Colonialism in East-West Relations: A Study of Soviet Policy Towards India & Anglo-Soviet Relations 1917-47, Second Edition 8170500451, 9788170500452

Table of contents :
Contents
Preface to the Second Edition
Preface to the First Edition
Introduction: Ideological Background
Part I: Revolutionary Phase
The Effects of the Russian Revolution on India: 1917-1920
Early Contacts: 1917-1920
Promises and Intentions 1920-1922
Part II: Interregnum
Crisis and Confusion: 1922-1924
Reappraisal and Readjustment: 1924-1926
Part III: National-Revolutionary Phase
Internationalism versus Nationalism
1927-1929
Nationalism Supreme: 1929-1931
Who is the Greater Enemy? 1931-1935
The Dangerous Years: 1935-1939
The Crucial Phase: 1939-1945
The Reckoning
Postscript
Bibliography
Notes and References

Citation preview

COLONIALISM IN EAST-WEST RELATIONS

Colonialism in East-West Relations Study o f Soviet Policy towards India and Anglo-Soviet Relations: 1917-1947.

ZAFAR IMAM

PATRIOT PUBLISHERS New Delhi

Colonialism in East- West Relations

© Zafar Imam First Published in India, 1969 Second Edition, September. 1987

ISBN 81-7050-045-1

All Rights Reserved No part from this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including pho­ tocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrie­ val system without prior written permission from the publishers.

Published by

Patriot Publishers Link House Bahadur Shah Zafar Marg New Delhi-110002

Printed at

Jay Print Pack Pvt. Ltd., 8/39, Kirtinagar Industrial Area New Delhi-110015

To My Father

Contents Preface to the Second Edition Preface to the First Edition

I. Introduction

Ideological Background

ix xi

1

Part I : Revolutionary Phase II. The effects of the Russian Revolution on India ; 1917-1920 III. Early Contacts ; 1917-1920 IV. Promises and Intentions ; 1920-1922

49 87 121

Part II : Interregnum V. Crisis and Confusion ; 1922-1924 VI. Reappraisal and Readjustm ent; 19241926

167 207

Part III : National-Revolutionary Phase VII. VIII. IX. X. XI. XII. XIII.

Internationalism versus Nationalism ; 1927-1929 Nationalism Supreme ; 1929-1931 Who is the Greater Enemy ? 1931-1935 The Dangerous Years ; 1935-1939 The Crucial Phase ; 1939-1945 The Final Turn ; 1945-1947 The Reckoning

XIV. Postscript Bibliography Index

237 277 323 369 407 455 477 487 503 533

Preface to the Second Edition The first edition of the book is being reprinted now with the addition of a postscript. When the first edition of the book was printed in the late sixties, British archival materials for the year 1939-1947 were not available. Hence, unlike other chapters of the first edition the two chapters the ‘Crucial Phase’ and The Final Turn’, dealing with the years 1939-1947, could not use archival materials. The second edition of the book seeks to remove this lacuna, and thus its historical authenticity is likely to increase. The postscript is entirely based on new archival materials that were made public in Britain during the seventies and are available in British archives. These are Foreign Office, WarOffice and India Office materials concerning British policies towards the Soviet Union and various dimensions that comprise the main theme of the book. The postscript simply correlates relevant materials from these sources and does not attempt to draw any fresh conclusions. The conclusions drawn in ‘The Reckoning’, the last chapter of the first edition of the book, remain valid. With the addition of such a postscript, the book certainly now presents a much more complete and definitive account of colonialism in East-West relations in the specific context of Anglo-Soviet relations and India during 1917-47. A discerning reader would no doubt find it useful to go through the postscript as a supplement to the last two chapters of the first edition of the book. I was able to collect these archival materials from Public Record Office and, India Office Library, during my six-weeks stay in London. This visit to London was made possible by a field-trip grant under the Soviet Studies Programme sponsored by the

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Colonialism in East West Relations

University Grants Commission in the Centre for Soviet and East European Studies, Jawaharlal Nehru University. I am grateful to the University Grants Commission and the Jawaharlal Nehru University for providing me with this opportunity. I am also thankful to the Patriot Publishers and its Director, Mr. V.D. Chopra, in particular, for bringing out the second edition.

New Dehli December 1986

ZAFAR IMAM

Preface to the First Edition This book attempts to examine an important aspect of the ideology and practice of Communism. Since the esta­ blishment of the Soviet state in November 1917, the belief that the external and internal policies of the Soviet Union played a decisive role in the break-up of the world colo­ nial system has become one of the main articles of faith of Communism. It has been claimed that the birth and growth of the socialist system in Russia steadily weakened the hold of imperialism over the colonies and semi-colo­ nies, on the one hand, while on the ether, it inspired and encouraged the nationalist movements agitating against imperialist ru le ; thus the dialectical process worked towards the break-up of the world colonial system. To examine this claim objectively, one inevitably must focus attention both on the policies of the Soviet leaders towards the colonial world and on the nature of Soviet Russia’s relations with the imperialist Powers during the crucial period of the upsurge and intensification of natio­ nalism in the colonial world. I have chosen for this book a case study which is the most representative and is a classic model for such a pur­ pose. Britain was the world’s leading imperialist Power during the period 1917-1947 and was the main antagonist of Soviet Russia over the colonial question ; it was preci­ sely during this time that nationalism matured in British India which, in 1947, initiated the process of the break-up of the world colonial system. Three main aspects of this confrontation between Britain and Soviet Russia over British India have been dealt with in this book : Firstly, the strategy and tactics of Soviet policy towards India ; secondly, their effects on Anglo-Soviet relations ; and thirdly, their repercussions on the Government and politics of British India. An introductory chapter discusses the

xii

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ideological background of the Soviet view of the whole colonial world so as to put the case study of this book within the general frame of reference of its main theme of the East-West confrontation over the colonial question. Two points need clarification. Firstly, no allowance has been made in this book for the separate identity of the Comintern, and the organs of the Soviet state. While some distinction between the two is valid in considering^/ their work in the West, the same does not hold regarding the colonial and semi-colonial countries because of the lack of strong indigenous Communist Parties and the absence of direct inter-state relations with these countries. Secondly, after Stalin’s death, Soviet historians and Indo­ logists have begun to reappraise the policy and attitude adopted by the Soviet Union towards the nationalist movements and the national bourgeoisie in the colonies from the mid-twenties onwards. However, they have not gone so far as to attempt at a definitive assessment of the nature and causes of the then Soviet view of the colonial world. This book, it is hoped, will fill this vacuum. This book is the result of eight years of research in various libraries of Britain, the Soviet Union and India. Almost all the Russian materials have been collected from the Soviet libraries, while other materials have been con­ sulted in Britain and India. Without the co-operation and help of various organizations, institutions and individuals, this research could never have been completed. During my one and half year’s stay in the Soviet Union, various Soviet organizations and institutes helped me to gain access to the invaluable source materials in the libraries of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, the Institute of Marxism and Leninism and the Fundamental Library (Moscow). My grateful thanks are recorded here to the Institute of the Peoples of Asia (the Academy of Sciences of the USSR), the Student Council of the USSR and the Ministry o f Higher and Secondary Specialised Education of the USSR. The Hayter fund of the Russian Centre of Bristol Univer­ sity enabled me to pay a visit to Moscow during the winter of 1966-1967 for final checking of the Russian source materials. For this, I thank Bristol University and

Preface to the First Edition

xiii

in particular, Professor P. Bromhead of the Department of Politics. I acknowledge the co-operation of the Libra­ rian of Brimingham University for allowing me to use the Private Papers of Sir Austen Chamberlain and to quote from them, and of the New College, Oxford, for grant:ng me permission to use the Private Papers of Lord Milner in the College library. I am indebted to the Marx Memorial Library, (London), whose librarian, Mr. J. Williams, assisted me in exploring the very rich collection of socialist and com­ munist literature stored in the library. I should also like to thank the staff of British and Indian libraries in which I have principally worked : The British Museum (London), the Public Record Office (London), the India Office Library (London), the library of the Royal Institute of Internatio­ nal Affairs (London) and the National Library (Calcutta). A number of experts in Soviet Studies, British politics and in Indian affairs, and my friends and colleagues have read the manuscript and offered valuable criticisms- and suggestions. My thanks are due in particular to : Profes­ sor L. Schapiro, the Professor of Russian Studies, the London School of Economics and Political Science ; Professor H. Tinker of the School of Oriental and African Studies (London University) ; Mr. David Dilks of the London School of Economics and Political Science; Professor V.V. Balabushevich and Professor A. Dykov, both of the Institute of the Peoples of Asia, the Academy of Sciences, USSR ; and Mr. Armando Del Torto, the University of Maryland (USA) and London School of Economics and Political Science. Needless to add that I alone am responsible for the opinions expressed in this book. I am indebted to Miss. Carol Leaver who has typed the manuscript with unfailing attention. The cover of this book is designed by a promising young Indian print-maker Zarina, for which I am grateful to her. I am thankful to the Oxford University Press for allowing me to include in this book an article published in a slightly different form in St. Antony's Papers (Oxford, no. 18, 1966).

Colonialism in East West Relations

XI V

The first seven chapters of this book were presented as my Ph. D. thesis at the London School of Economics and Political Science and to these chapters I have added new materials, which are now available in the Public Record Office, London. Department of Politics, Bristol University, Bristol (U.K.) July 1967

Note:

ZAFAR IMAM

The book was delayed in getting into print be­ cause of my transfer of residence to India.

New Delhi

CHAPTER O N E

Introdu ction : Ideological Background

The colonial question before the Bolshevik Revolution

Marx’s and Engel’s concept of colonialism was mainly economic and social. Both of them recognised the importance of colonies in the strengthening of captalism in Europe. Marx also realised that the exploita­ tion of colonial territories by capitalism would inevi­ tably lead to social and economic changes in the colonial countries, beneficial to the cause of socialism all over the world. But Marx and Engels did not pay enough atten­ tion to the colonial world ; they neglected it in laying down their strategy of the world revolution. Among the followers of Marx, the Second Inter­ national groped with the tangled issue of the colonies and semi-colonies. It failed, however, to evolve a satis­ factory approach as it disagreed on the fundamental issues involved in the whole question. It was Lenin who devoted his attention to the question of colonies and semi-colonies.1 With characteristic zeal, he laid down a remarkable strategy in the interest of his ultimate objec­ tive— the overthrowing of capitalism and the victory of the socialist revolution. Lenin’s earliest writing on the colonies and the semi­ colonies dates back to 1900, when he analysed the Boxer uprising in China and denounced Tsarist Russia’s role in crushing it.12 He did not return to the subject until the 1. The Russian Social Democratic Labour Party was also drawn into the question of nationalities inside the Tsarist Empire. The inaugural manifesto issued by the first congress of the party, held in 1898, proclaimed the right of self-determination. Later, the party programme of 1903 again recognised “the right of self-determination to all nations contained in the state.” (See K P S S v rezoliutsiiakh i retiheniiakh, Moscow, 1953, vol. 1, p. 40). 2. V.I. Lenin, “Chinese War”, Sochineniia, Vol. IV, 4th Russian Edition, Moscow, 1948, pp. 347-352.

4

Colonialism in East-West Relations

Stuttgart conference of the Second International, held in 1907, which he attended as a delegate. Lenin’s under­ standing of the colonial problem was stimulated by the cumbrous problem of nationalities in Europe in general, and inside the Tsarist empire in particular.1 He, therefore, initially tried to provide an effective solution to this problem by advocating the right of self-determination for all nationalities in Europe. Unlike his predecessors in the Second International, Lenin later realised that the basic issue involved in the national question, namely sup­ pression and domination of one nation by another, had much in common with the colonial question. In advo­ cating the right of nations to self-determination, Lenin provided an approach to an effective solution of both these questions, and extended its application to include the colonial world. He thus established a link between the colonial and natidnal questions through the advocacy of a common policy for them, which later became a guiding principle of Soviet policy. By the time of the October revolution, Lenin’s attitude towards the colonial question was clearly defined by his ideas on self-determiation. One of the most important factors that influenced Lenin’s views from 1903 onwards was the new develop­ ments in Asian countries. In his article, ‘The inflamm­ able Material in World Politics’, written in 1908, Lenin hailed the Persian revolution of 1905 and the Young Turk Movement of Turkey, and welcomed the general strike in Bombay in protest against Tilak’s imprisonment as a portent for the future. He noted that “ the inflammable material in every advanced country of the world is in­ creasing so speedily and the conflagration is so clearly spreading to most Asian countries which only yesterday were in a state of deep slumber, that the strengthening of the international bourgeoisie reaction and the aggrava­ tion of every national revolution are absolutely inevitable.” 2 1. Lenin analysed the economie aspect of the colonial question in his Imperialism, the Highest State o f Capitalism, which was first pub­ lished late in 1916. 2. V.I, Lenin, Selected Works, vol. IV, Moscow, 1935, p. 303

Introduction : Ideological Background

5

Before 1913, Lenin had not, however, very thoroughly examined the problem of national and colonial oppression beyond the domains of Tsarist Russia. But after 1913, under the impact of new developments in Asia, Lenin developed a wider perspective in his advocacy of the right of nations to self-determination, linking the national problem in Tsarist Russia and Europe, and the colonial question in Asia with the general weakening of the hold of imperialism all over the world. In March 1913, he wrote : “The Russian revolution (that of 1905) was followed by the Turkish, Persian and Chinese revolutions. It is in this era of storms and their repercussions in Europe that we are now living...certain people who were inattentive to the conditions of preparation and the development of mass struggle were driven to despair and anarchism by the prolonged postponement of the decisive struggle against capitalism in Europe...it is courage and not despair that one should draw from the fact that Asia with its population of eight hundred millions has been brought into the struggle for the same European ideals”.1 Within the following few 'months, Lenin was all the more convinced of the practical advantages of forging a com­ mon link between the problems posed by imperialism and capitalism in Asia and in Europe. In May 1913, he wrote : “Everywhere in Asia a mighty democratic move­ ment is growing spreading and gaining in strength. There the -bourgeoisie is still siding with the people against reaction...what delight this world movement is arousing in the hearts of all class conscious workers...all young Asia, that is, hundreds of millions of toilers in Asia have a reliable ally in the proletariats of all civilised countries. No force on earth can prevent its victory which will liberate both the people of Europe and the people of Asia.” 12 The new developments in Asian countries impelled Lenin to understand their genesis more comprehensively and, among many other things, he engrossed himself in the study of this problem during the period 1913-1916. Lenin attributed the cause of the new landmarks in 1. V. I, Lenin, Sochineniia, vol. 18, 4th Russian Edition, p. 546, 2, V.I. Lenin, Sochineniia, vol. 19, pp. 77-78,

6

Colonialism in East-West Relations

Asian nationalism mainly to two factors. The first was the development of capitalism and with it, the rise of a native bourgeoisie, and the creation of an industrial working class in countries like India and China. The second was the character of the national bourgeoisie and their progressive role in the national movements. Like Marx, Lenin considered that the capitalist develop­ ment in backward Asian countries was causing a social fermentation, which was already being felt. Lenin believed that because the beginning of nationalism and the nation­ alist movements were progressive manifestations in the capitalist epoch of history, the national awakening of Asian countries was in itself a welcome sign. In a polemical article against Rosa Luxemburg, Lenin pointed out “ We do not know whether Asia will have time before the downfall of capitalism to become crystallised into a system of independent national states like Europe. But it remains undisputed that capitalism having awaken­ ed Asia has called for national movements everywhere in Asia too, that the tendency of these movements is towards the creation of national states in Asia and that the best conditions for the development of capitalism are secured precisely by such states.”1 For the same reason in spite of his eloquent praise for the revolutionary role of Sun-Yat-sen, he assailed his opposition to the indus­ trialization of China, and expressed the hope that “ the Chinese proletariat will increase as the number of Shanghais increases.”12 Lenin, like Marx, believed that the rise of a native bourgeoisie and the creation of an industrial working class as a result of capitalist develop­ ment in the colonies were paving the way for strong national movements and laying the bases for a new society. In the concluding remarks of his article, ‘The Awakening of Asia’, Lenin wrote “ World capitalism and the 1905 movement in Russia have finally awakened Asia. Hundreds of millions of down-trodden and be­ nighted people have awakened from mediaeval stagnation to a new life and are rising for elementary human rights and democracy.”3 While analysing the nature of the 1. V.I. Lenin, Selected Works, vol. IV, (Eng. Edn.) 1935, p. 254. 2. V.I. Lenin, Sochineniia, vol. 18, pp. 147-149,

Introduction : Ideological Background

7

native bourgeoisie, Lenin noted their progressive role in the social development of the colonial countries. He said : “The East has definitely taken the Western path... The Western bourgeoisie is in a state of decay ; it is al­ ready confronted by its grave-diggers— the proletariat. In Asia in contrasts there is still a bourgeoisie capable of championing a sincere, militant and consistent democracy, a worthy comrade of France’s great enlighteners and great leaders at the close of the eighteenth century.”1 After the outbreak of the First World War, Lenin’s stand on the question of self-determination was attacked from three fronts ; by Rosa Luxemburg and inside the Bolshevik Party, by the Bukharin-Piatakov group, and by Radek.123This provided him with a fresh opportunity to clarify his stand on the question. In 1916, Lenin wrote a series of articles attacking the Zimmerwald Left and defending his viewpoint on national self-determination. The right of nations to self-determination, Lenin argued, was a demo­ cratic right of all nations, big or small, all over the world. The active propagation and support of this democratic right was an incumbent duty of all those who subscribed to Socialist principles. This was more so, Lenin pointed out, because “ Socialism cannot be victorious unless it introduces complete democracy....... The proletariat will be unable to prepare for victory over the bourgeoisie unless it wages a many-sided, consistent and revolutionary struggle for democracy.”8 On the other hand, defending the Party programme, Lenin dismissed the assertion that “ selfdetermination is illusory under imperialism mainly from theoretical and practical considerations.” From the theoretical point of view, it was mistaken because it in­ volved “ incorrect definition of the general and fundamental relation of capitalism and political democracy.” Even in the epoch of rising financial capital, political democracy still remained a distinct form of class oppression in theory and an effective machinery for waging a relentless class struggle in practice. On the other hand, from the practical 1. V.I. Lenin, Sochineniia, vol. 18, p. 145. 2. See O.H. Gankin and H.H. Fisher, The Bolshevik and the World War ; The Origin of Communist International, Stanford, 1940, pp. 219-221. 3. V.I. Lenin, Selected Works, vol. V., Moscow, 1935, p. 268,

8

Colonialism in East-West Relations

point of view, the recognition of the right to self-determi­ nation for all those nations suffering under colonial and national oppression would ensure a beginning of political democracy as well as the first stirrings of class struggle in those countries. Under capitalism, therefofe, advocacy of the right of nations to secede freely and to decide their own future was aimed at a progressive realization of the sharpening class struggle inside the country that had preferred to secede. Lenin concluded that ultimately this process would systematically weaken the hold of imperia­ lism all over the world and enhance the chances of the triumph of Socialism over Capitalism.1 In this connection, it should be noted that Lenin was strongly in favour of an unqualified application of the principle of self-determination to the colonies and semi­ colonies. He emphasised that “even in those colonial countries where there are no workers but only slave-owners and slaves, etc., the demand for self-determination, far from being absurd, is obligatory for every Marxist.” 123 In fact, one of the main tasks that Lenin assigned to Western proletariats was to agitate for the recognition of this right for themselves, and for their respective colonies, as well as the unity of all proletarian movements.8 It is, however, important to understand the real motive behind Lenin’s advocacy of unequivocal application of self-determination to the colonies and semi-colonies. Lenin did not favour it from disinterested high idealism. Far from it. He advocated this policy from the practical con­ sideration of realizing his objective. Firstly, a united pro­ letarian class struggle against imperialism in the Western countries, where there were workers, and secondly, an unqualified self-determination in colonies4* where there were no workers, were the only effective means for the realization of this objective. As we have seen earlier, he 1. Ibid., pp. 269-270. 2. V.I. Lenin, Collected Works, Vol. 19, London, 1942, p. 251. 3. V.I. Lenin, Selected Works, vol. 5, Moscow 1935, pp. 276-277. 4. By self-determination of the colonies Lenin meant the libera­ tion of colonies from foreign rule and the formation of the bourgeoisdemocratic national states. (See his article, “A caricature of Marxism and Imperialist Economism”, Collected Works, vol. 19, London 1942, pp. 214-263).

Introduction : Ideological Background

9

believed that the colonies, by effectively exercising the right to self-determination, were destined to fulfil a pro­ gressive social mission, and to carry out a democratic task of throwing off foreign oppression as a first step forward towards the transitory stage to world socialism. With this in mind, i.e., application of the principle of selfdetermination to the workers and toilers only, Lenin was prepared to go so far as to write off the class historical condition for the colonial countries in exercising the right of self-determination, and vehemently denounced all those who advocated this. As he put it : “ The social revolution cannot be the united action of the proletariats of all countries for the simple reason that the majority of the countries and the majority of the inhabitants of the globe have not even reached the capitalist stage of development or are only at the beginning of that stage.” 1 The world social revolution would come only “in the form of an epoch of proletarian civil war against the bourgeoisie in the advanced countries combined with a whole series of democratic and revolutionary movements, including move­ ments for national liberation in the undeveloped backward and oppressed nations.”2 The future that Lenin envisaged for the colonial people was that of a federation of free and independent states becoming a component part of the socialist world. Thus the international outlook of Lenin on the colonial question before the October revolution cannot be overstressed. Lenin refused to examine the colonial question and the prospect of proletarian revolution in the West, and the final victory of socialism over capitalism as en­ tities, separate from one another. On the contrary, for a final victory of socialism over capitalism he laid equal emphasis on the success o f Socialist revolution in the West, and on the imperative need for national revolution in the colonies. He declared : “ To imagine that social revolution is conceivable without revolts by small nations in the colonies, and in Europe without the revolutionary outburst of a section of petty bourgeoisie, with all its pre­ judices, without the movement of non-class conscious pro1: V.I. Lenin, Selected Works, vol. 6, p. 294. 2. Ibid,, p. 296.

Colonialism in East-West Relations

10

letariats and semi-proletarian masses against the oppres­ sion of landlords, the church, the monarchy, the foreign nations, etc.— to imagine that, means repudiating social revolution.”1 For Lenin, the socialist revolution was, therefore, a stream that must absorb numerous channels of all popular discontent (whether in the East or West) including colonial exploitation and national oppression. As we have seen, the Leninist theory of self-determi­ nation was carefully designed for a particular purpose. First, it was essentially to become an incentive to class struggle within the capitalist society and thus to sap its foundations. Second, it was intended to forge an insepa­ rable link between the proletariats of the West, and the people of the colonies, through the media of the mother countries and the colonial world. No distinction was made between national oppression and colonial exploitation, or between the Tsarist and non-Tsarist colonies.12 The first objective was to be achieved in the realm of internal policy within the confines of national boundaries, while the other was to transcend national boundaries and enter into the realm of proletarian internationalism. The remarkable fact was that the meeting point of these two divergent courses of action converged on the same objective— the ultimate victory of socialism and proletarian internationalism.

1. Ibid., p. 303. 2. Lenin did not make any distinction between Tsarist colonies and non-Tsarist colonies. He approached both these types of colonies on a common theoretical ground. Unlike the German and Dutch Marxists he was not prepared to accept the fine distinction between national oppression and colonial exploitation. His comment on the peculiarity of Russia was characteristic : “Its peculiarity lies precisely in the fact that the difference between ‘our’ colonies and ‘our* oppressed nation is not clear, not conorete and not vitally felt.’* (Cf. p. 56, ff pp. 255256, Collected Works, vol. 19).

The colonial question after the

Bolshevik Revolution

After the Bolshevik revolution, the whole question of applying the principle of self-determination to the colonies and semi-colonies assumed a new importance. So far, in advocating the principle of self-determination, Lenin and his supporters had made no distinction between the Tsarist part of Asia and the non-Tsarist part. Because of their belief that both colonialism and national oppression stemmed from imperialism, the common policy of advocat­ ing the principle of self-determination for all nations, suffering under colonialism and national oppression, was considered necessary to oppose imperialism. But not long after the Bolshevik revolution, a discrepancy between theory and practice eventually crept in that policy, and different criteria were adopted in actually implementing the principle which Lenin and the Bolshevik Party had consistently advocated in the past. As soon as the Bolsheviks captured power, they pro­ ceeded to implement the principle of self-determination by readily recognising the independence of Poland, Finland and other Baltic states, and annulling unequal treaties concerning Persia, Turkey and China. The two policy declarations, namely, “ To All Muslim Toilers of Russia and the East”, and the “ Declaration of the Rights of Toiling and Exploited Peoples” promised the championing of the “ belief and usages of Russian Muslims” , upheld “ free self-determination” of all nations, and condemned “ the enslavement of hundreds of millions of toiling masses in Asia and in the Colonies” .1 But as early as the winter 1. Source Book on European Governments, Edited by William E. Rappard, S.E. Harper and others, New York, 1937, p. V-65.

11

12

Colonialism in East-West Relations

of 1917-18, all these promises had to be modified when sharp conflicts developed between the Bolsheviks and the local nationalists in Ukraine, Georgia, Kokand, and in Turkestan. Subsequently, all these areas were incorporated into the Soviet system without much consideration of theoretical purity. These events, crystallising within a few months of the ^ assumption by the Soviets of power, brought the Bolshe­ vik Party and the Soviet Government face to face with the new realities of their situation, and a reappraisal of the old policy became both necessary and timely. The Third All-Russian Congress of Soviets, held in January 1918, provided the platform, and Stalin as the Com­ missar of Nationalities explained the new policy “All this pointed to the necessity of implementing the princi­ ples of self-determination as the right to self-determina­ tion not of the bourgeoisie but of the. labouring masses of a given nation. The principle of self-determination should be a means in the struggle for socialism and should be subordinated to the principle of socialism.” 1 Later, in an article in Pravda, Stalin argued that revolu­ tion in Russia had patently changed the character of the national and colonial question. Because of the fact that bourgeois democratic revolution in Russia had passed into proletarian revolution, bourgeois national move­ ments in the border region had now acquired a counter­ revolutionary character. “ The Socialist conception of self-determination, with its slogan of all power to the toiling masses of the oppressed nationalities”, he con­ cluded, “entered its own and obtain the opportunities of being applied into practice” .12 Later, in March 1919, the Eighth Party Congress, which discussed the question in detail foally put the seal of approval on the new policy by its resolution “ On the question as to who is to express the will of the nation to secede, the Russian Communist Party adopted the class-historical viewpoint (it said) and in this takes into consideration the stage of historical development of the given nation, whether it 1. J.V. Stalin Works9 Vol. IV, Moscow, 1953, p. 33. 2. Ibid.,1 pp. 161-166.

Introduction : Ideological Background

13

is evolving from medievalism to bourgeois democracy and from bourgeois democracy to Soviet or proletarian democracy, etc.”1 The class-historical point of view was, however, to be limited to the domains of the former Tsarist empire. In the Eighth Party Congress, Lenin strongly rebuked Bukharin for his advocacy of different criteria in East and West, i.e., unequivocal application of self-determi­ nation to colonial countries of the East and self-determi­ nation of the working class in the West.12 The resolution of the Congress itself, on the other hand, left open such a possibility, when it upheld a general application of selfdetermination to all nations along with the advocacy of class-historical point of view.3 Trotsky sought justifica­ tion of the occupation of Georgia precisely on these lines and declared : “ We do not only recognise but we also give full support to the principle of self-determi­ nation whenever it is directed against feudal, capitalist and imperialist states. But whenever the fiction of selfdetermination, in the hands of the bourgeois, becomes a weapon directed against the proletarian revolution, we have no occasion to treat the fiction differently from the other “ principles” of democracy perverted by capita­ lism.”4 It was significant that Trotsky justified Bolshe­ vik action within the confines of Tsarist Russia on classhistorical consideration, but extended his support to the unequivocal right of self-determination of all those nations, struggling against imperialism, beyond the con­ fines of Tsarist Russia. Thus two aspects of one and the same policy of promoting world revolution emerged. One was directed towards consolidating and, if possible, expanding Soviet power within the domains of former Tsarist Asia, and the other towards supporting the natio­ nal aspiration of all the nations under colonial rule in the non-Tsarist part of Asia and elsewhere. It has to be 1. K P S S v rezoliutaiiakh i reiaheniiakh, vol, II, Moscow, 1953, p. 417. 2. V.I. Lenin, Sochineniiay vol. 29, Moscow, 4th Edn. pp. 149-150. 3. See point 2 of the 8th Party Congress Programme in K P S S v rezoliu taiiakh op. oit.y p. 416. 4. L. D. Trotsky. Between Red and Whitey New York, 1945, p. 86.

14

Colonialism in East-West Relations

noted that the proclaimed objective o f both these tactical policies was also to weaken the hold of imperialism in the world. The confirmation of this tactical policy in the 8th Party Congress also marked the clear distinction between internal and external policies of Soviet Russia ; those were based on the common objective of strengthen­ ing and consolidating the Soviet power internally and promoting world revolution as an effective means of safeguarding the Bolshevik revolution against imperialist countries during the period of foreign intervention and the Civil War. As we have seen, in the first few months of the Bolshevik revolution, an attempt was made to imple­ ment the theory of self-determination to all nations within the confines of Tsarist Russia, but later it had to be modified when confronted with practical difficulties. Likewise, as the clash of interest with the imperialist Powers, mainly Britain and France, grew within a few months of tl\e revolution it appeared to confirm to Lenin that championing the cause of the people of the colonies and semi-colonies would be a powerful weapon in the hands of Soviet Russia against the capitalist Powers. Already in the 8th Party Congress, Bukharin candidly ex­ plained the raison d'etre of Soviet support to the natio­ nal aspirations of the colonial people : “ If we propound the solutions of the right of self-determination for the colonies, the Hottentots, the Negroes, the Indians, etc., we lose nothing by it. On the contrary, we gain ; for the national gain as a whole will damage foreign im­ perialism.”1 Nevertheless, in 1919, the national interest of Soviet Russia was still merged with the idea of bring­ ing about world revolution. Everybody in Moscow was looking hopefully towards the Western proletariats to rise against the capitalists of their own countries and join hands with the victorious Russian working class to stamp out capitalism all over the world, and to establish a ‘World Union, of Soviet Socialist Republics’. In the first Congress of the Communist Internationa], speaker after speaker gave expression to such revolutionary 1. The Communist International 1919-1943, Documents, Seleoted and Edited by Jane Degras, vol. 1, 1919-1922, London, 1956, p. 38,

Introduction : Ideological Background

16

optimism, and no special significance was attached to the colonial problem beyond a general awareness of its con­ necting link with the revolution in the West. The manifesto of the Congress reiterated the classical position that “ the emancipation of colonies is conceivable only in conjunction with the emancipation of the working class in the metropolis...Colonial slaves of Africa and Asia : The hour of proletarian dictatorship in Europe will strike for you as the hour of your deliverance.”1 But within a few months, the world situation had changed. The working class in Europe had failed miser­ ably ; Spartacist and Left Socialist upheavals in Germany were crushed. The hope of bringing about world revo­ lution was dampened and in its place the consolidation of Soviet Russia and the weakening of the capitalist Powers were regarded as guarantees for promoting a world revolution at a future date. Moreover, the success of the Red Army in the Civil War boosted the morale of the Soviet Government and provided some self-assur­ ance in their own capacity to consolidate themselves and to deal with the capitalist Powers. When the hopes of the success of revolution in the West had faded, attention was turned to the East. In the autumn of 1919, Sultan Galiev, who was then Stalin’s deputy in the Commissariat of Nationalities, expressed in a series of articles the belief that it was a blunder to place the main emphasis on Europe. The weakest fink in the capitalist chain was not the West, he suggested, but the East, and the failure of communist revolution abroad was directly attributable to the inadequacy of Soviet effort in the Eastern border lands.12 An important event indicating the new orientation towards the East was the convocation of the Second Con­ gress of Muslim Communists in Moscow in November 1919. The Congress was more representative than the first, one year earlier, and was marked by renewed vigour and consciousness of the seriousness of the task 1. Ibid., p. 43. 2. Richard Pipes, Mass. 1954, p. 169.

The Formation of the Soviet Union, Cambridge,,

16

Colonialism in East-West Relations

ahead. In November 1919, Stalin, addressing the Con­ gress, stated that it was to the East that imperialism would retreat on its defeat in Western Europe ; hence it was the duty of the Communists to destroy the reserve of imperialism by assisting national movements in the East.1 Lenin personally addressed the Congress, and laid emphasis on the need of translating communist ideas into Asian language and called upon the delegates to work extensively among the masses, particularly among the peasants.12 The resolution of the Congress declared boldly that “ the problem of international social revo­ lution cannot be solved without the participation of the East as a definite social and economic unit.”3 Finally, it was at the Second Comintern Congress that the Soviets turned their full attention to the East. In point of fact, the task of the Second Comintern Congress was mainly to search for allies in their crusade against capitalist Powers. Just before the Congress began, the Comintern journal declared: “The Second Congress of the Communist International should direct its attention to the East....... for whoever is able to approach the subjected nations of the East and make them his allies........will come out as conqueror in this last struggle between labour and capitalism.”4 The Eastern countries, (notably Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, India and China), where sentiment against Western domination and foreign rule was already running high, were no doubt a natural ally of the Soviets in the fight against the imperialist Powers. As we have noted, already in the 8th Party Congress in 1919, the nature and form of support to the national aspiration of colonial people was discussed equivocally. Now it was the task of the Second Congress of the Comintern to decide and lay down the ways and means of securing an ally against the capitalist Powers. Finally, the Second Comintern Congress met in July 1920 and discussed the colonial and semi-colonial question 1. Xenia JoukoifJEud in and Robert C. North, Soviet Russia and the East, 1920-1927, California, 1957, p. 163. 2. V.I. Lenin, Sochineniia, vol. 30, 4th Edition, p. 144. 3. Eudin and North* op oit.9 p. 164. 4. Communist International, Petrograd, June-July 1920, p. 2 3 1 6.

Introduction

:

Ideological Background

17

in great detail. The national and colonial commission of the Congress was presented with two sets of theses, one by Lenio, and the other by M.N. Roy, the young Indian living in exile. The general theme of both these theses— the division of the world into oppressor and oppressed nations by imperialism, the growing importance of the colonies and semi-colonies in the struggle against imperia lism and the need to draw them into this struggle, and the inevitability of the world-wide revolution embracing the colonial world as well— was quite common. But there was a major difference in tactics in the policy to be adopted towards the colonies. The issue was debated first in the colonial commission and then in the plenary session of the Congress. At first, the controversy centred round the fundamental question of tactics} as to what should be the form and content of the support to all such move­ ments in the colonies and semi-colonies which were directed against foreign rule and imperialist domination. In his theses, Lenin viewed the whole question from the strategy of world revolution. Lenin’s starting point was the alliance of the “ proletariats and the working masses of all nations and countries for the common revolutionary struggle” leading to “ the overthrow of the landowners and bour­ geoisie” in feudal and backward countries and capitalism in advanced countries.1 But at the same time, Lenin left no doubt that the success of world revolution depended mainly on the victory of Soviet Russia over imperialism. He said : “ All the events of world politics are necessarily concentrated round one central point, the struggle of the world bour­ geoisie against the Soviet Russian Republic, around which are inevitably grouping, on the one hand, the Soviet movement of the advanced workers of all countries, and on the other, all the national-liberation movements in the colonies and among the oppressed nationalities, who are being taught by bitter experience that their only salvation lies in the victory of the Soviet system over world 1. The Second Congress of The Communist International ; Full Report of the Proceedings of Petrograd Sessiont of July 17th and of Mos­ cow Sessions of July 19th-August 7th, 19201 • Publishing Office of the Communist International, America, 1921, p. I ll,

18

Colonialism in East-West Relations

imperialism,”1 He went on to emphasise that in view of such a world political situation, it was necessary to pursue a policy that would “achieve the closest alliance of all national and colonial movements of the liberation with Soviet Russia.” So much so that he even envisaged the form and structure of the future federation of Soviets of all nations.2 After thus stating the general objective of his theses, ^ he proceeded to deal with the actual tactics to be adopted for achieving this end. Quite in accord with bis previous stand, here again Lenin was in favour of supporting the bourgeois-national movements, and he regarded the nature of bourgeois-nationalist revolution as potentially revolut­ ionary against imperialism. Later, reporting on the work of the Commission, Lenin explained his stand: “There is no doubt that every nationalist movement can be a bourgeois democratic movement for the great mass of the people in the backward countries consisting of peasants who are repre­ sentatives of small capitalist relations. It would be utopian to suppose that the proletarian parties— as far as there is a chance of forming such—are in a position to carry on a communist activity and communist policies without forging definite relations with the peasants of backward countries and without their support.”3 On the other hand, Roy in his theses, advocated a tactical policy which was already in operation in relation to the Tsarist part of Asia, namely the class-historical viewpoint of the theory of self-determination. Mainly basing his arguments on conditions in India, Roy em­ phasised the growing class character of the nationalist movements as a rtsult of the industrialization of such colonies as India, China, etc.4 He pointed out that to support the national liberation movements in the colonies and semi-colonies would merely amount to supporting the bourgeoisie against the working mass of those coun­ tries.6 Roy pleaded that the foremost and revolutionary task of the Comintern was to encourage the formation of 1. Ibid., p. 112

2. Ibid., p. 112.

3. Ibid., p. 113.

4. Ibid., p. 120.

5, Loc. Cit.

Introduction

:

Ideological Background

19

Communist Parties, and to help the Communists to take over the leadership of the national movements from the bourgeoisie.1 He asserted that the backward countries would thus skip the capitalist stage of development, and would join the ranks of the advanced capitalist countries in a world socialist order.2 Roy’s forceful advocacy of the growing class character of national liberation move­ ment in the colonies forced a compromise, and Lenin agreed to a significant change in his theses and made these less committal than their earlier position of total and unqualified support to the national bourgeoisie.3 Lenin’s final theses laid down “The Communist International should collaborate provisionally with revolutionary move­ ments of the colonies and backward countries and even form an alliance with it, but it must not amalgamate with it it must unconditionally maintain independence o f the proletarian movement even if it is only in an embryonic stage.”4 Thus the Comintern adopted a dual and non­ committal tactical policy of supporting the national bourgeoisie in their struggle against imperialism and also influencing them during this struggle. The other controversial issue concerning the future course of socialist revolution in the East was mainly theoretical. Could the Communist Party be created as a separate mass organisation in the East ? And was capitalist development inevitable for socialist revolution in the East ? Lenin provided answers to both these questions in the affirmative yes. He related the experience of Bolsheviks in pre-capitalist conditions, as in Turkestan, where he claimed that both the Communist party and the idea of Soviet organisation had been remarkably success­ ful. Where the proletariats existed, there was, of course, no difficulty. But experience had shown that the idea of the Soviet could be successfully put into practice even in those areas, where proletariats did not exist, with the co-operation of the peasantry. “ The idea of the Soviet is a simple one and can be applied not only to proletarian conditions but also to the feudal and semi-feudal peasant 1. Ibid., pp. 121-122.

2. Ibid., p. 122.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., p. 114.

Colonialism in East-West Relations

20

relationship.”1 But the social revolution in colonies would not be successful simply by its own independent action and by forming Soviets and working through them. The practical hope and guidance of the advanced and victorious Western proletariats would be a decisive factor. The Commission agreed that the colonies would be able to skip the painful and long process of capitalist develop­ ment and reach socialism directly with the help of western^/ proletariats. The delegates to the conference welcomed the general support to national revolutionary movements. The theses of Lenin and Roy were adopted by the Congress. Lenin’s theses became the guiding light of Soviet policy, while Roy’s theses were relegated to the background. Thus a general support to the national movements in the colonies and semi-colonies was conceded on the assumption that they would weaken the hold of capitalism all over the world. But the question was left open as to what form this support should take. This depended on the future course of world politics, and Soviet Russia’s position vis-a-vis the capitalist states. If the Western proletariats were successful in their revolutionary tasks of safeguarding and supporting Soviet Russia in particular, and promoting a world revolution in general, the bourgeoisie in the Eastern countries would lose their importance and their revolutionary character. In that case, support of and co-operation with bourgeoisnational movements and bourgeois-democratic govern­ ments would be inexpedient and unnecessary. Communist Parties then must take the lead; Soviets should be formed and united with Soviet Russia. With active help from the Western proletariats, the East would be led to communism and skip the stage of capitalist development. But if the safety and security of Soviet Russia remained in constant danger and capitalism survived, active support for the national movements in the colonies and semi-colonies and alliance with the national bourgeoisie would remain effective and expedient. The 1. Ibid., p. 115.

Introduction

:

Ideological Background

21

immediate tasks of the Communists then would be to side with the revolutionary elements in the national liberation movements and to revolutionise the anti-imperialist struggle in the colonies and semi-colonies. The East in this case would have to pass through the transitory phase of bourgeois-democratic revolution before passing into socialist revolution. Thus the fortunes of Soviet Russia and those of world capitalism were to decide the future course of action. Meanwhile, in the interim period, support and professed sympathy with the national aspirations of the people of the colonies and semi-colonies was the effective and expedient policy. A large majority of the Soviet leaders continued to believe that under the present international situation propaganda rather than actual commitment was the most effective instrument of their policy against the capitalist Powers. In the Second Comintern Congress, Radek rather apologetically tried to defend Soviet policy thus “When our attempts to prepare the grounds in Turkey and Persia are being regarded in England as some­ thing which the Soviet Republic is doing for the purpose of creating trouble for England, that is an utter misconcep­ tion of the foreign policies of the Soviet Government. All that work is part of the programme of the Communist International. The Soviet Government is fulfilling its duty as a detachment of the International.”1 The Baku Congress of the People of the East was held immediately after the Second Comintern Congress in September 1920. It was the first organised attempt to appeal directly to Eastern people to ally with Soviet Russia against imperialism.12 The Congress was attended by 1891 delegates from 26 countries, by far the largest gathering of Eastern representatives in any conference 1. Ibid., p. 131. 2. The invitation for the Congress declared : ‘‘Workmen and Peasants of Near East, if you organise yourself, form your own work­ men and peasant power, if you are yourself, join the Russian Workmen and Peasant army, you will conquer British, French and American capitalists. Get your freedom found in a free republic of Workmen. We want to talk to you about all this at the Congress" (Communist International, June-July 1920, p. 251G).

22

Colonialism in East-West Relations

sponsored by the Comintern.1 The proceedings of the Congress, though an extremely confusing affair owing to the presence of so many people of different background, left no doubt that its main purpose was to rouse the East against imperialism. Zinoviev’s opening speech was a classical piece of propaganda when he went so far as to invoke Holy War : “ Comrades, Brothers, the time has ^ now come when you should begin to organise a true people’s Holy War against the robbers and oppressors... Brothers, we call you to a Holy War to be directed first of all against imperialism..” 12 But Radek as usual indulged in some frank talk to dispel doubts on Soviet intentions. “ In its Eastern policy, the Soviet government is not simply manoeuvring (he said) ; it is not dragging the people of the East into the struggle in order that the Russian Soviet Republic may profit by it...your destiny and ours are one; either we and the peoples of the East shall be united and consequently shall hasten the victory of the Western European proletariat or we shall perish and you will become slaves.”3 But the Congress was remarkable mainly because it showed that Soviet propaganda was gaining ground and fell on receptive ears. The Baku Congress aroused hopes among the Eastern delegates—a fact noticeable in all speeches delivered in the Congress by them. A typical example of this was the speech of the Indian delegate. He told the Congress that “ we have been waiting for a long time for this Congress with a hope that all the people of the East will unite and free us from world capitalism.”4 1. According to the official stenographic report of the Baku Congress, out of 1891 delegates there were 1273 Communist [Steno­ graphic report of the Baku Congress, (cited fn. below) p. 5], But in his speech Zinoviev claimed the presence o f ‘'hundreds of delegates who do not belong to the Communist party or any other party” and even emphasised the non-party character of the Congress (X. J. Eudin and R.C. North, op9 cit.y p. 165). It is true that a large number of nonCommunists were present and actively participated in the Congress, although representatives from the British Communist Party and other Communists were also present in the Congress. 2. I-yi Sezd Narodov Vostoka, Baku, 1-8 sentiabr* 1920 g, stenograficheskie otchety, Petrograd, 1920, p. 15. 3. Ibid., p. 76. 4. Ibid., p. 106.

Introduction : Ideological Background

23

The only tangible result of the Baku Congress was the formation of the Council of Propaganda and Action in the East, which later turned into an effective organ of the Comintern. A year later, the Third 'C om intern Congress met in Moscow on June 22,1921. 'T he Cong­ ress met at a time when the trade agreement with Britain was already concluded and there were high hopes of a detente with other capitalist Powers. The attention of the Congress was not, therefore, focussed on the colonial question as it was in the Second Comintern Congress. Rather the failure of revolution in the West, particularly the fiasco of the March action in Germany cast their shadows over the Congress. Trotsky while delivering the main report on ‘The World Situation and Our Task*, argued that capitalism had managed to restore a tem­ porary balance in its favour. In replying to Roy’s allegation of not haying paid enough attention to the colonial countries, Trotsky asserted that the colonies were merely “one of three river-beds along which the revolution flows.”1 In his speech before the Congress, Lenin emphasised that although there was no chance for the success of international revolution in the near future, a fundamental preparation for revolution was necessary. He added, however, that in the coming struggle against the capi­ talist Powers, the revolutionary potentianties of the colonies must not be underestimated.” 2 However, it was still too early to re-examine the policy towards the colonial world. The theses adopted on the ‘World Situation and the Task of the Comintern’ merely reaffirmed the dual tactical policy of supporting the national movements in the colonies and semi-colonies, on the one hand, and on the other, of emphasising the growth of “new social foundation for the revolutionary struggle” as a “result of vigorous development of capi­ talism in the East.”3 Report of the Meetings of the Third Congress of Communist Inter­ national, Communist Party of Great Britain, London, 1921, pp. 38-70. 2. Ibid., p. 82, also see V.I. Lenin, Sochineniia, vol. 32, 4th Russian Edition pp, 454-458. 3. Decisions of the Third Congress, Communist Party of Great Britain (n.d.), p. 125,

24

Colonialism in East- West Relations

It was one year later, at the Fourth Congress of the Comintern, that a well-defined pattern of the Soviet attitude towards the colonies and semi-colonies emerged. We have noticed that the Third Congress finally admit­ ted that the prospect of revolution in the West was obscure and remote. But at the same time, because of the newly found entente with the capitalist Powers, full ^ f attention was not given to the colonies and semi-colonies at the Congress. After the Third Congress, the Soviets suffered a series of setbacks in their efforts to come to terms with the capitalist Powers, and they settled down to a long spell of intermittent friction and compromise with the capitalist Powers. Internally, it made the need for consolidation of Soviet Power paramount. This had already expressed itself in the official inauguration of the New Economic Policy, and later, in its full imple­ mentation. Externally, among other things, it resulted in the renewed interest in the colonies and semi-colonies. In the meantime, the notable success of Mustupha Kemal in Turkey, the reluctance of the Persian Mejlis to ratify the Anglo-Persian Treaty, and the subsequent coup d'etat of February 1921 of the nationalists led by Reza Khan, as well as the growth of the nationalist movements in India, China and other Eastern countries were now vital factors which the Soviets could not afford to underesti­ mate and overlook in working against imperialism. Moreover, the first contact that Soviet Russia was able to make with Turkey, Afghanistan and Persia, had created a favourable impression on these countries. On the other hand, Soviet Russia’s advocacy of the right of all nations to self-determination projected a favourable image on all nations under colonial and semi-colonial rule. Besides that, all nations of the colonies and semi­ colonies and Soviet Russia had a common vested interest in opposing foreign rule, and therefore, it was not difficult for them to become natural allies against a common enemy. For Soviet Russia, it was of paramount importance not only that a favourable image of her should be pre­ served but also that she must increase and extend her influ­ ence as much as possible. The episodes of Kuchik Khan’s

Introduction

:

Ideological Background

26

Soivet Republic in North Persia1 and the persecution of Communists in Turkey123 were, no doubt, a foretaste of future developments, but they had to be tolerated. Soviet Russia’s need for maintaining the alliance with the new emergent Eastern countries against the capitalist Powers was too great to let such minor incidents impair and weaken it. Against the background of this sequence of events, the Fourth Congress of the Comintern discussed the colonial and semi-colonial question in considerable detail. Although there was much dissatisfaction among the Eastern delegates that the Eastern question was dis­ cussed so casually, the conference devoted more than the customary routine attention to it. In the discussion that followed the main reports on the question, a majority of delegates representing the colonial and semi-colonial countries welcomed Comintern’s policy of supporting the national movement and its bourgeois leadership. But some, notably Roy and the Turkish delegate, bitterly criticised the whole basis of this policy. Roy restated the ideas embodied in his supplementary theses of the Second Comintern Congress and pleaded for the formation and support of Communist parties in countries like India and China8. G. Safarov, representing the Russian Communist (Bolshevik) Party attacked Roy and his sup­ porters and plainly told them : “ The problem of Soviet revolution is not our immediate task in these countries, where our first duty is to fight for the liberation of the working class and organisation in the political and econo­ mic field.” 45 Radek, who took a leading part in the Cong­ ress calmly told the delegates that in pursuit of the great task of world revolution success and failure had to be faced.6 He suggested that in Turkey, Kemal’s Government 1. For a detailed account of Kuchik Khan’s Soviet Republic in Gilan, see, George Lenczowski, Russia and the West in Iran, 1918-1948, New York, 1949, pp. 48-60. Nasrollah Saiffour Fatemi, Diplomatic History of Persia, 1917-1923, New York, 1952, pp. 217-243. 2. On the Turkish Communist Party, See Z.W. Laqueur, Com­ munism and Nationalism in the Middle East, London, 1956, pp. 205-213. 3. Communist International Bulletins, published by Press Bureau of Fourth Congress of Comintern, Moscow, Dec. 1, 1922, No. 19 (Contain full verbatim reports of the meetings), p. 24. 4. Bulletin, op, c i t No. 20, Nov. 25, 1922, p. 11. 5. Ibid., p. 14.

26

Colonialism in East-West Relations

were objectively playing a revolutionary role against imperialism in spite of its persecution of Communists. He advised the Turkish Communists “ Let not the present moment obscure your outlook on the future. You have a long road ahead. You will have to follow it together with the other revolutionary elements of Turkey for some time to come.”1 t? The theses on the Eastern question adopted by the Fourth Congress of the Comintern fully reflected the strategy and tactics of Soviet policy towards the colonial world. The theses began by stressing the importance of the growth of the national movements in the colonies and semi-colonies. They pointed out that the growth o f those movements already disturbed “the equilibrium of the entire imperialist world system.”2 The theses then proceeded to lay down the strategy and tactics utilising all those national movements which, in their opinion, were directed against imperialist powers. Firstly, they laid down the strategy : “ While being completely aware that the will of the nation in varying historical conditions can be expressed by the most diverse classes, the Com­ munist International supports all national revolutionary movements against imperialism.” 3 The theses then out­ lined the tactics of implementing such a strategical policy. They pointed out that whether or not a particular national movement adopted economic and political pro­ grammes, like the agrarian reforms, the drawing of masses into the movement, etc., would characterise it, and, also, determine the attitude of the Communists towards it.4 Thus in different circumstances, differing and often contradictory tactics might well be considered either revolutionary or bourgeois-nationalism, and vice-versa. According to the theses, for example, the existing inde­ pendent national states were objectively revolutionary 1. Ibid., pp. 14-15. 2. Resolution and Theses of Ths Fourth Congress of The Communist International, held in Moscow, Nov. 7 to Dec. 3, 1922, Communist Party of Great Britai n? 1923, p. 53, 3. Ibid., p. 55. 4. Loc. cit.

Introduction

:

Ideological Background

27

against imperialism despite persecution of the Communists in those countries ; while continued support to the national movements in countries like India, Egypt and China, was tactically correct notwithstanding the com­ promise of the bourgeoisie with the imperialist rulers of those countries. Here a special role was assigned to the labour move­ ments in the East. Since the communist movement in the East was either non-existent or still in an embryonic stage, the labour movements which were claimed to have been developing remarkably, attracted more attention than the Com m unist movement itself. The young labour movement must not only confine itself to “ the limits of common national interest of the bourgeois democracy.”1 But also ally itself with the revolutionary proletariats of advanced countries. This alliance was dictated “not merely by the interest of a common struggle against imperialism” but also by the consideration of their own revolutionary future. “ An alliance with the proletariats in the West will lay the path towards an International Federation of Soviet Republics.”123 But in terms of tactical policy, the immediate task of the labour movement and Communist parties, in countries where they then existed, was the formation of a united anti-imperialist front with all those elements, bourgeois, religious etc., who were working against imperialist domination of their countries. Because of the “ prospect of a prolonged struggle against world imperialism” , the watch-word in the East, as in the West where it was the united labour front, must be the united anti-imperialist front.4 Significantly the theses also laid down that the labour movement must “ first of all secure for itself the position of an independent factor in the anti-imperialist front.” 4 Apart from the partial demands and temporary compro­ 1. 2. 3. 4.

Ibid.y p. 59. Loc. Git. Loc. Gift* Loc. Git.

28

Colonialism in East-West Relations

mises with the bourgeoisie, the independence of the labour movement and the Communist Parties must be utilized in explaining to the masses “ the necessity for an alliance with the international proletariat and the Soviet Republic which is one of the most important tasks of the tactics of the anti-imperialist front.”1 The Fourth Congress of the Comintern thus very clearly defined the Soviet attitude towards the colonial world. The broad alternative programme, as outlined by the Second Congress, was finally welded into one single integrated plan. With the stabilization of capitalism in Europe, revolution in the West became almost inconceiv­ able in the near future, and therefore, it was conceded that world revolution was a long way off. Now Soviet Russia had to be content to live with the capitalist world and safeguard herself against any possible capitalist offensive. Under the circumstances, the best possible ally in Soviet Russia’s struggle against the capitalist Powers could only be the nationalist movement in the colonial and semi-colonial countries against imperialism even if they were of bourgeois or of pure religious-nationalist character. But as the struggle against the capitalist Powers was going to be a long-drawn affair, the form and nature of support necessitated careful planning and a shrewd programme of action. In the East, it soon took the form of ultra-realism on the one hand, while on the other hand, it prompted premature attempts to influence the nationalist movements themselves. A general support of all nationalist move­ ments of every hue or colour was indeed agreed upon. But, significantly enough, the nature and form of this support was necessarily to be determined by the objective test of its revolutionary role in the great struggle against world capitalism, now confined to the strengthening of Soviet Russia against the capitalist Powers. The precedent, as Radek pointed out during the Congress, was found in Marx’s criterion of judging the national movements of Europe in terms of revolutionary gains. Hence the positive role of the independent national states of Asia and the 1, Resolutions and Theses, op. c i t p. 60.

Introduction : Ideological Background

29

importance of the bourgeois-national movements in the colonies and semi-colonies in the struggle against capi­ talist Powers were recognised. Meanwhile, a more tactically effective way of influencing the national movements in the developed colonial and semi-colonial countries was left open by the advocacy of a united anti-imperialist front with them and the local labour movements. The in­ digenous Communist Parties, if they were already existing, were assigned a specific role and well-defined sphere of action inside the movements. But the implication was that in such countries, like India, where the conditions were still not ripe, the formation of a Communist Party could not be recommended. Meanwhile, two important developments in Soviet Russia had begun to influence Soviet policies at home and abroad. Firstly, Lenin was incapacitated by his illness which prevented him from effectively guiding the Party and the Government for the rest of his life. Secondly, the Comintern apparatus gradually began to be directly controlled by the leaders of the Soviet Communist Party and Comintern policies gradually became closely identified with Soviet diplomatic efforts particularly in relation to imperialist countries visa-vis colonial affairs ; the distinction between the Soviet and Comintern policies became more and more unreal. As far as the colonial question was concerned, there began a marked tendency to view it against the back­ ground of the European events and to regard it as an adjunct to Soviet diplomatic efforts in the West. It was indeed symptomatic that when the Third Enlarged Plenum of the ECCI (Executive Committee of the Communist International) met in June 1923 in the midst of the crisis of the Curzon ultimatum, it passed a resolution assuring the support of the proletariats of all the world to Soviet Russia, if an armed struggle against imperialism broke out.1 The colonial question, however, was not discussed at all, with the sole exception of Roy’s oblique references to India. But in October 1923, Krestintern or International Peasant Union was formed in 1. Rasshirennyi Plenum Ispolnitelnovo Komiteta Kommunisticheskovo Intematsional, 12-23 Iiunia 1923 goda, Moscow 1923, p. 287.

Colonialism in East-West Relations

30

a Conference representing forty countries. It was to serve as the headquarters of the World Peasant Movement. In its inaugural session, an appeal to the “ toiling peasants of the colonies” was issued. Earlier, towards the end of 1922, the Profintern or International Labour Union had begun to take more interest in the labour movements in the colonies. A year later, when the Fifth Comintern Congress met, Soviet Russia had already gained full diplomatic recogni­ tion from Britain, and the Anglo-Russian Conference was in progress in London. The attention of the Congress was focussed, therefore, neither on the prospect o f world revolution nor on colonial affairs. The whole tone of the Congress was conciliatory from the very beginning. Zinoviev, in his opening speech, asserted that capitalism had entered into the pacifist and reformist phase and had resorted to liberalism and social reforms. In vain did Roy and other delegates from the Eastern countries complain of the Comintern’s lack of interest in colonial affairs. Roy made an effort to exhort the conference to establish direct contacts with revolutionary social classes in countries like India and China. Manuilsky who deliver­ ed the main report on the Commission not only accused Roy of following “ the nihilism of Rosa Luxemburg” , but also declared that the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party had expressedly charged him to oppose Roy’s formulations on the colonial question.1 On the other hand, Manuilsky’s long report on the colonial question was only the reaffirmation of the tactical policy the Comintern had adopted in the Fourth Con­ gress. As regards the future, Manuilsky was vague : “What concrete organisational form these general revolu­ tionary fronts (e.g., workers’ and Peasants’ Party in Java, Kuomintang in China etc.) must adopt in the fight against imperialists ? We know that the Comintern will decide these questions as they arise.”2 Later, a manifesto adopt­ ed in the enlarged Plenum of the ECCI, which met 1.

Piatyi Vsemirnyi Kongress, stenograficheskii otchet, Vol. 1, Mos­

cow, 1925, p. 963

Introduction

:

Ideological Background

31

immediately after the Fifth Congress, reiterated the policy of supporting all those national liberation movements “directed against the exploiting yoke of foreign capital and against the international bourgeoisie” based on the tactical policy of the anti-imperialist united front.1 But the Comintern took step to tighten its control over all its constituent members by revising its statutes. The revised statutes ensured an effective direction of their policies from the ECCI. On the other hand, the guidance of the embryonic Communist Parties in the East was to be done through the Communist Parties of the imperialist countries. Although the policy towards the colonies and semi­ colonies decided at the Fourth Congress remained effec­ tive, the Comintern had already moved towards openly taking over the direction and control of the Communist Parties in the East and West. It should also be noted that in reaffirming the old policy in the Fifth Congress, the prime consideration was not to jeopardise the prospect of the detente with the capitalist Powers, parti­ cularly Britain. Likewise, in the West, in spite of the very critical attitude towards Social Democrats, the tactics of the United Front were reiterated. The Fifth Congress also marked the beginning of the ascendancy of Stalin’s group in the Comintern’s apparatus and its growing involvement in internal party feuds of the Bolsheviks. But, in 1925, as the hopes of a detente with the capi­ talist Powers began to fade, this policy needed reappraisal and the Comintern’s attention was again focussed on the Eastern Countries. Moreover, in order to coun­ teract Trotsky’s growing opposition to Stalin’s programme of building ‘socialism in one country’, it was necessary that the idea of revolutionary internationalism must be kept alive. In 1925, the reappraisal of policy towards the colonial countries provided the most effective and ex­ pedient way to show this. Nine months after the Fifth Congress, the enlarged Plenum of the ECCI met and 1. Ibid.%vol., II, pp. 214-215.

32

Colonialism in East-West Relations

discussed in detail the tactics to be adopted in the colonies and semi-colonies. In his opening address to the Plenum, Zinoviev pointedly mentioned that after the Fifth Comintern Congress, the national liberation move­ ment in the colonies had assumed great revolutionary significance for the struggle against world imperialism.1 Agreeing with Lenin he went so far as to declare that “ the mighty reserve force of revolution is marching from the East and that the revolution would change its course from the West to the East ; it probably will enter through another door.”12 Zinoviev’s opening remarks set the tone of the meeting and its attention was focussed on the colonial question. After having examined reports on the situation in various colonial and semi-colonial countries in the colonial commission, the Plenum decided to con­ tinue supporting national liberation movements and advis­ ed the Communists in countries like India, Dutch East Indies, and China to form “ mass people’s anti-imperialist party” so as to work effectively under its cover.34 This policy was indeed simply an extension of the dual tactical policy which the Fourth Congress had laid down earlier, and whose objective was to direct more concerted efforts to influence the national movements through the indigenous Communist Parties, under an effective guidance of the Comintern, as well as by simply supporting them. This was best summed up by Zinoviev himself in his closing speech to the Plenum : “ Our conference will be remembered as a conference of the Bolshevization of the Communist Parties of the Communist International.”2 Mainly to demonstrate his revolutionary zeal, Stalin showed so much concern for the effective implementation of the policy of supporting national movements in the colonial world, that he went out of his way to criticise the conduct of Soviet foreign policy. In June 1925 he declared “ There can scarcely be any doubt that the pre­ 1. Rasshirennyi Plenum IspoVkoma Kommunisticheskovo Internal8ionala, stenograficheskii otchet, Moscow 1925, p. 44. 2. Ibid. p. 46. 3. Inprecorr (International Press Correspondence), 28/4/25. vol. 5. No. 37 (The Russian education of the report had omitted this decision). 4. Rasshirennyi, op. cit.9 p. 490.

Introduction : Ideological Background

33

ssure of the capitalist states on our state is enormous, that the people who are handling our foreign policy do not always succeed in resisting this pressure, that the danger of complications often gives rise to the temptation to take the path of least resistance, the path of nationalism.”1 Henceforward, during the period under review, attention remained focussed on the colonies. In the Sixth Plenum of the ECCI, held in FebruaryMarch, 1926, the colonial world continued to be the object of Soviet attention. Zinoviev also utilised the opportunity for attacking the Left opposition, who, he alleged, advo­ cated the policy of establishing Soviets in more rebellious colonies like China. He reiterated the policy of support­ ing the nationalists in the East. The theses on the main report of Zinoviev noted that “ the national liberation movement in the East has taken a big step forward and in some places it has developed even more quickly than anticipated.12 The Eastern Commission, however, confined its attention to China only by reiterating the tactics of United Front with the Kuomintang ; it did not discuss anything connected with the strategy and tactics of the policy towards the colonies and semi-colonies in general. But significantly enough the resolution on Zinoviev’s report “ On the Routine Problem of International Com­ munist Movement” expressed concern at the activities of the Second International in the colonies particularly in India and China, and warned them against promoting reformist influence on the workers’ movement of these countries.3 This indicated that Soviet policy in the colonies and semi-colonies, like the Comintern’s policy towards the Western Communist Parties, was now being increasingly motivated by the considerations of consolidating and strengthening the USSR against the capitalist Powers. Obviously, the Comintern was now moving more and more towards Stalin’s views. In Decem­ ber 1926, Stalin plainly told the Comintern that “ the interests of building socialism in our country completely 1. J.V. Stalin, Works, vol. 7, pf 171. 2. V I Ras8hirennyi Plenum IspoVkomo Kominterna, tezisi i rezo iuteii Moacow-Leningrad 1926, p. 13. 3. V I Rasshirennyi, op. eit.9 p, 33r

34

Colonialism in East-West Relations

and fully merge with the revolutionary movement in all countries in the one general interest of victory of the socialist revolution in all countries.*” As the hope of rapprochement with the capitalist Powers was not entirely lost during 1926, it was still early to begin reappraising the present policy and to lay down any specific new programme in the colonies and semi-colonies. In the Plenums of the ECCI, held in bet­ ween the Sixth Plenum and the Sixth Comintern Congress, only the possibility of such a change in policy became obvious.12 Moreover, the Comintern was preoccupied with the events in China and the setback it had suffered there. But discussions on China in the Comintern were, in fact, not quite relevant to the Soviet policy towards the colonial world because they were more concerned with justifying Stalin’s policy of supporting the K uom intang against the attacks of Trotsky and his supporters rather than with the change of policy as such. But the policy of generally supporting the national movements and thereby influenc­ ing them to take a more resolute anti-imperialist line still held good, as became evident from the sponsorship and active participation of the Comintern in the inaugural Conference of the League Against Imperialism held in February 1927. The nationalist movements were still regarded as allies, although not very reliable, against the capitalist Powers. However, the setback in China unsettl­ ed the Comintern and the Party on the policy hitherto pursued in the colonies and semi-colonies. Towards the end of 1927, the policy in these countries once again be­ came one of the controversial questions between the various factions of the party. In the Fifteenth Party Congress, held in December 1927, Stalin again emphasised the importance of revolu­ tionary movements in China, India, Java and elsewhere as “a decisive blow to imperialism” , in spite of the tem­ porary setback in China.3 But it was left to Bukharin 1. J.V. Stalin, Works, vol. 9, Mosoow, 1926, p. 65. 2. For the VII, VIII and IX Plenum meetings, see full verbatim reports in Russian and also see, Kommuniaticheskii Internatsional v dolcumentakh 1919-1932, Moscow, 1933. 3. J. V. Stalin Works, vol. X, P, 2S2.

Introduction : Ideological Background

35

who had joined hands with Stalin against the Left to warn against “ mechanically transferring the experience of our Chinese tactics to Indian territory(and to the definition of our tactics in India.”1 He left no doubt that the old policy of supporting the native bourgeoisie in India could no longer remain effective. Evidently Bukharin sought to disarm the Left by making it clear that the policy of encouraging the United Front with the national bour­ geoisie in the colonies and semi-colonies could no longer be held valid. Apart from using the Comintern for internal party feuds, the other important factor in reappraising the Soviet policy in the colonies and semi-colonies was the fact that the international position of the USSR was weakened considerably during 1927. The rupture of diplomatic relations with Britain, the murder of the Soviet Ambassador in Poland and various other factors finally ended the last remnants of hopes for rapprochement with the capitalist Powers ; the need for strengthening and consolidating the USSR became the matter of paramount importance. By the time the Sixth Comintern Congress met, Stalin had defeated and disgraced Trotsky and his sup­ porters, ousted Zinoviev from the Comintern and was thus very nearly successful in imposing a monolithic unity on the Comintern. The way was thus clear to launch his policy of socialism in one country in dead earnest, and to make moves against the Right. What little resistance to the Stalinist leadership remained in the Comintern, it was swept aside by the ousting of Bukharin in December 1929. The decisions reached at the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern were merely the confirmation of all those trends which were in evidence since the Fifth Plenum of the ECCI. But the eventual confirmation of all these trends and this shift in the Comintern could not have been more unfortunate for the cause of Soviet policy itself. 1. XV. Sezd Vsesoiuznoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii (B ), stencffra■ ficheskii otchet, Mosoow-Leningrad, 1028, p. 606.

36

Colonialism in East-West Relations

The Sixth Congress of the Comintern met at a time when the national movements in the colonial and semi­ colonial countries had assumed their own distinct indi­ vidual character. They had grown mature and become confident of their own potentialities and had begun to draw a wide popular support among their own people. They had already begun to advance more and more insistent demands of freedom and self-rule on their foreign rulers. Against such a background, the Sixth Congress dis­ cussed the colonial question and laid down a policy which was completely at variance with the actual situation in the colonies. The debate on the question in the colonial commission was devoid of interest and originality, perhaps with the sole exception of India, because of the already strictly enforced monolithic nature of the Comintern. Most of the speakers on the question de­ livered the same type of speeches and used identical argu­ ments in support of the main report on the revolutionary movement in the colonies, delivered by Otto Kuusenin, then a close associate of Stalin.1 The theses adopted by the Congress began by reiterating the importance of the colonial movements because they represented “the most powerful auxiliary force of the Socialist World Revolution.” The theses added that “ the colonial countries at the present time constituted for world imperialism the most dangerous sector of their front.”12 The programme of the Comintern reiterated the possibility of the federation of ex-colonies and ex-semi-colonies with “the World Union of Soviet Socialist Republic.”3 The theses went on to emphasise that “ the alliance with the USSR and revolutionary proletariats of the imperialist countries creates for the toiling masses of the people of China, India and all other colonial and semi­ colonial countries, the possibility of an independent, free 1. See 6-i Vsemirnyi Kongressy stenograftcheskii otchet, Moscow, 1928. 2. Revolutionary Movement in the Colonies, London 1929, p. 7. 3. The Programme of the Communist International adopted in the Sixth Congress, Calcutta, 1946, p. 31.

Introduction : Ideological Background

37

economic and cultural development, avoiding the stage of domination of capitalist system or even the develop­ ment of capitalist relations in general...”1 But that related to the distant future ; what about the immediate present ? The theses provided the answer : “In particular the emancipation of the colony from the imperialist yoke is facilitated by the development of the socialist revolution in the capitalist world and can only be completely guaranteed by the victory of the proletariat in the leading capitalist countries.”123 But in order fully to achieve these aims, the theses pointed out that one of the most important objective conditions was “precisely the development of a strong Communist Party with a mass influence”4 and outlined in great detail the tactics to be adopted by such parties. The theses made it clear that the bourgeois-revolutionary movements in the developed colonies and semi-colonies like India, China, etc, had already gone over to imperialism against their own people, and could not be expected to lead the colonial people to national revolution and later to the social revolution. Hence their total rejection of all such movements. Not only this but also the theses expressedly forbade the Communists to enter into any form of co­ operation with the bourgeois-national movements at the cost of their independence of policy and freedom of action.4 Thus according to the Comintern, the short-term task of all the colonial and semi-colonial countries must be independence from foreign rule, to be followed, as a long­ term task, by socialist revolution whose ultimate success depended on the alliance with Soviet Russia in the first place, and secondly with the Western proletariats. The tactics to be adopted for pursuing these tasks should be based on a three-class alliance of workers, peasants and the town petty-bourgeoisie under the leadership of the Communist Parties of the colonial countries, and not under 1. 2. 3. 4.

Revolutionary Movement, op. cit.y p. 8. Ibid., p. 22. Ibid. Ibid., p. 35.

38

Colonialism in East- West Relations

the bourgeois national movements led by the nationalreformist leaders. Anybody with the slightest knowledge of the conditions prevailing in the colonies and semi­ colonies at that time would have realised that such a policy was bound to lead to disastrous results, both for the Communist Parties themselves and for the Soviet leitmotiv, and perhaps also for the cause of the freedom of the colonial countries. But it is important to realise the main reason for the adoption of such a policy. It becomes clear from examining the Comintern’s evaluation of the international situation and its elaboration of the duties of the Western proletariats in the existing world situation. The manifesto of the Sixth Congress stated specifically that capitalism was entering a new phase of aggressiveness owing to the loss of its temporary stability, and that capitalist states were seeking to provoke a war against the Soviet Union. Thus the Comintern was left with no other alternative but to forsake its subtle policy of equating world revolution with the security and consolidation of Soviet Russia. Now it was forced to come out openly and to define its position in unreservedly clear terms confirming its view that the struggle for the world revolution, and for the security and development of Soviet Russia, were one and the same thing. The theses on ‘the International situation’ averred : “In view of the fact that the USSR is the only fatherland of the international proletariat, the principal bulwark of its achievement...the international proletariat must on its part facilitate the work of the socialist construction in the USSR and defend it against the attacks of imperialist Powers by all the means in its power.”1 It was also essential that the colonial people should also be drawn into this task ; the programme, therefore, emphasised the imperative need for the unity of Western proletariats with the toiling masses of the colonies. Further, the theses explained the leitmotiv o f Soviet policy in the colonies with complete frankness : “In the colonies particularly in the colonies of any imperialist country attacking the USSR, the International Proletariat must retaliate by organising bold and determined mass action and struggle 1. The programme...op. c i t p. 49.

Introduction

:

Ideological Background

39

for the overthrow of the imperialist governments with the slogan of dictatorship of proletariats and alliance with the USSR.”1 From 1929 onwards, it became increasingly clear that under the Stalinist leadership the colonial question had nearly lost its former ideological significance for pro­ moting the cause of Communism and world revolution. Instead, the Soviet leaders now viewed the colonial question only against the background of European events. The developments inside the colonial countries lost significance in their own right." During the four Plenums of the ECCI, held between 1929 and 1933, and in the Soviet and Comintern press, the developments inside the colonial countries were interpreted with deliberate distortion in order to justify and support Soviet diplo­ matic efforts in the West and Comintern’s appreciation of events in Europe. At their best, the developments inside the colonial countries were treated as a frame of reference for the greater stakes involved in the consolidation and defence of the USSR. At their worst, they were made the bases for exercising a monolithic control of the Comintern, and for imposing impossible and irresponsible policies on the indigenous Communist Parties. Another notable feature of the attitude towards the colonies was the subtle shifts and balances in its strategies and tactics while pursuing the leitmotiv of Soviet policy in the fast changing situations in the West. These trends were more evident in the Comintern and Soviet press than in the frequent Plenum meetings, while Comintern itself focussed its attention on the West. Hence Soviet interest in the colonies was purposely misguided, frequently regulated and sometimes withdrawn as the situation in the West demanded and the Soviet diplomatic efforts in the West required. During 1929-1933, two crucial questions were deter­ mining factors in such an attitude towards the colonies. The first and most important was the danger of foreign armed intervention against the USSR, and the second, the 1. Ibid,

40

Colonialism in East- West Relations

role of the nationalist movements, or, as the Soviets put it, the role of the national bourgeoisie. The most important question of the day, as the Soviet ideologues saw it, was the struggle between the capitalist system and the socialist system, or to put it in plain words, how to avert the danger of armed intervention against the USSR. Hence all questions of the day, including the liberation of the colonies, as the theses adopted by the Sixth World Congress asserted, were to be determined from the position of averting this danger and of ensuring the ^ triumph of the socialist system, that is, the triumph of the USSR over the Imperialist Powers. The over-riding importance of the liberation of colonies and imperialist rulers was never disputed or questioned. However, in view of the danger of war and intervention, the pressing problem before the Soviet leaders was that of who ought to be instrumental in striking a quicker and heavier blow on the imperialist interests of the principal hostile Powers in the West, the nationalist movements, or the communist movements ; while the crucial question as to what form the eventual liberation of the colonies ought to take, a socialist path or a bourgeois path, was correspondingly relegated to the background. By the close of the ‘20s, the nationalist movements in the advanced colonial countries, like India, China, Egypt, Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies, had developed themselves into movements with definite commitments to their own national aspirations. But as they developed further, these movements were beset with confusions, doubts and frustrations ; their organizations and political and economic programmes left much to be desired. Each had been reacting to its own complex national background and in turn, each was faced with more com­ plexities than the other. Each had acquired its own momentum for advance, depending on its national back­ ground. All these factors precluded the possibility of a swift, determined and powerful blow against their im­ perialist masters. The Stalinist leadership could not rely on such move­ ments in facing the urgency of averting danger to the USSR and in the need for making its policy of socialism

Introduction

:

Ideological Background

41

in one country successful. For this, fully-fledged ‘Bolshevised* Communist Parties were required. Hence its trenchant criticism of the national bourgeoisie and its insistent demands on the indigenous Communist Parties to ‘Bolshevise’ themselves ; and more attention to the developments inside the nationalist movements and Jess to the imperialist policies in the colonies. This policy had the additional advantage of leaving open the possi­ bility of a diplomatic breakthrough in relations with the Imperialist Powers in the West. The facts that the actual situation in the colonies was far from what the Soviet and the Comintern leaders had believed it to be and that the indigenous Communist Parties were hardly strong enough to carry out the pro­ gramme imposed upon them by the Comintern, were largely irrelevant to the understanding of Soviet leitmotiv in the colonies. This was evident from the increasing vagueness noticeable in the Soviet and Comintern pro­ nouncements after the Sixth Comintern Congress on the ultimate goal for the colonies. Whether the ultimate goal was national freedom or social revolution was no longer perfectly clear. But the evidence suggested as this book will show, that the long-term objective remain­ ed social revolution, while the short-term objective was simply to raise the tempo and fire of the nationalist movements. In the early ‘30s, Britain and Japan were the chief antagonist Imperialist Powers ; hence more attention was focussed on British and Japanese imperialist interests. On the other hand, the set-backs that the nationalists suffered in the early ‘30s in India (withdrawal of civil disobedience movement 1931) ; in China (Japanese invasion of Manchuria, 1931) ; and in Indo-China (failure of the Jenbay uprising, 1930), in­ creased the impatience and disbelief of the Stalinist leadership in the viability of such movements in its drive to strengthen the USSR. Hence the increasing virulence of its denunciation of the national bourgeoisie of the colonies on a par with the antagonism shown towards the Social Democrats in Europe ; and deliberate distor­ tion of the actual situation in the colonial and semi­

42

Colonialism in East-West Relations

colonial countries and concerted efforts to ‘Bolshevise’ the indigenous Communist Parties. It is, therefore, not surprising to find during this period not only that the nationalist movements in the colonies kept on advancing at their own pace but also that the indigenous Communist Parties suffered irrepar­ able damage. From 1933 to 1939, the main threat to the USSR was posed by Nazi Germany and Japan. The Soviet leaders considered Britain and France as the third group of ‘non-aggressive’ Powers who were potentially interes­ ted in peace. A more conciliatory attitude was adopted towards them in the hope of reaching an alliance for collective security against the danger of war. On the other hand, the accommodating attitude of Britain, France and Poland towards Nazi Germany and the long history of their bitter hostility towards the USSR had made the Soviet leaders cautious in the face of the danger of an eventual alliance of Nazi Germany with these Powers. Both these factors led to the adoption of the policy of ‘Popular Front’ by the Seventh World Congress of the Comintern, held in August 1935. The Popular Front policy will be discussed later in the book. But it is necessary to point out here that the Popular Front policy in the colonies in practice meant moderation, compromise and restraint when the antiimperialist sentiments in India and the anti-Japanese struggle in China were at their height. As in the West, the basic strategies and tactics of the Popular Front in the colonies were directed towards maintaining the unity of a common platform of action against all odds. The difference, however, was that in the colonies, all antiimperialist groups, associations and parties were to be united on a common anti-imperialist platform. The long­ term objective of the anti-imperialist united front was to raise them to what Wang Ming, the chief spokesman on the colonial question in the Seventh Comintern Cong­ ress, called “ the highest forms of struggle for power” . On the other hand, the short-term objective was to promote unity on the minimum demand of national

Introduction : Ideological Background

43

independence and anti-imperialism. But the Popular Front policy left so many important questions, like how to promote unity yet to make preparations for the final struggle, deliberately vague. On the other hand, the crucial question, whether the Communist parties should make a bid to capture the anti-imperialist united front at an opportune moment, and thus, after going through the required period of preparation eventually seize power, was left unanswered. This vagueness of the Popular Front policy was to be clarified as and when the situa­ tion in Europe demanded. In the meantime, it fostered the persisting disbelief among the Soviet leaders of the “revolutionary potentials” of the national bourgeoisie. On the other hand, although the restraint and moderation imposed on the Communist Parties and the relative organizational freedom given to them after the Seventh Congress helped to build them up, they very often failed to meet the demands of rapid radicalization of the nationalist movements. The classic example of this was the signing of the Soviet-Chinese Treaty of Non-aggres­ sion in 1937 and the isolation of the Indian Communists from the Indian Nationalist Movement during 1941-1945. It is also not in the least surprising that the KuomintangCommunist United Front broke in China in 1939 and that the Communist Party of India almost severed relations with the Congress-Socialist Party in 1938 and that finally a break occurred in 1940. However, as the war approached, the Soviets did not pay much attention to the colonies. After the war broke out in September 1939, the Soviets continued to support the Popular Front policy in the colonies with the objective of encouraging anti-war sentiments in these countries. Un­ like some indigenous Communist Parties like the CPI, the Soviets obviously did not consider it expedient to disturb the balance of forces among the belligerent nations by actively encouraging the Communists in the united antiimperialist front to make a final bid for capturing the United Front or to end imperialist rule. But the war itself was declared as an imperialist war for the re-division of colonies and spheres of influence. However, after Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union, the war was declared

44

Colonialism in East-West Relations

a just war not only for the USSR but for all “ progressive” humanity everywhere. The Comintern journal summed up ; “ ...the routing of Hitlerism is a supreme, decisive task of all peoples and to the solution of this task all else is subordinate.”1 The theoretical, assumption was that it was only after the world had rid itself of Fascism, that a new order of ‘New Democracy’ would arise in the West, and in its wake, this new order would bring freedom and democracy for colonies. In the meantime, everybody ought to take an active part in winning the war.2 Various indigenous Communist Parties themselves took the initia­ tive without waiting for help and guidance from Com­ munist Parties of the imperialist countries in putting these two ideological strands together in a programme of action. In practice, this amounted to working consistenly for broad based united anti-fascist platforms in order to combine the promoting of war effort with demands for national independence. But as the war progressed, the Communist Parties in colonial countries became totally involved in the war effort and failed to give equal em­ phasis on the demands for national independence. In fact, the turning away of the Soviet leaders from the colonies was unprecedented. For instance, during this period, articles on India, published in Soviet journals, were largely non-committal, purposeless and expressed no opinions on the far-reaching political events then taking place, while the Comintern journals carried no articles on China during 1941-1943. It was indeed symbolic that the last resolution adopted by the ECCI in May 1943, which announced the dissolution of the Comintern, reviewed the record of the Comintern in the past and present, and gave reasons for its dissolution (“ proper and timely” ), but made no reference either to its work in the colonies or to the future of the colonial peoples.3 In January 1942, the Soviet Union had formally adhered to the Atlantic 1. “Edinyi front narodov giterovskovo fashizma” , Kommunisticheskii Internatsional, No. 6-7, 1941, p. 16. 2. World News and Views, vol. 21, No. (July 1, 1941), p. 326 also see I b i d No. (August 1 1942), p. 326. 3. Text of the ECCI resolution in World News and Views, vol. 23, No. 22 (May 29, 1943), p. 169,

Introduction : Ideological Background

46

Charter as the declared war aims of the Allies. Stalin in his war-time speeches often reiterated the principle of selfdetermination of nations1 as the war aims of the Allies. But in the face of known opposition from the British Government against extending the application of the Allied war aims beyond Europe, Stalin never expressed disagreement with the British view during the three war­ time Summit Meetings and numerous high-level AngloSoviet conferences. Indeed he never referred to the subject during these meetings. On the pther hand, Molotov showed more than usual diplomatic interest in discussing Iran, where vital Soviet interests were involved,2 with Eden. In the closing stages of the war, an article in a Soviet journal welcomed the principle of Allied Trusteeship for the former colonies.3 Only towards the end of 1945, an authoritative article in Bolshevik mildly urged the applica­ tion of the Allied War aims to the colonial countries ; on the other hand, it also clearly indicated Soviet support to the idea of U.N. Trusteeship for some colonies.4 How­ ever, no clear-cut policy towards the colonies was defined. The Soviet leaders were too preoccupied with more important post-war European problems to give any proper attention to the colonies. But as the sinews 'o f cold war gradually began to appear, a critical look was cast at the colonial question. By the beginning of 1947, it was apparent that the colonial system had broken at its strongest link with the forthcoming independence of India. The Soviet leaders refused to recognise the historic signi­ ficance of the event and rejected the creation of India and Pakistan as sovereign states free from British control and domination. They turned there backs on them in 2. e.” , (Oct. 9, 1920) in Documents Relating... op, cit.t Cab. 21/200, 1920 2. “Conclusions of the Meeting of Cabinet...... on Oct. 12 1920° Cab, 21/173, 1920 3. DoJcumenty Vneshnei Politiki S S S R , Vol. I ll, Moscow, 1960, p. 316 (For checking Chicherin’s note, see Documents Relating....!, op, c i t * pp. 64-66) * 4. Ibid. 6. Letter from (Sir) Maurice Hankey to Lord Curzon Nov 12 1920, Co6. 21/200, 1920 ’ * ' 6. Extracts from conclusions of a meeting held in Mr. Bonar Law’s Room...... Nov. 26, 1920, (Cab, 64/20) Cab, 21/200 7. Ibid, 8. Letter from (Sir) M. Hankey to Sir R. Home. 27 Nov 1920 Cab. 21/200, 1920

Promises and Intentions : 1920-1922

1$9

When the trade talks were finally resumed in earnest in November 1920, the British Government showed no slackening o f their efforts for extracting a suitable guarantee from the Soviets against continuing hostile propaganda ; they were in no mood to give way on this point. Sir Robert Horne demanded from Krasin “ a closer definition relating to propaganda and hostile activities.” The British now submitted another draft of the proposed treaty, in which the geographical areas of the British Empire where the Soviets must desist from propaganda were specifically defined as “ Caucasus, Asia Minor, Persia, Afgnanistan and India.” 1 On the other hand, the Soviet Government were still reluctant to give any undertaking with clearly defined commitments, still hoping, perhaps, to strike a favourable bargain with the British. When the Soviet siie produced its own draft treaty, it promised the cessation of propaganda albeit in general terms, and carefully avoided any clear-cut commitments on this issue.9 In the meetings that followed the presentation of the draft treaties, Krasin opposed the naming of areas, and particularly the inclusion of the Caucasus in it, for which the British were pressing all along. Instead he proposed the entire question of hostile propaganda be discussed in a bigger conference of the two sides.123 Even at this final stage of the talk, Soviet policy seemed to be consistent and it was carefully pursued. It now became quite clear that Soviet Russia had no desire to forego her main source of strength against Britain without extracting maximum concessions from her. The Soviet Government would agree to enter into a well-defined commitment on hostile activities and propaganda only when the British Government had declared their readiness to grant Soviet Russia essential credit facilities and full diplomatic recognition. It was mainly because of this desire to keep up the pressure of hostile propaganda on Britain that 1. In the original British draft of June 30, geographical areas were not defined. The addition was made at the insistence of Lord Curzon. When this discrepancy was pointed out by Krasin, Lloyd George bluntly told him that it was now added because the Soviets were oarrying out so muoh host ile propaganda in those areas (DBFP, Vol. VIII, op. o i t p. 880) 2. Ibid., p. 870 3. Ibid.

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Izvestiia strongly objected to the inclusion of the Near East and the Middle East in the propaganda clause on the ostensible ground of “ turning over these regions and populations in advance to Great Britain.”1 In fact, right from the very beginning of the trade negotiations, the Soviet Government, like their counterpart, always regarded these talks as primarily of political nature, and a first impor­ tant and decisive step towards establishing relations with Britain.123 In fact, the Soviet leaders made every attempt to gain maximum advantage from the talks at th e^/ minimum price ; they even threatened the British with increased propaganda. Earlier, in a reply to Curzon’s note of 9th October, Chicherin sharply reminded Curzon that the propaganda could not be stopped before the agreement was signed. Likewise, in December 1920, addressing the Party Members, Lenin.confidently stated : “The line we follow in the Central Committee is one of maximum concessions to Britain... If they hope to gain some advantage out of this point, let them try, we won’t be the losers” .8 As the Anglo-Soviet talks entered into the final stage, opposition inside the Cabinet to Lloyd George’s policy continued. Although there was no longer any opposi­ tion to trading with Soviet Russia4*, the main controversy centred round the question of how to force the Soviets to cease their hostile propaganda against the Empire. The Cabinet sub-Committee under the chairmanship of Lord Curzon was entrusted to prepare an elaborate statement on Soviet hostile activities in Asia Minor, Russia, Afghanistan and India. The Committee prepared an ela­ borate document on Soviet hostile activities in the area on the basis of intercepted Soviet telegrams, messages and British intelligence reports and on November 24, 1. Izvestiia, January 30, 1921 2. Oodovoi otchet N K I D k 1V I I I sezdu Sovetov , 1919-1920 god Moscow, 1921, p. 3 3. V.I. Lenin, Vol. 31, p. 443 4. Lord Curzon’s biographer pointed out that Lord Curzon agreed to Lloyd George’s policy mainly beoause of his fears that his opposition would prompt the Prime Minister to seek another Foreign Secretary, and thus his chance of becoming Prime Minister might be jeopardised (Harold Nioholson, op. c i t p. 207)

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1920, Lord Curzon forwarded the document to the Prime Minister.1 However, on November 26, the Cabinet decided to include in the preamble of the agreement it­ self a mutual general pledge of binding nature with areas of British interest simply defined. The British stand on Soviet propaganda was to be clarified in detail by send­ ing a letter to the Soviet Government. It was decided that the letter should be drafted on the basis of the Cabinet sub-Committee report.12 Lord Curzon deeply re­ sented this decision and wanted the inclusion of the state­ ment on the trade agreement itself so as to give it a de­ finite character. On December 13, 1920, in a long memorandum on policy towards Soviet Russia, Lord Curzon told the Cabinet “ ...I was afraid that unless we are very much on the alert the Russians might get their Trade Agreement while v.e should lose what is in my view, our sole quid pro quo, viz., the cessation of Soviet hostilities and propaganda both at home and in the East. From the abundant evidence at our disposal it looks as though my fears are in danger of being realised even more quickly than I had imagined.”3 He argued that the Soviet Government were aiming at gaining full re­ cognition from Britain and would not observe any pledge given by them unless they achieved their objective. He urged upon his colleagues not to allow themselves to be cheated by the tactics of the Russians and must not leave in abeyance the exact meaning and application of any propaganda pledge by the Russians.4 He concluded : “ On the former occasion I pleaded that the fulfilment of the political conditions should be anterior to the con­ clusions o f the Trade Agreement. The Cabinet decided that it should be simultaneous. It is now proposed that it should be indefinitely subsequent. I hope that this stratagem may be defeated and that our preamble will be retained.”5 Lord Curzon was again actively supported 1. “Russian Trad© Agreement ; Report of the Cabinet Com­ mittee” , (C.P. 2138), Gab. 21/200, 1920 2. “Extracts from c o n c l u s i o n s . op. oit. 3. “Memorandum by the Secretary of State F.A.” , Dec. 13, 1920. Gab. 21/200, 1920 4. Ibid. 5. Ibid.

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by Churchill and Balfour. However, the Cabinet did not Change its earlier decision and the British version of the draft agreement was handed over to Krasin on January 8, 1921. On February 4, 1921, Chicherin officially communi­ cated his Government’s acceptance of the draft treaty. To set the British Government’s doubt at rest, Chicherin gave assurances of observing the propaganda pledge and denied that the Soviet-Afghan treaty was desigoed to incite tribal uprisings on the Indian frontier. He also rejected the charges of anti-British activities in Asia Minor, India, Afghanistan and elsewhere.1 A last minute hitch occurred in defining the geographical areas where both sides pledged to refrain from hostile propaganda and similar activities ; however, the British agreed to drop the Caucasus and Asia Minor as their areas of interest from the final version of the treaty. The Anglo-Russian Trade Agreement was signed on March 16, 1921 and thus Britain accorded de facto re­ cognition to Soviet Russia. The preamble of the treaty pledged both the countries to refrain from hostile propa­ ganda and activities in defined geographical .areas. The Soviet Government agreed to refrain from “any attempt by military or diplomatic or any other form of hostile action” against British interests or the British Empire, especially in India and the independent state of Afghanis­ tan.12 The British Government on their part undertook corresponding obligations, though in this case no specific areas were defined in the treaty3 where they were to be operative. The entire agreement was to lapse in case of infringement of these conditions by either side. In accordance with the decision of the Cabinet, Sir Robert Home handed over to Krasin the day the agree­ ment was signed a long letter which was prepared on the basis of the report of the Cabinet sub-Committee on Soviet propaganda and hostile activities. The letter 1. Documenty, op. eit., Vol. I ll, p. 462 2. Russian Trade Agreement, Cmd. 1207, 1921 3. Ibid.

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catalogued a series of anti-British activities near the North-Western frontiers of India. They were alleged to be solely engineered by the Soviet Government, and their object was the “ overthrow of British rule in In d ia/’ The letter went on to accuse the Soviet Government of mili­ tary preparations in and around India’s North-Western frontier, and of providing aid to the Indian revolutionaries in Afghanistan and Soviet Russia with the ultimate ob­ jective of aggression on India. For the first time, the Soviet Government were thus accused of serious hostile activities along the borders of India by their own agents.1 The sole purpose of the letter was to impress upon the Soviet Government, once again, and much more forcibly, the utmost concern of the British Government to protect India from the hostile Powers and from undesirable in­ fluences like that of Soviet Russia and Communism. It was in effect a clear notice to the Soviet Government that as long as they refrained from their efforts to weaken the roots of British rule in India, economic rela­ tions and some form of political recognition could be kept intact. In the words of Lord Curzon, the letter was meant to provide “a dampening effect even upon the humour of Chicherin...”* But in fact it never brought the required dampening effect on the humour of Chicherin. The long drawn-out trade negotiations, the British concern about hostile Soviet activities against the British Empire, and later H om e’s letter, only spotlighted the weakness of British policy towards Soviet Russia. In their concern to safeguard India, the British Government confirmed the prevailing Soviet belief that India was really the Achilles’ heel of the British Empire. They also realised that Britain was determined to retain her hold over India and to keep prospects of revolutionary upsurge as remote in India as they were in the West. With these considerations before them, the Soviet Govern­ ment could only foresee a future in which India would for some time remain a trump card in their dealings with12 1. The Times 9 March 17, 1921. Full text in Anglo-SoveUkie otno8heniia, noty i dokumenty, Moscow, 1927, pp, 8-11 2, D BFP, Vol. VIII, p.

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Britain without any real involvement on their part in Indian affairs. Surely enough, Chicherin lost no time in replying to Sir Robert Horne’s letter and assured the British Government that “nothing shall be done to infringe the agreement with Great Britain,” and he even spoke of the great value that Soviet Russia attached to the trade agreement.1 There was satisfaction all around in Moscow and Lenin welcomed it as the first window opened on Soviet Russia. But at the same time there was no inten­ tion to regard the trade agreement final and binding on Soviet Russia. The day the trade agreement was signed, the Tenth Congress of the Russian Communist Party passed a resolution approving the policy of enter­ ing into trade relations with the capitalist Powers, and declared that this opportunity must be used for develop­ ing Soviet Russia’s economy.12 At the same time it left no doubt that the arrangement should be regarded as a purely temporary, if necessary pause, in the struggle to gain recognition and economic help from Britain and other capitalist Powers.3 It followed logically that Soviet Russia must get more and more economic conces­ sions and full diplomatic recognition from the capitalist countries.4 And the more pressure exerted on the British Government, the easier it would be to obtain concessions. Their own experience in dealing with Britain had so far shown that the most effective and forceful pressure was that of hostile propaganda against British rule in India. This Soviet policy towards India gradually became a reckoning factor in the relationship between Soviet Russia and Britain. But because of the firm attitude of the British Govern­ ment, and owing to dire economic need and political re­ quirements of Soviet Russia, the Soviet leaders had to 1. Anglo-Sovetskie otnohoeniia, 1917-1927, notyi i dokumentv Moscow, 1927, p. 12 ’ 2. K P S S v rezoliutaiiakh i resheniiakh, Part 1, Moscow, 1953, p. 556 3. Ibid. 4. Kamenov obviously meant precisely this when he boldly declared in the 10th Party Congress that “our arrangement (t.e., trade agreement) represents only a new force of struggle, the struggle to establish communism in one isolated country (Desiatyi sezd Rossiskoi Kommunisticheski Partii, stenograficheskii otchet, 8-16 marta 1921 a Moscow 1921, p. 33)

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compromise, though only temporarily and outwardly. For the present the propaganda drive against Britain had to be slowed down. The Third Congress o f the Comintern was held after the signing of the trade agreement in June 1921, but unlike the Second Congress, India and the other Eastern countries were not in the forefront of its deliberations. M.N. Roy and others registered their protests but nobody paid any attention. The Soviet Government also decided to close down the propaganda and military schools in Tashkent where Indians were being trained. But these were only outward manifestations and no change of heart was either intended or even pretended. The British Government were also taking stringent mea­ sures to make India safe from any form of Soviet hostility, whether propaganda or military. First of all, the Government of India took steps to ward off the danger of Bolshevik propaganda in India. On October 12, 1920, in a telegram to the Secretary of State for India, the Viceroy described the anti-Bolshevik measures taken in India as follows : “ Special precaution by all frontier officers to exclude Bolshevik agents and propagandists ; appointment of officers in special duty in most provinces to investigate reports on and hinder spread of Bolshevism ; (proscription of—added) Rouble notes ; proscription of undesirable papers such as Daily Herald e tc .: surveillance and detention of refugees, press and other written propaganda.”1 The India Office and the Foreign Office were very well and correctly informed on the movements and doings of the Indians who were active in the Com intern; each and every incident of Indians crossing over to India from Central Asia was regularly reported by local officials and they were duly put under surviellance and detention.2 Both in India and in the War Office, the military plan­ ners still dreaded the possible threat of a direct armed 1. “From Viceroy (Foreign, and Political Dept.) to tho Secretary of State for India, (12 Oct., 1920)” ; Weekly Telegram from Vicroy, F.O. File 179-3713, 1920 2. See for example Weekly Reports of Special Bureau of Infor­ mation, Simla, F.O. F ile 86-914, 1920, and “Turkish Propaganda Among India Muslims” , F.O. File 262, 1920

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attack on India through Afghanistan and the NorthWestern frontier. The General Staff in fact never abandoned this idea even after the war was over. In August 1919, in a memorandum to the Secretary of State for War, Sir Henry Wilson, the C.I.G.S., discussed the new tasks facing the army after the War.1 He pointed out that the centre of a future war had now shifted from Europe to Asia, which would seriously threaten the British Empire in India and elsewhere in the East. He made it abundantly clear that Soviet Russia might in the futurq^ take aggressive actions against the British Empire in India. He suggested the reorganisation o f the entire military set-up of the Empire.12 By 1920, as the Soviet Government had gained de­ cisive victories in the Civil War and finally established themselves in Central Asia and the Caucasus, the danger of an armed Soviet attack on India was then all the more seriously apprehended in Simla as well as in London. All the British military sources and diplomatic missions in the areas adjoining India were specially ins­ tructed by the War Office and Foreign Office to keep an open eye for any Bolshevik military movements in the area and all forms of hostile activity. All these watching posts and diplomatic missions stretching from Constantinople to Tiflis and Kasghar to Shanghai com­ piled and sent weekly intelligence reports on Bolshevik activities and movements in the area. Inevitably these reports very often contained conflicting informations and were based on dubious sources. For example, Lt. Col. Stokes, then stationed in Tiflis, sent a report to the War Office in December 1920 stating that Trotsky had given orders to mobilise 5 to 6 million men for preparing an attack on the Baltic States, Rumania, Ukraine in the West, and Persia and India in the East.3 A British re­ presentative in Norway reported to the Foreign Office in November 1920 that he had learnt from reliable sources that Soviet Russia was preparing to attack Poland and 1. Military Policy and the Empire,” C.I.G.S. Secret, 7th August 1919, Austen Chamberlain Mss., box AC-21 2. “Military Policy and the Empire,” op. cit. 3. “Report No, 12”, F.O. File 2820-3656, 1920

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India.1 On the other hand, Gen. Malieson reported to the Chief of Staff, India, from Meshed in April 1920 that “I do not apprehend immediate danger from them (Bolsheviks)” .12 A few days later, he reiterated his opinion mainly on the grounds that Britain already occupied the Caspian and that the Bolsheviks were reluctant to encou­ rage the Afghans.3 The C-in-C of India forwarded a report from an intelligence source in Central Asia to the War Office in February 1921 which stated that the Russians were making preparations to invade Persia, Afghanistan and India and were specially recruiting natives of these countries in their army.4 A report by General Bruisilov to the War Office dated March 10, 1921, gave details of a Bolshevik military preparation to invade India. It stated that the Revolutionary Military Council of the Bolsheviks had London, June 15, 1920, in a more sensational from.) 1. M.N. Roy, March 29, 1953

"Memories” , Amrita Bazar Patrilca, Calcutta,

2. M.N. Roy, "Memoirs” , Amrita Bazar Patrilca, Calcutta, July 27, 1952 3. Ibid• 4. Ibid. 5. Ibid. 6# Roy, "Memoirs” , Amrita Bazar Patrilca, March 29, 1953

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sharp cleavage among them and a large majority resented Roy’s leadership and distrusted his “ un-Islamic” up­ bringing.1 Secondly, the Soviet leaders were not really interested in Roy’s plans for liberating India by force of arms. In fact, in 1920, no responsible Soviet leader, except perhaps Trotsky,123*seriously toyed with the idea of liberating India from British rule by armed action. No doubt Roy had some arms at his disposal and a military school for training his compatriots8 was also opened in Tashkent. However, coming soon after the Civil War, they meant nothing more than a sort of symbolic gesture to anti-imperialist movements, whose worthy representa­ tive, Roy was then regarded in Soviet Russia. None­ theless, it appears that the main purpose of the whole exercise was to provide some evidence of Soviet influence in the East and a clear indication to the British of what Soviet Russia might be capable of doing in India. Little did M.N. Roy and other Indians in Soviet Russia realise that their activities in Moscow and elsewhere at that time would strengthen Soviet Russia’s bargaining position against Britain, and nothing more. Their cause was doomed to failure from the very beginning of their adventure in Soviet Russia. Even Roy had to admit later that his plan of invading India was unrealistic and even childish, and he had to return to Moscow after a few months. Back in Moscow, Roy began to web his theories of bringing about revolutions in India and soon he was to become a prisoner of his own ideas and environment, out of tune with the realities of the Indian situation. By the summer of 1920, the Soviet Government had inflicted heavy defeats on the White armies. It was obviously an appropriate time to formulate their policy towards India. The occasion was the Second Comintern 1.

Shaukat Usmani, I met Stalin Twiee%Bombay 1953, p. 53

2. According to Roy, the m ilitary school was founded in early 1921 with great official fanfare and enthusiasm, but it was quietly and unceremoniously closed a few months after the signing of the AngloSoviet trade agreement (see Roy, Memoirs, Ibid., April 12, 1953). Out of 50 Indians, who formed R oy’s group in Tashkent, the majority some­ how made their way back home, a few joined the Red Army, while a hard core of 16 were brought by Roy to Moscow. They entered into the Communist University o f the East (see Abdul Qadir Khan, "The Pupil of the Soviets” , The Times9 26/2/30).

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Congress. In Chapter I we have already discussed in considerable detail the proceedings of the Second Com­ intern Congress, and here we shall confine ourselves only to its relevance to India. In discussing the colonial question, first in the colonial commission and then in the open session, India became the main centre of controversy and attracted the attention of all the delegates, because of the presence of Roy and his known disagreement with Lenin’s views. The main point of controversy was the nature of the Indian bourgeoisie and the degree of industrial development in India. Roy maintained that India was well advanced in industrialization and had passed the stage of feudalism. He pointed out that there were al­ ready five million workers in India1 and support to the bourgeoisie would be tantamount to postponing social revolution in India. Roy was thus essentially advocating a nationalist point of view by rushing to bring about social revolution in India without caring much whether Soviet Russia and the embryonic world Communist movement could muster sufficient strength to seriously challenge British rule in Iodia. Lenin, on the other hand, maintained that like other colonial countries, India was still a feudal-agricultural country, in spite of the beginning of industrialization as a result of the ex­ port of the British capital to India and also because of the co-operation of the native bourgeoisie with Britain. It followed, therefore, that there could only be a bour­ geois national movement for the independence of India, while a proletarian movement which combined liberation and social revolution together would not be feasible for some time to come. Hence his advocacy of supporting the bourgeois national movement in all colonies and semi-colonies, including India.12 As pointed out earlier, 1. The Second Congress, Full Report, op. cit.f pp. 119-122 2, In open sessions of the Congress, Lenin spoke of all colonies and semi-colonies in general, and did not make any specific reference to India, But according to Roy, in the colonial commission meetings, Lenin mainly discussed the case of India. Roy says that Lenin thought that judged against the background of the Indian situation, Gandhi was an inspirer and leader of a mass movement ; hence he was a revolutionary. Lenin also believed, Roy claims, that the bourgeoisie in India were destined to fulfil their historical task of bringing about

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in taking this position, Lenin had taken into considera­ tion the strategy and tactics of dealing with all the capitalist Powers and of promoting world revolution. In this scheme, an unqualified support to the Indian Nationalist Movement was obviously the most expedient and effective policy to adopt in dealing with Britain, and this policy coincided with the needs and demands of Indian nationalism of the time. By adopting Lenin’s theses, Soviet Russia had acquired a formidable weapon in her hand against Britain. On the other hand, Roy’s theses were much ahead of their time. Soviet Russia was still too weak to commit herself in any practical way for promoting revolution in India, or anywhere else. In this connection, it is interesting to find Soviet sources of information on India, and the nature of such sources. Besides the contacts established with the emigre' Indians, the Soviet Government had now developed their own means of collecting informations through their mis­ sions abroad. During the period of Intervention and Civil War, it was the Soviet embassy in Berlin, one o f the earliest Soviet missions abroad, which collected informations on India, particularly the British press coverage o f the Indian situation.1 Later, when the Soviet embassy was established in Kabul, it became another centre for collecting infor­ mations on India. After the trade agreement, the Soviet mission in London also became a channel for collecting such informations, but their activities were greatly hamper­ ed by the close watch kept on them by the British Govern­ ment.2 The bulletin of the Narkomindel, which started publishing early in 1920, contained accurate and detailed reports on day to day events in India mainly based on a bourgeois national revolution, which, in due cousse of time, would be followed by a proletarian revolution (Roy, “Memoirs, op, cit. 12. 7. 53). The records of the colonial commission meetings have not yet been published, but Roy’s inside story of the discussions in the colon'al commission seemed to coincide with Lenin’s stand in the open sessions and with his report of the colonial commission on the colonios and semi-colonies in general. Interestingly enough, Roy claims that Stalin whom he met privately at that time, agreed with his plea of promoting proletarian movement in India (“Memoirs”, op. cit., July 1*/, 53). 1. This was also confirmed by the Soviet Indologists who told the author in Moscow that this was exactly the case g. Revolutionary Activities, Cab. 21jl97t 192g

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British press reports. One of the earliest reports on India thus described the situation in the summer of 1920 “India is highly disturbed. Every day in some provi­ nces or cities some agitation goes on and the merciless suppression of the bourgeoisie is continued.”1 The re­ port then went on to describe the recurrence of strikes and demonstrations in various cities.123 This report was published just before the Second Comintern Congress and such concern for the bourgeoisie was indeed reveal- ^ ing. Another Soviet journal of the early period, i.e., 1920-1922, “Life of the Nationalities” , was the organ of the Commissariat of Nationalities which published a few articles of an analytical character on India. The annual sessions of the INC attracted considerable atten­ tion in this journal. As we have noted earlier, the 1920 annual session of the INC decided to change its creed. This decision of the INC coming so soon after the Second Comintern Congress, was warmly welcomed in the journal. “All these resolutions accepted in this Con­ gress”, remarked the journal o f the Commissariat o f Nationalities, “ are representative of all the sections that are opposed to the oppression of the Indian people.”8 It pointed out that the growing militancy of the Indian Nationalist Movement' seemed to uphold the decision of the Comintern to support it.45 Optimism about the Indian Nationalist Movement was indeed running so high that the same journal even published a short article on the life of Gandhi.6 The bulletin of the Narkomindel also noted the magic influence of Gandhiji on the masses, especially among the peasants.8 Surit, the Soviet ambassador in Afghanistan, who was well-informed on India, gave a long interview to the Soviet press in which he described in detail the progress of the nationalist movement in India. He thus spoke approvingly of Gandhiji : “In the centre of the movement stands Gandhi. 1. Biidleten Narodnovo Komissariata Inostrannykh Del (referred to hereafter as Biulleten N K ID ), No. 12, 1920, Moscow, p, 9 2. Ibid. 3. Zhizn Natsionalnostei, Moscow, No. 3 (101) 1921 4. Ibid. 5. Ibid., No. 4(104), 1921 6. Biulleten N K ID , op, cit., No. 65, 1921

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Essentially he is more an apostle, a preacher than a political leader. His popularity in India is immense. Gandhi himself all the time shuttles from right to left and back. But he stands for the self-government of India as it has been accepted in Canada and Australia Surit then proceeded to give a little more detailed cate­ gorization of the Indian Nationalist Movement. He rightly noted that the INC comprised various groups of different affiliations. He, however, emphasized the anti-imperialist character of the whole move­ ment but admitted that “ the proletarian movement as a class is now appearing only at the present time”, and added that “ the leadership of the trade unions still lies in the hands of the intelligentsia and compromisers. The progress of the non-cooperation movement did not pass unnoticed. Throughout 1921-1922, the bulletin of the Narkomindel regularly published news and com­ mentaries on the non-cooperation movement and even the arrests of the leaders of the movement were reported.* It can be said that from 1920 onwards the Soviet leaders were beginning to get enough informations on Indian affairs. Beginning with vague pronouncements and a symbolic interest in Indian affairs, the Second Congress of the Comintern laid down definite policy towards India along with other Eastern countries. Afterwards their own informations on India tended to strengthen their optimistic belief in the usefulness of the Indian movement, and also seemed to vindicate their own policy towards it. In fact, in 1920, the Indian Nationalist Movement provided a classic example of the efficacy of the bourgeois national movements and of extending whole-hearted support to them. The Soviet leaders now seemed to realise fully that Indian nationalism was their natural ally against Britain, despite the two different goals pursued by them and the Indians. The Soviet policy of supporting and wooing the Indian Nationalist Movement was thus in full swing by123 1. 25 (31), 2. 3.

“Borba In dii za svoiu nezavisimost”, Zhizn Natsionalnosti, No. 1921 Ibid. See various nutubers of Biulleten N K ID for April-May, 1921

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the close of the year 1920. At that time, there seemed to be no prospect of a crisis of world capitalism in the near future, for which the Soviet leaders were hopefully waiting. Moreover, after having understood the extreme concern of the British Government for the safety and security of India during the trade negotiations, it was also realised that propaganda pronouncements and revolution­ ary appeals could not penetrate through the scordon sanitaire which the British were striving to establish in and around India. Hence in addition to the propaganda and revolutionary appeals, it was essential that Soviet Russia should have a favourable image in Indian minds by support and sympathy for the cause of Indian nationalism. As the journal of the Com m issariat of Nationalities pointed out : “ For the success of the Indian revolution it is neccessary that Socialist Russia should not limit herself purely to platonic regrets and wishes. She must give active help to the Indian revolution remembering that India is the citadel of British imperialism and it is the only singular vulnerable point in the whole world where a death blow can be struck on it.”1 In March 1921, the NEP (the New Economic Policy) was announced and its effects were immediately felt in foreign policy : world revolution for the time being was soft-pedalled. The Third Comintern Congress, held in June 1921, confirmed this trend, and consequently, the colonial question was relegated to the background of the Congress. In complete contrast to the Second Comintern Congress, no declamatory speeches about the evils of colonialism were made. Nevertheless, India attracted some interest, when the colonial question was discussed. The need for having some definite policy towards India was regarded as necessary in dealing with Britain. Of all the theses, significantly enough, it was the theses on the tactics of the Russian Communist Party that made a pointed reference to India and said : “The emergence of the national liberation movement had assumed a new significance in the correlationship of the 1. B. Kriazhin, “Revoliutsnnoe dvizhenie v Indiiy Zhizn’ NnUionalnostei, Nos, 13-14, 1920

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class forces on international scale...British India is at the head of these countries and there the revolution is developing more rapidly.”1 The formal rapproche­ ment with Britain imposed some obligations on Soviet Russia and, outwardly, at least, they had to be kept. Under the circumstances the policy of verbally supporting and wooing the nationalists was the only conceivable and effective means of keeping up pressure on Britain and weakening the hold of world capitalism. Military schools and armed help to drive the British out of India were not necessary for the objective in view. Nor would the-buttressing of a Communist movement, which did not then exist in India, could have served its purpose at that stage. Indeed the Communist Party of India was already formed in Tashkent in January 1921 by a small group of emigre' Indians.2 It was significant that Roy, who was then member of the Turk-bureau in Tashkent, firmly opposed the move to form the party and other members of bureau remained neutral.8 The Party was formed only at the insistence of the group concerned. All evidence now tended to confirm that the need for encouraging the Communist movement in India did not get any attention from the Soviet leaders till the second half of the year 1922, when it was considered necessary to have a firm footing right inside India. Against the background of growing unrest in India, Lord Curzon revived the old controversy of hostile propaganda in the British Empire, especially in India. In the note of September 7, 1921, Lord Curzon drew the attention of the Soviet Government to a series of flagrant violations of the trade agreement. He indignantly alleged that the Soviet Government had stepped up their antiBritish propaganda and had encouraged hostile elements

1. D e c isio n s o f the T h ir d Congress , Communist Party of Gt. Britain nd., p. 126 2. M.N. Roy, “Memoirs”, A m r ita B azar P a tr ik a , Calcutta, March 29, 1953. Roy’s story is now confirmed by the Communist Party of India in its publication (see Muzaffar Ahmed, C o m m unist P a rty o f In d ia Y ears o f F o rm a tio n 1921-1923 . Calcutta 1959, pp. 12-13). 3.

Ib id ,

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in and around the Western borders of India.1 He deman­ ded immediate cessation of all these forms of propa­ ganda if the trade agreement was to continue. The Soviet Government in their reply dismissed all the allegations which they said were based on forged documents. The Soviet reply emphatically declared that the Soviet Government had had no contact, directly or indirectly, with the Indian revolutionaries since the beginning of the trade agree­ ment.12 But Litvinov, who signed the Soviet note, was shrewd enough to drop a hint of Soviet intentions of keeping up the pressure of propaganda on Britain. He squarely put the blame for hostile propaganda, if any, on the vagueness of the agreement itself, short of a general peace treaty, such as the Soviets wanted. The Soviet note said “It must be admitted that in some instances, the representatives of the Russian Government have uncons­ ciously-infringed upon British interest, not knowing exactly in what directions these interests lie.”3 But Lord Curzon followed up with still another note reite­ rating all the previous charges with greater vehemence. It was further alleged that regular trains loaded with propaganda leaflets in oriental languages were being despatched to the vicinity of the Indian border. The activities of the Indian revolutionaries in Moscow and that of the Soviet emissaries in Afghanistan again came under fire. How much pre-occupied Curzon was with keep­ ing' India safe from Soviet Russia was shown by his protests against the deliberations of the Third Comintern Congress. While in the Third Comintern Congress the question of the East and in particu’ar that of India was practically shelved, Curzon thought that its main purpose was to “ decide on measures for fomenting revolution in India.”4 This exchange of notes in the autumn of 1921, soon after the trade agreement, spotlighted the fact that the British Government were as much apprehensive 1. A Selection of Papers 1921-1927, Cmd. 2895, HMSO, 1927, pp. 13-15. 2. Ibid., p. 15* 3. Ibid., p. 16. 4. Ibid., pp. 18-19.

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Soviet propaganda and 'the threat of armed aggression as they were before the conclusion of the trade agreement. But before the matter could flare up all over again, as Lord Curzon perhaps desired, Prime Minister Lloyd George decided to negotiate all the outstanding problems with the Russians. The opportunity came at the Genoa Conference held in April 1922. The terms of the Genoa Conference were agreed upon by the Allied Powers in January 1922 at a meeting in Cannes. The object of the Conference, as laid down in the Cannes resolution, was mainly economic, but political questions like “non-inter­ ference in each other’s domestic affairs, non-aggression against neighbours and refraining from propaganda, subversion of order and established political system in other countries than their own” 1 were included in it. Lloyd George always believed that economic needs were the bridge to political rapprochement between Soviet Russia and the west. Hence his advocacy of an economic conference with Soviet Russia for arriving at a settlement of the political question.12 In fact the British Government attached considerable impor­ tance to the political aspect of the talks.3 Lloyd George told the House of Commons on February 13, 1922 that the Soviet Government had violated the propaganda pledge on a number of occasions and added that the Government were “ looking for the opportunity afforded by the Genoa Conference to secure more gu­ arantees from the Soviet Government against the question of propaganda.” 4 Lloyd George was even prepared to accord de jure recognition to the Soviet Government if the Soviets showed signs of compromise on all outstanding issues between the two Governments, namely the question of debts, private property and hostile propaganda ; he 1. Resolutions adopted by the Supreme Council at Cannes, January 1922, HMSO, Cmd. 1621, 1922, p. 3 2. See Lloyd George’s opening remark in “ Resolution moved by Lloyd George and passed by the Allied Powers in conference. Jan. 6, 1922” , F.O. File 397-458, 1922 3. See various memorandum in Genoa Conference (Political Commission), Cab. 31/6, 1922 4. House of Commons Debates (referred to hereafter as H.O. Debates), Fifth Series, Vol, 150, Col, 597

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also believed that the Soviet Government were prepared to make compromises on all these basic issues.1 But he faced a virtual revolt inside the Cabinet led by Churchill who was totally opposed to the de jure recognition of Soviet Russia and indeed even to the idea of conference with the Russians123. The result was that the Cabinet authorised Lloyd George very limited discretion in dealing with the Russians both in economic and political matters. For the Soviet Government the Genoa Conference provided another big opportunity to test their policy to­ wards Britain. Again, the theme in the Soviet pronounce­ ments before the Genoa Conference was Soviet Russia and the East. Earlier, in January 1922, Chicherin while report­ ing on the invitations to the Genoa Conference, noted with approval that the British were now realising that the political influence of the Russian Republic in the East constituted one of the important reasons for rapproche­ ment with Soviet Russia.45 Again on the eve of the Con­ ference, Chicherin reaffirmed Soviet Russia’s need for getting more loan and credit facilities from the developed capitalist countries.6 But, at the same time, he em­ phasised that full diplomatic recognition of Soviet Russia was necessary for the success of any form of agreement with other foreign Powers.® Thus the Soviet delegation 1. Lloyd George to Austen

Chamberlain,

22/3/22 ;

Aueten

Chamberlain M ss., box AC- 23

2. “Report of the Conference of Ministers held on Monday, 27/3/°2,” Austen Chamberlain M ss., box AC-23 . (Also see Letters from Chamberlain to Lord Curzon and Lloyd George dated March 22, 1922 in Ibid.) 3. The Cabinet decided that unless the Soviet delegation fully accepted the Cannes resolution without any reservation and also the British delegation was fully satisfied of the bonafides of the Soviet Government, no more concessions, economic or political, would be given to Soviet Russia. Even when these two conditions were fulfilled, no more than a diplomatic relationship of Charge d’Affaires level would be considered ; that too, for a probationary period (“Conclusions of a meeting of the Cabinet held at Downing Street, S.W. 1 on Tuesday, 28/3/22,’’ Secret, Cabinet 21 (22), Austen Chamberlain M ss., box AG-23). It was obvious that Lloyd George was given very limited discretion and the Genoa Conference was ’doomed to failure before it actually began. 4. Oenoezshaia Konferentsiia, stenograficheahii otchet, materialy i dokumenty, N K 1 D , Moscow, 1922, p. 15 5. Pravda , March 26, 1922

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went to the Genoa Conference in an expectant mood and was prepared to bargain. But it was quite clear that any mutually agreed formula must be reached by concession from both sides; from the British, full diplomatic recogni­ tion and more loan and credit facilities, while from the Russians, renewed guarantees about propaganda and hostile activities, and a sincere desire to keep such promises. The Conference at Genoa began in April 1922. Immediately after the Conference begaD, the Allied Powers handed the Soviet Relegation a memorandum laying down the conditions on which credit facilities could be given to Soviet Russia. Clause I of the memorandum dealing with the political questions de­ manded a fresh guarantee from the Soviet Government against propaganda and revolutionary activities in other countries.1 However, after a few meetings it became clear to the Soviet delegation that Lloyd George was not in a position to go further than what was necessary to give the Conference a semblance of success. There was cer­ tainly no question of Britain granting a de jure recognition to the Soviets, but for a trial period Lloyd George was inclined to raise the diplomatic mission in Russia to Charge d ’Affairs’ level.1 23 Lloyd George’s flirtation with the Soviets was causing a flutter in the Conservative Party in London, and opposition inside the Cabinet was growing.® Once the Soviet side realised Lloyd George’s 1. M e m o ra n d u m sent to the R u s s ia n D elegation, Otnd. lfii>7, HMSO, 1022, pp. 6-7 2. R ep o rt o f the m eeting l'etween L lo y d George a n d K r a s in on 28th J u l y , 1922 ( N 73721155138), F .O . F ile 155-182, 1922 3. During the Genoa Conference, Lloyd George was boing pressed from home agamst further rapprochem ent , political or economic, with Soviet Russia. Austen Chamberlain, then leader of the Conserva­ tive Party, through telegrams and letters, constantly urged upon him the seriousness of the growing opposition at home to his policy towards Soviet Russia. Lord Curzon, on the other hand, was oxtremelv critical of the Genoa Conference. In a letter to Austen Chamberlain, he noted that the Russians very clearly refused the political conditions about propaganda and informed him that Foreign Office had been getting very reliable evidence proving tho hostile activities of Soviot Russia. Ho told Chamberlain : “To have dealings with such people is bad at ail times...But to do it in the conditions described and in order to save something out of Genoa would be the nadir of humiliation (“letter from Lord Curzon to Austen Chamberlain.” May 13, 1922, A u sten O h a ^h e rla in Mss., box AC-23).

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unstable position and consequently lost all hopes of any success in the Genoa Conference, they flatly rejected any new move to involve them into further commitments in political matters, particularly fresh guarantees against propaganda and hostile activities directed against British interests.1 The fate of the Conference was thus sealed within a few days of its beginning. The treaty of Rapallo between Germany and Soviet Russia sounded the epilogue. Lloyd George returned to London empty-handed. The ^ failure of the Genoa Conference contributed to the exit of Lloyd George from the Prime Ministership. The net result of the Conference was that Anglo-Soviet relations were further strained and the two Governments gained nothing from each other. Early in 1922, the INC finally decided to launch a mass civil disobedience movement throughout the country. Within a few days, the movement spread throughout the country like fire and the entire civil and administrative machinery of the Government was paralysed. The move­ ment, however, fizzled out, when Gandhiji suddenly with­ drew it because of the recurrence of violence in various places. The Government easily got control over the movement and Gandhiji and thousands of others were put in jail. But the discontent and unrest remained. In the spring of 1922, India presented a picture of a country seething with discontent. Under these circum­ stances, it was feared in official quarters that the danger of Bolshevik penetration in India was indeed formidable. The Government o f India always dreaded the possi­ bility of dissatisfaction and discontent in India coinciding with the presence of a formidable enemy on her borders. In the spring of 1922, the situation in India was similar to that, and the Government hastened to take measures against both these possible sources of danger. In June 1922, the Cabinet sub-Committee of Indian Defence made its final recommendations to the Govern­ ment. It stated: “ The present situation in the Middle 1. Papers relating to International Economic Conference* Qenoay April-M ay, 1922, Cmd. 1667, 1922 (For Soviet reply to the Allied memo­ randum, see pp, 38-47).

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East, the uncertain tempo of Afghanistan and the general unrest prevailing among Mohammadens in India render it an inopportune moment to initiate any scheme for partial evacuation of Waziristan.”1 It called for economy in defence expenditure but recommended stationing of more troops in the Indus valley and building of roads and military installations near the North-West frontier.12 On general military policy the sub-Committee stated “ Our policy should be as far as possible to avoid committ­ ing the Army to military operations on a large scale in the mountainous border region and to keep in readiness either to strike heavily at the enemy’s formed bodies as the occasion offers or to turn and crush internal rising in India.”3 Secondly, the Government of India’s attitude towards the Indian Nationalist Movement become more hardened and suspicious. Arrests were, of course, made but something more than that was needed to deal with the situation. Whatever the real motive, the nationa­ lists were again suspected of complicity with the Bolshe­ viks and their agents in India. In a public address, Edwin Montagu, the Secretary of State for India, declared that apart from political grievances of the Indians, the main causes of unrest and widespread disorders prevailing in India must be attributed to the events in Russia and, also, to the activities of Russian agents in India.45 Lord Sydenham, a former Governor of Bombay, and the President of the powerful Indo-British Association, publicly gave a warning to the Government that unless the defence of India was reorganised, the Bolsheviks would certainly step in and join hands with the non-cooperation movement in driving the British out of the country.® The Foreign Office and the India Office were fully and correctly being informed on the movements and activities of the Indians active in the Comintern and in Kabul. 1. “Report o f the Sub-Committee of Imperial Defence’*, Committee of Imperial Defence, p. 165, Cab. 6(4, 1022

2. Ibid., pp. 171-172 3. Ibid., p. 171 4. Bombay Chronicle, Bombay, February 13, 1922

5. Advocate o f India, Bombay, May 6,1922

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Likewise, all manifestations of anti-British propaganda directed against the Empire were studiously reported from places as far as Shanghai, not to speak of areas adjoining the western borders of India.1 Similar reports were nor­ mally collected and sifted in India before being despatch­ ed to the India Office and as a rule they were strengthened by additional notes establishing their connection the with nationalist activities in India.12 Taking a cue from the Government, semi-official press and pro-government influential papers had published similar accusations against the nationalists. A typical example of such opinions came from a semi-official paper which declared : “ There are professed admirers of Bolshevism in India and the lesson is obvious—that no steps to prevent the spread of Bolshevism can be neglected.”34 As things stood in early 1922, there was no reason why Soviet Russia should stop taking interest in Indian affairs. Early in 1922, the Indian Nationalist Movement had begun to agitate against the Government in an organised manner throughout the country. The Soviet leaders kept an eye on the movement with considerable interest and anticipation. As before, the bulletin of the Narkomindel published regular reports on the movement with the optimism characteristic of the times. In one of its commentaries, the bulletin declared : “ The protest against Government repression is now from all classes and from all people of India, and is apparently not so simple now. The latest disorders show that the national movement in India is not, however, the work of a small group of fanatics.”1 The progress of this movement was taken as further vindication of the Soviet policy of unreservedly supporting the Indian Nationalist Movement and its leadership. ButG andhiji'sdecision tow ithdraw the movement, which even bewildered some of his own 1. See F.O. File 6, 1922 2. See for example, “North-West Province Intelligence Bureau ; Diary No. 12” , F.O. File 173, 1922. Also see “Gilgit Agenoy Political Diary” , “Baluchistan Intelligence Bureau Diary” , “Despatches of British Legation in Kabul” (All in F.O. File 173, 1922). 3. Englishman, Calcutta, May 12, 1922 4. Biulleten, N K ID , op. No. 110, 1022

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leading followers, was a mortal blow to the prevailing optimism of the Soviet leaders. They just failed to understand Gandhiji’s decision and it was termed a “ classic example of fantasy.”1 But, surprisingly, Gandhiji came under very mild criticism ; even his difficulties were taken into consideration. “The situation stood critical and confusing. It was necessary to find out a slow way for the present. In the opinion of Gandhi, open rebellion has no chance of any success and all the moderate opinion joined hands to demand from Gandhi the stoppage of the boycott.”12 Although the collapse of the civil disobedience move­ ment disheartened the Soviet leaders, they were not disillusioned. On the contrary, a reappraisal of policy towards India became still more vital, and likewise, a better understanding of the Indian situation. In March 1922, therefore, initial steps towards a better understanding of the Indian situation were taken with the publication of the theoretical journal of the Association for Oriental Studies, Novyi Vostok. Almost all the articles in the inaugural number of the journal were on India and were written in strict conformity with the general line of Soviet policy towards India. I. Reisner, who was later to become an expert on Indian affairs, wrote approvingly of the Indian Nationalist Movement and expressed satisfaction that it was “ acquiring a mass character and also taking shape in all directions.”3 Another interesting article was contributed by A. Tivel, who also became a regular writer on Indian affairs.4 The article was interesting because the author attempted to draw a parallel between the Indian Nationalist Movement and the Russian revolutionary movement. He pointed out that like the All Russian Peasant Congress of 1905, the Indian movement in 1921 was also divided on the 1. AT, "Rol Gandhi v nats-revoliutsionnoe dvizhenie” , Zhizn Nat8ionalno8tei9 No. 4(10) 1922 2. Ibid., p. 14 3. I. Reisner, “Ekonomicheslcie predposylki politicheshoi borbi v sovremennoi In d ii* \ Novyi Vostok, No. 1, 1922, p. 121 4. A. Tivel, "P uti i perespektivi Indiiskoi revoliutsii ” Ibid, pp. 104.118

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effectiveness of peaceful means as a matter of policy.1 But eventually the Russian revolution had to adopt a different path, and he suggested that the Indian movement would also come to the same conclusion sooner or later.12 But for the present, he was content to emphasise the community of purpose between the two movements : “ The revolutionary movement in India has adopted its own character different from the Russian, but one funda­ mental element was common to the two movements. ^ Right up to the present time it can be said about the revolutionary movement in India that like the Russian revolution, it spreads in all directions against imperialist rule.”3 Tivel then went on to analyse the Indian Nationalist Movement in Marxist terminology. He pointed out that there were three main forces in the movement ; progressive bourgeoisie, proletariat and the peasants. All these classes had different and, indeed, conflicting interests in the liberation of India.4*6 But Tivel pointed out that at present only the bourgeois;e occupied a commanding position and they were, therefore, destined to play a leading role in the movement.8 He ended by saying that in spite of its predominantly bourgeois character, the movement would slowly, but surely8, weaken the imperialist hold over India. Another article, first of its kind, appeared on Gandhiji and his philosophy. A Golfar, the author of the article, began by an exposition of Gandhiji’s ideas on non-violence and religion.7 But he summarily dismissed them as an “ idealist utopia” and called Gandhiji “a petty landowner by disposition.”8 He ridiculed Gandhiji for believing “ that the Indian people will obtain Swaraj as soon as they turn to peaceful occupation.” After thus having criticised Gandhiji, rather mildly by Soviet standards, he, surprisingly 1. Ibid., p. 104 2. Ibid., p. 106 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid., pp. 112-113 6. Ibid., p. 117 6. Ibid., pp. 117-118 7. A. Golfar, “ Qandhi i gandiztn” , Mezhdunarodnaia Zhizn, N K ID , Moscow, "No. 6(124) 10th May 1922, pp. 10-12 8. Ibid., p. 12

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enough, turned to, what may be called, the positive side of him. Golfar pointed out that in spite of the reactionary make-up of Gandhism it was “ a great step towards the liberation movement of the Indian people.” He went on to explain “ Gandhism—it is the unification of 300 million people, broken up because of social divisions into a number of ethonographical and religious groups and castes torn by antagonism and centuries of tradition. Gandhism— it is the consciousness of the need for unification and solidarity of the Indian people against English ownership.” 1 Such commentaries on Indian affairs initiated a process for a better under­ standing of India and eventually paved the way for a direct Soviet approach to Indian affairs. At the same time, they provided an indicator of the changing pattern of Soviet policy towards India. We shall see in the following chapters how these commentaries and articles turned into an important medium for interpreting Soviet policy and became a valuable asset to its implementation. The inaugural number of Novyi Vostok came out at a time when the news of the collapse of the non-cooperation movement had just come through. No indication of reappraisal of the policy towards India could have come so soon. But the next issue of the journal contained a long article on the latest event in India. For the first time, the leadership of the INC came under criticism, though the criticisms were mild and of a general nature.12 The article attributed the reasons for the collapse of the movement to the bourgeois nature of its leadership, and made a distinction between revolutionary nationalism and reactionary nationalism.3 It went on to draw its own con­ clusions : “ There is no need to be a prophet to foresee... that the inner contradiction of revolutionary and re­ actionary nationalism excludes the possibility of the bourgeoisie becoming the main force which will determine the future destiny of India.” 4 One must not draw the 1. A . Golfar, op. cit., p. 12 2. I Vanin, “Fahty i vpechatleniia V o tto k , No. 2, 1922, p. 301 3. Ibid. p. 312

.

4 Ibid, p. 316

iz poslevoennoi In dii" ,

Novyi

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conclusion tbat such criticisms nr "ant a change of policy. It was only an indication that a reappraisal of policy was under way. Unconditional support to Indian nationalism was still an expedient and effective policy, but at the same time, it was being realised that the bour­ geoisie were after all not to be fully trusted. If Soviet policy towards India could be expected to bring about desired results in their relationship with Britain and in providing an incentive to the struggle against v/orld capita-^,/ lism, it was considered imperative that along with the support and wooing of Indian nationalism, Soviet Russia in her turn must win support and active sympathy inside India. Moreover, the failure of the Genoa Conference also brought home the point that mere support and wooing of the nationalists might not prove sufficiently effective to exert a strong pressure on Britain ; something more, in addition to that, was needed. Perhaps a Com­ munist party was the right answer. But in the early summer of 1922, the reappraisal of policy had probably only just begun. The form and contents of the new policy had yet to be decided. In this connection it is interesting to note that it was after the collapse of the non-cooperation movement that the Soviets began to think about the role of the working class in India. Even earlier, the news about the workers’ strike, particularly in railways and textile mills, was given prominence.1 But the tendency to emphasise the role of the workers in the nationalist movement and a conscious attempt to exaggerate their militancy became more and more discernible after the collapse o f the non-cooperation movement. One commentator remarked : “ In spite o f the fact that the latter (bourgeoisie) persistently reject the idea of armed revolt, trying to keep the movement within the bounds of peaceful struggle, workers and peasants put up mass resistance to the government........The passive resistance method is being supplanted by such methods as *the direct action’ and the ‘agrarian revolution.* ”a Another 12 1. Biulleten N K ID regularly published the news about the strikes under the title “Workers’ Movement in India” during the second half of 1921. 2. V. Osetrov, “Otrazhenie Oktiabrakoi Revolt utsii” , Mtzhduarodnuia Zhizn, N K ID No. 15 (133) 1922, 7th November 1922, p. 36

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commentator warned the Indian workers to keep away from the nationalist leaders who “ regard the working class movement as a means for achieving their own bourgeois objectives,” and also from their own national reformist leaders who “ consider the struggle against foreigners to be much more important than the class struggle against the bourgeoisie.”1 These comments indicated a new and different approach compared with that adopted so far. They were, however, merely a pointer to the reapprai­ sal of a policy which was then in the process of formu­ lation but not yet being actively pursued.

1. Kh. Eudus, Ocherki rabochevo dvtzheniia Jdo8cowf 1922, pp. 63-64

v atranakh Voetoka,

P art II

Interregnum CH APTER FIVE

Crisis an d Confusion: 1922-1924

With the fall of the Lloyd George Cabinet, the policy of reconciliation with Soviet Russia received a serious setback. In the new Conservative Government of Bonar Law, Lord Curzon was completely free to act in the domain of foreign policy. The Lausanne Conference on the Near Eastern question, which began in November 1922, and dragged on till the signing of the treaty in July 1923, gave Lord Curzon a splendid opportunity to counteract Soviet policy in the East. Lord Curzon believed that the close relationship between Soviet Russia and Turkey constituted a serious menace to British interests in the East.1 At the Lausanne Conference, the main purpose of his policy was to drive a wedge between Soviet Russia and Turkey, thus weakening the position of Soviet Russia in the East. We are not concerned here with the details of the Lausanne Conference or an analysis of the treaty itself. It suffices to point out that Lord Curzon was eminently successful in his policy and, as a result of the Conference, the alliance between Soviet Russia and Turkey was de­ finitely weakened. However, the Lausanne Conference threw an interesting sidelight upon the nature of the relationship between the two countries. During the Conference, Chicherin launched a bitter attack on Britain and address­ ed Lord Curzon directly : “ While, listening to the Chair­ man, I had the impression that the fundamental ideas of the speech was to create a system against Russia. We propose peace to you and you perpetuate the struggle against us...Y ou are uneasy because our horsemen have reappeared on the heights of the Pamirs, and because you no longer have to deal with the half-witted Tsar who ceded the ridge of Hindu Kush to you in 1895. ”a Lord Curzon, on his part, in his only meeting with Chicherin, 1# Letter from Lord Curzon to Austen Chamberlain, May 13, 1922 \ Austen Chamberlain M ss., (referred to hereafter as Chamberlain M ss.), box -4C7-23 2, Lausanne Conference on Near Eastern Affairs, 1922-23, Cmd. 1814,1923, p. 194

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mainly talked about the anti-British propaganda of Soviet Russia. Chicherin assured him that while official pro­ hibition of anti-British propaganda was strictly enforced, he could not restrain private citizens from expressing their views on the question of the colonies, or com­ munists from being communists. The Soviet Govern­ ment were, however, prepared to give further guarantees on the question provided the British would also agree to reciprocate.1 Lord Curzon replied by saying that “ a j mere fifty per cent reduction in propaganda” could not * serve as the basis for good relations.123 He was obviously not prepared to respond to such Soviet overtures not backed by action, and their talks, therefore, ended in­ conclusively. When the Lausanne Conference was well under way, Bonar Law, the Prime Minister, reiterated in the House of Commons that the main conditions for the recognition of the Soviet Government were “ the recognition of debts, restitution of private property, or effective com­ pensation, and cessation from political propaganda.”2 Again on the 26th February, the Prime Minister refused to enter into any commitment with the Russians on the same grounds.45 A month later, on March 29, Robert McNeill, the Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs stated on the floor of the House of Commons ; “ We know perfectly well it (propaganda) is going on in many parts of the w orld...I want to assure the House that so long as the Russian Government pursues the policy it has up to the present adopted in this respect, it cannot look for any recognition from His Majesty’s Government more than the de facto recognition already obtained.” 6 It was evident that under the direct guidance of Lord Curzon, British policy towards Soviet Russia had harden­ ed. Lord Curzon was well satisfied with the outcome of the Lausanne Conference and, as a result of it, was 1. Tretii Seed Sovetov Soiuza Sovctskikh SotsialistichesJcikk Respublik, stenograficheskii otchet, Moscow, 1925, p. 93 2. Ibid. 3. H.O. Debates, Vol. 159, Col. 674 4. H,C. Debates, op. cit. 5. Ibid., Vol. 160. Col. 160

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encouraged to pursue further the policy of confrontation with Soviet Russia.1 In fact, Lord Curzon always believed that the causes of friction with Soviet Russia were mainly political and not economic, like the questions of the recognition of debts and restitution of private property.8 Because of his long association with India, he was very much con­ cerned, perhaps more than any other person in the Cabinet, with safeguarding India from any form of hostile activity from Soviet Russia. Hence he attached great importance to the question of hostile Soviet activities and directed his energies towards securing from Soviet Russia more and fresh guarantees against such activities. But, at the same time, there was no indication to suggest that Lord Curzon was prepared, as he had been earlier, to make some political or economic concessions to Soviet Russia. After his success at the Lausanne Conference, he felt that a firm British stand on the hostile activities of Soviet Russia was necessary not only to resist Soviet pressure but also to compel her to give fresh guarantees against such activities. The effects of NEP on Soviet foreign policy had been apparent for some time, and during the year 1922 they were being fully felt in practice. Although Lenin had linked the success of NEP with the revolution in the advanced countries of the West, improved economic relations with the capitalist Powers was an immediate need for Soviet Russia. In the year 1922, there had been a series of un­ successful attempts in Genoa, Hague and later at the Lausanne Conference, to establish normal economic and diplomatic relations with the capitalist Powers. In the Fourth Comintern Congress, which met in November 1922, one of the main themes was the need to direct all efforts towards helping the Soviet state. Once again, the main tactical policy of the Soviet Government was to be put12* 1. H. Nicholson, op. cit.t p. 313 2. While criticising Lloyd George’s flirtation with the Soviets during the Genoa conference, Lord Curzon wrote to Austen Chamberlain : “You have very justly said in your telegram to the Prime Minister that the danger of the situation was in the political rather than in the economic sphere” (Letter from Lord Curzon to Austen Chamberlain, May 13, 1922, Chamberlain M$s.f box AC-23).

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into practice in the East1, affecting their relations with Britain also. The annual report of the Narkomindel rather ruefully reflected that “our relations with Great Britain during the year 1922 did not take any new form compared to the Anglo-Russian trade agreement”12, but it foresaw welcome developments in the near future. In fact, there was no inclination to let the matter rest as there had been in the autumn of 1922. On the contrary, there was a firm determination to keep trying to improve economic and political relations with Britain. Soviet attention was now focused on India. The occasion to demonstrate the activation of policy towards India was provided by the Fourth Comintern Congress which met in Moscow in November 1922. We have already discussed the switch-over of the Comintern from the West to the East. We have also seen that the tactical policy of supporting the nationalist movements in the colonial countries still held good both for the imme­ diate objective of strengthening and consolidating Soviet Russia and for the ultimate objective of world revolution.3 The Fourth Congress, therefore, re-affirmed the policy of supporting the bourgeois national movements as against the Communist Parties in the East. As far as India was concerned, the policy was reaffirmed unequivocally and with more clarity than ever before. Zinoviev, in his re­ port of the ECCI candidly explained the raison d'etre of Soviet policy in India : “ The great movement which we have been watching in India........is by no means commu­ nistic but dispassionately considered they rate as an im­ portant factor in the fight against capitalism.”4 The Congress also rejected Roy’s advocacy of the formation 1, Michael Farbman, then Moscow correspondent of the Manchester Guardian, wrote : •‘The failure of the Genoa and the Hague Conferences once more brought the East to the foreground, I met in Moscow Soviet diplomats who were staunch adherents to a Western orientation...be­ came enthusiastic supporters of an active Eastern policy” (Michael Farbman, Ajter Lenin , The New Phase in Russia , London, 1924, p. 278). 2, Mezhdunrodnaia politika R .S .F .S .R . za 1922 god, Moscow, 1923, p. 25 3. For discussion see Ch. I 4. Communist International Bulletins published by the Press Bureau of the Fourth Congress of the Comintern? Moscow, No. 8, Nov. 9, 1922, p. 13

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173

of a Communist Party in India. It also did not pay any attention to what Zinoviev called “ the gathering of com­ munist elements in India.” Obviously the view held in the Comintern was that the time had not yet come to support and encourage the communist movement in coun­ tries like India. As Lenin in his last famous article, “ Better Fewer, But Better,” commented : “ In the last analysis the outcome of the struggle against the capitalist powers will be determined by the fact that Russia, India, China, etc., account for the overwhelming majority of the population of the globe. And it is precisely this majority that, during the past few years, has been drawn into the struggle for emancipation with extraordinary rapidity...In this sense, the complete victory of socialism is fully and absolutely assured.”1 The basis of these hopes was that if an effective liaison developed with movements like the Indian Nationalist Movement, and if they could be influ­ enced and encouraged by Soviet propaganda and Soviet example, not only would Soviet Russia be in a stronger position in dealing with the capitalist Powers, like Britain, for her immediate political and economic needs, but this would also pave the way for the ultimate objective of world revolution, and the formation for the World Soviet Socialist Republics. In the above mentioned article, Lenin precisely referred to this tactical policy in terms of the immediate need of the Soviet state when he stated : “ What interests us, however, is not the inevita­ bility o f this complete victory of socialism, but the tactics which we, the Russian Communist Party and the Russian Soviet Government, should pursue to prevent the West European counter-revolutionary states from crushing us.”* In making this assumption about the Indian Nationalist Movement, the Soviets, as we shall notice later, took a very simplified view of the Indian Nationalist Movement insofar as they saw it only in terms of the confrontation o f class forces in India. Once it was agreed that the Indian Nationalist Move­ ment should be the object of Soviet interest, both direct12 1. V.I. Lenin, Sochineniia, Vol. 33, Fourth Russian Edn,, p. 459 2. Ibid.

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and indirect tactics were employed in implementing Soviet policy. The direct tactics took the form of attempts to influence the movement by appeals and by propaganda. In September 1922, an emissary from the Comintern (Ashleigh by name and a member of the CPGB) arrived in Bombay to contact the Indian Communist leaders for the forthcoming Fourth World Congress of the Comintern.1 However, he had to leave India within a few days because the police got wind of his presence. The Fourth Comintern Congress itself made a direct bid to come into contact with Indian political life. It sent a message to the AllIndia Trade Union Congress expressing solidarity with the Indian workers’ movement, and assured it of the sympathy and support of the Soviet workers. But it also warned the Indian labour unions of “ the false friendship and misleading advice of labour leaders that are subservient to imperialism.” 2 The message, however, seemed to have failed to reach India. Indirect tactics were employed in utilising the services of M.N. Roy in order to gain access to the Indian Nationalist Movement and influence it from within. In fact, by the year 1922, M.N. Roy had become the main ins­ trument of Soviet policy in India. In spite of the fact that Roy openly expressed disagreement with official Comintern policy and in spite of the intrigues of his Indian colleagues against him, the Soviets still regarded him as the main instrument for implementing their policy in India. In the Fourth Congress, Zinoviev in his main report, and later Radek, handsomely praised Roy for his work and for his Marxist interpretation of Indian conditions.8 But Roy by disposition and also because of his intellectual arrogance was prone to exaggeration and tended to ignore some of the basic facts of the situation in India. Right from the beginning of his sojourn in Soviet Russia, he was not only critical of the Comintern policy 1. “Early History of the Party” , New Age, (New Delhi). Vol XIV No. 6. (Feb. 6, 1906), p. 14 2. Resolutions and Theses of the Fourth Congress of the Communist International, CPGB, 1923, p. 15 3. Communist International Bulletins, op. cit., Nos. 8 and 20 oi 1922, pp. 13 and 15

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176

but sometimes overstepped it and showed a lack of under­ standing of the complexities and peculiarities of the Indian situation. While, during 1922-23, the Comintern had no intention of supporting and encouraging a separate Communist movement in India, Roy consistently advo­ cated such a policy and urged his contacts in India to follow his line.1 On the other hand, his analysis of the Indian situation was becoming more and more divorced from its realities.2 Without going into details, it must be said that after the Second Comintern Congress, Roy’s role in the actual formulation of Soviet Policy on India was insignificant indeed. The Comintern and the Soviet Government hardly saw in Roy a potential leader of a socialist revolution in India, but his organisational ability and intellectual power made him indispensable to the tactical Soviet policy of gaining access to the Indian Nationalist Movement and of influencing it from within. This explains why he was given so much latitude and indulgence in organising propaganda work in India and abroad. In April 1922, Roy left Moscow and established himself in Berlin. With the money provided by the Comintern, he actively assumed the role of the main instrument of Soviet policy in India. Next month, he started publishing his journal, Vanguard o f Indian Independence, which changed names a number of times to prevent police interception in India. The purpose of the journal, according to Zinoviev, was “ to smooth our way in India.” 8 But his main pre-occupation in Berlin, as he himself admitted later in his memoirs, was to develop clandestine contacts in India, win over leading personali­ ties in the INC and to smuggle Comintern literature into 1. See, for example, his letter to Dange dated November 2, 1922, King Emperor vs. Nalani Das Qupta and others, Allahabad, 1924 (?) exhibit No. 5 2. In his first book, India in Transition, published in 1822, he criticised Gandiji in unusually sharp terms which was at that time an

unprecedented practice in the Comintern {India in Transition, Geneva, 1922, p. 205). In October 1922, he confidently declared that “National Congress as a political organisation is dead (The Advance Guard, Berlin, October 1922, p. 1). 3. Communist International Bulletins, op* e it.9 No. 8, 1922, p, 13

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India including his own journal through Indian seamen and by other secret means.1 It was in December 1922, that the Soviet leaders through M.N. Roy sought to make another direct and a bolder attempt to influence the course of Indian politics. Early in December, M.N. Roy published in his journal, Advance Guard, a programme of the Communist Party of India for the consideration of the INC. The programme ^ was obviously prepared in close collaboration with the Executive Committee of the Comintern (ECCI).2 But quite in line with the policy towards India, the programme in itself was very mild in nature and included only a few characteristic features of a communist programme. The programme advocated complete independence, abolition of landlordism, distribution of land to the peasantry and nationalisation of the big industries. It recommended to the INC only a mass demonstration and a general strike of workers as political action.8 Through the London Office of the Reuter News Agency, the pro­ gramme got wide publicity in India ; Indian newpapers published it just one day before the INC was scheduled to to meet in Gaya and its publication created excitement all over the country. But, as we shall see later, it had no influence on Indian politics. Again in March 1923, the Executive Committee of the Comintern (ECCI), issued a manifesto protesting against the conviction of 172 persons, arrested in disturbances during the civil disobe­ dience movement in 1922, and it also called upon the proletariat of Britain to take action against such repression.4 1. M.N. Roy, 0Momoirs, \ August 23, 1953

Ansrita Bazar Patrika ,

Calcutta,

2. In his Memoirs, Roy claims that the draft of the programme was scrutinised by Lenin and Stalin. Stalin even suggested some ohanges in the draft,,notably from the abolition of usuary in villages to the control of usuary with a view to keeping intact the credit system in the villages (Roy, “Memoirs?*, op. c i t 19-7-53). But the programme when published did not include any proposal about usuary. 3. Roy’s programme was published in most of the Indian press and in The Times, December 21, 1922. The author has seen the full t u t in the original in The Advance Orard, Berlin, December 11, 1922. 4. International Press Oosrsspondemss, Vok,

N o. 46, 1022

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Moreover, the developments in the 1922 annual session of the INC further stimulated Soviet interest in Indian affairs. In the 1922 annual session, held at Gaya, the policy of peaceful non-cooperation, as pursued by Gandhiji, was firmly opposed by a group of younger men. The controversy led to an open breach in the national organisation, and early in 1923, a new party, the Swaraj Party, was formed. These new developments were welcomed by the Soviets. M. N. Roy, who was still regarded as a spokesman of the Comintern, de­ clared with satisfaction that “ Gaya marks the beginning of the new period in the Indian National Struggle.” 1 But the Soviets wrongly believed that the split in the INC symbolised the confrontation of the class forces in India which was foreseen by the theses adopted in the Second Comintern Congress and then reiterated in its Fourth Congress : “ The split that followed gave birth to a new party inspired by progressive radicalism and promising to be the powerful organ of the bourgeois nationalists. In view of the fact that the Indian movement has not yet passed through this stage, the birth of the new party... has a revolutionary significance...It makes for the clari­ fication of the social forces militating in the ranks of the national movement.” 12 A few weeks later, the Comintern journal hopefully declared : “ The Swaraj Party contains within its ranks all the leaders of the non-cooperation movement possessing any personality and influence on the country as a whole, and it embodies the principle of bourgeios democracy as opposed to the reactionary and metaphysical politics of the orthodox Gandhists.”3 The unqualified and even instantaneous support that the Soviets extended to the Swaraj Party could be explained only by the fact that the new trends of the party which were reflected in its awareness of social and economic problems, brightened Soviet hopes for drawing India into their long-term strategy for world revolution 1. M.N. Roy, “I n d ia n N a tio n a l Congress ” , In tern a tio n a l P ress Correspondence, London, Vol. 3, No. 21, 1923 2. “New Orientations in Indian Nationalism,” In tern a tio n a l P ress Correspondence , London, Vol. 3, No. 21, 1923, p. 168 3. “The New Phase in the Indian National Movement”, In te r n a tio n a l P ress C orrespondence , Voi. 3, No. 36 (17), 1923, p. 318

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and also of winning sympathisers and active supporters for Soviet Russia. Moreover, within the general framework of the policy of supporting and wooing the Indian Nation­ alist Movement, this attitude towards the Swaraj party also reflected Soviet hopes of influencing Indian politics. These hopes were, however, destined to remain un­ fulfilled. Meanwhile, the Anglo-Soviet contacts had their effect on India too. The collapse of the Genoa Con-# ference, in fact, did not come as a surprise to India. On the contrary, the failure of the Conference was consi­ dered a foregone conclusion. But the treaty between Russia and Germany created some alarm and it was believed that it did not augur well for the prospect of peace in Europe. A characteristic comment on the situation came from a nationalist journal : “ The alliance of Russia and Germany with Turkey and PanIslamists will prove too strong for the Allies. England will have to grant Swaraj to India immediately to be able to utilize her manpower and resources in the event of War.”1 As far as the Genoa Conference was con­ cerned there was, in general, not much divergence of opinion between the officials and the nationalists. But this was not true in the case of the Lausanne Conference. Mainly because of the deep sympathy for Turkey then prevalent among the nationalists, the Lausanne Conference attracted their attention. Particularly, the manner in which Chicherin championed the cause of Turkey in the Conference left its mark on the nationalists. On the contrary, Curzon’s intransigent policy, particularly his attempts to drive a wedge between Soviet Russia and Turkey, came under widespread criticism. One nation­ alist daily after analysing Curzon’s policy confidently declared : “ We predict that all these attempts (to draw Turkey away from Soviet Russia) will fail. Turkey knows well who are her real friends.” 12 A score of similar critical 1. Hindustan, Kanpur, in U.P. Native Newspaper Reports Luoknow, No. 15 of 1922, p. 83 2. An interesting example of the marked sympathy shown to Soviet Russia by the Indian nationalist press was provided by com­ ments on the reports of uprising against the Bolsheviks in Central Asia. One nationalist daily commented : “The policy which has been pursued

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evaluations of British policy towards Soviet Russia came from the nationalist press. They reacted all the more unfavourably to the Government, and this contributed to a mounting feeling of estrangement between the Govern­ ment and Indian nationalists. The Government of India on their part never failed to emphasise the menace of Bolshevism to India. The official report of the Government of India pointed out “The defiant utterances of Lenin and Kamenoff (sic) dur­ ing 1922 show that England is still regarded as the greatest enemy in the world of the Red International. And it is in India that the Bolsheviks believe that they see the Achilles’ heel of the British Commonwealth....... it would be idle to deny that the Bolsheviks aided by the present political uncertainty have been to some degree successful in deferr­ ing the consummation of peace in the Near East.”1 At the other end, the press in Britain was almost unanimous in saying that the Bolsheviks and the Indian nationalists were in league with one another. The Times accused the Indian nationalist press of receiving subsidies from Moscow in return for its sympathies for Soviet Russia. It even went on to explain that the favourable disposition of the nationalists towards Soviet Russia was “largely the outcome of the influence of Gandhi whose teachings correspond in many ways closely to the doctrines of Lenin.”2 The Morning Post reported that Zinoviev had spent seven million gold roubles in supporting and main­ taining “ the revolutionary spirits amongst Gandhi’s adhe­ rents in India.”3 Likewise, in India, the Anglo-Indian and semi-official press repeated such accusations with greater equanimity. Such accusations might well have been motivated by strong resentment against Bolshevik activities in India, but of late in Eastern Turkestan is not at all the policy of Lenin. It aimed at imposing Russian Bolshevism upon Muslim people, who had been granted self-determination in the fullest sense by the authorities of Moscow. It is against that tendency which is against the policy of Bolshevism properly so called that the Muslim peoples have revolted under Enver’s leadership” (Bombay Ghronide, Bombay, June 22, 1922). 1. Government of India, India in 1922-23, Simla, 1924,;p. 24 2. The Time39 August 19, 1922 3. The Morning Posl? Loudon, June 13, 1922

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they were not borne out by the facts. Here it is necessary to bear in mind the nature of the nationalist movement and the developments insideit during 1922-23. As is well-known, the Indian Nationalist Movement had arisen out of a complex background of socio-economic needs and demands of the Indian middle class. The old Indian traditions of tolerance and non-violence had a strong hold over the movement light from its beginning, and later they became its guiding principles under the influence of Gandhiji. In April 1922, Gandhiji’s sudden withdrawal of the successful agitation movement because of an incident of violence in a small village, and the subsequent endorsement of his action by the INC amply demonstrated the firm commit­ ment of the entire movement to the principle of non-vio­ lence and its abstinence from drastic actions and extreme measures. Besides, during 1922-23, the declared objective of the Indian Nationalist Movement was still self-govern­ ment within the Empire. Moreover, after Gandhiji’s sudden withdrawal of the agitation movement, there set in a period of outward calm and quiet in Indian politics of 1922-23. Although the radical section of the INC, which emerg­ ed in the form of the Swaraj party in December 1922, showed more awareness of the need for political and economic changes, it never departed from the fundamental ideals of its parent body. The Swaraj party was in practice more traditional than its parent body as it later employed constitutional methods of parliamentary opposition to the Government in the Legislative Assembly. At this stage, let us examine the effect of Soviet policy on Indian nationalists, and their reaction to British policy in India and towards Soviet Russia. We have already noted that the message which the Fourth Comintern Congress sent to the Indian Trade Union Congress failed to reach India. But their second, and more direct attempt, through M.N. Roy, caused some excitement in India. M.N. Roy’s programme, or to be more exact, the Com­ intern programme, reached India just on the eve of the annual session of the INC, ironically enough with the help of the Reuter’s news agency. This strange coincidence aroused suspicion among the nationalists. The nationalists

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of all shades and opinions criticised its wide publicity on the eve of the annual session of the INC and they regard­ ed it as a clumsy attempt of the British Government to discredit the INC. The nationalist English daily, Independent, said “The object of giving publicity to Roy’s pro­ gramme is to damn the Indian National Congress as a body depending for its inspiration on the Bolsheviks and alienate from it the sympathies of the landlords, employers and the professional classes.” But it also did not agree with Roy’s programme: “ Our faith is non-violent andnoncooperation and it is based on love-force. Mr. Roy’s plan has no room whatever for love-force.”1 Another nationa­ list daily commented ironically : “The theory that Reuters thought that India ought to know the plan of liberation so carefully devised for her by Mr. Roy appealed to us, but did not make us any more desirous to print the tele­ grams for it seemed to us that there were plenty of people in India capable of devising such a project without re­ course to Germany or Moscow.”123 On the other side of the fence, the pro-Govemment daily, Pioneer, apprehended a real danger in such propaganda : “ The danger involved in the Bolshevik propaganda cannot be ignored either by the Government or by those members of the community who possess stakes in the country. The non-cooperation agita­ tion has created an atmosphere favourable to the develop­ ment of militant lawlessness.”3 Such allegations were great­ ly resented by nationalists of all shades of opinion. A charac­ teristic reaction came from one daily representing mode­ rate nationalist opinion : “ To say that Indian leaders are inspired by Bolshevik ideals because there is some resembl­ ance between items of the programme drawn up by Mr. Roy is a gross perversion of truth........There is not the ghost of a chance of India substituting the leadership of Lenin for that of Mahatma Gandhi.”4 In fact, Roy’s pro­ gramme failed totally to leave its mark on the Indian political scene, and the INC did not even take notice 1. U.P. Native Newspaper Reports, Lucknow, No, 1 of 1923, p, 7 2. Bombay Chronicle, December 25, 1922 3. U.P. Native Newspaper Reports, Lucknow, No. 1 of 1923, p. 7 4. I b i d pp. 6-7

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of it.1 As has been mentioned earlier, in the G aya Session, the Congress was split into two groups, traditional and radical, on the question of the method of boycott of the Government. In all these developments inside the INC, Roy’s programme had not the slightest effect— a fact which Roy himself later admitted.23But the Government of India viewed these developments in the Gaya Session of the INC (1922) with considerable apprehension. The official report of the Government of India com mented: “ Mr. Das (the leader of the Swaraj party) has adopted an attitude far more socialistic than that generally found in the addresses of the Indian political leaders....... sentiments such as these have excited considerable discussion among the educated classes and there was a tendency in some quarters of a leaning towards Bolshevism........”s The semi­ official and Anglo-Indian press took the cue from the Government, levelled more wild charges and called the programme of the INC “a fruitful soil for the machinal ion of the Bolsheviks.”* Besides, C.R. Das the leader of the Swaraj party, was under strong suspicion of maintaining close contacts with the terrorists and Bolsheviks.6 It was obvious that the British were inclined to identify normal political activities of the Indian nationalists with the machinations of the Bolsheviks ; so much so that even the whereabouts of suspected persons and arrest of ordinary offenders, sometimes even plain criminals, were reported as further confirmation of the activities of the Bolshevik agents in India.6 Expression of 1. The full official report of the Gaya session did not even men­ tion Roy’s programme. Only one Congress member from Madras, Singaravelu Chettiar, created a sensation in the open meeting of the session when he declared himself to be a communist, and made a plea for the consideration of Roy’s programme. However, nobody seemed to have taken any notice of what he advocated, and the matter ended abortively (See R eport o f the 37th A n n u a l S e ssio n o f the In d ia n N a tio n a l Congress held at G aya, Patna, 1923). 2. M.N, Roy, 45‘Indian National Congress” , In tern a tio n a l Press C orrespondence , London, Vol. 3, No. 21, 1923, p. 193

3.

Government of India, I n d ia in 1922-23 , Simla, 1923, p. 291

4. P io n ee r , Lucknow, January 2, 1923 5. The Earl of Lytton, P u n d its a n d E le p h a n ts , London, 1922, p. 65 6.

See Bombay Chroniotet Bombay, July 7, 1922

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sympathy for Soviet Russia by the nationalist press added to the Government’s suspicion of the Nationalist Move­ ment. Thus suspecting the Nationalist Movement of collusion with the Bolsheviks, the British Government not only tended to ignore its social, political and economic background but also rejected the persistent denials from its spokesmen of having anything to do with the Bolsheviks. The result was that while Soviet efforts showed no influence on the programme and policies of the Indian Nationalist Movement, they seriously affected the British Government in their attitude towards the Movement, and also in their dealings with Soviet Russia. This was precisely the result which the Soviet leaders immediately wanted and expected from their policy. However, it did not exercise the desired influence on Anglo-Soviet relations and the Curzon ultimatum followed. There was alarm in Britain over the apparent success of Soviet policy in India and Lord Curzon was prompted to make strong attempts at counteracting Soviet policy. On March 30, 1923, the British representative in Moscow sent a note to the Soviet Foreign Ministry protesting against the arrest and punishment of Roman Catholic priests. The next day, the Soviet Government sent him a reply, which not only rejected the protests but also in retaliation referred to the “ assassination o f political prisoners in cold blood in Ireland” and to similar atrocities committed under British rule in India and elsewhere. This retaliatory reply angered Lord Curzon. He proceeded to prepare an indictment of the Soviet Government. While preparing the draft, he insisted on mak­ ing use of Soviet telegrams and messages usually inter­ cepted by British Intelligence. This caused consternation among the Foreign Office officials, who thought that to quote from such telegrams in a diplomatic note would be tantamount to a breach of diplomatic practice.1 But Lord Curzon refused to listen. His draft was approved by the Cabinet and he was authorised to present his demands in the form of an ultimatum. Finally, on May 2, a long note 1. H. Nicholson, op. oit., pp. 368-359

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was handed over to the Soviet Government. Apart from some minor matters, like the treatment of British trawlers, outrages on British subjects, etc., the main complaint concerned the propaganda and hostile activities of the Soviet Government against the British Empire. Quoting chapter and verse from the intercepted Soviet telegrams, Curzon showed that Soviet ambassadors in Persia and Turkey were engaged in anti-British intrigues directed mainly against India. He specifically named the Soviet ambassador in Afghanistan for supplying money and arms to the tribes of the North-W estern frontiers of India. Curzon pointed out that even inside India the Soviet Government had not refrained from sending money and despatching their agents, specially trained in Tashkent, for the purpose of fomenting trouble and creating disorders in the country. The note emphasised that these charges contained only “a few selected examples among iuany scores of similar incidents.’ 1 The note ended by giving an ultimatum that all such anti-British activities must stop within ten days, failing which the trade agreement would be annulled. In Moscow, Lord Curzon’s note created a stir. The note was perhaps rightly termed in Moscow as “ the most dangerous episode of Soviet diplomacy.123” It was assumed in the Soviet capital that the ultimatum was a prelude to fresh intervention by Entente Powers led by B ritain8 The Government newspaper Izvestiia, published a series of articles which emphasised the danger of intervention.45 It was also realised that Soviet policy towards India and other countries of the East constituted the main reason for the hardening of the British attitude towards Soviet Russia.6 Chicherin noted that in Curzon’s ultimatum, 1. Correspondence between His Majesty's Government and the Soviet Government regarding the relations between the two countries, Cmd. 1869, 1923, p. 9 2. Qodovoi otchet za 1923 god, Narodnyi Kommissariat Inostrannyhh Del, Moscow, 1924, p. 24 3. See, for example, Trotsky’s speech to the Moscow Soviet, Izvestiia, 13/5/23. See also D.F. Volkov, Krakh Angliiskoi politiki interventsii i diplomaticheskoi izoliatsii sovetskova gosudarstva (1917-1924) Moscow, 1954, p. 303 ' 4. I z v e s tiia , May 12—13 1923 5. Qodovoi otchet za 1923 god, optf cit.y p. 41

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the Eastern question formed the main part as was only to be expected from the one-time Indian Viceroy.1 Under these circumstances, it was feared that any hasty retalia­ tion or even continuation of Soviet policy of propaganda and hostile activities against British interests in India and elsewhere might lead to a catastrophe for Soviet Russia. Faced with this situation, it was expedient for the Soviet Government to appear agreeable, even submissive. Within three days of the receipt of the British note, the Soviet Government gave their reply to the British Government. Very shrewdly, perhaps, for the benefit of Lord Curzon, the Soviet reply was very moderate in tone. It did not categorically deny the charges of carrying out anti-British propaganda in Persia, Afghanistan, and even in India. It simply disputed the authenticity of the tele­ gram quoted in the British note.123 But at the same time the Soviet reply showed no intention of giving up Soviet policy altogether. On the contrary, it went on to remind the British Government, rather submissively, of the dis­ tinction between diplomatic policy and propaganda : “These accusations give foundation to think (it said) that in the opinion of the British Government, the Russian republic should have no policy of its own at all in the East, but should everywhere support British aspirations. The Russian Government had taken no such obligations.”8 Interestingly enough, even in the midst of the crisis, the Soviet reply showed remarkable consistency by expres­ sing its readiness to sit at a conference not only to settle the disputed questions but also “ to regularise AngloSoviet relations in their full extent.” 4 Along with the Soviet reply, Krasin was hurriedly despatched to London where he met Lord Curzon. As a result of the meeting, Curzon agreed to extend the time-limit, but Krasin was left in no doubt that the British Government were in no mood for any compromise.5* On May 23, he handed 1. 2. 3. 4. 6. London,

Izvestiia, May 13, 1923 Correspondence, op. cit., p. 7 Ibid, p. 7 Ibid., p. 5 See Passim, Lubov Krasin, Leonid Krasin, H is Life and Work, 1929, pp. 212-219

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over to the Foreign Office a memorandum which conced­ ed most of the British demands except the replacement of ambassadors in Persia and Afghanistan. The Soviet memorandum also proposed a bilateral declaration from both sides on the question of hostile propaganda, if the British Government were not prepared for a formal con­ ference with Chicherin.1 The Soviet Government were thus forced for agreeing to a fresh promise to cease their hostile activities without any prospect of gaining anything from Britain in return. Indeed they could not deny their responsibility for carrying out anti-British activities in and around India. By the time the Soviet memorandum was being studied in the Foreign Office, Bonar Law had resigned and Stanley Baldwin had become Prime Minister, much to the chagrin of Lord Curzon. Lord Curzon, however, decided to remain at the Foreign Office mainly for the expressed purpose of carrying through ‘‘certain things in public interest.” One of these “certain things’’ was to settle the score with the Russians.2 He was determined that the Soviet Government should comply unconditional­ ly with all his demands, including the recall of ambassa­ dors from Kabul and Tehran. In reply to the Soviet memorandum, Lord Curzon sent another long acrimon­ ious note to Moscow, repeating all his previous charges with greater vehemence. Rejecting the Soviet offer of a conference with Chicherin for discussing all the out­ standing issues, Lord Curzon told the Soviet Government: “There remains the all important question of hostile propaganda...His Majesty’s Government cannot conceal their surprise and disappointment that on this, the Russian note gives no satisfaction.”3 But on the insistence of his colleagues in the new Government, who were reluc­ tant to aggravate the situation further, Lord Curzon accepted the Soviet offer of a bilateral declaration on propaganda and appended a draft to his note. After 1. Further Correspondence Between His Majesty's Government and the Soviet Government, Cmd. 1890, 1923, pp. 351-352 2. Ronaldshay, The Life of Lord Curzon, Vol. II, London, 1928 pp. 351-352 ’ 3* Further Correspondence, op. cit.9 p. 352

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some minor adjustments, which the Soviet proposed in June 1923, a new bilateral guarantee against hostile pro­ paganda was agreed to by both.sides. The new declara­ tion was very similar to the one which was incorporated in the trade agreement with an additional stipulation that the British Government would immediately bring to the notice of the Soviet Government any infringement of the agreed declaration. In a final message to Lord Curzon, Chicherin informed him that the Soviet Govern­ ment had already issued necessary instructions to their representatives abroad to observe the new obligations on propaganda and hostile activities.1 But two patterns of diplomacy emerged from the whole crisis, which were to remain noticeable for quite a considerable time. First of all, it is interesting to point out that in the first British note of May 2, and in all those following it, it was only shown that the Bolsheviks were making frantic efforts to encourage skirmishes near the North-Western borders of India and to engineer cons­ piratorial plans inside India ; these notes did not, except by implication, level any specific charge of collaboration or even contact with the Indian Nationalist Movement. Secondly, it was also significant that the Soviet Govern­ ment showed no inclination to deny these implied charges against them. From these two patterns of diplomacy it becomes increasingly obvious that the British showed too much concern for Bolshevik activities in India, while the Soviets made no sincere efforts to allay British fears about their influence and resourcefulness in India and other countries. This is further confirmed by the Soviet views on their handling of the crisis. There was no sense of defeat or acquiescence in Moscow but of success and achieve­ ment. The annual report of the Narkomindel for 1923 stated “ Beyond any doubt we came out of this diploma­ tic tournament with honour...the aim of the ultimatum— our humiliation in the East— remained unachieved. On the contrary, the authority of Soviet Russia has increased X. Anglo-Sovietskie otnosheniia, op„c i t p. 59

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everywhere.” 1 Notwithstanding such exercises in selfcongratulation,12 the fact could hardly be denied that the firm policy pursued by Lord Curzon considerably dam­ pened Soviet Russia’s enthusiasm for India. There was really no doubt that the Soviet Government had become less sure of the effectiveness of their policy in dealing with Britain. Lord Curzon was indeed satisfied with the success of his intransigent policy towards Soviet Russia. He wrote to Lord Crewe on June 13 “ I think that I may claim to have won a considerable victory over the Soviet Government and I expect them to behave with more circumspection for some time to come.”3 Lord Curzon was, no doubt, successful insofar as he had refused to be affected by the pressure of Soviet policy to India. Without undertaking any political or economic obligation on behalf of the British Government, he really succeeded in keeping the Soviet leaders quiet for some time. During the year 1922-23, the activities o f M.N. Roy described earlier, were far from successful. The emigre' Indian muslims, whom M.N. Roy had tried to win for his cause in Tashkent, were allowed to return to India. As we have seen in the previous chapter, most of the emigre' Indians were devout muslims, who by chance had drifted into Central Asia. Later, they returned to India shaken by the anti-religious orientations of the Bolsheviks and with little or no sympathy for the Soviet system. So much so that many of them later helped the Indian Government in the conspiracy trials of their erstwhile colleagues. Only a hard core of sixteen among the emigre' Indians volunteered to stay and study, and they were 1. Qodovoi otchet za 1923 god, op. c i t p. 41 2. Self-adulation was indeed more than evident. The report of the Narkomindel prided itself in the fact that the Soviet Govern­ ment were able to resist successfully Curzon’s pressure for the with­ drawal of Soviet ambassadors in Kabul and Tehran. It also pointed out, contrary to the actual facts, that Krasin was sent to London not for hurried talks with Lord Curzon but for winding up the Soviet Mission in London (Ibid., p. 36). 3. RonaldBhay, II, op. cit., p. 356

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subsequently admitted into the Communist University of the East in Moscow. After studying for a period of nine months, ten of them insisted on returning home. They undertook a long and hazardous journey and the Soviet authorities helped them in crossing the border over the Pamirs. But towards the end of 1922, when they had crossed the border, they were arrested, although two of them culded the police for another few months. After six months in jail, in May 1923, all the accused were tried before a Sessions Court in Peshawar charged with conspiracy to deprive the King Emperor of the sovereignty of India. Although the actual act of cons­ piracy could not be proved, the judge convicted seven of the accused for “ their desire to be Bolshevik agents.”1 The Peshawar conspiracy trial, however, did not attract much attention in India mainly because of the fact that the entire North-Western frontier area was under military censorship at that time. In the Curzon ultimatum of May 1923, however, one of the two main charges concerning Soviet hostile activities in India was the sending of Bolshevik agents there.123 Lord Curzon obviously had in mind the reports of the arrest and trial of these emigre' Indians, when he made these charges against the Soviets. But the two accused in the Peshawar case, though holding different political views, corroborated one another by saying that they were far from being Bolshevik agents.8 They simply wanted to go back to India and the Soviet Government agreed very reluctantly only after their insistence. Whether the suspicion of the British Govern­ ment was justified or not, their prompt arrest did not give them time to do any work which they had intended. By the beginning of 1923, Roy was, however, successful in establishing contacts mainly in Calcutta and with some individuals in Bombay. 1. For an account of the Peshawar Conspiracy Case, see the account of one of the accused, and the only one acquitted in the trial (Abdul Qadier Khan, “The Pupil of the S o v iets/’ The Times, 21/2/30, See also Muzaffar Ahmad, op. cit.) : No court records were made avail­ able mainly because of military censorship in N.W.F.P. 2. Correspondence, op. eit.f p. 15 3. Abdul Qadir Khan, op. oit,9 Also Shaukat Usmani, p. 99

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In the Curzon ultimatum, the other main charge related to the financial help the Soviets we alleged to have given to a revolutionary Punjabi in touch with other revolution­ aries in Kabul. Lord Curzon further alleged that during the Fourth Comintern Congress a total sum of £120,000 was allotted to the Indian Communist Party. Later, a British intelligence report stated that it was Roy who demanded that sum from the colonial commission of the Fourth Congress on behalf of the central committee of the Indian Communist Party for its expenses in India. It r could not be ascertained how much money" was sent to India, except a cheque worth £25 from a Dutch bank to Sbaukat Usmani, one of Roy’s principal contacts in India.8 But obviously it was a gross exaggeration to refer to the central committee of the Communist Party in 1922*23, as there was no such body, in existence at that time. In view of the extremely poverty-stricken con­ ditions .under which the communist pockets were then working in India, and their constant complaints against Roy’s extravagance in Europe,4 the amount of £120,000, if given at all, was most probably used by Roy in Europe and certainly never reached India. By the close of 1923, it was apparent that Roy’s conspiratorial plans and his constant efforts to orga­ nise a communist movement in India had proved futile. Roy’s journal Vanguar (and other Comintern propa­ ganda materials) were banned in India and most of his correspondence was intercepted by the Indian police. As the police shadowed his emissaries and kept a very close watch on persons with whom he was in touch in India, Roy could not establish effective contacts with them. In 1922-23, there were only small pockets of a few communists in Calcutta, Bombay, Madras and Lahore. There seems to have been little contact between 3. King Emperor vs , Nalini Bhushan Das Gupta, Mohammed Shaukat Usmani, Muzajfar Ahmad, Shripat Am rit D ings in the High Court of Judicature, Allahabad, 1924, Exhibit No. 46 4. King Emperor vs...... , op. cit., Exhibit Noa. 39 and 44. See also Samyuadraaabh Tagore, The Historical Development of the Communist Movement in India, Calcutta, 1944, p. 25

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them. Their only known activity was receiving and occasionally replying to Roy’s cryptic and sometimes incoherent letters. On the other hand, in 1922 and even up to 1925, there were only two known journals Socialist and Inquilab (in the Urdu language) in India who unreservedly professed sympathy for Soviet Russia and admired communist principles, though they denied contacts with the Bolsheviks and advocated extremely moderate programmes. As far as the trade unions were concerned, with the sole exception of the Girni Kamgar Union (a municipal workers’ union), started by Dange in 1922 in Bombay, it would be premature to suggest that committed communists were already working in the labour movement during 1922-23.1 In the Fourth Congress of the Comintern, Zinoviev in his main report on the work of the ECCI referred only to ‘‘the gathering of communist elements in India”, but expressed satisfaction that communists had entered into the Indian trade union organisation.123 Radek, on the other hand, confined himself to talking only about the existence of an indological centre in India. He caustically remarked : “ We have not even taken the first steps as a practical workers’ party, and all this means that ‘it is a long way to Tipperary’.”8 It was evident that even in the Comintern, nobody was prepared to believe that a full-fledged Communist Party was already working in India. Indeed there is no evi­ dence that before 1925 an organised com m unist party 1. In the contemporary Soviet writings, the" existence of the Communit Party in India is mentioned as early as 1921 (see SovetsJcaia R o ssiia i IcapitalistichesJcii m ir v 1917-1923 ggy Moscow, 1951, pp. 574-575). Again by 1923, the work of the Communist Party, according to one Soviet book published in 1927, was already forging ahead. Referring to it, the author said: “Tho small Indian Communist Party is under illegal position. The party in spite of its difficult conditions of work gradually gained popularity among the advanced workers of India.” (V.V. Balabushevich, L. Geller and others, Rabochei o rg a n iza tsii vostoka , Moscow, 1927, p, 27). Moreover, as we have seen above, the reference to organised Communist party work inside India was not found in the Soviet writings of that period. M.N. Roy’s Communist Party, in fact, had not been successful beyond the small community of Indians living abroad. 2. B u lle tin , op. c i t .f No. 8, 1922, p. 13 3. Ibid. No. 20, 1922, p. 15

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was in existence in India. Moreover, it is an over-simpli­ fication to suggest that the organised communist move­ ment in India began as a result of Roy’s activities or simply because of Soviet propaganda in India.1 Besides, much of the subtlety of the new shift in the strategy and tactics of the policy was lost momentarily in the wake of the Curzon ultimatum. The overall effect of the Curzon ultimatum on Soviet Russia’s policy cowards India was far greater than Lord Curzon ever could have imagined. From May 1923 till January 1924, Russia’s interest in Indian affairs suddenly waned. Hardly any article of importance appeared in the Soviet press, not even in such journals which had earlier specialised in Indian affairs. Not even the Third Plenum of the ECCI, which met immediately after the crisis of the Curzon ultimatum paid any attention to India and other colonies, a strange contrast to the Fourth Comintern Congress, held one year before. As we have seen, the Soviet tactics of infiltrating and influencing the Indian Nationalist Movement had very little success. In fact, considering the huge operation necessary to influence a political movement of such com­ plexity and dim ension like that in India, the Soviet activities had been on a very minute scale. But the British Government took a greatly exaggerated view of these activities, as was evident by the Curzon ultimatum. For example, see David N. Druhe, S o viet R u s sia a n d I n d ia n C om ­ m u n is m , (New York, 1939) and Minoo Masani, T h e C o m m u n ist P a r ty o f I n d ia , (New York, 1959) The Communist movement in India was, in fact, not transplanted from outside. On the contrary, it has its local roots in the Indian environment. The, Party was formally formed in 1925 indpendently without any prior approval or sanction of M.N. Roy or the Comintern (“New Political Parties,” T h e M asses o f I n d i a , ' Zurich, October 1, 1925). Roy could know about the proposed formation of the party by a private letter from one of his friends and he had serious doubts on its bonafides (T he M a sses o f I n d i a , Ib id ). Moreover, the Soviet leaders also had not decided to support and openly encourage the movement until 1927. (More on , Soviet attitute to the Party will be discussed later). Dange, one of the founder members of the Party, claimed in his trial in Kanpur in 1924 that he had propagated socia­ lism much earlier than the name of Roy was heard in India (See Cawnopre T r ia l Ju d g m e n t 9 Cmd. 2309, 1924, p. 13). There is no doubt some truth in his claim as he had in fact brought out a weekly journal T h e S o cia list from Bombay in 1922 which openly expressed sympathy with the Soviet system and admired Soviet Russia.

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The implication involved in the charges contained in the Curzon ultimatum was that the Indian Nationalist Move­ ment had been infiltrated and abetted by Bolshevik agents. The nationalists greatly resented even this implied accusa­ tion against them. A leading nationalist daily of Madras made indignant protestations “ It (Curzon Ultimatum) is a game of bluff carried to the danger point and the Government seems to have thought more of the game than of the danger.”1 In a similar vein, another nationa­ list daily commented “ So far as India is concerned we do not greatly fear the propaganda bogey. Attempts here may have been made to promote disaffection and isolated cases of Bolshevik agents being discovered have occurred. But these matters are trivial.” 12 Another widely read Urdu journal of Northern India averred : “ In view of the calm and contentment prevailing in India it cannot be believed that any group of persons is trying to spread Bolshevism. The present freedom movement in India cannot be labelled as Bolshevik and no foreign movement contrary to Indian temperament can flourish in India.”3 Similar opinions were expressed by other sections of the nationalist press. Thus the Curzon ulti­ matum failed to convince the large body of Indian nationalist opinion that a Bolshevik menace really existed. On the contrary, the ultimatum created adverse reaction among them and the Government’s bonafides were questioned. Besides these reactions, it was also felt that the Curzon ultimatum might lead to a rupture of relations with Soviet Russia. But when the crisis passed without a rupture, there was a general sense of relief in India. The consensus of opinion was that friendly relations between Soviet Russia and Britain were desirable in the interest of peace and the security of British rule in India.4 The aftermath of the Curzon ultimatum naturally left its mark on the attitude of the Indian Government to­ wards the Indian nationalists. The adverse reaction of the 1. Hindu, Madras, June 12, 1923 2. Advocate of India, Bombay, May 17, 1923 3. Avadh Akhbar in U.P. Native Newspaper Reports, Luoknow, No. 16 of 1923, p. 4 4. See U .P. Native Newspaper Reports, No, 25. 1923, Lucknow, and Advocate of India, Bombay, May 17, 1923

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nationalists to the Curzon ultimatum, and persistent reports of the Bolshevik activities in India1 increased Govern­ ment, suspicion of the bonafides of the Indian Nationalist Movement. This, no doubt, added to the 'estrangement of the nationalists from the official view on Soviet propa­ ganda. At the same time, fear of the Indian nationalists collaborating with the Bolsheviks also made the British Government more sensitive to Soviet propaganda efforts and other similar activities. Anglo-Soviet relations were further strained during 1923 by some incidents on the North-Western frontiers of India. We have noted earlier, that the SovietAfghan treaty of friendship, which was signed in Moscow in 1921, was viewed in London and Simla with alarm and suspicion. As recommended by the Cabinet sub-com­ mittee op Indian Defence in 1922, the Government o f India had been strengthening existing military installations and building new ones along the North-Western frontiers of India and in the western regions. After the episode of the Curzon ultimatium this build-up was increased further. Jn September 1923, some skirmishes with tribes took place on the North-Western frontier and two British officers were killed. The Indian officials believed that these skirmishes were a prelude to a full scale SovietAfghan, attack on India. So much so that in December 1923, the British Government sent an ultimatum to Kabul warning Afghanistan against further intrusions on the Indian border and demanded the severance of its diplo­ matic relations with Soviet Russia.1 The Anglo-Indian and semi-official press in India also for some time past had been accusing Soviet Russia openly of responsibility for these border incidents. The proGovemment daily, Pioneer stated : “ The Soviet Govern­ ment has designs on both Afghanistan and India. The Bolsheviks have endeavoured to make Afghanistan their base of operations against India...the object aimed at being the aggrandisement of Russia at the expense of 1. See Earl Winterton’s (Under-Seoretary of State for India) state­ ment in the House of Commons (H.O. Debate9, Vol. 161, Col. 66).2 2, The Times, December 15, 1923

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other nations. The Soviet foreign policy in Asia is that of the old imperialistic Russia.” 1 In an interview with a British journalist, Chicherin denied that Soviet Russia was contemplating aggression against Afghanistan for the purpose of turning her into a military base for a subsequent attack on India. Chicherin pointed out that Lord Curzon’s policy of subjugating Afghanistan and reverting her to her former status of a vassal state of Britain might bring nearer the danger of armed conflict between Britain and Soviet Russia.123 It was indeed true that the Soviet Government had no intention of embarking on a military adventure against Afghanistan or for that matter against India. Their interest was to keep Afghanistan indepen­ dent and to encourage her to resist British pressure for pursuing an anti-Soviet policy.® It was in pursuance of this policy that the Soviet Government of Bokhara decided to support Afghanistan if she were attacked by Britain.4 The crisis was, however, averted by the change of Government in Britain early in January 1924. But these incidents on the North-Western frontiers of India again spotlighted a characteristic feature of Anglo-Soviet relations vis-a'-vis India. On the one hand, it emphasised Britain’s preoccupation with safeguarding India from the menace of Bolshevism, while on the other, it encouraged the Soviet policy of cashing in on these susceptibilities of the British Government, Anglo-Soviet relations and the Labour Government

With the assumption of office of the first Labour Government, a new, though short, chapter began in Anglo-Soviet relations vis-a'-vis India. 1. Pioneer, Lucknow, December 23, 1923 2# J. Degras (ed.), Soviet Documents on Foreign Policy, Vol. 1, London, 1961, p. 20 3. A. Teplinskii, Sovetsko-AfgansJcie o tn o sh en iia , 1919-1960, Moscow, 1961 pp. 41-42 (See also the press interview of the Soviet ambassador in Kabul, in J. Degras, I b i d ,, p. 419). 4. Ibid., pp. 42-43

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In accordance with the declared programme of the Labour Party, the new Government of Ramsay Mac­ Donald accorded de jure recognition to the' Soviet Government in February 1924. It was an unprecedented step and a major change of policy as the British Government had accorded full diplomatic recognition without any pre-condition. But in spite of their known commitment to improve relations with Soviet Russia, the Lobour Government had no intention of leaving the out­ standing problems between the two countries unsettled. In fact, the Labour Government were inclined to believe that the de jure recognition was only the first step towards the settlement of all these problems, and accordingly, they proposed the convening of a conference to consider all such problems. One of the outstanding problems proposed for consideration was the question of hostile propaganda and other activities of similar nature. The British note of February 1 told the Soviet Government “It is also clear that genuinely friendly relations cannot be said to be completely established so long as one party had reasons to suspect the other of carrying on propaganda against its interests and directed to the overthrow of its institutions.”1 It was apparent that Ramsay MacDonald attached equal importance to the question of hostile Soviet propaganda against theJBmpire as his predecessors had done, but he proposed to settle it by reconciliation and mutual agreement. The Soviet Government had long been hoping for recognition. When de jure recognition was at last accord­ ed, and that too at a critical moment, immediately after the death of Lenin, they felt very satisfied. Rakovsky, the head of the Soviet Mission in London, replying on behalf of the Soviet Government, warmly welcomed the proposal for a conference. He assured the British Govern­ ment that the Soviet Government regarded “ mutual con­ fidence and non-interference in internal affairs as indis­ pensable conditions for the strengthening and development of friendly relations between the two countries.”2 In 1.

Anglo-Sovetekie otnothniia, 1921-27, noty i dokumentv, Mosoow ’

1927, pp. 60-61

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Moscow, the Second Congress of the All-Union of Soviet meeting in January-February 1924 passed a resolution warmly welcoming the recognition and called it “a histori­ cal step which shows one of the foremost acts of the first British Government of the working class.” 1 The Soviet Government were, no doubt, very satisfied at the fulfilment of one of their important objectives in Anglo-Soviet relations, namely full diplomatic recognition by Britain. But their objective of getting more and more credits from Britain and closer economic ties with her was yet to be attained. During the term of office of the Labour Government, Soviet policy became directed at attaining this objective as well. During the Anglo-Soviet Conference, which began in London in April 1924, different policies were pursued by the two sides. Ramsay MacDonald, the Prime Minister, opened the conference with a long policy speech. He told the Soviet delegation that the conference was primarily convened for the specific purpose of examining the outstanding questions between the two countries, namely, debts, recognition of claims and hostile propa­ ganda.12 On the question of hostile propaganda, MacDonald left no doubt that the British Government attached utmost importance to it. He emphatically dec­ lared :“ It is my duty to make it plain that the people of this country will require more on this head (i.e., propa­ ganda) than formal undertaking...This will have to be dis­ cussed firmly.”3 In Parliament, in the face of strong criti­ cism from the opposition for not giving enough attention to hostile activities still being carried on by the Soviets, the Prime Minister assured the House that “ one of the most important of these questions (i.e., unsettled questions) is that of propaganda against us upon which I shall cer­ tainly insist.”4 The Soviet Government, on the other hand, were not prepared to attach so much importance to the question 1. Ibid., p.62 2. Full text of MacDonald’s Speech in The Times, April, 15, 1924 3. ibid. 4. Jane Degras, op. cit., Vol. 1, p. 425

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of propaganda. To the Soviets the main purpose of the conference was to get a sizable credit from Britain for Anglo-Russian trade. The conciliatory policy of Macdonald encouraged the Soviet Government to think that the British Government could be persuaded to give major economic concessions without insisting on. new guarantees to cease hostile activities. Before the conference began, Chicherin had already made an attempt to under­ play the importance of hostile activities and propaganda ^ in Anglo-Soviet relations, even by appealing, to the work­ ing class sympathies of the Labour Party. In an inter­ view with a British journalist, Chicherin stated : “ Mr. MacDonald will understand that our unbreakable friend­ ship for the peoples of the East does not mean aggressive ness on our part, but on the contrary, means putting into practice the principles which the great ,Keir Hardie so magnificently advocated.”1 Again when the conference was already under way, Chicherin made another attempt to convince the British Government of .the harmlessness of Soviet activities in India. In an interview with the Soviet press, he declared : “ Our Eastern policy is. based on fundamental principles of our common policy. In it aggressiveness is absent and if. to the Government of MacDonald, aggressiveness is likewise alien, as to our Government, all the disputed questions will be easy to decide.’’123 After having said this, he went;on to emphasise Soviet Russia’s interest in the economic aspect o f AngloSoviet relations “In the economic sphere, the MacDonald Government knows how substantial credits will make it easier to solve the irritating: problem between us.”8 Likewise .Rakovsky, the leader of the Soviet dele­ gation, emphatically declared th a t-th e Soviet - Govern­ ment’s objective in the conference was to obtain economic concessions from Britain and not to enter into any new and unnecessary commitment.4 With these conflicting motives, it was not surprising that the conference should soon reach stalemate. After 1. 2. 3. 4.

Ib id .y p. '425 Anglo-SovetsJcie olnosheniia, op. cit,, p. 63 Ib id .

Pravdct, February 29, 1924

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some bard bargaining from both sides, coupled with Rakovsky’s appeal to Moscow for moderation, a draft treaty was finally agreed upon in August 1924. According to the draft treaty, the Soviets agreed to undertake a renewed pledge of refraining.from hostile propaganda and activities of similar nature against the British Empire and its neighbours. The British also agreed to undertake similar obligations against Soviet Russia. This is, of course, not to suggest that the Anglo-Soviet Conference was dominated by political issues. Economic questions were in fact the main bone of contention, yet the question of hostile propaganda had important bearings on them too. The Soviet Government overcame, their initial reluctance and agreed to enter into, new pledges against propaganda and hostile activities, however* temporary and unconvincing, only when they. vwere quite sure that the British were willing to grant the necessary, if inadequate, credit facilities to them. Under the draft treaty the British Government agreed to grant substantial loans and credit facilities.1 On the other hand, the British Government also,' for the first time* succeeded in.some­ what allaying fears of Soviet propaganda in .India by obtaining renewed pledges in exchange for agreements which stimulated British trade and industry as well. ^ T h e Soviets were.satisfied, at .least for the time being.? Soviet activity I n India diminished, and as we:shall, see, Soviet policy-towards India became even more confused and-in­ effective.. 1 After the conclusion of the draft treaty, there was every possibility that British rule in India might have, ceased to be one of the principal causes of friction be­ tween the two countries. But this was not to be. The Labour Party were soon out of office. In November 1924, the new Conservative Government refused ratification of the treaty. Anglo-Soviet relations reverted to-what they had been at the time of the Anglo-Soviet trade agreement of 1921.12 1. For the draft treaty see Cmd. 2260, 1924 2. Oodovoiotchetza 1924 god k I I I sezdu sopetov S S S R , Moscgw 1925, p. 28

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One might have expected that the Labour Govern­ ment’s conciliatory policy towards Soviet Russia would also affect its policy in India. But as far as India was concerned, no change of policy was notice­ able. The Government of India continued to be apprehensive of the success of Soviet propaganda in India and took further precautionary measures. During 1924, the emphasis of British policy shifted to meeting the danger of Bolshevik propaganda inside India. Moreover, the Government of India were alarmed at the recurrence of terrorist activities in Bengal, and the reappearance of Red Bengal leaflets.1 The Government of Bengal armed themselves with powers to arrest and detain persons without formal charges and without trial. Lord Lytton, the Governor of Bengal, in an address to the State Assembly gave expression to the Government’s fear of the Bolshevik propaganda in Bengal. He declared that the Government were prepared to suppress any conspiratorial and terrorist activity fostered by Bolshevik agents in India.123 At about the same time, the Government were successful in striking a major blow at the hopes of the Comintern in India. What little success Roy could show to the Comintern was frustrated by the swift action of the Indian police in arresting all the persons with whom Roy was in contact, and later, in bringing them to trial in Kanpur.8 In February 1924, the Government of India brought to trial eight persons on the charge that they “had entered into a conspiracy to establish throughout India a branch of a revolutionary organisation known as the Communist International with the object of depriving the King o f the sovereignty of British India.’4 In the 1. The pamphlets written in bad English were circulated in small numbers in and around the city of Calcutta. They were naive attempts to incite the people to violence. One of their declared objectives, as it appeared in one of the pamphlets, was the “establishment of a Communist Republic by means of armed action” , to which the Govern­ ment of India took a real fright (The Times, 5/2/25). But there is really no evidence to suggest that the sponsors of these pamphlets, presumably a Rmail group, had anything .to do with the communist movement in In d ia/ 2. The Indian Annual Register, Vol. I, 1924, Calcutta, 1925, p. 181 3. Ibid. 4. See King Emperor vs.N a lin i Das Qupta, op. cit., p. 2

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trial itself the prosecution, on the evidence of Roy’s intercepted correspondence with the accused, established that a conspiracy of that nature was planned. All the accused denied the charges with the exception of S.A. Dange. He accepted being in touch with Roy, but took the plea that he had disapproved of Roy’s programme and his methods. The conspiracy in itself was described by the High Court Judges hearing the appeal as “ fantastic” and the aims of the accused as “absurd and unbelievable”,6 but on the basis of the evidence against the accused,6 all of them were convicted. It was no doubt true that Roy was not only mistaken in his understanding of the political situation in India—a fact noted by the High Court Judges hearing the appeal but had also underestimated the efficiency of the Indian police. It was small wonder, there­ fore, that all his correspondence with his Indian sympathisers constituted the main prosecution evidence. The policy of the Government of India was summed up in the official report for the year 1924. It pointed out that one of the main causes of crime and conspiracy in India was the activities of Communist agents, and asserted that Soviet Russia constituted the main external danger.1 To say that Soviet activities in India constituted a danger to British rule in India was obviously alarmist and exaggerated ;* Soviet efforts in India at that time, how­ ever potentially menacing to Britain were quiet incapable of striking a chord in the Indian politics of 1924. During 1924, the nationalist movement showed no signs of out­ ward revival and was passing through one of its periodic phases of depression and inaction. The movement itself123 1. Judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad in the Revolutionary Conspiracy Case, Cmd. 2309, 1924, p. 16 2. Ibid. See the Exhibits 1. Government of India, India 1924-25, Simla, 1925, p. 13 3. An interesting example of the exaggerated fear of the Govern­ ment was provided by their act of arreasting the leading members of the Bengal Swaraj Party on the suspicion of their being Bolshevik agents (The Indian Annual Register op. c i t p. 181). In the absence of a formal trial, the accused protested against this charge to the State Governor in a special memorandum. C.R. Das, the Swarajist leader, told the State Assembly : “With regard to these men I cannot belive for one single moment that they are Bolshevik agents” (The Indan Annual Regsitert op. c i t , Vol. II, p. 290).

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Had not developed extra-territorial connections with the Bolsheviks or others, while the character and background of the movement, as pointed out earlier, remained exactly as before. Moreover, the ease with which the Indian Govern­ ment clamped down on the insignificant activities of Roy and his sympathisers clearly showed that these fears were exaggerated,1 if not entirely unfounded. The effect of the improved relations with Britain on Soviet policy towards India was indeed remarkable. It showed how Soviet Russia was using India in her dealings with Britain,' When the Labour Government was formed in Britain and the new Government" accorded full recog­ nition to Soviet Russia, there was no evidence of resurgence of more than customary interest in Indian affairs. Although the restraint that was noticeable after the episode of the Curzon"ultimatum disappeared, a con­ fusion over policy became apparent. The renewal of customary interest was marked by the reappearance of articles on India in the official Soviet press. The first of these articles appeared-in the Bolshevik, the authoritative journal of the Soviet Communist Party. The article signed by Tivel began by saying that the Indian Nationa­ list Movement had all the characteristics of.a riationalbourgedis movement2. Tivel explained that at the initial stage, the movement was eissentially being led by the in­ telligentsia, while at the later stage, during'the 192.1-22 campaign of passive resistance, it was influenced-by^the rise of the Indian working class movement in the political life of the country. He emphasised that although the interests of these classes—the intelligentsia, the Bour­ geoisie, and the workers and peasants-clashed with each other, they had stood together in their fight against the imperialist rule in India. He summed up the 1. Referring to the Communist movement in 1924, the Director of the Intelligence Department of the Government of India said: “It may be-accepted that Roy’s illegal party was never capable of much mischief and had in point of fact accomplised but little when the Cawnpore proseoution cut short its activities” (Government of India, Indta and Communism, Simla, 1933, p. 65). ■ 2. A. Tivel, “Voprosy Indiiskoi revo liu tsiiB o lsh evik, No. 1, 1924 Moscow, pp, 119-121 ‘ J

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situation in these words “ Already the very combination of such elements (i e., intelligentisa, bourgeoisie, workers and peasants—added), whose interests conflict with each other, had made the process of this struggle immensely complicated and zig-zag. This interreaction partially ex­ plains this strange historical phenomenon ; 15,00 foreigners have been oppressing the population of 320 millions economically, politically, and socially for two centuries.”1 Tivel was obviously following the official Soviet'line in speaking approvingly of the Indian Nationalist. Move­ ment123. Early in 1924, Stalin in an address to the Servdlov university showed unusual interest in India for the world revolution. He said “ Where will the (imperialist) chain break in the near future ? Again where is it weakest ? It is not precluded that the chain may break say in India;”3 Stalin went on to explain that the main reason for such an optimistic evaluation was the fact that the Indian national liberation movement, in alliance with the young and militant proletariat, was moving ahead against im­ perialist rule in India.4 Although Stalin was making ideo­ logical preparations to fight Trotsky, the very fact that he should apply “the weakest link theory” to India was significant.. It marked the beginning of the Soviet policy towards India under Stalin’s command. During the first half of 1924, confusion over policy towards India had also become apparent. While Tivel’s article in Bolshevik followed the Official line, others sharply contradicted it» The journal Novyi Vostok vehemently condemned’the Indian Nationalist 'Movement for having ‘bourgeois character* with its emphasis On the “ doctrine of the integral nationalism.” The ' author of the article explained that the doctrine of integral nationalism was tantamount to “ the recognition of the basis of the Old 1. Ibid., p. 121 It is interesting to note that A. Tivel, a member of the Party, worked with M.N. Roy as his secretary and interpreter.an 1921-22 (M.N. Roy, “Memoirs” , Amrita Bazar Patrikay May 3, 1953), but he held official view rather than being influenced by Roy. 3. J.V. Stalin, Foundations of Leninism, London, 1939, p. 37 4. Ibid. 2.

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Indian culture.”1 He went on to criticise Gandhiji as “ the typical representative of the petty bourgeoisie” , and accused him of standing “definitely on the side of the Anglo-Indian bourgeoisie and the Indian Government.” 123 He conceded that the nationalist movement in India had achieved some success. But he asserted that its success was mainly because of two factors firstly, the sponta­ neous movement of the workers and peasants ; secondly, ^ the way the bourgeois leaders had freely exploited the ignorance and religious prejudices of the workers and peasants for their own narrow political aims.1 The bourgeoisie had steadily become, he concluded, hostile to workers and peasants, while favourably disposed to imperialism. But in sharp contrast to this view in the next number of the same journal, another commentator wrote approvingly of the history of the INC and gave a favourable account of its work in the nationalist move­ ment.45 Such contradictory assessments of the Indian situation, and there were quiet a few during that period, inevitably created confusion and helped little in under­ standing the complexities of the political situation in India. This confusion indeed became more apparent during the Fifth Comintern Congress. In this Congress, which met ir the summer of 1924, the policy of supporting the nationalist movements in the colonial and semi-colonial countries was reaffirmed with certain reservation. Manuilsky, who delivered the main report on the colonial and national question, acknowledged Qn one band the advance of the nationalist movement in India during the last two years, but stressed on the other the rapid growth of the strike movement in Bombay and in other industrial centres, and noted the beginnings of a peasant movement in other parts of the country.6 So much so that he 1. P. V Kriazhin, *cRabochee i profesionalnie dvizhenie v ln d ii” Novyi Vostohy No. 5, 1924, pp. 230-231 2. Ibid. 3. Ibid. 4. B. Seigal, “Evoliutsiia IndiisJcikh NcUsionalnikh Kongressov” , Novyi Vostok, No. 6, 1924, pp. 226-244 5. Piatyi Vsemirnyi Kongress Kommunistichekoto Internatsionala, 17 iiuniia-8 iiuliia 1924t stenograficheskii otchet, Moscow-Lei> ingrad 1925 Part 1, p. 589

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criticised the British Communists for not doing enough to help the Indian Nationalist Movement.1 But when M.N. Roy having been encouraged by Manuilsky’s views advo­ cated open support and encouragement to the Indian Communist Party,* Manuilsky sharply rebuked him and invoked the authority of the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party against Roy’s stand.8 Consequently the Fifth Comintern Congress reiterated the policy of sup­ porting the Indian Nationalist Movement and not the Communists. But at the same time, the report of the ECCI for the year 1922-24,published in 1924, exaggera­ ted the success of the communist movement in India. It noted its advance during the previous two years and made reference to the functioning of an illegal party press and the increasing sale of party literature and documents. It also ended on an optimistic note, stating that the Com­ munist Party would soon become a mass party of the Indian proletariat.234* As we have noted earlier, such a rosy picture of the communist movement bore no relation to its actual position in India. The confused Soviet policy towards India was indeed connected with the talks then taking place in London on the establishment of economic relations with Britain. No doubt the death of Lenin and .the beginning of the struggle for leadership in Soviet Party hierarchy were the main internal factors contributing to this confusion. But 1. It is interesting to note that the English edition of the abridg­ ed report of the Fourth Congress, publised by the CPGB, contained a resolution which protested against the arrests and persecutions in India, ; this was supposed to have been passed unanimously by the Congress. But the full verbatim report in Russian did not record the adoption of such a resolution. Obviously, the British Communist party had later added the resolution to its abridged version in order to meet the criticisms of Manuilsky. 2. P ia ty i Vscmirnyi Kongress, op. c it.%pp. 611-612 (M.N. Roy had been steadily losing touch with India. So much so that in November 1923, he had advocated armed struggle against the British, and sharply criticised all those in India who advocated peaceful means for the struggle of national independence (Vanguard, Berlin, November 15, 1923).^By 1924, Roy’s star in the Comintern had begun to decline). 3. Ibid., 963 4. From the Fourth to the Fifth World Congress, Report of the Execu­ tive Committee, L ondon, 1924, pp. 08-69

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it was also perfectly in accord with the Soviet inter­ pretation of the international situation and with Soviet Russia’s existing relationship with the capitalist Powers. The Soviet Government officially welcomed the prospect of normal political and economic relations with Britain, and accordingly, the Fifth Comintern Congress conveniently declared that capitalism had entered into “pacifist re­ formist phase” . In other words, it was recognised that the chances of consolidating and strengthening Soviet Russia by means of economic help from the capitalist Powers were brighter than before. It was, therefore, logical that in her dealings with Britain, Soviet Russia should aim to be as compliant as possible at least for a while. But the entire confusion was cleared up, and all hesitancy disappeared as soon as the Conservative Government in Britain refused to ratify .the draft of the Anglo-Soviet economic treaty.

CHA PTER SIX

Reappraisal an d Readjustm ent 19241926

When the Conservatives won the elections and, in November 1924, Stanley Baldwin formed his Cabinet, the question of the relationship with Soviet Russia was one of the first to be decided. The success in the election was regarded by many as a clear verdict of the nation on the authenticity of the Zinoviev letter and thus, on the hostile activities of the Soviet Government. It was, therefore, assumed that the new Government was actually committed to the breaking off relations with Soviet Russia. Winston Churchill, the new Chancellor of Exchequer, insisted that the Zinoviev letter should be accepted as genuine and declared that “ full expression to the national mandate” must be given “in regard to the policy towards Soviet Russia”.1 He opined : “ The more I reflect on the matter the more sure I am that we should revoke the recognition of the Soviet Government which was decided on by MacDonald” .123Sir W. Joynson-Hicks, the Home Secretary, also made similar demands on the Foreign Secretary.® As Stanley Baldwin had not much taste for foreign affairs, Austen Chamberlain, the new Foreign Secretary, had a free hand in the Foreign Office. But he was vulner­ able to pressure from the Conservative Party directly and from his colleagues in the Cabinet, particularly Lord Birkenhead, the new Secretary of State for India and a close personal friend of Austen Chamberlain. Although Austen Chamberlain recognised the need for re-examining the existing relations with the Soviet Union, he was very reluctant to start his tenure of office by breaking off diplomatic relations with her, as suggested by his colleagues in the Cabinet. He advocated that the relations with the Soviet Union should be maintained in spite of 1. Letter from Winston Churohiil 14/11/24: ; Chamberlain M ss., box A tit., p. 44 2. The sentiment against Soviet support to the strike was so strong in the Government that the Permanent Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office told the Prime Minister : “Russian interference in coal strike and in China might justify in assuming that we are virtually at war with that country. This war is conducted not with guns and rifles but with money and propaganda"’ (Letter from the Permanent Under-Secretary of State to Sir A Chamberlain; reporting the conver­ sation with the Prime Minister, Ghamberlain Mss.%box AC-55), 3. Sir Austen Chamberlain told the Italian ambassador that he regarded the treaty as a new element of disturbance in Europe (Russia 1670/718/38, 19/4/26 ; Ghamberlain Mss., box AC-50). 4. See Churchill’s and Lord Birkenhead’s speeches in The Times, 21/6/26. 5. In December 1926, a five-man delegation of Conservative M.Ps. met the Prime Minister and appraised him of the strong feelings of their collagues on the hostile Soviet activities against the British Empire : they pressed for the rupture of relatiors with the Soviet Union (The Times, Deoember 16, 1926).

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1926, Sir Austen Chamberlain announced in the Parlia­ ment that the British Government would not hesitate to take necessary actions if the Soviet Government persisted in their hostile policy against Britain.1 Meanwhile, the Soviet Government were trying still harder for a rapprochement with Britain, and in this pursuit the familiar tactics of appeals to peaceful intentions and of implied threat to increase activities against the British Empire were used. It was Chicherin again who in a very subtle manner hinted at such a policy. Early in 1926, in an interview with the Moscow correspondent of The Manchester Guardian, Chicherin outlined Soviet policy in detail. He began by expressing concern for the increasing tempo of anti-Soviet propaganda in England and reaffirmed Soviet Russia’s need for improved relations with Britain.8 As usual, he proposed a conference to settle all disputed questions. Then came the claim for the effectiveness of Soviet policy in the Eastern countries : “ Our relations with the peoples of the East are based on mutual friendship and on a perfectly peaceful policy free from any sort of aggressiveness” .1234Chicherin then went on to hint broadly at the tactical policy of applying pressure on Britain through Soviet influence in the colonies : “ Looking over the history of the developments of these relations one may observe th at...o u r friendly relations with the national movements of the peoples of the East developed in the course of our struggle against the aggressive policy of imperialism directed against our­ selves”. He went on to deny any interference in India : “If there are Communists in India” , he declared indignantly, “ that is a product of India’s political life.” “Can it be that because in the USSR the Communist Party is in power” , Chicherin pointedly asked, “ Commu­ nist Parties in other countries ought to cease to exist ?” .* In April 1926, in a report to the VTsIK, Litvinov, the Deputy Commissar of Foreign Affairs, denied any aggressive intention towards Britain. He once more 1. 2. 3. 4.

H.O. Debates, op, eit., Vol. 200, Col. 1164: J . Degras, op. eit., Vol. 11, p. 78 Ibid. Ibid.

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expressed the Soviet Government’s readiness to live in peace with Britain.1 After similar broad indications of pressure and conciliatory tactics, there followed the shock treatment. By June 1926, when relations between the two countries had considerably deteriorated, the NarkQmindel issued a sharp statement on Anglo-Soviet relations. The statement angrily reminded the British Government that “ the Soviet Government think that these normal relations between the USSR and England are more necessary for the latter than for the former” .9 By the autumn of 1926, mainly as a result of internal developments it was felt by the Soviet leaders that rapprochement with the capitalist countries, particularly with Britain, was more necessary than ever before. By October 1926, Trotsky’s opposition was almost com­ pletely defeated and the commitment of the Soviet Com­ munist Party to the building of ‘socialism in one country’ was complete. The logical extension of the new pro­ gramme was to ensure good relations with Britain and the other capitalist powers. But it was also proclaimed that a detente would be more difficult to achieve than a year before. So soon after having defeated Trotsky and the Left, Stalin had to move rather cautiously in pursu­ ing his policy of ‘socialism in one country’. The official report o f the Soviet Government characterized the period 1925-1926 as “the intensification of the struggle between the USSR and the imperialist powers as a result of a big step forward towards the socialist construction in the USSR.”123* Indeed there was a renewed fear of war and intervention by capitalist Powers, a fear, which was deliberately used to defeat the Left Opposition. Yet the hopes of eventual rapprochement with Britain were not entirely lo s t; they had to be limited only to the normalizing of full state relations. On December 1, 1926, Stalin, while addressing the Eleventh Plenum of the 1. Tsentralnyi Ispolnitelnyi K om ilet; 2 sessia, 3 sozyva, stenograficheckii olchet, Moscow 1926, pp. 1057-1058 2. Anglo-Sovetskie otnosheniia, op. c i t p. 95 3. S S S B : ot se'-zda k se"zdu Mai 1925 g—apreV 1927 g ; Materialy K otchetu pravitel*tva9 Moscow, 1927, pp, 111-112

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ECCI, declared that there must be “a certain minimum of international conditions so that we may exist and build socialism”.1 On the other hand, in the same speech, Stalin stressed that the success of socialism in the USSR was a guarantee of the successes of proletarian revolutions in the West and the freedom of colonies in the East.123 He also admitted that the growth of the national libera­ tion movement in the countries of the East was the best safeguard against imperialist intervention in Soviet Russia.® Thus under Stalin Soviet policy in the East, and more specifically in India, had begun to assume new prominence in Anglo-Soviet relations. As the Soviet Union had not given up all hopes of rapprochement with Britain, no drastic change in Soviet policy towards India was noticeable. It was evident that the policy of general support for the Indian Nationalist Movement was still in force. But since the British Government had grown more impatient with the Soviet Union, still greater efforts were made to influence the Indian Nationalist Movement. As before, both direct and indirect tactics were employed. The direct tactics now took the form of sending trained communist workers to India for influencing the nationalist movement from within. The theses on the trade union movement adopted in the sixth enlarged Plenum of the ECCI, held in February-March 1926, noted hopefully the growth of strikes in India, but regretted that it had not assumed the same character as in China. They merely confined themselves to expressing the hope that “ in the very near future the proletarian mass in India will begin to play the leading role in the national liberation struggle just as in China”.4 In April 1926, George Allison, a member of CPGB was sent to India. His mission was simply to help in the organisation of trade union activities in India. But he could spend only nine months in India working in the 1. J. Stalin, Work8%Vol. 9, Moscow, 1954, p. 26 2. Ibid,f p. 27 3. Ibid. 4. Shestoi Bashirenyi Plenum IepoVkoma Komintema, iezisp i rezotiutsii9 Moscow-Leningrad, 1926, p. 1

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Workers’ and Peasants’ PaTty of Bengal and the workers* organizations in Bombay.1 The police watched him and he was finally deported in 1927. Another emissary, Philip Spratt, arrived in India in December 1926. His mission was to establish contacts with leading Indian communists and to instruct them to form a Workers’ and Peasants’ Party as a cover for the communist activity.12 Philip Spratt achieved some success in carrying out his directives not­ ably in organising a Workers’ and Peasants’ Party in Bombay in 1927. Later, he was joined by Ben Bradley, another member of the CPGB, in September 1927. But the police kept them under close surveillance and they were arrested in March 1929. In sending these emissaries to India, the CPGB was acting on the decision of the Fifth Comintern Congress, and thus virtually took over the role played by Roy in the Comintern. But it was significant that the mission of these emissaries was merely one of reconnaissance. It did not envisage an open support to the Indian Com­ munist Party. On the contrary, the documents adduced in the 1929 Meerut conspiracy case make it clear that the aim of Spratt and Bradley was to co-operate with the nationalist movement under the cover of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Party with a view to putting the com­ munists in a commanding position in the INC.3 Hence the policy of support for the leadership of the Indian Nationalist Movement had not been discontinued. Within the general framework of support to the Indian Nationalist Movement, the Soviet leaders were now on the look-out for potential allies and sympathisers for their cause. Thus when the Workers’ and Peasants’ Party was formed in Bengal and Bombay during 19261927, the Soviet leaders heartily welcomed them. The Bombay branch of the party in particular, organised under the guidance of Philip Spratt, attracted more attention than the Bengal branch which was not very 1. Government in India, India in 1926-27, Simla, 1927, p. 89 2. Philip Spratt, Blowing up India, Calcutta, 1955, p, 98 3. Meerut Case Judgment, op. c i t , p. 57

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much under the influence of the communists.1 At the same time the co-operation between the Bombay branch and the INC was welcomed. The Profintern Journal welcomed the agrarian programme of the party, and noted that “ the party has adopted measures towards the organisation of its group inside the National Congress”. It expressed satisfaction that “some of the leaders of the party already hold leading posts in the National Con­ gress”.12345 At the same time, the role of the working class was emphasized. Even sporadic strikes and hold­ ups were taken as an additional proof of the growth of the working class consciousness.8 But the blame for successful strikes and lack of organisation was put on two factors ; first, the opposition of the native bour­ geoisie, and second, the leadership of the working class movement who “have nothing in common with the masses” .* Significantly, the Communist Party was still not expected to fill the gap in the Indian working class movement and fulfil the role of the protector and sym­ pathiser of Soviet influence in India. Towards the end of 1926, the Profintern Journal pointed out that though the Communist Party was bound to become a vanguard party in India, it was “not numerous but gaining the sym­ pathies of the wide masses of the working class of India”.6 Although a final parting of ways with the INC had not yet taken place, criticisms of the Anglo-Indian and native bourgeoisie had never stopped. In particular, they were accused of attempting to influence the Indian work­ ing class movement for their own ulterior motives.6 But these criticisms were general and mild. The INC was still regarded important enough for the Soviets to make 1. “Indiia, Bombeiskaia rabochee-kreslianekaia partita”, Mezduharodnoe Rabochee Dvizhenie, (hereafter referred to as M RD), No. 30, 1927, p. 14 2. Ibid. 3. “Indiia ; itogi zabaslovochiievo dvizheniia'*, M RD, No. 28, 1926, pp. 12-16. 4. Ibid., p. 15 5. "Indiia ; popytka obrazovaniia raboebei partii", M RD , No. 48. 1926, p. 16 6. M RD, Nos. 18-19, p. 36

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efforts to win it over to exploring the possibility of the formation of a mass All-lDdia anti-imperialist party as agreed in the fifth Plenum meeting of the ECCI. In December 1926, in the name of the Indian Communist Party, but presumably under the auspices of the CPGB, a manifesto was published in London. The manifesto presented a programme for the consideration of the forth­ coming annual session of the INC. It advocated the transformation of the INC into a mass anti-imperialist All-India Party,1 with all the parties and splinter groups working together within it. It was significant that the manifesto did not lay down a separate programme of action for the communists in India. It was apparent that the Communist Party of India was still considered to be incapable of organising such a mass All-India party on its own.123 Meanwhile, the Government of India had grown more apprehensive of Bolshevik propaganda in India and of its success in the Indian Nationalist Movement. In February 1926, in the course of a debate in the Central Legislative Assembly, the Government and official members time and again emphasized the growing Bolshevik menace to India. Sir Alexander Muddiman, the Home Member of the Government of India, alleged that Bolshevik propaganda constituted a serious menace to India, and the Indian trade union movement had already established close contacts with Moscow. Sir Alexander emphasized : “I have a considerable amount of information which is perhaps not open to...any other member of this house. I may say that the evil and danger is undoubted and considerable.”8 The Swarajist members of the Assembly, on the other hand, kept on 1.

A Manifesto to the All-India National Congress, London, 1926

2. Contemporary Soviet writings on the subject now admit the unfeasibility of such a polioy atlthat time. But strangely enough they attribute its reasons to the then ineffectiveness of the Communist Party of India rather than to the mistaken view of the compromising nature of the Indian bourgeoisie, then held by the Soviets JV.V. Balabushevich, “ Zatozhdenie Kommunisticheskovo dvizeniia v In d ii in Uehenye zapiski instituta vostokovedeniia, Vol. X, Mosoow, 1959, pp, 20-27) 3. Legislative Assembly Debates, Vol. VIII, Part II, 1926, p. 1536

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vigorously denying the success of Bolshevik propaganda in India and challenged the basis of Government policy in regard to Bolshevism in India. On the contrary, they continued to suspect that such reports were deliberately circulated to strengthen the Government’s hands against the nationalists. One prominent Swarajist member told the Legislative Assembly: “ I beg of you (i.e., the Govern­ ment) not to take cover under these false pleas that there are Bolshevik conspiracies in this country, and that therefore, you want to utilize these exceptional pow ers...It (Bolshevik menace) is used by the Government in order to put down legitimate political propaganda in this country. It has been stated over and over again that it is so and the Government have not been able to disprove it” .1 Such pleadings of the nationalists, however, remained as unheeded as before. The Government continued to apprehend the harmful effects of Bolshevik propaganda on Indian political developments, and were convinced of ready response among the nationalists as a whole, more particularly among the workers and the intelligentsia. The official report for 1925-26, while referring to Bolshevik propaganda, reiterated “There has been constant evidence throughout the year of sustained efforts to disseminate propaganda designed to create a revolu­ tionary spirit among the masses, with a view to over­ throwing of the entire existing social and political system.”123 The report went on to express apprehension for “ the effect of Roy’s propaganda on the industrial workers” and concluded on a note of waning : “In all these directions there has been more activity than the immediate result achieved would appear to repay” .8 So much so that in December 1926 the Imperial General Staff considered the military situation in the event of Soviet aggression on India and recommended steps to thwart a possible attack' through Afghanistan and even 1. Legislative Assembly Debates, op. cit., p. 1527 Government of India, India in 1925-26, p, 195 3. Ibid,, p. 197

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through Persia.1 Surely another sign of extreme anxiety and exaggerated fear. But the general situation in India in 1926 was calm and quiet. The centre of political activity remained confined to the constitutional opposition in the Central Assembly. The workers and the trade union movement had not yet made their mark on the political life of the country as a whole. Only in February 1926 was the workers’ and Peasants’ Party of Bengal formed. The main objective of the party was to work among the workers and peasants as a separate group, distinct from the INC and under the control of the communists.123 But the programme of the party was of a very mild nature and not specifically communist. The membership o f the party was only forty8. As a matter of fact, during the year 1926, there was no untoward incident and no new agitation, not even any conspiratorial plan, ia the political life of India to warrant an alarming view of the effectiveness of Soviet propaganda on Indian political developments. But the persistence of the Government in believing in the success of Soviet activities and the threat it posed to British rule in India increasingly alienated the nationalists. It continued to strengthen their suspicion that the fear of Soviet activities was deliberately created and fostered by the Government to disarm and even discredit the nationalist movement. This naturally led to their further estrangement from the Government and to more difficulties for Britain not only internally but also in the conduct of Anglo-Soviet relations.

1. Letter from Lord Birkenhead to Sir A. Chamberlain, 16/12/26, Seoret; Chamberlain Mas,, box AO-55 2. A Oatt to Action, (Workers’ and Peasants’ Party of Bengal), Caloatta, 1028, p. 53 3. Ibid., p. 49

CHAPTER SEVEN

Internationalism versus Nationalism 1927-1929

By the beginning of 1927, the British attitude towards Soviet Russia had hardened. Persistent reports of wide­ spread Soviet activity in the British Empire accumulated in the Foreign Office. In addition, though less dangerous, there was evidence of some Soviet influence inside Britain, which came into the open during the General Strike. Moreover, there was now stronger and more vocal opposition to Chamberlain’s tolerant attitude towards Soviet Russia among his Cabinet colleagues, particularly from Lord Birkenhead.1 So much so that Sir Austen Chamberlain requested a fresh mandate for his policy. With this end in view, he prepared a memorandum on the question and circulated it among his Cabinet col­ leagues.8 The Cabinet considered the whole question in the third week of February. On February 17, 1927, Lord Birkenhead wrote to Lord Irwin, the Viceroy : “ We have had a long and indecisive Cabinet on the question of whether or not we should clear the Bolsheviks out of the country. The discussion is to be resumed. Opinion is very strong in the Party and in the House of Commons in favour of getting rid of them.”8 Sir Austen Chamberlain was still opposed to taking drastic action against the Soviet Union and defended his policy in the Cabinet.4 His policy was approved by the Cabinet by a narrow majority, but he was asked to send “a pretty stiff note to the Soviet Government which may conceivably bring things to a head this way or the other.”5 1. Frederick W.F. Smith, The life of F .B . Sm ith, 1st Bari of Birkenhead, London, 1959, p. 536

2. Letter from Sir Austen Chamberlain to R.D. Lindasy (Private), 1/3/27 ; Chamberlain, Mae., box AO-56 3. Frederick W.F. Smith, op. c it.9 p. 537 4. Letter from Sir Austen Chamberlain to Lord Robert Cecil, February 16, 1927, and Lord Cecil’s reply to Chamberlain, February 17, 1927, Chamberlain M ss., box AO-56 6. Letter from Lord Birkenhead to Lord Irwin, 24/2/27, quoted in Frederick W.F. Smith, op. eit., p. 537 239

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Subsequently, on February 23, 1927, a strong British note was sent to Moscow. Quoting from the speeches of the Soviet leaders and Comintern publicists, the British note was a powerful indictment of anti-British policy pursued by the Soviet Government not only in the British Empire but all over the world. The note warned the Soviet Government that Anglo-Soviet relations might be broken off if they persisted in pursuing their policy.1 There was no doubt that the main purpose of the British note was to give a strong warning to the Soviet Govern­ ment before actually deciding to break off relations. It was also meant to encourage the Soviet Government “ to concentrate a little more upon the interests of Russia and to be less active in fermenting world revolution.”8 The reaction to the British note in Moscow was characteristic of the time. The Soviet Government were obviously dismayed by it.8 It was a serious setback to their policy towards Britain. Only a few days before the British note was delivered, Litvinov delivered a mild speech before the TsIK and asked for concrete proofs from the British Government of the infringement of political clauses in the trade agreement. He went on to stress the need for more trade with Britain and offered fresh talks for normalizing relations between the two countries.1234* B u tv when the British note was received, hope of normalising relations with Britain was almost given up and a firm resolve for countering British policy was evident. Although Litvinov, who was deputising for Chicherin, counteracted by sending an equally firm reply 1. A Selection of Papers, op, cit,t Cmd. 2895, 1927, p. 63 2. Letter from Chamberlain to R.C. Lindsay (Private) 1/3/27, Chamberlain M ss., box AO-56 3. Even from British Government sources, it was known that the Soviet Government did not want rupture of relations with Britain and their main interest in trying to maintain and even develop relations with Britain was purely to gain more credits and commercial transac­ tions. In February 1927, Lord Birkenhead, the Secretary of State for India, wrote to Lord Irwin, the Viceroy : “Our intimate information is that they do not really want to break with us, partly because such a breach would stop whatever financial credit they have in this country and more important the credit they have or hope to gain in other countries” (Frederick W.F. Smith, op. cit., p. 537) 4. Tsentral'nyi Isolitel'nyi Komitet, 3 sessia 3 sozyva, stenografichesicii otohet, Moscow, 1927, pp. 660-661

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to Chamberlain, he expressed readiness to improve rela­ tions with Britain. On the charges of hostile propaganda against the British Empire, Litvinov sharply retorted that the British leaders had blamed “ the Soviet agents for each and every difficulty of the British Empire in pretty well every corner of the world.”1 Two months later, when the fourth Congress of the Soviets met, it became clear that although the Soviet leaders were convinced of firm intentions of the British Government, they had no inclination of changing their policy. Rykov, then Chairman of the Council of Ministers, while delivering a long report before the Con­ gress declared “ ...it is impossible to explain why the busi­ ness-like English have termed their note a broadsheet, a proclamation. The only purpose in issuing such a pro­ clamation is to gather broad bourgeois circles for the ideological preparation of the encirclement of the USSR.”123 Rykov explained that the period of stabilisation of capi­ talism was nearly at its end and as this process was gaining momentum, capitalist countries were bound to take an offensive against the Soviet Union.8 He also warned the Congress of the danger of armed interven­ tion in the near future and stressed the need for streng­ thening the USSR.4 Later, the Congress adopted a resolu­ tion on Rykov’s report, which while stressing the increas­ ing hostility of international bourgeoisie toward the USSR, expressed fears that this might lead to a war of intervention.5* Although Rykov’s report to the Congress of the Soviets indicated a tough posture words, he did also express the readiness of his Government to hold fresh negotiations with Britain. Early in May, the British Government ordered a search of the Soviet trade mission’s premises in London (Arcos) and it was claimed that incriminating documents 1. A Selection of Papers, op. oit.} p. 67 2. Semmzd Sovetov, stenograficheslcii otchet, Moscow, 1927, p. 19 3. Ibid,, p. 29 4. Ibid., p. 32 6. Se'*zd Sovetov, sbornik dohumentov 7017-36, Vol. I ll, Moscow, I960, pp. 113-114

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were found there. Even earlier it was generally under­ stood that the February note was itself a prelude to the breaking off the diplomatic relations with the USSR, which would follow in due course. “I do not conceal from myself,” Sir Austen Chamberlain stated, “ that the presentation of such a note alters the situation and carries us a step further towards a breach.” 6 It was, therefore, a logical result of British policy and only a matter of time that relations with the USSR were broken. The British note of May 26, 1927, which broke the news of the rupture, accused the Soviet Government not only of “ the uninterrupted hostile propaganda by the Third International and by the Soviet Government organs in the United Kingdom and British overseas territories,” but also of military espionage and subversive activities through the Soviet trade mission in London.1 Although the British note also listed hostile Soviet acti­ vities carried out in Britain itself, the main reason for breaking relations with the Soviet Union was clearly the intensification of Soviet propaganda and the activities of Soviet agents in India and other parts of the Empire.6 Just before diplomatic relations were broken, Sir Austen Chamberlain told the French Foreign Minister in Paris that discoveries made in the “ Arcos Raid” and other information in his possession had confirmed the wide­ spread nature of Soviet hostile activities in the Empire and China.8 He impressed upon him that this had left the British Government no alternative to breaking off the diplomatic relations with Soviet Russia. Later Sir Austen1234 1. Sir Austen Chamberlain to R.O. Lindsay, Berlin, Private, 1/3/27, Chamberlain Msa.%box AC-56 2. The charge of espionage was for the first time introduced in the embittered history of Anglo-Soviet relations—a fact which was noted and denied in the Soviet reply (Anglo-Sovetshie otnoaheniia, op. cit.9 p, 166). 3. In a letter to the Viceroy, Lord Birkenhead, the Secretary of State for India opined : “ ...at last we have got rid of the Bolsheviks. Personally I am delighted... we.have got rid of the hypocrioy of preten­ ding to have friendly relations with this gang of murderers, revolution­ aries and thieves. I breathe quite differently now that we have purged our"capital of these unclean and treacherous elements*’ (Smith Frederick Edwin, op. oit.t p. 539). 4. “Memorandum on conversation with M. Briand May 18 1927”, (W 4715/9715/17) 21/5/27, Chamberlain Mas., box AO-56

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Chamberlain frankly explained in a private letter : “We severed diplomatic relations with that country (i.e., the Soviet Union) not only because of the constant hostility of the Soviet agents to the British Empire...but because their agents have interfered in our domestic concern.”1 Moreover, during the intervening period between February and May, a powerful campaign was in pro­ gress in Britain demanding rupture of relations and the closure of Soviet diplomatic mission, which were regarded as the centre for directing hostile propaganda. Conser­ vative MPs vied with each other in asking questions in the Commons and making public speeches on the dangers of Bolshevism and the insidious activities of the Soviet agents in India.123 As a result of the breach with the USSR, it was hoped that she would have very limited opportunities for direct propaganda against the Empire and, at least, the activities of the Soviet agents could be fully checked and stopped.8 The official reaction in Moscow to the rupture was renewed fear of an imminent war of intervention. On June 9, Rykov told the Moscow Soviet that there was a real possibility of armed intervention by the capitalist Powers.4* Stalin wrote in Izvesliia that a real and material danger of a new war against the USSR had arisen.8 Although there was no evidence of military preparation of any kind in Britain®, the rupture followed by the 1. Letter from Sir A. Chamberlain to Sir William (Private), 26/1/28, Chamberlain M ss., box AC-58 2. For example, a leading Conservative MP pleaded for increased military expenditure to defend India against Bolshevik attack (H.C7. Debates, Vol. 207 Col. 1918) 3. See Sir Austen Chamberlain’s speech in the House of Com* mons (H.CJ. Debates Vol. 200, Cols. 2217-2219) 4. Anglo Sovetslcie otnosheniia , op . cit.9 pp. 130-137 6. Izvestiia , 28th July , 1927 0. Sir Austen Chamberlain was frankly not interested in the military aspect of the rupture of relations. When the Finnish Foreign Minister gave him a report of the Finnish General Staff on Soviet military potentials, he simply passed it to the War Office without caring even to read it (Chamberlain M ss., box A (7-59). On the other hand. Prime Minister Baldwin had made specific declaration that *’our rupture of diplomatic relations does not in any way mean or imply war against Russia (The Times 28/5/27).

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murder of tbe Soviet ambassador in Warsaw had created a war psychosis in the Party and the Government of the USSR.1 No doubt the war psychosis was also deliberately fostered to help Stalin crush the Left opposition ; apd an appeal to Russian nationalism paved the way for the Five Year Plans, and later, for the move against the Right opposition. But probably all the varying factions in the Party genuinely believed in the imminent danger of such a War. * The rupture of relations with Britain put an end to all hopes of reaching a modus vivendi with her. This was apparent from the way the Soviet Government interpreted the crisis of their policy. Rykov candidly told the Moscow Soviet that the main cause for the rupture of relations was the fact that Soviet policies towards Egypt, China and Other countries had threatened British imperialism.8 The annual report of the Soviet Government for 1927-28 also pointed out that immediate objective of Britain was to isolate the Soviet Union, weaken her influence in the East and finally to crush her.8 In the 15th Party Congress, held in December 1927, Stalin, while delivering the report of the Central Committee, made a pointed reference to the close relation­ ship of the revolutionary movements in China, India and Java with the USSR.1234* He asserted that this had affected the position of world imperialism, which in retaliation was 1. Louis Fischer, who was in Moscow in June 1927 wrote : “No one who lived in Russia at that time will be shaken in his conviction that the majority of Bolsheviks were thoroughly and sincerely frightened by the prospect of immediate hostilities” (Louis Fischer, 5Phe Soviets in World Affairs. Vol. II, Princeton, 1951, p. 741). Con­ temporary Soviet writers still maintain that fear of armed intervention was real and genuine. One writer asserts that Poland was supposed to fitrike the first blow as prelude to a full scale intervention (see V.I. Popov, Anglo-Sovetskie olnosheniia, 1927-28 Moscow, 2958, p. 15), while other connected the visit of the Secretary of War to India in the winter of 1927 and troop movement on the North-Western frontier of India with the preparations for intervention (D.F, Volkov, Anglo-Sovetskie otnoeheniia, 1924-29, Moscow, 1958, p.p. 342). 2. Anglo-Sovetskie otnosheniia, opt cit,y p, 137 3. S S S R Sovet narodnykh kommiesarov ; materialy k otchetu za 1927-28 god, Moscow, 1929, p. 72 4. J. V. Stalin, Poitical Report of the Central Committee to the 16th Party Congress of the CPSU, December 3, 1927f Mosoow, 1950, p. 27

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24ft

preparing to crush the USSR. Stalin went on to stress the importance of the revolutionary movements in China, India, Java and elsewhere as a “ decisive blow to imperialism,” in spite of the setback in China.1 The resolutions passed by the Congress stressed the danger of an imperialist offensive, and emphasised the need for directing all efforts to strengthen and defend the Soviet Union. It also resolved to strengthen Soviet Union’s relations with the proletariats and the oppressed people of the East.2 It was significant that as during 1924-25 when Britain refused to ratify the proposed Anglo-Soviet treaty, the Party once more specifically resolved to pay more attention to the countries of the East.* Moreover, it was now being openly claimed that Britain had been driven to break relations with the Soviet Union primarily because of the success of Soviet policy in countries like India, China, Egypt, etc., where Britain’s interests were threatened. From this, it logically followed that a more direct programme of action was called for to create difficulties for Britain in those countries and thus to defend the Soviet Union from the threat of armed inter­ vention from Britain. In view of the weak military* and unstable economic situation, it appeared to the Soviet leaders that this was the only practical policy for countering British hostility. In the 15th Party Congress, Bukharin called the problem of revolution in India as “ the biggest problem confronting the Comintern and our Party.”5 He stressed the need for promoting revolution in India through an Indian Communist Party alone without allying itself to the bourgeoisie ; he, however, 1. Ibid. 2. K P S S v rezoliutsiiakh i reslbeniiakh, Part II, Mosoow, 1953, p, 319 3. It was also in pursuanoe of this policy that during 1927 the Soviet Union signed treaties of friendship and non-aggression with Turkey, Persia and Saudi Arabia. 4 In this connection, it is interesting to note that the infor­ mation passed to the War Office by the Polish General Staff revealed that the Soviet Government had made no special military arrangements except the routine troop movements along the RusBo-Polish frontier and in the Baltic (Chamberlain Mss., box AO-59). 5. X V Se"zd Vsesoiuznoi Kommunisticheskoi Partii (B), stenoqra* ficheskii otchet, Moscow-Leningrad, 1928, p. 606

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warned the Congress against mechanically transferring the experience of Chinese tactics to India.1 It was evident that once again the Soviet Union had turned her full attention to India at a time of deep crisis in her relation­ ship with Britain. The Soviet leaders were to occupy themselves for the next two years in finding the most effective means to exercise strong pressure on Britain. The effects of the rupture of Anglo-Soviet relations on Soviet policy towards India wasfelt slowly but surely. Signs of change in Soviet policy were dis­ cernible in the first quarter of 1927 in the Soviet attitude towards the Indian trade union movement. The All-India Trade Union Council to which an indul­ gent attitude had hitherto been adopted was for the first time, severely criticised. But the criticism was solely directed against the leadership of the trade union organisation. The Profintern journal set the pace when it opined : “ The success of reformism in India is in­ debted to the Indian working class leaders. They energetically preach the idea of the close contacts between labour and capital, and use all means to curb the revolu­ tionary energy of the awakened proletariats.” 2 Later, Balabushevich, by this time a recognised expert on India, condemned the British Labour Party for making a bid to organise and mould the Indian working class movement. He warned the leaders of the working class movement against hobnobbing with the British Labour Party and allowing it to build up its Indian branch.8 Meanwhile, the attitude towards the INC was still ambivalent. The INC was divided between left-wing and right-wing factions. The right-wing was uncere­ moniously dismissed and was accused of siding with the British imperialists against the Indian masses.4* But the left-wing of the INC was favourably viewed; in particular, the association of the INC with the League Against Imperialism and the activities of the emerging leftist 1. Ibid., p. 607 (Seo the Introdutory Ch. I) 2. M RD, No. 3, 1927, p. 16 3. V.V. Balabushevioh, “Indiia i Angliiakie reformiati, M RD , No. 43, 1927, pp. 3-4 4. V.V. Balabushevioh, "Kilaiakaia sobytia i In d iia ," M RD . No. 31, 1927, pp. 14-16

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group under the leadership of young Jawaharlal Nehru were commended as “ the confirmation of manifested ideas of left-wing.” “ All these developments” , concluded Balabushevich, “ are symptomatic and deserve serious attention.” 1 On the other hand, the Swaraj Party was outrightly condemned for having degenerated to bourgeois tendencies : “ By refusing the real fight for the indepen­ dence of India, it (Swaraj Party) went over to co-operate with the British imperialists for the joint exploitation of the toiling masses of their own country.”123 It was also significant that Communist Party was still not mentioned in any of the Soviet writings on India of that period. Instead, it was still the W orkers' and Peasants’ Party (WPP) which was backed and was expected to become a substitute for the duties of a Communist Party. “ The Party (WPP) must strengthen the process of arousing the class consciousness among the workers and must free the trade unions from the effect of the reformists and connect the workers’ movement of India with the workers’ movements of all the world.”8 Broadly speaking, during 1927 a new policy had not been finally decided on ; only the process of change and reorientation towards a new policy had begun. Once again this trend was connected with the USSR’s relation with Britain. Before finally deciding upon a direct and active hostile policy against British interests in India, the Soviet Government made one final attempt to convince the British Government through normal diplo­ matic channels of their desire to normalize relations with Britain. While Stalin was delivering bellicose speeches in the 15th Party Congress, Litvinov met Sir Austen Chamberlain in Geneva and offered fresh assurances and new guarantees against all forms of hostile activities.4* But 1. Ibid. 2. L. Greller, “V I I I Se-zd Indiskii Kongreseov," M RD, No. 1, 1928 3. M RD , No. 3, 1927, p. 19 4. Eussia : N 6796/209/38 December 7, 1927 (Memorandum pre­ pared by Sir Austen Chamberlain on interview with Litvinov for Foreigh Office records; Chamberlain Mas., box AO-50)

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Sir Austen Chamberlain curtly refused to give credence to such assurances and the meeting ended in a fiasco.1 During 1927, the situation in India had radically changed. The INC at its annual session, held in Decem­ ber 1927 at Madras, decided to declare the goal of the Indian people to be complete independence for India instead of Dominion status. Moreover, the events in China and the rupture of relations with the Soviet Union had stirred the organisation. By now, a few leading communists, particularly from Bombay, had aligned themselves with the work of the radical wing of the •INC. But in the annual session at Madras, a resolution proposed by one of the communists congratulating the Soviet Union on the tenth anniversary of the Revolution was heavily defeated.* Sympathy and support for the Soviet Union parti­ cularly in her lelationship with Britain nevertheless in­ creased among the nationalists. In 1927, the Nehru family, and a year later, a former Congress President and a few other persons connected with the Indian labour movement visited the Soviet Union : they came back very much impressed with what they saw.8 Their impression, particularly that of young Nehru, which he made public in a series of articles published in a nation­ alist newspaper, created a very favourable image of the Soviet Union in the country. They also encouraged op­ position among the nationalists to Britain’s policy to­ wards the Soviet Union. Besides, attracted by the idea of developing international contacts, the INC sent Jawaharlal Nehru as a delegate to attend the Brussels Conference of the League Against Imperialism, and later formally associated itself with it. In November 1927, the All-India Trade Union Council (AITUC) in its annual session, passed a resolution con­ gratulating the Soviet Union on the tenth anniversary of 123* 1. Ibid. 2. Report of the Forty-Second Annual Session of the Indian National Congress, held at Madras, Madras, 1928, p. 63 3. See Jawaharlal Nehru, Soviet Russia : Some Random Sketches and Impressions, Bombay, 1929, see also Krishna Huthesingh, With No Regrets, Bombay, 1943

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the Bolshevik revolution and also expressed solidarity with her in the event of British intervention.4 As a result of the organizing talent of the Comintern emissaries, Philip Spratt and Ben Bradley, the Workers’ and Peasants’ Party became active in Bombay and in the United Pro­ vinces ; so much so that in 1927 the Workers’ and Peasants* Party of Bengal claimed a membership of 10,000.* On the other hand, in 1927, Sapruji Saklatvala, the Communist M.P. successfully toured India. Although he refrained from direct propaganda in favour of com­ munism, he fully exploited his privileged position as a M.P. and his tour was a great personal success. The central committee of the Communist Party of India met for the first time in Bombay in May 1927 and the leading communists, though still few in number, attended. The question of affiliation with the Comintern was consi­ dered, but no decision was taken except on one express­ ing solidarity with that body.8 The Government of India were seriously disturbed by these developments. The official report for the year 1926-27 noted with concern the growth of the Workers’ Party in Bengal and the increasing activity of the CPGB in India. It concluded : “During 1926-27, communism in India has been both more vocal than in the preceding years.”4 But the Government of India were still not disposed to distinguish between the growth of the nationalists movement and the nature of relationship between the communist movement and the Soviet Union. Both these developments were generally regarded as part of one big move against British rule in India. Again the1234 1. The I n d ia n A n n u a l R egister 1927, Vol. II, Calcutta, 1928, pp. 111-117 2. A C all to A c tio n , op. c it., p. 50 3. During 1926-27, the central committee of the Indian Com­ munist Party met a number of times (Muzaffar Ahmad, op. c it., p, 25). But its first important enlarged meeting took place on May 31, 1927 in Bombay which was attended by all leading Communists of the time. The meeting discussed the question of affiliation with the Comintern, But there was no evidence to suggest that the meeting was called at M N. Roy’s suggestion, or even it was known to him (See M eerut C onspiracy Case, C o m m itta l Order Meerut, 1929, p 128 and M eerut S essio n s C ourt J u d g m e n t, Simla, 1932-33, Vol. I, p. 155). 4. Government of India, In d ia i n 1926-27 , Simla, 1927, p. 288

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old fear revived of a combination o f disorder at home and the hostile actions of an unfrendly neighbouring Power. The official report for 1926-27 alarmingly ad­ mitted such a eventuality : “The openly confessed in­ tentions of the Soviets to capture and direct to its own ends the indigenous revolutionary movements in India continue to be translated into action in Bengal and elsewhere. A new feature has been the alliance of the Soviet with disaffected Sikhs in America, China and India.”1 Every year the Government of India had been steadily increasing defence expenditure. In March 1927, when the Swarajist members of the Assembly raised the whole question of increased military expenditure, Sir William Birdwood, the C-in-C of India, defended it on the grounds of “a potential danger behind the Bolshevik menace.”12 He dryly told his critics in the Assembly : “ Those who have seen the correspondence that has taken place between the Home Government and Russia, I think they will realise that we are not in a state of being able to sit down and disband our army.”3 On the other hand, Britain’s action in breaking re­ lations with the USSR evoked extremely hostile com­ ments from the nationalist leaders and the press. On British policy, the INC, at its annual session in Madras in December 1927, passed a resolution expressing grave con­ cern over the possibility o f war against the Soviet Union after the break in diplomatic relations and declaring its opposition to any such war.4 Indeed such a reaction of the nationalists was least surprising when it is borne in mind that not only they considered Bolshevik danger a bogey to discredit them but also they deeply resented any accusation of being influenced by Bolshevism. Moreover, during 1928, there were more new develop­ ments on the Indian political scene. On the one hand, 1. Ibid., p. 290. 2. Council of States Debates, Vol. IX, No. 14, 1927, p. 440. (See also Lord Birkenhead’s speech in the House of Lords on the 30th March 1927, Parliamentary Debates, House of Lords, 6th Series, Vol. 66, Cols. 869-870) 3. R id . 4. Report of the Forty-Second Session, op, cit.9 p. 61

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the Workers’ and Peasant’s Party became very active in Bombay and Calcutta. In Bombay, the Party was instru­ mental in organising a successful strike of the textile workers which lasted for seven months1 and caused shut­ downs in fifty mills. In addition, various units of the WPP merged themselves into an All-India Workers’ and Peasants’ Party in a conference, held at Calcutta in December 1928. Besides, a phenomenal increase in the number of strikes was registered all over India during the years 1928-29. On the other hand, almost all sections of nationalist opinion had decided to boycott the Simon Commission.12 When the Simon Commission arrived in India in February 1928, they were greeted by a nation-wide strike. To­ wards the end of 1928, the INC met in its annual session and agreed to reverse its 1927 decision on independence3 so as to give a one-year ultimatum to the Government before actually launching a mass movement demanding complete independence. Significantly, the INC in its 1928 annual session, showed more interest in outside events affecting India. On Jawaharlal Nehru’s insistence, the Congress declared that “ the struggle of the Indian people for freedom is a part of the general world struggle against imperialism and its manifestations.”4 Similar resolutions were passed on supporting the League Against imperialism, and on the dangers of war. These resolutions clearly implied that Britain was making preparation for waging a war against the Soviet Union.5 Dr. Ansari, a former Congress 1. During the Bombay strike, the profintern sent a few thousand Rupees to the strikers presumably through London. This was openly admitted by the Bombay Labour leader, N.M. Joshi, on the floor of the House (Legislative Assembly Debates, Vol. I ll, 1928, p. 473). 2. The Simon Commission was appointed by the British Government to review the working of the Montague-Chelmsford Reforms of 1919, and to recommend necessary changes. 3. At any rate, this decision was taken at the end of December 1928 and could not have affected Soviet policy. Soviet Policy was already fully defined in the Sixth Comintern Congress, held in July 1928, long before the INC took this decision. 4. Report of the Forty-Third Session of the Indian National Congress held in Calcutta in December 1928, Calcutta, 1928, p. 97 5. Ibid., p. 95

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President, who moved the resolution on the danger o f war, declared : “ We Indians have no quarrel with Russia. We do not know really whether the quarrel that England has with Russia is not really another pretext to perpetuate our own slavery. Therefore, it is proper and right that we should not allow ourselves to be made tools in the hands of imperialistic England to conquer other nations.1” Besides the gradual transformation of the INC into a mass party with a well-defined political programme, and ¥ the phenomenal rise of the strike movement, new organisa­ tions like the All-India Socialist Youth Congress and the Independence of India League, etc. had sprung up. These organisations were not only on paper, but they came into being with definite political and social programmes which appealed to the young and radical intelligentsia. In point of fact, the year 1928 was a milestone in the history of the Indian freedom movement. It was the moment in the history of Indian movements when indeci­ sion and confusion gave way to decision and advance. With the close of the year 1927, it was no accident that once hopes of re-establishing relations with Britain having faded after the unsuccessful meeting of Litvinov with Sir Austen Chamberlain in Geneva, Soviet policy towards India also entered its decisive phase. Whatever doubts there were about total involvement in Indian affairs, the persistency and firmness of British policy totowards the Soviet Union swept them away. The Soviet leaders now embarked on a clear-cut programme of action which conveniently ignored the actual situation in India. As we have seen earlier, these new trends in Soviet policy were discernable even during 1927, but they were sifted and integrated into a clear-cut programme with definite objectives during the years that followed. The emergence of this new and integrated policy was officially heralded by a long and exhaustive article by Eugine Varga in the Communist Party’s authoritative journal, Bolshevik, in its issue of February 1928. After 1. Ibid,, p., 95

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an analysis of the economic situation, Varga stressed that in recent years British policy had changed from promot­ ing the industrialisation of India to arresting it.1 He thought that Roy and Rajani Palme Dutt2 had exaggerat­ ed the degree of industrialisation in India. On the con­ trary, he asserted that British policy was to arrest the industrialisation of India and to refuse any concession to the native bourgeoisie. Varga went on to explain that although the interest of the Indian bourgeoisie lay in more and more industrialisation, the British policy of slowing it down had compelled them to compromise with British im­ perialism. He, however, conceded that the Indian bour­ geoisie had in the past taken an active part in the freedom movement; but he maintained that it was mainly motivat­ ed by their desire to improve their own position against the Indian proletariat.3 Varga thus concluded that the Indian bourgeoisie were no longer essentially a revolution­ ary force capable of leading the Indian masses to freedom, but had now assumed a reactionary role by siding with 1. E. Varga, “ P o litik a B r ita n s k ik h im p eria listo v v I n d i i .” B ol'shev i k 9 Nos. 3-4, 1928, pp. 64-68 2. Strangely enough at that time Roy and Rajani Palme Dutt had held identical views on India. Towards the end of 1928, Roy and Dutt published their books ‘‘The Future of Indian Politics’' and “Modern India’* respectively, in which they agreed with each other that because of the growing industrialisation of India under British control, the native bourgeoisie were more inolined to share the profit with British capitalists. The native bourgeoisie had gone over to imperialism and could no longer be trusted, and therefore, a new revolutionary mass movement must be started, Again in 1927, Roy restated his views on British policy in India which later became known as the theory of “Deoolonialisation” . Briefly, Roy maintained that as a result of the growing industrialisation in India, the native bourgeoisie had forced the British imperialists to give them more and more concession against the interest of the masses. So much so that the native bourgeoisie had come very near to managing their own affairs, and thus have entered into partnership with the British imperialists (see T h e M asses o f I n d ia , Zurich, November 1927 and April 1928). But at this stage, in Decem­ ber, 1927, contrary to his earlier stand, Roy advocated that tho com­ munists should not form a separate legal party but must work under the legal cover of the WPP [see Roy’s uAssembly letter” in J. Degras (ed.) T he C o m m u n ist In te r n a tio n a l , Vol. II, London 1961, pp. 569-564]. In June 1928, in a long article, Dutt used the same arguments as Roy’s and agreed with him in almost everything without mentioning his name. Like Roy, he favoured the WPP and the working of the commu­ nist inside the organization (“Notes of the Month” , Labour M o n th ly , June, 1928). Later, in the Sixth Comintern Congress, the CPGB dele­ gation opposed the disolution of the WPP. 3. E , Varga, op. ott.9 p p . 70-71

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the imperialists.123 The essence of his arguments was that the policy of support to the Indian bourgeoisie could no longer be considered an effective tactical policy in streng­ thening their movement against British imperialism in India. It is worth noting here that although Varga severely criticised Roy, he reached the same conclusions as Roy did. In fact, as we shall see later, Soviet policy was moving closer to Roy’s theoretical formulation on the Indian bourgeoisie, though they differed on the question of tactics. Surprisingly, one month earlier in January 1928, an­ other article signed by Ratboun reached the same con­ clusion as that of Varga from a completely different pre­ mise. Ratboun asserted that the British capitalists wanted to invest more capital in India for promoting the industrialisation of India at a much more rapid pace than hitherto. The result was, he went on, that the native bourgeoisie were faced with intensive competition and had put forward pressing demands for concessions in their favour.8 From this, he drew the conclusion, like Varga, that the Indian bourgeoisie were not sincere in their opposition to British rule in India, and were essential­ ly engaged in a reactionary struggle against the proleta­ riats of their own country.4* On the other hand, a few months before the Sixth World Congress of the Comintern assembled, the Journal Novyi Vostoh, which had consistently held moderate views on Indian affairs, gave a foretaste of what was to come in the forthcoming Congress by publishing a long article sharply criticising the Indian bourgeoisie. The author of the article pointed out that like Chiang Kai-Shek, the Indian bourgeoisie had become frightened of the revolutionary upsurge of the masses, and had been forced to forge a united front with the imperialists against the Indian proletariat.1 The article then proceeded to 1. Ibid. 2. G. Ratboun, €,

DBFP, op. cit., pp. 202-203 “Notes on Anglo-Soviet relations (1929-1930)", DBFP, op. oit., Ibid., p. 208

Q.W. and Z.K. Coates, op. oit., p. 374 Daily Herald, Fe&ruary 12, 1931

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other periodic uproar broke out in the Commons on the debate on India in the XI Plenum of the ECCI (discussed later). Prime Minister MacDonald curtly told the Commons that such propaganda must not cause undue concern or alarm as it did not reflect the actual situation. He assert­ ed that the Government must be left alone to judge such propaganda and to take appropriate action.1 No doubt, the British Government felt secure in the knowledge that f t the situation in India was well under their control and Soviet pronouncements on India had no bearing on the actual state of affairs there.123 The Soviet leaders had no intention of changing their policy of developing more advantageous economic relations with Britain. They kept on urging upon the British Government the need for a permanent treaty and for an extended credit for Soviet purchases.8 In fact, as we have discussed earlier in this chapter, they made some efforts to avoid direct anti-British propaganda, particularly in India, shifting the main emphasis of their criticism from Britain to the internal developments in India. On the other hand, by the middle of 1930, the Soviet leaders had begun to gain confidence in dealing with the Western Powers through normal diplomatic channels rather than by simply relying on propaganda. This confidence was mainly built up by the initial successes in the First Five Year Plan and Collectivization and by the total monolithic control imposed by Stalin on the Soviet Communist Party. The Labour Government’s policy towards the Soviet Union also facilitated the process of putting Anglo-Soviet relations on concrete economic and political bases. In June 1930, in the Central Committee report to the 16th Congress of the CPSU, Stalin stressed the growing might of the USSR as a result of the success in reorganising the economy and because of the popularity of the USSR in the West and East. He hinted at the possibility of develop­ ing normal political and economic relations with the capitalist Powers from a position of equality and strength. 1. H.O. Debates, vol. 252, cols. 1356-1357, see also cols; 1631-1635 2. Ibid., ools. 1636-1637 3. “ Notes.......” , D BFP, op. cit,, 751

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He emphatically stated that the question of Soviet pro­ paganda was a “ pretext for interventionist propaganda” and not a serious argument against normal economic re­ lations with the Soviet Union.1 In July 1930, Litvinov’s formal assumption of the office of Foreign Minister marked the beginning of this realistic shift in Soviet foreign policy. A fresh British protest against propaganda in December 1930 had certainly undermined Litvinov’s efforts and he complained to the British ambassador against “ Henderson’s con­ sistent efforts to confine Anglo-Soviet relations to messages and protests against the propaganda”12345; they were mainly made ; he thought, to satisfy the Tory Opposition in Parliament.* On the other hand, in Decem­ ber 1930, Sokolnikov was instructed to tell Henderson frankly that the activities of the Third International could not be curtailed because of the fact that the Soviet Government had no responsibility for that organisation. In March 1931, Molotov as Prime Minister of the USSR told the 5th Congress of Soviets of the growing antago­ nism of the capitalist Powers towards the USSR. He, how­ ever, singled out Britain among them with whom, he con­ sidered, normal economic relations could still further de­ velop. It was indeed significant that Molotov, while referr­ ing to the growing might of the USSR resulting from eco­ nomic reconstruction, did not claim increasing popularity and support for the USSR in the Eastern countries ; on the contrary, he confined himself to claiming such a support only among “ the working masses of capitalist countries.” During the winter and spring of 1930-1931, the danger of capitalist intervention, particularly from Poland at the instigation of France, was always expressed in official 1. J.V. Stalin, Works, vol, 12, p, 266 2. D BFP, op. cit., pp. 202-203 3. Ibid., pp. 206-206 4. Popov, op. t i t . 9 p. 38 5. T&IK \ 5 Sozyva, stenograflcheski otehet (Biulleten I)» Moscow, 1931, p. 25. Molotov directly attacked the Tory Party and its leaders : “If the wishes of this Party and these persons (its leaders) were realised and were they to return to power, the oause of universal peace will undoubtedly be jeopardised” (Ibid.).

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Soviet pronouncements. Judging from these official de­ clarations, it appeared that they were mainly intended for internal consumption to keep the tempo of the Five Year Plan high. A more serious view was, however, taken of the possibility of economic blockade of the Soviet Union. Soviet diplomacy, therefore, was primarily direc­ ted towards defeating any attempt at such an economic blockade. This also led to Soviet policy of drawing ^ border states closer by pacts of friendship and non-aggres­ sion with the Soviet Union, and to a desire to maintain and develop economic relations with Britain, France and other Western Powers.1 The Soviet leaders, as will be shown below, certainly now wanted to see the irritant factor of propaganda in Anglo-Soviet relations removed by concen­ trating their fire against the Indian Nationalist Move­ ment rather than British policy in India. In May 1931, Litvinov met Henderson in Geneva, and according to a Soviet source, he was successful in allaying his doubts on Soviet propaganda against Britain and the British Empire.* Sir Esmond Ovey, in a despatch to the Foreign Office in June 1931, with which Litvinov concurred,8 thus summed up the main objectives of Soviet foreign policy : first, to maintain peaceful co-existence of countries irrespec­ tive of their economic, political and social system ; second, to acquire credits for the Five Year Plan from any source available4. At the other end, Sokolnikov, the Soviet ambassador in Britain, engaged himself in some spirited public performances in extolling the vast potentialities of the Russian market for British exports and in urging more easily available credits for Soviet orders.8 By the spring of 1931, there were thus some definite indications that Anglo-Soviet relations would after all be' freed from the mythical genie— hostile Soviet propaganda against the British Empire. During AprilAugust 1931, in a similar situation a welcome change had taken place in the conclusion of a permanent 1. See for example Pravda, Maroh 10, 1931 2. Popov, op. cit.9pp. 42-43 3. D BFP, op. cit.} p. n o 4. Ibid., pp. 213-214 5. Izvestiia, June i9, 1931

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Franco-Soviet trade agreement and the beginning of negotiations for a non-aggression pact between the two countries. But unfortunately before such a thing could happen in Anglo-Soviet relations, the Labour Govern­ ment resigned on August 27, 1931. The publication of the Draft Programme of Action of the Communist Party of India was a signal for a concerted drive to put into practice the subtle shifts in the strategy and tactics of Soviet policy towards India. During the first few months of 1931, there began in the columns of various Comintern journals an intensive discussion on this programme by various European communist parties, European communist-front organisa­ tions and various groups including one by the Proletarian Freethinker’s International which advocated the inclusion of anti-religious work in the programme.1 Pravda carried a long commentary on the programme1234only one day after it was published by the Inprecorr, while other Soviet journals reproduced the programme in full. All these debates and discussion did not add anything new to the programme, and in the characteristic manner of that period, they loudly and fully approved it.3 An interesting example of the strategy and tactics of the programme was the Resolution of the All India Anti-Imperialist League on the general political situation and the task of the League’, published in Inprecorr in February 1931. The resolution was declared to be issued by the National Secretariat of the All-India Anti-Imperialist League. But as the contents of the resolution fully echoed the ultra-leftism and strategy and tactics of the CPI programme, it was obvious that it had originated from one of the Comintern Establishments. There were, however, some interesting tactical deviations. Firstly, unlike the programme, the resolution stressed only the need for a national revolution, yet it advanced the slogan of “a revolutionary united front of all anti­ 1, Inprecorr, v ol. 11, no. 0, pp. 125-126 2, Pravda , December 19, 1930 3. See for exam ple, G.S. Safarov, “ The N ext Task of the Indian R evolutionary Movement**, Inprecorr, vol. 11, no. 9, (February 26, 1931), pp. 179-182. 4. Inprecorr, vol. 11, no. 5 (Februaary 5, 1931), pp. 104*105

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imperialist forces” from which “ the INC, its left-wing and communist renegade, M.N. Roy must be excluded**. Secondly, the resolution also declared that the fundamental task of the All-India Anti-Imperialist League was to fight for the unity and solidarity with the world anti-imperialist forces led by the Soviet Union.1 Thus it was abundantly clear that the organisations like the All-India AntiImperialist League* were still to serve as front organisa­ tions for implementing the strategy and tactics which the CPI programme had adopted. This was in direct contravention of the general tenets of Soviet policy on the formation of an All-India Communist Party, and no doubt indicated some success for Litvinov’s efforts of restraining the Comintern. It was, therefore, hardly suprising that in the XI Plenum of the ECCI, which was held in March-April 1931, only a few references to India were made, and even those were highly exaggerated and rashly distorted. Manuilsky, who delivered the main report of the ECCI, though emphasising the deepening of crises in the colonies, admitted “ the lack of revolutionary crisis in India, unlike in China.”* Later in his report, he explained this : “In the case of India, the lack of revolu­ tionary crisis was mainly due to British imperialism which is still unshaken by the British working class. Besides it, the proletariats (in India—added) have still not organised themselves and developed consciousness as a class ; hence the national reformist movement draws with it considerable strata of the proletariats. Finally, in India the development of a revolutionary crisis into a revolutionary situation has been hindered by the absence of a communist party.”4 The obvious remedy, Manuilsky appeared to suggest rather rashly, was not merely a Communist party but an armed uprising : “ Take India. Is there in India an insurrectionary situation or not ? Who 1.

Ibid., p. 105

2. The A ll-India A nti-Im perialist League was formed in 1928 by the radical and left-w ing o f th e INC, Its m ain programme was agitation ard propaganda to com mit the INC to th e goal of oom plete freedom as against th e Dom inion status*

3. D.Z. Manuilskii, “ Kom partii i hrizia kapitalizm a"% in X I Plenum I K K L , stenographicheskii otohet, Part 1, Moscow, 1939, p. 72 4.

Ibid., p, 604

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would take upon himself to show that if the masses in India were in possession of arms, they, no matter, what is said in the theses of the Communist International, would not make an insurrectionary situation.”1 Earlier, in his report Manuilsky called the publication of the Draft Programme of the CPI “an important achievement of the Communist International since the last Enlarged Plenum met” and declared it to be “ consistent with the spirit of the programme of the Communist International adopted at the VI Congress.”* Here in Manuilsky’s analysis of the Indian situation, we notice the familiar dilemma before the Comintern policies in the face of concrete situations developing differently from the Comintern’s prophesies or wishes. More characteristic attempts to face this dilemma were made during 1930-1934 by making more wild state­ ments with no regard for the facts, and irrespective of their practicability. Moreover, it must have further reassured Litvinov by knowing the fact, which was later confirmed by a contemporary CPI source, that it was precisely about this time that the ECCI temporarily withdrew the affiliation of CPI because of “ the disorgani­ sation in the Party.”8 Meanwhile, in order to meet the requirements of their modus operandi with Britain, the Soviet leaders continued to focus their attention on developments inside India, interpreting them as they thought fit and expedient. To avoid repetition, we need not go into the details of the arguments in the few articles which appeared in the Soviet and Comintern press during the remaining few months of normal Anglo-Soviet relations before the fall of the Labour Government. Suffice here to quote from them on important developments in India during the first few months of 1931. First, on the Karachi session of the INC : “The Karachi Congress represents the final and definite withdrawal of the Indian bourgeoisie and their agents and allies among the intelligentsia from the political struggle against imperialism, which they had 123 1. Ibid. 2. Ibid., p. 72 3. M uza& r Ahmad, op* o44^ p« W

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carried on briefly ; now they are openly allied with British Imperialism against the Indian revolution.” 1 Second, the resolution of the Executive Committee of the League Against Imperialism, adopted in its meeting of May-June 1931, on Nehru and left-wing of the Congress: “ Jawaharlal Nehru has become traitor to the cause of the eman­ cipation of the people of India from the British imperialist yoke ; it (i.e., the League) stigmatises his desertion to the camp of counter-revolution before the broad masses of India and expels him from its ran k ...it warns the fighters for national freedom of India against the manoeuvres...commenced by Nehru, Bose, Roy and the rest of the left nationalists who have become agents of British Imperialism...”123 Third, on the Gandhi-Irwin pact of March 1931 : “ The Irwin-Gandhi pact is only the consum m ation of his (i.e., Gandhi’s-added) treacherous role. From the very beginning, Gandhi headed the movement in order to behead it. This can be proved by his entire policy.”8 Finally, and most comic, on the demonstration of the red shirt clad nationalist Pathans in Peshawar: “ ...the movement of the Red Shirts of Peshawar, has the hammer and sickle, as its device (sic) ; its slogans of struggle are a witness to the powerful influence of the example of the USSR, where a few hundred miles north of Peshawar, the peasants of Uzbekistan have been liberated from colonial oppression.”4

1. Inpreeorr, vol. 11, no. 19 (April 9, 1931), p. 364 2. Inpreeorr, vol. 11, no. 31 (June 11,1931), p. 670 3. Inpreeorr, vol. 11, no. 36 (July 6, 1931), p. 664

CHAPTER NINE

Who is the Greater Enemy 19311935

The change of Government in Britain greatly alramed the Soviet Government. The traditional' Soviet dislike and suspicion of the Conservative Party, which was now the leading partner in Britain’s National Government, and the adverse effects of Britain’s decision to go off the Gold Standard on Soviet exports to Britain, constituted the main causes for concern in the Soviet Government. More­ over, strong feelings were aroused in Britain against alleged practice of dumping of Soviet goods in the world market and against the reported Soviet move to suspend payment of interest on foreign loans. The anti-Sovietbaiting in the British press during the election campaign of October 19311 added to the anxieties of the Soviet Government. During the autumn of 1931, Molotov, Stalin’s close associate, in a number of speeches, gave expression to these fears and pointedly referred to the anti-Soviet orientation in the policy of the new British Government.123 On the other hand, the Soviet press8 and the Soviet foreign ministry, though echoing similar fears, exercised caution and restraint in criticising Britain, with the obvious motive of not endangering commercial rela­ tions with Britain.45 This restraint, however, could not be exercised for long. In December 1931, Molotov sharply reminded the TslK of the danger of a new imperialist offensive directed against the USSR, in which, he clearly implied an active role for Britain.6* 1. e.g. Morning Post , Oot. 21, 1931 and D aily Express , Sept. 30, 1931 2. V. M olotov, V bor'be za sotsializm, Moscow, 1935, pp. 102-103 3. See Izvestiia , June 19, 1931 and Oot. 1, 1931 4. According to Sir Esmond O vey, L itvinov told him on July 27, 1931 th a t “ world revolution is undoubtedly on th eir books, but for th e m om ent th ey were en tirely concentrated on th e F iv e Year Plan and w ished to show concrete results in their own country as the best form o f propaganda” (D B FP, op. cit., p. 216). Later, all the despatches from th e B ritish em bassy in Moscow em phasised the preoccupa­ tio n of th e Soviet leaders w ith th e F ive Year Plans and their pressing need o f more and more credit from B ritain (Ibid., p. 214). 5. T s lK ; Protokoloy (Biidleten 1), Moscow, 1932, pp. t3-34. N otw ith stan ing th e obvious advantage of keeping th e tempo of the F ive Year Plan high by th e propaganda o f foreign intervention, there was

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It seems worthwhile to jrecall here the attitude of the Conservative Party towards the Soviet Union. The Conservative Party was opposed to maintaining political and economic relations with the Soviet Union mainly because of two issues, hostile Soviet propaganda and the settlement of debts. The Conservatives had never fully accepted the economic need for increasing British exports to the vast Russian market, nor had they given any credence to Soviet pledges and undertakings on the question of hostile propaganda. It was, therefore, not at all suprising that within a few weeks of the assumption of office, the new Conservative Foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon, should call Bogomolov, the Soviet Charge d’Affaires in London, and remonstrate with him on the low volume of British exports to Russia and administer a sharp and stem warning of “ the grave consequences for the future” if the Soviets did not increase their export orders to Britain.1 Besides, Comintern’s declarations and articles on India in May 1932, which received wide publi­ city in the British press, created a great uproar in Parlia­ ment and in the Conservative press, and strengthened the hand of Sir John Simon to take a strong line against the Soviet Union. He brusquely told the Soviet dip­ lomat that the British Government were not prepared to accept the Soviet pleas that the Comintern was indepen­ dent and separate from the Soviet Government, and gave a clear warning to the Soviet Government that “ they (the Soviet Government) ought to realise that this propa­ ganda constitutes a real danger to the maintenance of present relations between the two countries.”2 British policy towards the Soviet Union thus appear­ ed to have reverted back to the pattern of 1922-27, wherein the question of hostile Soviet propaganda against the British Empire assumed its former importance in a genuine fear o f th is in th e S oviet Government, The basis o f th e fear was not that th e im perialist Powers would th em selves em bark on armed intervention, but th a t th ey would enoourage border sta te s like Poland and Japan to attack th e USSR. (For a confirm ation of th is view , see Pravda, Aug. 28, 1931 and record of Sir Esm ond's talk w ith L itvinov on Jan. 14, 1932, in D B F P , op . c it.p pp. 227-228) 1- D B F P 9 op. c i t p. 232

3.

Ibid,, p. 239

Who is the Greater Enemy ? 1931 1935

827

Anglo-Soviet relations. Soviet response to the new orient­ ation of British policy was also familiar. While replying to Sir John Simon’s plain talking in May 1932, Bogomolov not only reiterated the old Soviet plea of the indepen­ dent and separate identities of the Comintern and the Soviet Government, but also emphasised the need for a more generous extension of British credits before more Soviet orders could be placed in the British market.1 In July 1932, Litvinov met Sir John Simon in Geneva and insisted that the extension of British credits to Soviet purchases could easily have the effect of shifting Soviet orders from Germany to Britain, and thus would benefit Anglo-Soviet relations.8 Along with such renewed insitence on the extension of British credits, a more cautious and subtle approach manifested itself in Soviet policy towards India. *

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

*

Before discussing the working of Soviet policy towards India from the autumn of 1931 to the spring of 1935, it is essential to review very briefly the Indian political situa­ tion during this period and its relevance to this study. The Gandhi-Irwin pact of March 1931 signified the abandonment of the INC led civil disobedience move­ ment in favour of a truce with the Raj This decision was taken personally by Gandhiji and came at a time when almost the entire country was mobilised into action. Gandhiji’s decision bewildered the rank and file of the Congress, and created a"sense of bitter disappointment and disillusionment among the radical section of the party. They were further accentuated by the painful realisation that the Government had not conceded anything in return for Gandhiji’s compromise. This was further confirmed by the complete failure of the Second Round Table Conference on Indian Consititutional Reforms, held in London in the autumn of 1931, which Gandhiji attended as sole representa­ tive of the INC. We cannot affdrd to go into the detail* of the issues involved in these negotiations ; but it seem* relevant to point out here that although the question o! representation of the minorities in the proposed AU12 1. Ibid., 2. Ibid., pp. 240-241

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India Federation loomed large over the conference, the main cause of its failure was the irreconcilable positions taken up by the two main parties involved. On the one hand, the British Government were prepared to give only administrative autonomy at the centre and to the pro­ vinces along with an elaborate and efficient system of safeguards to ensure the supremacy of the Viceroy and the ^ Home G overnm ent; while, on the other hand, despi«e his readiness, even keenness, for compromise, Gandhiji wanted the British Government to concede, at least in principle, the INC demand for complete independence. Even after this complete failure, in his characteristic manner Gandhiji, on his return to India in mid-December, publicly denounc­ ed any intention of resuming the civil disobedience move­ ment and concentrated his attention on apparently trivial issues during the next few years. After Gandhiji’s with­ drawal from active politics, the British Goverment were more prompted to undertake drastic measures. From December 1931 to the end of 1934,.anyone with some voice in the INC, the left-wing organisations or in the trade unions, was put in prison or forced out of action. The result was that by the end of 1933, the civil disobedience movement had fizzled out (Gandhiji finally terminated it in April 1934), although some momentum was maintained by local movements, such as the no-tax campaign in U. P. and Bihar, strikes and sporadic terrorist activities in Bombay and Bengal, and by the Red Shirt Pathans in the NWFP. The Government were particularly severe with the radical and left-wing Congress leaders and workers’ groups, while the Coummunist Party of India was declared illegal in July 1934. In the meantime, the new Federal Constitution of India was proclaimed in 1935 and the INC decided to make preparations for contesting the elections under the new constitution. During 1931-1935, the nationalist movement became disorganised, disrupted and thorougly confused. How­ ever, two important developments made their mark on the Indian scene ; one was the flare-up of communal antago­ nism between Hindus and Muslims and the other, the beginning of an organisational form of radical and socialist thought and its impact on the policies of the

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nationalist movement. We are not concerned here with the former, but the later is of interest to our enquiry. We had earlier noted the political radicalisation of the nationalist movement during 1927-30, when ihe INC finally and irrevocably proclaimed the independence of India as its ultimate goal The next stage of radicalisa­ tion was reached a year later in 1931 when the Karachi session o f the INC adopted a resolution on fundamental rights which laid down that ‘in order to ?nd the exploita­ tion of the masses, ploitical freedom must include real economic freedom of starving millions’. Thus by 1931, the INC was committed to the political indepen­ dence of India as well as to the building of a new social and economic order. But no practical steps were taken towards the attainment of the second goal until 1936. For the next few years, attention was concentrated solely on the realisation of the political goal. However, the main burden of converting IN C’s programme of building a new social and economic order fell on the radical leftoriented members of the INC. To the left-oriented radical wing of the INC belonged the mainly middle class educated young intellectuals, trade union leaders, known communists and various student organisations. Apart from their intense nationalism, the only thing common to them was their fascination for socialism. There was no doubt was their interest in socialism was mainly created and fostered by the existence of the Soviet Union and by the attraction of the Soviet experiment. The impact of the Russian Revolution in India during 1917-1920, the wide­ spread sympathy of the nationalists for the Soviet Union, and the beginning and early development of the com­ munist and workers' movements have been discussed earlier. The general atomsphere of repression and sup­ pression, a growing disenchantment with the failure of the civil disobedience movement, a series of conspiracy trials, particularly the Meerut trail and M.N. Roy’s con­ viction towards the end of 1931, the role of leaders like Nehru and Subhas Bose, the growing conciousness among the mass of workers and, in some areas, among peasants, of their miserable plight, all were important factors which during 1929-1935 drew the radical left-wing more to the

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socialist experiment in the Soviet Union. Undoubtedly, there were divergent opinions on ends and means, more confused by a professed allegiance to the Congress creed of non-violence and by a vague understanding of socialist ideas in general; doubts were also expressed on the severity and authoritarianism of the Soviet experiment. We cannot do full justice to these complicated phenomena of the Indian Nationalist Movement in this book. However, a few pointers, which should help in explaining these phenomena, could be discussed without getting side­ tracked from the main theme. Firstly, the Meerut trial and general politicat situa­ tion, which have already been discussed earlier. Secondly, the role of leaders like Nehru and Subhas Bose. Nehru’s speeches during 1928-1930 were full of Marxist and Leni­ nist phrases and show the great influence on him of Marxist thought.1 He repeatedly and openly proclaimed himself a Socialist and a Marxist123. In a speech in September 1928, he praised Russia “as the greatest oppo­ nent of imperialism” and reaffirmed his belief in commu­ nism “as an ideal society” .8 His deep sympathy for the Soviet experiment and his admiration for the Soviet Union were widely publicised in India by the series of articles he wrote in 1928 after his visit to Moscow ; later, in 1929, they were published in a book. Two main themes run through these articles ; one, the Soviet economic and social experiment is an ideal which India should follow, and the other, Anglo-Soviet rivalry is entirely caused by the greed of British imperialism, while India has no clash of interest with Russia.45 Yet Nehru had his reservations on the authoritarian nature of the Soviet experiment.6 A very characteristic example of Nehru’s attitude to socia1. See, for exam ple, his presidential address to th e Lahore session of the INC, Report of the Forty^Fourth Annual Session, Lahore, 1929; also his address to Bengal Students Conference 1928 in L# D w ivedi & Ram Manohar Lai, Jawaharlal NehrU ; statements, speeches and writings, Allahabad, 1929, p. 135 2. J. Nehru, An Autobiography, op. cit., p. 366 3. D w ivedi & Manohar Lai, op. cit., p. 135 4. See, J. Nehru, Soviet Russia, op. cit. 5. See his presidential address to the U P Provincial Conference Oct. 27, 1928 in D w ivedi and Ram Manohar Lai, op. cit., p. 146

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lism and the Soviet Union was his presidential speech to the All-India Trade Union Congress (AITUC) in 1929, when the organisation was sharply divided over the pro­ posal of its affiliation with the Pan-Pacific Trade Unions, the Asian branch of Red International Labour Union. In his speech, Nehru commended the growth of militant class consciousness among the Indian workers, called for a new socio-economic system of equal opportunity and fair conditions for labour, attacked the record of the British Labour Party and called for the eradication of im­ perialism and capitalism. But on the disputed question of affiliation, he advised the AITUC to stand away from the Second International because it had become an exponent of a new form of imperialism and also from the Third International because it would only be a mere gesture and would mean the adoption of communist methods in their entirety.1 It was essentially because of this middleof-the-road position of Nehru that he could establish a rapport with both the left and right wings of the INC, and above all with Gandhiji. This enabled him to shape the policies of the INC after 1935 ; but during 1931-1935, he was prevented from doing so because of his almost uninterrupted imprisonment. Subhas Bose was equally attracted to Marxism and the Soviet Union, and in some ways more committed than Nehru, but like Nehru, he also had the same reservations. Yet Nehru and Bose provided the ideological education for many of their followers during 1929-1935. Thirdly, although there was a general growth of class consciousness among the workers, the trade union move­ ment was inflicted with recurring splits between the Right and Left and was plagued by disorganisation. Arrests and trials of the trade union leaders had a paralysing effect on the entire movement. The peasants, on the other hand, had only just begun to take part in the no-tax campaign in some provinces. For a few years after the Meerut arrest of its leaders, the communist movement was practi­ cally dead. In the isolation of the Meerut prison, the Communist leaders discussed their mistakes, quarrelled 1. Indian Annual Register, vol. 11, 1020, pp. 425-28

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and busied themselves in learning Marxism and Leninism.1 The few younger communists who were left outside, were caught in the tangle of the confusion and disillusionment of the civil disobedience movement and became more and more confused by the conflicting advice of the Comintern. Towards the middle of 1933, the Government began to release the Meerut prisoners. Immediately, they busied themselves in recorganising the Party.123 They organised a successful country-wide strike of textile workers in April ^ 1934 and began publishing a weekly, communist, in April r 1934.8 But the Government struck again ; they proclaimed the Party, along with some dozen trade unions under communist influence, illegal in July 1934. Thus during 1931-1935, the communist movement found itself losing what little influence it had on the workers* movement in particular, and the nationalist movement in general. Although it took years for the communist movement to to recover from government repressions of the 30’s, they gained great propaganda advantage by repeated trials, arrests and banning. This fired the imagination of many young and uninitiated, and in the long run, proved a great asset to the Party. The most curious aspect o f official policy towards the Indian communists was that it was entirely shaped by the articles, speeches and mani­ festos emanating from Moscow for the benefit of the Indian comrades. Indeed it appears that the strong-arm tactics of the Indian Government against the Indian communists was not connected with the actual work done by them in India, but was dictated by the haunting fear of the success of Soviet policy towards India. In fact, most of the Comintern advice sent to the Indian Com­ munist Party did not reach the nucleus of the Party because of strict censorship by customs and police autho­ rities.4* Much of this advice was announced to the Indian 1. P hilip Spratt, op. cit.%p, 153 2. R . P. D u tt, op. cit., p. 383, see also Masani, op. oit., pp. 48-52 3. “ F orty Y ears” , New Age, op. oit.9 p. 15 4. In Septem ber 1032, the Government issued a fresh oustom s n oti­ fication w hich prohibited bringing into India “ any docum ent issued by or em anating from (1) th e Communist International or (2) an y organisa­ tion affiliated to or controlled b y or oonneoted w ith th e Communist International, or (S) any person holding offloe in any suoh organisation

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communists in the form of prosecution documents. Look­ ing back with the benefit of hind-sight, one can take the cynical view that the then Indian Government would have done better in curbing the communists by being less vigilant, and by allowing some of the advice of the Comintern to reach them. This is more true when we realise how harmful an effect such an official policy in India was exercising on Anglo-Seviet relations. All these factors contributed to the beginning of an organisational form of socialist and radical thought in India. Most significant of all was the formation of the All-India Congress-Socialist Party in 1934 under Nehru’s patronage. A notable feature of the new party was that its membership was made conditional on membership of the INC ; hence it functioned as a group within the INC. After 1935, the party, with Nehru’s support, exercised considerable influence on the policies of the INC. The Soviet leaders* growing fear of a new crisis in Anglo-Soviet relations after the fall of the Labour Government was characteristically reflected by the fact that, unlike the situation during the proceeding months, a continuous stream of appeals and discussions on India began to appear in the Comintern and Soviet Press. A novel feature of these articles and discussions was that most of them were written or conducted, either by the exiled Indians who were active in the Comintern secretariat in Moscow and in other Com­ intern backed organisations, or by the members of the British Communist Party. Even important docu­ ments like the ‘Open Letter to the Indian Com­ munists* were not issued in the name of the Comintern but in the name of the Communist Parties of China, Great Britain and Germany.1 This procedure was un-

or (4) o f any docum ent containing a substantial reproduc tion o f the m atter contained in such docum ents/* A Government so u rce estim ated th a t during 1934 th e total number o f Communist newspapers and periodicals held up in the m ail was in th e neighbourhood o f 15,000 copies, com prising som e fifty different papers from ten different countries in Europe, Asia and America (Masani, op. cit,9 pp. 47-48). 1. Before th e ‘Open Letter* to th e Indian Communists, which was published in June 1932, a disussion article on th e “ D raft Programme of th e Indian C.P.*’ came out in th e name o f YCL o f B ritain and Amerioa in th e Comintern Journal (K.om munis tioheskii Intematsional, no. 24, 1931, p. 34)

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doubtedly adopted to avoid provoking the new Govern­ ment in Britain. But inevitably, it also marked the beginn­ ing of the shifting of responsibility for practical work of the Comintern in India from the Comintern secretariat to the British Communist Party (CPGB) and to the exiled groups of Indians under the influence of the CPGB. After the excommunication of M.N. Roy from the Comintern and bis departure for India, there was no other Indian Marxist of sufficient training and experience left in Europe ; so the main burden of this responsibility quickly gravitated to the CPGB. In many ways this proved a tragic error and added to the Soviet leaders* mystical belief in the rising tide of revolution in India. During 1931, the CPGB was going through one of its periodic crises after its very poor showing in the two General Elections as a result of the bitter factional fight which the new ultra-leftist line of the Comintern had forced on an unwilling party.1 By the end of the year, although the doubts of the majority in the party on the ‘new line’ persisted, the party leadership came under the total control of the ultra-leftists. So much so that even those like R.P. Dutt, who readily adjusted themselves to the new party line, failed to regain their former influence on the party’s policies. The result was that the party’s work on India was directed by the new leadership, while Clemence Dutt, R.P. D utt and R. Page Arnot, who had earlier held moderate views or did not instantly agree with the Comintern line on India, were kept away from it.* Besides, lack of complete unanimity in the British party on Indian policy encouraged the new leadership to take a more ultra-leftist line op India,9 and 1* L.J. Maofarlane, The British Communist Party, London 1966, pp. 230-241 2. A characteristic example of this was that the ECCI secretariat curtly rejeoted J.T. Murphy’s (an ex-member of the Politbureau of the CPGB and an ex-member of the ECCI secretariat) proposal for appeal­ ing to the Labour Party for the release of Meerut prisoners on the ground that such demands were no part of the ‘new line’ (Maofarlane, op. oit.9p. 237) and the Party leadership of course aooepted ECCI’s views. 3. During 1930-1935, R.P, Dutt, a very frequent oommentator on Indian affairs, wrote only one commentary on Indian events in his Journal Labour Monthly (see. vol. 12, no. 5, pp. 2S9-7 ), though his arti­ cles appeared in the Comintern’s English and Russian press.

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contributed to the party’s habit of looking at the Indian situation from its own experience in Britain. The influence of the CPGB on Soviet policy towards India was obvious from the intensity of the campaign con­ ducted against M.N. Roy in the Comintern press during the winter of 1931-1932, when he was tried and convicted in India. A statement, published in Inprecorr in the name of Young Workers’ League of Madras, indignantly disputed the remark of the judge, who had tried Roy and who had stated in his commital order that he was the organiser of the Communist Party “ A man like Roy, an opportunist and a self-seeking adventurer, never can organise a Com­ munist Party............ We hope that the Imperialist Govern­ ment will come to a better recognition of its allies and reward Mr. Roy’s services to the measure of his services to counter-revolution.”1 Another article, by Nelson, a member of the CPGB, came out in the leading Soviet journal specialising in colonial affairs, which, while discussing the entire work of Roy in the Comintern and in India, made out the case that Roy was in fact a coun­ ter-revolutionary and an agent of imperialism right from 1907 when he was first arrested by the police.123* On the othere hand, Valiia (real name I. Mazut), a noted Soviet expert on Indian affairs, in a long article, criticised the CPGB for not paying enough attention to India and en­ joined it not to forget that the success of its own pro­ gramme in Britain very much depended on the independ­ ence of India.8 Another indication of special attention given to India after the fall of the Labour Government was noticeable—a series of articles appeared in the local press of Uzbekistan and Tadjikistan during the autumn of 1931. Although these articles did not say much on the Indian political developments, they provided a clue to the apprehension felt by the Soviet leaders because of the change in the British Government. The main theme running through these articles was that Britain was mak1. Inprecorr, vol. 11, no. 55 (Nov. 13, 1931), p. 996 2. Nelson,