Common Security and Nonoffensive Defense: A Neorealist Perspective 9781685854577

Table of contents :
CONTENTS
PREFACE
1 INTRODUCTION: THE STUDY OF NOD
2 REALISM, COMMON SECURITY, AND NOD
3 NOD AND ALLIANCES
4 NOD AND ARMAMENTS DYNAMICS
5 NOD AND WAR PREVENTION
6 NOD AND TRADITIONAL STRATEGY
7 THE STRATEGY OF NOD
8 CONCLUSION: NOD AS AN INSTRUMENT OF SECURITY POLICY
ACRONYMS
BIBLIOGRAPHY
INDEX
ABOUT THE BOOK AND THE AUTHOR

Citation preview

COMMON SECURITY AND NONOFFENSIVE DEFENSE

COMMON SECURITY AND NONOFFENSIVE DEFENSE

A Neorealist Perspective

Björn Moller

Lynne Rienner Publishers • Boulder UCL Press • London

Published in the United States of America in 1992 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. 1800 30th Street, Boulder, Colorado 80301 Published in the United Kingdom by UCL Press Limited University College London, Gower Street, London WC1E 6BT The name of University College London (UCL) is a registered trademark used by UCL Press with the consent of the owner. © 1992 by Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data M0ller, Bj0m. Common security and nonoffensive defense : a neorealist perspective / Bj0rn M0ller. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index. ISBN 1-55587-259-X 1. Deterrence (Military strategy) 2. Offensive (Military strategy) I. Title. U162.6.M65 1991 355.02'17-dc20 91-28864 CIP British Cataloguing in Publication Data A Cataloguing in Publication record for this book is available from the British Library. ISBN 1-85728-008-3 Printed and bound in the United States of America The paper used in this publication meets the requirements of the American National Standard for Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials Z39.48-1984.

To my family: My wife, Ulla, my daughter, Ditte, and my son, Hans

CONTENTS Preface

ix

1

Introduction: The Study of NOD

1

2

Realism, Common Security, and NOD

9

3

NOD and Alliances

49

4

NOD and Armaments Dynamics

79

5

NOD and War Prevention

105

6

NOD and Traditional Strategy

131

7

The Strategy of NOD

161

8

Conclusion: NOD as an Instrument of Security Policy

199

List of Acronyms Bibliography Index About the Book and the Author

215 219 279 285

vii

PREFACE The momentous events of 1989-1990 were the harbingers of a new era, the dawn of which we were witnessing by early 1991. A profound metamorphosis of the international system had begun, with the potential of supplanting the postwar with a new "post-postwar" system. Whereas the postwar (or cold war) system was characterized by bipolarity and nuclearism, its successor seems likely to be multipolar (or at least "post-bipolar"), as well as, in a certain sense, postnuclear (or at least "less nuclear"). While the collapse of communism and the breakdown of the Soviet alliance system in 1989-1990 ended the cold war, events in 1990-1991 demonstrated that world peace was not around the corner. Internal strife was raging in the former Soviet empire, most intensely in the Soviet Union itself. And the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait led to a war between the aggressor and practically all the rest of the world. To expect these episodes to be the very last twitches of the moribund old system rather than features of the new era may well be naively optimistic. The cold war was certainly far from peaceful in any sense other than that of an absence of large-scale interstate violence. It did, however, provide some comfort in this limited sense: predictability and a certain degree of security. First, it was reasonably clear, even in a long-term perspective, who was on whose side against whom and over what issues. Whereas this may have fostered hostility in relationships that might otherwise have been amicable, at least states were clear about their ties of amity and enmity. Second, the specter of global nuclear holocaust was so frightening as to induce everybody to step gently. A number of minor conflicts and wars may thus have been averted, albeit only at the cost of a low (yet not negligible) risk of total annihilation. Even though the world order of the cold war was thus in many ways unjust and uncomfortable, it was an order of sorts, based on the twin principles of bipolarity and nuclearism. Both these ordering principles seem destined to recede in the coming years. Even though NATO, unlike the Warsaw Pact, has survived to the present day, it may simply fade into oblivion in the coming years, if it is not formally dissolved before that. The loss of the "Great Enemy" (i.e., the Soviet "evil empire") may thus spell the end of the "Great Alliance" as we know it. The post-bipolar world in the making may be characterized by

ix

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PREFACE

patterns of cooperation and confrontation along both the military and the political dimensions, which may well be transient and fluctuating, and almost certainly different from the rigid ones of the recent past. It is, for instance, not obvious why Greece and Turkey should join ranks against Bulgaria, or why Hungary and Romania should do so against, say, Germany or Italy. The many worms that have been lurking underneath the stones of the bipolar structure for decades in the form of unresolved intraalliance conflicts may crawl out into the open and grow in the decades ahead. Whereas the divisive issues have so far been ideology and sociopolitical system, in the future matters such as nationalism, territorial disputes, and even religion may become at least equally divisive.1 Furthermore, the West's loss of the very same Great Enemy, along with the Great Threat emanating therefrom, namely that of being engulfed by expansionist world communism, may spell the end to the Great Deterrent in the form of the Bomb (cf. Prins 1990a; 0berg 1990). On the one hand, some nuclear weapons are likely to remain in the arsenals of the great powers for quite some time yet, and nuclear weapons technology may even to a certain extent proliferate to other parts of the world. As the presumed panacea for security problems, however, nuclearism seems to have run its course. Because nuclear weapons have become anathema to the publics around the world, nuclear deterrence will most likely henceforth be merely a last resort. Whereas this will alleviate the danger of global thermonuclear annihilation, it also entails risks: Because the credibility of nuclear first-use is likely to diminish, and the wherewithal of implementing it may well be reduced by several orders of magnitude, the benign step-gently regime that has characterized postwar intra-European relations may be in jeopardy. As its successor, a war system just might reappear, under which states might, once again, come to contemplate war for political purposes. Combined, these trends toward fluctuating patterns of alignment, reemerging issues of conflict, and abating reluctance to go to war may bode ill for peace and stability in the post-cold war world. The world of the 1990s and beyond thus badly needs ordering principles, if a recession to anarchy is to be deflected. Whereas several ordering principles are conceivable, it remains to be seen which will ultimately prevail. One possibility might be a return to the principle of self-help, which might lead to a truly anarchic world order, what some have called an "immature anarchy." Conflictual perspectives would dominate the thinking and behavior of states, and war would remain an option that might be seriously contemplated in times of tension and crisis. Alternatively, some lessons may have been learned by the international society in the course of the cold war. If so, the accumulated wisdom may facilitate a shift to a "mature anarchy," which may, in its turn, merely constitute a halfway station on the path toward even higher forms of societal

PREFACE

xi

organization on a global scale. 2 The United Nations might gradually be vested with greater powers in comparison with the individual nation-states, and the world might thus approach the goal of world government that has for centuries, indeed millennia, been proclaimed as the ultimate goal for which to strive. The realization, sooner rather than later, of this ambitious program may, indeed, be the only salvation for mankind through the twenty-first century, when the problems of pollution, global warming, ozone depletion, and so forth may reach such proportions, and such an urgency, as to be soluble only on a world scale. Although speculation about such perspectives is long overdue, it would be premature to demand their immediate implementation. In any case, it is not in the cards as far as the 1990s are concerned; more readily implementable programs are called for. The halfway station of mature anarchy, described by Barry Buzan and other neorealists, can be characterized by such features as a proliferation of regimes across various issue-areas. Regime building would imply that certain norms of behavior on the international stage would gradually become universally acknowledged and largely respected, albeit for reasons of enlightened national self-interest, rather than as an effect of international law. There are already numerous examples of such tacit understandings and generally respected rules of prudence, the combined effect of which is to relieve tension, to prevent tension from developing into crisis, and to manage the latter without incurring risks of war.3 This stage of informal mutual accommodation and cooperative conflict resolution may, in due course, be supplanted by various forms of international integration and amalgamation. As far as security politics in the narrow sense is concerned, collective security seems to recommend itself as an appropriate ordering principle at this stage (and probably beyond the turn of the millennium), wherein at least part of the sovereignty of the nationstate is transferred to supranational bodies. Whether the transitionary regime phase or the subsequent supranational phase will be genuinely peaceful remains to be seen, but it is at least conceivable that they will not be: Military problems may well remain, and attempts at their solution in the traditional confrontational mode may, in turn, stand in the way of the development of more-cooperative forms of security. Even though the military factor is thus likely to recede gradually in importance, this process is far from automatic and requires political efforts. Even though intentions—that is, the political attitudes to the use of military means for political ends—are, in the final analysis, what really matters, the structure of the armed forces—that is, capabilities—are also of considerable importance. According to a growing number of analyses, the transformation of armed forces that is required would be tantamount to a defensive restructuring, pointing toward a nonoffensive defense, or NOD. NOD connotes a particular configuration of armed forces intended to make

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PREFACE

them well adapted for defense, yet unsuitable for offensive purposes. The notion of NOD entered academic and political agendas in the course of the 1980s, spurred by, inter alia, the increased focus that came to bear on conventional forces in general, and on their offensive capabilities in particular, as a corollary of the nuclear debate and the 1987 INF Treaty. Whereas the catchword became conventional stability, it was explicitly acknowledged by all parties that this implied building down offensive capabilities and gradually approaching strictly defensive structures. Various neologisms have been coined for this notion of strictly defensive forces. In addition to the neutral term conventional stability, they include: nonprovocative defense, nonaggressive defense, structural inability to attack, defensive defense, confidence-building defense, and the catchall, yet slightly misleading, alternative defense. I prefer what is actually my own invention, nonoffensive defense, with the convenient acronym NOD and the adjective "noddy" which might even be conjugated (noddy, noddier, noddiest).4 According to its proponents (among them myself), NOD would provide the solution to the problems of war prevention and disarmament in a postnuclear setting by minimizing the capabilities, as well as the incentives, for waging wars of aggression without any need for a nuclear Damocles' sword; and, by virtue thereof, by increasing the margin for unilateral arms builddown, facilitating arms control and disarmament. Furthermore, NOD would presumably be flexible in the sense of being applicable to both a bloc system such as the present one, and to a system of more-fluctuating alliances between nation-states. Whereas NOD has hitherto almost exclusively been suggested for application in Europe, it might also (at least partially and mutatis mutandis) be applicable to other potential conflict areas around the world. Elaborate analyses of how NOD principles might help solve a panoply of problems abound, along with a host of concrete proposals for the actual restructuring of the armed forces of various countries. Nevertheless, the ongoing exploration of the field continues to reveal uncovered ground, and the topic has thus been far from exhausted yet. Part of the empty conceptual space is, mirabile dictu, the theoretical underpinnings of NOD. It remains unclear what the relation is between NOD and a number of key conceptions in international affairs: • Does NOD presuppose a different image of international relations than that painted by the (self-proclaimed) realists, that is, a world consisting of sovereign states pursuing their national interests in an anarchic setting? • Is NOD compatible with a maintenance of adversarial alliances, or does it presuppose neutrality and nonalignment? • What is the status of NOD? Is it (an element in) a military strategy, some kind of antistrategy, or a purely political conception?

PREFACE

xiii

• What might be NOD's contribution to solving the problems of the arms race? • Could NOD replace or supplement (nuclear) deterrence as a form of war prevention? • Does NOD presuppose a particular setting, in casu the Central Front for which it was originally conceived, but which does not really exist any longer (subsequent to German unification)? Or are the same principles mutatis mutandis applicable on a global scale? These are some of the questions I seek to answer in the present work. It has had a long gestation period. From 1985 until the present date, I have been working on a research project on nonoffensive defense in Europe at the Centre for Peace and Conflict Research at the University of Copenhagen. In this capacity, I have been a participant in the international debate on NOD almost from its beginning, and have on numerous occasions been asked to prepare papers for conferences and write chapters in books on various concrete subjects, such as nonoffensive naval or air strategies and regional applications of the NOD principles. Having thus already covered a good deal of the "nitty-gritty" work of elaborating concrete NOD proposals, and analyzing those of other NOD proponents, 5 1 eventually came to feel that the time had come to approach the topics head-on. The purpose of this book is thus to elaborate on the theoretical ramifications of the NOD debate in progress. I would like to express my thanks to a number of institutions and individuals: First to the Centre for Peace and Conflict Research at the University of Copenhagen for giving me the opportunity and time first to complete my dissertation, "NOD as a Security Political Instrument," and subsequently to transform it into the present book. I thank the director of the center, Professor HSkan Wiberg, whose unswerving moral support and constructive criticism have been most helpful. Thanks also to colleagues around the world with whom I have had the pleasure of discussing a number of issues related to this topic. Last, but certainly not least, thanks are due to my wife, Ulla, my daughter, Ditte, and my son, Hans, for their indefatigable patience with my growing workaholism. —BM

xiv

PREFACE

Notes to the Preface 1. On latent West-West and East-East conflicts, see Kaldor 1978; Senghaas 1986, 1988. On the resurgence of nationalism, see Brzezinski 1989; Larrabee 1990. 2. For pessimistic views, see Mearsheimer 1990; Snyder 1990. For moreoptimistic predictions, see Evera 1990a, b. For the notion of mature anarchy, see Buzan 1991a, b: 93-101; cf. Buzan et al. 1990: 229-252; Booth 1991: 335376. 3. On regimes in general, see Krasner 1982; cf., for various examples from the realm of US-Soviet relations, George, Farley, and Dallin 1988; Allison and Ury 1989. 4. Cf. the newsletter, which I edit, NOD. Non-Offensive Defence. International Research Newsletter, issued by the Centre for Peace and Conflict Research in Copenhagen since 1985. The adjective noddy was coined by H&kan Wiberg. 5. See, e.g., (on the German NOD debate) M0ller 1991a; (on naval matters) M0ller 1987b, 1989a, 1990c; (on air strategy) M0ller 1989b; (on land forces) M0ller 1987a, 1990d; (on nuclear weapons) M0ller 1988a; (on war prevention) M0ller 1989d; (on the regional application of NOD) M0ller 1985, 1989c, 1990b, 1991d; Gleditsch et al. 1990: 105-164; (on NOD, the armaments dynamics, disarmament, and conversion) M0ller 1990e.

COMMON SECURITY AND NONOFFENSIVE DEFENSE

1 INTRODUCTION: THE STUDY OF N O D What follows is an analysis of NOD as a potential security political instrument on the state level. Before embarking on the analysis of NOD, however, a tentative definition of the concept is an inescapable necessity. Definitions NOD is a military strategy and as such concerned with the "distribution and application of military means to fulfil the ends of politics" (Liddell Hart 1974: 321)1. Any strategy is teleological, that is, a plan for applying means to an end, in casu military means to political ends. Its main purpose is thus to provide the state in question with certain options. In order to do so, it must be implemented in terms of both military functions and structures. NOD might thus be defined either structurally (i.e., in terms of structure and posture) or functionally (i.e., in terms of activities and options). There are many competing definitions of NOD, among which the most prominent (as well as the most elaborate) seems to be the structural definition of Frank Barnaby and Egbert Boeker (1988: 137): "The size, weapons, training, logistics, doctrine, operational manuals, war-games, manoeuvres, textbooks used in military academies, etc. of the armed forces are such that they are seen in their totality to be capable of a credible defense without any reliance on the use of nuclear weapons, yet incapable of offense." The high degree of elaboration, in combination with the telling "etc.," suggests that a structural definition may miss the point. I therefore prefer a simpler, but functional, definition that focuses on options: The armed forces should be seen in their totality to be capable of a credible defense, yet incapable of offense. This definition, first, focuses on military capabilities; not because political intentions are not important, they most certainly are. Indeed, between certain dyads of states military capabilities hardly matter at all, because their intentions vis-à-vis each other are so obviously peaceful that war is inconceivable. Denmark and Sweden, as well as the United States and Canada, are obvious cases in point. Between most other dyads of states, however, war is far less inconceivable, in which case intentions are never entirely credible. Assessments of capabilities therefore influence mutual 1

2

COMMON SECURITY & NONOFFENSIVE DEFENSE

threat perceptions decisively, also as indices (i.e., material signs) of intentions (cf. Jervis 1970). Second, the definition takes perceptions into account by the stipulations that the defense should be credible, that is, be perceived as a potent capability by any would-be aggressor, and that the armed forces should be seen as (rather than merely be) incapable of offense. Regardless of the absence of true offensive capabilities, a defense posture that looked threatening would be unable to fulfil its confidence-building, peace-promoting, and détentefurthering goals. Perceptions are, however, a somewhat fuzzy notion because they lend themselves so easily to, inter alia, deception and abuse. Political statements on the part of a state's opponents to the effect that they find something threatening could, of course, never constitute sufficient grounds for abandoning a certain policy that was otherwise regarded as being in the national interest. Deceitful behavior aside, however, the military power of other states does occasionally give rise to earnest fears, and these ought to be taken into account. To distinguish between genuine and faked threat (mis)perceptions is, ultimately, a matter for political decision, which ought, however, to be informed by meticulous scholarly analysis. Third, the definition distinguishes between offensive and defensive capabilities. This distinction is very complex, indeed, as will emerge from the analysis in Chapter 6 below. Sufficient at this stage is a preliminary definition of offensive as entailing options of invasion or long-range bombardment of, or disarming strikes against, an opposing state. Fourth and finally, the definition explicitly refrains from distinguishing between offense and defense on the level of individual weapons, but refers instead to the (deliberately somewhat vague) notion of totality. The appropriate level of aggregation varies according to context and is thus impossible to specify on this abstract level. For an elaboration of the pros and cons of various levels of aggregation I refer to Chapter 6 below. Briefly stated, the NOD discourse is tantamount to urging states to convert or "transarm" to NOD, that is, to restructure their armed forces to conform with the above definition. The purpose of so doing would be fourfold: 1. 2. 3. 4.

To prevent war, above all by improving crisis stability; To limit damage should war nevertheless erupt; To facilitate disarmament; and To promote détente, mutual confidence, and rapprochement between states with a view to minimizing the international system's political propensity for war.

All of these objectives should, according to NOD proponents, be achievable without sacrificing the capability for defense against premeditated aggression, as well as without relinquishing other vital means of security.

INTRODUCTION

3

There remains a certain ambiguity of terminology and syntax, which I have found impossible to eliminate. Depending on the context, NOD may have different connotations, such as: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

A concept, defined as above; A theory, that is, an ordered set of propositions, such as those stated above; A proposal for a type of defense conforming to the criteria in the definition above; The common features of a set of such proposals; and An actual defense posture conforming more or less to the criteria in the above definition.

In cases where the context rules out equivocation I usually prefer the shorthand NOD. Where the shorthand might lend itself to misunderstandings of substance, I use more explicit and lengthy expressions. For any instances where I have underestimated the potential for misunderstanding, I hereby apologize.

NOD Among the Academic Disciplines NOD is relevant for various fields of academic research, particularly for international relations, strategic studies, and peace research. To some extent these various fields might be conceived of as different approaches to the study of the same concept, in casu NOD, or as different angles from which to view it, implying that different aspects may be relevant for the three disciplines. International relations deals with the relations between countries and societies, and international politics more particularly with political relations between states (Holsti 1977: 20-22; Dougherty & Pfaltzgraff 1971: 15-30; Morgenthau 1960: 15-18). From the angle of international politics, NOD is thus of interest as one security political instrument among others, as well as for its influence on the international system. NOD may thus, on the one hand, be analyzed for its ability to promote the various national interests states pursue, that is, for its ability to insure a country against attack, for its compatibility with existing alliance obligations, and so on. On the other hand, NOD may also be analyzed for its effects on the international system, that is, on the relationship between states, the patterns of their interaction, the propensity for war, arms racing, and competitive alliance formation within the system, et cetera. However, from the angle of international relations and international politics, a military strategy, and per implication NOD, is viewed merely as one out of a panoply of different instruments. It can never form the exclusive focus. Strategic studies deals with "the effects of the instruments of force on international relations," 2 and hence among other matters with strategy,

4

COMMON SECURITY & NONOFFENSIVE DEFENSE

defined above as the "application of military means to fulfil the ends of politics." The curriculum of strategic studies is, however, somewhat broader and encompasses more-analytical and descriptive topics than strategy, which is essentially prescriptive and pragmatic. From the angle of strategic studies, NOD is relevant above all for its military contents, that is, for its recommendations pertaining to weapons systems, deployment modes, tactical and operational principles, et cetera. Furthermore, strategy is, according to its most prominent thinkers (Liddell Hart, Beaufre, Luttwak et al.) what might be called a dialectical discipline. The strategist is concerned with the interaction, indeed contest, of wills (materialized in states, conceived of as actors), each trying to defeat the other, more often than not by "paradoxical methods." The logic of strategy may hence differ considerably from traditional, say, Aristotelian logic, since it is a question of outwitting and outsmarting an opponent who is taking a similarly strategic (and hence paradoxical) approach to the contest (Liddell Hart 1967: 319-337; Beaufre 1963: 95-118; Luttwak 1987: 3-17). From this angle, NOD might be analyzed as one strategic move (or a sequel of moves) conceived of as a counter to a move by an opponent, and as itself being countered by strategic moves on the part of the opponent. This is relevant both as far as actual war is concerned, and with regard to the continuous peacetime competition. Finally, from the angle of strategic studies, NOD might also be analyzed for its implications for grand strategy, that is, for the role of military power in the panoply of power resources available to states (on this concept, see Liddell Hart 1967: 321-322, 352-360; cf. Luttwak 1976, 1983). Peace research has been defined in many different ways, for instance as "research into the conditions of realizing peace" (Galtung 1969: 131; 1975: 150, 167; Dunn 1978; Wiberg 1990a). It is thus a focused or oriented discipline, exploring how peace might be promoted. Peace reseachers, in their turn, tend to understand peace not merely in the negative sense of an absence of war, but also in the broader (and positive) sense as "a working, interacting relationship based on mutual exchange for mutual benefit" (Galtung 1969: 131; 1975: 150, 167; cf. Dunn 1978; Wiberg 1990a). From the angle of peace research, NOD may be relevant for several reasons: It may, for instance, be analyzed for its war prevention, confidencebuilding, or disarmament-furthering effects, but its impact on the degree of structural violence (on this concept, see Galtung 1969; Wiberg 1990a, 3036; Rapoport 1989: 64-65) in the system ought also to be taken into consideration. The three disciplines thus analyze different aspects of NOD, all of which are interrelated: Unless NOD is found viable from the angle of strategic studies, international politics theory is bound to find it inadequate, and peace researchers will have to abandon any high hopes in its peace-promoting potential because it will most likely never be adopted by any state.

INTRODUCTION

5

On the other hand, unless NOD is compatible with the broader security policies pursued by states, it is not really relevant, regardless of its potential intrinsic strategic or peace-promoting merits. Conversely, NOD would fall short of its proclaimed purpose on all accounts were it, for example, to increase the likelihood of war. No matter how powerful NOD might be as a war-fighting method, or how well it might fit into existing alliance patterns, its potential for furthering peace must be acknowledged as a sine qua non, not only by peace research, but by the other disciplines as well. Since all three disciplines are thus relevant for the study of NOD, I allow myself the liberty of selecting from their curricula a number of specific topics as points of departure for my analysis of NOD. Furthermore, I feel free to pick and choose from the methodologies of each discipline, as outlined below.

Plan of the Analysis In this section I briefly outline the plan of the present study, that is, the analytical questions it seeks to answer, as well as roughly indicate the conclusions at which I have arrived through this analysis. In Chapter 2 we deal with the relationship between the theory of NOD and the various theories of international relations, above all, political realism. NOD and its conceptual framework, namely the security political philosophy of common security (CS), are both found to be entirely compatible with realism, particularly if the focus is on the theories of the security dilemma. In Chapter 3 we explore the possibility of combining a shift to NOD with the maintenance of alliances, which has often been denied. Neither an analysis of alliances in the abstract, nor a concrete analysis of NATO and the (now defunct) Warsaw Pact, however, pointed to any fundamental incompatibility. On the other hand, NOD would also be compatible with a shift from competitive alliances to a system of collective security. In Chapter 4 we analyze the implications of a shift to NOD for the armaments dynamics. The common assumption that NOD would have a benign influence on the external dynamics is confirmed, and certain indications of a potentially benign effect on the internal dynamics are mentioned. In Chapter 5 we analyze NOD's potential contribution to war prevention, that is, to averting premeditated as well as inadvertent wars. In this connection, the notion of deterrence is found to contain a grain of truth, but to be far too narrow, providing no adequate counter to inadvertent wars, whereas NOD would hedge against both types of war. In Chapter 6 we deal with the questions of whether NOD constitutes a full-fledged military strategy, and whether (or to what extent) it is new. On the basis of an affirmative answer to both these questions, the subject of Chapter 7 is the concrete contents of this NOD strategy. The

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COMMON SECURITY & NONOFFENSIVE DEFENSE

account is introduced by a context-setting analysis of the role of nuclear deterrence, followed by a description of how the NOD principles might be applied to all three military environments: land, air, and sea. In Chapter 8 we sum up the conclusions of the preceding analyses with a view to assessing NOD's viability as an element in the security policies of states, both as far as the present world is concerned and in the future. The Methodology The three aforementioned academic disciplines abound with different methods of research, many of which would, at first glance at least, appear to recommend themselves for the study of NOD. On closer analysis, however, most reveal themselves as unsuitable3. Direct testing with a view to falsifying the stipulated hypotheses would be tantamount to nothing less than, first, persuading a country to adopt NOD as the guideline for its defense policy (which is a political, rather than a scholarly, task, and one that might well prove futile); second, waiting for the state in question to actually implement NOD in terms of posture, exercises, etc. (which might well take decades); and third, waiting for an event (or a sequel of events) to occur, the outcome of which might falsify the hypothesis. It is thus clearly inapplicable. Simulation is a way of testing very specific hypotheses, not in real life, but under (an approximation to) laboratory conditions. A number of such studies have already been conducted, mostly at military research institutions (such as the University of the Bundeswehr in Munich) or at institutions that have the military services as their main contractor, as, for example, RAND, and some that have actually sought to simulate NOD-type forces in combat.4 Unfortunately, most simulations can be criticized for their lack of relevance: First, the current generation of computers does not allow for fullscale simulations of, for example, total battles, much less entire wars, but are merely capable of handling tactical (i.e., up to division-size) engagements. To assume that battles are merely sums of tactical engagements, or that wars amount to nothing more than the sums of battles, would be tantamount to a pars pro toto fallacy. Furthermore, a number of the most important NOD hypotheses are by their very nature not amenable to combat simulation at all, because they simply do not deal with combat but are concerned with, for example, NOD's impact on the armaments dynamics, on war prevention, etc. Comparative methods, such as often used in political science research, might also seem to recommend themselves. Comparison may either be synchronic (i.e., a comparison of phenomena at the same time, but per implication at different points in space) or diachronic (i.e., a comparison of the same entity or phenomenon at different points in time). For the present

INTRODUCTION

7

purpose, however, both methods suffer from the serious deficiency that there is nothing truly relevant to compare, since NOD is basically a set of proposals that have yet to be implemented. We are thus left with what some have called the classical approach of pure mind exercises (Bull 1969; cf. Jervis 1969): "Testing" assumptions analytically for their intrinsic logic, as well as semiempirically by comparing them with the available evidence in a rather impressionistic fashion. The best one can hope for is to formulate assumptions, arguments, and conclusions with a view to making them meaningful (i.e., neither tautological nor ambiguous, nor unfalsifiable in principle); to continuously confront these propositions with the available empirical facts; and to modify the theory accordingly. This is the manner in which I shall proceed in the subsequent analysis.

Notes 1. For a critique of the allegedly too narrow scope of "strategy," also see Beaufre 1963: 16, who recommends the broader definition "the art of utilizing force for attaining the ends of politics." 2. On strategic studies as a discipline, see, e.g., Buzan 1987a (definition from p. 8); cf. Gamett 1987. For a critical analysis of the entire discipline, see Green 1966; Rapoport 1970a. For an attempted rebuttal, see Gray 1982; Bull 1968. 3. See, for good overviews of the methodology of international politics, Mueller 1969; Hermann et al. 1987. A good exponent of the scientific imperative is Morton Kaplan (1970, 1972). For a rebuttal, see Jervis 1969; Bull 1969. 4. Numerous examples of simulations applied to the topic of arms control objectives are to be found in Avenhaus et al. 1986; Huber 1990c: 129-202. Good examples of computer-aided dynamic analyses of battles, and per implication of force ratios, are found in Epstein 1985, 1988, 1990. The results of the cited computer simulation of NOD models can be found in Hofmann, Huber, and Steiger 1986.

2 REALISM, COMMON SECURITY, AND N O D

NOD has rarely been explicitly embedded in the framework of a theory of international relations, not because there are no underlying assumptions or premises, but merely because most of these remain tacit and implicit. NOD is a military strategy and as such concerned with the "distribution and application of military means to fulfil the ends of politics" (Liddell Hart 1967: 321). Some strategies may be highly elastic in the sense of lending themselves easily to utilization for different political purposes, whereas others are more inextricably connected with specific types of policies. Ideally, strategies should be as elastic as possible, and the actual selection of means should be tailored to meet the chosen ends. However, the opposite, of course, also holds true to a certain extent. There are ends and purposes that will have to be abandoned because the available means will never suffice for attaining them, or because the required means would be dysfunctional in other respects. Nevertheless, as a general rule, ends rather than means must be the analytical point of departure. An assessment of NOD (as of any other strategy) ought therefore to take as its baseline a theoretical conception of the international system as well as of the political goals for which states should strive within this context. Only against such a background is it possible to evaluate whether the strategy in question is adequate for the stipulated purposes. Strategies in general, and military strategies in particular, may, in principle, be relevant for a number of issue-areas, by virtue of their having a number of secondary or latent, in addition to their primary and manifest, functions. A defense policy (such as might be derived from a NOD strategy) would thus have an impact on a number of issue-areas besides security policy: For example, the size, composition, and dislocation of forces that would follow from a particular strategy would have implications for, inter alia, employment, on both the national and local scales; the organizational structure of the armed forces (professional, conscript, or militia) may have implications for the political structure of society, and vice versa. I will, however, ignore such latent functions of defense policy and focus on the manifest one of promoting security. Our purpose is to analyze whether NOD is inextricably connected with political idealism, as it is frequently claimed (mostly by critics), or whether 9

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NOD is at least compatible with political realism. This is a theoretical question, and as such logically independent of the actual theoretical leanings of the majority of NOD proponents (many of whom may undoubtedly be rightly categorized as idealists) as well as of the military predilections of the majority of realists (most of whom may well prefer offensive capabilities and strategies to defensive ones). I thus abstract from much of the actual ramification of both NOD theory and realism in order to compare the core assumptions and tenets of the two traditions of thought so as to assess their intrinsic compatibility. In this connection, I treat the CS theory as a conceptual mediator between the two schools of thought, since CS appears to be the theoretical framework most congenial to NOD, while at the same time most comparable to realism in terms of its level of analysis. Both deal with the same subject matter, international relations, and both contain sets of propositions on the workings of the international system. The method is one of logical reconstruction, and as such runs a certain risk of straying too far from the actual thinking to be found in the literature emanating from the three schools of thought. Ultimately, both proponents of CS-cum-NOD and advocates of realism might be unable to recognize their stipulated theoretical constructs. This risk is probably inevitable, since no universally acknowledged authoritative expositions of either tradition exist. Nevertheless, certain authors do stand out as almost unchallenged proponents of the respective traditions. In order to minimize the risk entailed by the reconstructive endeavor, I have taken these as my sample case in order to ensure that the logical reconstruction is at least undertaken on the basis of central, rather than peripheral, authors. The sample of classical realists consists of Hans Morgenthau, John Herz, Henry Kissinger, Stanley Hoffmann, Arnold Wolfers, E. H. Carr, Hedley Bull, and Raymond Aron. The neorealists include Kenneth Waltz, Robert Gilpin, and Barry Buz an.1 Before proceeding with the actual analysis, I shall attempt a brief exposé of political realism, which is by no means intended to be exhaustive but merely takes into consideration those approaches (and those aspects of each approach) that are deemed relevant for the subsequent analysis of CS and NOD. It is thus highly, but deliberately, selective.

Idealism vs. Realism The dichotomy between idealism and realism in the study of international relations is well-nigh universally acclaimed as significant and meaningful, although the distinctions are sometimes blurred, in the sense that not every author fits in neatly within either category. Idealism, as a term coined by self-proclaimed realists, carries certain pejorative connotations, just as realism signifies something positive.

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11

Idealism has traditionally been taken to imply a concern with the world as it ought to be, more often than not combined with a certain neglect of the actual state of affairs. The term, furthermore, tends to carry metaphysical connotations (as its etymological origin in Plato's philosophy of forms indicates) and is often used as a synonym for utopianism. The basic assumption of nearly all idealist thought is one of a fundamental harmony between human beings as well as between states. This harmony may well be obscured by superficial cleavages, but its revelation, manifestation, or restoration is regarded, in principle, as possible, something that is proclaimed as the paramount goal of philosophical as well as political endeavors. In the modern age writers such as Immanuel Kant have often been used as examples of idealists. Kant's concern was with building perpetual peace, an imperative deduced from the categorical imperative at the heart of his theory of ethics, which was, in its turn (at least tentatively) inferred deductively from the critique of pure reason, that is, from epistemology and the critique of metaphysics (Kant 1963b). 2 The means to accomplish perpetual peace were, according to Kant, on the one hand, internal reforms in the respective states: the establishment of a republican form of government with elements of representative democracy and an abolition of standing armies in favor of militias. By virtue of the presumed aversion of ordinary citizens to war, this was believed to further the cause of peace by eliminating most of the reasons for belligerence and hence wars. On the other hand, and in order to make peace truly perpetual, an arrangement ought to be established between states that would be roughly similar to that between citizens within a state, that is, a federation of states. Idealism experienced a renaissance in the aftermath of World War I, when Wilsonian ideas about federalism played a decisive role in the foundation of the League of Nations. Modern examples of idealism can be found in the world order and federalist traditions, which advocate, inter alia, the eventual abolition of nation-states in favor of world government. Many examples of this trend are to be found in the peace research community, where, in addition to urges for world government, admonitions for replacing Occidental with Oriental cosmology (presumably implying a more holistic worldview) are occasionally voiced. Idealism also has had a considerable appeal to peace movements around the world, including the Green movements. 3 Although idealism has ceded some ground to realism in the scholarly community and among political decisionmakers, it would be premature to write it off entirely as an infantile disorder in the study of international relations. By virtue of its claiming (rightly or wrongly) the moral high ground it will undoubtedly continue to play a role (albeit perhaps from somewhat marginalized positions) in scholarly debate, as well as in political discourse.

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Norms are regarded by idealists as important vehicles for shaping national policies, and per implication as having a considerable potential for transforming international relations. Idealism thus tends to be distinctly normative, occasionally explicitly so, in which case it is usually acknowledged, even by realist opponents, as a legitimate venture (albeit somewhat exotic and perhaps slighdy irrelevant). However, when idealism is not explicitly normative but couched in predictive or even descriptive terms, it is (rightly) criticized for ignoring the logical gap between is and ought. The opposite pole in the theoretical debate is realism, which, in its turn, allegedly rests on empirical foundations and is concerned with the actual state of the world, rather than with Utopias. Political realism in the modern age dates back to Machiavelli and Hobbes: From Machiavelli has been derived the idea of raison d'état and the associated proclamation of the inapplicability of the norms of human morality to the conduct of states (or individuals acting as personifications of states); from Hobbes has been derived the interpretation of society, as well as of the world, as a perpetual bellum omnium contra omnes. This permanent "state of warre," according to Hobbes, stemmed from the basic equality of man in terms of abilities as well as of needs, which made every man the natural competitor of his fellow human beings for the scarce available resources: homo homini lupus. The only escape from the resultant dilemma between "anticipation" (i.e., aggression) and extinction was the establishment of the state (Leviathan).4 Political Realism E. H. Carr is usually regarded as the founder of modem political realism by virtue of his path-breaking critique of the Utopian approach to international relations. The distinguishing characteristic of realism, according to Carr, is the acknowledgment that politics would always remain power politics. Furthermore, whereas power had economic and ideological elements as well, the ultima ratio for states remained military power. In spite of his urging for realism, Carr did, nevertheless, acknowledge the legitimacy of a Utopian stage in the development of any infant science, as well as the survival of some Utopian traits through the maturation of this science. Indeed, just as realism was a necessary corrective to utopianism, the inverse was also true, lest realism should become barren and cynical (Carr 1964: 1-10, 89-94, 102113; cf. Smith, M. J. 1986: 68-98; Aran 1984: 567-596). In the postwar era, we find the true founding father of realism in the person of Hans Morgenthau, whose Politics Among Nations is nearly universally acclaimed as the main work on political realism as applied to international relations. The program of political realism was therein summed up in six articles (see Morgenthau 1960: 4-15) the gist of which was the following:

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1. 2. 3. 4.

5. 6.

13

Politics is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature. Statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as power; a rational foreign policy is a good foreign policy. Power can include anything that establishes and maintains the control of man over man. Universal moral principles cannot be applied to the actions of states in their abstract universal formulation but must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place. Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe. The autonomy of the political sphere must be defended against its subversion by other modes of thought.

States are thus regarded by realists as the central actors in international relations, although the very concept of state is occasionally acknowledged as an abstraction. States are, furthermore, visualized as vehicles of national interest defined in terms of power. The presumed urge for power has sometimes been explained through analogy with human nature, which is, according to Morgenthau, dominated by "the drives to live, to propagate and to dominate." 5 Other realists have even traced this lust for power back to original sin (Niebuhr quoted in Smith 1986: 99-133). Whereas these explanations refer to man as an individual, another early realist, John Herz, explained the same phenomenon with each man's awareness of the danger posed to him by other human beings. Men were thus facing an inescapable security dilemma (kill or perish), to the interstate counterpart of which I will return at some length below. Others have gone even further and completely rejected the individual-state analogy as spurious, interpreting the struggle for power as systemic imperative, that is, as a form of behavior integral to the very structure of the international system (Waltz). I will return to the latter approach below, under the heading of neorealism. The lust for power is seen by realists as theoretically boundless, albeit circumscribed when it comes to practice; hence the possibility of distinguishing between basically saturated status quo-oriented states and imperialist (also called revisionist or revolutionary) states. The natural preference of realists is for the status quo, since a world composed predominantly of revisionist states would almost inevitably be disorderly and volatile. Nevertheless, some realists have acknowledged the legitimacy of at least some calls for revisions, thus couching the problem in terms of how to accommodate incremental change while preserving the system (Here 1951: 2-3; Morgenthau 1960: 38-71; cf. the critique of status quo powers [bead possidentis] in Wolfers 1965: 63). Stability, furthermore, presumably presupposed legitimacy (Kissinger 1957: 1-3, 180-181), implying that all states had to acknowledge the basic

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rights of each other, and that revolutionary states were effectively contained because of their proclivity for absolute security which was unobtainable as well as bound to lead to permanent revolution (cf. Gulick 1967). The international system was regarded by realists as, in principle, a state of nature or anarchical, that is, without any political authority above or beyond the sovereign states. Although this anarchical setting might seem to augur volatility, perhaps even to the point of the proverbial bellum omnium contra omnes, some degree of order was nevertheless attainable, thanks to particular structural features and patterns of behavior. Indeed, far from being war-prone, the state of nature might even be logically compatible with a state of perpetual peace (Aron 1984: 339). Whereas the latter perspective was, to say the least, atypical for realists, they have without exception acknowledged some kind of order as a central (albeit neither the only nor necessarily the highest) goal, defined as "a pattern or disposition of international activity that sustains those goals of the society of states that are elementary, primary or universal" (Bull 1977: 16, see generally, 3-22). The international society in statu nascendi was by no means without rules and norms, but merely lacked a central power to enforce them. As the only available functional substitute for such central authority in a self-help context, realists have pointed to the principle of reciprocity, that is, each state's option of reciprocating to violations of the rules on the part of other states (Bull 1977: 117, 139; cf. Hoffman 1965: 98; for a good analysis of reciprocity, see Goldstein & Freeman 1990). I will return to this principle of reciprocity below, in the shape of reciprocal restraint that forms an integral element in a common security regime. The principle of balance of power might be seen as an instance of this rule of reciprocity and as such stands out as one of the most important among the mechanisms of order in an anarchical setting, and thus as one of the most central notions of the realist school. Unfortunately, there is a considerable degree of confusion among realists with regard to the proper definition of the term, both as far as the balance and the power elements are concerned. First, does the term refer to any form of balance, implying that the system is bound to regain balance (i.e., a stable state, albeit perhaps of a different nature) after a crisis? Or does it signify a particular form of equilibrium, the establishment, maintenance, and possible restoration of which requires a balancer, or at least deliberate balancing behavior on the part of the participating states?6 Whereas the former type of balance would be compatible with a dynamic international system, the latter seems fairly static and conservative, if conceived of as a goal. Certain realists (e.g., Kissinger) have leaned toward the static ideal of balance, modeled on the post-Napoleonic Concert of Europe. Indeed, Kissinger seems to have sought to emulate Prince Mettemich's endeavor for legitimate order with the triangular diplomacy and linkage policy he

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15

orchestrated during his tenure at the White House (Kissinger 1957: 312-332 et passim, cf. 1979a: 125-130). Other realists have, however, taken a less rigid and conservative attitude to balance. I will return to the question of balance of power in Chapters 3 and 4 below (on alliances and the armaments dynamics), with a special view to the alliance and the arms race security dilemmas. Second, power is a highly aggregate term, signifying both actual influence and capabilities. In the latter sense, power might comprise various economic and military elements, to which authors have assigned different relative weights. Even though it does not follow logically from the tenets of realism, realists tend to assign a central importance to military power and to value other factors primarily for their contribution to war-waging potentials. In order to perform its role in the balance-of-power mechanism, this military power, furthermore, has to be usable ("fungible") to a certain extent. In this sense, war remains the ultimate arbiter in the international self-help system, according to the realists (cf. Holsti 1972; Aron 1984: 58-80; Morgenthau 1960: 118).7 The allegations of certain critics of realism notwithstanding, the majority of realists neither take war lightly nor are inclined to recommend the use of military force on every occasion, in cynical disregard of the thermonuclear revolution (although a few might, indeed, be charged with doing so).8 Most realists were in fact sincerely disturbed by the new facts of the nuclear stalemate and acknowledged, without any major reservations, the problem of peace as "the foremost problem of our time" (Morgenthau 1960: 386). Even realists of this pacific persuasion, however, tend to see no escape from the relentless contest for power. At best, they may place their hopes in a sublimation of the struggle. Actual wars might thus be supplanted by less disastrous forms of contest, such as arms racing or trade wars (Morgenthau 1960: 386, 396). Stanley Hoffmann (1965: 154) compared the present situation of struggle for power under nuclear conditions with a game of "roulette in a cellar," and noted that "as long as the competition goes on, the players cannot be asked to behave as if it were over; it is absurd to want states to give up their separate interests merely because they have a common interest—divergently perceived—in survival and a modicum of order. But it is not absurd for states to refrain from pursuing separate interests with means that are capable of throwing not only their immediate rivals but all bystanders and themselves into the abyss." Most realists would tend to agree with Hoffmann's disillusioned remarks about the continuing game and the need for playing according to the rules, while modestly seeking to modify them somewhat as well as exercising a certain restraint. However, a few avowed realists have recommended moreradical steps be taken. Some have, indeed, urged a truly radical shift of emphasis away from the military into the political, diplomatic, and

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economic realms. First among these was George Kennan, who openly criticized the military usurpation of the direction of foreign policy, resulting in an exaggerated emphasis on the military means of struggle and in the creation of huge military apparatus that obscured policymakers' awareness of problems and opportunities on the international stage.9 Whereas there was, according to Kennan, a persistent need to contain the USSR, the appropriate means for doing so were not military (although some military underpinning of foreign policy was still deemed indispensable), but political and partially economic. The ideal way of meeting the (above all, political) Soviet challenge was, furthermore, the indirect approach of shaping conditions so as to allow for change, rather than seeking (in vain) to enforce it. Over the years, Kennan became increasingly critical of the encroachment of the military upon the prerogatives of politics, and recommended quite radical shifts in military strategy (such as military disengagement and no-flrst-use [NFU] of nuclear weapons), above all with a view to allowing politics to assume the reins once again, and to "containing the arms race."10 The balance of power was thus an amorphous and elusive concept. Two particular instances of balance of power have received special attention: on the one hand, the balance of armaments, which was made a sine qua non of arms control in the United States; and, on the other hand, the balance of terror, credited by most realists and like-minded scholars from the strategic studies community with a powerful deterrent and, per (alleged) implication, war prevention potential. I will return to these two instances at some length in Chapters 3 and 4, respectively. The analysis of the contest for power has lent itself to a certain degree of formalization, above all in the shape of the games theory of Neumann, Morgenstem, and others. A typical means of formalizing the choices facing individual states are two-person games, including both zero-sum and nonzero-sum games such as Prisoners' Dilemma. A good deal of the game theoretical discourse has amounted to little more than couching traditional thinking in mathematical terms, which has also been done in support of lessrealist, or outrightly idealist, theories.11 Certain nuclear strategists seem, however, to have brought the approach around full circle by their subsequent reification of games. The avowed thinker of the unthinkable, Herman Kahn, thus seemingly applied the lessons of games to scenarios of nuclear war, wherein games of "chicken" for example, played a central role. Thomas Schelling might, likewise, seem to have been inspired in his strategic thinking by games theory. He did, however, arrive at considerably less bellicose conclusions than Kahn, and recommended, inter alia, placing an increased emphasis on cooperative and mixed-motive (i.e., non-zero-sum) games, for example, with a view to arms control and crisis stability (Schelling 1960; cf. Schelling & Halperin 1985).12

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17

Games theory has merely taken to extremes a final central assumption of realism, namely that of rationality. In addition to their desire for power, states are conceived of by realists as invested with an unswerving rationality. Indeed, this assumption is essential for the realists from a methodological point of view, since theirs is basically a method of rational reconstruction. Games theory merely formalized this assumption by making the deliberations of an abstract homo strategicus its level of analysis. Political realism has commanded an immense following in the field of international relations studies in the entire Western world, to such an extent that its view of the world might be described as the ruling paradigm. Indeed, even in the case of analysts who distance themselves from realism, it could be seen as agenda setting. In spite of this intellectual predominance, the basic assumptions of realism have nevertheless been challenged from several different angles. I will briefly summarize some of these before proceeding with neorealism.

The Challenges to Realism One might distinguish between three main categories of challenges, only some of which should rightly be called critiques: 1. Intrinsic or logical challenges, that is, intrinsic contradictions and inconsistencies that have been uncovered through a pursuit of some of the core assumptions of realism to their logical conclusion. 2. Complementary challenges, that is, studies of factors disregarded by realist analyses. Most realists would tend to agree with such studies, or at least regard their findings as relevant. Some of these findings have subsequently been incorporated into realism, thus giving rise to neorealism. 3. Antithetical or paradigmatic challenges, that is, head-on attacks against the very core of realism.13 From the category of logical challenges, one might mention the fact that the entire theory of the balance of power has been challenged by developments within the anarchical international system: What happens to the role of the balancer, or the options of realignment of minor powers in a bipolar world, wherein the superpowers are so preponderant that the realignment of minor states does not really matter? Can power remain fungible when it is universally acknowledged that war is impermissible? If not, to what extent can power be balanced?14 Is the state really a vehicle of national interest when the actual use of its powers might be tantamount to national suicide? Furthermore, the entire theory of the security dilemma (which is integral to realism) constitutes a logical challenge: The pursuit of security through the accumulation of power in general, and military power in particular, may become dysfunctional because of the integral mechanisms at work

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in an anarchical, self-help system, among them the aforementioned principle of reciprocity. If states in their quest for security through power become less, rather than more secure, does this not point to the need for a revision of the entire theory of power and security? To resolve these puzzling dilemmas is exactly what the theory of CS-cum-NOD is all about, and CS might thus be regarded as an intrinsic, rather than an antithetical, challenge to realism. From the category of complementary challenges, one might mention, first of all, the methodological challenges, that is, the repeated urges for the application of scientific methods to the study of international relations, and references to realists as traditionalists (with unmistakable, and undoubtedly intended, pejorative connotations). Because traditionalist analysis is about unquantifiable factors that do not lend themselves (easily or at all) to mathematical analysis, and because the rigid standards of falsification are usually inapplicable to their conclusions, the scientific critics tend to dismiss them as pure speculation. The rebuttal by the traditionalists tends to refer to the special nature of the subject matter, that is, human behavior in general and international relations in particular. Scientific analysis thereof, such as that of behavioralism, tends to disregard the causal element, that is, volition, in these purposive matters. Furthermore, the obstinate search for data that "happen to" lend themselves to scientific treatment tends to divert attention into rather irrelevant matters while ignoring the most fundamental problems. This disagreement notwithstanding, most traditionalists would not dismiss scientific methods as a matter of principle, but merely relegate them to the role of auxiliary methodological tools, rather than elevate them to a sine qua non of political science.15 As already indicated in Chapter 1,1 tend to agree with this traditionalist rebuttal. Second, among the complementary challenges with a greater substantive content one might mention the bureaucratic politics school. Authors of this persuasion have questioned the realist assumption of the state as a unitary actor and tried to open the black box of the decisionmaking political entity. The often decisive influence of the contest between subgroups pursuing their parochial interests has been demonstrated through a host of case studies. This school might thus be said merely to internalize the struggle for power by applying the same notion to intranational relations as the realists did to international affairs. The effect thereof is, however, to destroy the realist image of the state as a unitary actor, along with the notion of its rationality, in which sense this tradition might also be categorized among the logical challenges. The bureaucratic politics approach has been applied both to the study of acute crises and to that of business as usual. In both cases the special instance of military influence has tended to receive a fair amount of attention, and the findings have confirmed that, for example, the military does play an

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19

important political role (albeit occasionally primarily as one element in the so-called military-industrial complex [MIC]); that military decisions are hence not always based on national security interests, but that parochial budgetary interests play an important role as well; that not even the military is a unitary actor, but that alleged military interests are the result of interservice bargaining; and that bureaucratic politics exerts a distorting influence on national perception, for example of threats, usually leading to threat inflation. 16 I will return to these matters in Chapter 3, under the heading of endogenous armaments dynamics. Another line of scientific criticism against realism has likewise challenged the focus on the state, this time, however, from above rather than from below. The point of departure for this systems approach has been that the patterns of interactions constitute a structure defining the system as such. Analyzing systems as such, and the behavior of the participants as an element therein, is presumably more fruitful than explaining the behavior of units (in casu states) by reference to their concrete decisionmaking deliberations. According to this approach, neither the internal nature of states nor the goals for which they presumably strive are decisive for international relations, which are governed by more impersonal, abstract rules, the laws of which might be derived deductively, with consistency as the only criterion.17 The realist assumptions of rationality have, furthermore, been challenged by what might be called perceptualism. According to this approach, perceptual phenomena, rather than the realities beneath them, are what determine policymaking. When these factors are taken into account, the interactive behavior of states appears in a different light; hence the importance occasionally accorded to, inter alia, "the logic of images" by authors on the fringes of the realist tradition, such as Robert Jervis (1970, 1976).18 The perceptual approach has also challenged the assumption of rationality by pointing out the frequent breakdowns of decisionmakers' rationality, particularly during crises. Perceptions tend to be distorted by perceptual lenses, related to, inter alia, the aforementioned bureaucratic interests, but also inherent in the very position of the state in the international context. Enemy images are merely a special case of this perceptual distortion and have their own self-perpetuating logic, in its turn closely interrelated with the entire deterrence system.19 I will return to this, in my opinion highly valid and important, additional focus for international politics in the concluding chapter, where I shall mention, inter alia, the impact of NOD on mutual perceptions. Yet another line of criticism has pointed to the inadequacy of the nationstate as the exclusive level of analysis. According to interdependence theory, nations are becoming increasingly interdependent and woven into each other, to such an extent that the realist paradigm of an anarchic international system consisting of sovereign nation-states is only partially valid. Beneath the state

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level, transnational corporations and international non-governmental organizations play an increasingly influential role, whereas above the state level, international governmental organizations are gaining in importance as well. Simultaneously with minimizing the relative importance of the state, interdependence also creates a wide range of security problems for which military force, the traditional instrument of state power, is not relevant at all. These include structural threats, which are integral to the system as such, rather than stemming from the concrete behavior of individual states. Whereas interdependence between nations is usually believed to promote peaceful relations, it also creates problems in other fields because of a lack of appropriate instruments for the management of nonmilitary international (or transnational) problems.20 The CS philosophy to be outlined below might in fact be viewed as an attempt to manage the challenge of complex interdependence in a cooperative mode. The final complementary challenge I will mention on this occasion is that of regionalism. Its point of departure is the observation that the international political system is discontinuous, in the sense that there are fields and regions where specific rules of behavior seem to be at work. Among states in a region, integrative behavior may, for instance, override the struggle for power; low politics may overcome the obstacles presented by high politics, while gradually influencing the latter, and so forth. In certain regions and issue-areas, security regimes and security communities may gradually develop, wherein the internal balance of power is rendered irrelevant.21 From the category of paradigmatic challenges, one might mention various forms of criticism of the core assumptions of realism, and alternative (rather than supplementary) approaches to the study of international relations. Classical Marxism was highly critical of the raison d'état element in realism, since it regarded the state as an instrument of the ruling classes, that is, as a weapon in the class struggle. The state could thus never represent national interest, but merely the parochial interests of (segments of) society's ruling class, that is, the capitalist class. Furthermore, the state was believed to be predestined to disappear along with the division of society into antagonistic classes, with the implicit assumption that wars would disappear along with it. The theories of imperialism of Lenin, Rosa Luxemburg, and others pursued this line of analysis, by identifying a law of uneven development that presumably forced (monopoly-) capitalist states to struggle for colonies as recipients of their capital surplus, resulting in a high propensity for war between imperialist states. War was, however, predicted to disappear eventually along with the capitalist mode of production, if only after a (presumably brief) period of capitalist attempts to exterminate socialism.22 From the angle of critical theory and neo-Marxism, realism has been criticized for its inherent conservative bias; for its neglect of economic power

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21

and production relations (in the Marxist sense),23 as well as for its alleged acceptance of war. Realism has almost been held responsible for the entire discipline of strategic studies and thus been charged with complicity in the deterrence system as such. In his "Critique of Strategic Thinking" Anatoli Rapoport (1970a: 224; see also Rapoport 1989: 247-346; Green 1966) expressed the latter concern about the cynicism of such intellectual exercises: "We have translated the game of strategy (where men may engage in ruthlessness and cunning to their heart's content because it is only a game) into a plan of genocidal orgies, and we call the resulting nightmare 'realism'." 2 4 Others have accused the main pillar of realism, the state, of being a far cry from the bulwark against anarchy envisioned by Hobbes and his successors, but rather as an important cause of war in its own right: "Military sense and logic are the legitimate offspring, a variety of the raison d'état" (Krippendorff 1984: 363). Regardless of its possible intrinsic merits, critical theory remains marginalized, and I will therefore largely disregard it in the subsequent analysis.

Neorealism Neorealism might be seen as an attempted synthesis between classical realism and elements of the various critiques, above all, of course, the complementary ones. However, since many of the classical realists attempted a similar synthesis, the distinction between realism and neorealism is blurred, to say the least.25 Modern neorealists tend to take into greater account than their predecessors the growing interdependence, by focusing on the international system and its structure rather than on the nation-state. This has above all been the mission of Kenneth Waltz, with his attacks on reductionism, that is, theoretical attempts to explain international relations with human nature analogies or foreign policy behavior studies. As an antidote, Waltz (1959) has consistently urged a shift of emphasis toward the third image, that is, the systemic level. In his main work, Theory of International Politics (1979), Waltz sought to develop a theory of, rather than merely a set of laws or other empirical propositions about, the international system. The need was for a theory of the international system as something sui generis, a theoretical accomplishment described as a Copernican revolution (Waltz 1979: 5, 18, 40-59, 69; see also the critique of Leninism as reductionism, Waltz 1979, 19-30). Waltz's was thus a structural approach, hence the occasional term structural realism. As far as the structure of the international system was concerned, he willingly conceded that states were not the only actors, while maintaining that they did remain the most important ones. In a self-help

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context states were forced to pursue their national interests, while being subjected to "the tyranny of small decisions." The ensuing plethora of small decisions, all based on national interest, might well be damaging to all states, because "with each country constrained to take care of itself, no one can take care of the system" (Waltz 1979: 93-97, 105). This anarchy nevertheless, according to Waltz, was a lesser evil than a hierarchical structure, such as collective security, world government, or the like. When left to itself, the system would be shaped by the balance-of-power mechanism, serving as both cause and effect of the behavior of states, which he believed to have a greater propensity for balancing than for "bandwagoning" behavior (Waltz 1979: 126).26 Power remained important in this environment, and nuclear power even more so, the impossibility of actual employment notwithstanding. Waltz thus explicitly welcomed the nuclear revolution and even rejoiced in the prospects of a certain nuclear proliferation. Far from leading to bellicosity, nuclear weapons would presumably impart a sense of caution and selfrestraint on the states in their possession. Furthermore, even large-scale nuclear proliferation would not change the system fundamentally, since nuclear weapons were not the great equalizer some assumed them to be, but merely a reflection of more basic power and force potentials (Waltz 1979: 185-192; cf. Waltz 1986: 327-328; 1981).27 The anarchical system was thus regarded as a blessing rather than a curse by Waltz, who nevertheless was not indifferent to the variety of shapes the system might assume. A sensible duopolistic structure was deemed the least undesirable solution, since it partially solved the aforementioned problem of small decisions. The greater powers were naturally more inclined to identify their national interests with those of the whole than were small powers, whose decisions mattered little and whose dependency on the outside world was immense. The more responsible behavior on the part of great powers was thus seen as a reflection of their low degree of interdependence, in sharp contrast to the views of interdependence theorists (Waltz 1979: 197-199, 203; and see 138-160 for his critique of interdependence theory).28 Neorealists have, furthermore, paid more attention than their predecessors to economic factors in general, and to transnational economic actors in particular. This has, above all, been the mission of Robert Gilpin, who took as his point of departure an explicit acknowledgment of the state as "a coalition of coalitions" rather than a unitary actor (Gilpin 1981: 18-19, 35, 122; see also Gilpin 1986: 318, where he explicitly declared that "the state does not exist"). Furthermore, Gilpin abandoned the realist predilection for the status quo with his acceptance of transformations of the international system as inevitable. However, whereas changes within the system might be peaceful, the change of system was more war-prone. What might bring about such war-prone changes, as well as change in general, were economic factors:

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Nations were presumably guided by cost-benefit calculations in their inherently expansive policies, and would thus tend to expand to the point when the marginal costs thereof (in terms of war, armaments, etc.) exceeded the marginal gains (Gilpin 1981: 39-55, 105-155, 208). The reason change was characterized by conflict, or even war, was the proclivity of states to meet impending decline with overextension, necessitating an increasing emphasis on coercion and military means. This interpretation received valuable support from Paul Kennedy's momentous work The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, the message of which was that the United States had reached exactly this stage in its development.29 Other neorealists have focused their attention on the notion of security. The most outstanding of these analysts is Barry Buzan, whose People, States and Fear remains the most elaborate analysis of the entire security problématique, written by an avowed neorealist whose views are quite close to those of CS and NOD advocates.30 Security, according to Buzan, had to be approached holistically, that is, as combining the security of the individual with that of the state and the international system, while taking possible conflict between the three levels into account. Whereas individuals might benefit from the services of the state, those services might also constitute a threat to them because of the socalled defense dilemma. The very means of defending people might lead to their extinction, especially so in the nuclear age. States, in their turn, were both vehicles of individual security and objects of security in their own right. In the latter respect, security was synonymous with power to a lesser degree than usually assumed by realists because, among other reasons, threats came in a variety of types, and because they might be averted by a variety of means, among which military power did not even rank as the most important one (Buzan 1991b: 11, 18-92, 156-172). Whereas Buzan characterized the international system as an anarchy, he distinguished between immature and mature anarchies. The former variety roughly resembled the popular image of anarchy; the latter would be tantamount to a structure wherein "the benefits of fragmentation can be enjoyed without the costs of continuous struggle and instability." The power-security dilemma was regarded as intrinsic to the international system, and the evolution of a mature anarchy as the only realistic way of coming to grips with it (Buzan 1991b: 93-101, 173-213; Buzan et al. 1990: 229252).31 There remained a need for an intermediate level of analysis between the state and the international system, according to Buzan, who for this puipose invented the term security complexes, in part synonymous with the wellknown terms subsystem and subordinate system, but with a clearer focus on security aspects. Having previously applied this analytical tool to Southeast Asia, Buzan has recently focused on Europe, an endeavor that has resulted in a somewhat mixed picture of the European landscape. Whereas Europe did

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unquestionably constitute a region, the regional patterns of transaction (including bonds of amity and enmity) were overlaid by the bipolar global system. This overlay might, however, be on the verge of being lifted, leaving the old continent with a panoply of severe challenges, for which purpose NOD might presumably prove useful (Buzan 1991b: 105-115, 1986, 1989; Buzan et al. 1990; cf. M0ller 1989c). His analysis of the powersecurity and the defense dilemmas as well as of regionalism landed Buzan (who started in the realist camp) in the CS and NOD camp, thus refuting the well-known Irish bull (an answer to the proverbial traveler in the middle of nowhere asking for directions to Trinity College) "If I were you, I wouldn't be starting from here." Regardless of their numerous defects, realism and neorealism do appear valid as basic approaches to the study of international relations. They focus attention on states, which, to all intents and purposes, remain the most important (albeit far from the only) actors in the international field. They focus on the world as it actually is, while acknowledging the permissibility of idealist speculations about how it ought to be. They take into account the actual mechanisms working in the present world, an understanding of which must be assumed to be a precondition for their transformation. They relegate the scientific approach to an auxiliary role by virtue of their insistence on first things first: A problem may be important and hence merit attention, regardless of whether it happens to be amenable to quantitative analysis or not. Their merits notwithstanding, realism and neorealism do, however, stand in need of some modification, revision, and modernization. To analyze whether CS and NOD might contribute to this is our purpose in the remainder of this chapter. The CS approach is an innovation in the study of international relations. It hardly deserves to be called a full-fledged theory, since it does not pretend to offer any explanation of the workings of the international system, but above all a (it is hoped coherent) set of principled policy recommendations.32 As a security political strategy, CS is thus comparable with certain elements of strategy in the realist and neorealist discourse, and might be compatible with the central tenets of these theories. I commence the analysis of these questions with an account of the theory of the security dilemma, which forms the main link to CS. Subsequently I will describe the distinguishing features of the CS approach, thus paving the way for the attempted comparison and compatibility assessment by seeking to uncover the core of CS beneath several layers of political propaganda. The Security Dilemma The gist of the theory of the security dilemma is that threats breed threats, and that a quest for security by means of power may hence be dysfunctional.

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This notion is intrinsic to realism and neorealism, and can be found explicitly in the writings of, for example, John Herz, Robert Jervis, Glenn Snyder, and Barry Buzan, as well as in those of their theoretical ancestors as far back as Thucydides (1972: 80) and Hobbes (1968: 184-185). Among modern analysts of international politics, John Herz (1950, 1951) stands out as the first to focus explicitly on the security dilemma, the workings of which he did not merely identify in interstate relations. It was described in his work Political Realism and Political Idealism as a much more fundamental condition affecting individuals and groups in society as well as states. The fact that Herz is in some respects at odds (theoretically) with his fellow realists (e.g., by virtue of his more benevolent attitude to idealism) does not warrant dismissing him as a "rogue realist." A number of other classical realist writers have likewise described the security dilemma, albeit most often without using the actual term. Even the grand old man of realism, Hans Morgenthau, came close to formulating the same idea with, for example, his observation that "the policy of imperialism pursued by the victor in anticipation of his victory is likely to call forth a policy of imperialism on the part of the vanquished." Furthermore, while acknowledging that "it would be fatal to counter imperialist designs with measures appropriate to a policy of status quo," the opposite, mistaking a policy of the status quo for a policy of imperialism, might be equally fatal: By doing so, State A resorts to certain measures defensive in intent, such as armaments, bases, alliances, with respect to State B. The latter, in turn, resorts to countermeasures, for it now sees State A embarking upon a policy of imperialism. These countermeasures strengthen the initial misapprehension, on the part of State A, of State B's policies, and so forth. . . . Out of an initial error develops a vicious circle. Two or more nations, each only seeking to preserve the status quo, but each convinced of the imperialist designs of the other, find support for their own errors of judgement and actions in the errors of the others [Morgenthau 1960: 54, 63-64, 67] , 3 3

At the present stage of development, the thesis of the security dilemma could be seen as constituting an integral (albeit sometimes merely implicit and occasionally ignored) element in neorealist theory, acknowledged by both Gilpin (1981: 94, 186-210 [the chapter titled "Hegemonic War and International Change"]) and Waltz (1979: 186-187) although most extensively treated by Barry Buzan (1991b: 171-213). The gist of the security dilemma argument is that in a dyadic relationship with at least some conflictual elements (if only the almost inevitable competition for scarce resources), each party will a priori perceive the other as a potential threat and feel the need for a certain defense against this threat. If we call the two parties (be they individuals, groups, states, or

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alliances) A and B, A will thus perceive a threat emanating from B and deploy some kind of defense against it. B, however, likewise visualizes A as a potential threat and hence perceives the additional means of defense deployed by A as an increased threat to his own security. B is therefore likely to respond in kind, for example, by means of increments to his own defense potential. This, in its turn, will be perceived by A as both a confirmation of the original threat perception (i.e., as a sign of malevolent intent) and as an addition to the material threat. A is therefore likely to add further to his own defense potential, and so on ad infinitum. Increasing threats to, and diminishing security for both sides are conceivable, regardless of the absence of any malevolent (e.g., revisionist or imperialist) intents on either side. Even when both sides are content with the status quo, have no intentions of attacking the respective other side, and are pursuing merely their national interest, defined in terms of security (as opposed to the more all-encompassing power or even aggrandizement), a malign interaction may ensue. In the course of this sequence of interactive moves the relative power ratios are likely to remain stable (i.e., to fluctuate around a predetermined balance), while the security of both sides steadily deteriorates. The one horn of the dilemma is thus a decrease in security as a paradoxical result of the quest for security. The other horn of the dilemma (which ensures that none of the parties can easily escape it) is that at any stage, either party to the spiraling interaction would leave himself open to exploitation if he were to abstain from reciprocal moves by withholding his response to an amiaments increase on the part of his opponent. This theory of the objective security dilemma has been undeipinned by perceptual arguments, formulated above all by Robert Jervis (1976: 58-93; cf. 1978) whose analyses showed how "the basic security dilemma becomes overlaid by reinforcing misunderstandings" (Jervis 1976: 75). The origin of these misunderstandings is the inevitable application of double standards. Because a state knows its own intentions directly (by introspection), and may thus be certain that it would never even contemplate an attack, alleged fears on the part of its adversaries have to appear as mere figments of the imagination, or as deceitful propaganda. Since no state, however, is in a position to ascertain its opponent's intentions directly, it has to infer these inductively from the available manifest evidence, above all the actual conduct and military capabilities of the other state. On the premise that any fears and security concerns on the part of other states are unfounded, armaments and similar security political instruments are predestined to be perceived as signs of malign intent, requiring reciprocal action on the part of the threatened state (and on through the sequence). Prophecies concerning the attitudes and plans of other states thus have a tendency to become self-fulfilling, and security policies to become entrapped in spiraling armaments dynamics, competitive alliance building, etc.

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The security dilemma is thus based on the inability of states to ascertain with any certainty the true goals of their respective opponents, whence the predilection for overinsurance according to the "better safe than sorry" moral. Intelligence activities may certainly help but have proved most useful for obtaining hard data, whereas insight into intentions will always remain open to question. 34 Conversely, states cannot demonstrate to their adversaries beyond any doubt their own true goals. Diplomacy may, of course, help, but it suffers from the same defect as caused the former problem: All states are aware that there is such a thing as the aggressive (revisionist, imperialist) state, and that such a state would do its utmost to conceal its true intentions. The security dilemma is important in at least three different contexts: armaments competition; the formation of alliances; and (hypothetical) crisis scenarios. As far as armaments dynamics are concerned, the security dilemma could be seen as generating a competitive process of arms acquisition, operating in a spiraling mode usually known as the action-reaction phenomenon (Jervis 1976: 62-67; Buzan 1987a: 76-93; Rathjens 1973; cf. Kahn 1983). I will return to this armaments dynamics security dilemma in Chapter 4 below, in order to assess inter alia, whether NOD might open up an escape therefrom. As far as alliance policies are concerned, the security dilemma tends to translate the role of all states into that of potential foes. A state of amity, or merely a relaxation of tension between two former adversaries, may spur fears on the part of the enemy of either of them, since it might result in a coalition against him: If A and B in a triadic relationship were to join forces, they might be in a position to overwhelm C. And C is therefore likely to seek alignment with either A or B against the respective other, preferably preemptively, whence the tendency toward a continuous struggle for preemptive alignment. Even neutrality may be seen as destabilizing, since it leaves the option of alignment with either side open. Neutralization of a formerly allied state may be even more worrisome, since it is most often indistinguishable from the first step toward realignment with the opposite side. The workings of this alliance security dilemma may be seen in, for example, the US containment policy in the 1950s, when any breakaway from the Western grip and exploitation by developing nations was interpreted as the first move toward an entry into the Soviet camp; whence the domino theory which in the long run was to prove counterproductive and detrimental to Western interests.35 The debate in 1990 on the status of united Germany in-the-making also clearly illustrated these problems, among them the fears on the part of most European states that Germany might opt for a shuttle position between East and West. Whereas this alliance security dilemma is obviously of a global scope, I limit myself to returning (in Chapter 3) to its implications for the NATO area, and the impact of NOD thereupon. As far as crisis scenarios are concerned, a number of authors (most of whom belong to the strategic studies community) have warned against the

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potential development of a vicious circle of reciprocal fears of suiprise attack between two status quo-oriented and pacific countries. According to such analyses, it is conceivable that, in the midst of a political crisis, preemptive urges might acquire a momentum of their own, which could ultimately result in war. Such an imagined sequence of events was described by Thomas Schelling (1960: 207): "A modest temptation on each side to sneak in a first blow—a temptation too small by itself to motivate an attack—might become compounded through a process of interacting expectations, with additional motives for attack being produced by successive cycles of 'He thinks we think he thinks we think . . . he thinks we think he'll attack; so he thinks we shall; so he will; so we must.'" I will return to this problem in Chapter 5 on war prevention. Common Security The concept of CS gained prominence with the publication in 1982 of the report by the Palme Commission, that is, the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, an independent body under the auspices of the United Nations, whose members included prominent statesmen from East and West such as Olof Palme, Egon Bahr, Cyrus Vance, and Georgi Arbatov (see also Palme Commission 1989). The actual status of CS remains unclear, in the absence of any authority besides the Palme Commission, the analyses and prescriptions of which, furthermore, bore the signs of political compromise, which explains the occasional ambiguity. Subsequently, the concept has acquired political prominence, thanks to its being included in the security political discourse of the Social Democratic parties in Western Europe (above all the SPD of West Germany), as well as, since around 1987, of the USSR along with its then fraternal allies.36 This has contributed to blurring the edges of the concept, since a number of ideas have simply been couched in CS terms, rather than actually contrived through a pursuit of the intrinsic logic of the concept. Major theoretical efforts at clarification have been undertaken by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) as well as by the Hamburg Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy (IFSH) under the directorship of Egon Bahr (sometimes called the father of the CS idea).37 Nevertheless, to seek to assemble the entire (by now fairly voluminous) literature on CS in order to reconstruct inductively a coherent theory of CS would probably be futile because of the abundant ambiguities and inconsistencies in and between various authors. As an alternative, I will try to reconstruct the basic tenets of CS deductively on the basis of some of the most central writings, above all the Palme Commission's report. The guideline for the reconstruction will be to seek answers to the questions asked (and answered) by realists, so as to facilitate comparison. The subsequent account might thus be likened to an interview of the commission

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by an avowed and inquisitive realist, although I have refrained from actually couching it in such terms. In the process of reconstruction, I will, furthermore, point out (some of the) disagreements and ambiguities between CS advocates, and thus peel off several layers of idealism, wishful thinking and political propaganda with the help of Occam's razor. In conformity with this epistemological principle of parsimony, I shall treat ideas that are not essential for the conceptual coherence of CS as extrinsic to it. The point of departure for realists was the assumption that states pursue national interest, defined either in terms of power or of security. CS seems to concur with this as an accurate description of the present international system: "As long as the community of nations lacks a structure of laws backed by a central power and legitimacy to enforce these laws, then nations are likely to continue to arm, in most cases for legitimate reasons of selfdefense, but in others to gain unilateral advantage" (Palme Commission 1982: 3-4). CS thus did not rest on unfounded assumptions about basic harmony in the idealist sense. CS has, however, taken into account the security dilemma, described thus: "In the absence of a world authority with the right and power to police international relations, states have to protect themselves. Unless they show mutual restraint and proper appreciation of the realities of the nuclear age, however, the pursuit of security can cause intensified competition and more tense political relations and, at the end of the day, a reduction in security for all concerned" (Palme Commission 1982: 138). The adoption by a state of CS principles as its guideline for security policy thus required no altruistic motives, but merely a prudent pursuit of national interest, which did, however, call for circumspection and concern for the interests of others (cf. Miiller 1986a: 164). CS has, furthermore, taken a systemic view of the international environment and acknowledged the growing interdependence as modifying the framework conditions of the quest for security: "National boundaries are no longer, if they ever were, impervious shields, the penetration of which could be prevented by military forces. . . . The security—even the existence—of the world is interdependent" (Palme Commission 1982: 5, 7). In the framework defined by the security dilemma and growing interdependence, the notion of rationality needed modification, since it would be futile, and per implication irrational, for states to pursue national security in complete disregard of other (and particularly adversarial) states. It therefore had to be acknowledged that genuine rationality had to transcend its previous bounds. According to the basic CS principles, states had to take into account the security concerns of other states in, so to speak, an enlightened rationality mode. The guideline for policymaking was thus modified by prescribing that nations pursue only such policies as they would willingly accept other states' (including their adversaries') pursuing as well, not out of a sense of

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ethical obligation, but rather out of "enlightened self-interest," that is, for pragmatic reasons and according to rational deliberations about national interest. Translated into prescriptions for national conduct, a CS policy thus resembled what Immanuel Kant (1963a: 53) two centuries ago called the categorical imperative: "Act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law." According to the CS line of reasoning, security had to be conceived of as a common good, and as such might seem to (and, according to a number of CS advocates, did) require truly cooperative ventures. Application of the aforementioned Occam razor, however, shows that the same effects might be obtained through less-radical changes in the decisionmaking mode, necessitating simply a certain degree of unilateral restraint (exercised for purely selfish reasons), as well as a certain tacit coordination of national policies. According to the commission, "restraint should be the watchword of all states; restraint, out of respect for the right of others to security, but also in selfish recognition that security can be attained only by common action" (Palme Commission 1982: 9). A security regime (to which I will return shortly) would be an instance of such tacit coordination, fully compatible with the CS principles. According to most of its proponents, however, CS would in fact imply that "cooperation will replace confrontation in resolving conflicts of interest" (Palme Commission 1982: 5-6; cf. Fischer 1987; Mutz 1986: 127). This notion has given rise to the term security partnership, which has been used by, for example, the SPD and political and social scientists close to the party. The notion of a Common European House (or even Home), which has been included in the Soviet CS discourse (but which is also used by some SPD spokespersons), signifies such a state of affairs where cooperation has almost entirely superseded competition. It is closely interconnected with the new Soviet emphasis on interdependence, which is now referred to as something to be promoted, both for reasons of economic gain and because of its presumed war-preventing effects (Gorbachev 1988: 194-195; Schmidt & Schwarz 1988; for an SPD use of the same term, see Bahr 1987a: 19). Whereas such conceptions rightly deserve the label idealist, (regardless of how valuable they may be as ideas), they are by no means the logical conclusion of the CS logic. The acceptance (if only as a goal) of the notion of a Common European House is bound to have implications for the attitude to alliances. Whereas many CS advocates have acknowledged the incompatibility (as a matter of principle) of CS with the alliance structure, others have envisioned a maintenance of the alliances for a protracted period. Egon Bahr (1987a: 21) was (at least until recently) quite unequivocal with his statement that it would only be possible to "attain security with the blocs, not without or against them" (cf. Lutz 1982, 1986b: 47, 66-67). There thus seems to be no

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common attitude among CS advocates to alliances, but rather a wide divergence of opinions. If any, the common denominator would be that the opposing alliances ought eventually (a very vague term, indeed) to wither away. The cooperative approach intrinsic to CS has been recommended above all for the attainment of what is allegedly the paramount goal of humanity: war prevention. For this purpose, national security policies of deterrence have been discarded as quite inadequate (often directly dysfunctional), and occasionally as totally incompatible with CS. The goal of CS has thus often, even by the Palme Commission itself, been claimed to be to replace deterrence: "A doctrine of common security must replace the present expedient of deterrence through armaments. International peace must rest on a commitment to joint survival rather than a threat of mutual destruction" (Palme Commission 1982: 138-139). 38 When couched in such absolute terms, however, the statement verges on absurdity. In a certain sense, CS ought rather to be understood as a reflection of mutual deterrence, that is, as constituting the presumably only rational way of pursuing national interests under conditions of shared vulnerability.39 If the mutual deterrence stalemate were (per impossibile) to disappear, the premises of the CS argumentation would fall apart, and many often-heard CS propositions would become blatantly untrue: Wars might, once again, become winnable, and security might well become obtainable through national policies pursued in complete disregard of one's opponents. What CS advocates seem to have in mind (and occasionally, albeit rarely, spell out explicitly) may not in fact be the situation of deterrence (i.e., deterrence as a fact), but, rather, particular national policies of deterrence, that is, what might be called operational deterrence or deterrence as a doctrine (for this distinction, see Bahr 1985). I will return to the entire deterrence/war prevention issue below (in Chapter 5). Suffice it therefore at this stage to note that CS is quite compatible with, perhaps indeed preconditioned on, mutual deterrence as a framework condition for security policy. Whereas the relationship between CS and deterrence is thus ambiguous, that between CS and disarmament is straightforward. Although military means of self-defense are deemed warranted (as can be seen from the quotations above), CS advocates are unreservedly in favor of disarmament. This is, however, envisioned as a process (and as such quite compatible with realism), rather than conceived of in idealist terms of general and complete disarmament (although the latter is proclaimed as the ultimate goal; Palme Commission 1982: 7-8, cf. 177). It is equally clear that CS implies that cooperation should, as far as possible, supersede confrontation. Whether this cooperation does, however, in the final analysis, require some degree of supranationality is debatable. According to the commission, as well as to most CS advocates, a gradual establishment of some supranational bodies would be desirable. As the ultimate goal, CS thus appears to

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favor a gradual replacement of the nation-state with higher authorities. Conceived of as a long-teim goal, this does not, however, contradict the tenets of realism. Even Morgenthau (1960: 10) acknowledged that "nothing in the realist position militates against the assumption that the present division of the political world into nation-states will be replaced by larger units of a quite different character" (cf. Palme Commission 1982: 5-6). As I hope has emerged from the above analysis, the CS philosophy, reduced to its logical foundations, does not seem to be incompatible with realism. Although CS might be seen as an attempt to find a middle ground between realism and idealism, the establishment of a CS regime (i.e., a situation in which those of CS had become the prevailing norms of international relations) would amount to little more than the creation of what Barry Buzan aptly called a mature anarchy (see Väyrynen 1985: 1-15; Buzan 1991b: 93101; Booth 1991: 335-376). The emphases may differ, as do the policy recommendations derived from the respective theories. As approaches to the study of international relations, however, realism and CS are quite compatible. I will now dwell at some length on some of the ramifications of the CS concept, in particular its application to other fields of research, its relation to other security political conceptions and approaches, and its presumed mode of implementation. Implications of Common Security Advocates of CS have sought to apply its principles to a wide range of issueareas beyond the realm of traditional security policy, thus contributing (albeit in a less authoritative manner) to giving the concept an increasing scope. Presumably, the CS approach would prove suitable for refocusing research and redirecting policy in areas such as psychology, economics, and ecology. Since these fields remain fairly unexplored, I limit myself to recapitulating briefly a few of the findings that have some relevance for international relations. In the field of perceptual research (i.e. psychology), CS has been considered a necessary antidote to the prevalent enemy images that tend to obscure rational security political analysis by serving as distorting perceptual lenses. The enemy images, in their turn, are seen as a reflection of the deterrence system, and their gradual dismantlement thus as being facilitated by the eventual replacement of deterrence by common security. A state might even unilaterally dismantle its enemy image in the eyes of an opponent by deliberately creating cognitive dissonance in the adversary's mind through behavior that differed from the predictions derived from its enemy image (E. Müller 1986a: 170-171).40 The fact that CS should contribute to dismantling enemy images does not necessarily entail an (idealist) denial of conflicting interests or actual

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ideological hostility. CS advocates have, in fact, frequently acknowledged the necessity of continuing the ideological struggle, albeit under recognition of the respective adversary's right to exist. The call has thus been for a more peaceful "culture of struggle."41 In the field of economy, the focus has been on East-West economic relations. CS advocates have been critical of what might be called the US approach, that is, a restrictive attitude to trade, conceived of as technology transfer. They have recommended, as an alternative, what might be called the traditional capitalist, Ricardian, or simply liberalist approach to trade. They thus conceive of trade relations as a mixed-motive, or even cooperative, game that is beneficial to both sides, rather than as (almost) a zero-sum game, such as it is often found to be in US analyses. By thus understanding economic issues as an integral element of security policies, CS proponents have furthermore applied some of the theoretical lessons of both critical theory and neorealism (Gilpin) mentioned above. The policy recommendations have tended to point to the advisability of expanding trade relations, both in order to spur economic growth in both camps, and as a way of weaving (presumably peace-promoting) integrative ties between East and West (Becker 1986; Jacobsen 1986; Stent 1987; Wonnann 1986). The disarmament imperative has played an important role in the CS analysis of economic matters. The present level of armaments has been seen as exacerbating the so-called defense dilemma, that is, the risk that measures intended to safeguard national values might inadvertently destroy these because of their exorbitant costs among other things. CS, however, according to the Palme Commission, required common prosperity. However, it also required economic security, both as far as the system as a whole was concerned and with regard to individual states. Although, as a general rule, interdependence should thus be promoted, it should not be allowed to jeopardize the independence of states, as might be the case if economic relations were to be instrumentalized for foreign policy coercion in a form of linkage policies, which have therefore been expressly proscribed by CS advocates (Palme Commission 1982: 71-99). 42 In the field of ecology, CS proponents have seen the predictions of global environmental disaster in the Brundtland Report of 1987 as a challenge to explore what might be accomplished through cooperative ventures. The most concrete recommendation has been to divert resources from armaments into environmental protection, but, on a more principled level, the globe has been depicted as a common heritage of mankind, in desperate need of cooperative endeavors to save it from catastrophe. Although this notion cannot be said to flow logically from the hard core of CS that I have sought to excavate, it seems perfectly in line with the logic of CS (and is, in my opinion, a valuable notion in its own right). If security (as acknowledged by the Brundtland Commission) is to be something more than an absence of threats by one state against another, it

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seems logical to include structural threats. People, regardless of their belonging to different states, are up against increasing dangers flowing from, say, the pollution of the oceans, which are almost entirely unrelated to the behavior of individual (state) actors on the international stage. They stem rather from the structure of the international system and the resultant tyranny of small decisions, under the auspices of which it does not really make much difference that a country would dump, say, ten barrels of nuclear waste in the North Sea, but where, on the other hand, it makes a tremendous difference that everybody does so (Brundtland Commission 1987; cf. Prins 1990c; Westing 1989; Mische 1989; Soroos 1990b). In the field of North-South relations, CS advocates have taken seriously the critique raised against imperialism and neocolonialism. They have tended to see the towering problems of malnutrition, starvation, environmental decay, and so forth in the Third World as severe challenges to global stability, because of, inter alia, the risks of Third World conflicts spilling over into the central conflict area, through mechanisms such as the following: • • • •

Militarization contributing to underdevelopment Underdevelopment breeding conflict and unrest Internal conflicts tending to attract foreign involvement Involvement by one foreign power tending to draw its adversaries in other fields into the conflict • Internal conflict in underdeveloped countries hence leading possibly to conflict between industrialized, say, European, states Once started, such a conflict may spread, that is, escalate horizontally as well as perhaps vertically. In order to prevent this from happening, the development problems that give rise to conflict in the first place have to be solved. Because of a vicious circle, this is usually impossible without foreign assistance. Development aid thus has to be seen as an intrinsic element of a CS approach. In this manner, links have been established to the Palme Commission's predecessor, the Brandt Commission (1980: 268), which dealt with development issues. It pointed to the challenges of interdependence, included therein the links between the East-West and the North-South conflicts, and proclaimed that "real progress will only be made nationally if it can be assured globally" (Palme Commission 1982: 12).43 CS, as usually conceived, might in a certain sense be seen as an umbrella concept, subsuming a number of other ideas that have been promulgated by largely the same political and scholarly constituency. Some of these ideas have been incorporated into CS thinking as potential preparatory steps, others as special forms of CS, others again as presumably central elements in a CS regime. Some of them seem to follow logically from the hard core of CS, whereas others have the appearance of being based

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on flawed logic accompanied by the best intentions. In the following, I give an account of some of these conceptions. As a preparatory step on the way toward a CS regime, the establishment of security regimes seems to recommend itself. Such a regime has been defined by Robert Jervis (1982) as consisting of "principles, rules and norms that permit nations to be restrained in the belief that others will reciprocate" (cf. Wheeler & Booth 1987: 316-317; on regimes in general, see Krasner 1982). It would thus be in continuity with the realist conception of reciprocity and at the same time elevate the principle of restraint (which is so central to the CS approach) to the status of a vital element in national security policies, at least within bounded (geographical or issue) areas. Such a regime would be tantamount to a deliberate promotion of trends that are already visible in a wide range of problem areas; for example, between the superpowers. The restraint principle was, as a matter of fact, codified in the Basic Principles agreement of 1972, and elements of the same approach may be found in a number of other fields. On a regional scale, analogous principles seem to be at work between, say, the Nordic countries and the USSR. The so-called Nordic Balance might thus be seen as a balance of mutual restraints, that is, as a regional security regime. It thus seems to have been guided (albeit unwittingly) by the principles of CS, but one might also explain its mechanisms in terms of the reciprocity principle mentioned in the previous chapter. What has maintained mutual restraint may have been exactly the fear of the respective adversary's reciprocation to any violation of the unwritten code of mutual restraint.44 A more ambitious step toward a CS regime might be the establishment of security communities, a concept well-known from integration theory. The term was originally contrived by Karl Deutsch, who applied it to the NATO area while acknowledging it as a possible goal for the West European integration in progress. Integration, according to Deutsch, Haas, and other functionalists was to be pursued gradually. The first accomplishment might be a pluralistic security community, wherein war ceased to be a genuine option, but no relinquishment of national sovereignty would occur. Gradually, however, the integrative momentum (above all in the low politics sphere) would presumably create expectation among elites, who would strive for further integrative steps, culminating in the eventual establishment of an amalgamated security community, that is, a confederation of states or even a federation. Some European authors belonging to the CS community have accepted this as a promising path and urged placing the transformation of (the whole of) Europe into a pluralistic security community on the agenda, thus opening up the perspective of eventual amalgamation (Deutsch et al. 1957; Haas 1966, 1970, 1987; Hansen 1972; Schlotter 1982; Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991). Indeed, the establishment of a security community (of either type) seems to resemble closely what some have called a common security regime

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(i.e., a situation wherein CS had been adopted by all relevant states as the guideline for policy i.e., had become the dominating norm), just as the presumed way toward this goal would, likewise, resemble a CS policy. Some CS advocates have been even more ambitious and resurrected from oblivion the concept of collective security that enjoyed such prominence in the interwar period, and that was also mentioned by the Palme Commission, albeit with a very circumscribed field of application. The idea has even been combined with the notion of a European settlement, that is, a genuine European Peace Order (Palme Commission 1982: 162-164; cf. Lutz 1983, 1985a, b, 1990c). I will return at some length in the next chapter to the new opportunities, and concrete implications, of collective security arrangements for Europe. From Here to There Even if a world governed by the principles of CS were universally acknowledged as preferable to the present system, it might still be a nonstarter, because of Waltz's tyranny of small decisions, implying that nobody takes care of the system. The basic problem is how to initiate a cooperation that may well be in everybody's best interest, but only if everybody else actually does cooperate, something nobody is able to know in advance about the others. This problem has often been couched in terms of the well-known twoperson non-zero-sum game called Prisoners' Dilemma: Whereas both the apprehended criminals would benefit from cooperation, either one of them stands to benefit even more from unilateral defection (i.e., selfishness), and would be severely penalized for unilateral cooperation, from which almost inevitably follows a mutually detrimental noncooperation. The intellectual attraction of this game stems from, among other things, the fact that it seems to resemble closely the actual world, in which there is no central authority, in which communication is difficult (and never really credible; cf. JOnsson 1990; Fischer 1990: 74-82), and where the security dilemma rules—that is, the world described in the realist tradition. Whereas the prisoners' dilemma has no satisfactory solution as originally conceived, recent analyses have demonstrated that there is in fact such a solution to an iterated Prisoners' Dilemma game, which may allow cooperation to take off and common interests to prevail, in the long run, over shortsighted selfishness. Through a series of computer tournaments, Robert Axelrod (1984) demonstrated that there was in fact a satisfactory strategy for playing the game, with examples of which the real world, furthermore, seemed to abound: Not only game theorists played according to the said strategy, but also "nations and bacteria" (sic) (p. viii; cf. Fischer 1990: 170-176). The strategy in question was Tit-for-Tat (submitted by Anatol Rapoport), according to which one of the players should commence

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each round with collaboration, while reciprocating symmetrically to each defection on the part of his opponent, only to return subsequently to the cooperative mode. Tit-for-Tat was in fact able to prevail over morecompetitive strategies in the consecutive rounds of the tournament and thus seemed capable of explaining "how cooperation may emerge amongst egoists without central authority" (Rapoport 1989: 273-274, 558-559), that is, in a world according to the realist vision. The preconditions for successful application of Tit-for-Tat were, first, that the duration of the game was regarded by the players as indefinite, since it would always pay off to defect in the ultimate round. Second, it presupposed that the shadow of the future was sufficiently long to influence the present, that is, that the players valued future gains highly enough, compared with present ones, for them to regard continuous cooperation as sufficiently advantageous. The time perspective thus turned out to be of paramount importance for the success or failure of such endeavors. The longer the shadow of the future, the greater would be the incentive to seek cooperation. The importance of the time perspective would hence seem to be of tremendous importance for, say, East-West relations, a topic that has, unfortunately, not received quite the attention it seems to deserve. Hence a few tentative suggestions off the top of my own head. Nobody is, of course, able to foretell either for how long mankind as a species shall survive or the life span of individual states, and a given political leadership's adoption of a time perspective is hence inevitably somewhat arbitrary, but assumptions nevertheless have to be made for planning purposes. For nations engaged in systemic conflict, there are two interrelated preconditions for adopting a long time perspective: on the one hand, a preparedness to accept the other system for the indefinite future; on the other hand, a belief in the other's ability and willingness to maintain similarly peaceful relations. Until recently neither East nor West met these conditions entirely, because, inter alia, of ideology: Both East and West denied the basic legitimacy of the respective other system and adhered to an ideologically founded belief in the eventual extermination of the other, be this by way of his collapse under the weight of self-inflicted burdens, or even as a result of his defeat in an anticipated final and decisive clash between the two systems. Communism remained faithful to the Marxist classics with their belief that capitalism was moribund, and that its eventual collapse would merely be a question of time. Peaceful coexistence was thus conceived of as a pause strategy, rather than as a permanent state of affairs, although the envisaged length of the pause varied considerably (Kubalkova & Cruckshank 1980: 106-108, 145-154, 165-167; Jahn 1986: 448-451; Jegorow 1972). Capitalist ideology (and particularly the varieties predominant in the United States), on the other hand, regarded communism as something that would eventually yield the world stage to liberal, capitalist democracy

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(Frei 1986: 120-125; see also, for a good example, Fukuyama 1989). Even though this assumption appears to have been validated by developments since 1989, neither of these ideological tenets were, needless to say, suitable for any long-term strategy of coexistence, based on CS, and particularly not for initiating it. The shadow of the future was simply too short. Moreover, these time perspectives were intertwined with the reciprocal evaluations in East and West of the respective other system's ability to maintain peaceful relations. As long as capitalism was perceived by the socialist states as inherently tending toward war, 45 then prudence would dictate preparing for the eventual shoot-out. At best, a fairly long (but not indefinite) period of coexistence might be hoped for, which would, however, prudently have to be spent on preparations for the anticipated final struggle, through arms buildup, alliance formation, or even geopolitical expansion. By the late 1980s, however, an ideological reassessment was apparantly made in the East as a corollary of glasnost and perestroika. In the USSR new thinking entailed a new concern for global problems regardless of their class content, as well as a positive attitude to interdependence, which made sense only on the precondition of a long time perspective. In Eastern Europe, a similar reassessment was apparently made by the ruling Communist parties, even prior to the 1989 revolutions. For instance, the SED of East Germany in 1987 issued an important ideological document jointly with the West German SPD, in which it was explicitly acknowledged that both parties had to live with each other for a long time, perhaps indefinitely (something that history has since proved wrong). Furthermore, economists were beginning to reevaluate the inherent tendency of capitalism toward war, and ideologists had begun to speak of peace as something not inextricably connected with socialism, thus ideologically paving the way for a strategy of permanent peaceful coexistence by depicting this as an achievable goal. At the very least, the period of coexistence, rather than any confrontational phase beyond it, might henceforth become the focus.46 The development in the West was almost parallel with that in the East, albeit with a certain timelag. Although their more pluralistic ideological patterns made it more difficult to discern a uniform enemy image, capitalist states until recently held very pessimistic views concerning the nature of the Communist challenge. Particularly the United States tended toward a belief in the inherently expansionist nature of the Communist "evil empire" (Frei 1986: 125-146) and acted accordingly in terms of military buildup, and so on. This attitude, however, also seemed to be receding in favor of a more optimistic assessment, not as a result of the democratic revolutions in Eastern Europe, but prior to these. A precondition for CS is that the aim-point adopted for policy planning is a semipermanent state of affairs, that is, a period of indefinite duration, during which both sides coexist. At the very least, no final and decisive struggle should be anticipated or planned for. As we have seen, this is, in its

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turn, preconditioned on a recognition of the adversary as a state capable of maintaining peaceful relations. Since both preconditions seem to an increasing extent to hold good for the present world (particularly after the ideological element in the East-West conflict has faded away), the strategy would seem to recommend itself as a partial solution to the security dilemma, and is, furthermore, entirely in keeping with the realist perspective. Alongside (and closely related to) tit-for-tat, other strategies for tacit coordination of national policies may play an important role in bringing about a CS regime: By exercising restraint out of concern for the security of its opponent (and thus, in the final analysis, for reasons of enlightened national interest), a state may be able to promote at least the modicum of a security regime. In the same mode, it might be able to set in motion a process of disarmament (or transarmament to NOD) by, inter alia, application of the gradualist approach. This has been contrived by authors such as Charles Osgood (1962) and Amitai Etzioni (1962), and might be described as a method of calibrated and coordinated unilateralism that might be applicable to both crisis resolution and disarmament (cf. Boge & Wilke 1984: 19-56; George 1988d; Fischer 1990: 196-202; Goldstein & Freeman 1990). Gradualism has been based on two premises, both of which held good as far as the present East-West conflict was concerned. The first premise was the assumption of a certain security surplus, measured, for example, in terms of military power and implying a degree of robustness of the balance of power and an ensuing elasticity of military requirements. Small shifts in the prevailing balance should be seen as entailing no major dangers, so that states might be in a position to make down payments on an envisioned bilateral disarmament process. One state might, for example, unilaterally cut back its forces slightly (or reconfigure them to more-defensive formations), while inviting its adversary to reciprocate and promising to follow up the down payment with further steps in the same direction. The second premise, equally essential for actually setting in motion such a disarmament spiral, was the assumption that both sides so desired, that is, that they were in fact locked in a vicious circle (stemming from the security dilemma) from which they would welcome an escape route. However, it was, of course, perfectly conceivable that states might be inherently expansionist and malignant, and that they, for instance, might arm as a matter of deliberate political choice—in the pursuit of supremacy, for example, or in the hope of wearing down the adversary through competitive armaments. Whereas gradualist endeavors would be futile in this case, they would nevertheless have the important advantage of unmasking the opponent. As the above account has, I hope, shown, both tit-for-tat and gradualism resemble CS in terms of their suppositions as well as their conclusions. By virtue of this resemblance, they seem eminently suitable for the implementation of (at least elements of) a CS regime. This would, indeed, be

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tantamount to nothing less than implementing CS by a shrewd application of the realist principle of reciprocity. The Role of Military Power Even though the respective attitudes of mainstream realists and CS advocates to military power diverge, the two may not be logically incompatible. The typical realist would tend to regard military forces as a sine qua non of politics on the international stage, the purpose of which should not merely be to defend the state against threats from other states. The armed forces should, ideally, also enable the state to pursue national interest more assertively, for example by being utilized for coercion or even overt aggression, if the circumstances should allow doing so without jeopardizing national security. When circumstances do not allow such use, however, even the most hawkish realists would tend to advise states to settle for the more modest goal of security, in conformity with the rationality criterion. Even though most realists would, furthermore, attach great importance to the maintenance of the balance of power, including, as a minimum, an equilibrium in destructive potential, they would nevertheless tend to welcome any prospects of achieving the same balance on a lower level of armaments. It cannot possibly be regarded as being in the national interest to maintain an excess of military force that is both matched by an excess on the opposing side and acknowledged as unusable for any but strictly defensive purposes. Some realists nevertheless maintain the need for usable military force of appropriate size. Even if they acknowledge that it is not for actual use, but for more-symbolic purposes, for which the shadow of armed force matters more than its substance, they tend to emphasize that "the shadow must be a relevant one" (Martin 1983: 46). Whereas most realists would tend to visualize military forces in this almost mythological way, a growing number of them seem prepared to relinquish the idea, if only because of its expense. In any case, there is nothing in the realist position as such that militates against arms control, or even disarmament. The typical CS advocate, in his turn, would tend to attach paramount importance to disaimament and hence to regard the maintenance of military power as a necessary evil, and as merely a temporary remedy. The CS proponent would tend to regard all wars in the nuclear age as disastrous and to dismiss any possibilities of positive gain by means of war. He would, however, not dispute that nations are entitled to self-defense, including such as might require military means. Nor would he disagree with the view that disarmament, realistically, is obtainable only in a piecemeal fashion, by means of, inter alia, arms control. The gap between the two positions thus seems to be bridgeable. A field of more-profound disagreement might be that of nuclear weapons. It is, of course, not the case that realists have been "nuke lovers"

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(although some might seem so), and many realists have in fact expressed the wish to return (per impossibile) to the prenuclear age (Bull 1977: 126). Nearly all realists have nevertheless regarded nuclear weapons as a fact of life that is going to remain for the indefinite future, while acknowledging the prudence of controlling the arsenals so as, inter alia, to prevent inadvertent nuclear wars. The majority of CS proponents have been more unambiguously "nuke haters," and almost without exception have expressed wishes for abolishing nuclear weapons altogether. Most would, however (as would I) tend to agree with the realist view as far as the immediate future is concerned: that there is no alternative to arms control endeavors, which ought to seek to build down the most destabilizing weapons categories first while maintaining, for an intermediate period of indefinite duration, minimum deterrence arsenals (cf. Chapter 7 below) designed for the purpose of stable deterrence. Once again, the disagreements thus reveal themselves as less profound than they might appear at first glance.

NOD and Common Security Having thus (I hope) established CS as compatible with realism, even as far as the role assigned to military power is concerned, the remainder of the argument is fairly straightforward, since it merely has to be demonstrated that CS requires armed forces conforming to the NOD criteria. According to CS, states should take into serious consideration the security concerns of their opponents, because neither side can be really secure unless both are (and perceive themselves to be so). To opt for a military posture that would deliberately eschew posing threats to the opponent is the only logical answer to this requirement, since this would enhance the opponent's security and, by so doing, improve that of the first party as well. It would thus be a reflection of what I have called enlightened rationality. Although CS has qualified the call for national security somewhat, it has by no means entailed an abandonment of this goal. In spite of its insistence on common interests, CS has disregarded neither the actual hostility between states nor the possibility of premeditated wars being launched by aggressive states. It has hence acknowledged the legitimacy of, and need for, self-defense as a means to national security, in the absence of which CS would be null and void. In order to meet the CS criteria, NOD would thus have to maintain a sufficient degree of military efficiency. This is, of course, exactly what NOD proponents claim to be able to accomplish, the validity of which claim I do not seek to assess at the present stage, since it forms the topic of Chapters 6 and 7 below. Suffice it to say that NOD by no means implies a lowering of the standards of defense. A distinguishing feature of the CS approach is its systemic perspective, implying a focus on the security dilemma in all its ramifications. Nations

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have been seen by CS authors as entrapped in vicious circles, and the task has been identified as that of finding escapes from these systemic traps. CS advocates have hence tended to attach at least an equal importance to the avoidance of inadvertent wars as to the prevention of deliberate, aggressive war, and therefore have focused on crisis stability. NOD has, likewise, been designed with the crisis stability criterion in mind. Its emphasis on avoiding offensive capabilities is intended to minimize incentives for preemption on the part of the respective opponent, and its insistence on déconcentration stems from the quest for a defense profile that presents as few lucrative targets to the opponent as possible, so as to deprive the latter of preemptive options. CS has attached paramount importance to disarmament but acknowledged the workings of the armaments security dilemma. NOD presumably opens up an escape from the armaments dynamics by virtue of the possibility of discriminating arms control, through a distinction between offensive and defensive military structures and the deliberate builddown of the former in favor of the latter. I will return to this problem in Chapters 4 and 6. CS has identified the prevention of nuclear war as the paramount goal and, as a corollary, urged a builddown of nuclear arsenals. NOD is presumably able to accomplish exactly that, through its creation of conventional stability that should relieve the pressure for nuclear gap filling, that is, for employing nuclear weapons to repair deficiencies in the conventional defense posture. NOD would thus presumably be capable of making first-use of nuclear weapons superfluous, and thus to pave the way for deep cuts in the nuclear arsenals. Whether NOD should strive for the complete abolition of nuclear weapons remains contested. Even if so, however, this would not automatically amount to dismantling the deterrence system as such. A considerable amount of so-called existential deterrence would be likely to remain in any case, thanks to the impossibility of disinventing nuclear weapons. To the extent that CS advocates have asserted (and actually meant) that CS should replace the deterrence system, we may, however, be facing a genuine incompatibility between CS and NOD: Were the deterrent effects of nuclear weapons (the nuclear shadow) to disappear for good, conventional forces would, indeed, have to be measured according to much higher standards, that is, would have to be able to stand alone, so to speak, even against the most offensive and ruthless opponent, something that might well prove impossible without violating some of the other criteria listed above. I will return to this problem in Chapter 5. Suffice it therefore at this stage to recapitulate that the equation of CS with an abandonment of deterrence does not by any means follow logically from the CS approach. NOD thus seems to be conceived of as in perfect conformity with the CS requirements, at least according to its own design criteria. Almost all NOD proponents have in fact embedded their concrete proposals in the CS

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framework, or at least couched them in CS terms, just as an increasing number of CS proponents have recommended restructuring military forces in the direction of NOD.47 Whether all the NOD criteria can, in actual fact, be met simultaneously is another matter, to which I will return in the subsequent chapters and with which I have dealt on numerous other occasions (e.g., M0ller 1988a). N O D and Realism Having by now, I hope, established the compatibility of NOD with realism in a slightly roundabout fashion, the time has come to conclude the analysis with a direct comparison. • Both NOD and realism take the nation-state and the anarchical international society as their point of departure. • Both acknowledge the reality of hostility and conflict, and hence the possibility of deliberate aggression, although NOD tends to emphasize the risks of inadvertent war to a greater extent than does realism. • Both acknowledge the influence of the security dilemma. Where NOD differs from realism is in its assumption that the dilemma may be (at least partially) resolved through a more discriminating attitude to military forces. • Both regard military means as required for the security of nations. There may be a certain difference of degree, since NOD tends explicitly to rule out the option of assertive use, whereas some realists take a somewhat more permissive view. • Both consider balance to be of some importance. Where they differ is in the identification of the form of balance that will promote peace and stability. Whereas realism focuses on a more or less vague balance of power, NOD implies rather an advocacy of a balance of incapabilities, that is, a mutual incapability of attack. • Both acknowledge the need for arms control, although NOD attaches more weight to actual disarmament. • Both emphasize the importance of war prevention in general, and crisis stability in particular, although NOD seeks this primarily through minimizing incentives for preemption, whereas realism tends to recommend deterrence measures for dissuading preemptive attacks. There ought thus to be no rational obstacles to NOD's being accepted as an element in the realist view of the world. Indeed, this may be about to occur, at least in part, as a side effect of the growing interest in conventional arms control matters shown by realists.48

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Notes 1. See, e.g., Morgenthau 1960; Kissinger 1957; Hoffmann 1965; Wolfers 1965; Carr 1964;.Bull 1977; Aron 1984; Waltz 1979; Gilpin 1981; Buzan 1991b; cf. Smith 1986; Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1971: 65-101; Behrens and Noack 1984: 58-68. 2. See also Kant's main work on ethics (1963a, orig. pub. 1788); cf. Piepmeier 1987. 3. On the interwar experience, see Carr 1964: 22-40. For examples, see Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions 1973; Galtung 1980. For a critical analysis, see Claude 1972; Neumann 1988; Suganami 1989. On the Occident vs. Orient dichotomy, see 0berg 1983: 145-225; Fischer et al. 1987: 133-190. On the Green movement, see Falk 1987; Galtung 1988: 322-356. 4. On Machiavelli, see Meinecke 1984. For Hobbes, see Hobbes 1968: 183-188, 223-228 et passim; cf. "De Corpore Politica," in Hobbes 1962: 277281. 5. On the state, see the chapter "The Actors in International Politics," in Wolfers 1965: 3-24. On the urge for power, see Morgenthau 1960: 33; "The Escape from Power," in 1971: 3-9, and for an explanation in terms of man's basic loneliness, "Love and Power," in 1971: 189-196. 6. See Morgenthau 1960: 167-223; Kissinger 1957: 1-6; Bull 1977: 101-126; Aron 1984: 137-144. On the ambiguities, see, e.g., the chapter "The Balance of Power in Theory and Practice," in Wolfers 1965; or Haas 1972. 7. Morgenthau (1960: 28-29) defined power as basically a psychological relation, that is, as "man's control over the minds and actions of other men"; cf. Morgenthau 1960: 211, where the author bluntly states that "preventive war . . . is in fact the natural outgrowth of the balance of power"; cf. Aron 1984: 28, 133156; Bull 1977: 107, 184-199. 8. See, e.g., Kissinger 1969. Kissinger's recommendations for (the ability to wage) limited nuclear war were strongly criticized, not merely by pacifists, but also by nuclear strategists such as Bernard Brodie (1959: 329). 9. See the chapter "American Diplomacy and the Military," in Kennan 1984a: 168-179. The "Long Telegram" of February 22, 1946, and the classified "U.S. Objectives with Respect to Russia" are reprinted in Etzold and Gaddis 1978: 50-63, 173-203. The article "The Sources of Soviet Conduct" is reprinted in Kennan 1984a: 107-128. 10. Cf. the authoritative study of containment, by an author apparently very congenial to Kennan: Gaddis 1982: 25-54 et passim. Kennan's later reflections on containment can be found in his 1987a; b. The proposal for disengagement, including an element of civilian-based defense, is found in Kennan 1958: 65-66. Kennan advocated NFU as early as the 1950s; see, e.g., his 1982: 3-10. For a later recommendation to the same effect, see Bundy et al. 1982. 11. Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1971: 345-378; Nicholson 1989. For a critique, see Rapoport 1968: 69-77; 1970a; b; Rapoport and Chammah 1970. More benign uses of the methodology of games are found in Schelling 1960; Axelrod 1984; Brams and Kilgour 1988; Goldstein and Freeman 1990. 12. For Kahn's views, see his 1960; 1962; 1965; 1984. On Kahn as a person, see, e.g., the chapter "Dr. Strangelove" in Kaplan 1983: 220-231. 13. On the concept of paradigm change see Kuhn 1970. 14. Morgenthau (I960: 360-361, 396) tried to solve the first problem by assigning to bipolarity only a short duration. It was likely to be transformed into

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either a two-bloc system or to disintegrate. The tentative answer to the second problem was the observation that a sublimation was occurring, with armaments and arms racing serving as substitutes for war. Cf., for an argument to the effect that bipolarity is only partial, and that multipolarity may be stable, Niou et al. 1989. 15. For the scientific critique, see Kaplan 1972. For the classical formulation of the falsification criterion, see Popper 1959; 1963. For a defense of traditionalism, see, e.g., Bull 1969; Jervis 1969. 16. For a general theory of bureaucratic politics, see Halperin 1974. On the influence of the military on politics in general, see, e.g., Finer 1976. An excellent case study on the basis of this approach is Allison 1971. A similar approach is taken by George (1983). Elements of the same approach have been applied by Evera (1984; 1985) and Snyder (1985). On the MIC, see, e.g., Pursell 1972; Barnett 1970; Kaldor 1981; Prins 1983: 133-168. Cf., for a critique, Sarkesian 1972. On weapons procurement, see, e.g., Allison 1983; Allison and Morris 1975; Enthoven and Smith 1972; Greenwood 1975; Head 1983. On interservice competition, see Kester 1983; and on the perceptual implications thereof, see, e.g., Prados 1982; Freedman 1986. 17. On general systems theory, applied to the state, see Easton 1965; Almond and Powell 1966. For an application to the international system, see McClelland 1972; Holsti 1977: 29-65. Kaplan's famous models can be found in his 1957 work; cf. Kaplan 1970. 18. See also Singer 1972: 104-106; cf. the stimulus-response model of Holsti et al. 1969. 19. On crisis decisonmaking, see Lebow 1981; Snyder and Diesing 1977; Fischer 1990: 74-82. On enemy images, see Frei 1986 for a good case study. 20. For a general account of interdependence, see Keohane and Nye 1977; cf., on the United Nations, Claude 1984. On the problems flowing from interdependence, see, e.g., Mische 1989; Tromp 1988; Westing 1989; McKinley and Little 1986; Soroos 1990; Brundtland Commission 1987; Prins 1990c. 21. On regionalism in general, see Young 1968; Boals 1973; Cantori and Spiegel 1973; Buzan 1986; Buzan et al. 1990: 219-223. On the potential of integration, see Deutsch et al. 1957; Haas 1966; 1970; 1987; Hansen 1972. On security communities, see Jervis 1982a. On the Nordic region, see, e.g., Mottola 1988; M0ller 1989c; 1991d; Gleditsch et al. 1990; Heisler 1990. On subregional cooperation in the Third World, see Tow 1990. 22. Marx and Engels 1848; see also Engels 1884: 166-168. On imperialism, see Lenin 1914; 1917; Luxemburg 1981. For the Soviet reinterpretation of these tenets, see Kubalkova and Cruckshank 1980. For lessdogmatic analyses of imperialism, see, e.g., Galtung 1971; Amin 1973; 1976; Emmanuel 1969; Frank 1969. 23. Good examples are Ashley 1980; 1986; 1988; Cox 1986; Little 1986a; b. 24. For an attempted rebuttal, see, e.g., Gray 1982. 25. A good example is Herz, who accepted the interdependence challenge as early as 1951 (see Herz 1951: 95, 121, 132-133, 146, 226-227); see also Herz 1981, in which he called for "a planetary view of the world," assigned paramount importance to the global challenges to mankind, and recommended a greater role for international governmental and nongovernmental organizations. Cf., on the distinction between realism and neorealism, Keohane 1986: 1-26, 158-203; Ruggie 1986. 26. Cf. a recent article by two of Waltz's disciples, Christensen and Snyder (1990); Evera 1990b; Jervis and Snyder, eds. (1991).

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27. Mearsheimer (1990) has pursued the same logic (if so it is) to the point of recommending orderly proliferation in casu, German nuclear weapons. 28. The argument that bipolarity is more stable than multipolarity has recently been challenged by Niou et al. (1989). 29. Gilpin 1981: 186-210; see also Kennedy 1988, esp. the chapter on the United States facing decline (pp. 514-535). For comparable European views, see, e.g., Kaldor 1978: 14-28, 173-208; Senghaas 1986: 23-50, 1988: 9 4 110. 30. See, e.g., the chapter "Non-Provocative Defence" in Buzan 1987a: 276-288; and 1987b. Buzan also did me the favor of writing the foreword to M0ller 1991a. 31. For a comparable image of post-cold war Europe; see Evera 1990b. 32. Reinhard Mutz (1986: 154-155) seems to have grasped the range of CS properly with his characterization of it as "theoretically more than an approach, but less than a full-fledged model" and "politically more than a postulate, but less than a ready program." 33. Cf. the chapter "National Security as an Ambiguous Symbol," in Wolfers 1965; Little 1986a: 85. 34. Michael MccGwire (1986: 59) has been the most outspoken critic of this approach and has maintained that "Soviet intentions must be examined directly." He has attempted such a logical reconstruction of Soviet intentions, inter alia, in his works 1987a; b; 1991. 35. For a classical description of the alliance security dilemma, see Snyder 1984; cf. on the abandonment vs. entrapment aspect, Sharp 1987; on the buckpassing vs. chain-ganging aspect, see Christensen and Snyder 1990; Jervis and Snyder, eds. 1991. On containment, see Gaddis 1982. On the debate on German NATO membership, see, e.g., Rotfeld and Stiitzle 1991, particularly the documentation section; or M0ller 1991a. 36. On the history of the concept, see Lutz 1986a; Lutz and Theilmann 1986; Theilmann 1986. On the background of Soviet new thinking, see Shenfield 1987; Bialer 1988; Legwold 1989; Wettig 1988; Kastl 1988; Zagladin 1988; MccGwire 1991. 37. See Vayrynen 1985; Bahr and Lutz 1986, 1987; Nakarada and 0berg 1989. On the relationship between NOD and CS, see Bahr and Lutz 1988; Buzan 1987b; M0ller 1988a. 38. Cf. Lutz 1986b: 51. Also, for the view that CS is incompatible with deterrence in the long run (which may indicate a real difference of opinion), see Mutz 1986: 103. 39. For a critique of the SPD discourse from a researcher at one of the party's own think tanks, see Liibckemeier 1988; for a critique from a more independent author, see Bertram 1987. 40. On the concept of cognitive dissonance, see Festinger 1957; Jervis 1970: 77. On enemy images and CS in general, see Fischer 1990: 59-74; Richter 1987; Werbik 1985; 1987; cf. Mutz 1986: 135-138. 41. See the joint document by SPD and SED (1987); cf. Eppler 1988; Birkenbach 1989. 42. On the defense dilemma, see Buzan 1991b: 156-172. On East-West trade, see Bolz 1987: 131-132; Wilke 1987; on linkage, see Kissinger 1979a: 125-130. 43. See also a more recent work by the chairman of the Brandt Commission, wherein the concept of CS is explicitly tied to the former analyses: Brandt 1985: 4 6 - 4 8 , 99. On the link between militarization and underdevelopment, see Ball 1988. On uneven development, see Emmanuel 1969;

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Frank 1969; Galtung 1971; Amin 1973; 1976. On the spillover risk, see Nincic 1985; Ravenhill 1990; Widgren 1990. 44. On the Basic Principles agreement, see Garthoff 1985: 290-298; George 1989. On fields of superpower cooperation based on mutual restraint, see, e.g., the many case studies in George, Farley, and Dallin 1988. On the Nordic regime, see M0ller 1985, 1989c, 1990b, 199 Id; Gleditsch et al. 1990; Bomsdorf 1989. 45. See Frei 1986: 41-71; cf. Soviet theories of the MIC in Faramazyan 1974. 46. On Soviet ideological reorientation, see Shenfield 1987: 6 0 - 6 9 ; Bialer 1988. On East Germany, see SPD and SED 1987; cf. Birkenbach 1989; Eppler 1988. On the war-proneness of capitalism, see Klein 1988a; b; Hahn 1988. 47. For an analysis of the interconnection between NOD and CS, see, e.g., Lutz 1988b. For evidence of the use of the CS term by NOD advocates, see, e.g., the results of two hearings at the IFSH, at which almost all important German NOD advocates participated; the contributions are gathered in Bahr and Lutz 1988. Or see M0ller 1991a. See also a number of articles in the SIPRI anthology on CS (Väyrynen 1985), including Mertes 1985; or Lodgaard 1985. 48. See recent articles by the director of the Brookings Foreign Policy Studies program: Steinbruner 1988; 1990. Apparently, the author uses the term cooperative security as a synonym for CS.

3

NOD AND ALLIANCES A very frequent critique against NOD has been that it would be incompatible with alliances, in either of two different senses: Either an adoption of such a defense on the part of an individual state would be tantamount to a withdrawal from any alliance it might be a party to; or an adoption of NOD on an alliancewide scale would lead to a dissolution of the alliance in question.

Attitudes to Alignment vs. Neutrality Whereas such allegations are not entirely without foundation in NOD literature, they disregard the actual heterogeneity of NOD advocates, who fall roughly into four categories: 1. Neutralists recommend a neutralization of their respective countries and envisage NOD as a means of facilitating this. 2. Autonomists or disengagers, found particularly among West Germans, seek to create by means of, inter alia, NOD as much scope as possible for independent action on the part of their own country (e.g. by means of a form of piecemeal dealignment) within the overall framework of NATO. 3. Conditionalists (inter alios certain British authors) urge their respective countries to switch to NOD and to try to persuade their alliance partners to go along. If these attempts should prove futile, however, the said country would have to withdraw rather than remain within the alliance as an odd man out. 4. NATO supporters (the majority of NOD advocates) see no viable (at least short-term) alternative to NATO. This group of NOD advocates (among whom I count myself) explicitly envision NOD as an option for NATO as a whole, albeit perhaps most likely to be implemented by, say, the FRG before the rest.1 Although they thus constitute no homogeneous group of neutralists,

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most NOD proponents do appear to envision a gradual dissolution or at least mellowing of the bloc system in Europe. However, they tend to see this as more likely to come about through processes of change within the blocs than through unilateral withdrawal from the blocs on the part of individual states. In such a process, some have recommended piecemeal changes, such as, for example, a loosening of the alliance bonds and a gradual disintegration or dealignment of individual states, visualized as moving toward the neutrality pole of a neutrality-alignment continuum.2 In this context, the actual policies of the neutral countries have occasionally been viewed as partial models in some respects. NOD does, indeed, in many respects resemble the actual defense postures of European neutrals, such as Finland and Sweden, Austria and Switzerland, as well as nonaligned countries such as Yugoslavia.3 This might also be taken as (at least circumstantial) evidence of a certain affinity between NOD and neutrality. However, even if neutrality should imply NOD, NOD does not necessarily imply neutrality. Whereas there may thus be at least a grain of truth in the allegations against the actual NOD proposals of a certain neutralist orientation, NOD has also occasionally been criticized from the left for not breaking with the alliance structure, that is, for its being envisioned as a reform of NATO from within. This critique has sometimes been rather hostile, depicting NOD as a way of making alignment palatable, and hence as almost a militarist ploy.4 That NOD advocates are thus caught in a cross fire might count as evidence of a considerable elasticity of NOD with regard to alliance obligations. Whereas it might be possible to assess the hypothesized neutrality-NOD link empirically, that is, by testing the correlation between advocacies of NOD and of neutrality (in an opinion poll mode, so to speak), such evidence would be quite inadequate for our present purpose. It would not really answer the question whether NOD logically implies neutrality or is compatible with alliance membership, but at most whether a majority of NOD proponents think so. They might simply be wrong in this respect. Furthermore, any significant correlation between proposals in favor of NOD and of neutrality might well be spurious, because, for example, the two options might be viewed (erroneously) as an aggregate alternative to another aggregate, namely that of NATO and nuclear deterrence. In an attempt to settle the matter, I devote this chapter to, first, a principled and theoretical analysis of the logical compatibility of NOD with alliance membership as such, and second, of the compatibility of NOD with the present alliance system. Third, because one might well argue that the present alliance system is a contradictio in adjecto (because of the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact), I venture a tentative analysis of how NOD might fit into an alternative security arrangement for Europe (and perhaps beyond), namely a collective security system.

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Theories of Alliance Alliances play an important role in the realist theory of international politics where they are typically seen as arrangements of expedience intended to serve the national interests of states defined in terms of power. Under conditions of international anarchy, wherein international conflict constitutes an intrinsic feature of the system, rather than an anomaly, alliances become an important means of self-protection. They are, by their very nature, directed against something, in casu against other states or alliances. Competitive alliance building might thus serve as a functional substitute for war, that is, a quest for either security or aggrandizement by means of power exerted in ways short of war. According to classical realism, alliances were, however, expected to be of relatively short duration, and certainly not permanent, because of inherent tendencies toward erosion (Morgenthau 1960: 181-194; cf. his "Alliances," in 1971: 368-389; Liska 1962: 12, 26-27, 108-115, 168-201). Furthermore, alliances have been regarded by realists as essential for the balance of power and eo ipso as stabilizing. This did, however, presuppose that states were actually in a position to opt for alignment and realignment, with a view to attaining, maintaining, or restoring an equilibrium. Furthermore, it rested on the assumption of an intrinsic proclivity to balance rather than to "bandwagon": As a general rule, states were presumed to respond to the growth of a potentially hostile alliance by counteralignment, rather than by joining it (Walt 1987: 17-33, 147-180; Evera 1990a, b; Christensen & Snyder 1990; Jarvis and Snyder, 1991). In the prenuclear, or at least in the preideological age, alliances were in fact one of the most important ways of influencing the balance of power, realignments were rather frequent, and they were apparently guided by power calculus considerations in general, and the so-called size principle (Riker 1962; cf. Liska 1962: 27; Kissinger 1957) in particular: Alliances thus tended to grow until they reached an optimum size, beyond which the costs of co-opting additional members outweighed the accruing benefits. Above the optimum size, the marginal returns in terms of aggregate power tended to decline, because of, inter alia, the pragmatic nature of alliances, from which inevitably followed a less than total commitment by individual states to the common interest. That "the power of a coalition is hence always inferior to the forces at its disposal on paper" (Aron 1984: 56) was due to, inter alia, the fact that the security provided by the alliance was a common good, whence inevitably ensued incentives for free riding and buck-passing: Why indeed contribute to some common good that one might enjoy for free? Presumably, however, the contribution of great powers gave them a direct impact on the benefits accruing from the alliance, explaining their allegedly lesser propensity for selfish behavior (Waltz

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1979: 197-199, 203; cf. Trevorton 1985: 17-21; Christensen & Snyder 1990). An important determinant of alliances, largely omitted from the realist account, has apparently been geopolitics, which, according to the classics determined not merely the foreign policies of states, but also the patterns of amity and enmity in international politics. According to MacKinder, the control of the world-island (i.e., Eurasia) was tantamount to global domination. From this assumption followed that of the predominance, as well as the inherently expansionist nature, of land power, associated particularly with the heartland (or the pivot area), presumably locked in a relentless quest for control over the adjacent rimlands. This theory has been taken over with slight modifications by certain modern authors (e.g., Gray 1977), as an explanation of the nature of the Soviet Union, which has been depicted as an heir to the czarist imperial aspirations, rather than as a Communist power sui generis, bent on world revolution. According to this view, it is vital for the states in the rimlands (above all for Europe) to join ranks in order to resist the expansionist drive toward world domination emanating from the heartland, that is, the USSR. According to the diametrically opposite geopolitical view of Mahan (1987), however, sea power was the decisive factor, since it invested insular powers with a near invulnerability, preconditioned only on their maintainance of global sea command and the prevention of a complete domination over Eurasia by a single state or coalition.5 The postwar alliance configuration might thus be interpreted as a contest between a MacKinderian alliance (the Warsaw Pact) and its Mahanian counterpart (NATO). Such an interpretation would, however, have to allow for the anomaly that each alliance (at least according to official statements) paradoxically seemed to believe in the superior intrinsic merits of the other. Until the 1989 revolutions NATO considered the Warsaw Pact to be geopolitically stronger and more robust, whereas the USSR apparently regarded NATO as the stronger type, and itself as inherently more fragile and vulnerable. Although the realist image of alliances may well originally have been a fairly accurate description of international behavior, it seems to stand in need of some refinement and revision. First, in the post-Napoleonic age, and even more so in the nuclear era, ideological factors have changed the pattern radically, and coalitions rather than traditional alliances have become the rule (the Concert of Europe, etc.). Under bipolar conditions, furthermore, realignment has become well-nigh inconceivable, whence the unprecedented rigidity of the alliance pattern, at least as far as Europe is concerned. In other parts of the world (particularly in low-interest regions) the phenomenon of competitive realignment may still occur. Under European conditions, however, alliances have been unable to perform their traditional roles.

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Second, serious doubt has been cast on the contribution of alliances to the preservation of peace. Even though they may be important vehicles for maintaining the balance of power, the very alliance structure in Europe prior to WWI did apparently contribute to bringing about this war (or at least to expanding its scope) and entirely failed in preventing it (see Kennedy 1985; Kennan 1984b; Tuchman 1962). The evidence, however, remains contradictory, since the lack of binding alliances against Hitler probably facilitated the initially successful German combined blitzkrieg and salami strategy. Third, alliances are inherently contradictory. The aforementioned freeriding problem might thus be seen as an instance of what has been called the alliance security dilemma, in casu the buck-passing versus chain-ganging dilemma. Another instance hereof is the abandonment versus entrapment dilemma: One horn of this dilemma is that states party to an alliance risk abandonment if they behave too independently of their allies (even as far as alignment with a superpower is concerned, wherein smaller allies hardly matter in power terms); the other horn is that states by excessive dependence on the others may become entrapped in wars from which they might presumably otherwise have stayed aloof (G. Snyder 1984; cf. Sharp 1987). One might argue, however, that the risk of abandonment has almost been negligible in the bipolar alliance configuration, since neither superpower would allow its adversary to take over its former allies, no matter how undeserving of support the latter might seem. If so, the United States may have had no choice but to continue supporting the Europeans, regardless of the actual behavior of the latter, since, conversely, the Europeans were able to loosen their bonds to the United States and make decreasing contributions to the common defense without thereby incurring risks of abandonment. The USSR may have been in a less enviable situation, because its allies did not fear, but rather hoped for, abandonment. Be that as it may, the impossible did indeed happen, when the WTO collapsed and East Germany changed sides in 1990, only to become part of a united Germany that remained a party to NATO. If taken to its logical conclusion, the realist assumption of states pursuing their national interests would seem to imply a further dilemma, which might, for lack of a better term, be called the commitment dilemma: Alliances may be caught between the two horns of being either superfluous or incredible, and hence ineffective. An alliance obligation might be seen as a pledge to do something that a state might otherwise choose not to do, such as assisting a friendly state by becoming involved in a war itself. If the said state would participate, in any event, because national interest would so dictate, a formal alliance might be superfluous. On the other hand, if the consequences of fulfilling its pledges were to appear too severe (e.g., if they might result in a suicidal nuclear war), the commitment would be inherently incredible, and the alliance obligations thus little more than a hollow shell.

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This dilemma was spelled out in Henry Kissinger's (1979b) famous dictum: "Our European allies should not keep asking us to multiply strategic assurances that we cannot possibly mean, or if we do mean, we should not want to execute because if we execute, we risk the destruction of civilisation." This dilemma might, in fact, be understood as constituting merely a special variety of the so-called ex ante-ex post dilemma, to which I will return in Chapter 5 on deterrence and other forms of war prevention. One seeming solution to this dilemma was the introduction of sliding scales of ambiguous commitments, combined with calibrated means of implementing the threatened responses. In the final analysis a strategy of "threats that leave something to chance," as analyzed at length by Thomas Schelling (1966: 35-91, cf. 1960: 187-204) (and as partially implemented by NATO in the form of the flexible response strategy), thus appears to flow from the very nature of alliances. An additional way of preventing alliance dissolution by making commitments somewhat more binding is the introduction of rigid alliance norms. Conformism and homogeneity are elements of this norm system, implying an inherent tendency in alliances toward homogeneity in terms of rights and obligations, etc. In actual fact, however, this tendency remains exactly that because of the opposite influence of the free-riding problem and the predominance of the entrapment over the abandonment syndrome. Alliances therefore most often end up as fairly heterogeneous compounds, rather than as streamlined, homogeneous, and highly cohesive coalitions. On the basis of the above abstract analysis of the nature of alliances as such, I proceed with an analysis of certain aspects of the postwar alliance system of particular relevance for NOD. I shall focus on the geopolitical nature, the structure, the policy orientation, and the strategy of both NATO and the (now defunct) Warsaw Pact. NOD and NATO NATO, Geopolitics, and NOD The extent to which geopolitics influences security policies is debated, but there is hardly any doubt that where you stand depends on where you sit (i.e., where the country in question is located). The security political perspectives of states are thus, at least partially, determined by geopolitical, and more specifically geostrategic, considerations. This makes it possible to identify a number of peculiarities of an alliance such as NATO, as well as to explain some of the recurrent differences of opinion between member states. NATO is a transatlantic alliance, consisting of two approximate halves separated by a wide stretch of ocean. If such an alliance is to remain viable, no adversary should be in a position to sever the communication links between the two halves. This was exactly what NATO observers in the

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1970s feared was about to happen as a result of the Soviet naval buildup in progress, which threatened to place NATO's SLOCs at risk. In response to this challenge, NATO launched several programs: • Provisions were made for the storage of heavy equipment for the US divisions that were assigned to NATO, but stationed in CONUS in peacetime—the POMCUS arrangements. • It was envisaged to reinforce NATO-Europe before an attack, that is, in times of crisis, rather than after, when it might well be too late— the Rapid Reinforcement Plan of the ACE (Allied Command Europe). • Greater emphasis was placed on a forward maritime strategy, one rationale for which was to tie up the Soviet attack submarines (which constituted the main threat to the SLOCs) in defense of the Arctic bastions of the Soviet strategic submarines.6 Apart from their shared interest in maintaining allied control of the Atlantic, the geopolitical interests of the various NATO countries have diverged considerably, as might be expected from countries in such different positions as, say, the United States and West Germany. The FRG, for instance, had (at least until unification) an obvious interest in a forward defense, since all scenarios of East-West war envisioned a Soviet invasion of West Germany. This particular German interest was, however, only partially shared by France, and to an even lesser extent by the United Kingdom. It made perfect sense for French defense planners to envision a defense in depth if this depth was available in the West German glacis. The natural defense perimeter from a French (geopolitical) point of view was thus the Rhine rather than the Elbe, whereas the British, thanks to their insular status, might even prefer the Channel as the ultimate defense perimeter. The geopolitical interests of the even more insular United States, finally, merely pointed toward preventing hostile domination of the entire world island, as well as preserving command of the sea (Bluth 1986: 31-35). Needless to say, geopolitics has not been the only determinant of national policies, and a compromise was therefore accomplished on forward defense as the guideline for the entire alliance. Some divergence of interests nevertheless remained, as illustrated by the problems inherent in FrancoGerman cooperation, stemming from, inter alia, the French reluctance to commit themselves unreservedly to forward defense (Yost 1985; Andrets 1986; Ehrhart 1987; Brock et al. 1988; Weisenfeld 1989; for critical views on French strategy, see, Lellouche 1985: 264-278; Schulze 1986). Furthermore, although interests have converged on the desirability of a US military presence in Europe, the underlying rationales for this have in fact diverged. Europeans (and above all the Germans) have valued the presence of the US forces primarily as a coupling device and only secondarily for their material contribution to the defense of the ACE area. The

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Americans, on the other side, have appreciated forward deployment for its geostrategic advantages of providing forward launch pads, thus extending US global military reach without thereby automatically drawing fire onto the CONUS area.7 Whether these divergent interests have ever been really compatible seems questionable, and the latent disagreements may merely have been covered by a thin layer of superficial consensus, as the disputes over the use of US bases in Europe for the attack on Libya demonstrated, and as the recent nuclear modernization debate might seem to show as well.8 These geopolitical particularities of NATO are tantamount to a set of demands on NOD, which will have to be met if the Atlantic alliance is to remain viable in the face of an implementation of NOD; or conversely, if NOD is to be realistic without requiring a simultaneous dissolution of, or withdrawal from, NATO: 1. 2. 3.

NOD must allow for a satisfactory protection of NATO's transatlantic SLOCs. NOD must allow for a continued allied participation in the forward defense of the FRG, if this is maintained. NOD must not prevent allies from coming to one another's assistance in case of an attack on either of them.

These requirements must somehow be reconciled with the seemingly incompatible demands flowing from NOD: la. The (maritime) defense must not threaten the adversary's vital interests. 2a. The land forces must be incapable of major border-crossing operations. I will return to the problem of maritime protection shortly. As far as forward defense and land forces are concerned, there is no incompatibility in principle, since there is no particular reason why the allied forces stationed in, say, the FRG should need offensive capabilities, since their raison d'être is to prevent invasions, not to conduct them. On the other hand, there may well be a practical problem, since the forces actually stationed in the FRG happen to possess considerable offensive capabilities. The United States Army and Air Force, above all, are equipped with all kinds of offensive-capable weapons systems (MBTs; IFVs; heavy, selfpropelled artillery; MLRS; fighter-bombers and the like) and are, furthermore, supposed to fight according to the so-called ALB doctrine, envisaging offensive maneuver-type warfare. Whether Europe constitutes an exception to the global applicability of the ALB doctrine remains disputed, but many analysts (including me) find it hard to believe that entirely different

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operational concepts would be applied by the same military units operating in different settings. Furthermore, NATO in 1984 adopted the FOFA doctrine, which is currently under implementation, above all as far as the US forces are concerned, and which will imply a greater emphasis on deep strikes.9 NATO in general, and the United States Army and Air Force in particular, thus in the mid-1980s seemed to be heading in the direction of more-offensive tactical and operational conceptions. It might thus be difficult to reconcile the actual allied presence in Germany with a shift to an NOD posture on the part of this country, unless accompanied by a similar trans arm am ant on an alliancewide scale. The need for an agreed strategy may, furthermore, grow in the years ahead with the planned introduction of multinational formations (see, e.g., the communiqué of the DPC meeting, May 28-29, 1991; Lowe & Young 1991). The concrete shape of this organizational innovation, as well as the accompanying change of strategy in the direction of smaller and more mobile forces, however, remained unresolved at the time these lines were written. The concrete compatibility problem aside, however, there is in principle nothing in the NOD conception that militates against the maintenance of a multinational posture for forward defense of allied territory. There might, on the other hand, be a genuine incompatibility between allies' assistance to one another and NOD's restriction on invasion capability, since the forces from, say, the United Kingdom assigned to assisting, among others, Denmark would require a considerable amount of strategic mobility (i.e., an ability to move over longer distances) in order to do so, a mobility that might be indistinguishable from an ability to invade enemy territory. There seem to be three conceivable solutions to this problem: 1. NATO might deemphasize considerably its mutual assistance obligations in terms of actual military reinforcements, only to place greater emphasis on other forms of cooperation. The allies might, for instance, assist each other by, for example, protecting each other's vulnerable flanks or by the delivery of supplies. 2. NATO might station, already in peacetime, the required number of allied troops at approximately their envisaged combat positions, which might, however, be difficult to accomplish politically in the light of the emerging burden-shedding contest. 3. Finally, there might be a strategic solution to the problem, which might allow for a distinction between strategic mobility and what might be called offensive strategic mobility. The allied forces in question might be restructured so as to maintain the mobility required for entering allied territory while being deprived of their capabilities for genuine offensive operations through certain deficits in the realms of logistics, air support, or

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whatever. This is the gist of the proposal developed by the international SAS group, to which I belong. I will return to this problem in Chapter 7 below on the strategy of NOD. Suffice it at this stage to notice the (at least theoretical) possibility of distinguishing analytically between (even longrange) mobility and offensive capabilities. There may be pros and cons to any of these solutions: As far as the first option is concerned, there seems to be no intrinsic need for actual US combat formations, since the Europeans ought to be perfectly capable of defending themselves against the already numerically inferior Soviet armed forces (see Brzezinski 1988). A fortiori they would be in a position to do so after the attainment of parity (as will be the result of CFE). The US commitment might thus safely be scaled down to a solemn pledge along with the unseverable nuclear link (for an analysis of which I refer to Chapter 7 below), as well as a commitment to provide material assistance in case of war. The United States might thus need no forces with intrinsic strategic mobility in order to meet its NATO obligations. As far as the second option is concerned, NATO might seem well advised to maintain substantial allied force contingents up front (wherever that may be) in peacetime. First, this would ensure a wartime presence without strategic mobility. Second, these forces would symbolize, as well as materialize, the alliance commitments and thus serve as coupling devices. Third, an arrangement resembling the present layer-cake structure may in fact contribute to minimizing overall offensive capabilities. The geographical separation of the United States Army, as well as of the Bundeswehr, by forces belonging to other states would hamper any (hypothetical) offensive ventures on the part of either state. Furthermore, the actual integration of forces may well make them incapable, to all practical intents and purposes, of independent military actions on a national scale. According to this logic, the planned multinationalization of NATO's corps structure may be a step in the right direction. The third option would, on balance, appear preferable, but might, on the other hand, present serious political problems. It would amount to a relinquishment by the states in question of the capability of independent operations and thus render alliance integration more irreversible. The most attractive solution might be a mixture of all three alternatives: First, a maintenance of substantial (albeit reduced) allied troop contingents in Germany, only deprived of their most offensive-capable elements; and second, contingency plans for shipping US resupplies and military reinforcements to Europe in case of war. As I argue at some length in Chapter 7, such plans are in fact realistic, and no offensive strategies or postures would be required for protecting the transatlantic SLOCs, since this might be done by means of barrier-type defenses combined with naval escort task forces.

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NATO Structure and NOD The aforementioned alliance security dilemma has been at work in NATO ever since its foundation, manifested in, inter alia, the perennial burdensharing issue, which reflects the well-known free-rider problem. Many in the United States have the impression that the Europeans contribute far less to the common tasks of the alliance than the Americans do themselves, which has fueled isolationist sentiments, both in the public at large and in the security political elite. A new wave in this isolationist trend appeared in the late 1970s with the new right, who felt betrayed and exploited by the European freeriding, combined with lack of support for US policies worldwide. Whereas such attitudes have in isolated instances led to calls for abandoning Europe altogether, the majority of the US elite continue to support the alliance, which has spurred attempts to persuade Europeans to contribute more to NATO, for example, by means of threats of (partial) withdrawal from Europe.10 The trouble with many such arguments is that they misrepresent European attitudes. First, there has been sincere disagreement about actual defense requirements, since European governments tend to doubt the inherent aggressiveness of the USSR and consequently feel less threatened than the Americans, their greater vulnerability notwithstanding. If, however, it is not the European defense efforts that are insufficient, but those of the United States that are excessive, Europeans need not feel automatically obliged to reimburse the United States. Second, most European states have, as a matter of choice as well as of necessity, abandoned previous aspirations for global power. They thus feel no obligation to reward or reimburse the United States for the expenses involved in maintaining US global power; also they tend to doubt the value of interventions. These differences of attitude lie behind the recurrent debates on the out-of-area problem, concerning the extent to which NATO is obliged to act in unison beyond its fonnal treaty boundaries (in casu the Tropic of Cancer). Even though the United States has repeatedly urged a European commitment, this has been to no avail. Often the Americans have not even received the political support to which they have felt entitled, because the Europeans simply have not agreed with the rationale for, say, invading Grenada, bombing Libya, or intervening in Panama. Operations in the Persian Gulf in 1990-1991 may have been the closest the allies have ever been to agreement, and not even in this instance was there complete unanimity, because of, inter alia, German constitutional constraints against out-of-area engagements. The dispute in the spring of 1991 about WEU versus NATO out-of-area obligations reflected the same disagreements and were only superficially resolved at the ministerial meetings.11 Whereas the Americans have felt discontent with the distribution of burdens within the alliance, the Europeans have become increasingly weary of the distribution of influence. NATO has hitherto represented a clear-cut

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case of hegemony, as a result of the size differentials as well as of the nuclear emphasis in NATO strategy. For as long as nuclear weapons were regarded as a precondition for war prevention, in its turn the raison d'être of the alliance, then the holder of the means of nuclear deterrence almost inevitably enjoyed a final say in alliance matters. Both foundations of hegemony have, however, become shaky. First, the United State's power basis is shrinking in all but the military realms, perhaps as a backlash from previous overextension. Economically as well as demographically, the European member states now clearly surpass the United States, whence a discrepancy between hegemonic aspirations and actual power potentials, which will most likely grow in the coming decade as a result of the European integration in progress.12 Second, to the extent that the nuclear emphasis recedes, the US claim to hegemony will lose its foundations. Such a weakening of emphasis seems to be about to happen, albeit gradually and not without reluctance on the part of the Europeans, who are both ambivalent and divided about the continued value of nuclear deterrence.13 US hegemony is thus likely to be challenged in the near future, as indicated by numerous proposals (made both by Europeans and by Americans seeking to preempt their demands) for greater European military influence. It has, for example, been suggested that a European be appointed SACEUR, leaving the United States with the prestigious, yet militarily less influential, post of secretary-general of NATO. In a more radical vein it has been proposed that the United States should leave NATO altogether, thus transforming it into an exclusively West European alliance, proposals that are quite compatible with the widespread disengagement views in the United States. One might view the 1984 resurrection of the WEU from complete oblivion, as well as the emerging Franco-German defense cooperation, as reflecting the same general trend toward Europeanization.14 US disengagement-cum-Europeanization does, however, presuppose détente, whereas an exacerbation of international tension, or even a return to the climate of the cold war, would tend to strengthen US hegemony. Indeed, certain political analysts on the fringes of the NOD community (Mary Kaldor [1983, 1987] and others) have suggested that neither the cold war nor the entire deterrence system were ever directed against the enemy, in casu the USSR, but inward, that is, toward a maintenance of US hegemony. Be that as it may, the intraalliance distribution of burdens as well as influence seems bound to change over the next decade or so, and some degree of Europeanization is thus likely to ensue. It may hence be more relevant to assess the compatibility between this trend and NOD than to compare NOD with an untenable status quo. Fortunately, nothing in the concept of NOD seems to militate against a strengthened role for the European states within NATO, but Europeanization would indeed be facilitated, because of NOD's diminished emphasis on nuclear deterrence.

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A final point about alliance structure pertains to the terms of membership. It has occasionally been claimed that it would be impossible to combine continued NATO membership with the constraints on military forces, including allied reinforcements, implied by NOD; or that the unilateral adoption of NOD by individual member states would constitute such a radical break with NATO strategy as to rule out continued membership. These allegations seem to underestimate the elasticity of membership terms and to disregard the fact that national terms of membership have always differed widely. The FRG, for example, has been in a unique position, by virtue of its assignment of the entire Bundeswehr (with the exception of the Territorial Army) to NATO command in peacetime, as well as by virtue of the stationing of armed forces and weapons systems belonging to several allied states on its territory. Most countries are much less tightly integrated into the NATO framework, and reservations, as well as special arrangements of various sorts, abound. For instance, France, in 1966 withdrew entirely from the integrated command system and has since then participated only in the integrated airdefense system (NADGE), as well as in a number of R&D ventures. Greece chose a similar position for a number of years, because of, inter alia, the conflict with Turkey. One country does not participate in the military cooperation at all, because of its complete lack of armed forces, namely Iceland. The Nordic NATO members—Denmark, Iceland, and Norway—have explicit policies of allowing no foreign nuclear weapons on their territory during peacetime, whereas others are similarly nuclear-free, albeit more by accident than by deliberate choice (Portugal, for instance). Certain countries (such as Denmark and Norway) do not host any foreign armed forces or weapons systems at all, a feature they share with, among others, the United States. 15 The actual diversity has thus always been considerable, and there seems to be no particular reason a country's (even unilateral) adoption of a NOD strategy should stretch this tolerance beyond the breaking point. Even if this should be the case, in the opinion of its allies, there would not be much that the latter could do to enforce their views, since the Atlantic Treaty contains no provisions for expelling states. NATO Policy Orientation and NOD NOD seems perfectly compatible with NATO's policy orientation (or grand strategy). First, the very fact that the alliance (with a few occasional exceptions) has consisted entirely of democracies has served as a powerful inhibition against aggression, as predicted by Immanuel Kant two centuries ago. Certain NOD proponents have even proclaimed democracy, as well as further democratization, to be intrinsic elements of the structural inability to attack in a wider sense (i.e., NOD). The greater the influence of ordinary

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people on NATO matters, as compared with that of the armed forces and the MIC, the smaller a country's presumed propensity for aggressive policies.16 Second, NATO has consistently proclaimed its strictly defensive intentions, as well as, since 1967 (the Harmel Report), emphasized the need for combining deterrence with détente, even though the relative importance of these two tracks has been a matter of some disagreement between the allies. At the risk of oversimplification, one might distinguish between two main positions. The European allies (with the United Kingdom as a partial exception) have tended to attach great and continuous importance to the détente track, implemented by a means of an active Ostpolitik, expanding East-West trade relations, and a tireless pursuit of arms control as well as other types of international cooperation. The United States, on the other hand, has generally been more cautious and circumspect in its pursuit of détente, and has, for example, been concerned about the implications of EastWest trade for the growth of Soviet military power.17 Former US ambassador Raymond Garthoff (1985: 122) aptly summed up the distinction thus: "Détente in Europe, in short, developed naturally, involving countries and peoples more than political acts and institutions. It emerged on a much more solid basis than the later, more dramatic rise of U.S.-Soviet détente, precisely because it involved the interests of people rather than just the sometimes fickle political interests of leaders." Occasionally, however, the Americans have almost overtaken the Europeans in their eager pursuit of détente, for example, in the early 1970s, when not merely the SALT and ABM treaties were signed, but also the Basic Principles agreement, which almost raised the specter of a "superpower condominium" (Garthoff 1985: 289-318; cf. George et al. 1988, esp. Rice [pp. 293-306], Farley [pp. 618640], and George [pp. 641-678]), and hence became the cause of some concern on the part of European allies. The image of a wide gap between détente-minded Europeans and deterrence-minded Americans may thus be too simplistic. The Europeans might, alternatively, be seen as oscillating between the two poles in almost a contrapuntal way. The more the Americans have drifted toward the détente pole, the more concerned have the Europeans tended to become about the prospects of condominium and abandonment. Conversely, the more the Americans have approached the deterrence pole, the more the Europeans have sought to contravene this by emphasizing détente (Calleo 1987a: 6; Trevorton 1985: 80-86; Joffe 1987: 1-44). If this analysis should hold true, the prospects for détente would be quite bleak, since one might expect US balancing steps in an offensive direction, if the Europeans should further emphasize the détente track, by means, for example, of NOD. In actual fact, however, the empirical foundations for the analysis seem somewhat weak, and there have been precedents for simultaneous US and

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European détente policies, as well as for their behaving tough-mindedly in unison. The general defensive orientation of NATO is, of course, the perfect match for a defensive military strategy such as NOD. According to classical alliance theory (e.g., Liska 1962: 39, 126-127), defensive alliances are, furthermore, intrinsically more cohesive, because, inter alia, the urges toward counteralignment are less serious, and because the accruing benefits (above all, security) do not lend themselves to distribution by competitive means, as would be the case for an offensive alliance. Hence, the very fact that NATO aims merely at a preservation of the status quo should bode well for its internal cohesion, and a manifestation of its defensive nature in a defensive strategy would presumably strengthen, rather than weaken, cohesion. NATO Strategy and NOD I will not elaborate at any great length on the compatibility of NOD with NATO's present strategy, since like any other alternative strategy, NOD is precisely intended to effect a change of strategy. From this does not, however, follow that NOD is entirely incompatible with either flexible response or forward defense, that is, the two pillars of present NATO strategy. Although certain NOD proponents (e.g., Afheldt 1976: 218, 1988) have intended an abandonment of forward defense, others have sought to strengthen it by means of an allegedly impenetrable defense wall (Hannig 1984, 1986). Most NOD advocates, however, have steered a middle course by envisaging a maintenance of forward defense by strictly defensive means (tank barriers, infantry webs, killing zones, and the like), backed up by various fallback options, as alternatives to nuclear escalation (Barnaby & Boeker 1982, 1988). The fallback option preferred by most NOD proponents has been that of an in-depth defense by means of a strictly defensive area-covering defense web (SAS 1984; SAS 1989, esp. Unterseher [pp. 149-164, 240-270]). Some have, however, envisaged maneuver warfare by means of operational reserves that would be strengthened by withdrawing armored formations from the forward area (e.g., Loser 1982a, 1989). A few (self-proclaimed) NOD proponents have even gone to such lengths as to demand a conditional offensive capability by investing these armored formations with sufficient shock power to allow the original defender to conduct (operational or even strategic-scale) counteroffensives onto enemy territory, thus exploiting the attrition suffered by the aggressor during his transit through the forward defense zones (A. Miiller 1986: 253254; cf. Huntington 1983; for a critique of this notion, see Mearsheimer 1981; Dunn & Staudenmaier 1985). Such models, however, do not rightly belong to the NOD category, but should rather be categorized alongside the proposals by, for example, Samuel Huntington for conventional retaliation. It is even questionable whether they are compatible with NATO's defensive

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grand strategy, and they would certainly violate the constitutional prohibition against offensive operations on the part of the Bundeswehr. Whereas most of the genuine NOD models would, however, be compatible with forward defense in principle (more about their adequacy for this purpose in practice in Chapter 7), NOD would constitute a far more radical break with the other main pillar of NATO strategy, namely flexible response. With the exception of Albrecht von Miiller, all NOD advocates have recommended a complete abolition of all means of nuclear war fighting, that is, battlefield, short-range, and theater nuclear weapons, and some have even embedded their proposals for offensive-weapons-free zones in broader disengagement schemes, alongside nuclear-weapons-free zones. Since this would be tantamount to an abandonment of nuclear first-use, it would constitute a break with flexible response, albeit not automatically necessitate a departure from nuclear deterrence as such.18 Although flexible response is currently being treated as a noli me tangere, the strategy is neither sacred nor a precondition for NATO's survival. It was only adopted officially by NATO in 1967, after having been the de facto US strategy for half a decade, while the rest of NATO continued to adhere to massive retaliation. Furthermore, flexible response from the very start was a compromise, in casu between a US preference for stronger conventional defenses and a European attachment to nuclear deterrence. There are thus precedents for strategic diversity within NATO, just as there are precedents for strategic change. That nuclear weapons have increasingly become anathema to the publics in the West is apparent from the growth and subsequent survival of the peace movements, as well as from the elite debate on NFU. 19 Furthermore, NATO's recent official relegation of nuclear escalation to a truly last resort means of deterrence may indicate that the alliance is approaching a strategic sea change in this respect, which seems long overdue. Since, as has, I hope, emerged from the above analysis, NOD might fit in well with the alliance in other respects, NATO may well be approaching an adoption of NOD (or a truncated version thereof) as its strategic guideline. NOD and the Warsaw Pact The question of the compatibility of NOD with the WTO is somewhat academic, for two reasons: (1) the entire WTO had by 1987 proclaimed NOD as their official doctrine; and (2) with the formal dissolution of its military structure in March 1991 the WTO became nothing but a hollow shell that was cast as well in July of that year. 20 An analysis is nevertheless a precondition for the assessment of NOD's general alliance compatibility and may furthermore shed some light on a number of particular requirements that a Western implementation of NOD would also have to meet.

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Geopolitics, the Warsaw Pact, and NOD Geopolitically the WTO has, according to most Western analyses, served either as a buffer zone or as a stationing area for Soviet armed forces, or as a combination of both. Whereas the two functions are not mutually exclusive, it makes a great deal of difference to which of the two one attaches the greatest importance. The buffer zone interpretation implies the possibility that the USSR may, indeed, have felt threatened from the West and hence have felt a need for a buffer to prevent a repetition of the numerous invasions from the West to which the USSR has, in fact, fallen victim through the centuries. This interpretation does not hinge on any (admittedly quite far-fetched) assumptions about Western aggressive intentions but merely presumes that the Soviets may sincerely have feared such malevolent intentions (see, e.g., Steele 1985: 70-79; MccGwire 1987a: 13-35; Dibb 1988: 109-114). There is, in fact, some empirical evidence for this theory. First, the formal establishment of the WTO occurred in response to the rearmament of the FRG as a new member of NATO, at a historical juncture when the cold war was very cold, indeed, and when the memory of the Great Patriotic War (the defense against the German invasion) was only a decade old. The FRG, in its turn, was committed to the goal of German reunification and thus neither unequivocally committed to the status quo nor entirely defensive (Wettig 1967; Schubert 1970; cf. Brill 1987, 1989). Second, the security imperative might explain the lesser freedom of action enjoyed by the WTO's Northern Tier, compared with the rest of the WTO, since these countries were simply of greater importance for Soviet security. Any hypothetical Western invasion would thus have been launched from the FRG and undertaken by either the Bundeswehr or the US forces stationed in the south of the FRG, or by NATO as a whole. It would have to transit through either East Germany and Poland or Czechoslovakia on its way through Byelorussia or the Ukraine to the heart of Mother Russia. Whereas such scenarios might have made some strategic sense, invasions through Hungary, Bulgaria, or Romania were practically inconceivable. The stationing-area interpretation, however, might also go some way toward explaining the same phenomena, for example, why the WTO was founded in 1955 rather than sooner or later. The stationing of Soviet forces in, for instance, Hungary had previously been legitimized by the need for maintaining communications with the Soviet occupation forces in Austria. With the Austrian State Treaty of 1955 and the cessation of the occupation, however, this argument vanished, whence the need for an alternative legitimation in the form of a formal alliance (Holden 1989: 6-9, 44—46; Mackintosh 1984). Most versions of the stationing-area interpretation have been based on the assumption of inherently aggressive Soviet intentions and have thus seen

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the Soviet groups of forces as poised to invade Western Europe. One might, however, also view the Soviet invasion capability as defensively motivated, that is, as a set of offensive means intended to serve basically defensive ends, something that is only seemingly a contradictio in adjecto, as I argue in Chapter 7. If Soviet leaders did indeed feel a genuine threat from the United States, which was seen as invulnerable and thus undeterrable, then the taking of hostages may have made sense, for which role Western Europe might well have been chosen, if only for lack of alternatives. The USSR may thus conceivably have hoped to deter the United States from aggressive ventures by means of its ability to invade and/or devastate Western Europe. According to a slightly different version of this interpretation, the main objective may have been to deny the United States a bridgehead in Western Europe, from which may have been derived the imperative of conducting a future war as a blitzkrieg, regardless of its defensive or offensive nature (cf. MccGwire 1987a: 48-49). There was also some empirical evidence in support of this hypothesis, first the stationing of numerous divisions in a high state of readiness along the only possible invasion routes into Western Europe (Anon. 1987; Lippert 1987). The fact that there were only few Soviet forces in Bulgaria, and none at all in Romania, might thus be due to the limited strategic utility for invasion purposes. That there were, prior to the 1968 invasion, no Soviet forces in Czechoslovakia would, however, seem to contradict this interpretation, and the forces henceforth stationed there were probably not so much invasion forces, poised against the West, as forces of repression directed against the Czechs themselves. There thus seems to be no conclusive case for either of the two interpretations, and the truth might well lie in a combination of both, perhaps even with an admixture of other and more political motives. The two interpretations, however, have somewhat divergent implications with regard to the advisability of a Western adoption of NOD. If the WTO served primarily as a buffer zone, defensive Western strategies would have tended to diminish the need for such a buffer and might thus have made the WTO redundant and facilitated its dissolution (cf. Tiedtke 1984, 1986). If the WTO, however, primarily served as a stationing area for offensive-capable forces poised against the West, then the defensive signals conveyed by a shift to NOD would miss the point, and NOD would have to be measured according to austere military efficiency criteria. If the conversion to NOD might have been perceived by the USSR as the West's lowering its guard then it might have invited an attack, thus putting the newly adopted NOD strategy to a very severe test, indeed. Whether NOD might have passed such a test is the main topic of Chapter 7 below. Whereas the implications of a Western adoption of NOD are thus somewhat ambiguous, a shift toward NOD on the part of the WTO in

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general, and of the USSR in particular, would seem to have unambiguously positive effects, regardless of the geopolitical background. According to the buffer interpretation, the USSR might either have reassessed Western intentions and come to find the buffer superfluous; or Soviet leaders might have become convinced of the intrinsic merits of a NOD-type buffer zone. According to the stationing-area interpretation, the Soviet adoption of NOD and the associated withdrawal of the Soviet forces stationed in Eastern Europe might be due to a Soviet abandonment of their former aggressive plans. In neither case would the West apparently have had anything to lose. Warsaw Pact Structure and NOD As far as alliance structure was concerned, the Warsaw Pact level of integration was very tight on almost all accounts, albeit only one-directional. Whereas the armed forces of the smaller WTO states were rendered incapable of independent action, the Soviet armed forces remained unconstrained. Had the principle of integration, however, been uniformly applied to all WTO forces, it would have hampered the offensive capability of both individual countries and the entire pact considerably. Because the Soviet armed forces were the only ones capable of offensive operations on a national scale, role specialization might have minimized these capabilities considerably. If, say, the GSFG had been deprived of its organic air-defense capability and made dependent in this respect on the host nation, in this case the GDR, their invasion capability would have suffered considerably. Some thought was actually given to such schemes in the brief interregnum in postrevolutionary East Germany (see, M0ller 1991a), inspired by, inter alia, the spider-and-web conception of the SAS. If such schemes had been applied to the WTO, the GSFG and the entire Red Army might have come to play the part of the spiders (i.e., mechanized, armored, and thus intrinsically offensive-capable forces), which might have been made dependent (e.g., in terms of air defense, logistics, combat engineer services, and the like) on their web consisting of the forces of the host nation, to such an extent as to be no longer capable of attack. If restructured in this mode, the WTO might have been deprived of most of its offensive potential, even without a Soviet withdrawal from Eastern Europe. A further structural peculiarity of the WTO was the severity of the burden-sharing problem, far surpassing NATO's: Whereas the ratio between US manpower and that of the rest of NATO has been about two to three, that between Soviet and allied manpower has been as uneven as four to one (Rice 1984; Holden 1989: 46-51, 164-167), which explains the persistent Soviet quest for higher defense contributions from its allies; to no great avail, however. The extreme discrepancy between Soviet and allied defense spending was probably connected with the dual task of the Soviet armed forces, which were directed against their allies to at least the same extent as against the

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West. Furthermore, the low defense spending on the part of the East European countries might be due to a rather peculiar variety of the alliance security dilemma. The Soviet allies were probably able to improve their capability of independent action through increased defense expenditures only up to a certain point, beyond which Soviet intervention might become imminent, thus rendering the acquired autonomy largely fictitious and of short duration. In addition to tremendous free-rider temptations, there were thus elements of an adversarial security dilemma embedded in the WTO version of the alliance security dilemma. A WTO conversion to NOD, however, might have gone some way toward meeting the burden-sharing problem to the satisfaction of the USSR, particularly if the allies had been made responsible for the defense of their own national territory. Such an arrangement would, however, have meant a revoking of the hegemonic claims of the USSR. Warsaw Pact Policy Orientation and NOD In addition to the two possible main functions of the WTO already mentioned (as a means of conquest or as a defensive buffer), it may have served a further purpose, which certain observers have even regarded as the most important of them. Even though it may have been rendered irrelevant by the 1989 revolutions, I briefly mention it. The WTO might have been intended, above all, as a means of maintaining the communists in power in the face of a popular opposition, that is, as a defense of the regimes, rather than of the nations, or even as a defense of the regimes against the nations. Whereas this rationale would be defensive according to a realist states-as-actors perspective, it would certainly not be so in most other senses of defensive. Proponents of this view (e.g., C. Jones 1981a, b, 1984; for a critque, see Holden 1989: 20-28) have seen the entire WTO structure, with its unified military education system, doctrinal uniformity, joint maneuver practices, etc. as a means of maintaining cohesion within the socialist bloc short of the last resort, namely military intervention. Should this interpretation hold true, any shift toward NOD on the part of minor WTO states would have been highly significant. Since it would presumably have been tantamount to a shift to territorial defense, it would not merely have prevented the said state from participating in an attack against the West, but also have hampered Soviet intervention severely, thus perhaps militarily underpinning a political quest for autonomy. There is a certain empirical basis for this interpretation. First, Yugoslavia has adhered to a territorial defense (i.e., NOD) doctrine for decades (indeed fought according to one during WWII), which might go some way toward explaining the Soviet compliance with Yugoslav dissent since the late 1940s, because its military efficiency may have dissuaded the Soviets from overt interference or intervention. Second, Romania adopted similar

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strategic principles, subsequent to the Soviet withdrawal in 1958, followed by a refusal to participate in WTO exercises since 1963 and a complete withdrawal from the WTO's military structure. This defense posture might, likewise, go a long way toward explaining Soviet compliance with Romania's dissident behavior, since an intervention might have appeared too costly when opposed by territorial defense forces. Third, the structuring of the Polish army largely according to territorial defense principles might also explain why the USSR did not invade Poland in 1956, as it did Hungary at the same time. Finally, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968 might have been intended (partially) to preempt an implementation of the proposals for a territorial defense included in the Gottwald Memorandum published shortly before the invasion.21 Evidence consisting primarily of nonevents is inevitably inconclusive, and other explanations are, admittedly, conceivable. The absence of interventions against Yugoslavia or Romania might, for instance, be due to their low salience in Soviet strategy, and an explanation for the Soviet nonintervention in Poland in 1956 and 1981 might be the availability of internal solutions. Finally, the reasons for the 1968 invasion may well have been ideological, rather than strategic. All of the above argumentation, furthermore, hinges on the assumption of a Soviet propensity to intervene militarily unless dissuaded from it. There is hardly any doubt that the Soviet Union, even prior to the proclamation of the Brezhnev Doctrine, did in fact intend to protect the accomplishments of socialism against attempts to reinstate capitalism, because, inter alia, it was implied by the dogma of an irreversible global trend toward socialism on a world scale; hence the need for preventing counterrevolutions in order to salvage the ideology constituting the very raison d'etre of Communist rule.22 Now, however, the infamous Brezhnev Doctrine has been abandoned for good. The revolutions in Eastern Europe during the autumn of 1989 took place with explicit Soviet consent, even when they led to a complete ousting of the Communists from power (cf. Dawisha & Valdez 1987; Kramer 1989). Even according to this (probably realistic) sanguine view, however, some East European democracies may still fear that a modified (perhaps geopolitically rewritten) version of the Brezhnev Doctrine might be reinvigorated, perhaps subsequent to a setback for glasnost and perestroika in the USSR. Whereas the East European quest for NATO security guarantees, or even membership in the alliance, may well prove futile, the recently acquired sovereignty might be strengthened by effective NOD (i.e., territorial defense) strategies. Warsaw Pact Strategy and NOD The extent to which NOD would have been compatible with WTO or Soviet military strategy was disputed, and hinged on, inter alia, presumptions about

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the military role of the WTO in Soviet strategy. Even according to the offensive (stationing-area) geopolitical interpretation, the role of the NSPFs remained unclear. On the one hand, the NSPFs were envisaged as subsumed under the Soviet command system almost as auxiliaries to the Red Army. Entire national armies might thus be subordinated to the Soviet TVD commands in wartime, arrangements that were exercised in peacetime and facilitated by the unified military education system of the WTO.23 On the other hand, according to most analyses, the reliability of the NSPFs was dubious, and only militarily awkward configurations might have been politically viable. Whereas the Nationale Volksarmee of the GDR was believed to be highly reliable in general, its reliability would have shrunk to zero if up against its fellow Germans of the Bundeswehr, something that would, indeed, have happened in all but the most unlikely contingencies. Furthermore, the Polish army was believed to be generally unreliable because of deep-rooted national resentments against Germans as well as Russians. Because of their complete unreliability, the Czechoslovak armed forces were almost entirely dismantled after 1968. The only reliable fraternal forces might thus have been those of Bulgaria, which were, however, so far removed from the likely battlefield as to be of small avail (Johnson et al. 1980; Herspring & Volgyes 1980; Volgyes 1982; MacGregor 1986, 1989; McCausland 1986; Walendowski 1988). The extent to which these latent unreliabilities would have become manifest would probably have depended on circumstances, for example on the duration as well as the offensive or defensive nature of the war in question. In a swift, blitzkrieg campaign the tight command structures of the Soviet TVDs might well have sufficed for maintaining control, but loyalty would have tended to decline with the duration of the war. Eventually, the Red Army might have found itself fighting against the combined forces of the West and the NSPFs, rather than against the West with the assistance of the NSPFs. 24 A protracted war would hence almost certainly have been won by the West, which was exactly what NOD should seek to accomplish (albeit only for the sake of war prevention), as I argue in Chapters 6 and 7 below. Even though nothing in NOD would thus have militated decisively against the maintenance of some form of alliance between socialist states, this may have been rendered largely irrelevant by the collapse of Communist rule and the accompanying rapid, and irreversible, disintegration of the WTO. The democratic successors to the Communist rulers have, however, maintained the commitments to NOD made by their predecessors in the years 1987-1989, and seemed to be pursuing this path, for example in the CFE negotiations. They thus apparently sought, above all, to curtail Soviet offensive power without seemingly longing for such power themselves.

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NOD and Alliance Transcendence The above analyses of NATO and the WTO, I hope, have established the fact that NOD would not necessarily lead to fragmentation but would be compatible with some kind of alliance system in Europe. Be that as it may, the postwar alliances are in any case facing transformation, most radically as far as the WTO is concerned, the military element of which has already ceased to exist. A more relevant question therefore becomes whether NOD might be compatible with the future patterns of alignment in Europe. In order to answer this question, I will first sketch some possible future developments in the alliance system and the role of NOD therein. Second, I will focus on one particular option, namely that of a pan-European collective security system, that appears to be entering at least the intellectual, if not yet the political, agenda. Adversarial alliances in Europe may have outlived their purpose and thus be facing either dissolution or at least decreasing salience. The bipolar alliance system has been geared toward war, based on the belief, inter alia, that large-scale war might well erupt and do so on rather short notice. However, whereas the eventuality of unexpected wars may still be taken into account by most governments, they tend no longer to think of Europe in this respect, but of the Third World, that is, out-of-area and so-called lowintensity contingencies. The worst eventuality that the majority of European governments might presently envisage would be something on a scope comparable to the war against Iraq, but certainly nothing like a third world war fought on European soil, such as used to be the scenario used for planning purposes. To take the improbability of large-scale European war as the point of departure in the design of national security policies may result in a shift from enduring or permanent to ad hoc alliances. The rigid postwar alliance structure in Europe was based on the belief that war might be imminent; hence the perceived need for a high defense readiness. Just as this preparedness was found to require in-place forces, it was also believed to call for in-place friends, that is, permanent, or at least durable, alliances. As far as West Germany was concerned, the two requirements were even combined in the form of in-place friends stationing in-place forces along the inter-German border. This unusual arrangement was based on the logic that a would-be invader should be faced with the prospects of immediately finding himself at war with the entire NATO alliance. Other states within NATO (say, Denmark or Norway) were, on the other hand, content with their allies' solemn declarations of intent to assist, underpinned by frequent rehearsals of reinforcement plans. To an increasing extent, the alliances are, however, felt as liabilities to at least the same extent as they are still viewed as assets, because of, inter alia, the aforementioned alliance security dilemmas in general, and

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the entrapment versus abandonment dilemma in particular. Furthermore, the discrepancies between the various elements of power have grown to such proportions as to make a maintenance of nuclear-based hegemony in the Western alliance infeasible in the long run. The economically prosperous EC countries have surpassed the United States along most dimensions, and are unlikely to remain indefinitely acquiescent with a position of subordination to the holder of a nuclear deterrent that is felt to be increasingly dispensable and irrelevant, since the threat has vanished. The WTO, in its turn, ceased to be, de facto in 1990 and de jure in 1991. What might happen to NATO as a consequence of the receding fears of war is still an open question, but one could for instance imagine the following forms of alliance conversion, or a combination thereof: • NATO might be dissolved • It might be maintained, but watered down almost beyond recognition • It might survive (albeit in a transformed shape), notwithstanding the demise of the WTO • New alliances might be forged, either as replacements for, or as supplements to, the old ones • A regular collective security system might supercede the alliances The first option, alliance dissolution, seems a genuine possibility, at least when viewed in, say, a ten-year perspective. No historical alliances have hitherto been permanent, and there is no reason to expect NATO to constitute an exception to this rule, particularly not when the threat it was supposed to guard against has vanished and is openly acknowledged to have done so. Abandoning peacetime alliances will not, however, be tantamount to isolation and exposure to aggression on the part of more-powerful states, since alliances might at any time be reforged, just as they have been in the past. Contrary to certain theories, states seem to have a propensity to balance against an aggressor (at least if the force ratios allow the former to outbalance the latter), rather than bandwagon with it. Were one domino to be pushed over, the others would tend to join ranks and form a solid fence against further transgressions, rather than collapsing (Jervis and Snyder 1991). A more moderate (albeit not necessarily more likely) variation would be that the skeletons of NATO (and perhaps even a resurrected and truncated WTO) might be maintained, if only because of inertia. Whatever flesh might remain on the bones of the alliances would, however, tend to be political, rather than military, cooperation. It will simply make little sense for the West to devote much interest to the deterrence of, or defense against, a decaying USSR on the verge of collapse, which may, furthermore, be a trading partner and collaborator of the West in other fields. Even though the

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maintenance of capabilities for deterrence and defense may nevertheless be regarded as a prudent hedging of all one's bets, military cooperation is not likely to attract much day-to-day attention. The predicted politicization of NATO may prove to be a controversial issue, because, among other issues, it poses the question of a redistribution of influence in alliance matters. On the one hand, the United States might be inclined to oppose politicization, at least beyond a certain point, because it would tend to undermine US hegemony. On the other hand, certain European states might be reluctant to politicize excessively, lest this might provide the transatlantic ally with a say in matters previously beyond the scope of NATO. It might thus inadvertently hamper the Europeanization striven for by powerful forces in Europe. The search for new enemies and threats apparently under way with a view to legitimize maintaining NATO in approximately its present shape might conceivably succeed, but it is unlikely that the one-dimensional nature of the Western alliance shall survive. In order to survive, NATO must become far less anti-Soviet and far more tous azimut, that is, directed against all disturbers of peace, rather than specifically against the Soviet Union. Furthermore, in addition to the likely shift of attention toward political cooperation, new members might gradually be co-opted into NATO (as has already happened to the former GDR), thus gradually transforming the Western alliance into a more encompassing, indeed well-nigh pan-European, security organization. Futuristic visions about a peaceful Europe aside, it does seem likely that a considerable potential for conflict will remain between European states, albeit probably crisscrossing over the previous divisive lines. Disputes between, say, Hungary and Romania, or Greece and Turkey, seem far more likely than between, say, Czechoslovakia and Germany. Whereas the reemergence of a new, all-encompassing alliance structure therefore seems unlikely, there appear to be preconditions for the emergence of a patchwork of small, almost local, and partially ad hoc alliances (Greece and Bulgaria vs. Turkey, and the like). Finally, states are likely to shift their emphasis from the present adversarial alliances to more-cooperative structures, say from NATO and the WEU to the EC, CSCE, or the United Nations. In the fullness of time, this shift of emphasis may reach fruition with the establishment of a genuine collective security system25, or perhaps a plenitude of such systems, arranged in hierarchical order. One might, for instance, envision the United Nations vested with the power of an actual collective security organization, responsible for keeping and restoring peace on a global scale. Subordinate thereto might be several regional organizations with comparable prerogatives, of which the European organization would merely be one. A collective security regime would be tantamount to such a profound transformation of military and security political affairs that it could not

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possibly be implemented overnight. Furthermore, the modalities would need to be thought through carefully. The following are a few (highly tentative) suggestions for the narrow security political aspects of such a "European Collective Security Organization" (ECSO), which place a special emphasis on the all too often neglected military element. • ECSO should comprise all European states, including the USSR; also the United States and, if it so desires, Canada. • ECSO should be registered as a regional UN organization, and nonEuropean states should be represented as observers (perhaps most realistically on a rotational basis) in its bodies, as well as have the right to be consulted. • The highest authority in ECSO should be a general assembly, subordinate to which should be an executive branch, comprising a security council as well as a permanent secretariat. • The voting rules in the general assembly should be a combination of the one-state-one-vote and one-man-one-vote principles, best attainable through a two-chamber arrangement. In the chamber of states the former principle should reign, and all states, from the USSR to Liechtenstein, should thus be treated as equals. In the Chamber of Peoples, however, the larger states should have a proportionally greater say. • In the security council decisions should, in most matters, be reached by consensus, but in matters of extreme urgency or severity a majority of, say, two-thirds or four-fifths in both chambers of the general assembly might overrule this veto.26 • Subordinated to the security council should be a military organization (ECMO: European Collective Military Organization). • ECMO should have at its disposal assigned forces from the member states (with shares proportional to a weighted mean of gross national product and population) as well as major weapons systems in secure storage during peacetime (e.g., in an arrangement implying that British troops would serve as custodians for German weapons stored on Soviet territory, and vice versa). • The military means at ECMO's disposal should include weapons systems with a clear offensive potential, such as MBTs, major surface combatants, fighter-bombers, etc. Some of the assigned forces should be heliborne troops and amphibious forces. • ECMO should conduct frequent staff exercises as well as regular small-scale field exercises, say, with the participation of one to ten thousand troops. The responsibility for providing the participating troops as well as for hosting the exercises should be rotated. • No individual state should be allowed to field military forces in excess of one-third of the total number in Europe. • National armed forces should be strictly nonoffensive, that is, no state party to ECSO should be allowed to field military forces with any offensive

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potential, the criteria for which should be worked out by ECMO and decided by the ECSO general assembly. • All states should have the right to conduct challenge on-site inspections on the territory of any other member state in order to verify that this rule was abided by. Suspected violations could be brought before the security council and the general assembly, subsequent to consultations by the ECMO staff. The envisaged transarmament of national armed forces to strictly NOD-type forces could go a long way toward averting aggression, by strengthening defensive capabilities while diminishing any preemptive urges (cf. the next chapter). The ECSO arrangement would therefore merely serve as a safety net under (particularly smaller) states who might nevertheless be attacked, since it would ensure them of assistance in times of peril. However, in order for such a system to perform its role (and, by so doing, make individual states comfortable with strictly defensive postures), it would need military means at its disposal that would have been rightly called offensive if fielded by individual states: forces with long-range (strategic) mobility, with the ability to move forward under fire, to break through prepared defense lines, etc. Whereas such capabilities are correctly rejected as destabilizing on the national scale, they would be far from threatening if fielded by a global organization such as described above.

Notes 1. A West German neutralist NOD proponent is Mechtersheimer (1984); see, for a British example, Johnson 1985. Afheldt (1983) belongs to the category of disengagers. The advocacy of conditional membership is represented in ADC (Alternative Defence Commission) 1987: 214-238. Prior to this final report of the ADC, it was discussed with an invited group of international NOD experts in Bradford in 1986, which meeting I attended. Among unconditional supporters of continued NATO membership is the SAS (to which I belong); see, e.g., SAS 1984, 1989. 2. Albrecht 1982; Albrecht et al. 1988. The latter work constitutes the preliminary result of an international research endeavor in which I took part. On the notion of the alignment-neutrality continuum, see, e.g., 0rvik 1986: 1-14. 3. See Roberts 1976; on neutrality in general, see, Hakovirta 1988; Kruzel 1989; Lutz and Grosse-Jutte 1982; Fuhrer 1987; Danspeckgruber 1986. On Austria, see Bundeskanzleramt 1985; Rotter 1984; Vetschera 1985, 1986. On Switzerland, see Cramer 1984; Daniker 1987; Spillmann 1989. On Yugoslavia, see, Lukic 1984; Bebler 1987. On Sweden, see Agrell 1979; Andren 1989. On Finland, see Ries 1989a, b; FCMH 1985. 4. See the critique by an author working for the Green party in the FRG, Schulze-Marmeling 1987; or that by a member of the former West German Communist party (DKP), Reusch 1988. 5. On MacKinder, see Gray 1977: 33-53; on Mahan, see Sprout 1941. On geopolitics in general, see Gray 1977: 14-32; Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1971: 46-64; Spykman 1972; Aron 1984: 187-214.

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6. On POMCUS, see, e.g., Duke 1989: 362-366. The formal decisions for the Rapid Reinforcement Plan are contained in "Ministerial Guidance 1977," in NATO 1980: 71-74. On the maritime strategy, see Watkins 1986; Brooks 1986; Friedman 1988; cf„ for a critique, Mearsheimer 1986; M0ller 1987b, 1989a, d. 7. For a comprehensive overview of the US military installations in Europe, see Duke 1989; Sharp 1990. On nuclear installations, see Arkin and Fieldhouse 1985. 8. On the attack on Libya, see Kaldor and Anderson 1987, in particular the articles by Spaven, Fotia, Phillips, and Lowe. On the nuclear modernization debate, see, e.g., Binnendijk 1989; Ramsbotham 1989; Deminsky et al. 1989; Brauch 1989. 9. On the new United States Army doctrine, see, e.g., Headquarters, Dept. of the Army 1982. Cf„ on the 1986 edition, Richardson 1986; Kipp 1987. There seems to have been a certain assimilation on NATO's part to the new US doctrine, inter alia by a modification of NATO's army doctrine, which is found in "Allied Tactical Publication (ATP)-35(A)," quoted in Bellamy 1987: 124-129, alongside references to the new NORTHAG concept, which also appears as a partial assimilation to the new US style; cf. Carver 1991. On FOFA, see, e.g. Rogers 1983; cf. OTA 1987; Sharfman 1991; Skingsley 1991. For general overviews of deep strike, see Sutton et al. 1984; Wijk 1986. For a critique, see, e.g., M0ller 1987a. 10. Kelleher 1983. For a particularly extreme version of US resentments, see Krauss 1986: 17-28. Cf., on the Nunn-Roth amendment, Roth 1985; Wood and Howard 1987. 11. Bills 1979; Bentinck 1986; Luard 1987; Sherwood 1990: 149-183. On German constitutional constraints, see Souchon 1990; M0ller 1991a. On the gradual US return to interventionism, see Klare 1981. 12. On US overextension, see Kennedy 1988: 514-535. On the West-West balance of power, see Kaldor 1978: 14-28; Senghaas 1986: 23-50, 1988: 9 4 110. On the impending economic conflict between the EC and the United States, see Zupnick 1988; Hufbauer 1990. 13. See, e.g., the response by a group of prominent Europeans to the NFU proposals of McNamara and consorts in Kaiser et al. 1982. On the post-INF disagreements, see Ramsbotham 1989; Lucas 1988, 1990; Binnendijk 1989; Brauch 1989; J. George 1990. 14. The plans for reorganization can be found in Kissinger 1984; Schmidt 1986: 176-177; 1987; cf. Calleo 1987a: 162-163. For US disengagement proposals, see, e.g., Krauss 1986; see, for less-radical proposals with the same general orientation, Layne 1987; Calleo 1987b. On the WEU, see Cahen 1986a, b; Hintermann 1988. For a US perspective on these Europeanization initiatives, see Wells 1985. On the Paris-Bonn axis, see Kaiser and Lellouche 1986; Ehrhart 1987; Lucas 1988: 209-216. 15. On Denmark, see Heurlin 1983; Holbraad 1986. On Greenland, see, e.g., Claessan 1983; Petersen 1988. On Norway, see, e.g., Saeter 1983; Hoist 1985; Brundtland 1985; 0rvik 1986: 186-247. On the general Nordic system, see M0ller 1985, 1989c, d, 1990b, 1991d; Gleditsch et al. 1990; Bomsdorf 1989. 16. The classical idea of the peacefulness of democracy stems from Kant (1963b). It has, however, been questioned whether democratic countries are inherently more peaceful than others, that is, whether there is any significant correlation between democracy and war involvement. See, e.g., the critique of R. J. Rummel's attempts to prove this proposition: Chan 1984; Weede 1984.

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Examples of NOD proponents emphasizing the importance of democratization for NOD are Lutz 1988b: 18-21; Büro 1982. 17. On Ostpolitik, see, e.g., Griffith 1978; Bender 1986; Ehmke et al. 1986. On East-West trade from a European view, see, e.g., Bolz 1987; Jacobsen 1986. On the US view, see, e.g., Stent 1987; Becker 1986. For an extreme example thereof, see Pipes 1986, cf. 1984: 259-273. 18. The pronuclear position is represented by Schmückte and Müller 1988; For the antinuclear position, see Afheldt 1978, 1984b, 1987; M0ller 1987a, 1988b. On the combination of zones, see Lodgaard and Berg 1985; Bahr 1987b; Lutz 1988a, d. 19. On the history of flexible response, see Stromseth 1988. On the antinuclear movement, see, e.g., Rochon 1989; Solo 1988. On NFU, see, e.g., Bundy et al. 1982; UCS 1983; Steinbruner and Sigal 1983; Blackaby et al. 1984. 20. On Soviet support for the NOD idea, see J. Snyder 1986, 1987; Garthoff 1988, 1990; MccGwire 1987b, 1988, 1991; Holden 1989, 1991; Arbatov 1988. On the WTO, see Holden 1989: 97-114; J. Krause 1988; Dunay 1990. 21. On Yugoslavia, see Roberts 1976: 124-217; Lukic 1984; Bebler 1987. For the historical background, see Tito 1966; Trgo 1966; Dedijer 1952. On the protracted German antiguerrilla campaign, see Winkler 1986; Gschwendtner 1986. On the evolution of the Soviet-Yugoslavian split, see Djilas 1962; Claudin 1975: 480-548; Fejtö 1972: 48-76, 164-172, 222-244, 258-262. On the defense doctrine of Romania, see Cemat and Stanislav 1976; Coman et al. 1984; Burke 1982; Holden 1989: 56-59; Dunay 1990: 63-65. For a comparison of the 1956 crises, see Harman 1974: 94-188. On Czechoslovakia, see Holden 1989: 86-87; Jones 1981a: 95-100. 22. On the Brezhnev Doctrine, see Brezhnev, "Speech in Warsaw," referred to in Pravda, November 13, 1968, in Mechtersheimer and Barth 1985: 89-90; cf. Summerscale 1981; Larrabee 1984. On the ideological imperative in Soviet foreign policy, see Bialer 1987: 191-212; Jahn 1986. 23. Jones 1984; Suvorov 1984: 19-24. On the system of military academies, see Scott and Scott 1981: 331-374. On the TVD structure, see Hemsley 1982: 58-64; MccGwire 1987a: 118-121. 24. On the Soviet blitzkrieg strategy, see Sidorenko 1970; Vigor 1983; Leites 1981; Hines and Petersen 1984; Petersen 1987. 25. On the general notion of collective security, see, e.g., Lutz 1985a. Various schemes to this effect were proposed in 1990, including Senghaas 1990a, e; Schütze 1990; Chalmers 1990. For an analysis of the EC as a future core of a "Europe of concentric circles," see Buzan et al. 1990: 202-228. 26. The purpose should be to dissuade member states from aggression. Under a unit veto system, however, they would be immune to reprisals.

4 N O D AND ARMAMENTS DYNAMICS According to its proponents, NOD would facilitate disarmament by breaking the momentum of the arms race. I seek to assess the validity of this claim by analyzing propellants of the aimaments dynamics and the impact of NOD, as well as of traditional arms control, thereupon, with particular emphasis on the so-called action-reaction phenomenon. Whereas NOD's contribution to the solution of this problem has hitherto been argued almost entirely on grounds of intrinsic plausibility, I venture some tentative suggestions pertaining to the development of testable hypotheses. Furthermore, I briefly compare possible modes of NOD implementation with a special view to the respective merits of unilateralism and arms control. Finally, I venture a preliminary and inconclusive analysis of the possible effects of NOD on the so-called internal dynamics, which points directly toward a problem that would ensue from successful disarmament, namely how to convert from a militarized to a civilian economy and society.

Arms Races, Disarmament, and Arms Control The level of armaments has continuously been a cause of concern, for two reasons: (1) armaments represent a drain on societal resources in short supply and thus constitute an instance of wasteful consumption; (2) high levels of armaments (and particularly arms races) may compound the risks of war, rather than lessen them. 1 Both these lines of critique presuppose that no stable level of armaments is attainable, but that dynamic and destabilizing forces are at work. In principle, one might distinguish between four different propellants in the armaments dynamics between two states or groups of states, while not excluding the possibility that several factors may be at work simultaneously, that is, that an arms race may be overdetermined (cf. Nj0lstad 1990: 238240): 1.

One side may be seeking supremacy and thus increasing its level of armaments in parallel with (or preferably at a faster pace than) its adversary, with a view to either attaining or maintaining a certain lead. 79

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2. 3.

4.

Both sides may be driven by security dilemma-like forces, and their arms competition thus constitute an action-reaction sequence. Either side may be spurred by fear of the respective adversary and thus merely be responding to the latter, yet doing so in an anticipatory mode, that is, be responding to the next expected, rather than to the last actual, move. Either side may be propelled by internal factors, thus merely exploiting an alleged external threat for legitimation purposes.

Whereas the term arms race seems appropriate for the occasional acceleration of the armaments competition, the term dynamics seems to better describe a competition at a steady pace, regardless of whether it is fast or slow (Buzan 1987a: 69-75). The notion of a dynamic may also accommodate the phenomenon of downward trends, which are rare but nevertheless do occur, particularly in the aftermath of wars. Although the quest for disarmament has most consistently been a preoccupation of idealists, avowed realists have also taken an interest in breaking the momentum of the armaments dynamics. The idealist trend predominated in the interwar period, when the 1932 Disarmament Conference constituted an ambitious quest for substantial disarmament, above all in the categories of offensive weapons. It fell, however, miserably short of its aspirations, and the only successful disarmament negotiations were those on naval forces. 2 Idealism also exerted a considerable influence in the decade immediately after WWII, when all the founders of the United Nations shared (or at least proclaimed to share) the goal of general and complete disarmament, as well as the more specific objective of nuclear abolition (Myrdal 1976: 66-84). 3 Needless to say, nothing came of these ambitious plans, probably in part because the issue became infected with political propaganda to such an extent that neither side was able to ascertain its opponent's true intentions. In the 1960s a more modest and realist, but only slightly somewhat more successful, approach to coming to grips with the armaments dynamics made its appearance, namely arms control. The avowed objective was neither general and complete disarmament, nor even disarmament, but merely some control over the armaments dynamics with a view to stability. It was even (correctly) pointed out that such stability might sometimes require more, rather than fewer, arms, and that the composition of the arsenals was what mattered most.4 This was the theoretical background of the quest for specific and partial arms limitations, which accomplished, inter alia, the Partial Test Ban Treaty, the Antarctica Treaty, the Seabed Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention, and the two SALT treaties, and which launched ultimately unsuccessful negotiations such as the MBFR.5 This unimpressive record was due to, among other factors, several pitfalls intrinsic to the arms control

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approach, if not as originally conceived, then at least as actually practiced. One of these pitfalls was the focus on balance, conceived of as numerical parity, which was explicitly made a precondition for arms control by the two superpowers in the McQoy-Zorin Agreed Principles of 1961. In conformity with a "vulgar realist" notion of the balance of power, parity was credited with peace-promoting as well as generally stabilizing effects (Goldblat 1982: 153-154, §5). When applied to numerical ratios, however, the notion of balance reveals itself, on closer analysis, as both logically flawed and practically unobtainable, as well as well-nigh irrelevant. First, there is simply no saturation point at which balance might be said to obtain. In a state of pure anarchy, each state is, in principle, surrounded by potential enemies, and in the (loose) bipolar system of postwar Europe at least the USSR perceived itself as being in fact thus surrounded: a perception that soon became a self-fulfilling prophecy. The only satisfactory balance, in the Soviet view, was thus tantamount to parity, not with each of its potential enemies, but with all of them together. This may even be expressed in mathematical terms. If we let P stand for military power, s for the USSR, a for the United States, b for NATO-Europe, c ... n for various other potential adversaries (non-NATO Europe, Japan, China, etc.), we get the following equation, describing the only force ratio satisfying Soviet security concerns entirely: ps > pa

+

pb

+

pc

+

pn

Because of geopolitical asymmetries, however, this implied a Soviet preponderance in various regions (Europe for example): Ps > Pb + Pc This logical consequence of bipolarity was, of course, not found satisfactory by Western Europe, the US superiority in other parts of the globe (e.g. Latin America) notwithstanding, where the ratio might be:

psPa-U

A similar fallacy stems from confusing static with dynamic force comparisons: A prima facie plausible assumption is that an aggressor will have mobilized prior to his attack and will thus enjoy a mobilization lead of at least some days over the defender. In the assessment of an opponent's peacetime strength, skeleton formations are thus usually included, which would presumably be filled up prior to the attack, whereas one's own formations tend to be calculated at (or even below) their average peacetime strength, because time may not permit full mobilization in case of an attack. If we let M stand for mobilization lead, we arrive at the formula: If Ps = Pa, then Ps + M> Pa Reciprocal threat assessment, and per implication the entire notion of numerical parity, is carried ad absurdum, when account is taken for all these threat-inflating factors. Even if both parties should seek nothing but parity, they would be structurally locked in a quest for superiority wherein the only entirely satisfactory force ratio (apparently tantamount to squaring the circle) would be: Pa > Ps, and Ps > Pa Whereas, for the sake of simplicity, we have focused on the two superpowers and their respective allies, our analysis would, in principle, apply to any dyad of states or coalitions locked in an adversarial relationship. Balance thus seems impossible to define consistently, unobtainable in practice, and unrecognizable, even if it should, per impossibile, be attained. Finally, balance is, to almost all intents and purposes, irrelevant as an objective because, inter alia, parity with an opponent is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for war prevention or successful defense.

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On the one hand, parity is not necessary, since a state may well defend itself against (and per implication dissuade an attack from) a somewhat stronger opponent. In the conventional field it is one of the timeless verities of combat that the defense enjoys certain intrinsic advantages, and that an attacker would thus ceteris paribus need a superiority of approximately three to one in order to prevail, albeit only on the tactical scale (Dupuy 1980: 326-334; Mearsheimer 1982, 1988b, 1989a). 7 In the nuclear realm a numerically inferior defender may likewise be able to inflict defeat on an aggressor, if only he possesses invulnerable retaliatory forces. Deterrence would thus only require an AD capability of a finite size, to which the notions of parity and superiority are quite inapplicable, since above a certain AD threshold the marginal returns of destructive capabilities tend to diminish rapidly.8 On the other hand, parity is not a sufficient precondition for effective dissuasion, since even an outnumbered aggressor may prevail (e.g., by means of a blitzkrieg strategy, which might prevent the defender from using all of his forces). 9 In the nuclear realm it may also be possible for an attacker to accomplish a disarming first strike by means of numerically inferior forces, under certain technological circumstances. With arsenals consisting of singlewarhead missiles the party launching an attack is bound to consume more missiles in the strike than the party absorbing it, because at least two warheads with high CEP need to be targeted against each opposing missile. The calculus, however, changes drastically with the introduction of MIRVed missiles, which allow an attacker to take out several enemy missiles (each perhaps containing several warheads) with each of his own and thus to prevail (in the sense of improving the ratio of residual striking power). An attacker might also hope to incapacitate the retaliatory forces by means of decapitation strikes against the other's command structures, communication chains, etc.10 Parity thus constitutes neither a sufficient nor a necessary precondition of war prevention. Since it allows for no good estimates about the outcome of wars either, it is a very poor measure of relative military capabilities. Even though this might well count as a sufficient explanation of the failure of arms control, there were additional flaws in the traditional approach that rendered failure almost a foregone conclusion. First, negotiations on specific types of weaponry led to loophole armament, that is, a diversion of resources into unconstrained fields. SALT I, for instance, merely prescribed a maximum number of launchers, while leaving the parties at liberty to MIRV, hence spurring a MIRVing of almost all US and Soviet strategic missiles, the total striking power of which thus actually grew. Second, negotiations may invite bargaining-chip armaments, since both sides have an incentive to maximize the number of their bargaining chips, enabling them to negotiate from a position of strength. Arms control

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negotiations, or even agreements, may thus damage, rather than improve, armaments stability. Third, arms control may have been hampered by the requirement (i.a., in the McCloy-Zorin principles) for adequate verification. Part of the problem has been a Soviet rejection (until the INF Treaty) of on-site inspection, which was just as unswerving as the US requests for it. Even with the best of intentions on both sides, however, demands for adequate verification are open-ended, because it will remain impossible to eliminate any conceivable risk of cheating. Furthermore, the emphasis on verification tends to focus attention on verifiable objects, whereas some facts are simply not verifiable, but may be no less important for that.11 Fourth, arms control has often been too late to be effective, which has led even some classical arms controllers (e.g., Kissinger 1960: 280) to recommend preventive arms control. Whereas the ABM treaty might, according to a benign interpretation, be seen as an instance of (at least partially) preventive arms control, 12 there have been very few other examples, indeed. A final (and perhaps inevitable) flaw in traditional arms control has been that of misplaced emphasis. Very few agreements have been reached that have restrained, still less reduced or abolished, high-priority weapons systems. Most have merely banned activities that neither side ever seriously contemplated, or weapons systems they never intended to develop or deploy (e.g. the Outer Space, Antarctic, and Seabed treaties). The INF Treaty was thus nearly unique by virtue of its complete prohibition of recently deployed and high-priority weapons. However, the explanation of this accomplishment was not so much the soundness of the traditional arms control approach as a basic unilateral reassessment of priorities by one of the superpowers.13 These numerous deficiencies inherent in negotiated arms control have led a number of NOD advocates to dismiss the very notion out of hand (Neild 1989). As we shall see below, however, others have taken a more constructive attitude to arms control, regarding it as one among other viable means of NOD implementation.

NOD and the Action-Reaction Phenomenon NOD has been conceived of as a middle ground between the realist (arms control) and the idealist (disarmament) approaches to controlling arms competition. On the one hand, NOD advocates tend to acknowledge the need for sufficient defense and certainly do not recommend that nations lower their standards, much less disarm unilaterally. Furthermore, their point of departure is that systemic dynamics sui generis constitute a sufficient explanation of the arms competition, and that the solution therefore has to be sought in the dynamics themselves. NOD advocates, finally, share the realist

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predeliction for stability, which they tend to seek through working with the dynamics, while depriving them of their malign features. On the other hand, almost without exception NOD proponents have proclaimed disarmament to be one of their highest-ranking goals, thus revealing some affinity to the idealist tradition.14 Only rarely, however, have the ambitious claims of NOD advocates to possess a panacea for disarmament been embedded in elaborate theoretical analyses of armaments dynamics, perhaps because NOD's potential has appeared so obvious as to require little elaboration. NOD advocates have tended to regard the so-called action-reaction phenomenon (or ARP) as the fundamental feature of armaments dynamics, with manifestations on several levels. First, there is the ARP at the level of individual weapons systems, the development of which may be understood as a sequence of measures (M), counter-measures (CM), counter-countermeasures (CCM), and so forth. 15 The classical example thereof was the Soviet-US strategic arms competition, wherein the introduction of ICBMs led to the planned deployment of ABM systems, in its turn spurring (or legitimizing) the development of MIRVs, intended, inter alia, as means of ABM penetration. The proliferation of MIRV technology on both sides created a fundamentally unstable situation, in the United States referred to as the window of vulnerability, that allegedly necessitated a defense of the deterrent; hence the SDI program.16 Although developments such as these thus constitute a logical sequence, the temporal sequence is less clear-cut, because of, inter alia, the phenomenon of anticipatory reaction, as well as to the different lead times of various types of weapons, an analytical problem to which I will return below. Similar M-CM-CCM sequences are to be found on the conventional level, for example, between antitank weapons based on innovative physical principles, and increasingly sophisticated (composite, reactive, etc.) armor.17 Second, there are ARPs that transcend the boundaries between weapons categories and military environments, and thus also between services. Examples include the contest of tanks versus antitank helicopters, submarines versus ASW aircraft, surface warships versus coastal artillery or naval aircraft, ground-attack aircraft versus SAMs or interceptors, etc.18 Third, the ARP may transcend the separating line between the conventional and the nuclear sphere. Conventional weapons may thus be deployed as counters to the opponent's nuclear weapons (as in the SDI program, or the US Maritime Strategy), just as nuclear weapons may be used as "gap-fillers" in the conventional defense line, etc. The result may be two parallel armaments dynamics, since, as pointed out by Randall Forsberg (1985: 187): "in a circular manner, we maintain nuclear weapons to make sure that we do not use our conventional forces; and we maintain conventional forces to make sure that we do not use our nuclear forces." 19

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An explanation (on the phenomenological level) of this seemingly irrational behavior may be fallacies of the last step. Decisionmakers tend to take into account merely the immediate gains to be reaped from a particular step, while disregarding the likely CMs of their adversaries. The result of the ensuing M-CM-CCM cycle may, at best, be undiminished security for both sides, only at a higher expense. At worst, the security of both sides may deteriorate, because the resultant technological arms competition may reach unstable regions (Neild 1984: 216-217). The introduction of MIRVs was an obvious instance of the latter, where reciprocal first-strike advantages were created through what appeared as incremental technological improvements in response to challenges from the respective adversary. A more fundamental cause of the ARP is the security dilemma that played such a central role as a link between realism and common security. Robert Jervis (1976: 64) described what might be called the armaments security dilemma thus: "When states seek the ability to defend themselves, they get too much and too little: too much, because they gain the ability to carry out aggression; too little because others, being menaced, will increase their own arms and so reduce the first state's security." The reason the level of armament plays such an important role is that it presumably reflects intentions as well as capabilities. Threats do, of course, consist of capabilities and malevolent intentions in combination, whereas neither element alone is a sufficient cause for alarm. Capabilities, however, tend to enjoy greater credibility by virtue of their visibility and durability, whereas intentions are intangible and changeable. Indeed, because of the "better safe than sorry" syndrome, most decisionmakers have a propensity to assume intentions to be the very worst that are compatible with capabilities (Buzan 1991b: 186; cf. the distinction between "signs" and "indices" in Jervis 1970). The founder of NOD, the West German peace researcher Horst Afheldt, as well as his successors, took this security dilemma problematique as their point of departure, with the general (albeit surprisingly implicit) understanding that what mattered was to find an escape from, or resolution of, this dilemma. As pointed out by Robert Jervis (1978: 197), a distinction between offensive and defensive postures would open exactly such an escape route because "when defensive weapons differ from offensive ones, it is possible for a state to make itself more secure without making others less secure." If and how such clear distinctions between offensive and defensive military capabilities can in fact be made are questions to which I will return at length in Chapter 6. Suffice it at this stage to postulate that it is possible, albeit not at the level of individual weapons, but only at higher levels of aggregation. A distinction between offensive and defensive military means would, first, prevent misunderstandings by, for example, enabling states to tell genuine from imagined threats, and thus go a long way toward eliminating

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the perceptual aspect of the security dilemma. States without offensive capabilities would not constitute threats, regardless of their possible malicious intentions. Second, eschewing offensive capabilities would allow states to demonstrate beyond any reasonable doubt their peaceful intentions. The distinction would also influence the armaments competition by modifying what might be called its algebra, for example by introducing entirely new rules of counting and comparison. Previous assumptions have been that X = X (e.g., that tank = tank), due account taken for qualitative distinctions. According to NOD theory, however, X may actually represent two different magnitudes, depending on the use to which it is put. Some weapons, formations, or items of logistics are, for example, better suited to offense than defense (such as tanks, bombers, armored divisions, or bridgebuilding equipment), whereas the opposite is true for other types of forces (such as SAMs, antitank missiles, home-guard battalions, or obstacle construction equipment). All these categories have, however, some utility for both types of combat. According to this algebra, there is neither anything contradictory in propositions such as X > X, nor in distinguishing between X° and Xd (where the o and d stand for offensive and defensive functions, respectively, and > signifies superiority). It may be more of a coincidence than a rule if Xd = X", while formulas such as Xd > X° or Y° > Yd are more likely to be accurate. Substituting tank for X brings out this fact: A dug-in tank lying in wait for approaching tanks may well be a very powerful antitank weapon, that is, it may be more powerful in the defensive than in the offensive role. Carl von Clausewitz's famous dictum about the inherent supremacy of the defensive constitutes an important point of departure for the presumed NOD solution to the various problems associated with the security dilemma. The French philosopher André Glucksmann was among the first to realize the implications of the defensive supremacy for the algebra of warfare. In 1967 he emphasized that the distinction between offense and defense meant that "two combatants may balance each other by virtue of their both being 'the strongest,' one in the offensive, the other in the defensive. . . . The asymmetry between offensive and defensive allows the defense to even out an offensive power greater than itself' (Glucksmann 1967: 42-43; cf. Clausewitz 1980: 361 [1832: Bk. 6.1.2]). The renowned physicist Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker invented the term Clausewitzian weapons for weapons conforming to the above thesis of defensive supremacy and pointed out that, if only such weapons were to be deployed, the immanent causes of the arms race would be eliminated, because "at an even level of forces, each side will be superior in the defense against the other's attack, and therefore need not fear such an attack, even if it were to be undertaken" (Weizsäcker 1976: 165-166, cf. 150). Under such preconditions, balance in the sense of parity would cease to be relevant, if

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ever it was. If a state were in no position to attack, why should its adversaries be concerned about improvements in its ability to defend itself, unless of course the said adversaries were to contemplate an attack themselves? The emphasis would thus shift from parity to superiority in the sense of mutual defensive superiority, implying that either side would be able to dissuade or fend off an attack from the other, while itself being incapable of attacking. A disaggregation of the indiscriminate power concept used in the above equations might even make sense of the impossible requirement of balance, according to which either side should be superior to the other: P a > P b, and P b > P a

Inspired by Glucksmann and Weizsäcker, the late Danish sociologist Anders Boserup (1985) solved this problem by simply writing the distinction between offensive ( 0 ) and defensive (D) power into the equation. The two ensuing inequalities were entirely mutually reconcilable, thanks to the inherent supremacy of D: D a > O b, and D b > O a

This simply describes a situation wherein either side's ability to defend itself is greater than the other's ability to attack, which would presumably be inherently stable. Whereas the above may be called the logical approach to the armaments security dilemma, other NOD advocates have approached the same problem from a perceptual angle and focused on mutual distrust as a propellant of the armaments dynamics. According to this logic, a precondition for disarmament would be to falsify unfounded threat perceptions, something that might presumably be done by depriving mutual military potentials of their threatening character and, ideally, transforming them into strictly defensive instruments. A state's conversion to defensive forces might even cause cognitive dissonance in the mind of an opponent (if one's own behavior were to differ consistently from that implied by the enemy image), which might effect a radical revision of the latter's threat perceptions, thus paving the way for mutual confidence and disarmament.20 A related approach taken by NOD advocates is based on what might be called legitimation rationality, that is, on the (inherently plausible) assumption that all policymakers require at least some legitimation (sincere or deceptive) for their armaments decisions. Even without acknowledging the possibility that the USSR might ever have felt threatened from the West, it was thus possible to argue in favor of a defensive Western strategy on the grounds that it would deprive the Soviet leaders of legitimation for their arms buildup (Löser 1982b: 241-242).

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NOD might thus presumably influence the armaments dynamics in several, albeit closely related, ways, yet with a number of caveats. First, the alleged benign influence presupposed that offense and defense were in fact distinguishable, and that defense was superior to offense in one way or the other. None of these assumptions is, however, unquestionable, but closer analysis does reveal the offense/defense distinction as a highly complicated matter, as will become apparent in Chapter 6. Furthermore, it is not entirely clear what the proposition that defense is superior to offense is supposed to mean, a matter to which I will likewise return in Chapter 6. Second, NOD has so far concentrated on the exogenous armaments dynamics, that is, the actual competition between two or several states, while disregarding other factors, particularly the so-called internal dynamics, to which I will return in due course. Toward Testable Hypotheses As the above argumentation stands, it contains neither directly observable or measurable variables, nor hypotheses about (and still less calculations of) correlations. As argued in the introductory chapter, I do not regard such scientific methods as a sine qua non of scholarly research. Nevertheless, armaments dynamics has traditionally been a research field where quantitative methods have been frequently utilized (cf. Nicholson 1989: 147-166; Wiberg 1990b); I therefore (at least up to a point) accept the challenge and venture a few preliminary suggestions as to how testable hypotheses might, in principle, be developed. Whether or not this may be possible in practice is quite a different matter, with which I deal only superficially. What we are interested in is basically the relationship between two variables: on the one hand, approximations to NOD (for which Hdkan Wiberg has invented the convenient term noddiness; N); and, on the other hand, the pace and extent of the armaments dynamics (A), that is, the degree to which states become involved in competitive arms buildup. A preliminary hypothesis might be that under specified conditions the noddier a state is, the less will it compete with other states in terms of armaments. This might even be couched in terms of a mathematical formula (with s standing for state):

Unfortunately, both N and A are highly elusive concepts that are not immediately amenable to quantitative treatment. A crude measure of N might, however, be found in the armaments profile, that is, the ratio between weapons of merely defensive utility and those that might also be used offensively. As the common denominator of offensive and defensive forces we might choose expenditure, and define the elusive N thus:

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a

NJE

-EQ)_ Ea

E° Ea

where Ea stands for total expenditures on armaments (i.e., the total military budget minus personnel and nonweapons costs) and E° for the annual costs of offensive-capable weapons. Unfortunately, however, weapons expenditure is a very complex term, including, in addition to the naked procurement costs, also R&D, maintenance, and so on. Even if both Ea and E° were thus, at least in principle, statistically available (which is not the case for a number of countries), the extraction of them might prove difficult. Since the adjectives offensive and defensive are not in fact, on closer analysis, applicable to weapons, but, at most, to military formations (cf. Chapter 6), we might, as an alternative approach, seek to measure the total annual costs of formations, including personnel, weapons consumption (i.e., procurement costs divided by the approximate length of service), procurement, maintenance, and required logistic support. By identifying for each period the offensive-capable formations, one should be able to measure over time the development toward (or away from) noddiness; for example, in terms of cost ratios between formations with an offensive and a defensive utility, respectively. Whether reliable statistics of this type actually exist is a different matter, which need not bother us at this stage. Focusing exclusively on expenditures may, however, miss the point that some defensive measures may cost next to nothing and thus would not show up in the statistics at all. An alternative approach might be to focus on the other major national resource devoted to military purposes, namely manpower. It might be possible to measure N in terms of manpower requirements; for example, by comparing the personnel strength of offensivecapable formations (such as tank battalions) with that of strictly defensive formations (such as local air-defense squadrons). This might, however, exaggerate the offensive component, since strictly defensive units are often cadred to a greater extent than offensive ones (at least according to the recommendations of some NOD proponents). The home guards of many countries, as well as the entire Swiss army, are obvious cases in point. Leaving the problem of measuring N unresolved, the next question is how to measure competitive arms buildup (A). This is not possible simply by recording, for example, annual rises in defense expenditures. First, we would have to eliminate military expenditures unrelated to perceived threats, such as pensions and salaries for the administrative staff. Second, we would have to identify which threats caused what. Here, the roughly bipolar system may be a (theoretical) blessing, since it might safely be assumed that, say, the externally caused armaments of the FRG would be a response to Soviet (rather than, say, French) armaments. In order for this to make sense, however, we might still have to focus on alliances rather than on individual countries, since Soviet armaments may safely be presumed to

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constitute reactions to NATO, rather than West German, French, Danish, etc. armaments. The very long lead times for most types of weapons systems, however, make the identification of cause and effect very difficult, since these may be separated by several years. The Soviet naval buildup in the 1970s and 1980s (measured in terms of the IOC of vessels) might thus be seen as a response to a Western buildup a decade earlier. A correlation test would thus have to allow for a considerable time lag, which might even vary between categories because of different lead times (the development and production of, say, tanks is considerably shorter than that of SSBNs).21 Furthermore, an inverted time lag (i.e., a propensity for anticipation) may also be at work, as I will expand on shortly, but unfortunately it would not be justifiable to assume that the two would automatically cancel out each other. Third, we would have to eliminate from the calculation those annaments intended for use against countries outside the systemic framework under investigation (e.g., US arms for use against Grenada or Iraq, Soviet arms directed against China). The predominantly general purpose (or at least multipurpose) character of military forces might make this a highly complex, indeed perhaps impossible, theoretical task. Having thus indicated in a preliminary manner how our variables might, in principle, be operationalized, we are left with the problem of how to measure their correlation, so as to verify or falsify the stipulated significant correlation (and possible causal link) between N and A. We are, however, faced with the problem of at least one intermediary variable between the independent (N) and the dependent variable (A), since it would be counterintuitive to expect armament programs to spur each other directly. The explanatory model might be made more plausible by inserting the factors options, threats, and operational requirements as intermediary variables: Aa

—» Ta'b ->

Rb^>Ab

where a and b are the two states, A the armaments decisions, O the options created thereby, T the threat thus wielded by one side against the other, and R the operational requirement springing from this threat. The logic herein is that when a state acquires certain forces, this provides it with various options, which are perceived by its adversary as threats, in their turn necessitating particular capabilities. Furthermore, we are faced with the problem of dealing with continua rather than discrete entities or events. The fielding of any major weapons system might be subdivided into at least six steps (each of which could be protracted and might be further subdivided almost ad infinitum, shown in Figure 4.1. One option would be to compare two individual countries (x and y) diachronically, and measure the correlation between their degree of

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Political decision I R&D I Prototype development J, Testing I Production

i

Deployment Figure 4.1

Six steps in fielding major weapons systems

N and of A on a temporal dimension, so as to test the hypothesis that the more noddy they have been, the less have they arms-raced against each other:

An alternative option would be to compare samples of countries at a given time, so as to measure the synchronous correlation between a country's noddiness and its propensity to become involved in armaments competitions with other countries. Both of these hypotheses, however, would probably be untestable in practice because of the too-short time span (with adequate statistics available, etc.) and the too-limited number of countries. A very crude approximation might be to test correlations between NOD steps and responses in kind, which would take us down from the level of structures to that of individual decisions (e.g., about weapons procurement). We might even restrict the hypothesis to cover only particular categories of weaponry, on the (at least prima facie) plausible assumption that, say, naval armaments tend to spur naval (rather than, e.g., nuclear) armaments by the other side. If we further limited our frame of reference to dyads of individual states (or perhaps alliances) with an indisputable adversarial relationship (such as, e.g., NATO and the WTO, or the USSR and the United States), we might be able to develop a testable hypothesis of the type: "The noddier the procurement decisions of country/alliance x in category A are in year T, the noddier will those of y in category A be in year 7+1." The above account of the pros and cons of various possible methods for testing the NOD hypothesis has, I hope, illustrated the immense complexity of the task, thus explaining the hitherto merely speculative and unscientific nature of the theory. However, it has, I hope, also shown that there is

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nothing in the theory that is, in principle, unfalsifiable, and per implication (according to Popper) meaningless.

NOD and Internal Dynamics Probably nobody would attribute the entire armaments dynamics to the action-reaction factor. Whereas residual factors tend to be lumped together as endogenous factors, internal dynamics, or domestic structure, this simplification disregards the difference between genuine internal dynamics and what might be called the internalized ARP. By internalized ARP I refer to anticipatory reaction, which is only seemingly a contradictio in adjecto. States as well as individuals react not only to events that have already taken place, but also to anticipated events, or to sequences of events in progress (cf. Buzan 1987a: 86-89). Indeed, the long lead time for major weapons systems means that anticipation may be a precondition of not falling behind in the arms competition. If a state were to postpone the decision to respond until its contestant's deployment of a particular weapon had been detected and verified, it would already be several years behind. Both sides do, in actual fact, appear to be engaged in anticipatory reaction to a large extent. Even though the USSR is, for example, fond of graphs depicting the arms race as headed by the United States, on closer analysis the list of categories of weapons systems by year of introduction22 actually shows quite something else. The short intervals between US and Soviet IOCs imply that the USSR must, at least, have been engaged in anticipatory response. An even less benign interpretation might be that the Soviets have sought to get ahead, whereas the United States has been reacting anticipatorily, only been better at it than the USSR. The boundaries between the ARP, the internalized ARP, and the genuine internal dynamics are obscured somewhat by the constant need for legitimation. Groups and institutions with vested interests in armaments production need to couch their demands in terms of national interest by reference to external threats. This factor may lead to serious perceptual distortions, as has been the case with, inter alia, intelligence estimates in the United States. In preparing the authoritative NIEs, the intelligence branches of the respective services have tended to promote their parochial interests by pushing intelligence data or interpretations emphasizing particular threats that might warrant the program in which the service takes an interest.23 Because of this legitimation factor, it may be difficult to discern the genuine internal dynamics. Nevertheless, the evidence seems conclusive that there is in fact such a thing as truly internal dynamics, that is, societal forces that seek to maintain at least a minimum (but preferably a maximum) of armed force, regardless of external threats, thus per absurdum even in the

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complete absence of an enemy (see, e.g., Albrecht 1990; Thee 1990, 1990b; Brauch 1990a; cf. Greenwood 1975; Allison 1983; Allison and Morris 1975). A conversion to NOD might have a certain impact on the endogenous factors as well, at least on the industrial structures, including the so-called MIC. Unfortunately, however, this potential impact is a hitherto almost entirely unexplored topic, notwithstanding the fact that prominent NOD advocates have taken a vivid interest in internal dynamics. They have, however, tended to be more interested in, say, the importance of curtailing the MIC for the sake of defensivity and/or democratization, than vice versa.24 Because of this research lacuna the following are merely a few tentative suggestions for further research. The impact of NOD on internal dynamics would, first of all, be a side effect of its modification of the weapons profiles of the armed forces. As a general rule, weapons platforms (tanks, aircraft, ships, etc.) would tend to receive a lesser emphasis than the weapons and munitions themselves. The typical weapons for land warfare might thus include various types of hand weapons, machine guns, grenade launchers, recoilless rifles, flamethrowers, mortars, and combat drones, the bulk of the ammunition for which would consist of mines and guided short-range missiles, and the platforms for which would mainly be lightly armored wheeled personnel carriers and ordinary trucks.25 Such a modification of the weapons profile would be tantamount to a shift of the industrial emphasis from the current main contractors (airframe plants, shipyards, etc.) toward other companies. Furthermore, alternative main contractors would not automatically emerge, because of NOD's particular configuration. Since most concrete NOD schemes envisage a spatial separation of sensors from launchers, and a substitution of a multitude of individual systems for huge complexes of interconnected subsystems, there would be no compelling need for uniting all the systems and subsystems in the phase of production. Although a main contractor system might nevertheless emerge (such as has been identified as a powerful force in the internal dynamics), it would seem possible to avoid such a system. The defense ministry might, for example, serve as its own main contractor, delegating component orders directly to individual firms, without this requiring (yet allowing for) a nationalization of the defense industry. An arrangement such as this would allow for a greater industrial diversification, through distributing, say, the air-defense orders over a greater number of firms and industrial sectors. With a fixed arms procurement budget, one might envision an average arms production share of, say, 10 percent distributed among hundreds of companies, as opposed to, say, a 50 percent arms share concentrated in a smaller number of larger firms. This would tend to relieve the pressure for follow-on systems, since individual

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firms would be in a much better position to diversify their production. A further advantage of a NOD posture (especially as seen from the viewpoint of smaller states) might be a greater scope for indigenous production, because of the generally lesser sophistication and complexity of the products in demand. To what extent this would actually happen would, of course, depend on the exact "hi/lo" technology mix, which differs considerably between various NOD models. Ruggedness, simplicity, reliability, and, above all, numbers would, however, as a rule of thumb, tend to become more important than technological sophistication. Small countries, such as the European neutrals, would probably be the more competitive the lower the degree of total complexity, as well as generally more competitive in weapons and munitions than in platforms.26 Whether indigenous arms production would be desirable at all is, of course, disputed, and many avowed antimilitarists would undoubtedly advise against thus allowing the MIC "a camel's nose in the tent." However, unless one rejects the use of arms altogether, it is not obvious either why imported arms should be ethically preferable to indigenous ones, or that any production of weapons will create MICs, which may well presuppose procurement budgets above some MIC threshold.27 Finally, the critics seem to beg the question of whether one huge US MIC would be preferable to a plenitude of smaller MICs in the otherwise importing countries, which might well provide the political authorities with better opportunities to balance competing demands from the military and civilian sectors against each other. In addition to the economic effects, a conversion to NOD would also have certain societal and organizational effects with a likely impact on internal armaments dynamics. Because most concrete NOD schemes imply a certain decentralization of actual combat, they also provide greater scope for peacetime decentralization. Furthermore, the greater role envisaged for reserve forces (or even genuine militias) in most NOD proposals (see Loser 1982a; Biilow 1988) would tend to further weaken the service hierarchies, presumably one of the most powerful forces behind the present armaments dynamics. The interservice rivalry presently spurring armaments might, likewise, diminish by virtue of the structural integration envisioned in most NOD proposals Implementation By virtue of its benign effects on both the exogenous and endogenous armaments dynamics, NOD seems to have the potential of promoting arms race stability. This preliminary conclusion does not, however, answer the question of how to reach this stable state and proceed with genuine disarmament, in which connection the main controversy has been about the respective merits of unilateralism and arms control.

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The preference of most NOD advocates has been for unilateralism, occasionally combined with a certain informal bilateralism. In conformity with their spiraling interpretation of armaments dynamics, most NOD advocates have leaned toward gradualism, as developed by Osgood and others (see Chapter 2), as an attempt at, inter alia, inverting the spiral.28 Whereas this approach presupposes both sides to be basically defensively (i.e., security) oriented, other NOD proponents have taken into account the possibility that some states might seek to exploit any openings presented by NOD on the part of their defensive opponents. In this case, the advisability of NOD presupposes its cost-effectiveness at the margin. Because any defense scheme and any particular weapon may be defeated by CMs of various sorts, such CMs must be more demanding (in financial or other terms) than both the initial defensive measure and the subsequent CCM on the part of the defender. NOD's presumed potential in this respect may be either structural or technological. First, NOD would presumably be in a better position than offensive strategies to capitalize on technologies with a downward price trend, such as microelectronics. NOD literature thus abounds with examples of such cheap NOD technologies as compared with increasingly expensive offensive technologies (Hannig 1984; Bamaby 1986; A. von Miiller 1988: 72-78). Second, it is often pointed out that the defense enjoys inalienable structural advantages over the offense, inter alia, by virtue of its more modest level of ambition and better ability to specialize. Even in a contest between, say, aircraft, the defender would presumably be at an advantage in terms of cost-effectiveness because of specialization in interceptor technologies (air-to-air weapons, take-off time, etc.) rather than fighter-bomber technologies (range, speed, payload, air-to-surface as well as air-to-air weapons, SAM CMs, etc.), because the former are intrinsically less demanding. Besides the unilateralist and gradualist approaches, the traditional approach of negotiated, bilateral arms control might also recommend itself as a mode of NOD implementation, and vice versa: NOD might be a way of invigorating arms control. The latter seems to have been the case of the CFE negotiations, the first round of which was successfully concluded in November 1990 with agreement on a very radical builddown of conventional weapons in Europe. It obliged the Warsaw Pact (or what was left of it) to something like a 50 percent reduction in conventional armaments, whereas NATO had to reduce by merely 10-15 percent, averaging out to a dismantling of approximately one-third of the holdings of major conventional weapons systems in the ATTU area. Out of a total of around 250,000, as many as 100,000 pieces of heavy equipment (tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery pieces, and combat helicopters) were scheduled for elimination in pursuance of the treaty.

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In line with what had been proposed by NOD advocates, these talks focused on offensive potentials and major weapons systems particularly suitable for surprise attack and large-scale offensive action. During the preparatory talks, numerous proposals for unmistakably noddy reduction packages (tank-free zones and the like) were also made by traditional arms controllers (Brzezinsky, Aspin, and others), thus narrowing the gap between NOD and arms control considerably, to make it appear entirely bridgeable.29 NOD and Conversion Since the end of the cold war both (former) East and West have embarked on genuine disarmament, in pursuance of agreements such as the aforementioned CFE as well as unilaterally. Indeed, one might even get the impression that arms control is under severe strains in its attempt to keep pace with unilateral builddown. Whereas most observers would regard this as a highly fortunate development, such disarmament is not without its problems, which tend to be lumped together as conversion. As I have argued on other occasions, what usually goes under this name (the conversion of the economy from military to civilian purposes) is merely one aspect of a broader problem, that is, one species of a genus for which no concept is yet available. "Transformation of societies from the war mode to the civilian mode," or "shift from a war system to a peace system" are different ways of describing what might also be called conversion. Thus conceived of as a generic term, conversion would lend itself to a subdivision into several different, albeit interlinked, species, and the conversion from military to civilian production or consumption would merely be two particular instances. NOD might have an impact on these various types of conversion, indeed might constitute a particular type of conversion in its own right.30 One might, for instance, conceive of conversion as a process, the first step wherein might be called intramilitary conversion, which would not transcend the boundaries of the military domain but remain a set of military answers to what were still understood as military problems. Three particular varieties of this type of conversion might be envisioned: 1. 2. 3.

Conversion from nuclear to conventional defense ('conventionalization'). Conversion from offensive to defensive military forces, also known as transarmament (Galtung 1984: 172-184,1988). Conversion from actual to potential armed forces, that is, from standing to inflatable armed forces.

Transarmament would, as already mentioned, imply a rather profound transformation of defense postures, which (depending on the time frame)

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might entail more or less demanding procurement requirements, as well as render numerous high-value military items redundant. Even though the resultant posture would probably be cheaper than the present one (in the sense that a hypothetical country building a defense posture from scratch would have to pay less for an NOD posture than for an offensive one), the economic implications of such defensive transarmanent might nevertheless be staggering. Economic constraints, however, make it seem highly unlikely that any major procurement would be embarked on, even though some pressure to this effect from the MIC might be expected.31 Under the prevailing internal balance of power in most countries, it does, however, seem considerably more likely that defensive conversion would commence with a simple and cheap redeployment and partial reconfiguration of existing forces, accompanied by reductions of particularly offensive-capable force components and entire formations, either unilaterally or in the framework of a "CFE-2" agreement, or any combination thereof. In order for transarmament to NOD to be feasible, it may thus have to be accompanied by disarmament, as has persistently been emphasized by Eastern NOD proponents.32 The presumably modest size of procurement budgets notwithstanding, some form of intra-MIC conversion would inevitably ensue, for example, a shift of military orders from some producers to others. In addition to the transformation of production patterns, a conversion task might ensue from the retirement of henceforth undesirable, if not downright prohibited, types of armaments, which would have to be either turned into scrap iron or converted to civilian use. The worst of all worlds would, however, ensue if these sophisticated and usually highly lethal weapons systems to be withdrawn from the ATTU region were simply to be sold on the open market, whence would follow a surge of proliferation throughout the Third World of weapons systems that would be eminently suitable for offensive operations.33 The conversion from actual to potential military forces would constitute a supplement to, as well as a possible element in, transarmament. It would reflect a shift from immediate defense readiness to the mere possession of adequate mobilization potentials, such as has, incidentally, been recommended as an element in NOD. Such a lowering of the state of readiness based on the availability of longer warning, furthermore, seems to be already in the cards, since practically everybody in the West concurs that whatever standing-start attack options the Soviet Union may or may not have possessed in the past have presently disappeared. The West is likely to reap the fruits thereof by, inter alia, shifting from in-place forces (particularly as far as Germany is concerned) to home-based forces, and from large to smaller standing armies, yet with an enhanced growth potential. Rather small but inflatable armed forces may thus come to be seen as the ideal. They might appear as relatively handy, comparatively cheap, and less visible than the present military forces. By virtue of the last feature, the

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military might constitute less of a nuisance to the civilian population and a more elusive target for the charges of the peace movements, yet might incorporate almost the same potentials as the present armed forces. Whereas the resultant posture would, on balance, seem to be preferable to the present postures, if only for economic reasons, such a scheme would not be without problems. WWI demonstrated that rigid mobilization schemes may under certain circumstances lead to malign interactions between adversaries, in the course of which growing fears of war may lead, through a process of escalation, to the point of war: the so-called Guns of August syndrome.34 It would therefore have to be acknowledged as a sine qua non of such an inflatable defense that it would be strictly defensive, in which case no mere mobilization, for whatever reason, could be perceived by adversaries as constituting a threat that might spur an escalatory momentum. To the extent that such an inflatable defense should come to be striven for, this will have implications for production. First, some equipment will have to be in place, both for use by the allied reinforcements to be received by any country under attack, and for the country's own mobilized reserves. Second, the anticipated time scale of such a future war may point to the need for industrial mobilization schemes as well. If the ensuing war should turn out to be protracted, it would not be entirely a "come as you are" war, in which only in-place forces and equipment would count, such as would be the only reasonable assumption under the present circumstances. The ability to start up, continue, or expand military production during war might thus become important, an observation that would seem to point against making industrial conversion of production from that of military to that of civilian commodities irreversible. Preferably plants should, for instance, produce civilian vehicles in peacetime while being able to shift to building armored vehicles in times of war. Whereas conversion studies have hitherto pointed to the need for schemes on how to convert military into civilian production, schemes to the opposite effect might be equally important, albeit only as blueprints that will, one hopes, remain in the cupboards indefinitely. According to the same logic, military R&D might prudently have to be continued, albeit henceforth with a distinct emphasis on CM to whatever cunning schemes an adversarial state might devise. The availability of such blueprints might, furthermore, facilitate the actual, that is, material, conversion of factories, shipyards, etc., to civilian use, since it would deprive hard-liners of the traditional "better safe than sorry" argument. Presently, the need for an adequate military production capability for the unlikely, yet conceivable, eventuality of war serves as a rationale for the maintenance of actual military production in peacetime. If the former insurance could be had without the implication, a substantial, actual (that is, material) conversion could be achieved at the price of opting for a deliberately reversible (swing-door) conversion, which would under certain viewpoints indisputably be suboptimal.35

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Implementing swing-door conversion would, of course, not be entirely without costs: Private firms would be entitled to some compensation for being obliged to, and per implication having to be constantly ready to, produce particular items in a situation that may never arise, in particular because such readiness would not merely require blueprints, but also some training of workers, storage of spare parts, etc. The demands thus placed on business by the state would seem to be roughly comparable with those presently ensuing from economic defense, involving emergency stocks of various commodities and the like. This analogy, however, seems to indicate that the costs would be neither unaffordable nor excessive in comparison with those involved with running the present military production system on a permanent basis. In order to meet the risk of clandestine R&D in prohibited areas (the well-known secret weapon, able to decide a future war), the recommended swing-door conversion might prudently have to be combined with certain controls and/or confidence-building measures pertaining to military R&D as well as production. Whereas national technical means of verification (satellite surveillance and overflights under a future open-skies regime) would suffice for monitoring most of the field testing of new weapons, cooperative modes of verification would undoubtedly be called for as far as laboratory testing was concerned (say, in the form of challenge on-site inspections of laboratories and plants). Certain precedents therefore, as well as some practical experience in the field, do, however, already exist, pertaining to, inter alia, the biological and the prospective chemical weapons convention, as well as to the NPT and the INF Treaty. There seem to be no reasons why the monitoring of military R&D and production could not be extended to the field of conventional weapons.36 The above recommendations for reversible conversion, with appropriate safeguards attached, seem valid for as long as the prospect of war has merely receded into the distant future, but not disappeared for good, that is, until that historical juncture is reached, beyond which war has become truly inconceivable, even as a long-term future peril.37

Notes 1. The point about armaments as wasteful consumption has been made by the consecutive commissions appointed by the United Nations; for example, the Brandt Commission (1980: 117-125, 284), the Palme Commission (1982: 7 1 99 et passim), and the Brundtland Commission (1987: 290-307). The link between arms races and war is analyzed in Huntington 1958: 394-395; Wiberg 1990c. 2. On the disarmament endeavors of the 1930s, see Neild 1990: 1 1 9 144; Borg 1990. On naval disarmament, see Bull 1973; E. Miiller 1986b; Prawitz 1990; Hill 1989: 26-36; Kaufman 1990.

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3. On US nuclear disarmament proposals, see, e.g., Newhouse 1989: 6 3 64; on Soviet proposals to the same effect, see Anon. 1986: 106-117. 4. For a classical statement, see Bull 1965. For modern urges for a revival of the classical approach, see, e.g., Bull 1987: 119-128; Schelling 1986; Blechman 1983. For the distinction between arms control and disarmament, see Kissinger 1960: 210-229; Schelling and Halperin 1985: 56-58; Bull 1987: 4 1 57. 5. Cf. Carter 1989: 42-105 (on the PTBT), 105-172 (on SALT I and II), 230-256 (on MBFR). On the MBFR, see also Ruehl 1982; Dean 1987: 153-184; M. Müller 1988. On SALT I, see Newhouse 1973; Kaplan 1973. On SALT II and START, see Talbott 1985: 209-342. 6. On the institutionalized practice of GET (greater-than-expected-threat) assessment, see Enthoven and Smith 1972; cf. Freedman 1986: 81-96. 7. For a critique (or rather qualification) of Mearsheimer's assumptions, see Posen 1986, 1988; Epstein 1988, 1989. 8. For classical formulations, see Wohlstetter 1958; Snyder 1961: 5 4 63, 97-110; Brodie 1959; Schelling 1960: 230-255; McNamara 1968: 51-67; cf. Freedman 1983: 121-257. 9. Mearsheimer 1983; cf., on Soviet military thinking in this regard, Vigor 1983. 10. Frei and Catrina 1983: 31-36; cf., on CEP calculations, Tsipis 1983: 130-146. The reciprocal ICBM vulnerability was, in fact, what the so-called window of vulnerability (the initial rationale for the MX) was all about. See, e.g., Scheer 1982: 66-82; Jervis 1984: 111-118 et passim; Newhouse 1989: 318-323; Kaplan, 1983: 356-391. On incapacitating anti-C 3 I strikes, see Bracken 1983; Blair 1985; Carter 1987b: 560-573; May and Harvey 1987: 720722. 11. For attempts at defining adequacy so as not to hamper arms control unnecessarily, see, e.g., Schelling and Halperin 1985: 91-106; Myrdal 1976: 293-316; Meyer 1984b. On the Soviet view of verification, see, e.g., Heckrotte 1986; Abarenkov 1989; Efinger 1989. Cf., on the mounting verification problems with regard to CFE, Krepon 1988; Graaf 1989; Dean 1989a; Karkoszka 1989; Altmann and Rotblat 1989; Grin and Graaf 1990; Kokoski and Koulik 1990; Kokoyev and Androsov 1990. 12. On the ABM negotiations, see, e.g., Garthoff 1985: 133-198. On the contents of the treaty, see, e.g., Schneiter 1984; Drell et al. 1986. 13. On the story of the protracted, yet futile, Geneva negotiations, see Talbott 1985: 21-206; Dean 1987: 125-154; Carter 1989: 172-204. 14. For examples of ambitious claims to the disarmament-promoting effect of NOD, see Afheldt 1976: 324-325; Hannig 1984: 15-16; Galtung 1988: 40. 15. Action-reaction can be carried on virtually indefinitely: M—>CM—> CCM—»CCCM—>CCCCM, ad infinitum. Whether any specific action by a state is, for example, a CCM or a CCCM is part of the problem of perceptions. 16. On the ARP in general, see Rathjens 1973; cf. Kahn 1983; McNamara 1968: 60-67. On the strategic competition, see Schwartz 1984; Newhouse 1989: 199-208. For somewhat divergent interpretations of the same phenomenon, placing greater emphasis on the internal dynamics, see, e.g., Greenwood 1975; Allison 1983; Allison and Morris 1975. 17. On CMs against tanks, see Herolf 1983; Hoffmans 1985; Walker 1986; Foss 1986. On the CCMs by tank designers, see Simpkin 1987. 18. On the tank vs. helicopter contest, see Cobleigh 1987; Simpkin 1986: 117-132; Walker 1987b; Zugschwert 1987. On the ship vs. missile

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contest, see French 1986; Stanley 1986; Lautenschlager 1983; Canning 1987. On the aircraft vs. SAM contest, see Lombardy 1986; Walker 1987a. 19. On SDI, see, e.g., McNamara et al. 1985; Miller and Evera 1986; Carter and Schwartz 1984; Bowman 1986; C. Snyder 1986; Stockton 1986. On the maritime strategy, see, e.g., Watkins 1986; Brooks 1986; Friedman 1988. On the element of strategic ASW therein, see, e.g., Rivkin 1984; Pocalyk 1987; Stefanick 1987. For a critique, see Mearsheimer 1986; M0ller 1987b, 1989a, d, 1990c. 20. Miiller 1982: 73, 77, 1986: 170-172; on cognitive dissonance, see Festinger 1957. 21. MccGwire 1987a: 406-447. On the analytical importance of time lags, see Dixon 1987. 22. See, e.g., USSR Ministry of Defence 1982: 7 (repeated in subsequent annual editions). 23. On the NIE procedure, see Prados 1982: 3-14, 291-300 et passim; Freedman 1986: 30-61; Betts 1983. A case study is available on, inter alia, the intelligence push toward MIRV in Greenwood 1975: 83-105; cf. Ranelagh 1987: 490-499. On the general concept of interservice competition, see, e.g., Huntington 1965. 24. A good example of an internal dynamics researcher who is also a NOD advocate is Senghaas (1972, 1986, 1988). On the MIC, see, e.g., Pursell 1972; Barnett 1970; Kaldor 1981; Prins 1983: 133-168. Cf., for a critique, Sarkesian 1972. Good examples of NOD advocates stressing the need for democratization are Lutz 1988c; Buro 1983. 25. This enumeration is based on Unterseher's work in SAS 1989 and describes the web forces of the SAS model, on which more in Chapter 7. 26. Cf., on the arms industries of Sweden and Switzerland, Hagelin 1982; Eberhardt 1986; Sigmund 1985, 1986. 27. Cf., on the absence of an MIC in Austria, its relatively large share of indigenous arms production notwithstanding, Skuhra 1986: 255-257. 28. Afheldt 1983: 44, 1984a: 19; Lutz 1988b: 69-74. On gradualism in general, see Osgood 1962; Etzioni 1962; Boge and Wilke 1984: 19-56; George 1988d; Granberg 1978. 29. On the CFE, see, e.g., Dean 1989b, 1990a, b; Hansen 1990; Wittmann 1989; Blechman, Durch, and O'Prey 1990. For noddy proposals from mainstreamers, see Aspin 1987; Brzezinski 1988; cf., for a proposal from two self-proclaimed NOD advocates, Miiller and Karkoszka 1988. 30. See, e.g., Dumas 1988; Renner 1990; Kollner and Huck 1990; UNIDIR 1991. For the broader approach, see M0ller 1990f. 31. This is one of Hylke Tromp's (1990: 171) critical points against NOD: that it "might work as a recipe to continue and expand the arms race with other means." 32. For the Soviet viewpoint, see, e.g., Arbatov 1989a, b, c; Zhurkin et al. 1989; Blagovolin 1990; Rogov 1990. For East German assessments to the same effect, see, e.g., Schmidt and Schwarz 1990. A Hungarian example of the same views is Valki 1990. 33. On the dynamics of the arms trade with the Third World, see Sampson 1978; Pierre 1982; Klare 1984; Catrina 1988. On the special problem of proliferation of ballistic missiles, see, e.g., Carus 1990; Karp 1989. On the insufficient controls of the international arms trade, see, e.g., Allebeck 1989; Nolan 1988; Catrina 1988: 129-132. 34. On the causes of WWI, see, e.g., Tuchman 1962; Taylor 1969; Miller

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1985, esp. Evera and Snyder. For a rebuttal of the mobilization imperative explanation, see Trachtenberg 1990. 35. This seems to be the approach taken by China; see Renner 1990: 2 9 30; Deger and Sen 1990: 96-104. 36. On the general question of contolling R&D, see, e.g., Ruina 1989. On CFE-related problems, see, e.g., Oelrich 1990; Krepon 1990. 37. A path of development resembling this evolution has been outlined by Richard L. Wagner (1990) who distinguishes among the attack paradigm (i.e., the situation of today or yesterday when immediate combat readiness was deemed imperative), the mobilization paradigm (resembling the emphasis on inflatable defense), and, as the final stage, the rearmament paradigm, when war is deemed highly unlikely and states basically rely on their ability to rearm if the need should unexpectedly arise.

5 N O D AND WAR PREVENTION War prevention has become almost universally acknowledged as the primary, indeed well-nigh the only, legitimate puipose of military forces. This attitude to armed force is regarded as so self-evident today that its actual novelty tends to be forgotten. Taxonomy of War Previously, military forces were primarily used for waging war, which was in its turn either regarded as per se a positive activity or at least as a legitimate means to positive political ends. The attraction of war per se has receded into oblivion (at least on the state level) since the ordeal of WWI, a change of attitude reflected in, inter alia, the Locamo and Briand-Kellogg treaties. Still, the notion of war as a legitimate means for achieving political ends persisted until the dawn of the nuclear age (with the same caveat). Henceforth, however, it came to be acknowledged by all states that war in general is an evil, and that, in particular, nuclear war can serve no positive political goals and must never be fought. Bernard Brodie (1946: 76) expressed what was to become the prevalent attitude with his famous commentary: "Thus far the chief purpose of a military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have no other useful purpose." Whereas war prevention has thus attained the status of the primary goal pursued by military means, it is neither the only goal, nor is it likely to ever become so. No matter what peace movements, peace researchers, or certain political parties may solemnly proclaim, war prevention will frequently have to compete with other goals. Indeed, if all states actually regarded the preservation of peace as their supreme goal, the international system might well have developed into a global empire, because all states would have sought to avert war by simply surrendering, thus allowing the most ruthless among them to prevail. Furthermore, unless the resort to direct violence were at least sometimes justifiable, structural violence (in the vocabulary of peace research) might well be boundless.1 Wars come in many varieties, distinguished, inter alia, by their divergent underlying motives. A panacea for coping with any type of war will thus be 105

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hard (probably impossible) to devise, and trade-offs between different means of war prevention are quite conceivable, in the sense that attempts to parry one threat may increase the likelihood of others. With these caveats, a strategy for general purpose war prevention might still be conceivable, which would, however, have to encompass a panoply of options for different contingencies. NOD has sometimes been described as exactly such a strategy, allegedly sufficing for the prevention of all likely forms of war. As a preliminary to assessing this claim, an analysis of the various types of war and war prevention is indispensable. One might distinguish between two genera and a total of five species of war: I. Premeditated War

1. Bellicose war 2. Clausewitzian war

II. Inadvertent War

3. Preventive war 4. Pre-emptive war 5. Accidental war

These five species may be viewed as a continuum, mirroring a declining purposiveness of, and increasingly negative attitude to, war. Type 1 might be paraphrased as "war for the sake of war," and type 2 as "war for the sake of conquest," both of which are positive descriptions of meaningful wars, whereas with type 3 we enter the realm of negative descriptions of, in a certain sense, meaningless wars. Type 3 might be paraphrased as "a deplorable war intended to avert an even worse one," and type 4 as "a war intended to limit the damage of an inevitable war." Type 5 takes us entirely beyond the boundaries of purposive war and might best be described as "war for no (political) purpose whatsoever." On the presumption of an increasingly negative attitude to war over time, we should expect a corresponding shift in the relative likelihood of the different species of war, implying that the probability of the first types has receded in comparison with that of war at the other end of the spectrum. I now venture a brief analysis of the various species as well as identify viable approaches to preventing them, with a special view to the contribution of NOD thereto. Bellicose War War for the sake of war fortunately seems to be entirely a historical phenomenon, which once was, however, widespread, for example in ancient Greece. The prevailing attitude to war was positive, and Sparta was thus often acclaimed as superior to its neighbors because of its emphasis on the martial arts (Bowra 1969: 20-41; Murray 1980: 120-131, 153-172; Carlton 1990: 45-56). Modern Germany is another example of the occasional

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positive attitude to war, as the following quotations illustrate: "The grandeur of war lies in the utter annihilation of puny man in the great conception of the state, and it brings out the full magnificence of the sacrifice of fellowcountrymen for one another. In war the chaff is winnowed from the wheat" (Treitschke, quoted in Hamerow 1973: 307-308); "War and politics serve to preserve the existence of a people. War, however, is the ultimate expression of a people's will to live. Therefore, politics should be subservient to warfare" (Ludendorff, quoted in Bald 1989: 5; cf. Kull 1990). Since then, however, war has become so horrible that practically nobody regards it as a positive phenomenon per se (or at least professes such opinions openly) any longer. As far as interstate wars are concerned, the only possible exception might be certain varieties of jihad (holy war) practiced by states of a fundamentalist Muslim persuasion, such as Iran or (with certain qualifications) Iraq.2 Whereas one might find instances of bellicose struggle on the intrastate level (e.g., among guerrillas), the overwhelming majority of guerrilla struggles have in fact been waged for political purposes, at least according to their leaders. 3 To the extent that they should be categorized as wars, such guerrilla struggles belong to the species of Clausewitzian wars rather than to that of bellicose wars. Whereas as a cultural phenomenon bellicose war thus seems to have virtually disappeared, instances of it may still be found on the subcultural level, in the shape of frames of mind and modes of conduct of particular societal groups. Since we are now entering the realm of individual and group psychology, attitudes to war tend to become tantamount to attitudes to violence. An instance of such an infatuation with violence as an end in itself might be the activities of certain terrorist groups, even though the majority remain Clausewitzians in the sense used below. It has occasionally been claimed that bellicosity is common to the military profession as such, which has been charged with a fascination with violence in general, as well as with offensive warfare in particular. However, well-documented historical instances of this phenomenon notwithstanding, it, too, seems to be becoming increasingly rare. In modern, professionalized aimies, and especially so in countries accustomed to peaceful coexistence with their neighbors, the armed forces seem to have largely shed whatever offensive and bellicose predilections they may have had in the past. With the possible exception of certain types of special forces, this seems to hold true for all European armed forces, even the Red Army. Whereas the Soviet aimed forces have been charged (probably correctly) with many vices, the desire to wage war has apparently not been one of them.4 A few feminist radicals have even attributed the offensive urge, and per implication bellicosity, to the male gender as such,5 a proposition that seems extremely difficult to either verify or falsify. Even though soldiers have most often been male, this correlation may be spurious and explicable in

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numerous other ways that do not presuppose a genderic disposition in favor of the martial arts. To the (very limited) extent that bellicose wars may remain a danger to be taken seriously, NOD might be an appropriate antidote, since it would oblige the armed forces to think in defensive terms and to strive for war prevention. It is my conviction that this would suffice for avoiding bellicose interstate wars, at the very least between states of the European type, the democratic ideals of which make a certain degree of political control over the armed forces obligatory. Were those authors correct who regard an offensive predilection as inextricably connected with the profession of arms, the only remedy would be a complete abolition of the armed forces, say, in favor of nonmilitary, nonviolent, or social defense. Their principled rejection of military means notwithstanding, certain authors belonging to this school have, however, lent their support to NOD, albeit merely as an intermediary stage on the way toward demilitarization, diminishing the risks of bellicose war somewhat (see, e.g., Ebert 1983, 1984; Galtung 1988: 42-60; Nolte & Nolte 1984). NOD might even accommodate to a certain extent the feminist critique by, inter alia, allowing for, albeit not necessitating, a larger female element in the armed forces, say in the form of female conscription. Clausewitzian War Whereas bellicose war constitutes an anomaly, Clausewitzian war might be called the paradigmatic type of premeditated war. Such wars are waged for political purposes, that is, as "the continuation of politics by other means," both as far as the aggressor and the defender are concerned. They might be described as clashes of (political) wills, differing from day-to-day foreign policy only by virtue of the means employed. Even though wars are regarded by Clausewitzians as an evil, they are nevertheless envisaged as legitimate last-resort means in the pursuit of "national interest defined in terms of power" (Clausewitz 1980: 34 [1832: Bk. 1.1.24]).6 In the final analysis, states wage Clausewitzian wars in order to gain control over other states, usually in the form of territorial conquest, in its turn conceived of either as an end in itself or merely as a means to a more far-reaching end. As an end in itself, conquest may be motivated by, inter alia, geopolitical aspirations, such as was the case of the Third Reich, the Nazi leadership of which followed the prescriptions of geopolitical authors such as Haushofer and others for lebensraum. According to some interpretations, the same has been the case for the Soviet Union (the heartland), allegedly determined to establish control over the whole of Eurasia, that is, the rimlands (Gray 1977: 19-20, 33-53). Such conquest may also be sought for economic motives such as outright plunder or more long-term exploitation of the productive potential

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of other states. Whereas my own ancestors, the Danish Vikings, followed the former path, more-sophisticated conquerers have pursued the latter. The colonial wars of previous centuries, for example, might be explained by the need of the emerging absolutist monarchies to lay their hands on the gold and silver treasures of the New World, in order, inter alia, to finance the increasingly expensive upkeep of standing armies in Europe. Economic motives may also go some way toward explaining incidents such as Germany's attack on Denmark in 1940, and have even been offered as a partial explanation for the (presumed) Soviet expansive urge since WWII.7 Finally, conquest may be sought for political and ideological reasons, such as was the case for the late-medieval crusades as well as for the largely simultaneous Islamic expansion that served as their legitimization. According to some interpretations, communism, materialized in, inter alia, the foreign policy of the USSR, was inherently expansionistic and bent on world revolution for largely the same reasons. This assumption does, however, seem to be based on an extremely selective and superficial reading of the Marxist classics (as well as on an exaggeration of the extent to which the Soviet leaders have based their worldview on Marxism). Whereas Marx and Engels as well as Lenin did certainly envision a global spread and eventual victory of socialism, they expected this to result from the inherent contradictions of capitalism, which was presumably moribund and bound to collapse without any need for external intervention.8 Conquest may also be sought merely as a means to a further end. Whereas this merely postpones the question of the nature of this further end, the distinction is nevertheless important for explaining concrete instances of aggression. In a war that may last for decades, each particular incident of aggression may serve primarily strategic purposes and be explicable with reference to second-order motives. By means of an attack against another state, an aggressor may seek to improve his prospects of prevailing in an anticipated larger contest by, among other measures, establishing bridgeheads or enforcing access rights. Similar strategic purposes might be served by sheer destruction of other states or objects in order to prevent an adversary from taking advantage of them in an impending war. There are thus a number of goals for which war can be applied in an entirely rational fashion, that is, through an allocation of means to ends. Since these ends are by no means mutually exclusive, any particular instance of aggression may be overdetermined, that is, motivated by several mutually reinforcing considerations. Whether such a Clausewitzian aggression will actually be undertaken is presumably a matter for rational decision, that is, it presupposes a comparison of expected costs with gains. If the anticipated gains appear to outweigh the expected costs, aggression is presumably likely. Hence also the possibility of influencing this cost-benefit calculus in order to dissuade aggression. In principle, this might be done either by increasing the costs, or

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by minimizing the prospects of positive gain, or by various combinations thereof. From this have been derived the two basic alternative approaches to war prevention, which might best be subsumed under the generic term dissuasion. For the time being, I will, however, continue to use the more common term deterrence with its two subcategories: deterrence by denial; and deterrence by retaliation (the classical expression is found in Snyder 1961: 14-16). Nuclear Deterrence The notion of deterrence rests on two premises: 1. That the ends of the adversary are tantamount to a revision of the status quo, and that he is prepared to use military means for the attainment of these ends. 2. That the opponent is a rational actor, that is, guided by cost-benefit considerations. If these premises hold true, the defender may seek either to increase the costs of aggression or to minimize the prospects of gain. There are several possible ways of increasing costs: First, even in a halfmature anarchy such as the world of today, aggressive wars are regarded as illegitimate, and an aggressor is bound to incur substantial nonmilitary costs, among them loss of international goodwill, severance of trade relations, and realignment of previously friendly states. Hence the possible conception of usefulness as a dissuasive asset. The more useful a state is to its would-be attacker, the greater a loss would the latter suffer through a termination of cooperation in response to an aggression. Second, the defender may seek to increase the direct military costs of aggression by means of a strong defense. In addition to exacting direct costs from the would-be aggressor, it may also have reverberations in other respects, since the forces required for the said aggression would be unavailable for other purposes. The Soviet forces stationed in Eastern Europe since WWII, which would most likely have spearheaded any invasion of Western Europe, until recently also served the purpose of maintaining Soviet hegemony in the stationing countries. Losing them might thus conceivably have resulted in the loss of the entire Soviet empire (cf. Jones 1981a, b). Third, the defender may inflict civilian losses on the aggressor in retaliation, either by means of nuclear or conventional weapons. In the latter case, retaliation may occur either through aerial bombardment, as envisaged by Douhet and others, or through regular ground forces' counteroffensives, as suggested by Samuel Huntington or the German (alleged) NOD proponent, Albrecht von Miiller.9

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Since World War II, and particularly in the United States, the subcategory of nuclear retaliation has come to be regarded as almost synonymous with deterrence. As long as the United States enjoyed an effective thermonuclear monopoly, the case for nuclear deterrence seemed logically flawless, even though the means were still insufficient. Thanks to the immense destructive potential of thermonuclear weapons, the costs ensuing from an aggression followed by nuclear retaliation were bound to dwarf all conceivable gains (Freedman 1983: 76-90; Rosenberg 1981,1983). 10 It even appeared reasonable (during McNamara's tenure as secretary of defense, that is, after the abandonment of massive retaliation) to calculate the level of destruction required for dissuading the USSR, from which was derived a criterion of deterrence sufficiency, requiring the ability to wipe out a quarter of the Soviet population and half their industry. This AD criterion happened to coincide with the maximum marginal destructive utility. Beyond a certain point worthwhile targets tended to become scarce, and destruction hence to attain diminishing marginal returns (Enthoven & Smith 1972: 207208; cf. McNamara 1968: 51-67). Both the criterion of sufficiency and that of maximizing marginal utility thus seemed to logically point toward minimal deterrence, defined, for example, as one AD. I will return in Chapter 7 to the implications thereof. Since the advent of nuclear balance, that is, mutual second-strike capabilities, many of the inherent, but previously latent, logical flaws in this form of deterrence have become manifest. At the root lay the fact that nuclear weapons would presumably deter only if their actual use were conceivable (albeit not necessarily likely), whereas unusable weapons were to no avail. Deterrence was thus not so much a matter of military posture as of political will on part of the deterrer, and, furthermore, it existed only in the eyes of the "deterree." It thus required not merely an unswerving will on the part of the deterrer to proceed with the implementation of the threats, but also the deterree's belief therein, which was tantamount to an inherent credibility problem of how to convince a would-be aggressor of one's determination to retaliate. This was not merely a communication problem, which might be solved by diplomatic means, but the entire concept was fraught with morefundamental inconsistencies and led to apparently insoluble dilemmas to which I now pay some attention, because they have constituted logical challenges that NOD has also had to solve.11 First, the defender is bound to be self-deterred by the prospects that his retaliation against a nuclear-armed state may trigger counterretaliation, amounting to a deterrence versus self-deterrence dilemma. How might a defender make his deterrent threat more credible than the aggressor's implicit threat of counterretaliation? This was in fact exactly the kind of reasoning behind the window of vulnerability allegedly facing the United States in the late 1970s: Because of the vulnerability of the US ICBM force vis-à-vis the (superior) Soviet ICBM force, the Soviets might presumably take out the

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US Minutemen with a fraction of their ICBMs, thus rendering the United States susceptible to blackmail (Kaplan 1983: 385-391; Newhouse 1989: 321-323, 357-361; Scheer 1982: 66-82, 157-165). 12 Second, deterrence suffers from the so-called ex ante versus ex post dilemma. Whereas a threat of retaliation may seem rational and credible for as long as it works, its hollowness would be revealed if deterrence should break down and, say, the USSR should launch a first strike against the United States. In that case, retaliation would be pointlesss, since it might, at best, punish the aggressors, while by no means making good the damage already endured. Furthermore, retaliation against Soviet cities would violate all ethical principles of warfare and thus be unjust, even if undertaken in retaliatory response to an overt and unprovoked Soviet first strike—the victims would be (presumably innocent) civilians. Regardless of how rational and ethically justifiable a threat of retaliation may thus appear ex ante, its implementation ex post could never be so.13 Third, the rationality versus irrationality dilemma stems from the fact that deterrence works only against a rational prospective aggressor whose actions are guided by cost-benefit calculations. Not only does psychology not support this assumption, it is also challenged by the need for making diametrically opposite assumptions about the deterrer who (as we have seen above) could not retaliate in a rational manner, but only for irrational motives, such as revenge (cf. Green 1966: 157-212). Fourth, what might be called a limitation versus escalation dilemma derives from the above deterrence versus self-deterrence dilemma, which presupposed that nuclear war would be predestined to escalate beyond bounds. An obvious escape from this dilemma might be to somehow limit escalation, for example through flexible nuclear options, allowing for calibrated responses to various levels of provocation, thus presumably less liable to self-deterrence. Both superpowers have hence procured nuclear weapons suitable for, if not officially intended for, limited nuclear war, and NATO has since 1967 adhered to the flexible response strategy, which is logically tantamount to a limited nuclear war strategy. In addition to being anathema to the publics in Europe, however, the notion of limited nuclear war suffers from a severe logical flaw. According to deterrence strategies, what deters is precisely the prospect of boundless escalation, whereas thresholds or firebreaks in the escalatory momentum might presumably allow an aggressor to calculate his risks and perhaps conclude that aggression might pay off. Without thresholds, on the other hand, escalation would presumably proceed unbounded, and the very first nuclear detonation, however limited, would result in slow-motion suicide, from which the deterrer would inevitably be self-deterred. Since the deterree would be aware of this effect, no threats of first-use could ever be really credible. For the deterree to fear unlimited escalation, but the deterrer to feel reasonably confident of his ability to keep escalation within bounds, this

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escalation would have to be both boundless and bounded, which is tantamount to squaring the strategic circle.14 Finally, deterrence theory is faced with what might be called the war prevention versus war-fighting dilemma, combining elements of all of the above. If the deterrer were able only to threaten nuclear war, while incapable of actually waging it, his deterrent would be ineffective. Notwithstanding the solemn declarations by both superpowers that a nuclear war must never be fought, both sides thus have to prepare for such a contingency as well as convey the impression that they are actually prepared to fight. By so doing, however, they may easily mislead their respective adversary into believing that they are actually preparing for an offensive nuclear war and thus induce the other side to respond in kind.15 Most of the above dilemmas have been acknowledged by US defense intellectuals, who have striven tirelessly to devise solutions. Probably the Soviets have reasoned along roughly similar lines, although the available evidence does not allow for a confirmation of this assumption. Among a panoply of presumed solutions, I highlight only a few of the most important ones. Most radically, it has been recommended (or perhaps merely meant as a reductio ad absurdum) to increase the automaticity of the nuclear response so as to eliminate self-deterrence. The Soviet doomsday bomb in Doctor Strangelove was merely an extreme version of the kinds of devices and procedures that have actually been taken into serious consideration. Institutional precautions such as LOW, or at least LUA, have been considered, at least for the ICBM force. Although these procedures to launch nuclear warheads have never been adopted in peacetime for fear of intolerable risks of accident, contingency plans may well exist for introducing such practices in cases of extreme emergency (Blair 1985: 234-238; Ford 1985: 37-38). Peacetime safeguards on the sea-based deterrent have been relaxed (as compared with the land-based forces) in order to ensure retaliation, even subsequent to a severance of communication between SSBN commanders and the NCA. Hence the absence of PALs on SLBMs as well as the apparent predominance of procedural over technical control principles. Whereas the other legs of the deterrent triad require transmitted codes as well as procedural checks before they are able to open the locks and launch their weapons, the SSBN fleet (beyond a certain predefined point) requires only launch orders and special procedures, and may even have contingency plans for launch in case of a severance of its communication with the NCA. This is in fact the only way of guarding against a taking out of the NCA by the enemy (e.g., in a decapitation strike with Soviet depressed-trajectory SLBMs launched from nearby combat stations) with a view to preempting the order to launch the retaliatory strike (Blair 1985: 68-69, 96-102, 118-124, 153-154, 178-179, 205-209, 282; Ford 1985: 41-43; Bracken 1983: 22, 229; Pringle & Arkin 1983: 116-122). 16

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Such ominous and accident-prone schemes are not (only) the result of incompetence or cynicism on the part of the Pentagon, but of genuine problems involved with the very notion of assured retaliation. There is simply no recipe for ensuring that retaliation will occur subsequent to an attack that does not simultaneously increase the risk that the putative retaliatory strike might occur by accident. The more safeguards a state builds into its retaliatory forces with a view to minimizing the risks of unauthorized launches, the more options for preventing retaliation will be created for a would-be aggressor. Conversely, the more a state seeks to prevent the latter eventuality by relaxing safeguards, the greater the ensuing risks of unauthorized launches.17 A less radical approximation to this automaticity principle can be found on the substrategic levels of the nuclear command chain. In a conventional war in Europe it is, for example, envisaged at a certain point to delegate tactical nuclear launch authority to field commanders. Indeed, it is even regarded as a deterrent asset, rather than a liability, that the said commanders are bound to be facing "use 'em or lose 'em" dilemmas when confronted with approaching enemy forces. However, whereas such schemes may well have a certain deterrent effect, they also inevitably increase the risk of crossing the nuclear threshold inadvertently. Furthermore, although a number of safeguards have been built into these forces (separation of warheads from launchers, special custodian teams in charge of the warheads, installation of PALs, etc.) with a view to preventing unauthorized launches, such safeguards will gradually have to be removed as the war progresses (or perhaps even under severe crisis conditions) if the deterrent effect of the theater and battlefield nuclear systems is not to be rendered null and void (Kelleher 1987, 1988; Bracken 1987; Field Manual 101-31-1 [1977]). The final presumed escape from the dilemmas has been sought in strategic defenses. By means of effective BMD and similar systems, a state might presumably be able to escape annihilation and defend itself against a first strike on the part of the adversary, hence, it is hoped, minimizing (or perhaps even eliminating) the need for retaliatory capabilities. However, no matter how attractive the notion of strategic defenses may appear as an alternative to nuclear deterrence, defenses are inherently ambiguous if deployed as a supplement to nuclear deterrence. By virtue of defenses, a state might escape the stipulated retaliation of its opponent and thus acquire an actual first-strike and war-winning superiority. Combined with offensive nuclear forces, BMD thus leads to mutual suspicion and spurs armaments dynamics, whereas as a substitute for offensive nuclear forces on both sides, BMD systems become pointless. If neither side has offensive nuclear capabilities, then neither do they need defenses against such (nonexistent) threats (McNamara et al. 1985; Glaser 1986; Stockton 1986).

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NOD and Nuclear Deterrence The numerous and apparently insoluble dilemmas of nuclear deterrence have, understandably, made many critics reject the notion of deterrence altogether. This goes for, inter alia, the peace movements and some of the Social Democratic parties along with other CS proponents. One might even, paradoxically, claim that both superpowers have rejected the notion of nuclear deterrence. Mikhail Gorbachev did so with his proposal to abolish nuclear weapons by the year 2000, and Ronald Reagan nearly did the same in his Star Wars speech of March 1983, wherein he proclaimed his determination to render nuclear missiles "impotent and obsolete." Furthermore, at the 1987 Reykjavik summit the two sides apparently came close to an agreement to this effect.18 In their principled and unqualified rejection, critics seem to disregard the rational nucleus of deterrence, which might be excavated and be worth preserving as one element in a comprehensive strategy of war prevention. Before proceeding with the attempt to extract this rational core, however, a caveat seems in order. Notwithstanding the claims of many deterrence advocates, there is absolutely no empirical evidence in support of deterrence. To argue that the actual absence of major war in Europe since the advent of nuclear weapons constitutes such evidence is tantamount to a post hoc, ergo propter hoc fallacy, based on an entirely spurious correlation. It disregards rather obvious alternative explanations, among them that the USSR may never really have wanted to attack the West, or that it may have been dissuaded by other considerations such as the horrors of conventional war, of which it must have a vivid recollection.19 On the other hand, there is no more empirical foundation for rejecting deterrence than for supporting it. Furthermore, certain assumptions inherent in deterrence thinking do appear plausible (as do, to be sure, some of the critical points). On the presumption of approximate rationality, it does seem plausible that the prospects of boundless destruction of nuclear war, well in excess of any possible gains, will influence to a not negligible degree the cost-benefit calculations of any would-be attacker. There may simply be war plans that are never seriously contemplated because of these prospects, but might well have been so had it not been for nuclear deterrence. Furthermore, nuclear weapons seem to have induced what might be called an international step-gently regime, at least as far as the superpowers and their immediate allies are concerned. The 1973 Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement might be seen as codifying such a regime with its solemn commitment on the part of both superpowers to "act in such a manner as to prevent the development of situations capable of causing a dangerous exacerbation of their relations, as to avoid military confrontations, and as to exclude the outbreak of nuclear war between them and between either of the

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Parties and other countries."20 The question remains, however, whether this step-gently regime is a function of a particular configuration of nuclear forces or simply based on the availability, in principle, of nuclear weapons. "Existential deterrence" (Bundy 1986) might constitute a sufficient explanation of this regime, making operational or postural specifics superfluous. It simply signifies a situation wherein both sides have to reckon with the possibility that nuclear weapons might be used, a prospect only very remotely related to the size of the arsenals, or to specific strategies or postures. Furthermore, whereas the observation that nuclear weapons cannot be disinvented is often used as an argument against abolition, the argument works both ways. Even after a hypothetical complete abolition of nuclear weapons (and regardless of the available means of verification), neither side could ever rule out the possibility that its respective adversary might have concealed a few nuclear warheads or might clandestinely build some. Since even very small numbers would suffice for a tremendous destructive potential, this possibility would inevitably instil some caution. The shadow of nuclear weapons could thus never entirely disappear, at least for as long as wars are conceivable. "Weaponless deterrence" wherein "blueprint deters blueprint" (Schell 1984: 119; cf. Miller 1988) is thus no contradiction in terms, but a genuine possibility. It might well suffice to maintain the benign effects of mutual nuclear deterrence, by, inter alia, rendering notions of total war obsolete. Neither could an aggressor henceforth safely plan to escalate a conventional war beyond bounds, since he would always have to reckon with the possibility of nuclear retaliation; nor could wars any longer be won in the Clausewitzian sense of enforcing on the vanquished a total submission to the will of the victor. The losing side would always retain the last-resort option of negating victory by playing the nuclear card. In this sense, nuclear deterrence would, indeed, strengthen the defender, as has often been claimed by neorealists (Mearsheimer 1989b; 1990; Evera 1990b). Its compelling logic notwithstanding, the present nuclear powers seem most unlikely to place their entire faith in such a scheme, and might be expected to insist on maintaining some actually deployed nuclear forces, if only for the sake of visibility. Some variety of minimum deterrence might thus be the best to hope for, say, until the next millennium. Numerous concrete proposals for the composition of such an arsenal are already available, 21 but I will nevertheless make some suggestions to this effect as well in Chapter 7. Such minimum deterrence might constitute a first step toward blueprint deterrence, which would preserve the benign effects of the deterrence regime while relieving mankind of the danger of global extermination. It remains disputed if, and to what extent, deterrence is compatible with NOD. Certain NOD proponents have advocated not merely a complete abolition of nuclear weapons, but also the replacement of the deterrence

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system with a defensive or common security regime. A principled rejection of existential or minimum deterrence does, however, presuppose a very austere definition of NOD, which is far from logically compelling. Whereas nuclear weapons do enable a state to devastate its opponents, they are not appropriate means of war winning, which requires either invasion capabilities or at least the ability to disarm a defender. Whereas states may, of course, surrender to nuclear blackmail (just as they might to any coercive threat), they cannot be forced to do so. Since states cannot therefore break the will of their adversaries by means of mere threats, they are per implication unable to win Clausewitzian wars by means of only nuclear weapons. Contraintuitive though it may appear, pure deterrence by means of nuclear weapons thus constitutes something less than a genuine offensive capability, albeit undoubtedly also more than a strict defense. 22 A combination of such pure deterrence with NOD is thus at least logically conceivable, as I will attempt to show in the following chapters. The pure deterrence that might accompany NOD would, however, presuppose an NFU strategy. The two are, in fact, connected in several ways, inter alia by emphasizing the same strategic principles (preemption stability, target avoidance, etc.) and by the option of being implemented in the form of zonal arrangements.23 An NFU strategy would, however, be tantamount to abandoning extended deterrence as presently understood. Whether to abandon the presumed coupling of the United States to the defense of Europe by military means will constitute a serious loss depends on whether extended deterrence has ever been a reality. In my opinion, it has never been much more than an elaborate bluff, an assessment shared by, inter alia, Henry Kissinger (1979b), who urged Europeans to "stop asking the USA for assurances they could not possibly mean." 24 Even a withdrawal of such assurances and their material underpinning would, however, be a far cry from a complete withdrawal of the nuclear umbrella, since the USSR would in any event have to reckon with the possibility of a US involvement in any major war in Europe, and therefore with the risk of nuclear escalation. What might bring about such an involvement would, however, not primarily be military, but profoundly political considerations.

Alternative Means oi Dissuasion The present emphasis on nuclear deterrence notwithstanding, there are many other means of dissuading Clausewitzian wars. First, there are various types of conventional deterrence, either in the form of conventional retaliation or deterrence by denial. Second, nonmilitary means of dissuasion might be envisaged as functional substitutes for deterrence. Finally, one might think of more associative, above all political, means of dissuasion.

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Among the advantages of conventional retaliation would allegedly be its more equitable distribution of the burdens of war between the attacker and the defender, as compared with, say, a pure in-depth defense wherein all fighting would take place on the defender's territory. According to the proposals of Huntington and von Muller, the defender should therefore seek to carry the war onto the aggressor's own territory as swiftly as possible. Presuming the USSR to be the aggressor, this would, furthermore, have allowed the West to capitalize on the basic unreliability of the USSR's then allies, as well as on the unstable nature of the USSR iself, where civil disorder, rebellion, and perhaps mutinies might spread in the non-Russian republics, and where the oppressed population would presumably greet the Western forces as liberators rather than as invaders. A second advantage of conventional retaliation would allegedly be to relieve the pressure on the forward defense line, since the invader would have to assign part of his forces to preventing breakthroughs and offensive maneuver warfare by the defender, and consequently have fewer forces available for his own offensive thrust. The reallocation of forces would, however, work both ways, since the defender would also have to allocate forces to counteroffensives, which would be unavailable for forward defense. If, and to what extent, such a reallocation would benefit the defender remains disputed, but it is hard to see why it should automatically be the case.25 The disadvantages of conventional retaliation are both military and political. Militarily, a credible capability for such large-scale offensive operations may well be unachievable and would in any case necessitate a major arms buildup with a distinct emphasis on weapons systems and logistics suitable for offensives. Politically, the will to fund such a buildup would almost certainly not be forthcoming, and futile attempts to shift the strategic emphasis would merely weaken actual defenses without providing any viable alternative. Furthermore, it would violate the political principles of NATO to embark on genuinely offensive ventures, and plans for doing so would undoubtedly result in severe intraalliance disputes. Finally, the offensive capabilities required for retaliatory offensives would be nearly indistinguishable from ordinary offensive capabilities, which might well lead to a new arms race. Since one of the main reasons for the Soviet shift to a defensive strategy seems to have been a reassessment of the Western threat, the Soviet leaders just might reconsider the matter if the West were to deliberately acquire invasion capabilities. Likewise, the operational preparations, say, in times of crisis, for large-scale offensives might well give the adversary an incentive to preempt, because of their similarity to preparations for attack. On balance, therefore, the notion of offensive retaliation seems ill-conceived as well as highly unlikely to be implemented, at least on an alliancewide scale. Furthermore, the strategy is entirely incompatible with NOD, and authors recommending it (e.g., Albrecht von Muller) should not be regarded as genuine NOD proponents.

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NOD has been conceived of as a form of deterrence by denial, which is in fact the traditional approach to war prevention, whereby prospective aggressors are to be dissuaded by the demonstration that they would be unable to attain their goals at acceptable costs. This remains the war prevention strategy of, for example, the European neutrals,26 but there is no a priori reason why it might not constitute a viable strategy for an entire alliance such as NATO. This conventional deterrence has been criticized for having failed too often in the past, and it cannot be denied that wars have, indeed, frequently broken out between conventional and denial-oriented contestants. Those authors nevertheless clearly overstate their point who claim that conventional deterrence has never worked, since nobody knows how many wars might have been fought in the absence of conventional defenses. If any lesson may be derived from history, it is that there is a close correlation between expectations of short wars and deterrence failures. States have almost never launched attacks except when they have expected a swift and decisive victory, for example by means of a blitzkrieg strategy, whereas the prospects of protracted war seem to have appeared utterly unattractive to would-be attackers.27 An appropriate strategy of war prevention might thus be to seek, and subsequently demonstrate, the ability to transform attacks into protracted wars of attrition. In such wars, the inherent advantages of the defense (on which I will elaborate in Chapter 6) would be brought to bear fully, and the attrition rates would, as a general rule, tend to benefit the defender. The cumulative costs incurred by the attacker would thus almost inevitably come to outweigh any conceivable gains of aggression. Of course, this proposition holds true only for contestants of approximately equal strength (measured in terms of mobilization potential), whereas states enjoying an overwhelming superiority might still be able to afford a disproportionate attrition. To what extent such a strategy of protracted war is actually possible to implement under the present circumstances, and whether there might be effective countermeasures against it, is the subject of the next chapter. Suffice it therefore to say that it would seem to hold eminently true for the USSR vis-à-vis NATO. Recognizing their clear inferiority in terms of mobilization potential, Soviet war planners, at least until very recently, seem to have adhered to a blitzkrieg strategy as the only safeguard against the towering uncertainties of a protracted war.28 Compared with nuclear deterrence, this NOD grand strategy is a relatively low-risk strategy. Whereas a breakdown of nuclear deterrence would have utterly disastrous consequences, even a lost conventional war would not constitute a complete and unmitigated disaster, since defeat would never be entirely irreversible, and because damage would be less than total. Needless to say, this should not be taken to imply that defeat in war should be taken

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lightly, and certainly not as implying that defeat would become more likely than is presently the case. Postwar recovery, however, presupposes a certain damage limitation, which is, furthermore, a precondition for dissuasion itself, since states might well fall victims to a paralyzing self-deterrence if defense were tantamount to suicide. Almost all NOD advocates have therefore emphasized damage limitation by, inter alia, avoiding lucrative targets for nuclear and quasinuclear strikes; by refraining from aimed combat in densely populated areas; and by respecting the laws of war so as to provide the attacker with no excuse for their violation. While not allowing for a war without tears, such precautions would contribute to limiting the intensity, and thereby minimizing the destructiveness, of a conventional war. In addition to this conventional deterrence by denial, another form of conventional war prevention sui generis has recently made its appearance, which might, for lack of a better term, be called conventional self-deterrence. Industrial or postindustrial societies such as those in Europe may have become so vulnerable to modern conventional weapons that they would be, to all intents and purposes, annihilated by a war fought in their midst, say, through contamination from chemical plants or nuclear power stations. Whereas some of the conclusions occasionally drawn from these premises (i.a., that defense is futile) seem highly questionable, another conclusion does appear valid: If a conventional war in Europe can only be won by an aggressor through a complete destruction of the envisaged target, then at least Clausewitzian wars are unlikely to be embarked on, because of the would-be attacker's self-deterrence. It simply makes no sense to start a war in order to, at best, conquer a country devastated beyond recovery, particularly not if one's own country might be similarly devastated.29 Nonmilitary Dissuasion Whereas we have thus far dealt exclusively with military means of averting Clausewitzian war, there might also be nonmilitary means of such dissuasion, to which I now give some, admittedly rather superficial and inconclusive, consideration. In principle, there are three forms of nonmilitary dissuasion: civilian-based defense; nonmilitary retaliation; and various associative strategies based on usefulness. According to its proponents, civilian-based (also called nonviolent or social) defense would be a viable functional substitute for a military defense, not merely for war fighting, but also for war prevention purposes. It has, for example, been pointed out that by making society ungovernable by means of civil disobedience, combined with strikes in and sabotage against production facilities, the defenders might demonstrate to prospective attackers that the costs of occupation would outweigh the gains, and thus dissuade an aggression.30

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For all its merits, however, civilian-based defense might, at best, be viable against particular types of aggressors, with particular kinds of war aims, and under specific circumstances, whereas it might well prove largely irrelevant against other types of threats. Against aggressors with economic motives the strategy might well work, whereas it would be to little avail for the prevention of aggression for strategic goals, that is attacks that aim merely at an improvement of the strategic position of the aggressor with a view to, for example, a future war with other states. Nonmilitary retaliation has been tried on several occasions, most recently in the form of the United Nations-imposed blockade of Iraq in punishment for its invasion of Kuwait. In such cases, the basically economic form of retaliation requires some military (in casu naval) underpinnings, whereas other instances of retaliation have been entirely nonmilitary. The economic sanctions imposed on the USSR and Poland subsequent to the military takeover of the latter country in 1981, as well as the boycott-cumembargo of the USSR after its invasion of Afghanistan, were examples of genuinely nonmilitary forms of retaliation. The effectiveness of such means is disputed, and the question whether, for instance, the economic sanctions against Iraq might have rendered Operation Desert Storm superfluous may never be satisfactorily answered. Even though associative strategies fall largely beyond the boundaries of the present investigation, a few observations seem warranted. Countries that are useful to their neighbors (including prospective attackers) in peacetime, while able to withhold their services in retaliation to aggression, may possess an important dissuasive asset, without any of the negative side effects of all types of military deterrence (Galtung 1984: 198-205; cf. Fischer 1982). An often-cited example of such dissuasion through utility was the Swiss WWII policy of permitting some transit between Germany and Italy, while threatening to sever these communication lines if either state should violate Swiss neutrality, a threat rendered all the more credible by the installation of demolition devices in the major mountain tunnels. A more all-encompassing associative war prevention strategy might be the furthering of interdependence in the economic as well as other spheres, the mutual economic benefits flowing from which presuppose peaceful relations, thus serving as a disincentive to war.31 As I hope this analysis has shown, there are several different types of Clausewitzian wars, and per implication a need for a panoply of options tailored for a wide range of contingencies. Unfortunately, it will not suffice to simply cumulate options according to the "the more the better" principle, since there may well be trade-offs between them. By increasing conventional deterrence options, for instance, a state might well give rise to bellicosity in its own ranks and thus raise the likelihood of bellicose wars. The most fundamental and important trade-off, however, seems to be that between preventing premeditated war and avoiding inadvertent wars.

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NOD and Preventive and Preemptive Wars Inadvertent wars come in three basic varieties, two of which might be called security dilemma wars, whereas the third represents a genuine accidental war (Schelling & Halperin 1985: 9-17; cf. Frei & Catrina 1983). The two types of security dilemma wars, that is, preventive and preemptive war, resemble each other so closely that it is often difficult to distinguish between them. The difference is one of degree more than of kind, with the variables being the pace of events and the degree to which military considerations supersede political ones. Preventive wars are started by one side with a deliberate political decision to go to war, a decision that is, however, taken because war is believed to be inevitable, however deplorable. States hitherto enjoying the status of a great power may, for example, experience a gradual decline and hence expect faster-growing states to soon challenge their hegemony. They may thus see themselves facing a choice between waiting for an attack at a time of the adversary's choosing (say, after a further shift of the relative power ratios in the latter's favor), or initiating war themselves under relatively more favorable conditions. The perceived choice is thus not between war and peace, but between war now and war later. The security dilemma comes into play because one side, fearing an attack, tends to respond in ways that make its opponents fear an attack and ipso facto induce them to respond, perhaps by actually attacking. The classical example was WWI, but the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 may well be another, since the imperial government apparently feared an impending US curtailment of their power in the Pacific and may have believed a preventive war to be a lesser evil.32 Preemptive war might be described as fast-pace preventive war. Just as in the former case, the original motive may well be strictly defensive. The party launching the initial attack may do so in the conviction that war is already in progress, either in the sense that the adversary has embarked on the operational preparations for war, or that he has already pushed the button, in which case the best chance of limiting damage and averting defeat may be preemption. Preemption is a reflection of crisis instability that is a characteristic of the interaction between two or several states under conditions wherein military means are employed for purposes short of fighting. Such an interaction constitutes a sequence of actions, perceptions, and reactions. As compared with everyday interaction, however, crisis interaction is more fraught with dangers, because of the short time span, the perceived urgency, the high stakes involved, and above all because of the risk that the military logic may take over in the midst of the crisis.33 Scenarios of preemptive nuclear war abound for the obvious reason that it strains the imagination to envisage a state deliberately opting for nuclear

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war, regardless of how adverse or even deteriorating the strategic balance may be, still less doing so in the hope of positive gain. The reason for the emphasis on preemptive nuclear war may thus not so much be its likelihood, as the extreme improbability of other causes of war. Furthermore, the very setting of nuclear warfare makes preemption more conceivable. As far as strategic nuclear forces are concerned, decisionmaking is highly centralized and under extreme time pressures. Rather than consisting of a series of minor decisions by military field commanders, nuclear decisionmaking is highly compressed, spatially (within the NCA) and temporarily (within the approximately thirty minutes it would take a Soviet ICBM to reach CONUS, or vice versa) as well as logically (go or no go choices) (see Bracken 1983; Ford 1985; Blair 1985,1987). If a state's nuclear deterrent is perceived to be vulnerable to enemy strikes, the decisionmakers may find themselves facing a choice between launching the missiles and bombers preemptively or risking having them taken out by the enemy and thus rendered impotent. At the very least a loosening of peacetime safeguards is likely to occur with a view to allowing for a prompt response when an attack is believed to be imminent, for example, through LOW or at least LUA. It is thus perfectly conceivable that a nuclear war might ensue from reciprocal fears of surprise attack, with one party striking first in the erroneous belief that the opponent had already done so (Schelling 1960: 207-229). Even though the conventional realm has hitherto received considerably less attention in terms of analyses of security dilemma wars, preemptive conventional wars are certainly conceivable, and at least one may actually have occurred: the 1967 June War between the Arab countries and Israel, prior to which the Arab states had made no secret of their hostile intentions toward Israel, had mobilized to a considerable extent, poised their forces for attack, etc. The war was nevertheless launched by Israel, which, by means of a preemptive attack against the Arab airfields, managed to effectively defeat its opponents in a few hours. If the Japanese had succeeded in destroying the US aircraft carriers at Pearl Harbor in 1941, something roughly similar might, furthermore, have occurred, since Japan might have been able to establish command of the seas, at least in the Pacific, by virtue of an unchallenged naval air supremacy.34 Whereas it is thus sometimes possible to wipe out an opponent's aerial power (and perhaps most of his naval power) in a bold preemptive strike, nothing exactly like this seems conceivable as far as ground forces are concerned. In the ground dimension the pace of military events is inevitably slower, and it may hence be more appropriate to speak about risks of preventive, rather than preemptive, war. Chains of events approximately similar to those above might, however, ensue from, for example, a political crisis, in the course of which war may become gradually less and less inconceivable.

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Once war comes to be viewed by one or both sides as a serious possibility, factors such as mobilization leads, readiness of forces, force ratios, etc. become important, occasionally even decisive. If one party should embark on mobilization (say, by calling up reserves) and initiate a redeployment of certain forces (say, by moving them closer to the border), then the adversary might feel forced to reciprocate and follow suit in order not to be caught off guard and defenseless. Such a process may well acquire a considerable built-in momentum, and a point may eventually be reached when a decision has to be taken, since the level of mobilization cannot be maintained indefinitely. A choice may have to be made between either stepping down and demobilizing (but thereby perhaps allowing the other side to prevail if it should choose to strike) or striking first oneself (cf. Karber 1986: 30-32). A large-scale first-strike premium is thus conceivable, which just might lead to a peculiar mixture of preventive and preemptive war wherein the decision to go to war may well be political, yet determined by military imperatives, thus tantamount to a military decision taken by politicians. In many respects this was exactly what happened in July 1914, when the political leaders of both opposing alliances saw no escape from war, because of the very rigid mobilization schemes, the fixed and immutable timetables, and so on.35 Similar first-strike premiums en miniature can be found on the tactical and perhaps operational levels, as a few examples show: • The commander of a surface ship approaching an enemy warship may, for example, have to choose between firing first or risking being sunk by the opponent's guns, torpedoes, or antiship missiles. • The commander of a tank battalion facing the enemy's tanks in an eyeball-to-eyeball stand may be under severe pressure to fire first. The commander of an air squadron may be inclined to order his planes on airborne alert so as to diminish their vulnerability to enemy OCA strikes. Once airborne, however, the squadron would be under severe time pressure, since a return to base might be suicidal, from which follows an obvious incentive to seek lucrative enemy targets before the fuel tanks are emptied.36 In themselves such tactical decisions would, of course, not lead to war. Under tense political conditions, however, diplomacy may be rendered largely ineffective, because basically unbelievable. Everybody realizes that a prospective attacker would be likely to deny any plans for war, and proclamations of peaceful intent are hence unbelievable. Under such circumstances, incidents like the ones above might lead to chain reactions entailing retaliation to an initial (perhaps inadvertent) provocation, retaliation to the retaliation, etc.

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The basic cause of preemptive as well as preventive wars, and the feature that makes the description of them as security dilemma wars appropriate, is the element of ambiguity of military precautions. There is usually no way for an adversary to distinguish between strictly defensive precautions and preparations for an attack, since the same units are being mobilized, the same weapons systems are being readied, and so forth, in both cases. The party seeking to dissuade a war may thus actually provoke it, most often as the outcome of a chain reaction of responses, counterresponses, etc. The identification of this element of ambiguity as decisive constitutes the point of departure for NOD, among the highest-ranking goals of which has always been the prevention of inadvertent war in general, and the improvement of crisis stability in particular. In this respect, NOD theory has drawn heavily on the voluminous literature on stable deterrence.37 According to this theoretical tradition, crisis stability and instability are largely functions of the composition and deployment pattern of forces. In order to maximize stability, these ought to be as invulnerable as possible so as not to provide the adversary with any options for successful preemptive strikes; hence, inter alia, the rationales for the sea-based deterrent and for mobile, as opposed to silo-based, ICBMs. 38 From this prescription, NOD has borrowed the notion of avoiding lucrative targets through, inter alia, dispersal of forces: the no-target principle. Furthermore, according to stable deterrence theory, states should refrain from posing threats to their adversaries that might give the latter incentives to preempt, for example by not possessing HTK capabilities sufficient for disarming the foe. The NOD derivative thereof is the recommendation for unmistakably defensive forces that cannot be misinterpreted as threatening. Were the current ambivalent forces of offensive as well as defensive utility to be replaced with strictly defensive ones, a number of the aforementioned problems would presumably vanish. There would no longer be any incentives for either of the two opposing sides to start a preventive war or to launch a preemptive strike. On the contrary, waiting for the opponent to launch the attack would become advantageous, since by doing so the attacker would merely expose himself, thus allowing the defender to prevail. Furthermore, a strictly defensively armed state might safely mobilize if it felt threatened without fear of thereby provoking an otherwise avoidable war. The surprise factor is of particular importance, since it would only make sense to attack in the midst of a crisis if it were possible thereby to eliminate the respective opponent's retaliatory and defensive capabilities in a bold strike. Adequate surveillance and timely early warning are thus of paramount importance as preconditions for political, rather than military, decisionmaking. The surprise factor is, however, also a function of the deployment of forces: The shorter the time required to prepare for attack and move forces into position, the greater the potential surprise effect, and the more unstable the situation.

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Certain varieties of NOD would go some way toward solving this problem by virtue of the envisaged withdrawal of offensive-capable forces from the front line, say in the framework of a tank-free zone. Such zones would improve crisis stability by prolonging warning (e.g., by serving as early warning devices), since an opponent would have to move his forces and weapons systems into the prohibited zone before launching his attack, thus alerting the defender to the imminent assault. The same effect might be achieved by, for example, pulling back ammunition depots, bridge-building equipment, and the like. These benign effects do, however, presuppose that the defender maintains adequate capabilities of forward defense, regardless of his withdrawal of certain forces from the border region. If not, the defender might feel inclined to reintroduce his own heavy and offensive-capable formations into the zone in times of crisis, which might lead to a malign interaction, since this forward movement would resemble preparations for an attack (cf. Unterseher 1987).39 A NOD-type defender would, furthermore, be in a better position to respond adequately to any warnings, by virtue of the elimination of selfdeterrence. With only ambivalent forces available, states would be facing what might be called the preparedness versus provocation dilemma on the receipt of (often ambiguous) early warning. They might have to choose between, on the one hand, taking adequate defense precautions, which might be interpreted as preparations for an attack, and might thus trigger an otherwise avoidable war; and, on the other hand, accepting paralysis, thus exposing themselves to an attack. With strictly defensive forces, however, this uncomfortable choice could be circumvented, and defense preparations safely taken without fear of provocative effects. NOD and Accidental War Whereas both preventive and preemptive wars were inadvertent, they were nevertheless purposive, intended by their instigators to accomplish something. Accidental wars, however, are inadvertent in a more profound sense, serving no purpose whatsoever. This category may be particularly relevant for the nuclear realm, at least if understood narrowly to mean wars caused by (technical) malfunctions. Numerous studies have demonstrated how technical sophistication is not necessarily an asset, but may on certain occasions turn out to be a liability. As a general rule, the greater the number of subsystems, the greater the aggregate risk of failure in one of them. If all the subsystems are interlinked into a coherent whole, the aggregate risk of malfunction may thus amount to the sum of the probabilities of subsystem failures. This fact (well known from, e.g., household appliances) may hold true for an entire military apparatus, where chain reactions between subsystems (perhaps of the size of,

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say, NORAD, the Fifth Fleet, or the Western TVD) may add up to a compounded malfunction. The worst imaginable malfunction of this kind would be a nuclear war by accident (cf. Bracken 1985; Frei & Catrina 1983: 155-166; Smoker & Bradley 1988). What might be called the nuclear system is composed of a multitude of subsystems, including, for example, ICBM silos, SSBNs, communications antennae, early warning satellites, ASAT systems, and the NCA and other command posts. Each of these subsystems is subject to a finite probability of malfunction and is, furthermore, so closely interlinked with all others that it is presumably possible to calculate the compounded probability of a nuclear war. This might be triggered by, for instance, a false warning signal, giving rise to a raised level of alert, being detected by the adversary, who would respond (Bracken 1983: 52-68 et passim; cf. Blair 1987; Lodgaard 1987). Although such chains of events may well be conceivable as far as the strategic arsenals of the superpowers are concerned, especially if the technical accident should happen during a period of intense political crisis, it is difficult to imagine a war on the conventional level being thus started accidentally. Still, if this should in fact constitute a serious risk, a conversion to a NOD posture would probably have benign effects. Most NOD models imply a certain decentralization of the military apparatus, and would thus allow for a more rapid containment of any failures. Especially the replacement of a hierarchical with a weblike C3I structure should render the total system effectiveness less susceptible to subsystem malfunction and, conversely, prevent malign chain reactions.40

Conclusion Although I have hitherto distinguished between wars according to their underlying motivation, this is, of course, an oversimplification. There is no such thing as one motive or cause of a state's embarkment on war, because, inter alia, a state is an abstraction, which in actual fact comprises numerous and often competing groups, which frequently have widely divergent interests. What constitutes a bellicose war for one group, and perhaps a Clausewitzian war for another, may well amount to an inadvertent war on the national level of analysis. Furthermore, even if one motive does constitute the decisive cause of the start of a war, additional motives and goals may well emerge in the course of a war in progress. Although the war may be inadvertent, opportunities for political gain and even territorial aggrandizement may ensue, which may be irresistible, hence transforming the war into a Clausewitzian war on the part of the original defender. As already mentioned, war prevention is such a multifaceted task that it requires a whole panoply of options. NOD provides for a certain range of

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options, although it deliberately omits such military options as preemptive strike, large-scale offensives, OCA, etc. As has, I hope, emerged from the above analysis, the available options should, in principle, suffice for preventing the types of war mentioned in the sections above. Offensive capabilities do not appear necessary for the prevention of bellicose or Clausewitzian war and seem to be positively counterproductive for the prevention of the various types of inadvertent war. This assessment, however, presupposes that the defensive strategies would actually work. In order to analyze this claim, it is necessary to translate the above abstract principles into more-concrete military planning schemes and weapons procurement plans, a matter that forms the subject of Chapter 8.

Notes 1. On the dichotomy between direct and structural violence, see Galtung 1969. 2. The general attitude of Islam to war is, however, by no means favorable, and war is regarded as legitimate only in defense of the true believers. See, e.g., the Quran, Skhura 2, verses 191 and 219. On modern (ab)use of jihad, see, e.g., Jansen 1979: 25-29; Creveld 1991: 139-142. 3. Mao Zedong 1936; Lin Piao 1965; Tito 1966; Guevara 1960; Giap 1970; cf., for analyses of guerrilla wars, Beaufre 1972; Baylis 1987; Chaliand 1982: 1-34; Shy and Collier 1986; M0ller 1991c. 4. Huntington 1957. For a study of the Danish officers' corps, see S0rensen 1988. Cf., for the historical case, Evera 1984, 1985; J. Snyder 1984; Wallach 1967, 1972: 89-164. On the Red Army, see, e.g., the alleged Soviet defector "Victor Suvorov" 1981, 1984: 295-342; and for a more sober assessment, Cockburn 1984: 80-119. 5. A moderate example of this interpretation is Caldicott 1985: 308349. I encountered more-extreme views when I participated (in a consultant's capacity) in the annual session of Women for a Meaningful Summit in the Aegean Sea in April-May 1988. 6. For a brilliant analysis of Clausewitzian war, see Creveld 1991, who prefers the term trinitarian war and finds it more culture-dependent than is usually presumed. 7. On the Soviet Union's presumed wartime objective to establish an alternative socioeconomic base of communism in Western Europe, see MccGwire 1987a: 73, 102. 8. On the crusades, see Carlton 1990: 95-109. A good example of the ideological interpretation of the USSR is Pipes 1984: 37-48 et passim; cf. Marx 1867: 790-791. 9. On aerial bombardment, see Douhet 1942; Warner 1941; Maclsaac 1986. On "the heritage of Douhet" in the nuclear age, see Brodie 1959: 71-106. On conventional retaliation, see Huntington 1983; Miiller 1986. 10. On the political background for the adoption of the doctrine, see Gaddis 1982; 127-197. See also the various analyses contained in Lynn-Jones et al. 1990. 11. For critical analyses of the fundamental problems of deterrence, see Wiberg 1989; Buzan 1987a: 163-196; Jervis 1982b; Lebow 1983, 1985a;

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MccGwire 1986. Cf., on the "put up or shut up" dilemma, Kaufmann 1956: 24. 12. Cf., for a critique, Harvard Nuclear Study Group 1983: 171-174; Jervis 1984: 111-118; Nacht 1985: 67-74. For an alternative theory of the rationale behind the MX, see, e.g., Aldridge 1983: 103-132. 13. On the ethical dilemmas of deterrence, see Shue 1989; McCall and Ramsbotham 1990. 14. For principled discussions of the issue, see, e.g., Kissinger 1969; Martin 1979. For critical views, see, e.g., Brodie 1959: 329; Clark 1982: 203237 et passim. For the actual development of the arsenal, see, e.g., Ball 1986; Pringle and Arkin 1983. For the shifting rationales, see, e.g., Schilling 1981; Ikl6, Wohlstetter et al. 1987. For the developments in NATO, see Stromseth 1988; Sigal 1983: 7-24. On the damage resulting from limited nuclear war in Europe, see Weizsäcker 1971; Kendall 1989; Lindop 1989; Clarke 1986. On the role of limitation in Soviet nuclear strategy, see Catudal 1988: 97-123; Holloway 1983: 29-57. 15. For the view that a war-waging and -winning capability should be sought deliberately, see Gray 1984. 16. For an assessment of US vulnerability to decapitation attacks, see Carter 1987b. 17. On peacetime safeguards, Cotter 1987: 42-54. On the trade-offs, see, e.g., Carter 1987c. 18. Gorbachev's speech is excerpted in Survival, 28 (3) (March-June 1986): 246-249; cf. Garthoff 1990: 94-148. The relevant passages of the Star Wars speech can be found in Miller and Evera 1986: 257-258. On Reykjavik, see, e.g., Mandelbaum and Talbott 1987: 171-181. 19. Recent examples of such support of deterrence include Gaddis 1986; Mearsheimer 1990. The possible dissuasive effects of the horrors of conventional war are explored in Mueller 1989. 20. See Garthoff 1985: 334-344; cf. George 1988a. The full text is included in Allison and Williams 1990: 269-271. 21. Szilard 1964; cf., for a modern version, Feiveson et al. 1985; and for a Soviet view, Arbatov 1989a. 22. Erwin Müller (1986b: 82-92, 133-137, cf. 1986a: 174-176) uses the term defensive in the second grade. For a critical analysis of the notion of nuclear blackmail, see Betts 1987. 23. Bundy et al. 1982; UCS 1983; Steinbruner and Sigal 1983; Blackaby et al. 1984. On the connections between NFU and NOD, see Afheldt 1984b; M0ller 1988b. On the combination of nuclear-weapons-free and various types of defensive zones, see M0ller 1985, 1987a, 1988b; Lodgaard and Thee 1983; Lodgaard 1987; Lodgaard and Berg 1985; Bahr et al. 1988. 24. On extended deterrence in general, see, e.g., Ravenal 1988; Sigal 1983: 7-23. 25. Proposals for conventional retaliation include Huntington 1983; Müller 1986; cf., for a critique, Mearsheimer 1981; Dunn and Staudenmaier 1985. 26. On neutrality in general, see Hakovirta 1988; Lutz and Grosse-Jutte 1982; Fuhrer 1987; Danspeckgruber 1986; Kruzel 1989. On Austria, see Bundeskanzleramt 1985; Rotter 1984; Vetschera 1985, 1986. On Switzerland, see Cramer 1984; Däniker 1987; Spillmann 1989. On Yugoslavia, see Lukic 1984; Bebler 1987. On Sweden, see Agrell 1979; Andren 1989. On Finland, see Ries 1989a, b; FCMH 1985. 27. This is the main conclusion from Mearsheimer's (1983) analysis of conventional deterrence. 28. Vigor 1983; Hines and Petersen 1984; Petersen 1987. Cf., on the new

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defensive emphasis in Soviet strategy, MccGwire 1987b, 1991; J. Snyder, 1986, 1987; Holden 1991. 29. See, on what I have called the totally destructive conventional war thesis, Gorbachev 1988: 195-196; cf. Schmidt and Schwarz 1988. This thesis is criticized in M0ller 1989e, f, where some attention is also given to damage limitation. 30. Good examples of this strategy, which place some emphasis on dissuasion, are Galtung 1976: 280-340, 378-426; Roberts 1976; Boserup and Mack 1974; Ebert 1981; Mellon et al. 1985; Sharp 1985; Sharp and Jenkins 1990. Elaborate proposals for a combination of civilian-based defense with NOD are Galtung 1984, 1988: 42-60; Nolte and Nolte 1984; Fischer et al. 1987; cf. M0ller 1991b. 31. On interdependence, see Keohane and Nye 1977; Tromp 1988. For a critical view, see Haas 1987. 32. On WWI as a preventive war, see Taylor 1969; Tuchman 1962; Miller 1985. For alternative views, see, e.g., Levy 1990; Trachtenberg 1990; Geiss 1985a, b; 1990. On Pearl Harbor, see Hart 1973: 221-250; Wohlstetter 1962. 33. A good description of the interaction pattern is the stimulus-response model of Holsti et al. 1969. More-complex models can be found in Brecher and Wilkenfeld et al. 1989; cf. Lebow 1981: 7-13. For various descriptions of the decisionmaking setting of the Cuban missile crisis, see, e.g., Allison 1971; Kennedy 1969. An even better description is provided by the transcripts of the ExComm meetings: Anon. 1985; Bundy and Blight 1987. 34. On the June War, see O'Ballance 1972: 49-84. On Pearl Harbor, see Watson 1948; Wohlstetter 1962. 35. Tuchman 1962; Taylor 1966. For a critique, see Trachtenberg 1990; Levy 1990. For an interpretation of German behavior as fundamentally warprone, see Geiss 1985a, b; 1990. 36. On the vulnerability of warships, see Schmahling 1990b. On the Berlin crisis, see Blechman and Kaplan 1978: 432-434. 37. See, e.g., the seminal work on NOD: Afheldt 1976, which laid the theoretical foundations for all subsequent NOD thinking, including the present work. 38. Wohlstetter 1958; Scoville 1973; Garwin 1983. For recommendations of the mobile ICBM Midgetman, see Scowcroft Commission 1983. 39. This critical point seems to rule out certain NOD schemes as too unstable, such as those of Loser (1982a, b; 1989); von Miiller (1986); and von Biilow (1986, 1988). 40. The most comprehensive study of this topic is Grin 1990.

6 N O D AND TRADITIONAL STRATEGY The analysis so far has found NOD to have the potential of breaking the momentum of the arms race, of making wars less likely, and of being compatible with the present alliance structure as well as with a less rigid one in the future. These findings were, however, based on a number of assumptions: first, that a distinction between offensive and defensive strategies and postures was possible; second, that a stricdy defensive type of defense could be devised; and third, that such a defense would be sufficiently effective, even without recourse to offensive operations or nuclear escalation. To assess these premises is our present task, and a theoretical comparison of NOD with traditional strategy is attempted (in Chapter 7, we will turn to a concrete analysis of how the basic NOD principles might be applied to the three main military environments, i.e., to land, air, and maritime forces, as well as to the metaenvironment of nuclear forces). The Essence of Strategy NOD is a particular species of the genus military strategy, in its turn defined rather narrowly by Clausewitz (1980: 84, 34 [1832: Bks. 2.1, 1.1.24]) as "the use of engagements for the objects of war" (in its turn "a continuation of politics by other means"), whereas twentieth-century strategists have tended to define the subject in broader terms as, inter alia, "the distribution and application of military means to fulfil the ends of politics" (Liddell Hart 1974: 321), or "the art of applying force in order to attain the ends of politics" (Beaufre 1963: 16; cf. Gamett 1987). Strategy is thus conceived of as subordinated to politics, yet as ranking at the pinnacle of the theoretical hierarchy of military science. In order to provide politics with the required means, however, strategy stands in need of both functional and structural implementation: first, in concrete plans for military activities, that is, tactics ("the use of armed forces in combat," according to Clausewitz); and second, in the material means for performing such activities, that is, military postures. Western military theory has, at least until recently, applied a simple dichotomous ordering of military science into strategy and tactics, plus an 131

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ill-defined and blurred notion of doctrine (as in "the FOFA doctrine"). It has been recommended that this terminology be refined by adding the notions of "grand strategy," ranking above strategy, and "operational art," in an intermediate position between strategy and tactics.1 Soviet military science has been more systematically ordered and divided its subject matter roughly into four parts: doctrine, the primarily political assignment of military means to political ends (i.e., roughly comparable to grand strategy); strategy, the application of military means to these objectives; operational art, the science of major operations within a vast theater of military operations (TVD); and finally, tactics, relating to the activities of individual formations in single engagements (see, e.g., Lider 1983; Savkin 1972; Arbatov 1988).

Table 6.1 The Terminology of Military Science Western Terminology

Soviet Terminology

Politics (grand strategy)

Politics (doctrine)

Strategy

Strategy

Doctrine (operational art)

Operational art

Tactics

Tactics

Strategies are teleological, that is, conceived of as means to an end, and to ask whether they are true is thus meaningless. What matters is whether they work, that is, provide the state in question with a sufficient panoply of relevant options (Gray 1982: 99). Neither do strategies, however, spring out of nothing, nor are states entirely at liberty to select strategies from a permanently available menu. At any given time and place there is a finite range of possible strategies from which the choice can be made. The determinants of strategy that define the width of this range can be divided by a matrix of constant and variable as well as contextual and intrinsic factors, as illustrated in Table 6.2. Among the variable factors are, first of all, politics, that is, the deliberate choices states make about the ends for which to employ military means; second, the continuous technological development that determines which military options are available at any given time, as well as the relative merits of various options; third, the economy, which determines, inter alia, the extent to which technological opportunities can be exploited, as well as the total amount of resources available for military purposes; and fourth,

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Table 6.2 Determinants of Strategy Variable Factors Contextual Factors

Intrinsic Factors

Politics Technology Economy Societal structure

Constant Factors Geography

Principles of war

societal or organizational factors that determine, inter alia, the nature and organization of the available manpower. Among the constant factors are geography, which constitutes the to all practical intents and purposes (albeit not logically) immutable context of military operations. There are also, at least according to most authors, a number of timeless principles or laws at work, comparable to, say, the laws of geometry or physics (cf. Jones 1988; Bellamy 1990: 7-29). I will briefly survey each of these sets of determinants with a view to assessing the range of available options and thus determining whether NOD might be accommodated therein. In other words, NOD just might require unavailable technologies, or infeasible forms of enlistment, or be adequate only for countries with very particular geographic features; or it might violate certain basic laws, which might be truly valid and timeless. If any of these hypotheses should be confirmed, NOD would have to be dismissed unless appropriately modified. Technology exerts a determining influence on modern military operations and postures. This is, however, a fairly recent phenomenon, and throughout previous centuries the technologies relevant for warfare changed only slightly and at a very slow pace (see Creveld 1989; Dupuy 1980; Warner 1989; Ropp 1962; Howard 1976; McNeill 1983; Johansson 1988; Bellamy 1990: 30-52). The classical strategists hence paid almost no attention to technology and presumed their strategic discoveries and inventions to possess perennial validity. One of the very first to take the impact of technology on warfare seriously was a Polish banker, Ivan Bloch, who accurately predicted the stalemate that actually ensued in WWI, but whose advice was completely disregarded by professional strategists (Bloch 1889; cf. Howard 1985). Today, however, the impact of technology on strategy is almost universally acknowledged. The magnitude of this impact can be gathered from a diachronical comparison, say, between the ancient Greek infantry (the hoplites) and modem infantry in the motorized rifle, mechanized infantry, or

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Panzergrenadier formations of the USSR, the United States, and the FRG, respectively. Most conspicuously, technology has affected the types of weapons wielded by the infantry. The basic armaments of ancient infantry comprised spears, swords, and shields, and it was occasionally assisted by special detachments of archers or cavalry. Modern infantry, however, has at its disposal a broad panoply of weapons for both close and fairly long-range combat: handguns, machine guns, and bayonets for close-in fighting and selfdefense; mortars, ATGMs, and portable SAMs for stand-off combat; minelaying and mine-clearing equipment, etc. Furthermore, modern infantry divisions include integrated tank battalions (i.e., modern heavy cavalry) and artillery, as well as occasionally helicopters (i.e., airborne light cavalry); all integrated into the infantry formations, which thus almost constitute miniature armies with several service arms.2 The decisive determinant of strategic change has not so much been the invention of particular weapons as their introduction on a massive scale, as well as the synergetic combined arms contexts wherein they have appeared. The invention of gunpowder was, for instance, of little use to musketeers without shielding detachments of pikemen. Until the introduction of the bayonet, it thus required tactical skills to exploit the technological innovation.3 Technology has also influenced mobility. Whereas the Greek infantry marched afoot (occasionally assisted by horse cavalry for scouting and other puiposes), modem infantry is almost entirely mechanized, tends to fight from mounted positions, and is thus, by several orders of magnitude, more mobile than its predecessors. This enhanced mobility is not merely a function of innovations in the means of transportation, but also of the relationship between these and the weapons.4 Logistics influence military capabilities to at least the same extent as weapons, in which connection the general technological level of developments plays at least as great a part as military technology. Small surplus production, for example, does not allow for the maintenance of large armies over protracted periods, and thus points toward short campaigns fought by rather small armies, and preferably over short distances from home. In modern times, however, the high level of productivity and effective system of transportation permit the fielding of huge armies, operating far from home over protracted periods (McNeill 1983: 222-306). Finally, technology has enhanced the opportunities of commanding large and scattered forces by several orders of magnitude: The ancient Greeks relied on visible and audible signs for tactical C 3 I, and on messengers for longrange communication, whence a strategic emphasis on short distances and small forces. Furthermore, military operations were generally slower, because of the span of weeks between events and the strategic responses

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thereto. By comparison, in modern armies command is close to real time; tactical communication is close to instantaneous thanks to radio and spacebased communications systems; and superior as well as field commanders have an almost real-time view of the battlefield. The battlefield has thus expanded as well as become more transparent, and the pace as well as the impact (in terms of destruction) of events has increased considerably. Strategic results may now be a matter of minutes or hours, rather than of months or years.5 Technology has thus revolutionized warfare, even as far as the most oldfashioned forces (in casu infantry) are concerned, and has hence provided strategists with a much more varied panoply of options to take into consideration. Nevertheless, strategic sea changes have not been caused by particular wonder weapons, nor is there any reason to expect this to be any different in the future. What matters will, at most, be the introduction on a massive scale of whole categories of weapons in complex synergies with other technologies, as well as the strategic decisions made for their utilization (Dupuy 1980: 301-307). 6 Economy is obviously of tremendous importance for what strategic options a state possesses. A certain productive surplus is, for instance, a precondition for allocating resources from civilian to military consumption and hence for assertive power politics by military means. From this does not, however, follow that prosperous countries have a higher propensity for war, since they also have better reasons to be content with the status quo than crisis-ridden and impoverished ones, which may occasionally embark on offensive ventures in a desperate fuit en avant. The availability of resources for military use reflects economic factors only as filtered through politics, and thus also depends on the preferences of the population and the extent to which these are taken into account. In totalitarian states civilian consumption may be allowed to suffer more severely than is the case in democracies, many of which have recently experienced serious difficulties with increasing military expenditures at the expense of the welfare state. Whereas economic factors thus determine strategy, the opposite may also be true, since a conversion from military to civilian production and consumption (as now seems to be on the agenda) may necessitate a change of strategy. Furthermore, positions of economic inferiority may rule out particular strategies, while making others advantageous. The postwar Soviet proclivity for blitzkrieg may thus be due to their clear economic inferiority, that is, the one-dimensional nature of their power, implying that they would be sure to lose a protracted war of attrition. Finally, economic potentials also determine the extent to which the aforementioned technological opportunities can actually be exploited. The stronger the economy, the larger is usually also the R&D budget, and the greater the possibilities of mass-producing sophisticated weaponry.7

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Societal factors influence, inter alia, the terms under which the armed forces are enlisted or employed, in their turn determining what types of operations are possible. The armies of the Greek city-states were, for instance, usually loyal and often imbued with considerable heroism, but the fact that the male, free, adult population rarely exceeded a few thousand individuals placed narrow limits to their size, factors that boded for heroic, yet distinctly small-scale, warfare. The mercenaries of the Middle Ages and the Renaissance as well as the peasant armies commanded by the landed nobility, in their turn reflecting the struggle between feudalism and the monarchial state, were rather ineffective instruments of war, albeit for different reasons. Whereas mercenary captains, such as the Italian condottieri, were often very competent commanders, they suffered from combat avoidance because of their eagerness to preserve their capital, that is, their armed forces. The peasant armies, in their turn, were often poorly led as well as equipped, of questionable loyalty, and with limited combat skills. All of these factors boded for protracted and indecisive warfare, wherein actual combat was an exception and evasive maneuvering the general rule, presenting only few opportunities for innovative strategists.8 The French Revolution and the subsequent Napoleonic empire constituted the first experiments with universal conscription (la levée en masse) and a general war economy, which vastly increased the mobilizable resources. This paved the way for the Napoleonic revolution in warfare, wherein true mass armies operated with enhanced flexibility and over very long distances. In addition to these social factors, the Napoleonic revolution also drew heavily on the strategic reformers of the ancien régime (De Saxe, Guibert, and others), whose ideas now became ripe for implementation. The absolutist Prussian state wielded another, likewise highly effective, new type of armed forces, commanded by a highly competent and dedicated professional officers' corps, trained in the newly established military academies.9 In modern, Western-type societies, armed forces are fielded in three different basic modes, as well as various combinations thereof: 1. 2. 3.

Professional armed forces, normally found, for example, in the US and British armies. Universal male conscription of regular forces, found in most European countries. Militia forces, as found in Switzerland and to some extent in, for example, Austria and Finland.

Each particular type has its specific strengths and weaknesses, and lends itself particularly to certain forms of warfare, thus determining what options strategists have at their disposal.

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Professional soldiers, on the one hand, usually serve for long periods and are often imbued with a considerable service loyalty that tends to enhance discipline, making them eminently suitable for demanding, offensive-type operations. On the other hand, employment within the rank and file of the armed forces tends to be a low-status occupation, attracting primarily the underprivileged strata of society with the shortest education, factors that detract somewhat from the skills of such forces. Finally, professional forces are expensive and therefore tend to be rather small, thus more suitable for, say, interventionary purposes than for defense against large-scale invasion. It is probably no coincidence that the two (thanks to their insular position) least exposed countries in the Western Hemisphere have chosen this alternative, whereas countries on the immediate front line have opted for other solutions. Conscripts tend to be comparatively cheap and to represent a fair sample of the (male) population, both as far as their level of education and so on is concerned, and in terms of attitudes. The typical length of service (one to two years) allows for an adequate drill in the most important types of combat, an arrangement enabling states with conscript armies to field rather numerous armed forces in case of an emergency. By virtue thereof, this mode of enlistment is well suited for defensive purposes, particularly when adequate strategic warning can be counted on. Militias provide the greatest mobilization potential, but standing forces of states with militia systems tend to be minuscule. Furthermore, the bulk of the armed forces are usually rather primitively equipped and possess only elementary military skills. By virtue thereof, militias are quite inadequate for offensive operations, while eminently suitable for defensive purposes, albeit dependent on timely warning, which explains their particular attractiveness to countries in the second defense line, rather than to front-line states (cf. Bald; 1987; Bald and Klein 1988). The mode of enrollment is not a matter of entirely free political choice. It is, for example, well-nigh inconceivable to introduce a militia system (implying, inter alia, arming of the entire male population) in countries or regions with severe internal conflicts (say, in Ulster or Cyprus). Most Western states are, however, so internally stable as to possess a genuine choice between the three basic options, as may be gathered from, for instance, the US swing between the draft and an all-volunteer force, or from the mixed enlistment systems applied by most West European states. That geography is an important determinant of strategy seems so obvious as to need only little elaboration. Island states tend to value navies over land forces; mountainous countries tend to place less emphasis on armored, mechanized warfare than do flat ones, etc. In addition to such trivial factors, particular terrain features also influence those strategies that are successful, whereas poor strategies tend to pay insufficient attention to topographical particularities. The Finnish defense forces were, for instance,

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quite successful during the Winter War by virtue of their being eminently equipped for, as well as trained to fight under, Finland's extreme climatic and topographical conditions. Whereas the Soviet invaders were likewise accustomed to the cold, they were equipped for combat only in open spaces and experienced tremendous difficulties fighting in the snow-covered Finnish forests and frozen marshes. That mountains are advantageous for a defender has been known by the Swiss armed forces for centuries and was recently demonstrated by the Afghan mujahidin. Even though the defensive advantages of mountains (stemming above all from the ability to look down on the adversary from elevated positions, as well as from the general inaccessibility of alpine regions) have been somewhat modified by air power, they continue to represent insurmountable obstacles to, say, armored and mechanized invaders. Forested terrain in general, and jungles in particular, provide the defenders with many advantages by virtue of their abundant cover and nature's many obstacles to the invader's mobility. Although, once again, air power does slightly qualify these advantages, neither aircraft nor helicopters have been convincingly effective in, say, jungle antiguerrilla warfare. Even water may under certain conditions present a topographical diversity that can be exploited by the armed forces. Currents as well as differentials in terms of salinity may for instance hamper ASW in seas such as the Baltic, just as the marginal ice rims of the Arctic oceans provide excellent acoustic cover for (strategic) submarines.10 Geography thus presents strategists with a number of constraints as well as opportunities, which are, on the one hand, constant, but which, on the other hand, can occasionally be overcome by means of new technologies, or through skillful strategic and tactical adaptation. Some analysts, notably Richard Simpkin (1986: 57-77), have even sought to lay the foundations for a scientific study of what they call the physics of war, consisting in very abstract rules concerning the appropriate types of maneuvers for specific types of ground, almost tantamount to a choreography of maneuver warfare. Whereas the technological, societal, and geographical features constitute contextual (i.e., external) factors from the point of view of strategy, strategy is presumably also governed by an intrinsic logic, to which prospective strategists, herein included NOD proponents, have to conform. The principles of war are presumably immutable when reduced to their abstract form and give rise to variation only when applied concretely. There is, however, a risk of confusing the two levels of analysis with each other, for example, by erroneously assigning permanent validity to something that is in actual fact merely a special case of a more abstract rule. The relative weight of abstract rules as compared with specifics is, furthermore, a matter of some dispute.

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One might, indeed, divide strategic thinkers into three main groupings or schools. At one end of the spectrum, we have what might be called the "nothing is new" school, stressing continuity over change and taking an almost geometrical approach to strategy. At the opposite end we find what we might call the "constant flux" school, who emphasize the revolutionary changes in the art and means of warfare. An intermediate position between these extremes is occupied by what might be called the "long cycles" tradition, authors of which persuasion do acknowledge change, while visualizing it as occurring at a relatively slow pace, and in long cycles rather than in abrupt shifts. Whereas the constant flux school tends to deny that valid lessons of relevance for the present and the future may be derived from historical experience, both the nothing is new and the long cycles schools emphasize learning from the past, although the long cycles school tends to dismiss the lessons of previous centuries as largely irrelevant.11 I stand somewhere in between the nothing is new and long cycles positions and happen to believe that something may, indeed, be learned from the past, with the caveat that one should never absolutize such lessons. From this vantage point it seems appropriate to commence the subsequent account with a brief mention of some of the presumably perennial strategic lessons and principles, with a view to comparing them with NOD. Before proceeding with the contents of strategy, it seems appropriate to begin with defining its nature. As André Beaufre (1963: 16) pointed out, strategies are by their very nature about "the dialectic between two wills using force for resolving their conflict." Since they are hence about two interacting and competing sides, they have to be couched in terms of conditional propositions, such as: If A does X, B should do Y. Some of the most sophisticated strategists have sought to formulate highly abstract, almost philosophical, rules of strategy, such as Liddell Hart (1974) with his "indirect approach," Beaufre (1963) with his "indirect strategy," or Edward Luttwak (1987) with his "paradoxical logic of strategy," all three of whom might be said to merely paraphrase Sun Tzu (1985: 23) who in the fifth century B.C. formulated the following rules: "All warfare is based on deception. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe that we are away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near. . . . If he is superior in strength, evade him. . . . If he is taking ease, give him no rest. If his forces are united, separate them. Attack him when he is unprepared, appear where you are not expected." This formulation captures the dialectical or paradoxical nature of (successful) strategy. Translated into the vocabulary above, strategic rules ought thus to be formulated in terms such as: If A were to do X, B would respond by doing Y. Therefore A should rather do Z. In even more complex terms, we could propose the following: If A were to do X, B would respond by doing Y. Therefore A contemplates doing Z. Since B is aware of these

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considerations, B should expect A to do Z, and should hence respond with X—and so on, ad infinitum, with an endless sequence of guesses, second guesses, etc. Although rationality is an underlying assumption of strategy, the notion of rationality receives a curious twist when applied in this manner. Because the prima facie rational decision is likely to be what the opponent expects, it is not truly rational, whereas a per se irrational action may well represent the best (i.e., the rational) choice, by virtue of exactly its irrationality and hence unexpectedness. This interactional nature of strategy has, understandably, made the methodology and vocabulary of game theory seem appropriate.12 On a less abstract, but still highly generalized level of analysis, we find the so-called principles of war of presumably perennial validity. Such principles had been sought for throughout the Enlightenment but were first formulated by Antoine-Henri de Jomini in 1811 (Jomini 1811, 4: 275-286; cf. Gat 1989: 79-135 et passim; Shy 1986; Reichel 1988; Johansson 1988: 49-69; Bellamy 1990: 7-30; Dupuy 1990: 246-253). Subsequently they were slightly modified, but not basically revised, by modern armies. Even today they constitute a common heritage (with slightly varying emphases and in different formulations) of armies as different as, say, the United States Army and the Red Army. These principles are (in the United States Army's formulation [Headquarters, Dept. of the Army 1982: B1-B5; cf. Savkin 1972]): • Objective: "Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective." • Offensive: "Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative." • Mass: "Concentrate combat power at the decisive place and time." • Economy of Force: "Allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts." • Maneuver: "Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible application of combat power." • Unity of Command: "For every objective, insure unity of effort under one responsible commander." • Security: "Never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage." • Surprise: "Strike the enemy at a time and/or place and in a manner for which he is unprepared." • Simplicity: "Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and clear concise orders to insure thorough understanding." Of course, the almost complete unanimity among military experts with regard to the validity of these principles does not constitute proof thereof, but merely testifies to their persuasiveness and their fitting well into military

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minds. Even overwhelming majorities of renowned experts have occasionally been completely wrong in the past (e.g., the Ptolemaic astronomers), and the expert community might also err in this particular respect. Nevertheless, the standing of the principles of war means that they should be taken seriously. I will return below to the question whether, and to what extent, NOD constitutes a departure from these principles. Among the most revered of these principles is that of concentration, which has often been taken at face value to imply that superior numbers of like weapons should always be gathered against inferior numbers, a point of view that has been formulated abstractly in the so-called Lanchester square law (Lanchester 1916; cf. Lepingwell 1987; Dupuy 1990: 207-218 [a chapter written by Robert McQuie]). I will return below to this concentration principle and its implications for NOD. Suffice it at this stage to clarify the dictum by pointing out that concentration of effort is by no means logically synonymous with, say, gathering together as many tanks as possible at the same spot. One of the most important general rules of strategic thinking, finally, and one that presumably represents the distillation of the experience of warfare through the ages, is the notion of the intrinsic supremacy of the defense over the offensive form of combat. This thesis was acknowledged by Clausewitz (1980: 361 [1832: Bk. 6.1.2]) and has subsequently come to be couched in the (somewhat simplistic) terms of a rule of thumb, according to which the defender is able to prevail (under certain circumstances) over an attacker of up to three times his own strength: the so-called Three-to-One Rule (cf. Mearsheimer 1988b, 1989a). Since I will return below, and at some length, to the emphasis in NOD strategy on this conception, I will not elaborate on it at this stage. Suffice it to recall that it ought to be counted among the general principles of war or, as Trevor Dupuy (1980: 326-327) called them, "the timeless verities of combat."

NOD as a Strategy Our preliminary and tentative identification of the essence of strategy may serve as the yardstick against which to measure NOD. I therefore analyze the relationship of NOD (as a strategy couched in abstract terms) with the above contextual factors, as well as with the intrinsic rules of strategy. As far as politics is concerned, NOD concurs with traditional strategic thinking in urging a subordination of strategy to politics, and a subjection of the armed forces to political control. However, NOD tends to circumscribe somewhat more narrowly the range of political demands that strategy should seek to meet. Even though power is not regarded as a per se illegitimate objective, certain particular manifestations thereof, such as territorial aggrandizement and the subjugation of other states, are dismissed by all NOD advocates as impermissible, whereas security and territorial inviolability are

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emphasized alongside war prevention, disarmament, and cooperative international arrangements. Technology has been an important element in the NOD discourse, and, particularly in its infancy, NOD was often claimed to be the only means of capitalizing on emerging and recently emerged technologies. Early NOD proponents tended to point to the strength and relative cost-effectiveness of ATGMs and other PGMs as compared with tanks, of antiship missiles as compared with surface warships, of SAMs as compared with aircraft, et cetera (Hannig 1984; Barnaby 1986a; Walker 1986). Whereas some such claims may have been supported by the (rather scarce and inconclusive) available empirical evidence, others were clearly based more on wishful thinking than on thorough analysis. This was particularly the case with emerging technologies, the ambitious claims about which ought always to be taken with a grain of salt because they are, at best, founded on prototype testing. I return to this matter in concrete terms in Chapter 7, where I examine the strategic concepts of NOD as applied to the various environments. In addition to such wonder weapon claims, it has sometimes been assumed that NOD enjoyed a structural advantage by virtue of its emphasis on types of technology predestined to a more rapid pace of development than those emphasized by traditional and offensive strategies. Data collection and procession technologies (used in NOD, e.g., for sensor networks and computerized fire allocation) have, for instance, experienced a far more revolutionary development than, say, propulsion technology (of importance for tanks and the like), a difference that is, furthermore, likely to continue at least for the foreseeable future. Whereas this would, indeed, tend to benefit NOD, it is, at most, a very general rule with numerous exceptions. Long-range strike aircraft as well as tanks and artillery also place great emphasis on advanced guidance systems, and hence capitalize on the emerging opportunities as well, albeit perhaps to a slightly lesser extent than NOD. NOD-type forces would, furthermore, also need mobility, if only for tactical agility and hence invulnerability, and they would therefore also suffer somewhat from the comparatively slow pace of development in this field. Certain authors have even raised their claims in quite abstract terms, with formulations to the effect that, say, in the perpetual contest between fire and mobility, "the pendulum has swung to the side of fire" (Hannig 1984: 45; cf. Simpkin 1986: 168). Couched in such abstract terms, however, the claims appear to be almost devoid of concrete meaning. Bearing all these caveats in mind, it does remain true that NOD seeks to "ride with the tide" of technological trends and seems to enjoy good prospects of success in this endeavor, as will, I hope, be substantiated in Chapter 7. Concern about the economy has been a powerful motivating factor for many NOD advocates, whose various schemes have been intended not least to facilitate disarmament and a subsequent conversion of military to civilian

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production and consumption. 13 As argued in Chapter 4 above, NOD does indeed entail prospects thereof, particularly so after the USSR has lent the notion its support, thus placing it on the arms control agenda. On the other hand, to the extent that particular NOD schemes rely heavily on emerging technologies, their initial implementation might well be beyond the means of many states, in particular of the impoverished and crisis-ridden East European ones, along with the USSR itself. First, however, most NOD schemes envisage the utilization of merely well-known technologies and thus presuppose no major investments. Second, to the extent that NOD implementation is embedded in arms control agreements and/or accompanied by a general military builddown, the required investments in new NOD technologies are unlikely to exceed the savings achieved through the builddown. Societal factors enter into NOD considerations as well. Many NOD proponents did, in fact, take as one of their points of departure the demographic (and hence conscription) problems that the FRG and other NATO countries were up against. Their proposals either envisioned a shift to a less manpower-intensive posture, accompanied by a relentless pursuit of disarmament, or an increased emphasis on militia-type forces and other hitherto unexploited reservoirs of manpower. However, NOD does not presuppose any particular form of enlistment, nor have most NOD advocates recommended major changes in the types of enlistment. US and British authors have usually taken the all-volunteer army as their point of departure, and almost no West German authors have recommended professional forces but have tended to regard general conscription as the most appropriate mode of enlistment, to which they have merely proposed to add a militia element.14 Under the heading of societal factors, we might also briefly mention two of the allegations often heard from critics, namely and first, that NOD would be unsuitable for modem, Western-type societies with their particular species of human beings. Allegedly, NOD would require supersoldiers, capable of operating in complete independence and isolation, cut off from all support, and under nearly continuous exposure to enemy fire. However, such allegations could, at best, be based on an extremely selective and biased reading of NOD authors, and far from reflecting mainstream NOD opinion. Second, it has been alleged that NOD would require a general arming of the population, which might lead to an upsurge of violence in the civilian domain. This, however, is no more true than the previous allegation, since only very few NOD advocates have recommended any such thing, but usually envisaged a mere redeployment of the armed forces. To the extent that NOD schemes do envisage an additional reserve element, this would rather resemble something like the Danish Home Guard. Whereas such forces do, indeed, keep their personal weapons at home, this has increased violence to only a very negligible extent. Neither does the number of armed robberies

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and assassinations in Denmark reach the level in, say, the United States, with its all-volunteer armed forces; nor is Switzerland (with its militia structure) a particularly violent society where armed gangs roam the streets.15 Geography enters into the N O D discourse to an even greater extent than into traditional strategy, because of the emphasis on specialization to the home terrain and deliberate downgrading of general purpose forces. The intent is not merely to enhance combat efficiency but also to amplify the difference between offensive and defensive force efficiency. The greater the difference between how strong a state's forces would be at home and on the territory of an adversary, the more credible will its proclaimed intentions be to stay at home, that is, remain on the defensive. Under certain circumstances, such terrain specialization might even suffice for establishing a mutual defensive superiority regime (see below), as a hypothetical example may show. In an adversarial dyad of states consisting of a land power and an island state, the land power might deprive itself completely of offensive capabilities simply by not possessing a navy, and the insular state might accomplish the same by a simple abstention from amphibious capabilities. Whereas such clear-cut cases belong to the realm of theory, practical approximations thereto might nevertheless be devised. By omitting bridge-building equipment from its arsenal, a state might, to all practical intents and purposes, deprive itself of offensive capabilities vis-à-vis adversaries shielded by rivers or other bodies of water. Terrain specialization may also allow states to improve their defensive capabilities, as the aforementioned Finnish example, as well as that of guerrillas such as the Vietcong or the mujahidin, demonstrates. Whereas such forces treat geography as a constant factor beyond their control, man actually modifies his environment to a substantial (and increasing) extent, albeit usually only over protracted periods of time. The most obvious example thereof is the continuous urbanization that has transformed large tracts of central Europe into almost contiguous cities and urban sprawl, features that also have to be taken into account by strategists. Certain authors have recommended including urban areas in defense planning, thus forcing invaders to accept combat in the metropolitan concrete jungles, where the defender would presumably enjoy a number of terrain advantages: the abundant cover provided by the buildings; the semimountainous character of houses along streets, whence one may look down at the enemy, who is channeled along narrow passages, etc. It should be remembered, however, that while cities do indeed confront an attacker with highly adverse combat conditions, they also suffer from an important disadvantage from the point of view of the defender, namely their inhabitation by civilians. Besides constituting a disaster in itself, the vast number of casualties to be expected from urban combat might, furthermore, easily lead to paralyzing self-deterrence. There are thus good reasons for leaving cities militarily undefended, while perhaps defending suburbs and

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other urban sprawl, as well as defending cities by means of civilian-based defense.16 A final geographical point made by a few NOD authors (including myself) is that some thought ought be given to terrain modifications with defensive purposes in mind, albeit not as the decisive consideration. Excellent tank barriers might, for instance, be provided by plantations or canals, which would also serve many civilian, including recreational, purposes. Relatively tank-friendly terrain (such as on the north German plain) might thus be transformed into inaccessible ground as far as tanks are concerned. As far as the relationship of NOD to the intrinsic strategic logic of military operations is concerned, it remains disputed among NOD proponents whether, and to what extent, the aforementioned principles of war remain (or were ever) valid. Whereas most NOD advocates tend to disregard the principles entirely, either because they find them so self-evident as to require no elaboration, or because they find them irrelevant, a few have gone so far as to reject them expressis verbis on the assumption that they are incompatible with NOD, and that NOD supersedes them (for an approximation to this view, see Borg 1989). In actual fact, however, the strategy of NOD might well be formulated in line with these principles, if only they are understood sufficiently abstractly. NOD may thus represent a considerable degree of continuity in a context of technological flux, that is, under circumstances wherein continuity cannot be synonymous with immutability but presupposes continuous adaptation and modification. Conversely, the principles of war might also be slightly paraphrased in order to uncover their compatibility with NOD, even though they might still neither render full justice to NOD's novelty nor grasp its essence. Thus paraphrased, some of the principles are no more than elaborations, explicitations, or modifications of those quoted above, whereas others are tantamount to a dialectical inversion, according to the paradoxical logic of strategy described above (Sun Tzu, Liddell Hart, Beaufre, Luttwak, and others): • Objective: Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective; that is, toward the defense of national security, while assigning overranking priority to war prevention. • Offensive: Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative by taking the offensive tactically, while remaining strategically on the defensive. • Mass: Prevent your adversary from defining the decisive place and time by, inter alia, waiting for the opposing forces to approach, by distributing forces across the entire territory, and by transforming the enemy's campaign into a protracted war of attrition.

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• Economy of force: Force the enemy to allocate as much essential combat power as possible to secondary efforts through, inter alia, being present everywhere. • Maneuver: Place the enemy in a position of disadvantage through the flexible and asymmetrical application of combat power, that is, by refraining from meeting like with like. • Unity of command: Ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander on the nationwide scale, while decentralizing command at the lower levels. • Security: Never permit the enemy to acquire an unexpected advantage by, for example, offering lucrative targets that would invite preemption. • Surprise: Strike the enemy at a time and/or place and in a manner for which he is unprepared, while guarding yourself against surprise actions on part of the enemy. • Simplicity: Prepare clear, uncomplicated plans and clear, concise orders to insure thorough understanding, while avoiding rigidity and allowing subordinate commanders a wide scope for initiative. This formulation seems to capture the gist of the revered principles of war while showing them to be far from incompatible with NOD. However, what has sometimes been regarded as the most important of them all, the principle of concentration (mass), might present a particular problem, since it seems incompatible with NOD's emphasis on dispersal of forces. Before rejecting NOD on these grounds, however, one ought to recall Liddell Hart's (1974: 334) brilliant description of the dialectics of concentration: The principles of war, not merely one principle, can be condensed into a single word: "concentration." But for truth this needs to be amplified as the "concentration of strength against weakness." And for any real value it needs to be explained that the concentration of strength against weakness depends on the dispersion of your opponent's strength, which in turn is produced by a distribution of your own that gives the appearance, and the partial effect of dispersion. Your dispersion, his dispersion, your concentration—such is the sequence, and each is a sequel. True concentration is the fruit of calculated dispersion.

Through such application of the paradoxical logic of strategy, the true (i.e., abstract) significance of concentration is disclosed, which may be neither spatial nor temporal. What should be the focal point on which to concentrate one's effort (albeit not necessarily one's forces) is the adversary's objective, something that may well require a protracted (rather than an instantaneous) effort across an extended area, rather than at a specific spot. A similar reinterpretation of concentration may be warranted at the tactical level, where even a temporal and spatial concentration of force (i.e.,

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firepower) does not necessitate an actual physical concentration of weapons platforms, since it is (at least in principle) perfectly conceivable to allocate synchronized fire from dispersed, and perhaps quite heterogeneous, launchers onto the same spot. Dependent on the capacity of the C3I network, tube and rocket artillery, combat drones, and various forms of direct-fire systems as well as air power might well be employed for barraging the same spot simultaneously.

Offensive and Defensive There remains what I referred to above as the most important of all strategic principles, namely that of the inherent supremacy of the defensive over offensive types of combat. Before proceeding with an assessment of the validity thereof, however, a preliminary analysis of how to distinguish between the two is indispensable. The connotation of the terms offense and defense is unclear in several respects. Do they refer to political ends, or to the military means by which to accomplish them? Does "means" refer to particular actions, or to the wherewithal of performing them? It is, for example, perfectly conceivable for a state to be politically defensive, yet to intend to defend itself with offensive (e.g., preventive or preemptive) military actions. "Offensive" may, furtheimore, refer to activities on different scales. A state might well intend, for instance, nothing more than to defend its own territory, yet to do so by being tactically offensive, that is, striking first in each individual engagement. Table 6.3 (inspired by Robert Neild [1990: 17]) may illustrate the logical sequence of choices between offensive and defensive options that a state faces at each level of analysis. The boldfaced letters roughly indicate NOD's particular emphases. Di might, for example, be a strategy of territorial defense, and Oj one of preemption (say, like Israel's strategy); D 2 might be a positional weblike defense, whereas 0 2 would envisage fairly large-scale counteroffensives. The tactical elements D 3 and 0 3 might, for instance, include mine warfare and guerrilla fighting, respectively. Also illustrated in Table 6.3 is how on each level military operations would be a mixture of offensive and defensive elements, albeit not in the same proportions. Generally speaking, the distinction between offensive and defensive may either be structural, that is, refer to the means in a broad sense of the term, or functional, that is, refer to activities and options. I commence with some observations on the structural distinction. Certain authors might want to add a fifth level to Table 6.3 which might be called the technical level, referring to the weapons themselves. On closer analysis, however, the implicit distinction between offensive and defensive weapons makes little, if any, sense, since the same items may be used for

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offensive and defensive purposes, depending on the circumstances. Whereas the term defensive weapon is often heard (albeit mostly from critics seeking to ridicule NOD), nobody has been able to define such an entity satisfactorily. Johan Galtung (1984: 172-176), for example, proposed to

Table 6.3 Offensive and Defensive Options at Four Levels of Analysis Level of Analysis

Defensive (D)

Political

Offensive (O)

O

Do

Strategic

Oi

Di

Operational

»2

O

D

Tactical

D3 0

03 D

0

D D

O

D

Qz 0

D

O

D

0

D

O

0

D

O

D

O

D

define a defensive weapon as one with a short range and a limited radius of destruction, whereas an offensive weapon would be characterized by long ranges and wide impact area.17 Its superficial persuasiveness notwithstanding, this distinction would imply that, for instance, the Romans established their empire by means of predominantly defensive weapons, namely swords with ranges of a few meters and a destructive radius of, at most, a few feet. Modern battlefield air defense would, likewise, have to be categorized as defensive, although its possession is a precondition for offensive operations on enemy territory. Certain species of ASATs would, likewise, be defensive by virtue of their destroying the target by immediate impact. Indeed, when I asked, on two separate occasions, how the SDI program might be accommodated within this conceptual framework, Galtung resorted to a rather puzzling reinterpretation of the entire SDI conception as consisting largely of offensive weapons, intended for "igniting cities from space." Since this notion violates some of the most basic laws of physics (including that of gravitation), it might serve as circumstantial evidence against the adequacy of Galtung's definitions.18 George Quester (1986: 23) has suggested a considerably more sophisticated definition of a defensive weapon as one favoring a second-strike approach, whereas offensive weapons would be such as reward striking first in individual engagements. This would, however, imply that the machine gun would have to be counted as an offensive weapon, notwithstanding the fact that it strengthened the defense considerably in WWI, as described by Quester himself, among others.19

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A few hypothetical examples may also illustrate the absurd consequences of disregarding historical, technological, and geographic factors in definitions couched in absolute terms. First, whereas the Roman legions with their infantry equipped with swords, shields, and spears did undoubtedly represent a tremendous offensive capability in antiquity, they certainly would not do so today. Even Hitler's and Guderian's armies with their, in 1939, unprecedented offensive power might be quite incapable of offensive operations under modern conditions, when nuclear weapons would appear in the strategic and operational calculus, where they would be facing huge arsenals of antitank weaponry, and so on. History thus does make a difference, and it cannot therefore be the weapons themselves that are either offensive or defensive. Second, certain weapons systems are utilizable for offensive purposes only under specific conditions. Tanks, for instance, would have no offensive utility if deployed in Iceland or New Zealand, nor do other countries' tanks pose serious threats to such countries. Offensive capabilities thus depend on the nature and location, as well as on the military configuration, of the respective opponent. Soviet tanks are ineffective vis-à-vis both islands and mountainous regions, such as the Swiss Alps, as well as vis-à-vis countries fielding substantial amounts of antitank weaponry. Some of these constraints may, however, be lifted by means of support structures, and sea or airlift capabilities may to a certain extent overcome the boundaries set by nature. These observations should not be taken to imply that weapons are all the same, or that it makes no difference whether a country places its main emphasis on, for example, tanks or antitank weapons. A state with, say, ten tanks and one hundred antitank weapons would certainly be less capable of offensive operations than a state with one hundred tanks and ten antitank weapons. Conceptions such as that underlying the CFE negotiations may certainly make sense, according to which certain weapons systems are particularly suitable for offensives, albeit only within a specified geographical area (the ATTU region), containing a number of particular states (those of NATO and the Warsaw Pact), and at a specified point in time (A.D. 1990). It may also be possible to assign different values to various types of weapons for offensive and defensive combat, respectively, an analysis that might bring out the fact that certain weapons are, indeed, more suitable for attack than for defense, and vice versa. There is, however, a clear need for higher levels of analysis than that of individual weapons. Just how high may, however, be open to dispute. Whereas the divisional level has much to be said for it, as representing the smallest self-contained formation in modern-day armed forces, even seemingly defensive divisions (say, only slightly mechanized infantry divisions) may nevertheless serve as force multipliers for offensive divisions (such as Soviet-type tank divisions) within the same theater of war. An even higher level of analysis might thus seem warranted in order to take into

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sufficient account the synergies of combined-arms operations. On such a higher level, we might have to shift from a structural to a functional distinction, implying a focus on options rather than on the physical means of implementing them. Unfortunately, there is no unanimity at this level either about what to call offensive or defensive, respectively. Some authors favor a narrow definition of offensive, implying implementable options of conquering and occupying territory, in the absence whereof even the most impressive arsenal of means of long-range mass destruction would be tantamount to no offensive capability. Certain authors (Albrecht von Miiller) have even recommended "conditional offensive capabilities," that is, the option of invading the attacker's own territory after the initial forward battle, a notion reminiscent of Huntington's "conventional retaliation" or the ALB doctrine. Most NOD proponents, however, have preferred broader definitions of offensive, including, in addition to invasion capabilities, various stand-off threats by means of, for example, air forces or nuclear weapons, which might conceivably be used for coercing other states to surrender.20 The problems of definition are compounded by the fact that defensive and offensive may actually be relative concepts without any absolute meaning. A state may, for instance, possess an offensive capability (in terms of options) vis-à-vis some specified states but not against others, just as a military formation of a particular size and configuration may possess an offensive capability vis-à-vis other particular formations, or as a weapon may vis-à-vis other weapons systems (see E. Miiller 1988). At first glance, this might make a definition of offensive in terms of ratios attractive; say, of the type: a hundred-division country is offensive-capable vis-à-vis countries with a combined strength of x divisions; or one motorized rifle division is offensive-capable vis-à-vis x Panzergrenadier battalions; or even, one antitank helicopter is offensive-capable vis-à-vis x number of MBTs. Such relative definitions might support the common assumption that offensive capabilities might be eliminated through mutual force reductions, if only the ratios were sufficiently asymmetrical, such as seems to have been NATO's premise for entering the CFE negotiations. While pointing toward the importance of quantitative ratios, however, relative definitions need not lead directly back to the "numbers game" that was criticized so severely in Chapter 4. One reason we are not predestined to be caught in the trap of futile numerical comparisons is that there are several flat-of-the-curve phenomena at work, implying that numerical ratios may be irrelevant below or above certain thresholds. As far as individual weapons are concerned, this has to do with, inter alia, physics and technology, implying that, say, one or one thousand SAMs with effective ranges of five kilometers will be equally ineffective against aircraft flying at altitudes of ten kilometers. At a higher level of analysis, the flat-of-the-curve phenomenon is connected with, inter alia, force-to-space ratios. Whereas forty divisions might constitute no effective offensive capability against ten defending divisions, four (or even

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two) might well do so against one, since the residual defending force would be inadequate for holding the required ground. Neither would four hundred divisions versus one hundred necessarily imply any offensive capability, because of the so-called crossing-the-T phenomenon, 21 which prevents an attacker from bringing his. entire force superiority to bear in any engagement. A final metaproblem concerning the appropriate criteria for distinction between offensive and defensive consists of the fact that we are not really interested in objective facts, because they are not the immediate causes of arms races, inadvertent wars, etc. Perceptual lenses, such as, for example, the well-documented military predilection for the offensive (Evera 1984,1985; J. Snyder 1984; Wallach 1967, 1972: 89-164), thus have to be taken into account, opening up whole new fields of ambiguities and definitional problems, for example: whose perceptions are important, to what extent? How can perceptions be measured? There are thus numerous problems confronting the analyst seeking to devise criteria for distinguishing between offensive and defensive forces in absolute terms, independently of, inter alia, space and time. This does not, however, imply that there are no relevant distinctions, only that they are hard to capture in terms of definitions couched in such absolute terms. In concrete terms, there is, for example, no doubt that, say, the USSR would pose an offensive (although not necessarily aggressive) threat to countries such as Denmark, because of the size and configuration of the Soviet armed forces, which include amphibious forces and aircraft for desant operations, tanks and other ground-force equipment for holding ground, etc.

The Criteria of Nonoffensiveness In principle, NOD might be defined either structurally or functionally. The most prominent (as well as most elaborate) structural definition in the NOD literature is probably Frank Barnaby and Egbert Boeker's (1988:137): "The size, weapons, training, logistics, doctrine, operational manuals, war-games, manoeuvres, textbooks used in military academies, etc. of the armed forces are such that they are seen in their totality to be capable of a credible defense without any reliance on the use of nuclear weapons, yet incapable of offense." Whereas the elaborate nature of this definition constitutes a hedge against simplistic fallacies such as those of Galtung and Quester, the revealing "etc." nevertheless suggests that even elaborate structural definitions may miss the point. I therefore propose a simpler, yet functional, definition, which focuses on options: The armed forces should be seen in their totality to be capable of a credible defense, yet incapable of offense. This is deliberately a very abstract definition, wherein "totality" signifies that anything might, in principle, be relevant. It thus includes software (i.e., military art) and orgware (i.e., the organization of the armed forces) as well as hardware (i.e.,

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weapons and other equipment). "Be seen to be" is tantamount to an acknowledgment that perceptions are what matters when military means are to serve political ends. "Capable" and "incapable," in their turn, deliberately leave the questions of "how" and "to what extent" open, as not properly pertaining to the definition. Should it, for example, be possible to guarantee one's inability to attack in an entirely different way, it would make no sense to insist on a military solution. Furthermore, capabilities and incapabilities are continua, since a state may be either entirely, partially, or not at all capable of one or the other and may develop in either direction over time. It might, for example, be possible to diachronically compare a state's defense structure with a view to identifying a gradual trend toward (or away from) NOD. The term NOD might thus be conjugated: noddy, noddier, noddiest. "Defense" and "offense," finally, deliberately do not specify the appropriate scale (alliancewide, territorial, or whatever), since this is bound to vary over time as well as between regions, as pointed out in the analysis above. By virtue of its abstract nature, this definition is, on the one hand, able to claim universal validity. It allows, in principle, for a distinction between offensive and defensive in terms of both postures, strategic conceptions, and military activities on several scales. On the other hand, it lays claim to applicability only as far as concrete instances are concerned, and might thus by applied to, inter alia, Soviet tanks vis-à-vis specific countries, fielding specific defensive forces, and under specific circumstances. It is, however, inapplicable to abstract entities or categories such as tanks or even Soviet tanks. The concrete implications of applying such a criterion to the various environments of warfare is the subject of Chapter 7. The Supremacy of the Defensive I have already stressed the thesis of the intrinsic supremacy of the defensive as one of the most fundamental principles of war, even though it is not included in the traditional list. It is, however, not entirely clear what the thesis means, since different authors tend to attach different meanings to it. It should certainly not be taken to mean anything like "defensive weapons are stronger than offensive ones," since this would effectively render it meaningless. First, as argued above, the defensive weapon per se is a figment of the imagination. Second, a comparison of weapons in terms of strength is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible. Whereas couching the original thesis in more-concrete terms (such as "antitank weapons are stronger than tanks") might make the proposition meaningful, it would not solve the problems of measurement. Should we compare the firepower of the respective systems, or their reciprocal survivability in abstract duel situations, or either of those weighted in terms of costs? A common denominator of weapons systems as diverse as, say, battleships and land mines, is, indeed, extremely hard to

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come by, although Richard Simpkin (1986: 81-85) has made an (almost) convincing case for the seductively simple formula: "Fighting power equals airlift weight." Although this may well hold true for many categories of armaments, it strains the imagination to conceive of it as a general rule. Third, unless they are couched in extremely concrete terms, propositions concerning weapons performance are always open to charges of being based on unwarranted ceteris paribus assumptions. The actual outcome of, say, fireduels between x number of defensive weapons and y number of offensive weapons will always be somewhat dependent on circumstantial factors, such as terrain, time of day, weather, visibility, and crew performance. In order to arrive at meaningful (i.e., in principle falsifiable) propositions we would have to make them very elaborate and concrete, but even this would not entirely solve the problem. Whereas testable propositions such as "under circumstances C, x numbers of ATGMs of type T will be able to defeat y numbers of MBTs of type M with a probability of P" might easily be formulated, even huge numbers of such (tested) propositions would not suffice for a validation of the thesis on the inherent supremacy of defensive weapons. As is always the case with inductive generalization, the hypothesis might at any time be falsified by the n + 1 test. Less simplistically, the defensive supremacy hypothesis might be formulated as "between approximately equal forces of similar composition, the defender will most often prevail," which might be inverted thus: "Unless an attacker possesses a substantial superiority, or is structured differently, or operates in a different manner, he will be able neither to overwhelm nor outsmart the defender." Couched in such terms, the hypothesis would (at least in principle) lend itself to testing with a view to falsification. In order to be testable, the propositions would, of course, have to be specified in terms of ranges (by substituting concrete, albeit perhaps arbitrary, figures to the terms approximately, similar, and most often). Furthermore, the propositions might refer to concrete dyads of forces, or even of states, from which might be derived (in principle) testable propositions about the offensive capabilities of states vis-à-vis each other. Testing the thus rephrased hypotheses in practice would, however, be difficult, because, inter alia, the available (unclassified) data are sorrily inadequate. Force comparisons, such as those published by the Pentagon, NATO, or the USSR, are generally unreliable, because of the high level of aggregation and a deliberate manipulation. They either count divisions, with no account of their different types, sizes, and compositions; or weapons, with insufficient differentiation in terms of quality. 22 Furthermore, they almost never count the support systems required for defensive and offensive utilization, respectively (such as bridge-building equipment, POL, or munitions stocks). Finally, they are able to measure neither synergetic

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effects of the combination of various types of weapons nor immeasurable factors such as skill, combat motivation, reliability of allies, which are undisputably of immense importance. More-sophisticated measurements than the division or weapons counts are, however, available. One example is the ADE measure developed by the United States Army, which is considerably more meaningful because it attempts to measure the actual combat power of formations. However, it still does not account for tactics, including the option that outnumbered formations have of withdrawing rather than letting themselves be defeated. Another example is dynamic analysis, based on (or at least adaptable for) computer simulations, whereby forces are measured as a function of time. Such analyses, in their turn, introduce the problem of the appropriate multiplier, of whether or not, for example, to accept the renowned Lanchester Square Law, according to which initial force disbalances will be magnified through successive engagement rounds.23 There are thus a number of problems involved with finding appropriate data in addition to the problems of appropriate definitions, adding up to even more severe problems of operationalization. Nevertheless, as couched in the latter set of terms above, the proposition of the inherent supremacy of the defense is, in principle, falsifiable, and thus a scientifically meaningful proposition (see Popper 1959, 1963). As such, it has much to be said for it, most of it based on common sense and actual experience, as formulated by, inter alia, military analysts through the ages. There are so many different explanations of the presumed defensive supremacy that it may simply be overdetermined. While refraining from attempting an exhaustive account, I limit myself to listing a few of the intrinsic defensive advantages that have been mentioned by the classics of strategy. Sun Tzu (1985: 33, 42, 47-48) pointed, for example, to the advantages of what might be called a defensive or second-strike attitude, as well as to the importance of exploiting the defensive advantages of certain types of terrain: Whoever is first in the field and awaits the coming of the enemy, will be fresh for the fight; whoever is second in the field and has to hasten to the battle will arrive exhausted. . . . When an invading force crosses a river in its onward march, do not advance to meet it mid-stream. It will be best to let the army get across and then deliver your attack. . . . With regard to narrow passes, if you can occupy them first, let them be strongly garrisoned and await the advent of the enemy. . . . With regard to precipitous heights, you should occupy the raised and sunny spots, and there wait for him to come up.

Jomini (quoted in Laqueur 1978: 42-44) developed, first, the concept of the advantages of operating on interior lines, an advantage almost automatically enjoyed by the defender. Second, he described (on the basis of his personal experiences in the Peninsular War) the tremendous strength of guerrilla-type warfare as waged by defenders in the midst of their own

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country: "No army, however disciplined, can contend successfully against such a system applied to a great nation, unless it be strong enough to hold all the essential points of the country, cover its communications, and at the same time furnish an active force sufficient to beat the enemy wherever he may present himself." 24 Clausewitz (1980: 360-580, esp. 361-371) was the one to proclaim the thesis of the supremacy of the defensive form of combat. From among the numerous intrinsic advantages of the defense identified by him, we might mention the help of local terrain ("the assistance of the theatre of war" p. 369); the ability to operate on interior lines ("the eccentricity of defense as opposed to the concentricity of attack" pp. 371-374); the availability of reserve forces (pp. 377-379, 521-528); the possibility of constructing fortifications of various sorts (pp. 406-422); and the option of withdrawal whereby the attacking forces might be lured into the depth of the country, their logistic chains stretched and thereby weakened, (pp. 507-520; cf. Gat 1988). Most important of all, however, time was bound to favor the defender, both strategically and tactically. Strategically, the defender might slow down the struggle, through, inter alia, deliberate withdrawal: "It is the attacker, who loses the time that passes, and any loss of time is a defect and must in some way weaken the party that suffers it." (Clausewitz 1980: 391). Tactically, even the surprise effect would gradually wear off, and in fact be inverted to the benefit of the defender: "The attacker has only the advantage of the actual attack of the whole with all his forces, whereas the defender in the course of battle is continuously in a position to achieve surprise through the strength and the form of his assaults" (Clausewitz 1980: 364). Modern authors have discovered additional reasons why the defense is presumably superior. Kenneth Boulding (1962: chs. 12-13), for instance, formulated the general rule of the "loss of strength gradient," according to which military strength is inversely proportional with distance. In other words: close to home (i.e., for the defender) military strength is high, whereas it declines the farther away from base the state employs it (in the attacker's role). This also holds true en miniature, since individual weapons pay for increased range in terms of diminished firepower, which might be taken as a recommendation for short-range (and eo ipso more-defensive) combat. Finally, some have claimed it to be a general rule that retreat is superior to pursuit (needless to say: not in moral terms), since the latter is inherently the more demanding type of operation (Jones 1988: 667-668; see also Schmahling 1988). However, whereas there are thus a number of advantages inherent in the defender's role, an attacker also enjoys important inherent advantages, such as that of deciding the time and place of the (initial) battle, whereby he may take the defender by surprise; that of almost automatically enjoying a lead in terms of mobilization, etc. Even though the defense may thus be the inherently stronger form of combat, this is only as a general tendency, which

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does not rule out the offensive's occasionally prevailing. The history of warfare might, indeed, seem have evolved in cycles of alternating defensive and offensive supremacy, as a few glimpses of history illustrate: The Middle Ages were generally an era of defensive supremacy, thanks to, inter alia, the logistical barriers against long-range maneuvers, the strength of fortifications as compared with siegecraft, etc. In the age of Napoleon, however, the offensive rose to supremacy, by virtue of the levée en masse and the divisional system, the combination of which allowed for large-scale maneuver warfare on a strategic range. The late nineteenth century presented no clear picture, since offensive warfare was occasionally very successful, but the US Civil War presented evidence of the growing strength of the defensive, thanks to, inter alia, the introduction on a massive scale of new weapons technologies. • Around the turn of the century defensive supremacy was a fact, albeit unnoticed by military authorities. The defensive strength was a result of, inter alia, the introduction of machine guns and barbed wire, the combination of which made trenches nearly unconquerable, thus strengthening positional (i.e., defensive) warfare considerably. Furthermore, the previously mentioned defensive advantage of being able to operate on interior lines of communications received an entirely new meaning by virtue of the increasing density of the railway network, which greatly facilitated the defender's provision of supplies to the front. Subsequently, however, the development of weapons technology and strategy entered an offensive cycle, thanks to, inter alia, the introduction on a major scale of a number of innovations, which had made their first appearance during WWI, albeit on a small scale and without making any major impact: tanks, aircraft, etc.25 The two last examples illustrate the danger of both exaggerating and underestimating the supremacy of the defense. It was underestimated prior to WWI, when military thinkers, almost without exception, believed in the possibility of swift and decisive attack, which would permit the forces to return home victoriously "before the leaves fall." These beliefs found their expression in the war plans of, inter alia, the German and the French general staffs, that is, the Schlieffen Plan(s) and Plan XVII, respectively, which made war well-nigh inevitable by poising the forces of Germany and France directly against each other in highly threatening modes. The only observer who accurately foresaw how WWI would develop into a bloody, protracted, and indecisive contest of attrition because of the strength of the defensive was the aforementioned military amateur, the Polish banker, Ivan Bloch (1889; cf. Ropp 1962: 194-235). The strength of the defense was exaggerated during the interwar years, when the memory was still vivid of the defensive stalemate in the trenches

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along the Western Front, and when prominent military analysts such as Liddell Hart, as well as the entire French military, subscribed to the (as it turned out, erroneous) belief in the inherent supremacy of defenses, even against armored maneuver warfare, hence paving the way for the German blitzkrieg victories.26

Conclusion Its inherent advantages notwithstanding, the defense does thus not permanently hold the upper hand, but offensive cycles alternate with others of defensive supremacy. Bearing this caveat in mind, NOD's claim (often couched in absolute terms unsupported by the available evidence) might hence be rephrased thus: We are presently experiencing a cycle of defensive supremacy, because of the obsolescence of previous (i.e., basically WWII-type) means of offensive warfare. This cycle is likely to endure for quite some time, although the invention of alternative types of offensive warfare is by no means excluded in principle. For the sake of disarmament, war prevention, and common security, this opportunity ought to be exploited with a view to creating a regime of mutual defensive superiority. The advantages of such a regime were first described by authors such as George Quester (1976: 212-213), André Glucksmann (1967: 4 2 ^ 3 ) , and Carl Friedrich von Weizsäcker (1976: 165-187), and were subsequently popularized by the late Anders Boserup (1985). As described in Chapter 4 above, each side would under such a regime be superior to its respective adversary if only it assumed the defending role. Neither side would therefore possess any genuine offensive options, and both sides would be able to coexist peacefully without endangering each other's security. By virtue thereof, such a mutual defensive superiority regime might be an integral element in the CS regime described in Chapter 2.1 will explore its concrete implications in the next chapter.

Notes 1. On grand strategy see, e.g., Hart 1974: 320-321; on total strategy, see Beaufre 1963: 24-25. On operational art, see, e.g., Luttwak 1980; Simpkin 1986: 2 3 - 2 4 . 2. In addition to the works cited on p. 133, see, e.g., on ancient Greek warfare, Ferrili 1985: 91-148; Jones 1988: 1-81; Dupuy 1980: 10-15. For an in-depth account and analysis of the most decisive battles, see Fuller 1956: 1. A good description of modern infantry can be found in Dunnigan 1983: 18-45. 3. On the synergy of gunpowder, pikemen, and bayonets, see Dupuy 1980: 93-97; McNeill 1983: 68. 4. On the importance of the chariot and the stirrup for the exploitation of horses, see Dupuy 1980: 36^11; McNeill 1983: 9-11, 19-20.

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5. On ancient C 3 I, see Creveld 1985: 17-57; Fuller 1956, 1: 21-25. On modern means of C 3 I, see, e.g., Haeffner 1987; Hewish et al. 1987; Sweetman 1987; Karas 1984: 94-123; Jasani and Lee 1984: 29-49; Zimmerman 1987; Grin 1990. 6. For an argument to this effect concerning naval forces, see Lautenschlager 1983. 7. On the general connection between economy and power, see Kennedy 1988. On armaments as wasteful consumption, see Brandt Commission 1980: 117-125, 284; Palme Commission 1982: 71-99 et passim; Brundtland Commission 1987: 290-307; Ball 1988. On the overextension of the present superpowers, see Cohen and Wilson 1990; Dibb 1988; Deger and Sen 1990. On the welfare state vs. military power dilemma, see, e.g., Vogt 1990; Bebermeyer 1990. On conversion, see, e.g., Dumas 1988; Renner 1990; M0ller 1990f. 8. On ancient Greece, see Andrews 1971: 161-183. On the Middle Ages, see McNeill 1983: 63-116; Ropp 1962: 21-22; Howard 1976: 20-37. 9. On social development in the revolutionary age, see Hobsbawn 1962: 101-125. On the social and technological factors of the French Revolution and the empire, see McNeill 1983: 188-201; Howard 1976: 79-86; Ropp 1962: 98-139; Dupuy 1980: 154-165. On French strategy, see Saxe 1985; Napoleon 1985; cf. Paret 1986; Gat 1989: 25-53. On Prussia, see Ropp 1962: 44-59, 132-133, 152-160; McNeill 1983: 126-139, 154-155, 215-222; Howard 1976: 66-72; Dupuy 1980: 148-154. On Prussian strategy, see (for an outstanding example) Frederick II 1747; cf. Palmer 1986; Gat 1989: 54-94, 139155. 10. On Finland's Winter War, see Vuorenmaa 1985a, b; Juutilainen 1985; Ahto 1985; Ries 1988: 81-171. The last author makes the pertinent observation that "Finland stands alone today as the only nation in the world to have defeated an outright Soviet invasion attempt" (p. 123). On Afghanistan, see Urban 1988. On Switzerland, see Quester 1976: 48-50. On Vietnam, see Gibson 1988: 9 3 154. On arctic ASW, see Stefanick 1987: 217-240, 265-92, 307-365. 11. An example of the nothing is new school is Jones (1988: 613-716). Many NOD researchers fall (probably unwittingly) into the constant flux school, whereas the long cycles school is represented by, inter alios, Dupuy (1980: 287290) and Simpkin (1986: 3-18), who advances, inter alia, a theory of fifty-year cycles; cf. Bellamy 1990. 12. On game theory in general, see, e.g., Dougherty and Pfaltzgraff 1971: 345-378. For outstanding applications of the methodology, see, e.g., Schelling 1960; Brams and Kilgour 1988. For a critique, see, e.g., Rapoport 1970a, b; Rapoport and Chammah 1970. 13. For a West German example, see Bebermeyer 1990. 14. On the manpower problems of the Bundeswehr, see Grass 1990; Thimann 1989a. NOD proposals envisaging a greater use of reserves include Biilow 1986; Funk 1988a, b. For a critique thereof, see Thimann 1989a; Thimann et al. 1988. One of the few British NOD advocates to suggest conscription is Booth 1983; see also Booth and Baylis 1988: 172-173. For more-traditional, albeit still noddy, British opinions, see ADC 1983: 138-140; Chalmers 1985: 158-173. For a US point of view, see, e.g., Boston Study Group (including two of the first NOD proponents in the United States—Randall Forsberg and Paul Walker) 1979: 274-276. 15. The critique can be found in, e.g., Hinrichs 1977; Steinsecker 1982; Lippert et al. 1984; for a rebuttal, see Hanolka 1984. 16. Bracken 1976; on cities as combat ground, see Simpkin 1986: 70-72.

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For the proposal to use civilian-based defense for cities, see Nolte and Nolte 1984; M0ller 1989e, f. 17. Galtung (1984: 176) does, however, recognize the existence of gray areas and does acknowledge that "it would be naive to believe that any component of a weapon system is inherently defensive or offensive: it depends on the total system." 18. On the ASAT problematique, see, e.g., OTA 1986; Stares 1987. On the ambiguities of air defense, see M0ller 1989b. Galtung's views on SDI can be found in his "The Real Star Wars Threat," The Nation, February 28, 1987, pp. 248-249. 19. In the article "Avoiding Offensive Weapons and Strengthening the Defensive," (Quester 1986: 229-250), the author does, however, modify his definition somewhat by adding, for example, terrain specialization and other factors to defensive characteristics; see also Quester 1976: 3-7, 83. 20. For the permissive definition, see, e.g.. Hannig 1984: 31; Müller 1986a; Dünne 1988. The proposal for conditional offensive capabilities can be found in Müller 1986: 253-254; cf. Huntington 1983. On the ALB doctrine, see Headquarters, Dept. of the Army 1982. For more-austere definitions of defensive, see Lutz 1988b, c; Afheldt 1983; SAS 1984, 1989. 21. On force-to-space, see Bertele 1982; Thomson and Ganz 1988. On crossing-the-T, see Mearsheimer 1982, 1988a. 22. For critical analyses of US assessments of Soviet military power, see Prados 1982; Gervasi 1986. For a critique of NATO's force comparisons, see, e.g., Bülow 1984, 1985. For a comparison of the tank forces of the two alliances, see Chalmers and Unterseher 1988, 1989. 23. On dynamic analysis, see Epstein 1985, 1988, 1989, 1990. For a critique of official force comparisons, see Posen 1986, 1988; Mearsheimer 1982, 1988b. On the square law, see, e.g., Lanchester 1916; cf. Lepingwell 1987; Biddle 1988; Neild 1986. 24. Jomini, in Laqueur 1978: 110-111; and, on Jomini's predecessors in this respect, Lloyd and Bülow, in Gat 1989: 67-94. 25. The examples are based on Ropp 1962; Quester 1976; McNeill 1983; Howard 1976; Creveld 1989; Fuller 1954, vol. 3; Jones 1988; Dupuy 1980; Bellamy 1990. 26. Among Liddell Hart's writings from this period on the strength of the defensive, one could mention his 1937 and 1939 works. For a critical reassessment of Hart's role, see Mearsheimer 1988a. On Hart's previous advocacy of the offensive, see, e.g., Bond and Alexander 1986. On the Maginot Line, see, e.g., Gibson 1941; Posen 1984a: 105-140.

7 THE STRATEGY OF N O D In Chapter 6 a tentative definition of NOD was suggested, according to which 'The armed forces should be seen in their totality to be capable of a credible defense, yet incapable of offense." Whereas this definition seemed free of some of the inconsistencies of other definitions by virtue of its abstract nature, this advantage came at the price of leaving the concrete implications open: • How might the armed forces be configured so as to provide them with adequate defensive capabilities, while depriving them, to all practical intents and purposes, of the ability to attack? • How might the strategic principles of NOD be applied concretely to nuclear forces as well as conventional land, air, and maritime forces? • What level of ambition would be appropriate, that is, should the defense be able to meet all conceivable threats, most of these, or merely the likely ones? • What kinds of, or scale of, offensive and counteroffensive operations would have be ruled out, and which might still be permissible? • How might these capabilities and incapabilities best be made known to the relevant adversaries with a view to achieving the intended political, disarmament, and war prevention goals? In this chapter, an attempt is made to answer these questions, and I therefore focus more on military details than heretofore. Even though I have chosen a division into military environments (land, air, sea) as my ordering principle, I feel no obligation to respect present boundaries between the military services, but feel completely at liberty to recommend, say, army units take over tasks previously performed by navies or air forces, or vice versa. The level of abstraction and generalization is lower in this chapter than in the preceding ones, since the focus is on concrete weapons systems, actual military operations, and so forth. On the other hand, I have not aspired to the level of concreteness required for actual defense planning. The focus is thus

161

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on weapons categories rather than actual weapons, deployment modes rather than the actual location of forces, and operational and tactical patterns of behavior rather than blueprints for military exercises (or actual war fighting). With a few exceptions, I have therefore also refrained from providing concrete figures, and preferred quantitative expressions such as many and few, more and less, or cheap and expensive. To give the semblance of further precision would be misleading and to attempt greater accuracy would be misplaced, since the following is about neither any particular country nor any specific point in time. The predominantly future tense and the abundance of prescriptive terms notwithstanding, this chapter is not intentionally any more normative than the previous ones. The future and prescriptive tenses (as in "the defense should") are simply preferred as convenient shorthand expressions for cumbersome phrases such as "in order to comply with the criteria derived from the preceding chapters, the defense would have to . . ." Also, while the reader will undoubtedly note extensive use of jargon, and acronyms of a "pentagonistic" origin, to thus use the terminology of a particular social group is not necessarily tantamount to an acceptance of the substance of its argumentation. Nuclear Forces I commence with the implications of NOD for the nuclear sphere, because it defines, so to speak, the context (or setting) of conventional defenses, including their appropriate level of ambition. Whereas I begin the analysis with an assumption of nuclear bipolarity (as the most abstract and simplest case), I subsequently give some consideration to the implications of multi polarity. As already mentioned, the only nuclear strategy compatible with NOD would be minimum deterrence, which would preserve the benign effects of mutual deterrence at the lowest possible level of actually deployed nuclear forces. The sole purpose of nuclear forces would henceforth be to deter nuclear attack, and hence also insure against attempts at nuclear blackmail. An NFU strategy would be the logical corollary thereof, which would have to encompass declaratory policy as well as a particular posture.1 Since there seems to be no particular limit to how small a nuclear force might suffice for these purposes, zero would be what to strive for. Even after a hypothetical complete abolition of actual nuclear weapons, the nuclear potential would remain, since either party might build new nuclear weapons on rather short notice, and because neither side could ever be entirely sure that its respective adversary might not do so, or even have concealed some nuclear weapons. In this sense, the nuclear genie is out of its bottle for good, and even its shadow will continue to exert a considerable deterrent effect, say in a weaponless or blueprint deterrence mode.2

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Since it does, however, strain the imagination to visualize the present nuclear powers opting for this solution overnight, the only realistic hope would be for a gradual dismantling of the arsenals, say through consecutive S T A R T agreements. Since the process of builddown might conceivably move through plateaus of instability, it is far from trivial how to proceed. At each stage crisis stability should, as a minimum, be maintained, and preferably improved, and no options should remain open for exploitation by either side with a view to achieving a usable supremacy. At one of the transitory stages the opposing postures would be tantamount to minimum deterrence, based on arsenals containing, say, a few hundred warheads on each side. It is, however, of considerable importance how these would be distributed and deployed. For the sake of stability and in order to allow for the smallest possible arsenals, weapons survivability will be of the utmost importance. Weapons survivability is a combined function of each side's deployment of strategic nuclear weapons and the respective opponent's ability to destroy them. Adequate protection is, in principle at least, obtainable unilaterally, simply by being better at concealing and shielding one's weapons than the adversary is at finding and targeting them. However, a cooperative approach to the matter is much to be preferred (if only for reasons of cost), according to which each side should deliberately abstain from holding the other side's deterrent at risk. The latter requirement will necessitate a reduction of counterforce and particularly HTK capabilities to an absolute minimum, so as to allow neither side to disarm the other in a preemptive strike. This implies a need for de-MIRVing ballistic missiles and for limiting their throw-weight, as well as for reversing the trend toward very low CEP. Single-warhead, light, and somewhat inaccurate missiles would thus constitute the ideal type of weapon, which would pose the smallest risk to the survivability of the opponent's strategic deterrent and thus allow him to meet his requirements with a minimum of weapons. The protection of one's own weapons depends, above all, on their deployment. Because the depth of the oceans is likely to remain the most inaccessible location, the majority of the strategic nuclear weapons had better be deployed on submarines, at least as far as the United States is concerned, whereas mobile ICBMs might be preferable for the USSR because of its almost landlocked position. In order to minimize vulnerability, S L B M s ought to be distributed among as many SSBNs as possible, for example by reducing (as well as de-MIRVing) SLBMs but not SSBNs and sealing off the vacant launch tubes. The present trend toward longer ranges ought to be pursued, since it expands the available operations area, thus hampering localization, as well as because it allows the Soviet Union to compensate for its poor access to the sea by deploying its strategic submarines in adjacent seas.

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As an insurance against accidental launches, SLBMs should, furthermore, be equipped with PALs. Even though the theoretical risk of decapitation attacks against the NCA or the antennae for submarine communications cannot be dismissed entirely, to all practical intents and purposes the threat of retaliation from the SSBNs would remain credible, because, inter alia, the only serious threats to these facilities presently stem from low-trajectory and low-CEP SLBMs, launched from stations close to the coast. Any remaining risks might thus be eliminated by prohibiting tests of low-trajectory SLBMs, by stand-off zones for SSBNs off the coast of the respective opponent, as well as by abstaining from the deployment of SLBMs with HTK capabilities, such as those apparently inherent in the D-5 (Trident 2) SLBM.3 Regardless of the advantages of the sea-based deterrent, it would probably be ill-advised, even for the United States, to rely entirely on this one leg. A maintenance of the present triadic structure would thus be prudent, because, inter alia, of its benign synergies, which render the synchronization of a surprise attack well-nigh impossible. Whereas the ICBMs could only be taken out by other ICBMs (which alone possess the required precision and/or large yield), the launching of these missies would be detected by the target state from, inter alia, early-warning satellites in geostationary orbits, which provide a warning of up to thirty minutes. This would allow the strategic bombers of the state under attack to go on airborne alert and thus to become practically invulnerable. The air-breathing leg of the triad, in its turn, could only be taken out preemptively by means of low-trajectory SLBMs, the launch of which would, however, provide enough time for a launch of the ICBM force in an LUA mode, prior to its own destruction by the incoming, but delayed, attacking enemy ICBMs.4 The arsenals should thus comprise SSBNs with SLBMs, silo-based as well as mobile ICBMs, and an air-breathing fleet of penetrating strategic bombers. The addition of cruise missiles to the arsenals does not appear to constitute a problem per se, if only they were conceived of as penetration devices rather than as means of counterforce (such as is presently the case), and if, furthermore, the arms control verification problems were to find a satisfactory solution. If so, cruise missiles would have the advantage of making other weapons programs superfluous, since penetrating ALCMs would make genuine penetrating bombers (e.g., with "stealth" features, such as the B-2) redundant.5 Although the triadic structure had thus better be maintained, its total size could safely shrink drastically, say, to something like five hundred warheads on each side. A possible configuration of such an arsenal might be that shown in Table 7.1, with the caveat that a satisfactory solution would have to be found to the verification problems pertaining to SLCMs, in the absence of which they had better be replaced by, say, additional bombers and SLBMs.

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Table 7.1 Minimum Deterrence Postures, United States and the Soviet Union USA Systems

USSR WHs

Systems

WHs

ICBM/WHs

50

50

250

250

Bombers/ALCMs

50

100

25

50

SSBN/SLBM/WHs

250

250

150

150

SLCMs

25

100

100

15

50

50

Total

450

500

475

500

Reciprocal vulnerability and the ensuing stalemate of mutual deterrence should be accepted as facts of life, first because a viable defense against nuclear attack will remain infeasible, and second because the very quest for such a defense would be destabilizing. The technical infeasibility is a result of the immense destructive power embedded in nuclear weapons, implying that the standards to which such a strategic defense would have to comply in order to be at all meaningful are very high indeed. An efficiency of, say, 99 percent would ipso facto imply leaks of 1 percent. As measured against arsenals of approximately the present sizes, even a 1 percent leakage (i.e., around one hundred fifty WHs) would be tantamount to an unprecedented disaster with perhaps tens of millions of casualties. That it would be to no avail to simply aim for even higher standards (say, a 99.99 percent efficiency) is a function of the strategic logic. The more one side were to approach a true damage limitation by means of strategic defenses, the more eagerly would its adversary search for CMs in order to forestall this, which would be tantamount to an effective warwinning capability. This strategic logic brings us back to technological boundaries of strategic defenses once again, which are due to the panoply of CMs available to a state determined to preserve its retaliatory nuclear strike capability vis-à-vis another nuclear power. Whereas each and every single CM might be parried with CCMs, the latter could never be "cost-effective at the margin" (Nitze 1986), because of the different standards. Whereas the party seeking to maintain its retaliatory capability might well be content with a penetration probability of, say, 10 percent, the defender's strategic defenses would have to aim for infinitely higher standards.6 Whereas BMD-type means of damage limitation are thus infeasible, other conceivable means to the same end would not fare much better. Strategic ASW is likely to remain extremely demanding for the foreseeable future, in addition to which it is highly destabilizing. Preemptive strikes against the opponents' nuclear forces, inter alia surgical counterforce strikes of a decapitation character, are likewise beyond the means of the present

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nuclear powers.7 In both cases, the would-be strategic defender would have to aim for a near certainty of destroying all of the opponent's nuclear forces, whereas the respective opponent might rest content with the preservation of a fraction of his retaliatory forces, which would suffice for assured destruction. The quest for strategic defenses is not merely futile, but fraught with dangers, since it would signal the intention to break the stalemate of mutual deterrence. It would therefore elicit a response from the respective adversary, from which an arms race might well ensue. Even worse, if one side should come anywhere close to a meaningful defensive capability, it would become a matter of considerable urgency for its opponent to prevent this, whence an incentive for a preemptive strike.8 The only setting wherein strategic defenses would be neither impossible nor dangerous would be that of a minimum deterrence regime. Under these circumstances, however, the sought-for damage limitation might be attainable in a more cost-effective mode through a simple builddown of the arsenals. Furthermore, the only political circumstances that might allow a safe transition to a strategic defense regime would be the very same as would allow such truly deep cuts; as a matter of coincidence perhaps precisely the present situation, when tension between the superpowers is low, and their mutual relations close to amicable. There is thus very little to be said in favor of strategic defenses, since they would be feasible only in a setting where they would be superfluous. That I have nevertheless been so elaborate on this matter is because SDI and NOD are occasionally erroneously regarded as two sides of the same coin. As has, I hope, emerged, however, this is very far from the truth, indeed. On the contrary, it has to be acknowledged that in the nuclear age pure deterrence is the best that might be hoped for, albeit with the paradoxical implications that "Offense is Defense. Defense is Offense. Killing weapons is bad. Killing people is good."9 For this kind of stability under MAD conditions balance of anxiety seems a more appropriate term than balance of terror. "Terror" conveys the impression of a purposive quest for inducing terror, which may well be a good description of present nuclear strategies, focusing on operational issues and emphasizing counterforce, ethnic targeting, or whatever (Richelson 1986; Cattell & Quester 1986). "Anxiety" describes a situation of risk, wherein the danger is neither manifest nor imminent, and structural rather than stemming from a particular opponent: a fair description of the reciprocal vulnerability implied by existential deterrence. "Balance," in its turn, should not be understood numerically, since numerical ratios matter little, if at all, between nuclear contestants in possession of invulnerable second-strike capabilities. The term thus signifies no more than an equilibrium based on mutuality and reciprocity, for which reciprocal anxiety might be the most appropriate, albeit slightly awkward, term.

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Such a reciprocal anxiety regime seems perfectly compatible with, and might even constitute a precondition for, the CS regime analyzed in Chapter 2, the principled rejection of deterrence on the part of many CS proponents notwithstanding. Under such a regime it is only sensible to shift attention from maintaining (in any case robust) mutual deterrence toward preventing inadvertent, and in particular accidental, nuclear war. Sensible supplements to the regime might therefore be various crisis management mechanisms, such as improved communication links, joint crisis management centers, a panoply of nuclear-related CBMs, etc. 10 The described regime would basically be a matter between the two nuclear superpowers, encompassing merely strategic weapons, whereas there would be scope for neither theater nor battlefield nuclear weapons, nor other FBSs. Not merely the LRTNF missiles would thus have to be dismantled (as has already happened in pursuance of the INF Treaty), but also the mediumrange as well as carrier-based aircraft for nuclear land-attack purposes, along with the entire stock of nuclear artillery shells and short-range missiles for the land forces, and the iron bombs and stand-off missiles of the air forces. Furthermore, tactical nuclear weapons at sea would have to be abolished altogether along with most nuclear SLCMs and the nuclear weapons for carrier-based aircraft, a process that may, indeed, already be under way with the unilateral US decision to phase out three such systems. 11 Such drastic postural changes would have profound implications for other countries, as well as for other parts of the strategic spectrum: 1. 2.

3. 4.

Most of the globe would become nuclear-free, including the US allies, since there would no longer be any rationale for F B S . Extended deterrence could no longer be a function of F B S or other particular nuclear deployment modes, but would have to become entirely a matter of political coupling, or be abandoned altogether. States would have to learn to live without the presumed protection of any nuclear umbrella. Conventional defenses would have to be made self-sustainable.

The first point implies that NWFZs would be rendered obsolete, in the sense that the entire globe, minus the nuclear powers, would come to constitute one contiguous zone. This is, however, precisely the purpose of the present NWFZs (established by the Tlatelolco and Raratonga treaties), just as it is the rationale for proposed additional zones (for the Nordic region and the Balkans) and corridors (in central Europe). 12 There would a fortiori be no need for filling any alleged gaps created by the INF Treaty in the "seamless web of deterrence." Not only the plans for an FOTL might thus safely be abandoned, but also those for stand-off missiles for NATO's tactical aircraft. Along with the F B S , and in order to preserve the ABM treaty, the plans for the creation of an extended air-defense system

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against short-range and theater nuclear missiles (i.e., an ATM defense) would also have to be shelved. 13 The only possible rationale for an ATM defense might be the need to defend against (predominantly conventional) ballistic missiles, which are presently proliferating rapidly in the Third World ( see Karp 1989; Carus 1990; Nolan 1991). This is, however, not a matter of nuclear postures but of conventional defenses pure and simple. I have already (in Chapter 3) expressed the opinion that extended deterrence, to the extent that it has ever been real, has been profoundly political. There is simply no way of forcing a state to engage itself in a war from which it would prefer to stay aloof by means of any particular deployment of weapons, or entire armies for that matter. For as long as a certain degree of (would-be rational) human decisionmaking is involved, that is, as long as there is " a president in the loop," decisions of such immense importance as to give nuclear clearance to subordinate commanders, or even to order a nuclear strike, will be guided by political war/no-war considerations, rather than by urges to rescue (or revenge the loss of) troops, much less inanimate objects such as weapons. Some extended deterrence is nevertheless bound to remain, for example, in the NATO context, for as long as there are political affinities as well as common (i.a., economic) interests joining together the two halves of NATO. No adversary could ever rest assured that the United States might not eventually become involved in a war in Europe. The US nuclear might would therefore have to be taken into account in any prospective aggressor's war/no-war calculus. This is, however, neither a function of weapons, nor of troop deployments, nor declaratory policies about first-use, nor of solemn declarations of allegiance. Extended deterrence is a matter of an adversary's perception of the likely political deliberations of target states and their friends and allies, combined with the intangible whiff of nuclear first-use, that is, the inalienable option of crossing the nuclear threshold rather than accepting defeat.14 Notwithstanding how easy it may be in principle to bid farewell to firstuse and manifest extended deterrence, it would undoubtedly require a rather profound shift of attitude, particularly as far as the countries of Western Europe are concerned. To the extent that the international climate improves, however, and détente is perceived as growing and becoming more solid and robust, such a shift of attitude may well be realistic, indeed would already seem to be in progress. Successful arms control may, furthermore, facilitate this attitudinal shift by reducing the opponent's capabilities of aggression along with his presumed intentions. For as long as war continues to be regarded as a possibility, albeit highly unlikely to materialize, defenses have to be, and be perceived as, adequate for all likely eventualities. Since no nuclear weapons will any longer be available for war-fighting purposes, say for preventing a breakthrough of invading tanks, conventional defenses have to

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be self-sustainable, a matter to which I will return at length below. Up to this point, the analysis has merely referred to a bipolar nuclear system wherein stability in the dual sense of crisis stability and arms race stability is presumably conceivable. However, whether this form of stability can be attained in an expanded model, including several nuclear powers, remains an open question. There is hardly any doubt that a surge nuclear proliferation would complicate matters immensely. I do not share Kenneth Waltz's (1981) optimistic belief in the inherent stability of a multipolar nuclear world. 15 Although the possession of nuclear weapons might, of course, teach states to behave with greater circumspection, then again it might not. Indeed, it would seem particularly unlikely to do so if the acquisition of nuclear means were to occur (as seems likely) in a context of rising political tension and fear of imminent war between the countries in question. Although the fears prevalent throughout the 1960s of boundless proliferation have not (yet) materialized, the present nonproliferation regime, on the other hand, seems inherently fragile. The danger continues to loom of chain reactions between dyads of threshold countries such as India and Pakistan or Israel and its neighbors (even though the risk of an Iraqi bomb may have been eliminated), which would bode ill for strategic stability, as a result of, inter alia, the accruing risks of catalytic nuclear war.16 The present nuclear powers are probably here to stay, but some matter more than others, at least for Europe. It seems permissible to leave China, Israel, and South Africa outside the scope of analysis. Furthermore, because of the peacetime integration of the British nuclear forces with NATO and the intimate collaboration of the United Kingdom with the United States, they hardly constitute an independent problem from a stability point of view. The French force de frappe, however, does, by virtue of its genuine independence and present growth, as well as because French nuclear strategy differs, albeit perhaps in principle more than in practice, from that of NATO. In addition to the problems created by both French and British nuclear forces for arms control, and a fortiori for an implementation of the new regime outlined above, the resultant partial nuclear multipolarity constitutes an element of latent instability because it might eventually also legitimate German nuclear power. Whereas it certainly helps that the new Germany has solemnly renounced its right to acquire nuclear weapons, no such guarantee is unbreakable indefinitely. That a German move to nuclear status would improve stability in Europe (as argued by certain authors) seems questionable, to say the least, particularly because Germany is still haunted by its (not really confidence-inspiring) past. Germany's breaking out of the nonproliferation regime might therefore well spark a prairie fire of uncontrolled proliferation.17 Even in this (unlikely) worst of cases, that is, in a truly multipolar world, some stability might still be attainable, if only the new nuclear

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powers would abstain from counterforce. Whereas the proliferation of counterforce potentials among a state's potential adversaries might jeopardize the survivability of its nuclear deterrent and hence induce it to increase the arsenal, the same would not be the case for countervalue (or pure deterrence) proliferation. Even a state confronting, say, ten nuclear-armed opponents would seem to need only one AD capability (e.g., of the same magnitude as proposed above, that is, five hundred WHs) in order to deter them all, since no adversary could be sure of escaping retaliation.

Land Forces The above account of nuclear deterrence was merely intended as a preliminary to the analysis of conventional defense. NOD is, indeed, a profoundly conventional strategy, and many (perhaps most) NOD models have actually been devised with a view to making nuclear weapons impotent and obsolete, and thus as contributions to nuclear disarmament.18 Seen in this light, NOD might seem to blend in with the host of recent proposals for raising the nuclear threshold. Most proposals to this effect, however, have had as their aim-point merely a shift to a no-early-first-use strategy. Furthermore, they have envisaged achieving such a strategy through nuclear equivalence, that is, by assigning conventional (in the sense of nonnuclear) and quasi-nuclear weapons to various military missions which have hitherto been the prerogatives of nuclear forces, such as deep interdiction and OCA. A range of so-called deep-strike conceptions fall into this category, but differ considerably from NOD, inter alia as damaging to crisis stability and likely to spur an armaments competition (see e.g. Wijk 1986; Burgess 1986; Flanagan 1986; Harris 1988; M0ller 1987a). The land forces must logically form the core of NOD, since possession of offensive-capable ground forces is a sine qua non of genuine offensive capability. In the absence of forces capable of conquering and holding ground no wars could be won, and the ground forces hence have to be the focal point of any NOD discourse, as well as of the eventual implementation of NOD. There is, however, no unanimity among NOD advocates about the proper standards of defensivity. The most austere proposals (see, e.g., Afheldt 1983; Lutz 1988b) rule out the possession of capabilities not merely for invasion and occupation, but also for minor border crossing, as well as standoff systems by means of which enemy territory might be hit. This would effectively rule out all mobile systems, along with the entire air force as well as most missiles, and would thus constitute a very radical break, indeed, with the present defense. Ipso facto, however, such models are quite unlikely ever to be implemented in practice, because, inter alia they would require a scrapping of (perhaps recently acquired) extremely expensive weapons systems, as well as major investments in alternative hardware. Other NOD schemes are, however, considerably more permissive and

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envisage the maintenance of mobile systems for the purpose of, inter alia, counteroffensives as well as fairly long-range (say, up to one hundred kilometers) stand-off systems. I subscribe to the latter, more permissive, view; indeed belong to one of the most prominent model-building groups of this tradition, the international Studiengruppe Alternative Sicherheitspolitik, or SAS. I will describe how the so-called spider-and-web principles of the SAS might be applied to the ground forces in central Europe. Needless to say, these principles might take on quite different appearances if applied elsewhere. 19 I proceed in what appears to be the logical order—from the strategic level to those of operational art and tactics—and I conclude with the technological level, that is, the rough weapons profile of the defense scheme. The strategic purpose of the land forces would differ from that emphasized by traditional, Clausewitzian, strategy, since the objective of war winning (in the sense of imposing one's will on the opponent) is out of the question in the shadow of existential deterrence. The objective of a war could only be to avoid losing, that is, to accomplish a restoration of the status quo ante bellum with as few casualties and as limited material destruction as possible. In order to accomplish this, the intensity and destructiveness of a war in progress would have to be minimized, and fighting would have to be terminated as swiftly as possible, matters to which I will return in due course. The paramount objective would, however, be to prevent the war from starting in the first place, something that (as analyzed in Chapter 5 above) would call for two sets of precautions: first, safeguards against inadvertent wars, falling into two categories: measures minimizing incentives for preemption by depriving the respective opponent of reasons for feeling threatened, through a strictly defensive defense, and an elimination of options of preemption through an avoidance of lucrative, concentrated targets; second, safeguards against premeditated (Clausewitzian) war waged for positive purposes, in its turn calling for a combination of existential (nuclear) deterrence and conventional deterrence by denial. Thanks to the aforementioned existential deterrence effect, only limited wars could possibly make any sense, and an aggressor would thus have nothing to gain by upping the ante through escalation. Limited wars for limited ends and fought with limited means would thus be what the conventional defense should seek to avert by ensuring (and making it apparent) that such wars would be unsuccessful and/or prohibitively costly. The latter requirement is inextricably connected with the time perspective. Quite a lot might be deemed affordable for a short while, and an aggressor might thus not be dissuaded by the prospects of losing, say, the equivalent of x billion dollars, or y thousand troops over a limited period, since the value of the expected prize might well exceed these costs. What would, however, undoubtedly dissuade an attacker would be the prospects of

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not gaining the prize, while suffering steadily cumulating losses in terms of both manpower and material resources in a protracted war of attrition. In such a war, furthermore, the attrition rates would tend to benefit the defender, because of the intrinsic advantages of the defense mentioned in the previous chapter. The dissuasive potential would, however, presuppose, first, an approximate rationality on the part of the prospective aggressor, and second, that the defender's potential would be apparent. That not all aggressors are always rational (in the Western homo economicus or homo strategicus sense) was aptly illustrated by the militarily puzzling behavior of Saddam Hussein's Iraq in the course of the war with the UN coalition. With these caveats, and as a general rule with possible exceptions, a considerable dissuasive effect should derive from the ability to prevent swift and decisive blitzkrieg campaigns and to transform them into protracted and indecisive attrition contests. 20 This would a fortiori hold true for the particular pair of contestants that faced each other (at least until 1989) in Europe. The only type of war that either NATO or the WTO might have had any hope of winning would have been a blitzkrieg, whereas both sides would have been certain to lose an attrition contest on the respective opponent's territory, such as would have accrued if they had themselves attacked. The USSR has already demonstrated its ability to prevail in protracted wars of defense on two separate occasions, namely during the French invasion in 1812 and during the Great Patriotic War from 1941 to 1945.21 In both cases, the enormous space to be covered by an attacker, in combination with the demanding climate, eventually made the aggressor's logistic chains impossible to maintain. At the same time, the strategic withdrawal on the part of the defender, combined with scorched earth tactics, made it impossible for the aggressor to live off the country while being gradually, but inescapably, lured into the depth of Russia. Whereas the actual waging of such a war would be extremely devastating for the defender, the apparent ability to do so would have a powerful dissuasive effect on any aggressor motivated by expansionist aims and guided by cost-benefit calculations. The West would, likewise, have been almost certain to prevail against the USSR, if the latter had attacked, if only a protracted struggle could have been ensured. The total mobilizable potential of the West is vastly superior to that of the USSR, because of the indisputable Western economic superiority, as well as to the larger population {and hence manpower pool) available for military service. Contrary to the prevailing opinion, the West has furthermore enjoyed the advantages of a tremendous strategic depth, even exceeding that of the USSR, both in spatial terms and as a function of inaccessibility. NATO's transatlantic nature implies that no aggressor would have won a war against it, before either one of two conditions had been met: either the United States would have to have been defeated along with its European allies (something that would be well-nigh impossible to achieve, because of

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this country's insular position); or the communication between the two sides of the Atlantic Ocean would have to have been severed beyond restoration. This assumption is supported by historical evidence, since the entry of the United States into the two previous world wars did in fact prove decisive. An effectively invulnerable and nearly inexhaustible mobilization pool was thus placed at the disposal of one of the competing sides in the war in progress in Europe, thus rendering the beneficiary, to all practical intents and purposes, invincible. These strategic advantages would, however, presuppose that the attacker could not irreparably sever the transatlantic SLOCs, to prevent which would above all be a naval task (to which I will return in due course); and that a bridgehead might be established for the United States in Europe. No aggressor should therefore be allowed to attain complete control of the continent, before the reinforcements start arriving and begin to decisively tip the scales to the detriment of the aggressor in the attrition contest in progress.22 A further reason for the USSR to prefer a blitzkrieg would be the Soviet fear of NATO's crossing the nuclear threshold, the likelihood of which would inevitably increase the longer the war were to last. Finally, the Soviet allies have always been unreliable and would most likely have become increasingly so, the longer the duration of a war against the West (Johnson et al. 1980; Herspring & Volgyes 1980; Volgyes 1982; McCausland 1986; Walendowski 1988; MacGregor 1986, 1989). Whereas this last reason has now been rendered obsolete by the mass defection of former Soviet allies, the other reasons would remain valid. In conformity with these requirements, Soviet strategy and posture seemed tailored for exactly such a blitzkrieg: with an all-mechanized army, emphasizing the ability to penetrate positional defenses; with succeeding echelons as well as OMGs capable of exploiting such penetrations; and with various air-mobile formations suitable for large-scale maneuver warfare in general, and desant operations in particular, all of them designed with a view to achieving swift and operationally decisive results. Whereas these strategic and operational conceptions have been undergoing a revision since around 1987 with a view to building down offensive elements, it still remains to be seen to what extent they will actually be replaced with more-defensive ones.23 The West would thus, to the same extent as the East, have been nearly certain of prevailing in a protracted war of attrition launched by the other side, albeit not in the sense of winning (i.e., of achieving any positive gains) but in that of not losing relative to the other. The transformation of what would have been intended as a blitzkrieg by an aggressor into a protracted war would hence have been a valid strategic goal for which to strive. In the following, I investigate the requirements springing from this goal, as seen from the West, in a hypothetical scenario wherein the East is

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stipulated as attacking the West in an attempted blitzkrieg. That I have thus chosen an admittedly one-sided point of view may well reflect a parochial Western attitude. There is, however, nothing in the analysis that would not, mutatis mutandis, be applicable to the opposite scenario of a Western attack on the USSR. On the level of strategy the defense would have to constitute a combination of a forward with a territorial defense. On the one hand, effective barriers should be emplaced against an invasion, and the defense should commence directly at the border, for several reasons. First, an adequate forward defense would slow down the invader and thus give the defender more time to mobilize, assume combat positions, etc. Conversely, by virtue of his possession of this forward defense capability, the defender would be in a position to cadre the rest of his forces to a greater extent, thus minimizing his own capability for surprise or short-warning attack. Forward defense thus strengthens crisis stability. Second, forward defense would be valuable for parrying and containing small-scale, probing attacks, which some have regarded as the most (or even the only) serious threat in contemporary and future Europe.24 Third, to the extent that the forward defense should prove effective in halting the would-be invader, a considerable damage limitation would be accomplished through sparing the major part of the defender's own territory. Fourth, such a forward defense has (at least until quite recently) been a political imperative as far as central Europe is concerned, namely as constituting the only way of meeting West German fears of being regarded (above all by France and Britain) as a forward glacis. The latter objective may, however, have been rendered outdated by German unification, a problem to which I will return in the final chapter. Finally, the maintenance of a forward defense, along with the multinationality of NATO's NORTHAG and CENTAG commands would add to deterrence and war prevention, if the allied forces were to remain in the first front line, so that no attacker could in earnest hope to escape a war against the combined power of all of NATO. On the other hand, the area behind this forward defense should not be left undefended, but be covered with an all-pervasive defense web, the purpose of which would be to hamper the aggressor's exploitation of any penetrations of the forward line he might be able to effect. It would hence make the concentration of forces for penetration purposes less inviting. Furthermore, the in-depth character of the defense would ensure that the war could not be terminated after a penetration, such as would always have to be reckoned with as a possibility. It would thus be a sine qua non of attaining the strategic goal of protracted defense. Both as far as the forward area and the rest of the territory are concerned, the defense should comprise two main elements: (1) an area-covering and

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largely stationary web of predominantly infantry character, and (2) a number of mobile (i.e., mechanized and lightly armored, or air-mobile) forces serving as internal rapid reinforcement units, also called spiders. The latter should be capable of reinforcing exposed parts of the web, of concentrating against axes of attack, of conducting tactical and operational-scale counteroffensives, etc. They would thus provide the defender with mobility and flexibility, as well as with the means to engage the attacker's armored forces head-on. A number of advantages would accrue from integrating the spiders in the web, rather than deploying them in the rear, as proposed by most NOD advocates (see, e.g., LOser 1982a, b; Biilow 1986, 1988; Funk 1988a, b; A. Miiller 1986, 1988, 1990). The overall mobility (and hence offensive potential) of the mechanized forces could remain limited, since the distances they would have to cover from their peacetime locations to their combat stations would simply be shorter. Furthermore, forward defense would be strengthened, since the spiders could directly reinforce exposed parts of the front, indeed might well be deployed up front. Finally, they would not have to embark on (inherently ambiguous) forward movements in the case of a presumably imminent attack in order to reach their combat positions in time, such as would be the case with the heavy, mobile forces in a number of other models. The defense would remain nonoffensive in spite of the presence of these spider forces for two reasons: (1) the spiders would be numerically small in comparison with the web forces (as well as compared with the present mechanized and air forces); and (2) they would be so dependent on the stationary web in terms of logistics and other support functions as to be, to all practical intents and purposes, incapable of major operations beyond its confines, that is, on the opposite side of the border. They would hence possess only very limited border-crossing and no invasion capabilities at all. Neither would they be intended as a sword, as in certain other models that combine offensive-capable forces with a defensive shield. The purpose, as well as the operational tasks, of the mobile forces would be exclusively defensive. On the operational level, the spider-and-web principle should serve as a guideline as well, implying that the brunt of the defense would fall on the web, which should erode, delay, and channel the attacking forces. For the destruction of the latter, however, spiders would most often be required. In order to accomplish this task, the spiders should be integral to the web, that is, be allocated to specific sections, whereas cross-country mobility would be neither intended nor required. Although, as a general rule, the entire territory should be defended, this does not hold true for cities, which should not be fortified or defended militarily at all. Rather, they should be declared open towns, first, for the sake of damage limitation, and second, with a view to avoiding any

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paralyzing self-deterrence (see Nolte & Nolte 1984; M0ller 1989e, f; on open towns, see De Lupis 1987: 74-75, 254-258). As far as possible, lucrative military targets should be avoided by substituting a multitude of individually unimportant targets for a few important ones, both with regard to the forces themselves and as far as logistics are concerned. The forces should hence, as a general rule, operate in small teams and in rather great dispersal, just as the rear services should prefer many small depots scattered across the territory to large central storage sites. For basically the same reason, the armed forces ought to be decentralized to a rather large extent, that is, with a view to minimizing command structure vulnerability. Major command centers and, as a corollary thereof, rigid hierarchical command structures should be avoided. As an alternative, directional control (Auftragstechnik) should be emphasized, which would provide greater endurance as well as flexibility (cf. Simpkin 1986: 227-240; Creveld 1985: 270-272). The pattern of communication between the different parts of the system would consequently resemble a web, rather than a pyramid, and horizontal links would, as a general rule, take precedence over vertical ones. Most often, the forces in adjoining squares within the web would alert each other directly, rather than doing so through any central headquarters. There would hence be a need for a rather dense network of lines of communications, rather than for a small number of heavily protected lines. The very redundancy of channels should be able to provide the necessary survivability of the network itself. Nevertheless, it would seem prudent not to take the problems of jamming, EMP-induced breakdown, and the like too lightly. The communications system should hence seek a maximum of invulnerability and resistance against likely countermeasures, while not sacrificing cost-effectiveness and hence redundancy, something that could probably best be accomplished by emphasizing dug-in optical fiber cable networks. 25 The flexibility presumably provided by the total system of land forces would also be called for because an expansion of the functions of land forces would be envisioned, which would make centralized control extremely demanding and probably too cumbersome. In this defense scheme the land forces should not merely deal with the aggressor's ground forces, but also be charged with certain air and coastal defense missions, to which I will return below. As far as the level of readiness is concerned, there should be variable degrees, albeit differentiated according to criteria that are the exact opposite of those of most NOD models. The most offensive-capable forces should by no means be cadred, since their subsequent mobilization in times of crisis might well be destabilizing. They ought therefore to be maintained at all times at (approximately) their envisaged combat strength, while being built down to an absolute minimum. Since the web forces, on the other hand, might safely

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be mobilized without any unintended provocative repercussions, they could be cadred to a rather large extent. On the level of tactics the armed forces in general, and the web forces in particular, should emphasize both dispersal and agility as contributions to elusiveness and survivability. The forces should be well adapted to the terrain, in terms of equipment, training, SOPs, etc. As far as possible, the launchers (for, say, A T G M s or grenade launchers) should be separated from the launch crews, for several reasons: in order to hamper detection and hence neutralization; and in order to avoid tactical self-deterrence, that is, the alleged (and admittedly not entirely implausible) incentive of relatively dispersed forces, operating in comparative isolation, to remain inert in order to avoid detection. The forces should also not be expected to fight courageously until death—something that might constitute a convenient heroic fiction, and indeed something that sometimes happens, but something that is unrealistic to count on. The small units of the defense should hence, as a general rule, only be obliged to hold out for a certain period (for instance until bypassed by the enemy, or until their ammunition was expended), after which they should be allowed to withdraw (at least temporarily) from battle, while the units in the adjoining sectors would fight on. T o the extent that fighting spirit, or the lack of it, is a genuine problem, rigid hierarchical structures do not solve it, as pointed out by the military historian John Keegan: "Regulations designed to keep dull-witted conscripts together on the shoulder-to-shoulder battlefields of the blackpowder era are inappropriate in an age when weapons and tactics demand dispersion on the battlefield, and when initiative may be more important than blind obedience. In the last analysis, fighting spirit centres upon the morale of the individual soldier and the small group of comrades with whom he fights."26 At the level of technology, the defense web would emphasize various types of antitank weapons ( A T G M s , mines, recoilless rifles, grenade launchers, etc.), as well as air-defense weaponry (guns, portable SAMs, etc.), but some effort should also go into terrain modification (such as instant tank ditches) and readily emplaceable obstacles. Ordinary trucks, which have the advantage of being relatively cheap, expendable, and readily replaceable, would mainly be used for crew mobility, and as weapons platforms. For certain types of terrain, however, tracked vehicles might be called for (cf. Messenger 1987). In the category of spiders we would find many of the same types of weapons and weapons platforms as are presently to be found in the armed forces, only with different relative emphases, and in much smaller numbers: tank destroyers and (preferably light) tanks, including MBTs; various types of wheeled vehicles (some with a certain armor protection); helicopters and drones, the latter primarily intended for reconnaissance, but also to some extent for direct combat tasks. As compared with the present forces, say with

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Panzer or Panzergrenadier formations of the Bundeswehr, the overall weapons profile would, however, be distinctly lighter. Generally speaking, the technological level would range from state-ofthe-art to outdated-but-functioning, whereas no items of emerging technology should be included before they pass this stage of development. As a general rule, ruggedness and low costs would be more-important features than technological sophistication. Various types of countermeasures are, at least in principle, conceivable against a defense of this sort. I will mention a few of these (in a descending order from strategic and operational to tactical and technical CMs) along with some appropriate responses from the defenders. Strategically, an attacker might concentrate his forces with a view to overpowering the defender's forward line and effecting a penetration. This will always remain possible, at least in principle, and the only CMs, according to traditional wisdom, would be to strengthen the forward defense line and to deter such enemy concentrations by other means. One of the rationales for maintaining battlefield nuclear weapons has, indeed, been that of thereby forcing the attacker to operate in a nuclear-scared posture, that is, to refrain from massing his forces in order not to invite nuclear (artillery or aerial) strikes against them. By adopting an NFU strategy, however (so a prevalent critique against NOD and NFU goes), the defender might allow the attacker, once again, to concentrate freely and hence to saturate the forward defenses in order to effect a penetration. The appropriate response to this charge is, first, that there are in any case certain limits to the degree of concentration possible, because of, inter alia, geographic factors. In central Europe, for instance, the corridors suitable for attack are in fact neither all that numerous nor broad enough to accommodate simultaneous multidivisional assaults. Second, the defender will be in a position to make these corridors even narrower (i.e., to channel the attack), by means of, inter alia field fortifications and various rapidly emplaceable obstacles, as well as (as a long-term measure) certain terrain modifications. Third, the crossing-the-T phenomenon would benefit the defender in such engagements, since the entire firepower of the attacker could not possibly be brought to bear against the forward defense on a narrow strip. Numerical superiority would hence attain decreasing marginal returns. Finally, the very fact that the defense would be in-depth and distributed over the entire territory behind the forward line would mean that the attacker would, in any case, have to spread out subsequent to a breakthrough, since this would be a precondition for mopping up the territory. He would hence have to operate in a combat order similar to the nuclear-scared posture, albeit for entirely different reasons. There are two other strategic (or perhaps, rather, grand strategic) CMs which an attacker might conceivably employ, but for which I do not

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recommend any remedies, but rather venture a rebuttal. First, an attacker might allegedly embark on a salami strategy, implying, for example, an initial small-scale attack aiming at the conquest of a small piece of territory, subsequent to which he would sue for peace on favorable terms. There is, in principle, no military answer to this, since there will always be prizes small enough to be conquerable if only sufficient forces are allocated to the task. However, the nonmilitary costs of such aggressions would undoubtedly far outweigh the (per definition) very limited gains, and therefore the scenario does not merit serious attention, as least as far as Europe is concerned. Second, the attacker might allegedly seek to coerce the defender to surrender, rather than defeat him militarily, by means of, for example, nuclear blackmail, exemplary terror bombardments, or the like. Such coercion has almost never worked, and when it has, it has worked as a result of political rather than military factors. Consequently, once again, it would call for no military counter, but (if any) rather for political hedges against premature surrender.27 Operationally, the attacker would always be in a position to concentrate his forces along rather narrow axes, not merely for the large-scale breakthrough mentioned above, but at any subsequent stage as well, with a view to, inter alia, conquering objects deemed central, such as, say, airfields or ports. There are two appropriate counters to this threat: (1) to have as few such central facilities as possible, that is, to distribute military assets among a large number of individually unimportant sites rather than concentrating them (the no-target principle, referred to above); and (2) to have some ability to concentrate force against these axes. For this purpose, a concentration of fire delivered from dispersed launchers, such as recommended by Horst Afheldt and consorts, may constitute a valuable element (Acker 1984). It would, however, probably not suffice for complete and adequate area coverage, and might, furthermore, prove susceptible to technical countermeasures, as well as be quite unaffordable. This is exactly the reason the SAS model includes mobile spider forces as an integral supplement to the web. By means of these formations, flexible and swift reinforcement of exposed parts of the web would be possible, both in terms of additional firepower and of enhanced mobility, for example for evacuation. The invader might presumably also take advantage of the militarily deserted cities with a view to using them as bases or shelters. The defender, in his turn, would, according to the above recommendations, deliberately refrain from defending his cities, as well as from pursuing the aggressor into them. It would hence be possible for the invader to rest secure against military attack in the cities. To what extent this might constitute a serious problem for the defender is, however, open to question. On the one hand, cities are, indeed, very numerous and extensive, for instance in most parts of Germany, especially so if the surrounding urban

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sprawl is counted as well. In order to prevent the entire territory from being thus inadvertently demilitarized, while at the same time preserving the protection presumably afforded by open towns, a somewhat arbitrary dividing line may have to be drawn between cities and other urban agglomerates, say in terms of population density, or whatever. This is entirely a matter of concrete declarations to be made by the country in question, rather than of abstract criteria. In this manner, the preservation of considerable open spaces between cities might be ensured, in which the aggressor could be engaged by the defender's armed forces. An aggressor who had sought shelter in the cities would enjoy no rights of free passage or communication between them, and might therefore soon suffer logistical troubles. Furthermore,, he would be in no position to enforce a capitulation of the armed forces by holding the urban population hostage, although both the political authorities and the commanders of the armed forces might, of course, at any time surrender as a matter of deliberate choice. Especially if measures of civilian-based defense were to be employed for urban defense purposes, the conquest of the cities might prove to be of small avail for the attacker. The cities could not be made to serve as mobilization bases, since the production facilities would remain susceptible to strikes and other forms of civilian resistance. The administrative apparatus residing in cities could not be forced to work for the aggressor for the same reasons, and the attacker would be unable to bring the military resistance in the surrounding countryside to a halt, even if it should attempt to, by virtue of the extensive decentralization of the armed forces.28 Tactically, the aggressor might employ various types of desant forces, such as air-assault brigades, OMGs, paratroopers, speznaz forces, or the like. Furthermore, he might use specially trained and equipped infantry forces to locate and mop up the defending units one by one. However, this type of threat does not appear to call for any particular CMs on the part of the defender, since it happens to be exactly what the defense seeks to accomplish on the strategic and operational levels: a shift of emphasis from swift operations toward time-consuming ones, from heavy forces with great shock power toward lighter types of forces with merely staying power, etc. Nevertheless, there are bound to be certain objects in the defender's territory the defense of which would have a high priority. For this purpose, however, home-guard forces such as included in the SAS model (or as fielded by many countries, for instance Denmark) should suffice, particularly since they would (to the same extent as the web) be in a position to call on reinforcement by the spiders. Finally, the aggressor might employ artillery barrages or aerial bombardment against pockets of resistance.29 However, the ability of the web forces to dig in and employ various types of natural and man-made shelters would provide them with a considerable protection. They would, furthermore, not be envisaged moving about under enemy fire, something for

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which they would, indeed, be quite unequipped; hence the inherently stationary character of these forces. Finally, by virtue of the defender's dispersal, the requirements (in terms of ammunition and rate of fire) for genuine saturation barrages would be very high, probably prohibitively so, and impossible to sustain over protracted periods. Technically, a number of CMs recommend themselves against any single type of weapon. As a defense against various types of ATGMs and antitank mines, tank armor may be thickened, new (e.g., composite or reactive) armor might be used, or the contours of the tank might be modified somewhat. The ultimate CM might be to gradually shift from tanks to, say, helicopters, which some regard as predestined to become their successors. Against SAMs, aircraft and helicopters might employ various types of decoys designed to fool the specific sensor systems employed by the airdefense systems in question. Stealth technologies and antiradiation missiles, as well as various forms of evasive maneuvering, might be employed against the defender's radar systems (e.g., attached to the defender's SAMs), and so on. 30 I refrain from going into any kind of detail with these options, and merely point to a very general rule. Just as every weapon has a technical CM, every CM can be met with a technical CCM. This is likely to develop into an ongoing dialog, wherein cost-efficiency considerations are bound to prove decisive. In order to be truly worthwhile, CMs would have to be costeffective at the margin, that is, it should at every single stage be cheaper to add CMs (or CCCMs) with a view to maintaining combat value than to parry them with CCMs (or CCCCMs). This, in its turn, is ultimately not so much a technical as a structural question. As a very general rule, that side is predestined to prevail (in the sense of giving up last), whose level of ambition is the less demanding in terms of mission structure. Once again, this seems to point directly to the defending side. It is almost bound to be less demanding to somehow prevent a tank from functioning properly (by interfering with the engine, gun, target acquisition, and night-vision devices, crew, or otherwise) than to maintain it in working order on all accounts, in the midst of hostile territory. It is structurally less demanding to defeat an aircraft by downing it, blinding it, protecting oneself against it, etc. than it is to fly it in the enemy's airspace while performing worthwhile tasks. Another general rule is to opt for the maximum diversity in terms of weapons profile. The more varied the types of sensors employed by the defender (seismic, acoustic, infrared, etc.), the more difficult will he be to outsmart. From the more different angles he threatens the enemy's tank (for instance simultaneously with direct fire, antitank mines, and attack drones), the more demanding will be the requirements for protective armor, etc. A final general rule would be to diversify in terms of levels of technology. The most technologically sophisticated weapons are not always

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preferable, because of, inter alia, the inherent connection between complexity and breakdown liability. With a finite probability of subsystem malfunction, the aggregate likelihood of a malfunction of the total system increases proportionally. Simpler, that is, usually older, weapons have the additional advantage of being almost always cheaper, hence the advantage of being able to deploy them in larger numbers, thus substituting redundancy for sophistication. Finally, older and simpler weapons often have the advantages of being easier to operate and more rugged.

The Other Dimensions As already mentioned, the land forces matter before anything else, whereas air and maritime forces serve merely auxiliary functions, because they can neither take nor hold ground. Whereas these auxiliary services may well be quite important, particularly because most modern military operations include combined arms, they could not possibly amount to any genuine offensive potential on their own. Certain NOD advocates have therefore adopted a very permissive attitude to these service arms and refused to acknowledge any problems with either, say, plans for deep strikes by means of aircraft or missiles or, for instance, plans for establishing command of the sea, regardless of how ambitiously and aggressively pursued. As argued by George Quester, an army without fighter-bombers might still constitute a threat, whereas a fleet of fighter-bombers without an army could at most be a nuisance. 31 Although there is a certain logic to such views, they appear excessively abstract, as well as based on a slightly flawed logic. The synergisms between the various service arms may simply mean that the offensive potential of the whole exceeds that of the sum of its constituent parts. There are thus good reasons for taking the other services into account, at least as far as their contribution to the offensive capabilities of the ground forces is concerned. Furthermore, this contribution does not have to be defined narrowly, for several reasons: An aerial raid in an entirely different part of the country under attack may well divert resources and distract attention from the central land battle. Operations thus do not have to occur within the same area of interest for them to have an impact. A successful OCA strike against the opponent's air force may, likewise, allow a state to establish unchallenged air command over the battlefield and hence provide him with a powerful force multiplier for the land forces (as actually happened in the June War of 1967 in the Middle East as well as in January 1991 with the allied air attack against Iraq) (O'Ballance 1972: 49-84; Vuono 1991). Operations by the other service arms, consequently, do not even have to be directed against ground forces for them to have an impact on the land battle. Since nuclear and conventional forces are, as of today, closely interlinked, and because the state of nuclear deterrence determines the framework of

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conventional land defense, operations by the other service arms against the nuclear forces of an opponent (such as envisioned in the United State Navy's Maritime Strategy) may also have to be taken into account. Both the maritime and the aerial dimensions thus matter, and the forces operating in these dimensions have to be, at the very least, compatible with the N O D requirements for land forces; ideally supportive thereof. In conformity with the N O D definition in the introduction to this chapter, the armed forces in their totality (i.e., per implication also the air and maritime forces) should be seen as incapable of offensive, yet capable of defensive, operations. What this implies in concrete terms is the subject of the remainder of this chapter.

Air Forces The air is a highly attractive environment in several respects, particularly for states with great-power ambitions, because, inter alia, it allows for a high speed of transportation and a global reach, and because of the high functional and geographical versatility of air forces. The perpetual quest for air power (i.e., "the ability to project military force by or from a platform in the third dimension above the earth or the sea") 32 is thus understandable even though air power does not possess any intrinsic value, but is, at most, a means to an end. The command of the air for which states have traditionally striven is, however, an exclusive concept (i.e., something that two adversaries cannot enjoy simultaneously) and as such incompatible with common security. It therefore has to be applied merely to a circumscribed airspace, in particular to that above a state's own territory. Indeed, if it might be ensured that each side would automatically enjoy air supremacy above its own territory, this would be an important element in the aforementioned mutual defensive superiority. In addition to being spatially circumscribed, air power also ought to be disaggregated into its constituent functions, with a view to, inter alia, prioritizing the mission structure, in casu according to N O D criteria. Such missions as were indispensable for an adequate defensive capability would remain essential, whereas others might reveal themselves as superfluous or even harmful. The following is a brief enumeration of what are presumably the most important air-power missions, with an indication of their importance for NOD. Strategic bombardment is a form of countervalue warfare, and as such based on two fundamental assumptions of questionable validity, namely that of the supremacy of the offensive, in casu bombers, and that of the fragility of civilian morale, presumably liable to break under the strains of aerial bombardment. Both the moral permissibility and the actual efficiency thereof seem, however, dubious and are certainly not supported by historical experience (WWII, Vietnam, etc.).33

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That countervalue warfare for coercive purposes tends to fail may be a result of mutual deterrence, which dissuades both sides from "going total." The obvious risk is that by sowing the wind of limited countervalue attacks a state might reap the whirlwind of even more devastating retaliation. Furthermore, there are numerous political inhibitions (at least in democratic societies) against using total (and according to most people morally wrong) means for merely limited ends. On the other hand, it is inherently more plausible that countervalue capabilities might serve as a deterrent against countervalue attacks or threats. As argued above, NOD might therefore, at most, be compatible with minimum deterrence, that is, a strategy and posture for limited countervalue deterrence. As far as actual warfare is concerned, however, counterforce remains the name of the game. Interdiction is a way of preventing enemy forces from ever reaching the FEBA, rather than engaging them there, an approach emphasized by NATO in, inter alia, the form of the FOFA doctrine. NOD would, however, require an abandonment of such plans for deep interdiction, both for reasons of sheer cost-effectiveness and for the sake of crisis stability, since striking deep creates both incentives for, and options of, preemptive strikes on the part of an opponent. 34 Close interdiction, however, would remain important, for example, as a way of severing the invader's supply chains on the territory of the defender. Counterindustrial warfare against an adversary's war-making potential seems to have been of questionable efficiency in most instances, and it might thus safely be abandoned in an NOD strategy, particularly as seen from the West. Air transport falls into several different categories. Strategic, that is, long-range (e.g., transatlantic) airlift is problematic, particularly as far as NATO's emphasis on reinforcements in times of crisis is concerned, which might be open to misinterpretation as preparations for attack. Furthermore, for a protracted war of attrition in Europe, only sealift would suffice. On the tactical and operational scales, however, airlift might still be indispensable for the reinforcement or evacuation of surrounded units, for example. For this purpose, however, helicopters would probably be more suitable than fixedwing aircraft by virtue of their independence of airfields. Close (or tactical) air support encompasses, on the one hand, tactically defensive missions such as battlefield surveillance; air defense of army formations against enemy ground-attack aircraft; and reinforcement of exposed and isolated units, in terms of firepower, supplies, or ultimately by evacuation. Needless to say, such tactically defensive missions may constitute elements of offensive operations, in, inter alia, offensive-tumeddefensive scenarios. After its initial offensive thrust, one side might assume defensive positions in order to preserve its conquest, whereas the real defenders would be forced to counterattack in order to restore the status

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quo ante, such as was, for example, the case with Iraq in early 1991.35 Aircraft do, however, also have directly offensive utility, since they are able to bring substantial, and occasionally decisive, firepower to bear against ground targets, notwithstanding their inferiority in terms of gross firepower compared with that of ground artillery. In terms of effective firepower, however, aircraft are very potent by virtue of their mobility and versatility, allowing for much more pointed utilization. Fixed-wing aircraft are, of course, supreme for firepower allocation on an operational scale, whereas rotary-wing aircraft have a higher tactical agility and are thus preferable for a number of missions. Indeed, according to certain futuristic visions, a highintensity war would be truly three-dimensional; aimored helicopter gunships would play the role of the current tanks (Simpkin 1986: 117-132). It remains disputed to what extent NOD would need such aerial fire support, since the need for gapfilling would presumably be diminished by the area-covering land posture. Certain NOD proponents have therefore felt that fairly short-range missiles might suffice for firepower concentration, and regarded them as preferable because of their independence of airfields as well as their lack of offensive utility. Other NOD advocates, (among them myself), however, have been less sanguine and advised against such a "hitech" and centralized system. They have hence recommended more-flexible means of reinforcement and firepower concentration in addition to the missile squads, such as cavalry detachments consisting of light armored vehicles along with combat helicopters and ground-attack aircraft, the offensive capabilities of which might be diminished by deliberately making them dependent on fixed C 3 I and logistical structures in a spider-and-web symbiosis. Furthermore, without offensive-capable ground forces capable of taking and holding ground, ground-attack aircraft could not meaningfully be counted as offensive.36 Battlefield surveillance has experienced such a revolutionary development, not least thanks to aircraft, as to make vast areas of interest almost entirely transparent, thus making operational surprise well-nigh impossible to achieve. Because surveillance aircraft are, however, intrinsically vulnerable to fighter and SAM attack, less-expensive and moresurvivable substitutes would be preferable for the form of war envisaged by NOD. Since NOD would tend to eschew the single decisive battle in favor a multitude of smaller skirmishes, dug-in optical fiber sensor arrays would largely suffice for tactical and operational reconnaissance and would, furthermore, be unambiguously defensive. To the extent that aerial surveillance might remain indispensable, drones and helicopters should probably suffice.37 Target acquisition has obvious offensive implications, and the development of long-range strike complexes (such as J-STARS) has tended to expand the battlefield undesirably. Since NOD would primarily need rather short-range target acquisition, the aforementioned surveillance systems

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should largely suffice for this purpose, particularly since they would merely be called on to fill gaps in an area-covering web of infantry artillery observers. Support of naval operations is a shorthand for a panoply of missions, almost as varied as that on (or above) land. Since I will return at length to this matter in the next section, suffice it to mention that a proliferation of land-based naval aviation would, on balance, be desirable from a NOD point of view, whereas carrier-based air power is problematic because of its offensive implications. Air defense is of overranking importance, precisely because it will be imperative to deny the enemy all the aforementioned advantages of air power. Its prima facie defensive character notwithstanding, air defense may have substantial offensive implications if combined with capabilities for immediately offensive air missions. In principle, there are three modes of air defense: 1. Offensive counter air (OCA) implies a neutralization of enemy aircraft on the ground. This is entirely incompatible with NOD, as well as highly problematic on crisis stability accounts, since it is practically tantamount to targeting two offensive-capable air forces against each other. Genuine OCA would hence have to be abandoned altogether, even though there would be no inhibitions against targeting such airfields and airstrips as the invader might establish on occupied territory. States might, furthermore, mine their own runways and prepare for the demolition of other equipment in order to prevent their use by invaders, precautions that would, ironically, be tantamount to defensive OCA. 2. Active air defense implies the downing of aircraft in the air, and has traditionally been a task for fighter-interceptors. The primary target for these would be the enemy's bombers and other ground-attack aircraft, but because these are usually accompanied by fighter escorts, most air battles commence with dogfights beween fighters, thus illustrating the intrinsic ambivalence of this type of aircraft. From a NOD viewpoint, a preferable solution would be weapons that were effective above one's own, but powerless above enemy territory. SAMs seem to be a close approximation to this ideal, as they are, of course, mobile in principle but would not in practice be so under wartime conditions because of their lack of armor protection. Ironically, however, its preference for SAMs notwithstanding, NOD would allow states to rely more on fighters, thanks to the removal of offensive-capable long-range strike aircraft and the resultant elimination of the ambiguity surrounding air defense as a potential offensive force multiplier. As a hedge against technological disappointments and unforeseen CMs by the enemy, the maintenance of at least some manned aircraft does, indeed, seem prudent. For this purpose, single-role, short-range fighterinterceptors would be the ideal type by virtue of their minimal offensive utility. Preferably, such aircraft should have STOL or VTOL features in order

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to eliminate their dependence on runways. Pending this, as large a number as possible of alternative runways (on highways and the like) should be made available as contingency airstrips, in order to make a crisis dispersal possible: the no-target principle, once again. 3. Passive air defense is the usual pejorative term for modifications of the target set, intended to minimize its vulnerability through, inter alia, active protection by means of hardening, point-air defense, and the like. However, in addition to such active-passive air-defense measures, states may also resort to what might be called passive-passive air defense by, for example, dispersing and/or enhancing the mobility and hence elusiveness of targets. Most radically, it may in certain instances be possible to eliminate targets altogether, which is exactly one purpose of NOD, namely to remove targets such as nuclear storage sites, long-range missile sites, and a good many of the air bases, tank assembly areas, etc. NOD would thus be tantamount to a formidable type of passive air defense in its own right. The general dispersal of forces would, moreover, constitute excellent protection against enemy air raids, since mop-up operations would be very costly and time-consuming and because annihilating air strikes would necessitate rather indiscriminate (and hence costly, unrewarding, and perhaps escalatory) area bombing. In addition to its genuine military functions, air power also serves various political functions. The global reach and extraordinary versatility of air forces, in combination with their being viewed as merely secondary reflections of a state's military power, make them highly suitable for crisis management purposes. They may, for instance, be swiftly deployed to threatened allies or regions without requiring any cumbersome and expensive infrastructure, and without straining military resources to such an extent that it would expose the state on other fronts. They may, on the one hand, demonstrate a military presence without, on the other hand, signaling any total or irreversible commitment, as would be the case for army units. Superpowers may thus conveniently assist Third World allies of somewhat dubious repute on a trial-and-eiror basis. An assistance in terms of airpower thus frequently constitutes a commencement of a military presence, just as it may represent its final disengagement stage, as was the case in Vietnam. Not all of the air-power components mentioned above would lend themselves to utilization for demonstrative purposes, such as crisis management, a deficiency that many might regard as disqualifying. I will return to this problem in the concluding chapter. Maritime Forces The sea is of tremendous importance for all nations, except for those completely landlocked: as a lifeline connecting states with the rest of the

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world; as a unifying factor for many states; as a fountain of resources, etc. Militarily, the sea is important for various purposes: • As a medium of blockade, as illustrated by the recent UN attempts to starve Iraq into withdrawing from Kuwait • As a medium of power projection • As a medium of concealment and protection for otherwise vulnerable military means • As a first defense line, both in the literal and in a more symbolic or political sense The following enumeration probably captures most of the tasks a naval defense would be expected to perform today, with an indication of the kind of country or alliance for which the task would be (particularly, or at all) important: • Defense of the home country against seaborne attack: in principle all countries bordering on the sea, but in practice only those located in a potentially hostile naval environment • Defense of internal SLOCs: all countries consisting of, or at least including, islands, with the same reservation as under the previous point • Defense of external SLOCs: all states aligned with other states that are accessible only by sea (a fortiori, this holds true for alliances divided by water, such as NATO)38 • Nuclear deterrence, by means of SSBNs and carrier-based nuclearcapable aircraft, as well as to an increasing extent SLCMs on various surface and subsurface platforms: only nuclear powers • Defense of off-shore and overseas possessions: all countries in possession thereof • Peacetime surveillance and exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters: all states with a coastline • Naval diplomacy, that is, the demonstration, rather than actual use, of military power in general, and power projection capabilities in particular, for political purposes: mostly great powers with global ambitions, but in principle (and in the future perhaps in practice as well) also coalitions, collective security organizations, and the like Sea power possesses an inherent flexibility and general purpose nature, since navies are neither stationed in specific areas nor assigned to particular tasks as more than a temporary expedient. A legal corollary of this flexibility is the mare liberum principle, implying that national sovereignty extends only to territorial waters and is even in this instance much more narrowly circumscribed than with regard to land territory.

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An obvious temptation, to which most great powers throughout history have succumbed, is to maximize this flexibility by seeking command of the seas (Mahan 1987), that is, complete control over the naval activities of other states. 39 Such command is, by its very nature, exclusive and liable to cause conflict, since two adversaries cannot simultaneously thus rule the waves of the same oceans. The naval contest hence tends to become a zerosum competition wherein the gains of one contestant equal the losses of the other. Since a truly decisive battle is no longer conceivable in the nuclear shadow, exclusive goals such as these will have to be abandoned as unachievable as well as harmful, and yield to less-ambitious ones, which might, furthermore, lend themselves to more-cooperative approaches. Mutual respect for the legitimate security concerns and truly vital interests of the respective other side thus ought to govern the naval domain, just as was the case for the other environments. Three naval tasks seem to stand out in this respect: 1. 2.

3.

Both superpowers' perceived need for an invulnerable (and minimal) nuclear deterrence The need to protect vital sea-lanes, among which NATO's transatlantic SLOCs stand out as a special case, whereas the USSR has no comparable vital requirements The need for a defense against seaborne attack, either by means of stand-off systems or in the form of amphibious assaults

In the following, I explore how these three tasks might be performed in as defensive a manner as possible. As is apparent from the previous enumeration, however, these do not exhaust the naval requirements of states. Subsequently, I therefore briefly assess whether the remaining tasks would require additional means. As argued in the section about the nuclear realm, to hope for a nuclear builddown to a lower level than minimum deterrence before, say, the turn of the millennium is probably unrealistic. In order to facilitate a reduction to this level the greatest possible survivability should be sought as far as the remaining strategic weapons are concerned. Refraining from targeting the respective opponent's deterrent would be in either side's best interest, since it would allow the other to make ends meet with fewer of them. Counterforce capabilities ought therefore to be eschewed also, as far as the sea-based deterrent is concerned. The latter ought, furthermore, to be deployed as invulnerably as possible in order to maximize the margin for builddown. The simple truth may be that not much needs to be done in this respect, since the depth of the oceans is likely to remain quite a safe place to deploy one's retaliatory forces, provided only that the communications links between SSBNs and the NCA could be maintained in working order during war.40

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The bastion concept, apparently favored by the USSR, appears to be a perfectly sound approach to this problem, and respecting as sanctuaries these bastions (in the Barents and Okhotsk seas) would by no means jeopardize Western security. It does, however, presuppose that adequate SLOC defense could be provided by other means than by tying up Soviet attack submarines in bastion protection through explicit plans for strategic ASW, such as is presently the US policy. In addition to creating risks of inadvertant nuclear war and preventing nuclear builddown, it also tends to increase the general level of tension in the formerly peaceful Nordic region.41 Before proceeding with some suggestions for a less offensive SLOC defense, a few caveats seem warranted. First, one should not exaggerate the threat to the Western SLOCs posed by the Soviet Northern Fleet, which is far less capable than the number of vessels might suggest. Furthermore, there is nothing to indicate that cruising warfare should be high on the Soviet list of naval priorities. Second, the options of defending the SLOCs in a nonprovocative manner seem just as underestimated by the West. Third and finally, the very need for transatlantic reinforcement of Europe may have been inflated by flawed force comparisons between the land forces of NATOEurope and those of the WTO. Whatever the true force ratios may have been in the past, it now seems certain that an approximate balance will ensue from the combination of Soviet builddown, WTO disintegration, and bilateral reductions agreed on under the auspices of the CFE.42 These reservations notwithstanding, SLOC protection ought prudently to remain a concern for the West, for two interconnected reasons: First, as argued in the section on land warfare, the West should seek the ability to transform any attempted blitzkrieg into a protracted attrition contest, in which the West would be sure to prevail if continued access to the United States as an almost inexhaustible fountain of military and economic power could be ensured; second, the apparently inevitable cutback of US forces in Europe presupposes the option of their return in an emergency, lest NATO should become an empty shell. Both of the above requirements, however, presuppose that NATO-Europe's lifeline is not severed, that is, that the transatlantic SLOCs are to be kept passable in times of war. Only on this precondition will it be possible to sealift reinforcements and to provision Western Europe with essential civilian commodities, not least oil, which will be needed for a protracted war of attrition. The establishment of defensive sea control south of the GIUK gap would appear to suffice for protecting the SLOCs. If only the Soviet attack submarines could be prevented from passing this line in any great numbers, NATO's sea-lanes would be effectively out of harm's way. The choice between a NATO defense perimeter in the GIUK gap or on the GIN line depends on the severity of the presumed threat against Norway, as well as on the availability of other means of defense of this country. Whereas I tend to regard a GIUK gap perimeter as sufficient, a rather convincing case might

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certainly be made for the somewhat more ambitious G I N alternative (Mearsheimer 1986: 86-89; M0ller 1987a). Neither of these perimeters would, however, intersect with a potential Soviet defense perimeter approximately on the dividing line between the Barents and the Norwegian seas. A precondition for a Soviet acquiescence with this perimeter might well be, however, that the West would refrain from stationing aircraft carriers, S L C M platforms, and the like within striking distance of the Soviet heartland, as well as from holding the Soviet sea-based deterrent at risk. In other words: for the USSR to be content with a defensive strategy, the West would have to adopt one as well. The G I U K gap would be a highly convenient defense perimeter for the West, since it might be fairly easily saturated with A S W and other sea mines, as well as thanks to the availability of bases ashore, from which maritime patrol aircraft might operate, supplemented with land-based antiship missiles, torpedoes, etc., and backed up by a fleet of attack submarines. Of course, no such A S W barrier could be impenetrable, and some Soviet attack submarines might thus succeed in joining the (not very numerous) subs that would already be on station south of the barrier prior to the outbreak of hostilities. Unless the Soviet Union should acquire (as seems most unlikely) allies who might provide replenishment, the endurance of these rogue attack submarines would be severely limited. Nevertheless, the sinking of some Western ships would have to be anticipated. As a means to keep down Western losses, a convoy-with-escorts system would appear warranted, with the escort fleet consisting mostly of frigates, destroyers, and small A S W carriers with helicopters, all optimized for A S W missions. Finally, escorting attack submarines might be required for hunting down the enemy subs that expose themselves in order to attack the convoy (cf. Grove 1990a: 19-21, 209-210). The last of the aforementioned vital naval tasks was the defense against seaward attack, which in the final analysis has to do with landing invasion fleets, that is, with transforming naval ventures into operations involving land forces, capable of taking and holding ground. As a general rule, this is primarily a problem for small powers with exposed coastlines. The first line in the defense against such attacks would be air defense, by means of which a state should, first, be able to fend off the naval stand-off threat emanating from aircraft carriers and S L C M platforms, which would call for a combination of S A M s and interceptors. Second, it would be important to be able to prevent amphibious landings, in its turn likewise primarily an air-defense task. Third, the defender would have to establish a forward defense against the invading fleet with its amphibious craft and other surface ships. According to N O D principles, this defense perimeter should under no circumstances be emplaced so far forward as to appear provocative and offensive. As far as possible, any intersection with the defense perimeter of a

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likely opponent should be avoided, and preferably some kind of disengagement zone should be attempted. The resultant relatively shallow defense would in many respects be militarily advantageous because, inter alia, the defender would have ample shore-based air-defense assets at his disposal, whereas the attacker would have to carry his offensive air power along. Furthermore, in adjacent waters the defender would have access to the redundant surveillance assets of other services, such as satellites, aircraft, and drones. Mine fields would be an important feature of the forward barrier but would need some backup so as not to resemble a naval Maginot Line. Whereas the defense against the enemy's mine-sweepers and so forth might, of course, be provided by surface ships, mounted with torpedoes, cannons, and antiship missiles, most of these weapons would be better deployed ashore in a coastal artillery mode. Mounted on mobile launchers, they would be able to hide in the heterogeneous land environment, where they would be more difficult for the attacker to locate and neutralize. These means might be supplemented with a number of small surface vessels (patrol boats, etc.) optimized for exploiting the cover provided by the friendly coastline. Likewise, submarines might be useful, if only with a view to forcing the attacker to carry along ASW assets. The defender would be ill-advised to present his forces for any decisive battle, but ought rather to opt for (as a fallback strategy, in case the forward barrier is penetrated) a modem fleet-in-being strategy, which would, however, differ from the traditional one by being more of a combined-arms than a naval strategy: a defense that would be elusive and hard to come to grips with by virtue of its dispersal, but at the same time one that no aggressor could afford to ignore, and that would thus have to be defeated before the aggression could be terminated successfully and the conquest incorporated. Most appropriately, the defender might opt for a strategy of nonbattles, resembling in certain respects a kind of naval guerrilla warfare, such as preferred by the French naval strategists of the Jeune École. It would, however, be set apart from this ancestor by virtue of its exclusive emphasis on defensive missions: The piratelike assault ships should not roam the oceans, holding other seafaring nations at risk, but merely roam the nearby waters, thus holding the intruder at constant risk. An important element herein would be to deny him safe passage for replenishment ships and the like, and strike at his vulnerable logistical tail. Such a strategy should aim for a persistent sea denial, through which the aggressor would be prevented from ever being able to navigate freely in the conquered waters, and forced to employ costly convoying systems in order to provision his occupation forces, etc.43 Certain traditional naval tasks would obviously not be performable by means of naval postures such as these, but might call for large numbers of surface warships with offensive capabilities. First among these

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conceivable tasks stand those of coercive naval diplomacy and foreign intervention.44 Naval diplomacy falls into two categories. The first variety is intended to deter prospective aggressors from attacking other states, while simultaneously reassuring the latter by means of demonstrative naval activities such as friendly naval port calls, participation in maneuvers, and the like. In this case the actual capabilities of the vessels probably matter little, since their function is merely to convey a promise of more to come. To the extent that such tasks could not be performed by small surface ships, they might be better left to the United Nations, for example to UN naval peacekeeping task forces, if such were to be inaugurated. The second type constitutes attempts to coerce other states into doing things against their will. In this case the capabilities of the participating warships do matter, since they must possess the ability to actually do damage in order for the conveyed threat to be credible and hence effective. In most cases, however, this type of coercive diplomacy should be regarded as violations of the (in certain cases unwritten) international code. As far as foreign intervention is concerned, it is certainly indisputable that states cannot intervene forcefully in distant parts of the world without fairly large surface fleets. It is, however, my firm conviction that foreign interventions (to the extent that they are at all required) had better be left to international bodies, such as the United Nations, and that a nonintervention regime should be established that would outlaw interventions by individual states.45 Interventions are demanding, particularly in aggressor-turned-defender cases, that is, when a fait accompli has been accomplished and a status quo thus exists that other powers will have to challenge in order to restore the true status quo ante bellum. This is a rather demanding case, because the aggressor now enjoys most of the inherent advantages of the defender, whereas the true defenders are forced to operate under the unfavorable conditions of aggressors: beyond their own territory, etc. Nevertheless, some ability to do so on the part of the international community would seem to be a sine qua non of dissuading salami-type expansionist agggressions. Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in 1990 was a classical example of such a contingency, where it seemed obvious to the world that a line had to be drawn, if only pour encourager les autres. On the other hand, Iraq had succeeded in establishing a fait accompli, and was dug in in new defensive positions in Kuwait from which they had to be evicted by force. The initial approach to this problem seemed wise, even though it will never be possible to ascertain whether it might have sufficed: an enforced blockade of Iraq, decided on by what came close to constituting the international community and implemented by a hastily assembled task force of surface warships from numerous states, including minuscule naval powers such as Denmark. Great emphasis was placed on involving regional powers

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in the blockade so as to remove any impressions of foreign intervention that might have rekindled the antiimperialist flame. It may well have been a mistake to declare January 15, 1991, the ultimate deadline for withdrawal, since this made war practically inevitable. Whether it could actually have been avoided is a question for future historians to answer when all the facts have become available.

Conclusion I have sketched the main components of what would presumably constitute a viable nonoffensive defense. It implies no lowering of the standards of defense but presumably provides at least undiminished defensive potential, yet without any significant offensive capabilities. Furthermore, it should be affordable, provided of course that it be implemented at a reasonable pace, say, over a ten-year period. A defense such as this would imply a number of organizational changes, first of all because the three environments would be integrated much more closely than is the case in most armed forces of today. The land forces would participate in air defense, as well as in the defense against seaborne invasions, whereas the aerial forces would play an important role in the maritime defense, in its tum ensuring that the land defense could always be provided with the needed supplies and reinforcements, etc. This functional integration would make an organizational integration sensible, at least as far as operational command structures are concerned. I will return in the concluding chapter to the problems this might raise in terms of bureaucratic inertia. It has to be acknowledged that the recommended defense strategy and posture have never been put to the ultimate test, that is, been applied successfully in war. The same objection might, however, be raised against the present defense posture, the alleged demonstrable success of which is usually argued with reference to the fact that it has never been tested but has succeeded in war prevention. In all fairness, however, the two must be compared as alternative options, to be evaluated according to their intrinsic merits, and above all on the basis of educated guesses. Such an evaluation is, however, hampered by the (inevitably) different degree of generality versus detail. Whereas NOD is a theoretical concept and a proposal, the existing armed forces are, for obvious reasons, deployed concretely and equipped in detail, just as NOD would have to be, were it to be selected by the political authorities for implementation by the armed services. In the account of the general principles on the preceding pages, the kind of detailed information that would be a sine qua non of implementation has deliberately been omitted. These pages thus contain (almost) no concrete identifications (by name) of weapons, no precise figures for the required numbers, nor any specific locations for their eventual deployment. To have

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done so would have exceeded both the scope of the present analysis and my abilities. It is undoubtedly a task for professionals rather than for arm-chair strategists such as myself.

Notes 1. On minimum deterrence, see Szilard 1964; Feiveson 1989; Feiveson and Hippel 1990; Feiveson et al. 1985. For a Soviet view, see Arbatov 1989a. On NFU, see Bundy et al. 1982; UCS 1983; Steinbruner and Sigal 1983; Blackaby et al. 1984; Lee 1988. 2. On existential deterrence, see Bundy 1986. On blueprint deterrence, see Schell 1984: 119; cf. Miller 1988. 3. On PALs, see Caldwell 1987, 1988a, b; on the United States Navy's reaction, see Zimmerman 1989. On decapitation, see Carter 1987b, c. On the D-5 and SLCMs, see Feiveson and Duffield 1984; Goetemoeller 1987; Frogett 1987. On the START negotiations, see, e.g., May et al. 1988, 1989; Mendelsohn 1989. 4. On early warning, see Jasani and Lee 1984: 44-46; Lee 1987: 216218; Toomay 1987. On the synergy inherent in the triad, see Scowcroft Commission 1983. 5. For arguments in favor of maintaining strategic bombers, while abandoning B-2, see Brown 1989, 1990. For an argument to the contrary, see Welch 1989. 6. For analyses of the inherent logic of strategic defenses, see McNamara et al. 1985; Glaser 1986; Stockton 1986. On CMs to SDI, see Carter 1984; Garwin 1986a, b; Barnaby 1986b: 96-101. For a Soviet analysis, see Velikov et al. 1986: 98-105. On the presumed potential of orbiting battle stations, see Graham 1983: 145-187. 7. On strategic ASW, see Garwin 1983; Stefanick 1987; Daniel and Zelikov 1987; Pocalyk 1987. For an official US endorsement of the plans for strategic ASW, see Watkins 1986. On ensuing risks, see Posen 1984b; M0ller 1987b, 1989d. See for an (exaggerated) account of the first-strike capabilities in the pipeline, Aldridge 1983. 8. See for an account of possible modes of transition and their implications, OTA 1986: 1-325 Rathjens and Ruina 1985. 9. Quoted as an often-heard joke among officers, intended as a critique against the AD conceptions of Secretary of Defense McNamara; see Newhouse 1973: 176. 10. For views similar to mine see Bahr 1985; Liibckemeier 1988; Jervis 1989: 74-106. For the opposite opinion, see Lutz 1986b, 1988b. On nuclear CBMs and crisis management, see Horn 1986; Garthoff 1986; Mobbs 1986; Ury 1985; Betts 1985; May and Harvey 1987. 11. For a comprehensive survey of the US arsenal, see Cochran et al. 1984. For an account of the naval nuclear arsenals, see, e.g., Handler and Arkin 1988; Fieldhouse 1989. On the unilateral US decision to withdraw naval nuclear weapons from service, see Fieldhouse 1990: 164-165. 12. On various types of FBSs, see, e.g., Arkin and Fieldhouse 1985; Duke 1989. On NWFZs, see Palme Commission 1982: 146-150; Lodgaard and Thee 1983; Lodgaard 1982; Lodgaard and Berg 1985; M0ller 1985; Fry 1986. 13. On the post-INF modernization debate, see Binnendijk 1989; Ramsbotham 1989; Deminsky et al. 1989; Brauch 1989; J. George 1990: 107-

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119. On the ATM issue, see Enders 1986; Gormley 1988; Worner 1986; Yost 1982. For a critique, see Brauch 1987; Smit 1986; Smit et al. 1987. 14. On extended deterrence, see Cimbala 1989: 72-95; Ravenal 1988. Mearsheimer argues, on the one hand, that NFU would imply higher standards for the conventional defense. On the other hand, he admits that "even the whiff of American nuclear retaliation" would suffice for deterrence (1989b: 73), as well as the continued availability of the first-use option, regardless of the adoption of an NFU strategy (p. 85). 15. Cf. Mearsheimer 1990; Garrett 1990: 63-72. For a somewhat less complacent attitude, see Evera 1990a, b. 16. On the early fears, see, e.g., Liska 1962; Kissinger 1960: 240-257. On the background and limitations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, see, e.g., Myrdal 1976: 159-193. On the risks of proliferation, see, e.g., Spector 1984; Meyer 1984a. On catalytic war, see Nacht 1985: 67-195; Dunn 1983; Harvard Nuclear Study Group 1983: 215-232; Rowen 1985: 148-163. 17. On the British deterrent, see Prins 1983: 171-194; cf. the chapter on Britain (by an anonymous author) in McLean 1986: 85-153. On France, see McLean 1986: 154-185, likewise by an anonymous author; cf. Yost 1985; David 1989: 43-110; Nehrlich 1986. For historical accounts, see Gnesotto 1986; Stromseth 1988: 96-120. On the modernization program, see Kolodziej 1987, 1989. On German nuclear power, see Mearsheimer 1990; cf., for a critique, Russett et al. 1990. 18. In addition to the works by the SAS (1984, 1989), one might mention Afheldt 1978, 1984b; Loser 1982a; Loser and Anderson 1984; Schmahling 1989. 19. The major works are SAS 1984, 1989. 20. This is the main message in Mearsheimer 1983. 21. On Napoleon's attack on Russia, see, e.g., Ropp 1962: 132-139. On the German-Soviet war, 1941-1945, see, e.g., Ropp 1962: 333-345; Calvocoressi and Wint 1974: 4 5 7 ^ 8 8 ; Perrett 1985: 160-231; Hart 1973: 147177, 251-276, 498-520, 605-616; Fuller 1954, vol. 3: 4 1 3 ^ 4 8 , 517-542. 22. On the inferiority of the USSR, see Dibb 1988: 20. On Soviet strategic planning, see MccGwire 1987a: 87-88. For an assessment to the effect that both the United States and the USSR are so easily defensible as to need no offensive capabilities, see the quotation from Stephen Van Evera in Feldman 1990: 102. 23. On Soviet blitzkrieg strategy, see Lebow 1985b; Sidorenko 1970; Vigor 1983; Leites 1981; Hines and Petersen 1984; Petersen 1987. On operational art, see Simpkin 1983; Erickson et al. 1986: 56-81; Dick 1985; Bellamy 1987: 105-124; 1990: 121-190. Cf., on echeloning, Vigor 1982; Hines 1982. On desant, see Isby 1985; Holcomb and Turbiville 1988. On special forces, see, e.g., Suvorov 1983. On the defensive revision, see Holden 1989, 1991; MccGwire 1987b, 1991; J. Snyder 1986, 1987. 24. This is, e.g., the view of the retired general and SPD member Christian Krause, who has been one of the most congenial critics of NOD (see his works dated 1984, 1987a, b; 1988). 25. The best analysis of the C 3 I requirements of NOD (in casu an SAS-type defense) is Grin 1990. 26. Keegan et al. 1985: 56; cf. Keegan 1978: 274-284 et passim; or the chapter "The Poor Bloody Infantry," in Dunnigan 1983: 18-45. 27. For a critical analysis of this notion, see Betts 1987. 28. On the problems for conventional defense constituted by cities, see, e.g., Bracken 1976. For a recommendation of a differentiation between military and civilian-based defense along the same lines as suggested here, see, e.g., Nolte and Nolte 1984.

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29. See the critique against NOD raised by Colonel Brian Mcdonald in the discussion section of Paul 1985: 232-233; or by Charles Dick (1986), as well as the latter's dialog with Lutz Unterseher (1986). 30. On tanks, see, e.g., Simpkin 1987; Ogoriewicz 1986; Anon. 1988. On aircraft, see, e.g., Merriman 1987; Walker 1987a, b. 31. Oral comments made in reply to my presentation of my views on maritime defensivity at an East-West workshop on "Non-provocative Defence as a Principle of Arms Control and Its Implications for Assessing Defence Technologies," at the Free University in Amsterdam, November 1989. 32. This is the definition of Armitage and Mason 1983: 2, with my addition of the words "or the sea." 33. On strategic bombardment in general, see Douhet 1942; cf. Warner 1941; Brodie 1959: 71-106; Maclsaac 1986; Creveld 1989: 193-195. On the ethical considerations, see Best 1983: 262-285. For an only seemingly cynical analysis, see Quester 1989. On the WWII strategic air offensive, see Kenett 1982: 142-162; Webster and Frankland 1961, vol. 2: 138-157; vol. 3: 95-119; vol. 4: 454-457; Saward 1985: 243-363. For critical analyses of Rolling Thunder and its successors, see Gibson 1988: 319-334; Armitage and Mason 1983: 106-111; Stokesbury 1986: 280-283; Clodfelter 1989. 34. On FOFA, see Rogers 1983; OTA 1987; Sharfman 1991; Skingsley 1991. For a critique, see Wijk 1986; M0ller 1987a, 1989b, d. 35. This ambiguity of "defensive" is elaborated on in Mearsheimer 1983: 134-164; cf. Freedman 1987: 12-21. 36. This combination of stationary infantry and missile squads was recommended by Afheldt (1983: 89-122); cf. Acker 1984. In certain respects similar (albeit with an emphasis on forward, barrier-type, defense) was Hannig's (1984: 74-103) scheme; cf. Hannig 1986. The spider-and-web principle is the guideline of the SAS (1989). Ludger Dunne's (1988) proposals are rather similar, even though he places the main emphasis on helicopters as airborne cavalry. 37. On the principle of nonbattles, see Brossollet 1975. On the C 3 I structures of this spider-and-web scheme, see Grin 1990: 272-291; cf., on the various relevant technologies, Barnaby 1986a: 11-13, 89-93; Zugschwert 1987; Zimmerman 1987; Cobleigh 1987; Haeffner 1987. 38. The distinction between external and internal SLOCs is far from clearcut and certainly does not connote any difference in scale: The cross-Channel (external) SLOCs between the United Kingdom and the European continent are, for instance, considerably shorter and better protected than, say, the internal SLOCs connecting the Western with the Far Eastern Soviet military districts. 39. On the background of, and internal logic in, Mahan's strategic thinking, see Sprout 1941; Crowl 1986. 40. On the strategic C 3 I problems with SSBNs, see Blair 1985: 198-207; Carter 1987a, b; Cotter 1987; Bracken 1983. 41. On Soviet SSBN bastions, see MccGwire 1987a: 98-102. On the US maritime strategy, see Watkins 1986; Friedman 1988. On the element of strategic ASW therein, see Rivkin 1984; Pocalyk 1987; Stavridis 1987; O'Rourke 1988; Nathan 1988; Williams 1990. For a discussion of the connections between strategic ASW and SLOC protection, see Brooks 1986: 40; Mearsheimer 1986: 86-87. On the regional implications, see, e.g., Tunander 1989; M0ller 1989d. 42. For an elaborate analysis of the Soviet Northern Fleet, see Toi 1988. For general analyses of Soviet naval strategy, see MccGwire 1979, 1981; Ries 1988; Rohwer 1990a, b. 43. On fleet-in-being, see Till 1982: 111-121. On the Jeune École, see Ropp 1941; Ceillier 1990.

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44. For a general analysis of the role of force in diplomacy, see Craig and George 1990. On the importance of image building, see Jervis 1970. Cf., for a general analysis of naval diplomacy, Cable 1981; Booth 1977. On US naval crisis management, see Blechman and Kaplan 1978: 38-46 et passim. 45. Forsberg 1987; see, for a slightly more skeptical, albeit sympathetic assessment, Evera 1990a.

8 CONCLUSION: N O D AS AN INSTRUMENT OF SECURITY POLICY In this chapter I attempt an overall assessment of the viability of NOD as one security political instrument among others. This assessment falls into two halves, reflecting two different levels of ambitions, as well as different time perspectives. In the first part I assess the viability of NOD as a functional substitute for the present military forces and strategies, and the level of ambition is hence relatively modest: In addition to having a number of presumed advantages, NOD should not be significantly worse at accomplishing basically the same tasks as do the present forces. This part is thus focused on the present, which is (paradoxically) an unrealistic framework, since any implementation of NOD would inevitably take time, thus postponing the relevant point of comparison to some moment in the future. In the second part I venture an assessment of NOD according to a somewhat higher level of ambition, namely by placing it (hypothetically) in the context of various alternative futures. In a certain sense, this is a more realistic form of assessment, since the implementation would undoubtedly occur in the future. On the other hand, the future has the serious disadvantage from a scholarly point of view of being unknown, which explains the inevitably somewhat speculative nature of this assessment. I thus aspire only to educated guesses, the validity of which will at best become obvious in the fullness of time.

NOD as a Functional Substitute From the analysis in the preceding chapters, it has, I hope, emerged that NOD would compare favorably with present forces and strategies on the following accounts: • In terms of defensive capability, since NOD (combined, for a transition period of indefinite duration, with minimum nuclear deterrence) should be able to avert defeat in a limited conventional war, that is, the only war that would make sense for a rational aggressor • With regard to war prevention, since NOD would be able to dissuade 199

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premeditated attack by virtue of the above capability, as well as minimize both incentives for and options of prevention and preemption • As facilitating arms control and disarmament, because NOD would eliminate an important factor in the external armaments dynamics, as well as presumably have a benign effect on the internal dynamics This is far from a small accomplishment, indeed, and might suffice for recommending NOD. Whether states will actually opt for NOD will, however, depend on a number of other factors, some of which may be irrational, whereas others may be entirely in keeping with the principle of applying military means to fulfil the ends of politics. There might simply be political ends and derived military functions, not yet taken into account, for which NOD might be quite inadequate. If so, states would be facing a choice between dispensing with these services or dismissing NOD as inadequate for their needs. The following extroverted military tasks might appear as cases in point: El. E2. E3. E4.

War-winning and territorial expansion Coercive crisis management Foreign intervention Competitive strategies

In addition, certain introverted military functions might also have to be taken into account: 11. Internal order and/or repression 12. Bureaucratic continuity 13. Economic and social functions Finally, the armed forces have a number of symbolic functions, which are tantamount to: Symbolizing Power, gloire I will analyze these functions one by one in order to assess the utility of NOD for each, as well as the indispensability of the said function. El: War-winning and territorial aggrandizement are quite intentionally rejected by NOD proponents as inadmissible, and it is indeed one of NOD's paramount objectives to render such functions impotent and obsolete. As argued above, the thermonuclear revolution has, in conjunction with other developments since WWII, rendered Clausewitzian wars too dangerous to constitute rational options any longer. Wars can no longer be won in any status quo-plus sense, and no state or alliance will henceforth be able to

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decisively break the will of its adversary. The only rational objectives to pursue by military means will therefore be to prevent wars in the first place, as well as, should they nevertheless erupt, to limit damage as far as possible and to terminate fighting as swiftly as possible, with a restoration of the status quo ante bellum. E2: Coercive crisis management has previously been an important element in the East-West conflict. The consecutive Berlin crises of 1948, 1958-1959, and 1961, the Cuban missile crisis of 1962, as well as the Middle East crisis of 1973, are obvious instances in which military power played an important role without being actually employed in a shooting war. 1 Furthermore, the history of relations of the First and Second worlds with the Third World abounds with instances of gunboat diplomacy, where the rich and industrialized, and consequently militarily stronger, states of the Northern Hemisphere have imposed their will on weaker countries through mere demonstrations of force, often without even a single shot being fired. Presumably, usable military force is required for such purposes, and it may thus be to no avail for a state to possess strong defensive, but largely stationary, forces, deployed on its own territory, as implied by NOD. In order for intimidation and coercion to succeed, usable offensive power has to be poised against the target in order to break its will to resist, purposes for which NOD would be quite inadequate. The rationale for this deliberate inadequacy will be explained shortly, under the heading of interventions. On the other hand, NOD would apparently be adequate for withstanding attempted coercion on the part of other states, perhaps even more so than armed forces with an offensive potential. Since a mobilization of offensive forces in a situation of tense political crisis could be regarded as provocative, states might well abstain from it for fear of triggering an otherwise avoidable war. Even vis-à-vis determined aggressors—i.e., in so-called justification of hostility crises (Lebow 1981: 23-40)—a defensive mobilization of offensivecapable forces might render the situation inherently ambiguous and thus politically facilitate aggression by, for example, making it easier for third parties to justify staying aloof from the ensuing war. Strictly defensive forces, however, might allow for a combination of appeasement with mobilization, since the latter precaution would neither endanger the prospective aggressor nor justify reprisals in the eyes of the rest of the international community. If an attack should nevertheless occur, then at least the distribution of responsibility would be obvious, and the victim of aggression should therefore have somewhat better chances of receiving support. The neutrality and military weakness of Belgium was, for instance, one of the reasons why the German attack on this country in 1914 pulled the British, and subsequently the Americans, into WWI (cf. Kennedy 1985; Kennan 1984b; Tuchman 1962). E3: Foreign intervention is regarded by the international community as impermissible but is nevertheless frequently undertaken, particularly by

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superpowers. Since NOD advocates almost unanimously disapprove of intervention, all proposed NOD postures are deliberately inadequate for this purpose. The incompatibility between NOD and foreign intervention, furthermore, works both ways. On the one hand, a complete conversion to NOD as far as the European states and the two superpowers are concerned implies that neither the former colonial powers (above all the United Kingdom and France) nor their successors in the intervention business, the United States and the USSR, would any longer be able to intervene in the Third World. What might be called a de facto nonintervention regime would hence accrue. On the other hand, a mere conversion to NOD of the US and Soviet forces deployed in Europe would leave the two superpowers in the continued possession of intervention-capable forces, such as aircraft carriers, amphibious and airlift capabilities, etc. This might even be regarded by the Third World as a deterioration, as compared with the present situation. The more unstable the military situation is in Europe (because of, inter alia, the prevalence of offensive-capable, as well as nuclear, forces), the greater the circumspection with which the European states and the superpowers tend to behave vis-à-vis each other everywhere on the globe. There might thus have been more interventions in the Third World had it not been for the shared fear of prospective interventionists that events might escalate beyond control. From this might follow a justifiable concern that a stabilization in Europe, perhaps combined with nuclear disarmament, might increase the frequency of interventions. Because of these interconnections, it would seem advisable to combine the envisaged shift to NOD in Europe with the establishment of a nonintervention regime pertaining to the Third World (Forsberg 1987; cf. Evera 1990a). The two objectives would, however, have to be approached simultaneously, albeit perhaps with a certain division of labor between the United States and NATO-Europe. Whereas the Europeans are concerned about conventional force postures but do not intervene abroad to any great extent, almost the opposite is the case for the United States. It might hence be easier to gather support for NOD in Europe, and for a nonintervention regime in the United States, than vice versa. Whatever the precise timing, the logic behind the combination seems strong, leaving us, however, with the problem of defining, and devising ways of implementing a nonintervention regime. The main problem with devising a viable nonintervention regime is that foreign intervention is part of a continuum of relations between prospective interventionist states and Third World countries. Furthermore, the distinctions between different activities on this continuum is far from clear, say between military support or covert operation, and intervention. The problem is not merely one of terminology or of international law, but also of political logic, since most foreign interventions are legitimized with

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reference to the behavior of the opposing superpower. The official rationale for A's intervention may thus be B's previous involvement in terms of massive military supplies, or perhaps his rudimentary military presence with the advisors that often accompany deliveries of military hardware. Or B's intervention may allegedly be intended to put a stop to A's covert operations (or subversive activities somehow supported by A), and so forth.2 We are thus apparently dealing with a continuum of increasingly massive and violent types of North-South relations, ranging from arms sales through several intermediary rungs, to direct intervention. Indeed, intervention itself may well also be a continuum, as illustrated by the piecemeal US involvement in Indochina during the 1960s, where one step led almost unnoticed to the next (cf. MacLear 1981; Gibson 1988; Clodfelter 1989). Nevertheless, clear-cut instances of intervention have been known to occur (such as, say, the US invasions of Grenada and Panama, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan), which justify the establishment of even arbitrary limits. The advantage of ceilings couched in terms of, for example, number of troops would be to contain escalatory competitive involvement. No matter how many arms A might have provided to the said country, and regardless of how many of his advisors might be operating there, in whatever capacity, this could never legitimize an intervention, thus defined, on the part of B. The disadvantage is, of course, that, if pictured in isolation, such a regime might be seen as ipso facto legitimating everything beneath the intervention threshold. From this follows a rationale for combining the nonintervention regime with additional measures, designed for crisis prevention and conflict resolution in the Third World, for containing the arms trade, for development aid, etc. E4: Competitive strategies might be likened to using the arms race as a functional substitute for war. The notion became fashionable in the United States during the Reagan administration, when hopes were raised of defeating the USSR by means short of war, by exploiting US technological superiority. By leading the way in an armaments competition in carefully selected fields, the stronger side might exacerbate the problems of its weaker adversary by forcing the latter to compete in especially demanding and resource-consuming fields. As a result, the Soviet Union might either become more forthcoming in, say, arms control (or even human rights) issues or simply collapse under the weight of the increasing economic burdens. Whereas it is certainly not its purpose, NOD might in fact be quite suitable for such competitive arms-racing, since NOD would tend to be costeffective at the margin, in the sense that noddy CCMs would tend to be cheaper than both the CMs and the CCCMs of the adversary, as a structural reflection of NOD's lesser level of ambition in terms of mission structure. If the West were therefore in actual fact up against a USSR determined to

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prevail in the arms race with a view to attaining a war-winning superiority, then an M-CM-CCM-CCCM-CCCCM, etc., contest might well ensue, which would place greater strains on the Soviet economy than on those of the West. The great advantage of NOD in this respect would, however, be that it would also hedge against the alternative possibility: that the USSR might in fact be eager to opt out of the armaments competition, and that NOD might allow it to do so, which would presumably be in the best interest of the West, since there would in any case be no winner in an EastWest arms race, but only losers, namely the consumers whose livelihood would be jeopardized by the wasteful consumption on armaments. II: Armed forces are primarily intended to serve as military means for political ends with regard to the external world. However, in addition to this manifest function of, above all, defending a country against attack from other states, the armed forces tend to perform a number of secondary (or latent) functions, which are not directed against other states at all. Occasionally, the armed forces are used against the country's own population (most often as a supplement to the police forces), thus demonstrating the state's monopoly on the legitimate use of violence. I will not dwell at any length on the pros and cons of such use, only point out that many different types of governments, and not merely overt dictatorships, have occasionally felt the need for armed forces as means of maintaining order. Furthermore, even in the case of nondemocratic governments, the armed forces have not invariably constituted a reactionary element in the internal political process, and there is thus a need for a more discriminating attitude to internal use of armed forces than implied, say, by analysts of an antimilitarist and leftist persuasion.3 During the dramatic events in December 1989 in Romania, for instance, the army sided with the new (at least would-be) democratic, provisional government against the repressive instruments of the previous dictatorship, the Securitate. In the USSR, the Red Army has, furthermore, been sent to central Asia in order to stop what might well have developed (and probably still may) into a bloody internecine war between Azerbaijani and Armenians. Even when the armed forces have been charged with more unambiguously repressive roles, this has occasionally constituted what most observers would regard as the lesser of two evils, namely to the extent that the alternative would be foreign intervention. This may well have been the case of Poland in 1981 with the imposition of martial law, the alternative to which might well have been a 1968-style Soviet invasion. There seems to be nothing in the strategy or posture of NOD that would militate decisively against its being utilized for such internal purposes. As a result of a conversion to NOD, the armed forces would, on the one hand, be largely deprived of their fighter-bombers, aircraft carriers, heavy artillery, and tanks, as well as, of course, of their nuclear armaments. On the other hand, neither of these types of weaponry (with the possible exception of tanks)

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would really be suitable for internal purposes. What would be required for upholding order would, above all, be infantry equipped with various types of antipersonnel weapons, that is, exactly the type of forces emphasized by NOD. Furthermore, the deployment of NOD forces across the entire territory, rather than in a narrow strip along the border, would make them more readily available for such purposes. There would seem to be no decisive political inhibitions against such use of NOD forces, either. The only genuine inhibition is circumstantial, namely the distinct reluctance on part of democratic governments to use armed forces against their own populations, in conjunction with the likelihood that such democratic governments would probably be most inclined to adopt NOD. In other words: if democratic states that had converted their armed forces to NOD would be hesitant to make use of the military for internal purposes, this would be by virtue of their democratic persuasion, rather than because they did not have the appropriate means at their disposal. 12: Bureaucratic continuity (or inertia) is a powerful obstacle to change in most societies, and not least so in the case of the military apparatus as an institution (cf. Halperin 1974: 99, 247, 308). However, to acknowledge this as an obstacle might, at most, be a conservative argument against any change, rather than a serious argument against a particular change. Nevertheless, NOD may be up against a particularly stubborn resistance from the military apparatus, because a shift to NOD might well imply rather farreaching bureaucratic changes. On the one hand, the integration of land, air, and maritime defense envisaged in most NOD schemes would render the division of the armed forces into different services superfluous and anachronistic. The division might therefore be abolished, if the political authorities should so decide, something for which there might be good reasons, indeed. The well-known phenomenon of interservice rivalry has in the past often acted as an additional spur on the arms buildup; and the vested, but usually divergent, interests of the various services have contributed to further distorting national perceptions (i.a., threat estimates).4 For the same reason, however, the said services might be expected to obstruct, to the best of their ability, any such a restructuring, since it might upset such tacit bargains as already exist between them, say, on the distribution of missions and, per implication, of budget shares. On the other hand, NOD would not prevent a maintenance of the division into services during peacetime if this should be deemed politically advantageous or cost-effective. There are, in fact, numerous precedents for two parallel sets of organizations for the two, actually quite different, circumstances of peace and war. 13: Armed forces provide jobs for several million people around the world, and militarily related industries and service firms (including those belonging to the MIC) depend on the military for their jobs as well as

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profits. This raises the question whether NOD would do irreparable damage to any of these interests, and whether this ought to be regarded as a serious argument against it. As far as employment is concerned, there is nothing in NOD that would make reductions inevitable. At best, NOD would allow for a reduction in the number of troops, above all by being well adapted for arms control and disanmament. However, NOD shares this problem (if so it is) with the present defense, which is also, at least according to the official points of view, capable of being reduced if only this would occur bilaterally, and if the terms were satisfactory. However, regardless of how many troops another state might decommission in reciprocation of a builddown, the ensuing redundancy problems would remain the same. Furthermore, as a general rule with a number of exceptions, NOD implies a more manpower-intensive type of armed forces than the present ones. From this would follow a gradual increase, rather than reduction, in employment, presupposing, of course, a fixed level of defense expenditures (a standard no NOD proponents, however, regard as sacrosanct). The opposite side of the same coin is, needless to say, that there would be a smaller share of the total military budget available for procurement purposes, and that employment in the arms industry might hence suffer somewhat. There seems to be absolutely no reason to expect the aggregate national level of employment to decline as a result of a conversion to NOD. On the contrary: to the extent that NOD were to be implemented, and to accomplish the said objectives in terms of disarmament, the money released from the military budgets would become available for employment-furthering projects in the civilian sectors of the national economy, where they would, as a general rule, create more jobs for the same amount of money (cf. Dumas 1988).5 However, although NOD would thus cause no serious, nationwide, or long-term economic or social problems, it might well do so locally, in certain industrial sectors, or among particular groups of military employees. This calls for taking such vested interests into due account when planning for the implementation of NOD in order to devise transition schemes that cause as little harm as possible. Presently, the armed forces are used as manifestations of national gloire, for signaling commitment to allies, and for impressing potential foes. Whereas some of these functions overlap with those of coercive crisis management, there is a fine distinction between the two, related to what is being demonstrated. A military parade, or a visit to a friendly port, may, of course, demonstrate military power and alliance commitment, and thus, for example, serve a war prevention purpose (or, indeed, the purpose of coercing other states into concessions). In the category that we are presently dealing with, however, it is not so much the military potential that is being displayed, but rather commitment, national power, gloire, and other political intangibles.

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The function is thus more symbolic, and as such does not depend for its intended effect on actual capabilities, but rather on the value attached to the said activities or military means both by the state itself, and by those other states it seeks to impress. Whether such a display of (perhaps unusable) military power constitutes a sensible form of behavior might certainly be debated; in fact I tend to think that it does not. On the other hand, some such practices may be so deeply entrenched in diplomatic practice that they might be extremely difficult to abolish (cf. Jervis 1970; Craig & George 1990; Jônsson 1990). The question is therefore, whether (at least for the short term) NOD might still serve some of these symbolic purposes. Fortunately, this seems to be the case. Whereas NOD would imply rather deep cuts in some of the most visible and thus presumably impressive categories of weapons (surface vessels, tanks, aircraft, and the like), it would not necessarily abolish them entirely. Some weapons of the appropriate visibility might thus remain available for display purposes. Furthermore, some of the symbolic functions are directly related to the phenomenon called goldplating, a specific military variety of the well-known social phenomenon called conspicuous consumption. There would, however, be nothing in the conception of NOD that would militate against goldplating. One might, for example, envisage large surface combatants entirely stripped of land-attack or nuclear arms, which might thus well be accommodated within a NOD-type defense. Even though they would serve practically no purpose besides the symbolic one, neither would they do any great harm, and it might, indeed, be more cost-effective to use them for such missions than to scrap them entirely. NOD would thus seem to possess at least certain capabilities for those nondefense functions that are presently filled by offensive-capable armed forces. Furthermore, those functions for which NOD would be blatantly inadequate appear dysfunctional and ill-advised on other accounts. As a conclusion, NOD thus has to be acknowledged as a viable functional substitute for the present defense.

NOD and the Future The remainder of this concluding chapter is devoted to a general assessment, above all from a political viewpoint, of the likely effect of NOD on international relations in the future, with a special view to Europe, as well as to the relationship between the two superpowers. The central concept in this respect is détente, and I thus venture an assessment of the possible contribution of NOD to détente, both presently and in the (not too distant) future. There are different definitions of détente; indeed the different meanings attached to the term by the two superpowers played an important role in

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eroding the détente regime between them in the course of the latter half of the 1970s (Garthoff 1985: 24-68; cf. Gelman 1986). Rather than entering into the (partially semantic and partially political) debate on the appropriate and/or politically advisable definition of détente, I take as my point of departure the definition of Kjell Goldmann (1988: 82) of détente as "peaceful coexistence in the sense of a continuation of conflict by means other than war, i.e. amity between enemies." In this minimalist and realist version, détente resembles what Barry Buzan (1991b: 96-97) called "a mature (or perhaps only halfmatured) anarchy." Thus conceived, détente is neither tantamount to a termination of conflict, nor does it presuppose any sublimation of national interests under universal interests shared by all mankind. It is therefore something less than a common security regime and certainly less than a peace order, albeit undoubtedly an element in both. Under conditions of détente, however, states should be expected to continue in the pursuit of their national interests (even defined in terms of power) and even at the expense of each other, only not to the point where war would become a serious possibility. Seen in this light, détente obviously has to be acknowledged as a continuum, ranging from highly adversarial to more-cooperative types of relations. It also becomes obvious that détente is not something that either is or is not a reality, but something that may be more or less achieved. According to this understanding, détente is, furthermore, more of a process than a stable state and may thus either grow and solidify or deteriorate, albeit not necessarily in a linear fashion. Thanks to simultaneous developments in the fields of arms control, superpower rapprochement and relaxation of tensions in Europe, a breakthrough for détente occurred in the early 1970s. Its subsequent breakdown, however, indicates that there must have been serious flaws in détente as conceived by the instigators, including the following. Détente and arms control were accompanied by no real disarmament, but on the contrary allowed the competitive arms buildup to continue largely unabated, particularly as far as the USSR was concerned.6 Whereas this lack of disarmament was not logically incompatible with the avowed objectives of arms control (to create a stable military environment), it was certainly incompatible with the political expectations of the general public as well as parts of the elite, from which followed a mounting frustration over the lack of tangible results (cf. Blechman 1983). Furthermore, the two superpowers' conceptions of détente were incompatible in several respects. First, whereas the USSR saw détente as largely synonymous with peaceful coexistence, that is, as a continuation of the class struggle by other means, the United States understood it as a commitment to a status quo policy and thus interpreted any increase in Soviet influence around the world as a violation of its détente obligations. Second, the Soviet Union subscribed to a very narrow conception of internal

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affairs, encompassing, in the Soviet view, the existing spheres of influence (in casu Eastern Europe), rather than merely the USSR itself. This view contrasted sharply with the US conception, according to which Eastern Europe could not possibly be acknowledged as off limits, and which, furthermore, implied more-permissive and liberal criteria of interference (Kubalkova & Cruckshank 1980: 106-108, 145-154, 165-167; Jahn 1986: 448—451; Jegorow 1972; Nygren 1984). A number of lessons might be derived from this experience with détente in the 1970s: • The conceptions of détente have to be compatible, if not necessarily identical. • For détente to be viable and robust, political and military détente should go hand in hand. • There is no such thing as divisible détente: Since détente is fundamentally a reflection of reciprocal perceptions and resultant intentions of states vis-à-vis each other, it is impossible to exploit the respective adversary in one field without this having negative repercussions in other fields. In this sense, some linkage is inevitable. • Disarmament, rather than merely arms control, ought to be pursued, and should include fields of major military importance. If not, the salience of détente will simply be deficient for overcoming opposition. • Vested national interests in the continuation of détente should be furthered, as they were in Europe, where East-West trade assumed a growing importance. • One should not exaggerate the prospects of détente, so as to avoid disappointments. A new wave in détente started around 1986-1987, which raised hopes very high, indeed. Many serious statements have been made, even by former hawks, to the effect that the cold war is over, or even that the East-West division is obsolete. Occasionally, however, such statements have received the particular twist that the cold war is over because the West won, indeed scored "a total victory in the ideological Cold War," as Michael Howard (1989a: 8) expressed it. Although there is undoubtedly a certain truth to such allegations, they ought nevertheless to be taken with a grain of salt, as will emerge from the subsequent analysis. In analogy with the paradoxical logic of (military) strategy, it may also be possible in the realm of politics to win by means of retreat as well as to expand and grow through contraction. The impetus for the new wave of détente undoubtedly came from the East. Whereas even the Brezhnev leadership had never entirely abandoned détente (at least as a political goal), the Gorbachev revolution paved the way

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for placing détente on a more solid footing. Western concerns were now being taken seriously, both as far as military matters were concerned, and with regard to the previously taboo issue of human rights. Old dogmas were abandoned, inter alia the inherent aggressiveness of imperialism, the imperative of maintaining parity with the West, and the need for negotiated bilateral agreements as a precondition for arms control and disarmament. The Soviets thus apparently realized that they possessed a considerable margin of security, which they intended to exploit politically. Disarmament rose to a new high point of salience because of the ambitious program of perestroika, the economic aspects of which required considerable extra resources, whose major source could apparently only be the military budgets. The existence and obvious urgency of a number of global problems (global warming, pollution, extinction of animal species, etc.) were acknowledged as reflections of interdependence, and constructive interdependence strategies were contemplated as the appropriate way of meeting these challenges. The purge of the higher ranks of the military hierarchy presumably provided the political leadership with better opportunities for pursuing détente and disarmament ventures that would previously have been regarded as far too risky. And internal reforms, such as the general democratization of society, largely met the Western critique with regard to human rights, thus allowing the USSR to take a more holistic view of détente, for example in the CSCE process.7 As a result, Western perceptions of the Soviet threat underwent a radical transformation, in at least two respects. First, Soviet intentions are generally viewed in a more positive light, almost to the extent that the burden of proof may have changed place: Whereas it used to lie (in the Western view) with the (presumably malevolent and deceitful) USSR, it may now have shifted onto those who uphold the validity of the former enemy image. Second, the West realizes that something is definitely changing (and at a fairly rapid pace) with regard to Soviet military capabilities: Their offensive potential has declined distinctly, above all as a result of the Soviet emphasis on NOD, implying a strengthening of the strictly defensive at the expense of the offensive-capable forces, previously assigned first priority (J. Snyder 1986, 1987; Holden 1989: 96-146, 1991; Garthoff 1988, 1990; MccGwire 1987a, b, 1988, 1991). The West now openly acknowledges that the USSR would most likely be incapable of launching any surprise or short-warning attack on the West, even if it should so desire. This reassessment is partially a result of the even more radical changes that occurred during the autumn of 1989 in all of Eastern Europe, with the result that the Warsaw Pact has, to all practical intents and purposes, dissolved, and the former pact member states sought close relations with the West. In any future European war they would either remain neutral or side with the West, but under no circumstances join their former Soviet oppressors in a westward attack.

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These developments have apparently created a new détente with a considerable built-in momentum, which seems to have set in motion a downward spiral of disarmaments and vanishing fears. Nevertheless, it is frequently acknowledged (and almost as frequently forgotten) that things may go wrong. There are several possible events and developments that might presumably halt and reverse this process of détente: Gorbachev might be ousted, perhaps as a result of unsatisfactory accomplishments of perestroika in the field of economics; or he might simply die, for whatever reason. In either case, his successor(s) might revert to the policies of the old hard-liners (or ones resembling those policies). Or the USSR might simply disintegrate as a result of mounting nationalism and perhaps suffer an almost total collapse, in which case almost anything might happen. Europe, and indeed the world, is thus experiencing a tremendous turbulence, and the future seems increasingly uncertain. Particularly in Europe, the present situation seems open-ended, in the sense that there are several trends visible, which are partially mutually reinforcing, partially incompatible. The only thing that seems almost certain is that matters are going to change, and probably radically. There is no longer any such thing as the status quo. In the following, I will analyze two of these trends, with a view to identifying the role of NOD (if any) in these contexts. The two trends, or paths into the future, were already touched upon in the introductory chapter, namely Europeanization and denuclearization. A clear trend points in the direction of a greater and more independent role for Europe. As the perceived threat from the East continues to rapidly decline, it becomes increasingly unlikely that the two sides of the Atlantic alliance will be able to remain united in the present sense: with US forces and (nuclear) weapons deployed in Europe; with a clear US hegemony (as manifested in, inter alia, the command structure); and with the European states expressly acknowledging their dependency on US extended deterrence, and ipso facto their status as clients. The reasons this is unlikely are, first, that the United States is not apt to be willing to tie up its military power in Europe forever. Forces deployed in Europe are expensive but largely unusable for purposes other than deterrence (of an increasingly incredible threat). It would hence be preferable, from a US point of view, to either dismantle these forces (and thus help solve the deficit problem) or withdraw them to CONUS, which would make them more usable, say, for interventionary purposes. Second, the United States is unlikely to be prepared to link its security with that of Western Europe forever. By virtue of its superinsular position, CONUS is largely invulnerable (or at least uninvadeable and unconquerable). This is, indeed, an enviable position, which the United States has, however, partially relinquished as a matter of deliberate choice by tying its security to

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Europe, as manifested in the (professed, albeit scarcely credible) willingness to wage even potentially suicidal nuclear war for the sake of Europe. Third, Europeans in general, and Germans in particular, are unlikely to remain content with a secondary position indefinitely. The economic and political strength of Europe has grown dramatically both in absolute and in relative terms since WWII, and may be approaching yet another quantum jump in the wake of 1992. If Western Europe becomes clearly stronger than the United States in economic terms, it is likely, sooner or later (and rather sooner than later), to demand an equality with the United States to which the latter is unlikely to accede, for the reasons mentioned above. Some Europeanization thus seems well-nigh inevitable, which might imply that all US troops, say, by the turn of the millennium, will have been withdrawn, except perhaps for a token contingent of, say, fifty thousand troops at most. To the extent that NATO would remain in force, it would thus develop into, first, a predominantly political, rather than military, organization, and second, into a largely West European organization, with the United States having more of an observer's status. Whereas the United States would thus gradually move away from its European allies, the rest of the continent might be expected to approach this core of Western Europe, with the result that the reformed NATO would become almost identical to a somewhat expanded EC. The resultant WETO as Barry Buzan (1989: 35-38) has called it, would have all the wherewithal of a third superpower: a tremendous economic potential; two nuclear powers, plus the option of expanding, and possibly multilateralizing, its arsenals; impressive conventional forces, including sufficient air and sealift capabilities for interventionary missions, etc. However, in spite of Europe's recently acquired independence, it would still be tied to the United States with some bonds of amity, that is, by cultural affinity and continued shared economic interests. One could well envisage this WETO as a disruptive force in the international system. First, if it were to remain as clearly directed against the Soviet Union as NATO is presently, it might be perceived as an additional threat by the USSR, from which an armaments dynamic might ensue. Second, united Germany would be in a position to dominate the organization, perhaps to the point of attaining a hegemonic position, by virtue of its economic strength, the size of its population, and its central location. Third, WETO would act as a magnet on the smaller European states presently beyond it, from which might well ensue an expansive momentum that might lead to competitive alliance building on part of the USSR, but perhaps even on the part of the United States (if, say, the United Kingdom should opt out of WETO, something that does not seem entirely inconceivable). Fourth, integration might well acquire a momentum of its own, pointing in the direction of confederation and perhaps eventual federation (i.e., amalgamation) in the sense used by Karl Deutsch and others

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(Deutsch et al. 1957; cf. Haas 1966, 1970; Hansen 1972). This would point even more directly toward Europe's becoming a third superpower. What role might NOD play in this scenario? The answer to this question depends, of course, on the circumstances. If the East-West conflict were to remain a reality, and to maintain a high degree of saliency, then the confederating WETO's adoption of NOD might make it somewhat less of a threat, as seen from the Soviet side. Although WETO would undoubtedly constitute a serious economic challenge, at least it could not be regarded as an imminent military threat. To the extent that the creation of WETO were to be embedded in a pan-European cooperative framework, including to a certain extent (but, as a matter of principle, formally excluding) the USSR, it might be even more confidence inspiring. Indeed, it might come to resemble the Common European House of the Soviet security political discourse.8 The best way of securing this seems to be through the foundation of a collective security organization overlapping, or superceding, WETO, namely the ECSO described in Chapter 5 above. A somewhat related trend in the world of today is that of denuclearization. We may, indeed, be approaching a situation in which nuclear weapons may have come to be regarded as so unusable that they will actually be dismantled, except, for a transitional period of indefinite duration, for a truly minimal deterrence. As argued above, this would not automatically mean a disappearance of nuclear deterrence as such (or of reciprocal anxiety, as I proposed to call it). Nevertheless, denuclearization might somewhat increase the scope for military adventures beneath a certain threshold. Some analysts have, for example, argued the case of a so-called stability-instability paradox (cf. Jervis 1984: 29-34, 1989: 19-22). This presumably implies that stability (such as actually enjoyed by Europe for several decades) is, paradoxically, a function of instability, namely of the grave risks involved with any rocking of the boat. To the extent that the situation were to become genuinely (and apparently) stable, it might ipso facto provide more scope for instability on the lower levels, say, for conflicts between individual states, including such as might result in war. Still, it is only in pursuit of the most extreme worst-case analysis (and in complete disregard of existential deterrence) that one might seriously fear an impending reemergence in Europe of anything like the war system or the traditional balance-of-power system, of previous centuries, in which war would, once again, come to be regarded as a usable means of politics. Nevertheless, such fears have in fact been expressed and may actually be sincere. If so, then a conversion to NOD on the part of all, or at least most (and above all the strongest), states might make a certain contribution to allaying such fears, and ipso facto to facilitating denuclearization politically. The reason for this is obvious: NOD would leave all states with the capabilities of waging only defensive wars, from which no war system could possibly ensue.

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Notes 1. On coercive crisis management in general, see Blechman and Kaplan 1978; Kaplan 1981; Booth 1977. On the Berlin crises, see Adomeit 1982; Allison 1989a: 24-25. On the Cuban missile crisis, see, e.g., Allison 1971; Kennedy 1969; Anon. 1985; Bundy and Blight 1987; Allyn et al. 1989. On the 1973 crisis, see e.g., Blechman and Hart 1984. 2. On the US conduct of various types of covert operations, see, e.g., Agee 1976; Prados 1986; Ranelagh 1987; Woodward 1987. On the dynamics of the arms trade with the Third World, see Sampson 1978; Pierre 1982; Klare 1984; Catrina 1988. For a historical account of containment in the Third World, see Gaddis 1982; cf. Feinberg 1983; Fukuyama 1986. 3. For a good example of this attitude, see Tatchell 1985. 4. On the general concept of interservice rivalry, see, e.g., Huntington 1965. On the NIE procedure in the United States, see Prados 1982: 3-14, 291300 et passim; Freedman 1986: 30-61. On the intelligence push, see, e.g., the case study on MIRV: Greenwood 1975: 83-105. 5. For a Third World perspective, see Ball 1988: 332-334. 6. For rather alarming figures, see Collins 1985. For a more sober assessment and comparison of various threat estimates, see Gervasi 1986. For an analysis of the strategic rationale behind the Soviet buildup, see, e.g., MccGwire 1987a: 48-59. 7. On Soviet human rights policy, see Rees 1986; Elliot 1989. On the aggressiveness of imperialism, see Gorbachev 1988: 212-218; cf., for East German views to this effect, Klein 1988a, b. On the imperative of reducing military expenditure, see Gorbachev 1988: 124-132; Bergson 1989; Abalkin 1989; cf., for the view that not even military builddown can help in the short run, Kaufmann 1988. On global problems, see Gorbachev 1988: 139-157, 194-195, 235-236; Zagladin 1989; Baranovsky 1989; cf. Adomeit 1989; Shenfield 1987: 60-69; Bialer 1988. On the political role of the armed forces, see Larrabee 1988; Rice 1987; Bodansky 1987; Herspring 1987; 1989. On democratization, see Gorbachev 1988: 102-124; Tatu 1989; Krutogolov 1989. 8. Gorbachev 1988: 139-157, 194-195, 235-236; Zagladin 1989; Baranovsky 1989; cf. Adomeit 1989; Shenfield 1987: 60-69; Bialer 1988. For an East German version, see Schmidt and Schwarz 1988.

ACRONYMS ABM ACE AD ADE ALB ALCM ARP ASAT ASW ATGM ATM ATTU BMD C3I CBM CENTAG CEP CFE CONUS CS CSCE EC ECMO ECSO EMP FBS FEBA FOFA FOTL FRG GDR GIN GIUK GSFG

Antiballistic Missile Allied Command Europe Assured Destruction Armored Division Equivalent AirLand Battle Air-Launched Cruise Missile Action-Reaction Phenomenon Antisatellite Weapon Antisubmarine Warfare Antitank Guided Missile Anti-Tactical Missile Atlantic to the Urals Ballistic Missile Defense Command, Control, Communications, Intelligence Confidence-Building Measure Central Army Group Circular Error Probable Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Continental United States Common Security Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe European Communities European Collective Military Organization European Collective Security Organization Electro-Magnetic Pulse Forward-Based System Forward Edge of Battle Area Follow-On Forces Attack Follow-On to Lance Federal Republic of Germany German Democratic Republic Greenland-Iceland-Norway Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom Group of Soviet Forces, Germany 215

216

ACRONYMS

HTK ICBM IFV INF IOC LOW LRTNF LU A MAD MBFR MBT MIC MIRV MLRS NADGE NATO NCA NFU NIE NOD NORAD NORTHAG NPT NSPF NWFZ OCA OMG PAL PGM POL POMCUS R&D SACEUR SALT SAM SAS SDI SED SLBM SLCM SLOC SOP SPD SSBN

Hard Target Kill Intercontinental Ballistic Missile Infantry Fighting Vehicle Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Initial Operating Capability Launch on Warning Long-Range Theater Nuclear Forces Launch Under Attack Mutual Assured Destruction Mutual Balanced Force Reductions Main B attle Tank Military-Industrial Complex Multiple Independently Targeted Reentry Vehicle Multiple-Launch Rocket System NATO Air Defense Ground Equipment North Atlantic Treaty Organization National Command Authority No-First-Use National Intelligence Estimate Nonoffensive Defense North American Air Defense Command Northern Army Group Non-Proliferation Treaty Non-Soviet Pact Forces Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone Offensive Counter Air Operational Maneuver Group Permissive Action Link Precision-Guided Munition Petrol, Oil, and Lubricants Prepositioned Overseas Material Configured into Unit Sets Research and Development Supreme Allied Commander Europe Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Surface-to-Air Missile Studiengruppe Alternative Sicherheitspolitik Strategic Defense Initiative Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands Sea-Launched Ballistic Missile Sea-Launched Cruise Missile Sea Lines of Communication Standard Operating Procedure Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands Strategie Submarine, Ballistic Nuclear

ACRONYMS

START STOL TVD VTOL WETO WEU WH WTO

Strategic Arms Reduction Talks Short Take-Off Landing Teatr Voennykh Deystivy, or Theater of Military Operations Vertical Take-off Landing West European Treaty Organization Western European Union Warhead Warsaw Treaty Organization (Warsaw Pact)

217

BIBLIOGRAPHY Abbreviations in the Bibliography AP BAS Blatter BPP EA EW FA FES IA IAM IDR IFSH IMEMO IS JDW JPR JSS MR NSN Proc ÖMZ S+F WP WPJ WQ

Adelphi Papers (London: IISS) Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik (Köln: PahlRugenstein Verlag) Bulletin of Peace Proposals (Oslo: Peace Research Institute) Europa-Archiv. Zeitschrift für internationale Politik (Bonn: Deutsche Gesellschaft für auswärtige Politik) Europäische Wehrkunde. Wehrwissenschaftliche Rundschau (Herford: Verlag Europäische Wehrkunde) Foreign Affairs Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung International Affairs (London) International Affairs (Moscow) International Defense Review Institut für Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik an der Universität Hamburg (Hamburg, FRG) Institute of World Economy and International Relations of the USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow International Security Jane's Defence Weekly Journal of Peace Research (same publishers as BPP) The Journal of Strategic Studies Military Review NATO's Sixteen Nations US Naval Institute Proceedings Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift (Vienna: Bundesministerium für Landesverteidigung) S+F. Vierteljahresschrift für Sicherheit und Frieden (BadenBaden: Nomos Verlag) World Politics World Policy Journal The Washington Quarterly 219

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INDEX Blackmail, 117, 162 Blitzkrieg, 53, 66, 70, 83, 119, 135, 157, 172, 173, 190 Bloch, Ivan, 133, 156 Blueprint deterrence, 116, 162 Boeker, Egbert, 1, 151 Boserup, Anders, 88, 157 Boulding, Kenneth, 155 Brandt Commission, 34 Brezhnev Doctrine, 69 Briand-Kellogg Treaty, 105 Brodie, Bernard, 105 Brundtland Commission, 33-34 Brzezinsky, Zbigniev, 97 Bulgaria, 65, 66, 70, 73 Bull, Hedley, 10 Burden sharing, 59, 67-68 Bureaucratic politics, 18-19, 194, 205 Buzan, Barry, xi, 10, 23-24, 25, 32, 208, 212

ABM, 62, 64, 65, 167-168 Accidental war, 106, 113-114, 126-127 Action-reaction phenomenon, 80, 84—89 Afghanistan, 121, 138, 144, 203 Afheldt, Horst, 86, 179 Air power, 183-187, 191 AirLand Battle, 56, 150 Alliances, 5, 27, 30-31, 49-77, 212-213 Anarchy, x-xi, 14, 17-18, 19, 22, 23, 43, 51, 81 Antisubmarine warfare, 55, 85, 138, 165, 191-192 Arbatov, Georgi, 28 Armaments dynamics, 19, 26-27, 79-100, 114, 200, 205, 212 Arms control, xii, 40, 41, 42, 43, 62, 7 9 100, 143, 168, 200, 203, 207-208, 210 Arms race, xiii, 16, 79-100, 118, 203 Arms sales, 98, 203 Aron, Raymond, 10 Aspin, Les, 97 Atlantic-to-the-Urals, 96, 98, 149 Attrition, 119, 145, 172 Austria, 50, 65, 136 Axelrod, Robert, 36-37 Bahr, Egon, 28 Balance of power, 14-15, 16, 17, 20, 39, 40, 43, 51, 81, 122, 213 Balance, 43, 81-84, 87-88, 111, 150-151, 166 Bandwagoning, 22, 51, 72 Barnaby, Frank, 1, 151 Barriers, 58, 63, 145, 174, 177, 178, 191 Basic Principles Agreement, 35, 62 Bastions, 55, 190 Beaufre, André, 4, 131, 139, 145 Belgium, 201 Bellicose war, 106-108, 121-122, 127128 Bipolarity, ix, 17, 24, 52, 53, 71, 81, 9091, 162

C 3 I, 127, 134-135, 147, 176, 185, 189 Canada, 1, 74 Capabilities, 1-2, 86, 87, 152 Capitalism, 20, 109 Carr, Edward Hallet, 10,12 Categorical imperative, 11, 30 Central Front, xiii CFE, 58, 70, 96-98, 149, 190 China, 91 Civilian-based defense, 108, 120-121, 145, 180 Clausewitz, Carl von, 87, 108, 131, 141, 155, 171 Clausewitzian war, 106-107, 108-110, 116, 117, 120, 121, 127-128, 171, 200 Coercion, 40, 117, 184, 193, 201, 206 Cognitive dissonance, 32, 88 Collective security, xi, 5, 22, 36, 50, 7175, 115, 117, 188, 213 Colonel's fallacy, 82 Common European House, 30, 213

279

280

INDEX

Common Security, 5, 10, 18, 20, 23, 24, 28-43, 157, 167, 183, 208 Concentration, 141, 146-147, 174, 175, 178, 179, 185 Concert of Europe, 52 Conditional offensive, 63 Confidence building, 2, 100, 167 Conscription, 9, 136-137, 143-144 Containment, 16, 27 Conventional deterrence, 117-120 Conventional stability, xiii, 42 Conventionalization, 97, 213 Conversion, 79, 97-100, 135, 142-143, 205-206 Countermeasures, 85, 86, 96, 99, 165, 178-182 Counteroffensive, 63, 110-111, 118, 150, 161, 171, 175 Crisis stability, 27-28, 42, 43, 118, 122126, 163, 174, 184, 186 Critical theory, 20-21 CSCE, 73, 210 Cyprus, 137 Czechoslovakia, 65, 66, 69, 70, 73 Damage limitation, 2, 120, 144-145, 165, 166, 174-175 Dealignment, 49-50 Decentralization, 94-95, 146, 176 Deep strike, 57, 170, 182, 184 Defense: dilemma, 22, 33; expenditure, 8993; in-depth. 55, 63, 118, 174-175, 178; inherent superiority of, 83, 87-88, 89, 96, 119, 141, 146, 152-157, 172, 181, 193; Defense Wall, 63 Defensive defense, xii Defensive weapon, 148, 152, 153 Demilitarization, 108, 180 Democracy, 11, 61-62, 94, 135, 184, 204, 205, 210 Denmark, 1, 57, 61, 71, 109, 143-144, 151, 180, 193 Deterrence, 5, 19, 31, 41, 42, 54, 110-122, 125, 166-167, 184, 189, 192, 211 Deutsch, Karl, 35, 212 Détente, 2, 60-62, 207-213 Disarmament, xii, 2, 31, 32, 39, 40, 42, 43, 79-100, 200, 206-211 Disengagement, 16, 49, 60, 64, 192 Dispersal, 125, 145, 146, 176, 177, 181, 187, 192 Dissuasion, 110, 120-122, 171-172

Doctrine, 132 Domino theory, 27 Douhet, Guilio, 110 Dupuy, Trevor, 141 Eastern Europe, 110, 209 EC, 72-73, 212 Economy, 33, 97-100, 109, 132, 135, 136, 142-143, 204-206, 210-212 Enemy image, 19, 32, 38, 88, 210 Escalation, 34, 99, 112-113, 116, 117, 171, 187, 202, 203 Ethics, 112, 183-184 Etzioni, Amitai, 39 Europeanization, 60, 211-213 Existential deterrence, 42, 116, 162, 166, 171, 213 Extended deterrence, 117, 167-168, 211 Fallacy of the last step, 86 Federalism, 11, 35, 212-213 Feminism, 197-198 Finland, 50, 136, 137-138, 144 Flexible response, 54, 63-64, 118, 126 FOFA, 57, 132, 184 Force-to-Space ratio, 150-151, 178 Forsberg, Randall, 85 Forward defense, 55, 56, 57, 63-64, 174175, 178, 191-192 France, 55, 61, 136, 156, 169, 172, 174, 192, 202 Functionalism, 35, 212-213 Galtung, Johan, 148, 151 Games theory, 16-17 Garthoff, Raymond, 62 Gender, 107-108 Geopolitics, 52, 54-58, 65-67, 69, 108, 137-138 Germany, 27, 49. 53, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 61, 64, 65, 70, 71, 73-74, 98, 106-107, 108, 109, 121, 136, 156, 169, 174, 179, 212 Gilpin, Robert, 10, 22-23, 25, 33 Glasnost, 38, 69 Glucksmann, André, 87-88, 157 Goldmann, Kjell, 208 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 115, 209-211 Gradualism, 39-40, 96-97 Grand strategy, 4, 61, 64, 119-120, 132, 178-179 Grecce, 61, 73, 106, 133, 136

INDEX

281

Grenada, 59, 91, 203 Guerilla warfare, 107, 144, 147, 154-155, 192

Kennedy, Paul, 23 Kissinger, Henry, 14-15, 54, 117 Kuwait, ix, 121, 188, 193-194

Haas, Ernst B., 35 Harmel Report, 62 Hegemony, 60, 72, 73, 122, 211, 212 Herz, John, 10, 25 Hitler, Adolf, 53, 149 Hobbes, Thomas, 12, 21, 25 Hoffmann, Stanley, 1, 15 Howard, Michael, 209 Hungary, 65, 73

Lanchester Square Law, 141, 154 Latent function, 9, 204-207 Laws of War, 120 League of Nations, 11, 80 Lenin, Vladimir I., 20, 109 Libya, 56, 59 Liddell Hart, Basil, 4, 131, 139, 145, 146, 157 Liechtenstein, 74 Locarno Treaty, 105 Logistics, 57, 67, 87, 126, 134, 153, 155, 156, 175-176, 180, 185, 192 Low-intensity conflict, 71 Luttwak, Edward, 4, 139, 145 Luxemburg, Rosa, 20

Huntington, Samuel, 63, 111, 118, 150 Iceland, 61, 149 Idealism, 9-12, 29, 30, 32, 80, 84-85 Ideology, 52, 69 IFSH, 28 Inadvertent war, 5, 41, 42, 43, 122-126, 171, 190 India, 169 INF Treaty, xii, 84, 100, 167 Infantry, 63, 133-135, 149, 175, 180, 186, 205 Integration, 20, 35, 212-213 Intentions, 1, 86, 87, 210 Interdependence, 19-20, 22, 29, 30, 33, 34, 35, 121, 210 Internal dynamics, 89, 93-95 International relations, 3 Interservice rivalry, 19, 93, 95, 194, 205 Intervention, 59, 68, 137, 193-194, 2 0 1 203, 211 Invasion, 57. 117, 118, 150, 170, 172, 175, 191-192 Iran, 107 Iraq, ix, 71, 91, 107, 121, 169, 172, 182, 185, 188, 193-194 Isolationism, 59 Israel, 123, 147, 169 Italy, 121, 136 Jervis, Robert, 25, 26, 35, 86 Jihad, 107 Jomini, Antoine-Henri de, 140, 154-155 June War, 123, 182 Kahn, Herman, 16 Kaldor, Mary, 60 Kant, Immanuel, 11, 30 Keegan, John, 177 Kennan, George, 16

Machiavelli, Niccolò, 12 Mackinder, Halford, 52 Mahan, Alfred T., 52, 189 Maneuver warfare, 55, 63, 118, 136, 138, 156, 157, 173 Manpower, 90, 136-137, 143-144, 2 0 5 206 Maritime Strategy, 55, 56, 85, 183, 190 Marxism, 20-21, 37, 109 Massive Retaliation, 64 Mature anarchy, x-xi, 23, 32, 208 McCloy-Zorin principles, 81-84 McNamara, Robert, 111 Methodology, 6 - 7 , 18, 89-93, 153-154, 194-195 Military-industrial complex, 19, 62, 9 3 95, 98, 205-206 Militia, 9, 11, 95, 136-137, 143-144 Minimum deterrence, 41, 111, 116, 117, 162-165, 166, 184, 185, 189-190, 199, 213 MIRV, 83, 85, 86, 163 Mobility, 57-58, 75, 142, 170-171, 175, 179, 180-181, 185, 187 Mobilization, 82, 98-100, 119, 124, 125, 136, 137, 155, 172-173, 174, 176-177, 180, 201 Morgenthau, Hans, 10, 12-13, 25, 32 Müller, Albrecht A.C. von, 64, 111, 118, 119, 150 Multinationality, 57, 58, 174, 212 Mutual defensive superiority, 88, 144, 157, 183

282

INDEX

NATO, ix, 5, 49, 50, 54-64, 65, 67, 69, 71-73, 81-84, 91, 92, 96, 118, 119, 149, 153, 167-168, 169, 172-173, 184, 188, 190-191, 202, 212 Naval strategy, 124, 186, 187-194 Neild, Robert, 147 Neorealism, xi, 21-24, 33, 116 Neutrality, xii, 27, 49-50, 95, 119, 201, 210 1989 revolutions, ix, 38, 52, 69 No-first-use, 16, 64, 117, 162, 168, 170, 178 Nonaggressive defense, xii Nonalignment, xii Nonoffensive Defense, 1, 151-152, 161, 182-183 Nonprovocative defense, xii Nonviolence, 108, 120-121 Nordic Balance, 35 Norms, 12, 54 Norway, 61, 71, 190-191 Nuclear weapons, 40-41, 50, 60, 64, 72, 83, 85, 105, 111-117, 120, 123, 126, 127, 162-170, 178, 182-183, 188, 212-213 Nuclear-weapons-free zones, 64, 167-168 Nuclearism, x, 22 Occam's razor, 29, 30 Offense/defense distinction, 1-2, 42, 66, 86-89, 114-115, 117, 125, 131, 144145, 147-152, 184-185, 186, 193 Offensive weapons, 80, 147, 152, 153 Open towns, 120, 144-145, 175-176, 179-180 Operational art, 132 Osgood, Charles, 39, 96-97 Ostpolitik, 62 Out-of-Area, 59, 71 Overlay, 24 Pakistan, 169 Palme Commission, 28-32 Palme, Olof, 28 Panama, 59, 203 Parity, 81-84, 87-88, 210 Peace movement, 99, 105, 115 Peace research, 4, 11, 105 Pearl Harbor, 122, 123 Perceptions, 2, 19, 25-26, 32, 81-82, 87, 88, 93, 151, 152, 168, 205, 207, 209, 210

Perestroika, 38, 69, 211 Persian Gulf, 59 PGM, 142 Plato, 11 Poland, 65, 69, 70, 121, 204 Politization, 73 Popper, Karl, 93 Portugal, 61 Power-security dilemma, 23 Preemption, 42, 43. 75, 106, 113, 117, 122-126, 146, 147, 163, 165, 166, 171, 184 Premeditated war, 41, 106-122, 171 Prevention of Nuclear War Agreement, 115116 Preventive war, 106, 122-126, 147 Principles of war, 133, 138-141, 145-146, 152 Prisoners' dilemma, 16, 36-37 Professional forces, 9, 136-137, 143-144 Proliferation, x, 22. 98, 169-170 Protracted war, 70, 99, 119, 145, 172-173, 174, 184, 190 Quester, George, 148, 151, 157, 182 R&D, 90, 92, 99, 100, 135 RAND, 6 Rapoport, Anatoli, 21, 36-37 Rationality, 17, 41, 109, 110, 112, 115, 140, 168, 172, 200-201 Reagan, Ronald, 115, 203-204 Realignment, 51, 52 Realism, xii, 5, 9-28, 28-29, 32, 37, 39, 40-41, 43, 51, 52, 53, 68, 80, 81. 8 4 85, 86 Reciprocity, 14, 18, 35, 37, 39^10, 86, 209 Regimes, xi, 32, 35 Regionalism, 20, 23-24 Reinforcement, 55-58, 61, 71, 173, 175, 179, 184 Restraint, 30, 35 Retaliation, 110-115, 121, 125 Revisionism, 13 Romania, 65, 66, 68-69, 204 SALT, 62, 80, 83 SAS, 58, 67, 171, 179, 180, 181 Schelling, Thomas, 16, 28, 54 Schlicffen Plan, 156 SDI, 85, 114-115, 148, 166

INDEX

Security community, 20, 35 Security dilemma, 13, 17-18, 24-28, 29, 36, 39, 41-42, 43, 53, 59, 68, 71, 80, 84-89, 122, 123, 125 Security partnership, 30 Security regime, 20, 30, 35, 39 SED, 38 Self-deterrence, 111-112, 120, 126, 144, 175, 177 Self-help, x, 14, 15, 18, 21-22 Shadow of the future, 37-39 Simpkin, Richard, 138, 153 Simulation, 6, 154 SIPRI, 28 Size principle, 51 SLOC, 55, 56, 58, 173-174, 188, 189, 190-191 Snyder, Glenn, 25 Social defense, 108, 120-121 South Africa, 169 Soviet Union. See USSR SPD, 28, 30, 38 Spider-and-Web, 67, 171, 174-175, 179, 180, 185 Stability, 80, 85, 95, 125-126, 202, 213 START, 163 Strategic defenses, 62, 84, 85, 114-115, 165-166 Strategic studies, 3-4, 17, 21 Strategy, 1, 9, 131-141, 141-147 Structural inability to attack, xii, 61 Structural violence, 4, 105 Sun Tzu, 139, 145, 154 Sweden, 1, 50 Switzerland, 50, 90, 121, 136, 138, 144, 149 Systems theory, 19 Tacit understanding, xi, 30, 39 Tactics, 124, 131, 145, 146, 177, 180-181 Targets, 42, 117, 120, 125-126, 146, 171, 176, 179, 187 Technology, 132-135, 142 Territorial defense, 68, 69, 174-175 Terrorism, 107 Testing, 6 Third World, 34, 71, 187, 201, 202 Three-to-One Rule, 141 Thucydides, 25

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Time-lag, 91 Tit-for-Tat, 36-37 Transarmament, 2, 39, 97-98 Turkey, 61, 72 TVD, 70, 127, 132 Unilateralism, 39, 95-97 United Kingdom, 55, 57, 62, 74, 136-137, 143, 169, 174, 201, 202, 212 United Nations, 2, 73-74, 80, 121, 172, 188, 193 United States, 1, 53, 54-64, 66-67, 72-74, 81-84, 92, 95, 111-117, 123, 136-137, 140, 143, 163, 164, 165, 168, 169, 190, 201-204, 208-213 University of the Bundeswehr, 6 USSR, 28, 30, 35, 38, 52, 53, 55, 64-70, 72, 74, 81-84, 88, 90-91, 92, 107-117, 118, 119, 121, 123, 132, 135, 138, 140, 143, 148, 151, 153, 163, 164, 165, 172-173, 174, 190-191, 202-204, 208213 Vance, Cyrus, 28 Verification, 84, 100, 116, 164 Vietnam War, 144, 183, 187, 203 Walz, Kenneth, 10, 21-22, 25, 36, 169 War prevention, xiii, 2, 31, 43, 54, 59, 70, 82-83, 105-128, 194, 199-200 Warning, 125-126, 137, 164 Warsaw Pact, ix, 5, 50, 52-54, 64-70, 71, 72, 92, 96, 118, 149, 172, 173, 190, 210 Weizsäcker, Carl Friedrich von, 87-88, 157 WEU, 59, 73 Wiberg, Häkan, xiii, 89 Wolfers, Arnold, 10, World government, xi, 22, World War I, 53, 99, 105, 124, 156, 157, 173, 201 World War II, 53, 68, 109, 111, 121, 122, 133, 148, 156, 173, 183 Worst-case analysis, 82 WTO. See Warsaw Pact Yugoslavia, 50, 68 Zones, 63, 64, 97, 117, 126, 164, 167, 192

ABOUT THE BOOK AND THE AUTHOR Bj0rn M0ller explores the implications of switching to a new type of defense structure, nonoffensive defense (NOD), that would maintain an undiminished—or even improved—capability for defense while possessing no offensive capabilities. The advantages of such a switch, he posits, would be enhanced possibilities for aims control and disarmament, increased crisis stability, and the elimination of incentives for preventive war and preemptive attack. M0ller compares NOD with traditional military strategy and elaborates its distinguishing features with regard to land, air, and maritime forces, as well as nuclear strategy. He also analyzes the implications of NOD for alliances in general and NATO in particular, finding no incompatibilities in principle. Placing NOD in theoretical perspective, M0ller sees it as a logical corollary of "common security," which in turn is consistent with both "realist" and "neorealist" approaches to the study of international relations. BJ0RN M0LLER holds an M.A. in history and a Ph.D. in political science, both from the University of Copenhagen. He is a senior research fellow at the Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, where he serves as editor of the international research newsletter NOD and Conversion. He is the author of Resolving the Security Dilemma in Europe: The German Debate on Non-Offensive Defence, and The Alternative Defence Dictionary.

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