Comparative Approaches to Chinese Philosophy (Ashgate World Philosophies Series) 0754605078, 0754605086, 9780754605089, 9780754605072

Table of contents :
Cover
Half Title
Title Page
Copyright Page
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments
Notes on Transcription
Contributors
Editor’s Introduction
Part One Identity of Chinese Philosophy and Its Modern Studies
1 Emergence of the History of Chinese Philosophy
Part Two Yi-Jing Philosophy
2 Inquiring into the Primary Model: Yi-Jing and Chinese Ontological Hermeneutics
3 Hegelian, Yi-Jing, and Buddhist Transformational Models for Comparative Philosophy
4 Becoming-Being Complementarity: An Account of the Yin-Yang Metaphysical Vision of the Yi-Jing
Part Three Confucianism
5 Virtue Ethics and Confucianism
6 The Principled Benevolence: A Synthesis of Kantian and Confucian Moral Judgment
7 Social Justice: Rawlsian or Confucian?
8 Towards a Minimal Common Ground for Humanist Dialogue: A Comparative Analysis of Confucian Ethics and American Ethical Humanism
9 The Project of Boston Confucianism
Part Four Philosophical Daoism
10 The Metaphysics of Dao
11 “It-self-so-ing” and “Other-ing” in Lao Zi’s Concept of Zi Ran
12 Eternal Dao, Constant Name, and Language Engagement: On the Opening Message of the Dao-De-Jing
13 Zhuang Zi and Aristotle on What A Thing Is
14 The Daoist Conception of Truth: Lao Zi’s Metaphysical Realism vs. Zhuang Zi’s Internal Realism
Part Five Logic-Related Concerns
15 Ming-Jia (the Logicians) and Zeno: A Comparative Study
16 The Thesis of Antilogic in Buddhism
Index

Citation preview

COMPARATIVE APPROACHES TO CHINESE PHILOSOPHY

This anthology explores how Chinese and Western philosophies could jointly and constructively contribute to a common philosophical enterprise. Philoso­ phers with in-depth knowledge o f both traditions present a variety o f distinct comparative approaches, offering a refined introduction to the further reaches o f Chinese philosophy in the comparative context, especially regarding its three major constituents - Confucianism, philosophical Daoism，and the Yi-Jing philosophy. This book examines various issues concerning philosophical meth­ odology, ethics, metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy o f language, and logic, and investigates both the living-spring source of Chinese philosophy and its contemporary implications and development through contemporary resources. The balanced coverage, accessible content, and breadth of approaches presented in this anthology make it a valuable resource for students o f Chinese Philosophy, Comparative Philosophy, and other related courses.

Ashgate World Philosophies Series The Ashgate World Philosophies Series responds to the remarkable growth o f interest among English-language readers in recent years in philosophical traditions outside those of “ the West” . The traditions of Indian, Chinese, and Japanese thought, as well as those of the Islamic world, Latin America, Africa, and of Aboriginal Australian, Pacific, and American Indian peoples, are all attracting lively attention from professional philosophers and students alike, and this new Ashgate series provides introductions to these traditions as well as in-depth research into central issues and themes within those traditions. The series is particularly designed for readers whose interests are not adequately addressed by general surveys o f “ World Philosophy” ，and it includes access­ ible, yet research-led, texts for wider readership and upper-level student use, as well as research monographs. The series embraces a wide variety o f titles ranging from introductions on particular world philosophies and informed surveys of the philosophical contributions of geographical regions, to in-depth discussion of a theme, topic, problem, or movement and critical appraisals of individual thinkers or schools of thinkers.

Series Editors: David E. Cooper, University of Durham, U K Robert C. Solomon, University of Texas, Austin, USA Kathleen M. Higgins, University of Texas, Austin, USA Purushottama Bilimoria, Deakin University, Australia

Other titles in the series: An Introduction to Madhva Vedanta Deepak Sarma An Introduction to Yoga Philosophy An Annotated Translation of the Yoga Sutras Ashok Kumar Malhotra Knowing beyond Knowledge Epistemologies of Religious Experience in Classical and Modern Advaita Thomas A. Forsthoefel Mencius, Hume and the Foundations of Ethics Xiusheng Liu Personal Identity and Buddhist Philosophy Empty Persons M ark Siderits

Comparative Approaches to Chinese Philosophy

E dited by BO M OU

ROUTLEDGE

Routledge

Taylor & Francis Group

LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published 2003 by Ashgate Publishing Published 2017 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017, USA Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

Copyright© Bo Mou 2003 Cover Photo: The Autumn Mountains amid Cloud Sea, by Zhi-tao Li (1988). From 'Zhi-tao Li's Painting Collection' with the artist's permission. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Comparative approaches to Chinese philosophy. - (Ashgate world philosophies series) 1. Philosophy, Chinese 2. Philosophy, Comparative I. Mou, Bo 181.1'1 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Comparative approaches to Chinese philosophy / edited by Bo Mou. p. cm. -- (Ashgate world philosophy series) Includes index. ISBN 0-7546-0507-8 (alk. paper) -- ISBN 0-7546-0508-6 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Philosophy, Chinese. I. Mou, Bo, 1956- II. Series. B5231 .C65 2002 181 '.11--dc21 2002021439 Typeset in 10/l 2pt Times Roman by Graphicraft Limited, Hong Kong ISBN 13: 978-0-7546-0508-9 (pbk) ISBN 13: 978-0-7546-0507-2 (hbk)

Contents Acknowledgments

vii

Notes on Transcription

v iii ix

Contributors Editor's Introduction

Part One

XV

Identity of Chinese Philosophy and Its Modern Studies

1 Emergence o f the History o f Chinese Philosophy Antonio S. Cua

Part Two 2

3

4

3

Yi-Jing Philosophy

Inquiring into the Primary Model: Yi-Jing and Chinese Ontological Hermeneutics Chung-ying Cheng

33

Hegelian, Yi-Jing, and Buddhist Transformational Models for Comparative Philosophy Robert E llio tt Allinson

60

Becoming-Being Complementarity: An Account o f the Yin-Yang Metaphysical Vision of the Yi-Jing Bo Mou

86

Part Three

Confucianism 99

5 Virtue Ethics and Confucianism Bryan W. Van Norden 6 The Principled Benevolence: A Synthesis of Kantian and Confucian Moral Judgment Robin R. Wang

122

7

144

Social Justice: Rawlsian or Confucian? Ruiping Fan

8 Towards a Minimal Common Ground for Humanist Dialogue: A Comparative Analysis o f Confucian Ethics and American Ethical Humanism You-zheng L i V

169

Contents

vi

9

The Project of Boston Confucianism Robert Cummings Neville

Part Four

Philosophical Daoism

10 The Metaphysics of Dao Chad Hansen 11

“ It-self-so-ing” and “ Other-ing” in Lao Z i’s Concept of Z i Ran Qingjie (James) Wang

12

Eternal Dao, Constant Name, and Language Engagement: On the Opening Message of the Dao-De-Jing Bo Mou

13

Zhuang Zi and Aristotle on What A Thing Is Chenyang L i

14 The Daoist Conception of Truth: Lao Z i’s Metaphysical Realism vs. Zhuang Z i’s Internal Realism JeeLoo Liu

Part Five 15

185

205 225

245 263

278

Logic-Related Concerns

Ming-Jia (the Logicians) and Zeno: A Comparative Study Chuang Liu

297

16 The Thesis o f Antilogic in Buddhism Yiu-ming Fung

307

Index

323

Acknowledgments I am grateful to the authors for their valuable contributions, which are either unpublished original pieces written for this volume or, largely, substantial revi­ sions of some previous publications, and for their patience, cooperation, and understanding throughout the process o f bringing this book into print. Thanks are due to the editors of the following journals and press for permitting the authors o f the named articles to publish their revised versions in this anthology: International Philosophical Quarterly, for Antonio S. Cua's “ Emergence of the History o f Chinese Philosophy” ，which appeared in vol. X L, no. 4 (2000), and for Chenyang L i’s “ Zhuang Zi and Aristotle on What A Thing Is” ，whose original version, “ What-Being: Chuang Tzu versus Aristotle” ，appeared in vol. X X X III, no. 3 (1993). The Journal o f Chinese Philosophy, for Ruiping Fan’s “ Social Justice: Rawlsian or Confucia n?'', whose early version, “ Confucian and Rawlsian Views o f Justice: A Comparison” ，appeared in v o l.24 (1997), for Bo M ou's “ Eternal Dao, Constant Name, and Language Engagement” ，part of an early version of which, “ Ultimate Concern and Language Engagement” ， appeared in v o l.27 (2000), and for Qingjie Wang’s “ ‘I t-self-so-ing' and ‘Othering’ in Lao Z i， s Concept of Z i Ran” ，whose original version, “ On Lao Z i， s Concept o f Z i Ran” ，appeared in v o l. 24 (1997). Polylog: Zeitschrift fu r Intelkulturelles Philosophieren (Polylog: A Journal o f Intercultural Philosophy), for Bo M ou's “ Becoming-Being Complementarity: An Account o f the YinYang Metaphysical Vision o f the Yi-Jing” , whose early version, “ Werden-Sein Komplementarität: Die Yin- Yang-Metaphysische Sight des Yijing ” ，appeared in no. 7 (2001). The State University of New York Press, for Robert Cummings N e ville 's “ The Project o f Boston Confucianism” , which is a revision o f por­ tions of the first chapter of his Boston Confucianism (Albany: SUNY Press, 2000) which in turn includes a revision of his paper “ Confucianism as a World Philosophy” published in the Journal o f Chinese Philosophy v o l.21(1994). I appreciate the helpful reviews of some manuscripts by two anonymous reviewers. A California State University Research Grant and a Faculty Career Development Grant of SJSU, both in 2002, have significantly contributed to my work on this anthology. I am thankful to Sarah Lloyd, Publisher at Ashgate, for her encouraging enthusiasm, remarkable efficiency, and always-timely as­ sistance, and to Kristen Thorner, Senior Desk Editor, for her variety of profes­ sional assistance. Bo Mou Albany, California, USA

V ll

Notes on Transcription Because o f its accuracy in transcribing actual pronunciation in Chinese common speech and its current wider use, the pinyin romanization system is employed in this volume for transliterating Chinese names or terms. However, those Chinese names or terms are left in their original romanizations (typically in the Wade-Giles system) in the following cases: (i) the titles o f cited publica­ tions; (ii) the names whose romanizations have been widely and conventionally accepted (such as “ Confucius”)； and (iii) the names o f writers who have had their authored English publications published under their regular non-pinyin romanized names (such as “ Fung Yu-lan” ). The titles o f cited Chinese books and essays are given in their pinyin transcriptions with their paraphrases given in parentheses. The following rule o f thumb has been used in dealing with the order of the surname (family) name and given name in romanized Chinese names: (i) for the name of a historical figure in Chinese history, the surname appears first, and the given name second (such as “ Zhu X i'' )； to avoid possible confu­ sion, in the index a comma separates the indexed surname from the given name; (ii) otherwise, the given name appears first and the surname second. In the pinyin versions o f Chinese publication titles and those proper phrases that contain two or more Chinese characters, hyphens are used to both indicate suitable character-syllable separations within the pinyin versions and highlight their status o f being proper.

Transcription Conversion Table Wade-Giles

Pinyin

Wade-Giles

Pinyin

ai ch ch'

ei zh ch

P P' szu t t' ts, tz ts' ， tz' tzu ung yu

b P si d t z c zi ong you

q hs ien -ih j k k'

X ian -i r g k

viii

Contributors ALLINSO N, ROBERT E. is Professor at the Department o f Philosophy o f the Chinese University o f Hong Kong. He is the author or editor o f seven books and over two hundred academic papers including Harmony and Strife: Con­ temporary Perspectives, East and West (co-edited with Shu-hsien Liu) (Chinese University Press, 1988); Understanding the Chinese Mind: The Philosophical Roots (ed.) (Oxford University Press, 1989, 2000, tenth impression); ChuangTzu fo r Spiritual Transformation: An Analysis o f the Inner Chapters (SUNY Press, 1989, 1996); A Metaphysics fo r the Future (Ashgate, 2001); and Space, Time and the Ethical Foundations (Ashgate, 2002). His works have been trans­ lated into Chinese, Japanese, French, German, and Italian. He serves on eight Editorial Boards o f international journals including the Journal o f Chinese Philosophy and Asian Philosophy (UK). He has been invited to be Visiting Professor at Peking University and Fudan University, Visiting Fellow at Yale University and Templeton College o f Oxford University, an Associate Member of Balliol College of Oxford University, Senior Associate Member of St Antony’s College o f Oxford University, and a Fellow at the Needham Research Institute in Cambridge University. CHENG, CHUNG-YING is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Hawaii at Manoa, USA. He received his BA degree from National Taiwan University (1955) and his Ph.D. degree from Harvard University (1964). Cheng is the founder and honorary President o f the International Society for Chinese Phi­ losophy and International Society for the I Ching ( Yi-Jing); he is also the Editor-in-Chief o f the Journal o f Chinese Philosophy. He is the author o f many articles and books on Chinese philosophy and comparative philosophy, includ­ ing Peirce’s and Lewis's Theories o f Induction (1969); Modernization and Uni­ versalization o f Chinese Culture (1988, in Chinese); New Dimensions o f Confucian and New- Confucian Philosophy (SUNY Press, 1991); Knowledge and Value (1996， in Chinese); and On Uniting the Outer and the Inner: A Theory o f Confucian Philosophy (Beijing: Chinese Social Sciences Press, 2001). He co-edited (with Nicholas Bunnin) Contemporary Chinese Philosophy (Blackwell, 2002). CUA, ANTONIO S. (Ke, Xiong-wen) obtained his BA from the Far Eastern University (Manila, 1952), and his M A (1954) and Ph.D. (1958) from the University o f California at Berkeley. Cua had been Professor o f Philosophy at the Catholic University o f America and became Professor Emeritus in 1996. He is past President of the Society for Asian and Comparative Philosophy ix

X

Contributors

(1978-1979) and the International Society for Chinese Philosophy (1984—1986). His numerous articles have appeared in many professional philosophical jo u r­ nals. He is the author of the following books: Reason and Virtue: A Study in the Ethics o f Richard Price (1966); Dimensions o f M oral Creativity: Paradigms, Principles, and Ideals (1978); The Unity o f Knowledge and Action: A Study in Wang Yang-ming， s M oral Psychology (1982); Ethical Argumentation: A Study in Hsiin Tzu s M oral Epistemology (1985); and M oral Vision and Tradition: Essays in Chinese Ethics (1998). Cua is the editor of the Garland/Routledge Encyclopedia o f Chinese Philosophy (2003), co-editor o f the Journal o f Chinese Philosophy, an associate editor of the International Journal o f the Philosophy o f Religion, and a member o f the Editorial Board of the American Philosophical Quarterly and Philosophy East and West. FAN, RUIPING is Assistant Professor o f the Department of Public and Social Administration at the City University of Hong Kong. He received his Bachelor o f Medicine degree from Baotou College of Medicine in Inner Mongolia and his Ph.D. in philosophy from Rice University in Texas. Focusing on com­ parative philosophical studies in bioethics and the philosophy o f medicine, he has authored over forty journal articles and book chapters in both English and Chinese. He was editor o f an anthology entitled Confucian Bioethics (Kluwer, 1999). He also serves as Assistant Editor of the Journal o f Medicine and Philo­ sophy (USA) and co-editor of Chinese and International Philosophy o f Medicine (China). FUNG, Y IU -M IN G teaches philosophy at the Hong Kong University of Sciences and Technology. He received his Ph.D. degree in philosophy from the Chinese University o f Hong Kong in 1984. Fung has held various research or teaching appointments at the Institute of East Asian Philosophies in Singa­ pore, the Department o f Philosophy at the Chinese University o f Hong Kong, the Institute o f History and Department of Chinese Literature and Linguistics at National Tsing Hua University in Taiwan, and the Sun Yat-Sen Institute of Social Sciences and Philosophy at Academic Sinica in Taiwan. Fung is the author o f the books The Methodological Problems o f Chinese Philosophy (1989， in Chinese); Chinese Philosophy in the Ancient Period, 4 volumes (1992, in Chinese); and Kung-Sun Lung Tzu: A Perspective o f Analytic Philosophy (1999, in Chinese). He is also the contributing editor of the following two collections: Collected Essays in Analytic Philosophy and the Philosophy o f Science and Col­ lected Essays in Analytic Philosophy and the Philosophy o f Science (1990 and

HANSEN, CHAD is Chair Professor of Chinese Philosophy at the University o f Hong Kong. He first went to Hong Kong in 1961 and has lived in Asia (Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Japan) for fifteen years of his adult life. He obtained

Contributors

xi

his BA at the University o f Utah in 1960 (philosophy and political science), and his M A and Ph.D. (philosophy) at the University o f Michigan (1972) work­ ing with Don Munro. His dissertation, Ancient Chinese Theories o f Language, examined theories o f the Later Mohists and School o f Names. He attended the “ Stanford” (Inter-University Program) school o f Mandarin in Taipei in 1969 and did dissertation research at the Universities Service Center in Hong Kong, where he studied at New Asia College under Tang Junyi and Mou Zhongshan. He has taught in philosophy departments at the Universities o f Pittsburgh, Michigan, Stanford, Vermont, UCLA, Hawaii, and Hong Kong. He was selected as University Scholar at the University o f Vermont in 1992. He has published over sixty scholarly articles and two books on Chinese thought focusing on theory of language and mind in China and the impact of those theories on the moral and political thought o f the ancient period (Language and Logic in Ancient China (Michigan, 1972), and A Daoist Theory o f Chinese Thought (Oxford, 1992)). L I, CHENYANG is Professor and Chair o f the Department o f Philosophy at Central Washington University, USA. He grew up in China during the Cultural Revolution and was among the first class o f college students after the Cultural Revolution. He earned his BA and M A at Peking (Beijing) U ni­ versity and his Ph.D. at the University o f Connecticut. He is author o f The Tao Encounters the West: Explorations in Comparative Philosophy (1999) and editor of the anthology The Sage and the Second Sex: Confucianism, Ethics, and Gender (2000). He has also authored articles in such journals as International Philosophical Quarterly, Philosophia, Journal o f Applied Philosophy, Journal o f Chinese Philosophy, Philosophy East and West, Hypatia: A Journal o f Feminist Philosophy, Journal o f Value Inquiry, and Review o f Metaphysics. He was the first president of the Association of Chinese Philosophers in America (19951997). L I, YOU-ZHENG is a special senior research fellow at the World Civilizations Study Center and the Chinese Academy o f Social Sciences, and a member of the Executive Committee o f the International Association for Semiotic Studies. He became a self-taught and independent philosopher during Mao’s period. Since being admitted into the Institute o f Philosophy, CASS, in 1978, he has been engaged in contemporary Western philosophy and comparative philosophy, specializing in phenomenology, hermeneutics, structuralism, and pragmatism. For the past two decades he has received various visiting appointments at the philosophy departments o f the Universities o f Princeton, Columbia, Munich, TU Berlin, Bochum, and Taiwan. He also became visiting scholar at the Maison des Sciences de L ， Homme, Paris, the University o f Tokyo, Saijo University, Fokuang Buddhist University as well as Furen Catholic University in Taiwan, and Stanford University. During his research tenure at Bochum from 1989

xii

Contributors

to 1997, he published three books on comparative philosophy: The Constitu­ tion o f Han Academic Ideology, The Structure o f the Chinese Ethical Archetype., and Epistemological Problems o f the Comparative Humanities (Peter Lang, 1997). Li is the author o f the following Chinese books: Contemporary Western Film Semiology., Introduction to Theoretical Semiotics; Structure and Meaning., A C ritical Study o f Contemporary German and French Ethical Epistemology; Crisis o f Ethics: On Contemporary German and French Ethics' and Ethics o f Desire: Freud and Lacan. He is also the translator of several contemporary Western philosophy classics by Husserl, Levi-Strauss, Ricouer, Rorty, and Barthes. LIU , CHUANG is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Florida, USA. After receiving his BS degree in physics (1982), he studied philo­ sophy at the University of Pittsburgh, USA (Ph.D. degree in philosophy, 1991). His research areas include the philosophical foundation of physics, philo­ sophy o f science, history of science, and Chinese philosophy. His representative publications include “ Explaining the Emergence of Cooperative Phenomena” in Philosophy o f Science (1999), uApproximation, Idealization, and the Laws of Nature” in Synthese (1999), “ Theories and Models I: the Semantic View Revisited” in International Studies in Philosophy o f Science (1997), and “ Potential， Propensity and Categorical Realism” in Erkenntnis (1996). LIU , JEELOO is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the State University of New York at Geneseo, USA. She studied philosophy at National Taiwan University (M A in 1984) and at the University o f Rochester (Ph.D. in 1993). Liu ’s areas of specialization are philosophy of mind, philosophy of language, Chinese philosophy, and metaphysics. Her representative publications include “ Physical Externalism and Social Externalism: Are They Really Compatible?” in the Journal o f Philosophical Research (2002), “ A Nonreductionist， s Solution to K im ’s Explanatory Exclusion Problem” in Manuscrito (2001), and “ Is Human History Predestined in Wang F uzhi’s Cosmology?” in the Journal o f Chinese Philosophy (2001). MOU, BO teaches philosophy at San Jose State University in California, USA. After receiving his BS degree in mathematics (1982), he studied philosophy at Peking University, the Graduate School of Chinese Academy o f Social Sciences (M A in 1987), and the University o f Rochester, USA (M A in 1993 and Ph.D. in 1997). His recent English publications in contemporary analytic philosophy, Chinese philosophy, and comparative philosophy, concerning the issues in metaphysics, philosophy of language, and ethics, appeared in such journals as Synthese, Metaphilosophy, the Southern Journal o f Philosophy, Philo­ sophical Papers, Philosophy East and West, the Journal o f Chinese Philosophy, Asian Philosophy, and Polylog: A Journal o f Inter cultural Philosophy. Mou is editor of three anthologies: Two Roads to Wisdom? — Chinese and Analytic

Contributors

xiii

Philosophical Traditions (Open Court, 2001); and Contemporary Inquiries into the Fundamental Issues o f Philosophy and Comparative Studies o f Chinese and Western Philosophies (both from the Commercial Press, 2002; in Chinese). He is editor and translator o f the collection Truth, Meaning, Events and Actions: Selections o f Donald Davidson’ s Philosophical Writings (the Commercial Press, 1993; in Chinese). He is current president o f the International Society for Comparative Studies o f Chinese and Western Philosophy (2002-2005). NEVILLE, ROBERT CUM MINGS is Professor of Philosophy, Religion, and Theology at Boston University, USA, and is Dean o f its School of Theo­ logy. He is past President o f the International Society for Chinese Philo­ sophy, the American Academy o f Religion, and the Metaphysical Society of America, and was Director o f the Comparative Religious Ideas Projects at Boston University. He is the author of many articles and sixteen books, among which are The Tao and the Daimon (1982), The Puritan Smile (1987), Behind the Masks o f God (1991, translated into Chinese), Normative Cultures (1995), and Boston Confucianism (2000), all relevant to his essay contributed to this volume. VAN NORDEN, BRYAN W. is Associate Professor in the Philosophy Depart­ ment and in the Asian Studies Program at Vassar College, USA. He has a BA in philosophy from the University o f Pennsylvania (1985) and a Ph.D. in philosophy from Stanford University (1991). He has published extensively on early Chinese philosophy, including his articles “ Mengzi and Xunzi: Two Views o f Human Agency” ，in T. C. Kline and Philip J. Ivanhoe (eds), Virtue, Nature, and M oral Agency in the Xunzi (Hackett, 2000), and “ Competing Interpretations o f the Inner Chapters o f the Z huangzi' in Philosophy East and West (1996). In addition, he is editor and a contributor to Confucius and the Analects: New Essays (Oxford University Press, 2002), and has contributed a partial transla­ tion o f the Mengzi (Menciusノto Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy (Seven Bridges Press, 2001). His website is at “ faculty.vassar.edu/brvannor/” . WANG, Q ING JIE is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the Chinese U ni­ versity of Hong Kong. Before that he taught at Peking University, Tulane University, Southern University o f New Orleans, Montana State University, and Oklahoma State University. He received his Ph.D. degree in philosophy from Tulane University, USA. W ang， s main research areas are contemporary European/Continental philosophy, East-West comparative philosophy, and social and moral philosophy. In recent years his research papers have been published in International Philosophical Quarterly, Analecta Husserliana, Phi­ losophy East and West, Journal o f Chinese Philosophy, Asian Philosophy, China Review International, Ethics, and China Quarterly.

XIV

Contributors

WANG, ROBIN R. is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Loyola Marymount University in California, USA. She received her BA and M A in philosophy at Peking University (1980 and 1983), M A in philosophy at University of Notre Dame (1988), and Ph.D. in philosophy at University of Cardiff, U K (1998). She co-authored, with T. Shanahan, Reason and Insight: Western and Eastern Perspectives on the Pursuit o f M oral Wisdom (Wadsworth, 1996, 2002) and, with Bryan Van Norden, Images o f Women in Chinese Thought (Hackett, 2002).

Editor’s Introduction As different cultural communities and ideological traditions become closer than ever, the desire to bridge the “ gap” between different philosophical traditions and the concern with how they could learn from each other and jointly and constructively contribute to a common philosophical enterprise have become pressing in philosophical circles. The present volume addresses the concern. The theme of this volume is to investigate and show how Chinese philosophy and Western philosophy could learn from each other and jointly and construct­ ively contribute to a common philosophical enterprise in certain complementary, and philosophically interesting, ways. This is what the term “ comparative” in the book title primarily means in this context: Chinese philosophy and Western philosophy are not essentially alien to one another; instead, in the above sense, they are comparable in certain constructive, philosophically interesting ways. The primary purpose o f the volume is thus not historical and descriptive, but critical and constructive, seeking to achieve reflective progress in philosophy through a comparative examination of Chinese philosophy. The selection of the essays regarding their concerns and approaches has been based primarily upon this consideration. Furthermore, the aforementioned constructive way, as a methodological approach, is not considered to be exclusive, but consists in a variety of comparative approaches, which are diverse but, in my opinion, somehow complementary. This is one reason why the phrase “ comparative approaches” in the title is emphatically given in its plural form. Indeed, this anthology emphasizes its openness without a pre-set inclination for or against any ad hoc methodological approach or orientation. W ith the above primary sense o f “ comparative approaches” in view o f the theme o f the volume, its secondary sense, in regard to what is to be compared in this context, is twofold. First, some substantial ideas and visions historically developed respectively in Chinese and Western philosophical traditions are explicitly and directly compared in the above primary sense. Second, some con­ ceptual and explanatory resources historically developed in one philosophical tradition are consciously used to enhance our understanding of, and elaborate, some ideas, theses, insights, and visions in the other philosophical tradition, thus tacitly and implicitly in comparison and contrast to those original resources by means o f which those insights or visions were somehow delivered. The contrib­ uted essays in this volume take their comparative approaches either in the first way or in the second way or in both ways. Among the sixteen contributed essays in this volume, most o f them (nine articles) are unpublished pieces, and the rest are largely substantially revised XV

xvi

E d ito r’s Introduction

versions of some recent publications. Almost all of the current versions appearing in this volume are thus unavailable anywhere else. The anthology presents recent scholarship in the comparative studies of Chinese philosophy in a more or less balanced way in regard to topic and methodological approach. Besides its academic considerations, this volume is also informed by its heuristic and pedagogical considerations. The book has been planned to be suitable for use as a supplementary text for some relevant courses, like Chinese Philosophy, Asian Philosophy, or Comparative Philosophy, which either need such materials to make up some contents, topics, or concerns that, from an instructor’s point of view, are significant but are not (sufficiently) covered in the primary textbook(s) used, or expect the students to be familiar with some relatively advanced research work in the field, or require the students to read, and write some critical summaries or reviews of, some scholarly articles in the field to train the students’ ability in writing philosophy in view of Chinese philosophy. For this purpose, due attention has been paid to a balance of content and topic: it is not limited to one school or movement (say, Confucian­ ism) or one concern (say, moral concern). In this way, students with reflective interests in other major strands or movements o f thought in Chinese philoso­ phy like philosophical Daoism and the Yi-Jing philosophy, or in some issues in metaphysics, epistemology, philosophy of language, or logic, will find entries that will fit, or be close to, their concerns. The anthology consists o f the following five parts into which the sixteen articles are organized based upon the topics and issues they address: Part Part Part Part Part

One: Identity o f Chinese Philosophy and Its Modern Studies Two: Yi-Jing Philosophy Three: Confucianism Four: Philosophical Daoism Five: Logic-Related Concerns.

Within each part, the articles are arranged in certain chronological and/or logical orders when applicable. Note that the way to organize the entries is not exclusive. The reader might select her own order of reading for the sake of her own specific interest and concern. In the following, let me sketch the organiza­ tional strategy, some internal connections between various parts and (if any) among various entries within one part, and the basic lines of the contributions. The first part addresses two related general issues in comparative studies o f Chinese philosophy: first, what is the very idea, or the identity, o f (the study of) Chinese philosophy as an academic field or learning? Second, how to con­ duct the (comparative) study o f Chinese philosophy? By examining the emer­ gence o f the history o f Chinese philosophy and the constructive challenge of Western philosophy to its development, Antonio S. Cua holistically combines his investigations of the two issues together. Cua first examines the very idea of

E d ito r’s Introduction

xv ii

Chinese philosophy and samples the critical-historical spirit o f ancient Chinese thought. He then turns to three major modern works on the history o f Chinese philosophy (respectively by three scholars, Hu Shih, Fung Yu-lan, and Lao Sze-kwang, with their distinct Western philosophy backgrounds), especially focusing on their methodological aspects and illustrating how modern studies of Chinese philosophy can be creatively and fruitfully carried out in the context o f the Chinese-Western philosophical dialogues. The second part focuses on the Yi-Jing philosophy. The Yi-Jing philosophy occupies a unique position in the development of Chinese philosophy. Some fundamental visions delivered in the Yi-Jing have significantly influenced the development of all the major philosophical movements in the history of Chinese philosophy and still exercise a distinct influence on creatively developing Chinese philosophy, and even world philosophy. W ith their different focuses, the three entries in this part elaborate the Yin-Yang way o f thinking as revealed by the philosophical dimension o f the Yi-Jing text. In comparison with Western hermeneutics, Chung-ying Cheng elaborates how the primal model o f Chinese ontological hermeneutics has originated and developed from the original text of the Yi-Jing (as onto-cosmology) and its subsequent commentaries known as the Yi-Zhuang (as onto-hermeneutics). In so doing, Cheng gives a detailed account o f the structure o f the Yi-Jing text, especially in view o f its five stages o f formation, the rise of the Yi text from guan and xiang, the practical and logical relevance of divination, and those primary principles in onto-interpretation. Through proposing a general model for comparative philosophy as philo­ sophy proper, Robert Elliott Allinson shows how the Yin- Yang model o f inter­ action suggested in the Yi-Jing can contribute to an account o f the fundamental way in which to conduct philosophical inquiry. The model is a tripartite one composed o f Yi-Jing, Hegelian, and Buddhist dimensions: the Hegelian dimen­ sion contributes the element of seeking other points of view while revising one’s own point of view; the Yi-Jing dimension contributes the element of holding overturned points o f view in abeyance pending their future need; and the Buddhist dimension contributes a heuristic criterion for the provisional dominance of the elements selected. The basic metaphysical orientation o f Chinese philosophy, especially o f the Yi-Jing text, has sometimes been characterized in terms o f the overwhelming priority o f becoming (changing, indefinite, unstable, irregular, etc.) over being (unchanging, definite, stable, regular, etc.) in contrast to the alleged priority o f being over becoming in Western philosophy. Whether or not this is a correct characterization of the orientation o f some schools in Chinese philosophy, or even o f the subsequent Confucian commentaries in the Yi-Zhuang, my con­ tribution in this part argues that the Yin-Yang metaphysical vision delivered in the original text of the Yi-Jing is not as mono-simplex as the becomingconcerned perspective alone, but is instead a multi-layer metaphysical com­ plex that suggests a much more balanced metaphysical and methodological

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guiding insight, which needs to be characterized in terms o f becoming-being complementarity. The third part focuses on Confucianism, one of the most important and influential movements of thought in Chinese philosophy. The five essays in this part are arranged in consideration of both chronological order and comparison range. In a diachronic line, Confucianism is under comparative examination respectively with ancient thinkers like Aristotle, modern philosophers like Kant, contemporary philosophers like Rawls, contemporary secular humanism, and contemporary Boston Confucianism. With the comparison range enlarged, com­ parative examinations are conducted between Confucian and Western virtue ethics traditions, between Confucian virtue ethics and Kantian deontological ethics, between Confucian and Rawlsian egalitarian justice accounts, between Confucian and (American) secular humanism, and between Confucianism and American pragmatism in the context of late-modern societies such as Boston’s. Bryan Van Norden appeals to a virtue ethics framework to interpret Confu­ cianism. He intends to show:(1 )Confucians present challenging and powerful alternatives to the Platonistic, Aristotelian, and Thomistic views that have dominated the Western approach to virtue ethics; (2) using the virtue ethics framework helps illuminate many aspects of Confucian thought that we might otherwise overlook. Van Norden also emphasizes the significance o f this com­ parative methodology in carrying on constructive cross-cultural dialogue. Beyond virtue ethics, Kantian ethics is one of the most influential moral approaches in the Western tradition. Could Confucian virtue ethics and Kantian deontological ethics be synthesized into a coherent account to overcome their respective problems while keeping their distinct strengths? This is a quite inter­ esting but challenging issue. Through constructing a normative moral principle, the Principled Benevolence, Robin R. Wang argues for a balanced moral account that would install the Confucian virtue of ren (benevolence) on the grounds of the Kantian Categorical Imperative and moral reasoning and imbue the latter with the spirit of the former. Though Confucian virtue ethics, or the virtue ethics dimension o f Con­ fucianism, is concerned primarily with characterizing the appropriate virtue o f a moral agent and how she should cultivate herself to become a morally noble person, Confucianism has its important implications, and explicit points of view, towards the issue of social justice. In view of the influential Rawlsian theory of social justice, how could the Confucian account of social justice make its distinct contribution to the modern society? Focusing on this issue, Ruiping Fan identifies and analyzes Confucian disagreements with the Rawlsian assumptions and conceptions of social justice in their different social and historical conditions. He explains how the Confucian account could make a significant difference in view of its emphasis on pursuing intrinsic virtue, social harmony, and familialist welfare versus the Rawlsian emphasis on distribution of instrumental goods, equality, and egalitarian opportunity.

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I f the preceding treatments o f Confucianism are conceived as largely in com­ parison with those representative figures like Aristotle, Kant, and Rawls in the known field o f philosophy, You-zheng Li calls our attention to the significance o f Confucianism in the more extensive interdisciplinary-humanist context. He highlights the secular character of the original Confucian ethics as revealed in the Analects and explores how Confucian ethics originating in the authoritarian ancient East and American secular humanism originating in the democratic modern West can jointly contribute to various common ethical concerns on their shared basis o f ethical humanism. Through the project of Boston Confucianism, Robert Cummings Neville explores a further wider platform to bring the Confucian tradition into play with the other great civilized traditions in the creation of a world civilization. Accord­ ing to Neville, part of the project is to bring Confucian philosophy into the world philosophical conversation; he endeavors to show that Confucianism can be transported to non-East-Asian environments like Boston (a traditional center for liberal democracy in a late- or postmodern society) and that, through com­ bining with American pragmatism, such “ portable” Confucianism has some­ thing genuinely interesting and helpful to meet the Western society’s need for philosophical guidance. The preceding five authors’ distinct approaches to various dimensions and layers o f Confucianism and its contemporary significance would significantly facilitate a holistic understanding o f Confucianism on its own, and o f how it could jointly contribute to common human moral concerns. Furthermore, it needs to be pointed out that to really understand Confucianism and how it came into play in the Chinese tradition, one has to understand philosophical Daoism, which is the topic o f the next part. For philosophical Daoism and Confucian­ ism constitute a pair o f Yin- Yang contraries in Chinese philosophical tradition which jointly play in a certain engaging but complementary way. The fourth part consists of five essays on philosophical Daoism: the first exam­ ines the metaethical engagement between Daoism and Confucianism through elaborating the metaphysics of dao; the second and third focus on Lao Z i， s fund­ amental thoughts in the Dao-De-Jing in their distinct ways; the fourth discusses Zhuang Z i’s metaphysical view in comparison with Aristotle’s; and the last con­ centrates on both Lao Zi and Zhuang Zi, comparing their distinct conceptions of reality and truth, particularly in view of the contemporary debate between realism and antirealism. Note that, in this part, most o f the essays carry out their com­ parative approaches (in the aforementioned primary sense) either in their implicit comparison with certain metaphysical or moral concerns in Western tradition or through their consciously resorting to certain conceptual and explanatory re­ sources in contemporary philosophy (in tacit comparison and contrast to those original resources) to enhance our understanding o f the ancient thinkers’ ideas. It is traditionally known that what prominently distinguishes philosophical Daoism from Confucianism is the former’s profound metaphysical concern with

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dao. Though endorsing the orthodox view that Daoists are distinguished from earlier moral philosophers (Confucius and Mo Zi) by their more metaphysical use of the term “ dao” , Chad Hansen argues that this traditional way of fixing the reference of Daoism need not entail that it have separate Daoist metaphysical and moral meanings for the term “ dao” . He contends that Daoists address the same dao that is in dispute in moral philosophy and resorts to the metaphysics of daoguide as their metaethics to inform their criticism of the Confucian-Mohist moral debate. Rather than asking, “ What is, such that we may know it?” the Daoist asks, “ What is, such that humans can act in it?” and responds without using the familiar concepts of Western sentential philosophy such as propositions and truths. In light o f contemporary philosophical discussion o f self and others, Qingjie Wang investigates the metaphysics of dao through his detailed examination of one key term “ zi ran” (usually translated into “ nature” ) in the context o f the Dao-De-Jing. He argues that zi ran as dao is the natural ways of everything’s becoming his/her/itself, i.e., a unique and indispensable natural process of “ it-self-so-ing” before or beyond which there need be no creator. Based on Lao Z i’s concept o f wu wei, Wang emphasizes that the other side o f the same zi ran can be characterized in terms of “ other-ing” to the effect that any kind of coercion, interference, or oppression of others’ “ it-self-so-ing” should be reduced, eliminated, and morally blamed. The relation between the ultimate concern and its language engagement has long been an intricate issue in both East and West. Lao Zi in the Dao-De-Jing has been traditionally depicted as celebrating a sharply negative claim that any language engagement is doomed to fail to capture the genuine dao, which is often considered as one central message delivered in the two-statement opening passage o f the Dao-De-Jing. Through re-examining the opening passage in the context o f the Dao-De-Jing, my own contribution tries to spell out Lao Z i’s two-sided fundamental insight on the issue: in the first statement, Lao Zi posit­ ively affirms the role of the language-engaged finite point of view in capturing the dao, but alerts us to its limitation and emphasizes the transcendental char­ acter o f the dao; in the second statement, through a semantic ascent o f talking about the name of the dao, Lao Zi delivers essentially the same message in a distinct way that is philosophically interesting. Zhuang Zi is so fascinating a figure in the Daoist tradition that he has often been rendered mystical in some literature. Philosophical inquiry might begin with, but certainly not eventually be content with, something mystical if that means being kept secret or inexplicable. Taking his comparative approach to demystifying Zhuang Z i， s metaphysics, Chenyang Li endeavors to show how it is a reasonable alternative to the Aristotelian philosophy. He argues that, for Zhuang Zi, a thing has its distinct ways of being, all of which are different ways for the same object to be, and that not only is the world a world of diversity, but also the being of an object is a diversity. One thing we can learn from Zhuang

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Zi is to open our mind to the diversity of the being of objects, and allow an object to have possibly any number o f ways as its real being. With the above four authors’ separate accounts of Lao Z i， s and Zhuang Z i’s distinct metaphysical outlooks, one question emerges: what is the relation between their distinct metaphysical views? How could their views enhance our understanding of the relevant debate in modern philosophy? JeeLoo Liu presents a comparative study o f the two leading Daoists’ different conceptions o f reality and truth in the context of contemporary metaphysical debate on realism and antirealism. Liu argues that Lao Zi and Zhuang Zi do not hold incompatible views on the nature of reality, but they have different evaluations o f the human capacity to understand or to depict this reality. She explains how Zhuang Z i， s internal realism actually pushes Lao Z i， s original thesis about reality further, and thereby accomplishes a more coherent Daoist conception o f truth. Though, as indicated before, what prominently distinguishes philosophical Daoism from Confucianism seems to be the former’s profound metaphysical concern with dao, it turns out to be a controversial issue o f how to look at the Daoist metaphysical outlook(s) and how it is distinct from the metaphysical concern(s) in Western philosophy. Though the above five authors have seem­ ingly, more or less, different characterizations of the metaphysics o f Daoists like Lao Zi and Zhuang Zi, an interesting question is in which aspect(s) they are really engaging and competing and whether, or to what extent, their accounts would be compatible. The two essays in the fifth part deal with some logic-related concerns in Chinese philosophy. One such concern is the issue o f paradoxes: given the significance of Zeno-like paradoxes in Greek philosophy, are there any actual or potential counterparts of the Zeno-like paradoxes in Chinese tradition, especially in Ming-Jia (the Name School or the Logicians)? Focusing on this concern, Chuang Liu gives a close examination o f some distinguished scholars’ claims that some of M ing-Jia’ s aphorisms are Zeno-like paradoxes. Analyzing two groups of “ paradoxical” claims recorded in the Zhuang Z i, usually assigned to Hui Shi or his students, the author concludes that none of those claims are genuine paradoxes, but rather philosophical insights which refute the corres­ ponding common-sense beliefs. I f the preceding logic-related concern is a positive one that reveals some dis­ tinct logic-sensibility in classical Chinese philosophy, the next logic-related con­ cern to be addressed in this part is a negative one, with an antilogic orientation. It is the so-called thesis o f antilogic in Indian and Chinese Buddhism to the effect that the inner experience and understanding o f the ultimate truth transcends logic and goes beyond rationality and discursive concepts but through private access. Yiu-ming Fung challenges the validity o f this thesis: he gives a detailed examination o f several major versions o f the thesis and shows why the thesis is either self-refuting or trivial. With the thesis of antilogic having its cognates in some other philosophical traditions, a detailed critical examination o f whether

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or not it can hold water would enhance our understanding of some similar issues raised in the other traditions. Fung’s work has thus illustrated another constructive way in which the study of Chinese philosophy can contribute to the common philosophical enterprise. It is interesting to note that, although almost all the articles in this volume largely endeavor to positively identify and elaborate certain distinct ideas, theses, and insights in Chinese philosophy, Fung critically challenges one well-known thesis in Chinese Buddhism that has been sometimes celebrated in the litera­ ture. Indeed, when we favorably identify and elaborate some distinct ideas and lines of thought in Chinese philosophy, that certainly does not imply that nothing in Chinese philosophy is susceptible to criticism or that everything in the tradition is just great as it is. W ith their cultural roots in Chinese cultural tradition, and with their continuing philosophical engagement within, some Chinese scholars’ critical examinations o f certain ideas and theses in their own philosophical tradition, in a less celebratory, but more critical way, actually constitute an indispensable part of serious self-reflective efforts o f the very same philosophical tradition. In the historical long run, doesn’t the power and vitality o f a philosophical tradition consist in its own reflective and critical character, including its capacity of being self-critical within, when it construc­ tively engages without? Again, as with its pedagogical consideration, though the book is an academic anthology, together the essays in this volume constitute an advanced introduc­ tion to the further reaches of Chinese philosophy in the comparative context, especially regarding its three major contents - Confucianism, philosophical Daoism, and the Yi-Jing philosophy. Though the volume alone is not for absolute beginners, it will significantly reward attentive reading by serious stu­ dents of the subject, not least because many o f the contributors are distin­ guished experts on the subjects they treat and because o f the authors’ distinct comparative approaches to Chinese philosophy.

Bo Mou Albany, California, USA

Part One Identity of Chinese Philosophy and Its Modern Studies

CHAPTER ONE

Emergence of the History of Chinese Philosophy* Antonio S. Cua This essay is an inquiry into the constructive challenge of Western philosophy to the development of the history of Chinese philosophy. The discussion focuses on the methodological aspects o f three major works that appeared from 1919 to 1982. These works are remarkable, not only for illustrating the different Western philosophical assumptions and backgrounds of these writers, but also for their importance in Chinese philosophical education and discourse. As pre­ liminaries, in the first part, I consider the idea of Chinese philosophy and samples of the critical-historical spirit o f ancient Chinese thought. In the second part, I turn to three major works on the history o f Chinese philosophy, that is, works o f Hu Shih (Hu Shi), Fung Yu-lan (Feng You-lan), and Lao Sze-kwang (Lao Si-guang), and conclude with some remarks on the contributions o f a few recent works to the study o f the history of Chinese philosophy.

Preliminaries The idea o f Chinese philosophy It is common today for a teacher or scholar in Chinese philosophy to encounter the query “ What is Chinese philosophy?” Sometimes this query is a disguise for expressing doubt as to whether there could even be such a thing as Chinese philosophy. There is a terse answer to the question: as philosophy is a Western term, Chinese philosophy is an invention of Western-trained Chinese scholars. This answer, however, is not h e lp fu l.A better answer would be a reminder that, from ancient times to the present, ethics is a recognized branch o f Western philosophical inquiry, and ethics has its counterpart in ancient Chinese thought. Both Socrates and Confucius were preoccupied with basic questions o f norm­ ative ethics, questions about the manner of life that best befits humanity and about the ideals o f human excellence and well-being. These questions were * This essay is a revised, pinyin version o f the one published in International Philosophical Quarterly vol. X L, no. 4 (December 2000). I am grateful to Professor Daniel Dahlstrom o f Boston University for valuable suggestions for final revision.

3

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brilliantly pursued by Plato and Aristotle. We find comparable achievements in the works o f Mencius and Xun Zi (Hsün Tzu). Xun Z i’s writings, more­ over, reveal significant interest and insights into some basic problems o f moral epistemology, e.g., the problems of ethical language and justification as a form of argumentative discourse.1 O f course, the word “ philosophy” has no equivalent in Chinese before trans­ lations o f Western philosophical works in the nineteenth century. Yan Fu (18231921) was the first to translate Thomas Huxley’s Evolution and Ethics into Chinese in 1898.2 Later, Yan Fu translated some works of John Stuart M ill, Herbert Spencer, and Montesquieu. In the early 1960s, Wing-tsit Chan wrote: At the turn of the century, ideas of Schopenhauer, Kant, Nietzsche, Rousseau, Tolstoy, and Kropotkin were imported. After the intellectual renaissance of 1917, the movement advanced at a rapid pace. In the following decade, important works of Descartes, Spinoza, Hume, James, Bergson, and Marx, and others became available in Chinese. Dewey, Russell, and Dreisch came to China to lecture, and special numbers of journals were devoted to Nietzsche and Bergson. ... Almost every trend of thought had its exponent. James, Bergson, Euken, Whitehead, Hocking, Schiller, T. H. Green, Carnap, and C. I. Lewis had their own following. For a time it seemed Chinese thought was to be completely Westernized.3 In Taiwan and Hong Kong today, we also find followers o f Kant, Husserl, Heidegger, Wittgenstein, Maritain, Gilson, Quine, Pepper, Gadamer, Derrida, and different philosophical schools of thought. I f one visits any Taiwan or Hong Kong university today, he or she is likely to find a department of philosophy with a wide offering o f standard subjects and courses such as Chinese Philosophy, Indian Philosophy, Buddhistic Philosophy, and Comparative Philosophy. In the People’s Republic of China, there are still followers of Marx and Lenin, as well as specialists in logic, philosophy of science, and aesthetics.4 The translation of Western philosophical concepts and doctrines provided an impetus to the development o f Chinese philosophical discourse. In perusing a Chinese dictionary of philosophy, first published in 1925 (Zhe-Xue-Ci-Dian),5 we find a few Chinese translations of philosophical subjects and terms, e.g., ethics, logic, ontology, essence, accident, substance, attributes, and reason. These terms still have currency today. In fact, “ logic” appears as a translitera­ tion that becomes part o f Modern Chinese. It is instructive to note how some translations o f standard Western philosophical terms represent an effort o f Chinese and Japanese scholars to find functional equivalents in Chinese. Consider the word “ philosophy” . An ingenious Japanese scholar’s translation of “ philosophy” as zhe-xue is a good example. Nishi Amane, in his Hyakuichi shimron [Bai- Yi-Xin-Lun] (1874), appeared to be the first scholar to use “ zhe-xue” as a translation for the Greek “philosophia” and “ philosophy” . For justification of this translation of “ philosophy” as “ zhe-xue” , Nishi Amane

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5

appealed to Zhou D u n -yi’s notion o f x i xian-xue or x i zhe-xue, that is, “ to aspire to the learning o f a worthy person” or “ to aspire to the learning o f an intelligent, knowledgeable person” . This is an interpretive translation, for Nishi explicitly appealed to a brief remark o f Zhou Dun-yi (Zhou Lian-xi, 1017—1073) in Tong-Shu (Chapter 10): “ The sage aspires to become Heaven, the worthy aspires to become a sage, and the gentleman [junzi] aspires to become a worthy.” Zhou’s remark was interpreted as “ to aspire and pursue, through learning, in order to acquire the wisdom o f the worthy and the intelligent, knowledgeable person” .6 In Chinese, the first character or graph “ zhe” means wisdom. An alternative term for wisdom is “ z h i' often used interchangeably with its homophone, meaning “ knowledge” and/or “ capacity to acquire knowledge” .7Given its prim­ arily practical orientation, ancient Chinese thinkers were, for the most part, preoccupied with ethical questions about right conduct and the best conception o f human life. The good human life is commonly envisaged by the Confucians as a life o f ren, an affectionate concern for the well-being o f one’s fellows in a community, society, or state governed by a wise and virtuous ruler.8 “ Xue” is learning. “ Philosophy” translated as “ zhe-xue” means in Chinese “ learning to become a wise and knowledgeable person” . As learning and practice can be a delightful experience, the student may come to love the subject. Interpreting philosophy as the love o f wisdom reflects the Confucian con­ cern with practice or application o f learning. Confucius once remarked: “ Is it not a delight to apply one’s learning at an appropriate tim e?” 9 For the Con­ fucian, learning is important because of its relevance to resolving problems of human life. It is the acquisition o f practical, not theoretical knowledge. This translation o f “ philosophy” as “ zhe-xue” seems to be a very good attempt to find a functional equivalent in the Chinese language prior to the careful study o f Western philosophy. Indeed, the translation o f “ philosophy” from the Greek, on one interpretation, is closer to the ancient Chinese conception. John Passmore remarks: “ The Greek word sophia is ordinarily translated into English as ‘wisdom ’，and the compound philosophia, from which ‘philosophy’ derives, is translated as ‘the love of wisdom ， . But sophia has a much wider range o f application than the modern English ‘wisdom ’. Wherever intelligence can be exercised —in practical affairs, in the mechanical arts, in business there is room for sophia•” Passmore goes on to discuss different conceptions o f philosophy 一 a topic familiar to philosophy majors today.10The Chinese trans­ lation, though an interpretive adaptation, at least captures part o f the meaning o f philosophia. The term “ zhe-xue” is now a standard Chinese term. However, if one thinks o f philosophy as the construction o f grand systems of thought as exemplified in Aristotle, Aquinas, Hobbes, Kant, or Hegel, the person may find the idea o f Chinese philosophy problematic. Arguably, the works o f Zhu X i may be considered an embodiment o f a grand system. Setting aside this essentially contestable issue and focusing on ethics as a basic or

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even the basic subject of philosophical inquiry, the history of Chinese thought is replete with examples. As translation is an interpretive task, the Chinese translation of “ ethics” as “ lun-li-xue” perhaps illustrates best the concern of the Confucian tradition. Read independently o f its being a translated term, “ lun-li-xue” may be explained as an inquiry concerning the rationales of human relationships —one principal concern of Confucian ethics. For those impressed with the recent Western emphasis on personal relationships, they will find an ancient Confucian precursor for their ethical and/or political theory.11 Since a translation is an interpretive adaptation of an idea in a foreign language, it should not be a surprise for a Western philosophy student or scholar to have difficulties with the existing translations of some Chinese texts. For many Western philosophers, Wing-tsit Chan’s A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy is not a very helpful introduction. While it is an impressive con­ tribution to Sinological scholarship, his use of English words for translating key Chinese concepts is not always perspicuous to Western philosophers, in spite o f Chan， s painstaking effort to explain them. For example, when “li" , “y i-li" ， and “ tia n -li” are rendered as “ principle” ，“ moral principle” ，and " principle of nature” ，one can be puzzled about what these English terms mean. Absent an explanation of the uses o f " l i " ，the translation of “ li" ，as “ principle” unavoidably leads to such misleading questions as: What are the principles o f Chinese or Confucian ethics? I f such principles exist, do they serve as premisses for derivation o f moral rules? Are Confucian principles universal or relative? The selected texts do not provide clear answers to the question of how one goes about formulating the so-called principles.12 Moreover, though perhaps unavoidable, use o f such labels as “ idealistic" ,“ n a tu ra lis tic " , and “ rationalistic” for certain tendencies of Chinese thought may be misleading in implying that these tendencies are the Chinese counter­ parts o f those in Western philosophy.13 Unless they are carefully defined, even in Western philosophy today, these labels are useful largely as convenient pedagogical and/or mnemonic devices. I must note that, to a certain degree, a philosophical bilingual would face similar difficulties in reading Chan's book, while admiring his marvelous achievement.

Ancient history o f Chinese thought While the idea o f the history o f Chinese philosophy is a Western importa­ tion, the importance of critical exposition o f prevailing “ winds of doctrine” is recognized in some works in ancient Chinese thought. Somewhat reminiscent of book alpha o f Aristotle’s Metaphysics, Chapter 33 of the Zhuang Z i gives a critical account o f Zhuang Z i's contemporaries or predecessors.14 While acknowledging that there are many thoughtful persons in the world concerned with dao (Way), the writer asks: “ Where do we find what the ancients called ‘the arts of tao (tao-shu)', the arts for pursuing tao [or the ideal of the good

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7

human life]? I say that dao pervades everything that exists in the universe.” In this essay we find an extant, critical statement o f Mo Zi, Shen Dao, and Hui Shi, a famous proponent of such logical paradoxes as, e.g., “ I set o ff for Y üeh today and came there yesterday"， “ The southern region has no lim it and yet has a lim it” ，and “ Fire is not hot.” This chapter in the Zhuang Z i praises Lao Zi and Zhuang Zhou (i.e., Zhuang Zi), showing the author’s ethical commit­ ment. Notably, Zhuang Zi has a holistic moral vision o f the unity o f humans and other things in the universe: “ Heaven and earth were born at the same time as I was, and the ten thousand things are one with me.” 15 In Chapter 2, Zhuang Zi offers a brilliant critique o f the Mohists and the Confucians. Among other things, Zhuang Zi maintains that there are no fixed meanings of words, nor neutral, external standards for deciding correctness or incorrectness, truth or falsity o f their claims. The best course is to transcend the dispute and main­ tain clarity of mind (ming). Says Zhuang Zi, “ The torch o f chaos and doubt this is what the sage steers by. So he does not use things but relegates all to the constant. This is what it means to use c la rity ." 16 In the same holistic spirit, but appreciative o f the value o f argumentative discourse, Xun Zi gives an insightful critique o f influential thinkers in his time. Also, echoing Zhuang Zi, Xun Zi acknowledges the merits o f the doctrines of various Confucian and nonConfucian thinkers, for their doctrines were plaus­ ible, that is, they had good reasons for espousing their doctrines. Regrettably, they grasp only “ one corner” o f dao and mistake it to be characteristic of the whole. For example, Mo Zi exaggerated the importance o f benefit or utility without appreciating the beauty o f form or cultural refinement in human life. Zhuang Zi was too preoccupied with the thought o f Heaven and paid hardly any attention to the needs o f humanity. Says Xun Zi: “ Dao embodies the constant, yet exhausts all changes. One corner is insufficient to characterize it . " 17 These thinkers were victims o f bi (obscuration, blindness), that is, their minds were so dominated by one persistent idea o f dao that, as a consequence, they failed to take account o f other equally important aspects o f dao. Like Zhuang Zi, Xun Zi emphasizes the clarity o f mind. But for Xun Zi, clarity of mind is a mental state free from cognitive blindness or obsession with doctrines, a preparation for the acquisition o f knowledge and sagely wisdom, and not a characteristic o f sagely attainment. It is noteworthy that, apart from being the defender o f the Confucian tradition against external challenges, Xun Zi is also an internal critic o f the Confucian thought and practice o f his time. He reminds the learned Confucians that they must not confuse different sorts o f Confucians (Ru): the great and sagacious, the refined, and the vulgar.18 The value and integrity of Confucian teachings should not be perfunctorily identified with those in common practice. In this connection, let us note the ancient Confucian doctrine o f rectifying names or terms (zheng-ming) as a method for dealing with internal and external critiques of Confucian thought. Part o f the purport of this classical doctrine

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of rectifying the uses o f names or terms is to insure that names and titles are assumed by persons who carry out their tasks in accord with the responsibility implicit in the names and titles. Hu Shih aptly states that for Confucius, rectifica­ tion o f names is not a task for the grammarian or lexicographer, for it is primarily an ethical task o f intellectual reorganization: Its object is, first, to make the names stand for what they ought to stand for, and then to so reorganize the social and political relations and institutions as to make them what their names indicate they ought to be. The rectification of names thus consists in making real relationships and duties and institutions conform as far as possible to the ideal meanings, which, however obscured and neglected they may now become, can still be re-discovered and re-established by proper study and literally “judicious” use of the names.19 Influenced especially by Later Mohist logic, Xun Zi expands the scope o f the doctrine o f rectifying names to embrace more extensive linguistic, conceptual, and pragmatic concerns.20The Confucian task of intellectual reorganization may also be ascribed to Zhu X i， s (1130-1200) concern with the idea o f Confucian tradition (dao-tong) as a way of meeting the internal and external challenges of nonConfucian thought, such as Buddhism and Daoism.21 In the twentieth century the challenge for rewriting the history o f Chinese thought came from Western philosophy. Some Western-trained philosophy scholars of Han learning or Chinese studies must have experienced what Alasdair MacIntyre calls “ epistemological crisis” ， that is, the realization that the develop­ ment of Chinese thought had for some time been stagnant. To these thinkers, issues in discourse must have appeared sterile as they could no longer be resolved through the employment o f current internal standards of reasoned discourse. MacIntyre insightfully remarks: “ The solution to a genuine epistemological crisis requires the invention or discovery of new concepts and the framing of some new type or types of the o ry." 22 In the older spirit of the Confucian doctrine of rectifying names, the epi­ stemological crisis is a crisis of “ intellectual reorganization” . The challenge of Western philosophy involves nothing less than a wholesale reconsideration of the philosophical significance of the history o f Chinese thought. The her­ meneutical task involves adaptation of alien Western philosophical concepts and/or doctrines in interpreting the significance of classical texts. In Ronald Dworkin’s felicitous term, the task is “ constructive interpretation” . The aim o f constructive interpretation, as a species of the enterprise of creative inter­ pretation, is to present, in the best light, a coherent explanatory account o f an object or an existing practice, and more significantly, a sound or adequate justification o f the practice.23 The key issues involved in constructive inter­ pretation remain a continuing concern of Chinese philosophers today. Below, I focus on some o f these issues in three outstanding works o f Hu Shih (Hu Shi),

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Fung Yu-lan (Feng You-lan), and Lao Sze-kwang (Lao Si-guang) on the history of Chinese philosophy.

History of Chinese philosophy Hu Shih (1891-1962) It is a plausible presumption that a writer of the history of Chinese philosophy must have extensive training in Western philosophy and some familiarity with works on the history o f Western philosophy. Indeed, the subject o f the history of Chinese philosophy is a philosophical transformation of the history of Chinese thought. To my knowledge, the pioneering work is Hu Shih’s An Outline o f the History o f Chinese Philosophy, Part / (in Chinese) published in 1919, two years after the submission o f his brilliant doctoral dissertation to Columbia Univer­ sity. (Earlier, I cited this work in connection with the Confucian doctrine of rectifying names.) Hu did not complete his three-part project on the history of Chinese philosophy. The last two parts were intended to be an account of “ medieval” and contemporary Chinese philosophy. While H u’s work pretends to be no more than an outline, in some respects it is still a useful work of reference. One finds insightful discussion o f the evolution o f the Confucian concept o f li or rules o f proper conduct as well as logical-conceptual issues involved in interpreting, say, Xun Z i， s conception of empirical knowledge.24 Cai Y uan-pei， s Foreword (dated August 3,1918) singles out four special qualities o f Hu’s b o o k :( 1 ) the use o f the methods of evidence; (2) the skill in distinguishing the “ pure” elements of philosophical thought from those of the mythological and political history of the Chinese people; (3) the ability to render impartial evaluation o f the merits and demerits of different philosophies; and finally (4) the systematic character o f the work. Cai reminds the reader that Hu is among the very few scholars trained in Western philosophy who also has a mastery o f Han Learning.25 Hu’s long introductory chapter explains his aims and methodology. A t the outset, Hu points out that there is no fixed definition o f “ philosophy” . However, Hu proposes a broad conception: any kind o f study and research that deals with the most important and fundamental questions may be called “ philosophy"， fo r example, the question concerning the goodness or badness of human conduct. Hu delineates six different sorts of philosophical inquiry, familiar to students of Western philosophy: cosmology; epistemology; ethics; philosophy o f education; political philosophy; and philosophy o f religion. Says Hu, “ These kinds of inquiry, from the ancient times to the present, have passed through many philosophers’ investigations. Continually, since the inception of the formulation of a question, different interpretations and methods of solution have been proposed and contested in argumentation. Sometimes, one

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question, after a few thousand years, still has received no definitive method of re so lu tio n ." 26 Hu cites the example of the ancient Chinese dispute on human nature (xing) in the doctrines of Kao Zi, Mencius, and Xun Zi, and in subsequent views in the history o f Chinese thought. Hu focuses on three objectives o f a history of philosophy:(1 )understanding changes or transformations of a particular school of thought; (2) the reasons and causes for such transformations; and (3) objective, critical evaluation. Hu pays a great deal o f attention to the method for evaluating sources, modeled after the Western method of writing history. Perhaps, as Lao Sze-kwang later complains, he spends too much time with the problem of distinguishing genuine materials from forgeries. Hu briefly discusses five kinds of evidence: historical events; linguistic usages of the time; literary styles; the coherent or systematic character of thought; and secondary, collaborative evidence. In the last section of the Introduction, Hu stresses a deeper level of the method of guan-tong, the orderly, sequential presentation o f development o f a school o f thought. In the bibliographic notes of the introductory chapter, Hu lists mostly Western sources such as the German Wilhelm Windelband (1848-1915), A History o f Western Philosophy, translated into English by J. H. Tufts and published in 1893. Our sketch of H u’s concerns is familiar to teachers of Western philosophy. Note­ worthy is H u， s use of the notions of syllogism, proposition, and judgment in his discussion o f the Later Mohist logic. In 1919, just eight years after the founding of the Republic of China, a Chinese scholar or university student of “ Han Learning” would have found H u's book to be important as it presents a new point o f view o f the history o f Chinese thought. A fellow Chinese with a graduate education in Western philosophy would find H u's History an inspiring and enlightening work of Chinese scholarship in the 1920s. For philosophers interested in the informal, pragmatic, logical aspect o f ancient Chinese thought, he or she will find another pioneering study in H u's The Development o f the Logical Method in Ancient China. Influenced by Dewey’s “ experimental logic” ，Hu critically expounds the logical aspects of the Analects o f Confucius, Mo Zi and his school, and Xun Z i， s works. The impressive attempt at a comprehensive, reconstructive study of the Later Mohists' fragmentary, discursive texts appears almost half a century after H u’s doctoral dissertation.27 This work on logical method also expresses H u's attitude toward the history of Chinese thought, his solution, so to speak, to the “ epistemological crisis” . Hu writes: “ How can we [Chinese] best assimilate modern civilization in such a manner as to make it congenial and congruous and continuous with the civiliza­ tion of our own making?” The more specific problem is to find “ a congenial stock with which we may organically link with the thought-systems o f modern Europe and America, so that we may further build up our own science and philosophy on the new foundation o f an internal assimilation o f the old and the new” . Critical o f Song-Ming Confucianism, or what is commonly known in

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the West as Neo-Confucianism, as represented by major works of Zhu X i and Wang Yang-ming, Hu thinks that these thinkers, “ rejuvenated the long-dead Confucianism by reading into it two logical methods which never belonged to it" i.e., “ the theory o f investigating into the reason in everything for the purpose of extending one’s knowledge to the utmost, which is the method of Song School; and the theory of intuitive knowledge, which is the method of the School of Wang Yang-ming” . While appreciative o f Wang’s merits, Hu expresses his judgment that the method is “ wholly incompatible with the method o f science” . As to the Song method of the investigation o f things, it is a fruitless method in three different ways: “ （ 1) by the lack o f an experimental procedure, (2) by its failure to recognize the active and directing role played by the mind in the investigation o f things, and (3) most unfortunate o f all, by its construction o f ‘thing' to mean ‘a ffa ir' " . Hu has no doubt that the future of Chinese philosophy depends on “ emancipation from the moralistic and rationalistic fetters of C onfucia nism ''.28 H u's view raises important issues concerning his reading o f Song-Ming Con­ fucianism. One wonders, however, whether he has neglected a principal concern with ethical methodology in the works o f Cheng Y i and Zhu Xi, and Wang Yang-ming. Significantly, their different conceptions o f the ethical methodology deploy the Confucian classic, the Great Learning (Da-Xue), which emphasizes self-cultivation as the root or basis for the attainment o f the Confucian ideal of human excellence. This emphasis on self-cultivation crucially involves not only the development of moral character, but also empirical inquiry, for example, s interpretation of “ investigation o f things” as an activity o f exhausting Zhu X i， the li (rationales) for the existence of things and our conception o f what things ought-to-be. More important, without a constructive, philosophical interpreta­ tion o f Song-Ming Confucianism, it seems arbitrary to counsel Chinese thinkers to “ build up our own science and philosophy on the new foundation o f an internal assimilation of the old and the new” .

Fung Yu-lan (1895-1990) The first volume of Fung’s History o f Chinese Philosophy (in Chinese) was published in 1931 and the second volume in 1934. Derk Bodde’s English trans­ lation is an outstanding achievement, particularly in introducing Fung's work to English-speaking philosophers. The coverage of the first volume, from the beginnings to about 100 BC, is more extensive than Hu Shih's Outline. A ll major thinkers and schools discussed by Hu reappear in Fung’s first volume. As both Hu and Fung obtained their doctoral degrees in philosophy from Columbia University, it is not surprising that they shared similar judgment o f the philo­ sophical significance o f the literature of ancient Chinese thought. However, the difference in time noticeably makes a difference in influence. Hu was largely influenced by John Dewey in the 1910s; Fung by William P. Montague in the

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1920s. However, as we will later note, Fung was also appreciative of William James’s and other philosophers’ insights. In the Introduction, reminiscent of, but more explicit than, Hu Shih’s, Fung points out that originally, ‘‘philosophy" is a Western term. According to Fung, one main task o f the history of Chinese philosophy consists in selecting works that are amenable to philosophical treatment. The pursuit o f this task pre­ supposes that one has some understanding of the term “ Western P hilo sophy" . Fung remarks: “ In the West, the use o f ‘philosophy’ has a long history. Different philosophers have their own definitions. However, for purposes o f conveni­ ence, let us attend to its content. I f we know the content of philosophy, we can know what sort o f thing philosophy is ." 29 Again, much in the spirit of Hu Shih, Fung proceeds to mention the three­ fold Greek division of philosophy into physics, ethics, and logic; alternatively: “ A Theory of World” ，“A Theory of Life” ，and “ A Theory of Knowledge” . Fung maintains that philosophy is a product of reason. ‘‘[Thus,] if philosophers want to establish the reasoned foundation of their theses, they must provide arguments, proofs or demonstrations. This is the purport o f Xun Z i， s saying, ‘they [the thinkers criticized] have reasons for supporting their views and thus their words appear plausible, '30 and Mencius’s saying, ‘Do I love to argue? I have no other alternative’ (Mencius， 3B:9).” 31,32 Possibly addressing the audience o f Western-trained Chinese thinkers who have no special interest in the philosophical study of Chinese thought, or those skeptical o f the intelligibility o f talk about Chinese philosophy, Fung remarks: “ There are three questions that most often occur to all persons interested in the history o f Chinese thought. First, what is the nature of Chinese philosophy, and what contribution has it to make to the world? Secondly, is it true, as is often said, that Chinese philosophy lacks system? And thirdly, is it true that there is no such thing as growth in Chinese philo sophy?" 33 Regarding the first question, Fung points out that we do find ethical and metaphysical concerns, but very little attention to logic or methodology and epistemology. For the most part, Chinese philosophers do not think that knowledge has intrinsic value. Even in the case of knowledge o f the practical sort, Chinese philosophers would stress their application to actual conduct rather than approve o f empty discourse. Lack o f Chinese contribution to epistemology can be explained partly by the widely shared ideal of “ inner sageliness and outer kingliness” (nei-sheng wai-wang) and partly by their lack o f clear demarcation of “ the distinction between the individual and the universe” ； alternatively put, the lack o f the Western conception o f the “ ego” . As to methodology, what the Chinese thinkers have emphasized, given their ideal of “ inner sageliness and outer kingliness” ，are methods o f self-cultivation. In this regard, China has “ a great contribution to offer” . The foregoing contains a partial answer to the second question, “ Is it true, as is often said, that Chinese philosophy lacks system?” Fung maintains that

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we must distinguish “ formal (xing-shiy from “ real” systems (shi-zhi xi-tong). Says Fung: It may be admitted that Chinese philosophy lacks formal system; but if one were to say that it therefore lacks any real system, meaning that there is no organic unity of ideas to be found in Chinese philosophy, it would be equivalent to saying that Chinese philosophy is not philosophy, and that China has no philosophy. The earlier Greek philosophy also lacked formal system. Thus Socrates wrote no books himself, Plato used the dialogue form in his writings, and it was not until Aristotle that a clear and ordered exposition was given on every problem. Hence if we judge from the point of view of formal system, Aristotle’s philosophy is comparatively systematic, yet insofar as the actual content of the philosophy is concerned, Plato’s philosophy is equally systematic. ... although Chinese philosophy, formally speaking, is less systematic than that of the West, in its actual content it has as much system as does western philosophy. This being so, the important duty of the historian of philosophy is to find within a philosophy that lacks formal system, its underlying real system.34 Perhaps, Fung’s distinction o f formal and real systems is more plausibly rendered as a distinction between explicit or articulate and implicit or inchoate systems of philosophy. The idea of a formal system o f philosophy some­ times has as its paradigm a logical, deductive, or quasi-deductive system as exemplified in Spinoza and Kant. Fung’s use of “ organic unity” suggests his adoption o f the Hegelian terminology - an apt adaptation consistent with the holistic vision of dao in Zhuang Zi and Xun Zi, noted above. I f one accepts Fung's thesis that Chinese thought has “ real” systems though it lacks “ formal systems” ，this thesis must be qualified by saying that so-called “ real” systems are products o f philosophical reconstruction or constructive interpretation. In this task, one must preserve the holistic spirit o f Chinese philosophy. In the untranslated section entitled “ The Unity o f Philosophy” ， Fung cites Confucius' remark, “ There is one thread that runs through my teachings." 35 More informative is Fung’s citation o f Xun Z i， s critique o f differ­ ent influential thinkers that their minds have been “ obscured (b i)” ，because they were so preoccupied with one thing and neglected the importance of other things. (Xun Z i’s comments on Mo Zi and Zhuang Zi were given above.) Notably, Fung also reminds his reader o f William James's view in A Pluralistic Universe: “ I f one aspect of the universe attracts the special attention o f a philosopher, he would hold to it as if it were characteristic o f the w hole." 36 We find a similar view in a succinct remark o f Wittgenstein, reminiscent of Xun Z i’s view o f philosophers as victims o f bi (obscuration/blindness) or aspect-obsession: “ A main cause o f philosophical disease - a one-sided diet: one nourishes one’s thinking with only one kind o f exam ple." 37 This sort of preoccupation easily leads to overlooking other kinds o f examples that may be even more important in formulating an adequate view o f things. Like ordinary persons, great thinkers of the East or the West have a proclivity to

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exaggerate the significance of their insights as embodying “ the whole truth and nothing but the truth” . They tend to regard their partial views as representing the whole, presuming that they have the best understanding o f the subject matter of inquiry. In the spirit of Zhuang Zi, they are prompt to overstate the scope of their insights, “ forgetful (wang)" of the limits of the exercise of our intellectual capacity.38 Let us turn to the third question: is it true that there is no such thing as progressive growth in Chinese philosophy? Fung answers: “ The problems and scope of Chinese philosophy from the Han dynasty onward are not so numerous and comprehensive as those of the philosophy that preceded it, and yet the later philosophy is certainly more clearly expounded than the earlier one." 39 (This judgment seems implicit in Hu Shih’s critique of Song-Ming Confucian­ ism.) Invoking Aristotle’s distinction between potentiality and actuality, Fung maintains, in this Introduction to the first volume, that “ movement from such potentiality to actuality constitutes progress” . However, as evident in Fung’s division of the history of Chinese philosophy into two periods, progress does not mean advancement or development o f new philosophical perspectives in the modern Western sense. The two periods are the Period of the Philosophers (zi-xue shi-dai), from Confucius (551-479 BC) to Huai-nan Zi (died 122 BC), and the Period o f Classical Learning (jing-xue shi-dai), from Dong Zhong-shu (c .179-104 BC) to Kang You-wei (1858-1927). The Period of the Philosophers is characterized by “ the simultaneous flourishing o f many schools” . This explains the scope of Fung’s first volume, covering “ only some four hundred odd years” . For any philosophy student today, this is the most exciting period o f Chinese thought. Perhaps for this reason, since the 1960s, many philosophical scholars and historians o f Chinese thought have devoted their time and energy to the ancient literature. This is a period where many original thinkers confronted each other in a free arena of argumentative discourse. The Period of Classical Learning, on the other hand, is for the most part a period o f Confucian Classicism or “ scholasticism” . According to Fung, if one follows the usual division of Western philosophy into ancient, medieval, and modern, “ it may be said that China has actually had only an ancient and a medieval philosophy but still lacks a modern philosophy" . Says Fung in 1934, “ China, until very recent times, regardless of how we view it, has remained essentially medieval, with the result that in many respects it has failed to keep pace with the West. A modern age, indeed, has been lacking in Chinese history, and philosophy is but one particular aspect of this general s itu a tio n ." 40 Fung's view of the problem of Chinese philosophy raises an important issue of “ the development of Chinese philosophy” ， alternatively, the evolution o f the history o f Chinese thought into a history o f philosophy. For Fung philosophy must be distinguished from philosophers. A philo­ sopher's philosophy reflects his character (ren-ge), that is, an individual

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temperament and experience. Following James, Fung distinguishes between tender-minded and tough-minded philosophers. “ The tender-minded philo­ sophers, because o f tenderness o f mind, cannot bear to sum up (gui-na) things, events, or states of affairs as the sphere o f things that have no value what­ ever. Thus, their philosophies are idealistic, religious, free-willist, and monistic. The tough-minded philosophers, on the other hand, will have no qualms in ruthlessly summing up things, events, or states o f affairs as the sphere of things that have no value whatever. Thus, their philosophies are materialistic, irreligious, fatalistic, and p lu ra lis tic ." 41 Fung also cites Harold Hoffding’s reminder, much in James’s spirit, of the importance o f “ personal equation” . Common to philosophical problems (e.g., problems of knowledge, existence, estimation or worth, and consciousness) is “ that they lie on the borders o f our knowledge, where exact methods can no longer help us; hence it is impossible but that the personality of the inquirer should determine the course o f his thought, although he himself may be unaware o f the fact. ... We must also take account, especially with regard to the problem o f the estimation o f worth, historical circumstances, and intellectual movements in other spheres." 42 Therefore, when we take a person’s philosophy as a subject o f historical inquiry, we must pay attention to the circumstances and trends o f events, as well as the different aspects of the intellectual situation of the time. Fung informs the readers that Mencius has similar emphasis: “ When one reads the poems and writings of the ancients, can it be right not to know something about them as men? Hence one tries to understand the age in which they liv e d ." 43 Says Fung, “ Although their motivation lies in their interest in the aspect o f self-cultivation, the Song Confucians are specially attentive to qi-xiang, the prevailing spirit and atmosphere o f the ancient sages. Thus the researcher of the history o f philosophy must also have the same attitude toward a man’s philosophy, that is, attentive to his qi-xiang.’’44 Fung also discusses the relation between history and the history o f philo­ sophy. Just as the circumstances, events, and intellectual situation o f the time influence a philosopher’s thought, the philosopher can also influence his age and the different aspects of thought. Alternatively put: “ history can influence philosophy, philosophy can also influence h isto ry" .45 Next, Fung takes up the problems of writing history. Among his contemporaries, a common saying is that in writing history, one must inquire into the antecedents and consequents of events. However, because of the surfeit of materials, it is impossible to have a complete or exhaustive narrative. Inevitably, selective decision is involved in studying the documents that constitute both the primary and secondary sources. It is doubtful that a sincere and dedicated historian, in relying upon his selective materials, can write a completely “ faithful (xin)” or reliable history. There are three major difficulties.46 For clarifying the first difficulty, Fung cites a couple of passages from classical texts. In the Great Appendix o f the Yi-Jing, we find a saying attributed to Confucius: “ Just as writing is a poor vehicle of

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speech, speech is a poor vehicle o f thought." 47 In the same spirit, Zhuang Zi says: “ When men of old died, they took with them the things that cannot be transmitted. So what you are reading there must be nothing but the chaff and dregs o f the men o f o ld .， ， 48 Fung, therefore, contends that the researchers o f his­ tory can only rely upon these “ dregs” which they cannot completely comprehend. The second difficulty is this. Even for a dedicated and profoundly reflective scholar who understands the writers， intention, ancient texts are not completely credible. Mencius remarks: “ In the Wu-Qing chapter [of the Book o f History] I accept only two or three strip s." 49 The historian can employ scientific method in weighing the reliability of sources and engage in the task of analysis. Afterward, the work o f synthesis follows, tying the materials together through the exercise of imagination. Presumably, Fung has this point in mind. In order to establish continuity o f texts, the historian may need to envisage appropriate hypotheses and supply the lacunae, especially those of the ancient texts, as well as to engage in constructive interpretation of central concepts of a philosopher’s thought. A ll these tasks require the exercise of imagination. Historical claims, like Kant’s “ maxims” ，inevitably embody “ subjective principles of volition” rather than “ objective principles" .50Consequently, we have no assurance that the historian’s claims about his subject matter completely accord with the requirements of objective history. Moreover, unlike scientists who can set up experiments to test the adequacy o f hypotheses, the historian cannot set up analogous experiments for testing historical hypotheses. This is the third difficulty. A t the time Fung published his work in the early 1930s, Chinese philosophy and its history must have been an established subject of study. His lengthy introduction could have had in mind a particular audience of philosophy stu­ dents and perhaps skeptics. A t that time Fung's work was the first full-scale effort at presenting a history of Chinese philosophy. Until today, Derk Bodde’s translation is the only one available in English. Before he died in 1990, at the age o f ninety-five, Fung completed a comprehensive, seven-volume, new his­ tory o f Chinese philosophy. It was written from a single-minded Marxist point of view. His earlier work presented here, though more limited in scope, is informed by a liberty of spirit absent in much of Chinese Marxist histories of Chinese philosophy, and is thus open to greater independent, constructive philo­ sophical interpretation of Chinese thought.51

Lao Sze-kwang (1927-) The third and final volume o f Lao’s History o f Chinese Philosophy (in Chinese) was completed and published in 1982. As compared to Fung’s history, it has narrower scope. The last chapter deals with Dai Zhen (1723—1777). As any recent Western-trained Chinese philosopher would expect, Lao must provide some justification for his renewed attempt to write a history of Chinese philo­ sophy, given the widespread familiarity with Fung Y u-lan， s work. As compared

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with Fung's, Lao's is a more philosophically sophisticated work and addressed to an audience familiar with works of Western philosophy published since the 1930s. Since World War II, many Chinese have studied philosophy in the United States and Europe. Given their background in Chinese philosophy education, writings in Chinese on Western philosophy and Chinese philosophy are a familiar phenomenon. For philosophers and scholars in Taiwan and Hong Kong, and other Chinese in the diaspora, Chinese philosophy is a subject worthy o f serious scholarly and/or philosophical pursuit. Except for an encounter with Western skeptics ignorant o f the extensive works in Chinese philosophy since the 1960s, a Chinese philosopher or historian of philosophy is no longer beset with the question about the existence of Chinese philosophy. O f course, what is supposed is a contemporary Chinese philosophy audience. This is Lao's implicit audience in his long Preface in the first volume and Postscript in the third volume. In his Preface, Lao points out that the course “ History of Chinese Philosophy” had been an established offering in Chinese universities prior to Hu Shih’s lectures (at the University of Peking in the late 1910s). U ntil the time he com­ pleted his first volume in 1967, Lao claims that there has been no “ acceptable” work on the history o f Chinese philosophy that conforms to “ proper [Western] standards” . Lao assumes that there are general standards o f competence for Western philosophical writings. Lao remarks that there are philosophy text­ books in Chinese, arbitrarily and conveniently composed by instructors for lecture purposes. With the exception of Fung Yu-lan’s History o f Chinese Philosophy, there are no competently written works on the history o f Chinese philosophy. Hu Shih’s incomplete Outline o f the History o f Chinese Philosophy is said to be a subject of ridicule, presumably by Lao's audience o f colleagues and graduate students in Chinese universities. For Lao, the defect o f H u's Outline does not lie in its incompleteness, but in its lack of “ philosophical” elements. To Lao, a history o f philosophy must be a “ philosophy" and a “ history” . The historian of philosophy must not only present a narrative ac­ count o f actual thought and related events but also have an “ explanatory theory” . The former is the task of historians, and the latter requires “ theoretical foundation and analytical method” . I f these two requirements are not satisfied, what is written can only be considered “ history” and not “ history of philosophy” . While H u’s history is a pioneering work, “ strictly speaking, it can only be viewed as an unsuccessful experiment” . Hu spends too much time on questions of dating and authenticity of texts; although these questions may be con­ sidered a part o f the historian o f philosophy’s task, they are not the most important. Moreover, Hu Shih’s use of chang-shi (common sense or common knowledge) as a basis o f explanation is problematic. Says Lao, “ In any case, using chang-shi to interpret philosophy cannot make any contact with the real questions [of philosophy].， ， 52 As regards Fung’s History, it is definitely superior to H u’s. According to Lao, while Fung’s is a history of philosophy, it is not a successful piece o f work,

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for Fung does not show much depth in his command of Western philosophical literature. Fung's use o f “ concepts and theories is limited to Early Plato’s theory and New Realism” . Fung hardly shows a firm grasp of Western philo­ sophical theories. Moreover, lacking understanding of the special characteristics o f Chinese philosophy, Fung could handle simple theories. However: as soon as he confronts Song-Ming li-xue [Neo-Confucianism], he dis­ plays his weaknesses. From the very beginning, he could not deal with the concept of moral subjectivity. Though it may seem improbable, he was unaware of his deficient understanding [of the concept of] subjectivity itself. Consequently, he could only give an account, in a forced manner, of the Confucian doctrine of perfect virtue (cheng-de zhi-xue) as a mere metaphysical theory and failed to understand its essential aspects.53 Lao goes on to claim that there is a “ great distance” between Fung’s later Xin li-xue (A New Doctrine of L i) and Song-Ming li-xue (study o f li or principle/ rationale), as Fung's work is informed only by early P lato's works and New Realism. Lao expounds at greater length his own conception of the history o f philo­ sophy, stressing the importance o f methodology. Four methods of inquiry are discussed: systematic; developmental; analytic; and inquiry into fundamental questions of philosophic thought. The systematic method must also pay atten­ tion to the original contexts of theoretical thought. However, because o f the writer’s own philosophical interest, frequently he or she is liable to focus on philosophical questions and neglect the actual contexts o f discourse. While the method o f systematic inquiry has its pitfalls, from the holistic point of view, it has merits when it is employed with care. The developmental method raises complex questions. I f the use of the method of systematic inquiry tends to err easily on the subjective side, the use of the developmental method often results in a partial grasp of segments o f actuality with no appreciation of the holistic character (quart-ti) of theories. As a result, what we get is a narrative of frag­ ments. (Recall Xun Z i， s doctrine o f bi or aspect-obsession.) For Lao, from the philosophical point of view, this is a serious defect, because it is contrary to the basic objectives of philosophy. On the analytical method of inquiry, Lao stresses the importance of “ philosophical analysis” ， which gives rise to syntactical and semantical analyses. Particularly worthy o f attention and influential is the emergence of the theory of “ meaning criteria” and use of this kind of theory in the critique of traditional philosophy. While it is not expected of a historian of philosophy, training in the skills of philosophical analysis can be useful in carrying out these tasks. Nevertheless, philosophical analysis cannot be a substitute for the historian’s task of synthesis, for it can deal only with existing materials, and cannot propose new materials, in particular, an overall judgment of the history of philosophy as a whole. In sum, the three conditions for a history of philosophy are

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truth, systematicity, and unity. The first requires that the narrative be faithful to the actual texts and circumstances; the second, the systematic exposition of theory; and the third, the unifying character of the judgment of the whole history of philosophy. How is it possible for a historian to satisfy these requirements? Lao proposes his fourth method, embracing the other three methods. Lao says that for some time he has devoted much thought and energy to this question and arrived at the conclusion that, comparatively speaking, the fourth method is a good method. There are three steps in this method o f inquiry into fundamental ques­ tions of philosophy. The first step consists in having a good understanding of the foundation of Chinese thought. Every individual thinker or school has, as its basis, an ideal theory for resolving certain fundamental problems. Although explanation is central to this task, one must also deal with the question of textual analysis. As regards the second step, after having a handle on funda­ mental questions, we can then proceed to an explication of the relevant theory. In the process, secondary questions may emerge. Each of these questions has its own answer, forming a section of the theory. Finally, we must organize all the levels of the theory, thus completing the task of explicating an individual theory. In doing so, we adequately satisfy the first two conditions, i.e., “ truth ” ， and “ systematicity” . The last step, corresponding to the third requirement of unity, lies in coher­ ently organizing the materials into a series of the fundamental questions of different historical periods before rendering a holistic judgment on a theoret­ ical basis. However, one must acknowledge certain “ presuppositions (she-zhun)”， reflecting the writer’s “ own knowledge and experience as well as his philosophic wisdom” . Finally, the method of inquiring into fundamental questions must be consonant with the writer’s presuppositions. In the concluding section of “ Prefatory Remarks” ，Lao takes up some dis­ tinctive problems of the history of Chinese philosophy. The first problem, as Hu and Fung have noted, lies in managing the extant ancient textual materials. As an excuse for not engaging in argumentation, many Pre-Qin thinkers were fond o f appealing to the past.54 Also problematic is the tendency o f some Post-Qin and Post-Han writers to forge documents. Secondly, hitherto, Chinese philosophy has paid no attention to analysis. It has no logic nor epistemology. Says Lao, “ We must admit that what China lacks is analytical skills. Naturally, we have to adopt most o f these skills derived from Western achievements.” Thirdly, the fundamental questions o f Chinese philosophy differ from those o f Western philosophy. In the course o f exposition, it is inevitable that the writer will employ his theoretical presuppositions, hoping to encompass both Chinese and Western philosophy. In a somewhat modest tone, Lao reminds his reader that his History o f Chinese Philosophy is but one attempt to use the method o f probing fundamental philosophical questions. When the draft for the whole project is completed, he expresses the hope that others may write a

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more successful history of Chinese philosophy. (The third and last volume of his History was published in 1982.) Lao's critique o f the works o f Hu and Fung on the history of Chinese philosophy is hardly fair-minded. Lao’s work is a philosophical, analytic reconstruction o f the history of Chinese thought. It is distinguished by its conceptual analysis, emphasis on arguments and reasoned justification o f inter­ pretation, and a much greater command of Western philosophy and recent Confucianism that flourished in Hong Kong and Taiwan. Lao 's critique of Hu Shih and Fung Yu-lan, however, makes no allowance for the nature o f a particular audience.55 Lao seems to regard his audience as a universal audience, a presumption of most Western philosophers since Plato. Like many philo­ sophers of our age, with a penchant for objectivity or “ the view from nowhere"， Lao is a child o f those Western philosophers beset by the fear of relativism and subjectivism. He does not seem to be worried with the problems recently presented by Richard Rorty, Alasdair MacIntyre, or Derrida and his fellow deconstructionists. Indeed, the late distinguished philosophical Sinologist Angus Graham, in his book on ancient Chinese philosophy, proposed a novel deconstructionist interpretation of Lao Zi.56 Incidentally, G raham 's philo­ sophical history o f ancient Chinese thought is based largely on his philological research in Classical Chinese and the works of Benjamin W horf and Gilbert Ryle. Notably absent are insights derived, say, from the works of Wittgenstein or J. L. Austin. Were Hu Shih alive today, he would have pragmatically responded to Lao's or Graham’s work by appealing to the middle and later works o f Dewey such as Experience and Nature (1925, 2nd edn 1929), A rt as Experience (1934), and Logic: The Theory o f Inquiry (1938), or perhaps to the more recent meth­ odological pragmatism o f Nicholas Rescher.57 Perhaps out of courtesy, Lao acknowledges Hu’s Outline as a pioneering work, but he pays no attention to H u’s introductory chapter, especially those sections devoted to articulating his conception of the subject. While there is a terminological difference, would Lao disagree with Hu’s three objectives: understanding the changes or trans­ formation of a particular school o f thought, the reasons and causes for such transformation, and objective, critical evaluation? As to Lao’s complaint that H u's is not a “ philosophical” book, presumably because Hu spent too much time on textual analysis, it must be noted that at the time Hu wrote his book in 1918, ancient Chinese texts, as Lao is well aware, were in a state o f confusion. Hu has a pragmatic rather than analytic conception of philosophical scholar­ ship. While textual scholarship has no essential connection with philosophy, it is still important for a philosophical historian to use the state o f the art as a springboard for determining the development of a school o f thought. Textual scholarship was more advanced at the time Lao wrote his first volume. However, there is still much uncertainty about the background, current circumstances, climates of opinion, and contexts of discourse.58

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Instead o f a sweeping rejection of H u’s book as nonphilosophical, Lao should have examined H u's objectives and shown the ways in which Hu failed to accomplish his objectives. We must agree that H u’s methodological re­ marks in his Development are, in the light o f Fung or Lao or any later writer’s philosophical training and commitments, much too biased toward Dewey’s instrumentalism. For instance, H u’s unqualified condemnation o f Song-Ming Confucianism was based on an implausible assumption that Zhu X i and Wang Yang-ming were concerned with the application o f inductive, deductive, or intuitive scientific methods to human affairs. Even a cursory reading o f some of Zhu's and Wang’s works would lead to an appreciation of the different ways they tried to preserve what they considered as the “ Confucian tradition” and their concern with ways in which the Confucian tradition was misinter­ preted, abused, and misused, particularly in the hands of irresponsible scholars and/or officials. As I have shown elsewhere, a living tradition, as distinct from traditionalism or blind adherence to tradition, is amenable to quite different constructions, especially with regard to its concrete, temporal significance.59 In passing, a contemporary Confucian, appreciative o f the insights of Zhu X i and Wang Yang-ming, might even welcome Dewey’s version o f pragmatism as a supplement to explicating the nature o f Confucian ethics, as it provides a fairly effective way o f clarifying its practical orientation. Let me explain. Two salient features o f Confucian ethics are the primacy o f practice and the legitimate use o f plausible presumption. The former admits o f a pragmatic inter­ pretation, because o f the Confucian preoccupation with problematic situations and their ethical solutions. Although Confucians do not explicitly reject the doctrine of “ fixed” or absolute ends, their emphasis on y i (rightness) suggests that ethically acceptable conduct in problematic situations must in some way be based on reasoned judgment appropriate to the case at hand. In Xun Z i， s words, in coping with changing and exigent situations o f human life, one must employ y i or one’s sense of rightness (y i-y i bian-ying). Redolent of Dewey’s conception o f deliberation in Human Conduct, Xun Zi insists on clarity of mind as a prerequisite to wise and informed deliberation (zhi-lü), in dealing with problematic situations of human life.60 Xun Zi would have agreed with Dewey that, in the final analysis, the really important matter pertains to the resolution o f problematic situations through the use o f means derived from past experience. A propensity to rely on common knowledge o f the day with­ out regard to the relevance o f past experiences or the wisdom o f tradition is a ubiquitous, human affliction. An appeal to the wisdom of the past should not be rejected outright, because it is an appeal to the past deemed as a repository of insights or plausible presumptions. Xun Zi would also urge that just as we must employ the wisdom o f the past to deal with the present perplexities (yi-gu zhi-jin), we must employ our knowledge o f the present to evaluate any claims based on our knowledge o f the past and/or past experience (yi-jin zhi-gu).61 Moreover, the Confucian insistence on the unity o f moral knowledge and action,

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thought, and words and actions has affinity with Dewey’s thesis on the intrinsic connection between theory and practice.62 Lao's critique o f Fung's History is especially revealing or his own conception o f philosophy and the history of philosophy. Lao is not satisfied with Fung’s limited knowledge and use of Western philosophy. Lao cites Fung's inability to appreciate the character o f Song-Ming Confucianism, for he has no concep­ tion o f “ moral metaphysics” . Lao has a more extensive knowledge of Western philosophy, but his appeal to “ moral metaphysics” is an anachronism, for it is a Chinese/English term coined by Mou Zong-san in the 1960s, then a senior col­ league of Lao’s at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. Mou, an encyclopedic and original Chinese philosopher, expounds his thesis against the background of Kant’s conception of a “ metaphysics of morals” . For a student of Western philo­ sophy with no knowledge of Chinese philosophy, “ moral metaphysics” is an unfamiliar term. As far as I know, it is a technical term used by Mou Zong-san to distinguish his Confucian metaphysical theory o f morals from K ant's meta­ physics o f morals. The term “ moral metaphysics” is valuable in suggesting an important enterprise for Chinese moral philosophy. According to Mou, Kant has only a metaphysics o f morals but no moral metaphysics. Kant’s conception is no more than a “ metaphysical exposition o f morals” or a “ metaphysical deduction of morals” . Metaphysics of morals takes morality as a subject matter. It borrows from the fruits of metaphysical inquiry in order to discover and establish the fundamental principles of morality. Moral metaphysics (inclusive o f ontology and cosmology) considers metaphysics as a subject matter and approaches it through the human moral nature. In other words, for Mou, moral practice, in the sense of authentic attainment o f Confucian sagehood, is the basis for conferring metaphysical significance on all things.63 Whether Mou is right about Kant or about mainline Confucianism, the distinction between moral metaphysics and metaphysics of morals is a useful approach for studying Song-Ming Confucianism. This distinction raises an important question on the interpretation of Chinese Confucian ethics as normat­ ive ethics, metaethics, or metaphysical ethics. I wonder whether Lao's use o f M ou's interpretive thesis and such terms as “ zhu-ti” (subjectivity) in criticizing Fung’s work is an example of the fallacious use of “ appeal to authority” . I f we deem moral theory as a relatively autonomous discipline, we can appropriate M ou’s distinction for delineating an important aspect o f philosophical inquiry without depreciating Fung’s history. Underlying Lao's dissatisfactions with H u's and Fung's works is the extent to which his philosophical presuppositions are informed by a greater knowledge of recent Western and Chinese philosophy. It is unsurprising that H u's and Fung's presuppositions were informed by philosophical movements that pre­ vailed in their own times. Philosophical presuppositions in a history of Chinese or of Western philosophy reflect the influence of current philosophical con­ cerns as evident in Western, as well as Chinese, graduate philosophy education.

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Hu was influenced by John Dewey, perhaps not sensitive to the Hegelian ele­ ments in Dewey’s philosophy. Fung was influenced by his studies of early Plato, James, and Neo-realism. How could Hu and Fung be faulted for not knowing analytic philosophy or Mou Zong-san? Fung seemed to be familiar with some works of the Vienna Circle. Fung said of his Xin li-xue, one target o f Lao’s critique: “ The work of New Li-xue is to re-establish metaphysics by going through the empiricism of the Vienna C ircle ." 64 He could not be expected to know Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations, Nevertheless, Lao’s efforts at writing a philosophical history of Chinese thought merit approval, for a mastery o f the literature of the history of Chinese thought and analytical method is an enormous undertaking. Most Chinese and Western scholars o f Chinese thought are specialists in a historical period or in specific works o f individual thinkers. Many o f them do not have extensive philosophical training. Lao's emphasis on philosophical and argumentative analysis, as contrasted with H u's on textual analysis, is a valuable contribution. From the standpoint o f philosophical analysis, Lao’s history is superior to Fung’s. For a philosophical reader o f Chinese classics, Lao's H istory provides an excellent guide to the rich repertoire o f resources for philosophical thought, while he or she may demur on Lao's rash judgment on the worth o f the works o f Hu and Fung. Setting aside questions o f textual fidelity and acceptability o f his philosophical interpretations, Lao has performed a great service in pro­ viding a most useful resource for the development of the history o f Chinese philosophy. Regrettably, Lao does not have a Derk Bodde for an English trans­ lation of his History. While Lao’s requirements for writing a history o f Chinese philosophy may appear too exacting, a Western-trained Chinese philosopher or a Sinicized Western philosopher would find Lao's History an invaluable guide to research. While textual scholarship is an important enterprise, philosophical inter­ pretation o f Chinese thought has an integrity of its own, independently of the contribution to questions concerning textual scholarship. Apart from philosophical interpretation, there are also legitimate philological, intellectual, religious, and political interpretations. Admittedly, the history of Chinese thought may be interpreted in these different, and possibly complementary ways. Especially illuminating is a commingling o f philosophical and historical studies o f ideas, as in Lovejoy’s Great Chain o f Being. However, absent the knowledge o f and sensitivity to philosophical problems and issues, a confusion o f these interpretative approaches will impede not only efforts at any wholesale philosophical transformation o f the history of Chinese thought, but also the development o f Chinese philosophy.65 While Lao’s requirements for writing the history o f Chinese philosophy may appear too exacting, he is right that a historian o f Chinese philosophy must, to some extent, be a philosopher. Ideally, an understanding o f basic philosophical questions in different branches o f philosophy is a prerequisite to any serious

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philosophical inquiry into the thought o f a historical period or of a major philosopher. A coherent statement o f presuppositions in writing a history of philosophy, as Lao rightly insists, would provide the reader with a unifying perspective of the writer’s philosophical convictions. Nevertheless, in the Post­ script to the third volume, Lao expresses his belief that Chinese philosophy has “ universal significance” if we distinguish between “ open and closed concepts” of philosophy. The terminology is reminiscent of Karl Popper's Open Society and Its Enemies. In a later English article, Lao explains that an “ open concept” o f philosophy would “ enable people of different philosophical traditions to communicate with each other” . On this conception, philosophy is a reflect­ ive enterprise. Understanding Chinese philosophy rests on appreciating its primary, “ orientative” character, that is, that Chinese philosophy “ intends to effect some change in the self or in the world” . Alternative terms are " selftransformation" and “ transformation of the world” . Such a philosophy would give a statement of purpose, justification, and pragmatic maxims. Lao cites Zhuang Zi and Mencius as examples. It is noteworthy that Lao shows concern with intercultural communication. Presumably, he would also agree that this concern must be followed with an endeavor to provide some guidelines for resolving problems of intercultural conflict.66 The foregoing account of the works of Hu Shih, Fung Yu-lan, and Lao Sze-kwang presents illustrative samples o f the positive influence o f Western philosophy in the development o f the history of Chinese philosophy. I should be remiss not to mention the massive work of Archbishop Luo Guang’s History o f Chinese Philosophical Thought. The seventh and presumably the last volume, published in 1986, deals with the period since the founding o f the Republic of China in 1911. Separate chapters are devoted to major nonhistorical, philo­ sophical works o f Hu Shih and Fung Yu-lan as well as important contribu­ tions of the recent past, e.g., works of Xiong Shi-li, Tang Jun-yi, Thome H. Fang (Fang Dong-mei), and Luo Guang’s own philosophy of life. Today, philosophical writings in Chinese are quite extensive, covering topics in Western philosophy, Chinese philosophy, Indian, Buddhistic, and comparative EastWest philosophy. Philosophy journals in Taiwan, for example, are pretty much modeled after those in English. Unfortunately, except for some works of Thomé H. Fang, many original works of such influential philosophers as Mou Zong-san and Tang Jun-yi are not available in English.67 Worthy of note is Fang’s attempt in English to portray the holistic spirit o f the history o f Chinese philosophy. In Chinese Philosophy: Its Spirit and Its Development, Fang dis­ cusses the unitary spirit of Chinese philosophy by focusing on three ostensibly common features among primordial Confucianism, primordial Daoism, and Mahayana Buddhism, nam ely,( 1 ) the doctrine of pervasive unity, (2) the doctrine of dao, and (3) the exaltation o f the individual, along with an emphasis on a conception of the human individual “ in terms o f observed actualities and idealized possibilities” . This large book complements his earlier English

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work on the Chinese philosophy of comprehensive harmony.68 Perhaps, when translations of the principal writings of other major contemporary Chinese thinkers are available in English, there will be a beginning o f creative and fruitful Chinese-Western philosophical dialogue on the history of philosophy, or East-West philosophy. Apart from the importance of Chinese—Western philosophical dialogue, the study of Chinese philosophy should interest anyone concerned with exploring the possibility of discovering fresh resources for dealing with philosophical questions, especially those of moral philosophy. Knowledge o f Classical Con­ fucianism, Neo-Confucianism, and Classical Daoism is especially germane to the pursuit of normative ethics, metaethics, and philosophy o f morals. Questions of other branches o f philosophy may also receive some light from the study o f Chinese classics. I also hope that the last hundred years o f endeavor o f Chinese philosophical scholars may pave the way toward developing Chinese philosophy as a component o f a world-philosophical inquiry. A t the beginning o f the twenty-first century, this should be an exciting prospect for young philosophers trained in both Chinese and Western philosophy.

Notes 1 See Cua, A. S. (1985), Ethical Argumentation: A Study in Hsun Tzu's Moral Epistemology, Honolulu: University o f Hawaii Press; Cua, A. S. (1998), Moral Vision and Tradition: Essays in Chinese Ethics, Washington, DC: Catholic University o f America Press, Essay 11. 2 For an informative study, see Schwartz, Benjamin (1964), In Search o f Power: Yen Fu and the West, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 3 Chan, Wing-tsit (trans.) (1963), A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 743. 4 For a survey o f Chinese philosophy in Post-Mao China, see Lin, Tong-qi, “ Recent Trends in Post-Mao China” , in A. S. Cua (ed.) (2003), Encyclopedia o f Chinese Philosophy, New York and London: Routledge. This work also includes entries on other recent trends in Chinese philosophy. 5 Zhe-Xue Ci-Dian [Dictionary o f Philosophy] (1976), Taipei: Commercial Press, 4th edn. While the publisher did not give any date o f publication, the first Preface by Yuan-pei, Cai, an eminent philosopher of education and promoter of Western philosophy, was dated 1925. The second Preface in my 1976 edition was dated 1927. 6 My former graduate student Kazuaki Ohashi informed me that Nishi Amane, in his Hyakuichi shimron [Bai- Yi-Xin-Lun] (1874), appeared to be the first scholar to use zhe-xue as a translation for the Greek philo sophia and “ philosophy” . For detailed discussion, see Zhong, Shao-hua (1992), " Qing-Mo-Zhong-Guo-Ren-Dui- Yi-De-Zhui-Qiu ". Newsletter o f the Institute o f Chinese Literature and Philosophy, v o l.2, no. 2, Taipei: Academia Sinica, esp. p p . 162—167. I owe this reference and a copy of this article to Professor Nicolas Standaert of the Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. See Zhong, p. 163. (For translation o f Zhou’s remark, see Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, p. 471.) As for the currency o f zhe-xue in Chinese education, Lao Sze-kwang remarks: “ Although it is impossible to identify who first introduced t his Japanese translation o f ‘philosophy’ into China, it is quite certain that when the Capital University in Peking, in the first decade o f the twentieth century, did adopt this term che-hsüeh ( zhe-xue) as

26

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8 9 10 11 12

13

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15 16

A ntonio S. Cua a title for courses, this should indicate the official acceptance of this translation.” Lao, Sze-kwang (1989)，“ On Understanding Chinese Philosophy: An Inquiry and a Proposal” , in Robert E. Allinson (ed.), Understanding the Chinese Mind: The Philosophical Roots, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, p. 291,n . 1. In the Analects, zhi in the verbal form is sometimes used to mean “ to realize” . Such a use, however, reflects the retrospective sense of knowledge, i.e., knowledge derived from realizing the import of learning. Such knowledge, however, also involves use of zhi in the sense o f acquiring information. There are also uses of zhi in the senses of acknowledgment, under­ standing or appreciation, and knowing-how. For the informational sense, see, for example, 2.11, 2.23, 5.9, 7.31; for the sense of understanding and appreciation, see, for example, 2.4, 4.14, 11.12; for knowing-how, 12.22. No doubt, these sample uses o f zhi are subject to inter­ pretation. For the distinction between prospective and retrospective senses o f knowledge, see Cua, A. S. (1992), The Unity o f Knowledge and Action: A Study in Wang Yang-ming's Moral Psychology, Honolulu: University o f Hawaii Press, c h . 1 ; and (1993) “ The Possibility of Ethical Knowledge: Reflections on a Theme in the Hsün Tzu ", in Hans Lenk and Gregor Paul (eds), Epistemological Issues in Ancient Chinese Philosophy, Albany: State University o f New York Press. Cf. Ames, Roger T . (1988)，“ Confucius and the Ontology of Knowing” ，in Gerald James Larson and Eliot Deutsch (eds), Interpreting Across Boundaries: New Essays in Comparative Philosophy, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Cua, A. S. (1978), Dimensions o f Moral Creativity: Paradigms, Principles, and Ideals, University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, ch. 4. Lau, D. C. (trans.) (1979), Confucius: The Analects ( Lun Yü), Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1.1. Passmore, John (1967), “ Philosophy” ，in Paul Edward (ed.), Encyclopedia o f Philosophy, v o l.6，New York: Macmillan & Free Press. For more discussion, see Cua, A. S. (1998), “ Chinese Confucian Philosophy” ，in Edward Craig (ed.), Routledge Encyclopedia o f Philosophy, London: Routledge, v o l. 1 , pp. 536-549. For two specialized discussions o f the concept li (reason/principle), see my Ethical Argumenta­ tion: A Study in Hsün Tzu's Moral Epistemology, pp. 20-29; and The Unity o f Knowledge and Action: A Study in Wang Yang-ming’s Moral Psychology, pp. 26-50. A more general discussion is given in my (1997) “ Reason and Principle in Chinese Philosophy: An Interpretation of L i" . in Eliot Deutsch and Ron Bontekoe (eds), A Companion to World Philosophy, Oxford: Blackwell. For a conceptual history of li in Neo-Confucianism, see Chan, W. T . (1964), “ The Evolution o f the Neo-Confucian Concept L i as Principle” ，Tsing Hua Journal o f Chinese Studies, n.s., v o l.IV ， no. 2, pp. 123-149; and Liu, Shu-hsien, “ L i (Principle, Reason)” in the Encyclopedia o f Chinese Philosophy. This remark also applies to the standard Marxist texts’ classification of Chinese philosophy into “ materialism” and “ idealism” . See, for example, Ren, Ji-yu (editor-in-chief) (1979), ZhongGuo-Zhe-Xue-Shi [History of Chinese Philosophy], Beijing: Renmin. For a brief informative account o f later works, inclusive of classification o f ancient schools o f thought, see Mei, Y. P. (1964), “ Ancient Chinese Philosophy according to the Chuang Tzu, Chapter 33, The World of Thought, with an English Translation of the Chapter” ，Tsing Hua Journal o f Chinese Studies, n.s., v o l.IV , no. 2. A good interpretive study in the intellectual history o f the Ming dynasty is Huang Zong-xi’s Ming-Ru-Xue-An. For a selected translation, see Julia Ching and Chao-ying Fang (1987), The Records o f Ming Scholars, Honolulu: Univer­ sity o f Hawaii Press. See also The Complete Works o f Chuang Tzu, translated by Burton Watson (1968), New York: Columbia University Press, ch. 33. Watson, The Complete Works o f Chuang Tzu, p. 43. Ibid., p. 42. Zhuang Z i' s skepticism o f the existence o f neutral standards for evaluating philosophical, ethical claims has some affinity with MacIntyre’s thesis that there are no traditionindependent standards of rationality. However, unlike MacIntyre who endorses a sort of rationalistic version o f Thomism, Zhuang Zi would not endorse any particular system of

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18 19

20 21 22 23 24

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26

27 28

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thought. See MacIntyre, Alasdair (1988), Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. hereafter, Xun Zi. Cf. Watson, Li, Di-sheng (1979), Xun Z i Ji-Shi, Taipei: Xuesheng, p. 478， Burton (trans.) (1963), Hsün Tzu: Basic Writings, New York: Columbia University Press, p. 125. For other critical remarks, see Xun Zi, Books 8 and 17; Knoblock, John (1989, 1994), Xunzi: A Translation and Study o f the Complete Works, vols I and III, Stanford: Stanford University Press. Xun Zi, Book 8. Hu, Shih (1963), The Development o f the Logical Method in Ancient China, New York: Paragon Book Reprint Corp., p. 26. (This is a reprint of the 1922 Shanghai edition.) Note that this doctrine o f rectifying names may be plausibly viewed as an intellectual formulation of Confucius’ recurrent emphasis on the unity of words and action. For more discussion, see my Dimensions o f Moral Creativity, ch. 5. See Cua, Ethical Argumentation, chs 3-4. See my (1992) “ The Idea o f Confucian Tradition” , Review o f Metaphysics 45. A revised, expanded version is given in Essay 12 o f my Moral Vision and Tradition. MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?， p. 362. Dworkin, Ronald (1986), Law's Empire, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, p. 52. See my (1989) “ The Concept o f L i in Confucian Moral Theory” ，in Robert Allinson (ed.), Understanding the Chinese Mind: The Philosophical Roots, Hong Kong: Oxford University Press. For more discussion, see my (2002) “ The Ethical and the Religious Dimensions o f L i" , Review o f Metaphysics, v o l.55, no. 3, pp. 501-549. For Xun Z i' s conception o f knowledge, see my Ethical Argumentation, ch. 2 and “ The Possibility o f Ethical Knowledge: Reflections on a Theme in the Xunzi” . H u’s work is a notable achievement, especially when we compare the philosophical quality o f his work with most works o f Late Qing promoters and writers on Western philosophy. For an informative survey, see Zhong’s article cited in note 6. Hu, Shih (1919), Zhong-Guo-Zhe-Xue-Shi-Da-Gang (An Outline o f the History o f Chinese Philosophy), Shanghai: Commercial Press, pp. 1-2. Except for occasional translations o f the Chinese texts o f Hu Shih, Fung Yu-lan, and Lao Sze-kwang, I have freely presented their views as I understand them. Translation is in part an interpretive adaptation. Graham, A. C . (1978), Later Mohist Logic, Ethics and Science, Hong Kong: The Chinese University o f Hong Kong Press. Hu, Shih, The Development o f the Logical Method in Ancient China, pp. 7-9. For my view on some of these issues on Wang Yang-ming and Confucian tradition, see my The Unity o f Knowledge and Action and Moral Vision and Tradition, Essays 9 and 11. Fung, Yu-lan (1975), Zhong-Guo-Zhe-Xue-Shi (History o f Chinese Philosophy), Hong Kong: Tai-Ping-Yang, p . 1 . Unless indicated otherwise, the following exposition is an interpretive reading from the Chinese text, pp. 1-27. The Preface was dated 1962. Bodde’s Introductory Chapter is a selected translation o f Fung's Introduction to the Chinese edition. See Fung, Yu-lan (1952), A History o f Chinese Philosophy, 2 vols, translated by Derk Bodde with intro­ duction, notes, bibliography, and index, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Shortly before his death in 1990, Fung completed a seven-volume comprehensive history o f Chinese philo­ sophy from the Marxist point o f view. For a discussion o f some salient features o f this work, see Standaert, Nicolas (1995), “ The Discovery o f the Center through the Periphery: A Preliminary Study o f Fung Youlan’s History o f Chinese Philosophy (New Version)"， Phi­ losophy East and West, v o l.45, no. 4, pp. 569-590; and Standaert, Nicolas and Bie Geivers, “ Fung Yu-lan: Works on the History o f Chinese Philosophy” ，in Encyclopedia o f Chinese Philosophy. This saying appears frequently in Xun Z i’s essay “ Fei-Shi-Er-Zi-Pian” [“ Against Twelve Thinkers’’]. See Xun Zi, Book 6, pp. 93-97.

28 31 32 33 34 35 36

Antonio S. Cua Lau, D. C. (trans.) (1970), Mencius, Baltimore: Penguin Books, 3B:9. Lau’s translation is amended to reflect Fung’s different punctuation o f the Chinese text. Fung, Zhong-Guo-Zhe-Xue-Shi, pp. 6—7. Fung, A History o f Chinese Philosophy, v o l. 1 , p . 1. Ibid., p. 4. Analects, 4.15. Fung seems to have this passage in mind: No philosophy can ever be anything but a summary sketch, a picture o f the world in abridgement, a foreshortened bird’s-eye view of the perspective of events. And the first thing to notice is this, that the only material we have at our disposal for making a picture of the whole world is supplied by the various portions o f that world we have already had experience of. We can invent new forms of conception, applicable to the whole exclusively, and not suggested originally by parts. A ll philosophers, accordingly, have conceived o f the whole world after the analogy of some particular feature of it has particularly captiv­ ated their attention. (James, William (1971), Essays in Radical Empiricism and A Pluralistic Universe, New York: Dutton, pp. 125-126)

37 38

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43 44 45 46 47

Recall Francis Bacon’s remark: “ The dispositions for philosophy and the sciences is this: that some are more vigorous and active in observing differences of things, others in observing their resemblances. ... [Each carries the liability of] catching either at nice distinctions or shadows o f resemblance.” (Bacon, Francis (1856), Novum Organum, Aphorism 55, in the Works o f Francis Bacon, v o l.3, Philadelphia, p. 349.) Wittgenstein, Ludwig (1958), Philosophical Investigations, translated by G. E. M. Anscombe, 3rd edn, New York: Macmillan, # 595. This seems to be the purport of Zhuang Z i， s notion o f “ equalizing all things (qi-wu)" in his critique of the disputes between the Confucians and the Mohists. See Watson, The Complete Works o f Chuang Tzu, ch. 2. For the notion of “ forgetting (wang)", see my (1977) “ Forgetting Morality: Reflections on a Theme in Chuang Tzu ", Journal o f Chinese Philosophy, v o l. 4, no. 4; or Moral Vision and Tradition, Essay 3. Fung, A History o f Chinese Philosophy, v o l. 1, p. 5; Zhong-Guo-Zhe-Xue-Shi, pp. 22-25. Fung, A History o f Chinese Philosophy, v o l.2, pp. 1-5. Fung mistakenly refers to James’s A Pluralistic Universe (Zhong-Guo-Zhe-Xue-Shi, p. 15). His remark is almost a verbatim report o f James’s two-column table for contrasting tender-minded and tough-minded philosophers in Pragmatism. See James, W illiam (1955), Pragmatism and Four Essays from the Meaning o f Truth, Cleveland and New York: Meridian Books, Lecture 1 , p. 22. Ibid., p . 15. Note that I have replaced Fung's paraphrase with the clearer English transla­ tion he cites. See Harold Hoffding (1924), History o f Modem Philosophy, translated by B. E. Meyer, New York: Humanities Press, p. xvi. Ibid. Translation adopted from Lau, D. C. (trans) (1970), Mencius, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 5B:8, p. 158. Ibid., pp. 15-16. Ibid., p . 16. Ibid., pp. 19-21. Below is a concise paraphrase o f Fung’s discussion o f the difficulties of fidelity to history. M y translation. Cf. Legge, James (trans.), I Ching: Book o f Changes, edited with an Introduc­ tion and Study Guide by Ch’u Chai and Winberg Chai (1964), New York: University Books, pp. 376-377.

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Translation adopted from Watson, The Complete Works o f Chuang Tzu, p. 153. In the Ming dynasty, Wang Yang-ming is quite explicit about this aspect of teaching. Says Wang: Sages and worthies wrote about them very much like a portrait painter painting the true likeness and transmitting the spirit. He shows only an outline o f the appearance to serve as a basis for people to seek and find the true personality. Among one’s spirit, feelings, expressions, and behavior, there is that which cannot be transmitted. Later writers have imitated and copied what the sages have drawn. (This is an emended translation based on Wang Yang-ming, Instructions fo r Practical Living and Other Neo-Confucian Writings, translated with Notes by Wing-tsit Chan (1963), New York: Columbia University Press, Section 20)

49 50 51

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Lau, Mencius, 7B:3. Kant, Immanuel, Foundations o f the Metaphysics o f Morals, translated by Lewis White Beck (1959), Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, p. 17n. Some Marxist histories o f Chinese philosophy present extensive expositions and selections from original sources. See, for example, Hou, Wai-lu (editor-in-chief) (1959), ZIumg-Guo-SiXiang-Tong-Shi (Comprehensive History o f Chinese Thought), 5 vols, Beijing: Renmin; and Ren Ji-yu (editor-in-chief) (1979), Zhong-Guo-Zhe-Xue-Shi (History o f Chinese Philosophy), 4 vols, Beijing: Renmin. For accounts of Fung’s philosophy, see Lu-jun Yin, “ Fung Yu-lan"， in Encyclopedia o f Chinese Philosophy. For Fung’s histories o f Chinese philosophy, see Standaert’s paper cited in note 29. Lao, Sze-kwang (1984), Xin-Bicm-Zhong-Guo-Zhe-Xue-Shi, v o l . 1 , Taipei: Sanmin (1st edn, 1982), pp. 1-2. Ibid., v o l. 1 , p. 3. The illegitimate use o f the “ appeal to the ancients” has often been unjustly ascribed to all Chinese thinkers of the Classical period. A careful examination o f the works o f Xun Zi demonstrates the reasonableness o f this appeal. See my (1985) “ Ethical Uses o f History in Early Confucianism: The Case o f Hsiün Tzu ” , Philosophy East and West, v o l. 35, no. 2, pp. 133-156. For piny in version, see essay o f the same title in T. C. Kline and Philip Ivanhoe (eds) (2000), Virtue, Nature, and Moral Agency in the Xunzi, Indianapolis: Hackett. For the distinction between a universal audience and a particular audience, see Perelman, Chaim and Anna Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969), The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation, Notre Dame: University o f Notre Dame Press, pp. 31-35. Graham, A. C . (1989), Disputers o f the Tao: Philosophical Argument in Ancient China, La Salle: Open Court. Rescher, Nicholas (1977), Methodological Pragmatism, New York: New York University Press. On textual uncertainty, Knoblock, a translator and scholar o f Xun Z i' s works, remarked: U ntil we can establish a firm chronology o f debates, determine with assurance the relative dates o f texts, resolve problems of the authenticity o f some texts, and explore the broader range o f Chinese thinking, leaving behind the theological and imperial imperatives o f orthodox Ru [Ju, “ Confucian” ] thinkers, we shall not succeed in beginning the task o f “ reconstructing" Chinese philosophy, how­ ever consistent and coherent the game we play. One may not agree with Knoblock' attitude toward “ reconstruction” if it is meant to express a negative attitude toward philosophical reconstruction. The remark seems a good reminder o f the utility o f textual scholarship to the philosophical enterprise. See Knoblock, John (1988, 1995), Xunzi: A Translation and Study o f the Complete Works, v o l . 1 , Stanford: Stanford University Press, p. xi.

30 59 60 61

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Antonio S. Cua For further discussion, see my “ The Idea of Confucian Tradition” or Moral Vision and Tradition, Essay 12. See my “ The Possibility of Ethical Knowledge: Reflections on a Theme in the Hsün T zu \ These are the elucidative and evaluative functions o f the appeal to established historical knowledge in argumentative discourse. For further discussion, see my “ Ethical Uses of History in Early Confucianism: The Case o f Hsün Tzu” . See my The Unity o f Knowledge and Action. For a different view of Confucian ethics, see my “ Reflections on Moral Theory and Understand­ ing Moral Tradition” ，in Larson and Deutsch, Interpreting Across Boundaries; and my (2000) “ Problems o f Chinese Moral Philosophy” , Journal o f Chinese Philosophy, v o l. 27, no. 3, pp. 269-285. Quoted in Wang, Shou-chang (1994), “ Fung Youlan and the Vienna Circle (A Synopsis)"， Journal o f Chinese Philosophy, v o l.2 1 ,nos 3/4, p. 265. Admittedly, the linguistic, religious, social anthropological, political, and other approaches may furnish valuable perspectives for the philosophical interpretation of Chinese thought. A singular example is the concept o f li (rites) in Confucian ethics. See, for example, Fingarette, Herbert (1972), Confucius: The Secular as Sacred, New York: Harper and Row; Cua, A. S. (1979), “ Dimensions of L i (Propriety): Reflections on an Aspect of Hsün Tzu’s Ethics” , Philosophy East and West, v o l.29, no. 4; and my (1983) “ L i and Moral Justification: A Study in the L i Chi” , Philosophy East and West, v o l.33, n o . 1. Lao, “ On Understanding Chinese Philosophy"， pp. 265-291. For an attempt to state a set o f Confucian principles as ground rules for adjudicating intercultural, ethical conflict, see my “ Reasonable Challenges and Preconditions o f Adjudication” ，in Eliot Deutsch (ed.) (1991), Culture and Modernity: East- West Philosophical Perspectives, Honolulu: University o f Hawaii Press; expanded in Essay 14 of my Moral Vision and Tradition. Before concluding, I must draw attention to Lao Sze-kwang’s ongoing Internet project Lexicon o f Confucianism (in Chinese). The project is divided into texts, commentaries, personalities, and concepts. I have looked up some entries on fundamental concepts of Confucianism, such as daoltao, renljen (humanity, benevolence), yil i (rightness, righteousness), and lilli (rites). A ll are quite informa­ tive, particularly as a guide to the conceptual history o f these notions. Doctrines pertaining to such problems as xingihsing (human nature) provide an excellent guide to the issues and the historical, philosophical scholarship. Tang's English papers entitled Essays on Chinese Philosophy and Culture were published as Volume 19 of the Collected Works o f Tang Ch'ün-I (1987), Taipei: Student Book Co., Ltd. Fang, Thome H . (1980), The Chinese View o f Life: The Philosophy o f Comprehensive Har­ mony, Taipei: Linking.

Part Two Yi-Jing Philosophy

CHAPTER TWO

Inquiring into the Primary Model: Yi-Jing and Chinese Ontological Hermeneutics Chung-ying Cheng* Question of Chinese ontological hermeneutics There is no doubt that a strong hermeneutical tradition exists in the history of Chinese arts and humanities inclusive o f literature, history, and philosophy, but how to characterize this important tradition becomes itself a hermeneutical issue. Why so? This is because our understanding of what constitutes a hermeneutical understanding is hermeneutical, namely, is subject to different interpretations, ana is therefore subject to different changes in interpretations under different circumstances and from different perspectives. But we can also see that all different interpretations are founded on some underlying paradigm or model of understanding o f reality and truth. Perhaps it is in the nature o f interpretations and understanding that an appeal to an understanding of real­ ity and truth is always made. This understanding of reality and truth is thus simultaneously the source of meaning and the driving force for seeking under­ standing. Without such a reference, no understanding and interpretation can be made. Thus we can speak o f the Chinese hermeneutical tradition as basi­ cally ontological. To understand and to interpret is to appeal to this underlying ontological hermeneutics or the hermeneutical understanding of reality for the actualization and validation o f a specific interpretation in a specific situation as well as in light o f the understanding o f the specific situation. Thus we have ele­ ments of both change and constancy in the hermeneutical tradition, which are integrated to give rise to many philosophical and ontological hermeneutical texts. To characterize this singular phenomenon o f ontological interpretation o f a text in a situation, we may use the words of the Yi- Wei-Qian-Zao-Du in its description o f the concept of change (y i): “ Change is change (bian-yi), no change and simplicity (Jian-yi).” 1 This suggests for me three stages and three levels o f hermeneutical understanding: on the surface there are received texts which reflect a given understanding o f a subject matter which is open to inter­ pretation; then there is the subject matter o f which interpretations can be made * This essay is part o f a long manuscript on the philosophy o f the Yi-Jing.

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or are required to be made; and finally there is the ultimate source from which interpretations are made and in view of which justification o f interpretation is made. It is interesting to ask what this ultimate source may stand for. In my reflections it can no doubt be identified as a primary model or way in which any interpretation is to be made as well as the presupposed and pre-understood or presupposed experience of the ultimate reality in the hermeneutical tradi­ tion. Thus it may be suggested that the Chinese textual and even philosophical hermeneutical tradition could frequently change, but some standard o f reality and truth could remain basically unchanged. Besides, the way in which the tradition accommodates changes conforms to the need for minimally preserv­ ing the underlying structure of the tradition. A resulting question therefore is what the unchanging elements and changing factors in the Chinese hermeneutical tradition respectively are and what factors could link the two and integrate them into a systematic or unified understanding or vision o f understanding in an ontological hermeneutics. I f we can speak of an ontological hermeneutical tradition, can we speak o f developing an ontological hermeneutics for the tradition? Apparently, what is involved here is the notion o f ontological hermeneutics. What, then, is onto­ logical hermeneutics? Is it a closed concept hidden in the hermeneutical tradi­ tion or an open concept to be constructed from the tradition? This last question is very important, because it suggests that the very notion of ontological hermen­ eutics must presuppose an antecedent or a correlated notion of an ontological hermeneutic tradition and vice versa. One can easily see that in a philosophical exploration hermeneutics should not be confined to a mere phenomenological account of the hermeneutical practice, but instead could be established as a theoretical construction or reconstruction of the ways and means in which a hermeneutical practice and tradition has been carried on and implemented. This notion o f hermeneutics could also ascend to the level where ontological reference to both the subject and the object in a unified experience o f the ultimate reality is required to be made clear. Ontological hermeneutics or “ ontohermeneutics” is precisely such a way of understanding or interpretation in which reference to the ultimate reality is implicitly presupposed or is explicitly made. Based on this broad pre-understanding of hermeneutics we can see how an ontological hermeneutics arises from a hermeneutical tradition, first as a theoretical reflection and second as a metaphysical or ontological reflection and justification of such reflection. In this light, one can also see how a hermeneutical tradition could change with time and history and yet retain its fundamental identity or integrity in reference to reality, for this reference to reality is the ultimate way to provide the identity and integrity in a context o f changes accord­ ing to time. In light of this and the above understanding of hermeneutics as a broad open concept, we could come to see how a variety of forms of hermeneutical understanding - and thus a variety of historical development patterns - has been embodied in a single cultural tradition. There need be no

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surprise that the Chinese ontological hermeneutical tradition should give rise to a theory of Chinese ontological hermeneutical understanding or a Chinese ontological hermeneutics just like the Chinese philosophical tradition should give rise to a theory o f philosophical understanding or Chinese philosophy. This is not to deny that there are common traits and even common principles shared by both Western hermeneutics and Chinese hermeneutics, but the tempor­ ality and historicity of each construction also provides a basis for exhibition and sustaining of the difference. This is again not to say that contributions to a universal or universalizable onto-hermeneutics could not be made from each theory and each tradition. As a matter of fact, it should be recognized that it is only on the basis o f difference that a contribution to a totalizing or integrative theory could be fruitfully made. Chinese hermeneutics can be vastly different from Western hermeneutics. This vast difference may cause some scholars, when confronted with the problem of Chinese hermeneutics, to feel at a loss because they are not able to identify a Western pattern of hermeneutical understanding in a large Chinese context, and hence are tempted to declare that there is no way to talk o f Chinese hermeneut­ ical theory with regard to understanding and interpretation of Chinese traditional literary and philosophical texts.2 However, this need not be the case. It is to be admitted that the notion o f hermeneutics is a modern Western concept which focuses on studying the ways, methods (in a broad sense), and principles o f interpretation o f texts and the related subject matter embodied in the texts. Hermeneutics thus became cultivated in modern times as principles of interpretation o f texts as early as Friedrich Ast and Friedrich Schleirmacher at the beginning of the nineteenth century.3 It was in the middle o f the last cen­ tury that Hans-Georg Gadamer developed hermeneutics into a philosophy of humanistic understanding or understanding of humanities such as art, history, and language without specific reference to texts. Hermeneutics or philosophical hermeneutics, as Gadamer calls it, is simply a philosophical exploration into how understanding arises in a human subject in reference to a subject matter. In this regard Gadamer would like to see that all human undertakings in humanities and sciences belong to the domain o f the study of philosophical hermeneutics. His inquiry in his book Truth and Method (1960) has covered the major fields in human understanding, such as art, history, and language. He has dealt with science in some ways and he has also come to grips with practical and moral philosophy in certain ways. His major thesis is to establish the “ universality o f hermeneutical experience” which, however, encountered objec­ tions from Habermas.4 In this encounter I believe that Gadamer made this strong and important point: even in scientific constructions we cannot escape from raising questions which are hermeneutical in nature. It is not a matter of preserving authority in enlightenment. It is a matter o f relevance of the human subject for scientific and rational discourse. Thus, even scientific construction could be questioned

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in the interest of understanding based on an effective-historical reflection of its finitude and open-endedness.5As I see it, this leads to an urgent need to develop a hermeneutics from an even more profound basis or root, namely hermeneutics as a way of understanding the world both phenomenologically and ontologically at the same time. This no doubt implies that we need to concentrate on how our use o f language to describe a given phenomenon may open up to an under­ standing that goes beyond the present form and meaning o f the language. This new understanding could nevertheless feed back to enrich the meaning o f the given form o f language. In other words, language becomes creative when our minds become creative as energized by our encounter with the language of texts as well as our experience o f the world. Here we come to something which harks back to both Plato and Heidegger on the one hand and the Book o f Yi (hereto referred to as the Yi-Jing) on the other hand, and which I have chosen to call “ onto-hermeneutical".6 In this light, the movement from the tradition of exegetical interpretation to philo­ sophical interpretation and to onto-hermeneutical interpretation represents a process of emancipation from a given tradition, a text, and a given form of language so that the tradition, the text, and the form of language could be renovated, enriched, and innovated. In the West, such an emancipation has brought out the discipline of philosophical hermeneutics beyond exegesis. Now we can do the same for Chinese philosophical and ontological hermeneutics in bringing out the principles of understanding beyond exegetical practice. Not only can we do this, we can also look forward to embrace and incorporate methodological insights of exegesis, the subject-oriented reflective insights of the Gadamerian philosophical hermeneutics, as well as the analytical construc­ tive theories of scientific and logical knowledge, into an integrated theory of human understanding relative to our interpretation of human existence and reality. This we may title as the onto-hermeneutical enterprise.

Five stages (levels) of formation of the Yi text In light of the theoretical and abstract nature of modern and contemporary hermeneutics in the West, one can readily see that Chinese literary and philo­ sophical tradition may not have anything comparable to the hermeneutical theory in the West. Yet it is also obvious and evident that the development of Chinese humanities is marked by a strong ontological hermeneutical tradition in the sense that concrete and direct practice of ontological hermeneutical interpretation is heavily engaged. Hence it is meaningful to speak of the Chinese ontological hermeneutical tradition in Chinese learning even without any formulation of Chinese ontological hermeneutics or onto-hermeneutics. This position is no doubt apparently acceptable insofar as there is no theory o f interpretation proposed throughout the long tradition, but this does not

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mean that hermeneutics as a self-conscious form o f proposing and justifying interpretation is not consciously entertained by Chinese minds in their activities o f interpretation. The way that Chinese scholars and Chinese philosophers have done their interpretative work conscientiously and persistently suggests that they have hermeneutical pre-understanding, and they could have theoretical hermen­ eutical insights even though they may not systematically formulate them after­ wards or beforehand. Hence one may simply argue that the very way Chinese hermeneutics functions is different from the Western counterpart. They simply represent two different modes o f understanding and interpretation which do not need to be conceived as immediately incompatible or incommensurable. One does not need to be reduced to the other or made to substitute for the other.7 The insights o f ontological understanding in connection with using and interpreting human symbols and language are developed and presented in the Chinese philosophical tradition as early as the formation of the Yi-Jing text and consequent formation o f the commentaries o f the Yi-Jing text known as the Yi-Zhuan (Commentaries on the Yi-Jing, which since the early Han times has become part of the Yi-Jing). It is in my reflection and research on the origins o f the Yi text and the rise o f the Yi commentaries that I come to the ontological-hermeneutical understanding that leads to the formation o f the general concept of onto-hermeneutics. This also leads to the specific concept that Chinese hermeneutics has its primal model in the onto-hermeneutics based on the formation o f the Yi text and the transformation o f an intimate under­ standing o f the Yi text into the philosophical system o f the Yi-Zhuan, which discloses or illustrates the onto-hermeneutics of the Yi-Jing. In the following I shall develop my understanding o f a Yi-based ontohermeneutics consistent with an understanding of the text o f the Yi-Jing and an interpretation of the Yi-Jing text in terms of the Yi-Zhuan philosophy of onto-cosmology. We may point out that the very understanding o f the Yi text in light of the Yi-Zhuan and vice versa is a required procedure for any genuine understanding of the Yi text as well as the subject matter of the text.8 It can be considered as the very foundation and process in which both the text and event could be illuminated. Thus, one has also to consider how the original Yi-Jing text was formed in the encounter of an original position or situation in which the human person has to interpret this world-reality o f change and henceforth to register his understanding in a system o f symbols and a form of language. It must be recognized that the Yi-Jing is formed as a system of symbols that are intended to refer to and represent the world-reality based on comprehensive observation (guan). This system o f symbols has been used to divine the future for the purpose o f seeking correct and propitious action. In the formation o f the Yi-Jing we witness a dynamic unity between theory and action, or understand­ ing and practice, in the sense that the system of Yi symbols is not developed simply for intellectual knowledge, but for understanding the world-reality and world-life for the sake o f practice and action. This is the reason that the

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cosmic view embedded in the Yi-Jing symbols is readily used for interpreting divinatory results in divination. But this should not make the Yi-Jing just a book o f divination. It is a book of understanding, which finds its use in divination, yet nevertheless does not diminish its value as a book of cosmicl human understanding. We may, in fact, conceive the formation o f the Yi-Jing text and its use as a reference manual for divination which provides interpretation o f the lifesituation of a human person in terms of the following levels and stages of development: observation symbolization systematization divination interpretation. These five levels and stages can be described and explained in terms o f key concepts or key words in the Yi-Jing text or Yi-Zhuan texts. First, observation here means “ guan” or “ comprehensive observation” which is the name of the twentieth hexagram. This is a key concept that I use here to identify the very foundation of the formation of the Yi symbols in light o f both this gua and the X i-C i of the Yi-Zhuan as we shall see. Second, symbolization is the process of imaging (xiang) in light of which an image or likeness o f events and things of nature is formed. A ll trigrams and hexagrams are images or symbols which iconically and indexically stand for real situations in nature or life. Although the Yi-Jing text does not employ the word ''xiang", the use of the gua symbols is a manifest action o f imaging and iconic and indexical representation. It was in the interest of capturing the spirit o f imaging that a whole treatise of Xiang-Zhuan (as the largest systematic interpretation of the Yi text) was written. Third, the systematization of the Yi symbols, together with their names and appended gwa-divinatory judgments and line (yao)-divinatory explanations, is what makes the Yi-Jing a text, a book (shu), and a system of ordered sequence of guas. Although we do not know precisely when such a systematization was formed, we know that King Wen in the beginning of the Zhou period ( c . 1200 BCE) must have played an indispensable role in organizing the guas and their judgments and explanations into the form which was known as Zhou-Yi (Y i text o f the Zhou) by posterity. Fourth, divination stands for the Chinese concepts of divining with m ilfoil stalks (shi), reading or interpreting the future in light of present symptoms as revealed in cracks of burned oracle bones (tortoise back shells and oxen shoulder bones) (pu), and oral divination from such action o f divination (chan). There is also the ancient word “ zhen” , which suggests divination using sea shell or tortoise shell. The words “ zhen” , “ shi” ，and “ chan” have appeared in the Yi-Jing text, but we know that the general practice of divination (pu) has been recorded in “ divinatory judgments” (puci) traceable to the time of the early Xia era Finally, the interpretation here is intended to stand for two basic concepts in the Yi text, namely, the concept of clarification or illumination (ming) and the concept o f resolution (jie). In the Tuan, Xiang, and X i-C i commentaries

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the word “ ming” is used to clarify a belief, an argument, a punishment, an administrative policy, the meaning of a time, and the moral implication of fortune and misfortune ( ji and xiong). It is clear that “ ming” is to interpret and explain in the German sense o f “ Auslegung” so that a point, a truth, a fact, and a value could be made clear. But when we face a gua situation, we also wish to find a way out, or a way of resolution. The interpretation of a gua situation faces the demand that we can make an informed and enlightened decision on action in light o f the understanding o f the situation and that the action will bring out a relief and resolution o f the debacle present in the situation. Hence, the rel­ evance of the concept of “jie ” which stands for resolution out of difficulty. Given the above explanation we can see the correspondences o f stages or levels of formation o f the Yi text as follows: Observation Symbolization Systematization Divination Interpretation

guanlcha xiang/gua/yao shu/ci/yan pulzhenlshilchan mingljie .

Although I speak of stages of the development o f the Yi text, it is possible that in the process of systematization, divination may play a central role, because it is where divinatory judgments (gua-ci) and line explanations (yao-ci) are generated to illuminate the gua symbols, and correlating adjustments could be made in order to preserve a fundamental mode o f understanding in terms o f observations of yin-yang forces and their alignments. As a matter o f fact, during a long process o f time, each stage or level could feed back to enrich or rectify the earlier stage, or a presupposed level, in order to achieve an organic totality of interrelated parts. Here we have a primal form of an onto-hermeneutic circle, namely a circulation of attribution and regulation o f meaning in light of experience and understanding o f a given situation in the world-reality. It is not a matter o f a hermeneutic circle alone which consists in interdetermination of meaning o f terms in a holistic text/context o f understanding in which reference to a dynamic reality, or any reality, is not made or assumed. In the following I shall concentrate on the key processes o f observation, divination, and interpretation in the construction o f the primary model o f inter­ pretation in the Yi text formation as the foundation and beginning o f the Chinese hermeneutical tradition.

Rise of the Yi text from guan and xiang How does the Yi text or Yi-Jing text arise and form itself?9To answer this ques­ tion one needs to look into how the formation o f the earliest Yi symbols and names could be explained in terms o f human experiences o f the world which

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contain nature, the human person, and interactions between nature and the human person. It seems obvious that the trigrams as an organized set of symbols stand for salient natural events and processes and structures of nature as we have observed them. There are eight trigrams (ba-gua) because there are eight major and dominant natural phenomena and processes which have been observed to be central to our understanding of the natural reality. Not only are they central to our understanding of nature, they are observed and considered as foundations and resource-sources for all other concrete events and processes of nature. The eight phenomena-processes as represented by the trigrams are also observed to be derived from, or constituted of, even more basic forces or pro­ cesses, which correspond to our experiences of the general and pervasive qualities of the world. Hence, we can speak of our experiences of yin (shady) and yang (bright), kang (firmness) and ruo (softness), dong (motion) and jin g (rest), empty and substantial, potential and actual, progress and regress, and up and down as basic dimensions of events such as fire and water, or structures such as lake and hill. Even heaven and earth can be said to be observed to have those features which we normally experience in concrete, feeling, and actual situations. Based on those experiences of qualities o f events and things (we may call these qualities “ ontic qualia” )，we may reach a more generalized notion o f yin and yang which can apply to all experiences of ontic qualia in their polaristic contrast and dynamic interdependence. These notions of ontic qualia-experiences could be said to be represented by the ancient yin-yang symbols “ 一 一” and “ — ” which are open to distinction, differentiation and classification into further similar types of experiences. Be­ sides, a principle of relativity is built in: whatever is soft is relative to a chosen standard of softness at a scale of comparison. In this way, these two general­ ized ontic qualia symbols are primary symbols of experiences o f reality which register our experiences o f the world in whatever way we happen to experience, locally, regionally, globally, particularly, or generally, this moment, this period, and this era. As primary symbols of ontic qualia-experiences they are also iconic and indexical insofar as they do represent some configurable features of the reality with an explicit or implicit sense of impact or force. In fact, they can be explicitly described as signs of the movement and nature of the qi, or natural vital force. As far as we can be said to experience qi, qi is a natural substanceprocess of reality that we experience in terms of our ontic qualia-experiences such as dark and bright, soft and firm, moving and still, etc.10 Now, given the primary symbols of experiences of reality, the eight trigrams can be said to be composed of these primary symbols in terms o f certain internal qi-relationsmps. These trigrams are further components o f larger con­ figurations of events and processes, which we can build from them by way of certain natural and logical principles. The sixty-four hexagrams are thus constructed as a consequence. O f course, we need not stop at the sixty-four hexagrams, but it seems that for empirical reasons the set of the sixty-four

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hexagrams does seem to represent an adequate set o f basic human conditions that we can understand and manage or act on with easiness. Here we see the principle o f simplicity at work. We have mentioned the “ threefold meaning theory of the y i" in the Yi- Wei works of the end o f the Western Han period. This is an insight insofar as it is only rational and useful that we have to describe and handle reality in the simplest way we can invent without losing sight of the totality and the comprehensive scope o f all things and events. In other words, what are presumed as changing and nonchanging must be repre­ sented in the simplest system we can devise so that we can read meanings and act on understandings. The system o f the sixty-four hexagrams is precisely such a system. It can be said that it is a representation o f reality at a level consistent with our needs and capacity of understanding. No doubt the system can be further expanded, and it is not difficult to do so. In addition, the system also contains subsystems such as that of eight trigrams. In this sense, insofar as eight trigrams primarily form a system of natural symbols, the sixty-four hexagrams primarily form a system of human-natural symbols that can be given both naturalistic meanings and human or humanistic meanings, including mentalistic meanings as their extensions. As a system, we also need to remark that whether eight trigrams or the sixtyfour hexagrams, they are organically interrelated to form a web o f networked meaning. This is obviously a reflection of the interrelatedness o f things and events in human experiences. One thing leads to another by way o f transfor­ mation and change, and there are many forms of change and transformation. In these changes and transformations new meanings and new situations are realized. It is up to the human mind, the interpreter o f symbols, to make out meanings and tendencies in those changes and transformations. But, as an intended objective description of natural and human-social processes, formal and logical rules could be given, as these are ways in which a human mind could regulate itself. A ll in all, we see that a system o f image-forms-symbols is formed in the process o f observation of nature and in the experiences of organ­ izing our observations and reflections on nature and ourselves. It is to be noted that this system is formed in a long-range process of natural and historical observations which need not be confined to a single person. On the contrary, what is involved in the organization of observations belongs to a group of people and is intertwined with the progress of culture and technology. Based on my own archaeological observations, I have proposed that the process o f observation pertaining to the formation of the Yi trigrams and hexa­ grams may well begin in the late Neolithic period when we see the invention of fine tools from jade and animal bones.11 It is also the time when sheep became domesticated and nomadic tribesmen began to settle down to raise cattle and cultivate fields. In this light, we can then justify the story o f Fu X i as the story o f a culture-hero who, among other things, had engaged in observations o f nature and invented the system of primary symbols of our experiences of nature,

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and consequently invented the system o f eight trigrams and possibly the sixtyfour hexagrams as a culture and community developed into more advanced and sophisticated forms. We may quote from the X i-C i to describe this process of comprehensive observation as a source of inspiration for the formation of the Yi symbols: In the ancient time when Fu Xi reigns in the world, he observes heavenly forms upward and observes regularities of earthly things downward. He observes the patterns of shapes and habits among birds and beasts and their fitting environments on earth. He gathers information from nearby things as well as from distant objects. Consequently, he starts to make the eight trigrams for the purpose of penetrating into the powers of the divine and the clear, and in order to sort out things according to the natures (true states) of the ten thousand things. (Xi-Ci Part 2, 2) (my translation) Based on what I have described above, the authors of the Yi symbols have taken a naturalistic approach to the question of the formation of these symbols. This naturalistic understanding leads us to stress the importance of “ com­ prehensive observation” ( guan) and consequent contemplation o f the organic relationships of things in nature and in our social and cultural lives. It is also clear that the formation of the Yi symbols did not take place at one time, but required a long period o f time to make correct adjustments and to achieve a neatness and simplicity that would cover the totality of nature and life at the same time. We see that it is the principle of comprehensive observation and the principle of systematic or organic simplicity at work that leads to the choice of the yin-yang symbols as the basis for the formation of the eight trigrams. What is notable is that the Yi symbols are designed to capture the subtle and minute changes of the world-reality as well as the resulting overt large phe­ nomena o f the world. They are intended to be both comprehensive and exhaus­ tive so that no small change will be ignored. They are also intended to register the internal changes within a situation or process as well as external changes in an open context o f relationships. Hence, there is also a third principle at work: the principle of dialectical development, which indicates how the system of symbols and its interpretations or implications of meaning (both connotative and denotative) are expandable insofar as we have our experiences o f nature and life in a growing and expanding process. It is this principle which leads to the development o f the eight trigrams into the sixty-four hexagrams, with the subject matter of the eight trigrams fully incorporated in the structure of the sixty-four hexagrams.

The practical and logical relevance of pu (divination) Now we may consider the philosophical significance of divination in forming the interpretation of the symbols of the Yi-Jing. Although we have no idea

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on how divination began, we could speculate on the basis of the Yi-Zhuan to illustrate how divination started as a desirable practice toward seeking the well-being o f the human person. In one passage it is said that, “ The flourishing o f the Yi (symbolism), was it at the time o f middle antiquity? The author o f the Yi symbols, did he have a profound anxiety?” (X i-C i Part 2, 6). As we have reason to believe that the Yi-Zhuan was formed in the hands of the first-generation disciples o f Confucius, what was referred to as the “ middle antiquity” must refer to a time of the flourishing of the human civilization which can be any time from the reign of the Yellow Emperor (c. 3000 BCE) to the beginning of Xia dynasty (c. 2000 BCE). More important to notice is the implicit statement on the feeling o f the creator o f the Yi-symbols. The “ profound anxiety” (you-huan) here means worry and misgiving about an uncertain future which may prevent the fulfillment of the well-being of a human person. That future is uncertain because the world-reality is subject to change and transformation, and because we do not know when, where, or how change may take place. This uncertainty no doubt reflects our deficiency of knowledge of nature. It also reflects our unconscious misgivings about the complexity of the human condition and human mind. It is assumed desirable to have knowledge o f the nature o f a given situation, and also a trust in the virtues of a human agent. I f we have any understanding o f what a given situation may have involved and entailed and how things may move in a field o f dynamic forces, we are able to adjust our action to avoid disasters and to pursue benefits. The question is whether we can ever come to know this. Even though a human person may have acquired a rich experience o f life, and a community may have accumulated a wealth o f wisdom on what to do under certain conditions, there are still other conditions and situations when we are at a loss as to what to make out o f a situation and/or as to what would be the right action to take or the right decision to make. Hence, the uncertainty and indetermination o f the future is a real thing for us to inquire about and a real issue for us to deal with. It seems clear, then, that divination is adopted as the art o f understanding the future by understanding and interpreting a situation and what it holds for us in terms o f good fortune and misfortune. To make divination meaningful, one has to appeal to God or the spirits for revelation, or find a logical or scientific way o f reading the future. In the case o f divination under the Yi text, there is no mention o f appeal to God or spirits. In fact, by the very development o f the Yi-symbolism as an onto-cosmology that reflects states o f nature, and hence states o f the human life-world, appeals to God or the spirits are rendered unnecessary, for it is assumed that one can read the gua in order to understand a situation. The crucial problem o f divination becomes one o f deciding which gua to choose to represent a given situation. How we choose it and how we justify our decision and choice becomes the central difficulty to overcome. There is no direct solution to this problem. The only solution must be that by

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following a method of divination, one will naturally come to a gua which would be a symbolic representation o f the present situation relative to our question or goal of inquiry. But one can still query why such a method of divination must yield a correct answer. We may ask what distinguishes one method from an­ other in its ability to yield a correct gua or a picture of the present world. In the X i-C i we have a description of a procedure on how to form a gua by manipulating m ilfoil stalks in a certain ordered way. It is interesting to note that this procedure is founded on the onto-cosmology of the Yi philosophy: there is the tai-ji, and ta i-ji gives rise to two forms o f yin and yang which would generate four seasons, and then days, of a whole lunar year. It is by calculating numbers of the m ilfoil stalks in their mimicking of the cosmic generation pro­ cess that one comes to define a gua line by line. But still one can ask why this decision procedure must yield a true image rather than a false one. Here, a diviner may have to appeal to some naive faith that this process will reveal the reality of a situation, and one must trust one’s virtuous action to deal with the situation. To make this come true is to fulfill the helping power of the divine (ke-yu-you-shen-yi).12 To quote Confucius, “ I f one knows the ways o f change, could he know the doings of the divin e?" 13 In fact, the logic o f divination consists in probable knowing under the restrictions of a given situation. This logic would say: if one genuinely does not know a situation and one has to make a decision, then to decide one way or another would have the same probability. To divine is to find a point of contact with reality so that one may make a relevant decision in light of some induced interpretation o f a situation. The gua that is yielded by the divination provides an aid for anchoring oneself in a situation so that one can relate or organize all relevant information around the gua for achieving a reasonable answer and making a responsible decision on action. Divination therefore becomes a practical way of fulfilling oneself in certain critical conditions of life; a condition which involves great risk and responsibility. To divine is to find a way of justification for understanding and action. Logic and morality require one to generally adopt the wisdom of doing things with caution, patience, consultation, and readiness to respond to changes in accordance with faith in virtues and trust in the natural order of complementation, reversal, and balance. In this sense, divination becomes a way o f negotiating with one's understand­ ing o f a situation, a way of reflection, and a way of rallying one's spirit and one's intelligence. Divination becomes a matter o f practical understanding and a process of developing one's practical wisdom. There are two other ways in which divination is to be justified. One is to do with the doctrine o f “ feeling and response” (gan-ying). In Section 10 o f the X i-C i Part 1 , it is said that “ The Yi system is without thought and without action. It is still and without motion. But [once it is put to divination], it will have direct feeling and thus will penetrate to the causes of all things. I f it is not a most divine thing, how could it do this?”

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It is clear that the direct feeling must come from the diviner using the Yi system, and the feeling must be based on recognizing the nature of a situation so that our foresight and insight into the changes of the situation can be manifested. But how could a diviner come to possess such a divining (fore-knowing) power? O f course, he must know the given situation in a certain way, he must know what to divine for, and he must have a way o f telling the future trends by relating the moving forces in a situation; but there is still no guarantee that his judgment must be foolproof. What then is required is an account o f whether he is warranted in inducing judgment about future trends o f a given affair and about what good and bad could or would result. In order to do this, in the Yi-Zhuan, what is most essential is the ability to see minute and inceptive forces o f change in a given situation and the related ability to draw correct conclusions in light o f knowledge o f the situation. It appears that what is relevant are understanding and experience o f similar cases in the past, and one can learn from trials and errors o f the past, knowledge o f the relationships among things and forces in the world, and the way things normally develop according to principles o f dialectics of change as disclosed by the total system o f the Yi symbols. This then leads to the second way o f divining the future via the concept o f the sage in the Yi-Zhuan: it is the sage (sheng-ren) who has come to have an understanding of the people, their ambitions, and their desires, and an under­ standing o f the numbers and dialectical changes in light or his understanding o f how all things move in a total system. It is in this way that the sage will be able to detect and determine which situation is which and identify the image o f a situation without divination. It is said that: The sage has seen the complex things in the world and imaged them in form s and symbols. Thus those forms and symbols are called images (xiang). The sage has witnessed the movements of things and observed how things meet each other. In performing a proper ritual, he can append his judgments of fortune and misfortune to lines of the gua. This is called judgments to the lines (yao). To tell the most complex things without disliking them, to tell the most subtle movements of things without confusion. To simulate before speaking, to reflect before acting. It is in simulation and discursive thinking that the sage can detect and make changes.14 Although a proper ritual is mentioned, here one does not see much o f the appeal to divination. Perhaps one can see divination as a ritual that the sage needs to go through for its ritualistic importance, but what is actually required is that the sage has a genuine way o f understanding things. This way consists in observation, minute perception, simulation, reflection, and discursive thinking, not in blindly following a ritual. One can further see that, in the Xi-C i, for the most part, the authors are arguing for taking the way o f changes directly and using the Yi symbols as a tool or medium to fathom the subtle changes of

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the way o f change. It even suggests that the reason we can predict changes is that things are imaged in the symbols; things at large must change according to large principles, while particulars o f change in a concrete situation require close monitoring and awareness. The action of divination is to discover what minute beginnings o f change things in a concrete situation could have. It is advised, therefore, that “ A superior person at rest will contemplate an imageform [of a situation] and study its judgment, and in motion will observe the changes of the image-form and study its d iv in a tio n ." 15 So far as it could pro­ vide a clue for the future in the absence o f evidence to the contrary, and insofar as it provides an occasion to reflect on one’s capabilities and their limitations, it is hence an occasion to cultivate and nourish one’s virtues o f patience, per­ sistence, perseverance, and good faith. O f course, what is assumed here is that the Yi-Jing text has been systematized, and correlation o f meaning between form-images and judgments are aligned and hence represent an ideal manual for reference when needed. With familiarity with such a system one can make educated guesses and inferences by way of associations in experience and analogical-metaphorical understanding.

Systematization and interpretation In order for the sage to tell about the true nature o f a situation, the X i-C i has developed an explicit onto-cosmology to explain and justify the existence and meaning o f the gua. This onto-cosmology is essential, and effective for understanding the depth of meaning of the Yi symbols; one may even say that it is hidden in the mind o f the inventor o f the Yi text o f symbols. The following statements from the X i-C i largely indicate how this onto-cosmology is con­ ceived and how it becomes a basis for global interpretation: 1 “ One yin and one yang is called the dao" ， (X i-C i Part 1,5) 2 “ Therefore, the Yi system has its ta i-ji (the great ultimate). The ta i-ji produces two norms. Two norms give rise to four forms, and four images produces eight trigrams. The eight trigrams determine what is fortunate and what is misfortune. By considering the fortune and misfortune great deeds are produced.” (X i-C i Part 1,11) 3 “ The creative (qian) and the receptive (kun), are they the source and resource of the YP? When qian and kun are presented in order, the way o f change is established therein. I f qian and kun are destroyed, there is no change to be seen. I f one cannot see the changes, there is extinction of the qian and kun.” (X i-C i Part 1,12) 4 “ What is above the form is called the dao, what is within the form is called the vessel.” (X i-C i Part 1， 12)

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It is obvious that the Yi symbols and the Yi text that embody the Yi system have all the ideas hidden or present in their images, judgments, and relationships. These ideas become explicit as if emerging from the Yi text, but being explicit and articulated as a philosophy of reality and cosmology does make a difference, namely, the onto-cosmology philosophy of the Yi becomes itself a system and an object of understanding, thinking, and consideration. It is a movement from phenomenology to cosmology and ontology, or onto-cosmology, as changes are parts of the ultimate reality. O f course, it takes a human mind to make this happen, but the point is that, unless the substance of the thought is implicit, the explicit statement could not easily result. In the words o f the Xi-C i, “ the language o f judgment is such that it designates what it designates” (X i-C i Part 1， 3). It is because the Yi symbols have designated what they have designated, and the authors o f the Yi text have indicated what they have experienced, that the authors of the Yi-Zhuan would be able to bring out the subject matter of the Yi symbols system and formulate the underlying onto-cosmology. This onto-cosmology is further developed in the Tuan Commentary, which has focused on the qian and kun as two creative sources and brings out their onto-cosmological significance. Qian-gua is to stand for the Qian-yuan, and Kun-gua is to stand for the Kun-yuan. As such, qian and kun become two primary forces that give rise to all forms and, eventually, give rise to all things. They themselves presumably form a unity which would stand for the tai-ji. This seems to be an elaboration o f the X i-C i's basic idea o f the alternation of yin and yang. The Wen- Yan Commentary follows Tuan in elaborating the moral side of the creative power o f the qian and kun as two creative origins. There is also the Xiang Commentary, which strives to preserve the form-image side o f a gua. The Xiang Commentary also introduced the principle o f moral implication and projection as a principle o f interpretation. It is in the Xiang Commentary that all guas are seen and rendered to give moral instructions. This means that any image or gua will naturally carry a moral meaning - it is up to the human person to make this moral meaning clear and relevant. With the onto-cosmology of the Yi system thus formulated, one could inter­ pret the gua not only in terms o f its judgment, but also in terms o f all the judgments o f guas, as guas are themselves seen as correlates and complements o f each other in an ordered system. Moreover, one could interpret the judg­ ments in terms o f forms o f the guas as well. Whether one takes forms as the primary reference or takes the judgments as the primary reference, one could still make an interpretation o f a given situation in light o f the underlying philosophy. One does not need to appeal to divination as a means o f identify­ ing a situation. One could probably identify a situation in light o f the ontocosmology o f the alternation o f the yin and yang in the dao. One can also identify the dao as a system o f changes governed by return, reversion, opposi­ tion, mutuality and complemention, and continuous creative creativity (shengsheng). In this fashion, not only can divination be brushed aside as something

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unnecessary, but the whole system of the Yi text and its symbolism and judg­ ments are rendered unnecessary for understanding life and reality; one can directly appeal to one’s own observation, intuition, experience, and enlighten­ ment to determine what reality is and what the meaning of a situation is in light of reality. One can see Wang Bi as the interpreter of the Yi system who began this line of thought and paved the way for a full era o f Song and Ming Neo-Confucian philosophers to follow suit and flourish. One may also observe that in the YiZhuan, such a tendency is mixed with efforts to interlink philosophical reading with reading of the lines and structures of the gua. For Confucius, it is clear that moral cultivation requires an onto-cosmological philosophy, but not specifically a system o f images and symbols and a procedure of divination. Conversely, it must also be said that it is by reflection on the implicit and embodied onto-cosmology in the symbols of the Yi that one can come to directly confront and experience the changes of the reality. It might still be asked whether, in the absence o f the formulation of the Yi system, a vivid and penetrating understanding o f reality as onto-cosmology is possible. Considering the coherence and consistency of the system o f the guas in the Yi text, we could even suggest that the Yi text begins with an image of nature and the cosmos that reflects our comprehensive understanding of reality.16 It is only on the basis o f such a developed or developing image of nature that we are able to make practical use o f the image or system of symbols together with its underlying understanding. In this sense, one must not say that the book of Yi-Jing is a book of divination. Instead, one must assert that the Yi text is developed as a result o f cosmic understanding, which has made a cosmological interpretation or description of our observations of the nature and an onto­ logical reference to the forces and origin o f the changes. Thus, it is a book of onto-cosmological understanding which, nevertheless, lends itself naturally to the use o f divination. As indicated in the above, divination is recognized to play a central role in the enhancing of the quest for correlation of form and meaning, theory and action, symbol and reference, and fact and value in the formation and systematization of the Yi text. In other words, divination is recognized as an essential process or stage of the use of the symbols which enable the book to articulate its underlying principles of onto-cosmological understanding directly based on our natural experiences of reality. To say this is not to say that the Yi text was not used for divination for a long period, or that its origination may not be linked to some practical need and anxiety for controlling one’s future. We have seen how the primary yin-yang symbols of the Yi are onto-cosmological in nature even though they can be manipulated in the accruing of meaning for the gua and the yao in the gua. It is obvious that, without the primary onto-cosmological meaning o f the yin-yang symbols, no manipulation of images of the gua and of movements of the yao can be justified. It is in this sense that the systematization represents

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both a natural need for interpretation and a process of making rational and reasonable interpretation of the guas and the yaos. The systematization also implies a need to justify the need o f systematization. Here again we see a subtle process at work: it is the comprehensive observation continually at work that leads to the actual formation o f an organic system of symbols; but once the system is formed, one needs to know whether it suggests or reveals a reality that we can understand or contemplate. To come to this step, o f course, the human person has to undertake the task o f inquiring into the hidden reality in the Yi text and advance one’s experience as a basis for a new interpretation of the Yi text, not as a text, but as a document or a symbol of the reality which the inquirer confronts. This person here I presume is Confucius in his later years after the age o f fifty. It is in light of this inquiry that an explicit onto-cosmology emerges to form an explicit philosophy as articulated in the Yi-Zhuan. This is how the Yi-Zhuan itself is formed. In our discussion, we only make use o f the X i-Ci, but the same principle o f interpretation in light of the totalistic understanding of the Yi symbolism and its reference to reality applies equally to other Yi-Zhuan commentaries. One can see the Shuo-Gua-Zhuan (Discourse Commentary) as a systematic explana­ tion and interpretation of the symbolic forms against a background o f a dy­ namic understanding of the eight guas as natural forces that are interrelated in a circle o f complementary oppositions, as well as in a circle o f five mutually generating powers. An analysis will show that the before-heaven diagram (xiantian tu) and the post-heaven diagram (hou-dan tu) were first suggested in the Shuo-Gua-Zhuan. This is highly significant, as these two diagrams captured the systemic features of the gua system, which requires deep observation and analysis to produce. Here we see that the principle o f organic holism has been used as a principle of interpretation. By merging the theory of five powers with the eight-gua system it can also be shown how understanding could develop if we can integrate the two systems into one. There is also the principle o f extension of images by likeness, but this could be overdone, for many o f the images may be shown to only remotely relate to the primary image o f the gua. One sees in the Xu-Gua-Zhuan an effort to show the rationality or empirical validity of the order and sequence o f the guas based on the principle of balance and creative generation. In the case of the Za-Gua-Zhuan, an attempt to illustrate the meanings o f all guas, either in contrast or in some essential and abstract manner, is made. The principle o f interpretation is, again, holism o f meaning. In light o f our analysis o f the divination process, and o f the interpretation involved in the understanding of reality, and in the application of the Yi symbols (trigrams and hexagrams), we may distinguish between the formation o f the Yi symbols and Yi system of judgments based on divinatory practice and the formation o f the Yi-Zhuan based on understanding of the Yi text. It is obvious that the formation o f the Yi symbols and Yi system o f judgments involves the primary situation o f interpretation and understanding, where understanding of

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the reality is an unconscious interpretation of the natural events of the world. The primary situation involves primary use of primary symbols, which directly reflect experience o f reality. In the Yi text case, it also reflects a comprehensive observation which leads to the interpretation of a whole organic system o f events and processes, as well as a holistic system of interpretation. This involves an internal adjustment in terms of levels of differentiation of symbolism as well as a basic correlation between symbols and names, and between symbols and names on the one hand and making judgments and drawing moral lessons on the other hand. This primary model is based on the projection o f balanced feelings of truth, method, experience, and reason. It requires the whole person to react to the world as a whole and to individual situations in particular. In the formation of the Yi-Zhuan we see we are responding to a given body of texts, o f symbols, and of their judgments. To a great extent, the Yi-Zhuan commentaries, such as Xiang Zhuan, respond to the forms of the guas and the situation o f the gua as illustrated by the Tuan Commentary. What needs to be stressed are two important points: first, in responding to the symbols and texts of the judgments in the Yi text, the Xiang also responds to the open meaning and the subject matter of the gua; second, despite responding to the meanings of words and paradigms, it also responds to the real situation that the commentaries have suggested, but which one can see as richly implicit. Hence, the situation of interpretation in the Yi-Zhuan is highly selective, but often integrative. The YiZhuan has to respond to the text and the live situation as instructed by the text.

Original position of onto-interpretation and eight primary principles The Yi-Jing text has preserved the image o f the interpretation in a given situ­ ation. The individual person has to open himself to what is taking place in the world. He has to have understanding of the world-reality in terms of the ontocosmology o f change. It may take a sage (a person who has comprehensively observed the world and has deeply reflected on what he has observed) to do this, but again, the Yi text has made available the result of such an observation and reflection so that others who are not necessarily sages could rely on such a profound and comprehensive understanding of world-reality. Specifically, a diviner would have to assume having such an understanding so that he can make his divinatory judgment on the basis of such an understanding. What is called a divinatory judgment (gua-ci) is essentially a normative interpretation of a given situation based on such an understanding relative to a specific purpose. The specific purpose would require and enable the diviner to see the situation in an evaluative and practical or even moral perspective, which means that he has to draw some judgment of values (propitious or risky or good or bad in terms of impact of harm or benefit) in light of his understanding of the situation. It would also enable him to give some practical admonition on actions to be taken. Hence, the content o f divinatory judgment would normally have three

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components: interpretative description of the situation against the background o f the onto-cosmology of the guas; the evaluation o f the situation from the per­ spective o f a specific purpose or motive which motivates the divinatory inquiry; and the specific action to be taken or avoided. It is also understood that the value o f a situation or change depends on the action to be taken, and this means that the values in a gua-ci could be conditional on the action to be taken. Take for an example the gua-ci of the Kun: " Kun: Fundamentally prosperous, it is advantageous to be firm as a female horse. The superior person has to do something, but he may lose his direction first and then find his mentor or leader. In the west-south he will gain a friend, but in the east-north he will lose a friend. It is propitious to be firm in being stable.” Even though the gua-ci did not give a description o f the situation, the gua symbol and the name Kun have suggested what a basic situation it is as against the onto-cosmography of the change. The gua-ci has concentrated on the values o f the situation and practical advice given to the person who initiates the divination; it answers his worries and questions. The statement, “ In the west-south he will gain a friend, but in the east-north he will lose a friend” can be understood as the conditional sentence, “ I f one goes to the west-south, he will gain a friend and if he goes to the east-north he will lose a friend.” It is clear that the situation is an open and indeterminate one, as most times are, and it is up to the person concerned to make his choice and decide on his action. What we have learned from this divining instance is that a situation has its openness even though it has its restrictions and provides a framework for understanding and action. The so-called openness means opening of some possibilities under the restric­ tions o f the given situation. A situation is always a process or a transition in a process of change and transformation in the context o f all and other situations as provided in the onto-cosmography o f the guan. Conversely, the engaged person, whether he is the diviner or a third person who initiates a divinatory inquiry, is always free to make his choice or his decision on action. He is not totally determined by his situation, but knowing his situation he would know the enlightened decision and choice to make. In addition, there is another implication to be drawn, namely, that the engaged individual should be generally self-cultivated so that he would have better moral and intellectual resources to meet the needs o f a situation. Both Confucius and Mencius have stressed the importance of self-cultivation, which not only presupposes the existence o f free will (in some sense) but has the practical significance o f meeting the needs o f a situation. It is clear from our description o f a divining instance that one has to use a method o f divination to arrive at an image o f a given situation: this image of course is the gua o f the situation, which images or reflects the situation for us to understand and make judgment upon it. Hence the importance of divination, but is there an alternative to divination for the determining of a given situation? The answer is in the positive. In fact, the Yi text has provided the category o f

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“ Feeling” as such an alternative. The thirty-first gua is called “ Xian” which means simply “ Feeling” . This gua is composed of lake above and hill below which suggests a good yin-yang interaction between the above and below. It is a dynamic harmony, or harmony in action, as illustrated by the relationship of a young woman and a young man in a bond of feeling love and care. Thus, this image of a situation is one of creative production and regardful peace. In a sense, the larger universe is bonded in such a creative feeling of interaction and reciprocal regard so that all things can prosper. In the X i-C i this relationship of creative feeling is described as that of “ feeling and response” (gan-ying) in terms of which a penetrating understanding of causes and reasons is possible. With this understanding of the power of feeling, it is clear that one could respond to a situation by one's profound feeling of a situation and therefore could come to describe the situation in the form o f an image. Again, to have feeling is not to abandon perceptual observation and conceptual understand­ ing; instead, perceptual observation and conceptual understanding provide a framework for the occasioning of a feeling. Feeling in this sense is the con­ necting and interactive factor between two natural objects, and thus indicates the actual communication or sharing o f two states of being. Hence, a proper feeling represents and leads to an insight or understanding of some unknown situation. Based on recognition derived from the feeling, one could come to configure one’s situation with all the factors considered. This is like construct­ ing an image or model of one’s position in the world which can be put to test in view of one’s actual experience and in light o f one’s historical existence. This is also like formulating a theory o f a natural phenomenon in which the cause and nature of the phenomenon are explained and made available to confirmation and corroboration. I f what is constructed and formulated does come to reflect or disclose a reality, one may be said to have a penetrating understanding or comprehension (tong). From being capable of observation to being capable of feeling and from being capable o f feeling to reaching comprehension, one may be said to be capable o f generating a gua without using divination. It is to be noted that it is in the reflection on the meaning of the gua, and perhaps of the meaning o f the divination, that divination is transcended and transformed into knowledge and enlightenment, which we may call creative understanding. The way in which one generates a gua with one， s creative understanding is where it can be said that one has made a creative or a creative-ontological interpretation o f the situation. This interpretation is creative because it takes one’s feeling and mind to achieve an understanding, and it is ontological because it presupposes experience of a reality to be identified by observation, feeling, and comprehension. As this situation is both ontological and interpretative, we may also call it onto-hermeneutical. Another way o f looking at the matter is that one must have first developed or possessed an onto-cosmological under­ standing of reality in order that one may apply it to a situation to generate a

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specific understanding o f the situation within the scope of the pre-understanding o f onto-cosmological understanding. Whereas divination relies on a particular method o f divination to generate such an onto-hermeneutical understanding, observation-feeling-comprehension generates such an understanding without appeal to any divination. As divina­ tion can be dispensed with in this mode of generating understanding in terms o f a gua, Confucius could say that “ I do not need to engage divination.," Xun Zi also could state that there is no need to do divination to achieve knowledge. As a matter of fact, one can have knowledge of a situation with divination and without necessarily generating a gua for understanding, but this does not mean that one can dispense with a pre-understanding o f an onto-cosmological reality in having knowledge or understanding the reality of a situation. This does not mean that one need not engage with the reality o f a specific situation for specific understanding o f the situation. There is always the element o f seeing, observing, feeling, reflecting, or comprehending the reality o f the situation, together with a previous or prior understanding o f reality in general. Once one has reached such a non-divinatory understanding, one can come to produce a judgment o f the situation in the use o f language. This use o f language is to describe the situation as one sees it and to draw practical evaluation o f the situation relative to one’s descriptive understand­ ing, just like one does when producing judgment with divination. To divine is to have knowledge of a situation with future implication, for evaluation and action. This is how interpretation as understanding is always ontological, and there is no better place to recognize this ontological engagement than to generate an interpretation or understanding of the situation. The origination of gua in feeling and comprehension provides a primary model in terms of which under­ standing as creative interpretation becomes possible. It is perhaps because o f the possibility o f this creative interpretation in the primary situation of divinatory iudgment, or in the generation o f nondivinatory comprehension (tong), that all other interpretations are possible. Here, let me first present the primary situation o f creative interpretation in both the divinatory and the non-divinatory ways (in the following, “ ↓ " indi­ cates “ leading to ， "and "←----"， ’ indicates “ being based on" )：

Yi: Understanding o f change ←----- guan (observation)

↓ Xiang: perception o f specific situation ←----- pu (divination) or kan (feeling)

↓ Gua: symbolic representation ←----- tong (comprehension)

↓ M ing: naming ←----- zhi (identifying use of language) Ci: judgment ←----- yan (descriptive and prescriptive use o f language).

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I f we generalize this to a situation of creative interpretation and understand­ ing o f a situation in which we need to appeal to the onto-cosmology o f the gua system, we can have the following: Understanding of reality Perception of a situation Description of the situation → Evaluation o f the situation Prescription of action. Now we can come to the generation of the Confucian Ten Wings of the YiZhuan, which are general interpretations of the gwa-situation with reference to the Yi text, but not excluding reference to a pre-understanding o f reality and a conceptual engagement with the reality of a specific situation. We will see that the Confucian Ten Wings, as general interpretations of the Yi text, have been made after thorough discussion initiated by Confucius and continued by his disciples. It can be presumed that Confucius had led and inspired his disciples in a thorough discussion of the Yi text and came to reach a general under­ standing and interpretation o f the Yi text. The Ten Wings are the results of such discussion and inquiry. Here my focus is on the dynamics o f creative interpretation, or ontohermeneutical interpretation/understanding of the Yi text, not on the dating or the historical verification or authentication of the Ten Wings or their temporal ordering or philosophical importance or implication. I consider them as being produced at about the same time and as inquiries into different aspects of the Yi text from different, but related, points o f view. Their difference is the differ­ ence between topical focus, and they share a commonness in not only originat­ ing from the Confucian discourse, but in illustrating the same onto-cosmological understanding o f change generated by a long background of guan. It is in this sense o f the Ten Wings texts that we see the Tuan (two parts) as intended to illustrate the onto-cosmological beginning or cosmogony. We see the Xiang (two parts) as intended to draw moral lessons on cultivation of the human person in light of the understanding of a situation. We see the Wen- Yan as developing the moral and cultural implication of the first two qua in a meta­ physics of the cultural and moral values. We see the Shuo as a logical effort to sort out the origins of qua and their philosophical significance and to explore the pre-hexagram background o f the metaphysical cosmology of the eight trigrams and their extended application by way o f imaging. We see the Xu as a treatise to focus on the meaning and reason of the sequence o f guas in a systematic coherence. We see the Za, also, as a short treatise focusing on the meaning o f guas as contrastive polarities, so that an order o f development of the guas can be understood. Finally, we see the X i-C i (two parts) as efforts made to bring out a synthetic and comprehensive understanding o f the ontocosmogony and onto-cosmology o f the changes together with their application to cultural inventions and moral cultivation. It is the work of interpretation from many hands in the Confucian School. This is the Formation o f the M ulti-

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Dimensional Understanding o f the Primary Model in the Ten Wings of the Yi-Zhuan. W ith this short description we can now present the production of the Ten Wings as the result o f efforts to interpret the Yi text in a creative way after the Primary Model, but in a reflective and integrative way that transcends divination yet still incorporates divination. What is important to understand is that in modeling after the Primary Model, one can see that the engagement with reality and reflection on reality, while dealing with the Yi text, are made at the same time. There will be no such interpretative results if one only focuses on the text without focusing on the Sache11 o f the text, which means here the reality of change as reflected in the onto-cosmology of the change: The Yi text as a whole or a part (single guas) + observation, feeling, and comprehension o f reality → The Ten Wings (Tuan, Xiang, Wen- Yan, Shuo, Xu, Za, and X i-C i). There are two observations to be m ade:( 1 ) one needs to see here that the production of the Ten Wings follows the Primary Model o f Creative Inter­ pretation with a reference to the Yi text. It is through the Yi text that the authors o f the Ten Wings are brought to pay attention to the onto-cosmology o f change. Hence, the Ten Wings are creative interpretations as well as ontohermeneutic interpretations; (2) it is clear that the production o f the Ten Wings is a production of another Yi text, which eventually is incorporated into the primary Yi text and thus the whole text becomes a Confucian classic. It is on the basis o f this comprehensive new text of the Yi that future creative interpretation and onto-hermeneutical interpretations are made. These can be illustrated in the development o f both the Xiang Xu (Images-Numbers) School in the Han times and the Y i-li (Meanings-Principles) School in the Song-Ming times. The turning point in Wang Bi also illustrates how an onto-cosmological and an onto-hermeneutical approach could make a difference, even though all are within the tradition and paradigm of onto-cosmological understanding generated by guan. It is through this tradition that philosophers, common people, and other scholars in history and literature are brought to engagement and confrontation with a reality o f creative change and so are able to continu­ ously draw inspiration for new meanings to give to old tests in the literary and philosophical tradition o f Chinese civilization. We may now generalize this process o f generating creative interpretation and onto-hermeneutical understanding in the language o f the Ten Wings (specifically the Xi-Ci). We may regard this process o f generating creative inter­ pretation as the Origin of the Interpretation or Understanding ( Yuan-quan or Yuan-jie):

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Observation (guan) and Feeling (kan) Comprehend comprehensive interpenetration (hui-tong) One Yin and One Yang is called the Dao The Yi has its Tai-ji Establish the Images (guas) to image ideas Attach judgments (ci) and exhaust language (yan) Observe images and play with judgments Observe changes and play with divination

Observation Comprehension Symbolization Systematization Divination Interpretation.

We can see that each step leads to the other, and the final step also merges with, or goes back to, the first step. This is how an onto-cosmological circle is completed and yet is ceaselessly circulating in an open process o f comprehen­ sive understanding and creative interpretation. We may also call these eight processes the eight primary principles of interpretation in the Yi tradition.

Conclusion Often we speak o f the Yi-Jing way o f thinking and describe this way o f think­ ing as characterizing the basic mode of Chinese philosophical thought. How­ ever, characterizing this Yi-Jing way o f thinking can be difficult, because there are many aspects o f the Yi-Jing way of thinking to be integrated into an ontological unity experienced by the sage or a well-cultivated human person. In our analysis above, we have demonstrated how the Yi-Jing arises from a process of observation and an act of integration o f observation and feeling in the observer into a comprehensive and penetrating understanding. The feeling o f a person toward a given situation must be explained as the natural reciproca­ tion and interaction between the yin and yang forces at work, which lead to the person’s direct experience of dynamics of a unity in duality. Then, each step in the five steps (mentioned above) could also be regarded as realizing or exemplifying a relevant but partial approach and access to understanding reality. Apart from comprehensive observation and direct penetrating feeling, there are also understanding and thinking o f reality by way o f images. These so-called “ images” are actually form-objects or process-events, which we may refer to as overt and ostensible (observable and feelable) things in the world. Hence, they are not arbitrary mental fabrications, but things couched in the thickness of world-reality. As our experiences o f things as images (xiang) can be said to be based on our feelings (gan) as reponses (yin) to things which affect our perceptions or sensations and feelings in concrete contexts, they are related to our cognitive language on the one hand and to our idea-intentions of the mind on the other. Even though Wang Bi has argued that once one reaches images, one can forget language, and one can forget images once they reach ideas in the mind,18 there

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is no necessity of doing this Neo-Daoist transcendent thinking in the larger tradition of onto-cosmological and onto-hermeneutical thinking about the Yi-Jing. Instead, one can see how events or things in the world in the first place, image-language or symbols for naming and describing them in the second, and mental activities in our ideas or feelings in the third place, form an ontologicalhermeneutical circle and a creative unity o f understanding. Thus, each o f them cannot be logically separated. It is in this sense that we can speak o f a genuine ontological understanding or interpretation o f reality. This understanding or interpretation of reality is no doubt always rooted and supported individually and collectively by comprehensive observations, individualized feelings, and holistic penetrating syntheses, which should eventually lead to an organically interrelated image o f things. From this point o f view we can see how Yi-Jing thinking is largely a dynamic, dialectical (as a dialogical and negotiative process), interactive, and integrative process o f thinking and understanding, neither fixing on objects as objects nor insisting on reducing things or presentations to the Husserlian phenomenological pure ideation. Our critical study o f the Yi text has shown how the Chinese way of understanding and thinking does not focus on anything essentialist simpliciter, nor follows simply phenomenological methodology. Instead, it consists in letting reality speak to us, and in our learning from real­ ity in concrete and yet context-transcendent and context-inclusive contexts. It can therefore be characterized as focal, contextual, trans-concrete, interrelated, and dynamic. It would, no doubt, be useful and rewarding to show how the Chinese ontocosmology in the Yi text and the onto-hermeneutics model in the Yi-Zhuan have modeled, shaped, and contributed to later development o f the Chinese philosophical tradition. The onto-hermeneutics o f the Yi-Jing has functioned as a primary model in substance, but also functions as a primary model in form, as well as in formless spirit. It is not so much a following or imitating or simulating, but a genuine inspiration and a call for thinking and under­ standing in creativity that has guided and inspired the development o f Chinese philosophy. In this sense, the Yi-Jing onto-hermeneutics has functioned as an emancipating force toward an onto-cosmological thinking in face o f an ontocosmological reality. We can point to the history of Chinese philosophy and show that the major trends o f the development of this history are guided, inspired, sustained, and enriched by this primary model of onto-cosmological and onto-hermeneutical thinking, knowing, understanding, and interpretation in the Yi-Jing. We can cite many telling examples and near-examples in the Han Confucianism of Dong Zhong-shu; Wei-jm Neo-Daoism o f Wang Bi and Guo Xiang; Sui-Tang Chinese Buddhism o f Tian-tai, Hua-yan, and Chan; the Song-Ming NeoConfucianism of Zhou Dun-yi, Zhang Zai, Shao Yong, the Cheng Brothers, Zhu Xi, Lu Xiang-shan, and Wang Yang-ming; and the Mid-Qin Textual

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Confucianism o f Dai Zhen, to make our points. Both changing and unchanging elements, both identity and difference, both closure and openness, both conserva­ tion and creativity, both traditionality and trans-traditionality can be illuminated and illustrated thus. Even in twentieth-century Chinese philosophy, one will achieve a better and deeper understanding only in light of such paradigms of ontological thinking and understanding in the Yi tradition.19 It remains a task to be accomplished in the future.

Notes 1 In the occult interpretation o f the meaning o f Yi (the change), the anonymous work Yi- WeiQian-Zao-Du o f the first century A D mentioned the three senses of the yi. It is not clear as to what these three senses o f y i actually refer to and how they are related. Zheng Xuan suggested in his commentary on these three senses that y i as simplicity means the natures o f qian and kun as firmness and softness, etc., y i as bian-yi means the change in terms o f yin and yang, and finally, y i as bu-yi means the structure o f organization in cosmos and reality in which changes take place. In my opinion, we may also suggest that these three senses apparently indicate three levels of understanding change: language of change as presented in the bamboo text o f change, which refers to the symbolic system of the y i in the ordered Yi symbols and their divinatory judgments; the reality o f change (bian-yi), which gives rise to the representations in the Yi text (yi-jian); and finally the underlying reality which remains unchanged. We may even suggest that this understanding is actualized in Zheng Xuan’s commentary on this: Zheng suggests a spontaneous process o f creation o f being (you) from nonbeing (wu) in which there is the beginning of heaven and earth. From them come the four forms, five powers, nine palaces, and twelve times. To bring these changes in terms o f eight trigrams and sixty-four hexagrams is what is intended by the concept of jian-yi. Apparently, we can see two processes here: from the Yi text to changes in the actual world and then to a reality beyond reality, the wu -source o f you; from the source of nonchange come the changes of things and from these comes the way of description in the system o f symbols. The two interpretations in Zheng Xuan do not need to be in conflict; the virtues of basic changes in nonchanges are given as principles (li), which may be conceived to exist before qi is stirred. 2 See Yi-jie Tang’s (1999) article “ Lun-Chuang-Jian-Zhong-Guo-Jie-Shi-Xue-Wen-Ti” [On the Issue o f Constructing Chinese Hermeneutics], in Collection o f Essays in Celebration o f the 80"丨 Anniversary o f Professor Wang Yuanhua, Shanghai, pp. 52-64. In this essay, Tang suggests that one cannot talk o f a Chinese hermeneutics until one knows Western hermeneutics well and until one comes to a firm understanding of the nature o f the commentarial tradition in the studies o f Chinese classics. This is indeed a correct observation, but one need not doubt the legitimacy o f a theoretical reconstruction or construction o f hermeneutical understanding in the Chinese classics which reflects the understanding o f the subject matter in the classics according to ways o f understanding that come to define the content and form o f thinking in the classics. That is the reason why any hermeneutical understanding is ultimately ontohermeneutical understanding because understanding must reflect a reality and Chinese under­ standing must reflect a life-world of reality open to the Chinese experiences of reality. 3 For a survey of the rise o f modern Western hermeneutics see Ormiston, Gayle L. and Alan D. Schrief (1990), The Hermeneutic Tradition, Albany: The SUNY Press. 4 See Gadamer's article “ Universality of Hermeneutical Problems” ，written in the 1960s and made available in his 1976 German book titled Philosophie Hermeneutik (Tubingen: J. C. B. Mohr). This article is translated into English and presented in Ormiston and Schrief,

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5 6

7

8 9 10 11

12

13 14 15 16

17 18 19

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The Hermeneutic Tradition, pp. 147—158. Habermas's critique is found in his article “ The Hermeneutic Claim to Universality” ，written in 1971, again translated into English and pres­ ented in Ormiston and Schrief, pp. 245-272. For Gadamer, hermeneutics is a universal discipline bearing on human understanding and interpretation, even though human understanding and interpretation occur in historically situated concrete contexts. See Gadamer's essay “ Reply to M y Critics” , originally presented in the same 1971 volume of Habermas, and translated into English and presented in Ormiston and Schrief, pp. 273-297. Plato has developed a metaphysics o f idea-forms as the standard o f reality which has influ­ enced the Western tradition o f hermeneutical thinking over the last 2,300 years. Heidegger, in the early part of the last century, rejected this approach and focused on the human person as the source o f metaphysical insights which, however, are then limited to finite persons. The Book o f Yi ( Yi-Jing) gives rise to the concept o f ben-ti (translated as “ original substance” ， “ origin-body" , or, better, “ rooted world-reality” )，in which the world-reality arises from a source o f creativity from which the human person arises and in which the human person can fully participate as a co-creative force. I used the term " Ben-Ti-Quan-Shi-Xue" [Learning of Interpretation from Ben-Ti] as early as the late 1980s in my lectures at Beijing University. Initial exposition o f this learning has been presented in my book Zhong-Xi-Zhe-Xue-De-HuiTong- Yu-Rong-He [Integration and Fusion o f Eastern and Western Philosophies], published by Knowledge Press, Shanghai in 1991, later reprinted under the title On Philosophic Spirits o f East and West in 1995. The term “ onto-hermeneutics” ，which I also adopted in 1991，stands for my term “ Ben-Ti-Quan-Shi-Xue” . I intend to leave the term “ onto-” or “ ontology” open for possible integration or interrelation o f Western being and Chinese “ origin-body” . Another reason for my skeptical criticism: there exists a good deal o f poetic criticism (such as we can find in works like Shi Fu, Wen Fu, Wen-Xin-Diao-Long, etc.) which could be organized as part o f a formal theory o f language and interpretation. In the sense Heidegger and Gadamer have described as the “ Sache” or the subject matter of the text. Note that there are levels, dimensions, or stages o f our understanding o f the y i as a worldreality o f change and transformation o f things, as indicated in earlier discussions. I have advanced a theory of the meaning o f the word ‘‘y i ” in light of overshadowing o f the sunlight by the cloud-vapor ( yun-qi) and the coming out o f the sun from the cloud-vapors. See my (1995) article “ Philosophical Significances o f Guan (Contemplative Observation): On Guan as Onto-Hermeneutical Unity of Methodology and Ontology"， in Bo-kun Zhu (ed.), International Studies o f I Ching Theory, N o . 1 , Beijing: Huaxia Publishing, pp. 156-203. See Xi-Ci, Part 1 , 8. " Ke-yu-you-shen-yi" is the same as " Ke-yu-shen-you-yi". It is intended here that if one is fully virtuous, spirits may come to one’s aid in revealing what reality is presented now. See Xi-Ci, Part 1 , 9. See Xi-Ci, Part 1 , 8. See Xi-Ci, Part 1 , 2. This does not mean that I subscribe to the theory o f the origins o f the Yi in the He-Tu (River Chart) and the Luo-Shu (Lo Script). On the contrary, both the He-Tu and Luo-Shu are capable o f being interpretea in light o f this totalistic image/understanding theory. See note 8 above. See Wang Bi’s Zhou- Yi- Yue-Li. See my recent (2002) monograph “ An Onto-Hermeneutical Interpretation o f Twentieth-Cen­ tury Chinese Philosophy: Identity and Vision"， in Chung-ying Cheng and Nicholas Bunnin (eds), Contemporary Chinese Philosophy, Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., pp. 365-404.

CHAPTER THREE

Hegelian, Yi-Jing, and Buddhist Transformational Models for Comparative Philosophy Robert Elliott Allinson The model o f comparative philosophy implies that two philosophies (or more) are lined up side by side and common features are extracted which are then compared with regard to more subtle distinctions. (Such philosophies can also be contrasted for differences as the main extra-philosophical activity.) It is not altogether clear what benefits accrue from such an activity in addition to the “ feel-good” factor of having been politically correct in showing an aware­ ness o f multiple cultures or the “ show-off” factor o f having displayed one’s academic prowess. A more generous onlooker to the comparativist’s activities might aver that the comparativist and her or his reader would also broaden their minds through coming into contact with viewpoints that differ from their own. However, unless the comparativist actively incorporated different view­ points into her or his own, the comparison/contrast in itself would only afford intellectual benefits. Such an incorporation of viewpoints (or a disgorgement of one’s own previously held viewpoints) would be extrinsic to the activity of comparison/contrast and would not constitute part o f the goal or process of such comparison/contrast. In order to separate the approach taken in this chapter from the afore­ mentioned comparativist approach, a more proactive model of “ comparison/ contrast” will be adopted within. From the standpoint taken by the present author, “ comparison” will in its very nature include the dislodgement of, or temporary disengagement with, some previously held standpoints and the incorporation o f new standpoints as part of, nay, the key part, o f the very activity o f “ comparison” itself. It therefore becomes questionable whether the label “ comparative philosophy” is appropriate at all. But what one is attempting to discuss is the very activity of the philosophical reader or inter­ locutor as she or he engages in the act of reading a philosophical text or taking part in a philosophical discussion. It is only that the philosophical text or discussion is made up of a broader base including philosophical viewpoints, prejudices, methodologies, and strategic goals which are not initially part o f one’s own philosophical tradition. That such a precondition merits the label o f “ comparative philosophy” is scarcely justifiable. But, to make an 60

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advance raid on the “ comparative” methodologies utilized, it is within the natural change process of the Yi-Jing framework that it is appropriate to utilize the language of “ comparative philosophy" fo r the rubric o f the ensuing discussion. That such an activity will in due course divest itself o f such a label is also natural and at the same time reveals its characteristic self-revisionary quality, a quality absorbed from the Hegelian tradition, which thus betrays itself as an equal part o f its heritage. Finally, such an eventual abandonment o f the antiquated label o f “ comparative philosophy” will prove salubrious, an effect which will also be consonant with the third dimension of the pro­ active immersing in and developing form o f philosophical activity endorsed and practised within the prescriptive role of the Chan Buddhist sage or the Western philosopher who has embraced the Nietzschean view o f the philo­ sopher as physician. I f one considers the Hegelian approach simpliciter, and in so doing conflates the dialectical interaction of concepts with the self-revisionary character of concepts that are two earmarks o f Hegelian philosophy, in the pure Hegelian form, two philosophies are perceived of as coming into a conflict. Thereafter, a resolution is derived via the dialectical process described by the German word, “ aufheben” . In aufheben, the two viewpoints are at first perceived as antagon­ istic to each other. Thus, in a sense, one may say that they come together, as it were, in a collision of opposites. (If there is no dialectical or self-revisionary element involved, the initial clash is fully definitive o f the interaction, in which case one is straddled with the outlook of Huntington and the doomsday view o f the ultimate clash o f cultures.) In the dialectical collision, the resolution is achieved by three stages o f conceptual transformation, a process which more or less occurs simultaneously, although it is described as if it occurred ad seriatim. The first stage o f the process is to jettison what is no longer relevant within the two opposing views. The second stage o f the process is to salvage what is o f value. The final stage is to synthesize what is remaining o f the two viewpoints so as to form a third viewpoint which contains something o f the two previous viewpoints and yet also forms a new viewpoint of its own which transcends either o f the previous viewpoints. The emphasis in the Hegelian model is on confrontation, destruction, preservation, synthesis, and the creation of something new. One is well reminded of the roles of the three Hindu deities, Siva, the destroyer, Vishnu, the preserver, and Brahma, the creator. I f the present author must carry out the assigned task o f a meta-comparison, that is, a comparison o f methods o f comparison, it is o f interest to commence with what is both especially characteristic and especially worth preserving in the Hegelian approach. In this regard, one commences with the second stage of preservation rather than with the first stage of destruction. But the sequence is a sequence which is only logically described as successive and in fact may come into being in any order of its three component parts. Here, it is most germane to the ensuing discussion to stress that the viewpoints must come into contact

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with each other in order for the process to begin. Thus, the Hegelian stand­ point discourages isolationism of viewpoints. The emphasis in the Hegelian interactionism of viewpoints is on the transformation of each participating viewpoint with a view to creating a third standpoint which will then become the standpoint that resolves the previously conflicting viewpoints. Thus, the goal o f the interaction is to create a shared standpoint for both interacting standpoints which is better than the standpoint that either severally possessed. This goal of achieving progress, or a better viewpoint, reveals a difference from the Yi-Jing standpoint simpliciter, which more closely describes a natural pro­ cess and a closer affinity with the Chan Buddhist goal of self-transformation. There is the suggestion that the new standpoint will, in time, be supplanted by another standpoint via the mode of coming into contact with a different stand­ point. The emphasis is thus on the process o f transformation rather than on the particular viewpoints obtained in the course of the process. This emphasis on process enhances the prospect o f constant and future interactionism in the hope o f obtaining better and better resolutions which will improve the stand­ points o f the participating parties. The emphasis is not on the obtaining of the right or the final viewpoint or else this will defeat the notion o f the continuous process of transformation and progress. Process is thus ultimate over sub­ stance or content. The point o f the Hegelian dialectic is the constant endeavor to improve one’s viewpoint and thus, in the end, the motivation for coming into contact with other viewpoints is self-alteration. Such a description o f the Hegelian dialectic highlights the goal o f the individual in her or his adoption of the dialectic and de-emphasizes the fact that the dialectical process itself is only interested in its own line of development. In the YinI Yang or Yi-Jing model of interaction, there is not so much motiva­ tion to go outwards to seek the other. The YinI Yang model requires a Hegelian seeking starting point in order to possess more than an internal objective of self-resolution. One could have just as easily argued that the Hegelian view­ point previously described was already being described by means of the Yinl Yang model of “ comparison” , as the Hegelian dialectic was being described from the standpoint of the subject philosopher of the dialectic rather than the Absolute Subject. This was already to display the vantage point o f the Yin affinity with the subject philosopher portion o f the Absolute Subject. The use of this terminology, however, might be getting ahead o f the reader as the YinI Yang terminology has yet to be described. It is already noticeable that in the very attempt to first describe the three viewpoints that are being “ compared”， one has already shown that one viewpoint needs the other viewpoint to enhance its own proper description. Granted such a starter, in the YinI Yang model of two viewpoints coming into contact with each other, the motivation and the process of resolution are somewhat different. In the model o f YinI Yang interactionism the two viewpoints replace one another in turn. This replacement is only temporary, because the temporal model of the process is cyclical.

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Nevertheless, it is not a complete replacement because the replaced viewpoint is always necessary and in fact is a constituting element o f the replacing view­ point. The replacing viewpoint always retains a portion o f the replaced view­ point so that the replacement is always a matter of degree. When the replacing viewpoint is, in turn, replaced by the previously replaced viewpoint, it, too, lingers behind in a matter o f degree. No viewpoint totally replaces any other viewpoint, so the mixture is always a mixture of two viewpoints. The differ­ ence is only one of degree and not one of kind. In addition, the two viewpoints are not perceived as in conflict with each other, but as being in collaboration with each other. Thus, the total viewpoint that one embraces at any moment is always a combination of both viewpoints. The only difference between one moment and another is that the combination will contain both viewpoints in different degrees o f ascent and decline. Differing viewpoints are perceived as needing each other in order to constitute a complete whole. The two view­ points collaborate, as it were, to produce the relevant standpoint which is perceived as most suitable to a current situation. There is no idea o f a simple linear or vertical progress. The model o f change is that o f a circle in which differing viewpoints replace each other in a succession. The motivation for the merging o f viewpoints is the obtaining o f a complete harmony o f differ­ ing viewpoints. While self-alteration may be considered to be an overarching motivation, the self that is altered is a self that expands and contracts, so to speak, rather than a self that changes itself altogether. Its opposing sides are not so much in conflict demanding a solution that is different than either one alone, but rather are colleagues who rule in turn leaving the other as a shadow cabinet until such time as its services are desired. The model is thus one o f collegial cooperation rather than self-alteration. How then to reconcile the two differing integrating modalities described so far? Should one utilize a Hegelian model o f self-alteration or a YinI Yang model o f collegial interactionism to sort out how to structure the process o f interaction? This question is indeed difficult to answer. Perhaps a key to answering this question is to consider more closely two aspects o f the Yinl Yang model o f interactionism which have not yet been fully explored. One aspect is that the qualities o f Yin and Yang are modeled after the feminine and the masculine principle. In the Hegelian dialectic, there is no such gender parallel. When Yin and Yang are in collaboration, there is the driving force o f the attraction between opposites. This masculine and feminine aspect o f Yin and Yang may perhaps offer a clue as to how to collate the Hegelian dialectic with the Yin I Yang model o f interactionism. In Yin and Yang, one must balance the masculine and feminine sides to achieve a proper harmony. Depending upon the needs o f the time, the Yin or the Yang may require more or less emphasis. Thus, the question o f how to collate the Hegelian with the YinI Yang models of interaction depends to a large extent upon the needs o f the time. I f the needs of the time are such that a greater harmony between differing viewpoints is

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desirable, the YinI Yang model o f interactionism may be preferable as a model to adopt over the Hegelian model of seeking self-alteration. O f course, in a way, both viewpoints can be used together. In seeking a harmony between different viewpoints, it may be that in the end a new viewpoint will be selected which becomes a third viewpoint that both previous viewpoints subsequently share. Alternatively, if the needs o f the time are such that a greater diversity of viewpoints is desirable, it may be that the Hegelian model of seeking self­ alteration and new standpoints might become more desirable. (Even within the greater world, cultural pockets may display differences that suggest the need for different approaches.) However, as such new standpoints are adopted, the standpoints will become richer and richer in the sense that they contain more and more diverse elements which are retained from previous standpoints, and as a result the new standpoint achieved might, in turn, require a further reliance upon a YinI Yang model of harmonizing its parts so as to achieve a greater stability. This in turn may break down and result in the need to reach out to find new viewpoints once again. In truth, the YinI Yang model o f interactionism is no more static than the Hegelian model. What has happened is that already a third standpoint has been developed, or at least alluded to, and applied without a full acknowledgment o f its existence or an accreditation o f its status. This third standpoint may be described as a prescriptive model that makes choices in response to best addressing the social or philosophical needs of its time. This prescriptive model may be said to have its antecedents in the Chan Buddhist model of the sage’s prescriptions and/or in Nietzsche’s model of the philosopher as the physician and the present author’s model o f the philosopher as the diagnostician and physician.1 This third model, which contains both the Hegelian model of new standpoints and the YinI Yang model of forces in harmony with each other, may function as a philosophical ombudsman. This may appear to be more a Hegelian than a Yinl Yang resolution. However, this is not completely the case, as, while the new standpoint emphasis might be a Hegelian element, the constant need to harmonize the new viewpoint with its own incorporated parts would be a YinI Yang element. There is another element o f the Yin I Yang viewpoint which might prove very fruitful for the future. In the Yin I Yang perspective, the Yin and the Yang are complementary to each other. Whatever process is more emphasized at any point in history, the reconciliation of the parts with each other or the reaching out for the forging o f a new viewpoint, both of these aspects must also be seen as complementary to each other in order for a complete picture to be formed. In this sense, it could also be said that the resolution to the question as to which model to utilize, Yin I Yang or Hegelian, is that it is both. One never really chooses one or the other; one always chooses both in a matter o f degree. The question as to which to choose already assumes a Hegelian prejudice as if an absolute choice is to be made. The answer o f both implies a Yinl Yang model

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of harmony rather than a Hegelian model of change. In this sense, it appears as if preference is given to the Yin I Yang model. However, the element borrowed from the Hegelian model is the element that a third perspective is always sought in which the differing viewpoints can join and thus reconcile their differences. In a sense, the model of progress is incorporated in this integration o f Yinl Yang and Hegelian viewpoints which is lacking in the YinI Yang movement simpliciter. It may be said that an entirely new model has been constructed that is constituted by both approaches, which may be symbolized by a spiral that sometimes returns upon itself and some­ times moves upwards and sometimes moves downwards. While this may appear to be more o f a Hegelian than a YinI Yang resolution, it must be stressed that it is not always an upward movement, but sometimes a downward move­ ment, that is required. Thus, progress is reconciled in some sense with harmony. It is difficult to offer a pictorial image of the three forces in concert. The circle is not an apt image, as sometimes one must reach back to the past to discover inspiration for the future. The very question as to which aspect o f the model is dominant is answered differently depending upon the needs o f the time. It is this third aspect that does not lend itself to pictorial representation. One may think o f the caduceus, the two snakes intertwined with each other that are the Appollonian and traditional symbol o f the medical arts. In this sense, two methods, that of East and West, are forever bound to each other. It is o f interest that such a bond makes use of the symbol o f the medical fraternity or sorority, which implies that the ultimate goal o f philosophy is that it be, or possess a kinship to, one o f the healing arts. Was this, in the end, the meaning o f the famous question of Western philosophy, why were the last words o f Socrates “ Pay a cock to Aesclepiu s"， the god o f the physicians? In this case the answer reveals that Socrates' last thoughts on the subject of philosophy is that it owed a debt to the science or art o f healing, to which it was the closest possible brother or sister and to which it owed its homage as the ancestor o f its own divine right and obligation sine qua non o f being and plying its activity on earth. It would be appropriate, after a reference to such an exalted calling and a self-induced obligation, to enter into a discussion which justifies such highstanding references. It would be of special interest to take note o f a littleemphasized feature of the Hegelian dialectical model o f transformation which is the transcendence o f the empirical dimensions o f history and the betterknown focus on the development o f a new, integrated standpoint that tran­ scends the limitations of the previous, correlated standpoints. The fundamental feature of the Yi-Jing developmental model that one may draw upon is the background awareness that whatever standpoint that is chosen as the mostneeded co-temporary standpoint is chosen as a standpoint with the full under­ standing that it is in part a cyclical choice, and that it may need to be replaced in due course by its supplanted other. In other words, the development is

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not only upwards in a spiral; it may also revert to an earlier stage o f develop­ ment although its reversion may not be to the identity it previously possessed, but will doubtless possess new characteristics. Thus, in the current age, the age o f analysis in Western philosophy has already reached its apogee and is on the decline. It is moving backwards, so to speak, to a concern with metaphysical philosophy. From the standpoint of the Yi-Jing, such a move­ ment in philosophy reflects the fact that change is a part of life and that change takes place when a viewpoint has reached its fullest development and needs to be replaced by the tendencies that it has suppressed. To keep to the present example, analytical philosophy has put paid to the purely speculat­ ive rational metaphysics of previous philosophers such as Hegel, Spinoza, Schopenhauer, and Bradley. It has succeeded in freeing the philosophical reader from accepting the deductive consequences o f accepting metaphysical assumptions or premisses. On the other hand, it has offered little o f its own to replace the premisses that gave previous philosophical readers much insight, comfort, and wisdom. To know that and why and how the statement “ The King o f France is bald” is false leaves the philosophical reader with even less than Mencius' bald mountain. Conversely, in such works as the present author’s A Metaphysics fo r the Future and Space, Time and the Ethical Foundations, new metaphysical premisses are being generated which are now phenomenologically grounded.2 Premisses are no longer assumptions. Now, metaphysics can be practised once more because internal checkpoints have been provided. This is fundamentally a new standpoint because, for the first time, necessary truths o f metaphysics are grounded on epistemological certi­ tudes. On the other hand, it is not entirely “ new” because it also reflects the principle o f the Yi-Jing that once a standpoint has achieved everything that it can achieve, it is natural that it recede into the background and the standpoint that it had been transplanting come into the foreground. A new standpoint has emerged which, from the Hegelian standpoint, incorporates both elements of the two previous standpoints, analytical philosophy and the older version of rationalist metaphysics and at the same time cancels the assumed premisses of rationalist metaphysics, and cancels the narrow preoccupations with lan­ guage o f analytical philosophy. It maintains some of the analytic carefulness of analytical philosophy by limiting metaphysical claims to previously experienced truths o f phenomenological epistemology. A t the same time, it satisfies the ancient Chinese philosophical need (utilizing the Hegelian insight o f transcend­ ing the empirical dimension o f history in that a huge gap has occurred between that ancient Chinese philosophical need and the co-temporary recognition of that need) to reconcile earth and heaven and points to man as the link between earth and heaven. A further word on the dimension o f the combined development that renders the “ comparison” trilateral. In the ancient Chan and Zen Buddhist tradition, the “ answers” provided by the sage were provided as prescriptions. In other

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words, skillful means or upaya were the grounds on which the answers were presented to student questions. The same question from two different students might receive two opposite answers from the master. Indeed, the same question by the same student might be answered in opposite ways on two separate occasions. The answer chosen by the sage was chosen in terms o f what the student was prepared to understand. Even the same student was at a different stage of development at different times. There was no simple right answer to the question. This is one reason why collected sayings o f masters appear self­ contradictory. Each student (or the same student at different times) might need a different answer to trigger her or his understanding to reach an enlightened state of mind. This is why written works (at least of certain types of philosophy) always suffer from an inherent flaw. On the other hand, one can learn from this approach. The new standpoint previously referred to may be taken as a dialectical development from the Hegelian perspective and as a natural development from the perspective o f the Yi-Jing. From the standpoint of upaya, or Nietzsche's version o f the philosopher as physician, the new standpoint that is chosen is not chosen wholly because it is the right or the true stand­ point, but because it best fits the needs o f the time, or it is the most appropriate medicine for the co-temporary cultural disease. It is interesting in this respect to contemplate that, while Nietzsche saw that the philosopher most closely followed the practice o f the physician, in ancient Chinese medical training philosophy, particularly a philosophy which understood the dynamics o f Yin and Yang, was an integral, if not the key aspect, of medical understanding. It should perhaps be pointed out that in Chinese medicine the ultimate con­ dition o f health was not considered to be a simple blend of Yin and Yang in which the patient’s condition reflected a quality o f 50 per cent Yin and 50 per cent Yang, but rather a condition in which the patient’s condition reflected a proportion of 65 per cent Yin and 35 per cent Yang. This reflects an ultimate bias in medical priorities in favour o f a condition that is less intense. To put it in another way, it would be, in Western medical terms, to favour low blood pressure over high blood pressure rather than an arithmetic mean between the two extremes. In philosophy, then, there is also a prescriptive dimension in the choice o f standpoints which one ultimately favours and ultimately champions. This is the third element in the philosophical triptych of philo­ sophical development. In terms o f content, it could be said that it is more Yin and therefore more feminine. O f course, this reflects the social needs of the time. But more than this, it reflects the need to feminize, to replace conflict with care and combat with creativity. Ultimately, the beauty o f the feminine is the lure to the production o f something new and it is the interaction o f male and female that is the dynamic process that gives meaning to life. It is this process and its importance that is highlighted by highlighting the feminine. It is in this sense that it may be said that the proper prescriptive proportion between the sexes (with respect to balancing feminine and masculine poles within

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the human being) is that of 65 per cent feminine and 35 per cent masculine. In co-temporary society it is obvious that the emphasis is clearly the reverse. The feminizing o f society is long overdue, though Lao Zi certainly sounded this note a long time ago. (This proportion may vary with the differing needs of society.) For a moment it would be wise to focus on the value of the little-known Hegelian emphasis on philosophy’s transcendence from the empirical dimen­ sion o f history. One may call this proactive application of philosophy, for lack of a better word, philosophical license. One may recall that for Hegel, in terms of dialectical development, the philosophy of stoicism preceded that of the philosophy of skepticism. For Hegel, this made philosophical sense, and it did not matter how these philosophical movements actually developed in history. It was not that Hegel was ignorant of their actual chronological order. He considered that this order was irrelevant as it only reflected how the two philo­ sophical movements had come into being in history, and had nothing to say about their philosophical relationship to each other. History was only an empirical manifestation of philosophy, and its manifestation of viewpoints was accid­ ental to the essence of their dialectical relationships. Historical emergence was of course necessary or else one could never become aware o f the possibility of the existence o f different viewpoints. However, once the viewpoints had emerged, it made little sense to pay that much attention to their historical order o f emergence. (While one could argue that Hegel was therefore a post­ modernist, his mixing of history is different from the random mixing of post­ modernism as his mixing serves a definitive, conceptual purpose which is most unpostmodern.) Once the viewpoints had emerged, what was important was to realize their dialectical relationship. Philosophy thus freed one from the prison of historical order. History merely provided data for philosophy; philosophy provided the means for the ordering of the data. It made much more sense, to Hegel, that the dialectical consequence of adhering to stoicism that the mind was not affected by historical events - would be to ultimately issue in skepticism —that one not only negated the world, but one discounted one’s own mind and its premisses as well. Once one began to doubt the world, there was but a short step to the doubting of the ideas of the doubter. This in turn led to the unhappiness of the consciousness. In historical order, it is well known that the Greek skeptics came long before the Roman stoics, but for Hegel what was philosophically significant was not the order of the ideas as they emerged in history. What was important was the internal connection the ideas possessed with each other. Likewise, it is of course true that chronologically speaking, Daoism and Buddhism preceded the philosophy of Chan Buddhism or Zen Buddhism. Thus, to interpret Zhuang Zi, for example, as a kind of Chan Buddhist always raises hackles on the backs of some Daoist scholars. But from the Hegelian dimension o f the trilateral proactive interaction with the history of philosophy it makes perfectly good sense to understand how, at least

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in part, Zhuang Zi is practising Zen. In fact, it is not only not a detraction to understand some of Zhuang Zi in these terms; without these terms one cannot understand Zhuang Zi in the fullest sense. In this respect, one is not practis­ ing comparative philosophy (was Hegel doing comparative philosophy in his Phenomenology o f M ind when he argued that skepticism was the dialectical development o f stoicism?) when one argues that one can understand Zhuang Zi better than he understood himself if one understands his philosophy as, in some respects, a development from the philosophy of Chan or Zen Buddhism. It also works the other way around. One can better understand the philosophy o f Chao Chou or Joshu through understanding the philosophy of Zhuang Zi. It is Zhuang Z i’s brilliant characterization o f the Dao in Wing-tsit Chan’s inspired translation as “ When the self and the other (or the this and the that) lose their contrareity, there we have the very essence of the Tao” that makes it easier to understand Chao Chou's “ The Great Non-Dual Tao” . The cryptic phrase, the non-dual Dao, is better understood, and perhaps only understood, through the understanding of the non-dual at the moment o f the experiential understanding o f the loss o f contrareity between self and other. It requires a personal experience o f the loss o f the distinction between self and other to fully understand the nature of non-duality, which cannot be understood very well as an objective state of some kind or another. Indeed, this understanding is further advanced when one understands the sayings o f the Sixth Patriarch that one must transcend - not think about - good and evil before one can achieve enlightenment. The enlightenment that one achieves requires an experiential moment o f special understanding. Is not Zhuang Zi better understood, nay, understood in the first place, only if one realizes that one must participate in an experiential moment o f special understanding made possible in the first place only by transcending the categories o f good and evil? And the special kind o f self-transformation that is the key theme o f the Zhuang Z i only makes sense in the light o f understanding how that self-transformation is to be achieved; it can only be achieved in that moment o f liberation when categories o f good and evil are deconstructed in a most marvellous moment o f innocence in one， s mind that is, after all, the Buddhist moment in which one recognizes one's original nature.3 Hui Neng (Wei Lam) or Eno, the Sixth Patriarch o f Zen, is utilized to understand Zhuang Zi. It is in this sense that Wordsworth’s fascinating poetic line can be under­ stood, “ The Child is Father o f the M an" . Hui Neng or Wei Lam (Eno) can be used to understand not only his successor Chao Chou, but his predecessor, Zhuang Zi. O f course, the father is also the father o f the child. The philosophy o f Zen can be considered to have arisen as a comparative outgrowth o f the philosophies o f Mahayana Buddhism of India and Daoism o f China.4 The Zen and the Chan Buddhist developments can be seen as a reaction to both original Indian Mahayana Buddhism and Chinese Daoism.5 Zhuang Zi can be used to understand Chao Chou.

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Back to the moral sphere. Armed with Hegel's transcendence from history - a kind o f nineteenth-century repudiation of Gadamer - one can examine Mencius' brilliant and singular thought experiment of the universal existence of a moral feeling.6 With regard to Western philosophy, to the best o f the knowledge of the present author, no such comparable thought experiment can be discovered in the literature. Whether or not one agrees with Mencius’ test, the point is that it appears that no Western philosopher has considered making comparable use of a thought experiment in the area of ethics.7 This is most surprising because test examples are made use of in epistemology. For example, one is reminded of Kant’s famous use of a thought experiment which forms the entire second argument of his four arguments, or metaphysical expositions as he prefers to call them, for the a p rio ri character of space in his Critique o f Pure Reason. Regardless of whether one finds this argument valid, its methodological character as a thought experiment is obvious.8 Mencius proceeds to offer an argument as to why his theory that human nature is originally good can find so few supporting historical examples. While Mencius does not explicitly articulate his “ defense” of the absence of historical instantiations o f good human nature either as a defense or in the terms so suggested here, nonetheless an interesting and very modern defense is offered in his famous Ox Mountain example.9 Mencius’ point, put in modern terms, is that conditioning alters the original tendencies. The cattle and the goats that feed on the original plants (the original goodness) represent the influence of external conditions. The axe that hews down the trees is a symbol, perhaps, o f the encroachment of technology on the original nature of human beings. Whether or not one agrees with Mencius' defense is not important here. What cannot be denied is that Mencius has provided an argument, albeit in a meta­ phorical form but an argument nonetheless, for the countless counter-examples that can be pointed to as evidence that his theory is invalid. His argument is one which, for Karl Popper, could not count as a valid argument because, according to the nature of the argument, no counter­ example could be found and thus it is non-falsifiable and therefore meta­ physical and therefore an invalid argument. But this would be to accept Popper’s critique o f metaphysics as a valid critique. According to Popper, Freud’s psychoanalysis would also be a metaphysics, but is Freudian theory completely ineffective in the application to psychotherapy? On the contrary, with suitable modifications (which are arguably minor in nature) it still represents the most influential and therapeutic set of guiding principles to psychoanalytic and psycho­ therapeutic practice. What o f epistemology? In a proactive “ comparison” of Western philosophy, one can compare Plato with Descartes. O f course, one is not really com­ paring Plato and Descartes. One is making use of the standpoint of Plato to criticize that of Descartes. While this would normally not be the preoccupation o f experts, as Platonic scholars would argue amongst themselves and Cartesian

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scholars likewise, if one is to enter the history of philosophy, armed with the Hegelian transcendence o f the empirical dimension, whether one enters into a proactive involvement with Western or Eastern philosophy, and in so doing actively “ compares” Plato’s arguments for the impossibility of discerning if one is waking or dreaming with those o f Descartes, it becomes evident that Plato’s arguments are more sophisticated, and are superior to those of Descartes. The Cartesian use o f the criterion o f coherence introduced in Meditation Y I is vulnerable to Plato’s argument in the Theatetus. For Plato argues that the criterion of coherence may be upheld by one in a dream state to be true of her or his dream state while she or he is dreaming. While Plato does not make this point explicitly, the implication o f his argument is that all viewpoints including those applying to the validity o f criteria may be ones introduced in either the waking or the dream state.10 The notion that a dream is incoherent or less coherent than a waking experience is a notion that is introduced from the standpoint o f the waking state, but during a dream state, the opposite argument may be introduced. Thus, the coherence criterion is not sufficient to dermarcate the waking from the dream state. In that event, it is impossible to know at any moment whether or not one is dreaming. I f this is the case, how is one to adjudicate between the claims o f one in a waking state and one in a dream state? I f it is to be objected that sleep and thus dreaming takes place during an eight-hour period and hence does not represent equal lengths, Plato would perhaps reply that such an observation obviously takes place during the waking state, which is then granted a preferential status. But during the dream state, no such inequality o f length can be observed. One can then add Zhuang Zi to the list of interlocutors. Why not? The argument o f Zhuang Zi extends even further. I f one reads between the lines, in the butterfly’s consciousness there is no length (or coherence) o f the human’s life and therefore the “ length” or the “ coherence” criterion is only a human criterion. To accept either criterion as valid is to accept the human state as valid. But this is the very question at issue. I f one considers the arguments of Zhuang Zi, it becomes evident that those o f Zhuang Zi exceed even those of Plato. Here, it is not a matter o f finding a philosopher who agrees with or who goes further than Plato. It is a matter o f expanding one’s viewpoint as the goal o f studying philosophy. One can enlarge this dialogue to include an interaction between Zhuang Zi and Descartes. One can “ compare” Zhuang Z i， s questioning o f the “ I ” most favorably with that of Descartes. In several places within the seven authentic inner chapters o f the Zhuang Z i, Zhuang Zi raises the question o f whether or not he is dreaming. In the most famous case referred to above o f the butterfly dream at the end of Chapter Two, the Qi- Wu-Lun, the classic reading o f the butterfly dream story is that Zhuang Zi has no way to tell if he is Zhuang Zi who has dreamt o f a butterfly or if he is a butterfly dreaming he is Zhuang Z i.11 In this reading o f the butterfly dream, Zhuang Zi offers no criterion whereby

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he can distinguish between his identity as Zhuang Zi or a butterfly. He even entertains the possibility that his own philosophizing takes place during a dream. Descartes, on the other hand, in his Meditation VI, thinks that he has dis­ covered a criterion, that o f coherence, by which he can distinguish his waking life from his dream life. But for Zhuang Zi, to paraphrase his argument, the criterion o f coherence o f a philosopher’s may be part of a butterfly’s (or a philosopher’s) dream. Zhuang Z i， s philosophy ranks with Plato’s in terms of its sophistication, for Plato, too, argues that there is no means o f claiming that our waking life represents reality. It is just that Zhuang Zi adds an imaginat­ ive hypothesis to Plato’s intellectual dilemma. Not only is it impossible to distinguish, but such an impossibility may be a part o f a butterfly’s dream. The inclusion o f Zhuang Z i’s “ arguments” in considerations o f Western - nay global epistemology, would represent an advance in epistemology proper. Both Plato and Zhuang Zi offer a more sophisticated solution than that of Descartes in this trilateral “ comparison” . Both ancients, one Greek and one Chinese, are more advanced than the temporally advanced Frenchman. ( If one wished to include a more recent figure, one could add the viewpoint o f Bertrand Russell to this mix, but as a coherentist his approach does not significantly differ from that o f the Descartes of Meditation VI.) Zhuang Z i’s butterfly illustration is a more colourful, and in some ways a less cryptic way, of making Plato’s point. For both Plato and Zhuang Zi, the Cartesian criterion of coher­ ence begs the question. I f one cannot, from the standpoint of Plato and Zhuang Zi, distinguish a waking state from a dream state, then one could be within a dream state when one considers that the “ waking” life is more coherent. To return to the domain of ethics, it is of interest to consider P lato's stance with regard to the question of the original goodness of human beings and his consequent position with respect to the individual or the social self, and “ compare” these two topics with the treatment to be found in Confucius. (For purposes o f discussion it is useful to perceive the various Platonic dialogues as backwards and forwards movements within Platonic thought.) From Plato’s point o f view, it seems that he must consider that the human being is possessed of original goodness (though he, like Confucius, does not say this explicitly) as he argues that if one truly knows what is good for oneself, one will do what is good. I f ignorance is the cause of evil, then the original nature must not be corrupted. This does not represent his complete argument, for he also states that ethical action (or justice) cannot be located in the individual but must be found in the State.12 This implies that the human being is social by nature. Where then is the individuality that supposedly forms the bedrock of the Western tradition? Contrariwise, can one at the same time find statements supportive of individuality in the writing attributed to Confucius? What o f the statement that, “ The Master said, ‘What the superior man seeks, he seeks within himself, what the inferior man seeks, he seeks in others.'" ？ 13 Where is the social self

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that supposedly forms the bedrock of the Chinese tradition? (This is not to say that one can find no statement supportive of a concern for society in Confucius. It is only to say that one can find statements which emphasize the importance o f looking inwards and acting in conformance with one’s individual principles.) What o f when “ The Master said, ‘Cunning words, an ingratiating face and utter servility, these things ... I find ... shameful. To be friendly towards some­ one while concealing one’s hostility ... I ... find it sham eful.'" ?14Is this evidence of encouraging one to fit into society or is it an advocacy of standing up for one's own values in the face of possible social disapproval? Where is the vaunted Confucian social self? Back to Plato. P lato's position is, o f course, a many-sided one. In the Meno, Plato is led to the conclusion that, empirically speaking, morality is divinely dispensed by a sort of divine lottery. While this is a position that Einstein would probably deplore, it seems to be more close to the theories o f quantum physicists today. While Plato could appeal to the argument that whoever was an evildoer simply did not know fully what was the good, he does not always so appeal nor does he have to. For he has posited another solution here. Empirically speaking, there are all sorts of mixtures o f good and evil out there. Plato is saying that Mencius and Xun Zi and Kao Zi are all right:15 what exists is a mixture of types. Essentially, o f course, he is more on the side of Mencius, and his argument is put to a special use. It is not put to the use o f justifying the need o f strong punitive measures to ensure that those who have been provided by lot with very little ethics are to be monitored and guarded against. It is only, one imagines, put forth to explain, as Mencius’ Ox Mountain argument, why such evil characters continue to exist and dominate the human stage. Fundamentally, Plato thinks that the evil types that do exist will be mitigated by the construction o f the ideal State. Those with empirical instantiations of the good natures will be preselected and properly educated to become rulers. They will also be provided with a lack of social incentives (axes, cattle, and sheep) to become greedy and power seeking. P lato's insistence on the details of a powerful social structure to ensure goodness are far more socialist 一even communist when one considers the lifestyle o f the rulers, soldiers, and police force —than individualist. By instigating a proactive dialogue between Plato and Mencius one can utilize Plato to implement Mencius’ ideas. Is this not a fruitful use of a proactive involvement with philosophy? What of the more usual instances o f “ comparative philosophy" ？Would it not be helpful to understanding the proactive model if one lingered for a moment on a more commonly utilized “ comparative set” ： that o f Zhuang Zi and Nietzsche?16 To forget the differences which are ones of rhetoric, polemic, and temperament more than anything else, the similarities are astonishing when one considers that the historical and cultural environments are so very differ­ ent. Both philosophers are great writers and poets, filled with sardonic insights, who play with traditional philosophers, make use o f animals, fools, and other

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social misfits to prove their cases, are brilliant literati, and, in content, come very close in certain key respects. Both argue for transcending good and evil; both argue against traditional moral argumentation. In both cases, as this present author has argued in other places, neither philosopher is a relativist, and while they eschew traditional moral argumentation, they both advocate a kind of moral transcendence which is not to a state of amorality or immorality but to a higher state o f affirmation; in Zhuang Zi, that o f self-transformation; in the case o f Nietzsche, that o f self-overcoming.17 Both are models o f self­ transcendence. Noticing both is not for the purpose of sitting back and, while twiddling one， s thumbs, glorying in the delight o f self-congratulation on one’s ability to collect philosophical butterflies and point out to a bored audience the comparable colours on their wings which are now pinned motionless onto the dead cardboard of one’s philosophical scrap-book. O f course, it can be said that noticing both is a reminder that the need for, and the desire for, self­ transcendence is universal. Noticing both is a method of discovering more examples and arguments that induce the subject reader to alter herself or himself. That each culture can in turn produce a Zhuang Zi and a Nietzsche is evidence that such thinking is universal and thus, in a way, provides a greater possibility for the validity of the standpoints that are advocated. O f course, the standpoints require the greater test of being ethically sound, but, if they meet this test, and also inspire self-improvement, the fact that such “ alien” cultures have produced such astonishing advocates of self-transformation is a fact that may motivate someone who feared that paradigms taken from her or his culture may be limited and parochial- who may have considered one of these view­ points a culturally bound standpoint - to embark upon the great philosophical journey of multicultural exploration and self-transcendence. By now, the benefits of the construction of a universal or intercultural data­ base for philosophizing may be evident. What, however, would be the benefits of a universal or transcultural methodology? The benefits of a universal meth­ odology would be that intercultural dialogue would be enhanced and there would thus be a better access to, and use made out of, the data common to multiple cultures. For example, if each party to a dialogue were to enter the dialogue with a methodology in mind that the purpose of the dialogue was to enhance understanding and that to enhance understanding might require an alteration o f one’s viewpoint, the prospect of a mutual understanding would be greater. If, on the other hand, one entered an intercultural dialogue to prove that one’s standpoint was “ right” ，the prospect o f mutual understanding would be minimal. I f one entered into an intercultural dialogue with the concept that one’s standpoint was superior and that one would listen to the other’s stand­ point so as to become more tolerant of the other, again, the prospect of mutual understanding would not be much better. In fact, the notion of tolerating the other would be less likely to lead to any self-alteration, as one would, in one’s enlightened toleration, already be right. One would indulge the other in the

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sense of tolerating the other, but one would not be inclined to alter one’s own viewpoint. This would severely lim it self-growth. Toleration implies that the other’s viewpoint is wrong and inferior, and thus is not conducive to an attitude of mutual respect. The concept o f tolerance maintains the idea that there is one coherent view and one primitive and alien view. In addition, one must be aware of the Fallacy of Pure Tolerance under which any view is tolerated irrespective of the content of that view. Some views are not to be tolerated, i.e., those views which are ultimately destructive of the very possibility o f the existence of multiple points o f view in the first place. The concept o f tolerance nearly always leads one to the concept o f Pure Tolerance, which is accompanied by its corollary o f the Fallacy o f the Equal Representation o f Points o f View. In this case, the tolerance is for a process o f comparison which undermines one o f the points o f view represented and ultimately the possibility o f compar­ ison itself. Under the blanket concept o f Pure Tolerance, real understanding cannot take place because full understanding requires the alteration o f one’s own absolute standpoints. Pure Tolerance is only a mask for prejudice, a cloak for maintaining one's point o f view and deftly devaluing the points o f view of others. Pure Tolerance is not a route to understanding. Pure Tolerance is a camouflage for maintaining one’s prejudices. Pure Tolerance is excellent cam­ ouflage; it deceives the onlooker and the wearer alike. It is only in the very process o f self-alteration and the adoption of the other’s standpoint that one comes to fully understand the other. And, when this is mutual, the other, in adopting the viewpoints o f its other, comes to understand its self as well. In the end, there are no longer two alien others, but an inter­ active, pluralistic, self-revising viewpoint which is made up o f elements taken from each other’s standpoint. The problem with the concept o f tolerance is that it is only really interested in the self tolerating the other; it is not that interested in whether the other tolerates —not to speak of understands - the self. The willingness to alter one’s premisses is the key element to achieving a truly intercultural understanding. It is only from the standpoint o f the other that one can truly understand oneself. One is reminded o f Henry M ille r's The Air-conditioned Nightmare. In the case of Henry Miller, he became a foreigner by living abroad in France for twenty years. It was only after going outside of his own culture to another culture that he was able, in the end, to understand his own culture. In an intercultural dialogue it is only when one realizes the limitations of one’s original position that one can truly understand the other. But one cannot know oneself until, or unless, one goes out of oneself. One o f the benefits of the intercultural dialogue is not only that one may come to know the other, but that one can come to know oneself. And one comes to know oneself, or, strictly speaking, one’s previous self, only in the process o f expanding beyond that self. The other is an essential element in self-understanding.

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The concept of tolerance of the alien other is a preventative to selfunderstanding. O f course, one also benefits from the other’s view of oneself. I f both standpoints are not incommensurably alien others, one can learn a great deal about oneself from listening to (not merely tolerating) the other. In addition, as one leaves behind one’s preconceptions of the other and one’s lack of understanding of oneself, one can more truly understand the lim ita­ tions of the other. This is, o f course, a two-way street. In a fundamental sense, what is occurring in the intercultural dialogue is the abandonment of the concept of a random assortment of mutually opposing cultures and a develop­ ment o f a pluralistic world culture. Or, to make this point even stronger, what one is ultimately capable of accomplishing is the ability to transcend all cultural limitations and to perceive the universal values that are common to all cultures. Proper intercultural dialogue is the key to understanding the universal fam ily o f man. Proper intercultural dialogue requires the sharing o f a common dialogical methodology. To summarize. In world philosophy today, it is valuable to take into account a trilateral model of development that incorporates elements taken from Hegelian, Yi-Jing, and Buddhist approaches to transformation. This is not an eclectic model, as eclecticism is an approach that simply borrows elements from various approaches and assembles them into a static collection. This model is a transformational model which is trilateral. One corner of the trian­ gle is the Hegelian angle, which keeps guard over the tendencies to dismiss philosophical trends or interpretations that do not follow the empirical, espe­ cially the chronological dimension of history. For example, the tendency to dismiss understanding of Zhuang Zi as possessing the strategic methodology of Chan because Daoism must be kept separate from Buddhism does not take advantage of this key aspect of the Hegelian approach. Another aspect of the Hegelian angle is the emphasis on continuous improvement. The methodology o f the Yi-Jing is utilized in that one must realize that one cannot only focus on improvement, but that one must recognize both the role of nature and the need to hold prior tendencies in reserve. The role of nature is recognized when one realizes that whatever improvements one desires to effect, one cannot force such improvements but must wait until their time is ripe. Thus, it would make no sense to attempt to forge new metaphysical philosophies during the heyday o f analytic philosophy. This would be to go against the current. It is equally important, however, not to give up on the idea of making change, but to hold one’s principle of change in reserve. Thus, the understanding that metaphysics is needed and will have to be supplied is held in reserve until the time is ripe for such forays. Such a strategy reflects, at the same time, upaya or the strategy o f skillful means. The philosopher as diagnostician and dispenser of philosophical medicine is another linguistic and cultural description of the understanding that philosophical approaches include a desire to effect mental health and/or enlightenment, and that such mental health or enlightenment can be achieved

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only when it is recognized what mental “ illnesses” or mental prejudices exist that keep the philosophical reader in a state o f mental imbalance. To refer back to the example o f analytic philosophy and metaphysics, it is important to recognize that analytical philosophy arose because it seemed that rational metaphysics offered no ready means o f identifying its various manifestations as being true. Empirical science was superb in this respect. In terms of knowing whether a statement “ it is raining” is true, one could look out­ side. The truth claim could be tested instantly via empirical observation. The result was an instantaneous confirmation or disconfirmation. How to apply such a truth standard to philosophy? It would seem to be an enormous benefit if one could. Thus, analytic philosophy developed because it offered something marvelous and much needed, to wit, a method o f finding truth. Indeed, it was all the more needed as the abstruse metaphysical philosophy which preceded it had become so speculative and so far removed from any easy means of discovering its truth value that the previous metaphysics had, in a large sense, brought analytical philosophy into being. The excesses o f rationalistic meta­ physics were the result o f the fact that metaphysics had become too Yang. However, what rationalistic metaphysics had contained were wisdoms that had become entangled and sometimes lost in their metaphysical expansion. It was important to understand Spinoza， s concept that G-d spoke with man's tongue, but this insight and the world view it exhibited were lost in the proof forest of verbiage and elaborate mental constructs that were employed to achieve the perceived need to develop a nonrestrictive or a universalist rather than a regionalist metaphysics. On the other hand, the Yin diet of linguistic analysis did not provide enough mental nutrition for the philosophical reader. Did those who believed in G-d believe in G-d because, as a part o f speech, G-d was a noun and a subject o f a sentence and because there was a subject o f a sentence it was wrongly deduced that a substance, G-d, existed? Great puzzles were left unsolved. I f mathematics was composed o f analytical, definitional truths, how was it that one could apply such empty, analytical truths to the universe at large? A metaphysical answer was needed. Epistemological truths that applied to nature were possible because man was part o f nature and nature was part o f man. It was only metaphysics, albeit a metaphysics o f a certain variety, that is, the right metaphysics, that could sort out some o f the remaining puzzles o f mankind. This metaphysics would itself be grounded on recognized epistemological truths while at the same time providing the tran­ scendental conditions for the possibility o f those truths existing in the first place.18 Metaphysics could flourish once again and provide wisdom for a spir­ itually malnourished human race, but this time it was to be a metaphysics that was carefully constructed within analytical boundaries. Analytical truths would prove to be the index o f metaphysical truths. That this meant that such analytical truths might not be simply analytical presented a different side to the story — but this would prove to be a bedtime story for a different night.

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Analysis and metaphysics come together in the fashion discussed above, serving at once as an example of an Hegelian development, a natural change, and a prescription for the spiritual needs of mankind. A metaphysics may be entered into that exceeds K ant's shortlist of permitted metaphysical subjects, G-d, freedom, and immortality. A t the same time, it is not an unrestricted meta­ physics cut loose from any recognizable and easily employable truth standard. One can utilize such an approach as hinted at above to consider ethical questions. In ancient Chinese philosophy, one can once more consider the example o f Mencius. Quing-ping Liu has argued in an extremely well-written recent article that there is an inconsistency in Mencius in that his justly famous example o f the child in the well is at odds with his insistence upon the priority of graded love,19 for the child in the well would make Mencius resemble Mo Zi rather than himself. I f one embraces the trilateral model as advocated above, this question resolves itself. The higher philosophy of Mencius, transcending the cultural biases of his age, is obviously represented by the child in the well example. It remains true, however, that any human being, culturally educated as one is today, would save one’s parents before one saved a stranger. But this is a separate question. Under the rubric of trilateral transformational philosophy, one attempts to sort out this question by, first of all, utilizing the Yi-Jing, calling upon the recessive or dormant strategies of analytic philosophy to dis­ tinguish two separate questions. One question is the question whether human beings possess a universally shared ethical instinct and this question is answered in the affirmative. A separate question is whether, on top of this instinct, one will always favor one’s kin, and the answer to this is affirmative as well. These two answers do not contradict each other; they are answers to different questions. Life is more complicated than whether one will always act to keep innocent children from death. There is also the question of how to help one’s family members, but it also does not mean that one’s helping instincts will be confined to helping one’s immediate or extended family members. By reach­ ing forward to analytic philosophy, one can solve an ancient puzzle. This can either be taken to be a defense of Mencius —e.g., this is what Mencius really meant - if one borrows the Hegelian transcendence of the empirical dimension o f history as a criterion; or it can simply be taken to be a modern version o f philosophy utilizing some o f Mencius' essential ideas, thus reflecting the Yi-Jing model that every Yin or every individual example, such as the philoso­ phy of Mencius, contains Yang and vice versa, that every universal problem of philosophy, every Yang, can find an illustrative answer in a suitable Yin example. One can solve a problem o f modern philosophy, assuming it to be a problem of modern philosophy, namely, whether one’s natural inclination to assist one’s family members shows a graded version of universal love, by deferring to Mencius for an answer. Mencius’ answer, if this interpretation be allowed, is that universalist compassion does exist and a preference for one’s family mem­ bers exists alongside of it. One is not always being called upon to help one’s

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family members. Ethical action which transcends the demands of one， s family is frequently demanded of one. A t the same time, if one is presented with a conflict between helping one’s family members and strangers, o f course one will choose to help one’s family members or friends first. But this does not prove that one does not possess a universal love for all o f mankind. It only shows that certain special contexts reveal the primacy of family love. Outside o f these special contexts the conflict between love of family and love of stran­ gers is a pseudo-conflict. There is always the presence o f the feeling o f universal compassion. It can also be argued that the example of Mencius discussed above and the solution to the “ problem of universal versus graded love” represents an example of upaya, or a doctor’s prescription for the co-temporary age, because the mental disease of the co-temporary world is the disease of skepticism, relativism, and the loss of family values. In this way, universalism and family values are restored with one blow. It would be o f great interest to explore how all four o f Mencius' famous seeds of morality can be seen to apply to test cases of morally relevant situations. Space decrees that an analysis can be limited to an explanation o f one o f the seeds, that of righteousness. Righteousness keeps a person from abandoning the moral way. A good ethical puzzle is one provided by the real-life question posed in Simon Wiesentha' s brilliant work, The Sunflower.20 In The Sunflower, the question is asked, should one, if asked, forgive the Nazi soldier on his deathbed for brutally murdering innocent Jews so that this one Nazi can go peacefully to his G-d? This was the question which was actually put by a young dying Nazi soldier to Simon Wiesenthal when, as a Jew, Simon Wiesenthal was in a concentration camp. Could Simon Wiesenthal, as a Jew, forgive this Nazi for what this Nazi, a dreaded member o f the SS, had done to other Jews? Dostoevski raised this question in The Brothers Karamazov and argued that the mother of the murdered child had no right to forgive, on behalf o f her child, the murderer for murdering her child. How could the mother forgive the murderer for the pain he had caused, not to her, but to someone elsel But this answer is not simply given. For in Simon Wiesentha' s book, thirty-two distin­ guished contributors are asked to answer this question and the question is not always answered in the same way. Those polled for their answers include such figures as Jean Amery, the Dalai Lama, Cardinal Franz K önig, Primo Levi, Herbert Marcuse, Desmond Tutu, and Harry Wu. I f one considers Mencius’ seed o f righteousness, a hint o f what grounds on which one may answer is provided. I f one is righteous, for example, it could be argued that this would prompt one to recognize the limits o f one's capacity for forgiveness. Some crimes are too disgraceful and repugnant to warrant being made “ all right” by forgiveness. One could not then forgive the Nazi for crimes perpetrated against his Jewish victims. This is one answer to Simon Wiesentha' s question that he poses in The Sunflower. One can reach back to the ancient Chinese philosophy

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of Mencius and fast forward Mencius to the present (thus making use of the Hegelian transcendence o f the empirical dimension o f history) and at the same time utilize the Yi-Jing (unrestricted forgiveness as being too Yin), to answer the question “ should the Nazi brutal murderer be forgiven?” in the negative. In fact one could go even further and ask whether one ever has the right to forgive an objective evil. But this takes us, perhaps, too far afield. In the end, if one is guided by the Buddhist notion of upaya, utilizing skillful means to point to the answer that works best for mental health and moral improvement, the solution of nonforgiveness is better for mankind. For if one forgives and thus perhaps then forgets the Holocaust, the atrocities of the infamous “ medical” experiments o f the Japanese Unit 731, the Japanese rape of Nanjing, and other immoral horrors, they may well repeat. Unless one remembers history, there is no chance of learning anything from history. I f civilization is to progress morally and not only technologically, it can reach back to ancient Chinese philosophy for moral nourishment. This is not to say that this is the only place for moral nourishment to be found, but the employ­ ment o f the Hegelian- Yi-Jing-Buddhist transformational model provides clues as to how mankind can transform itself in a healthy style. And mental/moral health appears to be a much-needed kind of health at this time. Just as it was a Chinese city, Shanghai, which was virtually the only place in the world that was willing to accept Jewish refugees from the Holocaust, and great diplomats such as D r Feng Shan Ho, the Chinese Consul in Vienna from 1938 to 1941, who numbered among the few that were willing to risk their lives to rescue tens o f thousands o f Jewish refugees in real life, in philosophy, one can turn to Chinese philosophy to rescue civilization from its moral malaise. When D r Feng Shan Ho was asked why he had done what he did, he answered that it was out of compassion. The tens of thousands whose lives he had rescued never knew who it was who had saved their lives. Can one find a better example of the application of Mencius’ definition of moral action than this? For Mencius, one acts morally not for the sake o f recognition and approval, but out o f com­ passion for suffering. D r Feng Shan Ho died unrecognized by the government he served and cut o ff from his pension. Where is all o f this leading? Can the Hegelian- Yi-/mg-Buddhist model for transformation interact with ancient Chinese philosophy in such a way that a new standpoint can be formed that can enhance the cause o f moral progress? In the world today one sees signs of moral degeneration. In this past century one saw many examples o f the massacre of civilians. One may of course point to other past centuries to find abundant examples as well. But the point is, if the twentieth century was supposed to have been such an example o f intellec­ tual progress, how can one account for the Nazi massacre of innocent Jews in such a calculated and premeditated fashion and with such horrifying and cruel methods? One must bear in mind that one and a half million children made up the total o f the six million massacred Jewish people. Given the percentage of

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the existing Jewish population o f the world, this constituted over ninety per cent of all Jews in the world. How, in contemporary America, can child mur­ derers emerge; a new event in history? How, in turn, can the not infrequent murder of school children occur? Is this not also another historical precedent? Can one consider this past century to have been a civilized century? It was a century in which literacy was at an historical high. I f this past century was an example of high culture and high civilization then perhaps Rousseau was correct. Civilization is the cause of the moral degeneration o f man. And Josef Mengele, a Doctor o f Medicine, a lover o f music, and one who had studied Dante, was a most civilized man. One must recall that the atrocities o f Nazi Germany were not the actions of a single depraved dictator or a military mob but were the reflected actions o f an entire nation and a government democratically elected into office, which made use o f civilian mass transport and which carried out these barbaric actions continuously over a period of several years. The twenty-first century shows signs o f even further moral decay as if that were possible. In the twentyfirst century, innocent civilians were used as passengers on manned bombs that were aimed at buildings in which innocent civilians were working. Immoral means o f warfare condemned in the past as beyond the human pale, such as biological warfare, become common means o f dispensing weapons o f destruc­ tion in everyday envelopes intended for everyday innocent civilians including one ninety-four-year-old woman. A ll o f these acts are justified in terms o f the need to call attention to a country’s alleged abuses against other countries as if this were the only legitimate means of calling attention to one’s catalogue o f that country’s alleged social injustices. Can such acts as sending civilians to their doom and cutting the throats of female flight attendants en route be morally justified? Can such acts be called acts that stem from a moral point of view? From a point of view, no doubt. But how can such a view be honoured by referring to it as one view o f morality among others? If, armed with the HegelianBuddhist model o f transformation, one reaches back to the past and adopts a Confucian definition o f culture, such a problem may be obviated. In the Confucian definition o f a cultured person, a person is not considered cultured unless the person has achieved an ethical actualization. M orality is considered an indispensable attribute o f culture. One cannot, by definition, be cultured, even if musically educated, if one has not achieved a moral personality. Thus, retrieving this Confucian definition is an enormous asset in sorting out a most vexing problem,C ivilization is not necessarily a cause of barbarism, as Rousseau feared, or an instrument for the refinement o f the ways in which cruelty may be enjoyed, as Dostoevski sardonically observed; civilization without its moral attribute may indeed be a cause of barbarism, but then civilization without its moral attribute cannot be considered civilization. A point o f view lacking a moral attribute cannot, a fo rtio ri, be referred to as a moral view.

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For example, when referring to a cultured person, Confucius makes a pro­ found demarcation between humanity as the hallmark of a cultured person and religious practice or musical appreciation in the Analects (Lun Yu): The Master said, “ What can a man do with the rites who is not benevolent? What can a man do with music who is not benevolent?"21 In this passage, Confucius states that a person who possesses no humanity can possess no meaningful relationship to religion or music. It is evident from this statement that humanity is something that can, and in fact must, be possessed as a separate trait from ritual observance and musical appreciation, as it can and must be separated from ritual observance and musical interest. Because ritual observance may not be considered a sine qua non of culture, it will suffice to concentrate on Confucius’ awareness of the fallacy of identifying an ethical life with a life of musical enjoyment. With a Confucian definition of culture, one who had not attained to morality would not be considered a cultured individual. Mengele was not a civilized man according to Confucius. Mengele was a barbarian. Mozart is not enough to constitute civilization.22 Civilization requires the attribute o f morality. Such is the contribution o f Confucius. This is an application of the doctrine of the rectification of names.23 One can borrow a methodological principle from Chinese philosophy to solve a problem of Western 一 nay - world culture. Civilization can be restored to its ancient (Chinese) meaning which includes, as a necessary component, a moral self. This ancient Chinese meaning may now be shared with the world as a whole such that civilization in name and deed can be returned to its true meaning. One may not, with legitimacy, refer to the calling for the death o f all civilians of one race, or one nation, or one religion, as the expression o f a moral view. To call a spade a spade, it is the expression o f an immoral view, not a moral one. It seems to be of enormous interest that by digging into the ancient philo­ sophy o f China one may discover an ancient truth which can be applied to bring an important corrective to the twenty-first century. In order to create civilization, moral education is required. Without moral education the prospect of repeating the barbarism of the previous century cannot be ruled out. Here is an example o f how opening the West to China can create a benefit not only for the West, but for the world as a whole. Indeed, it can also create a benefit for the East, for, ironically, in its contact with the worst part of the commercial West, China is in danger o f losing its own Confucian heritage. This chapter up until this point has emphasized the trilateral character of proactive philosopmcal subject reader-book, subject discusser-discussant inter­ actionism. The example of turning to Confucius to sort out a vexing problem in Western thinking is a good example of the value that coming into contact

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with new views, the fruitful dimension o f dialectical philosophy, possesses for the world today. O f course, one can also comprehend this as Yang turning Yin, as Western philosophy becoming more and more conscious o f the need to turn to Eastern philosophy. One can be educated in culture and civilization providing education includes a moral education in addition to an intellectual, physical, and aesthetic educa­ tion. This is not the last insight to be derived from an openness of both traditions, Chinese and Western, to each other, but it does display the advantages o f openness and can therefore serve as an incentive to shed the coils of a useless comparison o f viewpoints and to engage in the active process o f altering one’s viewpoint so as to form a more humane and complete philosophical model for understanding and acting properly in the world today. The ultimate lesson may be that one must remain in a continuous state of openness to the other, that is to say, to such views that show such openness in return. One cannot, in the world today, continue to regard the other as an alien other. Advances in transportation and communication have brought what were previously considered to be alien others into instant contact. Technology has vastly outstripped moral advances. The cart is well in front o f the man, not to speak o f the horse. The rapid advances in technology have resulted in unforeseen moral crises. Moral dilemmas appear that need solutions that are not provided for by the technology that has produced them. Moral con­ sciousness must transform itself swiftly in order to attempt to keep pace with technological advance. The “ other” is only another empirical instantiation o f the self. The self and the other are wedded in a Yin! Yang harmony such that the self becomes the other and the other becomes the self. Yin/ Yang harmony is a model of collaboration, not one o f conflict and competition. I f cultures are perceived of as alien others destined for collisions and conflicts, then the outcome will most likely be a self-fulfilling prophecy. I f cultures are perceived o f as brothers, the prospects of harmony for the family o f man will be great indeed. As Confucius has said, “ A ll within the Four Seas are his [the superior man， s] brothers.， ， 24

Notes 1 Cf. Allinson, Robert Elliott (2001),A Metaphysics fo r the Future, Avebury Series in Philosophy, Aldershot: Ashgate. 2 Cf. ibid.; Allinson, Robert Elliott (2002), Space, Time and the Ethical Foundations, Aldershot: Ashgate. 3 Cf. Chapter 1 , Autobiography, Hui Neng, “ The Sutra Spoken by the Sixth Patriarch on the High Seat o f ‘The Treasure o f the L a w ^\ Wong, Mou-Lam (trans.) (1929), Hong Kong: Hong Kong Buddhist Press. 4 Cf. Allinson, Robert Elliott (1988), “ Taoism in the Light o f Zen: An Exercise in Intercultural Hermeneutics” ，Zen Buddhism Today, v o l.6, Kyoto, November, pp. 23-38.

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Cf. ibid.; Allinson, Robert Elliott (1975), “ The Buddhist Theory of Instantaneous Being: The Ur-Concept o f Buddhism” , The Eastern Buddhist, vol. V III, n o . 1，Kyoto, May. The entire issue of the legendary quality o f the Indian origin o f Zen can also be understood as irrelevant from the Hegelian understanding of the notion of philosophical rather than historical devel­ opment. The Indian origin may be as valid, philosophically speaking, as the stoic origin of the development o f skepticism. 6 Mencius, 2A:6. 7 For a fuller treatment of this topic, cf. Allinson, Robert Elliott (1989), “ An Overview of the Chinese M ind” ，in Robert Elliott Allinson (ed.), Understanding the Chinese Mind: The Philosophical Roots, New York: Oxford University Press, 1989, 2000 (tenth impression), pp. 1-25. In the case o f Plato’s use o f the ring of Gyges, there is a fundamental dissimilarity in the use of the example. In the case o f the ring of Gyges, the question is, would a man be unethical if he wore the ring? There is no comparable test of ethical behavior. In the case of Leontius, the example is also put to a different use. Leontius cannot tear his eyes away from dead bodies. Once again, the test is whether one can resist temptation, not whether one would necessarily feel a sense of compassion for fellow human beings. One could argue, however, that Mencius claims that one will feel the feeling of compassion whether or not one is ob­ served by others and in a sense is thus wearing the ring o f invisibility. Nonetheless, the test is not one of resisting temptation; the test is whether one will feel a sense of compassion for an innocent child who is about to lose her or his life. 8 For an elaboration as to a new interpretation and a new importance of Kant’s arguments here, cf. Allinson, A Metaphysics fo r the Future; Allinson, Space, Time and the Ethical Foundations. 9 Mencius, 6A:8. 10 “ … and in fact, our time being equally divided between waking and sleeping, in each con­ dition our mind strenuously contends that the convictions of the moment are certainly true; so that for equal times we affirm the reality of the one world and of the other and are just as confident o f both ” ；Theatetus, 158 BC. It could be said, though Plato did not say this, that there is no need to choose which mental state represents reality, the waking state or the dream state. This could be the message o f the Zhuang Zi. I f one is not forced to choose, it is possible to consider that both waking and dream states are related to each other in a complementary manner. Such a relationship is already betokened in art movements such as surrealism and in stream of consciousness writing. The psychotherapeutic techniques o f Freud and Jung show a strong awareness o f the need to recognize the complementary perspectives o f waking and dream life in order to achieve a more healthy mental state. The messages o f Plato and Zhuang Zi need to be distinguished from the message of skepticism (to which the standpoint of Zhuang Zi is often compared) though on the surface they seem to resemble each other. Sextus Empiricus writes that “ Sleeping and waking, too, give rise to different impressions, since we do not imagine when awake what we imagine in sleep, nor when asleep what we imagine when awake; so that the existence of non-existence of our impressions is not absolute but relative, being in relation to our sleeping or waking conditions” ； cf. Outlines o f Pyrrhonism, Chapter XIV. But for the skeptics, they keep on searching for the truth (Chapter I), whereas for Plato, in this case, it cannot be found (so there would be no point in searcnmg for it), and in the case o f Zhuang Zi, at least in the common interpretations, it also cannot be found. O f course in Zhuang Zi, unlike that o f Plato or the skeptics, the dream story carries a higher significance as an analogy to the need for enlightenment. Cf. Allinson, Robert Elliott (1989, 1996), Chuang-Tzu fo r Spiritual Transformation: An Analysis o f the Inner Chapters, Albany: SUNY Press. 11 Allinson, Robert E .(1988), “ The Concept o f Harmony in Zhuang Z i” , in Robert E. Allinson and Shu-hsien Liu (eds), Harmony and Strife: Contemporary Perspectives, East and West, Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, pp. 169-183.

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If one considers Plato’s examples o f the ring of Gyges and Leontius who was unable to tear his eyes away from the spectacle of dead bodies, one could argue that these represent indicators that human nature is not naturally good. But these examples do not necessarily represent Plato’s last word on the subject. These examples are susceptible to other interpretations, such as they may be examples in which the individuals do not really know what is good, or examples in which such problems would be obviated by a civil life such as one would find in the Republic. Or, as suggested in the body of the argument above, the examples might be covered by the divine random dispersal of good traits. Analects (Lun Yü), 15.21. Analects (Lun Yu), 5.25. For an attempt to sort out a solution to these puzzles, cf. Allinson, Robert Elliott (1998), “ The Debate Between Mencius and Hsün-Tzu: Contemporary Applications” ， Journal o f Chinese Philosophy, v o l.25, n o . 1， March, pp. 31-50. Cf. Allinson, Robert Elliott (1986), “ Evaluation and Trans-Evaluation in Zhuang Zi and Nietzsche” ，Journal o f Chinese Philosophy, v o l. 13, no. 4 ， December, pp. 429—443. Abstracted p. 326. in Philosopher's Index, 1987 Cumulative Edition, v o l.X X I ， Ibid. Allinson, A Metaphysics fo r the Future; Allinson, Space, Time and the Ethical Foundations. Liu, Quing-ping (2001), “ Is Mencius’ Doctrine o f ‘Commiseration’ Tenable?” ，Asian Philosophy, v o l. 11， no. 2, pp. 73-84. Wiesenthal, Simon (1969, 1998), The Sunflower, On the Possibilities and Limits o f Forgiveness, New York: Schocken Books. Analects (Lun Yü), 3.3. This is said despite the late Isaiah Berlin’s statement, in his account o f Tolstoi, that “ We find the works of Mozart and Chopin beautiful only because Mozart and Chopin were themselves children o f our decadent culture, and therefore their works speak to our diseased minds; but what right have we to infect others, to make them as corrupt as ourselves.” Cf. “ Tolstoi and Enlightenment” ，in Henry Hardy and Aileen Kelly (eds) (1979), Russian Thinkers, Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, p. 255. It is entirely possible, though it is not clear from the essay, that Sir Isaiah, normally a most perspicacious thinker, was merely restating Tolstoi's view. O f course, it might be that Sir Isaiah’s view (or Tolstoi’s) would find support from the example o f Josef Mengele, the worst of the death-camp doctors in Nazi Germany, who cruelly experimented on inmates. Xun Zi once spoke of zheng-ming, or the rectification o f names. There is a need now, in the West, or, what is more properly a global region in which philosophy is to be carried out, to become aware o f the existence o f this essential philosophical activity o f the rectification of names. Cf. Xun Z i, Book 22. To rectify a name, for Confucianism, was to return the name to its proper use, which meant in accord with its ancient meaning. O f course, this activity meant more than simply using language correctly, as its major emphasis was on orienting persons to engage in appropriate activities. Analects (Lun Yü), 12.5.

CHAPTER FOUR

Becoming-Being Complementarity: An Account of the Yin-Yang Metaphysical Vision of the Yi-Jing* Bo M ou

Introduction It is known that the Yin- Yang metaphysical vision of the Yi-Jing (I Ching), reflecting some collective wisdom of ancient Chinese people on the nature and fundamental features of the universe, has fundamentally influenced the orientation of mentality, and the way of metaphysical thinking, o f subsequent Chinese thinkers in various schools or movements. To understand how classical Chinese philosophy could contribute to the common philosophical enterprise in regard to metaphysical investigation as well as to understand the orientation and characteristics of Chinese metaphysical thought, the Yin-Yang metaphysical vision o f the Yi-Jing is one of the most important sources. Before presenting the main points to be made in this essay, I need to first make necessary preliminary clarifications of some key terms. First, by the term “ the Yin-Yang metaphysical vision of the Yi-Jing” , I mean a set of related metaphysical perspectives and their guiding insights that are revealed in the Zhou-Yi (the Yi-Jing text in its narrow sense), which consists o f the sixty-four ideographic symbols, the hexagrams,1 and their respective explanatory texts (i.e., gua-ci and yao-ci). In this way, the Yin- Yang metaphysical vision o f the Yi-Jing is explicitly distinguished from some metaphysical views suggested in the commentary part called the “ S hi-Y i” (the Ten W ings)， 2i.e., the Yi-Zhuan, of the Yi-Jing text in its broad sense; those metaphysical views, to a large extent, are subsequent Confucian interpretative elaborations of the Zhou- Yi text. Second, when using the term “ Yin-Yang” to label the metaphysical vision under discussion, I do not depend on how those subsequent Confucian commentators/ interpreters used the terms “yin” ， ''yang", or " yin-yang" in the Ten Wings; rather,

* This essay is a revised version o f an invited essay under the same title whose German version was published in Polylog: A Journal o f Intercultural Philosophy 7 (2001), pp. 42-51.

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I turn on these basic textual facts:(1 )the Yi-Jing text comprises the hexagram 一” or the yang-yao “ 一” and their explanat­ text, which consists of the yin-yao “ 一 ory text (the gua-ci and the yao-ci): (2) what yin-yao and yang-yao, when standing alone, denote are, respectively, those entities that the terms “yin” and " yang" are used, rather than mentioned, by us to denote; (3) though having been taken as a trade-mark term in ontological study in the history of Western philosophy, the term “ being" , when in contrast to the term “ becom ing"， is intended to denote the stable, regular, definite, unchanging aspect or layer o f existing things.3Throughout this writing, the term “ being” is used in the afore­ mentioned sense in contrast to “ becoming” . In this essay I focus on elaborating one fundamental guiding insight o f the Yin-Yang metaphysical vision o f the Yi-Jing, i.e., the guiding insight concerning becoming-being complementarity, which I render philosophically interesting and significant, but which somehow fails to be adequately emphasized or even fully realized. For that purpose, I intend to show:(1 ) the Yi-Jing presents two complementary metaphysical perspectives to look at things in the universe, i.e., the changing/becoming-concerned perspective and the unchanging / beingconcerned perspective that point respectively to the two most fundamental modes of existence in the universe, rather than merely the former one; (2) the two complementary metaphysical perspectives are guided and coordinated by a fundamental Yin-Yang guiding insight in the Yi-Jing which renders even the most fundamental modes o f existence, changing versus unchanging and becoming versus being, likewise complementary; (3) I thus call into question an alleged Yin-Yang metaphysical view which, though taking many other opposites as being Yin-Yang-complementarily constituted, separates being and unchanging from becoming and changing and renders the former inferior to the latter regarding metaphysical status. M y strategy to make the aforementioned points is as follows. First, I high­ light the metaphysical-vision aspect of the Yi-Jing, among its various aspects, and explain the multiple dimensions o f the metaphysical vision o f the YiJing. Second, through examining and explaining the metaphysical status and nature of the ideograpnic signs, the yin-yao and yang-yao and the hexagrams in the Yi-Jing, I endeavor to show that what comes into play in the Yi-Jing are two metaphysical perspectives, the changing/becoming-concerned per­ spective and the unchanging/being-concerned perspective, rather than the former alone. Third, I intend to show that the underlying guiding insight of the Yin-Yang metaphysical vision in the Yi-Jing, which guides how the two basic metaphysical perspectives play their roles, is a thorough Yin-Yang guid­ ing principle, which renders even the most fundamental modes o f existence, changing-becoming and unchanging-being, likewise interacting, interdepend­ ent, interpenetrating, and complementary. Finally, I discuss the significance of the Yin- Yang guiding principle o f the Yin- Yang metaphysical vision o f the Yi-Jing.

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Yi as changing-unchanging The Yin- Yang metaphysical vision of the Yi-Jing is typically identified with one single metaphysical perspective that highlights and celebrates the chang­ ing or becoming aspect of things. The Yin-Yang metaphysical vision is thus often identified simply with the becoming-concerned metaphysical perspective. Nevertheless, I argue that the Yin-Yang metaphysical vision o f the Yi-Jing is not a mono-simplex as the becoming-concerned metaphysical perspective alone, but instead is a multi-layered metaphysical complex in the following three senses. First, the Yin-Yang metaphysical vision of the Yi-Jing consists of both its perspective dimension and its guiding-principle dimension. Second, unlike a single-perspective metaphysical view that turns merely on one perspective sim­ plex, the perspective dimension o f the Yin- Yang metaphysical vision consists of both the becoming-concerned perspective and the being-concerned perspective. Third, accordingly, the guiding-principle dimension of the Yin-Yang metaphysical vision consists in a reflective guiding polymerization of becoming-concerned and being-concerned perspectives which takes neither priority o f becoming over being nor priority o f being over becoming, but regards becoming-changing and being-unchanging as complementary Yin-Yang opposites in an organic unity. In this way, the Yin-Yang metaphysical vision in the Yi-Jing is not identical with the becoming-concerned metaphysical perspective alone; rather, it is not only compatible with, but also includes, the being-concerned perspective as one indispensable component of its perspective dimension, although the becomingconcerned perspective is certainly one indispensable component of its perspective dimension, and although the becoming-concerned perspective becomes dominant in the later Confucian commentary Yi-Zhuan. In this section, I focus on the aforementioned second point: the perspective dimension of the Yin-Yang metaphysical vision is not one perspective-simplex but a dual-perspective-complex which consists of both becoming-concerned and being-concerned perspectives that point respectively to the becoming-changing aspect and the being-unchanging aspect of things in the universe. The being-concerned perspective in the Yi-Jing text is highlighted primarily through two basic ideographic categories: the category o f yin-yao “ —- ” and yang-yao “ 一 ” ，and the category o f hexagrams like " 巨至" . In the following, I explain how the two categories of ideographic symbols employed in the Yi-Jing text function to present the being-concerned metaphysical perspective in the Yi-Jing.4 Let me first examine the case o f yin-yao and yang-yao. The ideographic simplexes yin-yao and yang-yao, i.e., the ideographic symbols yin-yao “一 一 ” and yang-yao “ 一"， are used in the Yi-Jing text to refer, respectively, to what might be characteristically called “ the YIN-yang universal” and “ the YANG-yin universal” for the reason to be explained. The yin-yao “ 一 一 ” and yang-yao “ 一” alone point respectively to the two most basic, mutuallyopposed, but interdependent and interpenetrating forces that exist in everything

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o f the universe, in various and distinct ways insofar as each o f wan-wu (ten thousand things) has its own distinct identity. The two kinds of forces might be identified, in more or less metaphorical terms, as the negative, passive, yield­ ing, weak, and deconstructive yin force and as the positive, active, aggressive, strong, and constructive yang force. They constitute the two most fundamental components o f the universe: they present themselves as the unchanging in changing and the being in becoming. The ideographic symbolization via the yin-yao and yang-yao presents one o f the earliest attempts by human beings to generalize and abstract the being-aspect of the universe (in this case, what is shared by everything in the universe) into the fundamental metaphysical categories through ideographic symbolization. In this connection, the Yi-Jing text reveals a certain distinct being-concerned metaphysical perspective. In contrast to Platonic generalization and abstraction in this regard, which result in absolute one-ness in the Platonic Heaven, the Yin-Yang metaphysical generalization in terms o f the yin-yao and yang-yao represents a complementary and interpenetrating “ two-ness” within this universe: that is, two mereological collections5 o f concrete and specific parts in the following sense.6 What the yin-yao “ 一 一” alone denotes, i.e., what I call “ the YIN-yang universal” ，is the mereological whole o f those yin parts as the concrete and specific yin forces scattered in the individual or concrete things throughout the universe. By the same token, what the yang-yao “ 一” alone denotes, i.e., what I call “ the YANGyin universal” ， is the mereological whole o f those yang parts as the concrete and specific yang forces scattered in the individual things throughout the universe. ノ A collection as a mereological whole is not sometning abstract above, or separate from, individual and concrete things (material objects or dynamic processes). Now let me briefly sketch how the category of hexagrams like “ 互目" is em­ ployed in the Yi-Jing to present the being-concerned metaphysical perspective in another way. Each hexagram in the Yi-Jing is intended to denote a certain pattern of changing or Dao-guided changing process in the universe. One can say that, when identifying changing patterns and changing directions via the sixtyfour ideographic hexagrams and their internal structures and mutual structural connections, the Yi-Jing text focuses on the being aspect o f things through its being-concerned metaphysical perspective in another way: various individual and particular changes reveal multiple patterns o f regularity and directionality as the multiple hexagrams ideographically suggest. In this way, what the hexagram itself delivers in the Yi-Jing is a being-concerned metaphysical perspective; the hexa­ gram itself, as an ideographic symbol, is employed as an instrumental apparatus to carry out the aforementioned being-concerned metaphysical perspective. The two categories o f ideographic symbols used to deliver the beingconcerned metaphysical perspective in the Yi-Jing are closely connected with each other. On the one hand, the changing and unchanging in the universe result from the interaction between the two interdependent and interpenetrating basic forces yin and yang; the hexagram is constructed out of the ideographic symbols

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yin-yao “ --" and yang-yao “ 一" . On the other hand, the interaction of the yin and yang forces proceeds through a certain changing pattern and in a certain process o f its progress or during a certain period o f its development; the ideo­ graphic symbols yin-yao “ — ” and yang-yao “ 一” thus achieve their new meanings in the context o f the hexagram. What a yin-yao denotes, in the context o f the hexagram, is a yin-dominant stage of a dynamic event or developing process of something that follows a certain pattern rather than a pure yin force. A t this stage, the yang force of the event or process does not disappear but co-exists, or is correlated with, the yin force; it is an indispensable contributor to the devel­ opment in a certain direction and through a certain pattern. This is the reason in the context of why I call what the yin-yao denotes “ the YIN-yang universal” ： the hexagram, the term “yang” after the term “ YIN " in the phrase “ the YIN-yang universal” serves as a reminder of the indispensable role played by the yang force and as a referring expression which denotes the yang force at that yindominant stage of a dynamic event or a changing process, although the yang force is not in its dominant state at that stage of the changing process. In this way, the ideographic symbol yin-yao “ 一 一 ” or the term “ the YIN-yang universal” —” or the term means two related things. First, when used alone, the yin-yao “ 一 “ the YIN-yang universal” denotes the yin force as characterized before; in this case, the term " yang" in the name “ the YIN-yang universal” is used to highlight the interactive and interpenetrating relation between the yin force and the yang force. Second, in the context of the hexagram, the yin-yao “ -” or the term “ the YIN-yang universal” denotes the yin-dominant stage of a changing process at which the yang force is also an indispensaole contributor to the changing or development in a certain pattern and is denoted by the term " yang" in the phrase; in this case, the term “yang” in the phrase “ the YIN-yang universal” is used to denote the complementary yang-component in the yin-dominant state. The same holds for the yang-yao “ 一” or the term “ the YANG-yin universal” . However, as always emphasized in the literature, the becoming-changing aspect o f the universe is one central concern in the Yi-Jing text. As the preced­ ing discussion o f how the being-concerned perspective in the Yi-Jing plays its role shows, the being-concerned and becoming-concerned perspectives actually interactively and complementarily play their roles in the Yi-Jing; in taking the being-concerned perspective, the Yi-Jing always keeps an eye on the con­ crete changing process so that each ideographic hexagram is illustrated or explained by a certain concrete situation characterized by its gua-ci and yao-ci. The point is that the Yi-Jing simultaneously takes its being-concerned and becoming-concerned metaphysical perspectives. There is no doubt that one central concern of the Yi-Jing is with changing-becoming processes in the universe; but the Yi-Jing never denies, but emphasizes, that there is always something unchanging in changing, something Dao-guided in the seemingly chaotic, something definite in the indefinite, and something stable in the unstable. Now the question is this: how is it possible to take the two seemingly

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opposed metaphysical perspectives in a harmonious way? In this aspect, the Yin- Yang metaphysical vision of the Yi-Jing suggests some more fundamental guiding principle at its guiding-principle dimension, which guides how the two metaphysical perspectives complementarily function in the Yi-Jing text. The fundamental guiding principle might be called “ the Yin-Yang metaphysical guiding principle” ，which constitutes the core idea o f the guiding-principle dimension o f the Yin-Yang metaphysical vision o f the Yi-Jing. It is arguably right that the point explained above is also somehow highlighted by the linguistic meaning of the title of the Yi-Jing. It is known that the ideo­ graphic character “y i" means both changing and unchanging; metaphysically speaking, what the Yi-Jing text, via its key term “yi"， p oin ts to is thus not merely the becoming-changing aspect o f the universe, but also its being-unchanging aspect; the Yi-Jing text takes the being-concerned perspective as well as the becoming-concerned perspective. Thus, one can say that, in contrast to some standard and popular translations o f the title o f “ the Yi-Jing” into “ the Book o f Changes” ，a seemingly more inclusive paraphrase of the title so fa r might well be “ the Book o f Changing and Unchanging” —as the discussion proceeds, a more proper paraphrase which is based on the current paraphrase but is also to capture the aforementioned fundamental Yin-Yang guiding principle will emerge in the next section.9

Yi as the unity of changing-unchanging: the guiding principle of the Yin-Yang metaphysical vision As mentioned in the preceding discussion, behind the being-unchangingconcerned and becoming-changing-concerned metaphysical perspectives lies a more fundamental guiding principle, the Yin-Yang metaphysical guiding prin­ ciple, which constitutes the core o f the guiding-principle dimension o f the Yin-Yang metaphysical vision. The Yin-Yang guiding principle is suggested and presupposed in the Yi-Jing text to guide how the two metaphysical perspectives operate, and to unite them as two complementary metaphysical perspectives into a unified Yin-Yang metaphysical vision as a whole. From the point of view o f the Yin-Yang guiding principle, the being-unchanging aspect and the becoming-changing aspect of the universe are its two most fundamental aspects, which themselves constitute a most fundamental pair o f yin and yang as the basic modes o f existence; they thus, respectively, constitute the fundamental metaphysical foundations o f the being-concerned and becoming-concerned metaphysical perspectives. The core idea o f the Yin- Yang metaphysical guiding principle lies in its fundamental metaphysical insight that the being-unchanging aspect and the becoming-changing aspect are two elementary but complementary modes of existence; they constitute one of the most fundamental pairs o f yin and yang forces in the universe. This insight implies that the being-unchanging aspect

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is not just something constructed conceptually, but a fundamental ontocosmological constitutional force. Indeed, on the one hand, things in the universe always keep changing, and everything evolves in process. The becomingconcerned metaphysical perspective in the Yi-Jing is intended to capture this essential becoming-changing aspect of things. However, on the other hand, although things in the universe keep changing, things keep their beingunchanging aspect in at least one of the following four ways. First, things always keep their own identities at any stage of their changing process. For example, in the first hexagram, Qian-gua, the image employed to illustrate the changing pattern suggested by Qian-gua is the dragon; the dragon keeps its own identity as the dragon throughout the whole changing process, rather than altering itself into something else. Second, as the denotations of those hexagrams o f the Yi-Jing text indicate, things evolve or change in the course o f certain patterns or in certain fundamental ways (i.e., the daos in Chinese terminology). Third, as the denotations of the yin-yao and yang-yao in the context o f the hexagram indicate, the internal interaction between the comple­ mentary yin and yang forces universally exists in everything and throughout the course of changing; thus there exist the YIN-yang universal and the YANG-yin universal as explained before. Fourth, the Yi-Jing characteristically emphasizes the harmonious stability between the opposing forces at each of the stages of the development process of things. Although the harmonious stability is a kind of dynamic equilibrium, this metaphysical characteristic, as highlighted in the Yi-Jing, might well be adequately characterized in terms o f being-unchanging in changing-becoming rather than in terms o f changing and becoming alone. Indeed, in this connec­ tion, the dynamic character comes into play to achieve harmonious stability and thus results in the dynamic equilibrium. The being-unchanging aspect, or a variety of being-unchanging aspects as specified above, constitutes the fundamental metaphysical foundation o f the being-concerned metaphysical perspective; under the guidance of the Yin- Yang metaphysical guiding principle, the latter is intended to capture the former when coming into play together with the becoming-concerned metaphysical perspective. Let us consider some possible objections. One might object this way: isn’t the changing-becoming aspect of the universe considered as absolute while its unchanging-being aspect is considered as relative, so that the former is indeed superior to the latter regarding metaphysical status? It is important to note that, from the Yi-Jing point of view, throughout one thing’s changing process, the thing keeps its own identity and evolves in the course of a certain changing pattern; changing and becoming are thus intrinsically related with unchanging and being. In this sense, one might as well say that unchanging and being is absolute and fundamental to the same extent as changing and becoming is absolute and fundamental, and that changing and becoming is relative to the same extent as unchanging and being is relative. One might further object in

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another way: given that becoming/changing and being/unchanging per se con­ stitute a pair of yin-yang contraries, doesn’t their yin-yang complementarity relation itself go with its exclusive becoming/changing character when it is characterized in terms of interacting, intertransforming, and interpenetrating? So eventually becoming/changing is still superior to being/unchanging regard­ ing metaphysical status. This view fails to do justice to the yin-yang complement­ arity relation as revealed in the Yi-Jing in several ways. First, metaphysically speaking, the yin-yang complementarity relation is not something that exists above and beyond, but lies in, the actual function of wan-wu (many particular, individual, and concrete things); wan-wu, as the subjects or agents of the yinyang complementarity relation, have their own identities which are logically and metaphysically prior to their functions. In this sense, and to this extent, even if the yin-yang complementarity relation could be characterized exclu­ sively in terms o f becoming and changing, it is neither logically prior nor metaphysically more fundamental to its subjects and agents, which have, in­ trinsically, to meet their own identity conditions. Second, as far as the yin-yang complementarity relation per se is concerned, it is incomplete and one-sided to think that the characterization o f such a relation should be exclusively in terms o f becoming and changing. For, as indicated in the preceding discussion o f the fourth way in which things keep their being-unchanging aspect, the dynamic character of the yin-yang complementarity relation, which is specified in terms of interacting, intertransforming, and interpenetrating, is intrinsically connected with, or comes into play to achieve, harmonious stability, and thus results in the so-called dynamic equilibrium. Eventually, the crucial point is still this: from the point o f view o f the Yin-Yang metaphysical vision, the being-unchanging and the becoming-changing as two fundamental modes of existence of each thing are not, and cannot be, separated from each other, but are interdepend­ ent, interactive, intertransforming, and interpenetrating into each other, at a ll metaphysical levels at which becoming and changing comes into play; the YinYang metaphysical principle thus renders indispensable and complementary the becoming-concerned and being-concerned metaphysical perspectives. It is interesting to note that the point in this regard is also highlighted by the multi-meaning o f the title o f the Yi-Jing. As mentioned before, the ideographic character “yi"，in this context means both changing and unchanging; the Yi-Jing text points to not merely the becoming-changing aspect, but also the beingunchanging aspect; the Yi-Jing text takes the being-concerned perspective as well as the becoming-concerned perspective. There is one more point: the two metaphysical perspectives are united by the Yin- Yang guiding principle in the aforementioned sense. It is arguably right that, with the multiple related meanings o f the term “ yi"， a more suitable paraphrase o f the title “ the Yi-Jing” might be “ the Book o f Unity o f Changing and Unchanging” ，not merely “ the Book of Changing and Unchanging” and much less “ the Book o f Changes” . As paradoxical as it appears to be, the title o f the Yi-Jing hits the point home:

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guided by its Yin-Yang metaphysical guiding principle, the Yi-Jing text simul­ taneously takes two complementary metaphysical perspectives that look re­ spectively to two fundamental aspects of everything in the universe: the changing-becoming aspect and the unchanging-being aspect.

Significance of the Yin-Yang metaphysical guiding insight As I see it, the significance of the Yin-Yang guiding principle concerning becoming-being complementarity as examined and elaborated in the above discussion is threefold: its historical significance; its metaphysical significance; and its methodological significance. First, as far as its historical significance is concerned, the Yin-Yang guiding principle concerning becoming-being complementarity, if the elaboration given before is right, would highlight an important metaphilosophical idea suggested in the Yi-Jing and thus render at least incomplete a quite widely circulated Yin-Yang metaphysical view. This view, on the one hand, considers many other seemingly opposed contraries as yin-yang complementary but, on the other hand, explicitly or implicitly rejects the most fundamental modes of existence, becoming-changing and being-unchanging, as yin-yang complementary, but instead renders the former superior to the latter regarding metaphysical status. In this way, if my elaboration o f the guiding principle as presented before is correct, this partial Yin-Yang metaphysical view would fail to capture one central idea of the Yin-Yang metaphysical vision as revealed in the Yi-Jing text and thus, historically speaking, fail to be a complete account of the Yin-Yang meta­ physical vision in the Yi-Jing. Despite this historical interest in clarifying the Yin-Yang metaphysical vision of the Chinese classic Yi-Jing, my primary interest is in its metaphysical significance and its methodological significance. Second, as far as its metaphysical significance is concerned, the Yin-Yang guiding insight itself suggests a view of the fundamental nature and structure of the universe through its guiding how the being-concerned and becomingconcerned metaphysical perspectives are related to each other. Let me high­ light several points in this connection as explained in the preceding discussion: (1 ) the becoming-changing and the being-unchanging themselves, as two funda­ mental modes of existence, constitute an elementary pair of yin and yang contraries; (2) they are thus complementary in the sense that they are inter­ dependent, interactive, intertransforming, and interpenetrating; (3) they enjoy equal metaphysical status to the extent that neither could exist without the other and neither is absolutely dominant over the other. Third, as far as its methodological significance is concerned, the Yin-Yang metaphysical guiding insight guides us to endeavor to look at various aspects or layers of an object under reflective examination and to identify different perspectives, which look respectively to various aspects, as distinct but comple­ mentary approaches. For the Yin-Yang metaphysical guiding insight concerning

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becoming-being complementarity essentially takes various aspects of a thing in the universe as yin-yang complementary. Methodologically speaking, what the Yin-Yang guiding insight, as a methodological guiding principle, directs us to look at is not limited to a metaphysical object in metaphysical studies; instead, one can bring under examination any object that deserves reflective investiga­ tion. The methodological point of the Yin- Yang metaphysical guiding principle does not lie in mechanically locating some being-aspect and becoming-aspect of any object of study indiscriminately;10 rather, in the spirit o f dynamic yinyang complementarity, the Yin- Yang methodological guiding principle, as sug­ gested by the Yin- Yang metaphysical guiding principle discussed above, is to guide us to a balanced holistic understanding of various aspects or layers of the object and renders indispensable and complementary different and distinct methodological perspectives that aim to capture the distinct aspects.11

Notes 1 A hexagram, say, “ H ” , comprises two trigrams, say, “ 三 ” and “ 三 三” . A trigram consists of three lines, divided or undivided; the divided line is called “yin-yao" and the undivided line " yang-yao" (I will give more attention to the meanings and functions o f the yin-yao and yangyao in the subsequent discussion). A hexagram thus consists o f six yin-yao or yang-yao. 2 The Ten Wings, i.e., the Yi-Zhuan, consists o f the following ten commentary texts: two parts of the Tuan-Zhuan (the commentaries on the gua-ci), two parts o f the Xiang-Zhuan (the elaborations of the meanings of the gua-ci and the yao-ci), the Wen- Yan (the commentaries on the first two hexagrams, the Qian-gua and the Kun-gua, and their gua-ci and yao-ci), two parts of the Xi-Ci-Zhuan (the appended remarks), the Shuo-Gua-Zhuan (the remarks on certain trigrams), the Xu-Gua-Zhuan (the remarks on the order of the hexagrams), and the Za-GuaZhuan (the remarks on the hexagrams). Before the Han Dynasty (206 BCE-220), the Ten Wings were separated from the Yi-Jing text; the Han Confucians combined them with the YiJing original text into the Yi-Jing in its broad sense. 3 A prominent example o f using the term “ being” in this sense is Parmenides’ case, though Parmenides assigned much inflated import to the term “ being” in his philosophy. In the history of Western philosophy, the two characteristic uses o f “ being” are somehow closely connected with each other in some philosophers’ minds: because the stable, regular, definite, unchanging aspect of an object is considered as the defining or crucial aspect o f the object that is supposed to give the essence of the object, the metaphysical study o f being as existence is considered as essentially the study of being as the stable, regular, definite, and unchanging in existence. 4 A relevant discussion in this respect is given in Mou, Bo (1998), “ An Analysis of the Ideographic Nature of Structure o f the Hexagram in Yi-Jing: From the Perspective of Philosophy of Language” ，Journal o f Chinese Philosophy, v o l.25, no. 3, September, pp. 305-320. 5 The term “ mereology” means the (mathematical) theory o f the relation of parts to the whole. Its two major versions are S. Lesniewski’s formal theory o f parts and N. Goodman’s calculus o f individuals. It is important to note that a mereological part-whole characterization o f the world is by no means incompatible with the so-called “ qi.” -oriented metaphysical view, typically held by some classical Chinese philosophers, to the effect that qi, a kind o f fluid vital energy, constitutes the most fundamental stuff out o f which everything in the universe condenses and into which it eventually dissipates. (Cf. those discussions on qi in the Zhuang Z i and by Zhang Zai in the Song Dynasty.) For qi reveals itself as wan-wu (ten thousand things), and such ten thousand things might well be characterized in some mereological terms.

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Bo M ou For my discussions o f why the Platonic one/many problem was not consciously addressed, and o f how the characteristics o f Chinese language bear on ontological insights addressed in the classical Chinese philosophy, see Mou, Bo (1999)，“ The Structure of Chinese Language and Ontological Insights: A Collective-Noun Hypothesis” ，Philosophy East and West, v o l.49, n o . 1 ,January, pp. 45-62. In his recent book, Event and Substance: Metaphysics o f Reality and Realisation, Uwe Meixner’s ideas about the “ central substance and the pluralistic and conflicting character o f the world” (see ch. 5) seem to have some interesting parallels with the elaboration presented here about the Way o f the two complementary central forces, Yin and Yang. One might say that it is the fundamental interaction between the two complementary central forces, Yin and Yang, through­ out the universe that “ coordinates the conflicting decisions o f the substances concerning the choice o f the world and unites them by an impartial balancing o f the wills” (section 5 of Meixner， s essay “ The Metaphysics of Event and Substance” ，which is an outline o f the basic ideas of the aforementioned book). Insofar as he sets out to do justice to both the plurality and unity of the universe and endeavors to figure out the complementarity between oneness and pluralness o f the universe, Meixner， s view is, to some extent, kindred in spirit with the Yin- Yang metaphysical vision of the Yi-Jing in regard to the being-becoming complementarity. The Zhou- Yi-Qian-Zao-Du paraphrases the meaning o f “y i" this way: “ the single one name ‘yi'， has three implications: simplicity (y i [as jia n -y i] ), changing (bian-yi), and unchanging (bu-yi)”. There are three corresponding phrases in Chinese: “jia n -y i” (simplicity and easiness), “ biany i ” (changing), and “ bu-yi” (unchanging). Considering that the character “ bu” is a negationprefix and that "y i" in “ bu-yi” is assumed to mean changing, one might feel puzzled about how “y i" could express unchanging in the context of the Yi-Jing. It is noted that what coordinates the two seemingly opposed meanings of “y i ” (i.e., bian-yi or changing, and bu-yi or unchanging) into a harmonious whole is the other meaning of “ y i” —simplicity: what emerges as something simple, stable, and easy (to capture) in changing is bu-yi or unchanging; or, conversely, what is bu-yi or unchanging in bian-yi or changing is something simple (one in many) and stable. I prefer translating “yi ” into verb-form rather than into noun-form. I also prefer paraphras­ ing what is not changed in terms o f “ unchanging" rather than ‘‘nonchanges" . For the prefix “ non-” seems to suggest having no connection with what is prefixed; this implication is dearly not included in what the Yi-Jing suggests. A metaphysical object does not necessarily have both being-aspect and becoming-aspect. More­ over, an object o f study might have other aspects. For example, a person as an object o f study has his or her moral aspect, physical-physiological aspect, etc. The object under metaphysical examination in the Yi-Jing is the natural thing in the universe that characteristically has both its becoming-changing aspect and its being-unchanging aspect. What kinds o f co-present aspects an object of study has depends upon the metaphysical nature o f that object. An abstract mathematical object, say, hardly has any becoming-aspect except its conceptually stipulated being-aspect. For a detailed discussion o f the relation o f the metaphysical nature of an object o f study to relevant methodological perspectives, see Mou, Bo (2001), “ An Analysis o f the Structure o f Philosophical Methodology —in View of Comparative Philosophy” ，in Bo Mou (ed.), Two Roads to Wisdom? - Chinese and Analytic Philosophical Traditions, Chicago: Open Court, pp. 337-364. The research involved in this essay was supported by the Pacific Cultural Foundation, the ROC. Early versions o f this article were presented at the 12th International Conference on Chinese Philosophy, Beijing, July 23, 2001 and at the 2001 Workshop of the Foundation for the Study of Chinese Philosophy and Culture, San Jose, December 2, 2001.I am grateful to the audience, especially Yiu-ming Fung, Christian Jochim, Ming-huei Lee, Ji-tai Mo, and Esther Su, at the two meetings for their stimulating questions and thought-provoking com­ ments on some ideas in t his article. I am also thankful to Lin-he Han for his helpful criticism of an early version of the paper.

Part Three Confucianism

CHAPTER FIVE

Virtue Ethics and Confucianism Bryan W. Van Norden

Within the four seas, all are brothers. - Zi Xia I am a human, and nothing human is alien to me. 一 Terence

Introduction In this essay I shall sketch a comparative methodology that appeals to virtue ethics to help illuminate Confucianism. “ Virtue ethics” is a phrase well known to Western ethicians. I shall discuss virtue ethics in more detail below, but briefly, virtue ethics focuses on what sort o f person one should become, and what way o f life one should live.1 Although “ virtue ethics” is not a Chinese term, I think that Confucianism counts as a form o f virtue ethics 一 but a kind of virtue ethics different in many respects from those forms that have been dominant in the West.2These differences have the potential to challenge us and contribute to ongoing philosophical debates by making us aware o f new con­ ceptions of the virtues and o f ways o f living a worthwhile life. Furthermore, I believe that applying the vocabulary o f virtue ethics illuminates many interest­ ing aspects o f Confucianism that might otherwise go unnoticed. M y account will focus primarily on the classical Confucianism o f Confucius, Mencius, and Xun Zi. However, I shall also say a little about how this meth­ odology applies to the Confucians of the Dao-Xue, “ School o f the W ay"， o f the Song and later dynasties.3

Two objections I anticipate two major, well-articulated objections to this approach.4

Through thick and thin The use o f the categories o f Western virtue ethics to understand Confucian­ ism is open to the charge that it inaccurately assimilates Aristotelianism and 99

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Confucianism, when these world-views are, in fact, radically differentノSome­ times this charge is formulated in a manner that itself unfairly assimilates Aristotelianism to either Kantianism or Platonism.6 Early Confucianism has much less in common with Kantianism or Platonism than with Aristotelianism (especially if one has in mind unnuanced versions of the former two - Kant and Plato are much more multifaceted than some of their harsher critics allow).7 However, I agree completely that Aristotelianism and Confucianism disagree significantly over many major issues —what the virtues are, what a good life is, what the role of the family is in a good life, the significance of ritual in such a life, the role o f classic texts in ethical cultivation, and so on. Why, then, expect anything other than distortion to come from approaching Confucianism from the perspective of virtue ethics? The answer depends upon the distinction between “ th ic k " and “ thin" ac­ counts. Although there are various ways of applying the distinction, my own use will be closest to that of Martha Nussbaum, who suggests that we can give a description o f something in at least two ways.8 We can give a “ thin” descrip­ tion, which has little theoretical content, and which can be shared by a broad range of participants in a discussion, who might disagree significantly over many other matters. One might think of the thin description as simply “ fixing” the topic of disagreement between participants in a discussion. In contrast, a “ thick” description is a detailed account framed in terms o f the distinctive concepts and commitments of a participant in that discussion. For example, we might give a thin description of the Sun as “ the large bright thing in the sky during the day that illuminates the earth when it is not too cloudy” . One corresponding thick account (that o f Hesiod) would be that the Sun is a god. Yet another thick account (that of Anaxagoras) is that the Sun is a hot stone. One Chinese account (that of the Huai-Nan-Zi) is that the Sun is the quintes­ sence (jing) of the qi of fire.10 Our own thick account is that the Sun is a mass o f hot hydrogen and helium. It seems obvious that these are competing accounts o f the same thing. Using both thick and thin descriptions allows us to describe how this is so. I f we acknowledge the thick accounts, but deny that there is any corresponding thin account, then it seems that the accounts we have given do not really disagree, as they are talking about different things. I f “ Sun” ，when we use the term, means the mass of hydrogen and helium that the Earth revolves around, then Anaxagoras has no view about the Sun. But surely it is implausible to say that “ helios” does not refer to the same thing as “ Sun”？ We can see how the thick/thin distinction applies to ethics by considering the virtue of humility. A thin description of humility would be that it is the stable disposition to have an appropriate attitude toward one’s own worth as a person, as well as having the feelings and reactions that fit with that attitude. However, different thinkers will give different thick accounts of what it is to actually have this attitude. For example, Aristotle speaks of the person who is megalopsychos, “ great-souled” . Such a person takes great pride in his impressive

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virtues and accomplishments. In contrast, Christians emphasize a subordination of one’s w ill to God, and a recognition o f one’s own frailty and dependence on God. Ancient Confucians emphasize deference: to the sages o f antiquity, to tradition, to classical texts, to parents and elders, and to legitimate social superiors (wise teachers, virtuous rulers, etc.). However, Confucians do not have a clear role for the transforming power of superhuman grace. In addition, my sense is that some Confucians, at least, thought that genuine humility required a sort of false consciousness, in which one underestimates one’s own worth.11 Clearly, there is substantial disagreement here. However, I hope it is also clear that Aristotelians, Christians, and Confucians can all be said to be concerned with humility in the thin sense I characterized above, and that we learn something quite interesting by examining how the various thinkers fill out that concept.12 More generally, while I agree that Aristotelians and Confucians (as well as Platonists, Augustinians, Thomists, and others) give different thick accounts o f human flourishing, the virtues, ethical cultivation, and human nature (see subsection “ The four components” ， below), I submit that using a thin account o f virtue ethics allows us to see what they are disagreeing about.

The lexical fallacy Note that there are no terms in the earliest form of Classical Chinese corres­ ponding to at least some o f the notions that I employ. There is a term, "de"， standardly translated as “ Virtue” . But (as the capital letter at the beginning of the word suggests) we are not dealing here with a notion that is quite the same as either that expressed by the English “ virtue” or the Classical Greek "arete ". De is a sort o f ethical force that a person has, which can have a transformative effect on others.13 A person typically has this force in virtue o f possessing good qualities such as benevolence and righteousness (i.e., what we would call “ virtues” ).14 But it is not until around the third century BC (long after the time of Confucius and Mencius) that “ de” starts to be used as a countaole term that refers to individual virtues.15 Similarly, it is not clear that there is a term in Classical Chinese o f any period that corresponds to “ flourishing” . 丨 6 One might object that it distorts Chinese philosophy to interpret it in the light of notions for which there are no terms in Classical Chinese. This objection relies upon a principle often appealed to implicitly in criticisms o f comparative philosophy, but almost never stated outright. Henry Rosemont is an exception, having formulated the principle with admirable explicitness: the only way it can be maintained that a particular concept was held by an author is to find a term expressing that concept in his text. Thus we cannot say so-and-so had a “ theory of X ," or that he “ espoused X principles,” if there is no X in the lexicon o f the language in which the author wrote.17

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I shall label the preceding “ the lexical fa lla cy" , because (although it is often assumed) I want to argue that it is clearly an erroneous principle.18 We can see many examples o f authors who evidently “ have the concept o f X ” ，or “ have a view about X ” ，even though they have no term in their lexicon for X. For example, it seems clear that Anaximander and Anaximenes were doing philosophy, had views about philosophy, and (in some sense) had the concept o f philosophy, even though both lived before the Greek term for philosophy, “philosophia” , was coined by the Pythagoreans. Furthermore, Aristotle claims that there are “ unnamed virtues” ，by which he means virtues that he has a concept for, but which do not have names in Greek.19 Finally, outside of crossword puzzle fans and those in the shoelace industry, almost no English speakers know the word “ aglet” . However, I submit that almost all English speakers have the concept of “ the plastic or metal tip on the end of a shoelace” . I acknowledge that it indicates something when a word in one language does not map neatly onto one word in another language, and in some cases this something can be quite important indeed. But in other cases the lack of oneto-one lexical correspondence may be unimportant. We have to look at the particulars of the two languages being compared in order to determine whether the presence or absence of a particular term is significant. Although I have discussed the thick/thin distinction and the lexical fallacy to answer some objections about the application o f virtue ethics to Confucian­ ism, these concepts have application to a wide range of topics in comparative thought. For example, it has been argued that there is no notion of “ truth” in ancient China, or that the native Chinese tradition lacks a conception of “ rig h ts" .20 The arguments for these claims are sometimes based on the lexical fallacy, or move from the absence in native Chinese thought of a particular thick conception of “ truth” (or of “ rights” ）to the conclusion that there is no concep­ tion o f “ truth” or “ rights” at all (even a thin one). I hope I have provided some reason for thinking that both sorts of argument (whether applied to “ truth ” ， “ right” ，or “ virtue” ）are fallacious.

Virtue ethics What is it? Virtue ethics is generally contrasted with deontological and consequentialist ethics. However, these other theories can themselves take a variety of forms (and can be combined with each other and with virtue ethics in various ways). Here, I shall present rough characterizations of consequentialism, deontology, and virtue ethics. Philosophers will notice that I have left out many nuances import­ ant to a full understanding of the contemporary Western debates regarding these theories. However, I only wish to sketch the positions with an eye toward illuminating certain aspects of Confucianism.

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A consequentialist holds that the highest good is a state of affairs that, viewed impersonally, maximizes some property or properties, such as the satisfaction o f human preferences, or human happiness. Actions (either individual actions or types of actions), institutions, and human characteristics should then be judged by their tendency to maximize this good. Mohism, an ancient Chinese philosophical school that was critical of Confucianism, can be interpreted as a kind of consequentialism that claims we ought to maximize the goods of wealth, populousness, and social order. Broadly speaking, a deontologist holds that, sometimes at least, the right action for a particular person to perform may not be the one that maximizes the good, viewed impersonally. Intuitively (and imprecisely), a deontologist claims that the ends do not (always) justify the means. In contrast, a consequentialist holds that, as long as we are talking about the proper impersonal end, the end does justify the means. In the West, deontologists are often “ rule-deontologists". who hold that what is right and wrong can be captured by ethical rules (e.g., do not kill the innocent). However, deontologists disagree over the significance o f moral rules. A particularist (also known as an act-deontologist) holds that there are no exceptionless, nontrivial moral rules. Related to the distinction between consequentialism and deontology is the distinction between “ agent-neutral” and “ agent-relative” ethical considerations. An agent-neutral value has worth from a purely impersonal perspective. Every­ one in the world having enough food to eat is a state of affairs that (we might think) has value, regardless of who one is, or what one's own personal goals and projects are. In contrast, my visiting the pyramids at Giza has agent-relative value fo r me - i f seeing those pyramids up close once in my life is one o f my personal dreams.21 This value gives me reason to act in certain ways. However, my visiting the pyramids does not have any real value fo r you, and you are under no obligation to do anything to assist me in achieving my goal. Or so it seems, for one o f the issues that divides philosophers is whether there are any genuine agent-relative ethical considerations. Some philosophers have argued that the only genuine values are agent-neutral values, and that the only genuine obliga­ tions are those that arise from promoting the agent-neutral values. In contrast, Thomas Nagel offers a catalogue o f possible kinds o f agent-relative considera­ tions: there are agent-relative aspirations, which stem “ from the desires, projects, commitments, and personal ties o f the individual agent, all o f which give him reasons to act in the pursuit o f ends that are his own" .22 M y pyramid-visiting example is o f this type. Becoming a certain kind of person and living a certain kind o f life are aspirations that are especially important for virtue ethics. Bernard Williams gave a famous example to illustrate certain agent-relative considerations.23 Suppose a sadistic dictator has assembled a group o f twenty innocent victims whom he plans to kill, but he offers you the following proposi­ tion. I f you will shoot and kill one o f the innocent prisoners yourself, he will let the other nineteen live. I f you decline to shoot one o f the prisoners, that man,

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along with the other nineteen prisoners, will die. From an agent-neutral per­ spective, your choice is simply between one innocent person dying or that man and nineteen other innocent people dying. Consequently, the obvious thing to do is to bring it about that only one innocent person dies. However, there may be agent-relative prohibitions, which stem from “ reasons for each individual not to maltreat others himself, in his dealings with them (for example by violating their rights, breaking his promises to them, e tc.)" .24 Consequently, one might think that you may not kill one innocent person, even if that results in saving nineteen other lives. A passage from the Mencius illustrates the Confucian commitment to agentrelative prohibitions. One of Mencius' disciples suggests that he violate certain ethical principles for the sake of achieving some good consequences, or as the disciple puts it more delicately, “ Bend a foot to straighten the yard.” Mencius responds with an anecdote: Formerly, Viscount Jian of Zhao sent Wang Liang to drive the chariot for his favorite, Xi. A t the end o f the day, they had not caught a single bird. X i reported back that Wang Liang was the worst at his craft in the world. Someone told this to Wang Liang. Liang said, “ I ask to try again.” Only after some pressing was he allowed to do so. In one morning, they caught ten birds. X i reported back, “ He is the best at his craft in the world.” Viscount Jian said, “ I will have him take charge of driving for you.” When he told Wang Liang, Liang disapproved, saying, “ I drove my horses in the prescribed manner for him, and by the end of the day we did not catch one

thing. I violated the rules for him, and in one morning we caught ten. ... I am not accustomed to driving for a petty person. I ask to decfine.” Even the charioteer was ashamed to collude with the archer. Colluding with him to get game, although it be piled as high as a hill, is something he will not do. So how would it be if I were to bend the Way to follow those

others? (Mencius 3B:1) Finally, there are agent-relative “ obligations we have toward those to whom we are closely related: parents, children, spouses, siblings, fellow members o f a community or even a n atio n " .25 The Confucian notion of “ graded love” seems to be an example o f a set of agent-relative obligations. Graded love asserts that one has greater ethical obligations toward, and should have stronger concern for, those who are bound to one by special relationships, such as those between ruler and minister, father and son, husband and wife, elder and younger brother, and between friends.26 Confucius expressed his commitment to the doctrine of graded love in the following famous passage from the Analects: The Lord of She said to Confucius, “ Among my people there is one we call ‘Upright G ong' . When his father stole a sheep, he reported him to the authorities.” Confucius replied, “ Among my people, those we consider ‘upright，are different from this: fathers cover up for their sons, and sons cover up for their fathers. This is what it means to be ‘u p rig h t'. " 27

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From a purely impersonal perspective, it seems that the right thing to do would be to apprehend and punish the thieving father. (Confucians consider it a sign of bad government if order must be maintained largely through law and punish­ ment, but there is never any suggestion that punishment should be abolished in general.) However, Confucius commends a son who acts in accordance with the fact that it is his father who is under threat of punishment. The Confucian doctrine o f graded love seems to capture the common-sense intuitions that many of us have, both in China and in the West. Imagine how you would react if someone told you, in an indignant tone, “ People are going hungry tonight in New York, and Bryan isn’t doing anything about it!” I think most people would not take this to be a particularly serious ethical failing, and would perhaps respond to the statement with the tepid agreement that, yes, we should all do more about the problem o f hunger in the US. But suppose someone told you, “ Bryan’s father is going hungry tonight in New York, and he isn’t doing anything about it!” I f this were true, and if there were no extra­ ordinary explanation for Bryan’s behavior, I think most of us would regard it as reflecting a particularly severe ethical flaw in his character. The difference in our reactions may be explained by appealing to the claim that a person’s agent-relative obligation to care for his or her parents is much stronger than anyone’s agent-neutral obligation to care for strangers. Deontologists recognize, at the least, agent-relative prohibitions. However, as you might have guessed, many consequentialists believe that the only value is some agent-neutral value, and that the only obligation is the agent-neutral one to promote that value.28 It is therefore not surprising that the Mohists, being consequentialists, advocate what they call “ impartial caring” . Impartial caring is, in Western terms, a commitment to promoting the agent-neutral goods of wealth, populousness, and order for humans in general, regardless o f the relationship of those people to oneself.29 Because o f its emphasis on the ethical agent, virtue ethics generally stresses agent-relative prohibitions, aspirations, and obligations. In addition, a virtue ethics has (at least implicitly) four components that are not emphasized by most rule-deontologists or consequentialists:(1 ) an account of what a flourishing human life is like, (2) an account o f what virtues contribute to leading such a life, (3) an account o f ethical cultivation that explains how one acquires those virtues, and (4) a philosophical anthropology that explains what humans are like, such that they can acquire those virtues so as to flourish in that kind o f life. In its most modest form, virtue ethics can be seen as a complement to a con­ sequentialist or rule-deontological ethics, filling out one of the latter by adding on to it accounts of these four items that are consistent with it. However, in its most extreme formulations, virtue ethics attempts to serve as a foundation for all of ethics, and to completely supplant consequentialist and rule-deontological foundations. For example, a radical virtue ethician might claim that moral rules are logically dependent upon a prior conception o f human flourishing.30

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Other versions o f virtue ethics are radically particularistic, rejecting ethical rules in favor o f asking what a fully virtuous person would do in such a situation. (This is sometimes referred to as the “ good person criterion” for right action.)31

The four components To flourish is to live a certain kind of life: a life characterized by the ordered exercise o f one’s capacities. The term “ ordered” reflects the view that the exercise o f some capacities is more valuable, or more worthwhile, than others.32 The fact that “ flourishing” is a technical term for us may reflect, more than anything else, the poverty of contemporary English as a language for discuss­ ing virtue ethics.33 “ Flourishing” corresponds to the perfectly ordinary terms “ eudaimonia” in Aristotle’s Greek and “ beatitudo” in Aquinas’ Latin. Most of us at least understand the topic when someone talks about “ living the good life” . And, whatever philosophical position we pay lip service to, we some­ times act as if we think some ways of life are worth living, while others are not. For instance, running is the exercise o f a human capacity. I f someone is unable to run, due to birth defect, illness, or injury, we are usually quick to assert that she can still lead a full or worthwhile life. This can be seen as reflecting the assumption that the human capacities exercised in running, while important parts of being a human, are not the most important aspects of being a human. There are other activities (such as engaging in caring relationships with other people) that are of a much higher order. The Western virtue ethics tradition that grows out o f Aristotle has examined flourishing in terms of the particular goods that would be achieved by a person living such a life. There are many things that are acknowledged to be goods (e.g., bodily health), or to be goods i f rightly employed (e.g., wealth), but that are rejected as candidates for the highest good (summum bonum): wealth; satisfying one’s sensual desires; physical health; enjoying fame or honor; and power. A shortlist of goods has been favored by one or another o f the major Western virtue ethicians as the highest good: participation in political activity aimed at the good of the community; accumulating theoretical knowledge; contemplating God.34 Confucians reject some of the same candidates for the good life that are rejected by Aristotelians, but they have a positive conception of flourishing different from that of any of the major Western virtue ethicians: one that emphasizes participation in familial life and in ritual activity. The following passage from the Analects sums up, for me, what is distinctive of the Confucian view of human flourishing at its best:

Flourishing

Zilu, Zengxi, Ranyou, and Zihua were seated in attendance. The Master said to them, “ I am older than any of you, but do not feel reluctant to speak your minds on that account. You are all in the habit of complaining,

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‘I am not appreciated' . Well, if someone were to appreciate your talents [and give you employment], how would you then go about things?” Zilu spoke up immediately, “ I f I were given charge o f a state that

could field a thousand chariots - even one hemmed in between powerful states, suffering from armed invasions, and afflicted by famine - before three years were up I could infuse it with courage and a sense o f what is right.” The Master smiled at him, and then turned to Ranyou. “ You, Ranyou!” he said, “ What would you do?”

Ranyou answered, “ If I were given charge of a state sixty or seventy 一 or at least fifty or sixty - square li in area, before three years were up I would see that it was materially prosperous. As for instructing the people in ritual practice and music, this is a task that would have to await the arrival o f a gentleman.” The Master then turned to Zihua. “ You, Zihua! What would you do ?" Zihua answered, “ It is not that I am saying that I would actually be able to do so, but my wish, at least, would be to devote myself to study.

I would like, perhaps, to serve as a minor functionary - properly clad in ceremonial cap and gown - in charge of ancestral temple events or diplomatic gatherings.” The Master then turned to Zengxi. “ You, Zengxi! What would you do?” Zengxi stopped strumming upon the zither, and as the last notes faded away he set the instrument aside and rose to his feet. “ I would choose to do sometning quite different from any o f the other three.” “ What harm is there in that?” the Master said. “ Each o f you is merely expressing your own aspirations.” Zengxi then said, “ In the third month of spring, once the spring garments have been completed, I should like to assemole a company o f five or six young men and six or seven boys to go bathe in the Y i River and enjoy the breeze upon the Rain Altar, and then return singing to the Master’s house.”

The Master sighed deeply, saying, “ I am with Zengxi!” ... 35 Confucius here expresses a preference for activities characteristic o f a way o f life very different from the ideals espoused by any version o f Platonism and Aristotelianism: a life o f taking joy in simple pleasures with friends and loved ones. The virtues Virtues are relatively stable dispositions (to act, feel, think, or perceive), the possession o f which contributes to leading a flourishing life. The qualification that they be stable is meant to rule out moods. I may be in a generous mood today, but that does not make me a generous person, or mean that I have the virtue o f generosity. Western philosophers have proposed various lists of the virtues, and have developed an extensive technical vocabulary for discussing them. A “ part of a virtue” may be thought o f as either an aspect or a specific kind o f a given virtue.36 This is easiest to understand through some common-sense examples. Consider wisdom: a person might be wise in giving advice to others, or wise

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in running her own household, or wise in leading others.37 In turn, wisdom in giving advice to others might be thought o f as having many aspects: judging the character (maturity, honesty, etc.) of the persons the advice will affect; recognizing the difference between helping and meddling; being able to find the proper tone in which to put something; spotting potential conflicts o f interest that may bias one’s own advice, etc. Each o f these could be thought of as a part o f the virtue of wisdom in giving advice to others.38 Understanding the notion of parts of virtues helps one to understand the notion o f the “ cardinal virtues” . The cardinal virtues are either the virtues that are significantly more important than any other virtues, or the virtues that encompass all the other virtues.39 In his Republic, Plato listed four cardinal virtues: wisdom, justice, courage, and moderation. Every other virtue, Plato thinks, is a part of one of these virtues. A passing comment by the Apostle Paul was interpreted as suggesting a list of three cardinal virtues: “ And now abideth faith, hope, charity, these three; but the greatest of these is charity” (I Corinthians 13:13).40 Thomas Aquinas, the great synthesizer, combined the two lists, saying that there were four natural virtues (those named by Plato) and three infused virtues (those referred to by Paul, which are given by the grace o f God).41 It is not clear whether Confucius had a list of cardinal virtues. In one famous passage (Analects, 4.15) his disciple Zeng Zi asserts that loyalty and sympathetic understanding are the core of the Master’s teachings.42 However, several passages hint that wisdom and humanity (ren) were his key virtues (4.1, 4.2, 6.22, 6.23, 12.22), while still others suggest that wisdom, humanity, and courage were his cardinal virtues (9.29， 14.28， cf. The Mean 20). Whatever Confucius，own view was, his later follower Mencius certainly did have a list of cardinal virtues: benevolence, righteousness, wisdom, and propriety. As we can see, the Confucian and Thomistic lists differ substantially. This raises many interesting questions (most of which would not occur to us were we not using the virtue ethics framework). For instance, why doesn’t courage appear on Mencius' list of cardinal virtues? Mencius' own discussion o f courage suggests that he thinks the highest kind of courage is manifested when one acts out of righteousness. Consequently, we could say that, for Mencius, the virtue o f courage is a subjective part o f the virtue o f righteousness. Specifically, cour­ age is righteousness in situations in which one encounters opposition, espe­ cially opposition that threatens one's life.43 Consider another example. What is zhi, wisdom, for Confucius? Confucius suggests that a wise person is good at appreciating a person’s abilities (4.7, 4.14, 5.5, 5.8, 9.6), has intellectual under­ standing (5.9, 7.28, 9.8), as well as an understanding of and commitment to virtuous behavior (2.4, 3.22, 7.28). These comments point to three integral parts of the virtue of wisdom for Confucius. We find that both Western and Confucian virtue ethics distinguish between genuine virtues, on the one hand, and their counterfeits and semblances, on the

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other. Both semblances and counterfeits speciously resemble genuine virtues. However, in the case of a paradigmatic counterfeit o f a virtue, one consciously acts in an apparently virtuous fashion out of a selfish, ulterior motive. A politician who feigns a good marriage to obtain the support o f the voters has a counterfeit of one or more virtues. In the case o f a semblance, no decep­ tion is involved. A semblance is a relatively stable disposition that, although it results in superficially virtuous behavior (and perhaps even, to some extent, virtuous perception, thinking, and feeling), nonetheless lacks some part of the full virtue. Some semblances have names. Thus, I am rash, not courageous, if I rush in to face great danger for the sake o f minor or illusory goods. (Perhaps I sign up to fight in a war, not because I believe in the cause or because I feel that I have a duty to my country, but just because I want a “ red badge o f courage， ， .) Rashness is a semblance o f courage that lacks a part of the virtue: proper judgment regarding what is truly valuable, and what is a reasonable risk. The line between a semblance and a counterfeit can sometimes be hard to draw, though, because of the phenomenon of self-deception. Dorian Gray, near the bottom o f the pit o f decadence, believes that he has turned toward a “ new life” by declining to seduce an innocent girl. He goes to inspect the portrait that reveals his sins, hoping to see some positive change, however small: A cry o f pain and indignation broke from him. He could see no change, save that in the eyes there was a look o f cunning, and in the mouth the curved wrinkle o f the hypocrite. ... Then he trembled. Had it been merely vanity that had made him do this one good deed? Or the desire for a new sensation, as Lord Henry had hinted, with his mocking laugh? Or that passion to act a part that sometimes makes us do things finer than we are ourselves? Or, perhaps, all o f these? ... Vanity? Curiosity? Hypocrisy? Had there been nothing more in his renunciation than that? There had been something more. A t least he thought so. But who could tell? ... No. There had been nothing more. Through vanity he had spared her. In hypocrisy he had worn the mask o f goodness. For curiosity’s sake he had tried the denial o f self. He recognised that now’44

To choose not to bed a guileless maid is a counterfeit o f virtue if one does it just to see what it feels like to deny oneself sex. But Dorian Gray’s action is on the borderline between counterfeit and semblance. The look in the eyes and the appearance o f the mouth o f his portrait suggest that, at some level, he knew what his true motives were. However, his shock when he sees the portrait shows that he was not fully conscious of his own true intentions. Consequently, Yearley is correct in suggesting, not a sharp division, but rather “ a spectrum with counterfeit virtues and real virtues at either end and semblances o f virtue in the middle” .45

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The concepts of counterfeits and semblances illuminate many passages in Confucian texts. A paradigmatic demonstration o f sagely virtue in ancient China was for a king to step down and relinquish the throne to someone else (thereby showing his humility and lack of attachment to the prerogatives of ruler ship). Mencius observes that this practice can be abused by a counterfeit of virtue. However, he also thinks that counterfeits are likely to be found out: “ I f one is fond o f making a name for oneself, one may be able to relinquish a state that can field a thousand chariots. But if one is just not that kind of person, relinquishing a basket of rice or a bowl of soup would show in one’s face” (7B:11).And how else can we understand Mencius’ reference to “ the pro­ priety that is not propriety” and “ the righteousness that is not righteousness” (4B:6) except as comments on the semblances o f propriety and righteousness? Furthermore, the discussion of the village worthies in the Mencius is quite lucid when understood as a discussion of semblances: Mencius reports that, although the village worthies were regarded as virtuous by most people, Confucius dis­ dained to associate with them. In explaining why, Confucius said: I hate that which seems but is not. I hate weeds out of fear that they will be confused with grain. I hate cleverness out of fear that it will be confused with righteousness. I hate glibness out of fear that it will be confused with trustworthiness. ... I hate the village worthies, out of fear that they will be confused with those who have Virtue.46

Characteristic of many Western accounts is the doctrine of the unity of the virtues. A t its most extreme, this doctrine holds that, in order to have any one of the virtues, it is necessary to have all of them. Stated this baldly, the view seems difficult to accept, although it has had notable defenders. Part o f the reason for the disunity of the virtues is that humans (often due to complex psychological causes) sometimes have highly selective conceptual blind spots and narrow dysfunctional habits. Nonetheless, it certainly is true that many virtues are interrelated. I f wisdom involves an understanding of the relative values o f goods, then courage can only be present to the extent that we also have wisdom, for without wisdom, courage becomes rashness. Similarly, if we think of prudence as a healthy concern for one’s own well-being, then generosity is impossible without it, for the presence of prudence is part of what distinguishes generosity from one of its semblances 一 codependence. Did any Confucians believe in the unity o f the virtues? Zhu X i argues explicitly that all virtues are, ultimately, manifestations of benevolence.47 T his entails the unity of the virtues. It is hard to say what Confucius’ own view was, but he does seem confident in attributing some virtues to individuals without attributing others (e.g., Analects, 14.4).48 What about Mencius? It is intriguing that he presents an argument for the existence 01 innate but incipient disposi­ tion toward benevolence, and then continues as if he had proven the existence

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o f the dispositions of his three other cardinal virtues as well. (See Mencius 2A:6, discussed below.) This move makes much more sense if Mencius was assuming something like the unity o f the virtues.

Ethical cultivation and philosophical anthropology

A philosopher s account of ethical cultivation and her philosophical anthropology are, typically, closely related, because how one becomes ethical depends very much on what the capacities, traits, and dispositions o f humans are.

Three models Broadly speaking, we can distinguish three models of the process of ethical cultivation: discovery, re-formation, and development.49 According to a discovery model, each human has innately whatever is required for full virtue (be it knowledge, or certain dispositions, or some true nature). A ll that is necessary is for each of us to discover this source of virtue within ourselves. According to a re-formation model, in contrast, each o f us must undergo some fundamental transformation to create in us whatever knowledge, dispositions, or nature is required for virtue. Finally, according to a development model, each person innately has incipient tendencies toward virtue that must develop in order for the person to achieve full virtue. I hazard the broad generalization that every normative ethical theory at least implicitly takes as its paradigm one of the three models. However, there are perhaps no pure instances of any o f the three types. A philosophy o f cultivation will emphasize one model, but will also incorporate aspects of other models as secondary features. Mencius emphasized a developmental model o f cultivation. According to him, all humans are born with incipient compassion for the suffer­ ing o f others. Mencius defends this claim in a famous thought-experiment. He asks us to imagine someone who “ suddenly saw a child about to fall into a well” . He thinks our intuition will be that any human would have a feeling o f “ alarm and compassion” ，at least momentarily, at this (2A:6).50 However, these compassionate tendencies are only incipient. We frequently fail to mani­ fest compassion toward other kinds o f suffering. We need to fill out our innate compassion so that it extends to other people in a reliable way. Although this is primarily a developmental picture, there are also aspects o f a discovery model in Mencius' view. He thinks that many o f us are unaware that we even have incipient virtuous inclinations within us. Thus, Mencius explains to King Xuan o f Qi that the compassion the king showed by sparing an ox being led to slaughter demonstrates that he has the capacity to be benevolent toward his own subjects (1A:7). Mencius, thus, helps the king to discover that he has virtuous dispositions within himself. Xun Zi rejects the notion that humans have incipient tendencies toward compassion, righteousness, or other virtuous reactions. Instead, Xun Zi uses a re-formation model o f cultivation, according to which transforming a natural human being into a virtuous person is like steaming and bending a straight

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piece o f wood until it becomes a circular wagon-wheel.51 Indeed, Xun Zi might well agree with the advice that Hamlet gives to Queen Gertrude: Assume a virtue, if you have it not. That monster custom, who all sense doth eat, O f habits devil, is angel yet in this, That to the use of actions fair and good He likewise gives a frock or livery That aptly is put on. Refrain tonight, And that shall lend a kind of easiness To the next abstinence, the next more easy; For use almost can change the stamp of nature, And entertain the devil or throw him out With wondrous potency.52

However, as Donald Munro and Eric Hutton have pointed out, there are also developmental aspects to Xun Z i’s view of cultivation.53 For instance, Xun Zi acknowledges that humans innately care for their own kin.54 However, he does not regard this as a virtuous inclination, since such concern can lead to vicious action (e.g., harming others to benefit one’s own parents or children). Consequently, our innate concern for our own kin must be re-formed so that it becomes the virtue of filial piety. In contrast with both Mencius and Xun Zi, Chinese Buddhists and philoso­ phers of the School o f the Way believed that the key event in ethical cultivation was coming to discover one's true nature (although they disagreed about what the ethical consequences of this discovery are). For the Confucians, this human nature is the li (principle, or pattern), which links each thing to everything else in the universe. This true nature is typically hidden, in most o f us, by selfish inclinations. Zhu X i and his followers supplemented the discovery view with aspects of both the development and re-formation models. School of the Way Confucians hold that the li that is our nature is embodied in qi, a sort of self-moving stuff o f varying degrees of clarity and turbidity. Zhu X i believed that the qi o f most of us is so turbid that we cannot, initially, see the li within us. Consequently, it is best to begin by teaching children what he called the “ xiao xue lesser learning”， which re-forms their selfish, disordered inclinations: A t the age of eight, all the male children, from the sons of kings and dukes to the sons o f commoners, entered the school of lesser learning; there they were instructed in the chores o f cleaning and sweeping, in the formalities o f polite conversation and good manners, and in the refinements o f ritual, music, archery, charioteering, calligraphy, and mathematics. A t the age of fifteen, the Son of Heaven’s eldest son and other imperial sons on down to the eldest legitimate sons of dukes, ministers, high officials, and officers o f the chief grade, together with the gifted among the populace, all entered the school of greater learning.55

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In the greater learning, one studies (under the guidance o f a wise teacher) the classic texts of the sages. The aim of this study is to produce an ethically trans­ formative understanding: It would seem that every man’s intellect is possessed of knowledge and that every thing in the world is possessed o f principle. But, to the extent that principle is not yet thoroughly probed, man’s knowledge is not yet fully realized. Hence, the first step o f instruction in greater learning is to teach the student, whenever he encounters anything at all in the world, to build upon what is already known to him o f principle and to probe still further, so that he seeks to reach the limit. After exerting himself in this way for a long time, he will one day become enlightened and thoroughly understand [principle]; then, the manifest and the hidden, the subtle and the obvious qualities o f all things will all be known, and the mind, in its whole sub­ stance and vast operations, will be completely illuminated.56

Although one is, for Zhu Xi, only discovering knowledge by probing the prin­ ciples that are already present both in one's mind and in things so that they will become illuminated, his language also suggests (“ to build upon what is already known to him ， ， ）a development of an incipient awareness. Consequently, Zhu X i had a discovery model, but he also thought that the lesser learning of youth involved re-formation, and that the greater learning involved some development o f knowledge already possessed. W ithin the School o f the Way, Zhu X i was opposed by the followers o f Lu Xiang-shan and Wang Yang-ming, who had an almost pure discovery model o f cultivation. Wang said that all people already have complete access to their true nature. Attempting to develop into a virtuous person, in the manner that Zhu X i (or anybody else) suggests, is a distraction from simply being a virtuous person by listening to the guidance o f one’s innate moral sense. Wang adopted (and unintentionally adapted) a phrase from Mencius, “ liang zhi, pure know in g". to refer to this ethical sense.57 For Wang, to discover liang zhi is both necessary and sufficient for virtuous action. In summary, Mencius has a developmental view with secondary discovery aspects, Xun Zi has a re-formation view with developmental aspects, Wang Yang-ming has an almost pure discovery model, and Zhu X i has a discovery model with both re-formation and developmental aspects. Because the School of the Way Confucians assumed a discovery model of cultivation, it was difficult for them to fully understand the earlier Confucianism o f Mencius and Xun . For example, Mencius repeatedly uses agricultural metaphors to describe the process o f ethical cultivation. These metaphors are not rhetorical window-dressing. They are strikingly appropriate for his developmental model. However, they are not particularly apt metaphors for a discovery model. Thus, as Ivanhoe points out, Zhu X i is led to a complicated misreading o f Mencius.58 Recall the passage in which Mencius argues that any human would have a feeling of “ alarm and compassion” if he suddenly saw a child about to fall into

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a well (Mencius, 2A:6). Mencius refers to this reaction as the “ duan, sprout” ， o f benevolence. The implication is that we must carefully cultivate this sprout so that it grows into the full virtue (cf. Mencius, 2A:2 and 6A:7). However, Zhu X i glosses duan as “ xu, tip” ，and paraphrases what he takes to be Mencius’ point by saying, “ It is like when there is a thing inside something but the tip is visible outsid e." 59

Ethical connoisseurs Ethical cultivation has many aspects, but all views of ethical cultivation — except for the most simplistic of discovery models — assume that ethical perception is something that we can get better at. In other words, development, re-formation, and the more nuanced kinds of discovery models all assume that there can be what we might call ethical connoisseurs. In some areas of human concern there are evidently not connoisseurs. I might be better than my friend at doing things like setting up a new desktop computer, but this does not make me a connoisseur o f it. Setting up a new computer is simply a matter of following the instructions in the hardware manual. I f you can read the book, identify the parts of the computer referred to by the book, and manipulate them as the instructions direct, you can set up the computer. As this example suggests, part of what is distinctive about areas of concern in which there are not connoisseurs is that there are explicit rules about how to proceed, and it requires no special perceptiveness to apply these rules. Another distinction is that, in nonconnoisseur areas, there is a definitive way o f judging success. I f the computer simply w o n ’t boot up after I have set it up, and someone else comes along, reads the instructions, switches two cables, and the computer now works, there is no real debate over which o f us followed the instructions correctly. Most of us, I think, believe that there are connoisseurs in many areas of human concern. There are clothing connoisseurs, music connoisseurs, iceskating connoisseurs, food and scotch connoisseurs, film connoisseurs, and painting connoisseurs, to name just a few. Although my example above o f non­ connoisseur knowledge had to do with computers, there can be connoisseurs in scientific or technical areas as well: of two computer programs that have pre­ cisely the same input and output for all values, the connoisseur perceives that one program is elegant while the other is “ kludgy” . What is distinctive about connoisseurs in all of these areas is that they perceive clearly things the rest of us “ see darkly” (if at all), that there are no straightforward rules to follow in order to perceive these things (as Mencius observes, “ A carpenter or a wheel­ wright can give another his compass or T-square, but he cannot make another skillful” [7B:5]), and that there are no definitive tests for the presence of the things they perceive. To say these things is not to say that there are absolutely no standards for success or failure in these areas, or that there are no ways to learn how to be a connoisseur. A wine guide will teach you the meaning of words like “ gown"， “ aftertaste" , “ nose” ，and “ corked” ，and will give you hints

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about what kinds o f things to look for in a wine. This book learning is only useful, of course, in conjunction with the experience o f actually tasting various wines. And, ideally, as no wine book can be comprehensive, one should taste under the guidance of an experienced connoisseur. Why should there not also be ethical connoisseurs? After all, ethical action and judgments require perception o f what is ethically relevant, but we know that even seeing can be quite complicated. As Kuhn observed, “ Looking at a bubble-chamber photograph, the student sees confused and broken lines, the physicist a record o f familiar subnuclear events." 60 I f theoretical paradigms can enable us to see, or prevent us from seeing, facts about the world, how much more so do our desires and emotions enable or disable our vision. As Iris Murdoch remarks, By opening our eyes we do not necessarily see what confronts us. We are anxiety-ridden animals. Our minds are continually active, fabricating an anxious, usually self-preoccupied, often falsifying veil which partially conceals the world.61 The love which brings the right answer is an exercise of justice and realism and really looking. ... It is a task to come to see the world as it is.62

Confucians sometimes use gustatory metaphors to suggest that there are ethical connoisseurs. Thus, a quotation attributed to Confucius in The Mean (Chapter 4) observes, “ There are no people who do not eat and drink, but few are those who can appreciate the flavors.” Similarly, Mencius notes, Those who are starving find their food delicious; those who are parched find their drink delicious. They have no standard for food and drink because their hunger and thirst injure it. Is it only the mouth and belly that hunger and thirst injure?! Human hearts too are subject to injury. I f one can pre­ vent the injury of hunger and thirst from being an injury to one’s heart, then there will be no concern about not being as good as other people.

(7A:27) Clear ethical perception may be required in order to apply ethical rules. We need, after all, to be able to perceive when we are confronted with a situation to which the rules apply. However, many who have emphasized ethical cultiva­ tion (in both China and the West) have downplayed the importance o f moral rules. Thus, the emphasis on cultivating ethical perception is related to the fact that extreme versions o f virtue ethics tend toward particularism. Advocates of virtue ethics tend to hold that the complexity and subtlety o f actual ethical life requires judgment that goes beyond what could be provided by moral rules. Hence, moral rules are either just rules o f thumb, or else require substantive interpretation in order to be applied to specific circumstances. Because o f this, the need for ethical connoisseurs is great.

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We see a commitment to particularism evident in many Confucian texts. In a famous passage from the Analects (11.22), Confucius is asked by his disciple Zi Lu, “ should one immediately put it into practice” when one learns some­ thing? Confucius responds in the negative: one should defer to the judgment of one's elder family members before putting it into practice. On a later occasion, Confucius is asked the very same question by Ran You. This time, Confucius responds in the affirmative. Gong-xi Hua asks Confucius why he gave different answers to the same question. Confucius responds, “ Ran You is overly cautious, and so I wished to urge him on. Zi Lu, on the other hand, is reckless, and so I sought to make him more cautious.” 63 Here we see particularism illustrated in regard to ethical teaching. Such adaptation of the style, and even the content, of ethical teaching according to the needs and abilities of the student came to have a technical name in Buddhist thought, " upaya, skillful means， ， .64 The emphasis on ethical particularism is even clearer in the Mencius. Mencius is asked whether he would, in violation o f the ritual prohibition against it, grab his sister-in-law’s hand i f this were necessary to save her from drowning. Mencius’ interlocutor apparently expects this to be an inescapable dilemma for the Confucian, but Mencius easily responds, “ To not pull your sister-in-law out when she is drowning is to be a beast. That men and women should not touch in handing something to one another is the ritual, but if your sisterin-law is drowning, to pull her out with your hand is discretion [quan]" (4A:17; cf. 6B:1). The term Mencius uses here, “ quan” , became a technical term in Chinese philosophy, where it was contrasted with “jing, the standard” . (In this case, not touching your sister-in-law's hand is jing.)65 It is important to see that ethical particularism is not irrational. It is a requirement o f rationality that ethically similar cases be treated similarly, but it is not a requirement that this similarity be captured by rules that are highly abstract, nor is it a requirement that we be able to state necessary and sufficient (and nontrivial) conditions for an action’s being cruel, cowardly, unjust, sexist, etc. Necessary and sufficient conditions are the hobgoblin o f ethically small minds. This does not mean that we cannot have intelligent discussions o f cases in which we disagree, or in which our ethical perception is unclear. I cannot give you an abstract rule that always identifies whether something is a good play, a convincing character in a novel,a delicious soup, or a shameful action, but I can certainly discuss intelligently whether or not a particular thing fits into one of these categories.66

Conclusion When we compare Western and Confucian versions o f virtue ethics, we find that Confucians present challenging and powerful alternatives to the Platonistic, Aristotelian, and Thomistic views that have dominated Western discussions.

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Most o f us w ill,I think, be more attracted to the conception o f human flourish­ ing suggested by Zeng Zi and seconded by Confucius in Analects 11.26 than we will be by any of the major Western views. In addition, using the virtue ethics framework helps illuminate many aspects of Confucian thought that we might otherwise overlook. Mencius 7B:37, almost ignored by most interpreters, can be seen to be a fascinating analysis o f semblances o f virtues. I believe that there is much more that can be said and done using this comparative methodology.67 This methodology is controversial, but, to those with an eye for history, con­ temporary controversies over multiculturalism and comparative philosophy leave one with a sense of, in Yogi Berra’s phrase, “ deja vu all over again” . During the thirteenth century, students in Paris rioted over the issue of whether the writings of the pagan Aristotle should be included in the curriculum o f the universities. Some (the orthodox Augustinians) argued that including Aristotelian thought would water-down the curriculum. Others (the Latin Averroists) agreed that Aristotle and Christianity were incommensurable, but wanted to teach both anyway. A handful, though, led by a quiet, rotund, Dominican monk, believed in the possibility o f a rational dialogue that synthesized the best o f Jewish, Islamic, Christian, Platonistic, and Aristotelian thought. I am on the side of those who, like Aquinas, recognize the significant disagreements that divide major thinkers and their cultural traditions, but believe in the possibility of constructive cross-cultural dialogue.

Notes 1 Western virtue ethics has its roots in the philosophy o f Plato and Aristotle, but Thomas Aquinas is considered by many to have given the most sophisticated general account. There has been a recent revival of interest in virtue ethics. Perhaps the most seminal work is MacIntyre, Alasdair (1984), After Virtue, 2nd edn, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. 2 I am certainly not the first to use a virtue ethics framework to interpret Confucianism. Perhaps the most noteworthy work using this methodology is Yearley, Lee H . (1990), Mencius and Aquinas: Theories o f Virtue and Conceptions o f Courage, Albany: State University o f New York Press. Philip J. Ivanhoe has also made extensive use o f virtue ethics in his own impressive body o f work, including Ivanhoe, Philip J. (2000), Confucian Moral Self Cultivation, rev. edn, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, and Ivanhoe, Philip J. (2002), Ethics in the Confucian Tradition: The Thought o f Mencius and Wang Yang-ming, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing. 3 The School o f the Way is better known in the West as Neo-Confucianism. For philosophical introductions, see Gardner, Daniel K . (1986), Chu Hsi and the Ta-hsüeli: Neo-Confucian Reflection on the Confucian Canon, Cambridge, M A: Harvard University Press; Gardner, Daniel K . (1990), Learning to Be a Sage: Selections from the Conversations o f Master Chu, Arranged Topically, Berkeley: University of California Press; Graham, Angus C . (1992), Two Chinese Philosophers, reprint, Chicago: Open Court Press; Ivanhoe, Ethics in the Confucian Tradition; Ivanhoe, Confucian Moral Self Cultivation; and Nivison, David S. (1996), “ The Philosophy of Wang Yangming"， in David S. Nivison (ed.), The Ways o f Confucianism, Chicago: Open Court Press, pp. 217-231. 4 Elsewhere, I have sketched what I take to be some o f the major approaches to the study of Chinese philosophy today: Van Norden, Bryan W .(1996)，“ What Should Western Philosophy

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Bryan W. Van Norden Learn from Chinese Philosophy" ?，in Philip J. Ivanhoe (ed.), Chinese Language, Thought and Culture: Nivison and His Critics, Chicago: Open Court Press. This sort o f objection may flow from the claim (suggested by Hall, David and Roger Ames (1995)，Anticipating China, Albany: State University o f New York Press, pp. 153-154, 171175) that the Chinese and Western philosophical traditions are essentially incommensurable. I believe that a position this extreme is guilty o f a sort o f cultural essentialism: “ a picture in which cultures appear neatly, prediscursively, individuated from each other; in which the insistence on ‘Difference’ that accompanies the ‘production’ o f distinct ‘cultures’ appears unproblematic; and the central or constitutive components of ‘culture’ are assumed to be ‘unchanging givens' " (Narayan, Uma (2000), “ Essence o f Culture and a Sense o f History: A Feminist Critique o f Cultural Essentialism” ，in Uma Narayan and Sandra Harding (eds), Decentering the Center, Indiana: Indiana University Press, p. 95). As Narayan has pointed out, this sort o f essentialism is typically both false to the actual diversity o f individual cultures and also often politically dangerous. See also Kupperman, Joel (1999), Learning from Asian Philosophy, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 123-125. In a very illuminating article, David Wiggins demonstrates that Aristotle’s views on ethical thinking were “ nothing remotely resembling what has been ascribed to him by his Kantian and other deontomaniac interpreters” (Wiggins, David (1980), “ Deliberation and Practical Reason” ，in A. O. Rorty (ed.), Essays on Aristotle's Ethics, Berkeley: University of California Press, p. 231). (On “ deontology” ，see subsection “ What is it? ， ， , below.) This point is made by O’Neill, Onora (1984), “ Kant After Virtue” , Inquiry 26, and Louden, Robert B . (1997)， “ Kant’s Virtue Ethics” ，in Daniel Statman (ed.), Virtue Ethics: A Critical Reader, Washington: Georgetown University Press, pp. 286-299. Nussbaum, Martha (1988), “ Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach” ，in Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, Jr, and Howard K. Wettstein (eds), Ethical Theory: Character and Virtue, v o l. 13 of Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, pp. 32-53. The thick/thin distinction has been used in a variety o f ways by earlier thinkers. See Ryle, Gilbert (1971), “ Thinking and Reflecting” ，in Gilbert Ryle, Collected Papers, v o l. 2, London: Hutchinson and Company, pp. 474-479; Geertz, Clifford (1973), “ Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory o f Culture” ，in Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation o f Cultures, New York: Basic Books; Williams, Bernard (1986), Ethics and the Limits o f Philosophy, Cambridge, M A: Harvard University Press. Interestingly, the Tang Dynasty philosopher Han Yu made a similar point in his essay Yuan Dao, noting that some terms, like “ dao, Way” ，and “ de, Virtue” ，are Lixu, empty” ，because they have different specific senses for different individuals. For Hesiod’s view, see Theogony, lines 371-374. On Anaxagoras, see Kirk, G. S., J. E. Raven and M. Schofield (1983), The Presocratic Philosophers, 2nd edn, New York: Cambridge Univer­ sity Press, p. 381. My translation o f the Huai-Nan-Zi follows Graham, Angus C . (1989), Disputers o f the Tao, Chicago: Open Court Press, p. 332. King Shun was a paragon of filial piety for his unfailing patience and love toward his abusive father. Wang Yang-ming praised Shun, saying, “ Shun always viewed himself as most unfilial and therefore he was able to be filial” (Chan, Wing-tsit (trans.) (1963), Instructions fo r Practical Living and Other Neo-Confucian Writings by Wang Yang-ming, New York: Columbia Univer­ sity Press, §293). (For more on Wang Yang-ming, see subsection “ Three models” ， below.) Notice also that framing the disagreements in this way holds out at least the hope that there may be grounds for productive debate on this issue. It does not seem, prima facie, that it is purely a matter o f subjective opinion whether humans are as ethically fragile and as prone to wrongdoing (even in idyllic circumstances) as the (non-Pelagian) Christian tradition has claimed. Neither does it seem simply a matter of opinion what the likely consequences would be of systematically undervaluing one’s own worth. We cannot hope for uncontestable proof on any o f these issues. And it may turn out that, after a long period o f debate, we become convinced that these issues are rationally unresolvable. But we have a promising start.

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See Ivanhoe, Philip J. and Bryan W. Van Norden (eds) (2001), Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy, New York: Seven Bridges Press, p. 357. The most important scholarly studies of “ de” are Munro, Donald (1969), “ The Origin o f the Concept o f Te \ in Donald Munro, The Concept o f Man in Early China, Stanford: Stanford University Press, Appendix, p p . 185- 197; Nivison, David S. (1996), “ ‘Virtue’ in Bone and Bronze” ，in Nivison, The Ways o f Confucian­ ism, pp. 17-30; Nivison (1996), “ The Paradox o f ‘Virtue” ’，in ibid., pp. 31-43. De typically results from possessing good qualities, but not invariably: Mencius observed that Confucius’ disciple Qiu was the Steward o f the evil Ji family in Lu, but “ was unable to transform their de” (Mencius 4A:14). (A ll translations are my own unless otherwise noted.) “ De” is clearly used in this later sense in a work that probably dates from no earlier than the third century BC, The Mean (ch. 20): “ Wisdom, benevolence, and courage - these three are the universal de of the world.” Cf. Legge, James (1970), Confucian Analects, Great Learning, and Doctrine o f the Mean, reprint, New York: Dover Books, p. 407. It is possible that “ cheng” , as used in The Mean, means flourishing. However, this is not a common use for that term in early Classical Chinese. Furthermore, the School of the Way interprets the term in a very different way. Cf. Graham, Two Chinese Philosophers, pp. 67—73. Rosemont, Henry (1988), “ Against Relativism” ，in Gerald James Larson and Eliot Deutsch (eds), Interpreting Across Boundaries, Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 4 1 ,n . 11. Interestingly, I once committed the lexical fallacy myself in an objection (in conversation) against the work o f Kwong-loi Shun, who (I believe) was the first to point out to me that it is not a valid objection. Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, Book 2, ch. 7, passim. See Hansen, Chad (1992), A Daoist Theory o f Chinese Thought, New York: Oxford Univer­ sity Press, and Rosemont, Henry (1991) , A Chinese M irror, Chicago: Open Court Press, respectively. The distinction between agent-relative and agent-neutral considerations is different from the debate over ethical relativism and ethical objectivism. For instance, one could hold that ethical truth is relative to each individual person’s point o f view, but also hold that, from that person’s own point o f view at least, there are no agent-relative values. Nagel, Thomas (1986), The View from Nowhere, New York: Oxford University Press, p. 165. The terminology o f “ aspirations” ， “ prohibitions” ，and “ obligations” is not identical with that used by Nagel. Smart, J. J. C. and Bernard Williams (1973), Utilitarianism: For and Against, New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 98-100. Nagel, The View from Nowhere, p. 165. Emphasis added. Ibid., p. 165. Emphasis added. Nagel muddies the water a little, since he includes “ personal ties” under what I have labeled “ aspirations” . I am not sure what kinds of ties Nagel has in mind in the first category that are not included under the third category. These are sometimes called the “ five relations” ，and are mentioned in The Mean 20 and in Mencius 3A:4 (with “ elder and younger” replacing “ elder and younger brother” in the latter text). Translation o f Analects 13.18 by Edward Slingerland from Ivanhoe and Van Norden, Read­ . ings in Classical Chinese Philosophy (but with “ Kongzi” changed to “ Confucius” ） The situation is complicated, though, because just as there is act-deontology and rule-deontology, there is act-consequentialism and rule-consequentialism. Rule-consequentialism would war­ rant certain agent-relative prohibitions, obligations, and probably also aspirations. Brandt, Richard (1995), “ Some Merits o f One Form o f Rule-Utilitarianism” ，in Steven M. Cahn and Joram G. Haber (eds), Twentieth Century Ethical Theory, Upper Saddle River, NJ: PrenticeHall, pp. 418-436, defends one version o f rule-utilitarianism, and attributes it to M ill. See “ Impartial Caring” ，in Ivanhoe and Van Norden, Readings in Classical Chinese Philoso­ phy, pp. 63- 72. MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 52.

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Bryan W. Van Norden See Yearley, Mencius and Aquinas, p p .14, 71,202, and 218, n. 26. For more on particularistic virtue ethics, see subsection “ Ethical connoisseurs” ， below. The notion o f “ flourishing” can be generalized to apply to nonhuman animals and even plants. For instance, to flourish as a cat is to live a life characterized by the ordered exercise o f one’s capacities as a cat (e.g., hunting, grooming, playing, reproducing). Notice that most cat lovers agree that a cat can lead a very worthwhile life even if it is sterilized; however, few would say that its life is worthwhile if it cannot hunt or play. This suggests a pretheoretic sense of the ordering o f various capacities and activities. The generalizability o f the notion o f flourishing is important in understanding Mencius, who often uses plant metaphors to explicate human flourishing and cultivation (e.g., Mencius, 2A:2, 2A:6, 6A:1, 6A:7, 6A:8). As Stuart Hampshire laments, “ Even the word 'v irtue' itself now has an archaic and unnatural ring . . . ” (Hampshire, Stuart (1983), “ Two Theories of M orality” , in Stuart Hampshire, Moral­ ity and Conflict, Cambridge, M A: Harvard University Press, p. 41). On the various candidates, see Aquinas, Summa Theologiæ I—II, QQ. 2-3. Participation in political activity seems to be suggested as the highest good by Aristotle in Book I o f the Nicomachean Ethics, and arguably by Cicero (e.g., Cicero (1971)，The Dream o f Scipio, in Cicero, On the Good Life, trans. Michael Grant, New York: Penguin Books, p. 344); Plato and Aristotle in Book 10, ch. 7 o f the Nicomachean Ethics argue that theoretical contemplation is the highest good; and contemplating God (or the gods) is defended by Aquinas and by Aristotle in the Eudemian Ethics. On Aristotle’s complex view, see Nagel, Thomas (1980), “ Aristotle on Eudaimonia” ，in A. O. Rorty (ed.), Essays on Aristotle’s Ethics, Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 7-14, and Wilkes, Kathleen V . (1980), “ The Good Man and the Good for Man in Aristotle’s Ethics” ，in Rorty, ibid., pp. 341-357. Translation o f Analects 11.26 by Edward Slingerland, from Ivanhoe and Van Norden, Read­ ings in Classical Chinese Philosophy. Aquinas, Summa Theologian 11—11， Q. 48. Aquinas distinguishes between integral, subjective, and potential parts. See Yearley, Mencius and Aquinas, pp. 29-30. Aquinas would call these subjective parts o f that virtue, because they differ in terms o f the subject on which the virtue operates. Aquinas would call these either integral or potential parts of that virtue. Aquinas, Summa Theologice I—II, Q. 6 1 ,especially Art. 2. “ Charity” is the King James Bible’s translation of the Greek “ agape": a non-erotic love. Yearley, Mencius and Aquinas, pp. 29-31. I argue against the accuracy o f Zeng Z i， s interpretation in my Van Norden (2002), “ Unweaving the ‘One Thread’ o f Analects 4.15” ，in Bryan Van Norden (ed.), Confucius and the Analects: New Essays, New York: Oxford University Press. Mencius’ most extensive discussion o f courage is in 2A:2, which I analyze in Van Norden (1997), “ Mencius on Courage” ，in Peter A. French, Theodore E. Uehling, and Howard K. Wettstein (eds), The Philosophy o f Religion, v o l.21 o f Midwest Studies in Philosophy, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, pp. 237-256. Wilde, Oscar (1994), The Picture o f Dorian Gray, New York: Penguin Books, pp. 254-255. Yearley, Mencius and Aquinas, p . 19. For a suggestive discussion of hypocrisy that draws on both Chinese and Western philosophy, see Kupperman, Learning from Asian Philosophy, pp. 66-78. Mencius 7B:37. Cf. Analects 17.13. Zhu Xi (1986)， Zhu-Zi- Yu-Lei ( Classified Conversations o f Zhu X i), Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, v o l. 1 ,pp. 107ff. See MacIntyre, Alasdair (1991)," Incommensurability, Truth, and the Conversation between Confucians and Aristotelians about the Virtues” ，in Eliot Deutsch (ed), Culture and Modernity: East- West Philosophic Perspectives, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, p. 106. I borrow this typology, with modifications, from Ivanhoe, Confucian Moral Self Cultivation, pp. 17—18， 32-33, 59-60, 101-102; Schofer, Jonathan W. (2000), “ Virtues in Xunzi’s Thought” ,

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in Thornton Charles Kline and Philip J. Ivanhoe (eds), Virtue, Nature, and Agency in the Xunzi, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, pp. 71-72; and Yearley, Mencius and Aquinas, pp. 59- 61. But would a sociopath have this reaction? Mencius responds to this objection in Mencius 6A:8. The literature on Xun Zi is blossoming. See, e.g., Kline and Ivanhoe, Virtue, Nature, and Agency in the Xunzi, and Goldin, Paul Rakita (2000), Rituals o f the Way: The Philosophy o f Xunzi, Cmcago: Open Court Press. Hamlet, Act III, Scene iv , lines 160-170. Munro, Donald J. (1996), “ A Villain in the Xunzi” ，in Ivanhoe, Chinese Language, Thought, and Culture, pp. 193-201, and Hutton, Eric (2000), “ Does Xunzi Have a Consistent Theory of Human Nature?" in Kline and Ivanhoe, Virtue, Nature, and Agency in the pp. 220-236. Xunzi, in Ivanhoe and Van Norden, Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy, pp. 270-271. Gardner, Chu Hsi and the Ta-hsüeh, pp. 79-80. Since the lesser learning emphasizes training in good habits and developing skills, I take it to be a kind o f re-formation. However, it is possible that Zhu X i saw these activities as developing innate tendencies too. Ibid., p. 105. (Gloss is by Gardner.) Gardner has “ It would seem that every man’s intellect is possessed o f the capacity for knowing ... ” ，but the Chinese text literally says, “ It would seem that every man’s intellect is possessed o f knowing” (or “ knowledge” ） . I tnink this is precisely what Zhu X i (with his discovery model) wants to say, so I have modified Gardner’s transla­ tion slightly. In its locus classicus, Mencius 7A:15, “ liang zhi may be translated as “ best knowledge” (Ivanhoe and Van Norden, Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy, p. 148), which presum­ ably contrasts with amoral cleverness (see Mencius, 4B:26). However, Wang uses the term to refer to an understanding that is uncontaminated by selfish desires. Consequently, when discussing Wang, I prefer Nivison and Ivanhoe’s functional translation, “ pure knowing” (see Nivison, “ The Philosophy of Wang Yangming” ，and Ivanhoe, Ethics in the Confucian Tradi­ tion, pp. 38-41)• Ivanhoe, Confucian Moral Self Cultivation, pp. 46, 56. Zhu Xi, Si-Shu-Ji-Zhu, commentary on 2A:6. Kuhn, Thomas (1996), The Structure o f Scientific Revolutions, 3rd edn, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, p. 111. Murdoch, Iris (1986), “ The Sovereignty o f Good over Other Concepts” , in Iris Murdoch, The Sovereignty o f Good, New York: Routledge and Kegan Paul, p. 84. (Emphasis in original.) Ibid., p. 9 1 .(Emphasis in original.) Translation o f Analects 11.22 by Edward Slingerland, from Ivanhoe and Van Norden, Read­ ings in Classical Chinese Philosophy. The notion that Confucius employs skillful means has been used extensively to attempt to explain away apparent tensions in the Analects. This is explored by Henderson, John B. (1991), Scripture, Canon, and Commentary: A Comparison o f Confucian and Western Exegesis, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 169-170. See Wei, Cheng-t' ung (trans.) (1986), “ Chu Hsi on the Standard and the Expedient” , in Wingtsit Chan (ed.), Chu Hsi and Neo- Confucian ism, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, pp. 255-272. On these points, compare Nussbaum, Martha C .(1990), Love’s Knowledge, New York: Oxford University Press, especially pp. 66-75. I am at work on a book, tentatively titled “ The Classical Chinese Masters: A Philosophical Approach” , in which I interpret the Analects and the Mencius using a virtue ethics framework.

CHAPTER SIX

The Principled Benevolence: A Synthesis of Kantian and Confucian Moral Judgment Robin R. Wang The aim o f the present project is not to compare and contrast Eastern and Western perspectives, but to construct a creative synthesis o f two important moral traditions that transcends the limitations of each, and thereby to discover a moral principle adequate to meet the challenges posed by contemporary moral problems. The goal of a study such as this is not mere interpretation (although a great deal o f interpretation o f texts and positions is necessary), but rather to produce understanding and moral insight. A project of this nature could risk the generalization o f a theory yet it has two kinds o f benefits we can hope for: “ in ethical theory, a better understanding of moral obligation and justification o f moral judgment; in moral practice, an improved ability to determine what to do， ， .1 I will approach this task in three stages. In the first section I briefly charac­ terize what I see as the central features of Kantian ethics, and then identify what I believe to be the major shortcomings of such an approach. In the second section I subject Confucian ethics to the same treatment. In each case I want to identify both what is reasonable (and hence worth preserving) about each approach, as well as what conflicts with basic elements of our moral experience. This critical survey can then be put to use, in the final section, in the develop­ ment and justification o f a view that capitalizes upon the strengths o f the Kantian and Confucian approaches while avoiding their weaknesses. I call this synthetic view “ the Principled Benevolence” in recognition of the twin sources of its development. I ， ll consider several objections to this perspective, and argue that none of them succeed in weakening this approach. The test for any ethical theory is not just its internal consistency and coherence with our moral experi­ ence, but also its ability to help us resolve (or at least clarify) concrete moral problems. Consequently, in the final part of this essay I show, in an admittedly brief fashion, how the perspective developed here provides insight into a con­ temporary moral problem. My central claim in this essay is that the Principled Benevolence provides a powerful and persuasive synthesis of Kantian and Con­ fucian moral judgment, and is strong where each o f these views is weak. Such a perspective could help us to see pressing moral problems in a new light. 122

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The problems with Kantian vision In Kant’s writings, principles of morality become analogous to inviolable laws of nature, equally binding on each rational being. Instead o f basing ethics on feelings, ethics must be based on an understanding o f what duty requires o f us. A cco rding to K a n t, genuine m o ra lity m ust be based on reason. M o ra l actions are undertaken, not to accomplish some end, but rather simply because o f the principle they embody or are grounded upon. The moral worth o f an action, he insists, lies “ not with the purpose to be attained by it, but in the maxim in accordance with which it is decided upon” .2Principles, not purposes, are the stuff of morally worthy actions. K an t， s project is to construct such a pure moral philosophy based solely on reason and not on particular facts about human beings. Only in this way, he believes, can the moral principles arrived at be valid for all rational beings. “ Duty” ，Kant informs us, “ is the necessity to do an action from respect for law” ,3 and is independent of any expected results from so acting. An action done from respect for law excludes inclination as one of its motivating factors. There are three problems associated with Kant’s perspective.

The problem o f character detachment The first problem with Kant’s view might be called “ the problem o f character detachment” . As noted above, the primary emphasis in K ant’s ethics is placed on the “ moral law” ，which has its justification in the dictates o f rationality alone. A person succeeds in being moral on this view just insofar as his actions are motivated by respect for the moral law, irrespective or his own and others’ feelings, desires, and inclinations. But because persons consist o f more than their rationality, this leads Kant to overlook other important factors con­ tributing to a moral situation. Kant’s ethical view detaches moral action from the agent， s attitudes, the emotional tones and textures o f the situation within which the agent acts. Begin with the agent， s attitude. In many cases we think that the agent’s attitude is just as important as the nature o f the action performed. A good example o f this appears in Zhang Yim o’s film The Story o f Qiu Ju. In the film, Qiu Ju, the wife of a man kicked in the groin by the leader o f the village, seeks a monetary payment from the leader as part o f his apology. The leader does pay the money, but he does so by throwing it to the ground in front o f Qiu Ju rather than by placing it in her hand. The leader has paid the money he was ordered to by his superiors, but he did so not with an attitude o f remorse but rather with one of scorn and defiance. Qiu Ju refuses to take the money given in this way, and demands an apology; that is, a sincere indication o f the leader’s regret at having kicked her husband. He does not apologize, and Qiu Ju resolves not to give up until the leader compensates her and does so with the

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correct attitude. This scene strikes us as being quite natural and revealing about the sorts of factors that matter in morality. The action is certainly important, but so is the attitude with which the action is performed. Nancy Sherman describes this additional element as the “ emotional tone” in our moral experi­ ence, and rightly notes that “ the emotional tone of one’s action may make a moral difference" .4 It should be pointed out here that although the issue of character does not play a significant role in the Fundamental Principles o f the Metaphysics o f Morals, it does play some role in the second part of the Metaphysics o f Morals, entitled “ The Doctrine of Virtue” . The issue here, however, is not whether Kant discusses virtue, or even whether he has a place for virtue in his system, but rather what he means by “ virtue” . According to Kant, “ Virtue signifies a moral strength of the will. ... Virtue is the moral strength of man’s will in ful­ filling his duty, a moral constraint through his own lawgiving reason, insofar as this constitutes itself an authority executing the la w ." 5 Virtue is thus the moral strength to overcome obstacles in fulfilling one’s duty according to law. Virtue in this sense is an ability to assist us in overcoming our animality and thus to facilitate acting purely rationally. I f one wants to make a morally praiseworthy choice then physical existence with its worries, concerns, needs, and hopes — both one’s own and others’ - must be disregarded. A person succeeds in being moral insofar as he acts in a way that is detached from his own and others’ feelings, desires, and inclinations. As Andrea Nye states, “ The enemy o f the law is always the flesh, which locates us solidly in a given system whose w orkings are mechanical and inescapable, and it is always the

flesh that must be sacrificed.” 6

The problem o f detachment from personal relationships, social functions, and special responsibilities The second problem with Kant’s view concerns the way in which it detaches moral considerations from personal relationships and individuals，social func­ tions, and also ignores the sorts of special responsibilities we typically think we have toward select others. Kantian ethics embraces what is sometimes called the Principle of Impartiality. This principle states that the interests and welfare of any person are as important as those of any other and there are no privileged persons from the moral point o f view. (See Figure 6.1，“ The Equal Ethical Poll" .） This principle has two important consequences:( 1 ) we cannot justifiably regard ourselves as having special moral status, and (2) we cannot justifiably treat others differently in virtue o f morally insignificant properties. Although the Principle of Impartiality is an important assumption in much moral theorizing, it is also highly problematic when applied in some fairly common cases inasmuch as it has quite counterintuitive consequences. Not only do we practice partiality when it conies to deciding what to do, but also in

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many cases it seems that this is the right thing to do. This is especially the case with the second consequence identified above. For example, if you have enough additional income to support one additional person besides yourself, and your elderly parent is in need of such support, you would be quite reasonable to support your elderly parent, rather than a total stranger. People will spend huge sums o f money to support and care for their own children, and only a small fraction o f this amount to provide food for starving children in distant lands. Were one to do just the opposite (letting one’s own children go hungry while sending money to relief agencies), it is likely that one would be con­ sidered morally deficient rather than morally praiseworthy. Caring more for one’s immediate family members than for total strangers is, o f course, to show a great deal o f partiality, and hence to violate the Principle o f Impartiality. Yet such behavior seems quite unexceptional and is not the sort o f thing that anyone is likely to morally condemn you for. This suggests that our obligations to others are not to be discharged in a completely impartial manner and that some people merit or deserve our attention and assistance more than others. Our families, in particular, seem to have a special claim to our concern and assistance. Certainly our close family members have a greater call on us than do people who are related to us more remotely, or not at all. There are special moral considerations that pertain to the members of one's immediate family that do not (or do not necessarily) extend to those outside this circle. These observations, however, point up a problem with Kant 's ethics. Kant proposes universally binding moral prescriptions, according to which one has equal moral obligations to all rational beings. This is in conflict with the way in which most people actually form their moral judgments. The fundamental explanation for this problem in Kantian ethics may be traced to his account o f feelings. According to Kant, natural feeling, like chil­ dren's natural feelings toward their parents, or pupils' feelings toward their teachers, are “ im perfect" 7 and an expression of our “ a n im a lity" .8We need to

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constrain our natural feelings and conform or subject them to a law of duty. We may ask, why should our natural feelings be discounted in this way? As noted above, we naturally feel greater obligations toward our parents, children, friends, students, and so on, than we do toward complete strangers. This points to the fact that the moral life is dynamic and complex. It is logically and practically impossible to make certain feelings and attitudes a matter o f duty. However, we do blame people for character defects and praise those who dis­ play exemplary characters. We can encourage and develop in people certain feelings and attitudes related to a good character. The moral life cannot be reduced to combinations of generally recommended principles or obedience to universally binding rules. A moral theory should help us to make sense o f our most pervasive moral experiences rather than to conflict with them. Personal relationships and our feelings are an important part of our lives and ought to find a protected space within our moral thinking. Bernard Williams points out that “ the Kantian outlook on person emphasizes something like the separateness o f agents . . . ” and the Kantian approach allows very little room for “ the im­ portance of individual character and personal relations in moral experience" .9

The problem o f moral knowledge and moral skill The third problem with Kantian ethics concerns the distinction between moral knowledge and moral skill. According to Kant, acting morally depends on two factors: recognizing the law of duty and having the virtue or will-power to act in accordance with it. Kant’s theory provides a basis for arriving at moral knowledge, i.e., what it is one’s duty to do in general (and perhaps in particular situations, although this is more problematic), but it provides little resources for helping one to actually develop the skill to act morally in con­ crete situations. Jonathan Harrison proposes a connection between acting morally and acting skillfully.10 A person may fail to pay her debts, not because she does not know that debts ought to be paid, nor because she cannot resist the temptation to leave them unpaid, but simply because she is extremely unskillful at managing her finances. Another person might break her pro­ mises because she is bad at planning her time. Someone might give offense to other people because she lacks the skills to please others. Each o f these prob­ lems arises from a failure to have the right habit, rather than from a failure to acquire the right understanding. In our normal daily lives we are not always facing problems calling for sophisticated reflection on alternative courses of action, and we are not always making decisions according to some rule. Instead we unreflectively follow a norm or tradition which we just happen to have been brought up with. A t other times, however, we act because we have a “ habit of behavior” that has been deliberately acquired. This form of moral life is obtained through certain kinds of education that can nurture and maintain it. This kind of education gives us the power to act appropriately and without

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hesitation, doubt, or difficulty. We do not learn rules or precepts first, and then apply them. In most cases, we learn them by following the examples o f others, and these actions gradually become habits. These habits cannot be simply deduced from general principles. They cannot be acquired through the purely cognitive Kantian model o f knowing the principle for deriving moral rules. Jonathan Harrison makes this view clearly: “ We acquire habits o f conduct, not by constructing a way of living upon rules or precepts learned by heart and subsequently practiced, but by living with people who habitually behave in a certain manner: we acquire habits o f conduct in the same way as we acquire our native language." 11 The moral life is, consequently, a life o f balance be­ tween habit and reflection. While it is true that Kant’s project is to discover the fundamental principle o f morality, and not to show us how to become moral, his moral philosophy would be richer and closer to our moral experience if it included a greater emphasis on the acquisition o f moral habits. While both reflection and habit are important, Kant’s ethics unnecessarily privileges the former at the expense of the latter.

The problems with Confucian vision Confucian ethics is essentially an ethics o f virtue. The goal o f the moral life is to cultivate a certain kind of character (the character of the " j uzi”n/gentleman). - z i Rather than focusing on axioms o f conduct (like Kantian categorical imper­ atives), Confucianism emphasizes socially determined roles and the proper activ­ ities associated with them. Because the family and society are natural entities, one’s role is also naturally determined.12 Whereas Kant treats all persons as individuals to whom we have equal obligations, Confucius explicitly locates the individual in a nested set of relationships extending through one’s immediate and extended family, to one’s teachers, to one’s neighbors, to society at large. One’s obligations are determined by the relationship one has to persons in each o f these different naturally and socially determined categories. Benevolence (ren) has the central importance in Confucian moral teaching. Although Con­ fucius never gave a clear definition of benevolence we read from the Analects: “ Fan Ch’ih asked about benevolence. The Master said, ‘Love your fellow men'" .13 However, Confucian ren is a graduated love rather than a universal love, as is agape. This graduated love, or love with distinction, means loving others according to the nature of one's relation to them. David Hall and Roger Ames believe that one reason Confucius chooses to make this love graduated rather than universal “ lies with the importance o f personal judgment (yi) in the process o f person making’’.14One’s love toward others is displayed through the context of multi-faceted relationships. Confucius says: “ The jun-zi/gentleman devotes his efforts to the roots, for once the roots are established, the Way will grow therefrom. Being good as a son and obedient as a young man is, perhaps,

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the root of a man’s character.” 15Social roles and relations function in Confucian teaching as the ascription o f rational agency to other individuals does for Kant. There are also three problems in the Confucian perspective.

The problem o f the dissipation o f moral energy The problems attending Confucian ethics are, in some ways, the opposite of those attending Kantian ethics. Whereas the Kantian view faces the problem of detachment, Confucian ethics faces the problem of disparity. According to Confucius, every person has a natural affection towards his kin. One should exercise, develop, and cultivate this natural sentiment within one's family, and then extend it to all human beings. One first becomes a good child in one’s own home, and then one can become a good citizen in one’s society: The Master said, “ A young man should be a good son at home and an obedient young man abroad, sparing o f speech but trustworthy in what he says, and should love the multitude at large but cultivate the friendship of his fellow men. I f he has any energy to spare from such action, let him devote it to making himself cultivated.” 16

Human beings are all potential ren (benevolent) creatures and this ren will link all human beings into a harmonious whole, giving a natural justification to the idea that all persons are brothers/sisters. It is the innate affection a person feels for their “ brothers/sisters” that enables them to carry the ideal of a one-family world into practice. With this understanding o f human nature Confucius advocates the theory of zheng-ming (the rectification o f names). In the essence, the Confucian perspective gives personal relationships and social functions an ethical significance and regards them as a moral mechanism for bringing goodness and order into the individual’s life and society. Confucius' understanding of the essential nature of human beings plays an important role in the normative conclusions he reaches, but it also leads to some difficult ethical problems. One o f these problems concerns the dis­ sipation of moral energy. We could define our felt obligations toward those to whom we are most closely tied as the “ first-degree moral energy” . Our felt obligations toward all others could then be called the “ second-degree moral energy” . The first-degree moral energy is rooted mostly in our natural feelings and our human nature. It could also be a result of cultivation. The seconddegree moral energy is mostly a product o f cultivation; that is, it is rooted in our efforts. The dissipation of moral energy can then be seen in two ways. First, from a natural point of view, if one's moral energy should be primarily devoted toward those within one’s immediate circle(s), then the degree o f moral concern for those outside these circles dwindles to insignificance. (See Figure 6.2, “ The Dissipation of Moral Energy" .）

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Figure 6.2

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Confucian Images: The Dissipation of Moral Energy

To put the problem another way, Confucius' emphasis on relationships as the basis o f morality is in tension with our moral sense that all persons, not just those to whom we are closely related, deserve our moral consideration. One has moral affection and moral obligations towards parents, relatives, and friends, but what about the person to whom we are not biologically and socially directly related? On what grounds should one love all persons? I f one is truly behaving as one ought to those close to one, one is likely to run out o f time and resources available for the implementation o f the seconddegree moral energy. Fei Xiao-tong offers a vivid description: this Confucian view is “ like the ripples formed from a stone thrown into a lake, each circle spreading out from the center becomes more distant and at the same time more in sig n ifica n t" .17 Second, from the personal effort point of view, the question is how can we insure that the transition Confucius recommends from love for our parents, relatives, and friends to love for strangers actually obtains? What is the ethical foundation for this transition? David Wong thinks that although such trans­ ition is not a logical impossibility, it might still be a “ human im p o ssib ility" .18 Someone might argue that Confucius thinks that there is a single word that can be a guide to conduct throughout one’s life, that is, shu. “ Do not impose on others what you yourself do not desire." 19 This Confucian Golden Rule is a universal principle that provides the basic guidance for actions. However, this negative expression o f the Golden Rule only deals with don' ts not do's. It will help one to see what actions are morally forbidden but it does not necessarily propose the way one should treat others. This explains what might be called The China Myth. Westerners sometimes have a view o f China according to which, because of the Confucian ren tradition in that culture, the people they meet will be uniformly “ nice” . Once they are in China, however, they find that people on the street are often rude and nasty. Only when they make some friends do they begin to see the practical application

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of the Confucian ren tradition. Yet this disparity between the treatment of those within one’s circle and the treatment of strangers is arguably a direct result of a tension in the Confucian ethics.

The problem o f disparity o f self A second problem with the Confucian ethics must be mentioned here. As noted above, on the Confucian view, persons are not isolated entities but exist in webs o f relationships. In this sense, a person always see her “ self” as part of a larger whole or social framework, and as inseparable from this whole. There are many different ways to argue for the Confucian self. Roger Ames has given the five models for the interpretations of the Confucian self.20 But if we apply Amelie Rorty’s account o f a person to the Confucian construction o f person we will find that the concept of “ self” becomes prob­ lematic in the Confucian teaching. According to Rorty, the concept o f a person involves a unity of character and a self.21 Character is formed within one’s society in interaction with others under various circumstances. While characters are public persons, “ selves” are private possessors o f rights, pro­ perties, and qualities.22 Confucius recognizes that persons are embodied in many connections and one's self-identity is a function o f one's dynamic social roles in these complex interconnections. Relationships are the very essence of what it is to be a person. However, Confucius does not ascribe the posses­ sions, such as rights, and properties, to persons. In this sense we could assert that the concept of “ self” ，or at least Rorty’s self, is lacking in the Confucian thought. Someone might argue that learning to become a good person is the primary and ultimate concern of the Confucian teaching. Confucius places a great emphasis on how to cultivate oneself (xiu shen) and to know the true self. This teaching requires not simply that one becomes honest with oneself and loyal to others (although these are important), but requires, in addition, learning to become fully human. Self-cultivation (xiu shen) is the process o f becoming fully human. So, in a way Confucius does recognize the importance o f the self. There is no doubt that the concept of self-cultivation is an indispensable part of the Confucian account of person. But the question is, I contend, whether the Confucian concept of self-cultivation is the same as the concept of “ self” . This question can be answered through exploring the difference between the Confucian self-cultivation and the Aristotelian self-actualization. This difference will help us to see the essence of self-cultivation. Confucian self-cultivation focuses on training oneself to follow the li (rituals) of the social value system conforming orderly to the social norms. “ Yen Yuan asked about benevolence. The Master said, ‘To return to the observance of rites through overcoming the self constitutes benevolence'." 23 By contrast, self-actualization advocates the

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realization of one’s natural abilities and potentials. It is inner-directed to exhibit oneself within society. Self-cultivation is a gradual process o f building up one's character by making oneself receptive to the shared values of one's own society. The main purpose o f self-cultivation is not necessarily the proper exercise o f free choice, or a free play, but rather the removal o f obstacles that prevent the growth o f the mind by, for example, removing selfish thoughts. Self-cultivation promotes self-sacrifice of the individual for the preservation of the group. Self-actualization promotes the self-interest o f individuals for the sake of individuals. Being a self requires having the room to develop the features and styles that differentiate oneself from others and to be free from the pressure of others. But in the shame-dominated society it is difficult for someone to maintain a private sphere in which what counts is one’s own conception o f a good life, one's own standards of excellence, one， s own judgment o f success and failure. Consequently, the Confucian perspective seriously underestimates the import­ ance o f the self and its development.

The dilemma o f filia l piety The Confucian concept of person is characteristically defined in terms of biological inheritance, identities, and roles. These properties were not chosen, but received along with the gift o f life itself. The biological body is the original source o f integrity and biological and social functions are the basis for moral obligations. Biological and familial ties provide the enduring metaphors. Filial piety, in particular, is the basis of morality and the seed of benevolence: Confucius said: “ Filial piety is the foundation o f all virtues and the fountainhead whence all moral teachings spring.” Zeng Shen said: “ May I venture to ask whether there was nothing greater than filial piety in all the virtues o f the sages?” Confucius replied: “ O f all creatures in the world, man is the noblest. O f all the acts o f man there is none greater than filial p ie ty ."24

This concept of filial piety is elevated to the highest degree: “ Zeng Shen asked: ‘How great and profound is filial piety?' Confucius replied: ‘Filial piety is the first principle o f heaven, the righteousness o f earth, and the very code of conduct of people .'" 25Filial piety is manifested in two ways. One is the biological link between a person and her parents. It operates on the sentiment o f gratitude. The other is to follow in the steps o f one’s father. “ The Master said, ‘Observe what a man has in mind to do when his father is living, and then observe what he does when his father is dead. If, for three years, he makes no changes to his father’s ways, he can be said to be a good son.'" 26

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Despite the importance, indeed, the centrality of filial piety in Confucian ethics, there is a deep dilemma associated with it. The dilemma concerns a problem o f indistinguishability, on the one hand, and a loss of moral moorings, on the other. Begin with the problem of indistinguishability. Filial piety requires that one follow in one’s father’s footsteps. But we need to recognize not only our indebtedness to our parents, and the continuity o f our lives with theirs, but also our individuality 一 our distinctness and independence from other people, including, and perhaps especially, from those to whom we are biologically tied. There are, in fact, two distinct questions related to this requirement. First, what are the necessary and sufficient conditions for me to exist as a human being? Second, what are the necessary and sufficient conditions for me to exist as myself? Determining who (and what) is to count as a human being is at least partially an evaluative matter, requiring an evaluation of the essential elements o f human life. For Confucius, honoring one's parents is a necessary condition for one to be a human being because it is the most important element of humanness. What counts for myself is a descriptive matter, requiring recognition of the diversity of human characters. But becoming “ indistinguishable” from one’s father does not allow for the uniqueness and autonomy of each person. Although we have to respect our parents and take their examples seriously, we do not have to follow their ways in all things. Emphasizing the following o f one’s father may prevent individuals from constituting their own identity in society, and thus may result in depriving them of their individual agency. To clarify this claim we may make a distinction between the generic person, which is a description in terms o f the distinctive endowments of all human beings, and the idiosyncratic person, which is based on one’s specific merits or individuality. Confucius offers many accounts of what constitutes the generic human being, but gives little room for the idiosyncratic variations in a person. T his offers one of many reasons to explain why many Chinese youngsters experience inescap­ able internal conflict between meeting with their parents’ expectations and pursuing their individualistic dreams. The other horn of the dilemma of filial piety concerns the consequences of cutting oneself o ff from the ways of one's father. On the Confucian view, to reject this element of filial piety is to entirely lose one’s moral mooring - the very basis and foundation of morality itself. According to him, there are three thousand crimes that will be punished in five different ways, but no crime is greater than being impious to one’s parents.27One simply cannot be a morally good person without filial piety. The failure to exercise filial piety is the root of disorder. Consequently, Confucius' emphasis on filial piety creates a dilemma. On the one hand, filial piety may prevent the development o f personal autonomy; on the other hand, rejecting filial piety is equivalent to rejecting morality itself. One can be either an autonomous individual or a moral person, but not both. This dilemma is inevitable within the framework of Confucian ethics.

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The Principled Benevolence A proposal fo r synthesis The problems in both Kantian and Confucian moral views call for a synthesis of the two systems. The creative dialogue between Kantian and Confucian views will rest upon their points of convergence, rather than their difference. As noted earlier, Kant disregards natural feelings as a basis for morality and makes respect for the law o f duty the ultimate goal o f moral life. Yet, we are creatures o f feeling as well as reason, and the affections are themselves a source of obligation. Natural feeling could create an “ I must” ，because our natural sentiments have a moral standing and our moral obligations associated with these affections have priority over others in our moral life. Confucius sees this clearly, but fails to give an equal consideration for every individual in our moral discourse. I f human lives lack the guidance of impartial principles that are, to some extent at least, independent of natural inclinations, life would be full o f corruption, unfairness, and darkness. The only way to guide our actions toward strangers is to appeal to some general principles, such as respect for all. This is where Kant got it right. The Confucian outlook has to be equipped with a basic impartial principle of the sort that Kant proposed. Kantian theory will give Confucian material a solid foundation and structure. In the view I will propose, respect for the law o f duty is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for moral judgment. Duties toward others cannot be treated equally; some duties carry more weight than others. These important duties cannot be derived from reason alone, but rather from recognition of social relationships and social functions. Respect for all persons can thus form the foundation o f a perspective that also takes into account the special obliga­ tions we have toward some but not all others. David Wong claims: Our ethic must encompass at least two separate sources o f obligations at the most fundamental level: one is rooted in our nature as beings who need to bond with particular others and in a conception o f ethics as presenting ways for human beings to flourish; the other is the universalistic perception o f the moral worth o f all.28

Introducing a Principled Benevolence may thus combine the best elements of Kantian and Confucian ethics. It may be stated in a form that is reminiscent of Kant’s Categorical Imperative, but with an important Confucian perspective: Act in such a way that you always treat all persons (present and future, including oneself) not simply as means but benevolently, including respect fo r them as rational autonomous beings and consideration o f them as the particular social beings that they are ( i.e.，with cognizance o f their particular stations in the social order).

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The Principled Benevolence requires us to treat oneself and others benevol­ ently, and this requirement follows from the recognition o f moral agents as not only autonomous beings but also social beings. A good moral agent has certain social roles to play and some moral obligations are derived from these social roles. According to Mou Zong-san (Mou Tsung-san), in the eyes of Chinese Confucians, Kant’s autonomous beings will lack concrete moral feelings and become the being with only “ an isolated, abstract and subjective reason" . This reason is a “ dead substance” and cannot be “ the source of moral actions" .29 For Mou the ben xin (original mind/heart) and ren ti (benevolent being) are the “ real moral powers” and moral feelings are their manifestations.30 The recognition of an agent’s different orientations prevents the depersonaliza­ tion and separation of morality from human nature and strengthens the genuine moral sensibility. It would be morally better to act on a motive of direct con­ cern for the well-being of oneself and the welfare of others than the Kantian motive of duty. The Principled Benevolence considers benevolence as an important element for moral discourse in general. However, benevolence does not simply con­ sist in favorable attitudes and motivations, it is also a dispositional structure essential to the proper performance of a moral principle - respect for all. The concept o f principle from Kant is important, for without principles we are thrown back on arbitrary first-hand appraisals. Principle is indispensable, but it cannot be the only legitimate moral concern as Kant implies. The Confucian character o f ren (benevolence) has to be present in conduct. In the light o f this thinking, Barbara Herman explains the situation clearly: Kantian autonomy may be a necessary but not a sufficient condition for “ real” moral autonomy. Ordinarily, we have reason to think that the auto­ nomous person is not merely one who can act on principles but is, rather, the person whose situation or upbringing yields not only a character capable of practically effective critical reflection but also a character moved by desires and interests that are in some important sense her own: desires and interests that are neither the result of coercion nor the products of institu­ tionalized oppression.31

The central aim of the Principled Benevolence is to incorporate these factors and bring them into a coherent system. It argues for installing the Confucian attitude o f ren (benevolence) and also recognizes that the exercise o f benevolence depends on the principle, that is, respect for all. Therefore, the Kantian Categorical Imperative defines a basic structure for the Principled Benevolence. It regulates and guides the benevolent actions. Without such a framework, the actions seem more contingent and arbitrary. The point is that the expression of attitude and affection must pay heed to what is right and reasonable. Likewise, the exercise of a principle must be imbued with the spirit of benevolence. The Principled Benevolence reveals the presence of these two

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Synthetic Images: The Functional Integration

moral features and integrates them in the moral discourse. It can be seen as Confucian wisdom standing on the shoulders o f Kantian reasoning. (See Figure 6.3, “ The Functional Integration" .） The Principled Benevolence provides the acceptable channels for the fu lfill­ ment of a person as an autonomous being as well as a social being. It offers an outlet for our dealing with various moral problems, such as the problem of future generations. No claim to final adequacy is intended, as this synthetic work may be further challenged or contested. However, this position is embodied in the Chinese word for ethics. In the Chinese language, the term “ ethics” has two characters: “ Dao” and " De" They are used independently, but they can also go together and form a new word: “ dao de” ， that is, ethics. The connotations o f these two words are mixed and complicated. Generally speaking, dao refers to the way, the principle, the substance, the reality, etc. De means virtue - a person’s overall disposition and character. The de is closer to o ur natural, prereflective impulse and instinct. The dao is more reflective, as a well-thought-out universal order. This compound word “ dao de” (ethics) captures a plausible position for morality: any complete ethical stance requires both dao (way) and de (virtue). The establishment o f a conceptual structure for the intimate association between these two is what the moral theory is all about.32 This dao-de framework also helps us to explain the basic method to be used to formulate the Principled Benevolence. This perspective joins benevolence to a categorical principle. From the Kantian point o f view, in order to use the Categorical Imperative as a principle o f judgment or assessment, the agent must first produce her maxim. She must formulate a subjective principle that correctly describes what she is intending to do and why. From the Confucian point o f view, it is very hard to see how any moral judgments could ignore the particulars and characteristics o f the agent and circumstances. Without these contextual materials, how could one make the reasoned comparative judgments

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necessary for deliberation in circumstances containing competing moral con­ siderations? These two points of view would place an argument that a good moral agent who comes to the Kantian Categorical Imperative procedure should carry a Confucian “ whole package” ，containing as much of past, present, and future conditions as possible. The Principled Benevolence is not designed to be an abstract and impersonal rule but to provide a procedure for structuring the particular actions in a moral way. It argues for a balance of moral concerns and moral practice. First, it translates a moral principle into a disposition such as benevolent feeling, attitude, and motivation. Treating all persons benevolently requires that one cultivates benevolent dispositions and sentiments in oneself and promotes the acquisition o f such dispositions and sentiments in others. This transformation and requirement will solve the Kantian detachment problems. Second, the disposition should be guided and shaped by a universal moral principle. The moral principle introduces the moral reasoning and offers the agent the kind of rationale that could support a full deliberative judgment. As Robert Audi explains: “ A theory needs epistemic completeness to provide the comprehensive moral guidance we seek as moral agents; it needs normative completeness to enable us to explain and justify the moral judgments we arrive at on the basis of the facts that indicate our o b lig a tio n s." 33 The moral agent has to decide how to give moral weight to particular circumstances and realize that she would not violate a known moral precept. The Principled Benevolence can function as a regulation to which actions are to conform. This regulation will avoid the Confucian disparity of moral energy problem. What I have argued is that moral thinking should be sensitive to all o f the situations in which the caring person and the cared-for person find themselves. Therefore, a rational principle should represent the conception of good or s term, “ an empty contextual particularity. It should not be, using Andrea Nye， form ula" .34 I have also argued that a moral virtue, such as benevolence, cannot be per­ formed without a moral structure or content (it is not mere inclination). Moral thinking should be occupied by fully universalizable moral principles. The fact that morality calls for care does not imply that it is permissible to violate the rights of people who are outside the caring relationship. Marcia Baron thinks that a moral agent should be able to ask the question: “ This is the benevolent thing to do, but is it the right thing to do? Is it what I should do, all things considered?" 35 The Principled Benevolence shares some insights with Robert A udi’s Kantian intuitionism. In the discussion o f a Kantian intuitionism, Robert Audi con­ nects the Kantian Categorical Imperative with Rossian principles o f prima facie duty. According to him, this framework makes “ a theoretical advance” and provides a “ reflective e q u ilib riu m " .361 am convinced that synthesizing the emphasis o f moral principle and the practice of moral virtue creates a fresh

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way of thinking of moral issues. Moral principles cannot be fulfilled without being a morally sensible person. A complete account o f morality should contain both o f them. Consider a case where there are various ways one might save someone in danger.(1 )The Kantian duty approach: the object o f the action is to do what moral duty requires; the motive is to act in conformity with duty. (2) The Confucian personal relation and social roles focused approach: the object of the action is to save X; the motive is to fulfill my roles as a child or friend and to satisfy my natural feelings towards X. (3) The Principled Benevolence approach: the object of the action is to save this person; the motive is to provide morally called-for help. One may ask, which approach can be the appropriate model for a moral action? In the Kantian approach the help is offered because o f a commitment to duty and not from a feeling o f care and concern for this person. Failure to care about others is a failure o f moral sensitivity. In the Confucian approach the reason to act seems unreliable and narrow. One could not expect consistency of response in morally similar cases, particularly where one has no social rela­ tion or natural feelings towards the person who is in need of help. I may prefer that my friends help me out o f their feelings for me, but it is rational to prefer they be morally prepared to help me as well as others. With the Principled Benevolence approach one does not act to save this person in order to fulfill one’s duty, nor does one act for the sake of maintaining one’s social roles. One acts in response to a needed help. This action is the result of concern for another human being. This motive is also attached to a moral principle that can direct one to provide help for any person with such need and give one the reason for action. This approach constructs the basic conception o f value into the principle that fits the circumstances o f human action, judgment, and life. It can bring about the best state o f moral affairs and avoid the moral deficiency.

Objections to the Principled Benevolence A moral agent might ask why she should adopt the Principled Benevolence rather than another moral principle. The Principled Benevolence requires that a moral agent treat others benevolently. But does not this principle ask us to be “ moral saints” ? Susan W olf discusses the notion o f a “ moral saint” as follows: “ By moral saint I mean a person whose every action is as morally good as possible, a person, that is, who is as morally worthy as can be." 37 According to her, “ A necessary condition o f moral sainthood would be that one's life be dominated by a commitment to improving the welfare o f others or o f society as a w hole." 38She also describes two models of the moral saint. For the “ loving saint” ，personal happiness lies in the happiness o f others. Such a person “ would devote himself to others gladly, and with a whole and open heart” . The other kind o f moral saint is the “ rational saint” . This person sacrifices her own interests to the interests of others, but she does so out o f a sense o f duty, or

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some other intellectual appreciation and recognition of moral principles. The problem with either sort o f moral saint is that they devote all their time to helping others and consequently have no time for their own development. Thus, the moral saint will necessarily lack a healthy, well-rounded, richly developed character. Her saintly life is incompatible with being well rounded. The Principled Benevolence is not intended to create moral saints. However, this principle does require that one considers the well-being of others. This requirement promotes benevolence yet without swallowing up the moral agent’s own entire personality. This principle itself does not suggest that the only thing one does is to serve others. It does not exclude the development of a well-rounded character of the whole person. A second objection might claim that the Principled Benevolence does not provide us with any specific moral guidance. It does not specify what, precisely, is to be done in a particular situation. What practical guidance, if any, does this principle afford us? What difference will it make to our conduct whether we hold this principle or not? The Principled Benevolence expresses an attitude, and supports a certain kind of character, conduct, disposition, and way of life. This principle is, using W. D. Falk’s terminology, “ guiding” rather than “ goading” or “ com m anding" .39 But what sort o f guidance does it offer? The Principled Benevolence enjoins us to be considerate of others’ well­ being. The consideration o f others is a necessary condition for one’s own well-being. According to the well-known paradox of hedonism, an agent will likely fail to maximize her own pleasure by consciously attempting to do so. Conversely, she is more likely to promote her own pleasure by cultivating concern for others for their own sakes.40 David Wong states: [0]ur flourishing as social beings requires that we have certain sorts of relationships with others. The character of these relationships with others is partly defined and partly sustained by duties we have to them. Therefore, the reason for performing some of our most important duties is our social nature and our own flourishing.41

The Principled Benevolence can help us to acquire more of what David Wong calls the “ effective agency” . According to Wong, an “ effective agency" in volves (a) having “ the set o f abilities that allow us to formulate reasonably clear priorities among our ends” and (b) the ability to “ plan and perform actions that have a reasonable chance o f realizing our ends, given all the conditions beyond our control” . He argues that, on the one hand, an “ effective agency is a necessary condition of all forms of flourishing” . On the other hand, “ certain sorts o f relationships are necessary for being an effective agent" .42 The most basic reason for adopting the Principled Benevolence is that it gives one a moral orientation. Moral principles are put forward as guidelines

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for how to act or as registering resolutions to act in certain ways. Principles are more like an orientation of life which sets the manner in which one goes about whatever one is trying to do, rather than a recipe for telling one precisely what to do in every situation one could encounter. Just as fitness programs may train and prepare one to run a race, without necessarily anticipating every incident that will occur during the actual race. Neo-Confucianism has an interesting principle that relates to this view: Liyi-fen-shu: “ The principle is one, but its manifestations are many.” Principle (li) is the natural ordering pattern in all things and the reason for their coming into existence; principle (li) is also many because it is present in every individual thing. Zhu X i (1130-1200) explains the nature of the relationship between the Great Ultimate and individual things by using the analogy of the moon and its reflection: Originally there is only the single Great Ultimate, and all things receive it in its entirety. It is like the moon in the heavens. There is only one moon, and yet it spreads out over all the rivers and we see it [reflected] everywhere. We cannot say it is divided up into parts.43

This kind o f understanding might be applicable as well to the Principled Benevolence. In practice this becomes a one-many relationship in the following respects. First, benevolence is a macrocosm of all moral practice, yet every con­ crete practice is a microcosm. Second, treating all persons (present and future) benevolently should be the pattern o f our action as a general requirement, but benevolence can be manifested in a variety of forms, such as love, loyalty, caring, and justice. Each individual human and their actions share in one unifying principle. The Principled Benevolence suggests a standpoint from which to examine the contemporary moral problems. Moral perspectives, if they are to be con­ sidered justified, must make some difference for the practical problems facing humanity. (What gives an actuating force to a moral theory is, in effect, the person who embodies this theory in her conduct, rather than the theory itself.) Here I just want to indicate one particular moral problem to which the Principled Benevolence might contribute a solution. Mankind is facing global disaster in the near future. We are given the picture o f an exhausted future by scientists. The future consequences o f present action become morally relevant and urgent today. What would mankind’s future be like? What is humankind’s “ morally desirable future ”？How do the decisions we make now affect the younger generation and the yet-to-be-born generations o f the future? How can we insure that the interests o f the younger generation and the yet-to-be-born generations o f the future are somehow represented in the present when they have no voices in decision-making processes o f today’s society?

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Part o f the problem in thinking about future generations is the individualism inherent in most descriptions of the problem. A generation is understood to be a set of discrete individual persons. There is thought to be a clear division between the present generation and all future generations, but, at a deeper level, we know that it is not really like that. Generations overlap, and the actions of any given group o f people ramify through time for later people. The Principled Benevolence continues the Kantian tradition o f valuing the intrinsic worth o f persons, yet goes beyond the narrow “ rationalistic” definition of persons Kant presupposed into the richer Confucian concept of the human being. It recognizes the essential component of a person’s flourishing life: not just rational autonomy, but the development of a cohesive sense o f intrinsic interconnectedness. Sarah Hoagland created a word to capture this com­ plex notion o f personhood: “ autokoenony” from the Greek “ auto” （ “ self ”） and “ koinonia” （ “ community, or any group whose members have something in common” ). “ Autokoenony is literally self in com m unity." 44 A self is both separate and connected; elemental and related: An autokoenonous being is one who is aware of herself as one among others within a community that forms her ground of being, one who makes her decisions in consideration o f her limitations as well as in consideration o f the agendas and perceptions of others.45

This sense o f self does not merge with others, nor separate itself, but interacts with others in the different situations. Thinking o f persons and humanity as a whole, rather than as simply a collection of discrete individuals, as the Principled Benevolence claims, helps to overcome the unfortunate atomism. Instead of asking why we should be concerned about future, as yet nonexistent persons, we can ask why we should be concerned with humanity, which is present now and will continue to exist in the future. The other way to illustrate this view is by exploring the connection between one's actions and a common project. A common project is a project shared with other people. Individuals, as participants in a common project, are devoted to, care about, and are committed to this common project for its own sake. This common project can be friendship, marriage, parenting, a vocation, etc. The flourishing life for a child is a common project that is shared between parents, teachers, and whoever nurtures the child. Robert M. Adams connects common projects with moral virtue. According to Adams, one’s “ devotion to a common project is morally virtuous, and the absence of such devotion [is] a moral shortcom ing" .46 A person who has a certain depth o f moral com­ mitment to a common project, and who acts from worthy motives, is morally virtuous. The well-being o f humanity is a common project, which we should devote ourselves to, care about, and participate in. The Principled Benevolence

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automatically includes a concern for future generations, and, moreover, enjoins us to engage in larger, ongoing, enduring processes and ideals.

A fin al remark This project has led us through a dynamic process o f constructing and explor­ ing a normative moral principle: the Principled Benevolence. This principle has produced an integrated tension between the Kantian moral role o f reason and the Confucian moral sensibility. The Kantian moral principle might function as a kind o f “ moral insurance” in the context of the Principled Benevolence: “ a restriction on permissible means as the necessary or legitimate cost o f pro­ tecting ourselves from the real temptation to do very wrong things in pursuit o f perceived (and real) good" .47 The Confucian ren/benevolence could be seen as a “ moral journey” that one should actively engage in through one’s lifetime. “ Tzu-lu said, ‘I should like to hear what you have set your heart on.' The Master said, ‘to bring peace to the old, to have trust in my friends, and to cherish the young' ." 48 Barbara Herman points out: “ Different moral conceptions carry different narrative models. How we think about the fit o f morality with our lives affects what narrative o f a life looks like.’’49 This present endeavor might shed a new light on leading a happy, fulfilling, and flourishing moral life.

Notes 1 Audi, Robert (2001), “ A Kantian Intuitionism” ，paper delivered at the Philosophy Colloquium o f San Jose State University, February 1,2001. 2 Kant, I. (1990), Foundations o f the Metaphysics o f Morals, trans. Lewis White Beck, New York: Macmillan Publishing Company, p . 16. 3 Ibid. 4 Sherman, Nancy (1990), “ The Place of Emotions in Kantian M orality” , in Owen Flanagan and Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (eds), Identity, Character and Morality: Essays in Moral Psychology, Cambridge, M A: M IT Press, p. 150. 5 Kant, I. (1991), Metaphysics o f Morals, trans. Mary Gregor, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 206. 6 Nye, Andrea (1983), “ On the Alleged Freedom o f the Moral Agent’’，Journal o f Value Inquiry 17, pp. 17-32. 7 Kant, Metaphysics o f Morals, p. 244. 8 Ibid., p. 201. 9 Williams, Bernard (1969), “ Person, Character and M orality” , in Amelie O. Rorty (ed.), The Identities o f Persons, Berkeley: University o f California Press, p. 201. 10 Harrison, Jonathan (1953/54), “ When Is a Principle a Moral Principle?" , Proceedings o f the Aristotelian Society 28, p . 119. 11 Ibid., p. 118. 12 In this sense, Confucius shares the same conceptual background as Aristotle. The very nature o f being human is at work in ethical arguments. Put another way, for both Confucius and Aristotle the property o f being human is used to defend an ethical conclusion.

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Robin R. Wang Confucius (1979), The Analects, trans. D. C. Lau, New York: Penguin Books, 12.22. Hall, David and Roger Ames (1993), Thinking from Confucius, Honolulu: University o f Hawaii, p. 120. Confucius, Analects, 1.2. Ibid., 1.6. Fei, Xiao-tong (1992), Xiang- Tu-Zhong-Guo (From the Soil: The Foundation o f Chinese Society), trans. Gary G. Hamilton and Wang Zheng, Berkeley: University o f California Press, p. 65. Wong, David (1989), “ Universalism versus Love with Distinction: An Ancient Debate Revised”， Journal o f Chinese Philosophy, v o l. 16, pp. 251-272. Confucius, Analects, 15.24. Ames, Roger (1994)，“ The Focus-Field Self in Classical Confucianism” , in Roger Ames, Wimal Dissanayake, and Thomas P. Kasulis (eds), Self as Person in Asian Theory and Prac­ tice, Albany: State University of New York Press, pp. 187-212. Rorty, The Identities o f Persons, p. 321. Ibid., p. 315. Confucius, Analects, 1.11. Confucius (1993), The Classic o f Filial Piety, trans. Rui-xiang Liu, Shangdong: Shandong Friendship Press, p. 34. Ibid., p. 37. Confucius, Analects, 12.1. M y own translation o f The Classic o f Filial Piety, Chapter X. Wong, “ Universalism versus Love with Distinction” ， pp. 251-272. Mou, Zong-san (1971), Intellectual Intuition and Chinese Philosophy, Taipei: The Commercial Press, pp. 193-195. Ibid. Herman, Barbara (1996), The Practice o f Moral Judgment, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, pp. 202-203. See Chad Hansen’s (1996) “ Duty and Virtue” ，in Philip J. Ivanhoe (ed.), Chinese Language, Thought and Culture, Chicago and La Salle, Illinois: Open Court Press, pp. 173-192. Audi, “ A Kantian Intuitionism” ， p. 7. Nye, “ On the Alleged Freedom of the Moral Agent” ， pp. 17-32. Baron, Marcia (1983), “ On De-Kantianizing the Perfectly Moral Person” ，Journal o f Value Inquiry 17, pp. 283-293. Audi, “ A Kantian Intuitionism” ， p. 30. Wolf, Susan (1982), “ Moral Saints” , The Journal o f Philosophy, vol. lxxix, no. 8, August, pp. 419-439. Ibid. Falk, W. D . (1965), “ Goading and Guiding” ，in Rosalind Ekman (ed.), Readings in the Problems o f Ethics, New York: Scribner. Empirical studies also demonstrate this. University of Michigan researchers conducted a huge study called “ Monitoring the Future” . The study analyzed data from more than 33,000 young adults who were surveyed every two years up to fourteen years after leaving high school. Once these young adults left home, they were stunned by the fact o f their own freedom. They often acted like balloons with the air let out, increasing their use o f alcohol, drugs, and engaging in promiscuous sexual activity. But once they married or even became engaged, they started to clean up their acts and their excessive habits subsided. Those who became divorced often resumed their excessive lifestyles. Apparently, just being with someone else whom you care for, and vice versa, was often enough to change a person’s lifestyle. Real pleasure comes with concern for and commitment to others. (L.A. Times, Lynn Smith’s column, February 23,1997). Wong, David (1988), “ On Flourishing and Finding One’s Identity in Community ” ，Midwest Studies in Philosophy, vol. xiii, pp. 324-341.

The Principled Benevolence 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49

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Ibid. Zhu-Xi (1714), Zhu-Zi-Quan-Shu (Complete Works o f Zhu Xi), Beijing: The Commercial Press, 52.37 b (2:1154), 49.10b (2:1066). Hoagland, Sarah Lucia (1988), Lesbian Ethics: Toward New Value, Palo Alto, CA: Institute of Lesbian Studies, p. 145. Ibid. Adams, Robert M . (1988), “ Common Projects and Moral Virtue ” ， Midwest Studies in Philo­ sophy, vol. xiii, p. 304. Herman, The Practice o f Moral Judgment, p. 212. Confucius, Analects, 5.26. Herman, The Practice o f Moral Judgment, p . 181.

CHAPTER SEVEN

Social Justice: Rawlsian or Confucian?* Ruiping Fan Introduction Thanks to the publication o f John Rawls，A Theory o f Justice in 1971, scholars have since placed special emphasis on issues concerning social justice. Enormous intellectual energies have been invested in exploring what principles ought to be established to guide the basic structure o f society and improve social institu­ tions. As a result, “ the basic structure of society” becomes “ the primary subject of justice” (Rawls, 1971, p. 7). “ Laws and institutions no matter how efficient and well-arranged must be reformed or abolished if they are unjust” (p. 3). Some traditionally important subjects, such as what constitutes the appropriate virtue or character of a just human person, no longer attract major academic interests in the area of justice. Moreover, as Rawls assumes that justice primarily concerns “ the way in which the major social institutions distribute fundamental rights and duties and determine the division o f advantages from social cooperation” (p. 7, italics added), the theme o f distributive justice alone comes to the fore o f the basic philosophical examination of social justice. In the context o f this approach, inquiries into general justice (i.e., the exercise of complete virtue in the Aristotelian sense) appear unnecessary.1 Tremendous debates have taken place regarding whether Rawls’ two prin­ ciples o f justice are appropriate or sufficient to account for the basic structure of society. However, most debaters seem to have taken for granted one o f the major Rawlsian assumptions: social justice primarily concerns how society distributes primary social goods, such as rights and liberties, power and oppor­ tunity, and income and wealth. Scholars disagree with Rawls, as well as with each other, regarding which goods should be concerned for distribution and

* This essay is a substantially revised version of an original article entitled “ Confucian and Rawlsian Views o f Justice: A Comparison” published in Journal o f Chinese Philosophy, v o l. 24 (1997), pp. 427-456 (Copyright © 1997 by Dialogue Publishing Company, Honolulu, Hawaii, USA). I appreciate the permission granted by Editor Chung-ying Cheng for revising and repub­ lishing it in this volume. I also wish to thank Bo Mou and an anonymous reviewer for their useful comments on the original article. In particular, I owe a special debt o f thanks to my colleague Daniel Bell for his criticisms and constructive comments on many arguments o f the essay.

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which way of distribution is just, but few have radically challenged his funda­ mental starting point that has set the direction o f the examination o f social justice around the issues o f distribution. How should people in the Confucian tradition come to terms with Rawls， theory of justice? In particular, compared to Rawls’ view, what is the classical Confucian view o f justice? Apparently, the classical Confucian literature, although profound in its social concern and rich in its range o f topics, does not have a single concept congruent with the Western notion o f justice in the sense of giving everyone their due.2 However, this should not be an intractable problem in comparing Rawlsian and Confucian views on justice. Given that we can follow Rawls to understand social justice as involving establishing fundamental moral principles to guide the structure of society, such principles are already implicit in classical Confucianism. In other words, through com­ paring with Rawls’ view, the intellectual legacy o f Confucian views on social justice can be brought to light in contemporary Western terms. Meanwhile, we must attempt not to distort the substantive content o f the Confucian perspective. Some might contend that it does not make sense to compare Rawlsian and Confucian views on justice. Confucianism is a particular metaphysical and moral doctrine, while the Rawlsian theory, although there are differences between its early and late versions, is, in the end, a nonmetaphysical, political conception. It is the very purpose of the Rawlsian theory to transcend particular meta­ physical and moral traditions in order to provide general political guidance for a large-scale pluralist society in which different religious and moral communities find themselves. What is the point, then, in comparing Rawlsian and Confucian views? I would argue that comparing them makes great sense in disclosing their fundamental disagreements regarding social justice. Such disagreements can, in turn, be used as special tests to explore the extent to which Rawls’ view can be applied in countries and areas in which the Confucian tradition remains dominant in the people’s lives. To begin with, Confucians would agree with Rawlsians that there ought to be fundamental principles to direct the institutions, laws, and policies of society. However, I would argue that Confucians could not affirm that such principles primarily concern the distribution o f primary social goods. For Confucians, the first subject o f fundamental social principles should not be distribution. The particular Confucian understanding o f human nature and its implications for human society does not allow a theory o f social justice primarily to focus on the allocation of social goods, even if the allocation of some social goods is important and must be involved in the Confucian view of social justice. As I see it, this basic difference between Confucianism and Rawlsianism sets up a broad platform on which a series of particular con­ trasts and disagreements between the Confucian and Rawlsian views o f social justice take place.

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The distribution of instrumental goods vs. the pursuit of intrinsic virtues As a theory of distributive justice, Rawls，approach begins with a “ thin” theory o f the good. As he sees it, the primary social goods, such as rights and liberties, opportunities and powers, income and wealth, and a sense of one’s own worth p. 92)，constitute the universal prerequisites for rational persons to carry (1971， out their life plans. Whatever else a rational person wants, Rawls argues, he would prefer a wider to a narrower liberty and opportunity, and a greater rather than a smaller share of wealth and income (pp. 395-398). In this way, Rawls sets these social goods as instrumental—they are tools useful to everyone for their life plans. Individual life plans differ because individual circumstances, abilities, and ends differ. But whatever one's system of ends, these primary goods are necessary means (p. 93). Rawls calls these primary goods a “ thin” theory of the good in the sense that they are useful and even neutral to any full conception o f the good life. They simply serve as the basis of expectations for rational persons to establish the principles of social justice to guide their society, but these goods themselves, as universal instruments, need not be under the constraints of any sense o f right (or justice) in the first place. In other words, the principles of social justice in Rawls’ theoretical construction must be principles regarding the distribution of these instrumental goods. In this way, he believes his principles of justice are also justified independently of any full conception of the good life (the so-called deontological feature o f “ the right prior to the good” ). Indeed, it is the intention of being tolerant of, and even neutral to, different and conflicting views of the good life existing in modern Western pluralist societies that drives Rawls to base his theory of justice on a right-independent “ thin” theory of the good. However, this so-called “ thin” theory is already “ thick” in a significant sense. It assumes, among other things, that it is the way in which right-irrelevant instrumental goods are distributed that constitutes the adequate focus of the principles of social justice. Without this substantive assumption, Rawls could not have successfully directed his theory o f social justice to distribution. With this assumption, however, he has excluded import­ ant moral concerns from the exploration of social justice. No doubt, human life involves different types of goods. It is necessary to distinguish instrumental and intrinsic goods. Instrumental goods, such as income and wealth, are the means of the good life; intrinsic goods, such as moral virtues, are the ends o f the good life. For Confucians, a life short of intrinsic goods cannot be good, even if one has obtained a great amount of instrumental goods in that life; conversely, a virtuous life without the support o f sufficient instrumental goods, although unfortunate, remains good. I f the fundamental principles of social justice are meant to “ specify a system of cooperation designed to advance the good o f those taking part in it” (Rawls, 1971，p. 4, italics added), it would be insufficient to attempt to establish such principles without

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referring to any intrinsic goods, because “ the good” o f the people taking part in society should not be understood only in terms o f instrumental goods or profits. “ What is the point of mentioning the word ‘p ro fit'?" F or Confucians, “ all that matters is that there should be ren (humanity) and y i (righteousness)" (Mencius, 1A:1).3 I f intrinsic goods such as ren and y i are not established in the first place, the concern with instrumental goods such as money or profit would not really do good (ibid.). Accordingly, rather than focus on the dis­ tribution o f right-irrelevant instrumental goods, Confucian social justice first concerns the promotion o f right-relevant intrinsic goods, because it is such goods that constitute the good of humans in the fundamental sense. A list of such goods may include individual rights and liberties,4 but it cannot include economic values like property and income.5 Similar to Aristotelianism, Confucianism holds that a theory o f the good for humans cannot be defined without reference to primary human virtues.6 An account o f human virtues must imply a teleological theory o f human life in which the virtues are the essential human traits or qualities that enable humans to do the right thing at the right time in the right way in pursuing a telos 一the end o f the good life. Since it is necessary for individuals to exercise the virtues to achieve the good life, the Confucian theory of justice cannot fail to involve a theory o f the virtues, including an account o f the way in which humans learn and practice the virtues. In this light, Confucians cannot take seriously a theory o f justice, such as Rawls'， th a t does not touch on the issues o f the ends of lire. Specifically, while “ eudaimonia” is the Greek term for the good life in the Aristotelian corpus, the Confucian classics use “ zhi-shan” (“ the highest good”） to indicate it (The Great Learning: the text). Zhi-shan, as the end of the good life for Confucians, is being perfect and doing excellently throughout an entire process of life. How can one achieve this great end? In the first place, Confucius, the founder of Confucianism, emphasized learning as the most important condi­ tion: “ to learn with a constant perseverance and application” (Analects, 1.1). This learning, for Confucians, is not for acquiring the knowledge o f the physical environment. It is not even necessarily for mastering the Confucian classics (Analects, 1.6). Rather, it is first and foremost for learning the moral virtues for a normal human life. What virtues should the individual learn? How to learn them? From whom to learn? Is there any general guideline for such learning? Significantly, Confucius established a cardinal moral principle to guide the individual in learning and practicing the virtues: the principle of ren. In pre-Confucius ancient classics, ren connotes only a particular virtue for a particular type of person, namely, the kindness of a ruler to his people. It was Confucius who transformed it into the quality o f perfect virtue and identified it as the essential trait o f humans, and thus made it applicable to all human beings undifferentiatedly (Chan, 1955). In this way, ren becomes complete virtue and a fundamental moral principle in directing everyone’s life and actions.8

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Although Confucius never provided a precise definition of ren, he clearly told a student that " ren is to love humans” (Analects, 12.22). Indeed, it is most appropriate to interpret the principle of ren as a principle o f love in order to explicate its profound as well as broad moral sense.9 On the Confucian view, everyone is able to practice love through learning and willing in order to become a human o f ren: “ I f I will to be ren, ren is at hand” (Analects, 7.29). More specifically, Confucius gave expression to both negative and positive requirements of the principle. Negatively, it requires that one should not “ impose upon others what one does not desire for oneself” (Analects, 15.24). Positively, it states that “ the man of ren, wishing to be established himself, seeks also to establish others; wishing to be enlarged himself, he seeks also to enlarge others” (Analects, 6.28).10 Accordingly, in the Aristotelian sense of general justice (see Nicomachean Ethics, 1130a)，the principle o f ren can be understood as the C onfucian principle o f general justice, because it demands

one's complete exercise of complete virtue (ren) in relation to others, not only what concerns oneself. Accordingly, the ultimate concern of the Confucian general justice is loving humans by pursuing intrinsic goods, rather than distributing instrumental benefits. In other words, unlike Rawls, who assumes certain right-irrelevant instrumental goods as the basis for establishing the principles of social justice, Confucians care about promoting intrinsic values as the fundamental matter o f general justice. Now, what does this Confucian general justice mean to the Confucian social justice? To be sure, to follow Rawls to understand social justice as involving establishing fundamental moral principles to guide the struc­ ture of society, Confucians cannot simply stop at the principle of ren because this principle, embodying the moral nature of humans and representing the complete virtue of human individuals, is not direct guidelines for the structure o f society. Can we then derive, from this general principle, more concrete principles to guide society generally, politically, and economically, so as to lay out a complete picture o f Confucian social justice? M y answer is positive. Such principles are already implicit in the principle of ren, as well as other classical Confucian resources.

Equality vs. harmony Rawls’ general idea o f social justice is treating people as equals. He ties this general idea to an equal share o f primary social goods, but he adds an import­ ant twist: we treat people as equals by removing not all inequalities, but only those which disadvantage someone.11 Thus, he holds a general conception of social justice: “ all social primary goods 一 liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases o f self-respect - are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution o f any or all of these goods is to the advantage o f the least

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favored” (Rawls, 1971, p. 303). Under this general conception, we can roughly mark Rawls，theory o f social justice as consisting o f three requirements: equal (1 ) liberty, (2) opportunity, and (3) income, unless unequal arrangements are to the benefit of the least advantaged. This section will compare Rawls' general idea o f social justice and his equal opportunity requirement with the Confucian views, leaving his other two requirements to the next sections. Fair equality o f opportunity for offices and positions becomes a basic require­ ment o f Rawlsian social justice. For Rawls, fair equality o f opportunity is an improvement of the formal equality of opportunity. The formal equality of opportunity requires eliminating form al or legal barriers to persons in seeking jobs and positions, such as race, class, gender, etc. Fair equality of opportunity, however, requires taking further steps (e.g., through a public educational system) to enhance the opportunity o f those disadvantaged by social factors such as family background. Such social factors, for Rawls, are arbitrary from a moral point o f view, because none of us deserves the advantages conferred by accidents of birth. Therefore, Rawlsian social justice requires the state to step in to main­ tain equality of opportunity unless inequality is beneficial to the least advantaged (Rawls, 1971， pp. 72-74). Rawls invites us to adopt a hypothetical original position to arrive at his general idea o f social justice as well as his specific principles. He uses this posi­ tion as a heuristic device to explain his view on social justice. The position is characterized by two major features. First, all persons in this position are equal in the morally relevant sense: they are equally free, rational, and capable o f grasping a conception of their good and a sense o f justice (Rawls, 1971， p. 505).12 Second, they are all mutually disinterested individuals: “ they are con­ ceived as not taking an interest in one another’s interests” (p. 13). As a result, “ there is the symmetry o f everyone’s relation to each other” ( p . 12, italics added). Accordingly, a conception o f human persons as equals is reflected in the features o f Rawls，hypothetical original position. He believes such a position is a fair initial status quo for elaborating the principles o f social justice (thus he gives his theory the title “justice as fairness” ). Confucians cannot accept this Rawlsian conception o f person. Neither can they accept his general idea o f social justice (namely, treating people as equals). To be sure, Confucians understand that there is an aspect o f equality among humans that is morally important and ought to be maintained: namely, every human deserves love. The Confucian principle of ren, as we have shown, requires loving all humans. Because each human, qua human, possesses the capacity of human nature in learning and practicing ren, each human deserves love.13How­ ever, Confucians also understand that there are two types o f inequality among humans which are also morally important. First, human individuals differ from one another in the degree to which they possess and exercise the virtues. Some are more sincere, make more efforts, and accomplish more than others in such learning and exercising. It is the Confucian conviction that, other things being

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equal, those who are more sincere, make greater efforts, or accomplish more than others in practicing the virtues should receive more love and respect than the others.14Second, humans are far from being mutually disinterested as Rawls assumes they are in the original position. Instead, they are always familially and socially related to one another in human society, and thus their relations are bound to be asymmetrical. Some are born as intimate family members, some are made close friends, and some are only remote strangers. Since Confucians take such inequalities and asymmetries as important moral features of human society, a Confucian conception of social justice must take them into account. Indeed, in exploring social justice, Confucianism offers sufficient space for both human equality and human inequality. Although the Confucian principle of ren requires loving all humans, this requirement is not that one should love all humans equally or similarly. On the contrary, Confucianism always requires that there ought to be a clear and definite order, distinction, and differentia­ tion in the application o f love (Chan, 1955, pp. 8-9).15 It is not that one should not love all; it is that one should love all with differentiation and relativity of importance. This peculiar Confucian discrimination is well reflected in the Confucian slogan o f “ love with distinction” or “ care by gradation” (ai you cha deng) in the process of Confucian self-cultivation (xiu-shen). It is wrong for one to love strangers as one's close family members. It is inappropriate for one to love a sage as an ordinary man.16 As is well noticed, at the heart of the Confucian good life is self-cultivation, the cultivation of the virtues. Self-cultivation is closely related to the forming of appropriate human relations and social institutions —the family, the state, and the whole world (the all-under-Heaven): Individuals being cultivated, their families can be well regulated. Their families being well regulated, their states can be rightly governed. Their states being rightly governed, the all-under-Heaven can be made peaceable.

[Hence], from the king of a state to the mass of the people, all must con­ sider the cultivation of the individual as the root of everything. ( The Great Learning: the text)

This is certainly not to say that one cannot cultivate oneself in a poorly regulated family, a wrongly governed state, or a nonpeaceful world. Rather, it is to insist that the very process of one's self-cultivation is inevitably related to one’s performance in regulating one’s family, governing one’s state, and making the entire world peaceable. Confucianism holds that different human relations convey different moral significance in the application of the principle of ren. For instance, Mencius set forth five specific principles to guide the five basic human relations: the principles o f affection (qin) between parents and children, of righteousness (yi) between sovereign and subjects, of function (bie) between husband and wife, o f order (xu) between older and younger, and o f fidelity (xin) between friend and friend ( Mencius, 3A:4:8). These concrete principles,

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derived from the fundamental principle of ren in consideration of the distinct nature o f these natural relations, constitute the further specific requirements of Confucian social justice. Especially, three of such basic human relations are familial relations, and Confucianism takes human society to be family-based, rather than individual-based. For Confucians, the family is distinguished out­ standingly as an autonomous unit from the rest o f society.17 Confucians certainly do not have any quarrel with the requirement of formal equality of opportunity. But the Rawlsian requirement o f fair equality o f opportunity contradicts with the autonomy of the family that Confucians have to cherish in their social lives. The autonomy o f the family can be understood as the requirement that consensual relations within a given family governing the development of its children should not be coercively interfered with by the state.18 Evidently, families can give their children a great amount o f advantages: private schools, culture in the home, a secure home environ­ ment, trips abroad, private lessons, an advantaged peer group, and successful role models. A ll of these can substantially enhance the children’s opportun­ ities for seeking offices and positions in society. Given that the existence of such advantageous family opportunities is unlikely to be beneficial to the least favored children in society, Rawls’ social justice, with its requirement o f fair equality of opportunity, would have to restrict them in order to equalize life prospects for every child (or at least for those with similar natural endowments). But these family opportunities are alright and even encouraged by the Confucian principle of ren. The basic Confucian moral orientation of “ love with distinction” and “ care by gradation” under the principle o f ren requires one to start one’s love with one’s family and give preferential treat­ ment to one’s family members. One is also obliged to work hard for achieving a better life chance for one’s children. When the Rawlsian requirement of fair equality of opportunity has to use state-controlled measures to restrict or even prohibit the parents from pursuing better educational opportunities for their children, it violates the fundamental Confucian moral conscience of ren. Confucian social justice wants family-based opportunities autonomously provided by families, rather than the so-called “ fair” equality o f opportunity imposed by the state. For one thing, Confucians have always required that a government of ren make the taxes and levies light and leave resources to families for pursuing welfare for their family members as they see appropriate (see, e.g., Mencius, 1A:5). They strongly hold that welfare responsibility resides first with the family. Indeed, given the moral relevance of both equality and inequality in the real human condition, Confucians do not consider it appropriate to derive the principles o f social justice from the hypothetical position o f equality, as does Rawls. I f people are, in fact, unequal in the moral sense, the general idea of social justice should not be “ treating them as equals” . Rather, unequals should be treated as unequals. For Confucians, what social justice ought to maintain

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is harmonious relations among unequals. Accordingly, the Confucian general idea o f social justice is to treat people harmoniously. It is the function of the principles of ren (as well as its further derived particular principles for specific human relations) to direct naturally unequal humans to live harmoniously among one another. Hence, compared with Rawls' view of “justice as fairness” , the Confucian view can be noted as “justice as harm ony" .19

Liberal democracy vs. Confucian aristocracy Politically, Rawls’ view of social justice requires that the structure of society assign equal liberty to every citizen. This is well reflected in his first principle of justice as well as its priority: First Principle: Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system o f equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. ...

First Priority Rule (the Priority of Liberty): The principles of justice are to be ranked in lexical order and therefore liberty can be restricted only for the sake o f liberty. (1971, p. 302)20 The basic liberties of citizens are, roughly speaking, political liberty (the rights to vote and to be eligible for public office) together with freedom o f speech and assembly; liberty of conscience and freedom of thought; freedom of the person along with the right to hold (personal) property; and freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure as defined by the concept o f the rule o f law. (p. 61)

For Rawls, “ these liberties are all required to be equal by the first principle, since citizens o f a just society are to have the same basic rights” (p. 61). They are also required to hold a priority over other social goods by the first priority rule. Evidently, Rawls' principle of equal liberty and its priority naturally leads to, as well as defends, the political system o f liberal democracy. Liberal democracy can be characterized with three crucial features. First, it protects individual liberal rights in the process o f policy formulation, social administration, and elections. Second, it attempts to be neutral to the different conceptions o f the good life. Finally, it must hold regular, open, and competitive elections whose results can genuinely alter policy and the people who make it. The Confucian view of social justice, with its principle o f ren as the essential line to direct political systems, would hold reservations and disagreement with each o f these features o f liberal democracy. Eventually, a political system that can be strongly supported by the Confucian view o f social justice is a Confucian aristocracy, rather than a liberal democracy.

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Liberal rights vs. Confucian rights The modern Western liberal tradition understands human rights as inborn entitlements equally held by every individual. That one has a right to some­ thing means that one is entitled to it and ought to have it, independently of others' goodwill, permission, or benevolence. Others, instead, have an obliga­ tion not to prevent one from enjoying a right. In short, a liberal human right is an entitlement universally assigned to every individual, irrespective o f their virtue, ability, gender, race, class, culture, role, status, or the like. Any assertion o f such a right is premissed on the view that one is entitled to require one’s legitimate self-interests to be protected rather than curbed. Obviously, classical Confucianism never affirmed or used such a concept o f human rights. The primary Confucian moral language is the language o f the virtues, carrying a quite different value orientation from the language o f rights. The basic values implicit in the liberal conception of rights are equality, independence, and selfassertion, while the basic values embodied in the Confucian conception o f the virtues are harmony, interdependence, and other-regarding. Talking about my rights places emphasis on others' obligations to do or not to do things to me rather than my obligations to do or not to do things to them (although the latter obligations are also logically entailed). In contrast, talking about my virtues places emphasis on my obligations towards others, rather than their obligations towards me (although the latter obligations can also be logically inferred). On Confucianism, people in close personal relationships should not even think of themselves as subjects possessing rights upon which they make claims against each other. Rather, they should think o f themselves as par­ ticipating in a relationship o f reciprocal commitments and mutual caring. To introduce considerations of rights seems to motivate us to see others’ interests as limitations on ours rather than as interests we should promote. Because o f this difference of emphasis, Confucians cannot simply introduce the Rawlsian liberal conception of human rights into their conception o f social justice. In fact, there has been a debate regarding whether Confucianism is compatible with any universal human rights. One side argues that it is not, primarily because Confucianism is a pure relation-oriented or role-based moral­ ity, which leaves no room for any obligations or rights belonging to human persons s im p lic ite r The other side, to the contrary, argues that Confucianism is not a pure relation-based or role-based morality. Instead, the latter side con­ tends, there are nonrelational occasions when moral actions are also required by ren, and therefore Confucianism is able to accommodate universal human rights (Chan, 1999; see note 22, below). I think this debate has missed the main issue. On the one hand, it is hard to imagine an entirely relationalistic morality which does not include any general moral obligation. For one thing, a morality cannot avoid involving a normative notion of human persons which in turn must imply some general moral requirement o f persons (such as the Confucian

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requirement of shu: “ do not impose on others what you yourself do not desire” [Analects, 15.24]). On the other hand, given that some basic human relations are normally unavoidable in any human society, it is also unlikely to have an entirely non-relationalistic morality which does not include any role-based moral obligations. For instance, even in the liberal list of universal human rights, we can easily find such role-based rights as “ children’s rights” or “ women’s rights” , as special cases o f universal human rights. The difference between “ relationalistic” and “ nonrelationalistic” moralities is only a difference of focus or emphasis, not a difference o f all-or-nothing. Accordingly, the main issue is not whether Confucianism is compatible with any universal human rights. It cer­ tainly is. But “ compatible” does not mean “ necessary” . It may still be the case that liberal universal rights, although not contradicting with Confucianism, are not standing in the focus o f Confucianism. Confucians may have good reason not to establish them as rights in the Confucian conception of rights. Accord­ ingly, the main issue is what conception of human rights should be established in Confucianism. From my perspective, a Confucian view o f human rights must be derived from the Confucian conception o f the virtues, and this Confucian view is substantially different from the liberal view. The reasons are as follows. First, given that the virtues are the fundamental Confucian moral concep­ tions, a Confucian conception of human rights, if it should be worked out, should be derived from the Confucian virtues. I f such a conception is simply attached to Confucianism from outside, it cannot be coherently integrated into the Confucian view o f social justice. Second, we need to think about why it is necessary to introduce rights to the Confucian moral system. What is the purpose of doing so? To be sure, for Confucians, rights as individual entitle­ ments should not be considered constitutive of valuable personal relationships or necessary for the display o f the good life. However, rights as entitlements may be necessary as a fallback apparatus to protect legitimate self-interests when the virtues fail to obtain or people’s personal relationships break down.22 Even if rights are not necessary when the virtues prevail in society (because the virtues call for idealistic noble behaviors), they are necessary when the virtues do not prevail. Indeed, as a fact of Chinese history, the virtues often do not prevail. Accordingly, it is necessary to set down Confucian rights as moral and even legal requirements to protect Confucian people’s basic legitimate interests. I f this is so, then in order to establish a Confucian conception of rights, we need first to decide what the basic legitimate human interests are according to Confucianism. This problem can be naturally resolved if we can appropriately derive a Confucian conception o f rights from the Confucian conception o f the virtues. Can we? My answer is positive. In the first place, a Confucian virtue can be understood as implying a series o f obligations that ought to be undertaken in exercising the virtue (even if a virtue can never be totally reduced to a series of obligations). The better one performs such obligations, the more virtuous one

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is. Moreover, such obligations may not be of equal importance for the exercise o f the virtue. One obligation may be more important than others so that it can be taken as constituting a necessary requirement for exercising the virtue: if one does not perform this obligation, one cannot be taken as exercising the virtue. I f such an obligation towards another person is thus distinguished out, then an entitlement o f the other person entailed by this obligation can be set down as his/her right. Let’s consider the Confucian children’s virtue o f filial piety (xiao) as an example. This virtue implies that a number of obligations ought to be taken by a filial child to his parents, such as taking care o f his parents’ lives (especially when the parents become elderly), taking care of his parents’ mental needs and making them happy, and taking care of his parents' spirits after their death. Suppose taking care of one's elderly parents' lives can be taken to be a necessary obligation for exercising the virtue o f filial piety, then the entitlement of the elderly parents to receive such care can be set down as their right. In this way, a Confucian system o f rights can be worked out based on the Confucian system of the virtues. This way of introducing rights into the Confucian view of social justice is a virtues-based, bottom-up strategy, focusing on the specific. It differs from the liberal rights-based, top-down mechanism, which has a prejudice for general principles and ideals. The Confucian principle o f ren, with its internal requirement of “ love with distinction” or “ care by gradation" , is predicated on the priority o f the immediate and concrete over the general or the universal. Although there are general moral requirements and virtues to guide individuals, Confucianism normally teaches us to learn and practice such requirements and virtues in relation-based contexts.23 As a result, even if we should not preclude the possibility that some general (not role-based or relation-based) human rights should be established based on some general Confucian virtues, a Con­ fucian system o f human rights should focus on specific, agent-relative, contextsensitive, and role-based rights derived from the specific Confucian virtues. This is because, compared to general liberal rights (such as “ right to liberty” or “ right to property” )，a Confucian system o f specific rights ( 1 ) is more focused in protecting essential human interests, and (2) can, at the same time, contribute to preventing the possible “ abuse o f rights” —the erosion o f intimate human relations by over-asserting one’s general rights. A t this point I am not able to offer a complete list o f Confucian rights because the work needs to be carefully done in consideration o f all the major Confucian virtues as well as the related essential human interests, but some examples are obviously available. Based on the Confucian virtue of filial piety, elderly parents should have a right to share the personal income o f their children. In fact, this special moral right of parents has been established as a legal right existing for thousands o f years in the traditional Chinese society.24 It has also been incorporated into the civil law of both the Republic of China (since 1911)and the People’s Republic of China (since 1949). For another example, instead o f talking about a general

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right to free speech and expression, Confucians may want to focus more on specific rights in the field, such as a right to criticize government policies.25 Finally, Confucianism may not grant any moral right to saying or doing debased things, such as a right to pornography, even if they cause no direct harm to others (Chan, 1999， p. 232). A right to do the bad or wrong is simply a non­ starter in a virtue-based Confucian conception of rights, because the virtues are the qualities for the good life and right acts. This is to say, a list o f Confucian rights established through the Confucian virtues may be quite different from the list o f liberal rights. With this “ fromvirtues-to-rights” strategy, Confucians can engage in a serious dialogue with liberals (who hold the “ from-rights-to-obligations” strategy) in exchanging their agreements and disagreements regarding human rights. When Confucians and Rawlsians agree that social justice requires protecting individual rights, they may mean quite different things by “ individual rights” . Finally, Confucians may also have a problem with Rawls’ priority assigned to rights and liberties over other goods. Confucians can agree on a general precedence o f rights, but this should not suggest that there should never be any trade-offs between a right and other goods. It is unlikely that every right or liberty stands at the same scale of weight and trumps all other values in every particular social context. For instance, Rawls argues that everyone is free to “ hold and to have the exclusive use of personal income” ，and this liberty, Rawls emphasizes, is “ among the basic liberties of the person” (Rawls, 1993, p. 298; 1971, p. 61). Even if Confucians accept such a right, it must be qualified by the family authority for the shared property of the family in many contexts. Moreover, this right, for Confucians, may be restricted on the basis o f other goods. As an example, contemporary Singaporeans generally advocate a com­ pulsory saving system under which they are required to save forty per cent o f their personal income in the Central Provident Fund, which can be used for their medical care, purchasing a home, paying college education expenses, etc., but which may not be used for other purposes.26 Obviously, the restriction imposed by this system on one， s liberty to hold and to use one， s personal income is not for the sake of any other liberties. It is required for a good that Rawls does not even explicitly consider in his primary social goods: security — the security o f health care, home-owning, higher education for children, etc. Are these Singaporeans mistaken in giving security a priority over one o f their basic liberties? From the Confucian understanding, they may not be. However important basic rights and liberties are, they cannot be assigned an absolute priority over other values and goods in all social contexts.

Neutral vs. nonneutral As we have shown in the second section, Rawls holds that individual liberal rights and social justice should be justified independently of any particular con­ ception of the good life, because the right (or justice) should be prior to the

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good. Rawlsian liberalism sees human persons as autonomous and critical choosers among different moralities, religions, or life plans. A liberal democracy must assign the individual a right to free choice, including a right to choose the bad or do the wrong, as long as he does not directly harm others. The common good o f society, in this liberal light, should be understood in terms o f general instrumental goods, such as Rawls' primary goods. Accordingly, to be fair to every individual,a liberal democratic state should be neutral to different con­ ceptions o f the good life. O f course, liberals recognize that public policies often have different effects on different ways of life. What they contend by “ neutral” is that the government should not intend to use law or other governmental strategies to promote or restrain a particular way o f life. On the other hand, Confucianism sees the individual as a dynamic “ making process" :27 birth, childhood, youngness, adulthood, agedness, dying, and death. Although the individual has an original good mind as a root for moral develop­ ment, she does not have her personhood as a fixed “ given” . Confucians do not have a right to do the bad, because learning and practicing the virtues is the basis for leading a good life. How good one is depends on how well one cultivates one’s virtues and develops one's humanity (ren). Hence, the common good of society consists in the moral virtues realized in the society. Accordingly, the state should use active strategies in assisting individuals to cultivate their virtues and develop their potentials. O f course, Confucians understand that no one can become virtu­ ous by brute force, but there is nothing wrong in offering incentives to the people and manipulating them to the good. On Confucianism, a crucial thing for the state to do is to help everyone form appropriate human relationships, especially appropriate family relationships, to promote relationalistic virtues. A Confucian government should not intend to be neutral to different ways o f life. It must formulate its public policies in ways in which appropriate familial as well as other human relationships are strengthened and promoted.

Election

examination

Liberal democrats support “ rule by the people” . Liberal democracy exemplifies the virtues o f accountability, transparency, and equal political participation through regular, open, and competitive elections for the most powerful officials in a state. In Rawls’ list o f equal rights and liberties, there are the equal demo­ cratic participatory rights: “ the rights to vote and eligibility for public office” . On the other hand, Confucian societies have a long-standing meritocratic tradition: “ rule by the wise” . As we have discussed, Confucians recognize the moral significance o f human inequality. From their point o f view, differences in intelligence and virtues characterize human beings all the time, and set the stage for the division o f labor in society. A fair social order should be achieved through the harmonious operation of these differences. Attempts to equalize what is naturally unequal would destroy the rational division o f labor and overthrow the natural order into chaos. Accordingly, Confucians hold that

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social positions and public offices should be open only to those with appro­ priate abilities and virtues. A man without virtue should not be honored, a man without ability should not be made an official, and a man without merit should not be rewarded.28 In today’s words, Confucians would argue that qualified officials must be intelligent, adaptable, long-term minded, and public-spirited. Such officials may not be successfully elected through democratic elections, because voters are often swayed by their current material benefits and politicians have to pander to the short-term interests of the majority in order to win elec­ tions. This is the case even in societies where there is the tradition of conferring respect on educated elites. Thus, we need to seriously reconsider the merit of a special examination system for selecting public officials in the traditional Confucian societies. Under this system, only those who indicated their abilities in commanding the Confucian classics and virtues by passing a series of examin­ ations could be selected for high governmental positions. Huang Zong-Xi (1610-1695), a brilliant Confucian scholar in the early Qing Dynasty, carefully elaborated this examination system. Part o f his proposals can be taken as suggesting the establishment of a parliament o f scholar-officials.29 Recently, Daniel Bell revived Huang’s original project and made a proposal for a bicameral legislature for a special modern democracy with Confucian characteristics: with a lower house of representatives elected democratically by the people and an upper house o f scholars selected through examinations.30 The hope is through this bicameral legislature to take up the merits o f both democracy and elitism. A crucial problem, in addition to a number of practical issues regarding how to establish an appropriate house of scholars, is how to resolve gridlock: what if majorities in the house of scholars disagree with majorities in the house of representatives? Confucians would certainly empower the house of scholars with the right to override majorities in the house of representatives, because the Confucian tradition holds that it is those scholarly officials that have the virtues and visions of taking care of the common good of the people in the long run. To sum up: with Confucian rights developed from the Confucian virtues and nonneutral public policy for promoting the good life together with a bicameral legislature with the privileged power of the upper house of scholars selected by examination, the political system supported by Confucian social justice is a Confucian aristocracy, in contrast with the liberal democracy defended by Rawlsian social justice.

Contractarian neutrality vs. private-property economy How social justice stands as to the justification of an economic system is another crucial issue. Does social justice require a free-market economy based on the institution of private property? Or should it lead to a socialist institution? Or should it become neutral to private or public economic institutions insofar as

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they are connected with the market mechanism? It turns out that Rawls holds the last position. He made two major assertions. First, both private-property and publicly-owned regimes are bound to adopt the market mechanism as an efficient allocative means. Second, justice must be neutral to the choice between private-property and publicly-owned systems. Accordingly, he wants his theory o f justice to be consistent with either privately-owned or publicly-owned economies (Rawls, 1971, pp. 273-274). However, it is unclear whether this posi­ tion can be coherently defended in terms o f the Rawlsian contractarian strategy o f argument for social justice.31 It is, in any case, at odds with the Confucian view of social justice. Confucian social justice must require a private-property economy because the Confucian basic principle o f ren cannot be well satisfied except in the context o f a private-property economy. In the first place, Confucians agree with Rawls that a free market is neces­ sary for the human social life. A classical argument for this claim can be found in Mencius' discussion on the necessity o f a division o f labor, the unequal quality o f things, and the inevitability of a free market in human society. First, Mencius observes that people naturally work on different things. “ Some labor with their minds, and some labor with their strength” (Mencius, 3A:4). Some sow grain, some weave cloth, and some make tools. Those who sow grain are unable to weave cloth or make tools by themselves without injuring their hus­ bandry, and a similar limitation applies to those who weave cloth or make tools. Hence it is unavoidable that people need to exchange their products (3A:4). Moreover, as Mencius sees it, a natural character o f things is that they have different values. He contends: It is the nature o f things to be o f unequal quality. Some are twice, some five times, some ten times, some a hundred times, some a thousand times, some ten thousand times as valuable as others. . . . I f the large shoes and small shoes were o f the same price, who would make them? (3A:4)

He further warns that “ [i]f you reduce them all to the same standard, that will throw the whole world into confusion” (3A:4). Accordingly, for Confucians, there should be the free market in which the exchange prices o f things can be voluntarily determined by people themselves through negotiation, as people understand that different things are not o f the same value. In short, for Confu­ cians, the f ree-market mechanism is virtually inevitable because o f the natural inequality of things as well as the necessity of a division o f labor. This should be alright with Rawls ana his followers, but the real issue is why the Confucian principle of ren requires not only a free-market system, but also a privately-owned economic system? Why, Rawls might ask, cannot the prin­ ciple o f ren be similarly compatible with a publicly-owned market system? I think the answer is, for Confucians, that only the private-property economy, not the publicly-owned regime, really embodies the loving o f humans. Mencius puts forward the following particular argument for this proposition:

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The way o f the common people is this: if they have private property (hengchan), they w ill have a fixed heart; if they do not have private property, they will not have a fixed heart. And if they do not have a fixed heart, there is nothing that they will not do in the way o f self-abandonment, o f moral deflection, o f depravity, and of wild license. [Mencius, 3A:3)32

A fixed heart is a heart of virtue, a mind inclined to seek the good, and a will to do the right. Here, Mencius claims that it is the nature of the common people that they cannot have a fixed heart unless they have some private property on which to live their lives and support their families. Without a certain amount of private property, they would be motivated to act immorally. This seems to be an empirical proposition. An empirical proposition requires only empirical confirmation. Some may doubt its correctness: why must a publicly-owned economic system expect more immoral and even tragic outcomes than a private-property regime? As long as people can be distributed with sufficient or appropriate welfare, they might argue, people would be satisfied and already have a basis to follow morality, no matter whether they hold pri­ vate property or not. This argument, however, ignores the issue of production. No welfare can be allocated before it is produced, but production involves a series of sophisticated matters, such as choices, plans, motivations, managements, and efforts. The history of the socialist countries in the last century showed that publicly-owned economies had intractable difficulties in handling these matters. The outcome was that the people never obtained appropriate welfare in those countries, just as they had no appropriate production. The Mencian proposition was clearly confirmed in recent China. The latter half o f the twentieth century witnessed the enormous sufferings o f the people in Communist China, where the people were prohibited from owning land or the means of production. They were even constrained from consuming any “ luxury goods” . However, inefficiency, laziness, sabotage, and waste had become the everyday problems in China’s industries. Worse yet, cheating, stealing, and corruption eventually permeated the entire society. The Chinese should never forget what happened behind the apparently glorious mission of the Communist communes in the so-called “ great leap forward movement” in the late 1950s, when the government enforced the absolute collectivization (publiclization) of all assets and attempted to equalize the livings of the people in the communes through the “ big pot” meals. The outcome was the starvation and death of hundreds and thousands of the people. The tragedy is unbelievable. For Mencius, a social institution which deprives people o f private property and living resources will inevitably deprave their morality. They are thus led to commit immoral and criminal acts. Then, if the government follows them up and punishes them, this is equivalent to entrapping them (3A:3). Is it plausible, Mencius asks, that such a thing as entrapping the people by the government can be accomplished under the principle of rent (3A:3) How can a government induce people to perform evil acts by depriving them of private property and

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then punish them in the name of renl Accordingly, the principle of ren would unavoidably require a private-property economy. It is worth noting that what Mencius offers is not a utilitarian argument for a private-property institution. He is not saying that a private-property economy will maximize social utilities or goods. This may or may not be the case, but this is not his primary concern. His argumentation, instead, can be considered as a version of the so-called disaster-avoidance reasoning: if private property is deprived or prohibited, it leads to moral and social disasters; in order to avoid such disasters, the private-property economy must be invoked.33 As the principle o f ren requires avoiding such disasters, Confucians must require establishing the private-property institution. Evidently, a strength o f this argument consists in the fact that even if the requirement o f the principle o f ren does not require maximizing social goods or utilities, it cannot fail to require avoiding social and moral disasters. The Confucian advocacy o f privately-owned and privately-run economies is vividly illustrated in a famous book, The Debate on Salt and Iron, written in the Former Han Dynasty. This book records a debate that took place in 81 BC between Confucian scholars and Legalist officials regarding the economic institu­ tions and fiscal measures adopted at the time. It took place six years after the death o f the extremely ambitious Emperor Wu o f the Former Han Dynasty. The Legalist officials supported government monopolies in the contemporary vital industries o f salt, iron, liquor, coinage, and government trading. They argued that the government control o f these industries was necessary to ensure government revenues and to maintain defensive warfare against the xun-nu tribes who threatened the empire. Also, according to these Legalists, by its own­ ing and running these industries directly, the government could protect people from exploitation by private businessmen and corporations. Against this, the Confucian scholars argued that China should make peace with other nations and should not grasp the land o f its neighbors. Moreover, they pointed to the fact that, contrary to the argument o f the Legalists, it was the corruption and maladministration in the government system o f monopolies that were forcing people to use the inferior products o f salt and iron and at times to do without them entirely. In short, these Confucian scholars argued that the people should have a right to use natural resources to benefit themselves, while the govern­ ment should never make material profit a motive of its administration so as to compete with people in pursuing profits.34

Conclusion In fact, Rawls is modest with the application o f his theory o f justice. In his later works he clearly states that his theory is intended as a political con­ ception o f justice only for democratic societies (1985, p. 225).35 It is meant to

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allow for “ a diversity of doctrines and the plurality of conflicting, and indeed incommensurable, conceptions of the good affirmed by the members of exist­ ing democratic societies” (p. 225). Rawls does not deny that “ [his theory] tries to draw solely upon basic intuitive ideas that are embedded in the political institutions o f a constitutional democratic regime and the public traditions of their interpretation” (p. 225). What he offers, he believes, is a conception of political liberalism which makes possible “ a stable and just society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable though incompatible religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines” (1993, p. xviii). Obviously, by modern democratic regimes Rawls has in mind the contem­ porary Western social and historical conditions which “ have their origin in the Wars o f Religion following the Reformation and the subsequent development of the principle of toleration, and in the growth of constitutional government and the institutions of large industrial market economies” (1985, p. 225). The Confucian tradition, as a particular Eastern metaphysical and moral doctrine, though reasonable, stands outside o f these social and historical conditions. As it has been, and remains, enormously influential in East Asian societies, Confucianism stands in a significant relation to the direction of these countries in their ethical, political, and economic developments. Inquiry into the Confu­ cian view of social justice in comparison with the dominant modern Western liberal view is crucially important, both theoretically and practically. This essay illustrates several basic disagreements and contrasts between Rawls and classical Confucians regarding social justice. W ith regard to a series o f particular assumptions and understandings that Rawls sets forth (i.e., his thin theory o f the good for constructing the principles o f justice, his special emphasis on the equality of persons and fair equality of opportunity, his state­ ments on individual rights and liberties and their priority, and his attitude toward economic systems), Confucians hold different conceptions and ideals. Based on all these disagreements between Rawls and Confucians, we should be able to conclude that, no matter how anxiously some scholars (Rawls may not be among them) have expected, the Rawlsian theory of social justice may not be the appropriate doctrine to direct the development of the countries in which Confucianism is influential. Those countries should reconsider the merit and advantage of establishing an appropriate Confucian social structure that fits well with their traditional Confucian beliefs and values.36

Notes 1 Rawls, R . (1971) , A Theory o f Justice, Cambridge, M A: Harvard University Press. Through­ out Western intellectual history, philosophers have argued over what justice foundationally means and particularly requires. The content and scope o f justice change dramatically from one theoretical framework to another, such as egalitarianism, utilitarianism, and libertarianism. Cf. Buchanan, A. (1981), “ Justice: A Philosophical Review” , in Earl E. Shelp (ed.), Justice and

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Health Care, Netherlands: D. Reidel Publishing Company, pp. 3-21. The application o f the concept ranges from the moral character and act o f a single individual through the general structure of a large-scale state to specific social and public policies. As is well known, Aristotle, in his Nicomachean Ethics, lays out three different subjects o f justice: general justice, distribu­ tive justice, and rectificative justice. General justice is “ complete virtue ... in relation to another” ，or “ the complete exercise of complete virtue ...in relation to another, not only in what concerns himself” (1129b). Distributive justice is “ proportionate equality in distributing honors or wealth (1131a). And rectificative justice is “ what is intermediate between loss and profit” (1132a). See Aristotle (1985), Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Terence Irwin, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Book V ， p p . 116-127. Accordingly, for Aristotle, a complete account of social justice includes general, distributive, and rectificative theories. However, by focusing on distributive justice to guide society, Rawls down-plays the role of Aristotle’s general and rectificative components in justice consideration. Some might want to argue that the Confucian notion y i is similar to the Western notion of justice. However, in the classical Confucian literature, y i is not clearly set as meaning “ giving everyone their due” . For instance, in explaining Confucius’ concept o f y i in the Analects, D. C. Lau states that “y i is a word which can be used of an act an agent ought to perform in which case it can be rendered as ‘duty’，or it can be used o f an agent in which case it can be rendered as ‘righteous’ or ‘dutiful， . When used in a general sense, sometimes the only possible rendering is ‘moral，or ‘morality’ ” (Lau, D. C . (1983), “ Introduction ” ，The Analects, Suffolk: Penguin Books, p. 26). Conversely, Roger Ames and Henry Rosemont argue that y i is “ one’s sense o f appropriateness that enables one to act in a proper and fitting manner, given the specific situation” (cf. Ames, Roger and Henry Rosemont, Jr (1998), “ Introduction ” ，The Analects o f Confucius: A Philosophical Translation, New York: The Ballantine Publishing Group, p. 54). Finally, Wing-tsit Chan contends that y i was raised by Mencius to the highest level in moral values in order to oppose the Mohist doctrine o f universal love without distinc­ tions: ren is benevolence necessary to bind people together and y i is righteousness necessary to make distinctions (cf. Chan, Wing-tsit (1963), A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 50). This essay will rely on ren, rather than yi, as a general clue to disclose the classical Confucian view of social justice. My quotations o f Confucian classics are mostly adapted from James Legge， s translation by reference to other more recent translations. The only exception is the Xun Zi, for which I refer to John Knoblock’s translation (Xunzi, v o l.II, trans. John Knoblock, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990). Given that Rawls claims his theory of justice to be a deontological theory, it is a bit surprising that he treats liberties and rights as purely instrumental goods, combining them with income and wealth to make a group o f right-independent prerequisites or means for individual life plans. There is a tension in it. As Habermas points out: “ Rights can be ‘enjoyed’ only by being exercised.” Basic rights and liberties “ in the first instance regulate relations between actors: they cannot be ‘possessed’ like things” . Hence, they “ cannot be assimilated to distributive goods without forfeiting their deontological meaning” (Habermas, J. (1995), “ Reconciliation Through the Public Use o f Reason: Remarks on John Rawls’s Political Liberalism ’’，The Journal o f Philosophy, vol. X C II, no. 3, March, p . 114). This does not mean that instrumental goods (such as economic values like money or income) should not have any standing in a Confucian theory of social justice. The point is rather that instrumental goods should not be the only data for constructing the principles o f social justice. On the traditional Confucian view o f the good life, instrumental goods should not be pursued independently of the constraints of intrinsic goods. For instance, Confucius claims: “ Riches and honors acquired by unrighteousness are to me as a floating cloud” ( Analects, 7.15). He also argues: “ When a state is well governed, poverty and a mean condition are things to be ashamed of; when a state is ill-governed, riches and honors are things to be ashamed o f” (Analects, 8.13).

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This does not suggest that the Aristotelian and Confucian views on the good life do not have essential differences. For a comparative study o f Confucian and Aristotelian virtues, see MacIntyre, A. (1991), “ Incommensurability, Truth, and the Conversation between Confucians and Aristotelians about the Virtues” , in E. Deutsch (ed.), Culture and Modernity, Honolulu: University o f Hawaii Press, pp. 104-122. 7 Rawls distinguishes two types of theories: teleological and deontological. He follows W. K. Frankena to define teleological theories in the way that “ the good is defined independently from the right, and then the right is defined as that which maximizes the good” (Rawls, A Theory o f Justice, p. 24). In contrast, a deontological theory is characterized as “ one that either does not specify the good independently from the right, or does not interpret the right as maximizing the good” （ ibid., p. 30). He identifies his theory o f justice as a deontological theory. However, Rawls fails to distinguish teleology from consequentialism. His definition of teleology fits well into consequentialist theories such as utilitarianism, but not into teleological theories such as Confucianism and Aristotelianism. A teleological theory assumes a telos. A telos is not a state o f affairs (such as utility or pleasure) that may be achieved by any means. Instead, a telos as the end of the good life must be defined and pursued in terms o f the virtues which by themselves place constraints on acceptable means. A remarkable feature of teleological theories is the interdefinition o f the good and the right through the concept o f the virtues. The virtues, as the traits that are simultaneously needed for pursuing the telos, are constitutive o f the good life on the one hand and are presupposed of a sense o f the right on the other. A life o f exercising the virtues is the life o f struggling for the telos and thereby is both right and good at that. Hence, through the mediation o f the concept o f the virtues (between the concepts of the right and the good), the teleological concept o f the right (or justice) is already an internal component o f the teleological concept o f the good, because the virtues are both essentially definitive of the good and representative o f the right. Accordingly, it is misleading to say either, with the consequentialist, that the good is prior to the right or, with the deontologist, that the right is prior to the good. In this light, we should appropriately distinguish three rather than two different types o f theories: consequentialism, deontology, and teleology. Regarding these distinctions, see a brilliant observation made by Jeffrey Stout (Stout, J. (1988), Ethics After Babel, Boston: Beacon Press, pp. 322-323, n. 9). See also Alasdair MacIntyre (MacIntyre, A. (1984), After Virtue, 2nd edn, Notre Dame: University o f Notre Dame Press, pp. 148-149) and Julia Annas (Annas, J. (1993), The Morality o f Happiness, New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 35-42). 8 A t the time of Confucius (551-479 BC) and Mencius (327-289 BC), different classical Chinese schools offered the different dao (ways) o f the good life. For those who followed Confucius, the dao was ren. Etymologically, ren is made up of the element “ person” and the number “ two” ，meaning that one cannot become a person by oneself. By extension, it also means that the good life consists in forming appropriate human relations and the appropriate structure o f society. From the view o f Mencius, if humans are not made aware of ren, they would have no sense of right or justice. They would live their lives almost like the beasts, even if they are well fed, warmly clad, and comfortably lodged ( Mencius, 3A:4). Conversely, everyone is able to follow ren if one wants to. Confucius states, “ if one’s will is set on ren, one will be free from wickedness” (Analects, 4.4). When one has fully realized ren, one has fully realized the moral virtues (for instance, Confucius states that “ men o f ren are sure to be brave, but those who are brave may not always be men o f ren” (Analects, 14.5)), becoming a sage (Analects, 6.28; 7.33). In short, ren is the embodiment o f human nature in its perfect state. A human of ren is a perfect human. Ren has been translated into many different English words, such as benevolence, love, altruism, kindness, charity, compassion, magnanimity, perfect virtue, goodness, true manhood, manhood at its best, human-heartedness, humaneness, humanity, etc. I will leave this crucial concept untranslated in the text. To my knowledge, in the tremendous amount of literature

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dealing with the meaning of ren and its evolution, an essay by Wing-tsit Chan provides the clearest and most cogent account (cf. Chan, Wing-tsit (1955), “ The Evolution o f Confucian pp. 295-315). This essay generally follows Concept Jen". Philosophy East and West, v o l.4 ， Chan’s interpretation o f ren to develop its implications for social justice. Love might be taken as a general moral principle for many religions and moral traditions. For instance, Joseph Fletcher argues that Christian morality can be summarized as a principle of love. However, we must notice that even if “ love” is universally accepted, the content o f love is different in different traditions. For instance, given that there are fundamental differences between Confucianism and Christianity in their respective religious, metaphysical, and moral assumptions and commitments, the requirements o f Confucian love and Christian love cannot be the same. Cf. Fletcher, J. F . (1967)，Situation Ethics: The New Morality, Philadelphia: Westminster Press. Evidently, it is a misunderstanding to argue that Confucius offered only a negative principle o f the Golden Rule (see, for example, Legge, J. (1971), “ The Prolegomena” ，Confucian Analects, The Great Learning and The Doctrine o f the Mean, trans. James Legge, New York: Dover Publications, Inc., p. 109). See Kymlicka, W . (1990), Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Introduction, Oxford: Clarendon Press, pp. 52-53. Rawls elaborates moral persons as having two moral powers. First, they are capable o f having a conception o f their good. Second, they are capable of having a sense o f justice (Rawls, A Theory o f Justice, p. 505; Rawls, R . (1995), Political Liberalism, New York: Columbia U ni­ versity Press, pp. 294-324). It is worth noting that, for Confucians, this kind of love is not extended to nonhumans. The following story of Confucius is heuristic: the stable being burned down when he was at court, on his return he said, “ Has any human been hurt?” He did not ask about the horses (Analects, 10.12). This brings in one o f the crucial Confucian values: zun-xian, namely, the honoring o f men o f virtue. For instance, in The Doctrine o f the Mean, :m -xian is considered as one o f the most important moral standards. By honoring men o f virtue, one is preserved from errors of judgment (20.13 and 20.14). Here occurs another crucial Confucian value: qin-qin, namely, affection towards relatives (see, e.g., The Doctrine o f the Mean, 20.13 and 20.14). It is exactly for the practice of differentiated love and respect due to relatives and the worthy that Confucians give enormous weight to the obedience o f li, namely, the rules o f propriety. Such rules offer concrete guidance to individuals in specific situations. As The Doctrine o f the Mean states:

Ren is the characteristic element o f humanity, and the great exercise o f it is in loving relatives. Yi is the accordance o f actions with what is right, and the great exercise of it is in honoring the worthy. The decreasing measure o f the love due to relatives, and the steps in the honor due to the worthy, are produced by the rules o f propriety (li). (20.5)

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For a fantastic book that explains the meaning and role o f li in Confucianism, see Fingarette, Herbert (1972), Confucius: The Secular as Sacred, New York: Harper & Row. Cf. Fan, R . (1997), “ Self-determination vs. Family-determination: Two Incommensurable Principles o f Autonomy ” ， Bioethics 11,July, pp. 309-322. I adapted this description o f the autonomy o f the family from James Fishkin’s excellent work (Fishkin, James S. (1983), Justice, Equal Opportunity, and the Family, New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 35-36), where he discusses the systematic conflicts among fair equality of opportunity, the autonomy o f the family, and the principle o f merit in the liberal theory.

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Ruiping Fan Indeed, “ harmony” (he) is a vital concept in the Confucian view o f justice. For instance, Xun Zi (c. 310-? BC) clearly stresses fairness as balance or harmony rather than equality (Xun Zi, 9.2). As he states: Where the classes of society are equally ranked, there is no proper arrangement of society; where authority is evenly distributed, there is no unity; and where everyone is o f like status, none would be willing to serve the other. (9.3)

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Moreover, harmony also constitutes a good human character. For instance, according to Confucius, “ the superior man is harmonious but not adulatory; the mean man is adulatory but not harmonious” (Analects, 18.23). In his later work ( Political Liberalism, p. 291), Rawls gives more accurate expression o f his two principles of justice. For the sake of simplicity, I omit addressing any issues related to his different expressions because they don， t affect the argument in this essay. Cf. Ames, Roger T . (1988), “ Rites as Rights: The Confucian Alternative” ，in Leroy S. Rouner (ed.), Human Rights and the World's Religions, Notre Dame: University o f Notre Dame Press; Rosemont, Jr, H . (1988), “ Why Take Rights Seriously? A Confucian Critique” ，in Rouner, ibid.; Peerenboom, R. P. (1993), “ What is Wrong with Chinese Rights? Toward a Theory o f Rights with Chinese Characteristics” ，Harvard Human Rights Journal 6 , pp. 29- 57. For an original argument for this view, see Chan, Joseph (1999)，“ A Confucian Perspective on Human Rights in Contemporary C hin a" ，in Joanne R. Bauer and Daniel Bell (eds), East Asian Challenge fo r Human Rights, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 212-237. For example, in explaining the general requirements of shu (“ do not impose on others what you yourself do not desire” ）and zhong (taithfulness), The Doctrine o f the Mean teaches us: “ to serve my father as I would expect my son to serve me ... To serve my ruler as I would expect my ministers to serve me ... To serve my elder brothers as I would expect my younger brothers to serve me ... To be the first to treat friends as I would expect them to treat me … ” (ch. 13). There have also been some special rights and obligations among relatives of non-parent-childrelation. For instance, under the traditional Chinese legal system, theft among relatives was treated differently from theft among ordinary people. The severity o f the punishment varied in inverse ratio to the closeness of relationship. For this issue and other related legal issues u, T ， ung-Tsu (1961), Law and Society in Traditional China, Paris: in Chinese history, see Ch ， Mouton & Co. Some may want to argue that it is doubtful that a list of specific Confucian rights, such as a right to criticize government policies, can be derived from the Confucian virtues, because it is difficult to know which obligation is a necessary requirement or obligation for a virtue. I don’t think it is so difficult. In the first place, we can set down a general guideline for establishing a necessary obligation under a virtue: if there is an obligation under a virtue which is so important that if we do not take it as a necessary obligation and enforce it by a rule o f law, the outcome will be severe damage to our legitimate interests in the case that the virtue does not prevail, then this obligation must be a necessary obligation for the virtue. For instance, a virtue that government officials must nurture and exercise, as Confucianism always emphasizes, is ren (the so-called “ government o f ren", or ren-zheng). This virtue entails a number o f important obligations: taking appropriate measures to many people, to enrich them, and to educate them (Analects, 13.9), to guide them by virtue and keep them in line with the rites (l i ) ( 2 .2 ), not to impose the death penalty on people without having educated them, not to require from them suddenly without having given them warning, not to insist on a time lim it when first tardy in issuing orders, and not to be mean when giving pay or rewards to them (20.2), to govern means to rectify oneself (12.17), to require much from oneself and little from others so that others will not complain (15.14), to follow the dao so that the common

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people will not criticize (16.2), to allow people to criticize (“ if what [the ruler] says is not good and no one goes against him, then is this not almost a case o f a saying leading the state to ruin” (13.15)), to advance the upright and set them over the crooked so that people will submit (2.19), and so on. I am sure that more than one necessary obligation should be teased out from this virtue. But at least one o f them is to allow people to criticize government policies as well as governmental officials. Chinese history has repeatedly proved it necessary to assign such a right to the people so that they would not be worried about being retaliated against or persecuted by the government. In order to protect people’s basic interests and avoid social disasters caused by the government when the virtue o f ren does not obtain, such a right is important and should be formulated in the law. Asher, M . (1995), “ Compulsory Savings in Singapore: An Alternative to the Welfare State” ， NCPA Policy Report No. 198. Cf. Li, Chenyang (1999), The Tao Encounters the West, New York: State University o f New York Press, pp. 163-190. These ideas are discussed at length in the Xun Z /，especially in “ On the Regulations of a King” , “ On Enriching the State” , “ O f Kings and Lords-Protector” , and “ On the Way o f a Lord” ( Xun Z i, 9，1 0 ,11，12). For Xun Zi, if one’s virtue does not correspond to one’s rank, if one’s ability does not correspond to one’s office, and if one’s merit does not correspond to one's reward, these are great unfairnesses and misfortunes. An ideal Confucian society must manage to avoid these defects. Huang, Zong-Xi (1995), Waiting fo r the Dawn: A Plan fo r the Prince, trans. Wm. Theodore de Bary, New York: Columbia University Press. Bell first made this proposal in an article (Bell, Daniel A. (1998), “ A Confucian Democracy for the Twenty-first Century” ， A RSP-Beiheft 72, pp. 37—49)，where he addressed this proposal as “ A Confucian democracy.” When he explored the related issues further in Part III o f his new book (Bell, Daniel A. (2000), East Meets West: Human Rights and Democracy in East Asia, Princeton: Princeton University Press), he termed it “ democracy with Chinese characteristics” . I think Bell’s proposal deserves serious consideration for application in Confucian societies. For instance, in mainland China, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference (which currently consists primarily o f scholars from all minor political parties as well as academic circles) can be reformed to shape an upper house o f scholars through examination, while the National People’s Congress can be reformed to shape a lower house o f representa­ tives by democratic election. John Gray observes that “ because it entails imposing a productive ideal, the choice of collective ownership is precluded by justice ... When ... a culture contains both liberal and non-liberal forms o f life, we lack an overlapping consensus that might sustain such an ideal” (Gray, J. (1989), “ Contractarian Method, Private Property and Market Economy” ， Liberal­ isms, London and New York: Routledge, p. 187). Thus, Gray concludes that the Rawlsian contractarian neutrality is misplaced in the very circumstance o f value-pluralism that frames Rawls’ problem. For Gray, the Rawlsian contractarian argument has to lead to the privateproperty economy. Heng-chan has generally been translated as “ livelihood” or “ means o f support” rather than “ private property” . But heng-chan literally means constant real estates. In traditional China chan mainly referred to land and house, the major assets that people could have. In ancient China, all land nominally belonged to the ruler, the “ Son o f Heaven" . The Con­ fucian ideal o f land distribution is the so-called “ well-field” system, a family-based allocation that might have been adopted in the Zhou Dynasty (c. the eleventh to the eighth centuries BC). According to Mencius, the system was designed like this: “ a square li covers nine squares of land, which contain nine hundred mu. The central square is the public field, and eight families, each having its private hundred mu as the private field, cultivate in common the public field” ( Mencius, 3A:3). In this ideal system the “ public field” and “ private field” were clearly

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Ruiping Fan distinguished, although all land formally belonged to the ruler and his appointed nobles and could not be arranged for sale and purchase freely. The system was already broken in the time of Mencius, when farmers began to occupy uncultivated land and sold it to each other. The Confucian scholars, like Mencius, thus began to argue for the farmers' right to own land for their work (“gen zhe you qi tian” ) as well as a right to maintain their products for their living (without being heavily levied by government taxation). For an explication o f these issues, see Mou, Zong-san (2000), Philosophy o f History (in Chinese), 9th edn, Taipei: Xue Shen Shu Ju, pp. 19-29. For a discussion o f the modern Chinese debate concerning the well-field system, see Levenson, J. R . (1960), “ 111 Wind in the Well-field: The Erosion o f the Confucian Ground o f Controversy” ，in A. F. Wright (ed.), The Confucian Persuasion, Stanford: Stanford Univer­ sity Press, pp. 268-287. In short, I think translating “ heng-chan” into “ private property” expresses the meaning o f heng-chan more accurately. An important qualification is that, in the Chinese context, major private property (such as land and house) is primarily family-united jo int ownership rather than private individual ownership as in the West. For a detailed discussion of the disaster-avoidance reasoning and its differences from utilitarian principle as well as the Rawlsian rule o f maximin, see Kavka, G. S. (1986), Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory, Princeton: Princeton University Press, ch. 5, section 3). Wm. Theodore de Bary provides an excellent English abstract o f the debate contained in The Debate on Salt and Iron. Cf. de Bary, Wm. T. et al.(eds) (1960), Sources o f Chinese Tradition, vol. I, New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 218-223. Rawls, R . (1985), “ Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical” , Philosophy and Public Affairs 14, Summer, pp. 223-257. A final word about the place o f Confucianism is in order. Undoubtedly, the substance o f Confucian moral teaching remains at home in the ordinary life of most East Asian people. As Confucian civilization has been deeply rooted and widespread for more than one thousand years, its influences cannot be eradicated by far-fetched anti-Confucian political movements or the hostile attacks of radical modern intellectuals. Ironically, in the case of many modern Chinese intellectuals, their efforts to extirpate Confucian influences were frequently accompanied by an “ unconscious” identification with Confucian values (cf. Tu, Wei-ming (1979), Humanity and Self-Cultivation: Essays in Confucian Thought, Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, pp. 27980). It is unfortunate that many people fail to distinguish the simplified, politicized, and distorted Confucianism (that was propagated by the totalitarian rulers of the imperial dynasties) from the original classical Confucianism (that was established by the brilliant ancient Chinese minds, such as Confucius and Mencius). Moreover, it is unlikely that the modern Western liberal democracy is the only version of a polity that is worth defending. A vitally important work left for contemporary Confucian scholars is to bring the Confucian resources to bear on the ways in which people come to terms with the ethical, political, and economic issues that they face today.

CHAPTER EIG H T

Towards a Minimal Common Ground for Humanist Dialogue: A Comparative Analysis of Confucian Ethics and American Ethical Humanism* You-zheng L i Confucian ethics originating in the authoritarian ancient East, and American humanism originating in the democratic modern West, share a number o f moral principles because of their common empirical approaches to the ethical situations and ethical doctrines of mankind. A comparative analysis o f these two ethical systems can show why the present world, suffering as it does from multiple crises, needs a more empirically directed and operatively stratified ethical science. This ethical humanism, a humanistic ethics based on an empirical or naturalist approach, is the best hope for an ethics universally applicable to all communities despite historical and geographic divergences.

Confucian ethics and ethical humanism Confucian ethics is a historically transmitted school o f thought, and American ethical humanism is a modern synthetic movement. The systems as a whole are heterogeneous in composition and cannot be directly compared. So for pur­ poses of this comparison, it will be primarily the theoretical system o f ethical humanism, and the theoretical implication o f its other constituent aspects, that will be addressed. More simply, American ethical humanism in the present essay will be considered as a dynamic instance of empirical ethical theory. It is its empiricism and naturalism that is characteristic of the entire movement. As regards the Confucian partner in this comparative analysis, we have to first

* This essay is based on a lecture I delivered on the same topic at Buffalo on May 23,1999. The lecture was co-sponsored by the Center for Free Inquiry, Buffalo, and the Department of Philosophy and Asian Studies Program, the State University o f New York at Buffalo. Thanks to Mary Rorty for improving the English of the essay.

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explain what is meant by the term “ Confucian ethics” ，and secondly to disen­ tangle from the popular confusion its different content and function in different historical contexts.

A distinction between Confucian ethics and Confucianist academic ideology China has a continuing imperial history over 2000 years, characterized through­ out by its authoritarian Confucianism. In the popular view, Confucianism is presented as a deeply rooted despotic socio-political system and an unchanged state-run ideology. Since the beginning of the twentieth century, Confucianism has been widely taken to be the main impediment to China’s progress. It was generally regarded as the opposite of democracy and science during the first half of the century. Later on, different elements were gradually separated by modern scholars. Some are negatively conservative while others are seen as positive with respect to the modern world. The socio-political system is considered negative, while the intellectual and cultural spirit can be viewed in more positive terms. Confucianism, which can be traced back to the first Chinese imperial dynasties Qin-Han, literally means Ru-School, o f which Confucius was the legendary founding father. Much o f its socio-political content was a later accretion which has little to do with original Confucian thought, as Confucius is supposed to have lived about 300 years before the despotic politico-academic ideology of Confucianism was established. From a cultural-anthropological point o f view, then, we have to make a distinction between the earlier Confucian thought and the later Confucianism. The former is embodied in a single book, Lun- Yü (the Analects). It was considered as the first book written privately in Chinese history, and it appeared before the establishment of the first Chinese despotic empire. Confucianism as a politico-academic ideology and synthetic system originated in the imperial period, and includes the earlier Confucian thought as a constituent part. A lot o f misleading debates arise because o f this initial constitutive ambiguity. In addition, there was a translation problem caused by the early Western missionary scholars. Because of the linguistic divergence between Chinese and Western conceptual frameworks, early cultural communi­ cations suffered from confusions arising from different semantic organizations. Many discussions about Confucian thought and Confucianism involve quite inconsistent topics, and misunderstanding is further increased when different readers approach the topics from different contexts. Proper hermeneutic analysis requires that we should take the original Confucian thought out of the Con­ fucianist system and put it into a modern social and intellectual context for reinterpretation, in order to get a more relevant understanding. For, as I have suggested elsewhere, the same textual content can function differently in differ­ ent historical and academic contexts.1 In brief, then, Confucianism consists of a double system: the broader socio­ political one and a more narrow academic one. Both were historical phenomena,

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and both have virtually disappeared in this century, but despite its ancient origins, Confucian thought and ethics still play an active role in modem China. The Bible, of similar or greater antiquity, has effectively functioned in modern times as well. An important distinction between the two classical texts is that the Bible systematically uses supernatural and metaphorical language, while the Analects uses an empirical humanist language. The perenniality of the former is due to the lasting effects of the ancient Mediterranean mythological tradition, while that of the latter is due to its basis in a constant and universal human nature common to Confucius，contemporaries and all succeeding generations. This “ first Chinese book” is a valuable modern resource because it gives us access to cross-cultural and trans-historical universals about ethical human nature. Thus, we moderns do not need to employ any special literary technique or art for grasping the Confucian text. We can directly understand its literal meaning, first because o f its accessible aaily language, and secondly, because of its reference to empirical human conditions experienced in common by members of all cultures. Confucianism in its traditional form has sometimes been formulated as a quasi-religion o f a political-academic type. Many ancient and modern con­ servative advocates of Confucianism have tended to deify and dogmatize the Confucian texts, and invented Confucius as a founding father ol Confucianism. In a broad sense, Confucianism is said to be the very foundation o f the per­ ennial Chinese civilization. Some Chinese scholars tend to compare the role of Confucius to that o f the Buddha. Unlike Buddha or Jesus, however, Confucius appears in the Analects only as a wise human being. I f the historical existence of the person Confucius remains to some extent unauthenticated, his words and deeds as presented in the Analects have been universally accepted and respected. For understanding Confucian thought, the point is not to ask whether Confucius was a historical person, but rather to acknowledge his narrative role as a transmitter of ethical ideas that were, with amazing consistency, created, collected, and edited over a period o f about 300 years. The Analects was the result o f a collective practice expressing the same spirit and thought across that period. It is a set of ethical teachings deeply rooted and widely implemented in the long Chinese history. The content of this historical text can be further reassessed and reevaluated entirely in positive-empirical terms today. That fact, in my opinion, is the main reason why the Analects keeps its perennial value in the modern world. Another distinction that needs to be drawn is that made between Confucian thought and Confucianist philosophies, the latter including both ancient NeoConfucianist metaphysics (Song-Ming-Li-Xue) and modern New Confucianist philosophy (Xin-Ru-Jia). Modern Confucianist philosophy, based on its his­ torical counterpart, combines Daoist mysticism, Buddhist ontology, Western metaphysics, and Confucian texts to form a modernized philosophy o f nation­ alist character. The various philosophical schools of Confucianism have their

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own justifications and achievements, but many of them tend to change the structure o f the original Confucian ethics and therefore disturb its empirically operative logic. In the current interdisciplinary and cross-cultural academic context, a return to the empirical-humanist spirit of Confucian ethics becomes more and more possible and desirable. In addition to the scholarly reasons, there is a practical incentive as well. Confucian empirical humanism is badly needed today to deal with present social reality.

Relevance o f Confucian ethics to our times Confucius has often been compared to Aristotle, because the two philosophers were regarded sometimes as founders of the Chinese and Western ethical systems respectively. However, in contrast to Confucian thought, Aristotle’s is much more scientific in style, and ancient China was much weaker in scientific and logical potential. A more relevant comparison is perhaps between Confucius and Socrates. Both of them started the ethical way of reflection in human civilizations. For both, ethical thought was still not organized in political or legal terms, although the one deals with ethical problems more affirmatively and the other more skeptically. Both of them focus on the practical wisdom of ethical choices. Confucius treats it in a more pragmatic way, and Socrates treats it in a more analytical way. But both approach ethical problems in empir­ ical and rational terms. A t almost the same time, then, the two philosophers originally raised questions of properly ethical character in respectively the East and the West. Unlike many later, more elaborate developments of moral philosophy, they focused on the subjective aspect o f the moral situation. Through Plato, Socrates， conceptual tradition has been widely mixed with and absorbed into later Western philosophical developments. Confucian thought, however, uniquely keeps its textual, intellectual, and historical autonomy as well as its existential entirety. It presents itself as an amazingly well-developed subjective ethics. We might call it an attitudinal ethics, a discussion o f the proper attitude o f the agent to ethical values, an approach that is as pertinent to modern as to ancient peoples. It can effectively participate in a theoretical dialogue with modern Western ethical theories, but it needs a conceptual trans­ formation with a methodological combination of hermeneutic, semiotic, and pragmatic approaches. For this purpose, we have to establish both linguistic and theoretical common grounds for the dialogue between the ancient Eastern and modern Western ethics.2 For Confucius does not discuss ethical problems in the formalistic-logical mode characteristic o f the Western intellectual tradi­ tion, but rather through an intuitive, structural, and pragmatic approach deeply rooted in its original ethical experience. Because of this difference of approach, Confucian ethics can present a useful complement to ethical reasoning based on the Western logical tradition.

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In pre-Qin China, Confucian ethical discourse was organized independ­ ently of any specific political system. It was later incorporated into the socialideological Confucianist system in the course o f the historical success o f the Legalist philosophy of power. It is significant, however, that it maintained its textual identity throughout the long pre-modern period of Chinese history. Even in the authoritarian social context of the imperial period, Confucian ethical thought preserved its separate spiritual-cultural identity within the syncretic and changing Confucianist social system. It is because o f this ethical autonomy that we can speak of a separable modern significance o f Confucian thought. It is the basis of its ability to interact with other modern disciplines in different practical and theoretical fields, at different, though related, levels. It does not contain a primitive political science or a legal theory, and it has nothing to do with sciences and democratic procedure, but that does not reduce its theoret­ ical and practical significance from a modern ethical perspective. Its ethical autonomy is based on the unalterable empirical constancy in human nature. This subjective ethics was a product of specific historical experience, the historical interaction between a conservative authoritarian system and the critical moral personality ironically shaped in reaction to that system. This historical situ­ ation has produced a special ethical wisdom that has proved to be universally meaningful for mankind. A further contribution o f historical Confucian ethics lies in its potential for helping the development of modern ethical scholarship. It provides a historic­ ally tested model for dealing with basic human ethical experience. Its universal applicability lies in a practical wisdom presented in a historical mode. It has nothing to do with some ancient sage’s supernatural power; it is the crystalliza­ tion o f a collective human experience as such. In respect o f style, this Eastern practical coherence contrasts with, as well as supplements, the theoretical analysis of Western ethics. It is time now to combine these two ethical traditions in a way that is mutually supportive and mutually profitable. It is an opportunity for such a convergence that this comparison of Confucian ethical thought and Western ethical humanism presents.

A comparison between a secular humanist ethics and Confucian ethics Contemporary American secular humanism is a successful independent social and academic movement focusing on promoting an applied ethics that is deeply rooted in the achievements o f modern science. With a serious concern for the moral life o f the world, it has applied a scientifically directed ethical doctrine to various aspects o f modern society, playing an active role quite unlike that of academic ethics. The direction of this ethical humanism towards social reality and practical goals leads to an especially efficient empirical autonomy o f ethical scholarship.

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In their different social, political, and historical contexts the original Con­ fucian movement and the modern American humanist movement express three major tendencies in common: independent socio-ethical concerns and engage­ ment with this world; organizing efforts to pursue their ethical ideal; and an empirical-humanist approach to socio-moral problems. They surely differ from each other in other respects, because of originating from radically different geographical-historical-cultural conditions. However, the two systems are faced with essentially the same ethical issues. Confucian ethics initially arose as an alternative to the supernatural or primitive religious approach to moral-socio­ political problems that had prevailed since early antiquity in China. Confucian thought is characterized by its emphasis on the human will rather than on any supernatural power, expressing a rational spirit emerging from the early cultural enlightenment of the late Zhou period. American humanism as an ethical trend was a critical movement against the Christian tradition. Both are intellectual revolts against supernatural determinism of the moral life. This commonality of reaction is due to a properly ethical concern. It is directed toward the more relevant objectives of human ethical life. It is this direction towards true ethical goals and its related methodology that shapes their com­ mon spiritual orientation. In addition to this reactive commonality, there is a shared concern as well for the ethical implications of other aspects o f human sociality. Confucian thought indirectly touches on every aspect of life, including politics, educa­ tion, and law. Those social parts o f Confucian thought, however, do not play much of a role in Chinese history. Nevertheless, its concern for these socio­ political topics focuses on their ethical meaning. American humanism as a modern, scientifically directed movement deals with many more relevant social, academic, and ideological issues than the Confucian. These modern topics, however, directly or indirectly implicate the same ethical concerns that are also present in the ancient Chinese ethical doctrine. In general, American humanism places more emphasis upon moral values, while Confucian human­ ism places more emphasis upon the subjective attitudes towards those basic values.3 O f course, Confucian thought in its ancient form lacked the techno­ logical potential to realize its social goals, except in psychological and cultural dimensions.4 A basic ethical autonomy is essential to both of the two doctrines. We have already pointed out that Confucian ethics could maintain its ethical-operative coherence or autonomy even when separated from the historical Confucianist system. This characteristic becomes more salient after its alignment with modern thought. Its ancient social, political, and cultural connections have an ethical implication, which can be linked to the related social and intellectual aspects of the modern world. American humanism, especially in its recent developments, shares this ethical autonomy. This centrality of ethical focus makes it worthy of serious attention despite a relatively modest academic profile.5 Both ethical

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doctrines share the same intensive ethicocentric stance. In order to more clearly express the value of a possible intellectual collaboration between the two ethical systems, we will next turn to a background discussion about the categorization o f ethical scholarship.

Basic ethical autonomy of humanism We have several reasons for using the term humanism to represent an ethical movement developed in reaction to various religious and non-empirical ethics. The most remarkable feature of humanist ethics is its strict orientation on an empirically conditioned autonomy of ethical thought. This intellectual autonomy becomes the basis or core of the entire humanist ethical system. Both Con­ fucian ethics and the Western ethical humanist movement exhibit this basic ethical autonomy.

Minimal definition o f humanist ethics and a model fo r classifying ethical discourse In order to promote a wider international ethical dialogue, Paul Kurtz, in a recent article, raised the question of the minimal definition o f humanism.6 I have suggested a model for classifying ethical discourse which may be useful for further considering Kurtz’s requirements.71 hope that analytical model can contribute to the discussion o f humanist ethics in general. The model consists o f four main categories o f ethical discourse as follows: M l:

M2: M3:

M4:

Moral teaching and customs. The direct or straightforward presenta­ tion o f ethical values, norms, and instruction in oral and written forms. Confucian text is one o f its earliest types. The semantic and semiotic approaches to M l. The discourses o f Socrates, the Sophists, and the Daoists offer some ancient examples of this type. Scientific and technical approaches to M l and M2. This category can be further divided into natural, social, human, and interdisciplinary sub­ classes. Each o f the subclasses contains a number of branches. Philosophical, religious, and poetical. A ll super-empirical approaches to M 1, M2, and M3, such as metaphysical, ontological, theological, mythical, and poetico-rhetorical interpretations, including both rational and irrational styles.

This typology stresses a twofold scheme for dividing ethical discourse in history. Practically oriented moral teaching is the basic category and the three related, theoretical categories supervene upon it. A minimal definition o f an empir­ ical or humanistic ethics (M HE) should provide an adequate system o f moral

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doctrines covering both personal happiness and interpersonal justice. It must encompass subjective attitudes towards happiness and justice, as well as methods to attain them. Those ethical issues contain little in the way o f interpretation or explanation; they deal with more practical and often quite coherent moral teachings. Their pragmatic logic is formed on the basis of the rational practices o f human beings in their struggle for survival in the face of natural and social hardships, without necessarily involving other related or derived scholarly sub­ jects. As a pre-scientific ethical system, Confucian thought provides a typical example of the minimal humanist ethics. A desirable minimal definition of humanistic ethics could fall in the category M l, particularly one formulated in the pre-scientific period. American secular humanism, despite its modern scientific context and its more comprehensive system, provides a modern example of a minimal definition of a humanistic ethics, because of its epistemologically empirical direction of ethical inquiry. Not all minimal definitions of human­ istic ethics need to be directly presented as such. A M HE can present itself in society directly or indirectly. A system of M HE can be indirectly embodied by other theoretical discourses in ethical scholarship. Even very complicated or sophisticated ethical systems can incorporate a basic ethical autonomy. “ Humanist” ， “ empirical” ，and “ naturalistic” are similar terms, which can be used to describe the traits of the MHE. The MHE, on the one hand, is minimal in that it includes empirical moral principles, but few other indirect theoretical elaborations, empirical or nonempirical. Nevertheless, it should also be maximal in content, a common ground for all ethical systems that contain positiveempirical parts in their theories and practices, so as to allow and encourage a larger ethical dialogue among different ethical systems. Because most elaborated ethical systems exist in mixed forms, the fourfold classifying model can help separate different sections of each ethical system and more precisely redefine the M HE for each. I f we define the empirical basic ethical part, some related ethical discourse will be found to fall inside it and some outside it. Generally speaking, the semantic, scientific, and philosophical operations usually fall outside the MHE, as do all religious and other transcendental discourses. The fewer the basic principles are, the larger the applied extent. In practice, the minimizing and maximizing strategies are employed simultaneously. On the one hand, it is desirable to put all unnecessary parts outside the basic zone and organize them into different related categories of ethical science. On the other hand, however, we need to include as much empirical and positive reasoning as possible, including that taken from the natural and social sciences, to strengthen the inner structure o f MHE. Those empirical scientific elements should be widely accepted as irremovable principles in any ethical doctrines. There are thus two possible types o f MHE: one in its primitive form like the Confucian and other ancient empirical ethical systems, and the other in its modern scientific form, which will contain many more scientifically oriented principles which have already been accepted as universal norms in modern

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time. So, the demarcations between different categories o f ethical discourse are flexible. In general, the scientific type M3, more than the philosophical type M4, is closer to M l, for it is also primarily empirical. It is for this reason that we find that American ethical or naturalist humanism contains many more empirical or scientific elements, functioning contextually as the MHE. The same naturalist ethical discourse can alternatively function as M l, M3, and M4 in different contexts. The modern world has been pluralistic in its social, intellectual, and ideo­ logical compositions, which contain varying rational and irrational elements, including some very absurd and disgusting ones. A ll o f those phenomena have different historical, sociological, psychological, and ideological sources that cannot be changed or replaced merely by stronger rational arguments. The desired objective o f the empirical-rational humanist ethics does not lie in unrealistically anticipating the disappearance of its opposites, but rather in more effectively restricting their scope of impact. The danger o f superstitious and irrational rhetoric does not lie only in its social impact, but in its influence on more crucial realms o f human life, such as politics and the human sciences. The classification of ethical scholarship and the definition o f a M H E attempt to help shape different ethical discourses. Each concrete category contains different degrees of empirical, rationally operative elements, with the M H E providing the direct empirical and practical portion. Thus, on the one hand, there is the basic system of ethical values and instructions directly shaped in human historical practice; on the other, there are different types o f related interpretative and explanatory ethical teachings. The M H E provides an opera­ tively effective common denominator for different ethical systems across differ­ ent historical and geographical settings. Using this classifying principle, most scientific, philosophical, and religious theoretical supports for the M H E will not be confused with the M HE itself. The importance of this classification of ethical discourse is practical as well as theoretical. Ambiguity about, and con­ fusion of, ethical discursive categories are damaging because unclarity leads to less effective ethical theories. The mixture of categories and resulting ambigu­ ity could lead to inferential invalidity in ethical reasoning. We know the traditional concepts o f humanism, naturalism, and empiricism can be more precisely and more pertinently defined according to their differ­ ent contexts, functions, and usages. We do not need to fix their definitions on any specific historical theory. We have indeed learned a lot from the history expressed in those traditional ethical theories, but we should selectively use their concepts and terms in the contexts and programs we choose. The ethical humanism o f the future can be inspired by intellectual sources which are richer and more pluralistic than any past historical thoughts. Still, there remains a basic, or historically constant, empirical autonomy concerning human ethical situations. This is the very essence o f the humanist ethics, different from any traditional moral philosophies.

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One o f the most fundamental empirical concepts is the human nature that is the epistemological basis o f our concept of a MHE. Unlike the postmoderns, who reject the idea of a constant human nature, both Confucian and Western humanism accept it. We can better expand the term as “ essential nature related to humanity” and therefore acknowledge different kinds of “ nature” ， which include physical, biophysiological, psychological, and biosocial traits and tendencies. Naturalism should cover both biophysical nature and psychosocial nature; these two kinds of naturalism are respectively stressed by American humanism and Confucian humanism. A ll these different referents of the term “ nature” are empirically defined and therefore included in the empirical realm. According to our definition, humanism is empirically and pragmatically defined; it is an empirical ethics or an empirically-based ethics consisting of different theoretical levels. Whether it is a basic or derived type in its theoretical con­ struction depends on the chosen inferential sophistication and the operative stage concerning ethical projects. The basic ethics, the MHE, is intellectually justified by the persistence of human ethical situations across history. This close link to historical reality is what makes the basic ethics particularly empirical and practical, in contrast to its various transcendental rivals. It is this empirical orientation that allows empirical ethics to maintain a theoretical and practical logic shaped and tried within human historical experience. This form of ethics is almost objective and naturalistic because of its close connection to, and dependence upon, the stable part of external conditions. That explains why an ancient Chinese ethical thought and a modern American one can share so many principles across historical and geographic distance. O f course, this comparison is only applicable to the basic level, or the MHE. For the Confucian, that might be its conceptual entirety, but for the American, it is only one component of a more complicated ethical system. The redefinition of ethical autonomy or basic ethics is increasingly important today, not only because it is a theoretical and practical requirement of contemporary humanist movements, but also because it provides a link to similar historical movements. As Paul Kurtz said, “ Humanist ethical principles are autonomous, in the sense that they do not derive from theological or meta­ physical premises, but grow out of our own sentient experiences.， ， 8

The role o f a “minimal humanist ethics” ( M H E ) in general humanist ethics There are several important tasks facing general humanistic ethics. There is a need for a mutually acceptable and agreed-upon common ground for ethical discussion. Both the theoretical and the practical aspects o f ethical practice need to expand their range of influence on wider humanistic fields. It continues to be necessary to address the damage which can be done by various forms of irrational and transcendental ethics. Most importantly, humanistic ethics needs to continue to contribute to the broader humanist projects crucial

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to the contemporary situation. A ll o f these tasks can be furthered by the devel­ opment of the concept of a “ minimal humanist ethics” ，as suggested above. A modern version of M H E includes some theoretical or scientific parts, while a primitive mode of M HE presents only direct experiential content. Both primitive and modern versions of the M HE attempt to include within their basic scope only the necessary elements, in order to encourage more humanist schools to engage in dialogue with them. What that minimum consists of depends on the social and intellectual contexts. The specification o f a M H E is made in light of the answer to another practical question: who will be the chosen dialogic partners? W ill they be fellow humanists, or outside humanism? The definition of the minimum itself is flexible. For a cross-cultural ethical dialogue involving nonhumanists, the minimal scope can be more relevantly defined. For example, the present author used M l to refer to an ethical problem about personal happiness, and M2 to refer to problems about interpersonal justice.9 In crosscultural dialogues, it might be advisable to focus on the issues o f social justice, M2, and to exclude ethical debates about what constitutes personal happiness, for those issues involve a number o f different religious and philosophical posi­ tions. When the discussants are within humanist schools, on the other hand, a secular and social-directed good is already a widely accepted value, and therefore both M l and M2 can be included in the MHE. Thus we see that the specification of the M H E is always for the sake of a better ethical-practical priority in our inquiry and practice. Moreover, different elements from different basic systems can be linked to each other. In fact, we can assume a universal autonomy of basic empirical-ethical principles despite the constitutional difference of various basic systems, because of the common human ethical experience that deter­ mines the MHE. In the modern intellectually and socially expanded context o f ethical inquiry and practice, both “ inquiry” and “ practice” involve some additional or derived elements. Ethical inquiry can lead to an increase in the sum of human knowledge at the current epistemological level; ethical practice can also lead to expansion at the theoretical level. The polar binary concepts “ ends” and “ means” are relational terms defined in terms o f each other, and it is the same for “ practice” and “ theory” . In each stage or step o f ethical projects there are both practical and theoretical aspects, which complement each other. Theory requires prac­ tice, just as practice requires theory. In this sense, ethical inquiry is practice and theory simultaneously. It seems appropriate that ethical inquiry should be sufficiently open to new intellectual horizons to be able to ceaselessly enrich and develop itself. The most desirable and most feasible policy o f ethical humanism is to first strengthen itself. To this end, the minimal definition o f humanist ethics can provide an intellectual and practical division between the ethically basic and the ethically derived or elaborated, and facilitate the operations o f the two, separately as well as interactively. To have in the M H E a practicable system of

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ethical principles will further consistency of ethical understanding and activities among different people, and can more effectively exclude the harmful interfer­ ence of various nonscientific or transcendentally directed ethical speculations. The dangerous impact of the superstitious and irrational trends o f various kinds is increasingly obvious in intellectual and academic realms. A crucial and difficult task of humanist ethics today lies in determining how to resist the incursion of various irrational and amoral ideologies, secular and theistic alike, into academia. We need to more seriously emphasize the ethical implications of the humanities by stressing the importance of this basic common ethical ground among different scholarly branches. For example, we as humanists will seriously doubt postmodernist nihilism and extreme relativism when they rep­ resent theoretical threats to our basic empirically organized ethical foundation. So epistemological criticism of obvious and latent academic dominations, and efforts to strengthen the humanities, are part of humanist ethical inquiry. Free ethical inquiry has a twofold objective: an inward and an outward. As well as the consolidation of the humanist ethics and the development o f M HE as an internally directed task, there will also be an outward one oriented toward the intellectual horizon beyond humanist ethical scholarship. There is a need to narrow our operative ground within ethical practice; while on the other side we must expand its intellectual contact with other disciplines in its theoretical reconstruction. The definition o f the M HE promotes this two-pronged effort to advance ethical scholarship.

Contemporary ethics and its relations to the new perspective o f the humanities Humanist ethics is facing two major tasks today: to shape its basic ethical theory, and to develop related ethical science at higher levels. The first task is important and pressing, not only practically, but also scientifically. Nevertheless, the materials required for this task are mainly derived from human historical experience, and can be practically organized with appropriate methodology. The second task is more complicated and extensively involved in modern social and intellectual conditions. By separating the two goals, we can better see how to achieve them both. The formulation of basic humanistic ethics can more effectively promote our practical objectives of various kinds, but the latter is related to a long-term goal of developing a more comprehensive and more satisfactory ethical science. Ethical inquiry, as one branch of the humanities, is related to the much larger issue o f the rational reconstruction o f human sciences. It is true that the most successful product o f the human rational tradition is natural science, which has become the very model for all kinds o f scientific studies. But because of the different compositions o f physical, psychological, social, axiological, and pragmatic realms, different sciences should develop in their own respective fields. Relatively speaking, the human sciences, including philosophy, face more

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difficulty than the natural sciences in pursuing their goal o f scientific establish­ ment. Despite their longer history, the social and human sciences have been in their modern form for a relatively short period. The present-day humanities are faced with the task of systematically reforming themselves in the future. The current interdisciplinary and cross-cultural development in the humanities will lead to a readjustment of ethical scholarship as well. Both Confucian thought and American humanism, because o f their common emphasis on empirical ethical autonomy, have an important role to play in the tasks o f ethical discipline and its practical applications in the international context. The interdisciplinary and cross-cultural turn of ethical theory means that the new ethical inquiry, especially its theoretical development, will be freer and more open in the future, while still keeping a constant M HE as the basic core for ethical practice. Firmly based on the empirical, positivistic, and pragmatic, the new ethical inquiry will strive for a more extensive dialogue with all possible theoretical partners. Thus, the new Enlightenment, in the present humanist perspective, is not a simple return to the spirit o f its earlier historical stages; rather, it will be a much-expanded intellectual movement incorporating both ethical scholarship and the development o f the human sciences. Academic ethics has been institutionalized over the past two hundred years, and tends to be more and more rigidified and isolated from social reality. Con­ sequently, academic ethics cannot sufficiently or precisely describe human ethical situations, and it can hardly provide effective methods for grasping ethical situations and attaining ethical goals in the actual world. On the one side there are the technical or scholastic moral philosophers specializing in historical texts as a profession; on the other side there are rhetorical players in the same academic market aiming to invent new brands o f “ academic commodities” . Both oppose the empirical-positive direction o f realistic and humanist ethics. Unlike its historical predecessors, contemporary ethics as a single discipline is unable to solve moral problems by itself alone. The question is how, in our practical ethical programs, to arrange more suitable intellectual and social combinations of the ethical and other related scholarly aspects. For this pur­ pose, the role of ethics becomes at present not less, but rather more significant. Within its own proper scope, ethics needs to improve its quality and efficiency. It is only through the advance of the ethical discipline itself that the strategic combinations required can be secured.

Significance of the dialogue between Confucian ethics and ethical humanism We are now in a position to summarize the major points shared by American and Confucian ethical humanism. The two ethical traditions have the follow­ ing points in common:

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1 2 3 4 5 6

An empirical, human-centered stance in ethical doctrines Rational attitude to ethical reasoning Personal happiness, interpersonal love, and social justice as preeminent values High personal devotion to ethical truth and social commitment Solid focus on the ethical dimension of politics, society, and culture Wisdom for distinguishing between true and false moral conduct in ethical analysis, which leads to modern ideological criticism 7 Cosmopolitan or globally universalistic position in pursuing ethical goals 8 An empirical-ethical-minimalism, which is both flexible and open enough to be combinable with many related disciplines and fields for realizing ethical goals, which also makes them intellectual and social organizers in promot­ ing all ethics-related objectives.

The similarity of the two positions in presenting, organizing, and realizing their respective ethical doctrines is certainly due to their common empiricism and realism. Shared content on the level of the M HE is rooted in the unchanging part o f human nature across history. The long historical experience in the East, and the most recent social experiment in the West, form a reliable common ethical ground for us to more relevantly understand the human ethical situation and ethical scholarship. It should be emphasized that our comparison is not made between the two actual systems as such, which have emerged in completely different historical and social circumstances, but only between their central ethical bases. In order to reveal its MHE, Confucian ethics must first be detached from its historical shroud of socio-political and academic Confucianism. This nationalist ideology o f Confucianism can only hide the true ethical value of Confucian thought, and distort its intellectual direction. Similarly, a more intensive focus on its ethical dimension will allow American humanism, already notable for its atten­ tion to ethical practice, to enrich its other related scientific connections. Ethical humanism as a powerful movement emerging in the West should play a larger role in the twenty-first century. A possible scholarly union between the two ethical traditions, the historical Eastern and the modern Western, could lay a foundation for a new universal ethics to be shaped within the natural-socialhuman scientific framework that has been so important in the past decades. Ethical humanism and modernized Confucian ethical thought share the same intellectual potential for advancing ethical-epistemological and moralmethodological rationality. In my opinion, this fact will lead to the desirable emergence of a new positivist ethics in the future. First, their basic empirical tendency reinforces an orientation towards real ethical situations. Second, their positive potential for integrating related scholarly fields and social activities will constitute this as an attainable goal in the ordering of social and human knowledge. Even if the Confucian cannot be compared with modern theoretical ethical humanism in every respect, it can present a unique pragmatic holism

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leading the ethical agent to consistently operate with different ethics-related elements, and accordingly is conducive to shaping a more independent and adamant moral personality. The social ethics of the one and the personal ethics of the other can complement each other, uniting, hopefully, in a more satis­ factory ethical system. It has been suggested that modern Mediterranean orientalism can pose a relevant alternative to Western culture. I f so, Chinese Confucian thought posits a more radical, as well as an equally relevant “ O ther， ， ,10 especially alien to its latest type: American culture. It seems to be this cultural polarity that constitutes the possibility o f forming a common operative ground in the modern social-cultural world. As one o f the latest Western ethical traditions, American humanism has realized two kinds o f ethical synthesis. On the theoretical level, it combines different empirical ethical trends in Western history ranging from the ancient Greek to American naturalism; practically, it unites humanist ethical theory with the multiplysecularized socio-political activities o f the United States. We have suggested ways in which this latest ethical development, originating in the most developed country in the world, can be traced back to its spiritual founder Socrates. American ethical humanism, opposed to current irrational and dogmatic trends of various kinds, becomes the most consistent modern successor o f the Socratic tradition. Meanwhile, a new Confucian ethical humanism, after being scientifi­ cally modernized and epistemologically clarified, will be the natural successor o f the long Confucian tradition. The two ethical humanist movements, originat­ ing respectively in the largest historical-cultural Eastern country and in the largest modern scientific-industrial Western country, with Confucius and Socrates as the co-founding fathers in human ethical history, are joining forces to represent a vigorous empirical and positivist tradition o f humanist ethics which will be capable o f meeting future challenges.

Notes 1 Li, You-zheng (1997), The Structure o f the Chinese Ethical Archetype, Frankfurt: Peter Lang, p. xxxv. 2 The author stresses that a semantic commensurability between the two traditional discourse systems must first be established before the ethical comparison can be effectively made. See Li, You-zheng (1997), “ Semic Analysis of Ancient Chinese Abstract Words ” ， Journal o f Philo­ sophy (in Chinese), Taipei, Spring. 3 In different essays, Paul Kurtz explains the basic values or excellences for personal and social ethical norms, especially his list given in Kurtz, Paul (1983), In Defense o f Secular Humanism, Buffalo: Prometheus, p. 8 . Sharing all of the values Kurtz mentions, Confucian ethics uniquely organizes a special experience about the rationale that the ethical agent gives for his ethical actions. This belongs to the same category as the Kantian problematic, but Confucius treats it purely intuitively, expressing a “ quasi-objective” regularity rooted in the common empiricalpractical domain shared by all human beings. This special kind of ethical wisdom has apparently been ignored in the Western ethical tradition.

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It is very interesting and instructive to note the double role which Confucian ethics played within the Confucianist system as an independent as well as collaborative element. See Li, You-zheng (1997), The Constitution o f Han Academic Ideology, Frankfurt: Peter Lang, pp. 263-268. 5 Corliss Lamont pointed out that the American humanist movement has suffered from the limited expansion o f its membership. See his The Philosophy o f Humanism, London and New York: Continuum, 1990, p. x. 6 Kurtz, Paul (1998), “ First Things First: Toward a Minimal Definition o f Humanism ” ， Philo, vo l.V , n o . 1 ,p. 6 . 7 Li, You-zheng (1997), Crisis o f Ethics (in Chinese), Taipei: Tonsan, pp. 1-4. 8 Kurtz, “ First Things First: Toward a Minimal Definition of Humanism” ， p. 7. 9 Li, You-zheng (1997)，Epistemological Problems o f the Comparative Humanities, Frankfurt: Peter Lang, p. 279. 10 In his Forbidden Fruit: The Ethics o f Humanism (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 1988), Paul Kurtz said, “ The ethics o f humanism draws deeply from the well o f philosophical wisdom o f Greece and Rome, the Renaissance, the Enlightenment 一 and modern scientific learning” (p. 252). I may add that Confucian ethics plays a double role in confrontation with Western humanist ethics. It was indeed its historical-cultural “ a lie n " , but it is also its cooperative partner in both theory and practice. It is only through a structuralist reading o f the Confucian text that moderns can better grasp its ethical-epistemological traits and strength.

CHAPTER N IN E

The Project of Boston Confucianism* Robert Cummings Neville “ Boston Confucianism” is a project for bringing the Confucian tradition into play with the other great civilized traditions in the creation of a world civilization. Part of the project is to bring Confucian philosophy into the world philosophic conversation, for which two tasks are required, one negative and the other positive. The negative task is to show that Confucianism is not limited to East Asian ethnic applications and can in fact be transported to a larger, non-East Asian environment, for instance Boston. The argument for this requires address­ ing several important philosophical problems about the relation of a philosophy to its context and the nature of continuity in a philosophy or religious cul­ ture when moving from one context or time to another. The positive task is to demonstrate that Confucianism has something genuinely interesting and help­ ful to bring to contemporary philosophical discussions. These discussions are not defined by professional philosophers alone, but also, and perhaps in larger part, by society’s needs for philosophic guidance. “ Boston” is taken as a partly ironic symbol for a late or postmodern society, globally connected, egalitarian, meritocratic, and a traditional center for liberal democracy. Also, there exists a “ school” of Confucians in Boston, under the leadership o f Professor Tu Wei-ming, devoted to this Boston Confucian project. Confucians exist who are not East Asians, just as there are Platonists who are not Greek or even Western. But the idea of a Western Confucian seems more problematic to some than the idea o f a non-Greek Platonist. Confucianism, o f course, was not limited to China, spreading to Korea, Japan, Vietnam, and elsewhere in East Asia, and to diaspora communities o f these nationals outside o f East Asia. But Confucianism took with it, according to the common belief, a rich East Asian primary culture of family life and authority structures that was distinctive to Confucianism and yet is alien or irrelevant to the primary cultures o f non-East Asian societies. Confucianism is thought by many to be unable to flourish outside o f an East Asian family culture. This essay examines * This essay is a revision o f portions of the first chapter o f my Boston Confucianism (Albany: State University o f New York Press, 2000) which in turn contains revisions o f two papers, “ The Short Happy Life o f Boston Confucianism” , which was delivered at a meeting o f the American Academy o f Arts and Sciences in 1994, and my presidential address, “ Confucianism as a World Philosophy” ，for the Eighth International Conference on Chinese Philosophy in Beijing in 1993, published in the Journal o f Chinese Philosophy, v o l.21(1994), pp. 5-25.

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the conditions under which Confucianism might legitimately be transported to cultures outside the East Asian type, understanding this transition in Con­ fucianism to be influenced, in part, by the rise, temporary and ironic as it might be, of its Boston school. The argument of the essay has three steps. First is a formal hypothesis about the portable roots of Confucianism, with a discussion of ways of understanding the relation of those roots to the cultures in which they might be planted and the branches into which they might grow. Second, the discussion will present the programmatic point that Boston Confucianism calls for a recovery and a uni­ quely American development o f the ancient emphasis on li as ritual propriety. The heart of the program is the defense o f the thesis that American pragmatism offers a Western philosophical language for expressing the relevance of Con­ fucian ritual theory for the modern world. Third, several practical applications of Confucian principles to the Boston cultural situation will be laid out as projects for further development.

Portable Confucianism Although it would be fruitless to attempt to discover an “ essence” for Con­ fucianism, as if that were a historically neutral abstraction, in any questioning of cross-cultural transfer of influence it is imperative to state the core o f the influence. The identifying “ core” of any tradition is itself the locus o f ongoing controversy. Zhu Xi, in the twelfth century, drastically modified the canon of “ core texts” of Confucianism when he chose the “ Four Books” rather than the larger list of “ classics” that had been standard. The argument here is to offer an hypothesis fit for our own situation. The hypothesis attempts a minimalist statement —if leisure exists to transport more than this, so much the better. Because “ core” does not mean a universal essence, it should be stressed that what follows is an hypothesis about the core that ought to be carried over into the contemporary situation with respect to Boston (and the rest of the West); cores for other transportations, such as to India or Africa, might be different. The proposed core of any transported philosophical or religious culture consists of three elements: primary scriptures, secondary scriptures, and an interpretive context. In the case of Confucianism, the hypothesis is that the prim­ ary scriptures are the Four Books, selected by Zhu X i in the Song period as classics, i.e., the Confucian Analects, the Doctrine o f the Mean, the Great Learn­ ing, and the Book o f Mencius; in addition, the hypothesis gives primary scrip­ tural status to the Book o f Xun Zi. That the Four Books make the list is not surprising; the inclusion of Xun Zi will be justified later.1The secondary scrip­ tures for Confucianism are the major Neo-Confucian texts of the Song, Yuan, Ming, and Qing eras, including among many others the important writings of Zhou Dun-yi, Zhang Zai, Shao Yung, Cheng Hao, Cheng Yi, Lu Xiang-shan,

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Zhu Xi, Wang Yang-ming, Wang Fu-zhi, and Dai Zhen. The interpretive con­ text involves both the historical setting and surrounding texts required to un­ derstand how the primary and secondary scriptures took the shape they have; in addition to understanding some Chinese, Korean, and Japanese history, the interpretive context includes texts such as the Yi-Jing (I Ching), the writings of the Daoists, Mohists, and Legalists, other Confucians such as Dong Zhongshu and Wang Chong, and the texts as well as spiritual practices and social organizations of the Chinese Buddhists. In discussing each o f these briefly it will be possible to indicate both some­ thing o f the meaning o f the rubrics o f the primary and secondary scriptures and o f the interpretive context, as well as reasons for these specific choices for Confucianism as identified for its Boston school. Primary scriptures are those texts, or songs or rituals, that the entire tradition, “ generally and for the most part” (as Aristotle would say), accepts as provid­ ing its normative principles and motifs of self-understanding. Part o f claiming that one’s own reconstruction o f what is worthwhile in a tradition is correct is the demonstration that one’s reconstruction provides a legitimate appropria­ tion o f the primary scriptures.2 Primary scriptures are differently interpreted, o f course, with different points emphasized by different schools, some elements suppressed and others exaggerated; the interpretations of primary scriptures can be plainly contradictory to one another, and it is always to be recognized that the role that the primary scriptures play in one school or another is much a function o f the school, not only o f the scriptures themselves. Good test cases for the “ canon” of primary scriptures are cases in which a new movement within a tradition acknowledges itself to be partially heterodox because o f something it excludes from or seeks to introduce into the canon. The Confucian Analects are primary scriptures, not only because o f their founding role in “ Ruism” or what, in the West, came to be called "Confucianism " , but for two other principal reasons. First, they provide the major themes and motifs o f Confucianism, elements developed by nearly every other major thinker. These include humanity, ritual propriety, righteousness, filiality, learn­ ing, reciprocity, the importance of developing personal relations that acknow­ ledge differences as well as the equalities o f friendship, and a commitment to public life and service; these are usually associated in the Analects with incidents or characters that particularize them. Second, the Analects provide a particular orientation to the life o f the sage, namely, to criticize intellectually and seek to amend practically the current social habits in light o f a better way. For Confucius, this took the form of laments about the loss o f public and personal virtues compared with the golden age of ritual propriety, and a campaign to restore those virtues through a sens­ ible recovery o f ritual propriety. The Doctrine o f the Mean is a primary scripture o f Confucianism because it provides the classical expression of the Confucian model o f the self as a polar

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structure stretching between the inner heart of centered readiness to respond to all things according to their value and the ten thousand things of the world. A ll persons are the same with regard to readiness to respond in the center, a point identified later in the tradition as a universal principle, but each person is uniquely located in perspective on the ten thousand things, needing to respond differentially. The structures of psyche, knowledge, sensibilities, and skills con­ necting the two poles constitute the self. The Confucian lesson is that these need to be made sincere and subtly transparent so that the centered heart can see the ten thousand things without distortion and act upon them appropriately without perversion. The customary structure of the self in psyche, knowledge, sensibilities, and skills is selfish, however, both distorting vision and perverting action, and the Confucian Way is to remedy this selfishness.3 The Great Learning is a primary scripture because it shows that the task of education is not limited to the privacy of the soul or even personal life, but runs with appropriate shifts in nature through personal social roles, family structures, community life, to the most universal and remote structures o f polit­ ical office. Indeed, true education is based in cosmic realities: the self which should be clear with regard to the manifestation o f character; the highest good which is the true home for human nature; and the human community needing renovation which is the true scale of human nature. The juxtaposition of self and society, mediated by cosmic goodness, such that a continuity o f obligation exists between personal and public life, are themes surprisingly congenial to Plato, though expressed in unique ways by the Confucian classics. The Book o f Mencius is a primary scripture because of its elaboration of the nature of the centered readiness to respond to the true worths o f things, described by Mencius in his discussion of the Four Beginnings {Mencius 2A:6). Throughout the book he elaborated the themes of the original goodness of human nature and its perpetual frustration and perversion. He identified miseducation and inadequate social structures as the sources o f the failure o f the original goodness to be manifest and properly cultivated. His point focused the direction of the Confucian project of education. The writings of Xun Zi were not included by Zhu X i in his canon of primary scriptures. Nevertheless, nothing is more orthodox in the Confucian tradition than disputes about the canon. It would be surprising if the extension of Con­ fucianism to Western culture did not entail a rebalancing of the canon. Xun Zi has always been deeply honored and his contribution consists in a theory about nature, convention, and corruption. I f human nature is originally good, as Mencius said, why are people ever selfish? Xun Z i， s answer is that people are formed by ritual propriety, or by its distorted and perverted forms, or they fail to be formed humanly at all because of a lack of the normative but conven­ tional forms o f propriety. With no ritual formation, Xun Zi observed, people are merely biological capacities and impulses, like a baby, and are radically underdetermined with regard to civilized habits. Therefore, the content o f the

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Confucian project is to amend, rectify, and inculcate the forms of ritual pro­ priety. From an educational standpoint, this concern with propriety is far more important than celebration of any alleged original goodness o f human nature or attention to the stern stuff of obligation, which were preoccupations of Mencius. Rather, the Confucian focus is best directed, said Xun Zi, toward the stylized or conventional social forms that mediate people’s relations with one another, with nature, and with institutions such as family, community order, government, and the arts and letters. By the time of the Song revival o f Confucianism the philosophical stress on ritual piety had diminished, though Zhu X i published a massively influential book on household ritual. Certain stylized habits o f life were by then firmly associated with Confucianism as such, either rightly or because Confucianism had given in to some o f the social forms expressive o f other cultures, perhaps primal ones, that are not in accord with the spirit o f Confucianism as expressed in the Four Books and Xun Zi. The Neo-Confucian thinkers did not need to stress much what they thought they already had and, besides, it is embarrass­ ingly easy for stylized forms of ritual propriety to become hollow and oppressive forms; one might do well not to call too much attention to them. From today’s perspective, the traditional rules of propriety seem to be vehicles for the blatant oppression o f women and others at the bottom o f a ritually hierarchical society. The Neo-Confucian stress in the Song and Ming periods was rather on sincer­ ity, on perfection of personal knowledge and purity of will. Nevertheless, even in stressing sincerity and humaneness, Song and later Confucians were ready to acknowledge the point made by Confucius' and Xun Z i， s stress on ritual propriety. A major emphasis o f Boston Confucianism is precisely its revival o f the call for ritual propriety within Confucianism. To be sure, the humanizing conven­ tions of the American situation are vastly different from those o f ancient or Ming China, deriving from the Western tradition, especially from the Enlighten­ ment. The point o f Boston Confucianism is not to re-instate some older set o f personal manners - that would be Boston brahminism. The point, rather, is to focus ethical life on the development o f social forms and styles that properly humanize people, where humanization is seen within the context o f self, society, and goodness as expressed by both the Confucian and Western classics. The long-run argument for the orthodoxy o f Boston Confucianism has to be that the inclusion o f Xun Zi as a portable root for planting in America brings out the best in Confucianism for this situation. In contrast to the portable primary scriptures, the portable secondary scriptures do not constitute a body o f writings that needs to be appropriated and given some positive interpretation. However, they do constitute writings that exhibit a complex dialogue with reference to which subsequent Confucians must locate themselves. We do not need to side with Zhu X i or with Wang Yang-ming, nor do we need to agree with Zhou Dun-yi on exactly what is

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vacuous. Yet we do need to be aware of the issues that shaped that discussion and have a stance toward them. This is similar to a contemporary Western philosopher having to treat the great thinkers of early modernity such as Descartes, Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Kant as secondary scriptures; one need not agree with any against the others, but one does need to have a stance toward them. Perhaps contemporary Confucians have to “ get over” the Neo-Confucians just as postmodern Western philosophers are sup­ posed to “ get over” modernity; still, that would be shaping their current work with a stance toward those secondary scriptures. The portable interpretive context for Confucianism has to be enough know­ ledge of East Asian culture and history to be able to situate the primary and secondary scriptures, especially the former. Obviously there is never enough background knowledge, and scholars will continue to provide hermeneutic readings of the ancient Confucian texts regardless of their transportation beyond the bounds o f East Asia and the East Asian diaspora. But liberally educated Westerners can be expected to learn about the East Asian background so as to be able to situate the Confucian texts. In fact, given the decline in historical knowledge of the Western tradition in Western cultures, hardly any greater difficulty exists in making Confucian texts live with college students than in making the ancient Greeks or medieval Christians accessible. This section has expressed elements of Confucianism that need to be port­ able from East Asian to other cultural grounds, such as the American or even Bostonian. These are roots that need to be planted and to grow for a new and non-East Asian flowering of Confucianism to take place. The theme o f roots and branches from the Great Learning is a fruitful way to conceive the relation of a fully rooted and flowering culture in Asia to a new vineyard in different cultural soil.

Ritual propriety and pragmatism Although the basic Confucian texts were excellently translated into English some forty years ago by Wing-tsit Chan (1963)，Confucianism came to the attention of the broad American philosophical public with Herbert Fingarette’s Confucius: The Secular as Sacred. Fingarette’s thesis was that Confucius， philo­ sophy elaborated two essential principles, humanity {ren) and propriety (li).4 The lever of his interpretive argument was the concept of performance in sym­ bolic action, as contrasted with the mere meaning of the symbols. He showed that those things that constitute the human qualities of life, for instance filiality rather than biological connection, community rather than power relations, friendship rather than pragmatic cooperation, all consist in the performance o f symbolic acts. The acts do not symbolize something else as a sign means an object, but in their performance are indeed the humanizing elements o f life. Friendship is not described or signified by friendly behavior, but consists in it.

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In this and the next section these ideas shall be developed in other languages, first in terms of Xun Z i’s theory of ritual, and then in terms o f Charles Peirce’s pragmatism. Humanity (ren), the first of Fingarette’s pair, has seemed close to a range of Western philosophical notions, from Christian love to Heideggerian authenticity. Propriety or ceremony, however, has been a more difficult notion for Americans than humanity. Confucian propriety has been presented to the West as akin to good manners and polite behavior, and there has been a deepseated hostility in North Atlantic cultures since the late eighteenth century to the stylized manners of courtliness. European Enlightenment egalitarianism distrusts man­ ners that have to be learned from others through imitation (Confucius admitted this takes a lifetime). Rather, peasants and poor people are just as excellent as cultivated people if their heart is sincere, according to the typical American.5 To a Confucian this is to assert that humanity by itself is sufficient without propriety, but propriety has had a far deeper meaning in the Chinese tradition, and its Western parallels are not merely good manners. Three aspects o f its deeper meaning will be elaborated here, namely, that propriety creates culture, is conventional, and is a peculiar kind o f harmony. Perhaps the most important insight o f Confucius and Xun Zi, with almost no parallel in the West, is that the higher institutions of culture consist in the exercise or performance of ritual propriety, broadly considered. W ith little cul­ ture, people can be ruled by a strong man, but cannot enjoy good government. W ith little culture, people can cooperate, but they cannot be friends without the elaborate learned ways o f behaving that make up mutual interest, respect, sharing o f enjoyment and sorrow, and delighting in one another with faithful­ ness. With little culture, people can have children and receive life from their own parents, but without the learned ritualized behaviors they cannot bring up their children in virtue, or honor their parents in a filial manner. The Confucian problem with barbarians was not that they had the wrong culture, but that they hardly had culture at all, and the reason was that they had no (or inadequate) behaviors of ritual propriety by means o f which to embody the higher excellences of civilization. Ritual behaviors are conventional. What forms are practiced does not matter much so long as they work to give existence to the cultural virtue in question. Confucius pointed out that regarding ritual hats it makes little or no difference whether they are linen or silk, whichever is most convenient. But in showing deference with regard to the temple, a quick bow while going in the door is a diminishment or routinizing of respect; so it is far better to make a full obeisance before ascending the temple steps (Analects, 9.3). When Confucian propriety is properly generalized, language itself appears as a learned, conventional, ritualized behavior. Being conventional, languages differ from one another, but the normative question is whether the language in question can convey what is needed. Those languages able to support deep civilization are good; those

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that are impoverished so that friendship, family relations, and good government cannot be expressed and exercised linguistically are not so good. The third trait o f the Confucian notion o f propriety is that it produces a special kind o f harmony. “ Produces” is not quite the right word, however, for the harmony is not a consequent effect of propriety. Rather, the harmony consists in the practice of the rituals at the right occasions by the right people. This was Confucius’ most important moral point about propriety: when ritual propriety is observed, people are brought into cooperative action that respects the place, needs, and merits of each. Where ritual propriety is not observed, or where a society lacks the rituals that articulate the diverse positions, needs, and merits o f its citizens, morality falls back to dependence on the following of moral rules and the happenstance exercise of goodwill. Unlike moral rules and goodwill, propriety is lodged in the habits of bones and muscles and in the deepest schemes of imagination. Propriety, o f course, is no substitute for the deliberative parts o f moral reasoning, nor for sincerity o f the heart, just as having an eloquent language and habits of speech does not tell one what to say or how to intend. But propriety, especially an eloquent and nuanced language, brings the special harmony that can elude even moral correctness and the good heart.6 Propriety is the particular part of the Confucian tradition to be related here to American pragmatism, although there are other elements that are equally interesting to relate. When pragmatism’s theory of signs, its semiotic, is used to interpret propriety, a vastly more sophisticated analysis is available to Con­ fucianism than the tradition itself has developed, one that brings Confucianism into intimate connection with the wealth of the Western philosophical tradition without compromising its own heritage. Thus, Confucianism as a philosophy for the Western as well as East Asian world can incorporate significant elements of pragmatism while rejecting other parts, just as the Dao Xue movement of Neo-Confucianism did with Daoism and Buddhism. Pragmatism here means the philosophy of Charles S. Peirce and his followers.7 William James, who popularized the term “ pragmatism” ，did not have a theory of signs and missed Peirce’s whole point. Moreover, James popularized the view that pragmatism is the philosophy o f “ what works” ，a desperately mis­ taken distortion o f Peirce， s original insights.8 The tradition of pragmatism in America has grown through John Dewey in several directions. The most popular is the Neo-Pragmatism of Richard Rorty, which rejects the speculative side of philosophy and emphasizes its connections with rhetoric and sophistry.9 The line o f development that embraces the speculative side o f Peirce and Dewey and learns from Alfred North Whitehead and Paul Weiss is far more interesting for relating to the Confucian approach to ritual.10 Peirce invented pragmatism as a corrective to a line of Western philosophy from Descartes to Kant. Descartes had said that mind and body are distinct sub­ stances with the consequence that mental representations are of a mysteriously

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different stuff from the corporeal things they might represent. Kant had said that the only way to know that mental representations accurately and certainly represent the material world is by a transcendental argument about what that knowledge would be if it were to be possible. Peirce said, to the contrary o f both, that representations are just as much a part o f nature as anything else, and they exist in interpreters. Interpreters such as human beings are natural things whose interactions with the world and one another are guided by their representations. With well-guided interactions the interpreters construe the world accurately and do not miss the distinctions that are import­ ant for the interpreters’ welfare and purposes. For Peirce, the point is that the relation between representations and their objects is a special kind o f causal relation that has to do with guiding interactions in discerning ways. Rather than focusing on the mental property o f intentionality, which makes the causal connections between minds and external things unintelligible, pragmatism analyzes intentionality as a special kind (or kinds) o f causation having to do with purposive interaction. Peirce's major point about pragmatism as a test for ideas is that the realities o f the things with which interpreters interact will correct their representations. For Peirce and Dewey, knowing as having a mental picture is subordinated to learning as the correction o f the representa­ tions that guide interaction. Another important contribution o f pragmatism is to argue that representa­ tions are not mental entities but habits of the behavior o f interpreters.11 The habits have two main connections. On the one hand, the pragmatic theory shows how habits are connected with the things with which interpreters interact, includ­ ing physical nature, social structures, and other interpreters. The realities o f these other things are correctives to habits that do not anticipate them accurately. On the other hand, habits are connected with the human purposes from which interactions take their guidance. Interpretations have many functions. On rare occasions their purpose might be simply and only to know. On most occasions, however, they play performative functions, serving some other purpose which cannot be carried out without some construal of the world and o f how to accomplish things. Sometimes purposes are passive and interpretations func­ tion to enable sheer enjoyment. Like the Confucians, pragmatists recognize the primacy o f the performative or illocutionary functions o f interpretation.12 The interpretations in any interpreter or community are intricately interwoven and nested in the way habits jointly make up a complex life. Semiotics, or the theory o f signs, is the analysis of the structures o f interconnected interpreta­ tions. Interpretations are made up o f signs that interpret, signs as objects inter­ preted, and signs as the habits o f interpreting. Whereas European semiotics focuses on signs as interdefined in codes, pragmatic semiotics focuses on how signs come to be in this or that context, on how they become determinate or fade into vagueness, on how systems o f signs presuppose one another and how changes in one system o f signs affects other more or less general systems.

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Three particular traits of the pragmatic theory of signs should be lifted up for notice. The first is that it sees any particular interpretation as resting in a vast background of other interpretations, systems within systems; every inter­ pretation has a context and every environment of interpretations can contain an indefinitely large number o f focal points. The second is that interpretations are appreciative o f the value, worth, and appeal of things, as well as their dignity and place. These value-elements are all part of the reality o f things, and pragmatism does not have to accept any fact/value distinction that associates objects with form or structure and value with mental projections. Thus, prag­ matism treats experience as fundamentally appreciative, with the values of objects interacting with the purposes of interpreters. Third, the pragmatic theory of signs recognizes that appreciative interpretation spreads across the whole breadth o f interpretations from circumambient feelings of the world and its moods to specific purposes and enjoyments, all in continuity. The pragmatic the­ ory resonates with the sense of continuity, spontaneity, and aesthetic experience that Chang Chung-yuan ascribes to Daoism, but that applies equally well to the Confucian sensibilities.13 The continuity from background to foreground interpretations in the prag­ matic theory is supplemented by an even more important continuity, namely in the range of interpretive habits. A t the fundamental level are the animal habits of organic nature. In English, the ordinary language of “ interpretation” is stretched to say that the heart interprets exertion by beating faster, that the stomach interprets hunger by growling, or that an animal interprets sudden large movement by fleeing; nevertheless, these organic habits are low-level interpretations that construe the situation to be a certain way and respond a certain way. The human range of interpretive habits becomes distinctive within the animal world with elementary cooperation, gestures, basic language, and expressive semiotic modes. Together, the organic range of interpretations and those involved in elementary human cooperation and society constitute a kind o f biopsychic dance, attuned to and structured by nature’s rhythms, but reflecting purpose. A t this point, conventional signs begin to develop over and above, or as modifying, the natural signs of interpretation. W ith the more elaborate development of conventional signs, social discourse becomes possible with complex languages, cultures, and social organizations. Even though the signs and the habits they structure become more subtle and sophisticated, with conventional elements that may be artful and abstruse, they are still modifica­ tions and enrichments o f the organic and elementary habits. When societies develop the elaborate sign-systems of high civilization, they have those elements of ritual propriety about which Confucius and Xun Zi wrote, the elements that modify cooperation so that it becomes respectful friendship, sex so that it becomes profound love and caring, procreation so that it becomes family life with filiality, and so forth. As the ancient Confucians knew, it does not

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that a culture have some sign-system that does. This account of the pragmatic approach to signs shows, first, how signs create culture out o f and over and above nature, second, how signs are conventional, and, third, how the signs of high culture constitute the harmonious interactions in which the virtues of high culture consist. In this way, pragmatism picks up on three of the most important elements o f the Confucian notion o f propriety. The Confucian theory of ritual propriety can be generalized to include the entire pyramid o f signs or o f organic and social habits, the higher modifying the lower, the lower undergirding and making possible the higher. The ancient Confucians did not believe, as Daoists accused them, that the higher signs o f ritual behavior can be imposed carelessly on baser habits. On the contrary, the uses o f ritual propriety are precisely to fulfill the potential excellence o f more elementary natural habits by turning power into government, cooperation into friendship, and so forth. The Confucians recognized that the proper uses o f propriety require the acknowledgment o f and care for the entire range o f humanly meaningful nature. They have been optimistic about the power o f care­ fully observed propriety to bring us closer to nature and obviate its distortions. In this sense, for Confucianism, humanity fulfills Heaven and Earth, and forms a trinity with it, not through being a distinct substance, but through shaping interpretively the structured behaviors that constitute a new human reality in civilization. The pragmatic theory o f signs offers a rapprochement between the Confucian top-down view o f propriety as properly containing all nature and Heaven, and the Daoist bottom-up view o f nature’s habits as the touchstone for the authenticity o f human culture. The truth lies in recognizing the integrity o f the continuum, as expressed in the pragmatic theory. The moral significance o f propriety, or a fully civilized system o f signs, is that it makes possible and enables the existence o f high culture as harmonies of habits. The achievements of culture have life only in the exercise or per­ formance o f the habits whose sign-structures define the culture. Unless there are signs for friendship, family, good government, and so forth, it simply is not possible to have friendship, family, or good government. The moral significance of propriety or a civilized sign-system is its culture-building function. As already noted, the sign-system by itself does not solve the problems of moral deliberation, though it makes that deliberation possible at a sophisticated level. Propriety does not tell us what purposes to have except in the negative sense o f setting limits to purposes that would be destructive o f the practice o f civilized behavior. Nor does the fact that a society has a civilized sign-system and practices propriety mean that it is also humane: the rituals can be employed hypocritically and interpretation can be humanly empty. Nevertheless, without the sign-system o f high civilization, the civilization itself is impossible.14 What pragmatism learns from Confucianism at this point is that much of the moral critique required by our society consists in the analysis o f the signs shaping our social habits. More than deliberation about purposes and policies,

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although those also are to be considered, Confucianism calls attention to the strengths and weaknesses o f the sign-systems that define our civilization itself, our society’s practices of propriety. This leads the discussion to a few brief reflections on the moral contributions of Boston Confucianism, that is, on Confucianism enlarged by the pragmatic theory of signs reflecting on the sign­ shaped social habits characterizing Boston and analogous areas o f Western civilization.

Confucianism in Boston What follows are intended to be brief suggestive remarks for developing a Confucian critique of a largely non-East Asian culture. Three major Confucian themes will be defined as problems of both propriety and humaneness, and considered regarding how they might apply to the social situation in Boston and its analogues. The first theme is how individuals relate to their com­ munities and play official and semi-official roles in them. Although Confucians call this the relations among ministers and the emperor, here it shall be called the theme of civility, where “ civility” recalls its roots in the Latin word for city. The second theme is how friendships might be constituted in late-modern societies such as Boston’s. The third theme is how families should be organized in such societies. In this way at least certain important elements o f the “ five relations” (Doctrine o f the Mean, ch. 20; Mencius 3A:4) will have been translated to the modern Western context. A Confucian approach to civility in Boston must recognize and acknowledge the elementary cultural and social habits that a civilizing propriety needs to modify. The first and most important social fact about Boston and most modern cultures is that they are racially, ethnically, and religiously diverse. Ancient Confucians generally thought o f their own group as racially, ethnically, and religiously homogeneous (even when this was a fiction o f the Han people). For most Americans, although acutely conscious of their racial, ethnic, and religious character because of the always-visible alternatives, “ we Bostonians” means all the groups that live in Boston, not merely “ we Irish-American Bostonians” or “ we Chinese-American Bostonians” or “ we African-American Bostonians” . This sense o f diverse groups belonging together and needing to work for the good of all is one o f the great achievements of Western culture, and some of the milestones in its development in fact were planted in the locale of Boston. Boston Confucians thus need to point out that the “ in-principle” commitment to cultural diversity requires concrete positive social habits, that is, rituals, o f deference to the diverse cultures. Boston’s current social habits do not include harmonious ways of deferring to the appropriate cultures, and ethnic tensions are rife. Ironically, nearly everyone would like an inclusive and diverse society respecting all the groups together,

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but Boston’s actual social habits frustrate this desire and lead to alienation and sometimes violence. Boston Confucians need to invent rituals for everyday life and government that foster inclusive cultural diversity, for without that, the respect required for humaneness cannot be expressed or exercised. Another social fact with which Confucianism must deal is the Enlightenment tradition of egalitarianism. Egalitarianism is an internally rich ideal, begin­ ning with the equal dignity o f all persons as such and including equalities of opportunity, of standing before the law, and of rights o f expression and political participation. Although morally sensitive Bostonians are conscious of the fact that egalitarianism is habituated in our expectations far more than in actual practice, the habits o f actual practice often do give equality to women, ethnic minorities, and persons from lower classes and unconnected with powerful families. Racial inequalities seem almost intractable, but still there is greater opportunity for racial minorities in Boston and similar places than in places unaffected by the European Enlightenment. Confucians would point out that even where egalitarian ideals are institu­ tionalized fairly well in social habits, people still need to be recognized as individuals with unique positions and values. The abstractness o f equality is a dehumanizing burden, treating people as mere tokens occupying a position in a system, if the social habits o f equality are not also framed with the rituals that recognize persons in their different and unique qualities. By itself, abstract Enlightenment equality is inhumane, as Marx argued. The Confucian task in an egalitarian society is to develop social habits that recognize and reinforce equality while also addressing the unique persons playing egalitarian roles. That Boston’s late-modern society is egalitarian, at least in the habits of expectation, does not mean that it does not need a hierarchy o f roles in govern­ ment, business, and other systems such as education. Late-modern Enlighten­ ment hierarchy aims to be functional in structure and meritocratic in terms of qualification to office. Tradition has little weight in American culture for defining offices; offices and roles are constantly modified, rearranged, invented, or phased out. The meritocracy o f qualifications for office is similar in many respects to the ideal o f the Chinese Confucian examination system, but extends throughout society, for instance to business. Seniority has to do not with age, but with length of time and experience in a position. Although the functional hierarchies and meritocratic placement o f position-holders are always imperfect, even if it were perfect the Confucian should ask further critical questions: do the civilizing habits o f the society adequately recognize the whole person in the office, and are the offices defined so as to be held by whole people? For instance, a person in a low position at work might be a high official in church or in the family. A person in high responsibility in government or business might be extremely needy in the context of family and a poor athlete in recreational sports. The civil rituals by which we relate to ourselves and to others in various hierarchical offices need to acknowledge that holding those offices is not the entirety of the person’s life.

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Business relations need not invade privacy, but they ought not deny it either. Confucians in Boston should work to develop social rituals that allow people to relate to others in official or semi-official positions as complex human beings. On the matter of the Confucian theme of friendship, the conditions for friendship in Boston reflect the social conditions mentioned above, namely, inclusive cultural diversity in race, ethnicity, and religion, egalitarianism, and a social system with functional hierarchies and a meritocracy. Whereas Chinese Confucianism, as well as Western Aristotelianism, has emphasized equality as a condition for true friendship, that condition cannot obtain in a society with the late-modern conditions of Boston. Even egalitarianism means that people who are vastly different in age, talent, interests, and background are to be treated with equal respect. With rare exceptions, true friendships in the Boston situation will have to be possible among “ unequals” ，among people of different gender, different ages, different talents and intelligence, and different positions in social hierarchies. Boston Confucians, then, need to point out that at the heart of true friendship are the social habits or rituals for enduring through a long time. Friendships are formed only through long endurance of changes in relations among the friends; gender roles change as people age, social positions change with age, talents and responsibilities change, as well as offices in hierarchies. Friends are those who learn to love, respect, and defer to one another through a long period of changes. In this way, they come to relate heart to heart to one another as whole persons. Friendships can begin with the infatuation of a common interest, a shared attitude, or a reciprocal wit, but they need to develop so as to create a subculture of interpersonal habits that arises through participating in one another’s lives over time. Confucian ritual strategies need to be developed to sustain friendships through changes in inequalities over time. Confucians rightly warn against the fake rituals of instant familiarity that we associate with salesmen; the manners of “ instant informality” are a crass similacrum of friendship when applied to people who do not really know one another well. Boston Confucianism needs also to distinguish true friendship from two other relations with which it is easily confused in late-modern Western culture. One is the civil relations o f functional interaction within society discussed above, where the social habits with true propriety allow us to recognize people in their wholeness while relating to them according to their functions. Thus, we need rituals for dealing humanely with shopkeepers, bureaucrats, and politi­ cians; but these are not the rituals that necessarily foster true friendship. The second relation to be distinguished from true friendship is collegiality, which is much closer to friendship than civil relations and often its source. Collegiality is the type o f relation developed through close proximity, perhaps in working conditions or through living in the same neighborhood. Colleagues relate not only functionally but in sharing much of the rest of their social and personal lives. The rituals of collegiality properly insist that colleagues help one another

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when in trouble and rejoice and grieve with one another; in traditional societies collegiality is what is meant by “ community” . But collegiality is a function of the circumstances of proximity. When one changes jobs or moves to a different neighborhood, one can change colleagues with no serious loss. New people enter into one’s life to share events, to help, with whom to rejoice and grieve. In such a mobile society as has developed in late modernity, proper Confucian rituals of collegiality are extremely important, but they are not true friendship which endures the changes o f circumstances of proximity. True friends stay together through change and separation. The final Confucian theme to relate to Boston’s circumstances is the family, under which the themes o f husband—wife relations, filiality, and younger and older sibling relations are comprised. The general Confucian civilizing reality sought in the propriety o f family relations is that each member be prized, supported, and cared for with respect to the ongoing tasks o f integrating with excellence the appropriate roles the person has within the family with those the person plays outside the family. This is to say, the family is the matrix within which people find the home to become fully human in all the dimensions of their life, and the care and affection appropriate for the family should consist in the social habits fostering this. The differences between traditional East Asian and modern American families have often been emphasized by those who claim that Confucianism requires the East Asian structure. Among the differences are these: the traditional East Asian family more sharply distinguishes the sex roles; women tend more to be confined to the home and domestic activities whereas men are more likely to play public roles; seniority is granted greater authority; separate responsibilities are more likely to be given to children on the basis o f birth-order; and sharper separations are made between family members and those who are not kinfolk. Although these differences are real, they are still a matter o f degree; families in contemporary China may not be as close to the traditional stereotype as to the modern American stereotype. Confucianism for a modern American family, especially of the middle class, must cope with the fact that the family is intricately integrated into other public institutions, which, in traditional East Asia, would be internal to the family. Children, for instance, must relate to the school systems and often receive very little formal education by family members, but where the school system fails, the family in America must make up the difference. Instead of a typical Chinese family business in which people are secure in a position and attain seniority that can be exercised as long as desired, Americans often shift companies, working their way through promotions, and then retiring to a life o f expected leisure supported by retirement plans. American family proprieties or rituals need to accommodate their treatment of each individual according to the shifting roles they play in school and work. A youngish person might be junior in the family but the owner o f her business and the boss o f older people, including

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perhaps older relatives. A student might be a failure as a scholar but a helpful and responsible family member. Confucian family propriety cannot address the person as defined almost exclusively by the family role, as perhaps is typical in the traditional Chinese family, but must address the person as integrating the familial with the public roles. Given the differences in family conditions between traditional East Asian Confucianism and Boston Confucianism, what are some positive Boston Con­ fucian ritual projects? American families by and large do not have the civilizing rituals they need to integrate school and home life, to acknowledge women with careers who also are mothers and homemakers, to cope with mature men who can be consumed by job responsibilities or out of work completely, to mediate the passing on of family traditions with what children learn at school and work, to dignify retirement while keeping family ties, and so forth. American families need yet to cope with the fact that so many family members live alone, separated from the family. The modern American family enjoys many advant­ ages o f opportunity, and in certain circumstances has obvious problems to be addressed by more and better jobs or better housing arrangements. But even if the advantages were celebrated and the problems overcome, there are insufficient rituals of family life for it to be the home for people to be cared for and supported in working out the issues of wholeness in their lives. Confucianism in Boston and the modern West has both critical and creative philosophical work to do, in continuity with two and a half millennia of work in East Asia. The project o f Boston Confucianism is to enter into and reconstruct a Con­ fucian heritage as a vital philosophy for late-modern societies such as Boston’s, bringing Confucianism into the world conversation of philosophies. The project also is to enrich Confucianism by sincere engagements with Western philo­ sophies such as pragmatism, and vice versa. One form o f that enrichment is the development of an understanding of semiotic ritual as an analytical tool and instrument o f moral and social critique. The project, finally, is to enter into practical public life with the culture of enriched Confucianism integrated with other philosophical heritages. Boston Confucianism thus displays socially engaged philosophy at its most theoretical and practical.

Notes 1 With greater leisure o f transplantation, I would include the Yi-Jing, the Book o f Odes, and the Book o f Rites. 2 I have analyzed the distinction between primary and secondary scripture, and its relation to tradition, in Neville, Robert C . (1991), Behind the Masks o f God, Albany: State University of New York Press, pp. 36-46. 3 This compressed description of the Confucian model of the self reflects my own reading both o f the ancient texts and of their interpretation by Neo-Confucians down to the present day such as Tu Wei-ming. For a more complete description with citations o f relevant texts, see

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Neville, Robert C . (1987), The Puritan Smile, Albany: State University o f New York Press, ch. 2; Neville, Behind the Masks o f God, chs 7—9; and Neville (2000), Boston Confucianism, Albany: State University o f New York Press, ch. 9. See Wing-tsit Chan (1963), A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, Princeton: Princeton Uni­ versity Press. Also, Herbert Fingarette (1972), Confucius: The Secular as Sacred, New York: Harper and Row. See the extraordinarily profound description of this in Alexis De Tocqueville’s Democracy in America, Part Two, Book III. Propriety not only has this moral function, but also carries the moral to a religious dimension. Through civilization as embodied in the social practices shaped by proper ritual propriety, the domain o f the human becomes equal to and a fulfillment o f Heaven and Earth. Charles S. Peirce (1839-1914) was a philosopher, mathematician, and scientist; he was unsuc­ cessful in holding academic appointments, was chronically ill with a painful neurological disease, and died in poverty. Nevertheless, he was a philosophical genius on a par with Kant. Charles Hartshorne and Paul Weiss published six volumes of his philosophical papers, The Collected Papers o f Charles Sanders Peirce, and Arthur W. Burks edited two more (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1931-1959). A new and more nearly complete edition is being published by Indiana University Press, but it is not yet far enough along to cover the major philosophical papers. A survey o f Peirce’s philosophy is to be found in my The Highroad Around Modernism (Albany: State University o f New York Press, 1992), c h .1 .My own books develop­ ing pragmatism’s theory o f nature and signs with a Confucian theory o f ritual are a trilogy called Axiology o f Thinking, consisting of Reconstruction o f Thinking, Recovery o f the Measure, and Normative Cultures, Albany: State University o f New York Press, 1981, 1989, 1995. John Dewey, also a classical pragmatist, did understand Peirce’s theory. Nevertheless, Dewey toured China in 1919-1920 lecturing on the elementary advantages o f technology which he believed appropriate for China at that time; see his Lectures in China, 1919一1920，edited by Robert W. Clopton and Tsuin-Chen Ou (Honolulu: University Press o f Hawaii, 1973). The unqualified praise o f technology in these lectures contradicts the extremely nuanced and critical approach to technology o f Dewey’s other books and that is required for an extension of Confucianism. See Rorty, Richard (1982), Consequences o f Pragmatism, Minneapolis: University o f Minnesota Press. See Whitehead’s Process and Reality (corrected edition edited by David Ray G riffin and Donald Sherburne; New York: Free Press, 1978) and Weiss’s Beyond A ll Appearances (Carbondale, III.: Southern Illinois University Press, 1974). Whereas Rorty’s development o f pragmatism hauls the movement back to the modernist-postmodernist strand of latemodern thinking, I celebrate its neat evasion o f that dead-end o f philosophy (Neville, The Highroad Around Modernism, introduction and c h . I ). The sketch here of the pragmatic theory o f signs as natural habits relating interpreters both to nature and to purposive intentions and intentionality is developed at length in my Recovery o f the Measure and Normative Cultures. On the performative and illocutionary functions o f language, see John Searle (1969), Speech Acts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press) and also Fingarette, Confucius: The Secular as Sacred, which uses these notions to interpret ritual propriety. See Chang Chung-yuan (1963), Creativity and Taoism: A Study o f Chinese Philosophy, Art, and Poetry, New York: Julian Press (reprint edition New York: Harper, 1970). For a careful elaboration o f this, see my Normative Cultures, especially ch. 7.

Part Four Philosophical Daoism

CHAPTER TEN

The Metaphysics of Dao Chad Hansen

The metaphysics of dao Tradition treats as Daoists those thinkers who addressed what we might call the metaphysics of dao. I endorse that tradition with some qualifications about the appropriate implications to draw from it. M y argument w ill support the orthodox view that Daoists are appropriately distinguished from earlier moral philosophers (Confucius and Mo Zi) by their more metaphysical uses o f the term dao. However, this traditional way o f fixing the reference o f philosophical Daoism need not entail that there be a separate Daoist meaning for the word dao. Daoists could be said to address the metaphysics o f dao —but the same dao that is in dispute in moral philosophy. It needn’t have separate metaphys­ ical and moral meanings. Indeed, a careful account o f the metaphysics o f dao removes the motivation to postulate a separate, Daoist meaning. Precisely because their concept o f dao is the same, these reflections w ill be relevant to how Daoist metaethics informs their criticism o f the Confucian-Mohist moral debate. We can explain the fu ll range of Daoist usage, including its metaphysical use, without postulating a separate meaning. The kinds o f metaphysical comments I am targeting include observations that dao lacks beginning and end, is everywhere or inescapable, that we are in dao as fish are in water, that things come to be using dao, dao sustains/ nourishes things, from a dao point o f view there is not shi-feithls'not thls (or some other distinction), as well as the frequent comments and questions about dao and wuthing-kinds (some contrasting the two and others seeming to imply that dao is a 物Wuthing-kind) I f we reflect metaethically on the role and nature o f dao as a central normative concept, we should be able to appreciate a motivation for these kinds o f statements that does not require transporting them into a religious, God-and-creation context. Let us think o f metaphysics as a component o f the philosophical project of “ thinking about th ink in g" . In effect, we are asking what is (must be) such that we can engage in thinKing about it. The different answers we may offer to this question reflect to some degree the different conceptions and contexts of “ thinKing” . Typically the most closely related Western context will be cognitive knowing, e.g., what must the world be like for us to know it (or think about it)? Somewhat less dominating the stereotype, Western thinkers ask about the metaphysical conditions o f norms. What must be for us to be subject to 205

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them, know them, reason about them, and care about them as we do?2 Where the subject matter is a normative one, we call this second-order thinking “ metaethics" o f which moral metaphysics is a part (along w ith moral epistemology, moral semantics, moral logic, and so forth). I 'm suggesting we understand Daoists best as doing metaethics in this sense. They do this as part o f their project o f assessing (and criticizing) the ancient first-order moral debates in China. Moral metaphysics will consist of reflecting on the nature of the subject matter and o f our way o f dealing with it. It should address why there are moral disagreements and explain the role or importance we give to the concepts used in ethical thinking. They should have theories not only about the metaphysics (nature) o f dao, but also its knowability, its objectivity, decidability, and so forth.

The nature of dao Technically, I w ill not be seeking any specifically metaphysical account o f dao, I prefer to think o f the project as explicating the nature o f dao and will not argue that my account fits any standard definition o f “ metaphysical” . An account of the nature of dao will still differ from a theory of the meaning of the term daoguide. It would not be rebutted, for example, by evidence that some Daoist gave an account that contradicted it. Daoists, in my view, offered a variety of accounts so we need not conclude that knowing the meaning o f the term was sufficient to settle the matter. However, an account o f the nature o f dao should be consistent with the meaning in the sense that it plausibly specifies what different theories are talk­ ing about - what the ancient thinkers were disagreeing about. An account of the nature o f dao thus amounts to taking a position on the issues ancient Chinese thinkers themselves were discussing. Calling a position “ Daoist” ，in my reading of the traditional reference-fixing formula, does not attribute a commitment to any particular answer to secondorder questions. Metaethical questions include reflections about the nature of dao, but are not limited to these. In addressing these metaethical issues about dao, I am seeking to illuminate doctrines that are more characteristic o f Daoist reflections than they are o f first-order thinkers who also use the word dao (those dealing with simple casuistry or first-order ethics). Daoists may be skeptics, relativists, monists, or mystics. Daoists, on this proposal, may engage in first-order dao theorizing and may even draw inferences about such commitments from their metaethical reflections. However, again I w ill not treat any particular first-order dao as distinctively Daoist. Daoists may well disagree with each other in these firstorder inferences. My version of traditional naming convention is that we treat given thinkers as Daoist philosophers in virtue o f their centrally addressing

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metaethical questions. This way o f explaining their focus on dao effectively distinguishes theirs from early Confucian, Yangist, Mohist, and Legalist dis­ cussions about dao in classical China. A second reason I won， t offer a straightforward account o f the metaphysics o f dao is that I leave open the possibility that a satisfactory purely metaphysical account of the nature o f dao may be overwhelmingly difficult. That difficulty itself should explain why Daoist metaphysics turns out to be so obscure and does so without having to import Western mysticism as its explanation. The failure o f traditional metaphysical categories will serve to explain the Daoist penchant for evasive and skeptical accounts o f the nature o f dao without the assumption that Daoists use the word differently, or that they used it to refer to some obscure object newly introduced into the discussion by their changing the meaning o f the term. The obscurity, we will have discovered, is inherent in specifying the nature o f the dominant normative concept in ancient Chinese disputes about dao. A final reason my account may not seem like straightforward metaphysics is my view that metaphysics plays a radically different role in Chinese thought. I can characterize the contrast best by borrowing recent talk about the “ place” o f meaning. Consider this statement o f that place: “ the meaning o f words is determined by the role they play in the evidence-inference-action game"， .3 Meaning mediates between two poles o f human interaction with the world and contributes to the mental process o f inference. Brandom calls the two interactions “ entry and exit transitions with the world” . Traditional Western metaphysics has been preoccupied with the evidence or entry side, i.e., with the “ passive knower” and a dominant appearance-reality form as setting the problems o f metaphysics. Metaphysics and epistemology motivate each other in Western philosophy. Idealism and dualism are familiar and fairly obvious examples o f the link o f metaphysical and epistemic views. The epistemic pre­ occupation of Western metaphysics invites the positivist critique o f metaphysics as cognitively meaningless - because it seeks descriptions o f reality that are not subject to empirical testing.4 Chinese metaphysics inclines just as strongly to the exit-action end o f the “ transitions with the world” . It addresses how conceptions o f reality fit with the project o f guiding human action.5 M y metaphysics will, accordingly, seem like a distant cousin to the interpretive accounts usually found under the title “ the metaphysical dao” • Considering the possibility o f this difference in fundamental outlook, we needn’t read metaphysical passages about daogi udeas evidence that Daoists have changed the subject. Treating dao as a subject matter does not require that the word dao need be other than the one at home in the discussion o f practical and normative issues. In addressing metaphysical issues, we need not infer that Daoists must be referring to a reality in a classical Western (e.g., Parmenidean) sense - as something independent o f or transcend­ ing sense experience, conceptions, and beliefs. Keeping this difference in mind

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should help us to refrain from the temptation to situate metaphysical statements into our familiar appearance-reality structure. We needn’t assume that meta­ passages about the nature of dao must be about ultimate reality (or an ultimate source or creator o f reality). We needn't take claims about the ineffability of dao as claims about the ability to experience ultimate reality or o f language to represent, define, denote, prove, confirm, or “ capture” some ultimate reality.

The conceptual context One source o f the difficulty in characterizing the metaphysics o f dao is this deep difference in the role o f metaphysics. The other most important source is the wide gap between the conceptual schemes o f ancient China and those o f Indo-European (Buddhist, Islamic, and Judeao-Christian) culture. I have discussed these differences at length in my 1992 book A Daoist Theory o f Chinese Thought (see note 28), and will only restate the conclusions here. The important points for our purposes here include the absence of a Western repre­ “ knowledge", “ inference” sentational and propositional conception of “ belief" ， as well as (correspondence or coherence) “ truth" , “ reason" , or “ in ference" . The ways ancient Chinese grammar attributed commitments resembled de re belief ascriptions more than the de dicto ascriptions more familiar in English.6 When ancient Chinese thinkers ascribed commitments to each other, they treated these commitments as taking the form of a disposition to use a term or descrip­ tion of some part o f the world. They seldom attributed commitments in a way that suggested “ inner representations” of outer “ facts” or pictures o f things in the world. The writing may have been pictures, but the commitments were to use some term (written or spoken) o f the given object. In my 1992 book’s theory of language, I argued that they also did not other­ wise highlight the sentence as a significant unit of language. They did not have a clear notion o f the syntactic sentence which would be located conceptually between the clearly recognized mingnames (paradigmatically the ideographic char­ acter), the broadly construed ci phrase (ranging from compound characters to long strings “ with a y iintenl") and the discourse-like daoguide A key to my view was my hypothesis that daoguidewas a linguistic unit - at the opposite end from mingnames. Three other features o f classical Chinese grammar bear on our account o f the nature of dao. First, ancient Chinese does not have singular-plural gram­ matical marking, so references to dao are comparatively mass-like. To skip a lot o f controversy and detail, the important points are daos can be summed (your dao and my dao make our dao) and we may individuate them in several ways. Second, Chinese lacks articles 一 definite or indefinite. Again, traditional translations and accounts typically supply the definite article “ the” before occurrences o f dao, particularly in contexts where the nature o f dao is con­ cerned. I suggest instead using it as an implicit plural (e.g., like a mass noun) or an indefinite “ some” instead. Third, dao is sometimes used as a verb in Chinese

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- and most famously in Daoist texts such as the first line o f the Dao-De-Jing dao which can be dao-ed is not constant dao. Against the prevailing practice o f translating the verb as “ to speak” I argued that it (a) should incorporate the normative force o f the noun, i.e., something like “ to guide” ，and (b) that the range of denotation should include both speech and writing —as well as gesturing and so forth. I suggest treating the verbal use as “ to express as guidance” . Again, I won’t repeat these arguments here, but want to broaden them slightly in keeping with the entry-exit transition model. The notion of expression itself restricts the range of the verb in ways that seem to ignore how many ways one may endorse a dao. Brandom’s7 formulation of a notion close to what I ’m after would be “ to endorse a pattern o f material practical inference” whether in intention, plan, expression, or recommendation to another. I have reservations about explicating ancient Chinese commitments in terms (e.g., “ inference” ）that suggest a commitment to sentential analysis. Still, we can rephrase Brandom’s notion as expressing commitment to con­ form to a way (analogous to commitment to follow a practice), which leaves the reference to “ inference” im plicit in the structure o f the practice. Zhuang Z i， s helpful metaphor here gets the vague effect of “ inference” via our “ shooting out” 是非 shi-feithls-notthis distinctions and commitments to which we cling as we would to “ an oath or a treaty” . Talk o f a “ practice” ，rather than to a specific intent a principle or a norm, is advised because of these worries about segment­ ing dao sententially. Individuation o f dao, as I noted above, is best left vague. To dao is to undertake a commitment to correctly effecting some (bit of?) dao in behavior. 1 he variety o f ways to individuate dao stem not only from the mass-like segmentation, but also from the familiar difficulty o f drawing the boundaries with a word like “ community” . Im plicitly in ancient China, the stereotype of dao in ethical debate was a large, nearly universal human community.8 But Daoist literature regularly draws our attention to daos o f thieves, o f musicians, o f carpenters, etc. as well as to even more global daos o f all natural kinds, o f the world (natural and social), o f nature, and so forth. The notion o f dao clearly is not limited to ordinary moral discourse, but to any practical dis­ course —including perhaps the discourse of “ natural signs” .

The meaning o f dao W ith those caveats, the question o f meaning is relatively simple 一despite the impression that dao is an impenetrable mystery o f the East. The almost universal translation is one of the easiest and most familiar words o f the English language - “ way” . M y view is that it is no accident that the translation sticks and works so well. The two concepts are remarkably close in meaning —except that “ way” has rather more explicit grammatical individuation and lacks a verb form.

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To do the metaphysics o f dao, we can start by thinking philosophically about ways while trying to reason about them (a) using a conceptual structure like that available to ancient Chinese thinkers and (b) considering the issues salient in their philosophical agenda. We do not set out to do the impossible 一 reconstruct all features of their lives, all background religious beliefs, or any of the other impossible feats o f Verstehen that lead to hermeneutic regress and paradox. What we envision is reconstructing enough of the “ manifest history” of the philosophical issues and the inference structure o f their concepts to think along with them about the nature of normative ways. Part o f the appeal o f “ way” as an explication o f meaning is that, like dao, “ way” is indefinable - I do not mean ineffable but, in Hacking’s helpful phrase, it is one of those familiar, tiny, almost unnoticed words that “ tend to be circu­ larly defin ed" .9 Any synonym or attempted definition leads us back to “ way", which is a more primitive English term than any of its partial synonyms. Hacking’s phrase occurs in his discussion o f a “ loose” distinction between object words, idea words, and elevator words. This distinction w ill also be handy for our purposes in explaining a philosophical difference between dao and “ way” . “ In addition to ‘objects' and ‘ideas’ we need to take note o f a group o f words that arise by what Quine calls semantic ascent: truth, facts, reality. Since there is no common way o f grouping these words, I call them elevator words, for in philosophical discussions they raise the level o f discourse" 10 Hacking notes that elevator words are typically familiar, unproblematic words that have quite innocent uses - until we employ them for semantic ascent or with philosophical emphasis. Hacking, however, clearly would not consider listing “ way” among his elevator words. I t 's not that Western philosophers do not use the word; they use it a lot, but usually innocently. Hacking’s own account o f looping shows how “ handy” the term can be in philosophical dis­ course: “ People classified in a certain way tend to conform to or grow into the ways that they are described; but they also evolve in their own ways, so that the classifications and descriptions have to be constantly re vised.11 Ironically, Hacking’s (or anyone’s) shortlist of Western “ elevator words” （ “ truth” ， “ facts” ， “ reality” ）contains words that ancient Chinese thinkers seldom or never used as terms of philosophical ascent. We could expand the list o f philosophically pivotal “ familiar” terms which we all learn to analyze deeply as we learn philosophy: “ know" , “ reason” ， “ true”， “ believe” ， “ represent” ， “ refer” ， “ mean” ，along with some longer but equally central notions in our left-side world-view such as “ conscious” ， “ experience” ， “ sensation” ， “ perception” . Finally, we also learn to analyze a cluster o f other simple structural words like “ the" , “ some” ，and “ a” . To my recollection, how­ ever, I have never seen a philosophical article on the concept o f “ way" . The irony, then, is that the concepts in Hacking’s and my shortlist o f Western elevator terms include those that are usually either absent or “ innocent”

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in Chinese philosophical literature. The counterpart o f dao, the most widely used term o f philosophical ascent in ancient China, is an almost unnoticed “ innocent” in the West. The contrasting lists o f elevator words manifests the contrast in emphasis noted earlier. Western elevator terms cluster on the entry side o f the transitions between language and the world. “ Way” belongs to the exit side. While “ way” is not in Hacking’s list, we can find some close relatives - partial synonyms and situational counterparts 一 in Western ethical reflection and in the anti-Platonic strains o f Western thought, e.g., when Western philosophers analyze “ prac­ tices", “ conventions" , “ games" , “ form s o f life " , “ conceptions o f the good life", “ traditions” ， “ processes” ，and “ modes” . We may view “ way” as a more com­ prehensive term that embraces all o f these practical concepts —as a genus of which these others are species. The network of words we might use in defining “ way” includes another core term o f the language 一the question word “ how” . We point to a way in answer to either a “ how to” or a “ what to (do)" question. We may think o f knowing ways as unnke the routinely analyzed “ knowingthat” of Western epistemology, and more like Ryle’s “ knowing how’” 2or “ knowing to” . A possible motivation o f meaning-change hypotheses regarding dao may stem from this ironic contrast. Interpreters, cognizant that dao is a major elevator word in Daoist metatheorizing, naturally seek a counterpart elevator word from Western philosophical discourse. This explains the interesting coincidence that interpretation of dao makes it a Chinese philosophy counterpart o f “ reason" , “ tru th " , o r “ ultimate reality” 一borrowing terms from Hacking’s shortlist o f Western elevator terms. It “ way” had become a target o f Western philosophical analysis and a mainstream elevator word, one motivation for this interpretation would shrink.

D ao-things M otivation aside, my goal (reasoning about the nature o f ways using the conceptual structure available to ancient Chinese thinkers) counts against the temptation to explain dao in terms such as “ experience" , “ perception", “ belief” ， “ (propositional) knowledge” , “ reality” (as philosophically contrasted with appearance), “ tru th ” ， “ facts” ，and so forth. Our emphasis on the “ exit transitions” and the kinds o f practical nouns that do show up regularly in Western philosophy reminds us that “ way” is essentially a normative term. Equally important, perhaps, is that in being the central normative elevator term o f ancient Chinese discourse, dao signals an important difference in the conception o f normativity. Ancient Chinese thinkers did not make talk o f sententials, such as “ laws” ， “ rules” ， “ principles” ，or “ norm s" , ce ntra l to their metadiscussion o f normativity. Dao was the crucial way they referred to the normative realm (although without the familiar Western supposition that

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normativity implies a separation from common-sense nature - as did, e.g., Plato’s “ realm o f forms” ， Kant’s categorical imperative, or Moore’s open question). A dao is some aspect o f the natural context that invites us to perform or “ implement as guidance” our action. Both “ way” and dao share concrete uses as “ road” or “ path” . Roads seem fully object-like - highways are concrete (or asphalt) objects. However, if we picked up the asphalt “ object” that runs between Las Vegas and the Grand Canyon and put it back down between Las Vegas and Provo, a brown, ragged scar would then be the way to the Grand Canyon, not the original ribbon of asphalt. We can characterize a road as an information storage and retrieval device.13 Drivers with “ broadband access” read the information (in the form of the contrast between the black of the road and the earthy colors on both sides) to retrieve the architects’ knowledge of the way to get to the Grand Canyon. The abstract nature of ways is made clearer when we consider less techno­ logically developed roads. A path is blazed by the frontiersman who goes through the forest hacking a bit o f bark o f a tree every 100 yards or so. Such a “ path” would not strike us as being much more like an object than is a written instruction. Similarly, a boy scout who constructs piles of rocks leaves a fragment of a conventional scout “ language” behind for other scouts to interpret in their own purposive activity. To understand the notion of a dao or a way is to see the continuity between road-making, path-marking, drawing a map, or writing a list of directions. This underlying continuity motivated my earlier analogy of the metaphysics o f dao to that o f normative language, which I called “ guiding discourse" . The linguistic notion o f discourse was intended to capture the common normative content o f roads, maps, and instruction manuals. The lin­ guistic metaphor should neither lim it the explanation to the paradigmatically linguistic end of the continuity nor rule out concrete highways. The focus on the instruction book model o f a dao has the advantage o f launching us our “ manifest history” of the setting o f the Daoist meta-doctrines about dao. The paradigm initial form of Confucius’ dao was extremely text-like - a book of ritual (the rough counterpart o f a series o f books by Emily Post). Still, the Confucius o f the Analects clearly is engaged in a study o f ritual that is not exhausted in library work. The text has him placing importance on examples and the study o f history (not merely of rule-books, but of histories of the ways others acted in the past). Further, it will require some ingenuity to blend the linguistic core conception with a connected common use o f “ way” which w ill become important when we leave early Confucianism for more “ naturalistic” arguments about dao. The human paths a Confucius studies in history (e.g., the strips o f bare ground surrounded by grass) may not have been caused by an explicit intent to communicate guidance. Prior walkers were seldom intending to cause or elicit any belief in some later “ reader” of their tracks.14 Similarly, there are “ natural” ways (paths) that are created by animals. Consider a mountaineer finding his

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way by following the paths o f mountain goats.15The goats’ walking was certainly not intended as discourse. Still, we can and do read and follow such paths. We can even talk about there being “ a way through the forest” without supposing that either human or animal has gone that way before. That way con­ sists in a configuration o f objective components that contribute to their being a practical solution to a “ how to” problem, i.e., the dangers and opportunities between the starting point and exit, e.g., narrow spots in the river, fallen logs across ravines, and places where bears are not feeding at the moment. There are also ways that we read for guidance in dressing for the day - red skies at night. We will return to these later, but note that while they are non-languagelike in being natural rather than social, they are still language-like in being “ read” for guidance. We spot natural “ signs” and “ interpret” their significance for our actions.16

Dao-language Though we want to be able to take in these less language-like cases, the philo­ sophical story of Daoism requires a note on a passage in the Analects that does emphasize language - the “ rectifying names” sorites: If names are not rectified, language will not flow; If language does not flow, social-affairs will not be realized; If social-affairs are not realized, ritual and music will not flourish; If ritual and music do not flourish, ... people will not know how to move hand or foot. (Analects, 13.3) This passage initiates17 a philosophical reflection on puzzles about dao in China. In effect, the direction o f reflection signals the dominance in ancient China of questions of interpretation of dao over questions about the content of dao. Cognitive revision and originality are thought o f as expressing themselves in adapting guidance to real-time situations rather than as revising the explicit words of the guidance. Traditional Chinese thinkers focused on the problem of games and interpretation before they learned to doubt their traditional value systems - they did their Wittgenstein before their Socrates. This problem arises most acutely within Confucian traditional orthodoxies with their commitment to following conventional, ceremonial patterns. Confucius' students regularly discovered that, in concrete contexts, they disagreed about what to do even when they agreed on using the same “ rule-book” as their guide. A natural metaphysical treatment for this discourse-like situation is the typetoken model from theory o f language. We have dao-types (discourse dao) and dao-tokens (performance dao). A discourse dao is analogous to a play or a musical score. I coined the term “ performance dao” for that implicit token sense of “ way” that is the “ real” goal o f a discourse dao. A performance dao consists of a concrete, particular series of actions or behaviors. The score-performance

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model motivates a cluster of helpful insights. First, it illuminates Confucius' constant pairing of ritual and music in his formulations. Second, it explains the implicit “ method” o f rectifying names —which does not consist in giving defini­ tions or doing analysis, but simply in using them correctly yourself - as a model. Third, it points us to an important difference in interpretive processes at each end o f our language spectrum. Rather than a theory o f the meaning o f a word as related to the experiences or evidence for its use, we have a “ performance” of the discourse as the “ way of interpreting” . This is, however, different enough from our evidence-side notion of interpretation that it may be helpful to distinguish it. Let us call it “ performance interpretation” . Finally, it motivates my translation o f 德 devirtuoslty as “ virtuosity” and reminds us that interpretation in Confucianism (and for most of Cninese philosophy) is not simply a matter o f a bipolar right-wrong, but a more continuous aesthetic evaluation. This gives us one way to construe Hall and Ames' assertion that Chinese thought represents an aesthetic rather than a logical order.18 Despite these advantages, however, a type-token analysis is a more stark (and Platonic) metaphysical structure than is suggested by the contextually shifting individuation we have highlighted in ancient Chinese talk o f dao. The type-token model presents a particular problem for my approach as I find little motivation in ancient Chinese concepts of background beliefs for the kind of universal-particular analysis characteristic of ancient Greek (and Indic) thought. While handy for us today in understanding what a dao is, we are unlikely to find any echoes of this metaphysical structure in Daoist writing from the classical period o f Cninese thought. Thus, while we have no overt reason to reject this metaphysical analysis o f dao, it departs from the conditions on a solution that we began with. Arguably, it is not what would occur to a Chinese thinker with the conceptual structure and philosophical agenda o f ancient China.19

Dao-examp!es It， s hard to avoid some version o f a type-token analysis, however, if we con­ centrate on the problem o f metaphysical individuation. Let us agree not to seek a definitive answer to how we should individuate dao s. That will simply be another sense in which we will not seek an “ orthodox” metaphysics o f dao. We can still draw some interesting observations about the complexity Chinese thinkers encountered when they considered issues about the nature o f dao. To focus our issue, consider the use of example, or what Munro calls “ model em ulation" ,20 in Confucianism. Take Confucius in the act of rectifying names. He simply uses language correctly. The rectify names passage ends: Thus when an exemplary person uses a name, it can surely be spoken, and when spoken it can surely be acted upon. There is nothing careless in the attitude of the exemplary person to what is said.21

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The guidance that allows us to rectify names has the metaphysical status of an action (which we may analyze as a series o f events, as a process, and so forth). It is a bit of the world 一a concrete speech act. I t 's in the world as much as a road is. However, it is intended as a guide —e.g., for our use o f the word. When I “ follow” the junzi's example, I extrapolate or interpret to my different situation of action. The junzi uses the proper term to speak to someone younger, I fail to follow his example if I use the same term o f that same person. The relation o f that concrete particular and my action is interpretively like the relation between a play and performance, instruction and action. (This corre­ sponds to Wittgenstein’s point about pointing.)

Non-individuation o f dao So, rather than specifying exactly how to individuate dao, we start by observ­ ing that we can take two perspectives toward the same speech act. It may be regarded as a performance interpretation o f something (as the junzi saying what is permitted in the circumstances), or as something to be interpretively performed (the junzi being careful to set a model for us). These are different points o f view to take o f the same series o f events or actions. While they are explained here for speech, they clearly apply also to gesture, dance, chant, ritual, and other behavior according with a practice. A community relative to that practice exists when its members regularly take both kinds o f attitudes towards each other’s actions. The two points of view are somewhat like normat­ ive and descriptive. The way you did the action is regarded as descriptive when I have no commitment to follow you - i.e., to subject your way to practical interpretation in my own behavior. It is normative when I do accept or endorse such a commitment or when you interpret your own action as thus binding on me. We routinely intend our actions both to conform to duties and to exemplify the practices to which we take others to be committed. We may well disagree on whether I should acknowledge your performance as a guide for me. The undertaking reflects a judgment that another should use the per­ formance particular as a “ score” or guide. It is analogous to pointing to a road - another bit o f the furniture o f the world. The speech act is a bit o f our surroundings which we can endorse, pick out, or point to as a guide. Like the type-token contrast, the normative-descriptive contrast is another of the Western conceptual dichotomies that would be controversial to attribute to ancient Chinese thinkers.—Attributing the full conceptual apparatus o f our distinction is surely suspect, though we may find closely related counterparts in a different conceptual context. We can, therefore, mark the two perspectives on a manifestation o f a dao in a different but related way. One bit o f the concrete world we take as a correct theme for performance interpretation — we 是 sh ithisnight as something to be 行 x ing“walked" . We may also evaluate the concrete act as a performance o f a something we take in the first way —again

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是 shithls:nght it as a good “ walking” o f that dao or 非f ei not-thls:wrong it as a bad or wrong one. To regard something as a discourse dao is to take it as subject to interpreta­ tion (a dao-type). To regard it as performance dao is to take it as subject to evaluation (a dao-tokcn). Since they may take the different evaluative attitudes toward the same speech or ritual act, we should not be surprised that Chinese thinkers do not think o f them as different metaphysical types. They also do not clearly distinguish the two evaluative attitudes. They are both evaluative attitudes that can be expressed in terms o f a 是非 shi-feithls-not this judgment. Chinese thinkers need not sense in these two attitudes anything like the descriptive/prescriptive distinction. Routinely, we take a concrete document (a book o f ritual or a musical score) as a discourse dao —something to be interpreted or executed in performance. We can, however, also treat it as an extended performance - a writing act by some sage-king. We can treat it as subject to selection —as Mo Zi does when he initiates skepticism about the Confucian confusion o f the traditional and the 義yi_气 When we pick ( 是 a physical road out from the surround­ ings (or from other roads) we undertake to “ read and execute it” . The behavior we subsequently produce in each case either correctly follows the road or loses it. Note that the shifting-perspective insight does not solve the problem about what is dao, but it helps us appreciate how Chinese thinkers might have come to regard dao as being in nature without reducing it to descriptive history and while giving us an alternative, contextual, and pragmatic distinction to replace a type-token metaphysics. The ancient Chinese notion of human (moral) conduct is simply f l xingbehavior. Now we can see how a normative-perspective shift analysis instead o f a typetoken analysis can account for how dao works in human life. A great many behavior particulars, book tokens, physical structures, etc. may be regarded as guides to performance - as something “ to be performed” . Discourse dao is discourse or language-like essentially in being viewed as inviting 行 xingbehavior interpretation. It is unlike normal human discourse in not necessarily employ­ ing human conventions of communication. The “ authors” of the concrete entities that we treat as discourse might not intend to communicate anything. Nature might not have any intentions as to how we use its “ signs” . Recent pragmatists (e.g., Brandom 3 and McDowell24) face the challenge to show how norms can be enshrined in facts but still transcend those facts, and moralists25 address the way our moral practices rule out appeal to the fact o f our moral practices in justification. When China’s Socrates, Mo Zi, develops his similar point, he doesn’t see himself as leaving tradition in making the distinction. His argument is that we would not call something 義 y i morality or 仁 renhumdmty simply because it was a society’s tradition.26 Mo Zi uses the tradi­ tional language to express his philosophical approach to questions about dao and his doubts about Confucian traditional guiding dao.

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Having made that point, Mo Zi initiates the use o f the terms o f analysis o f dao that are crucial to understanding the mature Daoist metaethics — 是非 shi-feithls-not this and 辯 biandistinction dispute. As we saw, the general notion o f evaluation is shi-feithis-not this. The capacity to use 是非 shi-feithis-not this may be described as knowing how to 辯 biandistnction dispute. He also uses the concept o f 明 mingdiscern to describe the achievement o f mastery o f a 是非 shi-feitlns-not this distinction, i.e., as being able to 辯 bian“ distinctiondispute correctly.27 The interpretive and normative way o f explicating guidance and action that we see emerging in ancient China together with the shifting and vague patterns of individuation can help us understand the emergence o f skeptical, relativist, and mystical or monist talk about dao in Chinese metaethics. Confucians themselves noticed the puzzle about interpretation o f a dao into action in changing circumstances. This puzzle affects even as explicit a dao as a ritual ceremony. Mohists then draw our attention to the use o f terms, distinctions, and standards in selecting some dao as our basis o f guidance. It is not clear that Mohists distinguish the two ways (choice ana interpretation) that any explicit dao presupposes other standards. As I argued,28 Mo Zi seems to find a similar dynamic in the two normative activities —both count as 辯 biandlsUngmshmg 是非 shi-feithis-not this. We distinguish among different ways of making 是非 shi-f e i this-n isjudgments. th o

Dao-analysis M o Zi depends on 天 tiann'diurc:sky in this context and he makes appealing to 天 tiannaturesky more central to normative theorizing . 天 Tiannaturer:sky is not “ escapable” the way the edicts o f a ruler or the conventions o f a social group are. He also treats 天 tiannature:sky as a solution to the twin problems because o f its measurement-iiKe operationality. The standard exemplified in 天 tiannature:sky is the distinction between 利害 li-haibenefit-harm (and the natural preference for l i benefit) This step extends the apparatus o f dao to natural inclinations. Any learning o f a way presupposes some natural way - namely, our capacity to acquire and follow it. So the idea of a 天 tiannature:sky 道 becomes import­ ant in ancient Chinese dao talk. The Zhuang Z i takes up the theme o f daos depending on daos in the form of talk about dependency. Neither the Monists nor the Zhuangists make a clear dis­ tinction between justification and motivation, reasons and causes. 大 Tiannature:sky operational standard is not evidence for the daos it leads us to choose, as much as a cosmic metaphor for our having a way to choose and follow daos. So we have daos o f choosing and interpreting dao both built into identifiable dis­ course daos (like books o f ceremonial ritual or existing con d ieventions) and we u g o a have daos built into us as natural ways o f acquiring, selecting, and mastering socially generated discourse daos. In any normal dao-guided activity, much dao is presupposed (depended upon).

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It is important to recognize that the Mohist doctrines, while giving us the language o f analysis o f daos, differ from Daoist analyses. The appeal to 天 tiannature:sky 道 daoguide and the ideal o f a constant dao are Mohist innovations, not speci f cally Daoist doctrines (in fact, as I argue below, Daoist theory effect­ ively critiques both notions). Mo Zi speaks o f “ constanting” （ 常 changcontant used as a verb) language (Mo Zi, 80/46/37-38, 82/47/18) that is adequate to promote, pick out, or restore i~l xingbehavior. The idea o f a 常 changconstant 道 daogudie goes together with the idea of a 天 tiannature:sky 道 daogudie- constancy being the salient feature o f 天 tiannature:sky and its operational, inescapable standards. So we have ample basis for understanding talk o f dao being everywhere, inescapaole, incapable o f being made fully explicit, even for understanding Zhuang Z i’s metaphor o f humans being in dao as fish are in water. None o f this talk requires that dao has changed its meaning. A ll the Mohist apparatus o f normative analysis o f dao applies to both the activity o f interpreting a discourse into performance and evaluating a performance as a particular “ walking” of a discourse dao. The language is also highly context specific, e.g., “ choosing this and not that” ，interpreting in ways that “ benefit” . And finally his dao seems to place much more emphasis on the performance side, as a test applied to the effect of performance determines what discourse dao is right. In some sense, the real dao for Mo Zi is the way it works out in performance — which, via the standard for judgment (benefit-harm) brings nature into the discussion both as the operational standard and as the context in which success is achieved or not. There are other themes developed in the Zhuang Z i with the suggestion that the context is as much a part of any process o f dao guidance as is the explicit discourse. In the course o f any behavior, we presuppose other dao besides the one in view —dao of how to select a first-order dao and dao of how to interpret it. The idea of 德 devirtuosity in performance pulls in the dependence on context and criteria of success in real time. Clearly any act involves lots o f dao (many daos) and they are likely to be intertwined in a “ bloomin' buzzin confusion” not o f experience, but o f guidance.29 This iteration o f dao together with the individuation blurring and the naturalness o f summing to include context can even explain the talk of a holistic or single dao. The Mohist analysis itself promoted this view of the unity of dao. The natural standard o f benefit-harm is shared in every natural kind and everywhere - it is constant nature. The standard and context are set in constant nature and the ideal of finding a natural dao to guide all human action seems the solution that will yield an integrated constancy in human afiairs. The ideal, however, quickly required adjustment to fit the complexity noticed in the natural world. Mohist utilitarian analysis put the emphasis on the results o f actual perform­ ance and stimulated a trend toward emphasizing the uniqueness of situations o f performance at the same time that the universalized reasoning standard

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encouraged summing. Other moral thinkers, like Mencius and Yang Zhu, fol­ lowed suit (or influenced Mo Zi) in appealing to 天 tiannature:sky's authority, but lilted away from discourse toward a special intuition tuned to guiding concrete process. They still disagreed in their accounts o f what behavior was dictated by natural standards - their answers ranging from Mo Z i’s universal u tility to Yang Zhu’s egoism. The move toward intuition was thus both a product and a betrayal o f the e. The original goal was a formula Mohist ideal o f a 常 changconstant 道 daoguid or norm that could be a standard for choosing, reforming, etc. a constant discourse dao whose content will not have to vary with time or location. It also envisioned a discourse together with internal operational standards o f inter­ pretation into practice that were both unequivocal. Neither the content nor the interpretation should vary with schools o f emphasis as the traditionalist Confucian dao did. Implicitly, the goal was to evade the normal play of intuition, but the emphasis on performance made special intuitionism the dao of choice 一 prior to Zhuang Zi.

Two philosophical “ dead ends The history o f Daoism in the Zhuang Z i mentions neither Mencius nor Yang Zhu. It places two other developments between Mo Zi and Lao Zi. We w ill discuss only the second here. Shen Dao represents a stage in the dialectic that Zhuang Zi comes to view as a reductio o f the Mohist appeal to nature - as well as the consequent intuitionism. Shen D ao' s doctrine and the mature Daoist rejection o f it are crucial steps in the metaethical dialectic in ancient Cnina and toward the ultimate complexity o f the metaphysics o f dao. Shen Dao coins a term, “ Great dao” ，to refer to the actual, total process i.e., the actual history o f the world. Then he observes that we do not have to “ know” any guidance to follow Great dao. We can relax and mimic him in “ floating like a leaf on the water” . I have been suspicious o f the common analysis on which Shen Dao's doctrine represents a kind o f fatalism. His importance, I believe, lies in revealing that the Great dao, as he conceives it, has no normative force. The history in the Zhuang Z i puts the point by saying that Shen Dao's is a dao that is not dao - a dao for the dead. The important point about the nature o f dao is that token performance o f itself no normative force - offers no guidance. I f we take the sum o f all actual performance o f all things (the Great dao) as a normative guide, we have no guide. To get guidance, we need some other source o f normative direction that guides us to select a performance. That metaethical insight clearly would also undermine the idea o f a natural constancy. The injunction to conform to natural constancies gives us no guide. There is a dao o f nature (the course o f nature), but it is not one o f the options among which we are to make a dao choice. I interpret the opening o f Qi- Wu-Lun as expressing this insight.

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A ll the normative daos that compete for our real choice as guides are similarly “ pipes o f 天 tainnature:sky” . They are natural by virtue o f being “ puffed out of us” by our nature, i.e., it is our nature to generate these ways o f speaking and making distinctions to guide our behavior. The appeal to nature does not settle anything once we have noticed that the problem is a choice among rival actually occurring daos. Thus, there is insight in the traditional assertion that Daoists take 道 daoguide rather than 天 tiannature:sky as the guide. W ithout some dao other than natural constancy, we have no guidance. However, as the reflections so far have shown, without “ reading nature” accurately as we execute or perform some dao, we also don't get any guidance. Extracting guidance always requires a mixture of nature and “ discourse" . Themes in the Zhuang Z i develop this insight into an extended reflection on the complex and puzzling interrelation between the natural and the so cia l—the discussion o f 天 tian nature:sky and 人 renhuman. It expands on the point we noticed earlier in discussing Mo Zi, that anything we do with a dao presupposes some other dao - of interpretation, or of evaluation. In any dao activity, some dao is already given. A similar line o f reasoning yields the Zhuang Z i’s rejection of intuition. We could undermine Chinese versions o f intuitions as we do Western ones by noting that the intuitionist owes us an account o f why we should care about the “ simple moral property” grasped by the intuition. That an object possesses that property makes it analogous to any other natural property 一 potentially irrelevant to our practical concerns. The Zhuang Z i expresses this point by noting that we have to choose the intuition as a guide - from among alternat­ ive potential “ ways” o f guiding our behavior - and we have to choose which intuitions (of the conflicting kinds available in any medium-sized community) to grant this authority. His conclusion, as in the case o f nature and the Great dao, is that we cannot get a 是 shithis:night out of our A、 xinheart-mind without presup­ posing one. The Daoist theme clearly cautions against choosing daos that conflict with nature —“ do not let the human harm the natural” —but it otherwise removes the authority o f 天 tiannature:sky and intuition. Ultimately, our authority for choices and interpretation are some presupposed dao. 天 Tiannature:sky by itself makes no choices. The Zhuang Z i tries to balance its emphasis on the theme of the dependency o f social daos on nature with the insight that when we use any dao, our dependencies are on dao all the way down. We can’t escape presup­ posing some guidance that is not fixed by nature or history. The insight, I argued, is expressed negatively in the Lao Z i in the famous opening passage. Any dao that can dao is not a constant dao. I believe it surfaces in many o f the allegedly metaphysical passages precisely in insisting that dao is somehow like a thing but not a thing —not a natural kind. Many o f the allegedly “ metaphysical” passages in both texts read better as denials that dao is a natural kind than as affirmations. That daos guide our language

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(stereotypically in guiding our classification o f features that we count as con­ stituting a thing-kind for the purposes o f acting) together with the observation that natural kinds have to do things in certain ways to live, usually makes as much or more sense o f any alleged “ creation” passages than does an IndoEuropean story o f supernatural creation. This view o f the nature o f dao has trouble neither with passages that deny the “ visibility” o f dao nor with those that note that dao can’t be exhausted in language or ideas. The skill passages fit this account better than they do those that portray dao in terms of supernatural perfection. A recurring theme in these passages is how someone having the skill might fail at teaching it to others. That yields a far more plausible sense in which dao cannot be “ captured” in language. The famous “ difficult” part o f the Cook Ding story illustrates how dao outruns any content we acquire in past practice - not only in language. Finally, though we did not find a straightforward metaphysical solution to the problem of individuating dao, we can make sense of its nature. Much of the account comes via negation. Dao is not simply an object, though aspects o f dao may take the form of a road, a map, or a written score or book o f instructions. Process objects, such as the Great dao, are daos in one sense, but are irrelevant to our living choices —not daos in another. Similarly, natural processes are daos but represent mainly the limits on our possible choices, not guidance in making them. Dao is not limited to language or discourse except in an extended sense —where we consider as “ language” everything that is interpretable into 行 x ingbehavior performance. Dao always involves a mix o f nature but can never consist in mere “ receptivity" .30 Social or explicitly discourse dao always requires interpretation in ways that entail reading some natural dao along with it. Natural and norma­ tive dao are inextricably blended in all dao guidance. The normative side does not follow from the mere existence o f a social practice 一 nor does it require one. When social practice is an aspect o f a dao, it is subject to interpretation in some act 一 including the speech acts that constitute pronouncing dao. These speech acts can be evaluated as correct or incorrect as performances o f a dao of advocating or pronouncing (writing) dao. Choice of which dao to perform, qua act, can also be evaluated as a performance o f some dao o f choosing a dao. Interpreting a chosen dao is itself an action, for which there are several ways among which we may choose. That we should choose among them is a dao and so forth. Dao questions require dao answers all the way down 一 they do not come to rest in either history or nature. The picture could be a counterpart o f McDowell's claim that humans experi­ ence the world conceptually. Our rephrasing o f his Sellarsian picture using a normative conception o f concepts translates it into a claim that humans s picture o f humans being in dao in the encounter a world via dao. Zhuang Z i， way fish are in water starts to seem fully apt. To be human is to be in a reality viewed as open invitations to ways to “ carry on” .

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Conclusion I am proposing to refine a traditional account of the character of Daoist think­ ing that I take that tradition to have mistaken for a meaning change. The refinement does not deny that Daoists may give accounts of the nature of dao. To the degree that we consider such an account metaphysical, Daoists may be said to address the metaphysics o f daoguld\ but the “ metaphysical” viewpoint is of a metaphysics of action, not a way of turning their backs on the philosophical issues of ancient China to talk about a religious view of supernatural creation and divine nature. Rather than asking, “ What is, such that we may know it?” the Daoist asks, “ What is, such that humans can act in it?” His answer does not use the familiar concepts o f Western sentential philosophy —no proposi­ tions, truths (including moral truths), beliefs, practical reasoning, or most o f their close and distant conceptual relatives. Nor does a Daoist conception of either language or mind shift focus to the experiential or entry side of meaning. It does not start with mystical experience, consciousness, evidence, or either a successful or failed attempt to picture some ultimate being. The elevator terms of this conception include this-not this (right-wrong) (of actions of contextual selections), distinctions, discrimination, desires, deemings, and dao itself. Dao is the main elevator term, but is otherwise close to “ way” in English - a term that never had been a dominant elevator term o f Western philosophy. Chinese metaethics uses a radically different conceptual scheme in a different philosophical agenda, and with different ways o f setting o f its problems. I have not, as I predicted, provided a definitive individuation o f this confused practical concept, but we can begin to appreciate why (a) Daoists express the view that the subject matter leads to obscurity and paradox and (b) why their conclusions cover the range from monism to relativism and skepticism.

Notes I assume this metaphysical point may lie behind the sense of puzzlement and paradox in thinking o f dao having a name. 2 In much of the structure o f this approach to Daoism, I have been helped by the liberating clarifications found in Scanlon, T. M . (1982), “ Contractualism and Utilitarianism” ，in A. Sen and B. Williams (eds), Utilitarianism and Beyond, New York: Cambridge University Press. 3 This is Harman’s neat summary o f Sellars’ inferentialist semantics. Cf. Harman, Gilbert (1999), Reasoning, Meaning and Mind, Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 160. 4 This familiar view o f metaphysics underlies my first caveat. I might have proceeded instead to challenge this conception of metaphysics, but it seemed more constructive and useful to explicate the interesting contrast in focus that gives Chinese metaphysics its quite different character. 5 I am indebted here to Tang Jun-yi whose characterization of Neo-Confucian metaphysics as the point of view of a sage (either the point of view such that fully realizing it would constitute being a sage or the world-view that someone who achieves sagehood would thereby take) influenced my theorizing while I was his student in Hong Kong. Professor Tang warned us 1

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against treating Chinese metaphysics as accounts o f the external “ real” world in relation to the .epistemically characterized “ apparent” world in trying to unravel the puzzles or the elaborate Song and Ming systems. Also figuring in the refocus is my debt to M un ro’s insight that Chinese philosophical speculation tends to be guided more by consideration o f the effect of some doctrine on human behavior than on its empirical justification or “ truth” . The refocus fits into my own arguments, growing out o f that insight, that Chinese thinkers envision the role o f language (and mind) to be predominantly action guiding and that their theories o f sensation and reference tend to be embedded in the project o f addressing exit transitionspractice —again in contrast to the stereotypical traditional representational themes in Western theories of language and mind. A person ascribing a belief to Lois Lane would say “ Lois Lane with regard to Clark Kent, deems (him) ‘superhero’ ” or “ Lois Lane ‘superhero-s' Clark Kent.” These claims would be consistent with saying “ Lois Lane does not ‘Superman’ Clark Kent.” The person ascribing the belief implies that the believer would use the predicate term used in the attribution. He need not imply that the believer would use the same subject term as used in his ascription of belief. Thus, when in classical Chinese someone reports that X treats the unacceptable as acceptable (“ ke’s (the) bu ke” or “y ilwith bu ke deems ke” ) he is not committed to the claim that X would express the belief in question using a sentence containing both the terms used in the third person attribution. An interesting case is the fantasy conversation with Gong-sun Long in the famous “ frog in the well” parable o f the Zhuang Z i c h . 17 where he describes his own accomplishment as "fei-ing shi” . But we naturally take Gong-sun Long’s claim to have successfully disproved “ conventional wisdom” . Brandom, Robert B. (2000), Articulating Reasons: An Introduction to Inferentialism, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, p. 90. F or a statement o f the position that 人 renhuman was not a biological species term, see Shun, Kwong-loi (1997), Mencius and Early Chinese Thought, Stanford: Stanford University Press. Hacking, Ian (1999), The Social Construction o f What?, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, p. 23. Ibid., p. 21. Cf. Hacking, Ian (1995), “ The Looping Effects o f Human Kinds” ，in Dan Sperber and David and Ann Premack (eds), Causal Cognition: A Multidisciplinary Approach, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Besides illustrating a philosophical dependence on “ way” ，this accidentally amounts to a reasonably good gloss on “ a dao that can dao is not a constant dao” • This is a common theme today in explaining a contrast o f Chinese and Western thought. One o f the most complete developments o f this point o f view is in Raphals, Lisa (1992), Knowing Words: Wisdom and Cunning in the Classical Traditions o f China and Greece, Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press. I learned this interesting way o f thinking about roads from John Haugeland. Cf. Haugeland, John (1998), Having Thought, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. A “ walker” may so intend, particularly when he tries to “ lie” in ms track —as someone trying to escape from an accomplished tracker. A political science instructor in municipal administration once quipped “ the first city planning was done by cows， ’. Brandom draws attention to the distinction between the way we attribute intentionality to animals and (sometimes!) computers and the kind o f mutual recognition involved in human communication. Cf. Brandom, Robert B . (1994), Making it Explicit, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, ch. 2. Initiates it “ topically” . Whether it causally initiates it or is a response to concerns in other schools about the relation o f language and guidance is a matter o f textual dating theory. This passage has been subject to a long-running dating controversy. For a classic statement o f the skepticism, especially o f this passage, see Waley, A rth u r (trans.) (1938), The Analects o f Confucius, London: Allen & Unwin, pp. 22 and 172. For more recent textual theories about

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the Analects, see Eno, Robert (1990), The Confucian Creation o f Heaven, Buffalo: SUNY Series in Chinese Philosophy and Culture, and Brooks, Bruce and Taeko (1998), The Original Analects, Princeton: Princeton University Press. 18 Most prominently in Hall, David and Roger Ames (1987), Thinking Through Confucius, Albany: State University o f New York Press. M y idea (which may be less rich than theirs) is o f a contrast o f bipolar evaluations (true-false) with continuous evaluations (better-worse). 19 We may be tempted to experiment with a model like David Kaplan’s account o f words as dis­ tributed through space and time (in brains, sound waves, computer electric potentials, paper tracings, and so forth). Cf. Kaplan, D . (1990), “ Words ” ，Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume, v o l.64. Probably something like that will be a more precise metaphysical characteri­ zation, but Kaplan’s model is structured to replace the Platonic type-token model, not to explain language from scratch. For our interpretive purposes, it will be more instructive to see if we can get there from the ancient Chinese point of view (as far as we can understand it). We may find a way to use it here, but it would have to come from the concrete focus o f Chinese thought, not a rephrasing o f a Platonic insight. We may well notice ways to work that solution out differently given our different motivation. 20 For a development o f this idea in ancient Confucianism, see Munro, Donald J. (1969), The Concept o f Man in Early China, Stanford: Stanford University Press. 21 Ames, Roger T. and Henry Rosemont, Jr (trans.) (1998), The Analects o f Confucius: A Philo­ sophical Translation, New York: Ballantine Books, p. 162. Their translation o f junzi (usually “ gentleman” or “ superior man” ）appropriately emphasizes the importance o f modeling in Confucian moral theory. 22 On doubts about this, see Rosemont, Henry, Jr (2003), Confucian Alternative, forthcoming. 23 Brandom, Making it Explicit. 24 McDowell, John (1994), Mind and World, Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 25 Cf. Gibbard, Alan (1990), Wise Choice, Apt Feelings: A Theory o f Normative Judgment, New York: Oxford University Press. 26 The Mo Zi, 39/25/75-81. Interpreters frequently refer to these as “ Confucian terms” . We need only insist that they are the terms in the social practice of discussing morality, which were available to all ancient Chinese moral thinkers. Mo Zi objects that the practices are not the “dao o f the sage kings” - so he doesn’t seem here to be alleging any 天 " tainnature:sky basis fo r his criticism of conventional practice. The terms of criticism reference the tradition. 27 I treat it as significant that M o Zi is discussed and described in the “ history” o f thought leading up to Zhuang Zi in the Zhuang Z i ch. 33 (“ In the Social W orld” ) 一while Confucius and Mencius are absent. 28 Cf. Hansen, Chad (1992), A Daoist Theory o f Chinese Thought, New York: Oxford University Press, p . 118. 29 W illiam James’ characterization o f the preconceptual character of experience in his Principles o f Psychology. Daoists focus on the exit-side confusion, James, despite his pragmatism, on the entry side. 30 Contra Graham, Angus (1981), Chuang Tzu: The Inner Chapters, London: Allen & Unwin, and (1985), Reason and Spontaneity, London and Dublin: Curzon Press.

CHAPTER ELEVEN

“It-self-so-ing" and “Other-ing” in Lao Zi’s Concept of Zi Ran* Qingjie (Jam es) Wang Z i rana is one of the oldest philosophical concepts in China. Lao Zi, the founder of Daoism,1was the one who introduced the concept into Chinese philosophy.2 In the history of Chinese philosophy, zi ran was often used to designate some­ thing which exists above and, in most cases, in opposition to ren weih, i.e., something made by human beings. Therefore, zi ran is also interpreted as tian ran i.e., something which is made by heaven and has nothing to do with human beings. Clearly enough, this interpretation o f zi ran as tian ran is based upon an absolute separation and antagonism between heaven (nature) and humanity. It then implies that zi ran cannot be achieved without totally rejecting human activities and the human desires behind those activities. Because o f this, Daoism was criticized as a doctrine “ blindly following heaven but ignoring human beings” in the history o f Chinese philosophy.3 In what follows I shall discuss two interrelated aspects o f Lao Z i， s concept of zi ran in light o f contemporary philosophical discussions of self and others. On the basis o f a nontraditional reading o f the chapters where the term zi ran occurs in the Dao-De-Jing, I shall argue, first o f all, that zi ran as Dao is not something above or against human existence. It is rather within the human world as it is within heaven, earth, and everything else in the universe. It is the natural way o f everything’s becoming his/her/itself, i.e., a natural process o f “ it-self-becoming” ， “ it-self-growing” ，and “ it-self-so-ing” . I call it the positive sense of zi ran. In contrast with the positive sense o f zi ran as “ it-self-so-ing” ， the negative sense o f zi ran may be called “ other-ing” , which is also expressed in Lao Z i’s concept o f wu wei. Whether the negative sense o f zi ran or wu wei is understood as “ having-no-activity” ，as “ acting without desires/intentions” , or “ acting with a yielding attitude” , all o f these, I shall claim, are only different ways or means for letting others, helping others, and encouraging others on the ways to their own “ it-self-so-ing” ， i.e., “ other_ing， ， . Following this inter­ pretation, I hope that most o f the traditional “ inconsistent” understandings

* This is a revised version o f my article which, under the original title “ On Lao Z i’s Concept of Z i Ran” ，was published in The Journal o f Chinese Philosophy, v o l.24 (1997). M y thanks go to the JCP for its kindly allowing me to reprint the article here.

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and interpretations o f zi ran, as well as those of wu wei, can have a better and more coherent comprehension.

Etymological meaning of zi ran and its philosophical implications In the English translations o f the Chinese philosophical literature, the term zi ran is often understood as “ nature” ， “ spontaneity” , and currently as “ self-soing” or “ self-becoming" .4 In order to understand the meaning of the term more properly, a brief etymological discussion is necessary.5 As we know, the term zi ran is composed of two Chinese characters, i.e., zi and ran. According to the Shuo Wen lexicon, one o f the oldest Chinese dictionaries written 2000 years ago, the character zi was a pictograph representing a nose (b id) in ancient Chinese.6 However, in ancient classical Chinese texts, zi was rarely used in its literal meaning as “ nose” . Its two extended uses and metaphorical meanings, i.e., its use as a preposition meaning “ from . . . ” and its use as a reflexive adverb meaning “ self- ... " , are the two most common cases we can find in the pre-Qin classical Chinese texts. W. A. Callahan suggests that the connection between the literal meaning o f zi as “ nose" and its extended meanings as “ from . . . ” and as “ self- . . . ” may be seen from the facts in popular Chinese culture. For example, a Chinese often points to her nose, rather than to her heart, in referring to her perspective.7 Compared with zi, which is used in ancient Chinese as a preposition or as an adverb, the other character ran is used in most cases as a “ pronoun” which means “ like this” (ru cie) and has a function of affirmation, meaning “ yes, it is like this!” In order to clarify this affirmative function of ran in ancient Chinese language further, we need to emphasize two more points. First, the word ran, being affirmative, presupposes a process of identification as well as distinction. That is to say, when we say that “ it is like this” ，we presuppose at the same time that “ it is not like that” . Second, as a “ pronoun” ran and its negative, bu ran often had a different use from shig (“ yes” ) and its negative f ei h(“ no” ) in the ancient Chinese language. According to A. C. Graham, the difference between shi and ran was sometimes expressed by Later Mohist philosophers. Whereas shilfei were used to distinguish between names, i.e., to identify or to deny the existence of a thing or o f a quality of the thing, e.g., “ a horse" /“ not a horse” , ranlbu ran were often used to distinguish between propositions, i.e., to affirm or to negate an action, e.g., “ to ride a horse" /“ not to ride the horse" .8 Having clarified the ordinary meaning of the characters zi and ran, we come to that of the combination of them, i.e., the meaning of the term zi ran. Accord­ ing to the grammar of ancient Chinese, if zi has a noun following as in zi dong' (from the east) or zi x i] (from the west), it should be taken as the prepositional “ fro m ... " . I f zi is fo llow ed by a verb as in zi lek (self-enjoying), zi w ei] (self-

defense), zi f a m (self-flourishing), etc., it should be understood as a reflexive

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adverbial “ self- ... " . In the term zi ran, ran follows zi. Although ran is not a verb, it is a verbal pronoun which pronounces a process rather than a thing. It affirms an action rather than a substance or a quality. Therefore, the word zi in zi ran should be understood as the reflexive adverbial “ self . . . " . More­ over, because the English word “ self” has a stronger egoistic tone than the Chinese word zi which refers to the human self but is not restricted to that, I would like to put the neutral pronoun “ it ” before “ self” in order to weaken the egoistic tone o f “ self” . In view o f all these considerations, I propose that the appropriate understanding and translation o f the Chinese term zi ran is “ it-self-so-ing" or “ it-self-becoming” . I will use this translation throughout my discussion. The philosophical importance o f our understanding o f zi ran as " it-selfbecoming” or “ it-self-so-ing-” consists in a twofold implication o f the term. On the one hand, the Chinese character ran indicates that it is “ it-self-becoming” or “ it-self-so-ing” . This “ becoming” or “ so-ing” emphasizes that all things in the universe, including human beings, by their different, unique but correlated ways of being, i.e., coming, growing, flourishing, ripening, declining, and dying, provide a picture of organic differentiation within the larger process of the uni­ verse as a whole. Thus understood, zi ran as “ it-self-becoming” may be more properly seen as “ becoming-it-self” . That is to say, those ways of “ becoming” or “ so-ing” should also be ways o f everyone’s identification, realization, comple­ tion, and individualization. Conversely, the character zi in zi ran reveals that it is “ it-self-becoming” and “ it-self-so-ing” . It emphasizes not only the identifica­ tion but also the distinction between “ it-s e lf" and others. It is thus against any kind o f external interference, oppression, and coercion. According to this inter­ pretation o f zi ran, everything in the universe is both its way o f self-becoming and asks to be left alone in the process o f such becoming or it-self-so-ing. In my view, this twofold implication, or the two aspects o f the original meaning o f the Chinese term zi ran, which I call the positive and the negative sense o f the term respectively, were what Lao Zi tried to reveal through his use o f the term in his Dao-De-Jing.9

“It-self-so-ing” and the positive sense of zi ran in the Dao-De-Jing In order to make Lao Z i， s philosophical understanding o f the term “ zi ran” clearer, let us examine in some detail how he used the term in the Dao-De-Jing. There are five occurrences o f the term zi ran in the Dao-De-Jing. They are Chapters 17, 23, 25, 5 1,and 64 o f the popular Wang Bi version o f the book. I would like to divide these five chapters into two groups in light o f the two senses o f zi ran discussed above. Chapter 25 and Chapter 51 could be seen to focus on the positive sense of zi ran, while Chapter 17, Chapter 23, and Chapter 64 focus on the negative sense o f the term.

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In the past 2000 years o f Chinese philosophy these two senses, especially the positive sense o f zi ran, seemed not very clear in our understanding of Lao Zi. One reason for this, I think, is that Chapter 25 and Chapter 51 of the Dao-DeJing have been continuously misread in the past. The traditional reading of Chapter 25, for example, suggests a hierarchical ranking o f the universe with human beings on the lowest level. Therefore, in order to reach the highest rank, which is dao and zi ran, a human being should diminish or restrict herself by modeling herself after earth, and then, through earth, after heaven, and then, through earth and heaven, after dao and zi ran. Following this reading we Chinese were taught for a long time that Lao Zi and Daoism gave us a pessimistic philosophy o f life which leads to a rejection of the self and human value.10 Also based on this understanding o f zi ran and its domination over human beings, wu wein as a negative expression o f zi ran or dao is often inter­ preted as to teach human beings “ doing nothing" .11 The problem can be seen more clearly in the traditional reading and transla­ tion o f Chapter 25, which says:

Dao is great. Heaven is great. Earth is great. And the human being12 is also great. There are four great things in the universe, And the human being is one o f them. Human beings model themselves after Earth. Earth models itself after heaven.

Heaven models itself after dao. And dao models itself after zi ran (it-self-so-ing).13 There are two common points shared by almost all important interpreta­ tions and commentaries on this chapter o f the Dao-De-Jing in the history o f Chinese philosophy. First, almost all commentators o f the Dao-De-Jing agree that the last sentence of the chapter cannot be understood in an ordinary sense o f “ modeling” . As a matter of fact, there is nothing to be modeled after except the process o f being the dao itself.14 For example, Wang Bi (A D 221-244), maybe the most important commentator o f the Dao-De-Jing in the history of Chinese philosophy, makes this point very clear. He says, “ To follow zi ran as its standard is to model after the square while within the square and the circle while within the circle, and not oppose zi ran in any way." 15 Second, we are told that Lao Zi gave us a hierarchical order of the universe with the dao at the top, human beings at the bottom, and with heaven and earth in between, though all o f them are called the “ great” . Because o f this interpretation, we human beings became the “ smallest” of the four “ great” . The interesting thing is that these two points have been repeated for thousands o f years, but few pointed out that they are actually inconsistent with each

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other. This inconsistency, in my view, can be seen at least from the following three considerations. First, there is a grammatical inconsistency. I f “ ：i ran” cannot be used as something referring to an entity or to an object o f the modeling here, how can the other terms such as “ dao” , “ heaven", and “ earth” be used in that way, especially when we consider that all those four sentences have exactly the same grammatical structure? Second, there is a semantic inconsist­ ency in using the word “ great” . I f the universe follows the hierarchical order as those traditional Lao Zi commentators suggested, how can we legitimately call human beings “ great”？I f human beings must “ model” themselves after, and thus are inevitably restrained by, earth, heaven, and dao, are they still “ great”？ I f so, what is the difference between the “ greatness” of heaven, earth, dao and that o f human beings? Third, there is a logical inconsistency in using the term o f zi ran. As we have discussed above, the term zi ran implies a strong sense of “ it-self-so-ing” . How is it logically possible to say, as most of the traditional commentaries have suggested, that not only dao, but also heaven, earth, and human beings, should fa zi ran0 (to be “ it-self-so-ing” )，on the one hand, and that human beings’ “ it-self-so-ing” must also be mediated through “ modeling” after earth and heaven, on the other hand? Does that make human beings not “ it-self-so-ing” or at least less “ it-self-so_ing”？ In order to avoid all these problems or inconsistencies, I would like to intro­ duce a nontraditional reading and give a different interpretation o f Chapter 25 o f the Dao-De-Jing, This nontraditional reading was first made by a Daoist scholar Li Yuep in the Tang Dynasty (AD 618-907).16The reading changes the traditional punctuation of the last four sentences and reads some words, e.g., daq (great), tian" (heaven), d i (earth), etc. as verbs instead o f as adjectives or nouns. I believe that this reading w ill not only be well supported by textual evidence from the Dao-De-Jing itself, but w ill also provide a much clearer picture o f the positive sense o f Lao Z i， s concept o f zi ran. In comparison with the traditional reading above, this reading could lead to a new translation o f Chapter 25 as: Dao is great-ing (dao da). Heaven is great-ing (tian da). Earth is great-ing (di da). And the human being is also great-ing (ren ye da1). There are four great-ing in the universe (guo zhong you si da11), And the human being is one of them (er ren ju qi yi y a r ). Human beings model themselves after earth’s being earth (ren fa di diw), after heaven’s being heaven (fa tian tiarf), after dao’s being dao (fa dao daoy); [that is,] after zi-ran/it-self-so-ing (fa zi ran). Along with a change o f the reading, our old understanding o f Chapter 25 o f the Dao-De-Jing would also be changed. First, this reading does not hold a

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hierarchical order in the universe. The relation among dao, heaven, earth, and human beings is parallel rather than hierarchical. It is in this sense that Lao Zi called the human being “ one o f the four great-ing” . Thus understood, the human being， s modeling after earth's being earth, heaven's being heaven, and dao’s being dao is not restrained by any of the external entities. Just like earth’s being earth, heaven’s being heaven, and dao’s being dao, the human being has its own way o f being. Therefore, to model after earth's being earth, heaven’s being heaven, dao's being dao is to ask a human being to be itself and that is “ it-self-so-ing” (zi ran). Second, the reading o f da in “ di da” ，t i an da” ，“ dao da” , and “ ren ye da” as a verb rather than an adjective leads us to the interpre­ tation that earth, heaven, dao, and human beings are always in the process o f changing, becoming, growing, living, and being. That is ‘‘so-ing"lran.鼠 It corre­ sponds also to the above reading o f the second di in “fa di d i ” ，the second tian in “fa tian tian ” ，and the second dao in “fa dao dao” as verbs rather than as nouns. Clearly enough, here di di (earth's being earth), tian tian (heaven's being s illustrations of di da (earth heaven), and dao dao (dao's being dao) are Lao Z i， is great-ing), tian da (heaven is great-ing), and dao da (dao is great-ing).17 There might be two possible objections against this nontraditional reading and interpretation o f Chapter 25 o f the Dao-De-Jing. First, someone may claim that the new punctuation of the last four sentences of the chapter and the use o f the second di, tian, and dao as verbs rather than nouns is incompatible with the custom o f the traditional punctuation and with the traditional use o f those words in the ancient Chinese language. Second, someone may argue further that the interpretation o f the relation among human beings, earth, heaven, and dao not as hierarchical but parallel is not consistent with Lao Z i’s thought o f the hierarchical order o f the creation o f the universe expressed in some other places in the Dao-De-Jing, e.g., in the well-known Chapter 42, where the order of the creation o f the universe is given. It seems easier to answer the first objection, which is more technical. In the pre-Qin classical literature it is not very hard to find similar ways of punctua­ tion and o f using the same word twice with one o f them as a verb. As Li Yue pointed out,18 the most famous example can be seen in 12.11 of the Analects: Duke Jing of Qi asked Confucius about government. Confucius replied,

“Let the prince be a prince (jun junz), the minister a minister (chen chenm), the father a father (fu fu Ah) and the son a son (zi zi ac).,,!9 Besides the Analects, we can also find similar cases in the Daoist classics such as in the Zhuang Zi, even in the Dao-De-Jing itself.20 As for the answer to the second objection, I would like to change the punctua­ tion o f the first four sentences o f Chapter 42 too and to introduce a new reading o f it in light o f my interpretation o f Chapter 25. As we know, the traditional reading of Chapter 42 of the Dao-De-Jing says:

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Dao produced the one. The one produced the two. The two produced the three. And the three produced the ten thousand things. This traditional reading and interpretation has been used for thousands o f years for the explanation of Lao Z i ， s, as well as the dominant Chinese, view of the creation process o f the universe and served as the philosophical grounding of the Chinese cosmology. However, it seems to me that there is no reason why we cannot read, if it might not be called a better reading, Chapter 42 o f the Dao-De-Jing in the same way as we read Chapter 25. Hence, according to my new reading and interpretation, Chapter 42 could be translated as: Through dao emerges one’s being one, two’s being two, three’s being three, and emerge [in the same way] the ten thousand things. This new reading and interpretation o f Chapter 4 2 , like that I provided for Chapter 25, does not accept dao as an absolute entity which is the substantified creator o f the universe. Rather, it suggests a naturalistic process o f becoming, growing, and being, and therefore has legitimized each individual's unique being in the universe.21 That is, in my view, the true spirit of Lao Z i， s zi ran and dao.22 Thus understood, there is no inconsistency between Chapter 25 and Chapter 42 of the Dao-De-Jing. In other words, Chapter 42 should not be seen as a refuta­ tion o f my interpretation o f Chapter 25. It is rather a strong support for it. In light o f the above reading and interpretation o f Chapter 25 and Chapter 42 o f the Dao-De-Jing, it should be easier to see Chapter 51 as another place where Lao Zi discusses his positive sense o f zi ran. Compared with Chapter 25, where Lao Zi talked about zi ran o f the human being, earth, and heaven, Chapter 51 seems to focus on the zi ran o f the ten thousand things in the universe. Here is my translation o f Chapter 51 o f the Dao-De-Jing: Through dao ten thousand things have emerged and are alive.23 Through de (virtue) they get fostered, Through wu (thing-ing) they get configured, Through qi (instrumental doing) they get completed and finished.24 Therefore the ten thousand things esteem dao and honor de (virtue). Dao is esteemed and de is honored without having merit. They appropriate themselves as zi ran (it-self-so-ing). Therefore, because of dao the ten thousand things have emerged and are

alive, They are fostered, They are growing, nurturing, maturing, ripening, reserving, and declining. To keep alive without possession, To act without holding on to, To grow without lording over, This is called the profound de (virtue).

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Very clearly, this chapter discusses the relation between dao and the growing, living, and existing o f the ten thousand things. To me, at least two implications can be derived from my reading of the chapter. First, just as in Chapter 25 and in Chapter 42, dao is not understood as a substantified and transcendent entity which exists beyond or outside the existence of the ten thousand things. That is to say, there is no “ causal creator” o f the universe and of the ten thousand things. Dao is rather a process and a force going on within and with every one of the ten thousand things. It may not be the case, as the traditional interpreta­ tion holds, that dao as the “ creator” shows mercy by “ keeping alive without possession” ，“ acting without holding on to " , and “ growing without lording over” . Instead, if there is no “ creator” at all, such things as “ possession” , “ holding on to ” ，and “ lording over” cannot obtain even in the first place.25 Second, everything has its unique way o f existence as “ growing, nurturing, maturing, ripening, reserving, and declining” . That is, a natural and spontaneous way which makes one thing be itself, and therefore to be distinguished from being anything else. From both o f these, we can once again see the positive dimension o f Lao Z i’s zi ran.

Wu wei, “other-ing" ,and the negative sense of zi ran in the Dao-De-Jing Chapters 17, 23, and 64 are three other places where the term zi ran occurs in the Dao-De-Jing. Unlike Chapter 25 and Chapter 51，these three chapters seem to give more emphasis on wu wei, which can be seen as the negative dimension of zi ran, i.e., noninterference by others. Although a comprehensive discussion o f wu wei is not the main task o f this essay, I do think that my interpretation and discussion o f the positive sense of Lao Z i’s zi ran w ill help us to understand better Lao Z i’s concept o f wu wei. That is to say, wu wei as a Daoist philosophical guiding principle for human behaviors might not be fully understood without a positive understanding o f zi ran. There are at least three major interpretations o f Lao Z i， s and the Daoist concept o f wu wei in the history o f Chinese philosophy.26 Among them, the simplest one is the literal interpretation o f the term as “ doing nothing” ，which can be seen from the concept of wu shidd (“ having-no-activity” ）in the Dao-DeJing (e.g., in Ch. 2, 48, 57，and 63). Although this interpretation reflects some of the earliest Daoist hermits' genuine attitude to life27 and was popular among critics o f Daoism, it was not accepted by the mainstream o f philosophical Daoism in history.28 Compared with the first interpretation, which focuses on “ doing som ething" or “ doing nothing” ，the second one focuses on “ having intentions/desires” or “ not-having intentions/desires” of an agent in her doing things. The interpretation o f wu wei as unintentional spontaneity is also de­ scribed by Lao Zi as wu yude (“ no-desire" e.g., in C h .1， 3, 34， 57, and 64), wu xin af (“ no-mind” , e.g., in Ch. 49), or wu yi weidg (“ purposeless” ， e.g., in Ch. 38).29

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In the third interpretation o f the term, wu wei is seen as action which does not force, but yields. It strongly recommends a passive or a soft attitude rather than an aggressive or a strong attitude of action. In the Dao-De-Jing, we are given not only a family o f terms, but also several famous metaphors to illus­ trate this soft and yielding attitude: the terms such as that o f sedh (“ withholding", Ch. 59), jia n m(“ being frugal" Ch. 67), rou ruod] (“ softness and weakness” , Ch. 79), wei xiadk (“ to place oneself below others", Ch. 61), wu zi al (“ to grasp nothing", Ch. 64),f u am (“ to help", Ch. 64), shundn (“ to follow ” , Ch. 23), ciAO (“ deep love" , Ch. 67)，bu zhengdp(''not competing" , Ch. 3， 8，and 22), and bu gan wei tian xia xiandq (“ not daring to be ahead of the world” ， Ch. 67)，the meta­ phors such as those o f water (Ch. 78), female (Ch. 10)，and infant (Ch. 10). In the scholarship o f the Dao-De-Jing and Daoism these three interpreta­ tions o f wu wei co-exist. Obviously, they are not always compatible with each other.30 For example, the first interpretation advocates absolute nonaction while the second and the third interpretations do not. In order to explain or to avoid the problem o f the incompatibility, scholars either prefer a political rather than a purely philosophical interpretation o f wu wei, or else they trace the different origins o f the ideas o f wu wei back to the early Daoists. According to the latter approach, these different ideas o f wu wei have been, by their nature, inconsistent with each other from the very beginning.31 The incompatibility was also explained by a historical development o f the concept of wu wei in the Chinese political and philosophical tradition from Confucius, early Daoists, and Zhuang Zi to the Legalists and the Huang-Lao Daoists in the Huai-Nan-Zi.drl2 Although all o f these explanations make sense to some extent and from some perspectives, they do not seem to have paid enough attention to the ontological difference between “ I ” and the “ other” which, in my point o f view, is assumed by and thus is crucial to all the three major interpretations o f Lao Z i’s wu wei. That is to say, we should understood the true philosophical spirit o f Lao Z i’s wu wei not only as something refraining or even eliminating the action or the desire of the action from the agent, but also, or more import­ antly, as something requiring the agent to recognize and to have respect for the existence and the distinctness o f the recipients o f that action, i.e .，the existence and the distinctness o f the other. In light o f my previous discussion o f the positive sense of zi ran as “ it-self-becoming” ，or “ it-self-so-ing", I would like to call this negative dimension o f zi ran “ other-ing” . I would also like to claim that only on the basis o f the principle o f “ other-ing” ，according to which every unique and distinct way o f existence should not be arbitrarily interfered with, coerced, or oppressed from outside,33 can Lao Z i’s concept of wu wei be clarified and interpreted in a better way. Let us now see how this principle of other-ing expresses itself as wu wei, i.e., the negative sense o f zi ran, in Chapters 17, 23, and 64 o f the Dao-De-Jing, where Lao Z i’s term zi ran occurs. For example, at the beginning of Chapter 23

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Lao Zi says: “ xi yan zi ra ifs” . Traditionally, the sentence is translated as “ Nature says few words." 34 Here, zi ran is understood as an entity and as the subject of the sentence. I doubt this reading and understanding. There are at least two problems in this understanding. First, this popular and traditional translation and interpretation of zi ran as an entity seems to be inconsistent with all other places where the term is used in the Dao-De-Jing?5 Second, in ancient Chinese, yandi (saying) like mingdU (naming) indicated an active saying as well as a command, and thus is against dao?6 That is why Lao Zi repeated saying that dao o f rulership by its nature is wu yandW(nonaggressive saying), wu mingdW (nonpositive naming). Also, because o f that, zi ran was later understood as being against ming jia o dX (naming-morals/institution) in the Neo-Daoism of the Wei and Jin period (AD 220-420). Accordingly, not zi ran but a ruler, as in most o f Lao Z i’s sayings, should be understood as the real subject o f the sentence.37 Thus, a better translation and interpretation of the first sentence o f Chapter 23 o f the Dao-De-Jing would be: “ Seldom issuing commands is in accordance with zi ran" This interpretation o f zi ran as “ seldom issuing commands (from the ruler)” can be seen more clearly in Chapter 17 of the Dao-De-Jing where the concept of zi ran is also used. The chapter may be translated as follows:

The best (rulers) are those whose existence is (merely) known by the people. The next best are those who are loved and praised. The next are those who are feared. And the next are those who are despised. It is only when one does not have enough trust/faith (xindy) in others that others will have no trust/faith in him. [The great rulers] value their ‘‘yan" highly.

Tasks have been accomplished successfully and works completed. Nevertheless people say: I am simply being natural/my-self-so-ing (wo zi ra n az).

Having combined Chapter 17 and Chapter 23，we may see that for Lao Zi zi ran (being natural or it-self-so-ing) is different for a ruler and for common people. They have different ways of “ it-self-so-ing” . On the one hand, from the side o f a ruler, zi ran means not, or seldom, issuing commands or wu wei. On the other hand, from the side o f the people, thanks to noncommanding or noninterference by the ruler, people can complete their own works o f living in the way of zi ran as “ self-becoming” or “ self-so-ing” . Putting these two sides together, Lao Zi led us to his famous conclusion of the appropriation o f dao or o f zi ran as “ nonaction but nothing is left undone" .39 Here “ nonaction" refers to the side o f ruler or superiors, to the negative sense o f zi ran, while “ nothing is left undone” refers to common people or inferiors, to the positive sense o f zi ran. Just like all other pairs such as youhd and wubb, yinbc and yangbd, etc., in the Dao-De-Jing, these two sides are differentiated from each other, but are

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always complementary to each other as indispensable partners. For a ruler, “ the people” is a different “ other” and thus has its own way o f “ self-so-ing” . Recognition of such other-ing is the basis for a ruler to adopt wu wei, that is, to leave alone people’s “ self-so-ing” . Without the wu wei o f the ruler, there would be no “ self-so-ing” of the people, i.e., the other relevant to the ruler. O f course, the zi ran o f other as the other-ing in Lao Zi, as I have discussed about the positive sense of zi ran above, should not be understood as something entified or substantified, e.g., essence. It is rather something unnamed, ungrasped, and uncomprehended. These are “ ways (dao)" o f others.40 Sometimes Lao Zi called this other-ing sacred, and something with which one must not interfere.41 Also, because wu wei as “ seldom issuing commands” (Ch. 23) or “ being frugal in giving commands” (C h .17) is based on a recognition o f the “ other-ing", Lao Zi emphasized the word “ faith/trust” (xin) in Chapter 17. According to Lao Zi, a ruler should first o f all “ trust or have a faith in others/people” in order to be the true and the best ruler, otherwise he would not be really trusted (bu xinbe) by others/people. That is, he would be merely “ loved and praised, (qin yu zhibf ) " “ feared ( wei zhibg)" or even “ despised (ru zhibh)". This recognition o f and respect for “ it-self-so-ing” and “ other-ing” does not necessarily lead to “ doing nothing” or “ letting being alone” . In many cases “ I ” could do something to the “ other” without interfering or blocking its way toward “ it-self-so-ing” . It would rather help or support this “ it-self-so-ing” . This helpful support without interference is called by Lao Zi fu i in Chapter 64，the fifth and last place where zi ran occurs in the Dao-De-Jing. In that chapter, Lao Zi said:

[Thus the sage] is able to help/support (fu) the ten thousand things in their ways toward “ self-so-ing” (zi ran) but dares not to act/interfere. Here wu wei is interpreted as “ helping or supporting things in their ‘selfso-in gs'" . But this interpretation is still pretty vague and thus needs further discussion. First, Lao Z i， s concept o f fu indicates that the key to understanding wu wei consists neither in “ doing something” nor in “ doing nothing” ，neither in “ doing with intention/desire” nor in “ doing without intention/desire” . Rather, the point is how to do things so as to fit or support the “ it-self-so-ing" o f the thing.42 In some situations I ought not to do anything because that is the best way to support (fu) the “ it-self-so-ing” o f things. In some other situations I may need to do something because that is the best way.43 Therefore, wu wei as either one of the above mentioned senses is only a means toward zi ran (it-selfso-ing) while zi ran should be the end o f wu wei. That is to say, zi ran might call for “ having-no-activity", but “ having-no-activity” is neither necessary nor suffi­ cient for leading to zi ran (it-self-so-ing). The basis for us to judge an action as

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wu wei or not is to see whether it is to support/help (fu ) a thing’s zi ran (it-self-so-ing). Second, if we should understand Lao Z i， s wu wei in light o f zi ran, the next question would be how to judge whether what I do really supports/helps rather than interferes with or blocks a thing’s zi ran (it-self-so-ing). Fung Yu-lanbj suggests that wu wei as fu zi ran means that . . . a man should restrict his activities to what is necessary and what is natural. “ Necessary” means necessary to the achievement of a certain pur­ pose, and never overdoing. “ Natural” means following one’s [d]e with no arbitrary effort.44

To me, Fung’s suggestion does not take us a step forward, as we may still ask how one judges whether one’s action is overdoing or arbitrary. What is the criterion for judging “ necessary” or “ natural” action? How can I know the “ it-self-so-ing” of the other in order to behave “ necessarily” and “ naturally ”？ I f I take the other as the criterion of the judgment, how do I know whether this other has the real criterion or not? I f I take myself to be the criterion, how can I really avoid overdoing or arbitrariness?45 In order to find a way to solve such problems, I suggest changing our tradi­ tional way o f asking the question. I f wu wei, as discussed above, should be understood from zi ran, and if zi ran must be understood as nonsubstantial “ it-se lf-so -in g " , then simply to ask about doing “ what” ，as Fung did, may be misleading. Any affirmative answer to the “ what” question or to the ques­ tion o f the criterion for what is necessary and natural for the “ other’s” zi ran (it-self-so-ing) would treat zi ran as an entity and would thus eliminate the other-ing o f the other. Because of this, Lao Zi said in the famous first chapter of the Dao-De-Jing: The dao that can be told of is not the authentic dao. The name that can be named is not the authentic name.

Thus understood, when Lao Zi defined wu wei as fu zi ran in Chapter 64, what he was really interested in, from my point o f view, is not a question such as how “ I ” can “ know” or “ name” the other’s “ it-self-so-ing” or “ identify” myself with the other’s known “ it-self-so-ing” . It is rather a question o f how “ I ” can behave in such a way that the other’s “ it-self-so-ing” will have the maximum room for growth and realization. I think that those are two different questions. One is a theoretical question o f “ what to know " , w h ile the other is a practical question of “ how to do” . The answer to the first question assumes or requires my knowledge of the other’s zi ran (it-self-so-ing), but the answer to the second question may not necessarily involve such an assumption or requirement. It requires rather an attitude, e.g., showing respect for the other’s zi ran. This attitude “ recognizes" the other-ing o f the other but does not need to specify

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what the other-ing o f the other is. When Lao Zi put “ helping and supporting the ten thousand things in their ways toward ‘it-self-so-ing' ” (fu zi ran) to­ gether with “ not dare to interfere with” (fu gan weihk) in Chapter 64，he did not provide any criterion. Rather, he advocated a soft or yielding attitude such as se (withholding), or wei xiah] (to place oneself below others), so that the other things are not only allowed, but also encouraged to be in their ways o f “ it-selfso-ing” . This soft and yielding attitude should not be interpreted simply as something passive or as a rejection o f participation o f any kind. It is rather an attitude that calls for, or invites, a better kind o f participation. Therefore, all the three traditional interpretations o f wu wei can be consist­ ently and coherently explained on the basis o f the principle o f “ the other-ing” , which is the key to understanding the negative sense o f Lao Z i’s concept o f zi ran, i.e., “ noninterference by the other” . Here, whether wu wei expresses itself as “ h a vin g -n o a ctivity" , as “ acting without desire/intention” , or “ acting with a yielding attitude” ，all o f these are only different ways or means for let­ ting others, helping others, or encouraging others on the way (dao) to their own “ self-so-ings” . Which way will best serve this purpose will depend on specific situations. Therefore, it is neither necessary nor appropriate to argue about which is the only, or true, interpretation o f wu wei.

Conclusion Above, I have examined all five occurrences of Lao Z i， s concept o f zi ran in the Dao-De-Jing and discussed both the positive and the negative senses oi it. In this way, I attempt to provide a relatively coherent and comprehensive picture o f Lao Z i 's zi ran in the Dao-De-Jing. In sum, the positive sense o f Lao Z i， s zi ran insists that all things in the universe have their own unique and indispens­ able “ it-self-so-ing” . A ll things are emerging, growing, flourishing, ripening, declining, demising, and there need be no creator before or beyond these natural ways of “ it-self-so-ing” . In light of the positive sense o f zi ran, we could see that the negative sense o f the term is only the other side o f the same zi ran. That is to say, the positive sense o f zi ran as everything’s “ it-self-so-ing” implies that any kind o f coercion, interference, or oppression o f the “ it-self-so-ing” should be reduced, eliminated, and morally blamed, and that the sphere of “ other-ing” and the other must be established and respected. I must caution, however, that the terms such as “ self” or “ other” in my dis­ cussion should not be understood in an absolute or a strong substantial and dualistic sense, which, as we are told, dominate the modern understanding o f nature in the West.46 M y discussion of Lao Z i’s concept o f fu in our under­ standing o f the negative sense o f zi ran has already indicated that there is not, and should not be, an absolute separating line between “ self” and the “ other” . Fu cannot be possible without an ontologically assumed common

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ground between my “ it-self-so-ing” and that of the “ other” . That was expressed in a famous Chinese philosophical slogan —" Everything between heaven and earth belongs to the same body." 47 However, that all things belong to the same body does not mean that there is no differentiation among them. Therefore, in understanding Lao Z i’s concept o f zi ran, we should avoid two extremes. One extreme is to substantialize both “ self” and the “ other” ，so that the “ it-self-so-ing” or zi ran becomes the “ essence” of existence and the “ object” of knowledge. The other extreme is to eliminate completely both “ self” and the “ other” , so that the “ it-self-so-ing” or zi ran is reduced to some kind o f pure emptiness or totally indeterminable random spontaneity. In both cases, we would lose the “ it-self-so-ing” . The advantage o f Lao Z i’s interpretation o f zi ran, an attempt to take a “ middle way” between the two extremes, consists, as I have discussed above, in his treating zi ran primarily as a practical issue rather than as a theoretical one. Following this way, theoretical paradoxes such as “ no-action but nothing is left undone” (wu wei er wu bu weibm) and “ being able to help and support the ten thousand things in their ways toward ‘it-self-so-ing' but daring not to act and interfere” (neng fu wan wu zhi zi ran er fu gan weibn) turn out to be practically efficient guidelines, just as Si-ma Tanbo, a sympathizer o f Daoism in the early Han period, correctly commented: The Daoists advocate not acting, but they also say that, by virtue o f this non-action, nothing is left undone. The content o f these words is easy to put into practice, but the words themselves are difficult to understand.48

Notes 1 There is a controversy about the authorship o f the Dao-De-Jing in the history o f Chinese philosophy. M y discussion here simply follows the traditional saying that Lao Zi was the founder o f Daoism and the author o f the Dao-De-Jing. 2 Zhang, Dai-nian (1982), Zhong-Guo-Zhe-Xue-Da-Gangbp [The History o f the Philosophical Problems in China], Beijing: The Chinese Social Science Press, p. 421. 3 See Xun Z i: Jie-Bibq, in v o l. 2 o f Zhu-Zi-Ji-Cheng br [Collection o f Classics] (1954), 8 vols, Beijing: Zhong Hua Books. 4 There are several problems of these existing English translations. For example, first, the trans­ lation o f zi ran as “ nature” may misread it as a noun which refers to an entity rather than to a process of growing and becoming. Second, the translation o f “ spontaneity” may miss the “ active” sense o f the term zi ran. Third, “ sdf-so-ing” or “ self-becoming” may mislead our understanding o f the term to fall into an egoistic trap, i.e., to make the naturalistic process “ personalized” . 5 The etymological interpretation and discussion o f zi ran in this section follows greatly from W. A. Callahan’s linguistic discussion of Lao Z i’s zi ran. However, I do not agree with his philosophical interpretation. It seems to me that his interpretation gives too strong an im­ pression that Lao Zi is a perspectivist philosopher. Moreover, his translation o f zi ran as “ perspectival action-discrimination” sounds awkward to a Chinese ear. It may serve as one o f the possible interpretations rather than, as he preferred, a translation. For more about Callahan’s translation and discussion, see Callahan, W. A. (1989), “ Discourse and Perspective

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in Daoism: A Linguistic Interpretation o f zi ran” ，Philosophy East and West, v o l.39, no. 2, April, pp. 171-189. 6 Xu Shen (1963), Shuo- Wen-Jie-Zihs Beijing: Zhong Hua Books, p. 74. 7 See Callahan, “ Discourse and Perspective in Daoism: A Linguistic Interpretation o f zi ran ” ， p. 173. 8 See Graham, A. C . (1990), “ ‘Being’ in Western Philosophy Compared with shilfei and youlwu in Chinese Philosophy” , in A. C. Graham, Studies in Chinese Philosophy and Philosophical Literature, Albany: SUNY Press, pp. 322-359. 9 It seems to me that the two senses o f the Chinese term zi ran are very similar to the two senses o f the conception o f freedom or liberty discussed by Isaiah Berlin, i.e., the positive sense and the negative sense o f the concept as “ being free to . . . " and as “ being free from ... ” • See Berlin, Isaiah, (1990), “ Two Concepts o f Liberty” , in Berlin, Isaiah, Four Essays On Liberty, London: Oxford University Press, p p . 118-172.

10 See Note 3. 11 12

13

14 15 16 17

I will discuss the different interpretations o f wu wei in the next section o f the essay. Both Wang Bi’sbt and He Shang Gong’sbu editions of the text have the character “ wangbv/king” instead o f “ renbw/human being” here. The two Silk Manuscripts o f the Lao Z i had wang too. However, Fu Y i,sbx and Fang Y in g Y u a n ， sby texts have ren. M any modern scholars followed Fu and Fan and believed that the replacement of ren by wang was for political reasons. Also, considering that wang is here understood as the representative o f the human being, I follow Fu and Fan’s reading. In most cases o f the translation o f the Dao-De-Jing, I follow Wing-tsit Chan’s translation in Chan, Wing-tsit (1963), A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 139-176, with a reference to D. C. Lau， s translation (1963) Lao Tzu: Tao Te Ching, London: Penguin Classics, and with my modification in some cases. See the commentaries by Wang Bi and He Shang Gong on the text o f the Dao-De-Jing. See Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, p. 321. Li Yue, Lao-Zi-Dao-De-Zhen-Jing-Xin-Zhubz. See Heng, Gao (1956), Lao-Zi-Zhen-Gucl\ Beijing: Classics, pp. 61-62. Generally speaking, there are two basic ways o f use of the word da in the Dao-De-Jing. One is its use as an adjective while the other is its use as a verb. Lao Zi clearly downplayed the former use and favored the latter. For example, in the same Chapter 2 5 , just before Lao Zi calls the human being, earth, heaven, and dao “ great-ing” (da), he gave a verbal interpretation o f da: There is something undifferentiated and yet complete, Wmch existed before heaven and earth. Soundless and formless, it depends on nothing and does not change. It operates everywhere and is free from danger. It may be considered the mother o f the universe. I do not know its name. I call it dao. I f forced to give it a name, I shall call it great-ing (da). Now great-ing means functioning everywhere (shicb). Functioning everywhere means far-reaching (yuancc). Being far-reaching means returning to the origin (fa n cd).

18

If all shi, yuan, fan, which accompany da, are read as verbs, there is no reason then not to read and to interpret da also as a verb, meaning a process o f being great, i.e., being oneself. In some other chapters of the Dao-De-Jing such as Chapters 34, 41,45, and 29, we fina similar use. See Heng, Lao-Zi-Zhen-Gu, p. 62.

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19

See the Analects o f Confucius, trans. A rth u r Waley (1989), New Y o rk: Vintage Books, p. 166.

20

For example, in the Zhuang Z /‘， c h .12, “ tai chu you wu wu cr" (In the beginning nothing is no­ thing); in the Dao-De-Jing, ch. 71,“ y i qi bing bing ye, shi y i bu bing (because the sage recognizes this disease to be disease, he is free from it). This reading may also have strong support from Chapter 54 o f the Dao-De-Jing. It reads:

21

... (The dao o f a) person should be viewed from the person, (The dao of a) family should be viewed from the family, (The dao of a) community should be viewed from the community, (The dao o f a) country should be viewed from the country, (The dao o f the) world should be viewed from the world. How do I know this to be the case (ran) in the world? Through this (from the cultivation o f virtue in the person to that in the world). 22

23 24

25

26 27

28

29

30

31 32

It is not my intention to claim that my reading o f Chapters 25, 42, etc. o f the Dao-De-Jing is the only way to read and to understand them. What I would like to claim is rather that my reading and interpretation may open another alternative to understand Lao Zi. I hope that this way o f interpretation o f Lao Zi may finally make our understanding o f Lao Z i’s philosophical spirit richer and more coherent. The Chinese word shengcg has two meanings: “ giving birth” and “ keeping alive” . I interpret “ sheng zhich” ，“ x u zh i ci” ，“ ting zhicr", " du zhick,", etc. as saying that it is through or because o f dao that ten thousand things have “ sheng” , “ xu” ， “ ting” ， “ du” , etc. Here I would like to make a distinction between “ being caused by” and “ being so because o f . . . " . “ Being caused by” is a strict causal relation, but “ being so because o f” is not necessarily a causal relation. Because I don’t think Lao Z i， s dao, ded, wucm, qicn should be understood here as substantiating entities, I interpret the relations between them and the ten thousand things as the latter rather than as the former. That is to say, they are not creators of, but different ways of, ten thousand things “ it-self-so-ing” . This Daoist spirit can be seen later in Hui Neng’sc0 interpretation o f Chan Buddhism in his famous verse, “ Fundamentally perfect wisdom has no tree / Nor has the bright mirror any stand / Buddha nature is forever clear and pure / Where is there any dust?” See Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, p. 432. See also David L o y， s discussion o f this in his (1985) " Wei- Wu- Wei: Nondual A ctio n ” , Philosophy East and West, v o l.35, n o . 1 ,January, pp. 73—76. Herrlee G. Greel described it as “ ... the idea o f complete nonparticipation in worldly affairs” . See Greel, Herrlee G . (1970), “ On the Origin o f Wu Wei" , in What is Taoism?, Chicago: The University o f Chicago Press, p. 76. For example, Guo Xiangcp (died A D 312), a major commentator o f Zhuang Zi, criticized this interpretation o f wu wei by saying: “ Hearing the theory o f wu wei, some people think that lying down is better than walking. These people are far wrong in understanding the idea o f Zhuang Z i.” in Guo, Qingfan, Zhuang-Zi-Ji-Shicq, in v o l.3 o f Zhu-Zi-Ji-Cheng [Collection o f Classics] (1954), 8 vols, Beijing: Zhong Hua Books. A development of this interpretation leads to a Buddhist rejection o f both the agent and the recipient o f an action, e.g., no-self and no-objects. A contemporary view o f this interpretation can be seen in Loy, " Wei- Wu- Wei: Nondual Action” . Creel made a distinction between “ contemplative” Daoism and “ purposive” Daoism and pointed out that “ logically and essentially they are incompatible” . See “ On Two Aspects in Early Daoism” ，in What is Taoism?, p. 45. See Creel’s discussion o f this in his “ On Two Aspects in Early Daoism” ，in What is Taoism? An extensive and historical study on the concept o f wu wei in the ancient history o f Cninese philosophy can be found in Ames, Roger (1983), The A rt o f Rulership —A Study in Ancient Chinese Political Thought, Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.

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Because o f this, we can see why the concept o f zi yo u 1(freedom) comes out o f zi ran later in Chinese philosophy. 34 For examples, see Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, p. 151; Chen, Ellen M . (1989), The Dao Te Ching, New York: Pragon House, p. 113. 35 See Chapters 25, 51,17, and 64. 36 For example, in the Z h o u -L i' "ya n' was defined as a saying which is initiative and active and ‘‘yuct” as a saying which is corresponding and passive. See Kang Xi Z i Diancu (1958), Beijing: Zhong Hua Books, p . 1146. 37 Here I follow H. G. Creel and A. C. Graham and interpret the sentence from a perspective of political philosophy. As Graham emphasized in his comparison between Lao Zi and Zhuang Zi, “ Lao-tzu, which is written from the point o f view o f the prince, is pervaded by an awareness of the uselessness of trying to control political forces, which, however, the ruler can guide by locat­ ing the crucial points and moments and exerting the minimum pressure to the maximum effect.” See Graham, A. C . (1986), Chuang-Tzu - The Inner Chapters, London: Mandala, p. 170. 38 I follow Gu-ying Chen’s interpretation and Ames and Young’s translation. See Chen, G u­ ying (1984), Lao-Zi-Zhu-Shi- Yu-Ping-Jiacv. Beijing: Zhong Hua Books, pp. 157-160. 39 The Dao-De-Jing, Chapter 37, Chapter 48. 33

40

It should be noticed that the idea o f “ other” which is contained in Lao Z i’s negative sense o f

41

“ zi ran" as " wu wei” is not that o f the absolute other, e.g., the “ other” who has nothing to do with the “ I ” or who is against the “ I ” . Everyone is the “ I ” and the “ other” at the same time. It is the “ I ” in the sense that it has its unique and distinct way of “ it-self-so-ing” . It is also the “ other” in the sense that it is an “ other” o f another “ I ” . Therefore, on the one hand, as an “ I ” it should be against any kind o f outside interference or coercion, which could block or interfere with its “ self-so-ing” . On the other hand, as an “ other” it should also recognize and respect the other “ I ” s，unique ways o f their “ self-so-ings” . Therefore, according to Lao Zi, a respect for other-ing o f the other is not mercy, or using a more popular contemporary philosophical term, not “ charity” from “ I ” ，from the ruler, or the “ advantaged” . It is rather required by the unnameable and non-substantiated zi ran o f the other itself. For example, in Chapter 29 o f the Dao-De-Jing, the empire or “ all under the sky” is seen as a “ sacred vessel. It should not be acted on. He who acts on it harms it. He who holds on to it loses it.” Roger Ames made a similar point concerning wu wei, but from a different direction, in his “ Putting the [D]e Back into Taoism” when he said: " Wu-wei, then, is a negation o f that kind o f ‘maKing’ or ‘doing’ which requires that a particular sacrifice its own integrity in acting on behalf of something ‘o th e r', a negation o f one particular serving as a ‘means’ for something else's ‘end'. " See Callicott, J. Baird and Roger T. Ames (eds) (1989), Nature in Asian Tradi­ tions o f Thought, Albany: SUNY Press, p. 137. In the Huai-Nan-Zi, a Daoist classic after the Dao-De-Jing and the Zhuang Z i, a later Daoist saw this point very clearly when he said:

42

43

... suppose one were to use fire to dry out a well, or to use the water o f the Huaicw River for irrigating the mountains, that would be to exert the ego-self and thus to behave against zi ran [it-self-so-ing]. Hence, that can be called taking action ( you w e i). Suppose instead one were to use boats on water, wagon on sand, sledges on the mud, and baskets [for transporting earth] in the mountains, making ditches in the summer [when the rainfall occurs] and making retaining ponds in the winter, where the land is high, taking it for agriculture, and where it lies low, using it as ponds. Such would not constitute what I have called "you w ei” .

See the Huai-Nan-Zi, c h . 19, “ xiu ww xuncr". in v o l. 7 o f Zhu-Zi-Ji-Cheng [Collection o f Classics] (1954), 8 vols, Beijing: Zhong Hua Books.

242 44

45 46 47 48

Qingjie Wang Fung, Yu-lan (1948), A Short History o f Chinese Philosophy, New Y o rk: M acm illan, p. 101. This is the question asked by Zhuang Zi in his “ Qi-W u-Luncz” . See Graham, Chuang-Tzu The Inner Chapters, pp. 48-61. See Heidegger, M artin (1959), Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Ralph Manheim, New Haven: Yale University Press, pp. 10-14. See Zhuang Zi, " Tian-Xiada", in v o l.3 o f Zhu-Zi-Ji-Cheng [Collection o f Classics] (1954), 8 vols, Beijing: Zhong Hua Books. Si-ma Qian, Shi-Jiab. I use H. G. Creel’s translation in his What is Taoism?， pp. 51-52.

Chinese glossary a b c

d e

f g h i

j k

1 m n 0

P q r s t u V

w X

y z aa ab ac ad ae af ag ah ai aj ak al

自然 人為 天然 鼻 如此 不然

疋 非 自東 自西 自樂 自衛 自發 無為 法自然 李約 大 天 地 人亦大 國中有四大 而人居一焉 人法地地 法天天 法道道 君君 臣臣 父父 子子 ad 事 無欲 無心 無以為

回 儉 柔弱 為下 無執

“It-self-so-ing” and “O ther-ing” am an ao ap aq ar as at au av aw ax ay az ba bb be bd be bf bg bh bi bj bk bl bm bn bo bp bq br bs bt bu bv bw bx by bz ca cb cc cd ce cf eg ch ci cj ck

輔 順 慈、

不爭 不敢為天下先 淮南子 希言自然 名 4m::レ 無 S 無名 名敎 信 我自然 有 陰 陽 不信 親譽之 畏之 侮之 輔 馮友蘭 弗敢為 為下 無為而無不為 能輔萬物之自然而弗敢為 司馬談 張 岱 年 ：中國哲學大綱 荀 子 ：解蔽 諸子集成 許 慎 ：説文解字 王弼 河上公 王 人 傅奕 范應元 李 約 ：老子道德真經新注 高 亨 ：老子正詁 逝 遠 反 泰初有 以其病病也，是以不病 生 生之 畜之 亭之 毒之

243

244 cl cm cn CO

cp cq cr cs

ct cu cv cw cx

cy cz da

db

Qingjie Wang 德 物 器 慧能 郭象 郭 慶 藩 ：莊子集釋 自由 周禮 全五 卩 n 康熙字典 陳 鼓 應 ：老子注釋興評價 淮 有為 修務訓 齊物論 天下 司 馬 遷 ：史言己

CHAPTER TW ELVE

Eternal Dao, Constant Name, and Language Engagement: On the Opening Message of the Dao-De-Jing* Bo M ou In this essay, through a re-examination o f the opening message o f the DaoDe-Jingd which is delivered by its opening passage consisting o f the first and second six-character statements in Chapter 1， I intend to spell out one o f Lao Z i， s fundamental insights in the Dao-De-Jing on the relation between the ultimate concern with the eternal Daob (chang-Daoc) and its language engagement.1 By “ the language engagement with an ultimate concern” I mean any reflective endeavor to capture (characterize or somehow reach) what is ultimately con­ cerned through language. It is believed that, in the opening message, Lao Zi makes his sharply negative claim in this connection to the effect that any lan­ guage engagement is doomed to fail to capture the genuine Dao. M y view is this: instead o f indiscriminately giving a negative claim against any language engagement with the ultimate concern, in the first six-character statement Lao Zi reveals a two-sided transcendental insight which, on the one hand, positively affirms the role of the language-engaged finite point of view in captur­ ing the ultimate concern and, on the other hand, alerts us to the limitation of the finite point o f view and emphasizes the transcendental dimension o f the Dao as the ultimate concern. Furthermore, in the second six-character state­ ment, through a semantic ascent of talking about the name o f the Dao, Lao Zi delivers essentially the same message, though in a certain distinct way that is philosophically interesting. M y organizational strategy is this. First, I give an analysis o f one traditional paraphrase in English that clearly delivers one prevailing standard interpreta­ tion, and then I explain my paraphrase o f the first six-character statement o f the opening passage. Second, in the context o f the Dao-De-Jing, I spell out

* This essay is a substantial expansion and revision o f an early article under the title “ Ultimate Concern and Language Engagement: A Re-Examination o f the Opening Message o f the Dao-DeJing" , which was published in the Journal o f Chinese Philosophy, v o l. 27, no. 4 (December 2000), pp. 429—439.

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Lao Z i， s two-sided transcendental insight revealed in the first statement. Third, I then explain how, in some philosophically interesting way, Lao Zi delivers essentially the same message in the second six-character statement via a semantic ascent of talking about the name of the Dao.

An analysis of a standard interpretation of the opening statement One of Lao Z i’s most fascinating teachings in his Dao-De-Jing is the first pair o f twelve-character poetized aphorisms in Chapter 1: ( 1 ) Dao-ke-dao-fei-chang-Daod;2

(1*)

Ming-ke-ming-fei-chang- Minge.

which, according to one standard, or the most prevalent, translation, is para­ phrased as follows: The way that can be spoken o f is not the constant way; The name that can be named is not the constant name.3

or The Dao that can be told o f [in language] is not the eternal Dao; The name that can be named [in language] is not the eternal name.4

In this section, I focus on the first six-character aphorism, that is, (1)，on the Dao, which is also called “ the (first) opening statement o f the Dao-De-Jing” in this essay. As far as the first opening statement is concerned, in one crucial connection under discussion, the preceding standard interpretation might even assume the standard paraphrase. In his article “ On the Opening Words of the Lao-Tzu” , Herrlee Creel reviews twenty-nine English translations o f the opening passage. Among them, as Creel sees it, the standard pattern is used in fourteen translations, if some rearrangement and some use of synonyms are tolerated. As I see it, all those twenty-nine translations examined in Creel’s article seem to share the same core structure regarding the opening statement to the effect that the Dao (as a noun) that can or may be dao (as a verb) is not the chang-Dao. It is often thought that what the opening statement reveals is a fundamental Daoist insight that is strikingly similar to that of Wittgenstein’s well-known idea about the spoken and the unspoken: language expressions or formulations, or what is captured within language, cannot really capture what those expressions or formulations aim to say; the genuine Dao has to be captured in a way that is beyond language. It is often said that in Lao Z i， s case, contemplation o f the Dao in silence requires sharply distinguishing the eternal Dao from what can be

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formulated or captured in (or by) language;6 for the two are simply opposed to each other. This view clearly has a bearing on the linguistic structure o f the standard English translations cited previously: (2)

The Dao that can be told o f or formulated (in language) is not the

eternal Dao; That is, as it literally says, the so-called Dao that can be told o f is not the eternal Dao or is not the genuine Dao when the eternal Dao is identified as the genuine Dao; whatever can be told o f in language is not the genuine Dao. In other words, the genuine Dao, as an ultimate concern, simply cannot be captured through language; any language engagement with the genuine Dao is doomed to fail to capture the genuine Dao. Note that this kind o f paraphrasing implies that the first appearance o f the term “ Dao” in noun form in the opening statement o f the Dao-De-Jing does not refer to, or designate, the genuine Dao. I doubt if the preceding standard interpretation o f the opening statement o f the Dao-De-Jing captures the comprehensive point o f what is delivered there, although it does partially capture the point to the extent I w ill explain below. Let me begin with a comparative analysis o f the language structures of the standard translation and the Chinese original. The standard interpretation is essentially a negative paraphrase concerning whether or not the Dao can be captured through language. The message delivered by the standard translation in English, (2), can be paraphrased back into the following (ancient) Chinese expression: (2,)

ke-dao-zhi-Dao-fei-chang-Dao[;

in which “ ke-dao-zhi-Dao” g is the Chinese counterpart o f the complex noun­ phrase “ the Dao that can be told o f” ， which consists of a noun and its attributive clause. Now one question is whether or not, and to what extent, the statement (2), or its Chinese counterpart (2i), is an adequate paraphrase o f the original state­ ment ( I ). Let us examine the paraphrase in two aspects: syntax and semantics. That is, we shall examine: (a) whether or not the syntactic dimension o f such a paraphrase accords with the syntactic structure o f the Chinese original; (b) whether or not the semantic dimension o f such a paraphrase, or its mean­ ing, accords with the meaning o f the Chinese original which, according to the principle o f charity, needs to be coherent with other relevant fundamental insights revealed in the Dao-De-Jing. The paraphrase (2)，in my opinion, fails in both aspects. As far as the syn­ tactic aspect is concerned, (2) does not have the same linguistic or syntactic structure as that o f (1). To see the difference between the paraphrase (2), or (2i ) and the Chinese original (1)，let us compare the Chinese counterpart (2i)

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“ ke-dao-zhi-Dao-fei-chang-Dao” ，o f the statement (2) with the Chinese original (1). In the Chinese original, “ Dao-ke-dao-fei-chang-Dao' as a matter of fact, is a conjunction which consists o f two conjunct claims rather than one: the first one is “ Dao-ke-dao” asserting that the Dao can be talked about in language, while the second one is that what has been characterized in language is not, or cannot exhaust, the eternal Dao1 —which might be paraphrased back into the following Chinese expression: “ [suo-shu-zhi-Daoh] fei-chang-Dao” • That is, a complete presentation o f the two correlative messages in the context o f the first six-character statement might well be given in Chinese in this way: (3)

Dao-ke-dao, er-suo-shu-zhi-Dao-fei-chang-Daol;

or its paraphrase in English: (3j)

The Dao can be talked about in language, but the Dao that has been

talked about in language is not the eternal Dao; or, more exactly, (32)

The Dao can be reached in language, but the Dao that has been characterized in language is not identical with, or does not exhaust, the eternal Dao.

One thing is clear: in (1), the Chinese original “ Dao-ke-dao”] is a positive message delivered via a positive assertive statement, whereas in (2) or (2j), the positive assertive statement is turned into a complex noun-phrase “ the Dao that can be told o f” ，which consists o f a noun and its attributive clause, and then makes its negative contribution to the alleged meaning o f the opening statement with the notion that the Dao that can be told o f is not the eternal Dao ，To this extent, the difference in the syntactic structures o f ( 1 ) and (2) do make a difference in their meanings. This also provides one reason why I think that, semantically speaking, (2) fails to capture what (1 )delivers. Here one can see why and how a certain difference in syntactic structure bears on a difference in semantic dimension, although I cannot generally or systematically discuss this issue here for the sake o f space and topic. Now let us see why (2) fails in the semantic connection for semantic reasons that are independent o f the aforementioned syntactic structure. One clear textual fact is that, throughout the Dao-De-Jing, Lao Zi himself talked about the genuine Dao - the ultimate concern pursued. His language practice in the Dao-De-Jing shows his own language engagement with the ultimate con­ cern. Lao Zi talked even about the eternal Dao (chang-Dao) —exactly in the opening statement. One might object that, although Lao Zi talked about the eternal Dao, he emphasized that he could not clearly characterize the eternal, infinite Dao as the origin o f all things in the universe.9 Fair enough. However,

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note that the second appearance (as a verb) o f the character “ dao” in the opening statement does not merely mean being characterized in descriptive language; rather, it covers a variety o f language-engagement activities, includ­ ing direct reference through rigid designators. One can easily find that the genuine Dao, or even its eternal, constant, and infinite dimension, is reached in language in various ways in the Dao-De-Jing: in the bottom-line case regarding naming, it is rigidly designated either through direct reference (rather than via description) or through description10 by such rigid designators or descriptive (rigid-)designators as “ Dao" , ' ' chang-Dao” ， 1 or “ Da"， ， m.12 In this way, Lao Z i， s own language engagement with the genuine Dao would either render him incoherent with nimself if (2) is correct, or render (2) inadequate if Lao Zi himself is coherent with himself and if one seriously considers the relevant textual evidence in the Dao-De-Jing. By the principles o f charity and o f best explanation, I tend to think that Lao Z i’s language engagement with the genuine Dao in the Dao-De-Jing is essentially coherent, and thus I consider (2) as a semantically inadequate interpretation. Moreover, one would point out that the paraphrase (3), (31) , or (32) adds something that does not appear in (1). Indeed, in comparison with the Chinese original (1), the paraphrase (3) brings back something that is omitted in ( 1):13 it completes the second claim of (1 )with its omitted subject. As suggested above, the paraphrase (2) also provides the logical subject o f the second claim o f (1), ， , albeit by dissolving the first claim o f (1), “ the Dao can be told of in language， and turning the sentential claim into a complex noun-phrase, that is, “ the Dao that can be told o f” . In contrast, the restored logical subject o f the second conjunct claim in (3) is not “ the Dao that can be told o f” in the standard interpretation, but rather “ the Dao that has been described or characterized” (suo-shu-zhi-Dao). One might ask why the logical subject o f the second claim of (1 )should be the latter rather than the former. Let us consider the issue from two angles. First, why does it seem to be inadequate to take “ the Dao that can be told o f” (ke-dao-zhi-Dao) as the logical subject of the second claim? There are two reasons, (i) I f (2) is correct, the first appearance in the context o f the term “ dao” is not used to designate the Dao or the genuine Dao; but it seems very odd that Lao Zi would use the term “ Dao” to designate something other than the Dao when the term as a noun first appears in the Dao-De-Jing. (ii) I f my discussion in the preceding paragraph is correct, the first appearance o f the character “ dao” is indeed used to designate the genuine Dao, and thus “ the Dao that can be talked about” also designates the genuine Dao. Then something incoherent would happen. Given that the eternal Dao is (one dimension or layer o f) the genuine Dao, (2) would make Lao Zi claim that the genuine Dao is not the genuine Dao. Second, why does it seem to be adequate to take the logical subject o f the second ciaim o f (1 )as the one provided in (3)? We first need to make clear what

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“ chang-Dao， " (the eternal Dao) means. In my view, what “ chang-Dao” denotes is not something that is separate from the (genuine) Dao as a whole but one dimension or layer of the Dao: its eternal and infinite dimension that consists in the Dao going on forever and continuously transcending any finite manifesta­ tions of the Dao in wan-wun (ten thousand particular, concrete, and individual things o f the universe) in the course o f its developing and changing process. One who is familiar with the Dao-De-Jing can easily find that, in the classical text, Lao Zi used the character “ dao” in several different senses in its total seventy-three appearances. One might thus ascertain that those different senses indicate that, metaphysically speaking, there are different Daos involved there, such as the so-called ontological-origin Dao, law-like Dao, moral-principle Dao, performance Dao, and so forth. As a matter of fact, Lao Zi did not talk about different Daos; rather, he talked about the same Dao, but one with different dimensions, layers, facets, or manifestations. Those different dimensions or layers might be finite or infinite in character, but all of them are parts of the genuine Dao rather than something separate from the Dao. The Dao as a whole is the unity o f the infinite and the finite, the absolute and the relative, the eternal and the temporary, and so on. In some of the literature, one can find one trend in which the infinite and eternal dimension o f the Dao has been so emphasized that this manifestation o f the Dao is simply taken as the exclusive defining-character o f the genuine Dao. I consider this viewpoint as a one-sided understanding o f Lao Z i’s insight into the Dao. From the Daoist point o f view, any definite descriptions and characterizations o f the genuine Dao are finite in character in view o f the infinite and eternal dimension o f the Dao. In other words, what such descriptions and characterizations have captured in language are the finite parts of the Dao. As I will discuss in the third section below, even Lao Z i’s own characterizations o f the eternal Dao or the eternal dimension of the Dao, say, in Chapters 14 and 25, are considered as finite in character in the sense that what such characterizations capture do not exhaust the eternal Dao. So the Dao that has (so far) been described or characterized in language (suo-shu-zhiDao) is not the eternal Dao in the sense that the former is not identical with the latter, and the former does not, and cannot, exhaust the latter, rather than in the sense that the former is not part o f the genuine Dao or that the former has nothing to do with the latter. Note that, as discussed above, the Dao that can be talked about or reached in language is the genuine Dao rather than the bogus Dao. Also note that, when the term “ dao” as a verb means a variety of ways o f reaching the Dao in language that includes rigid designation through direct reference but is not limited to descriptive characterization in (partially) finite ways, at least the Dao that can be rigidly designated through direct reference can be, or be identical with, the eternal Dao. In this way, what is not the eternal Dao is not the Dao that can be reached in language (ke-dao-zhi-Dao) but the Dao that has (so far) been described or characterized in language (suoshu-zhi-Dao).14

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Lao Z i， s two-sided transcendental view: eternal Dao and its language engagement As the preceding discussion shows, the primary concern o f this essay is by no means merely with how to linguistically translate the fascinating opening statement o f the Dao-De-Jing, but with how to understand one o f the most fundamental Daoist insights in the Dao-De-Jing, which I think is relevant and significant to current philosophical inquiry. The fundamental insight delivered via the opening statement o f the Dao-De-Jing is a two-sided transcendental view. On the one hand, it positively affirms the role o f the language-engaged finite point o f view in capturing the Dao; on the other hand, it alerts us to the limitation o f the finite point o f view and emphasizes the transcendental dimen­ sion of the Dao as the ultimate concern. In the following, let me further explain Lao Z i’s point in his opening statement. The central message is this: in the opening statement o f the Dao-De-Jing, Lao Zi delivers both a positive point o f view and a negative point o f view, as explicitly highlighted in the paraphrase (3), rather than merely a negative one, as set forth in traditional paraphrases like (2). Lao Z i， s guiding principle underlying such a balanced insight is his Yin- Yang methodological vision that highlights the complementarity between two seemingly opposing but inter­ dependent and interpenetrating forces.15In the first assertive claim o f the opening sentence, ‘‘Dao-ke-dao” ，,Lao Zi presents a positive point which asserts the possibility and adequacy o f the language engagement with the Dao: there is no part or dimension o f the Dao that cannot be reached through language; or any part or dimension o f the Dao, or even its eternal dimension, can be some­ how talked about or reached in language. Note that, as suggested above, there is an important difference between the phrases “ being reached” and “ being (descriptively) characterized” ： the former, as emphasized in the last section, covers a variety of ways to talk about the Dao through language, far more than what the latter denotes. For example, among others, rigid designation through direct reference falls under the former, but not under the latter, though the latter does include descriptive designation as I w ill explain in the subsequent section. The Dao that can be talked about or reached through language is (part of) the genuine Dao rather than something else. Still, the preceding point does not amount to saying that the Dao that has been characterized through lan­ guage would be identical with, or could exhaust, the eternal Dao. First, because the eternal Dao goes on forever and keeps changing to transcend its own finite dimension, anything that has so far been (descriptively) characterized in lan­ guage about the Dao only captures the finite part of the Dao that presents itself in a certain finite way. Second, a linguistic expression or formulation that is used to describe and characterize something is limited and confined. In this aspect, however, the proposed elaboration of Lao Z i， s point is quite different from certain traditional views. Some argue that any language expression must

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totally fail to capture the Dao and that the Dao can be captured only through contemplation in silence. The paraphrase (2) suggests this, claiming that the Dao that can be spoken of is not the eternal Dao, anything that is open to the possibility o f being expressed in language is not the genuine Dao. In this regard, A. C. Graham’s view seems to be much more moderate when he explains why there is trouble with words: “ The trouble with words is not that they do not fit at all but they always fit imperfectly; they can help us towards the Way, but only if each formulation in its inadequacy is balanced by the opposite which diverges in the other d ire ctio n .， ， 16 The interpretation presented here is even more moderate than Graham’s to this extent: it is not the case that the language engagement always fits imperfectly. That really depends on which part, dimension, or layer of the Dao is set out to be captured in language engagement and on what kind o f language function is at issue. Let me explain why. First, if a language engagement does not pretend to be exhaustive or conclus­ ive regarding the Dao, but rather takes a finite point of view, it is reasonable to say that what has been captured in language in that case does fit adequately. For example, one might focus merely on a certain aspect or development stage o f the Dao. When a language engagement takes a finite point o f view, what is needed is not to reject such a language engagement per se, or such a finite point of view per se, but to hold a transcendental insight simultaneously, which would alert us to the limitation o f the finite point of view and its due scope. Second, capturing something in language does not necessarily mean imposing a definition or formulation with a certain fixed format, meaning, or usage. For instance, in contrast to mere description and descriptive designation, rigid designation through direct reference is one way to reach the genuine Dao, as Lao Z i， s own language-engagement practice shows. Moreover, language engagement, as suggested in the preceding discussion, does not necessarily, and does not in many cases, take the form o f the linear chain of reasoning typical o f deductive inference; an oft-cited charge against language engagement in this aspect fails to do justice to that fact.

Dao and its names: language engagement via semantic ascent I consider the second six-character statement o f the opening passage o f the Dao-De-Jing to deliver essentially the same message as that delivered by the first six-character statement in a certain philosophically interesting way. As a matter o f fact, various interpretations o f the opening message seem to reach one agreement: there is a close, coherent, and parallel connection between the first and second six-character statements. Indeed, the first six-character statement, staying with the second six-character statement, seems to serve as a semantic reminder for the latter: the name (the first appearance o f the “ ming” q)

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is the name o f the Dao (the first appearance o f the term “ dao” ） ), and the constant name (chang-Mingr) is the constant name o f the eternal Dao (changDao). Nevertheless, there seems to be some tension between the prevailing standard interpretation discussed above and the agreed sense o f the term “ chang-Ming” in the second six-character statement: if the standard interpreta­ tion is right to the effect that any language engagement with the Dao must fail, the constant name (chang-Ming) could not be the linguistic name o f the eternal Dao; for, according to the standard interpretation, the Dao that can be told of in language is simply not the eternal Dao. One immediate apparent advantage of the preceding interpretation of the opening sentence in view o f the meaning o f the second six-character statement is this: it does make sense to talk about the constant name o f the Dao; for the genuine Dao can be talked about in lan­ guage, say, by means of its constant name. Nevertheless, two questions remain: given the preceding interpretation o f the first opening statement and some coherent connection between the first and second six-character statements in the opening passage o f the Dao-De-Jing, how does the second six-character statement as a whole deliver essentially the same message o f the first opening statement in a distinct way? Does such a distinct way go with something philo­ sophically interesting? As presented at the outset o f the first section, the prevailing standard inter­ pretation paraphrases the second six-character sentence (1*)

Ming-ke-ming-fei-chang-Ming

(2*)

The name that can be named is not the constant name.

into

(2*) can be paraphrased back into the following (ancient) Chinese expression: (2 *)

ke-ming-zhi-Ming-fei-chang- Ming,s

in which “ ke-ming-zhi-Ming” 、is the Chinese counterpart o f the complex nounphrase “ the name that can be named” . Following a similar strategy to that employed in examining the first six-character sentence in the first section, we can realize what kinds of serious difficulties stay with (2*) regarding its syntactic structure and thus its subsequent semantic implication. For the sake o f space, I omit the similar syntactic analysis; we can tentatively restore the complete structure o f the second six-character statement in this way: (3*)

Ming-ke-ming, er-suo-ming-zhi-Ming-fei-chang- Ming u;

or its literal paraphrase in English:

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(3*1)

The name can be named, but the name that has been named is not the constant name,

which consists o f two conjunct claims rather than one. A t this point, there is a serious need to elaborate the meanings o f the first claim “ the name can be named (Ming-ke-mingv)” and then o f the logical subject, “ the name that has been named (suo-ming-zhi-Ming)", o f the second claim, both o f which seem to be ambiguous or even odd. It is known that there are three kinds o f naming activities in language practice:(1) descriptively assigning a name to an (any) object or thing17 that meets the descriptive content associated with the name; in this case, the solely descriptive name denotes whatever does fit the description; (2) rigidly, through direct reference (not through description), assigning a name to a certain specific object or thing that does not necessarily meet the descriptive content (if any) associated with the name; in this case, the name rigidly designates that specific referent through direct reference; and (3) rigidly, and descriptively, assigning a name to a certain specific object or thing that necessarily meets the descriptive content associated with the name; in this case, the name rigidly designates and denotes the referent. There are thus three kinds o f names in regard to their naming functions: (1) descriptive names, such as “ the first important Daoist philosopher"， ，(it could be Yang Zhu or Lao Zi or Zhuang Zi or whoever meets the descriptive content o f this descriptive name); (2) rigid designators via direct reference, such as " Dao" used by Lao Zi in the context o f the Dao-De-Jing; (3) descriptive ( rigid-)designators, such as “ Da” in Chapter 25 and " Y i" in Chapter 14，which , were used by Lao Zi himself and can be reasonably assigned to the Dao in the context o f the Dao-De-Jing. Note that the third kind o f naming activities or the third kind o f names, descriptive designators, might go with a certain metaphysical commitment to the nature o f the designatum to the effect that the designatum necessarily and/or uniquely possesses a certain property that is descriptively characterized by the descriptive designator; people use such descriptive designators in certain contexts (say, in certain philo­ sophical contexts). Although there are some significant, and philosophically interesting, distinctions between the names in the (ancient) Chinese ideographic language and the names in phonetic language, the aforementioned three basic naming functions have also evidently been performed by Chinese names, gener­ ally speaking, and, more specifically, by the Chinese character “ ming” and “ Ming” in the context of the Dao-De-Jing. A t this point, it is worth emphasizing that there is no doubt that the Dao-De-Jing text, or Lao Zi himself, did not use those contemporary explanatory and conceptual resources like the ones that explicitly distinguish three kinds o f naming functions. The point is that, to enhance our understanding o f the ancient thinker and his text, some sophisticated ideas and insights in the Dao-De-Jing could be presented in some unambiguous, nonparadoxical, and consistent way through resorting to those

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resources, though, partially due to lack o f such resources two thousand years ago, some of those ideas had to be delivered in some ambiguous terms and in some paradoxical ways. In the Dao-De-Jing, the Chinese character “ ming” / “ M ing” has, altogether, twenty-four appearances in ten chapters: Chapters 1,， 14, 21,25, 32, 34, 37， 4 , 1, 44，,and 47. The appearance o f “ Ming” in Chapter 44 is used to mean “ fame， ， ， and the appearance o f “ ming” in Chapter 47 is used as the pseudonym o f another Chinese character that shares the same pronunciation and tone meaning “ understand” ;； these two appearances can thus be disregarded for the purpose here. Examining the remaining twenty-two appearances o f “ ming” /“ Ming” in regard to naming and names, one can find that Lao Zi makes two types of different or even seemingly inconsistent claims on whether the Dao could be named or whether the Dao could have its names. On the one hand, Lao Zi, as widely highlighted and long celebrated in the literature, claims that the Dao cannot be named (cf. Chapters 14 and 25) and that the Dao does not have names (cf. Chapters 1,32, 37, and 41); but, on the other hand, Lao Zi also claims that the Dao can be named (also see Chapters 14, 21，and , 25) and that the Dao does have its names (cf. Chapters 1 ,2 1 , and 32). The traditional or standard interpretation discussed before considers only the first type o f claims as delivering Lao Z i’s genuine ideas in this regard and simply dismisses the seriousness o f Lao Z i， s second type o f claims.18 In my opinion, this view fails to give a complete account o f Lao Z i’s line o f thought in this aspect, which is fundamentally guided by the ancient wisdom revealed in the Yin- Yang model o f complementary interaction. Essentially going along with his insight in the first six-character statement in the opening passage, Lao Z i， s line o f thought in the second six-character statement (or generally speaking, on the issue o f language engagement with the Dao via naming) also consists o f a two-sided transcendental view .(1 )On the one hand, when claim­ ing that “ Ming-ke-ming ” ， , Lao Zi positively affirms the role o f the language engagement with the Dao via names in capturing the Dao: (i) it is presupposed in “ Ming-ke-ming” that the Dao can be named (rigidly designated) by the constant name “ Ming” (such as “ D ao"); ；and (ii) it is explicitly and positively claimed that the Dao can be further (descriptively) named (designated by certain descriptive designators): in other words, the (constant) name o f the Dao can be further named (i.e., further descriptively paraphrased by certain descriptive designators).19 (2) On the other hand, when claiming that “fei-chang-Ming ”， Lao Zi warns us that any descriptive names (descriptive designators) regarding certain characteristic finite aspects, dimensions, or layers are not identical with the constant name of the Dao that names (rigidly designates) the wholeness or infinite dimension o f the Dao; in this way, Lao Zi alerts us to the limitation o f the finiteness o f any descriptive designators and emphasizes the transcendental dimension of the Dao that transcends any finite aspects of the Dao itself and any finite stages of its infinite development. In this way, the second six-character

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statement o f the opening passage delivers essentially the same message as that delivered in the first six-character statement, though through a semantic ascent and in a distinct way. Indeed, as suggested by my preceding references to other chapters o f the Dao-De-Jing regarding how the names o f the Dao and their naming functions come into play in the text, Lao Z i’s message in the second six-character state­ ment needs to be understood in the context of the Dao-De-Jing as well as in the context o f the whole opening passage. Though also resorting to the textual evidence in the other relevant chapters as given above, I consider Chapter 14 of the Dao-De-Jing a good illustration, and an illuminating textual support, o f the preceding interpretation of the two-sided transcendental view delivered in the second six-character statement. Now let us have a close look at Chapter 14: Watched but not (entirely) seen, its name is “ Y i"y (“ The Minute"， ， )； Listened to but not (completely) heard, its name is “X i"， ， z (“ The Rarefied"， ， )； Clutched but not (thoroughly) gotten, its name is "W ei^'A(“ The Subtle， ").

These three cannot be exhaustively pursued (bu-ke-zhi-jiedb), And so are merged into one. Its top is not bright, and its bottom is not dark. Infinite and boundless, it cannot be named (sheng-sheng-xi-bu-ke-mingac): It reverts to nothingness; This is what is called “ the shape without shape” and “ the image with no thing ”;； This is what is called “ the vague and elusive” . Greet it and you w ill not see its head; Follow it and you will not see its back.

Hold on to the Dao of old in order to master the things of the present; One can thus know the primeval beginning,

This is what is called “ [capturing] the thread of the Dao".20 A t the outset of Chapter 14, based on three characteristic dimensions of the Dao, Lao Zi assigns three distinct names, “ Y i ， ， “, "Xi” ,，and "W e i", to capture the three characteristic dimensions: (i) the dimension o f the Dao that can be, ana is, watched but cannot be entirely seen (from any finite time-space point); (ii) the dimension o f the Dao that can be, and is, listened to but cannot be completely heard (from any finite time-space point); and (iii) the dimension o f the Dao that can be, and is, clutched but cannot be thoroughly gotten (from any finite time-space point). Note that each o f the three characteristics of the Dao con­ sists in a two-sided story. On the one hand, parts o f the Dao can be, and are, positively reached and captured by the human beings via finitely descriptive names as well as via rigid designators through direct reference (such as the name “ Dao” which “ ever remains with the Dao from the time of old until now” (Chapter 21)); however, on the other hand, the Dao cannot be exhaustively pursued or inquired into (bu-ke-zhi-jie) in these three dimensions; why? For, in all three dimensions (the-Dao-being-watched, the-D ao-being-listened-to, and

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the-Dao-being-clutched), there are “ infinite and boundless” aspects that “ cannot be named” descriptively in definite and finite terms or cannot be given an exhaustively descriptive name (in this aspect “ the Dao is hidden and thus has no [exhaustively descriptive] name” (Chapter 41)); so, the-Dao-being-watched, the-Dao-being-listened-to, and the-Dao-being-clutched go respectively with the aspects that cannot be “ seen， ， ，“, heard” ,，and “ gotten” (from any finite timespace point). Due to the positive side o f the story, the three characteristics of ， ， the Dao can be descriptively captured via such descriptive names as “ Yi",， “X i” ,，and "W ei"; due to the negative side of the story, the positive activity of descriptively naming and the partially positive descriptive contents o f those names are compromised by partially negative descriptive contents (“ the minute， ， ， “ the ra re fie d "， ,， ，and “ the subtle” )）of the names. Interestingly enough, by means of the aforementioned distinction between three kinds o f naming-functions and of names, those names, “ Y i", " Xi", and “ Wei” , need to be considered as descriptive designators but neither solely descriptive names nor rigid designators via direct reference. On the one hand, Lao Zi intends to use the three names to capture some describable characteristics o f the Dao via the descriptive implications of the three names, and so the names are descriptive in nature; on the other hand, the characteristics are considered as unique properties possessed exclusively by the Dao, Lao Zi intends to use the names to capture the unique characteristic dimensions o f the genuine Dao; and so, though with their descriptive contents, those descriptive names also rigidly designate (the aforementioned characteristic dimensions of) the genuine Dao rather than something else. To highlight the latter point, along with Lao Z i， s line here, it might be adequate and illuminating to rephrase these descriptive designators “ Y i" , " X i",， ， ，and “ Wei” in terms o f “ Yi-Dao"ad， , " Xi-Dao"ae and " Wei-Dao" respectively. Generally speaking, as discussed before, the metaphysical Dao as the ultimate reality is not something God-like or Platonic-Form-like that exists beyond and above the nature-universe; the Dao has to manifest itself through wan-wu in the universe (many particular, concrete, individual things in the nature); each o f the latter, though being finite, constitutes a manifestation o f the genuine Dao. This renders the Dao metaphysically impossible to be absolutely “ hidden” and “ infinite” but reachable, describable, and (descriptively) namable. Due to its fundamental metaphysical character in this connection, “ Dao-ke-dao” : the Dao not only can be rigidly designated through direct reference by means o f such rigid designators as “ Dao” , as highlighted in Chapters 1 ,21，and 25, but also can be descriptively designated by means o f descriptive designators, as high­ lighted in Chapters 1 ,14,， 25, and 34; in other words, its rigid designator can be descriptively paraphrased by means o f descriptive designators, as highlighted in the claim that Ming-ke-ming in Chapter 1. The preceding discussion shows that, to understand Lao Z i， s message delivered in the second six-character statement o f the opening passage, one needs to comprehend it in the context o f the Dao-De-Jing text and with a prerequisite

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understanding o f Lao Z i’s message in the first six-character statement. W ith this holistic understanding, we might well further paraphrase (3*1)

The name can be named, but the name that has been named is not the constant name

into the following in English: (3*2)

The name (the constant name —rigid designator) can be further named (further descriptively paraphrased by the descriptive designator), but the descriptive designator is not identical with the constant name (that is, what the descriptive designator descript­ ively designated cannot exhaust what the constant name rigidly designated).

There is one methodological point which the preceding discussion is intended to suggest regarding the studies of Chinese philosophy and contemporary philo­ sophy. I f my paraphrase o f the opening passage is correct, some conceptual and explanatory resources explicitly presented in contemporary philosophy are needed to have a complete and coherent understanding o f Lao Z i， s line o f thought delivered in the opening passage. In this way, at least as far as some philosophically interesting ideas and views in Chinese philosophy are con­ cerned, resorting to certain conceptual and explanatory resources developed in contemporary philosophy is fo r us not a mere choice with marginal value, but a must to have a complete and coherent understanding o f those ideas and their philosophical implications.21 Again, the point here is not that the relevant ancient thinkers in the Chinese philosophical tradition already had command o f some contemporary conceptual and explanatory resources used here, but that their ideas could be clearly delivered in nonparadoxical ways and in more sophisticated terms that would enhance our understanding o f the ancient thinkers'，ideas and avoid unnecessary confusions and losing sight of their due philosophical significance. It is noted that, although Lao Zi provides some important insight or vision regarding the relation between the ultimate concern and its language engage­ ment or, more generally speaking, between thought and language, he certainly does not exhaust the truth in this connection. The whole issue is far more com­ plicated than Lao Zi, or any ancient thinkers, could conceive two thousand years ago. Also note that a thorough understanding o f the relation between thought and language is certainly not philosophers’ privilege. Much work has yet to be done in this arena, through philosophical and interdisciplinary scholarship on the nature and function o f language and the relation between thought and language.22 In summary, in the preceding discussion I have endeavored to explicate the opening message o f the Dao-De-Jing by giving a critical examination o f

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one prevailing standard interpretation o f the opening passage and explaining my suggested paraphrase in the context of the Dao-De-Jing. It is my view that instead o f indiscriminately giving a negative claim against any language engagement with the ultimate concern, Lao Zi reveals his two-sided trans­ cendental in s ig h t:( 1 ) in the first six-character statement, Lao Zi positively affirms the role o f the language-engaged finite point o f view in capturing the Dao and, conversely, alerts us to the limitation o f the finite point o f view and emphasizes the transcendental dimension o f the Dao as the ultimate concern; (2) in the second six-character statement, through a semantic ascent o f talking about the name of the Dao, Lao Zi delivers essentially the same message, though in a distinct way that is philosophically interesting. On the one hand, Lao Zi positively affirms the role o f the language engagement with the Dao via names (the constant name - the rigid designator - and the descriptive designators) in capturing the Dao; on the other hand, he alerts us to the lim itation o f the finiteness o f any descriptive names (descriptive designators) and emphasizes the wholeness and infinite dimension o f the Dao that transcends any finite aspect of the Dao itself and any finite stage o f its infinite development. Indeed, such a transcendental insight itself is delivered through Lao Z i， s own language engagement in the opening passage and other ones in the Dao-De-Jing.23

Notes 1

It is known that there has been a controversy over the identity o f Lao Zi. Nevertheless, throughout this essay, Lao Zi is taken as a proxy figure who speaks for the ideas delivered by the text o f the Dao-De-Jing; the appearance o f the name “ Lao Z i” thus stays neutral to the controversy. 2 In my piny in transliterations in this writing, unless in the case o f proper names, the trans­ literation o f a Chinese character with the first letter being capital is used to indicate that the character in the relevant context of the Chinese original is used as a noun. In contrast, the transliteration o f a Chinese character without the first letter being capital is used to either indicate the non-noun-status o f the character in the context or suspend claiming its syntactic status. A prominent example in this aspect is the transliteration “ Dao” in contrast to “ dao"; and, by the same token, “ Ming” in contrast to “ ming” . 3 Lau, D. C. (trans.) (1963), Lao Tzu: Tao Te Ching, London: Penguin Books, p. 5. 4 Chan, Wing-tsit (1963), A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 139. 5 Cf. Creel, Herrlee (1983), “ On the Opening Words o f the Lao-Tzu ” ， Journal o f Chinese Philosophy, v o l. 10, pp. 299-329. 6 Note that there is a seeming nuance between “ what is captured within language” and “ what is captured in (through or by) language” ； the difference turns out to be significant. The former means the linguistic meaning (such as sense in Frege'， s sense), while the latter means the extralinguistic reference or denotation. 7 I will explain why, and in what sense, the logical subject o f the second conjunct claim is “ the Dao that has been characterized in language” rather than “ the Dao that can be reached in language” .

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Bo M ou It seems that the newly excavated manuscript of the Dao-De-Jing, written on silk and commonly known as the “ Ma-Wang-Dui” k text, provides some further linguistic evidence in this regard. ， 1is inserted respectively after “ Dao-ke-dao” and In the Ma- Wang-Dui text, the character ‘‘ye"， “fei-chcmg-Dao” ; the linguistic fact that the auxiliary character “y e” is usually used after a sentential judgment reinforces the proposal that the two expressions “ Dao-ke-dao” and “fei-chang-Dao” are used to deliver two distinct but related sentential judgments. It might be argued that in some situations Lao Zi was primarily concerned with knowing-how rather than knowing-that, which sentential judgments essentially involve. Nevertheless, that implies neither that Lao Zi had to, or did, give up consciously delivering his reflective thoughts via sentential judgments nor that his language expressions, say, in the Dao-De-Jing, did not have semantic content which Lao Zi seriously meant or cared about. It is arguable that those essentially pre-theoretic “ concepts” like proposition (or semantic content), truth, and belief were intrinsically presupposed in Lao Z i’s thoughts as delivered in the Dao-De-Jing text, whether or not Lao Zi himself intentionally carried out his theoretic examination of them, and no matter how those concepts were linguistically presented in the Chinese context at that time. To this extent, in my opinion, Chinese philosophy has not been essentially cut o ff from “ Western sentential philosophy” . I agree with the following observation made by Donald Davidson’s: We seldom stop to think how much, as philosophers, we share with other philosophers from other ages, other countries, other traditions. We tend to discover our common problems ana interests as we read, teach, and travel. The discovery surprises us for, to begin with, minds are best compared by finding as many points of similarity as everyday patterns o f action and reaction afford.

But once this fitting o f pattern to pattern is accomplished, the remaining differ­ ences loom out o f proportion. This perhaps explains why a first exposure to a new tradition seems to reveal an unbridgeable gap. What experience shows, though, is that, as in other areas, differences are to be understood only as seen against a background o f underlying agreement. The underlying agreement may be largely unspoken and unnoticed, but it is always available. Sometimes we need help in appreciating how philosophy builds on what we all know. No world views or conceptual schemes are truly incommensurable (from D. Davidson’s “ Foreword ” ， Two Roads to Wisdom? - Chinese and Analytic Philosophical Tra­ ditions, ed. by Bo Mou, Chicago: Open Court, p. v; my emphasis in italics). 9 10

Cf. e.g., Chapters 14, 2 1 ,and 25 of the Dao-De-Jing. Considering that the notions o f rigid designation and of direct reference are well presented in the literature, and also for the sake o f space, I will not give a detailed explanation o f them here, though in the following section I w ill briefly characterize them when specifying three kinds o f naming functions and three corresponding kinds o f names. For a recent clear presenta­ tion o f the two notions, see Lycan, W illiam (1999), Philosophy o f Language: A Contemporary

Introduction, London and New York: Routledge, ch. 4. Note that, although Kripke seems to be the first to explicitly and clearly characterize the notion o f rigid designation (cf. Kripke, Saul A. (1972, 1980), Naming and Necessity, Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press), the notion per se presupposes neither Kripke-style essentialism nor any other ontological commitment beyond the minimal one - the existence o f what is rigidly designated. To this extent the notion o f rigid designation is philosophically or metaphysically neutral, though, as I indicate in the next section, the notion o f descriptive (rigid-) designation might go with certain more-than-minimal metaphysical commitment. 11 Cf. Chapter 1 of the Dao-De-Jing. 12 Cf. Chapters 25 and 34 o f the Dao-De-Jing.

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It is not rare that a Chinese sentential claim omits its subject, especially in the ancient Chinese. When understanding such a sentential claim, one needs to restore its subject by examining the context in which the claim appears. One might put forward a further question: why isn’t the logical subject o f the second claim “ the Dao that can be characterized in language” (ke-shu-zhi-Dao0) but “ the Dao that has been characterized in language” (suo-shu-zhi-Dao)? Note that, due to the modality feature o f what is expressed by “ ke” p (“ can” )，which points to the future and the potential, the Dao that can be characterized in language has its open-ended character. That is, linguistically speaking, the attributive clause “ that can be characterized” would not lim it but enhance the direct-reference capacity of the term “ the Dao", Nevertheless, it is not clear whether Lao Zi really thought that the Dao that could be characterized in language - in the most charitable sense o f “ could” — might include the eternal dimension of the Dao. However, one thing is certain: the Dao that has been characterized in language (suo-shu-zhi-Dao) is finite in character and so is not, cannot exhaust, the eternal Dao - the eternal dimension of the Dao. This methodological guiding principle, in my opinion, is best delivered in Chapter 77 o f the Dao-De-Jing. Graham, A. C . (1989), Disputers o f the Tao, La Salle, 111.: Open Court, p. 219. Note that such terms as “ object” or “ thing” per se are philosophically innocent; for example, “ the object o f philosophical study” can simply mean anything that deserves our reflective examination without extravagant metaphysical commitment. The fact that a certain philosopher in the history o f philosophy used those terms idiosyncratically with extravagant ontological commitment does not render illegitimate the practice in which we continually use those terms in their philosophically innocent ways. For example, W ing-tsit Chan commented: “ Lao Tzu ... rejected names in favor o f the nameless. ... To Lao Tzu, Tao is nameless” ,，suggesting that, to Lao Zi, what is named is simply not the genuine Dao. Cf. Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, p. 139. The term “ ming” as a verb in ancient Chinese can be used to (rigidly or descriptively) name a nonlinguistic object or descriptively paraphrase a linguistic object (say, a remark). One example o f the latter case is “ mo-ming-qi-miao” w meaning that, referring to something (often to some linguistic remark; e.g., “ A remark mo-ming-qi-miao”）), one cannot descriptively para­ phrase or explain its subtlety; another is “bu-ke-ming-zhuang” meaning that something can

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hardly be descriptively paraphrased or explained. In several places o f this translation, with only minor modifications, I borrow Wing-tsit Chan’s versions (in Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, p. 146) or P. Ivanhoe’s (in Ivanhoe, P. J. and B. Van Norden (eds) (2001), Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy, New York: Seven Bridges Press, p. 165); nevertheless, there are a number o f substantial differences be­ tween my version and theirs. The interested reader is encouraged to compare and contrast the three translations o f Chapter 14. Saying this certainly does not imply that resorting to such conceptual and explanatory resources is also a must for the ancient thinker involved to understand herself. In one’s firstperson claim about one’s own ideas, one appears to be entitled to use any means, or even a noise unintelligible to others, to symbolize one’s own ideas, though it would be another matter whether or not others could (adequately and fully) understand what the sign or symbol is used to mean or whether or not (or, to what extent) a means that eventually fails to adequately communicate one’s ideas to others is entitled to be an eligible language expression, especially for the sake o f reflective communication and examination. The issue here involves that of private language which cannot be further addressed here for the sake o f space. For recent rich and stimulating scholarship and the debate on the relation between thought and language, see P. Carruthers and J. Boucher (eds) (1998), Language and Thought: Interdisciplinary

Themes, Cambridge: Cambridge U niversity Press; Chomsky, N . (1986), Knowledge o f Lan­ guage: Its Nature, Origin, and Use, New Y o rk: Praeger; and Bickerton, D . (1995), Language and Human Behaviour, London: UC L Press.

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Bo M ou I am grateful to Kelly James Clark for his helpful comments and criticism of an early version of the first two sections of this paper, which were presented at the Pacific Division 2000 meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Albuquerque, A pril 7, 2000. I am thankful to Kwong-loi Shun, Xianglong Zhang, and Robin Wang with whom I talked about the basic ideas o f this writing and who stimulatingly and helpfully responded to my ideas in various ways. I am also thankful to the audience at the above meeting for their various insightful critical remarks on the paper.

Chinese glossary a b c d e f

Dao-De-Jing Dao, dao chang-Dao

道德經

Dao-ke-dao-fei-chang-Dao

g h i

ke-dao-zhi-Dao suo-shu-zhi-Dao

j k l m n o

Dao-ke-dao

道可道非常道 名可名非常名 可道之道非常道 可道之道 所述之道 道 可 ，而 所 述 之 道 非 常 道 道可道 馬王堆

P q r s t u V w X y z aa ab ac ad ae af

Ming-ke-ming-fei-chang-Ming ke-dao-zhi- Dao-fei-chang- Dao

Dao-ke-dao, er-suo-shu-zhi-Dao-fei-chang-Dao Ma-Wang-Dui ye Da wan-wu

道 常道

也 大 萬物

ke-shu-zhi-Dao

可述之道

ke

可

Ming, ming chang-Ming

名 常名 可名之名非常名 可名之名 名 可 名 ，而 可 名 之 名 非 常 名 名可名 莫名其妙 不可名狀 夷 希

ke-mmg-zhi-Ming-fei-chang-Ming ke-ming-zhi- Ming Ming-ke-ming, er-suo-ming-zhi-Ming-fei-chang-Ming Ming-ke-ming mo-ming-qi-miao bu-ke-ming-zhuang

Yi Xi Wei bu-ke-zhi-jie sheng-sheng-xi-bu-ke-ming Yi-Dao Xi-Dao

Wei-Dao

微 不可致詰 繩繩兮不可名 夷道 希道 微道

CHAPTER TH IRTEEN

Zhuang Zi and Aristotle on What A Thing Is* Chenyang L i In a way, the philosophy of the Daoist Zhuang Zi (Chuang Tzu, b. 369 BC) is radically noncommon-sensical. For instance, he says “ nothing in the world is bigger than the tip of an autumn hair, and Mount T ， a i is sm all， ， .1Nevertheless, s willingness to depart from ordinary ways of talking, we behind Zhuang Z i， may find a metaphysics o f everyday reality. The purpose o f this essay is to s view (as can be found in the text) o f what an object is compare Zhuang Z i， - its “ what-being” - to a highly influential Western view that derives from Aristotle. I hope to show how Zhuang Z i， s metaphysics is a plausible alternative to the Aristotelian philosophy.

Being and ways of being A common view of being goes like this: an object2 falls into a certain substance sortal category S and is an there are other things that can be said o f the s, but those are merely qualities or properties; being s is its primary being and it determines the object’s identity. For example, the object is an ox, which is a substance. Being that individual ox determines the object’s identity; its being brown, seven feet long, composed o f the mass m, etc., are its properties. This is a view held, explicitly or implicitly, by many Western philosophers. The origin o f this view may be traced back to Aristotle’s doctrine o f ousia, i.e., primary being or substance,3 as it is usually interpreted. Aristotle discusses the problem o f ousia in the Metaphysics, mainly in the “ central books” . His discussions are lengthy, meticulous, and sometimes inconsistent. Commentators are often widely divided with regard to what Aristotle’s position really is on the issues. Here I present Aristotle as he is usually interpreted, or at least in a way that is not novel to commentators o f Aristotle. Aristotle maintains that philosophy is the science o f Being qua Being. He states that: *

This is a revised version o f my article which, under the title “ W hat-Being: Chuang Tzu versus

Aristotle” ,，was published in the International Philosophical Quarterly, vol. X X X III, no. 3 (Septem­ ber 1993).

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The term “ being” is used in several senses, as we pointed out previously in our account of the various senses of terms. In one sense, it signifies whatness and a this; in another, it signifies a quality or a quantity or one of the others which are predicated in this way. Although “ being” is used in so many senses, it is evident that of these the primary sense is whatness, and used in this sense it signifies a substance. For when we state that this has some quality, we say it is good or bad but not that it is three cubits long or a man; but when we state what it is, we say that it is a man or a god but not white or hot or three cubits long.4 Accordingly, there are many ways in which an individual object’s what-being can be spoken of, but only one way refers to primary substance (“ a what” or “ a something” ), the others being merely about predicates (or properties). It is to this primary being that the “ what-it-is-to-be” or essence (to ti en einai) belongs.5 Thus, Aristotle reduces the question “ what is being?” to the question “ what is substance?"， ， 6 The way Aristotle talks about essence and primary being clearly indicates that he believes that for each individual object (or at least a natural object) there is only one essence and one primary being.7 For the essence of an object is (determined by) its form; presumably one object only has one form; therefore one object can only have one essence.8 An object may have secondary being, but only one primary being. From this follow several interrelated Aristotelian claims in regard to an object’s what-being. First of all, viewing an object as a collection of its con­ stituent parts does not reveal the object’s reality. The essence belongs to the object as a whole, not to its constituent parts. As the primary being o f an object is determined by its essence, which its constituent parts do not possess, the primary being of an object cannot be revealed by an analysis into its parts. In other words, an object is a particular this, but not only a this; it is also a definite such, i.e., a this such. It cannot be a this without being also a such.9 Second, for Aristotle, because there is only one essence in an object, there is only one primary being in it, and therefore, there is a single objectively correct answer to the question of what an object is primarily. The correct answer is one that reveals the object’s essence and primary substance. Thirdly, Aristotle maintains that the essence of an object is linked to its species, and the species to which an object belongs has a hold on the object’s primary being. Hence, a withdrawal o f its membership from the species means losing the object’s primary being and amounts to its destruction. These views represent a signific­ ant part o f the Aristotelian metaphysics; further philosophical observations are based on them. Zhuang Zi, a near contemporary o f Aristotle, was not primarily concerned with metaphysics, or at least not in a direct way as Aristotle was. Nevertheless, we can read his implied metaphysics out of Zhuang Z i， s writings.10 I suggest that his metaphysics may be viewed at two levels. A t the fundamental level, every thing belongs to the Dao, or the Way. The Way is the ultimate truth of

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the universe. Every thing in the world has its root in the Way. In this sense, all are One. A t the object level, each individual object can be both a “ this” and a “ that” . An object’s being a “ this” does not preclude its also being a “ that” . The two levels are linked in that, an individual’s being a “ this” and being a “ that” s presenting itself. We will focus on the second level, on are ways of the W ay'， the issue o f an object’s what-being. For Aristotle, to be a primary substance is to be a member of its lowest-level substance-kind.11 For example, being an ox is a primary being.12 Accordingly, ceasing to be an ox means losing its primary being, and our recognizing the object as the individual ox is the only correct way for us to recognize its primary being. Zhuang Zi has a different account o f what an ox is. In his story about Cook Ding, the cook says: When I first began to cut up oxen, I saw nothing but whole oxen. After three years of practicing, I no longer saw the ox as a whole. ... I follow the natural grain, letting the knife find its way through the many hidden openings, taking advantage of what is there, never touching a ligament or tendon, much less a main joint ... A good cook changes his knife once a year because he cuts, while a mediocre cook has to change his every month because he hacks. I have had this knife of mine for nineteen years and have cut up thousands of oxen with it, and yet the edge is as if it were fresh from the grindstone. There are spaces between the joints. The blade of the knife has no thickness. That which has no thickness has plenty of room to pass through these spaces. Therefore, after nineteen years, my blade is as sharp as ever.13

The main purpose of Zhuang Z i’s story is to tell us how to find our way in the world. He suggests that it can be done by properly recognizing and using things in the world. After three years of fine training, Cook Ding saw an ox no longer as a whole thing but as a pack o f flesh and bones. For Zhuang Zi, Cook Ding was not mistaken. What the cook saw was real, but the object was certainly also an ox. What this shows is that an ox can be recognized not only as an individual ox, but also as a pack of flesh and bones. Thus, in telling the story Zhuang Zi suggests that, as a being, the object is both an ox and a pack of flesh and bones. This differs from Aristotle who writes, “ of the composite o f statue the bronze is a part, but not a part o f that which is called 'the form ’ o f the statue. For what should be stated is the form, or the thing qua having the form, but the material part should never be stated by itself.” 14 In a sense, the bronze is a part o f the statue as an object, and flesh and bones are parts of an animal.15 But these parts are not the elements o f the object’s form. Because Aristotle sometimes seems to believe that an objecfs primary being is its form, in a sense these parts are not constituent parts of the object’s primary being. An ox as a whole has the essence o f being an ox, while the parts do not possess this essence. Aristotle treats the relation between a pack o f flesh and bones on

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the one hand and an ox on the other as the relation between potentiality and actuality. The pack o f flesh and bones is matter which exists potentially to be an ox, but it is the form which gives the object actuality and makes it an actual ox.16 The primary being of the substance is exclusively the ox. Zhuang Zi, however, believes that the analysis into its constituent parts is a legitimate approach to an object’s reality. On the one hand, its being an ox does not exhaust its real being. It is an ox, but it is also a pack of flesh and bones. The object’s being a pack o f flesh and bones is not merely a potentiality. The pack of flesh and bones is as real as the ox. In Cook Ding’s eyes, it is not the case that the pack of flesh and bones are actualized in being an ox, nor is the object potentially a pack of flesh and bones which will be actualized after the ox is killed. In his eyes, the object is a pack of flesh and bones. However, Zhuang Zi recognizes no essence or primary being. He does not believe there is such a thing as essence which exclusively determines the object’s being. Therefore, the object’s being an aggregate of parts is no less real than its being an ox. Thus, conceptually, Zhuang Zi views the object at a level different from its being an ox or a pack of flesh and bones. While being an ox and being a pack of flesh and bones are not the same way o f being, they are the same object which has both ways of being. Instead of questioning how an ox can be identical with a pack of flesh and bones or vice versa, Zhuang Zi would ask, “ how could the object be an ox without at the same time also being a pack of flesh and bones?” Contrary to the Aristotelian view that every particular is a this such, Zhuang Zi states: Every thing is a “ that” ，every thing is a “ this” . You cannot see it as a “ this” if you are from the viewpoint of “ that”； you see it as a “ this” when you are from the viewpoint of “ this” . “ That” comes from “ this” and “ this” comes from “ that” . ... Thus, the sage does not bother with these distinctions but sees all things in the light of Heaven. “ This” is also “ that” ，and “ that” is also “ this” . ... When there is no more separation between “ this” and “ that” ， it is called the pivot o f the Way. A t the pivot in the center of the circle one can see the infinite in all things. Therefore, the best way is to seek the true light!17

For Zhuang Zi, we always look at things from a certain point of view. I f I begin from where I am and see a thing as I see it as a “ th is ， ， ，then it may also become possible for me to see it as another sees it as a “ that” . Therefore, seeing it as a “ this” and seeing it as a “ that” depend on each other and complement each other. The light o f the Way (the “ Heaven” ）shows that, in addition to being a “ this” (i.e., an ox), the object is also a “ that” (i.e., a pack of flesh and bones). Although the object’s being is not confined to being an ox and being a pack of flesh and bones (it is also an aggregate of molecules, etc.), these are ways for it to be a this and a that.18 Because being an ox and being a pack of flesh and bones are two ways o f the same object’s being, an individual ox is a

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pack o f flesh and bones, and a particular aggregate o f parts is an ox. Only when we see it not merely as an ox, but also as an object which is both a “ this” and a “ that” ，can we get to the pivot of the Way. One may want to object: perhaps instead o f one object what we have here are really two objects, one ox and one pack o f flesh and bones; although they spatially coincide, they are not the same object. Aristotle does not seem to favor this view. He strives for the unity of an object. When he speaks o f the statue and the bronze, he seems to have treated the bronze merely as matter. Instead of suggesting that there are two objects, one statue and one chunk of bronze, he treats it as one object. Aristotle writes: But, as we have stated, the last matter and the form are one and the same, the one exists potentially, the other as actuality. Thus, it is like asking what the cause of unity is and what causes something to be one; for each thing is a kind of unity, and potentiality and actuality taken together exist somehow as one.19

He explicitly rejects the suggestion that one individual can be two. He believes that the matter and the form are the same unity; it is not the case that there is a statue and a chunk o f bronze: In some cases, after the thing has been generated, it is called, when referred to the matter out of which it was generated, not “ that” but “ that-y” (or “ that-en， ， ); for example, the statue is called not “ stone"， ，but “ stony” . ... So, just as we do not say of a healthy man, who became so from being sick, that he is a sick man, so o f the statue we say not that it is wood but (by varying the word) that it is wooden, not bronze but brazen, not stone but stony, and o f the house not bricks but brick-en; for if we look at the situation very carefully, we would not say without qualification that the wood becomes a statue, or the bricks a house, since that which becomes must change and not remain. It is because of this fact that we speak in this manner.20

Thus, after the bricks become a house, the bricks (as bricks) are no more; after the bronze becomes a statue, the bronze (as bronze) is no more. So, when one points to the statue and asks “ how many objects are there?” the answer for Aristotle is definitely “ one” . One reason for me to agree with Aristotle in this regard is that the twoobjects approach inflates the number of objects in the world. It is not the case that there is an ox plus a pack o f flesh and bones; there is only one thing which is both an ox and an aggregate o f parts. Suppose two persons dispute over whether the object is an ox or a pack o f flesh and bones. I f there were two objects, there would be no dispute at all because they would be talking about two different objects, one ox and one aggregate o f parts: while one would hold that an ox is an ox, the other would hold that a pack o f flesh and bones is a pack o f flesh and bones. But we know the dispute is over the same object. We

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may want to say to the disputants that yes, it is an ox, but it is also a pack o f flesh and bones. Here the two “ it’s” must refer to the same object or the sentence would not make sense. In the story of Cook Ding, the cook sees an aggregate of parts in the same object in which others see an ox. The object can only be that which is both an ox and a pack of flesh and bones. A t a certain time t, the ox o and the pack of flesh and bones p are one and the same object. Some contemporary philosophers want to update Aristotle by saying that an object is “ a four-dimensional spatio-temporal w orm ， "， .21 According to such a view, two objects are identical only if they have the same history. Here again there is only one story to be told about the object. But two observations can be made on Zhuang Z i’s behalf. First, it is questionable that an object has to be a spatio-temporal worm. Our ordinary idea of an object seems to be that an object exists at a certain time. I f an object is a four-dimensional worm, one that takes a very different route in space and time would not be the same four-dimensional worm and therefore not the same object. However, I think that our ordinary notion is that the same object might have been at a spatiotemporal spot different from where it actually is. Moreover, if an object is a four-dimensional whole, a half of it would be a half object. Since it is true that if an object’s “ life-span” is cut short, the object is still a whole object, not a broken one, then what we mean by “ an object” is not a “ four-dimensional w orm ,， "， ，even though the object endures in time. Second, even if we grant that an object is a spatio-temporal worm, that will only change the terminology, not the issue at stake. In that case, what we have been calling an object would be a time stage of an object. Then the question of whether the time stage is substantially and primarily a time stage of an ox or a time stage o f a pack of flesh and bones (which presumably lasts longer than an instant in time) still remains for the Aristotelians. In my view it can still be said that the same time stage is both the time stage of the ox and the time stage of the aggregate of parts, without one being primary and the other secondary.22

Knowing and ways of knowing Because Aristotle believes that an object only has one essence and one primary being, it follows that, for Aristotle, there is a single objectively correct answer to the question of what an object primarily is. He holds that the question o f what a thing is refers essentially to primary being.23 In other words, the “ whatit-is” o f an object belongs to primary being, and to other categories merely potentially and derivatively, merely as a quality or a quantity. For example, an object o is a member of the kind ox, and that it is an ox is the correct answer to the question “ what is o?" Zhuang Zi denies that there is primary being and that there is a single objectively correct answer to the question o f what an object is. He believes that saying the object is an ox is not the only correct way

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to answer the question o f what the object is; that the object is a pack o f flesh and bones is also a correct way to answer the question. Then, how is it that the object is an ox and that the object is a pack o f flesh and bones are both right? Zhuang Zi believes that “ the way comes about as we walk it; as for a thing, call it something and that’s so， ， .24 Originally, there were no ways in the world. A way emerges only after we walk it. “ Call” (wei), which may also be translated as “ naming” here, can be understood as recognizing.25 A thing is so because we recognize it this way. The individual object is an ox when we recognize it so; it is a pack o f flesh and bones when we recognize it so. This may sound rather idealistic, but it should not be taken as meaning that we can view an object whatever way we like. Zhuang Zi continues the remark by saying “ Why so? By being so. Why not so? By not being so. It is inherent in a s so o f it, from somewhere th a t'， s allowable of thing that from somewhere th a t'， it.” (Gia-Fu Feng and Jane English translated the last sentence as “ Everything ， 26) It is not entirely arbitrary for one has its own nature and its own fun ctio n.， to recognize an object as “ a something” because an object has its own nature and its own function. From this it may be said that a thing’s being a such is not a pure invention o f ours. We should say that this is a hermeneutic process, which cannot be reduced to an “ either-or” . The Way has its ways. We have the view that an ox is more an ox than a pack o f flesh and bones, or vice versa, because we come to recognize it that way. We can do this because o f its “ being so"， ， . Yet, it is not true that there is only one correct way to recognize things. Zhuang Z i， s view appears even more appealing as we look at artificial objects. In analogy to Aristotle’s bronze statue example, I can ask a similar question: is my ring a primary substance which has a property o f being gold, or is this piece of gold a primary substance which has a property o f being a ring? On the one hand, this piece o f gold is a primary substance if anything is; on the other hand, there is no reason why my ring should not be a primary substance when other individual objects, such as bricks and tables, are primary substances. I f there is only one primary substance in one object, which is it? A t this point an Aristotelian may want to retreat and hold that only natural objects are substances. I f so, at least Zhuang Z i’s ontology would have the advantage of covering both natural objects and artificial objects. Zhuang Zi states: The Way has never had borders, saying has never had norms. It is by a “ That’s it” which deems that a boundary is marked. Let me say something about the marking o f boundaries. You can locate as there and enclose by line, sort out and assess, divide up and discriminate between alternatives, compete over and fight over: these I call our Eight Powers. ... To “ divide ” ， then, is to leave something undivided; to “ discriminate between alternatives” is to leave something which is neither alternative. “ What?” You ask. The sage keeps it in his breast, common men argue over alternatives to show it to each other. Hence I say: To “ discriminate between alternatives” is to fail to see something.27

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The Eight Powers are ways to define the boundaries of things in the world. The Confucians use the first four powers to delimit the “ That’s it” and “ That’s not” in human relations; the Mohists use the last four powers to delimit the “ That’s it” and “ That’s not” in our general knowledge of the world.28 For Zhuang Zi, they are all fundamentally mistaken. Zhuang Zi holds that the Way has no borders and the being o f an object has alternatives. When com­ mon men ask the “ What” question, they use the Eight Powers to draw borders, divide things, and discriminate between alternatives in order to show a de­ finite “ That’s it” or “ That’s not” of things. But the same thing is both “ That’s it” and “ That’s not” . To adhere obstinately to the “ That’s it” of an object is to discriminate against alternatives. In doing so, one is prevented from seeing the reality o f the Way. What Zhuang Zi here says about the “ Eight Powers” reminds us of Aristotle’s doctrine of things in the Metaphysics and the Categories. Aristotle makes a distinction between substance and qualities, generation and alteration, doing and being-affected, etc. For instance, he claims that among many things that can be spoken o f an object’s “ what-it-is” ,，there is only one way we speak of it as a substance, the rest being qualities. For Zhuang Zi, getting deeply involved in such disputes as whether an ox or a pack of flesh and bones is a substance is getting away from the Way, because one rails to see another side o f reality. For example, in distinguishing between an ox as substance and a pack of flesh and bones as a potentiality of the substance one fails to see that what can be said of an ox as a substance can also be said of the pack of flesh and bones. The aggregate of parts, like the ox, can be treated as a “ substance” which has certain properties. To know the Way is not to discriminate against alternatives, but to be open to them. Therefore, obstinately holding that the object is only an ox or a pack of flesh and bones is grossly one-sided. So Zhuang Zi remarks: To wear out the daemonic-and-illumined in you deeming to be one without knowing that they are the same I call “ three every morning” . What do I mean by “ three every morning” ? A monkey keeper handing out nuts said, “ Three every morning and four every evening” . The monkeys were all in a rage. “ A ll right then,” said he, “ four every morning and three every evening.” The monkeys were delighted. Without anything being missed out either in name or in substance, their pleasure and anger were put to use; his too was the “ That’s it” which goes by circumstance. This is why the sage smoothes things out with his “ That'， s it, that's not” ,，and stays at the point of rest on the potter’s wheel o f Heaven. It is this that is called “ letting both alternat­ ives proceed” .29

Here Zhuang Zi advocates the view that everything belongs to the Way. He criticizes those who fail to realize this as “ three every morning” . Zhuang Z i， s criticism also applies to Aristotelians who hold that an individual object has

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only one primary being. Zhuang Zi does not deny that there is a little differ­ ence between “ three every morning and four every evening” and “ four every morning and three every evening” . He believes, however, that the difference is not significant enough for one to hold an obstinate adherence to one instead o f the other. From the viewpoint of the Way the two are rooted in the same one. The monkeys fail to see that “ three every morning and four every evening” and “ four every morning and three every evening” amount to the same. Aristotelians are also “ three every morning” because they fail to see that, from the Way’s point o f view, “ being an ox with the property o f having the pack of flesh and bones"， ，and “ being an aggregate o f parts and having the property o f being an ox” amount to the same. They are two different ways o f describing the same object. Disputing which has the absolute primacy is like the monkeys fighting over whether they have three nuts every morning and four every evening or four every morning and three every evening. The sage, on the pivot o f the Way, would see the Oneness of the two sides and remain flexible on this matter. Recognizing that an object can be both a “ this” and a “ that” ,，Zhuang Zi is willing to judge as better or worse views o f what an object is on the basis of s it ” o f things “ goes by practice. This is what he means by saying that the “ that'， circumstance” . In the second chapter o f the Zhuang Zi, we find a conversation between Nie Que and his master Wang Ni: “ Would you know something of which all things agreed ‘That'， s it ’?， ， “ How would I know that?” “

“

”

. When a human sleeps in the damp his back hurts and he gets stiff in

the joints; is that so o f the loach? When he sits in a tree he shivers and shakes; is that so o f the monkey? Which of these three knows the right place to live? Humans eat the flesh o f hay-fed and grain-fed beasts, deer eat the grass, centipedes relish snakes, owls and crows crave mice; which o f the four has a proper sense o f taste? Gibbons are sought by baboons as mates, elaphures like the company o f deer, loaches play with fish. Mao-ch， iang and Lady Li were beautiful in the eyes of men; but when the fish saw them they plunged deep, when the birds saw them they flew high, when the deer saw them they broke into a run. Which o f these four knows what is truly beautiful in the world? In my judgment the principles o f Goodwill and Duty, the paths o f ‘That’s it, that’s not’,，are formless; how could I know how to discriminate between them ?"， ， 30

Here, through Wang Ni,s mouth Zhuang Zi expresses his own view. He is targeting the issue o f a universal “ That'， s it” in a broader sense, extending to the ethical as well as to the aesthetic. It certainly includes the metaphysical. For him, that there is no consensus on a universal ‘‘That， s it ” shows not only that we cannot reach such a state for epistemic reasons, but also that there is no such reality. An object has its being and functions. How we approach and value it really depends on the practice in which we are involved. Saying the

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object is an ox and saying it is a pack of flesh and bones are two ways of describing the same object. As to which way is right, it really depends on the context in which the object is recognized. The correct way to recognize an object depends on its purpose. For example, if we use the object as a farm animal, it is better to recognize it as an ox; for Cook Ding, seeing no whole ox shows that he has found his Way in the world. It is very important for Cook Ding that an ox is not only a whole animal, but also an aggregate o f parts. For only as a nonwhole, as a pack o f flesh and bones, is it possible for Cook Ding to find “ plenty of room” in between to play his blade. For him, the object as a pack of flesh and bones is by no means merely a potentiality as Aristotle holds. It is a real being to deal with. In this way, Zhuang Z i， s relativistic metaphysics and his emphasis on practice are linked. An Aristotelian perhaps would not straightforwardly deny that sometimes it makes more sense to treat the object as a pack of flesh and bones instead o f as a whole ox. He may try in two ways to avoid an obvious contradiction with his metaphysical view that the object is primarily an ox. First, he may maintain that there are two objects, one ox and one aggregate of parts; while the ox is primarily an ox, the pack of flesh and bones is primarily an aggregate of parts. However, as we have pointed out earlier, in this way the Aristotelian not only goes against Aristotle himself but also inflates the number of objects in the world by duplicating objects. Second, he may choose to say that there is only one primary substance; while the primary substance is the ox, sometimes it is useful to focus on its potentiality rather than its primary substance; the case of Cook Ding is such an example. I think, however, that this latter view has two disadvantages in comparison with Zhuang Z i’s view. First, for Aristotle, matter cannot exist without form and potentiality cannot exist without actuality. I f the pack o f flesh and bones is merely a potentiality, the pack o f flesh and bones cannot exist independently of the ox. This is obviously untrue. It is not the case that the pack o f flesh and bones is actualized as flesh and bones only after the ox is killed. It is a pack of flesh and bones even when the ox is still alive. For we would say that after the ox is killed, it is the same pack of flesh and bones that remains. For Cook Ding, the aggregate of parts is a real being which does not depend on anything else. Zhuang Z i’s account, therefore, works better here. Second and more important, treating the pack of flesh and bones merely as potentiality by the Aristotelian account, we can only approach the aggregate of parts through the ox. It is an indirect approach. In contrast, Zhuang Z i’s account enables us directly to approach the object as the aggregate o f parts. Because the object is really a pack of flesh and bones, instead o f taking the object as a pack o f flesh and bones for convenience, we take the object as the object in its real being. In other words, we treat it as a pack of flesh and bones because it itself is an aggregate of parts. Thus, Zhuang Z i’s metaphysics provides a suitable foundation for his practical philosophy, and the latter reinforces the plausibility of his metaphysics.

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Essence and existence without essence The third contrast between Aristotle and Zhuang Zi on the matter o f whatbeing is whether the same object can survive a substance sortal concept change. Aristotle links an object’s essence to its species. He writes, “ Essence, then, will belong to nothing which is not a species o f a genus, but only to a species of a genus."， ， 31 For an object, to maintain what it is, to possess its essence, is to belong to the species to which it actually belongs. Therefore, ceasing to belong to its species amounts to ceasing to possess its essence, which amounts to the destruction of the object. This Aristotelian view is very influential in today’s debates over the issue of identity. For instance, David Wiggins, a contem­ porary Aristotelian, holds that the substance sortal or kind concept into which an object falls is essential for the object’s identity. That is, “ for an x and any kind f, if f is a substance kind, then if x belongs to f, x always belongs to f ， ， ;" in other words, “ to be, for such a thing just is to comply with this ultimate or near ultimate concept f ， "， .32 That is, when an object no longer falls under the same substance sortal concept as it used to fall under, the object is no longer the same object. In this way, the concepts o f primary substance, essence, and necessity are linked. The object is primarily an ox, it is essentially an ox, and it is necessarily an ox. As a primary substance, the object cannot be the same object without being an ox. Zhuang Zi again disagrees. In the Zhuang Z i we have the famous story of a dream: Last night Zhou dreamt he was a butterfly, spirits soaring he was a butterfly, and did not know about Zhou. When all of a sudden he awoke, he was Zhou with all his wits about him. He does not know whether he is Zhou who dreams he is a butterfly or a butterfly who dreams he is Zhou. Between Zhou and the butterfly there must be some difference; just this is meant by the transformations of things.33

Here Zhuang Zi suggests that it could be that he is Zhuang Zi (Zhou) who dreams he is a butterfly or that he is a butterfly that dreams he is Zhuang Zi. He might never know which but, in either case, he would be the same indi­ vidual. Losing his species status as a human does not mean destruction, but a different way o f the being o f the same individual. That is, it is not necessary that he is a man but not a butterfly. He might be a butterfly and still maintain his identity as the same individual. I f an object can survive a substance sortal category change and remain the same individual, as Zhuang Zi believes, one might want to press further by asking “ the same w hat?， "， . To this question neither “ the same man” nor “ the same butterfly” can be the right answer. Even “ the same animal” would not do it, because we normally do not consider a man and a butterfly the same animal. But Zhuang Zi does not follow this way o f thinking. He does not deny that there is some difference between being a human and being a butterfly. But

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he believes that, from the viewpoint of the Way, the difference only shows “ the transformations of things” . In the Zhuang Z i, the transformations o f things are when the boundary between “ this” and “ that” is dissolved and the Oneness of the world is revealed.34 In such a state, whether he is a human or a butterfly does not matter much, not only because, from the viewpoint of the Way, every thing in the world belongs to the Oneness of the Way, but also because this could be two ways o f being the same self. The notion of the transformations of things becomes more plausible in the light of Zhuang Z i， s view on the unity of the “ that” and “ this” of the same object. He would deny that there is essence and that the identity of an object is determined by anything like essence. Accordingly, to say an object is essentially or primarily a man or a butterfly is already to be misled. For him an object can be both a “ this” and a “ that” ; it may remain the same object while transforming from one category into another. This view is probably the most difficult to accept for those who are used to the Aristotelian way of thinking. It is, however, an extension o f what Zhuang Zi has said about the simultaneous coincidence of different ways o f an object 's being to its temporal or chronological dimension. The view that a thing may survive a substance category change is grounded in traditions of Chinese thought. In Chinese classic mythology, we are told again and again that an individual maintains its identity after going through substance category changes. For example, the Monkey Sun is able to change itself into seventytwo varieties. It can be a fish or a temple. Yet it is the same Monkey Sun. Its identity as that individual object transcends any particular category with which the object is associated. This is hardly a real argument for Zhuang Zi and against Aristotle, but it suggests that it is not inconceivable for an object to maintain its identity through category changes. Suppose at time an object is a member of a species S, and at time t 2 it ceases to be an s and becomes an a. After t 2 we can point to the object and say “ It used to be (or was) an s at t 1 but now it is no longer an s but an a." This sentence makes perfect sense. But in order for the sentence to make sense the two “ it ， 's” must refer to the same thing. What is “ it ”？Zhuang Zi would say it cannot be an either/or and it has to be both. This intuition was probably what Zhuang Zi had in his mind when he told his story of the dream. But he did not go further to give an argument for it.

Conclusion In the Zhuang Z i, the question how “ this” (substance) and “ that” (substance) are identical does not arise. I f it is asked how “ this” way of being and “ that” way of being are identical, the answer is simply that they are not identical. But the object which has both ways of being is self-identical. It is the same object.

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This view of being fits well into the picture depicted by contemporary physics. A t the micro-level of the world, there is no ultimate substance-brick of the world. What are particles are also energy. To ask about the substance or primary being o f the world is futile. It is no more particles than energy-buckets; nor more energy-buckets than particles. It is both. The fact that we are more com­ fortable with the idea that it is particles is not a legitimate reason for us to take particles as primary substances and energy-buckets as secondary. Bertrand Russell once commented: The proposition “ Socrates is a man” is no doubt equivalent to “ Socrates is human” ,，but it is not the very same proposition. The is of “ Socrates is human” expresses the relation o f subject and predicate; the is o f “ Socrates is a man” expresses identity. It is a disgrace to the human race that it has chosen to employ the same word “ is” for these two entirely different ideas.35

Well, it may or may not be a disgrace to the human race that we use the same word “ is” for both propositions. It may be the fault o f some philosophers who, like the monkeys in Zhuang Z i， s story, have stubbornly maintained a distinction between the relation o f subject and predicate on the one hand and identity on the other hand. For Zhuang Zi, being human and being a man are both ways of an entity’s being, just as “ being an ox” and “ being a pack of flesh and bones” are ways of the object’s being. (Russell is incorrect in claiming that the two propositions are equivalent, because “ being human” includes “ being a man” and “ being a wom an".) ）It can be argued that one’s “ being a son” and one’s “ being brotherly” are two ways o f one’s being. They are not “ two entirely different ideas” . Whether we use a noun or an adjective should not make much difference. From the above discussion, we can see that, although Zhuang Zi did not provide a systematic metaphysical theory as Aristotle did, nevertheless he indicated an alternative metaphysics. Perhaps the biggest difference between Zhuang Zi and Aristotle on being is that, while Aristotle sees things as primary being or substances, Zhuang Zi does not accept the notion. For Zhuang Zi, things have their ways o f being. A thing can be a “ this” and a “ that” . While being a “ this” is a way for it to be, being a “ that” is another way o f its being. Nevertheless, they are different ways for the same object to be. Thus, from his point o f view, not only is the world a world of diversity, but also the being of an object is a diversity. One thing we can learn from Zhuang Zi is to open our mind to the diversity of the being o f objects, and allow an object to have both “ this” and “ that” ，and possibly any number o f ways, as its real being. To justify systematically Zhuang Z i’s ontology would require a magnum opus, which is far beyond the scope o f this essay, but I hope I have made it clear that Zhuang Zi has an ontology which is different from Aristotle’s and that this ontology deserves our attention.36

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Notes 1 Graham, A. C. (trans.) (1981), Chuang Tzu: The Inner Chapters, London: George Allen & Unwin, p. 56. 2 In this essay, I will use the term “ objects” to mean individuals. Thus, if there is only one horse and nothing else in a room, we say there is only one object in the room, even though the horse also can be said to be a pack o f flesh and bones. According to E. Halper, Aristotle usually reserves the term “ individual” for a composite ousia, something that is one because it has a single matter (Delta 6 , 1016b 31-33). See Halper, Edward C .(1989), One and Many in Aristotle's Metaphysics: The Central Books, Columbus: Ohio State University Press, p. 243. 3 As has been pointed out by numerous scholars, “ substance” is a misleading translation for ousia. See Owens, Joseph (1963), The Doctrine o f Being in the Aristotelian “ Metaphysics' Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, p. 139. “ Primary being” seems to have some advantages over “ substance” ，but because “ substance” has become the conventional rendering (and translation) o f Aristotle’s ousia, it is sometimes more convenient to use than “ primary being” . In any case, I use both interchangeably in this essay. But we have to bear in mind that in Aristotle ousia does not mean substratum, which “ substance” may imply. 4 Aristotle, Aristotle’s Metaphysics, trans. Hippocrates G. Apostle (1966), Bloomington: Indiana University Press, (1028a 10-17), p. 108. 5 Although the phrase is commonly translated as “ essence” ,， J. Owens thinks it is best translated as “ the What-IS-being” . See Owens, Doctrine o f Being, pp. 180—189. 6 Metaphysics, (1028b 4), trans. Apostle, p. 109. 7 Cf. Halper, One and Many, p. 4. 8 While many commentators believe that in Aristotle form and essence are the same, M. Loux disagrees. But there should be no question that in Aristotle form and essence are closely linked. For these different views, see Frede, Michael and Gunther Patzig (1988), Aristotle’s, "Metaphysics Z ” ,，2 vols, Munich: Verlag; Beck, C. H. and Loux, Michael J. (1991), Primary Ousia: An Essay on Aristotle’s Metaphysics Z and H, Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press. 9 Cf. Loux, Primary Ousia, p. 7. 10 There is little point in arguing whether Zhuang Zi actually intended such a metaphysics. The man is dead; even if he were alive today by the Daoist ideal of longevity, he probably would not remember what he meant in the text. Therefore we have to rely on hermeneutics in order to read what the text has to say on this matter. 11 Cf. Loux, Primary Ousia, p. 33. 12 I use the ox as an example because both Aristotle and Zhuang Zi talked about the ox. Aristotle used this example in Categories. See Aristotle’s Categories and De Interpretatione, trans. J. L. A ckrill (1963), Oxford: Oxford University Press, (2b 22-28), p. 7. 13 Zhuang Zi, Chuang Tzu: Inner Chapters, trans. Gia-Fu Feng and Jane English (1974), New York: Vintage Books, p. 55, with my slight revision. 14 Metaphysics, (1030a 22-23), trans. Apostle, p.122. 15 Cf. Metaphysics, (1035a 2-5). Sometimes Aristotle seems to believe that natural objects have an ontology different from artificial objects (e.g., 1043b 19-23). But when he talks about the relation between an individual, its form, and its matter, he does not keep the distinction so clear. The statue, bronze, and the shape are his favorite examples in investigating ousia. F ollow ­ ing his suit, I also use sim ilar examples, though my argument does not depend on them.

16

According to Loux’s interpretation, Aristotle holds that, in addition to being an ox, a pack of flesh and bones also has an essence; it is also a primary ousia. This interpretation brings Aristotle much closer to Zhuang Zi. But it seems that many Aristotle commentators would disagree with Loux in this regard. See Loux, Primary Ousia, ch. 7: “ The Completed Hierarchy o f Essences and Two Problems” .

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17 Zhuang Zi, Inner Chapters, Section 3, my translation. Cf. Gia-Fu Feng and Jane English, p. 29. 18 “ This” (shi) and “ that” (bi) stand for two sides o f a thing. But it does not exclude the possibility o f a third or fourth; just as in English we use “ on the one hand . . . on the other” which does not necessarily mean that there are only two aspects and no more. 19 Metaphysics, (1045b 17-21), trans. Apostle, p. 145. 20 Ibid., (1033a 6-23), p. 118. 21 See Heller, Mark (1990), The Ontology o f Physical Objects: Four-Dimensional Hunks o f Matter, New York: Cambridge University Press. 22 This is no place to launch a full-fledged argument against the “ four-dimensional worm” theory. I f my objection presented here is considered inadequate, this theory, after all, is not Aristotle’s. 23 Metaphysics, (1030a 23-24), trans. Apostle, p . 112. 24 Chuang Tzu, trans. Graham, p. 53. 25 See Chen, Gu-ying (1983), A Contemporary Exposition and Interpretation o f Zhuang Z i, Beijing: China Publishing House, p. 63. 26 Chuang Tzu, trans. Graham, p. 53; trans. Feng and English, p. 30. 27 Chuang Tzu, trans. Graham, p. 57. 28 See Chen, Contemporary Exposition, p. 75. 29 Chuang Tzu, trans. Graham, p. 54. 30 Ibid., p. 58, with one revision o f mine. “ Fan ran yao luan", which means formless, orderless, or chaotic, Graham translated as “ inextricably confused” ， which, though literally correct, may convey a negative sense. But Zhuang Zi is by no means bothered by the formless or chaotic character of reality. Since Wang Ni presumably represents Zhuang Zi, I use “ formless” instead. 31 Metaphysics, (1030a 12—13), trans. Apostle, p. 112. 32 Wiggins, David (1980), Sameness and Substance, Cambridge, M A: Harvard University Press, p. 146. 33 Chuang Tzu, trans. Graham, p. 6 1 ,with my revision. The last sentence Graham translated as “ Between Zhou and the butterfly there was necessarily a dividing ... The use o f the word “ necessarily” gives the sentence a strong sense o f metaphysical necessity which Zhuang Zi would not accept. The original is " ze bi you fen y i" which Chen Gu-Ying interprets as “ bi ding shi you suo fen bie de” • I translate it as “ there must be some difference” . 34 See Chen, Contemporary Exposition, p. 92. 35 Russell, Bertrand, “ Descriptions” ，in The Philosophy o f Language, ed. A. P. Martinich (1985), New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 215. 36

I wish to thank Joel J. Kupperman, whose encouragement and suggestions contributed greatly

to this essay, and Samuel Wheeler III for his discussion of Aristotle. This author, however, is solely responsible for all errors that may exist in this essay.

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

The Daoist Conception of Truth: Lao Zi’s Metaphysical Realism vs. Zhuang Zi’s Internal Realism JeeLoo Liu In this essay, I shall present a comparative study of two leading Daoists'， different conceptions of truth in the context of modern metaphysical debate on realism and antirealism. My basic contention in this essay is that both Lao Zi and Zhuang Zi embrace the realist’s thesis that the world is largely independ­ ent of us and the way we are; it has its own objective nature. But Lao Zi and Zhuang Zi differ in their opinions on whether our judgments could reflect, depict, or correspond to the way the world is. In my analysis, Lao Z i’s view on truth is likened to metaphysical realism, while Zhuang Z i， s view on truth is likened to internal realism. Hilary Putnam at one time or another championed both forms of realism. My exposition of the two forms of realism will be based on Putnam’s interpretation and others’ analysis o f Putnam’s usage.1I will analyze Lao Z i’s and Zhuang Z i’s views on truth and reality to demonstrate the justification for this comparative study. I will also compare Lao Z i， s and Zhuang Z i’s views to see if they can proffer a coherent Daoist conception of truth and reality.

Metaphysical realism and Lao Zi To begin with, I shall separate metaphysical realism from scientific realism. In contemporary discourse, “ metaphysical realism” and “ scientific realism” are often used interchangeably, or at least jointly. But the two views make separate claims that do not have to be endorsed together. Metaphysical realism (M R) basically includes the following theses:2

[MR1] [MR2] [MR3]

The world consists of a mind-independent reality. This reality is external to our conception and our conceptual schemes. Truth involves some sort of correspondence relationship between thought and the way the world is. There is exactly one true and complete description o f the way the world is (though we may never have a language capable of expressing it or may never know it).3 278

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Scientific realism (SR), on the other hand, includes the following theses that emphasize the validity o f science:4 [SR1]

[SR2] [SR3]

Science aims to give us, in its theories, a literally true story o f what the world is like, and acceptance o f a scientific theory involves the belief that it is true.5 The truth of a scientific theory is independent of our beliefs concerning it. Any theory we presently hold we may come to reject for good reasons. Nevertheless, successive theories can often be viewed as better approx­ imations to the truth. There may eventually be a “ finished science” that gives us the “ one true and complete description of the way the world is” .

Metaphysical realism can be interpreted as being compatible with scientific realism if the view is combined with epistemic optimism. I f the finished science will give us the “ one true and complete description o f the way the world is， ， ， then what we believe to be tables and chairs do not have to be totally different from the conception that our present science gives us. Science is making steady progress towards getting to the real truth. Under this interpretation, meta­ physical realism in combination with scientific realism can be used to support common-sense realism.6 But metaphysical realism can also be interpreted as being incompatible with scientific realism and common-sense realism. I f the mind-independent reality is what Kant calls the “ thing-in-itself", ，the “ noumenal world” ,，then it is beyond any human conception and human theorization. There is not only no guarantee, but also no way, that we can ever know it. Under this second interpretation, metaphysical realism actually undermines scientific realism in that science is not going to give us any story that is more “ true” than other nonscientific accounts of the world. Putnam thinks that this latter kind of metaphysical realism cannot be coherent. But I shall argue that Lao Z i， s view on truth is similar to this form o f metaphysical realism. Lao Zi would not accept scientific realism even if he were to live in a world o f modern science. To him, science, as part of humans’ projection o f the world, is bound to fall short of capturing the way the world is. Lao Zi says, “ The way that can be spoken o f is not the constant way; the name that can be named is not the constant name. The nameless was the beginning o f heaven and earth; the named was the mother o f the myriad creatures” (Dao-De-Jing, Chapter 1 ,p. 5).7 I think the “ nameless” here refers to the thing-in-itself reality, and the “ named” here refers to the use o f language. Myriad objects come from the introduction of human languages and human concepts, but this does not mean that the world itself is dependent on human conception. In Lao Z i， s metaphysics, there is clearly a reality beyond the descrip­ tions o f human languages. Because our languages and our concepts come after the presence o f the thing-in-itself reality, Lao Zi says that this reality cannot be “ spoken o f” and is “ nameless” . Lao Zi says, “ The way is forever nameless ...

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Only when it is cut are there names. As soon as there are names, one ought to know that it is time to stop” (Chapter 32, p. 37). In this passage, he seems to be presenting the impossibility of using our linguistic conventions and our conceptual schemes to depict this mind-independent reality. Nevertheless, when pressed, Lao Zi does end up giving it a name: “ the W ay， ， .8 Furthermore, Lao Zi does not really shy away from using our language and our concepts to depict the Way. As a matter o f fact, we can say that half of Lao Z i’s Dao-DeJing is devoted to describing the Way. In Lao Z i， s depictions, we can see many layers of meaning assigned to the Way. For example, Lao Zi first describes the Way as being the origin of the universe: “ The way is empty, yet use will not drain it. Deep, it is like the ancestor o f the myriad creatures” (Chapter 4, p. 8); “ [The way] is empty with­ out being exhausted: The more it works the more comes out. Much speech leads inevitably to silence. Better to hold fast to the void” (Chapter 5, p. 9); “ The gateway o f the mysterious female is called the root of heaven and earth” (Chapter 6， p. 10). Secondly, Lao Zi also describes the Way as the creator of the universe: “ Thus the way gives [the myriad creatures] life and rears them; brings them up to fruition and maturity; feeds them and shelters them” (Chapter 5 1 ,p. 58); “ The way begets one; one begets two; two begets three; three begets the myriad creatures” (Chapter 42, p. 49); “ The myriad creatures in the world are born from Something, and Something from Nothing” (Chapter 40， p. 47); “ It is the way alone that excels in bestowing and in accomplishing” (Chapter 4 1 ,p. 48). In these passages the Way seems to take up a more active role in the produc­ tion o f the world. Thirdly, Lao Zi sometimes talks about the Way as the substance or the essence of the universe: “ As a thing the way is shadowy, indistinct. Indistinct and shadowy, yet within it is a substance. Dim and dark, yet within it is an essence” (Chapter 2 1 ,p. 26); “ The way is broad, reaching left as well as right. The myriad creatures depend on it for life yet it claims no authority” (Chapter 34， p. 39). Under this interpretation, the Way is not an “ author” of the creation; it is merely the foundation on which myriad objects get generated. These different interpretations render the relationship between the Way and our commonsensical world confusing. What is Lao Z i’s ontology? First of all, he seems to believe that there was a beginning of the universe. Lao Zi says, “ The world had a beginning, and this beginning could be the mother of the world” (Chapter 52, p. 59). As, elsewhere, Lao Zi also discusses the generation of being from nothingness, we can speculate that in his view the commonsensical world, the world in which we reside, has not always existed. A t the beginning there was Nothing, which generated Something.9 This “ Something” is what Lao Zi calls “ the Way” . This Something exists prior to the introduction of human conception and human languages. It is therefore nameless. Once our language introduces names to differentiate objects, the myriad creatures are

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“ created” . In this analysis, the relation between the Something that is “ dim and indistinct” and the myriad creatures that are all “ named” is simply that between the world without discrimination and the world with discrimination. Or we can say it is a relation between the pre-language world and the post-language world. I f there is such a pre-language world, which Lao Zi calls in the style of “ the Way” ,，then this world is not constructed out o f our conceptual schemes. Lao Zi says, “ Man models himself on earth, earth on heaven, heaven on the way, and the way on that which is naturally so” (Chapter 25, p. 30). In other words, Lao Zi does not entertain the possibility that it is we who created or constructed the Way. The Way is the way things “ naturally are” . We can only copy from it through our observation of the operations o f heaven and earth. The way the world naturally is exists prior to our own existence and is the source of our conception. Even if there were no humans, no languages, no concepts, there would still be the way the world naturally is. Thus, Lao Zi seems to be advocating the metaphysical realist belief that “ the world is the way it is, independent o f our being able to talk about it or think about it "， ， .10 It is in this respect th at Lao Z i， s Way is likened to “ the m ind-independent th in g -in -its e lf”

posited by metaphysical realists. It is also in this respect that Lao Z i， s theory is said to incorporate [MR1]. The distinguishing feature o f metaphysical realism is not so much its inter­ pretation o f the nature o f reality (as a mind-independent thing-in-itself), as its interpretation of the nature of truth (as a one-to-one correspondence rela­ tionship). This is thesis [MR2]. As we shall see later, Zhuang Zi accepts the metaphysical realist notion o f reality but rejects its notion o f truth. Lao Zi, however, assumes this one-to-one relationship between human conception/ conduct and the world-in-itself. I think Lao Zi would not reject [MR2], because he does think that when our thought corresponds to the Way, then our thought is considered true. However, his notions of truth and correspondence are different from those o f metaphysical realists. Metaphysical realists commonly employ a propositional or sentential treatment o f knowledge, and a statement is true if and only if it corresponds to the state o f affairs in the world. But for Lao Zi, truth is not propositional, and thus the correspondence he seeks is not just a relation between our statements and the Way.11 It is rather a relation between our thought or our conduct and the Way. We can give close-to-beingtrue descriptions of the Way if our descriptions really match the way the world is; we can have objectively good conduct if our behavior meets the standard of the Way. As we said earlier, because this ultimate reality exists prior to the use o f language, our descriptions and our theories are bound to be inadequate. Nevertheless, Lao Zi seems to think that his descriptions (such as “ female”， “ empty， ， ， ","inactive， ， ， ","constant" , " vast， ， ，,“" dim and d ark"， ,， ，“ s ile n t and vo id ， "， , etc.) can be viewed as giving an approximation to the way the world actually is. This approximation o f truth is how Lao Zi views his own theory o f the Way. [MR3] states that there is exactly one true and complete description o f the way

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the world is (though we may never have a language capable of expressing it or may never know it). To Lao Zi, there is only one true description o f the way the world is. A ll the descriptions Lao Zi gives to the Way, however inadequate they may be in terms of representing the Way, are nonetheless regarded as the only true description o f the Way. He says, “ My words are very easy to under­ stand and very easy to put into practice, yet no one in the world can understand them or put them into practice. [My] words have an ancestor and [my] affairs have a sovereign. It is because people are ignorant that they fail to understand me. Those who understand me are few; those who imitate me are honored” (Chapter 70, p. 77). From this remark we see clearly that Lao Zi does not think that his theory is merely relative to his own conceptual scheme, or that other theories may be equally true. In this respect, Lao Z i’s whole project o f Dao-DeJing can be seen as the manifestation of his belief in the thesis [MR3]. Metaphysical realism is typically an ontological theory, or, in contemporary treatment, a semantic and epistemological theory. For Lao Zi, it is also an eth­ ical theory. In the context of ethics, correspondence is a relation between our conduct and the Way. This correspondence relation comes in a prescriptive form: one ought to act in accordance with the Way. It demands a one-directional match: from the sage to the Way. Lao Zi says, “ In his every movement a man of great virtue follows the Way and the Way only” (Chapter 21,p. 26); “ A man o f the Way conforms to the way. ...H e who conforms to the Way is gladly accepted by the Way” (Chapter 23, p. 28); “ A creature in its prime doing harm to the old is known as going against the Way. That which goes against the Way will come to an early end” (Chapter 30, p. 35; also, Chapter 55, p. 62). From these remarks, we see that Lao Zi embraces a kind of ethical naturalism, the view that an act is good if and only if it corresponds with what naturally is (the Way). Morality consists in imitating the Way, which transcends the human conception o f the good. Since there is only one good way, ethics is not relative to different opinions or cultures. Lao Zi would definitely reject ethical relativism, which is often associated with antirealism. Putnam argues that metaphysical realism is an untenable theory because it is incoherent:

The reason is that it depends on the assumption that we can conceive of a complete representation of the world which is radically detached from all of our beliefs. In order to conceive of such a representation, our concep­ tion of the entities to which our words refer would have to be available independently of all of our beliefs about those entities. But we have already seen that our conception of the entities to which our words refer is not available independently of all of our beliefs about them.12 We can see similar problems in Lao Z i， s philosophy: if the Way exists prior to language and cannot be spoken of, then how can Lao Zi even attempt to capture it in words? I f the Way exists independently of the human mind, then

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how can Lao Zi himself comprehend it? I f the Way is dim and vague, then why can Lao Zi alone see it? It is probably because of these problems in Lao Z i’s philosophy that Zhuang Zi chose to move towards a more relativistic and more skeptical attitude.

Internal realism and Zhuang Zi Zhuang Z i， s view on truth and reality has been widely branded as “ relativism ， ， ， “ skepticism” ，,o r even “ radical skepticism” .丨 3 Jung H. Lee in his “ Disputers o f the Tao: Putnam and Chuang-Tzu on Meaning, Truth, and Reality” is, to my knowledge, the first to contrast Zhuang Zi to Putnam’s internal realism, but he ends up concluding that in Zhuang Zi there is a “ mystical mode o f epistemology’’， ， .14 In this section I shall argue that Zhuang Zi advocates neither radical skepticism nor mysticism. He is actually a realist.15 His realism is closer to what Putnam calls “ internal realism” than other forms o f realism. Zhuang Zi is also a skeptic with respect to human knowledge, and a relativist with respect to human conception. But my main contention is that “ internal realism” is a more appropriate description for Zhuang Z i’s view on reality and truth. Internal realism, to some critics, is a form o f antirealism. I shall thus begin my analysis with a comparison between antirealism and internal realism. Zhuang Z i， s view on truth can be described as “ antirealism， ，if we employ Michael Dummett’s criterion of antirealism. Dummett says that any antirealist would reject the principle of bivalence:16

[The Principle of Bivalence]:

Every statement is determinately either true or false.

Zhuang Zi would clearly reject this principle. He argues that the content o f a judgment is relative to the speaker’s conceptual scheme, and the claim o f truth is relative to the speaker’s perspective. Zhuang Zi says:

Everything has its “that”，everything has its “this”. From the point of view of “that” you cannot see it, but through understanding you can know it. So I say, “that” comes out of “this” and “this， ，depends on “that” which is to say that “this” and “that” give birth to each other. But where there is birth there must be death; where there is death there must be birth. Where there is acceptability there must be unacceptability; where there is unaccept­ ability there must be acceptability. Where there is recognition of right there must be recognition of wrong; where there is recognition of wrong there must be recognition of right. (Zhuang Zi, Chapter 2，p. , 35)17 一

Here, Zhuang Zi seems to remark that every judgment is relative to a certain perspective. As “ right” or “ wrong” is relative to one’s viewpoint there is no absolute right or wrong. No statement can possibly be made outside all

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conceptual schemes or from the point o f view of nowhere. To judge whether a statement is true or false, therefore, we need to first evaluate in what concep­ tual scheme this statement is embedded. A statement true to human conception is not necessarily true to another creature’s conception. A statement true from one individual’s perspective is bound to be false from her opponent’s perspective. Statements are not determinately true or false independently of our conception; they simply do not have any intrinsic truth-value in and o f themselves. The view that Zhuang Zi advocates in this argument does seem to be the rejection of the principle of bivalence. However, to say that Zhuang Zi rejects the principle of bivalence is not to say that he denies the existence of the world-in-itself, which he also calls “ the W ay"， ， .18 So, if the debate between realism and antirealism is construed as a local debate on the existence of the Way, then Zhuang Zi is definitely a realist. For Zhuang Zi, the Way is as real as Lao Zi conceives it to be, but any human description (including his own) is bound to fail to represent it. Zhuang Zi says, “ As to what is beyond the Six Realms, the sage admits it exists but does not theorize” (Chapter 2, p. 39). Therefore, Zhuang Zi does not indulge in the effort of explicating the Way. No word could possibly do the job of giving us the truth o f the Way —even his own description would be relative to his conceptual scheme. Therefore, Zhuang Zi resorts to using metaphors, fables, parodies, stories, etc. to give us a mental picture of what the goal ought to be. We could probably say that Zhuang Zi is skeptical of our linguistic ability to express the truth o f reality, but he is not skeptical of the existence o f this reality itself. This combination of what we may call “ semantic antirealism” and “ ontological realism” is close to what Putnam describes as “ internal realism’’.19 Putnam characterizes internal realism (IR) in the following way:20

剛 [IR2] [IR3]

Internal realism is the view that a sign that is employed in a particular way by a particular community o f users can correspond to particular objects within the conceptual scheme o f those users. Signs do not intrinsically correspond to objects, independently o f how those signs are employed and by whom. Objects do not exist independently of conceptual schemes. We cut up the world into objects when we introduce one or another scheme of description.

According to Putnam, internal realism is compatible with conceptual relativism, and I think Zhuang Zi does defend some form o f conceptual relativism. What Putnam means by “ conceptual relativity” is the renunciation of the fact/value dichotomy. Putnam says, “ The doctrine of conceptual relativity, in brief, is that while there is an aspect of conventionality and an aspect of fact in every­ thing we say that is true, we fall into hopeless philosophical error if we commit a ‘fallacy of division’ and conclude that there must be a part o f the truth that

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is the ‘conventional part，and a part that is the ‘factual part’.’’21 Zhuang Zi also argues that all our thought is internal to our conceptual scheme, and therefore we can never say what a fact is other than voicing our value judgments. In a passage where Zhuang Zi presents Wang N i， s explanation of the impossibil­ ity of knowledge, Zhuang Zi puts forward an argument for the relativity of judgments:

If a man sleeps in a damp place, his back aches and he ends up half paralyzed, but is this true of a loach? If he lives in a tree, he is terrified and shakes with fright, but is this true of a monkey? Of these three creatures, then, which one knows the proper place to live? Men eat the flesh of grassfed and grain-fed animals, deer eat grass, centipedes find snakes tasty, and hawks and falcons relish mice. Of these four, which knows how food ought to taste? (Chapter 2, p. 41) We can formulate Zhuang Z i， s argument in this way: 1 Our judgments depend on our natura1/physical compositions. For example, men judge a dry place a better place to live whereas loaches would judge a damp place a better place to live; men find animals tasty whereas deer would find grass tasty. 2 Different compositions generate different perspectives. 3 Therefore, all judgments are made in accordance with a particular perspective. 4 Therefore, there cannot be universal judgments among agents with different compositions. As we can see, this argument can be seen as an argument for conceptual relativism. Different species have different physical/ biological make-ups and their judgments are bound to be determined, or affected, by their make-ups. Because of remarks like the above, Zhuang Zi is sometimes interpreted as hold­ ing a view called “ radical relativism” or “ perspectivism"， ， .22 But as I shall point out later, Zhuang Z i’s view, like Putnam’s internal realism, is not to be identified with either radical relativism or perspectivism. Perspectivism is the view that “ all knowledge is knowledge from or within a particular perspective"， ， .23 It can also be characterized as a form o f radical relativism, which argues that truth is simply what each person recognizes as true and there is no value distinction between different claims o f truth. A ll perspectives are simply equally good. In other words, perspectivism is making the following claim: [PI]

The truth of our judgments is relative to our perspectives. Incompatible statements can both be taken as true as long as they are true relative to the speaker' s perspective.

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But Zhuang Zi merely points out that all our judgments are made in accord­ ance with our make-up, our culture, or our perspective. He does not say that all our judgments are made true by our culture or our perspective. Zhuang Zi says:

Therefore the sage does not proceed in such a way, but illuminates all in the light of Heaven. He too recognizes a “this”，but a “this” has both a right and wrong in it. So, in fact, does he still have a “this” and “that” ？Or does he in fact no longer have a “this” and “that” ？A state in which “this” and “that” no longer find their opposites is called the hinge of the Way. (Chapter 2, p. 35) The notion o f truth that Zhuang Zi advocates relies on the denial o f dis­ criminations (of right and wrong, o f good and bad, o f this and that, etc.). But he is not denying the separation of truth and falsehood. To him, there is clear falsehood: to present one’s perspective as the only correct one. Zhuang Zi says, “ But to fail to abide by this mind and still insist upon your rights and wrongs .... This is to claim that what doesn’t exist exists” (Chapter 2， p. 34). To move to the perspectivist level- to view perspective as a determinant of truth, or to claim that all truths are equal- is no better.24 chuang Zi says, ‘‘[Waiting] for one shifting voice [to pass judgment on] another is the same as waiting for none of them. ... Right is not right; so is not so. I f right were really right, it would differ so clearly from not right that there would be no need for argument. I f so were really so, it would differ so clearly from not so that there would be no need for argument” (Chapter 2, p. 44). The paradox he is posing here is that the truly right would have no opposite, and the ultimate “ Truth” would actually be the elimination of the distinction between truth and false­ hood. What Zhuang Zi proposes is the notion of truth that is the synthesis of all perspectives: [P2]

True knowledge is the knowledge that denies perspectival knowledge. Truth is not relative to perspectives; rather, truth transcends all perspectives.

In contrast to the perspectivism thesis [P I], I think Zhuang Z i， s claims are the following instead: [P3] [P4]

Our judgments are relative to our perspectives. Our judgments are relative to our perspectives, but Truth is not relative to perspectives. Therefore, none of our judgments is true.

In other words, instead of granting all perspectives as equally true, Zhuang Zi is arguing that all perspectives are necessarily false. What he expresses is actu­ ally the opposite of perspectivism.

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I f we separate the two levels o f “ truth” in Zhuang Z i， s usage, we may see his view in a better light: [Truth1]:

[Truth2]:

It is the notion o f truth employed by ordinary people; it is relative to perspectives. It is the notion of truth that is beyond human conception o f truth and falsehood; it transcends all human perspectives and it is a clear representation of the Way.

Since Zhuang Zi holds the view that there is an ultimate notion o f Truth2, which is not relative to perspectives, and that this Truth2 is superior to T m th b he cannot be viewed as embracing perspectivism. This Truth2 is not what we could deem as true, because once we call it “ true” ，it is brought back to the s' eye cycle of truth/falsehood. It is also not an absolute Truth from a G od， view, or as Lao Zi puts it, from the point of view o f the Way. What Zhuang Zi introduces here is actually the absence o f all discriminations and the cessation o f all fact/value judgments. Truth2 is not a mapping between our conception and the way the world is, because there is no such mapping possible. Things for us or from our point o f view are necessarily internal to our conceptual schemes, and different conceptual schemes cannot compete for being the best “ match” for the world-in-itself. For Zhuang Zi, as for Putnam’s internal realists, the Truth2 that transcends all perspectives is “ inaccessible to us and inconceivable by us， ， .25 As Zhuang Zi holds the view that such a notion o f Truth2 is unavailable to us, he would often make the comment: “ How can I really know?” I f we say that knowledge is true justified belief, then even when we think our beliefs are justified (relative to our perspective), we can never obtain knowledge. In this respect, Zhuang Zi can also be called a skeptic concerning human knowledge.26 Zhuang Zi has several arguments for the impossibility o f the certainty o f our knowledge: (A) The Argument from Dream:

He who dreams of drinking wine may weep when morning comes; he who dreams of weeping may in the morning go off to hunt. While he is dreaming he does not know it is a dream, and in his dream he may even try to interpret a dream. Only after he wakes does he know it was a dream. And someday there will be a great awakening when we know that this is all a great dream. (Chapter 2, p. 43) We can formulate his argument as follows: 1 2 3 4

Our dreams seem to us as real as when we are awake. When we are dreaming, we never know that it was just a dream. Therefore, when we think we are awake, we could also be dreaming. Therefore, we can never be sure o f our judgment that we are awake.

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(B) The Argument from the Impossibility of Judgment o f Truth:

Suppose you and I had an argument. If you have beaten me instead of my beating you, then are you necessarily right and am I necessarily wrong? If I have beaten you instead of your beating me, then am I necessarily right and are you necessarily wrong? Is one of us right and the other wrong?...

Whom shall we get to decide what is right? Shall we get someone who agrees with you to decide? But if he already agrees with you, how can he decide fairly? Shall we get someone who agrees with me? But if he already agrees with me, how can he decide? Shall we get someone who disagrees with both of us? But if he already disagrees with both of us, then how can he decide? Shall we get someone who agrees with both of us? But if he already agrees with both of us, how can he decide? Obviously, then, neither you nor I nor anyone else can know the answer. (Chapter 2, pp. 43-44) We can reorganize Zhuang Z i’s remark into a reductio ad absurdum argument: 1 We are capable of judging a statement to be true. 2 But different judgments are necessarily relative to different perspectives, and Truth transcends all perspectives. 3 Therefore, no two people with different perspectives can ever give the judg­ ment of truth. 4 I f a third party sides with A, then she takes up A ， s perspective; if she sides with B, then she takes up B， s perspective; if she sides with neither A nor B, then she has her own perspective; if she sides with both A and B, then she takes up the perspective of a compromise. 5 Therefore, no third party can ever give the judgment of truth either. 6 Therefore, we are not capable of judging a statement to be true. In (A) Zhuang Zi presents a sort of Cartesian argument for the impossibility of knowing that we are not presently dreaming. In (B) Zhuang Zi expresses the impossibility o f obtaining truth on the basis of rational discourse and mutual agreement. They both support the conclusion that we can never know fo r sure. A ll our knowledge is relative to our understanding and our perspective. The true knowledge that is beyond perspectives is impossible for us. Whatever we do know and whatever we claim to be true is necessarily relative to our con­ ceptual schemes. I think this skepticism about knowledge is what motivates Zhuang Zi to move from metaphysical realism towards internal realism. Even if one embraces the relativistic character o f truth, one does not neces­ sarily embrace the relativistic character of reality. One can argue that there is no such thing as “ a view without a viewer” ，without ascertaining that there cannot be “ a world without a viewer” . Zhuang Zi certainly does not argue that reality is relative to perspectives or conceptual schemes, that there is no fact o f the matter with regard to the reality in itself. As we explained earlier, Zhuang Zi also acknowledges the existence of a mind-independent reality: “ Dao (the W ay)， ， .

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The Way embraces everything and transcends the empirical world. Zhuang Zi says, “ [W]hether I succeed in discovering his identity or not, it neither adds to nor distracts from his Truth” (Chapter 2， ,p. 33). The closest Zhuang Zi gets to describing the Way is the following, seemingly paradoxical, remark:

The Way has its reality and its signs but is without action or form. You can hand it down but you cannot receive it; you can get it but you cannot see it. Before Heaven and earth existed it was there, firm from ancient times. It gave spirituality to the spirits and to God; it gave birth to Heaven and to earth. It exists beyond the highest point, and yet you cannot call it lofty; it exists beneath the limit of the six directions, and yet you cannot call it deep. It was born before heaven and earth, and yet you cannot say it has been there for long; it is earlier than the ancient times, and yet you cannot call it old. (Chapter 6, p. 77) Because names and assertive statements are limited, Zhuang Zi could only give his description o f the Way in a metaphorical and paradoxical way. In Zhuang Z i’s depiction, the Way is very much like the mind-independent reality that metaphysical realists postulate. Whereas Lao Zi focuses on explicating this mind-independent reality, Zhuang Zi focuses on explicating the impossibility o f our knowledge and our description o f this mind-independent reality. One may argue that if Zhuang Zi believes in the existence o f a mindindependent reality, then he is really not an internal realist. However, from Putnam’s description of Kant’s internal realism, we can see that accepting the existence of a mind-independent reality is at least not incompatible with upholding internal realism. Putnam says, “ [Kant] does not doubt that there is some mind-independent reality. ... But we can form no real conception of these noumenal things; even the notion o f a noumenal world is a kind o f lim it ， 27 I think this interpretation can be o f thought rather than a clear concept.， equally applied to Zhuang Z i’s view. Both Lao Zi and Zhuang Zi are realists with regard to the Way. What makes Zhuang Z i’s view internal realism, and not metaphysical realism, is his relativistic attitude towards the content of our conception and our judgments. Because what we think is necessarily determined by our own conceptual scheme, we cannot use language to express any fact about the way the world is. Putnam explains his rejection o f the metaphysical realist correspondence theory of truth in this way: “ What I am saying, then, is that elements o f what we call ‘language’ or ‘mind'， penetrate so deeply into what we call ‘reality'，that the very project o f representing ourselves as being ‘mappers'，o f something 'languageindependent， is fa ta lly compromised from the very start” (his italics).28 I think Zhuang Zi would reject any attempt to give a truthful depiction o f the way the world is for the very same reason. Zhuang Zi is a realist with regard to the way the world is, but he is also a relativist with regard to the way we conceive the world. His arguments show that we can never have a conception o f the way the world is independently o f our perspective, but he does not go as far

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as radical relativists in upholding that all perspectives are equally right. We can probably say that Zhuang Z i’s internal realism serves as the middle path between metaphysical realism and radical relativism.

Lao Zi and Zhuang Zi in comparison The debate between realism and antirealism is often seen as a local disagree­ ment in the assumed existence of a particular kind of thing. Both Lao Zi and Zhuang Zi acknowledge the existence o f the Way, the reality that is beyond human conception and even human understanding. W ith regard to this par­ ticular thing, then, both Lao Zi and Zhuang Zi are “ realists” . But what makes the former a metaphysical realist and the latter an internal realist? In Mark Heller’s analysis, there are two broad senses o f “ realism” . He calls the first sense the “ ontological sense of realism” ，which is the acknowledgment o f the existence o f particular entities or kinds o f entities. The second kind o f realism, according to Heller, is the “ epistemological sense o f realis m ， ， ，w hich claims that there is a fa ct o f the matter as to whether a particular object or kind exists. Heller thinks that internal realism is antirealism in the epistemological sense.29 Both Lao Zi and Zhuang Zi would be realists under the ontological sense o f the term, but only Zhuang Zi would be an antirealist under the epistemological sense o f the term I think the dispute on whether we can know about the ultimate reality is what distinguishes Lao Z i， s and Zhuang Z i， s realism. Lao Zi does not share the same skepticism that Zhuang Zi adopts in his approach to this mind-independent reality. Lao Zi says, “ From the present back to antiquity, its name never deserted it. It serves as a means for inspecting the fathers of the multitude. How do I know that the fathers of the multitude are like that? By means o f this” (italics mine) (Chapter 21,p. 26). Even though it is not exactly clear what Lao Zi means by “ this” in the quote, it is at least obvious that he does not deny that he can know the fathers of the multitude, or, we may say, the Way. Furthermore, Lao Zi does not think that different opinions simply express different points o f view, and that our judgments are necessarily confined to our perspectives. To Lao Zi, there can only be one true perspective: the perspective o f the Way. He says, “ From the point o f view of the way these are excessive food and useless excrescences. As there are Things that detest them, he who has the Way does not abide in them” (Chapter 24, p. 29). Lao Zi also says, “ Those who are good I treat as good. Those who are not good I also treat as good. In so doing I gain in goodness"， ，(Chapter 49， p. 56). This remark is different from Zhuang Z i， s remark that good and bad are relative to one’s judgment, in that for Lao Zi, there are people who are good. Lao Z i， s treating good people and bad people equally does not mean that he is denying the true distinction between good and bad. Finally, Lao Zi says, “ It is the way of heaven to show no favoritism. It is forever on the side of

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the good men” (Chapter 79, p. 86). Here, we clearly see his recognition of the true good. Lao Zi is certainly not an ethical relativist by any means. Zhuang Zi, on the other hand, accepts a modest form of relativism. He is not a radical relativist who holds the view that all opinions are equally right. He is also not a radical skeptic who would even deny the validity of his own position. But he is, nonetheless, a modest conceptual relativist concerning our thoughts and beliefs, and a skeptic concerning our ability to know the ultimate Truth. As we demonstrated earlier, Zhuang Zi does hold the view that there is a mind-independent reality, and, as Lao Zi does, he calls this reality “ nameless” . But Zhuang Zi takes up from Lao Z i， s remark and emphasizes the fact that human language is in an eternal predicament: it distorts the Way. “ I f the p. , 40); “ Because right and Way is made clear, it is not the Way” (Chapter 2， wrong appeared, the Way was injured” (Chapter 2, p. 37). Since Lao Zi also has the premise that the Way cannot be spoken o f and cannot be named, Lao Zi himself should have come to the same conclusion that it is futile to describe the Way, and that no one can ever know its truth. In conclusion, I think Lao Zi and Zhuang Zi do not hold incompatible views on the nature of reality, but they have different evaluations o f the human capacity to understand or to depict this reality. What is the Daoist conception o f Truthl Ultimately it is still a form o f correspondence relationship, but the correspondence that constitutes Truth is not a relation between our statements and the commonsensical world; it is rather a relation between our thought and the world that exists independently o f us and is forever closed to our concep­ tion. Lao Z i’s whole project is to depict this reality to the best approximation he can accomplish, whereas Zhuang Zi' s endeavor is to prove how the whole project o f depiction is ultimately impossible. For Lao Zi, the Way is indeed unspeakable, but he nonetheless tries to speak about it. Zhuang Zi sees that s metaphysical realism incoherent. I f the Way is this attempt makes Lao Z i， pre-linguistic and contra-linguistic, then we can never speak about it or think about it. I f all our thoughts are relative to our conceptual scheme and our cultural/biological constitution, then we can never know what the way the world is independently o f our conception could be like. I think Zhuang Z i’s internal realism actually pushes Lao Z i， s original thesis about reality a step further, and thereby accomplishes a more coherent Daoist conception of truth.

Notes 1 For commentaries on Putnam’s realism see, for example, Anderson, David L . (1992), “ What Is Realistic about Putnam’s Internal Realism?” ， , Philosophical Topics, v o l.20, n o . 1，pp. 49— 83; Ebbs, Gary (1992), “ Realism and Rational Inquiry” , Philosophical Topics, v o l.20, n o . 1, pp. 1-33; Heller, Mark (1988), “ Putnam, Reference and Realism” , Midwest Studies in Philo­ sophy X II, pp. 113-128; LePore, Ernest and Barry Loewer (1988), “ A Putnam’s Progress” ， Midwest Studies in Philosophy X I I ， , pp. 459- 473; Sosa, Ernest (1993), “ Putnam’s Pragmatic

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JeeLoo Liu Realism” ，,Journal o f Philosophy, v o l. 92, n o . 12, pp. 605-626; and Wright, Crispin (1988), “ Realism, Antirealism, Irrealism, Quasi-Realism’’,，Midwest Studies in Philosophy X II, pp. 25-50. The summary o f theses comes mostly from Putnam'， s own remark (Putnam, Hilary (1981)， Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 49), and from LePore and Loewer’s formulation of Putnam's characterization o f metaphysical realism (LePore and Loewer, “ A Putnam’s Progress” ，p. 460), but I deliberately changed some wordings. What Putnam calls “ the fixed totality o f mind-independent objects” ,，I change to “ mind-independent reality” . What Putnam calls “ words or thought-signs” ,，I change to “ thought” . I think the rewording does not alter the spirit o f metaphysical realism, but it allows us to see Lao Z i， s view more in the light o f metaphysical realism. Lao Zi thinks that reality exists independently o f our conception, but distinctions o f objects come from the conventions of language/signs. So he would not call this ultimate reality “ the totality o f objects” , though he does embrace its mind-independence. The parenthesis is added by Ernest LePore and Barry Loewer. See LePore and Loewer, “ A Putnam’s Progress， ， ， p. 460. Ibid. This is Bas van Frassen’s formulation quoted by LePore and Loewer, ibid. Putnam sometimes calls metaphysical realism “ Realism (with a capital ‘R， )” and commonsense realism “ realism (with a small ‘r， ） )' ". The page numbers following the chapter numbers of Lao Z i’s Dao-De-Jing here and below refer to those in Lau, D. C. (trans.) (1963), Lao Tzu: Tao Te Ching, London: Penguin Books. Lao Zi says, “ There is a thing confusedly formed, born before heaven and earth, silent and void. It stands alone and does not change, goes round and does not weary. It is capable o f being the mother of the world. I know not its name, so I style it ‘the Way’ ” (Chapter 25, p. 30). O f course there is the question of how something can come from Nothing. Lao Zi does not give us any answer to this question. This is Mark Heller’s description of metaphysical realism, which he calls “ externalism” in his article. Cf. Heller, “ Putnam, Reference and Realism” ， p. 116. Chad Hansen in his analysis of Lao Z i， s view on knowledge points out that “ where Western or Indian analyses o f knowledge focus on propositional knowledge (knowing-that), Chinese, especially Taoist, critical theory focuses on practical knowledge cum skill (knowing-to or knowing-how-to)’’ (Hansen, Chad (1981), “ Linguistic Skepticism in the Lao Tzu” ，Philosophy East and West, v o l.31 ,no. 3, p. 322). In the same way, I argue that Lao Z i’s notion o f truth is also not to be viewed as expressing a relation between some proposition/sentence and some states o f affairs in the world. This quote is from Gary Ebbs’ interpretation of Putnam’s argument. See Ebbs, “ Realism and Rational Inquiry,"， p . 17. For example, Chad Hansen argues that Zhuang Zi defends radical skepticism and relativism; Lee Yearley argues that we can see a radical Zhuang Zi in his skepticism; A. C. Graham calls the view “ skepticism and relativism as extreme as Chuang-tzu， s” ，and Eric Schwitzgebel thinks that Zhuang Zi argues fo r radical skepticism, but does not sincerely subscribe to it. See essays in Paul Kjellberg and Philip J. Ivanhoe (eds) (1996), Essays on Skepticism, Relativism, and Ethics in the Zhuang Z i,， Albany: State University o f New York Press, and in Victor H. M air (ed.) (1983), Experimental Essays on Chuang-tzu, Asian Studies at Hawaii, Hawaii: University o f Hawaii Press. Lee, Jung H . (1998), “ Disputers o f the Tao: Putnam and Chuang-Tzu on Meaning, Truth, and Reality” , Journal o f Chinese Philosophy, v o l.25, no. 4 ， pp. 447—470， p. 463. For the purpose o f preserving coherence in authorship, I shall use only the Inner Chapters from the Zhuang Zi. Dummett， s less stringent principle, “ the principle of valence” ，assumes that every unambiguous statement must be determinately either true or false (Dummett, Michael (1982), “ Realism” ，

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Synthese 52, pp. 55-112). Zhuang Zi would reject both principles, as for him, the problem of indeterminacy does not come from ambiguity. A ll statements are intrinsically without a deter­ minate truth-value because they are relative to conceptual schemes. The page numbers o f the Zhuang Z i here and below refer to those in Watson, Burton (trans.) (1964), Chuang Tzu: Basic Writings, New York: Columbia University. Zhuang Z i’s position on reality may be another example to show the inadequacy of Dummett’s distinction between realism and antirealism. Dummett treats the debate as a semantic issue, as a debate on the truth conditions of a certain class of statements. But if viewed as a semantic issue, then even Lao Z i， s view could be called “ antirealism， ， . As Andrew Cortens points out, Dummett’s distinction seems to be too narrow to capture a lot o f the actual disagreements between realists and antirealists (Cortens, Andrew Joseph (2000), Global Anti-Realism: A Metaphilosophical Inquiry, Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, p. 2). David Anderson says that Putnam'， s internal realism “ keeps much o f the spirit of each of the seven tenets o f traditional realism” (Anderson, “ What Is Realistic about Putnam’s Internal Realism?",， ， ， p. 76). O f these tenets Anderson lists “ semantic realism” and “ ontological realism” . However, he is using “ semantic realism” in the context o f verificationist semantics. Anderson’s conclusion is that Putnam’s internal realism “ has a reasonable claim to the attribution, ‘realistic” ’ (ibid., p. 77). Putnam, Reason, Truth and History, p. 52. Putnam, Hilary (1990), Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge: Harvard University Press, p. x. Chad Hansen uses this interpretation in his (1990), A Daoist Theory o f Chinese Thought, New York: Oxford University Press, p. 266. Both Jung H. Lee and Philip Ivanhoe challenge this perspective interpretation. See Lee, “ Disputers o f the Tao,” ，p. 448，,and Ivanhoe, Philip J. (1996), “ Was Zhuangzi a Relativist?” ，in Kjellberg and Ivanhoe, Essays on Skepticism, Rela­ tivism, and Ethics in the Zhuang Zi, pp. 196-214. Lee, “ Disputers o f the Tao” ， p. 448. Philip J. Ivanhoe gives a good critique o f Hansen'， s radical relativistic interpretation of Zhuang Zi. Under such an interpretation, Zhuang Zi would be holding the view that all perspectives are equally valid and all judgments are equally good. Ivanhoe says, “ Hansen is correct to describe Zhuang Zi as a skeptic regarding language, but ... such a view does not entail strong relativism.” See Ivanhoe, Essays on Skepticism, Relativism, and Ethics in the Zhuang Zi, p. 202 . Putnam, Reason, Truth and History, p. 64. Lisa Raphals argues that skepticism and relativism are mutually exclusive in that “ skepticism precludes relativism” . She says, “ A skeptical thesis holds that we cannot know anything; a relativist thesis holds that we can know, but knowing is relative to our (individual, cultural, etc.) perspective. To put it another way, if we doubt our ability to recognize truth (the skeptical position), we must also doubt our ability to know that there isn’t any (the relativist position ).， ， See Raphals, Lisa (1996), “ Skeptical Strategies in the Zhuang Z i and Theaetetus in Kjellberg and Ivanhoe, Essays on Skepticism, Relativism, and Ethics in the Zhuang Zi, pp. 26—49， p. 29. In my analysis, this incompatibility between the interpretation o f Zhuang Zi as a skeptic and the interpretation o f Zhuang Zi as a relativist is dissolved. Zhuang Zi is a skeptic with regard ）are relative to our ability to know Truth2, and he thinks that all other claims o f truth (Truth 丨 to various perspectives. Putnam, Reason, Truth and History, p. 61. Putnam, Realism with a Human Face, p. 28. Heller, “ Putnam, Reference and Realism” ， p. 113.

Part Five Logic-Related Concerns

CHAPTER FIFTEEN

Ming-Jia (the Logicians) and Zeno: A Comparative Study Chuang Liu Introduction Few, if any, scholars who have dealt with Ming-Jia (the Logicians or the Name School) in more than a passing remark are able to resist comparing them to Zeno of Elea. There are undoubtedly surface similarities between some o f their claims, but are they substantive enough to justify calling the former Zeno-like paradoxes,1 or even just paradoxes? We often see remarks such as “ paradoxes (p) and (u) will be easily recognized by students of Greek Philosophy as identical with Zeno’s third and second argument against motion” (my italics).2 Or “ one is at once struck by the coincidence between the Logicians’ paradoxes and those famous paradoxes in Greek history associated with the name o f Zeno of E le a， ， ,3 and later, “ all are concerned with motion, and the last is startlingly similar to Zeno’s， ， .4These are strong and explicit claims by top-ranking scholars o f Chinese philosophy and civilization.5 But do they hold water? For an answer to this question, I shall, in this essay, carefully sift the evidence.

Preliminaries on the Ming-Jia sayings M ing-Jia was a school in the golden age o f Chinese philosophy. It was the time (from the fourth to the third century BC) of the warring states during which Confucianism and Daoism, to mention two o f the most famous schools, were founded. Unlike these two, M ing-Jia was short-lived and only popular at the time and soon forgotten, having little direct influence on the later development o f Chinese philosophy. The main figures o f Ming-Jia are Hui Shi (fourth century BC) and Gong-sun Long (third century BC) o f whom only the latter has a book under his name: Gong-sun Long Z i. We know that both were pacifists and advocates o f universal love, and so were affiliated in this respect with the Daoists and the Mohists. The primary concern of the Gong-sun Long Z i are the problems of the “ universals” . And the so-called ming-shi relation­ ship is really that between objects and their properties on the one hand and the names or terms for them on the other. From our modern perspective, the Gong-sun Long Z i seems to be filled with confusion about such relationships 297

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(e.g., “ a white horse is not a horse” )，but I will not comment on this matter. What concerns me in this essay is a set of claims recorded in the Zhuang Z i, which deals with issues on existence, time, and space. In the Zhuang Z i we have the following two sets of claims. The first set is attributed to Hui Shi with little dispute, but to whom the second set belongs has never been settled. Some say that they belong to Hui Shi but others think that his students (i.e., the debaters) were the authors.6

Group I 1 The greatest has no exterior, and is called the Great Unit (Da Yi); the smallest has no interior, and is called the Small Unit (Xiao Yi). 2 That which has no thickness cannot be piled up, but it can cover a thousand li. 3 The heavens are as low as the earth; mountains are on the same level as marshes. 4 The sun at noon is the sun declining, the creature born is the creature dying. 5 A great similarity (Da Tong) differs from a little similarity (Xiao Tong). This is called the little-similarity-and-difference (Xiao Tong Yi). A ll things are in one way all similar, in another way all different. This is called the great-similarity-and-difference (Da Tong Yi). 6 The South has at the same time a lim it and no limit. 7 Going to the State of Yüe today, one arrives there yesterday. 8 Linked rings can be sundered. 9 I know the centre of the world, it is north of the State of Yan and south of the State of Yüe. 10 Love all things equally; the universe is one body (Fan-ai-wan-wu, tien-diy i-ti).

Group I I 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11

Eggs have feathers. Fowls have three legs. Ying contains the whole world. A dog can (be? become?) a sheep. Horses have eggs. Frogs have tails. Fire is not hot. Mountains (have) (issue from) (produce) mouths. Wheels (while in motion) do not touch the ground. Eyes do not see. The zhi (universals) do not reach, but what reaches is endless. (The zhi is not touchable, what is touchable (the particulars) is endless.)

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Tortoises are longer than snakes. Carpenters’ squares are not square; compasses cannot make circles. Gimlets do not fit into their handles. The shadow of a flying bird has never yet moved (never moves). There are times when a flying arrow is neither in motion nor at rest. (Though flying swiftly, an arrow has moments when it is neither in motion nor at rest.) A puppy is not a dog (dogs are not hounds). A brown horse and a dark ox make three. A white dog is black. An orphan colt does not have a mother. I f a rod one foot long is cut in half every day, it will still have something left after ten thousand generations (wan-shi-bu-jie).

The first question that concerns all of the above is whether or not they are indeed paradoxes. What exactly is a paradox? A paradox, according to Webster s Third New International Dictionary, is ( 1 ) a claim which contradicts received opinion, (2) a claim or an argument which is self-contradictory or produces a contradictory conclusion respectively, although such a feature is normally invisible, or (3) beings with contradictory qualities. Sense (1 )is clearly too weak for our purpose: is it not true that most philosophical wisdom contradicts received views o f common folks? And sense (3) does not apply; therefore, sense (2) is the closest, provided that we do not take “ self-contradictory” to be strictly logically contradictory, but also physically so. Therefore, the following seems the right meaning o f “ paradox” for all philosophical analysis: a claim is paradoxical if, and only if, either it is self-contradictory or, when conjoined with another true claim about the same subject, the resulting claim is self­ contradictory. This definition has the advantage o f excluding from the category o f paradoxes those “ revelatory” claims such that by having them, their com­ monly believed counterparts are justifiably rendered false. I f such claims be included, we are forced to consider as paradoxes those scientific discoveries which contradict and correct common-sense beliefs. Nothing seems paradoxical in Group I save 1.6. 1.1 may simply be true but does not seem in any way to suggest atomism, so may be 1.2 if there are things with no thickness. 1.3, 4， 5, and 7 warn us about the relativity (or two-sidedness) of most things: where do heaven or mountains begin if not at the level o f the earth or marshes? Therefore, to say that the heaven and mountains are as high as thousands o f feet (known to the common folks) and as low as the earth and marshes is not saying anything self-contradictory. Since the predicate in 1.8 is “ can be sundered” ，not even relativity is needed to make it true. 1.9 is a puzzle. It is well known that the center o f China was then considered to be south of Yan and north o f Yüe. Hence, the north o f Yan and the south o f Yüe was not even a single region. Either its text was corrupt or it was intended to mean that

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the center of the world could be anywhere (but not even in a single region?). 1.10 seems out o f place with the rest in the group, unless one takes Hu Shih’s interpretation, namely, that together the claims of Group I argue for a monistic view o f the world.7 I ， m inclined to accept such an interpretation if 1.10 does belong to the group: what other motive could there be for arguing the relativity of things than to prove that the world is in essence an undifferentiated One? 1.6 ve been seems a real paradox: something at once has and has no limit, and we， reminded of its similarity with Zeno， s paradoxes. So, more on this later. Group II has been further classified into different categories by different commentators. Fung Yu-lan (1931) divided it into two sub-groups: one con­ sists of I I . 1,3, 4, 5, 6, 8 ,1 2 ,19，and 21 and is called “ of combining similarities with differences” ，while the other consists of the rest and is called “ of separat­ ing whiteness from hardness” . Hu Shih (1963) put them under four headings: a theory of time and space, o f potentiality and actuality, o f individuation, and of knowledge, while Needham (1956), siding with Hu Shih, added two more head­ ings. I ， m not interested in classification, but whether they tell us anything genuinely paradoxical under the most charitable interpretation. 11.1， 4 , ，5, , and 6 all make sense if they are taken to be referring to the unity o f natural things, and they also have a ring o f a theory of pan-evolution, namely, different species in the animal kingdom may evolve into one another. This fits well with the claims in Group I under H u’s interpretation. II.2, 7 ,1 0 ,1 1 ,1 2 ,1 3 ,14， 1 , 7 ,18， 19, and 20 are statements of several kinds, none of which is at all paradoxical. The third leg of a fowl is the spiritual one that moves the other two; without the essence of heat, fire cannot be hot, nor can eyes see without the spirit of seeing; universal terms cannot touch the particular things o f which they are predicates, while the latter are infinite in number. A tortoise is longer in age than a snake, and no particular objects can have a shape as precise as the geometrical one. A puppy as such is certainly not a dog and a horse plus an ox plus the properties they have (brownness and darkness) equals three (should it be four?).8 Take the color of its eyes but not of its hair, a white dog is a black one, and an orphan colt by definition could not have had a mother (false?).9 Some o f them might be false, or a meaningless play of words, but none is a genuine paradox. However, are they not paradoxical, someone may ask, under sense (1 )of our dictionary definition of “ paradox”？ This is true, for they all say something that contradicts what people usually take for granted, but for rea­ sons I have given earlier, they cannot be considered paradoxical. I I.3 and 8 are different. How can Ying, the capital of Chu, contain the whole world? Even the most conceited resident of Ying can only say that Ying is the whole world. For II.8, not even the translation is fixed. Needham has “ Mountains issue from m ouths， ， 10 and takes that to mean that mountains are born from volcanoes. Not only does this assume that Ming-Jia knew about the origin of mountains, which is very unlikely considering the time, but also it does not fit with any other claims in these two groups, for so interpreted

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it becomes a statement of a scientific fact which is either astonishing or banal depending on whether the fact was known at the time.

Earlier discussions on Ming-Jia The rest o f Group II, i.e., II.9 , 15，16, and 2 1 ,were claims that are supposed to remind us of Zeno of Elea, and these are the ones I wish now to examine in detail. First, what do they really mean? The first three are grouped together by Needham11 and a vague suggestion of their resemblance to Zeno， s four para­ doxes mentioned. But all I can gather is that they resemble each other in that they are both arguments for “ a monistic continuity universe， ， .12 Hu tried to explain them in terms o f “ tendency， ， .13 He has the textual support from Si-ma Biao (a well-known commentator o f the Zhuang Z i in the third century AD ) who said, “ the body (a moving body) is at rest, and the tendency is in motion. When the body is seen clearly and distinctly, it is in slow motion. When the tendency is seen clearly and distinctly, it is in rapid m o tio n .， ， 14 This may help us to fathom the meaning o f 11.16，but does it do the same for the other three? I will return to this point about tendency later. Fung put II.9 in a different category and his interpretation, though making its meaning clear, is nonetheless flawed.15 To him, the claim means that since only a small portion o f the wheel and the earth are in touch, and no portion of a wheel is a wheel, nor that o f the earth the earth, the wheel does not touch the earth. This claim therefore is a special case of the “ separation o f whiteness and hardness” by Gong-sun Long.16The last statement is clearly far-fetched. To be a special case of Gong-sun Long， s “ separation o f whiteness and hardness” ， the distinction has to be between a particular and its corresponding universal: a particular wheel, say, and the concept “ wheel” . But when one says that no portion of a wheel is a wheel, one means that for any particular wheel, no portion of it can be a substitute for the whole. There is no evoking here of the particular-universal relation. Hence, such a connection is forced, to say the least. Be that as it may, the interpretation itself is clear (i.e., it makes perfect sense). However, it is flawed because the same would be true whether the wheel is in motion or not.17 In fact, the same is true whether it’s a wheel or a table or anything else standing on the ground. I f Fung’s interpretation is right, nothing touches the ground! That cannot be what II.9 means. The use o f “ wheels” and “ in motion” must play a relevant if not crucial role. Another interpretation cited by Needham18 says that because a wheel only touches the ground on one point, and a point is without size, therefore, the wheel does not touch the ground. A clever move, indeed, but it does not work: (i) according to Hui Shi and the debaters, an actual wheel does not come into contact with the actual ground on a geometrical point (see 11.13, 14); and (ii) if this is true, it is so

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whether the wheel is in motion or not. Therefore, the implication of a moving wheel must be unpacked before this claim can be understood. Besides, it is the motion of the wheel that reminds us of the similarity between the claim and Zeno’s paradoxes.

The paradoxes of Zeno and of Ming-Jia Now, let us see whether the seemingly paradoxical claims o f Ming-Jia —the ones I singled out in the above discussion - are indeed similar to Zeno， s paradoxes; in other words, let us see whether Needham’s and Hu’s casual remarks are indeed true. To avoid the intractable problem of comparative studies often caused by the interpretive underdetermination o f what are compared - especially, in this case, the underdetermination of Zeno， s paradoxes - I shall adopt the follow­ ing strategy: to elicit the most sympathetic interpretation o f Zeno towards M ing-Jia’s claims and see whether the latter are indeed paradoxes. Therefore, I may not be reproached for not presenting the “ correct” interpretation o f Zeno, but if M ing-Jia’s claims are not Zeno-like as a result o f my strategy, they cannot possibly be said to be Zenolike in any other interpretations. Zeno’s argument against plurality by evoking the infinite magnitude was quoted by Simplicius as follows: and if there exist [many things], it is necessary for each to have a certain magnitude and mass, and for the one part of it to be separate from the other. ... Now it is all one to say this of one case and to say it for every case; for no such part of it will be last, nor will there not be another part related to another. Thus if there exist many things, it is necessary for them to be both small and large - so small that they have no magnitude, so large that they are unlimited.19 L e t'， s ignore the part about the small and concentrate on the large. The argument says that if there exist many things, everything has infinite magnitude. This in turn is because everything which has nonzero magnitude has separate parts which have nonzero magnitudes; the same is then true of any one o f such parts, and so on ad infinitum. Since each of these parts has nonzero magnitude and they are infinite in number, their sum, which constitutes the magnitude o f the original thing, is certainly infinite. This paradox of Zeno’s is naturally com­ pared to 11.21; now the question is, what exactly is the relation? First, taken literally, 11.21 is not a paradox at all, for it is not even about infinity: ten thousand generations are long, but finite in time. But the phrase “ ten thousand generations” is perhaps best understood as “ without end” . The Chinese had traditionally wished their emperors to live ten thousand years, which simply means that they wished them to live forever. In this sense, 11.21 becomes similar to Zeno’s paradox.

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Second, if we take the above meaning o f “ ten thousand generations” ，the translation then has to be modified because “ something left after ten thousand generations” would be incorrect. A better translation of that portion o f 11.21 would be “ one cannot exhaust the rod even if one repeats the operation (of cutting it in half) without end” . Under this translation, 11.21 is still not para­ doxical. It might just be true that a rod is infinitely divisible. A ll it takes is that there is no smallest unit - with nonzero magnitude - in the world. In fact, the very operation given in the claim produces a sequence whose magnitudes add up as follows. Suppose L is the length o f the rod, the sum S = (1/2)L + (1/4)L + (1/8)L + … . The sequence, as we now know, converges to L, hence, S = L, which is the expected result. Third, 11.21 so translated may just provide a resolution for Zeno’s paradox. In fact, Hobbes'，rebuttal of Zeno'， s paradox of infinity takes a similar line. It simply does not follow, according to Hobbes, that if something is infinitely divisible, it itself is unlimited. For all that is required for infinite divisibility is exactly what is implied in 11.21， namely, it can be divided as many times as one can conceive. It does not mean that there is an actual infinity o f nonzero magnitudes whose sum gives an infinitely large magnitude. To summarize, in order for 11.21 to be a Zeno-type paradox, it has to read as follows: “ I f a rod one foot long is cut in half every day, it will still have something fin ite left after an infinite number o f days.” However, the Chinese original ‘‘wan-shi-bu-jie"， ，does not mean this in whichever way you interpret or translate it; therefore, 11.21 is not really a paradox. Zeno’s four paradoxes about motion were recounted by Aristotle in his Physics. Here, I shall only consider the arrow paradox, which is the closest to our case. According to Aristotle, Zeno argues that: the flying arrow is at rest, [for] if everything when it occupies an equal space is at rest, and if that which is in locomotion is always in a now, the flying arrow is therefore motionless.20 I take the conclusion to be a contradiction, namely, the arrow is moving and not moving at t. The two premisses say that (i) if x occupies an equal space at t, it is not moving at t; and (ii) if x is moving at t,，it is in a “ now” at t. The argument is not valid unless Zeno had assumed (and therefore suppressed) two other premisses: (iii) the arrow is moving at t; and (iv) that which is in a “ now” at t occupies an equal space at t. This, no doubt, is very plausible. So, there we have the arrow paradox. Let’s consider 11.16 first as it does mention “ a flying a rrow "， . According to my translation, it reads “ though flying swiftly, an arrow has moments when it is neither in motion nor at rest” . It gives the same contradictory conclusion only if we change “ has moments” to “ always” or “ all the time” . To my best knowledge, no one has actually interpreted this claim by taking the phrase

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“ has moments when . . . ” seriously. It is almost impossible to make sense if the phrase is in there. Which moments? I f it is the moment when the arrow begins its motion or the one when it stops moving, then the claim is not even a paradox, not to mention bearing no resemblance to Zeno's paradox. It also could not mean some other moments in the arrow’s flight, for all moments except the above mentioned two are exactly alike, supposing that the arrow is moving uniformly on a straight line. So, let us treat 11.16 as if it reads: “ though flying swiftly, an arrow is at any moment neither in motion nor at rest” . Unlike Zeno’s,，this claim was not accompanied by any argument, at least none survived. As I mentioned earlier, later commentators took it as a challenge to articulate (and in some sense resolve) this seeming paradox. The “ tendency” theory was the earliest and seems quite cogent. Si-ma Biao seems to imply that, by its actuality, the flying arrow is at rest in an equal space at each moment of its flight,，but by its tendency or potential of moving to the next space, it is not at rest with that equal space at that moment. Every object contains at least these two aspects: the actual and the potential. Therefore, a moving object is neither at rest nor in motion, while a stationary one is at rest, for it is at rest by both its actuality and potentiality. As I discussed at length earlier, we may never find out what II.9 actually means, but if we consider it as similar to 11.16, it is possible that it should be read as “ wheels while in motion do and do not touch the ground” . The “ do” part is taken for granted by ordinary folks, while the “ do not” part is discovered by Ming-Jia; and hence, a paradox. It is easy to see now that a similar resolu­ tion as the one for 11.16 may also work for this one. From 11.16, a moving object is at the same time at rest and not at rest. Hui Shi and the debaters might have assumed that for two objects to be in genuine contact at t. they must be at rest (both actually and potentially) with each other at t. Considering its tendency, a wheel when moving on the ground is not at rest with any portion of the earth at any time, so it cannot be said to be in contact with it. In this light, II.9 is a result of the truth about motion (11.16) in general. I f we follow this line o f reasoning, 11.15 may also be a true statement rather than a paradox. Simply put, the shadow of a moving object, unlike the ooject, has no tendency o f motion for itself. More accurately, as the shadow o f an object, x, is produced in most cases by a light beam’s intersection with x and its effect on another motionless object, y (e.g., a wall), at a moment, t, the motionless light beam can only intersect with a motionless x which casts a shadow on y. And at each moment of x 's flight, such an intersection is repeated, and is a result o f the intersection of two motionless objects: the beam and the actual x. Hence, there is no tendency or potential in the shadow but only actuality. And, thus, the shadow itself must be at rest with each equal space on y at each moment, and so it is motionless. Therefore, the three claims form a coherent sequence, with 11.16 as the main “ paradox” and the other two as its implications in two different aspects.

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A moving object is neither moving nor at rest at each moment t, for by its actuality it is at rest at t and by its potential it is not. Therefore, it follows (i) that a moving object on the ground does not touch the ground because, via potentiality, the portion of the earth is not at rest with the portion of the object (the potentials of the object and the ground do not match); and (ii) that the shadow of a moving object does not move because it is created from moment to moment by an intersection between two objects, the beam and the moving object, both of which are actually motionless. It appears to be moving but it is not, and could not, for there exists no “ moving tendency” in it. It seems after all that only 1.6 is truly a paradox without a possible resolu­ tion, for it concludes flatly that something has and has not a limit. But without an argument, it is merely a contradiction, as sterile as “ P and not P” .

Notes 1 For a discussion o f Zeno paradoxes, see Vlastos, G . (1966), “ Zeno’s Race Course” ，Journal o f the History o f Philosophy, v o l.4, pp. 95-108. 2 Hu, Shih (1963), The Development o f the Logical Method in Ancient China, 2nd edn, New York: Paragon Books, p. 120. 3 Needham, J. (1956), Science and Civilisation in China, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 190. 4 Ibid., p. 194. 5 Except Fung Yu-lan (Feng, You-lan) who didn’t mention the Zeno connection in his A History o f Chinese Philosophy (Fung, Yu-lan (1931/1952), A History o f Chinese Philosophy, v o l. 1 (English translation by D. Bodde, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952)), but he did in his A History o f Chinese Philosophy: A New Edition, v o l.2, Beijing: People’s Press (in Chinese), 1983. In the first book he frequently compared Chinese figures to their Greek contemporaries, such as “ Confucius in many ways resembles Socrates” (Fung, 1931, p. 53); and he noted that Ming-Jia is almost contemporary to Zeno o f Elea. And yet, he didn’t mention any resemblance between the two. I tend to believe that this is a judicious choice rather than an oversight on Fung， s part. His second book is a thorough Marxist analysis of the entire history o f Chinese philosophy, so I have little confidence in it. 6 Both Needham, Science and Civilisation in China, and Chan (Chan, Wing-tsit (1963), A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, Princeton: Princeton University Press) attribute these to the debaters who debated with Hu Shih, while Hu Shih believed that they might belong to Gongsun Long, his argument being that some o f these sayings are found in the Gong-sun Long Zi. 7 Cf. Hu (1963), The Development o f the Logical Method in Ancient China. 8 Hu suggested that the “ ox， ，here might have been “ horse， ， ，w hich makes the claim consistent and true. Cf. ibid., p. 124. 9 A later commentator, Wei Mou, said, “ When it had a mother it was not an ‘orphan c o lt， ' .” This is certainly true, but 1.20 doesn’t follow from this at all. It’s like saying that because no child can be an adult, therefore, no adult has ever had a childhood. 10 The original sentence is “ Shan chu kou " It would have to be “ Shan chu yii kou” to make Needham’s translation undoubtedly sound. Hu translates the sentence as “ Mountains have mouths” ，which is also awkward. 11 Needham, Science and Civilisation in China, pp. 194-195. 12 Ibid., p. 195.

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13 Cf. Hu, The Development o f the Logical Method in Ancient China, pp. 120-121. 14 Ibid., p. 120. 15 Fung (1952), A History o f Chinese Philosophy, v o l. 1 ,trans. Bodde, pp. 215-220; (1983), A History o f Chinese Philosophy: A New Edition (in Chinese), v o l.2, pp. 126—80. 16 Fung (1983), A History o f Chinese Philosophy: A New Edition (in Chinese), v o l.2, p. 178. 17 Note that in Chinese 11.16 reads, “ Wheels don’t 'zhan the ground” ，not “ Wheels don’t 'chu the ground” . The former means the act of “ grinding through” while the latter means “ to touch” . 18 Needham, Science and Civilisation in China, p. 194. 19 Quoted in Barnes, J. (1979), The Presocratic Philosophers, London: Routledge, p. 237. 20 Barnes, J. (1984), The Complete Works o f Aristotle, v o l . 1 , Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 404-405.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

The Thesis of Antilogic in Buddhism Yiu-ming Fung The thesis of antilogic in Indian and Chinese Buddhism Like all religions that have the inclination toward mysticism, some o f the Buddhist schools in India and China have emphasized that the inner experience and the ultimate truth obtained through private access are beyond rationality, transcend logic, and cannot be understood through discursive concepts. I call ， . It appears that most o f the followers o f Buddhism this “ the thesis of a n tilo g ic ， and the scholars in Buddhist philosophy accept the thesis without hesitation. However, it is doubtable that a thesis o f antilogic is acceptable or can be held validly without any logical ground. I f other religious belief systems claim to have the same kind o f authority o f private access as some o f the Buddhist schools claim to have, how can we distinguish the Buddhist truth and experience from that o f the other systems and prove its absolute validity? So, it is clear that the appeal to the first-person authority o f private access is not a good reason for the acceptance of any religious or philosophical claim. A clear and influential example often mentioned by Buddhist scholars as a paradigm case of the thesis o f antilogic is Nagarjuna’s catuskoti or tetralemma (i.e., the four sentences), an important form of thinking in Madhyamika Buddh­ ism. Following this line o f thinking, most o f the major schools o f Chinese Buddhism, including Tian-Tai ( 天台) ， Hua- Yan ( 華厳)，and Chan (襌宗 Z en), have elaborated their own versions of the thesis of antilogic, which some scholars have also accepted as such. In this essay, I will argue that such a thesis cannot be validly maintained, that it is either self-refuting or trivial.

Nagarjuna's catuskoti Catuskoti is a form of thinking which consists of four alternatives o f assertions expressed by four sentences. A typical example o f catuskoti is found in the verse o f Nagarjuna’s major work, the Mula-madhyamaka-karika, which runs: Everything is suchness (tathyam), not suchness, both suchness and not suchness, and neither suchness nor not suchness. This is the Buddha’s teaching.1 307

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The four alternatives included in the verse can be expressed in the following four sentences: 1 2 3 4

Everything Everything Everything Everything

is suchness. is not suchness. is both suchness and not suchness. is neither suchness nor not suchness.

According to one o f the two likely interpretations offered by Richard H. Robinson, the four sentences can be symbolized as:2 li P 2

,

〜p

3i

P •〜 P

4j

〜p*— p

From a logical point o f view, it is obvious that the first and the second sentences are mutually contradictory, and the third and the fourth sentences are self-contradictory, respectively. In other words, the four sentences cannot be formulated as a coherent set, and some o f them are analytically false. I f one takes this problem o f antilogic seriously, there are two ways to solve it: claiming an alternative logic, such as some kind o f dialectical logic, which is absolutely different from what we have been using in rational discourses, or explaining away the illogical formulation by some kind o f non-standard logic such as intuitionist logic. Richard H. Robinson and Kajiyama Yuichi ( ネ尾山雄一）are two o f the leading scholars who claim some kind o f dialectical thinking as an alternative logic in dealing with the four sentences, while Huinan Yang (楊惠南)，following T. R. V. M u rti， s interpretation o f Nagarjuna， s idea as a rejection o f the Law o f Excluded Middle, tries to explain away the illogical formulation through an intuitionist hypothesis. In my view, neither of these two options, either the dialectical or the intuitionist interpretation, can be obtained with good reason. I f we look more carefully into Nagarjuna， s idea included in the four sentences, it w ill be shown that there is no violation or refutation of logical rules. Nagarjuna’s idea is not really antilogic, although he might have intended it to be so. In line with the dialectical interpretation, Ng Yu-kwan (吳、 汝鈞）indicates that the catuskoti is apparently opposed to logical rules. He argues: “ Its implica­ tion is rather on the dialectical.. . . The first alternative p is an affirmation, the second one 〜p a negation, the third one p p a combination o f these two, the fourth one 〜〜p the negation of the combination, leading to a transcendent sense. The first alternative corresponds to the thesis o f dialectic, the second one to its antithesis, the third and fourth ones to its synthesis, with, however, a transcendent entailment, which the synthesis lacks.” He concludes, “ It is not

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difficult to see that there exists a process o f elevation o f reality in the catuskoti th in k in g .， ， 3 Following Kajiyama Y u ic h i， s dialectical interpretation and the two-world theory, Ng proposes that the four alternatives indicate the affirmation o f the world o f being, the affirmation o f the world o f emptiness, the combina­ tion o f these two worlds, and the nonattachment to both worlds, respectively. I, for one, however, have difficulty seeing the existence o f such a process o f elevation. What Ng Yu-kwan explains does not really conform to the logical forms o f the four alternatives. For example, if the third alternative indicates the combination o f two different worlds, it would make no sense to use a self­ contradictory sentence (p*~p) to express the combination of two heterogeneous worlds: the world o f being or phenomenal world on the one hand and the world o f emptiness or noumenal on the other. I f it were the same world o f being that is affirmed from a phenomenal standpoint but negated from a noumenal standpoint, the two conjuncts would not be a pair o f contradictory sentences (p and 〜 p). Furthermore, as the fourth alternative is logically equi­ valent to the third, i.e., they are both self-contradictory sentences, it is absurd to interpret the fourth as transcending the attachment that is said to exist in the state o f synthesis expressed by the third. It is easy to show that there is no process o f elevation o f reality in the four alternatives. Different from the above propositional formulation, the other interpretation offered by Richard H. Robinson is the formulation o f predicate logic. He formulates the four alternatives as follows:4 1, 2, 3, 42

A ll x is A. [(Vx)Ax] No x is A. [(Vx) 〜 Ax] Some x is A, and some x is not A . [( ヨ x)Ax•(ヨ x)〜AxJ No x is A, and no x is not A. [(Vx) 〜 Ax*(Vx)〜 〜Ax]

Robinson thinks that, since “ No x is not A ” equals “ A ll x is A ” ，the fourth alternative is a conjunction o f the Aristotelian forms E and A. I think he is right in saying that the fourth alternative is a conjunction o f the contradictories of the conjuncts o f the third. However, according to his use o f the symbol “ x ， ， ， it stands for the attributes o f the entity in question instead o f the values o f a variable.5 Therefore, the above formulation is better reconstructed as follows: 13 23 33 43

A ll A No A Some No A

is is A is

B. [( V x ) (A x -^ B x )] B. [( V x ) (A x — 〜 B x)] is B, and some A is n o t B . [ ( ヨ x )(A x *B x )•( ヨ x )(A x . 〜B x )] B, and no A is n o t B. [(V x )(A x ~ ^ ~ B x )* (V x )(A x y ► Bx) ]

I f the above formulation is adequate, first, we can see that 23 is not the nega­ tion o f 13, because the former is not contradictory but contrary to the latter provided that the subject “ A ” has existential import. Secondly, 33 is not the

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synthesis o f 13 and 23 but the combination of 〜 23 and 〜 13. Thirdly, although 43 is the combination o f 23 and 13, it is neither a negation nor a synthesis of 33. Conclusively, we cannot see any “ dialectical progression” in Ng Yu-kwan， s or Robinson’s sense. I f the dialectical interpretation fails, does an intuitionist interpretation fare better? T. R. V. M urti thinks that “ four alternative views are possible on any subject”， but “ the basic alternatives are two: Being and Non-Being, Affirm ation and N egatio n， ， .6 As a main advocate for the dialectical interpretation, he does not believe that the Madhyamika is taking a middle position in between the two alternatives. He considers the Law o f Excluded Middle as presuming nothing more than the particular kind o f disjunctives called the contradictories - as Being and Non-Being, Affirmation and Negation. However, he thinks that the doctrine o f contradictories as conceived by formal logic is defective: “ for it is always possible to suggest one other alternative in all cases; besides being and non-being, we can admit the indefinite; affirmation and negation do not exhaust all attitudes towards an assertum; we may not assert anything at all, but simply entertain a datum without committing ourselves to any one o f these modes” . Consider the following two sentences: 5 An integer between 3 and 4 is prime. 6 An integer between 3 and 4 is composite, not prime. M u rti says, “ Neither o f these propositions is true, though they are contra­ dictories in the formal sense. Can the Excluded Middle help us here? This is a case where no adjective, no alternative, can be predicated without a b su rd ity.， ， 8 In the search for the metaphysical or ultimate reality, he thinks that the Law o f Excluded Middle does not help. The reason is that the Law is only for the regulation o f thought, and thought itself is not competent to grasp reality. Therefore, even if the Law is formally valid, it is applicable within thought only; it has no relevance with regard to the metaphysical problem about the relation between Thought and Reality.9 While M urti rejects the applicability of the Law of Excluded Middle to the realm o f Reality from a dialectical perspective, Yang Hui-nan rejects it from a perspective of intuitionist logic. The main reason for Yang Hui-nan to support the view that Nagarjuna’s Mula-madhyamaka-karika has the characteristic o f intuitionism is that the Law o f Double Negation and the Law o f Excluded Middle are not applicable to the four alternatives. Yang claims that if we realize that the four alternatives exemplify the intuitionist characteristic, it would be easy to explain why 〜〜p in 4 cannot be reduced to p and thus is not equivalent to 3丨 ，because the intuitionist logic accepts the derivation from p to

p, b u t n o t fro m 〜~p to p .10 H ow ever, as indicated above, the set o f

sentences from lj to 4, is not an adequate formulation of the four alternatives.

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On the one hand, if we accept the set o f sentences from 13 to 43 as more appropriate, this intuitionist color would disappear; on the other hand, if we accept, for the sake o f argument, that the formulation o f the set o f sentences from lj to 4, is adequate, thus cannot be considered as a self-contradictory sentence, 3, is still self-contradictory and would not be accepted by the intui­ tionist logic. Hence, no matter how the four alternatives are formulated, either in prepositional or predicate forms, they definitely do not have the characteristic of intuitionism. As for the problem of inapplicability o f the Law o f Excluded Middle, Yang Hui-nan quotes the following verse as an instance:11 It cannot be said that the Blessed One exists after nirodha [i.e., release from worldly desires]. N or can it be said that He does not exist after nirodha, or both, or neither.

Yang Hui-nan considers the Law o f Excluded Middle as inapplicable to this instance by his interpretation. He claims that the assertion o f the existence or the nonexistence o f the Blessed One cannot be held, so the Law o f Excluded Middle applied to this either/or case cannot be justified.12 Yang thinks that “ the Blessed One” ,， just as M u rti， s analysis o f “ an integer between 3 and 4” ，is also empty in reference; therefore, the Law o f Excluded Middle cannot be validly held with respect to these two opposites: the existence and the non­ existence o f the Blessed One. I don’t think that either M u rti’s or Yang’s analysis o f the descriptions o f empty reference supports their conclusion. It is obvious that the affirmation or negation o f a sentence including a description o f empty reference can be considered false, if we accept Bertrand Russell’s theory o f definite descriptions. The sentences 5 and 6 mentioned above can be interpreted as having the same logical structures as Russell’s paradigmatic sentences as follows: 7 The present king o f France is bald. 8 The present king o f France is not bald. These respective logical structures are: 9 10

(ョx){ [Fx*(Vy)(Fy-^y=x)]*Gx} (ョx){ [Fx.(Vy)(Fy~^y=x)]•〜Gx}

It is clear that the negation o f (9) is not (10) but 1 1

〜(ョx){ [Fx#(V y)(F y^y= x)]#Gx}

M u rti’s and Yang’s analysis o f 5 and 6 as mutually contradictory is obvi­ ously wrong; these two sentences are sub-contrary and can both be false it

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they contain an empty description. So, according to Russell 's theory, they are not the case o f violation or refutation o f the Law o f Excluded Middle. O f course, Russell’s theory is not the only one that can be used to deal with the problem. P. F. Strawson’s theory o f presupposition and truth-value gap is also available. However, if we accept Strawson’s theory, and agree, for the sake o f argument, that the two disjuncts are mutually contradictory, the dis­ junction would be no truth-values, and the double negation o f the disjunction would be no truth-values as well. Nevertheless, it does not conform to the intuitionist logic, because the form o f the double negation o f the disjunction is a theorem o f the intuitionist logic, and the problem o f inapplicability to sentences with description o f empty reference is not only related to the Law o f Excluded Middle but also related to all logical rules. Furthermore, not all who believe in the intuitionist program w ill side with Strawson in this respect; Michael Dummett, for instance, provides good reasons in favor o f Russell’s theory.13 So, there is no violation or refutation o f the Law o f Excluded Middle, and thus the four alternatives are not relevant to the intuitionist logic. I think that we can use the standard logic to formulate the four alternatives. To support the thesis o f antilogic for Nagarjuna's philosophy with the dialectical or intuitionist interpretation as discussed above is doomed to fail.

Mou Zong-san'， s interpretation of Tian-Tai's “dialectical paradox” It is well known that the so-called “ dialectical” or “ paradoxical” mode o f thinking frequently used by some o f the major schools o f Chinese Buddhism is basically developed from the Indian Madhyamika Buddhism. In Chinese Buddhism, there is a distinction between the real-dharma (實 dravya) and the expedient-dharma (權 upaya). According to the Tian-Tai school’s “ perfect doctrine ” （ 天台圓敎) ， expedient-dharmas are skillful means; they are not able to reach the ultimate truth, and are thus debatable ( 可序) . But the real-dharma is perfect, ultimate, and not debatable (不ロ丁静) . Why is the real-dharma not debatable? Mou Zong-san'， s ( 牟宗三）answer is that the reason lies in the peculiar mode o f expression in it. He says, “ Any system, if expressed by [discursive] language, is not the perfect doctrine",， ， ，therefore “ it is debatable” . Differing from all the doctrines o f either Hi nayana or Madhyamika Buddhism which are expressed in discursive language, Mou thinks that the T ien-tai's per­ fect doctrine is not debatable.14 It is a system without any definite form o f system, because its peculiar mode o f expression has the characteristic of being “ dialectical” or “ paradoxical” and its expressions are “ dialectical paradoxes” which transcend the normal logic.15 What does “ dialectical paradox” mean? Is it the same as “ logical paradox”? ？ We know that although the latter is a kind o f sentence which is logically

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equivalent to its negation and indeterm inate in truth-values, it does n o t tra n ­ scend lo g ic as the fo rm e r is said to do. F o rtu n a te ly , fro m the e arly great

masters down to Mou Zong-san, there are a lot o f paradigmatic examples o f “ dialectical paradox” provided. The most famous examples are: “ samsara is N irvana” （ 生死即捏槃),，“ klesha is bodhi” （ 煩惱即菩提)，uavidya is dharmata^ ( 無明即法性)，and ''prajna is not prajna, that is prajna,?( 般若¥ 般若， 斯之謂 般若) . On the one hand, by the criterion Mou uses to distinguish discursive from nondiscursive discourses, they are nondiscursive, because each o f them can be literally read as self-contradictory which is not allowed in discursive discourses. On the other hand, as Mou does not consider that the word “ is” in the form (“ A is B” )）o f the sentences mentioned above means “ identity ， ， ， they are not really self-contradictory. So, it is not clear in what sense, accord­ ing to M ou and other interpreters, the so-called “ dialectical paradoxes” transcend logic and rational discourse. They use the term “ dialectical” like a magic word, something that goes beyond the “ logical” ，,but they never tell us what the meaning o f “ dialectical paradox” is, except that it is not “ logical paradox， ， . We have two ways to find out the reality o f this “ magic”： the first is to search for the explanations indirectly through what the believers have said about such paradoxes; the second is to investigate the related metaphors. For the first, Mou Zong-san's remarks on some “ paradoxical sentences” are helpful. For example, to Mou, the sentence ‘‘prajna is not prajna, that is prajna” is not really an analytical or discursive expression, but rhetorically a negative expres­ sion derived from an existential feeling o f the mind or self. The real prajna can only be expressed in this way because it is something without properties and forms, or it is nothingness by which we can remove our attachment and delusion.16 In other words, this expression should not be understood in its literal meaning; it is a special kind o f speech act which can have an illocutionary force o f removing attachment and delusion or a perlocutionary force o f invit­ ing such a removal. I f this explanation o f the sentence is correct, however, there w ill be no magical sense in it, for we can rationally understand what it means and how it functions. The so-called “ dialectical paradox” can be explained away. Another famous example o f the seeming paradox is “ samsara is Nirvana” . According to the explanations o f Mou and many others, this expression is used to criticize the notion o f the absolute separation o f the two worlds.17 However, if the criticism is not a straw-man attack, both sides should use the terms “ samsara” and “ Nirvana” with the same meaning, and use the word “ is” in the sense of “ being inseparate” . By the Buddhist principle o f “ removing no dharma but its disease” （ 除病不除法)，usamsara is Nirvana” means “ to arrive at the realm of Nirvana is not to remove the realm o f samsara”， because only the disease o f samsara should be removed. Here again we can see that what Mou provides is a rational explanation; there is no dialectic or paradox to be found.

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For the second strategy of disclosing the seeming magic, some o f the inter­ esting and influential metaphors can be analyzed to reveal the real meaning of “ the paradoxical identity” . Take the following for examples: (A)

(B)

(C)

(D)

(E)

Just as the lotus cannot grow on highlands or the lands above the sea level but only in the wet and dirty mud o f lower places. ... Only in the mud o f klesha (defiling forces, passions) can the living beings develop Buddha’s dharma.18 Avidya (ignorance) is vidya (knowledge). You should know that being in the state of avidya is inseparate with vidya, just as ice is water, and water ice.19 Just as water will be changed into hard ice when the weather is cold; just as the mind [in the day-time] w ill be changed into [various states of] dream.20 Just as a pearl would produce water when faced towards the Moon, produce fire when faced towards the Sun, and produce nothing when faced towards neither. Here is only one thing, but it could have two different effects: producing either water or fire.21 Just as the bamboo has the nature o f [causing] fire, but this nature is not identical with the event o f fire, so having the nature is not having the burning [event]. When the relevant conditions are met, the relevant event happens and the evil [nature/thing] can be removed. Just as the bamboo has [the nature of causing] fire, when a fire happens, it will burn a bamboo in turn. The evil [thing/nature] has good [nature] in it, when the good [event] happens, some evil [nature/thing] w ill be ruined. Hence, the evil nature and phenomena are the good nature and phenomena.22

The above metaphorical expressions are all about the inseparation o f two items: either between two objects, two states, two functions, or an object and its nature. The first metaphor “ lotus is mud” is related to two objects one o f which cannot be maintained without the other. The second and third metaphors “ ice is water” and “ the [day-time] mind is the dream [m in d ]"， ，are respectively related to two states which are embodied in one and the same object or person. The fourth metaphor “ the function o f producing water and that o f produc­ ing fire are coming from the same object” expresses two different functions originated from the same object. The last metaphor “ the nature of causing fire (i.e., the good nature) is in the bamboo (i.e., the evil th in g )"， ，means that the nature is inherent in the object.23 After looking carefully into all these examples, we can conclude that there are no nondiscursive or dialectical characteristics in the expressions, whether the inseparation is about two different objects of interdependence, two different states of the same object, two different functions originated from the same object, or some kind of nature inherent in an object. I f the above metaphors can be understood in a discursive way, the original dialectical paradoxes explained by these metaphors can be understood in the same way. In other words, there would be no unintelligible magic power found in the so-called “ dialectical paradoxes” .

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Hua-Yan'， s idea of “the perfect interpenetration of the six characteristics” Hua- Yan is another school o f Chinese Buddhism interested in the dialectical mode o f thinking proposed by Madhyamika Buddhism. In H ua-yen， s philo­ sophy, among the best-known ideas that reflect this mode o f thinking are the four dharmadhatu ( 四法界)，the perfect interpenetration o f the six characteristics (六相 圓 融 )，and the ten im plicit nonobstructions ( 十玄無礙 ) . In this section, we w ill focus on the problem o f the six characteristics. The six characteristics are three pairs o f opposite items, namely:(1 )univer­ sality (總相） and particularity (別I); (2) identity ( 同相） and difference ( 異相); (3) integration (成相） and disintegration (壞相) . The former of each pair more or less expresses the feature of the whole, while the latter reflects the feature o f the part. The main idea o f the perfect interpenetration o f the six characteristics is tantamount to the idea o f the identification o f the whole and the part. In order to illustrate the idea, we quote a dialogue between the great master Fa Zang ( 法藏）and one o f his disciples which runs as follows:24 Question: What is the universal? Answer: It is the house. Question: That is nothing but various conditions, such as a rafter; what is the house itself? Answer: The rafter is the house. Why? Because the rafter by itself totally makes the house. I f you get rid o f the rafter, the house is not formed. When there is a rafter, there is a house. Question: I f the rafter by itself totally creates the house, then it should be understood that it creates the house even without roof tiles and other things. Answer: When there are no tiles and such things, a rafter [material] is not a rafter, so it does not create the house. It is not to say that there is a rafter but which is not able to create a house. ... A rafter is a condition [for the house]. When it has not yet created the house, it is not a condition, and therefore it is not a rafter. I f it is a [real] rafter, it w ill totally form [the house]. I f it does not totally form it, it is not called “ rafter” .... Question: Since the house is identical with the rafter,，then the remaining planks, tiles, and so on, must be identical with the rafter, aren’t they? Answer: Totally they are the rafter. Why? The reason is that if you take away a rafter, there is no house, because if there is no rafter, the house is spoiled. Since it is spoiled, they are not called “ plank” or “ tile” . Therefore, the tiles and other [particular] things are identical with the rafter. I f they are not the rafter, then the house is not formed, for planks, tiles, and so on, do not become formed either. Now, since they all are formed together, you should know that they are identical [with the rafter]. Since this is so o f the one rafter, the other rafters are the same. Therefore, if all the dharmas, which are conditions arising, are not formed, then they cease. I f they are formed, then they are all identical

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with each other, interfused, completely free in the state of non­ obstruction. It is extremely difficult to conceive its perfection and the idea surpasses the normal thinking.

The so-called “ It is extremely difficult to conceive its perfection and the idea surpasses the normal th in k in g ， ，means that the Hua-Yan'， s perfect doctrine cannot be understood through the rational thinking which conforms to logic. I f we think in a rational or logical way, the house as a whole can be considered as constituted from its parts, such as rafters, tiles, and planks. Although the combination or organization o f the parts can form the whole, the whole is not identical with its parts; neither is a part o f the whole necessarily identical with the other part. So, from the perspective o f normal thinking, the above token-identity statements (“ the house is the rafter” and “ the rafter is the tile ”） are unintelligible. I f “ the whole is the part” and “ this part (of the whole) is the other part (of the whole)” mean the inseparation or interdependence o f the whole and its part, or one part and another, they certainly do not surpass the normal discourse, or transcend the logical thinking. I f we, following Fa Zang， s mode o f thinking, think that “ the rafter totally forms the house,” ，we would give up the principle o f individuality, and the conventional use o f the terms “ whole” and “ part” . Maybe this is the reason why Fa Zang， s idea surpasses the normal thinking. I think that Fa Zang'， s idea o f interpenetration o f the six characteristics is nonsense, if not tr iv ia l.I also think that he should accept the conven­ tional relationship of the whole and the part as a minimal meeting point with us if he wants to communicate with us. Then, we can have the following true assertion: (a)

H =

The formula stands for the relationship that the house as a whole is con­ stituted from its parts, such as rafter, tiles, and planks. By the statement that “ I f you get rid o f the rafter, the house is not formed. When there is a rafter, there is a house” Fa Zang seems to assert both a necessary and a sufficient condition between having the house and the rafter. That is: (b)

(ョx)[ (x=a).(x くH) ]=(3y)[ (y=H>(a くy)]

This formula means that having some rafter (which is a part o f a house) is equivalent to having a house (which is the whole of which the rafter is a part). However, we cannot infer from (a) and (b) to (c) or (d): (c) (d)

(ix)[(x-a)-(x