Communalism in Bengal : From Famine to Noakhali, 1943-47 0761933352, 2004029996, 8178294710

Table of contents :
Cover
Contents
Series Editors' Preface
Acknowledgements
Introduction
Hunger and Politics
Politics Amidst Hunger
Politics Overtakes Hunger
War is Over: Efforts at Freedom
Violence Reigns: The Calcutta Riots
Violence Everywhere: The Noakhali-Tippera Riots
Looking for the Origins: The Noakhali-Tippera Riots
Battling with Hatred: Gandhi in Noakhali
Conclusion
Bibliography
Index
About the Author

Citation preview

Rakesh

Communalism in Bengal

Other Volumes in the Same Series Volume 1: Independence and Partition: The Erosion of Colonial Power in India by Sucheta Mahajan Volume 2: A Narrative of Communal Politics: Uttar Pradesh, 193739 by Salil Misra Volume 3: Imperialism, Nationalism and the Making of the Indian Capitalist Class, 1920-1947 by Aditya Mukherjee Volume 4: From Movement to Government: The Congress in the United Provinces, 1937-42 by Visalakshi Menon Volume 5: Peasants in India's Non- Violent Revolution: Practice and Theory by Mridula Mukherjee

Communalism in Bengal From Famine to Noakhali, 1943-47

RAKESH BATABYAL

Sage Series in Modern Indian History-VI

SERIES EDITORS

Bipan Chandra Mridula Mukherjee Aditya Mukherjee

SAGE Publications New Delhi· Thousand Oaks· London

Copyright © Rakesh Batabyal, 2005 All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.

First published in 2005 by Sage Publications India Pvt Ltd B--42, Panchsheel Enclave New Delhi 110 017

www.indiasage.com Sage Publications Inc Sage Publications Ltd 2455 Teller Road ~ 1 Oliver's Yard, Thousand Oaks, ~ 55 City Road California 91320 London ECIY ISP

Published by Tejeshwar Singh for Sage Publications India Pvt Ltd, typeset by InoSoft Systems in 10/12 Palatino-Roman and printed at Chaman Enterprises, New Delhi. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Batabyal, Rakesh, 1966Communalism in Bengal from famine to Noakhali, 1973--47 / Rakesh Batabyal. p. cm.-(Sage series in modern Indian history; 6) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Communalism-India-Bengal-History. 2. Famines-Political aspects-India-Bengal. 3. Riots-Bangladesh-Noakhali DistrictHistory. I. Title. II. Series. DS422.C64B385

954'.140359-dc22

ISBN: 0-7619-3335-2 (Hb)

2005

2004029996

81-7829-471-0 (India-Hb)

Sage Production Team: Jaishankar Prasad, Shweta Vachani, Radha Dev Raj and Santosh Rawat

For my mother, Shrimati Arati Batabyal (d.1997) my teacher, Father Joseph Van Troy S.J. (d.1990) and my friend, Dr Sub rata Sengupta (d.1997)

Contents Series Editors' Preface List of Abbreviations Acknowledgements Introduction: Communalism and Historiography

13 19

ONE:

Hunger and Politics

71

Two:

Politics Amidst Hunger

101

Politics Overtakes Hunger

138

War is Over: Efforts at Freedom

165

Violence Reigns: The Calcutta Riots

237

Violence Everywhere: The NoakhaliTippera Riots

270

Looking for the Origins: The NoakhaliTippera Riots

295

Battling with Hatred: Gandhi in Noakhali

333

Conclusion

380

THREE:

FOUR:

FIVE: SIX:

SEVEN:

EIGHT:

NlNE:

Bibliography Index About the Author

9 11

388 416 429

Series Editors' Preface The Sage Series in Modern Indian History is intended to bring together the growing volume of historical studies that share a very broad common historiographic focus. In the 50 years since independence from colonial rule, research and writing on modern Indian history has given rise to intense debates resulting in the emergence of different schools of thought. Prominent among them are the Cambridge School and the Subaltern School. Some of us at the Jawaharlal Nehru University, along with many colleagues in other parts of the country, have tried to promote teaching and research along somewhat different lines. We have endeavoured to steer clear of colonial stereotypes, nationalist romanticization sectarian radicalism and rigid and dogmatic approach. We have also discouraged the Ilflavour of the month" approach, which tries to ape whatever is currently fashionable. Of course, a good historian is fully aware of contemporary trends in historical writing and of historical work being done elsewhere, and draws heavily on the comparative approach, i.e., the historical study of other societies, states and nations, and on other disciplines, especially economics, political science, sociology and social anthropology. A historian tries to understand the past and make it relevant to the present and the future. History, thus, also caters to the changing needs of society and social development. A historian is a creature of his or her times, yet a good historian tries to use every tool available to the historian's craft to avoid a conscious bias to get as near the truth as possible. The approach we have tried to evolve looks sympathetically, though critically, at the Indian national liberation struggle and other popular movements such as those of labour, peasants, lower castes, tribal peoples and women. It also looks at colonialism as a structure and a system and analyses changes in economYf society and culture in the colonial context as also in the context f

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Communalism in Bengal

10

of independent India. It focuses on communalism and caste ism as major features of mod ern Indian development. The volumes in the series will tend to reflect this approach as also its changing and developing features. At the broadest plane our approach is committed to the Enlightenment values of rationalism, humanism democracy and secularism. The series will consist of well-researched volumes with a wider scope which deal with a significant historiographical aspect even while devoting meticulous attention to detail. They will have a firm empirical grounding based on an exhaustive and rigorous examination of primary sources (including those available in archives in different parts of India and often abroad); collections of private and institutional papers; newspapers and journals (including those in Indian languages); oral testimony; pamphlet literature; and contemporary literary works. The books in this series, while sharing a broad historiographic approach, will invariably have considerable differences in analytical frameworks. The many problems that hinder academic pursuit in developing societies-e.g., relatively poor library facilities, forcing scholars to run from library to library and city to city and yet not being able to find many of the necessary books; inadequate institutional support within universities; a paucity of research-funding organizations; a relatively underdeveloped publishing industry, and so on-have plagued historical research and writing as well. All this had made it difficult to initiate and sustain efforts at publishing a series along the lines of the Cambridge History series or the history series of some of the best US and European universities. But the need is there because, in the absence of such an effort, a vast amount of work on Indian history being done in Delhi and other university centres in India as also in British US Russian Japanese Australian and European universities which shares a common historiographic approach remains scattered and has no "voice". Also, many fine works published by small Indian publishers never reach the libraries and bookshops in India or abroad. We are acutely aware that one swallow does not make a summer. This series will only mark the beginning of a new attempt at presenting the efforts of scholars to evolve autonomous (but not indigenist) intellectual approaches in modern Indian history. f

f

f

f

f

Bi pan Chandra Mridula Mukherjee Aditya Mukherjee

List of Abbreviations ABTA AICC AICCP AIHM AIKS AIML AISF AITUC BFRCC BMPP BPCC BPCP BPHM BPKS BPML BPMRC BPSF BPSF BPTUC BRC BSS CDEC CDML

CFC CPI CSP

ewc CWMG

OM EPW

All Bengal Teachers' Association All India Congress Committee All India Congress Committee Papers All India Hindu Mahasabha All India Kisan Sabha All India Muslim League All India Student Federation All India Trade Union Congress Bengal Famine Relief Coordnation Committee Bengal Muslim Parliamentary Party Bengal Provincial Congress Committee Bengal Provincial Congress Party Bengal Provincial Hindu Mahasabha Bengal Provincial Kisan Sabha Bengal Provincial Muslim League Bengal Provincial Mahasabha Relief Committee Bengal Province Student Federation Bengal Provincial Students Federation Bengal Province Trade Union Congress Bengal Relief Committee Bharat Sebashram Sangha Calcu tta Distrubances Enquiry Commission Calcutta District Muslim League Central Food Committee Communist Party of India Congress Socialist Party Congress Working Committee Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi District Magistrate Economic and Political Weekly

12

Communalism in Bengal

FIC FIR

FR GOI IESHR IIL

IJMA INA INC IPTA

KPP NAI NDCC NMML NWFP PBLA PBLC PCC PCP PIHC PS RRM

RSP SC SCF SDS ST TF TOP

VVSS

Famine Inquiry Committee First Information Report Fortnightly Report Government of India Indian Economic and Social History Review

Indian Independence League Indian Jute Mill Association Indian National Army Indian National Congress Indian Peoples' Theatre Association Krishak Praja Party National Archives of India Noakhali District Congress Committee Nehru Memorial Museum and Library North Western Frontier Province Proceedings of the Bengal Legislative Assembly Proceedings of Bengal Legislative Council Provincial Congress Committee Progressive Coalition Party Proceedings of Indian History Congress Police Station Review of Revolutionary Matters Revolu tionary Socialist Party Scheduled Caste Scheduled Caste Federation Sana tan Dharma Sabha Scheduled Tribe Towards Freedom Transfer of Power Vidhava Vivah Sahayak Sabha

Acknowledgements This book has its origin during the days when I used to ask my grandmother about her early life in the tranquil village of Gaurnadi, in Barisal district of what is now Bangladesh, about the forces that compelled her family to come to this completely unknown tribal belt of Jhar khand as refugees. She was full of agony and anger at the thought of her refugee status, while nostalgic about her lost world. But there was no sense of vengefulness or bitterness. This was something very strange and special to me, at a time when the air was becoming thick with the sound and fury of avenging historical wrongs. It was in these days of the early 1980s, when communal hatred had begin to cloud the social and political space in this part of India, that this frail but beautifullady in her seventies gave me a glimpse of another world. I hope the pages in this book, which I finally wrote years after she had left this world, can at least capture cameos of that world of hers with its bittersweet memories but no sense of revenge. Of the many intellectuals, institutions and persons whose support, help and ideas influenced the writing of this book and whose encouragement sustained mef I wish to make special mention of those who played a particularly important role in the development of my ideas. I record my deep sense of gratitude to Professor Bipan Chandra, my supervisor, who helped me to look keenly at the past and not be resigned to the present. He not only helped me sustain a robust sense of optimism at a time of overwhelming despondency, but also gave me a healthy sense of respect for humanity. His comments on the drafts made me substantiate every argument with factually correct information as well as face my sources with honesty and present them without any fear or prejudice. I hope the reader will find glimpses of these qualities in the pages of the book. f

f

f

14

Communalism in Bengal

Some of the ideas in the book were first discussed in an M.A. seminar paper which I had written for Mridula Mukherjee's class. I thank her for her encouragement and inspiration over the years. I acknowledge with gratitude the atmosphere my teachers provided at the Centre for Historical Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University, where entering history classes were not like visits to the Waxworks or the Regions of the Dead. I particularly thank Professor Harbans Mukhia, Sabyasachi Bhattacharya, Satish Saberwal, BoO. Chattopadhyaya, Shire en Ratnagar, Aditya Mukherjee, Majid Siddiqi, Kunal Chakrabarti, R. Champakalakshmi and Bhagwan Josh for encouraging me through my University days. I am also thankful to Professors Dibagh Singh, Muzaffar Alam, Yogesh Sharma and K.K. Trivedi for their support. I remember today with a sense of humility and gratitude all those who presented their views at the Wednesday seminar at the Centre where I learnt to disagree, vehemently at times, without losing sight of the respect that their scholarship invited. I remember with a sense of gra titude my teachers at St Xavier's College, Ranchi, particularly Fr Joseph Van Troy, Fr Leo Frankleen, Fr Clarisey and Fr C. De Brower who helped a 15-year-old boy cultivate an interest in books, history and human affairs, and helped him sustain these interests for years. One of the persons whom I have dedicated this book to is the late Fr Van Troy, an erudite Sanskrit scholar with an astounding knowledge of classical history, who not only taught me the nuances of Greek, mediaeval and classical Indian philosophy for seven long years, but also exposed me to the suffering that thousands of families like his had withstood during the Nazi occupation of Belgium and parts of Europe. My colleagues at the Institute of Advanced Study in Shimla during 1996-99 will never know the horizons they have opened for me. lowe a special thanks to Professor Mrinal Miri, who spent hours clearing my doubts on Kant, Aristotle and other issues in philosophy. The company of Nrimalangshu Mukherjee, Bijoy Barua, BN. Pattanaik, Krishna Sobti, the late Bhisham Sahni, Raji Seth, Chidanand Dasgupta, T.R.S. Sharma, Ramasray Roy, Samir Bannerjee, Sekhar Pathak, Tejwant Singh Gill, Rustom Singh, Uma Banerjee, Sanjiv Ghotge and Shyam Bahadur Namra was both exciting and educative. I thank all of them.

Acknowledgements

15

I acknowledge my debt to Simon Digby and Maulvi Azizul Hasan who initiated me into the intricacies of Islamic thought. I also thank Professor Barun De for guiding me to the available sources in Bengal. The late Nikhil Chakravarty, late Mahamahopadhyaya Heramba Chatterjee Shastri and Bishnu Pada Majumdar provided many insights and significant information on the period of my research. Professors Mahashweta Choudhury and Sushil Choudhury have not only kept an open house for me in Calcu tta, bu t I also remember with fondness the long hours that we spent discussing history, historiography and historians. Lopita, Gurudas, Atanu and Leela Chakravarty made my stay at Calcutta comfortable. I express my thanks to all of them. A large number offriends at Jawaharlal Nehru University not only helped by just being there, but also kept me alert with their sharp arguments, often spending hours debating and suspending conclusions. I express my gratitude to Ajay Jha, Sanjay, Mahesh, Ranjan, Sudeep Mukhia, Subhajyoti, Ujjayini, Vikram Menon, Kailashpati Jha, Sanjay Joshi, Rakesh Agarwal, G. Anil, Sajana, T.J. Suresh, Regi Thomas, Sunil Raina, Raja Sen, Srinivas Talluri, Narayan Nagesh, Baldev Singh, K. Ellangovan, Muhammad Asif, Suryanath Singh,Avijit Ghosh, Gautam Pandey, the late Pao Wankhao, Han Seok Lee, Bijay Pratihari, Swapna and Gaurav Banerjee, and many others. Avijitda (Pathak), Sovanda (Sanyal), late Subratada (Sengupta) and Nutandi have been always there to encourage, and so too were Anjali and Arun Bali. Prof. c.P. Bhambri has always been concerned and affectionate. I am grateful to all of them. lowe Rajmohan Gandhi a special sense of gratitude for the long discussions that we had, which went into making of the last chapter of this book. The strong and vibrant collective comprising of Sucheta Mahajan and Bodh Prakash, Visalakshi Menon and Antony Thomas, Neeraj Singh, SalilMisra, Bhupinder Yadav, Lata Singh, Sashi Bhusan Upadhyay and Richa Malhotra will, I hope, find the work up to the standard they have always prescribed forme. It is their criticism and appreciation which Ihave valued most for the last 10 years or so. The Friday Seminars provided all of us with a sense of direction and belonging to a robust intellectual tradition. Attimes life was tough, and itwas Usha and Vicky who made it slightly easier with their care and support. Sushmita

16

Communalism in Bengal

Dasgupta and Madhushree Banerjee have always shown their excitement for all my intellectual ventures. Karthika (V.K) and Ravi (Singh) have not only been part of our extended family, but also the best support thatfriends can be in times of need. I thank all of them. Ajeet Kumar Batabyal, my father, whose struggle for the rights of the tribals since the 1960s has inspired me since my childhood, will no doubt try to look for the same honesty and courage in my work as that which inspired his own actions. Arati Batabyal, my mother, for whom the world was not divided into caste, class or religious affiliations, would have been very sad to read some of the tales of communal cruelty in these chapters. Shampa, Seema and Rajesh, my siblings, have been my greatest sources of strength. Mahalakshmi, my wife, has been a constant source of inspiration. I thank Rajeshwari and K.S. Ramakrishnan, my parents-in-law and Nandini and Ravi Ramaswamy for their concern and encouragement. Ideas appearing in the book have been debated intensely in the course of my interactions at the Bangalore University Post Graduate Centre (Tumkur), Government College at Sira (Karnataka), District teachers' meet at Tumkur, the Tribal Academy at Tejgarh (Gujarat), Mahatma Gandhi Antarastriya Hindi University, Wardha (Maharashtra), at the History department of Nagpur University, and with hundreds of teachers whom I have met at the Academic Staff College, Jawaharlal Nehru University, over the past four years. I express my thanks to all of them for the seriousness with which they have taken my arguments and debated. Notwithstanding the unending stream of criticism of our public institutions, one comes to know the better side of these in the course of one's works there and interactions with their personnel. I am indeed thankful to the extremely cooperative staff of the National Archives (New Delhi), West Bengal State Archives (Writer's Building, Calcutta), Nehru Memorial Museum and Library (New Delhi), and P.c. Joshi Archives on Contemporary History (Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi) who were always ready with their assistance and suggestions. I am also indebted to the Librarian and staff of the National Library (Calcutta), Central Secretariat Library (New Delhi) and Jawaharlal Nehru University Library (New Delhi) for their help and cooperation. I specially thank Mrs. Deepali Ghosh of the Rare Books

Acknowledgements

17

Section at the National Library (Calcutta) for her care and friendly assistance. I acknowledge with thanks Dr Amiya Samanta, the then Director General, Intelligence, West Bengal, for not only allowing me access to the intelligence files under his custody, but for also providing me a congenial abnosphere to work in. I acknowledge with thanks the University Grants Commission of India for the award of the Junior and Senior Research Fellowships for the period 1991-96, which allowed me to concentrate on my academic pursuits, of which this book is the outcome. The editorial team at Sage Publications has also been very cooperative and lowe special thanks to Mimi Choudhury, Ritu Vajpeyi-Mohan, Shweta and Jaishankar for their friendly attitude towards an otherwise errant author. As for any error in the work, I alone can be held responsible.

Introduction: Communalism and Historiography This book is about communalism, and the struggle by political parties in Bengal to gain political space during 1943 and 1947. We have tried to locate the process, in its historical context, through which the ideology of communalism played one of the most crucial roles in the struggle for political space. A number of serious writings have tried to examine the idea and the role of communalism in the historical progression of events in Indian society. Serious discussion on communalism becomes heavily charged with political connotations and when used in examining historical contexts and progression raises serious historiographical issues. The post-independence period has witnessed a spate of writings on communalism and communal riots. They can generally be characterized as denoting three particular trends, which not only demonstrate their respective historiographical approaches in writing and conceptualization but also, at a subterranean level, indicate the ideological positioning of scholars on the issue. The first variant consists of the writings of historians who find nothing new about politics based on communalism. For them in such a shapeless country as India, with its admixture of societies, politics has always been structured around religion, caste, community or factions and motivated by Ilsel£-interests". Fractured in so many ways and united by the enlightened British Empire, a coherent and united ideology like Indian nationalism, be it in the singular or plural (the two-nation theory of the Muslim League) could not take root easily. Hence, Anil Seal, one of the most prominent of the Cambridge historians, who belongs to this genre of historiography, writes: f

f

f

f

20

Communalism in Bengal

In so shapeless, so jumbled a bundle of societies, there were not two nations there was not one nation and there was no nation at all. What was India?-A graveyard of old nationalities and the mother of new nationalisms struggling to be born l f

f

Indian society and history provide these writers with a past replete with groups defined by caste, religion and other such primordial loyalties, with the mutual relationships of these groups seen as shaping their politics. Coherent and abstract notions like nationalism it is argued have no role in this as any such idea would find it extremely difficult to premise itself in a society marked by pluralities of primordial relationships. At times of antagonism these relationship Sf according to this view were marked by processes fitting the description of the concept of communalism. Communalism is seen as a phenomenon that existed since time immemoriat because it provided the only means for the pluralities or religious groups to interact as well as counteract with each other. Therefore, they conclude that the phenomenon of communalism is not modern at all-it always existed. 2 Here Ilmodern also presupposes Ilcoioniai under the ambit of its explanation. Therefore the denial of communalism as something modern, implicitly denies the link between colonialism and communalism. This link, however, can be clear ly seen not merely in the policies of the British to divide and rule the Indians, but also in the introduction of socio-political and economic structures and processes that brought about massive shifts in Indian society. Colonialism produced, for example, a land revenue system which changed the land relations in most parts of the country and later transformed the material conditions oflarge sections of people. The British created new political and administrative structures that helped shape the idea of large and panIndian communities in entirely new modes. It was colonialism and its operation that constituted the changed material production f

f

f

f

f

ff

ff

f

f

Anil Seal, The Emergence of Indian Nationalism: Competition and Collaboration in the Later Nineteenth Century, Cambridge, 1968, p. 339. 2 Ibid. John Gallagher, G. Johnson and Anil Seal eds, Locality, Province and Nation, Cambridge, 1972; c.A. Bayly, The Local Roots of Indian Politics, Allahabad 1880-1920, London, 1975. 1

Introduction: Communalism and Historiography

21

and agrarian relations. Communalism was a product of the modern age, which unleashed these historical forces in the colonized countries. This colonial Ilinterlude" is deemed insignificant by some and any attempt to link the processes is said to be reductive in nature. Thus criticism of the understanding of communalism as a modern phenomenon and the denial of colonialism as an overarching phenomenon, seem to go hand in hand when analysed critically. In addition, it is in this context that historians of the Cambridge school nullify any abstraction and consciousness of nationalism-and thereby even communalism which defined itself against nationalism. This involved employment of a two-pronged strategy: first, negating nationalism by bringing in concrete detailed local data, premised on the notion that the concrete is necessarily antagonistic to the abstract. The second, when such abstraction or ideology is hard to dismiss, showing it as a mask for individual or group motives or an aggregate of self-interest of individuals or groups. So, in this formulation, there was no scope for people to voice their ideas, angst or protest. Wherever groups of people talked in the language of nationalism or nation-in India or in Africa-Robinson and his colleagues theorized these voices as part of a ramshackle coalition". This theory of coalition was used first in India and later in Africa. The coalition and the parties were said to represent individual or group interests and in fact, the colonial rule even provided the space and the wherewithal to create and represent such a coalition. 3 In such general terms of analysis, evidently, the Indian National Congress seemed to be the most convenient case, and the Cambridge school historians have tried to study Indian nationalism and the Indian National Congress through the prism of the coalition theory. In a renewed effort to strengthen the old assertions made by the colonial authorities about south Asian history, Christopher Bayly emphasizes this faith, ostensibly in the name of "resurrection of f

f

f

II

f

f

See, R. Robinson, "Non-European Foundations of European Imperialism: Sketch for a Theory of Collaboration", in W.K Louis ed., Imperialism: The Robinson-Gallagher Controversy, New York, 1972, pp. 128-51; Michael Twaddle, "Decolonization in Africa: A New British Historiographical Debate?" in Bogumil Jewsiewicki and David Newbury eds, African Historiographies: What History for Which Africa?, New York, 1985, p. 131. 3

22

Communalism in Bengal

agency". He presents rich concrete material to emphasize the group linkages as against any pan-Indian or national universe. 4 Thus f if there was no Iinationar'f the definition of communal as opposed to the national does notfind sustenance. And therefore, Bayly suggests that many conflicts in the period 1700-1850, bear close resemblance to the communal riots that took place during the late 19th and 20th centuries. 5 Citing the land wars and the acts of indigenous states, such as that of the Sikhs and the Marathas, as examples of religious and communal conflicts, he questions the views that, he assumes, are held by a large section of Indian historians: If religious revitalisation did not necessarily give rise to religious conflict or communal conflict, it is also the case that the widespread Hindu-Muslim symbiosis of the pre-colonial and early colonial periods did not totally exclude the possibility of riot and disturbance along communal lines. 6

Criticizing the assumption that Ilcommunal violence was an export from the towns and that the syncretism of rural religion excluded the possibility of communal violence", Bayly concludes that neither Ilcommunal violence was incompatible with eclectic religious practices as the orthodox nationalist view of communalism has so often contended"f nor is there Ilground to assume that communal violence in the countryside was only an export from the town in the course of late 19th or 20th centuries".' By arguing that analyses of consciousness seem to lead nowhere if taken out of context"} he arrives at the conclusion that lithe Iland wars' of the 18th century, which saw the rise of agrarian Hindu and Sikh peasantry against Muslim rural gentry were apparently no more or no less communal than the riots in eastern D.P. in the 1920s or in eastern Bengal in the 1930s and 1940s"9 II

For a classic statement on the imperialist assertions about the history of the rise of Indian nationalism, see V Chirol, Indian Unrest, London, 1910. 5 CA. Bayly, "The Prehistory of Communalism? Religious Conflicts in India, 1700-1860", Modern Asian Studies, VoL 19, No.2, 1985, pp. 177-203. 6 Ibid., p. 180. 7 Ibid., p. 193. 8 Ibid., p. 203. 9 Ibid., p. 202. 4

Introduction: Communalism and Historiography

23

Though Bayly disclaims that he postulates any "teleology by which the conflicts of this period broaden out to provide the background for Muslim or Hindu-Sikh contentions in the late19th and 20th centuries"f 10 the contradictions in his argument are apparent when he transports the consciousness of communalism of the late 19th and 20th century into a 17th century context. If nothing else, it is teleology at its best. If the attacks on the Muslim rural gentry in 1700 are the same as, for example, the attacks on Hindu landlords by Muslim peasantry at N oakhali in 1946, then Bayly fails to provide Ilmeaning"f which he asserts is his intention, to the events of the 18th and 19th centuries. It is difficult to equate the demolition of mosques in 1700 by Hindu peasantry, with the desecration oftemples by Muslim peasantry in 1946, or with the demolition of the Babri Masjid at Ayodhya in 1992. Not only, as Gyanendra Pandey criticizes, did the two all-India communities (Hindus and Muslims) come up in the 19th and 20th centuriesf giving new meaning to the concept of community}l there was also a change in the political rhetoric, which motivated people to attack each other. This is because the contexts were drastically different. Therefore, as Romila Thapar terms it, by ignoring the "culture of politics"!2 of a particular age/period, Bayly retards his ovvn mission of attempting to resurrect agency" by analysing the contexts. 13 Thusf this group of historians interpret communalism as a normat common strife between religious groups. This interpretation helps these scholars bypass the problem of the existence of a colonial context, and of the historical experience of a substantial II

Ibid., p. 190. Gyanendra Pandey, The Construction of Communalism in Colonial North India, Delhi, 1990, pp. 15-16. 12 Romila Thapar, "Communalism and Historical Legacy: Some Facets", Social Scientist, VoL 18, 205-6, June-July, 1990, p. 12. 13 Works of Sandria Freitag and Warren Fusfield have, in a modified version, reproduced the same thesis that communalism is just the new form of the old "religious conflict" now being performed in the new theatres, public arenas and other spaces provided by the colonial state. See, Sandria Freitag, Collective Action and Community: Public Arenas and the Emergence of Communalism in North India, Delhi, 1990; Warren Fusfield, "Communal Conflict in Delhi, 1803-1930", Indian Economic and Social History Review (IESHR), Vol. 19. No.2. pp. 181-200. 10 11

24

Communalism in Bengal

section of humanity as colonial subjects. It is the control of administrative and other state apparatuses, the politics of the colonial state in negotiating betvveen communities to safeguard its own interests and the larger interests of British colonialism, which constituted the colonial context. However, the writings by this group find in communalism a convenient instrument to obliterate the impact of the colonial intervention. The second group of writers regards communalism as a modern phenomenon a consequence of the emergence of modern politics. According to Bipan Chandra, one of the chief representatives of this variant communalism in the modern period marked a sharp break with the politics of the ancient and the medieval or pre-1857 periods.!4 Situating communalism within the overarching colonial context, these scholars refute the notion tha t it was a part of India's hoary past, existing for centuries. Instead, its emergence is located in the context of the British colonial impact, and the response of different social classes, strata and groups of India to this factor. Communalism was a theme tha t had attracted historians even before the partition and independence of India, and in fact, W.e. Smith produced the most rigorous and insightful work on the rise and growth of communalism in India in 1946 15 In one of the first significant post-independence works, A.R. Desai tried to understand communalism through an analysis of the Indian social structure in the wake of colonial rule and its impact. Desai defined communalism as: f

Only the disguised expression of the struggle between the personal stakes belonging to different faiths that gave a communal form to that struggle. It also was the form within which the struggle of the professional classes of different communities over posts and seats carried on. 16 Therefore, in the final analysis, communal strife was a middleclass inspired struggle. Asghar Ali Engineer and Main Shakir 14 Bipan Chandra, Communalism in Modern India, New Delhi, 1984 (reprinted 1989), p . 8. 15 Wilfred Cantwell Smith, Modern Islam in India, Lahore, 1963 (1946). 16 A.R. Desai, Social Background of Indian N ationalism, Bombay, 1948 (reprinted 1959), p. 382.

Introduction: Communalism and Historiography

25

have expressed a similar view. 17 They see communalism as a product of the imbalances created in the economy by the capitalist system. The unequal economic system was a major factor in the Muslim middle-class lagging behind their Hindu counterpart. They began to feel uncomfortable about the entire capitalist scenario, and hence, gradually shifted towards parties demanding a separate homeland for Muslims. Engineer and Shakir have extensively studied the postpartition communal situation and conflicts. Engineer concludes communalism like ethnicity has existed since time immemorial in the form of prejudices and it is very much in keeping with human nature. However we should not confuse these ethnic and communal prejudices with present day communal conflicts".18 Engineer, and a host of others, who derive their definition of communalism often from their studies of the recent communal riots, suffer from an acute empiricist dilemma. The sudden and sporadic violent episodes demand a definition from the immediate, rather than the deep historical context. Therefore, anchoring any understanding of communalism on immediate contexts tends to shift the understanding of the causes and origins of communalism and communal riot from context to context. Prabha Dixit too finds communalism a modern phenomenon. For her, it is a political doctrine that uses religio-cultural differences and awareness and transforms them into communalism as a political doctrine 1 9 This deliberate choice, however, she argues, is not made by the community pe, se, but by the elite of that community. Thus Ilcommunalism is a consciously conceived political doctrine of one section of traditional elites".2o Locating herself in the tradition-modernity model, she opines that the Muslim elite, lagging behind in the race for modernization, took to safeguarding their interests. Even when some modernization occurred-as in the case of Syed Ahmed's efforts-these were superficial. She says: f

II

f

f

f

f

17 Of Engineer' s numerous writings I have taken his Communalism and Communal Violence in India, Delhi, 1989, as his representative work. See also, Moin Shakir, Khilafat to Partition: A Survey of Major Political Trends among Indian Muslims during 1919-1947, Delhi, 1970. 18 Asghar Ali Engineer, Communalism and Communal Violence, p. 5. 19 Prabha Dixit, Communalism-A Struggle for Power, Delhi, 1974, p. 1. 20 Ibid., p. 3.

26

Communalism in Bengal

The modernization of the Muslim community as heralded by Sir Syed Ahmed was not the modernisation of the whole community, but the superficial modernisation of the upper class Muslims. The modernisation introduced in this manner was not aimed at creating an intellectual or social revolution. Its sole aim was preservation of the old order.21 According to her, the failure to sufficiently modernize left the Muslim elite, in the end, ill-disposed to adopt democratic principles and institutions. Thus, when there was demand for such a democratic set-upf communalism became a convenient ideology for this group to retain its power. Since nationalism in India symbolized democratic institutions and egalitarian principles, the backward and lagging-behind Muslim elite did not want to accept either. Thus, the compulsion felt by the elite for retaining power made it use the religio-cultural differences and awareness by yoking them into a political doctrine of communalism. Dixit, therefore f treats communalism as a form of political doctrine f instrumental in nahue. According to herf communalism first originated among the Muslim elite, and hence, in this sense they were the original sinners. Dixit's explanation for the emergence of Hindu communalism is that it originated as a reaction to Muslim communalism. 22 In Dixit's argumentsf therefore f communalism comes out as an anti-democratic and anti-modern phenomenon. Bipan Chandra sees it as a Ilreactionff par excellence.23 For himf it was a

Ibid., p. 56. Ibid., pp. 138-164. Dixit says, "Muslim communalism did not arise as a reaction to Hindu communalism. Hindu communalism on the other hand grew as a reaction to Muslim communalism". (Ibid., pp. vii, 9.) However, Bipan Chandra criticises this argument. He suggests, by "assigning the blame or the original sin to the opposite commLUlalism, a sort of backdoor justification was provided for one's own communalism or the communalism one is studying or supporting". (Bipan Chandra, Communalism, p. 205.) 23 He says: 21

22

In the wider historical perspective, communalism was an extreme form of reaction, as is also brought out by the role of the Muslim

Introduction: Communalism and Historiography

27

middle-class, petty-bourgeois phenomenon-a product of the unique socio-economic and political situation of colonial India. He views communalism as a: belief that because a group of people follow a particular religion they have as a result common sociat political and economic interests. It is the belief that in India, Hindus, Muslims, Christians and Sikhs form different and distinct communities which are independently and separately structured or consolidated ... that in fact each religious Ilcommunityff constitutes a homogenous entity and even a distinct society in itself.24 f

For Bipan Chandra, ideology and consciousness, which help people to take subjective cognition of objective realities, are crucial for understanding communalism. Communalism is a false consciousness ff as it presents reality in a distorted form. This false consciousness fills in gaps created by the inadequate development of true consciousness. This inadequacy is evinced by the failure to develop a strong national consciousness and clear linguistic-cultural and class identities.25 His concept of false consciousness, like his analysis of communalism itself, proceeds along with the counterparts, viz., true consciousness and na tionalism. If communalism was false consciousness then nationalism was the true consciousness. lilt was historically valid at the moment as it provided a real solution to a real problem-national liberation against colonial domina tion. ff26 Randhir Singh, however, criticizes this perspective because of what he sees as its failure to theorize communalism and for Illegitimising the state ff .27 He criticizes Bipan Chandra for II

f

f

f

f

League and the Hindu Mahasabha in politics. Communalism was a major weapon of political, social and economic reaction in the modern period that has to be "fought on all fronts and given no quarter." (Bipan Chandra, Communalism, p. 78.) 24 25

26

Ibid., pp. 1-2. Ibid., pp. 18-28. Ibid., pp. 23-24.

v Randhir Singh, "Theorising Communalism: A Fragment-A Note in the

Marxist Mode", Economic and Political Weekly (EPW), 23 July 1988, pp. 1542-48.

28

Communalism in Bengal

providing an alibi to the ruling class for its failures. "Nationalism"f in his opinionf Iiserves to cover up or provide alibis for the historic default or the failure of the postcolonial class in India and increasingly turns into a legitimizing ideology for the new social order or powers that be" .28 He sees tvvo basic flawsideological and methodological-in the writings of contemporary historians and theorists of communalism. They are flawed ideologically because they understand it from the standpoint of nationalism, while methodologically they have studied contemporary communalism in an essentially empiricist and often ahistorical manner.29 His critique is primarily based on his need for, in his words, a theory and practice that will help articulate struggles against communalism with the class struggle. 3D SimilarlYf critique of religion and the inter-related phenomenon ofrevivalism, fundamentalism and communalismf especially as it is an escape into f or aggressive assertion ot an identity based on religionf must become the critique of the society that makes the religion".3! Achin Vanaik, on the other hand, studies the limits of "false consciousness" as proposed by Bipan Chandra.32 According to Iia

Ibid., p. 1543. Ibid., p. 1542. 30 He says, "The struggle against communalism and for secularism in India today has to be understood and waged as a part of the overall revolutionary struggle for socialism in India". (Ibid., p. 1548.) 31 Ibid., p. 1543. 32 Achin Vanaik, The Painful Transition: Bourgeois Democracy in India, London and New York, 1990. His criticism of Bipan Chandra is that though the latter "asserts that communalism is the politics of religious identity, but the question of importance of religious identity, its formation and meaning is never incorporated in any sustained way into his analysis". (Ibid., p. 154.) If one incorporates these, as Vanaik suggests, one may have an explanation on the following lines: 28 29

To sum up, I am suggesting that the rise of communalism should perhaps be seen in relation to the long-standing separateness of the religious networks, the acute social distance expressing a high level of social antagonism between Muslims and Hindus, the lapse of the formerly fLmctioning integrative political and administrative ties, and the growth of communally homogenous neighbourhoods in the Metropolitan Centres. (Satish Saberwal, "Elements of Communalism", Mainstream, 21-28 March 1981, p. 27.)

Introduction: Communalism and Historiography

29

himf the concept has some merit as it tells us that certain barriers exist in the true subjective perception of the structural character of capitalist relations"}3or that there is some true objective reality existing. Howeverf he criticises it for lithe concept cannot explain why these barriers exist and why they remain so powerful which is surely a theoretical prerequisite for removing them in practice" .34 Tracing the growth of communalism in India, Vanaik identifies the Indian Renaissance of the 19th century as the chief culprit as it was embedded in strong Hindu symbols. He labels Indian nationalism as a Hindu one. He counterposes this nationalism and the post-independence Indian state to the European nation states. He concludes that while the latter, prior to their emergence, went through a period of secularization, the Indian state, a product of the culmination of the national movement, inherited the predominantly religious colour which had marked the national movement. Indian civil society also never underwent a process of secularization. Within this contextf he defines communalism as: II

a process involving competitive desecularisation in a religiously plural society-that in a competitive striving to extend the reach of religion through ideology and control institutions-which along with non-religious factors helps to harden divisions betvveen different religious communities and increase tension betvveen them. 35 The theoretical merit of this definition is that unlike other Marxist writings it does not sidetrack or dilute the importance of religion in shaping communalism. However, the study as well as the tools of analysis through which Vanaik reaches this conclusion, show a lack of sensitivity to the strong secular current of the na tional movement. This leads him into over lapping and confusing Hindu revivalism, Hindu fundamentalism and Hindu communalism within the contours of Indian nationalism. 36 This in a way becomes a sociological explanation rather than a rigorous examination which Vanaik seeks. 33 Achin Vanaik, Painful Transition, p. 153. 34 Ibid. 35 Ibid. , p. 154. 36 Ibid. , pp. 140-54.

30

Communalism in Bengal

A central issue of debate among the authors of this variant is the kind of solutions proposed. They all seek a solution to the problem. Desai, writing in the late 1940s and the early 1950s saw the problem rooted in the capitalist epoch itself: In countries where due to historical reasons a centralised state came into existence before the whole mass of people whom it governed was transmuted into a well-knit nation living a common economic life ... as a result of the capitalist economic development, the problem did arise in the course of historical development. 37 f

f

However this seems to be an evaluation rather than an explanation. It does not explain why the problem arose in the form of communalism using religion for communal mobilization. The solution Desai prescribes is to Ilunite the lower strata of different communities for securing their economic and other interests". Thus if communalism is a distorted version of class division lito combat it effectively" one has to bring in a class consciousness" among the lower classes. 3S Writing in the wake of the re-emergence of the communal forces in the 1970s and early 1980s, Bipan Chandra realized the strong ideological content in communalism and the imperative to fight it at the ideological plane. He says, to "combat communalism is to create and propagate the counter ideology".39 This has to be a simultaneous process, along with the efforts at social transformation. However communal consciousness has to be fought at the level of ideology. Since objective conditions feed the false consciousness of communalism in order to successfully oppose communalism it is necessary to eliminate the social conditions favouring its growth i.e., to liquidate its social roots by bringing about fundamental changes in the social system. Capitalism, suggests Bipan Chandra, f

f

f

f

II

f

f

f

f

A.R. Desai, Social Background, p. 402. Ibid. 39 Bipan Chandra, Communalism, pp.310-35. Unlike Engineer, Bipan Chandra does not want to give way to the feeling of helplessness, and opposing it, says, "in facing the communal challenge, the starting point has to be the realisation that the way out is going to be a long haul" (p.310).

37 38

Introduction: Communalism and Historiography

31

can no longer bring about conditions favourable for national unity; this unity can only be maintained and strengthened by striving for a socialist transformation of society. Here he provides what Randhir Singh has been asking for-a critique of the social system. However, unlike the latter who is still far from an ideology to fight communalism, Bipan Chandra provides one. The counter ideology "is to be a continuing phenomenon along with the fight for the transformation of the society. The war should be waged on a synchronous time framework and at different levels".40 Vanaik, setting out to critique Bipan Chandra's alternative, reaches the same conclusion, though using a different phraseology. Setting an agenda for the Marxist socialists, he argues that lIit would be unmaterialist to imagine that collective religious identities might be easily replaced by other collective identities (class, for example) without some prior construction of an alternative working-class and socialist culture rooted in the everyday existence of the oppressed" Y This is what Vanaik claims as the Marxist remedy, as different from the "liberal model" of Bipan Chandra." He advocates a fight for the secularization of the Indian state, and the development of alternative sources of defence and principled militant violence against communal violence. 43 Engineer, on the other hand, is convinced of the incorrigible nature of communal conflicts and seems a bit resigned to the fact.'4 His logic is that the "final solution is too complex to easily yield to any solution. The dynamics of capitalist development are such tha t communal violence cannot be contained in our society. We will have to live with both communalism and communal violence for quite some time to come. We can however certainly try to reduce it".45 He sees capitalist development and the f

Ibid., p. 310. Achin Vanaik, Painful Transition, p. 159. 42 Ibid., p. 156. 43 Ibid., p. 161. 44 Asghar Ali Engineer, Communalism and Communal Violence, p.59. For him "communalism" becomes a given social fact, and one needs only to explain it rather than try to transcend the fact by applying a rigorous analysis. He also fails to separate communalism and communal conflicts, and uses them interchangeably. 40

41

45

Ibid.

32

Communalism in Bengal

resultant imbalanced growth as a major cause of communal problems. The macro-level cause of the communal problem in the economic sphere iS IIMuslims are left out in the process of economic development and the Hindus mainly benefit from it".46 This brings Engineer's empiricist dilemma combined with an extremely superficial economic generalization to the fore. Similarly, in his micro-level analysis, unbalanced economic growth of one community crea tes situations inducing violence by the other, be it in Meerut, Bhiwandi or Ahmedabad. This follows from Engineer's view that violence is an Ilintegral part of development. In the capitalist system, it takes place on ethnic and community lines while in the socialist system in class terms .... Development in South Asia has been taking place in capitalist form hence communal violence."47 Is class struggle, then, a part of the socialist system of development? Whereas, in its ideal-typical form, the socialist system of development presupposes the solution to class struggle by creating a classless society. Similarly, it is primarily in the capitalist system that classes emerge and class struggle takes place to solve the dialectics of exploitation. Engineer is not able to analyse the roots of economic imbalance which he maintains is the sole/basic cause of communal violence. He uses the terms capitalist system, capitalist model of growth, etc., quite interchangeably, and at the same time communalism and communal violence are synonymous for him. This prevents him from transcending the empiricist dilemma we have mentioned earlier. He also, at times, falls prey to a kind of crude economism, which argues that economic development and modernization will create conditions for the eradication of communalism. The argument is flawed because of its ahistoical reading of society and its role in the denial of ideological hegemony enjoyed by communalism, even in a completely modern society. This flaw has been highlighted by those who argue that in spite of economic development and large-scale modernization communalism has increased its hold over the society. The way, therefore, is to come outof the vision of development that is based on the so-called western centric f

f

f

f

f

f

46 47

Ibid., p. 41. Ibid.

f

Introduction: Communalism and Historiography

33

modernist notion of development. 4S We shall discuss this in later sections. The third group of writers advocate an altered periodization of Indian history in the pre-modern and modern phases'9 They attempt to restore Ilagency" to the voices which they argue have f

f

There is an intellectual trend which sees the state in India and its development project as the root of many problems, such as absence/erosion of democracy and factional clashes, ethnic violence and recently the problems related to environment and globalization. See, Rajni Kothari, Politics in India, Orient Longman, Delhi, 1970. For a recent statement by the same author see, Rajni Kothari, "Ethnicity" in Rethinking Development in Search of Human Development, Ajanta, Delhi, 1988. 49 There is a general agreement on the distinctive signs of modernity-an industrial society dominated by technology; and on the main characteristics of post-industrial society-typified by the primacy of knowledge. Modernity, for many, defines the modern phase as one that began with the philosophical foundations of an industrial society based on reason, rationalization and differentiation. Modernization, in this context, came to give meaning to the process of transformation to this modern, and to many, post-industrial phase, from the pre-industrial stage characterized by cohesion and lack of differentiation. It has generally been held that the ideology of progress was embedded in this process of transformation. Modernization, modernity and the ideology of progress are, therefore, the crucial elements in the chain. The theorists of the Frankfurt school, namely, T.W. Adorno and Max Horkheimer, saw modernization as the triumph of "reason" and "rationality". And therefore, these (reason and rationality) were to be critically examined in order to find out "the ills that these concepts brought". See, T.W. Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, London, 1973; M. Horkheimer, Eclipse of Reason, New York, 1974; Critique of Instrumental Reason, New York, 1977. Gradually, this critical appraisal of reason, which was understood as crucial in the process of modernisation gave way to consistent attacks on modernity, modernisation and the idea of progress. These attacks initially came from the scholars of the Frankfurt School, who, working on the epistemological foundations of Marxism, tried to present a critique of what they termed as capitalist modernity. From 1923, when it began, to the days of Horkheimer and Adorno in the 1940s and 1950s, and of Habermas in the 1970s, the theorists have gradually moved away from orthodox, often even Marxist, positions which also coincided with their moving away from politics. Kellner writes: 48

Despite their calls for the revolutionary transformation of society and for relating theory to practice to make social theory an instrument of emancipation, the critical theorists found themselves increasingly distanced from actual political struggles. Hence, their calls for liberation or revolution.. became increasingly paradoxicaL From this vantage point, Critical Theory represents a stage in the development of neo-Marxian

34

Communalism in Bengal

remained suppressed due to modernist and liberal historiographical practices. In their conceptualization communalism iSf among other things, a category constructed on the premise of European enlightenment and its paradigm of rationality, which became a universalizing force. In this waYf communalism as a category of defining certain kind of politics, is also implicit in the modernist

social theories, in which radical intellectuals were separated from revolutionary social movements, while fascism steadily gained power throughout the world. (Douglas Kellner, Critical Theory: Marxism and Modernity, 1989, p. 50.) For a critical review of the works of these theorists see, Martin Jay, Marxism and Totality: The Adventures of a Concept from Lukacs to Habermas, Cambridge, 1984. With the appraisal of the foundations of modern rationality and its homogenising agenda in the writings of Michel Foucault, attack on "reason" soon acquired academic prominence in the West, particularly in the USA. This coincided with a paralysis of radical politics in the West, particularly in France. See, Keith Gandal, "Michel Foucault: Intellectual Work and Politics", Telos, VoL 19, No.2, 1986, pp. 121-34; Walter Van Rossun, "The Triumph of the Void: On the Conversion of French Intellectual", ibid., pp. 178-86; Alex Callinicos, Against Post Modernism: A Marxist Critique, New York, 1990; John Ellis, Against Deconstruction, New Jersey, 1989; and Ernest Gellner, Post Modernism, Reason and Religion, London, 1990. Reason and rationality, and the social organization built upon these attributes of the modern phase, has had its non-Marxist and conservative critics also. Heidegger, Spengler and Moeller van den Bruck can be named as the most ardent critics of modernity, who considered rationality as the cornerstone of modern society. See, Fritz Stern, The Politics of Cultural Despair: A Study in the Rise of Germanic Ideology, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1961, for a brilliant portrayal of the reaction against modernity. The academic condemnation of "reason" was concomitant with the emergence of a trend of valorization of the popular in the name of emancipation. This came at a time when socialism was generally discredited, and there were attempts to normalize and sanitize colonialism by the neocolonial voices. The notion of "postmodernity", which is yet to find a commonly accepted definition even among its crusaders, emerged exactly at this historical juncture. The pessimism and the politically paralysing potentials of these new trends soon got reflected in the writings on communalism in India. The attempts to change the agenda into questioning categories rather than giving new meanings, the efforts at valorising fragments in opposition to the metanarratives, and the llilderstanding of communalism and problems of nationalism by deconstructing intellectual texts, are symptomatic of these changes.

Introduction: Communalism and Historiography

35

frame of knowledge. Partha Chatterjee, one of the prominent representatives of this genre f argues that it was the Iinationalist discourse"f premised on the same modenist framework as communalism, in its attempt at self-definition, defined a particular kind of politics as communalism. This process constructed nationalism and nationalist politics in counterposition to communalism. 50 Thusf in the final analysis f it is the nationalist discourse which constructed communalism as a category. Gyanendra Pandey, improvising on this stand, tries to argue that the nationalist elite-the superordinate classes-propagated this construction of categories through what he describes as nationalist politics. Thus, what was primarily the orientalist (and also colonialist), essentialist tendency, became part and parcel of the definitions of political assertion of sections of Indian people. Such knowledge also extended the category and language of representation of a particular type, based on the Enlightenment rationality now in the service of colonialism. The politics based on this knowledge structure did not recognize those forms of articulation of popular resistance, which were not based on this colonial (read Enlightenment, too) premise. Nationalism, it is argued, borrowed the same paradigm and knowledge structure and, in turn, suspected the politics and voices of the other. This not only helped the colonialists to impose modern categories through the nationalists, but also to legitimize the nationalist politics as the only legitimate modern politics. Modern knowledge is characterized by homogenization, argue these authors, and, therefore, it repressed many voices of the colonized by usurping the modes and language of representation through which they could articulate their experiences and resistance. 51 A IIconstruction" of the same repressive knowledge f communalism too needed to be deconstructed for any libertarian effort. The libertarian efforts, according to this understanding, are to be directed towards demystification of nationalism, and the historiography providing legitimacy to nationalism, so that a real attempt to understand and demystify communalism can be embarked upon. Thus f an attack was launched on what is termed as nationalist

5()

51

Partha Chatterjee! Bengal 1920-1947: Vol. 1: The Land Question! 1984. Gyanendra Pandey! Construction of Communalism.

36

Communalism in Bengal

historiography-an amorphous category embracing the history written by Marxist historians who had critiqued nationalist and colonialist history, and nationalist historians who had attacked the assumptions of the colonialist historiography and the communalist historians. Simultaneously, historiographical trends which premise themselves on the notions of supremacy of "reason"f hierarchy of causationf acceptance of the idea of objective truth and progress and development of the human species in a scientific direction, are labeled as liberal history. Liberal history and its problematique are to be breached and transcended. Following Edward Said's framework of examining Orientalist knowledge," Partha Chatterjee seeks to identify the contradiction within the nationalist thought, which according to him, "in agreeing to become modern accepts the claim of universality of this framework of knowledge" (i.e., the bourgeois-rationalist conception of knowledge established in the post-Enlightenment Europe).'" He finds that its contradictions are based on the very epistemic foundations f of "modern" knowledge on which the nationalist discourse premised itself.54

Edward Said, Orientalism, London, 1974, p.24. Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse, Delhi, 1986, p. 11. 54 Dissecting the structures of knowledge into problematic and thematic categories, Chatterjee elaborates: 52 53

We wish to separate the claims of an ideology, i.e., its identification of historical possibilities and the practical or programmatic forms of its realisation, from its justificatory structures, i.e., the nature of the evidence it presents in support of those claims, the rules of inference it relies on to logically relate a statement of the evidence to a structure of argument, the set of epistemological principles it uses to demonstrate the existence of its claims as historical possibilities, and finally, the set of ethical principles it appeals to in order to assert that those claims are morally justified. The former part of a social ideology we call its problematic and the latter part its thematic. The thematic, in other words, refers to an epistemological as well as ethical system which provides a framework of elements and rules for establishing relations between elements; the problematic, on the other hand, consists of concrete statements about possibilities justified by reference to the thematic. (Ibid., Nationalist Thought, p. 38.)

Introduction: Communalism and Historiography

37

Abdel Malik provides Partha Chatterjee with the characteristics of the dominant framework of nationalist knowledge, i.e., orienta list knowledge. The latter imposed rationalist postEnlightenment knowledge of the West on the Orient, stamping it with an Ilotherness".55 Atthe level of problematicf the Orient and Orientals in this frame, were the "object" of study, stamped with an otherness. This object of study will be, "as is customary, passive, non-participating, endowed with a historical subjectivity, above alt non-active f non-autonomousf non-sovereign with regards to itself"." At the level of the thematic, on the other hand, Iithere was an essentialist concept of the countries f nations and people of the Orient under study, a conception which expresses itself through a characterised ethnic typology."57 Applying these characteristics to his framework, Partha Chatterjee finds that the "problematic" in Indian nationalist thought is exactly the reverse of that ofOrientalism, "that is to say the object of nationalist thought is still oriental, which retains the essentialist character depicted in orientalist discourse. Only he is not passive f non-participating".58 At the thematic levet on the other hand, nationalist thought, according to Chatterjee, accepts and adopts the same essentialist conception based on the distinction betvveen lithe East and lithe West" and the same typology created by a transcendent studying subject. 59 For Partha Chatterjee, this contradiction between active and non-passive subjects but essentialist and objectifying frame of knowledge constitutes the derivative discourse that the Indian nationalist discourse was. This in turnf accroding to himf Iisignifies the theoretical insolubility of the national question in a colonial country, or for that matter, of the extended problem of social transformation in a post-colonial country within a strictly nationalist framework". 60 He, therefore, in order to look for a way out of the impasse argues for a change in the domain of discourse. It is the nationalist II

Anouar Abdel Malik, "Orientalism in Crisis", Diogenes, 44 (Winter), 1963, pp. 102-40, as quoted in Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought, p. 36. 56 Ibid., p.37. 57 Ibid. 58 Ibid., p. 38. 59 Ibid. 6() Ibid., p.39.

55

38

Communalism in Bengal

thought whose "presumed unity" has to be breached so that Iithematique" matches the Ilproblematique"f and therebYf solves the distortion in the discourse resulting due to a borrowed structure of thought. 61 In this way, an onslaught can be directed towards the categories imposed by the orientalist discourse. It is within this framework that the authors of this variant argued that Ilcommunalism is a conception of bourgeois-liberal ideology"." In the pre-independence stage, it was intrinsically linked with nationalism, while in the postcolonial society it is a notion which derives from the self-definition of the Indian state and iSf hencef inseparably tied to its counterpartf Le' f Iisecularism".63 The crucial elements that constitute an intellectual exercise, therefore, are their attacks on the idea of the nation state and secularism, either due to their origin in the post- Enlightenment Europe or their being implicit in the so-called modenist universalizing discourse. And it is here that one recognizes the congruence of views, notwithstanding their apparent differences, of those who take anti-secularist positions, i.e., TN. Madan, Ashis Nandy, and those who take an anti-nation-state position, i.e., Partha Chatterjee. 64 Some notion of a pre-existing community attracts the fascination of these scholars. For them, this community is supposed to be a concrete face-to-face community and not an imagined one. Such communities, they assume, are held together by the bond of tradition instead of institutions premised on modern rationality. Such communities, therefore, promise these scholars not only the perfect antidote to the modern and imagined ideas of secularism

Ibid., p. 50. Partha Chatterjee, Bengal 1920-1947, p. i. One can discern a conflation of categories here. "Post-Enlightenment liberal ideology", now, names as well as denotes the "bourgeois" without any conceptual or analytical explanation.

61 62

Ibid. Ashis Nandy, "Politics of Secularism and Recovery of Religious Tolerance" in Veena Das ed., Mirrors of Violence: Communities, Riots and Survivors in South Asia, Delhi, 1990; Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism, Delhi, 1983; T.N. Madan, "Whither Indian Secularism", Modern Asian Studies, VoL 27, No.3, 1993, pp. 667-97; Partha Chatterjee, "Secularism and Toleration", EPW, VoL 29, No. 28, July 1994, pp. 1768-77. 63 64

Introduction: Communalism and Historiography

39

and nation, but also a way out of the blind alleys they presume modernity has created. 65 For them f this community" -supposed to be a concrete faceto-face community and not an imagined one, bound by indigenous tradition instead of rationality driven modern institutions-promises not only the perfect antidote to the modern and imagined ideas of secularism and the nationf but also a way out of the blind alleys created by modernity. Chatterjee's attempts to alter the structure of the discourse in nationalist thought, based on an attack on the liberal-rationalist thought of the modern West aims at the resurrection of lime aning" and the Iisubject". He aims at dispelling what he saw as the imposed essences of the orienta list discourse. The national movement and its discourse, according to him, have to be breached on two domains of politics. First, the elite domain, in order to define itselt is seen to have created communalism as lithe other"f and on the lines of the Oriental discourse, imposed its own definition of communalism on the subject of the second domain. The second domain, the communal one, lost its own voice to the supposed rationality of the first. As a strategy, therefore, Partha Chatterjee breaks what others would call another event of communalism, into several constituent events and locates each of them in a different analytical plane. 66 This is so, because for him the task is to break up and supersede the liberal problematic of "communalism" and Ilsecularism"Y Since communalism is the Iiself definition of the Indian State", he does not regard "it as a problem and secularism as the answer". 68 Instead f he locates communalism in the structures of power relations f SOf in Bengat for instance f II

Academic justification for this fascination is expressed in terms of an essential dichotomy between what the author sees as the Western and nonWestern contexts, see, for example, Partha Chatterjee, "Community in the East", EPW, VoL 33, No.6, 1998, pp. 277-82. One reason for this intervention, he states, is, "the poor theorisation of the concept of community in modern social thought", ibid., p.279. And his own argument and analysis shows how much of a derivative is Chatterjee's own discourse. 66 Partha Chatterjee, Bengal 1920-1947, p. iiii. 67 Ibid., p. iii. 68 Partha Chatterjee, "Agrarian Relations and Communalism in Bengal, 1926-1935", in Ranajit Guha ed., Subaltern Studies: Writings on South Asian History and Society, VoL I, Delhi, 1984, pp. 9-35. 65

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Communalism in Bengal

communalism becomes synonymous with the actions of the peasant community. Thusf once the essentialist characteristics and definition imposed by the nationalists is purged, communalism emerges as counter-assertion by the communities against all those assertions that are defined and informed by modern rational knowledge. Chatterjee's formulation, it seems, collapses various analytical domains of explanation. He tries to explain away events by taking recourse to analytical structures. Howeverf Ilevenf' comes back to provide substance to his analytical categories. For example, his statement that "the crucial element which deflected the peasant agitation into an anti-Hindu movement was not that the zamindars were Hindusf and the peasants were considered part of the peasant communities whereas the Hindu Zamindars were not",69 begs the question-why were the Hindu Jotedars not considered as members of the peasant community? Chatterjee creates a vicious circularity which makes it difficult to find an answer to this question. Similarly, during the later phase of the communal strife f Hindu peasants were treated as Hindusf and not as peasants. Chatterjee's scheme, to put it crudely, would suggest that the Muslim peasants must have realized the possibilities inherent in the nationalist discourse and the insolubility of important issues by 1947, and therefore, taking advantage of it, carved out an independent state of Pakistan. Since, for Chatterjee, communalism, like nationalism, is a product ofbourgeois-liberal ideology (just as secularism), any breach of that imposed ideology is welcome. Therefore, he argues that such an event as communalism has to be studied not in relation to its counterparts-secularism or nationalism-but in its own right because it helps us to understand how the object of the oriental discourse tries to assert its own autonomy and sovereignty. Gyanendra Pandey takes it upon himself to challenge what is regarded as the given-ness of the categories of communalism, nationalism and f for that matterf secularism. He tries to question the finality and fixity of these categories, and the analytic apparatus of the dyads of communalism-nationalismf and communalism-secularism. 70 Communalism f in his analysis f becomes a 69 70

Ibid. Gyanendra Pandey, Construction of Communalism, p. 64.

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41

construction that is too epistemic. The context and the digit of this construction are the bourgeois colonialist knowledge. According to Pandey the Indian elite or the superordinate classes had internalized these ingredients n On the lines of the colonial West, the nationalist elite tried to define nationalism by defining the communal other". Pandey seeks to argue that nationalismf according to this native elite f was what communalism was not. This construction was achieved with the help of a colonial sociology, which imposed essences to the Indian population. "If bourgeois ideology continuously transforms the products of history into essential types, bourgeois colonialism seems to perform this task of transformation with a vengeance and essential types, i.e., bigoted Julaha, fierce Pathan, intriguing Brahman, the turbulent Ahir and criminal Pasi are created." Pandey argues that this takes history out of reality.72 If colonialism imposed an essentialist typology, argues Pandey, it also denied history to the people-"the oriental objects". The thinking of the Indian elite was in line with the colonial rulers in this respect. "Just as the colonial regime would, if it could, appropriate to itself the entire political life of the subject people, so the local elite would, if it had its way, appropriate the whole history of the local community", says Pandey. 73 Thus, the local community is seen as being deprived of an autonomous history and politics in this argument. It simply becomes the Ilirrational"f the communal Ilother" of the nationalistsf which is embedded within the modern rationality. Pandey attempts to restore this denied autonomy, history and politics to the much maligned oriental object. This he does by deconstructing the meta-textsf which are in the Ilriot narratives" and in the community history texts. The communal riotnarrativef then, is a history of the state imposed forcefully, says Pandey, by II

Ibid., pp. 156-57. One is not very sure of what would be the socioeconomic location of the elite that Pandey talks about. There seems to be confusion about who constitutes this supposedly elite or the nationalist elite. For a powerful critique of this confusion in Pandey's understanding of social classes, see, Mridula Mukherjee, Peasants in India's Non-Violent Revolution: Theory and Practice, Delhi, 2004. 72 Ibid., pp. 107-8. 73 Ibid., p. 150. 71

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Communalism in Bengal

positing the community history text vis-a.-vis these riot narratives. But it is possible to show how history can be contested, and how the community history is the real one, which challenges the colonial history and asserts the autonomy of the oriental object, his history and life vis-a.-vis the colonial construction to its contrary. Pandey links the Indian elite (also read nationalists) to colonial power and knowledge by arguing that they have collaborated with the colonial power in imposing colonial knowledge on the Indian society.74 Thus, Pandey transforms the economic collaborationist role of the Indian bourgeoisie, ascribed to them by the Marxist historians, into that of intellectual collaborators.75 Second, history is a site of contestation and, therefore, following the line of contending histories, the real contenders, for Pandey, are colonial history and community history, with the latter struggling to break the silences imposed on it by the colonial and liberal knowledge and construction. Nationalist historiography, which he, like many others, somehow associates with the national movementf evaporates aSf according to himf it subscribed to the same bourgeois colonialist knowledge that forms the basis of colonialist historiography. The nationalists, who mostly belonged to the middle classes from across the country, and not only from the elite as Pandey would have us believe, in their writings as well as in their politicsf never thought of communalism and its politics as the Ilother"f or the reality that defined nationalism." It was the contest with

Interestingly enough, the traditional and the modern elite (if elite is taken as a socio-economic category of description of a particular class in the society) were the two most bitter critics of nationalism and national movement and the idea of freedom that the national movement was trying to propagate. In fact, the later stages saw the elite becoming a major bulwark of the colonial powers against the forces of anti-colonial struggle. For one of the most detailed analysis of the class background of India's national movement, see, A.R. Desai, Social Background. This work still holds the most prominent position even after almost 60 years of its publication. 75 See, for a critique of the Marxist position on the role of the Indian capitalist class, Aditya Mukherjee, Imperialism , Nationalism and the Making of the Indian Capitalist Class, 1920-1947, Delhi, 2002. 76 See, for example of the writings of the nationalists, K.N. Panikkar and A. Pershad eds, The Voice of Freedom: Selected Speeches of Pandit MoWal N ehru, 74

Introduction: Communalism and Historiography

43

and opposition to colonialism and its politics that gave meaning and identity to nationalism and its politics. Communalism was thought to be an obstacle in the way of realizing the wider unity required to contest colonialism-if one like Sf its constructions too (through nationalist history)-and to thereby oppose it. 77 Since for Chatterjee and Pandey, communalism is a problem at the level of epistemic construction, they do not engage in providing any solution as such to the actual communal riots or communalism as it is manifested in these riots. Their suggested way is to break the totality of the category communalism, so that the meaning and rationale for the participants in the event of the supposed communal rioting could be understood in their own right. This would, according to this view, deny the imposed rationality of the post-Enlightenment discourse of reason, which the colonial knowledge had imposed on the communities of the non-Western locale. 78 Nationalism also is enmeshed with this

Bombay, 1961; Rajendra Prasad, India Divided, Bombay, 1947; Autobiography, Bombay, 1957. For a detailed bibliographical list of writings, Gautam Chattopadhyay, Itihas Charcha, Jatiyata 0 Sampradayikata (Historiography, Nationality and Communalism) Calcutta, 1985. 77 For a detailed and classic statement on this, see, Rajendra Prasad, India Divided. Interestingly, even contemporary India witnesses all communal ideologies, Hindu, Muslim, Christians, etc., trying and to define themselves vis-a-vis Indian nationalism by claiming to be religious or cultural nationalist. This claim is strongly contested in India but granted at the first instance itself by the historians or scholars and media in the West who cannot, if Chatterjee's initial premise is accepted, grant nationalism to the non-Western people. See, for example, Peter van der Weer, Religious Nationalism Hindus and Muslims in India, Berkeley, 1994. Aziz al Azmeh, a political scientist from the Middle East, has been able to see the Indian problem in a very penetrative manner and has accepted the term communalism in the Indian case similar to the way the Indian nationalists and historians (not merely the nationalist historians) tried to see the communal problem and had used the word in the early decades of the 20th century. See, Aziz al Azmeh, Islam and Modernities, London, 1995. 78 Ashis Nandy goes further and questions the discipline of history, grounded in modern rationality, and its capability of providing answers to the questions of communal violence. Consistently criticising of modernity, Nandy finds the Eurocentric reading of history as creating obstacles for exploring the many histories that a civilisation like India possesses. To him, the homogenising and absolutising efforts of history have a debilitating impact on any such efforts at exploration, which alone is a safeguard against

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Communalism in Bengal

rationality, which, in fact, has done more to propagate this category, and hence, should also be breached at the level of analysis, or bypassed for the purpose of this restoration.

II The debate about modernity, reason and colonial construction has brought an important question to the forefront-the experiences of the colonized, and the knowledge which had come to dominate the paradigms and categories which describe, represent and evaluate the relationship between the experiences and the explanations of those experiences. The issue of agency occupies a crucial place in such discussion. Some recent writings have emphasized that the most significant intellectual endeavour should be to examine and critique these categories and the paradigm of knowledge, in order to give the colonized or the nonWestern subject a voice and subjectivity, which had become entrapped due to the colonization of knowledge itself.79 Beginning with Edward Said's Orienlalism, this has become the subject of many studies on these lines. so violence. See, Ashis Nandy, "History's Forgotten Doubles", History and Theory, Theme Issue, 34, 1995, pp. 44-66. 79 Edward Said says: Perhaps the most important task of all would be to undertake studies in contemporary alternatives to Orientalism, to ask how one can study other cultures and peoples from a libertarian, or a non-repressive and non-manipulative perspective. But then, one would have to rethink the whole complex problem of knowledge and power. (Edward Said, Orientalism, London, 1974, p. 24.) See, Martin Bernal, The Black Athena, New Brunswick, 1987; The AfroAsiatic Roots of Classical Civilisation, Vol. 2, The Archaeological and Documentary Evidence, London, 1990. The above works were criticized for their gross factual and evidential errors, and for pandering to political prejudices and current intellectual fashions. See, review by Paul Kristeller, "Comment on Black Athena", Journal of History of Ideas, 1995, pp. 125-27. Among the large number of works aimed at resurrecting the "agency", one on the :Middle East, which is also the place which Said talks about, see Leila Tarazi Fawaz, An Occasion for War: Civil Conflict in Lebanon and Damascus in 1860, London, 80

1994.

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45

As mentioned ear lier, c.A. Bayly tried to resurrect" agency" by comparing modern communalism with the religious fights of the 18th and 19th centuries. Partha Chatterjee, too, has tried to accomplish this in two ways. First, by trying to read politics by dissecting its very structure for the colonized. Second, by conducting a virtual postmortem on the ideological superstructure of that politics, i.e., the paradigms and categories of knowledge on which the colonized laid the foundations of their politics. Gyanendra Pandey attempts to read a text written in the Qasba, Mubarakpur that tried to understand an event differently from its later day interpretation. This he does in order to give meaning to the event which the colonial authorities and nationalist readings saw as a communal riot. He calls his stance a counter-position to the colonial construction of the same event. This is an important attempt at questioning the supposedly dominant paradigm of knowledge, which, he has argued, seriously influenced the practice of history writing, and on history-making processes in colonial India. Communalism is one such important phenomenon that is, in his opinion, entrenched in such a scholarship. In all such attempts, the idea that communalism is a problem has been dispensed with, and instead, modernity and modernisation has been posited as the actual problem. Richard Fox, for example, has termed the entire edifice of communalism and the violence attached to it as a result of the booby-trap of modernity.8! Some of the most serious attacks of this nature have come from those who locate the problem in acceptance of Western modernity by sections of Indian people. Thus, a solution, if one is looking for it, according to them, has to be found through the transcendence of modernity and some of the ideas it imposedsecularism, reason, etc. It is in this context that Mahatma Gandhi has become a model for such critics, as he is understood as someone, who was attacking the edifice of modernity by employing a strategy of bringing tradition to the forefront. He is also seen as transcending the use of the liberal and modern cornerstone of

Richard C. Fox, "Communalism and Modernity", in David Ludden ed., Making India Hindu: Religion, Community and the Politics of Democracy in India, Delhi, 1996.

81

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Communalism in Bengal

reason or secularism in the face of what has come to be known as communalism. 82 This is, it seems, in effect a presentation of a normalized and sanitized version of the history of contestations in colonial India. The terms na tionalism communalism and colonialism are not just categories imposed by rational knowledge and constructed and passed on to a passive population, who in turn, participated in politics through the constructed categories. They, in fact, also signified the politics and contexts that went into making these categories political ones. The term modernity, which has of late tried to displace modernization as a category for understanding communalism takes this politics as well as the contestations in the societal field out of the debate. In turn, it normalizes the experience of the colonized, as it does not even talk about the ideational structures of colonialism and the fight that the colonized put up against such structures. The contest over the shape of the modernization that the colonial powers wished to implement was also sharply debated and contested by the Indian intelligentsia, but only of the structures of knowledge of the colonized. S3 The historical discussion on the process of modernization does take cognizance of the colonial period in concrete historical terms, and has tried to address the ideational structures of colonialism by studying its material and social bases. 84 f

f

f

See, for example, Partha Chatterjee, Nationalist Thought; Ashis Nandy, Intimate Enemy. 83 It categorizes all the earlier streams of historiography, i.e., nationalist, Marxist and Communist, as one-liberalist in nature. 84 One of the issues before the Indian intelligentsia during the last 150 years has been the process of modernization-its meaning, nature and direction. The first bold and unequivocal stand for modernization and modernity has been the statement of Raja Ram Mohan Roy. For a discussion on the debate on different issues of modernization in Indian society, see, Sabyasachi Bhattacharya, "Cultural and Social Constraints on Technological Innovation and Economic Development", IESHR, Vol. 3, No.3, 1966; Bipan Chandra, "Colonialism and Modernisation" in Nationalism and Colonialism in Modern India, Delhi, 1979, pp. 1-37; Yogendra Singh, Modernisation of Indian Tradition, Jaipur, 1985; M.N. Srinivas, Social Change in Modern India, Bombay, 1966; K.N. Panikkar, Presidential Address, Modern History Section, Indian History Congress, 1975; Milton Singer, When A Great Tradition Modernises: An Anthropological Approach to Indian Civilisation, Delhi, 1972; Lyod. 1. Rudolph and Susanne H. Rudolph, The Modernity of Tradition: Political Development in India, Delhi, 1972. 82

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The periodization of Indian history into modernity and premodernity normalizes the colonial context and in this sense there is an uncritical acceptance of the colonial assertions and the related historiography. Ironically, in these efforts, in the name of critical history, there is an uncritical acceptance of the colonial assertion of modernizing India. Transferring the debate on to the plane of modernity from that of modernization, in fact, glosses over a large number of issues that have remained unanswered such as economic exploitation of the colonies and the continuation of some of the institutional linkages. 85 In the age of neocolonialism as well as wha t is known as globaliza tion academic discussion on such premises have resulted in normalization and presentation of the same essentialist and stereotypical explanations about India and the Orient, which have been contested by the historians over last several decades. In this sense some of the new forms of history writings provide a backdoor entry and post facto justification of the colonial assertions, which were hitherto contested. Similarly, if communalism is merely a category constructed by the interplay of homogenizing rationality and elitist nationalism, accepted by both the colonialists and nationalists to define the otherness and the self, does it not imply similarity between the meanings that the religious armies in the past, and the Hindu villagers of Ambala or the Muslim villagers of Kohat gave to their actions in the 1920s and 1940s? Once stripped of the rationalistliberal categories, if one accepts this contention, Gyanendra Pandey and Christopher Bayly both reach the same position, despite superficial differences; the normalization and sanitization of communalism is achieved. By resurrection of agency, Bayly's aims are quite clear-not only to excavate the prehistory of communalism and thereby present it as a normal event in the long history of Indian society, but to show that colonialism did not introduce any break in this continuum. On the other hand, taking the notion of agency to its interesting logic, i.e., sections of people in India have been shown to be agents of their own servitude, f

f

f

f

f

See, Bipan Chandra, "Colonialism and Modernisation", pp. 1-37; "British and Indian Ideas on Indian Economic Development, 1858-1905", pp. 82122, Bipan Chandra, Nationalism and Colonialism.

85

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Communalism in Bengal

Bayley argues that colonialism was not all that hegemonic; there were willing partners, like the Indian Christians. He claims, "a proper revaluation of the British element in modern history might help us appreciate the limits of colonial hegemony and understand more precisely the locus of Indian agency and energy in the Indian context".86 Chatterjee does not accept the term communalism, nor does Pandey who uses lithe term Icommunalism' with or without inverted commas", despite his Ilargument that it is loaded and obfuscating", for the sake o ttl communication, and of convenient shorthand" .87 One comes across a very significant philosophical fallacy in most of these writings. It indicates the collapsing of what is to be studied with how it is to be studied. This also leads to a second collapse, i.e., a textual reading and an empirical reality existing outside the texts or perceptions about those realities. However, there are serious moves to obliterate this distinction-between reality and perception about that reality-by privileging textual analysis over context, or arguing that the form should be given priority over content. Therefore, the argument goes, it is not reality but representational tropes which are to be called as authentic historical practice. Even dispensing with history is made to be a libertarian project. However, assertions cannot escape an empirical reality existing outside the domain of perception. Since the idea of communal antagonism is related to factors outside and independent of "mind", the interplay betvveen mind and the world becomes imperative in any understanding of a phenomenon like communalism. The world outside has to be accounted for even if we accord priority to perception through the mind. Any historical explanation ignoring the world outside, does it with a great loss-its ability to relate itself to the processes of history. It is here that the question of communal violence becomes quite crucial. Some historians and social scientists equate communal riots with communalism. They are, however, not the same thing either analytically or in their nature. Violence in the form of the communal riot itself is not the cause of communalism; rather it is 86 c.A. Bayly, "Returning the British to South Asian History: The Limits of Colonial Hegemony", South Asia, VoL 17, No.2, 1994, p. 9. 87 Gyanendra Pandey, Construction of Communalism, p. VIII.

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the product. However, violence is certainly a reflective index of the communalization of society. Therefore, escalated violence and its aggressive insensitivity indicate the intensity and depth of the ideological penetration that has taken place. This violence is, therefore, part of an ideological whole called communalism. A discourse on violence, without taking cognizance of the ideological apparatus is to naively ignore the entire process that went into causing violence. Discussing the role of ideology in shaping the Nazi violence in Germany, Lucy Davidowicz says, "In slighting the relationship between Nazi ideas and the bloody events that proceeded from them, the historian reduces his own capacity to explain Nazi Germany's past."88 Communalism, given its ideological apparatuses, legitimizes, sanctions and creates occasions for violence. The Noakhali riot of 1946-47 is a prime example of this argument, and at that juncture, Gandhi's ideological contesta tion of communalism is a prime example of prioritization of the ideological fight, which alone could fight such attempts at sanitization or justification.

III Ideology denotes a set of attitudes and ways of behaviour which can be observed in the Ilreal world" .89 It represents a worldview, and, at that, an attempt to construct a coherent worldview, and therefore, as Seligar puts it, has a "distinctive intellectual perspective". It is not merely belief or a set of beliefs but an attempt to universalize certain local or native experiences. With the understanding that communalism is an ideology, I propose to capture its dynamic in a concrete historical domain. In the Indian context, it has been conceptualized as reflecting an entire gamut of beliefs and sets of ideas which conceive a different set of socio-economic or political organization. As a politics based on

Lucy S. Davidowicz, The Holocaust and the Historian, Cambridge, 1984, p.31. 89 I borrow this definition from Martin Seligar who writes: " ... ideology has always denoted sets of attitudes and ways of behaviour which can be observed in the real world". (Martin Seligar, Ideology and Politics, London, 1976, p. 15.) 88

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those beliefSf communalism identifies the socio-economic and political interests of an individual or a group on the basis of its association with a particular community, which is defined by, and constructed around, a particular religion. The sa tisfaction of those interests calls for a politics based on community identity. Communalism, as defined in the Indian context, therefore, is an ideological construct, as it not only denotes a set of attitudes and ways of behaviour but also provides a coherent mode of political praxis. As an ideology, the elements of communalism are always internalized by the individual and social actors, and provides them a coherent perspective and a worldview. However communalism at the same time retains the initiative and force of improvising itself into new forms and phases. The improvisations need not take place in the minds of the individual human actor; the structure and the operation of its inner logic are powerful enough to activate this transformation or improvisation. This is why communalism, like any other social phenomenon and unlike individual action, defies psychoanalytical explanations. A psychoanalytic explanation of communalism, as in the works of Sudhir Kakar and to an extent Ashis Nandy, faces this problem acutely. This may be due to the inherent problem in the discipline of psychoanalysis itself to explain larger social and group realities. It is postulated, as Freud did, that groups tend to actthrough libidinal ties to their leaders because groups undergo a collective regression, to an earlier mental stage dominated by a tyrannical father.90 A significant contribution is that of Erik H. Erikson, who tried to break this analytical and explanatory problem using a new tool of analysis, like the stages in an individual's life and questions of identity, especially in particular phases in an individual's life-cycle, etc. However, such efforts failed to go beyond attempts to understand society through a study of the minds of some f

f

f

Here one may be tempted to see how ideology as an expalnatory variable as well as a superstructure has been seen by Freud and the later psychoanalysts. For a serious discussion on some of the underlying tensions within its explanatory and justificatory matrices, see Mrinal Miri, Philosophy of Psychoanalysis, Shimla, 1977. 9()

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leaders, and tha t too at particular phases of their lives 91 Communalism, and particular ly communal conflicts, attracts the psychoanalysts to explore those inner realms working behind these conflicts. However the failure to accept communalism as an ideology forces analysts such as Sudhir Kakar, to consider only communal conflict and violence as units of study. Introducing the subject, Kakar says, "This book is a psychoanalyst's exploration of what is commonly known as religious conflict.ffn It does not need much intellectual force to argue that it is not commonly known as religious conflict but as Ilcommunal conflictff. This is a methodological compulsion for Kakar, too, because only by reducing communal conflict to a religious one can he apply his analytical categories, which operate on the basis of religion. For example, he writes, "Together with religious selfhood, the 'I-ness' of religious identity, we have a second track of 'We-ness' which is the experience of being part of a community ofbelievers. ff93 Ideology is linked to politics no less than all politics is linked to ideology. Ideology requires politics as its mode of articulation and implementation. The political structure and processes at a particular historical juncture, therefore, are significant in shaping the articulation of communalism as well as its own transformation into new forms and new phases. This makes the understanding of the primacy of politics a corollary to that of communalism as an ideology. It is in the process of political contestation that articulation is shaped. It is the political configuration at a particular historical juncture, which is the most significant factor in explaining communalism and its different manifestations at that juncture. The relevance of studying and treating communalism as an ideology becomes obvious here. When one accepts communalism as an ideology, the role of religion comes as a significant issue to be discussed. Not just in understanding communalism but also in presenting a critique of f

f

f

See, Erik H. Erikson, Young Man Luther: A Study in Psychoanalysis and History, New York, 1958; Gandhi's Truth On the Origins of Militant NonViolence, New York, 1969. See also, Sheldon Stryker and Peter l Burke, "The Past, Present, and Future of an Identity Theory", Social Psychology Quarterly, VoL 63, No.4, pp. 284-97. 92 Sudhir Kakar, Colours of Violence, Delhi, 1995, p. VIII. 93 Ibid., p. 245. 91

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it, one would have to address the issue. Religion, is used instrumentally as the locii of attempts to create, define and mobilize a community. It is in this way it plays a crucial role. However, if communalism is defined in a way which equates communalism with religion or religion in politics then in a critique of communalism it becomes imperative to critique religion. It is on this critical point that the role of religion has to be carefully outlined in any serious discussion on communalism. For the present understanding, religion, we believe, provides language, metaphor and imagery for articulating the non-religious interests of a large mass of people. Panikkar writing about its role inmobilization says: f

f

Religion is an integral factor in the existing state of social consciousness in our society. Religion provides an identity of being part of a community to all those who believe in the same religion have a certain common identity. It is this belief in commonality which is used for communal mobilisation or for crea ting conditions for communal mobilisation. That iS communalism and communal mobilisa tions are based on a perception (or a possibility of creating a perception) that there are identities which are based on religious belonging. Such an identity, in fact, can be manipulated for purposes of power at various levels. 94 f

This is significant as at certain junctures it becomes extremely difficult to distinguish between a religious discourse on nonreligious issues and a primarily religious issue. This happens when the line between them blurs. It is here that a dynamic critique and understanding of religion is required as in the Indian situation the blurring of the disctinction may obliterate a very critical distinction between the fundamentalsim and communalism. When communalism enters its extreme phase the points of difference between fundamentalism and communalism become less sharp and at time Sf converge. Fundamentalism indicates a phenomenon, which asks, and attempts to make, the religious community fall in line with what it decides or constructs as the fundamental tenets (or the rules of the book) of that f

f

K.N. Panikkar, "What is Communalism Today?", Selected Writings on Communalism, Delhi, 1994, p. 67.

94

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religion, while discarding all experiments and further developments pertaining to that religion. Communalism, on the other hand, does not ask the community to be anti-modern." This is not to suggest that religion or other cultural attributes playa secondary role. What I am proposing is that though at times their role seems the most significant and of primary import, what really happens is that these factors playa legitimizing role in an atmosphere determined by communal ideology. This, however does not mean tha t communalism alone determines-what is suggested here is that communalism at a particular juncture can become the determining factor. As an ideology, communalism can hardly be divorced from Ilfactual knowledge".% It cannot be studied in isolation divorced from societal realities which constitute its Ilcontext". The structures of politics and economics are the essential prerequisites of this context, and determine the structures of knowledge and ideas. Therefore attempts to represent and understand communalism by means of selected quotes from some intellectual works have remained unsuccessfut if not invalid. 97 This becomes more significant in the case of communalism in colonial India when a colonial power was there to supervise communal politics and at time Sf play an active role as its interests in those contexts demanded. 98 Similarly, communalism as an ideology cannot escape f

f

f

f

f

95

For a brilliant treatment of Islamic and Christian fundamentalism, see, Sadik

l AI-Azam, "Islamic Fundamentalism Reconsidered: A Critical Outline of Problems, Ideas and Approaches, Part-I", South Asia Bulletin, VoL 13, Nos 1 and 2, 1993, pp. 93-121; ibid., Part-II, Vol. 14, No. I, 1994, pp. 73-98. 96" ideology can as little be divorced from factual knowledge as from rational justification and moral and other prescription", Martin Seligar, Ideology and Politics, London, 1976, p. 16. 97 For a forceful criticism of this method of explaining a phenomenon like fascism, see, Gilbert Allardyce, "What Fascism is Not: Thoughts on the Deflection of a Concept", American History Review, VoL 84, No.2, 1979, pp. 367-98. 98 For the role of the British policy in the entire process of emergence and growth of communalism in modern India, see, Bipan Chandra, Communalism, pp. 237-89. He says: one way of demolishing the critique of British policy regarding communalism and of "covering up" the British role has been to present the critique in such an extreme or simplistic form that it appears ... absurd ..

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examination on standards of reason as it is a reflection of the interaction of structures and processes founded on rational structures, i.e., economy and polity. And, on the standard of reason, therefore it cannot escape a critique of its moral foundations and prescriptions. An attempt to read and understand communalism by examining the meaning of the term or the knowledge which gave meaning to it, must, therefore, stand up to the rational and moral critique of communalism before attacking the historiography of communalism. 99 The distinctively Indian (or South Asian) connotation of the term communalism has resulted in some problems in its conceptualization. This is in contrast to its definition in the West particularly in Germany, where the recent historical writings have used communalism to Iidesignate attempts to achieve autonomous self-government in town and country during the reformation period".lOo In its European context the term f

f

draws on an older historiographical tradition which stressed an inherent dualism at all levels of constitutional development between a corporate principle and one based on domination (herrshaft). The former was founded on the equality of all

to suggest ... that the British created the entire involvement of religion in politics.. or that the entire communal antagonism or politics can be attributed to British policy... is to create a paper tiger.. easily blown away with one puff. ... no responsible writer or leader has ever maintained that British rule was solely responsible for communalism.. What the anti-imperialist writers have maintained is that the colonial authorities followed a policy of divide and rule, encouraged and promoted communalism, accentuated communal conflicts and used communalism to perpetuate their rule; and that, consequently, the removal of colonialism was one of the necessary conditions .. for the "solution" of the communal problem .. To bring out British responsibility in this respect is to be accused of being a nationalist bigot. (Italics mine) (Ibid., pp. 238-39.) 99 Emphasizing the need to study ideology in the context of national socialism, Lucy Davidowicz makes a significant point regarding American historiography. See, Lucy Davidowicz, The Holocaust, pp. 29-30. 100 R.W. Scribner, "Communalism: Universal Category or Ideological Construct? A Debate in the Historiography of Early Modern Germany and Switzerland", The Historical Journal, Vol. 37, No.1, 1994, p. 199.

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55

members sharing common rights and obligations in a form of collective association.101 It, therefore, connoted a positive phenomenon, which strove for the common good, and as such, justified communal functions like the administration of justicef common economic functions like the distribution of common land, the administration of church finances, etc., while simultaneously legitimizing the subordination of "all individual self-interest (eigen nutz)" to the ideal of common good (gemein nutz)" .102 Some trends in political theory have also tried to give the word Ilcommunity" a very positive connotation in two ways. One f as a kind of protest against what is seen as the excessive individualist tendencies of liberalism inherent particularly in its utilitarian variety. Insteadf some sort of communitarian ideas are sought to be upheld against such excesses. Understanding communitarianism in this waYf and used as a form of ideological position, the writers come quite close to upholding the idea in the Indian contextf and communalism presents them with a very convenient Indian counterpart to communitarianism. The second understanding is the disagreement with any attempt to present a notionf which tries to attain a conceptual coherence f by inviting abstractions at a universal plane. The concreteness of a face-toface community is posited against such a notion of abstraction II

Ibid. The historians in Europe saw conditions for peasant resistance and democratisation being created by communalism. Peter Blickle, a historian of modern German history, has tried to present communalism as a phenomenon applicable to the early modern period as a whole, and as a preliminary stage to a process of future democratisation. See, Peter Blickle and Johannes Kunisch, "Commilllal Reformation and Peasant Piety: The Peasant Reformation and Its Late Medieval Origins", Central European History, VoL 20, 1987, pp. 216-28. Jerome Blum and David Sabean also saw the existence of strong communal forms as the precondition for active peasant resistance to the state. See, Sabean, "The Communal Basis of pre-1800 Risings in Western Europe", Comparative Politics, VoL 8, 1976, pp. 355-64; Power in the Blood: Popular Culture and Village Discourse in Early Modern Germany, Cambridge, 1984; Jerome Bloom, "The Internal Struchue and Politics of the European Village Community", Journal of Modern History, VoL 43, 1971, pp. 541-76. 102 R.W. Scribner, "Communalism". 101

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Communalism in Bengal

and then criticized. Here againf one can have allusion to communalism as an ideology that takes face-to-face community as a prime mover of human thought and actions, and is, therefore, to be conceptualized in positive terms. Before embarking on theorizing communalism as an ideology, it is important to examine some of the related conceptsf Le.fnation and na tionalism. Nation has become one of the most difficult and complex ideas in human hist oryl03 While the notion of territoriality definitely plays its role in giving a sense of belonging to a people, it requires something else for a people to transcend that sense of belonging, to a concept as complicated as that of nation. And, it is here that their political consciousness, or rather the consciousness of nationf becomes an integral part of conceptualization in human thought as well as in the political life of people. lo4 The dynamic process of nationalism, which the world has been witnessing in its differentfaces, has this political consciousness as its coreYI5 Geographical notions of belonging are activated through imagination, when an active political

W3 Though never defined to everybody's satisfaction, the debate about nation has been concentrated on whether it is an ancient fact or a modern creation, or as Anthony Smith calls it, "a seamless whole or an a la carte menu? Is it an immemorial deposit that archaeology has recovered and history explained, or a recent artefact that artists have created and media chefs purveyed to a bemused public?", Anthony D. Smith, "Gastronomy or Geology? The Role of Nationalism in Reconstruction of Nations," Nations and Nationalism, VoL 1, No.1, 1995, p. 3. 104 See, for a wide variety of short and varied summary of nation and nationalism in different national contexts, Anthony D. Smith, Nation and Nationalism in a Global Era, Cambridge, 1995; Elie Kedourie ed., Nationalism in Asia and Africa, London, 1971; R.J. Alexander, "Nationalism: Latin America's Predominant Ideology", Journal of International Affairs, VoL 15, No.2, 1961; and Mikulas Teich and Roy Porter, The National Question in Europe in Historical Context, London, 1993. 105 And it is here that the nahue of political consciousness becomes very important to analyse. On this depends any understanding of whether nation and nationalism are historically constituted or handed down from time immemoriaL It is on this issue that Marxist historiography has made the most original contribution to our knowledge. It has, by emphasising the historical nature of the social formation not only made it possible to link the idea like nation and national to its social roots but also enabled the society to critique any idea which takes nation to be a permanent structure. See, J.v. Stalin, Works 1907-1913, VoL II, Moscow, 1953, pp.300-81; E.}. Hobsbawm,

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consciousness is at work. Moreover it is this political consciousness and its different trajectories that provide for the different forms taken by even geographical imaginations. Thus, imagination and consciousness have an intimate relationship. How a nation is imagined is closely attached to how a politics is thought of. And it is here that the critical difference lies-between those who place an emphasis on imagining, where politics is understood by reading ideas in texts, and those who read an intricate relationship between ideas and politics. The trajectories of nationalism in India are different from that of Europe. A cursory glance atthe development of nationalism in Europe, from the days of the French Revolution to the Greek War of Independence, would show how nations came to be constituted and nationalism manifested itself106 In India, and most of the Third World countries, it is the anti-colonial content that made a significant difference to the way nationalism came to be constituted, which in turn enabled the people to regroup themselves in opposition to the colonial presence. It is in this sense that nation and nationalism both are modern. The particularities of British rule in India, for example, and its understanding by those who tried to resist it, had also given Indian nationalism its peculiar position. 10 7 Hence the anti-colonial confines also coloured the boundaries of imagining the nation. The subversion that the nationalist thought in the late 19th and early 20th centuries was trying to effect was not because they were helplessly entrapped in the power/knowledge syndrome. It was their way of coming out of the entrapment. If, for example, Rabindranath Tagore was advocating an indigenous historiographical course, he was f

f

Nation and Nationalism Since 1980: Programme, Myth, Reality, Cambridge, 1990. One of the best surveys of the entire debate on nation, nationalism and its relationship with the capitalistic development from a colonial country perspective has been, Barun De, "Jatiyatabad, Dhantantra , Upanibeshiketa: Samparker Jatilata", in Gautam Chattopadhyay ed., IUhas Charcha, Jatiyata and Sampradayikata, Calcutta, 1985 (English version of the paper not found.) 106 Liah Greenfeld, Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity, Massachussetts, 1992. 107 See, Surendranath Bannerjea, A Nation in Making, Calcutta (Kolkata), 1925 (reprinted in 1963); Jawaharlal Nehru, Discovery of India, Calcutta (Kolka!a), 1946.

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trying to seek a route out of the colonial knowledge as also the colonial presence. l OS Nation, after all, is an abstract category, and when compared with other social categories like class, community, and caste in the Indian case, it is quite distant from the individual. It is, therefore, difficult to imagine nation, bypassing these closer categories. The anti-colonial character of the national movement provided concreteness to the abstract concept of nation. This is again of critical significance that Indian nation was imagined in a context and any move to deprive the imagination of that context is then depriving the idea of India of its most critical component which sustained it over the last 150 years. And, it is here tha t concreteness of the categories of caste f class and community are also to be placed and examined in relation to the concreteness as well as abstractness of nation and the phenomenon of nationalism. And it is in this context that the character of Indian nationalism and communalism remains valid despite the fact that there is a powerful intellectual and political attack on their continuance as categories of explanation. Communalism as a conceptual category grew out of understanding of certain forces at wor k, and their shaping of an ideological articulation. It was found to be modern and a very new articulation-a product of the new colonial presence-and was a product of the gradual crea tion of an all-India community, both as nation and as people. Thus, colonialism, while credited with creating a pan-Indian national communityf was also seen as facilitating the process of different groups articulating their own statu Sf either in conjunction withf or withinf a pan-Indian nationf or in contra-position to it. While a number of such articulations could be brought under the nationalist ambit, the latter failed to accommoda te communalism as communalism increasingly went on defining itself against nationalism and nationalist politics. Both Hindu and Muslim communalism rejected the idea of an Indian nation that the Indian nationalist had put forward. Nation was seen as a given fact f just like the communities which

See, Rakesh Batabyal, "The Essence of a Nation, India", in Sanjeev Ghotge and Samir Banerjee eds, Contributions Towards a Future Agenda, Shimla, 2001, pp. 23-54. 108

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59

constituted the nation. They were also defined as given, and therefore, nationhood was to be asserted rather than created. For the communalist positions nation was a fact to be asserted-it was an essentialist position which, as Chatterjee and Pandey suggest, the nationalists espoused, thanks to their acceptance of colonial knowledge and its categories. As we saw, it was the communal positions that asserted the essentialist categories. Communalism is a product of that period of Indian history which witnessed colonialism as a political reality. Nationalism also which emerged as a reaction to colonial domination is a product of the same period. Communalism grew as a reaction to the politics and the ideology of nationalism, and soon gained importance. It captured the imagination of a large section of people in the subcontinent, finally resulting in the partition. However, it did not exhaust itself with the partition. As an ideology, it continued to exist in the form of a potentially live force, to resurrect itself repeatedly in the politico-social life of the sub-continent. f

f

f

IV

Bengal and Communalism Bengal was the region where the colonial rule first entrenched itself, and where it had a deeper impact than in any other region of the sub-continent. Colonialism and the various institutions it introduced, helped in producing conditions for the evolution and development of multi-layered and multi-dimensional conflicts in the Bengali society. Politics in the province developed into a kind of screen on which these conflicts were not only reflected but also played out. Not that the society before the coming of the colonial powers was a conflict-free society. But colonialism produced a context which was totally new and of significant consequence 1 09 f

1!19 Changes in the perceptions and formation of organizations along caste lines were taking place. See, Sekhar Bandyopadhyay, Caste, Politics and the Raj: Bengal 1872-1937, Calcutta, 1989. Colonialism created conditions for change among the population who adhered to different and even local variants of

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Communalism in Bengal

Agrarian dislocation, caused by the Permanent Settlement, introduced a new class in relation to land while dispossessing the older classes. Similarly, gradually, a new and larger domain of political articulation was introduced with new segments of society participating in it. The peculiar demographic and agrarian structures in later years combined to facilitate certain social processes in the provinces and worked against others. The political history of the province has been the story of these processes. Categories such as nationalism and communalism have been employed to capture this history of the last 100 years or so. These were not just categories of explanation but also ideologies that moved the masses into collective as well as individual actions. Communalism in Bengal had a trajectory different from its counterparts in other provinces due to different socio-political reasons. Communalism, therefore, has attracted a large number of historical studies, which have tried to grapple with the socioeconomic and political developments in the province that had directly or indirectly influenced the emergence and development of communalism. In the 1950s and 1960s, communalism was quite often associated with only Muslim separatism and, consequently, the inevitability of Muslim separatism has informed a number of studies on Bengal. This also means that these studies are characterized by a tendency to show the linear development of Muslim separatism in that society110Atthe same time, it is also assumed thatthe socio-economic and politically advantageous position of the Hindus necessarily meant that the only recourse for Muslims was to articulate their political aspirations in the form of communalism f

Islam. One direction of such change was towards the creation of a monolithic notion of Islam. Different religious organisations since the days of the Farazis and Wahabis had been active in this realm. In the later part of the 19th century, these efforts gained a new impetus from the Anjuman societies. See, Rafiuddin Ahmed, The Bengal Muslims 1871-1906: A Quest for Identity, Delhi, 1981. There were very strong anti-colonial feelings chanellized by different political groups. There were points of conflict, which became apparent in the 20th century. These were highlighted in recent writings on cultural studies, but they do not seem to be exclusivist and targeting against any other community. And it is here that the new politics would prove to be critical. 110 RC. Mazumdar, Bangla Desher Itihas, 1905-47 (History of Bangladesh), Adhunik Yug, Calcutta, 1975.

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and separatism. Studies on political groups, the failure of movements and an emphasis on political personalities in these works however does not allow the study of communalism as an ideology and its operation in the province. An implicit acceptance of the inevitability of Muslim separatism has forced historians to investigate the processes and changes in Muslim society in Bengal. Here the partitions of 1905 and 1947 act as significant landmar ks, leaving a teleological stamp on the studies with the assertion that the Muslim society had been preparing itself and its politics for the partition. Sufia Ahmad accepts the idea that separatism was a deliberate choice of the Muslim community, because they were conscious of Iitheir inferiority in education and economic strength"Yl f

f

The Muslims of Bengal...long pursued the policy of loyalty to the British power. ... Younger members of this community became dissatisfied with so passive and unfruitful a role. So, (as) rumours of impending political change spread in Morley and Minto's day, the Muslims of Bengal joined their forces with the Muslims of north India in approaching the Viceroy.1l2 According to Sufia Ahmad, this situation arose because the community was reluctant lito accept the western ideas and institutions of the conquerors",1l3 and gradually lagged behind the other community, i.e., the Hindus, "who were gradually trying to make up for their past failure in the industrial and commercial sphere"}14 and their educational backwardness. lIS By the end of the first decade of the 20th century, therefore, the Muslim community became very conscious of the disparity and their lag. This became reflected in their literature, which, devoid of Western sources of inspiration, gradually developed a reactive mind against the new subjects and modes that the Bengali Hindus produced. This, for Sufia Ahmad, explains why there was a

111 Sufia Ahmad, Muslim Community in BengaC 1884-1912, Dhaka, 1974, p. 371. 112 Ibid., p. 373. 113 Ibid., p. 98. 114 Ibid., p. 161. 115 Ibid., p. 163.

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profusion ofIslamic literature; "nearly all the histories are studies of Islamic history".11 6 The aim of the authors was lito make their co religionists aware of their religious not national history".11 7 Thus, the two political developments that marked this period were the ideological foundation of a religious rather than a national identity, and the growth of, loyalist and then, separatist politics. But why did this religious foundation not lead to movements like the Wahabi and Farazi taking root, and instead developed on separatist and communal lines. Second, the notion that the separatist idea was the Ilconscious choice of the community"}18 homogenizes the Muslim community, and its political orientation. Germane to this understanding was the fact tha t owing to its not having taken up modernization the community came under the grip of religion and took a loyalist and separatist position. ll9 This has provoked historians to show that there was, though later in the 20th century, a "quest for modernity which began in the first-half of the 19th century amongst the Bengali Hindus due to the western impact".120 Jayanti Maitra qualifies that there was a neo-modern Muslim section, but it failed to provide leadership at the crucial juncture: f

f

In the decades following the revolt of 1857, the leadership in the Muslim society in the most general terms came to be constituted of the IIMuslim westernising bourgeoisie". It had been gradually building up its distinctive position .... !twas sharply marked off from the rest of the Indian bourgeoisie .... Neither was it in a position to give correct leadership to the lower classes and other non-westernisers who most vividly preserved and warmly cherished the ideas of Islamic tradition.l21 She further substantiates this on the basis of Rajat Ray's argument: "the economic backwardness of the generality of the Bengali

116 117 118 119

Ibid., p. 373. Ibid., p. 30. Ibid. Ibid., p. 98.

120 Soumitra Sen, The Quest for Modernity and the Bengali Muslims, 1921-47, Kolkata, 1995, p. VII. 121 Jayanti Maitra, Muslim Politics in BengaC 1855-1906: Collaboration and Confrontation, Calcutta, 1984, p. 122.

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Muslims and their subordination to the rich and influential Urdu speaking elite also hindered the possibility of any co-operation betvveen the former and the Bengali Hindus."122 In course of timef this led to the evolution of a separatist political movement. The responsibility, according to her, was also shared by the prominent leaders of the Hindu communityf because even lithe most eminent Hindu political leaders on their part, failed to understand the real feelings and grievances of the Muslim community and to appreciate the motives which guided their policy"123 And here f the zeal of the Hindus Ilfor democracy and nationalism"f comes in for criticism because f as Maitra argues (along the lines of KC. Mazumdar), this zeal also made them forget the large section of people who refused to II accept these ideals" for livery good reasons".!24 The favouring of the Muslim community by the British was soon resisted by the Hindus. These studies, which emphasize the process of separatist ideas gradually emerging and gaining shape, take a very static view of the Muslim society and, in a way, homogenize the responses of the society. Although Maitra tries to break this homogeneity by studying the response of the leadership, she fails to provide any clue about the contestations within Muslim and Hindu society regarding these ideas. While the partitions were the obvious teleology that informed these studies, there was a group of writers for whom Indian nationalism was primarily a reflection of the interests of sections of the Hindu community, articulated through the Indian National Congress (INC). In the context of Bengal, the category of Bhadralok-a social one, denoting respectabilitywas brought out of its Weberian frame of reference, and loaded with political connotations to discuss developments in the province. Some writers emphasized that Muslim separatism was a product, among other things, of the lag amongst the Muslims in economic, social and educational fields. They argued that it was self-interest that motivated the Bhadralok to resist the 122 Rajat Ray, Urban Roots of Indian Nationalism: Pressure Groups and Conflict of Interests in Calcutta City Politics, 1875-1939, New Delhi, 1979, p. 165. 123 Ibid., p. 85. 124 RC. Mazumdar, British Paramountcy and Indian Renaissance, Vol. X, Bombay,

1965, p. 297.

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Communalism in Bengal

development of the Muslim community as such, and its leaders in particular. This pushed the latter towards communalism, while the former became increasingly bitter against the colonial authority for favouring the Muslim community. In fact, the argument leads them to conclude that the Bhadralok, feeling their political impotency, were rapidly turning towards Hindu communalism. In 1960, Broomfield wrote on the "elite conflict" in Bengal: For the Hindu bhadralok, forced to be helpless witness to the agonising death of thousand upon thousands of their fellowcountrymen the breakdown was an indicbnent on the alien Goverrunent and its Muslim associates who in their view had reduced the Hindus to political impotence. !25 (Italics mine) f

f

f

Therefore, in this argument, the Bhadralok was angry, both at the colonial authorities and the Muslims. "Bitterly resentful of the communal injuries they had suffered and fearful of what the future would bring," wrote Broomfield, "the Hindu Bhadralok distrusted the Muslim's every word and action".126 The self-interest which moved the Bhadralok of Anil Seal's analysis to turn into competitors of the Raj, is shown in Broomfield's study to distrust the Muslims when the former realized tha tthey had become politically impotent. Ideology has no place in these studies. Nationalism was just an articulation of individual or group frustration. The emphasis on their selfish interests-nationalism being just an articulation of these interests through group politics-renders these studies incapable of explaining why people were moved by a particular ideology, be it nationalism or communalism. Joya Chatterjee also attempts to include communalism in this same theoretical premise Le' the Bhadralok feeling threatened by the attacks on their self-interests, and hence turning communal. Even a communal riot in a town was, for her, only the reflection of the Bhadralok's feeling of impotency. She writes: f

f

f

In the Hindu majority districts in particular, Bhadralok Hindus had hoped to compensate for their loss of provincial power

lH. Broomfield, Elite Conflict in a Plural Society, Twentieth Century Bengal, Berkeley and LA, 1968, p.305. 126 Ibid., p. 311.

125

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65

with an increased voice in local affairs. However this had proved impossible and instead, they found themselves losing ground to Muslims on all fronts .... The vehemence ofbhadralok resistance to the introduction of Korbani for instance was not so much a measure of religious outrage-it was rather a measure of their increasing political impotence. 127 (Italics mine) f

f

The works ofSugata Bose, Suranjan Das and Partha Chatterjee are significant in that they view communalism in a wider frame and tend to accept it as a coherent societal perspective, which could dictate the political and social actions of a section of the population at a particular historical juncture. Sugata Bose has divided Bengal into three areas according to their distinctive agrarian and social structures and the characteristics of politics in these areas. He argues that enmeshing of agrarian Bengal with the world market gradually led to the unmaking of that society; integration with the world market in its period of crisis also adversely affected the rural society and its economy. It had the effect of sapping the symbiosis that existed in rural society.!28This was particularly so in the 1930s and 1940s, when the slump in the world market also resulted in a credit squeeze in the rural economy and tended to break the symbiotic relation between the creditor and peasants. He locates the origin of the Kishorganj riot and, to an extent, the Noakhali-Tippera riot, in this breakup of the symbiosis. He intervenes in the deba te over pre-existing peasant communal consciousness. He shows how the theme of Ilpeasant consciousness" was overplayed and says that lithe basic right in land in Bengal and, for that matter, in most part of India was f

f

f

127 Joya Chatterjee, Bengal Divided: Hindu Communalism and Partition, 19321947, Cambridge, 1995, pp. 218-19. 128 He writes:

Faced with the problem of ensuing subsistence from a diminishing holding the Bengal peasant, especially in the east, laid himself open to the vagaries of the world market upon which he had little controL The complex of credit relations which critically affected the liquidity of the internal economy, transmitted external influences on to the internal market. (Sugata Bose, Agrarian Bengal: Economy, Social Structure and Politics, 1919-1947, Cambridge, 1986, p. 57.)

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essentially an individual right. The perception of individual interests as collective interest was not easy to achieve" .129 However, he sees religion as the dominant element shaping the consciousness of the Muslim peasantry because it was readily available "as a powerfullegitimising ideology when a change in the balance of class power brought the rejection of the old order within the realm of possibility."!30 Thus, in the final analysis, it is religion and not communal consciousness f which is crucial for understanding lithe choice of certain identities"f in forging lithe community of resistance" .131 Refusing communalism the status of an ideology, what Bose has tried to show is similar to what Partha Chatterjee did-questioning the category of communalism itself. Bose writes: Since the la ter 19th century the language of communalism has tended to reserve the term community" to refer to social affilia tions determined by birth, among which religion and caste occupied a privileged place. The dominant discourse of Indian nationalism, accepting the methodology while rejecting the substance of colonial knowledge, increasingly sought to privilege the all encompassing nation over particularist ties .... 132 II

However, the way he resolves this problem bringing in the hegemony of the concept of a "nation", is different from that followed by Chatterjee and Pandey. He tries to locate this difference in the realm of resistance and free choice of the subordinate social group Sf Le' f peasants and labourers f in taking recourse to Ilcommunitarianism"f which is different from Ilcommunal conflict" .133 Suranjan Das tries to study the contours of communal violence in the province from 1906 to 1947, and examines its trajectory and nature of transformation during this phase. l34 He sees communalism through the prism of communal riots. Communal riots, says

Ibid., p. 280. Ibid., p. 185. 131 Sugata Bose, Peasant Labour and Colonial CapitaC Rural Bengal Since 1770, Cambridge, 1993, p. 160. 132 Ibid., p. 142. 133 Ibid. 134 Suranjan Das, Communal Riots in Bengal, 1905-1947, Delhi, 1990. 129

130

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Suranjan Das, shape the community's perception of boundaries given to it by symbols. Similarly, he tries to show how riots transformed communal consciousness. Das eschews the extremes of portraying communal riot as a class struggle, or suggesting that violence was inherent in the latent tendency in the Muslim community to separate, which informed history writings till recently. However, a linear development infonnshis treatment, i.e., a gradual convergence of Ilelite" and Ilpopular" communalism/riots and the increasing political overtones of the communal riots, which finally resulted in separation and partition. f

v The Present Work The present volume tries to locate the manifestations of communal ideology in a particular historical context. The term communalism is not in question, but the phenomenon and the ideology that sustains this phenomenon are. The activities of the Muslim League, the Communist party and the Hindu Mahasabha articulated different facets of politics, which either accepted or negated the ideological import of communalism in Bengal, in the period between the famine and the Noakhali riots. Education and employment were two crucial elements in the growth of the consciousness of communalism in the province. The colonial system had developed such an entrenched and entwined relationship between the two that social mobility required both, and therefore, both of these elements became the sites of contestation between communities. In fact they became instrumental in the forma tion of the sense of community. The two became the digits around which a certain kind of politics flourished, and began to colour public opinion. Thus, those who argue that the public domain creates communalism miss the dynamic nahue of communalism. 135 Education for instance was a domain where it was not only reflected, but which also enhanced its effect. f

f

135

Sandria Freitag! Collective Action and Community.

f

f

68

Communalism in Bengal

An intense contest began to take shape in the early decades of the century. One section of the population had already become entrenched in positions from where it was easy for it to be upwardly mobile. The second group arrived late on the scene. Only tvvo alternatives seemed available to the late arrivals Le. either they were to be accommodated within the first category, or were to replace or be replaced by the earlier lot. Both processes of accommodation and efforts at replacement seriously worked on places and institutions which directly influenced the social mobility of the sections. Calcutta University was one such institution ensuring some sort of mobility through education and jobs. Representatives of newly arrived sections of the Muslims demanded from the colonial state, which had retained the power of patronage, its share and space in such institutions. In the late 19th century the demand for English education was voiced forcefully by such sections while in the 1920s radical section argued that mobility could only be achieved through the extension of primary education among the people through the medium of their own language (Bengali). The debate could not continue, for by the 1930s the space was rapidly being occupied by sections who tried to define the space according to their different ideological inclinations. Masses began to mobilize and electoral politics began to shape the public domain more intensively than ever. Communalism as an idea of replacement rather than accommodation began to acquire a new hue. The colonial state helped create situations for the growth of communal consciousness by projecting itself as the political arbiter. It granted the Muslim community in Bengal the statutory status of a majority. The Congress-League Pact signed at Lucknow had paved the way for such a situation, even if unwittingly and with good intentions; the consequences however were long-term. The 1935 Act also proved disastrous for Bengal. Thus, the notion of being a monolithic community was imposed on the Muslims. These circumstances facilitated the discourse about replacement. In these circumstance Sf it was easy to crea te a worldview based on the notion of a face-to-face community. However such a community was defined by religion instead of any other criteria. There had been attempts earlier, in the 17th and 18th centuries, to strengthen the Muslim community so that it could face external f

f

f

f

f

f

f

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challenges. In the middle of 19th century, there were several movements to change folk Islam into high Islam. By the 1930s and 1940s, particularly the Muslim peasantry, began to embrace the idea that there was a pattern in the injustice they faced and their backwardness. These lived experiences were then translated into a universal plane f and an idea of a community in opposition to another community began to take shape. This oppositional idea gradually heightened the idea of replacement. The symbol of a collectivity as the enemy was to come later, but the seeds of this notion could be seen in the logic of the ideas of opposition and replacement. The public space created by the process of contestation between the colonial and anti-colonial forces, could also have witnessed emancipatory movements. The famine in 1943-44 was such an event when public space was open for the political parties for articulation of such movements. The end of the famine should have ushered in a new era. Howeverf the province saw two political events, which brought new life to its politics. Education became the site of contestation where replacement had given way to polarization-and this meant further official control. Gandhi had sensed Jinnah's growing popularity among the Muslim masses as early as 1944. He met Jinnah to settle the Hindu-Muslim question, and also agreed to the fact of partition, but did not agree to the notion that it should be based on the idea that the Hindus and the Muslims constituted two nations. In 1945, the elections were an episode that showed the unacceptability of the communist message. The Muslim League had won easily. Why this happened is a matter of discussion and requires extensive work on the historical details. More importantly, the elections also signified the fact that the approach towards accommodation had been failing. It was in such a situa tion that the Noakhali riots became a test case for the idea of replacement, which was tried out there in full strength. Gandhi visited Noakhali and saw a major problem in the riots. It was his idea that people should be good Hindus or Muslims; an idea that makes him dear to all those who try to uphold a postmodern love for tradition. It was in Noakhali that Gandhi tried to loca te communalism in the processes of society. He tried to re-conceptualize communalism as an ideologYf and to devise

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Communalism in Bengal

ways to counter it. Three notions became prominent in his combative ideas: responsibility, fearlessness, and ethical and moral justification. For him, the village community in Noakhali was important. Hindu Mahasabha on the other hand argued that the Hindu community should be segregated and kept under military security. Conversely, the Muslim League wanted that the Muslim community should rule and replace all semblance of Hindu dominance from that place. Gandhi counter-argued that both the communities shared a responsibility-both collective and individual-towards each other. And, that it was only through the notion of responsibility, that the idea of a violent replacement could be thwarted. The first chapter in this book discusses the politics and the discourse that began to take shape in the wake of the famine in the province. I have not made an attempt to deal with the causes and consequence of the famine but instead tried to present the perceptions of the political groups about the causes of the famine and link them to the debate about its occurrence which were taking place before and after the famine. The next chapter attempts to look at the ideological ambience that created space for mobilization by the other political parties, viz., the Hindu Mahasabha and the Communist Party of India. The chapter looks into the issues that went into the mobilization drive of the two parties, during the period 1943-45; the mobilization politics of the Muslim League has been dealt with in Chapter 1. Chapter 3 seeks to enquire into the politics of communalism in the province during 1944 when the issue of Gandhi-Jinnah meetings excited popular imagination. Chapter 4 analyses the broad political scenario in which there were talks of elections, and how communalism and nationalism were contending with each other. The chapter leads us to the eve of the Calcutta riot, appropriately called as the Calcutta killings. Chapter 5 looks into the Calcutta riot. The Noakhali riots and the entire gamut of questions related to it are dealt with in chapters 6 and 7. They not only describe the nature of the Noakhali riots but also situate it in a historical context. Gandhi's visit to Noakhali and his attempt to fight the communal ideology is discussed in Chapter 8. It also tries to look into the relationship that developed between Gandhi and Suhrawardy, and its political and ideological context and implications.

ONE

Hunger and Politics In December 1941, Japan declared war against the United States and soon proceeded with rapid strides towards East Asia. By mid-1942, it had reached the doors of British India. The ensuing war resulted in a massive dislocation of the society and economy of Bengal. The dislocation was of such a magnitude that the Bengal famine of 1943-44 has also been seen as a direct result of the war. The Famine Inquiry Committee (FIC), setup to inquire into the reasons for the famine, blamed the war and war induced situation, along with natural calamities, for the famine, which killed almost three million people. However, this line of reasoning has created problems in understanding the true nature of the famine. The war has been seen as causing an acute shortage of food supply, which went on to create famine conditions. However there are problems in justifying a direct correlation between the assumed food shortage and famine related deaths. Amartya Sen has argued that there was no substantial difference in the food availability between the years 1941 and 1943; he has, therefore, located the reason for such a large loss of life elsewhere. The problem as he has perceived it was not linked to the availability of food, but to the capacity of the people to procure food and other items with their available resources. Since the purchasing power of groups differed, the effect of the famine condition on different groups also varied. However, the reasons for the drastic fall in people's purchasing power remains contested. And here, the critical role of colonialism stares us in our face despite serious attempts to dilute its exploitative character or to normalize the period as merely one f

f

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of modernity.l A comprehensive explanation demands evidence of a long-term decline in the purchasing power. The recent debate on the nature of economy in 18th century Bengal is an example.'

1 It is here that one sees the problems with those attempts which try to periodize India's historical experience into the categories of modernity and pre- or post-modernity. It tries to normalize the rupture brought by the colonial period in the economic and social life and experiences of the people in the subcontinent. The series of famines in the 18th and 19th centuries had devastating effects on the population and had forced the intelligentsia to think about the reasons for the repeated occurrence of famines. It was not lost on the early nationalist leadership that there was a close relationship between the growing frequency and intensity of famines and the way colonial rule operated. They articulated this in their newspapers, public addresses and through the Congress platform after its formation in 1885. RC. Dutt, for example, made famines as one of the prime indicators of the growing poverty of the people during the colonial rule. "The famines", he wrote, "which have desolated India within the last quarter of the nineteenth century are unexampled in their extent and intensity in the history of ancient or modern times". (RC. Dutt, Economic History of India, p. vi, cited in Bipan Chandra, Rise and Growth of Economic Nationalism in India, Delhi, 1965, p. 29, fn. 118.) Similarly, Surendranath Banerjea in 1902 quizzed, "Is it possible to overlook the significance of these famines with their increasing severity and frequency and the silent but conclusive testimony which they bear to the material retrogression of the people?" (Congress Presidential Address, cited in ibid., p. 29 fn. 119.) See also the observations on the relationship between the foodgrain export and the famines in ibid., p. 164. Utsa Patnaik makes a restatement of the same argument in the context of the Bengal famine of 1943 in her critique of Amartya Sen's thesis on the famine. See, Utsa Patnaik, "Food Availability and Famine-A Longer View", Journal of Peasant Studies, VoL 19, No.1, 1991, pp. 1-25. 2 While the periodization along the axis of modernity-pre-modernity normalizes this experience, there have been other efforts to sanitize and dilute the colonial experience by arguing that there was no rupture or abnormality in the colonial rule brought to the people. It was merely a transition from one regime to another and for the better. The Cambridge group of historians have reshaped the old Imperialist argument that used to argue that colonialism was in fact developing and modernizing India, against which the nationalists presented their vigorous opposition. These historians have resuscitated the old argument in recent times with new sophistication and prolific production of manuscripts and with the help of focussing on the data from local and regional settings, i.e., Bengal, Punjab, Rajasthan and so on. The argument now is that the 18th century witnessed no rupture in the society and the argument of economic drain or decline has often been an exaggeration, and quite often, nationalist outburst of the leaders in the last century and nationalist bias of the historians in the

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Howeverf Amartya Sen's idea of entitlement" has also influenced the digits of the debate over the old Malthusian postulate of a direct and inevitable inverse correlation betvveen population growth and resource availability. This Malthusian postulate has been a fundamental naturalist position tending to discount the role of human agency. It is on this ground that there have been attempts to present an alternative which could account for human agency / interventionf even in circumstances otherwise considered to be conditioned and dictated by nature. And it is with this intervention in mind that we wish to examine the way the political articulations used the space created by the famine in Bengal. II

I For a long time, the famine has been defined in terms of food shortage. Within this premise f the famine was seen as a positive check by nature on population growth. T.R. Malthus (1705-77) had characterized famine as nature's corrective measure to restore the balance between population growth and food supply. Premised on this assumption, there has been a line of thinking that views famine as a natural wrath over sections of humanity. A consequence of this Malthusian agreement in recent years has been that Ilmortality" became a predominant area of interest in studies of famine. 3 Even without any knowledge ofMalthus and his theorYf the idea that famines are nature's wrath has been in present cenhuy. For a classic statement of this, see CA. Bayly, Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire, Delhi, 1990. As the title suggests, his efforts are to give agency to the Indian people in making their own history. In this case Indians are made to be the agent of their own colonial unfreedom by becoming what he calls "uneasy collaborators in the creation of colonial India". (Ibid. p.4.) For a robust counter-position, see Irfan Habib, Essays in Indian History: Towards a Marxist Perception, Tulika, 1995. For a discussion on the debate on the 18th century India, see, Barun De, Presidential Address, Proceedings of Indian History Congress (PIHC), 49th Session, Dharwad, Delhi, 1989, pp. 1-58. 3 C Walford, "The Famines of the World: Past and Present", Journal of the Statistical Society, VoL 41, 3 September, 1978, pp.436-42; Susan Watkins, Cott and Jane Menken, "Famine in a Historical Perspective", Population and Development Review, VoL 11, No.4, 1985, pp. 647-75.

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circulation for various reasons. However this view has several limitations and impedes the direction of human intervention in a serious manner. Famine in Bangladesh and Africa in the 1970s started a new wave of thinking about famine. Several studies tried to understand the issues causing a famine situation and the ways and means to face it and operate a relief system 4 And this has contributed to the development of a strong critique of the Malthusian position. There have been attempts to develop a general theory to explain why people died even in places and situations where per capita food availability was not less, slightly less, or even more than the requisite. In the light of these developments, famine was studied particularly by economists to test certain hypotheses challenging the Malthusian position. 5 This in turn has brought out some serious policy prescriptions for poverty and related themes. Amartya Sen has found that there was no natural correlations between increase in the population and famine and instead argued that the problem lay with the nature of the society and particularly in its distribution system. He has studied the Bengal famine of 1943 in order to test his concept of entitlement. This is a concept closely related to the issue of distributionan area which has generally been overlooked in mainstream liberal economics. His attempts have helped in bringing famine and famine relief into the general discussion on poverty and policies for poverty alleviation. But more importantly, this has also helped in linking a phenomenon hitherto thought in simply natural terms, with the nature of polity in a society. The experience of pre-independent and post-independent India,6 Communist China, Soviet Union and the African continent' have provided economists with the typologies to prove this point. f

f

f

Amartya Sen and Jean Dreze, Political Economy of Hunger, London, 1991. Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation, London, 1981 (Delhi, 1982); Muhiuddin Alamgir, Famines in South Asia, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1980. 6 Kali Charan Chose, Famines in Bengal, 1770-1943, Calcutta, 1944; Hari Shankar Srivastava, The History of Indian Famines, 1858-1918, Agra, 1968; B.M. Bhatia, Famines in India: A Study in Some Aspects of the Economic History of India (1860-1945), London, 1963. 7 Theddeus Sunseri, "Famine and Wild Pigs: Cender Struggles and the Outbreaks of the Majimaji War in Ujama (Tanzania)", Journal of African 4

5

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The 1943 famine was not the first one Bengal had experienced. It had suffered a series of famines in the 18th and 19th centuries

and the memories of the havoc wrought by the famine of 1770 were still fresh in the 20th century. 8 The famine of 1943 brought these memories back into popular discussion. However, from the FIC of 1943-44 to the recent studies by Sen and others, it is the famine of 1943 which has directed the course of historical examination into various facets of the famine. Apart from looking at different aspects of the phenomenon,' there were also efforts, like that of Paul Greenough, to study the famine in its particular cultural location with the help of the perceptions of the people who suffered.!O The FIC constituted by the Government of India in 1944, and subsequently others, had found the war, natural calamity and other factors rela ted to these as responsible for the famine. These were seen to have reduced the food availability for the year 1943 due to which people suffered from an acute scarcity of foodgrains

History, Vol. 38, No.2, 1997, pp. 235-60. See also, Theddeus Sunseri, "Gender and Famine in Central Tanzania: 1919-61", African Studies Review, Vol. 39, 1996, pp. 347-80. 8 See, David L. Curlie, "Four Grain Market and Mughal Famine Policy in the late Eighteenth Century Bengal", Calcutta Historical Journal, Vol. 11, No.1, 1977, pp. 1-26; Nani Gopal ChoudhLUY, "Monopoly of Grain in Bengal and Bihar during the Famine of 1770", ibid., Vol. 9, No.2, 1985, pp. 110-15. For contemporary accounts of some of the famines in recent history, see William Digby, The Famine Campaign in Southern India, 1876-78, London, 1878; A Loveday, The History and Economics of Indian Famines, London, 1914; Charles W. McMinn, Famine, Truths-Half, Truths-Untruths, Calcutta, 1902; Satish Chandra Roy, An Essay on the Economic Causes of Famine in India and Suggestions to Prevent their Frequent Recurrence, Calcutta, 1909. 9 Karunamoy Mukerji, The Problem of Land Transfer, Shantiniketan, 1957; KP. Chattopadhyay, "Famine and Destitution in Rural Bengal", Science and Culture, Vol. 11, No.5, November 1945; Ramkrishna Mukherjee, "Effect of the Food Crisis of 1943 on the Rural Population of Noakhali, Bengal", Science and Culture, Vol. 10, No.5, November 1944; KP. Chattopadhyay, "The Problem of Rehabilitation", Science and Culture, Vol. 10, No.8, November 1945, A.K Sen, "Starvation and Exchange Entitlements: A General Approach and its Application to the Great Bengal Famine", Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 1, pp. 33-59, March 1977. For a critique of such a position, see Ashok :Mitra, "Meaning of Meaning", Economic and Political Weekly (EPW), Vol. 27, 1982, pp. 488-89. 10 Paul Greenough, Prosperity and Misery in Modern Bengal: The Famine of 1943-44, New York, 1982.

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in the province. The starvation deaths were explained to a great extent by this short supply thesis. The political leaders in Bengal like Shyama Prasad Mookerjee of Hindu Mahasabha, Nalinaksha Sanyal of the Congress and others who were vocal in their criticism of the government during the famine had maintained that what caused the famine and aggravated the situation was the short supply of rice and paddyl1 In fact, even the bureaucracy and the provincial ministry maintained the thesis of short supply, and debated and tried to bridge the gap between demand and supply. Thus there seems to be unanimity over the fact that the most conspicuous reason for the famine was the short supply of rice and paddy caused not by natural calamity but by men and mismanagement. !2 One of the memoranda submitted to it simply put, "The famine of 1943 is a 'Man Made' famine as it precipitated through the wanton bungling both at the centre and the province. ff13 However, there is also a different aspect to the story. Most of those who suffered the famine belonged to the lower economic strata in society. As contemporary data reveals, paddy huskers, fish sellers, vagrants and those with very little land were the first targets of the famine. The fact that only the lower socio-economic strata suffered from the famine, and not every class, deserves attention. Thus, as Amartya Sen has shown, more than the shortfall in foodgrain supply, there was something else which explains the deaths and starvation. He argues that the supply of foodgrains in 1943, compared to the supply levels of previous three years, was not so low as to cause the death of almost three

11 See evidence by Dr Nalinaksha Sanyal, Whip of the Official Congress party, and Dr A.c. Ukil, 1 September 1944, in Nanavati Papers, VoL III, as cited in Parthasarathi Gupta, Towards Freedom (TF), 1943-44, Vol. 2, Delhi, 1997, pp. 2025-30. 12 See "Evidence by :Mr Somnath Lahiry, :Mr Bhowani Sen and Mr Bhupesh Gupta of Communist Party", 2 September 1944, in ibid., p. 2030; "Memorandum submitted to the FIC by the Calcutta Relief Commission through the Joint Honorary Secretary, Mr Jnananjan Niyogi", 4 September 1944, in ibid., pp. 2041-45; "Evidence by Dr Nalinaksha Sanyal, Whip of the Official Congress party and Dr A.c. Ukil", 1 September 1944, in Nanavati Papers, VoL III, as cited in Parthasarathi Gupta, TF, Delhi, 1997, pp. 2025-30. 13 Memorandum by the Calcutta Relief Commission through the Joint Honorary Secretary, Mr Jnananjan Niyogi, 4 September 1944, in ibid., p. 2041.

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million people. People died, he argues, not because there was a serious shortage of supply due to natural and other reasons but because they did not have sufficient exchange entitlement to food, or, in other words, they did not have enough wherewithal to buy food. Now, the entitlement that a person has is intimately linked to the political and social system in which it is to be enjoyed. Thus, the attempt to link famine with the prevailing socio-political system is obvious. It has been argued that in a democratic system, the severity of the consequences of famine is mitigated due to the openness of information and a democratic distribution system that helps timely relief for the population14 Amartya Sen cites the 1956 famine in China as an example where people died without the world even coming to know of it. For some, however, what Sen does not take into account is the crucial issue of the long-term decline of food availability in the province. It is said that the famine has to be explained by a long-term decline of the food production in the province and not by the entitlement thesis. The entitlement thesis primarily explains the reasons for the starvation deaths. It does not go beyond the issue and explain why did the purchasing power as well as production of foodgrains decline in the province in the long run. Analysis in this vein will essentially bring colonialism in the forefront. Utsa Patnaik, for example, has argued that colonial policies led to this long-term decline and, thus, the cause of the famine must be traced to those policies. 1s A study of Bengal during the period 1943-47, therefore, requires an understanding of the society, which witnessed social and economic cleavages being politically articulated. Different groups claimed to be the peoples' voice. The Muslim League claimed that it spoke for the Muslims, while the Hindu Mahasabha claimed that itwas the true representative of the Hindu interests. The Communists said that they were the representatives of the workers. Most of the Congress party members were in jail during the post-Quit India movement. Famine, with such gigantic dislocation, had created a large space conducive to any kind of

14 R.W. Davies, M.B. Tanger and S.G.W. Heatcroft, "Stalin, Grain Stocks and the Famine of 1932-33", Slavic Review, VoL 54, No.3, 1995, pp. 642-57. 15 Utsa Patnaik, "Food Availability and Famine".

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articulation and mobilization. 16 It is with this view that the present chapter purports to examine the political conditions during the famine of 1943. We shall also try to relate to the actual conditions with the understanding of the famine among those who tried to organise and mould public opinion, i.e., the political parties. This may show us, indirectly though, a way to understand the political behaviour of the organized political parties during the famine.

II The Second World War was declared in September, 1939, and the colonial state, without even a semblance of consultation with the Indian opinion, declared India's participation in the war. The Congress ministries resigned as a mark of protest. The operation of the war, however, saw the Indian economy being galvanized into a war-time economy, with production for the army getting priority. There were approximately three million men recruited by the British Indian Army to fight in the Second World War 17 Bengal's contribution to the army was around 125,000 men. Though the recruitment from Bengal was not very substantial, what was significant was the fact that the larger chunk of these recruits came from the East Bengal districts, viz., 18,000 from Chitta gong; 17,263 from Noakhali; 12,858 from Tippera; 13,332 from Dacca; 7,718 form Mymensing; and 8,781 form Bakergunj. Some of these areas also faced the problems of evacuation of the population by the military. An unofficial estimate shows that around 0.25 million people were evacuated in early 1942. This included, as an unofficial estimate put it, 75,000 people from Noakhali, 70,000 from Feni, and 20,000 and 25,000 from Tippera and Chittagong respectively18 Figures, however, do not convey the untold human suffering which accompanied these forced and often rapid evacuation processes. The problems of the people

16 T. Maniruzamman, "Bangladesh in 1974: Economic Crisis and Political Polarisation", Asian Survey, VoL 15, pp. 117-28. 17 See, entry on 18 August 1944, Personal Diary, Richard G. Casey Papers (Microfihn), Reel No.1, p.32. 18 P.e. Chose to Jawaharlal Nehru, 24 April 1942, All India Congress Committee (AICC) Papers, File No. C-31 (Pt. II), p. 29.

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were compounded by the atrocities perpetrated by the military, especially assaults on women. Due to strict censorship, these cases did not come out into the open, though the local political workers informed their leaders about these incidents. Many such cases-as in Nibodhai (Barasat),19 Alokdia (Noakhali)20 and Chanua (Noakhali)21-were brought to light by the local political workers. With the appearance of Japan on the scene, the war entered a new phase. The advances of the Japanese forces towards Burma rapidly turned the entire eastern region into a war zone. This caused even further dislocation of the economy. The dangers of the Japanese invasion early in 1942 compelled the military authorities to put into operation a denial policy involving two important measures. The first was removal of the rice and paddy estimated to be in excess oflocal requirements until the end of the crop year, from the coastal districts of Midnap ore, Bakerganj and Khulna. The other measure was the removal of all boats, capable of carrying 10 or more passengers, from the parts of the delta which were considered vulnerable to invasion. 22 The total number of boats capable of carrying 10 or more people registered within the denial area was 66,563.23 To add to the common people's woes, Japanese air raids greatly destabilized urban life in the province, i.e., in Calcutta, Dacca and Chittagong. Imposition of strict censure on the press, and the virtual military control of the administration of these areas prevented the information of the sufferings of the people coming out in the open. Interestingly, for the first time, the relationship between the Governor and the editor, of the pro-colonial organ, The Statesman, Mr Stevens, showed signs of strain. This was due to the fact that Mr Stevens had expressed his keenness to show sympathies with the famine victims through his newspaper. The correspondence between the Governor and the Viceroy reveals how the government was even directing the conduct of newspapers to safeguard its own wartime interests. f

19 20

21 22

Ibid., File No. G-28 (Pt. II)-42, pp. 507-11. Ibid., p. 513. Ibid., p. 43. Famine Inquiry Commission's Report on Bengal (hereafter FIC Report), Delhi,

1945, p. 26. 23

Ibid.

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!twas in this landscape that the emergence of another discomforting phenomenon-increase in the price of rice-began to cause considerable concern. The prices rose from Rs 11.40 per maund on 4 January 1943 to Rs 12.8 on 20 January 1943. On 3 February 1943, one maund rice cost Rs 13.2. The prices reached an all time high ofRs 15 on3 March 1943.24 This upward trend was seen not only in the districts which were normally deficit in foodgrains, but also in surplus districts like Barisal. 25 The reason, as a legislator from Barisal pointed out in the Assembly, was that rice from the surplus districts was finding its way to the Calcutta market." In Calcu tta, both the priva te and government industries engaged in the wartime production efforts were one of the biggest buyers of this rice so thattheir workers had a secure food supply. In 1942 and 1943 also, it was the war and the overall war efforts that directed the food policy of the provincial government. !t was in line with this that the procurement for Calcutta was a major preoccupation, where most of the industries producing for the army were located. In the meantime, however, when the procurement for Calcutta was in full swing and was facilitated by the ministry's decision to allow movement of rice from the moffusils to Calcutta, there were clear signals that the problem had reached deep into the province. This decision facilitated the movement of rice from the districts to Calcutta, thereby reducing even the surplus districts into deficit ones. 27 The crisis was deepening and by March 1943, even the mildest government report drew a grim picture of an impending crisis. !t said: The period ... has been one of particular anxiety as regards food supply. An increase in crime, looting of paddy and hunger marches or demonstrations are reported from many districts and there have been reports of deaths or suicide from starvation and selling of children for prostitution which however in some cases is unsubstantiated. 28 FIC Report, pp. 38-39. Narendra Nath Dasgupta, 18 September 1942, Proceedings of the Bengal Legislative Assembly (PBLA), VoL 13, No.1, pp.125-31. 26 Ibid. v FIC Report, pp. 38-39. 28 Fortnightly Report (FR), second half, March 1943, Government of India, Home Political (hereafter Home Political)! File No. 18/3/43. 24

25

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Responding to this a second scheme was announced on 9 January 1943. However, the competitive buying by the traders and shifting of the procurement to Calcutta finally forced even this scheme to be abandoned on 17 February 1943. And by this time the crisis had become acute in Calcutta too, where people from the neighbouring districts and villages began to pour in and die. Only a concerted and coordinated effort could have saved the situation. f

III Though the Fazlul Huq ministry was trying to tackle the situation it soon became clear that the bureaucracy and the Governor were running the show hand-in-glove. Any independent decision by the provincial ministry angered the Governor and was harshly dealt with. Shyama Prasad Mookerjee, Hindu Mahasabha leader, who had joined the Fazlul Huq ministry, in retrospect realized quite well the implications of what he had promised on the floor of the Legislative Assembly-the institution of an inquiry committee regarding the military atrocities in Midnapore. The Governor did not like this at all. Mookerjee finally had to resign; he realized that the idea of provincial autonomy in Bengal was a hoax. 29 Fazlul Huq had publicly accepted that there was shortage of food in the province thereby hinting at the responsibility of the central government to make up for this shortage. A crisis was impending and on 18 March 1943, the Bengal Governor wrote to the Viceroy expressing his anger about Fazlul Huq's decisions.3D This was contrary to what the colonial government intended; that its role should be seen as Ilcooperative and accommodative".31 It was in no mood to accept tha t the shortage was to be made up by the central government. 32 Engaged as it was in the war in which the men and the resources ofIndia were proving a great help, the government was in no mood to acquiesce to any such demand. f

f

29

30 31 32

Shyama Prasad Mookerjee, Why I Resigned, Calcutta, 1942. Parthasarathi Gupta, TF, p. 1833. Ibid. Maj. Gen. E. Wood, AddL Sec. to L.G. Pinnell 23 April 1943, ibid., p. 1837.

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Hence, paradoxically, in the case of Bengal, it took recourse to the notion of provincial autonomy maintaining that the province should help itself out. The reality was, however, to the contrarythe country in fact had a regulated economy, Congress ministries were not in office, the governors were de facto rulers of the provinces, and at this juncture, talk of provincial autonomy seemed hollow. If one agrees with Sen's thesis, a democratic system is seen to help people, particularly those with lower purchasing power, face the severity of famine. In the case of the 1943 Bengal famine, the argument for democracy must be extended to the issue of the presence of a colonial system, where it is obvious that the colonial state did not have any democratic component. The Bengal Governor's choice was to support a party that would, if not supportive, at least not be antagonistic to the colonial interests. And here his obvious choice was the Muslim League leader, the Nawab of Dacca, Nazimuddin, who in his eyes was weak and to whom the Governor did not need to divulge any secrets. To coincide and it appears as more than a mere coincidence, there were fierce political attacks on the Fazlul Huq ministry. The Muslim League attacked the ministry, that had recently won a vote of confidence in the Legislative Assembly on27March 1943, with a renewed vigour. The League, sensing the weakening of Fazlul Huq's hold in the Assembly, now came out more stringently against the ministry.33 Congratulating Syed Nausher Ali on being elected the speaker of the Bengal Legislative Assembly after defea ting the Muslim League candida te A.R. Siddiqui, the Star of India, an organ of the Muslim League, commented: f

The number of votes secured by Mr A.R. Siddiqi is highly significant and indicative of the popularity of the League with the large section of the house despite ideological differences, a pointer which must have given Mr Huq and his supporters a nasty jolt. The fact that the Muslim League is going from strength to strength ... is irrefutably proved by the speakership election drama. 34 The realisation of the growing weakness of Fazlul Huq's position, energized the Muslim League leaders into action. They See, Ispahani's attack on the ministry, Star of India,S February 1943, p. 2; Suhrawardy's attack, ibid., 23 March 1943, p. 1. 34 Ibid., 11 March 1943, p.3. 33

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became more determined and wanted to tryout all the ways to, as Ispahani wrote to Jinnah, "deal the knock out blow at Fazlul Huq."35 These developments did not go unnoticed by the colonial authorities; it witnessed the voting demands in the assembly as revealing an increasing determination on the part of the IIOppOsition to secure the defeat of the government".36 In such circumstances the results of the triennial elections for the six Legislative Council seats in the territorial constituencies were announced on 25 March 1943. All the six candida tes of the ruling party faced defeat by the Muslim League candidatesYThe Muslim League leadership portrayed this victory as further consolidation of Muslim unity.38 The Calcutta based League leadership began sensing the impending fall of the Huq ministry and was quick to demand the resignation of Huq. These events further strengthened the determination ofthe Muslim League leaders in Calcutta to deliver a decisive blow to the ministry. Ispahani, the closest confidant of Jinnah in Bengal, expressed this determination in a letter to Jinnah on 26 March 1943. He wrote: f

Inshaallah, our wound of having the majority of the Muslim M.L.A.s sitting opposite us, will soon be healed .... Fazlul Huq looks a picture of misery. Do not be surprised if the ministry fails sooner than anticipated .... 39 The words were prophetic. However, it was the Governor, Herbert, who seemed to be more eager to see Fazlul Huq out. He sent for the latter on 28 March, and suggested that he should formally resign." The Governor did not concede Fazlul Huq's Ispahani to Jinnah, March 1943, Z.H. Zaidi ed., M.A. Jinnah-Ispahani Correspondence, 1936-1948, Karachi, 1976, p. 335. 36 FR, March, first half, Home Political, File No. 18/3/43. 37 FR, March, second half, ibid. 38 Star of India, Calcutta, 26 March 1943, p. 2. Commenting on the result, Ispahani came out with a statement" congratulating ... Muslim brothers and sisters for having given a sledge hammer verdict", and advised Fazlul Hug to "bow to the will of the Muslim brotherhood and resign his office of Premier", ibid. 39 Ispahani to Jinnah, 23 March 1943, Z.H. Zaidi, Correspondence, p. 335. 40 It seems that the Governor had acted at the behest of the European group, which was at this time openly aligning with the Muslim League. See, VP. Menon, Transfer of Power in India, Calcutta, 1968, p. 150. 35

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request to allow him to consult his party and colleagues, and had to, in fact, virtually put his signature on an already "typed resignation letter"4! Next day, when asked on the floor of the Assembly by Kiron Shankar Ray, through the Speaker, about the veracity of the rumour floating in the town about his forced resignation, he admitted the fact, after which the Speaker declared that the ministry was out of office 42 Thus, Fazlul Huq's premiership, which had begun in 1937, finally came to an end. Describing the dismissal of Huq as lIan extremely tiresome constitutional crisis"f43 Linlithgowf the Governor Generat expressed his discomfort at the Governor's handling of the matter. In his letter to the Secretary of State on 2 April, he expressed his dismay at the "lighthearted manner in which Herberthad handled the situation"." He had been informed by the Governor himself that, at the time of resignation, Huq commanded a majority in the House as was evident from the division on 27 March in which he had won by 10 votes of the Congress members.45 However, despite his outburst at the Governor for indulging in political games, what really concerned Linlithgow was a ministry which would give effective support to the war efforts unlike the Huq ministry which, according to Linlithgow, was "dominated by somewhat sinister figure of S.P. Mookerjee in the background"46He found Nazimuddin, whom Herbert had brought in as the new chief minister, more acceptable to him in this regard than the Huq ministry".47 Thus, the first Muslim League Ministry was brought in office by an official fiat.

VI Meanwhile, when the Muslim League assumed office, the food situation had already started taking alarming proportions, and Ibid. Amrit Bazar Patrika, Calcutta, 30 March 1943, p. 1. 43 Linlithgow to Amery, 30 March 1943, N. Mansingh ed., Constitutional Relations between Britain and India: Transfer of Power, 1942-7, London, 197080 (hereafter TOP), Vol. III, p. 861. 44 Linlithgow to Amery, 2 April 1943, ibid., p. 875. 45 Ibid., fn. 4. 46 Linlithgow to Amery, 4 April 1943, ibid., p. 893. 47 Ibid. 41 42

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it was aware of it. The price of rice was soaring and at the same time paddy looting incidents were occurring in many placesfrom Nurunamala in Bogra (North Bengal) to Bardia Bazar in Chandpur (Tippera),4S and from Rajshahi and Faridpur districts 49 Reports of looting of rice from country boats at places like Majlispur, Brahmanbaria (Tippera) were being reported at the time when the Governor was taking charge of the administration. 50 Reports offurther deterioration in food supply were pouring in from different districts. 51 District officials were reporting deterioration of food supply.52 The government report also suggested the gravity of the situation: The period under report has been one of particular anxiety as regards food supply. An increase in crime, looting of paddy and hunger marches or demonstrations are reported from many districts and there have been reports of deaths or suicide from starvation and selling children for prostitution, which however in some cases unsubstantiated. 53 f

A newspaper report from Jessore said IIPeople are experiencing utmost difficulty due to high prices at which rice is selling".54 Situation was worsening and people were coming out themselves to seek solutions for their plight. A similar situation arose in N etrakona, where the price of rice had shot up and the understanding was that it was Iidue to profiteering of merchants in the town" and therefore local food committees were formed to ease the situation. 55 In Chittagong town, a largely attended public meeting, under the auspices of the recently formed Central Food Committee (CFC), presided over by S.L. Khastgir, urged the central government to treat the food policy as an indivisible and integral part of war strategy. The meeting further proposed the adoption of a uniform policy regarding food without any f

f

48 49 5()

51 52 53 54

55

f

Amrit Bazar Patrika, 2 April 1943, p. 1. FR, March, first half, 1943, Home Political, File No. 18/3/43. Ibid. FIe Report, pp. 225-27. Ibid., pp. 225-27. FR, March, second half, 1943, Home Political, File No. 18/3/43. Amrit Bazar Patrika, 13 April, p. 3. Ibid.

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Communalism in Bengal

distinction between the military and the civil population." The colonial au thorities however were not prepared to eschew such distinctions, and regarded the military and the war as their priority; all its policies were determined by this factor. Suhrawardy, one of the most prominent Muslim League leaders, who had been involved in the tirade against Fazlul Huq, assumed charge of the department of civil supplies. This, to some historians, heralded the ascendancy of the department over that of revenue department-an event of significance particularly regarding the policies that the ministry would pursue during the next few months to face the challenge of famine. 57 Suhrawardy regarded the famine as a problem of shortage of food availability. His policies, therefore, were based on this assumption. Soon, differences began to emerge over the way the shortness of supply was to be handled. However, in no circumstances the demands such as those made by the Chittagong food committee, i.e., treating military and civil population as part of the same food policy, were to be considered. The opposition had been constantly demanding two things. First, seeing the gravity of the situation, a large number of these groups, which however did not include the official Congress party, demanded that, instead of a League ministry, an all-party ministry be formed to deal with the situation. But, at the same time there was a constant demand that the central government should accept the fact that there was shortage of foodgrains in the province and own up the responsibility of their supply. Knowing that the real powers were vested with the Governor and the bureaucracy, the demands showed the contradictions not only in themselves and in the oppositions' thinking but also in the problems in a colonial setting. Had there been an all-party ministry, what would have happened if the Governor used his discretionary powers to veto any real policy of that ministry? This was a real threat and the experience of the earlier ministry pointed in the same direction. The Communist party tried to come out of this dilemma by adopting a line of action, which on the one hand demanded a Congress-League ministry, and mobilized people f

f

f

Ibid. Lance Brennan, "Government Famine Relief in Bengal, 1943", Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 47, No.3, 1988, pp. 542-67.

56

57

Hunger and Politics

87

for moral requisitioning in the villages and districts on the other. (Thus, there was an overall assumption of food shortage, yet the moral notions in the society made people donate food for the poorer sections.) However, the party workers were severely constrained by the changed political line of the party ever since the war entered a new phase in 1941, as we shall discuss later. Congress was not ready to join the ministry unless there was an all-India approach to the question and not merely from a Bengal point ofview".58 Nalinaksha Sanyal pointed out later in his statement to the FIC that "unless all India questions were settled we could not do anything".S9 Thus, for the Congress, a commitment to an all-India approach was significant. Hindu Mahasabha on the other hand, was consistent in its demand for what it termed national government"f Le' f an all-party government. National governmentf in this sense f meant a government in which Hindu Mahasabha too was to be accommodated as it claimed to be representing the Hindus and, in fact, this was the time when Savarkar issued the statement in which he asked the Hindu Mahasabha to try and get into ministries 60 In keeping with the idea of food shortage the department of civil supplies began to gear its activities towards increasing the supply of foodgrains. It aimed at increasing the supply by borrowings from other provincesf Le' f from Bihar and Orissa. This not only created problem in these provinces, the central government also was not very keen. The central authoritiesf II

Iia

58

Nalinaksha Sanyal, in Nanavati Papers, cited in Parthasarathi Gupta, TF,

p. 2027.

Ibid. The Hindu Mahasabha stand towards participation in the ministry was outlined by YD. Savarkar in his statement on 10 June 1943. It said:

59

6()

In the Hindu minority provinces whenever a Moslem Ministry seems inevitable whether it is a League one or otherwise and Hindu interest could be served better by joining it, the Hindu Sabhaites in particular should try as of a right to capture as many seats in the ministry as possible and try to do the best they can to safeguard the interst of the Hindu minority. But they should oppose publicly every attempt on the part of the Moslem Ministry to support Pakistan or trecherous principle of Provincial self-determination to secede .... The leading principle which must be emphasised is that boycotting the :Ministry altogether is bound to be more often than not highly detrimental to Hindu interest. (Hindu Mahasabha Papers, File No. C-39, p. 121.)

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Communalism in Bengal

however, stressed upon not over publishing food shortage and rather concentrate on drawing rice and paddy from the hoarding cultivators. A food department communique in July 1943, clearly stated this official point of view: Examination of the position as a whole shows a shortage of 1.29 million tons between the estimated surpluses likely to be secured through government procurement and the estimated needs of provinces, the Indian states and the defence services .... It is essentially one of getting adequate flow of foodgrains from the cultivators. That adequate flow is at present lacking. The cultivator continues to hold: 1. In the hope of increased prices; 2. Because of his apprehension (to some extent justified) of probable decline in value of token money and anxiety to secure bullion instead of paper; 3. In parts of the eastern areas, because of fear of Japanese invasion and anxiety to have reserve on which to draw; 4. There exists a deep rooted conviction among cultivators spread by diverse anti-government interest[sL which one [sic] propaganda [? ours] cannot shake, thatthere is a drain on India's resources for the defence services, so enormous as to lead to a certainty of serious shortage 6 ! The efforts of the department of civil supply do not seem to be in direct opposition to this view. Very soon the notion of hoarding of food grains as the reason for the shortage become the popular explanation. Suhrawardy, at the very first instance, held the previous ministry responsible for the crisis. He said: When we came into office we were faced with utter unpreparedness for the coming crisis. The rise in prices and the panic amongst the people was a clear sign that dangers were ahead ... there were no government stock and no reserve. Whatever was purchased was spent on priority undertakings in Calcutta. 62 61

Government of India, Food Department to the Secretary of State, 15 July

1943, TOP, Vol. lV, p. 75.

"Statement on Food situation in Bengal by the Hon'ble :Minister of Civil Supplies." (Read in the House by the chief minister) 5 July 1943, Proceedings

62

Hunger and Politics

89

He saw the crisis coming primarily due to rapid inflation and shortage of supply. The situation worsened due to widespread rumours and the mentality of hoarding. There was, according to him, a circular economy, where one finds psychology rather than economics playing a major role. The "panic created out of this news" were the contributory factor in creating the shortage situation and a steep rise in the prices of essential commodities especially foodgrains. This inflation and shortage were due to the news of shortages, which led to hoarding by consumers, producers and black marketeers. This, in turn, had resulted in the rise of prices. And, therefore, he said that he had to deal with two things: "one panic brought about by insistence on shortages, and the other greed brought about by speculative rise in prices. Both of them led to hoarding and maldistribu tion."" To refurbish the provincial supply, the ministry" abolished the zonal barriers" to facilitate the movement of the foodgrains from surplus to deficit areas.64 This was supplemented in the first week of June 1943 by the "Food drive" during which the government attempted to prepare a detailed report on the available supply of rice in the province and also locate the supposedly hoarded foodgrains in the province. In a sense it was an anti-hoarding drive, launched between 7 and 20 June 1943. 65 Calcutta and Howrah were excluded from this drive due to, what the minister called Iisome administrative purposes".66 The food drive coincided with the free trade policy, which was followed by the government with an anticipation of inflow of grain from the neighbouring provinces. The Governor, while writing to the Governor General, had expressed this hope even when he was fully aware of the alarming situation. He wrote: f

f

f

N azimuddin and Braund had just returned from Assam, while Suhrawardy had met Bihar officials in Patna. Although both of the Bengal Legislative Assembly and Legislative Council, 1942-47 (hereafter PBLA), Vol. LXV, pp. 80-81. 63 Ibid., p. 81. See also, Parthasarathi Gupta, TF, p. 1828. " PBLA, Vol. LXV, p. 81. 65 Ibid., p. 83. See also the FIC Report, p. 55. The commission records that a similar suggestion to undertake such a step was also given but at that time it was decided not to embark on this as it would be opposed by people who would feel panicky at any such move. Ibid., p. 56. 66

Ibid.

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Communalism in Bengal

these Provinces have expressed willingness to assist, supplies are very slow in coming in .... no rice has so far reached us from Orissa for some time, and Braund does not disguise his apprehension at the situation .... I feel strongly that our drive to dig out hoards and improved distribution within Bengal should have coincided with stocks coming in large quantities under free trade. 67 However, things did not change even after this attempt. In fact, they worsened. Not only the drive was not successful in unearthing substantial amounts of foodgrains; it spread panic and dissatisfaction instead. While the minister for civil supplies tried to ward-off any alarmist speculation and announced that the Ilfoodgrains were coming into Bengal and more were being promised"f 68 the Governorf in privatef howeverf himself was perceiving a much more serious situation. Writing to Linlithgowf he said: I must invoke all my powers of description and persuasion to convey to you the seriousness of the food situation in Bengal. Hitherto I have studiously avoided overstating the case and I have faithfully reported any day-to-day alleviation of the position: I am now in some doubt whether I have not erred in the direction of understatement. 69 Herbert to Linlithgow, 8 June 1943, TOP, VoL III, pp. 1049-50. Minister for Civil Supplies, 8 July 1943, PBLA, VoL LXV, p. 81. 69 Herbert to Linlithgow, 2 July 1943, TOP, VoL IV, pp.42-43. The colonial concern, however, was not primarily the food situation but rather the position of the ministry in Bengal, and its apprehensions were directed at any possible rapprochement between the Muslim League and the opposition. Writing to the then Secretary of State, Linlithgow expressed his primary concern in these terms: 67

68

Nazimuddin is a nice little man, but not outstandingly resolute or strong, and he is obviously very anxious in the first place to let some of the more innocuous prisoners out. For that there may be something to be said so long as the criterion is a pretty severe one. But he is also pressing very hard that his Hindu ministers should be allowed to go and see Sarat Bose, and that I confess, I do not feel so enthusiastic about. and Nazimuddin is inclined to suggest that if the same concession is not made to Goswami and Pain, he may lose Hindu support altogether. I doubt the Hindu support that he has in fact being worth a very great deal, but one is anxious always, in Bengal, to try to keep Hindu feeling reasonably sweet if possible. For all that my own instinct is, at this stage

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In the meantime, the opposition was consistently demanding that famine should be declared in the province and the government should apply the normal provisions for meeting famine conditions. 70 The Governor and the ministry were not prepared for this. Suhrawardy was adamant and, instead of declaring famine, committed his department to the food drive, which was aimed at revealing the true position of rice/paddy available in the province, and simultaneously unearthing hoarded foodgrainsn Soon he claimed that the food drive was a success and predicted an improvement in the situation. The food drive, according to him, had "restored the confidence of the poor and transferred the panic to the minds of the hoarders."72 The opposition presented an entirely different picture and blamed Suhrawardy and his drive for the worsening situation. Nalinaksha Sanyal described it as economically unsound" for Ilwhile the food drive was permitted to go on and while the village committees were allowed to have stocks estimated ostensibly for the purpose of maintaining local supplies, there was no restriction put on large purchases by ou tsiders in tha t very area and removal ofthe stock to Calcutta and other industrial areas" .73 nOne could not have/' he further commented,"free trade and simultaneously selfsufficiency. The tvvo are economically contradictory" .74 Ghiasuddin Ahmed of Mymensingh blamed the food drive for reducing surplus districts like Barisal and Khulna to deficit ones. 75 He asked the government to explain why Calcutta was left out of the drive and questioned the logic behind the Ispahanis being given the sole agency to get rice and that too by providing the firm with an II

against allowing any move of this nature. (Linlithgow to Amery, 10 June 1943, TOP, Vol. 111, pp. 1053-54.)

Shyama Prasad Mookerjee, 12 July 1943, PBLA, VoL LXV, pp.435-45. "In the first week of June 1943, the Government of Bengal launched a province-wide 'food drive''', says the inquiry commission, "To ascertain the actual statistical position, to locate hoards, to stimulate the flow of grain from agriculturalists to the markets, and to organise distribution of local surpluses as loans or by sales to those who were in need of food grains", Fie, p. 55. 72 Minister for Civil Supplies, 8 July 1943, PBLA, VoL LXv;. p. 81. 73 Nalinaksha Sanyal, 12 July 1943, ibid., p.293. 74 Ibid. 75 Ghiasuddin Ahmed, 12 July 1943, ibid., p. 287. 70 71

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Communalism in Bengal

advance of crores of Rupees." According to him, the anti-hoarding drive had resulted in no rice being available in the districts. In fact, he said, "it was a betrayal."77 Shamsuddin Ahmed of the Krishak Praja Party said that he had just returned from Noakhali district "where paddy was selling at Rs 10 per maund and rice at Rs 15 per maund and in Sandwip ... Rs 18 per maund and even at that it was not available"/8 and accused the ministry ofpursuing lIan anti-peasant policy."79 IIIt might be that some big jotdars or some big agriculturalists or some traders might have some hoards"f he further saidf Ilbut as there was no bar to Calcutta firms making free purchases of foodstuffs in the mufassil, whatever rice could be had was transferred to Calcutta as Calcutta was excluded from the operation of the drive."80 The political currents and predicaments soon began to display themselves on the food policy of the ministry. While the supply minister, H.S. Suhrawardy, attacked by the entire opposition which asked the colonial government to take the responsibility for such a mammoth crisis, clung on to the ministry, the acts of omission and commission by the ministry further vitiated the political atmosphere in the province. Suhrawardy appointed Ispahanis as the sole procuring agent of foodgrains and gave them an advance of Rs 40 millionS! This was, seen by all the political parties as a completely partisan and corrupt affair." ThatM.A. Ispahani was the biggest sponsor of the Muslim League was a well-known fact. Thus, partisanship was self- evident. One also gets a feeling that in many an allegation there was a clear undertone that the Muslim League did it because of communal considerations. The opposition attacked the ministry for its food policy and its recruiiment of Ispahanis as the sole agent and urged it vehemently to get Bengal declared a famine-hit province. Suhrawardy, on the other hand, was announcing the success of Ibid. Ibid. 78 Shamsuddin Ahmed, ibid., p. 410. 79 Ibid. 80 Ibid. 81 "Enquiry into :Mr M.A. Ispahani's Transactions as Buying Agent for the Bengal Government", Parthasarathi Gupta, TF, Vol. 3, p. 2919. 82 "Evidence by Krishak Praja Muslim Leaders", 1 September 1944, Nanavati Papers, Vol. I, cited in ibid., pp. 2019-25.

76

77

Hunger and Politics

93

the food drive even as the Governor himself was very pessimistic about it. Writing to the Viceroy, he said: Our "food drive" in the district(s) has located 100,000 tonnes ofrice (in stocks of 400 maunds and over) in the province .... But the essential fact remains that we cannot keep Bengal fed (certainly we cannot assume the responsibility of rationing in Calcutta or elsewhere) unless we can get food grains into Bengal from outside .... 83 Even at this stage when the Governor was expressing his grave concern over the food situation, the food department of the Government of India was issuing strict instructions to the province to do some good work in procurement and distribution rather than keep harping on help from outside,84 i.e., on imports, for which the Secretary of State had already shown his dismissive attitude. 85 Thus, the authorities outside the province were directly responsible for at least not coming to the aid of the provincial government, a fact which the FIC tried to eschew from deliberating. To put it plainly, all the neighbouring provinces, i.e., Bihar and Orissa were governed directly by the Governors as the Congress ministries had resigned, and therfore, did not have to even pretend to the existence of provincial au tonomy in following the central government's dictat. On the other hand, despite the fact that news came out late about the conditions in Bengal, people from different parts of India began sending their contribution in whichever way they could help to alleviate the conditions in Bengal. Bhookha Bengal still remains a major metaphor even today in the minds of many people from places like the Punjab. The ministry, which was brought into existence by the colonial regime, now found itself in an extremely difficult situation. Facing a hostile opposition (major attack came from the members of the erstwhile Progressive Coalition Party (PCP) and by the Statesman for the first time) the ministry gradually began to fall back Herbert to Linlithgow, 2 July 1943, TOP, VoL IV, p. 44. Memorandum by Government of India, food department, enclosed with a letter of 7 September 1943, from the Private Secretary to the Viceroy to the Private Secretary to the Secretary of State, ibid., pp. 196-200. 85 See, the regular correspondence between the Secretary of State and the Viceroy, TOP, VoL III, p. 515. 83 84

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Communalism in Bengal

upon the colonial authorities for support. The Governor, rather than Nazimuddin or Suhrawardy seemed to be in the controlling position. 86 Unable to face the charges made by the opposition (joined by a non-friendly press and individual members of the legislature from the deficit districts) namely the recruitment of the Ispahanis as the sole purchasing agent and providing it with financial advance and subservience to colonial interests the Muslim League members quickly took recourse to the evocation of community and religion. Abul Hashim, while defending Suhrawardy against the opposition, said, f

f

we are all Muslims. The Hon'ble leader of the house, the Chief Minister, is a Muslim; The Hon'ble Minister in charge of civil supply is a Muslim, we Muslims believe in God. Let us, therefore, take it that providence in his wisdom has placed Mr Suhrawardy in charge of the Supply department. 87

VII While the religious community was invoked by the Muslim League members, and the opposition members asked the government to own up to its responsibility for providing food to the people, the catastrophic nature of the famine began to get manifested in the forms of deaths and mass migration towards the cities (e.g. Calcutta). Contrary to the assertion that the famine was a collective catastrophe, the 1943 famine demonstrated that itwas a class famine where classes which were lower in the economic hierarchy, suffered far more than other sections. Though even the sections of the middle classes suffered from food scarcity wherever there was acute shortage offood, the fact remained that wherever there was relief they were provided with low priced grain which cut into food relief targeted for the poor. The small holders soon found out that their savings were exhausted and that they were unable to pay for the necessities of life. A conservative estimate puts this class to consist of approximately two million f

86 87

Herbert to Linlithgow, 23 August 1943, TOP, VoL IV, pp. 187-88. Abul Hashim, 8 July 1943, PBLA, VoL LXv;. p. 339.

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families (or 10 million people ).88 However, the worst victims were the landless labourers, the fishermen, the paddy huskers, the artisans and the schoolteachers. The demand as well as the immediate necessity was evidently for relief on a massive scale. 89 Most of the stories written during this time or shortly after portray a picture, which at times completely misses the human tragedy and the magnitude of the tragedy while some others are extremely sensitive to the tragedy. 90 By August 1943, death on streets became an ordinary spectacle. The flood of people coming to Calcutta was becoming unmanageable and the relief operation that was launched was incapable of checking this human migration. In fact, the hope that food was available in Calcutta and other towns made the situation worse. The need of the hour was that the food be sent to the villages to persuade their residents not to leave their homes. However, this seems to have been undertaken only through some gruel kitchens in the districts, but these too suffered from acute shortage of foodgrains. But they did emphasize the need for state support in providing relief in the situation. However, time was running ou t and coordinated efforts became even more necessary. It was at this time, in fact, that the government as well as the political parties realized the absolute necessity for relief operations. Shyama Prasad Mookerjee, expressing the opposition's demand that the colonial authorities take the responsibility for famine relief, had already said in July that it was impossible for the one-party ministry to confront the situation created by the famine. He asked the ministry to let the British government take up the responsibility for feeding the people of Bengal and maintaining law and order. He also urged the ministry not to indulge in the propaganda" of self-help or of forcible loan of rice, that barely exists". 91 From April 1943 the usual techniques of relief-cash for loans, doles and paymentfor test relief-were employed, but not on the scale required by the famine code. But there seems to be an invincible belief in the governmentthat supply would come either from

88 89 9()

91

FIe Report! p. 66. Ibid.! p. 75. Belal Chaudhury! Langarkhana! Calcutta! 1999. Shyama Prasad Mookerjee! 14 July! PBLA! VoL LXV! p.441.

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Communalism in Bengal

inside or from outside and relieve the province. This made the government rely on the impending supply and clearing of the channels of supply. The colonial central government had to be persuaded to help the province by functionalizing the centralized machinery. However, the government's empahsis tha t help must be found from other states as well as within the state made it difficult for the provincial government to begin any large-scale scheme of relief work." From September 1943 onwards various relief organizations began their activities." Almost all the political parties were engaged in relief opera tions. A Bengal Famine Relief Coordination Committee (BFRCC) was formed, which included members from the leading political organizations, and presented the government with its programme. 94 It sought active governmental assistance in dealing with the situation, especially because it sought to provide people with cheap or free foodgrains. Meanwhile, in the districts, the government had begun relief work butthe officials were handicapped by the non-availability of rice. Ramizuddin Ahmed of Tippera said in the Assembly: ... no grain dole were distributed before December when the harvest of aman crop had already begun. So far as the free kitchens are concerned, it was the non-official public who began these through public donations and itwas in the middle of October that Government began to distribute money to some areas. But the money was of no avail when no rice or paddy was available in the market even at Rs 60 or 70 per maund 95 The non-governmental organizations and private initiatives tried to face the situation by seeking relieffrom outside the province and moral requisitioning from the people of the area itself. Even though the colonial authorities failed to come to rescue at a crucial juncture they were however concerned in case the private organizations posed a threat to their legitimacy and f

f

f

f

92 FIe Report, pp. 69-75. See also, Lance Brennan, "Government Famine Relief in Bengal", p.543. He cites the revenue department sources which say that the confidence that supply would come prevented any vigorous action in this regard. See ibid., fn. 5. 93 FR, October, first half, 1943, Home Political, File No. 18/10/43. 94 S.P. Mookerjee Papers, Installment II-Iv;. F. 108, pp. 1-2. 95 Ramizuddin Ahmed, 29 March 1944, PBLA, VoL LXVI, No.5, p. 573.

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authority. Hearing that the Birlas and the Marwaris had opened free kitchens, the Viceroy wrote to the Governor expressing his concern. The Governor replied saying that philanthropy was part of the Indian tradition. 96 There were accusations of widespread corruption and allegations that the relief material was being used to enhance the fortune of the ruling party members.97 The Governor and the new Viceroy, Wavell, who succeeded Linlithgow, were aware of this situation, but the colonial interest lay in keeping the ministry intact on the pretext of letting the colonized administer their own affairs at this critical hour. However itwas the whole of the Bengal Province, which suffered from this shirking of responsibility. The interest of retaining the mask ofbenevolence was it seems no longer required. The new Governor General constantly looked for an occasion to impose the Section 93 in the province but the Secretary of State prevented him from taking any such action. The ministry, on the other hand, confessed its weakness and pleaded for colonial support. Even as late as January 1944, when the acute conditions created by famine had subsided, Nazimuddin sought the support of colonial authorities for its existence. Wavellnoted in his diary, "He said things would be all right if his ministry was given a chance and supported against his political enemies. ff98 Thus a matter of singular significance was that the Muslim League ministry depended for its survival on the colonial authorities; it helped in the war by, apart from other things, keeping Calcutta free from the famine situation and thereby helping the industries to run smoothly. On the other hand, it saved the authorities from having to shoulder any direct responsibility for a tragedy of such magnitude. f

f

f

VIII To whom should one attribute the responsibility for a famine and tragedy of such a magnitude? Was it the provincial government, Herbert to Linlithgow, 10 August 1943, TOP, VoL IV, pp. 167-68. See, Golam Sarwar, 24 March 1944, PBLA, VoL LXIX, No.2, p.487: Fazlul Hug, 14 July 1943, ibid., VoL LXv;. No.2, p.250; Jnan Chakraborty, Dhaka Jelar Communist Andolaner Atit Jug, Dhaka, 1972, p. 72. 98 See Penderal Moon ed., Wavell: The Viceroy's Journal, Oxford, 1973 (Indian edition in 1977), p. 47. 96

97

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Communalism in Bengal

which was, as the FIC indicated, responsible for the famine and the human tragedy? Alternatively, was it the war and the policies of the colonial government, which made the famine happen? Some historians have tried to put the blame on a particular ministry's role and have argued that itwas the Ministry of Civil Supplies in Bengal which bungled the entire issue. Some of the political parties saw the absence of a national government as the root cause. Here the Iinational" meant differently to different people and parties. While to the Hindu Mahasabha coalition government of all parties signified a national government, to the Congress it meant the exclusion of the British from effective rule. A serious discussion on the issue of responsibility will show the real contours of the ruling power. Responsibility as a notion also entails availability of space for alternate possible actions. In a situation where the famine was caused apparently due to the shortage of food supply and an inflationary situation, one has to look for the action that could have been taken in order to avoid the situation. The long-term analysis of per capita food availability in Bengal shows a decline and the reasons for it could be attributed to the context of colonialism. While sown areas had increasingly gone to jute and tea cultivation, the linking up of the Bengal market with the world market in a subordinate position had made it vulnerable to its fluctuations. On the national scene, Bengal increasingly became dependent on a national grain market for its own deficit. Thus, in the event of the war a national market which was also regulated in order to meet the demand by the army and war production industries was the responsibility of the colonial government. What we see however was the coming up of provincial restrictions imposed by the provincial governments most of which were ruled by the governors, i.e., Bihar, Orissa and the Central Provinces. Thus, an alternative policy to restore supply positions too rested on the colonial state. All the political parties believed that the famine was due mainly to the problem of supply. Thus, the idea of the shortage of food availability was shared by all. Thus, at a historical juncture, almost all the different political parties could share an economic perspective. Wherein lay the difference between them? The difference it seems lay not in the economic analysis but in the sociopolitical lelos in which such analysis is arranged. Muslim League f

f

f

f

f

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wanted to remain in the government even with the help of the British, while the Hindu Mahasabha wanted a coalition of all parties which included itself, knowing fully well that it was difficult for it to have an independent power. The Mahasabha was very vocal in its criticism of the ministry's handling of the relief and tried to organize relief in Calcutta and other moffussil towns. But along with the relief operation, the Mahasabha also had the intention of broadening its mass base by enrolling members for its branches. The Communist party too was for a coalition ministry to run the government. The party argued that people should be given relief immedia tely and the only way open for this was to organize Ilmoral requisitioning" and more supply. This they tried to organize by appealing to the consciousness of the people. They also tried to use the space provided by the famine to broaden their mass base through organizing relief works, demonstrating and organizing for moral requisitioning and helping authorities' relief efforts to reach the poor and the needy. The situation was complicated by the fact that the ministry had very little autonomy. So how can one criticize the ministry? But if one examines the wor k done ear lier by the Congress ministries in many of the provinces one finds that despite the constitu tional and political limitations they could undertake a large number of positive measures and progressive legislations. 99 And here the nature of resistance to the colonial interventions or the role that the ministries would like to play becomes crucial. The historical evaluation of the ministries in Bengal too has to be done in this context. The larger question of whether any solution to the social questions possible in the constitutional set-up granted by the colonial au thorities can therefore be answered not merely by any theoretical postulate but by an overall analysis of the programmes, work and relationship of the ministries with the colonial system. As regards the Muslim League ministry in Bengal during 194345, one finds that it had a very small degree of autonomy, and it is quite difficult to find instances of its struggling for it either. The For the work of the Congress ministry in the United Provinces, see Visalakshi Menon, From Movement to Government: The Congress in the United Provinces, 1937-42, New Delhi, 2003. For the Congress ministries as a whole, see Bipan Chandra et.aL, India's Struggle for Independence, New Delhi, 1989. 99

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officials were in charge of the overall policy matters and their implementation. The colonial state, it seems, was helped by the Muslim League ministry, which helped the former avoid taking a direct responsibility of the famine. Since there was a centrally regulated war economy already existing avoiding responsibility by making the plea of provincial autonomy does not sound convincing from any quarter. It is not easy for the colonial authorities to escape owning up the responsibility for the entire catastrophe. Lance Brennan, and others who tried to see the Revenue or other ministries as the guilty parties somehow overlooked the overall culpability of the colonial government.

Two

Politics Amidst Hunger The magnitude of the human tragedy during the famine and the forma tion of the Muslim League ministry, provided the other political parties the political space to articulate their positions and create an impression in popular imagination. In March 1943, all the political parties, with the exception of the Muslim League, were angered by the Governor's dismissal of the Progressive Coalition Party ministry led by Fazlul Huq. The Hindu Mahasabha took an active part in opposing this move. Shyama Prasad Mookerjee, who had emerged as a prominent voice of the Mahasabha in the province in the last couple of years, was a prominent speaker at the spate of meetings that were held in Calcutta organized to protest against the dismissal of the ministry.l The Bengal Provincial Congress Party (BPCP) was particularly known for the extreme political differences and internal bickering between its various factions. This had its origin especially in the Swadeshi movement, which had brought together groups with different political perceptions, under the broad rubric of the national movement.' Political development in the country as well as in the province during the next couple of decades witnessed not only accentuation of these differences but also the emergence of some new forces Leo Gandhi's influence and emergence of the radical groups and those influenced by the Russian revolution. All these gave the Congress in Bengal a character which was f

f

FR, April, first half, Home Political, File No. 18/4/43. For a detailed discussion on the different streams of thought and political articulations, see Sumit Sarkar, Swadeshi Movement in Bengal, 1903-8, New Delhi, 1973. 1

2

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unique in the country. This character of the Congress makes it a happy hunting ground for historians who take delight in valorizing factions and their mutual rivalry and its cardinal role in shaping the politics of a subject people. The colonized, it is thought, could not think in terms of over arching and cohesive ideas like nationalism or anti-colonialism or democracy. The existence of these factions and factional interests and squabbles were forwarded as evidence of this supposed inability. The period during and after the Non-Cooperation and Khilafat movements saw the emergence of not only a crop of new leaders i.e., J.M. Sengupta, B.N. Sasmal, Subhas Chandra Bose, Akram Khan, AsrafuddinAhmad Choudhury, H.S. Suhrawardy but also the coming into the anti-colonial struggle of some new forces, which would give the Congress as well as the national movement an entirely new face in the province. 3 While the leaders who were the products of the 1919-20 movements shaped the later character of the Congress, so did the revolutionaries from groups like the Jugantar and Anushilan Samities, and a large number of those who would return in the 1930s after long and torturous imprisonment, mostly from the dreaded Cellular Jail in the Andaman Islands 4 A number of these political prisoners were still in prison and their release remained a focal point of the Congress agitation in the province. This constituted a significant part of its civil libertarian demand as part of its nationalist agenda and it was under constant pressure to demand the release of political prisoners. The Congress insisted on this being the primary basis for any political understanding with the colonial authorities. It was this insistence that prevented the party from joining the ministry in 1937. However, people have seen personal or other trivial f

f

3 Rajat K. Ray, Urban Roots of Indian Nationalism: Pressure Groups and Conflict of Interests in Calcutta City Politics, 1875-1939, New Delhi, 1979; Chandiprasad SarkarI Politicisation of Bengali Muslims 1909-1928, Calcutta, 1991. 4 For the details of the jail life and the kind of psychological and physical torture that the security prisoners had to undergo, see, Trailokya Nath Chakraborty, Jele Tirish Bachar (Thirty Years in Jail), Calcutta, 1948; Barindra Kumar Ghosh, Dwipantarer Katha (The Tale of Exile), Calcutta, 1920; Kanak Bandopadhyay, Ruddha Karara Antarale (Inside the Dark Prison), Calcutta, 1948; and Satyendranath Majjumdar, Bandi Jiban (Imprisoned Life), Calcutta, 1944.

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matters, like Sarat Chandra Bose's refusal to meet Fazlul Huq at odd hours as the reason for the failure of the Congress to form the ministry with Fazlul Huq' Krishak Praja Party (KPP). It is argued that this incompatibility gradually pushed the KPP towards the Muslim League. The Congress, however, faced the most severe crisis in 1940 when Subhas Bose was expelled for anti-party activities. The Bengal Congress, which had witnessed intense internal ideological and factional differences since the ear ly part of the 20th century, was now split horizontally with Bose's expulsion in 1940. Large number of supporters remained with Bose leading to a crisis for the Congress organization in the province. In the organizational elections of 1940 that followed the split into the so-called official Congress supporters of Bose, the Provincial Congress Committee (PCC) could elect members for only 406 out of 548 seats; 142 seats remained vacant as the seven District Committees remained controlled by the followers of Sub has Bose. 5 The Quit India movement dealt a decisive blow to the already fissured Congress organization in the province. Most of the Gandhian leaders, known as the Khadi group, were in jail whereas a rump Congress with some leaders like Kiron Shankar Roy were active. However, this remained confined to the precincts of the Legislative Assembly. The ban on the Congress also prevented any serious political work which weakened the organization of the party even further. The Individual Satyagraha in 1940, and the Quit India movement witnessed most of the Congress workers, especially the Gandhian workers being incarcerated under the Defence of India Rules. This hampered organizational activity as well as relief work during the famine. For example, a correspondent touring the famine affected districts writes: Relief works in Commilla suffered considerably due to the absence from the scene of the members of the famous Abhay Ashram. For over fifteen years, the Ashram had been doing excellent constructive work. .. theywere gaoled in 1942 together with other good men. 6

See, Result of the Congress elections in 1940, Home Political, File No. 4/4/40, pp. 1-3. 6 LG. Narayan, Famine Over Bengal, Calcutta, 1944, p. 201. 5

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While the Congress was weakened due to these reasons, there were other processes taking shape during this period which would alter the course of events in the province quite significantly. In the absence of a well-organized Congress the famine presented an opportunity to other political formations to capture the imagination of the people and occupy political space. The Hindu Mahasabha lacked a mass base and its leadership was conscious of the fact that the Quit India movement had, in fact, enhanced the prestige as well as the appeal of the Congress leaders in popular imagination. Therefore, in a bid to adjust to the new situation the Mahasabha extended "moral support to the Congress Movement". At the same time however it reiterated its old demand that it should also be included in the government formation. The Mahasabha had always wanted to be part of the government, by virtue ofit being, as it claimed, the representative of the Hindu interests, and had argued that a government, in order to be nationat must have separate representation from the Hindu. The Mahasabha and the League were, thus, claiming similar representative characters. The stand of the Hindu Mahasabha on the na tional question and the solution it proposed had a strange combination of rhetoric and reality. While it supported the Congress movement, it claimed that emancipation would come only through the propaganda and demands formulated by itself. An official report put it very succinctly: f

f

The Sabha continued to extend its moral support to the Congress Movement demanding at the same time aN ational Government, and called upon all Mahasabha organisations and all sections of nationalists interested in the emancipation of India to mobilise public opinion on an extensive scale for carrying on a mass campaign in order to preach and propagate the demands formulated by the Hindu Mahasabha which, it claimed, could truly call upon the Hindu Sangathanists throughout India to keep themselves in readiness to respond to any call that might be given by the Hindu Mahasabha. 7 Butmore than issuing emancipatory and programmatic agenda, it wanted to force itself onto the government by issuing threats. Review of Revolutionary Matters (RRM), for the week ending 5 November 1942, Government of Bengal, Intelligence Branch, File No. SS-I, p. 117.

7

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105

It had indica ted its desire to share Ilministerial responsibilities in

coalitionministries".8 Sharpening its rhetoric it threatened direct action if the authorities did not install a national government. 9 The Mahasabha was, however, conscious of the fact that it could not endear itself to the people, experiencing massive repression unleashed by the colonial state, unless it sided with the popular opinion. Therefore, it simultaneously protested against the repressive measures employed by the colonial authorities to stamp out the Quit India movement. !O It was in this context that the famine provided the Hindu Mahasabha an opportunity to improve its mass base and gain popularity. The party considered the famine as man-made, which could have been avoided or controlled at an early stage by efficient administration l1 The Muslim League ministry, right from the beginning tried to put the blame for the worsening situation on the previous ministry1 2 Here the Mahasabha had to defend itself, as it was part of the earlier ministry. It argued that the earlier ministry had already declared its absolute lack of control over matters of distribution of food. At the same time since itwas the Governor and his permanent bureaucracy which was responsible for the distribution, they were the real culprits.!3 This was f

f

f

8 ":MY Savarkar's instructions to the Hindu Mahasabha to take the lead in forming coalition ministries evoked derisive comments in the nationalist press." FR, August, first half, Home Political, File No. 18/8/43. 9 Ibid. 10 In their resolution of 5 October, the Working Committee of the Mahasabha condemned the policy and manner of imposing collective fines, and set up its own Committee of Inquiry to enquire into allegations of police and military excesses. Ibid. 11 Annual Report of the Bengal Provincial Hindu Mahasabha (BPHM) for the year 1943-44 (hereafter, BPHM Annual Report), All India Hindu Mahasabha Papers, NMML, F. C-59, p. 142. See also, the "Memorandum submitted to the Famine Inquiry Commission, 1943", Ashutosh Lahiry Papers, N:MML; "Dr S.P. Mookerjee's speech during the debate on the food situation in Bengal at the Bengal Legislative Assembly on 14 July", published by Prof. Hari Charan Ghosh, Pamphlet No. 19, ibid. 12 See, Statement of the Minister of Civil Supplies on the food situation, 8 July 1943, Proceedings of the Bengal Legislative Assembly (PBLA), VoL LXV, pp. 81-86, where he says that the earlier minister exhausted whatever reserve the government had maintained. 13 Ibid. See also, BPHM Annual Report, p. 142.

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S.P. Mookerjee's contention. The Hindu Mahasabha defended his position: Although the Fazlul Huq Ministry was in office in Bengal in March-April 1942, when Burma fell and the sources of supply to meet the deficit of rice in Bengal were cut-off, they had practically no voice in the formulation of the food policy of the province and its administration. This was taken up almost entirely by the Governor himself in consultation with some of the permanent officials .... The past ministry did attempt to solve the food situation14 Shyama Prasad Mookerjee attacked the Muslim League ministry for its role in worsening the famine situation. IS But then how could he criticize the League for the same mistakes of which he was trying to absolve the earlier ministry? !tis here for the first time that the Mahasabha had the opportunity to criticize the Muslim League on grounds that were entirely new for the party. !t attacked the ministry and the Muslim League not for their being anti-Hindu but rather their being subservient to the British authorities. Thus, it was in a position to develop a critique of the colonial policies. Speaking at the Hindu Conference at Naihati in November, N.C. Chatterjee, the president of the Bengal Provincial Hindu Mahasabha (BPHM), blamed the League for its subservience to the colonial authorities, which had resulted in the famine condition. He said: Neither the Denial Policy nor the Unplanned Purchasing Scheme were initiated by the Ministry then in office. The Imperialists manouvred to get rid of Ministers who dared to protest, and were anxious to get in the League Ministry who were expected to be more subservient to their behest. 16 In the Assembly debate, S.P. Mookerjee criticized Suhrawardy's statement that there was no shortage of foodgrain in Bengal and 14 "Memorandum for the Food Shortage Commission", S.P. Mookerjee Papers, Instalment II-IV, Subject File No. 110, p. 80. 15 Shyama Prasad Mookerjee, 14 July 1943, PBLA, Vol. LXv;. pp.435-41. 16 N.C. Chatterjee, Presidential address at the Hindu Conference in Naihati, 21 November 1943, N.C. Chatterjee, Hindu Politics: The Message of the Mahasabha, Calcutta, 1944, p. 46.

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that hoarding was primarily responsible for the famine 1 7 The latter claimed that the Department of Civil Supplies had stated that there was no shortage of rice in the province, and hence, the resultant panic was wrong. IS Suhrawardy had earlier claimed that it was the news of shortage which was creating the panic and a situation for Ilhoarding and black marketing". Mookerjee vehemently attacked this position on 14 July on the floor of the Assembly. He said: God knows why this attempt was made by him to the unfortunate people of Bengal, namely to declare that there was really no shortage of foodstuffs, no shortage of rice in Bengal and all that had happened was that there was maldistribution and small hoarders private consumers and agriculturists were mainly responsible for the present deplorable state of affairs 1 9 f

He, along with other opposition parties, also took the Ministry for Civil Supplies to task for suggesting that the crisis was a result of the psychology of panic which, he argued, "minimised the gravity of the situation" .20 This also made it appear that Iithings were really not so bad as represented by the Nationalist Press and to lay the blame at the door of their predecessor-in office and also of the agriculturists and merchants who were accused of hoarding and of holding their stocks from the markets".2! By attacking the theory of "shortage of supply due to hoarding", etc., the Mahasabha could, in fact, point out the ministry's acceptance, and toeing of the arguments forwarded by the bureaucracy. He, in his statement on the food crisis said: f

One thing stands out prominently before our eyes; the past Ministry did attempt to solve the food situation but where it

17 Shy am a Prasad Mookerjee, Rashtrasangram 0 Pan chaser Mannantar, Calcutta, 1405 (Bengali Calander), 1999. 18 H.S. Suhrawardy, 8 July 1943, PBLA, VoL LXV, pp. 83-90. 19 Shyama Prasad Mookerjee, 14 July 1943, ibid., VoL LXV, p.435. 20 BPHM Annual Report, p. 142. 2 1 Ibid. Interestingly the most powerful campaign on the calamity was carried out by The Statesman, a not so friendly newspaper so far as the Indians were concerned. See, Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famines, Delhi, 1982 (first published 1981), p. 80, fri. 35.

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did not succeed, it did not keep the reasons back from the legislature or the Public of BengaL" At the same time he atttacked Suhrawardy for hiding the real reasons for the famine by attributing it to the so-called abnormal psychology. He said: I do not know when Mr Suhrawardy had become a student of abnormal psychology. His place then would then be Ranchi and not Calcutta because that was where persons suffering under delusion and anxious to study abnormal psychology were properly dealt with. He says that problem is psychological. And how is that to be tackled? People are merely to be told, 'Don't get panicky. I am sitting here as the civil supplies minister and telling you there is plenty of foodstuff. We have statistics which we do not intend to publish. Everything will be all right. Do not get panicky'.23 Later on, the Mahasabha presidentN.C. Chatterjee articulated this in his presidential address at Nadia on 21 November 1943. He said: On their assumption of office the League Ministry unfortunately started the propaganda that there was no shortage of food in Bengal. They danced to their master's tune and tried to implementMr Amery's thesis of hoarding and overeating by the people of Bengal as being responsible for the failure .... To substantiate the so-called hoarding theory, they resorted to food drive, excluding Calcutta and the stockists' centres and aided the hoarders to rehabilitate themselves.24 But even the authorities were realizing that the food drive was not going to solve the problem: We are organising anti-hoarding drives and our efforts have so far had some success. But that does not touch the root of the problem. We are clear after an exhaustive review of the whole position that only answer is substantial import of food grains 22 23 24

Shyama Prasad Mookerjee, 14 July 1943, PBLA, Vol. LXV, p. 436. Ibid. N.C. Chatterjee, Hindu Politics, p.46.

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from outside with the help of H.M.G. to start not later than September. 25 The attack by the Hindu Mahasabha was, therefore, also an attack on the official position of repeatedly emphasizing hoarding by the people as the chief reason for the crisis. It was also for this reason that it was very critical of the food drive initiated by the ministry. The Mahasabha, it seems, for the first time was gradually being able to develop a political critique which did not emerge out of its Hindu Sangathanist position, which was the basis of its origin in the 1920s. 26 The question before it was whether this stand had any inherent dynamic to prepare the Mahasabha to develop any political programme or agenda for mobilization or political action. An opportunity to develop such a programme appeared soon in the form of the food drive announced by the government. Even before the drive had begun, Manindra Nath Mitra, the general secretary of BPHM, issued a statement on 4 June criticizing it. He said that the entire process was based on an erroneous understanding that Bengal had food reserves. He also alleged that the news of the drive had created a sense of panic among the population, especially in the rural areas. He declared: It must be said thatthe Mahasabha has no objection in collect-

ing correct information of the existing supply of rice and paddy in the province. Actually Hindu Mahasabha wants this only. Hindu Mahasabha wants that illegally hoarded rice should be acquired and brought to the market. But Hindu Mahasabha will not tolerate any partiality. If there is a house to house search, the large godowns of the white men and the halfIndian Mahajans, friendly to the Ministry, should not be left out. Otherwise the nation will not forgive the efforts of the Ministry to retain its power and hide its inefficiency by

Ibid. For a discussion of its origin, see Papia Chakravarty, Hindu Response to Nationalist Ferment: BengaC 1909-1935, Calcutta, 1992. Another work which also deals with the origin of the Hindu Mahasabha is Joya Chatterjee, Bengal Divided. However, her contention that the sangathan and shuddhi arguments and mobilisation drive had a support of a substantial section of the Hindu Bhadralok population needs further scrutiny.

25

26

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Communalism in Bengal

disturbing the middle class and the peasants and creating conditions of panic and creating class war in every village and every locality." (Translation mine) The general secretarYf in the same communiqu€f listed a number of activities for the Mahasabha to perform in these circumstances. This was to suggest that the members be more involved in administrative and political processes. In the subsequent statement issued on 12 June, the populace was reminded of the food drive and asked to be vigilant. At the same time, it appealed to the party members for active participation. 28 The emphasis was on the active involvement of the Mahasabha members so as to not hamper the Squad Master and his group in obtaining a correct food census. 29 Thus, there still no idea of a political action developing. The Mahasabha was not opposed to the food drive as such, but what it apprehended was its use for ulterior purposes. " ... the Hindu Mahasabha has issued instructions emphasising the

v Manindra Nath Mitra, Aboidha Khadya Sanchoy Bandha Koribar Jonno Mantrigana Katrik Bari Khanatollasi Sombondhe Hindu Mahasabhar Bijnonpti (Hindu Mahasabha Communique regarding the house search by the ministry to stop unlawful hoarding of foodgrain), 4 June 1943, S.P. Mookerjee Papers, Instalment II-IV, Subject File No. Ill, p. 63. In carrying out the drive, the entire province, with the exception of Calcutta and the municipalities of Howrah and Bally, was divided into units consisting of two unions in the case of rural areas and a municipal ward or block comprising 3,500 or 4,000 houses in the case of urban areas .... Each unit was put in charge of a squad consisting of one officer, 4 official subordinates and 4 non-officials. They were given instructions to organise sub-unit committees.. consisting of 12 members who were elected, as far as possible by the residents in the sub-unit concerned. Under the supervision of the squad incharge, the committee of each subunit was made responsible for undertaking a systematic house to house inquiry to discover the quantities of rice, paddy and other foodgrains held by each family, as well as the requirements of that family.... (Famine Inquiry Report on Bengal, Alipore, 1945, p.56.) Manindra Nath Mitra, Bangla Government Kotrik Khadyo Sosyo Abhiyan Sombondh e Hindu Mahasabhar Bijnonpti: Sonkha 2 (Hindu Mahasabha Communique regarding the food campaign of the Bengal government, No. 2), S.P. Mookerjee Papers, Instalment II-IV, Subject File No. Ill, pp. 58-60. 29 Manindra Nath :Mitra, Aboidha Khadya Sanchoy, p. 63. 28

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necessity of caution to ensure that the Muslim League does not use its political influence in a manner prejudicial to the interest of the people."30 It further suggested: The Mahasabha's policy is apparently that there is no objection to co-operation with Government in the equitable distribution of foodgrain and no objection to the seizure of hoards but in the absence of a definition of Iisurplus" apprehension is expressed lest action taken should display partiality on conununal or party line ... there can be no co-operation where there is a possibility of a clash between classes of the population, when it must be made clear that the object of the drive is to harass the middle classes and emphasis is laid upon organising to use all constitutional means to protect legitimate interests. 31 So far as the class bias was concerned, it is quite apparent that the Mahasabha was also concerned about the class which felt most threatened by the food drive, i.e., the traders and sections which had stocks. However, as a corollary to the attack on the "hoarding theory", the party could bring to the fore the woes of those peasants "who had some stocks and felt threatened by the food drive of the ministry". The threat felt by this section of being deprived of their stocks appeared real and Mahasabha began reflecting this fear. Bengal, especially the eastern areas, had already experienced the hardships imposed by war. The food drive, which began on 6 June 1943, was, therefore, attacked by the Mahasabha for aggravating the situation. N.C. Chatterjee commented: Backed by all resources of the state, exercised on a terror stricken helpless people who could make no distinction between the agent and the principal, large scale purchases made in diverse districts [sic]. The covert threat of Defence of India Act, the willing co-operation of the Police and the Magistracy and the limitless resources placed at the disposal of the agents led to their successful operation in the rural areas. Rural economy of the countryside was thoroughly upset.32

30 31 32

Ibid. Ibid. N.C. Chatterjee, Hindu Politics, p.47.

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Thus, the Mahasabha began criticizing the ministry for helping the state be more tyrannical, in a situation where the suppression of the Congress and a large section of political workers had deprived the province of any vocal political opposition." Very soon however the partisan spirit took over and the ire was directed to its direct and visible enemy, i.e., the Muslim League. It accused the ministry of corruption, and of favouring the Muslim League supporters in various ways to the detriment of public interest. 34 The party tried to organize agitations against it. 35 This became clear when the party voiced its opposition to the procurement of the aman crop during the winter of 1943-44. "Bengal," it claimed, "could not afford to allow the state agents or profiteers to have another run with this crop and thrive on the starvation of the people."36 The Mahasabha showed its determination to agitate against the possible procurement of the aman crop as early as October 1943. The government and industry were asked to release huge stocks which "they are represented to be holding Up."37 It asked the government not to purchase directly butto leave" distribution of the crop to the ordinary trade channels".38 By February 1944, it intensified its agitation and in Nadia it issued Ilpropaganda leaflets opposing sale"39 while at meeting in Bakerganj towards the end of January the audience were urged to hoard foodgrains for one year" .40 f

f

Iia

For details of the suppression of the Quit India movement in Bengal see, RRM, File No. SS-I. 34 N.C. Chatterjee says: 33

In order to sub serve their object of establishing party hegemony in the interest of an exploiting group they had jeopardised the lives of thousands of Hindus and Muslims. The bulk of the Food of the Province was sucked in and handed over to the agents over whom neither the children of the soil nor the conscience of the Nation had any controL The agents were the illlfettered exploiters of the situation. The Famine-made prosperity helped the economic propping up of the party caucus which but for this timely succour would have been overthrown by their exploited victims. (Hindu Politics, pp. 45-46.) 35

36 37 38 39 40

FR, June, first half, 1943, Home Political, File No. 18/6/43. N.C. Chatterjee, Hindu Politics, p.47. FR, October, second half, 1943, Home Political, File No. 18/10/43. FR, December, first half, 1943, Home Political, File No. 18/12/43. Ibid. Ibid.

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Notwithstanding these protestations and resolve to agitate, the Mahasabha was not able to evolve any political programme on which it could mobilize a large number of people. Even the anti-aman procurement drive was not very successful. And very soon it was apparent that the Mahasabha, including its leader Shyama Prasad Mookerjee, went back to the Sangathanist argument for mobilization purposes. Writing on 20 July in the Mahasabha organ Hindustan, Shyama Prasad Mookerjee was writing the same stuff that the Hindu Mahasabha was saying for all these years, i.e., uniting all the Hindus by dissolving the caste restrictions and by making the Hindu powerful. The potential of evolving a critique of the colonial state had evaporated. And this did not go unnoticed by the secretary of the Hindu Mahasabha, Manoranjan Choudhury. He wrote to the central leadership: [have carefully gone through the pamphlet on 'Hindu Sangathan which is being distributed over the name of Dr Shyama Prasad Mookerjee, President, Bengal Provincial Hindu Mahasabha. [ have also gone through an appeal over the name of Asuthosh Lahiri, Vice President-in-Charge of Organisation in the Province calling upon Hindudom to enrol at least 4 lakh Hindu Mahasabha members by 30 November 1944. [ find that, in none of the schemes, there is any economic planning to be placed before Hindu masses, without which no mass enrolment is possible. 41 Two things became very clear from this observation of a careful Mahasabhite. First, the Mahasabha was keen on increasing its mass base but there was no economic programme to go about it. Second, even when the programme was sought, it was sought for the Hindus and therefore remained parochial and narrowly confined in its scope. This became clearer when in the matter of relief, the narrow definition of community became a factor even in its voluntary work. !twas around the last quarter of1943 thatShyama Prasad Mookerjee took the initiative to form two relief committees, viz., the Bengal Relief Committee (BRC) and the Bengal Provincial Mahasabha Relief Committee (BPMRC)42 The BRC began its

Manoranjan Choudhury, Secretary, Bengal Provincial Hindu Mahasabha, 18 August 1944, S.P. Mookerjee Papers, File No. 120, p. 1. 42 P. Greenough, Prosperity and Misery, p. 135. 41

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operations in September 1943 but soon the Hindu Mahasabha section prevailed upon Mookerjee to expend relief exclusively through the party platform. Thus, the BPMRC was formed." The enormity of the crisis meant that any individual or group action was insufficient, and state support was absolutely essential in this situation. The Mahasabha received assistance from the government to carry out relief works. By February 1944, Shyama Prasad Mookerjee received a sum of about Rs 0.7 million and 35,676 maunds of foodgrains,44 which, given the vastness of the calamity, was utterly inadequate. The authorities, however, never failed to notice that it was generating publicity for itself too. 45 The Mahasabha intended to extend its relief works to almost all the affected districts of the province but the enormity of the crisis and the paucity of resources made the scope and the area of action limited. Shyama Prasad Mookerjee remained the central figure in the entire operation. He received letters requesting relief from different parts of the province. These limitations probably resulted in the Mahasabha's relief organization being concentrated in Calcutta and a sort of voluntarism being practised in other parts. A large part of the famine was also Ilinflationary" -the prices of foodgrains rose consistently in this period.46 The lower 43

BPHM Annual Report, p. 143. The report further said: ... our President Dr Shyama Prasad Mookherjee [sic] took the initiative of inviting leading people and representatives of different organisations to a conference to devise ways and means for organising relief on a sound basis. Thus came into existence the "Bengal Relief Committee" which began relief operations in September 1943. But among the donors a considerable section wanted that their monies should be spent by and through Hindu Mahasabha and many persons began to send money to be spent at Dr Mookherjee's [sic] discretion. These donations constituted the Hindu Mahasabha Relief Fund to which the Hindu Mahasabha Relief Committee owed its genesis. (Ibid.)

BPHM Annual Report, p. 45. the Hindu Mahasabha and Shyama Prasad Mookerjee.. accepted government's assistance and procured the maximum publicity for such relief as they are doing with these and other resources". (FR, October, first half, 1943, Home Political, File No. 18/10/43.) 46 Amartya Sen, Poverty and Famines, p. 54. Also, see FIe Report, Alipore, 1944, p. 40; Mohiuddin Alamgir, Famine in South Asia, p. 84.

44

45"

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middle-class, especially in the small towns and villages of Faridpur,47 N oakhali,48 Bakerganj, Midnapore, etc., were badly hit as they exhausted their resources very early during the crisis. The Hindu Mahasabha tried to provide some relief to this section. Herein lies the significance of the Mahasabha's emphasis on the fact that it spent Rs 6,000 for relief of the Pandits of the lois, Rs 7,650 as cash relief in different districts of Bengal. 49 This too did not go unnoticed by the colonial authorities. A report said: "The Hindu Mahasabha has been prominent in announcing schemes for the relief of middle classes and has set aside considerable sums for relief to families of security prisoners".50 (Italics mine) Special relief was given to "Teachers of 35 Schools in Munshiganj sub-division, Dacca, teachers of the high schools in Noakhali District ... teachers of all high schools in the district of Pabna, 200 teachers of all high schools of the Chandpur sub-division in the district of Tippera. Special relief was also given to 100 families of lawyers (pleaders and muklears) of the Faridpur District through the district Hindu Mahasabha".51 The relief wor k for this section of the popula tion began in September. These activities were supplemented by its agitation against the procurement by the government of the aman crop in October." Though the Mahasabha leaders refuted the "insidious propaganda that Bengalleaders wanted to utilise the food crisis of [sic] their political purposes"f53 it was apparent that the famine as well as the relief work and agitation against government policies provided it with space to influence sections of the population. The party itself emphasized the correlation between relief works and its increased membership. It announced that Ilin spite of famine and pestilence", the number of branch Sabhas had increased from 1,004 to 1,217, and the membership figure to 40,887 from a mere 15,474 in 1942. 54

See, K Mukherjee, Agriculture, Famine and Rehabilitation in South Asia, Shantiniketan, Visva Bharati, 1965. 48 Ram Krishna Mukherjee, "Food Crisis of 1943", pp. 185-90. 49 BPHM Annual Report, p. 146. 5() FR, September, second half, 1943, Home Political, File No. 18/9/43. 51 BPHM Annual Report, p. 147. 52 FR, October, first half, 1943, Home Political, File No. 18/10/43. 53 BPHM Annual Report, p. 137. 54 Ibid. 47

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Barisal, traditionally a surplus district, was hit by the governmentpolicies which rendered it a deficit area. The food drive, and the subsequent procurement drive affected the area and a substantial part of the middle-classes badly. Some of the contemporary writings express the woes of the middle-classes: The middle class also suffered because no organised government relief touched it. Free kitchens, homes for destitutes and emergency relief hospitals were meant for the working classes. Middle class people were free to go to them. But they would not and could not because their notion of respectability stood in their way and it was also difficult to jostle with hundreds of unwashed men, women, and children for a meal of gruel. They would prefer to get dry grain doles .... Many district Magistrates when approached for help were reported to have disowned responsibility for aiding the middle class and said that if they could not go to the free kitchens they should fend for themselves. 55 Notwithstanding its woes in the face of the severity of the famine, the middle-class also came in for official scorn which was apparent to outsiders. For example: Every official whom we met asked with a slight suggestion of disdain whether we had come to help the Bhadralok. From the days of Macaulay the middle classes of Bengal have been an object of disdain to the rulers and when later these classes showed that even the worm could turn, they became an object of distrust. The distress of those who are getting 30 or 40 a month is no less than those of others attending the gruel kitchen. 56 Barisal District along with the Bhola sub-division recorded the highest membership figures for the Mahasabha in 1944 and 1945.57 This gives some credence to the party's suggested correlation.

55 56

See, LG. Narayan, Famine Over Bengal, p. 216. K. Santhanam, The Cry of Distress, The First Hand Description and an

Objective Study of the Indian Famine of 1943, Delhi, December, 1943, p.42. Amrit Bazar Patrika, Calcutta, 28 February 1945, p. 1.

57

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117

From the early 1920s, when the Mahasabha was formed in the province, itwas faced with the dilemma of reconciling the political aims and the cultural ideals and symbols around which it mobilized people for those political goals. 58 Thus, though its slogan of Sang at han of the Hindus was predominantly an evocation to rally around a cultural unit, i.e., the Hindus, it aimed at organizing Hindus to counter and wean people away from the Congress. In Bengal, this also meant a move to mobilize the depressed classes, particularly the Scheduled Castes who constituted a substantial population of the province. The party, since the early days of its formation, tried to include the removal of caste disabilities in the province in its agenda. Speakers at the Annual Conferences of the Mahasabha repeatedly stressed the importance of the removal of untouchability and other discriminations based on the caste system. 59 It was at this time that the Bengal Pact, 1925 and subsequently the Poona Pact, 1932 were signed which significantly changed the course of provincial politics. Acceptance of the Communal Award generated a lot of heat in Bengal and there were protests from Hindu Mahasabha and other sections of the Hindu population. It gave the Muslims 119 seats of the total 250 seats in the Provincial Legislature while giving 78 to the Hindus which was further fragmented later by giving 30 seats to the Scheduled Castes in accordance with the Poona Pact of 1932.60

For the history of the Mahasabha's inception and continued attempt to entrench itself in the Bengal politics, see, Papia Chakravarty, Hindu Response to Nationalist Ferment, pp. 179-90. 59 See, Presidential Address of Promath Nath Tarkabhusahan, Provincial Hindu Conference, 4th Session, 28 April 1928, Ashutosh Lahiry Papers, Pamphlet No. 62, pp. 9-22. 6() Telegram, 6 September 1934; Pabna Congress Committee [Jessore], 12 August 1934, addressed to All India Congress President, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, Alee Papers, File No. G-24 of 1934-36, cited in John Gallagher, 58

Decline, Revival and Fall of the British Empire: the Ford Lectures and Other Essays, edited by Anil Seal, London, 1982, p. 190. See for detailed discussion, Alee Papers, File No. G-24 (I), 1936; Communal Award: General Correspondence by Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru; Bengal Anti-Communal Award Movement: A Report, Calcutta, 1939; B.N. Dutta Roy ed., Sir N.N. Sirkar's Speeches and Pamphlets, Calcutta, 1934.

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The elections of 1937 and the post-election political developments demonstrated the importance of the Scheduled Caste leadership for any power alliance.'! It gradually became apparent that the colonial policy found a new instrument in the shape of the Scheduled Caste to deal with the Congress and other nationalist forces. The Mahasabha, which was trying to bring this section into its fold through its evocation of the unity of the Hindu community, now had to contest not only the Congress but also the Muslim League which found the new Scheduled Caste leadership a possible political ally. To add to the fray, the colonial au thorities were also trying to define the Scheduled Caste, differently from the manner in which the Hindu Mahasabha defined them. The census was a prominent site of contestation, and the Mahasabha campaigned vociferously against the attempts of the census authorities to categorize the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes as different from Hindus. The Mahasabha fought very strongly against the census operations of 1941 in which, apart from other things, the method of classification under the category of Ilcommunities" rather than "religion" had been adopted. The Hindu Mahasabha conceived this as a threat to the numerical strength of the Hindus. This, in its view, helped to increase the communal ratio of the Muslims in all provinces, most notably in Bengal." However, in Bengal, the problem had another dimension. The Scheduled Caste leadership in the province was powerfully entrenched by the 1940s, and hence, the Mahasabha found it difficult to penetrate. However, during the census operations of 1941 the Mahasabha sought to attack the colonial idea of categorizing the tribals as different from the Hindu community and spearheaded a movement for wha t it called correct enumera tion". They demanded tha t there be a correct enumeration of the Hindus so as to not give a clear and consolidated demographic majority to the Muslims." By this II

See, Sekhar Bandopadhyay, "From Alienation to Integration: Changes in the Politics of Caste in Bengal, 1937--47", IESHR, VoL 31, No.3, 1994, pp. 349-91, for a detailed discussion on the politics of castes, especially that of the SC in the last decade of colonial rule. 62 Census of India, 1941, All India Hindu Mahasabha Papers, File No. C-31, p. 2. 63 See, Amrit Bazar Patrika, Calcutta, 18 January, p. 9; 21 January 1944, p. 5; 3 February, p. 6; 4 February, p. 5; 5 February, p.5; 6 February, p.5; 7 February, p. 5; 8 February 1944, p.5. 61

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time the province already had a widespread public consciousness about the demographic nature of the two monolithic communities, i.e., the Hindus and the Muslims. And this correct enumeration move of the Sabha in which even several of Congress leaders joined, saw a deep resentment among the Muslim League workers and even among the leaders like Fazlul Huq who even gave a statement attacking any such move. All of these created deep communal antagonism in the province. Therefore in Bengat the party actually tried to widen its ambit by bringing the SC into its fold. Earlier, its primarily middle-class and upper-caste Hindu social base had precluded such overtures. The famine opened the possibilities of going beyond that limited social base, while conversely itwas this very social base that became a stumbling block in the venture, as it prevented the Mahasabha from transcending its limitations. The Mahasabha, as we have seen earlier, found itself in a tight spot regarding the Quit India movement launched by the Congress, as well as the popular appeal of the Congress leaders. 64 This was true even in the case of sections of the SC popula tion who, despite the condemnation of the Quit India movement by some of its leaders, had shown sympathy for the movement and had, in fact, participated in it. A report about the Scheduled Castes' Conference that took place in Calcutta on 25th October says: f

This conference which was sponsored by the Hon'ble UN. Burman, Birat Chandra Mondal, passed a resolution ... emphatically condemning the destructive movement started in the name of Indian National Congress which was creating anarchy and chaos in the country and was responsible for so many hardships in so many families .... Some Namasudras arrested in Barisal admitted having promised help in carrying out a raid that was proposed on Gournadi Police Station in that district, and one of them, a cultivator, said in the course of his statement to the police "we agreed to help the Congressmen as we were promised good services high education exemption from taxes, etc., by the Congress government-things we are not getting from the British government". 65 (Italics mine) f

f

Among the students and youth, Congress was more popular than either the Mahasabha or the Communist Party of India. See RRM, 1942 and 1943. 65 See, RRM, 5 November 1942, File No. SS-I, p. 119. 54

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Therefore, while the class base of the Hindu Mahasabha prevented it from penetrating deeper among the masses, the Quit India movement proved that it had to discredit the Congress before it could gain entrance into the popular psyche, even among the Scheduled Castes. The relief wor k done during this period, however, provided the Mahasabha an opportunity to enlarge its political space. In fact, it did to an extent, when it posed a threatto political groups like the Forward Bloc, some of whose members had joined the ministry. They were concerned by the former's growing influence. An Intelligence report says: ... two Forward Bloc Ministers and their Parliamentary Secretaries have watched with grave concern the growing popularity of Syama Prasad Mukherjee and the Hindu Mahasabha and the consequent eclipse of the Forward Bloc. In an attempt to regain the prestige a committee to be knovvn as IINational Relief Committee", which was to include all parties except the Hindu Mahasabha ... was formed on the 17 September with a framework of Forward Bloc leaders. The ostensible purpose of this committee is purely philanthropic, but the real motive behind it is the employment of ex-political prisoners on relief work in the hope of gaining the sympathy of the public and retaining its interest in the Congress. 66 Since the League ministry was cushioning the colonial authorities, it was also contextually correct to attack the former, as a corollary to the Sabha's criticism of the latter's policies. This it tried to achieve by levelling charges of corruption, nepotism and communal demand for Pakistan against the ministry. 67 In the absence of the Congress and other nationalist groups, the Mahasabha could therefore direct the political agenda in the province. The introduction of the Secondary Education Bill by the Muslim League ministry in April 1944, added thrust to the Hindu Mahasabha's contention that the Muslim League was communalizing the entire province. According to the Mahasabha, the Muslim League ministry's attempt was RRM, September 1943, File No. SS-II, p. 76. Even the colonial authorities accepted the fact that there was widespread corruption in the ministry. See, Penderel Moon, Wavell, p. 46.

66

67

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a calculated measure designed to cripple the Hindus politically and culturally and also to perpetuate the tension of feeling that is prevailing amongst communities just to serve the purposes of the rank communalists. By the introduction of the nefarious system of separate electorate it soughtto keep out of picture those Moslems [sic] who enjoy the confidence of the Hindus and other communities. 68

III On the eve of the Second World War, the Communist party was following what is generally referred to as the Congress-Left unity line.'9 This involved uniting all forces within the Congress and making a revolutionary situation possible. This was the time when the Congress and particularly its keen reader of international affairs, Nehru was warning about the impending war and its future stand on the eventuality. While campaigning for support for the anti-Franco forces fighting their battle for freedom and democracy, Nehru was categorical that in case the war began, India cannot be dragged into it without the consent of its own people. Writing to Kripalani from Budapest on 30 August 1938, he expressed himself very clearly. He said, "But the main thing is to state emphatically that in the event of War, India will not be at war with any country except by an express decision of the people of India."70 For the Communist Party of India (CPI), the war presented itself as one of the most opportune moments in showing the truth of the apparent contradictions within the imperialist world order. It soon announced its policy towards the war and declared that it was in fact a war among the imperialist forces. The only way Shyama Prasad Mookerjee to Rai Bahadur Harish Chandra, 29 June 1944, S.P. Mookerje e Papers, Instalment II-IV, Subject File No. 62, p. 41. 69 S.S. Jaheer, Dinkar Mehta and S.S. Batliwala, "Communist Thesis on Congress and the United Left", 31 January 1938, CPI Papers bundle on AICSP, Ajoy Bhawan Library, New Delhi, as cited in Basudev Chatterjee, Towards Freedom (TF): Documents on the Movement for Independence in India 1938, 1999, Vol. 1, p. 140. 70 Nehru to J.B. Kripalani, 30 August 1938, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Vol. 9, p. 117. 68

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that India could have been affected was to try and make the imperialist war situation a revolutionary situation. The Congress was against the British act of dragging India into the war without even consulting the Indian opinion, but it did not want to do anything tha t would help the fascist axis powers. Indian leaders, particularly Nehru, had shown considerable moral support to the forces fighting the fascists. 7! Supporting the Congress stand, and in order to turn the situation ripe for revolution, the CPI had adopted what it labelled as the line for national unity. On the programmatic level this meant making efforts to bring unity among all the groups within the Congress in their struggle against the British. It was while following this line of action that the party tried to capture the other factions in the Congress in a very strident way. It captured, except some individual leaders, the Congress Socialist Party (CSP); it also entered the Forward Bloc to capture it, and began to attack the Congress leadership. However, the CPI faced a tremendous crisis when the Germans attacked the Soviet Union in 1941. 72 What was earlier called the imperialist war has now turned into, what the Comintern argued, a people's war and the Soviet Union became the symbol of the "people". Defence of the Soviet Union became the motto of the policy of the Communist parties all over the world. It created a complex situation in India as ithad developed elsewhere too. The aggressive stance that the party had taken during the last couple of years had given a very radical anti-imperial tone and tenor to its cadre in the field. Any move to support the government would have taken away this radical sheen off their politics. The senior leaders of the party, under detention in Deoli, had come to an understanding that given the ground situation, the people's war line was the right way to follow. It was, however, difficult for the party members, out of prison or underground, who had problems in accepting this standpoint so easily. Thus, long after the line of action was forwarded by the Comintern, it was only in February 1942 that the people's war line was officially accepted by those running the party. P.c. Joshi now had his hands full. The party Basudev Chatterjee, TF. Gene D. Overstreet, and Marshall Windmiller, Communism in India, Bombay, 1960, p. 191.

71 72

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effected a policy change by the end of 1941 and declared the war as a people's war.73 An official reading of the change in the party line was presented by an intelligence officer in these words: The most important matter to consider in relation to the CPI is its change of policy towards the War. Before Russia was invaded, and when Russia was looked down upon as an ally of Germany, the war was held to be an imperialist war the prosecution of which had to be impeded. After Russia was invaded by Germany and became an ally of Great Britain, the party persuaded itself that it could and should support Russia's war effort without supporting Britain. In December before Japan's entry into the war, a change of policy was decided upon, although not announced .... The new policy is described in the Party Letter No. 54 dated 1 December from the Central Committee .... The letter says "We went wrong because our blind bougeoise nationalist hatred of British imperialist government prevented us from grasping the simple fact that that government was now in the same progressive camp with the Soviet Union and ranged against Hitler's fascism."74 To implement the people's war line, it had to call for national unity for national defence and national government Ilits tactical implementation" pushed the party to call for the Congress-League unity, i.e., embodying what the party called national unity. 75 This standpoint required the party to define the League afresh, which it did by calling it "the premier political organisation of the second largest community of our country".?6 This line, quite significantly, came from the students wing and was accepted by the central leadership.77 Without any analysis of the policy, programme or even the class composition of the leadership and masses, the Communist party accepted the Muslim League as the See, ibid., pp. 171-221 for a detailed discussion on the imperialist war line as well as people's war line of the CPI. 74 RRM, 29 January 1942, File No. SS-I, p. 7. 75 See S.S. Zaheer, "Letter to a Muslim Leaguer", People's War, Bombay, 20 September 1942, p. 1; B.T. Ranadive, "National Unity and the League", ibid., p. 2. 76 P.e. Joshi, "The Indian Communist Party", as cited in Gene Overstreet, and Windmiller, Communism, p. 201. 77 N.N. Mitra (ed.), Indian Annual Register (hereafter Annual Register), 1940, Vol. II, p. 415. 73

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organization of the progressive urge of the Muslim masses. This new definition demoted the Congress to a position almost at par with the League, and it was demanded that there should be cooperation between these tvvo parties. The party, therefore, conceded the communal basis of Indian politics by demoting Congress to a position of parity with the League. Joshi constantly reminded the Congress that the latter had some responsibility towards the League and the former cannot simply shrug off the League as just a reactionary party. It was, according to him, this attitude of the Congress which made for the communal disunity in the country. The Congress must, therefore, as the logic followed, boldly concede the sectional demands of the Muslim League. Joshi declared that the Congress must accept the League's demands based on the Lahore resolution of 1940. In the event of people's war, the imperative for unity increased because it would not only solve the Indian problem but also would not impede or hamper the war efforts. Thus, one of the first steps towards this unity was that the Congress should form joint ministries with the League in various provinces. It was precisely at this juncture that the Bengal situation, and the Communist activities there became quite significant. Bengal was closer to the war zone, and the so-called war efforts, as well as the Communist presence were more significant here compared to other provinces. The CPI had been passing through a very critical phase in the province. It had alienated almost all political forces, except to some extent the Muslim League. However the Communists were anathema to the League leadership. The Communist attacks on Subhash Chandra Bose and the politics of the Forward Bloc since the days of the Ramgarh session of the Congress constituted a prominent feature of the political landscape of the province. 7S The Congress Socialists, who had some followers in Calcutta, and especially among the peasant leaders of Noakhali, Tippera and Chitta gong were also bitterly opposed. Though the Congress Socialists were of no major f

For the political line which justified the party's attack on Bose before 1941, see G. Adhikary, Ramgarh: A "Review" and Evaluation, Bombay, 1940; P.e. Joshi, Whom , How and Why Does Bose Fight , Bombay, 1940. The German attack on the Soviet Union and Bose's close association with Japan provided the party with a different justification for its attack on the Forward Bloc. 78

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significance except for some labour leaders like Sibnath Bannerjee and some followers in Noakhali, Chitta gong and Tippera, the active role that they played during the Quit India movement made some of their leaders like Lohia and Jayaprakash popular in Bengal. The constant communication between the Congress Socialists and the Congress leaders like Ananda Choudhury and Kiron Shankar Roy provided the party with links, fresh enough to begin their operation in the post-Quit India movement Bengal. 79 Communist efforts to increase its membership among the students also did not come through. Attacks, often physical and violent, on the Communists, and counter-attacks by the latter on other groups were repeatedly reported. so To compound the problems, the party had been outlawed. Given this situa tion, it was na tural that the party would attract the ire of a substantial section of population. The situation was further complicated by the advance of Japan's forces in the eastern sector. Reception of the new party line by the beleaguered Communists in the province was crucial. Some senior leaders while not seeing eye-to-eye with the Central Committee, decided to follow its leadS! For the younger members of the party, however, the change meant that the "abandoning of bitter hostility to the British would rob their Ilbrand of communism of its chief attraction"." In fact, one of the reports said that Ganesh Ghosh and Ananta Singh of the Chitta gong Armoury Raid fame, and other convicts in the Alipore Central Jail who had joined the CPI were bewildered by the change of policy and were thinking of Ilreturning to the Jugantar Party S3 Its predicament was heightened by its policy of equating the Muslim League with the Congress, and by its decision to support the League demands. Soon, the party's opposition to the Quit India movement added to its discomfiture. The extreme sectarian attitude of the members towards all those who opposed the war and showed an anti-imperialist inclination and undertook anticolonial activities resulted in more trouble for the party members f

ff

ff.

79 80 81 82 83

See, RRM, March 1943, File No. SS-II, op. ciL, p. 33. See, RRM, September 1943, ibid., p. 79. RRM, 29 January 1942, File No. SS-I, pp. 7-8. Ibid., p. 8. Ibid.

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in the province. Branding of anybody opposing the government as 'Fifth Columnists' reached such a ludicrous extent that even a Ilprocession led by young students and some poor men under a socialist person was prevented by the party members owing to the concern that they would clash with the police".84 These factors accounted for the stagnation of the party in the province. The members were aware of this and, in fact, complained that their Ilpronouncements on the subject of Iself-determination' have incurred the displeasure of the local Hindu Mahasabha".S5 Notwithstanding these problems, the party seemed to be enthusiastic about capturing political space, aided by the absence of the Congress. At the all-India level too, the year 1943 was significant. The principal events were the All India Congress of the party, which was held in Bombay from 23 May to 1 June, and the dissolution of the Comintern on 10 June. 86 Sessions of the All India Kisan Sabha (AIKS) at Bhakhna in the Punjab in April, and the All India Trade Union Congress (AITUC) at Nagpur in May were also important for the Communists as the party scored some successes. S7 Absence of most of the labour leaders who were in jail provided the party with the opportunity to embark on its membership and union drive. 88 Taking advantage of Suresh Banerjee's detention in jail, it was able to extend its hold over the electrical workers in Calcutta and 24 Parganas; and it came to control the Calcutta Electrical Supply Corporation Mazdur Union with a membership of about 1,100 electric workers.'9 It succeeded in establishing control over the employees of public utility and transport services in Calcutta, particularly the Tramway Gas and Corporation workers, and by intervening in the bus strike in June was able to bring the bus drivers' union under its control. It also extended its influence over the engineering workers in the Entally, Ballygunge and Kidderpore areas in Calcutta and in several metal factories in Howrah. 90 84 See, Manikuntala Sen, Sediner Katha (Tales of Those Days), Calcutta, 1982, p. 61. 85 Communist Survey, April-June 1943, Home Political, File No. F-7/23/II, pp.9-10. 86 Ibid., p. 1. 87 Ibid. 88 RRM, 14 October 1943, File No. SS-II, p. 88. 89 Ibid. 9() Ibid.

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In May and June, the party launched a campaign in the Jute mill area to protest against the decision to close down some of the mills and for the redressal of the grievances of the Jute workers 91 When some factories in Dacca faced closure due to shortage of coal, the party workers organised themselves and brought "thousands of maunds of wood in exchange for coal so that the boilers in the factories remain in operation".92 The party was also active among the textile and hosiery workers of 24 Parganas, Howrah, Hoooghly, Kushtia Nadia and Dacca districts." A railway faction was also organized with Jyoti Basu as the secretary. He was Iitouring extensively in Bengal to increase the membership of the Bengal and Assam Railway Workers' Union".94 The efforts, it was reported, resulted in an increase of membership which exceeded 4,000, spread over Calcutta, Kanchrapara, Dacca, Mymensingh, Saidpur (Rangpur), and Assam 95 His efforts to effect an amalgamation of the Bengal and Assam Railway Workers Union, and the Bengal and Assam Railroad Workers Union, a rival union controlled by Birendra Das Gupta, an ex-detenue, however met with no success.% The party appointed Indrajit Gupta as the secretary of its trade union faction. Owing, however, to the opposition of the rival trade unionists under the influence of Dr Suresh Banerjee, Shibnath Bannerjee, A.M.A. Zaman, Aftab Ali, and other small groups, the party was not very successful in establishing undisputed command in this sphere. 97 In the newly elected executive of the Bengal Province Trade Union Congress (BPTUC) in 1943, it was able to capture only 9 out of 34 seats but it became the single largest group.98 The party generally exercised a steadying influence in the labour field and was not reported to have fomented any strikes during the period. '" When strikes did occur, however, Ibid. Jnan Chakraborty, Dhaka Jelar, 1972, p. 70. 93 Ibid., pp. 67-77. 94 RRM, 14 October 1943, File No. 55-II, p. 88. 95 Ibid. 96 Ibid. 97 Ibid. 98 Ibid. 99 Jnan Chakraborty, Dhaka Jelar, pp. 65-77. Presenting the report of the Trade Union Front to the Provincial Conference in Calcutta, Abdul Momin said: 91 92

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Communalism in Bengal

members mediated so that production was not held up. Even the government report agreed on this fact. Writing to the provincial governments, Richard Tottenham, the secretary to the Government of India, wrote: The Party has made every effort to extend its influence with labour, though it is doubtful whether any great success has been achieved ... certainly the Party's claims are exaggerated. Such influence as the party has with labour appears generally to have been exercised in the direction of opposing or minimising the effect of strikes ... and it seems probable that cases in which local communists have supported strikes were generally due to irresponsibility and lack of Party discipline. loo On the peasant front, Annual District Krishak Conferences were held in quick succession in the districts of Burdwan, Jessore, Tippera, Bankura, Bogra, Jalpaiguri, 24 Parganas, Howrah, Dacca, Noakhali, Bakergunj and Rangpur, in February 1943 101 The Annual conference of the Bengal Provincial Kisan Sabha (BPKS) at Nalitabari (Mymensingh) was attended by about 5,000 persons including 500 women and local Garo and Hajong peasantsl02 It was reported that a large number of volunteers of both sexes, including Krishak volunteers wearing red caps and carrying smallia this, guarded the Pandal and formed a guard of honour. The absence of Muslim peasants was noteworthy l03 Peasant

Without our effort citizens of Calcutta would have been without electricity and water.... Most of the factories would have been closed, and administration immobile.. We helped Calcutta from not turning into Rangun by keeping the factories open. (Abdul Momin, as cited in Amalendu Sengupta, Uttal Challis: Asamapta Viplav (The Tumultous Forties-Unfinished Revolution), Calcutta, 1989, p. 21. 100 Ibid. Richard Tottenham, secretary, Government of India, to the Provincial Governments, 28 September 1943, Home Political, File No. F-7/23/43, p. 1. 10 1 RRM, 14 October 1943, File No. SS-II, pp. 88-89. 102 Ibid. 103 Ibid., p. 89. Apart from notable exceptions, Muslim participation in the Quit India movement was negligible. See ibid., 20 August 1943.

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rallies and hunger marches were organized at times, and the enrolment of Krishak members and the formation of union and subdivisional Krishak samities was reported from all districts. A Kisan Week was held in the first week of March to enlist primary Krishak members f and a grow more food" campaign was organized in the first week of July. Bankim Mukherjee was elected President of the AIKS at the annual conference at Bhakhna (Punjab) in the first week of April. At the student front some very serious events were taking shape. The Communists were making headway by splitting the All India Student Federation (AISF) where they used to work alongside the students influenced by Gandhi. At the Nagpur session in 1940 there was a split on the question of accepting Gandhi's recommendation that students shun politics. Soon after this K.M. Ashraf and Hiren Mukherjee would pronounce a judgement on the national question that went a long way in making the Communist party's line of action. They argued that the Congress had failed to solve the national question in India. It held thatIndia was a not a nation in itself but a federation of nations and the Mulsim League was the true representative of the Muslims in India. The Bengal Province Student Federation (BPSF), with its head quarters in Calcutta and branches in all districts of Bengal (except Darjeeling), was the party mouthpiece on the students' front. Little headway was made in this sphere probably owing to two factors: (a) opposition of the rival revolutionary groups, and (b) general indifference of the public towards the type of propaganda indulged in by its members and supporters. In the heat of the excitement and disturbances that followed the 9 August arrests the previous year, Communist propaganda went unheeded by the student community, and the BPSF seemed on the verge of a collapse. The opposition was considerable, and clashes and fights betvveen its membersf supporters and rivals almost became a permanent feature at meetings and conferences of the students. The District Students' Conference in Chitta gong in April was attended by about 1,250 persons, including 750 students, of whom around 10 per cent were Muslims. lilt seems"f an official report suggested, "that some hold has been established as a result of fostering friendly relations with Muslim League". l04 Biswanath Il

104

Ibid., p. 88.

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Communalism in Bengal

Mukherjee presided over the Provincial Annual Conference of the BPSF at Rajshahi attended by about 300 delegates from Calcutta and other districts in August. The shouting of slogans condemning Subhas Bose and Forward Bloc provoked hostility from the anti-Communist elements and the delegates' camp was attacked with brickbats. Later, a free fight took place between members of opposing groups at another Communist camp outside the town resulting in injuries to both sides. IDS Thus, the party remained alive despite the odds working against it, and the members steadfastly held on to the belief which was more often passed on to them by the collective understanding of the party leadership. According to the Provincial Intelligence report in April, the total membership in 465 cells (excluding Midnapur and Bankura) was 2,972. The "class composition" of this membership according to sources was: 248 workers, 476 peasants, 329 students and 172 women. (The figure, however, excluded the districts of Bankura, Dacca, Midnapur, Howrah, Birbhum, Comilla and Assam.)l06 However, the number of party members and activists on 1 January stood only at 1,110 and 2,000 respectively, and the number of whole timers was only 549 on 1 January, and 695 on 14 October 1943 1 07 A provincial party letter, noticed in May by the intelligence authorities, I DS gave the party strength as it existed then: Party members:

Whole Timers: Trade Union members: Student Federation members:

4,681, including 592 workers, 1,059 peasants, 674 students, and 383 women. 867, paid workers 584. 37,015 (including Assam and Surma Valley). 20,815 (Bengal 18,115; Assam and Surma Valley 2,264).

RRM, 14 October 1943, File No. SS-II, p. 89. Ibid., p. 88. 107 The party, however, provided a membership figure of 4AOO members at the end of December 1942 which was an obvious exaggeration. See, Saroj Mukherjee, Communist Party 0 Amra, VoL II, Calcutta, 1993, p. 149. By 1943, the CPI claimed to have altogether 2,637 "whole timers" -full time salaried functionaries. See, Party Letter, TIl, 8 June 1943, p. 3. 108 RRM, 14 October 1943, File No. SS-II, p. 89. 105

106

Politics Amidst Hunger

131

Women's Self-Defence Committee: 23,480 (Bengal 22,780; Surma Valley 700). It is clear, therefore, that the party was conscious about the low level of its membership, when the famine appeared as an opportunity for the party to increase its membershi p l09 The implementation of the party's policies in Bengal took place in the political context of the assumption of the Muslim League ministry. The party criticized any attack on the newly appointed Nazimuddin ministry, because it felt that this would jeopardize the efforts to solve the food situation. Hence, instead of criticizing the Muslim League, it argued that other parties should join the ministry as only in this way the vital problems of the people could be solved. Bhowani Sen wrote in People's War:

All the groups composing the Progressive Coalition Party are busy working up popular sentiment against Nazimuddin ministry instead of considering the people's vital problems like food and working out means to achieve unity. 'If there is no united ministry, the blame belongs to the League, so now all unite against the League' -such is the meaning of the agitation carried on by Mahasabhaites, Krishak Praja Party, and the Bose-ite men. Meanwhile they do not bother about food, AR.P. and civilliberties. 110 By the time of the famine, the party had somehow resolved its dilemma and shed its earlier sharp rhetoric against the colonial bureaucracy, a fact observed by the bureaucracy. However, this was more visible in Bengal with the coming of the League ministry111 The Congress-League unity line was very enthusiastically The officials also commented on this characteristic of the Communists' Behaviour. "It is clear that during the period under review, the Communists' principal preoccupation has been to increase the strength of their Party." Tottenham, Richard, Secretary to the Government of India, to Provincial Governments, 23 September 1943, Policy towards Communist Party, Home Political, File No. F-7/23/43. 110 People's War, Bombay, 9 May 1943, p. 5. 111 RRM, 14 October 1943, File No. SS-II/43, p. 83. 1C19

Recently, however, famine conditions have had a sobering effect, and several party circulars and letters contain injunctions against

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Communalism in Bengal

followed in bringing what is being called "unity through food". It was found by the party that "unity was developing through the food movement among the people in general, and among the Congress and Muslim League sympathisers."1l2 Hence the Congress and the League together should form a ministry so that one could "bring the Congress and League patriots right into our food campaign" . 113 It was disappointed when the League ministry was installed, but, nevertheless, opposed anybody trying to destabilize the ministry. Its invocation was always for the Congress to join the ministry, to bring fruition to the unity line of the Communist party. This meant that the party no longer spouted antiimperialist slogans as it used to before the adoption of the people's war line. It favoured the food policy of the ministry and concentrated its energies on activities like hunger marches against hoarders etc. relief operations and organizing ration shops. In the Rajshahi Division, it organized Krishak Samities to demand for paddy seeds and suspension of repayment of agriculturalloans, and to protest against high prices.!!4 Food committees of the CPI took up rationing in Chittagong l !5 Even before the dismissal of the Huq ministry, the party organized a demonstration before the Assembly on 17 March, where "some thousands of women converged with demands for rice" . 116 The party wor kers took up relief work honestly, while atthe same time trying to increase their membership. In Dacca, Mymensingh, Burdwan, Chitta gong, Rajshahi, Faridpur, Calcutta and other districts, the Communist workers opened gruel kitchens, organized medical relief centres and distributed milk for children. f

f

provocative speeches calculated merely to expose and embarass the Government. The Party seems to have realised that the time wasted in a fruitless crusade against the Government could have been more profitably employed on relief work in cooperation with the Government. (Ibid., p. 81.) 112 Communist Circular, 506/43 Part-I, cited in Parthasarathi Gupta, TF, Vol. 3, p. 2935. 113 Intercepted Letter of Comrade Bhowani Sen, Government of Bengal, Office of DCP (Spl. Br.), s.n. 506/43 IV-V, cited in ibid., p.2927. 114 FR, April, first half, 1943, Home Political, File No. 18/4/1943. See also, the People's War, 11 April 1943, p.4. 115 Ibid. 116 FR, March, first half, 1943, Hom e Political, File No. 18/3 / 43.

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Jnan Chakraborty, who was then secretary of the Dacca district branch, has provided graphic details of the efforts by the party volunteers like Jiten Ghosh who led the party workers to Barisal in small boats to bring rice to Vikrampur, as rice at Barisal at that time did not cost more than Rs 30 a maund. Similarly, a group of volunteers under the leadership of Ananda Pal brought rice to the northern part of Dacca. Samar Ghosh and Pramatha Nandi led relief workers to the villages of Manickgunj subdivision.1l7 In Rangpur, especially in Nilphamari subdivision, Communist workers at Kurigram displayed special organizing capabilities by opening ration shops, medical relief centres, etc H8 Though the hills of Mymensingh were not affected as badly as other areas, Communist workers opened gruel kitchen there also.ll9 The dedication of the party workers, its newly organized cultural front-Indian Peoples' Theatre Association (IPTA)-and the women's organizations helped to popularize the party, and regain some of its lost ground l20 Retrospectively, most of the Communist leaders accept the fact that it was the famine that rehabilitated the party. The famine of 1943 came to us as a blessing of God. We tried to bring closer even the demoralised Congress minded students, through our relief wor ks. One has to keep in mind one situation-we were practically alone. We wanted to serve the people-wanted to free the country-but we fell in the wrong side. We, then, could remain close to the people only through our relief works. 12l

Jnan Chakraborty, Dhaka Jelar, p. 65. Sudhir Mukhopadhyay and Nripen Ghosh, Rangpur Jelar Krishak Andolaner Itihas 0 Party (History of the Peasant Movement in Rangpur District and the Party), Hooghly, 1985, p. 74. 119 Moni Singh, Jibon Sangram (Life Struggle), Dhaka, 1983 (1991 edn.), p.59. 120 See, Hemango Biswas, Ujan Gung Baiya, A Collection of Autobiographical Writings, Calcutta, 1990; Manikuntala Sen, Sediner Katha; Sudhi Pradhan, Marxist Cultural Movement in India: Chronicles and Documents 1936-1947, Calcutta, 1979; Anuradha Ray, Chollis Dasaker Banglaye Gana Sangit Andolan, Calcutta, 1992. 121 Student leader Kamal Chatterjee quoted in Amalendu Sengupta, Uttal Challis, p. 16. 117 118

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Communalism in Bengal

This was reflected to a great extent, in increased membership figures. 122 Even though it is difficultto ascertain the real membership of the party because of the tendency to inflate the numbers, it did gain ground during this period. The repeated official concern and suspicion of the party indica ted this growing influence. l 23 According to the party, "Imperialist policy led to the famine, the imperialist bureaucrats can't fight it. The hoarder is almighty and corrupt officials in key strategic posts guard him"l24 It began criticizing the bureaucracy regarding the food crisis and the hoarders and profiteers. But the need to adjust to the new tactical party line forced it to gradually shun its "Left Nationalist deviation" of attacking the colonial power with all its strength. While its criticism o( and agitation against the hoarders became stronger, its criticism of the bureaucracy became milder.125 Finally, the hoarders and profiteers became the paramount concern and the realization dawned that these had to be checked by a united ministry. While the Hindu Mahasabha demanded a national government which meant that it should be included in the ministry by the virtue of being the representative of the Hindus. The Communist party's idea of a united ministry followed from its theoretical understanding that the Congress and League represented two major sections of the Indian population; the Muslim League for the Muslims and the Congress for the nationalists. Therefore, the political crisis for the party was due to this lack of a united ministry. It said: f

f

The Muslim League ministry began very well. !thad supported the resolution for the release of the Congress leaders and for Congress-League unity. !t had offered very good terms to Dr Shyama Prasad for a Coalition Ministry which he found unexceptionable except that Huq could not be in the Ministry. Sir Nazimuddin was even prepared to take in Huq butJinnah did not allow it. Dr Shyama Prasad however wanted to stick to his alliance with Huq who did not represent the Muslim masses and RRM, week ending 14 October 1943, File No. SS-II, pp. 88-90. FR, March, Home Political, File No. 18/3/43. 124 P.e. Joshi, Who Lives in Bengal Dies, Bombay, 1943, p. 15. 125 Richard Tottenham, Secretary Government of India to the Provincial Governments, 28 September 1943, Home Political, File No. F-7/23/43, p. 14. 122

123

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135

would not go into a Coalition with the League which did represent them 126 (Italics mine) The results of the above mentioned crisis, the party thought, was calamitous for Bengal, as its political leaders, "having failed to unite to get people food, became puppets in the hands of their own section of hoarders and began factional wars to bring each other down" .127 The party, in forwarding this idea, scrupulously maintained equal distance from the Congress and the Muslim League. Thus, it argued that while the Muslim League was supported by the Muslim hoarders, Hindu Mahasabha and Fazlul Huq were supported by the Hindu hoarders.l2S This understanding led to a corresponding political line for the party. "My political thesis", wrote Joshi, "is that the acute political factionalism in Bengal is the struggle between the minority and majority hoarder to have supreme control over the ministry in its own selfish and sectional interests. Bengal is starving because Bengal's own patriots are not uniting to get the people food but playing into the hands of their own hoarders".129 Thus, the role of the bureaucracy or the Governor ceased to exist in such understanding. The agency shifted to the people and leaders who, as the party maintained, refused to unite. This is a peculiar way of arriving at conclusions which are historically untenable. At the Bombay Convention, the party tried to correct its "nationalist deviation" by toning down its criticism against the colonial authorities 130 Second, this clearly reflected its unity line Ibid Ibid. 128 Ibid. 129 Ibid. 130 The Political Resolution passed in the Bombay Convention examined the attitude of the Party towards the National leadership. An official report says: 126

127

The most serious shortcoming is described as a "left Nationalist deviation" (the emphasis seems to be on the word nationalist) which led the Communists to concentrate on "wordy abuse" of the bureaucracy while neglecting to expose the "negative and defeatist" policy of the national leadership. (Communist Survey, April-June 1943, Home Political, File No. F-7/23/11, p. 6.)

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Communalism in Bengal

and its exhortations for a successful war effortf and thereforef its support to the ministry. This also became evident from the party's relief efforts, which were enmeshed in its political line. After the Muslim League assumed office on 24 April, the party began to criticize any move which criticized the ministry and destabilize the political equation. l3l This was the time when the Muslim League began to expand its mass base; a kind of certificate from the Bengal Communistsall young and dedicated and full of progressive ideas-gave a lot of credibility to the Muslim League. On the other hand, by accepting an idea that India is a federation of communities in which the Muslims are one, the Communists lost all possibilities of entering the debate on communalism, as it had accepted, without critical scrutinYf that the Muslims constitute a monolithic community and that the Muslim League was the party of the progressive Muslim masses. The demand for Pakistan, therefore, by the same logic became a progressive demand. Was there any pragmatic reasons for the cpr taking such a standpoint? Was it due to the fact that in its efforts to gain popularity among the Muslim masses, it took resource to befriending the Muslim League?!32 This might be the reason because the Communist party had always used the tactics of entering and working from within a party, and then

131

"Fratricidal War on Bengal Front", People's War, Bombay, 9 May 1943,

p.5. 132 Communist Survey, July-October 1943, Home Political, File No. F/F-7/ 23/11, p. 18.

The Party's relations with the Muslim League were discussed at considerable length in the Central Committee and agreement was reached on the desirability of increasing the party's Muslim membership (which is less than 5 per cent) and of encouraging Communists to join the League ostensibly to enable the party to bring Congress and the Muslim League together and to stimulate an alleged" anti-imperialist awakening" in the Muslim masses as well as to foster a "progressive democratic trend" which the Communists profess to discern in Jinnah's leadership. As a first step in this direction the Urdu edition of the People's War is to be specially written in future for the consumption of the Muslim "Patriots", instead of being a mere replica of the English edition. This urge for closer relationship with the Muslim League is the logical, if somewhat belated outcome of the unity campaign now over a year old. (Ibid.)

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137

taking over it. The party did it with the CSP and ittried to do the same with the Congress. In Dacca, Mymensingh, Barisal, Rangpur and Faridpur its equal distance from the League and the Congress was remarkable, though in many places, such as the Rajshahi Division, the Communist members identified themselves with the Congress. !33 Thus, it could have been a reason for accepting this argument. But then it only tells, in hindsight, that it failed miserably.

133

FR, April, second half, 1943, Hom e Political, File No. 18/4/43.

THREE

Politics Overtakes Hunger The famine conditions improved bymid-1944 with the aman crop in the market. This was also helped by a new and better rationing and control system brought in by the new Australian Governor, Richard Cassey. However, as the study of mortality during the period shows, a weakened immune system among the people, caused by the famine led to high number of deaths during this period.! When the Communists party was engaged in mobilizing people and the Hindu Mahasabha was busy attacking the Muslim League ministry, a change took place within the Muslim League. Abul Hashim of Burdwan became the League secretary in November 1943. In 1944, he undertook a tour of the province to revitalize the party organization. While Abul Hashim was touring the state professedly to popularize, the League and exhort people to join it in order to achieve Islamic ideals,' the ministry was constantly under attack from sections of the League members who primarily came from the East Bengal districts, the very area Abul Hashim was touring. They also attacked the ministry in the Assembly. Maulvi Abdul Rezzak and Shah Golam Sarwar Hussaini attacked the ministry for not taking up seriously the matter of religious education and its failure to introduce Quran classes in the schools. This failure of the ministry, they said, had belied their expectations from the Muslim League, which had promised to establish Pakistan. These and similar attacks on the ministry were indications of the fact that there was a substantial 1 Arup Maharatna f Demography of Bengal Famine, Delhi, 1998; Amartya Sen! Poverty and Famines. 2 Abul Hashim, Amar Jibon 0 Bibhag Purbo Bangladesher Rajniti (My Life and Politics of Pre-partition Bangladesh), Dhaka, 1978 (Calcutta, 1988), pp. 58-63.

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139

section, including that of the ulama, which was unattached and even critical of the League and its ministry. But, at the same time, it was also clear from their attacks on the ministry thatthe idea of Pakistan had already been concretized in the psyche of the Muslims, even those who were critical of the League. It was around this time that an old and unresolved issue was brought in to dominate the political scene of the province. The issues of the control over secondary education and according priority to mass and primary or secondary educa tion had been an unsolved issue not only in the educational history of the province but also in its political history. Education had always been an arena of political contestation in modern Bengal. 3 While education was instrumental in the politicization of Bengalis-both Hindus and Muslims-soon however education itself became an instrument to retain political hegemony. The debate over the medium of instruction and the nature of education, which had earlier demonstrated the fissures as well as the dynamics of the political consciousness of communities} entered a new stage in the 1940s when control over secondary education was seen as the panacea for tiding over the political crises. The famine had already discredited the Muslim League ministry and it had difficulty finding allies. In addition to tha t itfaced the attacks by the Hindu Mahasabha. The Congress, as we have seen, it had labelled as the Hindu opposition. They were also being criticized by sections of the KPP members, and the Muslim ulama, who came from the predominantly Muslim areas of East Bengal. Apart from its handling of the famine situation, the ulama attacked the League ministry for its failure to introduce and encourage religious education in the schools. 5 To add to the woes of the ministry, some SC leaders were also disgruntled with it. 6 Therefore, by April 1943, the League was desperately in search of political allies and also something with which to attack and weaken the opposition. The issue of secondary educa tion came f

f

Aparna Basu, The Growth of Education and Political Development in India, 1898-1920, Delhi, 1974, p.33. 4 Chandiprasad SarkarI Politicisation of Bengali Muslims, p. 69. 5 Abdul Wahed, PBLA, VoL LXVII, No.5, p.291. 6 See, P.R. Thakur's attack on the ministry, ibid., VoL LXV. 3

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140

in handy, and on 24 April 1943, Education Minister Tamizuddin Khan, introduced the Secondary Education Bill in the Assembly. ' It had earlier been published in the Calcutta Gazette on 8 April 1943 and the minister had provided details of the Bill at a press conference in Calcutta on 10 April.s Speaking on the object ofthe Bill, the minister said: The object of the Bill is regulation, control and development of Secondary Education in Bengal. On no other subject within the legislative purview in this province there has been a more unanimous demand for reform and yet no other attempt at reform has met with greater opposition from certain particular sections of people. No other legislative effort in this province has had a more chequered history or a longer period of travaiL' The Bill sought to constitute a Secondary Board consisting of 53 members majority of whom were either nominated or exofficio. lO The Bill provided that the Board "shall have power to direct supervise develop and control secondary education Y It also authorized the Board to "recognise, regulate and inspect the condition of the schools".12 The elected members in the Board were to be returned by separate electorate of Hindu, Muslim and SC teachers 13 Chapter 4 of the Bill provided for school committees again on the basis of communi tie Sf Leo Islamic Secondary School Committee, 14 Hindu Secondary School Committee,!5 etc. The Bill attracted intense opposition in the Assembly. The entire opposition demanded its immediate withdrawal. Congress leader Nalinaksha Sanyal, Shyama Prasad Mookerjee of Hindu Mahasabha and members of the KPP, all highlighted the problems of communal course content and the increased communal and administrative control over the proposed education system. f

ff

f

f

7 8

f

Star of India, Calcutta, 25 April 1944, p.3. N.N. Mitra ed., Indian Annual Register (hereafter Annual Register), 1944, Vol.

I, p. 47. 9 PBLA, VoL LXVII, No.5, p. 104. 10 The Secondary Education Bill, Calcutta, 1944, p. 3. 11 Ibid., p. 7. 12 13 14

15

Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., p. 11. Ibid., p. 12.

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The entire opposition forestalled any attempt by the ministry to rush the Bill through the legislature. Members like Abu Hussain Sarkar said that the Bill was introduced as an eyewash. He said, "I think. .. tha t an opportune moment has been selected by this ministry to introduce this Bill to serve the purpose of propaganda literature ... even after the passing away of that famine, the ministry is not in a position to look into the bare necessities of the people."!6 Speaking of the proposed communal electorate in the Bill he said, "if this communal electorate is introduced, there would not be any Hindustan or Pakistan but simply gorostan [graveyard]"17 Some of the members of the opposition, however, did not criticize the proposition of a communal electorate, as they thought that overall it would serve well for the Muslim community,!8 but they appealed "with folded hands and eyes full of tears" to the ministry not to rush the Bill through but to "to create a public opinion first."19 What is evident from this argument is that the Muslim League had successfully shifted the focus of the political scene away from the famine, issues of epidemic, and scarcity of cloth, sugar and other necessities, to the question of secondary education. The education minister, however, tried to project the Bill as a product of the deliberations of a Select Committee constituted in 1942, and as such, a continuation of the efforts initiated in 1938, which had in the past, always been opposed by powerful forces." The present ministry, itwas argued, was just putting it before the Assembly for its approval. On this ground, and on some other points, he labelled the opposition to the Bill as "senseless", and maintained that the Ilantagonism came from a small but very influential section of the community".2! The opposition to the Bill did not, however, remain confined to the precincts of the legislature and soon the voices of protest began to come from general people. An agitation along the lines of the one in 1940 began to

16 17

18 19

20 21

Abu Hussain SarkarI 17 May 1943, PBLA, VoL LXVII, No.5, p.281. Ibid. Syed Badruddoja, 25 May 1944, ibid., pp. 517-19. Ibid., p. 519. Ibid., VoL LXVII, No.5, p. 104. Ibid., p. 105.

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Communalism in Bengal

take shape. 22 A call far an "All Bengal Protest Day" on 30 April was given. 23 Prominent personalities like Acharya P.c. Ray, whose objection to the Bill was criticized by Tamizuddin Khan in the Assembly and who had given a lead to the agitation against the Secondary Education Bill in 1940," came out into the open and called for Ilunrelenting opposition to the communal Bill".2s Scientist Meghnad Saha criticized the Bill for its "retrograde character"." The students of the Calcutta University protested against the attempt to impose Ilbureaucratic control over education"." The protests highlighted the potential of the Bill in intensifying communal consciousness. This was evident from the fact that while there were demands for the resignation of Hindu ministers," the ministry characterized the opposition to the Bill as essentially an attempt by the high-caste Hindus to retain their monopoly over higher education through the Calcutta University, which it labelled as the zamindari of Shyama Prasad Mookerjee. 29 The provision for a separate communal electorate in the Bill heightened the already existing apprehensions of the Bengali Hindu middle-classes that the ministry was out to crush them. An All-Bengal Secondary Education Bill Protest Conference was held in Calcutta university hall on 11 May, which called for a country-wide agitation. The conference concluded on 12 May with the following resolutions being passed:

See, Amrit Bazar Patrika, Calcutta, 18 October, 22 October, 1940; 6 January, 26 January, 8 February, 9 February, 10 February, 1941. 23 Ibid., 29 April 1944, p. 3 24 Ibid., 4 January 1941, p. 1; 6 January 1941, pp. 1, 3; 26 January 1941, p. 1. 25 Ibid., 2 May 1944, p. 1. 26 N.N. Mitra ed., Annual Register, VoL I, 1944, p.43. v Amrit Bazar Patrika, Calcutta,S May 1944, p. 3. 28 Ibid., 11 May 1944, p.3. 29 Speaking on the allegations of the Muslim League members that the Calcutta University had become the personal fiefdom of Syama Prasad Mookerjee, Abdul Wahed commented: 22

... I ask them .. from the days of his father Shyama Prasad Mukherjee has some contribution ... and sacrificed a lot for the Calcutta University and even if... agreed that they are enjoying a part of it, what sacrifice Khwaja Nazimuddin has accepted in their attempt to set up their empire over the schools of BengaL (Abdul Wahed, 17 May 1944, PBLA, VoL LXVII, No.5, p. 291.)

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1. The present Bill must be dropped; 2. An au tonomous and independent non-communal Secondary Board having the advancement of education alone as its objective must be constituted; 3. If flouting public opinion, the government set up its communal board, it must be boycotted. No school should seek affiliation to that Board; 4. The Bengal Education Council should authorise to take all necessary steps for implementing the decision.3D

Women's voices were reflected in one of the meetings which asked the government to drop the Secondary Education Bill in its present form because they felt that it destroyed the purpose of education itself.3! The meeting further said: We are firmly convinced tha t if the measure is proceeded with in spite of the protest of so many responsible elements in the country, it will destroy the purpose of education itself in the province. We are willing to develop secondary education on sound and progressive lines. 32 The teachers' protest against the Bill centred on the questions of Iispirit" and Ilcultural viewpoints" in education. According to Manoranjan Sengupta, the secretary of All Bengal Teachers' Association (ABTA), apart from generating communal spirit and placing secondary education under official control, the Bill ignored the academic and cultural viewpoints which he thought were essential for national education. 33 The ABTA asked the ministry to drop the Bill in its present form and chart a scheme for the development of secondary education in the province and outside, and publish its details to enlist public opinion." While the League was trying to win the Scheduled Castes as its political ally, reports of communal tensions between the Namasudras and the Muslims were coming in from Jessore and Khulna districts. 35 The riots at Mollahat (Khulna), Narail (Jessore) 30 31 32 33 34

35

Amrit Bazar Patrika, Calcutta, 16 May 1944, p.3. Ibid., 22 May 1944, p.3. Ibid. Ibid., 24 May 1944, p.3. Ibid. FR, March, second half, 1944, Home Political, File No. 18/3/44.

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Communalism in Bengal

and Faridpur were indicative of the fact that everything was not as smooth as the League had hoped. Opposition to Jogendra Na th Mandai and his party was already being mobilized in his home district, Backerganj.36 Realizing this, Mandai was sent to the district to enlist support for the ministry.37 The League during this time began to organize meetings in the districts to consolidate the support to the ministry on the issue of the Secondary Education Bill. The Nilphamari League Conference held on 6 May, which was presided over by Fazlur Rahman, adopted four resolutions, prominently showing support to the ministry.38 Meeting of the Ferozpur Sub-Divisional Muslim League and the Students League were organized to support the Bill." In Calcutta too a meeting of the people of Noakhali passed a resolution whole-heartedly supporting the Secondary Education Bill. 40 Students came out in support of the Bill in Noakhali and "paraded the town with loud slogans of Nazimuddin ministry zindabad".41

On the other side, the protest against the Bill brought together people from different political hues. Shyama Prasad Mookerjee who had already emerged as the major opposition voice during the famine came out vociferously against the Bill. Kiron Shankar Ray, who was not so prominent during the famine, but was the main spokesperson for the Congress during the last couple of years now came out to preside over protest meetings. 42 It was during this time that the government imposed a ban on a meeting f

The Hindu Mahasabha was actively engaged in this and was supporting Upendra Nath Edbar, the SC MLA from Backerganj, in oder to organise the SC members. He was explaining to the people "the present position of the Bengal ministry and their misdeeds and was preaching the dire necessity of the Hindu Sangathan among the Hindus". See, the correspondence between Shyama Prasad Mookerjee and Upendra Nath Edbar, S.P. Mookerjee Papers, Instalment II-IV, Subject File No. 90. 37 Pramatha Ranjan Thakur,S June 1944, PBLA, VoL LXVII, No.6, p. 141. 38 The other three resolutions were on "Pakistan, the Punjab Affairs" and about a "maintenance allowance to Kabi Nazrul Islam", see, Star of India, Calcutta, 15 May 1944, p. 2. 39 Ibid., 17 May 1944, p.2. 40 Ibid., 15 May 1944, p. 2. 41 Ibid., 25 May 1944, p. 3. 42 Amrit Bazar Patrika, Calcutta, 6 June 1944, p. 2. 36

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scheduled to be held in Lora at Backerganj, which was to be addressed by Shyama Prasad Mookerjee. 43 This added to the prevailing tension. By the third week of June the strength of the Muslim League ministry appeared to be depleting. The Governor on realizing this, prorogued the Assembly on 22 June to give the ministry breathing space.44 At this juncture eleven coalition members crossed the floor on 23 June which further embarrassed the minist ry4S The League now embarked on a counter-offensive. It stepped up its efforts at projecting the Bill as an attemptto" democratize education in Bengar' which it said in a meeting at Calcutta was being prevented by the "control over the secondary education by the coterie of high caste Hindus".46 To counter the opposition to the Bill it was decided in the same meeting to chalk out a plan of action. The Bill was claimed to be for the Muslims, and that was why it was being attacked by the Hindus. The meeting declared Muslim confidence in the ministry by supporting the Bill and deciding on a programme of action which included: f

f

1. Observance of an All Bengal Secondary Education Week; 2. Publication of pamphlets; 3. Journals to bring out special Secondary Education Bill issues; 4. Constitution of a Secondary Education Bill Committee of Action. 47

The opposition's attack on the Bill concentrated on the provisions of communal and separate electorates which would be responsible for the members constituting the Secondary Education Board, and the increased official control that the Bill envisaged. The Muslim League's efforts were directed at portraying the Secondary Educa tion Bill as a symbol of its crusade for furthering Muslim interests. It, therefore, demanded an unalloyed support

See, Pramatha Ranjan Thakur's attack on the ministry,S June 1944, PBLA, Vol. LXVII, No.6, pp. 141-42. 44 Casey to Wavell, 29 June 1944, TOP, VoL IV, pp. 1062-63. 45 Amrit Bazar Patrika, Calcutta, 22 June 1944, p. 2. 46 Star of India, Calcutta, 27 June 1944, p.2. 47 Ibid. 43

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from the Muslims. The support of the Pirs (Muslim saints) was enlisted to emphasize this effort and brought to the fore the Muslim League's attempts towards evocation of the community" in its political struggle to establish its hegemony. In Barisal, the Muslim League was declared as the "only political organization of the Muslims" by the Pir of Sirshina. 48 He also said that the League had the support ofJamait-ulama-i-Islam and the Muslim masses should also join it 4 9 The Conference passed resolutions sponsored by the Pirwhich included a resolution in favour of the early passage of the Secondary Education Bill." II

II While the Secondary Education Bill was agitating the people in the province, another issue, in the meantime, appeared on the scene eclipsing other local issues and adding to the already heightened communal polarization. It was the Chakravarty Rajgopalachari Formula, popularly known as the CR Formula. With Japan joining the war in December 1941, the course of the Second World War had taken a new turn. It effected a change in the attitude of the Indians towards the war. It was no longer a war fought in some distant land. While the entry of Japan and its continued advance made international opinion force Britain to solicit Indian support, it made some Congress leaders with their base in the threatened areas, i.e., Madras, Bengal, etc., express ideas which were at variance with that of the central leadership of the Congress. The Coromandel coast was hit by Japanese bombs in December 1941'1 which was followed by evacuation of coastal areas. The districts of Noakhali, Tippera and Chitta gong in Bengal presented a chaotic picture with large-scale evacuation, breakdown of communications, and sudden spurt in the flood of refugees from Burma. 52 The situation was made even more critical by the army atrocities and the complete breakdown of civil administration 48 49 5()

51 52

Ibid., 19 August 1944, p.3. Ibid. Ibid. Rajmohan Gandhi, The Rajaji Story, 1937-1972, Bombay, 1984, p. 82. S.P. Mookerjee Papers, Instalment II-IV, File No. Ill, pp. 66-70.

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in these coastal areas. 53 These events forced the leaders from the affected regions to express themselves against the demoralisation of their people and to plea for the restoration of some sort of order". It might be due to this line of thinking that one of the leaders of Tippera, Kamini Kumar Dutta, wrote to the general secretary of the All India Congress Committee (AICC) that there was a: II

... general desire expressed by the public that if the people in the Congress organisation be permitted in the committees for maintaining internal peace and for establishing communal harmony, the results will be better.... Public is feeling depressed and alarmed at the idea that they are living in an absolutely unprotected condition. 54 Rajagopalachari's thoughts, it may be suggested, were also moved to a great extent by similar considerations. The favourable inclination towards the Cripps proposals was, in fact, due to the same reasons. 55 It was only when he realized, along with Nehru, that the British were not sincere in their wish to impart power to the Indians that he supported its rejection. He, however, was more concerned about the Japanese advance and felt acutely the need for a national government. He realized that it could be possible only if a rapprochement was made with the Muslim League. It was now very obvious that the Hindu-Muslim question provided the perfect card for the British to deny the Indians any share in government. He said: Ilpolitics of the minorities were good counter-offensive in old days against nationalism, but today na tionalism is one grea t munition which India requires to be put into motion" .56 This realization made him approach the League Prafulla Ghose's letter to Jawaharlal Nehru on 24 April 1942, gives a detailed picture of the evacuation and the plight of the people living in the border areas of BengaL See, Prafulla Ghose to Jawaharlal Nehru, 24 April 1942, AlCC Papers, File No. G-31 (Pt. III), p.28. 54 Kamini Kumar Dutta to General Secretary, AICC, 9 June 1940, ibid., File No. P-5 (Pt. II), pp. 197-99. 55 See the Note by Cripps on 28 March 1942. It says: " .. so far as the whole scheme was concerned, he (Rajagopalachari) said he was in favour of its acceptance". TOP, VoL I, p. 512. 56 "Summary of the Press Statement made by Rajagopalachari at Bezwada on April 15th", Linlithgow to Amery, ibid., p. 790. 53

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with a changed attitude. This changed attitude was, however, not a strategy evolved only after the failure of the Cripps Mission. In December 1941 itself, as his biographer suggests, he had talked of "the India ofthe National Congress and the India ofthe Muslim League as together forming the India that Britain had to satisfy".57 After the failure of the Cripps Mission, he became more resolute in his attempts to solve this problem of "rapprochement". He got two resolutions passed by the Congress Legislative Party in Madras, one of which favoured the formation of the ministry (contravening the Congress resolution) and the other conceding the Muslim League demand of Pakistan. 58 He took these steps without ever consulting his colleagues in the Working Committee. This sudden move created a furore in Madras where he found himself totally alienated from the rest of the Congress. On the other hand, his colleagues in the Working Committee were embarrassed because it was Rajaji-the symbol of the Congress in south India-who was going against the Congress stand. With the intention of getting the Working Committee to buy his idea, he pleaded for a Congress-League agreement. The plan was turned down by the AICC by 120 votes to 15.59 After this, he opposed the Working Committee resolution of 14 July 1942. His break with the Congress was complete. Earlier he was asked to resign from the party which he did-an act which Gandhiji commended as dignified". 60 The Quit India movement was launched in 1942 and a civil martial law was established in the country. Rajagopalachari could only meet Gandhiji in jail on 27 February 1943, and got Gandhi's go-ahead to carryon his mission. A month la ter, he met Jinnah in Bombay but did not disclose during the 90 minute long meeting that the proposal had met with Gandhi's approval. Gandhi was released in May 1944 and, thereafter, a fresh move began by Rajagopalachari who entered into correspondence with Jinnah. II

Rajmohan Gandhi, Rajaji Story, p. 83. His fast alienation from the Congress workers and leadership is discussed in detail by his biographer. See, ibid., pp. 83-107. 59 PaUabhi Sitaramayya, History of the Indian National Congress, Vol. n 1935-1947, Bombay, 1947, p. 336. 6() Gandhi to Rajagopalachari, 12 January 1942, Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi (hereafter CWMG), Publications Division, Delhi, VoL LXXV, p. 448. 57 58

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The CR Formula, as it came to be known, was revived and on the basis of this correspondence Gandhi began a dialogue with Jinnah in July 1944 which finally culminated in the Gandhi-Jinnah meeting in September 1944. The terms of the formula were as follows. When the war ended, a commission would demarcate the Ilcontiguous districts" in North-West and East India having an absolute majority. In the areas thus demarcated, a plebiscite of the adult population would be taken. If the majority voted for a separate sovereign state, it would be given effect to, but border districts would have the option to join one of the new states. In the event of separation, mutual agreements would be entered into for safeguarding defence commerce and communication. These terms would be binding when the British transferred full power to India. 61 The meetings lasted for 20 days but produced very little agreement. A close perusal of the discussions during the meetings shows the detailed and very strong critique that Gandhi mounted against the notion of two-nation theory. In fact, the discussion presents a valuable insight into the logic and justification of Pakistan given by Jinnah and their forceful refutation, without ever rejecting the idea of a partition by Gandhi with equally robust logic." Gandhi's decision to meet Jinnah at this juncture was criticized by Jawaharlal Nehru,63 Azad and others who were in jail and did not have the opportunity to meet and discuss this with Gandhi. The most strident criticism of the move, however, came from Bengal, particularly from the Hindu Mahasabha. The Hindu Mahasabha and particularly its leader Shyama Prasad f

See, Jinnah to Gandhi, 10 September 1944, N.N. Mitra ed., Annual Register, 1944, Vol. IV, pp. 135-37. 62 "Text of correspondence and other relevant document", Delhi, November 1944. 63 S. Gopal ed., Collected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, VoL 13, Delhi, 1987, p.4SS. 61

Three weeks of growing perturbation and mental distress. I wrote then that I was not put out by various developments and the two proposals Bapu had made .... I take all that back. I am very much put out, angered and out of temper. The flood of sentiments, interviews, correspondence that have emanated from Bapu and the frequent utterances of Rajagopalachari, have overwhelmed me and others and I feel stifled and unable to breathe normally. For the first time in the these years I have a sensation of blackness and sinking of heart. (Ibid.)

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Mookerjee construed the move as a step to surrender Bengal to the Pakistan demand. Ashutosh Lahiry, a prominent Hindu Mahasabha leader, later on saw in this event the downward slide of Gandhi's magical powers. liThe downward course of Gandhi's monopoly of power as a leader started from this historic episode and the disillusionment about Gandhiji's magical power was complete."64 His indicbnent of Rajagopalachari was more severe. He wrote: South Indian politicians had never been able to appreciate the dangerous significance of the communal problem which was looked upon as a problem of Bengal and Punjab. Rajaji held that view that the Congress should accept the demand of the League, since itwas holding up the achievement of Freedom .... Rajaji at one time publicly stated that if Bengal had a Muslim majority why should the rest of India suffer for it.... Rajaji's share in determination of all-India Congress policy towards the problem created by the Muslim League had been most decisive, next only to Gandhi. 65 The CR Formula and the subsequent Gandhi-Jinnah meeting soon became the focus of public attention. From July 1944, when the correspondence between Rajagopalachari and Jinnah, and between Gandhi and Jinnah were released to the press, political discourse in the province began to take a different turn. What the Muslim League had initially thought as merely a "gesture from Gandhi", soon become a point of intense discussion. 66 From the middle of July and especially in August, the issue began to move political opinion and there were expectations as well as speculations about the results of the move. Gandhi's meeting rapidly overshadowed the CR proposals and the meeting was seen as a step towards an agreement between the Congress and the League. In a meeting at Jessore in the first week of August, the District League secretary, Habibur Rahman said: 54

Ashutosh Lahiry, Gandhi in Indian Politics: A Critical Review, Calcutta,

1976. pp. 90-91.

Ibid. The Provincial Press Advisor's Report on the press for the first-half, July, and second-half, July, 1944 (hereafter Press Advisor's Report), Home Political, File No. 18/7/44, GOL

65

66

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To those who wish for the achievement of a Congress League settlement, the Gandhi-Rajaji formula is acceptable. Mr Jinnah should consult his working committee and immediately start talk with Gandhiji. 67 Similarly, the District Students League leader Musharraf Hussainf in the same meeting said: IIEverything has become clear after Gandhiji-Rajaji formula and the Muslim League has now to come forward". 68 A big public meeting was held at Narayanganj in Dacca "which welcomed Gandhiji's proposals and pledged full support."69 Amir Ali on behalf of the Muslim League and Birendra Dutta of Congress advocated the call for joint support to the move. On 5 August, there was a meeting at Coronation Park in Dhaka in which Saroj Mookerjee of Congress and Abu Salek of the League spoke supporting the move. 70 The provincial League leadership, while welcoming Gandhi's move, now woke up to the issue of the partition of the province advocated by the CR Formula as a means to resolve the deadlock. On 20 August the Provincial League Working Committee concluded a long session which decided with a overwhelming majoritYf Ilagainst the vivisection of Bengal and in favour of a united Bengal".7! In a meeting on 19 August at Calcutta, Habibullah Baharf a prominent member of the League and a ministerf said that Bengal should not be partitioned and the same sentiment was echoed by the League secretary, Abul Hashim the next day.72 The official report said that the Muslim circles support the proposals and favour them but prefer to await the outcome of the projected conversation between Gandhi and Jinnah before committing themselves. 73 But as the date of the proposed meeting drew nearerf opinions came to be crystallized among the Muslims"f reported the government sources. 74 Though a large II

67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74

People's War, Bombay, 13 August 1944, p.3. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., 3 September 1944, p. 1. Ibid. See also, Abul Hashim, Amar Jibon, p. 66. FR, August, first half, 1944, Home Political, File No. 18/8/44. FR, August, second half, 1944, ibid.

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political section voiced its support to Gandhi's move as a step towards the solution to the communal problem Ilbitterness on the part of the Hindus was also reported. 75 The period between July 1944 and September 1944 witnessed the attention of the province and its political force being concentrated towards the Gandhi-Jinnah meeting and "Gandhi's failure to accept the Pakistan demand of Jinnah", which was maintained by one section as the reason for the failure of the meeting. There was intense opposition from the Hindu Mahasabha and a section of the Congress leadership. The Communist workers attacked all those voices which tried to oppose the formula or Gandhi's meeting with Jinnah as reaction from the Hindu communal forces. This had the effect later on of establishing the academic and political position that anyone who supported the partition of Bengal in 1947 was a Hindu communal. 76 For the League, this was an important political juncture. Its mobilization drive was in motion and the agitation on the Secondary Education Bill had already created sharp polarization in the provincial politics. There were, however, voices which prevented any such sharp polarization on the question of Pakistan on communal lines. The political attention received by the CR Formula had further narrowed down the distinction between communal and non-communal politics in the province. All attention was now focused on Gandhi Jinnah and Pakistan. lilt is no accident", wrote the League-friendly Communist party organ, "that the bulk of the enrolment was done during the three months from July to September when the country as a whole was expectantlywaiting for the Congress and League to unite for freedom."77 Therefore, these events and debates formed the ideological ambience of the mobilization drive of Abul Hashim. The CR Formula and Gandhi's approach to Jinnah have been criticized on the grounds that it added to Jinnah's prestige. It has also been seen as a factor legitimizing the Muslim League positions. Liaqat Ali Khan, for example, said that "it was not the Lahore Resolution but Gandhi-Jinnah meeting which in fact ff

f

f

75 76 77

Ibid. For such a view, see Joya Chatterjee, Bengal Divided. People's War, Bombay, 3 December 1944, p. 1.

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concretised the goal of communal demand"." This is to justify the League position by putting the blame on the Congress (read Hindu leaders from the Muslim League standpoint). What is generally ignored is the fact that this was the extent to which Gandhi could go to satisfy the League positions without sacrificing the ideological position of the Congress, which also determined, to a great extent, the ideological direction of the national movement. Thus, while there were signs of deterioration of the communal relations in the rural East Bengal, the issues of the secondary education and the CR Formula provided an ideological support base to mobilization and politics on communal lines. By the time the CR Formula came to dominate the political scene, the famine was fast on its way out so far as the issue dictating the political agenda of parties in the province was concerned.

III Therefore, the period was crucial for the Mahasabha as it could, in the absence of the Congress and other nationalist groups, influence the political agenda in the province. Since the League ministry was cushioning the colonial authorities it was also contextually correct to attack the former, as a corollary to the Sabha's criticism of the la tter' s policies. This it tried to achieve by accusing the ministry of corruption nepotism and communal demand for Pakistan. 79 The introduction of the Secondary Education Bill by the Muslim League ministry in April 1944, added thrust to the Hindu Mahasabha's clamour that the Muslim League was communalizing the entire province. According to the Mahasabha, the attempt was: f

f

a calculated measure designed to cripple the Hindus politically and culturally and also to perpetuate the tension of feeling that is prevailing amongst communities just to serve the

Liaqat Ali Khan in his foreword to the Gandhi-Jinnah Talks, September 1944. "Text of correspondence and other relevant document", Delhi, November 1944. 79 Even the colonial authorities accepted the fact that there was widespread corruption in the ministry. See, Penderel Moon ed., Wavell, p. 46. 78

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purposes of the rank communalists. By the introduction of the nefarious system of separate electorate it sought to keep out of picture those Moslems [sic] who enjoy the confidence of the Hindus and other communities. so The ministry found itself in a difficult situation and the introduction of the Bill was partially dictated by the exigent circumstances. The Mahasabha was at the forefront of the protests that followed the introduction of the Bill. The strident opposition to the Bill coming from all quarters including even from the sections of the KPP legislators, however, did not allow the Mahasabha to capitalize on this. By June 1944, the agitation took a radical turn with the ministry on the verge of losing its supportS! In the midst of the widespread opposition to the Bill for its avowedly communal and separatist nature, what agitated some of the Mahasabha leaders was the question of control over the field of education. Ashutosh Lahiry writing to VG. Deshpande, the general secretary, All India Hindu Mahasabha, on 10 June articulated this fact regarding the bill, " ... which if passed into law will mean the domination of the Muslim League over the entire field of secondary education in the province, that is to say over 1,600 high schools which the Hindus have established and [are] running with their own resources".fQ One can see that the underlying assumptions were pretty much on the lines of a notion of ownership. This ownership was then identified with a particular community. By the last week ofJune 1944, the Muslim League ministry was on the verge of collapse and it was at this juncture that Governor Casey intervened and notwithstanding his earlier reservations against this ministry, provided it with some breathing space. He prorogued the Assembly on 28 June, at a time when the antiSecondary Education Bill agitation had forced even the eversupportive European group to administer counsel to the chief minister to wind up the matter.83 After the Governor's sudden f

Shyama Prasad Mookerjee to Rai Bahadur Harish Chandra, 29 June 1944, S.P. Mookerje e Papers, Instalment II-IV, Subject File No. 62, p. 41. 81 See Chapter 1 in this volume. 82 Ashutosh Lahiry to VC. Deshpande, 10 June 1944, All India Hindu Mahasabha Papers, File No. C-40, p. 36A. 83 See, entry on 4 August 1944, Diary of Richard Casey, Richard G. Casey Papers, Reel No.1, p. 12. 80

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announcement of this decision, Shyama Prasad Mookerjee described the political scenario in his letter dated 29 June, to Rai Bahadur Harish Chandra of Delhi dated 29 June. He wrote: ... I presume you have learnt by this time about the dramatic turn thatthe Bengal political situation has taken. In the face of the growing strength of the Opposition the Assembly has been prorogued by the Governor. Public opinion has been strongly agitated over the matter.84 Barely a week later Chakravarty Rajagopalachari in a fresh move wrote to Jinnah and la ter released the correspondence to the press. 85 This resulted in the creation of a new scenario in the province, and Shyama Prasad Mookerjee, whose stature had risen in the wake of the famine, and the Secondary Education Bill controversy, found himself the chief spokesperson for the apprehensions of sections of Bengali Hindus.

IV The Congress leaders in the province demonstrated the confusion in their rank regarding the CR Formula. H. M. Kiron Shankar Ray, a prominent Congress leader who was not very active in the relief operations during the famine, expressed his shock and dismay. He met Gandhi at Wardha on 11 August and apprised him of what the newspapers described as IIBengal's opposition".86 Those who were following Gandhi, however, felt that this was a move by Gandhi to bring a kind of unity much needed for the cause of independence. Led by Satish Ch. Dasgupta, Gandhi's lieutenant in Bengal, a leading Congressman like J.e. Gupta attacked those who were criticizing Gandhi on this Ilunity move".87 A detailed description of the reactions of individuals and groups on this issue comes from Shyama Prasad Mookerjee's letter to Savarkar: f

Shyama Prasad Mookerjee to Rai Bahadur Harish Chandra, 29 June 1944, S.P. Mookerjee Papers, Instalment II-IV, Subject F. 62, p. 141. 85 N.N. :Mitra ed., Annual Register, Vol. II, 1944, pp. 129-30. 86 Amrit Bazar Patrika, Calcutta, 11 August 1944, p. 4. See also N.N. Mitra ed., Annual Register, Vol. II, 1944, pp. 180-81. 87 See, Amrit Bazar Patrika, Calcutta, 6 August 1944, p. 3. Also ibid., 2 August, p.5; 13 August, p.4.; 14 August, p.3. 84

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Regarding the two Congress Parties you should write to S.K. Basu and Mr K.S. Ray. The Congressmen who are with us (jar an all party anti-Pak Conference to be held in Delhi) are reluctant to come on a common platform until something actually happens after Gandhi-Jinnah interview. If the talks break down they do not propose to move further in the matter. If Gandhi commits himself finally to Pakistan then they will openly join with us. 88 (Italics mine) Hindu Mahasabha, in its outright rejection of this formula, reflected the mood of those who were apprehensive of Gandhi's new move. One Narendra Nath Das of Khalishota, Barisal, wrote, " ... any appeal to Gandhiji will be of no avail. We must marshall and organise public opinion and shatter this diabolical move .... "89 (Italics mine) The Bengali Hindus living outside Bengal also expressed their concern. The Bengali Association, Bihar, Danapur Branch reported: "In a special meeting of the Bengalee Association, Bihar, 16 August 1944, an unanimous resolution was passed severely criticising Rajaji's offer to Mr Jinnah .... "90 Dr Mookerjee found the occasion correct for taking a tough public position and began thinking of a broader alliance. Writing to Master Tara Singh he indicated this quite openly: "I am most anxious that the Hindu and the Sikh ... of the Punjab combine and Bengal is with them Pakistan will never come".91 With the political vacuum in the country and the increasing political space of the Muslim League and its pointed programme of Pakistan being talked of at very visible public spaces, the aspirations and apprehensions both were beginning to crystallize rapidly. In such a situation, while the Muslim League was being able to wrestle space out of its political opponent within Bengal, the opposition to Pakistan and communalization was gradually getting weakened due to the differences between the Congress leaders as well as incarceration of a large number of them on 8 August during the Quit India movement. In Bengal and Punjab, the Mahasabha, by its tough stand could gain a foothold in organizing public opinion which f

S.P. Mookerjee to YD. Savarkar, 31 August 1944, S.P. Mookerjee Papers, Instalment II-IV, Subject File No. 61, 1944, p. 253. 89 Similarly, Narendra Nath Das to S.P. Mookerjee, ibid., p. 173. 9() Ibid., p. 295. 91 S.P. Mookerjee to Master Tara Singh, 23 August 1944, ibid., p. 321. 88

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was apprehensive. The absence of the Congress workers or any other leader of standing, made its position favourable. The Mahasabha leaders thought of consolidating the public opinion. The Punjab Hindu Sabha leaders were in touch with the Bengal Sabha leaders. One Brijlal, writing to Shyama Prasad Mookerjee on behalf of the Punjab Hindu Vigilance Board, suggested attempts for consolidation of non-Muslim League public opinion. He wrote: "I agree with you that Mahatma Gandhi and the National Congress should give up for good their policy of appeasing the communalist Muslims .... Rather than wasting our time and energy on him it is better to consolidate the non-Muslim League public opinion"n Sarat Chandra Guha, president, Barisal District Hindu Mahasabha, wrote to Shyama Prasad: Ignoring all this Mahatma agreed to this particular without consulting Bengal at all. This will if carried out liquidate Bengal. The Bengalees will fight this menace under your leadership to their utmost might. [The] Local Congress, though many [are] against it, is vacillating. Only the Communist boys are loud in support of Mahatma along with Muslim League. We had a meeting of protest yesterday in which the Communists created little trouble but no body takes this into account." Intensity of feelings could be heard from Dhaka from where Girish Chandra Ghosh, a pleader in the district court wrote: " ... The Rajagopalachari proposal has to be resisted by allmeans"94 The protest against CR Formula gave a boost to the organizing efforts of the local Hindu Sabhas as could be seen from this report sent to Shyama Prasad Mookerjee on 14 August from Faridpur. ... I intend to reorganise the branch Sabhas by enlisting members and to form new branches wherever possible. Sj. Sara t Ch. Guha came here and he has taken charge of Madaripur Subdivision. It is expected that half the members may be enlisted from Madaripur. 92 Brijlal, Punjab Hindu Vigilance Board, Nabha, to S.P. Mookerjee, 20 October 1944, ibid., p. 19. 93 Sarat Chandra Guha, President, Barisal District Hindu Mahasabha, to Shyama Prasad Mookerjee, 7 August 1994, ibid., p. 285. 94 Girish Chandra Ghosh, Pleader, District Court, Dhaka, to S.P. Mookerjee, 20 August 1944, ibid., p. 257.

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The Pakistan protest meeting was held here on 7 August last. The Communists came in a body to create disturbances in the meeting .... The Ambica hall was packed up. We were sufficiently strong and had a grand majority. The protest resolution was moved, seconded and supported without any disturbances. Afterwards some Communists wanted to speak but they were not allowed to proceed." The opposition to the CR Formula brought the Hindu Mahasabha's slogan of Hindu unity into the forefront. A public meeting at Faridpur declared the formula anti-national and a "great hindrance to the independence of India. This meeting urges the Hindus to unite and to oppose it at all costs".96 The CR Formula, it was felt, would vivisect India, especially Bengal and the Punjab. The fear of the partition ofIndia agitated people's mind and the Mahasabha tried to give the fear an organized form. This was reflected in constantly perceived threat of vivisection, that the Hindu Mahasabha accused the CR Formula of generating. At the Jessore District Hindu Mahasabha meeting, it was stated: This meeting strongly condemns and records its protest against the Pakistan scheme in any form whatsoever introduced as at present by Mr Rajagopalachari and sanctioned by Mahatma Gandhi in his individual capacity, in as much as it tends to the vivisection ofIndia which is detrimental to the interests of the people of India specially those of Bengal. 97 Thus, the feeling of indignation was so great that even those people who had never attended Hindu Mahasabha meetings, readily responded to its call. 98 The indignation and apprehension that the Mahasabha leaders saw prevailing in the country soon Rajendra Nath Sen, Secretary, District Hindu Mahasabha, Faridpur to S.P. Mookerjee, 14 August 1944, ibid., pp. 233-34. 96 P.e. Moitra, President, Faridpur Hindu Mahasabha to S.P. Mookerjee, ibid., p. 237. '17 Resolution of the Jessore District Hindu Mahasabha passed on 7 August 1944, Jogendra Basu, President, Jessore District Hindu Mahasabha to S.P. Mookerjee, ibid., p.305. 98 Sarat Chandra Guha, President, Barisal Hindu Mahasabha to S.P. Mookerjee, 11 September 1944, ibid., p. 90. 95

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catapulted Shyama Prasad Mookerjee to the position of a major national spokesman. People from outside Bengal, especially the Hindu Mahasabha supporters, wanted him to take the lead. On 31 August, in reply to the correspondent Chandravarkar, Shyama Prasad Mookerjee refuted the charge that "he was lying low". He told Chandravarkar: I have been holding meetings in Bengal which have been attended by thousands of people and organising public opinion in every district. More than five hundred protest meetings have been held and resolutions adopted by various classes of people .... A large section of Congressmen is working with us. From the statement which I have issued I think I have made it abundantly clear that I am not just keeping quite [sic] and allowing things to drift. 99 On the same day he wrote to Savarkar stating his approval of an all-party anti-Pakistan conference in Delhi in Octoberl °O He was seen as a saviour and was compared with Surendra Nath Banerjee who, in the words of one correspondent, had saved Bengal from getting partitioned.!O! Shyama Prasad went to Sevagram and met Gandhi in order to apprise him of the apprehensions and resenbnent in Bengal. His enhanced status could be seen in that the Hindu Mahasabha members advised him to not meet Gandhi as it would weaken his and the Sabha's position. MV Ganapa ti, general secretary, Hindu Mahasabha, Madras wrote to him: Do not meet Gandhi. First of all you will put yourself personally in the wrong, even though innocently. ... We are thinking to make you President of the Mahasabha next year. But our President should not go seeking interview with any other leader.!02 In fact, P. Varadarajulu Naidu, president, Madras Hindu Mahasabha, also opined that his meeting with Gandhi would S.P. Mookerjee to Chandravarkar, 31 August 1944, ibid., p. 241. Ibid., p. 253. 10 1 Akhil Chandra Dutta to S.P. Mookerjee, 19 August 1944, ibid., pp. 259-61. 102 M. V Ganapati, General Secretary, All India Hindu Mahasabha, Madras, 30 July 1944, ibid., p. 302. 99

100

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weaken the Mahasabha lO3 This stemmed from the same apprehension expressed for the Gandhi-Jinnah meeting. Shyama Prasad, however, was sure that no result would ensue from the Gandhi-Jinnah meeting. He wrote, "Gandhi himself does not realise the harm tha t has been done in Bengal in respect of those Muslims who were so long fighting with the League. These Muslims rightly feel that they have been let down and they do not know where to go" .104 The colonial eye only saw what it wanted to see-the advantage for Jinnah in whatever form it might come. About the Punjab situation, a colonial authority reports: Political interest has been focussed on the coming conversations between Gandhi and Jinnah .... Whatever Gandhi's intentions may have been, his advance to Jinnah has certainly come at a most inopportune time so far as the Unionist Party is concerned. Jinnah's shares in the political market had begun to deteriorate. Thanks to Mr. Gandhi, Jinnah's importance has now revived and he will certainly do his best to ascribe to the Unionist the blame for any failure or disappointment in store for him at Bombay. ... Gandhi's manouvres have had the effect of solidifying the great bulk of Punjabi Hindus and Sikhs against Pakistan. There is a very strong feeling that Gandhi's behaviour in using minority communities in the Punjab as a pawn in his game without consulting them in advance was most reprehensible. lOS (Italics mine) To a great extent this was true. In fact, Gandhi's approval of the CR Formula and his subsequent meeting gave Jinnah an enhanced and representative status. This, in Bengal, meant that the internal dynamic of Muslim politics gave increased legitimacy to the idea of Pakistan than the socialist agenda that Abul Hashim, as he said, was propagating. 106 Pakistan got concretized in the imagination of the people. This endorsement also took

Varadarajulu Naidu to S.P. Mookerjee, 30 July 1944, ibid., p. 304. S.P. Mookerjee to S. Sad anand, Managing Editor, Free Press Journal, Bombay, 14 September 1944, ibid. 105 B. Glancy (Governor of Punjab) to Wavell, 23 August 1944, TOP, VoL Iv;. pp. 1223-24. 106 Abul Hashim, Amar Jibon, pp. 60-65. 103 104

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away from the Congress the moral strength to fight Pakistan in Bengal (and in the Punjab). Atthe same time, it brought into prominence Dr Shyama Prasad Mookerjee in Bengal and Master Tara Singh in Punjab to lead the fight against Pakistan I 07 Thus, the surrender of the anti-Pakistan movement to the two communal organs resulted in the heightening of the communal boundaries and increased legitimacy to the communal demands and that of Pakistan.

IV For the Communist party, the CR proposals and the subsequent correspondence between Gandhi and Jinnah came as an endorsement, both of its own appeal for national unity and of its demand for Congress' acceptance of the Pakistan demand as one for selfdetermination by the Muslims in India. It took upon itself to defend the CR proposals and the Pakistan demands with utmost energy and declared: "patriotic opinion of all sections in India backs it".lOS The Communists found the Reactions to Gandhiji's interview with Gelder and to Rajaji's formula on communal settlement stand in striking contrast to the atmosphere of mudslinging and communal discussion which prevailed in Bengal upto quite recently, following the controversy on the Secondary Education Bill. The generalfeeling among the people at large is that a great turning point as at hand l O9 The Communist party's reading of the situa tion, as reflected in its own press, was contrary to that of the Hindu Mahasabha. It said: Congress and League circles are both favourably impressed and the disruptive criticism coming from the dovecotes of the Hindu Sabha, the Proja Party and the Forward Bloc is not finding the public response they expected. The general feeling among the people at large is that a great turning point is at hand l !O 107 108 109

110

Amrit Bamr Patriki1., Calcutta, 6 August 1944, p. 4. People's War, Bombay, 23 July 1943, p. 1. Ibid. Ibid.

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Communalism in Bengal

Thus, the party took upon itself to attack any opposition to the CR Formula and labelled it as "Hindu Mahasabhite" or Hindu communal opposition. The party constantly dubbed Kiron Shankar Roy's criticism of the CR Formula as evidence of his closure of ranks with Hindu Mahasabha and Shyama Prasad Mookerjee. It emphasized the isolated stand of Kiron Shankar Roy in this regard. In a lead article, Nikhil Chakravartywrote about the overwhelming support that Gandhiji's formula was receiving from all quarters and especially from among the Congressmen. ll1 It also suggested that the anti-CR Formula stand was not that of the Congressmen but that of the "Official Congressmen" who had been in an unholy alliance with the Hindu Mahasabha. 1l2 He wrote: But the trouble is not with Congressmen, but with the official leadership of the Congress .... But one year of unholy alliance with Shyamaprosad [sic1has made them too weak, they cannot leave him. Their neutrality and inactivity has, however, only encouraged the Bose-ite press and leaders to intensify their anti-Gandhi campaign and become more disruptive provocative and communal day by day. ... The campaign terrorised Kiron Shankar to line up behind this Forward Bloc-Hindu Sabha cry against Gandhijiand unfortunately got from him this statement, published on 30 July: "It is understood that a large number of Congress leaders and workers including some members of the AICC belonging to Calcuttra and the Mofussil recently met" where it is felt that Rajaji's formula meant the vivisection ofIndia and partitioning of Bengal and therefore was unacceptable. Further, the principle underlying the formula ran counter to the last resolution passed by the AICC on the subject. 1l3 (Italics mine) f

However, the correspondent also tried to show how some of the groups of the official Congress were criticising the stand taken by Kiron Shankar Roy. The Nirmok group of Hooghly, he continued, in one of their meeting on 23 July declared "complete

111 112 113

Ibid., 6 August 1944, p.3. Ibid. Ibid.

Politics Overtakes Hunger

163

agreement with the recent writings and utterances of Mahabna Gandhi".114 SimilarlYf the Congress workers in Burra Bazarf it reported, met on 23 July and" accepted the solution of the present stalemate offered by Mahatmaji and Rajaji". 115 The Communist party now declared Kiron Shankar Roy's criticism of the CR Formula as unrepresentative, and instead tried to show how there was a genuine mass support for the move and how he had been criticized from different quarters including Gandhians like Satish Chandra Dasgupta 11 6 The Muslim League resolutions and the district leaders' support to the Rajaji formula, and Gandhi's approval of Bengal's support to the move was also highlighted. 1l7 The party, by attacking all opposition to the CR Formula as communal opposition, in fact, helped to narrow down the differences between the communal opposition to the idea of Pakistan and the non-communal opposition to it. Any opposition to the idea of partition was criticized and declared as absurd. Writing on the absurdity of the fear of partition, Somnath Lahiry said: There is nothing inconsistent in fighting partition forty years ago and recognising Pakistan today. Then it was fighting against the Government, today also recognition of Pakistan is to unite our people to fight against the Government. I would rather live in a free Pakistan than in an enslaved Hindustan [Sic].118 Once this line of argument was accepted, it became extremely difficult to differentiate between the logic behind the Congress' support of the partition of Bengal and that of the Mahasabha's in 1947. The party workers also assisted the Rajshahi District Muslim League to organize a Pakistan conference in 1944, in which Abul Hashim, who was touring the province on his mission to strengthen the League participated. Talking on the Gandhi-Jinnah meet, Hashim reciprocated the help by clothing his ideas on Pakistan in a language which only the communist leaders mastered in their utterings on Pakistan. Gandhi-Jinnah meeting was

114 115 116 117 118

Ibid., 20 August 1944, p. 1. Ibid. Ibid., 6 August 1944, p.3. See, ibid., 23 July 1944, p. 1; 6 August 1944, p . 3; 13 August 1944, p. 3. See, ibid., 27 August 1944, p. 5.

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Communalism in Bengal

described as not just a meeting between two leaders but, " ... the joining hands of forty crores of Hindus and Muslims." Hashim, said: Some say that Gandhiji's recognition of the right to self-determination is a defeat for him at Mr Jinnah's hands, but it is not so; the real defeat is for imperialism. And his acceptance of the right is the biggest guarantee of Indian unity.ll9 The party likened the CR Formula and Gandhi-Jinnah meeting and the attempt to come to an agreement with the Muslim League to its own national unity line for which it had been campaigning for some time. What was missed out in their espousal of the CR Formula and the Gandhi-Jinnah meeting was Gandhi's resistance to the Iltvvo nation theory". On the other hand, the Communist slogan of national unity had by now got mixed up with its support to the Muslim League's demand for recognition of a separate Muslim nation. Thus, the two positions were totally opposed to each other. The political imperative had forced the Communist party to recognize a communal demand as a national one. It not only supported the demand but campaigned for it too.

119

Ibid.

FOUR

War is Over: Efforts at Freedom In early 1945, the colonial authorities were troubled about certain political developments in the province.! The Governor was worried over N azimuddin' s declaration that there was a possibility of cooperation with the Congress. Colville, the officiating Governor General, felt that any such rapprochement between the Muslim League and the Congress leading to the formation of a coalition ministry in Bengal might cause 1/ a rise in political tempera hue".2 He was also worried about Gandhi's intended visit to Bengal, and that it might prejudice the discussions taking place between Wavell and the Cabinet in London. 3 Such a possibility would then have raised the question of releasing the political prisoners. The release of political prisoners was one major political question on which the Bengal Congress always took an adamant position vis-a.-vis the

1

Casey to Colville, 23 March 1945, TOP, VoL

~

p. 715.

Under outward appearance of quiet there has been considerable political manoeuvring in Bengal of late. The principal factors are: 1. Stresses and personal ambitions among League Ministry and its followers. 2. Approach to Nazimuddin by Kiron Shankar Roy, leader of orthodox Congress in Bengal, on the question of the formation of a LeagueCongress Ministry. This approach took place on March 21st and Nazimuddin told me about it today, March 22nd. 3. Alleged negotiations between orthodox Congress and forward block group (Sarat Bose) for re-amalgamation of Bengal Congress.

Suggestions for a visit of Gandhi to Bengal including :Midnapore are part of the background. 2 Colville to Amery, 23 March 1945, ibid., p. 717. 3

Ibid.

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Communalism in Bengal

colonial administration. This was the stand which was a reason for the provincial Congress not forming a coalition government with Fazlul Huq ministry in 1937. The Congress leadership had insisted right from the beginning that release of the political prisoners was their primary demand. Therefore, he disapproved of any show of encouragement to Gandhi's visit, and to the process of formation of a coalition ministry. Colville wrote to the Secretary of State that he "would advise the ministry not to give any encouragement to Gandhi to visit Midnapore".4 He also said that there seemed lllittle indication that possible advantages of a proposed coalition outweigh disadvantages of having a ministry that will press for release and possibly resign on the issue."5 While the colonial authorities were deliberating on the possible repercussions of any such rapprochement, the ministry suffered a defeat on 28 March 1945 when 21 members of Nazimuddin's tottering coalition crossed the floor and the ministry's" Agricultural budget" (sic) was defeated by 106 votes to 97 6 The Speaker, Syed Nausher Ali, declared the Assembly functus officio (out of office).' Thus, after remaining in office for two years, the opposition sent the ministry packing in a dramatic manner that was reminiscent of the way it was once ushered into office by the colonial authorities. The Governor had already shown his predilection for administering the province without a ministry. The Governor wrote f

The situation in Bengal is such that I am convinced that a substantial period of Section 93 Government is essential (repeat essential). Combining the prospective food situation and many other problems facing this province with the expected intensification of war against Japan (when presumably Bengal will be an even more important British base than now) I cannot contemplate without grave anxiety the drag which an inevitably corrupt and inefficient ministry would place on Bengal administration.

Ibid., Ibid., 6 N.N. Vol. V, 7 Ibid. 4

5

p. 718. p. 717.

Mitra ed., Annual Register, 1945, Vol. I, pp. 193-94. Also see, TOP, p. 831.

War is Over: Efforts at Freedom

167

In fact, he not only wanted to run the administration under Section 93 but wanted the spell to last a bit longer as well. ... further it is essential that with a view to new elections and a revitalised and cleansed legislature ... I therefore contemplate period of Section 93 government until new elections .... I believe that we will be able to show substantially better results under Section 93 than under any Ministry. ... I trust that my advice as regards the prolongation of Section 93 will be accepted by yourself and by Secretary of StateS It is quite clear from the above that though he had mentioned the possibility of a coalition to Colville, he would not have facilita ted such a move even if the Governor General had advised him to do so. He kept on impressing upon the authorities the need to have elections before revoking Section 93 9-a request the authorities were not very keen to concede. 10

I IICommunal antipathy" had by now attained such an autonomy that it was even cited by the colonial authorities as a factor holding them back from committing to an early election. The reason for not holding an early election was explained in terms of the prevailing Indian situation, as becomes clear from the official correspondence. Colville wrote to Amery: If general elections were held all over India, Pakistan would be a vital issue, and in view of the possibility of early constitutional changes the elections would presumably be treated as of

Casey to Colville, 30 March 1945, TOP, VoL V, pp. 785-86. Wavell had written in June, "after six months of experience of Bengal politics and administration, Casey is burning to take over the province under Section 93". Penderal Moon, Wavell, p. 77. 9 Entry on 13 June 1945, Casey's Diary, Richard G. Casey Papers (Microfilm) Reel No.2, p. 62. 10 Memorandum by the Secretary of State for India, War Cabinet Papers, w.P. (45) 218, 5 Ap,il 1945, TOP, Vol. V, p. 832. 8

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Communalism in Bengal

quite exceptional importance and be fought with the utmost vigour and bitterness. Communal antipathies might be accentuated, and at the end of the elections Congress and the Muslim League might be even further apart than they are nowl1 By virtue of the existence of this autonomous realm, the British now convincingly played the role of the "honest broker" in the arena of political Iinegotiations"f while in the social sphere f the colonial presence was justifiable as the variable that prevented communal antipathy from bursting into a communal conflagration. The situation prevailing in some parts of the province indeed substantiated such a justification. The other face of this argument was that while an alliance between the Congress and the League would lessen the bitterness betvveen the two communities}2 it would be fraught with the problem of "raising the politicalheat"13 Thus, keeping them apart was a safe strategy. The Governor, in a letter to the Governor General in September 1944, had referred to the report of the District Magistrate of Dhaka: No Hindu or Muslim, no matter how upright, honest or public minded he may be, is to be trusted for a single moment when he is making a statement about members of the opposite community and their actions. Dacca is divided throughout the 24 hours, into two camps, each of them feeling a deep rooted distrust of anything said or done by the other. The vast majority would never commit any crime or violence themselves-but communalism has taken such a hold on even the wisest and soberest that they do not, for one moment, consider that a crime

11 12

Colville to Amery, 2 April 1945, ibid., p. 808. Casey to Colville, 23 March 1945, ibid., p. 715 . ... the principal problem which is exercising my mind is the attitude I should take in the event of offer of a straightforward combination between Kiran and Nazimuddin as basis of a League-Congress :Ministry and on the assumption that such a combination would promise: (a) a stronger government free from the vacillations of venal supporters, (b) Hindu satisfaction and decrease of communal bitterness, (c) decline of the influence of the more virulent sections of Mahasabha, and (d) possible receding into the background, so far as influential politicians in Bengal are concerned, of demands for Pakistan.. (Ibid.)

13

See fn. 2 of this chapter.

War is Over: Efforts at Freedom

169

committed by a member of the other. Prevalence of such a state of mind provides an atmosphere in which the you th of Dacca know for certain that no matter what excesses they commit they will not be given away by their community.!4 In the same vein however Casey argued for a continua tion of the Governor's rule: "[ believe that Section 93 would remove the main present cause of trouble in Dhaka . 15 However the communal situation in Dhaka had accentuated more due to the communal riot of1941 than administrative failure of any sort. Therefore, justifying the administration of the province due to the communal relations was slightly off the mark. The Governor evinced a deep interest in the Iistate of Pakistan frequently even surpassing that of Suhrawardy,!6 now the most important leader of the League in the province. He made repeated efforts to understand how the provincial leaders defined Pakistan I7 It may be quite interesting to note here that a high ranking official, as high as the Governor of Punjab, believed that the "British themselves had contributed to the growth of the Pakistan idea as they had given it recognition in all constitutional discussions of 1942 without ever asking Jinnah what he meant by il.!8 Casey, while he was engaging the Muslim League leaders in the discussion of Pakistan was also aware of the increasing communalization of the administration a fact he addressed as Mussalmanization. He administered a note of caution to Nazimmuddin on what he called the IIMussalmanisation of the province He wrote: f

f

ff

f

ff

ff

f

ff

•

[repeated to him [Nazimuddin] ... that! was convinced that he was trying to go too fast in respect of the Mussalmanisation of

From a report by the District Magistrate of Dacca, commenting on the outbreak of stabbings in Dacca in June. See, entry on 30 July, Casey's Diary, Reel No.1, p.2. 15 Entry on 29 July 1944, Casey's Diary, Reel No.1, p.2. 16 Entry on 15 October 1944, ibid., p. 27. 17 It is quite interesting that Clow, the Punjab Governor, was of the view that the British themselves had contributed to the growth of the Pakistan idea because they had given recognition to it in the constitutional proposals of 1942 without ever asking Jinnah what he meant by it. See Anita Inder Singh, The Origins of Partition of India, Delhi, 1987, p. 143. 18 Ibid. 14

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Communalism in Bengal

administration-and that I did not desire to impress on Hindus that eastern Pakistan would be a joint Muslim-Hindu enterprise. I said that I thought it was rather significant that Ayyar, Mitter and Lakshmanan were all leaving the Bengal administration in one month. I said that I realised there were ostensible reasons to explain why each one was leaving-but that I was convinced that the real reason was that the government was making it clear that no Hindus were wanted-and that, if the drift went on, it would be an extremely bad thing for Bengalas there were a wholly insufficient number of qualified Muslims to take their places. He took all this in gloomy silence ... 19 The defeat of the ministry in the Legislative Assembly came as a relief to him, though he made known his displeasure with "the decision of the Speaker" as he thought it should rightly have been taken by the Governor himself." The League, however, did not take the dismissal lightly and soon the leaders began attacking those whom they thought responsible for this. Suhrawardy pinned the blame on the Marwaris and the Hindu Banias. A report said, "As the discussion bell rang, Mr Suhrawardy. .. shouted ... and said that if they were defeated today they would go out because there was a conspiracy of black marketers and profiteers on the other side. He added that the opposition was supported by hoarders, profiteers and black marketers and were trading with Marwari money."2! While addressing the meeting of the Calcutta Hawkers' and Vendors' Union, he said, IIMarwaris have challenged me to prove allegations of bribery with which they purchased some members off and defeated the Muslim League ministry"." Technically speaking, of course, the men responsible for the defeat were the 12 members of the ministerial party who had voted along with the opposition." Their statement revealed signs of fissures in the Muslim League on issues such as the working of the cabinet and the programmes and policies of the party. They

Entry on 14 October 1944, Casey's Diary, Reel No.1, p. 110. "It was my function to say whether there was a ministry in office, not the Speaker'S.", Richard C. Casey, Personal Experience, 1939-46, London, 1962,

19 20

pp.216-67. N.N. Mitra ed., Annual Register, 1945, VoL I, p. 197. 22 Star of India, Calcutta, 7 April 1945, p. 2. 23 Amrit Bazar Patrika, Calcutta, 4 April 1945, p. 1. 21

War is Over: Efforts at Freedom

171

blamed the ministry for various lapses which included "the doubling of sales tax, agricultural income tax, indiscriminate ... distribution of contracts, patronage to relations and friends, nepotism and favouritism of a reprehensible character" .24 However by accusing the Marwaris and Hindu Banias, the League leadership tried to externalize these internal feuds which, in turn, helped it to construct a vicious other on whom it could transpose the blame. At this juncture, the memory of the famine was resurrected and the attention of the Muslim masses was directed towards the profiteers and hoarders who had played havoc with their lives.25 The League ministry offered itself as the only saviour of the people in the light of the continued active presence of these elements. In a meeting at Muhammed Ali Park on 22 April, Suhrawardy's meritorious services during the famine, in checking the black mar keters and making the rationing scheme a success were remembered with gratitude." The Greater Calcutta League Conference held on23 April, demanded the revival of the League ministry, and declared that under no circumstances would the Muslims tolerate an anti-League ministry in Bengal." The League, therefore, brought back the famine and the sufferings wrought by it into the political discourse as a means to present itself as the protector of the Muslim masses. 28 The Bengal Provincial League had been trying since the 1930s to organize students. In fact, the activities of youth and students proved to be the best manifestation of the dissemination of its ideological content. Communal clashes on the issues of singing Vande Malaram and celebra tion of Saraswati Puja became quite regular in schools and colleges. In February 1943, the Dhaka University had witnessed one of the worst communal fracas between the Hindu and Muslim students.'" In Pabna, the Hindu students of Edward's College went on a strike protesting against the "slaughter of goat" on the Id day by the Muslim students in the College premises. Incidents of similar nature go to suggest the f

f

Ibid. Star of India, Calcutta, 25 April 1945, p.3. 26 Ibid. v Ibid., 24 April 1945, p. 3. 29 FR, February, second half, Home Political, File No. 18/2/44. 24 25

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Communalism in Bengal

bitter communal polarization that had come to dominate the province by this time.3D It was the emblem of Pakistan that was now used to mobilize the Muslims. In Murshidabad and Dacca, party meetings were organized and resolutions on Pakistan and the Secondary Education Bill were passed. 3 ! In Rangpur, Rajshahi and Noakhali the party was active in mobilizing public opinion around Pakistan. 32 There were two distinct interpretations that emerged regarding the meaning of Pakistan, though their political content was the same-a free, independent, but separate nation. Speaking at Pakistan Club, Abul Hashim gave his interpretation: Pak means only this that in countries like Assam, NWFP, Punjab, Baluchistan... the people must have completely free and independent State but this does not mean that we are asking freedom for us only but freedom for the whole of India. 33 On the other hand, there were people who abhorred this interpretation of Pakistan, especially the leadership including Nazimuddin, Akram Khan and those who constantly accussed Abul Hashim of being a Communist. Their idea of Pakistan and their suspicion of the Communists was articulated by Liaqat Ali Khan while addressing students on 11 May: My young friends who believe that Communism or through Communism they will secure Pakistan are greatly mistaken. They may secure Pakistan of the conception of Communism but they will not secure the Pakistan of Islamic conception. Pakistan has no meaning for me if it is not of Islamic conception. 34 Regarding the tactics of the Communists, he said, "I warn you against the grea t danger of Communism to Islam .... I do not want any Muslim to come to our Muslim League received with open arms and then to play the part of Shivaji".35 The demand and the

34

Amrit Bazar Patrika, Calcutta, 17 December 1944, p.2. FR, January, first half, 1945, Home Political, File No. 18/1/45. FR, January, second half, 1945, ibid. Star of India, Calcutta, 30 March 1945, p. 1. Ibid., 12 May 1945, p. 1.

35

Ibid.

30 31 32 33

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173

symbol of Pakistan now began to submerge the differences between the demands of class and that of community. It was not just a chanellization of these notions, and this reflects the hegemonic and overdetermining nature of the Pakistan idea. The earlier sharpness of the debate, and the fiery contest between those who demanded prioritizing primary and mass education for the Muslims and those demanding reserva tions etc' in secondary and higher education, were gradually blunted and the prolonged agitation over the Secondary Education Bill helped in this-" Now the students were asked to both "agitate for a Muslim University in Bengar' and take Iisteps for free primary education for the Muslim masses" Y This reflected the process of homogenization engendered by the movement, a delicate compromise of the interests of class and community. Speaking at the 8th session of the All Bengal Muslim Students" League in Kushtia on 1 January 1945, Prof A.B. Halim, former Vice-Principal of Aligarh College, asked the students to join the Pakistan movement because he felt that the "Muslims of Bengal have taken a back seat in the whole of Muslim India".38 Coming in the wake of the Secondary Education Bill fiasco the session passed a resolution demanding a separate Muslim University in Bengal" and asked lithe students to join the Muslim League" because "the Muslims could not rely upon their elder brothers the Hindus for the defence of their culture".39 The League tried to penetrate the domain of organized labour also. Here they faced the communists who had been organizing the labour for quite some time. Earlier, Suhrawardy had started organizing labourers under the auspices of his white unions. Now it tried to organize railwaymen and Jute mill workers. The Railway Muslim League's first session was held at Lilooah on 23 April under the Presidentship of the League MLA, S.M. Nauman. 40 f

f

f

II

For a detailed discussion on the differences and debates between different sections of the Muslim leadership over the question of education, see Chandi Prasad SarkarI Politicisation of Bengali Muslims, pp. 60-70. 37 Star of India, Calcutta, 3 January 1945, p. 3. 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid. See also FR, January, first half, 1945, Home Political, File No. 18/1/45. 40 Star of India, Calcutta, 3 May 1945, p. 3. 36

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Communalism in Bengal

The League's influence in the provincial and national politics had certainly increased since 1943. The ravages of the famine and the subsequent epidemic did not affect this growth. The announcement of elections enthused the party, as it perceived a major contest that could translate its influence into a hegemonic presence.

II The famine, the Secondary Education Bill and the Gandhi-Jinnah meetings were all platforms catapulting the Mahasabha and Syama Prasad Mookerjee as one of the predominant political voices in the province. This was facilitated by the absence of an active Congress. The absence of a large organization and continued lack of popular support however remained a constant refrain with Mahasabha. This, on the other hand influenced its policy and attitude vis-a.-vis the Congress as it saw the latter as a rival. The famine had provided, as we have seen, the Mahasabha with the opportunity and scope to reach beyond its middle-class base, i.e., into different sections and classes of the population. It also helped it increase its membership. This stimulated the party in Bengal to launch a membership drive in 1944 with the objective of enrolling one lakh members into its fold within three months. Subsequently, ad hoc committees were formed in almost all the districts,'! and the vice president of the Provincial Mahasabha was put in charge of organizational matters. In a circular to the president of Rajshahi District Hindu Sabha, he wrote: "! am confident that you are going forward and moving in the matter with determination .42 People were sent to various districts to organize new branches of the Mahasabha. Dhirendra Kumar Biswas and Purnachandra Chakravorti were sent to organize the Mahasabha branches in Rajshahi. 43 !nNoakhali, Brojesh Chandra f

f

ff

Ashutosh Lahiry to Rai Surendra Nath Gupta Bahadur, 9 January 1945, S.P. Mookerjee Papers, Instalment II-IV, F. 74, Part III, p. 66. Manoranjan Choudhury, however, indicated that the target of the Mahasabha was to enrol four lakh members by 30 November 1944. See, Manoranjan Choudhury, secretary BPHM, 18 August 1944, ibid., F. 120, p. 1. 42 Ibid. 43 Ashutosh Lahiry to Rai Sillendra Nath Gupta Bahadur, 14 August 1945, ibid., pp. 36-38. 41

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175

Chakraborti Thakur was in-charge'4 The mode of organization was to propagate Mahasabha's ideas during festivals like Jhulan and the Janmastami, both celebrated in the honour of Lord Krishna. The Mahasabha tried to associate itself with social issues like advocacy against untouchability and widow remarriage. Widow remarriages were encouraged through its organs. Interested people were asked to come to the Mahasabha offices. Vidhava Vivah Sahayak Sabha (VVSS), a Mahasabha organ, advocated these marriages. The local Hindu Mahasabha branches were active in this field. News of these marriages and advertisements for assistance came out regularly in the Mahasabha organ. 45 At the same time one witnessed that the Mahasabha tried to use the very active Vaishnava tradition, which had popularized the collective reading of the Bhagabat. The Mahasabha was directly and indirectly helped by the Bharat Sebashram Sangha (BSS) in these matters.46 The Mahasabha organ reporting the organizational activities said: Bolpur Jhulan utsav-on the occasion of Jhulan Jatra, President of the Sevashram Samity, Shri Pundarikaksha Hati. .. and organiser of Bengal Hindu Mahasabha Anandi Kinkar Ray. .. a week long celebration was organised ... attended by thousands of people. Secretary of the District Hindu Mahasabha was also present there. 47 On these occasions, the Mahasabha leaders of the locality made speeches and encouraged people to join the Mahasabha fold. After a Bhagabat reading in Mymensingh on 8 August, Jagadish Shastri, the Mahasabha preacher, spoke about the significance of Hindu Sangathan and Sangha. 48 The political expediency of presenting a Hindu front had been the guiding factor in the Sabha's efforts to mobilize the SC Manoranjan Choudhury to Nalini Ranjan Mitra, Khilpara, Noakhali, 8 August 1945, ibid., F. 70, Pt. II, p. 218. 45 See news item on widow remarriage, Hindustan, Calcutta, 6 September 44

1~p.~27~_ml~p.12~20~~ml~p.20~

Papia Chakravarty has discussed the relationship between the Mahasabha and the BSS in great detail. See, Papia Chakravarty, Hindu Response, pp.

46

226-52. 47 Hindustan, Calcutta, 23 August 1945, p. 26. 48 Hindustan, Calcutta, 30 August 1945, p. 44.

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Communalism in Bengal

population. In Bakerganj, which had a substantial SC population, a very active leader, Upendra Nath Edbar, helped the party in this effort.'9 A conference of Mahasabha workers' was also organized during the Puja (Dussehra) vacations. 50 Notvvithstanding its active involvement in these organizational activities, the party distinctively lacked any appeal among people. The leaders too were conscious that the party's reach had not yet gone beyond certain sections of the popula tion. Shyama Prasad Mookerjee articulated this feeling of the Mahasabha leadership. IIIf Mahasabha remains an organisation confined only to a section ofthe educa ted upper classes completely detached from the mass contact it is bound to prove a distant failure."51 It was only around "Hindu interests" that the Sabha tried to attract people to its fold. For members like ManoranjanChoudhury, this was because the Mahasabha lacked any" economic perspective" .52 A close analysis of his economic perspective interestingly shows that he himself was not very clear as to what he meant by economic interests". He however accepted the fact tha t the lack of such (economic) perspective did not help the Mahasabha to grow. Choudhury tried to attract the attention of the leadership towards this issue and assured them that if given the responsibility he might correct the situation, i.e., he would be able to recruit more members. The economic agenda tha t he provided in his appeal, was nothing more than an economic code of conduct for the individual Sangathan member. He suggested, for example, "that no Sangathanist shall spend more than 50 rupees per month" or that "they shall only travel in buses or in the third class comparbnent" (SiC). 53 He did not have an economic perspective of social problems as SUCh. 54 In the absence of an economic perspective, the Mahasabha's invocation of Hindu solidarity was dependent upon the presumed role of Hindus in the face of the Congress attitude II

f

f

See, Sekhar Bandyopadhyay, "From Alienation to Integration", fn. 136. Hindustan, Calcutta, 27 September 1945, p. 105. 5 1 Shyama Prasad Mookerjee, Awake Hindustan, p.34. 52 Manoranjan Choudhury, Secretary, BPHM, 18 August 1944, S.P. Mookerjee Papers, Instalment II-IV, F. 120, pp. 1-5. 53 Ibid., pp. 4-5. 54 Ibid. 49

5()

War is Over: Efforts at Freedom

177

towards the demands of the Muslim League, due to which the Congress was advocating false and unpractical Nationalism". Speaking at the Tejpur union Mahasabha meeting, its secretary, Prasad Chandra Chakrabarty, told the audience: Iia

Congressmen like Gandhiji, etc., are running after an indefinite and unpractical nationalism by rejecting Hindutva. But inspired by Chatrapati Shivaji and Maharana Pratap, the Mahasabha leaders are eager to arouse India's own Hindutva identity. One wants to dig a new river and bring water into it while the aim of the other is to desilt the powerful river which has been there for ages. 55 The Hindu Mahasabha proclaimed itself as the true and exclusive representative of Hindu interests, which, it declared, Ilcoin_ cided with those of the nation itself"." This identification of the IIHindu interests" with the nation was taken forward when the questions regarding the membership ofMahasabha came up. On the question of allowing non-Hindus to become members of the Mahasabha, Savarkar declared: If for economic and political reasons non-Hindus are allowed to join the Hindu Mahasabha then only the unity of the Hindus will be destroyed. It is because in Bharatvarsha every political problem is related to religious or cultural problems and every religious and other problems are part of the political problems. On the other hand, though the Pakistan Movement has taken a political shape yet it is enmeshed basically with religious problems. Hindu Mahasabha is the temple of the Hindus. Here only the Hindus have the right to worship national Shiva. We dare not change this temple into mosque or bazaar. In case we commit this mistake Hindus will lose their freedom, as Congress has seen its downfall. 57 (Italics mine)

Thus, the reason for the supposed downfall, of the Congress according to Savarkar, was its allowing non-Hindus to become its members. Hindustan, Calcutta, 5 September 1945, p. 44. S.P. Mookerjee, Awake Hindustan. 57 Veer Savarkar's wire to S.P. Mookerjee, 17 August 1945, S.P. Mookerjee Papers, Instalment II-Iv;. File No. 90. 55

56

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Communalism in Bengal

III The League ministry's acts of omission and commission had been creating conditions for the Mahasabha to enlarge its space. The Mahasabha leadership in the province, however, required to adjust itself to the local situation. In their attempt to adjust their communal premises with nationalism-which was sweeping over the province at that time-the leadership acquired a political language at variance with its national leadership or leaders from other provinces. Shyama Prasad Mookerjee could appreciate the political realities and popular consciousness better than the Mahasabha leaders from other provinces. This became apparent during the annual session of the Mahasabha at Amritsar in 1943 when he was able to pacify the crowd infuriated by the antiCongress statements made by some Mahasabha leaders.58 The Mahasabha leaders, it seems, also realized the limitations of communal politics quite well due to the same context. In the council meeting of the All India Hindu Mahasabha (AIHM) held in Delhi in August 1945, the representatives from Bengal struck a restrained note in an otherwise vituperative and aggressive stance of a large number of delegates. Bhojraj Ajwani, a representative from Sind moved a resolution stating, Ilif the Government did not accept the Mahasabha demands, the Mahasabha should resort to direct action".59 The representative from Punjab, Lala Hardayal, supported this for he felt, "if direct action was carried out Congress would lose its popularity".60 (Italics mine) The response of the representatives from Bengal, on the other hand, was cautious. N.C. Chatterjee, the president of the BPHM, opposed the resolution and saying, Ilit was useless to decide on direct action without making sure whether Mahasabha had adequate resources".'! Similarly, Ashutosh Lahiry, the vice president who was also in-charge of organizational matters said that he had been to different places and had not found the Mahasabha powerful enough to launch a direct action."

58 59 6()

61 62

N.N. :Mitra ed., Annual Register, VoL II, 1943, p.272. Ibid., 1945, VoL IV, p. 154. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid.

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The Mayor of Calcutta, ON. Mukherjee struck a similar note of realizm. He said, "if the committee approved the proposal of direct action, he would be glad to enrol himself for the purpose of launching it but the question was whether they had considered their position fully".63 He further added that his tour of UP and Lahore had showed that they did not have sufficient support. Their first requirement was to organize the people and establish mass contact. 64 Notwithstanding this realization of the limited social base of the party, the Mahasabha leaders began their electoral preparations with a sense of confidence. The party did not want to leave anything to chance. In January 1945 itself, Ashutosh Lahiry, the secretary of the Standing Election Board, asked the members to get themselves registered in the voter's list for the coming elections to the Central Legislative Assembly." Issuing a circular to the Mahasabha branches, he requested them to "immediately apply to the appropriate authorities for registration".66 This confidence was also due to the good performance of the Mahasabha candidates in the recently held local elections in different parts of Bengal. The Mahasabha candidates did extremely well in Suri (Birbhum),67 an area severely affected by the famine. It also played an active part in the locat district and municipal elections in Dhaka,68 BarisaV9 and Noakhali. 70 In Noakhali, the district Mahasabha leaders helped a nonMuslim League candidate Abdul Majid get elected as the district board chairman against the Muslim League nominee. KirtiJebon Ghosh, the treasurer of the district Mahasabha, became the vice chairman by defeating the League supported candidate n

Ibid., p. 155. Ibid. 65 Ashutosh Lahiry, secretary, Standing Election Board, BPHM Circular No. 5, S.P. Mookerjee Papers, Instalment II-IV, Subject File No. 70, Part II, p. 229. 66 Ibid. 67 S.P. Mookerjee Papers, Instalment II-IV, Subject File No. 90, pp. 100-104. 68 Surya Kumar Basu, President, Dhaka District Hindu Mahasabha, 27 February 1945, ibid., pp. 93-94. 69 Sarat Chandra Guha to S.P. Mookerjee, ibid., p. 146. 70 Nalini Ranjan :Mitra to S.P. Mookerjee, 21 January 1945, All India Hindu Mahasabha Papers, File No. P-44, pp. 40-41. 71 Ibid., p.41. 63

M

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The defeat of the district League president led to a split in the League. 72 The N oakhali election was significant for other reasons as well. Nalini Ranjan Mitra, the headmaster of Khilpara High School in Noakhali and a prominent Mahasabha activist in the locality, in his letter to Shyama Prasad Mookerjee, provided a picture of the political configuration during the district board elections. He wrote: In the election of Chairman and a Vice-Chairman of the District Board Noakhali, the League nominee (for Chairmanship) Khan Bahadur Abdul Goffran M.L.e. was defeated by our nominee Abdul Majid M.L.A. (Secretary, Bengal Parliamentary Board) by 20-21 votes. The League nominated for Vice-Chairmanship Babu Saral Saha BA (communist who took an oath of allegiance to the League in an open meeting of the League) was defeated by our nominee Babu Kirti Jibon Ghosh BL (Treasurer, District Mahasabha) by 21-20 votes. Abdul Majid M.L.A. sought nomination for DB Chairmanship but Goffran party (the majority party in the League) did not support him. Abdul Majid is the Vice-President and Goffran is the President of the District League. Between Majid and Goffran there was then contest to capture the Chairmanship of the District Board. Majid being disappointed by the League left the party and joined us-the Zamiat ulema and the Hindu group in the District Board-according to previous arrangement defying the decision of the League. Disciplining action may be taken against him. This is a definite victory for the ulema party and the Hindu Mahasabha party in the District board against the League party.73 (Italics mine) It was around this time that the political concentration was shifted towards Shimla where the Viceroy convened a conference of the leaders of various political parties. Wavell, who desired some initiative from the colonial authorities was being constantly denied this opportunity by the cabinet. The Shimla Conference was a result of a reluctant initiative from the home authorities on the condition that Wavell would not assure anything more than what the cabinet was willing to surrender. This meant that power of defence or foreign relations was not to be given to the Indian representatives. f

f

72

73

FR, February, first half, 1945, Home Political, File No. 18/2/45. Ibid.

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The Hindu Mahasabha was not invited by Wavell to take part in the deliberations in Shimla, to which the party took strong objection. But by treating the Congress as a caste based Hindu party and by trying to demote itto a status on par with the Muslim League, Wavell provided ammunition to the Mahasabha to sharpen its attack against the Congress. The Congress was now accused of succumbing to colonial pressure and accepting parity status with the League, in collusion with the colonial authorities and the League. The Mahasabha declared a bandh (strike) on 8 July 1945 to protest against such a treatment being meted to the majority community.74 It also organized a protest week against the Viceroy's proposals. "It argued that the plan proposed to place the Hindu Community at the mercy of Anglo-Muslim domination."'" The release of the Congress leaders resulted in a rapid change in the political mood in the nation. The Mahasabha was in some discomfort because it soon realized that the people were forgetting the relief and other activities of the party done during the past two years. Its grievance was articulated in a circular to the district and sub-divisional Sabhas. It said: Very few remember now that it is mainly the Hindu Mahasabha which saved thousands of Hindus of the rural areas of the Narayanganj sub-division from worst fate in 1941, which ran to the relief of the cyclone afflicted [sic] Hindus of Mid nap ore and which fought against the terrible famine of 1943 and saved lives of millions of people of the province. The fight against Pakistan has been solely carried out by the Hindu Mahasabha and that Pakistan still remains a far-off cry is largely due to the opposition organised exclusively by the Hindu Mahasabha. Besides during the last eight years every measure, administrative or legislative, that was designed to crush the Hindus or stifle their just rights have been fought against by the Mahasabha alone." It is quite significant that both the Hindu Mahasabha and the Muslim League attempted to resurrect the memory of the famine by bringing it into the political discourse. The secretary of All India Hindu Mahasabha Papers, F. C-70, p. 3. N.N. :Mitra ed., Annual Register, VoL II, 1945, p. 2. 76 "Election Circular No. 12 August 1945, Secretary, Parliamentary Board, BPHM, S.P. Mookerjee Papers, Instalment II-IV, Subject File No. 70, Part II, p.235.

74

75

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Communalism in Bengal

the Mahasabha blamed the shortness of people's memory for this forgetfulness on the part of the people. He said, "The general mass of people have got short memories and are easily misled by unreal slogans. Our services have, therefore, to be persistently hammered into the ears of the people".77 Mahasabha election manifesto showed that the party was trying to adjust itself to the tension that characterized the clash that existed between the notions of community and nation, and a politics based on these notions. A pan-Indian na tionalism, which had been inspiring the general mass of people, was thought to be unreal as it was not emanating from what the Mahasabha considered to be a real community, i.e., the Hindu society of its own definition. For the Mahasabha therefore, a movement like the Quit India movement, which had exercised people's memory and politics along an anticolonial nationalism should not be allowed to acquire the status of a Ilreal issue". N.C. Chatterjee in his election tours in Bengal declared: IIQuit India could not be a real election issue" .78 It appears that both the Hindu Mahasabha and the Muslim League tried to paint the communities they claimed to be representing as communities which were defeated, oppressed and constantly being attacked. Muslim League declared the Muslims as the community at the receiving end. Though the community was said to be an aggrieved one, the language and content of its propaganda was aggressive and betrayed signs of confidence arising out of its sense of superior might. On the other hand, the Hindu Mahasabha campaign never gained aggressive overtones as the party realized its organizational weakness. The increasing determination of the people to throw the British out had, in fact, rendered the Mahasabha redundant. However, this redundancy and failure to entrench into the popular imagination was quite often explained in terms of lack of organization. The constant refrain of a lack of organization manifested itself during the election campaign too. N.C. Chatterjee declared in his election tour, f

If Hindu Mahasabha wants to be successful it is vital that the organisation should be strengthened throughout the country. The Working Committee's appeal should be responded to in 77

Ibid.

78

Nationalist, Calcutta, 21 September 1945, p. 2.

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right earnest. The leaders in the district are generally with the Hindu Mahasabha, but they lack contact with the masses and the students. In some districts Students Federation has been organised and the Mahasabha has secured the willing allegiance of a batch of young workers. 79 Its election manifesto declared that "National Unity and full Independence" were two points which it would place before the electorate. so It also blamed the system of separate/ communal electorate for spreading the communal virus. It denied that there would ever be a true representative voice on real issues through this systemS! No judicious election could take place unless this system was replaced by a joint electorate." The Pakistan demand was rejected because it entailed partition of the country. Simultaneously, it argued that India was the land of Hindus, and that Pakistan was an absurd concept. il3 The fight against the partition was to be a fight of the Hindus and hence, it proclaimed, "a Hindu should not be a party to any partition as long as he was alive. "84 IIIn this religious battle"f it further expected f IIHindu Mahasabha will not be deprived of the Hindu sy.mpathy."85 Thus, while the League declared the election as well as the fight for Pakistan a religious battle-a Jehad, for the Mahasabha the electionf crucial in determining the question of Iinational unity and independence", was the battle ofthe Hindus. The essential unity of India, for the Hindu Mahasabha, was shown by the help rendered by all parts of this country.86 This was why, for the Mahasabha, movements organized by a group which did not represent the Hindu opinion"f were of no consequence. Therefore, it declared that the Quit India movement II

Nationalist, Calcutta, 21 September 1945, p. 1. "Asonno Nirbachane Hindur Kortobvo" (The Coming Election and the Duty of the Hindus), S.P. Mookerjee Papers, Instalment II-Iv;. Subject File No. 74, Part II, p. 392. 8 1 Ibid., p. 392. 82 Ibid. 83 Ibid., p. 394. 84 Ibid. 85 Ibid. 86 Ibid., p. 393.

79

80

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Communalism in Bengal

could not be an election issue. This was more so because the Mahasabha was at a loss to explain its role in it, and contest the Congress whose leadership had gone up in popular esteem. It was at this juncture that the Mahasabha tried to justify Shyama Prasad's participation and subsequent role in the ministry, as one inspired by an exalted sense of na tionalism and a sense of serving the interests of the community.87 Therefore, when the Quit India movement was made an election issue by the Congress, the Hindu Mahasabha tried to sideline it. Thus, while the League busied itself with strengthening its ideological attack against any criticism of the unity of the community and the demand of Pakistan, the Mahasabha searched for issues and workers to fight the Congress. The secretary of the party's Parliamentary Board complained of the paucity of workers.88 He at the same time said that there were enough village people anxious to do voluntary work for the Mahasabha but they must be properly approached and roused into action". He said he had found the Hindus eager to work for the party but "one must go to them, explain the programme of the Mahasabha to the people."89 The Mahasabha, however, began to feel the tension between the strands within its ideological position. With the landscape being captured by the image of the nation, the legitimacy of its nationalist credentials came under close scrutiny. This forced the Mahasabha to bring out a bulletin for its workers, to enable them to answer questions such as the political stand of the Mahasabha vis-a-vis the Congress. 90 With the idea of the nation rapidly capturing public imagination, people had begun to question the Mahasabha's stand, and whether it would or it could undertake the cause of nationalism. Upendra Nath Ball writing on 6 October 1945 from Midnapore, where the Mahasabha had engaged in relief wor k, enquired whether the BPHM would contest elections for the nationalist cause.91 To reach out to a II

87

"Dr Shyama Prosader Nirbachane Protidwandita", Hindustan, Calcutta,

November 1945, p. 207.

Ibid. Ibid. 9() Mahasabha Parliamentary Board, Bulletin No.1, "Congress vs. Mahasabha", ibid., pp. 12-23. 91 Ibid. 88

89

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185

wider audience, the party began publishing The Nationalist in 1944, and through it tried to provide its electoral campaign with a more elaborate and systematic character. The party asked all the provincial and district Sabhas to subscribe to the organ n The leadership tried to adopt a tough posture against the Congress, and on the question of independence. In an attempt to de legitimize Congress of its representative character, the Mahasabha proclaimed itself to be the unequivocal guardian of Hindu interests. IIWe must have courage to face the stern realities that the Congress policy of appeasement has merely widened the national resistance and has greatly jeopardized the legitimate rights of the Hindus as such'?3 declared Shyama Prasad Mookerjee. What was the Hindu Mahasabha's alternative then? Interestingly, for the Mahasabha, the answer to the vexed problem of Pakistan or the IIMuslim League's reactionary demands" lay in a strong and mobilized Hindu opinion. The All India Committee of the Mahasabha declared in its annual meeting in 1945 that they had offered a just and fair basis for political settlement between the Hindus and the Muslims. It said, f

If Hindu opinion is correctly mobilised, there will be no occasion for any non-Muslim organisation to run after the Muslim League for a temporary patched up solution. The Muslim community is bound to discover their folly and unwisdom of its own leaders and come to an agreement with a just and equitable basis. 94

The Mahasabha now drew attention to the "three issues before the country: [1] Pakistan, [2] Parity, and [3] Communal Award "95 N.C. Chatterjee accused Congress of conceding Pakistan by accepting the Wavell Plan." Manoranjan Choudhury, Secretary, AIHM, Circular to all District and Sub-Division Hindu Mahasabhas, S.P. Mookerjee Papers, F. 74, Pt. I, p. 6. 93 S.P. Mookerjee's Speech at AIHM committee's meeting at Delhi, April 1945, N.N. :Mitra ed., Annual Register, Vol. I, 1945, p. 297. 94 Ibid., p. 299. 95 Nationalist, Calcutta, 21 September 1945, p. 2. 96 He said: 92

The Wavell Plan was based on the Bhulabhai-Liaqat Ali Pact. The tragic pact had the blessings of Mahatma Gandhi. The pact was based on Congress-League parity. It was unfortunate that Congress which calls

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Communalism in Bengal

The real enemy of the Mahasabha was not the Muslim League but its rival among the Hindus. N.C. Chatterjee invariably brought home the point by arguing: We can understand a Muslim advocating Pakistan because he is misled into thinking that a communal rule based on the Shariat will further his communal interests. But it is the clear duty of the Hindus notto cast their votes in favour of any Hindu who accepts either Pakistan or parity in any shape or form.97 The question of parity was, for the Mahasabha, a major point of attack against the Congress. It accused the latter of accepting parity with the Muslim League and, thereby, sacrificing national interest. 98 This was because parity meant Ilhorizontal distribution of communal poison throughout the body polity".99 Further, according to him, the acceptance of the principle would mean "30 crores of Hindus should be reduced to the position of a minority of 8Y, crore"100 Thus, to accept a position of parity with the Muslim League by logical extension meant accepting the parity of Hindus and Muslims in other fields also. Since the interests of the Hindus, for the Mahasabha, coalesced with that of the nation, Congress was said to have sacrificed national interests. Hence Hindus were asked not to vote for it. f

itself a national organisation reduced itself to the same position as that occupied by an avowedly anti-national and communal organisation. The recent resolution passed by the Congress Working Committee declared its opposition to Pakistan but its provision connotes the acceptance of Pakistan by the back door. The resolution declared that Congress cannot think of compelling the people of any territorial unit to remain within the Indian union against their wilL That really means that if the majority of people of any district or of any province or of any territorial unit chooses to accept Pakistan, then the Congress will not oppose it. That is destructive to India's integrity. (N.C. Chatterjee Papers, pp. 48-49.) '17

N.C. Chatterjee in his election speech at Rangpur, 20 September 1945,

Nationalist, Calcutta, 21 September 1945, p. 1. 98 "Congress 0 Agami Nirvachan" (Congress and the Coming Election), Hindustan, Calcutta, 27 September 1945, p. 84. 99 N.C. Chatterjee in his election speech at Rangpur, Nationalist, Calcutta, 21 September 1945, p. 1. 100

Ibid.

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Similarly, "Congress did not reject the demand for Pakistan unequivocally whereas only the Hindu Mahasabha has the courage to reject the triple curse of Parity, Pakistan and anti-national Communal Award"I O! Hence, the Mahasabha claimed that the people should support it rather than the Congress. The perceptible change in the political mood of the country and the province began to challenge the confidence of the Mahasabha workers. It was at the same time aware of the weakness of its own position and hence was also trying to fall back on its original fortress, invocation of the politics of culture. In a bid to collect information about the Bengali society, Manoranjan Choudhury, who was also the secretary of the AIHM, wrote letters to Digindra Narayan Bhattacharya Vidya Bhushan of Maldah, requesting to inform him about the condition of the "Hindu society in Bengal". !02 He wrote a similar letter to Nalini Ranjan Chakravorty of Mymensingh.103 With an increased communal antagonism reflected during the immersion of images, Mahasabha wanted to play the role of guardian of the community's religious rights. In October there was trouble at Lalmonirhat in Rangpur during the time of immersion of the Durga idopo4 There were similar problems in Sandwip, Noakhali. Dhaka also witnessed bigger trouble as four idols in Dhaka and, as a newspaper reported, about 100 images remained unimmersed in Rekabi BazaarYI5 A significant fact, however, was that despite assuming this role the Mahasabha workers a t the local level were in no mood to fight the Congress. That is why the leadership complained about lack of workers. !06 The Mahasabha tried to adjust itself to the popular mood. A conference of presidents, secretaries, and workers of the district and sub-divisional Hindu Mahasabhas of Bengal took place on 1 October 1945. The conference recorded its emphatic protest "against the use of Indian soldiers for the suppression of freedom movements in Indo-China, Malaya and Java", 10 1

Ibid.

Manoranjan Choudhury to Digindra Narayan Bhattacharya Vidya Bhusan, 22 August 1945, S.P. Mookerjee Papers, Instalment II-Iv;. File No. 70 Pt. II, p. 145. 103 Ibid., p. 156. 104 Amrit Bazar Patrika, Calcutta, 20 October 1945, p. 3. 105 Ibid. , and 22 October 1945, p.5. 106 BPHM, Election Circular 2, ibid., p. 235. 102

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and urged upon the Government of India "to recall all Indian Units ... " 1 07 Shyama Prasad, on 22 October, announced the Mahasabha decision to observe INA Day on 4 November. lOs He also announced that the Mahasabha was opening an office to help the INA personne[109 By November 1945, when the INA agitation was at itspeak the members and sympathisers were in no mood to fight the Congress. Writing to Shyama Prasad Mookerjee from Pana on 20 November, Mohendra Mohan Roy said, "It would have been better if you could get two Hindu Mahasabha candida tes elected unopposed by meeting Sara t Chandra Bose .... Later on Hindu Mahasabha may not win even a single seae'y o At this juncture, when the elections for the Central Legislative Assembly were due, the leadership also showed signs of cracking. Sarat Bose publicly asked the Mahasabha to withdraw all its candidates, while Shyama Prasad Mookerjee appeared to be giving up the fight by trying to reach a compromise on the electoral front. Responding to a request from a Mahasabha wor ker to patch up an electoral compromise with the Congress, he wrote: f

I am always prepared to come to a settlement with the Congress regarding the ensuing elections. It is up to Sa rat Chandra Bose to make a gesture. His public statement requesting me to withdraw all Hindu Sabha candidates is not a solution of the present problem. Is there no scope for Sa rat Babu and myself to serve the province? It is now up to you to raise your voice. ll1 The Congress leadership, particularly Surendra Mohan Ghosh 1l2 and Sarat Chandra Bose,1l3 had taken a tough stand against the Mahasabha, and national sentiments were so high that even the popularity that Shyama Prasad Mookerjee had gained

N.N. Mitra ed., Annual Register, VoL II, 1945, p. 19. Amrit Bazar Patrika, Calcutta, 23 October 1945, p. 3. 109 Ibid. 110 Mohendra Mohan Roy, Pana, to Shyama Prasad Mookerjee, 20 November 1945, S.P. Mookerjee Papers, Instalment II-IV, Subject File No. 94, p. 27. III Shyama Prasad Mookerjee to Bimalendu Kishore Acharya Choudhury, Muktagagacha, Mymensingh, 25 November 1945, ibid., p. 23. 112 Surendra Mohan Ghosh, Interview on 16 JlUle 1973, Oral History Transcript, Nehru Memorial Muslim and Library (NMML). 113 Amrit Bazar Patrika, Calcutta, 25 October 1945, p. 1. 107 108

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since 1943 was of no avail. The central Congress leadership also took a tough posture. Vallabhbhai Patel, while writing to Nehru, disapproved of any efforts at compromise. Even before the INA Day demonstrations, he wrote to Nehru on 12 October 1945: there is absolutely no need as the Congress will easily secure all the seats in the Central Assembly. So far as non-Muslim constituencies are concerned, except perhaps Dr S.P. Mukherjee's own seat, which by courtesy the Bengal Congress may think it proper to allow without contest. There is no other place where we can allow anyone else to get inIl4 Similarly, he wrote to Rajendra Prasad about the tough stand that the Congress should adopt towards the Mahasabha,115 and his feeling that the days of the Mahasabha were numbered. He wrote to Nehru, " ... Hindu Mahasabha will be finally finished this time ... "1 16 The realization of the strong popular desire for freedom as well as the appeal that the Congress leaders had among people was forcing the Mahasabha to adopt a compromising posture in the electoral arena.

III On 14 June 1945, Wavell in his broadcast speech, announced his decision to convene a conference at Shimla on 25 June Vallabhbhai Patel to Jawaharlal Nehru, 12 October 1945, Durga Das ed., Sardar Patel: Select Correspondence, 1945-50, VoL II, p . 11. 115 Sardar Patel to Rajendra Prasad: 114

I do not think that the Hindu Maha sabha can get any seat except in BengaL It has no strength in any other provinces. My view is that excepting Syama Prasad, there was hardly any man whom we can accept sacrifice our seat instead. On the side League is attacking us and we have to rely largely upon our strength in non-Muslim constituencies. We cannot afford to surrender without cause any of the seat which can easily secure. If in an individual case we find that Hindu Mahasabha has a 50 per cent chance against the Congress we can settle with them and allow them that seat. But I personally feel that there will be no such case in the whole of India. (Ibid., VoL 2, p.91.) 116

Vallabhbhai Patel to Jawaharlal Nehru, 7 November 1945, ibid., p. 71.

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1945.117 Subsequently, Nehru, Azad, Patel and Narendra Dev were released on 15 June H 8 However, the Shimla Conference failed to arrive at any settlement between the parties. The meeting, while failing to solve the already vexatious problems, created some more. The Viceroy's attempt to trea t the Congress as a casteHindu party created trouble for the Congress, more so in a province like Bengal. However the announcement of elections in the coming winter, and the end of the war, provided some hope and expectation to the people. It was around this time that the INA issue began to agitate the popular mind. The formation of the INA was announced on5 July 1943 when Subhas Chandra Bose arrived in Singapore to take over the presidentship of the Indian Independence League (IlL) from Rash Bihary Bose, at a conference held by the delegates. The IlL had been formed at a conference in Bangkok held between 15 and 23 June 1942. "Over 100 delegates, representing Indians in Japan, Manchukuo, Hongkong, Burma, Borneo, Java, Malaya and Thailand, as well as representatives of Indian Army (prisoners of war) in Malaya and Hongkong were present. ff 119 Japanese cooperation was extended from the very beginning but soon their interference created problems for the IlL which aimed at an independent existence. Netaji arrived at this crucial juncture to take upon himself the mantle of leadership. The INA went into action on 4 February 1944, and on 18 March 1944 they crossed the IndoBurma frontier. Along with Japanese detachments, the INA surrounded Imphal after taking Morai and other villages. But the lack of air support and the disruption of supplies owing to the monsoon forced the INA to withdraw. Afterwards, however, with the advance of the British forces, around 6,000 INA soldiers surrendered in the Far East. After the surrender they were brought to India. The personnel of the army were later on grouped into four categories, i.e., White, Grey, Black, and Dark, according to the degree of their disloyalty to the crown, and the brutality displayed in their treatment of the British soldiers. The authorities f

f

117 118 119

N.N. :Mitra ed., Annual Register, VoL I, 1945, p. 239. Ibid., p. 72. Ibid., VoL II, p. 194.

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decided to try them for these acts. The venue chosen for the courtmartial was the Red Fort of Delhi.!2D Bengal, which had suffered acutely during these years of war and which was the closest point from which the INA wanted to enter India, witnessed a tremendous upsurge of popular sentiment on this issue. This could be discerned from the popular mood from September onwards. With the release of Sarat Chandra Bose on 14 September, this began to take an organized form. The announcement of the trial of some INA officers generated hectic activity in the political realm. From the middle of October 1945, this became the most important political issue in the province. On 19 October, Congress President Surendra Mohan Ghosh announced the establishment of a fund for the INA personnel. l21 Syed N asher Ali was made the chairman of this proposed fund. 122 It was the Congress in the province which led the populace, spearheading the moves to attack the colonial authority for its decision on the trial. The INA brought two issues to the forefront of Indian political life-a strong national sentiment and an essentially noncommunal platform for the Indian fight for freedom. The noncommunal character of the INA became more sharply focused when the colonial authorities decided to court-martial Major Shahnawaj Khan, G.S. Dhillon and Prem Sehgal, a Muslim, Sikh and Hindu officer respectively in the INA. The news had an electrifying impact on the popular imagina tion. The Congress tried to give an organized voice to the demand for the release of the INA officers, because they, as the country felt and as expressed succinctly by H.N. Kunzru, "were soldiers of freedom N and lithe treason law did not apply to them N . l 23 The Congress had been under constant attack from the Muslim League, the Mahasabha and the Communist party on the one hand, and f

f

120 Here, I have summarized some essential details regarding the INA. The major SOillces for this summary are: KK Ghosh, INA The Second Front of the Indian National Movement, Meerut, 1965: N.N. :Mitra, Annual Register, 1945, VoL II, pp. 194-97; and Amrit Bazar Patrika, Calcutta, 9 October 1945,

p.4. 121 122 123

Amrit Bazar Patrika, Calcutta, 21 October 1945, p. 3. Ibid. Ibid., 25 October 1945, p.4.

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the colonial authorities on the other. It had also experienced the colonial complicity in the attempts to reduce it to a caste-Hindu organization. Therefore f the need to prove its secular credentials was urgent. The INA issue provided it with the perfect medium through which it could make its ideological stand clearer to people. The role of the Congress in the political life of Bengal has been studied mostly from the point of view of assessing the effects of its internal dissension}24 or its decline. 12s SimilarlYf its failure to take on the challenge posed by different forces operating in the political realm of the province has also been studied. Muslim communalism, and the increasing influence of the Muslim League in provincial politics, has also been discussed as a part of such studies on the Congress's failure. 126 Some historians have conveniently branded the Congress politics as representing Hindu nationalism". 127 Yet it is obvious that its position in Bengal vis-a.-vis communalism was of a peculiar kind, owing to the fact that in this province Muslims were in a majority and the agrarian structure was such that it weighed heavily on this section. In the 1930s, the operation of the Communal Award had reduced the most politically vocal segment of the population, i.e., the Hindus, to a statutory minority in the province. 12S The Communal Award encountered intense opposition II

See, Rajat Ray, Urban Roots of Indian Nationalism. John Gallagher, Decline, Revival and Fall. 126 lH. Broomfield, Elite Conflict in Plural Society. 127 John Gallagher, Decline, Revival and Fall, p. 160. In the writings of more recent Cambridge historians the Congress leaders' politics and the politics of the colonial authorities become same. For example, CA. Bayly writes: ... the article is not urging a collective return to exclusive studies of high politics of colonial viceroys and Congress leaders Bayly, CA., "Returning the British to the South Asian History: The limits of colonial hegemony South India", South Asia, VoL 17, No.2, 1994. 128 Acceptance of the Communal Award generated a lot of heat in BengaL There were protests from the Hindu Mahasabha and several other section of the population. See, Advance, Calcutta, 21 August 1932; Liberty, 5 September 1932. Protests were even heard from the Congress ranks. See for example, Telegram, protests of Khulna Congress Committee, 6 September 1934; Pabna Congress Committee (Jessore), 12 August 1934, etc., 124

125

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not only from the Hindu Mahasabha, but also from the Congress.!29 The emergence of the Muslim League as the ruling party (after it had overthrown the KPP in 1943) helped the Hindu Mahasabha to push the Congress towards a communal position. However, the Congress's objective of representing all communities and classes was an ideological imperative f which retained an open channel for anyone representing any community or class to join and give his voice. Thus, it could not afford to succumb to the Hindu communal political line. The Congress was, therefore, working against heavy odds. It was situated between this impera tive of maintaining the doctrinal purity of its secular na tionalism, and the necessity of catering to the political exigencies and economic structure in the province. With the launching of the Quit India movement, most of the Congress leaders were interned and the Congress Committees were banned.!3D The post-Quit India movement period saw two parallel developments. While the Muslim League had organized itself in a massive waYf and in the distress period succeeded in giving radical overtones to its programme, the Congress was without its leaders, and the few that remained outside, were involved in debates within the precincts of the Legislative Assembly. These mostly agitated for the release of the political detenues and for the removal of the ban on the Congress Committees. l3l On the other hand, we have already seen that the Hindu Mahasabha was engaged in organizing the Hindus. The

addressed to All India Congress President, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, AICC Papers, F. G-24 of 1934-36, as quoted in Gallagher, Decline, Revival and Fall, p. 190. 129 It gave the Muslims 119 seats of the total 250 seats in the Provincial Legislature, and 78 to the Hindus which was fragmented even more later by awarding 30 seats to the SCs in accordance with the Poona Pact of 1932. See for detailed discussion, AICC Papers, File No. G-24 (1) 1936, NMML; Communal Award: General Correspondence by Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru; Bengal AntiCommunal Award Movement: A Report, Calcutta, 1939; Gallagher, Decline, Revival and Fall; B.N. Dutta Roy, Sir N.N. Sir"kar's Speeches and Pamphlets. 130 In reply to the question of the release of political prisoners and removing the ban on the Congress Committees, Chief :Minister Khwaja Nazimuddin said that "he found that a ban was imposed on five district committees in Bengal in 1942", N.N. Mitra ed., Annual Register, 1945, VoL I, p. 195. 131 Ibid., pp. 192-97.

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Communists were also at large and attracted a number of Congressmen into their fold when they came out of detention.!32 Thus, from all quarters, the Congress appeared to be in a disadvantageous position. However some historians have argued that imprisonment saved the Congress leadership from sharing any responsibility for the wartime problems that the people faced 133 Coming from historians, these statements show the depth of ahistorical and uncritical nature of treatment that the nationalist leaders get even from serious historians. On the other hand, in fact, the imprisonment of the leadership did prove fatal to their party organization and its peasant base, especially that of East Benga[134 This does not, however, take away the sheen from the Quit India movement. Thus, two parallel events even if their f

132 A letter from the secretary of the Chittagong District Congress Committee to J.B. Kriplani, secretary, AICC, dated 7 August 1945, provides an example of this. It says: "During the last few years, there has been a tremendous change over the mentality of the people. Some of the members of the then District Congress Executive have changed from right and left and some 4/5 owe allegiance to Communist Party of India", AICC Papers, File No. P-5, p.467. 133 See Sumit Sarkar:

From the point of view of the Congress leaders, imprisonment and defeat paradoxically brought certain benefits. Isolation in jail helped them to avoid taking a clear public stand on the pro or anti-Japanese war issue .. much more important was the fact as D.D. Kosambi pointed out .. "glamour of jail and concentration camp served to wipe out the so-so record of the Congress ministries in office, thereby restoring the full popularity of the organisation among the masses", ["Bourgeoisie comes of Age in India" in D.D. Kosambi, Exasperating Essays, Poona, n.d., p. 17.]. (Sumit SarkarI Modern India, Delhi, 1988, pp. 404-5.) 134

Sumit Sarkar agrees with this when he says: Brutal repression must have exhausted many peasant bases, built up through years of Gandhian constructive work or radical Kisan Sabha activity. It is significant that Bihar, Eastern D.P. and the Maharashtra, Karnataka cOillltryside played little or no part in the anti-imperialism upsurge of 1945-46, while most of the rural Gandhians of :Midnapur and Hooghly found themselves largely pushed aside in Bengal Congress politics in the post-war and post-Independence period. (Ibid., p.405.)

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consequences go against each other do not necessarily cancel each other out in any historical scrutiny. Three important events, having a significant bearing on the political landscape of the province took place around this time. First, the release of the political prisoners began to take place during August-September. The second significant change took place in the shape of the release of INA officers, which soon turned into a movement that provided a very conducive ahnosphere for the Congress leaders to reorganize the party, now in a total disarray, for the coming elections. Suppression of the organization since the Individual Satyagraha in 1940 and the Quit India movement, had left the faction-ridden Congress in the province completely paralyzed. Third, it was at this juncture that the Communist party was presented with a chargesheet by the AICC on 21 September 1945, in which it was asked to show cause for its "incessant propaganda through newspapers, pamphlets and books and meetings, and otherwise in favour of the war effort, calling the war as it affected the people ofIndia a people's war"135 f

IV The Communist party had been demonstrating its equidistance from the Congress and the Muslim League, and it asked Muslim Congressmen to act as the Muslim League's unofficial interpreters inside the Congress. However, the party maintained that the allegations against its members, viz., Sajjad Zaheer, Z.A. Ahmed, and K.M. Ashraf, that they were "asking the Muslims ofU. P. to leave Congress and join Muslim League" were totally unfounded l36 The party proclaimed itself as the "only non-Muslim Party which accepted the demand of Pakistan". On 7 January 1945, Sajjad Zaheer wrote in Peoples' War: We communists work for bringing the Congress and the Muslim League together into a brotherly unity for National

135

136

N.N. Mitra ed., Annual Register, 1945, VoL II, pp. 118-20. People's War, Bombay, 7 January 1945, p. 1.

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Government.... In fact what we have been telling the Muslim Congressmen is that they should remain inside the Congress and thus act as the bridge between the brother Congressmen and the League by interpreting to them the League demands .... We are likewise pleading with Muslim League that they cannot win Pakistan except by brotherly unity with Congress and by joining the campaign for release of leaders ... all Muslim Congressmen, Hafizur Rahman, Mr Mujaffar Hussain and Shahid Fakhri testify to thiS ... 1 37 This attitude, technically, followed from the "unity line" of the party wherein all problems of high communal content were viewed as a tussle or fight between the Congress and the League; in effect a complete reduction of the ideological battle to a merely tactical plane. This also meant conceding the League's demandrecognition of its status as sole representative of the Muslims in India, who were supposed to have constituted a nation. The logical conclusion from the party line, therefore, was the reduction of the Congress to a Hindu party, which even the colonial au thorities had found a difficult task. The Communist party in Bengal was no exception to this line ofits centralleadership's thought. The Muslim League in Bengal had taken up the issue of the eviction of illegal migrants by the Assam government in March 1945. It tried to project and propagate this act as one displaying the communal, partisan attitude of the Assam government with the objective of evicting the Muslim settlers of Bengal. The Communist party sought to act as the arbiter between the Congress and the League as, in its view, they were "likely to come to blows unless they accept the Communist arbitration plan".138 As an official put it: This attitude of equidistance was increasingly seen even by the colonial authorities as flattery of the Muslim League. This reached to the extent of ignoring and, at times absolving the leaders of the League their culpability in matters, which even the party thought were, of unsavoury nature. !39 (Italics mine) Ibid. Ibid., 11 March 1945, p. 1. 139 EG. Crackness, Review on the People's War, 26.5.45, Home Political, File No. 7/2/45. 137

138

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A Government report reviewing the party organ stated: The editorial is devoted to scolding the Aligarh students for their alleged demonstration against Azad. The names which they are said to have called him seem to have come from Dawn editorials, but Mr Jinnah gets no share of his blame and is described as an esteemed national leader deserving of the highest honour. !4D What seemed important to the Communist party was the fact that the Muslim masses were joining the Muslim League, an obvious sign that the party was democratic and the demand for Pakistan was not a communal one. And since Pakistan was not a communal demand, the leaders argued, its acceptance by the Congress would strengthen the movement for national liberation. Z.A. Ahmed, while speaking to Nehru, expressed this conviction: We are convinced that the acceptance of Pakistan would not weaken but strengthen the Congress in the sense that it would lead to a mighty united front of our two premier national organisations which would enable us to get freedom and isolate all communal and reactionary pro-imperialist elements. 141 The Punjab and Bengal were two provinces where the party was most active in consolidating the League's sway over the Muslim masses. Jubilant over the League's progress in the Punjab where the party had played a crucial role in this progress, Romesh Chandra wrote: The Punjab League manifesto has opened the doors of the League to every Progressive Muslim .... In a number of districts, the first trickle of Ahrars and Khaksars into the League is becoming a steady stream.l42 He declared the Lahore resolution as Iineither religious nor indefinite",l43 and that the movement for Pakistan had, Ibid. Ahmed's Talk with Nehru, 4 June 1945, File No. 9/45, Pc. Joshi Archives, J.N.D. 142 People's War, Bombay, 22 July 1945, p. 5. 143 Ibid. 140

141

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strong democratic essence in that... in Pakistan minorities (Hindus) will always have adequate, effective and mandatory safeguards regarding their cultural, religious rights .... Pakistan will be a democratic state completely free from sovereign control like rest ofIndia .... Pakistan will be a creation of all the people of Pakistan without distinction of caste or creed I44 f

The party even took upon itself the task of defining the "freedom ff content in the Pakistan demand. liThe League leaders did not define in this way but it is truly the freedom content of the picture of Pakistan that inspires the bulk of the Muslims populace. Sindhi, Baluchh, Punjabi, and even Pathans do really rally round the Muslim League .... ff l 45 This was the strategic layout when the colonial authorities began to release the Congress and other leaders who went to jail during the Quit India movement. Their release made the Communist party workers uncomfortable due to the Congress leaders' enhanced popularity. Their bitterness towards the Communists for the latter's role during the Quit India movement made them attack the latter on the political piatform I46 The situation worsened with the rising post-war nationalist ferment on the eve of the INA movement. Changes in the popular mood were discerned by other party workers in Rangpur, Calcutta, Sylhet and other districts of Bengal.!47 There were eager expectations all around, and all classes were expecting some major steps to be taken by the colonial authorities. The peasant leaders discerned an expectation of fulfilment of the class demands along with the national demands. The organized sections of Communist wor kers were mobilized to explain the party's stand to the people. In Dhaka, one ofthe key functionaries of the party at tha t time wrote:

Ibid. Ibid. 146 Almost all the memoirs and works on the party give graphic details of the intense, popular anger, and how the party members fought their way. See, Amalendu Sengupta, Uttal Challis. 147 See, Sudhir Mukhopadhyay and Nripen Chose, Rangpur Jelar Krishak Andolaner Itihas 0 Party (History of the Peasant Movement and the Party), Hooghly, 1985. 144 145

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at that time we also organized meetings at various places in our district to explain our feelings .... Our campaign gained a lot of strength by the attendance of thousands of textile workers who came out in procession with hundreds of red flags. 148 In places like Rangpur, where the Communist party had gained a foothold, the party realized that the colonial authorities were bent on suppressing any peasant protest 149 On the eve of the Shimla Conference, when the Hindu Mahasabha was attacking the Congress in Calcutta for its supposed surrender to the colonial pressure of treating caste-Hindus as equal to Muslims, the general secretary of the Communist party, P.c. Joshi declared that "Hindu-Muslim parity must be there"150The failure of the Conference was blamed on both sides because "both sides banked on Wavell, both tried to ignore each other, both forgot the people amidst their airy principles and their high sounding claims, brothers they stood apart and not together at this very crucial juncture. ff 151 Thus the Congress stand of representing all sections of the people was not accepted by the Communist party. Despite these failures, however, the party was fast becoming powerful amongst the labour and the peasantry. The organizational activities which began in 1943 in the absence of the Congress leaders had by now resulted in the party's successful control over the Tramway Workers' Union and other unions of the Howrah and Budge-Budge area. On these fronts, the party advanced the theory that the Communists represented the interests of workers and peasants. At this time, the party was also trying to argue that it was wrong to think the demand for Pakistan was withholding India's independence. Adhikari wrote: f

The British imperialists have given pledges for Pakistan as for Akhand Hindustan with equal levity. Pakistan can never be

148 149 15()

151

Jnan Chakraborty, Dhakn. Jelar, p. 97. Sudhir Mukhopadhyay and Nripen Chose, Rangpur Jelar, pp. 85-86. People's War, Bombay, 22 July 1945, p. 1. Ibid., 23 September 1945, p. 1.

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won by relying on their pledges. Pakistan can only be won when Congress and League and Nationalist Muslims come to a Common understanding on the question and are able to forge a Congress-League joint front for breaking the deadlock and for a free Pakistan in free India. This means the remaining doubts of the Congressmen must be removed. There was a time when Congressmen thought Muslim League want Pakistan but not freedom. That doubt has now been cleared up. Now Congress realises tha t whenever it talks about Pakistan it knows that it is to be gained through independence of India. We will win independence of India by conceding Pakistan to our Muslim brothers, but do we thereby lose the unity and integrity of India-the common heritage of our National Movement. 152 The answer to this question was soon given by Adhikari himself. He wrote: The answer to this question which a patriotic Muslim Leaguer must give is-certainly not as long as you are not thinking of a united India-Constitution in which Pakistan state is not free but subordinated against its will to the central state l53 The Congress leadership was already embittered with the Communists because of their role during the Quit India movement, and thereafter, the constant attack against it. Finally, the Congress Working Committee at its meeting at Poona in September 1945 appointed a sub-committee consisting of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, and Pandit Govind Vallabh Pant, "to go into the complaints and charges of indiscipline which the AICC office had received against Congress members of the Communist Party". On the basis of the report of this committee, AICC chargesheeted its Communist members on21 September 1945. Reacting to this, the Communists left the Congress. The CongressCommunist conflict reflected on a larger domain the clash between the fundamental policies of the two parties, their

152 153

Ibid., 4 April 1945, p. 1. Ibid.

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understanding of communalism and their particular political positions which were premised on that understanding. Communalism was one area where their understanding completely differed. These positions, gradually, became mixed with the renewed nationalist ferment in the winter of 1945. The party general secretary, accusing the Congress of anti-League and antiCommunist policy, said "the Congress high command is giving direct encouragement to the forces of civil war" and subsequentlYf asked its members to resign from the Congress l54

v Simultaneous with the upsurge of national sentiments was the electioneering process. For the League, it was Pakistan which was the crucial slogan. Muslims were asked to rally around the League as it was the true representative of the Muslims. Islam became the mobilizing point. The Pirs and Maulvis, as we have seen, rallied around the Jamait-ul-Ulama-i-Islam. Now, the League began to attack the non-League parties and individuals, such as the nationalist Muslims, the KPP etc., as anti-Islamic. Jamait-ulUlama-i-Hind was declared as working for Hindus, while the Jamait-ul-Ulama-i-Islam was for Islamiat. Similarly, it was said: They remembered the prayer, but they forgot the chain of armour donned by the Prophet Muhammed when he wentforth to fight the unequal battle with the infidels .... They misled the Muslims to the unworthy tenets of ahimsa l55 The change in the entire discourse was evident in the fact that the anti-League people were no longer addressed as betrayers or ghaddar, as they were with the League before 1943. They were now addressed in religious termsf more often referred to as shaitan (the evil one). Addressing a meeting in N etrakona on 20 November, Maulvi Tamizuddin Khan said that the "Non-League Muslims who were trying to create disruptions in the League Party and the Communist Party are Shaitan".156 Commenting on the

154 155

156

N.N. Mitra ed., Annual Register, 1945, VoL II, p. 118. Morning News, Calcutta, 28 October 1945, p. 3. Amrit Bazar Patrika, Calcutta, 22 November 1945, p. 6.

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nature of the League politics on the eve of the election, Maulana Azad later on commented: In fact, the elections in Bengal were hardly an election in the normally understood meaning of the term. !t was more in the na hue of a crusade in which worst religious passions were excited than an election in the modern age where political parties placed before their constituencies alternate programmes to be carried out through legislatures.!57 Similar ideas were expressed by Humayun Kabir when commenting on the nature of the election campaign by the League: Another feature of the present Bengal elections was the constant fanning of religious fanaticism. On behalf of the League it was preached in meetings and throughout pamphlets that any body who voted against the League would incur divine displeasure. The effect of such propaganda on the illiterate masses can be easily understood. In many cases, the electors lost their freedom of judgement on account of interference by their religious teachers and threats of divine displeasure and punishment in the after life 158 The League attacked any force which tried to challenge its attempt to create a homogenized Muslim front. This should be seen in the light of its decision to treat the election as a plebiscite for Pakistan and a vindication of its claim to be the sole representative of the Muslims 159 !twas at this juncture that the nationalist Muslims tried to come together under one platform to fight the

Ibid., Calcutta, 5 April 1946, p. 1. Ibid., 14 April 1946, p. 1. 159 The colonial authority was well aware of the entire development and Wavell's letter to Pethick Lawrence in October 1945 testifies to what was going on in the ground. He wrote: 157 158

The election propaganda in the Punjab had taken the line that these elections will decide whether there is to be Pakistan or not, and that if the League win in the Pakistan provinces no further vote by the legislature or plebiscite will be needed. (Wavell to Pethick Lawrence, 22 October 1945, TOP, Vol. VI, pp. 337-38.)

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League. The initiative was taken by the Jamait-ul-Ulama-i-Hind, a stout opponent of the League, and its Pakistan and two nation theory. A conference of all the non-League nationalist Muslim organizations was called in Delhi on 18 September 1945. 160 They decided on a common policy to fight the election against the Muslim League. This was followed by another conference on 2 October in Karachi, where it was decided to "set up a Nationalist Muslim Parliamentary Board to select candidates and conduct the forthcoming elections"161 The board, it was decided, would" consist of21 members having 8 representative ofJamaitul-Ulama-i-Hind and Muslim Majlis, 3 Momin conference, and Krishak Proja Party each, 2 of Anjuman Watan and 5 other Parties. Maulana Hussain Ahmed Madani was elected Chairman of the Board."162It was also decided that a Iinew political alternative for the Muslim masses in the provinces" will be presented. 163 The kind of propaganda launched by the Muslim League could not be answered back by the Congress because of the differences in perceiving the elections as such. While Muslim League declared the election to be the battle for Pakistan, for Congress "it was a small test ... a preparation for the greater things to come". 164 It cannot be denied that the Congress also took the election seriously, but the kind of appeal to the emotions and psyche which the Muslim League had among the Muslim masses was not to be matched. In this atmosphere, the nationalist Muslims faced

16(J 161 162 163

164

N.N. Mitra ed., Annual Register, 1945, VoL II, pp. 163-64. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. The Congress Election Manifesto declared: Many a time the people of India have taken the pledge of independence; that pledge has yet to be redeemed, and the well beloved cause for which it stands, and which has summoned us so often, still beckons to us. But the time is coming when we shall redeem it in full, but not by the election, but what comes after it. Meanwhile this election is a small test for us [italics mineL a preparation for the greater things to come. L et all those who care and long for Freedom and the Independence of India meet this test with strength and confidence, and march together to the free India of our dream. (Ibid., p. 112.)

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tremendous problems and even Congress had difficulty in supporting them for reasons of political expediency. Any kind of Congress help would easily attract flack from the Muslim League, and strengthen its oft repeated claim that the nationalist Muslims were stooges of the Hindu Congress. This could easily have proved detrimental to the interests of both the nationalist Muslims as well as the Congress. To add to this, the Muslim League had succeeded in its efforts to bring the election campaign down to the issue of Islam where the election itself was designated a religious battle. The nationalist Muslims were forced to fight on the former's terms because, unlike the 1937 election, by this time the Muslim League had embraced all other non-communal issues for example abolition of zamindari without compensations. The nationalist Muslims therefore, depended on the appeal and the support of the Jamaiti-Ulema-i-Hind and its leader Maulana Hussain Ahmed Madani to counter the religious appeal of the League. A report from Tippera suggests the intensity of the opposition to such efforts by this section. It claimed: f

f

f

A big conference of the Nationalist Muslims was organised inviting Maulana Madani in which there was a clash with the Leaguers and Ashrafuddin Ahmed Choudhury who had organised the conference, "mustered his forces and challenged the League to a free fight". The Conference passed off with minor mishaps.l65 Therefore, while the League succeeded in bringing the entire discourse to religion, attempts were made to oppose it on this very ground. To compound the problems, the nationalist Muslims had to face attacks of League's volunteers. The attacks were carried out against all the non/anti-League Muslim Leaders. On 22 October, the meeting ofMashriqui, the leader of the Khaksars who was bitterly opposed to Jinnah, at the University Institute Hall was disrupted by the League volunteersl66

165 Secret Report on the Political Situation in Bengal for the first half of February 1946, IfP and /5/153, India Office Records and Library, as quoted in Sugata Bose, Agrarian Bengal, p. 222. 166 Amrit Bazar Patrika, Calcutta, 23 October 1945, p. 4.

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The results of the elections were, therefore, never accepted gracefully by any party due to the recourse to violence that was a part of the process from the very beginning. There were a series of claims and counter claims regarding the fairness of the elections too. Maulana Azad issued a statement sayingf lithe election in Bengalhad been reduced to mockery". Allama Mashriqui, the Khaksar leader, said that he entirely agreed "with the Congress President that the Muslim League could not possibly have secured the number of seats that it has if British officials had not openly supported it everywhere"l 67 On the other hand, Suhrawardy replying to the Congress president's sta tement said f IIIf there has been any official interference during the recent elections in Bengal, it has been on behalf of the Congress"l 68 However, what seems to have proved fatal for the Congress's attempt to fight Muslim communalism at this stage was the fact thatthe nationalist Muslims themselves failed to understand the current Muslim opinion. They also failed to understand the logic, in fact, the very phenomenon of communalism. Even a veteran Congress leader like Ashrafuddin Ahmed Choudhary said, "[it] was a fight between the top leaders of the Congress and the Muslim League .... masses had no role in it".169 This was unfortunate for the Congress which, as Kripalani wrote to AshrafuddinAhmed Choudhury," depended on the Nationalist Muslims for its policies regarding the Muslims". 17o The Congress, on the other hand, had to fight the forces of Hindu communalism especially that of the Hindu Mahasabha.

N.N. Mitra ed., Annual Register, 1946, VoL I, p. 48. Ibid. 169 Later, writing to the Congress president, he deplored the Working Committee resolution on accepting Pakistan and the Partition of India. He wrote: "It is a fight between the Congress and League organisations. If it is inevitable (partition) which appears to be so let the members of two organisations fight it out amongst themselves with whatever arms they can secure and decide the issue once for all". (Ashrafuddin Ahmed ChoudhillY to lB. Kripalani, 30 April 1947, AICC Papers, File No. CL-8, 1946.) 170 "In its policy towards the Muslims or the League, the Congress was first guided by the Ali brothers and then by Dr Ansari and Maulana Abul Kalam Azad. After the death of Dr Ansari, it has been guided by the Maulana Saheb and Khan Abdul Gaffar Khan. What more could it do". (lB. Kripalani to Ashrafuddin Ahmed Choudhury, 13 May 1947, Ibid.) 167 168

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But given the latter's limited mass base and its failure to capture the imagination of the people, the Congress had no difficulty in defeating the Hindu Mahasabha candidates in the election arena. However, in the post-election phase, changes in the overall situation in Bengal brought the Hindu communal forces to the forefront, and it was then that the Congress had to face a lot of problems. The trial ofthe three INA officers began on 5 November 1945. The province witnessed an upsurge of activities. Calcutta observed "INA Day" and about a lakh of people turned out in Shraddhanand Par k I71 N ausher Ali, the Chairman of the INA Fund, spoke about the non-communal character of the INA and exhorted people to shun communal politics. 172 Reports from places like Faridpur,173 Jessore, Rajshahi,1" Nabadwip,175 Jhargram,1'6 Barisal, Maida and Satkhira 177 talked about the observance of the INA Day by the Congress. So far as organized articulation of the movement was concerned the Congress leadership provided it with the requisite voice. Nehru and Sarat Chandra Bose were its undisputed leaders. So far as the Congress was concerned, the campaign for the elections for the central and the provincial Legislative Assemblies began around the third week of October, with the INA movement in the air. Most of the time, there was little to distinguish an election meeting from a meeting to demand release of the INA officers. In Barisal, a report says,"At the conclusion of INA Day function the President at the instance of the District Congress Committee invited speakers to address the meeting on the coming Assembly election. ff 178 Bengal, especially Calcutta, witnessed another popular upsurge on22 November, in the wake of a call given for a strike to protest against the trial and sentencing of the three leaders. This was at a time when the electioneering was on, and the issue of the f

171 172 173 174 175 176 177

178

Ibid., 7 November 1945, p.5. Ibid. Ibid., 10 November 1945, p.2. Ibid. Ibid., 15 November 1945, p. 7. Ibid. Ibid. Amrit Bazar Patrika, Calcutta, 15 November 1945, p. 7.

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INA soon made Iinational freedom" from colonial rule the predominant political will of the people. Thus, the agenda for the election was freedom. While the protest against the trial of the INA officers was a parallel process characterizing the predominant political statement ofthe province, the INA agitation suddenly took the upper hand when, on 21 November, a strike call of the Bengal Provincial Students Federation (BPSF) led by the Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP) demanding the release of the INA prisoners, stole the march over the events. A huge student rally marched towards Dalhousie Square along Dharmatolla Street. Armed police on horseback barred the path of the procession around 3 p.m., and the students saten masse at the Madan Street and Dharmatolla Street crossing. The students wanted Sarat Chandra Bose to come and address them. He refused and sent a message to the students asking them to disperse. The students refused to disperse and rejected the appeal. At around 6 p.m., the police opened fire at the students and made repeated cavalry charges, killing at least one student and injuring several others. As a reaction to the police firing, Calcutta tram workers went on a complete strike, followed by the bus workers and rickshaw pullers. 179 On the next day, there was a complete strike in Calcutta and the suburbs. The troops came out to control the city, but in lanes and bylanes of Calcutta, barricades were put up to keep the troops out of bounds. Muslim students came out in procession with the League flag and were embraced by the Hindu students. The scenes of the tying together of the League and Congress flag, were described movingly and vividly with the help of an eye witness and student leader of those days l 80 The anti-colonial feeling of the entire upsurge was remarkable. Writing to the Secretary of State on 27 November, Wavell said: Casey was impressed by the very strong anti-British feeling behind the whole demonstration, and considers the whole situation still very explosive and dangerous. Root cause of it all he thinks and I agree lies in the inflammatory speeches of Ibid., 22 November 1945, p. 1. Gautam Chattopadhyay, Bengal Electoral Politics and Freedom Struggle , 1862-1947, New Delhi, 1984. 179

180

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Communalism in Bengal

the politicalleaders during the last month or two, working on the unstable minds of the youthful Bengali. So long violent speaking goes on, we shall have to expect outbreaks of this kind.!S! The colonial authorities did not give any credence to the anticolonial sentiments that were being expressed, and blamed it all on the "violent speeches of the leaders". The Muslim League leadership, however, could not take the participation of the Muslim students lightly. The Calcutta District Muslim League secretary, S.M. Usman, immediately issued a statement asking the Muslims to stay clear of any such demonstrations. He said: The demonstration by the students and the Hindu public against INA trial has created a critical situation in Calcutta. Mobs are getting out of control and in some places the police is resorting to firing. !t has been brought to my notice that Muslim League flags were also flying amongst the demonstrators. I would like to inform the Muslim citizens of Calcutta that the Muslim League flags among demonstrators should not mislead the Muslim citizens of Calcutta. They should abstain from all such demonstration. They should not be seen sightseers [sic] of such demonstration 1 s2 The participation in this demonstration was unwelcome not only because of the leaderships' fear of radical politics, but because it was not oblivious to the fact that the participation was based on anti-colonial feelings. This stand could easily demonstrate the fragility of the ideological content of the Pakistan demand based as it was on the creation of an exclusivist psyche. This was evident in Bengal, Punjab, United Provinces and most other places from where reports were coming in. Therefore, such exclusivity could easily be shattered by a front embracing anticolonial agenda. !twas, therefore, on this ground that the League leadership now took up the cause of the INA officers. No League leader, not even Jinnah, had earlier pleaded for the release of the officers.!S3 The November upsurge, however, had sent different f

181 Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 27 November 1945, N. Mansergh ed., TOP, Vol. VII, p. 553. 182 Star of India, Calcutta, 22 November 1946, p. 1. 183 KK Ghosh, The Indian National Army: Second Front of the Indian Independence Movement, p. 208.

War is Over: Efforts at Freedom

209

signals and not very long after, on 25 December, the leaders met in Lahore at Mamdot' s house and decided to take up Capt. Abdur Rashid's case l 84 Capt. Abdur Rashid of the INA was convicted and sentenced to seven years imprisonment. The League gave a call for Capt. Rashid Ali Day on 12 February. Calcu tta, once again erupted and witnessed unprecedented violence on the part of the police in dealing with what essentially began as a students' demonstration. Disturbances broke out in Calcutta on 11 February 1946, following demonstrations protesting the sentence imposed on Capt. Abdul Rashid of the INA. On 12 February 1946 people came out in a mile-long procession to protest against the police firing on students. "Calcutta, on February 12, presented a grim picture. Public transport was completely paralysed. Tram, Bus and Rickshaw workers had gone on an indefinite general strike, responding to the call of the CPI controlled union"l 85 A mammoth meeting was held at the Wellington Square to condemn police lathi charges and firing. The procession was led by Mr H.S. Suhrawardy and Satish Chandra Das Gupta of Khadi Pratisthan, the two leaders moving arm-in-arm, under Congress and League flags tied together and held aloft by the volunteers I86 The sequel to the meeting and the procession was a complete paralysis of the city's civic life with frequent opening of fire by the police on people trying to set aflame military lorries, post offices and tram depots. On the third day, i.e., 13 February, the police opened fire about 15 times and some sections of the town were soon handed over to the army. lS7 The echo of the anger against the colonial authorities was heard from almost all over Benga[188 Students of Dacca University boycotted their classes I 89

Star of India, Calcutta, 28 December 1945, p. 1. Amrit Bazar Patrika, 13 February 1946, p. 1. 186 N.N. Mitra ed., Annual Register, 1946, VoL I, p.271. 187 For details see, ibid., pp. 269-84. 188 Star of India, Calcutta, 14 February 1946, p. 1. 189 Ibid.; see also, Amrit Bazar Patrika, Calcutta, 13 February 1946, p. 1; 14 February 1946, p. 1. For reports of protest meetings against the military firing in Calcutta, also see, ibid., 17 February 1946, pp. I, 5. 184 185

210

Communalism in Bengal

Gautam Chattopadhyay, a participant, and later, a chronicler of the events later claimed in a rather exaggerated manner lithe stage was set in February 1946 for a victorious conclusion of the long and complex struggle for Indian independence". This was because, he argued, the Hindu-Muslim unity shown during the tumult could have easily been channelized into the anti-imperial struggle 190 While he saw a complete Hindu-Muslim front forged on the eve of the Rashid Ali Day-a unity strong enough to challenge the colonial might, a section of the Muslim League leadership, which was preparing the ground for the agitation was quoting Rashid Ali as saying that his predominant interest in joining the INA was his desire to serve the Muslim community. A report said: f

f

f

Reading from written statement in a clear ringing voice he declared, I was cut off from the rest of the world and could get only such news as were supplied by the Japanese. I was convinced that the non-Muslims who were the moving spirit in the I.N.A. were going to invade India with the help of the Japanese. I was also convinced that this would result in the domination of India by the non-Muslims [helped] by the Japanese. In order to safeguard the interests of my community I decided like most of the other Muslims to join the INA in order to arm myself and thus be in a position to safeguard the interests of my community in India .... 191 f

Similarly, criticising the assertions of the INA officers of the non-communal spirit of the INA, it was said: There was no communal difference in the INA and among the 25 lakh of Indians in East Asia over whom the Provisional Government exercised authority, thus observed Shah Nawaz, replying to an address of welcome presented to him on behalf of the Hindu public of Calcutta. The falsity of such utterances

19()

191

Gautam Chattopadhyay, Bengal Electoral Politics, pp. 202-3. Star of India, Calcutta, 28 January 1946, p. 2.

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211

becomes apparent when compared with the sensational disclosure made by Capt. Abdul Rashid, that the INA under the leadership ofMr Subhash Bose had no other aim than to establish Ram Rajya under the aegis of Japanese Government. 192 It also argued that Subhash Bose's communalism reflected in the fact that no Muslim had access to the secrets of the government, Bande Malaram was retained and the two journals brought out by the government, i.e., Purna Swaraj and Jai Hind, distinctively stank of IIHinduism" .193It also said that the communalism in the INA also reflected in the way the Hindu and Sikh soldiers committed atrocities and Iishowered bullets on Muslim soldiers".194 Thus f one has to be cautious while imposing a revolutionarYf anti-colonial attribute without examining the stream of ideological inputs that went into the making of such movement as the Rashid Ali Day demonstration. But why did the Congress play a very limited role in the entire event? The first reason which may be given for such a back-seated role was the disavowal by the Congress of any isolated violent action at this stage. As the Congress President Abdul Kalam Azad in his statement on February events argued: our struggle for Independence has reached a stage when sporadic and isolated action of individuals and groups served as a hindrance rather than help"l95 The local Congress leaders were in fact very apprehensive of the law and order situation, and II

apprehending danger the leaders of public opinion, including the BPCC president and other responsible Congress leaders, Muslim League and Communist party leaders met at Khadi Pratisthan to devise ways and means how to ease the situation. They decided to organise a meeting next day as a protest against the police firing and lathi charge on peaceful processionists. 1% Ibid., 13 February 1946, p.5. Ibid. 194 Ibid. 195 N.N. Mitra ed., Annual Register, 1946, Vol. I, p.283. 1% A Report by the Secretary, Bengal Provincial Congress Committee (BPCC), to Mahatma Gandhi, dated 18 February 1946, AICC Papers, File No. P-5 [Pt. IJ, 1946-47. 192 193

212

Communalism in Bengal

Thus, the leaders were working out ways to avoid danger, and it was not only the Congress which was involved in such an operation. However what was important was the communal colour under which the Rashid Ali Day was organized on 11 February. Though, the Congress report did not say anything about this fact, its absence from any initiative was obvious. 197 The strike on 11 February was called by the Muslim Student League and supported by the Students Federation (the Communist students wing).!98 This suggests that the Congress leaders were conscious of the fact that calling an all-India demonstration demanding the release of Capt. Abdul Rashid alone, was the culmination of the Muslim League's attempt to communalize the INA issue too. True, the demonstration was joined by the Muslim masses in a big way, but it appears that the mobilization drive for the election on a communal basis had more to do with it than a sheer anti-imperialist impulse. To add to it, even the Communist leader, Somna th Lahiry, who had criticized the Congress leaders for their betrayat 199 confessed later saying Iithere was a limitation in the Rashid Ali Day-it had a communal side. Since the League had supported it, ordinary Muslims from bustees jumped into it. Entire bustees got involved into it. As soon as the League became silent they also went back".20o What is important is the question whether even at this stage the Congress lost a chance to forge a Hindu-Muslim front by not taking the lead of an anti-imperial upsurge. It appears that the limitation that Somnath Lahiry talked of, and the spontaneous character of the entire reaction made it difficult for Congress to forge this unity. Hailed by some as one of the biggest opportunities f

197 The Report says, "On the 11th February the Muslim League and the Communist Party organised a demonstration and a procession as a protest against the conviction of Capt. Abdul Rashid of the INA", ibid. 198 Gautam Chattopadhyay, Bengal Electoral Politics, pp. 199-200. 199 In his article "Prostut Hou" (Prepare yourself) which appeared in the Communist organ Swadhinata on 16 February, he wrote, "the Communists had to take the reign of the movement against the imperialist powers, as the other parties, i.e., Congress and the League were not ready to fight". Quoted in Amalendu, Sengupta, Uttal Challis, pp. 79-82. 200 Ibid., p. 82.

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213

for a joint Hindu-Muslim assault on the colonial regime, we have however seen how there were unmistakable signs of presenting Abdul Rashid's case as a divisive legacy. From the beginning, there were attempts to present Capt. Abdul Rashid as a crusader for the Muslim cause. He was supposed to have joined INA to protect Muslim interests. The League also tried to attack the non-communal basis of the INA in its appeat accusing it of visualizing a Ram Rajya"201 and "excluding Muslims from positions of trust"."2 While 5ubhash Bose was said to have reflected his communalism in the INA in different ways, the League volunteers broke his portraits along with the Congress tricolour. 203 Therefore, every attempt was made to shatter the non-communal legacy of the INA, and thereby, also the possibility of formation of any joint anti-colonial and noncommunal front. Whatever might have been the implications of this demonstration, it certainly added to the prestige of the League. While INA brought nationalism on the agenda and helped the Congress to boost the morale of the populace, it also helped the League justify its claim that it was also nationalist and fighting the colonial authorities. 50, the INA movement proved beneficial to the League in the sense that it normalized the communal content. The February demonstration caught the imagination of the Muslim masses in Bengal, who for the first time in the post-war era could vent their anti-imperialist feelings. But the direction it took was communal. Muslims were asked to sink their differences because, as the League leaders said, their political enemy "had declared war against Muslim aspirations" .204 The INA demonstrations and the presence of other Muslim groups under the leadership of Jamaitul-Ulama-i-Hind constituted a common challenge to the construction of a collective psyche, which would assure victory to the League in the coming elections. It adopted two strategies to counter this challenge. First, it began to strengthen its ideological position by sharpening its rhetoric couched in religious and cultural f

f

II

20 1 202 203 204

Ibid., 13 February 1946, p.5. Ibid. Hindustan Standard, 1 February 1946, p. 3. "Let Us Go to War", Appendix 1, this Chapter.

214 Communalism in Bengal

terms. The League was now painted as the advance guard of the "cultural defence that the Muslims required in the face of the Hindu attack on it".205 The support of the ulama was crucial to validate this claim. It was quite significant, therefore, that the League sponsored the creation of the Jamait-ul-Ulama-i-Islam in October to counter the Jamait-ul-Ulama-i-Hind. Its first conference was held in Calcutta from 26 to 29 October 1945, to "mobilise forces of Islam for Pakistan and the renaissance of the Millat".206 The League president, Maulana Akram Khan, while opening the conference, said: "As one of the founders of the Jamait-ulUlama-i-Hind, Delhi, I wholeheartedly welcome the first session of the newly formed All India Jamait-ul-Ulama-i-Islam in the capital of Islamic Pakistan".207 (Italics mine) The resolutions passed in the conference, in fact, projected the idea of a solid Islamic unity, with the Muslim League as its vanguard. The Muslims of Bengal were asked to sink their differences. 208 Why should they do this? The answer came from Maulana Azad Subhani, a respected Leaguer: "We are weak, We are being beaten, crushed, but there is a spark which burns, an inspiration which shivers through our frame .... the unmistakable signs of our revival-a supreme renaissance .... the time is not far when the Muslim nation will rise" .209 Thusf the IIMuslim Nation" was seen as being Ilbeaten and crushed", and the people were exhorted now to join the Islamic unity to Ilrise". There was a radical change in the political rhetoric with the frequent use now of Ilenemy"f Ilcrushing"f Iisuffering"f and the metaphor Ilwar". One of the best expositions on the theme had come from Lt. Col. Hussain Suhrawardy. Speaking at Pakistan Club, he identified the Muslim League's fight with that of the Muslims and drew attention to the manner in which they Iisuffer as an enemy nation suffering to get freedom."210 On the ideological front, therefore, a complete identification ofIslam and a Muslim nation was sought to be created. The election of 1946

205 206 207 208 2(19

210

Star of India, Calcutta, 24 October 1945, p. 3. Ibid., Calcutta, 5 October 1945, p. 1. Ibid., 24 October 1945, p.3. Ibid. Ibid., 27 October 1945, p.3. Ibid., 30 March 1945, p. 3.

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215

presented itself as the culmination of this process. The interests of the Muslim nation were sought to be satisfied only through the creation of a nation state called Pakistan. The second important aspect of the strategy unfolded itself as the electioneering progressed. Creation of a united Muslim front was a process that went along with the construction of a vilified other-the Hindu front. Owing to the operation of the logic of separate electorates, the Muslim League had to fight the non-League and the nationalist Muslims in this arena. This vilified other-the Hindu-was the enemy, but these were the people who posed the challenge directly in the electoral arena. The League's method of confronting this section was direct-it tried to silence them by using terrorizing tactics. Bengal witnessed widespread attacks on the non-League and the nationalist Muslims. Humayun Kabir was assaulted,2l1 Major Shahnawaj, the INA officer who was championing the anti-communal cause of the Congress who was constantly attacked by the League press as a stooge of the Congress, was "assaulted in front of the Nakhoda Masjid until the Khaksars rescued himlf .212 liThe people who attacked him/f the report said Ilasked him to join the League. ff 21 3 Habibur Rahman Choudhury, a non-League candidate from Kasba-Burichang in Comilla, was kidnapped by 100 hooligans near Salbandi Railway Station and was taken to Gaffargaon from where he was released after eight days.2!4 The KPP candidate from Serajganj Central Mohammedan constituency, Barat Ali, was attacked by a "mob shouting League slogans at village Pratap (P.S. Uttarpara)".2!5The newspaper report said, he "could escape only when he signed a bond saying he would never contest against the League".2!6 The Bengal Muslim Parliamentary Party which was fighting the League, in its appeal to the Muslim electorate, focused on this phenomenon: f

f

Our main opposition is from the Muslim League fold. While we stand for popular ideals and progressive ideologies, the

211

212

m 214 215 216

Hindustan Standard, Calcutta, 12 January 1946, p. 1. Ibid., 28 January 1946, p.3. Ibid. Ibid., Calcutta, 4 March 1946, p.3. Amrit Bazar Patrika, Calcutta, 3 March 1946, p. 4. Ibid.

216

Communalism in Bengal

League stands for what it is showing everywhere. Their appeal they know cannot reach the Muslim public .... recourse to armed goondaism and organised vandalism. The Muslim public will not fall victim to this hooliganism and will refuse to have anything to do with this organised goondaism. The Muslim mass is with us and will not support the vested interest of black-marketers and profiteers whatever reign of terrorism the Leaguers might try to create.217 The terrorising methods of the League party workers were matched by the aggressive tone of its election manifesto which declared the election a religious war-Jehad. 218 Similarly, in Calcutta and its surrounding areas, a victory celebration on 11 January 1946, was organized to pray for victory in the ensuing Provincial Assembly elections.219 The Muslim League issued detailed directions for the celebrations: special thanks giving prayers for the success achieved and for the cent per cent success in the coming elections; meetings in the Central Mosques to be held, the printed message of the Calcutta Muslim League to be read out; Charghanai-illumination of the Muslim houses; Muslims of Howrah, Calcutta, Metiaburuz, 24 Parganas should make house to house collection for the Muslim League Election Fund; Muslim League broadcasting centres will be opened where National poems of Pakistan will be read OUt. 220 The "celebrations" and the way the Bengal Provincial League thought of observing it, provides a clue for the later events. It was not just a coincidence that some of the worst affected areas during Calcutta riots of August 1946, i.e., Metiaburuz, Howrah, 24 Par ganas, etc., were also ones where the Calcutta Muslim League concentrated on Ilcelebrating" and campaigning for election funds. It was in these circumstances and under such created situations, that the elections took place. As expected in the political circles, the Muslim League swept the Muslim seats, validating its position as the "sole spokesman of the Muslims". Its rivals, the KPP and the nationalist Muslims were routed.

217 218 2 19 220

Ibid., 14 March 1946, p. 3. "Let Us Go to War", Appendix 1, this Chapter. Star of India, Calcutta, 9 January 1946, p.5. Ibid.

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217

VI The Communist party saw the coming elections as great programmatic battle betvveen Indian parties"f221 and declared: Iia

other parties claim the monopoly of patriotism and wisdom and will put the blame on each other for coming in the way of the freedom of India . ... Ours is the only party that will do nothing of the sort, but tell people the simple truth that India's main parties by fighting each other will not bring Indian freedom nearer. 222 Therefore, it kept on treating, ideologically speaking, the programmes of the Congress and League at the same level, and each was seen as fighting for establishing domination over the other. The party claimed that their "vision of freedom stood apart from those of the Congress and the League".223 Based on the assumption that it was the "accepted leader" of the labouring classes, the party decided to field candidates for all labour seats: ... Our party will put its own candidates in almost all labour seats to demonstrate that it is the accepted leader of the working-class. We will also contest such rural seats, both general and Muslim, where we are the existing majority of the people to demonstrate the strength and vitality of the organised Kisan movement. 224 But, the Communist candidates were asked not to stand against the League candidates for the Muslim seats, and in return they were promised the Muslim League support in the labour P.c. Joshi, For a Free and Happy India, Election Policy of Indian Communists, Bombay, 1946, p. 1. 222 Ibid. 223 Ibid., p. 5 . 22 1

... Our purpose in contesting the elections is not to expose the Congress and the League and glorify ourselves, but to popularise among the electorate such a vision of free India that ensures freedom to all and does not become the domination of some over others, based on principles that can and must unite all freedom-loving Indians. (Ibid.) 224

Abul Hashim, Amar Jibon, p. 15.

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Communalism in Bengal

seats. 225 The party ultimately put 11 candidates for the general rural seats, 2 for the Muslim rural seats and 7 for the Labour seats.

VII The election of 1945-46 was, from the point of view of the Muslim League, the final battle for Pakistan. In the elections for Bengal Assembly, it won 113 seats as compared to three by the KPP. The Nationalist Muslims failed to gain any seat. A detailed analysis of sectoral votes would show the extent of penetration of the League in rural areas where the KPP had an edge in the previous election of1937. The Table 4.1 shows the votes polled by different parties in the 1946 elections for the Provincial legislature. Table 4.1: Votes Polled in 1945-46 Elections

Party

No. of Votes Percentage No. of Muslim Percentage of Polled of Votes Votes Polled Muslim Votes Urban/Rural

Congress Muslim League KPP and Nationalist Muslims Hindu Mahasabha Communists Pro-League Muslims

2,337,053 2,057,830 272.880

42.2 37.2 3.1

78.981 736.883 157,197

1.4 13.83 2.8

11,759 205.805

Urban/Rural

713

95 2.7

556

2.2

-

0.5 89.6 7.1

7.7 0.1

Source: Return showing the results of elections to the Central Legislative Assembly and the Provincial Legislatures in 1945-46, New Delhi, Government of India Press, 1948, pp. 110-36.

225

Hashim wrote: The leftists in the Muslim League had good relations with the Communist party. I had warned the leaders of the Communist party that if there was any contest between the Muslim League candidates and the Communist party in the Muslim seats, the relation would not remain good. We assured them that we would support the Communist party in the seats reserved for the labour. The Communist party did not agree and said that it had some pockets in the Muslim majority areas and in these pockets their victory was certain. They put up some candidates in Noakhali and Mymensingh. All the candidates nominated by the Communist party were defeated and lost their deposit. We, true to our

War is Over: Efforts at Freedom

219

The table clearly shows that the penetration of Muslim League in the rural areas was almost complete. Thus, its hold in the period took a qualitative turn as compared to the pre-1937 period, when it was still confined to the urban areas. This could be easily gleaned from contrasting the sectoral votes that the Muslim League and KPP polled. From a meagre 26.52 per cent of the rural Muslim vote that it polled in 1937, the Muslim League increased it to 89.6 per cent. On the other hand, the KPP which had secured 31.5 per cent of the rural Muslim vote in 1937, could gain a meagre 7.1 per cent, thalloo when the Nationalist Muslims and the Jamait-ul-ulamai-Hind were supporting it in the electoral battle. 226 This in a way sounded the death-knell of the KPP. This also vindicated Abul Hashim's efforts at making the party broad-based and giving it a new orientation. The elections witnessed a very high percentage of voters' participation, especially in East Bengal where the turn out was very high. In areas like Tippera and Noakhali, the turn out went to the extent of 79 per cent. In comparison, the turn out in the general seats was lower with the exception of one or two seats such as in East Bengal where Jogendra Mondal was contesting, the turn out was below 50 per cent. This shows tha t notwithstanding the allegations of violence and official connivance, the high turn out was a measure of their strong appeal. And this appeal took the form of votes for the League and its demand of Pakistan. For the Hindu Mahasabha, the election results proved disastrous. It not only losllo the Congress, but the insignificant number of votes that it polled exposed its inherent weakness. Sarat Chandra Bose defeated the Hindu Mahasabha candidate by 7,290 to 88 votes while Shyama Prasad Mookerjee despite his stature, could secure only 346 votes against 10,216 of his Congress rival Nagendra Nath Mukhopadhyay.227 f

f

assurance, however, supported the Communist candidates in the labour seats. (Ibid., p. 94.) For an analysis of the results of the 1937 elections, see, Humaira Momen, Muslim Politics in Bengal: A Study of Krishak Praja Party and the Elections of 1937, Dhaka, 1972, pp. 63-64. 227 Rehun showing the results of the Central Legislative Assembly and the Provincial Legislatures in 1945-46, New Delhi, 1948, pp. 13-15. 226

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Communalism in Bengal

In the elections for the provincial Legislative Assembly, the Hindu Mahasabha could field candidates for only 23 seats out of the total number of rural seats, and three for the six urban seats. Its candidate for Calcutta (East), Sarojendra Prasad Bagchi polled 27 votes against the 12,305 polled by Jyotish Chandra Chose of the Congress. Patita Paban Chatterjee who stood as the Sabha candidate from Calcutta (Central) polled only 217 votes against 13,566 of the Congress candidate. It did better in the North Bengal Municipal seat where its candidate polled 1,393 votes against 22,902 votes of the Congress candidate. Thus, in urban Bengal, it was totally rejected. In rural areas, all of its 23 candidates were defeated and most of them lost their deposits. In the area where it was most active, i.e., Birbhum, Bakerganj, Noakhali, Jessore, Khulna, and other places in Mymensingh and Faridpur, its candidates were rejected. 228 It is not clear how far these electoral results reflected the ongoing ideological contestation atthe societallevel. This was particularly because the franchise was limited. The fact, however, remains that the Hindu Mahasabha was totally rejected by the people at the very first chance they got to prove their electoral preference. Does it, then, mean that the people who had voted for the Congress, necessarily rejected the Hindu communal stance of the Mahasabha, and deliberately opted for the nationalist Congress to get what they wanted at this historical juncture, i.e., freedom? Or, can one argue, that at this juncture, when the tide of nationalism was very strong, the Hindu communal strand had not expressed itself only through the Hindu Mahasabha, but had channelized its voting preference to the Congress? This is a question that remains to be explored more deeply, and the present work does not attempt to probe into this channelization. The results were disastrous for the morale of the communists. Only Jyoti Basu who defeated Humayun Kabir by eight votes in the Railway labour constituency and Ratan La Brahmin could come out successfully. The party sources lamented that there was a big gap between the expectations and the actual results."229 II

Ibid. "ON THE RESULT OF THE ELECTIONS (The Central Committee Resolution of April 1946)", Party Letter, No.6, 21 May 1946, p. 1. 228

229

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221

The party, trying to analyse the results, saw a new nationalist upsurge behind this failure of the Communists. "With the release of the Congress leaders a new political upsurge began to sweep the country," said the party letter, "people felt that all the issues can and must be solved through the immediate realisation of freedom" .230 However the party never gave up its earlier line of consistently seeing the League as the main instrument of liberation for the Indian Muslims. It said: "Election results showed that the vast masses regard the Congress as the freedom front, as their main instrument of liberation. They equally showed that the Muslim masses regarded the League as their organisation which they must line up with to secure freedom."231 At the same time it maintained that the Congress had exploited the sentiments of the backward and labouring classes. The party presented its analysis in these terms: f

The labour seats won by the Congress were mostly won by exploiting, in a period of rising political upsurge, the broad national sentiment of backward, mostly unorganised workers and in cases of advanced workers, by fanning the prejudices against the League and the demand for self-determination. The Congress also invariably utilised Bose's men and in many centres police and goonda terror was let loose against the Red Flag. 232 The leaders from different districts maintained that the Congress organization as well as its election campaign was not in as good a condition during the election as that of the Communist party. The campaign of the Congress candidate against whom we fought, was very weak compared to us. The number of our workers was also very big .... But after the election it was seen that our candidate got around six thousand votes while the Congress candidate got more than 30 thousand.233

230 23 1 232 233

Ibid. Ibid., p. 2. Ibid., p. 5. Jnan Chakraborty, Dhaka Jelar, p. 99.

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Communalism in Bengal

There was a general helplessness in the Congress. 234 Similarly, in Mymensingh where the Communists were organizing the peasants and the Hajongs for a long and successful struggle. Explaining their defeat, Moni Singh said: "The Congress organised relatively less number of meetings than us", but even then it got all the seats .... Middle classes were at that time generally against us. They said that we had helped the British by opposing the Quit India Movement by calling World War as People's War.235 Therefore, success of the Congress in the election was explained in terms of its appropriation of the prejudices of the backward sections among the leaders. Its success was shown to be the victory of the middle classes who were against the communists for their role in the past. League's victory was not commented upon very much. For the Communists in Bengal the rehabilitation during the famine, therefore, brought them members but the agenda of na tionalism brought to the surface the fact tha t for a substantial number of people at that juncture, freedom was far more important an issue than the one put before the people by the Communist party.

VII Despite its resounding victory, the Muslim League did not have an absolute majority in the Bengal Assembly and Suhrawardy, once called upon to form the cabinet, met both Maulana Azad, then the Congress president, and Kiran Shankar Roy, the leader of the Bengal Congress Assembly, from 11-14 April 1946. The Congress Wor king Committee set the guidelines for Ray's talks with Suhrawardy. They were: barring the Premier, the number of ministers from the Congress and the League parties must be equal; either the home or the civil supplies portfolios must be allotted to a Congress minister; an anti-corruption board must be established; all categories of political prisoners, convicted or

234 235

Ibid. Moni Singh, Jibon Sangram, 1991, p. 67.

War is Over: Efforts at Freedom

223

otherwise, should be released; comprehensive steps for ameliora ting the hardship of the masses in response of cloth and food storage should be taken; and there should be no introduction of any communal legislation of a controversial nature without mutual agreement. 236 The talks for a coalition ministry finally broke down as the League could agree neither to the condition of equal number of ministers nor that the home portfolio be given to the Congress. The Ilpolitical prisoners issue" was also problematic for the League. Kiran Shankar Roy, on the other hand, issued a statement that he would like to make it clear that there was no ideological bar to the Congress party cooperating with the Muslim League, provided the issue of Pakistan was kept out of the provincial politics.'" However, a critical perusal shows that the Congress was not very keen on joining the cabinet, nor the Muslim League on taking it in. The same cannot be said about Suhrawardy. Historians of the period are of the opinion that he wanted a League-Congress coalition quite seriously.238 But why? Here I think Suhrawardy was motivated by the idea of a greater Bengal". In his meeting with the Cabinet Mission, he had demanded a "redistribution of boundaries ofBengal so as to include Jharkhand State, Singhbhum, Manbhum, and Santhal Pargana".239 In quite the same vein, he said later that lithe question before the country now was one of Pakistan and Hindustan. Once this was conceded, it would be for the Pak State to define the status of its constituent unity". The unity he added should so far as possible be a workable one, and should conform to the conditions of "linguistic and cultural affinities".240 Suhrawardy wanted the whole of Assam and Bengal to be included into Pakistan, and here he put aside religion as the deciding factor.24! But for him, Pakistan state was for all the II

Statesman, Calcutta 15 April 1946, p. 1. Star of India, Calcutta, 23 April 1946, p. 1. 238 Gautam Chattopadhyay, Bengal Electoral Politics, p. 205. 239 Star of India, Calcutta, 10 April 1946, p. 1. 240 Ibid., 12 April 1946, p.2. 241 Suhrawardy's Idea about Eastern Pakistan, Note on Meeting between Cabinet Delegation, Field Marshal Viscount Wavell and Mr H.S. Suhrawardy on Monday, 8 April 1946 at 11 a.m., TOP, VoL VI, p. 163. 236

237

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Muslims of India. His idea of a Bengal that was not partitioned was articulated in his discussion with the cabinet committee on 8 April 1946. He was very conscious of the communal divide of the province, and anticipated the demand for its partitioning. He said, "Bengal ought notto be dismembered and I believe that my Hindu friends also would like Bengal to remain one entity".242 One may point out here the Muslim League's, especially Suhrawardy's, support to the tribal demand for a separate Jharkhand state neighbouring Bengal, was part of its policy of using all divisive avenues. It not only supported the cause of Jharkhand, but even effectively campaigned for the SC organizations' demands. 243 From the beginning of 1945, we encounter the Muslim League actively supporting the president of the Scheduled Caste Federation, P.N. Rajabhoj's diatribe against the Congress. 244 This, I believe, was done in part to divert the Congress energies. An equally important reason was that in East Bengal, i.e., Faridpur, Jessore, Khulna and Bakerganj, the SCF had a substantial following. If it could be won on the side of the League, then any demand for the partition of the province could be thwarted through its organized support to the Muslim League. The League was conscious of the fact that the support of the SCF in any future combination of things, was essential to its demand for Pakistan. On similar lines, the Jharkhand demand was also supported. Here, Suhrawardy came out actively to help Jaipal Singh, the president of the AdivasiMahasabha, to address a public meeting along with the Muslim League. He even formed the LeagueJharkhand Friendship Council on February 1946, which was called Jharkhand-Pakistan Conference. 245 At this juncture, Ibid. From the beginning of 1945 (and even earlier) the League leaders supported the Scheduled Caste Federations' demand for a communal settlement, where the SCs also would be given a share in the separate commilllal representation. Rajabhoj's statements were given prominence in this regard, for example, "Scheduled Caste people are not Hindus". Criticizing Gandhi, he said "it is only through potential power and not through social and religious ways that questions of Scheduled Castes will be solved". (Star of India, 17 January 1945, p. 1.) 244 Ibid., 25 February 1946, p. 1. 245 Ibid. 242 243

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Suhrawardy anticipated a demand for the division of Bengal. He, therefore, wanted the Muslim League's reach to extend to the other flank of West Bengal so as to utilize this friendly base in case of the demand for partition. Therefore, the support to Jharkhand was basically a counter move to check any future demand for partitioning of the province. This reasoning emerges from the incongruities in Suhrawardy's technical as well as ideological stands on the issue. On the one hand, he supported Jharkhand, on the other he wanted it inside Bengal. Again, he supported a separate Jharkhand state while simultaneously demanding that cultural and linguistic affinities should be recognized and therefore Ilin case Jharkhand state is not carved out then Bengali section be added to Pakistan".246 It became clear, then, that the plan for including the whole of Bengal into Pakistan had already existed in Suhrawardy's schema, and his move to bring the Congress into the cabinet was a tactical one, intended to forestall any counter move, and to also build a joint front against the partition of Bengal. Suhrawardy finally formed his cabinet on 23 April and thus began the last Muslim League ministry in pre-partition Bengal. f

f

VIII There was an air of certainty about the impending freedom but there were also reports from different parts of Bengal which indicated the deteriorating communal situation. 247 The post-war situation was substantially different from the pre-war situation on several counts and this has been variously described and interpreted by various historians. 248 From mid-1945 onward the Ibid., 12 February 1946. See, "Communal Trouble at Habiganj College Function", Amrit Bazar Patrika,5 February 1946, p. 7; "Communal Trouble in Jessore", ibid., 24 May 1946, p.3; "Dacca", ibid., 5 July 1946, p.l. Also, Government of India, Home Political, File No. 5/27/46. 248 AK. Gupta ed., Myth and Reality: The Struggle for Freedom in India, 194547, Delhi, 1987; Anita Inder Singh, The Origins of the Partition of India, New Delhi, 1987; Sumit SarkarI Modern India, 1885-1945, New Delhi, 1983; Sucheta Mahajan, Independence and Partition: The Erosion of Colonial Power in India, Delhi, 2000; Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan, Cambridge, 1985. 246

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British were concerned about the rising tide of popular resentment, manifested through the demonstrations and breakdown of law and order and the disquiet among the armed forces, as the events like the mutiny of the RIN ratings indicated. There were signs of what one would call "suspected loyalty". As high an official as the Chief of the Armed Forces, Auchinleck felt" against trying the loyalty of the Indian troops too highly in an attemptto repress their own countrymen" .249 Aware of all these the British government could not offer any gesture. 250 However if one views the concerns carefully one discerns and would tend to agree with some historians that itwas from the point of an eroded hegemony, as one can describe the colonial state in India at this point of time, that the authorities were approaching the developments in India.25! However, the mood during the QuitIndia movement and the events thereafter had also indicated to the colonial authorities that the gesture had to be substantive unlike the Cripps Mission. It was at this juncture and from this perspective that the British cabinet deliberations were organized. The Cabinet Mission that came to India was a result of this initiative. There were two aspects of these moves which are worth mentioning here. One was the fact that a number of historians have pointed out: the Labour government was not much different from the conservative party in the past in its views on Indian independence. 252 Second the strategic considerations of the colonial power now came to the fore and, as has been argued by historians, it was the consideration of its own strategic interest that Britain saw unity of India as the policy to be pursued in all further talks on f

f

f

249 John Connell Auchinleck, London, 1959, pp. 823-24 as cited in Anita Inder Singh, The Origins of the Partition, p. 147, fn.26. 25() For some indications of the need for such gestures see Pethick Lawrence to Wavell, 21 November 1945 and Cabinet Paper, 22 November 1945, TOP, Vol. 6, pp. 516-17 and 522-23 respectively. 25 1 Sucheta Mahajan, Independence and Partition, pp. 220-25; Anita Inder Singh, The Origins of the Partition. 252 For a detailed and excellent discussion on the ideas and shifts or absence of shifts in the bases of the British Labour party towards imperialism and the on the question of independence of the colonies, see Parthasarathi Gupta, Imperialism and the British Labour Movement, 1914-64, Delhi, 2002 (first published in London, 1975).

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independence or partition. 253 Both of these would come to playa crucial role in the shape of the deliberations that took place under the aegis of the Cabinet Mission which arrived in India on 14 March 1946. Its aim was to start the process of the framing of the constitutional structure in which Indians will have "full control of their own destiny and the formation of a new interim government."254 The Cabinet Mission deliberations finally concluded with the announcement of the Draft Plan on 16 May 1946. The Cabinet Mission, although trying very hard to work out something which would keep the Congress as well as the League happy, had to come out openly against the Pakistan plan as something which it considered as impractical and incapable of solving the communal problem. It suggested instead a loose federation with three major groupings of provinces. There were provisions in the scheme for sufficient autonomy to the groupings. The Cabinet Mission Plan divided the provinces into three sections. Section A comprised Madras, Bombay, United Provinces, Bihar, Central Provinces and Orissa; Section B consisted of Punjab, Sind and North Western Frontiers Province (NWFP) and the Section C comprised of Bengal and Assam. Each section would meet separately to decide on the constitution for the group. The common centre would look after defence, foreign affairs and communica tions. A province could ask for a reconsidera tion of the group or the Union constitution. A province could come out of a group after the first general elections. After 10 years a province could ask for a reconsideration of the group or the Union constitution.255 Thus as Sucheta Mahajan has suggested, " Cabinet Mission chose to be ambiguous about whether groupings was compulsory or optional in the hope of somehow reconciling the irreconcilable. The discussions between the Viceroy, officials and political leaders make it evident that the ambiguity was intentional."256

Parthasarathi Gupta, "Imperial Strategy and the Transfer of Power, 1939-51" in Power, Politics and the People Studies in British Imperialism and Indian Nationalism, Delhi, 2001, pp. 240-307; Sucheta Mahajan, Independence and Partition; Anita Inder Singh, The Origins of the Partition. 254 Cabinet Delegation to Cabinet office, (T) 25 March 1946, TOP, Vol. 7, p. 6. 255 R.]. Moore, Escape from Empire: The Attlee Government and the Indian Problem, London, 1983; Sucheta Mahajan, Independence and Partition; Anita Inder Singh, The Origins of the Partition. 256 Sucheta Mahajan, Independence and Partition, p. 153. 253

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Though the Muslim League did not like this criticism of its Pakistan proposal, it welcomed the grouping system which it said would form the basis of Pakistan. The League wanted the provinces to have the right to question the Union constitution at the very outset, rather than wait for 10 years. It accepted the scheme on 6 June 1946. This was for the first time that the Jinnah led League had accepted any proposal before the Congress had made its decisions known.257 The Congress was in favour of provinces having the option not to join a group in the first place, rather than waiting till the first elections to leave the group. Assam and NWFP, both Congress ruled provinces, wished to opt out of Sections Band C, which were dominated by Muslim majority states. Nehru, in fact, threatened that the Congress was going to work for a strong centre and to break the group system and they would succeed. The Mission, in its wish to keep both the League and the Congress happy, left

Jamiluddin Ahmad to Jinnah 29 May 1946, Quaid-e-Azam Papers, File No. 12, cited in R]. Moore, "Jinnah and the Pakistan Demand", in Mushirul Hasan ed., India's Partition Process, Strategy and Mobilisation, Delhi, 2001, pp. 191-92. 257

The League should work the plan up to the Group stage and then create a situation to forces the hands of the Hindus and the British to concede Pakistan of our conception.. (We should) make known in most emphatic terms our objections to the plan specially with regard to the centre and declare that we will. .. not be bound to submit to Union Centre which does not accord us a position of equality. We (should) give a chance to the Hindu majority to accommodate us at the Centre .... After we have made the constitution of Groups Band C according to Oill wishes our position will be stronger than what it is now if we use our opporhmities properly. We will have some foothold. When we reassemble in the Union Constituent Assembly we can create deadlocks on really important issues ... if the worst comes to the worst and the Hindu majority shows no willingness to compromise we can withdraw from the assembly in a body, and refuse to honour its decisions. Ours will be a solid block as there won't be more than two or three non-League Muslims in the Assembly ... We will be on strong morally and politically because firstly we will have previously declared that we can never acquiesce in any Centre which reduces us to a subordinate position and secondly we will be in power in the groups, and will be better able to resist the imposition of an unwanted centre.

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its plan ambivalent and open to different interpretations. The Congress would have in any case opposed the compulsory groupings as it conveyed an acceptance of the communal division of the country. Thus, while Nehru said that the Congress would work against the grouping system, the League accepted the plan for altogether opposite reasons. It accepted the Plan" in as much as the basis and foundation of Pakistan are inherent in the Mission Plan by virtue of the compulsory grouping of the six Muslim provinces" .258 An endorsement of Pakistan of some sort. The events were moving faster and the League was keenly aware of it. It was, it seems, becoming clear that Jinnah was losing his power to veto over any constitutional or other moves that the colonial authorities had provided him. It could be that in the emerging arrangements, the British would not allow Jinnah to use the veto that Wavell had given him during the Shimla Conference. Jinnah soon came into action and retracted League's acceptance of the Mission's proposals when it became clear that the British government would not sacrifice the Congress at its altar. Nehru's press statement on 10 July in which he had argued the already known Congress stand that it would not accept the groupings to be compulsorily accepted before the constitution making process begins, was made a pretext for League's withdrawal. This statement was forwarded by Jinnah as the proof of Congress intransigence. Jinnah now threatened the British that the League would now leave the constitutional pa tho Thus Direct Action came to be seen as a redressal for this betrayal. The AIML, in its council meeting at Bombay on 27-29 July 1946, passed two resolutions. The first rejected the Cabinet Mission Plan and, the second, resolved to resort to Direct Action to achieve Pakistan. The second resolution said: Where as the Council of the All India Muslim League has resolved to reject the proposals embodied in the statement of

258

6 JlUle 1946 resolution, forwarded to Viceroy, ibid., p. 836. Inasmuch as the basis and the foundation of Pakistan are inherent in the Mission's plan by virtue of the compulsory groupings of the six Muslim Provinces in Sections Band C (it) is willing to cooperate with the constitution-making machinery proposed in the scheme outlined by the mission, in the hope that it would ultimately result in the establishment of complete sovereign Pakistan. (TOP, Vol. VII, p. 469.)

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the Cabinet delegation and the Viceroy dated 16th May 1946 due to the intransigence of the Congress on one hand; and the breach of faith with the Muslims on the other; and whereas Muslim India has exhausted without success all efforts to find a peaceful solution of the Indian problem by compromise and constitutional means; and whereas the Congress is bent upon setting up of caste-Hindu Raj in India with the connivance of the British; and whereas the recent events have shown that power politics and not justice and fair play are the deciding factors in Indian affairs and whereas it has become abundantly clear that the Muslims ofIndia would not rest contented with anything less than the immediate establishment of independent and fully sovereign state of Pakistan and would resist any attempt to impose any constitution making machinery or any constitution, long term or short term or the setting up of any interim Government at the Centre without the approval and consent of the Muslim League. Council of the All India Muslim League is convinced that now the time has come for the Muslim Nation to resort to Direct Action to achieve Pakistan to assert their just rights, to vindicate their honour and to get rid of present British slavery and the contemplated future caste-Hindu domination.'59 When in July 1946 Jinnah threa tened Direct Action, it was not the same Jinnah and Muslim League that the Congress leaders had known. Jinnah and the League had grown from strength to strength and, as we have seen, the colonial policy of facilitating this growth had resulted in the League actually overshadowing the Muslim popular imagination by 1946. Though his demand and assertions were nothing new but the circumstances were new. The elections in 1945-46 had demonstrated that Jinnah and the League commanded almost unchallenged space among the Muslims in the country. Jinnah by convening the elected Legislators meeting during 7-9 April in Delhi had strengthened himself further. Therefore, any call by him now was a call from the position of strength.

Resolution No.2 passed at the meeting of Council of AIML on 29 July 1946, cited in Syed Sharifuddin Pirzada ed., Foundations of Pakistan All India Muslim League Document: 1906-1947, Vol. II, Delhi, 1982, p. 557.

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The call to come out of constitutional means to achieve its demand, did not look ominous due to the past history of the League. This was the reason why a lot of Congress and other leaders did not take this announcement seriously. Historians also take this proclamation to argue that it was also part of Jinnah's bargaining game. To put into effect the call for Direct Action, the Muslim League Working Committee instructed the Muslims to "suspend all business on the 16th of August and observe complete hartal" and directed the provincial district Leagues to "hold public meetings throughout the country on Friday" in order to explain the two resolutions to the Muslims. The call for the Direct Action day was taken up quite zealously by the BPML and witnessed the aggressive character of the communal passions that had been accumulated in the society during the whole of 1940s. Evidence suggests that the aggressive manifestation of the Direct Action day was not simply an organized affair of the League. Before such an organized action played havoc with society, the society had already been divided vertically and the League's race was to provide, apartfrom the wherewithal for an organized outlet of the communal outburst, ideological sustenance for it. The Direct Action day rioting which resulted in the worst communal carnage in Calcu tta was in fact a violent manifestation of the ideological communal divide of Bengali society. f

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Appendix 1 Let Us Go to War' Quaid-I-Azam Mr Mohammad Ali Jinnah on behalf of the All India Muslim League (AIML) declares that the ensuing election of the central and provincial legislatures of India will be taken as a plebiscite of the Muslims of India on Pakistan and the Working Committee of the Bengal Provincial Muslim League (BPML) in its meeting on 1 August 1945 adopted a resolution to this effect. Major Attlee's Labour government on behalf of the British Imperialism has accepted this challenge. In these days the ballot box is the only medium through which the public opinion can be ascertained with the greatest possible accuracy. The Muslim League, therefore, as the organization of the plain blunt Muslims who are not addicted to clever machinations have straightway demanded general election in India and have declared that they would take this election as a plebiscite on Pakistan and a plebiscite on their claim to represent the whole of Muslim India. His Majesty's government has decided to hold election in the next winter. "We are, therefore, in the midst of a war as the General Election is going to be the first pitched battle for Pakistan with the enemies of Muslim India." The Bengal Provincial Muslim League is making necessary preliminary preparations for fighting this battle. We have to marshall and mobilize our resources for winning this war. The BPML represents the 35 million of Muslims of Bengal and it has now on record over 10 lacs of members. In such a democratic organization as this, it is quite natural that there will be difference of opinion among its leaders, wor kers, members and supporters. "I appeal to all in all sincerity and earnestness to bundle up all their differences and to preserve them if necessary in cold storage during the pendency of our common struggle. Our internecine conflict either for power, personal likes or dislikes or for anything for the matter of that at this juncture would be suicidal." The result of the coming general election shall have far reaching consequences and for sometimes the destiny of India shall be determined by it. In this war of ours, in spite of all our differences legitimate or otherwise, ideological or personal, we must unite. As a first step, in

1 "LET US GO TO WAR", issued by Abul Hashim, Secretary Bengal Provincial Muslim League. Later on published by Society for Pakistan Studies, Dacca, January 1970, cited in Shila Sen, "Muslim Politics in Bengal, 193747, Ph.D. Thesis, JNU, 1972, pp. 403-9.

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order to avoid all possible chances and apprehensions of disruption in our own army the Wor king Committee of the BPML in its meeting of the 27 August 1945 passed a resolution suspending all elections for reconstituting the union, the sub-division, the district and the provincialleague till the declaration of the result of the elections of the central and provincial legislatures. I am summoning the Council of the BPML Parliamentary Board among other things to elect members of the BPML Parliamentary Board. "It does not require much wisdom to understand that our winning this General Election would much depend upon the composition of the Parliamentary Board. I, therefore, warn the gentlemen of the Council of the Bengal Provincial Muslim League from now not to allow personal interest to overpower their sense of Patriotism." Pakistan means complete independence. They are fools, dreamers, visionaries or the hypocrites who think that Pakistan can be achieved without the greatest imaginable struggle and sacrifice. It must be known clearly to every soldier of Pakistan that the way to Pakistan is harder than the way to calavry (sic.). Our poets and literators, artists and artisans, youths and students, landlords and peasants, ulama and laymen must answer to the clarion call of the great leader of Muslim India, sink all their differences, forget the past, and pull all their resources for the winter struggle, the general election of Legislatures. The Congress has plunged itself into a useless and unnecessary conflict with the League. Let us gallantly meet the challenge. Maulana Abul Kalam Azad has in his recent statement talked of territorial autonomy and the right to secede from the centre and has kindly promised place his proposal to the All India Congress Committee. It is very kind of him indeed. But the Muslims of all India are, unfortunately for the Congress, not just as foolish as they would like them to be. They can by the grace of God now see below the surface. The Pakistan formula is very simple and corresponds with the realities of India politics. The basis of Pakistan idea is real democracy, freedom, equity and justice and is opposed to Imperial domination and economic exploitation which is the basis of the favourite, "Akhand Bharat" of the Congress. Free India was never one country. Free Indians were never one nation. In the past India was "Akhand" under the domination the Mouriyas and the Mughals and is now" Akhand" under the domination of Great Britain. Liberated India must necessarily be, as God has made it, a subcontinent having complete independence for every nation inhabiting it. However, much weakness the Congress may have for the capitalists of Bombay and however much they may desire by way of doing a good turn to them to open opportunities for

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exploiting the whole of India under the cover of Akhand Bharat", Muslim India to a man will resist all attempts of the Congress to establish dictatorship in India of any coterie, group or organization. Pakistan means freedom for all, Muslim and Hindus alike. While appealing to the Muslims to join the army of the League and to fight its defensive war against the Congress I would warn them not to forget the now quiet and apparently indifferent Imperialist of Delhi and London. We must not forget that the achievement of Pakistan lies in the ultimate liquidation of the British imperialism .... We shall win Pakistan by the toils and sacrifices of our own people and not through the courtesy and benevolence of the British since we have taken our stand upon the solid rock of equity, justice and fair play, since freedom and liberty and not domination and exploitation is the incentive of our struggle, by the grace of God we are going to win, if we are united. So unity, fraternity and liberty shall be the battle cry for our first war of Independence. The head and the heart of the people as I have seen during my tour in Bengal are perfectly sound and they will not make any mistake unless the leaders at the top in their anxiety to secure their leadership create confusion in their mind. We, therefore, must guard ourselves against this only possible source of disruption. We must never forget for a moment that Pakistan is our end and a ministry under the Government of India Act of 1935 will be merely incidental. VVhoever amongst the leaders will exhibit any tendency to secure his position from now in the future Assembly either as a minister or prime minister shall be marked well and Muslim Bengal shall never forgive him. The general election is the beginning of our struggle. Immediately after recording our votes in favour of Pakistan at the polling centres, immediately after winning our plebiscite liquidating the false claims of the Congress to represent the Muslims we shall direct our attention towards British Imperialism and demand immediate transference of power to the peoples of India on the basis of Pakistan. Our battle is a battle for freedom for all and we hope and trust that every genuine freedom loving man and woman shall be with us. We are going to fight the Congress but we don't feel quite happy about it as we never like to consume any part of our energy in fighting the Congress, the Mahasabha or in fact any Indian people or organisation. Our battle is entirely defensive. We did not like to fight the Congress, they unjustly and unfairly, like the Fascist aggressors have forced war on us. Therefore, without malice, without vengeance, with complete faith in our ultimate victory, with heart within and God over head LET US GO TO WAR. 1/

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Appendix 2 Coming Election and the Duty of the Hindus 2 The general election to the Legislative Assemblies of India is impending. Two main issues that will be raised before the countrymen arenational unity of India and complete freedom. The ideology of the Hindu Mahasabha is very clear. Hindu Mahasabha has clearly announced to the countrymen that it would follow the same policy towards both the Hindus and the Muslims, even if they are in minority in any province in India. No scientific procedure has been followed in defining the existing provincial boundaries. On the contrary, the self-interested imperialists have drawn them in such a way that the people of the country are forced to indulge in suicidal quarrel amongst themselves; so there is no one to point out the flaws and injustices in defining the present boundaries. We have to solve the problem by redefining the boundaries on a scientific basis. Ideally and justifiably, the provinces should be defined on the basis of language and culture. Unless this policy is followed, dissatisfaction and loss of interest among a large section of population enhances the administrative complexities perennially and endangers the peace and well-being of the country. Nowadays, quite a few, swayed by the bluff of self-determination, are being attracted to unrealistic plan. I hope people will not be deceived by these unrealistic promises. In fact, it is the aim of a group of communal and selfish people to strengthen the imperialist role by dividing the country in the name of self determination. Their real intention is to create national disunity and separation. But the majority community of India cannot let their fatherland, their holy land, disintegrate to serve the interests of a group of narrow minded communal opportunists. Those, who want to divide the country and the nation unnecessarily and unjustifiably would be considered as anti-national in the eyes of international justice and they should be treated likewise. The communal award has erected the wall of disunity and separation among the concerned communities. Until this award is repealed and joint electorate established, no fair election is possible. The really independent wishes and feelings of the people of the country cannot be properly reflected in an election based on separate electorate. A Election manifesto issued by the Bengal Provincial Hindu Mahasabha, S.P. Mookerjee Papers, S.P. 74. Translated from BangIa by the author.

2

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genuinely democratic election cannot be held without a joint electorate comprising every adult citizen of the country. So, the so-called demand for self-determination cannot be proved by a hastily and spuriously held election. Here, till now communal obstinacy is stronger than reason. The influence of a middle-aged fanaticism is more effective than political or economic reasons. So, is it possible to know the real wishes of the people if this situation prevails. In India there was never any obstruction in celebrating religious rites by different communities. India has always been famous for liberality and tolerance to other faith. So religion has never been a problematic issue in India. If the 35 crore people of India raised their demand in unison, in spite of their different religious beliefs, then and no nation in the world, however strong, would dare to dismember India. Our neighbouring countries, i.e., Russia and China, are the glaring examples of it. Now our common people also know it. There is no doubt that the death toll would have been much higher in the great famine of 1943 if assistance had not come from the other provinces. In Bengal, Muslims are relatively poorer, so it was possible, due to a higher death toll among them, to get reduced to minority from majority. Those Muslim league slyboots, stupefied with the daydream of forming a separate independent state do not even remember the tragic lesson of the great famine of Bengal. Moreover if India disintegrates, the neighbouring countries will become tempted to attack India. Such examples are frequent in Indian history. Especially, the aggressors will become more daring with the belief that the different communities of India would not or could not unite and resist them. There is no hope for India from self-interested and unsympathetic communities-under the circumstances it will be cause for greater danger to link the fate of independent state with the interest of such a community. These apart, Hindus will have even more important religious reasons. Hindustan is their fatherland, their holy land and their divine land. Hindus must see that their ever worshipped motherland is not destroyed. Hindus will not hesitate to make sacrifices to preserve the unity and integrity of the holy motherland. For the Hindus, India is not only their motherland but also the holy place to worship. Hindus will never tolerate the dismemberment of their motherland until the last. So their aim is clear, duties are clearly defined-united India and complete freedom. In this crusade, the Hindu Mahasabha will never be deprived of the Hindu's sympathy.

Vande Mataram Sri Haridas Haldar Secretary, Parliamentaty Board Bengal Provincial Hindu Mahasabha

FIVE

Violence Reigns: The Calcutta Riots Historians have argued that violence is integral to the efforts of the oppressed in their questfor emancipation l The Calcutta riots of August 1946 is recorded in the memory of the people of Bengal as an extremely violent episode and generally referred to as the great Calcutta killings. It was a violent episode that seems not to have scripted any emancipatory discourse. On 16 October, observing the call of the Direct Action day given by the Muslim League Working Committee in its resolution of 29 July 1946, a large number of people took recourse to violence in articulating wha t they thought was the correct political action. The spectre of death that the streets of Calcutta witnessed as a result indicates the limits human vindictiveness and collective psyche can reach. During the riots, the streets of Calcutta were lined with dead bodies and, as many eyewitnesses la ter recalled, the bodies were carried in lorries and disposed en masse. Most of these bodies did not even get decent burial and as one witness recalled, We had gone about wearing iodine masks for three days and nights preceding this visit and picked up from the street 5,869 dead bodies, whole and mutilated, and disposed of them through mass burials and cremations. 2

1 The fundamental underlying assumption in the writings collectively called the Subaltern Studies, is the belief that it was violence which differentiated subaltern movements from other such movements called as elitist! constitutional, or nationalist politics. The latter, they belief! tried to suppress or contain this violence of the subalterns. See! Ranajit Guha ed., Subaltern Studies, Vals 1-6, Delhi, 1982. 2 P.S. Mathur, "The Great Calcutta Killing" f The Illustrated Weekly of India, 19 August 1973, p. 47.

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Violence of such magnitude cannot be simply reduced to the manifestation of an assumption of emancipation of the oppressed. It rather demands an explanation of the ideological ambience in which such acts of violence and violations were carried out. Stories of such brutality support the contention that there was a brutalization of consciousness which began with the famine. 3 He writes IIThere was a brutalization of consciousness on a mass scale, as if the people were being prepared for the inhuman episode of August 1946."4 However viewing events from another angle it seemed a very systematic insanity-the Muslims killed the Hindus and the Hindus killed the Muslims. Therefore, even in the brutalization of consciousness there was a pattern a line of demarcation. And here one can see that the crucial element defining this line was the identification of the other community as a single monolithic whole defined by its religion. The significant question here relates to the process that makes this demarcated line available, and then prepares individuals and groups to position themselves along that line. So, behind the insanity worked a very sane idea. And therefore, one can argue for the primacy of the study of these sane ideas before embar king upon looking at the demonstrated insanity. Violence has been seen in some instances as instrumental in the articula tion of the voices of the oppressed. This has given rise to a historiographical tradition which sees Ilviolence" to be the most significant aspect of the actions of people who demand freedom. It is also argued, in quite a simplistic manner, that the historiography of the Indian national movement has privileged non-violence and suppressed all the voices that were articula ted through violent means. 5 Thus, violence by the crowd in Bombay or the students in Calcutta or peasants in Awadh is shown to have had the potential to change the destiny of the country. Since that did not happen, according to this line of argument, it is either the nationalist leaders or the nationalist historians who are to be blamed. National leaders because they did not come out to help these causes, and nationalist historians because they look at f

f

f

f

f

f

f

f

Suranjan Das, Communal Riots in Bengal, p. 162. Ibid. 5 See, Ranajit Guha, "On Some Aspects of the Historiography of Colonial India", in Ranajit Guha ed., Subaltern Studies, VoL I, pp. 1-8. 3 4

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these violent incidents from their supposedly elitist perspectives and do not recognize the emancipatory discourses written into these episodes. Thus, episodes and not explanations or processes, are to be privileged. Most of the time it is the nationalist and particularly the Congress leadership who are made into a whipping horse, as their condemnation of violence by the people is shown to be their disavowal of any popular discourse on emancipation. Thus, the inability of the violent episodes to bring about any emancipa tion is not examined in any structural or processual manner. Even when structural analysis is attempted, these scholars teleologically arrive at positions where those who were fighting colonialism with the help of ideas of nation and the national are denounced without a proper trial. It is the nationalist leaders who are shown to be responsible for the failure of the episodes, which would have in fact then turned into movements. Thus, the ideas of nation and the national movement the nationalist leadership and since very recently nationalist historians are all necessarily to be faulted for the breakdown of such theoretical arguments, which fail the test of concrete historical reality. f

f

I The Direct Action day in Howrah on 16 August 1946 began with a procession that started between 8 to 9 a.m. at Salkia, Shibpur, Panchanantola, Kali Babu's Bazar and other places. Sharif Khan, MLA and leader ofthe HowrahMuslim League, was found leading a procession at Panchanantola road where some of the Hindu shopkeepers who had opened their shops were asked to close them.' It was also reported that from the morning, groups of Muslims armed with lathis went round the town enforcing a hartal. Before 2 p.m. no incidents were reported. Some people collected in the Howrah maidan began closing shops on the C.T. Road. The Hindu residents of Rameswar Malia lane resisted. Another Procession coming from Shibpur looted two shops and then the rioting began. 7 AlCC Papers, File No. G-53, p. 113. Calcutta Disturbances Enquiry Commission (hereafter CDEC), Government of Bengal, West Bengal State Archives, File No. 398/46.

6 7

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On 17 August 1946, small incidents of violence were reported. The major incident of the day was the setting on fire of 15 boats laden with straw, which were lying on the edge of Bichali ghat. The boatmen were also attackedSThe incident resulted in a large number of deaths. As the district magistra te reported, the Hindus soon recovered from the shock and from the next day Hindu hooliganism began to show its full face.' The commissioner of Burdwan Division commenting on the report of the district magistrate,however, refuted this and contended that it was the crowds of Muslims who started the killings even on 18 August. !O On this day, there were altogether 15 clashes, 40 incidents of looting and 14 murders. The issue of who began the rioting troubled even the officials. The commissioner argued that "even on the 19 the Hindu attack on the Muslim buslee at Olabibitola was preceded by the determined attack by 200 Muslim armed with bows, catapults with iron balls etc., who attacked the Municipal ambulance car upon which one of the armed guards had to fire in self-defence."!! On 19 August, the third day of the riot, there were reports of Hindu mobs attacking the Muslim localities in the same area leaving 10 dead, 20 injured and all the houses looted. However, there were signs of some obvious improvement on 20 August though 10 deaths were reported even on this day. Reports of disturbances came also from the area under the jurisdiction of the railway authorities. On 16 August 1946, Muslim League volunteers tried to disrupt train services. The next day, at around 10.30 a.m., a mob of up- country Hindus and Punjab is looted the quarters of Marines of Noakhali District employed by Shalimar Marine workshop. The riot continued on 18 December also when there were massive clashes between what is generally referred to as up country Hindus and the East Bengal Muslim Khalasis in another side of the ferry yard, BN Railway. All the marine barracks were looted. 12 Report of the DM, Howrah, CDEC, ibid. Ibid. 10 Comments of the commissioner of Burdwan Division on Howrah DM's Report, ibid. 11 Ibid. 12 Report of the DM, Howrah, ibid. The majority of these mariners were from Noakhali and Chittagong areas, and it was reported later during the Noakhali

8

9

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The district magistrate of Howrah rejected the idea that the attacks were organized. He saw no Ilevidence for regular plan of action or pre arrangement on either side."13 SimilarlYf he arguedf "as the proportion of Muslim population was a meagre 1/5th of the total population and there were hardly any able leadership to organise f it was not possible to organise such a massive riot."14 Howeverf the commissioner did not accept the contention that the riot was not premeditated. Arguing on the basis of the report of the superintendent of police, the commissioner contended that the riot in some places was started by lorry loads of Muslims, while at the same time the raid on the floating boats could not have been done without any plan. !S Therefore, one could not rule out the possibility of the riot being premeditated.

II News of violence on the Direct Action day came from other quarters too. In Chandpur, Tippera district, the Muslim shops and business were kept closed in observance ofhartal. The Hindus did not close their shops and their business. The Muslim volunteers were seen to move in [sic] the markets asking all shop keepers to close their shops. They forced the fish sellers to go out of the market and stop their business for the d ay1 6 In Chittagong, "the Hindus passed a restless day. There was hartal-some Hindu shops remained open. Muslim volunteers forcibly shut the doors in some cases and at places there was

riot that the news of the attack on them had reached Noakhali and Chitta gong, and that one of the reasons for the Noakhali riot had been this incident. 13 Ibid. 14 Ibid. 15 Comments of the Commissioner of Burdwan Division on Howrah DM's Report, ibid. 16 Upendra Ghosh, "A short statement of the Tragic happenings on the 16th August 46 in observance of the Direct Action Day in Chandpur, District Tipperah", S.P. Mookerjee Papers, Installment II-Iv;. Subject File No. 151, p. 103.

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intimidation"17 From the early months of 1946, reports from different parts of Bengal indicated a deteriorating communal situation IS The Calcutta riots brought them into sharp relief. It appears now that Calcutta was preparing herself for this communal holocaust. Given the manner in which intense communal propaganda was carried out in its heart the eventual explosion was not unexpected. The city was the hub of the entire electioneering activities campaigns and the intense communal feeling generated thereof.!9 In Calcutta, the day did not, like in Howrah or Chandpur, begin with justforcible closure of Hindu shops. From the early morning, about 8 a.m., news of violence began to pour in from central and north Calcutta. The staff at the police stations of Bow Bazaar 20 and Hare Street21 soon realized that the situation was grave, and that they were seriously outnumbered to handle such an emergency. Military intelligence had its probing eye on the movements in the city, reported acts of violence early in the morning of 16 August 1946 and its rapid spread." The secretary of the provincial Congress in his report said: f

At 7.30 a.m. we got reports from Fulbagan area under P.S. Entally that passers-by were being molested, robbed of their

A letter from Chitta gong to Dr Shyama Prasad Mookerjee, ibid., p. 111. See, "Communal Trouble at Habiganj College Function", Amrit Bazar Patrika,5 February 1946, p. 7; "Communal Trouble in Jessore", ibid., 24 May 1946, p. 3; "Dacca", ibid., 5 July 1946, p. 1. Also, Home Political, File No. 5/27/46. 19 The pamphlets issued just before the Direct Action Day by the Calcutta District League's Secretary, S.M. Usman, bears this out. For example, in one of his pamphlets, he gave enough indication of the impending danger: 17

18

In this month of Rarnzan, the first open war between Islam and Kafirs started and Mussalmans got the permission to wage Jehad .. and Islam secured a splendid victory... according to wishes of God, the All India Muslim League has chosen this sacred month for lailllching this Jehad for achieving Pakistan. (English translation of an Urdu pamphlet published by Usman, Modern Review, Calcutta, September 1946, p. 170.) "General Diary, Bow Bazaar Police Station, 16-20 August", Government of Bengal, Home Political, Confidential files, 1946. 21 "General Diary, Hare Street Police Station", 16-20 August, ibid. 22 "Diary of Events of Eastern Command Intelligence Centre from 16 to 20 August 46", ibid. 20

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purses, specks, and other valuables in their possession by Moslem hooligans of the locality who were shouting "PAKISTAN KAEM HO CHUKA" ... By 11'0 Clock [sic] in the morning the whole of Dhumtollah Street and Circular Rd. from Rajabajar. .. Moulali seemed to have been completely under the sway of the Moslem goondas. 23 As he had reported, by 7.30 in the morning barricades of dustbins tied to iron rods had been erected to block Tala and Belgachia bridges. Efforts to barricade Vivekananda Road and Central Avenue were afoot, and one person had been killed and seven wounded in the fracas that ensued there. Around the same time Bow Bazaar Dharmatalla, Lower Circular Road witnessed large processions. Around 8.45 in the morning communal clashes in China town and Vivekanand Road were reported, and by 8.50 a.m. there were reports of IIChokras ff and IIGoondas ff collecting at Russa road while a Muslim mob was reported to be collecting at Tolly village and was looking ominous." At 9.10 a.m. increasing reports of violence on the part of angry Muslim groups from various locations began to come. Muslim League volunteers were seen pulling people off cycles; they were also obstructing the delivery of essential good&all the supplies of Macdonalds' boarding house were tipped onto the road.25 At around 12 noon, Suhrawardy is reported to have gone to the Bow Bazaar street to pacify a predominantly Hindu crowd and was unsuccessful-his car window was broken by a stone." By 1.30 p.m., there was widespread rioting in the city, particularly in Central Avenue and Bow Bazaar districts.27 By 3 p.m., there was already a pitched battle going on opposite Kalighat tram depot and Russa road where a Muslim procession was attacked by Hindu and Sikh crowds." The central and northern parts of the city had witnessed violence on Rashid Ali Day in February 1946 too. Unlike in February 1946, this time the anger was not against the colonial authorities. Now the Muslims were attacking the Hindus. Although the f

23 "Report of the Bengal Congress Committee", AICC Papers, File No. G-53, p. 81. 24 Diary of Events of Eastern Command Intelligence Centre.

Ibid. Ibid. v Ibid. 28 Ibid. 25

26

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leadership tried to show that their Direct Action was as much against the authorities as it was against the Congress it was reported that: "It is noticeable that the crowds are not interfering with military vehicle and personnel. ff29 The meeting of the Muslim League was to take place in the Maidan at 4 p.m. on 16 August 1946, but could not as the rioting had already begun in full scale in the northern and central parts of the city. Muslim processions coming from Tollygunj, Howrah30 and 24 Parganas 31 to the Maidan, attacked and looted Hindu houses and people on the roadside, with or without provocation. As the momentum for a clash built up, most of these places saw the Hindu population also in a state of preparedness. This indicates as Suranjan Das has shown that a counter mobilization of the Hindus had also been in progress during the last few days.32 Provocation of a different nature came as one eye-witness wrote: f

f

f

f

When a procession under the auspices of Muslim League passed through the street the processionists shouted the slogans of Larke lenge Pakistan and Hindu Congress Barbad. One Hindu boy out of fun shouted larke lenge Hindustan whereupon two Muslim boys rushed to him and struck him with Lathis. This was the signal for trouble. 33 (Italics mine) Hence, by the time the meeting at the Maidan could begin, Direct Action was already in progress. The enemy, whose identity was defined in religious terms, had been targeted with the fury and violence of the mob shouting Larke lenge Pakistan (We will fight and win Pakistan). The fact that hooligans and even common people were well equipped with deadly weapons and that the entire affair was well-arranged, was borne out by reports of the on-the-spot Ibid. Report of the DM Howrah, CDEC, File No. 398/46. See also, "Muslim Leaguers' Violence at Howrah. Direct Action Day and aftermath incidents" [sicL AICC Papers, File No. G-53, pp. 113-27. 31 Commission of Enquiry into Calcutta Disturbances, Report of the DM 24 Parganas, Government of Bengal, ibid., File No. 392/46. See also IG Police's Report (Disturbances in Howrah, Calcutta, 24 Parganas), ibid., File No. 393/46. 32 Suranjan Das, Communal Riots in Bengal. 33 B. Mukherjee, Managing Director, Darjeeling Bank Ltd., Amrit Bazar Patrika, Calcutta, 26 March 1947, Letter to the Editor, p. 5. 29

30

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correspondents, as well as by the accounts of eye witnesses. 34 Tarapada Banerjee, the Nadia District Congress Conuniltee President, describing his experience on his arrival at the Sealdah railway station on that eventful day, said: the elaborate arrangements I found in front of the station on the day of the proposed Direct Action could by no means be construed as meant for peaceful observance of the day, nor could they be described as a full fledged armed action against imperialism. A crowd of over one thousand fanatics armed with big lathis, drawn daggers, iron rods and house breaking implements and shouting slogans like "Larke Lenge Pakistan" and "Muslim League Zinda bad" had collected at the road crossing and breaking heads of passers by of other community.35 Very soon the entire north and central parts of Cal culta became scenes of civil war. Reports from Kidderpore, Metiaburuz and Howrah were also not good. 36 The violence from the Hindu quarter was sporadic on the first day and in the initial hours of 17 August 1946. But soon a consolidated and mobilized frenzy began to wrest the initiative for organized reprisals, and showed its determination to outdo the kind of violence indulged in by the Muslim section of the population. Sandip Bandyopadhyay, in his recent work on the riot, sums this up in a powerful way. He writes: The physical exercise which one day had started as part of the freedom movement against the foreign rule, that power, that For detailed study of the composition of the rioting crowd and other components of the violence that is associated with the Calcutta riot, see Suranjan Das, Communal Riots in Bengal, pp.161-92. See also, Joya Chatterjee, Bengal Divided, p. 238. 35 N.N. :Mitra ed., Annual Register, VoL II, 1946, p. 182. 36 Files containing reports on violence, police actions and actions taken by various departments during and after the riot are available in West Bengal State Archives, Calcutta. See, Home Political, Confidential File No. 351/46, Part B; 351/46 Part B, I-XI; Report on the Muslim Hindu Conflict in Calcutta on Direct Action Day. No File No., 1946; "Diary of Events of Eastern Command Intelligence Centre from 16th August to 20th August". No File No., 1946. Suranjan Das has done a comprehensive work based on the reports of the Police and the Calcutta Disturbances Enquiry Commission Report. See, Suranjan Das, Communal Riots in Bengal, pp. 161-90. 34

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physical strength-arms, were now employed in killing brothers. Although tragic but one has to accept the truth that many members of the clubs and committees with Swadeshi underpinnings had taken part in the riot. The Hindu youth joined initially with a feeling of self defence which was mingled with the consciousness of the "duty" to free Bengal of the Muslims, as the Muslim youth had felt it a moral and religious duty to join the Direct Action. Foundation of this consciousness was prepared by the "Awake Hindu" campaign of the Hindu Mahasabha. 37 The Kidderpore area, and especially Metiaburuz, were the scenes of utmost cruelty. Bustees were wiped off and loss of life here alone amounted to 600, the lowest available figure. At this time,near the Kesoram Mills of the Birlas, sources reveal that around 500 Oriya workers were brutally killed, which impelled the Orissa chief minister to come to Calcutta to enquire into the events. 38 There was also an attack by Muslim crowds on a few nonLeague Muslims during this riot. The la tter became victims of the communally charged aggression. It was reported that Syed

Sandip Bandyopadhyay, Itihaser Dike Phire-Chechallisher Danga (Looking back to History-The Riot of Forty-six), Calcutta, 1992, pp.44-45 (English translation mine). 38 The killings of the Oriya workers brings out an element of the communal ideology, which though ubiquitous as far as communalism is concerned, goes illlnoticed. This is the idea of revenge that is transferred irrespective of context. On 7 January 1946, the Provincial Labour Unit stationed at Chitta gong attacked the villagers of Kasaipara, killed a few people and set houses on fire. This was in retaliation of the attack on a personnel of the corps by the villagers, who had tried to molest Surujjueval, wife of Bidgha Mian of Kasaipara. See, Baroda Prosad Nandy, Secretary, Report of Chitta gong District Congress Committee, AICC Papers, File No. P-5 (Pt-I). The Congress and other political parties and people rose against this and felt outraged at this barbarity, but the Muslim League attempted to give it a purely Muslim colour, so that, it seems, it could help in vilifying "the other" a bit more. (Akram Khan, the president of the Provincial League, issued a statement that "the Muslims were aggrieved and demand punishment". See, Ananda Bazar Patrika, Calcutta, 15 January 1946. Muslim League instituted an Enquiry Committee illlder Habibullah Bahar and observed 15 January as Chitta gong Day. Star of India, Calcutta, 16 January 1946, p. 1. It soon became known that the Chitta gong unit of the provincial labour unit was from Ganjam District [Orissa]. 37

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N ausher Ali, who had been an enemy of the League since long, was the target of such violence. Syed Nausher Ali was a direct offender-he had forced the Nazimuddin ministry out by giving his now famous Speaker's ruling. I distinctly remember, he said, "that four or five days before August 16, a number of people went past my house at about 3:30 crying 'Finish Nausher Ali, enemy of the community'''. I had heard similar slogans previously also. Reports of similar speeches and meetings reached me and I was warned by some friends against apprehended danger. 39 The police finally rescued him, and when he returned on 24 August with military pickets, he found his house in a devastated condition with the Muslim League flag hoisted on top, and a notice at the gate saying IIMuslim League Office".40

III Calcutta was taken over by the communal frenzy and the situation remained unchanged until the evening of 19 August 1946. The death toll mounted to around 5000, though the actual figure was never known.41 The injured looted and homeless were number less. Harrowing tales of the Calcutta riot kept on appearing in the newspapers for several weeks, until the winter of 1946, when tales of the riots in Noakhali would surpass the brutality of the Calcutta riot. The testimonies of survivors only touched the outer core of the violent manifesta tions. Shaista Ikramullah, one of the nieces of Suhrawardy, who returned to the city during those fateful events, wrote after four decades: f

N.N. :Mitra ed., Annual Register, 1946, Vol. II, p. 182. Ibid. 41 See, "Casualties in Communal Disturbances, Record of Figures", Government of Bengal, Home Political, File No. 77/47.

39 40

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As we entered the town further ghastly sights of violence met our eyes, dead bodies lay strewn everywhere. I clearly saw the body of a person lying on the marble steps of the porch of a house, his head was neatly severed from his body and lying a few feet away. I saw a Sikh clad only in shirt and shorts, without his turban, being chased by a man with an unsheathed sword, panting after him like an animal after its quarry42 The police was absent in the initial hours, and they remained so when their need was felt the most; when they finally appeared on the scene they were hopelessly outnumbered. The absence of the police was generally attributed to the declaration of a holiday by the ministry and to its collusion with the Muslim League rioters. While the colonial authorities demonstrated their latent antiCongress attitude and hatred for the national liberation movement, by expressing their inability to help the Hindus and after some time the Muslims too, a number of Muslim officials also showed their anger against the Congress. When approached for protection, the SD.C. of Chandpur, Mr A.A. Khan was reported to have retorted: " ... the Muslims did not ask for any protection when the Congress people organised processions, so why should the Hindus ask for protection when the Muslims were going to lead a procession in observance of Direct Action Day" .43 Similar incidents were also reported from Chittagong 44 However, individual efforts to save people across religious lines also came to the fore in quite a large number of cases-the

Shaista Ikramullah, Husseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy: A Biography, Karachi, 1991, p. 53. 43 "A Short Statement of the Tragic Happenings on 16th August 46 in observance of 'Direct Action' Day in Chandpur, District Tipperah", ibid., pp. 103-4. 44 A letter from Chitta gong to Dr Shyama Prasad Mookerjee, S.P. Mookerjee Papers, Subject File No. 151, p. 111. The report of the partisan attitude of the official in Chitta gong was raised by the local MLA Mrs Nellie Sengupta. The League press, however, praised him and criticized :Mrs Sengupta for this allegation. See, Star of India, Calcutta, 23 August 1946, p. 1. 42

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only silver lining in a situation marked by death and injuries. Similarly, the army authorities, who were keeping a strong vigil on the situation from the very beginning, when brought in for relief work contributed positively. They rescued 11,751 people from the northern area of the city, 5,969 from the central area and 6,380 from the southern area. Pinne!, who was made in-charge of the rescue operation remarked: III trust that operation Bernard as it has been posthumously christened, will leave to those who wor ked in it some brighter memories against the dark background of the week."45 He thanked the army and especially Major Littleboy46 The Calcutta riot has been one of the worst communal riots in the history of pre-partition India. The death toll is generally placed at around 5,000 or more. The residents of Calcutta still recall the dead bodies on the street they saw from their windows during those dreadful days. The official statistics provide us with a figure of around 3,000. Given the intensity of the communal hatred in those days of rioting, especially among the working class, we do not know the figures of those killed on the banks of the Ganges and thrown into it. However, even without these figures, the available statistics do not indicate a small estimate from any angle. A special incident that must be mentioned here is the extraction of bodies from the sewer at the Bollygunj sewage pumping station. In the night of 20 August 1946, it was reported from Fort William that three or four dead bodies were stuck in the sewers at this station, and itwas feared that if it rained the bodies might float over the grating and jam the pumps. Mr Keating, personal assistant to chief engineer, W&B department, reconnoitered the station on 21 August; and working every day from then till the 24 August, with a party of dams recruited and held together by him, dragged out as many as 110 dead bodies. The dams were paid Rs 12 per body they pulled out, a special rate, as they had to work inside the sewers, a t levels between 14 and 20 feet, and tie each body before heaving it to the surface. A similar though less severe f

4 5 Activities/Action taken by chief minister's department. Rescue Organi sation, CDEC, File No. 351/46 B-1I. 46 Ibid.

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case was reported in Mominpur Pumping Station, where 20 bodies were taken out. 47 It is ironical that the person who was placed in charge of the relief works during the famine was also given the charge of relief for riot victims. He received an order form the chief minister's office to rescue people and transport them to safer places.

IV The vexed question as to why the government, which saw the deteriorating conditions, did not call the army out to bring the situation under control, remains unsolved till today. A tragedy of such a magnitude, where more than 5,000 people died, naturally calls for an explanation from those who were supposed to be maintaining law and order. A government officer, working with the chief minister in those crucial days, maintains tha t the police had lost grip over the situation and "Suhrawardy had pressed for the Army to be called OUt."48 He maintains that the Chief Secretary Walker, Home Secretary Martin and Police Commissioner Hardwick had opposed the idea. They, he says, thought that the police could still control the situation 49 According to him, Suhrawardywentto meetthe Governor to press to call army. The Governor, he informs us, declined to meet him due to high blood pressure. 50 We have seen that the military intelligence was aware of the increasingly vulnerable position of the police force. 51 Unlike the police, which some say was in a state of demoralization and unpreparedness, the military was quite aware of the increasingly deteriorating situation and the vulnerable position of the police. However, there seems to some unknown factor wor king against calling the army even though there was very little bureaucratic hurdle in the process. In normal times all requests for calling out troops were to come from the provincial government (chief secretary) and the district magistrates were to 47 Action taken by Health and Local Self Government, CDEC, File No. 351/ 46, Part B, IX. 48 P.S. Mathur, "The Great Calcutta Killing", p. 45. 49 Ibid. 5() Ibid., 47. 51 Reports of the Military intelligence available to us from the archival records have been used.

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move the provincial government whenever such aid was necessary. In special circumstance Sf howeverf the above procedure could be modified and the rules were laid down in the government memo no. 802(28) of 2 August 1945 which said: 1. Any Magistrate who is charged with maintaining the peace in an area maYf if necessary requisition the assistance of troops when such troops are locally available without recourse to the District Magistrate [D.M.], but such aid should invariably be obtained through the District Magistrate if situation permits. 2. If troops are available in a district the D.M. may in a situation in which he cannot wait for the government orders ask for troops to be called ou t. All such cases as well as the cases mentioned in (1) must be reported to the Government inunediately. 3. The above principles apply to the Calcutta area in which the Commissioner of Police will act in the same way as a D.M. in his district. Military Asssitance should normally be obtained through Government but when in a particular situation this procedure cannot be complied with, without serious consequencesf a request for assistance may be made by the Commissioner of Police to the Military authorities direct and the fact reported to the Government inunediately.52

The modifications issued on 21 February 1946 empowered even the sub-divisional officer to call in the army for civilian purposes. 53 This means that the Calcutta police commissioner could have called for the army without any permission from the higher authorities. It leaves no doubt that the power and responsibility for calling the army to help the civilian administration was vested with the bureaucracy and local administration. The Governor was the at apex of it and his presence and initiative were of crucial significance. Once it became very obvious that

52 Government of Bengal, Home Political, Memo 802(28), Police Station (p.S.) Calcutta, 2 August 1945. 53 Government of Bengal, Home Political, D.O. No. 152, P.S. Calcutta, 21 February 1945.

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things had gone out of control, why he or any official did not call the army is a question which has attracted several explanations. First, it has been argued, particularly by senior police authorities, that the chief minister had assured them that the day would be peaceful. Suhrawardy, speaking later on the floor of the Assembly, however, blamed the new police arrangements that were introduced that very morning for the first time as the main reason for the ineffectiveness of the police force. But in spite of these, an emergency action scheme was in place and could have been operationalized at any moment. 54 In Howrah, for example, the forces were called but not used, and were actually returned on 17 August itself.55 The district magistrate's report says that he had actually asked for the army.56 Thus, the argument that it was an administrative or procedural problem or that the Governor was not available does not hold water. The justifica tion for the acts of omission was to be seen in the varieties of explanation offered. One of the explanations extended for the unpreparedness of the administration was, apparently the assurance by the chief minister himself of a peaceful day on 16 August 1946. The other explanation, which also found favour with the officials, is the fact thatthe fear of untoward incidents during the protests and demonstrations was very much there. This fear had increased after the police action against the rioters during the November 1945 demonstration protesting the INA trials, and the Rashid Ali day demonstrations in February 1946. However, this reasoning seems slightly superficial, given the fact that many such events were supressed with utmost force when it hurt colonial interests directly, with no regard for the sensitivities of the demonstrators. When faced with any anti-imperialist movement or public demonstration, the army was called immediately on many occasions but this was not done in the case of communal riots as it hardly involved a threatto imperial power. The situation, in fact, justified the claim of the colonial power to be the arbiter of the fate of the warring factions; this is a line of argument that seems more plausible behind the tardiness in taking appropriate security f

f

54

55

56

CDEC f File No. 390/46. Ibid. CDEC f File No. 398/46.

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measures on 16 August 1946. The communal mob violence was not seen as directly against the law and order. Following this argument it can be said that the attitude of arrogance adopted, so far as taking immediate action was concerned, by the colonial police and the administrative personnel worsened the situation on the Direct Action day. An official in Suhrawardy' s office overheard a police officer replying to a caller requesting for help from some European officer IIKya bolega mister, aap jo mangta hai us rakam ka sergeant to aap ka hi hookum ka sath India quit kar gaya" (What do I say Mister, the kind of sergeant you are asking for has quitIndia as you had wished him to).57 Similarly, Police Commissioner Hardwick sarcastically replied that one should rather go to the Congress office for help. "Who am I to interfere in your affairs. The Hindus want us to get out. The Muslims want us to leave the country to them. I am so helpless. Why not ring up the Congress office."58 In Bengal, a substantial section of the Muslim population appears to have rallied around the idea that independence was approaching, and with this Pakistan too. Among the Hindus the idea that it was the League and its tactics which were blocking any development towards independence was getting entrenched. The election campaign, as well as the election results, had already shown the mutually antagonistic nature of these positions. The Direct Action day declaration brought these forces in direct confrontation with one another. !twas made abundantly clear by the League leadership that the Congress, since it represented only the Hindus, was a stumbling block to the speedy partition of the country and hence, it had to be taught a lesson through Direct Action. The frequently asked question, where the responsibility for such an incident which resulted in the huge loss of life and property in Calcutta lies, remains to be answered. From the juridical point of view where the proof for the unfolding events have to be accounted for and weighed, Suhrawardy appears to be circumstantially responsible for the calamity.!t was he who had declared 16 August a public holiday, thereby creating wrong notions about the proposed plans of the Muslim League f

57 58

P.S. Mathur, "The Great Calcutta Killings", p. 45. Ibid.

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on that day. While the Muslim supporters of the League saw this as an open invitation or even licence to do whatever they felt like without impunity, the opponents of Pakistan saw in it an active support by Suhrawardy to the forces of Muslim communalism. He was even accused of interfering in the duties of the police. From an oppositional point, it is again easy to hold Suhrawardy responsible for such colossal calamity. However as a historian one faces problems in reposing responsibility on any single person for an event of such a magnitude. The Direct Action day, on historical scrutiny, appears primarily as the Mulsim League's platform for attacking the Congress, which it blamed for blocking the establishment of Pakistan. And thus, the question of responsibility requires a deeper understanding into the meaning, ideological positions and alterna tives available for such Direct Action. Here, the ideological factors have to be studied as the relationship between cause and effect, whether they are direct at times or circumstantial in others for the links remain tenuous, and have to be traced to the social context from where ideas spring. Suhrawardy has often been accused for his involvement or sometimes even absolved of all blame, but the real question does not disappear. This relates to the generation of the ideas that influenced and directed so many people to engage in communal violence. The Calcutta riot, in the study by Suranjan Das, is seen to have started as a planned confrontation since all the parties, i.e., the Hindus and the Muslims, were preparing themselves for it. 59 f

f

f

f

v The Calcutta District Muslim League's (CDML) preparations for the Direct Action were elaborate. The party had announced on 9 August 1946 that the Direct Action day in Howrah, Hooghly, Metiaburz and 24 Parganas would be observed under the direct supervision of the Calcutta District Muslim League. 60 The working committee of the League met on 5 August to decide upon the programme for the Direct Action day. Presided over by Khwaja Nazimuddin, it decided: 59 6()

Suranjan Das, Communal Riots in Bengal. Star of India, Calcutta, 9 August 1945, p. 1.

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1. to observe complete hartal and general strike everywhere; 2. to explain and reiterate the resolution of the League Council about Direct Action before the congregation in all Mosques before the Jumma prayer; 3. to offer Munazat for the freedom of Muslim India, Muslims of the world and for the people in the east in general; 4. to hold peaceful processions and demonstrations; 5. to hold open air meetings and to reiterate the full support for the League Council resolu tion; 6. to request all other parties to observe complete hartal on that date and to take part in the demonstrations, but the request must be made in peaceful manner.6i

Suhrawardy, on announcing these directions, added: There is one very important clause which I should earnestly commend to the notice of everyone and that is tha t all demonstrations, processions, meetings, protests, closing of shops, observance of Hartals, etc., should be absolutely peaceful. There must not be violence of any kind." Emphasizing the need for discipline, he said: This is our first step which we are taking in pursuance of our new policy and we must be absolutely disciplined. Let us show the world that we can perform our task with complete discipline and that we have sufficient control over the orders issued by the high command of the Muslim League. 63 The leadership, under Nazimuddin and Suhrawardy, emphasized the need for the peaceful observance of the day. At the same time, however, the League leaders starting from Jinnah were unequivocal in their stance that they would not commit themselves to the peaceful observance of the day. Instead, even responsible leaders like LiaqatAli said that the Muslims were not going to be restrained by any constitutional means. They were

61 62

63

Ibid., 6 August 1946, p. 1. Amrit Bazar Patrika, Calcutta, 10 August 1946, p. 3. Ibid.

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Communalism in Bengal

ready to use if necessary extra constitutional means to Ilresist". But against whom was this resistance to be expressed? From the time of the Gandhi-Jinnah meetings, the impression had been circulated by the League leadership that the British had ceased to be the lima in" player and the Ilobstacle" in the way of the Muslims getting their Pakistan was the Congress, represented by Gandhi, and ultima tely, the Hindus. For those sections of the population who had concretized Pakistan in their imagination, before long they would be getting what was promised. The election campaign had told them that the election itself was a Jehad to win Pakistan. Thus, after the electoral victory, Direct Action was the next logical step towards that goal. While the council meeting of the League witnessed evocation of violent action by members in so many forms the character of that action was defined by the CDML. A pamphlet issued by its secretary said: f

f

Muslims must remember that it was in Ramzan that the permission for Jehad was granted by Allah, it was in Ramzan that the battle of Badr-the first between Islam and heathenism was fought and won by 313 Muslims and again it was in holy Ramzan that 10,000 Muslims under Holy Prophet conquered Mecca and established the kingdom of heaven and the commonwealth of Islam in Arabia. Muslim League is fortunate that it is starting its fight in this month. 64 Thus, the Direct Action was elevated to the level of a fight replete with religious symbolism. It invoked the religious emotions rather than the political ideology of the League members. It was declared as a fight between Muslims and heathens, and the fight was equated with Jehad in the month of Ramzan. The identity of the enemy was further specified, and the religious identification of the enemy was placed before the people. In a similar pamphlet issued by S.M. Usman, the secretary of the CDML, it was declared: By the grace of God, we ten crores in India, through bad luck have become slaves of the Hindus, and the British. We are starting a Jehad in your name in this month of Ramzan. We promise before you that we entirely depend on you. Make us 54

Star of India, Calcutta, 9 August 1946, p. 1.

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victorious over the kafirs, enable us to establish the kingdom of Islam in India. 65 The Muslims, for whom the elections were presented essentially as a Jehad, were once again asked to participate in war. Earlier it was through ballots, bu t now the method and weapons were left unspecified. The League leadership in Bengal called upon its National Guard to prepare for the day. The Bengal Provincial National Guard, which had opened its recruiting centre on 10 July,66 started its training centre in Calcutta on 14 July 1946,67 and on 1 August, it decided to hold a rally in which, a report suggested, Nazimuddin and Akram Khan were to be accorded a salute. 68 !twas quite evident that the National Guard which had recently been reorganized was working very closely withN azimuddin and Akram Khan, and not with people like Abul Hashim. On 12 August, the National Guard asked all its units to reportto the Calcutta training centre. A National Guard communique said: All units ofBengal Muslim National Guard are hereby informed that they must reach the training centre at Muslim Institute, Wellesley Street at 8.30 a.m. on 16 August.... Officials of each unit are instructed to see that strict discipline is maintained by the Guards while on duty.... Guards use their Salar Caps.'9 !t was at this juncture that the chief minister declared a public holiday on 16 August. This created consternation in Calcutta, especially amongst the Hindus. The announcements created ideologically consolidated blocs irrespective of political differences. The Congress moved an adjournment motion in the Assembly on this issue, but the Speaker ruled the motion out of order. !t was thought "absurd that the Party in power should declare a public holiday to support the Party's political action".70 Issued by S.M. Usman, Let Pakistan Speak for Itself, Information and Broadcasting Ministry, Government of India, New Delhi, 1947, p. 6. 66 Star of India, 31 July 1946, p. 3. 67 Ibid. , 31 July 1946, p. 1. 68 Ibid., p.3. 69 Ibid. 70 Statesman, Calcutta, 13 August 1946, p. 5. 65

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Communalism in Bengal

During the election process, the League propaganda, rhetoric as well as methods adopted by it, had substantially vitiated the communal situation in Bengal. There was a sharp deterioration in the law and order situation especially in eastern Bengal. This was intimately connected to the growing communal aggressiveness, which took the form of dacoity, burglary, abduction, etc. There were reports in JanuarYf that Iithere has been an increase in the robbery in trains in Dacca Bhairav sector".71 Howeverf it became clear by March that there was a pattern behind the robberies. Calling it goondaism, a Calcutta newspaper reported, Goondaism in Bhairav sector is increasing. One feature of these robberies is that generally Hindu passengers have to bear the burnt of the degradation of these gangsters and Muslim passengers are left untouched. It must be recalled that Bhairav Bazar was the area where the great devastation took place in 1941. 72 Similarly in Madaripur, "Muslim League Volunteers defiled the National flag and portrait of Netaji"/3 while in Chittagong the famous IIChandranath temple was desecrated"J4 The League's effort to continuously keep up an anti-Hindu front was reflected when it took up the case of the eviction of illegal immigrants from Assam. The preponderance of Muslims among the immigrants, and the presence of a Congress ministry in Assam made it very convenient for the Bengal Muslim League to colour the entire episode as a drive against the Muslims. 75 The campaign was launched in a massive way by the League, and it even thought of taking direct action against the evictors who, according to the terminology of the League leaders, were Congress and Mahasabha people. The issue raised a lot of passions in Bengal. 76 The Calcutta riot, from one point of view, shows other facets of the League's politics. On the eve of the Direct Action day, we find that the charge and direction of the observance of the day had 71 72 73

74 75

76

Hindustan Standard,S January 1946, p. 3. Ibid., 4 March 1946, p. 5. Ibid., 1 February 1946, p. 5 Ibid., 17 May 1946, p. 7. Star of India, Calcutta, 2 May 1945, p. 1. Ibid., 2 July 1946, p.5.

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been vested in the CDML/ 7 and hence, the BPML was not very aware of the preparations being made. This may be the reason why Abdul Hashim, one of the stalwarts of the party, said later that he took his children with him to the Maidan where the meeting was scheduled to be held." To substantiate this argument, we find that the areas assigned to the CDML for organizing the victory celebrations in January, and later for organizing people on the Direct Action day, were the spots where the trouble really occurred. The areas were "Howrah, Hooghly, Metiaburuz and 24 Parganas".79 On this circumstantial evidence the CDML stands convicted for the rioting. Again, the CDML was under the control of the non-Bengali Muslims and the business class of Calcutta, who supported the politics of the All India Muslim League, and were the traditional loyalist supporters of the Ispahani and N azimuddin section of the provincial League. At the same time, however, to repose the burden on Suhrawardy and the League, and on the other hand to blame the Congress leadership for uttering irresponsible statements or being eager to arrive at a compromise with the colonial authorities leads one to the fallacy of ignoring the culpability of the communalised masses of people, who alone could commit acts of such communal depredations. Here, the role played by Suhrawardy becomes crucial. He has been accused-at times with sufficient evidence valid enough to prove his role-of being responsible for the entire riot. But he has also been stoutly defended. "What happened in Calcutta," said Abul Hashim, while speaking on the no-confidence motion, "did happen not due to Mr Suhrawardy or his Ministry, but in spite of them".80 Defence of Suhrawardy has even led a historian to challenge the sources by terming them as IIHindu sources" .81 Suhrawardy has been accused not only of being responsible for the Calcutta riots in 1946, but also of having organized them. Though as the chief minister Suhrawardy was responsible for f

f

Star of India, Calcutta, 9 August 1946, p. 2. Abul Hashim, Amar Jibon, p. 105. 79 Star of India, Calcutta, 9 August 1946, p. 2. 80 N.N. :Mitra ed., Annual Register, 1946, VoL II, p. 188. 8 1 Tazeem Murshed, Sacred and Secular Religion and Society in Bangladesh 1871-1971, Delhi, 1995.

77 78

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Communalism in Bengal

law and order in Bengal, it must be remembered that declaring 16 August 1946 as Direct Action day was Jinnah's decision, not Suhrawardy's. In this case, the effort is to pass the blame on to Jinnah. Similarly, the author further clarifies that according to S.A. Masud, who defended Suhrawardy on behalf of the Muslim League along with B.A. Siddiqui, an enquiry into the killings revealed that the riots had begun before Direct Action had begun, before Direct Action was defined. He places the blame squarely on Mahasabha and Hindu communalism." Here, the person who had defended the accused at that conjuncture, is cited by the scholar to plead Suhrawardy's innocence. Reposing the blame for the killings on Suhrawardy, or defending him and then passing the blame on to Hindu communalism, ignores the fact that Muslim communalism had reached an extreme phase and had established a hegemonic hold over the Muslim population. The idea that the electoral victory would guarantee Pakistan had been taken seriously by the people. The leadership of the League, after its rejection ofthe Cabinet proposals, informed their supporters of the betrayal by the colonial authorities and the Congress, and presented them with an opportunity for Direct Action to achieve their desired goal. It was the hegemonic presence of the communal ideology that guided the pattern of behaviour on the Direct Action day. It was, therefore, the ideology of communalism and its sway over the populace that determined the character of communal violence witnessed in the city during these days. In fact, even Suhrawardy accepted this when, as quoted by a close associate of his, during the very early phase of the Calcutta riot, he said The Congress leadership has long passed into the hands of Militant Hindus and the Muslim leadership into the hands of the Mullahs and some of those bearded folk seem to chase me wherever I gO.83

82 83

Ibid., pp. 177-78. P.S. Mathur, "The Great Calcutta Killings", p. 47.

Violence Reigns: The Calcutta Riots

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What Suhrawardy forgot to say on that occasion was that he himself was one of the actors responsible for the impasse, and he was as entrapped in the logic of communalism as others. He had to go ahead with the communal agenda. There was no looking back ifhe wanted to retain his leadership over those masses who had elected him.

VI The Calcutta riot was, in fact, the first testing ground for the Congress in its attempt to take on the extreme communalism of the Muslim League. The ground for communal mobilization on the part of the Muslim League had already been prepared. A natural question is the role of the Congress in the entire episode. Was it in the mood to confront the Muslim League on the question ofthe Direct Action day strike, and thereby, did it help in preparing the ground for a large-scale confrontation between the Muslims and Hindus of Calcutta? Then again, one may ask how the Congress perceived the entire confrontation between the two communities and whether it developed any ideological or strategic counter to this phase of communalism, which had led to the confrontation in the first place. On 16 August 1946, crowds in Howrah,84 Chandpur S5 and the suburbs of Dhaka86 created violent situations by attacking Hindu shops, temples, etc. Calcutta was no exception; rather this centre of radical politics saw even its communally mobilized people getting the most radical versions of communal texts. On the question of how the Hindus reacted so quickly and ferociously to the attacks on them, historians have argued that there was a parallel communal mobilization, led especially by the Hindu Mahasabha,

Report of the Howrah District Congress Committee on "Muslim Leaguers Violence at Howrah, Direct Action Day and Aftermath Incidents", pp. 113-27. 85 Upendra Ghosh, "A short statement of the tragic happenings on the 16th August 1946 in observance of Direct Action Day in Chandipur, District Tippera", ibid., pp. 103-11. 86 Sat yen Sen, "Pratyakhya Sangram Dibas" (Direct Action Day) in Amitabh Dasgupta ed., Parichay, Calcutta, May-June 1991, pp. 32-41. 84

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Communalism in Bengal

going on among them. 87 They further saw the Congress itself as rapidly getting influenced by the Hindu Mahasabha and other Hindu communal elements. This, in their view, led the Congress to create a confrontational situation vis-a.-vis the Muslim League with regard to the observance of 16 August as the Direct Action day. Thus, Congress, according to this argument, was pushed to the Hindu corner, and had actually prepared the Hindus for a counter attack. The report of the secretary of the provincial Congress read: You are aware that the Moslem League Ministry in Bengal declared the 16th of August the day of "DIRECT ACTION" as a public holiday at the teeth of the united opposition of all parties barring the Muslim League. As the Congress party in the assembly moved on the 12th August an adjournment motion on this issue to censure the Government and to place the view of the opposition in this connection, but the Speaker [Muslim Leaguer] ruled the motion out of order whereupon the Congress party withdrew from the House as a mark of protest against this arbitrary decision of the Speaker.88 Was the attitude of the Congress one of confrontation? It seems it was not because the Congress adjournment motion arose from its belief that it was absurd for the party in power to declare a public holiday in support of its party's political action. Moreover, given the communal attitude of the ministry, this step of declaring a holiday crea ted a grea t deal of apprehension. To add to this, the popular mood, as it appears from the newspapers and other writings, was also quite confused and apprehensive. 89 This mood was heightened by the utterances of responsible Muslim League leaders. Thus, the declaration of a public holiday was naturally perceived with all kinds of suspicion and the Congress, it appears was correct in taking up the issue with the government. The disallowing of the adjournment motion and the subsequent walk-out by the opposition naturally intensified the f

See, Suranjan Das, Communal Riots in Bengal, pp. 166-67, 169, 180. "Report on Calcutta Riot", Secretary, BPCC to the General Secretary, All India Congress Committee (AlCC) dated 16 September 1946, AlCC Papers, File No. G-53, pp. 77-91. 89 See, Amrit Bazar Patrika, Calcutta, 7, 8, 9 August 1946.

87 88

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reigning apprehensions and confusions. The self-defence mechanisms of the fearful Hindus attracted organized defence strategies, in the form of Hindu Shakti Sangh and the up-country roughs. 90 But what was the Congress doing in this situation? On 14 August, the Bengal Provincial Congress Committee (BPCC) organized a mass meeting in which all "shades of public opinion were expressed".91 The meeting was described as Ilprovocative" because IIK.S. Roy urged the audience to pursue normal business on 16th August"/2 while IICongress President Surendra Mohan Ghosh described the declaration of public holiday on 16 August as an attempt to force the hartal on the Hindus"." A Sikh and a Gurkha leader promised their community's support to the Congress, and prophesied a "good thrashing" for the Muslims. 94 The Muslim League leaders alleged that the Hindu Mahasabha and Congress created an air of Ilcoming disaster on Hindus" in Calcutta, by raising the fears against impending Muslim violence." On the other hand, the Congress sources said that it had organized the meeting of 14 August "to combat the feeling of helplessness, insecurity and frustration among the general public"." The report of the BPCC rejected the assumption that the Congress leaders had built up a confrontational atmosphere in the meeting as the official charges of the Muslim League suggested. The leadership also requested the people, as Suhrawardy had to the Muslim masses, to remain peaceful. The report said, "A joint appeal was issued requesting the people to remain calm and peaceful and to avoid provoking or being provoked under all circumstances".97 It further said that lias a result of this most of the Hindu shops and business houses remained closed on 16 August to avoid clashes".98 Thus, the Congress sources absolve

Suranjan Das, Communal Riots in Bengal, p. 169. "Report on Calcutta Riot", AICC Papers, File No. G-53, pp. 77-91. 92 F. Tuker, While Memory Serves, London, 1950, p.156, as quoted in Suranjan Das, Communal Riots in Bengal, p. 167. 93 Extracts from the Report by the Commissioner of Police, Calcutta, on the Political Situation and Labour Unrest, Home [Pol] Dept. West BengaL 9()

91

94 95

96 97 98

Ibid. L/p.8, J/8.655, India Office Library and Records as quoted in ibid. "Report on Calcutta Riot". Ibid. Ibid.

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the Congress of any provocative posture altogether. In the final analysis, however, the Congress actions contributed to the constitution of that collective Hindu psyche, which was apprehensive of the aggressive posture of the Muslim League. The riot started on the morning of 16 August 1946, and took a serious turn by the evening when the crowd, returning from the Muslim League's Direct Action day meeting at Maidan, began attacking shops and houses on the way. Till 20 August, Calcutta remained in the grip of communal violence. And Congress as an organizer of public opinion, found itself helpless in the face of the communal fury. There was no anti-communal strategy or drive that was launched, and the best it could dowas to organize peace missions,99 and issue public appeals: f

Congress leaders Sarat Chandra Bose, Surendra Mohan Ghosh and Kiran Shankar Ray, together with H.S. Suhrawardy, Khwaja Nazimuddin, Abul Hashim, et aI., issued a joint appeal on the 17th August requesting people to stop the fratricidal war... and to stop the fighting at any cost.100 The situation, however, revealed that the Congress was fast accepting the reality of the Muslim League's hegemony over the Muslim mind, and that any appeal to the Muslims had to be routed through the League. The Congress report on the riot makes this very clear. It said: On the 16th morning when we found the communal situation fast deteriorating and the mad orgy of violence being let loose, we contacted several times the League Secretary and the League Mayor, Mr Osman and sought to explain the real situation in order to enlist their sincere co-operation in the matter of restoringpeace and communal harmony in the city. Butunfortunately, our efforts failed to evoke sufficient response from League head quarters [sic]. However, the Mayor of Calcutta was prevailed upon to go out with me [Kalipada Mukherjee, the Secretary, BPCC] on a joint peace mission. But before we could actually go out on the peace mission, the BPCC office was attacked .... of course, [sic] the Mayor Mr Osman and myself went out on a 99

100

Ibid. Amalendu Sengupta, Uttal Challis, p. 187.

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peace mission and visited some of the affected areas and sought in vain to bring about the communal harmony. l01 The irony of the entire effort of the BPCC secretary, was that he had to "enlistthe support" of Mayor Osman, who had been one of the persons giving direction to the fury of the communally charged and the mobilized Muslim populace of the city. Further, the Congress had been viewing the riot as a law and order problem from the very beginning, and soon became frustrated by the fact that the Muslim League ministry had failed to carry out its primary responsibility of maintaining law and order. Sarat Bose's attack on the Governor was also directed on the same point Le' Ilhe failed to maintain the law and order". He said: f

f

The Governor has completely failed in the discharge of his special responsibilities to maintain law and order in the city. Whether it is due to utter incompetence or to surrendering himself completely into the hands of the Bengal Ministry, it is difficult for me to say. .. the Governor has proved himself unfit. The Governor should be recalled and the present Ministry should be dismissed ... what has happened in Calcutta will be very useful to British imperialist and reactionaries in working on their propaganda that India is not fit to govern itself.102 He was correct in this regard. This shows that communalism had now entered a completely new phase, and the containment of this would require a strong authority to maintain law and order. The British authorities, clearly, were not ready to do so. The Congress was helpless. The best it could do was to intervene and prevent a Hindu communal reaction which the Mahasabha would try to mobilize and direct.

VII For the Communists who were in the forefront organizing one of the biggest strikes in the postal services on 29 July, which f

"Report on the Calcutta Riot". Sarat Chandra Bose, I Warned My Countrymen: Collected Works of Sara t Chandra Bose, 1945-50, Calcutta, 1968, pp. 155-57. Also see, Leonard A. Gordon, Brothers Against the Raj, Delhi, 1990; N.N. :Mitra ed., Annual Register, 1946, VoL II, p. 185. 101 102

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Communalism in Bengal

witnessed the unity of workers belonging to both the communities, the Calcutta riot came as a surprise and a shock. The party realized the communal side of the Direct Action programme, and it tried to channelize the agenda of the Muslim League towards an anti-colonial goal. In Calcutta 103 and Dhaka,104 it decided to support the League and joined the demonstration in a bid to take it to the anti-colonial level. Realization soon dawned upon the Communists that they themselves were the most unwanted elements in the entire scenario. During the riot, when they tried to intervene, they were branded as agents of the Muslims in the Hindu areas, while in the Muslim areas their loyalty was suspected. Thus, the eruption of a communal riot in the society, which had seen sustained communaliza tion meant that communal identification became the only source of political legitimacy. f

VIII The Mahasabha's defeat in the election was complete. But this did not mean that as an ideological force it was of no significance. Given the manner in which the politics of the nation was developing, it had all the potentiality to rise from the ashes of its electoral defeat. The Cabinet Mission and its ensuing discussions, and the presence of the League ministry provided it with a weapon to keep alive the Hindu communalist option to hit back at the Congress. Butthis time it was not just an opportunity to hit out at the Congress but to fight the League as well. The League's de clara tion of Direct Action day also provided space for the Mahasabha to launch a new phase Le' extreme communalism. While a collective psyche for mass violence was being prepared by the Muslim League, the Mahasabha, was also preparing the psychological basis and justification for a counter-communal attack, though apparently on the grounds of defence. The Hindu Mahasabha pamphlet entitled "16 August Beware" asked the Hindus to give a suitable answer to the Muslim League hartal. It read: f

f

Amalendu Sengupta, Uttal Challis, pp. 180-81. Jnan Chakraborty, Dhaka Jelar, pp.104-5; Satyen Sen, "Pratyakhya Sangram Dibas" . W3

104

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It is the duty of every Hindu to carryon as usual his normal occupation. The Hindus must make organised efforts to see that no Hindu, Non-Muslim or non-League Muslim is forced to join the harta!. We, therefore, request the public to continue on that day their normal work. They must not yield to any coercive measures. Remember that to join the hartal is to support the demand for Pakistan lO5 The student wing of the Mahasabha also joined the platform to urge Hindus against joining the harta!. It said: "The Hindus must make organized efforts to see that [none] is forced to join the hartal [on 16th August] .... Remember thatto join the hartal is to support the demand for Pakistan" .106 This propaganda was, however, not suggestive of an aggressive overtone nor was it much of a challenge to the Muslim League sponsored Direct Action day hartal of 16 August 1946. Did the Mahasabha have the organizational strength and ideological hegemony to pose such a challenge or to mount a counterattack? As we have already mentioned, its leaders were always conscious of their organizational weakness. The Hindu Mahasabha in Bengal was in a state of confusion. Its programme and the composition of its membership had given it the character of a liberal communal party despite its militant rhetoric 107 The famine had given it an opportunity to enlarge its mass base as well as to transcend its middle-class agenda. The re-emergence of the agenda of freedom through the medium of the INA trials and its concretization through the elections of 1945-46, however, snatched away an ideal opportunity to measure its appeal and to penetrate the Bengali society. This was because of several

105 Government of Bengal, Home Dept., Political Notes on the Causes of the Calcutta Disturbances, August 1946 (Calcutta, 1946), p. 20, as quoted in Suranjan Das, Communal Riots in Bengal, p. 169. 106 Star of India, Calcutta, 21 September 1946. Also see Suranjan Das, Communal Riots in Bengal, p. 169. 107 "The liberal communalist demanded separate communal rights, safeguards, reservations, etc., within the broad concept of one Indian nationin-the making. He accepted national unity as the ultimate goal as also the concept of the ultimate common interests of Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, Christians. Liberal communalism had also a rather narrow social base. Politically it was based mainly on the upper and middle class." (Bipan Chandra et aLI India's Struggle for Independence, Delhi, 1989, p.428.)

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factors, which included its lack of mass base and the nature of its leadership. Then, what did it want or hope to achieve? Did the Mahasabha have any independent role to play? Though Suranjan Das has tried to show that a communal mobilization parallel to that of the Muslim League was going on,!08 it would be quite far fetched to equa te the two. It was not the Hindu Mahasabha but Hindu communal ideology, which was structured and empowered in the wake ofthe riot and it was the latter that strengthened the Mahasabha. It was only after the riot that we find a radical shift in the language, idiom and demands of the Mahasabha. And this was its moment of transformation to an extreme phase. The riot in Calcutta, however, had shown how in a mass frenzy all other boundaries were forgotten. Once the riot began, it required no political party, let alone the Hindu Mahasabha, to tell people how to kill each other. But, how did the Mahasabha perceive the communal riots and did it have any action plan to counter them? Unlike the Congress and the Communist party, which always tried to mediate between the two rioting communities either through peace missions or by actively working against the communal forces, the Hindu Mahasabha did not have any direct role in resisting the communal riots. The basic pre-requisite for the Mahasabha's idea of communal harmony was that the Hindus should be strong and organized l O9 In this strategic perspective, the problems were of two types. First, what about the Hindus who were weak and not organized. Thus, though the Hindu Mahasabha could openly champion or incite the Hindu population in predominantly Muslim localities like Kidderpore to become strong and organized apparently under the banner of this or that Hindu organization in situations of actual rioting this did not come to their aid. Though the Mahasabha and its front organizations such as the Hindu Shakti Sangha had their branches throughout the city, they could hardly do anything except help the Hindu riot victims. Given the intensity of communalization of the society during the riots, the responsibility for which squarely lay on the Muslim League leadership and its heightened communal overtones, the role of the Hindu f

f

108 109

Suranjan Das, Communal Riots in Bengal, p. 166. See, N.C. Chatterjee's speeches collected in Hindu Mahasabha Tracts.

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Mahasabha has to be located in the process of communalization ra ther than in the riot itself. Second, on a larger scale and in the same logical frame, what could the East Bengal Hindus do as a minority in a Muslim majority area? The Hindu Mahasabha tried to answer this by telling the East Bengalis to be organized under the aegis of the Hindu Mahasabha, and advocating to them partiion of the province HO The answer it provided was that the strong, Hindu West Bengal would protect the Hindus of East Benga1. 111 Whatever role the Mahasabha played during the Calcutta riots, the riot itself and the role of the Muslim League ministry gave credence to its stance that the latter was out to trample the Hindu population. This was bolstered by the coverage given to Shyama Prasad Mookerjee's spirited attack on Suhrawardy during the no-confidence motion moved in the Bengal Legislative Assembly. His antagonistic stance, which included calling Suhrawardy the "biggest Goonda", must have appealed to a large number of frustrated Hindus, who felt helpless because of the manner in which the government had managed this calamity.112

IX The Direct Action day call tried to combine communal ideology with the anti-colonial urges of the Muslim community. The League, therefore, was driving towards what could be called religious nationalism in a colonial context. However devoid of the anticolonial critique which could have given this a positive ideological ambience, the idea of freedom which flowed from the League was created, disseminated, sustained and provided outlets through an anti-Hindu tirade and activities. This was in precise terms communalism in its Muslim variant. f

f

f

110 Constant flow of letters from the East Bengal Hindus demonstrates this fear and insecurity. See, S.P. Mookerjee Papers, File Nos 74 and 90. 111 See Anand Bazar Patrika, Calcutta,S April 1947. 112 N.N. :Mitra ed., Annual Register, 1946, VoL II, p. 191.

SIX

Violence Everywhere: The N oakhaliTippera Riots The Noakhali-Tippera riot of 1946-47 signals the culmination of the pre-independence communal violence in BengaP The riot was a direct sequel to the Calcutta killings of August 1946, and therefore, believed to be a repercussion of the latter. A closer study, however, reveals that the Noakhali-Tippera riot (hereafter Noakhali riot) was different in nature from the Calcutta killings for more than one reason. First of all, unlike the latter, it was primarily an example of rural-centred communal violence and therefore, invites a different treatment.' Second, though the news of the Calcutta killings sparked it off, the area had experienced intensive communal propaganda for quite some time which f

1 Bengal did not witness partition riots in 1947, and despite sporadic clashes there was no major communal riot after the Noakhali incidents. It remains the last major communal conflagration between the Hindus and the Muslims before the partition. Thematically! the atmosphere of terror that was created in the villages and the patterns of violence which included mass conversions, forcible marriages and looting! demonstrated total communalization as well as the climax of communal violence. Suranjan Das sees it as the riot which" completed the shift from the relatively unorganised and often class based commilllal violence to organised rioting with direct involvement of the organised political world" (Suranjan Das, Communal Riots in Bengal, p. 201). 2 Though the towns of Noakhali, Feni and Comilla were sensitive they did not witness any violence as such, whereas about 350 villages in the region were affected. (Burrows to Pethick-Lawrence, 18 November 1946, TOP, p.98.) It was only in the later phase, that panic and some violence was reported from Feni town, though restrained. This, therefore, makes the Noakhali riot a predominantly rural phenomenon.

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catalysed the rapid rupture of the peasant society.3 This resulted in forms of violence, hitherto not experienced by the populace of the province 4 Finally, and importantly, it was the Noakhali riot rather than the Calcutta killings that had a greater psychological impact at the all-India level owing to some of its constitutive elements. Reactions to Noakhali occurred far and wide, and were intense. Reports of reaction poured in not only from the neighbouring districts, i.e., Chittagong, Barisal and Faridpur/ but also from other parts of the country. Reports from Bombay, 6 Madras, UP the Punjab etc., also indicated a deteriorating communal situation. The intensity of the reaction can be judged from newspaper reports, often exaggerated, in these quarters. A report from Allahabad said: As the Pratapgarh-Allahabad passenger train stopped at Prayag station it is alleged some persons including girls checked the comparbnents to see if there were any abducted women from N oakhali and other districts of Bengal. One man was stabbed to death. The train was brought back to Allahabad station and then left with armed escort.' (sic)

The Muslim League sources maintained and insisted that the Noakhali riot was a spontaneous reaction to the Calcutta riot. See, enclosure to document no. 70, TOP, VoL IX, p. 130, also cited by Suranjan Das, Communal Riots in Bengal, p. 201, fn. 360. It is interesting and significant that all kinds of communal ideologies justify their existence and actions as reaction to some other communalism. This necessitates a powerful critique of the idea that one communalism had emerged as a reaction to the other. In a similar way, communal riot by one commllilal group is also justified by calling it as a reaction to some other riot. 4 The Noakhali riot demonstrated the completeness of communalization reflected in the extreme forms of violence such as, mass conversion, forcible marriages and brutal killings. One can argue that all communal riots, at a particular point of time, show total communalization of a society. But the Noakhali riot, with its violent forms and intensity, demonstrated a complete psychological rupture which alone can cause such an intense reaction. 5 Reports of the exodus of Hindus which began around 19 October in Madaripur in the wake of communal tension was published in Hindustan Standard, Calcutta, 1 November 1946, p. 1. 6 Hindustan Standard, Calcutta, 2 November 1946, p. 5. 7 Ibid., 2 November 1946, p.5. 3

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The worst reactions however came in the form of massacre of Muslims in Bihar and Garhmukteswar in UP. The Bihar riot began on 25 October 1946, which was being observed as N oakhali day. Severe violence broke out in Chapra, Saran District, between 25 and 28 October. Very soon Patna, Monghyr and Bhagalpur became the sites of serious killings and destruction. By 3 November, the official estimate put the figure of death at 445 8 Therefore, the Noakhali riot had a dimension which was wider and significant than other communal riots in the 1940s. In fact, it brought the communal discourse as well as violence to a crescendo. f

f

I Rioting in the districts of Noakhali and Tippera began in the Ramganj Police Station area in the northern part of Noakhali district on 10 October 1946. The violence unleashed was described by the Congress MLA from N oakhali, Haran Chandra Ghosh Choudhury, as "the organized fury of the Muslimmob"9 It soon engulfed the neighbouring police stations of Raipur, Lakshmipur, Begumganj and Sandip in Noakhali district, and Faridganj, Hajiganj, Chandpur, Laksham and Chudagram in Tippera district. lO The devastation caused by such widespread

N. Mansergh ed., TOP, VoL IX, p.48. H.C. Ghosh Choudhuy, 6 February 1947, PBLA, VoL LXXVII, No.2, p. 39. 10 Burrows in his letter to Pethick-Lawrence wrote:

8

9

... the trouble quickly spread ... over Ramganj police station as a whole. The western part of the neighbouring police station of Begumganj and to the south the northern part of Lakshmipur and part of Raipur police stations were also affected.. and by the 20th in the district of Tippera where they had spread to the southern part of Hajiganj police station on the 13th, following the arrival of hooligan elements from Noakhali, and from there to the neighbouring police stations of Faridganj and Chandpur to the west and Laksham and Chouddagram to the east during the next day or two. (Burrows to Pethick-Lawrence, 18 November 1946 cited in TOP, VoL IX, p.98.)

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violence was quite extensive. Statistics regarding casualties however, remained typically doubtful. The government sources constantly harped on the fact that the Hindu sources were exaggerating the death toll. 11 If the "Hindu" press placed the figure in thousand Sf the IILeague press went to the other extreme and even denied incidents of deaths. The official estimate showed a conservative 200. "Up to date the verified deaths by violence in the two districts combined for the period of the actual disturbances is 131 wrote the Governor Iland I do not imagine that the figure will in any event exceed 200 . 12 The government did not publish the reports of E. S. Simpson and R. Gupta, the civil servants appointed to enquire into the disturbances. This also led to a kind of distrust against the government. The reports reveal a figure which in fact supports the official position that the number of deaths was not very large despite claims to the contrary.13 While Simpson found only f

ft

ft

f

f

ft

"the figures of deaths were grossly exaggerated by non-official Hindu sources and that the number will certainly be low in the three figure category." (Ibid., p. 100.) Non-Muslim League newspapers in Calcutta, in fact, published the telegrams which were sent to them in a state of panic. They published these telegrams without substantiating their content. Thus, they helped in maintaining a situation of panic. One such telegram which was published without substantiating the details received wide publicity. It was sent from Tippera by a veteran Congress leader of the area, Kamini Kumar Dutta, which added to the panic as well as rumours about the nature of the riot. The history of the press in Bengal is a story of one of the most dynamic institutions. Its role in the political and socio-cultural awakening of the general mass of population is without parallel in the world. However, with the growing communalization of society in the earlier decades of the 20th century, even this otherwise vigilant institution could not remain untouched. In 1938, this issue was taken up by poet Rabindranath Tagore, see, "Communal Politics and Bengal Press" in Basudeb Chatterjee, TF, 1938, p. 2386; "The Poet's Protest", the Press statement by Rabindranath Tagore, The Statesman, 26 December 1937, ibid., p. 2386. Hence one has to be very careful when dealing with the newspaper as a source in reconstructing the history of the period. 12 Ibid. Lt. Gen. F. Tuker, of the Eastern Command writes, "Our estimate was that the total killed in this episode was well under three hundred". (F. Tuker, While Memory Serves, p. 176.) 13 See the copies of the report, "Versions of eyewitness about Noakhali", S.P. Mookerjee Papers, Instalment II-Iv;. Subject File No. 149/1946, pp. 41-59. (Hereafter "Versions of Eyewitness") 11

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32 instances of murder in the area under the jurisdiction of three police stations in Tippera,14 Gupta also did not note mass killings, though other forms of destruction had evidently taken place on a large scale. 1s The damage to homesteads and huts, however, was complete. Simpson's report indicated the trend in some villages, viz., Paikpara in Faridganj Police Station, where 62 out of 66 homesteads and 496 out of 530 huts were destroyed in fire 16 He reported destruction of altogether 1,073 homesteads and 4,798 huts in three police stations in Tippera 17 His description of the devastation of Haemchar Bazar was succinct: lilt looks like destroyed by a high power Bomb."!8 Gupta described the destruction of the house of Rajendra Lal Roy Choudhury of Karpara in similar words. He wrote, "At present it looks as if it has received a direct hit from a h.e. [sic] Bomb."19The rioting crowd according to eyewitness and victims' accounts, used petrol to set the houses on fire after looting them." Looting was complete, as evinced by the condition of those houses which remained unburned and the survivors who escaped. One touring party described the completeness of looting in these terms: f

f

We found an expecting mother in her mature stage, at Jayak village vacantly looking at us for an extra piece of dhoti other

Computed from the statistics provided by B.S. Simpson which constitutes appendix to his report. B.S. Simpson to the additional secretary to the Government of Bengal, Home Department,S November 1946, ibid., pp. 51-52. 15 R. Gupta to P.D. Martyn, 6 November 1946, ibid., pp.53-59. 16 B.S. Simpson to the AddL Sec., ibid., p. 51. 17 Ibid., pp. 51-52. 18 Ibid., p. 50. 19 R. Gupta to P.D. Martyn, ibid., p. 55. 20 Almost all the eyewitness accounts talk about the completely burnt markets, homesteads, etc. The use of kerosene and petrol indicates the premeditated and organized nature of the attacks because the attacking crowd, as one victim informed, had "an abundant stock". In a place like Sandip island, which had no motor cars, a newspaper reported, they were investigating into the matter as to how petrol could be imported and used here for setting houses on fire. See, Hindustan Standard, Calcutta, 10 November 1946, p. 3. 14

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than a rugged piece she had in her body. .. women folk of Panchgaon, Desgharia, Raipura, Nandigram and other places bitterly wept before us for an extra piece of cloth to change their ugly ones.'! The fire and the loot left the refugees in a pitiable state. "In some villages I visited/' wrote E. S. Simpson, lithe few remaining Hindu inhabitants were living on coconuts (dabs), bananas (where available) and what is known as Kochu".22 The towns of Chandpur, Comilla and even Calcu tta received thousands of refugees who had lost all their material possessions. Even uptil18 November, when the Governor sent his report, normalcy had not been restored. He reported: Though disturbances have ceased, the area affected is not as yet, in a completely orderly condition. An indication of the unsettled state of affairs has been the attacks on the Police while carrying out their duties. The most spectacular of these attacks was made at the beginning of the month on a senior ICS officer and his Police party escorting Hindu refugees to a relief camp. Firing had to be opened on the hooligans who attacked the party on three occasions and seven persons were killed and ten wounded. 23 The people whom the Governor was calling "hooligans", however, attacked the officer and the refugees in a very organized way and with the help of a substantial number of people. The official mentioned reported: As we approached the junction of two District Board roads at Kachua, we could see a large mob gathered on the Dutta Para road mainly in the vicinity of the bridge. Their numbers were augmented every minute by the number of men who were coming in on boats from the direction of Dasgharia as also from the west. We found that the mob had erected a sort of barricade of sheets of corrugated iron pieces of furniture, planks,

21 22

23

Samar Guha and Ardhendu Bhattacharya, "Versions of Eyewitness", p. 21. B.S. Simpson to the AddL Sec., ibid., pp. 45-46. Burrows to Pethick-Lawrence, TOP, VoL IX, pp. 98-99.

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etc., blocking the mouth of the roads. The mob began advancing forward .... I noticed that those in the front ranks carried sheets of corrugated iron which they held in front of themselves as shield." In fact, the situa tion never returned to normal, and though the riot had begun on 10 October it never remained just a sporadic affair or a sudden eruption of violence. The entire area was ablaze with tension throughout the next few months. This prolonged nature of communal violence also marks the uniqueness of the Noakhali riot and the relevance of Gandhi's intervention has to be studied in this very context.25 On the other hand, the situation in the affected area was reflected in the popular psyche, even as late as May 1947. One of the local newspapers reported widespread lawlessness in the Noakhali villages: The lawlessness was supplemented by the boycott of the Hindus by the Muslim villagers. For example, on 23 March 1947, Yunus Mia Pandit while presiding over the meeting in Khilparato to celebrate Pakistan Day on 23 March, criticized untouchability and absence of Purdah system among the Hindus and justified their boycott by the Muslims." The completeness, as well as the continuation of looting in the region made the repatriation of refugees a difficult proposition. f

R. Gupta to P.D. Martyn, "Versions of Eyewitness", pp.56-57. Gandhi's intervention in this matter is worth examining. His decision to come and stay in Noakhali has to be seen in the context and background of the complete communalization of the society and its aggressive violent manifestation. 26 Desher Vani, Noakhali, 2 April 1947, p.3 (Some issues of Desher Vani are available in the S.P. Mookerjee Papers). Another report in the Hindustan Standard, Calcutta, 18 April 1947, p. 1, paints a distressing picture: 24 25

... recent happenings and the threat of economic boycott of the minority commilllity and the persecution of the Muslims who are in the employment of the Hindus. A new technique has been developed in some areas of attempting to set fire to huts at night after locking up the ... inside .. In broad daylight people are apprehended on the highway and their belongings are forcibly taken away. See also, Amrit Bazar Patrika, Calcutta, 18 April 1947. Reports of houses being set on fire were numerous. For example, see Desher Vani, Noakhali, 19 March, pp.2-4; 28 March, pp. 1, 4; 2 April 1947, pp.3-5.

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After touring the villages in Ramganj Police Station, a relief worker reported that "even after 4 months, people have not returned to many villages". 27 The violence of such magnitude broke out on 10 October. "The immedia te occasion for the ou tbreak of the disturbances was the looting of a Bazar in Ramganj police station following the holding of a mass meeting and a provocative speech by the person now arrested"f wrote the Governorf Iialleged to be the organizer of the disturbances-Gholam Sarwar Hussein."28 Gholam Sarwarf one victim claimed, had incited people to avenge the Calcutta killings in a public speech." This included an attack on the "Kutchery bari of Babu Surendra Nath Bose and Rai Saheb Rajendra Lal Ray Choudhury of Karpara".30 The crowd in Sahapur Bazar 1110 to 12 thousand Musssalman" resorted to looting and destroying. Sahapur Bazar which the touring officer, Gupta, found completely devastated. 3 ! The next action was the attack on the house of Rajendra Lal Roy Choudhury, the erstwhile president of the Noakhali Bar and a prominent Hindu Mahasabha leader in the district. A victim gives a graphic detail of the attack: On 10 Oct. 1946 at about 8 a.m. a Muslim crowd of several thousand men, in batches of about 200 persons armed with deadly weapons passed by our house shouting Muslim League and other slogans such as IIPakistan Zindabad"f IILarke lenge Pakistan" [sicL IIWant Hindu Blood" and IICalcutta Retaliation" and moved towards the ex-MLA's house. At about 12 a.m. another mob including both outside and local Muslims passed by our house shouting "Want Rai Sahib's head", IISanyasi's Head" and on their way towards the ex-MLA's house forcibly tried to drag away one Monoranjan Bose of our

v Desher Vani, Noakhali, 26 March 1947, p. 3. It was, however, not just the material loss that impeded repatriation, but also an all-pervasive fear and absolute lack of confidence. 28 Burrows to Pethick-Lawrence, 18 November, TOP, VoL IX, p. 98. 29 Account by Jnanada Mohan Guha Raya, 5/0 late Kali Mohan Guha Raya, Village 5hahapur, P.5. Ramganj (hereafter Jnanada Mohan Guha Raya), AICC Papers, File No. CL-8, 1946, p.353. 30 Ibid. 31 R. Gupta to P.D. Martyn, "Versions of Eyewitness", p. 56.

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house who was taken back by Rai Sahib and others. Immedia tely we sent one Sailesh Roy of our house to P.S. Ramganj to lodge an ejahar but to our utter misfortune he could never come back. On the same evening the mob looted and set fire to Sahapur Bazar. On 11 Oct. 1946 at about 10 a.m. a crowd of about 700 Muslims looted and set fire to all the houses of Southern Karpara and then attacked our house with deadly weapons and shouting Muslim League slogans. In the scuffle that ensued in trying to repulse the attack, one Brojonath Das of our house instantaneously [sic] died as a result of an injury caused by a konch thrown by one Monnu Mia of N akaribari and sometime after that the mob left our house and proceeded towards the house of Golam Sarwar. After about an hour a mob of about eight to ten thousand Muslims led by Sarwar with a gun in hand, proceeded towards our house shouting League slogans IISarwar Zindabad N IIHindur rakta chaiN (want Hindu blood), "rai sahaber matha chai" (want the head of rai sahib), "Sanyasir matha chai" (want the head of sanyasis). The numerical strength frightened us a great deal. We, however organised ourselves in two groups and took shelter in Rajen Babu's building because the rest were kucha houses (about 100). The aged men including myself (68 years old) women and children took shelter on the roof trying to repulse the attack by throwing brickbats while the young men mostly guarded the building entrance with the only available crude weapons usually meant for home use .... On reaching our house Sarwar gave the lead by opening fire and the mob started wholesale looting and setting fire to all our houses. By about 4 p.m. our defence completely broke down and they set fire to the building by spraying petrol and kerosene oil of which they had an abundant stock. ... They asked us to come down and talk rna tters over with Baromiya and Chotomiya (Sarwar and his younger brother), who, they said, had forbidden further killings .... One Ledu Shaik, one Rajen Babu's client and others were persuading us to come down assuring safety on oath of the Koran. At this moment Sarwar ordered his men to go up by ladders and bring everyone down. The Goondas (Ledu Shaikh, Shamsul Haque, Abdul Rashid, Khalek, Sikandar, Kala Miya, Muslim Maji, Abdul Kasem, Doctor, Abul Hossan Choudhury, etc.) then came up in strength. The ladies were forced to get down. As soon as they got down they were struck and wounded, f

f

f

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their ornaments and cash money being snatched away. The sca ttered men were overpowered their hands were tied and forced to get down and murdered. Sarwar had declared a special reward for Rajen Babu's and Sanyasi's head. As soon as Rajen Babu was forced down, his head was chopped off and a batch ran away with it making a terrific shriek of joy [sic].32 f

This and other such attacks, on 10 and 11 October, seem to suggest that the violence was spontaneous. It was not; the frenzied psyche, which made that "shriek of joy" possible, had been building up for quite some time. The government report as well as other sources supportthe fact thalfor some time now a vola tile communal situation prevailed in the area. 33 Thus in the third week of August, the Army had sent the Gurkha regiment to reinforce eastern Bengal as a note of alarm had been sounded from there. 34 Lt. Gen. Tuker of Eastern Command wrote IIReports received at command H.Q. during the six weeks before the trouble started certainly indicated tension in the rural area, particularly in Noakhali and Chittagong".35 The local Congress report, which was sent to the Bengal Provincial Congress Committee (BPCC) a few days before the riots began warned: liThe Muslim masses have been converted into so many explosive bombs to explode any moment on the slightest pretext."36 The actual momentum to the riot was provided the week before 10 October. The Muslims, congregated in mosques on the Id day (28 September 1946), were exhorted to avenge the Calcutta killings. The rumour of "Hindus (who) stealthily f

f

f

Mohendra Mohan Roy, Village Karpara, Noakhali, to the District Magistrate, Noakhali, n.d., Alee Papers, File No. G-65, p. 17. 33 The Governor writes, " ... the district had been in a particularly disturbed state for some time previous to the date of the outbreak of the disturbance". Burrows to Pethick-Lawrence, 18 November 1946, TOP, VoL IX, p. 98. Report of the N oakhali District Congress Committee to the Bengal Provincial Congress Committee clearly shows that the situation was quite alarming and that even the government officials were conniving with communal forces. See "Noakhali Situation after the Calcutta Killings and Suggested Remedies", (hereafter "Noakhali Situation"), Alee Papers, File No. G-53, pp. 93-95. 34 F. Tuker, While Memory Serves, p. 170. 35 Ibid. 36 "Noakhali Situation", p. 95. 32

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imported Sikhs and arms and kept them concealed in some important houses" spread rapidly.37 The crowd rushing out of the mosques raided a large number of Hindu houses in search of lithe Sikhs" and arms.3S From 2 October there were frequent instances of stray killings, snatching of goods, and lootings throughout the district and the authorities were well aware of these. 39 Lt. Gen. Tuker, however, informs us that the local authorities were quite in the dark 40 However, the district officials were regularly f

37 H.C. Ghosh Choudhury, 6 February 1947, PBLA, VoL LXXVII, No.2, p. 39. It is quite interesting to note that in 1939 there were exactly the same type of rumours which had come to dominate the communal landscape. Rai Haran Chandra Sur, the local M.L.A made a statement on the situation. He said:

From January 13, for about a fortnight, Muslim population in large numbers representing different Union boards, different associations and rival parties marched in processions, carrying flags and festoons and crying varying slogans. Simultaneously, some mischief mongers spread an unfounded rumour to the effect that Hindus were secretly cospiring to stop cow sacrifice on the occasion of the Bakr Id and for this purpose they had imported goondas from outside the province. (Rai Haran Chandra Sur, 16 March 1939, ibid., VoL LIV, No.3, p. 419-20.) "Noakhali Situation", p. 95. Jnanada Mohan Guha Roy, p.353. See also, diary of events, Acharya Kripalani's tour in Noakhali, AlCC Papers, File No. P-5-1946, p. 87, for the chronology of the events: 28 September, Id-day-Maulavi Ghulam Sarwar exhorts people; 2-8 October incidents of propaganda loot and extortion start; 10 October disturbances begin on mass scale. 40 He writes, "So little was the local civil administration perhubed by what was going on about them that the Commissioner of Chitta gong on the arrival of the company protested against its being sent to him". (F. Tuker, While Memory Serves, p. 171.)

38 39

My first job the next day was to.. go and pay my respect to the Superintendent of Police, :Mr Price and District Magistrate, Mr Devali. They showed genuine surprise at my company coming to Comilla .. When they asked "why has your company been sent to Comilla?" I replied, I was ordered to come.. as the communal situation is pretty bad.. they both were more surprised than ever and said, "what communal situation? Everything is perfectly peaceful here and always has been and we are expecting no trouble". Two days later the Commissioner from Chittagong came to Comilla. He had heard nothing and was equally surprised.. At 3 p.m. on the 14th October the Superintendent

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approached by the people, especially the Hindus, and were appraised of the prevailing situation. The president of the district Congress and the local MLA met the superintendent of police and the district magistrate on 12 September and informed them of "the apprehension of the Hindus of serious trouble during the Puja"41 The officials, for some unknown reason, acted very slowly, and the vicious rumours which were floating throughout the district were publicly countered by the authorities only as late as 70ctober.42 The rumours and the communal preparedness indicated by the reports were the direct consequence of, and reaction to, the Calcutta killings. Noakhali Muslims had begun returning from Calcutta. This gave credence to the argument that the Noakhali riot was a reaction to the Calcutta riot. But, had it been just a spillover from the latter, the other districts of the province should also have reacted in the same manner as Noakhali. The argument that the presence of a large number of Maulvis who incited it also does not explain why the society did not react to them earlier. 43

of Police told me that very serious communal trouble had broken in the Noakhali district and also in the area about thirty miles south-west of Comilla. (The personal report of Captain Wimbush who was commanding "A" company of the 4/2nd Gurkha regiment in F. Tuker, While Memory Serves, p. 607.) H.C. Ghosh Choudhuy, 6 February 1947, PBLA, VoL XXVII, No.2, p.39. Professor Samar Guha and Ardhendu Bhattacharjee saw such a pamphlet issued on 7 October. They wrote, "Apprehending imminent trouble Nagendra Guha Roy a Congress M.L.A issued an appeal to the authorities for proper protection. Even Superintendent of Police himself apprehending trouble issued a pamphlet asking people not to allow themselves to be carried". ("Versions of Eyewitness", p.30.) Captain Wimbush of "A" Company of 4/2nd Gurkha regiment writes: 41 42

The Police did not inspire us; on certain occasions when we were going to make a raid on a village to arrest well known goondas we had proof that the police had given information of our intended move and we found that the men concerned had bolted. What was even more discoillaging was the fact that when we occasionally did catch red handed goondas and send them to sub-divisional officer would release them on baiL It made us very angry... like it or not, the whole civil administration from top to bottom was communally minded. (F. Tuker, While Memory Serves, Appendix VI, pp. 609-10.) 43

N.K. Bose, My Days with Gandhi, Bombay, 1974 (1987), p. 30.

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The singularity of the Noakhali riot lies in understanding why such an intense form of violence took place in a society not particularly known for violent turns. 44 What made the Noakhali riot so distinct was the recourse taken to Islam, and its location in the entire episode-an aspect yet to be carefully studied. A close perusal of the acts of violence shows how efforts to legitimize these acts were attempted by taking recourse to Islam. This differentiates it from all other stages and forms of communal violence where the point of contention stemmed from religious difference but religion was never the instrument to legitimize acts of violence. In Noakhali, however, it was not only the religion that constituted the identity of a particular community which was attacked violently, but also the symbols and the religion itself. And this was effected through the process of forcible conversion. H.S. Suhrawardy, the chief minister, while answering the question of Dhirendra Nath Dutt on the floor of the Bengal Legislative Assembly, gave a figure of 9,895 cases offorcible conversion in Tippera, while that for Noakhali was not known "but (which) ran into thousands".45 This submission came from the ministry which had until now constantly maintained that the situation was not as grave as it was made out to be by the Hindu press and Hindu propaganda. The Star of India clearly expressed the government stand: f

The reports appearing in the Hindu Press about mass conversion of Hindus have hardly any foundation. There have been cases, however, of Hindus going to Muslims out of sheer panic and offering to become Muslims. In almost all cases, the Muslims assured them they would be protected whether they remained Hindus or not. 46

Secretary, BPCC Report, AICC Papers, File No. P-5, 1946, p. 121. Even at the times of Wahabi and Farazi movements, Noakhali, which was a prominent centre of these movements, did not witness inter-religious or intercommunal violence. Colonial accounts, not having much love for the Wahabis or Farazis, related that though they were intensely religious and orthodox, they, however, did not commit acts of violence against the members of the other community (read Hindu). See W.W. Hunter, Statistical Account of Bengal, Vol. VI, p.31. 45 H.S. Suhrawardy, 6 February 1947, PBLA, VoL LXXVII, No.3, p. 323. 46 Star of India, Calcutta, 17 October 1946, p.3. 44

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This was made more explicit by a Muslim League legislator from Noakhali, Mujibur Rahman, who, responding to the chief ministerial statement, asked the latter whether he was aware of the fact that "the majority of the Hindu population gave up their religion out of fear"'7 In all these cases, though deliberate attempts at conversion were denied by giving agency to the Hindus themselves, the argument brought out the fact that it was a state of fear or panic which would have forced the Hindus to give up their religion and accept Islam voluntarily. While Suhrawardy gave the figure of 9,895 converts in Tippera, he was already in possession of Simpson's report which had estimated the number of conversions in three police stations of Faridganj, Chandpur and Hajiganj to be around 22,550 and the entire Hindu population of three villages, i.e., Gupti, Bachtali and Gobindpur of Faridganj police station. 48 As regards Hindus volunteering to become Muslims, the term "voluntary act" when qualified by the community's fear of destruction of their possessions and lives, meant something altogether different. Men with property were threatened; men without property were also intimidated. Fear stalked these villages. S.c. Ghosh, S. Ghosh and Bhatta of Karpara wrote, "On the 12th these miscreants planned to attack our house, one of the biggest houses with population of about250 .... In order to save our lives and properties ... [we] agreed to their proposal of conversion to Islam which they advanced as a condition precedent to our protection."49 The Zamindar of Panchgaon Lakshmi Mazumdar sta ted: On 12th morning I called in some leading Muslim gentlemen for help and advice, notably Gholam Kibria, Latu Mia of Bhaor, our Union Board President (U. No. 12), Nure Rahman (dismissed sub inspector of police) and other people. They promised to save our life and property on conversion to Islam. Surrendering our guns and our agreeing to abide by their decision ... I was told by a known Muslim to go to the nearby

Mujibur Rahman, 6 February 1947, PBLA, VoL LXXVII, No.3, 1947, p. 324. B.S. Simpson to AddL Sec., "Versions of Eyewitness", pp. 52-53. 49 S. Ghosh, S.c. Ghosh and Aswini Kr. BhaUa of Karpara, Police Station Ramganj to the district magistrate, Noakhali, 31 October 1946, AlCC Papers, File No. G-53, p.37. 47 48

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mosque with some other leading Hindu gentlemen like Chandra Kumar Mazumdar and others whom he named and told us that if we decided to save our life and property we must not make delay in making up our mind bu t must go to the mosque to be converted. We went to the mosque as we had no alternative where we found several Muslims armed with weapons. 50 These were definitely not voluntary acts, bu t were forced upon the population under threat of death. The Governor, in his report, accepted the fact that forcible conversion had taken place on a large scale. S ! The modus operandi of the phenomenon of forcible conversion indicates certain factors which went into making the Noakhali riot qualitatively different from other communal riots.52 A victim's account states: The same night local Muslims in batches of 5 to 7 came to our house and asked us to get converted to Islam. We, out of fear, did not meet them. On the Saturday morning of 12 October around 200 Muslims came to our house and threatened that if we do not convert ourselves they would kills us. We, to save our lives, agreed to their proposal. Thus, the Maulavi Saheb of Shahapur High School converted me, and other members of my family into Islam. Then from amongst the crowd, the particular Maulavi Badu Mian and Mahmud Mian Patari forced us to destroy the images and photographs of all Gods and Goddesses. On 13 October they constructed a mosque in front of my house and later on Kudur Mian, Mujibul Huq Kerani and Khaliq Mian demanded one thousand rupees from me as contribution to the League 53 . (Italics mine) Refusal to get converted was often met with violent reactions, as this particular experience details: ... these leaders assisted by the Mohammedans of the locality and neighbourhood localities joined the mob and looted

5()

Lakshmi Babu's Statement, "Versions of Eyewitness", p.65. See, R. Gupta,

ibid., p. 55. 51 52 53

Burrows to Pethick-Lawrence, 18 November 1946, TOP, VoL IX, p. 100. B.S. Simpson to AddL Sec., "Versions of Eyewitness", p.44. Jnanda Mohan Guha Roy, AlCC Papers, F. CL-8-1946, pp.353-55.

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everything they can. When this was finished they attacked my sons late Jasoda Kumar Roy, Prossanna Kumar Roy at Kergah and Chitta Ranjan Roy and my son-in-law Binode Behari Roy Marmundar of Babupur and asked them to get converted into [sic.] Islam and to take beef. When they expressed unwillingness Mendi Meah of Abirpara cut the throat of my eldest son Jasoda Kumar Roy in the nature of Jabai and killed my two other sons like wild beasts.54 Though no circumcision was reported,55 the Hindu population was generally forced to perform certain practices as part of their allegiance to the new faith. 56 The formula, as Simpson calls it, was the same almost everywhere. It included compulsion to wear a cap upon which was inscribed Pakistan, a lungi as worn by Muslims, to eat beef, recite the Kalma and offer prayers. Acharya Kripalani, the Congress president, on touring the affected villages wrote in his report: Even after looting and arson and murder, the Hindus in the locality were not safe unless they embraced Islam. The Hindu population further to save themselves had to embrace en mass. As a sign of their conversion they were supplied with white caps used by the Muslims of the locality. Very often these caps were new and were stamped with the map of Pakistan with the words Pakistan Zindabad and Larke Lenge Pakistan." Thus, after conversion people were supplied with caps and copies of the Quran. The president of the Congress party noted that in one particular village, Khilpara, all the Hindus had been compelled to embraced Islam. Copies of the Quran had been distributed and people were compelled to wear the Muslim dress. Annanda Sundari Roy of Baragobindapur, Police Station Begumganj, Noakhali, to the Officer-in-Charge, Begumganj Police Station, Noakhali, ibid., p. 365. 55 B.S. Simpson to the AddL Sec., "Versions of Eyewitness", p.44. See also, Burrows to Pethick-Lawrence, 18 November 1946, N. Mansergh ed., TOP, Vol. IX. p. 99. 56 The Reports of B.S. Simpson, R. Gupta and lB. Kripalani discuss these acts in details. 57 "Acharya lB. Kripalani, Congress President's Report", AlCC Papers, File No. CL-8-1946. p. 371. 54

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New caps with the League flag, a map of Pakistan and carrying the slogan "Pakistan Zinda bad" had been distributed in thousands. 58 This clearly proves that all the arrangements were made by some very resourceful organization in advance accounting for the enormous quantity of cloth made available in days of strict cloth control. Simpson, Samar Guha and his associates also found the operation of a similar pattern in the method of conversion. 59 It was also tried to make the conversion permanent by forcing the victims to show adherence to their new faith. A victim's account denotes this clearly: f

All the images of Gods and Goddesses have been broken and thrown away from the temples and dwelling houses. In brief, we are prevented from offering prayers and uttering mantras and cannot lead the Hindu mode of life. We are treated like slaves .... The Maulvie [sic] appointed by the Muslims, come every now and then and teach the Namaj. On Fridays, the Hindus are compelled to accompany them to the Mosque for Jumma. Wearing of Muslim caps and growing of beards have become the order of the day. ... Muslims are asking the Hindus to purchase ca ttle and slaughter them with their own hands in Hindu houses on the coming Id day. 60 It is clear, therefore, tha t irrespective of the fact whether the riot was organized or not, the attack on religion was complete. While the acts of forced conversion attacked the religious sentiments of the Hindus and brought communal violence to a high psychological pitch, itwas the acts of violence against/ on women, i.e., abduction and forced marriages that transported the Noakhali riot to a totally new arena of communal discourse. It gave credence to the Hindu communal discourse which had been depicting Hindu women as victims of the violent Muslim male. The instances of forcible marriages and abductions during the riot provided a retrospective justification for the Hindu communal argument which saw Muslim male violence on Hindu women as

Ibid., p. 373. Samar Guha and Ardhendu Bhattacharya, "Versions of Eyewitness", p. 26. 6() S. Ghosh, S.c. Ghosh and Aswani Kumar BhaUa to the district magistrate, Noakhali, 31 October 1946, AICC Papers, File No. G-53, p.39. 58

59

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one of the primary reasons for the rapidly increasing Muslim population.'! J.M. Datta a statistician who wrote a series of articles on various aspect of the census figures, and during the 1941 census headed the campaign for "impartial enumeration", started by the Hindu Mahasabha wrote: liThe surest way to destroy a nation or a community is to confiscate its women". 62 He calculated the average number of abductions of Hindu women as 700 per year and concluded by saying, " ... in any view, abduction of Hindu women by the Mohammedans and their continued loss to the Hindu community, so far as it affects the growth of the Hindus is a matter which cannot be neglected any longer without serious consequences."63 The large number of abductions of women and forcible marriages during the Noakhali riot may easily be placed within the ambit of this discourse. What was more significant was that it gave credence to, and validated, the hitherto debated and contested discourse. f

f

61 The debate on the comparative growth rate of Hindu and Muslim population in Bengal while taking a communal turn invariably brought to the forefront the fact that the Muslim men had abducted and forcibly married Hindu girls. See, }.M. Dutta, "Continued Abduction of Hindu Women-its Effect on the Bengali Hindus", Modern Review, Calcutta, October 1941, pp. 358-59. See also, "Will the Hindus Regain their Majority in Bengal? Yes", ibid., December 1940, pp. 676-80; "Are the Bengali Hindus Decadent? No", ibid., January 1940, pp.36-41; "Estimated Population of the Muhammedans in Bengal at the Next Census", ibid., August 1940, pp. 156-57; "No. of Hindus Not Properly Recorded at the Last Census of 1931", ibid., September 1940, p. 294. 62 Ibid. 63 Ibid. The demographic factor had been a very significant aspect of the communal discourse in Bengal. In shaping of the Hindu and Muslim communal perceptions, the debate revolving around the comparative increase in the population of Hindu and Muslims in the province had an important bearing. Publication of CoL U.N. Mukherjee's book entitled A Dying Race in 1909 triggered a debate and apprehenSions among a section of the Hindu middle-class intellectuals. Comparing census data, Col. Mukherjee had concluded that there was a possibility, as predicted by 0' Donnel in the 1891 Census Report, of Hindu extinction. The demographic factor became politically more significant after the communal award (1932) and the operation of the provincial autonomy clause which saw election and formation of ministries in 1937. A sense of loss of political power of the community was a point repeatedly stressed by the

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The news of violence on women shook the Bengali Society. This is reflected in the appeals made by the provincial leaders. Labanya Prova Dull issued an "appeal to the public and dealers for contributions of vermilion and Conchshell bangles for the riot affected women of Noakhali". 64 The Muslim League ministry also understood the importance of this fact. But it preferred to deal with it by minimizing the gravity of the occurrences to the lowest possible degree. Answering the question on facts of abduction and forcible marriages, the chief minister delivered the figures of

Hindu communal discoillse. On the other hand, the colonial attempts of classifying tribes and other groups separately from the Hindus added to the already existing apprehensions that the colonial authorities were out to crush the Hindus politically by reducing them to an extreme minority. This factor became further complicated with the demand of Pakistan as a separate homeland for the Muslim majority. The demand was to a great extent based on a demographic argument. This made the 1941 census a bitterly contested operation. (See, "Hindus and the Census", Amrit Bazar Patrika, Calcutta, 18 January 1941, p. 9; "Coming Census", ibid., 3 February 1941, p. 6.) To the Hindu Mahasabha demand for an "impartial census enumeration" the Muslim League and even the chief minister made statements which had a communal tinge. They added to the communal propaganda which made the census of 1941 a symbol and an arena of political contestation. On the other hand, the Muslim communal perception was also significantly influenced by the question of population. The argument in the 1940s in favour of Pakistan was quiet often an argument based on the demographic consideration. For example, Casey reported his conversation with Nazimuddin in these terms: I asked him about Pakistan. He said he was just on the point of writing to Jinnah telling ... they want Bengal (less Billdwan Division), Assam, a subdivision of Bihar.. This would give them 58% Muslim in place of 51 % .... He says that Muslims are more virile than the Hindus and breed faster. (Entry on 5 September 1944, Personal Diary, Richard G. Casey Papers, Reel No.1, p.58.) Forcible conversion, forcible marriages and mass exodus from the place brought these issues to the debate on comparative population growth. (Hindustan Standard, Calcutta, 7 November 1946, p. 4.) 64 People demanded military help to rescue the abducted women. Amiya Chakravorty, who worked closely with Gandhi said, "only a military police force composed of women or duly authorized women workers, fully protected by the military, could help in.. work". (Hindustan Standard, 7 November 1946, p. 3.)

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tvvo in Noakhali and five in Tippera. 65 His assertion came at a time when one of his own officers, Simpson, had announced 716 cases of rapes and 157 cases of restraints from three police stations of Tippera i.e., Faridganj, Chandpur and Hajiganj.66 Though the press, especially the non-Muslim League ones, had exaggerated the numbers, often crossing the figure of thousands, Sucheta Kripalani and Muriel Lester's efforts at rescuing these hapless women and the description of their condition in the press and through the "tales of the refugees" certainly created a different psychological world. The efforts of the chief minister to minimize their importance was counter-productive and embittered the Hindu community.67 However, without a detailed or confirmed report, the numbers, figures and condition of the women remained a subject of widespread speculation and exaggeration which further aggravated the Hindus. 68 Violence on women provided the necessary justification for the Hindu communal portrayal of the IIMuslim men's virility and potential aggression". This again brought back the fears expressed in the debate on the increasing Muslim population during the two census operations of 1931 and 1941. 69 This clearly shows the operation of the logic of communal ideology. What was important in Noakhali was not only the aggression on women but also the consideration of women as repositories of the honour of the community and its traditions. Conversion and

PBLA, VoL LXXVII, No.3, 1947, First Session, p.323. B.S. Simpson to AddL Sec., "Versions of Eyewitness", pp. 52-53. 67 See, Muriel Lester's Report on Noakhali, Hindustan Standard, Calcutta, 8 November 1946, pp.I-2; and "Calcutta Observes Noakhali Women's Day, December I", ibid., 29 November 1946, p. 1. 68 A reaction of a follower of Gandhi provides a clue to the kind of emotion and frustration that was generated by the aspects of the Noakhali riot:

65

66

Most urgent need now is to receive the numberless abducted women who were entomed in Burkha and who for obvious reasons, could not be approached by the Ministry... It is intolerable that helpless women victims of a cold blooded planned assault should suffer hourly distress and that we should be alive and still be unable to save them. (Hindus tan Standard, Calcutta, 7 November 1946, p. 3.) 69

See Chapter 1 for a discussion on this debate.

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forcible marriages together meant that the entire religious complex of a population was sought to be forcibly changed. They were not just being forced to convert into Islam, but also abducted and forced into marriages with Muslim youth.70 The local Muslim population either actively or tacitly participated in these acts n Muslim women in the affected areas, at times displayed their covert support. When Hindu women sometimes rushed into neighbouring Muslim homes in a state of panic, it was the women of the households who removed the vermilion mar k and broke the conch shell bangles. 72 This was, however, not out of any altruistic motive of hiding their identity from the attackers. N.K. Bose narrated the experience of a girl who told Gandhiji about how the ladies in a Muslim household asked her to become like one of them. 73 Worst of all was the plight of the women several of them had to watch their husbands being murdered and then be forcibly converted and married to some of those responsible for their death. These women had a dead look. !twas not despair, nothing so active was there. !t was blankness ... the eating of beef and declaration of allegiance to Islam has been forced upon many women as a price for their lives.?4 The nature of violence in these attacks forces one to look beyond the descriptions and seek a causal explanation. The Noakhali riot as mentioned earlier was generally seen as just a reaction of and retaliation to the Calcutta riot which had taken place seven weeks f

f

One eyewitness thought forced marriages were "the shortest possible way to make conversion a reality". See, Samar Guha and Ardhendu Bhattacharya, "Versions of Eyewitness", p. 28. 71 A substantial section of the Muslim population actively and tacitly supported the conversions that were carried out. (H.S.E. Stevens, chief secretary, Government of Bengal to the secretary, Government of India, Home Political, File No. 18/10/46.) Most assailants were known to the victims. For example, the residents of SonaimLUi village, P.O. Begumganj, provided the name and address of about 60 hooligans who were not arrested by authorities but who had been threatening the villagers. (The inhabitants of Sonaimuri village to the president, Indian National Congress, Alee Papers, File No. CL-8/1946, pp. 381-83.) 72 S.c. Ghosh et aLI of Karpara, Ramganj, to the district magistrate, Noakhali, 31 October 1946, Alee Papers, File No. G-53, pp.37-41. 73 N.K Bose, My Days with Gandhi, p. 126. 74 Modern Review, LXXX: 5 November 1946, pp. 322-24. 70

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earlier. 75 The Muslims, returning from Calcutta, brought with them exaggerated stories of their Muslim brethren suffering in Calcutta, which vitiated the already tense situation created by rumours. 76 Ghulam Sarwar in particular and the Muslim League in general gave this reaction an organized form. Thus, the theory of reaction and organized violence actually constitute one logical whole. The organization of the crowd, similar pattern of the act of conversion everywhere, the large number of caps with Pakistan written on them, and availability of cloth, petrol, etc., prove this argument. 77 A close perusal of the events and acts of the riot, however, reveals one pertinent point. An insistence on lithe fact that the riot was organized" minimized the extent of communalization of Noakhali society. Communalization was, in fact, complete and hence, the event needs to be studied from a different angle-the significant ideological make-up of the society, which had made the riot an example of penetrative violence. In fact the organized core" of the rioting crowd was more like the execu tive wing of the completely communalized Noakhali society. It was also not just a reaction to the Calcutta riot on account of the fact that Bengal had witnessed other riots, for example the Dhaka riot of 1941. Noakhalinever "reacted" to them, nor in this manner. Second, there were other places which were communally as tense, such as Dhaka, Faridpur, Chittagong. But they did not erupt like this. This also suggests that the roots of this particular violence have to be studied more carefully. The completeness of communalization could be seen in the nature and composition of the people involved in the communal II

Noakhali riot is generally considered chronologically as well as thematically as a "reaction" to, or extension of the Calcutta killings. 'What I have tried to argue in this study is that one should not premise itself on this "reaction" aspect as it dilutes a number of other issues. 76 Emphasis on this aspect will dilute the fact that a substantial proportion of the Muslim population, barring some noble exceptions, was under the spell of communal ideology. By pinning the blame on the party or a person, we in fact, tend to overlook the hegemonic presence of communal ideology. 77 "Chitta gong residents passed a restless day on the Direct Action Day", A letter from Chittagong to Dr Shyama Prasad Mookerjee, S.P. Mookerjee Papers, Subject File No. 151, p. III. Chittagong, according to Lt. Gen. Tuker, was equally tense. See, F. Tuker, While Memory Serves, pp. 170-71, 607. 75

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violence in those villages. From the very beginning, i.e., 28 September, on the day of Id, Muslims were exhorted to avenge the Calcutta killings. At this time the Ilorganized core" was given lead by the erstwhile peasant leader Ghulam Sarwar. This core was composed of about 1,000 to 1,200 men which included some demobilized soldiers.78 The presence of this group gave the appearance of organized violence. However what was more significant was the fact that there existed, with some noble exceptions, a total collaboration and cooperation of insiders, i.e., neighbours of the same village and people whom the victims knew. In most cases, people were attacked by inhabitants of their village. The Maulvi who converted people was often a local, and the hooligans who were also of the same village were supported by crowds coming to attack from outside. Thus, we need to correct the understanding of this riot put forth by the authorities, that it was" activity apparently organised of a body of hooligans who have exploited existing communal situations" .79 Attackers were most often knovvn to the victims. In cases where the victims sought help from people they knew, some facet of communal ideology was ever present in the way help was rendered conditional. Lakshmi Majumdar of Panchgaon stated that when he asked for help, his Muslim friends advised him to get converted first. so In most cases, the victims were asked to convert to Islam by the persons whose help they f

f

78

Tuker wrote: Ghulam Sarwar's gang was estimated to be about one thousand, a certain number of ex-army personal were reported to be adherents. The main gang had split into smaller gangs of one hundred and fifty to two hundred and these had been working in conformity with an obviously worked out plan. (F. Tuker, While Memory Serves, p. 174.)

Burrows to Wavell, TOP, VoL IX, p. 98. See also, Government of India, Home Political, File No. 5/55/46. "Some held, as so often they do hold that the rioters were men/' wrote the adjutant of the 1/3rd Gurkha regiment, "who had come in from outside. That is not so they were local inhabitants who worked up to a pitch of frenzy by such agitators as Ghulam Sarwar.... " See F. Tuker, While Memory Serves, p. 618. 80 See, Lakshmi Majumdar's statement, "Versions of Eyewitness", pp. 64-68. 79

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had sought.'! This third group of people were the tacit supporters and included even police officials.82 This was evinced by the latter's inaction on complaints to be present at moments of violence, thereby, tacitly supporting acts of commission of violence. In fact, when the house of the zamindar of Panchgaon, Lakshmi Majumdar, was looted and he was asked to convert, the superintendent of police was present there.8"l Hindu policemen's houses were burnt too, and people in the vicinity of police stations were not spared. 84 The secretary, N oakhali District Congress Committee, gave an account of the situation prevailing there prior to the rioting: In some cases the officers have been poisoned with communalism. The Hindu officers are apathetic and studious, cautious not to incur the displeasure of the other community and for the matter of that the Muslims .... Government and almost all Muhammendan officers are inclined towards the Muslim League and do not hesitate to condone the aggressive acts of the Muslim hooligans by helping suppression of evidence against them submitting false reports.85

Ibid. Police officials as well as the local government officials acted in a highly communal manner. The house of Lakshmi Majumdar, zamindar of Panchgaon, was looted in the presence of the superintendent of Police. See, R. Gupta to P.D. Martyn, ibid., p. 55. 83 Lakshmi Majumdar's statement, "Versions of Eyewitness", pp. 64-68. 84 R. Gupta stated, "These people residing so close to the thana are in such a state of terror still that they are reluctant to talk about what they have suffered as a result of looting.. The Quarters of the Hindu constables (yards from the thana) were gutted". R. Gupta to P.D. Martyn, "Versions of Eyewitness", p.54. These instances show not only communalization but also the confidence of communal elements by the time they actually resorted to violence. 85 "Noakhali Situation", pp. 97-99. Lt. Gen Tuker wrote: 81

82

Lists of these men took an inordinate time for the local police to prepare.. Informers were very loath to come forward with evidence. Until such time as the goondas were rounded up it was certain that if the soldiers left the area trouble would at once break out again. (F. Tuker, While Memory Serves, p. 178.)

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This shows that communal ideology had a complete hegemonic presence. 86 The physical reality of this was manifested in a total societal rupture. How this hegemony was established, therefore becomes the crucial question facing historians. f

Therefore, the total communalization of Noakhali Muslims shows that at any particular junchue even a factor like communalism could become an overdetermined one. 'When the peasants of Noakhali attacked the Hindus, it was not as peasants that they attacked the latter but as Muslims. Communalism is a significant explanatory category in this context. 86

SEVEN

Looking for the Origins: The Noakhali-Tippera Riots Noakhali district had a high preponderance of Muslim popula tion bordering on almost 82.5 per cent of the total popula tion. ! The majority of the local Muslim population had, notwithstanding the claims to the contrary, "descended from the aboriginal races of the district".2 The census operation during the later decades of the 19th century saw the local cultivating communities claiming Sheik and Syed status which also meant claiming foreign descent. This was, however, not peculiar to N oakhali district alone but of the whole of the province and was instrumental in the prolonged debate about the origin of the Bengali Muslims. The second half of the 19th century also witnessed the puritan movements in Bengali Islam under the aegis of the Anjuman societies which tried to remove wha t they found as the traces of syncretic elements in the local Islam. The wave of Wahabi movement had already made inroads in the region. The area under the direct influence of the Wahabis during the early decades of the century were the districts of Barasat and Nadia. 3 However, one finds that gradually there were movements of the Wahabi leaders into the eastern part of the province. Maulana Imaduddin of Sadullapur, Noakhali, who

W.W. Hunter, Statistical Account, p. 24. Ibid. Also see, Webster, East Bengal and Assam District Gazetteers Noakhali f Allahabad, 1911, p. 39. "Vast majority of the Shekh (Muslim cultivators) and lower sections of the community are descended from the aboriginal races of the district." Ibid. 3 Narahari Kavirajf Wahabi and Farazi Rebels of Bengal, New Delhi, 1982, p. 62. See! District Census Report Noakhali f 1961, Karachi, 1962, pp. 1-25. 1

2

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was an associate of Syed Ahmed of Rai Bareily (who preached Wahab ism and led the Wahabi army against the British) came to Noakhali after the defeat of the Wahabis in the battle of Balakot (1850), and propagated their doctrines among the Muslims of Noakhali and Tippera 4 Maulana Keramat Ali, who was married in Chunua village of Noakhali, and "wielded great influence in Faridpur and Backerganj" also propagated the message of Islam with renewed fervour. 5 His influence on the society is described, as late as 1961, in these words: The influence ofMoulana Keramat Ali in the reorientation and rejuvenation of religious thoughts and beliefs and performances ofNoakhaliMuslims has been profound and lasting. Moulana Keramat Ali taught the essence of Islam and the country-side was swept with an urge for practising in every-day life what Islam stood for. People found in his teachings the true values of Islam and rallied round his banner for self-less service to the humanity. Each household became a stronghold of Islamic culture and prayers, fasting, Zakat and Haj were made the pillars of their activities.' The Farazi movement, which can be called as indigenous to Bengal and had a very strong rural and peasant component, had also influenced the peasants of Noakhali and the surrounding areas of Tippera. 7 Hazi Shariatullah was the person who strengthened the Farazi tradition in the areas The streams of Wahabi and Farazimovements constituted whatwe know as the reform movement that swept across these parts of Bengal in the second half of the 19th century. Thus, the area though tucked in a corner of the easternmost part of British India, had witnessed two of the most powerful movements that influenced the future course of history of the country in general and the people practicing Islam in particular.

Khaled Masuke Rasul, Noakhalir Lok Sahitye Lok Jiboner Parichay (Reflection of Folk life in the Folk Literature of Noakhali), Dhaka, 1992, p. 27. 5 Ibid., pp. 27-28. 6 District Census Report, Noakhali, 1961, pp. 1-21. Keramat Ali, it appears from all sources, was representing the Wahabi opinion in the region. See also, Narahari Kaviraj, Wahabi and Farazi Rebels, pp. 101-102. 7 Khaled Masuke Rasul, Noakhalir Lok Sahitye, p. 26. 8 Ibid.; also see, Narahari Kaviraj, Wahabi and Farazi Rebels, pp. 63-66, 100. 4

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Talking about the impact of these movements, people have seen them in terms of their revivalist tendencies. Narhari Kaviraj is of the view that lithe Wahabi and the Farazis were tvvo separate streams in the Muslim revivalist movement in Bengal, side by side".9 On the other hand historians also have tried to see in these movements the seeds of later day development of a strong tie of unity among the Muslim population in Bengal. These reform movements, as Rafiuddin Ahmed argues, also saw the propagation by the Anjuman societies, which vehemently attacked the syncretic elements in the socio-culturallife of rural Bengal and tried to "rid Islam of all that they considered spurious accretion, including much that was revered by the orthodox". This added to Wahabi puritanism already arrived on the scene. Rafiuddin Ahmed links this to the social changes and asp ira tions of a section to claim superior status of Ashraf. He argues thatthe clue to the "ties of understanding between the Ashraf and the Atrap and the emergence in rural Muslim society of a sense of identity, which included the distant patricians, were developments of the late 19th century".10 liThe reform movements"f he arguesf Ilhow_ ever limited in their direct impact, acted as a catalyst in all these and helped bring Muslim masses with Ashraf aspirations, although the elitist competition for loaves and fishes of office or jobs had nothing to do with their immediate problems" l! How far the religious reforms affected the social movement is still a question to be examined in the context of the region. One thing, however, can be said is that by the end of the century and even in the 20th century, the area had a very strong presence of popular religiosity of the people. This struck even the occasional visitors in the early years of the 20th century1 2 This fact is Narahari Kaviraj, Wahabi and Farazi Rebels, p. 99. Rafiuddin Ahmed, The Bengal Muslims 1871-1906: A Quest for Identity, Delhi, 1981, pp. 37-38. 11 Ibid. 12 Apart from the normal religious symbols, visitors often came across some novel experiences in Noakhali. An assistant settlement officer, himself a Muslim, experienced a new facet of Noakhali life. "Not once but several times/' writes W.H. Thomspon, "he had instances in which two venerable Muhammedans in their own village before all their acquaintances had sworn the exact opposite on the Koran". See, W.H. Thompson, Final Report on the Survey and Settlement in the District of Noakhali, 1914-1919, Calcutta, 1929, p.29.

9

10

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indicated by writers even in the 1960s and as late as the 1980s. In the 1961 census, the observer reported about the area in these words: Traditionally, therefore, religion plays a very important part in the conduct and behaviour of the Muslims of Noakhali and is a very real thing to them. Prayers are punctually offered by most of them at the appointed times. Every village has its own mosque and it is rarely that one can find a grown up adult not responding the call of prayers (the Azan) .... Maulavis and Hafizes (those who have committed the Quran by heart) form a very large section of the community and they run a number of private madarasas. Noakhali Maulavis proudly claim to have kept the banner of Islamic learning flying in all corners of the province for generationsY Writing on the popular culture and life in Noakhali, a writer recently observed that the most striking fact about Noakhali's society is Islam, and the ways it influences the life of the people in this district. 14 Historians have also linked the lower incidence of violence in that society to the predominance of religion.!S Independent researches have also confirmed that the crime rate in this district was relatively lower than other districts 16 In fact, the contemporary sources reveal that the predominance of Wahabi and Farazi movements in the district did not create situa tions of communal violence. This brings us to a new problem. If, even in the days ofWahabi and Farazi ascendance f Noakhali did not witness conditions of violence against a particular communityf then how do we explain the extent and nature of violence during the winter of 1946? If one

District Census Report, Noakhali, 1961, p. 1-21. Khaled Masuke Rasul, Noakhalir Lok Sahitye, pp. 26-28. 15 Taj ul-Islam Hashmi, Pakistan as a Peasant Utopia: The Communalisation of Class Politics in East Bengal 1920-1947, Boulder, 1992, pp. 192-93; 252-53. 16 A comparative study of the crime rate of different districts of pre-partition Bengal will also be a valuable aid to analyse the agrarian structure, levels of violence, etc. Such a study for an earlier period brings out the fact that Noakhali, indeed, had a lower rate of crime and even political violence, in comparison to most of the other districts in the province. See, Bazlur Rahman Khan, Politics in Bengal, 1927-36, Dhaka, 1987, Appendices. 13 14

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accepts that the Ilfolk Islam"f or what is termed as the rural or little tradition of Islam by sociologists and social anthropologists, of rural Bengal with its syncretism (targeted by the Wahabis and other organized efforts to prune its un-Islamic practices) gradually followed the puritan or orthodox direction of what Ernest Gellner calls "high Islam", then one can suggest that the reform movements acted as catalysts in accelerating this societal movementY The Wahabi as well as the Farazi movements had a strong kernel of revivalism and fundamentalism. Despite claims by some authors that movements like the Farazi had a strong component of class consciousnessf the movements themselves clearly showed that sectarianism and revivalism were such strong components in their philosophy that they represented neither the whole community nor a class. If the history of Noakhali were to be studied from the point of view of Hindu/Muslim history (for tha t matter like the history of Pakistan is studied by some, or the land wars of the 18th and 19th century by Christopher Bayly), then the 1946 riot could be explained as the culmination of the struggle that the suppressed class and community had been waging since earlier times. This will vindicate the position of those historians who see the movements of the Farazis and Wahab is as representative of the pre-history of Pakistan.!S This is because they represented the struggle of the Muslims for their liberation from Hindu domination. 19 In the same veinf therefore f See, Ernest Gellner, Postmodernism, Reason and Religion, for an interesting discussion along this line. 18 Azizur Rahman Mallick, British Policy and the Muslims in Bengal (17571856), Dhaka, 1961; Muin-ud-din Ahmad Khan, History of the Faraizi Movement in Bengal (1818-1906), Karachi, 1965; A History of the Freedom Movement (1707-1947), 4 Vols, Karachi, 1960. 19 The Noakhali riots, according to this line of enquiry, would represent the conjuncture of the Muslim attack on Hindus because the latter had prevented the unity of Islam in the shape of Pakistan. The fallacy of this treatment becomes apparent in the context of the Noakhali riots of 1946, because, in the month of October 1946, it was not the "religious agenda" of Ghulam Sarwar which was the determining factor but the overdetermination of communalism. Ghulam Sarwar, who had been fighting the League, at this point, accepted the agenda of the Muslim League, i.e., communalism. What gave the riot its character was definitely the fact that it was the surrender of the religious leaders and their fundamentalist and revivalist positions to the communal 17

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the genesis of the N oakhali riots could be seen as the logical culmination of the Ilmarch of history"f or an inherent cultural clash"f if one accepts the contention of historians like Hossainur Rahman, who says, II

... Hindu Muslim conflict was not merely a religious one in the western sense of the word; it was cultural as well, the protest of an alien civilisa tion, which could only be reconciled by new synthesis. However, the reverse happened: their entire antagonistic characteristic dormant for generations were quickened to new life by Hindu and Muslim leaders." However, the Noakhali society did not display the kind of inter-communal conflict and violence in the 20th century, which the other parts of the province had demonstrated. This suggests that the penetration of the Wahabi and Farazi traditions, which manifested themselves in the religiosity of the people, was not conducive to communal violence. Wherein, then, lies the explana tion for the exceptional na ture of communal violence tha t took place in 1946?

agenda of the League. Thus, the Noakhali riots is a pointer to the situation when religious fundamentalism surrenders before communalism or gets mixed with it and provides justification for the latter's violence. Simultaneously, the riot cannot be studied through the framework of "religious history" or "history of Islam", as it would do injustice to the historical context and at the same time would uncritically accept the idea of the inevitability of cultural conflict expressed most unhistorically by the conservatives like Samuel Huntington. He writes, "The fault line between civilisations will be the battle line of the future.. The most important conflict of the future will occur along the cultural fault line separating these civilisations from one another." Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash of Civilisation?", Foreign Affairs, VoL 72, No.3, 1993, pp.22-49. 20 Hossainur Rahman, Hindu Muslim Relations in Bengat 1905-1947. A Study in Cultural Confrontation, Bombay, 1974, p. 97. It is, therefore, not very difficult to understand why it is ultimately the "civilisational difference" which is forwarded as the determining factor for the establishment of Pakistan. Khalid B. Sayeed, for example, says, "perhaps a dominant or decisive cause of Pakistan is that there has never taken place a confluence of the two civilisations in India-the Hindus and the Muslims. They may have meandered towards each other, but on the whole the two have followed their separate ways". See, Khalid B. Sayeed, Pakistan: The Formative Phase, London, 1968, p. 9.

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The roots of this lay not in the backwardness of the region, revivalist movements or aggravation of the economic conditions themselves. These only provided the material and ideological background. !tmay be suggested that the clue to the violence is found in the ideology of communalism, and the politics based on it.

I W.W. Hunter described the western district of Chittagong division, Noakhali, in 1876 in these terms: The present limits of the districtofNoakhali contain population of 961,319 inhabitants and an area of 1852.18 square miles. The principal civil station which is also the chief town of the district is Sudharam of Noakhali, situated in 22°48'N and 91°6'E. The word Noakhali, which is never applied to the station, but only to the entire district, is taken from the name of a Khal or na tural watercourse, which passes through the town of Sudharam and runs southwards into Meghna. Noakhali is bounded on the north by the district of Tipper a and the state of hill Tippera and the district of Chittagong and by the eastern mouth of Meghna, known as Sandwip (Sandip) channel; on the south by the bay of Bengal and on the West by the main stream of Meghna. 21 The features that characterized the predominantly agrarian society of East Bengal were typical of Noakhali and Tippera, i.e, mainly Muslim small-holding peasants and scattered uppercaste Hindu rent-collecting and moneylending groups.22 The bulk of the peasantry had rights of occupancy raiyats and was not sharply differentiated (at least till the survey of 1910). What differentiated the agrarian structure of N oakhali was tha t the Hindu high caste landed gentry had a relatively weaker presence here than elsewhere in the province. 23 There were also lesser numbers of landlord agents here than anywhere else in the province." There was, W.W. Hunter, Statistical Account, VoL VI, p. 23. Sugata Bose, Agrarian Bengal, pp. 183-84. 23 Ibid., p. 184. 24 Settlement Report, Noakhali, 1930-31, Calcutta, 1932, p. 25, as quoted in ibid. 21

22

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however, a substantial population of untouchables and depressed castes both in Noakhali and Tippera. 25 Noakhali and Tippera were centres of radical peasant agitation since the 1920s. The area had responded to Gandhi's NonCo-operation movement and produced some exceptional mass leaders like Muniruzzaman Islamabadi and Ashrafuddin Ahmad Choudhury-some of the staunch anti-colonial critics in the province." Predominantly a jute growing district, Tippera was hard hit by the depression in the 1930s, and this had the impact of radicalizing the peasant agitation, which at this time began to take on strong organizational shape as manifested by the crystallization of the Krishak Samities in the district. While the pro-Congress and pro-Krishak Proja Samiti peasant groups came into prominence under Maulvi Ashrafuddin Ahmed Choudhury and Abdul Malek, the groups under Asimuddin and Yaqub Ali showed communist sympathies. 27 Leadership was mostly in the hands of the Maulavis and the religious leaders, a reflection of the religious texture of the society. Noakhali, also a jute producing centre, was hit by the depression which created conditions for radical peasant agitation in the 1930s. In this region, we come across Krishak Samiti factions of Rashid Ahmed, and of Ghulam Sarwar and Muhammad Fazlullah respectively. Quite significantly, the major issue here was Iidebt settlement". Ghulam Sarwar emerged as the most prominent voice. He gave vent to his strong anti-Congress utterings and expressed his distaste for Fazlul Huq's supposedly pro-Congress feelings." In Noakhali too the leadership was in the hands of the religious leaders. In the 1937 elections, Tippera Krishak Samiti won five out of the 10 seats in Tippera. 29 The pro-Congress peasant leaders like Maulavi Ashrafuddin Ahmed Choudhury and Mukhleswar Rahman were disqualified by the colonial authorities from taking part in the elections. 30 On the other hand, four out of six winners f

W.W. Hunter, Statistical Account, p. 23. Chandiprasad SarkarI The Bengali Muslims, fn. 224, p. 143. v Sugata Bose, Agrarian Bengal, p. 202. 28 Ibid., p. 203. 29 Humaira Momen, Muslim Politics in Bengal, p. 65. 30 The colonial authorities had much to worry about the activities of Ashrafuddin, who had been leading the "mass--contact programme" of the 25

26

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in N oakhali namely, Md. Ibrahim, Ghulam Sarwar, Syed Ahmed Khan and Abdur Rezak were local Samiti activists. 3 ! Significantly, they were also part of the influential section of ulama in the region. Those activists whose activities the authorities thought as antagonistic to their interests were always prevented from participating in the political arena in the region. Therefore, the colonial authorities clamped down upon the activities of Syed Ahmed, who had shown an inclination towards the Congress. 32 It seems that there was a congruence in the area of operation of the extremist factions of the Noakhali Krishak Samiti and that of extreme communal rioting in 1946.33 The corollary to this argument is that an extreme peasant consciousness (read classconsciousness) was transformed into an extreme communal identity (communal consciousness). Drawing the argument up till 1946, is it possible to argue that the Noakhali riots was primarily a peasant uprising in which religion played an important role? It has been argued that in almost all peasant wars, religion and religious symbols have played an important role. 34 But, in the case of the Noakhali riots, there was nothing to indicate that the rioting crowd was fighting an agrarian battle by using religious symbols. There were hardly any demand or uniqueness about the rioting crowdf which may be termed as Ilpeasane'f or demonstrating grievances of the peasantry vis-a.-vis the landlords. 35 The

Congress in the district quite successfully. See, Bengal Congress Committee to Congress Mass Contact Committee, 16 August 1946, Rajendra Prasad Papers, File No. IX/36/31, as cited in Sugata Bose, Agrarian Bengal, p. 207. 31 Ibid., p. 207. 32 Ibid., p. 209. 33 Sugata Bose writes, "The extreme wing of the Krishak Movement was especially influential in Ramganj, Lakshmipur and Raipur Thanas [which became the scenes of the Noakhali riots of 1946]. (Ibid., p. 204.) 34 See Janos M. Bak and Gerhard Benecke eds, Religion and Rural Revolt, Manchester, 1984. 35 Sugata Bose links the riot to economic distress and sees it as a breakdown of the symbiotic relations, which had been holding the peasant society together. The commilllal violence of 1946, for him, was the result of the continued economic dislocation that became acute with the depression of 1930s and continued thereafter. This had the effect of squeezing the "credit" available to the peasants, thereby affecting their day to day existence. The economic distress was aggravated by the war and the famine resulting in

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attacks fully demonstrate that the identity of the victims zeroed in upon was,not as landlords or gentry, butas Hindus-"Was this because of the "inadequacy of the peasant communal ideology" as Partha Chatterjee suggests, "to provide an adequate perceptual guide for the identification of friends and enemies in a situation of rapid agrarian change"?37 A study of the politics and protest in Noakhali and Tippera located within a historical context however presents a more complex picture. The districts had suffered tremendously during the 1930s and 1940s. The slump in the jute market had the effect of drying up of the traditional channels of credit in the predominantly jute growing districts of northern and eastern Bengal, i.e., Mymensingh, Faridpur, Rangpur, Bogra, Pabna and Tippera. 38 The debt-settlement boards that began operating after 1935 caused a further setback. Noakhali, which also had a substantial jute growing area, witnessed the stoppage of credit facilities from the f

f

the break up of this symbiotic relationship. This, together with the radical peasant politics in the area, according to Bose, explains the NoakhaliTippera riot. See Sugata Bose, Agrarian Bengal, pp. 181-231. 36 See Part I of this chapter. 37 Partha Chatterjee, "Agrarian Relations and Communalism in Bengal, 1926-35" in Ranajit Guha ed., Subaltern Studies, VoL I, p.37. Since Partha Chatterjee does not accept the category of communalism as a tool of analysis or an ideology to understand peasant behaviour, he is unable to explain why the peasants, labourers and others attacked the landlords, peasants and moneylenders only as Hindus. (He, in fact, will not explain it because for him "communalism" obfuscates any study of the "second domain of politics", i.e., the subaltern leveL) See, Partha Chatterjee, Bengal 1920-47. 38 "The crisis came in 1930 ... the cultivators found themselves unable to meet the ordinary obligations of life. In normal times they would have tided over the crisis by resorting to the village Mahajan but on this occassion this source of supply practically dried up." DM Tippera to Under Secretary, Poll Dept., 26 December 1931, Home Poll Dept., Government of Bengal, Confidential File 849(1-9)/31, as quoted in Sugata Bose, Agrarian Bengal, p. 190. For Bose, the drying up of credit facilities holds the key to understanding the rupture in the peasant society in East Bengal. See, ibid., pp. 190-203. Omkar Goswami also comes to a similar conclusion through his study of the slump in agriculture-jute-in the districts of north and eastern BengaL See Omkar, Goswami, "Agriculture in Slump: the Peasant Economy of East and North Bengal in the 1930s", IESHR, VoL 21, No.3, 1984, pp. 335-60.

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moneylending class. 39 What was crucial here was the fact that there was a significant section of radical peasant agitators who had been demanding total debt remission. 40 A district where the dominant characteristic of the household economy was its Ilperennial indebtedness"f the combined effect of the slump in the jute market, operation of the debt settlement boards, and the radical peasant politics based on the demand of complete debt remission created conditions which adversely hit the sections which needed credit. This found expression in the Iino rent" demand in these districts. 41 The ou tbreak of war in the eastern quarters of India imposed serious hardships on the population of Noakhali and Tippera. The forcible evacuation terribly angered the people." There were 75,000 people from Noakhali and 20,000 from Tippera who, by April 1942, were evacuated out of a total of one-and-half-Iakh people. 43 The situation was made worse by the serving of short notices and in fact, there were cases where only a 48-hour notice had been given. Government help was the last thing which people received, and to complete the picture in Fenif some people were forced to evacuate again. 44 In answer to the question on moneylending, the Noakhali Landholders' Association as well as the Noakhali Bar Association submitted before the Land Revenue Commission that "village moneylending had already disappeared". See, The Bengal Land Revenue Commission Report, Alipore, 1940, VoL IV, p. 339; Vol. VI, p.286. 40 The struggle for control over the Krishak Samities in Noakhali, particularly in the area of Lakshmipur and Ramganj thanas, led to the emergence of leaders like Ghulam Sarwar Hussaini and Syed Ahmed, both of whom had a "close connection with organised armed dacoity". (See Sugata Bose, Agrarian Bengal, p. 208.) The extremist section led by Ghulam Sarwar demanded complete debt remission. 41 There was an attack on Rajendralal Roy Choudhury's house. Later, in a meeting held illlder the Presidency of M.H. Ali, the district magistrate of Noakhali, Ghulam Sarwar, MLA, at the request of the DM, asked the audience to pay the rent and other legal dues. See, Star of India, Calcutta, 20 February 1940, p. 3. 42 Kshitish Chandra RoychoudhillY, Gopal Haldar, Parimal Mazumdar and Rasomoy Mazumdar (Congress workers) of Noakhali to AICC (hereafter Kshitish Chandra Roychoudhury), AICC Papers, File No. G-31 (Part II), 1942. p. 69. 43 Prafulla Ghosh to Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, 24.4.1942, ibid., File No. G-31 (Pt. 11). 1942. p. 28. 44 Ibid., p.31. 39

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People had to practically carry their belongings on their heads. 45 Instances of oppression by the police, and atrocities committed by the military during the evacuation and afterwards were numerous. Harassment of villagers and molestation of women became a common feature. Some such incidents took place in the villages of Alokdiya and Chunua, which caused great consternation. In Alokdiya, a soldier attempted to molest Ameena Kha toon, wife of a villager, Ahsanullah. Later on the soldier killed Ahsanullah. Amena Khatoon's later narrated the incident in her testimony: All of a sudden I felt a pull from behind and turned to find another soldier pulling me by hand. I raised a cry and attempted to strike the man with the daw in my hand ... the soldier... chased my husband to the sou tho A short while after I heard the sound of the gunshot and came to learn ... that my husband had been shot dead by the soldier.46 The incident at Chunua village also involved the molestation of women. K.K. Dutta, whom the BPCC sent to enquire into the matter, found "the people very much agitated" but they were, as he said, determined to resist any such aggression". 47 In Feni, about 20,000 labourers engaged in the construction of a road for the Military went on a strike to protest against these oppressions and atrocities. 48 Kamini Kumar Dutta,M.L.C., and a respected Congress leader, in his report to the Secretary, BPCC, described one of many such instances of viola tion, II

These girls (Ayesha Khatun, aged 16 and Punjaberenesa, age 15) are son's wife and sister's daughter of one Abbas Ali Chaukidar, an old man. This old Chaukidar in tears did give the pitiable story to me. He told me that the girls wanted to run away when the alarm was raised of the raid by the soldiers but he advised them to remain inside assuring that as he was a Chaukidar in uniform the soldier will not molest his family

Ibid., p. 30. Ibid., File No. G-28 (Part II), 1942, p. 513. 47 K.K. Dutta, M.L.e. to Secretary, BPCC, 23.4.1942, ibid., File No. G-31 (Pa,' II), 1942, pp. 43-55. 48 Kshitish Chandra Roychoudhury et al., p. 69.

45

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members. But he was disillusioned when he was forcibly removed from his house and the girls were raped ... 49 The collapse of civil authority and the imposition of press censorship aggravated the woes of the people. The frustration of the inhabitants of the area found expression in the letter of these Congress wor kers: Minor incidents of soldiers' zoolum, of course, are very common .... The situation in the Feni subdivision is very serious .... We appeal to all Indian leaders to take up the cause ofFeni. We appeal to Sm!. Naidu, Sm!. AmritKaur and Begum Shah Nawaz to take up the cause of Indian womanhood. We approach particularly to Gandhi. .. and only Gandhiji's strong and just pen can possibly help in the matter, make the government realise the gravity of the question. 5il The local political workers earnestly appealed to the national leaders to come to redress the grievances of the local people. 51 However, before the leadership could react to these appeals, Gandhi gave the Quit India call. The suppression of the Congress and the other groups who supported the Quit India movement was as complete in the province as it was throughout the country.52 Further, at this juncture, the province was face to face with the devastating famine. Noakhali and Tippera, being deficit districts, were affected from the very beginning. Both the unavailability of rice as well as the soaring prices of rice and paddy affected the districts. 53 The commandeering of boats by the British in Tippera,

KK Dutta to Secretary, BPCC, 23.4.1942, ibid., p. 55. Kshitish Chandra Roychoudhury, et al. 51 Ibid. 52 See, RRM, 1943, Intelligence Branch, File No. SS-II. 53 Even those areas where evacuation did not take place were now hit badly. In this case, therefore, it appears that we have to accept the contention that along with the crisis in "entitlement", though here it was primarily due to the inflationary side of the famine, "food availability" (see Alamgir, 1984) was also an extremely important factor. See, Omkar Goswami, "The Bengal Famine of 1943: Re Examining the Data", IESHR, Vol. 27, No.4, OctoberDecember 1990, pp. 335-64. 49

5()

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Noakhali and other coastal areas had seriously hampered the movement of foodgrain. 54 Here even personal mode of communication was seized by the authorities. Prafulla Ghosh who was in touch of wha t was happening, in fact, warned the leadership that the commandeering policy might lead to extreme food scarcity. The extent of the British fear of Japanese advance could be seen in the seizure of even bicycles. "In Camilla town, bicycles were seized. The first bicycles seized were that of Dr Nripendranath Basu, General Secretary, District Congress Committee."55 The districts of Noakhali and Tippera soon became the worst hit regions, and in Noakhali, the three police stations areas of Begumganj, Lakshmipur and Ramganj were the most adversely affected, especially Lakshmipur. 56 A sample study of the effects offamine on the population of 10 villages in the most adversely affected western part of the district, i.e., the police station areas of Begamganj, Ramganj, and Lakshmipur, by an anthropologist, showed that some of the effects of the famine were far more crucial than those factors that had been shaping the peasant society of Noakhali prior to its outbreak. It showed that the period between March and December 1943 witnessed an increase in indebtedness, loss of property and changes in the occupation of certain groups of population, which exceeded the rate of change during the period 1939-43.57 The national leadership of the Congress had already launched the Quit India movement to protest against the colonial apathy and, in fact, insensitivity to the suffering of the Indians. The happenings in N oakhali and Chitta gong demonstrated the necessity of addressing this attitude of the British. Bengal was the worst hit as a result of the war, the famine and the subsequent epidemic that ravaged the region. And in almost every situation, the role of the colonial regime (or lack of it) was obvious. But instead of an anti-colonial upsurge, 1946 saw the outbreak of a communal riot of acute intensity. Where does the explanation lie? f

Prafulla Ghosh to Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru, 24 April 1942, AICC Papers, File No. G-31 (Part II), p. 32. 55 Ibid., p. 33. 56 Ram Krishna Mukherji, "Effect of the Food Crisis of 1943 on the Rural Population of Noakhali, Bengal", in Science and Culture, Vol. 10, No.5, November 1944, pp. 185-91; Vol. 10, No.6, December 1944, pp. 231-38. 57 Ibid., p. 185. 54

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It may be suggested that the answer lies in the nature of politics

in the region. These districts had been the arena of a sturdy Krishak movement since the 1920s and the leadership of the Maulavis and ulamas was quite prominent. But this movement was soon embroiled in provincial politics. And here, the ideological presence of nationalism and communalism became important. The beginning of 1940 saw strong Iino rent" demonstrations by the peasants in the area over which Ghulam Sarwar's leadership held sway, i.e., Lakshmipur, Begumganj and Ramganj.58 There were even attacks on the household of a prominent landlord. 59 The changes in politics may be attributed to this liquidity crunch which the peasants were suffering from. The period between 1941 and 1943, when the Muslim League ministry was not in power, witnessed an intense struggle between the Muslim League and the KPP in a bid to capture political space. The intensity of the antagonism that prevailed in the area between the two parties can be gleaned from the official description: On 10 January 1942 Nazimuddin and his colleagues went to Noakhali where a black flag demonstration against them was organised by some people. The volunteers of Muslim League under the leadership of Maulavi Mujibur Rahman, Secretary, Noakhali District Muslim League, tried to snatch the black flag .... As retaliation when the Chief Minister went to Noakhali, the students and the Muslim League workers behaved disgracefully. Maulavi Mujibur Rahman issued an objectionable leaflet which was a political squib attacking the coalition partyw The arrest of Sarat Chandra Bose when he was all set to enter an alliance with Fazlul Huq had forced the latter to join hands with Shyama Prasad Mookerjee. This was a crucial shift which facilitated his being branded a pro-Hindu as well as his party, unable to serve either class or community interests. This lifight for

Star of India, Calcutta, 20 February 1940, p.3. Ibid. 6() Government of Bengal, Home Political, File No. 96/42, as quoted in Shila Sen, Muslim Politics in Bengal, Delhi, 1974, p.152. In fact, there were reports of "Mohammedan villages being poisoned with communalism" as early as in January 1939. See Harendra Kumar Sur, 16 March 1939, PBLA, VoL LIV, 58 59

No.3, pp. 419-20.

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space" within Muslim politics given the logic of communalism invariably meant heightening the anti-Hindu attack, because only then could the League justify its claim to be the only authentic voice of the Muslims. 61 This becomes clearer from a subsequent communication of the district magistrate who wrote: f

f

He then accused me of taking strong action against the Muslim League leaders of this place and said that he had a discussion with the Governor about them. I told him that action had been taken in the district where it was necessary as the localleaders of Muslim League were propagating class hatred and communal passion in connection with their propaganda. He [Suhrawardy] said that the policy of the Muslim League was not to quarrel with the Hindus and that their entire quarrel was with Fazlul Huq. I told him if that was so, why did Sir Nazimuddin allow Khan Bahadur Abdul Gafoor, the President of the Dis!. League to make a highly communal speech. I also mentioned to him that the Secretary of the District Muslim League, MaulaviMujibur Rahman, Mukhtar had issued highly One major ingredient of the politics of Communalism is to demand complete political allegiance of the followers-a point which brings communalism closer to fascism as an ideology, as well as "a politics" based on it. For a discussion on different manifestations of fascist ideology, see Zeev Sternhell, "Fascist Ideology" in Walter Laquer ed., Fascism A Reader's Guide, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1976; James Gregor, The Ideology of Fascism: The Rationale of Totalitarianism, New York, 1969; Jeremy Noaks, The Nazi Party in Lower Saxony, London, 1971; Ernst Nolte, Three Phases of Fascism Action, Italian Fascism, National Socialism, Chicago, San Francisco, 1966; and Noel O'Sullivan, Fascism, London and Melbourne, 1983. There are problems in studying and analysing communalism within the fascist paradigm, an issue that has been raised by Achin Vanaik. (See, Achin Vanaik, "Situating Threat of Hindu Nationalism: Problems with Fascist Ideology", EPW, 19 July 1994, pp. 1729-48.) But a comparative study of communalism and fascism as ideologies which shape organization of parties, i.e., communal parties, shows that there are striking similarities between the structure of the fascist parties in Italy, Spain and France, the Nazi Party in Germany and the parties in question in the present study. The colonial context was what made the biggest contextual difference. Studying communalism as well as fascism as ideologies manifesting societal context and contemporary politics will definitely be helpful in contextualizing as well as anlaysing communalism too. For a strong advocacy of studying national socialism as an ideology, see Lucy Davidowicz, The Holocaust and The Historians , Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1981. 61

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inflammatory pamphlet attacking not merely the Hon. Chief Minister, but the Hindu religion, Hindu Culture, and Society .... Mr Suhrawardy had then to admit that these leaders had gone to some excess. 62 (italics mine) While the bureaucracy did not actively support the League, it did turn a blind eye to its anti-Huq tirade. The chief minister himself resented this attitude of his officers as he discerned the strong anti-Hindu aspect of it. Fazlul Huq wrote: During the last seven months, the leaders of the Muslim League have had the greatest latitude in carrying on their propaganda throughout the province .... In each meeting atrocious lies have been circulated about me and my cabinet generally. The sympathy of the Muslim officers for this anti-Hindu propaganda is well known and well established. 63 It was at this juncture when the area was already under severe crisis due to the evacuation army atrocities and floods that the famine appeared on the scene and by March 1943, it was a full-fledged reality.64 In a move of great significance, the Fazlul Huq ministry was dismissed and the Muslim League was asked to form the new ministry. Apart from its other manifestations, the famine also had an inflationary aspect. Ramkrishna Mukherjee who was in Noakhali in December 1943, wrote: f

f

f

D.O.C. 217C, dated 4 February 1942, from IN. :Mitra, District Magistrate to O.M. Martin, Commissioner, Chitta gong, Government of Bengal, Home Political, File No. 96/42, as quoted in Shila Sen, "Muslim Politics in Bengal, 1937-47", Ph.D. Thesis, IN.U., 1975, p. 219, fn. 104. 63 Fazlul Huq was very agitated and he "WTote to the Chief Secretary about it: 62

I know that officials are League minded and I do not mind saying so very frankly to you. But as a Minister in charge of the Home department, I have had to resent very much the manner in which my administration is being flouted by even responsible officers. I am not making this remark on accOilllt of what had happened at Noakhali but this is my general impression. (Government of Bengal, Home Political, File No. 328/42, as cited in ibid., p.222.) 54

Amrit Bazar Patrika, Calcutta, see issues of 20-25 March, 1943.

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... we can understand why these people were so much affected by the food crisis. In 1943 the prices of the food stuffs, specially of rice, began to soar up at a tremendous rate while these people could neither be provided from their small holdings nor could they manage to buy the necessities from their meagre income. The result was that those who had some assets began to sell them and those who had not such things or had lost them already either starved and faced the natural consequence of death or became sick and invalid or took to begging and depending on charity to maintain their physical existence any how. 65 People starved on the one hand because there was no rice to eat, and on the other because some sections did not have sufficient wherewithal to buy rice. 66 It is this particular aspect of the economy of Noakhali and Tippera that has to be studied more carefully. Though out of the scope of this volume, we will try to examine some of these features in greater detail. The outbreak of war and the resultant conditions in the market prompted the jute industry to induce the government to fix the prices of jute, which the jute growers constantly complained was very 10w. 67 The famine situation with its inflationary effect resulted in a further drop in price. 68 Representatives of jute growing districts constantly demanded a higher price for raw jute. 69 Tippera, being a jute-growing district, was significantly affected. The low prices of the cash crop further impinged on the peasant household economy because of the simultaneous rise in the price of foodstuff, which increased the gap between the revenue from agricultural products and the expenditure on foodstuffs. Noakhali, neighbouring Tippera, also revealed that the peasant's household economy which was characterized by Ramkrishna Mukherjee, Effects of Food Crisis of 1943, p. 232. Ibid. 67 See, Suhrawardy's admission of the fact that in June 1943 the Indian Jute :Mill Association (IJMA) had fixed a maximum price for raw jute which the Government of Bengal considered low, and had approached the Government of India to bring the price up to a level of parity with the price of manufactured goods. (Suhrawardy, 1 February 1944, PBLA, VoL LXVII, No.1, p. 20.) The manufacturers, however, did not increase the prices as they reasoned that the shortage of coal supply had forced them to close a number of mills-an argument that the chief minister did not contest. 68 Ibid., VoL LXVI, No.2, pp.250-55. 69 See, PBLA, 9 February 1944, VoL LXVII, No.2, pp. 320-25. 65 66

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deficits, regularly forced him to take recourse to loans from the moneylending classes. 70 However there was a rapid recession of moneylending in the area due to the combined effects of peasant agitation, formation of debt settlement boards and demands for total remission of debt. The under-raiyats and the agricultural labourers were the most seriously affected sections of the populationn The famine worsened this situation. Mukherjee's sample survey indicated a significant increase in the percentage of outstanding loans incurred mainly to meet the expenditure on food stuff in the period between March 1943 and December 1943, without any concomitant increase in their income to meet this increased expenditure. 72 The calamity had brought moneylending back, but now the lending class wanted a solid security. On the other hand, mortgages would not result in the liquidity necessary to buy foodstuff in a tyrannically inflated market-only a sale would accomplish this. As a result, there was a rapid transfer of landholdings during this period. 73 Thus there was an immense change in the peasant economy of Noakhali and Tippera as the economy of subsistence was acutely hit. This, however, did not constitute a change in Noakhali' s basic agrarian structure. Along with this process, there was the effort of the Muslim League to entrench itself in the area by means of the relief work which it provided as a part of its governmental responsibilities. It was, therefore, not just a coincidence that the leaders from the area, i.e., Ghulam Sarwar, Abdur Rezzak, began to attack the ministry in the strongest terms from the beginning of 1944.74 He accused the ministry of utilizing the relief work for its propaganda activity.75 By March 1944, with the famine situation no longer a pressing problem, Ghulam Sarwar's declamations against the ministry reached a crescendo, and by the end of f

f

Report of Land Revenue Commission (Food Commission), Government Press, Alipore, 1940, VoL V, pp. 536-85. 71 Ibid., pp. 577-81. 72 Ramkrishna Mukherjee, Effects of Food Crisis of 1943, p. 190. 73 Mukherjee in his survey in the two police stations of Noakhali after the famine, indicates this. See Ramkrishna Mukherjee, Effects of Food Crisis of 1943, p. 187. 74 PBLA, VoL LXIX, No.2, pp. 205-6, 252, 487. 75 See, Ghulam Sarwar, 16 March 1944, ibid., Vol. LXIX, No.2, pp. 205-6. 70

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the year he pulled out all the stops in his war against the Muslim League. This was incidentally the time when the League was at the peak of its mobilization drive." The issues that the League raised such as secondary education and the applicability of the CR Formula had caught the imagination of a substantial number of people. 77 It was at this time that the split in the local Muslim League, on the issue of elections to the district board, occurred." We are informed that the League went on a reorganizing drive soon after, beginning with the suspension of the persons involved in the split. 79 What is interesting here is the line of attack chosen by Ghulam Sarwar to retain his political hegemony, and the Muslim League's counter offensive. Sarwar belonged to a Pir family.so A report on him describes him in these terms: There one Mr Gholam Sarwar, an ex M.L.A., started against the Hindu rich men. As far as we know he belonged to a Pir family and has about 35000 disciples. He is an ex-M.L.A. having been a member of the KPP in the last Assembly and this time also he stood for election as a candidate for the same Party opposing the League candidateS! In the 1930s, he emerged as a radical peasant leader in the district. His area of activity comprised of the police sta tions areas See, Chapter 1 this volume, for a discussion on the theme. There were demonstrations staged in Noakhali on the issue of Secondary Education Bill in which people supported the ministry. See, Star of India, Calcutta, 15 May 1944, p. 3. 78 FR, January, second half, 1945, Home Political, File No. 18/1/45. 79 Ibid. 80 Further Report by Secretary, BPCC, AICC Papers, File No. P-5, 1946, p. 121. 81 Ibid. Alec Reid, who visited Noakhali in February 1949, described Ghulam Sarwar and his area of influence. About Sarwar he said: 76

77

Sayed Gulam Sarwar Hussaini, Pir of Daira Shariff, Dhampur, Noakhali. That is what he calls himself, for the sake of brevity let me simply refer to him as Gulam Sarwar by which name he has been most widely known in Bengal these past two years. (Reid, Alec, "The Mission of Gulam Sarwar: What Price Justice in East Bengal?", The Hindustan Times, Delhi, 22 March 1949, as quoted in G.D. Khosla, Stern Reckoning: A Survey of Events Leading Upto and Following the Partition of India, Delhi, 1989, Note III, Appendix I, p. 309.)

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of Ramganj, Begumganj and Lakshmipur." He demanded complete remission of debts. Through the Krishak Samiti organ Krishak Vani, he propagated his idea of" elimination ofMahajan elements from Debt Settlement boards", and he even urged the cultivators to give evidence collectively against the police in dacoity cases. He later on entered into electoral politics while retaining his IISamities as a separate movement".83 With the onslaught of the famine, his attack against the Muslim League took an extreme turn. On 27 March 1944, he accused the ministry of being responsible for the famine, and regretted the fact that he did not support Fazlul Huq against the Muslim League. 84 He used an orthodox plank against the ministry in decrying, along with Abdul Rezzak, its failure to provide sufficient religious education in the primary schools. 85 He even criticized it for putting a ban on the Hindu Mahasabha conference in Lori in Bakerganj district. 86 Sarwar however retained his economistic line of attack against the League, and on this plank he entered into the election fray in 1945-46 as a Muslim Parliamentary Board candidate. His campaign, as a report suggests, Iithough economic in nature naturally degenerated into communalism and the agents of the League took advantage of the situation thus created by the open propagation ofMr Ghulam Sarwar and the whispering propaganda of the natives of Noakhali returning from Calcutta .... "87 The Muslim League's electioneering revolved around the slogan of Pakistan and the invocation of the community's support towards it. 88 It brought the entire campaign into the sensitive arena of Islam, Muslims and Pakistan. The Muslim League candidate Fazlul Karim defeated Ghulam Sarwar by about 20,000 votes in Ramganj and Raipur Muslim rural constituency. He f

f

f

Sugata Bose, Agrarian Bengal, p. 203. Ibid. 84 Ghulam Sarwar, PBLA, 27 March 1944, VoL LXVI, No.3, pp.582-83. 85 Ghulam Sarwar, 13 March 1944, ibid., pp.29-31. The major attack on the ministry was from the other leaders in the area. Abdul Rezak attacked the ministry for its failure to introduce religious education, particularly Quran classes in primary schools. See, ibid., p.26. 86 Ghulam Sarwar, 5 June 1944, ibid., VoL LXVII, No.6, p. 145. 87 Further Report, Secretary BPCC, ibid., p. 121. 88 See, Chapter 2 in this volume. 82 83

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polled 4,642 votes as against 24,336 of the League candidate. 89 The defeat of Ghulam Sarwar, therefore, suggests the defeat of his political stance. On the other hand, the victory of the League shows the strength of the Pakistan demand, and its penetration into the popular psyche. At the same time, however, the antiLeague candidates, mostly those of the Jamait-ul-Ulama-i-Hind and the Muslim Parliamentary Board, fared better than any other candidates opposing the League anywhere in the province. Abdur Rezzak of the Jamait in Feni, Rezzakul Haidar Choudhury of Muslim Parliamentary Board in Noakhali North, and Manzurul Huq Shah of the Jamait in Noakhali West, did better than any non-League candidates in the Muslim seats in the province. This indicates that although they were defeated, they retained a scope for their initiative. 9o Sarwar had opposed the Direct Action day in the area. The Calcutta riot, however, provided him with the opportunity to regain the initiative. Realizing the potential of the ideology of communalism Sarwar abandoned his exclusive economic Le' peasant agenda and became a Leaguer. Around this time, Fazlul Huq had joined the League, which, in a sense, paved the way for Sarwar's entry into the party.9! He brought to the fore the anti-Hindu rhetoric latent in his hitherto anti-landlord and antimoneylender position. His ideas found fertile ground amidst the Muslim population, which was repeatedly reminded by the League that the Hindus were bound to destroy them unless Pakistan was established. By the time the Calcutta riots and the rumours surrounding ithad made forays into the peasant psyche ofNoakhali, the pro-peasant economic content of Sarwar's rhetoric was completely lost into oblivion. When the rioting mobs attacked Shahpur Bazar and the house of Rajendra Lal Roy Choudhury in the region, the ideas of Pakistan, the Muslim League and Islam were the dominant motifs around which the rioting crowd, their tacit supporters and silent spectators had mobilized. f

f

f

Detailed statement showing the result of election to the Bengal Legislative Assembly, Return Showing the Result of Elections to the Central Legislative Assembly and the Provincial Legislatures in 1945-46, Delhi, 1948, No. 157,

89

p. 131. 9()

91

Ibid., No. 155, 158, 160. Jnanada Mohan Guha Ray, AICC Papers, File No. CL-8, 1946, p. 353.

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An explanation for this channelization of the supposedly classbased agitation into a community-based attack lies in an analysis of the political economy of the region. But what defies this mode of explanation is the factthat it was religious hatred that made this riot qualitatively different. Studying it as just a reaction to the Calcutta riot does not explain the elaborate organization and the religious fervour. The mobilization of the entire religious appara tus for a purpose which was either a reaction or as some suggest, an approximate class war made it unique." While absence of a sharp differentiation provided the economic foundation for a solid peasant bonding, religion concretized and cemented that bond in the Noakhali society." Not going into the debate about the different racial characteristics among the Noakhali Muslims, it would suffice to say that religion, i.e., Islam, had a living presence among the Muslims of Noakhali. 94 f

Even the prominent Muslim League minister, Mr Shamsuddin Ahmed, who toured Noakhali, questioned the argument of the riot being a class war. He said, "It had been said that Muslim ryots had retaliated on zamindars. If that was so why then were these forcible conversion". (Hindustan Standard, Calcutta, 10 November 1946, p. 3.) For Partha Chatterjee, 92

the crucial element which deflected peasant agitation into anti-Hindu movements was not that most zamindars were Hindus and that the grievances of the predominantly Muslim tenantry consequently took on anti-Hindu overtones, but the fact that Muslim rent receivers, where they did exist were considered part of the peasant community whereas Hindu zamindars and talukdars were not. (Partha Chatterjee, "Agrarian Relations and Communalism in Bengal 1926-1935" in Ranajit Guha ed., Subaltern Studies, VoL 1, Delhi, 1982, p. 11.) This explanation together with his argument that lack of differentiation (till the onset of depression) of the East Bengal peasantry helped the peasant movement aim against the exploitation of the zamindar's rent, abwabs etc. (see, Partha Chatterjee, "Agrarian Structure in Pre Partition Bengal" in Ashok Sen, Partha Chatterjee and Sugata Mukherjee eds, Perspectives in Social Sciences 2: Three Studies on the Agrarian Structures in Bengal 1850-1947, Delhi, 1982) can explain the Noakhali riots only as a peasants' class war, fought with the help of their notions of community. 93 W.H. Thompson, Final Report on the Survey, p.29. See also, Khaled Masuke Rasul, Noakhalir Lok Sahitye, p. 29. 94 "Muhammedans are not quite the same race as the Muhammedans of other districts .... The bulk of the Muhammedans in Bengal are the descendents of converts from the lower Hindu castes with only a level of the original Muhammedan invaders." (W.H. Thompson, Final Report on the Survey, p.28.)

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Wha t was happening in this period was tha t the political fight for space between the Muslim League on one side, and Ghulam Sarwar and the KPP on the other had resulted in the former's adoption of a posture which targeted Hindu religion and Hindu culture. Thus, it took the fight to a different plane-the level of communalism and culture-to fight its political battle. By 1945-46, the terms for a fight between the Muslim League and the parties representing peasants' interests had already been set by the former's invocation of community and its politics of religion. Lacking an alternate agenda, Ghulam Sarwar's position of simply opposing landlords and moneylenders, which was fast losing out to the Muslim League's agenda, left him little space to manouvre. The 1946 election results showed that while the Muslim League had established its hegemony, the religious leadership in the shape of the Jamait-ul-ulama-i-Hind and the other peasant leaders like Abdur Rezzak and Ghulam Sarwar who opposed the League did manage to get considerable number of votes. This suggests that they did not surrender their leadership. At the same time however, the limitations inherent in the political agenda of the KPP movement forced Sarwar to surrender to a position, which called upon the community with the promise of nationhood." Here, we need to explain why the peasant movement in the other part of Bengal, i.e., West Bengal, led to the struggle against the colonial government while East Bengal witnessed a commilllal upsurge. It appears that it was the presence of an anti-colonial critique in the peasant agenda in the western part of the province that explains the dominant position that nation rather than community occupied in the political imagination. Partha Chatterjee, however, thinks that it was due more to the absence of differentiation within the East Bengal peasantry which explains its solid community bond and consequent failure to identify the class enemy. In the western part, according to him, it was the advanced stage of differentiation that made the peasantry act against the colonial state. See Partha Chatterjee, Agrarian Relations. B.B. Chaudhuri, criticizing this explanation of Chatterjee, writes: 95

The particular state of the peasant society in Eastern Bengal might preclude an acute conflict within it and thus create a sense of solidarity among the peasants when encountering a common adversary. Why should this sense of cohesion and solidarity be incompatible with the organisation of a movement against the government? A relatively advanced stage of differentiation in the peasantry might make a united movement of the entire peasant community somewhat difficult to organise, since certain issues might not be acceptable to alL. B.B. Chaudhuri, "Perspectives on Bengal Agrarian Structure", Indian Historical Review, VoL 9, Nos 1-2, p. 204, July 1982-January 1983.

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Now, leaders like Ghulam Sarwar succumbed to the communal agenda, which had now become the hegemonic agenda. The line dividing his own economistic agenda (mixed with the religion) and that of the Muslim League, had always been very thin. Therefore, the shift did not require any great effort on his part, and he was helped by the presence of a communalized society. Thus, communalism provided dynamism to the social process and mode of resistance. Finally, the most significant fact remains that there was the possibility of this communalization of the society leading to uncontrollable consequences, as evinced by the Noakhali riots.

II The Muslim League, as we have seen, had been fighting for space in the political realm in the region. The strong presence of the Krishak Samities and peasant leaders in Tippera and of radical peasant leaders in Noakhali prevented the League from establishing its hegemony. The famine and the subsequent changes it wrought saw the League making headway with its aggressive propaganda. !thad its problems in Noakhali,96 but by the time the riot took place, the agenda and the terms for political activity had already been clearly set by the League. And it was a communal politics that it took recourse tO as a means to tide over the fissures in interests. 97 Once the riot broke out, the League's attitude was one of dismissal ofthe gravity ofthe situa tion, and to absolve the N oakhali League members. 98 Notwithstanding his criticism of the happenings, Suhrawardy, from the very beginning maintained that the incidents taking place were just a Ilproblem of law and order" .99 In the leaflets that were dropped over Noakhali by a RAF plane, the chief minister reasoned that the Muslims should not indulge f

"Muslim League activity is reported from Rangpur, Noakhali and Rajshahi .... In Noakhali, local interest centred around the election of the District Board Chairman which resulted in the split in the Muslim League ranks." FR, January, second half, 1945, Home Political, File No. 18/1/45. 97 FR, February, first half, 1945, Home Political, File No. 18/2/45. 98 "Shamsuddin Ahmed was moved to tears during his visit to Noakhali town". Hindustan Standard, 25 November 1946, p. 1. 99 Ibid., 17 October 1946, p. 3. 96

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in such activities as they no longer had any reason to feel left out because now the Muslim League had been given a share in the interim government. 1OO The provincial Muslim League leaders did pass a resolution condemning the lawlessness in Noakhali and Tippera district and exhorted the Muslim Leaguers to behave well. IOI At the same time, however, they condemned the Hindu press for the exaggerated reports of the happenings in Noakhali lO2 On the one hand the press kept supporting the League and on the other, completely ignored the truth and reality of the situation and asserted: "there had been no incidents in Noakhali after 17 October and that the situation was definitely under control"YJ3 The Provincial League's Enquiry Committee report also played down the nature and extent of the violence and denied any validity to the events lO4 It said that there had been no mass upsurge and that the incidents were not evidence of a rising of one community against the other" .1OS It accepted that there were stances of conversions and of stray marriages" .106 The total number of deaths due to outrage, according to it, was "15 in Tippera and less than 100 in Noakhali".lo7 What it thought important to emphasize was the fact that "not a single scheduled caste man was either killed or injured" (SiC).108 Thus, even at this stage the II

Ilin_

100 One hundred thousand such leaflets were dropped by a RAF plane. The Hindustan Times, Delhi, 20 October 1946, p. 1. 101 Star of India, 25 October 1946, p. 1. 102 Ibid. 103 See a press note which says:

Mr Suhrawardy refutes Hindu Press canard. The communal disturbances at Noakhali district have been localised. The situation in almost all the affected areas is well in hand said Mr H.S. Suhrawardy. He deprecated the coloured version of the news from Noakhali.. The reports.. about mass conversion of Hindus have hardly any foundation.. (Ibid., 17 October 1946, p. 3.)

Ibid., 25 October 1946, p.2. Ibid. 106 Ibid. 107 Ibid. 108 Ibid. It should be noted that the Muslim League was trying to have a strategic alliance with the SC leaders and Jinnah had recently nominated IN. MandaI to the Interim Government. Raj Mohan Gandhi suggests that Gandhi's visit to Noakhali was also guided by this attempt on the part of Jinnah. (Rajmohan Gandhi, The Good Boatman: A Portrait of Gandhi, Delhi, 1995.) 104 105

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Muslim League leaders were conscious of the importance of the SC population and the need to project themselves as the latter's political ally vis-it-vis the Congress which claimed to represent all segments of society. The reality, as was clear from the events in N oakhali and Tippera, was that the communal fury did not leave the SC population untouched. In most cases they were the worst sufferers. The League leaders soon, however, shunned their defensive posture and began to put pressure on the police to withdraw all criminal cases against persons involved in the rioting. 109 The manner in which the local Leaguers as well as the Muslim League ministers defended the persons accused of murder, rioting, arson and in a few cases, rape, revealed the character of the upsurge. This added to the lawlessness to the extent that the local Hindu population was driven out of the villages of Noakhali and Tippera l10 The Bihar riot, at this time, provided the rationale for the communal attitude and acts of the Leaguers and the League ministers. Thus, the communal acts of one community legitimized and validated that of the other. During the Calcutta killings, whatever might have been the attitude of the Muslim League government in general and that of Suhrawardy in particular, at least there was a semblance of an effort at tackling the situation (though only after two days of riots had elapsed), and Suhrawardy, along with the other leaders, toured the city in an effort to restore peace. But in Noakhali even this token gesture was lacking; there was instead a far more terrible attitude where the ministers prevented the administration from bringing to book the real culprits whose names were listed in the complaints. III The ministry constantly attempted to discourage even the relief workers operating f

1!19 The adjutant of the 1/3rd Gurkha Regiment writes: "The Chief :Minister most unfortunately ordered the release on bail of goondas who had been arrested .... " (F. Tuker, While Memory Serves, p. 618.) 110 See, Desher Vani, Noakhali, 2 April 1947, pp.2-3; Hindustan Standard, 18 April 1947; Amrit Bazar Patrika, 18 April 1947. 111 The residents of Sonaimuri village of Begumgunj police station wrote:

we have forwarded an application mentioning their very case and the names of the hooligans to the authority to immediately check but as ill luck would have it, we returned being frustrated as they paid no heed to it. (The inhabitants of Sonaimuri village to the District Magistrate, n.d. November 1946, AlCC Papers, File No. CL-8, pp.379-83.)

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in the affected areas. The culmination of this policy of actively conniving with the communal forces lay in the attack on Gandhi for his presence in N oakhali.1l2 At the local level, some of the Muslim officials connived with the rioters. The general belief that prevailed among the Muslims was that "the Ministry would take no action if anything was done against the Hindus".113 The lawlessness that prevailed in the area was to a great extent the result of the active collaboration of the local officials with the rioters. This, then, was how a communalized society appeared.

III The Congress had a strong presence in the area, especially in Tippera, where it had taken an initiative in the Krishak Samities. Ashrafuddin Ahmed Choudhury, a prominent peasant leader and Congress member, along with Kamini Kumar Dutta, held sway over the peasant agitation there. The Congress workers in the area helped in the difficult task of evacuation and, as we have seen, voiced the people's anger to the higher leadership 114 Communal propaganda was already at work and attempts were made to communalize cases of molestation of women; it was the Congress workers who tried to stop this 115 The Congress, however,

See Chapter 8, this volume, for a detailed discussion. Even the chief minister was aware of the general attitude for in the leaflets that were dropped from air, he stated: I am told that my government will not take action against those who break the law in name of the Muslim League". (Hindustan Standard, Delhi, 20 October 1946, p. 1. See also, Alee Papers, File No. G-53, p. 132. 114 See, Prafulla Ghosh's letter to Nehru, 24 April 1942, Alee Papers, File No. G-31 (Pa" II), pp. 3-27. 115 KK Dutta in his report to the Secretary, BPCC, on 23 April 1942, regarding the incident of molestation in Chanua village wrote: 112

113

i I •••

There is no communal feeling. The general mass both Muslims and Hindus are solidly united. Some mischief makers are trying to give a communal complexion to the affairs stating that Sikh soldiers have intentionally molested Moslem women but work of the Congress volunteers has frustrated that effort. In evacuation and in these affairs Congress workers have been helping the public there. (sic) (italics mine) (Alee Papers, File No. G.31 (Pa,' II), 1942, pp.59-61.)

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found it difficult to help people because of its meagre resources. 116 The organizational fighting in the Bengal Congress also had its effect on the local Congress activities inN oakhali, while in Tippera a large section of the local Congress was dissatisfied with the officials at the district Congress level.1l7 How far these weaknesses affected the party's ability to fight the prevalent communal ideology could have been evaluated properly had the Congress not given the Quit India call. In 1942, when the N oakhali-Tippera people were in a state of extreme privation, most of the Congress workers, especially the Gandhian workers, were not on the scene. The Noakhali District Congress Committee (NDCC) was declared unlawful by the Government of Bengal under the Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1908. 118 The president of the NDCC was arrested on the charge of "keeping in his possession some prejudicialleaflets" 119 These activists would come out of jails only in 1945 and miss the course of events that would lead the politics towards an intense electoral battle with great ideological underpinnings. The NDCC described the prevailing collective psyche in Noakhali as Iidisclosing a state of mind amongst the Muslims"f of extreme intolerance. 12o It appreciated the situation correctly. However, the local Congress committee in its report to the

"Due to the shortness of the time, serious weakeness of the Congress organisation in Bengal since 1939 and the vastness of the task in the evacuation of the population of such a big area, we could not much help the people with the meagre resources at our disposal". (Haran Chandra Ghosh Choudhury, president, Noakhali District Congress Committee to Jawaharlal Nehru, ibid., p. 79.) 117 In 1940 itself, the peasant mobilizers like Yaqub Mia and Kamini Kr. Dutta clashed with the Tippera Sadar Congress Committee president Nripendra Nath Bose. During the organizational elections Yaqub Mia and his group, trying to prevent the election, said, "we have been suffering all these years .... " (See, Alee Papers, File No. P-5 (Part II), 1940, pp. 125-31; 147-51.) 118 Amrit Bazar Patrika, 23 January 1943, p. 4. 119 Ibid., 15 June 1943, p. 5. 120 It reported to the BPCC: "The present state of things prevailing in this district discloses a state of mind amongst the Muslims that if the Hindus are at all to live in this district they must live according to the way their Muslim neighbours want them to behave" (sic). CN oakhali Situation", Alee Papers, File No. G-53, p. 95.) 116

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provincial Congress committee, confessed its utter helplessness. Even before the riot started, it appealed for protection: The Hindus and those of the Mohammedans opposed to the League or to the acts of goondaism perpetrated in the name of the Muslim League demand adequate protection of their persons and properties from the Government of the country.l21 (Italics mine) This feeling of helplessness arose in the face of the strong, collective communal antipathy. Its helplessness, as the report demonstrates, was heightened when it found that even officers were Ilpoisoned with communalism" .122 Thus, the Congress reached a dead end. This was because all the "remedies" suggested by the local Congress were addressed to, and depended on the active help of, the bureaucracy. There was not a single step that it could undertake. Hence, the local Congress, which had been so active on the local political scene, found itself in 1946-47, relegated to a position from which it had no initiative left to fight communalism. However, the NDCChad anticipated some of the principles for fighting communal forces, which Gandhi later sought to apply in his Noakhali sojourn. Formation of peace committees in every village consisting of persons in whom both the communities had confidence was one of them. Similarly, the report contained some suggestions which, had they been implemented on time, could have at least minimized the level of lawlessness. These included increasing armed forces f and more importantlYf improving Ibid., p. 99. An interesting observation was made with regard to the attitude of the Hindu and Muslim officials: 121

122

... Hindu officials are apathetic and studiously cautious not to incur the displeasure of the other community and for that matter of the Muslim League Government, and almost all Mohammedan officers are inclined towards the Muslim League and do not hesitate to condone the aggressive acts of the Muslim hooligans by helping suppression of violence against them and submitting false reports. (Ibid., p. 99.) In the post-riot phase, this attitude of the Muslim officers was evident on a number of occasions. See, F. Tuker, While Memory Serves, pp. 178, 60910, 617.

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communications so that the interior areas would become easily accessible. l23 At the provincial level, the Congress committee did nothing more than to apprise the bureaucracy of the terrible situation in the N oakhali villages. 124 The leaders of the provincial Congress committee were cons tan tl y sent tele grams from the N oakhali villages which, though at times "gave exaggerated figures of death and different forms of havoc done",125 revealed the gravity of the situation. The president of the BPCC went to the additional home secretary, P.O. Martyn and impressed upon him the "necessity oftaking strong action" which included "sending the military to the 10cality"l26 "A European ICS Magistrate (in place of an Indian one) was sent by aeroplane to take the charge ofthe district."127 The fact that the Congress did not even appeal for the restoration of law and order to the Muslim League ministry indicated its complete loss of faith in the ministry. The appeal to the colonial authority /bureaucracy was indeed ironical, and it appeared to prove the colonial authority's much vaunted claim of being the honest arbiter betvveen the tvvo warring communities. The provincialleadership, however, demonstrated its utter helplessness and under the circumstances could do nothing beyond "sending Girija Prosanna Chakraborty, a member of the BPCC and inhabitant of the Noakhali district with a ba tch of volunteers and some money to help the situation and do whatever work of relief and rescue they could".!28The provincial Congress expected the central leadership, who at that time headed the interim government, to intervene directly. This was why the leaders rushed to Delhi to" apprise the central leadership of the situation". 129 Ibid. "A Short Report of the Communal Devastations in the District of Noakhali" (hereafter A Short Report of Noakhali) by the secr etary, BPCC, File No. G-53, Alee Papers, p.53. 125 Ibid., p. 54. 126 Ibid., p. 53. 127 Ibid. 128 Ibid. 129 BPCC, Secretary's Second Report to the AlCC, 7 November 1946. He wrote: "There is a growing sense that if the Congress members in the interim government are so helpless and constitutionally handicapped then what is the good of their keeping there". (File No. P-5, 1946, Alee Papers, p. 131.) 123

12 4

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The popular reaction forced a section of the Congress leaders to call for an organized defensive body to fight "lawlessness". Niharendu Dutt Majumdar called upon the youth to join the organization "to protect peace loving people of the province irrespective of caste creed and religion ff .l30 Sarat Chandra Bose on the other hand, demonstrated his complete loss of faith in the League by calling for a strike on4 November 1946. Though finally the strike was called off after the members of the interim government reached Calcutta on 3 November,!'! the colonial authorities paid greater attention to this strike than the violent riots in Noakhalp32 After his tour of Noakhali, Sarat Chandra Bose stated, f

f

I have also advocated the formation of volunteer corps in each and every district of Bengal.... I took steps to form volunteer corps in some districts .... such volunteer corps should be drawn from all communities and sections of the people and they should be above communal and party consideration .... Our volunteer corps should be inspired by the ideals and spirit of the I.N.A.!33 The Noakhali riots and the violence associated with it brought to the fore the helplessness of the Congress leaders in the face of extreme communalism. While the local leaders gave a call to organize defensive corps to deal with the situation, the central leadership was totally confused regarding the next course of action. J.B. Kripalani, the president elect, who toured the affected areas, asked "every Bengali to defend himself and her by whatever means he or she can thinkff. 134 Quoting the example of those "who defied the mob for full two days before [they] fell fightingff} 35 Kripalani said that this resistance was the closest approach to non-violence. This again reflected the extremely

This growing sense of helplessness was evident from other quarters also. (Hereafter, BPCC Secretary's Second Report to the AICC) 130 Hindustan Standard, Calcutta, 1 November 1946, p. 1. 131 Ibid. 132 Penderel Moon, Wavell, pp.369-70. 133 Sarat Chandra Bose, cited in L.A. Gordon, Brothers Against the Raj, Delhi, 1989, p. 570. 134 Hindustan Standard, Calcutta, 22 October 1946, p. 1. See also, "Versions of Eyewitness about Noakhali", S.P. Mookerjee Papers, Installment II-Iv,. File No . 149/1946, p. 38. 135 Ibid.

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confused position of the leadership. This, however, was not strange because well before the Noakhali riots, Congress workers and organizations were finding it difficult to come to terms with extreme communal violence. This was well articulated in a note by Mridula Sarabhai, the then general secretary of AICC. It said: Recent communal conflict in Ahmedabad as well as trouble in other provinces have raised many organisational problems and have resulted in shaking up confidence in many of our fundamental basic policies. Congress committees and men are confused and do not know how they are expected to act in crisis.!36 Thus, the basic tenet of non-violence was also affected by this crisis. Jawaharlal Nehru in his letter to Kapila Chatterjee best articulated this. He wrote, The working committee in consultation with Sarat Babu is passing a resolution on the subject. But we know that resolutions do not mean much. It is action that is required when a situation becomes so desperate. You ask me abou t non-violence in these circumstances. I do not know wha t I would do if I was there bu t I imagine that I would react violently. I have no doubt whatever that violence in self-defence is preferable to a cowardly non-violence. 137 In the meantime the Congress Working Committee passed its resolution on the happenings in East Bengal. It appealed to "all the decent persons of all communities in Bengal and elsewhere not only to condemn these crimes, but also to take all adequate steps to defend the innocent from lawlessness and barbarity, no matter by whomsoever committed". It in addition warned against the Ilretaliatory outbreak of communal violence". 138 The provincial Congress, however, was sceptical about the Congress policy on the communal situation. It said, f

We agree with the Working Committee that the remedy for communalism is not counter communalism but nationalism 136 "A Note on the Communal Disturbances" by Mridula Sarabhai, File No. G-53, AICC Papers, 1942, p. 187. 137 Nehru to Kapila Chatterjee, ibid., p. 173. 138 Ibid., pp. 139-40.

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but at the same time we cannot ignore the natural reaction in the mind of the public who upto now were strong followers of the Congress .... 139 Amidst all this confusion, there was no guideline to ascertain what could be done to arrest the rapid communalization of society and its violent manifestations. While the talk of the formation of volunteer bodies by the Bengal leaders showed their utter helplessness before the extreme Muslim communalism, the eruption of violence in Bihar proved that the Congress leadership was also not in a position to prevent the Hindu communal reaction from becoming an extreme one in the face of extremely violent communal onslaughts.

IV The later part of the 1930s was marked by growing discontent in Noakhali as we have seen and this was manifest in the attacks on sections of people. In December 1939, a section of people had attacked the household of Rajendralal Roychoudhry in the Lakshmipur area. !4D During the same period, Feni and Noakhali town witnessed communal tensions. 141 People of even Congress persuasion showed an inclination towards the Hindu Mahasabha as a sense of insecurity gradually came to prevail in some areas. 142 However, it is not very clear whether the Mahasabha made considerable inroads into Noakhali. They had a very powerful organizer in the person of Nalini Ranjan Mitra, a reputed teacher in the Khilpara High School, with strong nationalist leanings143 This then raises an important question, as to why leaders of such deep nationalist leanings gradually turned towards communal organizations. f

f

BPCC Secretary's Second Report to the AICC, p. 131. Star of India, Calcutta, 1939, p. 2. 141 Rai Harendra Nath Sur, 16 March 1939, PBLA, VoL LIV, No.3, pp. 419-20. 142 CWMG, 26 February 1940, VoL LXXI, pp. 291-92. 143 See, Dinesh Chandra Singh, Noakhalirn Mati 0 Manush (The Earth of Noakhali and Men), Calcutta, 1995. 139 140

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A perceptible change took place from 1943 onwards, when the Mahasabha sent Brajesh Chakraborty Thakur to propagate and organize the Hindu Sabha in the district.!44 He along with an exdetenue Abala Kant Chakraborty toured the district and organized branches of the Sabha. !45 Mahasabha had also gained some strength in the district board election in 1945. Its strength was reflected through the fact that it supported Abdul Majid of the Muslim League. Abdul Majid was not the official nominee of the League and stood against the district League president, Goffran Ahmed, and won against the latter. This created a rift within the League. 146 The remarkable fact tha t with concerted efforts, from not more than 10 in 1943-44, the number of branches ofthe Sabha rose to 143 in the 146 unions of the district in 1945-46.!47 The famine, the procurement drive, and the fact that the Mahasabha was the only vocal opposition, contributed to this rapid increase but the rapidly communalizing political scenario also resulted in this shift. This rapid growth of the Mahasabha was at a time when the Muslim League's political fortunes were at the peak. The political agenda was set by the struggle for supremacy between the League and the erstwhile peasant leader of the area, i.e., Ghulam Sarwar, but the struggle was fought at the cost of communal peace in the district. Soon after, the Noakhali riots took place. The Calcutta killings brought the Mahasabha, which went into political hibernation after its electoral defeat, back on the political scene. However, it was the Noakhali riots that saw the Mahasabha making a concerted effort to start an all-India campaign. All the Sabha branches in the country passed similar resolutions and sent them to the Congress and other organizations!48 while trying to mobilize popular opinion. The

144 Brajesh Chakraborty Thakur to S.P. Mookerjee, 22 March 1944, S.P. Mookerjee Papers, Instalment II-IV, 121, pp. 315-18. 145 Hindustan, Calcutta, 23 August 1945, p. 31. 146 Nalini Ranjan :Mitra to S.P. Mookerjee, 21 January 1945, AlHM Papers, File No. P-44, pp. 40-41. 147 List of Mahasabha Branches, ibid., File No. P-32, pp. 139-55. In 194344, the Sabha had only eight branches in the district. See, ibid., File No. P-14, pp. 138-39. 148 See, AlCC Papers, File No. G-65, 1946, pp.5-39.

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atrocities on women and the forcible conversion of the Hindus in Noakhali provided the Mahasabha with digits around which it could do this. In fact the Hindu Mahasabha had an exeperience in mobilizing along these lines since the 1920s and 1930S 149 At its Gorakhpur session in 1946, several resolutions were passed regarding the Noakhali riots 150 In the province, the riot provided the Mahasabha with an issue to spring back into the political arena. On 31 October, 20 days after the riot began, Shyama Prasad Mookerjee announced the formation of a HindustanNational Guards to meetwhathe termed as the "Bengal crisis". He informed that steps are being taken to inaugurate a body knovvn as Hindustan National Guards lito meet the need for a well organized and disciplined body of youths who will fearlessly defend their rights and interests and the honour of our womanfolk at this supreme crisis that threatens the very existence of Hindus in this great province."151 The old idea of Sangathan too was not lost sight of and he appealed "to all sections of Hindus irrespective of caste or class to join this organisation and stand united at hour of peril".152 A IIConsolidation of Hindu Society Board" was announced to remove all inequalities. Shyama Prasad Mookerjee stated that under the auspices of the BPHM, a board called the Hindu Sangathan Society was formed with Rai Bahadur Jatindra Mohan Choudhury of Nakipur as president and treasurer. The object of the board was to: consolida te the Hindu society by removing all disabilities and inequalities in respect of enjoyment of social rights and privileges for the revival of which the learned pundits in Bengal have given their wholehearted sanction. 153

149

Papia Chakravarty, Hindu Response to the Nationalist Ferment, Calcutta,

1993. 15()

See, Gorakhpur Resolution on Noakhali, AIHM Papers, File No. 121, 1946,

pp.2-3.

Hindustan Standard, Calcutta, 1 November 1946, p. 5. Ibid. 153 The Board consisted among others of, "Rai IN. Choudhury Bahadur of Nakipur, Mahamahopadhayay Bidhu Sekhar Shastry, N.C Chatterjee, RC Majumdar, Dr Meghnad Saha, Dr Sunity Kumar Chatterjee, P.R Thakur, Birat Chandra Mondal, Manmohan Das, Rai Bahadur T.C Ray and Damodar Das Khanna". (Ibid.). 151 152

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Noakhali riots saw the Mahasabha began taking a strong position on the future shape of the province. From the frequent utterances of its leaders one feels that Mahasabha began demanding for partition during this time. This was formalized in its Tarkeshwar Conference on the 4 April 1947. Shyama Prasad Mookerjee, who had already taken a lead role during the agitation over the CR Formula and the Gandhi-Jinnah meetings, began to assume the voice which was supposedly the voice representing the province. And ironically, this voice demanded partition now, which it had opposed so bitterly a year-and-half ago. The agenda of the party saw an about turn.

v The Communist party had been organizing the peasants in the districts for quite some time. But its presence was extremely weak. The presence of the radical peasant fronts and the earlier efforts by the Congress wor kers, however, did not leave much ground for the communist workers. However the war years and especially the absence of the Congress provided an opportunity to the party to make some inroads into this district. The colonial repression against the peasant leaders of the neighbouring Tippera also helped in this. It was only around this time that the party made some Communist pockets in Hasnabad and all the 180 villages in the district. The party could sense the trouble in this part of Bengal and had been reporting on this l54 At the same time it sensed what it called "the sinister role of bureaucracy and the police in fanning the flames of Fratricidal War"l55 After the riots broke out the party focussed on the stout defence that the villages surrounding Hasnabad put and thereby prevented the flames of violence from spreading. However, what is significant is the fact that even now, the party did not accept the hegemony of communalism and rather blamed the colonial policy for the riot. P.c. Joshi was calling Noakhali as "the poisoned fruit of British plan",156when the f

154 155

156

People's Age, 13 October 1946, p. 8. Ibid. Ibid., 3 November 1946, p. 11.

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Communalism in Bengal

People' Age correspondent was reporting about the communal atrocities from the villages of Noakhali. 15 7 The attack on colonial policy made the role of the League or Muslim variant of commualism in the entire episode a little lighter.

VI Noakhali riots demonstrated the fact that the complete communalization of a society-manifested in the nature of the violence and the emergent combination of forces-had left society in a state of hopelessness. If the famine had contributed to the brutalization of consciousness on a mass scale 158 Noakhali created the occasion as well as the justification for the paralysis of conscience. Hope was the first and foremost victim and forced different political parties to create defence groups to tackle the communal problem. It was in this state of political helplessness that Gandhi decided to come to Bengal. f

157 Ibid., 27 October 1946, p. 4; 3 November 1946, p. 10; 10 November, p. 6; 17 November, p. 7. 158 Suranjan Das, Communal Riots, p. 162.

EIGHT

Battling with Hatred: Gandhi m Noakhali While the viciousness of the Noakhali violence showed how deeply the spirit of hatred had touched a substantial section of the Muslim population, attempts were made to organize the reactions in a similar vein. Hindu opinion was expressed by different organizations, such as the 5anatan Dharma 5abha (505), which even released a series of letters of protest to be sent from all over the country, i.e., from Madras, Bombay, Oudh, etc., to the office of the All India Congress Committee (AICC) at Allahabad. Thus, the implication of this for the ideological make up of the country could not be minimized. The countrywide repercussions of the Noakhali riot was soon to be seen in the vitiation of the communal rela tions in the country. ! The violence that the Hindu communal mobilization could inflict was manifested immediately in riots in Bihar and in Garh Mukteswar in the United Provinces. They were all indications of the crystallized form of a very strong consciousness Leo communalism. At this juncture, Gandhi decided to come to Bengal and visit the riot affected areas of Noakhali and Tippera.' Gandhi's f

f

1 The Noakhali riot demonstrated the sweep of communalization in society reflected in the extreme violence. Mass conversions and forcible marriages and the brutality demonstrated the complete psychological rupture of society which alone can cause such an intense reaction. 2 Gandhi's Noakhali experiment has been the theme of quite a few works which include H. Alexander, "On March with Gandhi", The Manchester Guardian, 3 March 1947; Gandhi Through the Western Eyes, Philadelphia, 1986; N.K Bose, My Days with Gandhi, Bombay, 1974; Manubehen Gandhi, The Lonely Pilgrim, Ahmedabad, 1964; Sukumar Ray, Noakhalite Mahatma (Mahatma in Noakhali), Calcutta, 1970; Kanai Basu ed., Noakhalir

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presence introduced a new dynamic into the entire discourse on the question of communal ideology and riots.' This dynamic was transported to the realm of politics, especially that which contained a steady undertone of violence as manifested by the communal riots. His presence provides the backdrop to the study of the situation that prevailed in Bengal during those fateful days, and how this situation reshaped men and their minds. liMen create violence but violence recreates them."4 This chapter attempts to locate this process of reshaping of the social fabric in the geographical context of Bengal, within the larger thematic context of communalism and its violent manifestation-the communal riots. Gandhi, it seems, had already seen in the Calcutta riots the potential for greater, escalated violence-probably on the scale of a civil war. IIWe are not yet in the midst of a civil war" he said Ilbut we are nearing it. At present we are playing at it."5 In fact it appears that Gandhi took a close personal interest in the affairs of Bengal, especially in the violence there. After the violence that followed the Rashid Ali day demonstrations of 11-12 February 1946, Gandhi had asked the secretary of the Bengal Provincial Congress Committee (BPCC) to send him a report on the incidents. The secretary's letter dated 16 February 1946, said: f

f

Revered Maha bnaji, I beg to confirm the telegram to you on 15.2.1946 in reply to your query regarding Calcutta Disturbances. The Telegram was as follows: REACTION AGAINST POLICE FIRING AND PEACEFUL PROCESSIONIST EXCITED .... CITY UNDER MILITARY CONTROL. [sic]6

Patabhumikaye Gandhiji (Gandhiji in the Backdrop of Noakhali), Calcutta, 1946; Ashoka Gupta, Noakhalir Duryoger Din (Noakhali's Days of Misfortune), Calcutta, 1999. 3 The Noakhali riot demonstrated the confusion and helplessness of all organized forces in the face of such an intense and violent manifestation of communal ideology. The Muslim League, on the one hand, tried to distance itself from the violence, but constantly supported and gave legitimacy to the perpetrators of communal violence in the area. Thus, Gandhi's intervention was the only illlorganized human intervention; there was a constant interaction and dialogue between organized politics and individual efforts. 4 Hannah Arendt, On Violence, London, 1970, see Introduction. 5 Harijan, 15 September 1946, p. 312. 6 AlCC Papers, File No. P-5 (Part I), 1945-46, p. 123.

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It was, however, the news of violence in N oakhali and Tippera that prompted him to come to Bengal. In the meantime communal violence had erupted in Bihar in an unprecedented manner and a very large section of the Muslim population was either killed or rendered homeless. "Why and why only Noakhali whereas rioting had been taking place in Ahmedabad, Bombay or for that matter in the neighboring Bihar", was the question repeatedly asked of him.? This question was important as the answer to it not only suggested the significance that Gandhi attached to the Noakhali riot, but also provokes us to probe deeper into the ramifications of Gandhi's visit to the riot affected areas. Gandhi's answer to this question was that he would certainly have gone to any of the places mentioned (not Bihar) by the friend if anything approaching what had happened at Noakhali had happened there and if he had felt that he could do nothing without being on the spotS Thus, it seems, he attached greater significance to the happenings in Noakhali despite the fact that the number of people killed either in Calcutta or Bihar far outnumbered those killed in N oakhali. f

I The Noakhali riot, as one can see, was qualitatively different from the earlier communal riots including the Calcutta killings of August 1946 immediately preceded it 9 It may be that Gandhi could sense that the difference lay in the transformation of a

Why do you want to go to Noakhali? You did not go to Bombay, Ahmedabad or Chapra, where things have happened that are infinitely worse than Noakhali. Would not your going there only add to the existing tension? Was it because in these places it was the Muslims who had been the sufferers that he did not go there and would go to Noakhali because sufferers there were Hindus. (Talk with a Muslim friend, Sodpur, Calcutta, 1 November 1946, CWMG, Vol. LXXXV1, p. 65.) 8 Ibid. 9 As we have seen, violence in Noakhali was the product and manifestation of a complete communalization of the society. The constitutive elements of the riot, viz., conversion, forcible marriage and the kind of legitimacy and sanction that these acts tried, and in fact, gained, from even religious personnel made it qualitatively different from the Calcutta riot of August 1946. 7

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communal discourse as a politics based on religion to one in which violence was sanctified by religion. Gandhi, it seems, became aware of this very acutely. It was evident from the pattern of violence that a total rupture of an essentially peasant society had occurred and that communal ideology could entrench itself in that social milieu and legitimize itself as a source of valid and just political action. It was not difficult for Gandhi, being an astute reader of the peasant psyche as he was, to understand the impact of such a rupture. Noakhali, therefore, became important not just because it demonstrated an intensity of violence, but also the power of an ideology, i.e., communalism. By this time the idea of Pakistan had been concretized in the popular mind. At the end of the elections of 1945-46, it was quite clear thatthe League had achieved some sort of mandate of being the representative agency fighting for Pakistan. The Muslim League wanted people's support in its endeavour to realize Pakistan. Neither the Muslim League nor its leader Jinnah had ever espoused a critique of colonialism so that the movement for achieving Pakistan could not be galvanized by critiquing the colonial power. Instead it was the Congress, which the League argued was the representative of the Hindu population, that was attacked. By the 1940s, it was not just the Hindu Congress but also the general Hindu population that was depicted as opposing the creation of Pakistan. Gandhi, it seems, was practical enough to see the writing on the wall. In September 1944 itself, he sensed the increased hold of Jinnah on the Muslim masses, and therefore, while writing to Jinnah he acknowledged the latter's hold over them. His meeting with Jinnah was basically an acceptance of this realization. Aware of the significance of "symbols", he wanted to attack the idea of "two nations" and thereby, attack the ideological basis of Pakistan, by attacking communalism. He was prepared to accept any kind of partition as long as it was not based on this theory. He wrote to Jinnah that he could already see the dangers of its operation. He wrote: f

f

Dear Qaid-i-Azam, For the moment I have shunted the Rajaji formula and, with your assistance, am applying my mind very seriously to the famous Lahore resolution of the Muslim League .... As I write

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337

this letter and imagine the working of the resolution in practice, I see nothing but ruin for the whole of India.lO The Noakhali riot presented for Gandhi the first field demonstration of the ruin that he had already envisaged in 1944. In Noakhali, it came in a form most intense and most frightening. Gandhi's visit to Noakhali, therefore, had a combating element to it as he tried to counter the ideological underpinnings of the riot. IIIn any war/' he said, Ilbrutalities were bound to take place; war is a brutal thing" l ! Once this was accepted by Gandhi,he started looking beyond the violence and the violations taking place there. He was, as suggested by a close aide in Noakhali, not very concerned about the casualties or the extent of material damage. Instead he concentrated on II discovering the political intentions working behind the move and the way of combating them successfully" .12 The spread and the intensity of the viola tions convinced him that the war was to be a long drawn one and that he would have a personal stake in it. While itwas "the cry of outraged womanhood" which brought him to Bengal,13 he was equally aghast at the religious intolerance shown by the local populace. This further convinced him that his place was in Noakhali. He took it upon himself to combat the operation of the Iitwo nation theory", while also de legitimizing violence of its apparent religious sanctions. Therefore, Noakhali was made the battlefield on which he sought to uphold his political as well as personal credo. This attitude of combating the war brought out a novel form of experience in its train-significantly entitled Gandhi's Noakhali experiment. In this experiment, Gandhi's principles were at stake. 10 Gandhi to M.A. Jinnah, 15 September 1944, N.N. Mitra ed., Annual Register, 1944, Vol. II, pp. 140-41. 11 N.K. Bose, My Days, p.43. 12 Ibid. He made it clear that he was not there to fight even Pakistan. He told his audience at Dattapara,

Whether you believe it or not, I want to assure you that I am a servant of both the Hindus and the Mussalmans. I have not come here to fight Pakistan. If India is destined to be partitioned, I cannot prevent it. But I wish to tell you that Pakistan cannot be established by force. (Speech at Dattapara, CWMG, Vol. LXXXVI, p. 106.) 13 Harijan, 10 November 1946, p.396; "It was the cry of outraged womanhood that had peremptorily called him to Noakhali", CWMG, VoL LXXXVI, p. 65.

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"My own doctrine", Gandhi said to N.C. Chatterjee, "was failing. I don't want to die a failure". 14But what was his doctrine that was failing? Throughout his sojourn he would mention about this failing doctrine but one does not come across any specific instance where he is explicit about his doctrine. It raises a very serious question. The Noakhali riot, as everyone knew by that time, was between the Hindus and Muslims. And by this time so many riots between the Hindu and Muslim communities had already taken place that there was nothing novel about a communal riot as such. Then, why was itthat only in the case ofNoakhali, Gandhi would talk about the failing of his doctrine. It seems to us that it was phenomena like forced conversions and the way that religion was made to legitimize violence, which shook Gandhi's previous understanding of communalism. It may be due to this shaken understanding that he was groping for a way out. One might ask whether he possessed any coherent stra tegy when he landed in N oakhali? Gandhi, notwithstanding his determination to go to Noakhali, it appears, was quite apprehensive of his plan of action in Noakhali from the very begining. Even enroute, he did not know what he was going to do there. He invoked God as the only one who knew what he could do. !S The only thing he was certain of was tha t his presence in Noakhali was necessary16 He grappled in the darkness and told N.K. Bose, his secretary during those days, that he might have to stay on there for several years Y While he was fighting this uncertainty vis-a.-vis the Noakhali situation, there erupted in the neighbouring province of Bihar ghastly communal riots. Hindu crowds began slaughtering Muslims in order to avenge the rumored massacre of people of their community by the latter in Noakhali. The communal situation in Bihar had become quite tense after the Direct Action resolution of the Muslim League at the end of July 1946 itself. There was violence in Muzaffarpur on 27 September 1946. On 25

14 Gandhi with Mahasabha leaders, 5 December 1946, CWMG, VoL LXXXVI, p.200. See also N.K. Bose, My Days, p. 85. 15 N.K. Bose, ibid., p. 40. 16 Ibid., p. 62. His numerous letters w r itten during this time indicate this uncertainty. See CWMG, VoL LXXXVI, pp. 47-63. 17 N.K. Bose, My Days, p. 85. See also, CWMG, VoL LXXXVI, p. 200.

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October 1946, meetings were held throughout the province to observe Noakhali Day. This was the beginning of the Bihar riot. Writing to the Viceroy, H. Dow, the Governor reported: On October 25th meetings were held all over the Province to commiserate with Hindu victims of Noakhali and itwas meetings in Chapra (Saran District) and in Patna which started the present widespread riots in South Bihar... 18 In Bengal, however, Gandhi's position became very delicate as the Bihar riot boomeranged on his peace mission in Noakhali. The number of casualties in the Bihar riots was much more than those in the latter. Though there were conflicting reports about the casualties, the Bihar government had given the figure of 5,246, which is suggestive of the intensity of the violence that swept across the area. 19 Therefore the Muslim League ministry in Bengal, which from the very beginning had been trying to minimize its own responsibility in the the Noakhali riots, now found some justification for asking Gandhi to shift his attention to Bihar instead of Noakhali. The details of the Bihar riot were exaggerated and made the centre of projection. The Bihar riots were presented as another stage of the anti-Muslim campaign led by the Congress ministers, which, according to the Muslim League, wanted to annihilate the Muslims and their culture and religion. The Star a/India, a prominent Muslim League daily of Calcutta, dedicated its issue of 11 November 1946, "to the dead of Bihar". "It is only now," it wrote, "that the full staggering enormity of their terrible ordeal has begun to escape through the conspiracy of silence that surrounded the orgy in a thick veil."" As regards the number of people killed, it began with the initial statistics of 13,000. 21 Fazlul Huq came out with a figure of one lakh in Azad, which was quoted in the Star a/India on 13 November 1946. After being criticized for exaggeration, Fazlul Huq brought the figure f

18

H. Dow (Bihar) to Wavell, Telegram, L/P & J/8/575:f220, 9 November

1946, TOP, VoL IX, p. 38.

L.P Singh, "The Bihar Government's Case", 2 February 1947, RP. Papers, 6-B/46, Part I, No. I, cited in Sucheta Mahajan, Independence and Partition, p. 258, fn. 5. 20 Star of India, Calcutta, 14 November 1946, p. 1. 21 See, ibid., 6 November 1946. 19

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down to 30,000. 22 The irresponsible behaviour of the press, which became manifest during the Noakhali riot, reached its climax during the Bihar riots, which forced the Viceroy to ask the ministers of the interim government to control the press. 23 Thus communal discourse whether Hindu or Muslim, justified, and thereby, validated itself and the other. The Muslim League government did not like Gandhi's visit to Noakhali as it felt that world attention would get focused on the active collaboration of the League workers with the rioters. It, therefore, exerted pressure through propaganda and personal insinuation against Gandhi. Even a person of Fazlul Huq's stature urged his audience to make it impossible for Gandhi to remain in Bengal." People holding responsible positions attacked Gandhi and asked him to leave N oakhali, and attend to the Bihar situation. Hamiduddin Chaudhury, a Parliamentary secretary of the Muslim League Ministry, who had visited Noakhali with Gandhi and initially condemned the atrocities there, issued a statement to the press that Gandhi was in Noakhali "only to focus attention of the world on the happenings there and to magnify the issue".25 The full statement read: f

Mr Gandhi does not intend to go to Bihar.... will it be wrong if one feels that Mr Gandhi is in N oakhali only to focus attention of the world on the happenings there and to magnify the same for keeping the Bihar happenings in the background? Does Mr Gandhi want to complete his organisation through the number of volunteers he has got from outside? .. Mr Gandhi may conveniently ask all the outside volunteers both male and female to quit while advising the refugees to return to their homes .... Mr Gandhi is holding prayer meetings everyday in the evening and after the prayer he sometimes delivers lectures .... the Hindus will realise that the mischievous propaganda of their so called friends has been the cause of (bringing upon them) more misery and discomfort, they will begin to think rightly. Free from outside propaganda, they will begin to See, ibid., 14 November 1946, p. 1. See, Wavell to Pethick-Lawrence, 13 November 1946, TOP, pp.56-57. 24 Modern Review, March-October 1947, p. 174, as quoted in Suranjan Das, Communal Riots in BengaC p. 202. 25 Azad, Calcutta, 14 December 1946, p. 1.

22

23

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341

repose confidence in their Muslim neighbours with whom they have been living peacefully for centuries." Synchronizing with statements of this sort was the behaviour of the local Muslim League workers. They began to harass Gandhi, as well as the relief workers, so thattheywould perforce leave the place. Members of the Feni sub-division of the Muslim League sent Gandhi a postcard, containing a copy of the resolution passed by that body, which read: It is appreciated that Mr Gandhi's presence in Bihar is much more useful than at Noakhali where the situation is normal. He is therefore requested to leave for Bihar.27

Gandhi remained undeterred by these attacks. His reply to the Feni sub-division Muslim League request was direct and curt. He wrote that he was unable to follow their advice as it was based on ignorance of the facts. "In the first place, I know that the situation is not normal here and that so far as I can contribute to the Bihar problem, I have to inform you that such influence as I have on Bihar can be and is being efficiently exercised from Srirampur. ff28 It is not that he was not aware of the magnitude of the Bihar riots. Gandhi could see the logic of communalism and the relationship between the Noakhali and Bihar riots. He perceived that Noakhali was the disease, while Bihar was just an outgrowth or casualty of the former. Gandhi's reply to the statement of Hamiduddin Choudhury bears out this understanding. He wrote: It will not serve the cause of peace if I wentto Bihar and found

the Bihar Muslims League's report to be largely imaginary and the Bihar Govt.'s conduct substantially honourable, humane and just. I am not anxious to give them a certificate of good conduct as I am to give you, much though you may not want it. My spare diet and contemplated fast, you know well, were against the Bihar misdoings. I could not take such a step in the Ibid. Gandhi to Ferri Muslim League, 25 December 1946, CWMG, Vol. LXXXVI, p. 265, fn. 4. 28 Ibid., pp.265-66. See also N.K. Bose, My Days, p. 106. 26

27

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matter of Noakhali misdoings. It pains me to think that you a seasoned lawyer should not see the obvious. 29 With the society showing hightened polarization and intolerance and when there were attempts to portray Gandhi as a Hindu and the greatest enemy of the Muslims, this seems to be a sound judgment. He was aware of his ability to influence the ministers and people of Bihar even from a distance. His presence in Noakhali, on the other hand, was a deterrent for any further retaliatory action anywhere else. At another level, he neither had a hold on the Ministers in Bengal, nor did he have any strong influence, as he had witnessed, on the Muslim populace of Noakhali, many of whom had even condemned him as an arch enemy of Islam. 30 Gandhi, on his part, faced all these charges with the simple statement that he was as much a friend of the Muslims as he was of the Hindus. However, this was increasingly disbelieved by the villagers and towards the end of his sojourn they not only boycotted his prayer meetings,'! but also dirtied the roads which he used everyday from village to village. 32 He accepted this as the misdemeanours of those who had failed to understand him and his work. But he f Bose saysf resolved not to "surrender his own love for men even if they were erring" .33 Though outwardly unfazed, the situation in Noakhali, the Bihar riots and its reaction, the strong and entrenched opposition from the Muslim League quarters in Bengal, and his own search for a way out, created some intense moments of self-doubt for Gandhi, who was, thus, not at peace with his inner self. This forced him to put his "will" to the test. He not only reduced his food intake and retained but two of his aides, he also experimented with his personal purity. Though it created a stir even among his close aides, this shows the desperation with which Gandhi was fighting the last battle of his life-a battle against communal ideology.

29

30 31 32 33

N.K. Bose, My Days, p. 109. Gandhi at Srirampur, 27 December 1946, CWMG, VoL LXXXVI, p. 280. N.K. Bose, My Days, p. 132. Ibid. Ibid.

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It seems that the Noakhali sojourn had deep implications for Gandhi's personal understanding of the politics, as well as for his own credo. It is here that he experiments with his vow of celibacy. Sudhir Kakar, who categorized the period as a very depressing one for Gandhi, and it truly was, argues that such a period of desperation, had the potential to disturb the "integration of his [Gandhi's] sexuality and spirituality"." This was because "for Gandhi, celibacy was not only the sine qua non for moksha, but also the mainspring of his political activities [sic]".35 Kakar further argues that 'it is from the repudiation, the ashes of sexual desire, that the weapon of nonviolence which he used so effectively in his political struggle against the racial oppression of the South African white rulers and later against the British empire was phoenix-like born' .36 Bhikhu Parekh, on the other hand, tries to understand this traumatic episode through an analysis of Gandhi's political discourse. For Gandhi, says Parekh, personal purity and political success hung together. Parekh suggests that personal purity generated the energy and power he desperately needed to succeed in his momentous political struggle. On the basis of this argument, he tries to explain Gandhi's Noakhali experiment. He maintains that, f

the more intense his political problems became, the greater was the moral struggle in his personal life. It was hardly surprising that his finest political experiment of successfully controlling violence in Noakhali should have been conducted alongside his heroic sexual experimentY This, however, presumes tha t before every deep crisis he had experimented in this manner. Thus on this ground the crisis at Noakhali is not seen as something deeper than just a political crisis that he had been facing. Gandhi did not experiment with his celibacy before 1942, when almost all his colleagues were f

Sudhir Kakar, Intimate Relations: Exploring Indian Sexuality, New Delhi, 1990, p. 102. 35 Ibid., p.96.

34

36

Ibid.

Bhikhu Parekh, Colonialism, Tradition and Reform: An Analysis of Gandhi's Political Discourse, New Delhi, 1989, p. 195.

37

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dead against launching the Quit India movement. Similarly, before meeting Jinnah when he faced such a severe crisis about accepting the inevitability of partition, he did not experiment. To Kakar and Parekh, therefore, the Noakhali experiment provided a model to be tested, which, however, a closer historical scrutiny disproves. Kakar and Parekh both agree on one central point, i.e., the integration of the spiritual (Parekh calls it the moral) and the sexual in Gandhi's political life. In the context ofNoakhali, however, his experiment needs to be analysed in a much more dynamic manner; to shift emphasis from reading Gandhi the person, to the political context in which he was situated in the winter of 1946. Much earlier, Erikson, one of the pioneers of psychohistory, tried to study the Gandhi of 1918 "in his middle ages, just before he became Mahatma", through primarily the latter's autobiography and interviews with the participants in the textile mill strike in Ahmedabad. 38 The Noakhali experience provided an excellent opportunity to study Gandhi in his "old age", in the sense of Erikson's life cycle theory, according to which there is a distinctive characteristic or Ilgoal" in each stage of life for example youth is marked by an identity crisis. However, given the problems that psychoanalytical studies focus on, any such reading of Gandhi-the man, appears as more of a biographical exercise than a serious discussion on why, say, the population of Noakhali reacted the way they did in the winter of 1946. This shows that, despite attacks by the literary theorists and the external critics of history, historical discourse is most appropriate to understand social realities and to a great extent social psychology too. A post-1942 reading of events shows a strangely quiet Gandhi. That fire of the Quit India movement appeared to be missing. However, he continued his fight against the ideological basis of Pakistan, i.e., the two nation theory. His endorsement of the CR Formula, and subsequent meetings with Jinnah, demonstrated his determination to achieve his ends. The increasing hold of Jinnah over the Muslim masses, which Gandhi himself acknowledged, made him aware of the shrinking space to combat communalism and the notion of Pakistan. Writing to Jinnah on 15 September f

f

See, Erik H. Erikson, Gandhi's Truth on the Origins of Militant Non-Violence, New York, 1969.

38

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1944, he said, "I know that you have acquired a unique hold on the Muslim masses. I want you to use your influence for their total welfare."" His acceptance of the envisaged partition in the CR Formula was the limit to which he was prepared to compromise with Jinnah 4 0 With this compromising stroke, however, he lost his advantage to fight "Pakistan". By 1946, he had no political weapons left to arm himself against the Muslim League and the rapid communalization of the societyf which in a sense culminated in the Noakhali riot. The religious sanction behind the Noakhali riot disturbed him terribly because it robbed him of one of his most significant political weapons-a politics based on ethics and morality. He, therefore, had no plans, no weapons, and helplessly asked "Kya Karoan, Kya Karoan?" (what should I do, what should I do?). Thus more than a personal crisis, itwas also a moment of a deep theoretical crisis. It is at this critical juncturef when a crisis at the theoretical level faced a person involved so deeply in public life, that a rupture between Gandhi's personal life and political struggle seemed imminent. The situational adversity, his feeling of loneliness and the intensity of communal hatred, together forced Gandhi to engage in an intense battle with his own self. This explains to some extent his moments of agony. At this point, he tested himself to garner moral strength, and equip himself to dispel the darkness around 4 !

II Gandhi was in Noakhali from 6 November 1946 to the end of February 1947. In May 1947, he visited Calcutta when the question of a united and sovereign Bengal vis-a.-vis the partition of the province was agitating the minds of the leaders and people ofthe province. His last visit to the province was in August 1947. The news of the Punjab killings had already poisoned the air in Calcutta, and there were all the indications of the city erupting

Gandhi to Jinnah, 15 September 1944, N.N. Mitra ed., Annual Register, 1944, Vol. 11, p. 141. 40 See Chapter Three for a detailed discussion on the CR Formula. 41 N.K Bose, My Days, p. 101.

39

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in a communal conflagration again. It was on the verge of this situation that he undertook the now famous Ilfast" to intervene in the continuing civil strife. He was supposed to leave for Noakhali on 1 November 1946, but the departure was postponed to 6 November.42 Beginning his tour with the villages of Gopdirbag, he reached Srirampur on 20 November 1946, where he decided to spend the next one and half months.43 His visits to these villages on the one hand stirred the entire area with new life, and on the other strengthened his own determination to contest communal politics, with Noakhali as his battleground." In combating communal ideology and the forces that represented it, he sought to heal the societal rupture that had sustained the communal breach. The battle was a difficult one, because the communalization of the population was complete. This made him more determined to fight it with all his strength. After a long sojourn in Srirampur, which had soon become the nerve centre of his mission in Noakhali, Gandhi embarked on his journey into the interior of Noakhali and Tippera from 2 January 1947. He repeatedly expressed his desire to be left alone on this journey, and in fact, desired that the military protection provided to him be withdrawn. He felt it prevented him from showing the people that his concern was genuine, and that they could approach him without any fear. He wrote to Suhrawardy on 8 January 1947, All my attempts at bringing about real friendship between the two communities must fail so long as I go about fully protected by armed police or military. ... The fright of the military keeps them from coming to me and asking all sorts of questions for the resolution of their doubts .... " He wanted the Muslim population to give vent to their anger openly, which would clear avenues for dialogue, rather than Hindustan Standard, Calcutta, 1 November 1946, p. 1. He visited 48 villages during his stay in Noakhali. He covered those Noakhali-Tippera villages most affected by the riot, including Karpara and Devipur. 44 CWMG, Vol. LXXXVI, pp. 62, 65, 70. 45 Letter to Suhrawardy, 8 January 1947, CWMG, Vol. LXXXVI, p. 330. In fact in some villages when he reached, people had fled with the news of the arrival of police and military. 42 43

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continue with the present scenario of sullenness. He wanted both the conununities to be brave but, as he wrote, "unfortunately both lack this very necessary human quality".46 In almost all the villages he visited and the congregational prayer meetings he addressed, he admonished the Hindus for being cowards and exhorted them to be fearless. He was aware of the fear that prevailed, and of the fact that the Hindus were really in great danger without adequate protection. The total social rupture that was demonstrated by the brutality of the communal attacks was soon compounded by the Muslim League workers instituting false cases against Hindu villages,47 at times with the active connivance of the local authorities. 48 Even the army found it difficult to tackle the situation. Therefore, talk of fearlessness in such an atmosphere of allpervasive tyranny of fear was seen by many as unwise. Leaders of political parties, especially the Mahasabha leaders, demanded military protection for the Hindus of Noakhali 49 Contesting this line of argument, Gandhi refuted the claims that he was not practical in advocating military protection for the Hindus. "I am an idealist,"50 he said to the Hindu Mahasabha delegation, "but I claim to be a practical idealist".51 And as a Ilpractical idealist"f he must have realized that any talk of army protection would make the Muslim villagers more belligerent against the Hindus, as well as hamper the return of a normal social existence in these villages. In the same vein, he contested the idea of the "segregation of Hindu population in protected pockets".52 For him, this Ibid. F. Tucker, While Memory Serves, pp. 609-12: Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi: The Last Phase, Book I, Ahmedabad, 1958, p. 15. The colonial attitude can be contrasted here:

46

47

He [Burrows] was relieved that G. [Gandhi] had left Bengal, it had taken 20 of his best police to protect him; and he was sarcastic over an American correspondent's article headed "Gandhi walks alone"! (Penderal Moon, Wavell, p. 428.)

Ibid. Gandhi's discussion with Mahasabha leaders,S December 1946, CWMG, Vol. LXXXVI. p. 199. 5() Ibid. 51 Ibid. 52 Ibid. 48

49

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Ilwouid be interpreted as preparation of war"53 by the Muslim League. IIFor myself/' he declared, lithe path is different." He wanted one worker in each village "to steal the heart of the inhabitants".54 It did not matter, he added, if there was only one or many Hindus in a village. His prescription was that they should stick to their posts and even face death if necessary with courage and willingness. If they live in clusters it would only mean accepting Muslim League's mischievous tvvo nation theory.55 Here, the idea that the villagers, irrespective of their religious affilia tion, should take responsibility for each other was a very fundamental one for Gandhi. It was this idea of responsibility that he atttempted to use as an antidote against the atmosphere of violence, created with the help ofthe idea of Pakistan through which people were trying to legitimize their acts of irresponsibility. It is on this level that a face-to-face community could be validated against an abstraction, which was proving to be negative and anti-emancipatory.56 Therefore, the path he chose was different. The talk of migration was in the air but in his opinion if it had to take place, "it must be complete".57 After all this was what Pakistan meant. He did not want to be "a willing party to Pakistan".58 Pakistan was a political agenda and not a social solution, just as migration was not the solution to the problem. liN 0 police or military would protect those who are cowards" .59 Gandhi emphasized the need for Hindus to be courageous and shun their inferiority complex. From the beginning he asked them to be fearless. On 12 November at Dattapara he said that he "had seen the terror-stricken faces of the sufferers. They had been forcibly converted once and they were afraid the same thing would be repeated. He wanted them to shed thatfear."60 In fact, he tried Ibid. Ibid. 55 Ibid. 56 This validation, however, is not on the plea of pragmatism but on the argued and reasoned understanding of the emancipatory potetnial of any discourse, particularly when we are trying to understand two ideas like nationalism and communalism. 57 Ibid. 58 Ibid. 59 Ibid. 6() Prayer meeting, Dattapara, 12 November 1946, CWMG, Vol. LXXXVI! p. 113. 53

54

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to attack the tyrannical hegemony of fear that the communal violence had created in the minds of the people. It was here that he reflected on his idea of an imminent civil war tha t communalism posed at this stage, and with which the League was trying to get Pakistan. Therefore, Gandhi in his talk with Nalini Mitra and Rasomoy Sur of Noakhali at Srirampur, concluded that "the present problem was not the question of Noakhali alone; it was a problem for the whole of Bengal and the whole ofIndia"61This was why Gandhi was so perturbed about Noakhali. In fact, his determination to go back to N oakhali even after the partition, reflects his idea of attacking communal ideology and the "two nation theory" from here. Thusf unlike his Iisearch for light"f as far as his actions were concernedf he was determined that Noakhali was going to be his testing ground. In Dattapara he said, The question of East Bengal is not one of Bengal alone. The battle for India is today being decided in East Bengal. Today Mussulmans are being taught by some that Hindu religion is an abomination and therefore forcible conversion of Hindus to Islam is a merit. 62 Noakhali in his mind was like Champaran or Bardoli-the Ilmodel site" for launching his movement. His speech at Nabagram reflected what was going on his mind. He said, "Noakhali offered an almost ideal situation for testing whether ahimsa could effectively be used by a small number of people against an almost sullen, if not hostile, majority all round."63 He was conscious that "the problem here was also complicated by the fact of the existence of a popular Government controlling the destinies of the people". 64 About the contrasting psyche of the two communities in Noakhali, he stated that he had been "moving amidst a sullen population on the one hand and a frightened one on the other".65 A conciliationf he resolvedf was to be achieved through the one's openness and the other's fear lessness. Gandhi's presence and his attempts at meeting people in Iitheir home"f Srirampur, 22 November 1946, ibid., p. 145. Dattapara, 12 Nov ember 1946, ibid., p. 115. 63 Gandhi's interview at Nabagram, 1 February 1947, CWMG, VoL LXXXVI, p.416. 64 Ibid. 65 Ibid., p. 417. 61 62

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were themselves a symbolic attack on the prevailing atmosphere marked by fear. Gandhi was very upset by the targeting of violence against women who were the worst victims. The male population in most of the villages had to run for their lives and the women lived in great fear and danger. Gandhi asked them to be courageous without sounding patronizing-he shared their grief. Manubehen Gandhi, his granddaughter, who was there with him wrote: f

many of them had been forcibly converted to Islam. As the husbands and sons of some of them had been murdered, they were plunged in grief. With sobs and tears they poured out their stricken hearts to Bapuji. "The only difference between you and me/'he consoled them Ilis that you cry and I don't. Butmy heart sorrows for you. Your grief is my grief; that's why I have come here. There is no remedy for our pain except faith in God. Is the one, most efficacious panacea dead. If one imbibes this truth, there will be no cause for such outbursts of grief."66 f

Later, Gandhi in a sad tone told Manubehan, "the meeting with those sisters is still vivid, who knows how many more tragic sights like this I am fated to see".67 Speaking at Jagatpur on 10 January 1947, he advised his audience about courage and the need of never surrendering one's honour even on pain of death".68 Gandhi's presence his prayer meetings, which encouraged women to come out confidently in the open after a long time, and his constant evocation of courage, fearlessness, honour and death, had a significant impact. Women began to come out and share their tales of woe with him. In Bansa, they put before him their dilemma, "what is a woman to do when attacked by miscreants-run away or resist with violence".69 Gandhi shared their concern and advised them to come out of the trap of violence. He said, II

f

My answer to this question is very simple. For me there can be no preparation for violence. All preparation must be for 66

67 68

69

Manubehen Gandhi, Lonely Pilgrim, p. 81. Ibid. N.K. Bose, My Days, p. 126. Palla, 27 January 1947, CWMG, VoL LXXXVI, p.397.

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non-violence if courage of the highest type is to be developed. Violence can only be tolerated as being preferable always to cowardice .... For a non-violent person there is no emergency but quiet dignified preparation for death. 70 He asked them to be like Sita and Savitri who by their deeds refuted the fact that women were "weak". While speaking at Bhatialpur he noted, "!twas often said that women were naturally weak-they were abalas". His advice to women was that they should not believe such thingsn They could be, he opined, as hard as men.72 While advising Hindu women to become courageous and fearless, he asked them to help the neighbouring Muslim women shed their ignorance and illiteracy, as also in other aspects where they lagged behind the former. 73 As Gandhi's journey progressed, a sense of confidence built up in the N oakhali villages. Women started coming out more often and they even displayed the courage that Gandhi was exhorting them to live with. Bose wrote that after one prayer meeting a girl came up to tell her story without the slightest fear, and on being asked whether she would be able to go back and stay once more in the midst of scenes she could never forget, the girl answered in the affirmative. 74 Bose recorded that she answered in this manner because now she knew that she could save herself by dying. 75 This forced Bose to think about the transformation Gandhi had caused. Though equivocal in his judgement, he could not negate the influence of Gandhi's speeches on that girl.76 When told that the Muslims were willing to receive the refugees back in their villages, provided they withdrew the criminal cases arising out of the disturbances, Gandhi provided the guilty with two alternatives: They could admit the crimes and justify their conduct on the ground that whatever they had done was under advice, solely for the establishment of Pakistan without anypersonalmotive

70 71 72 73 74 75

76

Ibid., pp. 397-98. Bhatialpur, 14 January 1947, CWMG, Vol. LXXXVI, p. 353. Ibid. Ibid. N.K. Bose, My Days, p. 146. Ibid. Ibid., p. 147.

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and face the consequences. Or, they should report and submit to penalty of law by way of expiation. 77 But he negated any compromise such as dropping the cases. Hence, personal responsibility was to be accepted, as also the root of those acts which had forced people to create such a situation. He rejected the idea of the Hindu Mahasabha that the entire Hindu population should be segregated in pockets. N.C. Chatterjee, the president of the Bengal Provincial Hindu Mahasabha (BPHM), personally came to Gandhi to argue on these lines. Gandhi's counter-argument contained his idea of responsibility. For him, the former was an unworkable proposition. He said to N.C. Chatterjee: Put yourself in Mr Suhrawardy's shoes; do you think he would favour it, or even the Muslim residents of Noakhali? For it would be interpreted as a preparation for warJ8 He could see that by putting forth that demand, they would practically be conceding the logic of the Muslim League's demand of Pakistan. He opined, and quite forcefully, that if migration had to take place, it must be systematic and complete, and it was not therefore to be thought of so long as there was any hope of cooperation. And so long as there was any hope, efforts were to be made for a permanent solution to the communal problem. It is here that he could see the Hindu Mahasabha and the Muslim League actions as complementary to each other. Gandhi, on the other hand, insisted that for a permanent solution, responsibility as well as proximity were absolutely necessary. While talking to NaliniMitra and Rasamay Sur at Srirampur on22 November his advice to the victims was not to leave their homes and go elsewhere. 79 In conversation with Nalini Mitra and Rasomoy Sur at Srirampur, he said, The Bengalees were always in the forefront of civilised life in bravery and sacrifice and it was really shocking to find that Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi, p.416. N.K. Bose, My Days, p. 84. He countered similar arguments from the Muslim quarter during his visit to the riot affected areas in Bihar. 79 Srirampur, 22 November 1946, CWMG, VoL LXXXVI, p. 145. 77 78

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people would run away in fear giving up their hearths and homes:so He said that he wanted to see every Hindu family settle down in its own village and face the situation fearlessly and with courage. 81 While he asked them to seek protection through their inner strength, he also tried, through the peace committees, to create bridges between the communities. This would enable the communities to come into physical proximity with one another, which again would bring moral responsibility into the social life of the population.82 The enactment of this idea of the sense of responsibility lay in his idea of peace committees of the local population. Initially, the idea to have peace committees was mooted by the Bengal Muslim League government while Gandhi was in Srirampur. The plan was to have equal number of Hindu and Muslim members in these peace committees with a government official as chairman. Gandhi was favourably disposed to the idea because it fulfilled his idea of responsibility. This is why he asked the Hindu members to give it a chance to succeed when the latter insisted on first bringing the miscreants to book. Gandhi advised them not to summarily reject the proposal by placing any conditions. Thus, the Hindus had to trust and honour the wor k of these committees. The functions of the peace committees were defined as: f

Ibid. Ibid. 82 Relating the idea of responsibility, its social and moral dimensions, and their mutual relationship, with the larger context of modernity, sociologist Zygmunt Bauman in his study on the Holocaust makes this observation: 80 81

Responsibility, this building block of all moral behaviour arises out of the proximity of the other. Proximity means responsibility and responsibility is proximity.... The alternative to proximity is social distance. The moral attribute of social distance is lack of moral relationship, or heterophobia. Responsibility is silenced once proximity is eroded; it may eventually be replaced with resentment once the fellow human subject is transformed into another. The process of social transformation is one of social separation. It was such a separation which made it possible for thousands to kill, and millions to watch the murder without protesting.. (Zygmilllt Bauman, Modernity and the Holocaust, London, 1989, p. 184.)

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1. Undertaking intensive propaganda work to restore confidence; 2. Helping in constructing shelters for the returning refugees, and in processing and distributing relief, e.g., food, clothing etc.; 3. Drawing up lists of miscreants who should be rounded up. These lists would be checked with the First Information Reports (FIRs) already lodged with the police and arrests would be made on verification. If an innocent person was found to have been arrested, the peace committee would recommend to the magistra te his release on bail or unconditionally as the case might be; 4. Preparing a list of houses destroyed or damaged during the disturbances.

Similarly Gandhi asked the people to trust representatives of the government. In Srirampur, he said: Here were elected Muslims who were running the government of the Province, who gave them their word of honour. They would not be silent witnesses to the repetition of shameful deeds. His advice to the Hindus was to believe their word and give them a trial. This did not mean there would not be a single bad Mussulman left in East Bengal. There were good and bad men amongst all communities. Dishonourable conduct would break any ministry or organisation in the end. S3

When the government's efforts proved wanting, Gandhi even went to the extent of advocating that Iione brave man" in a village could achieve the desired peace, if he was ready to lay down his life when the occasion arose rather than shun responsibility. He was of the firm conviction that a single man could change the entire complexion of societal thought by his acts. He was glad to meet the MaulviatMuraim who "helped in sustaining his theory that one individual can transform the entire society". There was no riot in Muraim where, according to Pyarelal, the Maulvi was like an oasis amidst the desert; he saw to it that the Hindus did not even panic and made himself responsible for their well-being. 84

83 84

N.K. Bose, My Days, p.58. Pyarelal, Mahatma Gandhi, p.399.

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The third ingredient in Gandhi's battle in Noakhali-Tippera was an attack on communal ideology from a high moral and ethical plane. First, he emphasized the right of every individual to profess or follow any religion as long as it did not negatively affect the others' religious creeds. He was appalled to witness the religious intolerance shown during the riot and which continued during his visits. In the village of Masimpur, which he visited on 7 January 1947, the Muslim audience leftthe place once he began his prayer meeting. At which Gandhi remarked: "1 am sorry because some of my friends had not been able to bear any name of God except Khuda but I am glad because they have had the courage of expressing their dissent openly and plainly."S5 This small incident provides an inkling of the mentality that prevailed during the fateful October disturbances in the district. He then appealed to the "Muslim brethren" to assure him "of thatfreedom which is true to the noblesttradition ofIslam. Even from the Muslim League platforms, it has been repeatedly said that in Pakistan there will be full tolerance of the practice of their faiths by the minorities and that they will enjoy freedom of worship equally with the majority."86 There was no sense of appeasement. His stout defence of his Ram dhun and the prayer meetings testified to his fight for religious freedom. Here again, it will not be out of place to suggest that prayer for him broke all religious and communal boundaries and in addition it even gave voice to the protesting soul. The prayer meetings of Gandhi brought people out into the open for the first time after 10 October 1946, and thereby, broke the tyranny of fear. In a place where all symbols of a particular religion had been made the target of attack, the Gandhian defense came as an attack on that particular undercurrent of communal ideology, which legitimized religious intolerance. Another aspect of this was by bringing up ethical-moral questions, Gandhi was trying to de legitimize the forces of communal ideology, which, in fact, claimed religious sanction for their agenda of violence. In retrospect this seems quite significant, because clerics of religion, and religion itself, had become the main prop and legitimizing factor in the Noakhali riot. Apart from the physical manifestation of it, f

85

86

f

Prayer meeting at Masimpur, 7 January 1947, CWMG, VoL LXXXVI, p. 323. Ibid., pp. 323-24.

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Gandhi perceived the prevailing psyche from a discussion with MaulviKhalilur Rahman of Devipur, when he visited there on 17 February 1947. The Maulvi was reportedly responsible for the conversion of a large number of Hindus during the disturbances. s7 On being asked about the truth of the matter, the Maulvi said: "the conversion should not be taken seriously, it was a dodge adopted to save the life of the Hindus".88 Gandhi was aghast at this casual attitude that the religious preceptor displayed towards religion. Bose noted, "[he] asked him if it was any good saving one's life (jan) by sacrificing one's faith (iman)? It would have been much better if, as a religious preceptor, he had taught the Hindus to lay down their lives for their faith, rather than give it up through fear."89 The divine stuck to his position that such false conversions for saving one's life had the sanction of religion. This angered Gandhi considerably and he lamented that if "ever he met God, he would ask Him why a man with such views had ever been made a religious preceptor". 90 This and other encounters made him realize that the acts of communal violence and attacks on religion during the riot had the strong sanction of the clerics and religious teachers. The large-scale conversions were a living testimony. Therefore, he tried to invoke Islam itself, to counter the ideology seeking to premise itself on Islam. Requesting the Muslims to join the peace committees, he said: It was only in order to serve the cause ofIslam that the Muslims

are being called to join the committees. The most important task is to restore the confidence among the Hindus that they would be able to pursue their religious practice in freedom 91 In another place when he was describing his meeting with the Hindu women Ilwho put on vermilion mark indoors but wipe it off when they stir out in public", Gandhi invoked the name of the Prophet and Islam:

87 88 89 9()

91

N.K Bose, My Days, p. 130. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., p. 64.

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I will ask my Mussulman friends to treat this as their sacred duty. The Prophet once advised Mussulmans to consider the Jewish places of worship to be as pure as their own, and offer itthe same protection. !tis the duty of the Mussulmans of today to assure the same freedom to their Hindu neighbours n He himself referred to Jinnah so that the local Muslim Leaguers did not commit misdeeds by using the latter's name. He said, Qaid-i-Azam Jinnah has said that every Muslim must show by his conduct that not a single non-Muslim need be afraid of him, the latter would be guaranteed safety and protection. For, thus alone can the Mussulmans command honour and respect. 93 He knew quite well that Jinnah held sway over the masses. So, his was a very practical realization that he could not fight this battle by attacking Jinnah but rather by taking his name. His constant references to the Quran were also supportive of his argument that "if people had known the true meaning of their scriptures, happenings like those of Noakhali could never have taken place".94 In a talk with the villagers of Fatehpur, he appealed to their reason by saying: !t is the easiest thing to harass the Hindus here, as you Muslims are in the majority. Butis it just as honourable? Show me, please, if such a mean action is suggested anywhere in your Koran. I am a student of the Koran .... So in all humility I appeal to you to dissuade your people from committing such crimes, so that your own future may be bright." The major part of Gandhi's experiment in Noakhali was the attack on communal ideology with three ingredients, viz., advocacy of fearlessness, invoking the sense of responsibility and taking the discourse to an ethical-moral plane. He struck at the core of the crisis by posing a counterpoint to the prevalent mental blocks. He understood that the hegemony of communal ideology

94

Ibid., pp. 64-65. Ibid., p. 65. Ibid., p.57.

95

Gandhi's talk at Fatehpur, 8 January 1947, CWMG, VoL LXXXVI, p.328.

92 93

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was partially a reflection of the socio-economic structure of that society. And this was quite significant for his own ear lier understanding of the problem of communalism." He endeavoured to understand the problem in its totality and this made him realize that his task would be a long one. However, he remained faithful to his prioritizing of the ideological fight, as he recognized its necessity at this particular historical juncture.

IV A study of Gandhi's presence in Bengal during those fa teful days brings another personality within our analytical ambit-Hussain Saheed Suhrawardy. Suhrawardy was not only the prime minister of the province where the acts of communal violence were taking place but he was also an actor in the drama of communal politics itself. Gandhi had realized that the attendance of both Hindus and Muslims in his prayer meetings was dwindling and that there would come a day when he might be left without anyone to listen to him at all. But he was confident that this was "no reason for him to give up his mission in despair".97 He said he was prepared to roam from village to village taking his spinning wheel with him. It would be an act of service to God . ... A worker who travelled from village to village teaching people how to clean their ponds effectively and teaching them other arts and crafts so as to enrich the life of the villages, should be able to make the villagers long for his company rather than shun him.98 He was, therefore, prepared to live there and fight his battle, preparing himself and N oakhali for a major offensive. He was not just trying to test his non-violence but test it vis-a.-vis the Ilpoisonous spread of communalism". In a letter to Patel from the village Datta, he wrote: "The poison [of communalism] is public

96

~ 98

Gargi Chakravarty! Gandhi and Communalism! Delhi! 1988. CWMG, Vol. LXXXVI, pp. 318-19. Ibid.

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knowledge. Non-violence has to make its way through it. That is the only way in which it can be put to the test."99 He never attacked IIPakistan" but communalism which constituted the ideological basis of the demand. After all, Gandhi had accepted that he was not averse to a partition of sorts if it was not based on the theory of two nations:!OO f

f

I proceed on the assumption thatIndia isnotto be regarded as two or more nations but as one family.... I can ... recommend to the Congress and the country the acceptance of the claim for separation contained in the Muslim League resolution of Lahore of 1940 ... and that it had to be mutually agreed and not a gift of the British.!O! He was trying to call the Muslim League's bluff on the threat of violence. Speaking at Karpara on 12 January 1947, he said that it was wrong to think that "Pakistan could be achieved through civil war" . 102 The Bihar riot however interrupted his plan and he had to leave Noakhali in March 1947, but Noakhali remained a recurrent theme on his tour of Bihar. Afterwards, he wanted to go back to Bengal and particularly to Noakhali. On the eve of independence, he finally arrived at Calcutta from where he proceeded to Noakhali. Here, he found himself staring at the danger of an impending communal riot. Gandhi reached Calcutta on 9 August 1947 from Srinagar. On the same day a deputation led by S.M. Usman, ex-Mayor of Calcutta, waited upon him and requested him to postpone his Noakhali journey, as the Muslims of Calcu tta needed his presence more than anybody else. Mr Usman pleaded with him by saying: "We Muslims have as much claim upon you as the Hindus. For you yourself have said you are as much of Muslims as of Hindus"Y13 For Gandhi, the violence in Calcutta did not constitute the core of the problem, and he was concerned with the situation in f

Gandhi to Patel, Datta, 24 January 1947, CWMG, VoL LXXV, p.386. Gandhi to Jinnah, 24 September 1944, N.N. Mitra ed., Annual Register, 1944, Vol. 11, p. 147.

99

100

10 1 102 103

Ibid. Karpara, 12 January 1947, CWMG, VoL LXXXVI, p.347. Gandhi's discussion with U sman, 10 August 1947, ibid., VoL LXXXIX,

p.21.

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Noakhali, about which he was kept informed by his workers engaged in relief work there. He, in turn, kept Suhrawardy informed, and demanded that he attend to these matters. He wired Suhrawardy saying, " ... I continue (to) receive doleful wires about increasing lawlessness Noakhali (stop) I suggest prompt attention ... and prompt action .... "l04 Therefore, when requested to stay in Calcutta, he asked for an assurance that the situation in Noakhali would not deteriorate. "If anything happens here," he said, "I now have a right to go on a fast for Noakhali and you will have to be a witness during the fast".105 He was reassured that the Leaguers in Noakhali would be informed, but that he would not be allowed to fast. It was at this point that Suhrawardy encountered Gandhi again. He met Gandhi on 11 August and had a long talk with him. Gandhi told Suhrawardy that he would remain in Calcutta, if the latter was prepared to live with him under the same roof: This is my second offer to you. We shall have to work as long as every Hindu and Mussulman in Calcutta does not safely return to the place where he was before. We shall continue in our effort till our last brea th ID6 Suhrawardy was prepared but Gandhi did not want him to commit immediately and advised him to consult his family 107 as the decision had serious implications. "The old Suhrawardy would have to die"l08 Why did Gandhi choose Suhrawardy?

104 105 106 107

Gandhi's telegram to Suhrawardy, 7 April 1947, ibid., VoL LXXXVll, p.221. Manubehen Gandhi, Lonely Pilgrim, p. 21. N.K. Bose, My Days, p.224. Manubehen writes: Shri Suhrawardy came at 10 p.m. He was with Bapu for nearly an hour and a half. Bapuji said, "We shall both work together you should join me if you are sincere (sic). Then I do not have to go to Noakhali. This is a path of renunciation so, you should consult your family before you decide." (Manubehen Gandhi, Lonely Pilgrim, p. 23.)

for the implication of what I mean", Gandhi said, "is that the old Suhrawardy will have to die and accept the garb of a mendicant (fakir)." (Gandhi to Suhrawardy, 11 August 1947, CWMG, VoL LXXXIX, p. 28.) 108 " ••

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After all, he was the person who was held primarily responsible for the Calcutta killings and the rapid deterioration of communal relations in the province. The search for the answer to this question leads one to explore the way Gandhi was trying to understand and act according to the situations that were arising. Gandhi had met Suhrawardy for the first time at a conference in Faridpur in 1918. This was the time when Gandhi was trying to launch the Non-Cooperation movement. Suhrawardy, like other men of his age was attracted towards him. The strong attraction that Suhrawardy had felttowards Gandhi in 1918 had made him ask the latter to address him as son. Reminding Suhrawardy of their old acquaintance, Gandhi wrote: I remind you of our pleasant meeting in Faridpur when Deshbandhu Chittaranjan Das was still in his physical case. If I remember rightly, you were the only one sitting in front of me spinning assiduously, though you were unable to pull an even or fine thread. And then, if I remember rightly, when I applied to you some distant adjective of affection, you corrected me by saying that you felt as son to me [sic]. I would like to think still that you are the same Shaheed and to feel proud tha t my son has become Chief Minister of Bengal... 1 09 Their relationship waned over the years, during which Suhrawardy emerged as the most powerful leader of the Muslim League in Bengal. But, this coming together in the month of August 1947 appears to have revived the old attraction. It was the realization of Gandhi's potential and the question of safety of Muslims in Calcutta, which brought Suhrawardy close to Gandhi, and he soon became Gandhi's Ilmessenger of peace". During his stay in Noakhali, Gandhi repeatedly impressed upon Suhrawardy the need to own up responsibility for the state of affairs and to improve the situation in Noakhali rather than add fire to the already tense communal situation. Writing to him about the rationale for being in Noakhali, and asking him also to be mindful of Noakhali, Gandhi said, I wish you had Bengal on the brain rather than Bihar. Assume the truth of all that has been said in the Bihar provincial

1C19

Gandhi to Suhrawardy, 24 December 1946, CWMG, VoL LXXXVI, p.260.

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Muslim League's reports .... You do not want to satisfy yourself by thanking God for Bengal being as bad as Bihar.... I frankly confess to you that these reports do not carry conviction to me. If even 50 per cent of the stories are true, life would become a burden for me .... You should know tha t though here, I was able to affect events in Bihar by my putting myself on protein and fat free diet and by my proposal, if things did not mend, to undertake complete fast. 110 He in fact volunteered his services for creating conditions conducive for the refugees to return. However even in this there was a strong message of responsibility to be shouldered by Suhrawardy: f

f

Though I have not come out publicly, and I hope I shall never have to do so, things in this part of Bengal are notat all rosy. Fear still dominates the refugees. Refugees ought not to be threatened with stoppage of ra tions. There are several other humane ways of inducing them to rerum to their homes. If you really want them to do so, you ought to supply them with proper food, warm clothing and decent habitation .... If you cannot do so, because of want of funds or sufficient workers, it would be quite proper and honourable to make that announcement and let philanthropists do the needful. There are workers enough in the country who would respond to the call. You, single-handed, will not be able to cope with the work. .. you will find in me a ready, willing, and, I hope, efficient helper. (Italics mine)111 Suhrawardy had been defending his government quite forcefully by constantly harping on the fact that Noakhali was just a law and order problem, and that the situation would soon be brought under control (which, as we have seen, was not the case).1l2 It was Gandhi who advised the people to trust the government and honour Suhrawardy's words. While resolute in his fight against the the two-nation theory in the fields and villages ofNoakhali, Gandhi kept in mind Suhrawardy's potential as the leader of the Muslim masses. By virtue of this, he could have challenged Gandhi's politics with the help of his mass base in

110 111 112

Gandhi to Suhrawardy, 24 December 1946, Ibid. Ibid., pp. 160-61. Star of India , Calcutta, 17 October 1946, p. 1.

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Bengal. Gandhi's insistence on remaining in Noakhali even when the Bihar riot had boomeranged on his mission, indicates his strong resolution. The opportunity, however, was lost due to several reasons, primarily owing to his entanglement in the logic of communal politics. Even as late as June 1947, when the partition of Bengal had become an imminent possibility, he wrote to Suhrawardy saying that this could still be undone. He wrote, Instead of being angry you should be thankful to me that I have dispelled all suspicion, if there was no ground for any. ... Do you not realise that the unity of Bengal is as dear to me as it is to you? The partition agreed to by the Congress and the Muslim League, however reluctantly it may be, can still be undone by you if you would, as I suggested to you when we met, stoop to conquer the Hindus. 113 Meanwhile, in order to counter the influence of the Nazimuddin-Ispahani combine who owed their political existence more to Jinnah's appeal than to their base in Bengal, Suhrawardy had attempted to radicalize his stance. This radicalization, as we have seen, was rather a combination of radical rhetoric and communal politics, than what Hashim claimed he was trying to project, i.e., radicalization on communistic lines. Therefore, by 1946 Suhrawardy not only outshone the Nazimuddin-Ispahani combine in provincial politics, but also came out as the most enthusiastic exponent of Pakistan. It was not a coincidence that he turned out to be the most Ilenthusiastic Direct Actor" on that fateful Direct Action day. What he failed to understand was the fact that Jinnah could deliver extremely radical and communal rhetoric and ask people to go for direct action, without taking any responsibility for such actions. Suhrawardy, on the other hand, was the Premier of the province, where any such action that escalated communal oppositions would alienate him from one section of the population. And by 1947, he had successfully managed to alienate almost the whole of the Hindu population. This was quite strange, given his ambition of holding together a greater Bengal. He confessed to Gandhi that " ... no Hindu would listen to him today; he found it hard to 113

Gandhi to Suhrawardy, 12 June 1947, CWMG, VoL LXXXVIII, p. 137.

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prove the utter sincerity of his proposal" .114 It was upon this confession that Gandhi offered to act as his secretary and "live under the same roof with him and see to it tha t the Hindus at least gave him a patient hearing." Was he prepared to accept the offer?115 Suhrawardy was perplexed at what he thought of as a "mad offer"Y 6 However he accepted the invitation when proffered a second time by Gandhi on the eve of the partition and independence. However, the time and context had changed drastically. But it did not mean Gandhi's offer was less consequential; rather, it went on to provide the ingredient for a sound countercommunal stratagem at a high, symbolic level. Once Suhrawardy had accepted to live under the same roof as Gandhi, a place was selected, to demonstrate its symbolic value. On the afternoon of 13 August 1947, Gandhi arrived at Beliaghata. He was accompanied by S.M. Usman, the ex-Mayor and secretary of the Calcutta District Muslim League, Mr A.P. Chaudhury, political secretary to the chief minister, Manubehen Gandhi and Abha Gandhi. 1l7 By the time the entourage, which also included N.K. Bose, reached the Hydari Mansion-the house where they stayed in Beliaghata-a number of demonstrators had gathered there. They were protesting against the fact that Gandhiji had come to stay here, instead of going on to Ultadanga and Kankurgachi, where Hindus were being killed by Muslims. People also shouted at Suhrawardy, and accused him of complicity in the communal riots. Gandhi felt glad that, f

the demonstrators had not merely the courage to oppose him openly, but also to charge Mr Suhrawardy to his face with all that they had to say against him. Such courage was good; it was indeed a contrast to what he had witnessed in the district of Noakhali hitherto. 118 Despite such pronouncements, Gandhi was quite conscious of the fact tha t he was taking a big risk by staying with Suhrawardy. In a letter to Vallabhbhai Patel he commented, N.K. Bose, My Days, p.200. Ibid. 116 Ibid. 117 D.C. Tendulkar, Mahatma , The Life and Works of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, Ahmedabad, VoL II, 1954, p. 227. 118 N.K. Bose, My Days, p.227. 114 115

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I am stuck here and now I am going to take a big risk. Suhrawardy and I are going to stay together in a turbulent area from today. Let us see what happens. Keep a watch.ll9 But then the rationale was that no Hindu in Bengal trusted Suhrawardy, and itwas rebuilding trust that was most important for the restoration of communal harmony. In a letter to Sa tish Chandra Dasgupta written from Beliaghata, also dated 13 August 1947, he wrote, "Shaheed Saheb will be with me. Let me see what happens. Ihave taken many risks, perhaps this is the greatest of all. Who knows what will happen? We have to live as God wills and be content".120 This had its desired effect. On the eve ofindependence, i.e., 14 August 1947, a strange fever of fraternization gripped the Calcuttans, and the same Hindus and Muslims who had strictly avoided each other's company ever since the Direct Action day riot overflowed on the streets with fraternizing scenes. Thisf an eye witness who travelled with Gandhi said, reminded him of Eric Maria Ramarque's All Quiet on the Western Front, when on Christmas eve, the French and German soldiers came out of their trenches and forgot, even if it were for a brief moment, that they were to regard each other as enemies.l21 Gandhiji himself wrote in a piece in the Harijan entitled IIMiracle or Accident"f that the Iljoy of fraternization [sic] is leaping up from hour to hour". l22 However, Gandhi was not very jubilant about this show of goodwill. "I am not lifted off my feet by these demonstrations of joy/'123 was his response to the events. Why? Becausef he saidf "he could not be satisfied until Hindus and Muslim felt safe in one another's company and returned to their own homes to live as before. Without that change of heart, there was likelihood of future deterioration in spite of the present enthusiasm".124 His anticipation proved correct because very soon Calcutta saw the recrudescence of communal violence. This finally forced Gandhi to sit on a fast, for the "return of sanity among the people of

119 120 121 122 123 124

Gandhi to Patel, 13 August 1947, CWMG, VoL LXXXIX, p. 35. Gandhi to Satish Chandra Dasgupta, 13 August 1947, ibid., p. 40. N.K. Bose, My Days, pp.228-29. ":Miracle or Accident?", 24 August 1947, CWMG, VoL LXXXIX, pp.48-49. N.K. Bose, My Days, p.230. Ibid., p.229.

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Calcutta". This was again a symbolic act, because he thought his duty was to "go to every citizen of Calcutta and argue with him until he was convinced that any attack upon the Muslim community, as such, was wrong. But as that was physically not possible, he had decided upon the other alternative of a fast. Then people's hearts might be touched .... " 125 Later in his statement released to the press, he said: f

From the very first day of peace, that is August 14th last, I have been saying that the peace might only be a temporary lull. There was no miracle. Will the foreboding prove true and will Calcutta again lapse into the law of the jungle? Letus hope not, let us pray to the Almighty that He will touch our hearts and ward off the recurrence of insanity. 126 His fast was broken only when the leaders of different communities and parties took upon themselves the responsibility of preventing any communal attacks from taking place. On 6 September 1947, addressing an immensely large crowd at Calcutta, Gandhi said that he broke the fast on the "strength of the pressure of friends drawn from all communities in Calcutta and outside, he threw the burden on them of preservation of peace at the cost of their lives .... What all wanted was not peace imposed by the Government forces but by themselves."127 The fast lasted for three days, and it was broken only when necessary assurances were made by important citizens that they were prepared to lay down their lives if necessary for the restoration of peace in Calcutta. While all this was happening, one person though, shorn of his powers, was gradually coming to terms with the new realities. It was Shaheed Suhrawardy. He was beside Gandhi during his fast, when Gandhi insisted that Suhrawardy should give his word that there had been no attack on the Muslims. Suhrawardy had met Gandhi on 11 May 1947 at Sodpur, and in the course of conversation, he retorted to Gandhi's words that he was responsible for every life lost in Bengal by saying, "it is you who are responsible for it, for you have denied

125 126 127

Ibid., pp. 236-37. Ibid., p.239. Ibid., p. 246.

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justice to the Mussulmans" .128 5uhrawardy quite unlike this salvo of some months ago, now admired Gandhi for his role in the Calcutta riot of 1947.129 He narrated in his memoirs his experience with Gandhi during August: There were mixed ga therings of men and women, Hindus and Muslims, who attended in hundreds of thousands, in complete friendship and mutual understanding. The atmosphere was completely metamorphosed; instead of bitterness and hatred and murder and rapine, communal harmony was established, although not without some attacks on myperson in the beginning, which fortunately for me, failed to find their target l 30 Thus, it was evident that Gandhi's peace efforts at Calcutta brought him closer to Suhrawardy, who having accepted Gandhi's invitation had worked for communal harmony. The question of why Suhrawardy suddenly joined Gandhi and the communal harmony mission remains, when he knew fully well that it would cost him very dearly as far as his political future in Pakistan was concerned. Was it because, as Suhrawardy's biographer says, "Calcutta Muslims were in the middle of another nightmare and they asked Suhrawardy to stay with them. Suhrawardy could not refuse them during the most perilous period after they had stood solidly by him in all his movements for over a quarter of a century"?131 Orf was it because as the Governor of Bengat Burrows told Wavelt 115uhrawardy was a very frightened man"?132 Mountbatten's aide, Allan Campbell Johnson, also expressed a similar view. He wrote 115uhrawardy is frightened of Partition and is ready to play with the Hindus."!33 There is some truth in this but it may be said that what made Suhrawardy accept Gandhi's invita tion was the fact that since he f

f

f

N.K Bose, My Days, pp. 198-99. M.H.R. Talukdar ed., Memoirs of H.S. Suhrawardy, Dhaka, 1987, pp. 1079, pp. 246-47. 130 Ibid. 131 Raghib Ahsan, "Jib on nay, Itihash" (life, not history), Tafazzal Hossain (Manik :Mia), ed., Ittefaq: Suhrawardy Edition, March 1964 (Dhaka), p. 17 as quoted in M.H.R. Talukdar, Memoirs, pp. 32-33. 132 Penderal Moon, Viceroy's Journal, p. 428. 133 Allan Campbell Johnson, Mission with Mountbatten, London, 1985, p. 65. 128

129

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had been the chief minister of the province till 13 August 1947, he was well aware of the explosive situation that existed in Calcutta. One may argue that a sense of moral responsibility might have disturbed him. Gandhi's letters constantly reminded him of his past role, and Suhrawardy might have really become conscious of the fact that he bore some responsibility for the communalization and its outcome in the Bengalee society. This was especially so when the Hindus (for whom 16 August 1946 was still a living testimony of the League's and Suhrawardy's irresponsibility) made reprisals. Suhrawardy himself provided a rationale along similar lines. He said that he wanted to protect the Muslims of India from communal onslaught after the partition. He writes in his memoirs f

that if the Muslims of Calcutta and environs were massacred or driven away there would be repercussions in East Bengal and that the Hindus there would be similarly treated. There were about four times as many Hindus in East Bengal as Muslims in West Bengal.... The result could be that the Muslims of Bihar, Assam and the United Provinces certainly and elsewhere probably would be slaughtered or driven out to make room for the refugees. There would be a terrible holocaust all over the countryy~4 Thus, it may be surmised that he took it upon himselfto induce Gandhi to work for communal harmony in Calcu tta 135 A close perusat however makes it more complex than the mere assertion of owning a moral commitment and therefore, shouldering moral responsibility for one's past actions. It also indicates the attempts of a political career to save itself from the brink of extinction. Suhrawardy was quintessentially a man from and of Calcutta, and the political base that he had built was in Calcutta. This had been so since his emergence as one of the young leaders during the Non-Cooperation and Khilafatmovement days. The communalization of the political life gradually catapulted him from being a leader of the Calcutta Muslims to that of the Muslims f

134 135

M.H.R. Talukdar, Memoirs, p. 107. Ibid., p. 108.

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of entire Bengal. However, neither had he any base in eastern Bengal, nor did he ever seriously make a dent in the politics or life there with the help of any social or economic programme. If individual motive has any role in shaping policies, Suhrawardy's wor k for an independent and sovereign Bengal should be seen against this backdrop. By April 1947 one could see that though Suhrawardy was the leader of the Muslim Legaue and the Premier of the province, he had successfully made himself the most hated man of the province as far as the majority of the Hindu population was concerned. For a large number of Hindus in the province, the Calcutta and Noakhali incidents stood as the living testimony of his communal partisanship. After the statement of 20 February 1947 from the British authorities, which precipitated the discussion and activities towards independence, things were moving very fast and the talk of partition was very much in the air. The demand for Pakistan was now to be physically weighed. The last time somebody had realistically visualized it was C. Rajagopalachari in the quite maligned CR Formula in 1944, and we have seen how it was received by the general public, as well as by sections of the leadership. The Pakistan movement had thrown up a large number of ideas about what Pakistan was all about, in physical or geographical terms. But a concrete design was always missing. It seems that it was like a utopia, and the utopia was deliberately kept vague so as not to disillusion people sharing that vision. It was at this point that the Congress appeared to make a last ditch effort at saving the unity of the country by invoking partition of the provinces, so that the real picture of partition would dawn on the supporters of Pakistan, at least in the affected provinces. Writing to Gandhi, Nehru said, I feel convinced and so did most of the members of the Working Committee that we must press for this immediate division so that reality might be brought into the picture. Indeed this is the only answer to Pakistan as demanded by Jinnah l36

Nehru to Gandhi, 25 March 1947, Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru, Second Series, VoL 2, pp. 77-78.

136

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Communalism in Bengal

This, for the first time, got a boost due to the congruence of the interests ofthe British colonial state, which saw the unity ofIndia as beneficial to the interests of the commonwealth. The slight change in the attitude of the colonial state towards the Pakistan demand, was seen as trying to call the Muslim League bluff. But this conversion came too late what with the bureaucracy taking a brazen pro-League stance. Jinnah remained unmoved and, in fact, told the authorities that these were strategies devised to threaten him. This was also the time when the Muslim League began talking about the unity of the Bengali and Punjabi cultures. Thus, there was gradually a reversal of the rhetoric. And, it was during this time that Suhrawardy came out with the scheme, seen by many as an antidote to the partition, and which many thought was a great idea that should have been supported by the Congress leaders for the sake of posterity. Mountbatten was, however, in the final stages of deliberation with the Indian leaders, and the stage was almost set for the partition. There were some major tactical moves attempted by the colonial authorities at this time. Suhrawardy's idea of the united Bengal suited these tactical moves quite well. He, therefore, immediately found support with the Bengal Governor Burrows. The scheme for a united Bengal came to be formulated by Suhrawardy, Abul Hashim and some of the Congressmen like Sara t Bose and Kiron Shankar Roy. Joya Cha tterjee sees the support of Sara t Bose for independent Bengal as a reaction to the talk of partition by the Congress. Congress, she argues, was in fact organizing the partition movement in Bengal, which she perceives as well orchestrated. 137 Sucheta Mahajan, however, sees elements of support from Mountbatten as a move which could have countered Jinnah's insistence and could have brought him around to agree to the unity proposa[138 She argues that at this stage colonial authorities saw their interests better served by having a united India. 139 Whatever the parentage ithad, Suhrawardy tried to argue forcefully in support of the move. This led him and Sarat Bose to f

137 138 139

Joya Chatterjee, Bengal Divided, p. 248. Sucheta Mahajan, Independence and Partition, pp. 277-79. Ibid.

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approach Gandhi. Gandhi saw the spirit of the move as positive. He was, as he had argued earlier, against any move for a forced or imposed partition. The idea of United Bengal seemed to him to deal a blow to the two nation theory and therefore seemed to contain seeds for a future attack on the idea of communalism. But Gandhi had recently seen the depth of communal antagonism in the villages of Bengal and Bihar-a reminder of the fact that communalism had reached very deep inside the people's psyche. The United Bengal move could have been an antidote to the communal demand for partition and also communalism. Gandhi argued: "An admission that Bengali Hindus and Muslims were one would really be a severe blow against the two na tion theory of the League."!40 Gandhi had also seen the distrust and hatred around. !4! Seeing the popular psyche he knew that it would be extremely hard to persuade the Hindu populace to accept the proposal, because unless persuaded they could not be compelled to stay against their own will. And it is with this in mind that he volunteered to support the idea ofSuhrawardy. He even offered to campaign with him and to persuade the Hindus to forget the past. !42 This was notwithstanding the strong opposition that the move created among the Bengali Hindus. The move for a united and independent Bengal had already created a very strong opposition in Bengal. The Congress central leadership, in the meantime, could see the point. Any admission of united culture and history, etc., at this juncture by the League leaders, who were opposed to the very idea of such unity till recently was laudable. However, it smacked of opportunism and could not be taken so easily by anyone at its face value. Any such stand would have to vindicate the League's position on the unity of the country. On the other hand, Congress demand for the partition too was committing it to a position that went completely against its own stated ideologically held position against partition pe, se. This is a dilemma, which not just political leaders but some historians as well have tried to use as a critique of the Congress, and at times against the whole proj ect of nationalism. f

140 141 142

To Shyama Prasad Mookerjee, 13 May 1947, CWMG, VoL 87, p. 465. 12 May 1947, ibid., p.459. 10 May 1947, ibid., p.446.

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Initially, even the local League workers took the United Bengal move very enthusiastically, and used intimida tory tactics to make people accept it. Gandhi, upon becoming aware of this, expressed his unhappiness. Soon, however, there was a change in position and the central leadership of the Muslim League too went against it. It soon passed a resolution to this effect: The council of the All India Muslim League is of the opinion that the only solution ofIndia's problem is to divide India into two-Pakistan and Hindustan. On that basis, the council has given the most earnest attention and consideration to HMG's statement. The council is of the opinion that although it cannot agree to the partition of Bengal and the Punjab, or give its consent to such partition, ithas to consider HMG's plan for the transfer of power as a whole. 143 The Congress Working Committee (CWC) decision also had come by this time and Gandhi had approved of this, although with a heavy heart. The question regarding whether he could have taken a lead in opposing the partition and started a movement, is one that is still very valid. But from his frequent pronouncements during this time, one knows for certain that he was not thinking along those lines. But his determination to live and work in Noakhali shows tha t he was determined to fight communalism-a much deeper malaise than partition. After all, the partition was agreed to by the Congress leadership with an idea of stopping the communal violence. Recently historians have argued that he was not thinking about starting a campaign. Others, critical of Gandhi and the national leadership in general, have always argued that he was betrayed and therefore, isolated and Noakhali was a kind of individual, isolated effort. This position is not tenable, if one sees Gandhi's position in congruence with what was happening in the larger kaleidoscope of Indian politicS. 144 Thus, the United and Independent Bengal scheme by Suhrawardy failed to gather momentum even with the support of Gandhi during its initial phase. His problems were compounded

143 144

A.M. Zaidi, Evolution of Muslim Political Thought, New Delhi, 1975, p. 238. See, Sucheta Mahajan, Independence and Partition, pp. 360-81.

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when the central leadership of the All India Muslim League (AIML), while keeping him busy in the partition negotiations, elected Khwaja Nazimuddin as the leader of the Muslim League Parliamentary Party. This was despite Jinnah's assurance that there would be no election for the Parliamentary leadership of East Benga[145 But Liaqat Ali Khan, who, according to Suhrawady's biographer, disliked Suhrawardy and was jealous of him, suddenly announced an election, not in the Punjab but in Bengal only, throwing in his support behind Khwaja Nazimuddin 1 46 In the meantime, Suhrawardy also attracted wrath due to his recent hobnobbing with the Hindu leaders. This seemed to make him a persona non grata in the ranks of the Bengal Provincial Muslim League (BPML) leadership, which paid allegiance to the AIML leadership. In addition, the partition and the subsequent loss of Calcutta meant that he had lost his political base too. This background is, however, provided not to suggest that Suhrawardy was forced to work with Gandhi only because he was left with no political base. This substantiates my earlier contention that the internal fissures in the BPML were the forces that resulted in radicalizing the communal overtones of the party. This had culminated in the Calcutta carnage of 1946. With the assumption of leadership, the N azimuddin government became thoroughly communal in East Bengal, while, on the other hand, situational realities or some other forces pushed Suhrawardy into acting and helping Gandhi extinguish the flames of the communal riots. The change was, however, not sudden. Suhrawardy, despite his communal rhetoric, had always aspired to become the leader of the province, and here, his communal stance and broader political ambitions clashed. However, partition snatched away his political leadership and mass base and he was even barred from entering East Bengal. These were the factors tha t led him to become Gandhi's ambassador of peace rather than Jinnah's roving ambassador-his Ilpersonal representative to acquaint the Governments all over the world with the raison d'etre of Pakistan". 147 145 K. Ahmed, Socio-Political History of Bengal and the Birth of Bangladesh, Dhaka, 1978, p. 35. 146 M.H.R. Talukdar, Memoirs, p. 32. 147 Ibid., p. 32.

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The pressure of the local representatives of the AIML was a significant factor throughout the years, in pushing the Muslim leadership of the province to espouse an extreme communal position. This was proved once again when the Nazimuddin government adopted an extreme communal stance and even prevented Suhrawardy from entering East Pakistan (East Bengal).

III In some historiographical interpretations, Gandhi's presence and efforts at Noakhali have been seen as strong evidence to prove that partition was against his wishes, and that he was completely sidelined by what is generally referred to as the High Command of the Congress. 148 This argument is used to underestimate and condone the role of the Muslim League, as is done by Ayesha Jalal, by arguing that it was the Congress and not the Muslim League, which demanded and was responsible for partition 149 Similarly, it has been asserted that what India experienced was not independence, but merely a transfer of power. From the orthodox Marxist standpoint, historians have always believed that it was no real independence as there was no radical change or social revolution that heralded it; the colonial structures were only taken forward by the bourgeoisie 150 Another group of historians has argued that the agency for independence lay not in the self-seeking groups or individuals who led, what is termed by the Indian nationalists and nationalist historians as the nationalist freedom movement. It was ra ther, a transfer of power or decolonization tha t occurred by the colonial power's ovvn volition as maintaining the colonies became unprofitable by this time.!S! In fact the official publication of the British government is also entitled The Transfer of Power, f

f

See, Sumit Sarkar, Modern India. See, Ayesha Jalal, The Sole Spokesman. 15() R.P. Dutt, India Today, Bombay, 1949. 151 John Gallagher, Decline, Revival and Fall; John Gallagher and Anil Seal, "Britain and India between the Wars", Modern Asian Studies, VoL 15, No.3, 1981, pp. 387-414; LM. Drummond, British Economic Policy and the Empire, 1919-1939, London, 1972. 148

149

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375

solidifying such an assertion. Here the agency of Indians as a people who were struggling to wrest political power is completely denied. Historians have however, shown that the argument that the declining British interests in India or India becoming a burden do not stand. In fact, it has been shown that the control, and the desire to control, of the British imperialism intensified during the war and there were very strong moves towards financial gains from India 1 52 Sucheta Mahajan has brought out the fact that even at this stage, the British, who had helped in resuscitating the Muslim League, were ready to shed part of their love for the Muslim League in the larger interests of imperial control. It is in the context of a deep historiographical contestation that Gandhi's N oakhali experience is seen as a sign of protest against his erstwhile comrades in arriving at the partition agreement and is portrayed as a time of loneliness and betrayal. Thus, the Noakhali sojourn became implicated in the actions of the Congress leaders, who had been negotiating with the British authorities. The nature and results of these negotiations were shovvn to be in contrastto the stated positions ofthe Congress and are said to be the result of the compromises that the Congress leadership had effected. The argument is augmented by a Freudian understanding-the supposed lust of the old leadership for any kind of power, and the state of war fa tigue among the senior leaders, which led to their surrendering of principles and accepting the British plan of partition without consulting Gandhi who was completely opposed to it. This seems to be a myth perpetuated along with another notion that the lust for power by the Congress leaders is further demonstrated by their reluctance to heed Gandhi's advice to give Jinnah the office of Prime Minister. It can be shown, and quite convincingly, that this was done, not because of any personal lust for power but understanding its full consequences in the national interests. f

See Basudev Chatterjee, "Business and Politics in the 1930s: Lancashire and the Making of the Indo-British Trade Agreement, 1939", Modern Asian Studies, VoL IS, No.3, 1981, pp.527-29; Aditya Mukherjee, "The Indian Capitalist Class: Aspects of its Economic, Political and Ideological Development in the Colonial Period, 1930-47", in Sabyasachi Bhattacharya and Romila Thapar eds, Situating Indian History, New Delhi, 1986, pp. 239-82; Aditya Mukherjee, Imperialism, Nationalism and the Making of Indian Capitalist Class, New Delhi, 2002. 152

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Gandhi's stay in Bengal during the fateful days of May 1947 coincided with the period when the talk of an independent Bengal was in the air and, in fact, his support was also tried to be enlisted by signatories to the proposal. Gandhi had initially shown his inclination and he was very consistent on the point that he was ready to accept an independent Bengal, provided the ideological basis of the two nation theory was jettisoned. He asked whether the signatories could guarantee that in case a call was given to unite only the Muslims in the name of Pakistan, there was enough support for those talking of a United Bengal on the basis of a single culture and language. Thus, the war that he had fought with Jinnah during their meeting three years ago was still on. This plan appeared as a real antidote to the partition, according to some scholars, and had the Congress leadership taken a supportive stance, it could have seen the light of d ay1 53 A.G. Noorani, a regular commentator suggests, "!twas a willful refusal by the Congress to share power with the League which led to, both, the collapse of the Mission's Plan and the defeat of the moves for a United Bengal as the third independent State on the subcontinent."!54 The problem with this kind of explanation is that first of all no credence is given to the larger ideological ambience towards which the country was progressing. Arguing for a critical look at these positions Mahajan writes lIone must not overdo the tendency to reduce history to biography. By 194647 the forces behind Pakistan were larger than the overweening ambition of an individual. ff 155 A close perusal of events, and Gandhi's own positions on those events, indicates that Gandhi, when in Noakhali, had written to his comrades that he concurred with their actions. He had appreciated their work in a letter to Patel: f

f

I am thinking of my duty in terms of the country's good. !t is quite possible that what you can see while administering the affairs of Millions may not be realised by me. If I were in the

153

See, Parthasarathi Gupta, "Who Divided the Bengalees?", in Amrik Singh,

The Partition in Retrospect, Delhi, 2000, pp. 212-21; A.G. Noorani, "United Bengal Plan Pipe Dream or :Missed Opporhmity", ibid., pp. 247-57. 154 A.G. Noorani, United Bengal Plan, p.256. 155 Sucheta Mahajan, Independence and Partition, p. 378.

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place of you all, [would perhaps say and do exactly what you are saying and doingl56 Similarly, it can be argued that Gandhi felt lonely not because he was left alone or not consulted, which was anyway not the case. But he did feel that he was different from the rest of the Congress leadership, and this made him think that he had moved away from the public mood once he realized that the population had been communalized. People have argued that Gandhi could have seized the opportunity and started an agitation. This is in line with an earlier argument that the Congress and the nationalist leadership never come out in support of an agitation when there was the time for it and people needed it. Gandhi, no one would disagree, was a better reader of the pulse of the people, than writers of the sectarian Left, claiming to understand the popular pulse in 1945-47. He himself argued that the situation, as he read it, was not right to start an agitation and that he had never created any situations himself.157 Gandhi was right, if the happiness on the faces ofthe people in Noakhali was any marker. Colonialism has its own logic, and therefore, even at the last stage when its own child, the Muslim League, asserted the right to speak, it retained the autonomy to change its strategy so that it could serve its ovvn interests. For example on the crucial question of the division of the country and the strategies of the various parties in either achieving or opposing it British interests were paramount in maintaining unity. There were several reasons for it, but post-independence strategic and defense interests loomed large. ISS This was a matter of preference and not one of conviction and hence, when Mountbatten had to take the decision on partition, it was not his individual decision but was guided by the interests of colonialism. Some historians, for example, Ayesha Jalal who sees the Muslim League and Jinnah as the wronged parties, have tried to argue that Mountbatten sided with the Congress for a different reason that it was one more instance of how partition was precipitated by the Congress. f

f

f

f

156

13 April 1947, CWMG, VoL LXXXVII, p. 271.

157

Ibid., p. 368.

158

Sucheta Mahajan, Independence and Partition, p. 147.

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Communalism in Bengal

The Congress f as we saw in the previous chaptersf was not a monolith and was a platform for various groups and interests that wished to gain influence. One such pressure group was the Hindu communalists, who became more powerful as the Muslim League's influence grew. This has enabled historians like Joya Chatterjee to show that the Congress in Bengal was totally communalized, and that people did not require the Hindu Mahasabha to articulate their communal voice as the Congress could easily fulfill that role 1 59 But the presence of such pressure did not mean the Congress accepted it. That some individual Congressmen accepted the communal digits did not imply, as Mahajan argues, that the Congress had become a Hindu communal party. In the light of the riots in Calcutta, Noakhali and Bihar, the arguments that the partition had become imminent as there was a division of hearts already, seems plausible. Gandhi was trying hard to arrive at a permanent solution. But at a strategic levet in the prevailing circumstances there were very few options left.160 In the last years of the decline of colonial authority, to a large extent caused by the movements launched by the Congress, communal violence because difficult to suppress. The Calcutta and Noakhali riots were some of the cases in point. liThe consensual answer"f Mahajan arguesf lito the first dilemma was independencef to the secondf partition".161

IV Partition has been a tragic event in the history of India. The memories continue to haunt us due to the presence of the forces that created and activated itf Le' f communalism. There have been serious attacks on the explanatory and causative modes which are employed by historians. The critique of the historical mode in the context of the partition ofIndia is essentially grounded on the assumption that agonies and experiences, especially the untold tragedies suffered during and after the partition, could not and

159 16()

161

Joya Chatterjee, Bengal Divided, pp. 220-74. Sucheta Mahajan, Independence and Partition, pp. 358-59. Ibid., p. 355.

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possibly cannot find expression in the modes of historical practices that are used by what the historians variously labeled. Among others, it is argued that the prevailing historiography is not able to incorporate the living memories of the survivors of the partition. Therefore memory has been cited as a crucial corrective to such inabilities of historical methods. It is in memory that the history of partition is supposed to have been encoded, and the violence of those days recorded. Thus, historians have been prodded to look for tropes that can establish memory instead of the historian's narrative. 162 It is in this mood that different tropes are applied to memoria lise partition and as an extension communal violence. Here stories and fictions are found to be more authentic genres for memorializing. l63 This entails not merely a critique but quite often a rejection of history, and it is in this situation that fictions films like Earth and Hey Ram can receive celebratory adulation as valid forms of telling history. There are very few advocates of any kind of positivism which encourages fetishiza tion of facts and fear of processes. Historians have adopted complex ways oflooking at the reality. Abstraction from reality is as significant to human life as the reality itself. And it is here that the study of ideology becomes a serious concern in historical understanding. There exists a celebration of fragments in opposition to the idea of something called totality. A large body of writings have premised themselves on this simplistic binary framework to attack serious quest for understanding and relating to society in its complexities. Communalism in this sense is a complex phenomenon and cannot be understood in simple binary frameworks. Its ideological grip can encompass and transcend the sociological models as well as the boundaries of social existence. A study of the power of ideology, therefore, is what became evident in the contesting site of Bengal during 1943 and 1947. f

f

f

f

f

162 Urvashi Butalia, The Other Side of Silence: Voices from the Partition of India, Delhi, 1998. 163 See, Gyanendra Pandey, Remembering Partition, Delhi, 2001.

NINE

Conclusion Communalism is an ideology, and like all ideologies it is rooted in a social milieu. It cannot be separated from the politics of the time, nor can it be distanced from the material foundations of society. The dynamic nature of communalism has to be grasped at every phase of its manifestation. Political parties are one of the prime channels through which it is articulated. The nature and characteristics of its transformation can be understood by reading the changes in the agenda and the role of different political parties. The famine of 1943 appeared on Bengal's provincial landscape with significant implications. It was a tragedy which left almost three million people dead and the entire socio-cultural fabric crumbling. This was a social situation that should have resulted in a revolution if revolutions are a direct result of human misery.! This is what a contemporary writer anticipated in 1943. She said that Bengal was awaiting revolution and it was just around the corner.2 1/Any revolutionary whose convictions as to the necessity of a major revolution are wavering"f thinks Llosa's protagonist, after seeing the tragedy of the famine on the hills of Salvadore, "ought to take a look (at the situation) .... it would put an end to all his doubts.'" But there was no revolution to speak ot nor even jlsimple" violence, in Bengal during the entire period. Political parties, the main source of organized political opinion did not talk of any revolu tion but were busy increasing f

Basudha Chakravorty, "Bengal Awaits Revolution" f Independent India, Vol. 7, No. 24, 13 January 1943. 2 Ibid. 3 Mario Vargas Llosa, War at the End of the World, Delhi, 1989, p. 33. 1

Conclusion

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their membership. The political parties had their ideological stands and approached people as per these positions. The only thing that the province did not witness was a popular uprising against the famine and its management. What the province witnessed, two years later, was the riot in Calcutta and Noakhali where it was not the hungry killing the opulentfor food but rather the Hindu and Muslims, both the rich and the poor, killing each other, as if they had found a new identity transcending their most basic necessity in life, i.e., food. It was not hunger but communal identity which dictated this violence. An explanation for this lies in the political agenda that the different political parties followed during the famine period. The deepening economic crisis caused by the famine coincided with the Muslim League forming the ministry. The colonial presence and its need to have a ministry that was supportive of its war efforts brought the Muslim League in power. The League ministry not only cushioned the colonial authorities but also saved them from shouldering the burden of responsibility for the large number of deaths during the famine. While the newly appointed secretary of Muslim League claimed that he was democratizing and radicalizing the message and meaning of Pakistan, his own party was defending the measures, dikta ts and whims of the colonial rulers. The Communist party, facing opposition from all quarters of the nationalist forces, utilised the opportunity provided by the famine to rehabilitate itself. While pursuing relief work and mobilization activities the party put forward the national unity line favouring the contemporary political set-up and the colonial arrangement of having the Muslim League ministry. Simultaneously, the period also found the party steadfastly campaigning for the CR Formula; and it attacked all the forces that opposed this as Hindu communal forces led by Shyama Prasad Mookerjee. The colonial authorities and the ministry found in the Communist party a supporter which morally and ideologically legitimized their actions. The party's policies and mobilization process, on the one hand, diluted the critique of colonialism and on the other, indirectly strengthened the communal agenda and accorded legitimacy to the demand of Pakistan. It was at this juncture that the Hindu Mahasabha tried to capture the nationalist space provided by the absence of the

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Communalism in Bengal

Congress and other parties facing suppression during the Quit India movement and after. The famine period and the presence of the Muslim League ministry had given it the opportunity to blend its communal rhetoric with criticism of the colonial authorities and thereby developing a nationalist position by having a critique of colonialism. Gandhi-Jinnah meet and the CR Formula provided it an opportunity to establish itself as the foremost nationalist but at the same time the champion of the interests of the Hindus in Bengal. The political conjuncture of the period helped it to capture the limelight for some time. Therefore, the Mahasabha had the opportunity of changing the contour and character of its politics and to entrench itself in the political mind of the province by transcending its hitherto narrow limits. It is generally assumed that the democratization and popularization of the Muslim League was a product of the efforts of Abul Hashim's energetic efforts to make the party a broad-based and democra tic party. The ideological ambience under which the mobilization took place was created by the agitation over the Secondary Education Bill, the CRFormula and the Gandhi-Jinnah meeting. These strengthened communal overtones of the provincial politics as also concretized the IIPakistanff imagination both for the Hindus and Muslims. The post-war expectations and the upsurge of nationalist sentiments were reflected in the agitation for the release of the Indian National Army (INA) officers. This culminated in demonstrations in Calcutta in November and much more widespread disturbances in February 1946. The widespread sympathy for the INA made the League leadership soon join the fray. Itfound Capt. Rashid Ali's case convenient for this purpose as it could present it in communal colour too, and thereby, attack what it saw as the anti-communal platform that the INA had provided. After the Rashid Ali day demonstration it also could claim an anticolonial legacy. Therefore, by February 1946, the League could present itself as a true front for liberation for the Muslims, with the Congress as the only obstruction. The elections of 1945-46 proved to be a major channel for launching this propaganda campaign in a vigorous way. The elections it appears was the first national one as the question of the nation was put before the people. Thus, by 1946, we have f

f

f

f

Conclusion

383

a society which was ready to erupt into orgies of communal violence. Election results showed two contrary developments. While the Muslim League representing the Muslim face of communalism had succeeded in establishing its hegemony over the Bengali Muslims, the Hindu Mahasabha failed as a political party to capture the imagination of the Hindus. It was, however, resurrected from its low ebb by an extreme form of Muslim communalism as demonstrated by the Noakhali-Tippera riot. The elections and the events thereafter show that there was a positional difference between the Muslim League which had already reached the extreme phase and the Hindu Mahasabha in Bengal which was, despite its rhetoric, still in its liberal communal phase. However, the communalism of the Muslim League helped the Hindu Mahasabha to transcend this liberal phase and attempt to go over to the extreme form. By November 1945, it had become clear that the Mahasabha had very little support among the populace and its wor kers were reluctant to fight the Congress in the ensuing elections for the central and provincial Legislative Assemblies. Therefore, while the strong nationalist sentiment paradoxically paved the way for the Muslim League to overcome its pro-colonial character and helped it to present itself as an anti-colonial front, Hindu Mahasabha failed to do so. Sustained efforts at communalizing society became manifest when, just after a few months of the INA agitations, Calcutta erupted into ghastly communal riots. All memories of class and communal solidarity against the colonial power were forgotten. The Calcutta riot may be seen as a culmination of the political process ushered in by the colonial and communal politics. The Noakhali riot demonstrates the nature of violence that communalism produces once it enters a region where agrarian radicalism and religion were living traditions. Communalism not only defined the attributes of a class enemy, it also provided a religious identification for tha t enemy which gave religious legitimacy to an attack on that enemy. The Noakhali riot also shows different contours of communalism. Here the clash for space between the League and the other parties with a strong peasant base had resulted in attacks on the Hindus. This being so the ultimate collapse of the anti-League front meant the collapse of this critique too. However, in order to

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Communalism in Bengal

retain the initiative, the attacks on Hindus were radicalized. The riot in Noakhali demonstrated the fact that the communalized rural locale, in this case a society with a predominantly Muslim population, and a blend of religious orthodoxy responds in ways which are much deeper in meaning thanf saYf action-reaction based urban communal violence. Noakhali had seen the Wahabi and Farazi traditions and there is unanimity among the scholars that the Muslim society here had a living presence of Islam. The leadership which emerged in the early decades of the 20th century also came from a religious background. The opposition to the League and its policies came from this section. The famine period and the war saw the League establish itself in the region. Simultaneously, the anti-League critique was also fading fast. The 1946 elections saw the rout of the anti-League candidates, but at the same time the ulama, which had been opposing the League, received votes greater than the non-League candidates. This showed that they still had some initiative left. With the Calcutta riot, this opposition collapsed, and the same section which was criticizing the League also took the initiative to attack Hindus. One may point out that the Noakhali riots symbolized the combination of communalism and fundamentalism where communalism provided the ideological hegemony under which the Islamic elements were interpreted and Pakistan supplanted. Writing on the significance of events, Gramsci had said Events are the real dialectics of history. They transcend all arguments, all personal judgements, all vague and irresponsible wishes .... Events present themselves as universal fatality.... Men as individuals and en masse find themselves as a universal fatalit y 4 Riots are also events. Events create their own logic. Bengal during 1946-47brings this out quite forcefully. The Calcutta and Noakhali riots created a situation where political parties and personalities found themselves entrapped in a crisis and a situation of universal fatality. Gandhi's attempt was a hard fought battle against this sense of fatality, which in turn had produced the sense of inevitability Antonio Gramsci, Selection from Political Writings, edited by Quintin Hoare New York, 1989, p. 15.

4

Conclusion

385

that partition demonstrated. Herein lies the importance of his intervention. The demand for Pakistan and its concretization in the imagination of a substantial section of the provincial population went together with the communalization of the social fabric. Communal riots were the result of this communalization. The former were the symptoms rather than the disease. Hence, the proper arena of historical analysis should be communalism and the forces that helped it to become a socially produced ideology and later on enabled it to hegemonize society. Gandhi's intervention was a pointer towards this. He tried to breach communalism at the ideological level which provided legitimacy to communal violence. The logic of fatality or inevitability produced by the Calcutta and Noakhali riots, he showed, could be countered only at the level of ideology, i.e., countering communalism ideologically. Attempts to draw an analogy with events in other countries brings Fascism into the discussion. Fascism like communalism is also an ideology and, as studies have shown, its ideological prerequisites and the methods it applies in its efforts to establish hegemony are similar to those of communalism. Fascist ideology is born of a political tradition that considered the individual a function of the group life. "This view of man as an integral part of an organic whole is the basis of Fascism's political philosophy.'" The propaganda by the Muslim League during the elections of 1946 always invoked the so-called ideals of the Muslim community. Its political creed was also based on creating a Iisolid monolithic community of the Muslims" which could fight the League's political battle. On the other hand, Muslims who did not subscribe to its creed were ostracized in the name of the community. Similarly, Hindu Mahasabha's campaign was for a Hindu Rashtra (nation) or community. Other parallel ingredients were also present in the Bengal situation which make communalism strongly resemble Fascist ideology and methods.' These included the creation of f

f

Zeev Sternhell, "Fascist Ideology" in Walter Laqueur ed., Fascism, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1976, pp. 344-45. 6 Creation of Muslim National Guards, their active participation in the Noakhali riots and in the preparation of the Calcutta riots, etc., on the one hand, and Hindu Mahasabha's efforts to create Hindustan National Guard 5

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Communalism in Bengal

paramilitary forces, such as the Muslim National Guards and the Hindustan National Guard; and propaganda on a massive scale with rhetoric which catered to emotional rather than rational aspects of politics. Analogies, to be historically valid, should be drawn from historically congruent categories and here I think communalism, as this empirical study suggests, resembles Fascism more than the post-medieval European riots or medieval Indian land wars. Similarly, communalism exists not simply in epistemology or intellectual domains of a society. It is an ideology, and hence, socially produced.' It will not be out of place here to quote Callinicos, who says Ideology is a concrete attribute of human individuals .... Explaining why an individual holds ideological beliefs is a matter of analysing social processes, not of diagnosing intellectual error or individual pathology.' (Italics mine) To analyse or understand social processes behind the ideas which are "social products, which cannot be understood by the philosopher outside history".' It was in order to enter into an ideological contestation that Gandhi visited and roamed around the Noakhali villages. This may appear as lIan isolated personal effort"f but in this Ilfinest hour" as his Noakhali experiment has been described, Gandhi was not representing Ilhimself" alone but an entire stream of forces that had been contesting the communal ideology since its emergence. It (his experiment) had not yet given in to the ostensibly for defensive purposes, show developments along Fascist practices. What Linz writes about Fascist organizations to an extent was true of these organizations. He says: "The discovery of the parliamentary political organisation ready to use violence against its opponents, rather than electioneering or conspiring, was a tragic innovation that made even minor Fascist parties a significant factor in the crisis in many European democracies." (Juan l Linz, "Comparative Study of Fascism", in Walter Laqueur ed., Fascism, p. 15.) 7 Anthony Giddens, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory, Cambridge, 1971, p.209. 8 Alex Callinicos, Making History, Agency, Structure and Change in Social Theory, London, 1987, p. 139. 9 Anthony Giddens, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory, p. 209.

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universal fatality. For it, hope was still alive. And it wanted the embers of hope to keep burning in the villages of N oakhali. It is in the realm of hope, Gandhi knew well, that all ideology finds its fullest expression, and he felt, so would an anti-communal ideology.

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Index Adivasi Mahasabha, 224 Adorno, T.W., 33n Ahmad, Sufia, 61 Ahmed, Ghiasuddin, 91 Ahmed, Goffran, 329 Ahmed, Rafiuddin, 297 Ahmed, Ramizuddin, 96 Ahmed, Rashid, 302 Ahmed, Shamsuddin, 92 Ahmed, Syed, 25-26, 296 Ahmed, Z.A., 195, 197 Ajwani, Bhojraj, 178 Ali, Aftab, 127 Ali, Amir, 151 Ali, Barat, 215 Ali, Liaqat, 255 Ali, Maulana Keramat, 296 Ali, Nausher, 206 Ali, Rashid, 209-13, 382 Ali, Syed Nausher, 82, 166, 191, 246-47 Ali, Yaqub, 302 All Bengal Muslim Students' League, 173

All Bengal Teachers' Association (ABTA),143 All Bengal Protest Day, 142 All-Bengal Secondary Education Bill Protest Conference, 142 All Bengal Secondary Education Week, 145 All India Committee of the Mahasabha, 185

All India Congress Committee (AleC), 147-48, 162, 195, 200, 233, 327, 333 All India Hindu Mahasabha (AIHM), 154, 178, 187 All India Jamait-ul-Ulama-i-Islam, 214 All India Kisan Sabha (AIKS), 126, 129 All India Muslim League (AIML), 229-30, 232, 259, 372-74 All India Student Federation (AISF), 129 All India Trade Union Congress (AITUC), 126 All Quiet on the Western Front, 365 Aman crop, 112, 115, 138 Amery, 108, 167 Anjuman societies, 295, 297 Anjuman Watan, 203 Annual District Krishak Conferences, 128 anti-colonialism, 102 Anushilan Samiti, 102 Ashraf, K.M., 129, 195 Asimuddin, 302 Attlee, 232 Auchinleck,226 Azad,339 Azad, Maulana Abul Kalam, 149, 190, 197, 202, 205, 211, 222, 233

Index

Babri Masjid at Ayodhya, demoliti on of, 23 Bagchi, Sarojendra Prasad 220 Balakot battle (1850), 296 Ball, Upend ra N ath, 184 Bande Mataram, 211 Bandyopadh ya y, Sandip, 245 Bannerj ee, Sibnath, 125, 127 Bannerjee, Suresh, 126- 27 Sari sal D istr ict Hindu Mahasabha, 157 Basu, Jyoti, 127, 220 Basu, N rip endranath, 308 Basu, S.K., 156 Bay ly, C.A., 20n, 21- 23, 45, 47-48, 73n, 192n, 299 Bengal, CR Fo rmula, 146- 53; census operat ions, 11 8- 19; circular to district and sub-div is ional Sahhas, 181; coa lition ministry, 223- 25; communal antipath y, 167- 74; communal riot in, 169; communalization of administration in , 169- 70; Congress party activ iti es in, see, Congress party; Congress role in political life of, 192; control over education in, 139--46; elections, 179- 80, 182- 83, 202-4, 21 4- 22, 382; evacuation of coasta l areas due to Japanese attack in World War from, 14647; famine, 71- 77, 79- 100, 174, 380- 82; Fazlul Huq governm ent, 79- 84; food supply crisis, 85- 94, 107, 116; Governor predilection for administering.. 1 66- 69; Hindu Mahas abha activ ities in, see, Hindu Mahasabha; Hindu Mahas abha membership dri ve in, 174--77; id eo log ica l suppo rt base to mobil iza tion of politics on commun al lines in, 153-64; Japanese in vas io n in 1942, 79; l

417

middle-cl asses woes in, 11 6; Mu s lim Leagu e activ ities in, 84; Mu ssalmanisation o f, 16970; partition of, 152, 370- 71; po larization o f politics in, 146, 152; politica l cond itions during famin e in, 76, 79- 94; political prisoners release issue, 165-66; politiCS amidst hun ger in, 10137; price of rice in, 80, 85; protest against trial of INA officers in, 206- 8; rec ruitment in British Indian Army from, 78- 79; refugee problem in, 146; relief activities, 94-97, 103, 114-15; resp onsibility of famine in, 97100; Second a ry Ed ucation Bill, 140-46, 152, 172- 74; move for united,371- 72 Benga l and Assam Railroad Worke rs' Union, 127 Benga l Famine Relief Coordinat ion Comm ittee (BFRCC), 96 Bengal Mu s lim Parliamentary Party, 215 Bengal Pact, 1925, 117 Bengal Prov in ce Cong ress Committee (BPCC), 101, 211, 263, 265, 279, 306, 325, 334 Bengal Prov inc e Mus lim League (BPML), 231-33, 258-59, 373 Bengal Province Student Federation (BPSF), 129-30, 207 Benga l Province Trade U nion Cong ress (BPTUC), 127 Benga l Prov incial Hindu Mahasabha (BPHM), 106, 109, 113, 178,184,330,352 Benga l Prov incia l Kisan Sabha (BPKS), 128 Bengal Provincial Leagu e, 171 Bengal Provincial Mahasabha Relief Committee (BPMRC), 11314

418

Communalism in Bengal

Bengal Provincial National Guard, 257 Bengal Relief Com mittee (BRC), 113 Bengali Association, 156 Bhadralok, category of, 63~4 Bharat Sebashram Sangha (BSS), 175 Bhattacharya, Digindra Narayan, 187 Bhulabhai-Liaqat Ali Pact, 185n Bihar riots, 321, 333, 335, 338-39, 341-42,359 Biswas, Dhirendra Kumar, 174 Bose, Manoranjan, 277 Bose, N.K., 281n, 290, 333n, 337n38n, 341n,342,345n,350n,351, 352n,354n,356,364,365n,367n Bose, Rash Bihary, 190 Bose, Sa rat Chandra, 90n, 103, 165n, 188, 191 ,206-7,219,26465, 309, 326, 370 Bose, Subhas Chandra, 102-J, 124, 130, 190, 211 , 213 Bose, Sugata, 65~6, 204, 301n-5n, 315n Bose, Su rend ra N ath, 277 Brahmin, Ratan La, 220 Brennan, Lance, 86n, 96n, 100 Brijlal,157 British lnd ian Army, recruitment from Bengal in, 78- 79 Broomfie ld, J.H., 64, 192n Burman, U.N., 119 Burrows, 270n, 272n, 275n, 277n, 279n, 284n- 85n, 292n,367,370 CR Formula, 146-53, 155, 157-58, 160- 64, 314, 331, 344-45, 369, 381-32 Cabinet Mission, 223, 226-29, 266 Calcutta District Muslim League (CDML), 208, 254, 256, 259 Calcutta Electrical Supply Corporation Mazdur Un ion, 126

Calcutta Haw kers' and Vendors' Union, 170 Calcutta Mus lim Leagu e, 216 Calcutta riots, 216, 237- 70, 281, 290- 92,316- 17, 321 ,329, 33435, 359, 373, 383-35; call for Direct Action day by Muslim League and, 237, 239, 241, 24446,248,25 3-56, 258 ~4,266~ 7,

269; Communists and, 265- 66, 268- 69; Co ngress party and, 242, 245, 257, 261- 69; Gandhi and, 361; government inaction to, 250-54; Hindu Mahasabha and, 258, 261 - 63, 265- 69, 329; Muslim League and, 237-48, 253- 69 Callinicos, Alex, 34n, 386 Casey, Richard G., 138, 145n, 154, 165n, 167n- 68n, 169, 170n, 207, 288n Centra l Food Committee (CFC), 85 Chakravarty, Papiya, 109n, 11 7, 175, 330 Chakraborty, Abala Kant, 329 Chakraborty, Girija Prosanna, 325 Chakravarty Rajgopa lachari (CR) formula, see, CR formula Chakravarty, Nikhil, 162 Chakravorti, Purnachandra, 174 Chakravo rty, Na lini Ranjan, 187 Chandra, Bipan, 24, 26-28, 30-J1, 46n-47n, 53n, 72n, 99n, 267n Chandra, Rom esh, 197 Chandravarkar, 159 Chatterjee, Basudev, 121n- 22n, 273n, 375n Chatterjee, Joya, 64, 65n, 109n, 152n, 245n, 370, 378 Chatterjee, Kapila, 327 Chatterj ee, N.C., 105n, 108, 111, 112n, 178, 182, 185- 86, 268n, 330n, 338, 352

Index

Chatterjee, Partha, 35-40, 43, 45, 46n, 48, 59, 65-66, 304, 317n18n Chatterjee, Patita Paban, 220 Chattopadhyay, Gautam, 43n, 57n, 207n, 210, 212n, 223 Chaudhury, A.P., 364 Chaudhury, Hamiduddin, 340-41 Choudhury, Ananda, 125 Choudhury, Ashrafuddin Ahmad, 102, 204-5, 302, 303n, 322 Choudhury, Habibur Rahman, 215 Choudhury, Haran Chandra Ghosh, 272, 280n, 323n Choudhury, Jatindra Mohan, 330 Choudhury, Manoranjan, 113, 174n-75n, 176, 185n, 187 Choudhury, Rezzakul Haidar, 316 Civil Supplies, Department of, 107 class-consciousness, 29 class struggle, 28, 32 Clow, 169 coalition, theory of, 21 colonialism, 377; communalism and, 20-21, 24, 41, 43, 59 Colville, 165-67, 168n Com intern, 126 Communal Award, 117, 185, 18788,192 communal conflict/violence/riot, 22-23,25,31,45,48,51-52,64, 66-67, 69; in Calcutta, 237-69 communal consciousness, 68 communal electorate, 141, 183 communalism, anti-democratic and anti-modern phenomenon, 26-27; as modern phenomenon, 21, 24-38; Bengal and, 59-67; bourgeois-liberal ideology conception, 38; categories of, 40-41, 66; class struggle and, 28; colonialism and, 20-21, 24, 41, 47, 59; communal violence and, 22-23, 25,

419

31, 44--49; concept of, 20; consciousness of, 23, 66-67; definition of, 22, 24-25, 29, 39, 50; European context, 54-55; false consciousness of, 30; form of, 30; historiography and, 19-70; ideology and consciousness, 27, 49-59,66; ideology and nature of, 379-80, 383, 385-86; ideology of Muslim elite, 26; interpretation by historians of, 19-23; modernity and, 45-47; Muslim separatism, 60-61; nationalist discourse on, 35--44; nature of, 67; political doctrine, 25; psychoanalytic explanation of, 50-51; rise and growth of, 24, 29; role of religion in, 5154, 66; secularism and, 38-39, 46; writings of historians on, 19-23 Communist Party of India (CPI), 67,70,86,99,121-37,191,195201,211; arbitration plan, 196; Calcutta riots and, 265-66, 26869; Congress party and, 195201,217-18; election in Bengal and, 217-18, 220-22; famine in Bengal and, 381; Muslim League and, 195-201, 209; Noakhali-Tippera riots and, 331-32 communitarianism, concept of, 55 community, notion of, 38-39 Congress Legislative Party, in Madras, 148 Congress Movement, 104 Congress party, 21, 63, 76-77, 8687, 93, 98-99, 101-3, 112, 11726, 129, 131-37, 139, 144, 146; appeasement policy, 185; Cabinet Mission and, 227-29; Calcutta riots and, 242, 245, 257, 261-69; Communal Award and,

420

Communalism in Bengal

192-93; Communist party and, 195-201; demand for Pakistan and, 187, 233, 256, 267; elections in Bengal and, 184, 203, 206; Hindu comm unalism, 2056; Hindu Mahasabha and, 178, 184-89, 205- 6; INA pe rsonnel iss u e, 190- 92, 195, 206-15; Muslim League and, 140-46, 148, 150-53, 155- 61, 165, 168, 177,186,195- 201,217; Muslim Leagu e coalition, 223-25; Noakhali-Tippera riots and, 322-28, 334; parity w ith Mu slim League, 186; performance in elections, 218- 22; policy on communal situation, 327-28; Wavell's Shimla Conference and, 181 Congress-Leagu e Pact, 68 Cong ress Socialist Party (CSP), 122, 137 Council of the BPML Parliamenta ry Board, 233 Cripps Mission, 148, 226 Cripps proposals, 147 Das, Brojonath, 278 Das, Deshbandhu Chittaranjan, 361 Das, Girish Chandra, 157 Das, Narendra Nath, 156 Das, Suranjan, 65-67, 238n, 244, 254, 262n-63n, 267- 68, 270n71n, 332, 340n Das Gupta, Birendra, 127 Dasgupta, Satish Chandra, 155, 163, 209, 365 Datta (Dutta) N.K., 287 Davidowicz, Lucy S., 49,540, 310n Defence of India Ru les, 103 Desai, A.R., 24, 30, 42n Deshpande, V.G., 154 Dev, Narendra, 190

Development, socialist system of, 32 Dhaka riot of 1941, 291 Dhillon, G.S., 191 Direct Action day, 231, 316, 365 Direct Action resolution, of Muslim Leagu e, 229-31, 237, 239, 241, 244-46, 248, 253-56, 25864, 266- 67, 269, 338 District Students League, 151 District Students' Conference, Chittagong, 129 divide and rule policy, 20 Dixit, Prabha, 25-26 Dow, H., 339 Dreze, Jean, 74n Drummond, I.M., 374 Dutt, Dhirendra Nath, 282 Dutt, Labanya Prova, 288 Dutta, Akhil Chandra, 159 Dutta, Birendra, 151 Dutta, Kamini Kumar, 147, 273n, 306, 307n, 322, 323n Earth, 379 Edbar, U pendra Nath, 144n, 176 education, mobility through, 68; Muslim League and, 139-46; Secondary Education Bill, 14046,152-55 Elite con flict, 64 Eng inee r, Asghar Ali, 24-25, 30n, 31-32 English ed u cation, demand fo r, 68 Erikson, Er ik H., 50, SI n, 344

Fakhri, Shahid, 196 false consciousness, concept of, 27- 28,30-32 Famine Inquiry Committee (FIC), 71, 75, 87, 93, 98 famines, causes ot 75-78, 98, 108; entitlement thesis, 77; facets of, 75; factors responsible for, 7578; in Bangladesh and Africa,

Index

74; in Bengal, 71-77, 79-100; in China, 77; politics amidst, 10137; population and, 74; relief activities, 94-97, 103, 114-15; responsibility of, 97-100; studies of, 73-78 Farazi movement, 62, 296-300 Fazlul Huq, 81-84, 86, 97n, 101, 103,106,119,134-35,166,302, 309-11, 315-16, 339-40 Fazlullah, Muhammad, 302 Forward Bloc, 120, 122, 124, 130, 161 French Revolution, 57 Freud,50 fundamentalism, 29, 52; phenomenon of, 28 Gafoor, Abdul, 310 Gallagher, john, 20n, 192n-93n, 374n Ganapati, M.V., 159 Gandhi, Abha, 364 Gandhi, Mahatma, 45, 49, 69-70, 101, 129, 148-53, 155, 157-64, 165-66,177,185n,211,224,290, 302, 307, 322, 324, 332; attack on communal ideology, 34650, 355; Muslim League views on visit to Noakhali, 338--45; Noakhali experiment, 343--45, 357, 375, 386; on conversions, 356; on two nation theory, 34849, 359, 362, 371; on United Bengal move, 371-72, 376; on violence against women, 35051; partition and, 374-79; peace committees, 353-54; Suhrawardy and, 358-74; visit to Noakhali after riots, 333-79, 384-87 Gandhi, Manubehan, 333n, 350, 360n, 364 Gandhi-jinnah meeting, 149-52, 156, 160, 163-64, 174,256,331, 336, 344-45, 382

421

Gandhi-Rajaji formula, 151 Garh Mukteswar riots, 333 Gellner, Ernest, 34n, 299 Ghose, jyotish Chandra, 220 Ghosh, Ganesh, 125 Ghosh, jiten, 133 Ghosh, Kirti jebon, 179-80 Ghosh, Prafulla, 305n, 308n, 322n Ghosh, S., 283, 286n Ghosh, S.c., 283, 286n, 290n Ghosh, Samar, 133 Ghosh, Surendra Mohan, 188, 191, 263-64 Giddens, Anthony, 36 Goffran, Abdul, 180 Government of India Act of 1935, 233 Gramsci, Antonio, 384 Greater Calcutta League Conference, 171 Greek War of Independence, 57 Greenough, Paul, 75, 113n Grow more food campaign, 129 Guha, Ranajit, 39n, 237n-38n, 304n, 317n Guha, Samar, 275n, 281n, 2S6n, 290n Guha, Sarat Chandra, 157, 158n, 179n Guha Raya, jnanada Mohen, 277n, 280n, 284n, 316n Gupta, Indrajit, 127 Gupta, Parthasarthi, 76n, SIn, S7n, 89n, 92n, 226n-27n, 376n Gupta, R., 273-74, 276n-77n, 284n85n, 293n Gupta, Surendra Nath, 174n Haldar, Haridas, 236

Halim, A.B., 173 Hardayal, Lala, 178 Hardwick, 250, 253 Harijan, 365 Hashim/Hasim, Abul, 94, 138, 151-52,160, 163-64,172,217n,

422

Communalism in Bengal

219, 232n, 257, 259, 264, 370, 382 Hati, Pundarikaksha, 175 Herbert, 84, 90n, 93n-94n, 97n Hey Ram, 379 Hindu Bhadralok, 64 Hindu communalism, 26, 29, 58, 64, 205-6, 260 Hindu Conference, Naihati, 106 Hindu fundamentalism, 29 Hindu Mahasabha, 67, 70, 76-77, 81, 87, 98-99, 101, 104-21, 126, 134-35, 138-46, 149-50, 15256,161-63; anti-Congress statements, 178, 199; Calcutta riots and, 258, 261-63, 265-69; Congress and, 184-89, 199,205-6; demand for Pakistan and, 18587,234,267; direct action resolution and, 178-79; district board elections and, 179-80; economic code of conduct, 176; election campaign, 182--89; election manifesto, 182, 235-36; elections and, 179-80, 218, 383, 385; famine in Bengal and, 38182; ideology of, 235; membership drive in Bengal, 174-78; Muslim League and, 138-39, 153-55,186; Noakhali-Tippera riots and, 328-31, 347, 352; on Communal Award, 185, 18788,192-93; on parity issue, 18587; opposition to CR Formula, 158-59; opposition to Secondary Education Bill, 140-46; performance in elections, 218-20; protest against Viceroy's proposals, 181; representative of Hindu interest, 177; Wavell's Shimla Conference and, 18081 Hindu National Guards, 330 Hindu nationalism, 192

Hindu revivalism, 29 Hindu Sangathan, 113, 117, 175, 330 Hindu Sangha, 175 Hindu Secondary School Committee, 140 Hindu Shakti Sangha, 263, 268 Hindu Society Board, 330 Hindus, duty in election, 235-36 Hindustan National Guards, 386 Howrah Muslim League, 239 Hussain, Mujaffar, 196 Hussain, Musharraf, 151 Hussaini, Ghulam Sarwar, 97n, 138, 277-78, 280, 291-92, 299, 302-3, 305n, 309, 313-18, 329

Ibrahim, Md., 303 Ikramullah, Shaista Suhrawardy, 247 Imaduddin, Maulana, 295 INA Day, 188-89, 206 INA Fund, 206 Indian Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1908, 323 Indian Independence League (IlL), 190 Indian National Army (INA) personnel, issue, 188-92, 195, 198, 206-13, 252, 267, 382-83 Indian National Congress, see, Congress party Indian Peoples' Theatre Association (IPTA), 133 Indian Renaissance, 29 Individual Satyagraha, 103 Islamabadi, Muniruzzaman, 302 Islamic Secondary School Committee, 140 Ispahani, M.A., 83, 92n, 259, 363 Jai Hind, 211 Jamait-ul-Ulama-i-Hind, 201, 203-4,213-14,219,316,318

Index

jamait-ul-Ulama-i-[slam, 146, 201, 214

Jessore District Hindu Mahasabha, 158 Jharkhand-Pakistan Conference, 224 jinnah, Mohammad Ali, 69, 83, 136n, 148-53, 155, 160- 61, 16364,169,1 97, 204, 208, 225,22831, 232, 255, 260, 320n, 336, 337n, 345, 357, 359n, 363, 36970, 373, 375- 77 job s, mobility thr oug h, 68 johnson, Allan Ca mpbe ll, 367 joshi, P.c., 122, 123n, 124, 134n, 134, 199, 21 7n, 331 jugantar Party, 125 jugantar Samiti, 102 Kabir, Humayun, 202, 215, 220 Kakar, Sudhir, 51 , 343-44 Karim, Fazlul, 315 Kaviraj , Narahari, 295n- 96n, 297, 298n Kedourie, Elie, 56n Khadi Pratisthan, 209, 211 Khan, A.A., 248 Khan, Akram, 102, 172, 246n, 257 Khan, Liaqat Ali, 152, 153n, 172, 373 Khan, Maulana Ak ram , 214 Khan, Shahnawaj, 191 Khan, Sharif, 239 Khan, Syed Ahm ed, 303, 305n Khan, Tamizuddin, 140, 142, 201 Khastgir, S.L., 85 Khatoon, Amena, 306 Khilafat mov em ent, 102,368 Kisan movement, 217 Kishorganj riot, 65

know ledge, bourgeois-nationalist conception of, 36-37; colonization of, 44; parad igms and categories of, 45; stru ctures of, 53

423

Krip a lani, j.B., 121, 194n, 205, 285, 326 Kripal ani, Sucheta, 289 Kri shak movement, 309 Krish ak Praja Party (KPP), 103, 131, 139-40,153, 193, 201 , 203, 215- 16, 21 8-19,302, 309, 314, 318 Krishak Samities, 315, 319, 322 Krishak Vani, 315 Kunjru, H .N., 191 Lahiri, Asuthosh, 113, 150, 154, 174n, 178- 79 Lahiry, Somnath, 76n, 163, 212 Laho re Resolution, 152 land revenue system, 20 Lea gu e -j h a rkhand Friends hip Coun cil, 224 Lester, Muriel, 287 lib eralism, tendencies of, 55 Linli thgow, 84, 90, 93n- 94n, 97 Littleboy, Major, 249 Llosa, Ma rio Vargas .. 380 Lo hia, Ram Manohar, 125

Mada n, T.N., 38 Madani, Maulana Hussain Ahm ed,

203-4 Madras Hindu Mahasabh a, 159 Mahajan, Su cheta, 225n- 26n, 227, 339n, 370, 372n, 375- 76, 377n, 378 Maitra, jayanti, 62-63 Maj id, Abdul, 179-80, 329 Majumd ar, N iharendu Du tt, 326 Malek, Abdul, 302 Malik, Abdel, 37 Maltl1U S, T.R., 73 Manda I, jogendra Nath, 144, 320n Mansergh, N., 165n, 270n, 272n, 275n, 277n, 279n, 284n - 85n, 292n, 339n-40n Ma rtyn, P.O., 274, 276n- 77n, 293 n, 325

424

Communalism in Bengal

Mashriqui, Allam a, 204-5 Masud, S.A., 260 Mathur, P.5., 237n, 248, 250n, 253n, 260n Mazumdar, Lakshmi, 283, 284n, 292- 93 Mazumdar, R.C., 60n, 63, 330n militant violence, 31 Mitra, Manindra Nath, 109, 1l0n Mitra, N.N., 123n, 140n, 142n, 149n, 155n, 166n, 170n, 178, 181n, 185n, 188n, 191n, 193n, 195n, 201, 203n, 205n, 209n, 211n, 245n, 259n, 265n, 269n, 337n, 345n Mitra, Na lini, 349, 352 Mitra, Na lini Ranjan, 179n, 180, 328,329n modernization, concept process of,46 Momin Conference, 203 Mondal, Birat Chandr a, 119, 330n Mondal, jogendra, 219 Mookerjee, Saroj, 151 Mookerjee, Shyama Prasad, 76, 81, 84, 91n, 95, 101, 105n- 6n, 107, 113- 14, 120- 21, 134, 140, 142, 144- 45, 149-50, 157- 62, 174, 176,178, 179n, 180, 181n, 18385,187-89,219,242n,248n,269, 291n, 309, 326n, 329n, 330-31, 371, 381 Moon, Penderal, 97n, 120n, 153n, 167n, 326n, 347n Mountbatten, 367, 370, 377 Mukherjee, Bankim, 129 Mukherjee, Biswanath, 129-30 Mukherjee, D.N., 179 Mukherjee, Hiren, 129 Mukherjee, Ka lipada, 115n, 264 Mukherjee, Ram Krishna, 75n, 115n, 308, 311, 313 Mukhopadhyay, Nagendra Nath, 219

Muslim communalism, 26, 58, 254, 260, 269, 383 Muslim community, 68 Mu slim League, 19,67,69,77,8287, 92, 94, 97- 101, 103- 6, 111 12, 118, 120- 21 , 123- 26, 129, 131-36; attempt to communalize INA issue, 212; Cabinet Mission and, 227- 28; coalition ministry, 222- 25; communalization of administration in Bengal, 169- 74; Communist party and, 161- 64,195- 201,209; Congress coalition, 223- 25; Congress party and, 148, 150-53, 155-61, 165, 168,177,186,195- 201,217; CR formula and, 146-53, 155; demand for Pakistan, 149-50, 152,156,160- 61,163; d emands, 177,185; Direct Action resolution by, 229-31, 237, 239, 241, 244-46, 248, 253- 56, 258- 64, 266- 67, 269, 338, 363; election campaign, 182- 83, 202-4, 21416; elections and, 139-46, 38283, 385; Hindu Mahasabha criticism of, 138-39, 153- 55, 186; ministry and famine Bengal, 381- 82, 384; Muslim students protes t against INA officers tr ial and, 206--15; national sentiments upsurge and, 201-6; nationalist Muslims and, 201-6; nature of politics of, 202; Noakha li- Tippe ra riots and, 282- 92, 310- 22; on eviction of illegal migrants by Assam government, 196, 258; on Gand hi's vis it to Noa khali, 338-45; Pakistan demand, 336-37, 348-49, 352,355, 369- 70; partition and, 375- 77; performance in elections, 218- 22, 230; ruling party in Bengal, 193; Secondary Education Bill, 140-46; Suhrawardy

Index

and, 358- 74; two-nation theory, 348-49,359,362, 371; Wavell's Shimla Conference and, 181 M uslim League Election Fund, 216 Mus lim Leagu e Parliamentary Party, 373 Muslim League Wor king Committee, 231 Muslim Majlis, 203 Muslim m idd Ie class, 25 Muslim National Guards, 386 Muslim Parliamentary Board,31516 Muslim separatism, communalism and,60-61 Muslim Stud ent League, 212 Muzaffarpur riots, 338 Na id u, P. Va radarajulu, 159, 160n Nandi, Pramatha, 133 N and y, Ashis, 38, 43n-44l1, 50 N andy, Ba roda Prosad, 246n Na rayan, Jaya prakash, 125 nation, concept of, 56- 58, 66 Nat iona l Guard, 257 nationalism, 19, 21, 28- 29, 35, 4043, 56--57, 64, 102; and democracy, 63; in India, 57 Nationalist, The, 185 NationalistMuslim Parliamentary Board, 203 N ationalist Muslims, 218 N auman, S.M., 173 Nawaz, Shah, 210, 215 Nazi v iolence, in Germany, 49 Nazimuddin, Khwaja, 82, 89, 90n, 94, 97, 131, 134, 144, 165-66, 168n, 169, 172, 193n, 254-55, 257, 259, 264, 288n, 307n, 30910, 363, 373 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 57n, 78n, 117n, 121- 22,147,149, 189-90, 193n, 197,200, 206, 229, 305n, 308n, 327, 369

425

neo-colonialism, 47 N ilphamari League Conference, 144 Noakhali Day, 339 Noakhali District Congress Committee (NDCC), 293, 323- 24 Noakhali Krishak Samiti, 303 N oakhali- Tippera, ag rarian structur e, 301- 2, 31 2- 13; collapse of civil autho ri ty in, 307; debt settlement boards, 304--5, 315; electoral politics in, 315- 16; famin e in, 307- 8, 311- 13, 315; Muslim League's attitude towards riot in, 319- 22; Muslim politics and communalism in, 310- 11 , 316; no rent demonstrations, 309; oppression and atrocities comm itted in, 306- 7; p olitics and protest in, 304--5; rad ica l peasant ag itation, 3024; SC population and riots in, 320- 22; see also, Noa khaliTippe ra riots; Wahabi and Faraz i movements in, 295-300, 384

Noakhali- Tippe ra ri ot, 49, 65, 67, 69- 70; abduction of Hindu wom en during, 286- 89; beginning of, 272; Congress activities durin g, 322- 28, 334; descriptions abou t, 272- 94; forcibl e conversions and, 282- 92; Gandh i in Noakha li and, 33379; Hindu Mahasabha activ ities during, 328-31; historiographica l interpretat ions, 374- 79; Muslim League activities during, 282- 92, 310- 22, 383; orig in s, 295- 332; reac tion s to, 270- 72; Suhrawardy and, 35874; v iolence on wo men during, 286- 90; Non-Coope rati on move ment, 102, 302, 361, 368

426

Comm unalism in Bengal

non-gove rnm ental organizations (NG Os),96 Noorani, A.G., 376

OrientaIism, 44 Pakistan, demand / m ovement for, 149-50, 152-53, 156- 57, 16061, 169- 73, 177, 183-87, 19520 3, 20 8, 214- 15, 224-29, 232- 34, 244-46, 253- 54, 256, 260, 267, 336-37, 316, 344-45, 348-49, 352, 355, 359, 369-70, 381-82, 385 Pa ki sta n Clu b, 172, 214 Pa ki stan Day, 276 Pa l, Anand a, 133 Pandey, Gyanendra, 23, 35, 40-43, 45,47-48,59,66,379n Pandit, Yunu s Mia, 276 Panikka r, K.M., 420, 46n, 52 Pa nt, Gov ind Va llabh, 200 Pa rekh, Bhikhu, 343-44 Partition, histor iographical interpretations, 374-79, 385 Patel, Va llabhbhai, 117n, 189-90, 193n, 200, 358, 359n, 364, 365n, 376 Peace Committees, 353-54, 356 Peasan t communal consciousness, 65

People's Age, 332 p eop le's purchasing p ower, decline in, 71- 73 people's war line, 122- 24, 131-32, 195

Peoples ' War, 195 Pe rmanen t Settlem ent, 60 Pe thi ck-L aw ren ce, 2020, 208n, 226n, 270n, 2720, 275n, 277n, 279n, 284o- 85n, 340n Pinne l, 249 Poona Pact, 1932, 11 7 pove rty and poverty alleviation, p olicies of, 74

Pratap, Maharana, 177 primary education, 68 Progressive Coalit ion Pa rty (PCP), 93, 101, 131 Proja Pa rty, 161 Prov incia l Congress Committee (PCC), 103 Prov incial League Working Committee, 151 Provincial League's Enquiry Committee, 320 Provincial Mahasa bha, 174 Punjab Hindu Sabha, 157 Punjab Hindu Vigilance Board, 157 Puma Swaraj, 211 Pyarelal, 354

Quit India m ovem ent, 103-5, 11920, 125, 148, 156, 182- 84, 19395, 198, 200, 226, 307- 8, 323, 344,382 Rahman, Faz lur, 144 Rahman, Hab ibu r, 150 Rahman, Hafizur, 196 Rahman, Hossa inur, 300 Rahman, Mujibur, 283, 310 Rahman, Mukhlesw ar, 302 Railway Mu slim Leagu e, 173 Rajabhoj, P.N., 224 Rajagopalach ari, C.R., 146, 150, 155-58, 161 - 63, 369 Rajshahi District Hindu Sabha, 174 Rajshahi District Muslim League,

163 Ramarqu e, Eric Ma ria, 365 Rashid Ali Day, 209- 13, 243, 252, 334, 382 Ray, Anandi Kinkar, 175 Ray, Kiron Shan ka r, 84, 144, 15556, 264 Ray, P.c., 142 Ray, Raj at K., 62, 63 n, 102n, 192n Ray Choudhury, Rajendr a Lal, 277

Index religion, role in communalism,5154 religious and communal conflicts, 22 revivalism, phenomenon of, 28 Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP), 207 Rezak, Abdur, 303, 313, 315-16, 318 Rezzak, Abdul, 138, 315 Robinson, R., 21 Roy Choudhury, Rajendra Lal, 274, 277, 305n, 316, 328 Roy, Kiron Shankar, 103, 125, 16263, 165n, 222-23, 263, 370 Roy, Mohendra Mohan, 188, 279n Roy, Ram Mohan, 46 Roy, Sailesh, 278 Russian revolution, 101

Saha, Meghnad, 142, 330n Saha, Saral, 180 Said, Edward, 36, 44 Salek, Abu, 151 Sanatan Dharma Sabha (SDS), 333 Sanyal, Nalinaksha, 76, 87, 91,

140 Sarabhai, Mridula, 327 Saraswati Puja, 171 Sarkar, Abu Hussain, 141 Sarkar, Chandi Prasad, 102n, 139n, 173,302n Sarkar, Sum it, 100n, 194n, 225n, 374n Sarwar, Ghulam, see, Hussaini Ghulam Sarwar Sasmal, B.N., 102 Savarkar, V.D., 87, 105n, 156n, 159 Savar kar, Veer, 177 Scheduled Caste (SC), population and riots, 117-20,320-22 Scheduled Caste Federation (SCF), 224

427

Seal, Anil, 19, 20n, 64, 117n, 374n Secondary Education Bill, 120, 14046, 152-55, 161, 172-74, 382; protest against, 140-46, 153-55 Secondary Education Bill Committee of Action, 115 secularism, 38--40; process of, 29 Sehgal, Prem, 191 Seligar, Martin, 49, 53n Sen, A.K., 75 Sen, Amartya, 71, 72n, 73-74, 7677,82, 107n, 114n Sen, Bhowani, 76n, 131, 132n Sengupta, Amalendu, 128n, 133n, 198n, 212n, 264, 266n Sengupta, ).M., 102 separate electorate, 183 Shah, Manzurul Huq, 316 Shakir, Moin, 24-25 Shariatullah, Hazi, 296 Shastri, )agadish, 175 Shimla Conference, 180, 189, 199, 229 Shivaji, Chatrapati, 172, 177 Siddiqui, A.R., 82 Siddiqui, B.A., 250 Simpson, E.S., 273-75, 283n-85n, 289 Simson, E.S., 289 Singh, Ananta, 125 Singh, Anita Inder, 169, 225, 226n27n Singh, )aipal, 224 Singh, Master Tara, 156, 161 Singh, Moni, 133n, 222 Singh, Randhir, 27, 31 Smith, w.e., 24 social mobility, 68 Star of India, 82, 282, 339 starvation deaths, 76-77 Statesman, The, 79, 93 Students Federation, 212 Students League, 144 Subhani, Maulana Azad, 214

428

Communalism in Bengal

Suhrawardy, H .S., 70, 86, 88-89, 91, 94, 102, 106- 8, 169- 71, 173, 205,209,214,222- 25,243,24748,250,252-55, 259-61, 263-64, 282-83,310- 12, 320n, 321, 346, 358, 360-74; and Ga ndhi in Noakhali,358- 74 Sunseri, Theddeus, 74n- 75n Sur, Rasomoy, 349, 352 Swadeshi movement, 101 Tagore, Rabindranath, 57, 273n Thakur, Brajesh Chakraborty, 329 Thakur, Brojesh Cha ndra Chakraborti, 174- 75 Tha kur, Pramatha Ranjan, 1441145n Thapar, Romila, 23, 375n Tippera Krishad Samiti, 302 Tottenhem, Richard , 128, 131n, 134n Tramway Workers' Un ion, 199 Transfer of Power, 374 true consciousness, concept of, 27 Tuke r, F., 273n, 279- 80, 281n, 291n-93n, 321n, 324, 347n

two-nation theory, 19, 149, 203, 348-49, 359, 362, 371 United and Independent Bengal sch em e, 371-72, 376 Usman, S.M., 242n, 256, 257n, 265, 359n, 364 Vanaik, Achin, 28-29, 31, 310n Vande Mataram, 171

Vidhava Vivah Sahayak Sabha (VVSS), 175 Wahabi movement, 62, 295-;)00 Walker, 250 Wave ]], 97, 145n, 165,167,180- 81, 185, 189, 199, 202, 207, 208n, 226n, 229, 248,292n, 340n, 367 Wave ]] Plan, 185 Wom en's Self-Defence Committee, 131 World War II, 71, 78; political conditions in India during, 121 - 25 Zah ee r, Sajjad, 195 Zaman, A.M.A., 127

About the Author Rakesh Batabyal is Assistant Director / Assistant Professor at the Academic Staff College, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi. He has previously been a Fellow at the National Institute of Punjab Studies, New Delhi and also at the Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla.