7 A n additional reason for the rise in prices in the autumn of 1936 was the devaluation of the franc in late September, 1936, about which more will be said in the next chapter. Devaluation acted as an accelerant upon a price rise that had already begun, and subsequent devaluations, in July, 1937, and July, 1938, also contributed to rising prices in later months. W h a t e v e r the causes, the problem of price rises plagued the Popular Front government and its successors throughout the prewar years. T h e attempt to cope with the problem through a form of government price control met with little success. A weak price control law that went into effect in August, 1 9 3 6 proved difficult to

THE AUTUMN OF 1936

33

enforce and prices continued to rise until 1939, when they finally began to level off. 1 8 B y the autumn of 1936, labor was aware that the gains of June were being nullified by the rise in prices. As one union official noted, in referring to the Seine cost of living index, which had risen from 82.6 in M a y to 9 1 . 9 in November: The new cost of living index shows a 1 0 per cent rise. The Matignon agreement raised wages 7 to 1 5 per cent. W e are back to where we started from originally! 1 9 Confronted not only with the cancellation of their gains but with a threatened decline in real wages, the unions countered with demands for 1 0 to 1 5 per cent wage increases and when these were rejected, followed up the demands with strikes. Had there been no other contributory causes, the rise in prices alone would have been sufficient to create labor unrest at this time. The Dilemma of the Popular Front T o meet this second strike wave, in the autumn of 1936, the government continued its strenuous mediation efforts. As in the previous period, several important disputes were settled by governmental arbitration awards, including the strike in the Paris hotel and restaurant industry, the Paris construction strike and the Lyons metallurgical strike. A new feature of this period was the success of the recently instituted Departmental Conciliation Boards in getting the parties to settle disputes amicably. 20 Criticism of the government's mediation efforts, however, grew more pronounced. Opponents of the Popular Front accused the government of favoring the workers wherever possible. Employers balked at accepting government mediation of any kind and, in particular, denounced members of the government as ill-qualified to serve as impartial arbitrators. O n e critic sneered at "what the government pretends are arbitration decisions." 2 1 It was probably as a concession to these charges that the government at this time began to select high career officials and members of the judiciary as arbitrators, a practice that served as a precedent for the arbitra-

34

THE AUTUMN OF 1936

tion system later adopted. The strike of the Paris candymakers established the model. Here, a section president of the Council of State (Conseil d'Etat)—France's high administrative, advisory and judicial body, and highest court of appeal in matters of administrative and public law—was called upon to serve as arbitrator. The same magistrate was also named to arbitrate the Paris electrical workers' strike. In the Paris boatmen's strike both sides agreed to submit their dispute to an arbitrator chosen by the government "from members of the Council of State." In another case, the government proposed arbitration by the presiding magistrate of the Court of Accounts. Finally, in the most important strikes toward the end of the year—the critical metallurgical strikes in the Nord Department —the government named as arbitrator Paul Matter, the presiding justice of the COUT de Cassation, the highest court of appeal in France in all matters except administrative and public law.22 But all of the government's efforts did not avail to meet the new sitdown strikes. If ever a statesman was on the horns of a dilemma, it was Leon Blum in the autumn of 1936. To do nothing about the strikes would have meant the compromise or failure of the Popular Front social and economic program. Yet to employ force to end them was inconceivable for a life-long Socialist and the head of a government elected and supported by labor. It was evident that the policy carried out so far was inadequate. The government's resources were being severely strained by its mediation efforts and its attention diverted from pressing tasks, both in domestic and international affairs.23 It was feared also that the practice of cabinet members rushing all over the country to settle disputes would diminish their prestige and dilute their authority.24 Labor and industry might build up too high a tolerance to government intervention of all kinds—especially arbitration—for these efforts to have any continued effect. The government's anxiety was shared by the C G T . The labor leaders, too, were aware that a continuation of the strikes might lead to the failure of the government's social and economic program, and might result in the collapse of the Popular Front. Such a contingency would mean the return to power of a reactionary

T H E A U T U M N OF 1 9 3 6

35

government and an end to further social reform. An even more dire possibility—that the fascist enemies of the Republic might triumph—could not be ruled out. T h e C G T feared also that the labor movement would dissipate its new strength if the strikes continued. Even with their greatly increased membership, the unions did not possess the financial resources to support repeated strikes. Finally, the C G T leaders were conscious that public sympathy, favorable in June, was now rapidly being lost. They knew that in view of the growing threat from across the Rhine, the continued strikes were beginning to outrage French patriotic sentiments. On the other hand, although eager to see an end to the strikes, the C G T was reconciled to the inevitability of continued labor unrest, if only because of the difficulties associated with the collective bargaining practices just being introduced in the country and the rising price curve. 25 As a solution to the quandary of the Popular Front, the C G T came forward in September with an important proposal. It urged the creation of an official conciliation and arbitration system, with a regulation making it mandatory that all unsettled disputes be submitted to official conciliation boards. If those boards failed to get the parties to adjust their differences, the dispute might be submitted, on a voluntary basis, to arbitration. T h e C G T did not yet propose compulsory submission of disputes to arbitration. 26 The conciliation machinery recommended at this time by the C G T became the nucleus of the system that was later adopted under the compulsory arbitration act of December 31, 1936. A large role was assigned to the unions and the employers' associations. A hierarchy of mediation agencies was to help in the settlement of disputes: first, a Departmental Conciliation Board was to make an effort; if it failed, a second board representing the labor and management federations for the industry in question was to try; if it failed, a third board representing the two national confederations, the C G T and the C G P F , would make a final effort. Government officials were to serve as chairmen of all three boards. If all of these conciliation steps failed, arbitration by a government representative was to be possible as a final measure.

36

THE AUTUMN OF 1936 The Second Matignon Conferences and the CGT Proposals

While the C G T came forward with this proposal, Blum took additional action. Deciding to try the same method that in June had resulted in the spectacular Matignon agreement, he invited C G T and C G P F representatives to hold a new series of conferences— this time to agree on a conciliation and arbitration system.27 Although the attempt was not destined to have the same success as in June, the conferences, before they collapsed, resulted in considerable agreement on the blueprints of an arbitration system. As the government expected, the C G T took the initiative at the opening of the conferences in mid-September and advanced its proposal for a system requiring the submission of all disputes to official conciliation boards. The employer representatives were receptive. Both sides agreed, however, that they did not favor the compulsory submission of disputes to arbitration, although the C G T proposal strongly recommended government arbitration as a possible last resort. With the arbitration question temporarily left open, a subcommittee was named to work out the details of the proposed system.28 While these negotiations were under way, a changc took placc in the C G T position. Especially after the Lille episode, the labor leaders became convinced that the increasing unwillingness of employers to accept government arbitration had to be overcome. Accordingly, about two weeks after the opening of the conferences, the C G T came forward with a new proposal that went considerably beyond its original one. After a speech by Jouhaux, the C G T national council on September 25, 1936, went on record as favoring the legal establishment of compulsory arbitration. The resolution explained that they were proposing something stronger than the conciliation and arbitration procedures hitherto advocated because of "a systematic and concerted refusal by certain employer groups to have recourse to these procedures." The resolution called for the establishment of "practical and effective mediation measures . . . including arbitration." 28 By this resolution, the C G T reversed the position 011 compulsory

THE AUTUMN OF 1 9 3 6

37

arbitration it had maintained through its forty years of existence. As a labor official recalled at the time: " W e have never been partisans of compulsory arbitration. The labor movement has always endeavored to keep its freedom of action in the social struggle." 30 The reasons for the volte face were apparent. The political situation was unlike any that had prevailed before. For the first time in French history a government was in power principally through the efforts of organized labor and working class political parties. Through a compulsory arbitration system set up with the aid of the Popular Front government, the C G T hoped to achieve its ends without strikes. And the prevention of strikes was of paramount importance if the Popular Front was to succeed in its program of social reform, economic recovery and resistance to fascism. Not because of any change in fundamental attitude toward compulsory arbitration, but because of the practical needs of the moment, it was now willing to abandon its traditional hostility. As Jouhaux wrote, the motivation was "not theoretical but practical considerations." 31 Labor saw little danger in compulsory arbitration under a Popular Front government. T o what compulsory arbitration might be like under an unfriendly government it gave little serious thought and adopted a generally opportunistic attitude. As an assistant secretary of the C G T stated: "What if a reactionary government comes into power? The working class will take that under advisement. It has known battles of that kind before." 32 On the other hand, there was some awareness that precautions were necessary. As one important C G T official noted, the labor movement "realized that compulsory arbitration is a subtle but effective procedure by means of which it is possible to curtail and even suppress the right to strike." 33 At least a few safeguards were to be insisted upon. First, any procedures adopted were to be temporary. One labor official suggested that a six months time limit be set, but generally, a year was considered satisfactory. Secondly, organized labor and industry would set up the procedures themselves: the Matignon conferences then going on would permit thorough discussion and approval by both sides before any proce-

3«

THE AUTUMN OF 1936

dures were adopted. A large role was to be assigned to labor and employer organizations in the mechanics of the procedure. T h e C G T would be represented at every stage. Above all, compulsory arbitration did not mean that labor was surrendering its strike weapon. Under the system as the C G T interpreted it, strikes were not to be illegal but were to be considered a weapon of last resort— a contention that later gave rise to considerable controversy. 14 At the same session in September, the C G T national council also demanded a sliding wage scale, to be required by law in all collective agreements. This device to permit wages to keep pace with rising prices was considered an additional means of preventing future strikes over price rises. Although traditionally French labor had never viewed the principle of a sliding wage scale with favor—since it tends to keep real wages constant instead of augmenting them—the C G T now advocated it as a means of maintaining industrial peace and of protecting wages against rapidly rising prices.35 T h e danger of inflation resulting from such an instrument in a period of limited production was ignored. A third recommendation proposed by the C G T at this time must also be noted, although, like the sliding wage scale, it never came to fruition. In order to prevent further occupation of the factories, the "neutralization" by the government of struck plants was advocated. Under that plan, whenever a majority of the workers in a factory voted to strike, it would be closed down under government supervision. For the duration of the strike the factory would be a "no man's land." There could be no sitdown strike by labor and at the same time no possibility· of the plant being operated by the employer with scab labor. 36 Some time later the government introduced a bill based on this proposal—a bill to "democratize" strikes—but it never materialized. 37 Meanwhile, interrupting the second Matignon conferences and the new C G T proposals, an event occurred that placed both compulsory arbitration and the sliding wage scale proposal on the agenda of the French Parliament. T h a t development, the devaluation of the franc, proved to be the first step in the legal introduction of compulsory arbitration in France.

4· The Introduction of Compulsory Arbitration: the Act of December 3 1 , 1936 Pcace within France is today one of the conditions for peace in the world.—Leon Blum, to Senate, December 27, 1936. 1 The First Step: the Currency Act of October 1, 1936 IF compulsory arbitration gradually had been creeping into the program of the Popular Front, it was catapulted there by currency devaluation. On September 25, 1936, in spite of repeated promises to the contrary, the Blum government found itself forced to devalue the franc in order to stop serious gold losses resulting from a disparity between French prices and world prices. T h e franc was devalued in relation to the dollar and pound through a tripartite agreement between France, the United States and England, and the Chamber and Senate were then called upon to ratify the action. 2 This currency devaluation made the danger of future labor trouble even more imminent, for it was anticipated that devaluation would lead to new price rises—if only because of the higher prices of imports. 3 As a means of protecting labor and of forestalling trouble, the government proposed a legalized sliding wage scale— as the C G T had recommended even before the devaluation. Under this plan wages were to be revised periodically in line with changes in the official cost of living indexes.4 T h e proposal ran into difficulties at once and never became law. Opposition appeared from several sources, including Popular Front parties. T h e Radical Socialist deputies held that it would not help industrial peace but would lead to new conflicts. In line with their

40

INTRODUCTION OF C O M P U L S O R Y

ARBITRATION

political tradition, they spoke up for agricultural and middle class groups who would have to do without the protection that was being envisaged exclusively for labor. Members of Blum's own party likewise objected that in trying to apply a sliding wage scale more difficulties would be created than would be solved. The Communists vigorously backed the proposal, but on the other hand, denounced devaluation. From many directions the argument was advanced that a sliding wage scale would be tantamount to giving a psychological impetus to price rises—it would lead the public to believe that price increases were automatically expected as a result of devaluation.5 To the pressure of these arguments, especially the last, Blum yielded." A substitute proposal offered by the Chamber would have granted the government temporary enabling powers to take all necessary emergency measures to safeguard purchasing power. One of the methods to be adopted, it was made clear, was to be the introduction of new conciliation and arbitration machinery.7 But opposition to this proposal arose in the Senate. In that body the government did not command majority support—two-thirds of the Senators had been elected three to six years before the Popular Front victory in 1936.8 Opposed to devaluation, they had to accept it as a fait accompli, but as Joseph Caillaux, the chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, warned, they could insist that "nothing accompany it—no delegation of powers, no special compensation provisions." 9 The Senators rejected both the original sliding wage scale proposal and the request for a temporary grant of full powers. They refused to pass any special protective legislation on the ground that such measures could be instituted after future events revealed what was necessary.10 Compulsory arbitration now entered the picture. Unwilling to abandon his plans for labor protection, Blum decided to capitalize on the Senate's all-consuming concern with the continued industrial unrest by proposing compulsory arbitration for all labor disputes arising out of eventual price rises. This measure, he hoped, might placate the Senate and yet accomplish the government's goals: provision for wage adjustments in the eventuality of price

INTRODUCTION OF COMPULSORY

41

ARBITRATION

rises and the prevention of new strikes. T o the new proposition the Senate reluctantly gave its consent. Both houses thereupon passed, as Article 15 of the Currency A c t of October 1, 1936, a provision granting the government authority to set up for a six month period a system of compulsory arbitration to regulate wage disputes that might arise out of price increases. 11 Blum pledged that any arbitration system established would be based on principles agreed to at the Matignon conferences then going on. 1 2 Although the government never was to make use of the specific decree powers it received under Article 15, the Currency A c t of October 1, 1936, meant that compulsory arbitration had been introduced in France at least in principle. But it was to be some time yet before any actual machinery would be established. The Collapse of the Second Matignon

Conferences

Although faced with continually rising prices, new strikes (particularly in the metallurgical industry in the Nord Department) and growing disaffection in Popular Front ranks, especially among the Radical Socialists, Blum refrained from establishing a compulsory arbitration system by decree, despite the authorization of the Currency Act. T h e reason lay in his steadfast resolve to see the system established through a second Matignon agreement. Convinced that a system of compulsory arbitration would hold greater promise of success if drawn up by labor and management, he tried to impress the C G T and C G P F delegates, w h o had been conferring since September 14, with the urgency of reaching a voluntary agreement so that the authorized government decrees need not be issued. 13 T h e logic of Blum's position was strong, but unfortunately, he reckoned without the obduracy of the C G P F . A letter to Blum by C . J. Gignoux, the recently elected president of the employers' organization, set the tone for the latter stage of the conferences. 14 T h e communication firmly declared that agreement on arbitration procedures had to be contingent upon a formal guarartee against future sitdown strikes. Pointing to the record of labor disorders since September, Gignoux argued that his organi-

42

INTRODUCTION OF COMPULSORY

ARBITRATION

zation was unable to accept new mediation procedures when those already existing in collective contracts were ignored. T h e failure of the government to enforce respect for the law, for property rights and for existing contracts made it unlikely, he asserted, that any new arbitration machinery would be effective. Meanwhile, the C G T , in a public statement, reaffirmed its decision to press the government and management for the establishment of the arbitration system it had proposed.15 In a vigorous statement to a union audience, Jouhaux charged that the C G T proposals were being rejected by "the reactionaries and big business." This, he said, made the duty of the government clear. If business continued its resistance, the Popular Front government would have to assume responsibility for the introduction of the arbitration system.16 While the conferences were going on, employer circles voiced open hostility to compulsory arbitration. Opposition to state intervention was the outstanding theme of their protests. If free collective bargaining were to be preserved, it was argued, labor and management had to settle their disputes independently—without control by the state. A series of critical editorials in he Temps recapitulated foreign experience with compulsory arbitration and summarized all of the major criticisms ever raised. T h e newspaper did not omit the opportunity to attack labor's reversal of position and charged that the C G T planned to act "as both judge and party" in any contemplated arbitration system.17 Since "neutralization" was also in the air, employers could decry the threat of a double-barreled invasion of their property rights. The contemplated combination of "neutralization" and compulsory arbitration, they were convinced, would end in the total suppression of their economic liberties. "Neutralization" would mean a provisional transfer of ownership to the state that would not end until the dispute had been settled by an arbitrator—in all probability, a government official.18 Although the Matignon discussions were evidently not proceeding in an atmosphere that was conducive to success, substantial progress was being made. By late November, nine successful sub-

INTRODUCTION OF COMPULSORY ARBITRATION

43

committee meetings had been held, a preliminary agreement was all but completed, and the time set for the signing of a final agreement. It remained only for the C G P F to consult its membership on ratification when suddenly, on November 26, less than two hours before the final agreement was scheduled to be signed, the C G P F announced its withdrawal from the conferences. A delegation, led by Gignoux, explained to Blum that their step was dictated by dissatisfaction with the continuing sitdown strikes and with the tolerance shown by the government toward the strikers. T h e y asserted, as before, that they could not agree to new procedures and obligations when existing commitments were being disregarded. Plans for "neutralization" were also condemned and indignation expressed over labor demands for an increased share in managerial decisions on personnel and other matters. T h e specific basis for their decision, they declared, was the failure to include a preamble guaranteeing property rights, which they had been insisting upon ever since the opening of the conferences. 1 ' A later statement by Gignoux cast further light on their motive. T h e C G P F was convinced, he said, that in spite of any compulsory arbitration plan, sitdown strikes and violations of property rights would continue. For that reason they had refused to accept compulsory arbitration on a contractual basis, preferring that the government assume full responsibility. 20 T h e employers regretted having signed the original Matignon agreement and were bent on not making the same mistake again. Undoubtedly, they also hoped to deprive the C G T of another opportunity to act for all of French labor as it had at the original Matignon conference. 21 Thus, the traditional opponents of state intervention in industrial relations shifted responsibility to the state. Blum did not conceal his disappointment and chagrin. "I have nothing to say in reply," he announced to the delegation that called on him. " Y o u have made a serious decision." 22 He felt that the reasons given for their withdrawal—the continued sitdown strikes— merely emphasized the very problem that the proposed agreement had been designed to solve. Labor leaders cast doubts upon the sincerity of the employers

44

INTRODUCTION OF COMPULSORY

ARBITRATION

from the start and placed the blame upon their new leadership. T h e y intimated that the negotiations had been broken off so that the legislature—especially the S e n a t e — m i g h t whittle d o w n the scope of the future system and perhaps exclude disputes involving e m p l o y m e n t and dismissal practices. Jouhaux described the reasons given by the C G P F for its withdrawal as chicanery and hypocrisy. 23 Since it was plain that compulsory arbitration could not be established autonomously by labor and management, B l u m resolved upon government action. H e promptly introduced in Parliament a government bill calling for the compulsory submission of all labor disputes to conciliation boards and eventually t o arbitration. T h e bill was broader in scope than the Currency A c t since the latter authorized compulsory arbitration only for wage disputes arising out of increased living costs. It was faithful in its m a j o r outlines to the preliminary draft agreed to by the subcommittee of C G T and C G P F representatives, which was itself based on the proposals of the C G T . " The Compulsory

Arbitration Bill in

Parliament25

O n N o v e m b e r 27, 1936, the government bill was introduced in the C h a m b e r . T h e proposed arbitration system was intended to serve as a "substitute" for strikes and lockouts, the preamble to the bill declared. But no sanctions were to be provided other than public opinion and "moral responsibility." Penalties, such as fines, were deliberately rejected on the ground that they might hurt the chances for the system's success. T h e bill passed through hearings before the C h a m b e r Labor C o m m i t t e e without much difficulty. T h e C o m m i t t e e associated itself unreservedly with what it described as " t h e boldest innovat i o n " of the government bill, the provision for compulsory arbitration, which it described as a means of "reconciling the interests of the parties with the higher interests of the n a t i o n . " 26 Sentiment a m o n g the legislators at the opening of the C h a m b e r debates was favorable to the bill because there was unanimous agreement on the need to substitute some more effective form of official conciliation and arbitration machinery than existed. 27 Y e t ,

INTRODUCTION OF COMPULSORY

ARBITRATION

45

despite this general agreement, the machinery proposed was subjected to heavy assault in both Chamber and Senate. T h e principle of compulsory arbitration itself incurred attack on the ground that the government had no clear idea as to its meaning, especially in regard to the future status of strikes. It was the particular features of the government bill, however, not the principle of compulsory arbitration, that met with the greatest opposition. T h e government was charged with desiring to place the entire national economy under the arbitrary control of the executive, a design that was observed in every aspect of the procedures, from the conciliation boards where the prefect sat as chairman to the government's choice of arbitrators and umpires when the parties were unable to agree on selections. Secondly, the monopoly on labor representation assigned to the C G T was assailed, particularly by spokesmen for the Christian trade union movement who insisted that the C F T C , which had grown to include a half-million members, merited representation. 2 8 T h e potential power of the future arbitrators was so feared, especially in disputes involving employment and dismissal practices, that passage of the bill was delayed over this issue. Aware that the strikes then taking place in the Nord Department had been caused by the dismissal of a number of shop stewards, the opposition attempted to exclude disputes over dismissals from the scope of arbitration. 2 9 But Blum adamantly insisted that such disputes had to fall within the scope of arbitration if the new law were to have any meaning, and won his point. 3 0 Objections raised by the vociferous but weak Chamber minority on these issues were easily overcome, but Senate resistance was strong enough to delay passage of the bill and to alter the original measure substantially. T h e stubbornness of the Senators provoked Blum at one point to an outburst of impatience. He spoke of the resistance encountered from employers, who seemed bent on regaining the concessions wrung from them in June, and hinted that Senate obstinacy was a reflection of this. It was shameful, he said, to deny the government the conciliation and arbitration machinery it so vitally needed to restore industrial peace. T h e need was urgent

46

INTRODUCTION OF COMPULSORY

ARBITRATION

not only in order to promote economic recovery, but for an even more pressing reason: It is because we desire to restore [industrial] peace and because we need it more than ever under present conditions in France and in Europe that we have acted. . . . I ask you to consider that peace within France is today one of the conditions for peace in the world. 31 After a series of shuttle trips between the Senate and Chamber, the bill finally was adopted on the last day of 1936, more than a month after it had been introduced with a request for emergency action. In its final form it represented a compromise: although it established as law the principle that all collective labor disputes had to be submitted to arbitration, it authorized the government to set up specific machinery by decree, subject to certain prescribed specifications. 32 T h e system established at this time was temporary. It was to be in force until the close of the next regular session of Parliament, or for a period of about six months, since parliamentary sessions usually end in June or July of each year. The Original Machinery: the Act of December 3 1 , 1936, and the Decree of January 16, 1937 T h e cardinal principle of the A c t of December 31, 19 36,33 was announced in Article 1: "All collective labor disputes in industry and commerce are to be submitted to conciliation and arbitration procedures before any strike or lockout." These procedures, the act stipulated, might be decided upon by the parties and incorporated into their collective contracts. If they were not autonomously fixed, official machinery was to be employed. Agricultural labor disputes were not included within the scope of the arbitration system at this time, or later, because of bitter conservative opposition. 34 T h e act placed a number of restrictions upon the machinery to be established by governmental decree. As an over-all restriction, it bound the government to organize the new procedures within the legal framework of the country. Next, there were specific instructions for the government on the selection of final arbitrators. This was necessary, for two arbitration stages were planned. In the first

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there would be two arbitrators, one appointed by labor and one by management. If these two initial arbitrators ("arbitTes") failed to arrive at a decision (as would almost invariably happen), a final arbitrator or umpire ("surarbitre") would be chosen—by the parties if possible, otherwise by the government. In the latter case the government was instructed to make its choice from among the active or retired members of the highest state bodies ("les grands corps de l ' E t a t " ) . T h e opposition in both houses fought to substitute the judiciary for the executive as the appointing agency for the arbitrators and, secondly, to require that all arbitrators be members of the judiciary. Blum stubbornly opposed both of these proposals. On the first count, for obvious reasons, he desired to have the executive retain control over nominations. On the second, although he did not oppose the use of magistrates as arbitrators, he did not believe that the arbitrators ought to be chosen exclusively from judicial ranks.35 T h e compromise adopted meant that the arbitrators were to be chosen by the government from the various higher judicial, administrative and educational bodies of the state. So strong was the bureaucratic influence in France that no one even suggested that private individuals might be effective as arbitrators. T h e majority of arbitrators later chosen consisted of important magistrates, professors on the various university faculties, members of the Council of State and other high career officials in the civil service. T h e law stated that arbitrators were to have all the powers of "amiables compositeurs." This referred to the broad powers of equity granted by French law to arbitrators in such matters as commercial disputes—the right to make decisions without restriction to statutory law or legal formalities. 38 Each arbitration decision, it was provided, was to explain the reasoning behind the decision and was to be made public. Awards were described as "compulsory" and "not subject to appeal." T h e goal of arbitration was to be "an equitable regulation of labor conditions in order to create in all places of employment an atmosphere of cooperation and mutual respect for the rights of

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management and labor." These rights were specifically enumerated as the right to property, the right to organize ("droit syndical"), freedom of person ("liberte individuelle"), freedom from interference with the right to work ("liberte du travail") and the freedom to belong—or not to belong—to a trade union ("liberte syndicale"). Blum noted during the debates that these rights, with their implied restrictions on union activities, were balanced in management's favor, despite the Popular Front origin of the law. 37 Beyond these few general principles governing the system, little else was prescribed by the law. It was left to the government to provide the detailed blueprints. O n January 16, 1937, the government issued a decree establishing the compulsory conciliation and arbitration machinery authorized by the 1936 Act. 38 T h e decree differed little from the original government bill, which had been based on the system originally proposed by the C G T and which had almost been accepted by the C G T and the C G P F . A few of the ideas advanced in the parliamentary debates, such as the shortening of time intervals and some limited representation for the Christian trade unions were incorporated, but otherwise little difference was apparent. Under the new machinery, the compulsory conciliation procedures were to be exhausted before recourse to arbitration. These procedures, which would go into operation after the failure of direct negotiations, consisted of three stages, designed to conform to the three levels of organization of labor and management: the units within each Department, the federations for each industry, and at the summit, the two national confederations. T h e first stage, the Departmental Conciliation Board (commission departementale de conciliation), was a slightly modified version of the type of board set up in July, which had enjoyed so much success. It will be recalled that in these boards employer delegates were nominated by the Chamber (or Chambers) of Commerce in the Department, and labor representatives by the C G T organization for the Department. Consisting of an equal number of employer and labor representatives, three to five for each, they were presided over by the prefect or his representative. T h e divisional

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labor inspector or his representative might sit with the board in a consultative capacity. For industries extending over more than one Department, the Minister of Labor was authorized to set up an Inter-Departmental Conciliation Board. It was now provided that if "the most representative" organization in a given Department was in dispute, the prefects were to consider the respective importance of the various organizations in the Department and to distribute seats in proportion to the strength of each.39 This provision was designed to meet objections to the exclusive privileges previously afforded the CGT, which had been vigorously denounced during the debates. Actually, very little came of it, and the C F T C received representation in only a few areas. If the Departmental Conciliation Board did not succeed in its conciliation efforts within four days, the dispute, at the initiative of one of the parties or of the prefect, would be submitted to the next higher body. This was a Joint (Industry) Conciliation Board (commission mixte paritaire de conciliation), consisting of representatives chosen for each dispute by those national labor and management federations that were the parent bodies of the parties to the dispute. Any disagreement over which was "the most representative" organization and federation for each party was to be settled, after investigation, by the Minister of Labor or his representative. If no agreement were reached within four days, at the request of one of the parties or of the chairman, the dispute would be submitted to a National Inter-Industry Conciliation Board (commission inter-professionnelle de conciliation). This board would consist of an equal number of representatives chosen by the "most representative national confederations of management and labor." The chairman, as in the case of the previous board, was to be the government minister whose jurisdiction was most closely associated with the dispute (in most cases, this was the Minister of Labor) or his representative. As a formality, in deference to legislative will, the most representative confederations were not named by the law but were selected by the permanent committee of the National Economic Council, the French advisory body in economic matters,

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consisting of government, labor and management representatives. The C G T and the C G P F were, of course, designated.40 The failure of this last conciliation board marked the end of the conciliation stages. The board was to prepare a statement specifying the points on which disagreement persisted and invite the parties to select a single common arbitrator or an arbitrator each for a two-man arbitration board. If within two days one of the parties refused to select an arbitrator, the government minister whose jurisdiction was most directly associated with the dispute would make the choice. He would make the selection from a labor or management panel of fifteen acceptable names, submitted in advance by each of the two confederations. If within three days the two initial arbitrators could not agree upon a decision, they were to choose an umpire. If they could not agree on an umpire or refused to designate one, the Premier would make the choice. To facilitate the Premier's choice of an umpire, the two confederations were to draw up in advance a common panel of thirty suggested names acceptable to both sides and qualified under the terms of the 1936 Act as being members, active or retired, of the important state bodies. This list, however, was suggestive, and the Premier was not restricted to it.41 There was no time limitation on the final arbitration decision. As the government decree prescribed, the two confederations met in early 1937 and agreed upon a common panel of umpires. The names on the panel were drawn heavily from the high judicial bodies of the state, the government ministries, the administrative services and the university faculties. The eminent jurists included Paul Matter, First President of the COUT de Cassation, Francis Villette, First President of the Court of Appeals of Paris, PierTe Guinand, First President of the Court of Accounts, and such distinguished members of the Council of State as Georges CahenSalvador and Paul Grünebaum-Ballin. Important government officials included Robert Jacomet, Controller-General of the Army. Named also were several inspectors-general of the Department of Bridges, Roads and Mines. The assistant director of the International Labor Organization, Fernand Maurette, was included.

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Among the well known academic persons, distinguished in law and economics, were Professors Henry Capitant, William Oualid, Charles Rist and Andre Siegfried. 42 It could be argued that serious violence had not been done to voluntary conciliation and arbitration principles, or to management and labor autonomy. T h e parties might avoid the governmental procedures entirely if they wished, by writing their own arbitration provisions into collective contracts. Secondly, the labor and management organizations were to nominate the panels of arbitrators and umpires from which government selections for the most part would be made. Thirdly, no penalties were provided for failure to obey any of the provisions of the system. Finally, although this point was left ambiguous, it was unlikely that in the case of original contract negotiations, the government could substitute its decision for that of the parties. Yet the elements of compulsion were considerable. All disputes were explicitly to be submitted to conciliation and arbitration before any strike or lockout. In the event that the conciliation procedures could not operate because of the unwillingness of one of the parties, the dispute was to be submitted to arbitration. In case of a refusal to name the arbitrators, selection was to be made by the government, ultimately by the Premier himself. Thus, while some concessions had been made to voluntary, autonomous principles of industrial relations, elements of compulsion were present and the role of the government loomed large. Organized labor in most respects was gratified by the government system, although they would have preferred a voluntary agreement. They were pleased that jurisdiction was to be in the hands of the executive, and not the judiciary, in whose labor sympathies they had little confidence. T h e most important source of security, they felt, was the role assigned to the C G T in the procedures. In that they saw the strongest guarantee against political vicissitudes and threats to union independence. 43 The government hoped that the system would satisfy the employers as well. T h e grant of a substantial degree of control to the C G P F was expressly intended to meet that aim. Moreover, the

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machinery established was in large part based upon the preliminary draft that had been agreed to by the C G P F delegates. That employers would not be well disposed to the new law, however, was made plain when the president of the C G P F , M . Gignoux, called attention to an article in the Socialist newspaper, Le Populaire, which extravagantly described the arbitration system as a first step in the direction of socialization. This attitude, he asserted, threw considerable light on the true nature of the new procedures.44 T h e system was ready to begin its career. Despite criticisms that might be made, especially of its complexity, much might be said in its favor. It enlisted the participation of the qualified representatives of organized labor and management from the local to the national level, and moreover, gave priority to autonomous procedures where they existed. It aimed at exhausting all possibility of conciliation before permitting arbitration. Finally, it tried to guarantee the appointment of competent, impartial final arbitrators when selection by the government would be necessary. But, as in the case of all such machinery, time and experience alone could reveal its virtues and faults.

5· The Permanent System: the Act of March 4, 1 9 3 8 Instead of destroying the instrument of industrial peace that we have created, imperfect as it may be, is it not wiser, more humane, more in conformity with the national interest, to perfect it?—Camille Chautemps, to the Chamber of Deputies, February 17, 1938. 1 BEFORE going on to examine the operation and results of the arbitration system, it is necessary to explain how the system, originally adopted on a temporary basis, was twice extended and then made permanent under the Act of March 4, 1938. T h e reforms introduced at that time in order to remedy defects in the original system must also be described. Extension of the Original System: the Act of July 18, 1937 Under the Act of December 31, 1936, the arbitration system was scheduled to expire at the close of the regular session of Parliament, that is, in June or July, 1937, about six months after passage of the law. This scheduled expiration date could hardly have fallen at a more critical time. It will be recalled that most collective agreements had been concluded at approximately the same time—shortly after the Matignon agreement in June, 1936—and in the majority of cases, for a period of one year. They were, therefore, in the spring of 1937 on the verge of expiring simultaneously—with appalling prospects for the country. Contract renegotiations were expected to lead to difficulties and perhaps to widespread strikes. A repetition of the spring of 1936, and even a general strike, was not to be discounted. Such a labor upheaval had to be prevented at all costs. Apart from

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the need to avoid a new strain on the economy, preparations were under way for an International Exposition to be held in Paris and visitors from all over the world could not be permitted to see France again torn by industrial strife. Blum first hoped that labor and management might voluntarily agree to renew all existing contracts for a period of six months, which would carry the country through the critical period. 2 T o this the C G T was agreeable, although it insisted that the arbitration law be similarly extended so that there might be some means of continuing to obtain wage adjustments were prices to keep rising.3 This request seemed equitable since the unions would have to accept existing wage schedules if the contracts were extended. T h e attempt to reach a voluntary agreement foundered, however, when the C G P F demanded a formal guarantee by the government that it would not permit future sitdown strikes and that there would be no interference with management autonomy in hiring and firing. T h e employers objected especially to a C G T demand for a law on employment practices, which the latter sought in order to prevent the dismissals of trade unionists and the hiring of n o n - C G T workers, as had occurred in the spring construction work at the Exposition grounds. T h e C G P F opposed any such law as a violation of the rights of management. 4 Since Blum was unwilling to accede to the C G P F demands, he was forced once again, in lieu of a voluntary agreement, to ask Parliament to act. A government bill, introduced M a y 20, 1937, avoided the question of employment practices altogether and confined itself to a six month extension of existing contracts and of the arbitration system. 5 Meanwhile, in the midst of the parliamentary deliberations on the bill, after a momentous year in office, the Blum cabinet fell on another issue. Blum's resignation on June 21, 1937, was forced when the Senate refused to grant the full financial powers he considered necessary to stop a continued flight of gold from the country. Camille Chautemps, a Radical Socialist, succeeded Blum as Premier. His ministry was still a Popular Front government, but it marked a move toward the Right. 6 After the fall of the original Blum cabinet, which had lasted over a year, the

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Popular Front was never again the same, although it did not definitely come to an end until some time later, in the autumn of 1938. T h e political crisis did not affect the bill and it passed without m u c h difficulty. T h e Act of July 18,1937, 7 a second milestone in the life of the compulsory arbitration system, accomplished two objects. First, all collective bargaining contracts scheduled to expire between June and November, 1937, were extended by law for six months. Secondly, the new act provided for a six month renewal of the compulsory arbitration system, which was now to be in effect until December 31, 1937. T h e urgent need to extend the system because of the Exposition and the imminent adjournment of Parliament made any reforms impossible, although six months' experience had disclosed a number of shortcomings in the original system. Criticisms of the Original System W h i l e the contribution of the arbitration system to industrial peace was virtually uncontested, it was generally agreed that there were five major defects in the original system. 8 First, the procedures were too slow and complicated. Second, the arbitration decisions, taken together, lacked homogeneity and consistency, especially in the matter of wage adjustments. Third, there was no appeal body. Fourth, the jurisdiction of the system was not clear, because no definition existed of a "collective" dispute. And finally, there was no effective way of enforcing decisions. T h a t the system was too slow and complicated was emphasized by everyone. T h e procedures sagged under the large number of cases being processed. Disputes bogged down in each of the stages in disregard of the prescribed time limits. Some cases lingered on for five and six months. Although the pressure of work on the overburdened boards and on the Ministry of Labor was in part the cause of this slowness, the major responsibility rested with the system itself. Despite its good qualities, it was cumbersome and complex, and lent itself to delaying tactics by anyone who might be in a position to gain through such a policy. T h e slowness of the system continued to remain a major problem throughout the prewar years despite later improvements.

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The lack of homogeneity in the body of arbitration decisions was another important criticism. Instructions to arbitrators under the existing law were too general, especially since there was no agency with the power of review. A wide diversity in decisions had appeared on the same subjects and even in the same industry. One arbitrator, for example, decided that a shop steward could not be dismissed from his job unless the workers first agreed to remove him from his post. But in a similar case, another arbitrator decided that shop stewards were not entitled to any special consideration in dismissals.9 On the question of wage adjustments, the lack of any criteria for adjusting wages to price increases had created considerable difficulty for arbitrators and had given rise to wide discrepancies in awards, as will be explained in the next chapter. The jurisdiction of the arbitrators needed further clarification. No precise definition existed of a "collective" dispute, although the system was restricted by the existing law to such disputes. This issue was especially important because it involved the jurisdiction of the arbitration system over an important type of case—dismissals. Dismissals became particularly contentious when the worker involved had some kind of trade union function. The question of jurisdiction in such cases was of more than academic importance. If the dismissal were ruled to be an individual dispute, as the employers desired, it would then fall under the jurisdiction of the conseils de prud'hommes, which were empowered only to award damages to an improperly dismissed worker. Under the arbitration system, the arbitrators could order the reinstatement of the worker. The lack of an appeal body to which contests over jurisdiction and other problems might be referred aggravated a number of these defects still further. The need for such an appeal body was urgent, not only to guarantee a degree of consistency in the arbitration decisions, but also to provide redress against procedural violations and other arbitrary actions by arbitrators. Under the original law, decisions were stated to be final and not subject to appeal. The laudable purpose of the provision was to prevent disputes from being dragged out through automatic appeals by dissatisfied parties, but experience had shown that some appeal procedure was necessary. Attempts by

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employers to appeal decisions to the ordinary law courts had met with no success. So far as the enforcement of arbitration decisions was concerned —the problem is treated in detail in a later chapter—public opinion, the only sanction provided originally, proved insufficient. Although the number of violations in comparison to the total number of decisions was small, violations were growing and some means of enforcement had become urgent. The unions were particularly aroused over these various defects in the original system. Since it was they who initiated the demands in almost all disputes, the slowness of the system, the alleged inadequacy of wage awards and the non-enforcement of decisions were distressing. On August 4, 1937, the C G T national council formulated a number of recommendations to the government. W i t h the cost of living rising, and a second currency devaluation in July, 1937, adding uncertainty to the future, the C G T registered its dissatisfaction with the manner in which wage adjustments were operating under the arbitration system and demanded wage increases more in line with price rises. In addition, it recommended to the government that the arbitration system be accelerated by reducing the three conciliation stages to one and that sanctions be introduced to guarantee the enforcement of arbitral awards. 10 In response to the C G T ' s complaints about the slowness of the system, the Chautemps government issued a decree on September 1 8 , 1 9 3 7 , aimed at simplifying and accelerating the procedures along the lines of the suggestions made by the C G T . " T h e most important provision, designed to prevent the three stage conciliation procedure from unconscionably dragging out the settlement of disputes, sanctioned recourse to arbitration at any stage where further attempts at conciliation were voted useless by a conciliation board. It would no longer be necessary, as hitherto, for all three stages to be exhausted before arbitration could be resorted to. A number of other minor changes were also made in order to accelerate the procedures. Although a step in the right direction, the decree was no panacea for the ills of the system. It eliminated in part the more obvious defects stemming from the slowness and complexity of the

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original procedures, but further changes were still needed. T h e demands of the C G T remained basically unfulfilled. Chautemps'

Unsuccessful Efforts at Reform through a Voluntary Agreement

Convinced that stable labor relations depended less on laws than on mutual good will, Premier Chautemps tried to get the arbitration system reformed through a voluntary agreement between labor and management. As an even more ambitious goal, he attempted to get agreement on a voluntary labor-management "code" of labor relations. Such a code, he hoped, would remove the main grievances of both sides and alleviate industrial tension, which toward the end of 1937 had again grown serious. 12 T h e code, in addition to reforming the arbitration system thoroughly, was to cover the regulation of employment practices as well as the conduct of strikes. Although aware of the C G P F ' s hostility and conscious that Blum had twice failed to duplicate the original Matignon agreement of June, 1936—in November, 1936, on the proposed arbitration system and in May, 1937, on the renewal of collective contracts—Chautemps made new efforts. Twice, in September, 1937, and in January, 1938, he attempted to arrange a conference at the Matignon Palace between the C G T and the C G P F . Both efforts failed because of objections raised by the employers' organization. In the first instance the C G P F took exception to the proposal for a voluntary agreement. T h e y announced that although interested parties ought to be consulted, it was incumbent upon the government alone to take any necessary measures through parliamentary channels. T o consent to the suggested conference would be equivalent, they also implied, to recognizing the C G T as the sole spokesman for labor, which they would not do. In the second instance they repeated these objections, although they agreed to participate if two conditions were met. First, all existing labor and management organizations had to be invited, without exception, in order to prevent a monopoly on representation for any one group. Secondly, the consultations were not to bear in any way upon "structural reforms," that is, they were not to affect funda-

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mental principles of private property nor interfere with the existing social and economic structure of the country. T o have accepted the first condition, Chautemps protested, would have meant transforming the contemplated conference into an open forum, distorting completely the purpose of the meeting, which was to permit the two organizations that counted to confront one another and hammer out points of contention. T o have accepted the second condition would have meant excluding from the agenda plans to regulate employment practices, for the C G P F would have construed such measures as touching upon fundamental principles of liberty and private property. 13 In both instances the conditions attached to acceptance of Chautemps' invitations were equivalent to outright rejection. T h e rejection by the C G P F in January, 1938, marked the fourth refusal since the original Matignon conference—twice under Blum and twice under Chautemps—to work out a voluntary agreement with labor on problems affecting industrial relations so that government action might not be necessary. It may seem paradoxical that industry, generally the staunchest opponent of government intervention in such matters, preferred state action to autonomous procedures, but the inconsistency is not hard to explain. T h e bitter lesson of the original Matignon agreement, the consequent desire to shift responsibility for any new measures to the Popular Front government and the unalterable will not to strengthen the position of the C G T accounted for their actions. In Parliament, moreover, they could depend upon the aid of the political opposition, particularly in the Senate, whereas in tripartite procedures they feared they would always be hopelessly outvoted. While Chautemps was attempting to get a voluntary agreement on his proposed code, the arbitration system, which had been renewed only until December 31, 1937, was again on the verge of expiring. A week before the expiration date, the government introduced into Parliament a bill that would have extended the system for another year and at the same time would have instituted a number of reforms. 14 Had this bill met with favor by Parliament, it would have removed

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several of the outstanding criticisms of the system. But it was introduced too late. Since the system was scheduled to expire within a few days, there was insufficient time for a careful examination by Parliament of the proposed reforms. T h e Labor Committee of the Chamber proposed as a compromise that the system be extended without modification for a two month period—until February 28, 1938. This interim was to provide an opportunity to study the government bill and other proposed reforms. T h e government acccpted the Committee's suggestion, but the Senate created difficulties. T h e Senators were unwilling to extend the government's authorization to issue decrees on conciliation and arbitration, but insisted on restricting the extension to those decrees already in effect. Moreover, they tacked on an amendment to the bill—to extend for two months all collective contracts due to expire at this time. This meant almost all contracts, since the legal extension voted in July, 1937, was now running out and contracts were about to be renegotiated for the first time since June, 1936. T o the Senate the latter amendment was connected with an important constitutional question. T h e regulation of employment practices was at this time a paramount issue in industrial relations. T o permit a discussion of the problem during the period of contract negotiations about to take place on a national scale was courting danger. It was foreseen that the parties would be unable to arrive at agreements and that disputes would have to be submitted to arbitration. T h e powers of arbitrators to impose the terms of original contracts had not yet been made clear, but with these powers as elastic as they were, there was a danger that the arbitrators might proceed to decide upon employment practices. This would mean, in effect, a preemption of the legislative prerogative. For that reason, despite its traditional opposition to governmental interference in industrial relations, the Senate insisted on the two month extension of existing contracts, feeling that by the end of that period the regulation of employment practices would have been settled by the legislature. T h e Act of January xi, 1938, passed in the form given it by the Senate. It extended the arbitration system as well as existing collective contracts until February 28, 1938. 1 5

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The "Statut Moderne du Travail" and the Bill on the Arbitration System In view of his failure to achieve a voluntary agreement between labor and management, Chautemps laid plans to introduce into the legislature a series of six bills to constitute a "Modern Labor C o d e " ("Statut Moderne du Travail"). 1 8 An initial interruption in these plans occurred 011 January' 14, 1938, because of a ministerial crisis. This time the crisis was provoked by the Communists, who demanded a more rigorous control over monetary exchange than Chautemps could accept. In addition, they denounced the government's use of force in strikes that had recently taken place, particularly in the Goodrich tire plant. T h e crisis ended when a new government was formed, with Chautemps again as Premier but with a cabinet very different in composition from its predecessors. In the third ministry since June, 1936, no Socialists were represented; the cabinet consisted only of Radical Socialists and representatives of two Popular Front splinter parties. 17 The new cabinet, however, meant no break in policy on the proposed labor reforms. On January 27, the six bills were introduced in the Chamber. 1 8 Only the bill reforming and making permanent the system of compulsory conciliation and arbitration was eventually to pass. In a radio address, Chautemps made clear that the proposed code stemmed in part from the government's preoccupation with the threat from across the Rhine and from the need for national unity in the face of "too certain danger." T h e code was designed, he said, to meet the new labor problems that had arisen because of the development of industrial relations 011 a collective basis in the months since June, 1936. 1 9 Apart from the reforms proposed for the arbitration system, the code included bills providing for the establishment of government placement bureaus, the regulation of employment and dismissal practices, and a definition of the rights and duties of shop stewards. In addition, it included the plan that had been announced earlier to "democratize" strikes by making a strike vote mandatory, with an affirmative vote leading to a compulsory shutdown of the factory.

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A final measure provided for a temporary blanket collective agreem e n t to b e drawn u p for each industry and to be applied during any contract negotiations period w h e n the parties were unable to agree on a contract. Under the proposed code, the arbitration system was to b e set up on a permanent basis, with several important changes. It was planned to simplify and accelerate the procedures, to make appeals possible and to meet the problem of enforcing decisions. Since the arbitration system was due to expire on February 28, 1938, unless renewed or replaced by a permanent law, the bill on the arbitration system was the most urgent item of the proposed code. 20 For that reason, immediate attention was directed to it in Parliament. It cannot be recorded that Parliament passed the proposed arbitration bill without resistance. 21 T h e opposition, for the most part, was not based on the results that had been achieved by the system, b u t stemmed from political motives. Proposed technical modifications that on the surface appeared minor assumed large proportions because of the hostile, obstructionist spirit in which they were offered. Disagreements over the bill appeared as early as the C h a m b e r Labor C o m m i t t e e hearings a n d continued at every subsequent stage. In all, five trips back and forth from C h a m b e r to Senate and six considerations in each house were required before final agreem e n t could be reached. A deputy's quip was quite pertinent: an important feature had been omitted from the bill—conciliation and arbitration procedures for the t w o assemblies. 22 Chautemps, w h o had announced that he would stake his office on the passage of the bill, found it necessary on six separate occasions—four times in t h e Senate and twice in the C h a m b e r — t o remind the legislators of that warning before the bill finally passed. 23 The Permanent Machinery: the Act of March 4, 1938 Under the A c t of M a r c h 4, 1938, the compulsory arbitration system became permanent, while at the same time several important changes in the machinery were introduced. 2 4 T h e new law and the decrees that followed simplified the procedures, partially delimited the powers of the arbitrators and established an appeal

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jurisdiction. In addition, important changes in methods of adjusting wages to prices were introduced, which will be discussed separately in a later chapter. The new law attempted to encourage the inclusion of autonomous compulsory arbitration procedures in all contracts by stipulating that henceforth contracts would have to include such procedures in order to be eligible for administrative extension throughout an industry under the terms of the 1936 collective bargaining act. Only where these were not written into a contract would governmental procedures apply. This attempt to encourage autonomous contractual procedures was designed to ensure wider respect for the arbitration system and to counter the charge of excessive state intervention in industrial relations. Nothing barred the parties, however—as generally turned out to be the case—from stipulating in their contract, or at the time a dispute arose, that the official system was to be used. Accordingly, the latter soon overshadowed the contractual procedures in importance.26 The major procedural change, applicable to both the contractual and the official procedures, was aimed at accelerating the operation of the system. The three stage process was formally scrapped in favor of a single conciliation stage. The governmental procedures retained the Departmental Conciliation Boards, with an alternative stage possible for disputes of special importance—a National Conciliation Board (commission nationale de conciliation) for each industry. Under the contractual procedures, a Joint Conciliation Board (commission pantaire de conciliation) was to be designated by the parties in their contract and was to be presided over by the prefect or his representative. The two arbitration stages were retained as before, the first stage consisting of a two-man arbitration board representing labor and management, and the second, almost always necessary, consisting of a single umpire. Whereas formerly no time limit had been prescribed for the final arbitration decision, it was now stipulated that all disputes were to be settled in one month's time and that each phase was not to exceed one week. The method of selecting arbitrators and umpires was changed somewhat from the earlier system, with different rules for the offi-

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cial procedures and for the contractual procedures. The former may be summarized first: Official procedures—selection of initial arbitrators: Separate labor and management panels of ten names each were to be drawn up annually by the First President of the Court of Appeals in the area. These panels were to be based on nominations by the prefect, who was to have consulted the employer and labor organizations in the Department. If in a dispute one or both of the parties failed to name an arbitrator two days after a conciliation board had announced its failure to arrange an agreement, the prefect would make the selection from these panels. In more important disputes, where a national conciliation board was involved, the Minister of Labor was to make the selection from panels that were to consist of sixty names each, drawn up by the permanent committee of the National Economic Council. Official procedures—selection of umpires: If the initial labor and management arbitrators were unable to choose a final umpire, the choice was to be made by the Minister of Labor (formerly it had been made by the Premier) under the conditions prescribed by the 1936 Act: he was to be selected from the active or retired members of the important state bodies. No provision, incidentally, was made for recommended panels of umpires to be drawn up by the labor and management organizations, as under the original system. The restriction of government selections to the category of "important state bodies" was considered sufficient. Moreover, it was hoped that the parties would name their own panels of umpires under the contractual procedures. The prescribed contractual procedures may be described briefly. Each party, at the time of concluding the collective contract, was required to name an arbitrator as well as alternates for the duration of the contract. In addition, every contract was to include a panel of five umpires acceptable to both parties. If the latter were unable to draw up such a panel within a month's time after the signing of their contract, the panel was to be prepared or completed by the First President of the Court of Appeals in the area, after consultation with the prefect of the Department. When in

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a dispute the initial arbitrators were unable to choose a final umpire, the government would make the choice from this panel. The selecting official would be the prefect or, in disputes involving more than one Department or more than 1,000 workers, the Minister of Labor. As in the earlier system, the rules for establishing panels of arbitrators and umpires, as well as for making selections in both procedures, again represented a struggle in Parliament between those who desired to entrust these functions to the judiciary and those who wished to place them in the hands of the executive branch. Under the compromise adopted, both the judiciary and the executive were to play a part in the preparation and completion of the panels; the executive alone, however (the Minister of Labor or the prefects), would appoint the arbitrators and final umpires whenever governmental appointments became necessary. Perhaps the most important change of the 1938 Act was the creation of an appeal body—the Higher Court of Arbitration (COUT Superieure d'Arbitrage). While agreement prevailed during the debates on the need for an appeal procedure, there was disagreement over the agency to be employed and the types of appeal permissible. The government's original plan called for a special section of the Council of State to exercise the review power, but there were those who sought to have the function entrusted to the ordinary law courts. However, a third point of view prevailed. The problems in labor law created by the arbitration system and by the new pattern of collective labor relations, it was decided, required a new type of court; or as one deputy succinctly stated: "A matiere nouvelle, juridiction nouvelle!" 26 Accordingly, an entirely new and important tribunal was created—the Higher Court of Arbitration. Within its field of jurisdiction, that of collective labor relations, it was supreme; as such it took its place beside the two other high appellate courts of the land—the Council of State, supreme in matters of administrative and public law, and the COUT de Cassation, supreme in all other law.27 The new court was to consist of eight members, only seven of whom might sit at any one time: the vice-president of the Council

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of State as ex officio presiding officer; a section president of the Council of State, w h o would also serve as substitute presiding officer; two magistrates of the C o u n c i l of State (conseillers d'Etat) ; two magistrates from the higher judiciary; and two high civil service officials. If both the vice-president and the section president of the Council of State were present at a session, one of the other members of the Council of State was to abstain from participation so that that body might not have too preponderant a representation in proportion to the other categories. In April, 1938, the following members of the C o u r t were named: Georges Pichat, vicepresident of the Council of State (as President); Paul GrünebaumBallin, president of the labor section of the Council of State; Albert Delfau and M . Loriot, councillors of State; Edmond Scherdlin, of the Cour de Cassation; Joseph Sens-Olive, a retired magistrate of the same court; Gabriel Zaigue, retired quartermaster-general; and Cyrille Grimpret, director in the Ministry of Public Works. Alternates were named as well. T h e Court was aided in its work by legal assistants drawn from the staff of the Council of State. Some of these served as rapporteurs, summarizing the facts in each case; and others as commissaires du gouvernement, or special masters, empowered to draw up a detailed recommendation to the Court as to what its decision ought to be. Whereas the final Court decisions were terse legal rulings, many of the recommendations by the commissaires du gouvernement were rich expositions reflecting an intimate familiarity not only with legal but with social and economic problems as well. M a n y of these commissaires had served as arbitrators during the early phase of the system; others, like Pierre Laroque, had also written on problems of labor relations. Although the membership of the new Court derived from three sources—the C o u n c i l of State, the higher judiciary and the higher civil service—the Council of State predominated. In a sense, this was fortunate, because the Council of State was well known for a greater flexibility and a greater sensitivity to social needs than the ordinär}· law courts. T h e Higher Court of Arbitration followed in its footsteps. T h e accomplishments of the Court won for it the widest respect. It did not escape the censure of organized labor en-

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tirely, as in the cases arising out of the general strike of November 30, 1938, and in the interpretation it gave to the wage clause of the 1938 Act, both of which are discussed in later chapters, but generally there was an appreciation that the Court reflected a social philosophy far more friendly to labor than the ordinary law courts with their more rigorously legalistic jurisprudence. T h e opinion was almost unanimous that the Court consistently endeavored to adopt practical and equitable solutions and that it tried to place human and social needs on a level with legal principles in its decisions.28 Between May 16, 1938, when its first decisions were rendered, and the summer of 1939, the Higher Court in exercising supreme judicial control over the arbitration system gave cohesion to the body of arbitration decisions and, in addition, clarified the many features of the arbitration system that had been left ambiguous and ill-defined by the lawmakers. 29 It must be noted that the new appeal body was set up to provide procedural safeguards, not to review the substance of decisions. Despite its name, the Court was not a higher arbitration board empowered to reexamine original arbitration decisions upon request. Arbitration decisions might be appealed only on grounds of "lack of jurisdiction, excess of power, or violation of the law." The arbitrators continued to have exclusive power to determine the facts in settling disputes. This appellate jurisdiction of the Court was not always clearly understood, particularly by the unions. 30 There was one exceptional procedure under which the Court might hear an appeal on the substance of a dispute. T h e Minister of Labor was empowered to request such a review if he deemed it "in the public interest." He was required in such a case to consult the permanent committee of the National Economic Council. In hearing such disputes, the Court was to be augmented by two labor and two employer representatives who were to be named in advance and were to be available when needed. If this exceptional procedure had been used excessively, it might have altered the nature of the arbitration system as well as the work of the Court. N o arbitration decision would have been considered final and the Minister of Labor would have been subjected to continued pressure to submit

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appeals. The government, however, early revealed that it would resist such importunities and the procedure became exceedingly rare.31 By the nature of its duties, the work of the Higher Court was devoted principally to procedural refinements and safeguards. In this it made an important contribution in clarifying the legal powers of the arbitrators. In all cases where irregularities were found, it voided the decision in question and named a new umpire. If the decision of this second umpire were also annulled, a special procedure was provided: a rapporteur associated with the Court was to prepare a decision which, once endorsed by the Court, was final and not subject to further appeal.32 Another reform of the 1938 Act attempted to limit somewhat the powers of the arbitrators. As has been noted, labor disputes are often differentiated in technical usage as disputes over "rights," or legal disputes, and disputes over "interests," or economic disputes. Under the 1936 Act no differentiation had been made and arbitrators were left free to settle both types of cases as they saw fit. As a result, they could even decide legal disputes on the basis of equity and individual opinion. Some abuses had crept in, although generally the arbitrators were careful about drawing the distinction. The new act, however, established a formal differentiation. The arbitrators were henceforth to decide "according to the rules of law in all collective labor disputes of a legal nature" and "in equity in the case of all other collective labor disputes, especially those of an economic nature." The act categorized as "legal" disputes all disputes relating to the interpretation and enforcement of collcctivc contracts as well as those arising out of labor laws.33 One problem remained unsettled. The new act failed to delimit the jurisdiction of the arbitration system, largely because the legislators found it extremely difficult to write a legal definition of a "collective" dispute.34 But a step was taken to prevent questions of jurisdiction from interfering with the operation of the svstem. Originally, the government had planned to have special boards set up to decide on the nature of contested disputes. That plan was abandoned, however, for it would have involved additional dc-

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lays when everyone was interested in speeding up the system. Instead, under a provision of the 1938 Act, arbitrators were to decide in a separate decision within three days time whether a dispute was "collective" (and therefore, within their jurisdiction) before they might proceed to an award on the dispute proper. This provision, however, soon proved unsatisfactory and was later repealed under the November, 1938, decree laws. It then became optional for arbitrators to decide on their jurisdiction, the final authority in contested decisions resting with the Higher Court. T h e Higher Court eventually elaborated a working definition of a collective dispute, establishing two criteria. First, a labor group— not necessarily a union—had to be party to the dispute. Secondly, the issues in the dispute had to involve the collective interests of this group. T h e Court made clear that the dismissal of a union official or a shop steward was to be considered a collective dispute if the dismissal seemed to be influenced in any way by a consideration of the worker's union function. In that case, rights and interests common to the whole group were held to be involved. 35 T h e labor unions were well satisfied with the principle established by the Court on this question. A final feature of the 1938 Act must be mentioned. It provided that an arbitration award modifying the wage schedule of a sector of an industry might be extended by administrative decree throughout the entire industry if the "most representative" labor and management organizations were involved, as under the procedures governing the extension of collective contracts. T h e new arrangement seemed justified as a logical complement to the extension provision of the collective bargaining law. Under that provision, employers were able to obtain the extension of their wage schedules throughout the entire industry and so prevent competitors from paying lower wages. It now became possible to extend new wage schedules set up by an arbitration award in the same way. A number of important arbitration decisions were extended by the government in subsequent months under this provision. 36 A comparison of the permanent system with the temporary indicates important differences, although the fundamental principle

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of the 1936 A c t remained untouched. All disputes in industry and commerce were still to be submitted to conciliation and arbitration before any strike or lockout—either through contractual or governmental procedures. A serious effort had been made to remedy the major faults disclosed by experience. Technically, the procedure was simplified and accelerated, with only one conciliation stage before arbitration and with a theoretical maximum time limit of one week for each phase and one month for the entire process. T h e powers of the arbitrators were more sharply defined. Perhaps the most significant innovation was the creation of the Higher Court of Arbitration, which, as the supreme arbiter of the system, would guarantee homogeneity to the ever growing body of arbitration decisions and would clarify such matters as had been left ambiguous by the arbitration laws. T h a t an impressive number of such issues had been unforeseen or had been left unsettled, even under the permanent act, can be ascribed to the emergency circumstances under which the compulsory arbitration system was introduced in the country and the haphazard way in which it was renewed. As Part I has attempted to demonstrate, the original system, set up under the 1936 Act and twice renewed, was not a planned experiment but an expedient adopted to meet continued labor unrest. Although the permanent act adopted in 1938 attempted to remedy the most glaring faults of the original system, it still failed to clarify a good many points and itself introduced a number of new problems, which will become evident in the description that follows in Part II of the operation of both the original and the permanent system.

Part II THE SYSTEM IN OPERATION: PROBLEMS AND RESULTS 6. Wage Adjustments under the 1936 Act THE second part of this study is concerned with the problems that arose in the operation of the arbitration system and the general results. Among the aspects to be examined are the methods of adjusting wages to rising prices; the effect on "the right to strike" and on the actual strike record; the applicability of the system to the negotiation of initial contracts; the enforcement of arbitration decisions; and, finally, the role of the system in the aftermath of the November 30, 1938, general strike. Of all the problems that developed in the operation of the system, those relating to wage adjustments fell most distinctly into two separate phases. In the original system, the arbitrators enjoyed virtually complete liberty in adjusting wages to rising prices. Under the 1938 Act, however, a wage adjustment formula was adopted that left considerably less discretion to the arbitrators. Because of this marked difference between the two phases, separate treatment is first given to wage adjustments under the 1936 Act. 1 The Powers and Problems of the Arbitrators under the Original System

So broad and extensive were the powers assigned to the arbitrators originally under the 1936 Act that it would be only a slight exaggeration to say they enjoyed complete independence in all matters, including wage adjustments. Legally endowed with the powers of "amiables compositeurs"—the authority to render decisions on the basis of "equity"—they were to accord justice to the parties that came before them, with regard only for the mutual rights of both sides and the interests of the nation as a whole. As

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one arbitrator summed up his mission: "Equity as a goal; my conscience as a guide. In brief, Saint Louis under his oak tree." 2 Free agents in the crucial matter of wage adjustments, the arbitrators were guided only by the reference in the law to wage disputes developing out of an "appreciable" rise in the cost of living and the implication that they were to grant compensatory wage adjustments. Beyond the implicit requirement that they determine whether such a cost of living rise had occurred, they were under no restrictions. They were to use their own discretion on so important a question as the extent of the wage adjustment to be made. In practice, the arbitrators were handicapped in making a precisc evaluation of the cost of living rise by the unreliability and inadequacy of existing cost of living indexes.3 Under the system in effect at the time the arbitration law was adopted, regional cost of living commissions prepared a separate index for each of the Departments, using a budget for "a working class family of four," with 1930 as a base year. The budget employed was uniform in its major outlines (food, 60 per cent; heat and light, 5 per cent; rent, 10 per cent; clothing, 15 per cent; and miscellaneous expenses, 10 per cent), but some option was permitted the commissions within these divisions. T h e index was based on a sampling of prices in the first two weeks of the period in question. Until January, 1937, it was reported semiannually, in May and November. Thereafter, because of the increased importance of cost of living statistics after the introduction of the arbitration system, the commissions were ordered to report the indexes quarterly—in February, May, August and November. T h e record of these indexes for the period January, 1935, to August, 1939, appears in Table 4 on page 30. Unfortunately, the cost of living commissions included only a small number of statisticians and other experts, and consisted largely of labor, employer and government representatives, the composition often varying with the political coloration of the Department. Although a central cost of living commission existed, it exercised little technical coordination or supervision over the Departmental units. As might have been expected, therefore, considerable diversity existed in methods of observing and sampling prices. T o make

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matters worse, indexes were being reported in 1937 for only fifty of the ninety French Departments. Besides the index drawn up by these commissions, a separate index was drawn up quarterly in Paris, Bordeaux and Marseilles by municipal commissions, a practice that was not discontinued until 1939 (see Table 4 on page 30). These indexes had the advantage of using an average of prices over the preceding quarter, as against the sampling of prices at the beginning of each quarter employed by the Departmental indexes. Some arbitrators used them in preference to the first type. Between 1937 and 1939 the operation of the compulsory arbitration system gave continued emphasis to the need to reform the system of statistical reporting. Some improvement became especially imperative when the permanent system was established in 1938 because wage adjustments were then made legally dependent on variations in the cost of living indexes. At that time, an observer noted: "It is not the least merit of the present law [the 1938 Act] that it has caused the public authorities to interest themselves more actively in methods of reporting the cost of living." * As a major step toward improving the indexes, the 1938 Act directed that a new higher commission (commission superieure du coüt de la vie) be set up, consisting of technical experts, to supervise and control the Departmental cost of living commissions. In addition, commissions were to be established in every Department where one did not already exist. From the new regulations, which were implemented by the decree of April 3, 1938, a measure of improvement resulted. The new higher commission exercised some corrective control over the indexes, and, in addition, by September, 1939, a cost of living commission was functioning and reporting in every Department except one.5 Unfortunately, nothing was done to alter the composition of the cost of living commissions. A minor change was made by a decree in November, 1938, permitting the appointment of specially qualified technicians to supplement the commissions in all Departments of over one million inhabitants.® The commissions, however, never came to consist exclusively of impartial technicians and statisticians, and remained

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highly susceptible to local political pressure. There were those who deplored the use of these cost of living indexes as a basis for wage adjustments under the arbitration system, especially in connection with the 1938 Act. 7 Although the available indexes were inadequate, arbitrators had little difficulty in 1937 in discerning an appreciable rise in living costs since the spring of 1936. As indicated in Table 4 (page 30), by May, 1937, the nationwide cost of living index (an average of all Departments reporting) had risen from 80.3 in May, 1936, to 99.4, an increase of 24 per cent in twelve months. Between May, 1937, and February, 1938, the index rose to 113.2, a rise of 14 per cent over a period of eight months. Thus, in the twenty months between June, 1936, about the time of the Matignon agreement, and February, 1938, the approximate terminal date of the first phase of the arbitration system, the cost of living index rose from 80.3 to 1 1 3 . 2 , a rise of 41 per cent, or the equivalent of a 2 per cent rise per month. When it is recalled, as one arbitrator had occasion to point out, that during the depression years, 1 9 3 1 - 3 5 , the cost of living index dropped at the approximate rate of 2 per cent per year, the meaning of this monthly climb can be appreciated. 8 An examination of the movement of retail prices for the same period (May, 1936 to February, 1938) reveals an even more striking rise: for Paris, the index rose from 459 to 692, an increase of 51 per cent. T h e index for 300 other industrial cities rose from 429 to 641, an increase of 49 per cent (see Table 5, page 3 1 ) . That the retail price index registered a steeper rise than the cost of living index was to be expected because the latter included rent as 10 per cent of the total budget—an item that was held down by legal controls. Although the rise in the cost of living during these months as a general phenomenon was indisputable, the arbitrators felt it incumbent upon them to calculate this rise for the particular region concerned and for the period since the wages in question had last been fixed. They generally decided that a cost of living increase of about 5 per cent, observable over a few months period of time and evidencing more than a seasonal or transitory quality, constituted

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ACT

an "appreciable" rise within the meaning of the law and warranted a wage adjustment. 9 Once this was established, the arbitrators were confronted with three difficult problems. First, what kind of an adjustment—complete or partial—ought they make to the rise in the cost of living? Second, should their decisions be retroactive; and if so, to what date? And third, how handle requests for a sliding wage scale to protect real wages against future price rises? Methods of Adjusting Wages to the Rise in the Cost of Living

Although the discretion permitted to the arbitrators under the 1936 Act yielded considerable diversity in the answers to these questions, certain general tendencies emerged. An examination of the first two hundred decisions between January, 1937, and May, 1937, reveals that ninety-nine dealt with one or more of these issues, with the following results: 1 0 1. Requests for Wage Adjustments to Cost of Living Rise Granted—complete Granted—partial Refused 2. Requests for Retroactivity Granted—in varying degrees Refused 3. Requests for Sliding Wage Scale for Future Adjustments Granted—automatic Granted—limited Refused

99 9 88 2 78 56 22 17 ο 7 1ο

From these results, which were typical of the first phase of the system, 11 three conclusions emerge: First, the arbitrators refused to grant complete adjustments to the rise in living costs, but granted partial adjustments in almost every case. Second, although considerably divided on the question of retroactivity, they inclined toward granting it in some form. Third, they unanimously refused to grant an automatic sliding wage scale for future adjustments.

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One decisive consideration seemed to dictate the attitudes of the arbitrators on all three questions—the desire to prevent a race between wages and prices. In one of the earliest awards rendered, the arbitrator, Professor William Oualid, of the University of Paris Law Faculty, succinctly summarized the position later adopted in some form by almost every one of the arbitrators: Although a wage increase is justified from the fact that there has been an appreciable rise in the cost of living, it would be impossible to permit an immediate and complete parallel movement between retail prices and wages without condemning the economy to an instability that would be incompatible with business activity and without entering into an endless, uninterrupted race between wages and prices. . . . An inflationary situation [would result] in which the workers would be the first to suffer, for no matter how frequently wages are revised, they will still lag considerably behind price rises.12 A minority sentiment summarized by one arbitrator, Robert Mossc, a professor in the University of Grenoble, denied that a parallel movement between prices and wages had to be feared. A 20 per cent increase in the cost of living, he argued, ought to be met by a 20 per cent wage increase. Since in most industries labor comprised no more than 50 per cent of total costs, he maintained that the 20 per cent wage increase would lead to a new rise in prices, not of 20 per cent, but at most of 10 per cent. A new wage increase of 10 per cent might lead to a price increase of 5 per cent; a 5 per cent rise in wages to a 2% per cent rise in prices, and so forth. Eventually, after a few such adjustments, a point of stabilization would be reached. 13 But the overwhelming majority of arbitrators rejected this attitude. Raising wages in exact proportion to prices, they argued, would sustain and accelerate price rises—if only for psychological reasons. Even if prices did not rise indefinitely, there was no way of predicting the level at which stabilization might be reached. They insisted, like Professor Oualid, that complete wage adjustments, without any guarantee of increased production, would be a sure road to inflation. T h e arbitrators, accordingly, rarely granted a wage increase equal

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to the increase recorded by the cost of living indexes. The average compensation, it has been estimated, ranged from one-half to twothirds of the percentage rise in the cost of living. 14 In a typical case, where the cost of living was up 19.3 per cent, the arbitrator granted a 1 2 per cent wage increase. 15 A "coefficient of security," as one arbitrator termed it, was established—"a kind of insurance for the nation against excessive prise rises." 14 T h e arbitrators' solutions in the matter of retroactivity also were extremely important. For obvious reasons, a substantial period of time had to elapse before an arbitration award could be made. T h e slowness of the procedures further aggravated the situation. T h e unions, therefore, almost invariably included demands that their wage increases be made retroactive, either to the date on which the new cost of living index had appeared or to the date on which the wage request had first been formulated. Most arbitrators agreed that it was unfair not to grant retroactivity in some form. They pointed out that otherwise employers would benefit from a combination of stationary labor costs and rising selling prices while the procedures were under way. Furthermore, the absence of retroactivity would place a premium on obstructionist tactics by employers. T h e majority of arbitrators, however, opposed making decisions completely retroactive on the ground that such a practice would encourage the dangerous parallelism between wages and prices that everyone wished to avoid. As Andre Siegfried noted in one decision: " T h e adjustment that it is reasonable to expect cannot be automatic; on principle, it ought to involve a certain delay—even if only symbolic—of wages in relation to prices." 17 Complete retroactivity, furthermore, was considered unfair to the employer who had estimated the price of his product on the basis of lower labor costs. T h e majority, therefore, granted retroactivity, but of a limited nature. A variety of dates were employed, ranging from the time the wage request was first initiated to the date on which arbitration was first requested. Several arbitrators adopted special techniques, some insisting on reduced rates of increase (often on a diminishing scale) for the retroactive pay; others permitted it to be paid in

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several installments. A minority of the arbitrators refused retroactivity requests altogether and insisted that the adjustment go into effect on the date of the decision or even at a later date, such as the next pay day after the award. 1 8 T h e diversity of opinion on retroactivity brought a trail of criticism. It moved one critic to remark that the problem was of such fundamental importance that it ought to be decided by law and not by each individual arbitrator. 19 T h e situation eventually was remedied by the 1938 Act, when decisions were made automatically retroactive to the date on which the dispute was first submitted to the conciliation procedures. Although that solution tended to shorten the period of direct negotiations, it at least prevented the slowness of the system itself from interfering with adjustments once the procedures were initiated. T h e third problem faced by the arbitrators arose from union demands for sliding wage scales. Here the same reasons that militated against complete wage adjustments to price rises and against fully retroactive awards operated even more forcefully. T h e principle of permitting wages to vary automatically as a function of the cost of living had been rejected, it will be recalled, at the time of the Currency A c t of 1936. T h e unions, however, continued to demand it, either through collective bargaining pressure or through the arbitration procedures. B u t not a single arbitrator proved receptive to a request for a fully automatic sliding wage scale. T h e principal objection was again on inflationary grounds, although several arbitrators, in addition, stressed that it would be unfair to employers, who would have no advance assurances of their labor costs. A number of arbitrators were willing to grant a partial sliding scale, that is, permit partial wage adjustments to future price rises. In such cases, the arbitrators stipulated the m a x i m u m frequency with which the adjustments were to be made and the change in the cost of living index that would be required. 20 W h i l e the interests of the national economy were the principal factor that barred complete wage adjustments, a second consideration, the rights of employers, had important weight too. "Les poss i b i l i t y des entreprises"—the capacity of the companies in

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question to absorb a wage increase—became a standard consideration in the arbitration decisions. Despite the complexities involved, the arbitrators diligently inquired into the relative importance of cost factors in the particular industry. They tried to consider the effects of a wage rise upon prices and profits, seeking to determine, for example, how higher prices might affect the ability of the enterprise to compete in the national and international market as well as how, under given conditions of elasticity, higher prices might affect consumer demand. Efforts were made to take into account the financial resources of the industry, its capitalization, margin of return and similar aspects.21 The arbitrators were not always experts in such matters and, moreover, they lacked any power of independent inquiry, such as the authority to subpoena documents. For these reasons they had to rely upon the employers to fumish the relevant documents, although the law guaranteed the labor representatives the right to examine and question all such documents. Despite their unwillingness to grant complete wage adjustments to rising prices, the arbitrators did endeavor to protect minimum wages against rising living costs. The conception of a minimum wage had received initial sanction from the Matignon agreement and from the collective bargaining act of June 24, 1936, the latter requiring the inclusion of minimum wage scales for the various job categories in all collective contracts. In their arbitration decisions, many of the arbitrators did not confine themselves to the minimum base wages in the collective contract, but used a "minimum vital," which was interpreted both as a minimum subsistence wage—the wage needed to keep a worker and his family alive—and as a minimum living wage—the wage needed to guarantee a certain standard of living to the worker.22 The ambivalent interpretation of the minimum vital at this stage foreshadowed problems that arose in connection with the wage adjustment formula under the 1938 Act. Closely connected with the minimum wage in arbitration practice was the question of family allowances. These allowances, originally introduced in France under the Act of March 1 1 , 1932, in order to encourage larger families, were financed through joint contributions by the employers and the government. There was consider-

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able diversity in the sums paid out since the law prescribed only a minimum and a maximum rate. 23 T h e arbitrators were extremely generous in their decisions, out of a feeling that these allowances were part of the minimum subsistence sums urgently required by workers with families. They almost unanimously accorded increases on these family allowances and often granted a higher percentage increase than for the actual wage. 24 Another item high on the arbitrators' problem list was the task of determining the most equitable method of granting wage increases to the various categories of workers (skilled, semiskilled, unskilled, apprentices, women workers, etc.). Some arbitrators granted a uniform increase to all categories on the basis that "each worker—whatever his category—has the same consumption needs and suffers from increased living costs to the same degree." 2S Others insisted that a higher wage increase was necessary for the lowest paid categories because a higher proportion of their wage went for food and other physical needs. A third group raised the objection of wage leveling. They pointed out that a higher increase to the lower paid workers, or even a uniform flat sum increase to all categories, would have the deleterious effect of leveling wages— that is, decrease the wage differential between skilled and unskilled workers. This might reduce incentive for self-improvement and indirectly cause a scarcity of skilled workers. 28 T h e phenomenon of wage leveling was an object of considerable concern in France. Principally because of the elevation of wages at the bottom of the scale, a leveling trend had been going on ever since the first World W a r and had become especially pronounccd in the years after 1935. T h e wages earned by semiskilled and unskilled workers were rising appreciably in proportion to the wages earned by skilled workers. T h e skilled metalworker, for example, who in 1 9 1 4 earned 47 per cent more than the unskilled worker, in 1938 earned only 29 per cent more. 21 In this phase the majority of arbitrators tended to take the leveling threat into consideration by generally awarding increases on a percentage basis. This was designed to prevent wage leveling, since the lower paid worker then received a smaller money sum as an increase than the higher paid worker. There was a strong minority,

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8l

however, who insisted on granting higher increases to the lower paid workers.28 T h e problem was left unsettled at the time and assumed even greater significance in connection with the 1938 Act. The Results: the Paris Metallurgical Workers and other Examples

Since wage adjustments did not fully correspond to cost of living increases, the average 12 per cent increase in wage rates acquired as a result of the Matignon agreement in June, 1936, could hardly be protected against rising prices by the arbitration system. W h a t actually happened in a number of instances, especially in the case of the Paris metallurgical workers, may be demonstrated. T h e experience of the Paris metallurgical union with the arbitration system is of considerable importance, because this organization, under strong Communist influence, with a membership of about 350,000 in 1937, was the most militant and most aggressive of all the French unions. T h a t it exploited the arbitration system to the maximum and extracted all possible benefits from it is not surprising. A wage dispute involving this union was one of the first submitted to the arbitration system. In November, 1936, just before the arbitration law went into effect, the union had raised demands for a 1 5 per cent wage increase to compensate for the increase in living costs since May, 1936. When the demand was rejected, the union threatened a strike and held token work stoppages. Once the arbitration system was in effect, the dispute was submitted to it. T h e arbitrator was Professor William Oualid, mentioned above, who was well known for his labor sympathies and whose name had been suggested for the panel of arbitrators by the C G T . It was at this time, on February 7, 1937, that Professor Oualid rendered the important decision referred to previously, in which he denied full wage compensation for the increase in living costs on the ground that such a course would promote an inflationary spiral. Although he conceded the union's claim that the cost of living had gone up by about 1 5 per cent between May and December, 1936, he granted a wage adjustment of only 8.5 per cent, or less than three-fifths of the price rise. In his decision, he admitted that this adjustment "undoubtedly [did] not restore to the workers the strict equivalent of their

82

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purchasing power of June, 1936," when, as a result of Matignon and the collective contract that followed, wages had been increased on an average of 12 per cent. But he insisted that in the longer run, his decision was for the workers' benefit because of the need to prevent a runaway inflation that would harm labor as much as everyone else.29 T h e union was infuriated at the small wage increase granted. T o make matters worse, prices had risen still further between November, 1936, when it had originally made its demand, and February, 1937, when the decision was rendered. And in addition, only partial retroactivity had been granted—to the date on which arbitration had first been requested. In the course of its protest the union won from Blum, who was then Premier, one concession. Because of the price rise since the initial request, the union was permitted to ask for a new adjustment through the prescribed channels. T h e union did this, and in March, 1937, a second wage adjustment was granted. Subsequently, in October and in December, 1937, the union received two additional wage increases from arbitrators, making a total of four wage adjustments through arbitration decisions in 1937ζ 10 How did these adjustments compare to the increase in the cost of living in the Paris area? In order to understand the wage adjustments that were made, it must be noted that the forty hour week went into effect in the Paris metallurgical industry in December, 1936. Guaranteeing the workers the same compensation for a forty hour week as they hitherto had earned for a forty-eight hour week, it meant a 20 per cent hourly wage increase, although no increase in actual weekly wages earned for the worker who was already fully employed. As Table 6 indicates, after the introduction of the forty hour week, the four arbitration decisions increased hourly wages 21 to 30 per cent, depending on the category of worker. If one includes the 20 per cent increase due to the change from the fortyeight to the forty hour week, the increase in the hourly wage rate is considerably higher—45 to 56 per cent. But this has to be given separate consideration, since it does not represent an increase in weekly wages actually received. 31

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i - g< _ 1-8 «*I 3 C« 8ai 8s*·l«üä ΰ: j §β»a »i- · · fci* S^ Si ^ ^--o 8« .c η: Εο Jrΐ ^cβG e toEa^'T'^'iifpSE s sistence wage was being replaced by contract base wages and prevailing wages. Either of these was more practical and one or the other ought to have been prescribed originally by the law. The Interpretation of Article 10: other Problems There was another major question connected with the wage adjustment clause that required clarification. In the operation of Article

96

WAGE ADJUSTMENTS

UNDER T H E 1 9 3 8

ACT

10, three different wages were involved for any given category of workers such as electricians or manual laborers: first, the minimum base wage in the collective contract below which wages might not legally fall; second, the wage actually being paid ("salaire effectif"), that is, the minimum base wage supplemented by increases resulting from experience on the job, seniority, additional skill acquired, abnormal working hours, traveling requirements, etc.; and third, the minimum vital, the portion of the wage that represented, in the definition adopted by the Court, "the minimum the worker must receive in order to keep alive." In addition, each minimum base wage as well as each wage actually being paid had to be considered as made up of two components: a portion corresponding to the minimum vital and a portion representing everything above that subsistence minimum. The question that arose was whether the wage increment, computed on the basis of the minimum vital and the rise in the cost of living, was to be added to the minimum base wage in the collective contract, or to the wage actually being paid. If on the question of the minimum vital the Court did what it could to protect labor, such was not the case here. The Court decided that for any given category of workers the increase was to be added only to the minimum base wage in the collective contract and to those wages that were not already higher than what this new increased minimum would be. This complicated ruling can best be made clear by the following theoretical example, adapted from one prepared by an official of the Court. 28 This illustration, incidentally, in most details concretely demonstrates the operation of the wage adjustment formula, at least before two modifications made in 1939: 1. Given the following wages: a. Minimum vital fixed by the arbitrator for a given job category 800 francs b. Minimum base wage in the existing collective agreement for that category 1,000 francs c. Wages actually being paid in that category 1,000, 1,050, 1,100 francs 2. The Departmental cost of living index has risen 10 per cent since the date of the last adjustment.

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3. The employers fail to produce proof that the industry cannot absorb a wage increase in full proportion to this cost of living increase. 4. A 10 per cent wage increase is in order. It is calculated on the basis of the minimum vital: 800 X

— 80 francs 100 5. This increase of 80 francs is added to the minimum base wage in the existing collective agreement: 1,000 + 80 = 1,080 6. What happens to other wages actually being paid? They are raised to the new minimum of 1,080, if below it. They are not raised at all if already equal to or above it. 7. Wages actually being paid after the mandatory increase, therefore, would be 1,080, 1,080, 1,100 francs Thus, some workers—those who had been earning more than the minimum base wage for reasons such as seniority, experience or additional skill acquired on the job—were not entitled to any wage increase despite the rise in the cost of living. The procedure arose out of an understandable desire to avoid penalizing those employers who had granted increases above the prescribed base wages in the collective contract,27 but the results were manifestly unfair to many workers. As might have been expected, the unions denounced the Court's ruling and described it as an attempt "to make minimum wages maximum wages." It was their turn now to raise the charge of wage leveling, which was well-founded so far as this ruling was concerned.28 The complaint of the unions over this aspect of the procedures was never satisfied.29 There was still another important consideration governing wage adjustments. The minimum vital was to be adjusted in full proportion to the rise in the cost of living "unless," the law provided, "there be brought proof that this adjustment is incompatible with the economic conditions of the local, regional, or national branch of activity for which the adjustment request has been formulated." In such a case the adjustment was to be scaled down to a point compatible with these economic conditions. As the act was written, the burden of proof was placed upon industry, which is understandable, because the legislators were concerned primarily with protecting

98

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minimum wages against price rises. Unless there were truly exceptional conditions, therefore, the minimum vital was to be protected. During the debates on the bill, the Senate had tried unsuccessfully to make it obligatory upon arbitrators to consider the state of the "national economy" before making any wage adjustment. This was defeated as too convenient a loophole for the rejection of all increases. A second attempted amendment would have made the arbitrators consider the economic condition of the individual enterprise before granting a wage adjustment. This proposal was defeated because of the possibility that it might lead to union investigation of the financial condition of the firm—if not through the union, at least through the union-appointed arbitrator. Several indiscreet utterances on the part of Left spokesmen in Parliament and in the labor press during the debates lent credence to this possibility and reinforced the anxiety of the conservatives.30 Under the act as it finally passed, the industry, and not the individual firm, was to be considered—in its local, regional, or national setting, depending on the type of collective contract and wage request involved. As a further concession to conservative quarters, the documents to be produced in any given case were left to the option of the employers. These materials were to be submitted only to the two arbitrators and the umpire, and in the latter case each arbitrator was to be permitted an opportunity to refute the information submitted. The arbitrators, the umpire and any experts that might be called in were bound to professional secrecy. In practice, attention to the condition of the industry proved important. Although the arbitrators felt that their primary obligation was to adjust the minimum vital in full proportion to the rise in the cost of living, they did not hesitate to reduce the increase to be granted (the percentage rise in the cost of living index) when the industry demonstrated that it could not absorb the total increase. An example of such a reduction may be cited. In a decision previously noted, involving the metallurgical industry around Bethune and Arras in the Nord Department, the arbitrator, after calculating a 10.78 per cent increase in the cost of living in the Department since the last adjustment, scaled the wage increase down to 7 per

WAGE ADJUSTMENTS UNDER THE 1 9 3 8

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99

cent on the ground that: "the enterprises involved have been particularly affected by the depression, which has already led to a substantial reduction [in personnel]. . . . General expenses are such that profits have been considerably reduced, and the resources of the establishments are in such an embarrassed state that one of them as a consequence has had to cease operations." 3 1 In all such cases the Court would not review the findings of an arbitrator unless some procedural irregularity were alleged. The Final Wage Adjustment Formula

There were two minor changes in Article 10 in the months after the 1938 Act was passed. In November, 1938, a government decree equalized and regularized family allowances all over the country.32 A considerable increase was awarded, effective April 1, 1939, with the stipulation that arbitrators were no longer to increase family allowances in proportion to the rise in the cost of living as hitherto under Article 10. The same decree also required arbitrators to take into account the larger contribution that employers now had to make toward family allowances. Since the increase in contribution amounted on the average to about 3 per cent of wages paid, it made a substantial difference in the wage award. The Court, moreover, interpreted the provision strictly and decided that the added expenses had to be taken into full consideration in calculating the wage increase.33 The effect of the new provision on wage awards may be illustrated. In a decision involving the building workers at Lens, the arbitrator decided that the wage adjustment warranted by the rise in the cost of living (scaled down somewhat because of the industry's inability to absorb the full increase) was to be 10.8 per cent of the minimum vital. From this figure he deducted 3.8 per cent, which represented the increased expenses for the industry because of the new family allowances contribution, with the final result, a 7 per cent wage adjustment calculated on the minimum vital.3* In a decision in August, 1939, involving the Paris metallurgical workers, the arbitrator computed the rise in the cost of living as 8.69 per cent, reduced this percentage to a 5.8 per cent wage increase because

lOO

W A C E A D J U S T M E N T S UNDER T H E I 9 3 S

ACT

of the condition of the industry, and from this latter figure deducted the increased family allowances contribution of 2.3 per cent. The result was a wage adjustment on the minimum vital of 3.5 per cent instead of 8.69 per cent (the initial estimate of the rise in the cost of living)—and a storm of protest from labor! 35 The second change, the decree law of April 21, 1939, imposed another important restriction upon wage increases: arbitrators were to take into consideration compensation received for overtime work.36 This, the unions protested, meant payment of the same wages for longer hours, but their protests were of no avail.37 The final wage adjustment formula as it was operating in France on the eve of the war may be summarized as follows: Once an arbitrator found that the two prerequisites for a wage increase had been met (a lapse of six months since the last wage adjustment and a 5 per cent increase in the cost of living index), the following operations were necessary: 1. The exact rise in the cost of living (in percentage) had to be determined by comparing the latest cost of living index with the index that had appeared before the last adjustment of the wages in question. This yielded the percentage wage increase to be granted if other conditions were met. 2. The percentage was to be reduced, (a) if the industry proved that it could not absorb the full adjustment, (b) if there were increased expenses to the industry resulting from the new family allowances contribution after April, 1939, and (c) if overtime compensation was being received by the workers. 3. The workers were then to be divided into several broad categories and a minimum vital set for each category, with an explanation of each minimum. 4. The increment to be allotted was to be determined by multiplying the minimum vital in each category by the percentage wage increase decided upon in steps 1 and 2. 5. Finally, this increment was to be added to the minimum base wage in the collective contract and to those wages actually being paid that would not, with this increment, exceed the new minimum base wage. At that point the arbitrator might sit back and await the

WAGE A D J U S T M E N T S UNDER T H E 1 9 3 8

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ΙΟΙ

wrath of the union for all his pains! And if he had made any technical or procedural error, he might see his decision quashed by the Higher Court! It is no wonder that an observer on the eve of the war commented: The arbitrators are growing alarmed, and rightly, at the ever increasing complexity of their task. It is certainly no sinecure today to have to decide on a request for a wage increase. . . . [It involves] a series of delicate operations demanding a host of documents and a great deal of time and study.'8 If any doubt existed as to whether an automatic sliding wage scale had been adopted in March, 1938, it was dispelled by the interpretation of the Court and arbitration practice. A legal relationship between prices and wages had been established by the law —in theory, a sliding wage scale—but the conditions to be fulfilled and the manner in which wage increases were to be granted were so restrictive that no automatic relationship between prices and wages could result. T h e wage adjustment formula could not give protection to the real wages of the working class any more than the 1936 system. 39 Nor was it, any more than the earlier system, faithful to the spirit of the Matignon agreement, which had been designed to raise the purchasing power of labor as a major contribution to economic recovery. It is not surprising that in June, 1939, Alfred Lambert-Ribot, the French employer delegate to the International Labor Conference, expressed satisfaction with the trend of the new arbitration awards.40 So far as the unions were concerned, by 1939 their disappointment was profound. Although they had recognized shortcomings in the 1938 Act, they had looked upon it as a victory—as a partial conquest of the desired sliding wage scale. Even the initial disappointments they had met had not altered this conviction. T h e keynote report prepared in the summer of 1938 for the C G T congress, to be held in November, summed up this original attitude: The new law establishes a great principle: it affirms that the reward of the worker must be adequate for decent living conditions. It tends to remove wages from the fluctuations of economic activity; it can be a

102

WAGE ADJUSTMENTS UNDER THE 1 9 3 8 ACT

safeguard in time of crisis, an obstacle to an employer policy that would force the workers to bear the entire weight of depressions for which they are not in the least responsible; it can serve as a guarantee against a return to the practices of deflation. The new law marks a development whose importance has been able to escape us because the methods of applying it are inadequate. It is up to the working class movement to develop the principles that it establishes and to make them prevail completely, without any thought, of course, that the present level of living conditions be frozen, or that new gains be renounced.41 But the complaints that later filled the columns of Le Peuple were in marked contrast to this statement. Many of the unions unjustly blamed the Court for having altered what they claimed was originally a sliding wage scale.42 They were exasperated by the "legal brushwood" that had gathered around the arbitration system and by the added obstacles to wage increases. In May, 1939, a leading labor official demanded to know: What new legal formula will make wage increases even more impossible? What system will be invented so that Article 10 of the March 4, 1938, Act may become definitely impractical and impossible to use? Where will this indirect wage deflation being accomplished under the protection of the law end? 48 Besides general attacks on the system, the unions vented their wrath on the cost of living indexes, especially as the price rise tapered off in late 1938 and 1939. When the indexes failed to register the required 5 per cent increase, they did not hesitate to charge that the statistics were deliberately rigged. This was the case when the Seine index rose from 124.3 ' n November, 1938, to 128.2 in February, 1939, an increase that was just under the required 5 per cent. A slight adjustment in only one item in the budget might have made the difference, but this adjustment was voted down by the majority of the commission preparing the index.44 When between February and May, 1939, the Seine index recorded a decline from 128.2 to 128, the unions charged that the figures were obtained by "gross artifices" and "through false and artificial calculations." 4S The executive committee of the association of Paris unions threatened to

W A G E A D J U S T M E N T S UNDER T H E 1 9 3 8

ACT

withdraw its representative from the cost of living commission unless changes were made in the method of preparing the indexes.48 A specific criticism raised in this period was that under the older Paris municipal index, which was discontinued in January, 1939, an average of prices for the quarter was used, whereas the index for the Department was based on a sampling of prices in the first two weeks of the quarter, a method that did not permit an adjustment for seasonal or extraordinary variations.47 But the criticism was inspired less by any desire to improve the reliability of cost of living statistics than by dissatisfaction with the operation of Article 10. The arbitrary character of the minimum vital, the dependence on inadequate statistical reporting and the complexity of the formula as it finally evolved were the chief faults of the wage clause of the 1938 Act. Originally intended as a means of guiding arbitrators in making wage adjustments to price rises, Article 10 revealed itself on the eve of the war to be a complicated, restrictive mechanism that made the task of the arbitrators even more difficult, and made equitable wage adjustments to increases in the cost of living almost impossible. With all its faults, however, there is no doubt that it helped to prevent a considerable number of strikes that otherwise might have taken place over demands for wage increases, and that it provided some form of regularized wage adjustments in a period of rapidly rising prices.

8. Strikes under the Compulsory Arbitration System: Theory and Practice All collective labor disputes in industry and commcrcc arc to be submitted to conciliation and arbitration before any strike or lockout.—Article 1, Act of December 3 1 , 1936. DID the arbitration system outlaw strikes? 1 It is difficult to understand at first sight how strikes were permissible under the law. It was not, after all, a compulsory conciliation system that had been introduced. Such systems provide ample opportunity for strikes once the required conciliation procedures have been exhausted. T h e French law, in contrast, prescribed the compulsory submission of all disputes to arbitration decisions once direct negotiations and conciliation had failed. Arbitration decisions, by any definition, are meant to be obeyed, and the French law, moreover, even explicitly stated (Article 6 of the 1936 Act) that decisions were binding on the parties. On the other hand, under the original acts no provision was made for the enforcement of decisions except by the censure of public opinion. Not until later, in November, 1938, were sanctions introduced. T w o questions may be raised: first, the theoretical issue of what happened to "the right to strike" under the compulsory arbitration system; and secondly, since strikes did not disappear, regardless of any theoretical curtailment, what practical effect did compulsoryarbitration have on the record of strikes? The "Right to Strike"—Conflicting

Views

Disagreement over the effect of the new legislation on the right to strike appeared immediately after the passage of the 1936 Act. T h e

STRIKES UNDER THE SYSTEM

joint CGT-Popular Front sponsorship of the law seemed to offer the strongest evidence that no abridgement of the right to strike had been intended, but on the other hand, a literal interpretation of the new law might and did lead to the opposite conclusion. Three major theses quickly appeared: The C G T denied categorically that the right to strike had been limited in any way. Industry just as categorically asserted that strikes were no longer legal. T h e government, adopting a compromise position, maintained that strikes were not outlawed, but were permissible only after the exhaustion of the legal conciliation and arbitration procedures.2 T h e C G T leaders pulled no punches in affirming their position. Rene Belin, an assistant secretary of the C G T , flatly declared in an article that "compulsory arbitration has not abridged the right to strike." 3 Jouhaux pointed to foreign experience, the Australian in particular, as evidence that compulsory arbitration did not outlaw strikes.4 The principal argument the union leaders invoked was that labor had been liberated in the course of the nineteenth century from restrictions upon combinations and concerted action. Since nothing in the new law restored restrictions on the right of the workers to organize and to strike—a condition which, they asserted, would never have been accepted—strikes remained possible as a weapon of last resort.5 T h e C G T went further. It gave warning that the arbitration system would not be permitted to weaken labor. One union leader announced in no uncertain terms: "Arbitration is not going to end the era of strikes, snuff out the class struggle, and emasculate the militancy of the workers." 6 The C G T leaders gave the impression that the arbitration system they had helped introduce was not to be construed as compulsory at all. Under no circumstances was it to interfere with their freedom of action or militant traditions. Management and the conservative press took a diametrically opposite view. Laying the strictest construction on the law, they argued that strikes were prohibited. Their thesis seemed plausible if the law were interpreted literally: no strikes were possible before recourse to the conciliation procedures, and all disputes not settled by conciliation had to be submitted eventually to an arbitration de-

ιο6

STRIKES UNDER THE SYSTEM

cision that was binding. Therefore, there was no place for strikes.7 T h e y called attention to the profound contradiction between the compulsory arbitration law and the simultaneous sponsorship by the government of a bill to regulate and "democratize" strikes. " O n e cannot prepare a law for something that has been suppressed," was one terse comment. 8 This interpretation was carried to a climax when a half-day political strike called by the C C T in March, 1937, and the traditional M a y Day work stoppage in the same year were both denounced as violations of the arbitration law.® T h e thesis advanced by the employers resulted in serious interference with the operation of the system at the beginning. O n the premise that strikes violated the arbitration act, they maintained that any strike ipso facto voided obligations under the act and made illegal the very use of the arbitration system, including the government nomination of arbitrators. 10 W h e n strikes occurred, therefore, they very deliberately refused to deal with the strikers unless work was resumed and at the same time they refused to submit such disputes to the arbitration system. T h e precedent was set in the strike of the Paris slaughter house workers at the outset in January, 1937, and the pattern appeared repeatedly, approved by the C G P F . " T h e employers even petitioned the courts to set aside decisions where strikes had occurred, but they had little success. T h e Cour de Cassation, the highest court of appeal in all but administrative law, refused to hear these suits on the ground that it had no jurisdiction over the arbitration system. T h e Council of State, the highest administrative court of appeal, which was petitioned as well, had not ruled on the question before the passage of the 1938 Act, which created the Higher Court of Arbitration and invested it with appellate jurisdiction over the arbitration system. 12 Meanwhile, the government, although just as displeased by the strikes as the employers, insisted that the arbitration procedures were still applicable despite the outbreak of a strike and indeed, even more urgent in such cases. Blum pointed out that the restrictive interpretation of the employers served only to make a bad situation worse. 13

STRIKES UNDER THE SYSTEM

T h e government view that the right to strike was not suppressed but only suspended until the exhaustion of the prescribed procedures was based on the intentions of the law's sponsors. Although the question of the legal right to strike had not been met squarely during the parliamentary debates, there had been ample indications that neither the government nor the legislators had expected to prohibit strikes. Blum had expressly made clear that he did not expect strikes to disappear, declaring at one point: "In spite of everything, even if its application is complete and perfect, the compulsory arbitration system will always leave a certain number of loopholes, in which strikes may continue to appear." 14 T h e reports of the Chamber and Senate Labor Committees had also indicated that they did not expect strikes to disappear but only to decline in number. 1 5 It devolved upon the Higher Court of Arbitration to rule on the issue. It proved easier for the Court to decide whether a prior strike affected the applicability of the arbitration system than to rule on the more fundamental question of how the right to strike had been affected. O n the first question, the Court rejected the employers' argument that the arbitration system had no applicability once a strike had broken out. It decided that such a strike (or lockout) "did not relieve the parties of their obligation to seek a peaceful solution to the dispute," nor render illegal the use of the conciliation and arbitration system. 14 Pierre Tissier, the special master in the case in which the issue was decided, stated: The law making the procedures compulsory could not have desired to prohibit them precisely at the moment when disputes assume their sharpest character; nor, to use the picturesque formula of a member of the Council of State, could it have decided that the firemen ought to intervene only in case of a threat of fire, but ought to abandon the furniture to the flames once the fire has broken out. 11 It was the recommendations of the special master in the same case in May, 1938, that best illuminated the question of what had happened to the right to strike. Tissier insisted that the compulsory arbitration procedures were intended as a complete substitute for strikes and lockouts, and not merely as an optional, alternative

ιο8

STRIKES UNDER T H E

SYSTEM

course of action. But since the arbitration system had to be interpreted within the general framework of French law, the compulsory character of the procedures had to be reconciled with the wellestablished, legally recognized right to strike. He recommended as a solution an analogous situation in labor law. The courts had ruled that a union responsible for calling a strike without prior recourse to the conciliation and arbitration procedures prescribed by a collective contract might be sued for damages by the employer.13 Tissier, therefore, recommended that in the event of a violation of the compulsory arbitration procedures, the injured party might similarly be permitted to bring suit for damages. The Higher Court adopted this recommendation. It, furthermore, defined any strike that broke out before exhaustion of the legal procedures as non-permissible ("illicite"), and indicated that such a strike would lay the guilty party open to suit for civil damages.19 Some time later, in July, 1939, the Court went so far as to rule that an arbitrator might award damages in the case of such a strike— subject to its review—and that recourse to the civil courts would be unnecessary. In the one case in which this happened, the Court upheld an arbitrator who had awarded 20,000 francs damages to an employer because an electrical workers' union had struck in violation of both the arbitration law and its collective contract.20 Although the Court never settled the question of the right to strike with finality, these decisions made clear that the arbitration laws had gone far toward curtailing the exercise of that right. Pierre Laroque, a commissaire du gouvernement of the Court, admitted a few months before the war: "The laws on conciliation and arbitration have considerably restricted, if not even suppressed, the exercise of the right to strike." 21 And Pierre Tissier, whose recommendations to the Court were cited above, stated even more sweepingly in July, 1939: "The law prohibits strikes and lockouts, and places the responsibility for settling collective conflicts with the arbitration system." 2Thus, while it may be said that the right to strike, as a fundamental prerogative of the working class, was not in theorv abridged by the compulsory arbitration system, the exercise of that right was

log

STRIKES UNDER THE SYSTEM

considerably limited. T h e traditional labor fear that compulsory arbitration would mean a curtailment of the right to strike seemed to be receiving substantiation. W h a t might have happened if the system had continued is open to conjecture, but there is no doubt that the unions would have faced considerably more control than they had originally bargained for. The Arbitration

System a n d the Strike

Record

T h e circumstances surrounding the introduction of the arbitration system made it unlikely that industrial peace would be established on an impregnable basis. Its provisional character as a necessary expedient of the Popular Front was openly recognized. T h e failure to establish it by a voluntary agreement of labor and management was alone sufficient to dispel any elaborate expectations. But if strikes were not expected to disappear completely, it was at least hoped that they would become less frequent. Was that goal realized? W h a t did the compulsory arbitration system contribute to industrial peace? First, it must be pointed out that by January, 1937, when the system began to function, the extraordinary pattern of large scale sitdown strikes that began in the spring of 1936 and persisted until the end of the year had disappeared. For this the arbitration system, except for the Departmental Conciliation Boards, may claim no credit. T h e contribution of the system to industrial peace came in the years 1937 and 1938. In addition, it played an important role (but of a different kind) in 1939, after the failure of the general strike of November 30, 1938. Unfortunately, an exact and full evaluation of the contribution of the system is extremely difficult because of the inadequacy of available statistics. Table 7 summarizes the number of strikes and participatinc strikers for the period 1936 to 1939. As a basis for comparison in examining the strike record from January, 1937, to the end of 1938, the years 1921 to 1930 have been used. This eliminates the postwar turbulence of 1 9 1 9 and 1920, when strikes were abnormally high, as well as the apathy and inactivity of the depression years 1 9 3 1 to 1935, when strikes were at an ebb.

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~ Saposs, op. cit., pp. 222-23; 20. Clark, op. cit., pp. 1 3 4 - 3 5 and ILO, Conciliation and Arbitration, 1933, p. 184. See also the proceedings of the 1924 special session of the Conseil Superieur du Travail, an official advisory body made up of management, labor and government representatives, Conseil Supdrieur du Travail, compte-rendu, 28th session, November, 1924 (Paris, 1 9 2 5 ) . 21. See proceedings of Conseil Superieur du Travail, op. cit., passim; and ILO, Conciliation and Arbitration, 1933, p. 184. 22. See Ehrmann, op. cit., pp. 12 and 26; Robert Brady, Business as a System of Power (New York, 1 9 4 3 ) , pp. 1 4 0 - 6 5 ; and Ren6 P. Duchemin, Organisation syndicate patronale en France (Paris, 1940). 23. The best book 011 the history of collective bargaining and industrial relations in France is Pierre Laroque, Les rapports entre patrons

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

l6l

et ouvriers (Paris, 1 9 3 8 ) . For collective bargaining in France before 1936, see also by the same author a report made in 1934 to the Conseil National Economique entitled Les conventions collectives de travail (Paris, 1934) · In these notes, citations to Laroque refer to his book and not to this report. 24. Laroque, op. cit., pp. 331-34. See also Lorch, op. cit., pp. 566 3 ; Ehrmann, op. cit., pp. 1 8 3 - 8 4 ; Robert Moss£, Economie et legislation industrielles (Paris, 1 9 4 0 ) , pp. 3 0 2 - 1 8 ; and Lucien Girod, La convention collective comme moyen de legislation secondaire du travail (Paris, 1 9 3 9 ) , pp. 2 5 - 4 9 , 7 4 - 1 1 1 · Moss6 summarizes the number of

contracts reported annually from 1919 on, op. cit., p. 318. 25. Laroque, op. cit., p. 334; Lorch, op. cit., pp. 62-63; an< ^ Ehrmann, op. cit., p. 26. 26. For the background of the Popular Front see Ehrmann, op. cit., pp. 3-19; Louis Joxe, "Le Front Populaire," Sciences Politiques, LII (August, 1937), 115-39; L o r c h , °Ρ· ΡΡ· 2 9~33ί a n d Montreuil, op. cit., pp. 4 5 0 - 7 1 . See also Alexander Werth, France in Ferment (New York, 1 9 3 5 ) , and The Destiny of France (London, 1 9 3 7 ) . 27. For these statistics on the depression in France, see Ehrmann, op. cit., p. 16; and Laroque, op. cit., p. 351. 28. See Frangois Goguel, La politique des partis sous la Ille Republique (Paris, 1 9 4 6 ) , II, 1 5 - 3 8 . 29. See Ehrmann, op. cit., pp. 18-35; an< ^ Montreuil, op. cit., pp. 460-71.

30. For this program see Pierre Cot, Le procis de la

republique

(New York, 1 9 4 4 ) , I, 2 4 2 - 4 5 ; Lorch, op. cit., pp. 3 2 - 3 3 ; Ehrmann,

op. cit., pp. 6 2 - 6 7 ;

an

d Werth, Destiny of France, pp. 2 3 3 - 3 7 .

2. PRELUDE: THE "GREAT FEAR" OF MAY-JUNE,

1936

1. On the sitdown strikes and the events immediately following, see the daily press, especially Le Temps, Le Peuple and L'Humanite. See also Salomon Schwarz, "Les occupations d'usines en France de mai et juin 1 9 3 6 , " International Review for Social History, II ( 1 9 3 7 ) , 5 0 - 1 0 4 ; J. Compeyrot, "Prölude ä la XVIme Legislature," Revue Politique et Parlementaire, CLXVIII (July, 1 9 3 6 ) , 3 - 2 4 ; Roger Picard, "Le march£ du travail et le mouvement syndical," Revue d'Economie Politique, LI ( 1 9 3 7 ) , 1 0 6 2 - 7 5 ; Cot, Le proc&s de la republique, I, 1 4 4 - 8 1 , 2 5 5 - 8 9 ; Ehrmann, The French Labor Movement from Popular Front to Liberation, pp. 3 8 - 4 2 ; Montreuil, Histoire du mouvement ouvrier en

102

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

France des origines a nos jours, pp. 473-85; Dolleans, Histoire du mouvement ouvrier, II, 386-91; and Werth, Destiny of France, pp. 292-328. 2. For June figures, Bull, du Min. du Τrav., X L I I I (1936), 357; and see Table 1 of the present study. Ehrmann points out that no accurate strike statistics exist for May, 1936, when the strike movement actually began; op. cit., p. 290, note 6. For strike statistics of earlier years, see Table 2 of the present study. 3. Bull, de la Stat. Gen., X X V I I I (1938-39), 493-94. 4. ί,έοη Blum drew the comparison and used the phrase "The Great Fear of June, 1936," at the Riom trial; see Leon Blum devant la Cour de Riom, p. 198. 5. Radio speech, Temps, June 6-7, 1936. 6. For Blum's statements, and the interpellations and discussion that followed, Chambre, June 6, 1936, pp. 1 3 1 7 - 4 4 , especially pp. 1336-37· 7. For the Matignon conference, in addition to citations in note 1, see by Rene P. Duchemin, who participated as president of the CGPl·', "L'accord Matignon, ce que j'ai vu et entendu," Revue de Paris, X L I V (February, 1937), 584-94; account by ί,έοη Jouhaux in speech to C G T national council (Conseil Confederal National), Peuple, June 17, 1936; and descriptions by Blum in testimony at the Riom trial, Leon Blum, pp. 95-99; and in Parliament, Chambre, June 9, 1936, p. 1360. 8. For the Matignon agreement, see Bull, du Min. du Trav., X L I I I (1936), 222-24. For an English translation, see Ehrmann, op. cit., pp. 284-85. 9. William Oualid, "La legislation sociale," Revue d'Economie Politique, LIII (1939), 1372. On the significance of Matignon, sec also Frangois dc Menthon, "Note (sur les Accords Matignon)," Droit Social, I (1938), 33-35; and Charles Blondcl, "Nature et portec dc l'arbitragc obligatoire," ibid., pp. 98-100. 10. Jouhaux boasted that in one historic night France caught up to countries which for years had been far ahead in social legislation; see speech to C G T national council, cited in note 7; and radio speech, Peuple, June 9, 1936. 1 1 . This has been noted by de Menthon, op. cit., p. 33; and Maurice C o b l e n t z - B o u v e r e t , L'arbitrage

des conflits collectifs et le Statut ouvrier

(Paris, 1939), p. 1. 12. Chambre, June 9, 1936, p. 1360.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

13. Radio speech, cited in note 10. 14. Senat, June 16, 1936, p. 485 and p. 496. It was Senator Ldmery who used the phrase. 15. See resolution passed at extraordinary session, Assembly of Presidents, French Chambers of Commerce, Temps, June 10, 1936. The head of this organization, Pierre Dalbouze, was a signatory to the agreement. For similar statement by C G P F , ibid., June 9, 1936. 16. Statement by Groupe des industries metallurgiques, mecaniques et connexes de la region parisienne, ibid., June 1 1 , 1936. Cf. statement by Alfred Lambert-Ribot, president of this organization and a signatory to the agreement, ibid., June 9, 1936. 17. Raymond Millet, "Une grande enquete: chez les patrons," L'Europe Nouvelle, X X (October, 1937), 990. 18. Ren6 Dommange, Chambre, February 15, 1938, p. 350. 19. C. J. Gignoux, Patrons, soyez des patrons (Paris, 1937), p. 6. 20. For recognition by organized labor of this sentiment, only a week after the event, sec speech by Benoit Frachon to C G T national council, Peuple, June 17, 1936. Said Frachon: "They [the employers] have taken care to assert that their signature was imposed upon them by the arbitration of the government. They have maintained full reservations on the consequences." 21. For these laws, Temps, June 28, 1936; and J.O., June 26, 1936, pp. 6698-99. 22. On the changes introduced by the new act, see "Les conventions collectives," Bull, du Min. du Trav., X L I I I (1936), 334-35; Paul Pic, "Autour de la loi du 24 juin 1936 sur les conventions collectives du travail," Revue Politique et Parlementaire, C L X V I I I (September, 1936), 393-420; Lorch, Trends in European Social Legislation Between the Two World Wars, pp. 64-70; Laroque, Les rapports entre patrons et ouvriers, pp. 369-74; Girod, La convention collective comme moyen de legislation secondaire du travail, pp. 198-219; Philip, in Marquand, Organized Labour in Four Continents, pp. 38-43; and Mosse, Economie et legislation industrielles, pp. 302-16. 23. See report by Ambroise Croizat for the special committee that considered the government bill, and discussion, Chambre, June 1 1 , 1 9 3 6 , PP- 1 39 3-95· 24. See discussion in Chamber cited in note 23; and cf. Temps, editorial, "Le contrat collectif," June 14, 1936.

164

NOTES TO CHAPTER 2

25. Ηumaniti, June 1 2 , 1 9 3 6 . 26. Unsigned article, "Les caract£res g^i^raux des contrats collectifs d'apr£s la nouvelle legislation," Peuple, July 26, 1936. 27. Nothing made this clearer than when Blum argued against the incorporation of a compulsory conciliation provision into the collective bargaining law; Ξέηαί, June 18, 1936, p. 532. 28. Ehrmann, op. cit., p. 26. 29. Bull, du Min. du Trav., X L I I I ( 1 9 3 6 ) , 505; and X L V I (1939), 342. Cf. Lorch, op. cit., p. 70. 30. See Temps daily from June 10 to July 15, 1936, under heading, "Les conflits des greves" or "Le mouvement des gr£ves"; and see Table 3. 31. Chambre, June 26, 1936, p. 1607; and Temps, July 13, 1936. 32. Temps, July 10, 1936. 33. Peuple, June 26, 1936. 34. See Temps, June 12, 18, 22-26, July 16, 23, 1936; Peuple, June 21, 22, July 15, 1936. In recording instances of arbitration reported by the French press, care has to be exercised. The word arbitrage is on occasion loosely used to describe mediation. The report in Le Temps, for example, that the Paris metalworkers' strike was settled through "arbitration" was incorrect. It was settled by conciliation, the Minister of Labor, Jean Lebas, acting as mediator during the discussions. On this instance, contrast the official communiqu£, Min. du Trav., Temps, June 14, 1936, p. 4 and the news story of the same issue, p. 6. In another case the agreement reached in the Belfort metallurgical strike under the mediation of the Minister of Interior was incorrectly described as settled by arbitration, see Temps, July 25, 1936, pp. 5 and 8. This observation in no way detracts from the significant number of cases that represented genuine arbitration. 35. Min. du Trav., circular, June 23, 1936; Bull, du Min. du Trav., X L I I I (1936), 134-35. Important laws, decrees and circulars relating to labor are reprinted in the annual bound volumes of the Bulletin marked by asterisked pages; e.g., in the case just cited, pp. 134*~35*· The asterisks are omitted in these notes. 36. Min. du Trav., circular, July 3, 1936; Bull, du Min. du Trav., X L I I I (1936), 209-10; and statement by Minister of Labor Jean Lebas, Temps, July 5, 1936. See also Pierre Daniel, "Les commissions departcmentales de conciliation," Dossiers de VAction Populaire, December, 1938, pp. 1963-70. On the Lyons board, Peuple, July 8, 1936. The

NOTES TO C H A P T E R

3

165

French "d£partement" has been rendered as "Department" throughout this study. 37. The C F T C took added umbrage, since, unlike the C G T , it could claim a consistent record of favoring governmental conciliation and arbitration machinery; see statement in Temps, July 6, 1936; and see Daniel, "Les commissions ddpartementales de conciliation," Dossiers de Γ Action Populaire, December, 1938, p. 1965. 38. Senat, July 7, 1936, p. 667. Cf. Salengro's speech to Socialist party meeting, Peuple, July 6, 1936. On the statement and its repercussions, see Werth, Destiny of France, pp. 337-38. 39. For his explanation, Temps, July 1 1 , 1936. 40. For statements by Blum and Salengro, Chambre, June 26, 1936, p. 1607; and Peuple, August 15, 1936. 3.

T H E A U T U M N O F 1 9 3 6 : T H E D I L E M M A O F T H E P O P U L A R F R O N T AND THE

C G T

PROPOSALS

1. On the autumn strikes see comments by Laroque, Les rapports entre patrons et ouvriers, pp. 358-59; and Girod, La convention collective comme moyen de legislation secondaire du travail, pp. 229-31. 2. Lcfranc, Histoire du mouvement syndical franqais, p. 471. 3. See statements by Jouhaux, speech to C G T national council, Peuple, September 26, 1936; speech to Federation du Bdtiment, ibid., September 16, 1936; and L'arbitrage obligatoire, Conferences de l'Institut Superieur Ouvrier, No. 14 (Paris, 1937), pp. 5-6. The latter was based on a lecture given by Jouhaux after the introduction of compulsory arbitration. See also statement by C G T administrative committee, Temps, September 1 9 , 1 9 3 6 . 4. Conservative circles charged that this was the most important cause of the renewed agitation; see Temps, editorial, "La folie des greves," September 13, 1936. Jouhaux denied that the autumn strikes were in any way political; Peuple, September 13, 1936. Laroque minimizes the political element in the strikes; op. cit., p. 359. 5. Speech to C G T national council, Peuple, June 17, 1936. Cf. Blum's statement, Chambre, June 9, 1936, p. 1360. 6. For C G T grievances, see resolutions adopted by C G T administrative committee, Peuple, September 10, 1936; Jouhaux, speech to Federation du Bdtiment, cited in note 3; and open letter, Jouhaux to Minister of Labor, Peuple, July 24, 1936. For other union statements, ibid., Aug. 3, 29, Sept. 8, 12, 16, 1936. Cf. Laroque, op. cit., pp. 358-59.

ι66

NOTES TO CHAPTER

3

On the non-CGT unions see Raymond Millet, Jouhaux et la C G T (Paris, 1 9 3 7 ) , pp· 142-68, and articles in Le Temps, March and April, 1938, " L e syndicalisme dissident ou les rivaux de la C G T . " Sec also Jean Brethe de la Gressaye, " L e mouvement syndical depuis 1 9 3 6 , " Droit Social, I ( 1 9 3 8 ) , 2 2 4 - 3 1 . 7. Blum listed the changes that took place in his testimony at Riom; Leon Blum devant la Cour de Riom, pp. 1 3 2 - 3 3 . For his reference to an employer "counteroffensive," see speech, Temps, November 10, 1936. T h e new employer policy is well reflected in the brochure by Gignoux already cited, Patrons, soyez des patrons (Paris, 1 9 3 7 ) ; in a book by Philippe Fargeaud, L'application des nouvelles lois sociales (Paris, 1 9 3 8 ) ; and in the anonymous publication, Deux ans d'activite du Comite de pr&voyance et d'action sociales (Paris, 1 9 3 8 ) . The latter committee was a new publicity organization set up at this time with Germain Martin as president. On these changes, see also Ehrmann, The French Labor Movement from Popular Front to Liberation, p. 53; and Brady, Business as a System of Power, pp. 139-49. 8. See note 7 and also his speech, Temps, November 26, 1936. 9. See speech by Jules Verger, ibid., October 24, 1936. 10. See news stories and resolutions by employer organizations, ibid., September 24, October 2 1 , 24, 28, 3 1 , November 4, 28, 1936. 1 1 . See statement by Pierre Thiriez, chairman of the textile cmplovers' association, ibid., September 19, 1936. On the strike, see correspondence between Blum and Thiriez, and news stories, ibid., September 1 2 , 1 5 , 16, 19, 2 1 , 1936. C f . Temps, editorial, "La Ιεςοη des graves," September 1 5, 1936. 1 2 . For discussion of these price changes see A. Sauvv, "Mecanisme ct niveau des prix," in Charles Rist and Gaetan Pirou (eds.), De la France d'avant-guerre a la France d'aujourd'hui (Paris, 1 9 3 9 ) , pp. 2 9 1 328. This invaluable symposium, of which Sauvy's article is a part, was originally published in the Revue d'Economie Politique, L I I I ( 1 9 3 9 ) , 1-593. indexes referred to in the text, and presented in Tables 4 and 5, are discussed in detail in Chapter 6 of the present study. 1 3 . See joint statement by C G T and Union des syndicats de la region parisienne, Peuple, June 9, 1936; speech by Jouhaux, ibid., June 13, 1936; M . Kalecki, " T h e Lesson of the Blum Experiment," Economic Journal, X L V I I I ( 1 9 3 8 ) , 2 6 - 4 1 ; and Werth, Destiny of France, pp. 3 3° 31 · 14. See, e.g., the remarks by Paul Reynaud, Chambre, June 1 2 , 1936,

NOTES TO CHAPTER

3

167

pp. 1418-20. Cf. Temps, editorial, "Fascisme Economique," June 10, 1936. 15. Statements by Blum, Chambre, June 12, 1936, p. 1422; and Senat, June 16, 1936, pp. 493-94; Andr£ Philip, Chambre, June 12, 1936, pp. 1 4 1 4 - 1 5 ; Charles Spinasse, ibid., p. 1483. Cf. articles in Le Peuple: J. Duret, "Lcs salaires et les prix," July 6, 1936; Lucien Laurat, "Le cout de la vie doit-il monter?" July 9, 1936; unsigned article, "La part des salaires dans les prix de revient," July 23, 1936. 16. See initial statements by Ren£ Belin, Peuple, July 2, 1936; bv Jouhaux, ibid., July 5, 1936; and resolution adopted by C G T administrative committee, ibid. For subsequent charges, Blum, speech at Narbonne, Temps, October 26, 1936; and testimony, Leon Blum, p. 76; Jouhaux, letter to the Premier, Temps, November 2, 1936; and Spinasse, Minister of National Economy, radio speech, ibid., November 14, 1936. 17. See Alfred Sauvy and Odette Magnin, "La production industrielle cn France depuis 1928," Bull, de la Stat. Gen., X X V I I I (1938-39), 467-533; and Robert Marjolin, "Reflections on the Blum Experiment," Economica, n.s., V (1938), 177-91. For a record of the index of industrial production in France (a weighted index based on ten industrial groups, 1 9 2 8 = 100), see Bull, de la Stat. Gen., X X V I I I (1938-39), 493-94 and 520; and Statistique Generale de la France, Μouvement Economique en France de 1929 ά 1939 (Paris, 1 9 4 1 ) , pp. 146-48. The forty hour week, moreover, although an important social reform, fell short of expectations in reducing the volume of unemployment; sec, in addition to Marjolin's article, Paul Vaucher, "Social Experiments in France," Politica, III (1938), 105-6; and reports on unemployment in Revue d'Economie Politique: LI (1937), 1062-67, LII (1938), 955— 57,and LIII (1939), 1 3 5 1 - 5 2 . 18. See Louis Franck, French Price Control (Washington, D.C., 1942), pp. 1 3 - 2 2 . 19. See Temps, November 29, 1936. 20. On operation of these boards, ibid., July 30, August 15, September 1, 2, 24, 26 and October 28, 1936. For the arbitration settlements noted (by Marx Dormov, Paul Faure and Jean Lebas), ibid., October 3, 5 and 23, 1936. Cf. statement by Rene Belin, signed editorial, "Les ouvriers veulent la paix sociale," Peuple, October 24, 1936. 21. Xavier Vallat, a Rightist Deputy, Temps, September 22, 1936. See also statement bv President of Republican Federation of the Rhone, ibid.

ι68

NOTES TO CHAPTER

3

22. The section president of the Council of State referred to was Georges Cahen-Salvador. See news stories and communiquds, Minister of the Interior, Temps, October 16, 17, November 15, 1936. For other appointments, ibid., October 17, November 7, 12 and December 19, 1936. 23. For Blum's analysis of his position and dilemma, see his speech at Passy to the Socialist Federation of Seine-et-Oise, ibid., September 22, 1936. 24. On this, see Temps, editorial, "La plaintc des technicicns," September 20, 1936. 25. For the attitude of the C G T see speeches and proceedings at C G T national council, Peuple, September 26, 1936; Jouhaux, L'arbitrage obligatoire, pp. 1 6 - 1 7 ; and speech to Federation du Bdtiment, cited in note 3. See also Georges Lefranc, "La C G T et l'arbitrage," Esprit, V I (July, 1938), 526-34; R. Bothereau, speech at symposium on compulsory arbitration held in 1938 by the Association Franqaise pour le Progris Social, published in Les Documents du Travail, May, 19 38, p. 176. See also Ren6 Belin, "Avantages, inconv£nients, et limites de l'arbitrage obligatoire," Idde et Action, January, 1937, pp. 1 2 - 1 7 ; and signed editorial, "Les ouvriers veulent la paix sociale," Peuple, October 24, 1936; and Pierre Laroque, "L'arbitrage obligatoire dans les conflits du travail en France," Sciences Politiques, LII (August, 1937), 228. 26. For the outline of the proposed system, see Jouhaux, signed editorial, "La discussion doit 6tre obligatoire entre organisations ouvrieres et patronales," Peuple, September 18, 1936; see also speech to Federation du Bdtiment, cited in note 3. These two sources provide the dearest statements on the position of the C G T at this time. They are evidence that it was compulsory conciliation, not compulsory arbitration, that was first proposed. 27. Temps, September 16, 1936. 28. For account of the opening session on September 14, sec description by Duchemin in the last part of his article on the original Matignon conference, "L'accord Matignon, ce que j'ai vu et entendu," Revue de Paris, X L 1 V (February, 1 9 3 7 ) , 593-94. For Jouhaux' account, editorial and speech cited in notes 3 and 26. 29. Resolution, C G T national council, Peuple, September 26, 1936. The C G T resolution called for: "la mise en vigueur des mesures pratiques et efficaces de conciliation, engageant la responsabilitd des organisations ouvrieres et patronales et pouvant aller, dans les conditions

NOTES TO CHAPTER

4

169

ä determiner et sur le plan legal, jusqu'ä l'arbitrage." See also spcech and article by Jouhaux, ibid. 30. Ren6 Belin, signed editorial, "L'arbitrage obligatoire," ibid., October 5,1936. 31. L'arbitrage obligatoire, p. 1 1 . His phrase was: ". . . pas des considerations de doctrine mais des considdrations de fait. . . ." Cf. on reasons for labor's change in traditional attitude, Rene Bclin, signed editorial, note 30. 32. Bcnoit Frachon, Peuple, September 26, 1936. Fraclion was the leading Communist C G T official. 33. Rend Belin, signed editorial, cited in note 30. Cf. statement by Georges Dumoulin at C G T national council, Peuple, September 26, 1936: "It is an experiment we must try, but we must take precautions." 34. On these safeguards, see Jouhaux, L'arbitrage obligatoire, pp. 1 2 - 1 5 , and speech cited in note 3. See also resolution adopted by C G T national council, note 29; Bclin, signed editorial, note 30; and speech by Dumoulin cited in note 33. 35. See speech by Jouhaux and resolution adopted by C G T national council, Peuple, September 26, 1936. For a discussion of the sliding wage scale in France, see Robert Thomas, L'echelle mobile des salaires (Paris, 1939): for the years 1919 to 1935, pp. 1 1 3 - 2 9 ; and for 1936 to 1938, pp. 129-80. 36. Jouhaux outlined this proposal in his speech to the C G T national council, Peuple, September 26, 1936. Blum described neutralization as "a kind of temporary sequestration or sealing up of property during which rights on either side were held in reserve," Leon Blum, p. 188. 37. The government bill was part of the Modern Labor Code, introduced by Chautemps in 1938; see Chapter 5, p. 61, and note 18 of that chaptcr. For discussion of similar plans in the Fourth Republic, see Jean Rivero, "La reglementation de la grevc," Droit Social, XI (1948), 58-65. 4 . T H E I N T R O D U C T I O N O F C O M P U L S O R Y A R B I T R A T I O N : T H E A C T OF DECEMBER

31,

1936

1. Senat, December 27, 1936, p. 1770. 2. For the joint declaration by the three nations, Temps, September 27, 1936. On the reasons underlying the move and parliamentary reaction, see report by Jammy Schmidt for Chamber Finance Committee, Chambre, September 28, 1936, pp. 2765-66; the general discussion,

ΐηο

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

pp. 2766-97; and remarks by Blum, pp. 2809-14. See also report in the Senate by Abel Gardey for the Senate Finance Committee, Sinat, September 30, 1936, pp. 1396-1400; and the general discussion, pp. 140023, especially remarks by Vincent Auriol, pp. 1 4 1 3 - 1 7 . See also expose des motifs of the government bill, Temps, September 29, 1936. 3. See Blum's statements, Temps, September 28, 1936; Chambre, September 28, 1936, pp. 2 8 1 3 - 1 4 ; and Senat, September 30, 1936, p. 1432. Blum believed that devaluation could take place without a serious effect on prices. However, since it was taking place at a time of a rise in world prices—unlike England's devaluation in 1931—he felt it ncccssary to take safeguards. Cf. report by Jammy Schmidt, note 2. 4. See Article 14 of the original government bill, Chambre, September 28, 1936, p. 2809; and for Blum's explanation, Senat, September cover 30, 1936, pp. 1432-33. P'an w a s all workers not already protcctcd under existing contracts by sliding wage scales based on official cost of living indexes. No further details were announced at the time. 5. See statements and news reports, Temps, September 29 and 30, 1936; Humanity, September 28, 1936; and discussion, Chambre, September 28, 1936, pp. 2790-91. 6. See Blum's statements, Chambre, September 28, 1936, pp. 2 8 1 3 14; and S6nat, September 30, 1936, p. 1 4 3 1 . 7. For this proposal drawn up by the three major Popular Front parties, Chambre, September 28, 1936, p. 2809; for discussion and passage by the lower house, ibid., pp. 2809-20. 8. Ehrmann, The French Labor Movement from Popular Front to Liberation, pp. 46-47. Cf. Lindsay Rogers, " M . Blum and the French Senate," Political Science Quarterly, L I I ( 1 9 3 7 ) , 321-39. 9. Temps, October 1 , 1936. 10. See report of Abel Gardey for Senate Finance Committee, Senat, September 30, 1936, pp. 1399-1400; discussion, ibid., pp. 142934; and statement by Senate Finance Committee, Temps, October 1, 1936. Cf. at this time. Temps, editorial, "L'£chelle mobile," September 28, 1936; and letter, C G P F to members of the legislature, Temps, September 29,1936. 1 1 . Senat, October 1, 1936, p. 1441; and Chambre, October 1, 1936, pp. 2887-89. For the Act, J.O., October 2, 1936, p. 10403. The government was to consult the National Economic Council before issuing the decrees establishing the system.

NOTES TO CHAPTER

4

1 2 . Senat, October ι , 1936, pp. 1 4 4 2 - 4 4 . 1 3. See his statement, Temps, October 1 7 , 1936. The second Matignon conferences really fell into two phases. The organizations originally began discussions on September 14; then, after the passage of the Currency Act of October 1 , they were asked specifically to make plans for the authorized arbitration system. This second stage of the conferences began on October 19. 14. For this letter, ibid., October 19, 1936. It repeated and made known the contents of a previous unpublished letter at the opening of the conferences on September 16. Among other matters, a preamble guaranteeing protection to property rights and the right of workers to belong to non-CGT unions was sought. 1 5. Statement by C G T national bureau, Peuple, October 1 7 , 1936. 16. Speech at Mulhouse, ibid., October 18, 1936. 1 7 . Temps, editorials, all entitled, "L'arbitrage obligatoire," issues of September 27, October 4, 22 and 24, November 5 and 8, 1936; and earlier editorial, " L a legon des graves," September 1 5 , 1936. One writer lias asserted that the articles were inspired by the C G P F and the Comite des Forges in order to influence the Matignon discussions; A. Thuveny, L'arbitrage obligatoire dans les confiits collectifs du travail et son introduction en France (Oran, 1 9 3 8 ) , p. 1 52. Although there is 110 evidence to substantiate this, Le Temps did generally reflect the opinions of big business. 18. See resolutions of Lille Chamber of Commerce, and of administrative board, metallurgical employers' association, Temps, November 23, 1936. C f . Temps, editorials, "Les men£es communistes," November 23, 1936; and " L e joug communiste," November 26, 1936. 19. See letter transmitted to Blum at this time setting forth the reasons for their action, and public statement by C G P F ; Temps, November 28, 1936. Duchemin, one of the participants, points out in his article that they had made clear at the opening session on September 1 4 that a referendum would have to be held before anv final decision; "L'accord Matignon, ce que j'ai vu et entendu," Revue de Paris, X L I V ( 1 9 3 7 ) , 593. It was on the basis of this referendum that they announced their withdrawal. For an official report on the negotiations, see Doc. Pari., Chambre, 1936, Annexe No. 1366, pp. 894-95. T h e documents on the negotiations are also assembled in La Voix du Peuple, November, 1936, pp. 6 5 1 - 5 6 . For an account of these events, sympathetic to the C G P F , see Maria Pelissou-Roubichou, L'arbitrage obligatoire dans les

\ηΐ

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

confiits entre patrons et ouvriers (Pamiers, 1938), pp. 191-95; and for a hostile account, Thuveny, op. cit., pp. 1 5 1 - 5 4 . 20. Patrons, soyez des patrons, p. 17. Cf. resolution, Groupe des industries metallurgiques, Temps, December 5,1936. 21. Ehrmann, op. cit., p. 47. 22. Temps, November 28, 1936; see also communique, Premier's office, ibid.; and statement by Jules Moch, general secretary in the Premier's office, Peuple, November 28, 1936. 23. For labor reaction, see Ren6 Belin, signed editorial, "Lcs responsabilit£s des groupements patronaux," Peuple, November 29, 1936; and statements by Jouhaux, Temps, November 28 and 29, 1936. 24. For the text of the government bill and of the preliminary draft agreement, Temps, November 29, 1936. See also, for the government bill (and especially the introductory section, the expos0 des motifs), Doc. Pari., Chambre, Annexe No. 1366, pp. 894-95. 25. For an index to the debates ("Travaux Parlementaircs"): Droit Social, I (1938), 9. For summary of the debates cf. Ρέ1ί55θυ-Κου^ΰ1ιου, op. cit., pp. 190—212 and Thuveny, op. cit., pp. 160-73. 26. See report presented in Chamber by Albert Paulin, Chambre, December 1 , 1936, pp. 3169—73; and communique, Chamber Labor Committee, Temps, November 30, 1936. 27. See Paulin report and discussion in Chamber, Chambre, December 1, 1936, pp. 3169-3214. 28. For the keynote speech of the opposition in the Chamber, summarizing many of these criticisms, see speech by Rene Dommangc, Chambre, December 1, 1936, pp. 3173-76; see also statements by Paul Reynaud, ibid., pp. 3177-78; and report by Senator Duroux for the Senate Labor Committee, Senat, December 17, 1936, p. 1632. On representation for the C F T C , see, among others, statements by Fernand Wiedemann-Goiran, Frangois Reille-Soult, and Henri Meek; counterproposal made by Meek and Valentin; Chambre, December 1, 1936, pp. 3 1 7 0 - 7 1 . For Blum's attempt to meet the criticisms raised, sec Chambre, December 1, 1936, pp. 3179-81, 3185-86, 3191-92 and 3207-8. Cf. statements by Minister of Labor Jean Lebas, ibid., pp. 31903200. 29. See especially report by Senator Cement Raynaud for Committee on Legislation, Doc. Pari, Senat, 1936, Annexe No. 891, p. 514, and Sinat, December 1 5 , 1 9 3 6 , p. 1612. 30. See statements by Blum, Senat, December 26, 1936, p. 1761.

NOTES TO CHAPTER 4

31. For this speech by Blum, ibid., December 27, 1936, pp. 1 7 6 8 70; the quotation is on p. 1770. 32. This proposal had been made originally by Senators Jacquier and Dumont, Temps, December 19, 1936; and Sdnat, December 26, 1936, p. 1 7 5 1 · See statement by Chamber Labor Committee, summarizing the letter by Blum that advocated accepting the compromise; Temps, Dccembcr 23, 1936. 33. For the law see Bull, du Min. du Trav., X L I I I ( 1 9 3 6 ) , 255-56. 34. It was objected to most severely in the Senate; see especially Raynaldy report, Senat, December 15, 1936, pp. 1608-09. T h e motives for insisting on the exclusion of agriculture are nowhere better revealed than in the book by Fargeaud, L'application des nouvelles lots sociales, pp. 19-22. Sec also statement by Senator Pernot, Senat, December 26, 1936, p. 1760; and discussion, ibid., pp. 1755-62. It was agreed that the issue might be postponed until the extension of the collective bargaining law to agriculture was considered; see Sdnat, December 26, 1936, never pp. 1754-55. materialized. 35. See statements by Blum, note 28. Unless otherwise noted, the word "arbitrators" alone refers to the final arbitrators. 36. See P. H. Teitgen, "Les pouvoirs d'amiables compositeurs des aibitrcs des conflits de travail," Droit Social, I ( 1 9 3 8 ) , 74; and J. Mouton, Nature juridique de la sentence arbitrale (Paris, 1938). 37. Senat, December 27, 1936, p. 1785. 38. For the decree of January 16, 1937, see Bull, du Min. du Trav., X L I I I (1936), 3 1 6 - 1 9 . For explanations and comment on the procedures, see communiqud, Ministry of Labor, Temps, January 17, 1937; and Minister of Labor, circular to prefects, February 16, 1937, Bull, du Min. du Trav., X L I V ( 1 9 3 7 ) , 98-99. Cf. Pierre Daniel, "Conciliation et arbitrage; lc decrct du 16 janvier," Dossiers de 1'Action Populaire, March, 1937, pp. 621-32. A summary in English of the procedures may be found in Fernand Maurette, "A Year of Experiment in France," International Labour Review, X X X V I ( 1 9 3 7 ) , 1 8 - 1 9 . 39. For further instructions on this matter see Min. du Trav., administrative decree, February 3, 1937, Bull, du Min. du Trav., X L I V (1937).85. 40. Temps, January 27, 1937. 41. The selection of arbitrators and umpires by the government received later clarification. If one of the parties failed to choose an arbitrator, the Minister was limited in his choice to the panels drawn up

NOTES TO CHAPTER

»74

5

in advancc by the two confederations. On the other hand, when the Premier was called upon to name an umpire, he was not restricted to this panel. That list was merely suggestive; he was free to make any selection so long as it was from the membership of the important state bodies. See Minister of Labor, circular to prefects, March 22, 1937, Bull, du Min. du Trav., X L I V ( 1 9 3 7 ) , 1 0 0 - 2 . 42. Communique, Premier's office, Temps, January 29, 1937; and decrec of January 3 1 , 1937, ibid., February 4, 1937. 43. See Jouhaux, L·'arbitrage obligatoire, p. 24; his spccch to the C G T national council during the debates, Peuple, December 8, 1936; and A. Croizat, " L e projet gouvernemental sur la conciliation et l'arbitragc des conflits sociaux," Humanite, December 1 , 1936. 44. Speech to a manufacturers' association, Temps, Dcccmbcr 3, 1936; and statement to Cercle Republicain, ibid., Dcccmbcr 27, 1936. Le Populaire had written on December 2, 1936: " W c are entering a transitional period wherein big business is ceasing to be a private affair. W e are going towards socialization. The arbitration bill is only a first step in that direction." 5. T H E

PERMANENT

SYSTEM:

T H E A C T OF M A R C H

4,

193S

1. Chambre, February 1 7 , 1938, p. 398. 2. See communique, Premier's office, Temps, May 7, 1937. 3. Resolution, C G T administrative committee, ibid., May 8, 1937. 4. See two letters, Gignoux to the Premier, ibid., May 7 and 8, 1937. 5. See government bill, especially expose des motifs, Doc. Pari., Chambre, 1937, Annexe No. 2 3 9 1 , p. 586; see also report by Marccl Vardellc for Chamber Labor Committee, ibid., Annexe No. 2510, p. 668; and report by Senator Raynaldy for Senate Committee on Commerce and Labor, Doc. Pari., Senat, 1937, Annexe No. 348, pp. 236-38. 6. For this cabinet, sec Temps, June 24, 1937. Blum remained in the new cabinet as Vice-Premier. The Minister of Labor was Andre Fevrier, Socialist deputy, while Marx Dormov remained as Minister of the Interior. 7. For this act see Bull, du Min. du Trav., X L I V ( 1 9 3 7 ) , 392-93. 8. The best discussion of prevailing opinions and criticisms of the 1936 Act is found in the symposium conducted by the Association Franfaise pour le Progres Social and published in Les Documents du Travail, X X I ( 1 9 3 8 ) , 1 1 3 - 3 1 , 1 3 8 - 2 5 2 . Important also are the parliamentary

NOTES TO CHAPTER 5

175

debates on the 1938 Act; see especially report by Paul Lambin for the Chamber Labor Committee, Doc. Pari., Chambre, 1938, Annexe No. 3592; and report by Marcel Massot for Chamber Committee on Legislation, ibid., Annexe No. 3621. Sec also R. Savaticr, "Lcs rayons ct les ombres d'unc expericncc socialc: l'arbitragc obligatoirc des conflits collectifs du tTavail," Dalloz Recueil Hebdomodaire, February, 1938, pp. 9 - 1 5 ; Michel Debr6, "Commentaire de la loi du 31 decembre 1936; place de la conciliation et de l'arbitrage dans le droit du travail," Dalloz Recueil Periodique, 1938, quatrikme partie, pp. 4 - 1 1 ; Claude Leblond, "Resultats et lacunes de l'arbitrage obligatoirc," L'Europe Nouvelle, X X (October, 1 9 3 7 ) , 1009-10; Gervais Rigaux, "La conciliation ct l'arbitrage," ibid. (March, 1938), 260-62; and Pierre Laroque, "L'arbitrage obligatoire dans les conflits du travail en France," Sciences Politiques, LII (August, 1 9 3 7 ) , 225-38. 9. Ren6 Dommange cited these two contradictory decisions in the Chamber: the Pontrdmoli decision, of April 17, 1937, and the Guinand decision, of April 23, 1937; Chambre, February 15, 1938, p. 350. For other examples of inconsistencies, see Maurice Pinot, "L'arbitrage obligatoire: premi£res constatations," Nouveaux Cahiers, July, 1937, pp. 5-7· 10. See speech by Jouhaux, discussion, and resolution adopted by C G T national council, Peuple, August 5, 1937. For typical complaints by labor in this period see resolutions and statements, ibid., May 21, 30, June 17, 22, 23, July 5, 7, 8 and 14, 1937. One headlined statement read: "La loi sur l'arbitTage doit aider ä la solution rapide des conflits et non a les 6terniser" (July 14, 1937)· The Paris metalworkers even suggested that the C G T reconsider support of the system if improvements were not made; ibid., July 5, 1937. 1 1 . For decree of September 18, 1937, see Bull, du Min. du Trav., X L I V (1937), 433-34; for accompanying instructions see circular, Minister of Labor, September 30, 1937, ibid., pp. 454-56. 12. For the strikes of this period, see Chapter 8, p. 1 1 7 , and notes 34 and 3 5 of that chapter. 13. For Chautemps' first invitation, Temps, September 1 1 and 12, 1937; for his second, ibid., January 7, 8 and 9, 1938. For the C G P F rejections, ibid., September 1 1 , 1937, January 8, 9 and 12, 1938. These documents are also conveniently assembled in La Voix du Peuple, January, 1938, pp. 16-22. On the negotiations, cf. "Le Statut Moderne du

iy6

NOTES TO CHAPTER

5

Travail," Droit Social, I ( 1 9 3 8 ) , 1 3 0 and C . J. Gignoux, " L e Statut Moderne du Travail," Revue Politique et Parlementaire, C L X X I V (February, 1 9 3 8 ) , 2 0 1 - 1 4 . 14. Doc. Pari., Chambre, 1937, Annexe No. 3345, p. 379; and communique, Minister of Labor, Temps, December 30, 1937. 1 5 . On the changes made by the Senate, see report by Senator Raynaldy for the Senate Labor Committee, Senat, December 3 1 , 1937, p. 1455; and by Senator Raynaud for the Senate Committee on Legislation, ibid., pp. 1455-56. See in particular the statement by Senator Maulion, ibid., p. 1457. For the Act of January 1 1 , 1938, sec Bull, du Min. du Trav., X L V ( 1 9 3 8 ) , 2 - 3 · The initial authorization for the arbitration system, it will be recalled, was under the Act of December 3 1 , 1936; this authorization had been renewed in July until the end of 1 937· 16. Temps, January 1 3 and 14, 1938. 1 7 . See ibid., January 1 5-22, 1938. The new Minister of the Interior was Albert Sarraut; the Minister of Labor was Paul Ramadier; and L.O. Frossard was to serve as Minister without portfolio to assist in labor matters. 18. For these bills, ibid., January 30, 1938. 19. Ibid., January 29, 1938. 20. In addition, all contracts were again scheduled to expire at once. This was emphasized by Chautemps; testimony before Chamber Labor Committee, ibid., February 3, 1938. 2 1 . For an index to the parliamentary debates on the bill, see Droit Social, I ( 1 9 3 8 ) , 1 3 1 - 3 4 . 22. Paul Lambin, Chambre, February 28, 1938, p. 666. 23. See statement at Chamber Labor Committee hearings, Temps, February 3, 1938; and for votes of confidence, Chambre, February 28, 1938, p. 700; ibid., March 3, 1938, pp. 778-79; Senat, February 27, 1938, p. 216; ibid., February 28, 1938, pp. 262, 267; and ibid., March 4, 1938, p. 3 1 3 . 24. For the Act of March 4, 1938, see Bull, du Min. du Trav., X L V ( 1 9 3 8 ) , 4-8; and for the important decree of April 20, 1938, which followed, ibid., pp. 1 8 8 - 9 1 . For administrative comment on the act and decree, see Minister of Labor, circular, June 1, 1938, ibid., pp. 208—1 5. For a detailed analysis of the new act and decree, Pierre Duclos, "Commentaire de la loi du 4 mars 1938," Dalloz Recueil Periodique. 1939, quatrieme partie, pp. 169-88; and Pierre Daniel, "Les modifications

NOTES TO CHAPTER 5

177

apport6es par la loi du 4 mars ä l'arbitrage obligatoire," Dossiers de I'Action Populaire, April, 1938, pp. 693-700. 25. See Renee Petit, "Que contiennent les conventions collectives?" Droit Social, II (1939), 78-85; and Pierre Daniel, "Les juridictions du travail," Dossiers de VAction Populaire, September, 1938, pp. 1387-88. 26. See Lambin report, p. 180, cited in note 8. 27. For the decree of April 3, 1938, establishing the Higher Court of Arbitration, Bull, du Min. du Trav., X L V (1938), 182-86. For decree of April 4, 1938, naming members of the Court, Droit Social, I (1938), 1 4 1 . For the composition, operation and other aspects of the Higher Court, see C.C., "Cour Sup&ieure d'Arbitrage: sa place, son organisation, son röle," Temps, August 7, 1938; same author, "La premiere jurisprudence de la Cour Supirieure d'Arbitrage," ibid., August 14, 1938; J. Chapsal, " L e droit social et la Cour Supirieure d'Arbitrage," Sciences Politiques, LII (October, 1938), 461-74; M.G., "La Cour Supirieure d'Arbitrage: proc6dure et jurisprudence," Droit Social, I ( 1 9 3 8 ) , 235-36; and D. Sarrano, La Cour Supdrieure d'Arbitrage (Paris, 1938). 28. See, e.g., the tribute paid to the Court by Albert S6roI, Socialist deputy, Chambre, February 3, 1939; and tribute by Ren£ Bloch, of C G T legal staff, Peuple, October 24, 1938. 29. For a codification of the Court's decisions see Pierre Tissier, Repertoire methodique permanent des arrets de la Cour Superieure d'Arbitrage, and Supplements (Paris, 1938-39). See also official monthly tabular summaries, Tableau Methodique des arrets de la Cour Superieure d'Arbitrage, J.O., Annexe, 1939. The latter in addition published the Court's decisions in full. 30. See "L'application des procedures d'arbitrage," Droit Social, II (1939), 44-5. 31. Ibid.; and Pierre Daniel, "La Cour Supörieure d'Arbitrage," Dossiers de VAction Populaire, July, 1938, pp. 1 2 1 2 - 1 3 . 32. This was added under the November decree laws; see Chapter 10, note 19. 33. See Teitgen, "Les pouvoirs d'amiables compositeurs des arbitres des conflits de travail," Droit Social, I (1938), 74. 34. See discussion between Senator Paul Maulion and Senator Paul Jacquier, Senat, February 27, 1938, pp. 240—41. 35. See CSA No. 1 1 8 , J.O., Annexe, 1938, p. 1076. For other cases, Tissier, Repertoire Methodique, pp. 18-24. For a discussion of this

i78

NOTES TO C H A P T E R

6

problem see Paul Durand, " L a reorganisation des juridictions du travail," Droit Social, V I ( 1 9 4 3 ) , 3 2 1 - 2 5 ; and C . C . , " L a premiere jurisprudence de la Cour Superieure d'Arbitrage," Temps, August 14, 1938. 36. See periodic reports in Bull, du Min. du Trav., X L V - X L V I (1938-39). 6. W A G E

A D J U S T M E N T S UNDER THE

1936

ACT

1. An invaluable study of wage adjustments under the 1936 Act is Suzanne Bugnet, Le rajustement des salaires par I'arbitrage en ι 9 3 7 (Nancy, 193&)· See also analyses and comments by Franijois de Mcnthon, "Note [sur lc] rajustement des salaires," Droit Social, I ( 1 9 3 8 ) , 26-29, 79-83 a n d 1 2 6 - 2 8 . 2. Anonymous article, "Impressions d'un surarbitre," L'Europe Nouvelle, X X (October, 1 9 3 7 ) , 1 0 1 2 . W e are fortunate in having the observations of several surarbitres. In addition to this account, see the articles already cited: William Oualid, "L'arbitrage obligatoire en France," Revue d'Economie Politique, L I I I ( 1 9 3 9 ) , 6 6 5 - 7 1 1 ; and Charles Blondel, "Nature et port6e de l'arbitrage obligatoire," Droit Social, I ( 1 9 3 8 ) , 9 8 - 1 0 0 . See also Claude Leblond, "Sur l'arbitrage obligatoire," Nouveaux Cahiers, August, 1937, pp. 1 - 3 ; Fernand Maurette, "Notes d'un surarbitre," ibid., October, 1 9 3 7 , pp. 7 - 8 ; and Gaetan Pirou, "Impressions d'un surarbitre," ibid., January, 1939, pp. 10-12. 3. On French cost of living indexes see Ministere du Travail, Les indices du coüt de la vie en France (Paris, 1 9 4 1 ) . See also Les caracteres contemporains du salaire, publication of L'Institut de Science Economique Appliquee (Paris, 1 9 4 6 ) , pp. 5 0 - 5 1 ; Thomas, L'echelle mobile des salaries, pp. 32-45; Statistique G£n6rale, Mouvement Economique en France de 1929 ά 1939 (Paris, 1 9 4 1 ) , pp. 54-57; and official statement repeated in quarterly Bull, du Min. du Trav., e.g., X I , I V (»937). 5 4 0 - 4 2 · 4. Duclos, "Commentaire de la loi du 4 mars 1 9 3 8 " Dalloz Recueil Periodique, 1939, p. 180. 5. The one exception was Seine-et-Marne; Bull, du Min. du Trav., X L V I ( 1 9 3 9 ) , 3 5 1 . For decree of April 3, 1938, ibid., X L V ( 1 9 3 8 ) , 264-66. 6. See decree of November 24, 1938, and comment bv Frangois de Menthon, Droit Social, II ( 1 9 3 9 ) , 2 0 - 2 1 . 7. See, e.g., statement by Thomas, op. cit., p. 1 7 5 .

NOTES TO CHAPTER

6

179

8. See William Oualid, arbitration decision, December 27, 1937, Droit Social, I ( 1 9 3 8 ) , 75-76. 9. Bugnet, op. cit., pp. 63-65. 10. The first two hundred arbitration decisions (January-May, 1937) were published officially; see Repertoire chronologique des sentences surarbitrales, J .O., Annexe, 1937, pp. 6 1 9 - 8 7 , and ibid., 1938, pp. 3 4 1 402. A number of subsequent decisions were published in the press (Temps, Peuple) and in Droit Social. For a detailed breakdown of these results, see Bugnet, op. cit., pp. 45-54. For a similar breakdown see Rapport moral ("La 16gislation sociale"), CGT,- 1938 congress, La Voix du Peuple, July, 1938, p. 530. 11. For an analysis of wage adjustments in subsequent decisions under the 1936 Act see de Menthon, "Note [sur le] rajustement des salaires," op. cit., pp. 2 6 - 2 9 , 7 9 - 8 3 and 126-28. 1 2 . Oualid arbitration decision, February 7, 1937, J.O.> Annexe, 1937, PP· 626-27. 13. Moss£ arbitration decision, March 16, 1937, ibid., pp. 665-68. 14. Bugnet, op. cit., p. 152; and de Menthon, "Note [sur le] rajustcment des salaires," op. cit., pp. 28 and 79. 1 5 . Franckel arbitration decision, April 2 1 , 1937, J.O., Annexe, 1938, pp. 367-68. 16. Lesueur arbitration decision, March 1 7 , 1937, ibid., 1937, pp. 661-63. 1 7 . Siegfried arbitration decision, February 1 7 , 1937, ibid., 1937, p. 630. 18. For these solutions, see Bugnet, op. cit., pp. 66-72. 19. De Menthon, "Note [sur le] rajustement des salaires," op. cit., p. 29. 20. See Bugnet, op. cit., pp. 72-75, 120-24, decisions cited; and Thomas, op. cit., pp. 149-53. 21. See Bugnet, op. cit., pp. 111-43. 22. See ibid., pp. 55-63; and de Menthon, "Note [sur le] rajustement des salaires," op. cit., pp. 26-27 a n c * 81. 23. See Louis Alvin, Salaire et security sociale (Paris, 1947), pp. 161-62. 24. Professor Oualid, e.g., in the case of the Paris metallurgical workers, doubled the allowance to be paid for the first, second and third child; see decision cited in note 12. 25. Cauvin arbitration decision, March 25, 1937, JO., Annexe,

ι8ο

NOTES TO CHAPTER 6

1937, pp. 634-35. Cf· Hourticq arbitration decision, March 22, 1937, ibid., pp. 670-71. 26. See the decisions cited by Bugnet, op. cit., pp. 180-81. 27. See discussion and chart in Les caractkres contemporains du salaire, pp. 73-74. 28. On the problem and the solutions offered by the arbitrators, see Thomas, op. cit., pp. 156-59; Bugnet, op. cit., pp. 83-102; and dc Menthon, "Note [surle] rajustement des salaires," op. cit., pp. 80-81. 29. See decision cited in note 12. 30. For a summary of these awards, see Bull, de la Stat. Gdn., X X V I I ( 1 9 3 7 - 3 8 ) , 246. For the events described, Temps, February 1 1 and 12, November 1 and December 27, 1937; Peuple, February 8 and 25, and March 2 , 1 9 3 7 . The second decision was by Francis Villette, of the Paris Court of Appeals; the third and fourth by Pierre Brin, of the Court of Accounts. 31. See on this point Bull, de la Stat. Gen., X X V I I ( 1 9 3 7 - 3 8 ) , 247; and F. M., "Note [sur] la convention collective de la m£tallurgie parisienne," Droit Social, I (1938), 223. 32. The strike resulted in a virtual defeat for the union, sincc no more than a 3 to 4 per cent wage increase was won in the new contract signed in May, 1938. By the eve of the war the union had received only one more adjustment—a 3.5 per cent increase. Thus, while the Seine index had risen 56 per cent between May, 1936, and August, 1939, the union received wage adjustments (on a weekly basis, with adjustment for the shorter work week) of only 29 to 37 per cent, depending on the category of worker. For the collective contract of May 2, 1938, with comment by F. M., see Droit Social, I (1938), 219-23; sec also Bull, de la Stat. Gen., X X V I I (1937-38), 246, and X X V I I I ( 1 9 3 8 39), 248. For the final wage adjustment, Escarra decision of May 8, 1939 (voided by the Higher Court) and Kerviller decision of August 4 , 1 9 3 9 , see Peuple, August 8, 1939. 33. For the foregoing, see arbitration decisions and comments by Frangois de Menthon, Droit Social, I (1938), 74-80. 34. Cf. de Menthon, "Note [sur le] rajustement des salaires," op. cit., p. 180. On all analyses of real wages in France, the warning of the Bulletin de la Statistique Generale must be cited: "Unfortunately, wage statistics are still far too imperfect to permit a satisfactory study of this problem" ( X X V I I , 1937-38, 246). 35. A. Chariot, secretary, Federation de l'Alimentation, Peuple, Oc-

NOTES TO CHAPTER 7

l8l

tober 27, 1937· See also the following in the issues of Peuple indicated: statement by C G T national bureau, October 15, 1937; Gaston Dimon, "Ca ne peut plus durer ainsi," November 3, 1937; R. Bouyer, "Reflexions sur la conciliation et l'arbitrage," November 3, 1937; R. Bothcreau, "Sur la hausse du cout de la vie," November 9, 1937; J. Racamond, "La future loi sur la conciliation et l'arbitrage," November 17, 1937; Ren£ Belin, "Sur deux projets de loi," November 24, 1937; anonymous article, "Conciliation et arbitrage," December 1, 1937; and R. Bothereau, "Un jeu dangereux," December 12, 1937. 36. A fuller examination of the economy as a whole under the "Blum experiment" would be beyond the scope of the present work. For a consideration of the subject see, among others, Robert Marjolin, "Reflections on the Blum Experiment," Economica, n.s., V ( 1 9 3 8 ) , 1 7 7 91; M. Kalecki, "The Lesson of the Blum Experiment," Economic Journal, X L V I I I (1938), 26-41; and Henry Ehrmann, "The Blum Experiment and the Downfall of France," Foreign Affairs, X X ( 1 9 4 1 - 4 2 ) , 152-65. 7 . W A G E A D J U S T M E N T S UNDER THE

1938

ACT

1. See Jouhaux, testimony before Chamber Labor Committee, Temps, February 3,1938; speech at Toulouse, ibid., February 22, 1938. Cf. statement by R. Bothereau at symposium cited in Chapter 5, note 8, Les Documents du Travail, May, 1938, pp. 179-81; Bothereau, signed editorial, "Pas de paix sociale sans justice," Peuple, February 20, 1938. Cf. editorial, "Notre Action," La Voix du Peuple, October, 1937, p. 617. The Communists, particularly, demanded an automatic sliding wage scale; see position taken by Monmousseau and others at Chamber Labor Committee hearings, Temps, February 6, 1938; statements by Ainbroisc Croizat, Chambre, February 17, 1938, pp. 394-95; and Armand Pillot, ibid., February 18, 1938, pp. 420—421. 2. Sec testimony before Chamber Labor Committee, Temps, February 3 and 6, 1938; and statements, Chambre, February 17, 1938, pp. 400-1; ibid., February 18, 1938, pp. 4 5 1 - 5 2 ; and Senat, February 28, 1938, p. 265. 3. For commentaries on Article 10 see especially Frangois de Menthon, "Commentairc de Γ Article 10: la revision des salaires," Droit Social, I (1938), 1 1 2 - 2 2 ; and Duclos, "Commentaire de la loi du 4 mars 1938," Dalloz Recueil Periodique, 1939, pp. 179-82. 4. This 5 per cent figure was arrived at after a great deal of haggling.

l82

NOTES TO CHAPTER

7

The Senate unsuccessfully tried to set the required cost of living increase as high as 1 2 per cent and when that failed, at 1 0 per cent, before it finally accepted this lower figure. The provision would have permitted a downward wage revision with a decline in prices, but such a possibility was hardly applicable at this time. 5. See C S A decisions, Droit Social, I ( 1 9 3 8 ) , 307-8, 348-49; and note by Charles Celier, ibid., 349-50. For arbitration decisions before the Court's rulings and note by F.M., ibid., pp. 1 9 7 - 2 0 1 . 6. For discussion of the minimum vital see comments by dc Mcnthon, "Commentaire de l'Article 1 0 , " op. cit., pp. 1 1 4 - 1 7 ; and "Note [sur le] rajustement des salaires," ibid., pp. 339-44. T h e concept of the minimum vital has reappeared with the Fourth Republic in connection with government adjustment of wages; see "Lcs recentes controverses autour du minimum vital," Droit Social, X ( 1 9 4 7 ) , 1 9 3 - 9 8 , and R. Dufrichc, "Retour aux conventions collectives," Revue Frangaise du Tra\ail, II ( 1 9 4 7 ) , 1 1 1 - 1 3 . ^ a ^ s o has been important in Australian experience with compulsory arbitration; see "Australie: L'arbitrage des conflits du travail et la fixation du salairc minimum," ibid, II ( 1 9 4 7 ) , 697-700; and Orwell de R. Foenander, Industrial Regulation in Australia (Melbourne, 1 9 4 7 ) · 7. See de Menthon, "Commentaire de l'Article 1 0 , " op. cit., pp. 1 1 4 - 1 7 ; and Duclos, op. cit., p. 180. 8. Chambre, February 18, 1938, p. 4 5 1 . 9. Senat, February 27, 1938, p. 244. 10. Ibid., February 2 8 , 1 9 3 8 , p. 265. 1 1 . Ibid., pp. 267-68. 1 2 . C S A No. 284 bis, August 1 , 1938, Metallurgie de Bethune et d'Arras, Droit Social, I ( 1 9 3 8 ) , 339; and see commcnt by FranQois dc Menthon, ibid., pp. 339-44. See also C . C . , "L'echelle mobile et lc minimum vital," Temps, August 18, 1938. 1 3 . See comment bv de Menthon, Droit Social, I ( 1 9 3 8 ) , 340. 14. See Peuple, October 7, 1938. 1 5 . Cazes arbitration decision, September 28, 1938, Droit Social, I (1938), 440-41. 16. See comment by de Menthon on Cazes decision, ibid., pp. 4 4 1 42. 1 7 . See Peuple, May 9 and 1 5 , 1939. 18. See codification of the Court's decisions on the minimum vital under that heading in Tissicr, Repertoire metliodique permanent des

NOTES TO CHAPTER

η

arrets de la Cour Superieure d'Arbitrage, and Supplements; and in the official monthly tabular summaries, Tableau Methodique, J.O., Annexe, 1939. See also summary of the Court's jurisprudence in statement to the Court by Pierre Tissier, who was a special master (commissaire du gouvernement) of the Court, Peuple, May 1 5 and 17, 1939. 19. See Tissier's statement cited in note 18; and Tableau Methodique for May, 1939, JO., Annexe, 1939, p. 1023. 20. Capitant decision, May 16, 1938, Droit Social, I ( 1 9 3 8 ) , 1 9 9 200. 2 1 . Cazcs arbitration decision, see note 1 5 . 22. Racine arbitration decision, approved by the C S A , January 19, 1939, Droit Social, II ( 1 9 3 9 ) , 7 0 - 7 1 ; see note by H. Lcroy-Jay, ibid., p. 7 1 . 23. Oualid, "L'arbitrage obligatoirc en Francc," Revue d'Economie Politique, hill ( 1 9 3 9 ) , 702. 24. Sec note by de Menthon, Droit Social, I ( 1 9 3 8 ) , 342-44. 25. Frangois de Menthon, "Note [sur les] allocations familiales," ibid., II ( 1 9 3 9 ) , 179; and for foregoing, ibid., pp. 1 7 8 - 8 2 . 26. Tissier, Repertoire mdthodique, Supplement C, p. 8. 27. This attitude was well expressed in the earlier Thi6ry arbitration decision, March 3 0 , 1 9 3 8 , quoted by Bugnet, Le rajustement des salaires par l'arbitrage en 1937, p. 176, note 1 . 28. See Peuple, January 29, May 9 and 27, 1939· 29. See complaint of metallurgical workers over Kervillcr decision as late as August, 1939; ibid., August 8, 1939. 30. An article in the Communist press read approvingly by a Communist deputy during the debates claimed that a sliding wage scale was being introduced and that company books would be open to inspection. The article was bv Benoit Fraction, " L a position dc la C G T , " Hunianite, February 19, 1938. It was read bv M . Monmousseau, Chambre, February 28, 1938, p. 695; and was cited by several opposition speakers, see Senat, February 26, 1938, p. 198; February 27, 1938, p. 239; and Chambre, February 28, 1938, p. 680. 3 1 . Cazcs arbitration decision, September 28, 1938, sec note 1 5 . For other examples, see Pierre Daniel, " L a jurisprudence de la Cour Sup^rieure d'Arbitrage," Dossiers de 1'Action Populaire, February, 1939, pp. 295-302. 32. See Droit Social, I ( 1 9 3 8 ) , 4 0 9 - 1 0 ; and note by H. Leroy-Jay, ibid., pp. 4 1 0 - 1 3 .

184

NOTES TO CHAPTER

7

33. See Daniel, "La jurisprudence de la Cour Supirieure d'Arbitrage," op. cit., p. 300, and decisions cited. 34. See Landron arbitration decision endorsed by CSA, May 5, 1939, Droit Social, II (1939), 216; and note by Francois de Menthon, ibid., pp. 184-86. 35. For Escarra decision of May 8, 1939, and labor reaction, Peuple, August 8, 1939. 36. For this decree law see Droit Social, II (1939), 183-84 and note by de Menthon, ibid., pp. 184-86. See also Pierre Daniel, "Les nouvelles regies relatives a la fixation des salaires par voie d'arbitrage," Dossiers de 1'Action Populaire, August, 1939, pp. 1297-1304. 37. See R. Bothereau, signed editorial, "Consequences des decrctslois sur la fixation des salaires," Peuple, May 3, 1939; resolution, C G T administrative committee, ibid., April 29, 1939; and editorials by Jouhaux, ibid., May 5 and July 12, 1939. For operation of the new instructions and labor protests, see ibid., July 8, 24, 27, 29, August 3 and 8, 1939. 38. Daniel, "Les nouvelles regies relatives ä la fixation des salaires," op. cit., p. 1303. The Court, incidentally, would not permit arbitrators to refer important questions to experts, such as accountants, except in extraordinary cases; see Droit Social, II (1939), 291—93. 39. The Statistique Gen£rale compiled the wage adjustments received by metallurgical workers in the various regions of France through November, 1938; see Bull, de la Stat. Gen., X X V I I I (1938-39), 25374; and for tabular summary, Revue d'Economie Politique, LI 11 (1939), 947. An analysis of fifteen of these areas has revealed the following: Compared to an average cost of living increase of about 48 per cent in the areas, the wage adjustments (on a weekly basis, with adjustment for the shorter work week) ranged from 23 per cent for skilled workers to 28 per cent for unskilled workers. Thus, as in the case of the 1936 Act, the cost of living increase was considerably higher than the wage increases. These findings tend to coincide with observations on the general trend of real wages in this period. As Ehrmann states, "Though the workers still had such important advantages as vacations with pay, and at least for a time, the 40-hour week, in general their real income was no higher than in the worst years of the depression" (The French Labor Movement from Popular Front to Liberation, p. 72). See also annual reports, "Mouvement des Salaires en France," Bull de la Stat. Gen.: for 1936, X X V I ( 1 9 3 6 - 3 7 ) , 260-79; for 1937, X X V I I ( 1 9 3 7 - 3 8 ) , 237-

NOTES TO CHAPTER 8

185

47; and for 1938, X X V I I I ( 1 9 3 8 - 3 9 ) , 240-48. For further details see Les caracteres contemporains du salaire; Statistique G£n6rale, Mouvement Economique en France de 1929 ά 1939; Alfred Sauvy and Pierre Depoid, Salaires et pouvoir d'achat des ouvriers et des fonctionnaires entre les deux guerres (Paris, 1940); Pierre Jean Lavirotte, L'evolution des salaires en France depuis la guerre (Langres, 1 9 3 9 ) ; and Bernard Debray, Taux de salaires: salaries reels et coüt de la main (foeuvre dans VIndustrie franqaise ( 1 9 3 0 - 1 9 3 8 ) (Paris, 1 9 3 9 ) . 40. See his speech to the I L O reprinted in La Voix du Peuple, June, 1939, p. 348. 4 1 . Rapport moral, C G T Nantes congress, ibid., July, 1938, p. 489. 42. See Peuple, January 29, March 10, May 6 and June 19, 1939. 43. Louis Saillant, ibid.. May 6, 1939. 44. Ibid., March 1 4 and 16, 1939. 45. Ibid., May 29 and 30, 1939. 46. See resolution, and statement by Henri Raynaud, ibid., June 6 and 7, 1939. 47. See ibid., March 23, 1939. 8. STRIKES UNDER THE COMPULSORY ARBITRATION S Y S T E M : T H E O R Y AND PRACTICE

1 . If attention is focused on strikes rather than on lockouts in the discussion that follows, it is because they were of far greater importance in this period of labor ascendancy. The inclusion of lockouts within the scope of the law was only natural, but was not of practical significance. 2. For a summary of these conflicting theses see the "conclusions" (i.e., recommendations to the Court) of Pierre Tissier, commissaire du gouvernement, in C S A decision No. 8 1 , May 16, 1938, Sieur Costa, Droit Social, I ( 1 9 3 8 ) , 2 4 8 - 5 1 . See also Thuveny, L'arbitrage obligatoire dans les conflits collectifs du travail et son introduction en France, pp. 178-209. 3. " L e droit de greve," Peuple, January 9, 1937. C f . his earlier article in Syndicats, December 18, 1936, an extract of which was read into the Senate debates, Senat, December 27, 1936, p. 1788; and see also by Belin, "Avantages, inconvenients, et limites de l'arbitrage obligatoire," Idee et Action, January, 1937, pp. 1 2 - 1 7 . Bel· 1 1 , who was at the time "secretaire-adjoint" of the C G T and leader of the anti-Communist elements in the organization, later became Vichy Minister of Labor. 4. Jouhaux, L'arbitrage obligatoire, pp. 1 2 - 1 5.

ι86

NOTES TO CHAPTER 8

5. This was especially stressed by Belin; see articles cited in note 3. The law of May 25, 1864, repealed the ban on labor combinations; the law of March 2 1 , 1884, repealed penalties under the Napoleonic Penal Code for acts resulting from combinations. Sec Saposs, The Labor Movement in Post-War France, pp. 180-84. 6. Georges Dumoulin, Populate, January 6, 1937, citcd by Thuveny, op. cit., p. 207. For later similar statement by the same labor leader, see speech at Lille, Peuple, March 1 3 , 1937. For similar statements on the subject, see speech by Jouhaux to C G T national council, ibid., December 8, 1936; and statements at congress of Union des syndicats de la region parisienne by Henri Raynaud and Benoit Frachon, ibid., February 6, 1937. 7. Le Temps expressed this view repeatedly; see editorials, "Arbitrage et droit de greve," December 4 , 1 9 3 6 ; " L e blocus des usines," December 14, 1936; " L e droit de gr6ve," January 7, 1937; and " L e vote de la Chambre," March 1 1 , 1937· For another pointed statement of this thesis by an employer representative, see Fargeaud, L'application des nouvelles lois sociales, pp. 9 8 - 1 1 1 . 8. Temps, editorial, "Arbitrage et droit de greve," December 4, 1936. 9. See Temps, editorials, " L a question posce," March 24, 1937; and " L e nouveau pouvoir," April 1 7 , 1937. 10. See especially Fargeaud, op. cit., pp. 9 8 - 1 0 6 . 1 1 . See Temps, January 20, 1937; for other statements by employer groups, ibid., February 4, March 5, April 10 and 22, May 9 and 1 5 , June 10 and 1 2 , 1937. For statement bv C G P F , ibid., April 22, 1937; and see also letter, Gignoux to Blum, ibid., May 14, 1937· A notable instance of refusal to comply with the procedures was by the director of the Manufacture frangaise d'armes et cycles at St. Etiennc; see statements and news stories, ibid., October 6, 9, 23, November 5 and 10, 1937. For defense of the latter's actions by the C G P F , see Fargeaud, op. cit., pp. 9 9 - 1 0 3 . 12. See statement by the C G P F announcing appeal to the Council of State of arbitration decision of April 14, 1937, in case of the Compagnie continentale des compteurs, Temps, April 22, 1937; and statement by attorney for Societe des Brasseries de la Meuse before Tribunal Correctionnel de Bar-le-Duc, ibid., May 2 1 , 1937· For summary of other appeals, see Olga Dulias, L'arbitrage obligatoire dans les conflits collectifs du travail (Paris, 1 9 3 8 ) , pp. 1 2 0 - 2 1 ; and Sarrano, La Cour Supeneure d'Arbitrage, p. 2 1 .

NOTES TO CHAPTER 8

13. Chambre, May 7, 1937, p. 1462. 14. Chambre, December 1, 1936, p. 3179· At the Riom trial Blum spoke of the law "that prohibited strikes and lockouts before attempts at conciliation and arbitration had run their course"; Leon Blum devant la Cour de Riom, p. 188. Cf. on this point, Thuveny, op. cit., pp. 2049; cf. however, for an interpretation supporting the employer thesis, Pelissou-Roubichou, L'arbitrage obligatoire dans les conflits entre patrons et ouvriers, p. 260. 15. See Paulin report, citcd in Chapter 4, note 26; and Duroux report, cited in Chapter 4, note 28. 16. CSA decision No. 81, May 16, 1938, Sieur Costa; Droit Social, I (1938),247-48. 17. See his "conclusions," in this decision, ibid., p. 250. 18. See, e.g., decision, Cour de Lyon, November 5, 1937, and note, ibid., pp. 61-62. 19. See decision cited in note 16. 20. CSA Nos. 1329 and 1333, July 3, 1939, Societe Forclum; see decision and "conclusions" of Pierre Tissier, commissaire du gouvernement, Droit Social, II (1939), 280-90. 21. "Conclusions" of Pierre Laroque, commissaire du gouvernement, 111 CSA No. 1188, May 19, 1939, Syndicat du Papier Carton de Seine et Seine-et-Oise; ibid., p. 84. 22. Ibid., p. 282. See also R. Savatier, "R£gime actuel dc la greve en droit frangais," ibid., pp. 266-68. The latter states that the right to strike was suppressed, but adds that, as in international law, no genuine sanctions were possible. 23. See ILO, The Conciliation and Arbitration of Industrial Disputes, 1927, p. 7. 24. See circular, Minister of Commerce, December 15, 1905, reprinted periodically; e.g., Min. du Trav., Statistique des greves et des recoursa l'arbitrage, 1 9 3 3 - 3 5 (P ans > 1939), p. 224. It is to be regretted that statistics on labor disputes, as opposed to statistics on strikes, are not available for the period before 1937. 25. For strike statistics, see Table 7, p. 1 1 0 ; for disputes reported, see data on arbitration system, Bull, du Min. du Trav., X L V (1938), 3 1 8 - 2 1 , 4 3 1 - 3 2 ; X L V I (1939), 65-70; and Revue Frangaise du Travail, I (1946), 443-46. 26. For this quotation and the statistics cited, see report by Marcel Vardelle for Chamber Labor Committee, Doc. Pari., Chambre, 1937,

ι88

NOTES TO CHAPTER

8

Annexe No. 2510, pp. 668-69. See also reports in Chamber by Jean Lebas and Jules Moch, Chambre, June 3, 1937, pp. 1778 and 1786. 27. Vardclle report, op. cif., p. 668. 28. Senat, December 27, 1936, p. 1783. 29. Ibid., December 31, 1937, p. 1457· 30. The percentage, if based on the disputes reported, rather than on the disputes settled, would be even lower—54 per cent. This is substantially lower than the 59 per cent figure calculated by Oualid at the end of 1938 on the basis of disputes reported to that date; sec "L'arbitrage obligatoirc en France," Revue d'Economie Politique, LI 11 (1939), 706. 31. See on this point the observations of a number of individuals who served as umpires: William Oualid, "L'arbitrage obligatoire en France," op. cit., pp. 682-84; the anonymous "Impressions d'un surarbitre," L'Europe Nouvelle, X X (October, 1937), 1 0 1 1 - 1 2 ; and Gaetan Pirou, "Impressions d'un surarbitre," Nouveaux Cahiers, January, 1939, pp. 1 0 - 1 2 . 32. Bull, du Min. du Trav., X L V I (1939), 69; and see "L'application des proc6dures d'arbitrage," Droit Social, II (1939), 44. 33. See ibid.; Oualid, "L'arbitrage obligatoire en France," op. cit., pp. 706-7; Lorch, Trends in European Social Legislation Between the Two World Wars, p. 108; and Daniel, "Les commissions departcmentales de conciliation," Dossiers de 1'Action Populaire, December, 1938, p. 1970. 34. See Temps and Peuple, December 15, 1937—January 9, 1938. For these and other strikes of the period see, in addition to the daily press, Roger Picard, " L e marchd du travail et le mouvement syndical," Revue d'Economie Politique, LII ( 1 9 3 8 ) , 956-76, and LIII (1939), 1351-69. The latter were contributions to the annual economic survey, "La France Economique," published by the Revue d'Economie Politique. 35. Peuple, December 16, 25, 26 and 27, 1937; Temps, December 16 and 25, 1937. For arbitration decision and additional statements by Chautemps, Temps, January 7, 1938. Gignoux sarcastically remarked at the fact that the Premier had to spend several days examining the conduct of a telephone repairman; C. J. Gignoux, "Le Statut moderne du travail," Revue Politique et Parlementaire, C L X X I V (February, 1938),p. 212. 36. See Chapter 9, p. 120, and note 4.

NOTES TO CHAPTER

189

9

37. See also Chapter 1 1 , pp. 138-39, and note 3. 38. Le Temps and Le Peuple periodically ran accounts of the strike in the period August 5—October 23, 1938. 39. Temps and Peuple, September 1 1 - 2 4 , J 93840. Peuple, March 22 and May 2, 1938. The Higher Court later annulled this decision upon petition of the Minister of Labor, J.O., Annexe, 1938, pp. 1081-82. 41. The outstanding example was the Lemairc ct Dillics textile plant; see Chapter 10, p. 132, and note 18. 42. See, e.g., statements by Croupe des industries metallurgiques, Temps, March 26, 27, 31 and April 31, 1938. 9. T H E

ARBITRATION

SYSTEM

INITIAL

AND T H E

NEGOTIATION

OF

CONTRACTS

1. Sec ILO, Conciliation and Arbitration, 1933, p. 137 and passim. 2. Bull, du Min. du Trav., X L V (1938), 193 and 330. 3. Sec, e.g., resolution by metallurgical workers in Paris region, Temps, March 14, 1938; Rend Belin, "A propos des greves," Peuple, April 2, 1938; Jouhaux, statement, ibid., April 14, 1938, and speech, Temps, April 2, 1938. Cf. Ehrmann, The French Labor Movement from Popular Front to Liberation, p. 74. 4. Temps, April 14 and 21, 1938; and Droit Social, I (1938), 203-4. 5. See Chapter 2, pp. 19-20. 6. For discussion of the problem, see "conclusions" of M. Fouan, commissaire du gouvernement, CSA No. 41, May 16, 1938, Droit Social, I (1938), 252-55; anonymous, "Note [sur] l'arbitrage des conflits relatifs a l'dtablissement d'une convention collective," ibid., pp. 1 5 1 - 5 4 ; P. H. Teitgen, "Note [sur] la conciliation et l'arbitrage des conflits du travail," ibid., p. 9; "Note [sur] l'arbitrage des conflits relatifs a retablisscment d'une convention collective," ibid., pp. 297-302; and C.C., "Le r£glement arbitral des conditions du travail," Temps, March 28, 1939. On the subject as a whole see also Philippe Caillaux, Pouvoir des arbitres d'elaborer et de modifier les conventions collectives de travail (Paris, 1939). 7. Droit Social, I ( 1 9 3 8 ) , 253. 8. See Caillaux, op. cit., p. 50. 9. For the preliminary agreement referred to, see Chapter 4, pp. 4 2 44. For a statement by a labor spokesman indicating that the system would not have been extended to new contracts, see A. Guigui, Le droit

190

NOTES TO CHAPTER

ΙΟ

de greve, Conferences de Γ Institut Superieur Ouvrier, No. 7 (Paris, 1 9 3 8 ) , p. 30. See also Andrd Philip, Le renouvellement des conventions collectives de travail, Confdrences de l'Institut Supbieur Ouvrier, No. 2 (Paris, 1 9 3 8 ) , p. 12 and pasnm. 10. Chambre, December 3 1 , 1936, p. 3468. 1 1 . See Chautemps' statement at Chamber Labor Committee hearings testifying to opposition of both management and labor, Temps, February 3, 1938; and cf. Caillaux, op. cit., pp. 37 and 48. 12. Senat, March 4, 1938, p. 310. 1 3 . Sec, e.g., Ygoulin arbitration decision, Droit Social, I ( 1 9 3 8 ) , 1 54; and Amiaud arbitration decision, ibid., p. 207. 14. For examples, see Caillaux, op. cit., p. 50. 15. Sec, e.g., Celier arbitration decision, March 28, 1938, and note; Droit Social, I ( 1 9 3 8 ) , 1 5 1 - 5 4 . For other decisions and comment, see ibid., pp. 207-8. 16. C S A No. 4 1 , May 16, 1938, Chambre syndicale des constructeurs de l'arrondissement du Havre, ibid., p. 252. 17. For a discussion of the system as it finally evolved, sec E.R., " N o t e , " ibid., p. 345. For a broad view of the problem and a statement that the solution adopted might indirectly interfere with collectivc bargaining, see Georges Scelle, "Limites du reglcmcnt arbitral," ibid., pp. 404-9. 18. For this and what follows, sec communique, Minist6rc des Travaux Publics, Temps, September 1 , 1938; and news stories and statements, ibid., July 19 and August 7-September 16, 1938. C f . on this strike, account by Georges Hourdin, Droit Social, I ( 1 9 3 8 ) , 358-59; and Picard, " L e march6 du travail et le mouvemcnt syndical," Revue d'Economie Politique, L I I I ( 1 9 3 9 ) , 1357. 19. For the Masselin decision, sec Temps, August 16, 1938. 20. Ibid., August 21, 1938. 21. Ibid. 1 0 . T H E E N F O R C E M E N T OF ARBITRATION DECISIONS: B E F O R E AND AFTER THE D E C R E E L A W S OF N O V E M B E R ,

1938

1. Speech to thirty-fifth Radical Socialist congress at Marseilles, Temps, October 28, 1938. 2. See Blum's statements, Chambre, December 1, 1936, p. 31S6. 3. On the latter, sec Ehrmann's comments, The French Labor Movement from Popular Front to Liberation, p. 48; and Lorch, Trends in

NOTES TO CHAPTER

ΙΟ

191

European Social Legislation Between the Two World Wars, p. 109. 4. See reports by Jean Lebas and Jules Moch, Chambre, June 3 , 1 9 3 7 , pp. 1 7 7 8 and 1786; and report by Marcel Vardelle for Chamber Labor Committee, Doc. Pari., Chambre, 1 9 3 7 , Annexe No. 2 5 1 0 , pp. 668-69. 5. Chautemps, Senat, December 3 1 , 1 9 3 7 , pp. 1 4 5 7 - 5 8 . A number of the decisions officially designated as violations were being disobeyed by employers pending the outcome of legal appeals. 6. However, a legal controversy related to the procedure was of considerable importance at the time. It concerned the legal nature of arbitration decisions under the 1936 Act. The question debated was: were such decisions automatically enforceable by the courts or was a writ of execution (exequatur) first necessary? The issue was eventually settled by the 1938 Act, which provided that the simple act of depositing a copy of the arbitration decision with the clerk of the Tribunal Civil in the area made it automatically enforceable by the courts with no writ of execution necessary. On the controversy over the exequatur and enforcement in general under the 1936 Act, see Pierre L. Katz, L'arbitrage obligatoire et 1'execution des sentences arbitrates (Paris, 1 9 3 8 ) , pp. 37— 62; Paul Reuter, "Comment obtenir l'exdcution d'une sentence arbitrale," and court decisions noted, Droit Social, I ( 1 9 3 8 ) , 62-69. See also official statement by Minister of Justice, October 1 1 , 1 9 3 7 , ibid., pp. 46-47. 7. As Duclos states, " T h e majority of arbitration decisions involve obligations not to give but to do . . . ;" "Commentaire de la loi du 4 mars 1 9 3 8 , " Dalloz Recueil Periodique, 1939, p. 187. C f . Andre Parodi, L'arbitrage dans les conflits du travail d'aprks la recente legislation frangaise (Paris, 1 9 3 9 ) , p. 1 2 3 . 8. This handicap upon the unions was partly removed under the 1938 Act, when they were permitted to act for their members in the case of arbitration decisions that had been extended by decree throughout an entire industry or area. Later, under the decree law of November 12, 1938, they were permitted to act for their members in all awards. See anonymous " N o t e , " Droit Social, I ( 1 9 3 8 ) , 192; Pierre-Henri Teitgen, " N o t e , " ibid., pp. 1 1 0 - 1 1 and pp. 366-67; and Katz, op. cit., pp. 94-9)· 9. See Katz, op. cit., pp. 53-54; and Parodi, op. cit., pp. 1 1 8 - 2 0 . 10. See decision of Tribunal Civil de Montpellier, March 18, 1938, and anonymous "Note," Droit Social, I ( 1 9 3 8 ) , 1 9 1 - 9 2 ; and Katz, op. cit., p. 54.

192

NOTES TO CHAPTER

ΙΟ

1 1 . This was part of the decision cited in note 10. The astreinte was in addition to the award of token damages. 12. For Moss6 decision, Katz, op. cit., pp. 81-82; for Court ruling on it, CSA decision No. 56, June 15, 1938, Societi Cotonniere du Sud Est, ibid., Appendix, pp. 134-36. 13. See CSA decision No. 238, October 26, 1938, Societe ά responsabilite limitee, Pasquet Fröres et Cie., and "conclusions," Pierre Tissier, Droit Social, I (1938), 380-85. The "conclusions" provide a good summary of the status of the enforcement problem on the eve of the November reforms. 14. For the cabinet and the ministerial declaration, Temps, April 12 and 1 3 , 1 9 3 8 . 15. The handling of the strike of the Champlain crcw in May was evidence of the new policy; see Temps, May 8, 9 and 10, 1938; and cf. Raymond Bouyer, "Ou veut-on en venir?" Peuple, May 9, 1938. In August Daladier made a radio speech announcing the modification of the forty hour week; see Temps, August 23, 1938. The action led to the resignation from the cabinet by Paul Ramadier and L. O. Frossard. For protests by the C G T , Peuple, August 23, 1938. For employer reaction, C. J. Gignoux, "Les ides d'octobre," Revue de Paris, L (1938), 2 9 1 300. See also Temps and Peuple, August-Octobcr, 1938. For the political changes of this period, see Gogucl, La politique des partis sous la II I e Republique, II, 301-5. 16. For these strikes, see Chapter 8, p. 1 1 7 , and notes 38 and 39 of that chapter. 17. See speech cited in note 1. 18. Temps, October 31, 1938 and Peuple, November 1, 1938. The union later claimed that this was a concession to prevent an impending strike in the textile industry of the Nord Department; Peuple, May 23, 1939. 19. For these decree laws see Temps, November 15, 1938. See especially the rapport general, which prefaced the entire body of decrec laws, and the rapport d'ensemble, which prefaced the body of social legislation. The decree law on conciliation and arbitration is reproduced in Bull, du Min. du Trav., X L V (1938), 357-58. Decree laws arc executive decrees in lieu of regular acts of the legislature, issued when the cabinet has temporary enabling powers, as was the case in November, 1938. They are subject to eventual approval by the legislature. 20. See rapport d'ensemble, Temps, November 15, 1938.

*93

NOTES TO CHAPTER 1 1

21. Katz, op. cit., p. 97. 22. See resolution on social legislation and C h e v a l m e report at C G T national congress at N a n t e s , Peuple, N o v e m b e r 22, 1938. For fear, however, that penal sanctions m i g h t be introduced to suppress the right to strike, see statement by Maurice Boitel, labor attorney, Humanite, October 7, 1938. 23. Speech to forty-second session, Conseil Superieur du Travail, on N o v e m b e r 21, Temps, N o v e m b e r 22, 1938. 24. For a discussion of the operation of the astreinte, see PierreHenri Teitgen, " N o t e , " Droit Social, I ( 1 9 3 8 ) , 367-68; Parodi, op. cit., pp. 1 2 4 - 2 8 . See also "conclusions" of M . Fouan, commissaire du gouvernement, in C S A N o . 906, M a r c h 1, 1939, Sieur Cominhks; Droit Social, II ( 1 9 3 9 ) , 2 0 7 - 1 2 . 2 ; . " C h r o n i q u e de droit ouvricr," V o i x du Peuple, January, 1939, p. 72. 26. P . H . T . (Pierre-Henri T e i t g e n ) , " N o t e , " Droit Social, II ( 1 9 3 9 ) , 254; and cf. Peuple, April 25, 1939. 27. See letter, Ministre des Finances to the C G T , M a y 2, 1939, Droit Social, II ( 1 9 3 9 ) , 254. 28. See P . H . T . , " N o t e , " cited in note 26. 29. For these results, C h a c h u a t , "L'arbitrage en France avant la guerre," Revue Frangaise du Travail, I ( 1 9 4 6 ) , 452. 30. S e e C S A N o s . 1329 and 1333, July 3 , 1 9 3 9 , Societe Forclum, and "conclusions" of Pierre Tissier, cited in C h a p t e r 8, note 20. 1 1 . T H E L A S T P H A S E : THE G E N E R A L STRIKE OF N O V E M B E R AND

30,

1938,

AFTER

1. Temps, June 1 7 , 1939. 2. See speech by Jouhaux and resolutions by C G T national congress, Peuple, N o v e m b e r 1 6 - 1 7 , 1938. 3. T h e most violent episodes occurred at the Renault plant, Temps, N o v e m b e r 26, 1938, and Peuple, N o v e m b e r 25, 1938. See radio speech by Daladier, N o v e m b e r 27, Temps, N o v e m b e r 29, 1938. For other episodes, ibid., N o v e m b e r 2 3 - 2 6 , 1938; cf. E h r m a n n , The French Labor Movement from Popular Front to Liberation, p. 1 1 5 . 4. Sec statement, and letter to the Premier, Peuple, N o v e m b e r 26 and 29, 1938. 5. See dccrce, report prefaced to it and telegram to the prefects, Temps, N o v e m b e r 30, 1938.

194

NOTES TO CHAPTER

11

6. Radio speech, November 30, Temps, December 2, 1938. 7. See Roger Picard, " L e marche du travail et le mouvement svndical," Revue d'Economie Politique, L I I I ( 1 9 3 9 ) , 1 3 5 2 - 6 0 , especially his citations of Blum, Frossard and others, admitting the failure of the strike. C f . Ehrmann, op. cit., p. 1 1 5 . 8. Communiquö, Premier's office, Temps, December 3, 1938; news stories, ibid., and December 7, 1938. 9. See statement by Minister of Labor Pomarct, Chambre, June 1 3 , 1939, p. 1 6 1 6 ; his earlier statement, ibid., February 7, 1939, p. 4 2 1 ; and Chachuat, "L'arbitrage en Prance avant la guerTe," Revue Frangaise du Travail, I ( 1 9 4 6 ) , 4 2 1 . 10. Communique, Premier's office, Temps, December 3, 1938; statements by Minister of Justice Marchandeau, ibid., January 1 3, 1939, and Chambre, February 3, 1939, p· 392. Cf. Picard, " L c marche du travail et le mouvement syndical," op. cit., pp. 1 3 6 0 - 6 3 . 1 1 . See appeal by government, Temps, December 3, 1938; statement by Daladier, ibid., December 4, 1938; and Ministry of Labor, circular to divisional labor inspectors, December 5 , 1 9 3 8 , Bull, du Min. du Trav., X L V (1938), 398^9. 12. See radio speech by Gignoux, Temps, December 4, 1938; and statements by employers' associations, ibid., December 7 and 14, 1938. 1 3 . Charles Pomaret, Chambre, June 1 3 , 1939, p. 1 6 1 6 ; for the second appeal by Daladier, Temps, March 24, 1939. 14. Jouhaux, letter to Premier, Peuple, December 3, 1938; statement, C G T national bureau, ibid., December 2, 1938; letter, national bureau to members of Parliament, ibid., December 8, 1938; Jouhaux, speech to C G T national council and resolution adopted, La Voix du Peuple, December, 1938, pp. 980-83. % January, 1939, the decision to withdraw was revoked for most commissions: see circular by Jouhaux, January 19, 1939, La Voix du Peuple, January, 1939, p. 55. Prom the outset the decision had been not to withdraw from arbitration bodies; see the resolution of the C G T national council, ibid., December, 1938, p. 983, and circular by Bclin, December 16, 1938, ibid., p. 1002. C f . Ehrmann, op. cit., p. 1 2 1 . 1 5 . See estimate by Ehrmann, ibid., p. 57 and p. 124. C f . Picard, " L e marche du travail et le mouvement syndical," op. cit., pp. 1 3 6 4 - 6 5 . 16. See letter, secretary, Union departemeniale, Seine Inferieure, to prefect, Seine et Marne, Peuple, December 15, 1938; and articles by Maurice Boitel, of the C G T legal staff, Humanite, Dcccmbcr 1 9 . 1938,

NOTES TO CHAPTER 11

*95

and Peuple, December 23, 1938. The employer arguments were expressed in the subsequent arbitration cases. Cf. Pierre Daniel, "Les consequences juridiques de la gr£ve du 30 novembre," Dossiers de Γ Action Populaire, March, 1939, pp. 499-508; and C.C., "Les suites de la greve du 30 novembre," Temps, February 26, 1939. 17. Chambre, February 7, 1939, p. 415. 18. Ibid., pp. 421-23. For June discussion, and opposition by Ministers Marchandeau, de Monzic and Pomaret, ibid., June 8, 1939, pp. 1 516-27 and 1537-45; and June 1 3 , 1939, pp. 1608-23. 19. Sec Daniel, "Les consequences juridiques de la greve du 30 novembre," op. cit., p. 499. 20. For the Sέgogne decision, January 14, 1939, Εconomats du Centre de Montpellier, Droit Social, II (1939), 73—74. 21. See statement by Marcel Roy, secretary, Fedhation des Metaux, Peuple, January 17, 1939. 22. See circular by R. Bothereau, "L'dvolution de la jurisprudence arbitrale en ce qui concerne la gr£ve gdn6rale," La Voix du Peuple, March, 1939, pp. 175-76. For these early decisions, and comment, see Droit Social, II (1939), 72-76 and 1 1 0 - 1 5 . 23. See, e.g., the RoyέΓe decision, January 28, 1939, ibid., p. 72; and cf. Daladier's statement of satisfaction in the Chamber, note 17. 24. See, e.g., the Blondel decision, January 31, 1939, Droit Social, " (i939)»7325. CSA No. 930, February 15, 1939, Economats du Centre de Montpellier. For decision, "conclusions" by Pierre Laroque, commissure du gouvernement, and note by Herbert Leroy-Jay, ibid., pp. 102-6. 26. "Conclusions," ibid., p. 104. 27. See decision, ibid., p. 102. 28. Gapail decision, February 14, 1939, ibid., pp. 1 1 2 - 1 3 . 29. Capeau decision, January 26, 1939, ibid., pp. 1 1 0 - 1 1 and "note" by N.F., ibid., p. 115. 30. CSA No. 1059, May 3, 1939, Etablissement Ach Freres, J.O., Annexe, 1939, p. 967; and for "conclusions" of Pierre Laroque, commissaire du gouvernement, Peuple, May 7, 1939. 31. See decision by Edouard Dolldans in Toulouse textile ease, August 19, Peuple, September 6, 1939. 32. On this question see Pierre Laroque, "conclusions," in CSA No. 1188, May 19, 1939, Syndicats du Papier-Carton de Seine et Seine-etOise, Droit Social, II (1939), 199-204; C.C., "La greve rompt-elle lc

ig6

NOTES TO CHAPTER 11

contrat du travail?" Temps, August 1 3 , 1939; and Paul Durand, " L e s efiets de la gr£ve sur le contrat de travail," Droit Social, X I ( 1 9 4 8 ) , 2 6 2 65. 33. See C S A decision N o . 1 1 8 8 , cited in note 32. 34. See Paul Durand, " F i n d'une controverse: les effets de la grevc sur le contrat de travail (I'article 4 de la loi du 1 1 fevrier 1 9 5 0 ) , " Droit Social, X I I I ( 1 9 5 0 ) , 1 1 8 - 2 6 ; see especially p. 1 2 1 . 35. Besides the decision cited in note 32, sec decisions headed "Pas maintien aux rembauchds des avantages acquis," Tableau Methodique for June, 1 9 3 9 , J.O., Annexe, 1 9 3 9 , pp. 1 1 3 8 - 4 0 . For labor reaction, see Peuple, May 27, 1939. 36. See Tableau Methodique and decisions cited for each month between February and June, 1939; JO., Annexe, 1939, pp. 595, 7 0 7 - 8 , 7 2 4 , 1 0 1 7 - 1 8 and 1 1 3 8 - 4 0 . 37. See C S A Nos. 1 0 3 6 and 1 0 6 5 , April 5, 1 9 3 9 , Etablissement Doitteau, ibid., p. 7 1 5 ; and cf. Peuple, March 1 3, 1939. 38. Chambre, June 1 3 , 1939, p. 1 3 2 1 . 39. See, e.g., statements in Peuple, April 24, May 5 and June 18, 1939. 40. T h e most important of these was the strike of the Normandic crew, which spread to the entire Merchant Marine. Severe penalties were meted out. See Temps, December 5, 6, 1 2 and 16, 1938. 4 1 . See Bull, du Min. du Trav., X L V I ( 1 9 3 9 ) , 87; other 1 9 3 9 issues found it possible to omit the section on "Statistique des gr£ves." C f . Oualid, " L a legislation sociale," Revue d'Economie Politique, LIII ( 1 9 3 9 ) , 1 3 7 0 - 7 1 ; Ehrmann, op. cit., p. 1 2 2 ; and statement by Minister of Labor Pomaret cited in note 1. 42. See speech cited in note 1. For a similar testimonial, however, to the importance of the arbitration system, see Pierre Tissier, I Worked with Laval (London, 1 9 4 2 ) , p. 108. Despite its lurid title, this is a valuable book of reminiscences on prewar France by a member of the Council of State assigned to the Higher Court of Arbitration. For the political atmosphere of 1939, see especially Goguel, La politique des partis sous la Ille Republique, II, 3 0 5 - 1 8 . 43. C f . Chachuat, op. cit., p. 440. 44. Gauthier, minutes of congress, Union departementale du Nord, Peuple, February 26, 1939. 45. Georges Dumoulin, ibid. 46. Ibid., June 3, 1939.

NOTES TO CHAPTER

11

197

47. Dumoulin, C G T national council meeting, ibid., July 10, 1939. It is not impossible that in part this opposition was related to growing disunity within the C G T . 48. J. Vercruvsse, report on social legislation, congress, Federation Nationale du Textile, ibid., June 24, 1939. C f . report by E. Aubert at the same congrcss; ibid., June 22, 1939. 49. Minutes, annual congress, Federation du Livre, ibid., July 19, 1939. 50. Resolution, Syndicat des ouvriers raffineurs et sucriers de la region parisienne, ibid., June 9, 1939· For statements by other unions, ibid., July 19, and August 7 and 25, 1939. 51. Rapport moral, C G T , Nantes congress, La Voix du Peuple, July, 1938, p. 489; adopted at Nantes congress, ibid., December, 1938, p. 962. C f . Chapter 7, pp. 1 0 1 - 2 , and note 4 1 . 52. That is why the protests of Jouhaux and Bothereau were directed principally against such features as restrictions on wage adjustments; see editorials citcd in Chapter 7, note 37. 53. For expressions of labor sentiment advocating retention of the system with changes, see statement by A. Gazier at congress of Union des syndicats de la region parisienne, Peuple, March 1 1 , 1939; by Jouvance, report to congress, Union departementale, Loire Inferieure, ibid., April 27, 1939; by Delobelle, secretary, at congress of Federation Nationale Ouvriere du Textile and resolution adopted, ibid., June 23 and 26, 1939; by Louis Saillant, secretary, Federation du Bois, ibid., April 1 2 and May 6, 1939. See also statements by other unions and union officials, Peuple: December 20, 1938; January 23, 25, March 20, May 2, 27, June 2 1 , July 8, 14, 24, 25 and August 1 7 , 1939. 54. La Voix du Peuple, March, 1939, p· 149. 55. This is the article by Maurice Chachuat, cited in note 9 and referred to in Chapter 1 , note 1 , as an important recent contribution to the subject. 56. Ibid., p. 446. 57. See Chapter 8, p. 1 1 6 , and notes 31 and 32 of that chapter. 58. C S A Nos. 458 and 674, J.O., Annexe, 1939, pp. 1 5 and 1 7 9 - S 0 . See C . C . , " L e röle des arbitres choisis par les parties," Temps, February 23, 1939. 59. Sec comment by prefect of the Seine, Chachuat, op. cit., p. 4 5 1 . 60. Sec statements, ibid., pp. 4 5 1 - 5 2 . 61. Prefect of the Seine, ibid., p. 4 5 1 .

NOTES TO CHAPTER

198 6 2 . F o r decree l a w a n d n o t e , Droit

Social,

11

II ( 1 9 3 9 ) , 339.

6 3 . F o r w a r t i m e c h a n g e s , see d e c r e e l a w of N o v e m b e r 10, 1 9 3 9 , a n d n o t e b y P a u l D u r a n d , " L a revision des c o n d i t i o n s du travail," ibid., 3 6 0 - 6 9 . See also, f o r o t h e r c h a n g e s , ibid.,

pp.

pp. 370-73. C f . Ehrmann,

op. cit., p p . 1 8 2 - 8 6 a n d R . Jaussaud, " L e regime des salaires ouvriers e n F r a n c e , " Droit

Social,

VIII

( 1 9 4 5 ) , 391.

6 4 . See P . C h a m b e y r o n , " L e n o u v e a u r£gime des salaires," Social,

III ( 1 9 4 0 ) , 6 6 - 7 0 , P . D . , " N o t e , " ibid.,

Droit

p. 190; Paul D u r a n d ,

" L a ^ o r g a n i s a t i o n des j u r i d i c t i o n s d u travail," ibid.,

VI (1943),

318-

30, 3 6 3 - 7 0 ; P a u l P i c a n d Jean K r 6 h e r , Le nouveau

droit ouvrier

fran-

gais (Paris, 1 9 4 3 ) , p p . 3 4 1 - 4 7 ; a n d E h r m a n n , op. cit., pp. 1 8 2 - 8 6 a n d pp. 239-44. 6 5 . See Jean B r e t h e d e la G r e s s a y e , " L e n o u v e a u Statut des c o n v e n tions collectives d e t r a v a i l , " Droit

Social,

X

(1947),

103-14;

Leon

B u q u e t , "Salaires, n i v e a u de vie e t p o l i t i q u e des p r i x , " ibid., X I ( 1 9 4 8 ) , 523-30; Marcel Dufriche, " R e t o u r aux conventions collectives,"

Revue

Frangaise

Notes

du Travail,

Documentaires

II ( 1 9 4 7 ) , 1 0 7 - 1 5 ; a n d M i n . d u T r a v . ,

et Etudes,

N o . 6 1 8 , M a y 9 , 1 9 4 7 , p. 20.

66. A m o n g t h o s e u r g i n g t h i s was Professor Paul D u r a n d , editor of Droit

Social.

See his editorial, " V e r s le r6tablissemcnt des procedures

d e c o n c i l i a t i o n et d ' a r b i t r a g e , " Droit

Social,

XI (1948), 354-55· Cf.

Joseph D a n e l , " U n e i n s t i t u t i o n oublide; la conciliation et I'arbitragc," ibid.,

V I I I ( 1 9 4 5 ) , 2 3 2 - 3 5 ; a n d Jean R i v e r o , " L a r e g l e m c n t a t i o n de la

g r e v e , ibid., X I ( 1 9 4 8 ) , 58—65. 6 7 . F o r t h e A c t of F e b r u a r y 1 1 , 1 9 5 0 , see ibid., X I I I ( 1 9 5 0 ) ,

104-

9 . F o r discussion of t h e n e w system, Paul D u r a n d , " L a loi d u

11

f£vrier 1 9 5 0 sur les c o n v e n t i o n s collectives d u travail," ibid., p p . 9 3 - 1 0 1 a n d 1 5 5 - 6 2 ; a n d Jean R i v e r o , " C o n c i l i a t i o n et arbitrage dans la loi du 1 1 ί έ ν τ ί ε Γ 1 9 5 0 , " ibid., t i o n of C o m p u l s o r y

p p . 1 4 5 - 5 1 . See also Joel C o l t o n , " T h e R e j e c -

Arbitration

in F r a n c e : T h e

S e t t l e m e n t of L a b o r D i s p u t e s , " The

Arbitration

1950 Law

Journal,

VI

on

4 2 - 4 9 ; a n d A d o l f S t u r m t h a l , " C o l l e c t i v e B a r g a i n i n g in F r a n c e , " dustrial

and Labor Relations

Review,

I V ( 1 9 5 1 ) , 236-48.

the

(1951), In-

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Index Agriculture, 46, 173*134 Appeals, 56-57, 65-68; see also Higher Court of Arbitration Arbitration, compulsory, vii-viii, 1 7 , 22; definition and types of, 1-3, 1 1 9 , 128; international experience with and controversy over, 1-4; in Francc before 1 9 3 6 , 6-7, 8-9, 1 1 ; and 1 9 3 6 collective bargaining act, 1 5 , 19-20; principle introduced in 1 9 3 6 currency act, 40-41; since 1 9 3 9 , 15455; see also Arbitration system, French Arbitration, voluntary, 1 , 6, 22, 35, 1 5 5 ; in commercial disputes, 47 Arbitration system, French ( 1 9 3 6 3 9 ) , vii, viii, 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 1 4 , 7 3 ; authorized under 1 9 3 6 currency act, 39-41; bill debated in Parliament, 44-46; original system ( 1 9 3 6 A c t ) , 40-52; renewed, 53-55; original system criticized, 55-57; initial reform, 57; again renewed, 59-61; permanent system ( 1 9 3 8 A c t ) , 6270; general comments on, 70, 86, 103, 108-109, 126-27, 1 3 7 , 1 5 3 , 1 5 5 ; changes under 1 9 3 8 decrce laws, 1 3 2 - 3 5 ; importance after 1 9 3 8 general strike, 1 4 1 - 4 8 , 149; reforms suggested in 1 9 3 9 , 1 5 1 - 5 3 ; status since 1 9 3 9 , 1 5 3 - 5 5 ; see also Dismissals; Enforcement of arbitration awards; Negotiation of initial contracts; Strikes; W a g e adjustments Arbitrators, two-man labor-manage-

ment boards (arbitres): before 1 9 3 6 , 4; differentiated from final umpires (surarbitres), 47, 50, 6 3 , 173Π35; methods of selecting, 50, 5 1 , 63-65, 1 7 3 0 4 1 ; poor results, 1 1 6 , 1 5 2 ; Court ruling on, 1 5 2 - 5 3 ; see also Umpires Astreinte, 1 3 0 , 1 3 3 , 1 3 5 - 3 7 ; x e a ' s o Enforcement of arbitration awards Australia, 3, 1 0 5 , 1 8 2 0 6 Bank employees, Paris, 22 Bank of France, 1 1 , 1 4 0 Belin, Ren£, 1 8 5 1 1 3 ; quoted, 1 0 5 Bidault government, 1 5 4 Blum, L i o n , 29, 58, 59, 82, 1 1 6 , 1 2 2 , 149, 1 5 5 , 1 7 0 0 3 , 174Π6; at R i o m trial on arbitration system, vii; becomes Premier in midst of spring 1 9 3 6 sitdown strikes, 1 2 ; acts in sitdown strikes, 1 5 - 2 5 ; Matignon agreement, 15-18; dilemma in autumn strikes, 34; obtains authorization for compulsorv arbitration, 39-41; fails to establish system by labor-management agreement, 4 1 44; defends arbitration bill in Parliament, 45-46, 47, 48; fails to get voluntary renewal of system, 54; fall of first cabinet, 54; on right to strike under arbitration law, 1 0 7 , 187Π14; second cabinet, 1 1 2 , 1 1 7 , 1 2 0 , 1 3 1 ; on jurisdiction of arbitration system over initial contracts, 1 2 1 ; on 1 9 3 8 general strike, 1 3 9 ; on "neutralization," 1 6 9 0 3 6

214 Bridges, Roads and Mines, Department of, 50 Brin, Pierre, arbitration decision, 83, 1807130

Bulletin du Ministbe du Travail, 113, 158716, 1647135

Cahen-Salvador, Georges, 50, 168Π22 Caillaux, Joseph, 40 Canada, 2 Candymakers, Paris, 34 Capitant, Henry, 51 Capitant, Keni, 93 Categories of workers, and wage increases, 80-81, 90-92, 93-94 Cazes, Daniel, 93 C F T C (Confederation Frangaise des Travailleurs Chretiens), 8, 9, 24, 28, 45, 48, 49, 1657137 C G P F (Confederation Generale du Patronat Frangais [formerly, de la Production Franfaise]), 9, 1 8 , 35, 48, 50, 54, 1 2 1 , 1 7 1 Π 1 7 ; signs Matignon agreement, 16; criticism of Matignon agreement, 18; reorganizes and changes name, 28; breaks off second Matignon conferences, 41-43; attitude to original arbitration system, 51-52; rejects bids to new conferences, 58-59; on right to strike under arbitration law, 105-106 C G T (Confederation Generale du Travail), 1 3 , 20, 22, 24, 28, 54, 59, 8 1 , 1 2 1 , 1 5 3 ; early history, 7-8; 1906 resolution on compulsory arbitration, 8; united with C G T U , 1 1 ; signs Matignon agreement, 16; membership changes ( 1 9 3 6 - 3 7 ) , 26-27; proposals in autumn 1936 strikes, 34-38, 44, 48, 1687129; at second Matignon conferences, 36, 41-44; r ° l c ' n arbitration system, 45, 48-50; initial attitude to original arbitration system, 51; criticisms of original system, 57-58; dissatisfaction with wage adjustment formula, 1 0 1 - 1 0 3 ; on right to strike

INDEX under arbitration law, 105; statement of Bouches du Rhöne official, 1 2 5 ; on enforcement of decisions, 1 3 4 , 1 3 6 , 1 5 1 ; 1938 general strike, 138-41; use of arbitration system after general strike, 141-48; no strikes in 1939, 148-49; dissatisfaction in 1939 with arbitration system and reforms sought, 149-52 C G T U (Confederation Generale du Travail Unitaire), 8, 1 1 , 1 3 Chamber Labor Committee, 44, 60, 62, 89, 107 Chamberlain, Neville, 1 3 9 Chamber of Deputies, 6, 12, 15, 1 7 ; substitutes compulsory arbitration for sliding wage proposal, 39-41; debates original compulsory arbitration bill, 44-46; debates permanent arbitration bill, 62, 87, 89; proposals on reinstatements after 1938 general strike, 142, 1 4 7 Chambers of Commerce, 24, 48, 1 3 3 Chautemps, Camille, 1 1 6 , 149; succeeds Blum as Premier, 54; first change in arbitration system, 57; fails to get agreement on reform of arbitration system, 58-59; proposes "Modern Labor Code," 58, 61-62; forms second cabinet, 6 1 ; defends permanent arbitration bill in Parliament, 53, 62; on wage adjustment clause, 87, 89; personal intervention in 1 9 3 7 strikes, 1 1 7 ; on arbitration system and initial contracts, 122 Chemical industry, Paris, 92; Marseilles, 1 1 7 Christian trade unions, see C F T C Civil judgments, 129 Civil Service, 47, 66 Collective bargaining, 1 1 , 1 2 , 14; before 1936 ( 1 9 1 9 A c t ) , 9-10, 18-19; 1 9 3 6 Act and application, 18 2 1 , 27, 79; provision for extension of contracts throughout an industry, 19, 63; expiration and renewal of contracts by law, 53-55, 6 0 6 1 ;

INDEX changes under 1938 decree laws, j 34; in 1939, 148-49; since 1939, 153-54; ' n agriculture, 1737134; see also Negotiation of initial contracts Comite des Forges, 9, 1 7 1 m 7 Commissaires du gouvernement, 66; see also Higher Court of Arbitration Commission departementale dc conciliation, see Departmental Conciliation Boards Commission inter-professionnelle de conciliation, see National Interindustry Conciliation Board Commission mixte departementale de conciliation, see Joint Departmental Conciliation Boards Commission mixte paritaire de conciliation, see Joint (Industry) Conciliation Boards Commission nationale de conciliation, see National Conciliation Board Commission paritaire de conciliation, see Joint Conciliation Boards Commission superieure du cout dc la vie, 73 Communists and Communist party, 7-8, io, 81; oppose compulsory arbitration in June, 1936, 20; seek sliding wage scale in devaluation act, 40; cause fall of Chautemps cabinet, 6 1 ; criticize arbitration system in 1939, 147; seek sliding wage scalc in 1938 arbitration act. 1 8 1 m , 183Π30 Conciliation, compulsorv, 17, 104, 1641127; French proposals before 1936, 6, 8, 9; proposed by C G T in 1936, 35, 36; part of French arbitration svstem, 46, 48-50, 51, 57, 70; adopted in 1950, 154-55; x e also Arbitration, Compulsory; Arbitration svstem, French Conciliation, voluntary, 1 Confederation Gdnirale du Patronat Fran?ais (formerly, de la Production Franfaise), see C G P F

215 Confederation Generale du Travail, see C G T Conf£d£ration Generale du Travail Unitaire, see C G T U Conseils de prud'hommes (labor courts), history and functions, 7, 56; in enforcing arbitration awards, 129-31, 133, 134; importance after 1938 general strike, 1 4 1 , 147; suggested in 1939 as model for arbitration system, 152, 153 Construction industry, 9, 33, 99, 1 1 7 , '31 Contract, individual employment, 7; effect of strikes on in French law, 139, 1 4 1 , 144, 145-46 Cost of living, rise in, 26, 29-33, 74» 84; indexes, 1 9 3 5 - 3 9 , tab., 30; composition of indexes discussed, 72-74; indexes criticized by unions, 102103; see also Prices Council of State (Conseil d'Etat), arbitrators chosen from, 34, 50, 142; relation to Higher Court of Arbitration, 65-66; appeals of arbitration decisions, 106 Cour de Cassation, arbitrators chosen from, 34, 50; relation to Higher Court of Arbitration, 65; appeals of arbitration decisions, 106 Cour Superieure d'Arbitrage, see Higher Court of Arbitration Court of Accounts, 34, 50 Court of Appeals, 50, 64 Courts, law. 57, 67; and enforcement of awards, 129, 130, 135, 1 3 7 Croizat, Ambroisc, 20 Daladier, Edouard, 149, 1 9 2 m 5; 1938 strikes, 1 1 2 , 1 1 7 , 138-39; forms cabinet, 1 3 1 ; on enforcement of arbitration awards, 132; 1938 decree laws, 132-35; 1938 general strike, 139-42 Decree laws of November 30, 1938, 128, 132-35; defined, i 9 2 n i 9 Dclfau, Albert, 66 De Monzie, Anatole, 125, 1 2 6

INDEX

2l6 Departmental

Conciliation

Boards,

2 4>

33· 3 5 - 4 8 " 4 9 . 6 3 - 1 0 9> " 4 . l 5 ° D e p a r t m e n t stores, Paris, 22 Depression, economic, 8, 10-11, 109 D e S i g o g n e , Henry, 142, 143, 1 4 7 Devaluation, currency, 32, 38, 39-41,

57. 86 Dismissals, 45, 56, 1 1 1 , 129, 132; after 1938 general strike, 139-40, 141-48 Disputes, commercial, 47 Disputes, labor, 44, 4 ; , 46, 1 1 2 ; settlement of, 1-4; "rights" vs. "interests," 3, 68; distinction between " c o l l e c t i v e " and "individual," 7, 56, 68-69, 141-43; statistics on ( 1 9 3 6 - 3 9 ) , 1 1 2 - 1 6 , tab., 1 1 4 Dockers, Dunkirk, 22; Marseilles, 12427 Dollöans, Edouard, 145 D o r m o y , Marx, 167020, 17406 Droit Social, χ D u c h e m i n , Ren6 P., 28, 162Π7, 171Π19 D u m o u l i n , Georges, quoted, 150, 169033 Durafour bill, 6 Dyeworkers, Paris, 84 Electrical industry, 28, 34 Employers, 32, 45; attitude to compulsory arbitration, 3, 9, 42, 155; criticisms of Matignon agreement, 18; attitudes in sitdown strikes after June, 1936, 21, 27-29, 33; on right to strike under arbitration law, 105-106; lack of cooperation with arbitration system, 1 1 7 - 1 8 ; violations of arbitration decisions, 129, 1 3 1 , 132; rights upheld by arbitrators, 137; oppose use of arbitration system after 1938 general strike, 1 4 1 ; see also C G P F E m p l o y m e n t practices, proposals t o regulate, 54, 58, 59, 60, 61 E n f o r c e m e n t of arbitration awards, 2, 1 5 1 , 155; public opinion as sanc-

tion, 44, 51, 104; other sanctions before November, 1938, 128-31, 1 9 1 0 6 ; penalties under 1938 decree law, 1 3 1 - 3 7 , 149 England, 39 Equity, 4 7 , 68, 7 1 , 7 2 Executive branch of government, 45, 5 ' . *>5 Exequatur, 19106 Family allowances, 79-80, 95. 99, 100 Fascism and fascist organizations, 101 1 , 28, 35 Faure, Paul, 22, 167020 Fevrier, ΑηάΓέ, 1 7 4 0 6 Finance, Ministry of, 22, 1 3 1 , 136 Forty hour week: Popular Front economic reform, 10, 12, 18, 14p; in labor costs, 29, 31-32, 86; adjustment for in c o m p u t i n g wage gains, 82, 83, 85, 180032; under Daladier, 1 3 1 , 132, 1 9 2 0 1 5 ; and unemployment, 1 6 7 0 1 7 Fourth Republic, 146, 154. 18206 Frachon, Benoit, quoted, 163020 Franc, see Devaluation, currency Frossard, L . O . , 1 9 2 0 1 5 General strike, as syndicalist weapon, 7; of N o v e m b e r 30. 1938. 128, 136, 138-41; use of arbitration system after 1938 strike, 141-48 Germanv (Weimar Republic), 3 Gignoux, C l a u d e Joseph, 43, 52, 140, 188035; on M a t i g n o n a er cement. 18; becomes new president of C G P F , 18. 28 Giraud award, 120 G o o d r i c h tire plant, strike, 6 1 , 1 1 7 G o v e r n m e n t placement bureaus, 61 Grimpret, Cvrille, 66 Grünebaum-Ballin, Paul, 50, 66 G u i n a n d , Pierre, 50 Higher C o u r t of Arbitration ( C o u r Supericure d ' A r b i t r a g c ) , ix, x, 106, 122, 142, 147, 153; created under

INDEX 1938 Act, 65-68; membership, 66; rulings on wage adjustment clause, 87, 88, 89, 90-92, 94, 96-97, 9 9 ,

101, 102; on right to strike under arbitration law, 107-108; on jurisdiction of arbitration system over initial contracts, 120, 123; on enforcement procedure, 130-31, 137; on dismissal cases after 1938 general strike, 143-46; on effect of strikes on employment contract, 145-46; on labor-management arbitration boards, 152; on use of experts by arbitrators, 1847138 Hotel and restaurant industry, Paris, ,33 L'Humanite, 20 Industrial production, index, 10, 12, 32 Industrial relations, 3, 118, 155; " M o d e m Labor C o d e , " 58, 61-62, 122 Inflation, 29, 31-32, 76-77, 7 8 , 85-86

Insurance company employees, Paris, 22, 84

Inter-Departmental Conciliation Board, 49 Interior, Ministry of, 22, 24, 174Π6 International Exposition of 1937, Paris, 54, 55 International Labor Organization, 50, 138, 148, 149

Investigation, compulsory, 2 Jacomet, Robert, 50; arbitration awatd, 120 Jacquier, Paul, 89; quoted, 122 Jaurcs, Jean, 8 Joint Conciliation Boards, 63 Joint Departmental Conciliation Boards, 24, 33; see also Departmental Conciliation Boards Joint (Industry) Conciliation Boards, 49 Jouhaux, Leon, 8, 27, 140; on Matignon agreement, 17, 162Π10; on

217 compulsory arbitration, 36, 37; second Matignon conferences, 42, 44; on right to strike under the arbitration law, 105 Judiciary, 4, 32-34, 50, 51, 65 Justice of the peace, 4, 5 Kansas, 3 Labor and labor movement, and compulsory arbitration, 3, 8, 154; organizations before 1936, 7-8; attitudes to rulings of Higher Court, 69, 91, 92, 97; violations of arbitration decisions, 129, 131; attitude to arbitration system after 1938 general strike, 147-48; see also CGT; CGTU; CFTC Labor costs, 29, 31-32, 79, 86 Labor inspectors, 5, 21, 22, 23, 49, 140

Labor, Ministry of, ix, 49, 55, 124, 126, 150; in mediation and mediation proposals before 1936, 5, 6; role in 1936 collective bargaining act, 15, 19-20; warns in 1936 on excessive reliance on arbitration, 22; creates Joint Departmental Conciliation Boards, 23-24; empowered to name arbitrators and umpires under 1938 Act, 64-65; special appeal power, 67-68; on reinstatements after 1938 general strike, 140, 142, 146, 147 Lambert-Ribot, Alfred, 101 Laroque, Pierre, 66, 145; on right to strike under arbitration law, 108; on general strike, 144 Latin American countries, 3 Lebas, Jean, 167020 Le Corre, Darius, quoted, 147 Lcmaire et Dillies textile plant, 132 "Liquidation" of cumulative fine, '35> »37 Lockouts, 2, 1 1 7 , 132, 1 8 5 m ; see also Strikes

2x8 Loriot, Μ . , 66 L o u c h e u r bill, 6 M a c h i n e trades workers, Meurthe-etMoselle, 84 M a r i t i m e fisheries, 7 Masselin, M . , 1 2 4 , 1 2 ; M a t i g n o n , agreement of June 8, 1 9 3 6 , 14, 15-18, 20, 2 1 , 28, 43, 53, 79, 120; blanket w a g e increase, 16, 27, 29, 33, 8 1 , 84, 85; second conferences, 36, 38, 1 7 1 Π 1 3 ; collapsc of second conferences, 41-44; C h a u t e m p s twice fails t o arrange n e w conferences, 58-59 M a t t e r , Paul, 34, 50 M a u r e t t e , Fernand, 50 M e d i a t i o n , g o v e r n m e n t , in labor disputes, 1-4; in F r a n c e before 1 9 3 6 , 4-7; in 1 9 3 6 strikes, 1 5 , 21-25, t a ^ · · 23, 33-34; under C G T original plan, 35; statistics o n disputes settled w i t h and w i t h o u t governm e n t intervention, 1 1 3 - 1 6 , tab., 1 1 4 ; outside official system, 1 1 6 - 1 7 , 126; after 1938 general strike, 140, 142; arbitration a n d conciliation confused in press, 1 6 4 ^ 4 ; see also Arbitration system M e r c h a n t marine, 7 , 196Π40 Metallurgical industry, 9 , 18, 33; strikes, N o r d D e p a r t m e n t , 34, 4 1 ; Paris workers, w a g e a d j u s t m e n t s t h r o u g h arbitration, 81-85, tab., 83, 86, 99-100, i8ori32; Ardennes workers, 84; B c t h u n e and Arras, 9 3 , 98; wage adjustments c o m p a r e d to cost of living in fifteen selected areas, 1847139 M i l l e r a n d bill, 6 Minimum vital, 79, 100, 103, 182Π6; debated in Parliament (Article 10, 1 9 3 8 A c t ) , 88-90; interpreted b y Higher C o u r t of Arbitration, 90-92; interpretations bv arbitrators, 929 5 ; related wage problems, 95-99; in final a d j u s t m e n t f o r m u l a , 9 9 - 1 0 1 M i n i m u m wages, in collective con-

INDEX tracts, 19, 2 7 , 79; see also Minimum vital " M o d e r n L a b o r C o d e , " 58, 6 1 - 6 2 , 122 M o n m o u s s e a u , M . , 20 Mosse, R o b e r t , 76, 1 3 0 " M o s t representative" organizations, 19, 49-50, 69 M u n i c h Pact, 1 3 1 N a t i o n a l C o n c i l i a t i o n Board, 63 National Economic Council (Conscil N a t i o n a l E c o n o m i q u e ) , 49-50, 6 7 , 122 National Industrial Recovery Act (United States), 17 N a t i o n a l Inter-Industry C o n c i l i a t i o n B o a r d , 49 N e g o t i a t i o n of initial contracts, role of g o v e r n m e n t in, 3, 1 5 , 62; in 1 9 3 6 , 27; in 1938, 1 1 2 , 123; jurisdiction of arbitration svstcm over negotiation disputes, 119-24 " N e u t r a l i z a t i o n " of struck plants proposed, 38, 42, 1697136 N e w Zealand, 3 O u a l i d , W i l l i a m , 51; on avoiding wage-price spiral, 76; on wage award to Paris metalworkers, 80-81, 83; 011 minimum vital, 94 Parliament, 15, 16, 59, 154; 1936 A c t debated, 44-46; 1938 A c t debated, 62, 9 8 Patrons, soyez des patrons ( G i g n o u x ) , 28 he Peuple, x, 20, 102 P i c h a t , G e o r g e s , 66 P o m a r e t , Charles, 132, 142, 149; on e n f o r c e m e n t of awards, 134-35; on absence of strikes in 1939, 138, 148 Le Populaire, 52, 174Π44 Popular Front, vii, viii, 5, 9, 41, 105. 109; origin, program and election victory, 10-12; 1 9 3 6 spring strikes create critical situation, 12-25; dil e m m a in a u t u m n 1936 strikes, 26-

INDEX 35; theories on price rises, 29, 3132; devalues currency, 39-40; changes in and break-up, 54-55, 6 1 , 1 3 1 ; as economic experiment, viii, 86, 181*136 Prefects, mediation in strikes, 5, 2122, 23; functions in arbitration system, 45, 48-49 ( 1 9 3 6 Act), 63-64 ( 1 9 3 8 A c t ) , 1 1 3 ; recommendations on arbitration system, 152-53 Premier, role in naming arbitrators, 5°. 5 1 - 64 Prices, rise in ( 1 9 3 6 - 3 8 ) , 26, 29-33, 35, 39, 4 1 , 74; retail price indexes, 1 9 3 5 - 3 9 , tab., 3 1 ; government price control, 32-33; leveling off in 1939, 148; see also Cost of living Public opinion, 57, 128-29 Public Works, Ministry of, 125 Radical Socialists and Radical Socialist party, in Popular Front, 10, 27, 4 1 ; oppose sliding wage scale, 3940; Chautemps cabinets, 54, 6 1 ; Daladicr cabinet, 1 3 1 , 1 3 2 Railroads, French, 7 Ramadier, Paul, 124-25, 126, 176Π17, 1 9 2 m 5; on wage adjustment clause, 89; on compulsory arbitration, 125 Rapporteurs, 66, 68; see also Higher Court of Arbitration Reinstatements, see Dismissals Requisition, government, 125-27, 139 Retroactivity, in wage awards, 75, 7778 Revnaud, Paul, 1 3 1 , 138 Riom trial, vii, 1 5 7 m , 1871114 Rist, Charles, 51 Salengro, Roger, 22. 24-25 Sanctions, see Enforcement of arbitration awards Sarraut, Albert, 15, 1 7 6 m 7 Scandinavian countries, 3 Scherdlin, Edmond, 66 Scgogne award, 142-43 Senate, 6; opposition to Popular

219 Front, 18, 45-46, 54, 59; see also Parliament Sens-Olive, Joseph, 66 Shop representation (shop stewards), 12, 27, 45, 56, 6 1 , 1 1 1 Siegfried, Andr£, 51 Sitdown strikes, in spring of 1936, 1225; Blum on, 1 5 ; Salengro on, 2425; in autumn of 1936, 26-33; "neutralization" proposal, 38, 169η36; in 1 9 3 7 - 3 8 , 1 1 2 , 1 1 6 - 1 7 , 1 3 1 , 138-39 Slaughterhouse workers, Paris, 106 Sliding wage scale, sought by labor, 38-39, 87, 120; rejected in 1936 devaluation act, 39-40; in arbitration decisions ( 1 9 3 7 ) , 75, 78; under 1938 arbitration act, 87-89, 102, 183Π30 Socialists and Socialist party, 10, 1 2 , 40, 52, 61 Spanish Civil War, 27, 120 Statistics, French, commented on, x, 72-74, 95, 109, 1 1 3 , 1 1 5 , 158Π6, 180Π34, 1877124; see also Cost of living; Prices; Strikes; Wage adjustments Statistique Generale, 95; on real wages, 180Π34 "Statut Moderne du Travail," see "Modern Labor Code" Strikes, right to strike under compulsory arbitration laws, 2, 45, 104109; proposals to regulate strikes, 6, 38, 6 1 , 106; 1936 strikes and statistics, 12-14, tabs., 13-14, 26-33; statistics under arbitration system, 109-18, tabs., 1 1 0 - 1 1 , 120, 148; official definition, 1 1 2 ; strikes in 1 9 3 7 - 3 8 , 1 1 2 , 1 1 6 - 1 7 , 124-27, 1 3 1 , 138-39, 148; effect on individual employment contract, 139, 1 4 1 , 144, 145-46; see also General strike; Sitdown strikes "Structural reforms," 58 Surarbitre, see Umpires Sweden, 2 Syndicalism, 7, 8

220 Taft-Hartley Act (United States), 2 Le Temps, χ, 42, 1717117 Textile industiy, 10, 92-93, 150; strike at Lille, 28-29 T h i r d Republic, 12, 21, 25, 1 3 1 , 154 Tissicr, Pierre, 1967142; on right to strike under arbitration system, 107, 108 Treasury, public, 133, 136 Tribunal Civil, 4, 93, 191Π6 Umpires, or final arbitrators (surarbitres), before 1936, 4; methods of selecting, 46-47, 50-51, 63-65, 1737141; accomplish more than labor-management arbitrators (arbitres), 47, 1 1 6 , 152; powers, 47, 67, 68, 71-72, 88; names on initial panel, 50-51; changes recommended in selecting, 151-53 Unemployment, 10, 1 1 , 1677117 Vacations with pay, 10, 11, 12, 18, 29, 86, 149 V i c h y regime, vii, 154

INDEX Villette, Francis, 50, 83, 1807130 Violations of arbitration awards, 12829, 132, 191715 W a g e adjustments, through arbitration: general increase under Matignon agreement, 16, 29; problems under original arbitration system (1936 A c t ) , 55, 56, 71-80; results under original system, 81-86, tab., 83; clarification of formula under permanent arbitration system (Article 10, 1938 A c t ) , 87-101, 103; final formula illustrated and summarized, 96-97, 99-100; results under permanent system, 101, 1807132, 1847139; labor dissatisfaction with 1938 formula, 101-103, 1 49> >5l W a g e leveling, 80-81, 90-91, 97 W a g e s , real, 1807134; in 1936, 33; in 1 9 3 7 - 3 9 , 85, 101; metallurgical workers, 84, 1847139 Zaiguc, Gabriel, 66