Combating Islamic Militancy and Terrorism in Pakistan's Border Region [1 ed.] 9781613249413, 9781607413356

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Copyright © 2010. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved. Combating Islamic Militancy and Terrorism in Pakistan's Border Region, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2010. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved. Combating Islamic Militancy and Terrorism in Pakistan's Border Region, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook Central,

TERRORISM, HOT SPOTS AND CONFLICT-RELATED ISSUES SERIES

Copyright © 2010. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

COMBATING ISLAMIC MILITANCY AND TERRORISM IN PAKISTAN’S BORDER REGION

No part of this digital document may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means. The publisher has taken reasonable care in the preparation of this digital document, but makes no expressed or implied warranty of any kind and assumes no responsibility for any errors or omissions. No liability is assumed for incidental or consequential damages in connection with or arising out of information contained herein. This digital document is sold with the clear understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering legal, medical or any other professional services.

Combating Islamic Militancy and Terrorism in Pakistan's Border Region, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook Central,

TERRORISM, HOT SPOTS AND CONFLICT-RELATED ISSUES SERIES Wasted Lessons of 9/11 (US House of Representatives) 2009. ISBN: 978-1-60692-640-6 Suits Against Terrorist States by Victims of Terrorism Beatrice V. Mohoney (Editor) 2009. ISBN: 978-1-60692-835-6 Maintaining Homeland Security Alan P. Proctor and Jason T. Waleford (Editors) 2009. ISBN: 978-1-60692-990-2

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National Infrastructure: Protecting. Funding and Rebuilding Frederick H. Lupul 2009. ISBN: 978-1-60692-369-6 Antiterrorist Emergency Ventilation: System, Strategy and Decision-Making Xianting Li, Hao Cai and Lina Zhao 2009. ISBN: 978-1-60741-041-6

Terrorism Insurance Miguel H. Palacios (Editor) 2009. ISBN: 978-1-60741-794-1 Terror and Suicide Leo Sher and Alexander Vilens (Editors) 2009. ISBN: 978-1-60876-103-6 Terroristica: Flags and Emblems of Armed Non-Governmental Organizations Konstantin Zharinov 2009. ISBN: 978-1-60741-027-0

Symbolism of Armed Non-governmental Organizations and Movements Konstantin Zharinov 2009. ISBN: 978-1-60741-027-0

Combating Islamic Militancy and Terrorism in Pakistan's Border Region, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Country Reports on Terrorism 2007 Harris E. Metzler (Editor) 2010. ISBN: 978-1-60741-334-9 Taliban in Pakistan: A Chronicle of Resurgence A. Manzar 2010. ISBN: 978-1-60876-206-4 Renditions: Issues and Rights Eileen M. Baker (Editor) 2010. ISBN: 978-1-60876-032-9 Renditions: Issues and Rights Eileen M. Baker (Editor) 2010. ISBN: 978-1-61668-776-2 Terrorism: Motivation, Threats and Prevention Adrienne M. Gallore (Editor) 2010. ISBN: 978-1-61668-511-9

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Terrorism: Motivation, Threats and Prevention Adrienne M. Gallore (Editor) 2010. ISBN: 978-1-61668-710-6 Combating Islamic Militancy and Terrorism in Pakistan's Border Region Nikolas J. Koppel (Editor) 2010. ISBN: 978-1-60741-335-6

Combating Islamic Militancy and Terrorism in Pakistan's Border Region, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Copyright © 2010. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved. Combating Islamic Militancy and Terrorism in Pakistan's Border Region, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook Central,

TERRORISM, HOT SPOTS AND CONFLICT-RELATED ISSUES SERIES

COMBATING ISLAMIC MILITANCY AND TERRORISM IN PAKISTAN’S BORDER REGION

NIKOLAS J. KOPPEL Copyright © 2010. Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated. All rights reserved.

EDITOR

Nova Science Publishers, Inc. New York

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Copyright © 2010 by Nova Science Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means: electronic, electrostatic, magnetic, tape, mechanical photocopying, recording or otherwise without the written permission of the Publisher. For permission to use material from this book please contact us: Telephone 631-231-7269; Fax 631-231-8175 Web Site: http://www.novapublishers.com

NOTICE TO THE READER The Publisher has taken reasonable care in the preparation of this book, but makes no expressed or implied warranty of any kind and assumes no responsibility for errors or omissions. No liability is assumed for incidental or consequential damages in connection with or arising out of information contained in this book. The Publisher shall not be liable for any special, consequential, or exemplary damages resulting, in whole or in part, from the readers‘ use of, or reliance upon, this material. Any parts of this book based on government reports are so indicated and copyright is claimed for those parts to the extent applicable to compilations of such works.

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Independent verification should be sought for any data, advice or recommendations contained in this book. In addition, no responsibility is assumed by the publisher for any injury and/or damage to persons or property arising from any methods, products, instructions, ideas or otherwise contained in this publication. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information with regard to the subject matter covered herein. It is sold with the clear understanding that the Publisher is not engaged in rendering legal or any other professional services. If legal or any other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent person should be sought. FROM A DECLARATION OF PARTICIPANTS JOINTLY ADOPTED BY A COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND A COMMITTEE OF PUBLISHERS. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA Koppel, Nikolas J. Combating Islamic militancy and terrorism in Pakistan's border region / Nikolas J. Koppel. p. cm. Includes index. ISBN HERRN 1. Terrorism--Pakistan--Prevention. 2. Islamic fundamentalism--Pakistan. 3. War on Terrorism, 2001- I. Title. HV6433.P18K67 2009 363.325'170954911--dc22 2009034179

Published by Nova Science Publishers, Inc.  New York

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CONTENTS Preface Chapter 1

Chapter 2

Chapter 3

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Chapter 4

Chapter 5

Chapter 6

Chapter 7

ix Islamist Militancy in the Pakistan-Afghanistan Border Region and U.S. Policy K. Alan Kronstadt and Kenneth Katzman Bobby Wilkes, Testimony to the House Oversight and Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs Bobby Wilkes Acting Assistant Secretary Mull's Written Testimony for the House Oversight and Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs Nikolas J. Koppel Combating Terrorism: Increased Oversight and Accountability Needed over Pakistan Reimbursement Claims for Coalition Support Funds United States Government Accountability Office Combating Terrorism: The United States Lacks Comprehensive Plan to Destroy the Terrorist Threat and Close the Safe Haven in Pakistan‘s Federally Administered Tribal Areas United States Government Accountability Office U.S. Foreign Policy in Pakistan: Implications for Regional Security, Stability, and Development: Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Tenth Congress United States Government Printing Office The Deputy Secretary‘s Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Nikolas J. Koppel

Index

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19

25

27

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PREFACE This book looks at the increasing militant activity in western Pakistan which poses three key national security threats: an increased potential for major attacks against the United States itself, a growing threat to Pakistani stability and a hindrance of U.S. efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. A U.S.-Pakistan relationship marked by periods of both cooperation and discord was transformed by the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and the ensuing enlistment of Pakistan as a key ally in U.S.-led counterterrorism efforts. Top U.S. officials have praised Pakistan for its ongoing cooperation, although long-held doubts exist about Islamabad‘s commitment to some core U.S. interests. Thus this book also examines the influence of Islamist militants and the "talibanization" of western Pakistan, which appears to be ongoing and may now threaten the territorial integrity of the Pakistani state. This is an edited, excerpted and augmented edition of various government publications. Chapter 1 - Pakistan beyond the tribal regions have come under attack from pro-Taliban militants. Indeed, the ―Talibanization‖ of western Pakistan appears to be ongoing and may now threaten the territorial integrity of the Pakistani state. Chapters 2 and 3 features testimony before the U. S. House of Representatives. Chapter 4 - The United States has reimbursed Pakistan, a key ally in the global war on terror, about $5.56 billion in Coalition Support Funds (CSF) for its efforts to combat terrorism along its border with Afghanistan. The Department of Defense (Defense) provides CSF to 27 coalition partners for costs incurred in direct support of U.S. military operations. Pakistan is the largest recipient of CSF, receiving 81 percent of CSF reimbursements as of May 2008. This report focuses on (1) the extent to which Defense has consistently applied its guidance to validate the reimbursements claimed by Pakistan and (2) how the Office of the Defense Representative to Pakistan‘s (ODRP) role has changed over time. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed CSF oversight procedures, examined CSF documents, and interviewed Defense officials in Washington, D.C., U.S. Central Command in Florida, and Pakistan. Chapter 5 - Since 2002, destroying the terrorist threat and closing the terrorist safe haven have been key national security goals. The United States has provided Pakistan, a key ally in the war on terror, more than $10.5 billion for military, economic, and development activities. Pakistan‘s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), which border Afghanistan, are vast unpoliced regions attractive to extremists and terrorists seeking a safe haven.

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Nikolas J. Koppel

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GAO was asked to assess (1) the progress in meeting these national security goals for Pakistan‘s FATA, and (2) the status of U.S. efforts to develop a comprehensive plan for the FATA. To address these objectives, GAO compared national security goals against assessments conducted by U.S. agencies and reviewed available plans. Chapter 6 features testimony before the U. S. House of Representatives. Chapter 7 features testimony before the U. S. Senate.

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In: Combating Islamic Militancy and Terrorism… Editor: Nikolas J. Koppel

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Chapter 1

ISLAMIST MILITANCY IN THE PAKISTANAFGHANISTAN BORDER REGION AND U.S. POLICY



K. Alan Kronstadt and Kenneth Katzman

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SUMMARY Increasing militant activityin western Pakistan poses three keynational security threats: an increased potential for major attacks against the United States itself; a growing threat to Pakistani stability; and a hindrance of U.S. efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. This report will be updated as events warrant. A U.S.-Pakistan relationship marked byperiods of both cooperation and discord was transformed by the September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States and the ensuing enlistment of Pakistan as a key ally in U.S.-led counterterrorism efforts. Top U.S. officials have praised Pakistan for its ongoing cooperation, although long-held doubts exist about Islamabad‘s commitment to some core U.S. interests. Pakistan is identified as a base for terrorist groups and their supporters operating in Kashmir, India, and Afghanistan. Since 2003, Pakistan‘s army has conducted unprecedented and largely ineffectual counterterrorism operations in the country‘s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) bordering Afghanistan, where Al Qaeda operatives and pro-Taliban insurgents are said to enjoy ―safe haven.‖ Militant groups have only grown stronger and more aggressive in 2008. Islamabad‘s new civilian-led government vows to combat militancy in the FATA through a combination of military force, negotiation with ―reconcilable‖ elements, and economic development. The Pakistani military has in late 2008 undertaken major operations aimed at neutralizing armed extremism in the Bajaur agency, and the government is equipping local tribal militias in several FATA agencies with the hope that these can supplement efforts to bring the region under more effective state writ.



This is an edited, reformatted and augmented version of a CRS Report for Congress publication dated November 2008.

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The upsurge of militant activity on the Pakistan side of the border is harming the U.S.-led stabilization mission in Afghanistan, by all accounts. U.S. commanders in Afghanistan attribute much of the deterioration in security conditions in the south and east over the past year to increased militant infiltration from Pakistan. U.S. policymakers are putting in place a series of steps to try to address the deficiencies of the Afghan government and other causes of support for Afghan Taliban militants, but they are also undertaking substantial new security measures to stop the infiltration. A key, according to U.S. commanders, is to reduce militant infiltration into Afghanistan from Pakistan. To do so, U.S. General David McKiernan, the overall commander in Afghanistan, is ―redefining‖ the Afghan battlefield to include the Pakistan border regions, and U.S. forces are becoming somewhat more aggressive in trying to disrupt, from the Afghan side of the border, militant operational preparations and encampments on the Pakistani side of the border. At the same time, Gen. McKiernan and other U.S. commanders are trying to rebuild a stalled Afghanistan-Pakistan-U.S./NATO military coordination process, building intelligence and information sharing centers, and attempting to build greater trust among the senior ranks of the Pakistani military. Islamist extremism and militancy has been a menace to Pakistani society throughout the post-2001 period, becoming especially prevalent in 2007 and 2008. The numerous militant groups operating in Pakistan, many of which have in the past displayed mutual animosity, may be increasing their levels of coordination and planning. Moreover, a new generation of militants is comprised of battle-hardened jihadis with fewer allegiances to religious and tribal leaders and customs. Deputy Secretary of State Negroponte warned in late 2008 that, ―The United States and our allies face near-term challenges from Pakistan‘s reluctance and inability to roll back terrorist sanctuaries in the tribal region.‖ One Western press report called Pakistan‘s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) ―the most ungoverned, combustible region in the world,‖ and an unrelenting surge in Islamist-related violence in Pakistan has some observers fearing a total collapse of the Pakistani state.1 This untenable state of affairs is compounded by Pakistan‘s deteriorating economic conditions.2 In 2008, the influence of Islamist militants appears to have grown unchecked in large parts of Pakistan beyond the FATA, bringing insecurity even to the North West Frontier Province (NWFP) capital of Peshawar, which reportedly is in danger of being overrun by proTaliban militants. In late 2008, militants in the region have attempted to assassinate the U.S. Consul General in Peshawar and undertook the targeted killing of an American aid worker there. Other so-called ―settled areas‖ of Pakistan beyond the tribal regions have come under attack from pro-Taliban militants. Indeed, the ―Talibanization‖ of western Pakistan appears to be ongoing and may now threaten the territorial integrity of the Pakistani state.

THREAT ASSESSMENT The instability in western Pakistan has broad implications for international terrorism, for Pakistani stability, and for U.S. efforts to stabilize Afghanistan. From the State Department‘s Country Reports on Terrorism 2007 (released April 2008):

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The United States remained concerned that the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan were being used as a safe haven for Al Qaeda terrorists, Afghan insurgents, and other extremists.... Extremists led by Baitullah Mehsud and other Al Qaedarelated extremists re-exerted their hold in areas of South Waziristan.... Extremists have

also gained footholds in the settled areas bordering the FATA The report noted that the trend and sophistication of suicide bombings grew in Pakistan during 2007, when there was more than twice as many such attacks (at least 45) as in the previous five years combined.3 Rates of such bombings have only increased in 2008. CIA Director Hayden said in March 2008 that the situation on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border ―presents a clear and present danger to Afghanistan, to Pakistan, and to the West in general, and to the United States in particular.‖ He agreed with other top U.S. officials who believe that possible future terrorist attacks on the U.S. homeland likely would originate from that region.4

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The International Terrorism Threat The State Department report on international terrorism for 2007 said that Al Qaeda remained the greatest terrorist threat to the United States and its partners in 2007. The two most notable Al Qaeda leaders at large, and believed in Pakistan, are Osama bin Laden and his close ally, Ayman al-Zawahri. They have apparently been there since December 2001, when U.S. Special Operations Forces and CIA officers reportedly narrowed Osama bin Laden‘s location to the Tora Bora mountains in Afghanistan‘s Nangarhar Province (30 miles west of the Khyber Pass), but the Afghan militia fighters who were the bulk of the fighting force did not prevent his escape. Associated with Al Qaeda leaders in this region are affiliated groups and their leaders, such as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) and its leader, Tahir Yuldashev. Chechen Islamist radicals are also reportedly part of the Al Qaeda militant contingent, and U.S. commanders say some have been captured in 2008 on the Afghanistan battlefield. A purported U.S.-led strike reportedly missed Zawahri by a few hours in the village of Damadola, Pakistan, in January 2006, suggesting that the United States and Pakistan have some intelligence on his movements.5 A strike in late January 2008, in an area near Damadola, killed Abu Laith al-Libi, a reported senior Al Qaeda figure who purportedly masterminded, among other operations, the bombing at Bagram Air Base in February 2007 when Vice President Cheney was visiting. In August 2008, an airstrike was confirmed to have killed Al Qaeda chemical weapons expert Abu Khabab al-Masri. Prior to 2007, the United States had praised the government of then-President Pervez Musharraf for Pakistani accomplishments against Al Qaeda, including the arrest of over 700 Al Qaeda figures, some of them senior, since the September 11 attacks.6 After the attacks, Pakistan provided the United States with access to Pakistani airspace, some ports, and some airfields for Operation Enduring Freedom. Others say Musharraf acted against Al Qaeda only when it threatened him directly; for example, after the December 2003 assassination attempts against him by that organization. The U.S. shifted toward a more critical position following a New York Times report (February 19, 2007) that Al Qaeda had re-established some small Al Qaeda terrorist training camps in Pakistan, near the Afghan border.

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The Threat to Afghanistan’s Stability According to the Pentagon, the existence of militant sanctuaries inside Pakistan‘s FATA represents ―the greatest challenge to long-term security within Afghanistan.‖ The commander of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan, General David McKiernan, and his aides, assert that Pakistan‘s western tribal regions provide the main pool for recruiting insurgents who fight in Afghanistan, and that infiltration from Afghanistan has caused a 30% increase in number of militant attacks in eastern Afghanistan over the past year. Another senior U.S. military officer estimated that militant infiltration from Pakistan now accounts for about onethird of the attacks on coalition troops in Afghanistan.7 Most analysts appear to agree that, so long as Taliban forces enjoy ―sanctuary‖ in Pakistan, their Afghan insurgency will persist. U.S. leaders — both civilian and military — now call for a more comprehensive strategy for fighting the war in Afghanistan, one that will encompass Pakistan‘s tribal regions. The Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Adm. Mike Mullen, sees the two countries as ―inextricably linked in a common insurgency‖ and has directed that maps of the Afghan ―battle space‖ include the tribal areas of western Pakistan.8

Afghan Militant Groups in the Border Area The following major Afghan militant organizations apparently have a measure of safehaven in Pakistan:

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

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The original Taliban leadership of Mullah Mohammad Omar. His purported associates include Mullah Bradar and several official spokespersons, including Qari Yusuf Ahmadi and Zabiullah Mujahid. This group — referred to as the ―Qandahari clique‖ or ―Quetta Shura‖ — operates not from Pakistan‘s tribal areas, but from populated areas in and around the Baluchistan provincial capital of Quetta. Its fighters are most active in the southern provinces of Afghanistan, including Qandahar, Helmand, and Uruzgan. Many analysts believe that Pakistan‘s intelligence services know the whereabouts of these Afghan Taliban leaders but do not arrest them as part of a hedge strategy in the region. Another major insurgent faction is the faction of Hizb-e-Islami (Islamic Party) led by former mujahedin leader Gulbuddin Hikmatyar. His fighters operate in Kunar and Nuristan provinces, northeast of Kabul. His group was a major recipient of U.S. funds during the U.S.-supported mujahedin war against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, and in that capacity Hikmatyar was received by President Reagan in 1985. On February 19, 2003, the U.S. government formally designated Hikmatyar as a ―Specially Designated Global Terrorist,‖ under the authority of Executive Order 13224, subjecting it to financial and other U.S. sanctions. (It is not formally designated as a ―Foreign Terrorist Organization.‖) On July 19, 2007, Hikmatyar expressed a willingness to discuss a cease-fire with the Karzai government, although no firm reconciliation talks were held. In 2008, he has again discussed possible reconciliation, only later to issue statements suggesting he will continue his fight. Another major militant faction is led by Jalaludin Haqqani and his eldest son, Sirajuddin Haqqani. The elder Haqqani served as Minister of Tribal Affairs in the Taliban regime of 1996-2001, is believed closer to Al Qaeda than to the ousted

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Taliban leadership in part because one of his wives is purportedly Arab. The group is active around Khost Province. Haqqani property inside Pakistan has been repeatedly targeted in September and October 2008 by U.S. strikes.

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For their part, Pakistani officials more openly contend that the cause of the security deterioration has its roots in the inability of the Kabul government to effectively extend its writ, in its corruption, and in the lack of sufficient Afghan and Western military forces to defeat the Taliban insurgents. This view is supported by some independent analyses.9 Pakistani leaders insist that Afghan stability is a vital Pakistani interest. They ask interested partners to enhance their own efforts to control the border region by undertaking an expansion of military deployments and checkposts on the Afghan side of the border, by engaging more robust intelligence sharing, and by continuing to supply the counterinsurgency equipment requested by Pakistan. Islamabad touts the expected effectiveness of sophisticated technologies such as biometric scanners in reducing illicit cross-border movements, but analysts are pessimistic that such measures can prevent all militant infiltration.10

Attacks on U.S./NATO Supply Lines Militants in Pakistan increasingly seek to undermine the U.S.-led mission in Afghanistan by choking off supply lines. Roughly three-quarters of supplies for U.S. troops in Afghanistan move either through or over Pakistan. Taliban efforts to interdict NATO supplies as they cross through Pakistan to Afghanistan have included a March 2008 attack that left 25 fuel trucks destroyed and a November 2008 raid when at least a dozen trucks carrying Humvees and other supplies were hijacked at the Khyber Pass. Despite an upsurge in reported interdiction incidents, U.S. officials say only about 1% of the cargo moving from the Karachi port into Afghanistan is being lost.11 After a U.S. special forces raid in the FATA in early September 2008, Pakistani officials apparently closed the crucial Torkham highway in response. The land route was opened less than one day later, but the episode illuminated how important Pakistan‘s cooperation is to sustaining multilateral military efforts to the west. Pentagon officials have studied alternative routes in case further instability in Pakistan disrupts supply lines. The Russian government agreed to allow non-lethal NATO supplies to Afghanistan to cross Russian territory, but declines to allow passage of troops as sought by NATO. Uzbekistan also has expressed a willingness to accommodate the flow of U.S. supplies, although in exchange for improved U.S. relations, which took a downturn following the April 2005 Uzbek crackdown on demonstrators in its city of Andijon. A Pentagon official has said the U.S. military was increasing its tests of alternative supply routes.12

The Threat to Pakistan and Islamabad’s Responses The Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) — widely identified as the leading anti-government militant group in Pakistan — emerged as a coherent grouping in late 2007 under Baitullah Mehsud‘s leadership. This ―Pakistani Taliban‖ is said to have representatives from each of Pakistan‘s seven tribal agencies, as well as from many of the ―settled‖ districts abutting the FATA. There appears to be no reliable evidence that the TTP receives funding from external states. The group‘s principal aims are threefold:

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uniting disparate pro-Taliban groups active in the FATA and NWFP; assisting the Afghan Taliban in its conflict across the international frontier; and establishing a Taliban-style state in Pakistan and perhaps beyond.

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As an umbrella group, the TTP is home to tribes and sub-tribes, some with long-held mutual antagonism. It thus suffers from factionalism. Mehsud himself is believed to command some 5,000 militants. His North Waziristan-based deputy is Hafiz Gul Bahadur; Bajaur‘s Maulana Faqir Muhammad is said to be third in command. The Islamabad government formally banned the TTP in August 2008 due to its alleged involvement in a series of domestic suicide attacks. The move allowed for the freezing of all TTP bank accounts and other assets and for the interdiction of printed and visual propaganda materials.13 The NWFP governor has claimed Mehsud oversees an annual budget of up to $45 million devoted to perpetuating regional militancy. Most of this amount is thought to be raised through narcotics trafficking, although pro-Taliban militants also sustain themselves by demanding fees and taxes from profitable regional businesses such as marble quarries. The apparent impunity with which Mehsud is able to act has caused serious alarm in Washington, where officials worry that his power and influence are only growing.14 In addition to the TTP, several other Islamist militant groups are active in the region. These include the Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM) of radical cleric Maulana Fazlullah and up to 5,000 of his armed followers who seek to impose Sharia law in Bajaur, as well as in neighboring NWFP districts; a South Waziristan militia led by Mehsud rival Maulvi Nazir, which reportedly has won Pakistan government support in combating Uzbek militants; and a Khyber agency militia led by Mangal Bagh, which battled government forces in mid-2008.

Internal Military Operations To combat the militants, the Pakistan army has deployed upwards of 100,000 regular and paramilitary troops in western Pakistan in response to the surge in militancy there. Their militant foes appear to be employing heavy weapons in more aggressive tactics, making frontal attacks on army outposts instead of the hit-and-run skirmishes of the past. The army also has suffered from a raft of suicide bomb attacks and the kidnaping of hundreds of its soldiers. Such setbacks damaged the army‘s morale and caused some to question the organization‘s loyalties and capabilities. Months-long battles with militants have concentrated on three fronts: the Swat valley, and the Bajaur and South Waziristan tribal agencies (see Figure 1). Taliban forces may also have opened a new front in the Upper Dir valley of the NWFP, where one report says a new militant ―headquarters‖ has been established. Pakistan has sent major regular army units to replace Frontier Corps soldiers in some areas near the Afghan border and has deployed elite, U.S.-trained and equipped Special Services Group commandos to the tribal areas. Heavy fighting between government security forces and religious militants flared in the FATA in 2008. Shortly after Bhutto‘s December 2007 assassination the Pakistan army undertook a major operation against militants in the South Waziristan agency assumed loyal to Baitullah Mehsud. Sometimes fierce combat continued in that area throughout the year. According to one report, nearly half of the estimated 450,000 residents of the Mehsud territories were driven from their homes by the fighting and live in makeshift camps.15

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Pakistani ground troops have undertaken operations against militants in the Bajaur agency beginning in early August. The ongoing battle has been called especially important as a critical test of both the Pakistani military‘s capabilities and intentions with regard to combatting militancy, and it has been welcomed by Defense Secretary Gates as a reflection of the new Islamabad government‘s willingness to fight.16 Some 8,000 Pakistani troops are being backed by helicopter gunships and ground attack jets. The Frontier Corps‘ top officer has estimated that militant forces in Bajaur number about 2,000, including foreigners.17 Battles include a series of engagements at the strategic Kohat tunnel, a key link in the U.S. military supply chain running from Karachi to Afghanistan. The fighting apparently has attracted militants from neighboring regions and these reinforced insurgents have been able to put up surprisingly strong resistance — complete with sophisticated tactics, weapons, and communications systems — and reportedly make use of an elaborate network of tunnels in which they stockpile weapons and ammunition. Still, Pakistani military officials report having killed more than 1,500 militants in the Bajaur fighting to date. The army general leading the campaign believes that more than half of the militancy being seen in Pakistan would end if his troops are able to win the battle of Bajaur.18 Subsequent terrorist attacks in other parts of western Pakistan have been tentatively linked to the Bajaur fighting. The Pakistani military effort in Bajaur has included airstrikes on residential areas occupied by suspected militants who may be using civilians as human shields. The use of fixed-wing aircraft continues and reportedly has killed some women and children along with scores of militants. The strife is causing a serious humanitarian crisis. In August, the U.S. government provided emergency assistance to displaced families. The United Nations estimates that hundreds of thousands of civilians have fled from Bajaur, with about 20,000 of these moving into Afghanistan. International human rights groups have called for international assistance to both Pakistani and Afghan civilians adversely affected by the fighting.19 Questions remain about the loyalty and commitment of the Pakistani military. Pakistan‘s mixed record on battling Islamist extremism includes an ongoing apparent tolerance of Taliban elements operating from its territory.20 Reports continue to indicatethat elements of Pakistan‘s major intelligence agencyand militaryforces aid the Taliban and other extremists forces as a matter of policy. Such support may even include providing training and fire support for Taliban offensives.21 Other reports indicate that U.S. military personnel are unable to count on the Pakistani military for battlefield support and do not trust Pakistan‘s Frontier Corps, whom some say are active facilitators of militant infiltration into Afghanistan. At least one senior U.S. Senator, Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Levin, has questioned the wisdom of providing U.S. aid to a group that is ineffective, at best, and may even be providing support to ―terrorists.‖22

Tribal Militias Autumn 2008 saw an increase in the number of lashkars — tribal militias — being formed in the FATA. These private armies may represent a growing popular resistance to Islamist militancy in the region, not unlike that seen in Iraq‘s ―Sunni Awakening.‖ A potential effort to bolster the capabilities of tribal leaders near the Afghan border would target that region‘s Al Qaeda elements and be similar to U.S. efforts in Iraq‘s Anbar province. Employing this strategy in Pakistan presents new difficulties, however, including the fact that the Pakistani Taliban is not alien to the tribal regions but is comprised of the tribals‘

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ethnolinguistic brethren. Still, with pro-government tribals being killed by Islamist extremists almost daily in western Pakistan, tribal leaders may be increasingly alienated by the violence and so more receptive to cooperation with the Pakistan military. The Pakistan army reportedly backs these militias and the NWFP governor expresses hope that they will turn the tide against Taliban insurgents. Islamabad reportedly plans to provide small arms to these anti-Taliban tribal militias, which are said to number some 14,000 men in Bajaur and another 11,000 more in neighboring Orakzai and Dir. No U.S. government funds are to be involved.23 Some reporting indicates that, to date, the lashkars have proven ineffective against better-armed and more motivated Taliban fighters. Intimidation tactics and the targeted killings of pro-government tribal leaders continue to take a toll, and Islamabad‘s military and political support for the tribal efforts is said to be ―episodic‖ and ―unsustained.‖ Some analysts worry that, by employing lashkars to meet its goals in the FATA, the Islamabad government risks sparking an all-out war in the region.24

COMPLICATING FACTORS IN ACHIEVING U.S. GOALS

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Pakistan’s Strategic Vision Three full-scale wars and a constant state of military preparedness on both sides of their mutual border have marked six decades of bitter rivalry between Pakistan and India. The acrimonious partition of British India into two successor states in 1947 and the unresolved issue of Kashmiri sovereignty have been major sources of tension. Both countries have built large defense establishments at significant cost to economic and social development. The conflict dynamics have colored the perspectives of Islamabad‘s strategic planners throughout Pakistani existence. Pakistani leaders have long sought access to Central Asia and ―strategic depth‖ with regard to India through friendly relations with neighboring Afghanistan to the west. Such policy contributed to President-General Zia ul-Haq‘s support for Afghan mujahideen ―freedom fighters‖ who were battling Soviet invaders during the 1980s and to Islamabad‘s later support for the Afghan Taliban regime from 1996 to 2001.25 British colonialists had purposely divided the ethnic Pashtun tribes inhabiting the mountainous northwestern reaches of their South Asian empire with the 1893 ―Durand Line.‖ This porous, 1,600-mile border is not accepted by Afghan leaders, who have at times fanned Pashtun nationalism to the dismay of Pakistanis.26 Pakistan is wary of signs that India is pursuing a policy of ―strategic encirclement,‖ taking note of New Delhi‘s past support for Tajik and Uzbek militias which comprised the Afghan Northern Alliance, and the post-2001 opening of several Indian consulates in Afghanistan. More fundamental, perhaps, even than regime type in Islamabad is the Pakistani geopolitical perspective focused on India as the primary threat and on Afghanistan as an arena of security competition between Islamabad and New Delhi. In the conception of one longtime analyst, ―Pakistan‘s grand strategy, with an emphasis on balancing against Afghanistan and India, will continue to limit cooperation in the war on terrorism, regardless of whether elected civilian leaders retain power or the military intervenes again.‖27

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Xenophobia and Anti-American Sentiment The tribes of western Pakistan and eastern Afghanistan are notoriously adverse to interference from foreign elements, be they British colonialists and Soviet invaders of the past, or Westerners and even non-Pashtun Pakistanis today (a large percentage of Pakistan‘s military forces are ethnic Punjabis with little or no linguistic or cultural familiarity with their Pashtun countrymen). Anti-American sentiments are widespread throughout Pakistan and a significant segment of the populace has viewed years of U.S. support for President Musharraf and the Pakistani military as an impediment to, rather than facilitator of, the process of democratization and development there. Underlying the anti-American sentiment is a pervasive, but perhaps malleable perception that the United States is fighting a war against Islam.28 Opinion surveys in Pakistan have found strong support for an Islamabad government emphasis on negotiated resolutions to the militancy problem. They also show scant support for unilateral U.S. military action on Pakistani territory.29 Pakistan‘s Islamist political parties are notable for expressions of anti-American sentiment, at times calling for ―jihad‖ against the existential threat to Pakistani sovereignty they believe alliance with Washington entails. Some observers identify a causal link between the poor state of Pakistan‘s public education system and the persistence of xenophobia and religious extremism in that country. Anti-American sentiment is not limited to Islamic groups, however. Many across the spectrum of Pakistani society express anger at U.S. global foreign policy, in particular when such policy is perceived to be unfriendly or hostile to the Muslim world (as in, for example, Palestine and Iraq).

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Weak Government Writ in the FATA Pakistan‘s rugged, mountainous FATA region includes seven ethnic Pashtun tribal agencies traditionally beyond the full writ of the Pakistani state. The FATA is home to some 3.5 million people living in an area slightly larger than the state of Maryland. The inhabitants are legendarily formidable fighters and were never subjugated by British colonialists.30 The British established a khassadar (tribal police) system which provided the indigenous tribes with a large degree of autonomy under maliks — local tribal leaders. This system provided the model through which the new state of Pakistan has administered the region since 1947. Today, the Pashtun governor of Pakistan‘s North West Frontier Province, Owais Ahmed Ghani, is the FATA‘s top executive, reporting directly to President Zardari. He and his ―political agents‖ in each of the agencies ostensibly have full political authority, but this has been eroded in recent years as both military and Islamist influence has grown. Ghani, who took office in January 2008, gained a reputation for taking a hardline toward militancy during his tenure as Baluchistan governor from 2003 to 2008. Under the Pakistani Constitution, the FATA is included among the ―territories‖ of Pakistan and is represented in the National Assembly and the Senate, but remains under the direct executive authority of the President. The FATA continues to be administered under the 1901 Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) laws, which give sweeping powers to political agents and provides for collective punishment system that has come under fire from human rights groups. Civil and criminal FCR judgments are made by jirgas (tribal councils). Laws passed

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by Pakistan‘s National Assembly do not apply to the FATA unless so ordered by the President. According to the FATA Secretariat, ―Interference in local matters is kept to a minimum.‖31 Adult franchise was introduced in the FATA only in 1996, and political parties and civil society organizations are still restricted from operating there. Efforts are underway to rescind or reform the FCR, and the civilian government seated in Islamabad in 2008 has vowed to work to bring the FATA under the more effective writ of the state. The U.S. government supports Islamabad‘s ―Frontier Strategy‖ of better integrating the FATA into the mainstream of Pakistan‘s political and economic system.32 Many analysts insist that only through this course can the FATA‘s militancy problem be resolved.

U.S. POLICY

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U.S. policy in the FATA seeks to combine better coordinated U.S. and Pakistani military efforts to neutralize militant threats in the short term with economic development initiatives meant to reduce extremism in Pakistan over the longer-term. Congressional analysts have identified serious shortcomings in the Bush Administration‘s FATA policy: In April 2008, the Government Accountability Office issued a report in response to congressional requests for an assessment of progress in meeting U.S. national security goals related to counterterrorism efforts in Pakistan‘s FATA. Their investigation found that, ―The United States has not met its national security goals to destroy terrorist threats and close safe haven in Pakistan‘s FATA,‖ and, ―No comprehensive plan for meeting U.S. national security goals in the FATA has been developed.‖ House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Representative Howard Berman called the conclusions ―appalling.‖33

Increasing U.S.-Pakistan Cooperation and Coordination In late 2008, U.S. officials have indicated that they are seeing greater Pakistani cooperation. In February 2008, Pakistan stopped attending meetings of the Tripartite Commission under which NATO, Afghan, and Pakistani forces meet regularly on both sides of the border. However, according to General McKiernan on November 18, 2008, the meetings resumed in June 2008 and three have been held since then, with another planned in December 2008. Gen. McKiernan, Pakistan‘s Chief of Staff Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, and Afghan Chief of Staff Bismillah Khan represent their respective forces in that commission. In April 2008, in an extension of the commission‘s work, the three forces agreed to set up five ―border coordination centers‖ — which will include networks of radar nodes to give liaison officers a common view of the border area. These centers build on an agreement in May 2007 to share intelligence on extremists‘ movements. Only one has been established to date, at the Torkham border crossing. According to U.S. Army chief of staff Gen. George Casey in November 2008, cooperation is continuing to improve with meetings between U.S. and Pakistani commanders once a week. Also, U.S. commanders have praised October 2008 Pakistani military moves against militant enclaves in the tribal areas, and U.S. and Pakistani forces are jointly waging the ―Operation Lionheart‖ offensive against militants on both sides of the border, north of the Khyber Pass.

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In addition, Afghanistan-Pakistan relations are improving since Musharraf‘s August 2008 resignation. Karzai attended the September inauguration of President Asif Ali Zardari, widower of slain former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. The ―peace jirga‖ process — a series of meetings of notables on each side of the border, which was agreed at a September 2006 dinner hosted by President Bush for Karzai and Musharraf — has resumed. The first jirga, in which 700 Pakistani and Afghan tribal elders participated, was held in Kabul in August 2007.34 Another was held in the improving climate of Afghanistan-Pakistan relations during October 2008; the Afghan side was headed by former Foreign Minister Dr. Abdullah. It resulted in a declaration to endorse efforts to try to engage militants in both Afghanistan and Pakistan to bring them into the political process and abandon violence.

Increased Direct U.S. Military Action Although U.S.-Pakistan military cooperation is improving in late 2008, U.S. officials are increasingly employing new tactics to combat militant concentrations in Pakistan without directly violating Pakistan‘s limitations on the U.S. ability to operate ―on the ground‖ in Pakistan. Pakistani political leaders across the spectrum publicly oppose any presence of U.S. combat forces in Pakistan, and a reported Defense Department plan to send small numbers of U.S. troops into the border areas was said to be ―on hold‖ because of potential backlash from Pakistan. This purported U.S. plan was said to be a focus of discussions between Joint Chiefs Chairman Mullen and Kayani aboard the aircraft carrier U.S.S. Lincoln on August 26, 2008, although the results of the discussions are not publicly known.35 On September 3, 2008, one week after the meeting, as a possible indication that at least some aspects of the U.S. plan were going forward, U.S. helicopter-borne forces reportedly crossed the border to raid a suspected militant encampment, drawing criticism from Pakistan. However, there still does not appear to be U.S. consideration of longer term ―boots on the ground‖ in Pakistan. U.S. forces in Afghanistan now acknowledge that they shell purported Taliban positions on the Pakistani side of the border, and do some ―hot pursuit‖ a few kilometers over the border into Pakistan. Aerial Drone Attacks Since well before the September 3 incursion, U.S. military forces have been directing increased U.S. firepower against militants in Pakistan. Missile strikes in Pakistan launched by armed, unmanned American Predator aircraft have been a controversial, but sometimes effective tactic against Islamist militants in remote regions of western Pakistan. Pakistani press reports suggest that such drones ―violate Pakistani airspace‖ on a daily basis. By some accounts, U.S. officials reached a quiet January understanding with President Musharraf to allow for increased employment of U.S. aerial surveillance and Predator strikes on Pakistani territory. Musharraf‘s successor, President Asif Zardari, may even have struck a secret accord with U.S. officials involving better bilateral coordination for Predator attacks and a jointly approved target list. Neither Washington nor Islamabad offers official confirmation of Predator strikes on Pakistani territory; there are conflicting reports on the question of the Pakistani government‘s alleged tacit permission for such operations.36 Three Predators are said to be deployed at a secret Pakistani airbase and can be launched without specific permission from the Islamabad government (Pakistan officially denies the existence of any such bases).37 Pentagon officials eager to increase the use of armed drones in Pakistan

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reportedly meet resistance from State Department diplomats who fear that Pakistani resentments built up in response to sovereignty violations and to the deaths of civilians are harmful to U.S. interests, outweighing potential gains. A flurry of suspected Predator drone attacks on Pakistani territory in the latter months of 2008 suggests a shift in tactics in the effort to neutralize Al Qaeda and other Islamist militants in the border region. As of later November, at least 20 suspected Predator attacks had been made on Pakistani territory since July, compared with only three reported during all of 2007. Such strikes have killed more than 100 people, including numerous suspected foreign and indigenous fighters, but also women and children. The new Commander of the U.S. Central Command, Gen. David Petraeus, claims that such attacks in western Pakistan are ―extremely important‖ and have killed three top extremist leaders in that region.38 Officially, Pakistan‘s Foreign Ministry calls Predator attacks ―destabilizing‖ developments that are ―helping the terrorists.‖ Strident Pakistani government reaction has included summoning the U.S. Ambassador to lodge strong protest, and condemnation of missile attacks that Islamabad believes ―undermine public support for the government‘s counterterrorism efforts‖ and should be ―stopped immediately.‖ During his first visit to Pakistan as Centcom chief in early November, Gen. Petraeus reportedly was met with a single overriding message from Pakistani interlocutors: cross-border U.S. military strikes in the FATA are counterproductive. Pakistan‘s defense minister warned Gen. Petraeus that the strikes were creating ―bad blood‖ and contribute to anti-American outrage among ordinary Pakistanis. In November 2008, Pakistan‘s Army Chief, Gen. Ashfaq Pervez Kayani, called for a full halt to Predator strikes, and President Zardari has called on President-elect Obama to re-assess the Bush Administration policy of employing aerial attacks on Pakistani territory.39

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Military Capacity Building in Pakistan Some reports indicate that U.S. military assistance to Pakistan has failed to effectively bolster the paramilitary forces battling Islamist militants in western Pakistan. Such forces are said to be underfunded, poorly trained, and ―overwhelmingly outgunned.‖40 However, a July 2008 Pentagon-funded assessment found that Section 1206 ―Global Train and Equip‖ funding — which supplements security assistance programs overseen by the State Department — is important for providing urgently needed military assistance to Pakistan, and that the counterinsurgency capabilities of Pakistani special operations forces are measurably improved by the training and equipment that come through such funding.41

Security-Related Equipment Major government-to-government arms sales and grants to Pakistan since 2001 have included items useful for counterterrorism operations, along with a number of ―big ticket‖ platforms more suited to conventional warfare. The United States has provided Pakistan with nearly $1.6 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) since 2001, with a ―base program‖ of $300 million per year beginning in FY2005. These funds are used to purchase U.S. military equipment. Defense supplies to Pakistan relevant to counterinsurgency missions have included more than 5,600 military radio sets; six C-130E transport aircraft; 20 AH-1F Cobra attack helicopters; 26 Bell 412 transport helicopters; night-vision equipment; and protective

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vests. The Defense Department also has characterized transferred F-16 combat aircraft, P-3C maritime patrol aircraft, and TOW anti-armor missiles as having significant anti-terrorism applications. In fact, the State Department claims that, since 2005, FMF funds have been ―solely for counterterrorism efforts, broadly defined.‖42 Such claims elicit skepticism from some observers. Other security-related U.S. assistance programs for Pakistan are said to be aimed especially at bolstering Islamabad‘s police and border security efforts, and have included U.S.-funded road-building projects in the NWFP and FATA.

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Security-Related Training The Bush Administration has launched an initiative to strengthen the capacity of Pakistan‘s Frontier Corps (FC), an 80,000-man paramilitary force overseen by the Pakistani Interior Ministry. The FC has primary responsibility for border security in the NWFP and Baluchistan provinces. Some $400 million in U.S. aid is slated to go toward training and equipping FC troops by mid-2010, as well as to increase the involvement of the U.S. Special Operations Command in assisting with Pakistani counterterrorism efforts. Some two dozen U.S. trainers began work in October 2008. Fewer than 100 Americans reportedly have been engaged in training Pakistan‘s elite Special Service Group commandos with a goal of doubling that force‘s size to 5,000.43 The United States also has undertaken to train and equip new Pakistan Army Air Assault units that can move quickly to find and target terrorist elements. Some in Congress have expressed doubts about the loyalties of locally-recruited, Pashtun FC troops, some of whom may retain pro-Taliban sympathies.44 Coalition Support Funds Congress has appropriated billions of dollars to reimburse Pakistan and other nations for their operational and logistical support of U.S.-led counterterrorism operations. These ―coalition support funds‖ (CSF) account for the bulk of U.S. financial transfers to Pakistan since 2001. More than $9 billion has been appropriated or authorized for FY2002-FY2009 Pentagon spending for CSF for ―key cooperating nations.‖ Pentagon documents show that disbursements to Islamabad — at some $6.7 billion or an average of $79 million per month since 2001 — account for roughly 80% of these funds. The amount is equal to about onequarter of Pakistan‘s total military expenditures. According to Secretary of Defense Gates, CSF payments have been used to support scores of Pakistani army operations and help to keep some 100,000 Pakistani troops in the field in northwest Pakistan by paying for food, clothing, and housing. They also compensate Islamabad for ongoing coalition usage of Pakistani airfields and seaports.45 Concerns have grown in Congress and among independent analysts that standard accounting procedures were not employed in overseeing these large disbursements from the U.S. Treasury. The State Department claims that Pakistan‘s requests for CSF reimbursements are carefully vetted by several executive branch agencies, must be approved by the Secretary of Defense, and ultimately can be withheld through specific congressional action. However, a large proportion of CSF funds may have been lost to waste and mismanagement, given a dearth of adequate controls and oversight. Senior Pentagon officials reportedly have taken steps to overhaul the process through which reimbursements and other military aid is provided to Pakistan.46 The National Defense Authorization Act for FY2008 (P.L. 110-181)

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for the first time required the Secretary of Defense to submit to Congress itemized descriptions of coalition support reimbursements to Pakistan. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) was tasked to address oversight of coalition support funds that go to Pakistan. A report issued in June 2008 found that, until about one year before, only a small fraction of Pakistani requests were disallowed or deferred. In March 2007, the value of rejected requests spiked considerably, although it still represented one-quarter or less of the total. The apparent increased scrutiny corresponds with the arrival in Islamabad of a new U.S. Defense Representative, an army officer who reportedly has played a greater role in the oversight process. GAO concluded that increased oversight and accountability was needed over Pakistan‘s reimbursement claims for coalition support funds.47

U.S. Development Assistance for Western Pakistan

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Since the 2001 renewal of large overt U.S. assistance packages and reimbursements for militarized counterterrorism efforts, a total of about $12 billion in U.S. funds went to Pakistan from FY2002-FY2008. The majority of this was delivered in the form of coalition support reimbursements; another $3.1 billion was for economic purposes and nearly $2.2 billion for security-related programs. According to the State Department, U.S. assistance to Pakistan is meant primarily to maintain that country‘s ongoing support for U.S.-led counterterrorism efforts.

FATA Development Plan Pakistan‘s tribal areas are remote, isolated, poor, and very traditional in cultural practices. The social and economic privation of the inhabitants is seen to make the region a particularly attractive breeding ground for violent extremists. The U.S.-assisted development initiative for the FATA, launched in 2003, seeks to improve the quality of education, develop healthcare services, and increase opportunities for economic growth and micro-enterprise specifically in Pakistan‘s western tribal regions.48 A senior USAID official estimated that, for FY2001FY2007, about 6% of U.S. economic aid to Pakistan has been allocated for projects in the FATA.49 The Bush Administration urges Congress to continue funding a proposed five-year, $750 million aid plan for the FATA initiated in FY2007. The plan will support Islamabad‘s own ten-year, $2 billion Sustainable Development effort there. Skepticism has arisen about the potential for the new policy of significantly boosted funding to be effective. Corruption is endemic in the tribal region and security circumstances are so poor that Western nongovernmental contractors find it extremely difficult to operate there. Moreover, as much as half of the allocated funds likely will be devoted to administrative costs.50 Islamabad is insisting that implementation is carried out wholly by Pakistani civil and military authorities and that U.S. aid, while welcomed, must come with no strings attached.51 Reconstruction Opportunity Zones The related establishment of Reconstruction Opportunity Zones (ROZs) that could facilitate further development in the FATA (and neighboring Afghanistan), an initiative of President Bush during his March 2006 visit to Pakistan, ran into political obstacles in

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Congress and is yet to be finalized. The ROZ program would provide duty-free access into the U.S. market for certain goods produced in approved areas and potentially create significant employment opportunities. While observers are widely approving of the ROZ plan in principle, many question whether there currently are any products with meaningful export value produced in the FATA. One senior analyst suggests that the need for capital and infrastructure improvements outweighs the need for tariff reductions. A Pakistani commentator has argued that an extremely poor law and order situation in the region will preclude any meaningful investment or industrialization in the foreseeable future.52 In March 2008, more than two years after the initiative was announced, S. 2776, which would provide duty-free treatment for certain goods from designated ROZs in Afghanistan and Pakistan, was introduced in the Senate. A related bill, H.R. 6387, was referred to House subcommittee four months later. Neither bill has emerged from committee to date.

End Notes

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1

Negroponte statement at [http://www.state.gov/s/d/2008/111320.htm]; ―Like the Wild, Wild West, Plus Al Qaeda,‖ Washington Post, March 30, 2008; ―Analysts Fear Pakistan Could Fall to Extremists,‖ Los Angeles Times, September 23, 2008. 2 For broader discussion, see CRS Report RL33498, Pakistan-U.S. Relations. 3 See [http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2007/103709.htm]. 4 ―CIA: Pakistan Border‘s Clear and Present Danger,‘‖ Associated Press, March 30, 2008. 5 Gall, Carlotta and Ismail Khan. ―U.S. Drone Attack Missed Zawahiri by Hours.‖ New York Times, November 10, 2006. 6 Among those captured by Pakistan are top bin Laden aide Abu Zubaydah (captured April 2002); alleged September 11 plotter Ramzi bin Al Shibh (September 11, 2002); top Al Qaeda planner Khalid Shaikh Mohammed (March 2003); and a top planner, Abu Faraj al-Libbi (May 2005). 7 U.S. Department of Defense, ―Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan,‖ June 2008; NATO commander quoted in ―Ragtag Taliban Show Tenacity in Afghanistan,‖ New York Times, August 4, 2008; ―Gates is Pessimistic on Pakistani Support,‖ Washington Post, September 24, 2008. 8 ―Defense Chiefs Call for Wider War on Militants,‖ Los Angeles Times, September 11, 2008; Adm. Mullen‘s statement before the House Armed Services Committee, September 10, 2008; ―Obama to Explore New Approach in Afghanistan War,‖ Washington Post, November 11, 2008. A brief primer on the cross-border aspects of the insurgency is at [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7601748.stm]. 9 See, for example, ―As ISAF Command Changes, Time for a Reality Check on the Conflict in Afghanistan and Pakistan,‖ Defense & Foreign Affairs Special Analysis, June 4, 2008; ―American Failure in Afghanistan & Need for a New Social Contract in the FATA,‖ Center for Research and Security Studies, Islamabad, July 2008. 10 See [http://www.mofa.gov.pk/Press_Releases/2008/July/PR_208_08.htm]; ―Stopping Terrorists‖ (editorial), News (Karachi), June 10, 2008. 11 ―Taliban is Seizing, Destroying More NATO supplies,‖ Wall Street Journal, August 12, 2008; ―Taliban Ambushes Threaten NATO‘s Vital Logistics Route Into Afghanistan,‖ Sunday Telegraph (London), August 31, 2008. 12 ―Pentagon Seeks New Afghan Supply Routes,‖ Financial Times (London), September 23, 2008. 13 ―Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP),‖ Jane’s World Insurgency and Terrorism, October 28, 2008; Hassan Abbas, ―A Profile of the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan,‖ CTC Sentinel, January 2008; ―Pakistan Government Bans Taliban,‖ BBC News, August 25, 2008. 14 ―Mehsud Spending Up to 3bn on Militancy Annually: Ghani,‖ Daily Times (Lahore), May 30, 2008; ―Pakistan Marble Helps Taliban Stay in Business,‖ New York Times, July 14, 2008; ―Taliban Leader Flaunts Power Inside Pakistan,‖ New York Times, June 2, 2008. 15 ―Pakistan Lifts Veil on Not-So-Secret Waziristan War,‖ Reuters, May 20, 2008. 16 ―Battle of Bajaur: A Critical Test for Pakistan‘s Daunted Military,‖ New York Times, September 23, 2008; ―Pakistan‘s Fresh Resolve in Latest Battle Against Taliban,‖ Christian Science Monitor, October 6, 2008; ―Gates Lauds Pakistan Push in Tribal Areas,‖ Los Angeles Times, September 24, 2008. 17 ―‗Stability in Bajaur Within Two Months,‘‖ Daily Times (Lahore), September 27, 2008.

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18

―Pakistani Troops Destroy Taliban Stronghold,‖ Financial Times (London), September 30, 2008; ―8,000 Pakistani Soldiers Take on Al Qaeda in Volatile Tribal Region,‖ London Times, September 27, 2008. 19 ―Pakistanis Displaced by Fighting in ‗Dire Need,‘‖ Reuters, August 25, 2008; [http://islamabad.usembassy.gov/ pr-08082003.html]; ―Pakistanis Flee Into Afghanistan,‖ BBC News, September 29, 2008. 20 ―Right at the Edge,‖ New York Times, September 7, 2008; ―Pakistan‘s Dangerous Double Game,‖ Newsweek, September 15, 2008. 21 See, for example, ―U.S. Pays Pakistan to Fight Terror, But Patrols Ebb,‖ New York Times, May 20, 2007; ―Killing Ourselves in Afghanistan,‖ Salon.com, March 10, 2008. One U.S. military officer claimed that Pakistani military forces flew multiple helicopter missions to resupply Taliban fighters inside Afghanistan‘s Nangarhar province in 2007. The Islamabad government angrily denied the claims and a former top U.S. military commander in Afghanistan cast doubt on their veracity. In another example, an October 2008 press report claimed that British officials covered up evidence that a Taliban commander killed in Afghanistan in 2007 was in fact a Pakistani military officer (―Pakistani Forces Helped Taliban in 2007: U.S. Lt. Col.,‖ Defense News, September 22, 2008; ―Taliban Leader Killed by SAS Was Pakistan Officer,‖ London Sunday Times, October 12, 2008). 22 ―Border Complicates War in Afghanistan,‖ Washington Post, April 4, 2008; ―Democrat Questions US Aid to Pakistan,‖ Associated Press, May 27, 2008. 23 ―Pakistan Will Give Arms to Tribal Militias,‖ Washington Post, October 23, 2008. 24 ―Pakistan Uses Tribal Militias in Taliban War,‖ New York Times, October 24, 2008; ―Pakistan‘s Risky Military Strategy,‖ BBC News, October 15, 2008. See also ―As Taliban Overwhelm Police, Pakistanis Hit Back With Posses,‖ New York Times, November 2, 2008; ―Pakistan‘s Support of Militias Against Taliban Could Backfire,‖ Washington Times, November 10, 2008. 25 Documentary evidence indicates that Islamabad provided military and economic support, perhaps including combat troops, to the Afghan Taliban during the latter half of the 1990s (see ―Pakistan: ‗The Taliban‘s Godfather‘?,‖ National Security Archive Briefing Book 227, August 14, 2007). 26 Pakistan is home to some 28 million Pashto-speaking people, most of them living near the border with Afghanistan, which is home to another 13.5 million ethnic Pashtuns (also known as Pakhtuns or Pathans). A hardy people with a proud martial history — they are disproportionately represented in the Pakistani military— Pashtuns played an important role in the anti-Soviet resistance of the 1980s. 27 Polly Nayak, ―The Impact of Pakistan‘s and Bangladesh‘s National Strategies on U.S. Interests,‖ Strategic Asia 2008-2009, National Bureau of Asian Research, September 2008. 28 When asked about anti-American sentiment in Pakistan during his maiden July 2008 visit to the United States as head of government, the Pakistani Prime Minister offered that the impression in Pakistan is that ―America wants war‖ (―A Conversation With Yousaf Raza Gillani,‖ Council on Foreign Relations transcript, July 29, 2008). 29 See [http://www.terrorfreetomorrow.org/upimagestft/PakistanPollReportJune08.pdf] and [http://www.iri.org/ mena/pakistan/2008-07-16-Pakistan.asp]. 30 One often-cited incident involved the total defeat of a British-led force of 12,000 soldiers in 1842 when they tried to return to British India from Kabul by passing through the region and all but one were slaughtered by Pashtun tribesmen. 31 See [http://www.fata.gov.pk/subpages/admnsystem.php]. 32 See [http://www.state.gov/s/d/2008/105041.htm]. 33 See [http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08622.pdf]; [http://internationalrelations.house.gov/press_print.asp?id= 504]. 34 ―Musharraf Pulls Out of Peace Council,‖ Associated Press, August 8, 2007. 35 ―U.S., Pakistan, In Secret, Discuss Rise in Violence,‖ Philadelphia Inquirer, August 29, 2008. 36 ―US Launches Waziristan UAV Strike With Tacit Pakistani Approval,‖ Jane’s Defense Weekly, March 19, 2008; ―U.S., Pakistan Have Tacit Deal on Airstrikes,‖ Washington Post, November 16, 2008. In October 2008, Pakistan‘s Ambassador to the United States acknowledged that there is ―definitely‖ bilateral cooperation ―in using strategic equipment that is used against specific targets,‖ but that U.S. military aircraft do not overfly or launch strikes on Pakistani territory (see [http://www.cfr.org/publication/17567]. 37 ―Unilateral Strike Called a Model for U.S. Operations in Pakistan,‖ Washington Post, February 19, 2008. In mid2008, the Predator drones operating in the Pakistan-Afghanistan border region reportedly were fitted with sophisticated new surveillance systems that were employed successfully in Iraq. These systems allow for much better tracking of human targets, even those inside buildings (―Higher-Tech Predators Targeting Pakistan,‖ Los Angeles Times, September 12, 2008). 38 ―In Hunt For Bin Laden, A New Approach,‖ Washington Post, September 10, 2008; ―U.S. Airstrike Killed Key Al Qaeda Figure in Pakistan, Officials Say,‖ Los Angeles Times, October 31, 2008; ―Petraeus: Afghan Tribes Needed to Fight Militants,‖ Associated Press, November 6, 2008. 39 ―Pakistan Condemns US Strikes in Border Regions,‖ Associated Press, October 10, 2008; [http://www.mofa. gov.pk/Press_Releases/2008/Oct/PR_331_08.htm]; ―U.S. Airstrikes Creating Tension, Pakistan Warns,‖

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Washington Post, November 3, 2008; ―Pakistani Leader Seeks New US Policy,‖ Associated Press, November 10, 2008. 40 ―U.S. Aid to Pakistan Misses Al Qaeda Target,‖ Los Angeles Times, November 5, 2007. 41 ―Assessments of the Impact of 1206-Funded Projects in Selected Countries,‖ CNA Corporation, July 2008. 42 See [http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rm/2007/97946.htm]. 43 ―Pentagon Draws Up Plans to Train, Expand Pakistani Frontier Corps,‖ Agence France -Presse, November 19, 2007; ―U.S. to Step Up Training of Pakistanis,‖ Washington Post, January 24, 2008. One former Pakistani police official, presently a Harvard University-based analyst, opines that, without fundamental structural reforms, the prospects for meaningfully improving FC capabilities are dim. Among his recommended changes are the appointment of more local tribesmen into command positions and a restoration of the authority of local political agents (Hassan Abbas, ―Transforming Pakistan‘s Frontier Corps,‖ Terrorism Monitor, March 29, 2007). 44 See, for example, ―Sen. Carl Levin and Sen. Bob Casey Hold a News Conference on Their Trip to Pakistan and Afghanistan,‖ CQ Transcriptions, June 3, 2008. 45 Statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee, February 6, 2008. 46 See [http://www.state.gov/p/sca/rls/rm/2007/96566.htm]; ―U.S. Payments to Pakistan Face New Scrutiny,‖ Washington Post, February 21, 2008; ―Pakistani Military ‗Misspent Up to 70% of American Aid,‘‖ Guardian (London), February 28, 2008; ―Democrats Question $6 Billion in Pakistan Aid,‖ Associated Press, May 6, 2008. 47 See [http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08806.pdf]. See also ―Pentagon Puts Brakes on Funds to Pakistan,‖ Los Angeles Times, May 7, 2008. 48 See [http://www.usaid.gov/pk/mission/news/fata.htm]. 49 Statement of Acting Deputy USAID Administrator James Kunder before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, December 6, 2007. 50 ―Doubts Engulf an American Aid Plan for Pakistan,‖ New York Times, December 25, 2007; ―US Aid ‗Failing to Reach Target,‘‖ BBC News, May 16, 2008. 51 ―U.S. Aims to Turn Hostile Pakistani Tribes Friendly,‖ Reuters, January 30, 2008. 52 Statement of Amb. Teresita Schaffer before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, December 6, 2007; Hamid Waleed, ―Establishment of Reconstruction Opportunity Zones Almost Impossible‖ (op-ed), Daily Times (Lahore), January 13, 2007.

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Chapter 2

BOBBY WILKES, TESTIMONY TO THE HOUSE OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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Bobby Wilkes Chairman Tierney, Congressman Shays, Members of the Committee: Thank you for the opportunity to discuss Pakistan and Coalition Support Funds (CSF). I would like to discuss the evolution of the CSF program, the process for evaluating CSF claims, and why CSF is an important tool in the War on Terror (WOT). Before doing so, however, it is important to understand Pakistan‘s place in the region and the world. Pakistan, the second most populous Muslim state and sixth most populous country in the world, is located at the geopolitical crossroads of Central Asia. With nuclear armed neighbors and with a nuclear capability itself, Pakistan lives in a very tough neighborhood. And with Afghanistan and Iran next door, it finds itself in the front lines in the battle against global terrorism. More than ever, our national security is linked to the success, security, and stability of a democratic Pakistan. We acknowledge that Pakistan has made important strides towards democracy in the past several months, but much remains to be done. The elections in February were an important step for Pakistan; we applaud the return of civilian leadership and we remain committed to helping the people of Pakistan achieve stability. Pakistan, however, is facing severe budgetary, energy, and economic crises and must act decisively to eliminate the Al Qaeda and Taliban safe havens in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and North West Frontier Province (NWFP). The new coalition government has a difficult road to navigate, and requires steadfast support.

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EVOLUTION OF COALITION SUPPORT FUNDS Following the tragic events of September 11, 2001, Pakistan became a member of the coalition formed to eliminate Al Qaeda and the Taliban Government of Afghanistan. At the request of the U.S. during the early phases of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), Pakistan offered the use of its airspace, four airfields and a seaport, fuel, water, and other utilities at those locations, deployed large numbers of its armed forces to protect deployed U.S. personnel, and later permitted the establishment of air and ground lines of communication through Pakistan into Afghanistan. Today, much of the fuel and dry cargo required to support U.S. and NATO military operations in Afghanistan transit Pakistan, and because of our cooperative relationship with the Pakistani armed forces, we lose very little of the supplies to insurgent activity despite the close proximity of these lines of communication to Al Qaeda and Taliban safe havens. At the request of the U.S. in 2001, Pakistan deployed its Army for the first time in history into the tribal agencies of the FATA along the border with Afghanistan to assist U.S. operations in Afghanistan by capturing Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters fleeing Tora Bora. Several hundred of these fighters were eventually captured and turned over to U.S. custody. For example, Pakistani forces captured Abu Zubayadah, a senior Al-Qaeda operative and Osama Bin Laden confidant. During a raid on a residence in Rawalpindi, Pakistani forces arrested Al-Qaeda senior leader Khalid Sheikh Mohammad, the alleged mastermind behind the September 11th attacks and wanted by the U.S. for his involvement in the 2002 murder of U.S. journalist Daniel Pearl. Because Pakistan had only a limited capability to sustain such a high level of military activity in support of OEF, the United States decided it needed a mechanism to reimburse Pakistan and other cooperating nations for the support they were providing in the WOT. This program became known as Coalition Support Funds. It is important not to confuse CSF with military assistance or development programs to Pakistan. CSF is not bilateral assistance and it is not intended as a mechanism to build capability or capacity in other nation‘s defense forces. It is an authority Congress granted to the Department of Defense (DoD) to reimburse Pakistan and other key cooperating nations for logistical, military, and other support they provide to the United States in support of the WOT. To date, the authority has been used to reimburse Pakistan and 26 other nations for contributions to U.S. military operations. In 2002, Congress authorized and appropriated $390M in the FY2002 Emergency Supplemental ―for payments to reimburse Pakistan, Jordan, and other key cooperating nations for logistical and military support provided to United States military operations in connection with the Global War on Terrorism.‖ This program has been reauthorized and funds appropriated every year since FY2002. These payments are made only when the Secretary of Defense determines that documents provided to justify reimbursement requests ―...adequately account for the support provided...‖ and upon concurrence of the Secretary of State and in consultation with the Office of Management and Budget. The DoD is required to report CSF reimbursements quarterly to the four Defense oversight committees and has regularly briefed these Committees, and to the House Oversight and Government Reform Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs, to answer questions and provide details related to the CSF program.

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CSF payments are reimbursements for actual expenses incurred in support of the WOT operations. It is a means to reimburse countries that have incurred incremental costs to provide logistical, military, and other support to U.S. military operations. If the country would have incurred certain costs in the normal course of its activities, those costs will not be reimbursed. Moreover, the cost of reimbursing nations for these costs is far less expensive than if we had carried out these operations ourselves.

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REIMBURSABLE COSTS DoD reimburses costs associated with the movement and sustainment of forces engaged in providing support to the WOT. Typical categories of reimbursable support include strategic air and sea lift for deployment, troop rotation (for long-term commitments), and redeployment. Resupply flights may be approved for reimbursement on a case-by-case basis, though prior coordination with Combatant Commanders and the Office of the Secretary of Defense is strongly recommended. Reimbursable sustainment costs include expenditures for food; bulk and personal water; appropriate lodging; laundry; waste removal; base operations support; petroleum, oil, and lubricants (POL) for support of both vehicles and personnel (for heaters, air conditioners, and generators); medical consumables; selected inoculations; and planning conferences to facilitate support to operations. Countries may also incur reimbursable costs when providing services such as security for transiting or deployed forces. Additional costs that may be reimbursed include those for increased use of equipment or aircraft, additional employment of personnel, operation of a field hospital, incremental activities to manage flight operations, costs incurred to coordinate operations in support of U.S. operations, or incremental costs associated with actual provision of a specific unit. Reimbursement will not be approved for costs associated with salaries for troops, hazardous or overseas duty pay, insurance for equipment or personnel, depreciation of equipment used in operations, spare parts beyond those needed for the mission, or stipends for troops, such as those normally associated with missions undertaken on behalf of the United Nations.

EVALUATION AND PROCESSING OF CSF CLAIMS The Department of Defense has a multi-step approval process before releasing reimbursements to a coalition country. The guidelines DoD uses to review each claim were established in 2003 in concert with the Office of the DoD Inspector General (OIG). The current DoD process for reviewing CSF claims is as follows: 



A country incurs logistical, military, and other expenses in support of the WOT and submits a claim for reimbursement of those expenses to the U.S. Embassy in that country. (Typically, the Defense Attaché or other defense representative in the Embassy receives the claim for reimbursement.) The Office of the Defense Representative- Pakistan (ODRP),in the U.S. Embassy endorses that the country incurred the expenses in support of U.S. military operations in the WOT and submits the request for reimbursement to the Combatant Command.

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The Combatant Command evaluates the claim and recommends reimbursement of those items it deems reasonable and supportable and validates that the support was provided in connection with U.S. WOT operations. The Under Secretary of Defense for Comptroller evaluates the claim to ensure the reimbursement is based on adequate documentation and that expenses incurred are reasonable and credible. DoD obtains the concurrence of the Department of State and OMB for the proposed reimbursement. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Department of State confirms that reimbursements are consistent with USG national security strategy and do not unfavorably affect the balance of power in the region. The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Under Secretary of Defense for Comptroller recommend to the Deputy Secretary of Defense that payment to the country is reimbursement for support to the WOT and that the payment is based on adequate documentation or a comparison with potential U.S. costs for execution of a similar mission or activity. The Deputy Secretary of Defense notifies Congress of the intent to reimburse the country with CSF. DoD reimburses the country 15 days after the congressional defense committees are notified.

The Department seeks to improve its CSF reimbursement process, reviews it regularly, and has issued revised guidelines that implements recommendations from the GAO and DoD OIG. Consequently, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Comptroller, CENTCOM, and the Office of the Defense Representative, Pakistan (ODRP) agreed last year to request greater documentation from Pakistan. As a result, ODRP increased its oversight of the claims and recommended that a significant number of Pakistani requests for reimbursement be deferred pending receipt of additional documentation, or denied altogether. To ensure a completely impartial and thorough assessment of these changes, the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy – with the strong concurrence of the U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan – asked the DoD IG to conduct a management review of the CSF program in April. We will continue to work closely with the DoD OIG and others to address their recommendations and suggestions on how to improve this important program.

IMPORTANCE OF PAKISTAN TO U.S. NATIONAL SECURITY INTERESTS Since 2002 Congress has appropriated $7.3B for the entire CSF program and Pakistan has been the largest single recipient, receiving approximately $6B in reimbursements following a $373M reimbursement this week. CSF reimbursements to Pakistan have been a significant factor in Pakistan‘s ability to assist U.S. operations in the WOT. The key question that Congress has raised over the last several months is, ―What are the U.S. taxpayers getting from Pakistan for this $6B?‖

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Pakistan is a key partner in the WOT and plays a major role in our long-term efforts to build a stable Afghanistan. Without CSF reimbursements Pakistan could not afford to deploy and maintain 100,000 military and paramilitary forces in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). Since 2001, the Pakistan Army has conducted 91 major and countless small operations in support of the WOT, and it has captured or killed more Al Qaeda and Taliban than any other coalition partner. Following Pakistan‘s decision in July 2007 to remove by force a group of religious extremists that had taken over the Red Mosque in Islamabad, the number of retaliatory suicide bombings and ambushes of Pakistani military and police personnel increased dramatically. Since September 11, 2001, has taken efforts to combat extremists in the FATA, resulting in the death or capture of a number of Taliban leaders in the past year. In the past five years, Pakistani soldiers have sustained more than 1,400 combat deaths—700 just since July 2007—and more than 2,400 wounded in action.

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THE FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED TRIBAL AREAS (FA TA) On a final note, the security of the border between Afghanistan and Pakistan has been the subject of increasing interest and concern to the Administration, Congress, and the International Community, including the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The FATA border region with Afghanistan is now and has historically been a largely ungoverned space. This area—approximately the size of Maryland—was identified in the July 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on the Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland and the Country Reports on Terrorism 2007 as a safe haven where Taliban and Al Qaeda forces recruit, train and equip fighters and infiltrate them into Afghanistan. The FATA has always had a special constitutional status in Pakistan. Normal federal or provincial laws do not apply, and the area is only loosely governed under the provisions of the century-old Frontier Crimes Regulations. Operating there is challenging even for the non-Pashtun Pakistanis who are generally considered to be outsiders and interlopers by the fiercely independent Pashtun tribesman. The tribes of the FATA have a long history of military resistance and success in preventing foreign armies from entering and conquering their tribal areas. It is only by working with Pakistani military and security elements, such as the Frontier Corps and the Special Services Group (SSG), that security is possible in the FATA and NWFP. Neither the Government of Pakistan (GoP) nor a large majority of Pakistan‘s population support a U.S. troop presence in the country. The U.S. cannot afford to lose the hearts and minds of the Pakistani people. The United States is committed to stopping Al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other terrorist groups that threaten the stability and development of the FATA and the NWFP as well as Pakistanis‘ freedom and the open, democratic, and economically prosperous society that Pakistan is working to achieve. Consequently, the U.S. is assisting Pakistan with equipping and training of the Frontier Corps and supporting the government‘s frontier development strategy. The U.S. is deeply concerned about reports of ceasefire negotiations and other agreements in South Waziristan and other locations in the FATA and North West Frontier Province (NWFP). Previous attempts by the GoP to negotiate ceasefires and other agreements with the tribes in the FATA and NWFP were deeply flawed. After similar agreements were signed in 2005 and 2006, cross-border operations by extremist groups against U.S. and

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NATO forces increased substantially, due in part, we believe, to the provisions of the agreements. The United States recognizes that there is no purely military solution to insurgency, but we have made it clear to the GoP that any agreement should be enforceable and backed up by the credible threat of force. Also, any agreement should include a commitment to deny a safe haven to foreign terrorists and prevent attacks against U.S., Coalition, Afghan, or Pakistani forces in either Afghanistan or Pakistan. Finally, it is equally important that Pakistani military forces remain in the FATA and NWFP in order to enforce agreements. This message has been delivered to all levels of Pakistan‘s government over the past two months and the Government of Pakistan has told us it will not approve any agreement that does not contain all of these conditions. In conclusion, there are no easy answers or easy solutions in the FATA and the NWFP. We will need all the tools available to us to be successful. CSF is one of the most useful tools we have in this effort. It enables the United States to reimburse the logistic costs of Pakistan‘s enormous military deployment and operations in this key region. The new civilian government in Islamabad is currently struggling to balance the requirement to alleviate poverty and illiteracy; deal with nationwide shortages of food, fuel, and energy; contain the spread of religious extremism, and maintain large military forces along the PakistanAfghanistan border. CSF, therefore, is critical to our eventual success in Afghanistan and the WOT. Thank you. I look forward to your comments.

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Chapter 3

ACTING ASSISTANT SECRETARY MULL'S WRITTEN TESTIMONY FOR THE HOUSE OVERSIGHT AND GOVERNMENT REFORM SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

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Nikolas J. Koppel Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Subcommittee, thank you for asking me to testify today on the role the State Department plays in the "Oversight of Coalition Support Funds to Pakistan." I will focus my remarks on the procedures and standards that guide the Department in providing the Secretary of State's concurrence to the Department of Defense so that key cooperating nations in the War on Terror can be reimbursed through the Coalition Support Funds (CSF) program. In addition to providing support to 26 other nations, this program is an essential tool in enabling Pakistan to support War on Terror objectives and U.S. military operations. The Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM), which I lead, serves as the principal liaison with the Department of Defense on policy issues, including security assistance, and on coordination of U.S. military-related activities with U.S. foreign policy implications. As such, the PM Bureau coordinates State Department positions and clearances for numerous Department of Defense programs that require the concurrence of the Secretary of State. Along with CSF, these programs include, but are not limited to, the Iraqi Security Forces Funds, the Afghan Security Forces Fund, and section 1206 train and equip programs. The Department of State recognizes that CSF is not a foreign assistance program; rather, serves to reimburse cooperating countries for the support they provide to U.S. military operations. The legislation governing the use of CSF requires that the Department of Defense obtain the Secretary of State's concurrence prior to providing reimbursement. We understand the fundamental purpose of this concurrence is to ensure that payments made under this program are supportive of, and consistent with, U.S. foreign policy objectives for the recipient country, and that they will not adversely affect the balance of power in the region. There are three initial steps in the clearance process:

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1) The Government of Pakistan submits requests for reimbursement for costs incurred in the Global War on Terror to the Office of the Defense Representative at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, which is responsible for verifying that the claim is based on quantifiable information provided by the Government of Pakistan; 2) CENTCOM is responsible for verifying that Pakistan's claims support the objectives of the Global War on Terror and U.S. military operations, and that costs would not have otherwise been incurred by Pakistan; 3) Following CENTCOM's verification, the Department of Defense Comptroller evaluates CSF claims for credibility and reasonableness. Once these actions have been completed, the Department of Defense sends the CSF reimbursement request to the Department of State for the Secretary of State concurrence. Acting on the Secretary's behalf, the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs coordinates with the Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs (SCA) and the Office of the Director of U.S. Foreign Assistance (F) to ensure that CSF payments are consistent with foreign policy objectives for Pakistan and the region. For Pakistan, these objectives include establishing stability throughout the country, particularly on the border with Afghanistan, and improving Pakistan's capability to provide border security and conduct counterinsurgency and counterterrorism operations. Regional objectives include bolstering institutions that provide security; countering extremism; combating the drug trade; and improving peace and stability by building the political and popular will against terrorism. After SCA and F Bureaus provide clearance, PM Bureau transmits Department of State concurrence on the CSF reimbursements to the Department of Defense. The Department of State maintains a close relationship with the Department of Defense, and we ensure that any concerns identified during our review process are dealt with effectively through the interagency coordination process. Pakistan is on the front lines in the Global War on Terror. More than ever, our national security is linked to the success, security, and stability of a democratic Pakistan. The CSF program is a key tool for enabling the Government of Pakistan's contribution to our common struggle against violent extremists, particularly in Pakistan's frontier areas. The Department is supportive of the CSF program, which helps to ensure that Pakistan and other nations have the capacity to conduct the sort of long-term, aggressive, and comprehensive campaigns required to guarantee the safety of American lives. This concludes my formal remarks. Thank you for your time and attention. I would be happy to take any questions you might have.

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Chapter 4

COMBATING TERRORISM: INCREASED OVERSIGHT AND ACCOUNTABILITY NEEDED OVER PAKISTAN REIMBURSEMENT CLAIMS FOR COALITION SUPPORT FUNDS 

United States Government Accountability Office

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WHY GAO DID THIS STUDY The United States has reimbursed Pakistan, a key ally in the global war on terror, about $5.56 billion in Coalition Support Funds (CSF) for its efforts to combat terrorism along its border with Afghanistan. The Department of Defense (Defense) provides CSF to 27 coalition partners for costs incurred in direct support of U.S. military operations. Pakistan is the largest recipient of CSF, receiving 81 percent of CSF reimbursements as of May 2008. This report focuses on (1) the extent to which Defense has consistently applied its guidance to validate the reimbursements claimed by Pakistan and (2) how the Office of the Defense Representative to Pakistan‘s (ODRP) role has changed over time. To address these objectives, GAO reviewed CSF oversight procedures, examined CSF documents, and interviewed Defense officials in Washington, D.C., U.S. Central Command in Florida, and Pakistan.

WHAT GAO RECOMMENDS GAO recommends that Defense consistently implement existing oversight criteria, formalize ODRP‘s oversight responsibilities, and implement additional controls. Defense generally concurred with the recommendations but stated that the report lacked sufficient 

This is an edited, reformatted and augmented version of a U. S. Government Accountability Office publication dated June 2008.

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context, such as Pakistan‘s military contributions enabled by CSF and Defense‘s broad legal authority to dispense funds. This report does recognize Pakistan‘s contributions and Defense‘s legal authority.

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WHAT GAO FOUND Defense Comptroller issued new guidance in 2003 to enhance CSF oversight. The guidance calls for, among other things, CSF reimbursement claims to contain quantifiable information that indicates the incremental nature of support (i.e., above and beyond normal operations), validation that the support or service was provided, and copies of invoices or documentation supporting how the costs were calculated. While Defense generally conducted macro-level analytical reviews called for in its guidance, such as determining whether the cost is less than that which would be incurred by the United States for the same service, for a large number of reimbursement claims Defense did not obtain detailed documentation to verify that claimed costs were valid, actually incurred, or correctly calculated. GAO found that Defense did not consistently apply its existing CSF oversight guidance. For example, as of May 2008, Defense paid over $2 billion in Pakistani reimbursement claims for military activities covering January 2004 through June 2007 without obtaining sufficient information that would enable a third party to recalculate these costs. Furthermore, Defense may have reimbursed costs that (1) were not incremental, (2) were not based on actual activity, or (3) were potentially duplicative. GAO also found that additional oversight controls were needed. For example, there is no guidance for Defense to verify currency conversion rates used by Pakistan, which if performed would enhance Defense‘s ability to monitor for potential overbillings. Defense‘s guidance does not specifically task ODRP with attempting to verify Pakistani military support and expenses, despite recognition by Defense officials that such verification is best performed by U.S. officials in Pakistan, who have access to Pakistani officials and information. As such, ODRP did not try to verify Pakistan CSF claims from January 2004 through August 2006. Beginning in September 2006, without any formal guidance or directive to do so from U.S. Central Command or the Defense Comptroller, ODRP began an effort to validate Pakistani military support and expenses. This increased verification effort on the part of ODRP contributed to an increase in the amount of Pakistani government CSF claims disallowed and deferred. Prior to ODRP‘s increased verification efforts, the average percentage of Pakistani claims disallowed or deferred for January 2004 through August 2006 was a little over 2 percent. In comparison, the average percentage of Pakistani claims disallowed or deferred for September 2006 through February 2007 was 6 percent and for the most recent claims (March 2007 through June 2007) processed in February 2008, was approximately 22 percent. However, ODRP‘s continued oversight activity is not assured, as Defense had not developed formal guidance delineating how and to what degree ODRP should attempt to verify Pakistani claims for reimbursement. GAO recognizes that Defense may not be able to fully verify every Pakistani claim without the ability to access Pakistani records or do onsite monitoring. However, such ability would enhance CSF oversight.

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ABBREVIATIONS CENTCOM Comptroller CSF Defense FATA IMF ODRP

U.S. Central Command Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Comptroller Coalition Support Funds Department of Defense Federally Administered Tribal Areas International Monetary Fund Office of the Defense Representative to Pakistan

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Congressional Requesters Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States began reimbursing coalition partners for their logistical and combat support of U.S. military operations in the global war on terror. These reimbursements, known as Coalition Support Funds (C SF), have reimbursed 27 coalition allies for incremental costs (i.e., costs above and beyond the partner country‘s normal operating costs) incurred in direct support of U.S. military operations. Pakistan is the largest recipient of CSF payments, receiving $5.56 billion of $6.88 billion (81 percent) of all CSF reimbursements as of May 2008. CSF is structured as a reimbursement mechanism whereby the U.S. Department of Defense (Defense) policy is to validate that support was provided, costs were incurred, and that these costs were incremental to a country‘s normal military operations.1 In Pakistan, most of the reimbursements through CSF are intended to enable the government of Pakistan to attack terrorist networks in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and stabilize the border areas.2 Congress granted the Secretary of Defense the authority to make CSF payments ―in such amounts as the Secretary may determine in [his] discretion, based on documentation determined by the Secretary of Defense to adequately account for the support provided.‖3 Any such determination by the Secretary shall be final and conclusive. Despite this broad authority, concerns have been raised, given the large amounts of CSF reimbursement payments to Pakistan, about the level of accountability and oversight over these funds. This report focuses on (1) the extent to which Defense has consistently applied its guidance to validate the reimbursements claimed by Pakistan and (2) how the Office of Defense Representative to Pakistan‘s (ODRP) role has changed over time. To address our objectives, we obtained information on CSF procedures from relevant officials at the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Comptroller (Comptroller), the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), ODRP, and the State Department‘s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. We also examined all CSF oversight documentation provided to us, including Pakistani government reimbursement claims, ODRP memos, CENTCOM validation memos, Comptroller evaluations, and other CSF documentation from February 2002 through February 2008 (February 2008 was when the latest claim, for March through June 2007, was reimbursed). To assess the application of current CSF guidance, we examined the CSF oversight documentation noted above from January 2004 through February 2008. We chose this time frame because a previous Defense Inspector General report had already examined the pre-January 2004 CSF oversight controls and made recommendations to improve oversight.4 We evaluated these controls against all

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available Comptroller criteria and guidance, as well as internal control standards and general cost accounting criteria for adequacy, eligibility, and reasonableness. As part of our data reliability process, we confirmed that the data provided by the Comptroller were accurately recorded in the software we used to analyze the data. To assess the oversight role played by ODRP, we met with the relevant ODRP, CENTCOM, and Comptroller officials, as well as with other officials from the U.S. Embassy and Pakistan‘s Ministries of Defense and Interior. We visited Peshawar, near the FATA, to discuss operations being reimbursed with CSF funds with the U.S. consulate and Pakistan‘s 11th Army Corps and Frontier Corps. This is the fourth in a series of products we plan to release assessing various aspects of the U.S. engagement with Pakistan to combat terrorism.5 We plan to issue a fifth product that assesses the U.S. security, political, and development assistance activities used to meet U.S. strategic goals in Pakistan, as well as the progress of these efforts. We conducted this performance audit from September 2007 through June 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. (See app. I for details on our scope and methodology.)

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RESULTS IN BRIEF We found that Defense did not consistently apply its existing CSF oversight guidance and that certain deficiencies existed in Defense‘s oversight procedures. Defense‘s 2003 guidance calls for, among other things, CSF reimbursement claims to contain quantifiable information that indicates the incremental nature of support (i.e., above and beyond normal operations), validation that the support or service was provided, and copies of invoices or documentation supporting how the costs were calculated. While Defense generally conducted the macrolevel analytical reviews called for in its guidance, such as determining whether the cost is less than that which would be incurred by the United States for the same services, for a large number of claims Defense did not obtain sufficient documentation from Pakistan to verify that claimed costs were incremental,6 actually incurred, or correctly calculated as called for by the Comptroller‘s CSF guidance. For example, as of May 2008, Defense paid over $2 billion in Pakistani reimbursement claims for military activities covering January 2004 through June 2007 without obtaining detailed information that would enable a third party to recalculate these costs.7 In addition, Defense often did not adequately document the basis for their decisions to allow or disallow claims, and we found inconsistencies in Defense payments that were not explained. As a result, Defense may have reimbursed costs that (1) were not incremental—i.e., above and beyond normal operations; (2) were not based on actual activity; or (3) were potentially duplicative. For example, Defense paid  

more than $200 million for Pakistan‘s air defense radar before ODRP questioned whether this was an incremental cost, as stipulated in CSF guidance;8 approximately $30 million for army road construction and $15 million for bunker construction without evidence that the roads and bunkers had been built; and

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an average of more than $19,000 per vehicle per month for Pakistani navy reimbursement claims that appeared to contain duplicative charges for a fleet of fewer than 20 passenger vehicles.

We also found that additional oversight controls were needed. Comptroller guidance calls for a historical comparison of claimed costs; however, the Comptroller‘s instructions do not indicate how this comparison should be performed. In addition, we found that there is no guidance for Defense to verify currency conversion rates used by Pakistan, which if performed would enhance Defense‘s ability to monitor for potential overbillings. Defense‘s 2003 guidance does not specifically task ODRP with attempting to verify Pakistani military support and expenses, despite recognition by Defense officials in Washington and CENTCOM that such verification is best performed by U.S. officials in Pakistan, who have access to Pakistani officials and information. As such, ODRP did not try to verify Pakistan CSF claims from January 2004 through August 2006. Beginning in September 2006, without any formal guidance or directive to do so from CENTCOM or the Comptroller, ODRP began an effort to validate Pakistani military support and expenses. This increased verification effort on the part of ODRP contributed to an increase in the amount of Pakistani government CSF claims disallowed and deferred. Prior to ODRP‘s increased verification efforts, the average percentage of Pakistani claims disallowed or deferred for January 2004 through August 2006 was almost 3 percent. In comparison, the average percentage of Pakistani claims disallowed or deferred for September 2006 through February 2007 was 6 percent, and for the most recent claims (March 2007 through June 2007), processed in February 2008, was approximately 22 percent. For example, ODRP observed poor readiness rates of Pakistani helicopters and recommended deferring payment for helicopter maintenance that had been routinely reimbursed. However, ODRP‘s continued oversight activity is not assured. As of May 2008, Defense had not developed formal guidance delineating how and to what degree ODRP should attempt to verify Pakistani military support and expenses. To improve CSF oversight, we are recommending that Defense consistently implement existing oversight criteria, formalize the roles and responsibilities of ODRP, work with the government of Pakistan to gain greater access, clarify guidance for cost fluctuation analysis, and develop criteria to evaluate the effect of currency exchange rates on reimbursement claims. Defense generally concurred with our recommendations, and indicated they had updated their CSF guidance to incorporate our recommendations. We plan to review this guidance when it is made available to us. Defense provided written comments on the report, which are reproduced in appendix II. We also met with cognizant officials from Defense to discuss their comments and observations. Defense provided technical comments and updates which we incorporated throughout the report, as appropriate. Defense‘s comments noted that our report did not give sufficient weight to (1) Pakistan‘s military contributions enabled by CSF; (2) the Department‘s adherence to the law; and (3) Pakistan‘s accounting standards. Our report does reflect Pakistan‘s contributions and the role of CSF, and states that Congress gave Defense broad authority to make CSF payments. Regarding Pakistan‘s accountability standards, we acknowledge that there are limitations in any arrangement with another sovereign nation, but note that Pakistan provided more detailed documentation to support their claims after a request from the Comptroller in 2006.

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BACKGROUND In late 2001, as the United States focused on toppling the Taliban regime and fighting al Qaeda in Afghanistan, Pakistan‘s importance as an ally in the global war on terror increased. According to Defense, Pakistan‘s military operations and other contributions to Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan quickly threatened to become unsustainable on its $2.5 billion defense budget. As a result, Defense requested supplemental funding from Congress to provide payments to Pakistan for logistical and military support in connection with Operation Enduring Freedom. In response, Congress passed the Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2002, stipulating that the ―Defense Emergency Response Fund‖ could be used by the Secretary of Defense to reimburse coalition partners for logistical and military support to U.S. military operations.9 This funding became known as Coalition Support Funds. To provide Defense with maximum flexibility, Congress passed the Defense Appropriations Act for Fiscal Year 2002, which granted the Secretary of Defense the authority to make CSF payments notwithstanding any other provision of law in such amounts as the Secretary may determine in his discretion, based on documentation determined by the Secretary to adequately account for the logistical and military support provided by partner nations.10 Any such determination by the Secretary shall be final and conclusive. The act did, however, require Defense to provide a 15-day notification of upcoming CSF reimbursements. Congress continued to provide funding for Pakistan through Defense without requiring specific accountability controls until 2008.11 Subsequent legislation required Defense to provide quarterly reports to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations and the House and Senate Armed Services Committees on the use of funds made available for payments to Pakistan and other CSF recipients. Despite these revisions to the reporting requirements, Congress has consistently left decision-making on the suitability of documentation to the discretion of the Secretary of Defense. Defense, on its own, has instituted guidance that goes beyond what is mandated in law. According to Defense, CSF is critical to ensure Pakistan‘s continued support of U.S. efforts to combat terrorism. Defense officials stated that without CSF or a similar mechanism to reimburse Pakistan for support in Operation Enduring Freedom, Pakistan could not afford to deploy military forces along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border to support U.S. military operations in Afghanistan. Defense also indicates that 84 percent of all containerized cargo and approximately 40 percent of all fuel for U.S. and coalition forces operating in Afghanistan passes through Pakistan. According to Defense officials, CSF has been a major factor in Pakistan‘s ongoing cooperation in support of U.S. goals in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Defense has used CSF to reimburse Pakistan for Operation Al Mizan, a major deployment of the Pakistan army in the North West Frontier Province and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) that border Afghanistan that began in 2001 and has continued in various phases to this date.12 Defense also states that CSF payments to Pakistan have played a key role in supporting U.S. national security goals in Pakistan to combat terrorists that threaten U.S. interests in America, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Western Europe. The CSF reimbursements to Pakistan from October 2001 through June 2007 (the latest period of support reimbursed by Defense) are shown in figure 1.

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Source: GAO analysis of Defense oversight documentation. Note: The most recent claims processed during our review were completed in February 2008 and covered Pakistani government reimbursement claims for the months March 2007 through June 2007. Figure 1. U.S. CSF Reimbursements to Pakistan, October 2001 through June 2007.

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Evolution of the CSF Oversight Process In a February 2002 internal memo, the Comptroller expressed dissatisfaction with Defense‘s ability to verify the costs claimed in Pakistan‘s December 200113 reimbursement claim. The Comptroller noted that the reimbursement claim contained total costs but no supporting details. For example, the claim reported a total cost for army airlift without providing information on number of sorties flown, the dates, costs, time frames, purpose, According to the February 2002 memo, the government of Pakistan was unprepared or unable to reconstruct these costs in a verifiable manner in line with standard U.S. government accounting practices and expectations. Staff at CENTCOM in Tampa, Florida, and at ODRP in the embassy were unable to fill in such details. Despite this concern, the Defense Office of General Counsel concluded, based on the statutory authority provided to the Secretary of Defense, that the Secretary of Defense could legally reimburse all of the cost categories identified by the Comptroller as legally defensible. The United States eventually reimbursed Pakistan $300 million. In 2003, at the request of the Comptroller, the Defense Inspector General performed an audit of the CSF oversight process for all countries seeking CSF reimbursements. The report found deficiencies in both Defense‘s CSF guidance, as well as the supporting documentation CSF recipients provided to support their claims. It recommended improvements in Defense‘s analysis of CSF reimbursement requests and greater documentation requirements for countries seeking reimbursement.

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United States Government Accountability Office Table 1. December 2003 CSF Guidance for Embassies, Combatant Commanders, and the Comptroller.

Office responsibiliy Defense personnel (such as ODRP) at embassies assist host country military personnel in formulating their claims for reimbursement before forwarding the claims to their combatant commander.

Guidance



 

Combatant commanders (such as CENTCOM) must submit documentation to the Comptroller that sufficiently supports the country‘s reimbursement request.





  Comptroller receives the package from CENTCOM and evaluates the reasonableness of the reimbursement request.

 

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 

CSF reimburses countries that have incurred incremental costs (i.e., above and beyond normal levels) to provide logistical and military support to U.S. military operations in connection with U.S. operations in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere in the global war on terrorism. Examples of reimbursable costs: transport of forces, sustainment of forces, increased use of equipment or vehicles. Requests for reimbursement must contain quantifiable information that clearly indicates incremental nature of support, such as total personnel fed, number and types of vehicles repaired, total fuel consumed, total number of flight sorties. Identification of who requested the service, for what period of time (i.e., a one-time reimbursement requirement versus a recurring requirement), and the initial estimate of the cost of the support or service. Validation that the support or service was provided, and confirmation that the costs incurred were incremental (i.e., that the costs were based on the U.S. requirement and would not otherwise have been incurred by the country requesting reimbursement). A narrative description of the types of costs incurred and a description of how the costs for each were computed. Copies of invoices for support provided, or in the absence of invoices, documentation supporting how the costs were derived for each category of cost, and their basis of measurement. Comparison, at a macro level, of claimed costs to the U.S. cost to provide the same support. Evaluation of the reasonableness of the individual categories for which reimbursement is requested. Comparison of representative U.S. costs for a subset of items (where similar comparisons can be made). Assessment that the claimed costs are consistent with previous reimbursement requests.

Source: Defense.

In response, the Comptroller published guidance in December 2003 to clarify the roles and responsibilities of CENTCOM and other regional combatant commanders and of the Comptroller in the CSF oversight process. The 2003 guidance notes that Congress provided the Secretary of Defense with the authority to determine how much to reimburse partner countries, and how much documentation was required to adequately account for the support provided. However, the guidance also stated that CENTCOM and the Comptroller are to obtain sufficient documentation to validate that Pakistani military support had been provided and that costs were incurred, reasonable, and appropriate under the CSF program. Table 1 summarizes the review criteria in the December 2003 Comptroller guidance. We address the implementation of these and other criteria in greater detail later in this report. Under the December 2003 guidance and oversight process, Pakistan would first submit its claim for reimbursement to ODRP at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad. According to Comptroller guidance, ODRP would assist the Pakistani military in formulating the reimbursement claim before sending the claim to CENTCOM in Tampa, Florida. CENTCOM

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would then conduct its own review in an attempt to link claimed expenses to U.S. military operations before forwarding the claim package to the Comptroller. Under this process, ODRP and CENTCOM staff can make recommendations to defer or disallow costs based on their analysis of the Pakistan submission; however, the Comptroller makes the final recommendation to the Secretary of Defense on which costs should be paid, deferred, or disallowed.

Legend CENTCOM = United States Central Command Defense = Department of Defense DSCA = Defense Security Cooperation Agency ODRP = Office of the Defense Representative to Pakistan OMB = Office of Management and Budget OUSD/Comptroller = Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Comptroller Source: GAO analysis of Defense documentation and discussions with OUSD/Comptroller. Figure 2. CSF Reimbursement Process.

The Department of State, the Office of Management and Budget, and Congress also have a role in the CSF oversight process after the Comptroller has finished its review. The Department of State and the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy must each verify that the CSF reimbursement is consistent with the U.S. government‘s national security policy and does not adversely affect the balance of power in the region. In addition, Defense is required to consult with the Director of the Office of Management and Budget during the CSF process.

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Defense is also required to provide a 15-day notification of the upcoming reimbursement, as well as quarterly reports to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations and the House and Senate Armed Services Committees on the use of funds made available for payments to Pakistan and other CSF recipients. Congress passed the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008, which now requires Defense to submit an itemized description of logistic support, supplies, and services ―provided by Pakistan to the United States for which the United States provided reimbursement‖ during the period beginning February 1, 2008 and ending September 30, 2009.14 The CSF process is detailed in figure 2. In July 2006, the Comptroller provided the Pakistani government with a cost template and information intended to clarify the types of costs that were reimbursable under CSF and the information the Comptroller required to support Pakistan‘s reimbursement claims. Furthermore, according to Defense, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy emphasized the importance of enhancing transparency within Pakistan‘s CSF claims in a June 2007 letter to the Pakistan Ministry of Defense.

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DEFENSE DID NOT CONSISTENTLY APPLY ITS EXISTING GUIDANCE, AND ADDITIONAL PROCEDURES ARE NEEDED TO ENSURE ACCOUNTABILITY OVER CSF TO PAKISTAN We found that Defense did not consistently apply existing CSF guidance and that certain deficiencies existed in their oversight procedures.15 We reviewed the Pakistani claims for January 2004 through June 2007, as well as related CENTCOM and Comptroller memos, to determine if DOD had consistently applied the Comptroller criteria issued in December 2003. The memos prepared by the Comptroller generally included the four macro-level analytical reviews outlined in the criteria; however, implementation of these criteria was not sufficient to validate claimed costs. For example, the Comptroller generally performed a comparison of total claimed costs to the estimated U.S. cost to provide the same services; however, there was not enough information in the Pakistani claims to determine that the claimed amount and the estimated U.S. cost included the same expenses or that the claimed costs were valid. Defense guidance developed by the Comptroller calls for obtaining sufficient information to validate Pakistani claims to determine that costs were incurred, reasonable, and appropriate. However, Defense did not fully implement this criteria. For example, Defense reimbursed Pakistan over $2 billion for claims from January 2004 through June 2007 without obtaining detailed documentation that would allow a third party to recalculate the costs. In addition, Defense often did not adequately document the basis for their decisions to allow or disallow claims, and we found inconsistencies in Defense payments that were not explained. As a result, Defense may have paid costs that were (1) not incremental, (2) not based on actual activity, or (3) potentially duplicative. We also found that additional oversight controls were needed. Specifically, while Comptroller guidance calls for a historical comparison of claimed costs, the guidance does not indicate why or how the comparison should be performed. Additionally, Defense did not verify the currency conversion rates used by Pakistan from January 2004 through June 2007 and, as a result, may have overpaid Pakistani claims due to the devaluation of the Pakistan rupee.

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Defense Made Payments Without Obtaining Detailed Documentation to Support Pakistani Claims The Comptroller‘s CSF guidance states that Pakistani claims should include associated invoices. In the absence of such support, CENTCOM officials should obtain from Pakistan a detailed description of how these costs were computed. For example, claims for fuel should include information such as total fuel consumed, the number and types of vehicles supported, and best available assessments of the number of miles driven or hours employed. However, we found that few of the Pakistani claims we reviewed met the criteria contained in the Comptroller‘s guidance. For example, 76 percent of the army‘s costs from January 2004 through June 2007 lacked sufficient information to allow Defense to perform basic recalculations needed to verify the claims, such as quantity times price.16 Despite the lack of documentation, Defense reimbursed Pakistan more than $2.2 billion. An official at ODRP with a role in reviewing CSF reimbursement claims stated that, based on the scarce details provided in the CSF claims, it was nearly impossible to know the actual cost of claimed items. When we discussed this issue with the Comptroller‘s office, they indicated that the Pakistani claims do not provide enough detail to explain the context of the costs, which makes it difficult to determine whether the costs are incremental (i.e., that claimed costs are above and beyond the partner country‘s normal operating costs) and, therefore, whether under the Comptroller‘s guidance the costs should be reimbursed. We found other examples where Defense officials did not obtain sufficient information necessary to validate the claims and did not adequately document the basis for their decisions to allow or disallow claims. As a result, there were inconsistencies in Defense‘s reimbursement of certain costs. For example, as illustrated in figure 3, Defense paid Pakistani navy claimed costs for boats for about half of the months and disallowed them the other half, despite no discernable differences in the level of support the Pakistani government provided for the claims.

Source: Defense. Note: Figure includes all monthly reimbursement claims that itemized costs for navy rigid hull inflatable boats. Figure 3. Comptroller Approvals and Disapprovals of Pakistani Navy CSF Reimbursement Claims for Boats, by Month, December 2005 through June 2007

We identified additional inconsistently reimbursed costs that contained no discernable differences in the level of support. For example, the Comptroller generally disallowed Pakistani army claims for bulletproof jackets but occasionally paid them. Conversely, the Comptroller generally paid for army telephone cables but occasionally disallowed these costs.

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Without better support for the rationale behind disallowed costs, we could not determine if these costs were reimbursed consistent with the Comptroller‘s guidance. According to Defense officials, payments were made based on informed judgment, however they could not provide documentation to support each instance.

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Defense Paid Costs That May Not Have Been Incremental Comptroller guidance states that reimbursement claims must clearly indicate the incremental nature of the logistical and military support provided—i.e., that claimed costs are above and beyond the partner country‘s normal operating costs. However, we found that the Pakistani claims did not provide such information, which led to differences among Defense officials as to whether the claims should be disallowed or deferred until Pakistan could provide additional support. Defense paid Pakistan $200 million in radar expenses from January 2004 through February 2007. For the March through June 2007 claims, ODRP recommended the Comptroller disallow the costs, reasoning that this was not an incremental expense, as terrorists in the FATA did not have air attack capability. However, the Comptroller took the position that Pakistan likely incurred some increased costs by using the radars to police the airspace over the Northwest Frontier Province (i.e., to patrol, monitor, and provide air traffic control) and provide air traffic control for U.S. military support flights into Afghanistan. The Comptroller nonetheless agreed that the claims lacked sufficient detail to determine whether these charges were definitively incremental. In the March through June 2007 claim package, the Comptroller chose to defer the air defense radar costs until Pakistan could provide better justification for the charges. Defense May Have Paid Costs That Were Not Based on Actual Activity or Expenses According to the Comptroller‘s criteria, both the Comptroller and CENTCOM are responsible for validating that claimed costs are associated with actual activities and are based on documentation that adequately accounts for the support provided. However, the documentation we reviewed as part of our audit did not provide sufficient support that all claimed costs were based on actual activity or expenses. For example, Defense paid more than $30 million for army road construction17 and over $15 million for army bunker construction18 without adequate support. Defense paid these costs despite a CENTCOM recommendation to disallow the claims for road construction in September and October 2006 due to insufficient documentation. For the most recent claims processed in February 2008, covering the months March 2007 through June 2007, concerns about the validity of these charges led ODRP to request that the Pakistani military provide the coordinates of the roads and bunkers built. As of June 2008, Pakistan had not provided this additional information, and Defense has not paid these costs. We also found large unexplained differences between the average costs of food per person for each force, as shown in figure 4. As figure 4 shows, navy monthly food costs per person were generally higher than monthly air force and army food costs per person. Navy claims for food rapidly increased from approximately $445 per sailor in June 2005 to $800 per sailor in December 2005, while air force and army food costs per person remained stable. Despite these anomalies, the Comptroller continued to pay the navy $800 per sailor for food until September 2006, when

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the Comptroller partially disallowed these costs, reducing the cost of navy food to the same amount as that paid for the army (approximately $200 per person). In November 2006, Defense approved navy food cost at approximately the same level as that paid for the air force (approximately $400 per person). However, the Comptroller deferred all navy food costs for the March through June 2007 claim period (processed in February 2008), pending receipt of additional justification from Pakistan.

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Source: GAO analysis of food cost data from Defense and troop levels from Pakistan claims. Note: Pakistani reimbursement claims January 2004 through August 2004 did not provide sufficient information to allow us to calculate average food costs per person. Figure 4. Average Monthly Food Costs Per Person by Force Reimbursed to Pakistan Government, September 2004 through June 2007

In addition, we found that Defense paid the Pakistani navy more than $1.5 million in possibly inflated costs for damage to navy vehicles. On average, Defense paid the Pakistani navy more than $5,700 per vehicle per month in damages, in comparison with the army‘s average claim of less than $100 per vehicle per month.19 According to the most recent navy claims, these vehicles generally consisted of passenger cars and SUVs that were not involved in combat. By contrast, the army vehicles were used to conduct military operations in the FATA and border region.

Defense Paid Costs That Were Potentially Duplicative Comptroller guidance calls for CENTCOM to ensure that costs are not counted twice; however, none of the CENTCOM memos we reviewed provided any indication that a review for duplicate costs had been performed. As a result, Defense paid more than $8.9 million in potentially duplicative costs. For example, the most recent Pakistani navy claim (June 2007) includes cost categories titled ―vehicle damage‖ and ―cost of vehicles repaired,‖ but there is no detail provided to explain the differences between these two categories, and there was insufficient detail to determine whether some or all of the claimed costs were unique or duplicative. This claim also included the categories ―cost of fuel for vehicles‖ and ―average

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cost of running of vehicle deployment on operation,‖ which could also contain duplicate charges. The detail provided within these categories was insufficient to determine the difference between these costs, and therefore they could contain duplicate charges. Despite this lack of detail, we found that Defense paid the Pakistani navy an average of over $19,000 per vehicle per month (more than $3.7 million per year)20 to operate, maintain, and repair a fleet of fewer than 20 passenger vehicles without sufficient information to determine that these costs were not duplicative.

Opportunities Exist to Improve CSF Oversight Controls

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We found deficiencies in the Comptroller‘s guidance concerning historical comparison of claimed costs and verification of currency conversions. Specifically, we found that while Comptroller guidance calls for a historical comparison of claimed costs, it does not indicate how this comparison should be performed. In addition, we found that CSF guidance does not require Defense to identify or evaluate the exchange rates used to convert claimed costs from Pakistani rupees into U.S. dollars, and, as a result, potential overbillings may have gone undetected.

Potentially Significant Cost Fluctuations Were Not Investigated The Comptroller guidance calls for the Comptroller to perform a historical comparison of claimed costs to previous reimbursements made by the United States for similar support. Such an analysis could identify costs that do not reflect actual activity levels. However, we found that the Comptroller‘s guidance does not describe how the comparison should be performed. In our audit, we found that some of Pakistan‘s claimed costs experienced potentially significant unexplained fluctuations from month to month. Although the Comptroller noted some of these fluctuations, we found that it did not investigate the reasons behind them. For example, Defense paid the army‘s largest21 cost claimed in April 2006, which experienced a 12 percent ($2.8 million) increase from March, without investigating this fluctuation. As a result, Defense may be paying for costs based on activities that did not occur. Currency Conversions Were Not Verified CSF guidance does not require Defense to identify or evaluate the exchange rates used for claims presented in U.S. dollars. Foreign currency exchange rates, such as those computed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), fluctuate.22 As a result, transactions made in a foreign currency can result in transaction gains or losses. Since January 2004, the Pakistani rupee has declined over 6 percent against the U.S. dollar. Consequently, fewer dollars should have over time purchased more rupees, resulting in a lower cost to the CSF program. Pakistani reimbursement claims are presented in U.S. dollars; however, the Comptroller did not verify the currency conversions calculated by Pakistan. Although the Comptroller was not required to do so, lack of such verification may have resulted in overpayment of Pakistan claims. For example, on one cost category we reviewed, Defense may have overpaid more than $1.25 million over 12 months because it did not consider the currency conversion used to calculate the cost. In performing our review, we used the claimed amounts23 and exchange

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rates that were stated in Pakistan‘s September and October 2004 claims, and we converted the claimed cost into rupees. We then converted the claimed cost back into U.S. dollars using the applicable IMF exchange rates and compared the resulting figure with the amount paid by Defense. Figure 5 illustrates the results of our analysis and shows that CSF would have been billed fewer dollars had IMF exchange rates been used.

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Source: GAO analysis of Pakistani claims and IMF data. Note: IMF data includes market rate, period average, by month, exchange rates for U.S. dollars per Pakistan rupee. Figure 5. Effect of Exchange Rate Fluctuations on One Fixed Pakistani Claimed Cost, September 2004 through August 2005.

Most of the Pakistani claims do not provide enough information to determine if the costs were appropriately converted from rupees to dollars. Therefore, we were unable to calculate the potential overbilling for all claims for the entire period under review. However, if Pakistan has been using a fixed exchange rate, then Defense has likely overpaid its reimbursements. If the rupee continues to decline against the dollar, future Pakistani claims calculated using a fixed exchange rate will become more and more inflated over time.

ODRP BEGAN PLAYING A LARGER ROLE IN THE CSF OVERSIGHT PROCESS IN LATE 2006; HOWEVER, ODRP’S CONTINUED OVERSIGHT IS NOT ASSURED Defense‘s 2003 guidance did not specifically task ODRP with attempting to verify Pakistani military support and expenses, despite recognition by Defense officials that such verification is best performed by U.S. officials in Pakistan, who have direct access to

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Pakistani officials and information. As such, ODRP did not try to verify Pakistani CSF claims until September 2006, when, without any formal guidance or directive to do so, ODRP began an effort to validate Pakistani military support and expenses. This increased verification effort contributed to an increase in the amount of disallowals and deferrals of the Pakistani government‘s CSF claims from an average of a little over 2 percent from January 2004 through August 2006, an average of 6 percent from September 2006 through February 2007, and 22 percent for the most recent claims (March 2007 through June 2007) processed in February 2008. Despite this increased effort, there is no assurance that ODRP will continue this level of oversight because Defense has not issued formal guidance delineating ODRP verification responsibilities.

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Defense Never Formally Tasked ODRP to Attempt to Verify That Pakistani Military Support Was Provided and That Costs Were Incurred According to the Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, clear delegation of authority and responsibility is important to establishing an effective internal control system.24 Defense officials in Washington, at CENTCOM, and at the U.S. Embassy in Islamabad stated that U.S. officials in Pakistan are best suited to perform primary verification that Pakistani military support was provided and that claimed costs were actually incurred. ODRP officers have access to a broad range of Pakistani military officials, including some involved in military operations, and can conduct limited field visits and onsite inspections if permitted by the Pakistani government. By contrast, Comptroller staff are located thousands of miles from Pakistan and lack the level of access available to ODRP officials. Despite this, Defense never explicitly tasked ODRP with performing such verification efforts. In Pakistan‘s case, the Comptroller‘s 2003 guidance did not specify whether this verification should take place in Pakistan or from CENTCOM in Florida. The guidance simply indicated that ODRP should assist Pakistan in formulating their claims. However, the guidance did not require or suggest that ODRP attempt to verify that Pakistan‘s claimed military support had been provided or that its costs were actually incurred. For example, it did not recommend that ODRP conduct any oversight activities, such as onsite inspections of completed Pakistani construction or a comparison of flight hours to maintenance costs.

ODRP Initiated Verification of Pakistani Support and Costs; Contributed to Increases in the Amount of Claims Deferred or Disallowed In late 2006, without any formal guidance or directive to do so from CENTCOM or the Comptroller, ODRP began an effort to verify that Pakistani military support was provided and costs were actually incurred as claimed in the military‘s requests for reimbursement. According to ODRP officials, this new effort stemmed from a concern that some of Pakistan‘s reported costs may not have been valid or properly supported. They also stated that the Comptroller‘s July 2006 presentation to Pakistani officials helped ODRP conduct more detailed verification because Pakistan began to provide greater detail in its reimbursement claims. ODRP officials who were in Pakistan from July 2005 through March 2008 stated they

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had received no training or guidance from Defense on whether, or how, to conduct verification of Pakistani reimbursement claims. These officials said that the 2006 presentation was the first time they had seen any guidance on what could or could not be reimbursed under the CSF program or what type of information was needed to support Pakistan‘s reimbursement claims. As a result, ODRP recommended for the first time that Defense disallow or defer costs that it found questionable, beginning with Pakistan‘s September through October 2006 claim. For example, ODRP recommended that the Comptroller disallow payments to Pakistan for procurement of bulletproof vests, radios, and road construction due to insufficient information necessary to verify the costs. Defense eventually disallowed approximately $13 million of the September through October 2006 reimbursement claim. After ODRP submitted its recommendations, CENTCOM and the Comptroller performed their own reviews of the reimbursement claim (see figure 6).

Legend CENTCOM = United States Central Command ODRP = Office of the Defense Representative to Pakistan OUSD/Comptroller = Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Comptroller Source: GAO analysis of Defense oversight documentation. Figure 6. Reimbursement Process for Pakistani Claims, March through June 2007.

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ODRP‘s increased verification efforts contributed to significantly larger disallowals and deferrals ($81.2 million) in the most recently processed (February 2008) Pakistan government reimbursement claims for the months of March through June 2007. ODRP recommended deferring payment on $38.1 million in claimed costs until the Pakistani government provided information necessary to verify its claims. For example, ODRP recommended deferring payment to Pakistan on its reimbursement request for $22.3 million in helicopter maintenance costs. ODRP found that even though the United States had paid Pakistan $55 million in CSF reimbursements for maintenance of helicopters in the border area, only a few of these helicopters were fully operational.25 According to ODRP officials, the Pakistani army was not maintaining the helicopters, causing essential systems to malfunction. Given the poor readiness rates, ODRP recommended that the Comptroller defer payment on Pakistan‘s helicopter maintenance claims until a process could be implemented to ensure that Pakistan could maintain its helicopter fleet. ODRP also recommended disallowing payment on an additional $42.3 million to Pakistan for such things as air defense radars, procurement of tents and vests, and funding for Pakistan‘s joint staff headquarters operations.

Source: Defense. Note: There is a lag between the claimed period and Defense‘s reimbursement of claims. At the time of the issue of this report, the March through June 2007 claims, reimbursed in February 2008, were the latest round of claims reimbursed by Defense. GAO has not verified the reliability of Comptroller‘s data processing. Figure 7. Pakistani CSF Reimbursement Claims Disallowed or Deferred, January 2004 through June 2007.

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The amount disallowed or deferred for March through June 2007 represents a significant increase in CSF oversight by Defense. For example, from January 2004 through August 2006, Defense disallowed or deferred an average of a little more than 2 percent of each monthly Pakistani reimbursement claim, for a total of $59.4 million over a 32-month period. In comparison, the average percentage of Pakistani claims disallowed or deferred for September 2006 through February 2007 was 6 percent or $33.3 million over a 6-month period and for the most recent claims (March 2007 through June 2007) processed in February 2008, was approximately 22 percent, or $81.2 million in a four month period. This four month period accounts for approximately 53 percent of the total CSF funding disallowed or deferred by Defense since January 2004 ($173.92 million). The Comptroller disagreed with some of ODRP‘s recommendations. For example, ODRP recommended disallowing $26.4 million for the maintenance of air defense radars since terrorists in the border region possessed no air force. The Comptroller noted, however, that these radars could also provide air traffic control for Pakistani military aircraft operating in the area and for U.S. military flights to Afghanistan. As a result, the Comptroller modified ODRP‘s recommendations to disallow certain costs and instead deferred payment on these costs until Pakistan could provide more information to support the reimbursement request. However, as of May 2008, Defense has not paid any of these deferred CSF costs because Pakistan has not provided evidence to indicate that these costs were valid. Figure 7 shows the increased CSF disallowals and deferrals during ODRP‘s increased oversight activity in the September through October 2006 claims, and particularly in the latest claim period (March through June 2007), when Defense disallowed or deferred a total of $81.2 million over these four months. Based on our assessment, it appears that ODRP began this increased oversight effort without any formal guidance or directive to do so. The Comptroller has provided no formal guidance that stipulates ODRP should verify that Pakistani military support has actually been performed and that expenses were actually incurred. Furthermore, officials at ODRP from 2005 to early 2008 said that the Comptroller had provided no guidance or training on the level of oversight they should provide. Despite this lack of guidance, in November 2007, officials at the Comptroller and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy stated that ODRP was in fact responsible for performing this oversight. However, as of May 2008, Defense had not formalized any new guidance on ODRP‘s verification responsibilities.

No Guidance to Ensure Continued Oversight by ODRP Despite ODRP‘s increased oversight activity, continuity of this oversight is not assured. According to Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, clear delegation of authority and responsibility is important to establishing an effective internal control system.26 However, as of May 2008, ODRP continued to lack formal guidance or training that explicitly described either its oversight responsibilities or the procedures for conducting such oversight. Staff at ODRP stated they had previously received little to no guidance or training on their specific role in analyzing Pakistani CSF reimbursement claims. Formal guidance is especially important in Pakistan, where U.S. officials are generally limited to 1-year tours due to the

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status of the U.S. mission in Islamabad as a high-risk post. Because of the constant turnover of Defense officials in Pakistan, clear guidance is needed to ensure the continuity of oversight efforts. In addition, the Comptroller has never provided guidance on how ODRP and Defense representatives in other sovereign countries should verify that the countries actually provided military support and that expenses were actually incurred. ODRP is largely dependent upon the quality of information supplied by the Pakistani military. According to Defense officials, Defense lacks the authority to audit the internal finances of the Pakistani military. Because of this, ODRP staff described their analysis as ―macro-level verification,‖ whereby the reasonableness of high-level costs reported in the Pakistani claim is judged through a comparison with other information. For example, ODRP‘s recommendation to defer helicopter maintenance costs in the March through June 2007 claims stemmed from their comparison of Pakistan‘s reported maintenance costs against ODRP‘s knowledge of the low readiness rates of Pakistan‘s helicopters. Although such analyses can be supplanted by anecdotal information from discussions with Pakistani military officials or through occasional visits to the field, according to ODRP, the Pakistani government strictly controls foreigners‘ access to the FATA, making spot-checks difficult. The Pakistani submissions are, therefore, the chief component of the ODRP analysis. ODRP officials said they doubted that ODRP would ever be able to fully verify actual costs in Pakistan. First, the Pakistani military reports costs to ODRP that are already aggregates of many smaller costs. For example, food cost would include costs for procurement, transport, storage, and field preparation that ODRP cannot directly monitor. Furthermore, according to ODRP, although the Pakistani government generally keeps detailed financial records, these records are usually in paper form and electronic record keeping is rare. Additionally, the Pakistani military does not possess automated systems to track logistics and supplies. Because of these factors, information retrieval from the field and collation at the Pakistani joint staff level can take a great deal of time and may entail a certain amount of approximation and averaging. Given Pakistan‘s record- keeping systems, it is unclear to what level of precision ODRP should be expected to verify Pakistani support and incurred costs.

CONCLUSIONS Coalition Support Funds are critical components of America‘s global war on terror and the primary support for Pakistani operations to destroy the terrorist threat and close the terrorist safe haven in Pakistan‘s FATA. Following the attacks of September 11, 2001, Congress quickly authorized emergency funding to prevent another attack, and given the grave and immediate threat at the time, Congress recognized that ensuring accountability for these funds was secondary to protecting the nation from another attack. However, given the large amounts of funding provided to Pakistan since October 2001, and indications that Pakistan will continue to receive such payments in the future, we believe that Defense should ensure it follows its own guidance and consider what other guidance is needed.

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Our assessment found that while CSF played a key role in Pakistan‘s support for our war on terror, Defense had not followed its existing guidance and provided little oversight of the effort at the embassy in Pakistan. Defense had concerns about the accuracy of Pakistan‘s claims from the very first claim submitted in 2001. Based on the lack of supporting evidence in the Pakistani claims from January 2004 through June 2007 (the latest claims reimbursed by Defense), we found that neither Defense nor we could determine if Pakistan had actually incurred most of the costs in their claims. Prior to 2004, it appears that there was even less evidence to support Pakistan‘s claims. As a result, we conclude that Defense cannot accurately determine how much of the $5.56 billion in costs reimbursed to Pakistan since 2001 were actually incurred. As a result of these and other findings, we believe that Defense should consistently implement its own CSF guidance to fully verify Pakistani claims and ensure the effective use of CSF in meeting key U.S. national security goals. While we recognize that CSF is used to support 27 countries in fighting terrorism, the fact that Pakistan receives 81 percent of these funds indicates that Defense should provide oversight procedures that reflect the role Pakistan plays as both the major recipient of CSF and its role in supporting U.S. national security objectives in Pakistan and Afghanistan. Additionally, we recognize that Defense may not be able to fully verify all Pakistani claims without having the ability to access the Pakistani government‘s records and make site visits or conduct spot checks. ODRP‘s recent increased efforts, however, show that greater oversight may be achieved through the use of U.S. representatives in Pakistan.

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RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EXECUTIVE ACTION To improve the impact and oversight of CSF payments to Pakistan, we make the following five recommendations to the Secretary of Defense: 

Consistently implement existing criteria to disallow or defer Pakistani claims that do not include the documentation needed to verify the claims.



Define and formalize the roles and responsibilities of ODRP.



Work with the government of Pakistan to develop procedures to allow ODRP or other U.S. representatives to conduct greater oversight of CSF use in Pakistan, including the potential use of onsite inspections.



Clarify guidance for Comptroller analysis of cost fluctuations.



Develop and apply criteria to evaluate currency exchange rates to ensure that the U.S. government is not overpaying for Pakistan operations.

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AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR EVALUATION Defense provided written comments on the report, which are reproduced in appendix II. Defense generally concurred with our recommendations, and indicated they had updated their CSF guidance to incorporate our recommendations. We plan to review this guidance when it is made available to us. In addition, Defense‘s comments noted that our report did not give sufficient weight to three areas. These include the Pakistan‘s significant contributions to the global war on terror enabled by CSF; the fact that the Department has adhered to the law; and that Pakistan is a sovereign country that may not meet U.S. accounting and administration standards. However, our report does reflect Pakistan‘s efforts in combating terrorism and the role of CSF. Furthermore, we note several times that Congress granted the Secretary of Defense the authority to make CSF payments in such amounts as the Secretary may determine in his discretion, based on documentation determined by the Secretary of Defense to adequately account for the support provided. Although we acknowledge that there are limitations in any arrangement with another sovereign nation, we believe that Defense should work more closely with Pakistan to improve their capacity to support these claims. We note that the information provided by Pakistan has improved over time, particularly when Defense has provided additional guidance to Pakistan. For example, following the Comptroller‘s visit to Pakistan in 2006, Pakistan‘s more detailed submissions allowed ODRP to conduct greater oversight of Pakistan‘s claims, leading to the increases in deferrals and disallows in late 2006 and 2007. In addition, we did not assume that Pakistan could provide receipts for all items; we assessed whether Defense followed its guidelines. According to the Comptroller‘s guidelines, a recipient country‘s reimbursement claim must contain quantifiable information and supporting documentation on how costs were derived so Defense can validate the claim. Most of Pakistan‘s claims that we reviewed lacked this information. We also received technical comments from Defense, which we have incorporated throughout the report, where appropriate. We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional committees, as well as the Secretaries of State and Defense. We will also make copies available to others upon request. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. If you or your staffs have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 5127331 or [email protected]. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are listed in appendix IV.

Charles Michael Johnson Jr. Director, International Affairs and Trade

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List of Requesters The Honorable Howard L. Berman Chairman The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen Ranking Member Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives The Honorable Gary L. Ackerman Chairman The Honorable Mike Pence Ranking Member Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives The Honorable John F. Tierney Chairman The Honorable Christopher Shays Ranking Member Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

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House of Representatives The Honorable Tom Harkin The Honorable Robert Menendez United States Senate

APPENDIX I: SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY Legislation governing the Coalition Support Funds (CSF) program states that the Secretary of Defense‘s determination whether documentation adequately supports reimbursement to key cooperating nations is final and conclusive. Our review therefore focused on the extent to which Defense has applied its own guidance to validate reimbursements and on Office of the Defense Representative to Pakistan‘s (ODRP) role in this process. To conduct our review, we obtained information on current procedures from relevant officials at the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Comptroller (Comptroller), the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), ODRP, and the State Department‘s Bureau of Political-Military

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Affairs. We also examined all CSF oversight documentation provided to us, including Pakistani government reimbursement claims, ODRP memos, CENTCOM validation memos, Comptroller evaluations, and other CSF documentation from February 2002 through June 2007 (the latest period of support reimbursed by Defense.) Additionally, we examined all Defense CSF guidance provided to us. To examine the extent to which Defense has applied its guidance to validate costs claimed by Pakistan, we first reviewed a December 2003 Defense Inspector General report27 that cited deficiencies in the CSF oversight process from October 2001 through May 2003. Because this report led to new CSF oversight guidance in December 2003, our assessment of Defense‘s oversight controls focused on 42 monthly reimbursement claims submitted by the Pakistani government from January 2004 to June 2007. As part of our data reliability process, we confirmed that the data provided by the Comptroller were accurately recorded in the software we used to analyze the data. We did not verify the reliability of Comptroller‘s data processing. As part of this review, we examined all available Comptroller criteria and guidance—including the December 2003 guidance, as well as the July 2006 presentation to the Pakistani government and the February 2008 flowchart. Using the Comptroller criteria, the internal control standards, and general cost accounting criteria for adequacy, eligibility, and reasonableness, we   

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  

recalculated selected portions of Pakistani claims for mathematical accuracy; reviewed items included in claims and noted items that may be nonincremental under CSF, duplicative charges, and questionable dollar amounts for the charges; compared selected claims and payments over time to analyze consistency of charges disallowed; reviewed ODRP cables and memos, CENTCOM analyses, and Comptroller analyses for support for charges, disallowed amounts, and fluctuations in claimed amounts; compared supporting documentation to Comptroller-issued criteria to determine compliance; and compared supporting documentation to internal control criteria to determine the sufficiency of Comptroller criteria and current oversight procedures.

To assess the oversight role played by ODRP, we met with the officials noted above, as well as with other officials from the U.S. Embassy and Pakistan‘s Ministries of Defense and Interior. We visited Peshawar, near the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, to conduct discussions with the U.S. consulate and Pakistan‘s 11th Army Corps and Frontier Corps regarding operations being reimbursed with CSF funds. We also examined all of the previously mentioned CSF oversight documents and guidance. We conducted this performance audit from September 2007 to June 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

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APPENDIX II:

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COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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APPENDIX III: PAKISTAN CSF REIMBURSEMENT CLAIMS, JANUARY 2004-JUNE 2007a

Jan. 04 Feb. 04 Mar. 04 Apr. 04 May 04 June 04 July 04 Aug. 04 Sept. 04 Oct. 04 Nov. 04 Dec. 04 Jan. 05 Feb. 05 Mar. 05 Apr. 05 May 05 June 05 July 05 Aug. 05 Sept. 05 Oct. 05 Nov. 05 Dec. 05

$60,531,000 65,334,100 79,541,600 84,890,100 79,861,372 95,048,300 96,857,000 115,104,000 93,246,580 89,067,574 79,928,000 75,478,500 87,255,700 80,535,500 89,853,500 67,431,200 70,048,300 70,072,000 73,036,600 74,050,500 82,246,400 89,090,868 75,446,693 71,453,834

Defense reimbursement $58,251,000 62,981,000 76,886,000 82,094,200 77,287,372 327,033,276b 90,345,700 109,313,700 92,784,580 88,625,574 79,856,000 75,114,600 85,661,800 80,219,300 86,698,400 67,102,600 68,608,500 68,722,000 71,646,500 72,467,600 78,564,600 88,856,000 75,446,693 71,453,495

Jan. 06 Feb. 06

80,939,674 78,962,330

79,400,674 78,406,260

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Date

Pakistan request

Disallowed or deferred $2,280,000 2,353,100 2,655,600 2,795,900 2,574,000 3,097,000 6,511,300 5,790,300 462,000 442,000 72,000 363,900 1,593,900 316,200 3,155,100 328,600 1,439,800 1,350,000 1,390,100 1,582,900 3,681,800 234,868 0 339

Percentage of claim disallowed or deferred 3.77% 3.60 3.34 3.29 3.22 3.26 6.72 5.03 0.50 0.50 0.09 0.48 1.83 0.39 3.51 0.49 2.06 1.93 1.90 2.14 4.48 0.26 0.00 0.00c

1,539,000 556,070

1.90 0.70

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Appendix III (Continued) Mar. 06 89,039,426 87,766,027 Apr. 06 93,058,372 92,032,823 May 06 89,588,661 86,283,491 June 06 104,869,074 100,877,374 July 06 100,918,230 99,607,230 Aug. 06 99,609,440 97,656,140 Sept. 06 89,480,274 83,249,465 Oct. 06 95,299,466 88,126,587 Nov. 06 95,785,981 90,183,688 Dec. 06 91,370,854 86,146,231 Jan. 07 90,750,144 85,535,351 Feb. 07 89,482,052 85,628,299 Mar. 07 95,392,884 71,899,270 Apr. 07 92,914,150 71,145,810 May 07 90,265,124 69,536,440 June 07 84,353,540 69,153,140 Totals $3,597,488,897 $3,658,654,790b Prior to increased ODRP role Jan. 2004–Aug. 2006 avg. monthly disallow/defer Jan. 2004–Aug. 2006 total disallow/defer Post increased ODRP role Sept. 2006–Feb. 2007 avg. monthly disallow/defer Sept. 2006–Feb. 2007 total disallow/defer Mar.–June 2007 avg. monthly disallow/defer Mar.–June 2007 total disallow/defer

1,273,399 1,025,549 3,305,170 3,991,700 1,311,000 1,953,300 6,230,809 7,172,879 5,602,293 5,224,623 5,214,793 3,853,753 23,493,614 21,768,340 20,728,684 15,200,400 $173,916,083

1.43 1.10 3.69 3.81 1.30 1.96 6.96 7.53 5.85 5.72 5.75 4.31 24.63 23.43 22.96 18.02

2.15% $59,425,895 6.02% $33,299,150 22.26% $81,191,038

Source: GAO analysis of Defense data. Notes: GAO has not verified the accuracy of Defense Comptroller‘s data processing. a The last U.S. reimbursement to Pakistan covered March through June 2007 and was processed in February 2008. b June 2004 reimbursement includes a one-time Bell helicopter procurement totaling $235,081,976. The disallow/defer percentage for June 2004 does not take into account this figure. c Percent rounded to two decimal places.

END NOTES 1

CSF has funded a broad range of Pakistani military operations, including navy support for maritime patrols and interdiction operations; air force support for combat air patrol, reconnaissance and close air support missions, airlift support, and air traffic control; army military operations in the FATA; and increased management requirements at the Pakistan Joint Staff Headquarters. 2 According to U.S. embassy officials in Islamabad and unclassified U.S. intelligence documents, since 2002, al Qaeda and the Taliban have used Pakistan‘s FATA and the border region to attack Pakistani, Afghan, U.S., and coalition troops; plan and train for attacks against U.S. interests; destabilize Pakistan; and spread radical Islamist ideologies that threaten U.S. interests.

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3

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Reimbursements are made only after the Office of Management and Budget is consulted, the Secretary of State concurs and the 15 day notification to the appropriate congressional committees has taken place. 4 Department of Defense Inspector General, Financial Management: Coalition Support Funds, D-2004-045 (Washington, D.C., Jan. 16, 2004). This is a classified report. 5 See GAO, Combating Terrorism: The United States Lacks Comprehensive Plan to Destroy the Terrorist Threat and Close the Safe Haven in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas, GAO-08-622 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 17, 2008); Preliminary Observations on the Use and Oversight of U.S. Coalition Support Funds Provided to Pakistan, GAO-08-735R (Washington, D.C.: May 6, 2008); and Combating Terrorism: U.S. Efforts to Address the Terrorist Threat in Pakistan’s Federally Administered Tribal Areas Require a Comprehensive Plan and Continued Oversight, GAO-08-820T (Washington, D.C.: May 20, 2008). 6 Defense guidance defines incremental costs as those costs that are above and beyond the partner country‘s normal operating costs. 7 This example is based on our analysis of Pakistani army claims and does not include the other service‘s claims. However, we found generally that the navy claims‘ documentation was similar to the army‘s and the other services‘ claims had less documentation. 8 The Comptroller took the position that Pakistan likely incurred some increased costs by using the radars to police the airspace over the Northwest Frontier Province and provide air traffic control for U.S. military support flights into Afghanistan. The Comptroller nonetheless agreed that the claims lacked sufficient detail to determine whether these charges were definitively incremental. 9 Pub. L. 107-117, sec 301, January 10, 2002. 10 Pub. L. 107-206, Operation and Maintenance, Defense-Wide, August 2, 2002. 11 See, for example, Pub. L. 107-206; Pub. L. 108-11, sec 1310; Pub. L. 110-161. Beginning in 2003, with the passage of the Emergency Wartime Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2003 (Pub. L. 108-11), Congress required that CSF payments be made with concurrence of the Secretary of State and in consultation with the Director of OMB. The Secretary of Defense‘s determination with respect to the documentation supporting payments is final and conclusive. 12 The goal of this operation was to combat al Qaeda, Taliban, and other militants attempting to escape the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan by fleeing into Pakistan. According to Defense, Pakistan has deployed about 120,000 army and paramilitary troops in support of this operation, incurred more than 1,400 casualties, and killed hundreds of al Qaeda, Taliban, and other terrorists. 13 This reimbursement claim received by Defense in December 2001 covered activity from October through December 2001. 14 Pub. L. 110-181, sec 1232(b). 15 Because a previous Defense Inspector General report led to new CSF oversight guidance in December 2003, our assessment focused on reimbursement claims submitted by Pakistan between January 2004 and June 2007. 16 This example is based on our analysis of Pakistani army claims and does not include the other service‘s claims. However, we found generally that the navy claims‘ documentation was similar to the army‘s, and the other services‘ claims had less documentation. Payments made to the Pakistani army constituted over 85 percent of total payments made to Pakistan from January 2004 through June 2007. 17 Army road construction costs were included as a specific line item beginning in September 2004. These costs were claimed and paid each month from September 2004 through February 2007. 18 Army bunker construction costs were included as a specific line item beginning in July 2006. These costs were claimed and paid each month from July 2006 through February 2007. 19 Average vehicle damage cost paid was calculated using claims in which vehicle damage was listed as a specific category (September 2004 through June 2007). 20 These figures include the $5,700 average navy cost per vehicle per month for ―vehicle damages‖ discussed previously. In addition, these figures do not include claims prior to September 2004, as these claims did not contain specific categories. 21 This cost category was the largest for April 2006 based on the percentage of total dollars claimed that was included in each category. This cost category accounted for 28 percent of the entire claim for April 2006. 22 GAO used the IMF market rate, period average, by month, in our analysis because this rate takes into account economic variables such as gross domestic product (GDP), revenue, and wages. 23 These claimed amounts did not fluctuate over the 12-month period and were presented in U.S. dollars. 24 See GAO, Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, D.C.: November 1999). 25 Defense reimbursed Pakistan approximately $55 million for maintenance of the Pakistan army‘s MI-17 and AH-1 Cobra helicopter wings in the border area from July 2006 through February 2007. 26 See GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1. 27 Department of Defense Inspector General, Financial Management: Coalition Support Funds, D-2004-045 (Washington, D.C., Jan. 16, 2004). This is a classified report.

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Chapter 5

COMBATING TERRORISM: THE UNITED STATES LACKS COMPREHENSIVE PLAN TO DESTROY THE TERRORIST THREAT AND CLOSE THE SAFE HAVEN IN PAKISTAN’S FEDERALLY ADMINISTERED TRIBAL AREAS 

United States Government Accountability Office

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WHY GAO DID THIS STUDY Since 2002, destroying the terrorist threat and closing the terrorist safe haven have been key national security goals. The United States has provided Pakistan, a key ally in the war on terror, more than $10.5 billion for military, economic, and development activities. Pakistan‘s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), which border Afghanistan, are vast unpoliced regions attractive to extremists and terrorists seeking a safe haven. GAO was asked to assess (1) the progress in meeting these national security goals for Pakistan‘s FATA, and (2) the status of U.S. efforts to develop a comprehensive plan for the FATA. To address these objectives, GAO compared national security goals against assessments conducted by U.S. agencies and reviewed available plans.

WHAT GAO RECOMMENDS GAO recommends that the National Security Advisor and the Director of the NCTC, in consultation with the Secretaries of Defense and State and others, implement the congressional mandate to develop a comprehensive plan to combat the terrorist threat and 

This is an edited, reformatted and augmented version of a U. S. Government Accountability Office publication dated April 2008.

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close the safe haven in the FATA. Defense and USAID concurred with the recommendation; State asserted that a comprehensive strategy exists, while the Office of the Director of National Intelligence stated that plans to combat terrorism exist. In GAO‘s view, these plans have not been formally integrated into a comprehensive plan as called for by Congress. The NSC provided no comments.

WHAT GAO FOUND

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The United States has not met its national security goals to destroy terrorist threats and close the safe haven in Pakistan‘s FATA. Since 2002, the United States relied principally on the Pakistan military to address U.S. national security goals. Of the approximately $5.8 billion the United States provided for efforts in the FATA and border region from 2002 through 2007, about 96 percent reimbursed Pakistan for military operations there. According to the Department of State, Pakistan deployed 120,000 military and paramilitary forces in the FATA and helped kill and capture hundreds of suspected al Qaeda operatives; these efforts cost the lives of approximately 1,400 members of Pakistan‘s security forces. However, GAO found broad agreement, as documented in the National Intelligence Estimate, State, and embassy documents, as well as Defense officials in Pakistan, that al Qaeda had regenerated its ability to attack the United States and had succeeded in establishing a safe haven in Pakistan‘s FATA.

Sources: GAO; USAID and Map Resources (maps).

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No comprehensive plan for meeting U.S. national security goals in the FATA has been developed, as stipulated by the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism (2003), called for by an independent commission (2004), and mandated by congressional legislation (2007). Furthermore, Congress created the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) in 2004 specifically to develop comprehensive plans to combat terrorism. However, neither the National Security Council (NSC), NCTC, nor other executive branch departments have developed a comprehensive plan that includes all elements of national power—diplomatic, military, intelligence, development assistance, economic, and law enforcement support— called for by the various national security strategies and Congress. As a result, since 2002, the U.S. embassy in Pakistan has had no Washington-supported, comprehensive plan to combat terrorism and close the terrorist safe haven in the FATA. In 2006, the embassy, in conjunction with Defense, State, and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and in cooperation with the government of Pakistan, began an effort to focus more attention on other key elements of national power, such as development assistance and public diplomacy, to address U.S. goals in the FATA. However, this does not yet constitute a comprehensive plan.

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ABBREVIATIONS CENTCOM CIA CSF Defense DNI FATA FCR NIE NCTC NSC ODNI State USAID

U.S. Central Command Central Intelligence Agency Coalition Support Funds Department of Defense Director of National Intelligence Federally Administered Tribal Areas Frontier Crimes Regulations National Intelligence Estimate National Counterterrorism Center National Security Council Office of the Director of National Intelligence Department of State U.S. Agency for International Development

April 17, 2008 Congressional Requesters: The terrorist attacks of 9/11 were planned from an Afghan safe haven, and many of the terrorists who attacked the United States used Pakistan as the main route to travel from Afghanistan to the United States. Since the 9/11 attacks in 2001, the administration and Congress have repeatedly stated that destroying terrorist threats and closing terrorist safe havens are the nation‘s critical national security goals.1 As such, the United States has provided Pakistan, which has become a key U.S. ally in the global war on terror, with more than $10.5 billion for military, economic, and development activities in support of these goals. The 9/11 Commission, an independent, bipartisan commission created by congressional legislation in late 2002, concluded in 2004 that it is hard to overstate the

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importance of Pakistan in the struggle against Islamist terrorism. The commission found that the country‘s vast unpoliced regions have made it attractive to extremists seeking a safe haven and have reportedly provided a base for terrorist operations against U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan. Following the defeat of the Taliban in Afghanistan, al Qaeda and Taliban fighters are believed to have retreated across the Afghan border and into Pakistan‘s Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in an effort to re-establish a terrorist safe haven. Because of the challenges the United States faces in Pakistan in meeting its goals to destroy the terrorist threats and close the terrorist safe haven, we were asked to assess (1) U.S. progress in meeting its national security goals in Pakistan‘s FATA region, and (2) the status of U.S. efforts to develop a comprehensive plan for the FATA. This report is the first in a series of reports we plan to issue in response to your interest in U.S. support of the Pakistani government‘s efforts in the FATA region bordering Afghanistan. We plan to issue an interim product on the use and oversight of Coalition Support Funds (CSF) in May 2008 and a report on CSF in the summer of 2008, followed by a broader report covering security, political, and development assistance activities undertaken by the United States to meet U.S. national security goals in the FATA. To address our objectives, we reviewed relevant national security strategies, the 9/11 Commission Report, key congressional legislation, and related documentation from the Departments of Defense (Defense) and State (State) and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), and discussed these issues with relevant department officials in Washington, D.C. We also interviewed Defense officials operating out of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) headquarters in Tampa, Florida. We requested meetings with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and the National Security Council (NSC); however, only the CIA agreed to meet with us. To determine progress in meeting national security objectives, we compared the national security goals stated in strategic documents with unclassified assessments conducted by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), State, and U.S. officials operating in Pakistan. To determine if comprehensive plans were developed and contained the elements recommended by national security documents, legislation, and GAO, we requested all plans addressing U.S. efforts in the FATA from the CIA, Defense, NCTC, NSC, State, USAID, and the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan. CIA, NCTC, and NSC did not provide any plans. We reviewed all plans provided by Defense, State, and USAID, as of April 17, 2008. We also met with members of the International Crisis Group in Washington, including the director of their office in Pakistan.2 In addition, we conducted field work in Pakistan, where we met with officials from the U.S. embassy and Pakistan‘s Ministries of Defense and Interior, as well as international donors from Canada, Japan, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom. We visited Peshawar, near the FATA, to conduct discussions with the U.S. consulate, Pakistan‘s 11th Army Corps, the Frontier Corps, the FATA Secretariat and Development Authority, and a Pakistani nongovernmental organization with experience working in the FATA. We determined the amount of U.S. funding to Pakistan by analyzing Defense, State, and USAID budget documents covering the period from fiscal years 2002 through 2007 and by verifying the amounts used for the FATA and the border regions through discussions with agency officials. This analysis does not include funding for covert activities in Pakistan. We conducted this performance audit from July 2007 through April 2008 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis

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for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

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RESULTS IN BRIEF The United States has not met its national security goals to destroy the terrorist threat and close the safe haven in Pakistan‘s FATA region. Since 2002, the United States has relied principally on the Pakistani military to address its national security goals. There have been limited efforts, however, to address other underlying causes of terrorism in the FATA by providing development assistance or by addressing the FATA‘s political needs. Of the over $10.5 billion that the United States has provided to Pakistan from 2002 through 2007, we identified about $5.8 billion specifically for Pakistan‘s FATA and border region; about 96 percent of this funding reimbursed Pakistan for military operations in the FATA and the border region. According to Defense and State Department officials, Pakistan deployed up to 120,000 military and paramilitary forces in the FATA and killed and captured hundreds of suspected al Qaeda operatives. In October 2007, State reported that it had determined that Pakistan was making ―significant‖ progress toward eliminating the safe haven in the FATA. However, we found broad agreement, as documented in the unclassified 2007 National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), State and embassy documents, as well as among Defense, State, and other officials, including those operating in Pakistan, that al Qaeda had regenerated its ability to attack the United States and had succeeded in establishing a safe haven in Pakistan‘s FATA. No comprehensive plan for meeting U.S. national security goals in the FATA has been developed, as stipulated by the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, recommended by the independent 9/11 Commission, and mandated by congressional legislation.3 Since 2003, the administration‘s national security strategies and Congress have recognized that a comprehensive plan that includes all elements of national power—diplomatic, military, intelligence, development assistance, economic, and law enforcement support—was needed to address the terrorist threat emanating from the FATA. Furthermore, in 2004, a provision of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (Intelligence Reform Act) established the NCTC to develop comprehensive plans to combat terrorism that included clear objectives, the assignment of tasks among executive branch departments, and interagency coordination. We have previously reported on the need for these and other elements to enhance interagency cooperation and improve effectiveness.4 The NCTC also was tasked with monitoring each department‘s efforts. However, neither the NCTC, the NSC, nor the other executive branch departments have developed a comprehensive plan that integrates the capabilities of the executive agencies and the intelligence community. As a result, since 2002, the embassy has had no Washington-supported, comprehensive plan to combat terrorists and close the terrorist safe haven in the FATA. In 2006, the U.S. government, in conjunction with the government of Pakistan, began an effort to focus more attention on other key elements of national power, such as development and public diplomacy, to address U.S. goals in the FATA. In support of this effort, Defense, State, and USAID began to develop departmentspecific plans and hold interagency meetings to address security and development issues in

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the FATA. However, this effort has not yet resulted in a comprehensive plan. As of April 2008, not all of these efforts have been approved in Washington, funding shortfalls exist, and support from the recently elected government of Pakistan is unknown.5 We are recommending that the National Security Advisor and the Director of the NCTC, in consultation with the Secretaries of Defense and State, the Administrator of USAID, the intelligence community, and other executive departments as deemed appropriate, work to develop a comprehensive plan using all elements of national power to combat the terrorist threat and close the associated safe haven in Pakistan‘s FATA region. The comprehensive plan should also include key components called for in the Intelligence Reform Act and components that we have previously reported as being needed to improve the effectiveness of plans involving multidepartmental efforts to combat terrorism. State, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), Defense, and USAID provided written comments on a draft of this report, which are reproduced in appendixes I, II, III, and IV. State and ODNI did not comment on our recommendation, while Defense and USAID concurred. In general, they all commented on their individual planning efforts and interagency meetings to coordinate these efforts that began in 2006. This, however, was not the focus of our review; our report assessed whether a comprehensive plan had been developed that incorporated all elements of national power. State‘s comments asserted that embassy and U.S. government efforts to date have resulted in a comprehensive strategy. We disagree, and note in our report that while the initiatives begun by Defense, State, and USAID are being coordinated by the embassy, they have not been fully approved or integrated into a formal, comprehensive plan. ODNI‘s comments stated that they agreed with our finding that the United States had not met its national security goals in Pakistan‘s FATA; however, they disagreed that the United States lacks plans to combat terrorism. Our report does not state that the U.S. lacks agencyspecific plans; rather, we found that there was no comprehensive plan that integrated the combined capabilities of Defense, State, USAID, the intelligence community, and others, as called for by the 2003 national security strategy, the 9/11 Commission report, and Congress. We also received technical comments from Defense and USAID, which we have incorporated throughout the report where appropriate.

BACKGROUND The FATA is mountainous and shares a 373-mile border with Afghanistan known as the Durand Line (see figure 1). The FATA, which has a population of 3.1 million people, is one of Pakistan‘s poorest regions, with high poverty, high unemployment, and an underdeveloped infrastructure. Most of the population depends on subsistence agriculture. The FATA‘s per capita income is $250 per year, which is half of the national per capita income; about 60 percent of the population lives below the national poverty line. Per capita public development expenditure is reportedly one-third of the national average. Social development indicators are also poor. The overall literacy rate is 17 percent, compared with 56 percent nationally, with male literacy at 29 percent and female literacy at 3 percent. The FATA has just 41 hospitals for its population of 3.1 million, and a doctor to population ratio of 1 to 6,762.

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The FATA is governed by an administrative system and a judicial system different from the rest of Pakistan—the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) of 1901, codified under British rule.6 Because Pakistan retained the colonial administrative and legal structures of the British, as codified in the FCR, the FATA populations are legally separate from and unequal to other Pakistani citizens. Examples of these differences under the FCR follow:

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FATA residents do not have access to national political parties, and political parties are forbidden from extending their activities into the agencies of FATA. The FATA is under the direct executive authority of the President of Pakistan. Laws framed by the National Assembly of Pakistan do not apply in the FATA unless so ordered by the President, who is empowered to issue regulations for the tribal areas. FATA residents do not have the right to legal representation, to present material evidence, or to cross-examine witnesses in Pakistan‘s judicial system. Those convicted are denied the right of appeal in Pakistan‘s courts. The President‘s representatives to the FATA, who are called political agents, can punish an entire tribe for crimes committed on the tribe‘s territory by issuing fines, making arrests, implementing property seizures, and establishing blockades.

Sources: GAO; USAID and Map Resources (maps). Figure 1. Map of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, Pakistan

In response to the draft, Defense noted that the FCR is a culturally acceptable recognition of the tribal structure of the FATA, where the population is ethnically different from the majority of Pakistan‘s citizens, and precludes forced assimilation. Further, Defense noted that removing the FCR without a replacement mechanism that is accepted by the indigenous population has the potential to create a vacuum that could result in negative consequences. A

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recent announcement by Pakistani Prime Minister Yousaf Raza Gillani regarding the repeal of the FCR drew mixed reactions from tribesmen and political leaders, some of whom called for amendments to the FCR, rather than its repeal.

THE U.S. GOVERNMENT HAS NOT MET NATIONAL SECURITY GOALS IN PAKISTAN’S FATA The United States has not met its national security goals to destroy the terrorist threat and close the safe haven in the FATA, despite more than $10.5 billion in U.S. support to Pakistan since 2002. Various national security strategies have called for the use of all elements of national power, such as diplomatic, military, intelligence, development assistance, economic, and law enforcement support, to meet these goals; however, the United States has relied principally on supporting the Pakistani military to meet these goals. According to Defense and State, the Pakistani government deployed up to 120,000 military and paramilitary forces to combat terrorism in the FATA. Despite this effort, the 2007 NIE, State and embassy documents, and Defense and State officials, including those operating in Pakistan, have concluded that al Qaeda has regenerated its ability to attack the United States and succeeded in establishing a safe haven in Pakistan‘s FATA.

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Although State Has Reported Some Progress in Pakistan’s FATA, Other Sources Indicate Resurgence of an al Qaeda Threat and the Establishment of a Terrorist Safe Haven in the FATA On October 1, 2007, State provided Congress with a report in response to a requirement in the Implementation of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Commission Act).7 The report stated that it had determined that Pakistan was (1) committed to eliminating from Pakistani territory any organization, such as the Taliban, al Qaeda, or any successor engaged in military, insurgent, or terrorist activities in Afghanistan; (2) undertaking a comprehensive military, legal, economic, and political campaign to achieve the goal described; and (3) making demonstrated, significant, and sustained progress toward eliminating support or safe havens for terrorists. Notwithstanding State‘s report to Congress, we found broad agreement that al Qaeda had established a safe haven in the FATA and reconstituted its attack capability. In particular, the unclassified versions of the 2007 NIE and 2008 Annual Threat Assessment state that al Qaeda has regenerated its attack capability and secured a safe haven in Pakistan‘s FATA.8 These conclusions are supported by a broad array of sources, including Defense, State, and senior U.S. embassy officials in Pakistan. The NIE and other sources have found that al Qaeda has established a safe haven in Pakistan. The DNI‘s 2008 assessment stated that the safe haven in Pakistan provides al Qaeda with many of the same advantages it had when it was based across the border in Afghanistan. According to the assessment, the safe haven in the FATA serves as a staging area for al Qaeda‘s attacks in support of the Taliban in Afghanistan. Further, it serves as a location for training new terrorist operatives for attacks in Pakistan, the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and the United States. U.S. government officials in Washington and Pakistan also acknowledge

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that al Qaeda has established a safe haven near Pakistan‘s border with Afghanistan. For example, State‘s April 2007 Country Reports on Terrorism states that Pakistan remains a major source of Islamic extremism and a safe haven for some top terrorist leaders, including those of al Qaeda. The NIE, The Terrorist Threat to the U.S. Homeland, also found that al Qaeda had effectively found replacements for many of its senior operational planners over the years. The NIE stated that, in the past 2 years, al Qaeda‘s central leadership regenerated the core operational capabilities needed to conduct attacks against the United States. It also found that al Qaeda‘s central leadership, based in the border area of Pakistan, is and will remain the most serious terrorist threat to the United States. The 2008 DNI Annual Threat Assessment and other sources have concluded that the resurgence of al Qaeda terrorists on the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan now pose a preeminent threat to U.S. national security. The assessment also examines the impact of not meeting the national security goals. It states that al Qaeda is now using the Pakistani safe haven to put the last element necessary to launch another attack against America into place, including the identification, training, and positioning of Western operatives for an attack. It stated that al Qaeda is most likely using the FATA to plot terrorist attacks against political, economic, and infrastructure targets in America ―designed to produce mass casualties, visually dramatic destruction, significant economic aftershocks, and/or fear among the population.‖ DNI‘s 2008 assessment found that al Qaeda and other Pakistan-based militants now also pose a threat to Pakistan. The assessment found an unparalleled increase in suicide attacks against Pakistan‘s military and civilians over the past year, with total casualties in 2007 exceeding all such attacks in the preceding 5 years. These attacks were ordered by Pakistanbased militants, many of whom are allied with al Qaeda. It found that the terrorist assassination of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto could encourage terrorists to strike the Pakistani establishment anywhere in the country. The assessment concluded that radical elements now have the potential to undermine Pakistan itself.

The United States Has Relied Primarily on the Pakistani Military to Accomplish Its Goals in Pakistan’s FATA, with Little Focus on Economic Development and Improving Governance Since 2002, the United States has relied principally on the Pakistani military to address U.S. national security goals in the FATA. There have been limited efforts, however, to address other underlying causes of terrorism in the FATA, such as providing development assistance or addressing the FATA‘s political needs. For example, although the FATA has some of the worst development indicators in Pakistan and is ruled under colonial administrative and legal structures dating from 1901, the United States has devoted little funding to address these issues in the FATA. From fiscal years 2002 to 2007, the United States has provided Pakistan with more than $10.5 billion in funds and assistance.9 Approximately $5.8 billion of this amount has been directed at efforts to combat terrorism in Pakistan‘s FATA and the border region. As figure 2 shows, about 96 percent of this amount was used to reimburse the Pakistani government

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through CSF10 for military operations in support of Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, most significantly against terrorists in Pakistan‘s FATA and border region. We identified only two nonmilitary activities that occured in the FATA and border region: State‘s Border Security Program, which received about $187 million, and USAID development activities, which amounted to about $40 million. According to a State Department report, Pakistan‘s military forces have had some tactical successes in the FATA. The Pakistani government stationed military and paramilitary forces along the border with Afghanistan, and security operations in the FATA disrupted terrorist activity by targeting and raiding al Qaeda and other militant safe havens.11 According to State, Pakistan has helped kill or capture hundreds of suspected terrorists, including al Qaeda operatives and Taliban leaders. In addition, Pakistani military operations have resulted in the deaths of approximately 1,400 members of its security forces.

Source: GAO analysis of Defense, State, and USAID data. Figure 2. Percentage of U.S. Funding Directed toward Military, Border Security, and Development Activities in Pakistan‘s FATA and Border Region from Fiscal Years 2002 to 2007

Key Government Stakeholders Recognize That a More Comprehensive Approach Is Needed Defense, State, U.S. embassy, and Pakistani government officials recognize that relying primarily on the Pakistani military has not succeeded in neutralizing al Qaeda and preventing the establishment of a safe haven in the FATA. State‘s April 2007 Country Reports on Terrorism states that, despite having Pakistani troops in the FATA and sustaining hundreds of casualties, the government of Pakistan has been unable to exert control over the area. The report concluded that Pakistan has now recognized that military operations alone will not

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restore security and stability to the FATA. Similarly, U.S. embassy officials in Pakistan stated that Taliban and al Qaeda elements have created a safe haven in the FATA and have used it to plan and launch attacks on Afghan, Pakistani, U.S., and coalition forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The embassy further noted that al Qaeda and the Taliban continue to recruit, train, and operate in the FATA. According to senior embassy officials, U.S. reliance on Pakistan‘s military stemmed from the lack of a comprehensive plan to guide embassy efforts and the sense that the Pakistani military was the most capable institution in Pakistan to quickly undertake operations against al Qaeda immediately after the attacks of 9/11. Senior embassy officials stated that this may have led to an ―over-reliance‖ on the Pakistani military to achieve U.S. national security objectives in Pakistan.

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NO COMPREHENSIVE PLAN FOR GUIDING U.S. EFFORTS IN THE FATA HAS BEEN DEVELOPED, AS CALLED FOR BY THE ADMINISTRATION AND CONGRESS Despite the recognition of U.S. government officials, including the U.S. President and Congress, that a comprehensive plan employing all elements of national power—diplomatic, military, intelligence, development assistance, economic, and law enforcement support—was needed to combat terrorism and close the terrorist safe haven in Pakistan‘s FATA region, a comprehensive plan to meet U.S. national security goals in the region was never developed. Recognizing in 2006 that military efforts alone would not succeed in the FATA, the embassy, with Defense, State, and USAID support, and in conjunction with the Pakistani government in power at that time, began an effort to focus more attention on the other key elements of national power, such as development and public diplomacy, to address U.S. national security goals in the FATA. However, this effort has not been formally approved by U.S. government stakeholders who would play a key role in the funding and implementation of such an effort, and support from the recently elected Pakistani government is uncertain.

Presidential Powers for Implementing National Security Strategies and Developing a Comprehensive Plan The President of the United States has primary responsibility to ensure that his national security strategy is carried out effectively. The President has the authority to task executive branch departments to develop comprehensive plans that use all elements of U.S. power— diplomatic, military, intelligence, development assistance, economic, and law enforcement support—toward meeting U.S. national security goals. As a result, the President can task key national security agencies, such as Defense, State, USAID, the Departments of Homeland Security, Justice, the Treasury, and intelligence agencies, to develop a comprehensive, integrated strategy and to use their combined capabilities to combat terrorism, as called for in the national security strategies. The President can also use the NSC12 and the NCTC13 to assist in developing, coordinating, and monitoring these plans.

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Table 1. Key Recommendations by Executive, Independent, and Congressional Sources to Combat Terrorism and Close Terrorist Safe Havens Key document National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, 2003

Source President Bush and the NSC



 

9/11 Commission Report, 2004

9/11 Commission, an independent, bipartisan study group mandated by Congress in 2002

   

Intelligence Reform Act, 2004

Congress

 

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

9/11 Commission Act, 2007

Congress



Recommendation Called for comprehensive plans employing all elements of national power—diplomatic, military, intelligence, development assistance, economic, and law enforcement support—to combat terrorism Gave State lead to develop coordinated plans; all appropriate departments were to develop supporting strategies Directed Defense, State, and intelligence agencies to annually assess and develop plans to close safe havens Stated that long-term success demands coordinated, comprehensive, multidepartment efforts employing all elements of national power Recommended that a single entity be responsible for comprehensive, multidepartment planning for U.S. efforts to combat terrorism Recommended U.S. (1) make a long-term, comprehensive commitment to assist Pakistan to combat terrorism and (2) develop a strategy to close safe havens Authorized creation of the NCTC to develop comprehensive, multidepartment plans to combat terrorism employing all elements of national power Stipulated that such plans should include (1) the mission, (2) objectives, (3) tasks to be performed, (4) interagency coordination, and (5) roles and responsibilities. It also tasked the NCTC with monitoring each agency involved Required a report within 180 days of passage of the act on the administration‘s strategies for (1) closing terrorist safe havens and (2) assisting Pakistan to combat terrorism Required the President to submit a report by November 2007 on the strategy, employing all elements of national power, to combat terrorism in the FATA

Source: GAO analysis of key documents.

Despite Executive, Congressional, and Independent Calls for Comprehensive Plans to Combat Terrorism and Close Terrorist Safe Havens, Such Plans Were Never Developed As table 1 shows, the need for the development of comprehensive plans employing all elements of national power—diplomatic, military, intelligence, development assistance, economic, and law enforcement support—to combat terrorism and close terrorist safe havens has been recognized by the President‘s national security strategies (2003), the independent 9/11 Commission (2004), and by Congress in repeated legislation (2004 and 2007). As it became clearer that al Qaeda had retreated from Afghanistan into Pakistan and was creating a safe haven in the FATA, Congress increased its demands on the U.S. administration to

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develop comprehensive plans to help Pakistan combat terrorism and close the FATA safe haven. Despite recommendations by the President‘s own national security strategy, by the independent 9/11 Commission, as well as legislative mandates from Congress, a comprehensive plan to destroy the terrorist threat or close the safe haven in the FATA was never developed. Even after the creation of the NCTC, an organization specifically intended to develop, implement, and monitor multidepartment plans to combat terrorism, the embassy has yet to receive any such plan to combat terrorism in Pakistan‘s FATA. In addition, the administration did not report to Congress on its plans for assisting Pakistan in (1) combating terrorism and (2) closing terrorist safe havens, as required by both the 2004 and 2007 legislation. As a result, the embassy has lacked a Washington-approved, comprehensive plan that combines the capabilities of Defense, State, USAID, intelligence agencies, and other U.S. departments to combat terrorism in the FATA. According to senior embassy officials in Islamabad, the embassy had not received a comprehensive plan from the CIA, Defense, State, the NCTC, the NSC, the White House, or any other executive department. Further, these officials stated that they had not received any strategic guidance on designing, implementing, funding, and monitoring a comprehensive effort that would use all elements of national power to combat terrorism in Pakistan. According to senior embassy officials, given the strategic threat to America, the United States should have a comprehensive strategy to defeat terrorists that uses all elements of national power. Defense, State, the DNI, USAID, and the government of Pakistan recognize that a comprehensive approach is needed to meet U.S. national security goals in Pakistan. For example, in its 2007 Country Reports on Terrorism, State indicated that Pakistan recognized that military operations alone would not restore stability to the FATA; instead, a comprehensive strategy was needed that also included economic, social development, political, and administrative efforts to enhance security in the region. The U.S. Embassy in Pakistan also concluded that, while force is a necessary component of an overall strategy to combat terrorism in the FATA, it is not sufficient as the sole component. Similarly, the DNI stated that Pakistan now recognizes it must take a more comprehensive approach to defeating terrorism and that an intensified and sustained effort that combines administrative, economic, educational, legal, and social reforms to defeat the terrorist threat is required.14 We have previously reported on the need for plans to combat terrorism to include elements that would enhance interagency cooperation and improve effectiveness. Specifically, in large-scale interagency efforts where collaboration is essential, we have found that agencies should (1) define and articulate a common outcome; (2) establish mutually reinforcing or joint strategies; (3) identify and address funding needs by leveraging resources; (4) agree on roles and responsibilities; (5) establish compatible policies, procedures, and other means to operate across agency boundaries; (6) develop mechanisms to monitor, evaluate, and report on results; (7) reinforce agency accountability for collaborative efforts through agency plans and reports; and (8) reinforce individual accountability for collaborative efforts through performance management systems.15

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Pakistan and the U.S. Embassy are Encouraging More Focus on Other Key Elements of National Power to Achieve U.S. Goals in the FATA In March 2006, the President of Pakistan requested that President Bush support Pakistan‘s effort to support a more comprehensive approach to combating terrorism in the FATA. As a result, the U.S. Embassy in Pakistan began coordinating efforts by Defense, State, and USAID to develop department-specific efforts to support Pakistan‘s Sustainable Development Plan for the FATA. Pakistan‘s Sustainable Development Plan is a 9 year, $2 billion effort to provide economic development, extend the influence of the Pakistani government, and establish security in the FATA. To assist this effort, Defense undertook a counterinsurgency assessment in the FATA and began developing its Security Development Plan. At the same time, USAID provided technical assistance to the Pakistani government to help formalize its Sustainable Development Plan, as well as to plan USAID-development activities in the FATA. This approach, if approved by the administration and key U.S. government agency stakeholders, would constitute the U.S. government‘s first attempt to focus more attention on other key elements of national power to address U.S. counterterrorism goals in the FATA. These elements include development assistance and public diplomacy, as well as counterinsurgency training, which have not been part of the previous military approach. This new approach also calls for greater levels of direct U.S. planning, implementation, coordination, and oversight. However, this new approach does not yet constitute a comprehensive plan, and all of the agencies‘ individual efforts have not been fully approved in Washington. Furthermore, funding shortfalls exist, and support by the recently elected government of Pakistan is uncertain. If fully approved, the United States would provide an estimated $956 million between fiscal years 2008 through 2011 for development, security, capacity building, and infrastructure in support of the Pakistani government. This approach represents the first effort by the U.S. embassy to directly plan, implement, coordinate, and monitor a multidepartment effort to combat terrorism in the FATA. According to officials with the U.S. embassy, the Pakistani government, and international donors, this comprehensive approach is critical to addressing the terrorist threat in the FATA and represents a significant departure from the past. As of September 2007, the embassy planned to spend $187.6 million on this initial effort using fiscal year 2007 funds. The funding has been directed to four areas: Development: The $99 million development effort would be led by USAID and would include capacity building for the FATA institutions needed to plan, manage, and monitor development projects; efforts to build community and government relations; funding for health and education services; and efforts to increase employment and economic growth.16 Security: The $54.1 million Defense and State security effort would include training for military and paramilitary units in the FATA—including the Frontier Corps, special operations forces, and air crews—and for providing night vision goggles, radios, and other equipment.

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Infrastructure: The $32.5 million the U.S. embassy has designated for infrastructure improvements related to both its security and development efforts would be used for road construction, the Frontier Corps training center, and border surveillance outposts. Public diplomacy: $2 million in funding was allotted for public diplomacy programs. According to the embassy, the success of this new effort in the FATA will depend on close coordination among an array of institutions within the U.S. and Pakistani governments. The new effort also will involve partner agencies and allies, including the United Kingdom, Japan, and Europe; the Asian Development Bank; nongovernmental organizations; and the Pakistani private sector, civil society, and the tribes of the FATA. We plan to monitor the status and progress of the U.S. government in developing this effort and provide an assessment in a subsequent report covering security, political, and development activities undertaken by the United States to meet U.S. national security goals in the FATA.

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CONCLUSION Combating terrorism is the United States‘ top national security priority at home and abroad. Since 9/11, U.S. national security strategies have consistently called for using all elements of national power to combat terrorism, including diplomatic, military, intelligence, development assistance, economic, and law enforcement support. Because the use of the various elements of national power falls under the authority of numerous U.S. government agencies, the development of a comprehensive plan is needed to ensure that the full capacity of the U.S. government is focused on meeting U.S. national security goals. We believe that such a plan would help to ensure coordination, integration, and implementation of U.S. efforts to close the terrorist safe haven in the FATA. A comprehensive plan to combat terrorism in the FATA that establishes goals, objectives, priorities, outcomes, and milestones, including specific performance measures, would allow an assessment of progress and help ensure accountability of U.S. efforts. As such, we believe that the administration should develop a comprehensive plan using the full capabilities provided by Defense, State, USAID, and other U.S. agencies and stakeholders to further assist Pakistan in combating terrorism.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR EXECUTIVE ACTION We recommend that the National Security Advisor and the Director of the NCTC, in consultation with the Secretaries of Defense and State, and the Administrator of USAID, the intelligence community, and other executive departments as deemed appropriate, implement the congressional mandate to develop a comprehensive plan using all elements of national power to combat the terrorist threat and close their safe haven in Pakistan‘s FATA region. The comprehensive plan should also include key components called for in the Intelligence Reform Act, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of

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2007, and components that we have previously reported as being needed to improve the effectiveness of plans involving multidepartmental efforts to combat terrorism.17 The plan should (1) place someone directly in charge of this multidepartment effort to improve accountability; (2) articulate a clear strategy to implement the national security goal to destroy terrorists and close the safe haven in the FATA; (3) clarify roles and responsibilities of each department for implementing the goal; (4) provide guidance on setting funding priorities and providing resources to meet these national security goals; and (5) require a monitoring system and provide periodic reports to Congress on the progress and impediments to meeting national security goals in Pakistan.

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AGENCY COMMENTS AND OUR EVALUATION State, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI), Defense, and USAID provided written comments on a draft of this report, which are reproduced in appendixes I, II, III, and IV. State and ODNI did not comment on our recommendation, while Defense and USAID concurred with our recommendation. In general, they all commented on their individual planning efforts and interagency meetings to coordinate these efforts that began in 2006. This, however, was not the focus of our review; our report assessed whether a comprehensive plan had been developed that incorporated all elements of national power. We plan to conduct a detailed assessment of the individual agency efforts from 2002 to the present as part of our broader engagement efforts and look forward to working closely with ODNI, Defense, State, USAID, and other agencies in assessing their plans and efforts to meet national security goals in Pakistan. State‘s comments assert that embassy and U.S. government efforts to date have resulted in a comprehensive strategy. We disagree and note in our report that, while the initiatives begun by Defense, State, and USAID are being coordinated by the embassy, they have not been fully approved or integrated into a formal, comprehensive plan. While we acknowledge that this effort is a step in the right direction toward implementing the 2003 national security strategy, the recommendations by the 9/11 Commission, and Congress, it is unclear whether the new approach will include all of the key elements of national power, such as intelligence, economic, and law enforcement support. ODNI‘s comments stated that they agreed with our finding that the United States had not met its national security goals in Pakistan‘s FATA and that countering the growth of terrorist safe havens requires all elements of national power. They disagreed, however, that the United States lacks plans to combat terrorism in the area. Our report does not state that the U.S. lacks individual plans; rather, we found that there was no comprehensive plan that integrated the combined capabilities of Defense, State, USAID, the intelligence community, and others to meet U.S. national security goals in Pakistan. We also received technical comments from Defense and USAID, which we have incorporated throughout the report where appropriate. As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 30 days from the report date. At that time, we will send copies of this report to interested congressional committees, to the National Security

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Advisor of the NSC, the Director of the NCTC, the Secretaries of State and Defense, and the Administrator of USAID. We will also make copies of this report available to others upon request.

Charles Michael Johnson Jr. Director, International Affairs and Trade Congressional Requesters The Honorable Howard Berman, Chairman The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, Ranking Member Committee on Foreign Affairs - House of Representatives The Honorable Gary Ackerman, Chairman The Honorable Mike Pence, Ranking Member Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives

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The Honorable John F. Tierney, Chairman The Honorable Christopher Shays, Ranking Member Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs Committee on Oversight and Government Reform , House of Representatives The Honorable Tom Harkin The Honorable Robert Menendez , United States Senate

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APPENDIX I: COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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APPENDIX II: COMMENTS FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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APPENDIX III: COMMENTS FROM THE U.S. AGENCY

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FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT

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END NOTES

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1

These goals have been set forth in the 2002 National Security Strategy, the 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, the 2004 9/11 Commission Report, and endorsed by the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458, sec 7102 (b)(3)) and the Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53, sec. 2042(b)(2)). 2 The International Crisis Group is an independent, nonpartisan source of analysis on the prevention and resolution of global conflicts. 3 The administration‘s 2003 National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, the independent 9/11 Commission Report, and Congress‘s (1) Intelligence Reform Act and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108-458, sec. 7120) and (2) the Implementing the Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53, sec. 2042 (c)) all support the development of a comprehensive plan that uses all elements of national power. 4 We reported that strategic plans should clearly define objectives to be accomplished, identify the roles and responsibilities for meeting each objective, ensure that funding necessary to achieve the objectives is available, and employ monitoring mechanisms to determine progress and identify needed improvements. See GAO, Combating Terrorism: Law Enforcement Agencies Lack Directives to Assist Foreign Nations to Identify, Disrupt, and Prosecute Terrorists, GAO-07-697 (Washington, D.C.: May 25, 2007); GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO06-15 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005); and GAO, Combating Terrorism: Observations on National Strategies Related to Terrorism, GAO-03-519T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 3, 2003). 5 We will continue to monitor the status and progress of the U.S. government‘s effort in the FATA and report on the matter in a subsequent report. 6 The information on foreign law in this report does not reflect our independent legal analysis but is based on interviews and secondary sources. 7 P.L. 110-53, sec. 2042(d), Aug. 3, 2007. 8 The DNI‘s 2007 NIE and its 2008 Annual Threat Assessment are designed to help U.S. civilian and military leaders develop policies to protect U.S. national security interests and represent the combined judgments of 16 U.S. intelligence agencies, according to the NIE. 9 GAO arrived at this figure by analyzing Defense, State, and USAID documents. We identified major sources of U.S. funding to Pakistan, including $5.56 billion in CSF reimbursed through June 2007, $1.98 billion in development assistance (through December 2007), $1.6 billion in economic support fund cash transfers to support basic government operations, $1.22 billion for the purchase of military equipment, $9 million in international military training, and $202 million in border security assistance. 10 CSF reimburses Pakistan for a variety of activities in support of the global war on terror, the majority of which consists of Army and Air Force operations against terrorists in Pakistan‘s FATA and the border region. However, some of the CSF also supports Pakistani Navy and Air Force activities outside of this area. Defense was unable to quantify what was reimbursed for activities outside the FATA and the border region at the time of our report, and therefore, we included all CSF funds in figure 2 as funds going toward the FATA and the border region. 11 Department of State report to Congress, pursuant to Section 2042 of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commissions Act of 2007 (P.L. 110-53). 12 The NSC is charged with more effectively coordinating the policies and functions of the departments and agencies related to national security. The NSC advises the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security to enable the departments and agencies to cooperate more effectively in matters involving national security. 13 The NCTC is charged with conducting strategic operational planning for counterterrorism activities, integrating all instruments of national power—including diplomatic, military, intelligence, development assistance, economic, and law enforcement support—within and among agencies, with the ultimate goal of preventing future attacks against the United States and its interests worldwide. Both report directly to the President. 14 Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Feb. 5, 2008. 15 See GAO-07-697, GAO-06-15, and GAO-03-519T . 16 In commenting on this report, USAID stated they received $88 million for these efforts in the Fiscal Year 2007 Supplemental Appropriation. 17 GAO-07-697, GAO-06-15, and GAO-03-519T.

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Chapter 6

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY IN PAKISTAN: IMPLICATIONS FOR REGIONAL SECURITY, STABILITY, AND DEVELOPMENT: HEARING BEFORE THE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS

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United States Government Printing Office HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, WASHINGTON, DC The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:04 a.m. in room 2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard L. Berman (chairman of the committee) presiding. Chairman Berman. The committee will come to order. We have a really very impressive panel of witnesses for today‘s hearing. We also have a little partisan conflict on the House floor that may mess up my notion of a sensible and orderly way to go through with this hearing. But we will get started and see where that takes us. We are very delighted that the three of you made the time out of your schedule to come here today. Today we turn our attention to a region that defense experts have singled out as perhaps the most likely launching point of a future al-Qaeda terrorist strike. The tribal regions of Pakistan provide safe haven for thousands of militants and terrorists who seek not only to destabilize Pakistan and neighboring Afghanistan but who also plan attacks around the globe. For this reason I believe that it is imperative that we review United States foreign policy toward Pakistan to find out what is working, what is not, and how a new administration should approach this critical region. With new civilian and military leadership in Pakistan we now have a chance to establish a sustainable and mutually beneficial bilateral relationship: A relationship that recognizes

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how unfettered extremism poses a threat to Pakistan, its neighbors and the world, a relationship that focuses on economic and development assistance, not as an after thought, but as the necessary foundation to promote long-term growth, and a relationship that adheres to the values that both of our nations inherently share, bolstering forces of moderation, holding dear the principles of democracy, and promoting peace and prosperity throughout Pakistan. However, recent reports of negotiations between the Government of Pakistan and tribal leaders present a challenge for the United States: How can we balance the need to engage with certain tribal leaders but still hold firm against negotiating with terrorists who will continue to fight United States and NATO troops in Afghanistan regardless of any truce? I believe we must remain steadfast in our fight against the irreconcilable forces who wish to attack our country, destabilize the region, and return Afghanistan to the oppressive, hateful regime that gave safe harbor to al-Qaeda and other terrorist elements. However, this approach will require greater cooperation between Pakistan and Afghanistan, a concerted effort to show the Pakistani people that this is not just a fight for America but also for a secure Pakistan. The obvious first step would be to create a comprehensive United States strategy toward Pakistan. But a report released 2 weeks ago by the Government Accountability Office shows that this administration has failed to create any comprehensive interagency plan to tackle the problems of this region. Without a plan, how are we measuring, how do we measure our performance in meeting objectives? Without a plan, how do we assure the American people that their taxpayer dollars are being put to good use? Without a plan we make ourselves susceptible to agencies working at cross-purposes with each other. And we are now seeing signs of just these dangers coming to fruition. Yesterday the GAO released proof that the funds doled out by our Government to support the fight against extremism in the region have been subject to little or not internal oversight. For example, why is the United States Government being asked to reimburse Pakistan for air defense radar maintenance? Al-Qaeda is not known to have an air force, and the purpose of these funds is to support the fight against extremists, not to boost Pakistan‘s conventional warfare capability. This calls into question not just the value this administration has put on these tax dollars, but the effectiveness of what they are doing to keep us safe. It is time we learned from our Government‘s mistakes and move forward. Bringing stability and growth to Pakistan, winning in Afghanistan, and fulfilling vital United States national security goals are all at stake. The democratic institutions of Pakistan are our allies, and it is only through support for these institutions that we will ultimately serve the Pakistani people and gain their cooperation in our mutual fight against extremism. I look forward to hearing the testimonies of our three distinguished witnesses. But first we turn first to the ranking member of the committee, my friend Ms. Ros-Lehtinen of Florida for her opening remarks. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman, for calling this important and timely hearing on an issue of great importance for United States interests in South and Central Asia, as well as for our security here at home. Before I address the subject of this hearing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to note that however great the issues and partisan considerations that sometimes divide members on this committee, and in the House as a whole, ultimately our ability to make the process work and secure the public‘s interest rests upon our ability to trust one another. I regret that this bedrock requirement has been called into doubt in recent days. And I refer to language, as we

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have discussed, Mr. Chairman, in the Security Assistance bill that this committee approved last Wednesday. As you are aware, Mr. Chairman, prior to the markup we reached an agreement that I would cosponsor the bill and seek the support of all my Republican colleagues with provisions included in the text that I believed were necessary to prevent North Korea from being prematurely removed from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, and to ensure that any agreement with North Korea be truly verifiable. The members of this committee then endorsed this agreement when they rendered their unanimous support for the Security Assistance bill containing the compromise language. To my great surprise, less than a day after the committee‘s vote that agreement was essentially tossed aside and my staff was presented with a revised text negotiated between the Democrat majority of this committee and the leaders of the Senate Appropriations and Foreign Relations Committees which weakened the provisions in this agreement that we had worked out with the chairman, and again supported by members of this committee. The new text was a fait accompli, as efforts to restore elements of these provisions were effectively ignored. Mr. Chairman, if we are to proceed in a cooperative manner we need to be certain that agreements that have been negotiated in good faith with you and the members of the majority will be honored throughout and not unilaterally reopened or set aside whenever circumstances change. And I hope that trust and confidence can be restored. In our brief conversation before today‘s hearing, Mr. Chairman, you assured me that this will not happen again. I thank you. I trust you. And I trust that the dedicated, hard-working staff continues our bipartisan approach. Turning to the subject of today‘s hearing, Mr. Chairman, the Afghan-Pakistan border region is of critical geostrategic importance and the United States must continue to work closely with both the Afghan and Pakistani Governments to counter common enemies that are exploiting ungoverned territory in that region. The recent and highly significant democratic transition in Islamabad opens up exciting new opportunities for the people of Pakistan and for the future of United States-Pakistan relations. The United States congratulates Pakistan on the success of its recent elections. Despite enormous odds, the will of the people prevailed. And although the new government still enjoys strong public support, it also confronts a daunting agenda, from strengthening Parliament and other civilian institutions, to bolstering an independent judiciary and the rule of law, and working through challenges of rising energy demand and skyrocketing food prices. With respect to critically important security challenges, in the long run the best antidote for Islamic extremism should be a legitimately elected government that can fight this threat with the backing of the Pakistani people. In the short run, however, new uncertainties have emerged that our two governments must tackle together. The good news is that Pakistan‘s new government has correctly identified the need to develop a comprehensive counterinsurgency plan, including economic and social development and the integration of the tribal areas into the mainstream of the greater society. The goal of this plan is to eliminate safe havens and to marginalize the appeal of local militants. Contrary to popular misconceptions, this new approach largely dovetails with an evolving U.S. strategy premised on the understanding that military efforts alone have not eliminated extremist recruitment, training or operations in the tribal areas, and that countering extremist

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influence in these areas requires robust economic development and new security capabilities supported by the U.S. and others. However, the new government is also pursuing problematic new so-called peace agreements with local militants along the Afghan border. The CIA Director just a month ago said that the situation on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border ‗‗presents a clear and present danger to Afghanistan, to Pakistan, and to the West in general,‘‘ as well as to ‗‗the United States in particular.‘‘ I look forward to hearing the comments from the witnesses. And in conclusion, let me just reiterate that it remains in our nation‘s long-term interest to forge an enduring strategic partnership with a democratic, stable, and prosperous Pakistan that remains a strong partner in the campaign against Islamic militants and which maintains responsible controls over its nuclear weapons technology. We look forward to working with the Pakistani Government and the Pakistani people to accomplish this worthy goal. And I yield back the balance of my time. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Berman. The time of the gentlelady has expired. And I am pleased to recognize the chairman of the Middle East and South Asia Subcommittee, the gentleman from New York, Mr. Ackerman, for 3 minutes. Mr. Ackerman. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. ‗‗The United States has not met its national security goals to destroy the terrorist threat and close the safe haven in Pakistan‘s FATA region.‘‘ With that quote, the Government Accountability Office has clearly and succinctly described what is wrong with United States policy toward Pakistan: It has failed. GAO goes on to note that since 2003, the administration and Congress have recognized that all elements of national power needed to be brought together to deal with terrorist threats emanating from the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. Yet despite demands from Congress, there remains no integrated strategy and our Embassy in Islamabad has had to cobble one together for itself without support from Washington. But we were able to send the Government of Pakistan $10 billion. Ten billion dollars, and we have not met our national security goals. Yet the Bush administration is not actually seeking a new strategy. In fact, it seems they would like to double down on the guy who got them this far. But the inconvenient truth, if I can borrow a phrase, is that elections have produced a new government that ran against the administration‘s man and implicitly against his relationship with the United States. We need a new plan. The new plan needs to build a relationship with Pakistani institutions, not just one Pakistani individual. It needs to help Pakistanis build on the foundations of moderate Islam, devotion to democracy and justice, and a vibrant civil society. The United States needs to have many friends in Pakistan, not just one. But our friends in Pakistan must come to recognize that the terrorists who inhabit their borders are an existential threat to them. The Pakistani people, and not just government ministers, must see the fight against terrorism as more than simply yet another war the Americans want them to fight. I understand the new government‘s desire to distance itself from President Musharraf‘s policies and, by extension, to distance itself from us. But I also remain deeply concerned that the policy of negotiating with terrorists is one that has failed in the past and will likely fail again. Perhaps this is the course of democracy in Pakistan, that the path of negotiations must be tried once more before a democratically elected government can apply more forceful measures.

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To be fair, the United States must give the democratic government we demanded the room to resolve its own issues, less it be seen as merely a pawn. But if the reported deal with Baitullah Mehsud fails I hope the government in Islamabad will vigorously pursue the people who intend nothing but ill for their country. Too many innocent Pakistanis have died at the hands of terrorist for them to do otherwise. The United States needs the continued cooperation of Pakistan in the fight against terrorism, but we also need to give the government enough political space that the fight becomes their as much as ours. To date, the Bush administration has not shown the deftness necessary to accomplish such a feat, but then again, we can always pray. Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired. And we now turn to our distinguished panel of witnesses. First we will hear from Ambassador Richard Holbrooke, current vice chairman of Perseus, a leading private equity firm. Ambassador Holbrooke has served in numerous capacities for the United States Government. Most recently he was the United States Ambassador to the United Nations where he was also a member of President Clinton‘s cabinet. In addition, as Assistant Secretary of State for Europe he was the chief architect to the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreement that ended the war in Bosnia. Appropriate for this hearing, Ambassador Holbrooke recently took a trip to Pakistan to get his sense of the political dynamics at play. His insights will be invaluable to this committee, having served both within and outside the administration on such high profile foreign policy issues. Next we will hear from Ambassador Tom Pickering. Ambassador Pickring is currently vice chairman at Hills and Company which provides advice and counsel to a number of U.S. enterprises. Ambassador Pickring has an exemplary public service career that has spanned five decades, including service as the United States Ambassador to the United Nations, and Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs. And since I got to Congress, Ambassador, every hot spot from Latin America and Central America to the Middle East to India and around the world. So he is well-versed on the issues confronting the U.S. national security objectives in the region, and I look forward to his frank assessment on today‘s hearing topic. And, finally, we welcome the presence of General James Jones, who is currently President and CEO of the U.S. Chamber Institute for 21st Century Energy. General Jones is a decorated combat veteran who retired after 40 years of active duty service. General Jones most recently served as the 32nd Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Supreme Allied Commander Europe. He has worked closely with government, business and civic leaders in an effort to protect and advance United States and allied interests around the world, most recently on issues dealing with South Asia. Along with Ambassador Pickring, General Jones was a co-author of a report released by the Afghanistan Study Group which in part focused on the threats posed by the tribal regions of Pakistan. General Jones, we are happy to have you here today. Ambassador Holbrooke, your entire statement will be part of the record. And we await your testimony.

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STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE RICHARD C. HOLBROOKE, VICE CHAIRMAN, PERSEUS LLC (FORMER UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS) Ambassador Holbrooke. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is a great honor to appear before your committee. Before I begin testimony, with your permission I would just like to acknowledge the fact that Tom Lantos passed away a few weeks ago. He was a very dear friend of mine personally. I think he was a great chairman and a great American. I know you have honored him in magnificent ways here in the Capitol, but I just wanted to echo my own personal sense of loss and admiration. And I might just add, that in the last talk I had with him 2 weeks, less than 2 weeks before he died, knowing his situation he went out of his way to talk about how important this committee would be and how, what other confidence he had with the personal leadership that you would exhibit, as well as you, Congresswoman. And that was the bulk of our last conversation. And I just wanted to say that. You have called a hearing this morning on what I would submit is the second most urgent problem facing the next President of the United States after Iraq, and one that will go on far, far longer than the war in Iraq. I am not talking about Pakistan, Mr. Chairman, I am talking about what I would call theater AFPAK, the Afghan-Pakistan theater of operations. Important though Pakistan is in its own right, the comments that you and your colleagues have just made made clear why we are here today: It is because of Afghanistan. And there is no success possible in Afghanistan as long as Pakistan‘s tribal areas are a sanctuary for the Taliban and al-Qaeda, and a threat to the United States‘ national security continues to grow. All of the comments that you and your colleagues have just made, the GAO report, the terrific report that General Jones and Ambassador Pickring put out, my own observations on my trip last month to Pakistan and Afghanistan, all support the same general concept: This war in Afghanistan is stalemated at best and, at worst, we may be losing ground in some areas. But yet the administration denies that fact in almost every way. The last time the three of us sat at a table together was on the Senate side a few weeks ago. And after General and Assistant Secretary of State for this region was asked specifically whether he agreed with the conclusions of the Jones-Pickering report, which were that Afghanistan was not yet a failed state but was a failing state, the Assistant Secretary of State for the region flatly said no, said that he could not imagine—these are direct, accurate paraphrases—he could not imagine that anyone could not see how much better things were in Afghanistan. And he left your colleagues on the Senate side somewhat flummoxed. My own trip does not support his conclusions. I want to address very, very quickly three issues: One, domestic situation in Pakistan; two, the tribal areas; and three, the Afghanistan. On the first issue I agree completely with what you and Congressman Ackerman have just said. I think the only—that the best thing that has happened in Pakistan in a long time was this election. The situation is better in Pakistan today domestically than it has been in recent memory. President Musharraf is still President of the country but he has essentially been reduced to the constitutional powers of a chief of state, not a head of government, when he was forced to take off his uniform. General Kiani has made clear that he wants to keep the military out of politics. It is indispensable that take place. Nonetheless, there are many people

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in the administration who still are nostalgic for General Musharraf. It is always easier to deal with a general and a single person than a complicated coalition government. And what you have between Mr. Zardari and the PPP and Mr. Sharif and his party is an uneasy grand coalition, similar to Israel. That is not a very easy way to govern. But it is what the people wanted. And the most important thing to note is that the militant Islamic parties got only about 4 or 5 percent of the vote, a very dramatic repudiation of the journalistic cliche´ that Pakistan is the world‘s most dangerous nation. It is not the world‘s most dangerous nation, however, its tribal areas do pose a problem for us and must be paid attention to. So I would say that the domestic situation in Islamabad—and I happened to be there just as the National Assembly was taking office and I spent a lot of time with the new parliamentarians, and I saw the spirit and energy, that is an encouraging situation. But it needs strong American support. And I might say, it needs American understanding because democracy is not always a clean process. But the diminution of President Musharraf‘s power is in the interests of the country. And to his credit he seems to have accepted it. As we speak now, very complicated negotiations are going on between Prime Minister Galani, President Musharraf and the two party leaders, neither of whom are in the Parliament of course, over the future of the presidency. America‘s voice must be clear here: The best thing for Pakistan is democracy internally. However, there is no democracy in the Tribal Areas. As everyone knows, the Tribal Areas, often called the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, so if I might I will call them FATA without confusing them with a certain other Fatah to the west, the FATA areas are not democratic. Political parties are not allowed. They are administered under a law written by the British under the Indian Raj in 1901, and they are run in a very peculiar way. And this situation has led rise to a tremendous opportunity for the militants when they were driven out of Afghanistan. This delicate balance of independent tribes going back centuries worked until the United States successfully drove the Taliban out of much of Afghanistan in 2001, 2002, and the Taliban and al-Qaeda moved across the border into these areas, stirring up immense amounts of trouble which is continuing. I went to Peshawar. I went up to the Khyber Pass; I met with the Frontier Corps leadership. And I will tell you frankly, Mr. Chairman, I do not have a clue what is going on in the FATA. And if anyone ever comes before this committee and says so you better ask twice, because it is one of the most elusive areas in the world. But to go back to what you and your colleagues have just said, it is absolutely true, as the GAO has said, that there is not strategy for the United States. Worst than that, the Pakistani Government which is focused on its internal domestic line-up in this new era of democracy in Pakistan after a decade of military rule, is also not clear what it is doing. There are very credible rumors and concerns that one of the things that the government might do is to cut deals with some of the militants that would allow them to have a free hand in Afghanistan if they stayed out of the populated areas to the east in Pakistan. Two years ago when Musharraf tried a similar deal it was a disaster. And by the way, when I saw him privately he admitted that it did not work out very well. Everyone says, ‗‗Oh, this one would be different.‘‘ But the truth is, Mr. Chairman, you, the members of the committee, we at this witness table, none of us know what is being negotiated there. The only thing we know is that it is of the most immense importance to American security interests and will directly affect the lives of NATO forces, especially

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American forces operating in Afghanistan. Lives, American lives are at stake and we do not know what is happening. The American Government says it has a plan for the FATA. And the plan as it was briefed to me is approximately $750 million over 5 years for reconstruction. This was presented to me with some pride by American officials at a very high level. I would submit to you and your colleagues that this is a pathetic amount of money: $150 million a year for reconstruction when everyone agrees that this area is a part of the Afghan theater of operations. You have been authorizing billions of dollars for Afghanistan, and I support that, and yet the State Department and the administration have asked for less than, for less than 5 percent of that money for this all-important area. Furthermore, the bulk of this money will never reach Pakistan. And I want to stress this to all of you. The system that this administration has put into place, which is essentially to privatize foreign policy, allows, and particularly foreign assistance, means that you will give the money to the State Department or AID, they will contract with NGOs and consultant groups, not necessarily non-profits either, in the United States, and those groups will find subcontractors on the ground in Pakistan. And nobody in the Embassy in Islamabad will know where this money is going. You will not know where it is going. I have been reliably told that a very substantial percentage of it never leaves the United States, it goes into overhead. And I would respectfully recommend to your committee that you hold separate hearings on this question because it is not restricted just to Pakistan. And the American taxpayers are losing billions of dollars. And even more important than the waste, we have no idea how the money is being used. I sat next to the Minister of Education of one of the states at a dinner in Peshawar. And she was just leaving the government. And I said, ‗‗What are you going to do?‘‘ And she said, ‗‗I am going to go back to my NGO.‘‘ And she will be the recipient of some of this money. She was a very impressive person; I do not mean to criticize her. But none of you in this room and no one in Washington will know what her personal politics are, how the money would go. Last, on Afghanistan itself, with your permission I would like to submit five articles, four of which I wrote recently, and the fifth of which was written by my chief of staff Ashley Baumer, about the Afghan-Pakistan area. [The information referred to follows:]

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Ambassador Holbrooke. And I would just conclude with one bleak but unavoidable conclusion I came back from this trip with. We are now in the 7th year of the war in Afghanistan. This war is going to be lot longer than the war in Iraq. It is my conclusion that the Taliban cannot win because they are basing their policies on suicide bombers and terrorism. That is not a winning strategy. We should never confuse the Taliban with the Viet Cong who it is a whole different thing. On the other hand, the government we are supporting cannot win. It is riddled with corruption, it is weak, it is making all sorts of very unfortunate deals with the most conservative elements within Afghanistan itself, elements whose ideology is very close to the Taliban but happen to be in the Parliament. And the United States is getting deeper and deeper into a situation from which it can neither leave nor succeed in. The theory, of course, is that as we put troops into Afghanistan they will clear out areas and then we will turn those areas over to the local military and police. But the fact is it will not happen because we are so good, for example, they just dropped 3,100 of General Jones‘ Marines right into the middle of Helmand Province in the last few weeks and they are in the process of doing it, and they are going to be fantastic. And everywhere the Marines go, and they are going to the toughest part of the country, they will clear out areas. The people will be very pleased by and large because they hate the Taliban. And the Americans will be welcomed, as they always are, for what they do. Behind them will come works: Bridges, roads, schools. But the theory will get caught on the dilemma, Mr. Chairman, of whether or not the United States and NATO can ever turn those regions over to the local security forces. The military is not too good but slowly improving. The police, as their report said, the police are riddled with corruption. And there will be, and the military, improving though they are, are never in the foreseeable future going to be able to take over the security responsibility. We provide the logistics, the communications, a lot of the planning, the close air support. And we are efficient, we are not corrupt. And by doing all that we are running the risk of succeeding short term and creating a long-term dependency. This is the dilemma that we must face. And that is why I conclude reluctantly that this will be ultimately the longest war in American history but, Mr. Chairman, one we must wage. Thank you. Chairman Berman. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. Ambassador Pickring, do you have a more upbeat story to tell us?

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE THOMAS R. PICKERING, VICE CHAIRMAN, HILLS & COMPANY (FORMER UNITED STATES AMBASSADOR TO THE UNITED NATIONS) Ambassador Pickring. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Let me begin by joining Dick in his kind words about Tom Lantos whom we all admired, worked with closely, and felt the great loss that I know you and the committee share and the House shares in his absence from us all today. Let me also say that there is indeed much of what Dick has said that I think I find myself in very broad general agreement with. Much of the predicate of that, as Dick made clear

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himself, has to do with Afghanistan. And, in effect, we have a combination of three interrelated, perhaps inextricably intertwined very serious problems. Afghanistan, the tribal border regions which provide a special set of concerns and difficulties in dealing with that issue and Pakistan itself. And I know you have wanted to address these questions broadly. I would like just to spend a few minutes doing two or three things: One, trying to bring this committee roughly up to date on what we found were the major problem areas in Afghanistan and the thoughts that we had on what could be done about them, with particular relevance to Pakistan; and in addition I will have just a few comments to make from my own background and experience on Pakistan and the frontier tribal areas to try to respond to both the GAO report, with which I agree, and to your concerns on this. There is no question that Afghanistan has come to a critical crossroads and that 2 years ago we might have sublimely thought that it was well on the road to some kind of success. Now, after 6 years it is under serious threat from resurgent violence, weakening international resolve, mounting regional challenges, and a growing lack of confidence in the part of the people themselves. The U.S. and the international community have tried to win the struggle, in our view, with too few military, insufficient economic aid, and most importantly, without a clear and consistent strategy broadly agreed among the participants, including both the Afghans, the United States and our international partners. We now have to deal, unfortunately, with a reconstructed Taliban and with al-Qaeda forces in Afghanistan and in Pakistan, with a runaway opium economy and with severe poverty faced by most Afghans and, indeed, with a locus of central support that comes in an out of the border regions which continues to aggravate and make an already difficult problem extremely hard to deal with. Why is this important? Well, certainly in the words of our report Afghan has been, as Dick has made clear, is a significant national security imperative for us in terms of finding success there. Failure means new threats from Taliban, and particularly from al-Qaeda in a new sanctuary for them, and to our interests in the region and at home. Internationally it is seen a weakening of resolve on the part of our friends and our partners and, indeed, on the part of our enemies. It is clear that without an overall strategic vision to reinvigorate where we are we will not be able to attain unified or reachable goals or, indeed, as you made clear this morning, Mr. Chairman, to measure any progress. We are in the world if we do not know where we are going, any road will take us there. I think the corollary to that is if you do not know where you are going, any road is a road to failure. These are important points and I believe will be brought home in our recommendations. The most immediate threat remains the anti-government insurgency that continues to grow and has grown over the last 2 years. Attacks on Afghan military and police forces have surged. There have been some successes in targeting Taliban and the leadership, and our forces continue to show success. But significant areas in Afghanistan, particularly in the south, have been lost to friendly control and remain certainly in doubt and highly contested. Our allies also believe the mission is failing and NATO members have shown over the last 6 months an egregious interest, in my view, in departing from the scene and in certainly trying to find a way not to move ahead with the kind of progress that we have in mind but to cut losses and to remain static. A failure here on the part of NATO would also damage the future of the organization itself. We see an acute need, thus, for coordination, for military and especially police training, for the need to bring together the government, which is weak and is failing and which has shown much too much evidence of corruption. A sustainable government cannot— without a sustainable government and an honest government there is

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little that we can depend upon in the way of progress toward effective development or, indeed, political legitimacy. There are many other points that our particular report makes, but an important and I think significant point related to the purpose of the hearing is that Afghanistan cannot be considered as an isolated state that we can deal with on its own. That has not been true for a very long time; it is even less true now. It is vulnerable as never before to external pressure. And what goes on, particularly as we said 4 months ago, in the Pakistan border region is critical to success of failure. Kabul and the government there have to have better relations with their neighbors, but particularly with Pakistan. And the commitment on the Pakistani part to deal with the tribal areas in the Federally Administered Territories is something that is particularly challenging and elusive, and your focus on it I believe is correct and important and lies at one of the centers of the way forward, if I can call it that, if it can be corrected. We made several recommendations. I want to repeat just a few of those as further background for the close interrelationship between the problems in Afghanistan, the Tribal Areas, and in Pakistan. One of those goes to the heart of what we have been saying back and forth to each other across this table this morning. We felt it was important to create a group, perhaps eminent persons from among our allies and our partners, to work together with the Afghans to put together this long-term coherent strategy. It would be a strategy that would attempt to reflect intimate knowledge of Afghanistan, not necessarily to be made in one of the partner countries or the United States, but bring to bear the full efforts that all of those parties can collect together to deal with this issue. We think it is important to decouple in this country legislative and executive branch consideration of Iraq and Afghanistan. Up until now Afghanistan has slid into the debate and indeed the question of funding in Iraq as what we used to know in the Uniform Code of Military Justice as a lesser included offense. In a way, this needs obviously to stand on its own to get the kind of attention and focus that I know you and the committee would like to bring to it. And finally, we believe there needs to be a more coherent, more structured, more unified United States effort, perhaps around a specially appointed person to deal with Afghanistan, the border regions, and at least the Afghan-related problems of Pakistan. That person needs to be high in the administration, closely coordinating our activities, and helping in fact to execute the plan that we talked about. We need greater consolidation, I believe, of our military efforts. And I will let General Jones talk about that. We do need, we believe, more forces on the ground. But even more importantly, as Dick pointed out, when we and our forces are successful we leave behind a security mission that cannot yet be performed either by the Afghan National Army or by the Afghan police. Particularly the latter, at least the experts in our committee believed, requires a great deal of reinforcement and training. They are far below the standard that they need to achieve to have any capacity in fact to deal with the continuing security problems after military engagement while in fact rebuilding and reconstruction takes place. The United States could and should play a larger role in dealing with the Afghan National Police. We need a coherent and resource strategy to build the capacity and the legitimacy of the Afghan Government. This means tackling tough issues of corruption. And in that country it will not be easy. But we need to begin by developing pockets of competence in the country,

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bringing together judiciary, justice, prosecutorial and police functions around a system that can work and in which people gradually assume a confidence of posture. Narcotics remains a major question. It is in fact clearly one of the most important issues. It is frequently cited that 93 percent of the world‘s heroin originates in Afghanistan, even after in fact we have become, at least for all intents and purposes the military masters of that country in terms of when, where and how we wish to present ourselves on the ground there. In lieu, we believe, of massive eradication attempts we need an approach that can help to build a permanent effort upon current cultivators‘ part to be committed to alternatives. It has been fascinating to me, I do not think it is believable but nevertheless it is consistently repeated, and there may be a kernel of truth in this, that a very large percentage of Afghans engaged in narcotics production at least are willing to say to investigators they would take half the income if they could find a legitimate alternative crop to engage in. We need to test that. If in fact only half those people are telling the truth we are further ahead than I think we are in terms of current approaches toward that issue. And I have had the ‗‗pleasure‘‘ indeed, and I use that word in quotations, of dealing with narcotics issues on a number of continents in a number of jobs in the past. Economic development and reconstruction is badly lagging. We need Afghans to support the effort. We need a central focus in their government on making that happen. And as has been said several times, we need quickly to follow up the clearance of Taliban and other forces from provinces, towns and cities with development assistance. Finally, the neighborhood and your focus. We need to embark on a long-term and sustained effort to reduce traditional antagonisms between Afghanistan and Pakistan. And, indeed, the border area is heavily dominated by the Pashtuns. And true, in working with them, despite the enormous tribal animosities there needs to be a way to begin the process of building back some kind of confidence and indeed shaking their current faith in the Taliban, faith which I think in part is imposed and faith which is in part derived from their desire somehow to avoid central control. Extremist madrassahs and training camps are a beginning place to move. Encouraging the relaxation of Pakistani restrictions on the movement of legitimate goods in an out of Afghanistan will be a help. We need to find a way to deal with the long-term and somewhat dangerous dispute between Afghanistan and Pakistan over the actual border between the two countries. This will not happen right away but it is something we need to work on. With respect to Pakistan itself, Dick I think has more than adequately summarized the question. We no longer have, if indeed we ever had, a single individual on whom we can rely in the war on terror in Afghanistan. Secondly, we now have an electoral process: Parties that have moved to the fore as a result of democratic competition, parties which are strange bedfellows historically and which have had not, in my view, a fantastically remarkable track record either in governments or indeed in honesty in government. They will somehow now have to be dealt with in a new conundrum to move them ahead. They will have to assume the responsibility, I believe, for trying to make progress in the FATA area. Many have suggested—— Chairman Berman. Mr. Ambassador, I am going to have to interrupt. Ambassador Pickring. I will finish with two sentences. Chairman Berman. Okay. I yield.

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Ambassador Pickring. Many have suggested there needs to be stronger Federal control in this area. I believe they are right but I do not believe that that is going to be an easy or simple proposition. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. [The prepared statement of Mr. Pickering follows:]

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Prepared Statement of the Honorable Thomas R. Pickering, Vice Chairman, Hills & Company (Former United States Ambassador to the United Nations) Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: It is an honor to appear before you today to address one of the most pressing and emergent issues we face as a nation. One which for too long has been hidden by our focus and concentration on other issues in the region and beyond. In recognition of the growing crisis in Afghanistan and its relationship to Pakistan, three major American organizations each carried out studies of what was happening and what needs to be done to deal with the problems. It is no accident that the issue is so exigent that when the three organizations gathered to discuss their reports, they immediately agreed to issue their reports together and to join forces in their presentations. That was done on January 30, 2008. Today‘s hearing gives me a chance to highlight aspects of the report I had the welcome pleasure of co-chairing with General James Jones, former NATO SACEUR and US Combatant Commander in Europe. My task is a simple one. In order to highlight the urgency and the importance of the issue I want to present you a summary of the reports key conclusions on what is happening in Afghanistan. Secondly, I want to provide you with the most important recommendations of a distinguished group of panel members each one of whom has had extensive experience in Afghanistan or Pakistan and the region. I don‘t claim special knowledge or experience in these two significant countries and have relied heavily on the team‘s expertise and outside experts to make and justify both our conclusions and recommendations. I will draw directly in many cases on the wording of the report to make sure that its points are clearly and crisply conveyed to you.

ASSESSMENT Afghanistan is at a critical crossroads. Six years of progress is under serious threat from resurgent violence, weakening international resolve, mounting regional challenges and a growing lack of confidence on the part of the Afghan people. The US and the international community have tried to win the struggle with too few military, insufficient economic aid, and without a clear and consistent strategy. We must now deal with reconstituted Taliban and al Qa‘eda forces in Afghanistan and Pakistan, a runaway opium economy and the severe poverty faced by most Afghans. Why is this so important to us? In the words of our report, success in Afghanistan is a critical national security imperative. Failure means new threats from the Taliban and al

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Qa‘eda from a new sanctuary for them in Afghanistan to our interests in the region and at home. Internationally we are seeing a weakening of resolve among our friends and partners. Polls in many NATO countries show public attitudes are divided on bringing troops from their countries home immediately or remaining until the country is stabilized. In all but the US and the UK, majorities called for withdrawal as soon as possible. It is clear that there is a lack of an overall, overarching strategic vision to reinvigorate the effort to attain unified, reachable goals. This year has been the deadliest for US and coalition troops since the invasion of 2001. The most immediate threat is from the anti-government insurgency that has grown significantly in the last two years. Attacks against Afghan military and police forces have surged. Some success has been achieved in targeting Taliban leadership, but significant areas of Afghanistan, particularly in the south have been lost to friendly control. Some of our allies believe the mission is failing and several NATO members are wavering in their troop commitments, offsetting the strong involvement of Britain, Denmark, Poland, Canada, Australia and the Netherlands among others. A failure of NATO in Afghanistan would damage the future of the organization itself. Realizing an Afghanistan that is stable and secure and free of influence from radical, Islamic forces is a core objective. Taliban and al Qa‘eda maintain close links. There is an acute need for international coordination on both the military and civilian side. Separate military commands with some overlapping missions complicate the process as does the lack of a senior civilian leader. The recent appointment of Ambassador Kai Eide of Norway was a helpful solution to that critical issue. Military and especially police training are lagging as are counter narcotics efforts and dicial and penal reform. Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) fielded by many governments have separate reporting channels back to their capitals and there is no unified field theory on how they should operate, be coordinated or accomplish their missions. A recent report in the Washington Post concluded that: ‗‗While the (US) military finds success in a virtually unbroken line of tactical achievements, (US) intelligence officials worry about a looming strategic failure.‘‘ Six years after the fall of the Taliban Government in Afghanistan the country is still facing a fundamental crisis of governance. Without an honest, sustainable government there can be little effective development and even less political legitimacy. The country has ‗‗a stunning dearth of human capital‘‘ and a number of leaders, often in the provinces, are considered to be serial human rights abusers by much of the population. This shakes confidence in the rule of law and democracy and overall governance in critical ways. Underpaid civil servants are asked to undertake dangerous counter narcotics missions and easily fall prey to bribery and corruption in return. The public looks to the government not only for housing and health care, roads and schools, but just as much if not more for security and justice. At present the government annot do this and that leads neighbors, aid donors and troop contributors to hedge their bets. Former US Commander, LTG Karl Eikenberry, has said the greatest long-term threat is not the resurgence of the Taliban but ‗‗the potential irretrievable loss of the Government of Afghanistan.‘‘

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Equally, if not more disturbing are important findings from 2006 showing the spread of narcotics cultivation from 165,000 hectares to 193,000; more land than is under coca cultivation than in Latin America. And while some key provinces in the north and center are being reported as opium free, some key figures in those provinces continue to profit handsomely from drug trafficking. Extensive receipts from this activity—‗‗drug money‘‘—weakens key institutions and fuels and strengthens the Taliban, while at the same time corrupting the country‘s governmental leadership. There are serious disputes about how best to deal with the drug economy. Some want large scale, aerial eradication with the potential for serious, disruptive impacts on rural Afghans and their livelihood. Others are counseling more gradual but more complete approaches seeking to find crop substitutes and other supports for the 90 percent of Afghans who have said they are willing to abandon poppy cultivation if they can count on earning half as much from legal activities. Closely linked, but also independently important for Afghanistan‘s future, are questions of development and reconstruction. It is the second lowest country on the UN‘s Human Development Index for 2007–08. Life expectancy is short, infant mortality high and access to clean water and health services severely limited. Nevertheless, there are some positive economic indicators—8.7% growth (against a small base), low inflation, a stable currency against the dollar and significant foreign exchange reserves. Refugees are returning, agricultural output is up and roads are being repaired and rebuilt to the rural areas. The lack of security has disrupted trade, communications, transport and the energy infrastructure. Even after six years, foreign assistance amounts are hard to tabulate and coordination is weak. School populations have boomed particularly among girls and efforts are being made to fund primary health care. While some experts say it is an exaggeration, claims that only 10% of assistance gets to Afghans are worthy of attention and correction of the faults in these programs is badly needed. Finally, Afghanistan can no longer be considered as an isolated state to be dealt with on its own. It is vulnerable as never before to external pressure and what goes on, especially in the Pakistan border region, is critical to success or failure. Kabul needs better relations with its neighbors, especially coordination with Pakistan and a commitment on the part of Pakistan to deal with its own tribal areas in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) region, something that is particularly challenging and elusive and has been over the history of modern Pakistan. With all of these difficulties there is clear reason why we call attention to the need to improve and make more strategic and effective our support for Afghanistan. It is a state poised for a slide. Our ability to provide the help and support needed to make a difference remains a key factor. And for that purpose, I want to provide from our report a key list of major recommendations. The report itself should be consulted for the full list which is put together with the objective of forming a coherent and collective whole. These recommendations are divided into three overarching recommendations and six groups—international coordination, security, governance and the rule of law, counternarcotics, economic development and reconstruction and Afghanistan and its neighbors.

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OVERARCHING RECOMMENDATIONS Create an Eminent Person Group from among our allies and partners to work with Afghans put together a long-term coherent strategy. Decouple Legislative and Executive Branch consideration of Iraq and Afghanistan. Develop a unified management structure led by a US Special Envoy to Afghanistan to coordinate and lead all aspects of US policy and implementation.

KEY ISSUE RECOMMENDATIONS 1. International Coordination Work to consolidate command structure, missions and rules of engagement to simplify and clarify lines of authority and strategic objectives. NATO needs to review its command and control arrangements to simplify and streamline them. Appoint a high-level civilian coordinator under a UN mandate to work closely with the Afghan Government and to oversee the full range of activities, including contacts with regional governments. (Done). Develop an agreed concept of operations, goals and objectives.

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2. Security Increase the number of NATO troops and match quantity with quality Focus more efforts on the training of the Afghan National Army (ANA) and provide training, adequate pay and equipment to the Afghan National Police (ANP) so they can maintain security once coalition forces depart. Increase the US role in rebuilding the ANP. Work to reduce civilian casualties with a goal of ‗‗zero civilian casualties.‘‘ Better integrate Afghan forces in US and NATO planning and operations. Develop with the international community a coordinated strategy in support of President Karzai‘s political reconciliation efforts. Create a regional plan to target risks coming out of the border with Pakistan involving both the Afghan and Pakistan Governments and work with Pakistan to get it more closely to incorporate FATA into Pakistan.

3. Governance and Rule of Law A coherent and resourced strategy to increase the reach, capacity and legitimacy of the Afghan Government should be a top priority. Refocus efforts to develop and integrated an effective judicial system,

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Develop governmental pockets of competence in the country bringing together the judiciary, justice and prosecutorial and police functions.

4. Counter-Narcotics Build and sequence the introduction and use of the core tools of counter-narcotics—crop eradication, interdiction (arrests and prosecutions) and economic development. Increase investment in development—infrastructure and industry. Enhance drug interdiction efforts. In lieu of massive eradication, adopt an ‗Afghan centric‘ approach including public information campaigns, voluntary restraint, full delivery of announced programs for alternative livelihood, and provision of all the services for alternative crops now provided by drug traffickers—(agricultural extension, futures contracts, guaranteed marketing, financing and micro finance). Beware of negative effect of large scale eradication without careful support mechanisms and programs of support for the government and its programs.

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5. Economic Development and Reconstruction The Afghan Government should get more credit for development and it needs help to improve its accounting and anti-corruption defenses. Get Afghans to appoint an Afghan development czar. Spread development more evenly around the country Follow up quickly clearance of Taliban forces from provinces with development assistance. Enhance infrastructure development

6. Afghanistan and its Neighbors Embark on a sustained and long term effort to reduce antagonisms between Afghanistan and Pakistan with the goals of rooting out support for the Taliban and its ideology, closing down extremist madrassehs and training camps, and encouraging a relaxation of Pakistani restrictions on transport of goods to Afghanistan. The Afghans should continue to be urged to accept the Durand line as its border with Pakistan. Pakistan needs to be encouraged to regain physical control in the FATA. An effort needs to be made to resume conversations with Iran to coax out greater cooperation in helping to stabilize Afghanistan. A regional peace process should be developed beginning with confidence building measures with the eventual goal for Afghanistan becoming a neutral state protected by commitments against interference in its internal affairs, clandestine weapons supply and a comprehensive regime to support the flow of trade.

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PAKISTAN This country has gone through a number of critical changes since our report was issued on January 30, 2008. Previous to that time, former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto had returned to her country, had entered into what appeared to be inconclusive negotiations with President Musharraf over future governance, and was assassinated on December 26th 2007. President Musharraf‘s position as leader of his country had been eroding since March of 2007 when he tried to remove the Chief Justice of his country who had challenged the government over a number of cases which they considered important to their remaining in power. Subsequently, there were public protests and a crack down on the Red Mosque in Islamabad occupied by extremists. These were handled ineptly. The army has been taking a heavy role in efforts to increase their authority and their independence of the government. Previously exiled Prime Minister, Nawaz Sharif, returned from exile in Saudi Arabia, and was re-exiled in apparent disregard of a court order. Sharif and the remnants of Bhutto‘s party, led by her controversial husband Asaf Zardari, contested an election postponed from early February 2008 and Bhutto‘s Party won with Musharraf left well behind. The two opposition parties made common cause and agreed on a coalition government which has in turn sought to reinstate the deposed Chief Justice in contrast to Musharraf‘s past efforts to side line him. Pakistan remains divided with Musharraf, previously the US chosen favorite, in serious if not total decline. The two opposition parties, weakened by the loss of Benazir Bhutto, are not certain to be able to provide the kind of leadership desired to see the struggle against terrorism and Islamic fundamentalism inside Pakistan and in Afghanistan continue and move toward success. The two countries, Afghanistan and Pakistan, are closely tied together in the struggle against terrorist fundamentalism, the Taliban and al Qa‘eda. There is no real resolution of the issue if the two are not closely combined in the solution. Pakistan has shown itself, in the short term at least, weakened in this effort by the shift away from Musharraf and an increasingly independent line taken by the opposition parties who are acutely aware of the dangers but also wish to avoid being seen as US surrogates inside Pakistan. Despite Pakistan‘s efforts over the past four and more years, the Taliban and al Qa‘eda have not diminished in size and influence inside Afghanistan and by the reckoning of some have actually grown in strength and control. Their new position makes the pursuit of them and the further development of Afghanistan even more difficult. Troubling too have been the reports that the very large sums of US money provided Pakistan for this effort have not seemingly made a serious difference and some reports indicate the possibility of diversion of such funds from programs designed to reinforce Pakistan‘s ability to fight the insurgency and the fundamentalists. Other outside commentators had also noted that large scale intervention in Pakistan‘s tribal areas in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas would themselves be ‗‗disastrous for both Pakistan and US interests and would not provide a lasting solution to the problem.‘‘[ K Inderfurth, April 1, 2008, File/The Boston Globe]

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CONCLUSION

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This is a critically important issue for this administration in the United States and for the next. There are many problems. Among the most important are governance and the building of Afghan capacity in all areas, drug cultivation and export, security in the border areas, the future of Pakistan and its critical role in Afghanistan, and cooperation among our allies. The urgency is real. The problems can be dealt with. It will require new and enlarged efforts by this committee and the Legislative and Executive branches together. I look forward to your questions and comments. Chairman Berman. Thank you. Our situation, panelists in general, is that we now have about 3 minutes to get to the floor to cast the first of what might be as few as six or as many as 12 votes, depending on the temperature on that side of the aisle, but not here but on the House floor. So, and I know Ambassador Holbrooke has to leave at noon. But my guess is the rest of you have plans as well. So we will get back here as quickly as possible or try to make arrangements for you to do what you need to do. I will come back at the end of these votes. But they usually are 5-minute votes so which the good news is they will be done quicker, the bad news is we cannot get back here in time to proceed with the hearing before we go for the next vote. So hope some of you will be here when we get back. [Recess.] Chairman Berman. There are two critical people to hear your testimony, General, and both of them happen to be here. We are in the middle of the votes but this one is a 15-minute vote so we thought we would come back to try and move through and get this. General, is this good for you? General Jones. Yes, it is. Chairman Berman. All right.

STATEMENT OF GENERAL JAMES L. JONES, USMC, RETIRED, PRESIDENT AND CEO , INSTITUTE FOR 21ST CENTURY ENERGY (FORMER SUPREME ALLIED COMMANDER, EUROPE) General Jones. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I will have just a short introduction and then we can get to your questions which I think will be more interesting. First, I would like to tell you how appreciative I am to be at the same table with Ambassadors Holbrooke and Pickering, both of whom I have known for a long time and have been very supportive and helpful to me in my official capacities as Commandant of the Marine Corps and, more specifically, as the NATO Commander and the Commander of United States Forces in Europe. And so it is a great pleasure to be with both of them to talk about this very, very difficult problem, and a problem that is of central importance to the security of the United States. My expertise lies more on the Afghan side of the border. I wanted to say that up front. Although I did have some dialogue with the Pakistani military in 2006 when NATO assumed responsibility for, completed its expansion in Afghanistan and assumed responsibility for

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security and stability, I visited Pakistan on two occasions and even hosted a high ranking delegation at my headquarters in Belgium, which was a first I think in the alliance. My sense is that what we have been witnessing is a migration from two bilateral problems, one in Pakistan and one in Afghanistan, to one big regional problem. And I think that the trend is that we are going to be dealing with Afghanistan and Pakistan as a regional problem that is going to require regional solutions. In Afghanistan the two Ambassadors have talked about our reports. I will simply say that internationally Afghanistan has all of the international legitimacy that is needed, certainly with U.S. Security Council resolutions, the presence of most of the important international organizations, the United States, the European Union, NATO, the World Bank, and non-governmental organizations, over 40 countries on the ground. All of the instruments that one would need to have success are present in Afghanistan. And yet one has the impression that while we are certainly not losing in a military sense, that we are not making the progress that we would like to make. The recently-completed NATO summit in Bucharest has reaffirmed the alliance‘s commitment to being successful in Afghanistan. And indeed, on the 12th of June of this year the Paris Support Conference will convene and NATO allies will discuss ways in which they can make additional commitments to support a winning strategy in Afghanistan. I continue to feel, as I have said many times, that while the military equation is important, far more important than that is the ability to come to a strategic plan to address four or five things that simply have to be done in Afghanistan if that country is going to turn in the right direction. The first of these, the first three are related. And I would say I would highlight the necessity to deal with the narcotic problem, as Ambassador Pickring has mentioned, but you cannot do that until you have a stable judiciary, which they do not have and they are not moving toward in my view. And then a police force that is capable of providing security and stability throughout the country that is both adequately trained, adequately equipped and resourced. And that is certainly something that has been lagging. Fourth on my list of things that have to be done is the Karzai government in my view has to be held accountable to the international community for doing the things that it can do, for the expansion in the reach of its influence, for stamping out corruption in the government, and doing the things that the international community deserves to expect from a government that is benefiting so much by the sacrifice in both treasure and lives by so many countries around the world. So in Afghanistan I think our strategy is to increase the capacity. Many discussions about whether we need more troops or not. Generally what the commanders have asked for is modest, given the capacity of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. And I have always advocated both in uniform and out of uniform that they should be supported. The recent addition of United States Marines, in fact one of the units I used to command, the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit which I commanded in northern Iraq in 1991 during the Kurdish refugee operation, is in fact the unit that is going to be inserted in the south. And I so confident they will do a great job. In terms of coherence, we need to make some gains with the United Nations I am happy to say taking the lead in coordinating international assistance to Afghanistan. This has to be a very strong lead. I know Ambassador Qaiyaidi very well and I wish him well in this important undertaking. With regard to Pakistan, my sense is that this is in terms of the regional context it is still an evolving problem that we are dealing with and trying to understand. I think there is much

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great focus now. We are establishing our relations with a new government and the tripartite nature of that government. But we do have I think a better understanding of the scope of the problem and its seriousness. Specifically, the presence of the Taliban and the tribal realities on the border and the global al-Qaeda operations that are all existing in one area in the Federally Administrated Tribal Areas on the one point pinpoints the problem. We know where it is. The question is, What do we do about it? I have a sense that the problem with regard to Afghanistan and, in fact, the region, could be migrating east. That is not a good thing. We certainly want Pakistan to be a free and democratic state. But I am troubled by the fact that the largest proportional increase in suicide bombings is in fact in Pakistan now, not in Afghanistan nor in Iraq. And usually that is the precursor of worrisome things. I have done a little research on the aid question. WE do have $655 million in AID money, as Ambassador Holbrooke mentioned. We also have the Department of Defense and the Pakistani Government, they have each committed $1 billion toward the Pakistan military‘s operations in the FATA. Also the development of the Frontier Corps, Special Forces training and education, and the establishment of border coordination centers which I think will represent something that has been needed for quite a while. We have spent money in Pakistan. Coalition support funds between October 2001 and now amount to $5.6 billion. But these coalition support funds do not just exist in Pakistan, they also exist in 27 other countries. And we also have also other forms of assistance, particularly in security assistance which amount to over $300 million a year. So I think we have a realization nationally that this is a strategic problem, that it is regional in scope, and you cannot solve one without solving the other. I think one of the aspects of the solution is to get the Government of Pakistan and the new Government— I am sorry, the new Government of Pakistan and the Karzai government in Afghanistan to work together more closely on this common problem. For two long, at least in my active duty days, there was too much finger pointing between the two and not enough cooperation. We participated in a tripartite coordination council which is a council of militaries involving NATO, involving Afghanistan and Pakistan; that was generally a good thing. My last experience had to do with watching the strategy of the Musharraf government which signed this deal with the tribal areas but which collapsed, as Ambassador Holbrooke said, in failure. But it took—it had to run itself out to prove the point that this was not a strategy that had a longterm solution. So I hope that the regional aspect of this very important problem, the focus on the geographic location that has to be dealt with, and the resources that will be required not just from us but from the international communities in order to do this can altogether turn the direction of the region in a positive way. I look forward to responding to your questions. Thank you. Chairman Berman. I am just looking at the monitor of the floor votes to try and understand where we are. Let me ask you, Ambassador Holbrooke, you have to leave here at 12 o‘clock. Ambassador Holbrooke. 12:00. Chairman Berman. Ambassador Pickring, 11:00?

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Ambassador Pickring. 12:00. Chairman Berman. 12:00, okay. All right. General Jones? General Jones. 12:30. Chairman Berman. We are now voting on—actually this is a resolution out of this committee on the Georgia-Russia issue so I think I have to recess so we can cast our vote. I am very depressed by the situation we face right now because I do not know that we are going to get back here much before 12 o‘clock. We will come back. We will vote and I am going to miss the motion to reconsider the vote by this, if you are. We are going to go and just vote. We will be right back. [Recess.] Chairman Berman. I will be the last to leave this room now, I do not care what they vote on. But I apologize. I am going to recognize myself to ask a question to give, I know, Ambassadors, I know you have to leave, and then one question and then I will recognize Congressman Royce and Costa. And then to the extent anybody is still here I will come back for the rest of my questions. But it is a real specific one. Given these recent reports, and you have all talked about this issue, of negotiating truces between the Government of, the new Government of Pakistan and some irreconcilable terrorist elements such as Baitullah Mehsud, how do you believe the United States should react? What steps can we take to dissuade the Pakistani military and civilian leadership from making such deals which will undoubtedly lead to greater cross-border attacks on United States troops? To what extent do these deals represent discord—and I think there was a reference to this in one of your testimonies—to what extent do these deals represent discord between the Pakistani military and civilian leadership on how to instill political reform in the FATA? Install and instill. So? Ambassador Holbrooke. Mr. Chairman, you are asking a question nobody really has an answer to, including, and I stress this, the administration. They do not really know nor do we exactly what the nature of these deals will add up to. There is a difference of opinion over Baitullah‘s own role in the assassination of Benazir Bhutto, for example. So I would like to suggest a different approach to the issue which is to deal with the—not to deal with this specific problem out of context which will inevitably lead to a United StatesPakistan Government friction, but to deal with it with a comprehensive plan for the tribal areas. We do not have that now, as the GAO report makes clear, as my own trip made clear, as the comments of my two colleagues made clear. The Embassy in Kabul and the Embassy in Pakistan reflect the differing views of Kabul and Islamabad on that issue. President Karzai will tell you that everything that is going wrong in Afghanistan is Pakistan‘s fault. The ISI, with which I spent a morning, gave me chapter and verse on how they turned over certain number of terrorists to the Afghan Government at the request of Karzai and half of them were then released. So you can go back and forth between Islamabad and Kabul forever in this argument; it is a bitter anger between the two governments. And I hope that the new political situation in Pakistan will allow an Americansponsored reconciliation between Kabul and Islamabad. But to your point, we need a massive economic program not this pathetic little $750 million over 5 years, as I said earlier half of which will never leave the United States. We need to regard above all Afghanistan and Pakistan as a single theater of operations, in the

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western half of which NATO troops operate but in the eastern half of which NATO cannot enter. And, therefore, we need other means. Because following them into their sanctuary in hot pursuit on the ground is not a possibility. Predator missiles occasionally, everyone understands that, but not ground pursuit. I recommend strongly, Mr. Chairman, that your committee create a special oversight task force composed of your best staff that works 24/7 on AFPAK so that you on behalf of the American taxpayers know where the money you are appropriating goes. Last year you appropriated over $10 billion for Afghanistan. No one in this room could tell anyone where that money went. The short listing will tell you, for example, that $227 million went to alternative livelihoods. I have yet to meet anybody in Afghanistan who actually went into an alternative livelihood. Where did that money go? You do not know. I do not know. And I think it is worth pursuing. There is a good idea on the table which I would like to put forward to you. It has been sponsored in your House by Chris Van Hollen and in the Senate by Maria Cantwell. It is called Reconstruction Opportunity Zones, ROZs. It is a way of creating in effect many free trade areas in the Tribal Areas of Pakistan which could create many jobs. I would recommend that that get high attention from your committee and that it gets positive consideration. On the drug programs the money has been not only wasted, it has actually helped create Taliban and recruit both sides of the border. On the media front the Afghan Government is clamping down on free media. I have with me today Saad Mohseni, the leader of the largest independent media organization in Afghanistan, Tolo TV. He is under intense pressure not to report things accurately, to cut out Indian soap operas and other things which are offensive to the most conservative elements. That is, in effect, the government yielding to pressure from people who are in cahoots with the Taliban. So we need to do this comprehensively because the issue you raised taken out of context inevitably will lead to massive friction. With your permission, sir, I really ought to go, if that is all right. Chairman Berman. Okay. Ambassador Holbrooke. Thank you for the great honor of being here today. Chairman Berman. No, I apologize for the fractured meeting. Ambassador Holbrooke. Tom, not for the first time Tom will speak for me whether I agree with him or not. We have been friends and associates now—— Chairman Berman. Yes. Ambassador Holbrooke [continuing]. For over 30 years and there is no one I respect more in the Foreign Service. Thank you. Chairman Berman. Great. Well, thank you for I mean coming. And I apologize again for all the distractions that just go along with being in this place. Ambassador Pickring, do you have any thoughts you have on these questions? Ambassador Pickring. Yes, I do. I totally agree with what Dick has said. It will be difficult to put together a unified plan in any short period of time. We have to recognize that. Chairman Berman. Let me just interject one thing. Ambassador Holbrooke mentioned the Karzai-Pakistan, the relationship between the two. Based on one meeting I had with representatives of, a representative of the new government my sense is they think that relationship is going to get much better than the Musharraf-Karzai relationship.

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Ambassador Pickring. Let us hope that it is right. It is hard to think that it could get worse. Chairman Berman. Right. Ambassador Pickring. But let us assume in fact that it is also going to be a continuing difficult relationship in part because Nawar Sharif and Mr. Zardari have not yet shown that they can stay together through thick and thin even on the Pakistani side. But let us hope that they do. Let us hope it all goes well. It will still take time. I think the United States needs to send a signal. As General Jones said and as others said, it did not work last time, it is not going to work in the future. That any commitment that is made on the part of the new Pakistani Government to things that are decidedly against their interest and our interest has to be from our point of view at a minimum a null set. It has to be used in my view to do everything you can to leverage the new Pakistani Government in the direction in which we think we need to go which is the overall plan. And we have to be very specific that we are not prepared to accept a set of agreements on the ground that will not work in our interest as we see the process go ahead. And whether this has monetary reflections or not I do not know. I rather like the point that Dick made, 750 is not enough. If we have a large amount to put in we have a large amount of leverage. I also believe that in fact in tracking the money it is very careful to understand that in that part of the world we are going to have to spend things on stuff that may not quite pass muster if we are going to have some influence. Now, my own feeling is it may be better to spend $100,000 on renting a tribal chief, if I can put it that way, than it is to spend $100 million in trying to kill him and his tribe. That is hard to say. It is not the kind of thing the government finds comfortable to advocate. We know it has been done. And, indeed, one of the most successful aspects of our original combat success in Afghanistan involved some of the same tactics. But we have to be acutely conscious that this is a rental program, not a buying program. Chairman Berman. But does that not become an alternative to building capacity and—— Ambassador Pickring. No. It becomes basically a facilitating process to capacity building because capacity building absolutely has to accompany this. You are buying security in order to move ahead with capacity building. And I hate to say that because the traditional way of providing security is not available in the FATA, we know that. Let us train the Frontier Constabulary. But until in fact we have them committed not to their tribal objectives but to the plan objectives we have a problem. So this in my view is just one more piece of evidence of the whole difficulty. And we have to use different and more imaginative techniques to move it ahead. But my feeling is that we have to attack this from all sides and we will need your help and understanding to do that. Chairman Berman. Any thoughts you want to add to this, General Jones or should I turn it over to Mr. Royce? General Jones. Just one brief point. One is to recognize that we do have leverage to piggyback on Ambassador Pickring‘s comment and this leverage that we should not be reluctant to use on both side of the border, Pakistan and Afghanistan. And the second point I would make is that while we are having here a discussion about U.S. policy, let us not forget the international equities that are at stake here as well. On the Afghan side of the border we have over 40 countries involved in providing resources, manpower and the like. They have a huge stake in this as well. So that leverage can be

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international and we should not, I do not think we should be reluctant at all to stimulate the use of international leverage to solve some of these problems. But I think those would be the two points that I would make. Chairman Berman. Mr. Royce is recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Two of the main criticisms that we heard laid out is that the administration does not have a master plan for the Tribal Regions and that the approach there has primarily been military. But it is worth noting we have killed several hundred militants with this approach; that is one plus. But as we look at the development aid into the Northwest Frontier, and I was in the Northwest Frontier last year, I find it a little difficult to just going off the basis of what I have seen with development aid elsewhere in the world to assume that it is going to create the desired effects there. You have illiteracy running at 90 percent. The GAO, you know, raised the argument that the administration does not have a plan but the GAO would not go into that region because of the security concerns. And I remember a journalist from South Waziristan telling me, ‗‗There is only 2 percent of the people in this room that agree with you so, you know, do not raise any issues like Taliban or al-Qaeda.‘‘ And he said, ‗‗I am that person that happens to agree with you. But I was educated in Britain and everybody else here is not.‘‘ And so with this conundrum I think it is understandable why security would be the first focus. And I would like to know why we should be more optimistic about prospects for us sparking development in these regions based on what we have seen? I hate to sound pessimistic about that but I think we are bringing our mindsets and our structures to Pakistan instead of dealing with it as it is and as I think it is going to continue to be because the rapid transformation of Pakistani society we are seeing is primarily the Talibanization of the country as these madrassahs graduate more and more students. And also, regardless of what we spend on infrastructure, on health, on governance, on trying to create jobs, I do not think that that is going to be for anything but naught if—and actually some of that may harm our interests in the long term if Pakistan‘s education continues in the direction it is going. And there is no way we could afford to educate all of Pakistan. And lastly, this is not just an educational issue, it is not just because that education system is weak. The idea of radicalism that has this power to win adherence in that society is a phenomenon that is growing in the culture. Lastly, I just wanted to throw out an idea that I think Senator Joe Lieberman has raised which strikes me as a good one with regards to Afghanistan. The Afghan army has the confidence of 90 percent of the people there. Its one problem is it is so small it can only secure the capital. And so, as a consequence the government itself is now in the process, Karzai‘s government, in making negotiations with warlords in the outside area in order to try to secure some kind of stability, which we do not like to see. But if we paid that army properly it would still be paid at 1⁄70 th the rate of pay of NATO troops or U.S. troops in the theater. And if we built that army up, and what he is suggesting is the concept of an international trust fund, we could get NATO members, we could get European countries to pay into that because they do not want to send additional brigades. But you could have 70 brigades for what it would cost to get another brigade out of Germany over there. So what about Senator Joe Lieberman‘s idea about setting up for the future something that would decrease the Karzai‘s government dependency on any of these warlords and

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increase the future government‘s, Karzai‘s or whoever wins the next election, ability to actually pull the country together? Thank you. Those were my two questions, Mr. Chairman. General Jones. With regard to the military side, I think that one of the things that is most difficult to understand and explain in Afghanistan is it is estimated that less than 10 cents on the dollar ever gets to where it is intended to go to. So that is a problem of significant proportions endemic and representative of the current state of affairs in the government as it exists. And over the years I have made a lot of friends in Afghanistan who have participated in government, left government, and said one of the reasons they left was because they could not stand the level of corruption. The army in Afghanistan is one of the success stories up to a point in that the people of Afghanistan react to it well and the army when it is employed generally does a pretty good job. But it is the pay and the salaries need to rise. It is expensive; the equipment needs to get better. And the training needs to increase the size of the army. I think that Senator Lieberman‘s idea has merit. Obviously, the quicker you get the army on its feet the better. But the other side of the coin is that you have to develop the police force as well. And I think you could get to the point where you have the army functioning reasonably well but the police force I think is the glue that is going to hold the country together in terms of providing the sense to the people of Afghanistan that they can in fact go to sleep at night and wake up the next morning and be reasonably secure that drug lords and terrorists are not going to threaten their families during the absence of the army‘s presence, and that is not where we are in Afghanistan right now. So while I have always been pleased with the rate of progress in the Afghan army, it is the other part and the failure to do that adequately that concerns me. Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired. I am going to recognize Mr. Costa next because Mr. Costa, Mr. Royce and I skipped a few votes to come back here so we could get this proceeding going and hear General Jones‘ testimony. So I am making a unilateral decision to go out of regular order for the people who missed votes so they can ask a question. Mr. Costa, you are recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. Costa. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for that kindness. Gentlemen, I have been to Afghanistan twice in the last 3 years. Was there most recently at the end of March and saw some improvement in 3 years and saw some other areas that, frankly, were lacking and I think in measure with the testimony that you have provided here. In your testimony Ambassador Holbrooke and I think Ambassador Pickring referenced the political changes in Pakistan. But I was in visiting Afghanistan in the end of March I was questioned with the change in the politics, are the politics evolving in Afghanistan. Karzai told us he is seeking reelection. We talked about the issues we discussed this morning in terms of dealing with Helmand Province and the narcotrade and the governors and who is involved. But it just seems to me that there is an awful weak bench there in terms of—and I do not know what we can influence. We can help build up the army. We can try to professionalize the police team that was spoken of. Certainly General McNeil and all of those folks I think are doing a good job. But, Mr. Ambassador, I mean we just cannot remove the current leadership in Afghanistan; how do we address that issue? I mean you can have a plan but if you do not have good people implementing the plan it is not going to be very effective.

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Ambassador Pickring. I understand very clearly the point you are making. The only thing I can say is they do have elections in Afghanistan. And in the end it will be up to Afghans to decide who it is that they want to see running their country. We know and understand President Karzai would like to run again. And we certainly all wish him well. I understand there are others who may seek that office too and who may one way or another in the eyes of Afghans be better equipped to deal with it. We will just have to wait and see how that particular part of the process goes. Having been involved in the United States Government for a long period of time one of the things we do least well is to pick other people‘s leaders for them. Mr. Costa. Obviously. We do not have a good track record there. General Jones, I was struck when we were there in March, the balance of soft power versus our hard power. And going up to Kunar Province watching a platoon fighting the Taliban, at the same time building a road and building bridges is truly inspiring. But the primary mission of our troops is not to build roads and bridges. How do we strike a balance that allows us to build the schools and the water systems without putting that burden on our military? General Jones. Well, I think just to piggyback a little bit on Ambassador Pickring‘s point is that we have—there are a lot of contradictions in that country, we have the PRT system and every country has its own PRT. Mr. Costa. Right. General Jones. And different standards. We have to understand that there is not a onesize-fits-all category here. Somebody has to do it. The ultimate solution is in fact in my view civil reform. The disappointment that the electorate might feel in Afghanistan after these really fantastic stories of the vote in 2004 meant that the Afghan people got it; they really understood what the promise was. And they will now express their opinions at the polls whether those expectations are realized, and I suspect that in many parts of the country they will say they were not. But clearly wherever the, whatever part of Afghanistan one finds a problem you have to apply the solution that is most available to you. And sometimes, unfortunately,—— Mr. Costa. It is our troops. General Jones [continuing]. It is our troops. Mr. Costa. Final question, General. We were talking about the areas in the western area and having been up to the Khyber Pass and looking at that, clearly Pakistan‘s focus has been with India and a traditional armed forces. We have been trying to help them, I know, with their counterinsurgency efforts with the new general in command. I think Mr. Vickers has been there. What progress are we making there? Are we giving them the tools to deal with that? General Jones. Well, it has been a while since I have been up there. But in my recent conversations with people who know about these things say that we have in the eastern part of the country been quite successful in our counterintelligence, I mean counterinsurgency operations. We need to transfer some of that expertise into the south. And I think that between those two areas we really have the vulnerabilities from a military standpoint of the country because of the proximity to the border regions. So—— Chairman Berman. General, I am sorry. General Jones. Okay. Chairman Berman. The time has expired. Hate to do that to you but thank you.

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Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much. Chairman Berman. I recognize the ranking member for 5 minutes, then the gentlelady from Texas. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. Well, thank you for wonderful testimony, very insightful. And, General, I am a proud stepmom of two Marines. My stepson and daughter-in-law served in Iraq and she served in Afghanistan as well. Now they are back home at the U.S. Naval Academy. And they are proud of their service. And we congratulate you for the great contributions you have made in the past, present and the future. You have worn our nation‘s uniform proudly. I wanted to ask you gentlemen about the opium trade and the projections and what we can do about it. As all of us know, in spite of ongoing international efforts fighting Afghanistan‘s narcotic trade, the U.N. officials have estimated a record opium poppy crop was produced last year, supplying 93 percent of the world‘s illicit opium. And clearly, opium poppy cultivation, and drug trafficking constitute serious strategic threats to our security and to the stability of the country of Afghanistan. It jeopardizes the success of post-9/11 counterterrorism, and reconstruction efforts. In a nutshell what has worked, what has not worked with our counternarcotics policy there and what must we do to arrest this trend in the future? Ambassador Pickring. It is hard to see, Ms. Ros-Lehtinen, that much has worked. At least as part of our recommendation that we need to get a grip on the problem through a gradual but continuing transformation of our efforts. We made suggestions. One of those is that obviously we need to find the right substitute crops and the right markets for them. And we need to find a way to support this transition from growing to selling so that we are not putting people in a position where they grow something they cannot dispose of. There has been a strong suggestion by some people that fruit and tree crops are particularly important in the region and there will be a strong market for those. I am not a USDA specialist but it seemed to be interesting. And, of course, once you get invested in that it is hard to get disinvested, hard to pull up the trees once they get growing. But we do know that the drug lords provide everything from—— Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Transportation, pick-up. Ambassador Pickring [continuing]. Transportation,—— Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Yes. Ambassador Pickring [continuing]. Agricultural extension, loans, microfinance. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. I am going to cut you off, Ambassador, just to get the General‘s take on it. Ambassador Pickring. Okay. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Because I only have 1 1⁄2 minutes. Ambassador Pickring. I follow that. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir. Ambassador Pickring. So we need to do that. We also need to get some of the middlemen who are also government officials out of the business. General Jones. Thank you. I really appreciate that question because I think the direction of Afghanistan is directly linked to our inability, our international inability to deal with the narcotics problem. Ninety percent of the products produced, the illegal products are sold on the streets of European capitals. That money comes back and funds the insurgency, buys the weapons that kills and wounds NATO soldiers and ours as well. And it is really to me at the

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core of turning around that economy from being a narcoeconomy into an economy as we know it. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. I am going to interrupt you there, General, just to see if I can sneak in a quick question about new troops, new military assistance to Afghanistan, a fresh deployment of about 1,000 troops. How meaningful are these new deployments and commitments? General Jones. The overall request by NATO standards is modest, and it has always been modest. It has been in the thousands of troops. It has been additional helicopters, mobility assets, communications, intelligence gathering and the things. But if you rack it and stack it, it is modest. And it was modest 2 years ago, it still remains modest. And if—for the life of me I do not know why it is that we seem to have so much trouble providing those troops. But I want to state that despite that, the overall problems that we need to address are not more military troops. I think you could put 10,000 more troops in there and you would still have the same problems. If you do not address the civil sector reform, if we do not hold the Karzai government to metrics—— Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. General Jones [continuing]. That are deliverable we are going to continue to mark time. Ms. Ros-Lehtinen. Correct. Thank you, sirs. Chairman Berman. The time of the gentlelady has expired. The gentlelady from Texas, Ms. Sheila Jackson Lee, is recognized for 5 minutes. Ms. Jackson Lee. I think this is one of the more important hearings that we will have an opportunity to participate in. I thank the chairman and the ranking member, and I thank the witnesses and appreciate the presence of Ambassador Holbrooke and Ambassador Pickring and General Jones waiting because we have had a difficult morning. I co-chair the Pakistan Caucus and have the pleasure of cochairing with my colleagues the Afghan Caucus. And probably was one of the early members who went into Afghanistan in the early stages I believe was 2002. And really saw the rawness of Afghanistan. I think we were in before now President Karzai was elected, he was then Chairman Karzai, and we were in before the assassination had occurred in June of that year. In fact this country assisted, of course, with the security system that he had and was in place at that time. To Ambassador Pickring and General Jones as well, I frankly have a different perspective. I am glad to hear General Jones saying 10,000 more troops or 20,000 more troops; we must work on the diplomatic infrastructure of Afghanistan. And I believe we must work on the people aspect of it which means the education of people, etc., etc. And I like the statement let us find those or 50 percent of those poppy farmers and give them some alternative and let us see how it works. Some I am going to take you up on your offer. I am also going to take you up on the offer, Ambassador Pickring, of some high-placed person that is focused only on Afghanistan. I do believe we have to win the war in Afghanistan but there are many principles to win it by. Likewise, decouple Afghanistan from Iraq. And, frankly, let me say it again and again: Bring the troops from Iraq. We have won that conflict in honor by the troops having done everything we asked them to do. It is now in the hands of the diplomats and a better Iraqi Government. And Maliki has to stand up and be counted on leading that country and he is not doing that. But I want to go to Pakistan. I have a much more different attitude. I think we should applaud the PPP. And they are trying to work with Sharif. And, frankly, I believe that is more

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of a problem than the PPP. The PPP wants to govern and we should give them a chance to do so. They recognize that toppling Musharraf is not valuable, that Musharraf has history and experience. And, frankly, in talking to President Musharraf directly he wants peace and wants to work with the new government. Sharif has to be watched. I see no reason in moving forward for any actions against Musharraf. I think the people did do the right thing by restoring the judiciary. I would like you to speak to this new proposed agreement and so we can understand it. The agreement is not being made with the terrorists per se, it is not the same as it was before, and I am talking now of the agreement that is being made with the tribal groups of the Mehsud area where the tribal groups have asked for Pakistan to make an agreement with them. They have asked for them to provide protection. They have asked for them to help them get rid of the Taliban and other insurgents and al-Qaeda. The agreement is an agreement from a position of power. The government is operating from a position of power. So I do not think we should run away from Pakistan when it is making its own decisions to make peace. I think we should be monitoring it but we should look at it differently from the agreements that were made with the tribal areas before, even by Musharraf, that the PPP have a different perspective and they are doing it from a position of power. Ambassador Pickring, could you just in these waning minutes tell me how we treat Pakistan differently because you do have people there that love democracy and are prepared to move forward in moving their country forward, how do we deal with Pakistan? Ambassador Pickring. Two things I think in terms of your very eloquent statement: One, certainly encourage the coalition government, the new civilian, democratically elected government, to move along the directions that both we and they agree that they should be moving. This has to be 50 percent made in Pakistan at least. And secondly, as I said earlier, let us look at the agreements, let us look at the context and let us look at the construction. What is it that is there? Does it suit the common interests in Pakistan, Afghanistan, the United States? Fine; we should support it. If it does not suit those common interests then we should be very clear and we should make that clear to the Pakistanis as this process goes so we do not end up at the end of the day with take it or leave it. That is not the way I think to conduct the diplomacy here. Ms. Jackson Lee. I thank you. And I think that is very instructive. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Berman. The time of the gentlelady has expired. The gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Tancredo, is recognized for 5 minutes. Mr. Tancredo. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. An interesting mixed message that we hear here. On the one hand there is a need to retain the military in Afghanistan in order to, after we have essentially secured the country there is a need to have the military there to make sure that we have a civilian government in place that is competent and can take control. But on the other hand that is not an acceptable course of action in Iraq. Sort of a mixed message as I say. More directly to the point of the problems we face in Afghanistan, Mr. Ambassador, I am perplexed and have been for a long time when we talk about countries that are steeped in traditions that only encourage corruption and we talk about ending the corruption, which is absolutely necessary of course to get to the next stage of civil government, but we say it as if there are these magic elixirs that we can use in the country in order to attain that. And yet I look around the world even as close as our southern neighbor and see the degree of the

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problem that exists there as a result of corruption and our inability to effectively deal with it, being not part of that country, not matter what aid package we propose, no matter what. When corruption is so endemic just saying things like, you know, we have to deal with it, does not seem to be very clear to me, it does not seem to be clear to me how we can. I mean assume on one hand the Taliban are still hated by a majority of the people in this country or not that country, and there is no acceptance of the idea of having them back in power, there has got to be some alternative to that. And is it one that we can establish and is it one that we can in any way guarantee will be free of this corruption, of the corruption that has been problematic to date? I just do not know how to get there from here, that is all. Ambassador Pickring. Mr. Tancredo, a terrifically important and very good question. There is no magic snake oil. We have in this country at least fought corruption. I wish I could say we were totally free of it, but you and I read the newspapers and we know. Mr. Tancredo. Yes. Ambassador Pickring. But at least we have a judiciary, we have a prosecutorial system, we have evidence, we have in fact a bias against corruption. Those are the ways that we know how to deal with it. We have to help others accept the fact that corruption is the rot that eats away at the vitality of a country and over time it will destroy governments and regimes and it will force change one way or the other. We have to convince them that in fact their future rests in a different course. This is not easy. We have leverage and incentives. It is a long-term possibility. And you and I know because in fact we understand that in fact it has to be a constant preoccupation. It is not a Hollywood movie that ends at the end of the third reel when the glorious couple walks off into the sunset, corruption is finished, never to come back again. So all of those things are true. But my own feeling is that countries have made that change. It takes a lot of time and a lot of effort. There are ways that people have to help them. But it does not begin with us; it has to kind of begin with our selling them on the notion that in the end they do not have anything unless they can work this problem. Mr. Tancredo. Well, I think an important and an enormously difficult challenge for us, as difficult if not more so than the military one that confronts us. And, General, why do the better armed and trained regular forces frequently relinquish their security role in the frontier regions to the poorly equipped—now Pakistan we are talking about, I am sorry—to poorly equipped Pashtun Frontier Corps? General Jones. I think it is because of the sophistication of the problem in the region where regular Pakistani army units do not typically do well and have suffered a lot of casualties. And the tribal authorities representing the local population are sometimes, even though they are not as well equipped, are sometimes more capable of achieving the goals. This is a very sophisticated problem and I think one that the Government of Pakistan is going to have to deal with very centrally in order to resolve it. Mr. Tancredo. Thank you. General Jones. I would like to piggyback if I could on your question—— Mr. Tancredo. Sure. General Jones [continuing]. To the Ambassador just for one sentence. And that is to say that the corruption problem in Afghanistan will not be addressed until the international community en masse levies a certain metric on the government itself to show demonstrated performance. And it is inexcusable in my view that this is not being done. We will never

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solve the drug problem without a judicial system that works and without adequate police force. Mr. Tancredo. Thank you. Chairman Berman. The time of the gentleman has expired. Gentlemen, you have been very patient with us. We have two more people. Can you squeeze in another two 5-minute periods? If so, that is wonderful. The gentlelady from California, Ms. Woolsey. Mr. Woolsey. Thank you very much. So, all right, we are talking about narcotics and we are talking about how much it affects everything that is going on in that part of the world, what is going to happen with our young people, their young people, the average age, what, of a Pakistani is 21 years old. They need a future. What, you have been over there, what do you think the alternative crop is? What are the crops besides poppies? What is the market? How do we get these young people engaged in being educated and doing the right things and wanting to do the right things? I mean we are a nation that really does not know enough about alternative areas in the world. We tell them how we think they should do it and then we are so surprised they will not do it because we are talking as Americans. So I guess could I get you started on that and then I would appreciate it? General Jones. Thank you. One of the things that I think we have to understand is that during the Russian occupation of Afghanistan as a means of controlling the population the Russians destroyed the irrigation system of Afghanistan, which was really fairly sophisticated and complex and supported agricultural diversity in the country. Clearly what has to be done is in order to give the agricultural reform a chance to succeed is to rebuild the irrigation system and provide a comprehensive plan to wean the economy off of its narcotic leaning and dependency. This is not going to be done overnight. It was not, this problem was not created overnight. But you can see it grow exponentially every single year. One thing about the narcotic crop in Afghanistan is you can visually see it as opposed to some of the areas the Ambassador worked in where it was in jungles and hidden. In Afghanistan you can measure it because all you have to do is go up on a clear day and when the poppies are in bloom you can see exactly how the problem is growing. But there are alternatives. And it takes, it is going to take the reforms that I think we suggested in our reports and it is going to take the focus of agricultural experts internationally to massively turn the attention to the problem of water, to the problem of irrigation, and to the problem of supporting a livelihood. But in a secure way the problem of the lack of security is that even if they had the wherewithal to plant the crops and grow them, without adequate security at night when the army is not there and the police is not corrupt and is inadequately trained the population gets caught between the struggle, and what they have been doing for the last few years is waiting to see which side is going to win. Mr. Woolsey. Well maybe, Ambassador Pickring, you could follow up on that with we have been there for 7 years, I mean we were involved before that in Afghanistan, have we started? Are there any plans to help them with the irrigation system? If it were built would it remain or would it be destroyed or why are we not doing it? Ambassador Pickring. We helped them in the monarchy build the irrigation system in Helmand and Kandahar in particular, so we know it. Some have told me that in fact the

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people who brought back parts of the irrigation brought them back for poppy cultivation. So we face another problem there. I suggested earlier on that some are thinking about fruit crops because there is a potential market. You have to have a market, obviously. Mr. Woolsey. Right. Ambassador Pickring. Maybe vegetables. Of course there are the traditional crops and grains. But all of those have a local market but we have to facilitate that through security, through roads and through supports. We do not see yet the focus in the government or in our people on the comprehensive plan. And the one thing that we came with today was there is not a comprehensive plan that we can see to deal with these kinds of questions. And so your question is exactly the right one and our answer is we have to get to going in that particular area. And I wonder why after 7 years we have not been able to. Mr. Woolsey. Thank you. I will yield back, Mr. Chairman. Chairman Berman. I thank the gentlelady. Time has expired. And the gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, is recognized. Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And just to let you know, this is not a public announcement, but there is a coalition that has been working on this whole issue that you have been just discussing. And a bipartisan coalition of which I am a part will soon offer a grand bargain to our Afghan friends that those aqueducts will be rebuilt and that the irrigation will be rebuilt. There will be packaging available for food products and transportation improvements based on an agreement that they will end the poppy production, not the United States. With the understanding if they do not after we build, provide them this building material, we will have the right to step in and destroy the poppy crops. That might be a subject, Mr. Chairman, for an entire hearing, but some of us have been working on that for a long time. I am a bit concerned about some of the misconceptions about Afghanistan. I have spent a lot of time there, as you know. I do not believe that we will ever find a single individual that we can rely upon. And the fact that we are looking for a Musharraf of Afghanistan is not going to ever happen. And if we do, it is not going to end up well, just as it has not ended up well in Pakistan. That whole area, including Pakistan, is based on the tribal culture and we should recognize that. We should understand that that is the way they work in that part of the world. One of our major successes in driving out the Taliban was due to the fact that we worked with the tribal leaders, known as the Northern Alliance and others, rather than trying to just come in and do it all ourselves or trying to. And to the degree that we have not succeeded I think can be traced back to the fact that we have been trying to create this strong central government in a society that has no traditionally strong central government. And instead we should make sure that those people down at the bottom of the tribal level all know we are on their side. Now, with that said let me take that into Pakistan. In Pakistan we have relied on one guy, Musharraf, and before that Zia, and a list of these one individuals. I believe that we are reaping a bitter harvest for that now. We are reaping a bitter harvest for looking at the Pakistan army as the bulwark against radical Islam when in fact Musharraf and the Pakistan army and the ISI have been allied with radical Islam. We have equipped them then, what, we have equipped our army in Pakistan to fight who? To fight India rather than to actually do, be the bulwark against radical Islam as we have suggested.

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So I just have made a couple points there you might want to comment. And one last thing, General, I understand the Afghan army is still under 50,000 men. How could we ever expect the Afghan army—in Iraq we have built up a major force and it seems to me— how can you rely on an army of under 50,000 men with a country the size of Afghanistan? Why do we not rely on what is natural to them and that is their militias and their—what would be the equivalent of their National Guard?A whole different strategy. Just some thoughts. General Jones. The traditional function of an army is to defend the integrity of the country. I think the number is 80,000. But whatever it is there it is encouraging at any rate to see the people of Afghanistan, at least during the time I was there, react to the national army. But again I think you can create the size, you can continue to create the size of the army that one wants. And here there is a similarity between Iraq as well. If you do not create the internal security mechanisms that are required to sustain and overcome the problems that face the individual citizen every day then you are losing ground because armies generally do not do police work very well, and police do not do army work very well. You need both. Mr. Rohrabacher. The idea of a militia it should not be something that we just instinctively reject. General Jones. Right. Mr. Rohrabacher. And, in fact, it seems to have worked in many places. General Jones. Right. Well, one of the things that I thought should be considered in Afghanistan is the idea of compulsory national service. Interesting enough, the Afghan army is a volunteer force. What happens to all those young people who choose not to volunteer simply because the money generated by the narcoeconomy can pay them more to be part-time Taliban than full-time Afghan soldiers? So I think the concept of national security in Afghanistan, the country that has a very, very young population, is something that the government should consider. I proposed it privately many times in my meetings but it still is an all-volunteer force. But I think that Afghanistan needs to have its young people educated in the values of democracy and where the country is going so that when you return to society they can be contributing members. There are too many competing alternatives economically, there are too many other ways to make money in that country that are preventing it from following a more rapid direction in the ways in which we would like to see it go. Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you, that is fine. Thank you very much. Chairman Berman. All right, gentlemen, thank you very much. It has been a very useful hearing. One certainly understands the connection between these two countries and our policy. And I appreciate your spending a long morning with us. Thank you very much. [Whereupon, at 12:43 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]

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APPENDIX Material Submitted For The Hearing Record

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Prepared Statement of the Honorable Gene Green, A Representative in Congress From the State of Texas Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing. I would like to welcome our distinguished panel and thank them for being here today. Pakistan plays an instrumental role in our foreign policy and counterterrorism efforts in the Middle East, and given the political change that we have witnessed there over the last six months, this hearing is long overdue. Since 9/11, America has worked closely with President Musharaff and the Pakistani army to conduct counterterrorism operations in the Middle East. Now, with a new Pakistani parliament in power, it is questionable how influential President Musharaff is these days. What we do know, however, is that Islamist extremism and militancy, especially in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, continues to grow. Al Quaeda also continues to operate in the western part of the country and threaten our progress in Afghanistan. Nationwide in Pakistan, the human rights situation has worsened and inflation is rising. Several food and energy shortages have also been reported. Therefore, it is so important that we work with the Pakistani government to ensure security, stability, and development in their country, and I look forward to our panel‘s views and suggestions on we how should do this. The good news is that Pakistan‘s new Prime Minister, Yousaf Raza Gillani, has identified terrorism and extremism as Pakistan‘s most urgent problems. So my questions for our panel are what aspects of our policy have been the most successful in serving the national interests of both the United States and Pakistan and what should we change as we move forward? Anti-American sentiment persists across Pakistani society, and yet roughly three-quarters of the supplies for U.S. troops in Afghanistan pass either through or over Pakistan. How can the United States fix its image amongst the Pakistani people and work towards greater cooperation with their new leadership? I look forward to the testimony of our witnesses, and again, thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this important hearing.

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In: Combating Islamic Militancy and Terrorism… Editor: Nikolas J. Koppel

ISBN: 978-1-60741-335-6 © 2010 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 7

THE DEPUTY SECRETARY’S TESTIMONY BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE

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Nikolas J. Koppel Mr. Chairman, members of the Committee: with the successful transition to elected government in Pakistan, we have an historic opportunity to help the people of Pakistan build a base of democratic stability from which to counter violent extremism and fight international terrorism. This is vital to Pakistani interests, U.S. interests, and international interests, which are not limited to Afghanistan and Pakistan‘s other immediate neighbors. Pakistan is the world‘s second most populous Muslim state. It has nuclear weapons, and it is on the front lines of the battle against international terrorism, the most serious security threat of the 21st century. The United States is determined to help Pakistan meet the challenges it faces. We believe that the newly elected government of Pakistan welcomes our support with a determination as strong as our own. But before I discuss U.S. strategy vis-à-vis Pakistan, and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) in particular, I want to make three overarching points. First, the terrorist problem in Pakistan and the terrorist problem in Afghanistan are inextricably intertwined. Today I will focus on Pakistan, but I ask that you keep in mind the fact that we must have a fully coordinated strategy that addresses the ground truth on both sides of the Pakistani-Afghan border. What happens on the Afghan side of the border has a direct impact on Pakistan just as what happens on the Pakistani side affects Afghanistan. Terrorists and violent extremists continue to exploit Pakistan‘s rugged tribal areas as safehavens and cross the border to attack Afghan and Coalition forces in Afghanistan. We therefore must find ways to more effectively coordinate and synchronize operations by both nations, and thereby reduce the operating space where our common enemies function. Second, we must design and execute our strategy to assist Pakistan in such a way as to persuade other nations—many other nations—to take the problems the Pakistanis confront as seriously as we do. Regional, Middle Eastern, European, African, and Asian interests are just as threatened by international terrorism and violent extremism as our own interests here in the Western Hemisphere. So we must have a strategy of broad diplomatic engagement in support

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of specific programs resourced by the United States. In short, we see U.S. objectives in Pakistan and Afghanistan border regions as one single theater of operations that will require all of our skills— diplomatic, military, and developmental. Third, the U.S-Pakistan relationship runs much deeper than our mutual counterterrorism priorities. While the battlefield for the war against terrorism will be fought in the border regions, our programs to work with the people and government of Pakistan will be critical to our success in these areas. We are committed to building a broader, long-term relationship with Pakistan. Given the gravity of the dangers Pakistan confronts on a day-to-day basis, a broad but integrated commitment of assistance on the part of the United States is essential. This is true nation-wide, as well as with respect to the tribal areas on which we focus today. Nation-wide, our strategy is to help the newly elected government of Pakistan strengthen democratic institutions, provide children with a modern education, reform economic structures, provide the people with food and energy, and transform the military into a more capable security force for the nation. And again, let me emphasize that our commitment to Pakistan applies to the tribal and frontier areas as well as the nation as a whole. Our goal is to help integrate these areas into the national and world economy, to help the new government bring the people there into the life of their own country, to help provide a modern education that draws children away from madaris, and to help the people of the area provide their own security and resist the pressures of extremists. Nowhere are common U.S.-Pakistan interests more in evidence than in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas. But to address those interests, we first must help the Government of Pakistan exert its authority there. That is crucial to ameliorating the governance, economic, health, education, and security problems faced by the FATA‘s inhabitants on a daily basis.

GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN EFFORTS We welcome the fact that the new government in Pakistan wants to implement a comprehensive strategy to better integrate the Federally Administered Tribal Areas into Pakistan‘s economy and body politic. Government and political leaders more generally recognize that they cannot rid Pakistan‘s territory of violent extremists by military means alone—they also must create an environment inhospitable to terrorism and extremism. The Government‘s objective is to persuade the people living in this traditionally autonomous region that their interest lies in supporting the Government‘s efforts to bring development to the area. By thus improving the relationship between the region and the rest of Pakistan, the government hopes to weaken the sway of terrorists and extremists, demonstrating to the population that they will benefit by supporting the government and denying terrorists safehaven. The Government of Pakistan‘s comprehensive ―Frontier Strategy‖ emphasizes economic and social development, while strengthening effective governance. As part of its Frontier Strategy and after consulting with all interested parties including the public, the Government also has developed a nine-year, twobillion-dollar Sustainable Development Plan for the tribal areas. The Government‘s plan addresses the basic unmet needs that underlie the existing

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The Deputy Secretary‘s Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 129 social and economic problems and outlines measures to improve services, upgrade infrastructure, increase government capacity, promote the sustainable use of natural resources, and bolster activity in the trade, commerce, and industrial sectors. This will be a demanding effort. Pakistan‘s tribal areas have some of the worst social and economic conditions in the world. In some areas, the female literacy rate is as low as 3%. There is little access to safe drinking water or to even rudimentary health care. The system of public education is largely nonexistent. But the Government of Pakistan‘s decision to partner with the United States, the United Kingdom, and other international partners, such as Japan and Australia, in this effort demonstrates Pakistan‘s commitment to deny terrorists and violent extremists the ability to exploit its territory. We applaud the fact that in 2007, the Government made concerted efforts to reach out to its partners in various international fora, presenting its plan to members of the World Bank, the Group of Eight, the European Union, and various bilateral donors to coordinate political and donor support. This is consonant with the emphasis we place on broad international engagement with Pakistan. For our part, the United States has made a five-year $750 million commitment beginning in FY 2007 in support of infrastructure development, maternal & child health, education and capacity building initiatives in the tribal areas and border regions of Pakistan. Additional resources are requested in the FY 2009 emergency supplemental to support the Security Development Plan.

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U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT FRONTIER STRATEGY The U.S. Agency for International Development‘s economic development programs in the tribal areas and border regions of Pakistan target areas that have few jobs, low literacy, little hope and are vulnerable to militant infiltration. Just as our earthquake assistance to Pakistan in 2005 and 2006 had a profoundly positive impact on the people of Pakistan– generating good will that has lasted to this very day–we believe our support for developing the tribal areas will bring stability and prosperity. USAID‘s program is fully operational in the tribal areas, with 16 Agency projects currently operating there. This month, for example, USAID will refurbish several hospitals‘ delivery and surgical facilities, will train maternal health and other medical professionals, and will continue working with a local official to restore police authority to a central market. Other projects initiated in April, developed through a consultative approach that aims to build confidence and trust between the Government of Pakistan and tribal communities by identifying and implementing small community improvement opportunities, were in the health, drinking water, girls' education, government capacity building, and media sectors. Pakistani government partners stated in April that the competitive and open procurement process established by USAID in implementing these small projects has increased their credibility in the communities in which they work. These are just a few examples of the activities we are pursuing to improve lives and enhance governance in the tribal areas, Northwest Frontier Province, and Balochistan. Congressional support for the $60 million Economic Support Fund request for Pakistan in the Fiscal Year 2008 supplemental will allow the Agency to continue advancing these goals.

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Nikolas J. Koppel

We also believe Reconstruction Opportunity Zones can play a major role in promoting long-term economic development and stability of this remote part of Pakistan. We believe ROZs will provide the crucial economic component that complements our military and political strategies. We were very happy to see introduction of ROZ legislation by Senator Cantwell and her co-sponsors, and we hope that Congress will soon pass legislation to make ROZs a reality. In addition, our security and development programs in the tribal areas are critical to achieving our highest objectives in the War on Terror. These programs will boost sustainable, private sector-led economic development and provide long-term, legitimate livelihoods for citizens in impoverished areas at the epicenter of the war on terror and drugs. Just as important, these efforts are essential to maintaining forward momentum in building a long-term, broad-based relationship with the Pakistani people.

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SECURITY DEVELOPMENT PLAN Providing a secure environment that fosters economic and social development is critical. As the Committee knows, in March 2006, President Musharraf asked President Bush for U.S. assistance in developing and funding a comprehensive strategy to deny terrorists and violent extremists the ability to exploit the under-governed Federally Administered Tribal Areas which they have exploited as a hideout and safehaven. The United States agreed to provide support. Further, the Government of Pakistan has launched a program to increase the size of its Frontier Corps, a Pashtun-based paramilitary force raised in the border region. Members of the Frontier Corps have unique advantages operating in the tribal areas due to their linguistic and ethnic ties. The United States is supporting this expansion and is helping to train and equip the Frontier Corps to enhance Pakistan‘s ability to secure its border and provide security to the indigenous population. The United States Government‘s principal contribution to establishing security in the FATA and the western border region is the Security Development Plan, a six-year multifaceted program to enhance Pakistan‘s ability to secure its border with Afghanistan. The Plan was co-developed by our Embassy in Islamabad and U.S. Central Command, and fully coordinated with the Government of Pakistan. In Fiscal Years 2007 to 2008, the Department of Defense provided over $200 million. In Fiscal Year 2009, the Administration is seeking at least $100 million in Foreign Military Financing for the plan in the bridge supplemental request. Congressional support for the supplemental request will be instrumental in the U.S. Government‘s ability to implement the Security Development Plan. We are working hard to ensure that Pakistan has the necessary will and tools to conduct aggressive and sustained counterterrorism and counterinsurgency operations in the years to come. To cite an important example, the Department of Defense will equip and train special operations units of the Pakistan Army. Training will focus on the Special Services Group and its helicopter mobility unit, the 21st Quick Reaction Squadron, to enhance its ability to execute combat missions in the border region. Our programs are providing those forces with the skills needed to permanently prevent militants and terrorists from exploiting Pakistani territory as a staging ground for attacks in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and beyond.

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The Deputy Secretary‘s Testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 131 We are also enhancing coordination among Afghan, Pakistani, U.S., and NATO forces in the Afghanistan/Pakistani border region. Again, this effort focuses on the full internationalization of the response to a problem that threatens the world community at large. On March 29, we and our partners inaugurated the first of several Border Coordination Centers at Torkham, Afghanistan. The Centers will make it possible for Pakistani, Afghan, and International Security Assistance Force representatives to more effectively coordinate to counter efforts by our common enemies from using their superior knowledge of the terrain to skirt both sides of the rugged border to avoid engagement.

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SUPPORTING THE PAKISTANI PEOPLE As the Committee knows first-hand, we worked hard to help Pakistan establish conditions conducive to free, fair and transparent elections for the February 18 parliamentary elections. We are now working equally hard with Pakistan‘s leaders, including the moderate Awami National Party which won elections in the Northwest Frontier Province, to explore how we can help the new Government of Pakistan extend the authority of the Pakistani state to the tribal areas. We are encouraged by the electoral mandate that these parties possess. Our Embassy continues to meet with representatives from all Pakistani political parties that have a stake in the new government. As we support Pakistan‘s democratic transition, we continue to cooperate closely with Pakistan‘s government and military to combat violent extremism. The media has reported that the Government of Pakistan has been exploring peace agreements with certain groups in the tribal areas. Given past failures, we have raised our concerns about these negotiations with Pakistan‘s leaders. It is our belief that a moderate government with a democratic mandate has been and will continue to be a good partner in this extremely difficult effort. In conclusion, Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, Pakistan‘s tribal areas are of immense importance to the security of Pakistan and the world. That is why we must utilize a multifaceted approach to help the newly elected Pakistani Government and the Pakistani people bring these remote areas into the Pakistani mainstream and render them permanently inhospitable to terrorists and violent extremists. Thank you very much.

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INDEX # 9/11, 61, 62, 63, 64, 66, 69, 70, 71, 73, 74, 79, 118, 125 9/11 Commission, 61, 62, 63, 64, 66, 70, 71, 73, 74, 79

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A accountability, 14, 29, 31, 32, 46, 71, 73, 74 accounting, 13, 31, 33, 48, 107 accounting standards, 31 accuracy, 47, 50, 56 activity level, 40 acute, 100, 104 administration, 48, 61, 63, 70, 71, 72, 73, 79, 81, 82, 84, 85, 86, 87, 88, 101, 109, 112, 115 Africa, 66 age, 122 agents, 9, 17, 65 aggregates, 46 agriculture, 64 aid, 2, 7, 13, 14, 100, 103, 104, 111, 115, 121 air, 20, 21, 30, 38, 44, 45, 56, 57, 72, 82, 99 Air Force, 79 air traffic, 38, 45, 56, 57 al Qaeda, 1, 3, 4, 7, 12, 15, 16, 17, 19, 20, 23, 32, 56, 57, 60, 62, 63, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70 allies, 2, 29, 73, 82, 100, 101, 104, 106, 109, 110 alternative, 5, 102, 107, 113, 114, 119, 121, 122 alternatives, 102, 122, 124 amendments, 66 analysts, 4, 5, 8, 10, 13 anger, 9, 112 ANP, 106 antagonism, 6 anti-American, 9, 12, 16

anti-terrorism, 13 ants, 128 appendix, 31, 48 application, 29 Arabia, 108 argument, 112, 115 armed forces, 20, 117 Army, 10, 12, 13, 20, 23, 30, 50, 57, 62, 79, 101, 106, 130 arrest, 3, 4, 118 Asia, 8, 16, 19, 49, 75, 82, 84, 85 Asian, 8, 16, 26, 73, 127 assassination, 3, 6, 67, 112, 119 assessment, 10, 12, 22, 45, 47, 50, 57, 66, 67, 72, 73, 74, 85 assets, 6, 119 assignment, 63 assimilation, 65 attacks, ix, 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 11, 12, 20, 24, 29, 46, 56, 61, 66, 67, 69, 79, 81, 112, 130 attitudes, 104 auditing, 30, 50, 62 Australia, 104, 129 authority, 4, 9, 17, 20, 28, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34, 42, 45, 46, 48, 65, 69, 73, 106, 108, 128, 129, 131 autonomy, 9 average costs, 38 averaging, 46

B backlash, 11 Baluchistan, 4, 9, 13 Bangladesh, 16 bank account, 6 Belgium, 110 bias, 121 bilateral relations, 81

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Index

Bin Laden, 16, 20 bipartisan, 61, 70, 83, 123 blood, 12 boats, 37 bomb, 6 border crossing, 10 border security, 13, 26, 79 Bosnia, 85 Boston, 108 breeding, 14 bribery, 104 Britain, 104, 115 buildings, 16 Bush Administration, 10, 12, 13, 14, 84, 85

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C cables, 37, 50 campaigns, 26, 107 Canada, 62, 104 capacity building, 72, 114, 129 cargo, 5, 20, 32 carrier, 11 cast, 16, 109, 112 category a, 57 cease-fire, 4 CENTCOM, 22, 26, 29, 31, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 42, 43, 49, 50, 61, 62 Central America, 85 Central Asia, 8, 19, 26, 82 Central Intelligence Agency, 61, 62 CEO, 85, 109 channels, 104 chemical weapons, 3 Chief Justice, 108 Chief of Staff, 10 children, 7, 12, 128 CIA, 3, 15, 61, 62, 71, 84 citizens, 65, 130 civil servant, 104 civil servants, 104 civil society, 10, 73, 84 civilian, 1, 4, 8, 10, 19, 24, 79, 81, 83, 104, 106, 112, 120 Co, i, v, vii, 10, 27, 35, 57, 59, 61, 63, 70, 73, 79, 86 coherence, 110 collaboration, 71, 79 Colorado, 120 commerce, 129 Committee on Intelligence, 79 Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, 49, 75 Committees on Appropriations, 32, 36

communication, 20 communities, 111, 129 community, 63, 64, 72, 73, 74, 100, 103, 106, 110, 121, 129, 131 competence, 101, 107 competition, 8, 102 compliance, 50 components, 46, 64, 73 concentration, 103 conception, 8 confidence, 83, 86, 102, 104, 107, 115, 129 conflict, 6, 8, 81, 119 Congress, 1, 13, 14, 15, 20, 22, 23, 29, 31, 32, 34, 35, 46, 48, 57, 60, 61, 63, 64, 66, 69, 70, 71, 74, 79, 81, 84, 85, 125, 130 consolidation, 101 Constitution, 9 construction, 30, 38, 42, 43, 57, 73, 120 consulting, 128 continuity, 45 contractors, 14 contracts, 107 control, 5, 30, 38, 42, 45, 50, 56, 57, 68, 100, 102, 103, 104, 106, 107, 108, 120 conversion, 28, 31, 36, 40 conversion rate, 28, 31, 36 corruption, 5, 99, 100, 101, 104, 107, 110, 116, 120, 121 cost accounting, 30, 50 costs, ix, 14, 21, 22, 24, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 50, 57 counsel, 85 counseling, 105 counterintelligence, 117 counternarcotics, 118 counterterrorism, ix, 1, 10, 12, 13, 14, 26, 72, 79, 118, 125, 128, 130 courts, 65 covering, 28, 30, 38, 62, 73 crack, 108 credibility, 26, 129 credit, 87, 107 crimes, 65 criticism, 11 crops, 107, 118, 122, 123 cross-border, 5, 12, 15, 23, 112 CRS, 1, 15 CSF, ix, 13, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 47, 48, 49, 50, 55, 56, 57, 61, 62, 79 cultivation, 105, 109, 118, 123 cultural practices, 14

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Index culture, 115, 123 currency, 28, 31, 36, 40, 47, 105

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D danger, 2, 3, 84 data processing, 44, 50, 56 dating, 67 death, 23 deaths, 12, 23, 68 decisions, 30, 36, 37, 120 defense, 8, 12, 20, 21, 22, 30, 32, 38, 44, 45, 81, 82 defenses, 107 delivery, 107, 129 democracy, 19, 82, 84, 87, 104, 120, 124 Democrat, 16, 83 democratization, 9 Democrats, 17 Denmark, 104 Department of Defense, ix, 15, 20, 21, 25, 26, 27, 29, 35, 57, 61, 77, 111, 130 Department of State, 22, 25, 26, 35, 60, 61, 76, 79 depreciation, 21 depressed, 112 destruction, 67 devaluation, 36 development assistance, 30, 61, 62, 63, 66, 67, 69, 70, 72, 73, 79, 82, 102, 107 Development Assistance, 14 Director of National Intelligence, 60, 61, 62, 64, 74, 79 disappointment, 117 disaster, 87 disputes, 105 dissatisfaction, 33 distribution, 74 diversity, 122 donor, 129 donors, 62, 72, 104, 129 draft, 64, 65, 74 drinking, 129 drinking water, 129 drug interdiction, 107 drug trafficking, 105, 118 drugs, 130 duty-free access, 15 duty-free treatment, 15

E earthquake, 129

135

economic development, 1, 10, 72, 84, 105, 107, 129, 130 economic growth, 14, 72 economic indicator, 105 economic problem, 129 Economic Support Fund, 129 education, 88 elders, 11 election, 86, 108, 116 electoral process, 102 employment, 11, 15, 21, 72 empowered, 65 energy, 19, 24, 83, 87, 105, 125, 128 engagement, 30, 74, 101, 106, 127, 129, 131 enterprise, 14 environment, 128, 130 equities, 114 equity, 85 Europe, 66, 73, 85, 103, 109 European Union, 110, 129 evolution, 19 exaggeration, 105 exchange rate, 31, 40, 41, 47 exchange rates, 31, 40, 41, 47 execution, 22 Executive Branch, 106 Executive Order, 4 expenditures, 13, 21 expertise, 103, 109, 117 extremism, 1, 2, 7, 9, 10, 24, 26, 67, 82, 83, 125, 127, 128, 131 eyes, 117

F F-16, 13 facilitators, 7 failure, 100, 101, 104, 105, 111, 116 faith, 83, 102 farmers, 119 faults, 105 fear, 12, 67 fees, 6 feet, 116 field theory, 104 fighters, 3, 4, 8, 9, 12, 16, 20, 23, 62 finance, 107 financial records, 46 financing, 107 fines, 65 fire, 7, 9 flexibility, 32 flight, 21, 34, 42

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Index

flow, 5, 107 fluctuations, 40, 47, 50 food, 13, 21, 24, 38, 39, 46, 83, 123, 125, 128 food products, 123 foreign assistance, 25, 88, 105 foreign exchange, 105 Foreign Military Financing (FMF), 12, 13, 130 foreign policy, 9, 25, 26, 81, 85, 88, 125 Foreign Relations Committee, vii, 17, 83, 127 foreigners, 7, 46 France, 17 franchise, 10 free trade, 113 free trade area, 113 freedom, 8, 23 freedom fighter, 8 freezing, 6 friction, 112, 113 fuel, 5, 20, 24, 32, 34, 37, 39 full capacity, 73 funding, 5, 12, 14, 32, 44, 45, 46, 62, 63, 64, 67, 69, 71, 72, 73, 74, 79, 101, 130 funds, 4, 8, 12, 13, 14, 20, 28, 29, 30, 32, 36, 46, 47, 50, 67, 72, 79, 82, 108, 111, 118 futures, 107

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G GDP, 57 generation, 2 generators, 21 Georgia, 112 Germany, 115 girls, 105, 129 global terrorism, 19 Global War on Terror, 20, 26 goals, ix, x, 8, 10, 30, 32, 47, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 66, 67, 69, 71, 72, 73, 74, 79, 82, 84, 100, 104, 106, 107, 121, 129 goggles, 72 good faith, 83 governance, 104, 105, 108, 109, 115, 128, 129 Government Accountability Office (GAO), vii, 10, 14, 27, 59, 82, 84 government-to-government, 12 governors, 116 grains, 123 grants, 12 gravity, 128 greed, 130 gross domestic product, 57 grouping, 5 groups, 1, 2, 3, 6, 7, 9, 23, 88, 105, 120, 131

growth, 14, 72, 74, 82, 105 guidance, ix, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 57, 71, 74 guidelines, 21, 22, 48

H hands, 85, 119 harm, 115 Harvard, 17 harvest, 123 hate, 99, 114, 115 health, 72, 104, 105, 115, 128, 129 health care, 14, 104, 105, 129 health services, 105 hearing, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 101, 103, 109, 123, 124, 125 heart, 101 helicopters, 12, 31, 44, 46, 119 heroin, 102 high-level, 46, 106 high-risk, 46 Homeland Security, 69 honesty, 102 hospital, 21 hospitals, 64, 129 host, 34 House, vii, ix, x, 10, 15, 19, 20, 25, 32, 36, 49, 75, 81, 82, 99, 109, 113 housing, 13, 104 human, 7, 9, 16, 104, 125 human capital, 104 human rights, 7, 9, 104, 125 humanitarian, 7 husband, 108

I id, 16, 41, 42 identification, 67 ideology, 99, 107 illiteracy, 24, 115 IMF, 29, 40, 41, 57 implementation, 14, 34, 36, 69, 72, 73, 106 inauguration, 11 incentives, 121 income, 64, 102 independence, 108 India, 1, 8, 16, 85, 117, 123 indication, 11, 39 indicators, 64, 67

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Index indigenous, 9, 12, 65, 130 industrial sectors, 129 industrialization, 15 industry, 107 infant mortality, 105 inflation, 105, 125 information retrieval, 46 information sharing, 2 infrastructure, 15, 64, 67, 72, 73, 105, 107, 115, 119, 129 inhospitable, 128, 131 injury, vi insecurity, 2 inspections, 42, 47 Inspector General, 21, 29, 33, 50, 57 instability, 2, 5 institutions, 26, 72, 73, 82, 83, 84, 105, 128 instruments, 79, 110 insurance, 21 integration, 73, 79, 83 integrity, ix, 2, 124 intelligence, 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 10, 56, 61, 63, 64, 66, 69, 70, 71, 73, 74, 79, 104, 119 intelligence gathering, 119 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, 63, 79 intentions, 7 interference, 9, 107 International Monetary Fund, 29, 40 international terrorism, 2, 3, 127 internationalization, 131 intervention, 108 interviews, 79 investment, 15, 107 Iran, 19, 107 Iraq, 7, 9, 16, 34, 86, 99, 101, 106, 110, 111, 118, 119, 120, 124 irrigation, 122, 123 Islam, 9, 84, 123 Islamist extremists, 8 Islamist terrorism, 62 Israel, 87

J Japan, 62, 73, 129 jihad, 9 jobs, 102, 113, 115, 129 Joint Chiefs, 4, 11 Jordan, 20 judgment, 38 judiciary, 83, 102, 107, 110, 120, 121 justice, 84, 102, 104, 107

137

justification, 38, 39

K Kashmir, 1 kernel, 102 killing, 2 Korea, 83 Kurdish, 110

L lack of confidence, 100, 103 land, 5, 105 language, 82, 83 large-scale, 71 Latin America, 85, 105 laundry, 21 law, 6, 15, 31, 32, 48, 61, 63, 66, 69, 70, 73, 74, 79, 83, 87, 104, 105, 118 law enforcement, 61, 63, 66, 69, 70, 73, 74, 79 laws, 9, 23 leadership, 4, 5, 19, 67, 81, 86, 87, 100, 104, 105, 108, 112, 116, 125 legislation, 25, 32, 61, 62, 63, 70, 71, 130 limitations, 11, 31, 48 Lincoln, 11 links, 104 literacy, 64, 129 loans, 118 locus, 100 logistics, 46, 99 London, 15, 16, 17 long period, 117 Los Angeles, 15, 16, 17 losses, 40, 100 love, 120 loyalty, 7 lubricants, 21

M mainstream, 10, 83, 131 maintenance, 31, 42, 44, 45, 46, 57, 82 management, 22, 56, 71, 106 mandates, 71 manpower, 114 Marine Corps, 85, 109 Marines, 99, 110, 118 maritime, 13, 56 market, 15, 41, 57, 118, 122, 123, 129

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marketing, 107 markets, 118 Maryland, 9, 23 measurement, 34 measures, 2, 5, 73, 84, 107, 129 media, 113, 129, 131 memory, 86 men, 8, 124 metric, 121 Middle East, 49, 66, 75, 84, 85, 125, 127 migration, 110 militant, ix, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 68, 87, 129 military aid, 13 militias, 1, 7, 8, 124 misconceptions, 83, 123 missiles, 13, 113 missions, 12, 16, 21, 56, 104, 106, 130 mobility, 119, 130 momentum, 130 money, 88, 105, 108, 111, 113, 114, 118, 124 morale, 6 morning, 86, 100, 101, 112, 116, 119, 124 mortality, 105 motion, 112 mountains, 3 movement, 21, 102 murder, 20 Muslim, 9, 19, 127 Muslim state, 19, 127

N narcotic, 110, 118, 122 narcotics, 6, 102, 104, 105, 107, 118, 122 nation, 20, 31, 46, 48, 61, 84, 87, 103, 118, 122, 128 National Counterterrorism Center, 61, 62 National Defense Authorization Act, 13, 36 National Guard, 124 National Intelligence Estimate, 23, 60, 61, 63 national interests, 125 National Party, 131 national security, ix, x, 10, 19, 22, 26, 32, 35, 47, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 66, 67, 69, 70, 71, 73, 74, 79, 82, 84, 85, 86, 100, 103, 124 National Security Council, 61, 62 National Security Strategy, 79 National Strategy, 61, 63, 70, 79 nationalism, 8 NATO, 2, 4, 5, 10, 15, 20, 24, 82, 87, 99, 100, 103, 104, 106, 109, 110, 111, 113, 115, 118, 119, 131 natural, 124, 129 natural resources, 129 Navy, 37, 38, 79

negative consequences, 65 negotiating, 82, 84, 112 negotiation, 1 Netherlands, 62, 104 network, 7 New York, 3, 15, 16, 17, 84 New York Times, 3, 15, 16, 17 newspapers, 121 NGO, 88 NGOs, 88 NIE, 23, 61, 63, 66, 67, 79 nodes, 10 nongovernmental organization, 62, 73 non-profit, 88 normal, 21, 28, 29, 30, 34, 37, 38, 57 North Atlantic, 110 North Atlantic Treaty Organization, 110 North Korea, 83 Norway, 104 NSC, 60, 61, 62, 63, 70, 71, 75, 79 nuclear, 19, 84, 127 nuclear weapons, 84, 127

O observations, 31, 86 OEF, 20 Office of Management and Budget, 20, 35, 57 Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs, 48 oil, 21, 121 OMB, 22, 35, 57 Operation Enduring Freedom, 3, 20, 32, 68 opium, 100, 103, 105, 118 opposition parties, 108 Osama bin Laden, 3 Osama Bin Laden, 20 outrage, 12 oversight, ix, 13, 14, 20, 22, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33, 34, 35, 36, 42, 43, 45, 47, 48, 50, 57, 62, 72, 82, 113

P packaging, 123 Palestine, 9 paramilitary, 6, 12, 13, 23, 57, 60, 63, 66, 68, 72, 130 Paris, 110 Parliament, 83, 87, 99 partition, 8 partnership, 84 Pashtun, 8, 9, 13, 16, 23, 121, 130

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Index passenger, 31, 39, 40 peace process, 107 Pentagon, 4, 5, 11, 12, 13, 15, 17 per capita, 64 per capita income, 64 perception, 9 Pervez Musharraf, 3 petroleum, 21 Philadelphia, 16 planning, 2, 21, 64, 70, 72, 74, 79, 99, 106 platforms, 12 play, 69, 85, 101, 130 pleasure, 102, 103, 109, 119 Poland, 104 police, 9, 13, 17, 23, 38, 57, 99, 100, 101, 102, 104, 107, 110, 116, 122, 124, 129 policymakers, 2 political leaders, 11, 66, 128 political legitimacy, 101, 104 political parties, 9, 10, 65, 131 politics, 86, 88, 116 poor, 9, 14, 15, 31, 44, 64 poppy cultivation, 105, 118, 123 population, 23, 64, 65, 67, 104, 121, 122, 124, 128, 130 ports, 3 posture, 102 poverty, 24, 64, 100, 103 poverty line, 64 power, 6, 8, 22, 25, 35, 61, 63, 64, 66, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 79, 84, 87, 108, 115, 117, 120, 121, 125 powers, 9, 86 PPP, 87, 119, 120 predicate, 99 preparedness, 8 presidency, 87 President Bush, 11, 14, 70, 72, 130 President Clinton, 85 pressure, 101, 105, 113 prevention, 79 prices, 83 private, 7, 73, 85, 130 private sector, 73, 130 privation, 14 production, 102, 123 profit, 105 profits, 88 program, 12, 15, 19, 20, 22, 25, 26, 34, 40, 43, 49, 112, 114, 129, 130 propaganda, 6 property, vi, 5, 65 proposition, 103 prosperity, 82, 129

139

protection, 120 Provincial Reconstruction Team, 104 PRT, 117 public education, 9, 129 public service, 85 public support, 12, 83 punishment, 9

R radar, 10, 30, 38, 82 radicalism, 115 radio, 12 range, 42, 56, 106 reality, 130 reasoning, 38 recognition, 28, 31, 41, 65, 69, 103 reconciliation, 4, 106, 112 reconstruction, 88, 101, 102, 105, 118 record keeping, 46 recruiting, 4 reelection, 116 reflection, 7 Reform Act, 63, 64, 70, 73, 79 reforms, 71, 122 regional problem, 110 regular, 6, 116, 121 regulations, 65 reimbursement, 14, 20, 21, 22, 25, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 44, 45, 48, 49, 50, 55, 56, 57 reinforcement, 101 relationship, ix, 1, 20, 26, 81, 84, 103, 113, 114, 128, 130 relaxation, 102, 107 relevance, 100 reliability, 30, 44, 50 repair, 40 Republican, 83 reputation, 9 reserves, 105 resistance, 7, 12, 16, 23 resolution, 79, 108, 112 resources, 71, 74, 111, 114, 129 revenue, 57 risk, 46, 99 risks, 8, 106 rule of law, 83, 104, 105 runaway, 100, 103 rural areas, 105 Russia, 112

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S safe drinking water, 129 safety, 26 salaries, 21, 116 sales, 12 sanctions, 4 sanctuaries, 2, 4 SAS, 16 Saudi Arabia, 108 school, 99, 104, 117 scores, 7, 13 secret, 11 Secretary of Defense, 13, 20, 21, 22, 29, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 43, 45, 47, 48, 49, 57 Secretary of State, 2, 20, 25, 26, 57, 85, 86 Security Council, 61, 62, 110 seizures, 65 Senate, vii, x, 9, 15, 17, 32, 36, 50, 75, 79, 83, 86, 113, 127 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, vii, 17, 127 sentences, 102 September 11, 3, 15, 20, 23, 29, 46 services, vi, 4, 14, 21, 30, 36, 57, 72, 105, 107, 129 shares, 64, 99 Sharia, 6 sharing, 2, 5 short period, 113 short run, 83 signs, 8, 82 similarity, 124 skills, 128, 130 sleep, 116 social development, 8, 71, 83, 128, 130 software, 30, 50 South Asia, 8, 49, 75, 84, 85 sovereignty, 8, 9, 12 spectrum, 9, 11 stability, ix, 1, 2, 5, 19, 23, 26, 69, 71, 82, 110, 115, 118, 125, 127, 129, 130 stabilization, 2 stabilize, ix, 1, 2, 29, 107 stages, 119 stakeholders, 69, 72, 73 standards, 25, 30, 31, 42, 45, 48, 50, 57, 62, 117, 119 State Department, 2, 3, 12, 13, 14, 25, 29, 49, 63, 68, 88 statutory, 33 stockpile, 7 storage, 46 strategies, 61, 62, 63, 66, 69, 70, 71, 73, 130 strength, 108 stress, 88, 112

strikes, 5, 11, 12, 16, 115 structural reforms, 17 students, 115 subsistence, 64 substitutes, 105 suicide, 3, 6, 23, 67, 99, 111 suicide bombers, 99 summer, 62 Sunday, 15, 16 Sunni, 7 supplements, 12 supply, 5, 7, 107 supply chain, 7 surprise, 83 surrogates, 108 surveillance, 11, 16, 73

T tactics, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 114 Taliban, ix, 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 13, 15, 16, 19, 20, 23, 32, 56, 57, 62, 66, 68, 69, 86, 87, 99, 100, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 111, 113, 115, 117, 120, 121, 123, 124 targets, 16, 67 tariff, 15 task force, 113 taxes, 6 taxpayers, 22, 88, 113 technical assistance, 72 telephone, 37 temperature, 109 tension, 8 tenure, 9 territory, 5, 7, 9, 11, 12, 16, 65, 66, 83, 128, 129, 130 terrorism, ix, 2, 3, 8, 13, 19, 26, 27, 30, 32, 34, 47, 48, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 66, 67, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 83, 84, 85, 99, 108, 125, 127, 128 terrorist, ix, 1, 2, 3, 7, 10, 13, 23, 29, 46, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 81, 82, 84, 85, 108, 112, 127 terrorist attack, ix, 1, 3, 7, 61, 67 terrorist groups, 1, 23 terrorists, ix, 3, 7, 12, 14, 24, 32, 38, 45, 57, 59, 61, 63, 66, 67, 68, 71, 74, 79, 81, 82, 84, 112, 116, 120, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131 testimony, ix, x, 85, 86, 109, 116, 118, 125 Texas, 118, 119, 125 thinking, 123 third party, 28, 30, 36 threat, ix, 1, 3, 8, 9, 24, 46, 59, 63, 64, 66, 67, 71, 72, 73, 82, 83, 84, 86, 100, 103, 104, 127 threat of force, 24

Combating Islamic Militancy and Terrorism in Pakistan's Border Region, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook Central,

Index threatened, 3, 32, 127 threats, ix, 1, 10, 60, 61, 62, 84, 85, 100, 103, 118 time frame, 29, 33 tolerance, 7 total costs, 33 tracking, 16, 114 trade, 26, 105, 107, 113, 118, 129 traffic, 38, 45, 56, 57 training, 3, 7, 12, 13, 23, 43, 45, 66, 67, 72, 73, 79, 83, 100, 101, 102, 104, 106, 107, 111, 116 transactions, 40 transcript, 16 transfer, 117 transformation, 115, 118 transition, 83, 118, 127, 131 transmits, 26 transparency, 36 transparent, 131 transport, 12, 34, 46, 105, 107 transportation, 123 travel, 61 Treasury, 13, 69 trees, 118 tribes, 6, 8, 9, 23, 73, 87 trucks, 5 trust, 2, 7, 82, 83, 115, 129 trust fund, 115 turnover, 46

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U U.S. Agency for International Development, 61, 62, 129 U.S. military, ix, 4, 5, 7, 9, 11, 12, 16, 20, 21, 25, 26, 27, 29, 32, 34, 35, 38, 45, 57 U.S. Treasury, 13 unclassified, 56, 62, 63, 66 unemployment, 64 uniform, 86, 110, 118 Uniform Code of Military Justice, 101 United Kingdom, 62, 73, 129 United Nations (UN), 7, 21, 85, 86, 99, 103, 105, 106, 110 USAID, 14, 17, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 68, 69, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 79, 129 USDA, 118 Uzbekistan, 3, 5

V

141

validation, 28, 29, 30, 50 validity, 38 values, 82, 124 variables, 57 vegetables, 123 vehicles, 21, 31, 34, 37, 39 Vice President, 3 village, 3 violence, 2, 8, 11, 100, 103 violent, 14, 26, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131 vision, 12, 72, 100, 104 voice, 87 voting, 112

W wages, 57 Wall Street Journal, 15 war, ix, 4, 8, 9, 16, 27, 29, 32, 34, 46, 47, 48, 59, 61, 79, 84, 85, 86, 99, 102, 119, 128, 130 war on terror, ix, 8, 27, 29, 32, 34, 46, 47, 48, 59, 61, 79, 102, 130 War on Terror, 19, 20, 25, 26, 130 warfare, 12, 82 warlords, 115 Washington Post, 15, 16, 17, 104 water, 20, 21, 105, 117, 122, 129 Waziristan, 3, 6, 15, 16, 23, 115 weapons, 3, 6, 7, 107, 118 Western Europe, 32 Western Hemisphere, 127 White House, 71 winning, 82, 99, 110 wisdom, 7 withdrawal, 104 witnesses, 65, 81, 82, 84, 85, 119, 125 wives, 5 women, 7, 12 World Bank, 110, 129 worry, 6, 8, 104

X xenophobia, 9

Y yield, 84, 102, 123

vacuum, 65

Combating Islamic Militancy and Terrorism in Pakistan's Border Region, Nova Science Publishers, Incorporated, 2010. ProQuest Ebook Central,