Comparative Demography of the Syrian Diaspora: European and Middle Eastern Destinations (European Studies of Population, 20) 9783030244507, 9783030244514, 3030244504

Table of contents :
Preface
Contents
Part I: Genesis of the Syrian Diaspora
Chapter 1: Conceptualizing the Syrian Refugee Crisis and Migration during Armed Conflict
1.1 The Syrian Refugee Crisis
1.2 Defining the Gaps- What Do We Not Understand That Could Be Useful?
1.3 Purpose of This Edited Volume
1.4 Social Science as a Foundation for the Study of Migration During Armed Conflict
Chapter 2: Baseline Demographic Profile of Syria in 2009
2.1 Data Documentation
2.2 Population Characteristics
2.2.1 Population Age Structure
2.2.2 Education by Age and Sex
2.2.3 Education by Urban/Rural Residence
2.2.4 Education by Governate
2.2.5 Marital Status by Gender
2.3 Number of Live Births
2.4 Religious and Ethnic Composition
2.4.1 Short Political History: Baath Party
2.4.2 Alawites and Shias
2.4.3 Sunnis
2.4.4 Christians
2.4.5 Kurds
2.4.6 Druze
References
Chapter 3: Surveying Syrians in Diaspora: Methodological Aspects for Planning and Implementing Longitudinal Studies
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Literature Review
3.3 Methods and Sampling
3.3.1 DiPAS Sampling and Interview Locations
3.3.2 DiPAS Thematic Scope and Questionnaires
3.3.3 DiPAS Samples
3.3.4 FIMAS Sampling and Interview Locations
3.3.5 FIMAS Thematic Scope and Questionnaires
3.3.6 FIMAS Samples
3.4 Reflections from the Field
3.4.1 Language
3.4.2 Sensitive Topics
3.4.3 Cultural Diversity
3.4.4 Contact and Response Rates in the Longitudinal Samples
3.5 Discussion
References
Part II: Population Movement to Front-Line States
Chapter 4: Demographic Profile of Syrians in Turkey
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Movements of Syrians into Turkey and Legal Framework
4.3 Movements of Syrians Out of Turkey
4.4 Other Status Holder Syrians in Turkey
4.5 Size and Demographic Structure of the Syrian Population in Turkey
4.6 Geographical Distribution of the Syrian Population in Turkey
4.7 Syrian Refugees in Turkey and Education
4.8 Labor Force Participation of Syrians in Turkey
4.9 Discussion
References
Chapter 5: The Situation of Syrian Women in Turkey
5.1 Problems of Women Among Syrian Refugees
5.2 Polygamy as a Social Problem in Turkish Society
5.3 Polygamy as a Problem for Displaced Syrian Women
5.4 Research Design
5.4.1 In-depth Interview Procedures
5.4.2 Content Analysis
5.5 Results of Interviews and Participant Observation
5.6 Results of Content Analysis
5.6.1 Women Abuse, Child Abuse and Sex Trafficking
5.6.2 Blaming the Syrian Women
5.6.3 Marriages to “Save” Syrian Women
5.7 Conclusions
References
Chapter 6: Demographic Profile of Syrians in Jordan and Lebanon
6.1 Introduction
6.2 Policy Context for the Syrian Refugee Response in Jordan and Lebanon
6.2.1 Lebanon
6.2.2 Jordan
6.2.3 Policies Towards Palestine Refugees from Syria
6.3 Data Sources
6.4 Number, Geographic Distribution and Age-Sex Structure of the Syrian Population
6.4.1 Number of Syrians Over Time
6.4.2 Geographic Distribution
6.4.3 Population Structure
6.5 Marital Status and Household Structure
6.6 Educational Attainment
6.6.1 Educational Enrollments of Current Refugee Children
6.7 Discussion and Conclusions
References
Part III: Population Movement to Non-contiguous European States
Chapter 7: Demographic Profile of Syrians in Austria
7.1 Syrians in Austria: Time Line of Migration Flows
7.2 Characteristics of the Syrian Population in Austria
7.2.1 Legal Status
7.2.2 Housing and Residential Location
7.2.3 Fertility
7.3 Micro-level Data on Syrian Refugees in Austria
7.3.1 Educational Profile and Economic Status
7.3.2 Family Status
7.3.3 Economic Status
7.3.4 Ethnic and Religious Identity
7.4 Conclusions
References
Chapter 8: Demographic Profile of Syrians in Belgium
8.1 Introduction
8.2 Data Sources and Literature on Population of Syrian Origin in Belgium
8.3 Syrian Migration into Belgium, 2011–2017
8.3.1 Immigration to Belgium: Recent Trends
8.3.2 Declared Migration and International Protection
8.3.3 Syrian Asylum Seekers in Belgium: Mode of Arrival and Recognition Rates
8.3.4 Demographic Changes in Immigration Flows
8.3.5 Legal Processes for Syrian Immigration
8.3.6 Outmigration
8.4 Population of Syrian Origin: Size and Composition
8.4.1 Syrian Nationals (Current Syrian Nationality) and People of Syrian Origin (Syrian Nationality at Birth)
8.4.2 Country of Birth of People of Syrian Origin in Belgium: A Large Majority of Immigrants
8.4.3 Changes in Age and Sex Composition, 2011–2017
8.4.4 Comparison of Age and Sex Composition with Other Groups
8.5 Characteristics of Syrian Population Circa 2017
8.5.1 Type of Residence Permit
8.5.2 Geographic Distribution
8.5.3 Family Status and Living Arrangements
8.5.4 Economic Activities
8.6 Conclusion
Annex (Tables 8.10, 8.11, and 8.12)
References
Chapter 9: Demographic Profile of Syrians in Germany and Aspects of Integration
9.1 Migration from Syria to Germany
9.2 Developments since the Outbreak of the War in Syria 2011
9.2.1 Syrian Migrants in Germany in 2010
9.2.2 In- and Out-Migration from 2010 to 2017
9.2.2.1 Overview
9.2.2.2 Asylum
9.2.2.3 Humanitarian Admission and Resettlement
9.2.2.4 Family Migration
9.2.2.5 Further Types of Migration
9.2.2.6 Return to Syria and Onward Migration to Other Countries
9.3 Syrian Migrants in Germany 2016/2017
9.3.1 Duration of Stay and Residence Status
9.3.2 Age and Sex Ratio
9.3.3 Spatial Distribution and Housing
9.3.3.1 Spatial Distribution
9.3.3.2 Housing
9.3.4 Family Status and Living Arrangements
9.3.5 Educational Profile
9.3.6 Economic Status
9.3.7 Ethnic and Religious Affiliation
9.3.8 Acquisition of German citizenship
9.4 Conclusion and Outlook
References
Chapter 10: Demographic Profile of Syrians in Italy
10.1 Introduction
10.2 Arrival and Registration: Contradictory Statistics
10.3 Demographic Characteristics and Geographic Distribution of Syrians in Italy
10.4 A Summary Picture of Syrians in Italy
References
Chapter 11: Demographic Profile of Syrians in the Netherlands
11.1 Introduction and Background
11.2 Syrian Population by Age and Sex in 2010–2011
11.3 Annual In/Out-Migration of Syrians 2010–2017
11.4 Resident Syrian Population by Age and Sex in 2018
11.5 Legal Status of the Syrian Population, 2018
11.6 Residential Location and Housing
11.7 An Educational Profile
11.8 Family Status and Living Arrangements
11.9 Economic Status and Labour Market Situation
11.10 Identity, Health and Return Intentions
References
Chapter 12: Demographic Profile of Syrians in Norway
12.1 Introduction
12.2 Syrian Immigrants Living in Norway in 2011
12.2.1 Age and Duration of Stay: Similar to Other Immigrants
12.2.2 The Majority Were Norwegian Citizens
12.2.3 Many Refugees and Family Migrants
12.2.4 Most Adult Women Were Married
12.2.5 Many Lived in Oslo, Larvik and Kristiansand
12.3 In- and Out-Migration of Syrians 2011–2018
12.3.1 Emigration: Few Leave, but Some Go to Sweden
12.4 Syrians in Norway in 2018
12.4.1 From the 50th to the 5th Largest Immigrant Group
12.4.2 A High Share of Children
12.4.3 Large Majority of Men, Particularly in the 20s
12.4.4 Mainly Syrian Citizens
12.4.5 Nearly Four Out of Five Are Refugees
12.4.6 Most Men Are Unmarried
12.4.7 Many in Northern and Southern Norway
12.4.8 Others with a Syrian Background
12.4.9 Education: Fewer Have Attained Upper Secondary or Higher Education
12.5 Summary: Change from 2011 to 2018
References
Chapter 13: Demographic Profile of Syrians in Poland
13.1 Introduction
13.2 Forms and Procedures of Assistance to Individuals Seeking Residency in Poland
13.2.1 International Protection
13.2.2 Permanent Residence
13.2.3 European Union Long-Term Residence
13.2.4 Temporary Residence
13.3 Evolution of the Number and Spatial Distribution of Syrian Refugees in Poland
13.3.1 The Influx of Refugees into Poland, 1992–2017
13.3.2 Fluctuations in the Influx of Syrian Citizens into Poland
13.4 Number of Syrian Refugees in Poland
13.5 Spatial Distribution of Syrian Refugees in Poland
13.6 Demographic and Social Structures Among Syrian Refugees in Poland
13.7 Conclusions
References
Chapter 14: Demographic Profile of Syrians in Sweden
14.1 Syrian Migration to Sweden
14.2 Syrian Migrants in Sweden in 2010
14.2.1 Population Composition and Duration of Stay
14.2.2 Family Structure
14.2.3 Education
14.2.4 Citizenship and Reason for Migration
14.3 Syrian Migrants in Sweden in 2017
14.3.1 Population Composition and Duration of Stay
14.3.2 Family Structure
14.3.3 Education
14.3.4 Citizenship and Reason for Migration
14.4 Conclusion
Appendix
References
Part IV: Comparative Perspectives on the Syrian Diaspora
Chapter 15: Differences Among European States Involving Syrian Asylum Seekers
15.1 Introduction
15.2 Trends of Syrian Applicants in the EU
15.3 The Legal Framework
15.4 European Member States’ Treatment of Syrian Asylum Seekers
15.4.1 The Approach
15.4.1.1 Data
15.4.1.2 Indicators
15.4.2 Method
15.4.3 Empirical Evidence
15.5 Explaining Differences Across the European Union
15.5.1 Differences in the Distribution Among the European Member States
15.5.2 Differences in the Recognition Rate
15.6 Conclusions
15.7 Glossary
References
Chapter 16: Demographic Comparisons of Syrian Populations
16.1 Destinations of Syrian Migrants
16.2 Age and Sex
16.2.1 Age Distributions for Syrian Men
16.2.2 Age Distributions for Syrian Women
16.2.3 Sex Ratios of Syrian Men to Women for Age Groups
16.3 Selection by Educational Attainment
16.4 Choice of Destinations: Migrant Preferences and National Policies
16.5 Conclusions
References

Citation preview

European Studies of Population 20

Elwood D. Carlson Nathalie E. Williams Editors

Comparative Demography of the Syrian Diaspora: European and Middle Eastern Destinations

European Studies of Population Volume 20

Series Editors Elwood D. Carlson Ctr Demography & Population Health Florida State University Ctr Demography & Population Health Tallahassee, FL, USA Stuart Gietel-Basten Division of Social Science Hong Kong University of Science and Tech Division of Social Science Kowloon, Hong Kong

The book series “European Studies of Population” (ESPO) aims at disseminating population research with special relevance for Europe. The series is multidisciplinary in character and includes both formal demographic analyses, as well as studies of the social, economic and other determinants and impacts of population trends. International comparison is of prime interest to ESPO, and both contemporary and historical perspectives may be applied. ESPO is open to methodological work and theoretical studies, as well as to studies that focus on the social and policy implications of demographic trends. The series includes monographs and edited volumes. ESPO is published munder the auspices of the European Association for Population Studies (EAPS). More information about this series at http://www.springer.com/series/5940

Elwood D. Carlson  •  Nathalie E. Williams Editors

Comparative Demography of the Syrian Diaspora: European and Middle Eastern Destinations

Editors Elwood D. Carlson Department of Sociology Florida State University Tallahassee, FL, USA

Nathalie E. Williams Department of Sociology University of Washington Seattle, WA, USA

ISSN 1381-3579 European Studies of Population ISBN 978-3-030-24450-7    ISBN 978-3-030-24451-4 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24451-4 © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are reserved by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Preface

Barely a decade ago, the population of Syria stood at 21  million—a population similar to the state of Florida, or in between the population totals for Romania and Australia. In less than 10  years, this population has been fractured by a perfect storm of demographic, economic, political, ethnic, and sectarian forces. Today, about one-fourth of Syria’s people have been scattered across other countries as refugees, asylum seekers, and self-settled migrants. Another one-fourth of them live as internally displaced persons inside the country, driven from their homes by violence and economic and political chaos. Syria furnishes one of the most terrible lessons in recent history about just how disrupted life can become in a country and how quickly it can happen. Who are the six million or more Syrians who have fled the country? These pages provide a factual demographic portrait of the Syrian diaspora, now found for the most part in the neighboring states of Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan, but also including a sizeable minority who shelter in more distant destinations concentrated predominantly in Europe. The very serious economic and social challenges thrown up by this sudden, dramatic population movement in the second decade of the new century are obvious to everyone around the world. Angry, vocal, even violent reactions against perceived danger from strangers sometimes erupt inside these Middle Eastern and European destinations. So far, the resolve of both neighboring host countries and those further afield in Europe has been equal to these challenges and continues to furnish a humanitarian example to the rest of the world. One aim of this volume is to provide more detailed comparative information about the Syrian populations in a range of countries. We believe this information can provide a firmer foundation for making decisions about future population movements, about policies related directly to the current situation of these Syrians (and perhaps other groups), and about what we may have to look “forward” to as other kinds of natural and man-made crises threaten to displace other populations in the remaining decades of this century. Chapters contributed by population experts provide demographic details about Syrian residents in each country, including age distributions, sex ratios, and v

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i­nformation about education, marital status, and family living arrangements where available. We show the salience of families with young children in this exodus from Syria and highlight the concentration of these migrants in a few countries in particular as a result of both varying national policies toward refugees and the preferences of these Syrian exiles themselves. While there are demographic similarities in Syrian populations in different countries, we also document clear and systematic differences distinguishing the populations of Syrians in some countries from those in other places. Above all, we seek to reveal the variety of human faces behind this most dramatic and terrible demographic upheaval so far witnessed in the twenty-­ first century. The volume begins with three chapters setting the stage for the Syrian population diaspora. We first review the state of our current understanding of the general phenomenon of displaced populations as a result of armed conflict and other organized state-level violence. Masek provides a baseline sketch of the population of Syria itself in 2009, a year or two before the whirlwind struck, giving us a reference point with which to compare observations about Syrian populations displaced to other countries. Kohlenberger, Buber-Ennser, Rengs, and Hosner then share knowledge gained in Austria about how to design and conduct detailed, intensive surveys of displaced populations in order to record the specific characteristics, the successes, and the needs of such groups. The second section of the book includes chapters on the situation of the vast majority of Syrian refugees and other internationally displaced persons found in the adjacent countries of Turkey, Lebanon, and Jordan. There are Syrian refugees in other countries in the Middle East and North Africa as well, but nothing to compare with the massive populations found in these three contiguous states. Adali and Türkyılmaz provide the demographic portrait of Syrians in Turkey, along with an added chapter by Dumon that concentrates on the special problems faced by Syrian women in Turkey. Sieverding and Calderón-Mejía contribute the demographic portraits of Syrians now found in Lebanon and in Jordan. The third and largest section of this study then turns to Syrian populations in several European countries more distant from Syria. Buber-Ennser, Rengs, Kohlenberger, and Zeman summarize the demographic portrait for Austria, followed by the picture in Belgium provided by Vause and Schumacher. The German team of Worbs, Rother, and Kreienbrink tackle the most daunting challenge for Europe, giving us details regarding nearly 700 thousand Syrians living in Germany today—more than two-thirds of all the Syrians in Europe as a whole. Strozza and Gabrielli summarize the picture for Italy, while Lubbers and de Valk detail the situation in the Netherlands. Tønnessen, Drahus, and Dzamarija provide a look at Syrians in Norway. Janicki offers a brief look at Syrians in Poland, one of the European countries with the smallest Syrian communities, and the section concludes with the portrait of Syrians in Sweden by Aradhya and Mussino. This range of national case studies provides valuable comparative perspectives, but we confess to some disappointment that we could not manage to locate or convince any of our colleagues who might have contributed information about Syrians in the United Kingdom or France; in Denmark or Finland; in Eastern European countries like

Preface

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Hungary, the Czech Republic, or Romania; or in countries even closer to the frontline states such as Bulgaria or Greece. These are significant gaps in the picture we are able to present, but we think that the comparisons possible from the range of countries represented still here give unprecedented insights into just how the Syrian diaspora has unfolded—who moves where, and perhaps a hint about why. The last section of the book includes two chapters. The first by Ghio, based on data for EC Member States from Eurostat and the office of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, examines how three outcomes for Syrian refugees are patterned across Europe—the share of all Syrians who apply for asylum in different countries, the time (speed) involved in the decision process for such applicants, and the balance of positive and negative results when these decisions are reached. Ghio then attempts ambitious multivariate modelling to predict the share of all Syrians applying for asylum in Europe who apply in each country in a given year. Predictors include the population size of the member states, their gross domestic product levels, and several measures of the previously existing Syrian populations already in each of those countries—a model with a strong assumption of path dependence that is reinforced over time. The final chapter by Carlson and Williams draws on data from all the earlier chapters to develop a comparative perspective on similarities and differences between the Syrian populations found in different destination countries, with what we hope are stimulating new insights into the phenomenon of migration resulting from a massive and long-lasting armed conflict. We hope that this effort to document the Syrian diaspora in comparative perspective may give rise to additional studies, including data collection through surveys or registration systems, intensive ethnographic and qualitative field research on particular issues, and complementary systematic, quantitative, and comparative demographic analysis. Decision-makers and public opinion in every country of the world stand to benefit from the lessons we learn here, as we all face the decades ahead and the likelihood of future sudden population shifts. Tallahassee, FL, USA  Elwood D. Carlson Seattle, WA, USA  Nathalie E. Williams May, 2019

Contents

Part I Genesis of the Syrian Diaspora 1 Conceptualizing the Syrian Refugee Crisis and Migration during Armed Conflict����������������������������������������������������������������������������    3 Nathalie E. Williams and Elwood D. Carlson 2 Baseline Demographic Profile of Syria in 2009 ������������������������������������   13 Marty Masek 3 Surveying Syrians in Diaspora: Methodological Aspects for Planning and Implementing Longitudinal Studies ������������������������   29 Judith Kohlenberger, Isabella Buber-Ennser, Bernhard Rengs, and Roland Hosner Part II Population Movement to Front-Line States 4 Demographic Profile of Syrians in Turkey��������������������������������������������   57 Tuğba Adalı and Ahmet Sinan Türkyılmaz 5 The Situation of Syrian Women in Turkey��������������������������������������������   93 Tuba Duman 6 Demographic Profile of Syrians in Jordan and Lebanon��������������������  109 Maia Sieverding and Valentina Calderón-Mejía Part III Population Movement to Non-contiguous European States 7 Demographic Profile of Syrians in Austria��������������������������������������������  139 Isabella Buber-Ennser, Bernhard Rengs, Judith Kohlenberger, and Kryštof Zeman 8 Demographic Profile of Syrians in Belgium������������������������������������������  165 Sophie Vause and Bruno Schoumaker

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9 Demographic Profile of Syrians in Germany and Aspects of Integration����������������������������������������������������������������������  197 Susanne Worbs, Nina Rother, and Axel Kreienbrink 10 Demographic Profile of Syrians in Italy������������������������������������������������  237 Salvatore Strozza and Giuseppe Gabrielli 11 Demographic Profile of Syrians in the Netherlands ����������������������������  261 Marcel Lubbers and Helga de Valk 12 Demographic Profile of Syrians in Norway ������������������������������������������  281 Marianne Tønnessen, Kristin Mathilde Drahus, and Minja Tea Dzamarija 13 Demographic Profile of Syrians in Poland��������������������������������������������  303 Wojciech Janicki 14 Demographic Profile of Syrians in Sweden ������������������������������������������  321 Siddartha Aradhya and Eleonora Mussino Part IV Comparative Perspectives on the Syrian Diaspora 15 Differences Among European States Involving Syrian Asylum Seekers����������������������������������������������������������������������������  343 Daniela Ghio 16 Demographic Comparisons of Syrian Populations ������������������������������  377 Elwood D. Carlson and Nathalie E. Williams

Part I

Genesis of the Syrian Diaspora

Chapter 1

Conceptualizing the Syrian Refugee Crisis and Migration during Armed Conflict Nathalie E. Williams and Elwood D. Carlson

Abstract  Syrian migration following the start of the armed conflict is often called a crisis. This is due to the millions of Syrians who left in only a few years, but also to the fact that such a large stream of refugees and asylum seekers was largely unexpected and there was consequently little preparation in countries of reception. In this chapter, we identify gaps in the academic literature and identify the social scientific and demographic tools that can help to address the key questions of migration during armed conflict—how many, who, when, and where. The purpose of this chapter is to lay the groundwork for helping the reader understand and gain as much as possible from the rest of this volume. Keywords  Migration · Refugees · Forced migration · Demography · Syria · Theory · Selection · Exposure to risk

1.1  The Syrian Refugee Crisis In 2011, a Tunisian man named Mohamed Bouazizi immolated himself in protest of harassment by Tunisian officials. Bouazizi’s act ignited long-simmering resentments in the populace and catalyzed a wave of protests across Tunisia, which spread to other North African and Middle Eastern countries. And thus began the ‘Arab Spring’, which ultimately led to the toppling of three governments, major governance changes in at least six countries, and interstate wars in two. This largely unexpected turn of events was met with great hope by the international community, particularly hope for democratic reform across a traditionally autocratic region.

N. E. Williams (*) Department of Sociology, University of Washington, Seattle, WA, USA e-mail: [email protected] E. D. Carlson Department of Sociology, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, USA e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 E. D. Carlson, N. E. Williams (eds.), Comparative Demography of the Syrian Diaspora: European and Middle Eastern Destinations, European Studies of Population 20, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24451-4_1

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N. E. Williams and E. D. Carlson

Fast forward to 2019, when the word more commonly used for the present-day aftermath is “crisis”. Crisis for the state of governance in several countries, including Syria, Iraq, Libya, Yemen, Sudan, and sometimes Egypt. Crisis for the brutal armed conflict in Syria, that has lasted now 8 years and is morphing from an internal conflict to an international proxy war between world powers. And crisis for the almost unprecedented number of Syrian refugees who are now living in various conditions, ranging from challenging to utterly precarious, in Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, many European countries, and over 100 other countries worldwide. Indeed, Filippo Grandi, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) has declared, “Syria is the biggest humanitarian and refugee crisis of our time…”. Focusing just on Syria, the term ‘crisis’ is used to refer to Syrian migration in the last 8 years for several reasons. First and foremost, this is a crisis because of the sheer and almost unprecedented number of refugees who have left the country. According to UNHCR data1 there are now almost 6  million Syrian refugees and asylum seekers, in addition to the over 6 million Syrians living as internally displaced within the country—in total more than half of the entire population of the country when the conflict began. The second reason that the term ‘crisis’ is appropriate for this situation is because of the upheaval it has caused in the European Union. Individual European countries and the European Union (E.U.) as a whole have struggled to process asylum applications, recognize refugee status, house, feed, and otherwise care for upwards of a million displaced Syrians. This process has created political turmoil in individual European countries as well as the E.U.  Populist movements have arisen in most western and some eastern European countries, partially in response to the refugee crisis. Membership in the E.U., the Euro currency, and even the Schengen agreement have been questioned. Even the Brexit vote, for disassociating the United Kingdom from the European Union, was heavily influenced by immigration in general and the Syrian refugee crisis in particular. The third reason that the term ‘crisis’ is appropriate for this situation has received far less consideration in popular conversation, yet has substantial importance for the Syrian case as well as future situations of armed conflict and refugee movement. This third reason is that the massive influx of Syrian refugees and asylum seekers, to Europe in particular, was almost entirely unexpected. There was no early warning, there was little to no preparation, and little to no prior planning for how to handle such a large influx of people leaving Syria and appearing on the borders of European countries. We see this acutely in media images of chaotic camps on Greek islands like Lesbos, asylum seekers clinging to barbed wire on the border of Hungary and burning makeshift fires in the snows of Sweden. But the problem is spread throughout the Middle East and Europe and continues to date.

1  Data from UNHCR Population Statistics Database. Accessed on April 30, 2019 at http://popstats. unhcr.org/en/overview#_ga=2.111115333.1198189623.1556666712-1033871806.1527636393

1  Conceptualizing the Syrian Refugee Crisis and Migration during Armed Conflict

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1.2  D  efining the Gaps- What Do We Not Understand That Could Be Useful? We argue that part of the Syrian refugee crisis is due to the fact that it was unexpected. This suggests that if a large movement of refugees could be expected, then the crisis would be less problematic. So what can academic research do to help us better expect the unexpected? One might think that when there is a large armed conflict, we can expect that there will be an increase in refugees leaving the area. Indeed, numbers from the Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) show this to be the case in recent decades, with 2.6 million people leaving from Afghanistan, 4 million from Iraq, and 2.4 million from South Sudan. Even within Europe, 2 million people left within a year of the outbreak of violence that accompanied the break-up of Yugoslavia in 1991. The list goes on and the numbers would be even larger if we consider the likely millions of people who did not register for refugee status. Thus, it seems that we should have been able to anticipate the Syrian refugee crisis, based on past experience in general and in the Middle East and Europe in particular. However, past experience also demonstrates that there is great variation in the percentage of the population who left areas afflicted by armed conflict. For example, about 90% of Rohingya people left Myanmar as refugees or asylum seekers in recent years, compared to around 10% of Afghans and Iraqis. We currently have little ability to understand this variation, and thus little ability to predict whether a particular conflict (such as that in Syria) will result in many or few refugees and asylum seekers. This is obviously important because 500 asylum seekers do not constitute a problem, but 5 million do. In addition to the magnitude of a refugee migration stream, the timing of migration during armed conflict also remains confounding. Consider that the Syrian armed conflict started in 2011. Looking at Fig.  1.1, you can see that the initial increase in Syrian refugees and asylum seekers to anywhere in the world, largely 8,000,000 7,000,000 6,000,000 5,000,000

IDPs- Syria

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Refugees & Asylees- World

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Refugees & Asylees- Middle East Refugees & Asylees- Europe

2,000,000 1,000,000 0 2009

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2015

2016

Fig. 1.1  Annual numbers of Syrians living as refugees, asylees, and internally displaced

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N. E. Williams and E. D. Carlson

neighboring countries in the Middle East (Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, and Egypt), occurred after 2012, 1 year into the conflict. Since then, the slope of the increase has continued through 2016. Even more curious is that the substantial increase of Syrians seeking protection in Europe occurs only after 2014, 3 years into the brutal conflict. This demonstrates that there is incredible temporal variance in when people leave an armed conflict and when they arrive at transit or final destinations. As we discussed above, some people never leave, and it is important to understand why some leave and some do not, and who those people are. But even amongst those who leave, some leave right away and others leave months and even years later, as we can see in Fig. 1.1. Again, we currently have little ability to understand this temporal variation in migration from armed conflict. Such knowledge would help to better understand and respond to the Syrian refugee crisis. In addition, it can help to anticipate future refugee movements, both the magnitude and timing, from armed conflicts in Syria and other areas of the world. Spatial distribution of refugees is a third key gap in our understanding of the policy relevant dynamics of refugee migration. In a few cases, the majority of refugees leaving an insecure area end up directly across the border in one or a few well-­ delineated refugee camps. Such is the case with the Rohingya refugees, most of whom are living in camps and settlements on only a small area of land along the Bangladesh border with Myanmar. Such is not the case with Syrians however, and indeed not the case with the majority of refugee populations around the world. Syrian refugees and asylum seekers now reside in over 130 countries worldwide. Just as the Rohingya refugees are largely living along the border of their country of origin, it is not surprising then that a strong majority of Syrians (over 80%) reside in neighboring countries, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq, and Turkey. However, another substantial proportion of Syrians have ended up much further afield, with more than 15% in Europe. Even within Europe, there is great variation in residences of Syrian refugees and asylum seekers. One might think that there would be more Syrians in countries of southern Europe, closer to their origin. At last report (2017), UNHCR counted around 25,000 in Greece and an astounding 100,000 in far-flung Sweden. Similarly, Germany hosted over 560,000 Syrians refugees and asylum seekers, while neighboring Poland was home to only 530. On an anecdotal level, one can track down and make sense of how a particular Syrian individual ended up where they did: the path they took and the legal, logistical, and resource hurdles they overcame to get there. But on an aggregate level, making sense of the spatial distribution of Syrian refugees in Europe, and around the world, is much more difficult. Where refugees end up is a consequence of international law, policy, and diplomacy, combined with an astounding array of national and regional policies, laws, and public opinions, and further compounded by the individual’s desires and human, economic, social, and political resources. Further, spatial distribution of refugees changes with time, as some stay in their first destination country and others move on to second and even third places, only to be replaced in the first country by newer refugees who just left Syria. While patterns of spatial distribution of refugees are more difficult to understand on an aggregate level, they are also of utmost policy relevance.

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7

We have thus far identified three key and intersecting gaps in our understanding of refugee migration: the how many, the when, and the where. A fourth key gap is the who. Academics, policy-makers, the public (and even this chapter until this point) often talk about Syrian refugees as an ageless, androgynous and homogenous collection of people. But some refugees are male, some female, some young, some old, some married, some single, and the list goes on. In addition to the humanizing aspect of conceptualizing Syrian refugees and asylum seekers as people, it is also important to think about their characteristics from a policy perspective. Young single adult males tend to have a different set of capacities and needs than married adult women with children. Just as the when question intersects with the where question (how does spatial distribution of refugee migration change over time), the who question intersects as well. For example, policy and law would be best informed if we could know whether married people with children were more likely to leave a conflict early on, compared to single people. Reception could be better organized and impacts on host populations could be better addressed if we could know whether married people with children or single people are more likely to end up in an apartment in Sweden or a refugee camp in Lebanon, all to the benefit of less chaos and crisis.

1.3  Purpose of This Edited Volume Understanding the Syrian refugee crisis is the purpose of this volume. In other words, we seek to make some sense out of the unexpected migration of almost 6 million Syrians into the Middle East and Europe. Such a post-hoc understanding will of course not make the Syrian refugee crisis disappear. But by better understanding the dynamics of the past, we can learn how to improve our expectations for the future, the future of Syrian migration (given that the conflict still rages as we write this) and the future of other refugee migration streams as well. This is certainly not the first academic or policy attempt to study Syrian refugees and asylum seekers. Many studies have discussed issues of reception, legal status, politics, care and support, integration and so forth. In this volume, we have the broad aim of contributing to an understanding of the how many, when, where, and who of the Syrian refugee crisis. We seek to understand: why some people leave while others do not; when people are likely to leave and when they reach different destination countries along a multi-step route; where people go on this multi-step route, and what type of people they are. While the prospect of fully analyzing the Syrian refugee movement until this date is exciting and holds much potential for anticipation and amelioration of future refugee migration streams, full knowledge of these issues is of course not possible. Academic inquiry into these issues is limited by available data, current theoretical and methodological tools, and the incredible complexity and dynamicity of human behaviors and interactions.

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N. E. Williams and E. D. Carlson

Thus our goal with this volume is to contribute to improving our understanding of these immensely important and complex issues. We do this by leveraging existing data, examining the situation of Syrians in Syria before the war and Syrians in several countries of the Middle East and many in Europe. We also contribute social science and demographic perspectives to study of this topic. These perspectives are what set this volume apart from the large existing literature on the Syrian refugee crisis and we argue that they are important tools for future scholars to understand the Syrian and other refugee crises as well. We spend the remainder of this chapter introducing the social science and demographic perspectives that can help us to understand this situation better. The main body of this volume is then comprised of empirical chapters that use these perspectives to analyze pieces of the Syrian refugee crisis puzzle. The final chapter uses these perspectives to combine the pieces into a larger picture that allows us to better think about the how many, when, where, and who questions.

1.4  S  ocial Science as a Foundation for the Study of Migration During Armed Conflict Migration of refugees arguably has a history as old as that of humans themselves. The term “refugee” and the associated academic field of refugee studies, has an albeit shorter, but still substantial history. This began with the 1950 creation of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and the 1951 and subsequent refugee conventions. At this key juncture, the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees officially defined the term ‘refugee’ as: A person who owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.

This now well-known definition of “refugee” created a legal and political foundation for the newly developed protection regime for people in the situations described. After these initial developments at the level of the international community, academia followed suit, and we see the development of refugee studies programs. Most notable are those at Oxford and York Universities, although there are many others around the world. Top quality academic journals on this topic have since developed, such as Journal of Refugee Studies and Forced Migration Review, as well as professional associations like the International Association for the Study of Forced Migration. The work of many people at these highly respected institutions has resulted in incredible advances to our understanding of the situation of refugees and people in similar situations and to important contributions to effective policy-­ making and programming efforts.

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This brief trace through the 70-year history of refugee studies reveals some other notable things. As you can see, many of these academic institutions use the word ‘refugee’ as defined in the 1951 conventions. Others have begun to use the term ‘forced migration’, in recognition that there are many people who are faced with similar situations as refugees, but have not been officially and legally recognized as refugees or are living in their country of origin and are now known as ‘internally displaced persons’ or IDPs. A key point we learn from this is that academic analyses of this topic have largely drawn on the legal/political definitions of the 1950s. Effective legal definitions require clear delineation of people who are subject to international protection and those who are not, thus a clear definition of refugees versus not refugees. In order for the international community to provide protection, this legal definition must include the forced nature of this type of migration. It is precisely because the study of this topic has heretofore used these legal/political definitions of specific terms and situations as a foundation that it has been able to make real and substantial contributions to the legal and political protection of refugees and forced migrants. At the same time, we argue that using social science perspectives and analytical tools as a foundation can provide a new capacity to develop and address new questions that can also contribute to our understanding of these processes that are important to governments and the international humanitarian community and to the protection of people seeking to leave situations of armed conflict. In particular, the long history of social science teaches us that human decision-making and behaviors are incredibly complex. As such, in this volume we step back from the assumption that migration during armed conflict is forced and instead conceptualize the process of deciding to migrate, migrating, and settling to be complex and multidimensional. Amongst other things, stepping back from the assumption that such migration is forced allows us to consider those who do not migrate and to consider the substantial temporal and spatial variance amongst those who do migrate. In short, moving the foundation of social scientific study away from a political-legal perspective and towards a social science perspective allows us new opportunities to analyze the how many, when, where, and who of the Syrian refugee crisis. In the next sections of this chapter, we develop this idea more by describing in detail some key tools that the social scientific perspective brings to the table. The first social science tool is the concept of selection. This begins with the idea is that there is variation in any human behavior—some people do it, some people do not. Selection is the concept that this variation in human behavior is not random, but is almost always patterned, with a wide variety of characteristics causing some people to be more likely to undertake the behavior and others less likely. Of course, this basic concept is not new to most of our readers, but consider it in the light of ‘forced migration’. The term ‘forced’ implies that everyone in a particular situation (or place) migrates. However, as we mentioned earlier, many people do not migrate away from even the most violent conflicts, including an estimated 40% of Syrians who still live in their regular residences in Syria (not including those in IDP camps or settlements). At an even more local level, think about the city of Aleppo, which experienced about 5 years of near constant fight-

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N. E. Williams and E. D. Carlson

ing since 2011 and was termed one of the most dangerous cities in the world. By the time of the intense endgame to the fighting in 2016, it was estimated that 300,000 people still lived in the eastern rebel-­held portion of the city and 1.5 million in the western government-held portion. If migration during conflict was truly forced, then we would not have found these almost 2  million people still living in the most dangerous city in the world. Given that there is clearly variation in migration from Aleppo (some people did it, some people did not), then we must assume that there was also selection or characteristics that made some people more and less likely to leave. With this logic in mind, for the remainder of this chapter we discard the term ‘forced migration’ and instead use the decidedly less captivating, but more scientifically and empirically accurate phrase ‘migration during armed conflict’. The bulk of this volume then provides evidence for selection in migration during armed conflict, helping us to better understand the how many, when, where, and who. The second social science tool we advocate for a better understanding of migration during armed conflict is the demographic concept of ‘exposure to risk’. The idea behind exposure to risk is that in order to understand selection in human behaviors, one must examine all the people who were exposed to the possibility of undertaking a behavior. Then, we can compare the characteristics of those who undertook the behavior to those who did not. With this in mind, it would not make sense to simply calculate the education levels of Syrian refugees and conclude that there was selection in migration based on education. Instead, it would make sense to compare the education of refugees with the education of Syrians still in Syria, and then make a conclusion on how migration is selected on education. Of course, this strategy is decidedly more difficult, requiring data on people living inside and outside Syria. In this regard, the next chapter of this volume is of substantial importance, describing the social-demographic characteristics of the 2009 population of Syria, in other words, the approximate population that was exposed to the risk of migration during the armed conflict that began in 2011. This pre-conflict Syrian population can then be compared to the characteristics of refugees and asylum seekers in each of the Middle Eastern and European countries described in this volume, to provide an indication of how selection might be working on migration of Syrians, over time and across space. With some variation across countries due to availability of information, the teams of experts preparing chapters for each country generally follow a common descriptive strategy. Acknowledging that there were already small Syrian populations in many countries prior to the conflict, each country chapter gives a preliminary description of that starting-point for Syrians in about 2011 or slightly before. The authors then describe in as much detail as available how the arrival of Syrians developed in that country from 2011 and reaching as far towards the present as the data make possible. Finally, each chapter then describes the end result of this process, contrasting the profile of the Syrian population in each country around 2017/2018 with what it had been near

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the beginning. Particularly in the cases of Sweden and Germany this beginning-to-­ end contrast is striking. As we mention earlier, the diversity of Syrian (and any other) refugees and asylum seekers is of fundamental importance for policy relevance and academic advance. To address the who question, or the selection in Syrian migration during conflict, the chapters in this volume consider the most basic demographic dimensions of age and sex of the Syrian population in each destination country. Beyond these basic but absolutely critical population characteristics, there are other important ways in which Syrians in one country may differ dramatically from those in another country. With varying availability of data, many of the country chapters in this volume address differences in educational enrollment and attainment, family living arrangements, occupation, and even health. Comparison of results within and across countries indicates that selection on these factors is likely caused by a constellation of the abilities and resources of the migrants themselves combined with the different laws, policies, and social environments of receiving countries. To this extent, the penultimate chapter in this volume provides an explicit analysis of how the legal and policy variation across European countries has influenced the present-­ day distribution of Syrian migrants across that continent. Finally, the concluding chapter of this volume does some of the comparative work for the reader, by explicitly analyzing differences in key population characteristics, such as age, sex, and education, between Syria and destination countries. The variation is astounding and this is one of the strongest pieces of evidence yet of the heavy selection in migration during armed conflict and destination choice. The reader will quickly notice that not all of the 130+ countries that host Syrian refugees and asylum seekers are represented in this volume. Indeed, not all of the Middle Eastern and European countries are represented. The absence of many countries in this volume is primarily due to lack of appropriate data and limitations on access to existing data. Some of the country chapters herein have extensive information on occupations, educational attainment, co-resident family, and a host of other factors. These type of data often come from surveys explicitly designed for the Syrian refugee population, as in the chapters on Austria. Alternately, other country chapters are more limited in the characteristics discussed, such as the chapter on Poland that reports on age, sex, and documentation status, information gathered from government records. This is, of course, more thorough than the countries that are entirely missing from this volume, many due to simple lack of any accessible and reliable information on Syrian refugee and asylum seekers. Thus, one of the conclusions that can already be reaped from this volume is that if the global community is to better anticipate and prepare for current and future refugee migrations, a more insightful understanding of the how many, where, and when questions is needed. In order to develop such understanding, there is a strong need for additional, coordinated collection of high quality temporally and spatially explicit data on refugees and asylum seekers.

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Despite the current troubling dearth of data on refugees and asylum seekers, we are pleased that this volume includes chapters on the Syrian population before the conflict and on Syrian migrants in most of the primary host countries today, including Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Germany, and Sweden, to name a few. We also include chapters on some countries with strikingly few Syrians, for example Italy and Poland, which provide important comparative capacity for understanding the geographic spread of Syrians. Put together, this volume is one of the most c­ omprehensive collections on the how many, who, when, and where of Syrian migration during the armed conflict.

Chapter 2

Baseline Demographic Profile of Syria in 2009 Marty Masek

Abstract  The current chapter presents basic population characteristics of Syrians before the conflict as a reference for subsequent, country-specific refugee descriptions. Using the nationally representative Syria Family Health Survey administered in 2009, the profile provides standard demographic measures and a detailed examination of educational attainment by age, sex, and geographic location. Sex differences in education decline in younger ages, but sharp geographic contrasts remain. Marital and fertility characteristics also highlight sex and geographic differences by educational attainment. The final sections outline salient political, ethnic, and religious designations and potential rifts present at the beginning of the conflict to inform comparisons of characteristics not measured in the Survey. Keywords  Syria · Demographic characteristics · Education · Rural-urban differences · Politics and government · Religion

2.1  Data Documentation The 2009 Syria Family Health Survey (SFHS) provides baseline demographic data for Syria before the conflict erupted in 2011. Comparisons of these data with populations of Syrians in other countries at later dates should keep in mind that this 2009 population would have aged forward to older ages in such subsequent years. The SFHS is a multistage cluster design to select a nationally representative sample of households, with the addition of purposive sampling of Iraqi areas in Rural Damascus to obtain sufficient numbers of Iraqis. The first stage identified 1375 units of inspection (stratified, random selection) in all 14 governates, then identified 1500 clusters with the addition of extra Iraqis. The second stage selected about 20 M. Masek (*) Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL, USA e-mail: [email protected] © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 E. D. Carlson, N. E. Williams (eds.), Comparative Demography of the Syrian Diaspora: European and Middle Eastern Destinations, European Studies of Population 20, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24451-4_2

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M. Masek

households within each cluster, resulting in 30,064 households. Enumerators gathered data on all members of each household interviewed (n = 127,733). The final sample included 28,693 households of noninstitutionalized civilians, of whom 25,697 were Syrian (96.8% response rate, 24,883 households) and 2996 were Iraqi (98.8% response rate, 2959 households) (Government of Syria 2011). Iraqis comprised about 10% of the sample, while they comprise about 5% of the population of Syria. Neither a variable identifying Iraqi respondents nor an individual weight variable were provided with the data, so separation of Iraqi respondents was not possible. A household weight variable was provided, which was included in household level calculations. The Arab League supported this project in cooperation with Syria’s official departments of Health and of Population.

2.2  Population Characteristics The United Nations estimates the 2009 population of Syria at 21,906,000 (UN Stats 2011), and 1.2–1.4 million of those were Iraqi refugees (UNHCR 2009). Just under half of the population (48%) was urban. The average family size was five people (4.7 urban, 5.4 rural), with 10% of households headed by females (63% of whom were widows). Employed individuals comprised 42% of the population aged 15 and older (69% of males, 14% of females).

2.2.1  Population Age Structure The population was relatively young, with 38% under age 15 and only 4% age 65 and older, yielding 72 dependents for every 100 working-age individuals. Rural areas were younger than urban areas due to a greater share of individuals under age 20. Males outnumbered females in early ages, as expected, but the sex ratio equalized between exact ages 24 and 28, and women outnumbered men in their 30s. Age group distibutions by sex and residence appear in Table 2.1. This deficit of young men is likely due to the sample’s exclusion of military personnel and to male labor emigration. Assuming a sex ratio of 1.05 under age 40, the sample is “missing” 730 men under 40 (0.5% of a sample that would have an under 40 sex ratio of 1.05). This corresponds to about 125,000 “missing” men under age 40 from the population. Interestingly, men outnumbered women again by age 55 and above, indicating data problems such as age mis-statement or a sampling issue.

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Table 2.1  Percent distribution of males and females, Syria 2009 Age 0–4 5–9 10–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49 50–54 55–59 60–64 65–69 70+

Males (%) 13.0 13.0 12.2 11.1 9.5 7.9 6.2 5.3 5.1 4.0 3.5 2.9 2.2 1.4 2.7

Females (%) 12.8 12.7 12.2 10.5 9.1 8.4 6.8 5.8 5.3 3.9 3.7 2.9 2.1 1.3 2.3

Urban (%) 12.1 12.1 11.8 10.5 9.2 8.3 6.6 6.0 5.8 4.6 3.9 3.1 2.2 1.5 2.5

Rural (%) 13.7 13.6 12.6 11.1 9.4 8.0 6.4 5.1 4.7 3.4 3.2 2.8 2.1 1.3 2.6

Source: Original tabulations from 2009 Syrian Family Health Survey

2.2.2  Education by Age and Sex Women in middle and older ages were more likely than their male counterparts to have no education (42% of women and 17% of men ages 40–49, 80% of women and 46% of men ages 60–69). Gender-based educational attainment was more equal among younger generations. Of adults age 20–29, 23% of women and 17% of men had no education. More interestingly, these ages had equal levels of secondary or greater education (32% of women and 31% of men), while rates of basic education accounted for the remaining education gap, as 45% of women and 51% of men had only basic education. See Fig. 2.1 and Table 2.2.

2.2.3  Education by Urban/Rural Residence Forty percent of Syria’s 2009 rural population had no education level completed, compared to 26% of the urban population (age 15 and older). The prevalence of respondents with only basic education in rural versus urban areas was similar (43% for rural, 46% for urban), while urban areas had more individuals with secondary or higher education (17% for rural, 28% for urban). Males and females in urban areas had more equal levels of education than in rural areas, especially among younger cohorts. Overall, 27% of urban women and

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M. Masek 70+ 60-64 50-54 40-44 30-34 20-24 10-14 0-4

Males Females No Educ

Basic Educ

Secondary Educ +

Fig. 2.1  Syria 2009 population by age, sex, and level of education completed. (Source: Data from Table 2.2)

Table 2.2  Population by age, sex, and level of education completed, Syria 2009

Age 0–4 5–9 10–14 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49 50–54 55–59 60–64 65–69 70+

Male No Educ (%) 100.0 100.0 97.8 48.3 20.7 13.4 12.4 12.4 15.8 18.9 25.3 33.1 42.5 52.4 72.9

Basic Educ (%) 0.0 0.0 2.2 41.5 44.8 59.2 63.7 60.6 53.4 49.9 45.0 41.3 35.6 29.9 19.1

Secondary Educ + (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.2 34.5 27.4 23.9 27.1 30.8 31.2 29.7 25.6 22.0 17.7 8.1

Female No Educ (%) 100.0 100.0 97.4 42.7 24.6 20.9 21.7 23.4 38.7 46.9 57.4 71.1 78.4 82.5 92.4

Basic Educ (%) 0.0 0.0 2.6 45.0 38.6 52.5 55.4 53.5 40.0 35.9 29.2 19.9 15.1 13.5 6.1

Source: Original tabulations from 2009 Syrian Family Health Survey

Secondary Educ + (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 12.3 36.8 26.7 23.0 23.1 21.3 17.2 13.4 9.0 6.5 4.0 1.5

2  Baseline Demographic Profile of Syria in 2009

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Table 2.3  Urban population by age, sex, and level of education completed

Age 0–4 5–9 10–14

Male No Educ. (%) 100 100 98

Basic Educ. (%) 0 0 2

Secondary Educ. + (%) 0 0 0

Female No Educ. (%) 100 100 97

Basic Educ. (%) 0 0 3

Secondary Educ. + (%) 0 0 0

15–19 20–24 25–29

46 19 11

42 44 58

12 36 30

35 17 13

50 40 52

15 44 35

30–34

10

62

28

14

55

31

35–39

10

59

31

14

55

31

40–44

14

51

36

24

46

30

45–49 50–54

16 20

50 46

35 34

33 43

42 36

24 21

55–59 60–64

25 29

42 40

33 31

55 65

29 25

17 11

65–69

39

35

26

73

20

7

70+

60

27

14

87

10

3

Source: Original tabulations from 2009 Syrian Family Health Survey

26% of urban men had no education. Urban women in their teens and twenties had higher levels of secondary education than their male counterparts. For example, 44% of women age 20–24 had attained secondary or higher education, while 36% of men in this age group had attained the same (Table 2.3). On the other hand, rural areas had less equal levels of education between the sexes except among the youngest educated cohorts 10–14 years and 15–19 years old. Older rural women had an especially low prevalence of education. For example, 86% of rural women age 50 and above had completed no educational level compared to 55% of men in these ages. See Table 2.4 for age group distributions.

2.2.4  Education by Governate The highest prevalence of education concentrated in the south and west, and the lowest levels were in the north and east. In the study year, 33% of the population age 15 and older had no education, 45% had basic education, and 22% had secondary education or greater (12% secondary, 5% middle institute, 5% university). Basic education includes grades one through nine, and secondary education spans grades 10–12. Of the 14 governates in Syria, five governates had populations of respondents age 15 and older where at least three-quarters possessed basic or greater education: Tartous, Damascus, Lateqia, As-swidaa, and Rural Damascus.

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Table 2.4  Rural population by age, sex, and level of education completed

Age 0–4 5–9 10–14

Male No Educ. (%) 100 100 98

Basic Educ. Secondary Educ. (%) + (%) 0 0 0 0 2 0

Female No Educ. Basic Educ. Secondary (%) (%) Educ. + (%) 100 0 0 100 0 0 98 2 0

15–19

51

41

8

50

41

9

20–24

22

45

33

32

38

30

25–29 30–34 35–39 40–44

15 14 14 18

60 65 62 56

25 20 23 25

28 29 33 55

53 56 52 34

19 15 15 12

45–49 50–54 55–59 60–64 65–69 70+

23 32 42 56 67 84

50 44 40 31 25 13

27 24 18 13 9 3

64 73 87 91 92 97

28 22 11 6 7 3

8 5 2 3 1 0

Source: Original tabulations from 2009 Syrian Family Health Survey

The governates with the lowest prevalence of basic education—less than 60%— were Raqa, Dir Ezor, Halab (contains Aleppo), and Hasaka. Three of these four (Raqa, Halab, and Hasaka) form Syria’s northeastern border with Turkey (Fig. 2.2). Prevalence of secondary or greater education largely mirrored this pattern. Four governates had levels of secondary education over 30%: Tartous, Damascus, Latequia, and As-swidaa. Concurrently, Raqa, Halab, Edlb, Dir Ezor, Hasaka, and Qonitara had the lowest levels of secondary or greater education. The potential for age structure to influence education levels was considered, but age-standardized educational attainment calculations showed negligible effect of age structure on level of education by governate.

2.2.5  Marital Status by Gender Women were married at younger ages but experienced lower percentages of marriage in middle and older ages than men. The average age at first marriage for females was 25 compared to age 29 for males, according to official survey documentation (Government of Syria 2011). These calculations are not based on registration data. Rather, these ages represent singulate mean age at marriage calculations (Hajnal 1953) based on proportions never married by age 50 in the sample. In their late teens and throughout their twenties, women were more likely to be married than men. Yet more women than men were single at age 35 and beyond. By their late thirties (ages 35–39), 90% of men were married compared to 82% of

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2  Baseline Demographic Profile of Syria in 2009

Fig. 2.2  Syrians age 15+ with at least basic education by governate. (Source: Data from Table 2.5)

Table 2.5  Educational attainment of Syrians age 15+ by governate Damascus Halab Rural Damascus Hums Hama Lateqia Edlb Hasaka Dir Ezor Tartous Raqa Daraa As-swidaa Qonitara

None (%) 19 47 24 25 29 21 38 44 52 18 54 29 21 31

Basic (%) 50 38 51 49 47 46 46 38 32 48 34 50 48 50

Secondary (%) 16 8 14 13 12 18 9 10 9 18 7 11 17 12

Middle (%) 5 3 5 7 7 7 4 5 5 9 4 6 8 4

Source: Original tabulations from 2009 Syrian Family Health Survey

Univ+ (%) 10 3 6 6 5 8 3 3 3 7 2 5 6 3

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M. Masek

women. A small part of this difference is due to widowhood (1% of women) and divorce (1% of women), but lack of marriage (15% of women) mostly drives this difference. At ages 50–54, this pattern of greater marriage among men remained, but more of the difference came from female widowhood. In this age range, 97% of men were married compared to 84% of women. Only 5% of women were single, while 10% were widowed (Fig. 2.3), (Tables 2.6 and 2.7).

2.3  Number of Live Births Data linking women to their own children in the household were not included in this version of the dataset, but official documentation published for the 2009 survey includes Table  2.8 below. The majority of women with completed fertility (age 45–49) had experienced five or more live births, while less than 4% of this age group had never experienced live birth. The number of births declined with greater levels of education (Fig. 2.4). Illiterate women experienced an average of five live births, while women who completed secondary education experienced 2.6 live births on average. Women in rural areas were more likely to experience five or more live births (35.6%), compared to urban women who were more likely to experience 1–2 births (29.7%) or 3–4 births (37.2%). 70+ 65-69 60-64 55-59 50-54 45-49 40-44 35-39 30-34 25-29 20-24 15-19 10-14 5-9 0-4

Males Females Single

Married

Postmarried

Fig. 2.3  Marital status by age group and sex. (Source: Data from Tables 2.6 and 2.7)

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Table 2.6  Marital status of males Age 15+ by age group Age 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49 50–54 55–59 60–64 65–69 70+

Single (%) 100 92 59 24 9 4 2 2 1 1 0 1

Married (%) 0 8 41 75 90 95 97 97 98 97 96 88

Widowed (%) 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 3 11

Divorced/separated (%) 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1

Source: Original tabulations from 2009 Syrian Family Health Survey

Table 2.7  Marital status of females age 15+ by age group Age 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49 50–54 55–59 60–64 65–69 70+

Single (%) 89 59 33 22 15 10 7 5 3 3 3 3

Married (%) 11 40 65 76 82 85 85 84 80 71 64 43

Widowed (%) 0 0 0 1 1 3 7 10 15 26 33 54

Divorced/separated (%) 0 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 1 1

Source: Original tabulations from 2009 Syrian Family Health Survey

2.4  Religious and Ethnic Composition Official surveys, Syria’s national census, and humanitarian demographic surveys conducted in Syria all are required to omit religious, ethnic, and political affiliation questions. Historically, the Syria Census does not collect data on ethnicity or religion because sectarianism is illegal in Syria’s Constitution, so estimates provided by anthropologists, religious figures, journalists, and activists must suffice. These figures are contested, but most estimates agree on the following composition of the population: 74% Sunni Muslims (most are Arab, about 9% are Kurdish, and less than 1% each are Turkmen and Circassians); 13% Shia Muslims (most are Alawites, some are Ismailis, and few are mainstream Shias); 10% Christians (including

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Table 2.8  Percentage distribution of women by number of live births, age group, educational status, and place of residence

By age group 15–19 20–24 25–29 30–34 35–39 40–44 45–49 By educational status Illiterate Literate Primary Preparatory Secondary Middle Institute University + By place of residence Urban Rural Total

Number of births 0 1–2

3–4

5+

Mean

Women

43.4 16.6 8.1 5.7 3.5 3.2 3.7

54.1 61.6 38.6 22.4 15.5 10.5 9.7

2.5 20.8 42.6 43.1 38.5 34.7 29.7

0.0 1.0 10.6 28.8 42.5 51.6 56.9

0.8 1.7 2.7 3.6 4.3 5.0 5.3

747 2365 3493 3226 3054 2756 1924

6.5 11.9 7.4 9.4 12.5 7.4 10.9

15.5 24.1 26.2 32.1 39.4 39.2 42.9

23.3 31.3 36.7 39.5 34.3 43.0 39.8

54.6 32.6 29.7 19.0 13.8 10.4 6.3

5.0 3.6 3.6 3.0 2.6 2.7 2.4

3518 262 7401 2768 1713 1203 699

8.4 8.1 8.2

29.7 25.2 27.8

37.2 31.1 34.7

24.7 35.6 29.3

3.3 3.9 3.6

1646 3971 17,565

Source: Government of Syria 2011. Principle Report: Syria Family Health Survey

primarily Orthodox and Catholic denominations, and Armenian and Assyrian ethnicities); 3% Druze; less than 1% Jews and Yazidis (Bandak 2014; CIA 2012). Palestinians—about 560,000 before the conflict; 2.5% of the population (UNRWA 2017)—are mostly Arab Sunni Muslims, while very few are Christians. The lack of demographic, ethnic, religious, and political characteristics of individuals within Syria makes demographic and social analysis challenging. This section describes these characteristics at the population level and illuminates extant ethnic, religious, and political rifts among Syrians.

2.4.1  Short Political History: Baath Party The Arab Socialist Baath Party advocates Arab unity in a single secular Arab nation. Branches exist in many Arab nations, but the party has ruled in Syria and Iraq only. Years of political instability preceded the Arab Socialist Baath Party’s rise to power in Syria during a coup on March 8, 1963 (Emadi 2011). Another coup on February 3, 1966 saw the military wing of the government—the nationalist, not the progressive side of the party—seize power.

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100% 19%

90%

70%

10%

34%

43%

6%

30%

33%

80%

14%

40%

55% 40%

60% 37%

31%

50% 40% 30%

23%

43%

39% 39%

32%

24% 26%

20% 16% 10%

0%

7%

12%

0 births

7%

1-2 births

9%

3-4 births

13%

7%

11%

5 or more births

Fig. 2.4  Percent distribution of number of live births by educational status. (Source: Data from Table 2.8)

Then Hafez al-Assad, the Minister of Defense at the time, launched another coup to gain control of Syria on November 13, 1970, bringing stability to the country and the enduring governance of the Baath Party. The secular aim of the party was at odds with Islamist powers in the region, but Hafez al-Assad retained power via repressive and violent strategies to extinguish opposition groups (Emadi 2011), although the coup in 1970 was bloodless. Upon Hafiz al-Assad’s death in 2000, a popular referendum approved his son Bashar al-Assad as the new President (CIA 2017). Bashar al-Assad brought a measure of liberality to Syria at first but reemphasized authoritarian control one year later. Syria has existed under a declared emergency state, with the implementation of martial law, since 1967 (Friedman 2016), which impedes civil liberties in the country.

2.4.2  Alawites and Shias Islam is composed of two major branches: Sunni and Shia. Shia Islam has multiple subsects, including the Alawites and Ismailis. The Alawites in Syria—combined with Ismailis and few Shias—comprise about 13% of the population (Bandak 2014;

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CIA 2012), but command a significant share of power because President Assad is Alawi (as was his father). Muslims once denounced Alawism as heretical, but the Alawi sect has since been accepted by some Muslims and adopted by Shias. During the period of ‘Pan-Arabism’ a prominent Sunni mufti (a Muslim authority who rules on legal matters) issued a ruling that acknowledged the Alawites as Muslims and especially helped them in Syria, although some still contest their legitimacy. Later Shia scholars claimed the Alawites as part of the Shia branch of Islam and made possible a close relationship between the Shias of Iran and the Alawites of Syria (Talhamy 2010). Some Alawites enjoy elevated positions in government or the military, but most do not benefit from Assad’s rule. Regardless, most Alawites support the regime out of fear of the opposition should the government fail (Diehl 2012; Friedman 2016). Alawites in Syria live on the west coast of the country and in the adjacent mountains, and many migrated into the urban centers of Aleppo, Ladhakiya, and Damascus in more recent history. Alawites in Syria have ties to Alevis in Turkey (Byman 2015). The government of Iran—a majority Shia country—supports the Alawi regime in Syria by contributing funding and supplying Syria with Iranian military resources, including soldiers. This has enabled the otherwise weakened minority to fight more successfully (Diehl 2012; Fradkin and Libby 2013). Russia has also assisted Assad militarily (Byman 2015).

2.4.3  Sunnis Under the Assad regime, Sunnis held only lower offices in government, and many considered Syria “under occupation” by Alawites and Iran (Friedman 2016). The Sunni opposition arising during the conflict denies the legitimacy of Alawi rule because of the small size of the Alawi population compared to the Sunni population (74%), unjust political and economic treatment, and a perceived heretical history of Alawism. The Free Syrian Army, the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Islamic State form the major anti-government, opposition groups in Syria, all of whom practice Sunni Islam. Before the conflict, the Assad regime relegated Sunnis to infantry positions in the military, while Alawites occupied officer positions. When government response to protests became violent in 2011, many Sunnis deserted and formed the FSA (Free Syrian Army) due to perceived unfairness in the military and ideological rifts (Friedman 2016). The Muslim Brotherhood—a mainstream Sunni Muslim organization that advocates a less violent campaign for Sunni control than do extremists (Blanga 2017)—was not influential in the initial uprising in 2011 (Kahf 2013). Further, the Islamic State was not an ideological force in Syria at the time, but extremists gained more and more sway as the conflict continued, especially beginning in 2013 (Friedman 2016). Cooperation between these and secular opposition groups has fluctuated throughout the conflict but remains insignificant (Fradkin and Libby 2013). Regardless, these groups have attacked, kidnapped, and forced Alawites to flee their villages, some of whom wear Christian crosses to avoid

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violence from Sunni opposition groups (Diehl 2012). This Syrian opposition receives material support from Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and other Arab states (Byman 2015). As such, the Assad regime targets the Sunni majority, considered to be the primary threat to continued Alawi dominance in Syria (United States 2016). Anecdotal accounts repeat the theme of continual border crossing between Turkey and Syria. Areas of Turkey have allegedly become official and unofficial bases of operations and recovery grounds for opposition fighters and activists, who cross back and forth between the countries. Turkey allowed members of the Syrian National Council (an organization that tried to form a “government in exile” for Syria) to stay one year in Turkey (Krajeski 2012). Wounded members of the FSA and others who are wounded and wish to return to fight against Assad receive medical treatment and time to recover in Turkey before returning to fight in Syria (Krajeski 2012). Sunni and secular activists also traverse this border to fulfill duties in Syria (Lay 2013).

2.4.4  Christians Christians comprise roughly 10% of Syria’s 2009 population (CIA 2012). The previous (1973–2012) and current (since 2012) constitutions of the Syrian Arab Republic assert de jure religious freedom. One pre-conflict ethnographic study revealed Christian feelings of unity with Muslims in Damascus (Bandak 2014). Other studies find that during their reign, the Assads garnered support from Christians and other minorities by encouraging fears that Sunni fundamentalists would persecute Syrian minorities in the event of a regime change, while the Assads vowed to defend minorities from this threat (Amar 2012; Farha and Mousa 2015; Friedman 2016). When Bashar al-Assad became President, he forged and strengthened bonds with Christian leaders in the country, especially among the Greek Orthodox Church (Bandak 2015). Thus, Christians in Syria were more likely to support Assad because Christians were less marginalized. Some Christians were involved in Assad’s political sphere (Farha and Mousa 2015). However, class affiliation competes with religious identity in determining support for Assad. Social standing and especially occupational group status played a major role in Assad’s co-optation of Christians, many of whom occupy the middle and upper classes in Syria (Farha and Mousa 2015). Some evidence also points to coercive force used to encourage Christians to support the regime (Farha and Mousa 2015). Since the conflict began, some Christians (Armenians, Greek Orthodox, and Syriac), especially from Damascus and Aleppo, have crossed into Lebanon because of Lebanon’s history as a haven for Christians (Amar 2012). Armenians in Syria are overwhelmingly Christian and are predominantly Apostolic, while a minority are Catholic or Evangelical. Armenians found refuge in Syria fleeing the Armenian Genocide (1915–1917) that took place primarily in Turkey, so many fear Turkish intervention. Other Christians fear Turkish intervention as well because of Turkey’s intolerant treatment of them in the past and present.

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Armenians in Syria comprise a small but recognizable portion of the population estimated at 70,000–100,000, with the majority settled in Aleppo (Ministry of Diaspora 2014). According to Nigmatulina (2015), Armenians, like other Christians, find real or imagined protection under Assad control, so many support government forces.

2.4.5  Kurds The Kurds in Syria live primarily in the Northeast region of the country and make up about 9% of the population (Diehl 2012). As a group, the Kurds are a stateless people in multiple countries, who occupy a region around the intersecting borders of Iraq, Syria, Turkey, Iran, and a small portion of Armenia (Clark 2015). In Syria, Kurds have been marginalized by the Baath Party; their Kurdish identity is at odds with the pan-Arab push for unity, and their political parties are banned in Syria, as are all ethnic-based parties. Assad allowed a measure of autonomy in the Kurdish region during the 2011 uprising (Clark 2015) as government forces that had been stationed in the Northern Kurdish region left the area to face challenges elsewhere. At this time, the area witnessed a rise of Kurdish language in Kurdish schools. However, the Syrian government still denies Kurdish secession (Clark 2015). Kurds in Syria have relationships with Kurds in Iraq and Turkey (Byman 2015). Kurds and Turkish officials experience political tension as Turkish practices and policies have repressed Kurds, and Kurdish groups commit violent acts against the Turkish government. This conflict with Turkey impedes Kurdish alliances with Western powers (Paasche and Gunter 2016).

2.4.6  Druze The Druze minority in Syria has historically defended Arab nationalism, and part of the Druze identity relates to their role in liberating Syria from Ottoman and French rule. The Druze make up about 3% of Syrians or about 700,000 people (Schaebler 2013). The Druze religion is reserved only for those who are highly driven to study it, and full knowledge of the religion is kept even from most Druze. The Druze practice strict endogamy and value a rugged life on the “Druze Mountain.” They were structurally integrated in the ministry of both Assad regimes but have managed multiple “Druze revolts” largely originating in Jaramana (the largest concentration of Druze in Syria) because of economic neglect (Schaebler 2013). Since the conflict began, the Druze have tried to remain neutral, claiming a responsibility to protect those who live in their area instead. Most Druze silently

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support the regime of al-Assad because they wish to conform with the instructions from their religious officials, but some individual Druze have taken up arms in opposition to the government.

References Amar, J.  (2012). The loss of Syria: New violence threatens Christianity’s ancient roots. Commonweal, 139(18), 13. Bandak, A. (2014). Of refrains and rhythms in contemporary Damascus: Urban space and Christian-Muslim coexistence. Current Anthropology, 55(S10), 248. Bandak, A. (2015). Reckoning with the inevitable: Death and dying among Syrian Christians during the uprising. Ethnos: Journal of Anthropology, 80(5), 671–691. Blanga, Y. U. (2017). The role of the Muslim brotherhood in the Syrian Civil War. Middle East Policy, 24(3), 48. Byman, D. (2015). Containing Syria’s chaos. The National Interest 140, 30. CIA. (2012). The world factbook: Syria. CIA. (2017). The world factbook: Syria. Clark, P. (2015). Harriet Allsopp. “The Kurds of Syria: Political parties and identity in the Middle East”. Asian Affairs, 46(1), 135–137. Diehl, J. (2012). Lines in the sand. World Affairs, 175(1), 7. Emadi, H. (2011). Requiem for the Baath party: Struggle for change and freedom in Syria. Mediterranean Quarterly, 22(4), 62–79. Farha, M., & Mousa, S. (2015). Secular autocracy vs. sectarian democracy? Weighing reasons for Christian support for regime transition in Syria and Egypt. Mediterranean Politics, 20(2), 178–197. Fradkin, H., & Libby, L. (2013). Why Sunnis fear Shiites: The true nature of the Syrian conflict – And the Middle East’s. Commentary, 136(5), 24. Friedman, Y. (2016). In C. Lutmar & B. Miller (Eds.), The Alawi regime during the Syria Civil war 2013–2014: From collapse to fragile stability. Abingdon: Routledge. Government of Syria. (2011). Principle report: Syria family health survey. Hajnal, J. (1953). Age at marriage and proportions marrying. Population Studies, 7(2), 111. Kahf, M. (2013). Then and now: The Syrian revolution to date. Friends for a Nonviolent World: St. Paul 1.1(Special Report): 40. Krajeski, J. (2012). Taking refuge: The Syrian revolution in Turkey. World Policy Journal, 29(2), 59–67. Lay, T. (2013). Syria’s legal fight amid the gunfire. Socialist Lawyer, (63), 16–17. Ministry of Diaspora. (2014). The Virtual museum of Armenian diaspora. Republic of Armenia. Nigmatulina, A. (2015, April). Syrian refugees in Armenia: A warm welcome. Aljazeera. Paasche, T. F., & Gunter, M. M. (2016). Revisiting Western strategies against the Islamic state in Iraq and Syria. The Middle East Journal, 70(1), 9–29. Schaebler, Birgit1. (2013). Constructing an identity between Arabism and Islam: The Druzes in Syria. Muslim World, 103(1), 62–79. Talhamy, Y. (2010). The Fatwas and the Nusayri/Alawis of Syria. Middle Eastern Studies, 46(2), 175–194. UN Stats. (2011). World statistics pocket book 2010. Department of Economic and Social Affairs. United States. (2016). Report to congress: Proposed refugee admissions for fiscal year 2016. UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. (2009). Realizing protection space for Iraqi refugees: UNHCR in Syria, Jordan and Lebanon. Refworld. UNRWA. (2017). Syria regional crisis: Emergency appeal 2017.

Chapter 3

Surveying Syrians in Diaspora: Methodological Aspects for Planning and Implementing Longitudinal Studies Judith Kohlenberger, Isabella Buber-Ennser, Bernhard Rengs, and Roland Hosner

Abstract  This chapter provides insights on social surveys among refuge seeking persons carried out in Austria between 2015 and 2017. The methodological approach of the data collection, questionnaire preparation, experiences from the surveys, as well as insights from the field phases from wave 1 and 2 of the surveys are presented. Findings address several key challenges faced by surveys of the highly mobile and vulnerable group of asylum seekers and refugees, including contact and response rates, language barriers, and ethical considerations. In addition, we provide input for planning and implementing longitudinal studies to track the economic, social and cultural integration of Syrian migrants in the labor market and society of the host country. We discuss concrete solutions and recommendations for similar (inter)national, cross-cultural surveys on the Syrian population that recently arrived in Europe. Keywords  Refugees · Asylum seekers · Panel survey · Methodology · Field phase · Sampling · Research ethics

J. Kohlenberger (*) Institute for Social Policy, Vienna University of Economics and Business, Vienna, Austria e-mail: [email protected] I. Buber-Ennser · B. Rengs Wittgenstein Centre (IIASA, VID/ÖAW, WU), Vienna Institute of Demography/Austrian Academy of Sciences, Vienna, Austria R. Hosner International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD), Vienna, Austria © Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020 E. D. Carlson, N. E. Williams (eds.), Comparative Demography of the Syrian Diaspora: European and Middle Eastern Destinations, European Studies of Population 20, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-24451-4_3

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3.1  Introduction Given the high relevance of the latest arrivals of Syrian refugees in Europe, it has become of utmost importance to provide evidence not only on the number of people, but to find out who they are in terms of socio-demographic characteristics. In the wake of the ‘great summer of migration’ in 2015, about one million individuals sought asylum in Europe, with Germany, Sweden, Austria, Italy and France reporting highest inflows (Eurostat 2016). Rapid scientific research was demanded to accompany the design and implementation of policy measures for the integration of refugees and people in subsidiary protection (BMEIA 2015). Impacts on the receiving countries, including implications for labor markets, welfare and educational systems, family reunification potential and national resettlement programs, as well as integration and social cohesion in the host countries, are still controversially discussed by social scientists, policy makers, media and the general public alike. However, demographic research continues to be faced with a lack of quantitative data on forced migration from the Middle East, and Afghanistan as well as northern African countries, and a “paucity of statistics on refugees and related categories derived from sample surveys” (MacDonald 2015). This assessment proved especially true for the acute lack of demographic information on recent arrivals of Syrians in Europe. Inspired by this apparent research gap and the large number of Syrian asylum applications in Austria in summer and fall 2015 (roughly 20,000 between June and December), several surveys were carried out in Austria to investigate the socio-­ economic characteristics, human capital and attitudes of refuge-seeking persons. Among the first of their kind in the recent context were the Displaced Persons in Austria Survey (DiPAS) and the survey on processes of labor market integration of refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection in Austria (FIMAS), both including a panel component. In the current paper, we present the methodological approach of both data collections, experiences from the preparation of the first two waves, attrition and response rates, as well as general learnings from the field phases. In doing so, we aim to provide valuable insights for future national as well as international, cross-cultural surveys on (Syrian) displaced populations in the current European context.

3.2  Literature Review Asylum seekers and refugees are crucial in studies on forced migration, among which Syrian nationals have received heightened attention in recent years, given the ongoing Syrian diaspora since 2011. In Europe, data on asylum seekers are typically collected by governmental institutions as well as government-related agencies and are usually restricted to basic demographic information like sex, age and citizenship. Micro-level data have been scarce, as only very few projects captured the characteristics of displaced persons arriving in Europe in the last decade except for

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the most basic demographic data (Black et al. 2004; Brekke and Aarset 2009; OECD 2016; Ruiz et al. 2015; Strand et al. 2008; UNHCR 2015). A noticeable exception is a representative survey among Palestinian refugee households in Lebanon in 2010 (Ghattas et al. 2015; Habib et al. 2014). The large numbers of asylum seekers in Europe in 2015 are currently in the focus of various social surveys and data collections across Europe (e.g. AMS 2017a; Brücker et al. 2016; Hochwarter and Zeglovits 2016; Kohlbacher et al. 2017; Mendola et al. 2017; Tangermann and Hoffmeyer-­ Zlotnik 2018; Wilson et al. 2018). In addition, qualitative researchers analyze experiences and living conditions of individuals recently arriving in Europe (e.g. Kaufmann 2018; Kohlbacher and Schiocchet 2017). In recent decades, literature on displaced persons increasingly addresses ethical and methodological aspects of data collection (Bloch 2004, 2007; Jacobsen and Landau 2003; McMichael et al. 2015). Broadly speaking, (1) representativeness, (2) language, (3) ethical considerations as well as (4) cultural diversity are considered as main challenges (Kohlenberger et al. 2017). In general, strategies of surveying immigrants in social surveys including a country’s overall population have been addressed (Feskens et  al. 2006; Font and Méndez 2013). Carrying out surveys among asylum seekers and refugees is even more challenging, as it is particularly difficult to generate representative samples of mobile populations (Bloch 2007; Jacobsen and Landau 2003). Furthermore, displaced persons add the methodological challenge of being in a situation of emergency. They can be described as a rare or hidden group, whose members are hard to identify and locate for sampling (Faugier and Sargeant 1997; Kalton and Anderson 1986; Lee 1993; UNHCR 2013). In addition, governments often do not provide researchers with information to locate refugees for reasons of confidentiality (Bloch 2004). Hence, Vigneswaran and Quirk go as far as concluding that “representativity is an unachievable ideal in survey research on refugee populations” (Vigneswaran and Quirk 2013, p.  110). Non-­ probability techniques are common and mostly rely on access through community-­ based organizations or NGOs (Bloch 2007). Snowball sampling is frequently used, especially in qualitative research (e.g. Faugier and Sargeant 1997; Sulaiman-Hill and Thompson 2011). It has been argued that research on displaced persons always involves a degree of compromise (McMichael et al. 2015; Polzer Ngwato 2013). Addressing and adequately handling language barriers is generally relevant for survey participation, especially in cross-cultural studies and anthropology (Briggs 1986; Chen 2011; Winchatz 2006), and gains added significance in research on displaced persons with varying socio-cultural backgrounds and national heritages. Questionnaire translation is complex, because of linguistic and cultural variations (Warfa et al. 2012), as is the use of English as a lingua franca for communication with respondents with non-English mother tongues. At the same time, the use of interpreters as mediators between researchers and respondents brings its own challenges (Naroll 1962). Therefore, questionnaire translation is crucial to data quality in multi-ethnic context (Harkness et al. 2003, 2004; Pasick et al. 2001). For research involving a refugee-background population, ethical considerations gain heightened relevancy (Block et al. 2013). Experiences of trauma and insecurity during refugees’ flight continue into the settlement context and may also affect refu-

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gees’ willingness and ability to participate in research (UNHCR 2013). Sensitive topics like recent deaths of family members or testimonies of war atrocities might cause data collection to be problematic for participants and interviewers (Decker et al. 2011; Fahie 2014; Renzetti and Lee 1993; Ruzek and Zatzick 2000; van der Velden et al. 2013). Accordingly, the establishment of trust between the researcher and the researched is crucial (Hynes 2003). Finally, the aspect of cultural diversity, especially as far as it concerns researchers’ and respondents’ diverging cultural backgrounds, had to be addressed in the context of current surveys on Syrian migrants, which involved researchers from mostly (Western) European descent and respondents with Middle-Eastern background. Generally speaking, neither the one nor the other group constitutes a homogenous whole in today’s super-diverse (Vertovec 2007, 2009), cosmopolitan (Beck 2004) or convivial (Gilroy 2004) society. Therefore, cultural diversity is very much a cultural given from which follows that social surveys are always carried out, to a certain degree, in a culturally diverse setting. The cultural heterogeneity of interviewers and interviewees must be recognized accordingly in order to guarantee that ethical considerations are adhered to and that adequate response rates can be achieved. In addition, and in line with the constructionist approach in contemporary cultural theory, an individual’s cultural identity must be understood as fluid, subject to change and socially and historically contingent, rather than definite and coherent (Hall 1992, 1997). This is especially true for groups with high mobility such as migrants and refugees, whose social, cultural and geographic circumstances are in constant flux. In addition, and especially in recent years, one can discern a greater diversity within migrant groups (Font and Méndez 2013), particularly as concerns individuals’ reasons for (forced) migration, socioeconomic background and plans to return to their home country. Font and Méndez note that “the list of potentially difficult themes is longer when we are talking about surveys addressed to immigrants” (p.  16), including sensitive aspects of respondents’ actual circumstances (legal status, living situation, health, security concerns.). Ideally, these topics are negotiated in a continuous dialogue between researchers, interviewing staff and respondents (Myrberg 2013) to allow for flexibility before, during and after the field phase.

3.3  Methods and Sampling 3.3.1  DiPAS Sampling and Interview Locations The first wave of DiPAS – thereafter denoted DiPAS#1 – was carried out as CAPI (computer-assisted personal interviews) between November and December 2015. It focused primarily on refuge-seeking persons from Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, as these nationals constituted the largest share of asylum seekers in 2015 (BMI 2016). Minors below the age of 18, whether unaccompanied or not, were excluded from the survey. In the fall of 2015, the Austrian government allocated asylum seekers to various, mostly NGO-run emergency quarters in Austria. By the end of November 2015,

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one-third of forced migrants receiving basic assistance (Grundversorgung) in Vienna were accommodated in emergency quarters. Given the high number of individuals who had to be accommodated within a short period of time, no selective attribution was made, neither by ethnicity, education nor other characteristics. This strategy turned out to be crucial for selecting respondents for surveying. In order to sample displaced persons arriving in Austria in autumn 2015, DiPAS focused on large emergency quarters in and around Vienna, but also included smaller locations hosting asylum seekers. Interviews were conducted in seven NGO-run locations, among them two large emergency quarters, which in November 2015 hosted about 900 and 400 persons respectively and five smaller quarters hosting less than 200 refuge-seeking persons at that time. Accordingly, DiPAS#1 can be understood as a two-stage purposely selected quasi-random sample. The first stage was the selection of accommodations, which was not random but reasoned purposely as mentioned above. The second stage was quasi-random. Within each accommodation, interviewers approached individuals and asked for participation. Additionally, we benefitted from indirect snowballing effects, as those who gave an interview approached others within their accommodation and told them about the survey. For validation of the data and representativeness, we refer to Kohlenberger et al. (2017) and Buber-Ennser et al. (2016). Survey respondents did not receive incentives, but donations were given to the participating housing facilities. The interview staff consisted of Arabic, Farsi/Dari, Pashto and Kurdish speakers, many either refugees themselves or from refugee families, who received extensive technical and intercultural competence training. It has to be underlined that DiPAS#1 was conceptualized as a one-time survey with an option for interviewing respondents a second time, via asking for consent for future re-contacting and collecting contact data (telephone numbers, email addresses, Facebook name, name only). A second wave of DiPAS  – hereafter DiPAS#2  – was carried out between March and September 2017 via telephone interviews (CATI). Therefore, as a first step, respondents from DiPAS#1 in fall 2015 who consented to be interviewed a second time were re-contacted via the contact details they had provided. In addition, we refreshed the sample by collecting new phone numbers in one of the biggest asylum centers in Vienna, which was run by the humanitarian organization Caritas (the charity organization of the Catholic Church in Austria). For the collection of phone numbers, we employed student volunteers who handed out informational leaflets in Arabic, Farsi/Dari, German and English. Potential respondents could also send their contact details via Viber, WhatsApp, or text message to a phone number and/or email address we provided. In a second stage, native language interviewers in Arabic and Farsi conducted computer-assisted telephone interviews (CATI). Interviews with former DiPAS#1 participants had a median duration of 17.8 (mean 19.0) minutes, whereas interviews with new participants had a median duration of 20.7 (mean 22.7) minutes, as the DiPAS#2 questionnaire did not re-ask a number of required basic details. Interviewers used Syrian Arabic dialects to establish trust and rapport, a strategy that proved vital for achieving high participation rates.

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3.3.2  DiPAS Thematic Scope and Questionnaires The questionnaire for DiPAS#1 focused on human capital and was based on existing international surveys such as LFS (Labor Force Survey), EU-SILC (European Union Statistics on Income and Living Conditions), WVS (World Values Survey), SHARE (Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe), GGS (Generations and Gender Survey), and EHIS (European Health Interview Survey). In principle this approach allows the comparison of DiPAS respondents with the general population in the countries of origin as well as with the population of the host country (Bachleitner et  al. 2013). Moreover, we included questions regarding refugees’ journeys, such as costs, route and duration. The original English questionnaire was translated into Arabic and Farsi/Dari and captured the following aspects: (1) demography (age, gender, country of origin, marital status), (2) education, (3) former employment, (4) health, (5) information on partner and children, and (6) attitudes and values (religion, democracy, gender equality). In addition, meta information about interviewer(s) and interview situation was collected (for results, see Chap. 7). For DiPAS#2, we reiterated parts of the original questionnaire to ask for relevant changes, especially concerning marital status, employment, and status of the asylum application. Since its thematic focus was placed on progress of the respondents’ integration process and first steps in Austria we included items from the SCIP Survey (Causes and Consequences of socio-cultural integration processes among new immigrants in Europe), the German IAB-BAMF-SOEP refugee survey (2016– 2019), the MLD (Muslim Life in Germany 2008), the Canadian Ethnic Diversity Survey, and the Longitudinal Survey of Immigrants to Canada. Thematically, this involved questions on housing and accommodation, including place of residence of respondents in Austria, social networks and participation in local communities, as well as cultural immersion via media consumption. Information on partner and children and the interviewing situation was also collected. Both DiPAS-questionnaires were approved by the Ethical Committee of the Austrian Academy of Sciences. Even though the majority of the questionnaires consisted of items taken from existing surveys, intensive pre-test phases to test and adapt the questionnaire drafts with regards to suitability and comprehensibility in the specific contexts were conducted.

3.3.3  DiPAS Samples The DiPAS#1 sample includes 514 adult respondents, residing in seven locations in and around Vienna and arriving in Austria in 2015. Another 22 interviews were started, but aborted by the respondents. Eight in ten respondents (82%) arrived between September and November 2015, showing that the sample captures particularly those who arrived in autumn 2015. Detailed information was also gathered on spouses and partners, which allows analyses of 972 refuge-seeking persons in total living in Austria, and of further 419 partners and children abroad.

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To validate the DiPAS#1 sample for representativeness, it was compared to available data on the population of asylum seekers in Austria, in terms of arrival numbers, age and citizenship. The distribution by broad age groups of the 972 asylum-seeking individuals living in Austria captured in DiPAS#1 is almost identical with that of all asylum seekers in 2015. Further specification by citizenship revealed that deviations in the age distribution of Syrians and Afghans were comparably small. Due to lack of more detailed data on asylum seekers, biases regarding educational level, health or other individual characteristics cannot be explored. The DiPAS#2 sample includes 68 panel respondents and 285 refreshers, summing up to 353 interviewed persons. We briefly describe the composition of DiPAS#1 and DiPAS#2 in terms of nationality (Fig. 3.1). For analyses on attrition we refer to Sect. 3.4.4. In both DiPAS samples, about one third of respondents are Syrians. But whereas in DiPAS#1 Iraqis are a large group and Afghans a comparably small one (3% and 16%), their relative size is different in DiPAS#2 (19% and 32% respectively). The different composition of the two samples has various reasons. First, DiPAS#1 initially focused on asylum seeking persons from Syria and Iraq, and to a lesser extent on Afghans. Second, the proportion of asylum seekers originating from Iraq was high in 2015, but substantially lower in the following years, with 28% Syrians, 29% Afghans, 15% Iraqis and 28% other nationalities. Third, during the last years, chances of positive decisions of asylum applications were high for Syrian nationals, but much lower for Iraqis: According to the statistics on asylum decisions made in 2017, positive decisions were quite frequent among Syrian nationals (92%), but to a lesser extent among Afghan and Iraqi nationals (47% and 32%). In 2016, the share of positive decisions amounted to 89% among Syrians, 25% among Afghans and 29% among Iraqis (BMI 2017, 2018). Given the different composition in terms of educational background between Syrians and Iraqis on the one hand and Afghans on the other hand (Buber-Ennser et al. 2016), we are aware that it is important to take this heterogeneity into consideration when analyzing the two samples. DiPAS#1 (n=514) DiPAS#2 total (n=353)

34%

DiPAS#2 panel (n=68)

32%

DiPAS#2 refresher (n=285)

20% Syria

19%

32%

40%

22%

40% Iraq

60% Afghanistan

Fig. 3.1  Nationality of DiPAS#1 and DiPAS#2 respondents Source: DiPAS#1 and DiPAS#2 sample data

17% 6% 15% 10%

34%

14%

35% 0%

16%

38%

36%

80%

100% Other

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3.3.4  FIMAS Sampling and Interview Locations The FIMAS project was conceptualized as groundwork for a panel survey, providing background and valuable methodological insights for a planned panel survey. As the thematic focus was on labor market integration, respondents had to have received a positive decision on their asylum applications and thus the right to residence as well as full and equal access to the labor market, whereas asylum seekers (who are only granted very limited labor market access) did not form part of the target group. In this sense, the DiPAS and FIMAS surveys are complementary, targeting closely related but different populations – before and after status decision. Fieldwork for the first FIMAS survey started in August 2016 and continued until May 2017. The target group consisted of four citizenship groups – Syrians, Afghans, Russians (most of which were from Chechnya) and Iraqis – as those were the four most frequent groups of persons granted international protection and registered as unemployed with the Austrian labor market service (AMS 2017b) at the time. As the focus was on processes of labor market integration, respondents had to be of working age and likely to still be active on the labor market for at least a few years. The age range for respondents was thus determined to be 15–60 years. A further criterion was the timing of registration with the labor market service: target respondents had to be registered with the labor market service (AMS) after 2006, in order to exclude those from the sample with more than 10 years of residence. Contrary to asylum seekers, persons with a positive status are only very rarely resident in asylum shelters (only up to 4 weeks after they receive a status decision, the maximum period allowed). Most live in their own housing or shared private housing. Location sampling was therefore not possible. In order to be able to work with a sampling frame, the survey team decided to seek cooperation with AMS, as its client database is the only administrative register that includes information on this particular population. Subsequently, an address sample was drawn from that register. Regionally, the survey covered urban regions in five out of nine federal states in Austria (Vienna, Upper Austria, Styria, Salzburg and Tyrol). Accordingly, a ­stratified sample was drawn from the AMS data, including citizenship, community registry number and current employment status as strata. The gross address sample based on these criteria included postal addresses of around 5500 recognized refugees and beneficiaries of subsidiary protection in five federal states. Random samples were drawn in Vienna and Upper Austria, and full samples in the selected communities of the other three states because sampling in these states would have reduced respective gross samples below the desired sizes. Invitation letters were then sent to all persons selected, informing them about the aim of the study, the organizations involved, assuring them of anonymity of their responses, and inviting them to selected locations in state capitals for an interview (paper and pencil interviews, PAPI). No monetary incentives were provided. This sampling strategy fell short of achieving the desired sample size. Only 514 interviews were completed in this first stage.

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In a second stage of sampling, multiple organizations – NGOs, religious charities, language institutes and the AMS offices – were asked to support the survey by facilitating access to the target population. In addition, but on a smaller scale, interviewers were asked to use their private networks to find suitable respondents. In a few cases, respondent-driven sampling was also implemented. This second, non-­ random sampling stage was crucial in achieving the targeted sample size of 1200 interviews (for additional methodological details and results see Hosner et al. 2017). The follow-up project FIMAS+INTEGRATION implemented a longitudinal research design to analyze processes of labor market integration, building on the FIMAS study. Respondents who provided consent and contact data during the first wave were contacted for re-interviews (computer-assisted web interviews (CAWI) or CATI for illiterate persons or those who preferred the telephone mode). In addition, a refresher sample was used to complement second wave interviews and to ensure the longevity of the panel. Fieldwork for the second wave (FIMAS 2 hereafter) started in December 2017, lasted throughout April 2018 and resulted in more than 1600 interviews, including both the panel and the refresher sample. For the present analysis, only the panel component will be discussed further.

3.3.5  FIMAS Thematic Scope and Questionnaires The questionnaire for the first wave of FIMAS was drafted to ensure ease of use and simplicity of language. The survey team opted for this approach rather than using standard questions of established social surveys in order to minimize accessibility problems, particularly as a non-negligible share of respondents was expected to be partly or fully illiterate. Paper questionnaires were designed, translated, discussed with translators and tested before fieldwork. In addition to the German source questionnaire, versions in Arabic, Farsi, Russian, Chechen and English were developed. The Chechen version in particular was needed, as the interviewers (who spoke both Russian and Chechen) reported back after the first interviews that the use of Russian questionnaires was not appropriate for respondents from Chechnya and that they had to lead conversations in Chechen anyway. The main aim of the project and thus the questionnaire was to capture labor market biographies and indicators in related domains of integration. After the initial questions on (1) educational achievement and qualifications abroad and (2) in Austria, including recognition of qualifications, the main part of the questionnaire focused on (3) labor force status and previous occupations abroad, (4) previous and current occupations in Austria, and (5) availability for work. Additional questions on (6) language skills, (7) social networks, (8) housing, (9) health, (10) demographics and (11) open questions on personal experiences and aspirations were included in the questionnaire. Detailed country-specific questions for educational achievement based on the International Standard Classification for Education (ISCED) for Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Iran, and the Russian Federation were used in the questionnaire. For

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registering occupations, the research team decided to allow open answers for previous and current occupations. These answers were translated (where necessary) and classified according to the International Standard Classification of Occupations (ISCO) categories after data collection. The follow-up questionnaire for second-wave and refresher interviews in 2017/2018 was developed jointly with partner institutes and modelled closely after the questionnaire used for the German IAB-BAMF-SOEP refugee survey (Brücker et al. 2016). Only a few demographic characteristics were taken from data of the first wave and shown to panel respondents for confirmation, the remainder of the questionnaire, although often similar to the first wave, was administered in full length, in order to allow crosschecks. The main focus was on educational and labor market-relevant characteristics, and in more detail on income, qualification courses and trainings (on language, application, mentoring, etc.), values and attitudes, health, and work during as well as reasons for flight.

3.3.6  FIMAS Samples In FIMAS (i.e. the first wave sample), more than half of the respondents (53%) held Syrian citizenship, a quarter (26%) held Afghani citizenship, 8% Iraqi citizenship and 13% other citizenships, including stateless persons and naturalized Austrian citizens (Fig. 3.2). For the second wave interviews (i.e. FIMAS 2), most of the interviews were implemented with new respondents (1515), while the number of respondents in the panel component was rather low (114). Analyzed by citizenship, the sample composition of the FIMAS 2 total sample was similar to that of FIMAS. More than half of the respondents (52%) were Syrian citizens, a quarter (26%) were Afghani citizens,

FIMAS (n=1,198)

53%

8%

FIMAS 2 total (n=1,629)

52%

13%

FIMAS 2 panel (n=114)

26%

14%

50% 0%

20% Syria

40% Iraq

8%

8% 8% 4%

80%

FIMAS 2 refresher (n=1,515)

14%

25%

60% Afghanistan

Fig. 3.2  Nationality of FIMAS and FIMAS 2 respondents Source: FIMAS and FIMAS 2 data (ICMPD 2017, 2018)

27%

9%

80%

100% Other

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13% Iraqi citizens and 8% other citizens (Fig.  3.2). The composition of panel respondents, however, was strikingly different, particularly because the share of Syrian citizens was much higher (80%) and that of Afghani citizens markedly lower (8%). Most of that difference stems from the initial differential consent for re-­ contacts after first wave interviews  – Syrians were most likely to agree to a re-­ contact, Iraqis and Afghans less so. Partly, contact rates also differed between groups and were again higher for Syrian respondents. This corresponds to experiences from fieldwork of lower trust and readiness to participate for Afghan contacts in FIMAS, and higher trust and readiness among other groups. In other words, Syrians were easier to re-contact than the other groups.

3.4  Reflections from the Field Our insights regarding language, interviewing flow, ethical considerations on sensitive topics and cultural diversity stem from the preparation of the questionnaire, pre-tests, field phase and descriptive analyses. In addition, we discuss contact and response rates as well as attrition, to give indications for the feasibility of longitudinal studies among Syrian displaced populations. In this section, we discuss both the DiPAS and FIMAS surveys jointly.

3.4.1  Language To overcome the evident language barrier between the research teams and prospective respondents, DiPAS was conducted in English, Arabic, Farsi, Pashto and Kurdish. FIMAS was conducted in Arabic, Farsi, Russian, Chechen, English and German, while FIMAS 2 only offered the choice between Arabic, Farsi and German (Russian citizens were no longer included in the research design). This strategy helped to avoid biases from attracting more highly educated respondents who could respond to an English-only questionnaire. Conducting interviews as CAPI (DiPAS#1), CATI (DiPAS#2), PAPI (FIMAS), and CAWI/CATI (FIMAS 2) further guaranteed that respondents did not require basic literacy to complete the interview. Since a variety of languages and idioms are spoken in Afghanistan, a restriction of the translations to Farsi (no Pashto version) implies a limitation of the studies. Persons with other mother tongues were thus interviewed in German (FIMAS) or English (FIMAS/DiPAS). However, as both surveys mostly covered refuge-seeking persons from the Arabic-speaking countries Syria and Iraq, the according limitations in terms of possible interviewing languages and available interpreters seem acceptable. For DiPAS, software implementation of the questionnaire was bilingual in English and Arabic, while Farsi interviews were supported by hardcopies of English and Farsi questionnaires. For FIMAS, all interviews were face-to-face

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(PAPI) interviews. The panel component of the FIMAS 2 interviews relied on online interviews (CAWI) while telephone interviews (CATI) were offered as an alternative for respondents who did not have online access or preferred the telephone mode (very few, however, opted for this latter version). Among the 514 DiPAS#1 interviews, two-thirds (67%) were mainly carried out in Arabic, 20% in Farsi/Dari, and 11% in English (Table 3.1). Although the majority of interviews conducted in Arabic and Farsi/Dari were held in the respondents’ first language, the above numbers include interviews which were led by non-Arabic or Farsi/Dari speaking interviewers and interpreted or self-led by respondents through the translated versions of the questionnaire. A substantial number of interviews (37%) were carried out by both English-speaking interviewers and Arabic, Farsi or Dari-speaking interviewers or interpreters together, while the majority were directly led in first language (51%). The main interview language for FIMAS was also Arabic (66%). Almost all respondents with Syrian and Iraqi citizenship as well as stateless persons were interviewed in this language (Table 3.2). Farsi interviews made up around a quarter of all interviews (26%), and interviews in Russian or Chechen accounted for 6% of all interviews. Both the German and the English questionnaires were rarely used (2% and 1% of all interviews respectively), which was also the reason why an English translation was not provided for the second wave of interviews (FIMAS 2). More importantly, almost all respondents stated that they did not have advanced German Table 3.1  Main language of interview by citizenship in DiPAS#1 Iraq Syria Afghanistan Other Total

Arabic 34% 31%