Commission for Racial Equality: British Bureaucracy and the Multiethnic Society [1 ed.] 1560003650, 9781560003656

Citation preview

THE

COMMISSION FOR RACIAL EQUALITY

Social Policy and Social Theory Series D avid M arsland, Series E d ito r

Transforming Men, Geoff Dench The Australian Nation, Geoffrey Partington Darwinian Evolution, Antony Flew The Commission for Racial Equality, Ray Honeyford

THE

COMMISSION FOR RACIAL BRITISH LOCALITY BUREAUCRACY AND THE MULTIETHNIC SOCIETY

RAY HONEYFORD

First published 1998 by Transaction Publishers Published 2017 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon 0X14 4RN 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017

Routledge is an imprint o f the Taylor and Francis Group, an informa business Copyright © 1998 by Taylor & Francis All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. Library of Congress Catalog Number: 98-13611 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Honeyford, R. The Commission for Racial Equality : British bureaucracy and the multi­ ethnic society / Ray Honeyford. p. cm. (Social policy and social theory series) Includes bibliographical references (p. ) and index. ISBN 1-56000-365-0 (alk. paper) 1. Great Britain—Race relations. 2. Great Britain. Commission for Racial Equality. 3. Minorities—Great Britain—Social conditions. 4. Great Britain—Ethnic relations. 5. Equality—Great Britain. I. Title. DA125.A1H56 1998 305.8'00941—dc21 98-13611 CIP ISBN 13: 978-1-56000-365-6 (hbk)

Contents

Introduction 1. The Commission for Racial Equality

vii 1

2. The Race Relations Act 1976: The Background

15

3. The Race Relations Act 1976: Provisions and Effects

23

4. The CRE: Duties and Powers

51

5. The CRE in Action

83

6. Political and Economic Planning and Race Relations

93

7. Education and the CRE

125

8. Employment and the CRE

163

9. Housing and the CRE

195

10. Publicity and the CRE

257

11.

279

Libraries

12. Freedom of Association

291

13. Concluding Thoughts

299

References

305

CRE Reports and Papers

307

Index

309

Introduction My purpose in writing this book is to expose the theorising, policies, and practices of the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) to the pub­ lic gaze. I also hope that it will help to promote an informed debate about the right of the CRE to exist. The CRE possesses considerable legal powers, powers which seri­ ously undermine our great civil liberties. Far too few British citizens are aware of the serious threat to freedom of speech, freedom of con­ tract, and freedom of association the CRE, and the Act under which it functions, constitute. This is because the race relations lobby, at whose head stands the CRE, has been successful in labelling anyone who ques­ tions its orthodoxies “racist.” In this country any issue connected with race is surrounded by taboos, and any individual expressing a view must restrict him self to the politically correct vocabulary and concepts of those who consistently depict Britain as a society rotted with en­ demic racism, and our ethnic minorities as victims of a hostile social and political climate. I seek to show that this is a serious and mislead­ ing picture of multiracial realities, but one which is bound to prevail, if we fail to assert our right to free speech on the issue. In order to achieve my aim I place the CRE in its historical and political context, outline its powers, critically examine its literature, and give detailed analyses of some of its key reports in the fields of education, employment, and housing. I also look critically at the CRE’s publicity machine and its effects on public and educational libraries. I make a number of references to the excellent American literature which is highly critical of the U .S.’s equivalent of our CRE and its attendant lobby. I do so in order to point out the danger of this country going down the American road— which we show every sign of doing. Since the passing of the Civil Rights Act 1964, Americans have re­ placed their notion of a successful “melting pot” society, with all citi­ zens loyal to a national ideal, with a “tossed salad” concept, which seeks to create separate, self-conscious ethnic groups, each claiming special access to the public purse, and using the rhetoric of “rights.” Such groups have little regard for either national cohesion or tradi­ vii

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tional civic liberties, and have created a civic order which the philoso­ pher John Gray has described as “low-intensity civil war.” The CR E’s demands for greatly increased powers— rejected by suc­ cessive Conservative Home Secretaries— are very likely to be granted by the new Labour government. And that makes the need for an in­ formed, critical debate all the more urgent. There is a degree of repetition in the book. Specifically, I repeat ideas concerning the notions of racial representation, civil liberties, and Codes of Practice. There are two reasons for this: I want the reader to be reminded of these notions in relation to my attack on the CRE, and, by repeating them in different chapters, I allow the reader to focus his attention on just those parts of the text which may interest him, i.e., I make sections of the book self-contained.

1 The Commission for Racial Equality The Background Criticism of the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) can so eas­ ily be misunderstood or misrepresented that any informed discussion needs to begin with an open-minded examination of the broad prin­ ciples on which its existence is based. The CRE would claim that its roots he in the classical liberalism in­ vented during the Renaissance, expanded in the Reformation, and given revolutionary expression in the eighteenth century; and which reached its zenith in the nineteenth century. The rights of the individual to liberty in the fullest sense— over and above the claims of states, classes, and religions: this key liberal concept the CRE would assert as its honourable, historic starting point. Echoes of John Locke, the French Enlightenment and John Stuart Mill are often found in the rhetoric of the CRE— as are the ringing, absolutist tones of the United Nation’s 1948 Universal Dec­ laration of Human Rights, with its reference to respect for human rights “without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.” The CRE also looks back to the humanitarian side of British imperi­ alism. The basic intention of colonialism was the extension of territory, and the acquisition of wealth and power, enterprises which undoubt­ edly led to the exploitation of subject peoples. Alongside this impulse, however, there was also a deeply felt concern for the welfare, treat­ ment, and progress of indigenous populations. This expressed itself in the building of hospitals, the establishment of schools, the creation of economic infrastructures, and the bringing of principles of equity, ju s­ tice and order to areas formerly characterised by strife, barbarism, and instability. William Wilberforce is only the most prominent of those who, in their noble work, embodied this compassionate objective. This tradition survived the loss of empire. It can be seen at work when the first group of West Indian immigrants to postwar Britain dis1

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embarked from the “Empire Windrush” in 1948. It is embodied in such organisations as the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants, the U.K. Immigrants Advisory Service, the early, though not the current, Institute for Race Relations. It formed an important strand in the dis­ cussions and Parliamentary debates which foreshadowed the British Nationality Act, 1948, and the Race Relations Acts of 1965 and 1968, and of 1976, the legislation which gave birth to the CRE. Our myriad Race Equality Councils, at the local level, would claim to be operating from within this tradition. There is little doubt that public opinion in this country supports the principle of equality of opportunity, and deplores racial discrimination. There are few who would quarrel with the CR E’s aims of seeking to eliminate bigotry and promoting good race relations. The key issue, then, is not whether the CRE is a reflection of worthy principles and objectives. Its traditional, humanitarian roots are a guar­ antee of that. What matters is to ask whether a statutory bureaucracy is the appropriate means of achieving such principled aims. R ights an d the C R E W hatever one’s view of the CRE, whether it should or should not continue to exist, whether it should have its powers strengthened or reduced, there will be little disagreement with the statement that the CRE developed out of a specific understanding of the nature of human rights. The CRE is, or purports to be, about ensuring just and equitable treatment for all sections of the national community. It is about seeking to guarantee that the ethnic minorities enjoy the same human rights as those enjoyed by the ethnic majority population. So we can reasonably argue that, underlying the principles and practice of the CRE, there is a philosophy of human rights. W hat is the source of human rights? This age-old question is a key issue in considering the principle of justice the CRE expresses. Broadly speaking, there are two answers. First, we can think of human rights as inhering in the individual. They are not granted by any external, human source, nor by the more to the less powerful. They are inalienable, or, if you will, God-given. Secondly, rights can be thought of as privileges granted by the state. Human beings do not begin life with certain un­ questioned rights. Rather, they are bom into the world as servants of the state, and enjoy only those rights the state considers are, as it were, good for them.

The Commission for Racial Equality

3

The first notion of rights is the basis of the philosophy o f John Locke and the Founding Fathers— a philosophy which issued in the American constitution. The Bill of Rights does not grant the citizen rights. Rather, it says Congress shall not intrude on the preexisting rights of the individual. Rights are antecedent to the state. M oreover rights are rather vaguely expressed and limited. Life, liberty, the pur­ suit of happiness and property— these are the only rights the constitu­ tion recognises. The precise form these rights take depends, not on the State, but on society— on men and women living together, trans­ acting various arrangements and pursuing their own goals. Pow er is distributed over a series of institutions— the legislature, the executive, the judiciary— and the checks and balances these provide help to cre­ ate a climax within which rights can flourish. Though this country, unlike the U.S., has no written constitution, the same version of hu­ man rights underpins our system o f government. The second version was expressed in the old Soviet constitution. There, rights began with the state, not the person. The concept o f the person exists only in relation to those liberties laid down by the state. Since there was no division of powers in the Soviet Union, all rights proceeded from the omnicompetent state, and were administered by the party. There is a sense in which “society” existed only by permis­ sion of the state. Rights, therefore, have to be prescribed in some de­ tail. The individual cannot be allowed to assert his God-given rights, since he is not assumed to have any; and, even if he had, he could not be permitted to express them, since, in doing so, he might create oppo­ sition to the state, the fountainhead of all rights. The constitution o f the Soviet Union made frequent references to the right to work, leisure, and medical care— Articles 118,119,120— rights' arising not from the very nature of the human person, nor mediated, in the case of dispute, via the courts and the due processes of law, which assume an indepen­ dent judiciary, but from the all-powerful state. As Robert Nisbet has pointed out, this version of human rights is “perfectly compatible with the most despotic of totalitarianisms. Even Albania bestows such rights upon its thoroughly enslaved subjects; so does North Vietnam, North Korea, and all the Iron Curtain countries of Eastern Europe” (see Preju­ dices, Harvard University Press, 1982). Despite its apparent roots in liberal thought, the CRE, in my view, derives its concept of rights from this second version of human liber­ ties, as embodied in the Race Relations Act, 1976. This is so in a num­ ber of respects. First, the Act does not simply recognise rights. It confers

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them— though only on those defined by their minority racial group. Section 35 erects the concept of “special needs” of the racial m inori­ ties; and these are defined in terms of education, welfare, and training. This principle is extended in more detail in Sections 36, 37, and 38. The practical effect of this is that local authorities, and others, have seen fit to provide extensive services and opportunities for blacks and Asians, whose needs and rights have been assumed to go beyond those inherent in citizenship and which are shared by everyone. A similar development has occurred as a result of Section 5(2)(d), which speaks of “genuine occupational qualifications.” (A similar as­ sumption underpins Section 11 of the Local Government Act, 1966— which the CRE has always vigorously defended.) Secondly, the Act contains strong suggestions that public goods, for example, employment, education, housing ought to reflect in propor­ tionate ways the statistical group make up of the population. Section 1 says, inter alia, that, “A person discriminates against another,” if “he applies to that other a requirement or condition which he applies or would apply equally to persons not of the same racial group as that other but— (i) which is such that the proportion of persons as that other who can comply with it is considerably smaller than the proportion of persons not of that racial group who can comply with it: and (ii) which he cannot show to be justifiable.” W hat this has meant, in practice, is that, where statistical inequali­ ties of outcome with regard to race occur, this is assumed to provide prima facie evidence of racial discrimination— but only when the m i­ norities are said to be “under represented” ; if the ethnic majority is in the same position, this is not assumed to be problematic. The effect of this kind of approach is that the state, via its creature, the CRE, is effec­ tively, seeking to dictate the nature of the multiracial society we all inhabit. Society is being perceived and ordered, not as an integrated, harmonious whole regardless of race, and where outcomes reflect indi­ vidual and group choices, but as a mosaic of competing racial groups functioning in response to the State’s prescriptions. Rights are, at least with regard to race, being laid down by the state— they are not inherent in the individual. And, thirdly, the Act is based on the assumption that the state may, with impunity, violate, with regard to race relations, the conventional limits placed on the freedoms of speech, association and contract, which we have all, hitherto, taken for granted. This issue is examined in detail later. These fundamental liberties are, I would argue, quite significantly undermined by Sections 20,21, 25 and 70 of the Act. In all these ways

The Commission for Racial Equality

5

the Act embodies the notion that the state knows best about an issue which, in the past, has always been settled in societal terms. This dis­ tortion of established and accepted ways of settling matters connected with rights in relation to the acceptance and integration of newcomers and their descendants has several unfortunate consequences. For in­ stance, the formal, legal enshrining of rights of certain groups in soci­ ety requires a bureaucracy to ensure those rights are respected. Since all bureaucracies follow the two principles of retrenchment and self­ aggrandisement, rights become associated with the tendency to increased power in the agency entrusted with the overseeing of those rights, i.e., rights are not simply a function of human needs and liberties function­ ing in a taken-for-granted set of conventions and expectations. They are the object of intrusive vested interest. Moreover, since the terms which define the characteristics of the favoured groups are only vaguely defined in the Act, there will be a tendency for an increasing number of groups to claim the A ct’s protection and favours. This has happened to a very marked extent in the U.S., in response to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, 1964— an act which powerfully influenced the design and content of our 1976 Act. In this country, we have seen how the Sikhs, a religious group, have successfully claimed the protection of the Act, and are, in law deemed to be a racial group— as exemplified in M andla v Dowell Lee, the schoolboy turban case. And, since the Act focuses on group interests, rather than on the defence of the individual’s rights against the state; and, further, since the Act is posited on a negative view of human relationships, there is bound to be a built-in tendency for the CRE to perceive minority groups and their progress in pessimistic terms. To do otherwise would be to undermine the demand for its own services; or, to be somewhat flip­ pant, if there is no racism present, then the CRE will be sorely tempted to invent it. Thus, the spectacular success in certain fields of minority groups forms no part of the rhetoric of the CRE— so that society’s per­ ceptions of racial progress and the state of race relations is distorted. Worse yet, since rights are fragmented along racial lines, rather than being recognised as belonging to every citizen, whatever his race, what the Act has done is to create the impression within the minority popula­ tion that to be black or Asian is to be entitled to additional rights. Rights are, that is, associated with a certain racial consciousness. And that has led to the notion that race is a political issue. Politicians not only auto­ matically speak of society and its needs in racial terms, many actively court the ethnic vote— some would lose their seat in Parliament if they did not.

6

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This deplorable conjunction of race and politics is an inevitable out­ come of the mentality the CRE enshrines. If we have a powerful statu­ tory organisation which relentlessly seeks to encourage different racial groups to believe they are somehow separate from the rest of the com ­ munity, and have “special needs” which split them off from the rest of society— if that process is a regular feature o f our cultural life, then it should not surprise us if at least some sections of the majority comm u­ nity feel a certain resentment. An unemployed labourer living in the inner city, who feels himself to be at the bottom of the social pile, and who knows that his, say, Asian neighbours have “special needs” which are being m et by the taxpayer— would it really be surprising if he expe­ rienced a sense of being a second-class citizen? And how, one wonders, would that help the cause of good race relations? Now once the state grants rights, however they are described, the beneficiaries will not willingly give them up. The notion that the ethnic minorities are entitled to rights denied to others has now become an essential doctrine in the philosophy of the race relations lobby. (The increasing use of non-English languages by official bodies is a good example of this.) In order to sustain this position, and to give its ex­ pression a certain apparent validity, the CRE and its satellites uses two approaches. First, it constantly insists that the ethnic minorities are vic­ tims; and, secondly, it fixes on an enemy which it attacks relentlessly and with steadily increasing vigour. That enemy is “racism,” which is none the less real for being an abstraction. This twin-pronged tactic provides the CRE with a powerful rallying cry. Since all inequalities which affect the ethnic minorities adversely can be ascribed to a com ­ mon adversary, a sense of crusading zeal can be generated and m ain­ tained— and the necessity to take a better informed, more complex view of social reality avoided. If ethnic minority failure is a function of rac­ ism denying society’s victims a place in the sun, then the role of selfhelp, history, and cultural values can be readily circumvented. Apart from preventing rationality about group progress and development be­ ing established, this mentality provides powerful support for political pterodactyls: those on the left being enabled to link race and the class war; those on the right, to exploit the public resentment and anxiety which comes to surround the whole subject of race relations. Thus, an organisation founded to encourage good race relations, be­ cause it is founded on a defective understanding of the nature of rights in a free society— this same organisation finds itself doing the precise opposite. The simple and vital necessity of ensuring that rights are in

The Commission for Racial Equality

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no way connected with skin colour, and that all are equal under the law— this traditional colour-blind, equitable approach has been seri­ ously violated by the law which gave birth to the CRE. Again, we need to remind ourselves that the guarantee that all shall be treated as free and equal citizens, regardless of race, was first adumbrated in 1772 by Lord M ansfield in the famous Somerset case: “As soon as any slave sets foot upon English territory he becomes free.” The spirit which animated that judgm ent has been perverted, via political action and bureaucratic self-interest, into a mentality which makes skin colour a crucial factor in any discussion about a citizen’s rights. As a result fundamental liberties are confused with crude and irrational notions of material equality across groups defined by race. E quality and the L aw Another way of illuminating the philosophy of the CRE and its role in society is to consider a debate regarding race relations being conducted in the field of academic jurisprudence. This debate focuses on the func­ tion of the judiciary and its relation to the state of a multiracial society. One school of thought maintains that justice subserves the cause of social equality. Inequalities are perceived as being the outcome of un­ just historical and economic forces, and their removal is a m ajor re­ sponsibility of the judiciary. Social equality is so important, it must take precedence over individual liberty. An im m ensely influential advocate o f this doctrine is R onald Dworkin, an American liberal, and professor o f jurisprudence at Ox­ ford. In Taking Rights Seriously, Dworkin says this about the condi­ tions attaching to admission to a university, “Racial criteria are not necessarily the right standards for deciding which applicants should be accepted for law schools...neither are intellectual criteria, nor indeed any other set of criteria. The fairness and constitutionality of any ad­ mission programme must be tested in the same way. It is justified if it serves a proper policy that respects the rights of all members to be treated as equals, but not otherwise.” It is this commitment to the pri­ macy of equality which enables Dworkin to argue that positive dis­ crimination favouring blacks is more important than respecting the rights of the individual. For instance, Dworkin has condemned the American Supreme Court for finding for the appellant in the Bakke case. Here a better qualified white candidate for a place in medical school was, ini­ tially, rejected in favour of a poorer-qualified black candidate.

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This is a specific instance of the Dworkin, egalitarian principle in action, but it illustrates a theme which is generalised in the whole of Dw orkin’s work and outlook. Legal decisions are valid only in so far as they seek to create greater social equality. The notion of individual rights, both inherent and as sustained by the courts— this is subservient to the greater principle of equality of outcome. In short, the judiciary exists to establish and maintain a distinctive view of civil society, i.e., the judicial process is, or ought to be, a procedure for effecting political reform. Against this there are those who have argued that the job of a judge is to interpret the law in accordance with precedent, or the will of Par­ liament, i.e., in accordance with the Common Law or statute. The so­ cial outcomes of judicial decision-making are not a matter for the courts, though the courts will obviously seek to prevent decisions from creat­ ing discord. But social outcomes lie in the domain of politics, i.e., the relation between society and the state, which, in a democracy, is a m at­ ter for public opinion to decide via the constitutional procedures gov­ erning election to Parliament. In this context equality is important only in so far as it relates to the notion that all persons before the court are entitled to fair and equal treatm ent, i.e., equality is a procedural device for ensuring the elimination of prejudice. But equality as a political aim has no part to play in the work of the judiciary. An advocate of this philosophy is the American sociologist, Nathan Glazer. He has criticised the notion that positive racial discrimination aimed at producing greater social equality is a public good. On the contrary, it is a misguided and dangerous principle. In the first place, it is impossible in any remotely convincing way to show that the sole cause of minority failure is discrimination— there are far too many other historical and cultural factors involved. Secondly, positive discrimina­ tion does not favour the most disadvantaged; it benefits the skilled, professional classes, who can be shown to have been making good progress, anyway. And, thirdly, the most damning of all, by legally and formally dividing society into separate groups and conferring rights upon them, you run the risk of intensifying group conflict and under­ mining hopes of harmony and integration. (See “Ethnicity— North, South, West,” Commentary, May, 1982). Glazer is here referring to American experience, but his worries would also apply in this country, which, in terms of official intrusion into race relations, has already gone a long way down the American road. Now, although it is this second version of the role of the courts which forms

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the basis of our traditional and established understanding and practice, I would argue that the CRE has emerged from legislation which is rooted in the first, essentially political, version of the function of the judiciary. Social equality, rather than the equality of all under the law is the guid­ ing principle of the 1976 Race Relations Act 1976, and of the bureau­ cracy charged with implementing it.

The American Experience Another way of elucidating the principles and practice of the CRE is to consider developments in the U.S. with regard to ethnic minority progress and race relations. The key issue in the U.S. is the status and legality of racial quota systems. Now when the Civil Rights Act 1964 was progressing through the American Senate, it was made absolutely clear that quota systems were to play no part in the procedures estab­ lished under the Act. Title VII of the Act specifically forbade quota systems: neither race, nor culture was to be used to favour any group. Senator Hubert Humphrey, the chief sponsor of the Act, repeatedly as­ sured the Senate that racial quota systems would not be permitted. He declared that, if Title VII contained any language providing for the hiring of employees on the basis of percentages or colour quotas, he would start “eating the pages one after another, because it is not there.” (See Reversing Racism, Social Affairs Unit, 1984) This categorical undertaking has been systematically violated in the years since the Bill was made law. The wishes of the United States Senate have been pro­ gressively overridden by a process of judicial activism promoted by relentless pressure from the bureaucrats of the American equivalent of our CRE. Coupled with competition for the ethnic vote, and skilful exploiting of the American liberal conscience, this pressure has helped to generate a climate of opinion in which the very notion of the rule of law on this issue has been subverted. The sponsors of the Civil Rights Act would be appalled to contemplate just what has happened to their well-intentioned attempt to improve things through political action. Quotas are now more or less the norm in the U.S. A distinguished Ameri­ can jurist has suggested that the division of powers— the cornerstone of civil liberties, and the bastion against the over mighty state— is break­ ing down, as a result of the triumph of the quota system mentality, “We now have law suits vastly more like legislative proceedings.” (Lance Liebman, Ethnic Pluralism and Public Policy, Heinemann, 1983). An­ other, similar source, has averred, “M ost societies in which power is

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formally allocated among racial and national groups are strikingly op­ pressive, unequal and unstable.” (Paul Brest, Harvard Law Review; vol. 90, 1976). It is precisely the allocating of powers on the basis of group rights towards which the concept of quota systems inevitably points. Quotas violate the principle that rights inhere in the individual citizen. They also call into question the principle that all are equal under the law, irrespective of race, creed, or colour. Perhaps most damning of all in a practical sense, they undermine the key principle that rewards have to be earned by the person on whom they are conferred. The sole basis of personal benefit, honour or distinction is individual merit. Once indi­ viduals are considered, not as unique persons, but as representatives of this or that group— however defined— and have rewards conferred upon them on that basis, then resentments and jealousies are bound to result. Ultimately, the very coherence of society is threatened, since one of the fundamental means of holding the community together, individual merit, has been called into question. Merit has the great virtue of being per­ ceived as fair and proper by the great mass of the people: the alien notion of group entitlements— which is the basis of the quota system mentality— has no such public support. Moreover, quotas encourage the growth of group consciousness, rather than loyalty to a national ideal; so that inter-group conflict over the distribution of scarce re­ sources becomes a definite possibility— and that, within the context of a multiracial society, can scarcely be an encouraging prospect. Now quota systems are unlawful in this country, as they were, origi­ nally, in the U.S. But there are unmistakable signs that the CRE is very displeased with the failure of Parliament to support quota systems. I would argue that its submission to the home secretary in 1985 pointed in this direction, as does its current proposals for a massive increase in its powers which, as I write, are in the hands of the home secretary. In the meantime, and in order to circumvent the restricting effect on its powers by the absence of quota systems, the CRE has recourse to a whole range of interventions whose inevitable effect is to persuade people that quotas are somehow defensible— positive action, special needs, numerical targets, contract compliance, and Codes of Practice. To be fair to the CRE one has to concede that there is a degree of support for quotas in the Act itself, even though, in a strict sense, they are forbidden. Section 1 (a) (i) (ii) speaks of the relationship between the requirement or condition attaching to a public good and the propor­ tion of a particular racial group able to meet that requirement or condi­

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tion, and the validity of the conditions. W hat this means in practice is that in, say, drawing up the requirements for a job an employer has to have regard, not only to the qualifications necessary to do the job, but what proportion of blacks and Asians could meet the specified require­ ments. If a lower proportion of blacks and Asians than whites can sat­ isfy the conditions, then the employer has to be able to justify his understanding of just what is required to do the job. Now the CRE has exploited this section of the Act in order to pressure employers into drawing up job specifications which it, the CRE, finds acceptable. The extent to which an employer is being successful in creating an offi­ cially approved multiracial workforce is judged by the proportion of blacks and Asians he employs; a fact which is established via racial monitoring— a procedure demanded of employers in the CRE Code o f Practice for Employment. In short, the CRE has gone a long way on the road to establishing racial quotas, or, as it prefers to say, in typically slippery language, “numerical targets.” And it has done this by capital­ ising on what I would argue is a loophole in the Act, which specifically forbids quotas. Now the central argument in favour of quota systems is that they improve the lot of ethnic minorities. Persisting inequalities are swept away, blacks come to enjoy higher standards of living, and race relations are thereby improved, since minority resentment at ma­ jority success is abolished. However, a glance at the situation of the one group in the U.S. which has been the most obvious recipient of the policies produced by the quota system mentality clearly indicates that these sorts of assump­ tions have been very effectively disproved by experience. The very opposite of the original aims of quotas has occurred. Inner-city blacks have been assiduously courted by Am erica’s race relations lobby. They have been targeted for preferential treatment, urged to believe that “black is beautiful,” and relentlessly pushed to take advantage of quotas. The consequences have been nothing short of tragic. The social pathology of Am erica’s inner city blacks defies description. There is no dispute about the fact that drug addiction, AIDS, alcoholism, illegitimacy, edu­ cational failure, crime, abortion, and general social failure— that these things have grown massively worse since the American equivalent of the CRE insisted that poor blacks were incapable of helping themselves, and needed more and more state intervention to win a place in the sun. W hat the quota system has produced is not socioeconomic success based on hard work and individual merit, but an appalling, debilitating and, it seems, permanent dependency culture. Innumerable commentators have

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drawn attention to this dismal development, e.g., Charles Murray in

Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950-1980 (1984), and Tho­ mas Sowell in The Economics and Politics o f Race (1983). In the field of education the quota system mentality has had an equally disastrous effect. Attempts to coerce educational institutions into re­ cruiting ethnically representative student bodies have caused widespread resentment, not least among successful ethnic minority students such as those of Asian and Japanese origin who have found themselves be­ ing rejected for less well-qualified blacks and others. Black academics such as Professor Walter Williams have expressed outrage that his race should be so insulted that they need the support of “fixed” entry exami­ nations in order to make the grade: “The consent decree attempts to rectify this presumed ‘racial bias’ of PACE [Professional and Adminis­ trative Career Examination] by providing that the number of blacks and Hispanics who get these jobs will be proportional to the number taking the test. In other words, the same people who resist tooth and nail the slightest suggestion that blacks are genetically inferior want to construct a testing procedure which is based on that very assumption. To me, and I suspect many other blacks, that is offensive. It is no more objective than the racist ‘studies’ of the eighteenth, nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which purportedly showed blacks were childish, lazy, and ignorant; therefore they couldn’t be accountable (and it was cruel to make them be) to the civilised standards of white society, and I believe that most blacks resent its underlying assumptions.” (See “Blacks don’t need quotas to keep pace,” in Ethnic Enterprise News, Nov./Dec., 1989). In Out of Order: Affirmative Action and the Crisis o f Doctrinaire Liberalism (Prometheus Books, 1985) the American philosopher, Nicho­ las Capaldi, after a rigorous examination of the conceptual basis of affirmative action and the quotas through which it is expressed con­ cludes that the attempt, via quotas, to combine the pursuit of excel­ lence— the object of all genuine educational enterprise— with equality of outcome is a chimera. Quite simply, quotas involve a lowering of standards, create resentment of whites against blacks, and pervert the vitally important status of the individual in law. Capaldi’s conclusion is clear: “affirmative action very nearly destroyed the university as a viable, independent institution.” Writing in Campus Report, (February, 1990), Alan Brownfield, a campaigning journalist, under the headline “Affirmative Action Breeds Social Injustice,” gives chapter and verse to support his view that quotas do infinitely more harm than good on

The Commission for Racial Equality

13

the campus. In 1987 only 40 percent of the entering class at Berkeley were selected on academic grounds alone— the other 60 percent was made up of freshmen in “protected” categories. One headmaster com­ plained about the following case: Student A was ranked in the top third of his class, Student B in the bottom third. Student A had an examina­ tion score of 1290, Student B, 890. Student A had a record of good citizenship, while Student B was expelled the previous winter for break­ ing a series of major rules. Student A was white, Student B was black. Berkeley rejected Student A and accepted Student B. Such cases are not rare. The universities of Brown and Stanford have kept Asian en­ tries at roughly the same level, whilst the number of highly qualified students from this community has risen dramatically, i.e., there appears to be a process of discriminating against Asian students, so that less well-qualified students from other racial groups can be admitted. The president of the Organization of Chinese Americans is quoted as say­ ing, “I think it is pretty obvious that the practice of setting quotas against Asian-American students has been established.” There is now a consensus in the U.S. that race relations in the mod­ ern era have probably never been worse. The integrated American m elt­ ing pot has been transformed into a society riven by racial and ethnic conflict. Racial consciousness and intergroup jockeying for position and access to public goods are now characteristic of large sections of American life. An acknowledged American authority on ethnic m inori­ ties has expressed his anxieties as follows, “Preferential treatment of various racial and ethnic groups has produced political resentment and a growing racist extremist fringe in the United States. It has produced bloodshed in the streets of India” (Thomas Sowell, The Economics and Politics of Race, Wm. Morrow, 1983). Dramatic and appalling evidence for Sowell’s view was provided by the capture in 1991 of 40 percent of the vote, in Louisiana state elections, by a former leading m ember of the Ku Klux Klan. In a sober, not to say properly sombre, analysis of race relations in the U.S., Professor K.M. Holland has said that America has become, “a potential Belgium, Quebec, or, worse yet, Lebanon.” {Reversing Racism, Social Affairs Unit, 1984). These are not views emanating from the lunatic fringe. They are the weighty and considered opinions of distinguished American academ­ ics and observers with a deep, documented understanding of contem­ porary America, and the condition of its race relations. They point irresistibly to the immense dangers implicit in the mentality which sup­ ports such devices as quotas. And they are in direct opposition to the

14

The Commission for Racial Equality

philosophy which created and sustains the CRE, and the whole statefunded race relations lobby. If we value law and order, minority group progress and ethnic harmony, they are, perhaps, views to which we, in this country, ought to be paying at least some attention. Conclusion This brief attempt to place the CRE in its theoretical and practical context will, I hope, go some way to justifying my belief that we ought to be reconsidering the way in which we approach race relations at the offi­ cial level, as well as questioning some of the assumptions the race rela­ tions lobby makes regarding the fortunes of the ethnic minorities in Britain. Four basic issues require public discussion. First, what concept of human rights ought to underlie our approach to race relations: should it be of the inherent, personal type, or should we continue with our present group-based approach dictated by the state? Second, should we con­ tinue to interpose between state and society a race relations bureau­ cracy eager and willing to engage in the sort of lobbying and judicial activism characteristic of the C R E’s American counterpart? Third, should we assume that the ethnic minorities lack sufficient support from their own strength of character and cultural resources to make a suc­ cess of life, and need the notion of “special needs” and quota systems— under whatever name these latter exist— in order to make the grade? And, finally, should we be ignoring the American experience, or should we be seeking to learn from it? These four issues will be discussed in relation to specific questions as the book progresses.

2 The Race Relations Act 1976: The Background Since this Act is the prevailing legislation to do with race relations, and since it gave birth to the CRE, then some examination of its sources and contents is clearly necessary to our purposes. Sources

The 1965 Act A number of influences have been shown to have created a climate of opinion amongst the political classes favourable to the 1976 statute. (See P.N. Sooben, The Origins of the Race Relations Act, Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations, 1990). The 1976 Act was the third of its kind. The first expression of the urge to legislate in the field of race relations was the 1965 Act. Various reasons for the passing of this Act have been advanced. The race riots of 1958 in Notting Hill alarmed both public and politicians, and led pretty well everyone to take race relations more seriously than in the past; though, in point of fact, exist­ ing legislation allowed the courts to deal with appropriate severity with the white racial thugs responsible for the mayhem. There was also pres­ sure from the political left to outlaw racial discrimination— though it should be noted that the Labour Party and the trade union movement had not traditionally favoured legislation which would effectively vio­ late the ancient and essentially egalitarian principle of all citizens be­ ing equal under the law. Speaking in 1943, via a civil servant, Herbert Morrison, the Labour home secretary, and in the context of pressure to outlaw anti-Semitism, gave the following opinion, “It would be con­ trary to public policy to single out one section of the community for preferential treatm ent... we must maintain the principle that our law is 15

16

The Commission for Racial Equality

no respecter of persons” (quoted in Race and Law, A. Lester, and G. Bindman, Longman, 1972). But the arrival of increasing numbers of West Indian immigrants in Britain, and the tension in certain areas this caused, led many on the left to assert that traditional, societal methods of integrating newcomers should be replaced— or at least supplemented— by intervention by the state in the form of legislation. Reginald Sorensen prepared a bill in 1951. This was subsequently taken up by Fenner Brockway, who unsuccessfully floated a race relations bill in the Commons nine times in the 1950s. Pressure group activity also pointed to the possibility of legal ac­ tion. The Campaign Against Racial Discrimination (CARD) was very active in promoting the notion that aggrieved minorities required spe­ cial, official protection, and nothing less than legislation would suffice to accomplish this. CARD was influential in winning over politicians to this idea, and in the framing of the provisions of the subsequent Act. However, it should be noted that CARD did not represent the whole of black and Asian opinion. One influential study of race relations says this: “Until the creation of CARD, the voices of members of the coloured community had been conspicuously silent during public discussions about anti-discrimination legislation.” (See Race and Law, A. Lester, & G. Bindman, Longman, 1972). Also, both the Commonwealth Im ­ m igrants’ Advisory council, established in 1962, and its replacement, the National Committee for Commonwealth Immigrants, exercised in­ fluence in the direction of legal compulsion. It has also been suggested that the 1965 Act was, in some measure, an attempt to assuage the guilt that many people, particularly those on the left, felt about the ending of the open-door immigration policy em ­ bodied in the 1962 Immigration Act. In fact the Race Relations Act 1965 was promulgated in the same year as a White Paper further reduc­ ing access was issued. The link between immigration and race rela­ tions, however, was acknowledged in 1960 in the celebrated remark of Roy Hattersley that integration was impossible without limitation, and limitation without integration was inexcusable. There probably is some­ thing in this notion of a political balancing act. The belief that every citizen of the Empire was also a citizen of the mother country, a prin­ ciple of long duration, had been confirmed in the British Nationality Act, 1948; an act placed on the statute book when memories o f the Em pire’s contribution to the war effort were still very much alive. The assumption that this principle should be extended after independence, and integrated into the doctrines governing this country’s relationship with the emerging Commonwealth— this notion was widely supported.

The Race Relations Act 1976: The Background

17

And its violation in 1962 undoubtedly upset the liberal conscience. There was, as it were, a conflict between idealism and practical experience. And public opinion supported the pragmatic option regarding the con­ trol of immigration— though political support for the 1965 Act was the price exacted by those convinced that race relations had to be subjected to legal restrictions. A further influence may have been the advent of the anti-Semitic declarations in 1965 of Sir Oswald Mosley, and the antiblack rhetoric of Colin Jordan, who had been charged with violat­ ing the Public Order Act: these events attracted widespread publicity and condemnation. Those who support state intervention and the establishment of antidiscrimination laws have argued that the 1965 Act was not a sufficiently powerful instrument for suppressing the thing of which everyone dis­ approves. (See, Race in Britain, M. & A. Dummett, Hutchinson, 1982). The A ct’s provisions were limited to “places of public resort.” It did not apply to housing and employment. It had restricted enforcement pow ers, and relied on conciliation and voluntary am endm ent o f behaviour, rather than on court action. However, the 1965 Act was important in that it established the prin­ ciple that state intrusion into race relations was legitimate— at least according to Parliament— and that the law could and should be invoked in order to combat racial discrimination. Moreover, the notion that statu­ tory administrative procedures should be employed in this field was also laid down, and a precedent for bureaucratic expansion was en­ shrined in public policy thereby. Under this Act a Race Relations Board was set up. This had the duty of coordinating the work of seven re­ gional committees whose task was to investigate complaints o f racial discrimination. If the local committee failed in its efforts at concilia­ tion, the matter was referred to the Race Relations Board, and, ulti­ mately, to the attorney general. There was criminal sanction, and up to 1968 only four complaints finished up in the hands of the attorney gen­ eral. (This minuscule level of serious matters was in sharp contrast to the claims about the extent of grave racial discrimination later m ade by Political and Economic Planning— see The Facts o f Racial Discrimi­ nation, PEP Report 560, D.J. Smith, 1976).

The 1968 Act A number of factors conspired to create the second antidiscrimina­ tion Act. There was continuing agitation from pressure groups for in­ creased legal powers. The first PEP report appeared in 1967, and this

18

The Commission for Racial Equality

claimed that racial discrimination was rampant. As in 1965, the new Act followed increased control over Commonwealth immigration— this time from Kenya: so the balancing act between control and the protection of coloured minorities is again in evidence. And the Street Committee, which had examined race relations internationally, recom ­ mended a new Act with increased scope, and more powerful enforce­ ment procedures. Finally, Roy Jenkins was then home secretary, and he felt that a new Act would help to defend Britain’s liberal reputation abroad. The new 1968 Act extended legal cover to include housing, em ­ ployment, and the provision of goods and services. The Race R ela­ tions Board was empowered to investigate, even though no complaint of discrim ination had been made. It was also given powers to bring legal proceedings, and to demand redress for victims of discrim ina­ tion. The aim of actively prom oting conciliation and good will was carried over from the previous Act, though the Com m unity Relations Com m ission now functioned in place of the National Com m ittee for Comm onwealth Immigration; whilst local comm ittees becam e Com ­ munity Relations Councils. The general effect of this new and more coercive Act was to instil still further in the public mind the notion that political and legal action against discrimination was legitimate and necessary. However, these unprecedented extensions of the ideology of British lawmaking were not established without expressions of concern from many different quarters. As late as January 1967 both the TUC and the CBI advanced reservations. The TUC believed that a statutory remedy to one undesir­ able practice was not defensible, when the victims of other m alprac­ tices had no redress in law. It backed the idea of a gradual elimination of discrimination through good will and use of existing, voluntary pro­ cedures. The CBI was not convinced by the arguments of the pressure groups, or their claims to represent the minority communities. And the sam e organisation was w orried about the ability o f an outside organisation— the Race Relations Board— to understand areas of em ­ ployment of which it had no experience. (The ignoring of this anxiety by Parliament provided the race relations lobby with the opportunity to extend its powers considerably in the later 1976 Race Relations Act. The notion that race relations officials know better than employers how to define the skills necessary to do a particular job was to become a major part of race relations thinking and practice— which is precisely what the CBI had feared.)

The Race Relations Act 1976: The Background

19

There were, too, voices from the legal profession urging caution. There were expressions of concern regarding the concept of discrim i­ nation, about how it differed from choice in a free society, and how the law was to be used to protect only certain classes of persons— defined, essentially, on the basis of skin colour—rather than the individual per se. Thus, in 1969, Judge Harold Brown pointed to the dangers inherent in separate race relations legislation. Speaking in the context of a case involving the award of damages for the offence of trespass he said this: “It seems curious that if a landlord closes the door on a coloured appli­ cant, merely because of his colour, he might well get into serious trouble. But if he closes his door on white people with children, merely because they have children, he is under no penalty at all. Thus, a black mother may be seen to be a victim of discrimination, while a white mother cannot” ( Guardian, 2.8.69.). This curious anomaly, which clearly illus­ trates how the Act violates the fundamental principle of all citizens being equal under the law, was to be given further weight in the current 1976 Act, under which some notorious “blacks only” employment de­ cisions have been made. In a lecture on the concept of discrimination Lord Radcliffe expressed strong misgivings about the difficulties involved in giving key words in the Act any sort of legal status: A basic misgiving was that the two key words “prejudice” and “discrimination” do not carry any association of moral ill-doing.... Wrestling with the problem inherent in the meaning of the word “discrimination”, I cannot, for myself, imag­ ine how juridical notions can be founded on such vague conceptions. The conduct of human life consists of choices, and it is a very large undertaking indeed to outlaw some grounds of choice, unless you can confine yourself to such blatant combinations of circumstances as are unlikely to have any typical embodiment in this country. I try to distinguish between an act of discrimination and an act of preference, and each time my attempts break down.” (See Race & Law; A. Lester, & G. Bindman, 1972, Longman).

However, despite its unprecedented and radical nature, the 1968 Act failed to satisfy the demands of those clamouring for coercive legal powers to stamp out what they perceived as a great social evil. The American notion of “disparate impact,” constructed via judicial deci­ sions out of the Civil Rights Act, 1964, began to take hold— though its advocates in this country used the term “indirect discrimination.” Al­ though there was general agreement that direct discrimination was far less in evidence than in the 1950s and 1960s, the supporters of the race relations lobby alleged that discrimination remained a serious prob­ lem. There was, it was alleged, widespread, covert practice and proce­

20

The Commission for Racial Equality

dure, a sort of underground conspiracy, which the existing legislation was failing to reveal. The term “institutional racism” was coined to identify this alleged intrigue. By about 1970 race relations had become, not only a source of profes­ sional jobs, and intense pressure group activity, but also of academic interest. Sociologists, particularly those of a radical political persuasion, saw race relations as an area in which research interest could be served— and grants obtained. In 1967 the seminal work, Race, Community and Conflict, by two left-wing sociologists, John Rex and Robert Moore, was published. By 1979 this work— on ethnic minority housing— had been reprinted four times. The fact that it was subsequently found to be deeply flawed (see my chapter on housing) did not prevent it from becoming a major source of race relations rhetoric and demands. This country, then, had by about 1970, and for the first time in its history, a large and growing race relations lobby— a lobby which had professional, legal, and ideological dimensions. This lobby had two basic aims: to win over public opinion to its view that contemporary Britain was a nation rotted with endemic racism; and, despite contrary thoughtful opinion, to press for political and administrative action of increasing severity in order to rid our body social and political of the alleged pathology. Added to this was the perception that, in seeking to adapt to their new surroundings Commonwealth immigrants were experiencing a level of social deprivation significantly higher than that of their indigenous counterparts. This was acknowledged in Section 11 of the Local Gov­ ernment Act 1966. Under this provision local authorities with signifi­ cant numbers of immigrants were allowed grants to help them with any special charges incurred in connection with their immigrant communi­ ties. This started at 50 percent of approved expenditure, but was raised to 75 percent in 1969. This scheme was, originally conceived as a short­ term, emergency, measure— a prediction violated by experience. In 1969-70 the Section 11 grants amounted to £3.5 million, and by 197475 they had reach ed £10 m illio n . In 1 9 8 6 -8 7 th e fig u re w as £102,247,946. Section 11 is now a multimillion pound enterprise, sup­ porting a considerable sector of public welfare. It also appears to be a permanent feature of social expenditure, the authorities pursuing a “once an immigrant, always an immigrant” policy; though, to be fair, condi­ tions regarding its administration have recently (1992) been tightened up. A further official attempt to tackle alleged immigrant disadvantage was the Urban Programme adumbrated by Harold Wilson in 1965, and

The Race Relations Act 1976: The Background

21

given legislative expression in 1969. These measures set precedents whereby grants were earmarked in general terms for immigrant com ­ munities— grants emanating from the Commission for Racial Equality, and local authorities were specifically intended for racial minorities. Racial discrimination and immigrant disadvantage formed the gen­ eral basis, then, of the demand for further legislation. However, there were a number of specific influences at work also. First, there was the 1974 PEP survey of employment practices. This alleged—mainly on the basis of correlation studies, and fictional job applications— that ra­ cial discrimination did exist in the labour market. Second, the Select Committee on Race Relations issued a report in July 1975 which was critical of the government for failing to produce more powerful legal and administrative procedures for eliminating discrimination. Third, the Community Relations Commission was eager for reform, and com­ plained that the existing 1968 Act was largely ineffective. Fourth, the home secretary, Roy Jenkins, was much influenced in favour of more coercive legislation after, once more, considering American race rela­ tions policy. Fifth, the passing of the Sex Discrimination Act in No­ vember 1975 created a precedent for a further legal attack on racial discrimination. Roy Jenkins frequently stressed his view that racial and sexual discrimination were closely connected— though a 1974 W hite Paper took a more cautious view, pointing out that the two things were, in fact, far from being identical in their natures and effects. (This latter opinion has been given powerful support by a leading American legal academic, Richard A. Epstein, in Forbidden Ground, Harvard Univer­ sity Press, 1992.) These general and more particular influences generated a climate in which there was general political— if not public— support for a new race relations Act.

3 The Race Relations Act 1976: Provisions and Effects The 1976 Act is a long one: eighty sections and five schedules. It is also complicated, and has generated a great deal of case law— in 1990 the CRE published Race Discrimination Law Report, and this covers two fat volumes priced at £150.00. The Act has also generated a great deal of controversy, not least among lawyers. Since I am neither a lawyer, nor a legal academic, I do not pretend that what follows is a comprehensive and scholarly critique. I am here functioning in the position of the thoughtful layman intent upon exam­ ining those key sections of the Act which have been influential and which help to throw light on this book’s themes. I am also commenting on the mentality which created the Act, and the way the Act, as inter­ preted by the CRE, has helped to create a very distinctive, not to say arbitrary race relations ideology. Surveys show that the British have a high expectation of formally equal treatment at the hands of authority; the spirit of Dicey lives on in popular adherence to a version of the rule of law which views group differences with grave suspicion”. (Ken Young, Ethnic Pluralism and Public Policy, Heinemann Educational Books, 1983.) I did not wish to suggest that Britain is a racist society, nor that every Britain is a racist. Such a suggestion would be utterly false and grossly unfair. When all is said and done, Britain is one of the most decent and civilised societies in the world, and is characterised by a considerable sense of fairness and humanity”. (Bikhu Parekh, Five Views o f Multi-Racial Britain, CRE, 1978, reprinted 1983.)

The first of these quotations is from a leading expert on race rela­ tions ideology and a leading light at the Policy Studies Institute. The second is from a British-Indian academic, who subsequent to this state­ ment, became a vice-chairman of the CRE. The first suggests that the spirit of fair play is alive and well in the British public, who are very unlikely to support laws which violate the 23

24

The Commission for Racial Equality

notion of equality of treatment. The second clearly challenges perhaps the strongest argument in the race relations lobby’s philosophy, i.e., that Britain is, essentially, a racist society. Taken together these two opinions would appear to suggest there is a powerful case against any race relations legislation in this country. If the public do not support an Act based on differential treatment according to group membership, then that Act is hardly likely to achieve its purpose. And if that Act is based on a misreading of the actual state of race relations— as the Parekh view suggests— then it is unlikely to be addressing the real issues. These two statements alone, bearing in mind their expert provenance, do strongly suggest that it should be society, rather than the state via political action, which seeks to resolve the problems resulting from dif­ ferent ethnic groups living in the same community. However, whatever the case for allowing traditional and publicly supported processes to gov­ ern our aim of encouraging harmony and integration, the fact is that our politicians have determined that it shall be the state, via legal compul­ sion, which will play the dominant role. The 1976 Act emphasises this. This Act, much more than previous race relations Acts, positively encourages the citizen to perceive society as being divided along lines of colour, race, nationality, or ethnic origin. Society, that is, consists of certain disparate groups, and certain o f those groups shall enjoy protection and privileges denied to others. In the fields of education, training and welfare— which constitute a huge tranch of human en­ deavour— the racial minorities shall henceforth be regarded as being more deserving than the majority population. That means that the prin­ ciple of all citizens being equal under the law is violated. To put this matter another way, whereas the public favour a colour-blind approach to race relations, the 1976 Race Relations Act appears to embody the notion that the only way forward is for society to adopt a colour-con­ scious approach. The argument for this sort of policy runs as follows. This country is so afflicted by prejudice and discrimination that the only way to change things for the better is via legal compulsion. Blacks and Asians face such profound hostility at the hands of the majority population that they cannot reasonably be expected to make any real progress, unless they enjoy legal protection, and privileged access to public goods. Now it is certainly true that the ethnic minorities face greater chal­ lenges in their attempts to achieve success. And no one can deny that this country has its fair share of ignorant, bigoted people. But is this a complete picture of things in contemporary multiracial Britain? If we

The Race Relations Act 1976: Provisions and Effects

25

are, indeed, as the race relations lobby depicts us, why, one wonders, is this country so enormously attractive to people of every race, creed and colour? It seems intrinsically unlikely that this would be the case if, on the whole, the British people were unwelcoming to those from abroad. And why, if minorities require special, protective laws in order to suc­ ceed in this country, how does one explain the success of the Jewish community in overcoming anti-Semitism without benefit of such laws? Could it be that Jews are disproportionately successful because they have used obstacles to their advancement as a challenge, rather than as a reason for special pleading? They have exploited their own optimis­ tic cultural values, rather than arguing that they have special needs, as the race relation laws imply other minorities have. Moreover, the de­ piction of our racial minorities as uniformly failing in their struggles to achieve success is a travesty of the facts. There is growing evidence of black and Asian progress in this country— as, indeed, there was before the 1976 Act reached the statute book. (See the evidence adduced by the Census M icro-data Unit at M anchester University, reported in the Daily Telegraph, 20.1.94.) Despite these contradictions and questionable assumptions the 1976 Act signalled that those with a negative view of race relations and ethnic minority progress, and who insisted that the law must be used in unprec­ edented ways to eradicate racial discrimination— this lobby had won the day. Henceforth race relations was not simply a notion subserving con­ siderable academic, professional, and ideological interests. It was now the basis of powerful laws, and of a statutory body with a very wide remit indeed, i.e., the Commission for Racial Equality.

What the 1976 Act Did First, the Act established a single organisation, the CRE, in place of the Race Relations Board and the Community Relations Commission. The conciliation aspect, which was based on public education, and the eliminating of discrimination through goodwill, and, on the other hand, the pursuit of offenders via the law— these two distinct approaches, previously served by different organisations, were now subsumed un­ der a single body, the CRE. This new body had much wider powers than the two bodies it replaced. In addition to overseeing the legal ban on discrimination in employment, housing, education, the provision of goods and services, and access to private clubs, the CRE, according to a speech by Roy Jenkins in 1975, should have, “power to range over

26

The Commission for Racial Equality

the entire variety of ways in which racial minorities may receive less favourable treatment, and to propose the relevant remedies” (quoted in, The Origins o f the Race Relations Act, P.N. Sooben, Centre for Re­ search in Ethnic Relations, 1990). Secondly, the new Act created the new offence o f “indirect discrim i­ nation.” This meant that, regardless of intent, discrimination could be held to have occurred, “where unjustifiable practices and procedures which apply to everyone have the effect of putting people of a particu­ lar racial group at a disadvantage” (Section 1). Thirdly, the new Act amended the Public Order Act, 1936, and strengthened the 1965 Act making incitement to racial hatred a specific offence. Moreover, the Act abolished the notion of intention with re­ gard to incitement: the prosecution would no longer need, in the con­ text of race cases, to establish the defendant’s state of mind; it would be sufficient to convince the jury that racial hatred was likely to be stirred up as the result of the offending words. The general effect of these greatly increased powers was to emphasise the role of the state, of bureaucracy and of the law in the area of race relations. Parliament was, to an unprecedented extent, committed to the notion of ever-increasing levels of intervention in matters connected with race. The precedent established in the U.S. was now, it seemed, the guiding principle underlying this country’s response to race rela­ tions— a precedent the CRE was only too anxious to follow, as its two submission to the Home Secretary requesting much greater powers, in 1985 and 1992, clearly illustrated.

A Comment on Key Provision of the Act Racial Group A key issue in determining whether racial discrimination has or has not occurred, or is likely to occur, is this: W hat is meant by the terms “racial grounds” and “racial group”? The first focuses on the condi­ tions relating, say, to the appointment to a job, or promotion, and causes our minds to consider whether a specific ground is related to race, as defined in the Act, and as elaborated by judicial decisions. Thus, if a prospective employer stated that only British-born applicants would be considered, then that condition would be unlawful, since the Act for­ bids that sort of discrimination— though an employer just might suc­ cessfully pray Section 5(2)(d) in aid. A racial group is defined in terms of colour, race, nationality, or ethnic or national origin.

The Race Relations Act 1976: Provisions and Effects

27

Now the striking thing about these criteria defining race in legal terms is their astonishing width. To a layman a race relations Act will suggest a law about race defined as skin colour. Thus, the 1976 Act is, most people would assume, an Act to prevent whites from discriminat­ ing against blacks— or vice versa. But the designers of the Act thought otherwise. They constructed a view of the concept of race which has little to do with biology, common usage, or established dictionary defi­ nitions of the term “race.” The result is a definition which casts its net very widely indeed. However, one characteristic of crucial importance in defining both individual and group identity is omitted, i.e., religion. It would appear that discrimination on grounds of religion is not, legally, impermis­ sible. However, even this limitation appears to have been removed by the decision of the Law Lords in the celebrated schoolboy turban case. Here, the headmaster of a private school had refused admission to a Sikh boy on the grounds that he could not conform with the school’s uniform regulations, i.e., at his father’s command he insisted on wear­ ing a turban. The High Court, and Court of Appeal accepted that the Race Relations Act 1976 did not apply in this case, and the headmaster was within his rights, since Sikhism is a religion, and not, therefore, covered by an Act which does not include religion in its definition of the key term. However, the Law Lords thought differently, and laid down in March 1983 that a case of this kind was within the remit of the Act, as the CRE had argued. Lord Fraser enunciated a definition of race, within the meaning of the Act, which bore no relation to the generally understood meaning of the term, and which was astonishingly broad in its applica­ tion. Here are Lord Fraser’s words: For a group to constitute an ethnic group in the sense of the 1976 Act, in my opinion, [it must] regard itself, and be regarded by others, as a distinct community by virtue of certain characteristics. Some of these characteristics are essential; others are not essential, but one or more of them will commonly be found, and will help to distinguish the group from the surrounding community. The condi­ tions which appear to me to be essential are these (1) a long shared history, of which the group is conscious as distinguishing it from other groups, and the memory of which is kept alive, (2) a cultural tradition of its own, including family and social customs and manners, often, but not necessarily associated with religious observance. In addition to those two essential characteristics the following char­ acteristics are, in my opinion, relevant: (3) either a common geographical origin, or descent from a small number of common ancestors (4) a common language, not necessarily peculiar to the group (5) a common literature peculiar to the group (6) a common religion different from that of neighbouring groups or from the general community surrounding it (7) being a minority or being an oppressed or a dominant group within a larger community, for example a conquered people (say,

28

The Commission for Racial Equality the inhabitants of England shortly after the Norman conquest) and their conquer­ ors might both be ethnic groups. A group defined by reference to enough of these characteristics would be capable of including converts, for example, persons who marry into the group, and of excluding apostates. Provided a person who joins the group feels himself or her­ self to be a member of it, and is accepted by other members, then he is, for the purpose of the 1976 Act, a member.

Given all this it is difficult not to conclude that the Race Relations Act involves a considerable misnomer. It clearly is an Act which con­ cerns itself with very much more than relationships amongst different racial groups or individuals. But it is not just the breadth of the Law Lords’ definition which astonishes. W hat is also odd is that, in defining the key term, they do not use the actual wording of the Act itself. Sec­ tion 3(1) refers to “racial group”, whereas Lord Fraser uses the term “ethnic group.” W hether the two terms should be employed as syn­ onyms is open to question. Be that as it may, we are stuck with a legal definition which, I believe creates more problems than it solves. For instance, just what is omitted in defining “race” in these sweep­ ing terms? One could reasonably argue that in referring to culture, his­ tory, language, history, literature, family, and social customs the judges are exhausting pretty well every characteristic human beings employ in defining the group to which they belong. Consider the following possibilities: A Scottish family living in London insist that their son be allowed to wear a kilt to school, even though the school uniform specifies trousers. A Welsh couple living in M anchester claim that they have a right for Welsh to be placed on the local school’s curriculum. An indigenous Roman Catholic family claims that they have “spe­ cial needs” under the Act, in the same way as have blacks and Asians. A white Rastafarian (there are such people) claims the right to smoke dope. Each of these groups could lay claims to being an “ethnic group” as defined by the Law Lords. All are minority groups. Each could claim there are distinctive religious traditions associated with its community. Each could reasonably argue for a “long shared history”— though the Rastafarian case in this respect is somewhat weak. Each certainly has its own customs and manners. Three of the groups could claim a com ­ mon geographical origin. The Roman Catholics could certainly claim a history of oppression, in view of the penal laws to which they were subjected for two hundred years. And both the Rastafarians and Roman

The Race Relations Act 1976: Provisions and Effects

29

Catholics could claim that converts to their religion were members of an “ethnic group”—bearing in mind Lord Fraser’s last two sentences. It is difficult to see how each of these groups could not make claims to rights contingent upon the fact that they are, in law, an “ethnic group.” The issue, then, becomes not so much who belongs to an ethnic group, but who does not? And that question must, of course, undermine the whole notion that there are separable racial groups in society. If we all belong to an ethnic group of one kind or another, what is the point of a law which concerns itself with devolving unique rights and protection upon such groups? But this sort of definition does more than make o f the law a consid­ erable ass, since if pushed to its proper conclusions it would obviously make the whole Act unworkable. It also has serious implications for the cohesion of society itself. This is so because it clearly encourages people to perceive themselves, not as members of an integrated com­ munity loyal to certain public values, traditions, laws, and institutions, but rather as members of self-consciously separate groups, each defin­ ing itself in its own unique terms— and each claiming privileged ac­ cess to the public purse. Given this sort of development, the law then becomes not so much a protective mechanism as a device for weakening the bonds which hold society together. The possibility of creating the sort of disparate and aggressive factions which have made the U.S. into a society riven with ethnic and racial conflict— this possibility is made more, not less, likely by an Act which defines “race” in this absurdly comprehensive way. (See Reversing Racism, Lessons from America, K. Holland, Social Af­ fairs Unit, 1984.) The CRE cannot be blamed for this unfortunate definition— though it could be criticised for failing to accept the verdicts of both the High and Appeals Courts, and pushing the matter right to the House of Lords. But the real culprits, of course, are the politicians who allowed this Act to get on the statute book without giving it the sort of rigorous exami­ nation it clearly needed; though this is, perhaps, a trifle unjust. It would be kinder, perhaps, to say that what we have here is a good example of the law of unintended consequences. O f course the CRE welcomed this definition since it allows it to concern itself with an ever-expand­ ing number of client groups. The Irish are the latest British minority group with which is has become involved. According to its 1990 An­ nual Report, the CRE had commissioned research into “the nature and extent of the disadvantage and discrimination suffered by the Irish in

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The Commission for Racial Equality

Britain.” The disadvantage and discrimination, note, had, before the research was carried out, already been assumed to exist. Presumably, therefore, the function of the research was to provide the details. Pre­ dictably, in 1997, the CRE declared that, henceforth, the Irish were to be regarded as the victims of racism, and an ethnic minority entitled to the protection of the Race Relations Act. It does not seem unreasonable to assume that the Welsh and Scottish communities living in England will be the next groups to be added to the CR E’s clientele.

Genuine Occupational Qualifications Section 5 of the Act has had considerable consequences. Sub-sec­ tions (a) and (c) effectively permit racial discrimination on certain grounds, e.g., in a dramatic performance, in modelling for works of art, and in specialist restaurants, where, for purposes of authenticity, per­ sons of a particular racial group are required to provide the service. This, it may be said, seems unexceptional— merely a concession to common sense. Yet there is a sense in which this section violates the whole notion on which the Act is said to rest, i.e., that to advance race to justify, say, a job appointment under ordinary circumstances is to engage in an improper, indeed unlawful, act. In some forms of human endeavour race, it seems, is relevant and permitted. W hether the state, via a complex and powerful legal apparatus, should determine when race is, and when it is not, relevant, or whether the issue should be decided by society, a society in which freedom of association is held to be a basic civil liberty— that is a question which has never been ad­ equately and publicly debated in Britain. However, it is section 5(2)(d) which has caused most controversy. This section runs as follows: Being of a particular racial group is a genuine occupational qualification for a job only where the holder of the job provides persons of that racial group with per­ sonal services promoting their welfare, and those services can most effectively be provided by a person of that racial group.

There are a number of difficulties in interpreting this. First, there are problems of definition. Just what does “personal service” mean? What, indeed, is a “service” ? And how could a court of law adequately define the impossibly vague term “welfare”? One could quite reasonably ar­ gue that anything one does for another person in a spirit of goodwill is a form of welfare. How can terms as woolly and general as these be

The Race Relations Act 1976: Provisions and Effects

31

given the sort of clear conceptual status, such as to satisfy the normally rigorous demands of the judicial process? The Act gives no guidance on this key issue. Some concrete instances will help to make plain just what a gift to bureaucrats and lawyers such a hopelessly loose and woolly section of the law this is. For example, there is good evidence to show that a hugely disproportionate number of blacks are in jail. So the black com ­ munity has a particular interest in the conditions which obtain in our prisons. Could Section 5(2)(d) be used to justify a demand from black prisoners to be overseen by black warders— on the grounds that, since black convicts tend to hate a judicial system dominated by whites, their “welfare” is best ensured by being looked after by people of their own race? After all, warders do have to provide what could be reasonably called “personal services” for inmates. Could a white patient in a hos­ pital insist that the nurse looking after her should also be white, on the same “personal services” argument? Could a black parent insist that an I.Q. test given to his child in school be administered by a black teacher, on the grounds that the child’s welfare is best catered for by being pro­ vided with an appropriate role model? Has the Asian community a right to its own radio and television services on the grounds that they could best be provided by persons of the same racial group? These are hypothetical instances. But there is no shortage of reallife illustrations to show how this part of the Act can be exploited to justify an effective colour bar— at least in certain narrowly defined cir­ cumstances. For example, the CRE itself has strongly argued on this basis the case for racial segregation in the fostering of black children. In Fostering Black Children (1975, second reprint 1988), the CRE says, “wherever possible, minority children should be fostered by families from their own ethnic group.... Encouragement of more black people to come forward to act as foster-parents for children from their own ethnic group. This could be achieved through a conscious policy to recruit black people as foster-parents.” Similarly in Children in Care, the CRE’s submission to the House of Commons Social Services Se­ lect Committee (1983), we find the following: “it is desirable that black substitute hom es be sought for the m ajority o f black children in care...w herever possible black families should look after black chil­ dren, and black staff care for black children in residential homes.” The same mentality is articulated in Adopting a Better Policy (CRE, 1990). Here the CRE continues to argue that race is a very important factor in the fostering and adoption of children. It asserts that, “There

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The Commission for Racial Equality

is a strong body o f opinion am ong childcare professionals and organisations representing the interests and welfare of people from ethnic minority groups that the placement of a child with adoptive or foster carers of the same racial origin (same-race placement) is conducive to the development of the child’s confidence and sense of identity, given that the society we live in is demonstrably racist, with widespread dis­ crimination and prejudice” (Brown, 1984). The authors of this docu­ ment find no difficulty in placing this alongside mention of research studies which suggest a far more cautious interpretation is needed: Research into the effects of trans-racial adoption and fostering has proved incon­ clusive. Studies in Britain and the USA (Costin and Wattenburg, 1979, Bagley and Young, 1979, and Jackson, 1983) have shown that most transracially adopted children live in predominantly white, middle class areas and therefore have little contact with their own racial groups. However, the studies also show that some transracially adopted children have above average levels of general adjustment and educational achievement, and have suffered no obvious harm to their psycho­ logical development.

This doubt about the validity of the CR E’s race-based view is rein­ forced by a quotation from the work of Tizard and Phoenix (1989): “the psychological objections to transracial adoption are not well grounded in either empirical data or theory.” This leads the authors to the follow­ ing lame and anti-intellectual conclusion: “there is no adequate research to show that transracial adoption and fostering is not damaging, psy­ chologically and in other ways.” That is, in typical CRE fashion, one must assume the worst, unless and until research permits one to be optimistic. That is, the CRE, arguing from the mentality which under­ lies Section 5(2)(d), is committed to a colour-conscious policy on adop­ tion and fostering. This raises a number of issues. First, it would appear to violate Section 1(2) of the Act, which declares, “It is hereby de­ clared that, for the purposes of this Act, segregating a person from other persons on racial grounds is treating him less favourably than they are treated.” And Section 1(a) makes it clear that to treat someone less favourably on racial grounds than he treats or could treat other persons constitutes racial discrimination, and is therefore unlawful. Clearly, the CRE, in the context of fostering, is arguing that white parents ought to be segregated from black children on racial grounds; and that white parents ought, thereby, to be treated less favourably, in the same con­ text, than black foster parents. Quite apart from this legal doubt, fostering points to a fundamental contradiction in the CRE’s position on segregation. The CRE pressurised

The Race Relations Act 1976: Provisions and Effects

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local education authorities in areas of high immigrant population to stop their policy of bussing children from the Asian community to schools outside their home areas. The CRE did so on the grounds that this policy involved racially determined treatment of Asian children, and was, therefore, unlawful. That is, Asian and white children were being treated differently on grounds of colour. So the selfsame CRE which argues for racially determined policy in the matter of fostering, argues against the same sort of policy in the matter of bussing. (In passing, bussing did not use race, but educational criteria to determine the policy— but no local authority was prepared to challenge the CRE in the courts). However, the CRE’s case on fostering had a direct effect on foster­ ing agencies, which swallowed racial segregation whole— or, to put the matter more kindly, they did so, because they were afraid of what action the CRE might take against them if they did not. This m eant that black children, of whom a disproportionate number are in care, and in need of fostering, were consigned to institutions, when white couples were prepared to take them in. There was public uproar when this CRE policy became more widely known. The secretary of state for social services felt obliged to order a more humane and saner approach to cross-racial fostering. It is worth stating here that the CRE’s notion of “black identity” on which its policy on cross-racial fostering is based has been shown pretty conclusively to be bogus, muddleheaded and, in its effects, positively damaging. In 1987 David Dale, a highly qualified and very experienced social worker, published Denying Homes to Black Children (Social Af­ fairs Unit). This demonstrated that, on the basis of considerable research and practical experience, black children were in no way damaged by being reared in white families. It also made clear that anyone arguing this in public was likely to be excoriated by militant antiracists. Section 5(2)(d) is also widely employed by local authorities to ju s­ tify an effective colour bar. The Freedom Association has listed in­ stances. The following are culled from press advertisements and the Freedom A ssociation’s periodical, Freedom Today. Tower Hamlets unashamedly headed in bold black print an advertisement for a BLA C K LAW YER: “The successful applicant will be black (Bangladeshi, AfroCaribbean, Somali, Chinese, Vietnamese, etc.)” (The Guardian 23.7.86.) This raises interesting questions about how the word “black” is here being defined. W hat the designers of the advertisements are, of course, actually saying is that white people will not be considered.

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The Commission for Racial Equality

Brent Social Services segregates Asians from Afro-Caribbeans and both from white people in their residential homes. Lambeth Council runs a residential home for Afro-Caribbeans, and even the caretaker is required to be black. According to the Freedom Association, an increas­ ing num ber of educational courses are provided on a racially segre­ gated basis. Sometimes this is justified by reference to Section 5(2)(d), sometimes Section 35 of the Act is prayed in aid. For example, the London Borough Grants Committee and Greater London Arts funded a nine-day video school for fifteen to twenty-one year olds. This was open only to Asians, Africans, Latin Americans, and black Britons. The Arts Council has offered special exhibition traineeships to African and Asian candidates exclusively. The Polytechnic of Central London pro­ vided courses open only to Afro-Caribbeans in periodical and radio journalism. Leeds Polytechnic published an advertisement for a lec­ turer which banned white applicants. The educational quango, The Council for Educational Training and Community Work (CETYCW) has made it plain that, in validating courses, it will not be opposed to this sort of thing. The Black Unity & Freedom Party advertised a m eet­ ing in Lambeth Town Hall, and the invitations contained the words, “Black People Only.” West Midlands Council, Sandwell, operates a policy of racial segregation in the recruitment of home helps. Islington Council laid down that Afro-Caribbean patients must be completely racially segregated from people of a different race, when they attended a Council drop-in center: all ten staff, from manager to kitchen assis­ tant, must themselves be black, according to an advertisement in The Guardian (5.6.91). (See Section 5(2)(d): Britain’s Employment Colour Bar, Gerald Hartup, Hampden Trust, 1995.) Now I do not doubt that the people responsible for this kind of policy do so for what they regard as entirely proper, humanitarian reasons. Nor am I alleging that there is here anything necessarily unlawful. W hat I seriously doubt is the wisdom of the mentality involved. The Free­ dom Association, which is conducting a campaign against this colour bar policy, has this to say about what is happening: “The CRE does not monitor the use of Section 5(2)(d), and does not have a clue about the extent to which it is invoked. The Freedom Association believes it is growing like a cancer” (Freedom Today, Oct.1991, p.4). An act, therefore, which purports to make racial discrimination un­ lawful, appears, via this notorious section, to be sanctioning a limited form of what can only be described as apartheid. The only limiting factor appears to be that the beneficiaries m ust be from the ethnic m i­ norities. I know of no instance of where the reverse is true. It is not

The Race Relations Act 1976: Provisions and Effects

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possible to estimate the amount of resentment felt by those white people who are the victims of this policy, nor by those who simply observe what is going on. But there can be little doubt that there is overwhelm­ ing public opposition to this spectacular violation of both the tradi­ tional British regard for fair play, and of the principle that all are equal under the law. The deleterious effect on race relations can only be guessed at— it would be difficult to imagine a more effective way of providing racial bigots with ammunition. O f course, it could be argued that I am here being inconsistent. I am, throughout this book, arguing that we should not have on the statute book a law which violates freedom of speech, of contract, and, particu­ larly relevant here, freedom of association. W hat has it got to do with the state whom I choose for my friends and colleagues? Precisely the same could be argued for the CRE’s same-race philosophy: if black people want their needs to be met by black people, so what? In the total absence of race relations laws and oppressive statutory organisations to enforce them, then probably m ost people would not quarrel with that point of view— though they would almost certainly disfavour the idea if it meant black children being placed in institu­ tions, rather than in loving, white homes, which is the natural conse­ quence of the CR E’s policy on fostering and adoption. However, what causes offence— and what violates the principle of all being equal under the law— is that same-race policies appear to op­ erate in only one direction. Freedom to associate with whomever one chooses applies— in practice— only to racial minorities. Arrangements which had the effect of excluding black people would almost certainly be unlawful— and would cause an explosion of protests from the race relations establishment, and marching in the streets by antiracist zeal­ ots. But arrangements which exclude white people are, it seems, per­ fectly lawful— and such arrangements, far from being condemned by those who, in other circumstances would be objecting loud and long, are actually applauded. It is this blatant double standard which causes resentment. Either freedom of association should extend to everyone, and every group, or it should apply to no one.

Quotas Racial quotas are unlawful in this country. This represents a prob­ lem for a race relations lobby, at whose head stands the CRE, which constantly demands equality of outcome in jobs, housing, education,

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The Commission for Racial Equality

and so on. A lobby, that is, which perceives statistically representative work forces as highly desirable, and regards “under representation” as prima facie evidence of racism. If quotas are banned, how do you en­ sure that, if, say, 5 percent of the population is black or Asian, then 5 percent of desirable jobs are occupied by blacks and Asians? The difficulty has been approached by the CRE from two directions— the semantic and the legal. Since quotas and seeking to achieve racial balance are both unlawful, then some other form of wording is neces­ sary if the aim of racial equality of outcome is to be achieved. The CRE approves of what it calls “numerical targets” in relation to race. (See Positive Action & Equal Opportunity in Employment, CRE, 1989). But what is the difference between a target and a quota? And how will the one be interpreted as opposed to the meaning given to the other? It could be reasonably argued that they are different in this sense: whereas a quota is an outcome required by law, and ought to become effective in a given time, a target is a voluntary device without limit of time. But how long should the permitted time be? And what happens if the target is not achieved? Again, if the CRE pressures employers into adopting racial targets, how far, in practice, will the employer distin­ guish between the two? The busy industrialist knows that a powerful statutory body expects him to produce a given proportion of blacks and Asians in his work force, and m ight well express its displeasure if he fails to do so; and he also knows that, despite the ban on quotas, the CRE has vociferously supported the concept of racial representation in the labour force. It would not be surprising, in view of this, if employ­ ers come to equate targets with quotas, i.e., in practice, the difference is merely semantic. Regarding the extent to which the law encourages the business of proportionate racial outcomes, then, in so far as one takes a critical view, then it is Parliament, and not the CRE, which is the culprit— though it has to be said that the CRE has been shown to be ready to push the law to its absolute limits, and has, indeed, actively fostered the notion that disproportionate outcomes are prima facie evidence of racial discrimination. The key section of the 1976 Act which points to the unexamined desirability of proportionate racial outcomes, and which lends a certain legal validity to such CRE favoured notions as positive action, contract compliance, numerical targets, etc., is Section 1. This refers to the no­ tion that if a disproportionately small number of people from the ethnic minorities cannot fulfill a job requirement— and the condition cannot

The Race Relations Act 1976: Provisions and Effects

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be justified— then such a condition constitutes unlawful discrimina­ tion. Section 35, which speaks of the “special needs” of racial groups in education, welfare and training; Sections 37 and 38 which permit racially discriminatory training for racial minorities— these aspects of the Act also lend support to special, favoured treatm ent for racial minorities. These pressures point inescapably towards de facto quotas. Both the legal status of racial minorities and the attitude of the CRE point to­ wards the notion that employers and suppliers of goods and services ought to be actively concerned with creating racially representative socioeconomic outcomes. That is, race should be taken into account in determining relevant decisions. This raises several issues. How, for instance, can the notion of a racially representative work force be reconciled with the principle of freedom of choice? After all, there is overwhelming evidence that dif­ ferent groups given the same opportunities make systematically differ­ ent socioeconomic choices. We know that Asian families prefer large domestic premises because they have families significantly larger than the national average. W hilst certain ethnic m inority groups are “underrepresented” in some jobs, they are “overrepresented” in others. These variations tell us nothing about racial discrimination. They are a function of variations in customs and culture. Moreover, jobs are not allocated on the basis of group membership, however that is defined; they are filled on the basis of individual merit. Any suggestion of quo­ tas, however they are defined, and the principle of appointment and promotion on merit is undermined— a development which has two pre­ dictable outcomes: resentment in failed white candidates, who feel they have been passed over because of the colour of their skin; and the rise of that most depressing of all workers, the “token black” who knows he owes his success to his race. It is difficult to see how this state of affairs promotes good race relations, or is fair to able blacks who do not need, and are bound to resent, the patronage implied by the quota system mentality. This attempt to enforce equality outcomes is bound to be counterproductive in the long run. The history of quotas in the U.S. makes that clear. In a detailed article in The Times (16.4.93.) Peter Brimelow, o f Forbes Magazine, says this: “as quotas replace m erit hir­ ing, they undermine a uniquely important element of the American so­ cial order’s moral legitim acy.. .every office now carries its complement of incompetent minority employees who can neither be fired nor effec­ tively disciplined.... Everybody knows quotas do not work.”

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The Commission for Racial Equality

Second, the sort of pressures exerted on employers by the CR E’s insistence on “targets” are bound to involve significantly increased personnel bureaucracy, more paperwork, and, inevitably, an addition to the firm ’s costs. Attempts have been made in the U.S. to establish just how much the quota approach is costing American industry and com ­ merce. This point is developed below. But no one has, so far, attempted a similar exercise in this country. However, a glance at the CRE’s Code o f Practice in em ploym ent gives som e idea o f the extent o f the em ployer’s responsibilities in seeking to achieve racial targets. Here are some typical quotes from that document: In order to ensure (that) an equal opportunity policy...the following action by employers is recommended: allocating overall responsibility for the policy to a member of senior management; discussing and, where appropriate, agreeing with trade union or employee representatives the policy’s contents and implementa­ tion, ensuring that the policy is known to all employees, and, if possible, to all job applicants; providing training and guidance for supervisory staff and other rel­ evant decision makers...; examining and regularly reviewing existing procedures and criteria and changing them where they find that they are actually or poten­ tially unlawfully discriminatory; making an initial analysis of the work force and regularly monitoring the application policy with the aid of analyses of the ethnic origins of the work force...”

One does not have to be an industrialist to work out just how costly will be these complex and perpetual procedures. But the thing does not stop there. The CRE also expects employers to finance other ethnic minority demands: “provision of interpretation and translation facili­ ties, for example, in the communication of grievance and other proce­ dures, and of terms of employment; training in English language and in communication skills; training for managers and supervisors in the back­ ground and culture of racial minority groups; the use of alternative or additional methods of communication, where employees find it diffi­ cult to understand health and safety requirem ents...” and so on, and so on. There is no mention of costs in the CRE Code o f Practice. Third, as the CRE makes clear its targeting policy must involve eth­ nic monitoring. But this itself is extremely controversial. Those who support it argue that monitoring is necessary to measure how far a ra­ cially representative work force is being achieved— and this latter, any­ way, is, itself, controversial. Those who oppose ethnic monitoring, who include not only many employers, but also many ethnic minority people, say that questions asked are often offensive, and are, themselves, in­ nately racist, in that they encourage racial differences where race is not supposed to matter. M any people also worry about the way such infor­

The Race Relations Act 1976: Provisions and Effects

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mation might be used. In “British Racial Discourse”, Frank Reeves calls monitoring, “a benign form of discursive racialisation” (quoted in Race and Ethnic Relations, Cashmore E. Ellis, Routledge, 1988). Fourth, the quota system is an attack on a fundamental civil liberty, i.e., freedom of contract. W hen an employer offers a candidate a job, or promotion, then, when the candidate accepts the job, the two parties have entered into a contract. The terms of the contract are a m atter for the two parties, and for them only. The only limiting factor is that there should be no coercion or fraud involved. That is an ancient, well-un­ derstood, and universally accepted way of proceeding. Contracts are a private matter. They are a matter for society, not for the state. The role of the state is to defend the right of everyone to own property, to con­ tract, to sue, and to be sued, and to give evidence. But employers are, via the CRE Code o f Practice being urged, if not compelled, to include certain conditions of service in specific employees’ contracts, which would not be there without interference by the CRE, which, as a statu­ tory body, can be legitimately perceived as an agent of the state. The CR E’s standpoint seems to me to be, in this regard, a serious challenge to the legal regime under which social life is ordered. In Forbidden Grounds: The Case Against Employment Discrimina­ tion Laws, (Harvard University Press, 1992), Richard A. Epstein, an American legal scholar, says this: “An anti-discrimination law is the antithesis of freedom of contract, a principle that allows all persons to do business with whomever they please for good reasons, bad reasons, or no reason at all.” I do not see how this diminution of such a basic liberty can be conducive to an integrated and harmonious atmosphere in the work place— or anywhere else.

Freedom of Speech Freedom of speech is a jealously guarded civil liberty. The right of any man or woman to express his or her views without let or hindrance is so much a part of our daily experience that we take it for granted. We also take as read that any nation which prohibits open and free expres­ sion of views, is, by definition, an unfree society, or dictatorship. O f course we do not assume that speech can be totally free. There have to be certain limits. Matters o f public order, national security, personal character, and public decency— all these are readily understood to limit free speech. However, there is a well-established consensus, too, that, within these boundaries freedom of speech is more or less absolute.

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And this national concord remained unchallenged until the advent of our race relations law. Under the first, 1965 Race Relations Act, the government of the day— succumbing to pressure resulting from outbursts at fascist meetings— introduced a new offence. It was, henceforth, an offence for a person to publish, or to distribute, abusive, or insulting matter, or to use in any public place, or at any public meeting, threatening, abusive, or insult­ ing words, if the matter of the words was likely to stir up hatred against any section of the public distinguished by colour, race, or ethnic, or national origin. This meant that the Act made speech or writing of a particular kind a criminal offence, even though no public disorder had resulted thereby. The same offence under the 1976 Race Relations Act (Section 70) is even more oppressively defined. There it is made clear that it is no longer necessary to prove intention to stir up hatred. Needless to say this limitation on free speech caused considerable disquiet. Parliamen­ tarians, lawyers, and legal scholars all expressed alarm. W hen the Bill was passing through the House of Commons, Ronald Bell declared, of the provisions on incitement, that they were, “the greatest infringe­ ment of freedom of speech or writing since the days of religious perse­ cution.” A future lord chancellor, Lord Hailsham, declared, “ ...th e Government has, by this clause, subverted the whole doctrine of En­ glish law.... It is a fundamental principle of English law and one which is vital to the preservation of individual liberty, that a crime should consist of two separate elements: first, there m ust be a prohibited act...and then there should be a state of m ind...quite deliberately the Government has created in this new clause an indictable offence in which the mental element is removed altogether” (quoted in British Race Relations Legislation: How Democratic? Glory Osaji-Umeaku, The Abraham & Sarah Foundation, 1992). Professor Harry Street, an immensely distinguished legal scholar, and an authority on civil liber­ ties, advanced the following view: “The existing provisions of the Pub­ lic Order Acts would have been wide enough to cover the statement of this kind which resulted in disorder, so that the need for this new of­ fence is questioned.” (See Freedom, the Individual and the Law, Pen­ guin Books, 1977). In a lecture published as, “The State of Civil Liberties Today”, (The John Rylands University of Manchester, 1978), the same authority said this: “Notice that this offence has nothing to do with disturbance of the public order; it makes racialism a crime, and so runs counter to much of the philosophy underlying our laws relating to ra­

The Race Relations Act 1976: Provisions and Effects

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cial discrimination which stress the need for conciliation.... The cause of legal control of discrimination is only harmed by Parliament’s im ­ posing criminal sanctions which give others the opportunity to whip up frenzy among those who are easy victims of propaganda.... The right of freedom of expression within the law must be jealously guarded.” Referring to Section 29 of the Act, which relates to freedom of expres­ sion in advertising, and which embodies the same mentality which un­ derlies Section 70, D.J. Walker (a practising barrister), and M.J. Redman (a practising solicitor), said this: “Apart from emergency legislation in time of war, this provision making it unlawful for a man to proclaim that he is about to do an act which is, itself, perfectly lawful, must be unique in the law of England, and makes our much vaunted freedom of speech appear to be more shadow than substance.” (See, Racial Dis­ crimination, Shaw, 1977.) But perhaps the most telling indictment of Section 70 and the rea­ soning on which it is based came from the most unexpected quarter. Mark Bonham-Carter was the first chairman of the Race Relations Board established under the 1965 Race Relations Act, and he had this to say: “I always had reservations about the clause directed at incitement and racial hatred. Such behaviour could generally be caught under the Pub­ lic Order Act, and by introducing a provision of this kind, one runs the danger of providing special protection for a particular group, giving ammunition to the racialist opposition. Race relations policy should seek to convince the public that a policy of equal treatment irrespective of race is in the interests of the whole of society, and that it is not designed for the benefit of special groups” (quoted in Race and Law, A. Lester and G. Bindman, Longman, 1972). W hat this aspect of the Act clearly demonstrated was that those who favour the principles of compulsion and coercion in matters to do with race relations had won the day. And those who supported the age-old principles of education and conciliation had lost the argument. Racial­ ism is a repugnant philosophy to the vast majority of people at whom this Act is directed, but that its expression in public should constitute a criminal offence— it was this, above all, which created so much dis­ quiet. Criminalising racialism attacks the great principle that, though I may detest my neighbour’s viewpoint, I should, as a free citizen in a free society, be prepared to defend to the uttermost his right to state that viewpoint. But there was more than the violation of a great tradition involved. This section of the Act not only suppressed the expression of overt

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racialist views. It crucially affected the general climate of opinion sur­ rounding the whole area of race and race relations. Henceforth, per­ fectly honourable citizens became afraid of expressing any opinion about these matters; with the result that important issues connected with the actual state of race relations and the fortunes and progress of the ethnic minorities became taboo subjects. Unless, that is, the citizen were pre­ pared simply to echo the self-interested rhetoric of the antiracist pres­ sure groups and the bureaucratic nostrum s of the race relations professionals. This meant, amongst other things that those with an axe to grind were able to make questionable claims and implement policies without fear of being challenged by the rest of the community. This was bound to generate, not reconciliation and tolerance, but feelings of resentm ent in a society in which free speech was assum ed to be everyone’s right. But this notorious section involved not only issues of principle. It also created great disquiet over its interpretation and application. SubSection 5A(b), in referring to the defendant’s words speaks of, “words which are threatening, abusive or insulting, in a case where, having regard to all the circumstances, hatred is likely to be stirred up against any racial group in Great Britain by the matter or words in question.” Since the defendant is now deprived of the safeguard implicit in the prosecution’s need to demonstrate an intention to break the law, he is left only with the paper-thin protection afforded by the prosecution’s need to demonstrate things which are essentially subjective. That is, it will be the powers of persuasion of the prosecuting lawyer, rather than the nature of actual evidence, which will be the deciding factor. Although it may be possible with reasonable certainty to show that words are “threatening,” it would be much less possible to demonstrate that they are “abusive.” More to the point how does anyone, without fear of contradiction, define in any precise, or even approximate way, just what “insulting” means in specific context? After all, what one person considers insulting, the next person might regard as an example of verbal vigor. Different persons have different levels of tolerance about what they experience as a verbal attack on their person or their group; some people have a very low threshold and are prepared to be insulted at the drop of a hat; others have a much more relaxed way of responding to these things. Just how can language as vague as this be given the sort of conceptual status normally required in a court of law? Again, this section of the Act encourages those with an axe to grind to construct highly sub­ jective and arbitrary definitions of “racism.” Having done so, they can

The Race Relations Act 1976: Provisions and Effects

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then feel free to ban any speaker whose views they disagree with— and they can point to Section 70 for a degree of legal support. It was this mentality which led to the infamous “No platform” policy of the Na­ tional Union of Students, and to the persecution, and actual physical abuse, of certain individuals in those bastions of intellectual freedom— our uni­ versities. There have been many such cases, and they have evoked a great deal of unfortunate publicity and public concern. Another consequence is that political extremists have been encour­ aged to engage in public in squabbles about race. In practice, this has meant that the militant, sectarian left has consistently sought to ban its m irror image on the extreme right, the National Front, from expressing its views, despite the fact that—however morally deplorable and scien­ tifically misguided may be its views— the National Front is a perfectly legal organisation. People have a right to belong to the National Front, and, under the law, to seek to convey to others its philosophy and aims— just as have the Socialist Workers’ Party and the Anti-Nazi League. After all, the political pterodactyls of the left hold views which are as obnoxious to the vast majority of people as are those of their enemies on the fascist right. However, since M arxism and its m ultifarious branches are, in no sense, illegal, and since there is at least a suggestion under Section 70 that racialism is, and since the National Front is a racialist organisation, then, so the sectarian left argues, the National Front should be banned. Given the nature of Section 70, there is a cer­ tain logic in this. But, in terms of maintaining our democratic freedoms and institutions, you could only support this if you also believed that the extreme, militant left should also be suppressed. After all, if the fundamentalists of the left ever did get control of things, then the re­ sults for both individuals and society would be just as horrendous as if the extreme right took over. There is no evidence that M arxism in its various guises has been any less lethal than fascism— indeed, there now appears to be a consensus amongst historians that Stalin had more people murdered than did Hitler. But the fact is that the National Front is not a banned organisation; and those who want to see it declared illegal should seek to bring about that aim by the readily available, democratic means of changing the law. Instead of that, of course, what the extreme left does is deliber­ ately to confuse the use of free speech with that of public order. If the National Front plans a public meeting or rally— which it is legally en­ titled to do— the Left moves in, announces its intention to m ount a counterdemonstration, and threatens public order. This alarms the pub-

44

The Commission for Racial Equality

lie, the authorities take fright, and then use their powers to defend tran­ quillity on the streets by banning the National Front. Thus, threats of violence by the sectarian left effectively serve to deny an organisation of which is disapproves its legal right to freedom of expression. This has two effects: it encourages in the public the view that all extreme organisations, whatever their ideology, should be banned, which would drive them underground, and so make them more difficult to control— a process which would add to their attraction, particularly in the eyes of some young people eager to challenge the established order. Sec­ ondly, the relentless insistence by the left on its right to suppress the National Front provides that organisation with the publicity it would never otherwise attract; and allows it to play the martyr in the cause of free speech— which gives it a certain glamour in the eyes of mixed up, aggressive adolescents, who are a favourite recruiting ground for ex­ tremist organisations of all kinds. The law relating to incitement was reinforced and extended by the Public Order Act 1986. A new offence of possessing racially inflamma­ tory material with a view to its publication or distribution was cre­ ated— and this covered not only printed material, but also broadcasting, cable, and other media involving image and sound recording. However, this same law did go some way to reinstating normal legal principles in that it made reference to the concept of intention in relation to the alleged offence. But by 1986, of course, the oppressive Section 70 had implanted in the public mind the notion that the frank and open dis­ cussion of matters relating to the ethnic minorities was not permitted— particularly if there were to be any criticism of the minorities involved. The advent of the 1986 Act is not likely to effect an improvement in the intellectual atmosphere surrounding race relations matters.

Is Racism Uniquely Evil? Why was it thought necessary to introduce the Acts of 1965, 1968, and 1976— the latter with its unique clauses regarding racial hatred, and the absence of the crucial concept of intention? After all, as Profes­ sor Street pointed out at the time, the Public Order Act 1936 was en­ tirely adequate for the purpose of preventing public disorder, and stirring up hatred. The answer is that racism has come to be regarded as a unique evil. Now we need to understand why this is the case. Broadly speaking there appear to be three reasons. First, racism is indelibly associated in

The Race Relations Act 1976: Provisions and Effects

45

public consciousness with such horrendous historical facts as slavery, the cruelties of racial segregation in the southern states of the U.S., apartheid and its appalling human consequences, and, above all, the Holocaust. Some of the most unspeakable depravities have been perpe­ trated in the name of race. Little wonder, then, that we have an auto­ matic and deeply felt reaction against any form of behaviour motivated by racial hostility or discrimination. Secondly, there is the fact of racial attacks in our own society. We know for certain that our black and Asian citizens are the object of the nefarious attentions of a small m i­ nority of white racist thugs whose behaviour shames all of us. It is well documented that some from the ethnic minorities have been harassed, assaulted, beaten, robbed, and even murdered by white racists because of the colour of their skin. The shock thereby administered to our moral sensitivities, again, tends to give racism a special place in the unending litany of human misdeeds. And, thirdly, there is the aggravating influ­ ence of misreporting and race relations vested influence in the matter of racial attacks. No one doubts the seriousness of racial attacks, and the necessity of preventing them. However, if a problem is to be tack­ led, then we first need to understand its nature, to perceive it as it really is. If we fail to do that, then we are tilting at windmills. Worse, in this context, by failing to grasp reality, we may actually make things a good deal less than amenable to a satisfactory solution. If we exaggerate, distort, and generally misperceive, then we are likely to be moving away from, rather than moving towards a solution. Now we know for certain that this latter process has been occurring in our society for many years. Problems of definition, statistics, and conceptual validity have all been evaded, or misunderstood, by those with a race relations axe to grind. The Commission for Racial Equality, the Runnymede Trust, the BBC, and The Guardian newspaper are just some of the institutions which have seriously erred in this respect. The public have been offered a picture of racial attacks of an exaggerated and highly tendentious nature. Again, this has tended to produce a gen­ eral sense of guilt about racism, which is not justified by the evidence— the vast majority of the British public are not, nor ever could be, in any way implicated in racial attacks. However, as in so many aspects of our national life nowadays, it is not reality but the managed perception of that reality which has been decisive in creating and maintaining an acute sense of public guilt about racism. (For the definitive work in this area see Gerald Hartup’s Misreporting o f Racial Attacks, Hampden Trust, 1995).

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The Commission for Racial Equality

This is the context, then, of the belief that racism is uniquely evil. Now, even to raise the possibility that this belief is challengeable is to risk perdition in the eyes of those who have such an enormous influ­ ence in shaping and maintaining public attitudes in this area. The risk of being misunderstood, of being misrepresented, and, an ever-present possibility, of being labelled a “racist”— these things serve to inhibit a candid and honest discussion of the issues involved. But the risk will be worth taking, if a better understanding can thereby be established. Is racism such a uniquely evil thing that we need a statute which seriously inhibits free speech to control it? Is a specific law entirely justified and rational? Thinking particularly of racial hatred, we need to ask the question: Just what is being banned? The answer is hatred. But why should the law seek to ban something which is, itself, not a crime? Hatred— whatever its source— is manifestly morally deplorable. It always indicates a failure of those emotional restraints which are the basis of the civilised life. But it is not a crime to hate somebody or something. If it were, then we should all be in the dock. W hat has hap­ pened here is that the framers of the Act have equated racial hatred with violence to the person, rape, and murder, the incitement to which is properly and reasonably banned because they threaten human secu­ rity, and life itself. And all these things were caught under the Public Order Act, 1936. W hat the 1976 Act does is to ban incitement to a feeling, and not to an act. One does not have to be a lawyer to feel this is somewhat dubious law. Furthermore, if incitement to hatred is a crime, why confine it to race? Why is incitement to religious hatred not an offence? After all, through­ out history, millions of people have paid with their lives for their reli­ gious faith, thanks to violent bigotry. (Some Christians still are in parts of the Muslim world.) Perhaps even more to the point, why is incitement to class hatred not a crime? After all, large parts of the propaganda of the extreme— and not so extreme— left are calculated to generate hatred of the bourgeoisie by the working class. A glance at any of the sectarian newspapers of the left, which are published on a regular basis, proves that this is a key intention. And this systematic and well-established mes­ sage is met with no kind of official disapproval. It is a perfectly legal activity. Why is the incitement to racial hatred treated differently from incitement based on religion and class? In all the frenzied debate about race relations that question is never asked. I am not, needless to say, trying to defend incitement of any kind— all such behaviour is manifestly deplorable. I am simply attempting to

The Race Relations Act 1976: Provisions and Effects

47

point out the inconsistent and illogical status in law of incitement to racial hatred. Once one aspect of incitement is given privileged status, it is difficult to resist clamour for more of the same thing. Even as I write, race relations activists are demanding ever more oppressive laws regarding the supposed protection of minorities, and their demands seem likely to be met in the new Criminal Justice and Public Order Bill. Moreover, the Royal Commission on Criminal Justice have proposed that, in certain “racially sensitive cases,” judges should have the power to order that the jury should contain up to three members of the same ethnic background as the accused, a development which would seri­ ously violate the crucial principle that juries should be randomly se­ lected. M ight it not be wiser to rely on existing legislation, and the massive disapproval of public opinion to control incitement to racial hatred, than upon law which is unprecedented, inconsistent, and so manifestly unbalanced in its treatment of different groups in society? I suspect that the incitement part of the 1976 Act is confusing incite­ ment to hatred with incitement to a criminal act, i.e., violence to the person. A racially motivated crime is a crime per se, regardless of mo­ tive. If A hits a black person on the head with an iron bar because he hates black people, then it is the violence which constitutes the crime, not the irrational motivation. The same behaviour arising from a different mo­ tive would still be a crime. (For a fuller discussion of this issue see Roderick M oore’s Racialism and the Law, [Libertarian Alliance, 1986].) More fundamentally is racialism, then, a distinctive evil? Is it, by its very nature, and within the context of contemporary Britain, so pro­ foundly horrendous and so threatening to the social order that special, unique, and oppressive laws are needed to respond to it? The parlia­ mentarians responsible for the 1976 Act appeared to think so. They must have been convinced that racialist behaviour, and the potential for it, is a major evil in our society, that Britain is a nation rotted with a pervasive and endemic racism. I believe this is a serious misconcep­ tion— and the distortions involved in perceiving Britain in this way has produced flawed and unnecessary law. Now I am not here suggesting that racial prejudice and what it leads to does not exist in this country. It clearly does. And it is certainly easier for the racialist group or indi­ vidual to identify their victims when those victims so clearly signal their identity with their minority skin colour. But should the ease o f carrying out a crime be regarded as an index of its gravity? That would not be the normal view of a court of law. W hat matters in determining the seriousness of an offence is, inter alia, the degree of harm done to

48

The Commission for Racial Equality

the victim. If I fail to lock my front door, and am burgled, is the offence less serious than if I had provided my home with the protection of locks, searchlights, and Alsatian dogs? Clearly not. And, by the same token, being persecuted because of your religion, class, political views, or disability is just as painful, and just as culpable as being oppressed for racial reasons. In point of fact, there is no evidence in the scale of human atrocities to suggest that human beings have been less vile to one another on grounds other than race. We have already pointed out that the nonracial theories of communism have cost more human lives than the racialist theories of fascism. Nor is there any historical basis for believing that white people are any more guilty in this respect than black people, or Asiatics. One has only to consider the unspeakable cruelties perpetrated by the tyrants of black Africa— Amin in Uganda, Bokassa in the Central African Republic, Mengistu in Ethiopia, not to mention the atrocities of Mao Tse Tung in China. (See for this latter phenomenon, Wild Swans, Chang Jung, Flamingo, 1993) So the notion that racialism is a unique evil is at least arguable. And the belief that incitement to racial hatred is more manifest than incite­ ment on grounds other than race is equally arguable— at least as far as class hatred is concerned: anyone who doubts that should read The So­ cialist Worker, which is sold openly on the streets on a regular basis, and which makes no secret of its detestation of what it would call “the boss class.” To repeat, I am not for one moment denying that any attempt to incite hatred for racial, or any other reason, is morally despicable, and socially unacceptable. No one with even a modicum of civilised values can fail to be revolted by the demented ravings of racial and political pterodactyls. W hat I am arguing is that we lose more than we gain by the serious loss of free speech by the oppressive Section 70 of the Race Relations Act. This is not simply a matter of abstract principle. The taboo on free speech inherent in this Act has had, I suspect— and I do not deny this is difficult to demonstrate empirically— a damaging effect on race rela­ tions. It has helped to create and maintain an atmosphere in which only white people are assumed to be capable of racial animosity and hostil­ ity, despite the evidence I have quoted at a number of points that there is historic and continuing ill feeling betw een A sians and A froCaribbeans. (See Samir Shar, “Hard Facts about Black-Brown Solidar­ ity,” The Times, 19.9.85.) In the very serious matter of racial attacks, influential race relations professionals and their supporters, as well as

The Race Relations Act 1976: Provisions and Effects

49

aggressive antiracist agitators— leaning on the one-sided principle in­ herent in Section 70— have rejected as inconceivable the notion that a racial attack can be perpetrated by a black or coloured person on a white person— see the seminal work, Racial Violence and Harassment, by Paul Gordon (Runnymede Trust, 2nd ed. June 1990). Yet there is abundant evidence of antiwhite racial attacks— see the M etropolitan Police report to the Home Affairs Committee’s sub-committee on race relations (1981, press release from the same source, 8.7.94., and the Home Office British Crime Survey: Taking Steps, 1994). It is no exaggeration to say that we have a situation in Britain in which even the mildest criticism of nonwhite people— however well intentioned— is seized upon by the self-appointed, antiracist guardians of our national conscience as evidence of “racism.” In short, the noto­ rious Section 70 has been instrumental in creating and maintaining a much-resented double standard. And the tabloid press, frustrated by what it sees as a denial of free expression, produces ill-informed and dubious comments about the racial minorities, rather than engaging in open and serious discussion. It is difficult to see how we can produce a solid and intellectually well-grounded view of ourselves as a m ultira­ cial society, so long as this state of affairs continues.

Conclusions The general point I have tried to make is that the CRE is the creature of an act which, ironically, and despite good intentions, is itself oppres­ sive, and probably counterproductive. I have suggested that basic free­ doms are violated in the Act, that the Act was based on a questionable view of race relations in this country, and that the Act effectively seeks to create a society characterised, not by established notions of a single, integrated community loyal to certain public values, but a society con­ ceived of as a set of disparate factions, each defining itself in its own terms, and without the support of that most basic of all civic principles— the equality of all citizens under the law. This Act sponsors, not a colour blind, but a colour conscious, society.

4 The CRE— Duties and Powers The basic duties of the CRE are made plain in Section 43(1) of the 1976 Race Relations Act, which runs as follows: [T]he Commission for Racial Equality...shall have the following duties: (a) to work towards the elimination of discrimination: (b) to promote equality of opportunity, and good relations, between persons of different racial groups generally, and (c) to keep under review the working of this A ct...”

The CRE’s powers are equally explicit. It may assist any organisation it considers is concerned with the promotion of equal opportunities and good race relations. It may undertake appropriate research, or assist others to do so, and it has the right and the duty to produce an annual report on its activities. The CRE may also issue codes of practice relat­ ing to the elimination of discrimination in employment, education, and housing, and in relation to the promotion of equal opportunities be­ tween persons of different racial groups in those fields. It also— and crucially— has the power to conduct formal investigations, and to in­ sist, where it claims that racial discrimination has been established, that the alleged discrimination is ended, and it can enforce changes in policy and practice— though the defendant may appeal. These powers are extensive and weighty. They represent a consider­ able advance on what had gone before. They refer, not only to demon­ strated, or even suspected, discrimination, but to a wide strategic role in attempting to eliminate racial discrimination. After the 1976 Act the CRE was in a position to define what is meant by racial discrimination in general, and, more specifically, to describe and root out indirect dis­ crimination. Moreover, as we have already made plain, the CRE has no obligation to consider the motive or intention of the defendant: inten­ tion, a key principle o f law, was, in relation to racial discrimination, 51

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The Commission for Racial Equality

now redundant. All that mattered was for discriminatory effect to be established. The concept of indirect discrimination has, predictably, led to an enormous increase in state intervention in the life of the citizen in rela­ tion to race and race relations. It has significantly extended the defini­ tion of what constitutes discrimination, and has led to the creation of a much resented race relations apparatus and innumerable campfollowers. As I say above, there are now very considerable bureaucratic, ideologi­ cal, and academic vested interests for which the concept of indirect discrimination provides the foundation. One legal scholar has said this: “Consideration of the idea of ‘indirect discrimination’ in the Race Re­ lations Act 1976 involves issues of public policy, industrial relations, psychology, statistics and sociology of a high degree of importance and complexity.” (See C. McCrudden, Ethnic Pluralism and Public Policy, Heinemann, 1983.) If that is so, then race relations has, indeed, become a veritable industry. The greatly increased powers given to the CRE under this Act has inevitably created increased costs to industry and commerce. It is not possible to quantify this with any degree of precision, but all large and medium-sized companies, fearful of transgressing the law without in­ tending to, have been compelled to increase their personnel departments, and to take expensive legal advice. And the same is true of local govern­ ment departments and departments of state. The issue of a comprehen­ sive Code of Practice in Employment by the CRE in April 1984 will undoubtedly have increased the burden. This augmenting of nonproduc­ tive costs is bound to have made industry that much less competitive. Apart from this a further anxiety surrounds this legalistic approach to race relations. Again McCrudden— a lawyer who supports this ap­ proach— provides an opinion which undermines the case for it: “It is important, however, not to ignore or discount the problems which will be confronted should the legal process be given more responsibility as a method of bringing about change in this area. First, such a use of law will emphasise the idea of race. There is a danger that it will encourage racial thinking, perhaps to the detriment of the very groups sought to be protected.” There is no doubt that the courts have, indeed, been given increased responsibility in this area. The increasing case law accumu­ lated over the years is evidence of this. And the CRE has felt encour­ aged to generate a colour-conscious atmosphere, whereby the citizen is led to believe that race is a vital aspect of the life of society. I would want to argue, on the basis of considerable, countrywide experience,

The CRE—Duties and Powers

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and regular contact with both the serious literature and the media, that the “idea of race” has caused considerable resentment in the well-mean­ ing majority population, and has provided thugs with amm unition against blacks and Asians. The CRE has interpreted its role in fostering good race relations and equal opportunities by financing various surveys, organisations, and conferences concerned with racial matters. The 1990 Annual Report lists typical grants made in the previous year. Long-term handouts, for instance, went to Black Rights U.K. (£42,992), Concord Arts Educa­ tion in a M ulti-cultural Society (£16,353), National Association of Community Relations Councils (£83,165), NACRC(RU) (£34,713), plus several local authority projects, giving a total of £247,138. Short-term grants went to such outfits as South East Asian Studies, Federation of Black Housing Organisations, Conference of Indian Organisations, Nottinghill Festival, Unit for Racial Justice, Luton Law Centre, M us­ lim Ummah Solidarity Movement, Liverpool Law Centre. Eighty-eight R ace E quality C ouncils (form erly C .R .C .’s) received a to tal o f £4,179,089. Research grants were given for work to do with trade unions, education, health and social services, police and criminal justice sys­ tem, employment, and the establishment of a statistical and census data base at the Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations at Warwick Univer­ sity. In addition the 1990 Report also lists 112 publications of various kinds, together with a periodical, “New Community,” which is described as “A journal on race and community relations.” In short the CRE has interpreted its statutory duty to foster good race relations by establishing and continually financing what the pub­ lic has come to call “The race relations industry.” The CRE clearly believes that by thus creating powerful vested interests groups financed from the public purse you help to improve race relations. W hat is so striking about this approach is its one-sidedness. It implicitly assumes that race relations is one-dimensional and concerned only with the as­ sumed interests of just one sector of society. In reality of course, as the term implies, race relations is a concept to do with relationships be­ tween racial groups; so any organisation to do with fostering good race relations ought to have regard to the majority, as well as the minority, populations. What the white population thinks and feels about living in a multiracial society is clearly a vital aspect of race relations— all the more so since about 95 percent of the population happen to be more or less white, i.e., whites constitute a massive majority. But when one considers the way in which the CRE distributes its public money, it is

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as though this sector of the population does not exist. The CRE, in this sense, far from being a race relations body, is an ethnic minority de­ fence organisation— which is scarcely what Parliament intended. Just before the appointment of the present chairman a senior Asian official of the CRE said this: “The new chairman’s priority should be to win the support of the majority community” (Sunday Telegraph, 15.11.92). That the Commission have clearly failed to do so in the past is by no means surprising.

Legal Moves The CRE has pursued two approaches in using its legal powers: in­ dividual complaints and formal investigations.

Individual Complaints Under the 1976 Act complainants have the right to take employment cases to an industrial tribunal. Appeals are heard by the Employment Appeal Tribunal, and thence to the Court of Appeal. Nonemployment complaints are heard in a modified version of the County Court, and appeals in the Court of Appeal. Complainants may apply to the CRE for assistance, and this is given where the complainant is judged to have a prima facie case, or a matter of principle appears to be involved. W here no money help is given, the complainant may be allocated ad­ vice and assistance. In the first year of its existence (1978) the CRE obtained 1,033 ap­ plications for assistance; 986 in 1979; 779 in 1980; 846 in 1981. O f these the following numbers were considered sufficiently serious to qualify for representation: 170 cases in 1978; 141 in 1979; 73 in 1980; and 135 in 1981. In 1990 there were 1,118 applications for assistance. The Complaints Committee of the CRE actually dealt with 341 cases in that year, since some were brought forward from the previous year. The decisions for 1990 were as follows: No assistance = 228; No fur­ ther assistance = 792; Representation by the CRE = 147; Legal assis­ tance = 41; Withdrawn = 133. The results of complaints settled in 1990 were as follows: Employment cases = 90, of which 53 were settled on terms; 24 were successful after hearing; and 22 were dismissed after hearing. In nonemployment, cases totalled 10, o f which 6 were settled on terms; 2 were successful after hearing, and 2 were dismissed. The organisations referring complaints and the numbers involved for 1990

The CRE—Duties and Powers

55

were as follows: C.R.C.’s (now Race Equality Councils) = 261; Citi­ zens’ Advice Bureaux = 43; Law Centres = 7; Solicitors = 27; Trade Unions = 26; Others = 26. These figures are important for a number of reasons. First, they indi­ cate the level of racial discrimination in a given year, as perceived by the individual. Second, they give some idea of how far the CRE be­ lieves the complainants have a defensible case. Third, they suggest how far the CRE’s judgem ent is supported by case outcomes. Fourth, they show the wide range of organisations to which those who believe they have suffered discrimination can appeal for help and advice. Taking 1990 as being typical, the following comments appear to be justified. The first point to bear in mind when considering the number of aggrieved persons is the size of the populations. According to the most recent census (1991) the nonwhite population numbered 3,018,886— i.e., 5.5 percent of the total population of 54,888,844 (Office of Popula­ tion Censuses and Surveys; private communication, 6.5.93). Now bearing in mind that pretty well all the minorities live in large and crowded urban centres; and, further, that ethnic minority citizens share facilities with the majority population in DHSS offices, hospitals, colleges, schools, super­ markets, department stores, public transport, and so on— then that must mean that, every single day, there must be, in the nature of things, liter­ ally millions of cross-racial interactions in our society. If we set that beside that fact that in 1990 the CRE received 1,118 applications for assistance, then this latter figures does not seem excessive, bearing in mind the nature of fallen man, and the fact that every society is bound to have its share of ignorant and insensitive bigots. If we go further than this, and accept as valid only those cases the CRE considered worth giv­ ing continued support to— 188— then that figure, in relation to the obvi­ ous opportunities for racial discrimination and hostility in our multifarious society appears hearteningly small. Again, considering the 109 results of individual complaints, we dis­ cover that 59 were settled on terms, 24 were dismissed after hearing, and 26 were successful— then these figures do not suggest a society rampant with racial hostility. Rather they suggest that, in a very signifi­ cant number of cases, the CR E’s judgem ent of the validity of cases submitted to it is not all that impressive. O f course the CRE has a ready answer to all this. It would— and frequently does— argue that people tend not to complain; and that the number of complaints seriously underestimates the actual level of dis­ crimination. However, though we do know that there is a traditional

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The Commission for Racial Equality

consensus that the English have a marked reluctance to complain, I know of no corresponding belief—either anecdotally or empirically established— that the ethnic minorities share this cultural value. W hat I do know is that within the ethnic minority communities there is, thanks to considerable official intervention in race relations matters, a culture of complaints and a plethora of organisations willing and eager to lis­ ten to any black or Asian person who feels aggrieved. No black or Asian lives very far from a Race Equality Council; and, as we have seen, Law Centres, CAB’s, trade unions, and solicitors also offer a listening ear. It is very difficult to believe that the ethnic minorities lack the means of complaining if they feel they have been victimised. The truth is that there is a veritable complaints industry attached to the ethnic minorities, and it is less than likely that many blacks and Asians do not know this. All those who have any contact with the ethnic minority communi­ ties are keenly aware that standing behind every black or Asian person in this country there is a formidable race relations lobby with consider­ able legal powers. This lobby has, over the past thirty years or so, con­ sistently and vociferously argued that racism in Britain is rampant, endemic, and nationwide. Employers in particular are aware of this. They know that— if they take on a black or Asian worker— and he turns out to be, for whatever reason, unsatisfactory, then getting rid of him could involve a clash with the CRE and the lobby— ever eager for m e­ dia attention— which supports it. There is a more or less automatic ten­ dency on the part of a disgruntled black or Asian worker to assume that being sacked, or even disciplined, is the result of racism— and needs to be resisted on those grounds. We do not know how far this factor influ­ ences employers’ decisions, but it probably does not help blacks and Asians to find jobs. What we do know is that the vast majority of com­ plaints registered with the CRE emanate from this source. In 1990/91 of 1,118 complaints received, 1,050 were about alleged discrimination connected with a refusal to employ, refusal to promote, and unfair dis­ missal and detriment. In the context of complaints it is also worth remembering that we are never told in the CRE’s Annual Reports the ethnic origin of the complainant. The possibility that a grievance may come from a white person is never entertained. This may be because the CRE has never received a complaint from a white person. It may be because white people have the impression that the CRE is a purely ethnic minority body, having nothing to do with the majority population— and that be­ lief, though invalid, would be understandable, given the CRE obses-

The CRE—Duties and Powers

57

sion with the ethnic minorities. It may be that the CRE believes that only white people are capable of racial discrimination— that is certainly a view actively propagated by the race relations lobby. But the fact remains that an increasing number of firms are owned and run by eth­ nic minority employers, particularly Asians, and, indeed, Jews. It seems intrinsically unlikely that white people applying for jobs in such firms never meet a rebuff because they are the wrong colour. All human be­ ings have a natural tendency to prefer as friends and colleagues those whom they perceive to be of their own kind. And it is a serious, recur­ ring error within the race relations lobby to assume that this instinct is unique to white people. A case which surfaced in 1993 throws some light on the CR E’s atti­ tude to white people. A Scotsman complained that a pub landlord made hostile comments about the Scottish people, and insisted upon calling the complainant “Jock”— despite the m an’s request to desist, as he re­ garded such behaviour as an insult to his people and his culture. Now bearing in mind the legal definition o f what constitutes an ethnic m i­ nority (Mandla v Lee— the schoolboy turban case)— and bearing in mind that nationality and a long shared history were crucial criteria— then a Scotsman living in England might reasonably assume that he is en­ titled to the protection of the race relations law. The CRE turned him away. What, one wonders, would have been the response of the CRE if the complainant had been black, had been the target of insulting re­ marks about his culture, and had been regularly addressed as “nigger” ? The general point I am making is this: the number of individual com­ plaints made to the CRE does not support the notion that Britain is a racist society— as the CRE either directly, or by implication, constantly insists. And, again, one is here faced with a paradox. The CRE invariably concludes that racial variations in statistical outcomes point to racial dis­ crimination. Yet it signally fails this test itself. According to the CRE’s 1990 Annual Report its own staff’s ethnic make up is as follows: White Black Indian Pakistani Bangladeshi Chinese Other Total

66.85 95.50 16.00

6.00 3.00 3.50

10.00 200.85

58

The Commission for Racial Equality

This means that 66 percent of the CRE’s own staff are nonwhite. Bearing in mind that the ethnic minority population comprises 5.5 per­ cent of the total population, this means that the CRE violates its own ideal of racially representative work forces— and to a quite massive extent. The CRE would look askance at any firm whose work force displayed a similar pattern, but only if the racial balance lay in favour of white people. That would be assumed to be prima facie evidence of “institutional racism.”

Formal Investigations By the end of 1992 the CRE had published reports on fifty-four in­ vestigations and nine further investigations were in progress. These formal investigations cover employment, education, housing, and per­ sonal services. The CRE derives its powers to conduct investigations from Section 48 of the Act. These powers are considerable. The CRE may conduct a formal investigation “for any purpose connected with the carrying out of those (statutory) duties.” It may also influence the sort of representation a named person may use to give him support, since Section 49(4)(b)(2) says the CRE may reject anyone it considers “unsuitable.” Under Section 50 of the CRE has powers to obtain infor­ mation from a named person. It can— and does— lay down what sort of written information it requires, the form it must take, and when the information is to be produced. It may also require a person to attend meetings the CRE convenes, and produce all the documents the Com­ mission demands. If the CRE finds that discrimination has occurred, it may issue a nondiscrimination notice, in accordance with Section 58 of the Act. This orders the respondent to desist, and to change the practice(s) which embody the discrimination. If a non-discrimination notice’s demands are not complied with, the CRE can obtain an injunction, i.e., the CRE has legal powers to enforce its findings— though the respondent has the right of appeal. Moreover, as the CRE’s chief executive has stated {Ethnic Pluralism and Public Policy, N. Glazer and Young, (eds.) Heinemann, 1983), the CRE makes every effort to ensure maximum publicity is given to its findings. W henever a person, or organisation receives a nondiscrimination notice, the CRE uses its formidable pub­ lic relations machine to influence reporting in the media. (In 1990 the CRE employed sixty five people in its Public Affairs Division, and this spent £579,426 in the year ending April 1990.). These powers are un­

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precedented in time of peace. Neither the 1965, nor the 1968 Acts con­ tained them; they are analogous with the powers possessed by the In­ land Revenue and Customs and Excise.

Demands for More Powers However, to judge from statements from highly placed officials of the Commission, and from the CRE’s submissions to the home secre­ tary in 1985 and 1992, these powers are inadequate. These sources make it plain that the CRE will not rest until it possesses massively increased powers over the citizen. This drive towards self-aggrandisement is, in part, the predictable bureaucratic impulse common to all powerful bod­ ies; and it is, more specifically, the result of test cases, where decisions have clarified the CRE’s procedural powers and its interpretations of the law under which it functions. This process has not always issued in results of which the CRE approves, thought it has had some successes in the courts. For example, in R v CRE, ex parte, Cottrell and Rothon (1980), the CRE successfully argued that it had the right to hear representations from respondents before the issue of a nondiscrimination notice, even though the respondent had had no opportunity to examine witnesses. This case also confirmed that the CRE had powers to delegate its staff to collect information— which meant that the CRE could investigate without hearing evidence direct from witnesses. In 1981 the CRE had a notable victory over the Home Office. The Home Office had challenged the right of the CRE to investigate al­ leged racial discrimination carried out in the process of immigration control. But the courts upheld the CRE’s viewpoint. However, as McCrudden— in Ethnic Pluralism and Public Policy, (1983)— has pointed out, since the mid 1960s there has been a consid­ erable increase in the willingness of respondents to challenge the exer­ cising of their powers by public bodies. And the judiciary has shown itself willing to intervene to clarify, and, sometimes, to reduce the powers public bodies thought they possessed. As a result, the CRE has been chastised by the courts on more than one occasion for presuming to act

ultra vires. Before considering specific instances where this has occurred, it is necessary to clarify the CRE’s general approach to formal investiga­ tions. Using Section 48 of the Act, the CRE had, by 1983, begun forty big enquiries. These were classified as follows:

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A. General investigations into a particular activity, e.g., im migration, mort­ gage allocation. Here the production of evidence depends upon the con­ sent of the secretary of state. B. Investigations into a named person, where an unlawful act was suspected. Here the CRE could insist on the production of evidence, and the respon­ dent has the right to make representations from the outset. C. Investigations into named persons, where no unlawful act was suspected. Here the home secretary had to consent before evidence could be de­ manded—and there was no right to make representations at the outset. In 1982 there occurred the Hillingdon case. Here the law lords blocked a CRE investigation into the housing policy of Hillingdon Council. They ruled that the terms of reference of the investigation went beyond areas where there was reasonable suspicion of unlawful racial discrimi­ nation; and that the investigation— as designed— was therefore invalid, and must stop. The importance of this case went beyond its immediate context. In the course of the judgm ent Lord Diplock cast doubt on whether category C investigations— where there was no suspected un­ lawful act— were valid at all. Now at that time the CRE had a large number of category C investigations in progress. And when the Diplock remarks became known, a legal challenge to the CR E’s right to pursue category C investigations was mounted. In 1984 the Prestige Group pic resisted the CR E’s right to investi­ gate its employment policies (begun in 1978), when the CRE had no belief and no evidence that the Group might have committed any act of racial discrimination. In this case the law lords were not only unani­ mous in finding against the CRE, Lord Diplock administered a consid­ erable reprimand to the CRE for bringing the case. He expressed surprise that the CRE had seen fit to incur the “considerable expense” of pursu­ ing its appeal when the taxpayer was footing the bill. After all, the Hillingdon decision had laid down the legal objections to investiga­ tions of this kind, and the CRE ought to have learned from that. M ore­ over, the Court rejected the CRE’s claim that any invalidity in the use of its powers was corrected by the fact that, during its investigations, it had formed the belief that there had been unlawful discrimination; the CRE had to have a suspicion before the investigation was begun. Two factors connected with this case ought to gladden the hearts of all those who believe in the principles of natural justice. First, the CR E’s oppressive desire to point the finger of suspicion at a person or com­ pany in the total absence of suspicion was defeated. Secondly, the re­ m arks m ade by Lord D iplock should have brought hom e to the

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CRE— and to the public it is supposed to serve— that an investigation is no trivial matter. A CRE investigation could, said Lord Diplock, dam ­ age, or put at risk, harmonious race relations in the em ployer’s busi­ ness. M oreover, an investigation caused the firm inconvenience, dislocation of business, and expense. Moreover, the willingness of the CRE to mount category C investi­ gations at all raises doubt about its competence. The relevant part of the Act is Section 49(4). This says, “W here the terms of reference of the investigation confine it to activities of persons named in them and the Commission in the course of it, proposes to investigate any act made unlawful by the Act, which they believe that a person so named may have done.” The key word here clearly is “believe.” Now if any reasonable person has a belief that a certain act has been done, he must have some evidence, some rational grounds for so believing. Other­ wise his belief is a function of irrationality, superstition, or prejudice. If I suspect my neighbour has murdered his wife, then if my belief has to have any sort of substance it must arise from some sort of evidence. This elementary fact, apparent even to a non-lawyer, such as the present writer, appears to have eluded the CRE. Now the CRE has always bitterly resented the Prestige decision. It wants the power, denied by that decision, to go on what has been called “fishing expeditions,” i.e., to go into any company or firm, without any grounds for so doing, in order to carry out one of its investigations. Here is what the Commission said in its submission to the home secre­ tary in 1985: “The Commission needs, therefore, to be able to look at selected major employers to enable it to identify what practices are disadvantaging ethnic minorities. The Commission in this respect should be thought of as an inspectorate, bringing technical expertise to bear on identifying the causes of major social problems. We recommend that against this background the intended power taken away by the Prestige case can be restored.” This statement is very revealing. It throws a clear light on the sort of more or less unrestrained powers of intervention the CRE would like to possess. Its “Big Brother” attitude is here made patent. Its reference to “technical expertise,” again, indicates either an insufferable arrogance, or an ignorance of the true nature of civil liberties— or both— which is truly breathtaking. In effect it is claiming that a rigorous, expensive and interminable investigation of a company in connection with rac­ ism— real or imagined— is no more significant than a routine visit from a factory inspector, or someone from the local council. The CRE, in the

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light of this, appears to have no inkling of just how damaging its intru­ sions into the life of a company can be to that com pany’s operations and reputation. The CRE also saw a diminution of its supposed powers in the Court of Appeal decision in the Amari Plastics case. The issue was the function of industrial tribunals in appeals against nondiscrimination notices. Were industrial tribunals empowered, in considering an appeal, to review the findings of facts by the CRE, or were they confined to reviewing the remedial requirements set out in the notice? The CRE held that an indus­ trial tribunal, on appeal, must confine itself to the latter function. The findings of fact by the CRE was not subject to review in this context. But, again, the CRE was wrong on a major point of law. The law lords were unanimous in rejecting the CRE view— an appeal could be made on matters of law and fact, as well as proposed remedies. A more recent decision (1991) points to the fact that the CRE has a pretty consistent tendency to overstate its power, and to operate in offi­ cious and insensitive ways. A mother in Cleveland requested a school transfer for her young son. The reasons for this were that the mother felt that the child was being isolated in a school in which most of the pupils were of Asian origin. She was also worried about the status of the English language in the school, when her son came home chanting nursery rhymes in Hindi. Her uneasiness caused her to request a trans­ fer to a school where the proportion of Asian children was 2 percent, and where she felt there was a more balanced curriculum. The local education authority, on legal advice, but with great reluc­ tance, acceded to the parent’s request. An official of the local education authority tipped off the CRE, and the Commission started legal moves against the authority, on the grounds that its officers, in allowing the transfer, had violated Sections l(l)(a ) and 1(2) of the 1976 Race Rela­ tions Act, i.e., the local education authority was guilty of racial dis­ crimination. The clear implication was that the mother was a racist and motivated by racial animosity towards the Asian pupils. The case raised a number of questions about the CRE, and how it operates. In the first place, the CRE’s perception of the mother was wildly inaccurate. She had, in fact, lived most of her life amongst the ethnic minority community in Middlesborough. Her common-law hus­ band, and father of the child, was of mixed racial origin, and almost all her friends were Asian or African. A person less likely to be influenced by racial considerations would be hard to find. The CRE could have established all this by making a few simple enquiries, and talking to the

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mother. According to the mother this did not happen. For two years there were negotiations between the local education authority and the CRE— memos were sent, meetings were held, dossiers prepared. But the m other knew nothing of all this (Sunday Times, 20.10.91). Her motives and behaviour were, in effect, being investigated in secret. As a result of the enquiries it did make, the CRE advised government min­ isters to tell local education authorities that they would— in the light of this case— be in breach of the race discrimination legislation, if they allowed parents to choose schools for children on racial grounds. (The fact that the mother had clearly not been motivated by race, but by concern about the child’s education, appears to have escaped the CRE officials.) Secondly, this case must, yet again, raise concerns about the CR E’s grasp of its own legal powers— thought it has to be said that, after the judge’s decision rejecting the CRE case, an official of the Commission stated that the CRE was considering an appeal. However, the CR E’s contention that the 1976 Race Relations Act must take precedence over the 1980 Education Act is plainly contentious. It has to be borne in mind that the local education authority in this case sympathised with the CRE position, and only met the m other’s request with reluctance, and after taking the best possible legal advice. The 1980 Education Act is quite explicit about the right of the parent to choose the child’s school being paramount. Moreover, the parent is not obliged to provide the local education officer with reasons for her choice of schools— the motive is irrelevant, where pupil places are available. In this test case the judge, Mr. Justice Macpherson, said the law required the local education authority to ob­ serve parental wishes, even if they were to do with the racial composi­ tion of the school’s population. W hatever the parent wanted was all that mattered— the motives involved were not the business of the local education authority. Its duty, in law, was simply to respect the parents’ wishes, as far as was practicable. It is very difficult to see how the judge’s essentially reasonable in­ terpretation of the law could be challenged. The Education Reform Act 1988, reinforcing the 1980 Act, makes it absolutely clear that parental choice of school is a basic right: if the school has places available, then it must admit the child (Section 26). Nor could simple common sense lend support to the CR E’s view. If the CRE’s view were to prevail, then the local education authority would be landed with the nightmare duty of having to investigate the motives

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of any parent requesting a place in a particular school or a transfer betw een schools— w herever m ultiracial pupil populations w ere involved. In the third place, this case provides evidence, which is rarely diffi­ cult to find, of muddled thinking by the CRE. In the course of the case the barrister acting for the CRE expressed the view that, if the mother won her case, that this could lead to an avalanche of parental requests for transfers from multiracial schools, and to schools becoming racially segregated. But neither of these anxieties has any substance. If parents wanted racially segregated schools, why do we have so many racially mixed schools already? W hite parents— to an overwhelming extent— have shown themselves perfectly willing to allow their children to at­ tend local schools where an increasing proportion of pupils have been black and/or Asian. W hat has disturbed many white parents is, not the racial character of the pupil population of the schools, but the m is­ guided attempts by many local education authorities to impose on their schools an incoherent, multicultural curriculum— a policy the CRE has always vigorously supported. Teaching little children in English schools nursery rhymes in Hindi, before they have grasped the elements of English, is precisely the sort of educational absurdity which so upset and alarmed the mother in this case. Even more astonishing, and even more revealing of the CRE confu­ sion, is its expressed fear of racially segregated schools. Such schools already exist, and more will do so in the future. But this has nothing to do with the racism which so dominates the CRE’s thinking. There are three nonracial reasons for such schools: local housing patterns— im ­ migrants have a pronounced tendency to live in clustered housing pat­ terns; the fact that all inner-city schools, w hilst m asquerading as comprehensive schools, are, in reality, neighbourhood schools, so their pupil populations simply reflect the occupants of local houses; and the fact that the ethnic minorities have higher birth rates than white fam i­ lies— particularly the Asian community, which means that white fam i­ lies tend to be squeezed out of the population serving the school. These three factors alone would go a long way to explaining why we have so many totally, or nearly so, segregated schools. But the really decisive factor has been the CRE itself. This is be­ cause it was the CRE which banned bussing of ethnic minority pupils established so as to overcome the divisive effect of local housing pat­ terns, and create racially integrated schools. Many local education au­ thorities with large ethnic minority populations felt that the only way

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to produce schools which were racially balanced, and a genuine micro­ cosm of society, was to bus some children to schools outside their im ­ mediate area. In this way both standards of English and cross-racial friendships— the key to future race relations— could be fostered. But the CRE stepped in and stopped this policy, so the increasing concen­ tration of ethnic minority children of Asian origin in a limited number o f schools was greatly intensified. That is, the same CRE which justi­ fies its case against this m other on the grounds that her decision would lead to racially segregated schools was the same CRE whose policy against bussing was a major factor in creating that self-same racial segregation. (I am not here seeking to defend bussing. It is a very con­ troversial issue. W hat I am seeking to do is to illustrate the CRE’s hope­ lessly confused and inconsistent thinking.) More fundamentally, this case indicates the essentially authoritarian nature of the CRE’s mentality. The notion that people should be com­ pelled to love their neighbours— if fallen human nature fails to effect this happy outcome from choice—is never far from CRE policymaking. Sup­ posing some parents were racially prejudiced, and proposed to send their child to a monoracial school. In the world the CRE wishes to create, such parents would be compelled to send their child to the local school, even if such a school were racially mixed, and unacceptable, therefore, to the parents. Just what would be the outcome? The parent would clearly ob­ ject, there would be a conflict between home and the local authority, the parent would probably keep the child at home, and thereby risk prosecu­ tion, there would be a media sensation, and the whole thing would prob­ ably end up in court. How far, one wonders would such a situation further the admirable cause of good race relations? We have some experience here to guide us— the celebrated Dewsbury case. Here the local education authority refused to accept parental choice of school, and there was a long-running battle, which was given m as­ sive and prolonged media attention. The parents refused to send their children to a school they did not want, and there were confrontations with the head teacher of the school they did want. In the legal action which followed the local education authority case collapsed, and the parents got their way. This case polarised attitudes, incensed the antiracist agitators, and provided racial bigots with ammunition. Race relations did not benefit. Two further points need to be made about the Cleveland case. Ac­ cording to press reports the CRE finished up paying legal costs of over £100,000— and this from an organisation which constantly complains

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about lack of funding. Secondly, the response of the CRE, and its sup­ porters, to this particular lost cause emphasised its determination to promote good race relations, if necessary, by legal compulsion. W hilst the CRE announced it was considering an appeal against the judge’s decision, the local education authority and the Association of M etro­ politan Authorities demanded a change in the law— presumably so that parental motives could be formally scrutinised, and choice of school enforced— which is a contradiction in terms.

Review of the Race Relations Act, 1976: Proposals for Change (1985) Under Section 43(l)(c) of the Act the CRE must keep the 1976 Race Relations Act under review, and, when required by the secretary of state, “or otherwise think it necessary, draw up and submit to the secre­ tary of state proposals for amendment.” In a paper delivered in 1982 the CR E’s chief executive made it clear he was not happy with the existing law, and wanted it strengthened so as to increase the C R E’s powers substantially. (Ethnic Pluralism, Heinemann, 1983). The outcomes of such cases as Amari Plastics and the Hillingdon Council (discussed above) had alarmed the CRE, and had convinced it that it needed greatly increased powers. The Com m is­ sion was also concerned about the fact that it was losing m ost of the cases it was bringing before industrial tribunals, and very few cases were reaching county courts. It wanted Section 49(4) removed from the Act, and with that the respondent’s right to make representations at the beginning o f an investigation. And it was adamant that large em ­ ployers in a multiracial labour market should be compelled to engage in racial monitoring, whose results would be submitted to the CRE— which could then use these racial records to launch investigations, i.e., the CRE thereby was committed to the highly questionable notion that statistical inequality of racial outcomes was prima facie evidence of racial discrimination, and that, effectively, the employer was guilty until he was, via a CRE investigation, able to prove his innocence: “The new proposals would make this legally obligatory, and the Commission, as it were, would monitor the monitors.” (George Orwell would have been tempted to ask the obvious question: W ho would monitor those who monitored the monitors?) All this makes it obvious that the CRE appears to believe that its promotional and educational work aimed at fostering equal opportuni­

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ties and good race relations was to take second place to the principle of legal coercion. This is made clear in the CR E’s subsequent submission to the Home Secretary: In particular, the proposals are aimed at: (a) improving the definition of discrimination; (b) reducing the number of exceptions from the provisions of the Act; (c) providing for specialist tribunals to hear all discrimination cases; (d) redefining the Commission’s formal investigation powers; (e) providing for the Commission to have access to an independent tribunal of fact across the range of its law enforcement activities; (f) improving the remedies for dealing with proven discrimination; (g) improving a number of mechanisms for bringing about change.

The submission contains no fewer than twenty-three specific pro­ posals for change. These make it clear that the CRE is demanding, not simply a clarification of its powers, but new and greatly increased powers of investigation and prosecution over a far wider range of hum an ac­ tivities than the existing law permits. I now want to examine these proposals in some detail, and I shall use the CRE docum ent’s own sub­ headings.

Discrimination and the Scope of the Law A more exact definition of direct discrimination is here called for. A new act should make it clear either by statement, or by use of illustra­ tion, just what “on racial grounds” means. Reference to case law, i.e., the accumulated experience and wisdom of the courts should be dis­ pensed with. Moreover, there should be a firmer commitment to the principle that direct discrimination does not necessarily involve a ra­ cial motive, i.e., only the result o f an action, and not the state o f mind or intention which led to it, should be considered. A new definition of indirect discrimination is also demanded. This is based on Title VII of the American Civil Rights Act of 1964— or rather the American courts’ construction placed on that title. Indirect discrimination would be proved if a “practice, policy or situation” had a “significant adverse impact” on a particular racial group, and which could not be shown to be necessary. “Significant” here would be a simple arithmetical test: if a particular practice, or arrangement, caused a 20 percent difference in impact, as between different racial groups, then the “significant” part of the equation was proved.

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The term “shown to be necessary” is enormously important. The onus for demonstrating that a particular practice were necessary would be placed firmly on the shoulders of the respondent. This has two un­ fortunate results: first, the accumulated experience o f a company em ­ ploying labour would be disregarded. An exact laying down of the skills required for doing a particular job, for instance, would have to be un­ dertaken, and to the satisfaction of the CRE Any intangible qualities needed for doing the job, and known only to the company, would not be acceptable, since they cannot be reduced to a verbal formula. That is, job descriptions would, essentially, be determined, not by those who take the risks in hiring labour, but by officials of the CRE. Secondly, the onus of proof would pass from the prosecution to the defence. It would not be for the CRE to prove its case, but for the employer to disprove it. It is difficult to see how this violation of a basis aspect of natural justice and accepted legal principle could cause anything but resentment in those subjected to it. The implementing of this procedure would also, of course, increase bureaucracy and costs, with the result that the company would become less competitive.

Exemptions from the Act Here the purpose of the C R E’s proposals is to m ake its powers allem bracing. Exem ptions which exist in the present A ct w ould be removed. Under the new Act being requested by the CRE the Com ­ m ission would dom inate decisions in “all areas of governm ental and regulatory activities whether central or local, such as acts in the course of im m igration control, the prison and police services, and planning control.” Moreover, the new Act would require all other legislation to be sub­ ordinate to it: “The basic legislation making discrimination unlawful should be superior to earlier Acts and all subordinate legislation and other forms of rule-making.”

Formal Investigations and Law Enforcement Section 49(4) of the present Act, which gave rise to the Prestige case, would be repealed. This would mean that the CRE would be em ­ powered to go on “fishing expeditions” in any organisation or institu­ tion, without having even a suspicion that discrimination was occurring, had occurred, or was likely to occur. The right to appeal against a Non­

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discrimination Notice would be abolished. The existing nondiscrimi­ nation procedure would be replaced by a new system: the CRE would have the power to go direct to a new body, a “tribunal of fact” ; this could occur without a formal investigation having taken place. M ore­ over, the new tribunal would have the power— not available under present legislation— to order particular changes in practices.

Remedies This is perhaps the most radical and oppressive part of the CR E’s proposals for change. “The CRE would have the power to join in any proceedings in which discrimination is alleged,” and point out to the “tribunal of fact” the possibility of future discrimination, i.e., the tribu­ nal of fact could be influenced, not simply by the evidence, but by actions not yet carried out, or policies not yet implemented. The present nondiscrimination remedies would be increased and “a full range of mandatory orders” made available. W here discrimination has been proved “positive action” should be ordered. Special training and en­ couragement of racial minorities— at present voluntary— should be made compulsory. The tribunal of fact should be enabled to override the powers of the secretary of state and order changes in practice. In employment cases the tribunal of fact should have the power to order appointments, promotions, reinstatements, or reengagements. Statutory limits to monetary compensation should be removed. And Section 32(3)— which provides protection to an employer who has carried out reasonable steps to prevent racial discrimination— this protection would be removed. There is no doubt that, if implemented, these changes would repre­ sent a m assive and unprecedented (in tim e o f peace), and continuing, interference in human affairs by a statutory body. Apart from the as­ sault on basic civil liberties they embody, and apart from their ex­ traordinary one-sidedness, such changes contain the potential for legal conflicts— not to mention civil disorder— which is quite beyond cal­ culation. Again, the culture o f the workplace would be severely dis­ rupted. It needs little imagination to foresee ju st what a litigious black or Asian worker, backed by an eager “equal opportunity official”, could do with these sorts of imperatives. Nor is it difficult to imagine the resentm ent and jealousy evoked in the hearts and minds of white workers, when faced with such blatant favouring of people on the grounds of skin colour.

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Mechanisms for Bringing about Change In addition to having the original powers to issue a Code of Practice in employment, the CRE demanded the power to do so in other areas. This demand was subsequently met. There are now Codes of Practice in education and housing, as well as in employment. In addition, all public bodies would be compelled to keep very detailed records re­ garding race in employment, housing and other services, and would have to publish “annual programmes and reports to enable the public to evaluate their work in the field of race.” “Underrepresentation” in the work place would be sufficient reason for an employer to discriminate in favour of blacks and Asians, and an employer would be encouraged to provide exclusive training for racial minority individuals, even if that employer had no blacks or Asians in his work force. This latter objective is glaring evidence of the inability of the officials of the CRE to understand the effect of this sort of transparent racial favouritism on the existing, white work force. How is someone on the shop floor, do­ ing a relatively poorly paid, unskilled job going to react, when he learns that his employer is providing training from which he is disbarred be­ cause he has the wrong skin colour? But there are other, very worrying aspects of these CRE proposals. The CRE has here clearly failed to think through the significance of its acceptance of the desirability of racially “representative” work forces. At this point, the case against such thinking needs to be restated. The first objection is obvious: appointments and promotions in the work force of a free society are, in no sense, representative processes. Em ­ ployers have one, and only one, purpose— to appoint or promote the right person for the job. The sole criterion is individual merit. Candi­ dates for the job do not “represent” anyone, or any group, however defined. Attempts via a state apparatus (for that is what the CRE is) to interfere in this just and universally accepted procedure, and impose the notion of preference in accordance with the candidate’s racial group membership— this is bound to create resentment— and, in the long run, not just from disappointed whites, but from the manifestly patronised blacks involved. It would produce that most wretched of all products of race relations m ischief—the token black; for what this sort of thinking implies is that blacks cannot make it without privileged treatment. The able black, who would have succeeded in the face of fair competition anyway, is the one who, ultimately, suffers most— cursed for ever by the suspicion of favoured treatment. The fact that both quotas and at­

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tempts to create racially balanced work forces are unlawful under present legislation suggests that Parliament is aware of these dangers. The CRE, unfortunately, clearly is not. Another problem is the underlying notion that it is always blacks and Asians who are “underrepresented”. This is a transparent fallacy, as I seek to show in several places in this book. In an increasing num ­ ber of areas the ethnic minorities are disproportionately successful, i.e., they are, statistically, outperforming whites. The list of such areas is too long to detail. Even as I write, more evidence of minority success is published. A report issued in March 1993 by the Policy Studies Insti­ tute shows the following: Education: 33 percent of whites aged 16-24 have A levels or better, compared with Indians 36 percent, African Asians 41 percent, and Chinese 44 percent. Jobs: 37 percent o f white men gain jobs in the professional, managerial, or employer bracket. The figure for Indians is 45 percent, for African Asians 42 percent, and for Chi­ nese 48 percent. Women: O f Afro-Caribbean women of working age 32 percent have A levels or above, compared with 27 percent o f white women. In 1994 the Census Micro Data Unit at M anchester Univer­ sity— using information from our most recent census— reported that the ethnic minorities are now outperforming the white majority in terms of property ownership, economic activity and education; and the most strikingly, upwardly mobile group in our society is not white but Chi­ nese: 13 percent of British Chinese are professionally employed, com­ pared with 5 percent of whites. Now, if we accept the CR E’s crude, statistical philosophy regarding socioeconomic outcomes, here is clear evidence of discrim ination against whites. But no one actually believes that. There are two reasons for this: First, there is no official body urging the majority population to believe it is the case— unlike the reverse situation, where the CRE constantly seeks to convince blacks and Asians o f the validity of such bogus reasoning. Second, there is a growing realisation in this country that different groups tend to do better in different areas— and they do so, not from coercion, or necessarily as the result of some sort of bias in the system. They do so from choice. Offered equal opportunities, people from different groups make systematically different choices; a process which is bound to issue in disparity of results. This does not prove, or even suggest that we are a “racist” society, as the CRE and its support­ ers so vociferously insist. It proves we are a free one. Differential outcomes are inevitable in a society in which different groups espouse different religions, speak different languages, respect

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somewhat different values, have had different histories, and see the world, and the opportunities it offers, in contrasting ways. Given all that, why should it be a cause for concern that different groups excel in different areas of life? If a hugely disproportionate number of newsagents in the city of London are owned by Asian families, and a massively disproportionate number of young blacks are successful in big-time sport, so what? Why should these sorts of outcomes trouble any rea­ sonable person? Jews have always excelled in business, but no one perceives that as a problem. To assume that these sorts of culturally inspired variations betoken some sort of racial conspiracy is, I suspect, not so much a concern for the minorities, as a vested interest mentality determined to maintain the myth of systematic “racism.” This mentality encompasses more than a distortion of the truth. It runs a real risk of placing chips on young black shoulders.

The Government’s Response However, the government’s response to the CR E’s 1985 proposals for increased powers was distinctly lukewarm. In 1987 the CRE’s A n­ nual Report stated that the government had informally indicated that it should pursue its objectives by way of tabling its aims in the form of amendments to existing and proposed legislation. The Annual Report of 1990 stated, “In 1985 we set out in detail proposals for change in our first review of the Act. Those proposals have been ignored.” However, the CRE persisted in its view that, “specific legislation should be intro­ duced as a matter of urgency.” It has been busy seeking changes in proposed lawmaking. For ex­ ample, in 1988, the CRE sought by various means to influence the Edu­ cation Reform Act, the Local Government Finance Act, the Children Bill, and the Fair Employment (Northern Ireland) Bill. It also obtained permission to issue Codes of Practice in education and housing. The CRE also sought to make racial harassment a ground for possession in the Housing Act, 1985.

New Proposals The setback to the CRE’s hopes embodied in the proposals for change submitted in 1985 did not defeat its objective of acquiring greatly in­ creased powers via a new Race Relations Act. Its 1990 Annual Report

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stated that it was “now embarked on our second review.” This “Second Review of the Race Relations Act, 1976” was published in September, 1992. In general it follows closely the demands made in 1985. The CRE makes clear its disappointment about existing legislation, and the behaviour of the courts in resisting its attempts to push its powers to the limit, and, indeed, beyond, “Critical weaknesses and limitations have been exposed (i.e., in the 1976 Act), and in some respects the intentions of Parliament have been thwarted by the judiciary.” (This belief that the CRE is better able to understand the will of Parliament than the courts are is a regular theme in the CRE’s rhetoric.) In addition to existing demands, three new proposals are made. First, the CR E’s philosophy of legal coercion should be extended Europe­ wide: neither the Treaty of Rome, nor the European Convention make racial discrimination unlawful, and this the CRE deplores. The Com­ mission concedes that “our own Race Relations Act is very much stron­ ger than any comparable legislation of our European partners,” and insists that members of Britain’s ethnic minorities should enjoy the same legal rights when travelling in mainland Europe. Secondly, the CRE wants legislation to make religious discrimination illegal— though not by extending the provisions of the existing Act, nor by augmenting the powers of the Commission. On this issue, whilst being quite clear about the need for state intervention, the CRE is curiously ambivalent about specifics. This stance is a function, one suspects, of the Salman Rushdie case. That case placed the CRE in a highly embarrassing posi­ tion. Here was a British-Indian becoming the target of very serious death threats not only by a foreign tyrant, but by British Asian M us­ lims. The target of the CRE’s wrath, whichever way it jum ped, was bound to be the racial minorities— the usual white scapegoat could not be implicated. Statements from the CRE have made it plain just how confused and hesitant has been its thought on this matter. Whilst deploring the Rushdie book, which, at least in a fictional sense insulted Mohammed, who is revered by Muslims, the Commission could scarcely bring itself to sup­ port the appalling death threats— even though they came from a minor­ ity the CRE has always vigorously defended. Coping with Islam was not something which fitted conveniently into the standard CRE view of human conflict as white versus black. Religious bigotry, at least when emanating from an ethnic minority, cuts right across the CRE’s obses­ sion with racial prejudice. Hence this attempt to display its concern for Muslims, since they are perceived as an ethnic minority, by demanding

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legislation, whilst washing its hands of any involvement in enforce­ ment. Muslim pressure on the CRE to agitate for legislation had, no doubt, been increased as the result of a case heard in July 1991. Here, a company director refused to employ M uslims (because he regarded them as disruptive extremists in the light of the Salman Rushdie af­ fair), and the CRE arraigned him before an industrial tribunal. The CRE, in yet another case, was judged to have misinterpreted its powers, and the company director was judged not to be guilty of racial discrimination. Thirdly, the CRE makes it clear that it is very anxious to maintain its own, independent existence— a scarcely surprising ambition in a bu­ reaucracy: “N or...do we believe that it would be right at this time to combine the CRE with the Equal Opportunity Commission (EOC) to form a more comprehensive Human Rights Commission. We judge that race relation requires specific attention to legislation.” Those are the three major ways in which the 1992 proposals for change augment the demands of 1985. I want now to touch on and discuss some of the specific 1992 demands. The m ost wide-ranging, not to say oppressive, of these is the requirement that all laws should be subordinate to the current Race Relations legislation: “All legisla­ tion should include the provision that it is subject to the 1976 Act, un­ less a specific case for exemption is made.” There is little doubt that the CRE and its officials would, if this demand were met, assume pow ­ ers over the citizen, over national and local government, institutions of every kind, and private business which would place the CRE above the will of Parliament. Since Parliament enacts legislation, and since all legislation would function entirely within a context defined by the Race Relations Act and its creature, the CRE, then this clearly could not be avoided. The whole of human intercourse and endeavour would be domi­ nated by the business of race. All contracts, all decisions, all expres­ sions of views in relation to race relations would be dominated by the need not to provoke, or even upset, the CRE. The precise effect on civil liberties is impossible to gauge, but they could scarcely be beneficial, whilst the effect on race relations could prove disastrous. The danger of the ethnic minorities becoming scapegoats, and the cause o f a seri­ ous diminution in liberties the British have taken for granted for a very long time— this danger would become a very real one. In order to carry out the enormously increased responsibilities such a development would be bound to entail the CRE would require greatly increased funding, far more officials; and there would be the predict­ able inflation in paperwork. In addition to the increased powers m en­

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tioned in relation to the 1985 proposals, the 1992 proposals would undoubtedly bring the spectre of universal racial monitoring and quotas a great deal nearer. Contract compliance would be obligatory at least for contracts in the public service. Code-making would proliferate. There would be a special discrim ination division in industrial tribu­ nals, with jurisdiction over all discrimination cases. (To assist in bring­ ing cases the CRE has said it intends to establish an individual complainants organisation.) Legal aid would be extended to all racial discrim ination cases. The burden o f proof would be passed to the defendant: “once a com plainant established circumstances consistent with racial discrim ination or victim isation.” The CRE would assume unrestricted inspectorial powers; which means the effect of the key Prestige decision would be cancelled, and the officials of the CRE could mount a full-scale investigation into any institution, public or private and without a scintilla of evidence, or even a suspicion that discrim ination had taken place, was taking place, or was ever likely to take place. The limit on compensation would be removed. Racial harassm ent per se would be grounds for eviction. There would be a separate tort of racial harassment, and racial violence would be spe­ cifically criminalised. The necessity to involve the attorney general in any race cases would cease. Section 32(3) of the present law would be excised from the new law. This means that an employer could no longer offer as a defence against a charge of racial discrimination the fact that he had taken all reason­ able steps to prevent one of his employees violating the law. This is a particularly odious proposal. It means that, even if a concerned and conscientious employer had conformed with all the demands laid down by the CRE regarding the conduct of his business, he would still be held liable if one of his staff were to discriminate on racial grounds, without the em ployer’s permission, or even knowledge. The new law the CRE wants would also allow group enforcement proceedings. This means that the language of existing procedures would need changing. The present Act defines discrimination in terms of dis­ advantage to a particular “person,” but not to a designated group. (Though the notion of “special needs” refers to racial groups.) The fo­ cus of an alleged ill done to an individual means that proceedings can be sharply specific. The court or tribunal must concern itself with ac­ tions or policies having an injurious effect on one person. This means that, to some extent, the respondent is protected from vague, generalised imputations; the accent is on discovering evidence which proves be­

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yond reasonable doubt that this person, in these specific circumstances, has been treated in specific ways. Once this specific character of the proceedings is removed, and group actions brought, then the tendency will be for much more vague and woolly concepts to enter the action. Moreover, if groups can sue, all sorts of other factors arise. For instance, how is the group to be defined, given the astonishingly wide definition of what constitutes a racial group, in M andla v Lee (discussed above)? How should the claim be m an­ aged? Should the allegation be handled by an interest group? A lobby of some kind? A political party? The CRE? Or whom? How far back in history should the alleged offence be located? Even more disturbing, what effect does the concept of group actions have on the sort of multiracial society we want ourselves to be? Would not group actions tend— like reverse discrimination— to fragment, and, over time, harden divisions within society? Would not, ultimately, the whole notion of national cohesion be undermined? Would not the eth­ nic minorities be pressurised into classifying themselves, not simply as citizens of a stable, coherent society, but, first and foremost, as mem­ bers of a narrowly defined and contentious group claiming unique rights, privileges, and access to the public purse? And how would the majority population react to that? And would not the legal profession, with its specialised know how, its understanding of the legal limits, and its ob­ vious interest in capitalising on increased demands for its expertise— w ould not law yers com e to occupy a d om inant, and p o ssib ly compromised, position in society— as, in the view of many informed observers, has occurred in the U.S.? Warnings of the dangers of group litigation have been sounded by, amongst others, Professor Lance Liebman, of the Harvard Law School: “But the issue is more complicated than merely a matter of relations between group members and lawyers, or the inevitably chaotic arrange­ ments for selection of leaders and internal decision-making in a private organisation. We [i.e., the U.S.A.] are now recognising that important matters are being decided by “political” law suits, in which non-govemmental groups are litigants.... Now we have law suits vastly more like legislative proceedings” (.Ethnic Pluralism, N. Glazer [ed.], Heinemann, 1983). That is, the crucial division of powers as between the Commons and the courts— a basic guarantee of our civil liberties— is itself threat­ ened by the proposed, and essentially alien, concept of group law suits. The inability of the CRE to understand all this is truly astonishing. It appears to have no grasp on the relationship between its interests and

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those of the wider society. The same blank incomprehension is seen in its continued insensitivity to the issue of the costs involved in the addi­ tional burdens it proposes to place on industry and commerce. The is­ sue of costs is vital in a highly competitive world. The difference between profit and loss, indeed between survival and liquidation, can be determined by the skill with which a business m anages its costs. Yet the CR E’s massive interventionist plan makes no reference to this key issue. Just how much would its ambitions cost the factory owner to implement? The CRE neither knows nor cares. Like so many statefunded bureaucracies, whose survival is guaranteed by statute, it has no concept of costs in relation to business efficiency. But there is little doubt that significantly increased costs would be involved in implementing the new dispensation. Enforced monitoring, for instance, would mean a considerable increase in those involved in personnel work, and the more comprehensive and coercive legal de­ mands on industry would mean more money having to be spent on legal advice. The removal of employer indemnity in the prevailing Act would also mean more investment in training staff in the intricacies of race relations procedures. Again, we can, if we will, learn from the American experience of just what it costs for industry and commerce to implement the sort of mentality which lies behind the CR E’s proposals. Peter Brimelow and a colleague have worked out just what quotas, towards which the CRE is inescapably marching, have cost the American economy. Here is the gist of their findings: Using the standard procedures of regulatory economics, we were able to show that the direct costs (the amount spent to administer and comply with regulations) and the indirect costs (diverted time and effort) amounted to well over $100 bil­ lion in 1991. This means that the federal government is effectively commandeer­ ing nearly 2 per cent of the gross domestic product in addition to the 23 per cent it spends. The real impact of quotas, however, is the “opportunity cost”—what would have happened if those commandeered resources had been allocated efficiently. We estimated these as at least 4 per cent of GDP in 1991. That is, the economy has diverged on to a permanently lower growth path because of quota policies. And the divergence widens every year.... Everybody knows that quotas do not work. (The Times, 16.4.93.)

The CRE may protest that it does not favour quotas all it likes. But the plain fact is that its “numerical targets” and their achievement will be interpreted as quotas by busy entrepreneurs anxious to avoid the attentions of CRE apparatchiks— and the costs involved will be pre­ cisely the same.

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Conclusion This exposition of the powers of the CRE, and that organisation’s demands for greatly increased powers allows me, perhaps, to draw a number of conclusions. First, the CRE shows no awareness of the fact that the Act under which it functions makes serious inroads into three of our m ost funda­ mental civil liberties: freedom of speech, of contract, and of associa­ tion. Nor does it seem to understand that the Act, which is supposed to function in such a way as to create a colour-blind society, is, in its effects, and under the influence of the CR E’s interpretations, essen­ tially a piece of legislation which points to an increasingly colour-con­ scious society. The significance of this for the character of our multiracial society is difficult to overestimate. Far from helping to create and m ain­ tain an ethnic melting pot, in which there is a consensus about public values, whatever private cultural arrangements are preferred, the CRE is, effectively, seeking to create a tossed salad version of society— a society in which diverse groups give their loyalty, not primarily to the nation, but to the group and its sectarian concerns. That is, a divided, rather than a united society, appears to be the inevitable result of the CRE’s social philosophy. The model being pursued by the CRE is that of the U.S., which, by common consent, and as I have said above, is a nation riven by racial and ethnic conflicts. The CRE’s contention that the privileged position of our ethnic m i­ norities— under the 1976 Race Relations Act, and Section 11 of the Local Government Act 1966— is justified on the grounds that Britain is a society rotted with endemic racism, and that racial discrimination is so uniquely heinous that special legislation is required to combat it— neither of these two allegations will stand up to rational analysis. But not only is the CRE determined to hold on to the powers which flow from these beliefs, it actually urges the Home Secretary to increase such powers, via new legislation— as illustrated in its 1985 and 1992 proposals for change. This further attempt to intensify the sense in which the ethnic m i­ norities are a privileged class, in law, violates with increasing clarity a principle which, crucially, helps to hold any civilised society together, i.e., the principle that, under the law, all citizens are equal. For instance, the Comm ission’s demand that racialist behaviour ought to be m ade a separate crime means that, in the vital area of offences against the per­ son, there shall be two classes of citizens— effectively, one black and

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the other white. Since there are laws which already protect all citizens against all forms of assault, regardless of race, additional protection for just one class of citizen is bound to generate resentment in the unfavoured class. (The fact that a statistically disproportionate number of blacks and Asians are assaulted should not disguise the fact that the vast raw number of assaults are committed against the majority population.) Disparity of treatment for the victims of crime, the principle that some citizens are given greater protection than others— it is difficult to see how this sort of double standard can assist in maintaining good race relations. The man on the Clapham omnibus is, with complete justifi­ cation, going to assert, “There’s one law for them, and another for us.” The massively increased powers to investigate on a whim, the move towards compulsory ethnic monitoring, the requirement for all firms and other organisations to product annual reports to do with their race policies, the increased costs involved in all this— these things would be an inevitable outcome of the CRE’s bid for increased powers; and, in my view, they would greatly increase resentment both on the factory floor and in the boardroom. The consequences of giving the CRE increased powers, or even of allowing it to maintain its present powers, are, indeed, fearful. This is not just a personal view. There is an increasing literature arguing against the notion of political interventionism espoused by the CRE. American scholars such as Loury, Holland, Sowell, Steele, Williams, and Rich­ ard A. Epstein— all have adopted a highly critical view of positive ac­ tion and reverse discrimination policies favoured by the CRE. Epstein’s work, written from the point of view of the impartial legal analyst is particularly relevant and powerful. In Forbidden Grounds: The Case Against Anti-Discrimination Employment Laws, Epstein ef­ fectively demolishes the antidiscrimination approach on the grounds that it has no theoretical foundation, nor practical justification, is less effective than the common law in controlling discrimination, does not ultimately benefit those it is meant to protect, and seriously violates a traditional and essential civil liberty: “The anti-discrimination laws represent the antithesis of freedom of contract.” Moreover, Epstein draws attention to an American phenomenon which is echoed in this country, i.e., that the desirability of such laws as the Civil Rights Act, 1964, and our own Race Relations Act 1976, and their effects on both the indi­ vidual society, have never been adequately discussed: “The dangers they pose to open markets, competitive fitness, individual freedom, equal treatment before the law, and informed public discourse, were

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passed by in silence” (p. xiii). Though Professor Epstein is here refer­ ring specifically to the American experience, what he is saying cer­ tainly applies to the British adoption of the antidiscrimination approach. The other American scholars I mention above point to the following unfortunate outcomes of the sort of reverse discrimination mentality enshrined in the CRE: racial consciousness, social disharmony, aggres­ sive group images, poor black self-images, and welfare dependency. It is perhaps worth mentioning that a very high proportion of this criti­ cism comes from black academics— who have a common belief that reverse discrimination is patronising and offensive to minorities. Though there is a much less well-developed critique available in this country— virtually all the literature has been produced from within the academic counterpart of the race relations lobby— there have been several complaints emanating from individuals of ethnic minority ori­ gin. Here, for instance, is the view of Leon Hawthorne, a British-born black, whose parents came from Jamaica: “The CRE has achieved noth­ ing for black people in this country, and it should be abolished. It was set up under the Race Relations Act, 1976, with the goal of eliminating racial discrimination and promoting greater racial harmony. In fact, its actions and policies have exacerbated racial problems, and far from doing any good, it has done a great deal of harm .. .In its thirteen years of existence, the CRE has squandered £100 million of tax payers’ m oney” (Daily Telegraph, 20.6.90). Donu Kogbara, whose forebears came from Nigeria, and who works as a journalist in this country, has said this, “We [i.e., Britain’s ethnic minorities] have come a long way since the first immigrants arrived here in their mostly poor and huddled thousands. And we can go a lot further without the busy-bodying assistance of the C R E .... They (the Jews) have achieved magnificent results against the odds. They did not need the CRE, or the Race Relations Act. Nor do we” (Sunday Times, 8.4.93). Glory Osaju-Umeaku, the British-Nigerian editor of Ethnic Enter­ prise News, is fiercely opposed to the very existence of the CRE, and regards it as essentially unhelpful in its effect upon the younger gen­ eration of British blacks: “The CRE has succeeded in indoctrinating black people, especially the young, with the notion that m ost white people are anti-black and blacks should not expect to be treated fairly by whites. Young blacks are made to believe that they should look to the CRE in order to improve their condition, and have come to depend on the state. It is for this reason that so many have abdicated personal

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responsibility” (British Race Relations Legislation: How Democratic? Abraham & Sarah Foundation, 1991). Lionel Morrison, the black, former chief public relations officer of the CRE— and someone who knows the CRE from the inside— is equally dismissive: “Many ordinary black and Asian people have, therefore, come to believe that the CRE, despite good intentions o f fifteen years ago, is an irrelevance, a drain on the public purse, and an insult to the ethnic communities. And therefore it must go. Regrettably, I have to say I now share that view” (Daily Mail, 22.5.92). There are individual views. Nevertheless, I believe they reflect the feelings of a significant proportion of our ethnic minority population. They are views to which the rest of society ought, perhaps, to be listening.

5 The CRE in Action In order to examine how the CRE goes about its statutory business of working towards the elimination of racial discrimination, promoting equal opportunities and good race relations, and reviewing the work­ ings of the Race Relations Act 1976— in order to conduct this exami­ nation two basic procedures are necessary. First, there is a need to define the terms used by the CRE in its daily work. This will enable us to understand the conceptual framework within which the CRE does its thinking. Second, there is a need to focus on the literature it has pro­ duced, with a particular emphasis on certain key reports of formal in­ vestigations in those areas where the CRE has claimed discrimination is rife: i.e., housing, employment, and education. In this way it will become possible to see in practical terms how the CRE implements its underlying philosophy. It will also enable us to grasp how the CRE views the society it is meant to serve. The purpose of this chapter is to look at the CRE’s language. The examination of formal reports will follow in subsequent chapters.

The CRE’s Vocabulary Some of the recurring terms and phrases the CRE uses are contained in the 1976 Race Relations Act, some it has invented, whilst others have their origins in the language of the American equivalent of our race relations lobby.

Ethnic Minority Although the Act provides a broad definition of this term, and the law lords have provided an even broader one, the CRE has a striking tendency to confine the term to racial minorities defined by skin colour. Although it has given assistance to the Gypsies, the Jews, and has pro83

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duced some literature on the Chinese in Britain, and is currently inves­ tigating the Irish, the fact remains that the CRE literature and public statements are dominated by references to people from the Indian sub­ continent, known as “Asians,” and Afro-Caribbeans. Sometimes these latter groups are referred to separately, sometimes they are subsumed under the appellation “black.” There are occasions when these terms are used inconsistently, even in the same report.

Direct Discrimination This occurs when someone, or some organisation, openly treats an individual less favourably than he would treat other persons on racial grounds.

Indirect Discrimination This is a complex notion, and its definition can vary according to circumstances. An example is when an em ployer applies a condition to an application for a job, and a significantly sm aller proportion of ethnic m inority than ethnic majority candidates can fulfil that condi­ tion— and the condition cannot be justified in terms of ability to do the job. A specific instance m ight be where an em ployer requires ap­ plicants for a job as a street sweeper to have fluent English. This latter condition is not an obvious necessity for doing the job, and its enforcem ent would have a disproportionate, adverse impact on eth­ nic m inority candidates, a significant proportion of whom will not possess fluent English. (This notion clearly carries with it rich possi­ bilities for conflict between the employer, who may wish to define job specifications in one way, whilst the CRE may wish to challenge this— even with the simple example of the street sweeper there is the potential for different views: the em ployer m ight argue that fluent English is necessary, since the person appointed is bound to have a degree of contact with the public, who would expect all public ser­ vants to possess good English.)

Racism This is defined so broadly by the race relations lobby that it can refer to mild hostility, or even a somewhat cautious attitude, displayed by a member of the ethnic majority towards a member of the ethnic minor­

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ity population. It need have no connection with its proper use in de­ scribing a person, or organisation, who espouses a genetic theory of race, and believes that some races are inherently superior to others. As used by such bodies as the CRE, and those who support them, the term may have no connection with overt behaviour, or even an underlying attitude, but may refer to some supposed explanatory process where, for instance, a disproportionately small number of blacks or Asians are employed by a particular, targeted organisation. Moreover, the term is often used in a cavalier fashion by those with an axe to grind: anyone who seeks to challenge race relations lobby assumptions and actions is likely to find him self labelled with this highly pejorative belief. Fur­ ther, the word is often used as though prejudice and discrimination are synonymous— which is both untrue and misleading.

Institutional Racism This refers to certain, unexamined, and routine procedures which amount, in their operation, to a barrier against people from the ethnic minorities. This is a very vague term, and is sometimes employed as part of a circular argument where the actual reason for lack of ethnic minority success cannot be established.

Unconscious Racism This is said to occur when a person, or organisation, displays, or is alleged to display, hostility of some kind towards a person from the ethnic minorities, without consciously meaning to do so. Its advocates use the term as if it has scientific status: in reality, it has no more claim to scientific status than the Freudian defence mechanisms. However, precisely because it cannot be disproved, the term is a valued weapon in the race relations lobby’s fight against the enemy.

Positive Action A set of measures by which people from the ethnic minorities are either encouraged to apply for particular jobs, for certain educational courses, or, possibly, for certain kinds of housing, where they are “underrepresented.” Or it may refer to training exclusively for racial minorities in order to improve their chances of competing successfully in the work place.

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Contract Compliance A procedure which places the burden for removing alleged racial discrimination on the shoulders of the firm wishing to place a contract. If the firm wanting the contract has a disproportionately small number of black and Asian people working for it, then the CRE “recommends” that the contractors, or potential contractors, set themselves “num eri­ cal targets” for the recruitment and promotion of persons from the eth­ nic minorities “within a specified reasonable period of time.” The CRE supplies a questionnaire to the firm placing the contract to be com ­ pleted by the firm wanting the contract. Though this procedure has no statutory basis, the CRE drops broad hints that a noncooperating firm ought not to be given the contract. The CRE denies that this approach involves quotas— which are unlawful— but its reasoning is not entirely convincing. There is little doubt that both local authorities and private firms interpret contract compliance as a form of compulsion to recruit a given proportion of blacks and Asians. The BBC policies, for in­ stance, have for many years been based on the assumption that there ought to be statistically representative racial proportions in its work force. None of this is surprising in view of the fact that the pressure emanates from a powerful statutory body. (See pages 7 -8 of Principles o f Practice for Contract Compliance, CRE, 1987).

Disparate Impact This is a term drawn from American experience. It is a wider con­ cept of racial discrimination than appears in our legislation. It refers to any situation in which the outcome is that ethnic minority groups are “underrepresented” in the work force, or any other socioeconomic area. Any condition or procedure which leads to, or is likely to lead to, a racially “unrepresentative” work force, say, can be said to be having a “disparate impact,” and is, therefore, not permitted. The CRE wants this principle to be embodied in British race relations legislation. (See Towards Fair Selection, CRE, 1993.)

Disparate Treatment Largely the same as direct discrimination. It refers, again, to any condition or requirement which is, in any way, implicated in the pro­ duction or continuation of, say, a racially unbalanced work force. Any

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neutral practice which can be shown to be a barrier to the employment or promotion of ethnic minority workers is deemed unacceptable. This removes the caveat in British legislation that a condition which is re­ lated to ability to do the job can be justified, even if it has a disparate impact on ethnic minority applicants. The disparate treatment doctrine places the burden of proof on the defendants: “Plaintiffs need not make any showing of implicit intent: and demonstration by the defendant that there was good faith is no defence.... The defendant has the bur­ den of persuasion on these issues.” That is, two vitally important safe­ guards of natural justice intrinsic to British law— intent, and innocence preceding guilt— are set aside in the pursuit of equality of outcome. The CRE has made it clear it favours this notion, and wants to see it as part of our race relations legislation. (See pages 40-43 of “Review of the Race Relations Act 1976: Proposals for Change,” CRE, 1985)

Historic Disadvantage This refers to a situation where the past treatment of ethnic m inori­ ties is alleged to be preventing them from achieving their full potential in the present. It is, again, an American term, and forms no part of the British legislation relating to race. The CRE favours its inclusion in British law as a justification for the special and privileged treatment of ethnic minorities. The potential for confusion, not to speak of endless lawsuits, this concept involves can scarcely be exaggerated. It raises three irresolvable problems. First, given that many minority groups, despite persecution in the past, have made a notable success in life, how can the link between past experience and present performance be reliably established? Could the Jews claim special treatment in view o f the Holocaust? Second, given the very wide, legal definition of “ethnic minority,” which groups could qualify for the appellation “historically disadvantaged”? Third, how far back does the principle stretch? Could white, Anglo-Saxons claim its protection in view of their persecution under the Norman settlement? Could Roman Catholics in view of the punitive penal laws?

Special Needs This term appears in Section 35 o f the Act, though it is not defined. It may apply to education, training, or welfare. It is used to justify the taking of special measures on behalf of racial minorities. For instance,

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the CRE has argued that it should be used to allow extended leave of absence for Pakistani workers visiting their mother country, to perm it Muslims time off for daily prayers, and to violate existing rules of dress for Asian female workers. It has been cited in education to support absence from school for long periods abroad, to justify changes in morn­ ing worship, to permit rules of dress in physical education to be altered, to prevent Muslim girls from taking swimming lessons, to confirm that changes in long-established curricula are essential, and to justify pub­ licly funded ritual slaughter in the school meals service. Since the no­ tion of “special needs” is such a nebulous one, the scope for the CRE to engage in special pleading on behalf of ethnic minorities is virtually unlimited. This concept provides legal support— or has been held to do so— for the belief that the CRE perceives race relations, not in terms of integration, but of racial separatism, since only those who can success­ fully define themselves as being members of an ethnic minority can enjoy the favours this part of the Act confers. It is the notion o f “special needs” which lends support to the fact that the CRE sees itself, not so much as a race relations organisation, but as an ethnic defence body, which has little or no interest in the legitimate concerns of the ethnic majority population.

Numerical Targets The CRE has actively lobbied private firms and local authorities to adopt this procedure. Employers are urged to commit themselves to recruiting, and promoting, a given percentage of blacks and Asians by a certain date. The targets may be worked out in relation to the local area, or to the labour market as a whole. The CRE argues that this is justified because Sections 37 and 38 of the Act permits “positive ac­ tion,” in order to increase the proportion of blacks and Asians in the labour force. The CRE claims that numerical targets are not quotas, and in strict legal terms this may be true; but in practice it is difficult to see the difference.

Genuine Occupational Qualifications This term forms part of Section 5(2)(d) of the Act. It means that racial origin can be a qualification for a job where, for instance, the post is concerned with the provision of services promoting the welfare of people of a particular racial group, and the services can best be pro­ vided by a member of the same racial group. This notion has been used

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by the CRE to justify opposition to white people fostering black chil­ dren, and to support “same race” service provision by local authorities. There is little doubt that this policy contains the seeds of an officially sponsored colour bar— and, in practice, to an overwhelming extent, an antiwhite colour bar. Again, this points to racial separatism, rather than integration, as the defining principle of race relations.

Ethnic Monitoring The CRE regards this as a major procedure in creating its version of our multiracial society. The CRE argues that in order to increase ethnic proportions in the work force, in housing and educational outcomes, then the authorities concerned must physically count, and work out proportions of, blacks and Asians involved. Any “underrepresentation” of the ethnic minorities is perceived as a “problem,” and is taken as prima facie evidence that racial discrimination has occurred, and will continue to occur, unless and until some sort of CRE-approved antidis­ crimination policy is adopted. Curiously, the CRE appears never to have expressed any concern about those socio-economic areas where the ethnic minorities are “overrepresented”— of which there are an in­ creasing number.

Code of Practice This is an actual document published by the CRE. There are codes of practice covering education, employment and housing. Originally, in the Act, only employment was to be covered by a code of practice, but after pressure from the CRE, the politicians agreed to much greater powers for the CRE in this regard. The CRE may revise the whole or part of any code. Although a code does not have statutory force, if its recommendations are not complied with, this may result in a breach of the law. Moreover, the provisions of a code are admissible before an industrial tribunal, i.e., the CRE in prosecuting a case may use the code to illustrate how the defendant has failed in his lawful duty. In short, a code, in practice, is coercive, and it would be a foolish employer who disregarded its recommendations.

Representation This is an absolutely key concept in the CR E’s armoury. It relies on this notion again and again to make its case, and to make demands for

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changes in practice. It has grown out of Sections 37 and 38 of the Act, where the word “proportion” is used in referring to racial minority groups in relation to job opportunities. Racially discriminatory training in favour of ethnic minorities may take place where no person from an ethnic minority is doing the job in question, or the proportion of such persons doing the job is small in comparison with the proportion of such per­ sons in the general population. Although the Act appears to confine this concept to the narrowly defined area of training, in practice “represen­ tation” has come to be a quite crucial notion in virtually every field of social and economic life. If this were not so, then ethnic monitoring would have no purpose. The CRE appears to believe that, say, employ­ ment, should be a racially representative area. This is not, in a free society, defensible, since it violates the great principle that the only criterion for a job is individual merit. And, as we have already pointed out, the strict and fair application of this principle to all groups would lead to people from all groups being forcibly transferred to areas where they are “underrepresented.” It is interesting to speculate how this prin­ ciple would fare if applied to the massive “overrepresentation” of blacks in sport. The truth is that the representation view of the work force creates great resentment since it leads to the belief that blacks and Asians are being favoured in the appointment and promotion processes. It has created quota systems in the U.S., and these are hated by the vast m a­ jority of people— including thoughtful blacks, who regards such intru­ sions in the marketplace on their behalf as patronising.

Victimhood This is a concept borrowed from the American equivalent of our race relations lobby. The word itself reflects the special pleading im ­ plicit in the notion of historic disadvantage. In “Black Victimhood Ver­ sus Individual R esponsibility” (Libertarian Alliance, 1994), Anne Wortham, a black American academic, has examined the concept in some detail. W hilst no one could deny that certain groups— not just blacks— have, in the past, been subjected to subordination and vile in­ justice, certain groups and individuals have continued to claim victim status long after the historical wrong has been overcome or put right. Such people have become, in their own eyes, symbolic victims, and they have used this assumed status to evoke guilt in the assumed ag­ gressor in order to enforce demands for additional resources by appeal­ ing to the ideals of justice and equality.

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One consequence of this is the exalting of group rights over those of the individual, a development which causes individual success through effort and commitment to be perceived as a form of betrayal of the alleged victimised group. Another is the conviction that differences in levels of group success proves there are deficiencies in the system of oppression under which the alleged victimised groups are compelled to labour. It needs little imagination to see how this self-as-victim image can, and does, undermine the morale of ethnic minorities struggling to obtain a place in the sun. I suspect that this has had a particularly dam ­ aging effect on Afro-Caribbean youngsters, who are constantly urged by our race relations lobby and those who support it to regard the slave trade and current “racism” as forces preventing them from realising their human potential. Though this word does not feature prominently in CRE literature, the concept it refers to is a constant and dominating aspect of CRE propaganda. These are the words and phrases the CRE employs to guide its think­ ing and to communicate with the society it was established to serve. They point to a very distinctive— perhaps a better word would be ideo­ logical— view of race relations and of Britain’s ethnic minorities, their fortunes and place in society. Underlying this form of language is the allegation that Britain is a country rotted with endemic racial discrimination. This evil is present at both personal and institutional levels; and it can only be extirpated by the sort of publicly funded, statutory intervention and enforcement in the market place which the CRE increasingly favours. The ethnic minorities are represented in this sort of rhetoric as the hopeless, fail­ ing victims of a society intent on denying them opportunities. I have pointed out some of the fallacies and dangers this approach embodies. I want, in due course, to examine certain key CRE reports, surveys and other literature, in order to see how the CRE operates in practice.

6 Political and Economic Planning (PEP) and Race Relations The Background PEP is an independent research organisation whose philosophy and methodology are based on the principles and values of sociology. In 1978 it changed its name to the Policy Studies Institute (PSI). It typi­ cally investigates issues of social policy, e.g., housing, health, and edu­ cation. However, its most influential work has been in the field of race. It is no exaggeration to say that its work in this field is far and away the biggest source of information, ideas, and opinions about the state of race relations in Britain and the experience of racial discrimination by the ethnic minorities. It is impossible to delve into the relevant litera­ ture without coming across references to its work in this field. In Eth­ nic Pluralism and Public Policy (Heinemann, 1983) perhaps the most scholarly look at the issues and problems involved in race relations policy making, there are eight references to the work of PEP. In the Open University reader, Race in Britain, Continuity and Change (1983, reprinted three times) there are five references to the same source. The most detailed work on education and the ethnic minorities, The School Effect (Policy Studies Institute, 1989) makes two references to PEP. (The guiding light of PEP’s work in race relations, David J. Smith, is joint author of this latter work). Russell Lewis in his Anti-Racism: A Mania Exposed (Quartet Books, 1988) makes frequent references to PEP. And the comprehensive, Dictionary o f Race and Ethnic Relations (Routledge, 1984, reprinted 1991 and 1992) accept throughout the phi­ losophy and conclusions of PEP. The PEP summary of its separate reports on different aspects o f race relations was published in 1977 as Racial Disadvantage, with David J. Smith as its author. This book can be regarded as the bible of the race 93

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relations lobby in Britain. And its view of Britain’s race relations is consistently negative and disapproving. Its significance in this context is that it has been massively influential in determining the outlook and beliefs of the CRE— a body which PEP indirectly helped to create. The CRE employs precisely the same techniques of statistical sociology as the PEP organisation used to demonstrate its case with regard to race matters in Britain. No enquiry into the thinking and methods of the CRE can afford to ignore the work of PEP in the field of race.

PEP and the Law Successive PEP reports have had direct legislative consequences. Its 1967 report, which purported to answer the question “How exten­ sive is racial discrimination in Britain?” can be shown to have had a decisive effect on those responsible for the second Race Relations Act, 1968. In the introduction to PEP’s seminal work we find this comment: “In 1968 most of the forms of discrimination that had been shown to exist by the PEP report were made unlawful by the new Race Relations Act.” The relevant research was financed jointly by the Race Relations Board and the Home Office, a powerful conjunction of interests, which combine race relations lobby special pleading with government depart­ ment clout, which continues to this day. Roy Jenkins, the then home secretary, saw him self as a latter-day version of the Victorian social reformer, and he welcomed the 1967 PEP report. He had always sup­ ported the race relations pressure groups, and had appointed his old Oxford pal and well-connected Liberal, Mark Bonham-Carter, as the first chairman of the Race Relations Board. Jenkins embraced PE P’s negative view of Britain’s race relations, since it provided him with support for his interventionist, state-imposed notion of good race rela­ tions. Jenkins believed that, if the public was reluctant to accept his views on the subject, then they must be socially engineered into en­ dorsing them. Apart from his reformist zeal, and rather arrogant notion of politicians knowing best, Jenkins was concerned about Britain’s image abroad. Moreover, he was convinced that the new wave of postwar immigrants was a valuable means of overcoming our natural caution towards foreigners, and of providing an enriching “cultural diversity” . The fact that continued immigration from lands whose languages, reli­ gions, and general cultural assumptions were massively different from, and in some respects antagonistic to, those of the indigenous popula­ tions, and that this fact might conceivably create social conflict— espe-

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d a lly if the newcomers were causing new laws to be imposed— this realistic possibility, which was subsequently confirmed by events, was not one that Jenkins was prepared to consider. The bill leading to the 1968 Act was drawn up at the Home Office under Jenkins’ guidance; though it was steered through the Commons by Jenkins’ successor, James Callaghan, since Jenkins had, by then, gone to the Treasury. It is interesting and instructive to compare Jenkins’ PEP-dominated outlook and its reliance on coercive legislation with that of his prede­ cessor at the Home Office, Sir Frank Soskice. He piloted the first Race Relations Act, 1965, through Parliament. Soskice had a proper caution about the limitations and dangers of state-imposed solutions in this very sensitive area. He told the House of Commons, “We have taken what, in a sense, is a first step. I hope that events will show that it is not necessary to take any further steps, and that this may be the last step.” It would be, he went on, “an ugly day in this country,” if the legislation was ever extended. (Quoted in Russell Lewis, Anti-Racism: A Mania Exposed, Quartet Books, 1988). Alas, as subsequent events have shown, it is the Jenkins view, sup­ ported, and largely based on, PE P’s dismal images of race relations— and not the Soskice view which has won the day. PE P ’s later reports, issued in the period 1974-76, on housing, employment, and the ex­ tent of racial disadvantage, provided Jenkins with further am m uni­ tion to push forward his legalistic, enforced approach to race relations. (Jenkins was then back at the Home Office, after the defeat of the Heath governm ent in 1974). The result was the 1976 Race Relations Act, and the creation o f the all-powerful CRE— a CRE which com ­ bined the policing and educational functions previously, and sepa­ rately, discharged by the Race Relations Board and the Com m unity Relations Commission. The PEP reports, then, have shaped, not only general assumptions surrounding the debate about race relations and the position of Britain’s ethnic minorities; they have influenced both pressure groups and the Home Office. Crucially, they have led indirectly to a CRE which re­ lentlessly seeks to impose on the citizen the highly questionable notion that good race relations can only be created and maintained via pre­ scriptive laws and bureaucratic interference in the marketplace. Any attempt to question the wisdom of the CRE’s philosophy and techniques, therefore, must at least in part flow from a critical view of the PE P’s work in this area.

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The PEP Research There can be no doubting the thoroughness of the PEP research, nor the intellectual and moral integrity of its authors. The work which led to the production of the hugely influential, Racial Disadvantage in Brit­ ain was carried out between 1972 and 1975. It was financed by the Gulbenkian Foundation and the Home Office, and there was some sup­ port from the Nuffield Foundation. The findings were first published in a series of reports, the gist of which is recorded in the book. The pur­ pose of the book, we are told, is “to describe the present situation of the racial minorities in Britain and to show how far they are at a disadvan­ tage compared with the white population, and to explain, as far as pos­ sible, how this has arisen.” The tone of the book is established in the introduction. In referring to the 1976 Act, Smith says, “This is a far more serious attempt to combat discrimination than we had before the Act. It is opposed by an undercur­ rent of prejudice.” The fact that many very thoughtful people, including Sir Frank Soskice, whose views are quoted above, and the Labour M.P., Marcus Lipton, who, in the debate on the Bill leading to the 1976 argued that, if discrimination still persisted after the 1968 Act, this proved the law in this area does not work, and, far from being strengthened should be abolished— the fact that such eminently non-prejudiced people ex­ pressed concern about coercive race relations legislation, and the possi­ bility of it making things worse— this possibility is not conceded. Those who opposed the Act, and the argument on which it was based, are sim­ ply and rather offensively, dismissed as “prejudiced.” However, the author does admit that the issues involved are, indeed, complex: “In considering these sources it is important to distinguish as sharply as possible between unjust treatment and characteristics inherent in a minority population which has had little time to adapt to an alien culture.” He further concedes that the distinction between these two fac­ tors, “may tend to break down.” That is, it may be difficult to decide between “racism” and the culture of the group as factors determining outcomes. In point of fact, we now know that cultural characteristics are crucially important; there are considerable differences in levels of socio­ economic success as between different groups in this country— social as well as racial groups. I have, in other parts of this book, referred to the work of the American authority on these matters, Professor Thomas Sowell. He has shown that, on a world-wide basis, there is ample evi­ dence attesting to the crucial effect of the group’s cultural features on its

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progress in this world. Within this country we have the judgement of the Oxford sociologist, S.J.D. Green. He has said this: The PSI survey of 1984 established that socio-economic disadvantage is not ran­ domly distributed amongst ethnic groups in Britain. But the same report also es­ tablished that when data are analysed by area for Inner London, Birmingham and Manchester, ethnic groups are no more (original emphasis) underprivileged, ac­ cording to key socio-economic criteria, than the local indigenous population.. .we cannot be sure that certain of the socio-economic disadvantages endured by some (original emphasis) groups are not more the products of endogenous cultural, rather than exogenous “racist” causation.

Green goes on to say that there are massive differences in the rate at which Asians and Caribbeans in Britain are acquiring high level skills: This form of cultural “lag” is very worrying, but it cannot be blamed upon racism. They (Caribbeans) are treated no differently in British schools than Indian Asians. It might be due to the relative failure of Afro-Caribbeans to sustain stable, nuclear domestic environments in the same proportions as either the indigenous popula­ tions or Indo-Asians. If so, this failure cannot be blamed on “racism.” (London Review o f Books, 21.4.1988)

This cultural explanation of relative group failure is supported in the Swann Report on the education of ethnic minority children: “The rea­ sons for the very different performances of Asian and West Indian chil­ dren seem likely to be deep in their respective cultures.. .the tight-knit nature of the Asian community and family— more so than whites and West Indians— could explain the differences (in achievement rates) since parental influences on educational success have long been recognised”. (Education for All, London, HMSO, 1985, p. 86). The PEP author does concede that, in addition to alleged discrimina­ tion, there are obvious disadvantages which are not connected with racism. For instance, 40 percent of Asian men and 60 percent o f Asian women spoke English “only slightly or not at all.” There was also the fact of poor qualifications and living in culturally isolated communi­ ties in poor housing conditions. And Smith himself points to the factor Green mentions above—the incidence of lone parentage as between the indigenous population and the ethnic minorities, and within the eth­ nic minority groups. It is worth pausing for a moment and reflecting on the enormous variations which occur in relation to this factor. According to the General Household Survey of 1972, 9 percent of all families with dependent children are families with only one parent. Amongst British West Indian families this figure was 13 percent, and, amongst British Asians 1 percent. About 90 percent of these lone par­

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ents are women. Smith acknowledges that this, “must mainly reflect strong cultural differences” (p. 49). By about twenty years later this situation had grown steadily worse. In December 1993 the Office of Population Censuses and Surveys published data from the April 1991 census. This showed that no less than 43 percent of black families were headed by a lone parent, compared with 9 percent of Indian families, 13 percent of white families, and 14 percent in the total population (reported in The Daily Telegraph, 8.12.93). Now we know for certain that this sort of failing family background is very highly correlated with negative outcomes: a child from a lone parent background is significantly more likely to fail educationally, to be unemployed, or in a dead-end job, and to occupy poor accommoda­ tion in adulthood. (See Families without Fathers, N. Dennis and G. Erdos, I.E.A., 1992.) If, therefore, we accept that the relationship between family culture and socio-economic outcomes is real— and the evidence leaves no al­ ternative— then we can confidently predict that at least some o f the variance will not be due to the “racism ” which Sm ith so heavily emphasises. Now Smith claims that his research is entirely “objective”— the implication being that all the relevant variables have been allowed for in reaching his conclusions. And there is no doubt that his work was taken at face value by the Home Office, many politicians, large parts of the media, and by those social affairs intellectuals who have staked their academic reputations on the allegation that Britain is a “racist society.” There is no doubt the work of PEP in this area was uncritically accepted, and was enormously influential when it was published— and it continues to be generally accepted as the conventional wisdom. My own view is that, though Smith did, without doubt, discover it is more difficult for blacks and Asians to succeed in a material sense— a truism which no one doubted, anyway— the fact remains that there are doubts about the extent to which the dependent variables were controlled, and about the extent to which the very complex processes involved in analysing the multifactorial phenomena of housing and employment can be adequately understood by the sort of rather crude statistical so­ ciology favoured by Smith and his co-workers. I illustrate these points in relation to specific instances below.

The Time Factor Perhaps the biggest single factor for which Smith fails to provide adequately is that of time. We know for certain that when people from

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abroad arrive in any country, with their very different languages or ac­ cents, and perhaps from exotic religious backgrounds, and with differ­ ent notions about social relationships— not to mention variations in skin colour—then the point at which they are most likely to be per­ ceived as strangers, and to experience rejection, even hostility, is at the beginning of their settlement. This process is probably, at root, some sort of survival mechanism based on fear of the unknown; and it is, sadly, more likely to be evoked when the newcomers look significantly different from the indigenous population. However, as time goes on, this initial rejection is modified, the strangeness of the newcomers be­ comes less salient, the newcomers increasingly adapt to their new sur­ roundings, and levels of prejudice and discrim ination will tend to decrease. The history of the Irish immigrants after the potato famine, of the Jews who came here in the 1880s and 90s, and of the Poles who came in the aftermath of the Second World War— all provide sugges­ tive evidence of these processes at work. When the PEP/PSI surveys were carried out, blacks and Asians in their postwar numbers had been in this country about twenty years (considerably less, in fact, in the case of Asians); and that, in historical terms, is a very short time indeed. There is striking evidence of the influence of time on socioeconomic progress, and of the decreasing influence of racial barriers, given in Sm ith’s book (p.69). Here a table to do with “minority m en” and their job prospects over the previous ten years is given. It shows quite clearly the crucial effect of time spent in this country on levels of unemploy­ ment. Thus, nineteen per cent of men who had arrived up to 1959 had been unemployed in the previous ten years. Between 1960 and 1962 arrival times the figure was 24 percent; 1962-1966 the figure was 30 percent; 1967-1969 the figure was 30 percent, and for arrivals from 1970 onwards 40 percent. Thus, in so far that economic failure is a function of racism, then its effects would appear to decline with time. Smith, no doubt, would argue that the reduction in unem ploym ent amongst blacks and Asians which was noted in the early 1970s was due to the influence of the Race Relations Act, 1968, which outlawed direct discrimination in employment and housing. But it is very difficult to tie this up with the figures given— at least some of the decline in unem ­ ployment with the passing of time m ust have come before the Act reached the statute book. Moreover, this latter view— that it was time, rather than legislation which was the decisive factor— is reinforced by the fact that the experience of unemployment was particularly high amongst the most recent arrivals, post 1970, i.e., the group which did not enter the country until the 1968 Act was in being. Smith does, in­

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deed, concede the beneficial effects of time, as follows, “Thus, there was a very high level of unemployment among the minorities in the early 1960s when immigration was at its peak, but since then there has been a long term downward trend as new arrivals have been gradually absorbed into the workforce” (p.69). The key word, of course, is “gradu­ ally,” i.e., time reduces initial rejection and encourages integration and acceptance. M ore recent evidence from our two most prestigious professions, law and medicine, tend to support the view that time is an important factor; though distinguishing this factor from the effects of legislation is probably not possible. There is also suggestive evidence of increas­ ing levels of success by the ethnic minorities over time with regard to student numbers at Oxford and Cambridge— institutions of international renown, where there is intense competition for places. According to the Law Society Journal (ASR, 1994, ch. 2) the pro­ portion of practising solicitors from the ethnic minorities in 1990 was 1.3 per cent; in 1991 the figure was 1.4 percent; in 1992,2.0 percent; in 1993.2.3 percent; and in 1994,3.4 percent. Regarding trainees, 13 per­ cent of students enrolled with the Law Society in 1993-94 were from the ethnic minorities; and ethnic minority law students expecting to start a degree in law in 1993-94 accounted for 18 percent of the intake. The Law Society has stated in the same journal, “the percentage of solicitors from the ethnic minorities will continue to rise.” Although year-by-year comparative data for the medical profession are not available— as far as I am aware— it is common knowledge that the proportion of both students and medical practitioners from the eth­ nic minorities rises with every year that passes. According to the Brit­ ish M edical Journal of 1.3.97., no fewer than 23 percent of the medical workforce is from the ethnic minorities; and in some medical schools the proportion of students from the ethnic minorities is 30 percent. It should be borne in mind that, at the time of writing, people from the ethnic minorities, across all age groups, account for only about 6 percent of the economically active population of England and Wales. It is no exaggeration to say that in due course, if present trends continue, the legal and medical professions in this country will be, in proportion­ ate terms, dominated by members of the ethnic minorities. Regarding the proportion of ethnic minority students at Cambridge, the figures are as follows: 1993, 7.4 percent; 1994, 8.2 percent; 1995, 8.9 percent; 1996, 9.2 percent. In the age group concerned, black and Asian youngsters made up 7.7 percent. (See Freedom Today, Dec., 1996.)

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Anecdotal evidence suggests that the same picture is true at Oxford, i.e., levels of success vary directly with time. Language To be fair, Smith does attempt to allow for poor English in relation to Asians in the job market. But this is not so of West Indians: “Al­ though we do not underestimate the extent of the disadvantage caused to West Indians by the fact that they speak a special variety o f English, we decided it was not possible.. .to obtain a useful measure of their command of English.” That is, for a very significant section of the sur­ vey sample language was ignored.

The Details The key part of the work was a survey of a representative sample of 3,300 Asians and West Indians, together with a comparison survey of white men. This provided information about the general background of the minority population— country of origin, age, sex, religion, language, geographical distribution, family structure, etc.; about their jobs, earn­ ings and housing, experience of discrimination, and their attitudes to life in Britain. Fieldwork was carried out in the second half of 1974. The second field of enquiry was the “structure, policies and prac­ tices of key organisations.” And the third general field of enquiry was racial discrimination. This latter aspect of the work involved what the author describes as “experiments,” i.e., the sending of bogus applica­ tions for jobs, applications which, the author claims, differed only in the racial origins of applicants, so that variations in outcome could be pinned down to discrimination. Two aspects of socioeconomic experience are examined— employ­ ment and housing. Education is not dealt with.

Employment A central issue here is this: how do the ethnic minorities compare with regard to the white population in their levels of unemployment? Now, given the author’s conviction that the ethnic minorities are to be perceived as victims of “racism,” then we might reasonably assume that blacks and Asians would suffer more unemployment, and to a sig­ nificant extent. However, although it was possible to point to differ­

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ences in specific groups, for example, young people and women, the general conclusion is as follows: although in 1963 the unemployment level amongst the minorities was about four times as high as amongst the general population, by 1970, “unemployment was roughly the same amongst the minorities and the general population” (p. 68). However, it remains true that as the number of jobs decreased, then the minorities were more likely to experience unemployment. In other words, when demand for labour is high, any tendency towards racial prejudice is overcome by economic considerations. But when employers can pick and choose, they have a tendency to select those whom they perceive to be of their own kind, rather than those whose race and culture are dif­ ferent from their own. W hether one regards this as “racism,” or a natu­ ral human response common to all groups, is a matter of opinion. The author of this book would undoubtedly plump for the former—but would this tendency be any less marked in a society where the whites were in the minority? (It would be interesting to know the racial proportions in the work forces in firms owned by blacks, Asians, and Jews— to see if a tendency to same-race colleagues and friends is unique to white people, as is so often alleged.) What is encouraging in this context is that the tendency to choose same-race colleagues does not appear to go par­ ticularly deep; if it did, and was as profound and debilitating as the race relations lobby constantly alleges, then employers would tend to reject blacks and Asians en masse at any time, and pressure governments to encourage increased immigration from white countries to fill any gaps in the indigenous work force. This suggestion that prejudice tends to be superficial is further evi­ denced by data about the vulnerable group of young people: “Unemploy­ ment among Indian and Pakistani boys was not unusually high” (p. 71). The evidence regarding shift work, again, suggests that cultural fac­ tors and problems surrounding the process of adaptation, rather than racism, might account for ethnic variations. On a simple racial analy­ sis, about twice as many blacks as white do shift work. But within the “black” category there are marked differences. Pakistanis, for instance, are much more likely to work permanent night shifts, and the reasons for this appear to be a pragmatic balancing o f employer and employee needs and interests: “Asians working on permanent night shift tend very strongly to be poor English speakers.... Employers are using A sians.. .to do jobs which are intrinsically undesirable because of their unsocial working hours. Asians are seeking jobs, not only because of the premium rates of pay, but also because it allows them to form an

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ethnic work group which releases them from the need to speak English, and allows them to continue in isolation from the English community” (p. 82). It would surely be stretching the meaning of the word beyond recognition to describe this as “racism.”

Earnings Whilst, in general, whites earn more than the ethnic minority work­ ers, this simple comparison masks certain influencing factors. Time, again, is one such factor: Smith’s findings are now twenty years out of date, though the race relations lobby continues to quote them as through they were current. Secondly, the categories denoting type of work in relation to ethnic group are very broad, and take no account of varia­ tions within each category. For instance, the category “skilled manual worker” lumps together all skilled manual workers. But not all trades within this category pay the same rates. Does a m otor mechanic earn the same wages as a bricklayer? They are both skilled tradesmen, but they do not, thereby, necessarily get the same pay. It could be that the ethnic minorities are disproportionately attracted to trades which, his­ torically, pay comparatively low wages. We know from simple obser­ vation that there is a correlation between chosen job and ethnic group; for example, I live in a town where a hugely disproportionate number of Asians are taxi drivers, and an equally disproportionate num ber of Chinese own and work in take-aways and restaurants. Smith actually allows that, “ .. .there are a number of marked differences between the minority groups and the general population in the type of industry in which they work” (p. 89). The key question here is: does an Asian m o­ tor mechanic (to use this trade as an example) earn less than his white colleague? We cannot answer this question from the data given. W hat we can do is to speculate that, if the answer to the question is yes, then what were the trade unions doing? After all, we know that ethnic minority workers are more likely to be members o f trade unions than their white colleagues. That suggests that they are aware o f the unions’ duties regarding pay and working conditions, more specifically, that the principle of equal pay for equal work is respected in the work place. And we must also remember that violating this principle would land the employer in trouble, bearing in mind that, when Sm ith’s field work was done, the Race Relations Act, 1968, had been on the statute book for several years. The author actually states, “The 1968 Act has largely eliminated overt discrimination of this kind” (p. 141) in regard

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to job applications. If that is the case, then it does seem unreasonable to suppose that employers were unaware of the need not to discriminate in rates of pay for the same job. These same caveats can be asserted with reference to all the job categories used— they are so broad as to prevent precise comparisons to be made. Thirdly, and the author makes very little of this, the earn­ ings of women revealed no cause for concern: “we concluded from this that the earnings of minority and white women were much the sam e.... Thus, in spite of the substantial inequalities of earnings among men, between minorities and whites, there are no such inequalities among women” (p. 87). However, these considerations do not prevent the author from saying, “It is therefore correct to describe the use of Asians and West Indians for unskilled and semi-skilled shiftwork as a form of exploitation”— despite the fact that, as the author concedes, these sorts of jobs are what certain workers actually want, “though this is part of a reciprocal sys­ tem,” which, for purely practical and cultural reasons is agreed to by both parties. It is difficult to see how the notion of exploitation, with its connotations of cruelty and injustice can be applied to an arrangement which both parties accept as being congenial to their different needs.

Discrimination in Jobs Sm ith’s chapter on this general subject begins by conceding that, though the variations between ethnic minority and white employees are considerable, “At the same time, none of them [i.e., his findings] directly measure the level of discrimination, or even conclusively proves that discrimination exists” (p. 104, my emphasis). However, although there were a number of ways in which racial discrimination was explored, only one could be regarded as direct evi­ dence, i.e., the use of actors from different ethnic groups making bogus applications for jobs. These tests did, indeed, appear to indicate that employers had same-race preferences. But before we rush in to con­ gratulate the author on his confirming his own preconceptions, there are a number of practical, and, more importantly, ethical issues to be considered in relation to this technique. For instance, this approach would not have satisfied the then legal definition of racial discrimination. The author acknowledges this: “As they stand, and by themselves the tests would probably fail as legal proof of discrimination in particular cases” (p. 112). (The law then re­

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quired proof o f intent— a long-established and well-respected principle of English law. Thanks largely to this book and its political influence, this great principle was swept away in the 1976 Race Relations Act which created the CRE. A person can now be convicted of racial discrimination, even if he can show he had no intention o f committing the offence.) Second, the actors involved worked in pairs and were, it is claimed, identical in every respect. But this is not strictly true— if they had been their deception would have been too obvious to be effective. Besides, in practice, no two applicants for jobs are ever precisely the same. In­ deed, the examples given in the book show this is so: there are slight differences in age, and they want the job for different reasons. It can reasonably be argued that the differences were so slight as to be irrel­ evant to the doing of the job. But the fact remains that employers’ re­ sponses often are quirky, even illogical to the outside observer. This sort of approach does not allow for that. Third, this approach does not go beyond the initial stages— it does not proceed to interview. It is conceivable, though I concede unlikely, that though fewer blacks and Asians were invited to interview, more might have been offered the job if they had been. Fourth, the extent of the discrim ination may have been exagger­ ated by these tests, because the actors placed them selves in situations which the m ajority of Asians and blacks would tend to avoid. They them selves could have preferred a same-race employer, and in so far as the telephone was involved, could unwittingly have conveyed this preference. The author is dismissive of this objection, though he does, rather inconsistently, concede that, with regard to accom modation, there is a powerful tendency for minorities to prefer landlords from their own ethnic group. (The same tendency in white employers is regarded as racism.) Fifth, the sad fact is that the presence of people from different racial groups in the same firm could, conceivably, have an adverse impact on that firm ’s business— or the employer believes that is the case; and it is he, after all, who has to stand the risk. This is not just a matter of preju­ dice amongst potential customers, and possible bad feeling between white and ethnic minority workmates. It is also to do with the fact that there is, as common experience suggests, and as surveys confirm, ani­ mosity within the ethnic minority group, for example, as between Asians and West Indians. (See “Hard facts about black-brown ‘solidarity’,” Samir Shah, The Times, 19.9.85.)

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All this, of course, is very sad. It indicates that man is far from the perfection that race relations sociologists would like him to have at­ tained. But the fact remains that, as the author concedes (pp. 171-75), that industrial relations did tend to be worse in those plants with m ulti­ racial work forces, than in those with monoracial ones; and the rela­ tionship appeared to be a linear one, i.e., the bigger the ethnic minority element, the higher the degree of unrest, though there was also a con­ nection between unrest and plant size (see table, p. 171). Information from managers of plants confirmed this tendency; 41 percent of plants with no minority workers rated their industrial relations as “excellent,” compared with 28 percent of those with at least 5 percent of minority workers. It is also worth bearing in mind that, where white workers were asked why they preferred initially not to have minority workers as colleagues, their complaints were, overwhelmingly, of a cultural, rather than racial, nature (p. 175). These complaints may have had more to do with lack of familiarity— fear of the newcomer— than with real­ ity, but they may, nonetheless, have been keenly felt. I am not here seeking to defend discrimination. I am simply trying to take a rather broader, more human view of the issue than the author— and a view which perhaps takes more account of the principle of free association. It needs to be borne in mind that employers have to live in the real world with all its worries and complexities. They cannot take refuge in the detached, exalted attitudes of clipboard sociologists, whose per­ ceptions of reality have to function within crude statistical measures of what are very complex phenomena. The above are objections of a practical nature, and are to do with the extent to which the author supports his case that discrimination in jobs is a function of racism. However, for anyone with an awareness of the ethics of social research there are further worries about the author’s approach. I speak here of the use of actors submitting bogus applica­ tions for jobs. The author makes plain that this technique is of crucial importance to his thesis: “it is the only one which gives a true indica­ tion of discrimination in society” (p. 114). That may be so, but it om its the im portant question of how far the ends justify the means. Just how far does the use o f this technique actually, in the long run, help or hinder in the creation and m ainte­ nance of good race relations? M any people, perhaps most, will see this as a m oral issue. After all, when the actors present them selves as genuine applicants for jobs, they are not telling the truth; they are, however worthy they feel are their motives, involved in an act of

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deception. In any other situation such behaviour m ight w ell be characterised as entrapment, which both morally and legally, is very dubious behaviour indeed. Now whether people in a free society, where certain civil liberties and social goodwill are normally assumed to exist— whether people should be confronted with this sort of underhand technique is surely questionable. It may satisfy those with a vested interest in discovering racism, but it will not, in my view, win the support of those with a rather more sensitive understanding of people’s liberties. And I do not see how, in the long run, race relations can benefit. It is bound to create resentment in those who are its victims— assuming they are informed subsequent to the event (and, if they are not, what is the point of the exercise?)— and that resentment is bound to be trans­ mitted to others. And no kind of human relationship is successfully founded on resentment. An interesting and illuminating instance of how this sort o f tech­ nique can create a sense of outrage is a case which occurred in 1993. Two doctors submitted false applications for jobs in order to show that prospective employers were guilty of racial discrimination. As a result they were arrested by the fraud squad, and threatened with an enquiry by the General Medical Council. In the event the case was dropped, though why this occurred has not, to my knowledge, been revealed. However, the doctors concerned were informed that information about the case would remain on GMC files— which suggests that the GMC took a serious view of the matter (reported in New Community, 20(2): 301-8 January 1994).

Multiracial Workforces There is a great deal more in the book reflecting Smith’s findings and views on the subject of racial discrimination. But I have deliber­ ately concentrated on those aspects which created the most interest, and which, it is reasonable to suppose, had the m ost influence on the politicians who came to pass the sort of further race relations legisla­ tion for which Smith and the race relations lobby were pressing. How­ ever, before finishing with employment, I should like the reader to ponder this. The whole drift of Sm ith’s argument is that racial m inori­ ties face consistent, relentless discrimination in the workplace. Yet, throughout the book, there is table after table which examines work­ places which are multiracial in their makeup.

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Moreover, Smith is obliged to concede at the outset, The proportion (of ethnic minorities) at work is the same or higher among all minority groups than among comparable white groups, with the single exception of Moslem women, who are inhibited from going out to work by strong cultural factors. Comparisons between minorities and whites are strongly influenced by the differences in age profiles—far more of whites than of the minorities are above retiring age. Because of this, a relatively high proportion of men from the minor­ ity groups are working (91% of minority men, compared with 77% of white men.) However, within each of the age groups up to 54 the proportions of white and minority men who are working are about the same. Thus, confining our attention to men aged 16-54, we find that 93% of Asians and West Indians compared with 91% of whites are working.... The proportion of West Indian men who are work­ ing is substantially higher than for the general population...confining our atten­ tion to women aged 16-54, we find that 75% of West Indians are working, compared with 55% of the general population. (Pp. 64-65)

Is this the picture of a society in which some sort of vocational apart­ heid is in being, as Smith systematically implies, or is it the picture of a society— of enormous and unprecedented cultural complexity— in which the ethnic minorities have, in general, been accepted as an es­ sential part of the workforce? Of course I am not suggesting that within this general situation there are no instances of discrimination. There almost certainly will be specific cases where people have been rejected for the wrong racial reasons. But the sheer scale of minority employ­ ment scarcely supports the proposition that there are the sort of insu­ perable barriers to jobs which require interventionist laws of increasing severity to put the matter right— as the Smith philosophy demands.

Discrimination in Housing Before examining the relevant parts of the text in detail, I need to make two points. First, housing is a very complex phenomenon; and, being a basic human need, it arouses very strong feelings. We know that people’s ideas, and aspirations, about the subject vary with age, sex, class, income, experience, and personal taste. Secondly, and overlying all this complexity— and as the author is careful to point out— generalisations which can be made about white people’s housing patterns and preferences cannot be made about those of the ethnic minorities. For instance, owner occupation has a different meaning in the differ­ ent communities. With white people, the richer they are, the more likely they are to want to be owner-occupiers; and the quality of housing is higher with owner-occupation. But this is not true of the ethnic m inori­

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ties. And the pattern of tenure in the different groups is different— for instance, far more Asians own their own home than either the general population or than West Indians, and a far smaller proportion of Asians than either the general population or West Indians occupy council prop­ erties. If we add to this the fact that the ethnic m inorities’ experience of housing in this country is, historically speaking, very short— they had very little experience of the housing market at the relevant time— if we take all these factors into account, then we are faced with an enor­ mously complex, multidimensional subject. W hat we m ust also bear in mind is that we are dealing with a situation which has passed. The position regarding ethnic minority housing is vastly different today than when this survey was published in 1975. However, what matters here is that it is the 1975 survey on housing which so powerfully moved the politicians who placed the 1976 Race Relations Act on the statute book. The crucial research issue is this: can housing in all its intricate com ­ plexity be validly and convincingly analysed and judged through the sort of crude sociological statistics favoured by Smith?

Tenure There are three notable facts here. First, whereas twenty-eight per­ cent of the general population and twenty-six percent of West Indians rent from the council, only four percent, at the relevant time, o f Asians did so. Secondly, there is very little ethnic difference in relation to pri­ vately rented accommodation. Thirdly, and contrary to what might be expected, as many West Indians as whites live in owner occupied prop­ erty— 50 percent in each case. As for Asians’ owner occupation levels no less than 76 percent are involved, i.e., a far higher proportion of Asians than West Indians or whites own their own property. This might reasonably be thought to be a cause for optimism. In­ deed, with regard to West Indian housing success the author says this, “It is remarkable to find that the pattern (i.e., o f white home owner­ ship) is similar, because it means that, over a relatively short period in this country, and in spite of the fact that they tend to be doing inferior jobs, to be earning less, and to have larger families to support, West Indians have achieved the same level of owner-occupation as the white population” (p. 211). However, with regard to the even greater success of Asians in buying their own homes, the author attributes this to en­ tirely negative influences. It is due, he avers, principally to poverty, the fact that Asians have large families, and cannot find adequate private

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housing, and the fact that, for the lower socioeconomic groups amongst Asians, there is a need to cluster together, not least because they have little English with which to negotiate their way into the broader soci­ ety. The answer is large cheap houses in the inner city, i.e., the people concerned were more or less compelled to establish this pattern of ten­ ure because they were the victims of various regrettable social forces— with a strong possibility of racial discrim ination being involved. However, J.G. Davies and his co-workers have effectively demolished the whole idea that Asian housing in Britain is the grim story of exploi­ tation and failure. Asians in relation to housing— or any other endeav­ our for that matter— are not victims. Nor can their housing position be crudely ascribed to the confining influence of social conditions, or dis­ crimination. Here are some of Davies’s conclusions, based on irreproach­ able evidence: There is substantial evidence that Asians, that is, Indian and Pakistani immigrants, have successfully dealt with the task of providing themselves with decent hous­ ing. Most of them own outright, or are buying, the houses in which they live, and most of these houses are equipped with the basic amenities. Problems exist: but, in the main, the story of Asian housing is a success.... Yet this success story is insistently ignored by the academic literature emanating from sociologists or per­ sons associated with organisations such as the Community Relations Council. Their conventional wisdom depicts immigrants as the pathetic or passive victims of systematic racism.... The “problem” of Asian housing is, then, the discrepancy between the reality of success and the academics* imputation of, and insistence upon, failure. Fact and theory have parted company, and their rupture raises seri­ ous questions about the objectivity and disinterestedness of academics and race experts in a field urgently requiring dispassionate analysis.’* (Asian Housing in Britain, Social Affairs Unit, 1985)

One further point needs to be made about tenure and its supposed links with a hostile society in general, and racism in particular. Smith says this, “In general terms, these findings show that people who enter into relations with each other as landlord and tenant tend very strongly to belong to the same ethnic group, and this applies to the different minority groups separately” (p. 227). That is, the tendency for people to prefer as landlords and neighbours those they perceive as belonging to their own kind is common to all the groups with which we are con­ cerned, and is not a characteristic confined to white people— though one might be forgiven for supposing it was, given much of Sm ith’s argument. It is also clear from this that, as far as rented accommoda­ tion is concerned, the potentialities for racism must be distinctly lim ­ ited— unless one assumes that “racism” can occur between people of the same race.

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Quality of Housing In general, and at the time the PEP surveys were undertaken, there is no doubt that the housing accommodation of the ethnic minorities in Britain was inferior to that of the white population. For instance, far more whites lived in detached and semi-detached houses, and they— the ethnic minorities— occupied older properties whose external con­ ditions told in favour of whites. In order to illustrate variations in quality of housing the author com­ putes an “amenity score” for the difference groups involved. Six ameni­ ties were included (excluding outside WC). Each unshared amenity scored 2, while each shared amenity scored 1. The maximum score therefore was 12. The proportion of households having an amenity score of less than 9 was then calculated. This revealed the following results: Pakistanis/Bangladeshis— 44 percent, Indians— 25 percent, African Asians— 19 percent, West Indians— 23 percent, Whites 9 percent. There is a not dissimilar pattern for households not having exclusive use of bath, hot water, and inside WC. Council house tenancies display a similar pattern. However, there are a number of points to be made before we accept the Smith implication that these variations are a function of racism. In the first place the favourable amenity score for whites refers only to those white households where there were male heads— their amenity score could, and almost certainly would, have been lower if white house­ holds without male heads had been included, i.e. we are not, strictly speaking, comparing like with like here. Secondly, if possession of a white skin were in any degree the determining factor in housing qual­ ity, then we might reasonably argue that the ethnic minority groups would fare in a broadly similar fashion. But this is not so. And it is not so to a quite striking extent. O f course it could be argued that the differ­ ent ethnic groups experience discrimination in different degrees— that some groups are more likely to experience negative treatment than oth­ ers. However, Smith does not suggest this. Thirdly, the “amenity score” does not simply refer to the possession o f the basic amenities: cooker, bath, shower, hot water supply. It also refers to an unstated extent to the number of people sharing those facilities, i.e. amenity scores are bound to be lower the bigger the family; and we know for certain there are considerable variations in family size according to ethnic group. Thus, Smith himself quotes the 1971 census which revealed the following: average family size in England and Wales was then 2.86 people: by contrast the average size of Asian households was 5.19, and of West

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Indians 4.31. These are enormous variations, and what they mean in this context is that, if Asian and West Indian households were smaller, then their amenity scores would obviously be higher, perhaps much higher— but the author fails to control for this factor. Fourthly, and as the author readily concedes, there appears to be a vital cultural factor at work, i.e., language. There was a very significant relationship between amenity score and possession of English— 52 percent of Asians who spoke no English were without exclusive use of the three main ameni­ ties, compared with 29 percent of fluent Asian English speakers. One wonders in view of these complexities how anyone with an impartial mind could ascribe outcomes to a single, determining factor. Moreover, Smith’s insistent allegation is rather undermined by the view of the various groups themselves. Thus, 45 percent of Asians and West Indians said they were very satisfied with their accommodation, and a further 37 percent said they were just satisfied with it, i.e., 82 percent were not dissatisfied. The corresponding figures for whites were 57 percent and 31 percent, i.e., 88 percent. This is only a very slight differ­ ence in levels of housing satisfaction as between the minority and m a­ jority populations— a finding which, again, one might have reasonably imagined would be cause for general celebration. However, the author, ever the pessimist, cannot permit himself any other than gloomy interpretations. He explains this hard, optimistic find­ ing as follows: “This has the same significance as the earlier findings of high levels of job satisfaction among the minorities. It shows there is little active discontent, but this is because the horizon of expectations has been adapted to meet the facts” (p. 239). He does not define the term “horizon of expectations,” nor does he provide any empirical evidence that it exists anywhere but in his own head— a surprisingly subjective pronouncement in one who claims his findings are scientific, and who condemns those who question them as prejudiced. Is it not somewhat arrogant to ascribe to people feelings they have not expressed, and seek from the outside to impose an interpretation on those which they have expressed? And, especially within a supposedly academic treatise of this kind, is it not rather less than objective to attempt to do so? I suppose what this mysterious “horizon of expectations” might mean is that the ethnic minorities, particularly at that rather early date, had rather lower expectations with regard to housing quality than did the indigenous, white population. It would not be entirely surprising if this were so. After all, a key factor in changing the expectations of people who make a radical change in their cultural environment—true of all

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Asian and West Indian immigrants— is time. In the early days immi­ grants, for obvious reasons, do not demand parity of social outcomes with the historic population whose land this is. W hat probably happens for an appreciable time is that, after the initial settlement, the newcom ­ ers use, not the indigenous population’s achievement in housing, for example, as the yardstick of their own achievement. It is, much more likely, the sort of housing they would have experienced in their coun­ tries of origin. And it is probably that comparison which forms the basis of their generally satisfied attitude to their housing in this coun­ try. There is little doubt that, however modest ethnic minority housing in this country may be, it will, for the vast majority, be considerably better than their accommodation in their country of origin. Coupled with this is the strong possibility that black and Asian fami­ lies have hopes of steady improvement in their standard of housing. The fact, for instance, that a disproportionate number of Asians own their own property means that they have a capital asset on which to base their advancement in the housing market. Despite Sm ith’s pessi­ mistic comments about poor housing conditions and properties being difficult to sell, the fact is that relatively poor inner-city housing can be vastly improved by council grants: I have seen whole streets in inner city Bradford transformed by this process. Again, time and increasing familiarity with housing standards in this country will tend to raise ethnic minority expectations. We might, therefore, have predicted in 1971-72— when Smith collected his data— that ethnic minority hous­ ing would improve as time went on— a possibility Smith does not per­ mit him self to entertain. However, this potentiality has, indeed, been fulfilled. If we compare Sm ith’s gloomy prognostications with much more recent evidence— such as I quote in chapter 9, “Housing and the CRE”— we can see there have been huge improvements by 1982, only a decade after Sm ith’s survey. Asians, for instance, were maintaining their lead in housing ownership, many more Asians were in council housing— a welcome move in the direction of racial integration— and there had been a very big improvement in basic amenities in the accommodation of both Asians and West Indians. The Policy Studies Institute Report of 1984 says this: “There have, however, been considerable improvements in the housing of black [i.e., Asian and West Indian] people between 1974 and 1982. The proportion of black families sharing facilities with other households, or lacking the use of basic amenities, fell considerably in this period, from 26% to 5%, and from 37% to 7% respectively, as did

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the proportion living in properties built before the end of the First World War from 46% to 35%.” By 1988 even the CRE was having to admit to a degree of optimism. For instance, the differences between the minority and majority popu­ lations with regard to exclusive use of bath and inside WC was, by then, very small indeed— 93.1 percent compared to 95.3 percent. With regard specifically to West Indians, the CRE says this, “Overall, at the national level, West Indian households have almost the same housing condition as whites” (Housing and Ethnic Minorities Statistical Infor­ mation, CRE, 1988). In short, the notion that our ethnic minorities were generally failing in the housing market, and were trapped, more or less forever, in innercity squalor— an impression an uncritical reading of Smith could so easily produce— this notion is impossible to sustain. Any objective observer, willing to accept the crucial effects of time since settlement on the fortunes of immigrant communities, could have gained solace from the state of minority housing, even at the time of Sm ith’s survey. Immigrants always have a powerful tendency to improve their lot in their new abode simply as a function of their own cultural resources, energy, and commitment to self-improvement— factors which persuaded them to take the radical decision to leave their homeland in the first place. The idea that minorities improve their lot as the result of politi­ cal intervention in the form of race relations legislation— an insistent notion in Sm ith’s rhetoric— conveniently overlooks the fact that previ­ ous groups of immigrants to this country have vastly improved their lot, and obtained levels of success better than the indigenous popula­ tion, without such political intervention. The Jews are the most obvi­ ous group in this respect, but I suspect there are others who have also been very successful, for example, our central European communities. Unfortunately, Smith makes little of time and the group’s own cultural resources in the achievement of socioeconomic success.

Access to Council Housing This is a crucially important aspect of Sm ith’s work. There is no doubt that his claim that the ethnic minorities have been more or less systematically disfavoured— if not always consciously so— in the allo­ cation of council properties is a claim which the CRE, using identical statistical sociology as Smith, has ever since enthusiastically endorsed. The allocation of council properties is an enormously complex proce­

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dure— a multifactorial task incapable of being designed so as to satisfy every interested party. There is a huge demand; and there are always more people wanting property than there are properties available. Smith concedes not only that, “The situation that underlies these simple facts (of disadvantage) is a complex one.” He also admits at the outset that, “the end result is produced by the choices of the minority groups them ­ selves”— though he alleges that they are trapped into their choices by a malign council housing allocation system. Before examining Sm ith’s allegations, I should like, briefly, to illus­ trate the sort of agonisingly complex factors housing officers have to contend with in allocating properties. First, there is the rationing sys­ tem necessary because of the imbalance between supply and demand. This involves considering no fewer than four different factors: various sorts of applicants, various sources of accommodation, a system for determining the applicant’s priority level, and matching applicant to property. Clearly the possibility of creating a system which balances all these factors in such a way as to create an equitable outcome, be­ yond criticism, and satisfying to every clamorous demand— this is, given human fallibility— a pretty slim possibility. It is not difficult to imag­ ine how any individual or group, dissatisfied with the outcomes, could construct a case that somewhere in the complex matrix of decision making their interests are not being respected. Such a situation is bound to produce less than the ideal result. Secondly, there is the difficulty that different groups in society have different levels of knowledge about the actual presence of the Council’s housing responsibilities and stock of properties. Smith, himself, gives figures which clearly show that both blacks and Asians have (or had then) significantly less knowledge in this respect—far more whites than blacks or Asians were familiar with the fact that councils do provide housing. Given that, it is hardly surprising that councils can be shown to be allocating proportionately fewer properties to the ethnic m inori­ ties. Thirdly, there is the complicating factor of exclusions operating at that time. In many areas, such is the demand for properties, councils have to lay down certain qualifying criteria for inclusion on their wait­ ing lists. For instance, being a resident in the local area is a limiting factor— those who have not lived for a given time in the area are not eligible. Again, not having British nationality is an excluding factor in some areas. And living in owner-occupied premises is another. None of these factors, given the acute housing shortage, is oppressive, or even unreasonable. They are all basically an attempt to limit applications to

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those who, on the basis of fairness and public opinion, have the greater claim. The fact that some or all of these factors are bound, at least in the short term, to tell against the minorities is in no sense a reflection of racial discrimination— they would apply with equal force to every single application from a white person or family. I repeat, then, that the systems are so complex, and necessarily so, that there are bound to be winners and losers— and the losers, particu­ larly if they have influential interest groups proclaiming their disad­ vantage to all and sundry, will not find it difficult to make a case.

Opportunities for Racial Discrimination and Disadvantage Under this heading Smith outlines a number of different areas of concern, (pp. 248-252) For instance, he does concede that residential qualifications will tell to the disadvantage of minority groups. But not just to racial minorities, but, as he states, “to all newcomers.” Second, he states that the matching procedure, i.e., between wants and proper­ ties allocated “might be racially biased.” Third, properties allocated to ethnic minorities “might tend to be of inferior quality.” Fourth, the as­ sessment of housekeeping standards “might be racially or culturally biased”. Fifth, element of choice in the allocation procedure “might tend to work to the disadvantage of minority groups.” And, finally, minority groups might suffer a range of disadvantages because of “poor communication.” And one might be severely tempted after this catalogue of hypo­ thetical barriers to assert that pigs might just be persuaded to fly. At this point in the argument it is rather difficult to believe that Smith has not relinquished the role of detached sociological observer, and be­ come a self-appointed bloodhound searching for clues in the most un­ likely places in order to convict the suspect. He has, as it were, adopted what might be called the poison gas theory of racism— an ever-present miasma infecting every possible policy, procedure, or other human ac­ tivity. It is very difficult, given Sm ith’s obvious preconceptions, not to suspect that, at this point, Smith has become just a shade less than objective in his perception of things. He is virtually predicting the out­ comes he expects— and hopes?— to find. However, to be fair, though his suppositions are transparent, he does claim to have discovered ac­ tual racial bias in three councils out of the ten under investigation (p.264). I want now to look at these allegations.

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Westthorpe This was a borough in the north of England. Smith considers two housing outcomes: numbers rehoused and quality of housing. With re­ gard to the first factor, Smith admits he has no case. Here is the key paragraph: We do not know what proportion of waiting list allocations went to the minorities, but of all [original emphasis] lettings in 1972/73, 5.1 per cent went to families classified as “coloured”, and, since waiting-list allocations account for eight tenths of the total, a similar proportion of them went probably to the minority groups. At the same time, 3.9 per cent of waiting-list applicants were classified as “coloured”, a lower figure than the proportion of allocations.... This seems to imply that the minority applicants were given at least an even chance of being re-housed and to exclude the possibility of discrimination as far as the numbers rehoused [original emphasis] are concerned” (p.265).

To the dispassionate observer these figures suggest more than an “even chance.” They indicate, in the statistical terms Smith strongly favours, that the minorities were getting a disproportionately large share of the council housing cake— though Smith is not inclined to enquire if this is evidence of discrimination against the majority applicants. Regarding housing quality, there was indeed a strong suggestion that the minorities were living in the less desirable areas. However, the evi­ dence on which this finding is based is not such as would satisfy either a real, natural scientist, or a court of law. In the first place, the maps on which the evidence was based “were certainly not very reliable or up to date.” Second, there were no maps at all for some of the smaller estates. Third, the findings were based on the fact that most minorities were based in two-bedroomed houses— but this, we are told, was no more than an “assumption,” i.e., we do not know how minorities fared in other proper­ ties. Fourth, we are informed, “minorities would tend to congregate on estates with larger properties, and, in general, such estates are undesir­ able” (p. 267). Fifth, it may be that the previous homes of the minority tenants were close to the undesirable estates, and they were attracted there for this reason. (Smith airily dismisses this, but he did not check it.) Sixth, as Smith concedes, minority applicants “may tend to have ob­ tained lower ratings of housekeeping standards.” (Housing visitors de­ nied this.) Smith rejects all these lacunae as influencing variables, though he does concede they cannot be “completely dismissed.” There are further anxieties about this aspect of the research, insofar as Smith claims for it decisive evidence of discrimination. For instance,

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whilst it is true that the minorities showed a marked tendency— on the basis of unreliable maps— to be grouped in the less desirable estates, we are not told how the council arrived at the 4-point scale of estate desirability, except in relation to age of property, i.e., the older the prop­ erty, the less desirable it was. Nor are we told how far the minorities actually wanted to be on the older estates; the obvious fact that m inori­ ties actually prefer to be housed near to their fellows for a considerable time after entry is not considered. The fact is that putting the minorities on the smaller estates might well have meant violating this cultural imperative. Smith attempts to justify this omission by stating that “there was no reason at all to suppose that they (the council officials) were aware o f this relationship,” i.e., between the minorities and their loca­ tion on certain, less desirable estates. In other words Smith is suggest­ ing that the officials were guilty, not of overt discrimination, but of that catch-all device beloved of the professional anti-racist, and from which there is no more possibility of escape than from the notorious Freudian defence mechanisms, i.e., “unconscious racism.” To put it mildly, it is very unlikely that this was so. After all, housing officials, rent collectors, and council maintenance workers are in and around council estates every working day observing the scene— unless we assume that this veritable army goes around with its eyes firmly shut. Moreover, there is no con­ sideration, in relation to this council’s housing policy, given to the fact that there are marked differences between housing outcomes and pref­ erences as between blacks and Asians. These two distinctive groups are simply characterised as “coloured.” Was there a preponderance of Afro-Caribbeans on any of the less desirable estates? Or were Asians and blacks mixed up together? Or were these groups segregated? If the latter, were the “Asian estates” better or worse than the “black estates” ? After all, we do know that the extent to which council estates deterio­ rate and obtain an unenviable reputation is strongly related to the pro­ portion of “problem families” they contain. And we also know that blacks produce far more of these than do Asians. Blacks have a m as­ sively higher proportion of broken homes, and single parents— and these are highly correlated with the sort of despair which undermines selfrespect and sense of community, factors which, in turn, tend to produce general deterioration in the internal and external environments. However, none of this forms any part of Sm ith’s analysis. M ost wor­ rying of all, however, is the fact that none of the ethnic minority tenants of these estates were actually asked about their level of satisfaction with their accommodation.

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So what we have here is a situation where a council appears to be favouring the ethnic minorities in the allocating of properties, and, sec­ ondly, there is an allegation that the council is operating, whether it knows it or not, a racially discriminatory system with regard to the quality of its housing allocations. Now I do not suggest that this latter possibility should be decisively ruled out. W hat I do say is that it is a peculiarly harsh judgement, given the council’s obvious goodwill, and given the less than convincing data on which the allegation rests.

Picton This is a town in the Midlands. Smith has no hesitation in saying, ‘T here is no alternative to the conclusion that the authority has dis­ criminated unlawfully against the minority applicants.” This is a very serious allegation— though Smith does acknowledge it is not the result of official policy. How convincing is the charge? The key fact is that it is based, not on any suggestion of complaints from those alleged to have been adversely affected, but entirely on statistical imbalances with regard to ethnicity and housing allocations. The figures for just two years are given— 1970-71 and 1973-74. Now in 1970-71, 18 percent of waiting-list al­ locations went to what were described as “immigrants.” In the summer of 1973 a survey showed that the immigrants on the waiting list com­ prised 15 percent of the total on the list. We are not told whether this was the figure for 1970-71, but, if it were, then the immigrants were actually favoured in the proportion of properties allocated. However, the proportion of waiting list allocations that went to immigrants in 1973-74 is given— and that is 10 percent. Now because, in that year, 15 percent of the people on the waiting list were immigrants, Smith claims this is proof of racial discrimination. He does provide some rather speculative further evidence, and this needs to be examined. Smith claims that the immigrants had a substantially higher housing need than white applicants. “Housing need” is not defined. Presumably it means that immigrants, on the whole, were living in less satisfactory accommodations and had bigger households than whites. This is rea­ sonable, assuming that the social and political effects of allocating more properties to immigrants than to indigenous, local people can be ig­ nored. Bearing in mind that the white population has, through its rates and taxes, actually built pretty well all council properties— and before the immigrant community concerned arrived in this country— it does

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not seem entirely reasonable for a local council to be criticised for fail­ ure to allocate more of its precious, scarce-resource housing, to im m i­ grants than to local people— not if the crucial factor of good race relations is to be considered. Essentially, Smith is, by omission, argu­ ing that this element should be ignored, and only statistical disparities should be considered. And, since immigrants, particularly Asians, have bigger families than whites, and since family size is, presumably, a factor in determining housing need, then this problem of allocating more properties to immigrants is going to go on indefinitely. Could it be that the council was aware of this, and was allowing it to affect its percep­ tion of its housing duties? The point is that the council is involved in a complex human situa­ tion in which decision making has to take account of a number of sen­ sitive factors. Smith, and his clipboard collaborators, is a detached outsider armed only with the abstract paraphernalia of statistical soci­ ology. He can afford to make damning allegations from on high; the council is involved in real human dilemmas which do not yield to the egalitarian dictates of an impersonal and highly inexact pseudoscience. Besides, it is hardly convincing, in Sm ith’s own terms, to draw general conclusions on the basis of just one year’s figures; particularly when there is a suggestion in the data that on at least one other occasion the immigrants may well have been favoured in statistical terms.

Bankside This is a town in the south of England. An analysis of lettings to waiting-list applicants was carried out over the years 1972-74. Two things emerged: first, over this period, 10 percent of allocations went to the minorities, and second that only 6 percent of the local population was of ethnic minority origin. That is, as Smith admits, “this means that the minorities were being housed more than pro rata to their num ­ bers in the local population” (p.269). Now this is the sort of statistical imbalance which Smith normally seizes upon in order to substantiate a charge of racial discrimination. However, since, here, the balance of council housing allocations lies in favour of the ethnic minorities and against whites, Smith wastes no further energy on this outcome. This is illustrated by Sm ith’s observation that though a dispropor­ tionate number of properties are going to the minorities viewed collec­ tively, a disproportionately small number is going specifically to Asians. This imbalance, predictably, does cause him concern. He says, “There

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is no escape from the conclusion that the Asians have been the victims of discrimination.” So statistical imbalance where the outcome actu­ ally favours the minorities is not racial discrimination against whites (or, if it is, it can be ignored), but when the reverse occurs it is racial discrimination. This sort of tunnel vision is entirely typical, not only of Smith, but of the whole race relations lobby’s perception o f housing in relation to race. There are further disjunctions between the statistical evidence and Smith’s reaction to it. He states that, “West Indians and whites fared about the same” (p. 269). But how can this be so if Asians fared worse and the ethnic minorities collectively fared better? Surely the West In­ dians fared better than whites. If they did not, whence comes the col­ lective ethnic disparity? Moreover, though it is true that Asians fared worse than whites or blacks, we are not told the precise numbers in­ volved. We do know of Asians’ reluctance to apply for council prop­ erty— m ore evident then, tw enty years ago, than now. It is not unreasonable, therefore, to assume that the actual numbers of Asians involved would be comparatively small. This does not excuse any un­ fairness that might have been involved, but it does give a certain sense of proportion to the issue— a sense of proportion missing from Sm ith’s bald allegation of racism on the part of the council. Again, there is a very puzzling aspect to this council’s housing alloca­ tions. Why, if the council was, in any degree, and consciously or uncon­ sciously, motivated by racial prejudice— why was it that it directed that prejudice only against Asians? This seems at odds with what we know about racial prejudice, that it has a powerful tendency to be of a generalised nature— the anti-Semites are strongly correlated with group hostility to all groups perceived as racial minorities. Why, one wonders, was this factor failing to operate here? Smith gives no thought to this. Also, this finding violates what we know about the relationship be­ tween problem- and broken families and lowered respect for the built and internal environment. As I say above, we know— and knew then— that Asians make better tenants than blacks. Their solid, supportive family systems are a safeguard against the sort of despair and lowered self-esteem which is the curse of council estate management. Blacks— and, increasingly, whites— produce far more problems in this respect than Asians. Why, in view of this should the council adopt an antiAsian housing policy? One would have imagined that any latent preju­ dice would have been more likely to have been displaced on blacks than on Asians. Smith does admit, “Bankside is, therefore, a rem ark­

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able and unusual case in that racial discrimination has been directed specifically against Asians, and not against West Indians and Africans.” He offers no explanation of this beyond the rather feeble comment that it arose because the priority system was at fault, and the allocation procedure was “relatively informal.” The clear possibility that his alle­ gation is undermined by this curious specificity of racism is not, of course, entertained.

Loftus In this northern town it was found that 6.2 percent of applicants on the waiting list at December 1974 were Asians, whilst, over the preceding two and a half years only 2.2 percent of waiting-list allocations went to Asians. Smith implies that this is prima facie evidence of racial discrimi­ nation. However, he has a certain hesitancy in confirming this, because, as he states, of “the obvious goodwill shown by allocations officers to­ wards Asians.” He also admits that, “we are unable to find a full explana­ tion of the discrepancy.” He does suggest various possibilities— none of which is related to discrimination—but limply concludes it may have something to do with, “sketchy and confusing statistics.” However, he is generous enough to concede, “This may or may not have been a case of discrimination.” Or, it may, of course, have been the effect of little green men from outer space landing in the council’s offices. But I must not trivialise what is a crucially important point. The fact is that Smith is making a crucial admission, and one which undermines his whole enterprise: that statistical disparities do not necessarily point to discrimination, and that they may well, indeed, coexist with positive goodwill towards the minorities. This is a clear indication of the lim­ ited value of the sort of statistical sociology which underpins the whole of Smith’s work. There is surely here a strong suggestion that the whole business of housing policy and allocations is far too complex a process to be capable of valid and adequate analysis via the neat, abstract and essentially bloodless procedures favoured by Smith— and, indeed, by the whole race relations lobby.

Conclusions I have looked at only a fraction of Sm ith’s material, but I hope I have said enough to illustrate his perspective, his perceptions, and his m eth­ ods of working. He clearly belongs to that school of thought which

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believes that immensely complex, human phenomena, such as employ­ ment and housing can be effectively reduced to statistical formulae. The crux of his argument is that unequal outcomes are inherently unde­ sirable, and that they point to deficiencies in the system which result in racial discrimination. At several points he concedes there are lim ita­ tions in this sort of simple-minded egalitarianism, particularly where he admits that unequal outcomes are entirely compatible with manifest goodwill; but he nevertheless relies entirely on his ideological assum p­ tions and the dubious explanatory power of statistics to make his case. As I say above, the really important point about the work of Smith and Political and Economic Planning is that its assumptions and m eth­ ods have formed the unquestioned foundations of the work of the CRE. For twenty years enquiries and surveys undertaken by the CRE into crucial areas of social policy and practice, such as employment, hous­ ing and education, have followed the path mapped out by Smith. The values and attitudes of Political and Economic Planning have been, and continue to be, the mind set of the CRE.

7 Education and the CRE Not surprisingly for an organisation concerned with human attitudes and relationships, the CRE has done a good deal of work in education; and it has developed and disseminated a very distinctive view of just what is happening in school and classroom as a result. In order to see just how convincing is the CR E’s general perception of this important area, and how valid and useful is its educational philosophy, I intend now to examine some of the key reports the CRE has issued. These have formed the basis of a Code of Practice in education, which I shall present at the end of this chapter.

Secondary School Allocations A key issue in the administration of the education service is how places in secondary schools are allocated to children entering the sec­ ondary sector. Parents are naturally very concerned that they get a place in the school of their choice for their children. All local education au­ thorities are faced with appeals from parents who have failed to get their children into their first-choice school. But there is more than the business of parental choice involved. The way a local authority organises this aspect of its work throws light on the kind of educational philoso­ phy it espouses. Although the majority of areas run fully comprehen­ sive secondary schools, there are still some which favour selection at eleven plus and continue to run grammar schools alongside nonselective secondary schools. The central point here is that whatever system a local education authority favours, it must do so in a completely pub­ lic and evenhanded way. Any suggestion that the system contains any element of favouritism towards either an individual child, or group o f children, must be rigorously avoided. No local education authority wants to run the risk of attracting public attention to its allocation policy for the wrong reasons. And no procedure in education is more likely to 125

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provide the litigious parent with ammunition. Needless to say, the local education authority has to take particular care in dealing with parental choices regarding ethnic minority children. To allow itself to be influ­ enced by skin colour or national or ethnic origin— that would not only attract moral obloquy; it would be unlawful. Moreover, it would in­ stantly bring down on its head the vociferous condemnations of that race relations lobby which is only too happy to bring to the m edia’s attention any suggestion of “racism.” It is no exaggeration to say that local education authorities take the greatest possible care over their secondary school application policies. They always seek to provide a reasonable and fair set of criteria in order to ensure that their decisions can be publicly defended. It is against this background that the CRE sought to challenge one local education authority on this issue. In February, 1983, the CRE issued Secondary School Allocation in Reading—Report o f a Formal Education. W hat happened was this. In 1978 Berkshire local education authority (LEA) decided to change its existing system of allocating pupils to secondary schools in Reading. Up till that time allocations had been based on parental preference. However, following a conclusion reached by a working party of head teachers that existing arrangements were leading to a wide range in the standard of education the schools could provide, the LEA proposed to introduce a zoning systems in 1978. According to the CRE, these pro­ posals were “Extremely controversial.” Representations were made to the CRE from certain quarters that the proposals were, in fact, “racially discriminatory.” Thereupon the CRE set up a detailed enquiry to ascertain if these allegations were true. Its conclusion, at the end of the enquiry, was emphatic: “We did not conclude that the allocation arrangements, as they operated during most of the period of our investigation, were un­ lawfully discriminatory, nor that, as had been alleged, the Authority had devised them with the intention of discriminating.” That is, the allegations were false. There was no racial discrimination involved, either intended or unintended. However, a casual reading of the actual wording of this conclusion might give the impression that the phrase “most of the period” should be taken as meaning there was evidence of racial discrimination during part of the time the investigation was taking place. This would be an incorrect inference. The fact is that the data given provides no scrap of support for the view that racial discrimination occurred at any time. However, though no racial discrimination was established, the CRE insisted that the LEA had “taken insufficient account of their duties

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under the Race Relations Act.” This criticism is based on the belief that failure to carry out racial monitoring of pupil progress involved a vio­ lation of the principle of equality of opportunity, and that these things indicated a statutory failure on the part of the LEA. This is a strange allegation. In order to support it the CRE point to Sections 19 and 71 of the Act, which outlaw racial discrimination, and which aim to promote good race relations and equality o f opportunity in the field of education. Now, as we have said, the CRE itself con­ fesses that the allegations which provoked the investigations were false, and that there was no evidence of racial discrimination in the LEA’s policy of allocating secondary school places. Nor is there any evidence in the CRE Report that relations between the various ethnic groups in Reading’s schools were anything but good. And there is no evidence that ethnic minority pupils received any less in the way o f opportunity or resources than ethnic majority pupils. Indeed, there is evidence that the very reverse was true. For instance, Reading provided special lan­ guage tuition for ethnic minority children, and this, by common con­ sent, is very expensive. Moreover, the two schools which had provoked the allegation— Sutton Boys’ and Sutton Girls’— had the best pupilteacher ratio of all the twelve schools quoted (p. 70, table 2). There is, neither, any evidence that ethnic minority children had any fewer fa­ cilities available to them, nor any comparative restrictions in the cur­ riculum they followed. Indeed, the Report itself entirely agrees that this was the case: “We do not consider that, in terms of the resources, provisions and opportunities we examined, ethnic minority pupils had been at a disadvantage compared with pupils at other Reading compre­ hensive schools as a result of their concentration in the Alfred Sutton schools” (p. 55, para. 3.2). How, then, was the LEA failing in its statu­ tory duties? There can be only one explanation. Because a disproportionate num ­ ber of West Indian children were classified as remedial, and were there­ fore in need of, and were receiving, special help in the classroom— this differential outcome was assumed to be evidence of inequality of op­ portunity; and this despite the fact that there is no evidence in the re­ port that West Indian pupils were receiving any less in the way of resources or curriculum opportunities than any other group of children. Indeed, they were almost certainly receiving more in the way of public funding, since remedial help is comparatively expensive. One gets a strong sense that the authors of the report are less concerned with pro­ viding a properly informed and complex view of what is a very in­ volved issue than with making a conspiracy theory— racism— stick. If

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black children are achieving less than others, then this, of itself, must mean they are enjoying fewer opportunities.

Public Examinations As far as academic performance in relation to ethnic groups is con­ cerned, the data provided are a great deal less than adequate. In point of fact there is little evidence provided about examination results, as far as white, West Indian, and Asian pupils are concerned. Only examina­ tion entries in the main are given. And, employing that very limited criterion, then there is no scrap of a suggestion that the two relevant schools were any less willing to enter Asian and West Indian pupils for examinations than whites, or than other schools. Indeed, with regard to Asian girls, they appeared more willing to enter them. W hat also clearly emerges is that on the generally accepted measure of a school’s hopes for academic success— entry for five or more O levels— Asians of both sexes did significantly better than West Indians. Moreover, if we look at the one table which does give examination results— and then only for one year, and only for pupils overall, without regard to race— then we can see no evidence of racial bias. With reference to the two schools about which the CRE was most concerned— Sutton Boys and Sutton Girls— the following facts emerge: first there was a higher percentage of grade 1’s at GCSE at both schools than in all other schools’ second, in GCE O level, though Sutton Boys’ did less well than other schools’ pupils, the Girls’ School’s pupils did significantly better. Now since both the Sutton schools contained high proportions of ethnic minority children— 33.7 percent and 28.5 percent— we might have expected both to do comparatively badly, assuming that race is the crucial factor. But, as we have seen, it appears to be sex, not race, which is the really significant factor. Yet the report, though conveying this fact, makes little or nothing of it. As for A level entries, again the sex factor, and not race, appears to be the most relevant influence. It is true that West Indian boys and girls and Asian boys did less well than white boys, but Asian girls did as well as white pupils in the Alfred Sutton Girls’ school. (Curiously, the A level results are not given— so we have no means of comparing per­ formances at this level.) Moreover, if we look at “all other schools,” and exclude the two target schools, then Asian pupils’ entries at A level were only marginally inferior to white entries— 36 percent as opposed to 39 percent.

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And there is yet another factor which reduces the force of the CRE case about racial bias; Asian children appear to have overcome their remedial status at 11+ far more successfully than have their West In­ dian counterparts— assuming that the very scanty evidence regarding remedial status is typical, (table 8) Again, why this should be so, is ignored; but it certainly does not bear out the notion of white versus black bias in the schools. Conclusion Although the reports’ authors admit that no proper statistical analysis of the data was made, that no evidence was forthcoming that ethnic mi­ nority pupils had less favourable resources available to them, that the investigators failed to find “that ethnic minority pupils had been disad­ vantaged in terms of opportunities for entry to examinations by their relative concentration in the Alfred Sutton school,” and “that it is not possible to draw general conclusions from the observations”— despite all this, and despite the clear evidence that sex was important but ig­ nored, the Report makes sweeping recommendations to the LEA. These recommendations are based on the totally unsubstantiated allegation that there was racial disadvantage and bias operating in Reading’s schools. The LEA is recommended to: redraw one of its boundaries; rethink its policy regarding the content of tests and assessment procedures; carry out ethnic monitoring; conduct a special enquiry into the lan­ guage needs of West Indian pupils; make a specialty study “to achieve greater equality of opportunity”; “vigorously” develop in-service train­ ing in “multi-cultural education.” Analyse the selection system for gram­ mar schools; make a “vigorous effort” to involve the parents of ethnic minority pupils in discussions about their children’s education. (There is no evidence in the report that such parents were any less involved than any other parents.) The LEA responded to these recommendations as though the CRE allegations had been substantiated— including the appointment of a highly paid adviser for “multicultural education.” Now it is clearly important to ask how it is that a powerful, statutory organisation, hav­ ing totally failed to demonstrate its case, could, nevertheless, induce an LEA to effect radical, publicly funded changes in its policies. One factor is probably the very considerable legal powers possessed by the CRE. No local authority wants to stand accused of racial dis­ crimination, and although the CRE failed to issue a non-discrimination

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notice— since no kind of discrimination was established— and could, therefore only make ill-founded recommendations, the LEA m ust have judged it more prudent to attempt to solve a nonexistent problem than to take on the might of a body whose views could have threatened the Council’s public reputation. Second, the Council had to endure an in­ terminable delay. The CRE first signalled its interest in 1978, and it then took five years to issue a report. It is very difficult to see how this could be justified, or to square it with the fundamental principle that justice delayed is justice denied. The data in the report could have been provided in six months or less, and the Report produced within a year. In the meantime the LEA had the sword of Damocles hanging over its head. It is not difficult to imagine the atmosphere of anxiety generated by the CRE presence and its long-awaited report amongst both the Council’s officers and members. Nor is it difficult, in the light o f this, to understand the Council’s willingness to get the CRE out of its hair by going along with the Report’s recommendations. This way of ef­ fecting radical changes in school policy must cause grave concern to those who believe that changes in public policy should follow the demonstration of a genuine problem, rather than the dictates o f a pow ­ erful statutory body— a body which appears to be answerable to no one. This is all the more worrying when we consider that the CRE believe that the changes it has effectively enforced in Reading, should be effected throughout the country. “We would urge all LEA’s which have not yet done so to do the same” i.e., the recommendations based on this crude, superficial and highly tendentious report should be en­ forced nationally.

The Sin Bin Controversy In 1979 the CRE decided to carry out an enquiry in Birmingham regarding the number of black pupils being suspended from school for misbehaviour. Their investigators looked at records over the period 1974-1980, and in April 1985 issued a report, Birmingham Local Edu­ cation Authority and Schools: Referral and suspension o f pupils. It was established that black, i.e., West Indian pupils were more likely— and to a very significant extent— to finish up in suspension or referral cen­ tres than were other pupils. The conclusion of the investigators is em ­ phatic and typically portentous: The significance of this report goes beyond the situation in Birmingham. The Commission has no reason to suppose that conditions in Birmingham at that time

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were unique. It believes that the findings of this report may well apply to similar urban areas and that this report therefore has national implications. The dispro­ portionate levels of black suspensions uncovered by this investigation confirm the continued concerns expressed by the black community over the treatment of their children in schools and the Commission urges all education authorities in multi-racial areas to consider the implications of this report for their own suspen­ sion arrangements and to review them accordingly.

Two preliminary points need to be made. First, as we have noted elsewhere, because it claims to have found something amiss in one area, the CRE automatically asserts that this finding can be generalised to all areas. Secondly, as we have noted in the section above regarding Reading LEA, there was incredible delay in producing the Report. It took six years. We are given no explanation of this tim e lag. So again, as with the Reading case, an LEA had the threat of a possibly adverse report hanging over it for a very long time indeed. During that time, of course, the Council’s officers would have been very vulnerable to CRE influence. Is it unreasonable to suspect that this pronounced tendency for extreme delay is a deliberate tactic? It is interesting to note that the Report records that the proportion of West Indian pupils being sus­ pended was falling from 1979, i.e., from the year that the CRE an­ nounced its intention to launch a formal investigation, and six years before the Report alleging racial discrimination actually appeared, (p. 1, para. 1.1)

Equality of Outcome Throughout this report the underlying assumption is that all groups of pupils ought to be proportionately “represented” in behavioural outcomes. If there are more black than white pupils suspended or referred for bad behaviour, then this is prim a facie evidence that dis­ crim ination against black pupils has taken place. It is then up to the accused to disprove the allegation. We will not comm ent further than we have above on the inadequacies o f this mode o f reasoning. Suffice to say that there is increasing evidence that disparity and not equality o f outcome is the norm in education. The relationship betw een ethnic group and school performance, for instance, is not random: it dis­ plays system atic group variations. Data given in the Swann Report, for instance, indicates clear and consistent differences according to ethnic group— not least as between West Indian and Asian pupils. And there is evidence in this Report of sim ilar results with regard to pupil behaviour.

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Asian Pupils Although the authors of this Report seek to collapse differences within ethnic minority groups with regard to misbehaviour, by calling all non­ white groups “black”— another CRE tendency— their intellectual in­ tegrity compels them to provide some date about Asian pupils. Table 1 (p. 21) reveals that only 1.3 percent o f the pupils suspended for misbehaviour in the period 1974-1980 were of Asian origin. This means, that in relation to their proportions in the schools’ population, this group of pupils were about five or six times less likely to be suspended than statistical predictions would suggest. In other words the Report’s as­ sumption of the desirability of racial equality of outcome is seriously undermined by the massive “under-representation” of Asian pupils in suspension and referral rates. Curiously, the Report makes nothing of this. Although the fact that West Indian pupils are “over-represented” by a factor of four— and this is construed as prima facie evidence of discrimination against black pupils— the corresponding fact that Asians are “under-represented” by a factor of at least five, is not assumed to be evidence of discrimination against non-Asian pupils. W hilst in the period under review, 325 West Indian pupils were suspended, the figure for Asian pupils was just 12. This massive and patently revealing difference is totally ignored in the Report’s analysis, conclusions, and recommendations. W hilst the authors of the Report claim to have discovered evidence of indirect discrimination in “the system”— specifically in relation to the teachers responsible for suspension decisions— they fail to explain why this hostility should have been directed only at West Indian pupils. Why are the Asian children immune from the effects of this “institu­ tional racism” ? After all, Asians are a visible minority, and are as much a part of the teacher’s class control problems as any other group of pupils. Neither this obvious defect in the Report’s egalitarian theorising, nor the additional fact that, in relation to Asian pupils, white pupils are also significantly “over-represented”— neither of these two problems is acknowledged, let alone explained. In short, the transparent weak­ ness in the author’s notion of proportional outcomes is provided by the data the authors themselves provide.

Educational Guidance Centres As with suspension rates, the West Indian pupils were significantly “over-represented” in educational Guidance Centres. There are strong

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suggestions in the Report that West Indian parents disapproved of this. And there are broad hints that the explanation for this further statistical imbalance is discrimination against the black children. Again, this is a curious position for the authors to adopt. If the explanation lay in the alleged direction, and was against the wishes of the West Indian par­ ents, why, one wonders, does the Report itself say, “The parent and child had to be in agreement with the referral”? That is, if the authors of the Report are correct, the black parents appear to be complaining about a decision to which they, and their children, had given their con­ sent. There is no hint in the Report that the parents were coerced. M ore­ o ver, as w ith su sp e n sio n ra te s , the A sian c h ild re n w ere “under-represented” in the Guidance Centres. Yet, again, the possible significance of this is ignored.

Suspension and Types of Misbehaviour If we assume that all ethnic groups should be proportionately “rep­ resented” in suspension rates, it is reasonable to assume further they w ill be p ro p o rtio n a tely “re p re se n te d ” in the v arious kinds o f misbehaviour. However, if we were to find that one group of pupils w as m ore lik ely to engage in the m ore serio u s c a te g o rie s o f misbehaviour, then it is reasonable to predict that that group will be more likely to be suspended. After all, suspension is a serious matter. Schools do not suspend pupils for trivial misbehaviour. They have to be convinced that the pupil concerned has been involved in serious misbehaviour and, within the context of the school, misbehaviour which cannot be controlled. The pupil would also have had to show signs of being incorrigible. That is, his serious misbehaviour has recurred over a significant period of time. That is, suspension follows the establish­ ment of a record of serious transgressions. Both these patterns can be seen in the data. Table 3 reads as follows: Analysis o f behaviour leading to suspension Category

% o f U.K. Whites

% o f all W.I.

Violence to teachers Immoral conduct

11.4 1.6

19.4 4.5

Disobedience Disruption in class Theft/breaking into school Damage to property Truancy

6.8 11.2 3.4 6.2 5.7

3.4 6.2 0.6 2.5 1.4

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Table 4 reads as follows: Previous behaviour o f suspended pupils Category

% ofU.K. Whites

% o f all W.I.

Verbal abuse of staff Threatened violence to teachers Actual violence to teachers Aggressive behaviour

15.7 2.7 5.3 9.0

30.1 6.7 8.7 18.7

Disobedience Disruption in class Damage to property Truancy

20.7 41.3 9.0 30.7

17.7 37.5 5.4 22.4

These figures make it clear that West Indian pupils are much more likely to have engaged in the more serious bad behaviours, both as a prelude to suspension, and over time. The authors of the Report actu­ ally acknowledge this: “All West Indians thus continued to be over­ represented in the areas of direct confrontation with teaching staff, including actual violence, with the greatest over-representation being verbal abuse to staff (sic) (14.4% over). As with other reasons for sus­ pension, all West Indians were over-represented in aggressive behaviour. Similarly, all West Indian pupils were consistently less-represented in the less directly confrontational offences of disobedience, disruption, damage and truancy” (p. 28, para 3.15). Why this blindingly obvious relationship between serious and con­ tinued misbehaviour and suspension rates is totally ignored as an influ­ ence on differential rates of suspension— this can only be a m atter for speculation about the seriousness of the authors’ search for truth. But it hardly makes for confidence in the validity of the “institutional rac­ ism” the Report claims to have uncovered. If there are systematic dif­ ferences in levels and rates of the most serious misbehaviours between groups of pupils, then there are bound to be systematic variations in suspension rates. Unless, that is, we assume teachers ought to be more prepared to accept serious misbehaviours from black than from white pupils— a proposition the Report comes perilously close to suggesting.

The Cultural Explanation The authors claim that a significant factor in the teachers’ response to black pupils misbehaviour is cultural misunderstanding; the tendency

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for West Indians to lower their eyes when confronted by a teacher— this is misconstrued by the teacher as showing disrespect, even inso­ lence. And this, in turn, is translated into teacher hostility against black children. This tendency to clutch at straws, to blame the teacher, for pupil misbehaviour is made explicit in the report’s comments: “Con­ frontation arises when relationships break down and for that both par­ ties to the relationship are necessarily, at least in part, responsible” (p. 49, para 5.4). Now, of course, some teachers are more adept than others in m ain­ taining discipline in the classroom. And no doubt there is such a thing as a personality clash between teacher and taught. But to ascribe blame to teachers for the sorts o f serious and consistently unacceptable misbehaviours which alone lead to suspension— this is a very dubious form of special pleading. This is particularly so in the context of the secondary school, where pupils have as many as ten or more teachers in a single week. Moreover, this mode of explanation contains a rather offensive subtext, i.e., that serious misbehaviours are a function of West Indian culture. It is perhaps worth noting that this “cultural determinism” has en­ joyed considerable currency, thanks to its active promotion by the race relations lobby. For instance, another report on the same subject issued by the Nottinghamshire County Council in 1991— after pressure from the CRE— also takes refuge in this form of special pleading. In com­ menting on why, though black pupils account for only 6.7 percent of the relevant school population, they comprise 25 percent of warned, sus­ pended, and expelled pupils, the chairman of the education committee said this: “Sometimes teachers feel threatened merely because black youngsters have an exuberance that white pupils do not have.” The Re­ port itself claims that teachers misunderstand West Indian “body lan­ guage” in construing bad behaviour as disruption, abuse, and assault. Downcast eyes, exuberance, and body language, then, are all factors which the teacher must needs take into account when responding to black pu­ pils behaviour. If, that is, they are to avoid the charge of racism. The consequences of this double standard on life in classrooms is not something its advocates have bothered to think through. The teacher would clearly have to adopt two different rule books for the way in which he perceived and responded to pupil misbehaviours. He would have to make certain allowances, and these would vary according to the race of the pupil concerned in specific incidents. Before he emitted an appropriate reaction in relation to cheek, say, from a black pupil, he

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would need to stop and ask himself whether this was really cheek, or simply an acceptable behaviour in West Indian culture. If the latter, then he clearly would not be entitled to regard cheek as misbehaviour at all— and he would emphatically have to eschew any suggestion of punishment. However, in responding to cheek in, say, an Asian child, he might feel much more confident that the cultures of the classroom and that of the home were in harmony— and respond accordingly. One does not have to be particularly perceptive to imagine the effect of this behavioural apartheid on the atmosphere of the classroom— particu­ larly on race relations amongst the pupils. Notwithstanding all this, and in order to placate the CRE, Nottingham County Council has prom­ ised to hire more black teachers, and review its exclusions procedures.

Single Parent Factor There is now a consensus that children from single parent back­ grounds are, on the average, more likely to fail in schools than those from united, two parent families. This applies both to school work and behaviour. Variations on this variable between groups, therefore, could be held to be significant in determining variations in misbehaviour. (See Families without Fatherhood, IEA, N. Dennis & G. Erdos, 1992) There is some confusion in the Report about the proportion of black pupils coming from single parent homes. The Birmingham LEA m ain­ tained that, between 1974-76, 45 percent of all the black children re­ ferred to special centres were from single parent homes. The Report accepts that only 9 percent of the relevant population was black. How­ ever, the Report appears to dispute the LEA figure regarding the pro­ portion of single parent black families. On page 33 we find the following statement, “All West Indians (31.1%) were more represented than U.K. whites in the single parent category (19.9%).” So either the Birming­ ham LEA was overrepresenting the figure, or the records examined by the CRE officials were, to a significant extent, failing to record the fact. Either way, the black versus white difference was very large in­ deed— if we average the two figures given for West Indian children, there are very nearly twice as many black as white children from single parent homes. We are not told what proportion of Asian children in­ volved in suspension or referrals were from broken homes. This is pos­ sibly because there were so few of such children involved. However, by means of a complicated statistical procedure, the au­ thors of the Report claim that the single parent factor is more likely to

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be influential with white than with black children. That is, black chil­ dren are less affected by the experiences of single parent family life than white children, in terms of their tendency to misbehave in school. This is a surprising finding, since it appears to contradict what is known about the relationship between broken families and social pathology generally. It could be that black children from single parent families are less likely to be adversely affected than their white counterparts because broken families are much more common in the West Indian community. But that is pure speculation.

Inner- versus Outer-City Schools According to the Report there was a generally held belief amongst educational personnel that inner-city schools were less likely than outer city schools to suspend black children— and that this resulted from the fact that such schools coped better, because they understood West In­ dian cultures and behaviour better. However, according to the report “inner city schools had higher rates of suspension” overall. But, according to a further complicated statisti­ cal technique, “the extent to which the over-representation of West In­ dian pupils am ong suspensions can be accounted for by th eir concentration in inner city areas is very small.” So, at least to the au­ thors’ satisfaction, this factor, too, can be rule out as a factor contribut­ ing to the disproportionate number of suspended black pupils.

Conclusion Having ruled out the single parent and inner-city variables, the au­ thors of the report claim that only “institutional racism” is left to ac­ count for the considerable differences in the black versus w hite suspension and referral rates. However, this is posited on a num ber of very questionable assumptions. First, there is the ever-present belief that all ethnic groups “ought” to behave in similar ways in school, when the evidence the Report it­ self provides indicates that this expectation is invalid. Not only are there considerable variations in listed misbehaviours according to a black versus white distinction, there is very clear evidence that Asian children are far less likely than either black or white children to engage in serious misbehaviours, i.e., misbehaviour, according to the Report’s own data, does vary with ethnic group.

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Second, to rule out two supposed causal factors does not rule out other, unexamined possibilities. For instance, there is a widely held acceptance of the fact that discipline in the West Indian home is more severe than in white homes, and in school, where behavioural control is much more liberal and less dependent on physical chastisement. West Indian pupils may well perceive this softer approach as a form of weak­ ened authority, and are more inclined than their white classmates to engage in serious m isbehaviour as a way of testing the permitted limits of misbehaviour. The variations between the West Indian home and the school with regard to the concept of punishment may well lead to greater confusion in black children— and it would not be surprising if this con­ tributed to misbehaviour. This may have been a significant aspect, but it is ignored in the Report. Third, pupils who engage in the more serious misbehaviours are more likely than other pupils to be suspended from school. The Report’s own data does show that black pupils did, to a significant extent, engage in the most serious misbehaviours. But, again, this factor is ignored in the Report’s conclusions. Fourth, why do the authors of the Report ignore the devastating effect of the Asian pupils’ inclination not to misbehave to a serious extent on the “racism ” thesis? Why is significant black “over-repre­ sentation” taken to mean discrim ination against black pupils, whilst Asian “under-representation” is not taken to indicate discrim ination against non-Asian pupils? W hy this highly selective perception of what is going on? Is the CRE claiming that, whilst the first possibility is a function of “racism ,” the second is not? Are teachers perceiving and recording variations in m isbehaviour according to race only with regard to black and white pupils, but not to Asian pupils? But Asian pupils not only outperform black pupils in this respect, they outper­ form white pupils too. If the CRE allegation is to stick, then it would seem that teachers are ranking children in the order Asian, white, black before they m ake judgm ents about m isbehaviour in their own classrooms. This seems, to put it mildly, intrinsically unlikely. M ore­ over, if that were happening, one wonders why the CRE is not also complaining on behalf of white pupils and their parents, since they, too, are the victims of teacher bias. The overriding impression given to a dispassionate reader of the Report is that, on the whole, black pupils behave worse than white, who, in turn behave worse than Asian pupils. And these observed varia­ tions cause schools to suspend and refer accordingly.

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It is not without interest that, despite the considerable changes the Birmingham LEA made as a result of this Report and pressure from the CRE, the 1988 CRE Annual Report notes that black suspension rates in the city are again rising— a fact which evokes the ominous comment, “options for future action will now have to be carefully considered” (p. 38).

Racism and Educational Achievement The notion that inequality of educational outcome between groups establishes pretty well beyond question that the less achieving group is the victim of discrimination and unfairness in the system—this mode of egalitarian reasoning has been the bedrock o f both sociological en­ quiry and political assertion for decades. The major area in which this unquestioned assumption has operated is social class. Every trainee teacher has for thirty years and more been inculcated with the belief that if the working-class child, on the average, achieves less than his middle-class counterpart in school, then this, in itself, proves that there are assumptions and practices within the education system which oper­ ate to the disadvantage of—and explain the “underachievement” of— children from working class homes. This philosophy has been taken over by the CRE, except that the mechanism explaining variations in outcome is not social class prejudice but racial bias. If ethnic minority children achieve less, on the average, than children from the majority population, then the reason must be that the system, including— per­ haps decisively— the attitudes and expectations of white teachers— the system must be “racist.” The violation of the desirable outcome of group equality is enough to ensure that the system stands accused of failing the underdogs. However, the assumption that different ethnic groups ought to achieve equally is no more than that. It is an assumption which could only con­ vince if different ethnic groups were equal on all those factors which contribute to educational achievement. For instance, it may be that cer­ tain groups have a stronger urge to succeed in school than others. And this variation in attitude would be likely to express itself in variations in success-linked pupil behaviour. For instance, it may be that Group A spends more time in the library than Group B or C, that Group A takes greater care in doing homework, and possibly is more prepared to be­ have well in class and is more task-oriented and willing to concentrate. It may well be that the desire to succeed educationally as a prelude to

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professional and business success is not random but systematically variable amongst groups. All these factors could be operating to determine variations in aver­ age outcomes according to race. But none of this would be acceptable to the research establishment which serves the formidable race rela­ tions lobby headed by the CRE. The overriding power of “racism” to explain group differences is taken as read. This is made clear in the CR E’s response to the findings of the Swann Committee of Enquiry. In the section headed “Underachievement” we find the following: Evidence: the Committee concentrate on examination results as their measure of achievement and point out that, in the absence of ethnically based national statis­ tics, they have had to rely on a variety of research evidence, in particular the DES School Leavers Surveys of 1978-1979 and 1981-1983 and Crafts and Crafts study of 1983. From this evidence the Committee conclude that “Asian” and “White” children are achieving at roughly equivalent levels but that “West Indian” pupils are doing significantly less well. (p. 3)

The response to Swann then goes on to cast doubt on the reliability of the evidence, and regrets the absence of national statistics; dismisses the recording of examination results as “crude,” and deplores the fail­ ure of the Swann Committee to apply the notion of “institutional rac­ ism” to the business of “underachievement.” S everal com m ents are ap p ro p riate. F irst, th ere is re lu c ta n t acknowledgement of the fact that, whilst West Indian pupils are achiev­ ing less than other groups, Asian and White groups are broadly compa­ rable in their success rates. Secondly, the CRE’s dismissive response to the evidence Swann produced is scarcely convincing. It is true that national evidence was not available, but the evidence that was, was not inconsiderable. For the first part of the enquiry— the Rampton enquiry— into the education of ethnic minority children, six LEA’s supplied data. According to the DES statistics branch, this sample contained no fewer than one half of ethnic minority school leavers in the country— a pro­ portion any researcher conducting a survey would be very glad to ac­ cept as a pretty well representative sample. Five of the original LEA’s supplied information for 1981-82 school leavers to Swann. The re­ sponse to this second survey was 99 percent of the schools approached— which is as near perfect as one is ever likely to get. Thirdly, the CRE insistence on the influence of “institutional racism” as a way of explaining ethnic variations is distinctly puzzling. They define this term as the damaging effects on children’s education of

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“many educational procedures and practices which have the effect of disproportionately excluding ethnic minority children from access to educational opportunities”. There is a hint that teacher expectation and attitudes, access to preschool provision, and “culturally biased” assess­ ment procedures might be operating to the disadvantage of ethnic m i­ nority children. However, no evidence that any of these allegations is grounded in fact is given by the CRE. They appear to be assumptions seized on to give the nebulous “institutional racism” some sort of re­ spectability. However, even if these allegations had any validity, why should they adversely affect black, but not Asian children? After all, Asian children go to the same schools as other children, have the same teachers, follow the same curriculum, are subjected to the same assess­ ment procedures, and are just as likely to be faced with the same condi­ tions of entry to nursery schools as are black children. But there are other questions arising from the CR E’s attitude to Swann. For instance, they are very dismissive of the relationship be­ tween measured IQ and educational achievement. Now it is true that there is a very scholarly discussion of the IQ issue in Swann (pp. 12663), and that its authors dismiss the notion of a genetic explanation of ethnic variations. That is a view which I am very much inclined to support. Nevertheless, whilst variations may be entirely due to envi­ ronmental factors, the fact remains that the IQ is a good predictor of academic success. Swann acknowledges this in saying that the IQ “may be the best measure of potential that has yet been devised.” And the fact is that there are significant differences in average IQ ’s within the various ethnic groups— and black children, on the average, do score consistently below certain other groups of children. This has been shown to be the case over a long period of time, in many different parts of the world, and with all the relevant dependent variables held constant. A standard textbook in psychology, after considering all the available evidence, says this: “In general, it must be accepted that the difference (i.e., between black and white children with regard to average IQ scores) is a consistent one, and not due to accident or error” (A Textbook o f Psychology, Radford J. (ed.), Sheldon Press, 1982, p. 385). W hatever one’s view of the race and IQ debate, the fact remains that the average performance of black children in relation to their white and Asian counterparts in British schools is precisely what the protagonists of the IQ explanation would have predicted. W hilst there is no doubt that the causes of the IQ differences are open to debate, that the differ­ ences do exist, and can be shown to relate to academic performance—

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these things are indubitable. But since this mode of thinking cannot be accommodated to the “racism” explanation, the CRE dism iss it as irrelevant. The CRE also dismisses the possible influence of the group’s own cultural values on average academic performance. They do so by ignor­ ing it. Yet no one with any expertise in the field of educational perfor­ mance and assessment would deny that the group’s attitude to such things as family cohesion and support, the work ethic, postponed gratification, and the need for educational qualifications— these things are implicated in educational outcomes. And the fact is that there are significant varia­ tions on these factors as between different groups in society. Attempts by the Swann Committee to assess the specific influence of these sorts of factors, in research it, itself, had commissioned, were frustrated when the research was abandoned for reasons which have never been fully explained. However, despite the failure of the CRE even to acknowledge this factor’s existence, the Swann report pointed unequivocally to its importance: “Wherever the truth may lie, the reasons for the very differ­ ent school performances of Asians and West Indians seem likely to lie deep within their respective cultures” (p. 87, para. 6.7). Moreover, the supposition that “racism,” even if it can be shown to be operating, necessarily depressed achievement levels, is by no means self-evident. As I point out elsewhere, this notion has been challenged by Thomas Sowell on the basis of information gathered worldwide, and in relation to many different ethnic groups (The Economics and Politics o f Race, Wm. Morrow, N.Y., 1983). Despite the obvious de­ bilitating effects of prejudice and discrimination, the fact remains that, paradoxically, some of the most sinned against groups have been amongst the most successful: Japanese Americans, Chinese in South­ ern Asia, and the Jews almost everywhere. In this country, if we accept the Home Office data on racial attacks, then it is not the poorest achieving blacks who suffer the most, it is the Asian community, whose children appear to be doing rather well in school (The Response to Racial Attacks and Harassment, Home Of­ fice, 1989). And the question this raises is not why is it that the ethnic minorities achieve less than whites in school, but rather why is it that Asians appear to be able to overcome the effects of racism so much more successfully than West Indians? That is precisely the sort of ques­ tion the answer to which could be of real value in assisting black chil­ dren to achieve more in school. And it is precisely the sort of question the CRE relentlessly ignores. Because it cannot be fitted into the CRE’s

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racism explanation o f ethnic differences in educational outcomes, this question cannot be confronted, or even acknowledged. In addition to this, the CRE’s institutional pessimism prevents it from recognising that the Swann Report contains information encouraging to West Indian pupils and their parents. Though black children do achieve less than other groups, there is evidence that their performance is im ­ proving. Between the publication of the Swann report and its predeces­ sor, the Rampton Report, the percentage of West Indian school leavers obtaining five or more higher grade S.C.E.’s and O level increased from 3 to 6 percent, i.e., it doubled. In English language the percentage obtain­ ing higher grades rose from 9 to 15 percent. At A level the percentage of West Indian youngsters achieving at least one pass increased from 2 to 5 percent, i.e., it more than doubled. This striking improvement— in terms of the CRE’s racism argument— could only be explained either by a de­ crease in discrimination, or an increase in black youngster’s ability to overcome its effects— either of which ought to be a cause for rejoicing. The truth is that, anyone who is prepared to examine the best available data in an honest and dispassionate way, cannot but agree that the CRE’s racism explanation of “underachievement” is deeply flawed. Data made available since Swann reinforces this conclusion. A large-scale study in­ volving twenty multiracial comprehensive schools, and published in 1989— four years after Swann—provides information which is both op­ timistic, and which points irresistibly to the fact that racial prejudice has little or no effect on children’s achievements in school. The proportion of children from the ethnic minorities in the various schools ranged from 12 to 89 percent. This study not only measured attainment, as measured by public examinations. It also assessed academic progress— a vital datum, since it takes account not only of measured performance at the end of school life, but places this against the child’s achievement at the begin­ ning of his school life in the secondary school: The differences in exam results attributable to ethnic group are very much smaller than those attributable to the school level. In other words, what school a child goes to makes far more difference than which ethnic group he or she belongs to. The relative performance of different ethnic groups varies somewhat between schools, but such variations are trivial compared with the very large school differ­ ences across all ethnic groups” (The School Effect, D. J. Smith, and Sally Tomlinson, P.S.I., 1989, p. 282)

This same study also indicates that minority group youngsters have more positive attitudes towards school than have white children. They are more likely— and this includes West Indians— to pursue further study,

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both full- and part-time, after leaving school. On the specific issue of racial prejudice, the study offers no support for the CRE’s “racism” the­ sis: “there is no evidence that racial hostility at school is an important factor for 12 and 13 year old children. This is strongly confirmed by parents. When asked in what ways they were dissatisfied with the school, parents rarely mentioned racial prejudice or hostility of any kind. Just one per cent of parents mentioned racial attacks, or that black and white children don’t get on. Eight out of 2,075 parents interviewed mentioned racial prejudice among teachers” (p. 305). Moreover, the authors are anx­ ious to dispel contrary assertions from other sources, “Although a num­ ber of reports, such as the Bumage High School Inquiry, have created the impression that overt racism is a serious problem in multi-ethnic schools, on closer examination they provide little hard evidence on this matter, and no evidence at all of the size and extent of any such problem. The present findings are not, therefore, in conflict with any substantial body of evidence from elsewhere” (p. 306). A very similar and encouraging view has been taken by Professor Desmond Nuttall of the London School of Economics. A report in The Sunday Times of 3.11.91. says this: As recently as October 1991 he reported very encouraging results from a sample of multi-ethnic pupils from schools in six London Boroughs. He compared the English and Maths performances of six groups—Indian, Pakistani, Turkish, Bangla Deshi, Greek, and Afro-Caribbean—in terms of GCSE results for the year 1988. Four of the six groups outperformed the English group in maths, and five ex­ ceeded and one (the Afro-Caribbean group) equalled the performance of the En­ glish group in English. Although the sample may have been affected by the “London Effect” (the tendency for white, middle class parents to move out of London Bor­ oughs), the scores were adjusted to take account of social class. Professor Nuttall echoes the Swann Report in pointing to the influence of group values on children’s educational performance, “Parental aspirations are among the major ingredients here. We know that the Asian community are very keen to see their children do well, and offer them a lot of support.”

In short, the CR E’s view that average ethnic variations in educa­ tional outcomes are a function of “institutional racism” is not only deeply flawed. It is offensive to the schools’ and teachers’ efforts to serve the needs of all their pupils, whatever the colour of their skin.

The CRE and Ethnic Languages The attitude of the CRE to the issue of ethnic minority languages in the education service is precisely expressed in the following statement:

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“Government should make special grants and provisions to local au­ thorities which provide for the teaching of ethnic minority languages and the teaching of other subjects through the medium o f these lan­ guages” (“Ethnic Minority Community Languages; A Statement,” CRE, 1982). A number of points arise from this. The CRE has no hesitation in demanding special, increased public funding for ethnic languages. Why such languages should attract this privileged treatment is not made clear. Nor does the CRE make clear just what the term “ethnic languages” actually means. At the moment there are about 200 non-English lan­ guage groups in Britain. (See my paper, “M inority Languages in the Classroom,” Education Today vol. 41, no.4, Winter 1991.) Clearly, not all of these can be given the privileged position in the school curricu­ lum the CRE is demanding. Which, then, should be selected? And on the basis of what criteria? The CRE do not address either of these key issues; but in its many statements about this subject it invariably refers to the major languages of the Indian subcontinent—Hindi, Panjabi, Urdu, Gujerati, though it does, occasionally, refer to Greek and Turkish. O f course, any one of the many different language groups now present in this country could make a defensible case for its language to be favoured. No doubt they all have a developed grammar, a complex vo­ cabulary and worthwhile, perhaps even distinguished, literature. Learn­ ing any one of them could, no doubt, be claimed as a genuine educational experience. But in deciding which of such languages are to be favoured, and which, by definition, disfavoured, the education authorities are bound to be involved in a judgm ent which could cause conflict be­ tween the various foreign language groups now resident in this coun­ try. You cannot make choices—particularly about something as emotive as language— and support these choices out of public funds without upsetting those who are rejected in the process. It is curious that a body specifically obliged to promote good community relationships should be advocating such a patently divisive policy. Even more surprising, the CRE appears blithely unaware that this unfortunate and ill-thoughtout approach to language in a multifarious society actually is divisive. They appear not to have read the wise thought of Alexis de Tocqueville who said, after observing the United States’ commitment to a single, national language, “The tie of language is perhaps the strongest and the most durable that can unite mankind.” The opposite, of course, is equally true— failure to observe a single, unifying language at the public level can serve to disunite and fragment society.

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Moreover, if the CRE is concerned with assisting the progress o f the ethnic m inorities, it is, again, odd how it is failing to place the emphasis of its language policy on the learning o f English. English is the language of personal and vocational progress for everyone. It is the language of equal opportunities. A comment from a Spanish-speak­ ing imm igrant to the U.S.A. makes this clear: “M y children learn Spanish in school so they can grow up to be bus-boys and waiters. I teach them English at home so they can grow up to be doctors and law yers” (U.S. Brochure, p. 7). All previous imm igrants to this coun­ try have understood this, and have fulfilled their and their children’s potential as a result. English, too, is a powerful weapon against the sort of ignorance and fear about newcomers which can so easily be translated into hostility and discrimination. The indigenous population is much more likely to accept and work alongside people who have made the effort to learn our language than with those who have not. Without a common lan­ guage how can communication take place? Without English, people are cut off from the mainstream, and consigned to a virtual, or actual, ghetto. And how does that help the prospect of ethnic progress, or good race relations? This is particularly so in the case of Asian mothers, who are still sending their children to infant school without any English, and are incapable of helping them with the vital elements of early learn­ ing, such as reading. It is perhaps worth pointing out that a report published in 1989, by the Adult Literacy and Basic Skills Unit (a government-funded agency), stated nearly half a million adults in Britain have little or no English. Although 1.75 million use it as a second language, nearly a third speak only a little English, and four out of ten cannot cope with writing it. Only 44,000 adults were, at that time, attending English classes, and many more needed help. Why, then, is the CRE, which sees itself as the ethnic m inorities’ official friend and helper, not campaigning for more investment in English as a second language tuition? Why is it pressing for more and more provision of ethnic minority languages, when the minorities already know those languages and are seeking to maintain them by their own, private efforts— as immigrant communities in this country have always done? Every ethnic minority child who starts school is entirely competent in Urdu, Panjabi, Gujerati, or whatever, having learnt it at m other’s knee and in the bosom of the family. It is their inability to speak English which creates difficulties, and, for many, hin­ ders progress. (See a report in The Bradford Telegraph &Argos, 20.5.93.)

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M oreover, the notion that ethnic m inority children m ake better progress in school when taught in their first language is false— though this does not prevent the CRE from continuing to believe it is true. None of the research done for the Swann Committee on this issue pro­ vides support for the CRE view. (See pp. 403-404). And the extensive research done in the U.S.— where there is much more experience in this field than in the U.K.— effectively demolishes the idea. (See my paper, “Minority Languages in the Classroom,” Education Today, vol.41, Winter 1991.) Unfortunately pressure from the CRE and other sources has caused considerable sums of public money to be invested in this chimera; and a new vested interest functioning in the public service, and surrounding the whole issue of mother-tongue teaching, has thereby been created. A much more helpful approach from the CRE would be to support the “saturation technique” adopted in many Canadian schools in teaching French to English-speaking children. There, from the very outset, the pupil is totally immersed in the language to be learnt— he hears and sees nothing in his first language. And the results are good. If we used this method, children would acquire English quicker and make more rapid progress in the vital early stages of learning.

The E.E.C. Directive on Migrant Workers’ Children Just how muddleheaded the CRE is on this issue can be seen from the two most influential documents it has issued on the subject. In 1980 the CRE issued a statement by Ming Tsow, an official of the CRE. This was based on a directive of the EEC, and was aimed specifically at the chil­ dren of migrant workers within the EEC countries. Its purpose was to encourage member states to teach such children the mother tongue of their parents’ homeland—in the schools— with the main objective of eas­ ing their transfer back to the homeland. This intention is made explicit in the preamble: “Whereas host member states should also take, in con­ junction with member states of origin, appropriate measures to promote the teaching of the mother tongue and of the culture of the country of origin of the above-mentioned children, with a view principally to facili­ tating their possible reintegration into the member state of origin.” The CRE document claims that the directive applies with equal force to nonmember states, and, by implication to children whose parents are not migrant workers but British citizens. It is difficult to see how, if the authors of the directive wanted this to be the case, they did not say so in the first place. Moreover, though the directive does refer to the mother

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language, it also specifically stresses the importance of immigrant chil­ dren learning the language of the host state: “Whereas in order to per­ mit the integration of such children into the educational environment and the school system of the host state, they should be able to receive suitable tuition including teaching of the language of the host country.” But, predictably, the CRE response makes very little of this manifestly sensible point. Essentially, the CRE gloss on the EEC statement aims to show that the directive lends support to the view that mother tongue teaching is some sort of right. This is a very dubious proposition. But the CRE appear to support it. The CRE gloss actually deplores, by im ­ plication, the official British interpretation: “The D.E.S. has interpreted this Article (Article 3 of the Directive) as not conferring a personal individual right on those covered by the Directive to be taught the lan­ guage and culture of their state of origin.” The D.E.S. view was echoed in the Fifth Report of the Home Affairs Committee of the House of Commons (1980-1981) on Racial Disadvantage: “We are not convinced either that a local education authority is under any obligation to pro­ vide mother tongue teaching, or that it is necessarily in the general interest that they should do so.” And that was four years after the EEC Directive was issued. It is worth noting that the Swann Committee itself explicitly con­ demns those who present the EEC Directive as providing support for mother tongue teaching: “In order to justify the need to maintain and foster the linguistic diversity of British society today, it is surely irrel­ evant for the advocates of mother tongue provision to ‘pray in aid’ a Directive intended to meet an entirely different situation” (p. 402, par. 3.9). The same sort of special pleading on behalf o f the mother tongue is apparent in Ethnic Minority Community Languages—A Statement (May 1983). This presents the issue as being of major national impor­ tance, with huge implications for government, the DES, local authori­ ties, further education, the CNAA and other validating bodies, the teacher unions, and both sides of industry. (Like all pressure groups the CRE has a gift for this sort of gigantism— either one accepts their view, or the roof falls in.) However, apart from some rather overheated prose, which might have been culled from Pseuds’ Comer in Private Eye (“The dynamism of exchange and development are vital aspects of these lan­ guages as living experiences”), the statement provides no remotely convincing case. Indeed its references to research are misleading, and are effectively demolished by the reviews of the research given in the Swann Report. The CRE document claims that research evidence plainly

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shows the advantage of bilingual education: “The results (in Bradford) favour the bilingual curriculum (Panjabi and English). In particular the results demonstrated the positive effect of the bilingual curriculum in developing the child’s use of mother tongue and English, in facilitating the child’s general adjustment to formal education, and in supporting the bilingual curriculum within the first school ethos. The implication of this is particularly relevant to the overall education o f the children” (p. 10, para. 3.30.). These huge and categorical claims are in sharp contrast to the much more guarded and scholarly conclusions of the detailed assessment of the relevant evidence reported in Swann. In referring to the three major research projects in this country on the subject of bilingual education (Bradford was one of them), the National Foundation for Educational Research (NFER) says this, “It would be imprudent to draw any con­ clusions on the basis of the three different b ilin g u al education programmes which have been undertaken in this country as to implica­ tions for establishing the child’s mother tongue prior to developing skills in a second language, English” (p. 404, para. 3.11.). Moreover, with regard to the alleged benefits of bilingualism in education in general, the authors of the Swann Report say this, “In relation specifically to the possible benefits of bilingual education, the findings of much of the research work reviewed by NFER could hardly be said to provide con­ clusive evidence as to the value of such provision.” And they go on to quote Mitchell (1978) in aid of this view: “bilingual education of a pluralist character does not appear either to enhance or to depress the bilingual child’s performance in the majority language, English, or in the non-language subjects.... But there do not appear to be particularly compelling arguments, on the basis of promoting the academic achieve­ ment of the individual minority language child, for choosing between monolingual and bilingual education” (p. 403, par.3.11). Although the Swann Report came out after the CRE statement, much of the research evidence was already available at the time the CRE prepared its state­ ment— specifically, as we have indicated, the research relating to the Bradford project. Rarely can an official, statutory body have presented a public case on such flimsy and manifestly tendentious foundations. But there are other obvious weaknesses in the CRE document. For instance, the authors constantly refer to bilingual education, as though this country were a mirror image of, say, Canada, where there are just two languages— English and French— involved. But this is a serious misreading of the multilingual character of the British population. In­

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deed, the CRE document itself refers to evidence which showed that there were 131 languages amongst the children in London’s schools— and that was in 1981. Now, there is a consensus that the figure is about 200, i.e., the phenomenon is not static but dynamic. This, one might have thought, would persuade a body such as the CRE to press the claims of a single national language in our schools if we are to avoid the danger of becoming a Tower of Babel, and a nation rent by linguis­ tic conflict. Nor does the CRE seem to be aware of the practical prob­ lems involved in implementing its naive bilingual philosophy. In many of our inner-city schools it is not uncommon to find twenty or even more minority languages amongst the pupil population. Who chooses the one(s) to be favoured? They clearly could not all be given a privi­ leged position either in relation to the medium of instruction or cur­ riculum provision. So how is the choice to be made, by whom, and on the basis of what defensible criteria? And how does the school cope with the resentment of those parents whose first language is rejected in this process? It would be difficult to imagine a more divisive policy, and one more likely to sour community relationships. And what about the teachers? W here are all the teachers with the appropriate languages to be found? And how is the taxpayer to be persuaded to support the enormous additional costs involved? None of these practical problems is seen to exist, never mind addressed by the CRE. The truth is that multilingual provision is an enormously complex matter, having profound political and logistic problems. The sad thing is that the CRE document itself points to the one viable ap­ proach to this issue, when it mentions that mother tongue maintenance is flourishing in this country. But it is doing so on the same basis as it has always done— private initiatives by the communities concerned. But this, of course does not suit the CRE. As a statutory body it demands that unless the state, i.e., the taxpayer, is bearing the burden, then some sort of injustice is involved. No immigrant group in this country would ever have taken this position before the establishment of the CRE, which per­ ceives the mother tongue issue as a useful rallying cry in its battle with an insensitive state. The only argument advanced by the CRE in support of state provision is that some people are demanding it— as if a demand is the equivalent of a rational, justified case. The CRE also pray in aid the Welsh argument. Essentially, what this says is this: since Welsh-speaking children in Welsh schools are some­ times taught in Welsh, this sets a precedent for justifying— or even demanding— the teaching of, say, the children of Pakistani parents in

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Urdu. This is such a transparently false analogy, that it could only be advanced by those who are desperate for an argument. If it were to have any hope of convincing, of course, it would have to show that Welsh parents in sending their children to school in England should have the right to teaching in Welsh. But no Welsh parent living in En­ gland would ever dream of making such a demand. Why, then, does the CRE claim that Pakistani parents should have the right to make an equivalent demand? Indeed, the extent to which ethnic minority parents are making this sort of demand is by no means clear. The evidence certainly would not support the notion that the CRE on this issue actually is reflecting a sustained demand from the parents concerned. (See my paper, “M inor­ ity Languages in the Classroom,” Education Today, vol. 41, no. 4, W in­ ter, 1991.) The priorities of ethnic minority parents in this regard are well captured in the Swann Report: . .parents from the whole range of minority groups... want and indeed expect the education system to give their children above all a good command of English (original empha­ sis) as rapidly as possible, and that any provision for mother tongue teaching should in no way detract from this aim” (p. 405, para. 3.13). The extent to which the CRE is prepared to go on banging its head against a brick wall on this issue is brought out in its response to the Swann Report— which it clearly found bitterly disappointing. Now the CRE statement explicitly states that the Swann Committee’s investiga­ tion into non-English languages in education arrived at the following conclusions: • • • •

Bilingual education and mother tongue provision are not justified in schools. The E.E.C. Directive is not applicable in Britain. The Welsh argument is irrelevant. There is no evidence that English as a second language learning is assisted by mother tongue maintenance, or by bilingual instruction.

In judging the CRE’s response to these unpleasant truths, it is very important to bear in mind that the NFER’s overview of the evidence was the m ost comprehensive of its kind ever undertaken. Moreover, it was commissioned and reported by a committee which, to judge from the general tenor of its argument and recommendations, was not by any means unsympathetic to the CRE view that Britain is a society in which racial discrimination is endemic. Despite all this, the CRE relentlessly asserts that its case for bilingualism in education is valid. It actually

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accuses Swann of violating the principle on which it made its stand: “By not taking bilingual education and mother tongue maintenance seriously the report undermines its own basic philosophy of ‘Educa­ tion for A ll.’ The very attitudes of ‘linguistic prejudice’ (and discrimi­ nation against minority language communities) which the Committee deplore will only be reinforced, not dispelled, if bilingual realities are not incorporated within mainstream schooling.” (p. 9, Swann—A re­ sponse from the CRE, 1985). It would be difficult to find a more stubborn, a more irrational and a more unconvincing example of special pleading. Regrettably, it is a special pleading the CRE continues to retail at every opportunity.

Racial Bullying in Schools In February, 1988, the CRE published a report entitled “Learning in Terror: A Survey of Racial Harassment in Schools and Colleges.” Ac­ cording to the C R E ’s 1989 Annual report this survey “received favourable and widespread media coverage. Fifteen thousand copies were distributed, and there is continuing demand for it. Four successful regional seminars were held in London, Bristol, Birm ingham and Glasgow.” The Times Educational Supplement— taken in virtually ev­ ery one of our 23,000 schools— ran a large picture story headed, “The race bigots who don’t wear jack boots.” Clearly the CRE saw this exer­ cise not only as a means of sustaining and getting maximum publicity for its standard view that Britain is a racist society and that the ethnic minorities are helpless, hapless victims of widespread hostility— there was more involved than that primary aim. The exercise was also in­ tended to pressurise local education authorities to effect changes in policy along lines acceptable to the authors of the survey: “We hope that our survey will lead to an increase in the number of education authorities with published policies for combating racial harassment.” It is important to bear in mind that the CRE survey is concerned with alleged racial bullying in educational institutions. That racial minorities suffer from hostility in society at large is beyond question. The Home Office report of the Inter-Departmental Racial Attacks Group (1989) makes that clear. However, the CRE is here alleging that the situation outside schools and colleges is mirrored within them, i.e., racial hostility is a serious and persistent problem in schools and colleges. “Racial ha­ rassment,” we are told, “is widespread and persistent.” Moreover, the perpetrators are not simply the lunatic fringe responsible for harassment

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outside schools and colleges, “They include pupils, students, teachers, lecturers and parents.” More than this, the survey asserts that such bully­ ing ensures that ethnic minorities “are denied access to the full range of educational opportunities that they should enjoy.” That is, there is a deeply serious and chronic problem of racial intimidation within our educational establishments. In his foreword to the survey the CRE’s chief executive speaks of, “the alarming extent of the problem.” Now these are grave allegations. They concern an extremely emo­ tive issue. All decent human beings are appalled by any suggestion of bullying, whatever its cause. The hurt imposed by bullying can go way beyond the momentary damage to the self-esteem of the victim. Its effects can linger for years, even a lifetime. Within schools its effects may adversely affect the child’s ability to learn, or even to attend school. Moreover, bullying, particularly when it is concealed and unpunished, can damage, emotionally and psychologically, those who perpetrate it. Harassment can have particularly powerful consequences when asso­ ciated with the explosive subject of race. Any attempt, therefore, to measure the character and extent of its incidence in education— par­ ticularly if negative results are to be used to effect changes in policy— any attempt to elucidate the problem needs to be equal to the scale of the institutions involved, and to the size and character of the public they serve. It also needs to have impeccable credentials in terms of research design, if it is to avoid providing a false picture which could so easily mislead and alarm. Now there are 23,000 schools and colleges in this country. There are about nine million pupils, about 400,000 teachers, and up to fifteen million parents. No one knows precisely how many ethnic minority pupils and young people our schools and colleges serve. However, ac­ cording to the Office of Population Censuses and Surveys, as at 6.5.93., the total ethnic minority population was 3,018,886, or 5.5 percent of the total population. According to the Home Office Statistical Division the number of ethnic minority children and young people, based on average figures in the period 1987-89, in the age group 5-19, is 758,GOO917,000. The corresponding figure for the age group 5-15, i.e., chil­ dren likely to be in school, is 567,030 (data supplied via private communications). It is not unreasonable, therefore, to assume that the target population for the CRE survey was at least half a million. In human relationship terms this must mean that, in the course of a single day, there must, within schools and colleges, be literally millions of cross-racial inter­

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actions. Clearly a survey which claims to expose a problem located in such a vast, complex structure needs, at the very least, to be based on some sort of representative sample. That would be a sine qua non of any research work claiming to be a valid and reliable reflection of the phenomenon with which it was concerned. In fact, the very grave and sweeping conclusions of the CRE survey are based on just eighteen case studies. The authors claim that their work can be understood as “a survey of the incidence of racial harassment in educational institutions in England, Scotland and Wales.” They do provide brief reference to a number of official comments, newspaper cuttings, and complaints to the CRE. The authors contacted local education authorities about whether they had issued “guidelines” on the subject, sixty-one out of a hundred Community Relations Councils did not bother to reply to re­ quests for information, and of seventeen “monitoring groups” only three thought the subject sufficiently serious to respond. At least the authors admit that, “very little work has been done in the field of racial harass­ ment in educational institutions.” Essentially, then, the survey consists of an infinitesimal number of anecdotal incidents for the whole of the British mainland. None of the cases makes pleasant reading. Most involve name calling. One refers to racist graffiti. Five would be considered serious. Eight con­ tain serious allegations about the schools’ indifference. Despite the report’s comprehensive title, only one incident refers to a college— a sixth form college in the West Country. All the rest refer to schools. Apart from this very serious weakness in sampling, there are no comparisons made with the nature and incidence of bullying directed at ethnic majority children and young people— so we have no way of knowing if minority children suffered more bullying than their white classmates. Moreover, none of the anecdotal allegations is corroborated— except, perhaps, one, where an apology is reported. It is very difficult to see how such an incredibly slipshod approach to a very serious issue could have impressed those responsible, unless the object was to confirm a prior assumptions and create a public spectacle from the result.

Legitimate Work on Racial Bullying Quite apart from these obvious deficiencies, the report ignores the findings of the CR E’s lineal predecessor— the Community Relations Commission— on several aspects of multiracial schooling, including racial bullying, issued in 1977. There, there was an attempt to achieve

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some sort of representative sample, and to provide statistical data gath­ ered from a variety of sources— LEA’s, head teachers, teachers, and parents. This study included information from eight identified, urban LEA’s with multiracial pupil populations. Forty-six heads and teachers were interviewed, as were a multiracial sample of 700 parents. That is, unlike “Learning in Terror,” this study at least attempted to respect the canons of respectable research. The CRC survey reported that, “ethnic minority parents have a high opinion of the schools their children at­ tend and of the teachers who work there, as do other parents.” (p. 5, “The education of ethnic minority children”). Regarding racial bullying, two findings are relevant. First, when the 700 parents involved were asked if they had experienced racial dis­ crimination 576 (82 percent) said they had not, whilst 84 (14 percent) said they had to some extent. O f this latter group the following infor­ mation is of interest: Reasons for child’s difficulties arising from ethnicity or racial origin: Bullying by other children Teachers Unhelpful There is prejudice Language problems

42 19 18 15

percent percent percent percent

Now 42 percent of 84 is 35. That is to say, of 700 parents inter­ viewed 35 mentioned racial bullying had been experienced by their children, i.e., 6 percent. So that 94 percent of ethnic minority children— in the view of their parents— were not affected by such bullying. Now in an ideal world no child would suffer this indignity. In the real world we know for certain that bullying of all kinds goes on, even, some­ times, in the best regulated of schools. According to recent research on bullying— details below— 6 percent is, in relation to total bullying, in schools, a quite low figure. Moreover, although we are not told the number of schools involved, we are told that forty-six head teachers were interviewed, and it is not unreasonable, therefore, to assume that the sample of 700 parents was culled from forty-six schools. If that is so, then fewer than one parent per school was worried about racial bullying, i.e., thirty-five from forty-six schools. O f course this is, to some extent, speculation, since the children themselves were not inter­ viewed. But it seems intrinsically unlikely that parents would be un­ aware of bullying of this nature. It is worth quoting the parents’ response to the presence of all problems connected with race, “Only a small

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minority of parents believed this constituted a problem for the child” (p. 40). Now this conclusion is particularly interesting in that it was echoed in the extensive research by Smith and Tomlinson published in 1989 (The School Effect, PSI). This is what the authors o f that study— which did respect the requirements of genuine research— discovered: there is no evidence that racial hostility at school is an important factor for 12 and 13 year old children. This is strongly confirmed by the views of their parents. When asked in what ways they were dissatisfied with the school, parents rarely mentioned racial prejudice or hostility of any kind. Just one per cent of parents mentioned racial attacks, or that black and white children don’t get on. Eight out of 2,075 parents interviewed mentioned racial prejudice among teachers.... Al­ though a number of other reports, such as the Bumage High School Inquiry, have created the impression that overt racism is a serious problem in multi-ethnic schools, on closer examination they provide little hard evidence on this matter, and no evidence at all of the size and extent of any such problem. The present Endings are, not, therefore, in conflict with any substantial body of evidence from elsewhere, (pp. 305-306)

This well-researched and heartening fact confirmed findings estab­ lished in a properly conducted survey carried out by M urray and Dawson, and published as early as 1983. The sample consisted of ten multiracial, comprehensive schools and covered 5,219 pupils (Five Thousand Adolescents, Manchester University Press). The authors were emphatic that the sort of tendentious negativism favoured by the CRE is ill-founded: “In particular, there is little support for the suppositions made about ‘racism ’ in schools, negative teacher attitudes, inappropri­ ate curriculum or low teacher expectations.” Although the Smith and Tomlinson report was not available to the authors of “Learning in Terror,” both the other reports to which I refer were. But they were ignored by the CRE researchers. Moreover, Smith and Tomlinson, though concerned in part with racial bullying, totally ignored “Learning in Terror”— though several references in their bibli­ ography make it clear they had taken their reading up to, and including, 1988, i.e., the year the CRE survey came out (actually as early as Feb­ ruary of that year). So they must have been aware of it. It is difficult not to believe that they ignored it because they knew that, in research terms, it was worthless. The inappropriateness of the CRE view is, again, challenged in the most recent research. According to a paper to be published in Educa­ tional Research, by Irene Whitney and Professor P.K. Smith of Sheffield University, there was no evidence in their sample to support the notion

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that bullying in a school is linked to race: “Ethnic mix, taken as propor­ tion of non-white pupils, varied from 0.0% to 63.0% (average 12.8%) for junior/middle schools and from 0.0% to 40.0% for secondary schools. None of the 8 correlations between bullying behaviour and ethnic mix approached significance.. .school variations in bullying are appreciable.... We did not find school size to be a variable in this. Nor, reassuringly, was ethnic mix.” That is, a child attending a multiracial school is no more likely to be bullied than a child attending any other sort of school. It is important to point out that the Whitney and Smith research was the most comprehensive and detailed work on the subject of bullying in schools so far attempted in this country. Given the size of their sample twentyfour schools covering 6,000 pupils— and given the fact that their conclu­ sions agree with those of the other, genuine researches reported above, there can be no doubt that the alarmist and hugely depressing picture produced by “Learning in Terror” is seriously misleading. However, the transparent weaknesses in their approach to this sub­ ject do not prevent the CRE from assuming this is of no account, and that their survey ought to lead to radical policy developments. They clearly believe that their work establishes, not only that schools and colleges are hotbeds of racial animosity and hostility, but that ethnic minority children are thereby being denied educational opportunities. They make no fewer than 38 recommendations aimed at LEA’s, educa­ tional institutions, teachers and lecturers, colleges and departments of education, validating and accrediting bodies, professional organisations, and the DES, i.e., any and every group or organisation having anything to do with the state education service. The answer to the problem their survey has manifestly failed to demonstrate is essentially bureaucratic. The flavour can be gauged from the following: There should be standardised procedures for reporting and centrally recording inci­ dents of racial harassment so that effective monitoring can take place. The guide­ lines should offer a clear definition of racial harassment along with examples that might be identified. A senior officer should be designated responsible for seeing that the monitoring procedures are followed. Regular reports of progress should be presented to the appropriate education sub-committee. Publicity should be given to such reports, and the authority’s bulletin, for example, might be used to publicise institutional and authority initiatives as well as in-service training opportunities.

Conclusions From its melodramatic title it is clear that the CRE survey is meant to evoke an emotional, outraged response from all decent, well-mean­

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ing people— a response which would certainly have been justified if the very serious allegation of widespread racial bullying in schools and colleges had been confirmed by proper and responsible research m eth­ ods. Since the basis of the allegation is no more than unverified anec­ dote based on just eighteen case studies, it does not seem improper to describe the CRE survey as an irresponsible piece o f propaganda. The anxiety it must have caused to the parents of black and Asian children in our schools and colleges must be incalculable. And the resentment it must have engendered amongst teachers and lecturers working in m ul­ tiracial institutions— people often working in far from ideal conditions and doing their very best for all their pupils, regardless of skin colour— this resentment can scarcely have improved matters for anyone. The essentially bureaucratic solution to the problem the CRE insists exists would be simply absurd, if one felt it could be safely ignored. Unfortunately, the CRE, as a powerful statutory organisation, has the ability to exercise considerable influence over those it targets for treat­ ment. And there is little doubt that many of those responsible for the conduct of the state education service will take this survey at face value. Some will do so because they are genuinely compassionate and wellintentioned people who, without paying attention to the fine print, will accept the CRE allegations have been proved. Some will respond for reasons having more to do with the ethnic vote than with human concern. And the mandarins of the well-established race relations lobby will re­ spond with considerable enthusiasm, because they perceive the survey as the basis for an expansion of their professional vested interests. As a result, schools and colleges have been, and are continuing to be, pressurised into adopting a high profile, official, and essentially authoritarian approach to an issue which is much better dealt with in a more human, off the record and subtle manner. No experienced teacher or headteacher believes in the wisdom of isolating one specific aspect of human wickedness and divorcing it from the rest of the pupils’ moral education. Is any kind of antisocial behaviour best dealt with by mak­ ing frequent references to it in morning assembly, with lots o f meetings with staff, contact with officials, visits from alleged experts, and ever­ growing piles of so-called policy documents? That sort of mentality, far from reducing the problem, could very well exacerbate it, and give a certain perverted status to the bullies. The Macdonald Report (1989) into Bumage High School, where an Asian pupil was murdered in the playground, is relevant here. There, the antiracist policy advocated in “Learning in Terror” was adopted, thanks to pressure from a local au­

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thority wholly committed to the doctrines of the CRE. I can do no bet­ ter than quote from the Macdonald Report conclusions: “Bum age High School presents a paradox. Its governors and senior management are committed to anti-racist policies in perhaps a more whole hearted way than any other M anchester school. Yet, at the same time, the school has been the scene of greater social conflict and polarisation of its students along racial lines than any other school we had heard of.” That, no doubt, is an extreme example, but it points irresistibly to the dangers. It also suggests that any sort of educational approach should be based on the ascertained facts, and should respect tried and trusted ways of dealing with any kind of bullying. The high-handed, bureau­ cratic policy of the CRE, based as it is, on a deeply flawed survey, should surely be viewed with considerable and sceptical caution.

Code of Practice It was on the basis of the educational reports I have analysed and discussed above that the CRE felt compelled to issue Code o f Practice for the Elimination o f Racial Discrimination in Education, in Decem ­ ber 1989. By this time, the CRE had formed a highly critical view of the state of race relations in education. Its frequent comments about education have made it clear that, in its view, ethnic minority children are being denied educational opportunity, that black pupils are being wrongly placed in sin bins, that black “underachievement” is a func­ tion of “institutional racism,” that the allocation of secondary school places is influenced by racial bias, that ethnic minority languages are being denied a rightful place in schools, and that schools and colleges are hotbeds of racial bullying. This catalogue of despair has no empirical basis. None of the rel­ evant CRE reports and statements is convincing— and some are m ani­ festly worthless. Moreover, if we accept the tendency of the ethnic minorities to complain about their treatment in education as an objec­ tive indicator of their level of dissatisfaction, then the CRE view would appear to have little substance in parental attitudes. The average num­ ber of complaints, as stated in the CRE’s annual reports, is about fortytwo. (The Annual Report for 1990 does not even refer to educational complaints.) This has to be set in the context of a vast educational sys­ tem involving, literally, tens of thousands of schools and colleges, hun­ dreds of thousands of teachers and lecturers, and millions of pupils, students, and parents— and with at least half a million ethnic minority

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youngsters, and their parents. Moreover, we have no way of knowing whether there are more complaints from ethnic majority than from eth­ nic minority parents. No one appears to have counted the complaints from white parents, so we have no comparative data. But this failure to support its overwhelming pessimism with actual, convincing data has not prevented the CRE from seeking to impose its perceptions on those who operate the education service. It has done this partly through the recommendations of its various reports, partly through the presence of its investigators in local education authority offices, and partly through various seminars and conferences. But it needed some­ thing rather more coercive than all this. Hence the Code of Practice. Now a code of practice is not a statutory document. It does not im ­ pose a legal obligation. That is a strict interpretation. However, failure to conform to a code of practice can be cited as evidence at an indus­ trial tribunal and in courts of law, i.e., a code of practice has a powerful coercive tendency. In practice, it would be very difficult to disregard its requirements. This code of practice is typical of all literature issued by the CRE in that it is totally, and, one might reasonably assert, blindly egalitarian in its assumptions. That is, it is based on the premise that unless there is equality o f outcome in education in relation to race, then that, in itself, constitutes prima facie evidence of discrimination, i.e., there is a case to answer. We shall not repeat the fallacies in this line of argument. Suffice to say it ignores the fact that the norm in any free society is not equality but disparity of outcomes. Violation of this readily supported truth can lead in only one ultimate direction— the imposition o f racial quota systems, as has happened in the U.S., where the forbidding of such systems in the Civil Rights Act, 1964, has not prevented them from becoming a fact of life. However, the authors of the Code do seek to provide themselves with an escape route, as it were. In relation to assessment, allocation to ability sets, and exclusion from school for bad behaviour, for instance, there is a begrudging acknowledgement that variations betw een groups may be “ju stified ...o n educational grounds.” But, since there is no hint of what those grounds m ight be, the practising teacher can interpret the various clauses of the Code in only one permissible way, i.e., that there ought to be no significant racial variations in educational outcomes. Any teacher reading this docu­ ment is bound to feel under a strong compulsion to accept this. If the teacher finds, for instance, that in assessing a class of pupils a disproportionate number of those scoring at the bottom of the scale are

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black, then that will tend to make him anxious. And that anxiety, in turn, may well cause him to lower the standard so as to make things easier for his black pupils, or to go against his desire to stream pupils altogether and opt for mixed ability teaching. This result, of course, not only violates the ethics of the teacher’s profession, reduces levels of excellence, and patronises black pupils, it may also mislead their par­ ents. A case reported in the Wall Street Journal (4.10.91.) indicates just what happens when the CRE view is carried to its logical conclusion. A black parent in Florida, California, was worried about her son’s lack of progress in school. So she asked the local school to give her son an I.Q. test to assess his ability in relation to his attainment. The school re­ fused. I.Q. tests are banned for black children in California, though not for other children. The parent persisted, and told the school authorities, “Judge my son on who he is, not what he happens to be.” Other black parents said they were tired of the condescension inherent in the ban. A group of black parents has now challenged it. Their lawyer has said this: ‘T h e excuse for Jim Crow laws was that blacks had to develop separately, and couldn’t compete with whites. Now paternalism has replaced outright racism as a rationale for discrimination.” A further weakness in the Code is its underlying assumption that “cultural bias” may disadvantage black and Asian children. Items in curriculum and tests may be foreign to them, and this may cause them to underperform or to be wrongly classified in terms o f ability. This is a very curious anxiety, given that the vast majority o f our ethnic minor­ ity children are neither foreigners, nor immigrants. They are British children, bom and bred in this country. The CRE appear to take the view, “Once an immigrant, always an immigrant.” This is nonsense— we have third generation ethnic minority children in our schools. M ore­ over, the cultural bias completely collapses in relation to those children who do well. It is precisely those pupils, i.e., Asians whose language and religious backgrounds distance them the most from British cultural assumptions— it is precisely these youngsters who have done best of all in education from amongst our ethnic minority groups. Afro-Caribbean pupils, on the other hand, originate in cultures much closer to British culture, and they have tended to do worst. If the CRE cultural bias argument had any substance, the very opposite would be the case. O f course, the fact of these intraminority variations, which are signifi­ cant and persistent, leaves the antiblack discrimination argument in tatters, anyway— unless we accept the very dubious notion that only black pupils, and not Asians, are the object of teacher bigotry.

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W orst of all, perhaps, o f the damaging effects this Code is likely to have on life in schools is that it will cause the teacher to perceive his pupils, not as a group of unique individuals, but in terms o f racial groups, with the m inority groups having to be handled in a very cau­ tious and self-conscious way. How will that, one wonders, help race relations in school?

8 Employment and the CRE In April, 1984, the CRE issued a Code of Practice covering the field of employment. At that time the CRE had been in existence for eight years and, during that time, had made many forays into the world of work, and had issued a num ber of reports about its findings. The Code of Practice, then, represented the CRE’s considered view of its role in relation to the job market. Codes of Practice are issued under powers conferred on the CRE by Section 47(1) and (7) of the Race Relations Act, 1976. However, to repeat, a Code of Practice does not, in itself, impose a legal obligation, i.e., it does not have statutory status, and no one need conform to its recommendations and advice. That, at least is the theoretical position. But the authors of the Code are careful to point out that, in practice, the Code has powerful coercive tendencies. “If, however, its recommenda­ tions are not observed, this may result in breaches of the law.... M ore­ over, its provisions are admissible in evidence in any proceedings under the Race Relations Act before an Industrial Tribunal.... If employers take the steps that are set out in the Code to prevent their employees from doing acts of unlawful discrimination, they may avoid liability for such acts in any legal proceedings brought against them.” In short, the Code is, de facto, a directive, and it would be a foolish employer who disregarded it. In assessing the nature and aims of the Code it is important to be clear about where the responsibility lies. Ultimately, the burden lies with Parliament, which promulgated the Act. Section 47 permits the CRE to issue Codes of Practice on employment as it thinks fit. M ore­ over, the CRE may from time to time revise the whole or any part of a code. In issuing this Code, then, the CRE was doing a perfectly lawful thing. However, the issuing of Codes is not mandatory. The CRE may choose not to do so. Although a Code has to be laid before Parliament before it may be issued, the decision to issue a code is the CRE’s alone, 163

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and the CRE, therefore, can reasonably be held responsible for its con­ tents and the reasoning, assumptions, and empirical evidence on which it is based. Two preliminary points are necessary before we examine the de­ tails. A Code of Practice is based on the assumption that the citizen is ignorant of the law, and needs to be informed of his duties by an insititution located between the legislature and the judiciary. Now the principle that ignorance of the law is no defence against accusations of breaking it—this principle has been accepted since time immemorial. And for a very good reason. If ignorance were an adequate defence, everyone charged with an offence would be entitled to plead his inno­ cence because he did not know the offence was forbidden by law. The notion of respect for the law, and compliance with it, would collapse, if this age-old principle were to be dispensed with, and people felt they could ignore it with impunity. It is reasonable, therefore, to assume that employers, trade unions, training organisations, or any other group involved with employment would be aware of any law likely to affect their roles and responsibili­ ties— and that ignorance would not protect them against legal attack. This has always ensured that both individuals and groups will go out of their way to find out just what the law is. Employers, in particular, always have access to legal advice; large companies, local authorities, and government departments employ their own lawyers. Only the stu­ pid and the ignorant would, therefore be likely to be ignorant of their legal obligations. The CRE in issuing this Code clearly assumes that this is not the case, and that ignorance is the norm. This questionable assumption leads on to another, and more serious one. The CRE is not here simply assuming ignorance of the law, and no doubt rationalising its intervention as a service to employers. It is also taking on itself the right to dictate just how the law is to be obeyed, i.e., the CRE will, effectively, determine the actual practices and proce­ dures to be carried out by the employer to ensure he is not violating his legal obligations. It is in this latter assumption that so much of the CR E’s power and influence lies. The CRE can and does seek by the issuing of Codes, and by other means, to exert pressure on employers to establish changes, often of a quite radical nature, without there being any evidence that the employer has broken, or has any intention of breaking, the law. A rm ed only w ith the bogus notion o f racial “underrepresentation” the CRE has succeeded in effecting the estab­ lishment of whole departments in local authorities, created new, bu­

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reaucratic procedures, and produced considerable increased costs. Large companies have also been affected in this manner. It is not difficult to see how this sort of what is, essentially, state interference in an organisation’s internal affairs carries with it the very real danger of creating considerable resentment in the workplace. To be told that, whilst you are not actually breaking the law, and do not appear to have any intention of doing so, nevertheless you still have to carry out thoroughgoing changes in your appointment and promotion procedures— this scarcely seems an appropriate way of spreading sweet­ ness and light on the extremely sensitive matter of race relations. Nor does the creation of a specialised bureaucracy— which this approach inevitably helps to create and maintain. Moreover, and this is a somewhat academic issue at this stage, given Parliament’s decision, how should both employers and employees re­ gard a Code of Practice which effectively violates the great principle of freedom of association? This principle has formed an essential part of our great civil liberties for a very long time— and was not won without struggle and human suffering. Yet the implementing of this Code of Practice means that employers may be pressurised into undermining the principle of merit, and appointing people, it seems, not on the basis of the appropriateness for the job, but because they are from a distinct racial group. And existing employees are compelled to accept them as colleagues. Now I believe that any attempt to prevent people from get­ ting a job, or from obtaining promotion, on the, what is to me, wholly irrelevant grounds of race is fundamentally wrong. But, in view of the right to free association, have I the right to impose this view on others? Should what, I suspect, most people see as a moral issue, become the object, effectively, of a legal compulsion? Can such an approach really overcome prejudice, or is it more likely to increase resentment by driving it underground, and falsifying rela­ tionships resulting from official coercion? Or is the matter best left to the marketplace, and those natural, time-governed, processes which ensure that everyone, whatever his race, comes to be accepted by most people for what he is, and for what he has to offer his fellow men? Are racial minorities best served by self-help, and making themselves in­ dispensable to the economy through their own efforts to serve and to excel, as have the Jews (a group in which the CRE has shown very little interest)— or are they more likely to flourish, and build good relation­ ships with their white colleagues, in response to the sort of coercive pressures in a CRE Code of Practice? We do not know the answer to

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this question. W hat we do know is that immigrant minorities, in the past, have been successful in winning over majority acceptance and in making good progress without there being a state-sponsored institution to help them to do it.

Bureaucracy The CRE is a bureaucracy. It employs about 200 people (30 percent white and 70 percent non-white), and is currently spending about 15.5 million pounds per year of public money— according to its own 1994 Annual Report. Between 1977 and 1990 it published reports on fiftytwo investigations, and is, currently, conducting ten inquiries. It is closely linked to, and helps to fund, eighty-seven Racial Equality Coun­ cils in England and Scotland. The CRE also regularly distributes grants to numerous ethnic minority organisations and race relations bodies, and to a number of law centres. Its 1990 Report lists 107 reports and leaflets covering arts and media, education, employment, housing, health and social services, administration of justice, and formal investigations. It also issues posters and badges, and publishes a quarterly journal, New Community. In 1990 the CRE spent £579,426 on information ser­ vices, publications and conferences. And its Public Affairs Department employed sixty-five people. W hat all this indicates is that the CRE has considerable powers of propaganda. With a network of activists in every large centre of popu­ lation putting the CRE case, close links with the media, and the power to give public money to organisations which are sympathetic to the cause of race relations as perceived by the CRE— clearly the CRE has a considerable head start in arguing its case, and in influencing public opinion. There is no countervailing organisation able and equipped to challenge the CR E’s hegemony. As I point out elsewhere, the CRE is by no means satisfied with these very considerable powers. In 1985 it issued a formal request to the Home Secretary, “Review of the Race Relations Act 1976: Proposals for Change.” This would, if it had been accepted and implemented, led to a massive augmentation in the CRE’s powers. However, successive home secretaries have failed to respond. This has led to a further request, in 1992, the draft proposals for which the CRE had sent to every local council canvassing their support. The CRE has a chairman, two deputy chairmen, and, currently, eighteen other members. Its senior staff include a chief executive, and directors of legal, social policy, employment, and public affairs departments.

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In short, the CRE has all the hallmarks of a classic, state-funded bureaucracy. Like all bureaucracies it has a commitment to its own aggrandisement, and to the belief that all human problems are of a purely technical nature, and can be solved by administrative and legalistic procedures. Its Code of Practice for Employment expresses precisely this mentality. It is all-embracing. No one, and no organisation, is al­ lowed to escape its influence. Employers, employees, employment agen­ cies, and trade unions are all called to account. Every aspect of promotion and appointment procedures is covered. Training, dismissal, terms of employment, grievances disputes, cultural and religious needs, language training, racial monitoring— all are included in the sort of approach the CRE favours. Everyone must have a commitment to “positive action,” i.e., it is not enough for an employer not to discriminate. He has positively to seek to entice blacks and Asians into his organisation. And there are dark hints that if he cannot demonstrate he is doing so, he may well be taken to task, and lay him self open to a formal enquiry— a lengthy, costly, embarrassing, and possibly commercially damaging exercise. It is dif­ ficult to study this document without forming the view that its authors believe that an employer is, in fact, guilty, unless and until he can pub­ licly demonstrate his innocence. It is equally difficult to see how this coercive and alien notion— which violates our age-old commitment to the opposite principle of innocence preceding guilt— can, in the long run, actually foster good race relations in the workplace. Indeed, the employer is actively encouraged to see his work force not as a collection of individuals united in a common purpose, but as a series of racially and culturally divided subgroups. Employers are more or less instructed to advertise in the ethnic press. They are forbidden to inter­ view on the basis of personal recommendation. They must ignore the fact that a prospective employee may not be able to fill in the application form. They must look kindly on requests for extended leave abroad. They must make special and privileged arrangements for dress, prayer times, religious holidays. Employers are even advised to provide interpreting and translation facilities— and that may include multilingual safety no­ tices. (It would be difficult to imagine a device more likely to lead to chaos in an emergency— bearing in mind that any workplace these days is likely to contain speakers of several different languages.) The workplace, then, is not to be conceived as a melting pot, with all employees loyal to a single, institutional purpose, but as a tossed salad, in which the ingredients never cohere— a model of race relations which

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has proved a disaster in the U.S. Moreover, the responsibility for adap­ tation and change— a responsibility no previous generation of immi­ grants has ever thought to question is theirs— now, it seems, lies with the employer. Again, this drastic shift in an established and universally accepted social arrangement— a shift which is bound to lead to the minority employee being regarded as something of a burden rather than a company asset— this can scarcely be understood as a contribution to good race relations. Moreover, the employer must not simply demonstrate his innocence of racial bigotry once and for all. He must do so as a regular, systematic feature of his working practices. Racial monitoring of the work force has to become embedded in the whole of personnel work. There will have to be racial monitoring not only of the existing work force, but also of job applicants. And to make absolutely sure of escaping the disapproval of the CRE, employers “should be able to show that it [ra­ cial monitoring] is effective,” i.e., the employer must demonstrate his innocence by pointing to actual changes in the racial composition of his work force over time. These racial analyses must not only take in the total labour force. They must also refer to the racial makeup of each plant, department, section, shift, and job category. And reasons for de­ cisions connected with recruitment, promotion, transfer, and training must be stated in writing. The nature and extent of this huge exercise in interventionist bu­ reaucracy is worth illustrating from the Code itself: In order to ensure that an equal opportunity policy is fully effective, the following action by employers is recommended: a) allocating overall responsibility for the policy to a member of senior manage­ ment. b) discussing and, where appropriate, agreeing with trade union or employee representatives the policy’s contents and implementation. c) ensuring that the policy is known to all employees and, if possible, to all job applicants. d) providing training and guidance for supervisory staff and other relevant deci­ sion makers, (such as personnel and line managers, foremen, gatekeepers and receptionists) to ensure that they understand their position in law and under company policy. e) examining and regularly reviewing existing procedures and criteria and chang­ ing them where they find that they are actually or potentially unlawfully discriminatory. f) making an initial analysis of the work force and regularly monitoring the ap­ plication of the policy with the aid of analyses of the ethnic origins of the

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workforce and of job applicants in accordance with the guidance in para­ graphs 1.34— 1.35. (Pages 8 and 9, para. 1.3)

One does not have to be a committed libertarian to feel that the ef­ fect of all this is bound to be experienced by many, busy company managers as authoritarian imposition. It comes perilously close to the sort of suspension of civil liberties previously deemed acceptable only in times of national emergency. Moreover, a virtual obsession with race and skin colour is bound to result. And, as I say above, there would be bound to be an increase in costs, in paperwork and record-keeping, and in personnel not connected with actual production. Just how, one won­ ders, would race relations on the factory floor benefit?

Proportional Racial Representation But perhaps the biggest weakness in this Code is its author’s failure to think through its repeated commitment to the notion that the work force must statistically reflect the make up of the general, or local popu­ lation. Thus, if, say, 2 percent of the population at large is black, then, in the name of equality, the work force should contain 2 percent black people. And if it does not, then this may well be due to antiblack con­ spiracy. But both the expectation, and the supposed reasons for its dis­ appointment are, to say the least, of dubious provenance. The first problem with this argument, as we have seen, is that it defines a m inority only in narrow, racial terms— essentially in terms of skin colour. But lots of other groups can now legitim ately lay claim to being ethnic m inority groups, within the meaning o f the Act, e.g., the Jews, the Poles, the Irish. If one or two subgroups are required to be monitored, e.g., blacks and Asians, why not other ethnic m inority groups? Not only can the Jews, etc., lay claim to being ethnic m inori­ ties, they can also demonstrate that they, too, have been, and may still be, victims of prejudice. The point is that, once you take up the posi­ tion of the CRE, and insist upon the principle of ethnic proportional representation in the work force, either you have to restrict yourself to a very narrow definition of ethnicity according to skin colour— which, over time, may well lead to accusations of favouritism, or you comm it yourself to m onitoring all legally defined ethnic m inority groups now resident in Britain— which would lead to chaos. The first possibility has, I suspect, already been realised— there is a widespread belief that the only people the CRE is concerned about are blacks and Asians. And the only reason other m inorities are not pressing their

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claims is, I believe, because they have not yet realised that they are, in law, ethnic minorities. Second, underlying the CRE position is the idea that individual ap­ plicants for jobs “represent” the racial group to which they belong. But this is entirely false, and violates the principle that the one and only criterion for appointments and promotions is, or ought to be, individual merit, which reveals itself through a free and open competition. In any organisation which seeks to implement the CRE’s approach to the work force, there is bound to be a tendency— at least that— to create a ra­ cially representative body of people— and that, in turn, leads to the real possibility of people being appointed or promoted because they are black or Asian, rather than strictly on merit. This is precisely what has happened in the U.S.— thanks to the systematic violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act 1964. This reverse discrimination mentality can only lead to resentment and jealousy on the shop floor and in the board room— a development scarcely conducive to good race relations. The appalling situation in the U.S. stands as a warning sign of just what damage this mentality can do (see Richard A. Epstein’s Forbidden Grounds, Harvard University Press, 1992). Third, it is worth repeating that the notion that the racially nonrepre­ sentative work force points to discrimination ignores one blindingly obvious and well-attested fact: that different groups are systematically attracted to different jobs and other socioeconomic outcomes. There is nothing sinister in that— it simply relfects variations in history and cul­ ture: no one complains because a disproportionate number o f Jews are in the jewellery trade; nor does any one cry antiwhite racism because young blacks are massively, and disproportionately, successful in bigtime sport. If 74 percent of the newsagents businesses in London be­ long to Asian families— as they do— who complains? These quirky, uneven outcomes are a natural outcome in a society as complex, open, and as free as ours. The same holds true in the U.S.A., as Thomas Sowell has pointed out in Pink and Brown People (Hoover Institute Press, 1981). What these outcomes show also is that the representative work force argument is based on the entirely false notion that people ought to desire to work in racially representative work forces, regardless of their wish to prefer distinct trades and professions. The logical outcome of that sort of thinking is the direction of labour via state control, and this argument is basically totalitarian. If people’s personal choices are to be overriden in the sacred name of racial equality of outcome, then we are dangerously close to losing contact with our commitment to a free society.

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Perhaps even more worrying than the influence of the CRE m ental­ ity in the workplace, is its effects on the way we are encouraged to see ourselves, not as an integrated, harmonious society, but as a fragmented collection of self-conscious groups, each bearing its appropriate and defiant label. How this helps towards the admirable aim of good race relations again is difficult to see. Are cross-race relationships in the workplace likely to be helped or hindered by such a policy?

Methods In addition to the injunction to engage in perpetual racial monitor­ ing, the CRE also urges local authorities, firms, and organisations to set “numerical targets” for the employment of people from the ethnic minorities. In pursuit of this ideal employers are expected to engage in “positive action,” a term which implies that all employers have an ob­ ligation to make jobs particularly attractive to blacks and Asians: it is not enough simply to commit the firm to an impartial policy of choos­ ing the best person for the job, regardless o f race. Employers have ac­ tively to go out into the m arketplace and seek out and encourage applications from those citizens who happen to belong to racial minor­ ity groups. Now positive discrimination, racial balancing, and quota systems are all unlawful. Yet one wonders how real is the distinction between these things and what the CRE wants employers to do. How, for in­ stance, does the concept of “numerical targets” differ from that o f “quo­ tas”? The aim of each is clearly the same— to employ a given proportion of blacks and Asians. That is, if the target population contains, say, 4 percent of blacks, then the organisation should seek to employ this per­ centage of blacks in its work force. It may be that the methods em­ ployed to achieve this result are different— though precisely how is not immediately obvious. The practical effect is surely the same. Again, whilst positive discrimination is not allowed, “positive action” is more or less obligatory, if firms are to escape the attention of the CRE. Yet what is the essential difference? Each, again, has the same aim. Each encourages the employer to engage more blacks and Asians. Each im ­ plies that the actual and potential labour force should be perceived in racial, rather than personal terms. Each is assessed as to its effective­ ness by the same criterion— how far has the ideal of racial proportional representation been attained? Moreover, each carries with it the very real danger of creating disaffection in the workplace because many

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majority workers are bound to see official intervention on behalf of any group as unjust and unfair. Each also implies the patronising notion that minorities cannot make it without official adjustments to the re­ cruitment, appointment, and promotion processes. O f course it m ight be argued that whilst “positive action” refers to a process of encouraging minorities to apply for jobs, “positive discrim i­ nation” refers to favourable treatment at the point where an actual ap­ pointment is made. But this conceptual distinction suffers from two weaknesses. First, aims and evaluations of effectiveness of the two approaches, as we have said, are the same. Second, any theoretical dis­ tinction is likely to collapse in a world where employers are constantly being pressured by a powerful statutory body into believing that lack of proportional racial representation is prima faci of evidence of some sort of deplorable “racism.” The truth is that it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that these approaches are the CR E’s way of circumventing the restrictive effects of the ban on positive discrimination, racial bal­ ancing, and quota systems. A dispassionate reading of the C R E’s own literature makes one thing clear— it would prefer to be operating in a world where these controls on its activities were removed— though there is no suggestion that the CRE would seek to do anything unlawful. A further tactic in the CRE campaign— and one frequently mentioned in the Code of Practice— is the notion of “disparate impact.” This means that any appointment or promotion requirement which could be ful­ filled by proportionately fewer minority than majority candidates is unlawful— unless it can be shown that the requirement is an essential factor in actually doing the job. Now, to be fair, any criticism of this device ought to be directed at Parliament, rather than the CRE, since it arises from the Act itself (Section 1[1]). But the CRE cannot be said to have pointed to any of its obvious defects, nor, in their submission to the home secretary regarding their powers, did they ask for this section of the Act to be removed. It is reasonable, therefore, to assert that the CRE regards this device as legitimate and desirable. But just what are the skills and attributes necessary to do a particular job? And who is to decide? Now the number and range of jobs in a society as complex and technically advanced as ours is immense. And each has its own, unique requirements. Who better to make the deci­ sion as to the job description than the people who manage the estab­ lishments in which the job takes place? Who else can possibly claim to have the specialised knowledge about jobs necessary to recruit the right people? Until the advent of the CRE no one would have thought this a

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problematic issue. No one would have challenged the em ployer’s right to produce his own job descriptions. Quite apart from the matter of specialised knowledge, it is, after all, the employer who takes the risk in appointing people to his payroll— and if an appointment turns out to be wrong, it is the employer who takes the risk; which, in these days of voluminous and onerous, employment protection legislation, can be very considerable. But the CR E’s “disparate impact” philosophy has changed all that. In drawing up his employment requirements an employer is not free to use his own experience of a particular job and its related skills. He must do so to the satisfaction of the CRE— and risk retribution if he fails. One effect of this is that every job has to be described not in broad outline, as the employer might prefer, but in the minutest detail, so that the employer is able to cover his back and defend him self against pos­ sible future allegations from the CRE officials. All the necessary abili­ ties have to be spelled out in writing, so that the whole thing can be defended at a future industrial tribunal. All the time the employer must be asking him self if any of the abilities he requires is less likely to be possessed by blacks and Asians than by majority candidates. If so, then he must feel able to defend his decision in the strictest, job-related terms. He has constantly to bear in mind that someone from outside his organisation, a person with no direct knowledge of his firm or the jobs it provides, is likely to be coming along and querying his judgment. In turn this clearly means a considerable increase in bureaucracy and paperwork. Know-how, intuition, experience— all these established bases of decision making no longer count, since they cannot be re­ duced to the formulaic and legalistic approach demanded by the CRE. The spectre of big brother now hovers over everyone who hires people.

Contract Compliance In September, 1987 the CRE issued Principles o f [sic] Practice fo r Contract Compliance. This made it clear that the CRE was not satis­ fied with ensuring that targeted firms were complying with its racial representation philosophy. Such firms and organisations had also to ensure that firms competing for their contracts were also submitting to the CR E’s demands. The responsibility has shifted from the state— via the CRE— to society— via private organisations. This document repeats the racial proportionality fallacy, seeks by means which can only be described as jesuitical to distinguish between

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numerical targets and quota systems, and insists that firms wanting contracts undertake “positive action,” ethnic monitoring, and gener­ ally comply with the demands of the Code of Practice in Employment. The CRE even supplies a questionnaire to the firm awarding the con­ tract to be completed by all firms in competition for the contract— and there is a heavy implication that failure to conform will place the win­ ning of the contract in jeopardy. This is the position, then, which contracting firms and their suppli­ ers now face. Although neither the Code of Practice, nor the document seeking to enforce contract compliance, has any statutory force, each is being used, effectively, to coerce organisations to conform— or face the consequences. If the firm wanting a contract is to succeed, then it m ust dem onstrate its innocence to the satisfaction o f a statutory organisation. So here is a firm which has been accused of no offence, neither tried, convicted, nor sentenced being placed in a position where guilt is assumed, unless the contrary is demonstrated. Moreover, it must do so in a form acceptable to the CRE, which has taken on the roles of judge, jury, and, if need be, hangman. The contracting firm which, for sound commercial reasons, is eager to accept the cheapest bid, consis­ tent with quality— this same firm now has to face the possibility that the best bid may fail because the bidder may incur the wrath of the CRE by failing the contract compliance test. This level of interference in commercial decision making has no precedent in time of peace. Its assault on civil liberties could— in any other context— only be justified when the nation was faced with the choice of curtailing liberty in order to survive against a determined enemy.

Specific Employment Employment in the Metropolitan Borough of Kirklees. This case is important in that it shows what happens when the CRE implements the mentality which underlies the Code of Practice for Employment. It also illuminates the principle that the CRE has a strong tendency to begin with an assumption of guilt on the part of those it sees fit to investigate. Moreover, it clearly underlines the CR E’s lack of judgm ent in under­ standing the nature and limits of its own legal powers. In December, 1981 the CRE decided to make a study of “some as­ pects of employment procedures used in the Metropolitan Borough of Kirklees.” (In fact, the study was into the activities of the Borough

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Council— not the Borough itself. But that is a minor solecism.) The CRE’s reasons were as follows: 1. Local authorities are specifically mentioned in the 1976 Act (Section 71) as having a particular role in eliminating unlawful racial discrimination, and in promoting equal opportunities and good race relations. 2. Local authorities generally have a low level of “black” employees. 3. Kirklees had a “substantial and long-established “black” population (8.3 percent), and the Council had a large workforce of its own. Note the CRE had no evidence of, nor had they received any com ­ plaints about, racial discrimination in the Council. Nor was there any suggestions that race relations were anything but good. That is, they were, in the absence of any negative information, going on what the law lords were subsequently to call a “fishing expedition.” This prac­ tice was later found to be unlawful, i.e., in conducting an investigation without any prima facie evidence of racial discrimination, the CRE was acting ultra vires. It is important to repeat the background to this, since it not only throws light on just how cavalier the CRE can be, it brings out what a very serious matter for any individual or organisation a CRE investigation is. In July, 1982, the law lords stopped the CRE from conducting an in­ vestigation into the housing policies of Hillingdon Council on the grounds that the terms of reference were too widely drawn, and went beyond areas where there was a reasonable belief of unlawful racial discrimina­ tion. The CRE was very unhappy about this constraint on the powers it had wrongly supposed it possessed. In its submission to the home secre­ tary in 1985, “Review of the Race Relations Act, 1976; Proposals for Change,” the CRE sought to reinstate these supposed powers, so that it could go on “fishing expeditions” without let or hindrance. However, the CRE failed to learn the lesson of the Hillingdon judg­ ment, and proposed a not dissimilar investigation into the employment practices of the Prestige Company. Again, after protests from the com ­ pany, this case finished up before the law lords. And, again, all five law lords unanimously rejected the the CRE’s interpretation of its powers under Section 49(4) of the Act. Moreover, they did so in the strongest possible terms. Giving judgem ent the senior law lord, Lord Diplock, expressed sur­ prise that the CRE had seen fit to incur considerable public expendi­ ture. He also stated that the CRE’s real purpose was to persuade the House of Lords to overturn its decision in the Hillingdon case, which it

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had found “unpalatable.” In his view Parliament’s intention was that such investigations should not be purely exploratory in character. It had to be a condition preceding the start of an investigation that the CRE had already formed a suspicion, or at least had some grounds for suspecting, that the person or firm named had committed some unlaw­ ful act. Lord Diplock went on to say that being made the subject of an investigation by the CRE was not a trivial matter. It pointed “the finger of suspicion of racial bias,” and could well damage, or put at risk, har­ monious race relations in the employer’s business {The Daily Telegraph, 10.2.84). It is, of course, precisely this ability to “point the finger of suspi­ cion” which causes the CRE to be an organisation to be feared, and which enables it to get its way with so many firms and local authorities who fear for their public reputation if the CRE even hints that an en­ quiry might be mounted into their affairs. W hat is also notable is that it took an independent law lord to point this out to the CRE— they were clearly unaware of the reaction they can create in their victims. As a consequence of the Prestige judgment, not only was the Kirklees investigation declared invalid, the CRE was revealed as an organisation which appeared incapable of learning the lesson the law lords was at­ tempting to teach them via the Hillingdon judgment. However, the Kirklees enquiry was published, not as the result of an investigation, but as a “study.” Even so, even though the whole m is­ guided exercise was invalid as an investigation, such is the power of the CRE to get its way, Kirklees Council meekly accepted the CRE allegations and recommendations.

The Enquiry But given all this, just how convincing was this “study” ? There are a number o f reasons for questioning its assumptions and validity. First, the investigators defined “ethnic minority” in the narrow sense of skin colour. As we have said that was not how the law lords subsequently defined the term in the schoolboy turban case. But this approach is typical of the CRE, which, ironically, whilst constantly urging that skin colour is, or ought to be, irrelevant in the workplace, almost always makes skin colour its exclusive concern with an equal degree of ur­ gency, when conducting an investigation. The report concedes that Kirklees contains many other ethnic minorities, e.g., Irish, Poles, and Chinese. But these were of no interest to the CRE. W hether or not

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these groups are “over” or “underrepresented” in the Council work force is deemed to be irrelevant from the outset. Again, typically, the report refers to all nonwhite groups as “black,” or as “ethnic minorities,” and so cancels out any variation there may be between, say, Afro-Caribbean and Asian groups. Second, and again typically, the report displays a certain contempt for a proper, cautious approach to the notion of what constitutes evi­ dence— the sort of circumspection to be found in properly designed and executed social research. For instance, the authors admit they have very little in the way of evidence about how many West Indians have applied for jobs with the Council. But this does not prevent them from making assumptions in the absence of such evidence about West Indian experience in this context: “there is relatively little information about West Indians in Kirklees. It should not be concluded from this, how­ ever, that West Indians are less likely than Asians to apply for jobs in the borough and do not come up against similar difficulties.” That is, in the absence of evidence, a predetermined, negative outcome should be assumed to be the case; the guilt of the Council should be assumed to have been demonstrated. This not only violates an elementary rule of social research, it also overlooks the fact that there are differences within our minority groups regarding the jobs they prefer to apply for. It is also, of course, grossly unfair to the Council. Third, the report itself contains information which suggests it is un­ wise to draw any conclusions about comparative ethnic unemployment rates in Kirklees. It is true that in February 1981, whereas the total unemployment rate in the borough was 11.1 percent, that for “blacks” was 13.42 percent, in February 1982 this pattern was reversed— 12.4 percent “blacks” unemployed compared with a general rate of 13.4 percent (table A, p. 4). Fourth, although the report begins by lumping blacks and Asians together, in constructing a key table (table B), which shows compara­ tive success rates of applications submitted for Council vacancies, the authors drop this device when it suits them. Asians are compared with a group of “all others,” which includes West Indians, Africans, and non-U.K. candidates. And, although this table does, indeed, show a poor success rate for Asians, there is no way of knowing how Asian success rates compared with the subgroups included in the description “all others.” W hat the table does show is that the “all others” group did very much better than the Asian group. If we assume that the “all oth­ ers” included nonwhites (the West Indians and Africans certainly would

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have been) then this tends to undermine the notion of discrimination in the system. But the authors ignore this. Fifth, throughout the report the notion that “underrepresentation” proves racial discrimination is implicit. I shall not bother to repeat the obvious flaws in this a priori form of logic— except to say that, of the thirty-eight applications from Asians in a given period, in only two cases is the issue of equivalent qualifications referred to. This crucial matter is otherwise ignored— except that the assumption that all candi­ dates were equally well qualified is taken as read. Sixth, there is striking evidence in the report that anyone seeking a job with the Council, whatever the colour of his or her skin, faced very stiff competition indeed. For the 302jobs available from 4.12.80-3.6.82., no fewer than 2,149 applications were received. O f these thirty-eight were Asian, and one succeeded, i.e., thirty-seven Asians were disap­ pointed. 2,131 were non-Asian and, of these, 301 succeeded, i.e., 1830 (most of whom we can reasonably assume were white) were disap­ pointed. If we accept that unemployment is a deeply felt, human, and intensely individual, experience, rather than an abstract statistical con­ struct— as this kind of study suggests— then it is clear that massively more non-Asians (again, most of whom were white) than Asians were suffering disappointment. Again, in addition to these obvious weaknesses the report suffers from a curious inconsistency. This centres round the issue of home helps employed by the Council. The authors note that no existing home helps were black. They claim that this indicates “an assumption by the organisers (of home helps) that elderly white clients did not want West Indian or Asian home helps,” i.e., the organisers were assuming that white old people preferred white home helps, and this was, by implica­ tion, deplorable. Leaving aside the fact that there is very little in the way of evidence to support this allegation, the law, in fact, does allow discrimination on the grounds of race where “the holder of the job pro­ vides persons of that racial group with personal services promoting their welfare, and these services can most effectively be provided by a person o f that racial group” (1976 Act, Section 5(2)(d)). Now a home help, by common consent, clearly provides a personal service; and, whilst accepting that the old people’s prejudice in favour of white help is unfortunate, it could be argued that unless their view is respected, they could not receive the service they needed, i.e., the ser­ vice they require, in their view, is best provided by people of their own race. Now I am not here defending this view— I happen to believe it is

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mistaken— I am simply saying that it may well be justified in law. And, indeed, that is precisely the view taken, it seems, by the CRE itself, when the recipients of the service happen to be black, rather than white. The following case illustrates this. In 1991 Sandwell Council in the West Midlands advertised for home helps in the weekly West Indian tab­ loid, The Voice. The advertisement specified that only Afro-Caribbean/ Asian candidates need apply, since the job involved supplying a personal service to people of these groups. And it quoted Section 5(2)(d) in sup­ port. After some correspondence between the Council and the CRE., fol­ lowing a protest about the advertisement from the Freedom Association, the CRE gave its blessing to the Council, and gave as its considered opinion that home helps provided a personal service as described in Sec­ tion 5(2)(d). Yet when Kirklees Council appear to concur, the CRE im­ plicitly condemns them, and requires changes in its policy. So the CRE is in favour of racial separatism where the recipients are black, but opposed to it when the recipients are white. This curious contradiction is further highlighted by the CRE’s support for monoracial fostering and nursery schools— even to the extent of supporting the appointment of a black caretaker. In truth, this double standard runs right through the whole of the CRE’s approach to the issue of race relations. Despite these obvious weaknesses, nonsequiturs and contradictions, and despite the fact that the whole, unfortunate exercise was legally invalid, the authors of the report claim in so many words to have iden­ tified direct racial discrimination (p. 11). They also claim that certain practices “disadvantage” nonwhite applicants. In fact, these grave alle­ gations do not begin to be supported by this flawed report. Moreover, the Job Centre officials and Council officers are specifically recorded as denying that any instructions had ever been given that Asian appli­ cants should not be referred for Council jobs. In addition, the Council officials quite reasonably averred that the reasons for the low level of “black sta ff’ employed were to do with the small num ber of applica­ tions from the “black community,” perhaps because o f a lack of experi­ ence or qualifications, or as a result of cultural or religious objections to particular Council jobs. But this entirely reasonable explanation is airily and rather patronisingly dismissed; “W hilst this is a possible ex­ planation, racial discrimination on the part of the Council’s recruiting personnel is certainly another.” That is, the officers concerned— with their daily and considerable experience of the local situation— are dis­ posed of as people who are probably bigots and quite possibly liars by the visiting apparatchiks of the London-based CRE.

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It is not difficult to imagine the anger and resentment this poorly argued and tendentious “study” must have caused to those who were its victims. However, this did not prevent the politicians who controlled the Council from meekly accepting the report’s allegations as proven. Nor did it prevent them from accepting the recommendations for radi­ cal changes in recruitment policy and practice, including the setting up of a special subcommittee, and the appointment of a “race relations officer.” Such is the power of the CRE.

The National Bus Company The CRE decided in 1978 to conduct a formal enquiry into the em­ ployment practices of this company (NBC). They did so without any suspicion of there being racial discrimination present: “The decision did not follow from allegations of racial discrimination.” That is, the CRE were going on a “fishing expedition”— which, in view of the law lords’ decision in the Prestige case, made the investigations null and void. However, in a remarkable display of generosity, the NBC allowed the CRE report on its employment activities to be published. And again, as in the Kirklees case, the NBC showed itself prepared to comply with the CR E’s recommendations, even though they had no legal force. This report is important in that it sheds light on the CRE’s view of the labour market in general, and employment policies in particular. It also makes clear the sort of pressures which the CRE would bring to bear on em ­ ployers, if they were ever successful in their attempts to get the Pres­ tige decision reversed. The first thing to illuminate the CRE mentality in this sort of context is the time factor. From the point where a deci­ sion was made to investigate the NBC to the publication of the report took an astonishing seven years. This sort of delaying tactic— it is very difficult to describe it as anything else— is frequently employed by the CRE: the Kirklees study took two and a half years, and, as we shall see, the investigation into the Birmingham Local Education Authority took six years, and that into Reading LEA five years. Second, we need to note how the CRE’s approach succeeds in match­ ing findings with evidence— or fails to do so. The following is taken from the preface to the NBC report: “The report records the Commission’s view that certain recruitment and selection practices operated by subsid­ iary companies were indirectly discriminatory and that certain situations in which ethnic minority applicants did not obtain employment they had applied for could have involved discrimination.”

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There are a number of aspects to this statement. The first is a cat­ egorical assertion that indirect discrimination has been established. The second is the notion that this assertion is a “view”, not the sort of proven fact which would be likely to impress either a court of law, or a scien­ tist. The third point to notice is that the second assertion that discrim i­ nation has occurred is supported by nothing more than the speculative phrase “could have.” Bearing in mind that virtually every interaction between human beings “could” involve rejection or ill will, just how seriously are we supposed to take this sort of empty allegation? Be­ sides, are the public not entitled to rather more than this after the people responsible have been pondering the issue for no fewer than seven, prepublication years?

Success Rates Now the CRE began this enquiry with a certain disadvantage. Ac­ cording to the report itself the ethnic minorities were at that time actu­ ally “overrepresented” in the industry (RE.R report, “The Facts of Racial Disadvantage,” 1976). Here are the figures quoted on page 1 of the report: Indians 12 percnet, Africans and East Asians 11 percent, West Indians 10 percent, Pakistanis and Bangladeshis 5 percent. That gives an average ethnic minority employment rate in the industry of 9.5 per­ cent. Now the population figure was about 5 percent nationally. There­ fore, the sort of racial minorities with which the CRE is concerned were, in crude statistical terms, more successful than whites in getting jobs in this branch of the labour market. The report avers, “This might suggest that blacks were unlikely to be suffering discrimination in re­ cruitment to the passenger transport industry” (p. 1). It might, indeed, to the person with an open mind who comes seeking the truth, rather than to confirm a priori assumptions. Now if the reverse of this finding had been established, and there had been “underrepresentation” o f the ethnic minorities, the CRE would undoubtedly have used this to allege prima facie discrimination. In the present case, therefore, it would be logical to assume racial discrimination against white applicants, since they are “underrepresented.” But that is not the sort of logic which finds favour with the CRE. In order to defend its preexisting assump­ tions, the CRE now makes use of a second tactic, success rates. Not only must it be shown that the minorities are not “underrepresented” in the industry as a whole; it is also imperative to show no variations in success rates. Now even assuming that differential success rates can be

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established— and it would be surprising if it could not, given that, in many cases, there are likely to be English language differences— even assuming this, the fact remains that proportionately greater numbers of ethnic minority applicants are being welcomed into the industry. A fact which one might have thought the CRE would have welcomed.

Indirect Discrimination In addition to the authors’ confession that no evidence o f discrimi­ nation pre-dates the enquiry, there are several points in the report where absence of discrimination is acknowledged. In Company F, for instance, “The success rate for Asian applicants was higher in 1978/79 than that for whites,” and “there was no evidence of unlawful discrimination in this company.” In Company A— with regard to inspectors’jobs— “the rate of applications and short listing of blacks was similar to that of whites,” and “there was no evidence of discrimination treatment in those (employment) documents which had survived.” In the same category of jobs in Company B, “we found no discrimination.” However, in Company A, the CRE did claim to have uncovered evi­ dence of indirect discrimination— and this despite the fact that, in the job category concerned— drivers and conductors— no fewer than sev­ enty five of the 125 personnel were of African, Asian, or Caribbean origin, i.e., there was massive “overrepresentation.” It is instructive to consider how the CRE arrived at their allegation of indirect discrimination. The key issue was competence in English. Now since both drivers and conductors, in the nature of things, have to interact with members of an English-speaking public, a certain level o f English is clearly needed to do the job. This is particularly so in the case of conductors, who will not only need fluent English, but are likely to have to decode demotic and local variations. Not surprisingly those applicants whose first language was not English fared less well, in terms of success rates, than those whose mother tongue was English. But this predictable and entirely reasonable outcome was not acceptable to the CRE investigators. They argued that the tests of language the company used were not based on a strict, scientific assessment o f the exact level and type of language needed to do the job. And that constituted indirect discrimination, since it meant that existing assessments had a “dispar­ ate impact” on those whose first language was not English. Now the point to notice is that the CRE did not demonstrate that the com pany’s tried and trusted methods of assessing language were in­

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valid. Nor did they feel it necessary to do so. The onus, so the CRE claimed, was on the company to prove their case; the com pany’s guilt was assumed, and it was up to the company to establish its innocence. Now quite apart from this inversion of normal procedures, it seems less than likely that a bus company operating over many years in a particu­ lar region would be unaware of the English language needs of its em ­ ployees. It may be that its practices were less than strictly scientific; it is intrinsically unlikely they were not appropriate to the job about which the company knew so much. After all, as the overall employment rates showed, the company was in the habit of hiring a disproportionate num­ ber o f those for whom English was a second language— so they had clearly tackled the company’s tests successfully. W hat one suspects the CRE was really saying was that, in order to equalise success rates, the company should lower its language stan­ dards for ethnic minority applicants. W hether a public service would be improved by this is not an issue with which the CRE concerns itself. Nor is the question of whether lowering standards is good for the selfrespect of those concerned and for their public reputation. Race rela­ tions hardly seem likely to benefit either.

Promotion The investigators were much exercised by disproportions in the area of promotion. However, although they do quibble at candidates being required to write a 100-word essay, “potentially a discriminatory prac­ tice,” they could find no sign of discrim ination in the five of the company’s six subsidiaries they looked at. The real reasons for varia­ tions in promotion outcomes were, in fact, the blindingly obvious ones— variations in standards of education, lack of interest, and concern about possible loss of pay: “Interviews with a sample of black drivers showed that some were not interested in promotion, for example, because of loss of overtime or a preference for driving.” This latter factor is par­ ticularly interesting, since it highlights something the CRE consistently ignores— the role, often decisive, played by personal and group prefer­ ences in disparate ethnic outcomes.

Senior Management There was no evidence that any racial discrimination occurred here. But that does not prevent the authors of the report hinting that the com ­

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pany was failing because it was not providing “special training and encouragement for ethnic minority applicants.” In fact the report itself states that of the nineteen vacancies for m an­ agement staff at Company B from 1977-79, “There were no black ap­ plicants” for seventeen of the posts. The remaining two were externally advertised, and for one of these posts there were two ethnic minority candidates, and two white candidates. O f these, two met the job re­ quirements— one white, and one African. However, since the A frican’s application arrived several days after the deadline, he was ruled out. Despite this total absence of any scrap of evidence of racial impro­ priety, the Company felt obliged to state its commitment to “positive action”, and promised to do better in future.

Individual Complaints These were minuscule— though just how minute, in relation to total job availability is impossible to say, since the report does not give the relevant period over which complaints were received. However, we are told that the total work force numbered 65,000. According to the report the CR E’s predecessor— the Race Relations Board— considered thirty seven cases. O f these only seven led the Race Relations Board to be­ lieve there might have been some suggestion of discrimination— though we are not told how many of even these complaints were substantiated. There were two applications to the CRE for assistance in bringing com­ plaints to the Industrial Tribunal— one of which was dismissed, the other withdrawn. Subsequently (we are not told which period is being referred to) the CRE received fifteen complaints. (Were these, one wonders, connected in any way with the fact that the work force knew the CRE was conducting an investigation?) We are told that “In most cases (how many?) the application did not proceed, or was dismissed by the Tribunal.” In only one case was there a finding of discrimina­ tion, and in another an apology was offered and accepted. Viewed against the enormous number of employees of the NBC, and in relation to the sheer scale of job processing even in a single year, it is very difficult to imagine any company with a multiracial work force doing better than this. Unless we assume a counsel of perfection— an ideal the CR E’s own reasoning and practices make clear is not attainable in this world of fallen man— then it would appear to any reasonable person that the com pany’s existing procedures were about as near perfection with re­ gard to fair and equal treatment as they could be. One might have ex-

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pected a statutory body concerned with eliminating racial discrimina­ tion would have wanted to congratulate the company on its m anifest absence of any suggestion of racial bigotry towards its own employees. But not so. Pressure from the CRE, despite the fact that the Com­ mission was, in the first place acting ultra vires, compelled the com­ pany to undertake a lengthy and costly exercise in “equal opportunities.” Again, we witness the power of the CRE to get its way.

The West Yorkshire Passenger Transport Executive (WYPTE) (1983) In the Commission’s work in the employment sector, we have always argued that the employers themselves should find out if any racial groups are absent or under represented in any part of their work force. If they are, it is the employer’s respon­ sibility to find out the rasons [sic] for this, and, where appropriate, to take action to remove any barriers to equal opportunity for members of this group.

This is the opening statement of a CRE report of a formal investiga­ tion into the activities of the WYPTE in the Bradford district of West Yorkshire. Before proceeding to examine this report in detail, I should like to look at the assumptions this statement embodies. The first thing to notice is that the term “racial group” is not defined. But, throughout the report, it is made clear that it refers exclusively to those groups described as “Asian” and “black.” Now this will not do. This report was dated June 1983, i.e., three months after the M andla v Lee school­ boy turban case. As I say elsewhere, the law lords in this case spelled out a definition of “racial group,” within the meaning of the Act, in very broad terms indeed. This is confirmed in the standard text by Michael Malone, Racial Discrimination: Your Right to Equal Oppor­ tunity (Ross Anderson, 1983). If, as this statement says, the CRE was concerned here with “any racial group” then it ought to be as concerned about, say, the proportion of Jewish, or, possibly Irish workers, as with Asian and black employ­ ees. But the CRE’s near obsession with skin colour as the predominant characteristic of “racial group” prevents it from grasping this. Second, yet again, we see the CRE’s total commitment to the mindless egalitar­ ian fallacy which, in the face o f all the evidence, continues to insist that all racial groups should be proportionately represented in the labour market— when we all know that the link between particular outcomes in the labour market and racial group is not statistically, but culturally determined. Third, and, again, predictably, we see the CRE hinting at

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the illogical and unjust notion that the primacy of individual m erit in the appointment and promotion process should be subordinate to equal racial outcomes. Fourth, regarding the em ployer’s responsibilities, it is difficult to know where the CRE’s view comes from. There is no m en­ tion in the Act of 1976 o f an em ployer’s duty either to check whether people from the ethnic minorities are absent from, or “underrepresented” in his work force, or, indeed, his need to increase their numbers— nor to establish why Asians, blacks, or any other group may, or may not, be present in his work force. The Act speaks specifically of racial dis­ crimination as a procedure aimed at excluding, or disadvantaging, an individual solely on the grounds of race. This emphasis on the indi­ vidual is echoed in M alone’s standard text— and it lies with the indi­ vidual to prove his case. Unfortunately, the employer chose not to raise any of these fundamental issues when he was presented with the CRE report. In essence this report finds the employer convicted of both direct and indirect discrimination. The direct discrimination was established, according to the CRE, because the district manager had instructed se­ lection panel members “to be cautious when appointing the first Asian inspector.” This, it is alleged, had led to higher standards being applied to seven Asian applicants than to white applicants with comparable records. Given that this was the case, there is no doubt that the em­ ployer was wrong— to treat someone differently on the sole grounds of racial origin is unlawful. The indirect discrimination, according to the report, arose from the fact that the marking of the applicant’s service record was inconsistent, and the nature of the writing tests taken by all the candidates was not fair to the black and Asian applicants.

Direct Discrimination To get a general understanding of the em ployer’s view of the signifi­ cance of racial origin in his employees, it is instructive to look at the racial composition of his total work force. On page 2 of the report we are told that in September 1978 Bradford Metro employed 800 plat­ form staff, and 58 percent o f these were Asians. On page 3 we are told that, in September 1979, there were 900 busmen, of whom 48 percent were from the ethnic minorities. Now the target population in that area, at that time, was, being very generous, no more than 20 percent. So there is no evidence that the employer objected, on principle, to em­ ploying people from the ethnic minorities. On the contrary. Using the

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CR E’s own concept of racial equality of outcome, then the ethnic m i­ norities are massively “overrepresented,” and the majority population correspondingly “underrepresented.” So, if we accept the CRE view that inequality o f racial outcome is prima facie evidence of racial dis­ crimination, then the victims in this case are white. (I do not, of course, believe this, but this is where the CRE’s characteristic logic leads to.) More important, and much less open to question, is that these figures indicate a completely open, nonracial employment policy by the em­ ployer. No employer with this sort of record could possibly be accused of being influenced by skin colour in the appointment of his staff. It would not be unreasonable, given this, to assume that the employer had no objection on principle, no hidden motive rooted in racial bigotry, to Asians or blacks becoming inspectors. Moreover, as the report itself makes clear, there was in 1979 one black inspector out of fifty. Now that is 2 percent, and, although we are not told the size of the black target population, I know from personal experience that the black popu­ lation is very small— the overwhelming majority of the city’s ethnic minority group being Asian. It is conceivable, then, that blacks were not “underrepresented.” M ore to the point, this indicates that there was no absolute barrier to promotion to inspector against ethnic minority candidates. If the employer had been operating a colour bar, then there would have been no ethnic minority inspectors. So the conflict between the CRE and the employer is not about whether or not the employer is intrinsically, as it were, biased against employees on the grounds of race. It is about the extent to which the employer can justify his failure to promote Asians to inspector. (This is, of course, an inversion of a basic legal principle of innocence pre­ ceding guilt— it should be the CRE which has to prove its case, not the employer who has to demonstrate its falsehood. But that is the way that race law now operates in this country.) The em ployer’s case can be summarised as follows: 1. In the 1970’s there was union opposition to the promotion of Asians to inspector. In 1972 a TGWU district officer said in a TV interview that “No Asian busman now is capable of doing the job of inspector.” W hether this was an expression of bias, or a considered judgem ent based on experience, is impossible to determine. The word “now” sug­ gests that the union official did not preclude promotion in the future— perhaps when the general level of competence in English amongst Asians had increased? W hat probably mattered from the em ployer’s point of view was that promoting Asians at that time seemed likely to trigger

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trouble with the unions. This was before the trade union reforms insti­ tuted by the 1979 Conservative government. At that time the unions had very considerable power. Moreover, if the unions— in the face of an Asian promotion— had made the whole matter into a public issue, this could have inflamed feelings and damaged race relations gener­ ally. In view of this the employer’s advice to “proceed with caution” looks rather more like civic responsibility than racial discrimination. 2. There was a tried and trusted system of selection for all employ­ ees wanting promotion to inspector. The first part of the system con­ sisted of advertisements on notice boards of all the districts covered by the WYPTE. Candidates had to complete an application form, and have two years’ service. Candidates’ service records for the previous two years were then assessed. Aspects of the work records such as length of service, timekeeping, absence from work, disciplinary record, etc., were awarded marks. There had to be an elem ent of subjectivity at this point, since unreliability on night shifts, say, is more damning than on earlier shifts; absences of, say, two candidates may be equivalent in number, but one’s excuses may be less convincing than the other’s. Applicants with ac­ ceptable work records were then asked to sit a test. This test had been designed in 1978— by which time the company had a huge Asian work force— by the traffic officer, and was based on one used in the Leeds district. M arking was done by the traffic officer, and a second opinion was provided by the assistant traffic officer. Service records were then reexamined, and the service records and test scores totalled. At this stage a cut-off point dividing successful from unsuccessful candidates was established. About three candidates where then interviewed for each vacancy. The interviewing panel consisted of the personnel and training officer, the traffic officer, and assistant traffic officer and the chief inspector. This panel then decided whom to appoint. W hat all this makes clear to anyone with an open mind, and without an axe to grind, is that the WYPTE had a rational, detailed, and fair promotion procedure, based on the accumulated wisdom garnered from many years of experience in the bus business. The company clearly took the business of promoting platform staff very seriously indeed. There was nothing slapdash, secretive, or distorted about the proce­ dure. It was an entirely professional and administered by people with vast experience of what was required in order to do the job of inspector. However, the CRE investigators claimed that some of the rejected Asian candidates with “comparable,” or better, work records were given

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lower marks. That is, the appointing panel was racially prejudiced in assessing Asian candidates. The company claimed that the differences were probably due to the necessarily subjective aspect in judging some aspects of the work record, e.g., absence for a broken leg is more con­ vincing than for, say, “respiratory disorders.” (There is some evidence of a greater prevalence of such conditions amongst Asians— and the disorder is likely to result in a higher level of absence than accidents would.) Moreover, according to the company, some people, with re­ gard to absence, were “playing the system.” Again, the CRE investiga­ tors rejected this— though how people who were strangers to the company and who knew none of its employees could assess the factor of “playing the systems,” say, is not easy to see. The CRE then interview ed fifty-tw o applicants for prom otion, twenty-five of whom were “black.” (The inverted comm as are neces­ sary, since at this point in the report the authors collapse the distinc­ tion between Asian and black candidates— though in some other parts of this same report they m aintain the distinction.) O f the seventeen who had been appointed as inspectors four were Asian and one West Indian. There was evidence at this stage that some of the Asian and black candidates had been educated to a higher level than the white candidates— though neither O, A level, nor a degree was regarded as a qualification for the job. The nonwhites had slightly longer service records on the average— though this average bears no relation to the length of service required for appointment as an inspector, i.e., two years. An impartial reader of the report would be bound at this point to conclude that the CRE investigators considered that their obvious a priori assumptions of “racism ” in the appointments system had been established. They say that some of the nonwhite applicants alleged racial prejudice because the interviewers appeared unfriendly. That this might reasonably be considered as disappointed applicants clutch­ ing at straws, and supplying people who were professionally expect­ ing to discover “racism” with the evidence they were looking for— this is m ade evident by the following. Four white applicants, we are told, reported that the interviewers were friendly— but this hardly consti­ tutes evidence of anything when set beside the fact that there were twenty-seven white applicants. Are we to assume that the twentythree who did not report that the interviewers were friendly were treated in an unfriendly m anner? How far, one wonders, would a dis­ passionate social scientist, or a judge, consider this sort of thing as being significant?

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The failure rate provides rather more in the way of significant, ob­ jective evidence. Twenty-four of the applicants had applied for promo­ tion once, of whom fifteen were “black” ; twelve had applied twice, of whom eight were white, and ten had applied three times of whom eight were white. So, whatever other sins of which the company was guilty, a disinclination to turn down white candidates repeatedly was not one of them.

The Written Test The investigators claim, by implication, that the test was not valid, since an “expert” had not been hired by the company to link knowledge and skills demanded by the test and on the job. They reject the view of the traffic officer— who had devised the test and who had forty years’ experience and of his assistant that they were experts in the field, given their massive practical experience, and they knew precisely what was necessary in the way of grasp of written English skills and necessary practical knowledge to do the job of inspector. It is up to the reader to decide whether the company’s officials or the CRE investigators were correct on this issue. O f indisputable status is the fact that the CRE in­ vestigators have to admit that the Asian applicants “scored significantly lower than white applicants on the test, and the range of marks awarded to Asians was less, as fewer Asians scored high marks.” The Asians also scored lower in terms of their service record, and there is a suggestion in the report (top of p. 8) that Asians also did less well at the interviews.

Instructions to Discriminate There was no documentary evidence that anyone in the company ever did instruct anyone else to discriminate on racial grounds. The only evidence the investigators can point to is a number of off-the-cuff remarks made in the course of conversations between the officials and the CRE investigators. By taking certain remarks out of context, the investigators were, in the view of the company, not acting reasonably— too much had been made of them. The company simply argued, not that Asians should not, on principle, be appointed as inspectors, but that, on the basis of vast experience of handling Asian employees, the company had to proceed with caution. This was because it was felt that Asian inspectors might not be able to cope with a public which is not always either courteous or reasonable: this was the view of the general

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manager, though even this as a factor in the promotion process is o f doubtful status, since the traffic officer specifically denied he took it into account when making decisions about promotion. The executive did argue that there were undeniable cultural differences which it was reasonable to take into account in deciding to expose Asian inspectors to a public whose cultures were very different from those of India, Pa­ kistan, and Bangladesh. (One gets a clear impression that the company had a much clearer and more realistic understanding of the practicalities of being an inspector in a multiracial environment than the CRE had— and of the company’s humanitarian concern for its Asian employees.) The com pany’s view that, on the whole, Asians lacked initiative, and were followers rather than leaders, is contemptuously dismissed as “ste­ reotyping” by the report’s authors— an entirely predictable, knee-jerk response from an organisation which, on principle, dismisses the con­ cept of cultural differences— but only when it suits its argument: if the CRE believes that the ethnic minorities are suffering some sort of “cul­ tural deprivation,” then it readily supports the notion that cultural dif­ ferences actually do exist, and do affect people’s behaviour. Moreover, however much the investigators were anxious to pin the “racist” label on the company, they are forced, in their conclusions to admit “that an ability to write a report was part of an inspector’s job”— and on this crucial factor Asians did significantly less well than whites, which is hardly surprising, given that English is their second language.

The CRE Conclusions The CRE investigators found that the WYPTE was guilty of both direct and indirect discrimination, and issued a non-discrimination no­ tice accordingly. In essence this verdict is based on no documentary evidence— the company had never formally instructed its officials to discriminate racially. With regard to the allegation of direct racial discrimination, the sole evidence for direct discrimination is based on a remark made by one official— a remark the key official involved in promotion procedures denied had influenced him. Regarding indirect discrimination the key issue was the validity of the written test. The CRE admit this: “it was performance on the test which in effect determined whether or not an applicant was interviewed” (pp. 8-9). The investigators alleged that the test was invalid— though no details of the test are given in the re­ port, so that readers are unable to judge for themselves. Nor are we told

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if any of the CRE investigators were occupational psychologists, the only people who might make a claim to being professionally competent to pass judgem ent on whether performance on the test was a good pre­ dictor or not of an individual’s ability actually to do the job in question. As with so many of these sorts of CRE reports, one is left with two concluding thoughts. First, the investigators were convinced from the outset that racial discrimination was present, and that their job was to confirm their suspicions, i.e., there is a strong suggestion of a lack of rigour and objectivity. Second, one has a sense of regret that the vic­ tims of this exercise did not challenge the non-discrimination notice at an industrial tribunal or court of law, as they were entitled to do under Section 59 of the Race Relations Act 1976.1 find it difficult to believe that any half-way competent lawyer could have failed to convince an independent tribunal or judge that the onus on the CRE to prove its case had not been discharged.

The TVade Unions There is an interesting footnote to this unhappy affair. The CRE is­ sued recommendations to the Transport and General W orkers’ Union regarding its future conduct. These arose from the following comment in the report: “It is also regrettable that until 1979 the TGW U did not press more vigorously into the reasons why their Asian members in Bradford were not being promoted” (p. 2). Though the TGW U accepted the report, they angrily rejected the hidden allegation which lay behind this comment. They pointed out that during six of the previous ten years the branch secretary had been of Asian origin, and in a unique position to pursue any allegations o f discrimination. In addition at least 50 percent of the branch community was of Asian origin. The Union, therefore, “considered the recommen­ dations to be unnecessary” (p. 15). Would that the W YPTE had been as willing to resist.

Conclusion I have examined these three reports in some detail because they pro­ vide an insight into how the CRE operates in the field of employment, and into the mentality which produced the Code o f Practice in Employ­ ment. They illustrate the power of the CRE to get its way— even when it steps beyond its legal remit. They show the sort of anxiety which a

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CRE investigation can generate. And, most disturbing of all, they indi­ cate the CRE’s striking tendency to assume that racial discrimination of one kind or another exists, and it falls to the respondent to establish that it does not. How far these unfortunate things are an inevitable result of the re­ quirements of the 1976 Race Relations Act—and the responsibility there­ fore of the politicians who passed that Act— and how far they result from the CRE’s own high-handed interpretation of the Act is impos­ sible to say. W hat we can say with certainty is that the CRE is very unhappy with the Hillingdon and Prestige judgem ents, and has on two occasions requested the home secretary to amend the law so that the restrictions these two judgem ents place on the investigative powers of the CRE are removed. That is, the CRE continues to insist upon its need for yet greater and more oppressive powers.

9 Housing and the CRE I have argued that Political and Economic Planning (PEP) has had a decisive influence on the CRE, its philosophy and methods, and in all the major areas of social policy, except education. However, in the spe­ cific area of housing there is an influence predating the founding o f the CRE in 1976 and the issuing of the PEP reports; and I want to refer to this, after placing the CRE’s approach to housing in context. There is no doubt that, since its inception, the CRE has taken the view that housing is a key indicator of ethnic minority progress, and that there is systematic— if not always conscious and intentional— ra­ cial discrimination in both rented and purchased property transactions, and at both private and local authority levels. As early as 1978, in its second annual report, the CRE was making plain its suspicious precon­ ceptions about racism in the housing market. The following extracts will give the flavour of its attitudes: During the year we began to examine those local authority housing practices which may work to the disadvantage of ethnic minorities.... Four formal investigations into local authority housing were started in 1978.... Ethnic minorities continue to experience disadvantage both in buying property and in securing privately rented accommodation. The Commission therefore considers it essential that Building Societies’ practices at local branch level should be carefully examined to estab­ lish the extent and causes of any disadvantage which may exist.... In addition, we discussed with the Housing Corporation ways in which housing associations could help meet the housing needs of ethnic minorities” (Pp 10-11).

The relentless, and characteristic, pessimism is patent, as is the ab­ sence of any empirical evidence to support it. In point of fact, when this report was issued, there was, and had been for some time, good evidence that the ethnic minorities were faring surprisingly well in the matter of housing: the 1971 census revealed that 76 percent of Asians and 50 percent of West Indians owned their own homes, compared with approximately 50 percent of whites. The PEP report on housing had 195

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appeared at least three years before the CRE 1978 Annual Report, and this showed that there was very little ethnic difference in relation to privately rented accommodation. The figures for occupation of council property were almost identical for whites and West Indians, though they were much lower for Asians— and for obvious cultural reasons, not least the typical, Asian extended family. And no fewer than 82 per­ cent of the ethnic minorities were, according to the PEP report, satis­ fied, or very satisfied with their accom m odation— a figure only marginally lower than that for whites. In addition to all this, the total number of complaints the CRE received in 1978 was fifty-one— none of which had, at the time the 1978 report was published, been substan­ tiated, and which, in relation to the total number of people who were potential complainants was minuscule. It would have been very inter­ esting to know how many white people in the same period had com ­ plained against building societies, local councils, and private landlords; that is the sort of comparative data which would allow informed judg­ ments about the scale of the alleged ethnic minority disadvantage in the housing market to be made. And that is precisely the sort of data in which the CRE has no interest; the CRE can focus on only one aspect of what is, in reality, a complex issue. W hence, then, comes this dogmatic, unsupported pessimism of the CRE at the very outset of its life? In addition to the obvious, institu­ tional interest which any body posited on the principles which had given birth to the CRE is bound to have in alleging the all-pervasive racism in British society, there is, as I have suggested above, a specific source in regard to housing. This is a book published in 1967, Race, Commu­ nity and Conflict, (published for the Institute for Race Relations by Oxford University Press), and written by two, left-wing sociologists, John Rex and Robert Moore. This book was based on a study of Sparkbrook, a decaying, inner-city area of Birmingham, with a high New Commonwealth population. The authors concluded that black and Asian families were being forced into ghetto housing by an unsympathetic local authority, and by rapacious landlords. There are two key allegations in the book, allegations which have had a crucial influence, not only on the CRE’s perceptions and presup­ positions, but on the mind-set of the whole race relations apparatus in this country. Here, in the book’s own words, are these two allegations: “W hat we did observe was a process of discriminative and de facto segregation which compelled coloured people to live in certain typical conditions, and which, of itself, exacerbated racial ill-feeling” (p. 20).

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This notion o f compulsion is linked with veiled accusations of racial prejudice on the part of the local authority: “We do not by any means feel we are able to prove that the Birmingham Council operates a dis­ criminatory policy which keeps coloured people off its estates. W hat we do say is that it is quite possible, under the present arrangements, to discriminate without a policy ever being publicly admitted” (p. 27). This willingness to smear a local authority, to hint at grave allega­ tions, without any supporting evidence— other than some sort of un­ spoken racial conspiracy; this was to become standard practice in the race relations lobby. This mentality was reinforced by the unyielding pessimism of the PEP report, and has been reflected in the work of the CRE ever since. A much more balanced and intellectually defensible picture of ethnic minority housing, at least in relation to the Asian community, has been provided by J.G. Davies, whose work I have referred to earlier. Davies’s work effectively discredits the grim despondency of Rex and Moore, PEP, and the CRE. He rejects their highly questionable, and patronising view of the ethnic minorities as helpless victims, bullied into secondclass conformity by a hostile society intent on keeping them in ghetto housing conditions. Instead he chooses, and on the basis of unchallenged, empirical evidence, to put forward a much more constructive view— a view which, whilst not denying the existence of prejudice, celebrates the ability of an ethnic minority group to exploit its own character and cul­ tural resources to overcome the baleful influence of indigenous hostility. And Davies is uncompromising in his condemnation of the Rex and Moore book— a book which has done so much to distort the intellectual atmo­ sphere surrounding the race relations picture in this country: “This badly flawed book was faithful neither to its own nor to publicly available data, and successive critiques have revised it beyond credibility: yet it sur­ vives as the conventional wisdom” (p. 1). The vulnerability of the CRE to the influence of academics who share the race relations lobby’s fashionable gloom, and conviction that the ethnic minorities face more or less impregnable barriers in contest­ ing the racism alleged to be characteristic of British society— this vul­ nerability is by no means a thing of the past. It is significant that, when the CRE convened the most prestigious conference it has ever attempted, it chose one, Valerie Kam, senior lecturer at Birmingham University, as its eminence grise on the subject of housing. Valerie Kam has been an enormously influential voice in the field of ethnic minority housing. She has served on many local and national bodies, both statutory and

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private. She is— or was— chairman of the housing journal Roof; and she has published widely on race and housing. The paper she delivered to the conference was entitled, “Race and Housing in Britain: The Role o f the M ajor Institutions” (printed in Eth­ nic Pluralism and Public Policy, Glazer and Young [eds.], Heinemann Educational Books, 1983). This paper is typical of the school of thought I refer to above. The author alleges that racial discrimination is ram ­ pant in the major housing providers: “In this chapter I hope to illustrate some of the mechanisms through which the major institutions in the housing system protect white privilege against black incursions” (p. 162). (It is difficult to resist the temptation to feel that this sort o f rheto­ ric has emanated from Apartheid South Africa—rather than a society famous for its attraction to immigrants from every part of the globe.) Though eschewing the cruder forms of “racist” explanations, she purports to erect a convoluted description of decision making in the housing market which, she alleges, shows that both individuals and institutions engage in the “stereotyping” of housing applicants. She implies, for instance, that, in allocating what is a scarce resource, local authority housing officials are involved in a subtle form of racism. Her evidence for this belief is that, in dealing with applicants, officials dis­ tinguish between “respectable” and “disreputable” clients in assigning properties; and blacks and Asians are disproportionately perceived as belonging to the less desirable category, and are, therefore, disadvan­ taged. She does concede that, “the allocation system has to find some way of judging between applicants, on a justifiable basis. The alloca­ tion process is, by its very nature, one of discrimination between one applicant and another, or one class of applicants and another, in the distribution of a scarce resource of good council housing” (p. 167). But she disapproves, it seems, of the “respectable” and “disreputable” way of categorising applicants, since this, she alleges, tells against ethnic minority applicants. This procedure is a function, not of experience by housing officers over a long period of time, but of “culturally sanc­ tioned, rational responses over scarce resources” (p. 163). There are two obvious objections to this theory. First, though it is true that West Indians have a poor record in establishing and m aintain­ ing stable nuclear families, Asians do not— they are particularly suc­ cessful in this respect, in fact— notably more successful than either black or white communities. And it is this ability to produce successful families which is the key to being designated a “respectable” tenant by council officials. So it is difficult to see how K am ’s theory explains the

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treatment of Asian applicants. Second, council officials have to have regard to the views and feelings of local people, who are concerned about the presence amongst them of the well-known “problem family” syndrome, which is the curse of council estate management. This le­ gitimate, public pressure on council housing officials has, according to K am ’s theory, to be ignored. If a particular ethnic group in society pro­ duces a disproportionate number of less stable, troubled family envi­ ronments than other groups, then, if officials are to respect public opinion and manage estates for the greater good of the greater number, then there are bound to be ethnic imbalances in housing outcomes. But Kam will have none of this. She believes that officials should be “non-judgemental.” How officials can make decisions without making judgments Kam does not elucidate— she appears unable to grasp that to make a decision is to judge between alternatives. However, that “institutional racism” thesis, unconvincing as it is, does not prevent Kam from asserting with total confidence, that “racial discrimination and its attendant justifications are the products of the structural inequality which obtains in society as a whole. Racial dis­ crimination can be understood as a mechanism to protect perceived race interests, just as class discrimination is a mechanism for protect­ ing class interests” (p. 163). So in addition to the class war from which contemporary Britain is alleged to be suffering, we are also cursed with a race struggle. This sort of ideological preaching is highly typical of the academic input into the CRE’s thinking and methods. Shortly after Kam delivered her bleak pronouncement, additional and heartening information about ethnic minority housing became avail­ able— though, predictably, this appeared to have little effect on the CRE’s ingrained and tendentious pessimism. In 1984 the Policy Stud­ ies Institute published a survey entitled “Black and W hite Britain: the third PSI Survey.” This pointed with telling accuracy to the fact that, contrary to fashionable academic and race relations lobby opinion, our ethnic minorities are very far from being helpless, exploited, and fail­ ing victims of a race-conscious housing market. A nationally represen­ tative sample of white, black and Asian groups provided the following information: Asians

Whites

West Indians

Home ownership

72%

59%

41%

Council tenancy

19%

30%

46%

6%

9%

6%

Private rented

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The patterns holds across different households, regions, cities, and smaller areas. Two things are noteworthy: First, the significantly higher level of home ownership amongst Asians than amongst Whites— a de­ velopment which, considering the relatively short time we have had a sizeable Asian population in this country, can be described as immensely encouraging and a tribute to the Asian community’s determination to succeed. Second, in the competition for council housing West Indians actually do better than whites— though this does not mean that West Indians do better in relation to their demand for council property: it may be that a higher proportion of West Indians than whites actually want council accommodation; but this sort of outcome, empirically determined, scarcely supports K am ’s pessimistic theory. It is worth noting, too, that Asians appear now to be more willing to move into council property. In a 1974 survey only 4 percent of Asians rented from the local council, but, by 1984,19 percent were council tenants. This is important in that it shows an increased willingness to adapt and live in property which, originally, this group regarded without enthusiasm. And this, in turn, shows a greater willingness to live in close proximity to white people, the traditional occupants of council property. This must hearten all those who believe that the only way to create successful race relations is to encourage our various communities to integrate. Moreover, between 1974 and 1982— a very short time in the history of housing developments— housing conditions for the ethnic m inori­ ties underwent a significant improvement. The 1984 survey said this, “There have, however, been considerable improvements in the housing standards of black (i.e., West Indian and Asian) people between 1974 and 1982. The proportion of black families sharing facilities with other households, or lacking the use of basic amenities, fell considerably in this period, from 26% to 5%, and 37% to 7% respectively, as did the proportion living in properties built before the end of the First World War, from 46% to 35% ” Although it remains true that there is a gap between standards of hous­ ing as between those of whites and blacks and Asians— whites are better housed on the whole— it does appear that the gap is rapidly closing. Indeed, in its most recent publication on the subject, even the CRE cannot fail to present evidence which is positive. (“Housing and Ethnic Minorities: Statistical Information,” 1988). For instance, in regard to home ownership the average percentage of white people— across three social classes— is 49 percent. For Asians, where the proportions appear not to vary with class, the level of home ownership is 72 percent. In

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West and South Yorkshire no less than 91 percent of Asian families own their own homes (p. 10). The difference between the minority and majority populations with regard to exclusive use of bath and inside toilet is very small indeed— 93.1 percent compared with 95.3 percent (p. 10). An important way of assessing trends in housing is to look at what happens when people move home, or where residents are estab­ lishing a household for the first time. A marked tendency to buy prop­ erty is an indication of some success, since this shows possession of capital, and a desire to invest in an asset which is likely to increase in value, and so provide the basis for steadily improving housing quality. It suggests, that is, a generally optimistic view of the fam ily’s housing future. Again, judged by this criterion, the outlook is encouraging. At least for Asians. “New Asian households have the highest level of owner occupation of any ethnic group” (p. 12). Regarding West Indians, the report has this to say: “Overall, at the national level West Indian households have almost the same housing conditions as whites” (p. 12). It is true that, in general, more over­ crowding occurs in ethnic minority households, but it would be less than convincing to ascribe this to discrimination. It is bound, in some degree, to be related to significant variations in family size, for ex­ ample, 60 percent of Pakistani and Bangladeshi households have five or more persons, whilst this is true of only 9 percent of white house­ holds; and the average family size for Asians is 4.9, for West Indians 3.0, and 2.6 for all ethnic groups. If we add these facts reported in 1988 to those reported by Davies in 1985, it seems no less than reasonable to assert that, on the whole, the picture of ethnic minority housing in this country gives ground for optimism. The gap between minority and majority housing provision is steadily closing. And, in terms of home ownership, a widely accepted indicator of material progress, Asians are actually outperforming the white population. The most recent evidence regarding home-ownership is given in Trevor Jones’ Britain's Ethnic Minorities (Policy Studies Institute, 1993). This is based on PSI and Labour Force Surveys (LFS), and details are given in the table on page 202. Perhaps the most striking evidence of ethnic upward mobility is the performance of the Bangladeshi community. This group, emanating from one of the m ost politically disturbed and poverty-stricken nations on earth, has always lagged behind other ethnic minority groups in buying their own homes. But even they are now showing clear signs of high levels of home ownership.

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Percentage o f households owner-occupied by ethnic group during the 1980’s. Ethnic Group

1982

1984-86

1988-90

W hite

59

60

65

Afro-Caribbean

41

38

46

African Asian

73

81

82

Indian

77

77

76

Pakistani

80

78

75

Bangladeshi

30

31

46

Perhaps the most important thing about all this is that it largely dis­ credits the CRE’s relentless and misguided pessimism. It also raises questions about the objectivity of that research presented by certain academics who seem determined to hold on to the notion that ethnic minorities in Britain are failing in the housing market. In truth, the very reverse appears to be true. It does not seem unreasonable to infer that the pessimism prevailing in the race relations lobby m ust have some sort of functional value. This belief is strengthened by looking at any of the CR E’s recent Annual Reports. Take the one for 1988. The authors state that they are continuing to place emphasis on legal coercion; that they have inter­ vened in the passage of the new Housing Bill through Parliament, so as to make clear their intention of issuing a Code of Practice in the field of rented housing; and that they have established discrimination against one hapless estate agency, one building company, and three local au­ thority housing departments. (Methods employed in this field by the CRE are critically examined in relation to actual enquiries below.) Alongside the negative information on which the 1988 report fo­ cuses is a table of complaints made about housing in relation to race in the whole of the year. Now it is certain that, in a service as huge and complex as housing, there are bound to be literally tens of thousands of cross-racial interactions in any one year. Some idea of the sheer scale of housing phenomena can be obtained by considering the following facts, extracted from Britain 1986: An Official Handbook: There are 22 million dwellings, and 19.5 million households. There are 460 local housing authorities, some of which control stocks of well over 100,000. Housing associations now own some 500,000 homes. Over 500,000

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home improvement grants were paid to householders between 1980 and 1984. During 1984 a total of 190,400 dwellings were started, and 198,400 were completed— 48,000 in the public sector and 150,400 in the private sector. Such a marketplace is bound, in the nature of things, to offer an enormous potential for complaints and adverse comments. In fact, for the whole of the U.K., the CRE in 1988 received just seventy-eight complaints. Moreover, we do not know if the complaints were found to be justified; nor do we know how many complaints were generated by the ethnic majority community. It is particularly interesting to note that the CRE M anchester office, which serves a population of millions, in­ cluding a relatively large ethnic minority population in the North West of England, received just six complaints. And this is despite the fact that the M anchester City Council has a large race relations bureau­ cracy which constantly urges blacks and Asians to be aware of their rights, and to complain long and loud if they feel aggrieved. This very low level of complaints one might have thought provided an occasion for rejoicing. But that is not something the CRE’s institutionalised pes­ simism could ever permit. The 1990 Annual Report is, if anything, even more depressing. There we are informed— with no hint of hesitation or reluctance— that the CRE has invented “new techniques” for winkling out recalcitrant land­ lords. We are not told how many of these techniques were used in the previous year. But we are informed that “particular use of actor ‘test­ ing’” had been directed at accommodation bureaux throughout Britain. This presum ably means that applications for accommodation from people, who purported to be identical in all respects except the colour of their skin, were received by housing bureaux to see if offers of hous­ ing varied with race. This was done in partnership with local Race Equal­ ity Councils, i.e., people who have as strong a vested interest in negative outcomes as have the CRE. The CRE claim that this procedure uncov­ ered the fact that one in five accommodation agencies discriminated against the “testers.” With regard to hotels and private landlords this came out as one in twenty— five percent. Now at this point a curious thing happens in the report. W hilst its authors are confident that their findings about hotels and private landlords are correct, they are equally sure that, if the “testers” seeking accommodation via accommodation agencies had presented their applications in person, then the discrim i­ nation figure would have been even higher. The use of the telephone, it seems, did something to control bigotry levels, though the callers al­

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ways made their racial origins clear. They do not say how or why this curious anomaly occurred. Nor do they say whether their method of testing the accommodation agencies differed from that applied to ho­ tels and private landlords. The huge difference between 5 and 20 per­ cent discrimination levels is unexplained. Now even assuming that this sort of investigation is valid and reli­ able, two comments appear justified. Given that prejudice against a whole range of objects is an inevitable part of the imperfect world all human beings are compelled to inhabit, then we have no comparative data against which to evaluate these findings. We do not seek to m ea­ sure prejudice in any other field than race. W hat we do have is a pow­ erful, publicly funded organisation which goes out and systematically looks for instances of racial prejudice, with a grim determination to find it, even if that means using bogus applicants. If we had a statutory body as concerned with, say, class or age, as the CRE is with race, is it beyond the bounds of possibility that similar, or worse findings might not be established? Second, the CRE in engaging in this deceptive procedure appears to be unaware that there is an important ethical aspect involved. It is im ­ portant to be clear about just what the CRE was doing. They were— as were Political and Economic Planning before them— deliberately en­ couraging actors to pretend that they were genuine applicants for ac­ commodation, so as to provoke a response the technique was designed to elicit. Now, as I have said before, in any other circumstances this might well be regarded as a form of entrapment— which both morally and legally is very dubious behaviour indeed. I am not, of course, sug­ gesting that the CRE is doing anything unlawful here. W hat I am as­ serting is that the vast m ajority o f reasonable people w ould, in considering this technique, experience a sense of moral unease. Now, however worthy the intention— and no one doubts that racial discrimination exists, and ought not to— is this really an approach likely over time to improve race relations? How, one wonders, do the victims react when they are informed of their role in the charade? Or are they not informed? If they are— and what is the point of the exercise, if they are not?— how will they feel about their fiiture dealings with blacks and Asians? Will they be inclined to be more or less sympathetic? Are they not likely to experience both anger and resentment at being set up in this way? And are they not likely to share their negative feelings with others? And how will that improve race relations, or diminish the stock of big­ otry in society? No doubt the CRE genuinely believe that there is some­

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thing really rather commendable about this sort of thing, but it says very little for their understanding about how real people think and feel.

CRE Reports on Housing It is important that we examine actual documents issued by the CRE arising from their own formal investigations. This is for two reasons: these original data reveal aspects o f the CRE mentality which the unin­ formed public may not know about; and these documents form the ba­ sis of radical and costly changes the CRE is able to enforce. This is particularly so in the very large field of local authority housing admin­ istration. The CRE has a consistent tendency to argue that findings in individual cases can be legitimately generalised to all other cases. So if it claims to have demonstrated racial discrimination in one housing department, it automatically asserts that this specific finding is typical of all housing departments. A process of informing every housing de­ partment in the country is then undertaken, as if the finding were based, not on one single department, but on a properly controlled, representa­ tive sample o f housing departments. This generalised assumption is then used to pressurise all local authority housing departments into ac­ cepting CRE-dictated assumptions and procedures. This often involves radical, and sometimes costly, changes In established ways of working.

Housing in Hackney This is, of course, a reversal of the normal research method where generalisations are attempted, if at all, only after representative samples have been investigated. The CRE appear blithely unaware of this proper, scientific caution. Its comments on the first of its enquiries into council housing allocation in Hackney is typical: “It has always been our view that the issues we examined in Hackney were common to many other local authorities. We considered, therefore, that if we found racial dis­ crimination as a result of an exhaustive study of housing allocations in one Borough, our findings could subsequently be used to persuade other local authority departments to develop effective equal opportunity poli­ cies and practices in their areas.” That is, the outcome of the enquiry had been assumed before the enquiry began, as had its function in ef­ fecting the changes the CRE demanded of other local authorities. The Hackney enquiry is particularly important because it led, for the first time, to the issue of a non-discrimination notice by the CRE purely

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on the basis of statistical evidence. This meant that the CRE could, effectively, enforce their viewpoint on the local authority. There is little doubt that Hackney has become the model for what the CRE wants to see in all local authority housing departments. It is important, there­ fore, to examine just what happened during the enquiry.

Hackney Housing Department The Report was issued in 1984, as Hackney Housing Investigated— Summary of a Formal Investigation Report. Ethnic Group Membership. As with so many CRE proclam ations this document collapses distinctions within the ethnic m inority com ­ munities. Thus the word “black” is used to refer to W est Indians, A f­ ricans, and Asians. Although West Indians, we are told, form the largest single group in the borough, we have no means of establishing whether allocations of council properties to Asians, Africans, and W est Indi­ ans were significantly different. This is an im portant issue. We know from other sources that there are considerable differences betw een these various groups with regard both to family values and housing preferences, (see above, RS.I. Report, p. 155). This factor may have had no effect on the CRE findings. On the other hand it may have had. The point is that, since this factor was ignored, we have no way of knowing. The um brella term “black” m ight have been masking ethnic variations in housing allocations, and this, in turn, could have altered both perceptions and conclusions. It is quite conceivable that the officers of the local authority adopted somewhat different ways of responding to housing need according to known ethnic variations in values and preferred type of accommodation. But the adoption of a crude black versus white classification of people means that sort of more subtle factor is lost to view. Quality of Housing. The concept of quality was determined by the investigators, “because Hackney did not have any system of measuring the differing qualities of their properties, we had to devise a system.” This raises a number of points. Since the Council had no method of classifying their properties according to some notion of quality, it is difficult to see how they can be accused of discriminating in alloca­ tions with regard to quality. Unless, that is, we assume there was some sort of unstated but generally accepted taxonomy, and this influenced officer decisions— an assumption the investigators did make. That this is an assumption and not a fact is ignored in the Report’s conclusions.

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The normal way of establishing a typology of housing quality would be to conduct a properly controlled enquiry amongst those wanting prop­ erty from the Council. It should be the applicants’ preferences which ought to form the basis of quality in this context. Quality here is not an absolute concept. It is a function of what people say they want. And there might well be intraethnic differences revealed. The Report acknowledges this in some degree (While the quality of individual properties might be viewed differently by different individuals”), but it fails to accept the possibility of systematic group differences. In short, on this important issue the investigators put the cart before the horse. The only effective way to establish group variations in quality of housing offered would have been to ask individuals how far his or her first choice of property had been granted, and to aggregate individual choices into group satis­ factions. And even after being as careful as that, the investigators would have had to make an adjustment to allow for the fact that there could have been an imbalance between choices and properties actually offered, because there might well have been more first choices for particular prop­ erties than there were preferred properties available. The point is that the investigators erred in failing to construct an understanding of housing quality based on what people said they wanted. They, effectively, imposed their own concept of quality. Identifying Ethnic Origin. This was a crucial issue. If the investiga­ tors were to support allegations of racial discrimination in housing al­ locations, they would clearly have to show that in processing applications the housing officers knew the applicants’ race. However, the investigators admit this was a far from clear question: “At the time of our investigation Hackney did not have an official pro­ cedure for recording ethnic origin.” Nor— since the Report makes noth­ ing of this possibility— did the Council officials have an unofficial one. The question is further complicated by the fact that a high proportion of West Indians— the biggest ethnic group— would have had Anglicised names, so they could have been assumed to be white from the informa­ tion on the form. Again we do not know how many applicants were not actually interviewed by officials. Were the allocations made by the same official who might have interviewed the applicant, and so knew from observation his racial origin? Or were the staff at the reception desk different? W hat proportion of application forms were received through the post? It is important to bear in mind that the CR E’s investigators would be particularly adept at identifying racial origins. They have a professional

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interest in doing so. And, as I have indicated above, they admitted that they expected to discover racial discriminations had been made even before they began work. They were much more likely to have been able to make correct racial distinctions than were the Council officials— though, en passant, we are not told the racial origins of the Council’s officials. We are simply led to believe they were all white, or that non­ white officials are as likely to discriminate against ethnic minority ap­ plicants as are white officials. However, the investigators were a lot less than positive about their own powers in this respect: “We reasoned that if, after a brief review of the files, we could accurately assess ethnic origin in a fair number o f cases, it would be reasonable to assume that Hackney’s officers would have at least the same level of knowledge” (my emphasis). This statement— which is the crucial part of the Report— is open to question for a number of reasons. First, its equating of the CRE offi­ cials’ ability to spot ethnic origins with that of the Council’s officials’ ability is a very dubious proposition, as we have already suggested. The CRE officials are, day in, day out, concerned almost exclusively with people of minority racial origin. Council officials are not. They have to deal with members of the public on a simple first come, first served basis. Secondly, just what does “a fair number of cases” actu­ ally mean? It is given no kind of operational definition. Does it mean success in spotting people from the ethnic minorities in, say, 90 percent of cases? Or half the cases? Or a quarter? Or what? No first-year soci­ ology student would get away with this sort of sloppiness in defining key terms. However, having failed to specify what constitutes success in this crucial process, the investigators, to be fair, do record the proportion of cases in which they did succeed. More to the point, they reveal how far they failed. Assessed against applicants’ own classification of their ra­ cial group, the CRE officials failure rate was as follows: Black 40 percent,

Greek/Turkish 33 percent,

W hite 58 percent

Now even if we were to accept that Hackney’s officials were as skil­ ful as the CRE investigators, this level of failure should surely suggest a rather hesitant conclusion on this absolutely vital issue. This is made all the more necessary when we learn that, with regard to blacks, of the 60 percent they did successfully identify, only 22 percent of these came from inferred judgm ents— on 38 percent of the forms racial origin was actually stated. Moreover, “failure” to identify racial origin is not made

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clear. Does it mean failure to make a racial classification at all, or does it mean misidentification by allocating individuals to the wrong racial group? If it means the former, then we can say that no conclusion can be drawn from a very significant number of cases. If the latter, then evidence of confusion about racial on gin is clearly present in the sample. Unfortunately, the Report fails to elucidate this. If we add to this uncertainty the fact of a 45.5 percent failure rate in the combined Greek-Turkish/white group, then we can safely say that there is a significant level of doubt about how far the Council’s offi­ cials knew the racial origin of the applicants. But not only does the Report ignore this, or, at least, make an appropriate allowance in draw­ ing conclusions. It actually assumes that the Council’s officials did know, and in a systematic way. Dismissed Factors. It is axiomatic in this sort of research that all the factors which can be associated with particular outcomes have to be allowed for in making any deductions about the influence of a specific factor. In this case the specific factor to which the CRE points is racial discrimination. They are claiming that this investigation established beyond all reasonable doubt that decisions on housing quality varied with the race of the applicant, and that judgem ents were due to racism. But, as we have already suggested, contaminating variables were not controlled in the classification process. In the Guardian newspaper of 13 January 1984 the CRE is reported as agreeing that there is a lacuna in their argument. In addition to doubts about the classification process, there are other reasonable anxieties about the design of this enquiry. For instance, white waiting-list applicants and decant cases (where applicants’ houses were being improved or demolished) had more references to medical needs than was the case with black applicants. Now we are told that there was no significant connection between references to medical needs and the quality of property offered. But we are not told whether this factor could have had the effect of making officials more sympathetic in gen­ eral towards white applicants. After all, if there is a higher proportion of sick people in Group A than in Group B, then i t q u i t e possible that this, and not “racism,” could have influenced outcomes. Not only does the Report ignore this possibility, it implies it was being used in an underhand way to gain an advantage for white people, i.e., claims of sickness were bogus: “it appeared that medical needs may have been mentioned as an extra ‘bargaining’ counter in order to try to obtain better accommodation.” Just what does this presuppose? It surely means

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that there was some sort of evidence to support the allegation. The phrase, “it appeared” is presumably based on some sort of foundation. If it is, then that evidence is conspicuous by its absence. Medical need is a perfectly legitimate factor for any applicant to mention. In fact, applicants are routinely asked if there is a medical need present. Not only can the answer to this question affect quality of housing offered, it can also, obviously, influence the type of accommodation which is nec­ essary, e.g., people with heart conditions need ground floor accommo­ dation, as would applicants in wheelchairs. But the Report offers no data, only its own presupposition, to substantiate what is, in effect, a rather offensive allegation. Nor is there any attempt to explain why local doctors were supporting unworthy cases. One wonders what the attitude of the investigators would have been if m edical need had favoured blacks and Asians. Would they have been prepared to ques­ tion its validity, as they have in the case of white applicants? Again, we are told that, with regard to known standards of house­ keeping, whites are “more likely to be given the best grading.” Though the Report repeats the caveat sounded with regard to medical condi­ tions, nevertheless the awareness that there were differences in this respect as between the groups of applicants— this could have had a general effect on the allocating officers’ decisions; particularly when this is linked with the whites’ greater medical needs. But, again, not only is this possibility ignored but the integrity of the officials is im ­ pugned: “However, we consider that the differences in assessments and recommendations reflected a stereotyping process, possibly at an un­ conscious level, whereby black applicants and tenants were viewed less favourably than whites.” This airy, cavalier, and completely un­ substantiated allegation that white people’s judgem ents are a function of “stereotyping” and “unconscious processes,” rather than the result of actual knowledge— this is a favourite tactic of all those employed in the race relations lobby. In any context this is intellectually deplorable; in the context o f an im portant enquiry conducted by a statutory organisation funded from the public purse— and which purports to be entirely objective— it is nothing less than disgraceful. Within this sort of situation the notions of “stereotyping” and “unconscious processes” have no rem otely convincing status as science, and they would be laughed to scorn in a court of law. All that concerns the investigators is that, if whites did have higher standards of housekeeping than blacks, this would reflect badly on an ethnic minority, and could not, therefore, be permitted to enter the analysis. It must be attributed to some sort of

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defect in white people’s perceptions. Again, one wonders how the in­ vestigators would react to a similar attack on black people. A further worrying element arises when we consider the Report’s attitude to the policy of keeping black people together. The Council is criticised because there was a tendency for black families to be offered accommodation in the same neighbourhood. This is offered as racial discrimination. Now it is true that, in law, to treat people differently on the grounds of race is to discriminate, and that is, by definition, unlaw­ ful. At least that is the case when Section 1 (2) is prayed in aid; but it is not so when, for instance, Section 37 and 38— which cover racially discriminatory training— are enlisted in the argument. Nor is it true in relation to Section 11 of the Local Government Act 1966— this specifi­ cally requires the ethnic minorities to be treated differently from whites in the allocation of public funds arising from the operations of the Act. This confusion in the law is mirrored in the CRE’s attitude to samerace accommodation. W hilst the CRE criticises Hackney for placing black families in close proximity to one another, they vigorously sup­ port the notion with regard to the fostering of black children. As I have said above, in Fostering Black Children (1975, reprinted twice) the CRE specified a policy which states that, for reasons of racial and cul­ tural identity, black children should be accommodated exclusively with black foster parents. And yet when Hackney housing officials show some evidence of placing black families together, in response, perhaps, to the CR E’s notion of “black identity,” they are, effectively, accused of racism, and of infringing the law. Moreover, we are not told to what extent black families actually asked for this sort of arrangement. The Council is also criticised because the two worst council estates contain a disproportionate number of black people. The reason for the dilapidated condition of the areas concerned is, according to the Re­ port, “severe design faults”, though one of the estates, Holly Street, is said to have been desirable when new, and was only ten years old at the time of the investigation. Now the reasons why council estates deterio­ rate into vandalised, graffiti-ridden, and generally squalid environments are, by common consent, many and varied. But there is a consensus about one thing— the attitudes and behaviour of those who live there is a crucial factor. More specifically, we know for certain that estates tend to decline directly with the number of problem families they con­ tain. It may be that, in allocating housing the officials were convinced, on the basis of lengthy experience, that a higher proportion of blacks than whites were in this category. If so, their decisions may have re­

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fleeted an unspoken policy of putting problem families together, rather than putting blacks together. I am not arguing that this is the case. Nor am I defending a policy of placing problem families together, if that were, in fact, happening— though I would be prepared to assert on the basis of personal, inner-city experience that whites produce signifi­ cantly more problem families than Asians. W hat I am saying is that this possibility was ignored in the Report. Conclusions. I am not here arguing that the investigators were dis­ honest. I am not for one moment doubting their integrity. W hat I am saying is that there are questions to be raised about the prior assump­ tions made by the researchers and the adequacy o f the research design in relation to the conclusions drawn. Crude correlation techniques as used here do not permit statements about causes, unless all other pos­ sible influencing factors are taken into account. Even when this sort of rigour is present, conclusions about something as complex and sensi­ tive as housing have to be stated with caution. But far from adopting a proper, objective caution, the CRE states emphatically, not only that they have established racial discrimination, but imply that the present findings are typical of all local authority housing departments. More than that, they saw fit, on this basis, to use their full legal powers to issue a non-discrimination notice, which meant that the Hackney Council had to comply— though they had a right to appeal, a right they chose not to exercise. This in turn meant that the CRE were able to enforce considerable changes in staffing and procedures.

Housing in Walsall Walsall Council: Practices and Policies o f Housing Allocation This report of a formal investigation appeared in 1985, though the events with which it is concerned took place between 1978 and 1981. The CRE investigators claim, as a result of their enquiries, that “there had been direct racial discrimination arising from the operation of a form of dispersal policy in one housing area.” There were at the relevant time seven housing areas in Walsall. The investigators also claim that they had discovered prima facie evidence of indirect discrimination. Before looking in detail at this report and its findings, I think it worth glancing at the general housing situation in Walsall with regard to race. This is referred to on page 3. The proportion o f residents from the eth­ nic minorities in the area covered by Walsall council was about 7 per­

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cent — about 1 percent West Indian and 6 percent Asian. Now to get some idea of the general housing picture we need to relate this figure to racial proportions in housing outcomes. The report gives only limited information, but what it does give sheds some light. Regarding council accommodation, 28 percent of West Indians lived in such property, whilst 11 percent of Asians did so, and 47 percent of whites did so. So we can say with certainty that, in allocating its proper­ ties, the council gave a disproportionate number to Asians, and a hugely disproportionate number to West Indians. Now, bearing in mind that, by common consent, council housing is a scarce commodity, there is no evidence here that the council disfavoured ethnic minorities— the reverse case would be far easier to make. With regard to owner-occupied proper­ ties, 50 percent of West Indians and Whites were in this category, and 77 percent of Asians, i.e. a hugely disproportionate number of Asians owned their own homes. So the general picture would certainly not support the view that the ethnic minorities were being denied opportunities in the housing market— though we need to bear in mind that these sorts of fig­ ures tell us nothing about quality of accommodation. My second preliminary point is the relationship between Walsall Coun­ cil and a CRE which saw fit to make allegations of racism. The CRE made its initial allegations following complaints from one employee and two former employees. The council rejected the allegations, and asserted that discrimination had not occurred, or that the requirements or condi­ tions reflected in their allocation policies were justified. The CRE re­ jected this, and decided to embark on a formal investigation. The council declined to cooperate, and had to be subpoenaed and compelled to coop­ erate, and there was a row about whether or not, and in what circum­ stances, the CRE might propose to issue a non-discrimination notice. At this point (July 1981) the Hillingdon housing case established that the CRE had erred in its understanding of the terms of reference with regard to formal investigations. It was, therefore, compelled to abandon its origi­ nal terms of reference in the Walsall case; and it therefore drew up new terms of reference for a new attack on Walsall. At this point the council made representations regarding the new terms of reference, and, in view of changes the council had made in its procedures, the CRE dropped four of the five issues with which it was concerned; so that only one issue was then at stake. This concerned allegations about less favourable treatment toward Asians applying for housing accommodation in one area. The CRE then formed the view that unlawful racial discrimination had occurred.

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The council submitted written representations denying this. The CRE insisted that its view was correct. Though it suspended the issue of a non-discrimination notice for six months, the CRE used this threat in order to “persuade” the council to carry out certain changes in its pro­ cedures. These included new forms of record keeping, racial monitor­ ing of waiting lists, changes in the ethnic composition of staff, the e sta b lish m e n t o f re g u la r co n ta c ts w ith lo cal e th n ic m in o rity organisations, and provision for special needs. When all this had been done, the CRE dropped its threat. That is, the CRE used its powers to coerce a recalcitrant council to establish a race relations industry, in accordance with CRE prescrip­ tions— despite the fact that the council believed it was being wrongly accused. It needs very little imagination to understand just how much ill will and animosity the CRE intervention must have caused to a council which, as the CRE already knew, had produced clear evidence that it had consistently favoured blacks and Asians in allocating its proper­ ties— at least in a statistical sense. It is important to bear in mind that the council had not been before a court to argue its case, much less tried or convicted of anything.

The Report Itself The investigators o f the CRE claim ed that, “there had been direct racial discrim ination arising from the operation o f a form o f dis­ persal policy in one housing area.” They also expressed concern “about the operation of some of the rules for registration on the housing waiting list” . These allegations referred specifically to con­ dition at Pleck Flats. Dispersal. In March 1977 residents of the flats formed the Pleck Tenants’ Association, (PTA). The objectives of the PTA were to com ­ bat vandalism, filth in lifts, litter, defacing of walls, and deterioration of the property. The PTA was also concerned that the council’s officers should carry out a vetting procedure for applicants. According to the CRE report this latter wish was an attempt “to control the number of Asian families moving into Pleck flats” (p. 7). A comment from the PTA’s chairman throws light on this issue: “On the whole Asians will not conform to our way of life, and the way things are going in Pleck flats they are going to be turned into ghettos.” The Estate Superintendent serving Pleck flats also confirmed that he at­ tempted to prevent West Indians and Asians living on the same floor,

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since he knew from experience that they did not get on well together. These allegations are the crux of the CRE’s case. Now, whatever the motives involved, the CRE case in law is unas­ sailable. To treat people differently on grounds of race is unlawful— though, as we have seen, differential treatment is defensible in law, if the beneficiaries belong to the ethnic m inorities (Sections 5(2)(d), 35,37,38 make this clear), i.e., there is racial bias in the Act itself in certain circumstances. However, let us concede that the CR E’s legalis­ tic view is correct. The question surely is just how wise was it for the CRE to adopt a nitpicking, strictly formal, and essentially bureaucratic view? The primary statutory duty of the CRE is to promote good race relations. That is the issue which has to be kept constantly in mind in judging its tactics. Would intervention in this case be likely to promote good race relations? This hangs principally on how those involved per­ ceived the situation. Now it is difficult to know how far the PTA’s fears were founded on reality, or were, indeed, a function of racial hostility. Was it the case that there was a risk of a racial ghetto at Pleck flats? Was it the case that Asian families failed to conform to the majority community’s expecta­ tions by virtue of the cultural distances involved? Was it true that Asians and West Indians do not make good neighbours? The report does not give the information which could shed light on these questions. For instance, we do not know what proportion of the tenants were Asian, or whether, over time, it was increasing. Without this we cannot know whether or not the flats were becoming an Asian enclave. If that were the case, then the PTA’s fear of displacement and the triumph of what the majority tenants perceived as an exotic and alien culture— these anxieties would have been borne out by the facts. Fear of cultural con­ flict in this situation would not be an unreasonable inference. After all, first generation Asians—or, in many cases, subsequent, British-born generations— are strikingly different, in a cultural sense, from indig­ enous, white people. In terms of dress, religion, diet (there had been complaints about curry smells), language, attitudes to women, and gen­ eral social customs Asians can be strikingly different, and many show little inclination to conform or to integrate. That such people should be perceived as strangers is an entirely rational and understandable reac­ tion from the historic, settled community. An attempt to prevent the newcomers from becoming the dominant group within the flats would appear to be both entirely human, and from the race relations’ point o f view obviously desirable. In these circumstances some sort of dispersal

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policy, provided it did not lead to lack of accommodation, would ap­ pear to be eminently justified. As far as the estate superintendent’s view regarding the incom pat­ ibility of West Indians and Asians is concerned, he claims in the report that this is based on experience— though he is given no space to de­ velop this belief. After all, if his view is correct, then, again, it would appear perfectly reasonable to keep such groups as far apart as pos­ sible; it can scarcely be conducive to good race relations to place them next door to each other. Now, though the report fails to examine the superintendent’s conviction, there is sound empirical evidence that he is correct in his judgment. Samir Shah, a former producer of “Asian Eye” on Channel 4, a programme aimed specifically at an Asian audi­ ence, and a man whom I mention elsewhere, has said this: “W herever the two communities [i.e., blacks and Asians] have lived together, for example, in Uganda, they have been locked in antagonistic relation­ ships” (The Times, 19.9.85.). A national survey carried out in this coun­ try in 1984 by the Harris Research Organisation found that Asians consistently singled out blacks as the least desirable neighbours, em ­ ployers and employees, and those with least respect for authority. Shah avers, “just as in white culture, there is an anti-black feeling among many Asians.” This being so, one wonders why a public official should be criticised for doing his best to prevent blacks and Asians bumping into each other every time they opened their front doors. But this realistic, and well meant, consideration carries no weight with the CRE— its intention of discovering racism is its sole objective. The Council’s Representations. After the CRE had found, at least to its own satisfaction, that there had been racial discrimination at Pleck flats, it invited the council to comment. The council argued that the policy of limited dispersal was a response to representations made to it by local residents whose welfare and feelings it was obliged to con­ sider. The motive was not racial discrimination. The fundamental pur­ pose was to seek to create harmonious relationships amongst tenants who came from very different cultural backgrounds. The council’s in­ tentions were entirely virtuous. The purpose was not to disadvantage blacks or Asians, but to create and maintain some sort of cultural bal­ ance, whereby no community felt threatened. Integrating such very di­ verse peoples in a single building called for sensitive, and, at the same time practical, handling. There is no hint in the report that the council’s officers were failing in this respect. It is important to bear in mind that

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the council’s officers’ knowledge and understanding of the situation was based on daily, and lengthy contact on the ground. The CRE inves­ tigators were strangers to the situation, and they came around, not with the burden of responsibility for good race relations borne by the coun­ cil, but with abstract legalistic and statistical notions which had no con­ nection with practical realities. W hat we see here is a conflict, not between good and evil, nor between the lawful and the unlawful, but between practical human concern, based on experience and common sense, and the cold, desiccated mind of the state functionary. Moreover, during the period to which the CRE allegations related, there was no official consensus about the propriety o f operating a lim ­ ited dispersal policy; this was not in conflict with any of the existing guidelines to local authorities. If views on this issue had changed, then it was not proper for the council to be penalised retrospectively for events which had occurred previously, in 1978-79: the limited dispersal policy was officially disbanded in 1978, as was the vetting policy at Pleck flats. That is, the thing of which the CRE was complaining was a thing of the past. The CRE Response. None of this impressed the CRE. The fact that the council’s motives were entirely honourable, that the dispersal policy may well have been permissible, and that, in any case this policy no longer existed— all this counted for nothing. The fact that racial dis­ crimination had, in the eyes of the CRE officials, once taken place— this was sufficient for the council to be found guilty, and to have radical changes in policy and practice imposed upon it, under the threat of legal action, in the form o f a non-discrimination notice. I have detailed the extent of the changes above. Owner-Occupier Rules. This is an issue which, according to the re­ port, caused the CRE general concern. Walsall, like many other coun­ cils, operated a rule which disfavoured those applicants for council property who already owned their own homes. This rule applied to ev­ eryone, entirely regardless of race. The council argued that the rule was necessary in a situation of shortage of its properties, i.e., council prop­ erty was a scarce commodity, and allocations had, therefore, to go to those in greatest need. People owning their own homes were not in this category, since they were already housed. Moreover, they possessed an asset from which capital to buy another house could be realised. The council justified its policy on the further ground that anyone in real or urgent need— even owner-occupiers, of whatever race— could be con­ sidered on the basis of individual merit by the Housing Committee.

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That is, the rule was subject to a degree of flexibility in its actual op­ eration. The council also argued that, since council housing was in short supply, to admit owner occupiers as a matter of policy would cause other applicants to wait longer for property. And, in making compari­ sons across groups, the proper criterion was how far the proportion of low-income owner-occupiers compared with ethnic minority low-income owner-occupiers— a different rule would allow the daughter of a millionaire to be considered for a council property. (We note elsewhere how the CRE fails to allow for variations in social class in comparing groups.) Moreover, the council was under great pressure to permit ten­ ants to buy their council properties, and so become owner occupiers. Any change in the well-understood and universally accepted rule about not accommodating owner-occupiers— except in exceptional circum ­ stances— would, therefore, make the already difficult housing situa­ tion worse. In short, the council had a formidable, well-argued case, grounded in both rational analysis and considerable practical experience, to sup­ port its policy on owner-occupiers. There was no suggestion, at any point, and no complaint or empirical evidence to support the view that the council was then, or at any other time, guilty of racial discrim ina­ tion of any kind. The rule applied to everyone— regardless of race. The CRE accepted this, and admitted in its report that there was no direct racial discrimination involved. What is more, it is clear from comments in the report that the council had been just as keen to house Asians as much as any other group: “It was true, however, that the council had rehoused a high proportion o f Asian owner-occupiers [my emphasis] in the Caldmore area of Walsall as a result of redevelopment, and, by 1982, two Housing Action Areas and a General Improvement Area were in operation bringing direct financial support to all owner-occupiers there, including many Asians” (my emphasis, p. 16). It would be very difficult to imagine a more open-handed and totally fair-minded housing policy than that practised by Walsall Council. Equally, it would be little short of a fanatically determined mentality that could discover a scintilla of racial discrimination involved in its housing duties and how it discharged them. One could reasonably imagine Walsall’s housing department being help up as a model of multiracial success. But the CRE bloodhounds thought otherwise. Whilst they readily conceded that there was no evidence of direct discrimination, they found that the rule about owner-occupation was indirectly discriminatory— and there­ fore unlawful—because a higher proportion of Asians than other groups

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were owner-occupiers, and disproportionately likely to be turned down if applying for council property. They were not impressed with the council’s justifications for the owner-occupier rule. At this point in the argument the CRE shifts its ground. Clearly aware that, if the council abolished its rule, it could only do so in relation to all owner-occupiers— and not just Asians— and so create an impossi­ bly high demand for council properties, as well as infuriating those applicants without their own homes, and who may have been on the waiting list for years— given all this, the CRE seeks to construct a case on the basis that exceptions to the owner-occupier rule were too nar­ rowly drawn. The rule should be redrawn so as to admit more catego­ ries of people. Now the council was already operating a system whereby the following groups of people could be exempted from the rule: the elderly, medical cases, individuals in divorce proceedings, and those facing eviction owing to arrears. The CRE claimed this was too narrow a definition of exceptional need. The criteria should be widened to in­ clude the following: low income, heavy family commitment, chronic illness or disability, and those struggling to pay their mortgages in or­ der to carry out necessary repairs to their properties. Now the striking thing about this is how far the CRE list is a virtual facsimile of the existing council list of exceptions to the owner-occu­ pier rule. For instance, the council category of medical cases cover “chronic illness or disability”; those facing eviction because of arrears are equally clearly in the category of those accepted because they can­ not meet their financial commitments. The only real extension to the rule lies in the category “heavy family commitments.” W hat all this boils down to is that size of family should be included because Asians choose to have far more children than do other groups. It seems to have escaped the notice of the CRE that this latter rule would, in a statistical sense, indirectly discriminate against non-Asians, i.e., it would pro­ duce the very outcome for non-Asians of which the CRE complain when the same outcome applies to Asians. In other words, the concept of indirect discrimination applies only to ethnic minorities— though that is not what the Act actually says. Now despite all this, and despite the fact that the report heavily implies that indirect racial discrimina­ tion has occurred, the authors of the report are forced to concede that they have, in fact, failed to make a conclusive or convincing case: “We recognise, however, that further information was required to define [sic] precisely whether this was the case, and we, therefore, recommend that Walsall in its monitoring programme should review the effect of this

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rule in relation to its broad criteria of broad housing and social need.” That is, having failed to make a case, whilst heavily implying that it had, the CRE insisted that the council should set up a new procedure, with the obvious intention of pressurising the council into changing its eminently successful and equitable rule on owner-occupiers. Separated Family Rules. The council’s policy was as follows. Al­ though there was no formal rule, the practice over many years was that, if the family were living in different parts of the country, then if an applicant registered with the council he was given additional points for his dependants, and joined the appropriate queue for family accommo­ dation. This applied only to those domiciled in the U.K. If a person had a family living abroad he was registered for single-person accommo­ dation, until his family arrived here. The council justified this policy, after pressure from the CRE as fol­ lows. There was a shortage of family accommodation in areas popular with Asians. It was not considered fair, therefore, to other applicants on the waiting list that a person should be allocated a house in excess o f immediate needs, on the basis of dependent relatives abroad, who might (or might not) arrive in Britain in the future. Moreover, if a person accepted single-person accommodation initially, when his family ar­ rived he would be statutorily overcrowded, and would, therefore, be given immediate rehousing. Again, as with the owner-occupier rule, one senses a council strug­ gling to be both fair and, at the same time, practical in its approach. One also senses an awareness that the public generally would resent the notion that their local council has any sort of obligation to people who do not even live in this country. After all, a local council is be definition local in its identity and responsibilities. Any bad feeling arising from a change in the established rule could well threaten race relations. And that is something any responsible council would want to avoid at all costs. But, again, the CRE was not satisfied. Because Asians were more likely than others to be affected by the rule, the CRE considered it likely that the rule was, in an indirect sense, discriminatory. The coun­ cil was more or less forced to scrap the existing rule on separated fam i­ lies. In April 1982 the council resolved that, for cases where dependants were living abroad, the applicant should be given the “family” points three months before the anticipated arrival date. Conclusion. The Walsall enquiry illustrates clearly just how far the CRE was prepared to go in forcing its obsessions about race into the

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council’s consciousness and agenda. It insisted that both direct and in­ direct discrimination had been established in the council’s housing prac­ tices— despite the fact that a disproportionate number of blacks and Asians had been allocated council properties, and despite the fact that a hugely disproportionate number of Asians owned their own homes. The CRE chose to ignore the council’s entirely defensible case for limited dispersal, in just one of its seven housing areas, and implicitly rejected the notion that sitting tenants’ fears o f an Asian ghetto being created should be respected. It also refused to accept that the policy of placing West Indians and Asians on separate floors was in response to sound empirical evidence and daily practical experience that the two groups do not, in general, get on well together. The CRE even ignored the fact that the council itself, responding to a changed situation of rehousing, had already dropped the dispersal policy of its own volition. The fact that rational, limited dispersal had once occurred was sufficient for the council to be found guilty of direct racial discrimination. Moreover, the well-established owner-occupier rule— which was very convinc­ ingly defended by the council— and the eminently fair and sensible arrangements regarding separated families— both these practices were frowned upon in the name of indirect discrimination. It is important to bear in mind in judging the CRE’s behaviour here that its decision to mount such a thoroughgoing, intrusive, and heavyhanded investigation was not the result of complaints from black and/ or Asian tenants. It might have been understandable if such groups had presented a petition signed by a significant number of complainants. But there is no evidence in the report of any hint of dissatisfaction about the council’s housing policies on the part of W alsall’s ethnic m i­ norities. The whole interminable CRE investigation was the result o f just one allegation from one employee and two ex-employees. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the CRE used its powers, not so much to establish an informed and balanced assessment of coun­ cil housing policy, but to confirm it in its a priori assumption that rac­ ism existed, and that it was the duty of the accused to prove it did not. This approach clearly antagonised the council. This is made clear by the council’s initial and determined reluctance to co-operate, and its spirited defence of existing procedures. From the CR E’s point of view, of course, it mattered not at all that it had created such ill will. Its fell purpose was to pressurise the council into establishing a race relations industry within its ranks. The exercise had succeeded in transforming the council’s manifestly colour-blind philosophy into a colour conscious

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one, and had established a precedent for pressurising other councils, and that was all that mattered.

Housing Allocations in Oldham Oldham Council was not racist then [i.e., August 1988 to March 1990], is not racist now and never will be racist. We have been guilty of nothing more than allowing our tenants choice...{Daily Telegraph, 9.12.93.)

These are the words of the leader of Oldham M etropolitan Borough Council. They refer to a report of a formal investigation by the CRE, published in 1993, and alleging that racial discrimination had been dis­ covered in the Council’s housing department. They are the words of a man who believes he had been badly done to— found guilty of an of­ fence he is convinced he has not committed. They have the same tone of bitterness we have noted in other people who have been the object of the CR E’s inquisitors. Before examining the CRE case against Oldham Council, it is im ­ portant to describe the Council’s equal opportunity and race relations policy. This will throw light on how far the Council was taking its responsibilities in this respect seriously. I rely here on information in the CR E’s own report. Between 1985 and May 1990 (when the Council was informed about the possibility of a CRE investigation) the housing department had done the following, so as to guarantee racial equality: • • • • • • •

Appointed a Senior Officer (Ethnic Minorities) in 1985. Arranged the training of staff on race issues. Translated Council literature into relevant minority languages. Monitored housing allocations by race. Investigated cases of alleged racial harassment. Reviewed Council’s policy on racial harassment. Produced a monitoring report on housing allocations in 1986, and was in the process of producing another report in May 1990. • Adopted a policy on racial harassment in May 1989. • Arranged training of staff on Council’s equal opportunity policy. • Produced a guide on how to apply for Council accommodation in Urdu, the main Asian language in Oldham.

In addition to all this, the report says this: “Oldham Council has a policy of racial equality in housing based on the standards recommended by the CR E’s Code of Practice in Housing”.

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In short Oldham Council might reasonably be thought to be a model council as far as housing and racial equality is concerned. After all, if a council is creating policies and practices in accordance with the CR E’s own dictates, what can it be doing wrong? Why, given all this, did the CRE feel confident in convicting Oldham Council of racism? In justifying its decision to investigate the Council’s housing depart­ ment, the CRE alleged that the Council may have discriminated in the way in which residential properties were allocated contrary to Sections 20 and 21 of the Act, together with Section 32. Sections 20/21 are con­ cerned with equality of access to goods, facilities, or services. Section 32 refers to the liability o f an employer for the actions of his employ­ ees. The CRE, ironically, first became minded to pursue Oldham Council after the Council itself had submitted a report to it entitled, “The Re­ housing of Asian Applicants in Oldham: An Examination.” Later the CRE was sent, anonymously, a report prepared by the Council’s own Ethnic M inority Officer. It was this report which convinced the CRE that an investigation into possible racial discrimination should be car­ ried out. At this point the Council wrote to the CRE protesting that this report was incomplete and contained numerous and significant statisti­ cal errors. But the CRE ignored this protest, and initiated the investiga­ tion. It is very important to understand that the CRE was not proceeding in order to enquire into some sort of grievance; in fact not a single tenant had registered a complaint about the way the Council was allo­ cating its properties. The CRE methodology consisted of examining various documents in the housing department, looking at the external conditions in the areas studied, and seeking to evaluate different outcomes with regard to race by means of tests of statistical significance. There was a row about the size of the sample involved, and the effect of missing data on the CR E’s conclusions: Oldham Council argued that the missing data comprised some 25% of hous­ ing offers during the period of the investigation, and was even greater when it came to applicants’ access channels and area preferences. Consequently, some samples of Asian applicants were small so to compare their treatment with that of the white applicants could be biased. In the Council’s view, the CRE had not properly enquired into the impact of the missing data and, if it had done so, different conclusions might have been reached which would have invalidated the Endings. But, again, the CRE brushed the Council’s considered opinion aside, arguing that the sample, though small, was big enough for statistical

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purposes. It is clear that by this juncture the Council, to put it mildly, was in a state of considerable resentment. The CRE officials looked at four aspects of housing allocations: seg­ regation of tenants by race, quality of accommodation offered, house­ keeping standards, and waiting times. The areas covered consisted of four estates: Clarkwell, Barker Street, Waterloo Street, and Glodwick. All were in the town centre— an area favoured by Asians.

Segregation The essence of the CRE’s case here is that there was evidence that a disproportionate number of Asians, in relation to their actual popula­ tion, finished up on the Clarkwell estate. This is a statement of fact, which no one disputed. The conflict between the Council and the CRE concerned the reasons for this disparity. The CRE claimed it was the result of improper influencing of prospective Asian tenants by the Coun­ cil officials responsible for interviewing those seeking Council accom­ modation, i.e., the Council had separated Asian from other tenants for reasons of race; apart from creating unlawful segregation, this m eant Asians were getting lower quality accommodation. The sole grounds for the CRE allegations were statistical variations and so-called stereo­ typing by Council officials. The Council, on the other hand, claimed the racial disparities had nothing to do with discrim ination. The variations had occurred as the result of tenants’ own choices. Regarding the key estate, Clarkwell, the C R E’s own report lends some credence to the C ouncil’s case: “W hen Asians did this [i.e., specified a particular estate as their first choice] Clarkwell was the m ost frequently m entioned estate, but it only applied in 12 cases.” (Remember, the CRE has already claimed that small samples are no barrier to the drawing of reliable conclu­ sions.) This pattern o f preferences, moreover, is supported by evi­ dence in the records of the housing officials who had actually visited and talked to aspiring Council tenants. These showed that of seventyseven Asians visited no fewer than fifty-six had opted for Clarkwell, i.e., 72 percent, which is pretty well identical with the proportion of Asians actually living at Clarkwell at the time o f the investigation, i.e., 71 percent. A precisely similar pattern of outcomes equalling tenants’ choices is also found with regard to the Barker Street estate. There we find there had been seven Asian choices out of 117 offers, i.e., a massively dis­

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proportionate number of Asians did not want to live at Barker Street estate, a fact, again mirrored in actual residential area. At this point it would be an eminently reasonable conclusion that the Council was guilty o f no more than respecting the choices o f its own tenants. But there is yet more evidence to support the Council’s case. According to the CRE report the Oldham director of housing stated in a BBC programme, “File on Four,” in November 1990 that, “I think it’s a matter of fact that about three quarters of all the ethnic minority families live within about a mile and a half radius of the town centre. It has to do with the other facilities the Asian community would like to see there. The reason why Clarkwell estate is popular is because of the location of the mosque and the schools and the shops which provide the Asian community with the things they want to buy.” (This is pre­ cisely the view of J.G. Davies, whose work I referred to earlier, after investigating Asian housing in the North East.) But the CRE will have none of this. Neither the overwhelming sta­ tistical evidence of the Council simply meeting tenants’ wishes, nor the considered opinion of the most senior housing official in the area, cut any ice with the omniscient race relations bureaucrats from London. According to the CRE the “likely reason” for unequal racial outcomes is that the housing officers exercised considerable influence over ap­ plicants’ choices, i.e., the housing officers were guilty of encouraging Asians to choose particular estates in order to segregate them from white estates. This is a very serious allegation. Segregating a person from other per­ sons on racial grounds is treating him less favourably than they are treated, and constitutes direct racial discrimination. It is expressly forbidden by Section 1(2) of the Act. For a court or tribunal to convict a person there would have to be substantial evidence. However, the only evidence ad­ duced by the CRE is the allegation that housing officers “expressed broad stereotyped attitudes” in their reports of visits to Asian applicants. Now without wishing to quibble about just what a broad stereotype is, and how it differs from a thin stereotype, or one of average thickness, what one can say is that the concept of stereotyping is of dubious scientific status— and one much employed by the race relations lobby precisely because of its vagueness and difficulty of disproving. However, the CRE report does give seven comments by housing officers about Asian and white applicants. Bearing in mind that sev­ enty-seven Asians and 194 whites were interviewed, this means that the seven quotes represent less than 3 percent of the sample. This could,

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to be fair, be because of shortage of space. But, nevertheless, we are entitled to assume that the seven comments are the most compelling instances of the stereotyping phenomenon the CRE officials claim to have discovered. In fact I would contend that no impartial and reason­ able person could support an allegation of stereotyping from these com­ ments. The comments are just about what one might expect from an official involved on a daily basis with reporting his impressions of the people he has to interview, and of the properties they occupy. None of the comments is offensive, though they are frank. One comment on an Asian household runs thus: “Not at all spicy— badly overcrowded.” This is a simple play on words: it is a statement of fact that Asian cuisine is inclined to be more hot and spicy than that of the white popu­ lation, and “Not at all spicy” suggests that things are not well with this family. This is made clear by the phrase “badly overcrowded”— a com ­ ment which must tell in the applicant’s favour, since overcrowding earns points for the applicant on the waiting list. That is, this comment would appear to be essentially sympathetic. Again, consider this: “O ver­ crowded, cold and all the usual reasons. The house is dam p...I would think they will jum p at a property on Clarkwell.” W here is the evi­ dence of stereotyping in that remark? This same family had actually applied for Oldham town centre, and Clarkwell is such a town centre estate. Here is another allegedly stereotyping remark: “landlord (Asian) is 53 and still producing. Applicant is 57 and no guarantee that he w on’t have more children.” Is this an overgeneralised comment based on very slight evidence— which is what stereotyping involves— or is it draw­ ing attention to a well established fact, i.e., that Asian couples do have children over a significantly longer period of their married life than do their white counterparts— at least amongst the older generation? Is it unreasonable for a housing official to mention this fact, bearing in mind that housing need is directly related to actual and potential family size? A further factor that indicates that Oldham Council was doing no more than seeking to meet applicants’ expressed needs is the relaxing of the ground floor rules in flats. Now this was decisive in ensuring that Clarkwell would become predominantly Asian. The Council had, traditionally, not permitted property above ground floor level to be let to families with children under ten. However, since September 1984 this policy had been relaxed on Clarkwell. The reason for this was the housing directors’ view that several three-bedroomed, upper-floor maisonettes could be allocated to Asian families with young children who wanted town centre accom­ modation, and who, otherwise, would have to remain on the waiting list.

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The Council had been advised at the time by its own legal department that this change in policy was not in breach of the Race Relations Act, since the new policy applied to all racial groups, and actually widened the scope for all families with young children— a disproportionate num­ ber of whom would be Asians, i.e., Asians, more than any other group, would benefit from the new policy. Moreover, this change of policy had been supported by the Asian community and the local Community Relations Council. In 1991 the Council agreed to allow families with young children to live in upperlevel flats at all its estates. Its reason, again, illustrates its concern for applicants and their families: “The Council changed its policy because families preferred this to the long wait for a ground floor flat.” The CRE case for unlawful segregation, then, rests on very flimsy foundations. W hat the CRE appears to be saying is that, because, in meeting applicants’ demonstrated needs, the Council produced statisti­ cal disparities of racial outcomes, then something improper, indeed, illegal, had occurred. Neat correlations, that is, are more important than putting roofs over people’s heads.

Quality o f Accommodation Oldham Council did not have a quality index for its properties at the time of the investigation. So, as we have seen on previous occasions, the CRE officials invented one. This consisted of two criteria: characteris­ tics of the property, and the ranking given to each estate by the Council on a scale of deprivation. The Council rejected the CRE’s ranking sys­ tem as a measure of quality, but the CRE ignored this and went ahead. The outcome regarding quality of property was distinctly patchy. W hilst it was true that Asians did worse in some respects, they did better than whites in others. For instance, whilst a disproportionate number of Asian families did finish up on older estates, they were more likely to obtain the most desirable of all properties— houses— and they did so to a marked extent: 37 percent versus 22 percent. Moreover whites were more likely to be offered the less desirable flats: 60 percent ver­ sus 47 percent. Therefore, “As houses were generally considered more desirable, Asians fared better in this respect.” Asians were just as likely to be offered houses with gardens; and they were more likely to be offered desirable ground floor flats— 57 percent versus 45 percent. Regarding the quality of houses, the CRE considered that, “there was no clear difference in the relative quality of houses being offered

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to Asians and UK/Europeans.” So the Council had no case to answer in this respect. In fact the evidence decisively points to the conclusion that in the allocation of houses the Asian applicants were actually favoured. But, since the beneficiaries were from the ethnic minority, the CRE makes nothing of the possibility that this m ight well point to antimajority discrimination. However, regarding flats and maisonettes, the CRE concluded that, since Asians did worse “race was a factor,” i.e., this disparity indicates that the system was biased against Asians. The only evidence adduced is that because “offers of housing to Asians were mostly restricted to two estates, Clarkwell and Waterloo Street, then they had less chance of getting newer or improved flats.” Now at this point in the report something astonishing happens, and it is this statement: “We also found that Asians had no particular prefer­ ence for these estates.” Now there is clear evidence in this report that Asians did prefer town centre estates, and this is made clear, as I have shown above, at several points. Moreover, this is supported by the fact that 83 percent of Asians accepted the first property they were offered, though, like all other applicants, they could have refused. I cannot ac­ count for the CRE statement I have quoted. The only hint of an expla­ nation lies in the notion of the conspiracy theory I have referred to above, i.e., the housing officials had improperly steered Asian appli­ cants away from certain areas, and directed them to less desirable flats.

Housekeeping Standards Council officials were required to assess applicants’ housekeeping standards when they made home visits. They recorded their assess­ ments on visiting cards. Three factors were involved: Cleanliness, Oc­ cupants, Furniture. Each of these was assessed on a four-point Likert scale, ranging from “good” to “poor.” Now because the Asian group did significantly worse on all three factors, the CRE concluded thus: “The race factor was the only explanation we could find for this.” In point of fact there is no evidence offered to support this very seri­ ous and damaging allegation. All that is offered is the statement that the housing officials’ judgments were individual and subjective. But this is true of all the judgments made by the housing officials, includ­ ing white judgments. So what is here being alleged is that the housing officials were functioning as racists in making their assessments, i.e., they w ere system atically favouring and, equally system atically,

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disfavouring people because o f their skin colour. Given Oldham Council’s impeccable record of impartiality, and its transparent com ­ mitment to equal opportunities, this is a quite atrocious allegation. Let us, for a moment, go beyond conspiracy theory, and look at the facts. The people who are being accused here are people who are part of a culture based on long experience. They regularly visit all sorts and conditions of people and properties. They are making informed assess­ ments every working day. They are acutely aware of the dangers of bias of any kind, and know the possible consequences o f any applicant com­ plaining, particularly if that applicant is Asian and likely to call, not only on the local Community Relations Council, but on the CRE, with its very considerable statutory powers of investigation. Any official convicted of racial discrimination would face certain dismissal from a Council acutely aware of its race relations duties and responsibilities. Given this, is it at all likely that officials would act in a racially bigoted way? A more objective— and decisive— flaw in the CRE argument is the failure to follow established research procedures. If the CRE had been prepared to do so, then the extent of any bias could have been reliably known. W hat the CRE officials should have done was to have a repre­ sentative sample of applicants and properties assessed first by housing officials, then by completely independent experts. The two assessments could then have been compared, and the significance of any differ­ ences statistically established. In fact, there is no evidence in the report that a single person or property was independently assessed. Despite this the CRE felt able to say this, “The lower assessments given to Asian applicants showed that race was a factor”.

Waiting Time In this respect the CRE is compelled to accept that the Council has no case to answer: “The Commission concluded...that there was no significant difference between the waiting time of Asian and UK/European applicants.”

Statistics The impartial reader might, at this point, have been tempted to the view that the CRE allegation of racism against the Oldham housing department is rather less than convincing. But there is a further anxiety for those who believe that serious and immensely damaging allega­

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tions should be based on irrefutable proof. At several points in this report there are indications of statistical weaknesses. At the very outset there is a query about statistics. The decisive in­ fluence in the CRE decision to investigate Oldham’s housing depart­ ment was the report prepared by the Council’s race relations officer, and sent anonymously to the CRE. Now the Council advised the CRE that its decision to investigate was questionable: the race relations officer’s report was inadequate in data, and contained several statisti­ cal errors. At this point one feels the proper duty of the CRE would have been to check this out, i.e., to see if there were, indeed, errors present. But there is no evidence that the CRE did so. The Council asked for a delay in a possible investigation until a more accurate re­ port could be prepared. But the CRE ignored this. In assessing housing need in regard to the vitally important Clarkwell estate, we find a fur­ ther concern, i.e., the sample was far from adequate: in a footnote the report says this, “We are only able to obtain points scores for 35% of the relevant allocations. These figures should therefore be viewed with caution.” There is a similar, if less serious, inadequacy regarding data on points allocation to tenants at the Glodwick estate. In assessing neighbourhood choices in relation to town centre areas the sample of Asians consisted of only twenty-five households. In identifying access channels by means of which applicants were assessed for housing need the position of 60 percent of Asians was not known. Now I am not in any way accusing the CRE of being dishonest in relation to statistical matters. And I am well aware that the disadvan­ tages of small samples can be overcome by powerful nonparametric procedures. But what I am suggesting is that the CRE approach was high-handed in refusing to allow Oldham Council to prepare a more reliable, initial report based on sounder statistics than those in the re­ port the CRE relied upon to begin its investigation. If the Council had been allowed to produce a more comprehensive and statistically con­ vincing report, then the CRE decision might well have been different. I would also want to argue that, because of its statistical inadequa­ cies, this report may not meet those rigorous criteria normally required of this sort of sociological enquiry.

Conclusion It is my conviction that no court of law, and no competent social scientist, would accept that the CRE allegation of racial discrimination

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against Oldham Council begins to be proved by the data and the argu­ ments in this report. The overwhelming impression a detached observer would get from this report is of a conscientious Council striving in a thoroughly decent and humane way to meet the housing needs of a very complex group of applicants and tenants. Despite this, the Oldham Council, whilst totally rejecting the C R E’s allegations, but under the threat of having a highly damaging non-dis­ crimination notice slapped on it, capitulated to the CRE, and acceded to its demands. The Council agreed to make extensive changes to its policies and practices, including a requirement “to develop and carry out a training programme for councillors and housing department staff on the Race Relations Act.” Yet again we see the success of the CRE in persuading a perfectly honourable council to set up a totally unnecessary race relations indus­ try within its structures. The members and officers of Oldham Council must have found the CRE’s intervention irksome, and its allegations offensive. But so long as council’s continue to yield to CRE pressure, and are unwilling to challenge its procedures and techniques, so long will the CRE continue to badger, threaten, and to create the sort of resentment evident in the quotation with which I began this chapter. One afterthought is perhaps worth recording. The CRE which de­ plores racial segregation in housing in Oldham— even though that seg­ regation was the incidental result of entirely worthy intentions— is the selfsame CRE which, as a deliberate, published act of policy, has force­ fully argued for racial segregation in the matter of fostering and adopt­ ing children. It is also the selfsame CRE which used the threat of court action to compel local education authorities to desist from the bussing of school children— even though it must have known that, given local housing patterns, the end o f bussing would inevitably lead to increas­ ing segregation in the schools. Such manifest inconsistencies appear not to trouble an organisation whose philosophy of race relations appears to vary with its mood.

Race and Mortgage Lending In 1979 the CRE launched a formal investigation into the relation­ ship between race and mortgage lending in Rochdale. It did so because, “Asians and West Indians were not obtaining building society m ort­ gages to the same extent as were whites. Ethnic minorities were in­

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stead using more expensive sources of finance such as banks and fi­ nance companies to buy their homes” (p. 17). The aim of the investiga­ tion was to assess the extent of the disadvantage, if any, suffered by the Asian community, in obtaining mortgages; to check, if so, if this were the result of direct, or indirect discriminatory practices operated by the lending agencies: and to make recommendations. Rochdale was chosen because it was typically inner city in many of its characteristics, it had a sizeable Asian population (5.2 percent in 1981), and the Asians were likely to be disposed to owner-occupation. A further factor was that Rochdale Council had instituted an extensive housing improvement programme in its inner-city areas. The policies and practices of building societies, banks, and local authorities were looked at. Information was obtained about unsuccess­ ful loan applications, the relative importance of various property char­ acteristics in relation to mortgage opportunities, and about the mortgage experiences of the Asian and white communities. The investigation took four years to complete, and a further two years elapsed before the re­ port was published— 1979/1985. As we have noted elsewhere, this sort of unconscionable delay appears to be the rule rather than the excep­ tion with the CRE.

The CRE’s Conclusions This rigorous enquiry produced the following result: “The Commis­ sion did not find any rules or practices which were intended to dis­ criminate against Asians in Rochdale” (p. 25). The use of “intended” here is slightly misleading, since it might leave the reader with the incorrect assumption that there existed some sort of unintended, direct discrimination. In fact, there was no remotely convincing evidence of any sort of direct discrimination. The only cases of alleged, direct dis­ crimination concerned two applicants for mortgages. The first was a refusal to lend money on the grounds that the property involved would be difficult to sell because of the possibility of Asians living next door. This could not be verified, since the manager concerned was then dead. The second case related to a person who was alleged to have been re­ fused a mortgage on the grounds of national origin. However, when the CRE applied to the alleged victim and his solicitor they refused to con­ firm or deny this. Reading between the lines of the report they did not want to get involved— which hardly suggest they had any real griev­ ance. In the first case the applicant was white. So, after examining

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5,035 cases involving both local authority and building societies, the CRE investigators discovered two alleged, unconfirmed cases of direct discrimination, and one o f those concerned a white person. So we can state with considerable conviction that there was no evidence which could convince a court of law that there was any direct racial discrimi­ nation in the mortgage market of Rochdale. Moreover, with regard to rules of thumb, based on local discretion, the report says, “These derive from experience of local conditions and, in general, are unobjectionable”. However, the CRE found that these rules, such as not lending on properties without a front garden, were indirectly discriminatory because they disproportionately and adversely affected Asians, and, so the CRE claim, could not be justified on com ­ mercial grounds.

Preliminary Observations In judging the approach and Ending of this investigation, it is impor­ tant to bear in mind a number of relevant facts. In the first place the authors of the report admit that they discovered what they had already assumed would be the case: “It was envisaged [my emphasis] that the report would provide the basis for the commission’s work of eliminat­ ing racial discrimination” (pp. 2-3). That is, the investigators would discover racially discriminatory practices. Secondly, the effects of so­ cial class and differential incomes are ignored in the report. It is simply assumed that a valid comparison between the housing experiences of Asians and whites viewed collectively can be made. (The Asian com­ munity was, overwhelmingly, located in the two lowest social classes— 88 percent compared with 51 percent whites.) Yet one o f the assumed sources of indirect discrimination concerned the reluctance to lend on cheaper properties, i.e., properties bound to attract poorer people, i.e., Asians. The report actually states, “Asians were over-represented in the lower income groups, which necessarily had implications for the type o f property they could purchase” (p. 3). So Asians are bound to be disproportionately and adversely affected by this rule, not because they are Asians, but because they are disproportionately poor. And, in as­ sessing the impact of the rule, the only valid comparison is, not with the white group as a whole, but only with poor whites. We should also bear in mind the position of Asians in relation to council-owned property. The report misleadingly states, “The impor­ tance of owner-occupation to the Asian community in part reflects the

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difficulties and constraints that have faced them in securing council accommodation” (p. 1). Now there is here a clear hint that, in seeking council accommodation Asians have been dealt with less favourably than whites, that they have, as it were, had to overcome more obstacles. There is no empirical evidence adduced to support this. W hat is trans­ parently clear is that Asians prefer owner-occupation to council ten­ ancy, and to a massive extent. And that is bound to mean proportionately far less demand for council property from the Asian community. Crude statistical comparisons about council properties in relation to race tell us nothing about levels of demand; they only indicate outcomes. With regard to owner-occupation the picture of Asian housing in Rochdale was rather heartening. And it should always be borne in mind that a community striving to own its own homes, however modest those properties initially may be, is a community with hope for the future. Home ownership is, for the vast majority of people, the biggest single source of both family self-improvement, and mounting capital resources. Despite fluctuations in the value of property, such is the demand for homes, that, over time there is a pretty consistent tendency for proper­ ties to appreciate in value— a fact which enables any family to improve its accommodation by using positive equity to purchase a better house. It is in this sense that owner-occupation always scores over tenancy, which can never permit the acquisition of capital. Asians appear to understand this better than whites in the same social class. According to this report 72 percent of Asians are owner-occupiers, compared with 59 percent of whites, at the national level. In Rochdale the correspond­ ing figures are 84 percent and 53 percent. One m ight have thought that this considerable achievement— by a community in which the head of the household is a first generation immigrant— was cause for rejoicing. It certainly suggests that, in general, Asians have experienced little dif­ ficulty in obtaining loans for homes in Rochdale.

The Position o f Whites The essence of the CRE case regarding indirect discrimination is that, in certain instances, there were statistically disproportionate out­ comes as between Asians and whites. However, this sort of reasoning is applied only when it concerns outcomes alleged to be to the detri­ ment of Asians. W here the reverse is true, and whites are the alleged victims, this fact is ignored. Now in making its case for indirect dis­ crimination the CRE relies on Section 1(1) (b) of the Act. But this sec­

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tion is not confined to ethnic minorities. It simply refers to “persons,” i.e., the Act in the protection it affords against discrimination applies just as much to persons in the ethnic majority as in the ethnic minority communities. If the CRE were, then, to find direct or indirect discrimi­ nation against a white person, it ought to be just as concerned as if that discrimination were directed against a black or Asian person. But there is now clear evidence, to be found in a large number of its own reports, that the CRE, far from interpreting its role in this fair and evenhanded way, i.e, acting from a sense of concern about racial discrimination, whatever the skin colour o f the victim, actually functions as a virtually exclusive minority defence organisation. The welfare and interests of the majority population play little or no part in the CR E’s philosophy and practice. There is striking evidence of this in the report. On page 17, for in­ stance, we find the following statement: “ A further analysis of prop­ erty-related refusals by building societies [who supply 75% of mortgages to whites, and 50% to Asians, i.e., they are much the biggest source of home loans] shows that 42% of Asians and 62% of whites refused on those grounds [i.e., property-related grounds] were refused at the ini­ tial stage of enquiries.” That is, a significantly higher proportion of whites were rejected for mortgages at this stage. On pages 27-28, ap­ pears the following: “When we compared what applicants had asked for (in the way of a loan) and what they had been offered, we found that 21% of Asians were offered a shorter repayment period than they had asked for compared with 32% of white applicants.... The local author­ ity practice of offering shorter loan repayment periods than the m axi­ mum allowable was more likely to disadvantage white applicants than Asian applicants.” Page 28 reveals the following: “Since Asians are more likely to apply for older properties [pre-1919] than were whites, they would, in theory, have been more likely to suffer detriment as a result of such policies. However, when we examined the effect of such policies on the white and Asian communities in Rochdale, we found that whites were more likely to be detrimentally affected than were Asians.” On page 29 we have the following, in connection with the valuation of properties by building societies in multiracial areas: “A l­ though Asians are more likely than whites to apply for loans on proper­ ties in these areas, these [valuation] practices could only disadvantage those who applied for a higher percentage loan. Again, we found that only 14% of those Asians who applied for loans in areas with a high Asian population wanted to borrow 90% or more of the purchase price,

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compared with 56% of whites,” i.e., the white applicants were, in the crude statistical sense consistently favoured by the authors of this report, much more disadvantaged than were Asians by the valuation practices in this context. So what we have here is clear evidence of discrimina­ tion, of an indirect, statistical nature, against whites. W hether the prac­ tices which led to these outcomes were, or were not, commercially justified, is not something which the authors of the report feel is worth considering. Yet in those instances where Asians are statistically disad­ vantaged, commercial motives are rigorously and critically examined.

Inadequate Analysis W hat emerges from a reading of this report is that mortgage financing is an extremely complex procedure, or rather, set of procedures. Out­ comes and decision making depend on a whole range of interacting and elusive factors. Age of property, area, price, size of deposit, length of loan required, social class, commercial judgment— all these, at least are bound to be involved in any analysis which claims to be comprehensive. Even assuming that such factors can be reduced to crude statistical formulae, then these would have to be of a multifactorial nature, and able, not only to handle separate factors, but also to show how such factors depend in their influence on final outcomes on relevant other factors. I am no statistician, but even a layman can assert that the CRE reliance on simpleminded correlational techniques to demonstrate ra­ cial discrimination is wholly inadequate. Such an approach cannot be­ gin to capture the complex relationships of the relevant variables involved. It is simply not the case that demonstrating how one factor varies with another in such a very complex area proves the case, since more than two factors may be functioning. The price of bananas and braces has risen dramatically over the past decade, but no one with sense is going to claim that the one is the cause of the other; there is a further key factor involved called inflation. Yet much of the CRE rea­ soning is of this crude bananas and braces type. A typical instance of the CRE approach is in its treatment of investor status. A possible fac­ tor involved in obtaining a mortgage was likely to be whether the ap­ plicant was an investor in the society to which he was applying, i.e., that he had a deposit to put down. Now a higher proportion of Asians than whites were investors, yet Asians had a lower rate of success in obtaining mortgages— 76 percent of failed applicants to building soci­ eties were Asians, whilst 55 percent were white. The report concludes,

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“A significantly larger proportion of Asian investors were refused when compared with whites.” The clear implication is that this was the result of some sort of racial discrimination. However, this is manifestly mean­ ingless, since it ignores a vital, intervening variable, i.e. the size of the investment. The average size of the white investment m ight have been significantly higher than that of the Asian applicants. A deposit of £10,000 is more likely to attract a mortgage than one of £5,000 on the same property. This decision would certainly involve discrimination, i.e., the building society would be discriminating against a person, but not, emphatically on the basis of skin colour, but entirely on the basis of proper commercial considerations— the only factor involved here is the colour of people’s money, not of their skin. If building societies are to remain sound and helpful organisations, they have to make judg­ ments of this kind. But by adopting a crude white versus Asian di­ chotomy, and by thereby ignoring a crucial factor, i.e., size of deposit, the CRE is able to make a prima facie, but entirely unconvincing, case for indirect racial discrimination.

The Unacceptable Practices The CRE found that three mortgage practices were responsible for the indirect racial discrimination they claim to have found amongst building societies: “the application of requirements or conditions not to lend on properties without a front garden, not to lend on properties below a specified purchase price, and not to lend on properties in par­ ticular areas of Rochdale” (p. 32). Front Gardens. O f the six sources of mortgages, just one, the Provin­ cial Building Society, is mentioned as operating a policy of not lending on properties without front gardens— the rest all did so, at least to some degree. The proportion of local authority loans on such properties was 60 percent of all loans in the period 1977— 1981. Moreover, the report actu­ ally states that “the council concentrated [my emphasis] on providing loans for older, cheaper, terraced properties which lack front gardens.” In addition to this, banks also lent proportionately more on these types of properties. Given these two factors, then, at least in part of the mortgage market, Asians’ desire for no front gardens actually meant they were, vis-^-vis white applicants actually being favoured, at least in the crude statistical sense which forms the basis of the CRE’s complaints. A fur­ ther factor to consider is that only 3 percent of Asian loans in the relevant period came from the Provincial society; 97 percent of Asian loans ema­

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nated from sources which were not alleged to operate a front gardens policy. This shows that for the overwhelming majority of Asians wanting a home loan there were no shortages of sources. Even the Provincial’s policy had never constituted an absolute ban on no-front-garden property loans. A number of circulars issued by the Provincial between 1969-1976, according to the CRE report, indicated that the front garden issue was only one of several guidelines: “The circumstances in 1976 indicated that the requirement for a property to have a front garden may be relaxed in situations where improvement was taking place.” In 1977 the circular referred to a front garden requirement as “unreasonable.” That is, there was evidence, that even the Provincial was going along with the notion that the front garden policy was not a defensible policy. Moreover, this occurred two years before the CRE mounted its enquiry. In addition to this is the fact that the Provincial backed the council’s Support Lending Scheme, which was specifically aimed at “people of modest incomes and limited capital who were often seeking to buy older, cheaper houses, especially in inner urban areas,” i.e., overwhelmingly people from the Asian community. It would be difficult to show a greater willingness not to be impressed with skin colour. More evidence supporting the Provincial’s manifestly colour-blind approach is found in the report’s own comments: “following the intro­ duction of improvement grants in 1976 the society said that the corre­ lation between poor quality property without front gardens became less certain” (p. 35). And this, remember, is three years before the CRE became involved. It is very difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Provincial’s policy in this regard was entirely a function o f its commer­ cial judgment, and that, as conditions changed, it was quite prepared to amend that judgment. The case for indirect racial discrimination alleged to have been prac­ tised by the Provincial Building Society, in view of all this, appears to be remarkably thin. Specified Purchase Price. The extent to which a policy of not lend­ ing on properties valued below a given figure was operating is also problematic. The commercial grounds are clear: below a specific value property was likely to be in such poor condition that it would not meet with the approval of the valuer, and the applicant would be wasting a sizeable fee if the society failed to turn down applicants wanting prop­ erty below the minimum value. However, the only direct evidence quoted in the report that such a policy was actually operating, and that applicants were disappointed as

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a result, is that six individuals said that when they applied to the Halifax, the Burnley, the Provincial, and Bradford and Bingley Building Societ­ ies they were turned down on these grounds. (It is not clear from the report whether all six individuals applied to all four societies, or whether the six requests were spread out over the four societies— there is an important difference between the two possibilities, as far as proving the CRE’s allegation of systematic indirect discrimination is concerned.) There was no evidence that the other agencies operated such a policy. More to the point, the report itself concludes, “There was no reference to a minimum price limit in the policy o f documentation of the Halifax, the Burnley, the Bradford and Bingley, and the M iddleton.” So there was no evidence that the minimum price rule was part of the official policy of four of the five societies accused. But it is the case that the one remaining society, the Provincial, did issue a circular to its branches in 1975 which stated that, “serious arrears difficulties have been en­ countered in one or two cases of small loans on poor old properties, and they are more bother than they are worth.” But even that condi­ tion— where the minimum figure was £5,000— was omitted from a later circular issued in 1976— three years before the CRE got involved. So, any decisions in this area which disappointed applicants were locally based judgments, and did not reflect official thinking. However, it is only proper to point out that the report does claim that the Halifax, the Burnley, and the Provincial building societies had informed the council that under the council’s Support Lending Scheme properties below a certain price should not be referred for a loan. There is no evidence that these were any other than strict commercial judgements. And in any case, the fact is that the CRE investigators could find only six people who were disappointed (some— we are not told how many— were white) by this policy. Moreover, we are informed that “All but one o f the indi­ vidual applicants who had been refused by the society on the grounds that the property price was too low later obtained mortgages from the local authority or from the Halifax on the same properties” (p. 38). Now during the relevant period (1977-1981) the building societies in­ volved made 4,001 loans— and yet the CRE could find only one person who was adversely affected by the minimum price rule; and we are not told whether this person was Asian or White. True, there may have been more, but we are given no hard data establishing this. Clearly, the possibility that Asians could be adversely and disproportionately af­ fected by this policy was present, since a disproportionate number of Asians applied for mortgages on cheaper properties. But the fact re­

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mains that, over a four year period, only one person was permanently affected by the rule. Moreover, we are not told whether this person actually tried elsewhere for a mortgage or not; and, as I say above, we do not know whether this person was Asian or white. Again, it is diffi­ cult to see how the CRE can claim to have made anything like a con­ vincing case— except on the crudest of crude statistical grounds. Lending in Multi-Racial Areas. The only evidence supporting the CRE claim that building societies were refusing to lend on properties in m ul­ tiracial areas is based, not on a significant and substantial number of rejected applicants, but on an implied statistical comparison between proportion of total loans allocated to Asian areas, i.e., a lower proportion of total loans were going to properties in Asian areas. The only direct evidence is that one person had told the CRE investigators he had been refused a mortgage because, “the property would be difficult to resell because of the possibility of there being Asians living next door.” The person concerned was white. However, this allegation could not be con­ firmed since its alleged perpetrator had died in the meantime. A further scrap of evidence is in a 1977 Provincial circular containing the follow­ ing statement: “An assessment of acceptability of a property for mort­ gage is sometimes made more difficult by the presence of coloured occupants or neighbours, but this, in itself, should not be a reason for refusing properties if values generally are holding up” (My emphasis). Now this statement is held up in the report as implying that loans should not be granted on properties in multiracial areas. But a glance at what it actually says, particularly the part I have emphasised, does not support this assumption. All that the statement says is that decisions in this area are more difficult, i.e., where coloured people are present it can be more difficult, using normal commercial criteria, to decide whether property values will be maintained. Now the fact that property values may be adversely affected by the presence of Asians is regret­ table; but it may well be true. We may deplore this, but no prudent lender can afford to ignore this possibility, if he is convinced it is a relevant commercial factor. Unlike the CRE investigators, who carry none of the risks involved in lending money on properties, building societies cannot afford to make the classic error of confusing that which is with that which ought to be. The report examines the record of lending agencies in multiracial ar­ eas of Rochdale. No evidence, to repeat, is provided about how many applications for loans in these Asian areas there were and how many were rejected. What we are told is that, with regard to areas with 5 per­

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cent or more Asian voters, no less than 67 percent of loans were made by building societies; in many areas with 20 percent or more of Asians, 48 percent of loans came from this source. Whilst this suggests that building society loans vary inversely with the size of Asian presence, the reason could well be that the reverse relationship is present with regard to local authority loans. There is no evidence that Asians went to the council for loans because they had been rejected by building societies. They may have gone to the council because it possibly offered easier terms of re­ payment and required a smaller deposit than was the case with building societies. But, yet again, crude correlational reasoning is assumed to es­ tablish that which has still to be demonstrated. In general, therefore, there must be considerable doubts as the extent to which the CRE within the context of this investigation, has estab­ lished the case for indirect racial discrimination. What has happened here is that the investigators have extracted from a whole range of factors, just those factors which point towards a detrimental outcome for Asians. The total housing situation of Asians in Rochdale can only, on any reasonable basis, be considered heartening— particularly with regard to home own­ ership. After all, we are here considering the housing progress of a com­ munity which, historically speaking, is of very recent origin in this country. The majority of the people involved are first generation immigrants from a country vastly different from their adopted homeland. Moreover, this report demonstrates the manifestly onesided nature of the CR E’s perceptions— the four instances which the report itself indicates where whites were disadvantaged, in the crude statistical sense the CRE favours, are ignored. The investigators appear to have done no less, and no more, than to confirm their own a priori assumptions of racism in the housing market of Rochdale. To their own satisfaction they did so; but not to the impartial observer who is prepared to look at all the factors involved, and who has no axe to grind.

Recommendations The shakiness of the foundations did not prevent the CRE from seek­ ing to erect a formidable antiracist edifice following the investigation. There are eight recommendations as follows: • The building societies and local authority were required to establish an Equal Opportunity policy. • A senior officer was to be appointed to ensure conformity with the Race Relations Act.

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• There should be a review of lending policy and criteria. • Outside agencies must conform to the Equal Opportunity and Race Rela­ tions policies, (i.e., a form of contract compliance was to be enforced.) • Strict ethnic monitoring must be established. • There should be a rigorous six-monthly analysis of all applications and their outcomes. • Training in race relations proceedings must be given to all staff. • Current lending criteria should be provided for all mortgage applicants, and “such information should be translated into the appropriate ethnic mi­ nority languages.” (At that time there were at least thirty foreign-language groups resident in Rochdale.) The building societies accepted all this; and the report states that the CRE intend, via the building societies association, “to press for the establishment of ethnic monitoring throughout the building society movement” (p. 45). The local authority response was even more enthu­ siastic. In addition to accepting all the CRE recommendations, Rochdale Council appointed a race relations adviser and a race relations research officer. A race relations sub-committee, reporting to the council’s Policy and Resources Committee, was set up, as was a Race and Housing Working Party. The CR E’s power to get its way in creating an officially sponsored race relations industry at key points in the economy is here vividly illustrated. Its view that Asians in Rochdale should have special and unique consideration given to its wishes is also made clear. It would not be surprising if, in view of this, that same community came to regard itself as being a somewhat privileged group in local society. More worryingly for the good name of race relations, it would scarcely be surprising if the ethnic majority population in Rochdale were come to see itself as having a rather second-class status. And this would be particularly so of inner-city, working-class families whose standard of living is no better, and may in many instances be worse, than that of their Asian neighbours.

Accommodation Issues and Freedom of Contract So far, in adopting a critical response towards the CRE and its mode of functioning in matters to do with housing, I have relied principally on the inadequacy of disparities in statistical outcomes as a means of demonstrating racial discrimination. However, I want to carry the argument a stage further, and ask how far the antidiscrimination principle is in accordance with the rules of

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natural justice, or, indeed, in the best long-term interests o f race rela­ tions. Clearly there is a serious inroad made into the age-old principle of freedom of association, when we have an act on the statute book which effectively compels people to associate with those of whose com­ pany they wish to be free. Before the advent of race legislation, and the creation of a coercive statutory body to enforce it, the right of the indi­ vidual to have as friend or colleague anyone he wanted, and for w hat­ ever reason, was understood to be a basic civil liberty. No one was ever obliged to account to the state, via the apparatus of the law, for the choices he made in this area. Such a proposition would have been un­ thinkable, and incompatible with life in a society claiming to be free. However, within the context of housing, it is freedom of contract which is the essential civil liberty issue, though there is a clear overlap between the two freedoms in this context.

Freedom of Contract The right to enter into a contract with whomever one pleases, for whatever reasons, good, bad, or for no reason at all— until recent times this freedom was taken as read in societies claiming to be both free and democratic. Its violation by antidiscrimination law probably dates, in the postwar world from the American Civil Rights Act, 1964, specifi­ cally from that A ct’s Title vii. In this country the Equal Opportunities and Race Relations Acts of the mid-1970s saw the full-blown trans­ gression of freedom of contract with regard to the alleged and superior, countervailing rights of minorities. Until the latter statutes were enacted, the role of the state was con­ fined to ensuring that this contractual freedom extended to all persons the right to own property, to contract, to sue and to be sued, and to give evidence. Beyond that the state functioned simply to guarantee free­ dom of contract against aggression or fraud, and to provide legal rem ­ edies where the conditions of the contract are in dispute. No rules were laid down by the state regarding the nature of private contracts; except, of course, the requirement that no contract could violate the law, e.g., a contract to kill someone would be illegal because it violated the law against incitement to murder. Employers, landlords, manufacturers, suppliers of goods and services, and, of course, private individuals, could, within the law, lay down the terms of their contracts without reference to the state. This view of the nature of freedom of contract had evolved over a long period of time, was universally accepted, and could be shown to

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have facilitated the conduct of business. Both the social and economic consequences of freedom of contract understood in this traditional way could be shown to be benign. Moreover, this view had survived the arrival of generations of immigrants, including Jews. However, suc­ cessive Race Relations Acts in this country have, with increasing rigour, imposed limitations on this principle. The demonstrated presence of a degree of racial discrimination convinced Parliament that established concepts of freedom of contract had to give way to the need to extend special protection to ethnic minorities. The minimal role of the state in matters to do with contracts was abandoned. Henceforth, the state was to play a powerful role in regulating contracts where they involved, or could involve, the minorities. Individual preferences based on race were held to be so improper that they were to be outlawed. Moreover, “race” was to be very broadly defined indeed, as was demonstrated in the case of M andla v Lee, a decision which interpreted the concept so widely that neither common usage, nor dictionary definitions were respected. This case effectively extended the powers of the CRE across a very large portion of the population— “race” in law went way beyond its application to blacks and Asians. W hat I should like to do now is to examine the antidiscrimination principle in reference to three specific cases relating to contracts in the field of housing.

Cottrell & Tothon—Estate Agent (August 1980) This investigation concerned a firm of estate agents in south Lon­ don, situated in an area with a considerable minority settlement. The CRE set up the enquiry in response to allegations made by a form er employee that the firm systematically recorded, and obeyed, racially discriminatory instructions from vendors, i.e., people wanting to sell property via the firm. The sellers specified they would not sell to black or coloured people, and the firm, it was alleged, acceded to their re­ quests. Such behaviour is a violation of various sections of the Race Relations Act 1976. The CR E’s investigators did establish beyond reasonable doubt that the alleged discrimination had taken place. A non-discrimination no­ tice, under Section 58, was, therefore, issued. This not only ordered the firm to desist, but also laid down in detail measures the firm had to take in order to show they had complied with the notice. This case exhibits a number of features which underlie the relationship between the viola­

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tion of freedom of contract implicit in the Act, and those affected by the processes o f enforcement. It vividly conveys the powerful feelings of resentment left with those people who are doing no more than con­ duct a lawful and useful business, when they are made the target of the CR E’s interests. Early in its investigations the CRE wanted to interview three ven­ dors of properties because they may have given instructions to the firm to discriminate. The firm objected on the grounds that it lay outside the scope o f the investigations, and, more to the point, was likely to be damaging to the business. That is, the firm acted to protect its custom­ ers and its own legitimate business interests, a move which, under any other circumstances of freedom of contract, would have been an en­ tirely proper thing for any firm to do. Damaging your custom er’s inter­ ests, or seeking to question their motives in the first place would, before the advent of antidiscrimination law, have been both self-defeating, and a violation of accepted business procedures. The firm felt so strongly about this, that they applied to the High Court for an injunction to restrain the CRE from making such enqui­ ries. But the application was dismissed on the grounds that the enqui­ ries were relevant to the investigation. The CRE was awarded costs. However, the firm persisted in its resistance, even after the issue, on the completion o f the enquiries, of a non-discrimination notice, and asked for a judicial review of the CRE decision. The firm, essentially, challenged the CRE on the grounds that the procedures adopted were not in accordance with the rules of natural justice, or common legal procedures. Specifically, that, at the hearing of the firm ’s oral represen­ tations, witnesses were not available to be cross-examined by counsel; that the CRE had relied on hearsay evidence, e.g., reports of interviews by the CRE staff, which would not be admissible in a court of law; that the commissioners appointed for the investigation did not carry out the investigation, but left enquiries to the CRE’s staff; that the commis­ sioners for the investigation also heard the firm’s representations, and recommended that a non-discrimination notice should be issued. On all these points the firm ’s legal advisers considered that the CRE had erred. (The firm ’s intransigence may also have had something to do with the fact that the person making the original allegation had worked for the firm for only five weeks, and, so the firm claimed, had been dismissed, i.e., there may have been an element of malice involved.) However, the firm ’s case was dismissed in the Divisional Court of the Q ueen’s Bench Division on 7th May 1980. The firm had to pay

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costs. In giving judgem ent the lord chief justice made reference to a decision made with regard to the CRE’s predecessor, the Race Rela­ tions Board in 1976. There the Court of Appeal described the Board as an administrative agency, rather than a judicial institution. Therefore, judicial procedures were not required, e.g., the hearing of oral evidence in the course of a CRE investigation did not necessitate the cross-ex­ amination of witnesses. So, in addition to severely restricting the principle of freedom of contract, the legislation also gives the CRE judicial powers— in that it has the right to issue non-discrimination notices, which have the force of law— whilst relieving it of any corresponding commitment to ac­ cepted judicial procedures. It can, as it were, look both ways at once. In its prosecuting role it is a de facto court, but in its investigative role it is merely an administrative organisation. Now— and I speak as a layman in legal matters— this must mean that the scales of justice are tipped decisively in the direction of the CRE. W hilst it is provided with con­ siderable powers of investigation, its victims have no powers to chal­ lenge key witnesses upon whose testimony the CRE case may crucially rely. The normal safeguards protecting the rights and interests of those accused do not, it seems, exist. Now I am not here arguing that the CRE’s findings in this case were incorrect. There is little doubt that racial discrimination was occurring. W hat matters here is that, in order to carry out its duties in this sort of case, the CRE more or less has to resort to coercive and oppressive methods. That is the price society has to pay for allowing the state to violate the great principle of freedom of contract. It would be very surprising, therefore, if any firm, or person, subjected to a CRE inves­ tigation were not left with a powerful and persisting sense of injus­ tice— which is not a happy basis for good race relations. Now let us assume that this convicted firm disapproved of racial discrimination on principle, and would prefer to operate in a world free of racial prejudice. W hat is it to do, when a customer insists upon his assumed right to keep the neighbourhood in which he owns property, and whose tenants think as he does, monoracial in character? Well, the firm could seek to persuade its customer that this was unkind and un­ fair to black and Asian people, and therefore unacceptable on moral grounds. It could tell the customer that his wishes could not be re­ spected without a violation of the law. Or the firm could comply with the custom er’s wishes. Only the third alternative would be guaranteed to ensure the firm ’s getting the business. Now if the monoracial request

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were a rarity, this would have little detrimental effect on the com pany’s business. But, in this case, it is clear from the firm ’s records that a substantial number of the vendors were opting for the monoracial alter­ native. That is, if the firm had declined to comply with the custom ers’ wishes, they risked losing business, or even closing down— which is the direction in which the CRE’s coercion points. Now one may deplore prejudice. One may very m uch regret the obstacle to the welfare of minorities it represents. But by effectively enforcing racial integration in housing, and by threatening legitim ate business survival, is the CRE in the long run, helping to prom ote the good race relations as the law requires? After all racial separatism in housing operates in a quite dramatic way with regard to the ethnic m inorities. Toxteth, Brixton, St. Paul’s, Chapeltown, and M oss Side all bear clear testim ony to the desire of black people to live am ongst those whom they perceive to be, as it were, of their own kind. Large parts o f W est Yorkshire and the M idlands are given over alm ost ex­ clusively to Pakistani M oslem housing in order that a distinctive cul­ ture can be shared amongst those with a common background and heritage. Yet this sort of prejudice in favour o f one’s own is not considered improper, and is certainly not unlawful. Only when the same natural impulse is exhibited in white people is the full force of a disapproving law brought to bear in an attempt to suppress it. One can argue about the underlying reasons why monoracial housing occurs; and one can, equally, concede that minorities are at a disadvantage, simply because they are a minority in a world in which most, but by no means all, landlords, agencies and house owners are white. But the fact remains that those whites who wish to enjoy the same rights in this respect as minorities are bound to experience the mentality which motivates the CRE as an unfair double standard. I am not here, emphatically, seeking to defend racial prejudice in matters of housing— or anywhere else, for that matter. I am simply trying to understand this issue from the point of view of those sub­ jected to the violation of full freedom of contract and freedom of asso­ ciation— both of which are present in the Act, and both of which denials of basic civil liberties are being articulated by the CRE. Are the victims likely to be more or less inclined to be tolerant and kind to their black or Asian neighbours? Or is such an approach establishing focal points of resentment which are radiating out, as it were, and poisoning the whole race relations atmosphere?

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Accommodation Bureaux In October 1980 the CRE issued a report on a formal investigation they had conducted into the affairs of two accommodation agencies, and the behaviour of the owner of one of them— Mr. G.D. M idda and his D.S. Services Ltd., and Allen’s Accommodation Bureau. These were both in the same business, i.e., the letting of rented property on behalf of property owners. As a result of the CRE investigations both were effectively convicted of racism, each was issued with a non-discrimi­ nation notice, and warned as to their future conduct. In the case of Mr. Midda and his firm, the CRE had the greatest pos­ sible difficulty in persuading him to co-operate and provide it with the information it said it needed. It is clear that Mr. Midda deeply resented the powers which the CRE was seeking to exercise. Employees were said not to be available, appointments were made and not kept, investi­ gators were denied access to relevant records “on principle,” and so on. Eventually the CRE issued Mr. Midda with a subpoena. But he ignored this, and the CRE was forced to get a court order. And, even after that, he did not cooperate to a satisfactory extent. So the CRE went to court yet again, and Mr. Midda and his firm was each fined £50. Now this same Mr. Midda had taken a similar attitude in 1975 when interviewed by an official of the Race Relations Board. He then expressed his reasons for seeking to respect the wishes of his customers not to have referred to them individuals belonging to certain groups. He argued that he was not responsible for the prejudices displayed by his customers. That, of course, is the simple truth: none of us is responsible for the attitudes and values of his neighbour, and the behaviours these underpin. He was only reflecting these prejudices in his procedures. He also argued that, in conforming to customers’ instructions, he was saving a would-be tenant from embarrassment by sending him to a property where he would be rejected. He was also protecting himself from the anger of a customer whose business he valued. This was all, claimed Mr. Midda a matter of “bread and butter.” His pragmatic position was forced upon him by the interpersonal context in which his firm was functioning. It was not he who laid down the conditions of the tenancies; it was his customers: “If a landlord stipulates no Greeks, we don’t send him Greeks. We cannot afford to upset landlords.... I do what I am told. If a landlord wants an Englishman, he gets an Englishman.” However, despite the fact that he, himself, had not directly discrim i­ nated, the fact that he had been a party to discrimination meant that he

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was liable in law. He was, as it were, an accessory before, and, presum ­ ably, after the fact of the offence. The fact that there was good evidence that racially integrated housing was strongly opposed made no differ­ ence. If people did not like it, then, in the view of the CRE, they could lump it. The fact that its stance carried with it grave dangers o f the firm losing business was, again, irrelevant. The CRE coercion also meant, of course, that those landlords who would not accept people from cer­ tain groups would simply withdraw from the market, and so make an already serious housing shortage worse— as happened when the state intervened and sought to enforce a minimum rent law. In the second case, that concerning Allen’s accommodation bureau, the proprietor cooperated fully with the CRE; but she complained, as in the first case, that not to comply with the landlord’s wishes would mean embarrassment for both the bureau and the applicants, and the waste of an applicant’s deposit, which was payable when he registered with the bureau. Moreover, the bureau helped coloured applicants, wherever possible by offering them whatever accommodation was available which was not subject to the landlord’s prejudice. In addition, if a black appli­ cant had established himself as a good tenant at an earlier property, the bureau would try to persuade the landlord to accept him, even in the face of prejudice. The proprietor said that she had tried to persuade landlords not to discriminate against applicants on racial grounds, but had not been very successful. One feels that the CRE has here set its sights on essentially reasonable and fair-minded people trapped by others into violating the law. An interesting fact to emerge from this investigation was just how odd and quirky were the prejudices of the landlords—though, since prejudice is not entirely rational, one ought not to be surprised at this. Some re­ fused Italians, Middle Easterners, and blacks, others only coloured people, yet others Australians, and some could not stand the Irish. Skin colour was by no means the determining factor in every case. A further point worth noting is that the thing of which the CRE— and the Act— complain can only be said to be unlawful under certain conditions. Section 22 of the Act actually does permit a landlord to discriminate on racial grounds, provided that the landlord, or a near relative, lives in the property, that parts of the accommodation are shared, and that the premises are “small”. W hy this rule should apply in one case, but not in the other is suggested by Michael Malone: “Presum ­ ably the reason for the (above) exception is that if people are racially prejudiced it can do no good to make them share their home with the

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people against whom they are prejudiced” (p. 131, Racial Discrimina­ tion— Your Right to Equal Opportunity, Ross Anderson, 1983). But it is precisely because this sort of pragm atic, down-to-earth approach is violated with respect to other properties that so m uch resentm ent is caused. Would not the same sort of reasoning apply with m ore or less equal force to a property of an absentee landlord, whose tenants have expressed a wish to keep the property monoracial? W hy should the compromise with an unfortunate reality apply in one case, but not in the other? There does appear to be a serious inconsis­ tency in the sort o f reasoning underpinning this part of the Act. It seems particularly unfortunate that the proprietors of accom m oda­ tion agencies should be convicted of racial prejudice, when they are once, or, in the case of existing tenants’ objections, twice rem oved from the initial prejudice.

The Gypsy Issue In September 1981 the CRE published a report to do with alleged discrimination against a gypsy family living in Wales. As a result of CRE investigations non-discrimination notices were issued against two individuals and one community council. In essence a local council was pressurised into refusing a council house to a family claiming to be gypsies. This investigation brought the CRE into conflict with W rexham M aedor Borough Council, which refused to divulge information which the CRE demanded. The council agreed to co-operate only when its chief executive was subpoenaed. The residents, who appeared to have acted in concert, pretty well all having signed a petition objecting to the gypsy family coming to live on the estate, made it clear why they objected. First a large gypsy family with nine children already lived on the estate. Secondly, they feared that a further gypsy family would mean an influx of many such families, a development the existing tenants perceived as a threat to their comm unity’s culture and way of life. Thirdly, the residents were convinced that their estate was being used as a dumping ground for problem families, and they were fed up with this— there is, in the report, a statement from one of the defendants to the effect that the gypsy family in question was such a problem family, though this was not explored by the CRE investigators. Fourthly, the existing gypsy family on the estate was said to be unhappy at the pros­ pect of having an additional gypsy family as neighbours.

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Now, one of the points at issue between the CRE and the defendants was how the family concerned should be described. The latter described them as “itinerants.” The CRE said they were gypsies. This is not a mere semantic quibble. In law, so the CRE maintained, gypsies are an ethnic minority, and entitled therefore to the protection of the Race Relations Act. It is much less certain that “itinerants” could claim this status. The Shorter Oxford Dictionary defines “gypsy” as follows: “ A m ember of a wandering race (by themselves called Romany) of Hindu origin, formerly believed to have come from Egypt.” On this basis nei­ ther “itinerant” nor “gypsy” would appear to be an appropriate descrip­ tion of the family in question. In fact, the family had lived in a caravan near Brymbo for ten years. Both the mother and father had been bom in nearby villages, and had lived in the area all their lives. Their ten chil­ dren all attended local schools. Moreover, the family name was Jones— which is scarcely redolent of Eastern promise. Why in view of all this the family should be considered to be gypsies is difficult to understand: the only feature they shared with gypsies is that they lived in a cara­ van— but then so do lots of other people, who would certainly not be considered to be in any sense gypsies. Could it be that the CRE had, as it were, adopted the family so as to set up a test case? By insisting, in the face of considerable countervailing evidence that the term “gypsy” was accurate, the CRE was able to claim the protection of the Act did apply to this family. It is very doubtful if this had been so, if the family were simply described as they manifestly were— a family in perma­ nent, caravan residence; though it should be said that the parents, ac­ cording to the report, claimed they were gypsies. (If simply asserting one is a member of an ethnic minority group is sufficient to bestow such a legal status, then it is difficult to see how chaos can be avoided. If there are no limiting criteria, then the whole concept collapses.) Now it is difficult to know how far the residents’ fears and anxieties were justified. They certainly— even in the scarcely sympathetic refer­ ences made to them in the CRE’s report— appear to have been both real and universally shared. But there is no attempt to examine them by the CR E’s investigators. They were simply and solely concerned with the letter of the law— the local residents’ interests were irrelevant. However, even if the local residents’ fears were, or were not, wellgrounded, what can be said is that those who call themselves “gypsies” have acquired for themselves a bad public reputation. The CRE would, of course, ascribe this to “racism” occasioned by “stereotyping.” In fact, the evidence to support the public’s perceptions can be observed

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any time a local field is invaded by a fleet of gypsy caravans. I concede that I am unaware of systematic survey evidence to support this. But there is overwhelming anecdotal confirmation. I, personally, have had experience of antisocial and criminal gypsy behaviour in three metropolitan areas. When I was a councillor in one such area, I spoke to a number of local industrialists whose property adjoined a field on which gypsy caravans regularly and unlawfully ap­ peared. Every one of the industrialists insisted that theft o f their prop­ erty always coincided with the arrival of the gypsies; one had been forced to invest £12,000 in a fearsome metal fence to protect his raw materials. I have a close relative who, for many years, was the superin­ tendent o f gypsy sites in a m ajor city. His observations of gypsy behaviour included the follow ing: sm ashing of facilities such as washbasins, showers, and laundry facilities; illegal use of electricity; burning of rubber tyres; smashing of locks on entrance gates (sixteen locks in two weeks on one occasion); depositing and leaving of litter; and consistent ignoring of public notices. The requirement to tax ve­ hicles was widely flouted. As a headteacher in another large city, I at­ tempted to persuade gypsies encamped in a field where my pupils had to line up during the school’s regular fire drills to depart— and was treated to a mouthful of abuse. The only solution was to wait till the miscreants left, and then persuade the local authority to go to the ex­ pense of establishing a barrier of huge rocks across the entrance to the field. Another local authority of which I am aware has to spend an average of £6,000 per year in legal costs simply to eject illegally en­ camped gypsies. In addition I have followed eyewitness accounts of gypsy behaviour in local newspapers from many parts of the country. Even as I write, I find the following front-page news in the Bolton Evening News: the headline is POLICE RAID GYPSY CAMP, and here is the story under this: Seven gypsies were arrested and a haul of stolen property recovered after police raided two illegal camps. Uniformed and CID officers visited camps at Moses Gate, Famworth and Hart Common, Westhoughton. Those arrested were taken to forces throughout England to be questioned. Two stolen vehicles were recovered, and a third suspected of being involved in crime is being examined. Property, mainly power tools worth a total of £2,000, was also recovered...Ch. Insp. Jeff Hayes, of Famworth police, said the operation was a response to the concern expressed by the public about the travellers and environmental damage being done. The group camped at Moses Gate, which had previously been blamed for leaving litter and a wrecked caravan at Egerton Street, Famworth, has now moved on. The council is taking legal proceedings to move the gypsies at Hart Common. (25.6.93.)

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In short the gypsies’ deplorable reputation appears to be based on ob­ servable behaviour: people object to them, not because of their origins, but because of their characteristic, antisocial and criminal conduct. Now, I am not suggesting that all gypsies behave in this way. I have no doubt that there are, within the gypsy community many decent and law-abiding elements. And they, regrettably, suffer because of the ap­ palling behaviour of their neighbours. The fact remains that the gyp­ sies viewed collectively have a very bad public reputation, which often precedes them. And it is this fact that led to the indigenous community’s anxieties, and its attempts to prevent a family they, rightly or wrongly, perceived as gypsies from coming amongst them. As I have said else­ where in this book, all minorities have to strive to establish and m ain­ tain virtuous public reputations— that is their best guarantee of their acceptance by the majority population. Unfortunately, that is a lesson which, in general, the gypsy community appears not to have learnt. It may well be that the indigenous community’s perception of the family they objected to was mistaken; the family certainly did not dis­ play most of the characteristics associated with gypsies. In that case, one might have hoped that the CRE had used its considerable resources to negotiate with the community and try to persuade it to take a more generous view— instead of engaging in heavy-handed and threatening legal manoeuvres. It does not seem unreasonable to assume that the CRE’s tactics left a community burning with resentment. Perhaps the most telling part of this unhappy story comes at the end. As a result of the CRE pressure the family concerned was given a council house. After a matter of weeks they left.

The Housing Corporation The CRE has had a direct and decisive influence on the Housing Cor­ poration. This latter statutory body is a high powered organisation. In 1992 it allocated £1.6 billion of public money to various housing asso­ ciations, which provide rented accommodation for their clients. W hat it does in the field of housing, therefore, is of considerable consequence. In 1986 the Housing Corporation, under pressure from the CRE, adopted a colour-conscious policy with regard to the funding of certain housing associations. The CRE document “Code for Rented Housing” (1992) is the direct antecedent of the Housing Corporation’s present policy with regard to race. In 1992 the Housing Corporation issued a policy document entitled, “An Independent Future: Black and M inor­

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ity Ethnic Housing Association Strategy 1992-1996.” This made it clear that the race-driven aspect of housing policy was to continue at least until 1996. The key features of this strategy are given as follows: • Forty black and minority ethnic associations should become independent and effective organisations over the next five years. • Investment of about £750 million over the five year period in black and minority ethnic associations to provide new homes. • Increased revenue grants to assist black and minority ethnic associations to become fully independent. • Established associations will be transferring about 2,400 homes to black and minority ethnic associations. • At the end of the five year period, black and minority ethnic associations should own and/or manage about 16,500 homes. • Training programmes will be established specifically to assist the associa­ tions in reaching the required standards of performance, (p. 1) The term “Black and minority Ethnic” with regard to the citizen is defined as follows: “people who have African, Asian, Caribbean or South East Asian ethnic or racial origin” (p. 1). That is, the relevant characteristic in considering the strength of an applicant’s case will be, first and foremost, skin colour. W hilst claiming that it operates an equal opportunity policy the Housing Corporation has stated thus: “W here there is no applicant in housing need from the relevant group, the asso­ ciation must always be prepared to consider applicants from other groups who are in housing need.” How this can be reconciled with the notion that each and every ap­ plication must be considered strictly in terms of housing need, which is what an equal opportunity policy clearly implies, is difficult to under­ stand. If, for instance, a black and minority housing association has, say, ten houses available for rent, and there are twelve applicants, ten of whom are black and two white, then the latter will have no chance. If only eight applicants are black and two are white, then the whites can be considered. That is, in the situations in which such housing associa­ tions operate, the white applicants are second class citizens. In September 1993, this mentality was reasserted by the National Federation of Housing Associations. In that year it issued new policy guidelines to its 2,200 member bodies. Amongst other things these guide­ lines advised member associations to set “race equality targets” biased in favour of ethnic minorities deemed to be in greater housing need.

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Now, I have already drawn attention to the fact that the distinction be­ tween targets and race quotas— which are illegal in this country— is, in practice, little more than a semantic quibble. The success or failure of this policy will be determined by how far racial minority applicants are successful in the same proportion as racial minorities exist in the gen­ eral population, which is precisely the objective of quotas. Dr. David Coleman, special adviser to government housing ministers in the 1980’s, and lecturer in demography at Oxford has condemned the emergence of our sixty “all black” housing associations funded from public money as “legalised apartheid” (Daily Telegraph, 10.9.1993). There is not the slightest doubt that both the Housing Corporation’s and The National Federation of Housing Association’s thinking and policy making in this area are the direct result of pressure from the CRE. Conclusion The above instances of the work of the CRE in the field of housing serve, I trust, to illuminate both its reasoning and its practices. Whilst in no way seeking to question the CRE’s motives or integrity— the CRE, after all, is the creation of an Act which has to be obeyed— what I do suggest is that its crude, heavy handed approach, whilst perhaps being justified in law, lacks wisdom. Housing is a basic human need. Its alloca­ tion is an extremely emotive issue involving subtle human interactions and presuppositions. Any attempt to examine housing procedures and conditions needs to be both sensitive and complex. Can the CRE be said to have understood this in its typical forays into the housing market—a market which seeks to serve an immensely complex population?

10 Publicity and the CRE From its inception the CRE has sought to inform and to influence the media, and, through them, the public. Its very first report, for 1977, makes reference to thirty-five press releases, sixteen press conferences and thirty-nine press enquiries per week. The corresponding figures for 1978 are seventy, twenty-four and forty-five. The 1978 report states, “During 1978 the Commission maintained direct and indirect contact with all the national newspapers, with broadcasters, with a num ber of local papers, and with ethnic minority papers and editors. This contact involved general briefings, individual briefings, and a regular supply of literature. We also had close links with the trade and professional bodies in the communications industry” (p. 30). The same report refers to the CRE’s regular publications, including New Equals (circulation 103,000), New Community, a quarterly journal, Educational Journal— a bimonthly paper for people in education— and Employment Report. There is also reference to an internal publication, Network. This might be considered unexceptionable, and justified by the CRE’s statutory duty to “prom ote.. .good relations between persons of differ­ ent racial groups generally.” However, what need to be borne in mind is that it is not simply facts with which the CRE’s publicity machine is concerned— there can be no reasonable objections to a statutory body seeking to inform the public about the nature of the law in its field. W hat does cause concern is that the CRE also seeks to impress upon the public mind a very distinctive, and, I would argue, tendentious race relations ideology. As I have tried to show in several parts of this book, the CR E’s view of multiracial Britain is, in many respects highly con­ tentious and one-sided. The mirror it purports to hold up to the public gaze is a distorted one, one which reflects all the negative aspects of race relations, ignores the very high levels of tolerance in this country, and fails to acknowledge the generally tranquil state of race relations. It also has a striking tendency to represent the ethnic minorities as hap257

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less, sinned-against victims, whilst turning a blind eye to the growing evidence of ethnic minority success. There is, it should be remembered, no countervailing publicity machine which might, whilst deploring the racial prejudice and discrimination which undoubtedly exists, seek to place such regrettable attitudes and behaviour in their historical and social contexts. Nor is there any source from which the public might gain an understanding of just how well this country stands in relation to race relations in other countries. The picture constructed by the CR E’s propaganda is relentlessly pessimistic. By 1980 the CRE’s information service was involved in publishing and data distribution on a considerable and growing scale. By then there was a clear indication that the CRE’s presence in society represented a growth industry. An ever-widening range of organisations, institutions, and pressure groups were jum ping on the race relations bandwagon. The annual report for 1980 informed the public that, Throughout 1980 our Information Section maintained direct and indirect contact with all the national newspapers, with broadcasters, with a number of local papers and with ethnic minority newspapers and editors. We held 26 press briefings and conferences and dealt with an average of 78 recorded press enquiries a week. Twenty regional press briefings have been held and led to more regional press and broadcasting coverage. Meetings have also been held with the trade and pro­ fessional bodies of the communications industry, such as the National Union of Journalists, the National Council for the Training of Journalists, the Printing and Publishing Industry Training Board, Equity and the Writers’ Guild, the Indepen­ dent Broadcasting Authority and the British Broadcasting Corporation. Our re­ search staff completed work on a study of the role of the mass media in affecting racial attitudes and the report will be published in 1981. We held discussions on the establishment of an advisory group to develop our own media techniques. Research work also continued in association with the BBC and the IBA on a study of ethnic minority broadcasting.

In addition to all this the CRE had, by then, established a veritable publishing empire off its own bat, We continued to publish our regular journals, “New Equals” (circulation of 115,000), “New Community” (circulation of 2,500), “Education Journal” (28,000), and “Employment Report” (17,000). The readership survey of the Commission’s publications which our Research staff started is continuing. During the year we published 23 books, 9 occasional papers and 9 leaflets (in 9 languages), the total number exceeding a quarter of a million copies. Because of public demand for some earlier publications, we reprinted various books and leaflets. We have now produced nearly two million of the leaflet, “Some people will believe anything”, and 20,000 copies of the book “Five Views of Multi-Racial Britain”. The Commission’s library supplies new Commission publications to all the major li­ braries in the country.

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By 1980, then, the CRE had established itself as, far and away, the dominant, nationwide voice in matters to do with race relations and the fortunes of the ethnic minorities in Britain. Its influence on both media and public would be impossible to overestimate. Its publicity machine, after just four years of the Commission’s existence, had ensured that no one could be in any doubt that the one single and authoritative view on all matters to do with race in the UK was that of the CRE. The voice of dissent had little chance of being heard in the din produced by the CRE’s all-encompassing propaganda machine. The 1982 Report indicates a similar pattern, with two developments worthy of note. First, the CR E’s crucial influence on the BBC is made clear. We are told that the CRE gave “substantial support to a number of broadcasters, leading to such programmes as the BBC ‘Brass Tacks’ and ‘No problem here.’ This was the start o f a process linking the BBC and the CRE. M any more programmes, which faithfully reflected the CRE view of things, were to follow. It is no exaggeration to say that the BBC has, in matters to do with race relations, functioned very largely as the mouth piece of the CRE. The role of the BBC in convincing the public that the validity of the CR E’s race relations ideology is obvious and not to be challenged has been absolutely crucial in the post-1980 period. The extent to which the BBC has swallowed uncritically the CRE’s view of Britain as a “racist society” is graphically illustrated by a BBC 1 television programme, “The Race Game.” The message of this programme was encapsulated in an article published in The Lis­ tener in May 1990. Here the producer, Christopher Terrill, asserts that the reason why blacks, i.e., Afro-Caribbeans, do well in sport is that they are discour­ aged from doing anything else well. He repeats the well-rehearsed ac­ cusation that black pupils are stereotyped in school by their teachers as being no good academically, and had better opt for sporting success. He also alleges that racism is the reason that blacks are not proportion­ ately reflected in positions of authority in sport—and asserts that foot­ ball is being deprived of a “black perspective,” because there are, so far, no black managers. (There are two lacunae in this particular aspect of the argument. First, as the article itself mentions, black footballers have been involved in big-time soccer for only about ten years; and most of those are still playing. Now the vast majority of football m an­ agers are former players. Since there are, as yet, very few, if any, former black players, we have not yet established that pool of talent for m an­ agement from amongst former black players which could lead to black

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managers being appointed. I, as a keen football fan, would find it very difficult to believe that someone of the calibre of John Barnes could not pick up a m anager’s job, when his playing career is over— it that is what he wanted. Secondly, the whole notion of there being a “black perspective,” i.e., an understanding of life and human experience which is unique to black people is, itself, it seems to me, a distinctly racial way of arguing. One wonders if there is also an exclusively Asian, Chi­ nese or, indeed, white “perspective.” If there is, then we would appear to have little hope of creating and maintaining an integrated and har­ monious society in this country. The mentality which Mr. Terrill ap­ pears to support is surely that which sustained apartheid.) According to Mr. Terrill this alleged conspiracy against black com ­ petitors has made them bitter and frustrated, and he points to the estab­ lishment of separate black and Asian cricket leagues in Yorkshire. Yorkshire County Cricket Club’s famous refusal to offer contracts to non-Yorkshire players is, according to Mr. Terrill’s logic, somehow implicated in this. The possibility that no black or Asian cricketer of sufficient merit has yet emerged in Yorkshire to justify selection for his county— this blindingly obvious, though admittedly nonracial expla­ nation, offers no comfort to Mr. Terrill. There is a certain irony here. Not long after Mr. Terrill wrote his article, Yorkshire did change the rule— and the first person to benefit from this was a Pakistani test player. This relentlessly bleak picture of black possibilities is, however, quite dramatically undermined— at least for those who have an open mind— by specific indicators of spectacular black success which Mr. Terrill him self quotes: “the black population in Britain is barely four per cent of the total, yet 50 per cent of the British athletics team is black, as are a third of the English football and cricket teams and half our boxing champions. Surely this is good news for black Britons and race rela­ tions.” Well, yes, no one who is prepared to approach this issue without a prescribed antiracist script would want to differ with this latter senti­ ment. There does, indeed, appear to be striking evidence of black su­ premacy in a field which not only brings considerable material rewards, but also the devotion of huge numbers of sports fans of all colours. But this is not good enough for Mr. Terrill. He is so determined to make his racism-in-sport stick, that he dredges up an extraordinary sur­ vey into big-time soccer conducted by Loughborough University. This alleged that, although black soccer success cannot be gainsaid, neverthe­ less black players are disproportionately assigned to wing positions, which do not carry the status of “pivotal and glamorous” central positions. This

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is a uniquely absurd view of the nature of success in soccer— some of our most honoured and distinguished players have been wingers. The single most impressive icon of soccer fame in the last fifty years was a winger—the great Sir Stanley Matthews. So also was Tom Finney, as was Steve Coppel, and many many more of our most celebrated players. No football manager would accept that wingers are less important in the scheme of things than central players, either in defence or attack. More­ over, as a regular attender at league matches, I have grave doubts about the assertion that black players actually are more likely to finish up on the wing than anywhere else on the field. After all, the single most lethal striker in the game at the moment is, by common consent Ian Wright— who just happens to be black. And what about Andy Cole? His striker’s ability cost Manchester United £7m. And some of our best mid-field players are black—as the present English manager indicates every time he picks the national side. In the last international I saw on television the mid-field was dominated by Paul Ince, who is also black, and who hap­ pened, on that occasion, to be captain of England. This whole bizarre exercise in wholly unjustified racial resentment is not untypical of the sort of race relations fare dished up by the BBC. It never seems to occur to the likes of Mr. Terrill that their determinedly dismal portrayal of black life chances, especially in a field of quite spectacular black success, that this preconditioned pessimism may be, itself, a cause of quite unnecessary and self-defeating bitterness amongst black youngsters eager for a place in the sun. It was not until 1993 that the BBC showed any signs that it might be seeking to throw off the CR E’s ruling influence. A series entitled “All Black” actually dared to do something the CRE has never permitted in any of its propaganda— criticise an ethnic minority group in Britain. In the second of its programmes in the series the BBC drew attention to an important aspect of British Afro-Caribbean culture— the sexual pro­ miscuity of its young men. Young blacks think nothing of fathering up to six children by different women in order to prove their manhood, and then clearing off, to leave the lone mother to cope. This m ust have had a disastrous effect on the quality of family life, and has been an important cultural influence on the comparative educational failure of black children in the schools— a failure the CRE has always insisted is a function of “racism.” Let us hope that the BBC continues to examine race relations issues with an open mind. The above comments were written before an event involving the BBC occurred to dash any realistic hopes that our national, publicly-owned

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broadcasting service was, as a matter of course, willing to question any of the race relations orthodoxies created and transmitted by the CRE. In 1992 Radio 1 ran a special campaign called, “Race through the 90’s” in which listeners were invited to phone-in on the subject o f rac­ ism. This campaign culminated in the issue of a magazine with the same title as the radio campaign. The joint producers of this magazine were the BBC and the CRE. A second version was issued in 1993. It is worth examining this exercise of popular journalism in the supposed service of improved race relations. The tone is relentlessly pessimistic. There are three crucial and highly typical CRE messages beamed at the public. First Britain is a country rotted with endemic racism. Second, our ethnic minorities are victims of institutional racism. Third, per­ sonal and group failure is the inevitable lot of most blacks and Asians. As I have tried to show throughout this book, none of these allegations will stand up to balanced, critical enquiry. However, though the message is highly tendentious and question­ able the medium is highly professional— multicultured, carefully struc­ tured and geared to the sound-bite culture. The cover, for instance, is very striking. It shows a shifting, jostling crowd in what appears to be a dance hall. There is a fuzzy, soft-focus surface to the images. Top centre is one of those rotating, multifaceted balls which reflect light and colour into the surrounding gloom. One imagines this is an attempt to encapsulate the notion of a relaxed, multiethnic society in a single visual image— the effect is of a people whose race and culture are inde­ terminate in a close, physical and enjoyable encounter. In the top righthand com er is a square shape with a thin white border enclosing a pale green background. The whole is dominated by the word RACE in large block capitals, each letter being half black— the leading edge— and half white. Below this, in much smaller white block letters are the words THROUGH THE, and these in turn are placed above the image 90’s in large pink forms. Down the right-hand is a list of the subjects to be covered in white block capitals. Beneath this, in the bottom right-hand com er are the logos of the CRE and BBC Radio 1. In short, this cover is very carefully fabricated— dazzling, up-beat, youthful, and essen­ tially commercial. The reader is about to be sold something. And the key commodity is signalled by the dominating word RACE. Thus is the complex and sensitive issue of race relations reduced to the level of a teenage magazine. Each page has a distinctive background colour, and a wide variety of multicoloured shapes— squares, oblongs, circles, diamonds— encapsu­

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late short, snappy messages. Sometimes the shape breaks the edge of the page; sometimes it does not. Each subject is introduced with a strik­ ing photograph, drawing or painting. There are lots of anecdotal quotes from black and Asian citizens, each containing an allegation about rac­ ism. Statistics are reduced to coloured circles within which a question is posed with answers categorised as being from whites, blacks, and Asians. There is one bar diagram. As for content, the mindless notion that inequality of statistical out­ come is prima facie, or even conclusive, evidence of racism is taken as read. The fact that there could possibly be intervening, non-racial vari­ ables at work does not lend itself to this sort of crude propaganda, so this possibility is ignored. Take housing. On page 5 we find the follow­ ing statement: “Households with more than one person to a room in 1987-89 were: Whites— 6%, West Indians— 12%, Indian— 22%, Pakistani/Bangladeshi— 43%, Other—21%. Yet many white people still deny racism even exists.” That is, because, there are variations according to race, then racism must be the cause. W hat this mindless allegation ig­ nores is class, the fact that there are huge variations within the ethnic minority group, and, perhaps most telling of all, the fact of large varia­ tions in family size according to racial group. Certain ethnic groups have much larger average families than whites— when I was the head teacher of a multiethnic school in Bradford, the average number of children in Asian families was nearly six, when the national average was scarcely two. If couples choose to have large, rather than small families, then they will have less room per person in their homes. This is the outcome of free, cultural choice, and has nothing to do with race at all— much less with “racism.” This patent fallacy is reinforced on page 18, where we find the fol­ lowing bald statement: “94% of white families have at least one room per person. Only 57% of Bangladeshi and Pakistani families have this luxury.” It could just as easily have said that a much higher proportion of Asians than either whites or blacks own their own homes— in West Yorkshire 91 percent of Asians do so. But that would have been to point to ethnic success, a fact which has to be suppressed in this sort of propaganda message. Again, we are told, “People from the ethnic m i­ norities are four times more likely to be homeless in London than whites.” This statement may well be true. But it suffers from two weak­ nesses in so far as it functions to prove racism. First, the term “ethnic minorities” covers a very wide range of people, and we should need specific, comparative figures to see how homelessness varies accord­

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ing to race— if there are significant variations within the ethnic minor­ ity group, then that would seriously undermine the explanatory power of “racism.” Second, we know for certain that certain ethnic groups are much less successful than others in establishing and maintaining stable nuclear families; Asians, for instance, are much more successful than Afro-Caribbeans in this respect. It would not be surprising, therefore, if a disproportionate number of blacks were on the streets— family break­ down is much more common in their culture, and that is a potent source of homelessness. The same tactic o f proof from oversimplified statistics is evident in the section headed: “Is Justice Colour-Blind?” To support the implied charge that it is not, we are treated to the following: “In 1990, 16% of all male prisoners were from ethnic minority groups.... People from ethnic minorities make up only 4.8% of Britain’s population.” Ergo, racism must be the reason. Now whilst it is true that a disproportion­ ately large number of blacks are in gaol, it is also true that a dispropor­ tionately small number of Asians are there. If racism is the cause of racial variation, why does this factor affect only blacks? Second, since Asians are more successful in keeping out of gaol than either blacks or whites, why is this fact not considered to be at least prima facie evi­ dence of discrimination against non-Asians? Third, why is racial varia­ tion in this context considered to be a self-evident problem? I do not deny that if an ethnic minority group is much more criminally inclined than the ethnic majority group— as these figures suggest— I do not deny that that is not a good thing as far as race relations is concerned. Such an outcome clearly provides the prejudiced with ammunition, and would be likely to dismay the well-meaning and tolerant. But since there are systematic variations in pretty well every other socio-economic out­ come according to ethnic group, why should we assume that this should not apply here also? After all, there would be no fuss made about this, if proportionately more whites than blacks finished up in prison. There is a particularly lurid section on “Racial Attacks.” That these do occur is beyond dispute. And everyone with even a trace of decency absolutely deplores the fact. But it is crucially important in seeking to prevent them to grasp the nature, extent and legal status of the problem. There is, regrettably, a powerful tendency within the race relations lobby not to do this. This fact is echoed in this magazine. For instance, we find this on page 21: “W hat the law says. Racial attacks are crimes”. (original emphasis). This is false. There is no such phenomenon in law as a racial attack. Here is what the report of the Inter-Departmental

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Racial Attacks Group (Home Office 1989) says: “The terms ‘racial attacks’, ‘racial harassm ent’, and ‘racial incident’ have no legal significance.” The law, in fact, does not distinguish between attacks on the person or on property according to the race of the victim. That is, the key principle invoked is not race, or any other human category: it is, rather, the fundamental principle of all citizens being equal under the law. Or, to put the matter another way, it is ju st as culpable, just as serious, to attack a white person as to attack a black one. That is the current legal position. However, it is only proper to point out that, even as I write, the CRE is conducting a campaign to persuade Parliament to violate this great principle in such a way that an attack involving a racial ele­ ment would be judged, as it were, more serious than one not associated with race. W hether this move is in the best interests of race relations, or public tranquillity generally, is, to put it mildly, debatable. The CRE-dominated mentality from which this magazine originates is also illustrated by the way in which are reported crimes in which the victims are from the ethnic minorities. On pages 20-21 data given re­ fers to “racial attacks” reported to the police. In fact the term should be “racial incidents”— a much wider category which includes not only assaults, but minor assaults, criminal damage, abusive language, and “all other incidents.” To be fair, when the error was pointed out to the CRE, its press office at once issued the following statement: ERRATUM

pp 20-21 In the statistics quoted, the terms “attacks” and “racial attacks” should read “incidents” and “racial incidents”. “Racial incident” is the term used by the police to define “any incident in which it appears to the reporting or investigating officer that the complaint involves an element of racial motivation, or...which includes an allegation of racial motivation made by a person”. (CRE Press Office, 5.11.93.)

These are not the only examples of the CRE mind-set with regard to race and crime in relation to the ethnic minorities. On 23 February 1994 the CRE issued “Criminal Justice and How to Make a Complaint.” Under the heading “Enforcing the Law Equally” we find this state­ ment: “If you are from an ethnic minority group, and are the victim o f a crime such as an assault, theft, burglary, etc., the police must ask you if you think that a crime was racially motivated. They themselves must also consider whether racial motivation played a part in the crim e.”

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This statement is quite seriously misleading. In point of fact the words “are from an ethnic minority group, and” are redundant. And, if they were not, they would convey the erroneous notion that only people from the ethnic minorities can be the victims o f racially motivated crimes. Moreover, they would be urging the police to produce very questionable statistics. The police’s policy, in fact, is to ask all victims of crime this question. When the CRE issued its guidelines the M etro­ politan Police had issued information showing that, in 1992, in 22 per­ cent of racially motivated crimes the victims were white. The CRE guidelines did not, in reality, represent the police’s policy at all. M ore­ over, the M etropolitan Police later confirmed that they had not been consulted before the CRE issued its guidelines. Again, to be fair, the CRE acted with commendable speed when the error was pointed out; but that did not prevent at least some of the original, offending copies of the guidelines from being circulated (see Freedom Today, April 1994). To get a reasonably accurate grip on this problem, and to go beyond BBC race relations propaganda and CRE misrepresentation, we need to turn to what appears to be the most reli­ able source, The British Crime Survey (BCS)— though even this fails to produce data which would meet the canons of physical science. The BCS evidence is quoted in “Racially Motivated Crime: A British Crime Survey Analysis” (Research and Planning Unit, Paper 2, London, Home Office). There we find this statement: The BCS does not provide any evidence of an increase between 1987 and 1991 in the proportion of incidents in which there was thought to be a racial element, but this conclusion should be treated cautiously. The BCS suggests that there were nearly 17 million incidents of criminal victimisation and threats in England and Wales in 1991 of which 730,000 (4.4%) were against Asian and Afro-Caribbeans— more than would be expected from the number of adult [original emphasis] Asians and Afro-Caribbeans in the population. Of these, the BCS estimates that 130,000— nearly one in six—were felt to have involved a racial element.... About a quarter of the 130,000 estimated incidents were assaults (of which most were common assaults rather than serious woundings) and two-fifths were threats. Vandalism comprised another fifth of the total. Some will be incidents where the primary motivation was not necessarily racial, but racial abuse was present.... Only a small proportion of all BCS respondents thought that racial attacks [original emphasis] were a problem in their area, although, not surprisingly, levels were higher among Afro-Caribbeans and Asians, and in inner city. (P. vi)

This places racially motivated crime in a proper, realistic context, i.e., a society in which there are very high levels of crime from which all citizens suffer. It is also worth remembering that, though the ethnic minorities do appear to suffer disproportionately more from this de­

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plorable phenomenon, in terms of raw numbers, i.e., actual numbers of victims, it is the ethnic majority which, massively, suffers more; and necessarily so, given the comparative population figures. It is also the case that racial fears are not confined to the minorities. In the inter­ departmental report referred to above, we find this comment: “it is un­ doubtedly the case that there are parts o f Britain with substantial Asian or black populations in which some white people are frightened of be­ ing harassed or worse by people with a different colour” (para. 10). Moreover, it is clear from comments in the sources I am quoting that the available data is not corroborated evidence, such as would m eet the rigorous demands of either science or the courts. We are dealing, in fact, with the assumptions about criminal intention made by victims and with police officer judgements. The inter-departmental report says this: “there can be no truly objective indicators o f racial motivation” (para. 13). W hat is absolutely clear is that we are here dealing with a complex phenomenon, a phenomenon in which certain interested parties have a tendency to inflate and to dramatise. It seems reasonable to assert that the sort of slick and highly tendentious format of penny plain, tuppence coloured pop journalism reflected in the BBC Radio 1 magazine is emphatically not an appropriate means of informing the public about such a deeply serious matter. W hilst I in no way suggest that this is conclusive evidence, it is a fact that in the year following this Radio 1 campaign the num ber of racial incidents in the metropolitan police area actually rose by 18 per­ cent— in one district by 83 percent. (Metropolitan Police Fax, 8.7.94). This may, of course, simply reflect a greater tendency by victims to report incidents; or it could, conceivably, be that victims are more in­ clined to perceive every incident in racial terms, whatever the actual motive involved. But perhaps the most depressingly misleading part of this unfortu­ nate m agazine’s contents is the section on the education of ethnic m i­ nority children. This is headed “Learning the Hard Way,” and its message is clear and simple, i.e., black and Asian youngsters are being denied educational opportunities, and are being treated unjustly in the schools and colleges. This is a repetition of the standard CRE position on edu­ cation, and I will not here repeat my criticism of it in my chapter on education. Suffice to say that anyone who has not examined the sources, i.e., the overwhelming proportion of the public, is bound to get a wholly

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negative and quite seriously misleading message about education and race in this country. One would never imagine that some of our most successful pupils and students are from the ethnic minorities, that a disproportionate amount of public money has, over the years, been in­ vested in the education of black and Asian pupils, or that black and, more particularly, Asian students are now entering further and higher education at a higher rate than their white counterparts. The sloppy and irresponsible mind set which lies behind the whole approach exhibited in this magazine is also here revealed. In referring to the place of history and music in the national curriculum, the authors (Mayerline Frow and Yasmin Alibhai-Brown) say this: “Subjects like history and music are soon to be given a more ‘European’ perspective, never mind all the other histories and cultures that make up Britain today.” I shall ignore the petulant, adolescent tone which is not untypical of large parts of this publication. What matters is that this statement is seriously misleading, muddleheaded, and, quite simply, ignorant. It shows the authors have no knowledge or understanding of the fierce intellectual controversy which has surrounded the whole issue of his­ tory teaching evident from the very inception of the compulsory na­ tional curriculum under the Education Reform Act of 1988. Successive proposals from the group charged with deciding the content and ap­ proach of the history syllabus have become the basis for heated debate betw een the “new ” h isto rian s, who favour an in te rn atio n a list, multicultural and politically correct style o f history, with the emphasis on “empathy,” rather than on national history and the emphasis on the importance of factual knowledge preceding understanding— an approach broadly favoured by the “traditionalists.” Now there is no doubt that when this magazine was produced the state of play favoured the “new” historian’s approach, i.e., the approach presumably wanted by the au­ thors. To suggest that the multicultural approach had been ditched at that point is simply untrue. By May 1994, when what appeared to be the final version of the history syllabus was issued, the “new” approach had clearly had considerable success, in that the following politically correct items were included: ethnic and gender perspectives, differ­ ences in wealth, lifestyle, and culture, the life of people in Benin, Is­ lam ic c o u n trie s, and th e h isto ry o f the b la c k p e o p le s o f th e Americas— and the content o f specifically British history had been re­ duced. One dissenting member of the history group said this: “The pro­ posals would rob children of their birthright of knowledge about our country’s history.”

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It is revealing, too, to notice that the authors place the word “Euro­ pean” in inverted commas. This is meant, presumably, to imply that, despite Britain’s actual location in the world, and despite our member­ ship of the European Union, our European inheritance ought now to be suppressed in favour of some sort of multicultural mishmash, as vague as it is historically questionable. In fact the multicultural education which the authors favour has been under serious, thoughtful attack for many years— not least from black and Asian intellectuals in Britain. And, in any case, the national curriculum is unlikely ever to take up more than 70 percent of the available time, which leaves ample time and space on the school curriculum for any items the school chooses. I am not competent to comment on the music aspect of the authors’ alle­ gations, but, again, the school is perfectly free to include non-Euro­ pean m usical traditions in its m usic syllabus, and to my certain knowledge many schools do. This lamentable magazine contains a num­ ber of other sections, but I think I have perhaps said enough to indicate its provenance and prejudices. The CRE would, o f course, have been delighted with this striking evidence of the BBC’s support for its ap­ proach to race relations. The thoughtful citizen would, I suspect, have been rather less impressed. In addition to all this, the CRE printed and distributed copies of the National Union of Journalists’ pamphlet “NUJ Guidelines for Report­ ing on Race” (1982). This is now out of print, but a new, and very similar, issue appeared in 1987, “Guidelines on Race Reporting.” Whilst, in general, this is unexceptionable, its general effect is to stress the rights of the ethnic minorities to rather restricted and self conscious reporting of their affairs. For instance, journalists are warned to men­ tion someone’s race only if it is “strictly relevant.” This, one suspects, is coded language. It suggests that it is obligatory to report the race o f a victim o f crime if he or she is black or Asian, but not to report the racial fact if the perpetrator of the crime belongs to an ethnic minority— which is precisely the same mentality which excoriated the M etropoli­ tan Police for daring to publish facts regarding the relationship between race and the committing of crime in 1983, and again in 1996. This document also indicates its indebtedness to the ideology o f race relations as espoused by the CRE by the language it uses. For instance, we read the following: “Black can cover people of Arab, Asian, Chi­ nese and African origin.” The truth, of course, is that no Arab, Asian, or Chinese would be happy to be described as “black”— unless he be­ longed to that sectarian left group which has consciously sought to

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subsume all non-European cultures under a single heading so as to present race relations as a crude political conflict between white and black. Race conceived as part of the class struggle has been an influen­ tial factor in the left’s theorising and, at the local authority level, actual policymaking. O f course, one can hardly blame the NUJ when the CRE itself uses language in this way: the CRE’s Annual Reports divide its staff in this way, and many CRE reports on specific issues describe all non-white groups as “black”. The 1983 Annual Report stresses how active has been the CR E’s publicity section. It issued in that year thirty-nine press statements, held ten press conferences, and responded to 130 enquiries from the press. In addition support was given to “a number of broadcasters who were making programmes on race and the position of Britain’s ethnic minorities.” We are also informed that press, radio, and TV coverage of race issues was monitored. In the same year the CRE sponsored an MSC-funded, full-time training course for “20 black youngsters.” A report entitled “Ethnic Minority Broadcasting” was published, and this examined ethnic minority programmes from the BBC and IBA compa­ nies. We are also told that the CRE “maintained close links with media organisations and unions. Both our media advisory group and our eth­ nic minority press editors group met on four occasions.” In 1983, too, the CRE, “published 32 new publications, and revised and reprinted 60.” This sort of pattern was reflected in subsequent Annual Reports. However, a number of developments are worth noting. In 1984 we are again reminded of the close ideological links between the CRE and the National Union of Journalists, which, thanks to help from the CRE developed a typical and combative, not to say crude, “anti-racist policy.” We are also treated to further evidence of the CRE’s support for jour­ nalist training courses from which white hopefuls were disbarred: “A training course for black print and radio journalists.. .was jointly spon­ sored by the Commission and Black M edia Workers A ssociation.... A further course was started in October with twelve trainees. We are pres­ ently negotiating a Print Journalist course in London and a Radio/Print Journalism course in Wales for 1985.” (I mention, in passing that, even as I write, I hear an announcement on Radio 4 calling on Asians to apply for an Asians-only course for comedy writers.) In June 1994 the BBC announced that six o f its thirteen high-status traineeships on offer in 1994-95 were to be reserved for applicants from the ethnic minorities: indigenous white people could apply only for the remaining seven. Now given the fact that the ethnic minorities,

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in total, account for about five and a half per cent of the population, and given that six out of thirteen represents about 45 percent of the number of places available, this means that the ethnic minorities will be favoured over indigenous candidates by a factor of nearly nine. To put this another way, whilst about 5 percent of the population have the right to apply for six places, 95 percent have the right to apply for seven places. There is no doubt that the BBC will have checked out the legality of this ar­ rangement with the CRE— and it is a measure of the absurdity, not to say unjust nature, of the 1976 Race Relations Act that such a blatant instance of racial favouritism is probably lawful. However, it is very difficult to see how it can be said to square with European law: Article 48(2)(EU) requires jobs to be open to all citizens o f all EU countries. If further evidence of the BBC’s willingness to operate an antimajority colour bar were required, then it was provided in an advertisement in the Guardian of Monday, 6 June 1994. This applied exclusively to “eth­ nic minority applicants,” and referred to two highly paid jobs: senior radio producer and television producer— these are stated as being “traineeships,” but candidates would be involved in high-level respon­ sibilities and occupy leadership roles. The BBC prayed two factors in aid of this antiwhite approach: Section 37 of the Race Relations Act, 1976, and “under-representation” of ethnic minorities in this area of BBC work. This was such a blatant example of its kind that the Freedom Asso­ ciation referred the matter to the CRE, whose chairman immediately asked the BBC to explain its legal position, and to freeze the appoint­ ments. As a result the BBC “decided not to proceed with the CET scheme” (BBC Press Release, 11.10.94). The danger that such racially exclusive policies represent in terms of the understandable resentment felt by those who happen to be the wrong colour, and of producing that most depressing of all products of racial engineering, the token black—these dangers, and the threat they repre­ sent to genuine and decent race relations, appear to have no meaning for the BBC or CRE, though they are obvious to any detached observer. A further example of the CRE’s penchant for upbeat propaganda in the service of the race relations lobby is to be found in Kick It, an expensively produced, multicoloured magazine very similar in its as­ sumptions, form and tone to “Race Through the 90’s”. This was issued in 1994 as part o f a campaign against racialist chanting and abuse at football grounds, and to draw attention to the fact there are few, or no, people from the ethnic minorities who are football managers or in the

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boardroom. The campaign followed the lines of a commercial launch­ ing, and as well as the magazine, there were posters, stickers, tee shirts, and lots of media coverage. Now no responsible person could object to any well-meant attempt to see off the small minority of foul-mouthed, low-brow thugs who, in the recent past, have subjected black players to mockery and insult. So the underlying, antiracist intention of the CRE campaign is wholly ad­ mirable. W hat is odd is the timing, and the lack of subtlety in relation to the mentality of the offending group. As a very keen football fan who is a season ticketholder and m em ber at his local football league club, and someone who regularly watches matches both home and away, as well as on television, I can honestly say that my firm impression is that racial abuse had been on the decline long before this CRE campaign was initiated. There is a hint o f this in Kick It itself: “there are hopeful signs that some of the worst excesses of racism in football may now be over.” This needs to be placed in context. There has always been offensive shouting and bawling at football grounds, as well as a degree of hooli­ ganism. Mob violence can be traced back to the 1880s. But its advent showed a strongly sporadic, as opposed to a regular and worsening pattern. Periods o f boorish behaviour would be followed by periods of civilised conduct on the terraces. By the 1920s serious bad behaviour had virtually disappeared. However, in the 1970s a further outbreak of barbarism occurred, and, this time, it took a particularly virulent and violent form. No one knows precisely when this started, but most commentators date its prob­ able reemergence to the match between Leeds and West Bromwich Albion in 1971. Leeds were well on the way to becoming league cham­ pions, but lost the match and, arguably, the title, to a controversial off­ side incident which led directly to the winning West Bromwich goal. The Leeds players were incensed, fans invaded the pitch, and the ref­ eree became the focus of an appalling punch-up in the centre circle. Twenty-three people were arrested. After that, football hooliganism reached depths never experienced in the twentieth century. Over the next fifteen years and more the media were regularly filled with stories of outrageous and criminal behaviour by so-called soccer fans. There was mob fighting, regular pitch invasions, riots quelled by mounted police, and even woundings and killings. Outside the grounds property was wrecked, and local residents terrorised. The British football fan acquired a deeply unsavoury reputation throughout the world.

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It was into this atmosphere that black players— young men in their teens and early twenties whose parents had come to this country in the 1950s— were introduced. (There is evidence of black players in league football from the 1880s but they were a great rarity until this period). This meant that the mindless thugs had a new and easy target for their psychopathic hatred. And there is no doubt that blameless black play­ ers were often subjected to disgraceful barracking and abuse, particu­ larly by away fans and on away grounds. But it is important to stress, again, that the culprits were never more than a section of the crowd: the magazine itself uses the term, “small, unrepresentative bunch of fans.” The football authorities and the majority of fans had always deplored racism on the terraces. A good example of this is the response o f the Everton and the then president of the Football League, Philip Carter. Fearing that a forthcoming derby match with Liverpool might evoke abuse of John Barnes, he issued a press statement which said to the possible troublemakers, “Stay away, you scum” (see Daily Mirror, 31.10.87.). This sort of public stand, supported by virtually everyone connected in any way with football, and together with forthright con­ demnation in the media, made it very difficult for bigots to enlist sup­ port for their deplorable behaviour. A whole series of measures designed to make football grounds safer and more civilised places was implemented from the 1970s. :The Safety o f Football Grounds A ct 1975, the Taylor R eport, follow ing the Hillsborough disaster of 1989, the Football Offences Act of 1991, which made racial abuse illegal, and the investment of £20 million of public money annually into ground improvements— all these things were in place and having salutary effects long before the CR E’s intrusion into the game. Any sort of hooliganism became less and less likely in the light of the following: better policing, segregation of opposing fans, fences, searches, close-circuit television, video recordings of fans en­ tering the ground, personal telephones amongst police and stewards, limits on alcohol, better intelligence about known thugs, an increasing number of modernised grounds, all seater stands, increased accommo­ dation for families and the disabled. In short football grounds were better and more civilised places owing to actions taken by the gam e’s authorities and by Parliament. Above all, there was rapidly decreasing abuse of ethnic minority players because a hugely disproportionate number of successful— and often star—players were black. As I write there are at least 20 percent of players who are black— which is “over­ representation” by a factor of at least ten, i.e., there are ten times as

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many black players in big-time soccer than would be predicted by chance. The magazine itself states, “Very few league clubs have no black players.” Now even the neanderthal types who had indulged in racism found it very difficult to exhibit their execrable obsessions, when some of their own team happened to be black. How do you m ock those who are an integral, and often vital, component in your own team ’s endeavours? Racism was well on the way to extinction for the most authentic and admirable of reasons: black players’ determination to succeed, and the willingness of managers to judge them strictly on merit. This is underlined in a quote from Garth Crooks, the first black chair­ man of the Professional Footballers Association: “Sport is a foundation of social integration.” Black involvement in sport, “has allowed people to feel more comfortable with the society we live in, because sport shows a truer face of multi-racial Britain.” So, to repeat, the CRE publicity campaign was seeking to attack a menace, when there was every indication that the thing complained of was very much on the way out. Why draw attention to it, and possibly risk giving the racists something to shout about? However, none of the countervailing evidence is sufficient to pre­ vent the CRE from dropping broad hints that there is a significant ra­ cial prejudice in the game. They do this, first, by deploring the fact that there is an absence of black managers and blacks on the boards of league football clubs. Why this is considered to be a problem is not explained— we are simply left with the bald fact, and left to assume that this “un­ der-representation” is prim a facie evidence of discrimination. But the CRE, in an entirely predictable lack of intellectual consistency, fail to express a corresponding concern about the fact that there is massive “under-representation” of white players. Or, to put the matter another way, the bogus “representation” argument only applies to blacks, but never to whites. It is not necessary to stress just how typical this sort of racial tunnel vision is in CRE thinking. The real reason for disparity of outcomes in relation to race is, of course, cultural. This is borne out in the magazine’s section on the ab­ sence of Asian players in professional football. Here, the conflict be­ tween propaganda intention and realities grounded in fact is made clear— but only if the reader takes the trouble to read beyond the head­ lines. This section is dominated by the petulant, accusatory statement, “Why D on’t We Get a Kick Out of Football?” The whole style and design of the pages give the implicit answer “racism.” But the copy makes clear that this is arrant nonsense. This is made clear by a quote

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from Davinder Sangha, a PFA coach. In reply to the question, “Is Asian football failure due to racism?” Mr. Sangha says, “Yes, but not because w e’re victims. The problem is that we [my emphasis] are prejudiced. Asians are discriminating against football. Our parents cannot imagine a football career for their children. Doctors, lawyers and accountants are what they want us to be.” This induces two reflections in me. If the Asian issue has nothing to do with racism, why include a section on the issue in a magazine dedicated, ostensibly, to extirpating racism in soccer? And, secondly, one wonders why the CRE is not prepared to acknowl­ edge the sort of informed cultural explanation o f disparate outcomes offered by the likes of Mr. Sangha— an explanation which puts racism in its place, as one factor in what are often complex phenomena. Despite a signal failure to grasp the true incidence of racialist behaviour on the terraces, and a similar inability to understand the probable, real reasons for the comparative absence of authority figures in football, the CRE, via this campaign seeks to impose on all clubs a “9-Point Action Plan”— a plan, which, if taken at all seriously, would mean clubs becom­ ing virtually obsessed with the business of race. How that would assist matters, and improve the already vastly improved face of football in this regard is difficult to see—though it might, conceivably, hearten the po­ tential thugs who perceive their obsession with race being paradoxically, echoed in the culture of the clubs themselves. Leaving well alone; not seeking to mend something when it is not actually broken— these testa­ ments to prudence and common sense have never, unfortunately, been understood by an organisation which has a vested interest in discovering and highlighting the very thing it is in business to seek to eliminate. It may be entirely coincidental, but within a short time of the start­ ing of the CRE campaign, there were reports of neo-Nazi thugs trying to infiltrate the Chelsea ground. The same report says this, “British police have also uncovered evidence in recent weeks o f far-right fans contacting counterparts in other cities” (Sunday Telegraph, 25.9.94.). Underlying the notion that there ought to be more nonwhite people in the media is the belief that there is some sort of “black” conscious­ ness, inaccessible to white people; and this is essential to reporting on matters to do with race. There are, as it were, secrets within the minds of black people, secrets which give blacks a unique advantage over whites in this context. In short, there is a powerful racial elem ent in­ volved. This view was explicitly expressed in 1990 in two TV pro­ grammes— Channel 4 ’s “Right to Reply,” and the BBC’s “Black and W hite Media Show.” It is a view the CRE would certainly support.

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Herb Greer, the journalist, has analysed this sort of thinking, and his views are worth pondering. If we accept the premise, then it seems perfectly reasonable to believe it applies equally to white people, i.e., they, too, have within them unique experiences and understandings denied to black people. And if only blacks can legitimately deal with “black issues,” then only whites, logically, can respond to “white is­ sues.” And that, in turn, would mean an awful lot of black journalists would lose their jobs, since in an overwhelmingly white society most public issues are issues affecting a predominantly white public. That, of course, is the psychology of apartheid. But, of course, its real objec­ tive is not so much racial separatism but preferential treatm ent for blacks— which is precisely what is happening when the CRE supports training courses from which whites are expressly excluded (Sunday Telegraph, 18.3.90.). There are complaints in the 1985 Annual Report about the way the media handled the race riots in Handsworth, Tottenham and Brixton: “we were disturbed by the unhelpful and at times inflammatory report­ ing in some newspapers.” It is difficult to avoid the thought that this is the sort of coded language which makes up so much of the CRE’s rheto­ ric. One suspects that what it is really saying is that the media ought to have suppressed the fact that the vast majority of those behaving in anti-social and criminal ways happened to be black. In 1987 we are told that the CRE is pressing on with its support for blacks-only training programmes. We are also told that, for the first time, the NUJ had a black president, a man who “has worked to raise the profile of race issues in the union.” There in an unconscious irony here. This same gentleman subsequently became the chief public rela­ tions and press officer at the CRE. After his departure from this post, he wrote a scalding denunciation of the CRE and all its ways. His con­ clusion was as follows: “M any ordinary black and Asian people have, therefore, come to believe that the CRE, despite the good intention of 15 years ago, is an irrelevance, a drain on the public purse, and an insult to the ethnic communities. And, therefore, it must go. Regretta­ bly, I have to say I now share that view” {Daily Mail, 22.5.92.). The 1988 Report records continuing support for the increasing num­ ber of racially exclusive training courses, welcomes the BBC as an Approved Training Organisation, under Section 37 of the Race Rela­ tions Act 1976, offering such courses, and points out that the CRE con­ tinues to work closely with the NUJ, the Association of Cinematograph, TV and Allied Technicians (ACTT), and the Broadcasting and Enter­

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tainment Trades Alliance (BETA). We are also informed that, “in 1988 the BBC broadcast five programmes in the Brass Tacks series entitled “Black and W hite,” and “Commission staff were involved during the preparatory stages, and provided information about the legislation.” The 1990 Report underlines the CR E’s view that there ought to be special and exclusive access to the media for the ethnic minorities. It applauds the fact that, “ 1990 saw the launch of several independent radio stations,” reports it has organised a conference called, “Radio for ethnic and linguistic minorities,” and enthuses over the growing num ­ ber of “blacks-only” training courses. The CRE’s close links with the BBC are, yet again, indicated, “Work neared completion with the BBC and the Open University on the videos on race relations.” The 1990 Report also makes clear that it devotes a great deal o f its money and personnel to ensuring that the public is left in no doubt that the CRE official view of race relations was not likely to be missed. By that time the CRE had a large Public Affairs Division, with a director overseeing three sections: Field Services, Liaison, Information and Research. In 1989 this division spent the sum of £541,218.

11 Libraries In addition to establishing a large, growing, and expensive propa­ ganda machine of its own, the CRE has sought to influence public opin­ ion in other ways— most notably in its attempts to dominate policy making in both the public library service, and in school and college libraries. In 1976 the CRE’s predecessor, the Community Relations Commission, in conjunction with the Library Advisory Council, issued a report entitled “Public Library Services for a Multicultural Society.” The CRE issued a second edition in 1977, a revised edition in 1980, and a reprint in June 1987. This document is both remarkable and revealing. Remarkable be­ cause it implies a veritable revolution in both public and educational libraries. Revealing, in that the nature of Britain’s multiracial society as perceived and interpreted by the CRE is given clear, unashamed expression. The extent of the changes called for can be gauged from the following quotations: This (the multicultural society) necessitates new approaches in education, and fresh considerations of social and cultural values. It also calls for a reassessment of the concept of an efficient and comprehensive library service, and makes new demands on library authorities and their librarians. If the library service is to be relevant to these groups (i.e., the ethnic minorities), and if it is, effectively, to complement the work that is being done in education, social services, and other areas of local gov­ ernment activity, then it must be sensitive and responsive to the needs of minority groups. Over and above this, in all public library services—those without, as well as those with multiracial communities—an awareness of the multicultural nature of our society as a whole should be recognised and promoted. Librarians have a responsibility to provide material which reflects society and consequently library stock should reflect its changed composition...This must involve a continued reassessment of existing stock and the withdrawal of dated or inaccurate items as well as the examination of new material. [There must be] contact between the Library Director and the Director of Edu­ cation, both formally and through the committee structure...paralleled discus­ sions by members of staff with teachers’ organisations, teachers’ centres, 279

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The emphatic, not to say dictatorial tone of all this leaves little room for dissent. The implication is clear: there must be radical, wide-rang­ ing, and costly changes in the library services because about 5 percent of our population are of immigrant origin in the post-50s period. Even this lowly figure of 5 percent is somewhat misleading, since, as this report concedes, 40 percent of the population concerned was, by 1976, British-born. And this means that the indigenous ethnic minority would have passed, or be passing through the English schools system, and thereby acquiring fluent English. By the 1990s this figure of 40 percent would have increased considerably. The advent of Britain’s multicultural society and the sort o f attitude we all ought to adopt to it is made clear, as follows: Members of the ethnic minority groups at present constitute only a small propor­ tion of the national population as a whole. Nevertheless their presence changes the nature of our society. “The present situation is quite different [i.e., from previous immigrant settlements, e.g., the Poles] in that it reflects a wide cultural diversity, affects all sections of the community, and calls for wide-ranging positive action by both central and local government...this involves an active policy to project positive images of our multicultural society. Members of minority groups have a right to maintain and develop their own culture and language. A very few public libraries have some recordings of music from ethnic minor­ ity countries of origin. There is a lot of scope for this, Asian film music, for ex­ ample, is often popular, and music provides a particularly good way of projecting positive cultural contributions to all library users. In some areas promoting “Black Studies” in library stocks through exhibitions and programmes of events has produced a successful means of contacting young people, and by conveying the achievements of minority groups and supporting their cultural identity. The library service contacts with local organisations will reveal instances in which translation of this information into one of Asian languages is necessary.

Clearly there is here a very distinctive view of Britain’s population, and the function of a library service. There is here a new orthodoxy to which all good men and true are obliged to conform. Britain is no longer a single, unified nation with a population, however diverse, loyal to

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certain established institutions, and with a single national language in which to conduct its public transactions. We are now, it seems, a “multicultural society” whose benefits are to be the object of a propa­ ganda campaign emanating from libraries, schools, and colleges. There is to be special and privileged provision for those whose first language is not English. The maintenance and transmission o f the newcom ers’ original culture is not simply a matter of private arrangements, pri­ vately financed— as has happened with all previous immigrant cultures, e.g., Jews and Poles. Now we are instructed that such an essentially private matter has been translated into a public commitment, financed from the public purse. The transformations in the British population occurring in the post 1950s period must not simply be tolerated by the established commu­ nity, and accepted with a humanitarian grace. They must be welcomed as an unmixed blessing. Our transformation into a much less homoge­ neous population than hitherto is to be perceived and transmitted ex­ clusively as a cultural enrichment. And this tendentious view is to be imposed on all of us by a library service determined to suppress any other possible interpretation. That a more complex, more thoughtful, and perhaps even a more sceptical standpoint is permissible is not to be countenanced. The fact that at least some o f the historic, indigenous community might be experiencing a sense of something precious to them having been lost, of experiencing emotions of their culture being threatened by strange and exotic developments in an inner city which has been their home for centuries— these things are to be ignored, if not positively excoriated as something called “racism.” The entirely predictable and understandable feeling of the majority population that the vital sense of cultural continuity which ensures social and national cohesion— that this has been violated. This has no part to play in that officially sponsored multiculturalism which it is now the duty o f all libraries to sell to the public. Libraries are no longer places where one goes simply to consult and borrow books. They are, quite literally, pro­ paganda agencies for an artificially constructed, and not-to-be-questioned version of multicultural realities. This is bad enough. W hat perhaps is worse is the crass inability of the authors o f this pernicious and impertinent document to understand the fundamental principle which has enabled the people of this country successfully to integrate in the past people from many different societ­ ies and cultures, i.e., that the basic responsibility for adaptation and change lies with the immigrant and his descendants— and precisely

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because they are the newcomers in a society in which they have freely chosen to come and live. The decision to reject one’s country o f origin is a decision to engage in those social and cultural transitions all immi­ grants throughout the ages have had to endure— if they are to become successful citizens of their new place of habitation. The seventeenthcentury Huguenots, the French emigr6 fleeing from revolutionary per­ secution, the Central and East European Jews escaping from religious suppression, the postwar Poles, the Cardiff and Liverpool blacks— all these, and more, have been successfully absorbed as British citizens, whilst maintaining their distinctive cultures at the private level. But this happy transition has occurred because this basic, guiding principle has been accepted and implemented by the newcomers— though by no means without difficulty, and often in the face of prejudice. All suc­ cessful immigrant communities have accepted that natural justice de­ crees that the changes in attitudes, values and behaviour inherent in their changed status— that these things are a matter for them, and not for the established population which they are wishing to join. It is often argued by those with an axe to grind that Commonwealth immigrants came simply to help this country out of a crisis when labour was short in the postwar period. There is a grain of truth in this. There is no doubt that blacks and Asians did help in our economic recovery. But their basic motive was to improve their own lot in life. They thought, correctly no doubt, that life in this country offered more to them and to their children. They were no different in this respect than many who had preceded them. Moreover, the link with the state o f the British labour market is tenuous. The fact is that a huge proportion of Com­ monwealth immigrants have appeared on these shores during a time when there has been large-scale unemployment; and their presence on the labour market cannot be construed as an economic gain to this coun­ try— though there may, of course, be perfectly proper family reasons for their arrival here. W hat is so particularly odd about the library document I am examin­ ing is that it contains no mention of the fact that our public and educa­ tional libraries might play a useful part in equipping immigrants with the knowledge and understanding of British life and ways of thought to enable them to come to terms with their new identity, and interact suc­ cessfully with their new neighbours. Instead, what we find is a total commitment to the curious notion that immigrants and their descen­ dants are people whose original, overseas culture must, at all costs, be preserved and transmitted as a public service. The transitions involved

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are not located in the immigrant, but in the majority population and the library service— a library service established at public expense decades before these particular newcomers arrived. The authors’ insensitivity is shown in another way. It has its own obvious bias, i.e., its almost total and exclusive concern with the cul­ tures of the Indian subcontinent, and the connected languages. There is a passing reference to “Black writing” and Black Studies”, and to Pol­ ish, but the whole thrust is towards the preservation and transmission of Asian concerns. There are references to the Library o f Congress in New Delhi, Karachi, and Dacca, the Indian Office Library, the Delhi Public Library, the Indian National Bibliography, and the Indian lan­ guages stock in Birmingham library. The supposed right to translation services refers to “Asian languages” ; and the Birmingham stock, we are told, contains references to books in Urdu, Gujerati, Hindi, and Bengali. Quite apart from the obvious snub to those immigrants who do not originate in the Indian subcontinent, there is also here an astonishing inability to understand the extent to which this is now a multilingual country. We know for certain that there are at least 200 different lan­ guage groups resident in this country (see my “M inority Languages in the Classroom”, in Education Today, Dec. 1991). Moreover, this is not a static phenomenon. It is very much a dynamic one— with every year that passes new languages arrive, simply because this country is in­ creasingly attractive to people from every part of the globe. This latter phenomenon raises a number of questions with regard to publiclyfunded library services. Just how many o f these foreign lan­ guages and their associated cultures should our libraries espouse? They clearly cannot reflect all of them. In fact they can concern themselves only with a tiny fraction of them— and for obvious practical reasons. W hat criteria should be applied in selecting the favoured few? W ho is to do the choosing? More to the race relations point, how will the inevi­ table resentment of nonfavoured groups be expressed? How, in natural justice, and now that the precedent has been set, can any language and culture whose users are resident in this country be refused a place on the library shelves? Should Asian languages be preferred to European ones such as Polish? Should we go for Urdu and reject Panjabi? Favour Hindi and disfavour Bengali? Support Estonian, but not Ukranian? Fi­ nance Greek, but not Turkish? Is it an exaggeration to suggest that the sort of policy laid down in the document points not to harmony and understanding amongst groups, but rather to the real possibility of com ­

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munity conflict over the explosive issue of language? Moreover, it seems not unreasonable to point out that the authors of this document appear to be oblivious to the central issue of costs. There is no reference to finance, or to priorities in public spending anywhere in the document. Nor is there any understanding of the dangers involved in creating vested interests in minority languages in the public service. It ignores the fact that the implementing of the policy advocated is bound to lead to a cadre of ethnic “experts,” which, like all professional groups, will seek to intensify and expand the demand for their services. The spectre of an ever-expanding, limitless bureaucracy will only be denied by those who have never taken the trouble to investigate the dynamics of officialdom. At a more fundamental level this document displays no awareness of the acute need this country now has to commit itself to a single, national language at the public level— the incredible linguistic diver­ sity which now exists, and the potentiality for future conflict it con­ tains, demand this, if we are to maintain our coherence and sense o f identity as an independent nation state. The Tower of Babel could be just around the comer. But this document is guilty of more than intel­ lectual narrowness, obvious self interest, and lack of vision. It also contains demands which will cause concern to anyone who favours the right to independent thinking in the public service. In the section de­ voted to library staffing we find this: “There should be a multicultural component in the training o f all new staff, and in multiracial areas inservice training should be available. Such training should include not only information about the backgrounds and situation of minority groups, but also a librarian’s attitudes to those of other cultures and ethnic groups, his awareness of his own attitudes and fears, his perception of the cur­ rent situation and feelings about the future of our multiracial society” (p. 7). This makes one thing very clear: employment in the public li­ brary service, if the authors o f this document get their way, will depend crucially upon applicants having the politically correct attitudes, thoughts and emotions with regard to Britain’s changed population pro­ file. Subscribing to the new orthodoxy will be a precondition of getting the job. Free thinkers, reactionaries and sundry heretics need not apply.

The Professionals’ Response It is difficult to know how far these assumptions, preconditions and decrees have actually affected the library services, its materials and ideology in relation to the establishment of a multicultural norm. How­

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ever, we can gain some insight from the way in which the Library As­ sociation, the librarians’ professional body, which controls entry to the profession, has responded. The Library Association has contact with every library, of a public nature, in the country. Its publications, policy statements, and recommendations are likely to be very influential. Bear­ ing this in mind, we direct our attention to the Association’s equal opportunities statement, “Public Library Services for Britain’s M ulti­ cultural Society” (1990). This was directed “at all librarians and includes recommendations in relation to services, staffing, training, professional education and the allocation of resources.” That is, this document seeks a very wide-rang­ ing influence indeed. Its underlying purpose, and one which chimes perfectly with the document discussed above, is made clear as follows: “The Library Association wishes to restate its commitment to the pro­ motion of a multicultural, nonracist society and offer here some guid­ ance to individual libraries and information services who may wish to review their policies and practice in keeping with the changing needs of a multicultural society.” The key word here is, of course, “promote.” This is a precise echo of the previous, CRE promoted document, which says, “this involves an active policy to project positive images of our multicultural society.” That is, libraries must be involved in an essen­ tially propaganda exercise aimed at convincing the population at large that officially sponsored and publiclyfinanced multiculturalism is an unquestioned “good thing.” The Library Association’s indebtedness to the CRE document is made even plainer in the following instruction: “Each library service should ensure that all its services reflect the cultural and ethnic make-up and particular needs of the community it serves and of the country as a whole. It is therefore important that library services strive to communi­ cate a positive image of all racial groups living in Britain.” (I shall refrain from commenting on the curious, dysfunctional logic this state­ ment contains.) This document also follows the CRE’s document’s views on display in public libraries: “The highlighting of all cultural and reli­ gious festivals and routinely incorporating them into the Libraries’ Calendars for exhibitions, displays, etc., is recommended.” Again, the previous document’s almost exclusive concern with Asian languages is reproduced here: “The statement, therefore, concentrates primarily on the provision of Public Library services to communities from the New Commonwealth and other Asian and Far Eastern countries.” This is supported by reference to the fact that “80% of the 108 public library

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authorities in England presently provide materials in Asian and Chi­ nese languages.” (There appears to be no awareness at the Library A s­ sociation that a significant proportion of Britain’s immigrant community originates from Europe, i.e., the distinguishing characteristic for favoured treatment appears to be not cultural, but racial.) The CRE docum ent’s influence is, again, seen in the L ibrary Association’s document’s reference to the education of librarians: “In addition to the provision of specialist options and research initiatives, it is important that the core curriculum of the teaching institutions should include basic race and cultural awareness training.” (Again, the fact that “racism awareness training” has been exposed and excoriated as a coun­ terproductive exercise appears not to have penetrated the reigning men­ tality at the Library Association— See Murphy Dervla, ‘Tales from Two Cities” [Murray, 1988], Times Educational Supplement, 5.4.85., Daily Telegraph, 26.8.87., the Independent, 21.12.88., the Times, 24.2.86.— and numerous other attacks on what is now generally regarded as, not merely unhelpful, but as positively pernicious antiracist dogma.) In short, the Library Association’s document’s philosophy and sug­ gestions for library practice are almost identical with those of the CRE document. The same underlying assumptions, the same uncritical and superficial perception of multiculturalism, and the same urgent tone informs both documents. The influence of CRE thinking on the charac­ ter of British libraries cannot now be doubted. CRE orthodoxies are clearly a dominant part of the Library Association’s thinking and out­ look. If further evidence for this is required, it can be found in the Association’s, “The Recruitment and Training of Library and Informa­ tion Workers of Ethnic Minority Background” (March 1986), which swallows the CRE’s fallacious notions of ethnic “representation” in the labour market whole. The fact that, when faced with the same op­ portunities, people of different communities make systematically dif­ ferent choices— choices rooted in the communities’ history and culture, and not in alleged “racism”— this fact has not yet occurred to those at the Library Association who issue documents of this kind. It is not possible to document the precise effects of the Library Association’s acceptance of the CRE view of the function of libraries. However, there is no absence of anecdotal evidence to show that CRE propaganda has not fallen on stony ground. When I entered the Central Library of my home city, Manchester, recently I was immediately struck by the fact that the large notice pointing to the lending section was printed, not in English, but in Chinese. Birmingham library service has

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a stock of books in Indian languages numbering 18,000. In September 1986 Bradford Leisure Services Sub-Committee resolved the follow­ ing: “that some books deemed to be racially offensive, and to encour­ age racial stereotypes, especially with regard to children’s books, would be thrown out. Other books, including classics, would carry labels stat­ ing, ‘This book contains language and/or viewpoints which may no longer be accepted in our multicultural society. It is stocked because o f its social or literary m erit.” ’ These “official guidelines,” i.e., orders to library staff, were approved without discussion or opposition ( York­ shire Post, 13.9.86.). My local library contains newspapers in Urdu, but none in Hebrew, despite the fact that there is a large, and old-estab­ lished Jewish community in the district. (The CRE has paid very little attention to Jews, despite the fact that they are, undoubtedly, an ethnic minority community, and despite the obvious fact that they are often the victims of prejudice.) It is worth, perhaps, commenting on the Bradford decision, since it illustrates the dangers inherent in the antiracist mentality applied to public libraries. The disturbing thing about this exercise in censorship and patronising of the reaction of the reader is that none of the council­ lors present dared to challenge it— no one, regardless of party, had the courage not to be intimidated by this multicultural blackmail. No one sought to point out that decisions about which books should be stocked should lie, not with the Bradford burgesses, but with the public who pay for, and who use the library. And no one pointed out that sticking disapproving labels in classics of literature is an outrageous violation of the book’s integrity— a policy which might well deter some, at least, from reading books from our finest literature, e.g., Othello, Conrad’s Heart o f Darkness, Evelyn Waugh’s Scoop, and M ark Twain’s Huckle­ berry Finn— where all the villains are white, but where the forbidden, but historically justified, word “nigger” is used. Political correctness is clearly more important in Bradford than re­ spect for literature and the intelligence of those who wish to read it. I refrain from investigating the unworthy thought that the councillors’ de­ cision might, just possibly, have something to do with the ethnic vote.

The Educational Response That school and college libraries have been influenced by the CRE and Library Association views will be doubted only by those who, un­ like the writer, have had little recent experience of educational institu­

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tions. In point of fact there has been a systematic campaign for many years emanating from multicultural experts, local education authority advisers, teacher-training lecturers, teacher unions and politically correct librarians to fashion the contents and presentation of educational li­ braries in accordance with the diktats of the CRE and its camp followers. As early at 1981 we find an article in the CRE’s own Education Journal which epitomises the approved approach. The article is written by one, Gillian Klein, who, for many years, was employed by the Inner London Education Authority as a leading bearer of the multicultural and antiracist imperatives to schools and colleges, not least teacher training colleges. Entitled “Kids, Schools, and Libraries,” the article informs us that the National Union of Teachers has published a direc­ tory of racist books, the National Association for M ultiracial Educa­ tion has set up working parties around the country to reevaluate books in schools with regard to racism, and the Inner London Education Authority’s paper, “Assessing Children’s Books in a Multi-Ethnic So­ ciety,” has been adopted as a matter of policy by the Central Library Resource Centre. But all this is not enough for Miss Klein. She bemoans the fact that there is “still no directive from the [local education authority] advisers against having racist books in school, only recommendations against having them.” She clearly would prefer an interdict from on high, which would settle the matter, once and for all; and anyone violating the code could then be disciplined. Underlying this simpleminded and authori­ tarian m entality is the crass assumption that there are just two types of books— racist and nonracist; and separating them is no more than an automatic procedure. The criteria are self-evident, and not to be ques­ tioned. Such a grotesque view of the complex riches of literature would be merely sad in the man on the Clapham omnibus. But the Gillian Kleins of this world occupy positions of considerable influence in the state education service. W hat they preach has a real influence on teach­ ers, and, through them, pupils and students. Again, there is in this at­ tempt at sanitising school libraries, the implicit assumption that all librarians have an obligation to feature illustrations and texts which consciously draw attention to the presence o f people of foreign cul­ tures in Britain, so as to create in children a certain view of them. But children and young people are far too well aware that books are not real life, and that fictional characters are not flesh and blood human beings. That is not to say, of course, that youngsters are not influenced by what they read; but the way in which they are influenced is far too complex

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a process, far too subtle, and, some would say, mysterious to be expli­ cable in the sort of crude racist versus antiracist categories favoured by the multicultural mandarins. A further worry evoked by this approach is that commercial publish­ ers, eager to capitalise on the latest educational bandwagon, will be tempted to produce images and descriptions of other cultures which deliberately set out to depict them through flattering, rose-tinted spec­ tacles— because that is what the multicultural lobby approves of. That is, publishers will be pressured into producing, not literature and sound and honest texts, but propaganda in the service of the multicultural cause. To present other cultures warts and all— the treatment of women in many Muslim countries, for instance, or the level of violence in Ja­ maican politics— would clearly run the risk o f undermining the sort o f simpleminded approval of other cultures that the professional multiculturalists appear to want to convey to the next generation. Worst of all perhaps is the patronising belief that any teacher worth his or her salt could fail to throw out any literature which told lies about any group of people, whether the group is defined by race, culture, class or religion, or any other defining characteristic. If teachers are not suffi­ ciently sensitive to understand this, then what right have they got being teachers in the first place? But the reductionist, thought police view of literature and its role in conveying the officially approved stance is not simply a matter of cen­ soring and choosing books. Here are just some of the necessary duties of a school librarian, according to Gillian Klein: Are the books evalu­ ated with regard to their message on issues of race, class, and sex? Is there a working party composed of the librarian and teachers in school reexamining the library books? (Reexamining? How many times does this procedure have to be carried out?) Are there still racist books on the shelf? How long ago were the history and geography background reading books on the shelves published? W hat do you do with the books you withdraw? (They must be burnt, presumably.) Are there books about antiracist leaders, white and black? Do you stock books in the mother tongues of the pupils (if such books can be found)? (How many mother tongues, one wonders— some inner-city schools contain pupils speak­ ing over twenty such languages?) Do you carry a range of periodicals that relate to ethnic minority groups, including music journals? Do you have a purchasing policy and practice that prevents the acquisition of new racist materials? Are the multicultural books where they belong in the alphabetical or subject sequences on the shelves? Do you notify

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publishers of your objections to racist books, and encourage teachers and pupils to do so too? Do you express your own antiracist attitudes, where appropriate, in your work with the children and the teachers in the school? (and so on and so on). The extent to which this sort of mentality has triumphed can be gauged from Gillian Klein’s statement in the Times Educational Supplement o f 6 May 1983, “The much-missed ‘Children’s Book Bulletin’ is set to reappear, and MAAS now produce Artrage, a glorious review of the ethnic minority arts. There is a gratifying increased multicultural per­ spective in mainstream professional journals on education, librarianship, social work and sociology.” There is little reason to suppose that this commitment by those work­ ing in very influential sectors of society to a multicultural stance has lessened in the years since Gillian Klein published these words. To judge from the contents of Dictionary o f Race and Ethnic Relations (1988, second edition, reprinted twice) there is every reason to suppose that the multicultural/antiracist bandwagon is, indeed, gathering pace. There can be few aspects of social science and the practical worlds it serves which escape its influence. The CRE, then, has, from its outset, invested money, energy and personnel into persuading the public that its view of race relations is the only proper and defensible one. And there is no doubt that the CRE propaganda machine has had consider­ able success in achieving its aims. The press, radio and television— not least the all-powerful BBC— have all been successfully targeted, as have the media trade unions, the public library service, and schools and colleges. The CRE has been actively supported by the political left, a social science establishment which perceives race relations as being ideologically congenial, and a personnel industry which correctly per­ ceives that the CRE’s expansionist philosophy provides rich opportu­ nities for bureaucratic intervention and aggrandisement.

12 Freedom of Association The drift of my argument may have created in the reader’s mind the impression that racial disadvantage does not exist in Britain. But that would be a false perception o f my position. The simple fact that our most recent census found that the ethnic minorities make up only 5.5 percent of the total population, in a nation whose indigenous popula­ tion has always been overwhelmingly white, and whose power struc­ ture, therefore, is dominated by whites— this huge numerical difference is bound to mean that blacks and Asians often feel at a disadvantage. There is recent survey evidence that discrimination also exists. The Policy Studies Institute found that many blacks and Asians had jobs that were worse in terms of salary and status than those enjoyed by similarly qualified whites, whilst disproportionately few had top jobs— see Ethnic Minorities in Britain: Diversity and Disadvantage (1997). This picture is not unique to Britain. Disadvantage and discrimination is a fact of life in many, probably most, countries where ethnic minor­ ity groups exist: one thinks of Turks in Germany, North Africans in France, Albanians in Italy and Hungarians in Austria, to go no further than the continent of Europe. So what is my position? It is simply this: that the extent of racism in Britain has been greatly exaggerated, and the extent of tolerance and goodwill minimised by those with an axe to grind. Moreover, the abun­ dant evidence of the success of many ethnic minority groups has been ignored or understated. After all, Britain is a country, with all its faults, in which minorities are safer and more likely to flourish than in prob­ ably m ost other countries. As Russell Lewis says in his Anti-Racism: A Mania Exposed, “I would rather be a Tamil in the U.K. than in Sri Lanka, a Sikh in Southall than in New Delhi, a black man in Cardiff than in Kosice or in North India, a Chinese in London than in M alay­ sia”— where there are anti-Chinese quota systems. 291

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I would also argue that a distortion of multiethnic realities is bound to occur when Parliament has created a bureaucratic elite with consid­ erable legal and propaganda powers whose fell purpose is the detection and extirpation of racism from the British social order. As I say else­ where, there is a paradoxical sense in which the CRE actually needs racism, if it is to survive; and it is more or less obliged to over stress its incidence, if it is to justify its regular demands for increased powers. The extent to which the CRE has been successful in persuading a legislature anxious to display its liberal, antiracist credentials to support its perceptions and policies can be seen in the plethora of acts associated with racism passed since the inception of the CRE in 1976. The follow­ ing have all been placed on the statute book: Public Order Act 1986, Malicious Communications Act 1988, Football [Offences] Act 1991, Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994. And, we have recently learned, Parliament is soon to legislate for the new crimes of “racial harassment” and “racially motivated violence.” It is scarcely an over­ statement to state that Britain is passing through an antiracist obsession. I have grave doubts about this whole approach to solving the prob­ lems of our multiracial society, and of meeting the challenge of creat­ ing a society where we can all live in peace and reasonable harmony. Throughout this book I attempt to articulate my anxiety by attacking the CRE in terms of its oppressive and often inefficient bureaucratic methods. I also point out that the CRE’s tendency to treat people as group members, rather than as unique individuals, is inherently unjust, and generates ill will. But of all my objections to the CRE and its ways there is one which is absolutely fundamental: the way in which it seeks to violate the great principle of freedom of association. Until the creation of the CRE (and its sister organisation, the Equal Opportunities Commission) no Brit­ ish citizen worth his salt would have permitted any organisation or individual to question his right to select as friends, partners, or col­ leagues anyone he liked for good, bad, or no particular reason at all. Moreover, the tendency to prefer as company those whom one per­ ceives to be of one’s own kind had never been questioned. That tendency may be a less than perfect response to the injunction to love one’s neighbours without reserve or condition, but it is a persis­ tent, perhaps instinctive, human reaction amongst all groups— black and Asian, as well as white. No one who has visited the Bangla Deshi quarter o f Tow er Ham lets in London, the M uslim com m unity in Bradford’s M anningham district, or the West Indian neighbourhoods

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of Chapel Town in Leeds or Moss Side in M anchester could fail to be impressed by the powerful urge o f people, whatever their ethnic origin, to gather together with their fellows for emotional and cultural support. But of course the exercise o f free choice with regard to one’s human relationships by no means entails the total rejection o f people outside one’s immediate circle. Private separation in no way prevents public interaction. A mile away from my home is a famous Lancashire market where people from a wide variety of backgrounds come together— literally so in the narrow alleyways between stalls— stating their needs, transacting business, and generally functioning in a perfectly civilised and human way. Here there is a Pakistani clothes stall, there an Indian carpet seller, and alongside is a Polish patisserie next to an English pet food stall. No one finds this problematic. There is a spontaneous, unselfconscious quality about the whole situation. But that does not stop people, when they have done their shopping, from going home to areas of the town dominated by their compatriots. This balancing o f public acceptance and tolerance and private free association is surely the ideal in a multifarious society such as Britain. But it is of the essence of free association that it must be voluntary. Attempts to impose tolerance and multiethnic outcomes in human rela­ tionships is profoundly mistaken. People are not elements in some ab­ stract principle of equality. They are infinitely varied, complex, and intelligent organisms who know where their and their comm unity’s in­ terests lie. In a free society they have— or ought to have— the right to engage in any type of relationship, provided only they neither violate the law, nor harm others. By seeking to compel people to interact with those whom they perceive as strangers rather than as friends, the CRE is far more likely to create resentment, rather than acceptance. Indeed, any suggestion of coercion deprives the whole notion of tolerance of all its moral content. It is precisely because tolerance has to be volun­ tary, if it is to be genuine, that makes it worthy. Loving one’s neighbour is upheld as the commendable option precisely because one is free not to do so. Tolerance has to run alongside free association. If you deny this and plump for coercion you engage in what the American philoso­ pher Robert Nisbet has called “benign racism,” which can be every bit as counterproductive as its malign counterpart. You inescapably prod­ uct ill will in an area where goodwill is essential (see, Prejudices: A Philosophical Dictionary, Harvard University Press, 1982). Yet this is exactly what the CRE has done. And it has done so, not by denying freedom of association to all, which would at least have had

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the virtue of consistency, but, worse yet, by denying it to whites whilst accepting it in relation to the ethnic minorities. The CRE sees nothing wrong in “blacks only” jobs, exclusive ethnic minority housing policy, and mono-ethnic fostering and adoption of children— where the right to free association of blacks and Asians is fully accepted, and even encouraged— the same CRE takes exception to the corresponding right of whites. For instance, it has directly interfered in the life of private clubs, pubs and associations so as to seek to enforce multiracial out­ comes; it has taken legal action against accommodation bureaux which attempted simply to respect landlords’ ethnic preferences; and it has attempted, through the courts, to compel a mother to send her child to a heavily multiracial school, when she preferred a more mono-ethnic environment where her child’s culture was more likely to be taught and respected, and where he could mix with his own kind. Regarding jobs, the CRE has relentlessly attempted to “persuade” firms, local authorities and government departments to hire blacks and Asians, in defiance of free association. Moreover, the CRE has fre­ quently assumed that ethnic disparities in the world of work— where they appear to the disadvantage of blacks and Asians— are prim a facie evidence of unlawful discrimination; though this assumption is never made when whites achieve less. To judge from media comment this manifest violation of the principle of fair play, which is still very much a part of English culture, not only enrages those directly involved, but large sections of the general public. The perfect example of the CR E’s inconsistent and oppressive approach to free association was its atti­ tude to the Handsworth Horticultural Institute. In 1993 this gardening club was sixty-five years old. It had a membership of 1,500, and a wait­ ing list of thirty. It had enjoyed a blameless and absolutely respectable reputation since its foundation. The club followed the practice com­ mon to virtually all such associations in requiring applicants for mem­ bership to find two members to propose and accept their application. The club committee then decided to accept, refuse, or defer the re­ quest. This way of protecting the club’s interests, and of ensuring that those admitted to membership were acceptable to existing members— this was a standard, age-old, and universally accepted convention. However, the CRE saw fit to issue a non-discrimination notice on the grounds that, whilst the club permitted anyone to apply for m em ­ bership, regardless of race, a black or Asian person could not cause a club member to support him. The fact that this applied equally to a white person was, the CRE argued, irrelevant.

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The club appealed on the grounds that its rules were common form, and non-discriminatory. Moreover, the club had never been convicted of racially discriminating against anyone. But the appeal was lost in the county court, the judge ruling that, in the present state of the law, the CRE was entitled to its view. This case evoked considerable media reaction, much of it hostile to the CRE. The leading broadsheet, the Daily Telegraph, declared in a leading article, “The CRE scores a victory. Race relations suffer a set­ back” (29.1.92.). It is surely reasonable to ask when an entirely innocent and essen­ tially private association, is effectively, convicted o f racism, and of operating a colour bar, in the complete absence of any kind o f evi­ dence, and is compelled by a powerful statutory body to change the rules which have served the club well, and to which all its members subscribe— it is surely reasonable to ask just how far are human rela­ tionships thereby enhanced? And how is the duty o f the CRE to “prom ote...good relations between persons of different racial groups generally” furthered by this heavy-handed meddling in the affairs of private clubs? Even supposing the club did object to black and Asian members per se, and did deny them membership, how far would compelling it to accept people of whom—however irrationally— it disapproved add to the sum of human happiness and cooperation? W hat is here being as­ serted by the CRE is that a thing which is properly rooted in private, moral disposition, must now be a function of state coercion. How far can genuine freedom of association survive in the light of such a des­ potic doctrine? It would take a George Orwell to do justice to such a perversion of life in a free society. I am not, of course, seeking to support all-white, or all-black private organisations. I, personally, would deplore any suggestion of a colour bar, and should not want to be associated with any association which had one. I am simply saying that attempts to impose racial integrations are more likely to do harm rather than good. You do not improve race relations by violating such a fundamental liberty as free association.

The CRE Case O f course, the CRE would argue that the loss of freedom o f associa­ tion is a price worth paying, since, without it, and the bureaucratic and legalistic devices it entails, then the ethnic minorities in Britain could

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never make the grade and realise their full human potential. If we per­ mit genuine free association for all, blacks and Asians are doomed for ever to be, at best, second-rate victims of a society inherently hostile to their interests and ambitions. But this argument suffers from a number of weaknesses. For instance, it understates the extent to which we live in a society within which basic liberties are available to everyone, and this includes, of course, free and open access to our womb-to-tomb welfare state, and, more specifically, to the state education service, by means of which qualifications can be obtained as a prelude to a career and social ad­ vancement. Lawful immigrants to this country, entirely regardless of skin colour, are entitled to precisely the same rights as indigenous citi­ zens from the moment they arrive here. I have seen Asian ladies, who spoke not a word of English, being guided in how to place a cross on a ballot paper. Indeed, few would argue that one of the primary reasons why the U.K. is so enormously popular with immigrants of every race, creed, and colour is the existence of such liberties. For generations, and long before the advent of the CRE and all it symbolises, access to these liberties has produced an entirely sufficient degree of personal freedom to allow people from many and varied minority groups to make excellent progress. The Jews, who are certainly no strangers to preju­ dice and discrimination, are simply the most obvious of such people. In reading the literature of the CRE one frequently gets the impression that it is confusing the U.K. with the U.S. where, until relatively recent times, and the passing of the Civil Rights Act, 1964, blacks did not enjoy full civil rights. There were, in many parts of the States, system­ atic barriers to black advancement. But our experience of minority groups has been quite different from that of the U.S. We have no legacy of slavery and the tragic civil war it gave rise to, of Reconstruction, of Jim Crow laws— equal but separate. We have no tradition of imposed racial segregation, and there has been no struggle by minorities in this country for political equality. Yet the CRE, in order to bolster its powers still further, and to justify its case for preferential treatment for ethnic minorities, is canvassing the gov­ ernment for a law which includes the essentially American concept of historic disadvantage. A third weakness in the CRE’s position is that it ignores the relation­ ship between free association and the economic system. As I have ac­ knowledged, our ethnic minorities do suffer an element of disadvantage and discrimination, and that is due, at least in some measure, to the

Freedom of Association

297

operation of free association, in a country where the vast majority of people are white. But the power of free association to dictate m en’s actions is significantly weakened by the enlightened self-interest of capitalism. Corporate bodies have a powerful vested interest in func­ tioning efficiently; and a key factor in that is the quality of personnel. Getting the right man or woman for the job in the intensely competitive atmosphere of advanced capitalism can make the difference between profit and loss, success and failure. So few company chairmen, few personnel officers, are going to turn down an applicant for appointment or promotion on the strictly irrelevant grounds of skin colour. The only colour of concern to capitalist organisations is the colour of custom ers’ money. By seeking to interfere in this inevitable process— via the pro­ cedure of numerical targets, for instance— the CRE makes racial group membership, rather than individual merit, the key consideration. Ra­ cial engineering in the service of a bogus equality, rather than the real needs of the organisation, becomes the criterion of success. And that is bound to generate resentment, which is scarcely a recipe for good race relations in the work place. There is a further reason why the C R E’s interventionists policies may actually be underm ining the colour-blind tendencies o f capital­ ist enterprises, and that is its willingness to question the right o f an em ployer to fire a black or Asian worker. In the prevailing climate, if an ethnic m inority worker turns out to be unsatisfactory, then that worker is highly likely to cry “racism ” if he is sacked, and m ake a beeline for the CRE. And the CRE will alm ost certainly provide a sympathetic hearing— a hearing which could well lead to a formal investigation o f the company and possible legal action, a lengthy, costly and acutely embarrassing experience. And one which at least some companies may well seek to avoid by having no black or Asian workers on the payroll. Nor does the CRE grasp how damaging its commitment to special help for the minorities can be to their personal dignity and self-esteem in a meritocratic society such as contemporary Britain. W hilst other minority groups have succeeded despite the presence of free associa­ tion, current minorities are incapable of doing so. The system, as it were, has to be fixed, free association has to be suspended, in order for blacks and Asians to compete successfully in the market place. And that, surely, is a patronising notion which provides the real racists with ammunition, dismays the tolerant majority, and can so easily create a debilitating welfare dependency. Just how offensive thoughtful blacks

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find this sort of thinking can be judged from the number o f times it has been attacked in the black-owned newspaper, The Voice. In seeking to interfere with the simple but deep desire o f human beings to prefer the company of their own kind, the CRE may be acting within its legal powers, but is it really acting wisely? The right to be left alone with whomever one wishes is a precious one. Attempts by a state apparatus to undermine it are, in the long run, bound to create bad feeling. You cannot forever, in a free society, impose a social outcome which, by its very nature, depends on time-governed and voluntary ac­ tion. By explicitly denying that simple truth, the CRE tends to make things worse rather than better.

13 Concluding Thoughts At the very heart of the CR E’s philosophy is the notion that racial prejudice and the discrim ination it can give rise to can be controlled and, ultimately, eradicated only by legalistic and bureaucratic m ea­ sures. And, in order to m ake its case, the CRE feels com pelled to paint the blackest possible picture o f race relations in Britain. Essen­ tially, the CRE seeks to persuade the citizen and the power-wielding politician into accepting that this country is rotted with endemic rac­ ism, that such racism is a serious barrier to the progress of our ethnic minorities, who are failing victims in an unending struggle against the forces o f bigotry and xenophobia; and that to allow blacks and Asians to compete on an equal footing with the ethnic m ajority popu­ lation, a whole raft of special devices needs to be enforced, e.g., posi­ tive action, num erical targets, contract compliance, discrim inatory training for the ethnic m inorities, and the issue o f codes of practice in employment, housing and education— in other words what the Am eri­ cans call affirmative action. I believe that both the analysis and the proffered solution are essen­ tially false, and that the CRE’s institutional gloom has much more to do with bureaucratic self-interest than with sociological realities. The CRE is involved in an unmistakable paradox— whilst existing to elimi­ nate racism, it would cease to exist if it succeeded. Its discomfiture in this respect can be seen in a whole litany of intellectual contradictions which it feels it has to support. For instance, if it accepts that race relations are improving, it under­ mines its constant demand for increased powers. If it recognises the existence of ethnic minority success, it undercuts its claim that dis­ crimination is preventing this. W hilst pointing out the absolute right to equal opportunities and free association for blacks and Asians, it at­ tacks the same rights for whites by supporting notorious “blacks only” employment, housing, and fostering and adoption policies. W hilst look299

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The Commission for Racial Equality

ing askance at any organisation where whites appear to be “overrepre­ sented,” it ignores the corresponding situation where blacks and Asians enjoy a statistical advantage— and that includes its very own organ­ isation within which the ethnic minorities are “overrepresented” by a factor of about ten. On the one hand the CRE vigorously urges the rights and privileges of British citizenship for the ethnic minorities, whilst it perversely weakens the tendency to time-governed integration by demanding public m onies for the m aintenance and transm ission o f ethnic m inority cultures— a process which ought to be seen, not as a public, but as a private obligation, a fact never questioned by previous immigrant com ­ munities. The CRE, too, has regularly stressed the importance of re­ specting the ethnic identity of the minorities, but has shown no awareness of the ethnic majority population’s rights in this respect. These confusions and inconsistencies are mirrored in the very lan­ guage the CRE uses. For instance, it has confused the term “racial at­ tack,” which is a specific and very serious matter, with “racial incident,” a much broader notion which includes trivial misdemeanours. The CRE uses the word “racism” in a cavalier way, so as to conceal the important difference between the concept of prejudice— which refers, essentially, to an attitude, and the concept of discrimination— which refers to ac­ tual behaviour. “Discrimination” one finds used as a synonym for “dis­ advantage.” The notion of racial or group representation has been constantly applied in the CRE literature to socioeconomic institutions which are not, by their very nature in a free society, representative. Worse yet, the CRE has on many occasions referred to all Britain’s ethnic minorities as “black.” This not only gives offence to nonblack minorities, conceals important cultural differences and aspirations, and confuses the discussion about ethnic minority success, it, even more questionably, sets up race relations as a black versus white phenom­ enon. It polarises things, and gives the impression that race relations is an essentially belligerent area of social life, when the vital aims ought, surely, to be reconciliation and harmony. In short, the CRE presents as an organisation quagmired in intellec­ tual and conceptual confusion. But the CRE has been guilty of more than self-interested and ques­ tionable thinking. It has, on many occasions, displayed considerable insensitivity to people’s feelings. In examining key reports in employ­ ment, housing and education, I have frequently detected the heavy hand of thick-skinned bureaucracy triumphing over a proper, complex, and

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sympathetic search for truth. W here it should have been sensitive to local feelings and established ways of doing things, the CRE has played the role of a London-based inquisition: the Handsworth Gardening In­ stitute case is a good example, as is the enquiry into secondary school allocation in Reading. The CRE has even been hostile to, and deter­ mined to impose its will upon, organisations which have created equal opportunity policies based strictly on the CRE’s own code of practice: the disgraceful treatment of Oldham Council’s Housing Department is only the most blatant example of this. In a more general sense die CRE, to judge from anecdotal evidence, and the frequently hostile press it receives, has upset and annoyed the majority white population. It is now generally accepted that the CRE regards itself as an ethnic minority defence organisation, rather than as an impartial observer of race relations, as willing to chastise ethnic mi­ nority faults as those of whites. This state of affairs is hardly surprising, given that the whole CRE operation is dominated by blacks and Asians. But can antagonising the majority population really be reconciled with the CRE’s ostensible aims? The CRE’s confusions and insensitivities are compounded by considerable incompetence. This shows itself in two main ways. First, there are interminable delays in producing reports on its own formal investigations: the CRE can, literally take years to provide the organisation it is investigating with official feedback. It has little under­ standing of the considerable anxiety its targets suffer whilst awaiting their fate. More fundamentally, the CRE appears to have little regard for the principle that justice delayed is justice denied. Secondly, the CRE has, on more than one occasion, misjudged the limits of its own legal powers, a fact which the courts have had to put right. Crucial cases such as Amari Plastics, Hillingdon Council, Pres­ tige pic, and Cleveland Council were all lost. The CRE has even failed to learn from law already established: it was severely reprimanded by the judges for bringing the Prestige case to court, when a relevant judg­ ment had already been made. It is difficult to believe that such crass ineptitude could occur in any organisation whose continued existence was not guaranteed by the state. The present situation is made all the more chilling when one considers that the CRE is far from satisfied with its present legal and bureaucratic powers. Its two submissions to the home secretary on the workings of the Race Relations Act 1976 makes it clear that, if it gets its way, then it will be endowed with pow­ ers of an Orwellian character. And, if that happens, one could not dis­ count the possibility of a serious backlash effect.

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In view of all this is it unreasonable to raise the question: Should the CRE continue to exist? But it would be wrong to end with an implied hope which is bound to be empty if not supported by alternative possibilities. Now, in doing the reading and research necessary to complete this book, as well as working for some years in an area dominated numerically by ethnic minority groups, it has been borne in upon me that the business of race relations and of coping with a population more diverse than any this country has ever known in its long history— these things raise complex and painful questions. I do not profess to know the answers. I have no panacea. But I do feel able to suggest an alternative scenario than that embodied in the CRE mind-set. As a general proposition it needs to be accepted that race relations is a matter for society rather than the state. Political intervention, with its inevitable legal and social conflicts, does not work: in the long run it generates the resentment which confirms or initiates prejudice— preju­ dice out of which discrimination is bom. Harmony cannot be imposed from on high by an organisation created by politicians. The CRE and the Act which established it should be abolished. There should be no race laws in this country. There must be absolute equality of all citizens before the law, a principle which should not be confused with the chi­ mera of ethnic group representations in socioeconomic outcomes. The concept of affirmative action as symbolised by the CRE should be renounced. The patronising and controversial notion of “special needs,” whereby there is additional public help for the ethnic m inori­ ties, must give way to the doctrine of “human capital” as described in that great book The Economics and Politics o f Race by Thomas Sowell. On the basis of worldwide evidence Sowell has made it clear that, even in the fact of severe discrimination, the key factor in group success is the group’s own cultural values. Commitment to family stability, per­ sonal responsibility, hard work, looking to the future, grasping the func­ tional value of good education— commitment to such values is what distinguishes successful from relatively unsuccessful groups. I believe that if we add to such values our great civil liberties, then that is all the ethnic minorities need in order to make progress and compete effec­ tively with their white neighbours. There are unmistakable signs in contemporary Britain that groups which accept and practice the prin­ ciple of human capital are doing better than those groups which have a less secure hold on this principle: the greater success of Asians, par­ ticularly Chinese, than Afro-Caribbeans in acquiring higher level pro­ fessional skills is a case in point.

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The great virtue of human capital is that it respects the individual’s and group’s human possibilities and aspirations. It asks for no special favours. It eschews robustly the debilitating notion o f victimhood, whereby the CRE and likeminded organisations seek to explain ethnic minority failure. And that means there is a higher possibility of m inori­ ties getting the respect of the majority population because they are stand­ ing on their own two feet, and explicitly denying they have special needs. In the long run that, surely, must be good for race relations. Further, we must, as a nation, be prepared to learn from the Ameri­ can experience. A recent book published in the U.S. makes it alarm­ ingly clear just what damage has been done to American society— not least to its race relations— by the sort of philosophy and policies es­ poused by the CRE. The transformation of America from a highly suc­ cessful, melting pot, immigrant society to an intensely colour-conscious tossed salad made up of self-conscious, competing groups— this pro­ cess has caused enormous controversy and conflict (see Terry Eastland, Ending Affirmative Action: The Case for Colorblind Justice [Basic Books, 1996]). It is ironic that just when a growing number of Americans are seeking actively to reject all that has happened since President Lyndon Johnson called in 1965 not just for equality before the law but for “equality as a fact, and as a result”— it is ironic that just when the Americans are show­ ing distinct signs of overthrowing this oppressive doctrine, which inevi­ tably leads to group rights, quota systems, and affirmative action generally, our own CRE, it seems, is determined to do the very opposite. In America today people are so sick and tired of racial preferences and social engineering that nine out of ten white and one-third of blacks do not believe that ethnic minorities should enjoy any privileges in job applications. This belief is beginning to issue in actual judicial and political decisions. In 1995 there were two major victories by whites in the Supreme Court when race-based preference policies were over­ turned. (Reported in the Daily Telegraph, 19.4.95.). And the state of California— perhaps the most important of the states— has recently passed Proposition 209 by referendum, outlawing racial (and sexual) preferences in employment and contracts. (Reported in the Daily Tele­ graph, 13.2.97.). America is painfully learning. Do we have to repeat its experience before we do?

References Aye Maung, Natalie and Mirrlees. “Black Catriona, Racially Motivated Crime: A British Crime Survey Analysis,*’ Home Office, 1994. Bikhu, Parekh. “Five Views of Multiracial Britain,’’ CRE 1978, reprint 1983. Brest, Paul. “Foreword: In Defence of the Anti-Discrimination Principle,” Harvard Law Review; vol. 90, 1996. Brimelow, Peter. “Enforced equality dictates a US economy of lost opportunities,” The Times, 16.4.93. Brown, C. “Black and White Britain: The Third PSI Survey,” 1984. Brownfeld, Allan. “Affirmative Action Breeds Social Injustice,” Campus Report, Feb. 1990. Capaldi, Nicholas. Out o f Order: Affirmative Action and the Crisis o f Doctrinaire Liberalism, Prometheus Books, 1985. Cashmore, E. Ellis. Race and Ethnic Relations, Routledge, sec. ed., 1988. Chang, Jung. Wild Swans, Flamingo, 1993. Dale, David. “Denying Homes to Black Children,” Social Affairs Unit, 1987. Davies, J.G. “Asian Housing in Britain,” Social Affairs Unit, 1985. Dennis, N. and Erdos, G. “Families without Fathers,” Institute of Economic Affairs, 1992. Dummett, M. and A. “Race in Britain,” Hutchinson, 1982. Dworkin, Ronald. Taking Rights Seriously, Duckworth, London, 1977. Eastland, Terry. Ending Affirmative Action: The Case for Colorblind Justice, Basic Books, 1996. Epstein, Richard A. Forbidden Ground, The Case Against Employment Discrimina­ tion Laws, Harvard University Press, 1992. Gillbom, D. and Gipps, G. “Recent Research on the Achievement of Ethnic Minority Pupils,” Institute of Education, University of London, HMSO, 1996. Glazer, Nathan. “Ethnicity—North, South, West,” Commentary, May 1982. Gordon, Paul. Racial Violence and Harassment, Runnymede Trust, 1990. Green, S.J.D. “Anti-Anti-Racism,” London Review o f Books, 21.4.1988. Hartup, Gerald. “Section 5(2)(d): Britain’s Employment Colour Bar,” Hampden Trust, 1995. Hartup, Gerald. “Misreporting of Racial Attacks,” Hampden Trust, 1995. Holland, K.M. “Reversing Racism,” Social Affairs Unit, 1984. Home Office. “The Response to Racial Attacks and Harassment,” 1989. Honeyford, R. “Minority Languages in the Classroom, ” Education Today, Winter 1991. Husband, Charles (ed). Race in Britain: Countinuity and Change, Open University, 1985. Housing Corporation. “An Independent Future: Black and Minority Ethnic Housing Strategy 1992-1996,” 1992. Jones, T., Britain 's Ethnic Minorities, PSI, 1993. 305

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Kam, Valerie. Race and Housing in Britain, in Ethnic Pluralism and Public Policy, Lexingon Books and Heinemann Books, 1983. Klein, Gillian. “Kids, Schools and Libraries,” CRE Educ. Jnl, 1981. Leibman, Lance. “Anti-Discrimination Law: Groups and the Modem State,” in Eth­ nic Pluralism and Public Policy, Lexington Books and Heinemann Books, 1983. Lester, A. and Bindman, G. Race and Law, Longman, 1972. Lewis, R. Anti-Racism: A Mania Exposed, Quartet Books, 1988. Library Association. “Public Library Services for Britain’s Multicultural Society,” 1990. Macdonald, Ian et al. Murder in the Playground, Longsight Press, 1989. Malone, M. Racial Discrimination: Your Right to Equal Opportunities, Ross Ander­ son, 1983. McCrudden, C. “Anti-discrimination Goals and the Legal Process,” in Ethnic Plural­ ism and Public Policy, Lexington Books and Heinemann Books, 1983. Modood Tariq et al. Ethnic Minorities in Britain: Diversity and Disadvantage, PSI, 1997. Moore, Roderick. Racialism and the Law, Libertarian Alliance, 1986. Murray, Charles. Losing Ground: American Social Policy, 1950-1980, Basic Books, 1984. Murray, J. and Dawson, D. Five Thousand Adolescents, Manchester University Press, 1983. Nisbet, Robert. Prejudices, Harvard University Press, 1982. Osaji, Umeaku Glory. British Race Relations Legislation: How Democratic? Abraham and Sarah Foundation, 1992. Radford, J. (ed.), A Textbook o f Psychology, Sheldon Press, 1985. Reeves, Frank. Britain’s Racial Discourse in Race and Ethnic Relations, Routledge, 1988. Rex, John and Moore, Robert. Race Community and Conflict, Oxford University Press, 1967. Shah, Samir. “Hard facts about Black-Brown solidarity,” The Times, 19.9.85. Smith, D.J. and Tomlinson, S. The School Effect: A Study o f M ultiracial Comprehensives, PSI (1989). Smith, D.J. The Facts o f Racial Discrimination, Political and Economic Planning, 1976. Smith, D.J. Racial Disadvantage, Penguin, 1977. Sooben, P.N. The Origins o f the Race Relations Act, Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations, 1990. Sowell, Thomas. The Economics and Politics o f Race, Morrow, 1983. Sowell, Thomas. Pink and Brown People, Hoover Institute Press, 1981. Street, Harry. Freedom, the Individual and the Law, Penguin Books, 1977. Street, Harry. The State o f Civil Liberties Today, John Rylands, University of Manches­ ter, 1978. Swann Report. “Education for All,” HMSO, 1985. Walker, D.J. and Redman, M.J. Racial Discrimination, Shaw 1977. Williams, Walter. “Blacks Don’t Need Quotas to Keep Pace,” Ethnic Enterprise News, Nov. 1989. Wortham, Anne. “Black Victimhood versus Personal Responsibility,” Libertarian Alliance, 1994. Young, Ken. “Ethnic Pluralism and the Policy Agenda in Britain” in Ethnic Plural­ ism and Public Policy, Lexington Books and Heinemann Books, 1983.

Commission for Racial Equality (CRE) Reports and Papers Race Discrimination Law Report, 1990. Fostering Black Children, 1975, second reprint 1988. Children in Care, 1983. Adopting a Better Policy, 1990. Positive Action and Equal Opportunity in Employment, 1989. Towards Fair Selection, 1993. Principles of [sic] Practice for Contract Compliance, 1987. Review of the Race Relations Act 1976: Proposals for Change, 1985. Housing and Ethnic Minorities: Statistical Information, 1988 Secondary School Allocation in Reading, 1983. Birmingham LEA and Schools: Referral and Suspension of Pupils, 1985. Ethnic Minority Community Languages, 1982. Swann—a Response from the CRE, 1985. Ethnic Minority Community Languages—A Statement, 1983. Learning in Terror, 1988. Code of Practice for the Elimination of Discrimination in Education, 1989. Code of Practice for the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in Employment, 1984. A Study of Employment in the Metropolitan Borough of Kirklees, 1984. The National Bus Company, 1978. The West Yorkshire Passenger Transport Executive: Report of a Formal Investiga­ tion, 1983. Housing in Hackney Investigated, 1984. Walsall Council: Practices and Policies of Housing Allocation, 1985. Housing Allocations in Oldham, 1993. Race and Mortgage Lending in Rochdale, 1985. Cottrell and Rothon: Estate Agent, 1980. G.D. Midas and Allen’s Accommodation Bureau: Reports of Two Formal Investiga­ tions, 1980. Brymbo Community Council et al: Report of Four Formal Investigations, 1981. Code for Rented Housing, 1992. Race Through the 90*s (with the BBC), 1992. Criminal Justice and How to Complain, 1994. Guidelines on Race Reporting, 1987. Kick It, 1994. Public Library Services for a Multicultural Society, 1987.

307

Index British citizenship, 300 British Crime Survey, 1994, 49 building societies, 232, 233, 235, 236, 239, 240, 241 Burnley Building Society, 239 bureaucracy, 300

Accommodation issues, 203, 242-244, 248 affirmative action, 302 Afro-Caribbean sporting success, 259 Alibhai-Brown, Yasmin, 268 Amari Plastics, 62, 66, 301 American literature, vii American experience, 9-14,10,11,77, 78, 296, 303 American blacks* social pathology, 11 anti-discrimination law, 39 Anti-Nazi League, 43 anti-racist obsession, 392 anti-white colour bar, 33, 34 Asian cricket league, 260 Asian footballers, 274 Asians and Caribbeans in Britain, 97 apartheid, 198

California, state of, 303 Callaghan, James, 95 Campaign Against Racial Discrimina­ tion (CARD), 16 Capaldi, Nicholas, 12 Cardiff and Liverpool blacks, 282 Carter, Philip, 273 Cashmore, E. Ellis, 39 Central and European Jews, 282 Centre for Research in Ethnic Relations, 53 Chelsea football club, 275 civil liberties, vii, 39, 296 Civil Rights Act, 1964 (U.S.), vii, 296, See also Title vii Cleveland Council, 62-65, 301 colour conscious society, 49, 52, 253 Commission for Racial Equality (CRE), actor testing, 203, annual report, 1990, big brother, 61, BBC, 258,259, 261, 269, 270, 277, bureaucratic impulse, 59, 166-169, bussing, 33, 65, category C investigations, 61, client groups, 29, Codes of Practice, vii, 10,11, 38,39, 52,70,159-166, 172, 174, 222, Code for Rented Housing, 253, contract compliance and housing, 86, 195, 205, CRE’s defence, 295, demands for more powers, 59,61,66-71,166, division of powers, 76, duties and powers, 51, educational achievement, 139— 144, Equal Opportunities Commis­ sion (EOC), 74, ethnic composition of staff, 57, ethnic languages, 144-

Bangladeshis, 292 Barnes, John, 273 Bell Ronald, 40 benign racism, 293 bigotry, 299 Birmingham libraries, 287 Black and Asian progress, 24 black consciousness, 275 black identity, 33 black performance and the family, 97, 98 black studies, 283 black writing, 283 “Black and White Media Show,” 275 Bonham-Carter, Mark, 41, 98 Bradford and Bingley Building Society, 239 Bradford Leisure Services, 287 Brest, Paul, 10 Brimelow Peter, 37, 77 B ritish B roadcasting Corporation (BBC), 45, 259, 261,262, 267, 269, 270, 271, 275, 277 309

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152, ethnic m inority defence organisation, 301, ethnic monitor­ ing, 38, Europe, 73, formal investi­ gations, 58, fostering black children, 31,211, freedom of association, 292, 294, Home Office, 59, 96, 98, hu­ man rights, 2-6, individual com­ plaints, 54-58, 203, legal powers, vii, 67, Library Association, 285286, 9-point Action Plan, 275, non­ discrim ination notices, 58, 59, numerical targets, 36, 38, 254, phi­ losophy and background, 1-14, 65, Political and Economic Planning (PEP), 94, 95, 123, 195, public af­ fairs division, 58,270, public exami­ nations, 128,129, publicity machine, 166, 257-259, 290, racial bullying, 152-157, reprimand from Lord Diplock, 60, secondary school allo­ cations, 125-128, sin bin contro­ versy, 131-139, social equality, 9, tossed salad version of society, 78, tribunal of fact, 69, U.S. race rela­ tions, 9, vocabulary, 83-91 Community Relations Commission, 18, Community Relations Councils, 18 Commonwealth immigrants, 282 Confederation of British Industries (CBI), 18 contract compliance, 86, 173,174 Cottrell and Tothon case, 59, 244-247 council housing, 196, 199, 200, 202, 206, 213, 222, 223, 234, 237 council housing and PEP, 114-122 Criminal justice and how to make a complaint, 265 Criminal Justice and Public Order Act, 1994, 292 Criminal Justice and Criminal Order Bill, 47 Crooks Garth, 274 cultural enrichment, 281 cultural values, 302 Dale, David, 33 Davies, J.G., 110, 197, 201,225 Dewsbury case, 65, 66 Dictionary o f Race and Ethnic Rela­ tions, 290 Diplock Lord, 175 discrimination direct, 84,186,244,248

discrimination indirect, 19, 26, 52, 67, 182 discrimination racial, 8, 13, 19, 21 disparate impact, 19, 172 disparate treatment, 86 Economics and Politics of Race, The, 302 education of librarians, 286 Education Reform Act, 1988, 268 Epstein, Richard A., 21, 39, 79 equality and the law, 7, 69 ethnic minorities as privileged class, 78 ethnic minorities as victims, 24, 90, 258, 262, 265 “Ethnic Minorities in Britain: Diversity and Disadvantage,” 291 Ethnic minority success, 71, 100 European law: Article 48(2)(EU), 271 fair play, 294 Families without Fathers, 98 Football Grounds Act, 1975, 273 football hooliganism, 272, 273 Football Offences Act, 1991, 273, 292 football and racism, 272, 273 Fraser, Lord, 27 Freedom Association, 33, 266, 271 freedom of association, vii, 4, 78, 292, 294, 295-297 freedom of contract, vii, 4, 39, 78, 246 freedom of speech, vii, 4, 39-44, 78 Freedom Today, 100 French emigres, 282 genuine occupational qualifications, 30, 88 Glazer, Nathan, 8, 58, 76 Gordon, Paul, 49 Gray, John, viii Greer, Herb, 276 group law suits, 76 group rights, 10 Guardian, The, 45 Guidelines for Race Reporting, 269 Gulbenkian Foundation, 96 Gypsy issue, 251-253 Halifax Building Society, 239 Handsworth Horticultural Institute, 294 Hartup, Gerald, 34, 45 Hawthorne Leon, 80

Index Hebrew, 287 Hillingdon case, 60, 66, 175, 301 Hillsborough disaster, 273 historic disadvantage, 87, 296 Holland, K.M., 13, 29 Holocaust, 45 “Housing allocations in Oldham,” 222231 housing and the Asian community, 109110 “Housing and the CRE,” 113 housing and ethnic group, 111-113, 195, 199-202 Housing Corporation, 253 “Housing in Hackney,” 205-212 “Housing in Walsall,” 212-222 Huguenots, 282 human capital, 302, 303 human rights, 1-7, 29 immigrant languages, 283 incitement to racial hatred, 40, 46, 47, 49 Indian culture, 283 inequality of outcome, 263 industrial tribunals, 62 Information Workers of Ethnic Minor­ ity Background, 286 Inner London Education Authority (ILEA), 288 institutional racism, 85 I.Q. debate, 141 Irish the, 29, 30, 99 Jenkins, Roy, 18, 21, 25, 94, 95 Jewish community, 296 Jim Crow laws, 296 judicial activism, 9 justice delayed, 301 Kam, Valerie, 197-199 “Kick It,” 271 Kirklees Metropolitan Council, 174-180 Klein,Gillian, 288-290 Kogbara Donu, 80 Labour Party, 15 language factor, 101 Law Lords, 27 Lewis, Russell, 95 libraries and the multicultural society, 279, 281

311

libraries in education, 287 Library Association, 285 Liebman, Lance, 9, 76 Listener, The, 259 majority ethnic population, 53 Malicious Communications Act, 1988, 292 Malone, Michael, 185 Manchester central library, 287 Manchester United, 261 McCrudden, C„ 52, 59 melting pot theory, vii Metropolitan police, 49, 261 Moore, Robert, 20 Moore, Roderick, 47 Morrison Herbert, 15 Morrison, Lionel, 81 multicultural education, 269 multicultural history, 268, 269 multicultural society, 281 multiracial workforce, 107 Murphy, Dervla, 286 Murray, Charles, 12 Muslims, 73, 74, 292 National Association for Multiracial Education, 288 National Bus Company, 180-185 National Federation of Housing Asso­ ciations, 254 National Front, 43, 44 National Union of Journalists, 269,270, 276 National Union of Students, 43 National Union of Teachers, 288 natural justice, 243, 282, 283 neo-nazi thugs, 275 New Community, 53 Nisbet Robert, 3, 293 nondiscrimination notice, 294 Nuffield Foundation, 96 Orwellian powers, 301 Osaji-Umeaku, Glory, 40, 80 owner-occupier rules, 217 Parekh, Bikhu, 23 parliament’s responsibility, 172 Polish immigrants, 99, 282 Political and Economic Planning (PEP), 17, 93, 96, 101-107, 108, 181. 204

312

The Commission for Racial Equality

political correctness, 284 positive action, 85, 172 positive discrimination, 172 Prestige case, 60, 61, 301 Professional Footballers Association, 274 Proposition 209, 303 Provincial Building Society, 237-239 public and private cultures, 293 Public Library Service for a Multi­ cultural Society, 279 Public Library Service for Britain’s Multicultural Society, 285 Public Order Act, 44, 292 quotas, 9-12, 35, 37, 39, 70, 77 Race and Law, 19, 41 “Race and Mortgage Lending,” 231, 235 Race Community and Conflict, 20 Race Discrimination Law Report, 23 race equality councils, 2, 56, 203 “Race Game, The,” 259 Race Relations Act, 1965, 15-17, 40, 95 Race Relations Act, 1968, 17-21 Race Relations Act, 1976, 2, 4, 10, 23, 24, 26, 30-33, 40, 95 Race Relations Board, 41 race relations lobby, 20 race riots, 276 “Race through the 90’s,” 262, 267 racial attacks, 45,48,49,264-266,269, 292 Racial Disadvantage, 93 racial grounds, 67 racial group definition, 26, 27 racial harassment, 292 racial monitoring, 89, 171 racial preferences in housing, 248,249 racial representation, vii, 37, 70, 89, 164, 169-171, 300 racial segregation in U.S., 45 racially exclusive training courses, 276 “Racially motivated crime: A British crime survey analysis,” 266 racism, vii, 42, 44, 48, 49, 84, 297 Radcliffe Lord, 19 Radio 1, 262, 267 Rastafarians, 28 Reconstruction, 296

reverse discrimination, 80 “Review of the Race Relations Act, 1976,” 66 Rex, John, 20 “Right to Reply,” 275 Rochdale Council, 231 Royal Commission on Criminal Justice, 47 Runnymede Trust, 45 Salman, Rushdie, 73 Sangha, Davinder, 275 schoolboy turban case, 5, 27, 76, 185 “Second Review of the Race Relations Act, 1976,” 73, 74 Section 11 of Local Government Act, 1966, 4, 20, 211 segregated schools, 64 separated family rules, 220 Shar, Samir, 48, 105, 216 single national language, 284 slavery, 45 Smith, D.J., 17,93 Socialist Workers Party, 43 Somerset case, 1772, 7 Sooben, P.N., 15, 26 Soskice, Sir Frank, 95 Sowell Thomas, 12, 13 special needs, 4, 6, 37, 87 stereotyping, 198, 210, 225 Street, Harry, 40 Swann Report, 97 taboo subject, 42 Taylor Report, 273 Terrill Christopher, 259 time factor in ethnic minority progress, 98 Title vii of U.S. Civil Rights Act, 1964, 5, 9, 67 token black, 70 tolerance, 293 tossed salad theory, vii Tower of Babel, 284 Trade Union Congress (TUC), 18 underrepresentation, 274 victimhood, 90 Voice, The, 179, 298 West Indian neighbourhoods, 292

Index white consciousness, 276 white racist thugs, 45, 53, 272 white victims, 35 Williams, Walter, 12 Wilson, Harold, 20

313

Wrexham Maedor Borough Council, 251 xenophobia, 299 Young, Ken, 23