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A COMPARISON OF FREEDOMS AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT IN THE MUSLIM WORLD: A POLITICAL AND CIVILIZATIONAL ASSESSMENT Metin TOPRAK Banking and Regulation Supervision Agency, Turkey Abstract The Muslim world has never experienced circumstantial groundbreaking events which the Western countries have. The use of religion (important part of social capital) as an oppression tool on the society creates low economic output as well as political instability. Comparing with the Western or other developed countries, The Muslim world is in a miserable condition in terms of political rights and civil liberties, economic freedoms, transparency, ease of doing business, competitiveness, human development, and economic performance. The authoritarian and totalitarian political regimes and misuse of religion corrupt countries politically as well as economically. Backwardness, oppression, xenophobia, intolerance, corruption and nondemocratic regimes are almost the trademark of the Muslim world. Keywords: Muslim world, human development, freedom, values JEL classification: Z12, A14, D72, D74. 1.Introduction Similarity and distance between the West and Islam in terms of freedoms and performance: The social evolutions of the West and the Muslim world have been crucially different. There are also some contradictory views against to this. According to the advocates of these arguments, measurement of the cultural distance between the West and the Muslim world is a complex undertaking, and that distance is narrower than the Westerners assume. Main concern of this article is to evaluate the performance of the Muslim world in terms of freedoms and human development with the reference to the developed countries as benchmarks. However, two separate blocks are compared: On the one hand enlightened and secular democracies, and on the other hand backward-looking, religiously oppressed and inhumanly governed Muslim world. The use of religion as an oppression tool on the society creates low economic output as well as political instability. There is a huge literature assures that political instability has not only negative impact on economic development (Benhabib and Spiegel, 1994) but also

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positive relationship with economic inefficiency of the government in the globalized competitive world (Demir, 2003). The different values set and lack of sound nongovernmental institutions: The Islamic countries have never experienced circumstantial groundbreaking events which the Western countries have. The different sets of values between these two groups of countries also should be mentioned. In the context of system perspective, humans can shape their future social evolution (Banathy, 2000). The distance between the value sets of the West and Islam is accepted commonly (Mazrui, 1997). In addition, some writers argue the impossibility of separation of Islam and politics throughout the Muslim world (Fuller, 2002). In the Western countries, there are powerful non-governmental organizations (corporations, foundations, associations and so on) between the family and the state. These organizations are supposed to be pro-individual and pro-civil society. In the developing world, say Muslim countries, there has not been any noteworthy competitive experience among the state, individuals and religion, so all rights citizens have are given kindly (!) by governments. Everybody is indebted to the government, and the government always has vested rights in citizens (Buss, 2000; Abootalebi, 1999). The contemporary approach of accountability and transparency in official transactions is very contradictory to the traditional administrative understanding in the Muslim world. In this article, I examine why almost all governments in the Muslim world, either conservative or liberal, have to change their ways of reasoning and operating (Campell and Lindberg, 1991). Ethnic and religious discriminative names: The word “Islamic country” or “Muslim world” is used very commonly and seems without any ideological implication (Esposito and Voll, 1996; Çaha, 2004a). Both politicians and intellectuals agree on using that kind of naming. Almost all organizations established by Muslims have contained religious or ethnic thematic words in their titles: for example Arab League and Organization of Islamic Conference. Then, it is not surprising to see the reaction of the non-Muslim societies (Ferrari, 2005). For example, Mark Tessler has derived from surveys that more than half of Americans believed that 9/11 attack was motivated by a conflict between Christianity and Islam (Tessler, 2003). Some western writers also prefer to use ‘good Muslims & bad Muslims’ rather than ‘terrorists & civilians’ (Mamdani, 2002). However, it is hard to see any organization established by Western countries have religious or ethnic description. The writer of these lines is against such a religious or ethnic-based label, but prevalence of usage those terms also diminish the transaction cost and save the time to think on the issue. Therefore, in spite of all inconveniences, I also prefer to

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use such religious and ethnic-based descriptions those countries in which Muslim majority lives. Government’s involvement in religion: Main concern here is related to pervasive and deep economic and political problems of the Islamic countries. Of course, most of non-Islamic countries also face serious problems and turmoils. However, some problems are unique to the Muslim world (Lapidus, 1975). Separation of religion and state especially is still the most important and controversial issue in the Islamic countries (Fox, 2006; Turam, 2004). In addition, some writers argue that the real discussion that the West and the Muslim world divide is not about democracy but gender (Inglehart and Norris, 2003). Furthermore, the findings show that government’s involvement in religion has increased slightly after 1990 period. Empirical studies indicate that economic development and higher level of government’s involvement in religion go hand in hand. Nevertheless, the engagement between religion and the secular state has been unique in terms of Islam. Separation religion and state: the cases of Christianity and Islam: The Western countries have experienced the struggle for separation of church and the state for centuries and eventually passed the exam. This separation has a strong conceptual and moral standpoint (Audi, 1989). Definitely, the difference between Islam and Christianity in the context of morality and legislation changes differentiates critically: While Christianity only moralizes; Islam moralizes as well as legislates (Tamney, 1974). The battle in the West has been the battle among socio-political classes (Roy, 1984). However, the Muslim world has never seen any competition among social or economic classes such as in the West. In the Muslim world, the main actor is the state in both civil life and public sphere. And that area is under full control of the ideology-loaded regimes. Repressed societies and official authoritarian religions: In general, Islam is used to legitimize worldviews that serves vested interests, religious bans to freedom of speech and communalist norms that weakens incentives to develop political and economic institutions (Kuran, 1997). The crises of ideology-loaded regimes in the Muslim world reflect themselves as the crises of societies (Çaha, 2005; Çaha 2004b). That is the reason why the civil society is so humble in those countries. In the Muslim world, even social statuses of men and women described unequally by many governments. Universal definition of men and women in the context of common rights and needs is not the case (Haass, 2003). The state can think on behalf of people and groups. Main aim of all people, groups or classes have also been determined and clarified in constitution and laws. Nobody should re-examine his own duties or authorities, because everything is described, so there is no need to think on those issues. In fact, the way of reasoning between the West and the Islamic societies is profoundly discrepant. The way of doing business in the Islamic societies is mostly authoritarian and also generally totalitarian (Fish, 2002). 299

With the repression and manipulation of individual capabilities, it is almost impossible to flourish and bring to the light the real potential of the societies. Religion and ethnic-based public regulations: In today’s Muslim world, it is still very common to observe old fashioned regulations based on ethnic and religious concerns. Moreover, xenophobia and hostility continue to constitute an important part of national ideologies such that formatted emigrants from Middle East to Europe have continued to keep their exclusive ethnoreligious understanding way of life (Paz, 2002). Many prominent Islamic scholars across the world are very contrary to the use of religion and ethnicity to constitute an official ideology and produce hostility against “other” countries (UNESCO, 2004). They are aware of the danger of this practice which undermines the roots of possibility of civil Islamic society. Poor performance of freedoms, political rights and human development: In most Islamic countries, there are very important obstacles in terms of property rights, human rights, freedom of thought, accountability of public authorities and other democratic values. The status of human rights in the Muslim countries is quite complex as well as controversial. Human rights, in these countries, are influenced not only by religion but also by political regime (Arzt, 1990). The human rights perspective dominating the Islamic societies is still very backward and oppressive. It is still not very safe to invest or to transfer belongings easily without corruption. Feudal citizenship and deficient property rights: Furthermore, international referee mechanism has not been legalized truly. While investors are classified as residents and nonresidents in the Western countries, this classification, in most Islamic countries, has been still based on separation of foreigners and citizens or much more worrying Muslims and non-Muslims. It is not surprising to see the impact of religion to intensify the conflicts (Akbaba, 2006). It is very surprising to know that it is impossible to have citizenship right in some Islamic countries. It does not matter how many years you work there or get retired. Defective understanding of democracy: In the Muslim world, the linguistic meaning and philosophy of democracy are also very naïve (Rothstein, 1995; Abootalebi 2000). However, surveys indicate that there is a strong tendency toward democracy (Yousef, 2004; Tessler, 2002). There has been a growing empirical field on the compatibility of Islam and democracy. After Huntington’s “the clash of civilizations” thesis, very controversial arguments based on empirical studies have emerged rapidly (Huntington, 1993; Midlarsky, 1998). In the Western historical background, democracy is seen to guarantee minority rights. However, in the Muslim world, democracy is seen priority of majority and generally ignorance of minorities. Possibility of Western style democracy for all countries has been the focus of politicians who have hopes to reconcile Islam and democracy (Diamond, 2003; An-Na’im, 1987). State apparatus has worldly and 300

divine dimensions: on the one hand it collects resources from the society and distributes those resources as benefits or grants to its partisans or “patriots”. On the other hand, for the sake of the high interests of the state, everybody, if necessary, should sacrifice his belongings even his life. This approach is very concrete, because there are some patriots who keep some governmental positions busy and benefit from this “sacrifice”. They are supposed to devote their whole life to the state (to exploit its resources!) The adventure of democracy in the Muslim world has had poor records. The high positive correlation of democracy with the middle class, primary schooling, per capita income, urbanization, and country size explain the human development gap between not only developed and non-developed but also Muslim and non-Muslim countries (Barro, 1999). Due to being unfamiliar with the democratic culture and institutions, the transitory regimes of the Islamic countries implicitly or sometimes explicitly accuse democracy for having caused high political fluctuations. Empirical studies find that higher levels of democracy and diversification lower volatility, and volatility reduces growth, so volatility has a negative effect on the poor (Mobarak, 2005). The need for external dynamics to develop democratic evolution: In summary, when we take the backward, oppressive and discriminative ideological background of Islamic countries’ administrations, it can be easily said that without external dynamics and interaction with the developed democracies, it is hard to catch up reasonable governance and social life. While some of these countries see themselves strictly secular (Rabasa et al, 2004), some devote their all efforts to build a sacred religious state. And finally some of them have managed to remain modest. However, there is still a great confusion among Islamic scholars and intellectuals about separation of state and religion. Outline: In the following sections, I will try to depict a general picture of leading Islamic countries. The primary variables are political rights and civil liberties, economic freedoms, level of transparency, ease of doing business, competitiveness level, human development, and economic performance. International investors, analysts and general public opinion follow those indicators and evaluate countries and societies. Actually, it is not very important how your real situation and conditions you think are, it is how other people see and evaluate you. The Islamic countries examined here selected with the criteria of race, ethnicity, geography, and religious sect. 2.Political Rights and Civil Liberties The Muslim world has experienced a democratic transition for decades. However, comparing with the former Soviet republics, it is hard to say that the experience of the Muslim world is successful. Findings show that the main obstacles before democracy in the Muslim world are related to the political rights and civil liberties. 301

The primary determinants affecting the timing of successful democratic transition are lined up as per capita income, the distribution of wealth, educational levels, and the strength of preferences for political rights and civil liberties (Feng and Zak, 1999). Political rights can be handled by compromising electoral process, political pluralism and participation, and functioning of government. It is needless to say that political parties are the indispensable in democratic regimes (Inkeles, 1991). However, in the Muslim world, political parties have been seen as favorable tools to manipulate citizens for the sake of regime’s survival. It is certain that allowing political parties to participate in democratic process is crucially important for an evolution of Islamist political tradition. Otherwise, flourishing of democracy is almost impossible (Lipset, 2000). Civil liberties are categorized as freedom of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of law, and personal autonomy and individual rights (Isham, Kaufman and Pritchett, 1997). In the Muslim world, Islamist terrorism and extremist ideas have negative impact on the spread of political rights and civil freedoms (Karatnycky, 2002; Stepan and Robertson, 2003). However, considering political rights and civil freedoms, some writers point the difference between “Arab” and “Muslim” democracies. The ratings on political rights and civil liberties are combined and averaged to determine overall "freedom statuses" for all countries. Countries which have combined average rating of 1.0 to 2.5 are considered "Free"; 3.0 to 5.0 are considered "Partly Free"; and 5.5 to 7.0 are considered "Not Free". Under this circumstance, while Indonesia is among the “free” countries, Turkey’s rank goes to the group of “partly free” countries. The worst ranks belong to Syria and S.Arabia; both countries are among the “Not-free” countries (Table 1). Generally speaking, taking 193 countries into consideration, Islamic countries are in a desperate condition in terms of political rights and civil liberties. It is hard to argue that these countries comprehend that they live in the 21st century and they have even experienced the 20th century. 3.Economic Freedoms Economic freedom consists of business, trade, fiscal, investment, monetary, financial and labor freedom (Sen, 1993). Besides government size, property rights and freedom from corruption are also other primary elements of economic freedom. Index of economic freedom is an arithmetical average of 10 individual freedoms, each one is crucial to the development of personal and social welfare. It is well known for centuries that the right of property is a guarantee for being a free person. The other fundamental pillars for free persons are just listed above. For grading scale, each one of the 10 freedoms is graded using a 0 to 100 scale. While “100” stands for the maximum, “0” represents the minimum or totally lack of freedom. 302

Theoretically speaking, freedoms and economic development go hand in hand. Economic freedoms are vitally important part of freedoms (Wu and Davis, 1999). However, the Islamic countries differentiate in terms of economic and political freedoms. While Indonesia has the best score for political rights and civil liberties, S.Arabia has the best score in terms of economic freedom. Turkey’s rank is the second at the both freedom areas (Table 2). Libya and Iran are the most restricted countries in point of economic freedoms. With the increasing commercial, touristic and financial connections to the Western block, Islamic countries have also faced with increasing freedom-demands of their own citizens. High economic and political welfare of the developed countries are very important benchmarks for the people living with the poor-performance governments. Therefore, governments in the Muslim world often feel being in danger or fragile and try to take measure against their citizens’ unmet demands. 4.Transparency It shouldn’t be very assertive or groundless if we argue that more transparency accompanies to more freedoms or vice versa. Lack of market discipline and democratic procedures force the Islamic countries into the peril corner. Corruption perception indices represent perceptions of the degree of corruption (Bac, 2001; Friedrich, 2002). That perception belongs to the business people and country analysts. The range is between 0 and 10. “10” stands for highly clean, and “0” stands for highly corrupt. Almost all Islamic countries failed the transparency exam. Within the 10 highest scores, no one exceeds 5. Only Tunisia and Turkey have scores above 4 (Table 2). 5.Ease of Doing Business Doing business examines the regulations that improve business activity and those constraining it. There are many guides for international business experience (Walker, Walker and Schmitz). Doing business presents indicators, regulations and the protection of property. Regulations related to business consist of starting a business, dealing with licenses, employing workers, registering property, getting credit, protection of investors, paying taxes, trading across borders, enforcing contracts, and finally closing a business. In addition, some empirical studies indicate that religions and languages also have important effects on investors (Stulz, Williamson, 2003). Besides its limitation, doing business index can be comparable across countries but only for the companies have limited liability in metropolitan cities. The most developed countries are not simply defined as the countries have very hardworking people. On the contrary, the developed countries have the easiest doing business procedures. Ease of doing business is more difficult in developing or less developed countries than developed ones (Brunetti, Kisunko and Weder, 303

1997). Every barrier before doing any kind of business means a revenue gate for the people who use public authority. Most of the time public servants are the main obstacles before economic activities. In developing countries, it is not surprising to hear that public employment is seen as a cure for unemployment. Once public servants take the authority, they also try to protect their positions with regular payments to those who appointed them. Former Soviet republics are very popular in this issue. And then, a vicious circle comes to existence. S.Arabia is the easiest country among others to do business. And Turkey’s rank is the second best. The most difficult countries in doing business are Sudan, Syria and Iran, respectively (Table 3). 6.Competitiveness and Property Rights In a globalizing world economy, countries need to be compared with many indicators. Competitiveness level of a country is an abstract result and many indicators determine it. The competitiveness index calculation depends both on surveys and publicly available data (Lall, 2001). Over 11 thousand business leaders were covered in the surveys across the world. World Economic Forum conducts surveys by its network of partner institutes, including business organizations. The United States leads all countries at the global competitiveness. The Islamic countries consist of a vast variation. In the Muslim world, the most competitive economies are Tunisia and S.Arabia. Turkey and Indonesia are the followers of the first two. Bangladesh and Pakistan are the least competitive Islamic countries in the table (Table 4). Arguing that the property rights have constituted the fundamentals for the Western economic development should not be seen very cocksure (North, 2004; Horst, 2007). Property rights affect both the magnitude of investment and allocation efficiency of inputs. Many empirical studies have showed that stronger property rights have positive impact on economic growth (Kanck and Keefer, 1995). While Western Europe and North America have higher rankings of property rights, countries that have weak property rights are African, Latin American, central and eastern European economies. It is needless to say that the Islamic countries also have the poor performance with respect to property rights protection. 7.Human Development The final aim of all policies is supposed to intend to develop conditions for human beings. The parallelism between poverty and poor performance of government has been proved by many studies (Porta at al, 1999). Regarding human history as a linear trend, we should mention the de-link of religions from regimes. Weakening the interplay between democracy and religious affiliation, economic development deserves to be mentioned in terms of enlightment and secularism (Barro, 1999).

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Millennium development goals have also attracted attentions on this issue. 175 UN member countries are covered in the Human Development Report. Human Development Index (HDI) is a composite index measures the achievements of a country (Kelley, 1991) in three fields: a long and healthy life; access to knowledge; and a decent standard of living. The indicators for these areas are lined up as life expectancy at birth, adult literacy and combined gross enrolment in primary, secondary and tertiary level education, and gross domestic product per capita in purchasing power parity (Sagara and Najam, 1998). Countries included in the HDI are classified into three clusters: high human development (with an HDI of 0.800 or above); medium human development (HDI of 0.500–0.799); and low human development (HDI of less than 0.500). Only S.Arabia as an Islamic country is among the countries which have high human development. All other Islamic countries tabled are grouped as medium human development (Table 4). The poorest development level of Yemen, Sudan and Bangladesh is very dramatic (Ahsan, 2004). 8.Economic Performance The individual as entrepreneur, consumer, worker or renter has crucial role in the capitalist model. Therefore, various considerations on the individual deserve to be handled briefly. There are various indicators for measuring economic performance. However, authorities in the Muslim world prefer to use GNP growth rather than per capita growth. The main reason is a bit philosophical and cultural. Unit of analysis is community not individual. And underestimation of individuals does not seem a deficiency. Moreover, individualist approaches have been accused for forcing citizens to be extremely egocentric. On the contrary, empirical studies have indicated that more individualist societies are stronger in terms of social trust than the collectivist societies: the more collectivist a country the less social trust it has. In addition, there is a strong relationship between collectivism and corruption (Sandholtz and Taagepera, 2005). The Muslim world criticizes excessive individualism in Western human rights doctrine and thinks that the imbalance between allocentrism and egocentrism is exaggerated at the expense of community. It seems that this religion-based philosophical contrast between the West and the Muslim world will continue as long as the governments manage to avoid from the performing democratic secularism. According to a common belief, Muslims underestimate individualism in general (Ignatieff, 2001). The discussion on the direction of causality between economic development and freedoms would never end. However, the victory of the West has given priority to freedoms. Milton Friedman concludes that freedom is the natural result of capitalism (Friedman, 1962). Moreover, there is a huge literature on the relationship between democracy and economic development. Some of them indicate that two-way linkage is valid between democracy and economic 305

development (Helliwel, 1994; Huber Rueschemeyer and Stephens, 1993). Especially the argument of social requisites of democracy is pretty questionable (Lipset, 1959), because the implication of social Darwinism has a potential to discourage non-developed nations. Referring to empirical findings, some writers argue that political institutions are important for economic growth; however, it is hard to argue that there are statistically significant differences among various political regimes (Przeworski and Limongi, 1993). The World Bank classifies all countries by using their income levels (for 2005): high income (gross national income per capita of US$10,726 or more), middle income (US$876–$10,725) and low income (US$875 or less). Some empirical studies examine the impact of geography on per capita income (Sachs, 2003; Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2001). There are also very contradictory findings on the relationship between religion and economic performance (Noland, 2005). While S.Arabia and Libya are among the high level income countries, Turkey, Tunisia and Iran are among the upper middle income nations. The relatively low income levels of Yemen and Bangladesh are striking (Table 4). 9.Conclusion There is a popular saying argues that there are countries of developed or underdeveloped human beings instead of developed or underdeveloped countries. Of course, this approach does not extend beyond qualification of human resources. When governments are not able to meet the demands of their societies, then they try to reshape their communities whose demands just may reach capability or supply capacity of those governments (Isham, Kaufmann and Pritchett, 1997). The governments barely think that they need to be reshaped instead of citizen people. The authoritarian and totalitarian political regimes and misuse of religion corrupt countries politically as well as economically. The use of religion (important part of social capital) as an oppression tool on the society creates low economic output as well as political instability. Comparing with the Western or other developed countries, The Muslim world is in a miserable situation in terms of political rights and civil liberties, economic freedoms, transparency, doing business, competitiveness, human development and economic performance. While Indonesia is the only country classified “free” at political rights and civil liberties, S.Arabia is the economically “freest” country among the Islamic countries having rank of 60th. Corruption perception is quite unfavorable in the Muslim world. Tunisia and Turkey have relatively lower corruption perception with the ranks of 61st and 64th, respectively. Most Islamic have subjected to heavy stationary and transaction cost at ease of doing business. While S.Arabia’s rank is relatively favorable (23rd), Turkey’s rank is the second (57th) among the examined Islamic 306

countries. Global competitiveness of the Muslim world is parallel with the other indicators. Tunisia and S.Arabia are the most competitive countries among tabulated ones. However, the scores of Pakistan and Bangladesh terribly low -92nd and 107th, respectively. Property rights are protected efficiently in North America and Western Europe. Other countries’ or geographic blocs’ property rights performances are incredibly weak. Human development level is such important that, the scope of the millennium development goals have also been concentrated on this. S.Arabia is the most favorable country and has a rank of 61st. Turkey and Tunisia follows S.Arabia with the ranks of 84th and 91st, respectively. Backwardness, oppression, xenophobia, intolerance, corruption and nondemocratic regimes are almost the trademark of the Muslim world. It is possible arguing that this is only a constructed image created by enemies. However, this argument does not cure the problem. The contribution of the use of religion as a tool in these oppressive administrative models could not be ignored. And this vicious circle reproduces backwardness. In the Muslim world, state’s structure and ideology should be transformed from ethnic/religious content and historical/cultural framework to accountable, universal values-based, transparent and democratic institutions. There must be zero tolerance in the fields of human rights, property rights and corruption. Xenophobia shouldn’t be a part of the official ideology and public administration tool to manipulate citizens. Open society and open economy are to be indispensable targets. In the Muslim world, state’s structure and ideology should be transformed from ethnic/religious content and historical/cultural framework to accountable, universal values-based, transparent and democratic institutions. There must be zero tolerance in the fields of human rights, property rights and corruption. Xenophobia shouldn’t be a part of the official ideology and public administration tool to manipulate citizens. Open society and open economy are to be indispensable targets. The Islamic countries often have used the religion or secularism as a kind of symbolic violence also against their own citizens. Inefficient, ideological and oppressive governments have created negative externalities not only for their own societies but also for other countries (Tuastad, 2003; Juergensmeyer, 2003). Therefore, the governments in the Muslim world should transform their understanding toward the universal democratic regimes. Another crucial point is the separation of religion and state. State-controlled religions or religion-controlled states are equally dangerous and artificial for civil societies (Coleman, 1970). Some Middle East experts conclude that for a solution in the Muslim world, political systems firstly should take Islam into account and secondly should be truly democratic (Fuller, 2002).The most efficient remedy for 307

democratic and economic backwardness is strong civil institutions between gigantic state and atomic family to compensate the power discrepancy. The relationship between religion and economic performance is highly controversial. The impact of a certain religion on the economic development can be obtained by the actions of its believers. However, church attendance and religious beliefs are not interchangeable. While church attendance refers to belonging, religious beliefs, notably beliefs in hell and heaven, refer to believing (Barro and McCleary, 2003). The empirical findings do not support negative or positive relationship with respect to particular religions. On the contrary, if anything, Islam promotes growth (Noland, 2005). In addition, based on the empirical findings, we can say that the relationship between Islam and democracy is not contradictory (Jenkins, 2003). The Turkish example of compatibility of Islam and democracy is also particularly impressing. Furthermore, empirical studies indicate that high level support for democracy is quite strong among Muslims; and Muslims see civic engagement and political trust as basic elements to democracy (Hofmann, 2004). Tables Table 1. Political Rights and Civil Liberties (2007) Indonesia Turkey Bangladesh Morocco Yemen Algeria Iran Pakistan Tunisia Egypt Libya Saudi Arabia Syria

Political Rights 2 3 4 5 5 6 6 6 6 7 7 7 7

Civil Liberties 3 3 4 4 5 5 6 5 5 6 7 6 7

Status F PF PF PF PF NF NF NF NF NF NF NF NF

Status: F-Free; PF-Partly Free; NF-Not Free. Source: Freedom House.

Table 2: Economic Freedoms and Corruption Perception Index Economic Freedoms Rank 60

Saudi Arabia

Corruption 2008 Score

Rank

62,8

61

2007 CPI Score Tunisia

4,2

308

74 84 85 151 119 102 149 125 144 149 151 85

Turkey Tunisia Egypt Pakistan Morocco Algeria Indonesia Yemen Syria Bangladesh Iran Libya

60,8 59,3 59,2 56,8 56,4 55,7 53,9 52,8 46,6 44,9 44,0 38,7

64 72 79 99 105 131 131 131 138 143 162 172

Turkey Morocco Saudi Arabia Algeria Egypt Iran Libya Yemen Pakistan Indonesia Bangladesh Sudan

4,1 3,5 3,4 3,0 2,9 2,5 2,5 2,5 2,4 2,3 2,0 1,8

Source: Transparency International. 179 countries.

Source: Heritage Foundation, periodical. 165 countries.

Saudi Arabia Turkey Pakistan Tunisia Bangladesh Yemen Indonesia Algeria Egypt Morocco Iran Syria Sudan

23 57 76 88 107 113 123 125 126 129 135 137 143

36 43 59 68 92 175 168 131 55 51 77 169 95

47 128 93 96 116 35 99 108 163 88 164 86 131

40 136 132 113 129 63 153 118 108 165 141 126 140

3 31 88 66 171 44 121 156 101 102 143 89 32

48 68 68 97 48 158 68 115 115 135 68 158 135

50 64 19 147 15 122 51 64 83 158 158 107 141

33 56 94 28 112 128 41 114 26 67 135 127 143

136 34 154 80 175 41 141 117 145 114 57 171 143

Closing a Business

Enforcing Contracts

Across

7 54 146 148 81 84 110 157 150 132 97 98 60

Trading Borders

Paying Taxes

Protecting Investors

Getting Credit

Registering Property

Employing Workers

with Dealing Licenses

Starting a Business

Doing of Ease Business Rank

2008

Table 3: Ease of Doing Business

79 112 51 30 102 83 136 45 125 60 118 77 178

Source: World Bank. 178 Countries.

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Table 4: Global Competitiveness, Human Development and Per capita Income Global Competitiveness Human Development Per capita Income 2007-08 Tunisia Saudi Arabia Turkey Indonesia Morocco Egypt Algeria Syria Libya Pakistan Bangladesh

Rank

Index

HHD

Rank

32

4,59

Saudi Arabia 61

35 53 54 64 77 81 80 88 92 107

4,55 4,25 4,24 4,08 3,96 3,91 3,91 3,85 3,77 3,55

MHD Turkey Tunisia Iran, IR of Algeria Indonesia Syrian AR Egypt Morocco Pakistan Bangladesh Sudan Yemen

Source: World Economic Forum. 131 countries.

84 91 94 104 107 108 112 126 136 140 147 153

2007 (USD) Saudi Arabia Libya Turkey Tunisia Iran Algeria Morocco Egypt Indonesia Syria Sudan Pakistan Bangladesh Yemen

17.196 14.108 9.816 9.630 9.127 8.203 6.003 5.272 4.684 4.498 3.093 2.943 2.270 1.015

HHD: High Human Development Source: IMF. MHD: Medium Human Development, Source: UNDP. 175 countries.

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