Collaboration and Public Policy: Agency in the Pursuit of Public Purpose 3031095847, 9783031095849

Table of contents :
Acknowledgements
Contents
About the Author
Abbreviations
List of Figures
List of Tables
Chapter 1: Introduction: The Collaborative Conundrum in Public Policy
Introduction
The Domains of Collaboration
Human Actors and Agency
Public Policy Elements
Why Collaboration?
The Collaborative Context
Interdependence
Hybridity
Diversity
The Collaborative Conundrum
The Challenge of Collective Action Problems
The Challenge of ‘Publicness’
The Challenge of a Public Policy in Flux
The Structure of the Book
References
Chapter 2: A Framework for Analysing Collaboration: Actors, Collaborative Domains, and Public Policy Elements
Introduction
Collaboration in Space and Time
Privileging Collaboration
Crisis and Collaboration
Governance, Structures, and Collaboration
Neoliberalism and New Public Management
Globalisation and Re-scaling Governance
Co-governance
Digital Governance
Collaboration as a Necessary Response
A New Approach to Analysing Collaboration
The Political
The Material
The Cultural
The Spatial
Elements
Ideas
Rules
Ethics
Expertise
Emotions
Objects
Practice
References
Chapter 3: Ideas, Agency, and Collaboration
Introduction
Ideas and Public Policy
Ideas and Policy Studies
Ideas and Collaboration in Policy Studies
Ideas as a Source of Collaboration
Collaborating in Response to Climate Change
Ideas and the Spatial Domain in Collaboration
Collaboration as an Idea
Depoliticising Collaboration
Repoliticising Collaboration
Collaboration as a Source of Ideas
Conclusion
References
Chapter 4: Rules, Agency, and Collaboration
Introduction
Rules and Public Policy
Rules and Policy Studies
Rules, Agency, and Collaboration
Rules as Enablers of Collaboration
Public-Private Partnerships. New Policy Instruments, New Rules
Local Strategic Partnerships. Rules to Coordinate Complexity
Involving ‘Publics’. Rules for Inclusion
Rules and Collaborative Conduct
Institutionalising Collective Leadership
Rules to Regulate Conduct
Conflicting Rules of Conduct
Conduct Rules for Private Benefit Not Public Good
Rules Constraining Collaboration
Rulemaking, Actor-Ecologies, and New Governance Spaces
Rules, Time, and Structural Power
Conclusion
References
Chapter 5: Ethics, Agency, and Collaboration
Introduction
Ethics and Public Policy
Ethics in Collaboration
Is Collaboration Ethical?
Collaborating Ethically
Identity and Agency
Data and Privacy
Power and Place
Cross-cultural Collaboration
Conclusion
References
Chapter 6: Expertise, Agency, and Collaboration
Introduction
Expertise, Experts, and Agency, in Public Policy
Public Policy and Expertise
Collaboration and Expertise
Collaboration to Protect Expertise and Experts
Collaboration of Diverse Expertise to Generate Synergy
Creating Co-productive ‘Spaces’
Managing Identities and Relationships
Working with ‘Evidence’
Collaboration with ‘Non-experts’ in Pursuit of New Knowledge
Expertise for Collaboration
Political Sensitivity
Cultural Competence
A Special Class of Collaborative Actors: Boundary Spanners
Conclusion
References
Chapter 7: Emotions, Agency, and Collaboration
Introduction
Understanding Emotions
Emotions and Public Policy
Emotions and Collaboration
Collaboration as an Emotional Claim
The Emotional Lives of Collaboration
Vignette 1: Joy and Satisfaction
Vignette 2: Emotions not Admitted
Vignette 3: Moral Emotions and Ugly Feelings
Vignette 4: In the Room
Doing Emotional Work
Emotional Unsettling
Emotional Resources
Boundary Spanners
Being Emotionally Engaged
Empathy
‘Receptive Listening’
Sitting with Difference
Collaboration and Conflict
Conclusion
References
Chapter 8: Objects, Agency, and Collaboration
Introduction
Objects in Public Policy
Objects and Public Policy Collaboration
Objects at Work in Collaboration
The Policy Object
Identity Objects
Performance Objects
Multi-functional Objects
Collaboration as an Object
Boundary Objects
Boundary Objects as Models
Boundary Objects as Maps
Boundary Objects as Repositories
Boundary Objects as Standardised Systems
Conclusion
References
Chapter 9: Practice, Agency, and Collaboration
Introduction
What Is Practice?
Public Policy and Practice
Public Policy as Practice
Collaboration and Practice
Co-production
Co-producing New Services
Co-producing Policy
New Governance Practices
Creating Space at the Edge
Digitally Enabled Practices
Practising Conflict
Practices of Collaboration
Drawing Boundaries
Making Meetings
Being Accountable
Translating and Interpreting
Conclusion
References
Chapter 10: Conclusion: Prospects and Possibilities for Public Policy Collaboration
Introduction
The Future for Public Policy Collaboration
The Challenge of Collective Action Problems
The Challenge of ‘Publicness’
The Challenge of Public Policy in Flux
Preparing for the Future: Using the Analytical Framework
The Collaborative Self
References
Index

Citation preview

Collaboration and Public Policy Agency in the Pursuit of Public Purpose Helen Sullivan

Collaboration and Public Policy “In this tour de force, Helen Sullivan moves our understanding of collaboration to the next level by examining the interplay among actors, collaborative domains, and public policy elements. Through compelling real-world examples, her ingenious analytical framework comes alive in a way that will inform scholars and practitioners alike. This is a must-read for anyone interested in improving public policy and governance.” —Rosemary O’Leary, Edwin O. Stene Distinguished Professor, University of Kansas, USA “In this important text Sullivan masterfully synthesises the expansive collaboration literature and provides a fascinating account of this concept across time and space. While it is often accepted in the literature that collaboration is contingent on the work of humans, this is rarely unpicked. The framework developed in the book provides practical utility in understanding and operationalising collaboration and is well illustrated by relevant case studies. An absolute must read for any student or practitioner of collaboration.” —Helen Dickinson, Professor of Public Service Research, University of New South Wales Canberra, Australia “Collaboration will always be with us. This excellent book gives us the theoretical insights to understand why and the empirical breadth to see why it matters.” —Catherine Needham, Professor of Public Policy and Public Management, University of Birmingham, UK “Sullivan has produced a tour de force on one of the most fundamental concepts of our times and, in doing so, has built a compelling case for rethinking collaboration from the ground up. The terrain covered in her treatise is without equal.” —Janine O’Flynn, Professor of Public Management, University of Melbourne and the Australia New Zealand School of Government, Australia

Helen Sullivan

Collaboration and Public Policy Agency in the Pursuit of Public Purpose

Helen Sullivan Crawford School of Public Policy Australian National University Canberra, Australia

ISBN 978-3-031-09584-9    ISBN 978-3-031-09585-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-09585-6 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG. The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

For my father and for Deborah

Acknowledgements

A book that took 12 years to write owes a great deal of thanks to a great many people. First, I need to thank Palgrave and in particular the patience and persistence of my editors, Steven Kennedy, Lloyd Langman, and Stewart Beale. Steven Kennedy prompted and prodded me to write a follow-up to my first book Working Across Boundaries, offering me a contract in 2010 and then allowing me time to work out what I really wanted to say, even though by the time I got there in 2014 he had retired. Lloyd Langman gamefully took up the challenge of keeping the book alive with regular requests about progress and noble acceptance of why the last deadline needed to be replaced with a new deadline. When Lloyd decided to leave publishing for teaching Stewart Beale stepped in and stewarded the book to its completion. I also need to thank the convenors of the Policy and Politics conference who invited me to deliver a keynote in 2014. Drafted in that wonderful liminal space in the air between Australia and the UK the keynote formed the foundation for this book. In Q&A following the keynote I was challenged to think about space by Nicola Headlam and Allan Cochrane for which I am very thankful. Enough time has passed for me also to be sanguine about the rejection of my paper from the invited special issue of Policy and Politics arising from the conference. If my paper had been published I probably would never have written the book.

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I have been fortunate to have a network of extremely smart and supportive academic colleagues, many of whom are also collaborators and friends and who have provided ongoing encouragement to this project over a very long time indeed. Foremost among these is Helen Dickinson who read and critiqued a number of first chapter drafts always offering helpful insights. She regularly reminded me that this was a project worth pursuing as well as occasionally querying why I was engaged in yet another writing project, often with her, when this one remained incomplete. Steven Griggs encouraged me to think more deeply and critically about decentred governance and discourse as well as regularly suggesting new ideas for writing projects—no one I know has as many ideas as Steven. Speaking of ideas, the inclusion of a chapter on ideas in the book was prompted by Stephen Jeffares’s excellent doctoral work on policy ideas. Paul Williams introduced me to boundary objects and my collaboration with him published as ‘Whose Kettle’ in the Journal of Health Organisation and Management provided the basis of Chap. 8, as well as an instantly recognisable shorthand to practitioners about the role of objects in collaboration. Sara Bice took my nascent ideas about public policy in the Asian Century and established a research and teaching program around them, which required me to firm up my thinking. Andrew Walter made sharp observations on my account of the G20 and the Global Financial Crisis. Janine O’Flynn’s project on ethics and markets in public policy was helpful to my thinking about ethics and collaboration. We also share an affinity for ‘slow scholarship’, a source of great solace to me over the years! I have also benefitted from some of the best mentors an academic could have—people who are clever, critical, generous, and wise. Marian Barnes, Vivien Lowndes, Janet Newman, and John Clarke have inspired, provoked, and supported me throughout my career. Lucky me. This book draws on collaborative research undertaken over my career and supported by various institutions. I began the book while at the University of Birmingham in the UK. The ESRC funded projects with Marian Barnes, Janet Newman, and Andrew Knops (Power, Participation and Political Renewal, L215252001) and with Chris Skelcher, Stephen Jeffares, and Michael Farrelly (Democratic Anchorage in European Cities, RES-000-23-1295) were led from there, as well as my strand of the ESRC ‘Collaborative Futures’ seminar series led by Paul Williams

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with Michael Marchington and Louise Knight (ES/H9000333/1). The University of Birmingham also sponsored the Policy Commission Program, the first of which, ‘When Tomorrow Comes’ provided insights on expertise included in Chap. 6. I worked with the wonderful Audrey Nganwa on the Commission as well as 12 excellent commissioners and with Deborah Cadman, a remarkable public sector leader, as chair. At the University of Melbourne I collaborated with colleagues Sara Bice, Fiona Haines, and Colette Einfeld on an ARC-funded project on the Social Licence to Operate in the Coal Seam Gas Industry (DP1401102779). I also led the Australian strand of an ESRC-funded international project on Collaborative Governance in Cities under Austerity (ES/L012898/1), working with Brendan Gleeson and Hayley Henderson as part of a global team led by Jonathan Davies and including Ismael Blanco, Ioannis Chorianopoulos, Niamh Gaynor, Steven Griggs, Pierre Hamel, David Howarth, Roger Keil, and Madeleine Pill. While at Melbourne I was gifted my own natural experiment in collaboration when I was invited to establish the Melbourne School of Government (MSoG). It was, as they say, a learning experience. UK/ Australia collaborations on the Public Servant of the Future began at MSoG led by Helen Dickinson, Catherine Needham, and Catherine Mangan, with the important support of Maria Katsonis and the Victorian Public Service, and have continued to evolve. My ideas have benefitted from many discussions with practitioners over the period of writing the book. This includes postgraduate students across continents, in the School of Government and Society at the University of Birmingham, in the Melbourne School of Government at the University of Melbourne, in the Crawford School of Public Policy at the Australian National University, and in the Australian New Zealand School of Government (ANZSOG). It also includes practitioners involved in the 2014 ANZSOG conference and the many exchanges I have had over the years with colleagues at the annual conferences of the Institute for Public Administration Australia. I could not have completed the book without the help of two brilliant researchers. Hayley Pring reviewed literatures and offered important insights from her own areas of expertise, International Relations and International Political Economy, work she is now pursuing at Oxford University. Colette Einfeld took on the task of first reader of the final draft

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and demonstrated a singular capacity for spotting inconsistent structure, incoherent arguments, and insufficient evidence. Colette will make an excellent PhD supervisor. Family and friends offer reminders of what matters in life outside academia, and I am lucky to have people in my life who do just that especially Deborah, Julia, Anne, Phil and Tom, and Julie, Paul, Ben, Lawrence, Sam, and Alex. This book was written across two continents, four jobs, three periods of serious illness, and some significant personal losses. I am absolutely confident that it would never have been completed without the support of others, but any deficiencies are mine alone.

Contents

1 Introduction:  The Collaborative Conundrum in Public Policy  1 2 A  Framework for Analysing Collaboration: Actors, Collaborative Domains, and Public Policy Elements 19 3 Ideas, Agency, and Collaboration 47 4 Rules, Agency, and Collaboration 71 5 Ethics, Agency, and Collaboration 99 6 Expertise, Agency, and Collaboration129 7 Emotions, Agency, and Collaboration157 8 Objects, Agency, and Collaboration187 9 Practice, Agency, and Collaboration215

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10 Conclusion:  Prospects and Possibilities for Public Policy Collaboration247 Index253

About the Author

Helen Sullivan  is Professor of Public Policy and Dean of the College of Asia and the Pacific at the Australian National University. Her work explores the nature of state-society relationships, and their interaction with public policy systems. Her latest book (co-edited with Helen Dickinson and Hayley Henderson) is The Palgrave Handbook of the Public Servant (2021).

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Abbreviations

ACT AIIB ALGA ASEAN BRICS CEPI COAG CoVax EBPM EU FIND G20 Gavi GFC IAEA ICISS ICSU IMF INGOs LA21 LSPs NDCs NDIS NPM

Access to COVID-19 Tools Accelerator Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank Australian Local Government Association Association of Southeast Asian Nations Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations Council of Australian Governments COVID-19 Vaccines Global Access Evidence-based policymaking European Union Foundation for Innovative New Diagnostics Group of Twenty Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunisation, now—Gavi, the Vaccine Alliance Global Financial Crisis International Atomic Energy Agency International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) International Council for Science International Monetary Fund International Non-Governmental Organizations Local Agenda 21 Local Strategic Partnerships Nationally Determined Contributions National Disability Insurance Scheme New Public Management

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ABBREVIATIONS

OECD PFI PPP PSVI R2P RCTs SDGs SLO UN UNFCCC UNHCR WHO

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development Private Finance Initiative Public-Private Partnerships Prevention of Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative Responsibility to Protect Randomized Control Trials Sustainable Development Goals Social Licence to Operate United Nations United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change UN Refugee Agency World Health Organization

List of Figures

Fig. 1.1 Fig. 2.1 Fig. 4.1 Fig. 4.2 Fig. 4.3 Fig. 4.4 Fig. 4.5 Fig. 5.1 Fig. 5.2 Fig. 5.3 Fig. 6.1 Fig. 7.1 Fig. 7.2 Fig. 7.3 Fig. 7.4 Fig. 7.5 Fig. 7.6 Fig. 7.7 Fig. 8.1 Fig. 8.2 Fig. 8.3 Fig. 8.4 Fig. 8.5

COVID-19 and collaboration Framework for analysing collaboration and public policy A Local Strategic Partnership The Brackenridge Declaration The Murray-Darling Basin The Murray-Darling Basin Authority Rules creating institutional prisons The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Private Finance Initiative in the UK Addressing police violence against female sex workers in Karnataka, South India Australian Commonwealth Government University Research Commercialisation Action Plan ‘Partners Ending Homelessness’ Director General, WHO, COVID briefing 22 March 2021 Collaboration as consensus in the 1990/2000s Emotions in the Chronic Condition Management Program Emotions and peacebuilding Moral emotions and cross-cultural collaboration Emotions and the G20 London Summit Trump’s wall New York Declaration on Addressing Large Movements of Refugees and Migrants Food in the Revitalising Central Dandenong Program The Paris Agreement 2015 Estonia—Government as a Platform

2 31 78 81 89 90 94 111 113 117 144 166 167 169 171 173 175 177 190 193 199 205 209

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List of Figures

Fig. 8.6 Fig. 9.1 Fig. 9.2 Fig. 9.3 Fig. 9.4 Fig. 9.5

Boundary objects and neighbourhood revitalisation Australia’s National Disability Insurance Scheme Rights-based approach to the NDIS ‘Business as Unusual’ in London Borough of Lambeth #DiploHack and The Prevention of Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative PSVI #DiploHack practices

210 224 226 228 235 236

List of Tables

Table 4.1 Table 6.1 Table 8.1 Table 9.1

Rules of the Murray Darling Basin Roles and competencies for boundary spanners Boundary objects and public policy collaboration Neighbourhood partnerships as ‘proto institutions’ in Birmingham, Copenhagen, and Rotterdam

91 150 201 230

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction: The Collaborative Conundrum in Public Policy

Introduction Collaboration is a ubiquitous yet contested feature of contemporary governance. Described as ‘the coming together of actors to work across boundaries in pursuit of public purpose’ (Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002, p. 2), collaboration can take many forms, including partnerships, networks, coalitions, and alliances. Collaboration is present across all tiers and spheres of governance from local to global, and is embedded in the making, managing, and implementation of public policy. Appeals to, and claims for, collaboration are evident across governance scales, policy spheres, and practice sectors. Supporters argue that collaboration is essential to meeting any number of challenges including tackling cross-cutting public policy dilemmas such as climate change, and resource and human security; advancing innovation, particularly in the context of ‘the digital age’; and supporting user-centred public services. Critics meanwhile question the empirical evidence in support of collaboration and its political consequences. They identify significant gaps between the costs of collaboration and the recorded benefits, point to limited evidence of improved economic or social outcomes, and challenge the roles afforded to the state in enabling and constraining collaborative institutions.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 H. Sullivan, Collaboration and Public Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-09585-6_1

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Despite these ongoing debates, collaboration remains prevalent across a broad sweep of public policy, including domestic and foreign policy, global trade and development policy, public administration, and public management. In (large) part this reflects the conditions of contemporary governance, namely, the interdependence of policy issues and tiers of governance, the hybridity of policy and service institutions, and the diversity of peoples and publics, each of which implicates collaboration in public policy responses. However, these conditions are not immutable, and importantly, even while they prevail, they do not inhibit alternative public policy responses. And yet, collaboration persists, with mixed results as the recent experience of COVID-19 illustrates (see Fig. 1.1).

The COVID-19 pandemic offers a powerful illustration of collaboration’s ubiquity and variety, as well as the differing consequences. Public policy settings promoting global economic interdependence and manifest in global supply chains enabled the virus to spread rapidly around the world. In Victoria, Australia, embedded public policy preferences for public-private arrangements placed private sector security guards in key roles in hotel quarantine, rather than police or military organisations, with devastating consequences; the virus was not contained and the rapid spread of the virus (90% of cases linked to hotel quarantine) resulted in a four-month lock-down in the state in 2020. Internationally, the pursuit of a vaccine to address COVID-19 brought publicly funded scientists together with private corporations, to work at scale and at speed, delivering effective vaccines in less than a year. To try and secure accelerated and equitable access to COVID-19 tests, treatments, and vaccines for every country in the world, a combination of governmental organisations and non-governmental alliances (the Coalition for Epidemic Preparedness Innovations (CEPI), Gavi (The Vaccine Alliance), and the World Health Organisation (WHO), established ‘CoVAX’, whose impact is reliant on countries’ preparedness to collaborate.

Fig. 1.1  COVID-19 and collaboration

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Collaboration’s sticking power suggests an appeal and/or resilience that merits investigation. Embarking on such a venture may seem at the least indulgent, if not entirely unnecessary, in the face of the weight of research published each year into different aspects of collaboration. However, it is perhaps the very existence of this ever-growing body of work that prompts this investigation. Because despite the wealth of existing research, there is still no satisfactory explanation for why collaboration has become normalised in so many policy and governance arenas, especially given its many recorded limitations. This book is an attempt to offer a more convincing account of the persistent appeal of collaboration taking account of macro, meso, and micro explanations and drawing on empirical examples across time and space. In the process it aims to provide a more complete framework for analysing collaboration that might be of use to those interested in understanding what happens when human actors collaborate in public policy. The book does this by focusing on three distinct, but interrelated, areas of enquiry: 1. Identifying and substantiating the domains of collaboration, and affording equal and contemporaneous attention to each; 2. Interrogating the experiences of human actors in collaboration, exploring the potential and limits of human agency, including issues of identity and performance in collaboration; 3. Focusing on common elements of public policy systems that inform collaborative possibilities and demonstrating their influence singly and in combination. The book draws together each of these areas of enquiry to develop and apply an analytical framework that examines the theory and practice of collaboration and public policy from the perspective of human actors. The following section outlines the key concepts used in the book.

The Domains of Collaboration Writing on collaboration is replete with assessments of the success or more usually failure of collaborative working and descriptions of the key features or ingredients that generate success or failure. The focus is on effectiveness and the dimensions of analysis embrace both structure and agency, comprising some or all the following features: institutional arrangements,

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individual qualities, resourcing patterns, democratic alignments, and impact assessment. These are all relevant and valuable but tend to be limited because they discuss effectiveness simply in instrumental terms—were the goals of the collaboration achieved, were outcomes changed?—and fail to consider that there might be more going on in collaborative relationships than can be explained in this way. What this ‘more’ might be is captured if collaboration is considered as an affective space as well as an effective one. This opens new areas of enquiry that give weight to the emotional resources that are expended and enhanced in collaborative relationships and also offers opportunities to explore the impact of collaboration socially and culturally, as well as or even instead of instrumentally. This book works with four collaborative domains: the political, the material, the cultural, and the spatial (described and discussed in Chap. 2). These enable collaboration to be interrogated explicitly as arrangements that are alive with rather than bereft of politics, as in much public management literature, and full rather than empty of affect, as in much evaluative literature.

Human Actors and Agency Human actors are integral to public policy collaboration. They design the policy frameworks that promote collaboration. They build the relationships necessary for collaboration or undermine them. They engage in the activities required for collaboration to succeed or fail. They inhabit the roles associated with enabling or inhibiting collaboration. Collaboration then is dependent upon identity and performance, that is, who human actors know or believe themselves to be, how these identities fuel agency, and the various ways that agency is translated into performance—actors’ behaviours and actions in the various sites and spaces of collaboration (Sullivan, 2015). This agency is not unfettered, actors operate within and between existing structures of power, so their agency is always situated (Sullivan et al., 2012), but it acts on structural power, and can influence it. Consequently, a comprehensive understanding of collaboration requires positioning actors at the centre of analysis and paying attention to agency and action. As Griggs et al. (2014) argue, ‘People do not only make sense of situations which confront them by reflecting upon them within the context of traditions, belief systems, or ideologies, they also move about in the world in a more or less effective way by acting upon the situation at hand’ (p. 15). These actions may be routine or spontaneous, intimate, or

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public, but in all cases, they are expressions of agency into a dynamic environment, comprising a range of places, spaces, scales, and disciplinary boundaries. Collaboration is not self-contained but is interconnected with and influenced by collaborative activity in other places, scales, and spaces. The relationship between human actors and collaboration is also a dynamic one, collaboration shapes, and is shaped by the identity of individual actors and their ‘groups’ and is performed by those actors and groups in various public policy contexts.

Public Policy Elements Collaboration is not independent of the public policy system within which it operates. What it is and what it can do is informed by the public policy framework that designed and supports it. This book works with a range of elements common to public policy systems and relevant to collaboration. The elements are ideas, rules, expertise, emotions, ethics, objects, and practice (described and discussed in Chap. 2). They provide the analytical purchase for an in-depth investigation of collaboration and public policy.

Why Collaboration? This book is about collaboration, defined as, a more-or-less stable configuration of rules, resources and relationships generated, negotiated, and reproduced by diverse yet interdependent actors that enables them to act together in the pursuit of public purposes. The book uses the term collaboration deliberately. Its principal attraction is that it encompasses a wide range of relations and activities. Unlike the terms ‘partnership’ or ‘network’, collaboration is not associated with a particular country or policy area or academic school of thought. This makes it useful for a book that wants to explore a wide terrain of institutions, practices, and relationships that may be collaborative but are not easily reducible to one label or another. The book’s concern is with understanding the power and persistence of collaboration for policymakers rather than specifying the particular characteristics of forms of collaboration. To achieve this the book examines collaboration in multiple manifestations, including collaboration as a political ‘mood’—actors’ normative positioning, collaboration as policy instrument—tools that reflect the ‘shared discretion over action’; and collaboration as a practice—how actors engage.

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In addition to breadth, the term collaboration is useful for public policy analysis because it is imbued with conflicting and competing values. While it is deployed here to describe cooperative relations of one form or another to achieve public policy goals, collaboration can also describe relations between actors whose goals and actions may be self-serving, including exclusive networks, and in some cases, criminal, for example, Mafia type networks, and relations between elements of the state and social actors against others, such as collaborators in wars. Each of these interpretations of collaboration brings with it a set of emotions and affects, which are not normally considered in discussions of public governance and management but could add to our understanding of why collaboration matters and the dynamics at work in collaborative relationships. Understanding collaboration in these ways highlights the role of power and interests in collaborative arrangements, raises questions about the respective roles of structure and agency in collaboration, and suggests that there may be more going on in collaboration than can be explained by reference to reason. Acknowledging the multiple uses and values of collaboration in a book about its application in public policy is an important reminder that collaboration is a political act, underpinned by sets of power relations and operationalised to promote or reflect particular social and cultural relations.

The Collaborative Context The collaborative context is set by the conditions of contemporary governance, defined here as interdependence, hybridity, and diversity, and the corresponding demand for individuals and institutions able to work with and manage them. They are explored below. Interdependence Claims of interdependence emanate from a range of sources. Global policy challenges, most obviously climate change, emphasise our interdependence as citizens of the world. Globalisation and marketisation, not to mention the attempts by countries to flex their muscles in relation to the control of resources or the flow of trade, highlight our economic interdependence as producers and consumers of key goods, for example, food, water, and energy. The information revolution and the ubiquity of the Internet and of social media provide opportunities to connect and

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communicate in ways that arguably make the realisation of freedom interdependent. The growth in the organised production of ‘fake news’ and the use of digital tools to try and sway elections offer evidence of that interdependent freedom. Interdependence requires collaboration between citizens, organisations, economies, and governments at all levels to tackle climate change, secure basic resources, and achieve freedom. In the UK the innovation organisation Nesta represents the narrative of interdependence as a way of overcoming the divisions between ‘public’ and ‘private’ sectors, offering examples of what it called ‘the new radicals’ - individuals and organisations able to draw on the resources of both public and private to generate what it described as ‘social value’1 Interestingly these ‘new radicals’ are largely active within localities rather than nationally or globally, again reflecting the significance of different sites and spaces in managing interdependence through collaboration. Hybridity In public policy and administration hybridity refers to the mixing of elements from multiple sources and the generation of something new or different as a result. For example, Nesta’s ‘new radicals’ referred to above engage in ‘mixing’ public and private resources to generate a new property—‘social value’. Hybridity is also a descriptor for the institutions and organisations created to respond to interdependence. These are structural arrangements that ‘involve the interpenetration of different spheres of activity—government, business, civil society, not-for-profits—… [in] parastatal organizations such as public-private partnerships, collaborative management, and governance or policy networks’ (Skelcher et al., 2013, p. 11). Crouch (2005) argues that hybrid governance is the norm rather than the exception in advanced capitalist economies as actors (institutional entrepreneurs) use their agency to adapt structures so that they are ‘fit for purpose’, that is, offer the greatest chance of achieving agreed goals. Likewise, Gross’s (2017) review of hybridity in urban governance offers support for the idea that hybridity is a longstanding feature of urban governance with collaboration a visible contemporary expression. She proposes a refocusing of the researcher ‘mindset’ so that it ‘is directly 1  This program began in 2012 and is ongoing. https://www.nesta.org.uk/project/ new-radicals/.

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engaged with the hybridization processes underlying more complex forms of urban governance and the implications of those processes for policy and program outcomes’ (2017, p. 572). Diversity The movement of people is an important and enduring consequence of globalisation. This intensifies diversity of population, religion, and cultural and social mores and creates a plurality of perspectives within nation-­ states, and more particularly localities and neighbourhoods that in turn can make collaboration, more difficult to secure. Linked to globalisation and the marketisation of public services but also influenced by the identity based political movements of the 1970s is the promotion of the individual and individualism in public policy over that of the community or the collective. This also emphasises diversity though of a rather different kind. The co-existence of and interaction between interdependence, hybridity, and diversity challenges scholars to examine and delineate what collaboration might mean and be in different circumstances. This is exemplified in the prevailing dissonance in public policy between the need for collaborative action, and the capacity to respond, discussed next.

The Collaborative Conundrum Three key tensions or contradictions highlight the importance of collaboration to future public policy and governance, while emphasising the apparent unsuitability of the prevailing context for facilitating collaboration. The Challenge of Collective Action Problems Collaboration is associated with the attempted resolution of collective action problems in politics (Olson, 1971). These are problems, which may be addressed through the cooperation of a variety of partners, all of whom will benefit, but where the associated costs can be a disincentive to participate and there are risks of free riding (actors benefiting from others’ efforts). In public policy there is a wide range of collective action problems associated with different kinds of policy demands, so, for example, the challenges of climate change or international security are of a different

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order of intensity and magnitude than the challenge of integrated health and social care for older people, but all reflect the dilemmas of collective action. Public policy and public management texts tend to refer to collective action problems as ‘wicked’ or ‘complex’ problems, partly because of the economic model of rational actors that underpin the collective action model. For our purposes the term collective action problem is useful as it avoids the unhelpful debates that often occur about definitions of what is/ is not a ‘wicked’ problem. Collective action problems are not new to public policy. However contemporary conditions have both intensified the urgency of existing collective action problems such as climate change, while adding new ones, such as aged care, and limited the capacity of existing institutions to address these problems. This limited capacity is evident in the fragility of international institutions charged with addressing some of these problems, and the reshaping of national and local institutions in the context of globalisation and neoliberalisation. These developments introduced more actors into processes of governance at all levels while also making it harder to discern where power is and how to access it in the service of the delivery of public goods. The political and economic turbulence produced by the prominence of ‘strong man’ populist leaders and the ongoing impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic place further pressure on these institutions. Governing collective action problems requires collaborative action between state and non-state actors, with communities, and across governance tiers and spheres. However, the conditions of contemporary governance make collaboration harder to achieve. Globalisation and neoliberalism fragmented governance making the collaborative environment more congested. This in turn disguised power relations and compromised accountability, and so diminished the legitimacy of collaboration. The Challenge of ‘Publicness’ Collaboration is associated with specific formations of ‘the public’. These may be in relation to ideas of the public interest and public goods, that is, action that is orientated towards a public benefit. They may be linked to established institutional formations such as national and local government, or public bodies. And they may be based on traditional demarcations between sectors or interests, commonly, public/private/community. These formations will obviously vary depending on the context. For example, understandings of state/society relations in India are very

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different from those in the UK, partly because of the very different governance traditions and cultures that pertain in each country. Regardless, these formations are under challenge (Newman & Clarke, 2009). The nature of the challenge may vary again depending on context, but in advanced liberal democracies established formations have had to accommodate alternative conceptions. Establishing who ‘the public’ is is no longer simply a matter of national boundaries. The diversity of populations and the connections that are maintained across nations make it difficult to designate a geographically situated group as ‘the public’. Similarly, the penetration of digital and social media both make it possible for communities to remain connected across borders, but also enable the creation of entirely new communities or ‘publics’ who may seek to influence policy on a specific issue. COVID-19 intensified our relationship with the digital world as teaching, working, shopping, caring, and keeping in touch all moved online for those with access and capability. The pandemic created new publics such as ‘vulnerable groups’ and ‘essential workers’, and brought others to the fore, including ‘sovereign citizens’. The use of digital technology during COVID-19 further blurred the boundary between public and private lives as homes became workplaces and exacerbated the boundaries between those with economic and social capital and those without. The idea of a ‘public’ implies collective attachment or investment in an issue. However, in many countries the primacy of the collective has been systematically eroded and replaced with the primacy of the individual, as consumer, or occasionally citizen. Most obvious in relation to policies for personalisation of services, the primacy of the individual is also evident in expressions of charitable concern, for example, sponsoring a child. Digital and social media have facilitated this expression of individuality within a ‘public’, redefining ‘publics’ as temporary yet possibly intense relationships that exist in the digital sphere. These relationships may involve collective action such as flash mobs but are more often associated with the expression of individual acts like signing petitions. Finally, trying to differentiate between ‘the public’ and ‘the private’ has become increasingly difficult as governments enlist private and charitable organisations in the delivery of public services and privatise public institutions. Defining ‘the public sector’ in this context becomes harder. Is it only those working in state organisations, or does it embrace all those involved in delivering public services? (Olney, 2021). This matters because it raises questions of public conduct and accountability. The failure of the

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hotel quarantine system in Melbourne, Australia, that precipitated the devastating second wave of COVID-19 in the state is one example of this tension. Private security guards were working in quarantine hotels as part of a government-led, public sector initiative. The failure to ensure that they were fully aware of and compliant with what was required of them led to the virus entering the community. There is an important question of whether the outcome would have been different if the private security staff had been considered part of the public sector and managed accordingly (Coate, 2020). These various developments arguably increase the demands for collaboration to address the fragmented, multi-actor contexts that now describe ‘publics’. However, they also make collaboration more difficult, not least because of the ethos of individualism that pervades dominant approaches to public policy and public management. The Challenge of a Public Policy in Flux The book engages directly with mainstream public policy analysis to uncover how collaboration is accounted for in existing approaches and to explore possible alternatives. This engagement is important not least because what we think of as ‘public policy’ is also in flux (Bice & Sullivan, 2014). Developments such as globalisation and neoliberalisation have not just affected how we understand governance but also influenced how we think about the scope and scale of public policy. The traditional boundaries between public and foreign policy are blurring as policy spheres interconnect and interact, while scalar boundaries are challenged by the emergence of international and global public policy that are situated globally but function across multiple tiers of government and governing institutions. These developments increase potentially the elasticity of public policy across existing domain and governance boundaries. However, they also bring new ideas and practices into contact with established traditions, values, and ways of making and delivering public policy. Collaboration is implicated in all these developments, usually as a necessary consequence of the blurring of boundaries and broadening of activity. This in turn demands that we re-examine our modes of analysing public policy to assess the extent to which they remain relevant to the challenges of a more dynamic and contested environment.

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The public policy ‘flux’ is not simply a product of changes to the geo-­ political institutional landscape. It is also associated paradoxically perhaps with a loss of faith in the potential of states to secure positive change. The ‘high modernism’ that characterised the West’s post-Second World War approach to public policy was a reflection of what Goodin et al. (2008) characterise as ‘technocratic hubris, married to a sense of mission to make a better world; an overwhelming confidence in our ability to measure and monitor that world; and boundless confidence in our capacity actually to pull off the task of control’ (p. 4). Programs reflected the prevailing expectation that citizens had of government and governments had of themselves that chronic social ills or economic challenges could be met through government action. They also reflected the prevalence of macro theories in shaping understandings of the social world and informing policymakers’ decisions. However, the outright failure or limited impact of these and similar programs prompted reconsideration of the potential and limits of government amongst public policy analysts. For some these experiences left the policy sciences’ academy rather ‘more humble’ in its prescriptions (Goodin et al., 2008). Policymakers in the US and UK turned instead to economists and found support for radical reforms that relied on reducing government intervention and ‘rolling back the state’. The ensuing public policy revolution transformed states across the globe and further distanced the policy sciences from policymaking. Policy sciences made something of a comeback through the evidence-­ based policy movement. Here public policy analysts and policymakers drew together evidence of different kinds to develop and deliver ambitious programs of reform, to tackle issues such as social exclusion, one of the by-products of the ‘small state’. These programs sought to spread risk and gain advantage by engaging with communities, not-for-profit and private sector actors through collaborative formations with varying degrees of success (Head, 2008; Oliver & Boaz, 2019; Sutcliffe & Court, 2005). As policy problems multiplied and intensified, more was demanded of both policymakers and policy sciences. The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) of 2008 and the 2020 pandemic demanded massive government intervention to stabilise economies, societies, and governing institutions. In both cases the state re-emerged as a primary actor. While the 2008 crisis was followed by a return to public policy as usual, it is not clear that the pandemic will go the same way. What both crises have in common is the way in which they amplify the tensions

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discussed above and reinforce a collaborative conundrum; how to collaborate in an environment that demands it (such as COVID-19) but is not conducive to it, that is, when the public has less confidence in government to act well on its behalf, when doubt rather than certainty prevails in societies riven by insecurity, and when questions about the capacity of policy to secure change are rife. Nonetheless, so far policymakers have retained an attachment to collaboration as a means of enabling them to respond in and out of crises, further demonstration of collaboration’s appeal.

The Structure of the Book The book begins with a discussion of the presence of collaboration in public policy across space and time. It locates collaboration as a constant if often understated feature of public policy and administration. It then considers the particular force of collaboration in public policy in the late twentieth/early twenty-first centuries, and the challenges posed to policymakers and practitioners by ‘third way politics’, and then ‘austerity politics’. The discussion highlights the important but partial nature of existing scholarship on actors and agency in collaboration and suggests that a different approach is needed to develop a more rounded understanding. The remainder of Chap. 2 outlines a framework for understanding and analysing collaboration that recognises the influence of public policy systems on collaborative possibilities and situates actors and agency at the centre of analysis. The framework contains four collaborative domains. These distinct, but interconnected, domains identify and describe core aspects of collaboration in public policy contexts. The political domain is concerned with what collaboration is for, the material domain focuses on what collaboration does, the cultural domain considers what collaboration means, and the spatial domain explores what shape collaboration takes. This separation enables clear and contextualised questioning of collaboration and public policy. Actors move about these domains, their agency reflected in their capacity to act on and within each. Seven public policy elements are included in the framework: ideas, rules, ethics, expertise, emotions, objects, and practice. Each element is essential to public policy collaboration, shaping collaborative possibilities. Actors interact with these elements, more or less productively, contingent on their agency.

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The framework has a specific focus on human actors and agency, locating them as ‘situated agents’ and exploring their identity and performance in collaboration. The subsequent book chapters are based on an exploration of the seven public policy elements. Each chapter describes and demonstrates the importance of an element to public policy collaboration; how it shapes and is shaped by human actors; how it manifests in the political, material, cultural, and spatial domains of collaboration; and what it contributes to theory and practice of public policy collaboration. The chapter on ideas considers ideas as source of, or a spur to collaboration in public policy, and collaboration a source of or stimulus for ideas in contemporary governance. It describes how collaboration is both a means of enabling the acceptance and execution of ideas but can also be the means of resisting the adoption and application of ideas. It also examines ‘collaboration’ as an idea, one that attained almost hegemonic status in public policy in the 2000s, associated as much with its cultural force as its political value. The chapter on rules examines the rules that give rise to collaboration, illustrating how rules can overcome boundaries to collaboration, while also providing boundaries to facilitate collaboration. It considers collaboration as an institution, defining the rules that constitute it, as well as those that enable and constrain it. It discusses the rules that shape the conduct of collaboration, with reference to the rewards and sanctions associated with compliance and transgression. Finally, it explores the rules made by collaborations as institutional actors. The chapter on ethics explores the relationship between ethics, ethical conduct, and the actions of individuals in public administration, and how that might be challenged by collaboration. It examines how ethics can help make decisions about whether to collaborate or not, including contesting the idea of collaboration as an ethical activity. Finally, it examines how ethics informs actors’ conduct in collaboration. The chapter on expertise explores how expertise influences and is influenced by collaboration, and the ways in which expertise and collaboration interact productively and unproductively. It examines the challenges and opportunities collaboration presents to expert identities and performances, the role of actors and agency in enabling and constraining expertise in collaboration, and the implications for public policy in different places and spaces. Finally, it focuses on the specific expertise required to collaborate well.

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The chapter on emotions proposes that they are central to the policy and practice of collaboration: acting across time and in space to influence the potential and limits of collaboration; present in the relations that actors form and engage in; and generative of productive and unproductive collaborative outcomes. The chapter identifies the emotional claims made by public policy collaboration, the role of emotion in framing responses to collaboration, and the work of emotions in collaborative practice. The chapter on objects explores the presence and significance of objects in collaboration highlighting the uses, positive and negative, that actors make of them. The chapter then focuses on a particular kind of object, ‘boundary objects’, describing how they feature in collaboration and the affordances they offer to collaborative actors. The chapter examines the different kinds of objects and boundary objects at work in collaboration and how they facilitate and constrain collaborative identities and performance. The chapter on practice explores how practices are constituted in collaboration and their representation in the political, material, cultural, and spatial dimensions. It identifies practices that sustain or undermine collaboration. It examines how practice, identity, and performance interact and inform each other, and the implications of this for future public policy collaboration. The concluding chapter draws the analysis together, identifying implications for theory and practice, and for policymakers and practitioners. It also proposes the concept of the ‘collaborative self’ (Sullivan, 2015) as a way of better understanding actors’ identity, agency, and performance in collaboration. Throughout, the book draws on a range of public policy cases from the local to the global to illuminate how actors’ experience of collaboration are shared or distinct. It aims to show how understanding the ways which collaboration is employed in different contexts in relation to the same policy problem is as important as exploring the similarities and differences of the utility of collaboration across multiple policy problems in a single context. The book does not attempt to provide a definitive account of comparative collaboration but is concerned to identify and explore those factors that appear to influence the preference for and use of collaboration in public policy.

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Just as public policy is the core expression of policymakers’ efforts to rule and to shape the world in accordance with particular values and ideas, so collaboration is central to our understanding of how they try to do this in the post-modern period at all levels from the local to the global. This book aims to provide the reader with a fuller understanding of the appeal of collaboration, a richer appreciation of the role of human actors and agency, and a more nuanced framework for analysing collaborative possibilities.

References Bice, S., & Sullivan, H. (2014). Public Policy Studies and the ‘Asian Century’: New Orientations, Challenges and Opportunities. Governance, 27, 537–544. Coate, J. (2020). COVID-19 Hotel Quarantine Inquiry, Final Report and Recommendations. Victorian Government Printer. Crouch, C. (2005). Capitalist Diversity and Change. Oxford University Press. Goodin, R. E., Rein, M., & Moran, M. (2008). The Public and its Policies. In M. Moran, M. Rein, & R. E. Goodin (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy. Oxford University Press. Griggs, S., Norval, A.  J., & Wagenaar, H. (2014). Introduction: Democracy, Conflict and Participation in Decentred Governance. In S. Griggs, A. J. Norval, & H.  Wagenaar (Eds.), Practices of Freedom. Decentred Governance, Conflict and Democratic Participation. Cambridge University Press. Gross, J. S. (2017). Hybridization and Urban Governance: Malleability, Modality, or Mind-Set? Urban Affairs Review, 53, 559–577. Head, B. W. (2008). Three Lenses of Evidence-Based Policy. Australian Journal of Public Administration, 67, 1–11. Newman, J., & Clarke, J. (2009). Publics, Politics and Power: Remaking the Public in Public Services. Sage. Oliver, K., & Boaz, A. (2019). Transforming Evidence for Policy and Practice: Creating Space for New Conversations. Palgrave Communications, 5, 60. Olney, S. (2021). Serving the Public, But Not Public Servants? In H.  Sullivan, H. Dickinson, & H. Henderson (Eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of the Public Servant. Springer International Publishing. Olson, M. (1971). The Logic of Collective Action. Harvard University Press. Skelcher, C., Sullivan, H., & Jeffares, S. (2013). Hybrid Governance in European Cities: Neighbourhood, Migration and Democracy. Palgrave Macmillan. Sullivan, H. (2015). Performing a Collaborative Self. In D. Alexander & J. Lewis (Eds.), Making Policy Decisions: Expertise, Skills and Experience. Routledge.

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Sullivan, H., & Skelcher, C. (2002). Working across Boundaries: Collaboration in Public Services. Palgrave. Sullivan, H., Williams, P., & Jeffares, S. (2012). Leadership for Collaboration: Situated Agency in Practice. Public Management Review, 14, 41–66. Sutcliffe, S., & Court, J. (2005). Evidence-Based Policymaking: What is it? How Does it Work? What Relevance for Developing Countries? Sussex: Overseas Development Institute.

CHAPTER 2

A Framework for Analysing Collaboration: Actors, Collaborative Domains, and Public Policy Elements

Introduction This chapter introduces the approach to analysing collaboration used in this book. It begins with a discussion of the importance of collaboration in public policy across time and space. It argues, that while collaboration has always been present in public policy systems, developments in the late twentieth century privileged collaboration, with lasting consequences. The chapter then critiques existing approaches to analysing collaboration and proposes paying greater attention to human agency. The latter part of the chapter describes a framework for analysing collaboration that is attuned to the collaborative context and is responsive to the collaborative conundrum outlined in the Introduction. Collaboration is invariably linked to debates about changes in governance since the last quarter of the twentieth century. These debates tend to be concerned with the ‘hollowing out’ or ‘filling in’ of the nation-state (in politics and public administration), the emergence of a global polity (in international relations), and the identification and promotion of ‘good governance’ (in development). In each case collaboration features as either as a cultural expression of a new way of functioning, an instrument to secure delivery or as a mode of practice in a changed environment. But rarely, possibly excepting ongoing debates about governance networks, is collaboration the focus for analysis. In the discussion that follows collaboration is considered in the context of and in relation to debates about © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 H. Sullivan, Collaboration and Public Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-09585-6_2

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governance. However, the focus is on collaboration and not on the multiple strands and nuances of governance debates, so the material will be explored in a way that facilitates understanding of the evolution of collaboration in public policy. It is important to note that arguments about the presence and/or privileging of collaboration in public policy and politics do not imply the existence of a corresponding body of evidence pertaining to its successes or positive impact. In the same way that ‘first wave’ governance theorists were argued to have put a normative cart before the empirical horse, so too some collaboration scholarship is criticised for its conflation of what ‘ought to be’ with what ‘is’. This book adopts a different stance, arguing that perspectives on collaboration are constituted by and a product of a discursive environment that acknowledges and promotes collaboration in policy and practice. That there may not be a weight of evidence to support arguments made in its favour is of interest because it poses the question of why collaboration should remain a key feature of policy discourse—a question that this book will explore. It is also important to acknowledge that collaboration has a hinterland. It did not emerge fully formed in the late twentieth century as a response to unique conditions. Rather collaboration has been a feature of governing systems at different times and in different places. Its shape and form vary according to the history, traditions, and contexts of specific systems. Acknowledgement of contextual specificity is an important element of any attempt to understand the evolution of collaboration.

Collaboration in Space and Time Collaboration is an integral feature of governmental systems, in as much as all governmental systems include boundaries—organisational, professional, and political—that may need to be crossed to achieve public purpose. So, the creation of departments and policy portfolios inevitably generates the requirement for collaboration, as does the operation of systems with multiple tiers, such as federations. Within nations the spatial proximity of government units, including municipalities and states, usually stimulates demand for collaboration in relation to economic or social goals. This imperative is amplified in regional or international institutions where global political imperatives shape what is possible, for example, the European Union (EU), the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), or the United Nations (UN).

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However, the apparent need for or desirability of collaboration does not necessarily translate into collaborative action as other factors such as political priorities and cultures will influence when and how collaboration will be contemplated. For example, collaboration fits well into political cultures built on coalitions, for example, the Netherlands or associated with participative democracy, like Denmark. In these countries public policymaking and implementation is foundationally a collaborative matter, between state and non-state actors, and/or with citizens. In developing countries across the Global South, powerful, external forces of reform demand collaboration with private sector partners and sometimes with communities. Nonetheless, the dominant administrative traditions in those countries, including how they conceive of the state and its relation to society informed by their experience of colonial rule, shape the ways in which collaboration develops (e.g. Dwivedi and Mishra’s (2005) discussion of India). Distinct traditions, such as Confucianism in China, Japan, and Korea, reciprocity or ‘the economy of affection’ in Tanzania (Hydén, 1980), and the focus on the local as a site of decision-making, for example, ‘Panchayat’ (village council) in India, inform contemporary debates about the role of individuals and communities in social action, sanctioning collaboration between people and with institutions. Importantly, the adoption or promotion of collaboration in the service of policy goals is not without risk, particularly when non-state actors are involved. Wettenhall (2005) recorded relationships between private actors and the state as far back as the sixteenth century when ‘privateer shipping’ was essential to the rise of England as a major sea power—in the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588, 163 of 197 vessels in the English fleet were privately owned. He also gives an account of the way in which prior to the establishment of the institution of the Treasury in nineteenth-century Western Europe, private businessmen acted as accountants contracted to the state—a system which failed partly because it ‘depended on corruption to sustain it’ (2005, p. 28). So, collaboration in its various forms has histories, woven into the traditions and practices of different contexts. As indicated above collaboration is ever-present, but not omnipresent. However, in the last quarter of the twentieth century, the public policy environment changed, with lasting consequences for public policy and collaboration.

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Privileging Collaboration In the 1990s collaboration, or ‘partnership’ as the language of the time dictated it, comprised a key element of ‘the third way’, and much policy activity in Europe, the US, and further afield centred on designing collaboration into programs, institutions, and even evaluation. In some countries, notably, the UK, the promotion of ‘partnership’ was a normative act that complemented the ‘third way’ discourse (Giddens, 1998). Partnership was identified as something ‘other’, an intervention seeking to disrupt the mainstream, though it was never entirely clear whether the end point was a fully refashioned public policy system built on collaborative governance or whether an augmented system was the preferred state. Collaboration’s ubiquity in the policy sphere generated considerable interest amongst academics keen to examine the evidence supporting collaborative action, the potential and limits of collaboration, and the conditions in which it could be successful (Hudson & Hardy, 2002; Kickert et al., 1997; Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002). Despite the volume of research undertaken and publications produced, scepticism persisted about the value of collaboration. This arose partly because academic debates often occurred at the meta-level with insufficient attention paid to the contextual specificities of the empirical evidence, for example, in analyses of ‘network governance’. Equally important was the developing debate between academics who considered collaboration essential to meet contemporary policy challenges (van Bueren et al., 2003) and those who questioned the lack of evidence of its achievements (Powell et al., 2001).

Crisis and Collaboration The Global Financial Crisis (GFC) in 2007/2008 interrupted these norms of privileging collaboration in policymaking and practice and provided an opportunity for new norms to emerge in the context of austerity. The emergence of the Group of Twenty (G20), an intergovernmental forum comprising 19 countries, and the EU provides an example of the development of new norms. Established in 1999 in the wake of the Asian Financial Crisis and comprising finance ministers, the GFC a decade later prompted the inclusion of heads of state and government into the intergovernmental forum, raising its status to one of the most powerful forums

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addressing global economic health. The establishment of the G20 was an expression of the application of collaboration in extraordinary circumstances, a temporary intervention that would likely ebb away once normal conditions return. Instead, the G20 evolved into a key institution for developing longer-term strategies for global economic growth. The development of various non-state actor groups—B20, C20, T20, Y20, etc., point to its significance and the breadth and depth of collaboration associated with the G20. In contrast to the privileging of collaboration in the late 1990s, the G20 was conceived as a way of responding to complex and cross-jurisdictional challenges, but with a clear acceptance of existing boundaries, in this case those of nation-states, with the intent to build on them, rather than seeking to diminish them. Austerity generated other examples within nation-states. The UK Coalition Government’s ‘Program for Government’ published shortly after the 2010 General Election (HM Government, 2010) characterised austerity in the UK under the Coalition as a collaborative affair. It was a governmental program devised by a collaboration—a Coalition Government—that emphasised the involvement of non-state actors in the design and delivery of services, embracing marketisation for the National Health Service, new philanthropic models, mutuals and social enterprises, and citizen collaboration, advanced by the slogan ‘Big Society’. Notable is the intensely normative nature of proposed collaboration. Integral to the program is a preference for private actors and marketisation, and active citizenship, but it is framed within a narrative that presents collaboration as post-political—a common-sense response to conditions. These contingent and politically constructed articulations are not particular to collaboration, but it is significant that collaboration is identified as the appropriate vehicle for their expression. An academic review of potential ‘collaborative futures’ conducted during that period confirmed the continued appeal of collaboration to policymakers, but proposed that pre-austerity collaborative discourses had adapted to the new circumstances and evolved into new discursive formations (Sullivan et al., 2013). A decade on, collaboration remains an integral part of public policymaking and administration, with its adaptive capacity evident in the context of a new crisis, that of COVID-19.

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In sum, even though the 1990s ‘collaborative moment’1 has passed, the policies and practices privileged at that time proved resilient and adaptive in changing circumstances. This was enabled by the evolution and convergence of several trends. These are discussed below.

Governance, Structures, and Collaboration Neoliberalism and New Public Management The cluster of policies that became known as the ‘New Public Management’ (NPM) marked an important point in the popularisation of collaboration. The focus of NPM on efficiency in public services supported the preferment of marketisation and private or voluntary sector engagement in delivery. Initially exemplified through the enthusiasm for ‘contracting out’ of services, marketisation later included a range of policy instruments that referenced collaboration as offering a superior relationship to that of purchaser and provider. Public private partnerships, joint ventures, and a host of other multi-sector arrangements aimed to engage non-state actors in new relationships with the state, relationships that were sometimes underpinned by contracts, but which promised more than economic exchange. While enthusiasm for the strictures of NPM faded, to be replaced by any number of alternative labels including new public governance, post-­ Weberian state, and the public value state, the preference for the involvement of non-state actors in public policy and public services persisted, and in some cases intensified, in the period of austerity that followed the GFC.  Research by Davies and colleagues into the fate of collaborative urban governance under austerity in eight cities (Athens, Baltimore, Barcelona, Dublin, Leicester, Melbourne, Montreal, and Nantes) found evidence of state-led collaboration, state-supported collaboration, and the replacement of the state by non-state actors and communities (Davies et al., 2022). This continued enthusiasm is also evident in the attention paid to the role of philanthropy in supporting innovation in public policy and public services. Some philanthropic individuals and institutions moved away from their role as ‘grant giver’, choosing instead to position themselves as strategic investors in the achievement of social outcomes. This 1  Term coined by Professor David Howarth, cited in Davies, J. 2021. Between Realism and Revolt: Governing Cities in the Crisis of Neoliberal Globalism, Bristol University Press, p. 5.

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‘philanthrocapitalism’ is expressed in a variety of ways but in public policy is probably most closely associated with ‘Social Impact Bonds’. These are agreements between philanthropists, service providers, and governments in which private money is invested in innovative public services to address particularly challenging policy problems, for example, recidivism. Government pays for results achieved. These are controversial financial instruments, but they are nonetheless popular with policymakers in a variety of contexts. According to the Government Outcomes Lab, as of January 2022, 226 Social Impact Bonds were operating across 34 countries.2 NPM recast citizens as customers of public policy and services. Governments were criticised for presiding over bureaucracies that were unresponsive to citizens’ needs and run in the interests of public servants. The market model of public service delivery redefined the relationship between professional/bureaucrat and citizen as one between providers and customers, to change the power relation between them. Collaboration was invoked as a means of developing this new relationship and the language of partnership became associated with it. For some the increased emphasis on forms of collaboration was a reaction to the institutional fragmentation that occurred under NPM as governments tried to secure efficiency through creating arms-length bodies, devolving responsibilities and marketising services. For others it reflected the new realities of late modern governing; that policy challenges required the engagement of multiple actors with the state steering as best as it could. Globalisation and Re-scaling Governance While NPM forced governments to reconsider their internal organisation and functioning, other forces began to impact on governments’ ability to make decisions about policy issues. The global span of policy challenges, such as climate change, security, and public health, focused attention on international institutions to address them. At the same time a growing impetus for local action meant that many governments began to experiment with devolved institutions, sometimes to the neighbourhood level. These developments coupled with the involvement of multiple actors in policy decisions combined to re-scale governance vertically and 2  https://golab.bsg.ox.ac.uk/knowledge-bank/indigo/impact-bond-dataset-v2/. Accessed 30 January 2022.

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horizontally and created a collaboration challenge for governments involved in managing these different tiers and spheres of governance. This governance re-scaling not only challenged the appropriateness of existing institutional formations but also questioned established definitions of public policy. Boundaries between public, foreign, and defence policy were rethought as attempts to address key problems such as human security could not be contained within national boundaries or policy spheres but required action across each (Bice et al., 2018). The rise in populism in the 2010s and the accompanying nationalism were a rebuff to globalisation and re-scaling efforts. The goal became the restoration of ‘the nation’ in the name of ‘the people’, new social identities shaped by education and social conservatism. COVID-19 both intensified and diluted these developments. The race to develop a vaccine exemplified the human impulse to cooperation and competition identified by Sennett (2012, see below) and expressed through the work of researchers whose participation in a global scholarly network enhances their capability and that of their local laboratories. At the same time governments sought to secure the vaccine for ‘their people’, too often with little regard for coordinating international action to ensure access to the vaccine is available in poor as well as rich states. Co-governance Alongside reforms that embraced a range of non-state actors, were reforms that attempted to reconnect citizens and communities to their governing institutions. In democratic societies these reforms were a response to evidence of a growing disconnect between politicians and publics, and a lack of confidence and trust by the latter in the former and in the work of government. They are part of a wider debate about the sustainability of representative government and the merits of more participatory approaches to decision-making. Integral to more participatory governance is an assumption that citizens are prepared to get more involved in governing (representative systems are predicated on the basis that citizens have limited appetite for this), to be active rather than passive agents in decision-making. In non-democratic states co-governance’s appeal is similarly orientated towards a more responsive state and involving service users and beneficiaries directly in provider-user relationships, for example, rural-urban

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co-­governance in China (Ye & Liu, 2020) and rural stakeholder engagement in Vietnam (Powell et al., 2011) Governments of all kinds have developed instruments to try and reconnect with citizens and communities, and more particularly to bring citizens into decision-making about policies or services that directly affect them. These reforms go by several names: public engagement, public participation, empowerment, user-led decision-making, etc. The most recent label is ‘co-governance’. Its significance is the explicit reference to governing as a collaborative act. This does not imply that the public are equal partners in co-governance, but it affords citizens and communities greater status and agency in these relationships. Austerity, populism, and COVID-19 each inflected ‘co-governance’ in distinct ways. In the UK the early years of austerity were marked by a short-lived government policy—the ‘Big Society’, which exhorted citizens to come together to provide social and other supports that the state was withdrawing from. For populists’ co-governance afforded power to particular social groups and excluded others. COVID-19 recast co-­governance as collective action; people, state, and non-state actors observing new social rules and norms to minimise the spread of the disease. Digital Governance The potential and limits of the ‘digital age’, and its implications for public policy and public services, is firmly embedded in contemporary discourses of public administration. From being a new tool in governmental toolboxes to enable e-government, advances in the digital realm including the scope and scale of the Internet, social media, and now ‘big data’ offer a dizzying array of possibilities including the application of artificial intelligence and robotics in the design and delivery of public services. These advances provide a powerful means for facilitating collaboration across all aspects of life. Digital resources are identified as integral to a range of collaborative innovations including: • collaborative consumption—using technology to reinvent market behaviours and apply them on a scale only possible because of the Internet, for example, eBay • the collaborative economy—matching needs and haves bypassing ‘middlemen’, for example, Kickstarter

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• the sharing economy—peer to peer sharing of otherwise underutilised resources, for example, car-sharing • collaborative lobbying—online petitioning, for example, Change.org • co-production—user involvement in service design, for example, Australia’s National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) These developments create regulatory challenges and ethical dilemmas for governments and public policy in interactions that do not involve them as primary agents as well as those that do. Digital capability can facilitate the provision of improved information about services for users, but it also permits providers to try and shape users’ preferences. This is exemplified in the now ubiquitous suggestions that appear in digital feeds about products or services that might appeal based on browsing histories. Perspectives on the ‘end-game’ for digital era governance vary enormously with collaboration implicated in different ways. For some observers advances in digital capability remind us of how interconnected we all are, albeit virtually. Rifkin (2010) argues that this interconnectivity and the collaboration it sponsors could be the precursor to a new age of empathy as it ‘is quickly extending the central nervous system of billions of human beings and connecting the human race across time and space allowing empathy to flourish on a global scale for the first time in history’ (p. 3). For that to happen though requires a meaningful reason for us all to be connected—beyond simply because we can or for economic benefit, but for the purposes of sustaining our biosphere. Others are more circumspect suggesting that digital capability can facilitate collaboration between actors but also encourage competition. For example, Hocking and Melissen (2015) argue that in the context of the complex webs of international diplomacy, ‘digitalization, in the form of cyber-security and Internet freedom, will lead to growing disputes between geopolitical rivals—as much as enhancing collaboration between like-­ minded states’ (p. 29) Fisher (2015) suggests that combining diplomacy with data science will generate ‘data-driven diplomacy’ as more and more complex data can be assembled to support policy positions. This collaboration between diplomacy and data science could be used to encourage collaboration or competition between countries. Others adopt a pessimistic stance. For example, Zuboff (2019) argues that advances in digital technology have been harnessed to enable the advent of ‘the age of surveillance capitalism’, an era in which human users

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of technology become the raw material for a new industrial system with its attendant political and social institutions. Collaboration disappears to be replaced by co-option enabled and sustained through digitally facilitated social pressure. Unlike Rifkin’s focus on empathy, Zuboff explores the preoccupation of leading data scientists with mimicry as the defining feature of human existence. Peer pressure powers adoption of new behaviours.

Collaboration as a Necessary Response The discussion so far suggests that collaboration embedded itself in public policy systems following structural change in economic patterns, social relations, and/or institutions. In the face of increasing interdependence and diversity, collaboration was and is a necessary response, manifest in hybrid relationships and institutions. This discussion is often read as justifying the instrumental utility of collaboration—it is a means to a policy end. However, it can also be read as a pointer to the cultural utility of collaboration. Collaboration becomes the default response to a public policy question; it is, ‘the way we do things’— a cultural preference rather than a purely functional one. An early example of this use is contained in a Welsh policy paper, Sustainable Social Services for Wales: A Framework for Action (2011). The paper claims, ‘We want to change the question from “how might we cooperate across boundaries?” to justifying why we are not’ (p. 11). Introducing culture into the discussion of ‘why collaboration?’ moves the focus of analysis to include the role of human agency. Individuals and groups are central to the creation and operation of collaboration, and their agency may be applied positively and negatively to support or limit the collaborative effort. Dickinson (2014) made important steps in demonstrating how a focus on culture and agency enhances understanding of ‘why collaboration?’. Drawing on the work of Mckenzie (2001), she argues that too little attention has been paid to ‘efficacy’ as a domain of collaborative performance. Unlike organisational performance (cost/benefits, achievement of outcomes) or technological performance (use of information technology), efficacy focuses on cultural performance, the use of symbolic, rhetorical, and normative tools to create and maintain an expectation of/for collaboration. Efficacy is not simply another structural explanation as it requires attention to the human in developing symbols and creating and

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communicating rhetorical and normative claims. Efficacy is performed through practice. It relies on human agency to enliven collaborative structures and relationships. This is not an argument that presumes human actors valorise collaboration, though some may do (more of that below). Rather it is an argument that human actors read and respond to the environments they find themselves in and have had a hand in creating. Collaborative efficacy is constituted from the interaction of structural and agentic forces, though too little attention has been paid to the role of agency, a deficit that Dickinson’s book starts to address. This leads into an engagement with human predisposition (or not) towards collaboration, the age-old argument between conservatives and progressives about the nature of the human condition and the competitive/cooperative division. This debate is relevant to an understanding of collaboration and public policy because it adds weight to the role of human agents and their motivation in collaborating. Sennett’s (2012) work on cooperation offers helpful insights into the human condition, suggesting that cooperation and competition are two sides of the same coin, both indispensable as ways of describing the human condition. Arguably the relentless emphasis on competition as a way of ordering individuals in society and particularly in work, without a corresponding appreciation of the importance of cooperation, has resulted in individuals seeking out opportunities for collaborative working, to fulfil that aspect of their character. Of course, these categorisations are based in Western understandings of individual character and social life. Alternative perspectives may be found in countries with very different traditions, for example, South Korea, India, or the People’s Republic of China, but evidence of a relationship between individual effort and cooperative action exists, nonetheless. Understanding collaboration then requires a different approach, one that pays appropriate attention to human agency and culture as well as taking account of the multiple sites and spaces of contemporary public policy.

A New Approach to Analysing Collaboration What follows is a proposed approach to analysing collaboration that departs from the mainstream instrumental focus on purpose, process, structure, and outcome, and instead proposes a multifaceted approach

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that affords collaboration an affective as well as effective value and situates actors and agency at the centre of collaborative action. The intention here is neither to suggest that other kinds of analysis are irrelevant, nor to provide a range of factors that can be measured, and judgement made about the quality of the collaboration. Rather it is to direct attention towards some of the hitherto neglected aspects of collaboration and to encourage consideration of these in developing new knowledge about and more rounded understandings of human agency in collaboration. The analytical base comprises four domains that between them cover the range of functions collaborations perform in public policy: the political domain (what collaborations are for), the material domain (what collaborations do), the cultural domain (what collaborations mean), and the spatial domain (what shape collaborations take). Multiple public policy elements function across these domains giving form and expression to collaboration and enabling a deeper and more rounded exploration of what happens in public policy collaborations. These elements are ideas, rules, ethics, expertise, emotions, objects, and practice (Fig.  2.1). The Ideas

Material domain

Public Policy Elements

Practice Objects

Cultural domain

Rules Ethics

Spatial domain

Emotions

Expertise

Fig. 2.1  Framework for analysing collaboration and public policy

Actors and Agency

Actors and Agency

Political domain

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domains and elements are introduced here, and the following chapters explore the influence of the different domains on collaboration, the interactions of each element with collaboration, and the presence and impact of and on agency. The Political Any analysis of collaboration and public policy needs to begin with an appreciation of collaboration as a political act. Collaboration always and everywhere is deployed in the service of political goals, operates in political contexts, and is performed by political actors. It may seem odd to have to begin with the assertion that collaboration is political but the recent history of collaboration and public policy in some countries is one of politics formally denied or at least diluted. Collaboration and the various instruments associated with it, such as public-­private partnerships, policy networks, or user-provider forums, are noted and often valorised for their ‘non-political’ character. What is meant by this varies, from an absence of ‘party-politics’ in collaborative deliberations or simply an absence of politicians. However specified, these innovative instruments promised a broadening of governance to a variety of state and non-state actors in support of shared societal goals. Others saw these developments as an expression of a new form of statecraft summarised as ‘depoliticisation’, or ‘the process of placing at one remove the political character of decision-making’ (Burnham, 2001, p. 136). In contrast to the advocates of ‘the third way’ who promoted collaboration as one way of extending and deepening the influence of non-­ governmental actors over decision-making, political scientists like Burnham regarded collaboration as one more expression of a process by which ‘state managers retain arm’s-length control over crucial economic processes whilst benefiting from the distancing effect of depoliticisation’ (p. 136). This clouds accountability and contributes to altering citizens’ ‘expectations regarding the effectiveness and credibility of policy-making’ (p. 137). Theoretical and empirical support for depoliticisation is manifest in discussions about ‘meta-governance’. While the term has multiple and often contrary definitions, one strand focuses on meta-governance as a new role for the state in steering ‘governance networks’ (see Gjaltema et al. (2020) for a discussion).

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This book reasserts the role of politics in collaboration, embracing the political decisions and consequences of ‘depoliticisation’ in its various forms. It is through processes of political debate and exchange that policymakers identify collaboration as the means to realise public policy goals. Political exchange involves the interplay of ideas, power, and values amongst institutions and actors and the resolution to act or not in support of a particular public policy goal. Political demands for or resistance to proposed collaboration come also from those at the margins of the policy process, but deeply affected by the outcomes, for example, victims of family violence, poor communities, or disenfranchised populations. The book challenges the alignment of collaboration with the operation of network governance; the reduction of collaboration to a tool of neoliberal hegemony, or of a communitarian agenda; and the primacy afforded to individualism. Instead, it acknowledges collaboration’s operation across different modes of governance (hierarchies, markets, and networks), its shape, forms, and rules contingent upon the prevailing context, with the capacity to facilitate the expression of collective not just individual agency. A focus on the political enables an examination of how collaboration is designed in the context of prevailing power relations, with particular emphasis on the respective power of the state (local, national, supra-­ national) vis-à-vis non-state actors including the private and not-for-profit sectors as well as citizens and communities. It offers an opportunity to examine how old and new ideas enter political debates to inform and influence decisions about the use and form of collaboration, and the role of expertise and ethics in facilitating the passage of ideas. It also illustrates collaboration’s use as a political practice designed to promote or reflect particular social and cultural relations and associated values. This last is particularly important in revealing how particular attributes, such as consensus, are associated with collaboration and others, such as conflict, disassociated, and these associations normalised. The Material The material domain embraces what collaborations do, the tangible expression of their purpose. Collaborative action includes inter alia: development and implementation of joint strategies, initiation of new policies and practices, establishment of new/enhanced services and products, building new institutions, agreeing new treaties, etc. It also includes collaborative activities that enable collaborative action, for example, meetings.

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The material domain contains the resources for collaborative action (tangible and non-tangible); the combination of institutional, physical, monetary, and human resources that are assigned to the achievement of collaborative goals. How these resources are used is contingent on prevailing rules and ethics, forms of expertise, and established practices. Focusing on the material domain enables the examination of how these resources combine to generate collaborative capacity and the factors that promote or inhibit it (Sullivan et al., 2002). The material domain of collaboration is the one we think we know most about partly because it is what is observable, and it is what we are encouraged to look for (‘successes’ or ‘failure’). It is also because of the considerable resources allocated by governments and others for research into and evaluation of collaborative action. The evidence-based policy movement and its emphasis on research that illuminated ‘what works’ encouraged a focus on the material aspects of collaboration, that is, the activities and their contribution to policy goals. This technocratic perspective privileged a specific kind of collaborative performance, one that focused on collaboration as an instrument. In so doing it contributed to the depoliticising of collaboration. Developing a full understanding of the material domain of collaboration requires consideration of both structure and agency. Structure is illuminated by reference to key legal and financial institutions and embedded in relations of authority and control. In the context of collaboration, these can be mobilised in the guise of government reforms and policy instruments that create new strategic and organisational vehicles, redirect finances, reconfigure services, and promote ‘partnership’ behaviours in public services. They can require or encourage the inclusion or targeting of service user communities, citizens, or groups, to promote inclusion, equity, or control. These structural features contribute to the shape that collaborations take, and so are included in the ‘spatial domain’ (below). Agency by contrast is the ability to set and pursue one’s own goals and interests, which maybe individual or societal. Agency focuses attention on action, what motivates it, what influences the choice of action, and what constrains or confines it. These influencing factors take many forms. They may be relational, as actions are, at least in part, a product of individual agents’ interactions with others. They may be structural as actors have ‘subjective perceptions of the structures they have to negotiate, which affect how they act’ (Evans, 2002, p. 252). These influencing factors may also be temporal—processes of social engagement in which past habits and

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routines are contextualised and future possibilities envisaged within the contingencies of the present moment (Emirbayer & Mische, 1998). This book’s focus on ‘situated agency’ (see Introduction) does not deny the contribution of structure but rather acknowledges that studies of collaboration regularly point to the work of agents as integral to collaborative achievement. ‘Situated agency’ is a helpful way of exploring the material aspects of collaboration as it allows for consideration of both macro and micro relationships (Sullivan et al., 2012). The Cultural The cultural domain allows us to examine how actors take, create, and communicate meaning from and through collaboration. It focuses attention on the symbolic, rhetorical, and normative tools available to actors, the personal and professional resources they draw on to make sense of collaboration, and how these combine to generate collaborative practices. The cultural domain is the source of collaborative efficacy and cultural performance, referred to earlier in this chapter. Dickinson and Sullivan (2013) extend this discussion to build an account of the components and capacity of cultural performance in collaboration. They argue that ‘[c]ultural performance privileges social efficacy, the constitution of meaning and affirmation of values that is achieved via an engagement with social norms’ p. 164). It affords a different view of collaboration, exploring it as ‘a performance act, interactional in nature and involving symbolic forms and live bodies, [that] provides a way to constitute meaning and affirm individual and cultural values’ (Stern & Henderson, 1993, p. 3, quoted in Dickinson & Sullivan, p. 165). Dickinson and Sullivan draw from McKenzie’s (2001) use of Performance Studies to illustrate how cultural performance operates through staged or ritualised representations or enactments of particular social and cultural traditions, and note that cultural performances, ‘may be transformative or transgressive, encouraging and securing conformance to a set of traditions and values or promoting subversion of those same traditions and values in pursuit of others. Cultural performance then can offer the means of both reaffirmation and resistance’ (p. 164). Exploring collaboration through the lens of cultural performance offers the opportunity to consider alternative explanations for why actors collaborate, going beyond rational motivations for collaboration, drawing instead on attachments to values or meanings. This could provide new

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perspectives on why actors choose, or continue to rely on, collaboration despite an absence of evidence that it ‘works’. Dickinson and Sullivan (2013) identify several areas of enquiry that contribute to understanding actors, agency, and cultural performance. These are language, symbols and objects, emotions, practices, and identity. They are not presented as exhaustive or exclusive but rather as important pathways into cultural performance. Each of these is a focus of attention in this book, either within a chapter, so language is examined in the chapter on Ideas, as a chapter, so there are chapters on objects, emotions, and practice, or as a theme running throughout the book, for example, identity. They are each present in different ways in the four domains of collaboration, although the area of emotions is most firmly located in the cultural domain. Connolly’s (1999) work is helpful here. He refers to the way in which emotions and disposition inform the micropolitics of public action. He focuses on what he calls the ‘visceral domain’—the unsettling of which can affect individual disposition and influence their responses to change. Consideration of the ‘visceral register’ is relevant to collaboration as it is in collaborative exchanges that individuals are likely to experience feeling of panic or fear—bodily feelings which emerge when established identities are challenged. The anxiety this generates may be productive but may also be experienced otherwise, either way these situations are emotionally affective. The affective capacity of collaboration (and its emotional content) is in the cultural domain. The cultural domain is also important to collaborative actors’ sense of identity. Identity matters because the process and practice of collaboration can unsettle and threaten to disrupt established identities, whether the expert professional identities of individual practitioners, the political identities of elected officials, or the institutional identities of partner organisations. Equally collaboration can act to reinforce pre-existing identities or constitute new ones, professionally, politically, and institutionally. Questions of identity cut across the political (risks to existing power bases) and the cultural (consequences of diminution of professional status) but remain under-investigated in studies of collaboration. The Spatial Collaborations are designed and developed within a set of spatial relations. For example, neighbourhood partnerships operate in spaces proximate to

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‘local’ communities, determined by policymakers working at national, regional, and/or international scales. Likewise, global governance institutions sit internationally, but their design and operation are shaped by the spatial relations with nation-states and trans-global non-state actors. Collaborations also create new spatial relations through their existence and activities. These relations may arise from contestation between participants in the collaboration, resistance to the ambitions of policy designers, or creative exchanges within and beyond the collaboration into other spaces. Space and spatial relationships then are dynamic, actively engaged in the production of social relations as well as representing its result (Massey, 1994, p. 4). The ‘spatial’ is a point in time construct of the myriad social/ power relationships at play, experienced by social actors as ‘now’. Massey argues for the concept ‘space-time’ in acknowledgement of this dynamic that demands mobility and contingency. This is helpful for understanding collaboration as it enables consideration of past and future as well as present. The definition of space as constructed and dynamic rather than given and fixed raises questions about the nature of boundaries and the politics of space. Despite or perhaps because of this dynamism, actors are constantly engaged in attempts to ‘fix’ space through establishing boundaries. Politically this is evident in the contestation for control over the naming of space, through campaigns to claim the identity of a nation or a locality for certain people and values and against others. The politics of place demands fixity not fluidity. Contested or claimed space may be tangible and physical—a geographical area, a building, the human body; or it may be intangible, digital space, communication space; or it may be imagined, a future state. All are subject to the creation of boundaries. Public policy is deeply implicated in the construction of space. The idea of ‘place-shaping’ regularly emerges as an ambition for public policymakers keen to revitalise deprived neighbourhoods. Commonly associated with urban policy and planning ‘place-shaping’ is also allied to collaboration, either with communities in those places and/or with other non-state actors. Inherent in the application of the idea of place-shaping is a power dynamic that influences the shaping of space and by whom. In the context of ambitions to collaborate, this power dynamic can generate powerful emotional responses. As described above boundaries are expressions of attempts to stabilise meaning, to secure an identity or identities, attempts which are themselves engagements in social contests over who has power to name. This has

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resonance in the context of public policy collaboration where policy actors (state and non-state) seek to shape space and social identities for purposes. However as already noted the act of collaboration itself creates space. These may be mental, institutional, and/or physical spaces in and from which to think, engage, and to act, to address a particular challenge or meet a specific need. The creation of boundaries therefore is an act of both inclusion and exclusion and boundaries invariably place people and things at margins, on the boundary. For some, the space of the margin is a radical space, a site offering room for voice and resistance (hooks, 1991). In collaboration the role of boundary-spanners is essential to enable actors work together effectively (Williams, 2012). These actors can navigate across different boundaries but may feel themselves to be held in the margins. Whether they experience this positively or negatively rather depends on how comfortable they are within or without organisations (see Chap. 6). The politics of space and boundaries is also evident in differentiation of collaboration by scale. Collaborations exist at multiple levels from the local to the global and these scalar differences confer opportunities and challenges. Scale, like space, is not given and fixed, but different scales are created and populated according to the different formations of power and social relations at any point in time. For example, Valentine (2013) emphasises the ways in which dominant ideas privilege particular scales, citing the sustained focus in geography on nation-states and community, rather than the body or the home. Scales generate boundaries, and these have political consequences as they too include/exclude, rendering collaborations more or less accessible and legible. Papanastasiou (2017) considers that public administration has failed to take proper account of the relationship between scale and politics, preferring to treat scale as a descriptor rather than a political concept. She argues that this inhibits our understanding of how public policy is promoted, adopted, adapted, or resisted. Acknowledging scale as a ‘fundamentally political concept’ allows for it to be malleable, open to construction by social actors who use their agency to reshape scale, a practice she terms ‘scale craft’. Papanastasiou’s contribution is valuable to our examination of collaboration and public policy as it highlights the role of social actors and their agency, and points to the interaction and interdependence of ‘the spatial’ with ‘the political, cultural, and material domains’ in this book.

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The spatial domain is the locus for examining the shape that collaboration takes. Space and scale interact with agency to constitute the physical, institutional, and communicative forms of collaboration. It highlights the role of boundaries in giving life to collaborative possibility (and limits) but also highlights their temporality and contestation.

Elements Collaboration is a product of and a contributor to the political, material, cultural, and spatial domains. Public policy elements act within and across these domains. Analysing collaboration through these elements supports a more rounded exploration of collaboration and public policy. The elements chosen rarely feature in analytical frameworks for collaboration, and certainly not together. All are important as constitutive of or expressive of human agency. Some are what might be called foundational elements, that is, elements that underpin other features more frequently associated with collaboration. So ‘leadership’ comprises a number of elements including ethics, emotions, and expertise, but analysis of leadership in the context of collaboration often fails to explore these foundational elements in any detail (Sullivan et al., 2012). Other elements are central to any kind of collaborative action, for example rules and practice. Finally, some were selected because their significance in collaboration has not been fully acknowledged nor explored, for example, ideas and objects. Ideas Ideas shape public policy and are integral to the political domain. They function as generative and adaptive resources for actors enabling them to imagine new futures, framing possibilities and closing off others (Skelcher et al., 2013). Ideas also have a normative function, offering a template for required changes to rules and practices, and identifying the consequences of acting in one way or another. Ideas are one component in the causal models used to mobilise governments to reform. Collaboration is often employed in the service of ‘ideas’, such as ‘innovation’, ‘co-production’, or ‘place-based services’. Schön (1971) uses the phrase ‘ideas in good currency’ to capture the mobilising force of such conceptions. Any such force is also influenced by the cultural domain. Ideas offer a linguistic resource to legitimise change. They can provide a solution to material problems, supplanting the prevailing ideational

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framework, and promoting actions, manifest in the material and spatial domains. This highlights the relationship between ideas, discourses, and language in developing collaborative discourses (Sullivan et al., 2013). Rules Rules underpin institutions and provide coherence and stability for action. They act to frame the boundaries for action and to regulate conduct. Rules provide important continuity for public policy practice but are also permeable and amenable to change, as opposed to being given and fixed. Collaborations are themselves composed of rules that afford the possibility of joint action by multiple actors. Rules are important shapers of possibility in public policy collaboration. They provide the foundation for bringing actors together and creating a framework within which to operate. Where there is misalignment of rules and collaborative imperatives, rules can act as ‘institutional prisons’, denying the possibility of joint action (Barnes et al., 2007). Rules facilitate and constrain action in areas of conflict and contestation and create possibilities for action at a time of crisis. In collaboration rules are experienced primarily in the material and spatial domains. The political and cultural domains are influential in shaping how rules evolve. Ethics Ethics offers value-based answers to questions about why and how to govern and provides a framework for working out what action is permissible given available information. Questions of ethics in public policy systems are addressed in relation to the prevailing philosophical and other traditions, recognising that the diversity, complexity, and interconnectedness of the contemporary public policy system is disruptive of these traditions. Ethics is then rooted in the political and cultural domains. Collaboration is both a response to this changed public policy context and a disruptive force as it draws together diverse institutions and actors. This raises the question of how to protect and promote ethical public policy in collaborative contexts. Part of the answer lies in actors’ ethical identity and agency, and how this is experienced in collaboration. This will be shaped by the cultural domain, and manifest in the spatial and material domains.

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Expertise Expertise combines high levels of knowledge and skill with experience. It is held and performed by individual actors (‘experts’) and shapes their identities and agency. Expertise is fundamental to good public policy. Without it, political priorities may never be turned into sound policy programs. It exists in (mostly) healthy tension with political aspiration (ideas/ ideology). Collaboration interrupts established expert identities and agency. It enables/requires access to different sources of expertise, for example, technical, professional, political, or lay, raising important questions about power and agency (the political domain). It demands specific expertise to enable collaboration and requires this expertise to interact with other kinds (the material and spatial domains). It also raises questions about actors’ disposition or collaborative mindset, and the implications of this for their identities and the potential and limits of collaboration (the cultural domain). Emotions Emotions occupy a difficult place in public policy. Traditional readings of politics and philosophy view emotions as at best at odds with and usually ‘beneath’ the capacity for reason. They focus on emotions as uncontrolled expressions of strong feelings. These readings fail to account for the accepted inclusion of some emotions in public policy and administration. They also focus on emotions as instrumental rather than affective. Emotions are the source of affect in collaborative relationships. It is here that it is possible to examine how and why individuals respond in particular ways to collaborative opportunities or demands, the way in which they represent these responses, for example, as ethical challenges, or opportunities to improve services for users, and the consequences these responses have for collaborative possibilities. Emotions are at work across the four domains, shaping the purpose of collaboration (the political domain), influenced by the meaning assigned to collaboration (the cultural domain), and activated by the activities and form of collaboration (the material and spatial domains).

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Objects Objects are defined here as entities with material force or power. They may be tangible and visible, for example, an artefact, article, body, phenomenon, or thing. The policy document is probably the most ubiquitous object in public administration. Objects may also be intangible and invisible, for example, a concept, discourse, or model. They may be defined by their specific properties and by their relations with the properties of others. Objects are present in all social contexts, so what is of interest in this book is what properties or qualities make an object significant or relevant in the context of public policy collaboration, and their representation in each of the four domains. Particular attention is paid to ‘boundary objects’, how they feature in collaboration and the affordances they offer actors. Practice Practices are ‘specific configurations of action, norms and knowledge’, often undertaken with others, and with ‘reference to norms and standards that others, both participant and non-participant, will recognise’ (Freeman et al., 2011, p. 128). So, all practice is to some extent interaction. Practices are vital elements of collaboration as so much of what is achieved in collaboration requires action, or interaction, between individuals, or between human and non-human actants. In addition, collaboration can be analysed as practice—it is active and dynamic, focused on making change and in so doing being changed—including learning through practice (practising collaboration). Practice and practices are most evident in the material domain—what collaborations do. However, they are also present in the political and cultural domains, reflecting the purpose and meaning of collaboration, and the spatial domain, adapting to the shape and form of collaboration. In the chapters that follow, collaboration is explored with the aim of delineating and distinguishing the significance of the four domains, illuminating the contribution of each of the public policy elements, and offering a more rounded account of the influence of actors’ agency. The chapters draw on a variety of examples with some common across chapters. The concluding chapter draws the analysis together and considers what it offers to research and practice of public policy collaboration, including proposing a renewed focus on human agency through the identity and performance of the ‘collaborative self’ (Sullivan, 2015).

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References Barnes, M., Newman, J., & Sullivan, H. (2007). Power, Participation and Political Renewal: Case Studies in Public Participation. Policy Press. Bice, S., Poole, A., & Sullivan, H. (Eds.). (2018). Public Policy in the Asian Century. Concepts, Cases and Futures. Palgrave Macmillan. Burnham, P. (2001). New Labour and the Politics of Depoliticisation. The British Journal of Politics & International Relations, 3, 127–149. Connolly, W. E. (1999). Why I Am Not a Secularist. University of Minnesota Press. Davies, J. S., Blanco, I., Bua, A., Chorianopoulos, I., Cortina-Oriol, M., Feandeiro, A., Gaynor, N., Gleeson, B., Griggs, S., Hamel, P., Henderson, H., Howarth, D., Keil, R., Pill, M., Salazar, Y. and H. Sullivan (2022). New Developments in Urban Governance: Rethinking Collaboration in the Age of Austerity. Policy Press. Dickinson, H. (2014). Performing Governance—Partnerships, Culture and New Labour. Palgrave Macmillan. Dickinson, H., & Sullivan, H. (2013). Towards a General Theory of Collaborative Performance: The Importance of Efficacy and Agency. Public Administration, 92, 161–177. Dwivedi, O. P., & Mishra, D. S. (2005). A Good Governance Model for India: Search from Within. Indian Journal of Public Administration, 51, 719–758. Emirbayer, M., & Mische, A. (1998). What Is Agency? American Journal of Sociology, 103, 962–1023. Evans, K. (2002). Taking Control of Their Lives? Agency in Young Adult Transitions in England and the New Germany. Journal of Youth Studies, 5, 245–269. Fisher, A. (2015). Data-Driven Diplomacy: A Practical Guide. CPD Blog [Online]. University of Southern California Centre on Public Diplomacy, Retrieved February 23, 2017. Freeman, R., Griggs, S., & Boaz, A. (2011). The Practice of Policy Making. Evidence and Policy, 7, 127–136. Giddens, A. (1998). The Third Way: The Renewal of Social Democracy. Polity Press. Gjaltema, J., Biesbroek, R., & Termeer, A.  K. (2020). From Government to Governance…to Meta-governance: A Systematic Literature Review. Public Management Review, 22, 1760–1780. Cabinet Office (2010). The Coalition. Our Programme for Government. H M Government, Crown Copyright. Welsh Assembly Government (2011). Sustainable Social Services for Wales: A Framework for Action. Cardiff, Crown Copyright. Hocking, B., & Melissen, J. (2015). Diplomacy in the Digital Age. Clingendael Report. Netherlands Institute of International Relations. hooks, b. (1991). Yearning: Race, Gender and Cultural Politics. Turnaround Books.

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Hudson, B., & Hardy, B. (2002). What is a Successful Partnership and How Can it be Measured? In C.  Glendinning (Ed.), Partnerships, New Labour and the Governance of Welfare. Policy Press. Hydén, G. (1980). The Resilience of the Peasant Mode of Production: The Case of Tanzania. The Resilience of the Peasant Mode of Production: The Case of Tanzania, 218–243. Kickert, W. J. M., Klijn, E.-H., & Koppenjan, J. F. M. (Eds.). (1997). Managing Complex Networks: Strategies for the Public Sector. Sage. Massey, D. (1994). Space, Place and Gender. Polity Press. McKenzie, J. (2001). Perform or Else: From Discipline to Performance. Routledge. Papanastasiou, N. (2017). Practices of Boundary-Work in the Collaboration between Principals and Private Sponsors in England’s Academy Schools. Journal of Education Policy, 32, 82–99. Powell, M., Exworthy, M., & Berney, L. (2001). Playing the Game of Partnership. In R. Sykes, C. Bochel, & N. Ellison (Eds.), Social Policy Review 13: Developments and Debates 2000–2001. Policy Press. Powell, N., Swartling, A. G., & Ha, H. M. (Eds.). (2011). Stakeholder Agency in Rural Development Policy: Articulating Co-governance in Vietnam. Hanoi, Vietnam: World Agroforestry Centre ICRAF. Rifkin, J. (2010). The Empathetic Civilization. An Address Before the British Royal Society for the Arts. RSA. Schön, D. A. (1971). Beyond the Stable State. Random House. Sennett, R. (2012). Together. The Rituals, Pleasures and Politics of Co-operation. Yale University Press. Skelcher, C., Sullivan, H., & Jeffares, S. (2013). Hybrid Governance in European Cities: Neighbourhood, Migration and Democracy. Palgrave Macmillan. Stern, C. S., & Henderson, B. (1993). Performance: Texts and Contexts. Longman. Sullivan, H. (2015). Performing a Collaborative Self. In D. Alexander & J. Lewis (Eds.), Making Policy Decisions: Expertise, Skills and Experience. Routledge. Sullivan, H., Barnes, M., & Matka, E. (2002). Building Collaborative Capacity through ‘Theories of Change’: Early Lessons from the Evaluation of Health Action Zones in England. Evaluation, 8, 205–226. Sullivan, H., & Skelcher, C. (2002). Working across Boundaries: Collaboration in Public Services. Palgrave. Sullivan, H., Williams, P., & Jeffares, S. (2012). Leadership for Collaboration: Situated Agency in Practice. Public Management Review, 14, 41–66. Sullivan, H., Williams, P., Marchington, M., & Knight, L. (2013). Collaborative Futures: Discursive Realignments in Austere Times. Public Money & Management, 33, 123–130. Valentine, G. (2013). Social Geographies: Space and Society. Routledge.

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Van Bueren, E. M., Klijn, E.-H., & Koppenjan, J. M. (2003). Dealing with Wicked Problems in Networks: Analysing an Environmental Debate from a Network Perspective. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, 13, 193–212. Wettenhall, R. (2005). The Public-Private Interface: Surveying the History. In G.  Hodge & C.  Greve (Eds.), The Challenge of Public-Private Partnerships. Edward Elgar. Williams, P. (2012). Collaboration in Public Policy and Practice: Perspectives on Boundary Spanners. Policy Press. Ye, C., & Liu, Z. (2020). Rural-Urban Co-governance: Multi-scale Practice. Science Bulletin, 65, 778–780. Zuboff, S. (2019). The Age of Surveillance Capitalism: The Fight for a Human Future at the New Frontier of Power. Profile.

CHAPTER 3

Ideas, Agency, and Collaboration

Introduction Ideas are the currency that policymakers, especially politicians and leaders, trade in as they attempt to persuade their respective communities to elect or appoint them to governance roles. New ideas are particularly prized as they suggest innovation and change, key features of much contemporary public policy discourse. New ‘BIG’ ideas afford even greater attention. However, there is also a place for old ideas, ideas that have endured, as these imply stability and consistency. Collaboration is heavily implicated in both the engagement of ideas in public policy and in policy studies or analysis. Collaboration is frequently identified as how new, big ideas are to be realised, and the (r)evolution of New Public Management and ‘third-way politics’ stimulated an ongoing academic and analytical interest in the role of collaboration in public policy contexts. This chapter examines the relationship between collaboration, ideas, and public policy in theory and in practice. It argues that there is a symbiotic relationship between ideas and collaboration. Ideas are a source of, or a spur to, collaboration in public policy, while collaboration is itself a source of or stimulus for ideas in contemporary governance. Collaboration is both a means of enabling the acceptance and execution of ideas but can also be the means of resisting the adoption and application of ideas. Finally, ‘collaboration’ is itself an idea, one that attained almost hegemonic status © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 H. Sullivan, Collaboration and Public Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-09585-6_3

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in public policy in the 1990s/2000s, associated as much with its cultural force as its political value. The chapter explores the different ways in which collaboration and ideas interact and perform politically, materially, culturally, and spatially. In doing so it highlights the integral role of actors and agency in the constitution and performance of ideas in, about, and through collaboration. The chapter begins with a discussion of the role of ideas in public policy and policy studies. It explores how ideas inform public policy, and the treatment of ideas in policy studies. It highlights the importance of actors and agency to the take-up of ideas and considers the implications for collaboration. The chapter then turns to the interaction between ideas and collaboration in public policy. It begins with a discussion of ideas as the source of collaboration, identifying the circumstances in which ideas have force and the influence of the collaborative domains on how that force is expressed, focusing on the category of ideas identified as ‘wicked problems’, and the interaction of space and ideas in the formulation of public policy. The chapter then moves to consider collaboration as an idea, drawing on the discussions in Chaps. 1 and 2 to illustrate the role of language in naming and conveying ideas, exploring the contribution of collaborative discourses in enabling the adoption of policy positions, and reflecting on the role of the state, and of political actors in depoliticising collaboration. The discussion reveals the power of the political and cultural domains in shaping collaboration as an idea. Finally, the chapter examines collaboration as a source of ideas, identifying the different actor and institutional formations that generate ideas, and those that facilitate their wider communication. The material and spatial domains come to the fore here.

Ideas and Public Policy Ideas are powerful in public policy. They are the source of political contest, shape policy agendas, and prompt reform of public administration. Their power is derived from the agency of actors and the prevailing institutional context (Skelcher et al., 2013). Ideas are the source of visions for and routes towards ‘the good life’— the route chosen reflecting the dominant values of societies at a point in time and the power of human actors. Public policy ideas can transform societies positively, for example, the New Deal in the US, the European Union’s ‘social contract’, or China’s ‘opening up’ to markets in the 1980s.

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However, ideas and their application in public policy are also capable of devastating societies, such as apartheid in South Africa, or ‘terra nullius’ in Australia. Human actors’ appetite for ideas is shaped by their experience. As Neiman (2009) argues, what sustains us as human actors is the framework for living provided by customs, habits, and experiences. However, such an approach privileges the status quo, and the injustices and inequities that come with that. Ideas are meant to unsettle our acceptance of experience. ‘Reason’s task is to deny that claims of experience are final—and to push us to widen the horizon of our experience by providing ideas that experience ought to obey’ (Neiman, p. 154). Public policy is always a composite of old and new ideas combining experience and innovation. Ideas endure or persist because they are useful or appropriate to their context. New ideas or reconstituted ideas arise from actors grappling with a context in which policy problems and available solutions are misaligned or ill-fitting. In the last quarter of the twentieth century, contemporary governance reshaped itself in response to the dominant ideas of globalisation, and neoliberalism. This ideational framework is now being challenged by ideas of nationalism and populism; old ideas rehabilitated for uncertain times. Ideas may be both substantive—’inclusive growth’, or more procedural—’performance management’. The latter can change the operation of public administration sometimes systemically. The development and exportation of the ‘Westminster system’ is an early example, while New Public Management is a more recent one, beginning in New Zealand in 1980s and spreading across the globe.

Ideas and Policy Studies Ideas have experienced mixed fortunes in policy studies, the academic field dedicated to understanding public policy. Originally integral to explorations of the techniques of governance, ideas and indeed policy studies moved towards the periphery of political science as empirically based causal theories of political behaviour gained favour, and ‘realism’ trumped interpretivism. In turn, policy studies adopted ‘realism’ and developed its own tools to examine public policy empirically with the aim of developing causal theories, renaming itself ‘policy sciences’ along the way. As Fischer (2003) recounts, from the 1950s to the 1980s, a focus on ideas and values and the application of interpretive explanations were regarded as

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unscientific and potentially dangerous, leading ‘to the quagmire of relativism, which in turn can spawn political demagoguery and intolerance’ (p. 22). Fischer provides an excellent account of how ideas made it back into the policy studies mix, first as secondary variables in rational choice models, essentially plugging gaps in interest-based theories, but subsequently, and more substantially, as important elements in the re-theorising of policy research. Fischer traces this restoration of ideas from ‘new institutionalism’, which identifies ideas and values as present in the rules and norms that shape politics and policymaking; through ‘network theories’ (issue and policy), which rely on shared ideas about policy problems and solutions in order to function; via critical theory, specifically Habermas’s (1984) theory of ‘communicative action’ which rejects the technocratic practices of policymaking, and reinserts power and politics into policy practice, through the currency of ideas and ‘ideal speech’; and finally to ‘discourse as power’ and Foucault’s (2007) governmentality theory. For Fischer the next step in our understanding of the contribution of ideas is outlined in the ‘discursive policy approach’. Here the emphasis is on public policy and policymaking as a contest of actors, values, and politics. Stone’s (1988) work provides a powerful account of public policy as an ongoing contest of ideas and meanings in political discourse. Actors struggle to affix a meaning to political actions and then secure it as a shared meaning to legitimate action. The power to affix and secure ideas and meaning is based on actors’ capacity to use narrative and storytelling to persuade others to accept and adopt their position. Language is a key currency (though not the only one) for making and communicating meaning. The task of the policy analyst is to interrogate those meanings, explore their hinterlands, and the multiple understandings they attract, and how these are shaped and deployed. Yanow’s ground-breaking work in interpretive policy analysis (1996, 1999) offered new ways of thinking about the symbols and substance of policy (including language, but also artefacts and acts), and the significance of both. It also provided methodological advice for how to undertake this kind of policy studies research (Schwartz-­ Shea & Yanow, 2012). Schmidt’s (2008) work on the explanatory power of ideas and discourses offers another powerful counterpoint to more rationalist narratives of policy scholarship. Her proposal for ‘discursive institutionalism’ located ideas as ‘the substantive content of discourse’ present in policies,

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programs, and philosophies, and with either a cognitive or normative character. For Schmidt, ‘discourse is the interactive process of conveying ideas’ via either ‘coordinative discourse among policy actors and/or communicative discourse between political actors and the public’ (p.  303). The institutional context shapes which discourse dominates, that is, ‘simple polities have a stronger communicative discourse, compound polities a stronger coordinative discourse’ (p. 303). The role of discourses in collaboration will be explored later in the chapter. Ideas and Collaboration in Policy Studies Another trend in policy studies evolved alongside the rehabilitation of ideas. This offered frameworks for policy development and analysis that assumed and took active account of the interaction of multiple actors in the production and performance of public policy. A range of examples developed over time including Advocacy Coalition Frameworks, Policy Networks theory, and Co-production. Each assumed a governance landscape that was necessarily collaborative though not necessarily for the same reasons. There is an ongoing debate about whether these approaches do anything more than ‘dwell in the governance landscape NPM created’,1 but this has not halted their progress. Rather new contributions continue to emerge. Indeed Emerson and Nabatchi (2015) go so far as to suggest in the absence of existing institutional frameworks to tackle a policy problem; collaboration may be the preferred option. Consequently ‘new’ ideas will spur collaboration. Other ideas that prompt collaboration are those with positive or negative spill-overs into bounded areas such as departments, territories, and those ideas that defy boundaries and have become known as ‘wicked problems’. Béland and Cox (2016) focus the relationship between ideas and collaboration on a particular class of ideas they call ‘coalition magnets’. Coalition magnets are ideas that open a path for policy reform because of their valence (high political standing) and/or polysemic (elastic definitions) properties. These properties make them attractive to actors wanting to build powerful political coalitions. In keeping with the emphasis on agency in this book, Béland and Cox’s analysis emphasises the importance of policy entrepreneurs in converting ideas into ‘coalition magnets’, making them powerful as they ‘define, disseminate and establish the relevance of the idea 1

 Chloe Duncan, 2008, personal communication.

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for the policy prescriptions they advocate’ (p. 441). Policy entrepreneurs may be politicians, public activists, or experts. What matters is that they combine political nous with persuasive communication skills. The discussion so far has described the potential power of ideas in public policy, for good or ill, and discussed the development of policy analytic tools to account for that potential. It has suggested that contemporary governance conditions position ideas as pivotal to policy reform alongside and in concert with collaboration. Actors give life to and make meaning from ideas and collaboration and are integral to encounters between ideas and collaboration. The remainder of the chapter explores these encounters.

Ideas as a Source of Collaboration In public policy the category of ideas defined as ‘wicked problems’ (a specific sub-category of collective action problems) is probably the most readily identifiable ideational source of collaboration. Rittel and Webber (1973) first used the term ‘wicked problems’ to describe the features of societal problems facing policy planners. These are policy problems that have no agreed cause or solution, which cut across established policy, organisational, and geographical boundaries, and which require concerted and collaborative action on the part of multiple actors, many of whom will not agree about how to act. ‘Wicked problems’ are contrasted with ‘tame’ problems confronting scientists and engineers, which lend themselves to technical expertise and linear, rational problem-solving techniques. The term ‘wicked problem’ is now ubiquitous in policy studies and more general policy discourse. Its power as an idea is such that it can elevate a policy problem to a new status, one that demands attention while at the same time rendering any response as inherently insufficient. Labelling policy challenges ‘wicked problems’ is a call to arms, a demand for actors to face the difficulties posed by the policy challenge head-on and to marshal resources accordingly, and necessarily in collaboration with others. ‘Wicked problems’ loom large in the political domain—their severity demands attention while their complexity requires a collaborative response. However, the nature of political ambition allied to collaboration’s purpose will reflect the power relations of key actors in the policy process. The kind and quality of activities associated with any collaboration (the material domain) will reflect the prevailing political settlement, though this will also be mediated by the meaning(s) actors assign to collaboration (the cultural domain) in the context of the ‘wicked problem’ being addressed.

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The form collaboration takes (the spatial domain) will be shaped by interactions between the scope of the ‘wicked problem’ and existing governance scales. This domain analysis is developed below in the context of the pre-eminent ‘wicked problem’ confronting public policy—the idea of ‘climate change’. ‘Climate change’ is an idea of global significance (literally), and a cause of considerable disquiet amongst scientists, and dispute between nations. It demands action at multiple sites and levels from the individual and local, to the global community, across governments, and state and non-state actors. And it demands collaboration across and between institutions, spheres, and actors. In public policy discourse ‘climate change’ describes the contribution of human activity to global warming. This anthropogenic climate change is distinct from change that occurs through natural processes on earth, and the global warming that results is amenable to change through changes in human activity. It emerged as an idea of public concern in the last quarter of the twentieth century when scientists developed models and evidence in support of the facts of a warming climate (Weart, 2010). At the heart of the public policy challenge pertaining to climate change is awareness that it is not merely a science problem but a social and cultural problem. It is the multifaceted nature of the idea of climate change that makes it powerful. Hulme (2009) summarises this as ‘[t]he full story of climate change is the unfolding story of an idea and how this idea is changing the way we think, feel and act’ (Preface). The physical changes wrought by climate change are accompanied by changes to our social worlds. This alteration occurs because the plasticity of the idea of climate change allows it to be enlisted in support of multiple and competing ideological projects. In a similar vein Jeffares (2008) draws on Laclau’s work to argue that powerful public policy ideas are those that can take the form of ‘empty signifiers’, becoming repositories for a range of competing demands. The malleability and/or capaciousness of ideas such as climate change compounds their ‘wickedness’. Human agency is central to the evolution of the idea of climate change and its plasticity. As Hulme continues, ‘our discordant conversations about climate change reveal, at a deeper level, all that makes for diversity, creativity and conflict within the human story—our different attitudes to risk, technology and wellbeing; our different ethical, ideological and political beliefs; our different interpretations of the past and our competing visions of the future’ (Preface).

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In keeping with Rittel and Webber’s assessment of ‘wicked problems’, these ‘discordant conversations’ impact public policy possibilities and collaborative opportunities. This is explored below in the context of global and local action to address climate change. Collaborating in Response to Climate Change The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) launched at the Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 provided the basis for global action on anthropogenic climate change. The UNFCCC objective is to ‘stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that will prevent dangerous human interference with the climate system’.2 The convention is a symbolic representation of the global commitment to collaborate. Its continued legitimacy is contingent on the number of countries signed up to it (currently 197) and the preparedness of individual countries to act to bring their greenhouse gas emissions within the non-binding/binding limits set. The former is essential as an expression of a willingness to act collectively and collaboratively, while the latter gives effect to material changes. The political domain of global collaboration is contested and congested. It is contested because while the purpose of collaboration is clear— addressing anthropogenic climate change—country actors disagree about the appropriate degree of ambition, the balance of responsibility for achieving limits, and the best means to achieve these limits. The persistence of ‘climate scepticism’ and its influence over policy debate in various countries, notably Australia, a major coal producer, inhibits ambition on climate action, both in terms of aims and means. Differences in perspective between developed and developing countries about the burden of responsibility for action to address climate change is another major source of disagreement. Congestion occurs as countries try to navigate their internal politics and policy priorities and dilemmas while engaging in global negotiations. Over the life of the UNFCCC countries have experienced two global financial crises, a global pandemic, several regional epidemics, multiple country-specific natural disasters, and better or worse political leadership, all of which add to an already congested political domain. Activity in the political domain sets the form that collaboration 2

 https://unfccc.int/about-us/about-the-secretariat. Accessed March 24, 2022.

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takes in the spatial domain—setting ambition at the global level and focusing action at the national level. The cultural domain is also contested as state and non-state actors engage in attempts to set the meaning of global collaboration on climate change for their publics. In some countries and international institutions, there is consensus about the meaning of global collaboration, for good or ill. In others, state actors and non-state actors offer divergent representations of the meaning of global collaboration. For example, state actors representing collaboration as a challenge to their sovereignty over policy decisions, versus non-state actors representing collaboration as the only hope for securing meaningful action on climate change. These cultural representations are informed by the spatial domain, for example, non-state actors working across national boundaries to represent themselves as part of a global community. The material domain comprising what collaboration does is shaped by the political and cultural domains. For example, the landmark Kyoto Protocol adopted in 1997 was based on the principle of countries’ shared but distinct responsibilities. This meant that developed countries who bore the most responsibility for levels of greenhouse gases, and had greater capability to address them, agreed to legally binding reductions in their greenhouse gas emissions by 2012. Should participating countries not be able to meet their reductions nationally, they could fund reductions in other countries using agreed flexibility mechanisms. The legal agreements and flexibility mechanisms were the core global collaborative activities. The Kyoto Protocol was replaced by the Paris Agreement in 2015. The Paris Agreement adopted the principle of Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), whereby each participating country agrees to set, manage, and monitor increasingly stringent targets towards reducing the increase in global average temperature to 1.5 degrees Celsius. There is no legally binding mechanism. Collaboration between countries is permitted so that they might pool their NDCs. The NDC Partnership was established to provide technical and financial support to countries to help them achieve their targets. This reduced the number and range of global collaborative activities, replacing them with the NDC Partnership. The contribution of national actors to global collaboration in support of the UNFCCC receives the most attention and media coverage. However, the UN also operates in other collaborative action spaces. In addition to the UNFCCC, the 1992 Rio Summit also introduced ‘Agenda 21’; a non-binding action plan aimed at achieving sustainable

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development, through reconciling economic development with planetary sustainability. In 2015 the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) became part of the action plan. The prime responsibility for Agenda 21 sits with national governments, but action is required across tiers and spheres of government, and between state and non-state actors. For example, Local Agenda 21 or LA21 is the subnational version. In 1990 a global network ‘ICLEI- Local Governments for Sustainability’ was established to support local action. In 2021 it had 1750 local and regional governments as members and was active in 124 countries. The network operates through ‘peer exchange, partnerships and capacity building to create systemic change for urban sustainability’.3 The popularity and longevity of LA21 draws attention to the spatial domain of collaboration, and the interaction of space and policy actors in the production and implementation of ideas for sustainable development. Summed up by the idea ‘think globally, act locally’, first used in the 1970s to encourage individuals, communities, and organisations to act in support of the environment, LA21 appeals to actors to consider an issue holistically, considering space and scale together not separately. Ideas and the Spatial Domain in Collaboration The economic upheavals of the late twentieth century created or exacerbated concentrations of wealth and poverty within as well as between countries. In response, policy analysts promoted ideas that tried to reconcile economic development with societal wellbeing, including ‘inclusive growth’—(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development)4 or ‘social inclusion’ (World Bank)5 or ‘urban revitalisation/regeneration’. This last idea is the longest standing and possibly the most widely adopted. It can take a variety of forms, but it is commonly associated with programs to address economic and social decline, focused on ‘place’, and predicated on collaboration between state and non-state actors, including communities. Space and scale interact with the ideas of revitalisation/regeneration and ‘place’ to shape the boundaries, scope, and form of the policy program. In the US these interactions resolved in the policy of ‘local economic development’—the possibility that economic activity could be initiated  https://www.iclei.org/. Accessed March 25, 2022.  https://www.oecd.org/inclusive-growth/. Accessed March 25, 2022. 5  https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/social-inclusion. Accessed March 25, 2022. 3 4

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and shaped at the local level rather than the national or global. The idea of ‘the local’ is as open to interpretation as that of ‘place’ (Blanco et  al., 2014). Stone’s (1989) work in Atlanta recast the combination of local economic policy and cross-sector collaboration as ‘urban regimes’, an idea that became hugely influential in urban policy scholarship and policy practice. Why ideas at the local level might be distinctive is a matter of some debate and linked to the nature of the political domain. For example, Stone et  al. (2006) working in the US conclude that national political partisanship shapes attachment to ideas, whereas at the local level the absence of partisan politics focuses actors on identifying and utilising scarce resources. For others ‘the local’ is important because of the opportunities it affords collaboration in the material domain. Katz and Bradley (2013) argue in support of locally led collaborations to support innovative economic development. Katz and Nowak (2018) argue that ‘localism’ is ‘an umbrella idea’, one that can embrace action across a range of complex policy issues. In a similar vein the OECD concluded in its review of collaboration and innovation policy that the effects of collaboration are generally felt most at the local level (OECD, 2014). The work of urban regeneration or revitalisation described so far emphasises the ‘re-making of place’ through collaboration and economic, social, and cultural investments. Other versions of place-making have a different focus though they too demand collaboration. One version of place-making is more commonly known as ‘branding’ or ‘public diplomacy’. This brings the political domain to the fore in combination with the spatial domain. A brand is important to help a particular place stand out amongst its competitors for investment. Collaboration is essential in order that the preferred ‘brand’ is reinforced and promoted by all actors in the system, public and private. The image of the place projected into the world is designed to attract the ‘right’ kind of resources and keep out ‘the wrong kind’. Most evident in competitions for global events such as the Olympics, or World Cup, place-branding is now embedded in the programs of most cities. Place-branding has been criticised for focusing all resources on the attraction of ‘capital’ at the expense of the wellbeing of the local community, though more recent work considers how communities may benefit (González & Gale, 2020). A rather different interpretation of the idea of place-making also combines the political domain with the spatial domain but focuses on the

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internal health and sustainability of a place, rather than looking to external actors. Friedmann (2010) refers to place-making as requiring a definition of place that ‘encompasses both a physical/built environment at the neighbourhood scale and the subjective feelings its inhabitants harbor towards each other as an emplaced community’ (p. 149). The preoccupation with ‘branding’ results in displacement and loss of place. He proposes instead a place-making that is everyone’s job, residents as well as official planners, and that old places can be ‘“taken back”, neighbourhood by neighbourhood, through collaborative people-centered planning’ (p. 149). This focus on what might be termed the ‘ordinary’ of everyday life in place is evident in other very different contributions. For example, Lombard (2014) argues for the visibility of ‘place-making’ in informal settlements (‘colonias populares’) outside of established urban centres. In her study of two informal settlements in Mexico, she identifies the ways in which these settlements contribute to the viability of the nearby urban centre but also demonstrate collaborative place-making of their own through settlers’ lived experiences. Her analysis contests the dominant analytical and policy frame that ‘informal settlements’ are antithetical to the norms of formal urban centres, and necessarily marginal to them. Rather Lombard co-opts the discursive tools and material artefacts used to describe the ‘colonias populares’ as ‘other’ and employs them to explore the lived experience of those in the settlements and to construct alternative framings that work with an idea of place and place-making as dynamic not static constructions and reconceive of ‘colonias populares’ as places in progress.

Collaboration as an Idea Collaboration is itself a key idea in public policy. Chapter 2 outlined the presence and persistence of collaboration in public policy across space and time, highlighting the idea’s particular force in the last decades of the twentieth century and the early years of the twenty-first century. However, collaboration is not a singular idea, it appears in public policy in a variety of different ways. Chapter 1 introduced some of those, such as partnerships, networks, and coalitions; each signalling a particularity of intention, form, and value, represented thereafter in the name. The act of naming points to the importance of language in conveying ideas. Language has ‘agency’—it is an act with consequences (Morrison, 1997). This section

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explores the production and construction of collaboration as an idea, its representation in the public policy arena, and the role of actors in both. Ideas gain force in public policy through their discursive formation. So, the idea of collaboration and its possibilities are constituted by and in dominant discourses. Discourses are systems of meaning that frame, make, and express public policy. They comprise ‘all practices and meanings shaped by a community of social actors’ (Howarth, 2000, p. 5) and ‘are revealed as narratives, rhetorical strategies, organizational metaphors, traditions, collections of storylines, and cognitive normative frames’ (Jeffares, 2008, pp. 46–47). They persist over time and become ‘sedimented’, that is, ‘taken for granted’ as significant influencers over how actors perceive the conditions of possibility and their consequent room for manoeuvre. However, while sedimented, discourses are also dynamic, subject to constant modification in both incremental and radical ways. Actors’ thinking and acting will generate discursive modifications, while crises and other traumatic events can transform existing discourses, dislocating established systems of meaning but also offering productive possibilities. Jeffares (2008) argues that during periods of dislocated policymaking, the role of agency is accentuated. ‘The process mobilizes agents to articulate a new discursive order, and meanings become up-for-grabs’ (2008, p. 50). The discursive construction and constitution of collaboration reflects each of the four domains (political, cultural, material, and spatial), but reveals the influence of the political and cultural domains. This is explored below. Sullivan et  al. (2013) conducted research with a cross-disciplinary, cross-sectoral group of experts to explore the discursive constitution of collaboration. The authors identified four discourses of public policy collaboration: • The efficiency discourse • The effectiveness discourse • The responsiveness discourse • The cultural performance discourse Integral to each of these discourses is a political decision or series of decisions about the nature of the external environment and the key challenge to be met through the application of collaboration (the focus of the political domain). These decisions are political because they are arrived at through the interaction of ideas, power relations, and values between

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institutions and actors, and they reflect the balance of power and the dominant values that prevail because of those interactions. The ‘efficiency discourse’ promotes the idea of competition, supported by market-orientated institutions and actors. The ‘effectiveness discourse’ promotes the idea of coordination, supported by professional and political institutions and actors orientated towards particular social or political concerns. The ‘responsiveness discourse’ promotes the idea of co-decision-­making, supported by citizen and practitioner institutions and actors orientated towards democratic or delivery concerns. The ‘cultural performance discourse’ promotes the idea of representing meaning, supported by actors engaged in enacting and embedding particular values or meanings of collaboration (Dickinson & Sullivan, 2013). In all cases the decision to privilege a particular idea is a political act with important consequences. Discourses of collaboration perform several functions. They privilege ideas (as indicated above) and in so doing also promote a set of values, institutional designs, and instruments. These give shape to collaboration and scope to what it can do. Discourses are also constitutive of political subjectivities and identities. The scope and shape of the discourse determines which actors are to be included in the collaboration and which are not. This includes politicians, professionals, and non-state actors, including service users or citizens. As outlined in the previous section, actors use their agency to propel ideas forward. Discourse provides the means to do it. Discourses can redefine a policy problem or challenge to make visible potential partners who might otherwise not see themselves as concerned with a particular policy area. For example, the marketisation of public services recast business as major partners. Discourses also provide opportunities for shifting attention away from key actors who may be considered blockages to progress—a way of destabilising their position in the policy process. For example, the marketisation of public services recast bureaucrats and public service professionals as obstacles to the delivery of better public services. Discourses do not only define which actors are included and which are not, they also constitute collaborative identities for those actors that are included. Barnes et al. (2003) demonstrated this in the context of innovations in democratic practice in the UK. Pressures on local government to respond to claims of a loss of legitimacy and authority following declining participation in voting led to the development of a range of public

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participation initiatives, each aimed at a different ‘public’ deemed worthy of attention in the context of particular public policy challenges, for example, pressure on health and social care budgets, or persistent neighbourhood deprivation. The emergent discourses identified these publics as citizens with responsibilities to participate, but constituted their identity as citizens in specific ways, as older people, or as neighbourhood residents. The research found that these formal discursive representations were not simply accepted by those whose energy and participation was sought. Rather the micro-politics of engagement enabled the representation of alternative expressions of publicness, at once more complex and more dynamic. Central to these micro-political exchanges was a recognition of the unequal distribution of power between the various actors, coupled with an acknowledgement of the potential for citizens to walk away from the state’s invitation to participate. Barnes et al. also found that collaboration created the potential for new collective or actor-specific identities to emerge, ‘in which the boundaries between participants become less important than boundaries between who is present and who is absent from such forums?’ (2003, p. 397). Discourses are also constitutive of collaborative spaces. These are the opportunity spaces for exchange or decision-making that become possible by the terms of the collaborative discourse but are also mediated by the existing political dynamics. The discussion of urban regeneration/revitalisation in the previous section illustrates how ideas about ‘the local’ shaped the spaces of collaborative action. The resulting formations such as ‘urban regimes’, neighbourhood partnerships, or even ‘colonias populares’ reflect the prevailing power relations and act to reinforce or resist them. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) illustrates the role of cultural performance in sustaining collaborative spaces. An intergovernmental organisation established to pursue cooperative peace and shared prosperity, ASEAN claims a unique way of working—’the ASEAN way’—based on building consensus on issues and non-interference in the internal affairs of one another. Supporters and sceptics regularly comment on ASEAN’s performance in observing its own principles, and making progress towards its objectives (Goh, 2003; Narine, 2009). However according to Davies (2018), ASEAN should be appraised on the basis that it is a ‘shared performance’ in which ritual and symbolism are key. He argues that summit meetings, flags, group photographs, etc. are purposeful symbols of unity that also have a material impact in helping limit

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regional tensions. Here the cultural domain of collaboration imbues the material domain. Arguably it also influences the spatial domain, as membership of ASEAN implies members’ concurrence with its political purpose and cultural meanings. Depoliticising Collaboration The discursive formation of collaborative subjects and spaces has important implications for governance, particularly democratic governance, as it can redefine what is/is not political. The UK experience outlined in Chap. 2 exemplifies this. Between 1997 and 2015, the discursive formations of New Labour and latterly the Coalition generated a set of political subjectivities that defined collaboration first as ‘anti-political’ (New Labour) and then ‘post-political’ (Conservative/Liberal Democrat Coalition). In each case political leaders worked with sympathetic think-­ tanks, academics, and actors from within government, the business world, and the not-for profit sector, to develop their discourse(s). While there were important differences between them, both re-cast collaboration as part of a ‘new politics’ in which ideological distinctions between left and right were contested, and consensus was valorised. At the time I proposed this represented a new discourse of ‘collaboration as governance’: …unlike under New Labour when collaboration was identified by some as a refuge from party politics and reconstituted as an anti-political institution in which ‘experts’ could deliberate unencumbered by politicians and their manifestos, under the Coalition, collaboration is represented as a way of working that is ‘beyond politics altogether’ an expression of a lately voiced public will to govern differently. It combines the ‘new politics’ promise of rational deliberation with the ‘new common sense’ consensus about the nature of the problem to be solved (the deficit) and the means of solving it (public spending cuts, greater involvement of independent providers and more self-reliance)—articulated through apparently collective appeals—’we are all in this together’ and offers a particular (albeit one sided) vision of collaboration as the ultimate expression of governing in a post-political world. (Sullivan, 2010, p. 16)

Actors’ discursive representations were essential in populating the ‘collaboration as governance’ discourse, and in promoting examples of it in practice, through think-tank publications and public service professional media. The uncritical nature of this reporting helped establish the idea of

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collaboration as ‘a neutral instrument absent of values. However, these collaborative practices necessitate the destabilizing of organizational structures, reducing the pay and conditions of existing workers, and limiting the provision of services to citizens—especially those at the margins of society’ (Sullivan et al., 2013, p. 127). Repoliticising Collaboration Norval (2007) offers a route to repoliticising discourses of collaboration. Although her focus and purpose are on developing new understandings of democratic participation, her work is useful to the study of collaboration because she places power and conflict at the centre of her theoretical analysis. This contrasts with dominant political discourses of collaboration (see above) and much academic analysis that either ignores conflict or assumes that it is something to be managed away in the pursuit of consensus. For Norval, the practice of politics requires that power relations, conflict, and contestation occupy centre stage—they cannot and should not be circumvented. She draws on Laclau and Mouffe (1985) to illustrate the way in which actors persist in attempting to construct a hegemonic discourse that establishes their preferred perspective as the way in which things are done and understood in specific settings. Important here is the need to construct ‘political frontiers’ between potential participants to deliberation, separating out ‘friends’ and ‘enemies’. These separations are not fixed but remain in flux, open to further contestation and change. The construction of ‘political frontiers’ is an important element in the creation of collaborative discourses as it legitimises the assembly of a particular set of ideas, actors, and institutions and de-legitimises others. So, in the context of collaboration, ‘the efficiency discourse’ assembles public and private actors behind the idea of the market and creates a political frontier with those likely to be resistant to the discourse such as trade unions. Equally, and perhaps self-evidently, the attempts by groups of actors to construct discourses of collaboration that align with narratives of ‘post-­ politics’ are themselves political acts. Norval identifies disagreement as important in constituting common deliberative spaces. She cites Rancière (1999) in arguing that shared deliberative spaces are not automatically present but require creation and that this process of creation is one based on dispute and disagreement between those who have power in that context and those who do not. It is ‘in the moment of disagreement following the identification of a previously

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unarticulated ‘wrong’ the possibility of ‘new subjects and new spaces of commonality come into existence’ (Norval cited in Sullivan, 2014, p. 193). This is relevant to collaboration in two distinct but linked ways. First collaborative spaces are necessarily shared spaces, but they may not always nor indeed ever be constituted to include all relevant actors (see the discussion in the previous section). Second, too little attention is paid to the role of dispute and disagreement in the creation and maintenance of these spaces; physical acts and linguistic norms may inhibit the practice of disagreement in collaboration. This will be explored further in the chapter on Practice (Chap. 9). Norval connects the role of disagreement to Laclau’s (2005) construction of political identity. Here the claims actors make to and then against institutions constitute the identities of both the claimants and of those to whom the claims are made. The discussion on identity formation above illustrates this in operation in the context of government attempts to collaborate with ‘the public’. Finally, Norval draws our attention to what she terms ‘adversarial legitimacy’. Here she draws on Mouffe’s (2005) work on agonistic democracy and democratic subjectivity. This allows actors to recognise the difference between them (to be adversaries) but also to understand each other as members of the same political association, a space where rules are jointly constituted and within which conflict can occur. The legitimacy afforded the shared rules and procedures is key to mediating or containing conflict (see Chap. 4). The idea of legitimate adversaries is extremely helpful in distinguishing between those examples of conflict and those conflictual relationships that may be inevitable but are also counterproductive or unproductive, and those which reflect meaningful exchanges that have the potential to generate new ways of relating, new institutions, or practices. This offers an important way into examining conflict in collaboration as it both legitimises the idea of conflict in exchanges about the shape and nature of collaboration, and it also signals a way of differentiating the potential of conflict in collaborative situations.

Collaboration as a Source of Ideas Collaboration is a source of ideas. Collaboration between actors with different perspectives and skill sets and even different motivations generates breakthroughs that change how we work, live, play, and communicate. John-Steiner (2006) offers a range of examples of this in her study

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‘Creative Collaboration’. She demonstrates how scientific and artistic forms emerge from ‘joint thinking, from significant conversations, and from sustained, shared struggles’ (p. 3). Thinking and creating is not only, if at all, a solitary venture, rather it requires dialogue and exchange. It is also grounded in an intimacy between collaborators, one that is worked at and nourished through repeated activities and practices in collaboration. Here the spatial and material domains of collaboration reinforce each other. John-Steiner’s work offers examples of transformative collaborations, which generated new ideas that changed how we view the world and each other, such as the relationship between the philosophers Jean-Paul Satre and Simone de Beavoir, or that between the scientists Marie and Pierre Curie. She also reveals the importance of the creative process in reshaping existing ideas and practices, including through the collaborations of feminist scholars who contest established epistemological positions and offer alternatives based on ‘how women think about themselves, authorities, and choices in their lives, and how they construct their knowledge’ (John Steiner, p. 101) John-Steiner’s ideas about creative collaboration apply equally well to the world of public policy in which major reforms emerge from deliberation and debate between politicians, leading thinkers and activists, academic institutions, and think-tanks. Even ideological programs that are firmly linked to specific political leaders such as Thatcherism in the UK, or Trumpism in the US, have a deeper and wider genesis. For example, ‘Thatcherism’, the program of economic liberalism, social conservatism, British nationalism, and the ‘rolling back of the state’ begun in 1979 in the UK did not emerge fully formed from the mind of one of the country’s foremost conviction politicians. Rather it was the result of longstanding dialogue between Thatcher and members of the Hayekian UK think-tank the Institute of Economic Affairs, and Sir Keith Joseph, a key political ally, and subsequently with like-minded economists, politicians, and business leaders in the US including Milton Friedman and Ronald Reagan. The exchange of ideas was and continues to be facilitated by transatlantic and then global networks of supporters of what became known as neoliberalism and its public service manifestation, the New Public Management. While public policy ideas do emerge from the kind of serendipitous pairing or assembling explored by John-Steiner and represented here through the operation of public policy networks, this is not the only way collaboration facilitates new ideas. The public policy environment is

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populated by national and international organisations and initiatives whose purpose is to help facilitate the development of new ideas for public policy and public services by bringing people together and helping them to think creatively in collaboration. These developments are linked to another key idea in contemporary public policymaking—innovation. While the political domain determines the purpose of these collaborative innovation institutions, it is the spatial and material domains that create the conditions for collaboration to occur. This is explored below. One of the best known and arguably most influential institutions to support public service innovation is MindLab (2002–2018). Established in 2002 by the Danish Government, its aim was to improve public policy and services through disruption, experimentation, and risk taking. Using principles of ‘co-design’, the core team of ‘design thinking consultants’ worked with public servants across government to equip them with the skills and capability to innovate to improve outcomes. Collaboration was central to the process, and included collaboration across government, as well as with citizens and private and not-for-profit organisations. The principles of co-design were supported by collaborative tools to facilitate innovation (Bason, 2010). Denmark’s innovative institution spawned a worldwide enthusiasm for ‘labs’, including the OPM Innovation Lab in Washington, DC, the Laboratorio Para La Ciudad in Mexico City, and the Human Experience Lab in Singapore (Guay, 2018). All work with similar principles—human-­ centred design, collaboration, and experimentation. The ‘lab’ is a creative space, its form established by its scope and ways of working, and possibly incorporating a physical space. The importance of the material domain in ‘policy labs’ is evidenced in the centrality of ‘design thinking’ as a core activity. Design thinking derives from the work of product designers and draws on the designer’s toolkit—user-focused, data-informed, and experimental. In addition to creating the conditions for ideas to emerge, collaboration also plays a role in the communication of ideas between policy actors across sectors and countries and international institutions. There are numerous collaborations in the form of networks or knowledge exchange partnerships designed to promote and share new ideas, such as the ACT NOW Mayors’ Network, a group of local leaders from the Middle East to Northern Europe who offer peer support on shared concerns.

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Conclusion This chapter has demonstrated the different ways in which ideas and collaboration interact in public policy. Ideas are a unique source of collaboration, most clearly illustrated in the example of ‘wicked problems’. Collaboration is itself a key idea in public policy theory and practice, one that has informed policy responses across time, and spaces of governance. Collaboration is also an important source of ideas in public policy, with a variety of institutions established to help facilitate it. Human actors play a central role in the relationships between collaboration and ideas. Their agency gives ideas life and force and sustains collaboration. However, the examples in this chapter also shed light on the ways in which power relations enable and constrain public policy possibilities. The way ideas are constituted, how they gain traction, and how they become a focus for public policy are all conditioned by the structure of power relations which privileges some actors and groups at the expense of others in formal policymaking processes. This is an issue endemic to politics and public policy, and it shows up in collaboration in specific ways. It is evident in the kinds of actors who can posit ideas and build powerful coalitions to promote them. It is also evident in the operation of collaborative institutions established to put ideas into practice. Notwithstanding this, the chapter has also revealed that collaboration can generate ideas that are counter to the prevailing policy order. Lombard (2014) provides an important example of marginalised actors claiming a space in the evolution of the urban and collaborating in place-making to realise that claim. Such subaltern movements are an important reminder that collaboration is not only the property of the powerful, but that it can be a means of contesting ideas and politics. Creating the conditions in which collaboration over ideas and their implementation is demonstrably inclusive and enabling of conflict provides a route to contesting existing power relations though it requires deliberate and sustained attention, including to  the rules of the game. These are the focus of the next chapter.

References Barnes, M., Newman, J., Knops, A., & Sullivan, H. (2003). Constituting ‘The Public’ in Public Participation. Public Administration, 81, 379–399. Bason, C. (2010). Leading Public Sector Innovation: Co-creating for a Better Society. Policy Press.

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Béland, D., & Cox, R. H. (2016). Ideas as Coalition Magnets: Coalition Building, Policy Entrepreneurs, and Power Relations. Journal of European Public Policy, 23, 428–445. Blanco, I., Griggs, S., & Sullivan, H. (2014). Situating the Local in the Neoliberalisation and Transformation of Urban Governance. Urban Studies, 51, 3129–3146. Davies, M. (2018). Ritual and Region: The Invention of ASEAN. Cambridge University Press. Dickinson, H., & Sullivan, H. (2013). Towards a General Theory of Collaborative Performance: The Importance of Efficacy and Agency. Public Administration, 92, 161–177. Emerson, K., & Nabatchi, T. (2015). Collaborative Governance Regimes. Georgetown University Press. Fischer, F. (2003). Reframing Public Policy: Discursive Politics and Deliberative Practices. Oxford University Press. Foucault, M. (2007). Security, Territory, Population: Lectures at the Collège de France, 1977–78, Springer. Friedmann, J. (2010). Place and Place-Making in Cities: A Global Perspective. Planning Theory & Practice, 11, 149–165. Goh, G. H. (2003). The ‘ASEAN Way’ Non-Intervention and ASEAN’s Role in Conflict Management. Stanford Journal of East Asian Affairs, 3(1), 113–118. González, L. R., & Gale, F. (2020). Place Branding as Participatory Governance? An Interdisciplinary Case Study of Tasmania, Australia. Sage Open, 10, 1–12. Guay, J. (2018, June 5). How Denmark Lost its MindLab. Apolitical. https:// apolitical.co/solution_article/how-­denmark-­lost-­its-­minlab-­the-­inside-­story/ Habermas, J. (1984). The Theory of Communicative Action. Vol. 1: Reason and the Rationalization of Society, Beacon Howarth, D. (2000). Discourse. McGraw-Hill Education (UK). Hulme, M. (2009). Why We Disagree about Climate Change: Understanding Controversy, Inaction and Opportunity. Cambridge University Press. Jeffares, S. (2008). Why Public Policy Ideas Catch On: Empty Signifiers and Flourishing Neighbourhoods. PhD, University of Birmingham. John-Steiner, V. (2006). Creative Collaboration. Oxford University Press. Katz, B., & Bradley, J. (2013). The Metropolitan Revolution. How Cities and Metros are Fixing Our Broken Politics and Fragile Economy. Brookings institution Press. Katz, B., & Nowak, J. (2018). The New Localism. How Cities Can Thrive in the Age of Populism. Brookings Institution Press. Laclau, E. (2005). On Populist Reason. Verso. Laclau, E., & Mouffe, C. (1985). Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics. Verso.

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Lombard, M. (2014). Constructing Ordinary Places: Place-Making in Urban Informal Settlements in Mexico. Progress in Planning, 94, 1–53. Morrison, T. (1997). Nobel Lecture. In A. Sture (Ed.), Nobel Lectures, Literature 1991–1995. World Scientific Publishing Co. Mouffe, C. (2005). On the Political. Routledge. Narine, S. (2009). ASEAN in the Twenty-First Century: A Sceptical Review. Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 22(3), 369–386. Neiman, S. (2009). Moral Clarity. A Guide for Grown-Up Idealists. The Bodley Head. Norval, A.  J. (2007). Aversive Democracy: Inheritance and Originality in the Democratic Tradition. Cambridge University Press. OECD. (2014). Regions and Cities: Where Policies and People Meet. Paris: OECD. Rancière, J. (1999). Disagreement. University of Minnesota Press. Rittel, H.  W. J., & Webber, M.  M. (1973). Dilemmas in a General Theory of Planning. Policy Sciences, 4, 155–169. Schmidt, V. (2008). Discursive Institutionalism: The Explanatory Power of Ideas and Discourses. Annual Review of Political Science, 11, 303–326. Schwartz-Shea, P., & Yanow, D. (2012). Interpretive Research Design. Concepts and Processes. Routledge. Skelcher, C., Sullivan, H., & Jeffares, S. (2013). Hybrid Governance in European Cities: Neighbourhood, Migration and Democracy. Palgrave Macmillan. Stone, C. (1989). Regime Politics: Governing Atlanta, 1946–1988. University of Kansas. Stone, C., Orr, M., & Worges, D. (2006). The Flight of the Bumblebee: Why Reform is Difficult But Not Impossible. Perspectives on Politics, 4, 529–546. Stone, D. (1988). Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making. W. W. Norton and Company. Sullivan, H. (2010). Collaboration Matters. Inaugural Lecture, 8 June, University of Birmingham. UK. Sullivan, H. (2014). Designing ‘The Political’ in (and Out of) Neighbourhood Governance. In S.  Griggs, A.  J. Norval, & H.  Wagenaar (Eds.), Practices of Freedom. Decentred Governance, Conflict and Democratic Participation. Cambridge University Press. Sullivan, H., Williams, P., Marchington, M., & Knight, L. (2013). Collaborative Futures: Discursive Realignments in Austere Times. Public Money & Management, 33, 123–130. Weart, S. R. (2010). The Idea of Anthropogenic Global Climate Change in the 20th Century. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews Climate Change, 1, 67–81. Yanow, D. (1996). How Does a Policy Mean?: Interpreting Policy and Organizational Actions. Georgetown University Press. Yanow, D. (1999). Conducting Interpretive Policy Analysis. Sage.

CHAPTER 4

Rules, Agency, and Collaboration

Introduction Rules provide the essential scaffolding for public policy design and implementation. They are formally constructed and recorded guides to action most often in the shape of laws, policies, and regulations. These formal codifications provide clarity, predictability, and reliability for actors as part of a wider system of governance. Rules can offer rewards to actors for upholding them and can also impose sanctions for transgressions. Public policy systems also contain norms, informal guides to action that can complement but also compete with rules. Collaboration interacts with public policy rules in several ways. It is a response to rules that inhibit effective public policy action. It is composed of rules that shape and guide action. And it can be constrained by rules, including those designed to support it. This chapter examines the relationship between collaboration, rules, and public policy in theory and in practice. It considers the rules that give rise to collaboration, highlighting the importance of rules as a means of overcoming boundaries to enable joint action while also providing boundaries to facilitate collaboration. It examines collaboration as an institution, defining the rules that constitute it, as well as those that enable and constrain it. It discusses the rules that shape the conduct of collaboration, with reference to the rewards and sanctions associated with compliance and transgression. Finally, it explores the rules made by collaborations as institutional actors. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 H. Sullivan, Collaboration and Public Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-09585-6_4

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The chapter begins with a discussion of the role of rules in public policy and policy studies. It explores how rules enact public policy, and the treatment of rules in policy studies. It highlights the roles of actors and agency in the making, shaping, and application of rules and considers the implications for collaboration. The chapter then turns to the interaction between rules and collaboration in public policy. It discusses how rules enable collaboration and the different ways in which collaboration and rules interact and perform politically, materially, culturally, and spatially in different contexts. The chapter then considers the role of rules in shaping collaborative conduct, exploring rules of inclusion and exclusion, regulation, and instances of rule conflict. Finally, the chapter explores the limits of rules in collaboration, examining the use of rules to constrain collaboration, the way powerful actors can take advantage of institutional limits or gaps to construct rules that favour them in collaboration, and the role of time and tradition in shaping collaborative rule possibilities.

Rules and Public Policy Rules enable societies to be governed. They are present at all levels of governance from the local to global, and they are integral to public policy systems. However, this does not imply that rules are homogenous. Rather they are generated and developed in their social and political contexts, more or less influenced by their engagement with rules from other contexts. Policy studies has a long tradition of studying rules, principally through institutional analysis, which includes both the study of institutions such as parliaments and bureaucracies, and the development of institutional theory, such as rational choice. Policy studies scholarship was shaped by public policy systems in the Anglo and European traditions that operated within an independent legal framework of rules as the basis of legitimate and accountable decision-making. Some Asian public policy systems draw on traditions that emphasise familism. Communist systems such as China and Vietnam operate within a framework shaped by Party rules. Arab-states with deeply embedded rentier systems complicated by religious and monarchical pillars of legitimacy operate in an ad-hoc rule-­ based system of neo-patrimonial traditions and patron-client relationships. These variations (by no means comprehensive) highlight the importance of considering a public policy system’s context in any exploration of features.

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In contemporary public policy rules are important guides to how things are done across hierarchies (rules of decision), markets (rules of exchange), and networks (rules of trust). They are also necessary for navigating the interactions between countries and regions—the so-called rules-based international order—to maintain peace and avoid conflict, though this idea is currently under pressure. Rules and Policy Studies In Western public administration and political science, the analysis of rules is most closely associated with institutional theory, in particular ‘historical institutionalism’ which explored and explained the persistence of institutional stability through the perpetuation of rules over time. In the latter part of the twentieth century, institutional theory reinvented itself, embracing the work of rational choice theorists and developing new theoretical and analytical frames contained under the umbrella of ‘new institutionalism’. More recently institutional theory and analysis has extended into ‘cultural institutionalism’, ‘discursive institutionalism’, and ‘feminist institutionalism’. These theoretical and analytical developments embrace new kinds of rules and forms of agency. Institutional theory is now much more commonly understood as working with a combination of formal rules and informal norms. For example, Ostrom, one of the most celebrated institutional scholars and designer of the ‘Institutional Analysis and Development Framework’, identifies rules as the shared understandings about what actions are required, prohibited, or permitted and the enforced consequences of adhering to them or not (Ostrom, 2011, p. 17). Her framework embraces both formal rules (laws, policies, regulations) and informal rules (norms of reciprocity and exchange). Lowndes and Roberts (2013) argue that there is a third phase of institutional theory, one which embraces rules and practices and narratives and includes discursive institutionalism (as discussed in Chap. 3). This book deals with rules, practices (Chap. 9), and narratives (Chap. 3) separately as there are elements of the latter two that are not fully considered in an institutional analysis. However, it acknowledges the close link between them. For example, practices are the way actors model rules, but can often be more than just expressions of them, instead actors adapt them for goodness of fit with the environment.

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The role of actors and agency in rule setting and application is considered next. Rules, Agency, and Collaboration Earlier institutional explanations understood actors as subject to the dominant influence of established rules and norms, linked to values and cultures. Rules frame action, lead appropriate behaviour, and embed ideas about the ‘way we do things’ in a given context (Scott, 2001); often a ‘calculus of identity and appropriateness’ is more important to political actors in driving decision-making than ‘calculus of political costs and benefits’ (March & Olsen, 1989, p. 38). Later work offered greater scope for actors and agency as academics and practitioners grappled with the complexity and diversity associated with contemporary governing. For example, in the Global North the failure of existing rule structures to accommodate policy challenges and contain the demands of more heterogeneous societies created an opportunity space for alternatives. Hajer (2003) referred to these spaces as ‘institutional voids’, where ‘there are no clear rules and norms according to which politics is to be conducted and policy measures are to be agreed upon’ (2003, p. 175). Crouch (2005) proposed that particular kinds of actors, ‘institutional entrepreneurs’, could fill these spaces, by drawing on and combining elements of existing institutions ‘in a kind of institutional bricolage to produce new combinations that bring together apparently incompatible functions’ (2005, p. 154). Skelcher et al. (2013) named this process as ‘one of recombinant governance—in other words, hybridization—in which actors utilize those elements of different governance modes that offer the best prospect of achieving desired outcomes’ (p. 35) This focus on agency, hybridity, and adaptation sits uneasily with dominant political science interpretations (in the west at least) that privilege structure, singularity, and stability. It denies grand narratives and universal causalities and proposes instead ongoing construction and reconstruction of actor identities, institutions (rules and norms), and policy performances produced through challenge, change, and resistance and resolving in local settlements. It aligns itself much more with developments in decentred governance (Griggs et al., 2014) which situate actors at the centre of analysis and action and understand governing and public policy as practices. What is of interest here is the primacy afforded to flux and change rather than fixity and stability. In contrast to the mainstream ‘social

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proclivity to boundary fetishism’, and ‘essentialisation’ (Pieterse, 2001, p. 220), boundaries are necessarily malleable, subject to constant dynamic pressure. This has implications for collaboration, rules, and human actors. It normalises collaboration in public policy practice, dilutes the rigidity of rules, affords fluidity to actor identities, and creates space for agency. The agency of ‘institutional entrepreneurs’ is expressed through their ability to make and remake rules in seemingly intractable circumstances, not limited to collaboration. In contrast, ‘boundary spanners’—actors with particular capabilities in working across boundaries—exercise their agency in and on collaboration (Williams, 2012). These actors are not focused specifically on rules but on the range of ways in which collaborations can function. Agency and space for its expression is not unbounded, rather it remains situated, influenced by power relations past and present, that sustain privilege and inequality. Gains and Lowndes (2017) offer important analytic purchase on this issue in their work on rules and gender by separating out ‘rules about gender’ (aiming for differential outcomes for men and women) and ‘the gender of those working with rules’ (whether and how gender influences rule interpretation). In the context of public policy collaboration, a focus on ‘rules about gender’ might help explain why some policy areas, such as family violence, receive less attention than others, such as economic renewal, while a focus on ‘the gender of those working with rules’ might improve understanding about the relative importance of women being in positions of power in and over collaborations. The remainder of this chapter explores the interactions between rules and actors in creating and constraining the scope, content, and conduct of public policy collaboration.

Rules as Enablers of Collaboration Rules enable public policy collaborations in several ways—informed by each of the collaborative domains. Rules provide frameworks for achieving the purpose of the collaboration (political domain), they delineate what it is that the collaboration will do (material domain), they project prevailing values and norms (cultural domain), and they create the space and shape of the collaboration (spatial domain). The following examples illustrate how rules enable collaboration, and the relative impacts of the domains.

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Public-Private Partnerships. New Policy Instruments, New Rules In public policy, collaboration is often invoked to enable new ways of achieving public purpose. The Public-Private Partnership (PPP) is one of the most well-known and widely adopted of such innovative tools. PPPs defy precise definition but are understood broadly to be long-term cooperative (contractual) arrangements between government and businesses to achieve public policy goals, where the latter shares both benefits and risks. They are used in both developed and developing economies particularly for major infrastructure projects, although they are also used for public service provision. PPPs purport to take advantage of private sector discipline, innovation, and expertise for public benefit. Their effectiveness remains contested by researchers, but they have considerable appeal to governments facing major infrastructure challenges with limited public resources (Hodge & Greve, 2007). They remain an important public policy instrument throughout the world, including in new areas of activity such as electronic citizen identification.1 Rules feature in PPPs in a variety of ways. Their creation requires policy and legislation; rules that establish their framework for operation. Public sector organisations included in the scope of PPPs need new rules to support the enactment of PPPs, including the development of procurement policies, professional standards, organisational resources, and governance rules. Potential partners from the private sector need to develop appropriate rules to enable them to act as partners. The PPP requires rules of establishment and conduct that reflect its purpose and remit. The PPP contract(s) is a complex bundle of rules determining how the project will be designed, delivered, and regulated. New rules are also necessary to assess the benefit to the public of PPPs, as individual projects, and as an overall policy. In PPPs the political domain of collaboration is the dominant domain— the purpose of PPPs is to realise policymakers’ ambitions to achieve their goals via the engagement of private sector organisations. This necessitates the wide variety of rules identified above concerned with creating the environment for the operation of PPPs. The material domain enacts this purpose, comprising the rules that facilitate action by and in PPPs. The spatial domain is closely linked to the material domain as it describes the 1  https://www.thalesgroup.com/en/markets/digital-identity-and-security/government/identity/public-private-partnerships. Accessed March 25, 2022.

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PPP’s scope of action and the form the PPP takes. The cultural domain offers actors the opportunity to attach meaning and values to PPPs that may be positive or negative and connect PPPs to ideological programs or movements affecting public policy over time. Agency over rules in PPPs is aligned formally with the commissioners, that is, the politicians and officials responsible for the use of public money. However, in practice agency may be held and exercised by other actors, principally the private sector partners responsible for project delivery, who may seek to shape the rules as part of the negotiation of the PPP. This may be particularly so in areas where markets are ill-defined or where a small number of private partners have the necessary expertise. The contractual complexity of PPPs illustrated in the legal, financial, and regulatory rules privileges actors with requisite expertise, on all sides of the partnership. Local Strategic Partnerships. Rules to Coordinate Complexity Collaboration necessitates the development of new rules and (possibly) institutions, the consequence of which may be additional complexity in public policy systems, and the need for additional rules to aid coordination. This is not untypical in public policy over time and across space. However, it reached its zenith in the early years of the twenty-first century as some governments developed an unalloyed enthusiasm for ‘holism’ and ‘joining things up’ coupled with a focus on ‘place’. An emblematic example of this enthusiasm was the development and operation of Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) in England as part of the UK New Labour Government’s (1997–2010) ambition to transform local governance. LSPs were public, private, voluntary, and community sector partnerships overseeing economic, social, and environmental wellbeing in their area. Rules were abundant in LSPs, reflective of all four domains of collaboration, complementing and occasionally conflicting. LSPs were partnerships of partnerships, a combination of diverse institutional formations with different rules and norms. The range of institutional formations and rules is illustrated in Fig.  4.1. Some of these collaborations had a distinct organisational form, such as the Children’s Trust. Others had a legal basis and duty, but collaboration occurred across key partner organisations, such as the Community Safety Partnership. Others were voluntary collaborations that reflected the priority of the LSP area, such as the Environment Action Group. The LSP’s collective functioning was guided by additional rules describing the scale, scope, and

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Fig. 4.1  A Local Strategic Partnership

shape of its relationships and activities expressed via the structure, representation, and resourcing of the LSP Governing Board. LSPs were an expression of a political purpose to improve public outcomes allied with a cultural preference for collaboration in contemporary governance (political and cultural domains). However, LSPs were also limited by the political purposes and policy rules that enabled other partnerships that operated alongside LSPs. The clearest example of this was the tension between the voluntary nature of LSPs compared to the statutory nature of other collaborations, for example, Community Safety Partnerships. This could mean that local partners were pulled in different directions by national government policy levers that took precedence over locally focused LSPs. LSPs were also required to enact rules established nationally, in the delivery of the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund, and later the operation of the Local Area Agreement. The spatial domain afforded LSPs considerable freedom to shape their activities as LSPs were not confined to local government administrative

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boundaries but could describe their space according to their priorities, for example, economic areas of activity or neighbourhood identities, and develop rules to enable action in and across those spaces. The material domain provided the means of operationalising the purpose and form of LSPs. As the ‘partnership of partnerships’, LSPs had a distinct identity from that of the contributing partnerships. Articulating this identity was often difficult but partners were aware of the potential power of the LSP as an institutional actor in local governance. Developing rules for how the LSP engaged in priority setting, resource allocation, performance assessment, and accountability gave the LSP a distinct role in supporting the achievement of shared public policy outcomes. LSPs also needed to develop rules for supporting the engagement of non-state actors particularly community members and private sector bodies. This is considered in the next section. Agency in LSPs reflected the status of its constituent partners, and the capability of the leaders of those organisations. The ‘local’ focus of LSPs afforded flexibility to local leaders in rule design, and this enabled variation in LSP governance, organisation, and activities. The complexity of the LSP architecture and the range and diversity of rules in use called for actors with skills in navigating across and between different rule structures. These ‘boundary spanners’ worked to effect cooperation and coordination in support of LSP goals and often developed considerable agency amongst partners belying their official status. Involving ‘Publics’. Rules for Inclusion Rules determine who is included in collaboration and how they are included. This affords significant power to those setting the rules. In public policy, regardless of the system of government, rule setters comprise an ‘elite’: elected, appointed, or anointed. Consequently, there is a risk that collaborations aimed at making better decisions by including citizens or users will fail, without appropriate attention to their design. For example, Sullivan et al. (2003) found that the direct involvement of citizens or users in the making of rules for a collaborative enterprise influenced both the nature of the rules and the engagement of citizen actors. They found that the involvement of citizens in rulemaking increased their knowledge of and allegiance to the rules, encouraged communication of the rules to others, and involvement in debating rule changes. Conversely, an absence of citizen involvement in rulemaking was associated with little

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allegiance to them and limited engagement with proposed rule changes. They concluded that ‘[t]his is significant as without the wider interaction of agents with rules, future institutional change (and hence more meaningful dialogue) is unlikely’ (Sullivan et al., 2003, p. 42) Here the political and spatial domains of collaboration operate together to align the purpose of the collaboration—citizen influence, with its form—forums defined by identity, such as older people, culturally diverse communities, and/or locality. Rulemaking is informed by the culture or tradition of institutions, and individual actors’ own experiences. For example, a city-wide forum for older citizens in Birmingham, UK, developed rules that reflected the shared experiences many of the members had as trade unionists (Barnes et al., 2007). Their agency in rule making allowed for citizens’ identities to be expressed and for these identities to inform or in some cases define the identity of the collaboration. Collaborative performance became an act of identity as much an act of achieving forum goals. This is returned to in the next section.

Rules and Collaborative Conduct How actors engage with each other will influence the effectiveness of the collaboration. As actors may come from very different sectors or organisations, they are likely to operate with different rules and be unfamiliar with those of others. Developing rules of collaborative conduct can help facilitate agency by institutionalising agreed actions in support of public purpose. Conduct rules can also be used to regulate collaborative action, keeping it within appropriate bounds. In contrast agency and rules can combine to promote collaboration that advantages some actors at the expense of others. Institutionalising Collective Leadership In New Zealand the core public service leaders formalised their approach to collaboration in ‘The Brackenbridge Declaration’, an express commitment to collective leadership and joint action (Fig. 4.2). The declaration provided the basis upon which key leaders would act together in support of better public service outcomes (the political domain). It elevated these leaders into a distinct and bounded leadership team while simultaneously confirming the continued importance of the boundaries of partner organisations.

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WE are the leadership team of the State Services: Our purpose is: Collective leadership for a better New Zealand Towards this we will: 

Be collectively ambitious for New Zealand, by focusing on the needs of our customers



Mobilise our people and resources to ensure those leading complex systemwide issues are successful



See past any barriers and make what needs to happen happen



Champion state sector reform in our organisations



Support each other as a team “out together, back together”, pick up the phone



Collectively and individually support and implement the work of functional leaders



Own and champion decisions of the State Sector Reform Leadership Group



Prioritise our biannual State Services Leadership team meetings.

27 March 2014

Fig. 4.2  The Brackenridge Declaration. (Source: O’Leary (2014, p. 45))

Agency was expressed through both individual and collective action; collaboration occurred in accordance with the rules the leaders set themselves and the rules governing their own organisations. The material domain of collaboration is to the fore in this example. The Declaration is focused on what the collaborating actors do and how they do it. However, the spatial and cultural domains are important shapers of collaboration, describing the form the collaboration takes—the creation of a ‘leadership team’ reflects the partners’ desire to express a distinct collaborative identity that expresses shared values of collaboration. The

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collaboration is to be meaningful in its practice as well as what it accomplishes. Rules of collaborative conduct are defined and performed differently influenced by the cultural context of the public policy system or systems. For example, ASEAN follows the conventional rules of the ‘ASEAN way’, described as consensus decision-making, with a strong aversion among members towards formal rules, meaning laws, or legally binding rules. Decision-making by unanimous consensus is an embedded ‘rule’ identified in the regional social environment. The ASEAN rule system emphasises a personal approach, rather than the Western reliance on formal structures (Solidum, 1981, p. 130). This example demonstrates the priority afforded to the cultural domain—what collaboration means for these partners reflects their shared commitment to the ‘ASEAN-way’. Some observers argue that this preoccupation has constrained the development of rules that would encourage further economic cooperation (see Davidson, 2004, for a discussion). Such assessments arguably reflect a narrow approach to judging collaboration, one that does not consider the influence of different collaborative domains. Rules to Regulate Conduct Regulation is how institutions and industries are kept within acceptable bounds. It comprises rules and practices given force by governments and governmental institutions. In the context of international trade, regulation needs to operate across national boundaries and in relation to corporate actors of varying size. This can require collaboration in rulemaking and application between countries. Further complication is added when the trade being regulated is one that has implications for human and state security such as trade in ‘conflict commodities’ including ‘blood diamonds’ (diamonds traded from conflict zones). The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme is one attempt to meet these challenges, ‘an innovation in global governance that combines a voluntary industry-led certification system with an inter-state import/export control regime’ (Haufler, 2010, p. 403). The Scheme enables countries and companies to engage in the diamond trade while excluding the supply of ‘blood diamonds’. The Scheme is composed of different sets of equally important rules. It requires companies involved in the scheme to certify their products, and for member nation-states to develop enforceable regulations that facilitate their supply but inhibit the supply of other diamonds. Private sector actors

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designed and implemented the rules followed by companies, while states designed procedures to manage the import/export of diamonds at their borders. Haufler’s analysis of the Scheme highlights the role of specific kinds of agency in enabling its development. This includes that of key private sector actors concerned at consumer reaction to ‘blood diamonds’, major diamond producing countries anxious to preserve their terms of trade, and transnational activists able to change the normative framework within which states and firms interact. Overlaid on this are the peak industry bodies and the global institutions, such as the UN, brought into alignment Haufler suggests by ‘the complementary nature of emerging norms regarding both corporate behavior and international intervention in civil conflicts’ (p. 403). A key ingredient in this story is the ability of activists to alter the way in which particular products are perceived by consumers, hence the power of the idea of ‘blood diamonds’, gemstones associated and sold on the identity of love that are transformed into agents of human suffering. Abbott and Snidal (2009) argue that the Kimberley Process is one example of a growth in hybrid institutions in global governance, a trend that reflects similar developments at the regional, national, and local levels. Haufler (2010) in turn suggests that the overlapping nature of these global hybrids could act to strengthen them. The example of ‘blood diamonds’ highlights the fragility of rules in these contested relationships. It also points to the risk to governmental actors of being ‘captured’ by other actors with more power to shape and regulate action. The impact of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis on financial regulation offers insights into this and is explored later in the chapter. Conflicting Rules of Conduct New rules are introduced into governance systems already replete with rules. This almost inevitably means that rules will conflict. These conflicts may have implications for actors and organisations at the micro, meso, and macro levels. At the micro level professionals may find that the rules of collaboration conflict with their professional codes of conduct. At the meso level organisations may experience a conflict between the rules of collaboration and the regulatory rules that govern their organisation. Finally, at the macro level rule conflict can occur between governance values.

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For example, Hodge’s (2006), assessment of PPPs shows how observance of the rules of the PPP results in a failure to observe the rules of democracy. This is because of the way in which actors shape and apply the PPP rules and the power of contractors to enforce ways of operating. Transparency, which is essential to the operation of democracy, is limited in PPP deals due to a combination of ‘commercial confidentiality’, the lack of involvement of citizens in debates about the merits or otherwise of specific PPPs, and insufficient attention to the public interest in these debates. In response Auditors-General in Australia have argued for changes to the rules for PPPs, proposing ‘follow the dollar’ powers to apply a measure of external accountability for investments of public money (Doyle et al., 2014). Leach’s (2006) analysis of the relationship between collaboration and democracy is similarly bleak. His assessment of ‘watershed management’ (land use and water management to protect natural resources) pits the pursuit of consensus amongst actors that is a core part of collaboration against the regulatory responsibility of government, and suggests that the latter might be subverted by the former, citing Coglianese’s (1999) assessment of the Environmental Protection System in the US. Conduct Rules for Private Benefit Not Public Good Collaboration is rooted in relationships between actors, and the workings of hybrid institutions and networks. This makes it vulnerable to subversion by actors keen to shape or make use of rules to pursue self-interest and enrichment. Some critics argue that these features of collaboration necessarily render it unethical in public policy (see Chap. 5). Others focus on establishing rules of conduct and accountability to minimise this kind of behaviour and report on it where it occurs. The ongoing debate about PPPs described above provides an excellent illustration of the concerns about private benefit outweighing public good. The established norms in different cultural contexts will also shape how rules of collaborative conduct are understood and applied. These norms are present in different forms in almost all societies from the ‘old school tie’ and ‘old boys’ network’ at work in the Anglosphere from the UK and North America to Australia, to norms of reciprocity within different ethnic and tribal groups in Africa and Asia. Collaboration is a means of securing private interests and this includes public policy collaboration. One example that illustrates the universal practice is the role of ‘Wasta’ in

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middle-eastern economic activities and public policy. An Arabic term, Wasta, is ‘an implicit social contract, typically within a tribal group, which obliges those within the group to provide assistance (favorable treatment) to others within the group’ (Barnett et al., 2013). ‘Having’ Wasta enables individuals to by-pass bureaucratic procedures, procure government contracts, and seek favourable relationships with government over other businesses. Wasta is an embedded practice in institutions and networks of Arabic societies that shapes actors’ relationships. This connection between rules and practices will be explored further in Chap. 9.

Rules Constraining Collaboration The relationship between rules and collaboration in public policy is not always productive, even in circumstances where there is a purported intention for rules to facilitate collaborative action. This section examines why this is the case focusing on the disruptive potential of actors, history, and context. Rulemaking, Actor-Ecologies, and New Governance Spaces Crises, perhaps especially global crises, provide an opportunity for radical change to occur, in the prioritisation of public policy issues, and the ways in which public policy is made and implemented. Collaboration is often invoked in this context, evidenced in the recent experience of COVID-19 and in the earlier experience of the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. The fate of collaboration in the pursuit of new rules for effective global financial regulation post the GFC offers important insights into the influence of actor-ecologies. Created in the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis in 1999, the G20, an institution with representation of the Global North and Global South and emerging economies, came to the fore in the GFC, and attracted attention as ‘a new form of reordering in global governance’ (Cooper, 2010, p. 741). This reordering was both about the inclusion of the Global South, and the G20’s mode of operating, what Haass (2010) calls ‘informal multilateralism’; the rules determine that decisions are made by consensus and then implementation is left to nation-states. A key challenge for the G20 in devising a system of effective global financial regulation was how to avoid ‘multi-level regulatory capture’, a feature of pre-crisis relations, in which actors in the mutually dependent

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domestic and international spheres favour vested interests over the public interest (Baker, 2010). Actors’ agency is derived from their ‘actor-­ecology’, marked by revolving institutional doors, and intellectual and cognitive capture. The close relationships between private and public actors in banking and finance and the well-trodden pathway from banker to public policy official and back to industry creates a form of ‘cultural capital’ that serves those actors well and enables the easy sharing of expertise. This can result in distinct private and public sector identities becoming conflated and creating policy bodies that share and espouse similar views. Baker’s analysis of the post GFC attempts at institutional redesign for global financial regulation pointed to the persistence of the ‘revolving door’ syndrome. Despite broadening country representation on regulatory bodies, the individuals involved tend to share the same technocratic perspective, shaped in part by the dominance of a particular approach to financial policymaking and regulation that is embedded in the maintenance of the existing system and concerned with finding the right combination of technical fixes. The ‘cultural domain’ of collaboration dominates rulemaking, supported by the shared expertise, emotional connection, and ethical standards of the actors involved. This is further endorsed by the ‘spatial domain’ which describes the confined ‘professional ecology’ of the membership of the collaboration (Cooper, 2010). Collaboration is constrained by the rules these actors set. Phillips et al. (2000) suggest that collaborative rules are shaped by pre-­ existing rules in constituent institutional fields. Where ‘professional ecologies’ are congruent (as above) then the ‘constituent institutional fields’ may be likewise. However, collaboration is more often at work in the context of diverse and even divergent ‘constituent institutional fields’ meaning collaborative rulemaking will be more difficult. Importantly, Phillips et al.’s analysis proposes a two-way rule relationship—collaborative rules shaped by the rules of constituent institutional fields can in turn influence the rules of those constituent institutional fields. This emphasises that rules are dynamic not static, subject to adaptation over time, as actors and circumstances change. In public policy rule dynamics are shaped by forces of conservatism as well as change with important consequences for collaboration as explored next.

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Rules, Time, and Structural Power Water is an essential natural resource and watershed management a major public policy issue. As watercourses invariably cross geographical and jurisdictional boundaries, governing and managing them necessitates collaboration and the development of institutions to enable this. Watershed management involves a wide range of actors with diverse and sometimes competing needs and desires. Collaboration can be conflictual, and rulemaking is both essential and difficult, informed by history and human/ natural relations over time. The political domain of collaboration is at the fore in ongoing debates about watershed management. In the twenty-first century water is invariably included in debates about ‘resource security’. This focus on security signifies that water, its use, pathways, and preservation are all political matters; natural resources equate to political power; and their presence or absence can make states, companies, communities, and whole continents more or less powerful. The purpose of collaboration is security. The spatial domain of collaboration describes that purpose and how to achieve it. Watershed management evokes space in several important ways. There is the immediate space of the river basin. But there are also the spaces that rivers traverse on their way to the basin. What occurs in these spaces and indeed how these spaces are defined in relation to the basin is indicative of both contemporary concerns but also the traditions and legacies of past rules and practices. This introduces the cultural dimension of collaboration, specifically the ways in which water means different things to the different communities that rely on it or benefit from it and how that translates into collaborative potential. The spatial domain influences the scope and shape of any collaboration, while the material domain describes the activities and operations of the collaboration. Rules play a part in each of the collaborative domains; they reflect political purpose (rules of ‘security’, of conservation), they define space (rules of cartography, of geo-politics, of institutional form), they express culture (rules and norms of water access and use), and they inform management activities (rules as laws about water rationing). The Murray-Darling Basin, Australia’s most iconic river system and one of its most contested long-term public policy challenges, is a helpful illustration of the role of rules in and over time and their impact on collaboration.

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Composed of Australia’s three longest rivers, the Basin is of vital importance ecologically, economically, culturally, and socially (Fig.  4.3). First Nations’ Australians managed the water system for more than 50,000 years. Their approach to water management is expressed in the words of late Ngarrindjeri elder Tom Trevorrow, ‘our traditional management plan was don’t be greedy, don’t take any more than you need and respect everything around you. That’s the management plan—it’s such a simple management plan, but so hard for people to carry out’ (cited in Murray-Darling Basin Authority, 2013, p. i). European settlement prioritised the use of water for settlers’ domestic and agricultural needs with no regard for the traditional owners’ rules and practices. In addition, the construction of Australia as a federation of states divided the Basin and created new administrative boundaries that needed to be navigated, adding to the challenge of managing it and necessitating collaboration between states and with the Commonwealth government. Over the next 200 years the rules governing the Basin resulted in overconsumption, drought, decreasing river flows, and increasing salinity that severely affected the health of the Basin. Policy reform, first begun over a century ago (Connell & Grafton, 2011), was slow to address the problems as policy frameworks continued to privilege settlers over First Nations Australians, and domestic and economic benefits rather than environmental ones. Collaboration between Basin states and with the federal government followed these priorities and rules were devised to enable collaboration on this basis. The Water Act 2007, the establishment of the Murray-Darling Basin Authority and the Basin Plan (2012), is the most recent attempt to create a policy architecture to support ‘a healthy working and sustainable Basin’ based on the ‘collective endeavour’ of governments, industries, and communities (Fig. 4.4). Collaboration is at the core of the Act, the Authority, and the Plan. Rules abound in the management of the Basin, not all to do with collaboration by any means, but all designed in support of the stated ‘collective endeavour’ (Table 4.1). Hardy and Koontz (2009) examined a number of collaborative watershed partnerships ‘to investigate the rules governing how partnerships with different membership profiles act at different levels of institutional decision making’ (p. 395). Their findings suggest that collaboration at the ‘collective-choice level’—the level of collaborative governance—‘guide the operational management actions that are aimed at improving

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‘Australia is the driest inhabited continent in the world making water arguably its most valuable natural resource. The Murray–Darling Basin is a one million square kilometre area in the south-east of Australia, or 14% of the continent’s land. It comprises the Darling River (approximately 2,740 km long); River Murray (approximately 2,520 km long); and the Murrumbidgee River (approximately 1,575 km long). The Basin is Australia’s most important water catchment, providing water to 2.2 million people, countless native habitats, and thousands of farms.

Water is central to the cultural, social, and spiritual identity of Australia's First Nations’ peoples, as well as to their livelihoods. There are more than 40 First Nations in the Basin. First Nations peoples have been present in the Basin area for more than 50,000 years.

The Basin is ecologically diverse, supporting a wide range of nationally and internationally significant plants, animals and ecosystems. It plays an important role in supporting biodiversity including for many threatened species. The Basin is also essential for the lives and livelihoods of a significant proportion of the population as 10% of Australia's population live in the Basin area in New South Wales (39%) and Victoria (29%). Agriculture is a significant employer in the Basin and almost two-fifths (38%) of Australia's farmers reside in the Basin’.

Fig. 4.3  The Murray-Darling Basin. (Source: MDBA (2022). Accessed 16 February 2022. https://www.mdba.gov.au/importance-­murray-­darling-­basin)

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‘The sustainable management of the Murray–Darling Basin River system is a collective endeavour of the Australian and Basin state governments, with river dependent industries and communities.

The Water Act 2007 establishes the Murray–Darling Basin Authority (MDBA), the Statutory Agency which supports the Authority Board. 'The Authority' is comprised of the Chair, Chief Executive, Indigenous member and 4 part-time members appointed by the Governor-General in accordance with sections 177 and 178 of the Water Act 2007.

Authority members are appointed based on their specialised skills and experience in areas relevant to water resource management, governance, environmental, community and indigenous matters.

The Authority takes advice on Basin-wide strategy, and policy and planning, from the MDBA and collaborates with the Department of Agriculture, Water and the Environment (DAWE), the Commonwealth Environmental Water Holder and Basin jurisdictions. It also receives advice from Basin communities, industry, environmental groups, and other government organisations (including the Bureau of Meteorology and the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission) to secure Basin water resources’.

Fig. 4.4  The Murray-Darling Basin Authority. (Source: MDBA (2022). Accessed 16 February 2022. https://www.mdba.gov.au/about-­us/governance/water-­act)

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Table 4.1  Rules of the Murray Darling Basin Functions

Rules

Partners

Water resource plans

Sets local rules for water and how each region will achieve community, economic, environmental, and cultural outcomes Effective and fair rule system to maintain integrity of range of water use mechanisms

MDBA accredits Basin states and territory—develop and implement

Compliance

Water markets and trade

Rules for buying and selling water

Recovering water

Rules to maintain water and wetland health

Water for the environment

Rules to improve water and wetland health

MDBA—monitor and enforce at basin level Basin states— implement and enforce locally MDBA—enforce compliance Basin states— implement rules

Other actors

Australian Competition and Consumer Commission— advises on rules

Basin states— implement efficiency programs Department of Agriculture, Water and the Environment— strategic purchasing and efficiency programs MDBA—plan, coordinate and prioritise at Basin scale Basin states—plan and implement locally Commonwealth Environmental Water Holder—plan and implement across Basin (continued)

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Table 4.1 (continued) Functions

Rules

Monitoring and Rules to ensure water evaluation management works and remains on track

Sustainable diversion limit adjustable mechanism

Rules for improving performance of water delivery systems and reduce water losses

River Murray operations

Rules for developing and maintaining River infrastructure such as dams and levees

Partners

Other actors

MDBA—evaluate Basin Plan Basin states—report and monitor local performance Department of Agriculture, Water and the Environment— monitor water recovery Commonwealth Environmental Water Holder—monitor and report on water for the environment MDBA—coordinate and assess projects Basin states—propose and implement projects Department of Agriculture, Water and the Environment—fund and implement projects MDBA—overall operation Basin states—day to day management of local infrastructure

Source: Adapted from MDBA (2022). Accessed 16 February 2022. https://www.mdba.gov.au/node/1016

watershed health’ (p.  410). Stakeholder interactions at the collective-­ choice level will therefore have a lasting influence on operational rules. Translating this to the operation of the Murray-Darling Basin highlights the role of actors and agency over rule choice. The interaction between agency and influence is stark and has persisted over time, despite formal efforts to manage the Basin. This is most evident in the disregard for First Nations Australians’ knowledge about the river systems and the rules they employed to manage them. Since European settlement the political economy of the Basin has

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been shaped by actors working within a particular framework of economic productivity derived from alien histories and traditions. While ‘Water for First Nations’ is now a distinct element of the work of the MDBA and the National Cultural Flows Research Project led by First Nations Australians proposed a national framework for cultural flows in 2018,2 the rules dominating decision-making about management of the Basin remain skewed towards actors with powerful economic interests. There are occasions when rules appear to confound power, constraining the room for manoeuvre of all actors involved in the collaboration. Barnes et  al. (2007) describe these as ‘institutional prisons’. Figure  4.5 provides an example of an institutional prison—an attempt at collaborative governance that aimed to bring local elected politicians, state and non-­ state actors, and members of the public together to address local concerns. The attempt failed as the events described in the figure illustrate. There were multiple reasons for this failure including the lack of involvement of all partners in designing the rules, but what is of significance here is the way in which none of the actors, even those with the most formal power, that is the local elected politicians, experienced the rules as enabling. Rather the rules confined everyone and led to conflict and rule-breaking. The experience of not being involved in rulemaking in collaborative enterprises and subsequent rule-breaking is not confined to citizens and communities in their relations with the state. Countries can also experience this though their reaction will be determined partly by their global power and status. For example, the People’s Republic of China’s longstanding dispute with six neighbouring countries in Southeast Asia over control of resources in part of the South China Sea.3 In some cases, if spaces for collaboration fail to adapt their rules to changes in actors’ evolving capacities, new spaces with new rules can emerge to respond to the incongruence. The establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) in 2016 is one example. The AIIB is a multilateral development bank that aims to improve economic and social outcomes in Asia through a focus on infrastructure. A prominent interpretation of the rise of the AIIB links China’s frustration with the inadaptable rules of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) that have cemented in an anachronistic system of power distribution from the 2  (https://www.mdba.gov.au/about-basin/water-for-first-nations-people February 2020). 3  Thanks to Sarah Dobney for reminding me of this example.

accessed

8

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A local government organisation established new rules to involve the public in decisions that affected them. The rules established new local institutions - local area committees made up of elected politicians and ‘lay advisory members’. They determined who was eligible for ‘lay’ membership - representatives of public, private, not for profit and community organisations, and the process for becoming members – via application and appointment by the local government. They also shaped the running of the committee, for example, introducing a period of ‘question time’during each committee meeting, when members of the public could enter into exchanges with councillors and officials, and dedicating time within the meetings for focused deliberation on a topic of local concern.

Researchers’ observations of area committee meetings noted high levels of conflict between and amongst politicians, professionals, and the public. This was significant as the elected politicians were all experienced and skilful politicians, the chair of the committee was highly regarded as someone able to work across organisational and community differences, and the advisory members were experienced activists, voluntary organisation representatives or community leaders.

Conflict took a number of forms in the meetings. Notable examples were members of the public using ‘question time’ to make speeches about the failures of the local government, members of the public shouting at local government officers and politicians, and politicians arguing with amongst themselves in the meeting about why the committee was not ‘working’.

Fig. 4.5  Rules creating institutional prisons. (Source: Adapted from a Barnes et al. (2007, chap. 5), and Sullivan (2014, pp. 189–190))

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Research concluded that rule design and implementation contributed to the conflict (Barnes et al 2007). The local government determined the rules for the size and shape of the area committee, its membership, engagement and mode of operating without any consultation with the public or other organisations. Consequently the area committees covered large geographic areas and were not regarded as ‘local’ by members of the public. The added value of appointing lay advisory members onto the committee was not realised as most people didn’t know what they were for, and their presence was never explained. And meetings were choreographed in such a way as to create division. For example elected politicians sat at ‘the top table’, lay members below and the public in the well of the hall. Politicians were always invited to speak first, then advisory members, then the public.

This (albeit extreme) example draws attention to the ways in which power relationships can be intensified through the construction and operation of procedural rules.

Fig. 4.5  (continued)

twentieth century (Liao, 2015). China’s vote share of the IMF in 2015 was lower than the UK, despite a far larger economy and contribution of capital. The rules that govern lending within the IMF have also attracted much attention, with IMF conditionality cited as exacerbating the Asian Financial Crisis in 1997 and the socio-economic issues that plagued Latin America. The rise of regional powers and the creation of new institutions and rules to govern international collaborative policies are also evident in the creation of the Union of South American Nations by Brazil and the New Development Bank and Contingent Reserve Arrangement by the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) group (Kahler, 2018).

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Conclusion Rules are at the intersection of the political, cultural, material, and spatial domains that inform collaboration. In governance and public policy, rules are inherently political, they provide a way of managing power and offering expression of purpose and ideas. Rules have a material existence codified in laws and policies and embedded in the structures of institutions and organisations. They are also culturally informed; ‘the way things are done around here’ illuminates why some kinds of rules are likely to be more acceptable than others. Finally rules shape and are shaped by the particularly spatial contexts of public policy concerns. As governance interactions have become more spatially disaggregated and interconnected existing rules are complemented or replaced by rules operating from different spaces, which can in turn enable or constrain collaboration. These distinctions are analytical ones, not material. In practice the rules of collaboration, for collaboration and from collaboration are produced by the continuous interactions of the four domains, and this in turn generates possibilities and challenges in particular contexts. Rules matter in collaboration because they construct, defend, and overcome boundaries, and enable and constrain collaborative practice. However, they are not apolitical instruments as they shape and are shaped by actors in pursuit of particular objectives and/or representing particular values and norms. In addition to expressing actors’ values in collaboration, rules are also constitutive of collaborations as actors in public policy. Hence the significance of which actors get to shape the rules and how that happens. Collaborations may bring together diverse actors, but this diversity does not necessarily translate into hybridised rules. The next chapter focuses on the question of values and its manifestation as ethical frameworks for conduct.

References Abbott, K., & Snidal, D. (2009). The Governance Triangle: Regulatory Standards Institutions and the Shadow of the State. In N. Woods & W. Mattli (Eds.), The Politics of Global Regulation. Princeton University Press. Baker, A. (2010). Restraining Regulatory Capture? Anglo-America, Crisis Politics and Trajectories of Change in Global Financial Governance. International Affairs, 86, 647–663.

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Barnes, M., Newman, J., & Sullivan, H. (2007). Power, Participation and Political Renewal: Case Studies in Public Participation. Policy Press. Barnett, A., Yandle, B., & Naufal, G. (2013). Regulation, Trust, and Cronyism in Middle Eastern Societies: The Simple Economics of “Wasta”. The Journal of Socio-Economics, 44, 41–46. Coglianese, C. (1999). The Limits of Consensus: The Environmental Protection System in Transition: Toward a More Desirable Future. Environment: Science and Policy for Sustainable Development, 41, 28–33. Connell, D., & Grafton, R.  Q. (2011). Water Reform in the Murray-Darling Basin. Water Resources Research, 47. https://doi.org/10.1029/2010WR009820 Cooper, A.  F. (2010). The G20 as an Improvised Crisis Committee and/or a Contested ‘Steering Committee’ for the World. International Affairs, 86, 741–757. Crouch, C. (2005). Capitalist Diversity and Change. Oxford University Press. Davidson, P. J. (2004). The ASEAN Way and the Role of Law in ASEAN Economic Cooperation. SYBIL, 8, 165. Doyle, J., Pearson, D., Cameron, W., & Baragwanath, C. (2014, November 13). Opinion. Victoria’s Outdated Audit Act Needs Urgent Attention. The Age. Gains, F., & Lowndes, V. (2017). Gender, Actors, and Institutions at the Local Level: Explaining Variation in Policies to Address Violence against Women and Girls. Governance, 1–17. https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12329 Griggs, S., Norval, A.  J., & Wagenaar, H. (2014). Introduction: Democracy, Conflict and Participation in Decentred Governance. In S. Griggs, A. J. Norval, & H.  Wagenaar (Eds.), Practices of Freedom. Decentred Governance, Conflict and Democratic Participation. Cambridge University Press. Haass, N. (2010, January 2). The Case for Messy Multilateralism. Financial Times. http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/18d8f8b6-­fa2f-­11de-­beed 00144feab49a. html#axzz3V7tRrGOt Hajer, M. (2003). Policy without Polity? Policy Analysis and the Institutional Void. Policy Sciences, 36, 175–195. Hardy, S.  D., & Koontz, T.  M. (2009). Rules for Collaboration: Institutional Analysis of Group Membership and Levels of Action in Watershed Partnerships. The Policy Studies Journal, 37, 393–414. Haufler, V. (2010). The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme: An Innovation in Global Governance and Conflict Prevention. Journal of Business Ethics, 89, 403–416. Hodge, G. (2006). Public Private Partnerships and Legitimacy. UNSW Law Journal, 29, 318–327. Hodge, G., & Greve, C. (2007). Public-Private Partnerships: An International Performance Review. Public Administration Review, 67, 545–558. Kahler, M. (2018). Global Governance: Three Futures. International Studies Review, 20, 239–246.

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Leach, W. D. (2006). Collaborative Public Management and Democracy: Evidence from Western Watershed Partnerships. Public Administration Review, Special Issue: Collaborative Public Management, 66, 100–110. Liao, R. (2015). Out of the Bretton Woods—How the AIIB is DIfferent. Foreign Affairs. Council on Foreign Relations. Lowndes, V., & Roberts, M. (2013). Why Institutions Matter: The New Institutionalism in Political Science. Macmillan Education UK. March, J. G., & Olsen, J. P. (1989). Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics. Free Press. Murray-Darling Basin Authority (2013). Constraints Management Strategy 2013–24. Licensed from the Murray-Darling Basin Authority, under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 Australian Licence, Commonwealth of Australia. Murray-Darling Basin Authority. (2022). Retrieved February 16, 2022, from https://www.mdba.gov.au/importance-­murray-­darling-­basin O’Leary, R. (2014). Collaborative Governance in New Zealand: Important Choices Ahead. Ian Axford (New Zealand) Fellowships in Public Policy, Fulbright New Zealand, August. Ostrom, E. (2011). Background on the Institutional Analysis and Development Framework. Policy Studies Journal, 39, 7–27. Phillips, N., Lawrence, T.  B., & Hardy, C. (2000). Inter-organizational Collaboration and the Dynamics of Institutional Fields. Journal of Management Studies, 37, no–no. Pieterse, J. N. (2001). Hybridity, So What? Theory, Culture & Society, 18, 219–245. Scott, W. R. (2001). Institutions and Organizations. Sage. Skelcher, C., Sullivan, H., & Jeffares, S. (2013). Hybrid Governance in European Cities: Neighbourhood, Migration and Democracy. Palgrave Macmillan. Solidum, E. D. (1981). The Role of Certain Sectors in Shaping and Articulating the ASEAN Way. East West Centre Cultural Learning Institute. Sullivan, H. (2014). Designing ‘The Political’ in (and Out of) Neighbourhood Governance. In S.  Griggs, A.  J. Norval, & H.  Wagenaar (Eds.), Practices of Freedom. Decentred Governance, Conflict and Democratic Participation. Cambridge University Press. Sullivan, H., Newman, J., Barnes, M., & Knops, A. (2003). The Role of Institutions in Facilitating and Constraining Dialogue in Partnerships with Communities, in Scott, C. and Thurston, W. E. eds. Collaboration in Context, Calgary, University of Calgary, 33–44. Williams, P. (2012). Collaboration in Public Policy and Practice: Perspectives on Boundary Spanners. Policy Press.

CHAPTER 5

Ethics, Agency, and Collaboration

Introduction Ethics provide guides to action in public policy systems. They encourage conduct that accords with values and sanction conduct that transgresses them. As collaboration is a key expression of contemporary organising, interactions between ethics and collaboration will influence how collaboration is organised and practised. It may also impact understandings of ethics. This chapter explores those interactions to develop a better understanding of the relationship between ethics and collaboration and to identify how public policy practice might benefit. In doing so it highlights the challenges posed by collaboration to traditions and norms of ethical public conduct, and confronts questions of agency, identity, and performance in collaborative settings. It argues that collaboration draws attention to the constraints of existing ethical frameworks and creates the possibility for new frameworks to emerge. How questions of values—what a society values and why, morality; societal distinctions between good and bad actions based on our value positions, and ethics; frameworks for working out what action is permissible—are addressed in different public policy systems depends on the prevailing philosophical and other traditions. The changes wrought to the public policy environment via globalisation mean that these established ethical traditions are likely to meet with and be challenged/ influenced by the values and morality of other systems as each becomes more permeable. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 H. Sullivan, Collaboration and Public Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-09585-6_5

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Collaboration is both a response to this changed public policy context and a disruptive force as it draws together institutions and actors from different sectors, spheres, and even countries who may have different public traditions, different governing frames, and different value positions. This raises the question of how to protect and promote ethical public policy in collaborative contexts. The association of ethics with collaboration foregrounds the role of actors and agency. Ethics are embodied by human actors and performed by them in their professional and personal exchanges and relationships. This is not to say that institutional ethics do not have a bearing, clearly, they do as examples as diverse as the Mafia and the World Health Organization signify. But the reproduction and adaptation of these ethical positions occurs through human actors. This prompts a further question of how actors understand and experience their ethical agency. At heart this is a question about power and difference. Moral philosophy and societal practices are both products and reproducers of kinds of social and political relations that are inevitably racialised, gendered, and bound by culturally significant categories such as the public or private. The ethical frameworks they combine to produce are similarly partial and will enable and constrain the expression of ethical identities and practices in the context of collaboration. The question here is whether collaborative actors can develop different kinds of identity and agency associated (possibly) with the production of an ethics of collaboration. This chapter attempts to respond to these questions in the following ways: • It discusses what kinds of ethics are helpful in the context of contemporary public policy with its focus on collaboration. • It examines how ethics can help make decisions about whether to collaborate or not. The application of an ethical lens can contest the idea of collaboration as an ethical activity, highlighting the incidence of collaborative practices and in some cases, whole ventures, that are themselves unethical. • It examines how ethics informs conduct in collaboration. What does it mean to behave ethically in a collaborative context? How is ethical conduct judged?

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Ethics and Public Policy It is relatively unusual to come across the word ‘ethics’ in everyday discussions of public policy as opposed to discussions of public administration and conduct. Similarly, the word ‘morality’ is infrequently used. Much more common is the use of word ‘values’. Policy makers regularly refer to values as underpinning particular policy directions, particularly where they align with an ideological position, for example, the welfare cuts proposed by Joe Hockey the Australian Treasurer in 2014 were framed by his phrase ‘we are a nation of lifters not leaners’ (Griffiths, 2014), the normative phrasing denoting the kinds of values society should endorse. Evoking morality and ethics demand explicit judgement about actions that are good/bad and right/wrong. The Western canon of moral philosophy that shaped public policy and administration in many parts of the world, and is the basis for dominant forms of public policy scholarship, can be distinguished and summarised in similar ways: consequentialism (doing good), Kantianism (doing what is right), and virtuism (being good) (Fitzpatrick, 2008). These differing perspectives offer both comfort and challenge to policymakers in their deliberations but rarely permit an easy arrival at a binary decision. This may help explain why in many countries discussion of morality in public policy is confined to very particular issues, for example, euthanasia in the UK, abortion in the US, refugees in Australia. However, restricting discussion of morality and ethics to these very polarising issues disconnects them from everyday policymaking. O’Flynn’s (2018) work on the role of markets in government attempts to rectify this by explicitly focusing on how a moral framework can influence the way in which policy discussions are conducted and decisions made. Her work is a reminder that all policy decisions are made within a moral register even though the normalisation of a particular values framework, such as New Public Management, renders them neutral. It also draws attention to moral philosophies that engage directly with questions of inequality and are of direct relevance for public policy such as social justice ethics, which emphasises fairness, solidarity, and subsidiarity, for example, Rawls (1971). O’Flynn (2018) argues that public administration has bracketed the discussion of morality in debates about reform, preferring to focus on the mechanics of how to do something, rather than whether it should be done. She proposes that what is required is a return to an explicit and public morality in debates about public policy to make clear their collective impact.

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Newman (2007) provides helpful direction on what contemporary ‘public morality’ might look like. She suggests we reconceive ‘the public imaginary’ as an emergent property of values which privilege transnational ethical and political claims and social and political practices of state and non-state actors that support local public action cognisant of the dominance of ideas about ‘publics’ that can limit this action. This drawing together of the transnational and the local foregrounds the personal impact of morality in public policy through the necessary interaction and frequent interconnection between communities across space and time. The importance of dynamics in public morality is reinforced by Henricson (2016) who argues the lack of consistent engagement between morality and public policy means that we fail to understand that morality is in an ‘habitual state of flux’ and so are unable to think well about how morality operates when societies change, for example, by becoming more diverse and multi-cultural. Morality, she argues, ‘involves both cultural stability and cultural movement, and it has a strong social impact. As such it necessitates engagement by those responsible for the development and administration of public policy’ to enable change whilst also retaining continuity (2016, p. 115). Both Newman and Henricson appeal for a morality appropriate to cultural contexts, including taking account of cross-cultural ethics. This means reappraising dominant ethical frameworks and considering how to engage with alternatives in ways that are consistent with underlying public policy purposes. Flanagan (2017) offers a way into this enquiry, suggesting that the increasing diversity of populations means that more and more people are living ‘together’ but influenced by different moral traditions, and this creates an opportunity for learning. It also creates an opportunity for division. Enabling the former and avoiding or overcoming the latter requires the active engagement of policymakers with a ‘conscious handle on the moral sphere’ (Henricson, 2016). This is not easy work. ‘We are born into particular social worlds and we learn to speak, think, and judge, at least at first, inside these worlds’ (Flanagan, 2017, p. 5). It takes conscious effort to recognise the value of other social worlds, and to avoid becoming ‘imprisoned by one’s upbringing’ (Macintyre (2013), in Flanagan, 2017, p. 5). As situated agents we ‘are conduits of traditions, participants, and creators, but not by any means sole authors, of our lives’ (Flanagan, 2017, p.  7). In public administration and indeed most working environments workers operate within institutional or organisational codes of conduct

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that include guides to ethical decision-making. These guides are based on prevailing values and morals but also ideas and norms that reflect particular perspectives about who public administration workers are, and how they will arrive at decisions. This privileges groups who align with these ideas and norms and marginalises those who do not. In contemporary contexts norms of ‘public conduct’ would benefit from a concept of public actors and conduct that supports a ‘being together of strangers’, open to difference, passion, and play (Young, 1990, pp.  236–241) and inclusive of diversity and affect and emotion. Barnes et al.’s (2007) study of public participation endorses this characterisation, and Lepine and Sullivan (2010) explore it as the basis for the future role of local elected councillors as ‘public persons’. The ethics of care, which emphasises human relationships, intimacy and dependencies (e.g. Clement (1996) and Hamington and Miller (2006)), provides a framework for practice (see more below). This opening up of ethical public conduct highlights that while the conditioning of our moral conduct is situated, it is not absolute, and when individuals encounter situations that conflict with their personal ethical code (or professional), then they may object and ultimately refuse to comply. In addition, the particularities of a situation provide an opportunity for human actors to ‘look again’ at their codified or expected responses, and to make a different decision. The contemporary public policy environment with its diversity, complexity, and interconnectedness disrupts established value positions by bringing them into contact with different others. It intensifies the dynamic between the global and the local, and the universal and the particular in the working out of moral judgements. Collaboration is a response to this changed public policy context but an additional disruptive force as it reveals the limits of actors’ capacity to see beyond their own ‘upbringing’ political, professional, and personal. However, collaboration is also a spur to ‘looking again and learning’.

Ethics in Collaboration As in public policy generally, values rather than morality or ethics feature in writing about collaboration. Studies delineate actors’ values, the extent to which they are shared and the implications of this for the collaborative venture. For example, a multi-agency program to support service users’

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managing chronic conditions referenced ‘the promotion of a shared value system based on “openness, transparency, honesty and integrity” as integral to its success’ (Williams and Sullivan, 2009, Case Study 1, p. 10). In contrast, explicit reference to ethics is reserved for extreme examples of collaborative failure, most often involving vulnerable service users, for example, abused children (Hall, 2003). Fitzpatrick’s (2008) focus on how ethics are applied in public policy and practice provides a helpful way into an exploration of ethics and collaboration. His distinction between consequentialism (doing good), Kantianism (doing what is right), and virtuism (being good) offers insights on the place and purpose of collaboration, what may be termed an ‘ethic of collaboration’. Consequentialism, with its focus on actions and their impact on some pre-determined good, offers an ethic of collaboration that judges it to be warranted when it is anticipated to have positive outcomes, even if those outcomes are not obvious in the short term but require a longer perspective on the achievement of human happiness or wellbeing. The focus on outcomes aligns it with the political domain of collaboration. This ethic of collaboration fits well with the complex, diverse, and dynamic contemporary governance conditions, where traditional approaches have failed, and new ones are required. Kantianism, with its emphasis on the development and application of rational and universal principles that can justify actions and its respect for an individual’s sovereignty and inherent worth, offers an ethic of collaboration that is imbued with the importance of liberty and equality as well as reason. Here decisions to collaborate are made in the context of how collaboration might contribute to or detract from important values including democracy and the protection of individual rights. Kantianism speaks to both the political and cultural domains of collaboration—the ‘rightness’ of purpose coupled with the ‘rightness’ of collaboration. Finally, virtuism, with its emphasis on individual experience as well as action, suggests an ethic of collaboration that encourages the ‘flourishing of human potential’ (Fitzpatrick, 2008, p. 88) through its practice; that collaboration will in and of itself contribute to individual growth. This connects to ideas of collaboration as opportunities for engaging with and expressing community norms and traditions and which offer room for sentiment as well as reason. Virtuism connects to the cultural and material domains of collaboration—its meaning shapes and is shaped by action.

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In practice, collaboration may contain multiple ethical positions. For example, the ‘vision statement’ of a multi-institutional integrated disability service reflects consequentialism, Kantianism, and virtuism: The precise nature of the vision was important—making a difference to the lives of vulnerable people—was considered to be ‘deserving’ and ‘socially just’ [doing what is right]. It appealed to those professionals and managers who were motivated by public service and its values—it appealed to those who achieved satisfaction from improving the quality of life of individuals and communities [doing good]. Many public service organisations share the same clients, and it is incumbent upon them, therefore, to work together in the best interests of these individuals [being good]. (Williams & Sullivan, 2009, Case Study 5, p. 4, emphasis added)

In collaborative settings with a diversity of actors involved, who shapes or even decides what is ‘good’ and/or ‘right’ reflects the power dynamics amongst the actors. This is also influenced by the assumptions built into different moral philosophies. For example, a key dilemma in mainstream moral philosophy of the Kantian tradition is the separation of reason from emotion and the relegation of those ‘others’ including women and racial minorities to the natural sphere, thereby deeming them less capable of making good judgements. Designing ethical collaboration on this basis is therefore inadequate. A more sufficient ethic of collaboration may be found if the dynamics of contemporary boundaries between global/local, universal/particular, structure/agency are connected to other strands of moral philosophy that are concerned with some of these boundaries. A starting point is social justice ethics, which promotes fairness, solidarity, and subsidiarity as core values. Social justice ethics directly addresses the questions of structural inequality and/or power relations in public policy and collaboration. It is particularly pertinent to those collaborations that aim to include disadvantaged communities. The emphasis is on transformation, which in public policy comes from collaborative system change. Social justice ethics encourage a focus on the spatial domain of collaboration—the shape that collaborations take. This is expressed in the value of subsidiarity, a principle of social organising that accords power over decisions at the level most consistent with their resolution. This may be the individual, the family, the local neighbourhood, or the city, etc.

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Gibson-Graham (2003) draw on the values of solidarity and subsidiarity in their proposal for an ‘ethics of the local’. They situate Foucault’s ideas about the formation of the ethical subject in the context of globalisation and economic development. They focus on the local as the space in which the practices of globalisation—economic and otherwise—can be confronted and changed, arguing that, …the preoccupations of recent social theory, where any number of thinkers enjoin us to recognize particularity and contingency, honor difference and otherness, and cultivate local capacity, can be read as appropriate guidelines for an ethics of locality. (p. 51, emphasis in the original)

Gibson-Graham’s proposed ethical framework aligns well with the dominant features and challenges facing collaboration in the twenty-first century; how to work with interdependence based on diversity, how to develop shared policies that account for difference, and how to situate policy in the appropriate space. Their prescription emphasises the significance of ‘the local’, by which they mean geographical place. This frames ideas about and relations with other spatial scales. Their focus on the ‘locality’ may also be read as referencing human relations. This proposition arises from Gibson-Graham’s attention to what ethical practice looks and feels like, its impact on the body and emotion. This is inspired by Connolly’s (1999) suggestion that the ‘visceral’ domain, the ‘thought-imbued intensities below the reach of feeling’ affecting human disposition, should be embraced not denied in public discourse and supported by a ‘generous ethos of engagement between constituencies in which differences are honored’ (1999, p. 148 in Gibson-Graham 57, emphasis in original). For Gibson-Graham ethical practice takes account of ‘stubborn, unspoken bodily resistances’ and spoken expressions of emotion as part and parcel of the cultivation of positive possibilities. This will be considered further in Chap. 7. Of note here is the work of humans (inclusive of their feelings) in enabling ethical relations, including collaborative ones. Human actors’ ethical agency is thus situated and may imbue collaboration with a particular meaning. This connects it to the cultural domain of collaboration and the remaking of identity. Evolving the concept of ethical public conduct to include diversity, affect, and emotion opens a distinct identity for a collaborative public actor that may be more appealing than the ones available in their organisations.

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Catlaw and Jordan (2009) draw on Lacan (1973, 1992) to argue that public ethics ought to work with ideas of ‘desire’. Desire is understood as the absence of satisfaction and the pursuit of ways of bearing that desire by disentangling the self from external pressures and revealing the core of one’s own desire. They suggest that ‘by detaching from the symbolic and cultural systems of carrots and sticks that encourage us to do good, a space is created within which we can be with one another in a new way’ (2009, p. 292). Catlaw and Jordan link this to an ethics of public administration in which collaboration provides the means through which we can ‘be-with’1 others rather than simply enmeshed in their lives. Collaboration allows for the creation of a space of feeling or meaning or identity that is lacking from public administration. Rather than understanding collaboration as a ‘good’ thing—support for positive outcomes, or a ‘bad’ thing—being complicit in terror, Catlaw and Jordan point to ‘a third understanding, one distinct both from mutual aid and “aiding and abetting.” That is, collaboration can be understood in terms of the ways in which ‘we sustain and reproduce reality itself in the actions we take and the way in which we talk with others; the particular ways in which we are enmeshed in the lives of others’ (296 emphasis in original). Collaboration is an expression of ‘action beyond the good’ (296), a way of bearing desire by letting go of identity and attachments and creating spaces in which new identities and human relations can develop. Catlaw and Jordan’s focus on micro-­practices that build and sustain collaborative relationships between individuals echoes that of Gibson-Graham. Neither are dismissive of the structural relations that can inhibit social justice but rather emphasise the contribution of human interactions to create ethical relations that can counter them. The ‘ethics of care’ offers insights into how ethical collaboration might be practised. It too is concerned with the role of human relationships, intimacy, and dependency in our public and private conduct (Clement (2018). Gilligan describes the ethic of care as ‘a “different voice”—a voice that joined self with relationship and reason with emotion’.2 The ethics of care is practised and experienced in context. Its emphasis on actions such as listening and responding position it in the material 1  Referring to the problem in psychoanalysis (and collaboration) of the relationship of one to ‘other desiring subjects’ (2009, p. 292). 2  https://ethicsofcare.org/carol-gilligan/ Accessed 9 February 2021.

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dimension of collaboration—what collaborations do. It provides a framework within which human actors can ‘look again’ at their judgements and consider them in the context of others’ ethical standpoints. This ethical learning encompasses acquiring new knowledge and acknowledging the unknown. Ahmed describes this as ‘[the] ethical demand is that I must act about which I cannot know, rather than act insofar as I know. I am moved by what does not belong to me’ (Ahmed, 2004, p. 31). This offers a productive positioning for actors in cross-cultural collaborations, particularly those where systemic inequalities and power dynamics shape actors’ agency. This discussion has demonstrated how the particularities of collaboration are met through the application of ethical frameworks that engage with power, agency, and context. Ethics needs to account for the work collaboration does in public policy and the workings of collaboration. This locates ethics in all four domains of collaboration. The remainder of this chapter will explore the different ways in which ethical considerations are present in public policy collaboration, beginning with a return to a question arising from O’Flynn’s discussion of the morality of public policy choices, is collaboration ethical?

Is Collaboration Ethical? In public policy an ethics of collaboration is not exclusive of the act of collaboration; it contributes to our understanding of public morality. This introduces the question ‘is collaboration ethical?’ into public policy decision-­making. The importance of this question and the implications of not asking it are discussed below. In the 1990s collaboration enjoyed a strong normative pull amongst governments and other institutions across the political spectrum, cited as a key ingredient of new approaches to public management and governance. Many academics (including this one) and practitioners expressed enthusiasm for collaboration’s potential, but others, from a variety of disciplines, voiced disquiet. For example, the introduction of the term ‘network’ and ‘networking’ into the public administration lexicon provoked considerable discussion, led by Development Administration academics, about the wisdom of adopting a way of organising that to some signified unethical practice. This is not an argument of North versus South or developed versus developing countries. There is sufficient evidence of the use of networks as a means of securing and sustaining influence at all levels of governance in all

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parts of the world, to correct that misapprehension. Rather it is a reminder of how different the policy world can look from different standpoints. Friend and Cook (1992) offered an early ethically based critique of the rush to collaboration in education and schools in the US. While arguing that they were not opposed to collaboration, they proposed that, For collaboration to be effective, participants must have the opportunity to adequately understand it, to gradually determine its value for adults and children in schools, and to knowledgeably use it. By adhering to ethical principles in our own actions, we can help ensure that this occurs. (p. 184)

In their view the enthusiasm for the possibilities of collaboration were overwhelming necessary deliberation about whether different professionals had the skills to collaborate effectively, whether the time spent away from the classroom in meetings about collaboration generated sufficient benefits to students, and critically whether the purposes of collaboration were transparent. They cite the example of collaborative action to make mainstream schooling meet the needs of all children and reduce teacher burdens. In practice this focused on integrating disabled children into school. This is a laudable aim, but was not how the collaboration was framed, and so compromised professional integrity in their view. Friend and Cook’s critique highlights two important considerations that are not just about ethics but have ethical implications: political will and organisational or professional capacity. Without both public policy collaboration is very difficult to secure. If only one is present, then to proceed with collaboration may be unethical. The public policy failures in child protection are examples of where an ethical lens might have shaped policy practice and delimited collaboration. In the UK, Australia, and New Zealand, child protection has been a focus of collaborative action for decades—through multi-agency teams, safeguarding boards, etc. The aim is to improve the outcomes for children by requiring key organisations to work together to support the carers and the child/ren. When tragedies occur subsequent reviews usually report institutional failings, such as a lack of effective reporting of information to all partners. What is less often attended to is the extent to which individual organisations are equipped to collaborate effectively. The assumption often is that collaboration will be more effective in protecting children, but this will only be the case if the necessary infrastructure is in place. If organisations are not capable of collaborating because the infrastructure is

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absent or inadequate, or because the case loads of professionals are so high as to inhibit their involvement in collaboration then to require them to do so might be considered unethical. Not knowing about the lack of capacity might be considered a contributing factor (Smith, 2010). In some circumstances there is a case to be made for the ethics of non-­ policymaking, that is, taking a decision not to develop a ‘collaborative’ public policy on ethical grounds, which could be that it simply won’t achieve anything without major changes to other aspects of the operating context. The international governance arena is filled with examples of this kind in part because of the challenges associated with attempting global collaborative action. The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) is one such example. The R2P is notable in international relations scholarship and practice for the speed with which it became accepted as an international norm. First coined by the 2001 report from the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS), the R2P specifies the state’s role in protecting its peoples and endorses collective international intervention in the event that the state is not able or willing to perform this function. A version of the principle was adopted by the UN member states at a World Summit meeting in 2005 (see Fig. 5.1). The ethical force and claims of R2P are explicit as is the emphasis on collaborative action on this basis. Rochester (2006) describes it as an important step ‘to promote a society-of-states morality, given the fact that sovereignty is one of the few principles that has universal appeal among national elites and mass publics’ (in Weiss, 2006, p. 757). It is important to stress that what is being examined here is not the value of the content of the R2P, though that is contested. Rather what is of concern here is whether it was ethical to institutionalise the principle of R2P given the nature of global political relations and their impact on its likely implementation. Weiss argues that while there is always a disjuncture between ‘normative developments and political reality’, the experience of R2P offers an important illustration of ‘the dramatic disconnect between multilateral rhetoric and reality’ (p.  742), citing the Security Council’s inaction in 2003 over the disastrous situation in Darfur. Weiss points to important contextual changes that reduced the enthusiasm for and impact of R2P, namely, 9/11 and the Bush/Blair appropriation of the terminology of ‘humanitarian intervention’ to rationalise the invasion of Iraq. However, he also emphasises the presence of two prompts to action—political will and operational capacity. Without these R2P

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The three pillars of the responsibility to protect, as stipulated in the Outcome Document of the 2005 United Nations World Summit (A/RES/60/1,para.138-40) and formulated in the Secretary-General’s 2009 Report (A/63/677) on Implementing the Responsibility to Protect are: 1. The State carries the primary responsibility for protecting populations from genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity and ethnic cleansing, and their incitement; 2. The international community has a responsibility to encourage and assist States in fulfilling this responsibility; 3. The international community has a responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other means to protect populations from these crimes. If a State is manifestly failing to protect its populations, the international community must be prepared to take collective action to protect populations, in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. Abridged from UN A/ 63/677

On the 15th anniversary of the R2P the UN made further reference to the importance of collaboration: ‘Successful implementation of the responsibility to protect requires cooperation across all levels. For that purpose, dialogue and cooperation among civil society, national and regional actors must be prioritized. The responsibility to protect must extend beyond the United

Fig. 5.1  The Responsibility to Protect (R2P). (Source: United Nations (2022) https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/15th-­anniversary.shtml. Accessed 19 March 2022)

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Nations to regional and national contexts, but also beyond governments to civil society and key domestic stakeholders. Experience has shown that prevention and response are most effective when the United Nations works in tandem with its regional, national and local partners. Strengthening that relationship to maximize opportunities for prevention and protection remains a critically important aspect of the implementation strategy (emphasis added).

Fig. 5.1  (continued)

cannot function and he concludes ‘[t]he repeated failure to come to the rescue mocks the value of the emerging R2P norm’ (p. 759). The purpose of collaboration is clear under the R2P (political domain), although the shape any collaboration might take and what it might do are contingent on the circumstances (spatial and material domains). Indeed, experience suggests that collaboration under the R2P lacks the capacity to act at all. Nonetheless R2P collaboration has meaning for some actors as it represents global ambitions for a particular moral code of intervention and multilateral governance (cultural domain). It is arguably an important symbol of a possible future. The implications of a public policy on future possibilities focuses attention on the relationship between ethics and time and the complexity of collaborative relationships. The Private Finance Initiative (PFI) is a particular form of Public-­ Private Partnership that combines private and public resources to provide public benefit. It is used in countries worldwide including Australia and Spain but was probably most widely applied in the UK in the 1990s and 2000s by both Conservative and Labour governments (see Fig. 5.2). PFI is distinguished by its specific application of private sector debt and equity underwritten by the public sector and operationalised through complex contracts and delivery vehicles. Under PFI, funding arrangements are in place in the long term, at least 20 years, but the debt is not recorded as part of the public finances, instead it appears ‘off balance sheet’. PFI was used initially to deliver major infrastructure projects including roads, hospitals, schools, but latterly became associated with ongoing service provision. Public sector staff delivering services were often transferred to the new private sector delivery vehicles.

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‘1.3. There are around 700 PFI contracts in the United Kingdom. Over 500 of these are in England with a combined capital value of almost £50 billion. The forecast PFI payment for these projects for 2010-11 is estimated at £8 billion. They are usually long-term arrangements typically spanning 25 to 30 years. HM Treasury (the Treasury) estimates that the total commitments on current PFI contracts for the next 25 years for the United Kingdom are approximately £200 billion.

1.4. Since the mid-1990s, the majority of assets procured using PFI were commissioned by local authorities or arm’s length bodies within nationwide programmes of similar assets. Procurement often involves more than one public sector body’.

Fig. 5.2  Private Finance Initiative in the UK. (Source: National Audit Office, 2011, p. 12)

The PFI proved highly controversial and remains subject to a wide range of competing assessments of its delivery of public benefit. What is of interest here is the extent to which debates about PFI explored the ethics of using this kind of instrument. The National Audit Office Reports in the UK focused on questions of value for money, of data availability, staff skills and capacities and accountability, and most assessments of PFI worked with assessments of value for money as equating public benefit. However, it could be argued that the ethics of this kind of ‘collaboration’ are as important to question as its economics. Should core public services be funded in this way? Should private sector bodies be able to use the rules of the capital markets to buy and sell debt over time and make significant profits? Should future generations be subject to this level of public debt? Commentators including Monbiot (2009) and academics such as Pollock (2005) and Hellowell (2011) have explored ethical conduct in the process of designing PFIs, including focusing on the ways in which the ‘public sector comparator’ is used to determine whether a scheme should be funded privately. They don’t use the language of ethics but the conduct they describe can be considered in this way.

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This analysis speaks to the challenges public officials face when dealing with governments that are convinced about the merits of a particular policy instrument, based on ideology or what they see as necessary pragmatism. However, what remains absent is a policy debate about the ethics of this kind of collaboration, including whether the ‘what works’ mantra constitutes an ethical justification (Shaw, 2018), and whether post-hoc accountability affords sufficient cover for an absence of prior ethical considerations (Forrer et al., 2010). These questions came to the fore globally in 2020 when COVID-19 exposed the fragility of public sector contracting as part of a public health crisis response. For example, the previously mentioned use of private security firms rather than the police or army to monitor hotel quarantine in Melbourne, Australia, and the deadly consequences of their failure (Sullivan et al., 2021) Collaboration’s close association with contemporary public policy in many parts of the world and its impact on aspects of public administration, such as transparency and accountability, make it increasingly important to consider the ethical implications of public policy choices. This includes the ethical conduct of collaboration, which is considered next.

Collaborating Ethically This section explores ethical conduct in collaboration drawing on the earlier theoretical discussion and practical examples. It focuses on issues that have a direct bearing on human actors’ agency and the demands of public policy collaboration. Identity and Agency Ethical collaboration makes demands of individuals that challenge their sense of identity, whether that be public, political, professional, and/or personal. For example, professional identities combine attachments to core values and principles, attainment of levels of knowledge and skill, and the application of sanctioned models of practice. These are codified in professional standards and expectations and provide guides to appropriate ethical conduct in professional situations. Collaborative settings are likely to generate tensions between professional groups as they bring difference into decision-making. These differences may be experienced as competing priorities for action, such as responding to crime versus early intervention to avoid criminality, or

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conflicting models of practice, for example, the medical versus the social model of care in health and social care work, but they also reflect different ethical attachments. These differences will undermine collaborative action if their presence and significance is not acknowledged and worked with. But working with them is not a simple matter of adjustment and adaptation. Rather it demands that actors suspend or negate their ethical attachments to clear space to engage collaboratively with others to determine an agreed ethical position. This working out of how to ‘be-with others’ in ways that ‘enjoin self to relationships, and emotion to reason’ may generate considerable internal and expressed professional resistance if actors experience this as threating their identity as ethical actors and the agency this affords them. The interface between law enforcement and public health is one of the clearest examples of the power, potential, and limitations of identity and agency in ethical collaboration locally to globally. A series of articles in The Lancet (Thomson et al., 2019) explores how institutions with seemingly shared concerns for the safety and security of populations become engaged in oppositional action. Examples include the impact of military operations in Yemen on the provision of public health services and the consequent outbreaks of cholera amongst the civilian population (Michaud et  al. (2019), or the longstanding tensions between police and public health in Australia over the approach to recreational drug use at festivals. The authors (Thomson et al., 2019) acknowledge the significance of the distinct professional cultures to shape what it means to ‘be an ethical actor’ in different parts of the security services from the military to the police, and in the wide variety of public health professions, and the barrier they pose to collaboration. They also draw attention to the porousness of the boundaries of the policy domains of ‘public health’ and ‘law enforcement’. Paradoxically the very instability of these conceptualisations may have the effect of hardening the professional identities and ethical codes of those in one or other domain. van Dijk et al.’s (2019) paper in the series is a ‘call to action’ for law enforcement and public health to collaborate for the public good. It has an ethical basis—the idea of human needs and rights enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This is amplified by the knowledge that it is the most vulnerable populations, including sex workers, HIV + drug users, family violence victims, and individuals with severe mental health conditions, who are most likely to experience gaps or tensions between law enforcement and public health services.

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The authors’ focus on the work of contextually situated practice and practices in enabling law enforcement and public health actors to collaborate. These practices do not deny the ethical positioning of actors’ identities in law enforcement or public health, but they do require an acknowledgement of the legitimacy of ‘the other’. In so doing actors begin to create the space for ethical collaboration, in which that acknowledgement becomes embodied in engagements between frontline workers. The authors cite a range of examples of successful collaborative practice including one focused on the involvement of police in partnerships to decrease violence against female sex workers and decrease their HIV risk (Fig. 5.3) (Bhattacharjee et al., 2016). This example highlights the extreme vulnerability of female sex workers in places where sex work is criminalised and exposes how the professional identity and agency of the police legitimised deeply unethical behaviour including police harassment, extortion, and violence. The program to change this behaviour and the relationship between FSWs and the police illustrates different facets of ethical collaboration. The program itself worked within a particular ethical frame, that of human rights, to de-­ legitimise unethical behaviour in the context of the police’s identity, supported by clear policy directives from senior leaders. The program was developed in collaboration with representatives of FSW, and applied principles of collaborative education, necessitating participants’ active involvement in learning. Lastly, the changed approach to FSW/police relations was embedded through regularised and ‘embodied’ interaction between the police, other agencies, and the female sex workers. Data and Privacy Making better use of available but disparate data is frequently cited as a key potential benefit of public policy collaboration, aiding good and timely decision-making and improving outcomes. For example, collaboration between law enforcement and public health can facilitate information flows between a range of state and non-state actors as illustrated by Florence et al.’s (2011) review of the role of community safety collaboration in Cardiff in improving the exchange of anonymised data to reduce alcohol related injury. However collaboration raises the question of the ethics of data-sharing particularly where the data concerned is personal and often sensitive. The potential benefits to public service users of increased information exchange

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HIV prevalence amongst the female sex worker (FSW) population of 130,000 in the southern state of Karnataka, India is disproportionately high, as is violence against FSWs by intimate partners, clients, madams/pimps, rowdies and police. FSWs who report experiencing violence are significantly less likely to access HIV prevention and support services. The Karnataka Health Promotion Trust (KHPT) alongside partnering organizations, including sex worker collectives, developed a program aimed at creating an environment in which FSWs would be able to more readily address violence experienced at the hands of various perpetrators, including police. Early engagement led to the Director-General of Police directing police personnel to focus on harm reduction for female sex workers in their interpretation of the law and a commitment that any allegation of police harassment would undergo prompt enquiry and strict action. A series of sensitization workshops were held with police personnel at all police stations. Researchers Bhattacharjee et al (2016) reported that, ‘[O]fficers were guided through the interpretation of existing laws that were being used to persecute FSWs; educated about fundamental human rights and consequences of violating those rights, with specific reference to local sex work communities; and informed about the lives of FSWs and their daily challenges. Police officers were also provided with evidence that explicitly links violence and harassment directed towards FSWs with poor health outcomes. Between 2005 and 2011, 85 senior police officials and 13,594 police officers were trained as facilitators, covering 60% of all members of the state police force’ (p.4).

Fig. 5.3  Addressing police violence against female sex workers in Karnataka, South India. (Source: Adapted from Bhattacharjee et  al., 2016; licensee International AIDS Society)

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The police and local partners continued their engagement, including facilitators working with police training academies to incorporate sessions on sex work and police being involved in activities at local health clinics and drop-in centres for female sex workers. Survey results reported a significant drop in the number of police arrests following the implementation of the program.

Fig. 5.3  (continued)

between professionals and providers need to be assessed against the risks to an individual’s right to privacy particularly where the individual is not actively involved in those sharing decisions. Advances in digital data collection and sharing technologies facilitate the ambitions of policy makers keen to improve outcomes for their communities. It also raises the stakes for individuals concerned about privacy and accurate use of personal data in an environment where technology advances further and more quickly than citizens and governments anticipate. The promise of what might be achieved via a combination of an open data ecosystem and advanced data analytic tools is enormous but is contingent on individuals and institutions (public and private) being prepared to share data and Intellectual Property. This commitment to collaboration brings with it a requirement that publics can have confidence in how data is used, stored, and shared. The very public scandal of Cambridge Analytica and its use of Facebook data is a powerful reminder of the need to be proactive in relation to ethical conduct and regulation. The (ethical) public policy question here is whether and how government’s frame or regulate some activities in support of the Internet of Things. The balance between information sharing and privacy will vary according to the political values and traditions of the relevant context—particularly country contexts, and in turn these will determine what kind of collaborative information sharing is possible. For example, in Singapore concerns about privacy in the sharing and use of data between government bodies appear to be much less prevalent than in Australia. The development of China’s ‘social credit’ system has received considerable attention as an example of how governments might use data from multiple public and private sources to punish bad behaviour by citizens and reward good

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behaviour. This is a very particular use of technology that is already widely used in the UK and elsewhere, for example, to access financial credit consumers have to permit private companies to run ‘credit checks’ (Kobie, 2019). The point here is that context does shape what is considered permissible, and ethical, but also that as consumers we might volunteer our information to private companies for their use and sharing, such as Facebook, at the same time as resisting allowing government agencies access to and sharing of our data as a breach of our citizens’ rights. Advances in Artificial Intelligence offer the potential for our future collaborations to be with both human and non-human actors. This introduces a new layer of ethical complexity in our decision-making that demands attention (Broad, 2018). This issue will be explored further in Chap. 8. Power and Place Communities can often experience ethical difficulties in collaborations with public bodies. Community organisations or representatives may feel themselves compromised ethically in their engagement with ‘partnerships’, often designed to ‘empower’ them. Power is a fundamental shaper of the relationships between public, private, and community in these collaborations and it can support or inhibit ethical conduct. Neighbourhood regeneration or revitalisation programs are important examples of the way in which power shapes how community members and organisations negotiate relationships with government and private sector bodies in the name of ‘partnership’. Ethical issues here include whether the nature of the power relationships is acknowledged by all actors and addressed in the modes of engagement; whether the proposed regeneration program is framed in a transparent way or is distorted to reflect a specific economic or ideological agenda; and whether sufficient investment will be made in supporting effective community participation in decision-making. For communities too there are important ethical issues to address in relation to how they interact with each other. In the absence of this it is possible that regeneration may come at the expense of community division and a legacy of poor community relations. One contributor to an early book on community led regeneration in the UK summed this up in his chapter title:

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You fucked up the estate and now you’re carrying a briefcase. (McCulloch, in Hoggett 1997)

Unsurprisingly perhaps these power dynamics and consequences for communities persisted in the next generation of ‘place-based’ neighbourhood regeneration programs promoted by governments in the UK, other European countries, and Australia. O’Brien and Matthews’ (2016) edited collection reflecting on the legacy of a decade or more of neighbourhood regeneration in the UK offers an important account of the changing nature of ‘partnership’ in an era of austerity. It draws out the devastating consequences for community ‘partners’ of sudden changes in local policy priorities leading to the withdrawal of resources (Cohen and McDermont, 2016), and analyses a range of responses, including the presence and penetration of digital media in poorer neighbourhoods, interalia for the purposes of telling local stories (Harte and Turner, 2016) and developing neighbourhood maps through the use of smartphone apps (Jones et al., 2016). It reveals the persistent presence of concerns about privacy—that ‘stories’ might be used against local people, and of the complicated interactions between community members, bureaucrats, and others required for the resolution of ‘local’ issues. The consistency of lessons from these neighbourhood programs provides important guides to ethical conduct in collaboration that need to be considered as the enthusiasm for co-design and co-production between policymakers, professionals, and publics with takes hold across many parts of the Global North and South. What is also at issue is the way in which diversity and difference inflect public policy and therefore public policy collaborations. This may be of particular significance in the context of cultural diversity and the different ethical traditions and stances that may be present amongst potential collaborators. This is perhaps most acutely apparent when working with communities who have been systematically disadvantaged and discriminated against. Indigenous communities in North America, Africa, and Australia are regularly identified as the most disadvantaged peoples in their countries. They are also very likely to be communities most often in receipt of public policy initiatives that propose to collaborate with them to improve their lives. This is explored below.

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Cross-cultural Collaboration In Australia Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples experience poorer health, education, and employment outcomes than other communities and are more likely to be incarcerated, and to die early. In 2005 the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, Professor Tom Calma AO, used his Social Justice Report to argue for commitment from Australian governments to achieving equality for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples in health and life expectancy, within 25 years. ‘Closing the Gap’ became the shorthand for policy and strategy work in support of this commitment. In 2008, the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) agreed to six ambitious targets to address the disadvantage faced by Indigenous Australians in life expectancy, child mortality, education, and employment. The targets were set out in the National Indigenous Reform Agreement, which committed the Commonwealth, States, and Territories to investment in closing the gap in Indigenous disadvantage and to reporting progress annually to the Australian Parliament annually. The term collaboration is used often in connection with the Closing the Gap work: collaboration between governments and other organisations and with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Communities. However, the nature and extent of collaboration with communities received criticism at the publication of each Annual Report, and especially in response to the 2016 Annual Closing the Gap Report, both on the amount of progress made and the nature of collaboration. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander leaders focused on the need for the strategy to be designed as an ‘empowerment- based policy model’, encapsulated by prominent educationalist Chris Sarra as: • ‘Acknowledge, embrace and celebrate the humanity of Indigenous Australians. • Bring policy approaches that nurture hope and optimism rather than entrench despair. • Do things with us, not to us’ (Sarra in Beard, 2016). Sarra’s summary invokes the principles of social justice ethics—solidarity and subsidiarity—discussed earlier in this chapter as features of ethical collaboration and echoed by Beard in his assessment of Sarra’s claim,

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Solidarity…is the idea that each person has a deep and abiding ethical connection to every other human being. Solidarity is a check on self-interest and forces us to recognise our responsibility towards other people… The principle of subsidiarity … [is] about providing the opportunity for the privileged and the vulnerable to encounter one another as individuals, rather than bureaucratic abstractions. Doing things at a local level forces those in a position of (sometimes unjust) advantage to personally witness the consequences of social injustice. It makes matters personal.

Beard’s assessment reiterates the emphasis placed on ethical collaboration being engaged and embodied, that is, actors, specifically those ‘advantaged’ being prepared to challenge their own ethical identities and create space for new possibilities to be worked towards. In 2018 following two years of consultation and representation culminating in the Special Gathering Statement, ‘COAG committed to forming a genuine formal partnership with Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people to finalise the Closing the Gap Refresh and provide a forum for ongoing engagement throughout implementation of the new agenda’ (emphasis added). This included establishing a Joint Council co-chaired by the Minister for Indigenous Australians and the Lead Convenor of the Coalition of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peak Organisations (Coalition of Peaks). The Council has ministers from each state and territory, 12 members of the Coalition of Peaks, and a representative of the Australian Local Government Association (ALGA). A new Partnership Agreement on Closing the Gap 2019–2029 between all Australian Governments, the Coalition of Peaks, and ALGA was signed in 2019 (Coalition of Peaks, 2019). Adopting this approach—joint decision-making and robust accountability—is challenging for public service bureaucracies and the public servants within them and raises questions about their capacity to collaborate in this way. A lack of capacity and a failure to address that via investment in training and resources is itself an ethical issue, as discussed in the earlier example on the ‘Responsibility to Protect’. Ethical collaboration with First Nations’ peoples also demands ethical learning—described earlier as acquiring new knowledge and acknowledging and acting on the unknown. This requires attending to and respecting the ethical content of specific practices that influence collaborative content. For example, Piquemal (2005) reflects on the ethical stance taken by Canadian Aboriginal children when they are asked to contribute work

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done in the classroom to public view. She recounts how children will consider the parts of their lived experience that they consider may or may not be shared more widely and afford protection to parts of an individual and communities’ identity that is not communicable. Piquemal relates this ethical stance to what she calls ‘cultural loyalty’ which ‘emerges as an integral part of their Aboriginality and shifts and evolves in relation to an ever-­ changing world, enabling Aboriginal students to exist with rather than in spite of the world’ (p. 537). It is an ethical position rooted in empowerment.

Conclusion The contemporary context forces attention on ethics and integrity and how they may be recovered and secured including in the design and application of public policy, much of which will continue to require collaboration. This includes addressing the questions: what does it mean to govern ethically on issues that cross-boundaries and demand a collaborative response? how does that translate into ethical collaborative practice? And what does that mean for individuals? Newman’s hope for a reconceived ‘public imaginary’ that brings together transnational ethical and political claims with social and political practices of state and non-state actors that support local public action seems unlikely to be realised in the context of a resurgent nationalist populism. The global crisis of COVID-19 is possibly the most powerful motivator for realising a ‘public imaginary’, and the ‘Access to COVID-19 Tools (ACT) Accelerator’ launched in April 2020 is arguably a step towards this. The ACT Accelerator ‘is a ground-breaking global collaboration to accelerate the development, production, and equitable access to COVID-19 tests, treatments, and vaccines… [It] brings together governments, scientists, businesses, civil society, and philanthropists and global health organizations (the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, CEPI, FIND, Gavi, The Global Fund, Unitaid, Wellcome, the WHO, and the World Bank’.3 Its tagline, ‘No-one is safe until everyone is safe’ emphasises the necessity of collaboration. But securing sufficient funding for the four pillars of work including CoVAX, the vaccine pillar, from wealthy national governments, and discouraging those same governments from hoarding the available

3

 https://www.who.int/initiatives/act-accelerator/about.

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vaccines, highlights the ongoing challenges of enacting public policy collaboration, and of locating ethics in collaborative action’. Despite this, the idea of the ‘public imaginary’ does offer an alternative that can accommodate the conceptions of ethics discussed in relation to collaboration. These are conceptions that embrace the ethics of ‘the local’, social justice, and ‘care’ and which find in collaboration a space for human actors to practise these ethics together. This chapter has illustrated that the question of how human actors might practise together is not without its challenges. But what seems clear is that it is a continuous process of working things out based in a shared commitment to ‘looking again’ at established political, professional, and/ or personal ethical positions. One example of how this might work comes from the world of research. Increasingly researchers are required to work in multi-, inter- or even transdisciplinary teams, particularly in efforts to solve complex policy problems. Consequently they need to find ways to work together that support their ethical conduct. McGinn et al. (2005) describe a research collaboration in which the team developed a set of ethical principles to work by. They were named ‘living ethics’ as they were reconsidered throughout the life of the research. What is of interest in this study is not just that the ethics are active guides to action, but that the researchers acknowledge the different spheres in which they function—personal, professional, intellectual, institutional. Thinking about ethics in these ways opens the possibility of collaborators maintaining multiple identities, not all of which need to align precisely with the collaborative imperative. The next chapter examines another important aspect of identity that may be challenged by collaboration—expertise.

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O’Brien, D., & Matthews, P. (Eds.). (2016). After Urban Regeneration. Communities, Policy and Place. Policy Press. O’Flynn, J. (2018). Where Markets and Bureaucracy Meet: Theorizing the Dynamics of Markets for Misery. Paper Presented at Theorizing the Dynamics of Social Service Markets: Risk, Regulation and Rent-Seeking Workshop, April 4, Macquarie University, Sydney. Piquemal, N. (2005). Cultural Loyalty: Aboriginal Students Take an Ethical Stance. Reflective Practice, 6, 523–538. Pollock, A. (2005). NHS Plc: The Privatisation of Our Health Care. Verso. Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice. Oxford University Press. Rochester, J. M. (2006). Between Peril and Promise: The Politics of International Law 95. Sage, CQ Press. Shaw, E. (2018). ‘What matters is what works’. The Third Way and the Case of the Private Finance Initiative. In S.  Hale, W.  Leggett, & L.  Martell (Eds.), The Third Way and Beyond. Manchester University Press. Smith, R. (2010). One in Six Social Workers have more than 40 Cases [Online]. Community Care. Retrieved February 9, 2021, from https://www.communitycare.co.uk/2010/09/07/one-­i n-­s ix-­s ocial-­w orkers-­h ave-­m ore-­t han­40-­cases/ Sullivan, H., Dickinson, H., & Henderson, H. (2021). Conclusion. In H. Sullivan, H. Dickinson, & H. Henderson (Eds.), The Handbook of the Public Servant, Palgrave Major Reference Works. Springer. Thomson, N., Littlejohn, M., Strathdee, S.  A., Southby, R.  F., Coghlan, B., Rosenfeld, J. V., & Galvani, A. P. (2019). Harnessing Synergies at the Interface of Public Health and the Security Sector. Lancet, 393, 207–209. United Nations. (2022). Office on Genocide Prevention and the Responsibility to Protect. Retrieved March 19, 2022, from https://www.un.org/en/ genocideprevention/15th-anniversary.shtml van Dijk, A. J., Herrington, V., Crofts, N., Breunig, R., Burris, S., Sullivan, H., Middleton, J., Sherman, S., & Thomson, N. (2019). Law Enforcement and Public Health: Recognition and Enhancement of Joined-Up Solutions. Lancet, 393, 287–294. Weiss, T.  G. (2006). R2P after 9/11 and the World Summit. Wisconsin International Law Journal, 24, 20. Williams, P., & Sullivan, H. (2009). Getting Collaboration to Work in Wales. Lessons from the NHS and Partners. National Leadership and Innovation Agency for Healthcare (NLIAH). Young, I. M. (1990). Justice and the Politics of Difference. Princeton University Press.

CHAPTER 6

Expertise, Agency, and Collaboration

Introduction Expertise is fundamental to good public policy. Without it, political priorities may never be turned into sound policy programs, nor shepherded through the processes of decision-making and implementation. Defined as the combination of knowledge, skill, experience, and good judgement, expertise is highly prized across systems of governance, though manifests in different ways. Public policy expertise exists in healthy tension with political aspiration. This tension is vital in public policy, which needs to reconcile technical competence and political feasibility, occasionally pitting the prose of expertise against the poetry of ideology. The institutions of government structure the relations between experts and politicians to provide (ideally) a safe operating environment. However, this necessary tension can, and has, come undone, with devastating consequences. Chapter 1 described the post-1945 investment in technocracy fuelled by the belief that ‘grand plans’ and expert policy could reshape the world, only to find that this reshaping included the Cold War and persistent inequality. The twentieth century is also replete with examples of ideology overwhelming expertise, and/or putting it to use in perverse ways, usually at the behest of powerful leaders. Subsequent developments including neoliberalism, globalisation, the ‘third way’, and the work of social movements and counter-publics generated a new © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 H. Sullivan, Collaboration and Public Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-09585-6_6

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settlement in which different knowledge and experiences augmented the expertise/ideas relation. The limitations of that settlement became evident in the GFC and the years of austerity, and populism that followed. Expertise was maligned and ‘alternative facts’ became the mainstay of divisive politics and public policy, symbolised by the Presidency of Donald Trump in the US (2016–2020). The global pandemic of 2020 prompted the rehabilitation of expertise in public policy and the public consciousness. It also highlighted the significance of actors and agency in this rehabilitation. Public health doctors took centre stage in providing advice about how to respond to the pandemic. Importantly, they did so publicly, appearing in the media, often alongside political leaders, to answer questions and provide information. Expertise was both an identity (public health doctor) and a performance (the public provision of advice). In some cases, political leaders and public experts worked together effectively, for example, in New Zealand, Taiwan, and Rwanda. In others political leaders and experts acted together but ineffectively, for example, in Sweden, and the UK (initially). Finally in some cases political leaders and experts were divided, with political leaders denying and attempting to discredit expert opinion, notably China (initially), the US, and Brazil, with predictable and awful consequences. The pandemic also brought interactions between expertise and collaboration to the fore in ways that illuminate their relevance to public policy more generally. From virus-testing and tracing to vaccine development and distribution, and short-term emergency restrictions and support to long-term recovery planning, collaboration was evident across all tiers and spheres of governance. Experts and expertise were at the centre of these collaborative efforts—to develop vaccines, to design public health and economic programs, and to plan to vaccinate the world’s population. Collaboration enabled experts to come together, experts shaped collaborative systems and delivery arrangements, and collaborative expertise facilitated both. Importantly, collaboration functioned to facilitate the contestation of expertise, for example, between economists and public health doctors, and between experts and those with other kinds of relevant knowledge including lived experience, with the aim of creating new knowledge about how to act. Conversely, prevailing expertise about how to do things collaboratively could have devastating consequences, for example, the apparent assumption that the public/private contractor model was appropriate to

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manage the hotel quarantine program in Melbourne, Australia (as discussed in Chap. 5). Finally, expertise could prove insufficient to galvanise collaboration, illustrated most vividly in the struggle of the WHO CoVAX initiative to overcome vaccine nationalism. Here the undoubted evidence that sharing the vaccine globally based on need and risk would achieve global ‘herd immunity’ was too often sacrificed to the political imperatives of nation-states. This chapter examines the role of expertise in public policy collaboration. It will explore how expertise influences and is influenced by collaboration, and the ways in which expertise and collaboration interact productively and unproductively. It examines the challenges and opportunities collaboration presents to expert identities and performances, the role of actors and agency in enabling and constraining expertise in collaboration, and the implications for public policy in different places and spaces. Finally, it focuses on the specific expertise required to collaborate well. The chapter begins with a discussion of expertise and agency in public policy decisions. Expertise, Experts, and Agency, in Public Policy Expertise is the attainment of a certain level of knowledge and skill obtained through forms of study and practice, coupled with the ability to exercise wise judgement achieved through experience. Expertise is held and performed by individual actors—those who have achieved the status of ‘experts’, and it is relational, experts belong to communities that confer, validate, and amplify their status in accordance with relevant standards and traditions. Expertise shapes an individual’s identity and contributes to the agency they have in any given situation. This summation of expertise may evoke images for the reader. As this is a book about public policy, one image, likely the dominant one, is of a professional or technical specialist who has undertaken advanced level study at university achieving proficiency regarding a ‘body of knowledge’, and is a member of one or more professional associations that promote or even regulate access to work, and has gained a positive reputation amongst peers because of their expert practice. This is a conception of expertise that has global currency and seems uncontentious. However, Jasanoff’s (2004) work on the co-constitutive nature of knowledge and governance, and her

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suggestion that ‘the ways in which we know and represent the world (both nature and society) are inseparable from the ways in which we choose to live in it’ (2/3), poses a question about the representation of expertise in any public policy system. It highlights that what counts as expertise and whose expertise counts are contingent, with implications for actors’ identity and their agency. It also opens other possibilities based on other ways of knowing and being in the world. One such is evident in the traditional knowledges and related practices of indigenous cultures. The International Council for Science (ICSU) define traditional knowledge as: A cumulative body of knowledge, know-how, practices and representations maintained and developed by peoples with extended histories of interaction with the natural environment. These sophisticated sets of understandings, interpretations and means are part and parcel of a cultural complex that encompasses language, naming and classification systems, resource use practices, ritual, spirituality and worldview. (2002, p. 2)

In Australia Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples afford particular status to ‘Elders’ in their communities, those who are, ‘recognised within their community as a custodian of cultural knowledge and law. A recognised Indigenous community leader could also gain Elder status within their community’ (Australians Together, 2021). In the above the language of expertise may not be used, but the commitment to knowledge, skills, experience, and judgement, recognised by peers and legitimated through successful practice, and affording identity and agency, is present. My intention here is not to diminish traditional knowledge and Elder status in any way but rather to illustrate Jasanoff’s point and to highlight the power relations that hold a particular knowledge/governance configuration in place often to the detriment of good public policy. Another possible alternative representation of expertise is that of lay or service user expertise. Epstein’s (1995) account of the involvement of ‘treatment activists’ in clinical trials testing the safety and efficacy of AIDS drugs describes how the activists became credible actors in the biomedical establishment and changed the way drug trials were undertaken, including ensuring that the testing population was representative of the likely treatment population. The expertise of some of the activists was acknowledged by Anthony Fauci, then director of the National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases, ‘there are some that are brilliant, and even more so

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than some of the scientists’ (Fauci, 1994 cited in Epstein, 1995, 419). The activists’ contribution was also acknowledged by the National Research Council of the National Academy of Sciences, ‘not since randomized clinical trials became the orthodox mode of clinical investigation have the most basic approaches and assumptions regarding research methodologies been open to searching critique in the context of an epidemic disease’. (Jonsen & Stryker, 1993, cited in Epstein, 1995, 410)

This example is important for the discussion of expertise and public policy because it helps distinguish instances of ‘lay expertise’ from ‘lay or lived experience’. Lay experience is highly prized by service providers seeking to develop ‘user-centric’ services or products. Similarly, the lived experience of particular ‘publics’ such as disabled young people, or family violence survivors, is of particular value in helping shape or reshape resource allocation or the experience of health service users across a range of conditions or situations. Both are significant for their own sake. But they are different from expertise, usually because service users are not proficient in the body of knowledge about their condition (Prior, 2003). This discussion of the nature and constitution of expertise and the ways that is interpreted in the context of prevailing power relations provides important pointers to the potential and limits of expertise in public policy, and the contests that can occur in policymaking and in collaboration. Public Policy and Expertise In public policy, expertise takes a myriad of forms. ‘Policy experts’ are those with specialist and/or technical knowledge and related skills in particular fields. So, for example, health policy experts will have higher-level knowledge about one or more areas including population health needs, the economics of health, the role of public and private health providers, the nature of the health system and the respective contributions of primary, secondary and community healthcare institutions, and the education and training of health professionals. Experts will also have higher-level skills associated with these knowledge domains such as economic modelling, strategic planning, project management, as well as other more generic skills including policy briefing and specialist communication. These policy experts complement and are complemented by system experts or ‘public policy generalists’, those whose expertise lies in their

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understanding of how policy is made in government and how to get results. Policy generalists may have a specific area of domain knowledge but are more orientated to the development and implementation of good public policy, that is, policy that meets the political goals of the government and does so in a way that minimises process blockages and unintended consequences following implementation. Skills associated with these roles include strategy and system design, political sensitivity, communication, and consultation. Then there are policy advisors or political advisers, who may be experts in political strategy or communication and work closely with politicians and at the interface between politicians and the policy bureaucracy in some government systems. In systems where the distinction between public official and politician is complicated by traditions of patronage such as Argentina (Salazar-Morales & Lauriano, 2021), or the role of party officials such as Vietnam, then expertise includes the development of appropriate political skills (Painter, 2003). In all the above expertise is associated with learning from practice. The nature and arenas of practice may be different for domain experts, policy generalists, and political advisers, but in each case professional, political, and (increasingly) public credibility derive from experience. Expertise is performed through engagement with peers, with experts of different kinds, or with non-experts. In public policy it is not unusual for different types of experts to disagree, indicating that expertise is rarely an absolute. In cases of dispute, judgements about which expert to opt for may be resolved by reference to their credentials, the pre-eminence of their professional identity, and/or the power of their performance of their expertise. Questions about what counts as expertise, whose expertise counts, and what other forms of knowledge/experience should count, are integral to understanding the dynamics of expertise and public policy, and the interaction with collaboration. Evidence-based policymaking (EBPM), one of the most influential movements in contemporary public policy, provides an apposite example. Evidence-based policymaking may be defined as policy development subject to and shaped by the best existing evidence. Developed first in medical science it spread quickly in the 1990s as governments tried to find alternative ways to make decisions in difficult policy environments. EBPM was considered a boost for experts and expertise, including academic expertise as it promoted a ‘scientific’ approach to policymaking. This

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approach emphasises ‘objectivity’ and ‘rigour’ and operationalises these through the application of evidence collected via randomised control trials (RCTs), regarded as the ‘gold standard’ of evidence collection and assessment. In EBPM, what counts as expertise is established via the ‘scientific method’ and whose expertise counts is that of the relevant scientist. Unfortunately, this did not necessarily generate policy that ‘worked’. Key reasons for this were that insufficient attention was paid to the people and processes involved in implementing the policy, including those to whom the policy was targeted, and that the nature of the policy problem was beyond the scope of a specific source of expertise. Neither reason denies the value of evidence for effective public policy, rather they pose questions about how to generate evidence of value for public policy. Very often the policy problems that are most resistant to policy intervention are those that require collaborative effort, bringing together a range of different kinds of expertise. These experts will not all share the same ideas about what evidence is nor how best to find and apply it. RCTs or their close cousins, experiments are not necessarily the most appropriate ways of collecting evidence for complex policy problems (see Sanderson, 2009; Nutley et al., 2013). In response to these challenges, some governments decided to broaden the definition of evidence, and the range of actors involved in developing EBPM (Sullivan & Stewart, 2006). For example, a UK Government White Paper Modernising Government emphasised that evidence could be found in a variety of ways in a variety of places. ‘It could include expert knowledge, existing research, statistics, consultation findings, new research, options appraisal and ‘…a great deal of critical evidence…held in the minds of both front-line staff in departments, agencies and local authorities and those to whom the policy is directed’ (Cabinet Office, 1999). These expanded definitions of evidence and its sources acknowledge the contested nature of policy decision-making, and the role of the policy analyst, to ‘speak truth to power’ (Wildavsky, 1979) ‘where the truths involved embrace not only the hard facts of positivist science but also the reflective self-understandings of the community’ in all its forms (Goodin et  al., 2006, p.  7). Governments found that there might be no single ‘truth’ emerging but rather a range of ‘truths’, the respective merits of each to be determined through another, usually political, process (see Sullivan, 2011a for a discussion). This in turn responded to another criticism of EBPM that it was anti-democratic, as argued by Goodin et al. (2006),

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Individual crazes still sweep across policy worlds because they offer possibilities of evading democratic control: the enthusiasm for evidence –based policy making in arenas like health care is a case in point. (p. 27)

Making the case for diversity and collaboration of experts, expertise, and other forms of knowledge/experience, to develop effective public policy, raises questions about whether and how that happens. This is considered next. Collaboration and Expertise Collaboration’s concern with boundaries is to overcome them, for example, between organisations, institutions, peoples, and professions. Expertise, in contrast, is often concerned with building or maintaining boundaries, for example, expert associations establish rules of admittance and standards of performance that must be met to retain membership and may have effective control of policy agendas depending on their resource and political power. This suggests a tension between collaboration and expertise. Experts’ capacity to use boundaries to enable or inhibit collaboration is related to their identity and their agency. Organisational and professional boundaries can create space for collaboration between ‘like experts’ so that they may enhance their expertise or consolidate their professional identity. Conversely, those same boundaries can frustrate attempts to stimulate collaboration between experts from different fields or sectors, in the pursuit of government objectives, if expert actors perceive their professional identities, influence, and sometimes integrity, are threatened. Unless of course collaboration presents an opportunity for new expertise to develop or for experts to extend and enhance their influence and impact over others. Here collaboration may be embraced. Important influencing factors include the nature of the public policy issue at hand, the power and position of experts (in relation to each other and to decision-makers), and the operating context. The focus on boundaries and the creation or denial of space for collaboration points to the role played by expertise in shaping the collaborative form (the spatial domain). The dynamics described above have always existed in public policy systems. However, contemporary conditions exacerbated the importance and difficulty of managing them and prompted a variety of reforms, which continue to shape public policy design and implementation as discussed in Chap. 2. The ideas underpinning public policy responses—broadening the

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scope of those involved in public policymaking and implementation, encouraging ‘active citizenship’, and reorientating policymaking in a more ‘evidence-based’ direction, coupled a recognition of expertise with an acknowledgement of the knowledge/experience value held by other actors, and, importantly, highlighted the necessity of actors working together. Actors’ experiences of collaborating in public policy can be described in three ways: collaboration to protect expertise and experts, collaboration to secure the anticipated benefits of bringing diverse expertise together, and collaboration with ‘non-experts’ in pursuit of new knowledge. Each references the political domain of collaboration albeit with different purposes. These will be explored below, drawing on Carlisle’s (2002) work on knowledge specialisation in organisations and its relationship to collaboration, and extrapolating it to a discussion of expertise. Carlisle (2002) identifies three characteristics of knowledge that it is: localized, embedded, and invested in practice (p.  442). Localised knowledge is knowledge based on common problems. This helps explain why experts from different geographies but focused on the same problems can collaborate. Their training and development means that they share an understanding of what the problem is, and how it should be addressed. Conversely experts whose common problems differ find it harder to collaborate as they frame the problem differently and have different solutions to bring to it. Embedded knowledge is knowledge that is constituted by, and in practice, so it cannot be divorced from it—‘we know more than we can tell’. This attribute aligns closely to expertise and refers to the difference between tacit and explicit knowledge (Inkpen & Dinur, 1998). ‘Explicit knowledge is something that can easily be codified and communicated, whereas tacit knowledge is more complicated (Ray et al., 2004), not easy to capture, translate, or transfer (Palmer & Hardy, 2000), and does not readily move between different cultures (De Long & Fahey, 2000; Schein, 1997), professions and agencies’ (Williams and Sullivan, 2011, 9). Tacit knowledge helps build and bind experts together, aiding collaboration in cases of shared tacit knowledge, but hindering collaboration where diverse expertise draws on distinct tacit knowledge. Finally invested knowledge is that which becomes repeated because it ‘works’ in a particular context. Invested experts may collaborate in support of ‘what works’. Conversely collaboration that is likely to reshape the context and so challenge invested knowledge may be resisted by experts.

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Carlisle argues that while these three characteristics can support new approaches to problem solving ‘within a function’, they also hamper problem ‘across functions’ (p.  442). Collaboration then means ‘knowledge transformation: …to create new knowledge, old knowledge has to be changed’. This suggests important lines of enquiry for collaboration and expertise, including the possibility of new knowledge emerging in collaboration of ‘within function’ experts, as well as ‘across function’ experts. The same argument that Carlisle makes for knowledge it is also possible to make for another aspect of expertise—skills—they too can be localised, embedded, and invested in practice. Expert associations will demand proficiency in particular combinations of skills to demonstrate fitness for practice and membership. Skills themselves become the basis for boundaries. Collaboration within professional groups can help shore up these boundaries. Collaboration across professional groups is likely to challenge them and may result in the revision of boundaries. The performative character of expertise is evident in Carlisle’s characterisation. Knowledge becomes localised, embedded, and invested through the performance of actions that determine what appropriate knowledge is, how it should be used, and who is enabled to use it. These performances establish and reinforce accepted ideas of expertise. Collaboration may be a means of reinforcing these performances, of challenging them, and/or creating opportunities for new performances to be imagined. This reference to expertise being performed through collaborative actions references the material domain. What is less evident in Carlisle’s characterisation but of equal importance in understanding the relation between expertise and collaboration is identity. Performances of knowledge as localised, embedded, and invested in practice constitute and are constituted by identities. These identities denote and express expertise and afford actors agency contingent on the prevailing knowledge/governance relation. Expertise is then constituted and reinforced through its expression in practice, including collaborative practice. Collaboration presents a potential challenge or indeed threat to these performances and identities where it disrupts the settled terrain of policy action and requires actors to engage with each other outside of established patterns. This alerts us to the meaning of collaboration for experts and expertise (the cultural domain).

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Collaboration to Protect Expertise and Experts Collaboration is an often-overlooked means by which experts protect their status and influence. Expert networks, professional associations, peer review, and self-regulation are just some of the ways in which collaboration features in the safeguarding of expertise and experts. Their impact on public policy can be both positive and negative. The promotion and maintenance of professional standards, with appropriate action for transgressors, provides confidence to public policymakers that policies and services are in safe hands. Conversely, the marshalling of experts through their associations and networks to resist public policy reform is much less welcome by politicians, especially when experts are perceived to be acting in their own interests, rather than those of the wider public. At worst, expert collaboration can become collusion, resulting in ‘cover-ups’ of bad practice, and public policy scandals. None of these collaborative examples are particular to experts working in public policy, they exist in all sectors, and amongst non-experts. However, their presence is more grievous in cases where the public good or public interest is damaged. Collaboration can play a vital role in protecting and promoting expertise and experts who have limited agency. This may occur amongst experts who have less status in a particular policy system, and/or where their expertise is not recognised, or legitimated. The experience of First Nations’ peoples in the face of the disregard of indigenous expertise in public policy is a powerful case. The ongoing challenge of ‘watershed management’ in Australia’s Murray Darling Basin (discussed in Chap. 4) has only lately been met with an acknowledgement of the distinct expertise of the Aboriginal (First Nations) population. First Nations peoples understand humans to be integrally interconnected into land and river systems and with a clear responsibility for their health. They also believe that they have a spiritual obligation to care for water resources as part of their commitment to caring for Country. ‘Cultural flows’ is shorthand for the complex relationship First Nations peoples have with their land and water, and how that might be translated into the language of water planning and management. The complex collaboration that governs and manages the Murray-­ Darling Basin now includes a specific area of work led by Aboriginal peoples, the National Cultural Flows Research Project.1

1

 https://culturalflows.com.au/Accessed 26 March 2022

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The above example also illustrates the importance of intra-expert group collaboration to protect expertise and experts in the context of cross-­ expert, cross-sector collaboration. The strength and solidarity generated in intra-group collaboration through the National Cultural Flows Research Project has the potential to enhance the agency of Aboriginal collaborators in subsequent inter-expert collaboration of the Murray Darling Basin and make it more productive. In the examples above the purpose of collaboration (political domain) is closely linked to its meaning (cultural domain) for the actors (experts) involved. Collaboration of Diverse Expertise to Generate Synergy Policymakers pursue collaboration across expert boundaries to achieve improved public policy outcomes, via more effective use of existing expertise and/or the development of new knowledge and expertise. Collaborative action may be focused on a particular policy or service system. For example, Hattie’s (2015) proposal for the development and application of a model of ‘collaborative expertise’ in education to improve student learning focuses on the education system. He argues that a major barrier to improving student learning is ‘within school variance’ and that ‘variability in the effectiveness of teachers’ is a major contributor to this. His solution is to reanimate education systems by developing peer to peer collaboration (between teachers, and schools), and by system-wide collaboration, between teachers, school leaders, and policy makers (and including others such as teaching aides, parents, and pupils). What is particularly pertinent about Hattie’s proposal to this discussion is that he highlights the importance of expertise alongside collaboration in education, the teaching profession needs to recognise expertise and create a profession of educators in which all teachers aspire to become members of the college, society or academy of highly effective and expert teachers. (p. 2)

In some cases, the relevant policy system includes several distinct expert professions, such as health, or criminal justice. While there may be shared bodies of knowledge within these policy systems, and some shared framing of the policy problem, the different professions or experts will have their own professional cultures that may not necessarily align. For example,

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Bate and Roberts’ (2002) research on NHS ‘Collaboratives’ highlighted the distinct social and informal aspects of knowledge particularly the tacit forms, and stressed the need to convert and codify tacit knowledge to increase its fluidity across boundaries. Collaborative action may also be directed towards a policy problem that demands action across several sectors and policy areas. Climate change and inequality are persistent examples. In cases where experts may have different perspectives on almost all parts of the policy problem, and may be unwilling collaborators, there are some specific issues that will likely need to be addressed. These are described next.  reating Co-productive ‘Spaces’ C Enabling collaboration between diverse and potentially unsympathetic, if not antagonistic experts, to generate a different kind of conversation a specific public policy challenge, may require the creation of a new ‘conversation space’. Creating this requires attention to physical space, and the practices associated with the intended conversation. The idea is to offer neutral or safe spaces within which experts can work, in which they are treated equally, and draw on practices of exchange and interaction that enable deliberation, contestation, and the development of solutions.  anaging Identities and Relationships M Questions about identity and the relationship between expert actors can be challenging. For individual actors, questions of identity are both personal—how do they perceive themselves and their collaborators—and collective, what, if anything, does it mean to be part of a collaboration? Is the collaboration more than the sum of its individual parts, does it have a life and an identity that can be represented to the various expert worlds’ actors belong to? And if it does, what does that mean for the individual identity of the collaborating experts? Working with ‘Evidence’ Experts will have different ways of working with evidence, both in terms of how it is sourced and how it is employed. Depending on the kinds of experts involved the range of evidence and sources will include: • findings from academic and policy-based research and evaluation projects • expert knowledge drawn from relevant experience

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• findings from consultation activities • results of surveys • lay knowledge from service user experience • practice knowledge from experience Experts will have more or less strong ideas about the standard of evidence that will be convincing to them or, conversely, evidence with which they will neither agree nor accept as valid and reliable. Tensions therefore are likely to arise between those concerned that conclusions should be based on evidence that is ‘provably’ true, those who are satisfied by evidence that is ‘probably’ true, and those for whom conclusions could be drawn on the basis of evidence that is ‘plausibly’ true, that is, convincing to a ‘reasonable audience’ (Greenhalgh & Russell, 2005, p. 6). Positions may be determined by the importance actors attach to public policy being made on the basis of generalised and generalisable evidence. Experts will deploy different processes of argumentation including presentation, storytelling, testimony, and dispute. Exchanges about evidence and its potential and limits may be emotionally charged, partly because of the issues of identity that are stake—specifically how professional identities are tied to specific approaches and treatment of knowledge and evidence. For example, the cross-sector expert membership of a Policy Commission exploring the future of local public services found itself in conflict about how radical and ambitious it could be in what it wanted to recommend (Sullivan, 2011). An account of the Commission described how, For some Commissioners the ideas that had emerged in the discussion should shape the report, regardless of their evidence base, for others, ideas had to be rooted in evidence. A crucial meeting towards the end of the life of the Commission required the space to be created within the conversation for one sceptical Commissioner to present their view. It also necessitated the sceptical Commissioner to be prepared to do so in what was a fairly charged atmosphere and other Commissioners to work out what was going on, why it mattered and in some cases to use their professional skills as facilitators or conflict managers to help navigate the discussion to safe ground. (Sullivan, 2012, p. 17)

Expert collaboration between academics and public policymakers is a distinctive form of engagement that is regularly debated. Some countries such as the US have an established tradition of enabling academics and

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policymakers to move between the academy, polity, corporate, and non-­ profit sectors, their location dependent on the party in power. Indonesia regularly exchanges senior public servants for senior university leaders. Other countries, for example, China, have a close relationship between the government and the academy, mediated by the Communist Party. But in many countries the distance between the academy and the bureaucracy is both prized and lamented. Prized, because it allows for the independent undertaking of research and education. Lamented, because too little of that research and education is regarded as relevant to or benefiting policymaking. Consequently, considerable effort is invested in trying to bridge the academic-policy divide, using a variety of policy tools including incentives, regulation, and rationing. The available evidence suggests that progress is variable. The EBPM focused renewed attention on the academic—policymaker relationship. For example, the UK Government White Paper ‘Modernising Government’ declared that government ‘must produce policies that really deal with problems, that are forward-looking and shaped by evidence rather than a response to short-term pressures; that tackle causes not symptoms’ (p. 3).] In an oft repeated quote, the then Cabinet member David Blunkett argued that, [S]ocial science should be at the heart of policy making. We need a revolution in relations between government and the social research community— we need social scientists to help determine what works and why, and what types of policy initiatives are likely to be most effective. (Blunkett, 2000)

Two decades later the discourse has changed. The focus is now on science as the source of public policy innovation, from the psychological overtones of behavioural insights to the developments in neuroscience and Artificial Intelligence. The demand for collaboration persists but the emphasis is now more likely on science not social science (Pykett, 2017). For example, in February 2022 the Australian Government announced its University Research Commercialisation Action Plan aimed at improving collaboration between universities and industry and reshaping higher education’s contribution to the economy. The contents of the plan are focused on science, technology, and engineering, not social sciences (Fig. 6.1).

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‘The Action Plan lays out a comprehensive set of reforms to boost collaboration between universities and industry and drive commercial returns. This will be achieved through new ground-breaking initiatives, like the Trailblazer Universities Program and Australia’s Economic Accelerator, which will act as catalysts for change. It will also be driven by changes within the current research system to ensure that incentives and signals are all aligned to this end.

Research excellence does not happen in a vacuum; it requires a systemic, whole-ofgovernment approach. The Government’s Modern Manufacturing Strategy has set out clear priorities and leverages our strengths and resources to build new sources of growth. Medical products, food and beverage, recycling and clean energy, resources, technology and critical minerals processing, defence and space have been identified as 6 areas where Australia has significant comparative advantage and capacity to harness new opportunities. Aligning the Action Plan to these priorities means we can focus investment in sectors where Australia can build scale and have a real impact’.

The Hon Stuart Robert MP Acting Minister for Education and Youth, (2022, Foreword)

Fig. 6.1  Australian Commonwealth Government University Research Commercialisation Action Plan. (Source: Department of Education, Skills and Employment, 2022, Foreword)

Collaboration with ‘Non-experts’ in Pursuit of New Knowledge In public administration and management, ‘co-production’ is generally used to refer to the involvement of citizens or services users in the design and/or delivery of services. The term emerged in the US in response to the debates about the so-called myths of public production and the discovery that producing a service, as opposed to a public good, was difficult

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without the active participation of those supposedly receiving the service (see Parks et al., 1981 discussed in Bransden et al., 2018). Co-production was one way in which synergy could be generated between what a government does and what citizens do. There have been numerous attempts to develop these ideas in practice as governments seek to address longstanding public policy problems through the closer involvement of users in processes of service redesign, particularly but not exclusively, in neighbourhood regeneration/revitalisation (Smith et al., 2007). Their success or failure is linked in no small part to their ability to negotiate the power relations that inhabit any state-­ society interaction, relationships that condition the availability and use of resources, the design of institutions, and the determination of what may be included in the interaction. These conditions are familiar territory for collaboration theory and practice, specifically collaboration involving users or citizens (Barnes et  al., 2007; Lowndes & Sullivan, 2004; Newman et  al., 2004; Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002). The extent to which co-­ production is also collaborative depends on the nature of the relationship that underpins co-production and the expectation that what is co-­produced is synergistic in Ostrom’s (1996) terms. Similar developments occurred in the fields of policy analysis and evaluation, led by Weiss, who argued for greater consideration of ‘lay’ knowledge and experience alongside expertise saying, Laypeople as well as professionals have stories about the origins and remedies of social problems … These stories, whether they arise from stereotypes, myths, journalism, or research knowledge, whether they are true or false, are potent forces in policy discussion … to the extent that evaluation can directly demonstrate the hardiness of some stories (theories) and the frailty of others, it will address the underlying influences that powerfully shape policy discourse. (Weiss, 1995, p. 72)

Weiss’s work along with that of colleagues including Connell and Kubisch (1998) advocated for collaboration in the design as well as the evaluation of policy programs, embracing multiple stakeholders, multiple levels, and multiple dimensions of public policy interventions. These theory-­based approaches to policy design and evaluation influenced policymakers globally and spawned a range of linked models including in development policy and practice. They coupled a commitment to expertise—in policy design and evaluation—with an acknowledgement that lay

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or lived experience offered value to public policy programs. This coupling was not always successful in practice—see, for example, Sullivan and Stewart’s (2006) work on actors’ agency in public policy programs showing how powerful and expert identities can shape ‘Theory of Change’ evaluations. More recent approaches focus on system change, but share the commitment to multi-actor collaborative engagement, for example, Collective Impact,2 and Collaboration for Impact.3 Engaging ‘non-experts’ can prove challenging for experts. The University of Birmingham Policy Commission (referenced earlier in this chapter) was determined to engage with service users closely in its work. Young people were a key focus for the Commission’s work on the future of local public services, and it drew directly on young people’s experiences as service users, volunteers, and citizens and explored their views about public services in person and via a series of research projects (Sullivan, 2011b). However, all of this kept young people themselves somewhat at arms’ length from the experts. So, following an invitation from a not-for-profit chief executive at an early expert workshop, a group of young people with lived experience of multiple and complex issues were invited to come and present their perspectives. The initial encounter between the Commission and the young people was powerful in expected and unexpected ways as recorded in Sullivan (2012). The young people’s accounts of their lives and encounters with public services were unsparing and affecting. What was unexpected was the way in which the young people took on the spaces and practices of the Commissioners and made them their own. They disrupted the physical space arrangements—everyone sitting around a large table—by refusing invitations to sit and standing all around the room to deliver their presentation. They disrupted the group’s practices by presenting a PowerPoint presentation (with music and images) even though a key rule of the Commission was ‘no PowerPoint’, and by having conversations amongst themselves in response to questions, only returning their attention to the questioners when they were ready. The young people’s sense of identity and the agency they claimed in their engagement with the Commissioners confronted the experts with the limits of their expertise and challenged their ideas about how Commission meetings should take place. 2 3

 https://www.collectiveimpactforum.org/ Accessed 26 March 2022  https://collaborationforimpact.com/ Accessed 26 March 2022

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This experience had an important effect on the Commissioners. It convinced them that what they needed was active and regular engagement with this group of young people to test out emerging findings and ideas. This had an impact on how the rest of the project was organised and the way it would be run to try and maximise the different kinds of knowledge and experience involved in the Commission’s work. It also elicited a discussion amongst the Commissioners about why they wanted the young people involved, what knowledge, experience, or value were they bringing that would add to the Commission’s work? This informed the accounting of different kinds of evidence and knowledge that the Commission would draw on (see pages 224/225). In addition a heated and to some extent unresolved discussion informed the rest of the life of the Policy Commission about the affective response of the Commissioners to the young people, and the risk in one Commissioner’s words of ‘fetishizing’ the group. This raises questions about the intersection of expertise with ethical conduct and the role of emotions in collaboration, discussed in Chaps. 5 and 7. The examples in this final section have demonstrated the value of experts engaging with ‘lay people’, whose knowledge and lived experience can help generate new knowledge in collaboration. The distinct identity and status of ‘lay people’ may be of great importance to them because it helps retain a distance from the public policy machine, or because it alludes to an important characteristic of governance, specifically democratic governance, that citizen views have validity for their own sake. For example, in a research project examining new forms of collaboration between government and state institutions and citizens and communities, the chair of a resident organisation rejected the charge of expertise, some people think as soon as they see you’re on the committee that you know everything, you’ve only just got on and … you’re an expert. … And I said it’s not like that. I said there’s a group of us, anybody can go on to it, you can sit on it and listen to what the group’s talking about and what’s coming across and what they’re going to do… That’s the reason I’m on there, a voice. (Sullivan, 2014, p. 180)

Expertise for Collaboration Collaborations do not ‘work’ because policymakers deem that they should. They too require expertise to function effectively, expertise that is vested

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in actors and fuels their agency. Research on collaborative expertise runs in a number of linked directions: expertise demanded of any actors in collaboration; expertise associated with actors with particular roles in collaboration, namely, ‘boundary spanners’; and expertise linked to collaborative practice—a combination of ‘craft and graft’. Public services (broadly defined) regularly face calls for reform and reimagining, arguably from their inception. At any time, analysts all over the world are engaged in projects to reimagine public services. Collaboration is invariably a key feature in these scenarios, for example, Dickinson et al. (2019), Sullivan et  al. (2021), van der Wal (2017). There is a repeated emphasis on both changing roles and new skills, neatly summarised by Dickinson et al., Future public services will require a different set of workforce roles than in the past. Whilst professional skills remain important public servants increasingly have a role in negotiating and brokering interests among a broad array of different groups. The public service workforce therefore requires a set of relational skills which aid in forming shared values amongst a range of competing interests. Crucial in this skill set is the ability to understand service from the citizen or consumer perspective. (In Dickinson et al., 2019, p. 8)

This emphasis on relational skills speaks to the various ways in which public servants and public services exist interdependently with others, across space and time. It highlights the importance of collaboration as a feature of public services. It also signals the challenges facing collaboration in contexts where there is a diversity of ideas, views, expertise, and aspiration. These collaborative situations demand a particular kind of collaborative capacity amongst actors, the ability to see the world from the perspective of ‘the other’ (empathy, explored further in Chap. 7). This is something that not all actors are able to do and remains a persistent challenge for collaboration. It speaks to the need for collaborative actors to be able to develop a combination of political sensitivity and cultural competency in the same way as they might develop a technical expertise. Political Sensitivity The question of political sensitivity is never far from the practice of public policy collaboration. Understood here as being the capacity to see and manage politics within and across institutions, political sensitivity alerts actors to the potential risks and threats to collaboration as well as enables

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actors to support and enable collaborative action. Advances in technology and the use and potential of ‘big data’ can augment and enhance expertise. However, they can also destabilise collaborations. For example, disaster management is a policy area that benefits from the developments in technical capacity offered by ‘big data’ and more sophisticated modes of computer modelling and simulations. These developments are the product of collaboration between scientists of different disciplines, but they also contribute to the effective operation of disaster management operations that are themselves collaborative. The irony/challenge is that these developments risk elevating technical expertise over other kinds of knowledge and experience, such as traditional knowledge, or community experience, and then inhibiting the achievement of the desired outcomes. This is a very good example of where in the absence of political sensitivity, a fascination with and respect for technical expertise and capacity creates the conditions in which that expertise leads the collaborative effort rather than being one component element of it (Beaven et al., 2017). The lessons New Zealand learned after the Canterbury Earthquakes (2010–2012) included ensuring that the level of expertise of individual parties was subservient to the cohesiveness of all parties in devising a collaborative relationship. Similarly in the wake of a Swedish wildfire disaster in 2014, the privileging of expertise over collaborative relationships was seen as detrimental to the outcome of collaboration in disaster response (Bodin & Nohrstedt, 2016). Political sensitivity can aid the appropriate balancing of expertise with collaborative capacity. Cultural Competence Bice and Merriam’s (2016) research on Australian public servants’ ‘Asia capability’ gap picks up on the question of cultural competency. Their model of capability building covers knowledge, skills, experience, and attitudes, and distinguishes between generic and specific across these categories (p. 267). They pay particular attention to ‘cultural competency’ or what they term ‘intercultural’ capability described as, ‘comfort interacting and communicating within different cultures, mindsets and perspectives. This includes the sensitivity not to offend, and general awareness or appreciation of difference’ (p. 269). Identified in their model as a skill, it is nonetheless clear that skill development and proficiency is linked to the other categories.

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This is evident in their discussion of intercultural skills which includes acknowledging and working within environments where actors have different expectations, and representations of respect; appreciating and knowing how to interact in a context where your native language is not the dominant language; the ability to appraise one’s own biases, counter assumptions and recognise others’ perspectives and positions, and adapt your words and behaviour appropriately; working to develop and embed skills that come from interacting or negotiating with counterparts from other cultures (pp. 269–272). A Special Class of Collaborative Actors: Boundary Spanners Working collaboratively requires a reservoir of ‘collaborative capacity’ to be available from which individuals and organisational partners can draw (Sullivan et  al., 2006). While collaborative capacity is always situated, informed by structural constraints, research emphasises the importance of individuals with particular skills, attributes, and abilities for building and maintaining collaboration (Sullivan & Skelcher, 2002). Williams (2012, p. 58) describes these as aspects of the ‘boundary spanning’ identity, specifying four roles for boundary spanners and related competencies to go with each (see Table  6.1). Williams also addresses the question of how credible or legitimate a ‘boundary spanning’ identity can be in a professionalised public sector, as [p]rofessionals normally acquire their legitimacy through the possession of a discrete repository of knowledge and expertise that in turn is codified and protected by professional bodies. (2012, p. 63) Table 6.1  Roles and competencies for boundary spanners Role

Main competencies

Reticulist

Networking, political sensitivity, diplomacy, bargaining, negotiation, persuasion Interpreter/ Interpersonal, listening, empathising, communication, sense-making, Communicator trust building, conflict management Coordinator Planning, coordination, servicing, administration, information management, monitoring, communication Entrepreneur Brokering, innovation, whole systems thinking, flexibility, lateral thinking, opportunistic Adapted from Williams (2012, p. 58)

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He then suggests that the particular expertise of boundary spanners ‘lies in their ability to appreciate and analyse the connections, links and interrelationships’ (p. 63) in a given policy system. This capacity fits well with several of the competencies outlined in the table but goes beyond these, implying an ability to understand the contextual conditions of a collaboration and to synthesise a range of resources to work with those conditions to achieve specific ends. This capacity or expertise is difficult to codify and protect and so becomes problematic to traditional understandings of what it means to be a ‘professional’. A further complication suggested by Williams is the fact that over time the association of a particular set of skills and competencies with a class of actors known as ‘boundary spanners’ has changed as those skills and the boundary spanning activities have become part of the mainstream of public management, incorporated in a range of professions and associated with actors at all levels of the organisation including leaders and front-line workers. It is also worth noting at this point that despite the availability of expertise—technical and collaborative—many collaborations fail to meet the goals they set themselves. In public policy one explanation for this is the ‘wicked’ nature of some public policy problems. This results in the use of ‘best available’ approaches, in this case a combination of technical and collaborative capacity, in the absence of an approach that ‘works’, at least until one is found. A respondent in a long-term evaluation of a complex collaborative arrangement described this as ‘like housekeeping, endless work that continues needing to be done’ (Lepine in Sullivan, 2010, p. 8). The emphasis here is not on achieving a goal but maintaining a level of endeavour that respects the significance of the challenge but is also cognizant of the inadequacy of existing capacity to respond, including relevant expertise. This links to the last line of discussion, which focuses on the importance of collaborative actors (individuals) having the right ‘mindsets’ to function well in collaborative settings. It speaks to the debate about whether ‘boundary spanners’ are ‘born or made’ and to what extent factors such as personality traits influence how individuals approach collaboration. Williams (2012) differentiates the relevant literature in three ways, First, those that link boundary spanners to extrovert personalities including being outgoing, sociable, friendly, people-orientated and cheerful. Second, those that reflect a moral soundness such as respect, openness and honesty; and finally, those characteristics that emphasise commitment, persistence and hard work. (2012, p. 66)

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While research into collaboration continues to highlight a range of traits, dispositions, or characteristics that are claimed to be vital in combining with expertise to ‘add up to’ an effective boundary spanner, psychologists are split over the significance of these and particularly over the link between identified ‘traits’ and individual behaviours. This offers little assistance in the debate about whether ‘boundary spanners’ are ‘born or made’. However, this discussion does highlight the overlap between expertise, mindset and values. Our values influence how we prioritise public policy problems, how we frame policy questions and how we look for evidence, and ultimately, how we make decisions. Expertise in turn provides a way into understanding policy priorities and weighing up options, but alone it cannot provide a definitive mechanism for weighing up values which formally is the domain of the political, but which also operates at an individual level in collaborative decision-making.

Conclusion Expertise is socially constructed and informed by each of the collaborative domains. Expertise in collaboration is political as it is integral to determining the purpose and strategy of collaborations. It is cultural as the value afforded expertise in collaboration will vary depending on the social relations operating in each context, while the meaning experts attach to collaboration is also the product of social relations. It is spatial as the relevance and limits of expertise will influence/be influenced by the collaborative arena. It is material as expertise is present in the actions of actors in collaboration. However, the interactions between expertise and collaboration are mediated by the actors who embody and express that expertise in their exercise of agency. Expertise contributes to actors’ agency, and identity not least through the status it affords them in public policy contexts. The components of expertise: knowledge, skill, and experience combine in actors’ performance of expertise to reveal the importance of ‘craft’ in public policymaking and serve as a reminder that expertise is more than a technical capability, but requires judgement, attention to nuance, and pragmatism. Collaboration brings the craft of expertise to the fore as actors engage with diversity, uncertainty, and competing expertise. Expertise matters in and to collaboration in different ways. Specific kinds of expertise are needed to define and design collaborative purpose. As important is the expertise required to enable collaboration, the

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collaborative capability and capacity of actors and institutions. One of the outcomes of public policy collaboration should be better evidence of what works (and what doesn’t) and greater expertise in using that evidence. It is not clear that this is the case. What is clear is that collaboration interacts with and disrupts the identity and performance of expertise in several ways. The requirement to engage with other ‘experts’ presents a particular challenge to professionals used to navigating policy decision-making on their own terms. This challenge is compounded in collaborative settings where a range of different actors from various sectors are involved in decision-making. Collaborators must deal with the presence of very different kinds of expertise, some they may not even acknowledge to be so. This can be a source of emotional tension and will be examined next.

References Australians Together. 2021. Retrieved February 10, 2022, from https://australianstogether.org.au/resources-­2 /connecting-­l ocally-­w ith-­i ndigenous-­ communities2/#:~:text=An%20Indigenous%20Elder%20is%20 someone,Elder%20status%20within%20their%20community.&text=Some%20 Indigenous%20Elders%20are%20given%20the%20title%20Uncle%20or%20 Aunty Barnes, M., Newman, J., & Sullivan, H. (2007). Power, Participation and Political Renewal: Case Studies in Public Participation. Policy Press. Bate, S. P., & Roberts, G. (2002). Knowledge Management and Communities of Practice in the Private Sector: Lessons for Modernizing the National Health Service in England and Wales. Public Administration, 80(4), 643–663. Beaven, S., Wilson, T., Johnston, L., Johnston, D., & Smith, R. (2017). Role of Boundary Organization After a Disaster: New Zealand’s Natural Hazards Research Platform and the 2010–2011 Canterbury Earthquake Sequence. Natural Hazards Review, 18, 05016003. Bice, S., & Merriam, A. (2016). Defining Asia Capabilities for Australia’s Public Service. Australian Journal of Public Administration, 75, 263–279. Blunkett, D. (2000). Influence Or Irrelevance: Can Social Science Improve Government? Research Intelligence, 71, 12–21. Bodin, Ö., & Nohrstedt, D. (2016). Formation and Performance of Collaborative Disaster Management Networks: Evidence from a Swedish Wildfire Response. Global Environmental Change, 41, 183–194. Brandsen, T., Steen, T., & Verschuere, B. (Eds.). (2018). Co-Production and Co-Creation: Engaging Citizens in Public Services (1st ed.). Routledge. Cabinet Office. (1999). Modernising Government, CM 4310. The Stationery Office.

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Carlisle, P. (2002). A Pragmatic View of Knowledge and Boundaries: Boundary Objects in New Product Development. Organization Science, 13, 442–455. Connell, J., & Kubisch, A. (1998). Applying a Theory of Change Approach to the Evaluation of Comprehensive Community Initiatives: Progress, Prospects and Problems. In K.  Fulbright-Anderson, A.  Kubisch, & J.  Connell (Eds.), New Approaches to Evaluating Community Initiatives: Volume 2, Theory, Measurement, and Analysis. The Aspen Institute. Department of Education, Skills and Employment (2022). University Research Commercialisation Action Plan. Australian Government, Canberra. De Long, D. W., & Fahey, L. (2000). Diagnosing Cultural Barriers to Knowledge Management. Academy of Management Perspectives, 14(4), 113–127. Dickinson, H., Needham, C., Mangan, C., & Sullivan, H. (2019). Introduction: Imagining the Future Public Service Workforce. In H. Dickinson, C. Needham, C.  Mangan, & H.  Sullivan (Eds.), Reimagining the Future Public Service Workforce. SpringerBriefs in Political Science. Springer. Epstein, S. (1995). The Construction of Lay Expertise: AIDS Activism and the Forging of Credibility in the Reform of Clinical Trials. Science, Technology, & Human Values, 20, 408–437. Fauci, A. (Immunologist, Director of National Institute of Allergy and Infectious Diseases). Interview by Author, Bethesda, MD, 31 October 1994. Goodin, R. E., Rein, M., & Moran, M. (2006). The Public and its Policies. In M. R. Moran, G. Martin, & E. Robert (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Public Policy. Oxford University Press. Greenhalgh, T., & Russell, J. (2005). Reframing Evidence Synthesis as Rhetorical Action in the Policy Making Drama. Healthcare Policy, 1, 31–39. Hattie, J. (2015). What Works Best in Education: The Politics of Collaborative Expertise. Open Ideas. Inkpen, A.  C., & Dinur, A. (1998). Knowledge Management Processes and International Joint Ventures. Organization Science, 9, 454–468. International Council for Science, S.  A. T.  K. (2002). Report from the ICSU Study Group on Science and Traditional Knowledge, Paper Delivered to 27th General Assembly of ICSU. Rio De Janeiro, Brazil. Jasanoff, S. (2004). States of Knowledge: The Co-production of Science and Social Order. Routledge. Jonsen, A.  R., & Stryker, J. (Eds.). (1993). The Social Impact of AIDS in the United States. National Academy Press. Lowndes, V., & Sullivan, H. (2004). Like a Horse and Carriage or a Fish on a Bicycle: How Well Do Local Partnerships and Public Participation Go Together? Local Government Studies, 30, 51–73. Newman, J., Barnes, M., Sullivan, H., & Knops, A. (2004). Public Participation and Collaborative Governance. Journal of Social Policy, 33, 203–223.

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Nutley, S. M., Powell, A. E. & Davies, H. T. O. (2013). What Counts as Good Evidence, University of St Andrews. Ostrom, E (1996). Crossing the Great Divide: Co-production, Synergy and Development, World Development, 24(6), 1073–1087. Painter, M. (2003). Public Administration Reform in Vietnam: Problems and Prospects. Public Administration and Development, 23, 259–271. Palmer, I., & Hardy, C. (2000). Thinking About Management. Sage. Parks, R., Baker, P., Kiser, L., Oakerson, R., Ostrom, E., Ostrom, V., Percy, S., Vandivort, M., Whitaker, G., & Wilson, R. (1981). Consumers as Co-Producers of Public-Services – Some Economic and Institutional Considerations. Policy Studies Journal, 9, 1001–1011. Prior, L. (2003). Belief, Knowledge and Expertise: The Emergence of the Lay Expert in Medical Sociology. Sociology of Health & Illness, 25, 41–57. Pykett, J. (2017). Brain Culture. Shaping Policy Through Neuroscience. Policy Press. Ray, T., Clegg, S., & Gordon, R. (2004). A New Look at Dispersed Leadership: Power, Knowledge and Context. In J. Storey (Ed.), Leadership in Organizations: Current Issues and Key Trends. Routledge. Salazar-Morales, D.  A., & Lauriano, L.  A. (2021). A Typology of the Latin American Civil Servant: Patronage Appointee, Technocrat, Loyalist, or Careerist. In H. Sullivan, H. Dickinson, & H. Henderson (Eds.), The Palgrave Handbook of the Public Servant. Springer International Publishing. Sanderson, I. (2009). Intelligent Policy Making for a Complex World: Pragmatism, Evidence and Learning. Political Studies, 57, 699–719. Schein, E.  H. (1997). Organizational Culture and Leadership San Francisco. Jossey-Bass. Smith, I., Lepine, E., & Taylor, M. (Eds.). (2007). Disadvantaged by Where You Live? Neighbourhood Governance in Contemporary Urban Policy. Policy Press. Sullivan, H. (2010). Collaboration Matters. Inaugural Lecture, University of Birmingham, 8 June. Sullivan, H. (2011a). ‘Truth’ Junkies: Using Evaluation in UK Public Policy. Policy & Politics, 39, 499–512. Sullivan, H. (2011b). When Tomorrow Comes: The Future of Local Public Services. Report of the Policy Commission. Birmingham. Sullivan, H. (2012). Co-producing Matter of Value: Ideas, Emotions, Evidence and Practices in the First University of Birmingham Policy Commission. XVI IRSPM Conference Contradictions in Public Management: Managing in Volatile Times. Rome. Sullivan, H. (2014). Designing ‘the Political’ in (and Out of) Neighbourhood Governance. In S.  Griggs, A.  J. Norval, & H.  Wagenaar (Eds.), Practices of Freedom. Decentred Governance, Conflict and Democratic Participation. Cambridge University Press.

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Sullivan, H., Barnes, M., & Matka, E. (2006). Collaborative Capacity and Strategies in Area-Based Initiatives. Public Administration, 84, 289–310. Sullivan, H., Dickinson, H., & Henderson, H. (Eds.). (2021). The Handbook of the Public Servant, Palgrave Major Reference Works. Palgrave. Sullivan, H., & Skelcher, C. (2002). Working Across Boundaries: Collaboration in Public Services. Palgrave. Sullivan, H., & Stewart, M. (2006). Who Owns the Theory of Change? Evaluation, 12, 179–199. van der Wal, Z. (2017). The 21st Century Public Manager. Macmillan Education UK. Weiss, C. (1995). Nothing as Practical as Good Theory: Exploring Theory-Based Evaluation for Comprehensive Community Initiatives for Children and Families. In J.  Connell, A.  Kubisch, L.  Schorr, & C.  Weiss (Eds.), New Approaches to Evaluating Community Initiatives: Concepts, Methods and Contexts. The Aspen Institute. Wildavsky, A. (1979). Speaking Truth to Power. The Art and Craft of Policy Analysis. Little Brown. Williams, P. (2012). Collaboration in Public Policy and Practice: Perspectives on Boundary Spanners. Policy Press. Williams. P. and Sullivan, H. (2011). Lessons in Leadership for Learning and Knowledge Management in Multi-organisational Settings. International Journal of Leadership in Public Services, 7(1), 6–20.

CHAPTER 7

Emotions, Agency, and Collaboration

Introduction This chapter offers a counter to the limited attention paid to emotion and public policy collaboration. It proposes that far from being peripheral, emotions are central to the policy and practice of collaboration: acting across time and in space to influence the potential and limits of collaboration; present in the relations that actors form and engage in; and generative of productive and unproductive collaborative outcomes. The chapter demonstrates the emotional claims made by public policy collaboration, the role of emotion in framing responses to collaboration, and the work of emotions in collaborative practice. The chapter begins with an exploration of emotions, what they are, how they have influence, and how they are relevant to public policy. It differentiates between types of emotions, personal, group, and public emotions, and explores the relationship between emotion and affect. The chapter then considers the dominant treatment of emotions in public policy and administration scholarship highlighting its limits and proposing an alternative framing that is more inclusive and is also helpful for analysing collaboration. The chapter then explores how emotions matter in collaboration. It begins by identifying the analytical tools that will shape the exploration including the acknowledgement that the emotional life of collaboration is present in the ordinary as well as the dramatic. It is as much about ‘sense © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 H. Sullivan, Collaboration and Public Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-09585-6_7

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as sensibility’ (borrowing from Wetherell’s elegant summing up of affect, 2012, p. 13). The chapter then explores the ‘emotional claims’ of collaboration made by public policymakers and the consequences of this for collaborative practice. Finally, the chapter moves to a closer examination of the presence and influence of emotions in collaborative practice and their relationship with actors’ identity and performance.

Understanding Emotions It turns out that defining emotions is not straightforward. There is no settled scientific consensus on a single definition. In addition, emotions are the subject of study across a wide range of disciplines, each bringing its own ontology and epistemology. This chapter will draw on contributions from a range of disciplines to enhance an understanding of emotions and enable their analysis in public policy collaboration. This section outlines the key concepts used in this chapter. One dictionary definition describes emotions as ‘a conscious mental reaction (such as anger or fear) subjectively experienced as strong feeling usually directed toward a specific object and typically accompanied by physiological and behavioral changes in the body’ (Merriam Webster). This definition provides a good starting point for discussion. It identifies emotions as having both mental and physical manifestations, highlights their relational nature, and locates them in an individual actor. It also points to particularity and strength as important aspects of emotion. Each of these identified features is explored further below. Actors have in common the mental and physical manifestations of emotional states; what varies, and is arguably unique, is the what, how, and why of those emotional states. These are informed by an actor’s personal and social experiences, their history, upbringing, and disposition. As Lupton (1998) suggests, ‘[l]ike the body itself, emotional states serve to bring together nature and culture in a seamless intermingling in which it is difficult to argue where one ends and the other begins (p. 4)’. While most often illustrated, as in the above definition, by reference to ‘strong feelings’ such as anger or joy, emotional states can also represent more moderate feelings such as mild irritation, or pleasure. These moderate feelings are perhaps more commonly experienced in the everyday. Actors’ emotional states while ascribed to the individual are experienced in relation to another. This other may be a person, object, idea, or

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some combination of each. The relational nature of emotions extends further, relating actors to the social world, and enabling what Lyon and Barbalet (1994) term ‘embodied sociality’. This alerts us to the possibility of emotional states being shared by groups, a product of their existing relation to each other, for example, a community or profession, or a shared experience, such as a disaster. Emotional states are situated. Bodies are containers and communicators of history, tradition, and prior experience, all of which contribute to the particularities of an actor’s emotional state. However, emotional states are also situated historically, geographically (Jupp et al., 2016), politically, and culturally (Shaver et al., 1992). This broadens the range of terrains that emotions inhabit and perform on including the body, the organisation, and the nation-state, and shapes the potential and limits of actors’ agency. Sociologist Thoit’s (1989) multicomponent definition encapsulates the complexity and nuance of emotions outlined above as involving: ‘(a) appraisals of a situational stimulus or context, (b) changes in physiological or bodily sensations, (c) the free or inhibited display of expressive gestures, and (d) a cultural label applied to specific constellations of one or more of the first three components’ (p. 318). The ‘affective turn’ in academic scholarship focuses on how emotional states become influential. According to Hardt (2007, ix), ‘[a]ffects…illuminate…both our power to affect the world around us and our power to be affected by it, along with the relationship between those powers’. How this happens and what it looks like is encapsulated by Wetherell as ‘embodied meaning-making’ that is practised, patterned, and cognisant of power (2012, p. 4 italics in original). This description is helpful as it accounts for the mental/physical, relational, and situated aspects of emotional states, and the differing influence of affect in respect of agency and dynamic relations. Having established a working definition of emotions and made the link to affect, the next section considers the role of emotions in public policy and administration.

Emotions and Public Policy Emotions occupy a difficult place in public policy. Traditional readings of politics and philosophy view emotions as at best at odds with and usually ‘beneath’ the capacity for reason. In the making of public policy,

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emotional considerations or interventions are considered to impair judgements and inhibit good decision-making. In the conduct of public administration, actors are expected to have ‘mastery’ (sic) of their emotions, to be able to exercise self-control, and self-discipline. In this interpretation of public policy and administration, rationality rules (Andrews, 2007). However, these traditional readings are incomplete and inadequate. They are incomplete because they fail to account for the accepted inclusion of some emotions in public policy and administration. There is not so much an absence of emotion, but rather a neglect of particular kinds and sources of emotion. Traditional readings are inadequate both because of this neglect, and because of the instrumental focus on emotions. These critiques are explored below. The absence or neglect of emotions weakens public policy as it limits the scope of our understanding of the potential impact of the design and content of policy. Geographers Anderson and Smith (2001) reflect on this, in the context of public policymaking in the UK’s coal mining industry. Coal mining, which had once employed more than one million people across the UK, became more expensive and less profitable in the second half of the twentieth century. Nonetheless in 1984 173 pits employed over 200,000 people and supported numerous communities. The Conservative Government led by Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher proposed a major program of pit closures and privatisation, which they pursued following a bitter dispute with the National Union of Mineworkers in 1984/1985. The consequences for communities were devastating as unemployment soared and poverty became endemic. Anderson and Smith reflect, Generally, when key public sphere decisions are made, for example to effect the pit closures in the English North-East, the emotional impacts and costs do not feature in the decision-making calculation. There is no requirement to bring the privately emotional into the rationally public, despite the obvious interpenetration of these spheres. (p. 8)

They go on to argue that in the absence of any such requirement on policymakers, academics should undertake to examine ‘the emotional consequences of seemingly rational economic decisions’ as part of holding policymakers accountable (p. 8). In this they draw connections between emotions and expertise (economic decisions) and ethical policymaking (policy dependent on ‘the silencing of the emotions’).

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Arguably, however, UK public policy resulting in pit closures did include an accounting for emotions, just not in relation to the miners. Rather, the private emotional ‘benefits’ for politicians, private sector buyers, developers, etc. were part of the calculus, even if they were assumed rather than explicitly acknowledged. This identification of emotions as ‘private’ is important as it renders them invisible in public policy. This is intimated by Anderson and Smith in their consideration of the miners, ‘we recognize that many of the people affected by these decisions may not want their private emotions made public’ (p. 8). Recent developments in public policy have embraced emotions as integral to the success of policy design and intervention, with little or no reflection on making the private public. ‘Positive psychology’ as promoted by Seligman (2012) and others and which links positivity with ‘wellbeing’ and good organisational outcomes is based on building ‘emotional competence’ amongst publics, particularly school children. Behavioural insights enables policymakers to develop policy interventions that by-pass ‘publics’ resistance to reform by working with their internal ‘choice architecture’, including emotional disposition, to facilitate desired outcomes. Emotions are considered instrumentally, as policy tools to be used. This popular adoption of emotions in public policy is critiqued by a range of scholars, including Durnová (2019), who argues that what is being offered is a thin conception of emotions focused on the behavioural and neurological. This diminishes our understanding of emotions by excluding the socio-cultural dimension. For Durnová (2019), Emotions are both a trigger of how surrounding phenomena are made meaningful and explained, and also the context within which we understand those explanations, whether we believe them or deny them. (p. 110)

This aligns well with the relational and situational nature of emotions discussed in the section above. Like Wetherell, Durnova is also concerned with the relationship between emotions and power, arguing that understanding emotions is ‘essential to appreciating the role of power and meaning in policy designs’. She further proposes that we need to make an ‘analytical shift from ‘emotions’ to the ‘discourse on emotions’ ‘(118). These ‘discursive registers’ she argues position particular emotions as productive and others as unproductive depending upon the prevailing socio-­ political order. This is helpful in aiding our understanding of why some emotions are acceptable, while others are not.

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Scrutiny of the practice of public administration reveals that despite its valorisation of rationality, it is replete with emotions. This apparent inconsistency is comprehensible if one accepts that public administration is not absent of emotion (Vigoda-Gadot and Meisler, 2010) but instead discriminating about what kinds of emotions are regarded as appropriate for actors to use (Schofield and Goodwin, 2005). What this means in practice is that ‘emotion’ is not registered as significant unless or until ‘inappropriate emotions’ are observed. Of course, what is regarded as appropriate or inappropriate is invariably gendered and racialised—emotional permission is granted to those who can conform to expected norms (Brescoll, 2016). It is not emotions per se that are inappropriate but rather those emotions not associated with accepted codes of conduct and ‘ethical’ behaviour. Research on ‘emotional labour’ and public administration illustrates the work done by public servants to represent emotions in ways the organisation deems appropriate (Guy et al., 2008). These expectations and performances are also gendered (Meier et al., 2006) Developments in public management, informed by psychology and sociology, offer another justification for permitting some emotions over others. Emotions are differentiated between those considered valuable in supporting good management practice and those denoting weakness and destructiveness. The key is to identify and manage these within oneself. For example, public management’s adoption of ‘emotional intelligence’ (Goleman, 1998) alongside reason in exercising judgement drew attention to the need to match IQ with EQ. With two decades’ distance it is easier to view Goleman’s ‘self-help’ focus as a product of the global restructuring of work, and the negative consequences for minority groups and women, the rise of individualism, and the decline of social solidarity. As Emre (2021) argues, ‘emotional intelligence’ functions outwith any acknowledgement of social injustice, prescribing a ‘regimen of restraint’ that focuses on the virtue of self-control regardless of the circumstance. The association of effective public management with the exercise of a particular kind of emotional competence (‘mastery’, ‘self-control’) blurs the boundary between private and public. Emotions are performed by individuals, for example, public servants, relative to a shared professional understanding of what emotional competence looks like in the public service. This makes emotional management public as it sets it within professional codes of conduct and appropriate behaviours. Nussbaum (2015) expands the emotional scope further proposing ‘political emotions’ or ‘public emotions’ which take as their object the

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nation and act to enjoin citizens in a shared feeling about the nation. She argues that political principles need emotional support to enable us to see ourselves as societies with larger concerns pertaining to the common good and to resist the tendency to the division present in all of us. This emotional support may be rooted in love and generosity aimed at the full and equal humanity in another person or it may promote disgust and envy as the foundation for governing. These public emotions convey messages about who is included and excluded in the nation and society. This section has illustrated how emotions are present in public policy and administration and the ways in which some emotions are privileged, while others frowned upon. It has confirmed the relational and situated nature of emotional states and differentiated between emotions pertaining to individuals, groups, and even nations. The next section considers how our understanding of emotions and public policy can help in an analysis of collaboration.

Emotions and Collaboration Emotions are at work in collaboration in several ways. They influence and express actors’ responses to and conduct within collaboration. They contribute to and are important representations of the relational quality of collaboration. They inform and reflect collaborative actors’ agency and identity. The relational nature of emotions, their presence in actor/actor engagement, or actor/object engagement points to the importance of acknowledging and understanding the emotional experiences of actors in collaborative endeavours. The challenge posed should not be underestimated, based on the ‘neglect’ of emotion in mainstream public policy. This demands a focus on individuals and their agency, including the different terrains on which emotions are experienced, such as bodies, institutions, and states. It also requires attention to the diversity of emotional cultures and traditions actors may inhabit and bring to a collaborative situation. As emotions are also situated, actors’ agency will shape and be shaped by the context they are operating in, including that of the collaboration itself. This requires an examination of emotions beyond the individual, to include the ‘discursive registers’ at play (Durnová, 2019). These discursive registers may operate at and in different scales and spaces, including the nation. They offer a way of representing emotions and ethics and ideas to create a public sense of identity and purpose as proposed by Nussbaum (2015).

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Time is as important as space in understanding emotions and collaboration. Potential collaborations are apprehended through the lens of past experiences and the emotional demands, costs, and benefits of these relations for individuals, institutions, and countries. Those experiences may not necessarily have involved the actors concerned, but they are part of the organisational/professional/community memory and as such constitute reactions to new possibilities. Powerful examples of this are contained in peacebuilding efforts in conflict zones, for example, Northern Ireland, which are invariably shaped by past experiences of collaboration, and their emotional affect shapes what might be possible in the future. However, the same emotional affect can be present in more prosaic contexts of public policy and service delivery, for example, urban revitalisation, or health and social care. Emotions are the source of affect in collaborative relationships, the ways in which actors embody and express their feelings. It is here that it is possible to examine how and why individuals respond in particular ways to collaborative opportunities or demands, the way in which they represent these responses, for example, as ethical challenges, or opportunities to improve services for users, and the consequences these responses have for collaborative possibilities. Collaboration offers the promise of working across boundaries. Emotions can help fulfil that promise, or hi-jack it. Public emotions can be used to create positive or negative representations of what can be achieved through collaboration, and individual actors will draw on their own experience and situation to gauge their reaction to collaboration. Actors’ emotional registers may be heightened—the prospect of collaboration may induce joy or anger, or they may be moderate—the prospect of collaboration eliciting curiosity or cynicism. These emotional registers will result in affective action that may or may not be sufficient to overcome boundaries. At the same time collaboration constitutes new boundaries—institutional, professional, and/or personal. These new boundaries result partly from the affective impact of collaboration and are also imbued with its emotional legacies, which continue to circulate between and amongst collaborating actors and institutions. The remainder of this chapter explores empirical examples of emotions and public policy collaboration. It will consider how emotions have affect, how they shape agency, and their impact on actors’ identities and performance. It begins with a focus on discursive registers, examining collaboration as an emotional claim in public policy.

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Collaboration as an Emotional Claim As indicated in the Introduction to this book, collaboration has become an accepted way of doing things. Policymakers and practitioners regard it collaboration as a necessary policy instrument—the product of a rational assessment of the environment. But this does not tell the whole story of the reach for collaboration. As this book has also illustrated, collaboration is difficult; actors may not all agree that it is the right response, and even if they do, the demands associated with collaboration (politically, materially, culturally, and spatially) can hinder it or scupper it altogether. A more complete narrative needs to take account of the emotional claims associated with collaboration and their impact on actors’ identity and performance. These emotional claims can be observed in two distinct ways: • The emotional claim made in association with what collaboration can achieve and/or what can only be achieved through collaboration • The emotional claim associated with acting collaboratively—how it makes actors feel Durnova’s concept of ‘discursive registers’ and Nussbaum’s ‘political’ or ‘public emotions’ are helpful aides to examining the power of emotional claims in the reach for collaboration. Figure 7.1 offers an example of a common and enduring public policy problem—homelessness. This extract from the website of ‘Partners ending Homelessness’, an advocacy body based in North Carolina, in the US, first counters the idea that homelessness is intractable and goes further by stating simply that it is a ‘solvable problem’. The ‘discursive register’ is positive and optimistic. It encourages actors to believe they can make a difference and shows them how and with what kinds of feelings. This is achieved by acknowledging that the work is not easy but emphasising that collaboration can be effective provided partners maintain ‘steadfast fixity of purpose’. The reference to ‘a community courageously dedicated’ maintains that discursive register emphasising the demands that will be made of actors (courage, dedication). The statement also contains an appeal to ‘public emotions’, in this case shared humanity and solidarity—acting to end homelessness is of benefit to the whole community. The reach for collaboration can be made in a very different discursive register. For example, Stephen Taylor, the then director of the London-­ based Leadership Centre for Local Government and ‘parent’ of ‘Total

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Homelessness is a solvable problem.

With steadfast fixity of purpose, Partners Ending Homelessness (PEH) supports and facilitates a strong, collaborative network of community partners focused on solutions to end individual and family homelessness in our community. We envision a community courageously dedicated to ending homelessness in Guilford County, a vision attainable through living our mission of engaging critical stakeholders to bring about effective solutions through collaborations, advocacy, and resources.

Fig. 7.1  ‘Partners Ending Homelessness’. (Source: https://pehgc.org/)

Place’ a program to improve the efficient use of resources in English localities by ‘joining up’ the resource use of public service providers and drawing in private and not-for-profit providers, excoriated local authorities for their performance and any reluctance on their part to embrace the new collaborative approach, declaring, Unconscious inefficiency is incompetence. Conscious inefficiency is robbery. Either way a council which is not driving out waste is stealing from its public. (Taylor, 2008, p. 55)

Taylor’s discursive register provides clear political cues about how actors ought to act, and how they should feel (and indeed how the public should regard them) if they do not respond. Emotional claim making is perhaps most vividly observed when the reach for collaboration is proving a stretch too far. There may be a range of reasons for this, but one of the most common in public policy is when some actors decide that the overall benefits of collaboration are insufficient to overcome their own priorities. The distribution of vaccines to address the COVID-19 emergency offers an important example of this. Figure 7.2 is an excerpt from the Director General of the World Health Organization, Dr Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus’s remarks to the media on 22 March 2021. It demonstrates the failure of collaboration, and the discursive register is designed to shame publicly ‘the global community’.

‘In January, I said that the world was on the brink of a catastrophic moral failure unless urgent steps were taken to ensure equitable distribution of vaccines. We have the means to avert this failure, but it’s shocking how little has been done to avert it. The gap between the number of vaccines administered in rich countries, and the number of vaccines administered through COVAX is growing every single day andbecoming more grotesque every day. Countries that are now vaccinating younger, healthy people at low risk of disease are doing so at the cost of the lives of health workers, older people, and other at-risk groups in other countries. The world’s poorest countries wonder whether rich countries really mean what they say when they talk about solidarity. The inequitable distribution of vaccines is not just a moral outrage. It’s also economically and epidemiologically self-defeating. Some countries are racing to vaccinate their entire populations while other countries have nothing. This may buy short-term security, but it’s a false sense of security. The more transmission, the more variants. And the more variants that emerge, the more likely it is that they will evade vaccines. And as long as the virus continues to circulate anywhere, people will continue to die, trade and travel will continue to be disrupted, and the economic recovery will be further delayed. On Friday, WHO hosted a meeting of more than 800 experts on enhancing genomic sequencing of the SARS-CoV-2 virus globally, to improve the monitoring of its evolution.

Fig. 7.2 Director General, WHO, COVID briefing 22 March 2021. (Source: WHO (2021) https://www.who.int/director-­general/speeches/detail/ who-­director-­general-­s-­opening-­remarks-­at-­the-­media-­briefing-­on-­covid-­19-­22-­ march-­2021. Accessed 19 March, 2022)

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Knowing when, how and where the virus is evolving is vital information.

But it’s of limited use if countries do not work together to suppress transmission everywhere at the same time. If countries won’t share vaccines for the right reasons, we appeal to them to do it out of selfinterest’.

Fig. 7.2  (continued)

What is also noteworthy here is the way in which the Director General implicitly acknowledges that he and the WHO have limited power in this policy dilemma and so positions his appeal to actors to reach for collaboration from selfish not selfless motivations. The idea and practice of collaboration itself can also be the subject of emotional claims. Here the political cues communicated through discursive registers may be extreme and long-lasting. The most obvious example of this is in the context of conflict. The emotional cues about collaboration are invariably pejorative; to be labelled ‘a collaborator’ is to be outside of prevailing values and norms. It is a label that affords blame, shame, and opprobrium to the actors so called. This is relevant to public policy collaboration in the context of conflict resolution and peacebuilding, and its impact can be felt for generations. For example, Horning (2019) reflects on ‘collaboration’ in her work as an archaeologist in Northern Ireland, pointing to the dissonance that exists between the deliberate attempts to engage communities in the practice of archaeology for progressive purposes and the vogue label of ‘collaboration’ to describe that engagement. She says, To be a “collaborator” in conflict settings implies an allegiance, often deceitful, to one cause or another, and by intent or by default, contributing to or prolonging conflict and violence. Language, in these settings, must be chosen very carefully. (p. 445)

Consequently, Horning proposes not to use the word ‘collaboration’ though she holds out hope for the time when it might be used without its affective import.

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The emotional claim of collaboration can also be made in entirely the opposite normative direction. Political cues may be focused on collaboration as ‘a good thing’, an enterprise to be encouraged for its own sake. This charge is levelled at advocates for collaboration in the 1990s and early 2000s, who it is argued became swept up in the optimism associated with ‘third way’ politics. In this context discursive registers were accompanied by institutional adaptation to ensure that rules and norms reflected the preferred reality. These discursive registers and institutional adaptation make collaboration ‘sticky’—Ahmed’s term for the way in which emotions can ‘saturate’ objects with affect making them ‘sites of personal and social tension’ comprising the histories of contact and their emotional content (2004, p. 11). This stickiness matters as ‘it can function to “block” the movement (of other things or signs) and it can function to bind (other things or signs) together’ (2004, p. 91). In the 1990s and 2000s collaboration’s stickiness was associated with the affective force of the association of collaboration with consensus. Figure 7.3 offers an account of the collaboration as consensus paradigm as ‘Unlike under New Labour when collaboration was identified by some as a refuge from party politics and reconstituted as an anti-political institution in which ‘experts’ could deliberate happily unencumbered by politicians and their manifestos, under the Coalition, collaboration was represented as a way of working that was ‘beyond politics altogether’ an expression of a lately voiced public will to govern differently. It combined the ‘new politics’ promise of rational deliberation with the ‘new common sense’ consensus about the nature of the problem to be solved (the deficit arising from the GFC) and the means of solving it (public spending cuts, greater involvement of independent providers and more self-reliance) – articulated through apparently collective and emotional appeals – ‘we are all in this together’ and offered a particular (albeit one sided) vision of collaboration as the ultimate expression of governing in a post-political world’.

Fig. 7.3  Collaboration as consensus in the 1990/2000s. (Source: Sullivan, 2010, p. 14)

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activated by UK New Labour (1997–2010) and the Coalition Government of Conservatives and Liberal Democrats (2010–2015). It is important to note that practitioners continue to have agency in the context of collaboration as an emotional claim. They are not simply at the mercy of astute policymakers and the discursive and institutional tools. Practitioners can and will see beyond some of the more emotionally charged claims about collaboration, and indeed scepticism and even cynicism about collaboration are not too far from the surface in many public policy arenas. Nonetheless many actors in collaboration may feel themselves to be emotionally attached to collaborative working. This may reflect a deep commitment to and feeling for addressing the object of the collaboration, such as addressing inequality, improving services for users, or  securing peace. It may also reflect a more personal/professional emotional attachment. I have suggested elsewhere that the recasting of professional achievement as assessed principally via tangible measures proved insufficient for individual actors (and as it turns out, for public policy), leaving them searching for an alternative: [f]or professionals in particular the value of collaboration is not just (or even at all) bound up with ideas of impact. Rather… collaboration offers professionals a different, more personally rewarding way of working that may no longer be found in the technocratic performance management regimes that dominate public and latterly third sector organisations. The challenge associated with negotiating diversity and interdependence, the possibilities for creativity and the inevitability of conflict stretch individuals and require them to make use of skills such as judgement that cannot be read off a performance chart but need to be honed through experience. (Sullivan, 2010, p. 18)

The Emotional Lives of Collaboration Emotions are present in collaboration whatever the nature, purpose, or situation. They matter in collaborations that are dealing with extreme differences and challenging public policy but are equally important in collaborations that are working with more moderate perspectives and policy content. How they matter and the impact they have will of course vary, both across space and time, providing a great deal of scope for investigating the emotional lives of collaboration. This section examines four different experiences of collaboration to draw out the contents and characteristics of these ‘emotional lives’.

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Vignette 1: Joy and Satisfaction Collaboration can be sources of happiness for the actors involved. Such positive emotions manifest in two, often related ways: the achievements of the collaboration and actors’ experiences of working together. The Chronic Condition Management Program in Wales, a cross-sector collaboration designed to help people with chronic health conditions back into work, illustrates both the emotional satisfaction of achieving program goals and the enjoyment of collaborating (Fig. 7.4). The positive ‘energy’ of the collaboration helped promote ‘creativity’ in the program, and actors expressed feeling ‘excited’ and even ‘thrilled’ at being able to work outside their normal bounds to ‘take risks’ for a positive outcome. Emotions are present in the material domain of collaborative action as well as the cultural domain of meaning. A similar experience is recorded by Heckler and Russell’s (2008) in their analysis of a tobacco control partnership in the North East of England. They concluded that emotional engagement and positive personal relationships were more important than governance, structure, and ‘[p]articipants in a collaborative programme designed to help people with chronic health conditions back into work talked a great deal about the satisfaction of making a difference to users’ lives, but they also reflected on how much they enjoyed working collectively and the energy that existed in their creative collaboration. This was summed up by one respondent who talked about how practitioners, ‘find it very exciting to employ their skills in an environment of partnership, in a situation that is community based, and an arena where they feel they can make a difference by getting people back into employment’. Another referred to the appeal collaboration held for those ‘who have stepped outside their traditional models of working, who want to do things differently outside traditional constraints’. Frequent reference was made to partners’ ‘passion’ and ‘drive’, and the thrill associated with ‘taking a degree of risk – of being different’

Fig. 7.4  Emotions in the Chronic Condition Management Program. (Source: Williams & Sullivan, 2009, Case study 1, p 4)

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management in achieving success. They also highlighted the role of the partnership coordinators in creating ‘an environment where positive affect and mutual liking develop and underpin a dynamic and productive partnership’ (p. 331). This emphasis on the engineering of circumstances conducive to positive affect points to the importance of agency in collaboration design and conduct—neither joy nor productivity happen by accident. Some of these issues are considered next. Vignette 2: Emotions not Admitted Actors’ approach to collaboration is situated in the context of what is considered appropriate in their profession and/or in the issue being addressed. These norms or codes of appropriate conduct will include appropriate emotional conduct. There may be no need for these norms of emotional conduct to be made explicit such is their embeddedness in how things are done. This can mean that the power of these norms may not be the subject of enquiry or reflection, to the detriment of understanding what is/is not going on in collaboration. Johansson’s (2017) work on peacebuilding collaboration provides a powerful example of this. Her enquiry found peacebuilding professionals in International Non-Governmental Organisations (INGOs) adhere to norms of behaviour, which she argues are self-­ defeating, because they preclude attending to emotions. ‘[w]hile pushing emotions aside may be taken for granted by peacebuilding professionals to focus on partnership, doing so may be one reason why this partnership eludes them’ (p. 1). This is an important finding that will be returned to in the next section. However, what is equally important is the way in which Johansson arrived at this assessment (Fig. 7.5). Ideas about what it means to be ‘competent’ in peacebuilding precluded consideration of emotions, including by her; they were regarded as ‘beside the point’. Her attention was drawn to them via the affective expression of those she was interviewing, the ‘long sighs’ and ‘wry smiles’ that alerted her to the role of ‘feelings’ in their work. This example illustrates the tension that can exist across the domains of collaboration. The political domain references the affective through its ‘peacebuilding’ purpose, and yet collaborative action (the material domain) is constrained by the exclusion of emotions (the cultural domain); instead actors reveal their discomfort to the researcher through other embodied actions.

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‘Asking peacebuilding practitioners how they go about their day aims to get at their commonsense “dos and donts”. Experienced practitioners in any field develop a “feel for the game” (Bourdieu 1990, 66-68), a practical knowledge, a sense of what you are supposed to do – and not do – to be considered a competent “player” by other actors (ibid 140). Being considered incompetent by partners and donors involve serious risks to INGOs’ abilities to exist and carry out their work. Today, treating emotions as beside the point may be considered competent peacebuilding, which is probably why my participants (and I) did exactly this in our interactions. However, gradually I realized that bubbling up inside comments, coffee talk, and body language, in long sighs, wry smiles, and clenched teeth, winks, laughter, and excited exclamations, seemed to be another story about the feel for the game, that is, about their feelings for the game. Therefore, below I ask what happens if we treat those emotions as part of the game and the requirement to hide them as an unspoken rule that is taken-for-granted today but may (perhaps must) change tomorrow’

Fig. 7.5  Emotions and peacebuilding. (Source: Johansson, 2017, p. 3)

Vignette 3: Moral Emotions and Ugly Feelings What actors regard as appropriate conduct may be complicated in cross-­ cultural collaborations and can be detrimental to individuals as well as to the collaboration itself. Cook and Brunton’s (2018) work with culturally diverse healthcare teams in New Zealand revealed the importance of ‘moral emotions’ (Haidt, 2003) in enabling or disabling collaboration. Moral emotions are emotions that are linked to ethical practice and located in a particular cultural context. Their ethical content means that individual actors prize them and this along with their contextual resonance helps to shape and affirm an individual’s professional identity. Moral emotions become visible in cross-cultural contexts where difference is observed and practised outwith the ethnocentric norms that determine what is

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appropriate and what is ‘other’. These differences can cause tensions between workers, and with service users as communication breaks down and conflict arises. Cook and Brunton’s study of cross-cultural healthcare teams reveals how migrant nurses experienced a dissonance between their ‘moral emotions’ and what was considered ‘commonsense’ practice by non-­migrant nurses (Fig. 7.6). They also identify several practical ways to engage with ‘moral emotions’, and in so doing improve the prospects for collaboration, including investment in cultural awareness training and development for staff. This vignette reinforces the potential for emotions to be present and in tension in different collaborative domains. It highlights the way in which collaborative action (the material domain) is shaped by expert, ethical, and emotional norms that are reflected in the shape the collaboration takes (the spatial domain). In this example, that shape is one in which ethnocentric norms prevail until they are countered actively and directly. The vignette also raises the possibility of conflict in collaboration arising from individual actors’ sense of their identity and agency being negated. The nurses in the above example express powerful feelings about their treatment, including anger. They also express what Ngai (2004) terms ‘ugly feelings’, those feelings that block rather than enable agency, illustrated above by reference to feelings of shame and being made to feel ‘stupid’. Chapter 4 contains another example of ‘ugly feelings’ in action (see Fig. 4.5). A neighbourhood collaboration designed to increase the involvement of citizens in local decision-making, involved regular meetings between politicians, professionals, lay advisory members (citizens that had gone through a selection process to sit on the neighbourhood committee), and the public. At all the meetings we [the researchers] attended and interviews, the participants exhibited ‘ugly feelings’—irritation, paranoia and anxiety—feelings which acted as blocks to agency and which manifested themselves in low level but persistent conflicts between all parties to the collaboration that ultimately scuppered it. The role of conflict in collaboration will be explored further in the next section. Vignette 4: In the Room On 2 April 2009 the G20 leaders committed to a plan for global recovery from the GFC, providing significant fiscal stimulus to support the world’s economy, coupled with proposed reform of the global financial system. The Leaders’ Communique said,

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A study of culturally diverse healthcare teams found that members ‘interpreted the ‘right’ way to care through different cultural lenses’ (Cook and Brunton, 2018 p.5). Migrant nurses had a heightened awareness of the power of the dominant cultural lens to privilege one approach to care, and to diminish the clinical practice of nurses working with a different approach. The nurses reported feeling ‘shame and … anger when judged as providing inadequate patient care’ (ibid). The use of the term ‘commonsense’ was a particular source of resentment, as it encapsulated the privileging of one form of knowledge and practice and acted as shorthand that excluded others. One nurse respondent reported that ‘[i]t can come out as offensive when colleagues or patients make us feel stupid because we don’t know what is supposedly common-sense’ (ibid).

The respondent found a way to create space in staff training programs to ‘make visible’ these ‘taken-for-granted culturally based commonsense practices’ (ibid). Initially colleagues reacted angrily to what they experienced as being named as racists and bullies. However, the training enabled them to appreciate how culture and upbringing shapes what is regarded as common-sense. This in turn removed the negative emotions dominating the team and supported better communication in the team.

Fig. 7.6  Moral emotions and cross-cultural collaboration. (Source: Adapted from Cook & Brunton, 2018) We have today therefore pledged to do whatever is necessary to: • • • •

restore confidence, growth, and jobs; repair the financial system to restore lending; strengthen financial regulation to rebuild trust; fund and reform our international financial institutions to overcome this crisis and prevent future ones; • promote global trade and investment and reject protectionism, to underpin prosperity; and • build an inclusive, green, and sustainable recovery.

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By acting together to fulfil these pledges we will bring the world economy out of recession and prevent a crisis like this from recurring in the future. (G20, 2009)

While not all commentators evaluated the outcome of the London Summit as highly as the Brookings Institute which concluded, ‘in coming years, the London G-20 Summit will be seen as the most successful summit in history’ (Bradford and Linn, 2010), there does seem to be a consensus that the G20 Summit managed to stave off global recession and induce economic stability (Guardian, 2013). This then was a significant collaborative achievement. What is of interest here is the experience of how it came together. In her book about her husband Jeremy Heywood’s career as a senior British civil servant, Suzanne Heywood’s (2021) account of the final meeting, chaired by then UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown, offers helpful insights into the role of the spatial domain in creating and containing emotion (Fig. 7.7). The vignette reveals the importance of separating the leaders from their entourages, to create a sense of intimacy in which a deal could be done. The small meeting room and the lunch setting suggest a privacy and intimacy that could be productive. The element of surprise that this was a working lunch, and the UK PM’s hands on approach to working through the proposed agreement, created an energy and an urgency. The lunch was not without incident. At one point Heywood records Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner, the Argentinian President remonstrating with one of the British officials, pushing him against the wall and demanding that her sherpa be allowed in. At another, the French President Nikolas Sarkozy threatened to leave. But tempers were calmed, and compromises worked out, partly Heywood suggests because despite their suspicions about what the British PM might be up to ‘no-one wanted to walk out and take the blame for blocking progress’ (p. 260). The emotional work necessary to create and sustain collaborative relationships, whether amongst world leaders in a global crisis, or front-line workers dealing with long-term policy challenges, is considerable. This is examined next.

Doing Emotional Work Collaboration is unsettling. Whether welcome or not the prospect of collaboration brings with it the demand to think and act differently. These demands may be experienced as major or minor by the those affected, may

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The meeting room was set up so that delegates would sit around a very large table, which though circular, would still make it hard for individuals to interact given the distance between them. This was not unusual, high level government meetings followed this format, but it also generated a particular kind of interaction, specifically, set piece speeches by delegates with little space for them to engage in the issues. Heywood records Jeremy reassuring the PM that,

‘But the place where the leaders are having lunch is better,’ Jeremy told Gordon Brown when they discussed it, ‘because it is relatively small.’

At the meeting delegates were advised by the PM that space constraints meant that they would eat lunch in different groups, with the leaders eating together. Heywood notes in her account that the other delegates – finance ministers – and the Sherpas (the civil servants supporting their delegations) grumbled about this but were not in a position to resist.

At lunch time the PM moved to guide the other leaders into their private dining room. The PM’s advisors took it upon themselves to make sure everyone ended up where they should and they and other No 10 staff took up positions on either side of the dining room door to ensure no one entered or left.

Heywood continues,

‘Inside the room, Gordon took his seat, pushed his plate to one side, and began taking the other leaders through the communiqué, a thick black pen in his hand. He made swift work

Fig. 7.7 Emotions and the G20 London Summit. (Source: Adapted from Heywood, 2021, pp. 259–260)

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of the first few paragraphs, partly because everyone was getting settled and some people were attempting to eat. … Jeremy leaned back in his seat. This wasn’t the normal way to run an international meeting, but maybe it was the only way to agree such a huge intervention’.

Fig. 7.7  (continued)

be judged positively or negatively, and maybe novel or mundane; regardless, the demands of collaboration unsettle the normal, ordinary way of working and being in public policy and administration. The unsettling of collaboration is experienced first and foremost by individuals. It may also occur at a group, community, institution, or nation-state level. So, the representation of collaboration’s unsettling can include policy positions, rule changes, and institutional adaptation. In all cases however individual actors are present, feeling collaboration’s unsettling, and reacting and responding based on the combined effects of their disposition and experience. Of course, some actors’ emotional reactions and responses will be more impactful on collaboration than others; agency continues to matter. But all actors will experience them. Connolly’s (1999) work on the role of emotions and disposition in shaping the micro politics of public action is instructive here. He focuses on what he calls the ‘visceral domain’—the unsettling of which can affect individual disposition and influence their responses to change. Collaborative unsettling will impact the visceral domain as actors experience a range of feelings at the prospect of encountering a new experience, inter alia, excitement, anticipation, hope, antipathy, fear, or frustration. Collaboration’s unsettling may be short-lived or long-lasting. It may change over time as the collaboration evolves, prompting new emotional states. Whatever the dynamic collaboration will remain a source of and repository for emotions as the vignettes in the previous section described. This suggests that being alert to and engaged with emotions and affect is important for actors and for collaboration. It requires undertaking emotional work.

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Unfortunately, as I have already demonstrated in this chapter, attending to emotional work in public policy collaboration is complicated by the inadequacy of our current analysis of emotions and public policy and the absence of emotions as a focus for enquiry in collaboration. Nonetheless the work of several scholars provides important insights into what it means to do ‘emotional work’ in collaboration. These are discussed below. Emotional Unsettling Robison (2019) uses a psychosocial approach to examine the experiences of actors in low carbon collaborations. Her findings offer evidence of actors’ experiences of being unsettled by collaboration and insights into two areas of emotional work that respond to this unsettling: unspoken emotional work and constructive challenge. Robison proposes that unspoken emotional work comprises four tasks: (1) stepping outside our own defensive boundaries, (2) empathising despite stress, (3) continuing in the face of a lack of acknowledgement, and (4) containing anxieties. These tasks she says ‘share a commonality in that they are rarely spoken about and may not even be directly recognised by the person doing them’ (p. 94). Robison’s four tasks may be experienced and felt in radically different ways depending on the collaborative situation. One reading aligns these elements with ‘ugly feelings’—paranoia, frustration, resentment—and is exemplified in the experience of the neighbourhood collaboration described in Chap. 4. Another aligns them with more positive feelings— bravery, compassion, determination—exemplified by the chronic condition management program in Vignette 1. The ‘situated agency’ of actors informs the emotional possibilities in each case. Emotional Resources Actors need considerable reserves of emotional energy to undertake the kind of work required of themselves and with others in collaboration to navigate their way to a positive outcome. This is particularly challenging when these resources are rarely acknowledged not even by actors themselves. It is also the case that assessments of ‘emotional proficiency’ will be gendered and racialised. For example, De la Rey and McKay’s (2006) work on peacebuilding in South Africa reflects on how emotions are considered to be more important and present to women than men in

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peacebuilding activities, and that women carry their emotional proficiency into gender-based networks operating across conflictual boundaries. Note that this does not necessarily mean that women are regarded as more effective peacebuilders. Boundary Spanners Emotional work may become the particular responsibility of ‘boundary spanners’—those actors with a remit to support collaboration. As discussed in Chap. 6, boundary spanners are equipped with a range of skills and dispositions that enable them to fulfil that role. Integral to their success is their capacity to gauge the emotional temperature of a collaboration and act accordingly. This demands empathy, emotional self-awareness, and the ability to work with a variety of different emotional registers in a productive way. Alvinius et al. (2014) found that boundary spanners in a civil-military collaboration worked with ‘emotion management strategies’ to overcome hostility and meet the demands of partners and their own organisation. The emotional demands on boundary spanners can be significant and, on occasion, overwhelming. This is particularly the case in collaborations where the stakes are high, and where the boundary spanners have invested a considerable amount of emotional energy. This highlights the importance of attending to the emotional wellbeing of boundary spanners. Of course, emotional investment does not just apply to boundary spanners but to all actors in collaboration, but boundary spanners are likely to be most aware of its importance. Actors’ emotional resources contribute to their capability in collaboration through their ability to be emotionally engaged. This is considered next. Being Emotionally Engaged Empathy Emotional engagement in collaboration begins with empathy—the capacity to see the world from another’s point of view. It also requires being able to act on what is revealed in that empathetic assessment, using additional skills to work with the emotional states of different actors. Of course, not all actors will be empathetic, just as not all actors will feel the same way about collaboration. So emotional engagement may fall to particular actors to manage.

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Paying attention to emotion in the design and early operation of collaboration is as important as attending to its rules or ethics. Consciously engineering collaboration that is emotionally astute and engaged can contribute to its productivity and support creativity. ‘Receptive Listening’ Establishing an emotionally inclusive culture can be confounded by a range of conditions, including those that continue to negate the legitimacy of emotions in collaboration as Johansson’s work on peacebuilding highlights. She suggests that to be more effective partners, actors invest in what she terms ‘receptive listening’, which in turn demands emotional proficiency to ‘facilitate such receptivity’ (2017, p. 2). Receptive listening need not be all about language. Horning (2019) emphasises the power of archaeology to offer different, perhaps uncomfortable (for some) historical evidence. She suggests that its power rests in its ‘tangibility’. In the context of Northern Ireland archaeological finds can unsettle or even contradict communities’ ‘sectarian narratives in ways much more viscerally powerful than words on a page’ (p. 452). Sitting with Difference Receptive listening may be challenged in cross-cultural collaborations, where some actors are likely to be required to speak in a language that is not their first. This itself is a source of emotional tension as Beyene et al. (2009) found in the study of a global network. They uncovered that non-­ native English speakers experienced a range of ‘ugly feelings’ about their spoken English, including fear, anxiety, embarrassment, and shame. Attempts by them to communicate more effectively in their own language were experienced negatively by colleagues who were native English speakers and contributed to ongoing negative perceptions between colleagues which adversely impacted collaboration. While this is a corporate example rather than a public policy one, it offers important insights about the role of language in collaboration. This example also reflects the importance of the affective impact of being or feeling oneself ‘the other’ in collaboration, also illustrated by Cook and Brunton (2018). Chapter 6 explored the role of expertise in diverse or cross-cultural collaboration. What is evident from this chapter is the vital importance of the role of emotions and affect in collaborations where some actors are defined as ‘the other’. Without care the unequal social relations between actors may be exacerbated through affect. Hunter

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draws on Rosenberg’s (1997) ‘politics of empathy’ to show how actors use ‘emotional engagement’, to draw equivalences between themselves and those disproportionately affected by racialised and gendered social relations, to ‘obscure’ their relational power (Hunter, 2015, p. 64). Sitting with difference and acknowledging that some relations may always be unbridgeable is an essential part of some collaborations. Another is the recognition of conflict and its emotional impact. This is considered next. Collaboration and Conflict Collaboration and conflict interact in several ways. Collaboration can be a means of attempting to resolve conflict, for example, via peacebuilding. Collaboration can feature in conflict, as actors elect or are forced to engage with opposing parties. And conflict can and usually will occur in collaboration. Emotions shape, convey, and are constituted by conflict. They may be heightened and extreme, intense, low level, and simmering, or fleeting. But they are present and influential. Conflict and the emotions associated with it are regarded differently in different cultures and situations. So, what may be deemed inappropriate in one context is acceptable in another. This can cause complications and, on occasion, conflict(!), when collaborations bring actors from these different contexts together. So, acknowledging and seeking to understand the emotional states of actors and situations, and the role of structural power, and agency, is essential in any collaborative context. Research undertaken in Wales identified conflict as an important precursor to creativity. Respondents made repeated reference to the need for ‘open and frank discussions’, of the importance of often passionate exchanges and ‘arguments’ as a means of ‘rubbing each other’s edges off’, surfacing the differences in professional models and perspectives to try and get beyond them, ‘all those tears and tantrums and difficult discussions have been worth it—the stories are so emotional about people’s life changes’ (Williams and Sullivan, 2009, Case study 1, p. 6). Elsewhere conflict provided an important indicator of unbridgeable differences. In a case study of a collaboration of professionals and parents charged with working to improve the life chances of children under 4, conflict was never far from the surface in meetings of the partners, though the anger that was clearly felt was not expressed directly but rather couched in critical comments about the program. In an observation of one meeting, we recorded that,

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…some members of the board were seen as having particular views, often negative or critical, which they persistently voiced. From observation, this dynamic did occur, focusing on the concerns of some board members that the … project was not engaging with the full depth of difficulties that parents on the estate were facing—especially drugs and crime. There was some mention of party-political differences between board members leading to them ‘winding each other up’…. (Observation Notes) (Sullivan, 2014, p. 183)

Evident here is a lack of trust between actors, which informed their negative feelings about each other and blocked collaboration.

Conclusion Emotions play an important role in public policy collaboration. They can set the tone for collaborative possibilities and shape the nature and quality of actor’s relationships. Despite this relatively little attention is paid to them in practice or research as demonstrated in the work of Johansson and Robison. However, as Robison demonstrates in her study of low-carbon energy collaborations, once identified, the work of emotions is acknowledged by practitioners, although emotional work was not identified upfront by participants (and thus would not be readily developed from a thematic content analysis), when reflected back to participants (through sending follow-up questions) its relevance was directly recognised. (p. 103)

Making that relevance meaningful to practitioners’ engagement with collaboration requires attention to individual human actors, to the collaborative situation, and to the discursive registers. It means acknowledging that certain emotional states are privileged as ‘normal’ in the conduct of public policy, and that this ‘normal’ is likely to be either or both gendered/culturally specific. As most public policy collaborations will bring together people from a diversity of backgrounds, dispensing with the idea of ‘normal emotional states’ is advisable, and replacing it with a stance and process of emotional engagement. The next chapter addresses another underexamined aspect of public policy collaboration, that of objects.

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Acknowledgements  Grateful thanks to Dr Pernilla Johansson for the permission to reproduce material from her article ‘Feeling for the Game: How emotions shape listening in peacebuilding partnerships’ published in E-International Relations (2017). Extract from Cook and Brunton (2018) ‘The importance of moral emotions for effective collaboration in culturally diverse healthcare teams’ in Nursing Inquiry reprinted by permission of John Wiley and Sons. Extract from ‘What Does Jeremy Think?’ reprinted by permission of HarperCollins Publishers Ltd© (2021, Suzanne Heywood)

References Ahmed, S. (2004). The Cultural Politics of Emotion. Routledge. Alvinius, A., Kylin, C., Starrin, B., & Larsson, G. (2014). Emotional Smoothness and Confidence Building: Boundary Spanners in a Civil-Military Collaboration Context. International Journal of Work Organisation and Emotion, 6, 223–239. Anderson, K., & Smith, S.  J. (2001). Editorial: Emotional Geographies. Transactions, Institute of British Geographers NS 26 7–10 2001, 7–10. Andrews, C.  J. (2007). Rationality in Policy Decision Making. In F.  Fischer & G.  J. Miller (Eds.), Handbook of Public Policy Analysis: Theory, Politics, and Methods (1st ed.). Routledge. Beyene, T., Hinds, P.  J., & Cramton, C.  D. (2009). Walking Through Jelly: Language Proficiency, Emotions, and Disrupted Collaboration in Global Work. Harvard Business School. Bourdieu, P. (1990). The Logic of Practice. Stanford University Press. Bradford, C.  I., & Linn, J.  F. (2010). The April 2009 London G-20 Summit in Retrospect. Brookings. Brescoll, V. L. (2016). Leading with Their Hearts? How Gender Stereotypes of Emotion Lead to Biased Evaluations of Female Leaders. The Leadership Quarterly, 27, 415–428. Connolly, W. E. (1999). Why I am Not a Secularist. University of Minnesota Press. Cook, C., & Brunton, M. (2018). The Importance of Moral Emotions for Effective Collaboration in Culturally Diverse Healthcare Teams. Nursing Inquiry, 25, e12214. De la Rey, C., & Mckay, S. (2006). Peacebuilding as a Gendered Process. Journal of Social Issues, 62, 141–153. Durnová, A.  P. (2019). Understanding Emotions in Post- Factual Politics. Negotiating Truth. Edward Elgar. Emre, M. (2021). The Repressive Politics of Emotional Intelligence. The New Yorker. G20. (2009). London Summit - Leaders’ Statement. London Goleman, D. (1998). Working with Emotional Intelligence. Bloomsbury. Guardian. (2013). Gordon Brown Staked Reputation on G20 Summit in London. Guardian.

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Guy, M. E., Newman, M. A., & Mastracci, S. H. (2008). Emotional Labor. Putting the Service in Public Service. Taylor and Francis. Haidt, J. (2003). The Moral Emotions. In R.  J. Davidson, K.  R. Scherer, & H. H. Goldsmith (Eds.), Handbook of Affective Sciences (pp. 852–870). Oxford University Press. Hardt, M. (2007). What Affects are Good for. In P. Clough & J. Halley (Eds.), The Affective Turn. Duke University Press. Heckler, S., & Russell, A. (2008). Emotional Engagement in Strategic Partnerships: Grassroots Organising in a Tobacco Control Partnership in the North East of England. Evidence & Policy: A Journal of Research, Debate and Practice, 4, 331–354. Heywood, S. (2021). What Does Jeremy Think?: Jeremy Heywood and the Making of Modern Britain. HarperCollins. Horning, A. (2019). Collaboration, Collaborators, and Conflict: Archaeology and Peacebuilding in Northern Ireland. Archaeologies, 15. Hunter, S. (2015). Power, Politics and the Emotions: Impossible Governance? (1st ed.). Routledge-Cavendish. Johansson, P. (2017). Feeling for the Game: How Emotions Shape Listening in Peacebuilding Partnerships. E-International Relations [Online]. Retrieved July 13, 2021, from https://www.e-­ir.info/2017/05/17/ feeling-­f or-­t he-­g ame-­h ow-­e motions-­s hape-­l istening-­i n-­p eacebuilding-­ partnerships/ Jupp, E., Pykett, J., & Smith, F. M. (2016). Emotional States: Sites and Spaces of Affective Governance. Taylor & Francis Group. Lupton, D. (1998). The Emotional Self: A Sociocultural Exploration. Sage. Lyon, M.  L., & Barbalet, J. (1994). Society’s Body: Emotion and the “Somatisation” of Social Theory. In T. J. Csordas (Ed.), The Body as Existential Ground of Culture. Cambridge University Press. Meier, K. J., Sharon, H. M., & Kristin, W. (2006). Gender and Emotional Labor in Public Organizations: An Empirical Examination of the Link to Performance. Public Administration Review, 66, 899–909. Ngai, S. (2004). Ugly Feelings. Harvard University Press. Nussbaum, M. (2015). Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice. Harvard University Press. Partners Ending Homelessness. https://pehgc.org/ Robison, R. (2019). Emotional Work as a Necessity: A Psychosocial Analysis of Low-Carbon Energy Collaboration Stories. In P.  Hoggett (Ed.), Climate Psychology: On Indifference to Disaster. Springer International Publishing. Rosenberg, P.  M. (1997). Underground Discourses: Exploring Whiteness in Teacher Education. In M. E. Fine, L. E. Weis, L. C. Powell, & L. Wong (Eds.), Off White: Readings on Race, Power, and Society. Taylor & Frances/Routledge.

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Schofield, T., & Goodwin, S. (2005). Gender Politics and Public Policy Making: Prospects for Advancing Gender Equality. Policy and Society, 24, 25–44. Seligman, M. (2012). Flourish: A Visionary New Understanding of Happiness and Well-being. Free Press. Shaver, P.  R., Wu, S., & Schwartz, J.  C. (1992). Cross-cultural Similarities and Differences in Emotion and Its Representation. In M. S. Clark (Ed.), Emotion. Review of Personality and Social Psychology. Sage. Sullivan, H. (2010). Collaboration Matters. Inaugural Lecture, University of Birmingham. 8 June Sullivan, H. (2014). Designing ‘the Political’ in (and Out of) Neighbourhood Governance. In S.  Griggs, A.  J. Norval, & H.  Wagenaar (Eds.), Practices of Freedom. Decentred Governance, Conflict and Democratic Participation. Cambridge University Press. Taylor, S. (2008). Long Haul Leadership. In M. Bennett & R. Hill (Eds.), Efficient Local Government. SOLACE Foundation Imprint. Thoit, P.  A. (1989). The Sociology of Emotions. Annual Review of Sociology, 15, 317–352. Vigoda-Gadot, E., & Meisler, G. (2010). Emotions in Management and the Management of Emotions: The Impact of Emotional Intelligence and Organizational Politics on Public Sector Employees. Public Administration Review, 70, 72–86. Wetherell, M. (2012). Affect and Emotion: A New Social Science Understanding. Sage.  WHO. (2021). WHO Director-General’s Opening Remarks at the Media Briefing on COVID-19. Retrieved March 19, 2022, from https://www. who.int/director-­g eneral/speeches/detail/who-­d irector-­g eneral-­s -­ opening-­remarks-­at-­the-­media-­briefing-­on-­covid-­19-­22-­march-­2021 Williams, P., & Sullivan, H. (2009). Getting Collaboration to Work in Wales. Lessons from the NHS and Partners. National Leadership and Innovation Agency for Healthcare (NLIAH).

CHAPTER 8

Objects, Agency, and Collaboration

Introduction This chapter explores the role of objects in public policy collaboration. Of all the chapters in this book, one on objects may appear rather odd. Yet objects are as essential to public policy as rules or emotions. Indeed it is hard to think of anything more emblematic of public policy than ‘the policy document’—a crystallisation of ideas, plans, and proposed actions in a single object. This fulfils the basic definition of an object—a material thing that can be seen and touched. Policy documents are also the place where collaboration is proposed and its purpose, value, and form described. Despite this, objects are an under-examined feature of collaboration in public policy and administration. Exploring their presence and use can reveal a great deal about the nature and quality of collaboration and its practices. The study of objects in the context of collaboration can also inform public policy tools. The chapter begins by describing and discussing objects and their use in public policy before turning to their presence and significance in collaboration, highlighting the uses, positive and negative, that actors make of them. The chapter will focus on a particular kind of object, ‘boundary objects’, describing how they feature in collaboration and what they offer to collaborative actors. Drawing on empirical examples the chapter identifies the variety of objects and boundary objects at work in collaboration and examines how they facilitate and constrain collaborative identities and performance. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 H. Sullivan, Collaboration and Public Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-09585-6_8

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Objects in Public Policy A moment’s pause brings to mind a range of objects that enable the design and operation of public policy: manifestos, speeches, policy statements, reports, laws, and regulations. These objects are tangible and visible; they are material. Indeed the more we look, the more we see that public policy and administration is replete with objects facilitating the workings of public policy in government. Some objects are vital records of public governing, for example, the recording of exchanges of actors in parliamentary debates and business. Versions of ‘Hansard’, the system originating in the UK in the late eighteenth or early nineteenth century, developed across the Commonwealth and beyond, operating in Asia, the Pacific, Africa, and North America. Some objects may be mundane or prosaic, memos and briefings that support the process of policy formulation. Others may be more symbolic, the ‘royal assent’ on a piece of legislation, or the regalia worn by the head of state when articulating the program of government. Some objects can perform both roles. In the UK red boxes (actually leather cases) conveyed key documents for ministers’ attention for 150 years before a proposal to phase them out and replace them with smartphones. However the Chancellor of the Exchequer continues to make use of one on Budget Day, the box emphasising the connection between past and present governments and symbolising the significance of economic performance to successful governance. This example illustrates the ways that objects traverse the politics/policy boundary. Objects are present in all social contexts and their ubiquity is one reason why policy analysts and indeed other ‘publics’ tend not to pay closer attention to them and the functions they perform. Objects are particularly useful for denoting significance or identity or the significance of identity in public policy and administration. In ancient China, Japan, and Korea, different grades of officials wore different kinds of badges to denote their position. The 1840 Treaty of Waitangi (Tiriti o Waitangi) is considered the founding document of New Zealand integral to which is the acknowledgement of Maori peoples’ place within the governance of the country. In France civil servants do not sign employment contracts, rather their relationship is defined in statute, specifically the General Statue of the Civil Servants (Statut Général des Fonctionnaires). The Presidential Seal of the US is used only on

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correspondence between the President and the US Congress. These varying examples point to the myriad of ways in which objects work. The core definition of objects as visible and tangible is challenged in the digital age. Over time and across cultures, the nature of the policy document and many other of the items described vary as they manifest in digital form, remaining visible but not tangible. By contrast, other public policy objects may be inherently intangible, such as concepts or policy models or discourses. They may take material form through use, but their existence does not depend on this being so. Ideas then can also serve as objects, a point of overlap between public policy elements. Of course, some of the objects described above exist outside of public policy. Businesses run their own policy processes that are relevant to their company or sector. So while objects may be defined by their specific properties, they are also defined in their relation to other objects, human subjects, and the social context in which they operate. It is these relationships that denote specific objects as public policy objects. Taking a relational perspective raises the question of the nature of objects. Traditional definitions consider them inert, passive, subject to use by human actors. However it is also possible to conceive of objects as having their own agency, and that human experiences and actions are influenced by the presence of objects, which invoke or provoke unanticipated responses among human actors. In the context of collaboration, this suggests the potential value for researchers to be alert to the unexpected and to explore the role of objects in generating the unexpected. Some writers go still further and argue that ‘things’ have force and meaning outside of these relationships: ‘there is an existence peculiar to a thing that is irreducible to the thing’s imbrication with human subjectivity’ (Bennett, 2004, p. 348). Bennett differentiates between ‘things’ and objects, affording vitality to the former but not the latter. Others maintain agency is derived from action, or interaction. For example Star describes her use thus: An object is something people (or, in computer science, other objects and programs) act toward and with. Its materiality derives from action, not from a sense of prefabricated stuff or “thing”-ness. So, a theory may be a ­powerful object. Although it is embodied, voiced, printed, danced, and named, it is not exactly like a car that sits on four wheels. (Star, 2010, p. 603)

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From a different, ‘posthumanist’ perspective, Barad (2007) proposes first that we should not take ‘the distinction between ‘human’ and ‘nonhuman’ for granted in our analyses, and second that our analyses should focus on ‘intra-action’, which ‘signifies the mutual constitution of entangled agencies’ (p.  33, italics in the original). Agencies emerge through intra-action, rather than preceding it, and exist in that relation, not as individual entities. In the context of public policy, this means that ‘intra-­ action’ between ‘objects’ and ‘humans’ in a particular relation generates a changed state in both, and the meaning and/or utility of that relation is derived from that changed state. An example is ‘the wall’. Walls are not obvious public policy tools like policy documents. They do have material force and power in most contexts, depending on how well they are built. But they also have force and power in public policy because of the way in which they are deployed in political debates. The most notorious example of this in recent times is Republican President Donald Trump’s determination to ‘build a wall’ at the border between the US and Mexico to restrict illegal immigration (Fig. 8.1). In public policy terms the wall is both a physical and symbolic representation of appeals to security and border control. And it has a long history of use for these purposes, most notably perhaps in Israel’s separation barrier, which runs for 440 miles (700 km) near or along the 1949 armistice lines set following the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, though it is a fence of most of its length (Jacobs, 2016).

‘During his candidacy announcement speech in June 2015, Donald Trump first proposed the idea of building a wall along America's southern border, adding that, due to his real estate experience, he was uniquely qualified for the job: "I will build a great wall -- and nobody builds walls better than me, believe me -and I'll build them very inexpensively. I will build a great, great wall on our southern border, and I will make Mexico pay for that wall. Mark my words”’.

Fig. 8.1  Trump’s wall. (Source: Capatides (2016) http://www.cbsnews.com/ pictures/wild-­donald-­trump-­quotes/14/ Accessed 20 February 2021)

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Brown (2010) explored the appeal of walls to national governments in a world where threats to nations are far more multi-various than physical assault over a border. She argues that global connectedness generates threats to national identity, which walls appear to assuage, despite their obvious limitations. Walls perform the function of separation and in so doing perform identity. This neat inflection between performance and identity is helpful to understanding the dynamics of collaboration. But these objects also change or create identity—the wall and the human communities within/without are changed by its presence. A focus on such relational properties is useful in exploring the ways in which objects feature in collaboration efforts; how they are summoned, deployed, and designed in support or resistance to collaboration; and how they act to drive, develop, disturb, and disrupt it.

Objects and Public Policy Collaboration Objects matter in and to collaboration in a range of ways. They can be created or adopted by actors as a way of facilitating collaborative action. Collaborative strategies and plans are common examples, but so too are buildings designed to bring collaborating actors together and create attachments between them. Objects can provide mechanisms for or representations of collaborative identities; logos and brands are good examples here, and outcome-based performance frameworks are core objects for assessing collaborative impact. However, actors will also have or develop attachments to other objects not specifically designed in the context of collaboration. These too may be tangible objects such as the uniforms or organisational identifiers that individuals wear, or professional codes of conduct for a particular profession, or they may be intangible, such as ideas about expertise. These may be sources of support for collaboration or represent alternative and possibly contrary positions generating tension in practice. Consequently exploring the role of objects in public policy collaboration requires attention to actors’ motivation, their agency, and the contextual conditions.

Objects at Work in Collaboration This  section examines objects in public policy collaboration beginning with a public policy archetype—the policy document—but also embracing everyday objects that attain significance in certain collaborative settings,

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for example, the kettle. Each example provides insights into one or more of the collaborative domains. 

The Policy Object

The unprecedented displacement of people due to war, economic insecurity, or political oppression is a key public policy challenge of our age. Millions of people are classed as refugees or asylum seekers, and their movement is creating political and economic challenges for countries worldwide. The UN Refugee Agency (UNHCR) is the international organisation with responsibility for managing global responses to these crises, but as with all UN bodies its capacity to act is contingent on the agreement and participation of its member countries. On 19 September 2016 the UN made the ‘New York Declaration’, a policy statement committing 193 countries to improved protection for the unprecedented number of migrants displaced from their homes (see Fig. 8.2). The Declaration followed a UN Summit on Addressing Large Movements of Refugees and Migrants and precipitated the inclusion of the International Organization for Migration into the UN. It also tasked the UNHCR to develop a Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework and pointed to potential future commitments by leaders at their summit on the Global Refugee Crisis. The New  York Declaration is the key object of collaboration. The Declaration makes public a set of commitments made by 193 countries to act in concert in support of addressing the refugee and asylum seeker crisis. The policy object is integral to the purpose of the collaboration emphasising its alignment with the political domain. In addition, it sets out a series of proposed actions—new plans, new organising mechanisms—that connect it to the material domain of collaboration. However, on closer inspection the Declaration does not specify changes to country commitments or funding, limiting its own reach. However, this does not limit the import of the Declaration as a policy object. Rather, it redirects our attention to its role as a common narrative for a global response and a platform for that response. The Declaration’s purpose is symbolic as much as material. Objects can perform a symbolic role when their physical manifestation is overlaid or subverted by an alternative representation. Indeed, Swan et al. (2007) conclude that the symbolic importance of objects is as important as their instrumental effects at different types of knowledge boundary (Carlisle, 2002).

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‘The Declaration calls on countries which can resettle or reunite many more refugees to do so. It also calls for those in the richer part of the world to recognize their responsibili ty to provide timely and dependable humanitarian funding, while robustly investing in communities that host large numbers of refugees.

Host countries are called upon to increase opportunities for refugee adults to work and for children to go to school. The Declaration commits governments to better address the drivers and triggers causing the record numbers of forcibly displaced in today’s world…

“Today we have an extraordinary opportunity to change gear,” UN High Commissioner for Refugees Filippo Grandi said in remarks to the Summit on Monday (September 19).

Grandi said the Declaration “marks a political commitment of unprecedented force and resonance.”

“It fills what has been a perennial gap in the international refugee protection system – that of truly sharing responsibility for refugees, in the spirit of the UN Charter”…

With the Declaration, the International Organization for Migration was formally brought into the United Nations system on Monday. The commitments in the Declaration were agreed last month and will serve as the basis for future compacts. UNHCR, the UN Refugee Agency, believes the Declaration will mark a significant milestone in refugee and migrant protection’.

Fig. 8.2  New York Declaration on Addressing Large Movements of Refugees and Migrants. (Source: https://www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2016/9/57dfa1734/ un-­summit-­commits-­protect-­refugee-­migrant-­rights.html Accessed 20 February, 2021)

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Symbolic objects are frequently found in contested, complex policy settings where collaborative action is essential but difficult to secure, such as the United Nations. The potential significance of this is highlighted by Stone (1988) who suggests that symbols are collectively created, capture the imaginations of key actors, shape perceptions, and suspend scepticism. They can be created and communicated as a means of influence and control. The New  York Declaration exemplifies the symbolic importance of public policy objects in collaboration. It offers a clear narrative about the importance of international action, and the need for ‘shared responsibility’. It uses the language of ‘commitments’, of ‘calling’ for resources and action by countries and of their ‘responsibilities’. Leaders use passionate language to emphasise the significance of the Declaration and the ‘extraordinary opportunity’ it provides. What is being performed here is an appeal to a shared global identity and call to action within the bounds of international politics and policy. The New  York Declaration brings together the political and cultural domains of collaboration through its symbolism. Purpose and meaning are closely intertwined in this object. The Declaration also links the spatial and the material domains of collaboration. The object asserts the significance of the global scale in meeting the refugee and asylum seeker crisis and specifies actions to be undertaken at that scale, specifically the UNHCR’s Refugee Response Framework. However what is also clear is that action spaces are as much if not more regional, national, and local as they are global. 

Identity Objects

Objects in collaboration need not be landmark policy announcements to be powerful. Everyday objects can also be powerful, particularly when they are used by actors to signify their awareness of the complexity of identity in collaborative contexts. In one research project an interviewee used two different name badges, one for her organisation and one for the partnership she belonged to, to denote which identity she was performing at different points in the conversation (Williams & Sullivan, 2009a). Individuals who wear official uniforms, often police officers or other security related professions, may be given permission not to wear them in collaborative contexts, or conversely may be expressly required to wear them. In one instance a police officer confided that he opted to wear/carry a less

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formal uniform hat (baseball cap rather than helmet) when attending meetings with his partners in a crime reduction partnership. Objects provide a repository for identity and opportunities for collective expressions of resistance to, or subversion of high-level initiatives. On occasion actors may make use of ‘symbolic’ objects for the purpose of asserting their identity/expressing their resistance in the context of a high-­ level collaboration. This provides another expression of the cultural domain of collaboration, with objects unconnected to collaboration, conveying actors’ meaning towards that collaboration. An example comes from a collaboration initiative in health and social care in the UK. Under a policy of integration supported by new financial flexibilities, a new hospital was built in a small town. The hospital was designed to co-locate a variety of health and social care professionals so that they could offer integrated care to users of the hospital services as well as those referred by local general practitioners. The aim of integration was supported by streamlined assessment and referral processes as well as coordinated service governance. A study of the integration initiative was commissioned as part of a wider review of collaboration practice. The researchers attended the hospital and carried out interviews with various health and social care professionals, singly and in groups. The researchers were told about the practice of co-­ location within the building, the shared governance and joint management arrangements, and the integrated processes for assessment and service delivery. At one point during the visit the researchers were offered tea/coffee and taken to the staff kitchen, another shared space. In the kitchen were several kettles. When asked why there were so many different kettles, one of the respondents replied, ‘Well there’s the nurses’ kettle, and the physiotherapists’, and the social workers’…’. The kettles had become symbols of identity, a way of preserving professional identities in the context of collaboration. Understanding the meaning of the kettle as a symbol of support for or resistance to integration is harder to discern. Certainly for one of our respondents multiple kettles represented a potential expression of resistance to the integration effort—a physical expression of the failure of the co-location of health and social care staff from previously separated premises into a new facility to change staff identities and attachments. In her view, ‘you know you’ve cracked it when there’s only one kettle in the kitchen’ (Williams & Sullivan, 2009a).

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However it might also be possible to argue that the maintenance of separate kettles offered a benign way of professionals retaining attachment to a specific identity or tribe, that was important to them, but without it necessarily impeding the collaborative work they were engaged in. 

Performance Objects

Objects of performance assume major significance in the context of collaborative efforts on difficult policy problems. This is particularly the case when policymakers are not clear ‘what works’ and where politicians may be sensitive to the unsuccessful investment of public resources into high profile issues. Performance monitoring and management is utilised to clarify the former and avoid the latter. Integral to these performance frameworks is a set of objects tailored to the demands of the policy issue named as indicators and measures. Their purpose is to support the collaboration in its work and to offer decision-makers an account of progress. Evidence indicates that the difficulties of constructing indicators and measures for challenging policy issues can generate objects that are only partially adequate, and which can redirect effort towards what’s measurable rather than what matters (e.g. Stiglitz et al., 2018; van Thiel & Leeuw, 2002: Lawlor et al., 2009). This problem is compounded in collaborative efforts where partners are often required to meet organisation-specific targets that may conflict with collaborative ones (Skelcher & Sullivan, 2008). In an attempt to overcome this limitation, policymakers’ focus turned to a new object—outcomes. Outcomes describe what citizens care about in any given context, for example, safety and security, health and wellbeing, sustainable economy, and environment. They are necessarily cross-­ cutting of public services, businesses, and not-for-profit organisations and require collaboration to be achieved. They connect the political domain of collaboration with the material domain—linking collaborative activity to purpose. The Scottish Government was an early adopter of an outcomes-based approach. Within a Scottish policy context, outcomes based approaches are promoted to improve public services in a range of ways including by focusing on the concerns of individuals and communities and demonstrating accountability. At the centre of this work is the National Performance Framework that identifies 16 national outcomes that public services work to achieve and against which performance is publicly reported. This overarching framework

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is supported by a raft of more detailed outcomes frameworks operating at local and national levels. This focus on outcomes has been an integral part of what has come to be known as the Scottish Approach to public service reform, encapsulating a move within public services from top-down, service-led, reactive delivery, towards more personalised, preventative and collaborative ways of working. (Cook, 2017)

New Zealand was another early adopter of an outcomes approach. Here the Ministry of Social Development changed its approach to contracting, moving from funding effort to funding outcomes. Funding for Outcomes (FfO) is a new approach to contracting that enables holistic services funded by several government agencies to be specified in one contract. Whereas traditional contracts reward providers’ effort, integrated contracts focus on achievement—the impact of service delivery and how services contribute to improving outcomes for clients… The new approach is involving funders and providers, often for the first time, in collective contract negotiation and requires the building of strong relationships with all the parties. This gives providers a better understanding of funders’ requirements and funders a better understanding of the complete service being undertaken by the provider. (Pomeroy, 2007, p. 158)

Governments’ adoption of an outcome focus has generated both positive and negative commentary with both arguing that the focus on outcomes has altered the ‘priorities and practice’ of organisations offering support, with positive or negative implications for results (e.g. Lowe, 2013). Whatever the perspective the point here is that objects matter in public policy. 

Multi-functional Objects

Objects can perform multiple functions in collaboration, featuring across the political, cultural, material, and spatial domains. Food is a good example of a multi-functional object, often associated with policy efforts to revitalise places and communities. For example, the Revitalising Central Dandenong program in outer Melbourne, Australia, is based in a culturally and linguistically diverse city that has a history of settling different communities of migrants to Australia. Local and state governments involved in revitalisation projects in Central Dandenong recognised the value of cultural diversity in ‘place-making’ and developed

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tailored engagement strategies supporting local cultural activities, culturally sensitive design and cultural and food tourism (Fig. 8.3) (Henderson et al., 2020). Food symbolises the economic and social benefits of collaboration. It is integral to the political domain of collaboration as it is a key ingredient in achieving collaborative purpose, successful place-making. Food features in collaborative activities associated with the material domain, including trade, social support, and place-marketing. It creates social linkages through the practices of eating and sharing and the emotions these engender between producers and consumers, all contributing to the meaning actors gain through and from collaboration in the cultural domain. Finally, food is present in the spatial domain of collaboration, helping to create economic linkages across space, connecting the locality to the city and beyond, and defining collaborative space, amongst traders, between traders and the government, and across communities.

Collaboration as an Object So far objects have been discussed as tangible or sometimes intangible entities that are or become significant in the context of collaboration efforts. However, it is also possible to approach the idea and practice of collaboration itself as an object, one that is in relation with humans and other objects and is sustained and changed in the process. Present in public administration and public policy collaboration since both first developed, ‘the object’ moved from the periphery to the spotlight in the 1990s and 2000s when its encounter with politics and ideas generated new forms of collaboration such as public-private partnerships, linked collaboration to new forms of governance, such as network-governance, and invested collaboration with particular characteristics affording it value for its own sake rather than for what it could accomplish. From a rather different normative standpoint, collaboration may be described as ‘an object of desire’, a state of being that is imbued with a set of values and goals that promise improved outcomes, more satisfying professional lives, and more effective use of resources. Berlant (2011) describes an object of desire as ‘a cluster of promises we want someone or something to make to us and make possible for us’. To phrase ‘the object of desire’ as a cluster of promises is ‘to allow us to encounter what’s incoherent or enigmatic in our attachments, not as confirmation of our irrationality but as an explanation of our sense of our

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Food governance shines a bright light on how cultural diversity is used for mobilising collaboration and revitalisation. First, it is used by government to bring people of different cultures together, support interaction and build understanding. “If you make some flat bread, you all get sit around and talk. And so, we’ve used it as a mechanism of engagement. In other words, food is recognised as a…social unifier to bring together” (local government representative).

Second, food governance provides a practical way of responding to social needs in diverse communities, a link between government, non-government organisations and people in the community. For example, the Dandenong Food Alliance, a not for profit collaboration between local government and organisations provides food relief. Malnutrition is significant issue in Dandenong for low income groups, not only with limited access to healthy foods but to food per se.

Third, food is key to developing a local tourism industry through collaboration between the local, State Governments and different cultural groups, creating places that offer specific cultural precincts or activities, such as the Afghan Bazaar or Little India. These cultural quarters serve as a “public realm”, creating familiar sites for gathering by cultural groups and drawing in other members of the public: “…not only are they fantastic from a social cohesion point of view, they’re also destination drivers to Dandenong…to celebrate the diversity of the place, the diversity of the food offering” (former state official).

Fig. 8.3  Food in the Revitalising Central Dandenong Program. (Source: Henderson, et al., in Davies, 2017, p. 31)

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endurance in the object, insofar as proximity to the object means proximity to the cluster of things that the object promises, some of which may be clear to us and good for us, while others, not so much’ (pp. 23–24, emphasis in original). The almost hegemonic purchase of collaboration on policy makers in the late 1990s and its association with ‘third way’ politics reflected this position. Collaboration was specified as a means to redesign systems, overcome conflict, and improve outcomes. There was also the suggestion of collaboration being an end in itself, such was its inherent value. Approaching collaboration as an ‘object of desire’ focuses on its meaning to actors, the value of collaboration as ‘cultural performance’ Dickinson (2014), that includes creating or sustaining identities as opposed to the instrumental achievement of goals.

Boundary Objects Boundary objects occupy a special place in the analysis and practice of collaboration. While they are not the only source of object theory relevant to collaboration (see Nicolini, et al., (2012) for a discussion of multiple theories including boundary objects, epistemic objects, activity theory, and objects as infrastructure), boundary objects are a special class of objects that facilitate cooperation between diverse actors with distinct and possibly competing interests. First identified by Star and Griesemer (1989) in their work on scientific cooperation, boundary object theory is now widely used in a range of fields from information computing to management studies. It is of particular interest to public policy where so many policy questions demand concerted action by multiple actors with divergent and often conflictual perspectives. This search for a way of securing collaboration amidst difference is at the root of the evolution of boundary objects. Star observed that models of cooperation ‘often began conceptually, with the idea that first consensus must be reached, and the cooperation could begin’ (2010, p. 604). However, her own research into cooperation across disciplinary and other boundaries revealed this was not necessarily so. Rather she found that amongst these heterogeneous actors ‘[c]onsensus was rarely reached, and fragile when it was, but cooperation continued, often unproblematically’. She continues ‘[t]he dynamic involved in this explanation is core to the notion of boundary objects’ (ibid.). It affords actors the possibility of holding two forms of the boundary object in place, one which is ‘ill structured’ and enables interdisciplinarity or working across boundaries, and the other which is ‘more tailored’ and facilitative of

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local, bounded, or disciplinary work. ‘Groups that are cooperating without consensus tack back-and-forth between both forms of the object’ (2010, p. 605). Star and Griesemer also outline an initial taxonomy of boundary object types with different purposes: repositories that permit differences in the unit of analysis used by different groups; standardized forms, methods, and procedures to provide a shared format for solving problems across functions; models to provide an abstraction that works for all knowledge domains; and maps to provide common boundaries of analysis while permitting different internal contents. Star observed in an interview that she did not intend this taxonomy to be ‘exhaustive’ but rather as a starter for future development (Zachry, 2008, p. 453). Boundary objects may take a variety of forms depending on the context including tangible artefacts, such as reports, processes and systems, discourses, narratives, concepts, theories, and common ideologies (Thomas et al., 2007). As this list suggests boundary objects and objects are not exclusive. Fong et al. (2007, p. 12) suggest that ‘objects become boundary objects when they are effectively used at the interface of different communities of practice’ as translation devices to mediate between different communities (Gal et al., 2004) and therefore are useful in understanding collaborative interfaces. Table 8.1 illustrates examples of boundary objects in public policy collaboration using Star and Griesemer’s taxonomy. These are elaborated below. Boundary Objects as Models A ‘social licence to operate’ (SLO) affords permission to businesses to operate a given industry in a specific community. Its presence, or the need for it, signals disquiet or conflict between industry, community, and Table 8.1 Boundary objects and public policy collaboration

Taxonomy

Example

Models Maps

Social Licence to Operate Climate Change Accord 2015—Paris Integration Digital government Government as a Platform

Repositories Standardised forms, methods, and procedures

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government over proposed economic activity, and the SLO reflects the conditions under which that activity can go ahead. ‘“[S]takeholders” or “social licensors” play an intrinsic role in defining not only the criteria underpinning a social licence, but the concept of the licence itself’ (Bice, 2014, p. 68). Social licencing can apply across a range of industries and commercial activities though it is most often employed in extractive industries; indeed it is considered a ‘vital component to successful operations’ in the global resources industries (Bice, 2014, p.  63; Prno & Slocombe, 2012). The SLO enables cooperation between industry, community, and government but does not presume or seek consensus about the activity itself. The ongoing disputes between business, civil society, and government about the extraction of ‘unconventional gas’ in many parts of the world are the most recent example of this conflict (Einfeld et al., 2021). ‘Social licencing’ is relevant to collaboration as its development and operation requires cooperation between key actors, namely, businesses, communities, and civil society organisations. It is relevant to public policy as it gives governments a way of engaging with business/community relations beyond the formal regulatory framework. The SLO is a good example of Star and Griesemer’s ‘model’ construction—the boundary object as an abstraction that fulfils the information/ knowledge needs of all parties. The SLO is weakly structured in its common use, meaning that different and often opposing groups can locate their ideas, values, and prospects in it, so enabling a sense of shared, albeit ‘vague’ identity and connection with the SLO across the groups’ different ‘social worlds’. This provides the basis for opposing groups to begin to cooperate and points to the dynamism of the SLO as a boundary object; it is a process as much as an end point. At the same time the different ‘local’ groups can work on the SLO developing it in ways that tailor it to their particular ‘social world’. This helps to strengthen ‘local’ identity and build solidarity within the group. Research into the SLO in the ‘unconventional gas’ industry in New South Wales, Australia, supports Star’s assessment of groups cooperating without consensus tacking back-and-­forth between ‘ill-structured’ and ‘more tailored’ boundary object forms. Agreeing a SLO in a particular context requires it to be more strongly structured so that it can guide action, suggesting a meso level of operation for the boundary object and a reminder that the SLO is material in its application. The SLO features in all the domains of collaboration. Noteworthy in the context of the discussion of boundary objects is the SLO’s relationship

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with the spatial domain. The example of ‘unconventional gas’ drawn on above is focused at the level of the extraction, but the actors involved will operate in other governance spaces and scales, for example, multinational resources companies. This raises questions about whether it is possible or even appropriate to develop an SLO at industry or company level without the SLO losing its force as a boundary object (Einfeld et al., 2018). It also raises questions about the use that multinational companies might make of local SLO’s. For example, Mayes’s (2015) study of Global Production Networks argues that scalar interpenetration is evident in these industries and multinational corporations are present in localities as powerful global actors not merely local ‘partners’. Mayes concludes that SLOs are constructed as global objects by companies, and ‘local communities and places were mobilized to extend the firm’s business goals …by virtue of the company’s reputation’ (pp. S124–125). Mayes’s study points to an important criticism of boundary object theory that it fails to pay sufficient attention to power relations. Thomas et al. (2007) argue that these are key to determining the outcome of negotiations over boundary objects as well as influencing how boundary objects are maintained and held in place over time. Some critics contest the original proposition by Star and Griesemer (1989) that boundary objects are ‘anchors and bridges’ with Oswick and Robertson (2009) referring instead to ‘barricades and mazes’ that generate conflict and reinforce boundaries and existing power relations by protecting or privileging different interests’ frames of reference or occupational positions rather than creating new shared understandings. The key message is that boundary objects are not inherently apolitical or inert and may have a mediating rather than a performative role. Boundary Objects as Maps Bowker and Star (1999, p. 313) propose ‘boundary infrastructures’ as a response to challenges of scale and scope. ‘Boundary infrastructures’ are regimes of boundary objects, especially information objects and systems that support multiple communities of practice and social worlds. The focus on developing a systemic approach to promote common standards while also respecting the diversity of actors is particularly helpful to understanding the dynamics of complex collaboration. Boundary infrastructures also highlight that many collaboration efforts operate at the system level, taking in a wide variety of structures, processes, and organisations. Global

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public policy action on climate change is illustrative of the potential of boundary infrastructure to function systemically, offering routes to collective action while recognising that different countries start from different places and have different needs. The Climate Accord or Paris Agreement announced in Paris on 12 December 2015 (see Fig. 8.4) is an example of a boundary infrastructure supporting action amongst countries with very different perspectives on whether and how climate change should be addressed. The structure of the Agreement enabled action from all countries whatever their context. Then UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon summed up the Agreement’s significance, ‘For the first time, we have a truly universal agreement on climate change, one of the most crucial problems on earth’. The Agreement exemplifies Star and Griesemer’s ‘map’ boundary object, one that has a strong common boundary for the basis of analysis— the common accounting framework and transparent reporting identified in the Agreement but allows for variation in internal contents—the individual country plans. The significance of the Agreement was acknowledged by Michael Levi, an expert on energy and climate change policy at the Council on Foreign Relations: “The world finally has a framework for cooperating on climate change that’s suited to the task,”

However, he also said, “Whether or not this becomes a true turning point for the world, though, depends critically on how seriously countries follow through.”  (cited  in Davenport, 2015)

This apparent weakness could act as a strength in the context of its function as boundary object. This is because although the Agreement committed countries to producing plans to address climate change on their own terms, they are required to commit to monitoring and reporting on progress at future global summits. Davenport et al. (2015) summarised this adroitly as creating a ‘“name-and-shame” system of global peer pressure, in hopes that countries will not want to be seen as international laggards’. As history has since demonstrated peer pressure on leaders to ‘do the right thing by the climate’ proved only partially successful (Baker, 2021).

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‘At COP 21 in Paris, on 12 December 2015, Parties to the UNFCCC reached a landmark agreement to combat climate change and to accelerate and intensify the actions and investments needed for a sustainable low carbon future. The Paris Agreement builds upon the Convention and – for the first time – brings all nations into a common cause to undertake ambitious efforts to combat climate change and adapt to its effects, with enhanced support to assist developing countries to do so. As such, it charts a new course in the global climate effort…

The Paris Agreement requires all Parties to put forward their best efforts through “nationally determined contributions” and to strengthen these efforts in the years ahead. This includes requirements that all Parties report regularly on their emissions and on their implementation efforts. There will also be a global stocktake every 5 years to assess the collective progress towards achieving the purpose of the agreement and to inform further individual actions by Parties’.

Key features of the Agreement include: Voluntary cooperation/Market- and non-market-based approaches (Art. 6) ‘The Paris Agreement recognizes the possibility of voluntary cooperation among Parties to allow for higher ambition and sets out principles – including environmental integrity, transparency and robust accounting – for any cooperation that involves internationally transferal of mitigation outcomes. It establishes a mechanism to contribute to the mitigation of GHG emissions and support sustainable development and defines a framework for nonmarket approaches to sustainable development. …

Fig. 8.4 The Paris Agreement 2015. (https://unfccc.int/process-­and-­ meetings/the-­paris-­agreement/the-­paris-­agreement/key-­aspects-­of-­the-­paris-­ agreement emphasis added)

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Transparency (Art. 13), implementation and compliance (Art. 15) – The Paris Agreement relies on a robust transparency and accounting system to provide clarity on action and support by Parties, with flexibility for their differing capabilities of Parties. In addition to reporting information on mitigation, adaptation and support, the Agreement requires that the information submitted by each Party undergoes international technical expert review. The Agreement also includes a mechanism that will facilitate implementation and promote compliance in a non-adversarial and non-punitive manner and will report annually to the CMA.

Fig. 8.4  (continued)

Boundary Objects as Repositories Boundary objects can be used to catalyse change critiquing existing conditions and/or offering an alternative approach. In public policy the concept of ‘integration’ is an example of this. Integration is often used to assemble disparate actors and interests in support of a cooperative effort to address fragmented or disjointed service provision, frequently but not exclusively in health and social care contexts. Integration functions well as a ‘repository’ boundary object, one that supports cooperation amongst actors working with their own unit of analysis. For example, in one study of integration of local health and social care service in Wales, actors conceived of the unit of analysis, ‘the locality’ in a range of different ways. Conceptions included putting the needs of the service user at the centre of the design and delivery of services (chief executive of Local Health Board); making the most cost-effective use of scarce resources (health service manager); keeping people out of hospital and developing primary and community services to support them (general practitioner); and coordinating health and social care services at a local level (director of social services) (Williams & Sullivan, 2009b). Maintaining these separate units of analysis in the service of effective and integrated delivery proved problematic as the different conceptions took more concrete form. This suggests that there was insufficient

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plasticity in the boundary object so that it could not facilitate translation across social worlds, enabling actors to engage together without losing their particular languages (Gal et al., 2004). This is important in collaboration where actors from diverse backgrounds need to be able to communicate to their own professional, political, or lay constituencies as well as to each other (to foster/maintain solidarity as illustrated in the SLO example). However, as Star and Griesemer (1989) point out, translation efforts are dynamic and require negotiation between actors to ensure that they can be credible within and across social worlds. Boundary Objects as Standardised Systems Much of the work on boundary objects focuses on information and knowledge management, often fraught issues in public policy collaborations because of commitments to client confidentiality, privacy regulations, or commercial in-confidence concerns. It is here that the almost limitless potential of information technology comes up against political, ethical, and professional constraints (see Chap. 5). Information technology and bespoke management systems can perform as boundary objects, acting as bridging mechanisms to facilitate collaboration across the knowledge boundaries of different professional and other communities. In public policy and public services, unified and integrated data management and information systems can be crucial to effecting collaborative action. However, actors also must navigate the many and various attachments they and others have to data and information, including groups who can be sensitive about their professional knowledge stocks, service managers who are bound by different organizational policies towards confidentiality and data-sharing, and IT professionals who are focused on technology, hardware, and contracts. In a global environment where digital technology is advancing apace creating new opportunities for governments, corporations, and citizens to encounter each other and perhaps more importantly encounter data in new ways, the potential, and limits of information in governance intensify as do the demands for and on public policy collaboration. The form those demands might take is considered in the context of O’Reilly’s (2010) concept of ‘Government as a Platform’ (GaaP) and the empirical example of Estonia. GaaP is a new boundary object in digital governance, described by O’Reilly as:

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Government stripped down to the essentials. A platform provider builds essential infrastructure, creates core applications that demonstrate the power of the platform and inspire outside developers to push the platform even further, and enforces “rules of the road” that ensure that applications work well together. (O’Reilly, 2010, p. 37 in Margetts & Naumann, 2017, p. 3)

This description aligns with Star and Greisemer’s standardized forms, methods, and procedures type of boundary object, which provide a shared format for solving problems across functions. Integral to the GaaP is the preparedness of government to develop an ‘ecosystem of participation’ which encourages collaboration between public, private, and community actors to stimulate innovation and shape desired outcomes. O’Neill proposes that developing such an ecosystem requires adherence to seven principles: openness, simplicity, participation, learning from hackers, data mining, experimentation, and leading by example. Estonia is recognised internationally as a leader in the adoption of e-government. Margetts and Naumann’s (2017) assessment of the performance of the Estonian Government’s e-government program concluded that the Government as a Platform concept aligned with the Estonian system. What is of relevance here is that their assessment illuminates how the Estonian system operationalised characteristics of the standardized forms, methods, and procedures boundary object, that is, it contained layers of digital government that together formed a ‘backbone’ for government services: data registries, information exchange, secure identification, and front-end portals. See Fig. 8.5.

Conclusion Objects play a distinctive and important role in public policy collaboration. They act to bind individuals together by providing a collaborative identity, whilst at the same time securing individual identities whether they be professional, political, or personal. Objects enable collaborative performance and can be an expression of collaborative performance with all the attendant difficulties associated with measuring and valuing it. Objects also facilitate understanding of the relationship between identity and performance and how the manifestations of that relationship facilitate or constrain collaborative action across a range of public policy settings.

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Three Integral and Interdependent Layers

X-Road - a system of registries and data exchange that allow departments and agencies to share data. Each registry has an authorised owner of the data, responsible for its maintenance and security. Core to the system is a unique 16-digit personal identifier for every person which can be used to retrieve personal data from any registry, as well as a number of other identifiers for different purposes. Any data in transit in the system is encrypted.

eID - a system of digital and mobile identification used by over 90 per cent of the population. The electronic ID (eID) infrastructure is a secure system of identification and authentication that allows every user of Estonian government to identify themselves to the system through digital signatures, to access services from both public and private sectors. The eID can be used for various purposes including banking, internal applications of a company or public portals, and for signing encrypted emails.

A service layer accessed through various portals, the largest of which is the official state portal, eesti.ee. Citizens can access more than 800 services, most of which use X-Road. Any citizen interacting with the service layer can see who has accessed (and why) data that relates to them when they log on, as there is an audit trail of all accesses and changes to the data.

Fig. 8.5  Estonia—Government as a Platform. (Source: Adapted from Margetts and Naumann (2017, p. 5))

Objects gain force through their interaction with other elements, for example, expertise may privilege particular objects, objects can be imbued with emotion, ideas may be objects, objects are enlisted in collaborative practices or rules, and objects’ use may be permitted or promoted in the

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Fig. 8.6  Boundary objects and neighbourhood revitalisation

context of specific ethical codes. The presence and agency of objects will also be shaped by the material, political, cultural, and/or spatial domains of collaboration. The relationship between identity and performance is more variegated in the context of boundary objects in part because of the different ways in which boundary objects may work in collaboration. Neighbourhood revitalisation programs provide one illustration of this collaborative variation. Figure 8.6 illustrates a number of possibilities for understanding the role of boundary objects in a neighbourhood revitalisation scheme. The purposes of neighbourhood revitalisation embrace improving outcomes and services and enhancing democratic participation or community participation in decision-making. Boundary objects are performed through collaborative agreements and the use of symbolic language to appeal to or create identities. Collaborative action in these programs includes initiatives to fill gaps in services, coordination of existing services, support for community action, and the development of a performance management framework that includes common targets and data collection. Boundary objects are

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performed through shared information systems that aim to support these various activities, while collaborative identities are created through new models of service provision. The meaning afforded to neighbourhood revitalisation is connected to ideas of ‘the new’—a new way of governing, a new identity for the neighbourhood, as well as for the people who live and work there. Boundary objects are performed through these ideas of ‘the new’, while collaborative identities are representations of existing or aspirant social identities. Neighbourhoods are constructions in space, the product of history, politics, economics, among other things. Boundary objects perform by describing neighbourhoods as geographies of disadvantage and/or opportunity; boundaries may be drawn and redrawn in different ways to secure funding. Collaborative identities are also amplified or sometimes constructed through these processes of boundary drawing. The practices associated with actors in collaboration is explored next.

References Baker, K. (2021). IPCC Report: Global Emissions Must Peak by 2025 to Keep Warming at 1.5°C  – We Need Deeds Not Words. The Conversation, 9 August 2021. Barad, K. (2007). Meeting the University Halfway: Quantum Physics and the Entanglement of Matter and Meaning. NC, Duke University Press. Bennett, J. (2004). The Force of Things: Steps Toward an Ecology of Matter. Political Theory, 32, 347–372. Berlant, L. (2011). Cruel Optimism. Duke University Press. Bice, S. (2014). What Gives You a Social Licence? An Exploration of the Social Licence to Operate in the Australian Mining Industry. Resources, 3, 62–80. Bowker, G., & Star, S.  L. (1999). Sorting Things Out. Classification and Its Consequences, MIT Press. Brown, W. (2010). Walled States, Waning Sovereignty. Zone Books, Distributed by the MIT Press. Capatides, C. (2016). ‘On Building a Wall  - 30 of Donald Trump’s Wildest Quotes’ CBS News, March 18,  https://www.cbsnews.com/pictures/ wild-donald-trump-quotes/14/ Carlisle, P. (2002). A Pragmatic View of Knowledge and Boundaries: Boundary Objects in New Product Development. Organization Science, 13, 442–455. Cook, A. (2017). Outcomes Based Approaches in Public Service Reform. What Works Scotland. Davenport, C (2015). Nations Approve Landmark Climate Accord in Paris, The New York Times, December 12

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Davenport, C., Gillis, J. C. S., & Eddy, M. (2015). Inside the Paris Climate Deal. Highlights from the Final Draft Text of a Climate Agreement Submitted to the Delegates in Paris. Davies, J (2017). Governing in and Against Austerity: International Lessons from Eight Cities, De Montfort University, Economic and Social Research Council Dickinson, H. (2014). Performing Governance – Partnerships, Culture and New Labour. Palgrave. Einfeld, C., Bice, S., & Chen, L.  I. (2018). Social Media and Community Relations: Five Key Challenges and Opportunities for Future Practice. In M.  J. Clifford, R.  K. Perrons, S.  Ali, & T.  A. Grice (Eds.), Extracting Innovations: Mining, Energy, and Technological Change in the Digital Age. Taylor and Frances. Einfeld, C., Sullivan, H., Haines, F., & Bice, S. (2021). Playing by the Rules? How Community Actors Use Experts and Evidence to Oppose Coal Seam Gas Activity in Australia. Energy Research & Social Science, 79, 102170. Fong, A., Valerdi, R., & Srinivasan, J. (2007). Boundary Objects as a Framework to Understand the Role of Systems Integrators. Systems Research Forum, 2, 11–18. Gal, U., Yoo, Y., & Boland, J. R. J. (2004). The Dynamics of Boundary Objects, Social Infrastructures and Social Identities. Sprouts, 4. Henderson, H., Sullivan, H., & Gleeson, B. (2020). Variations on a Collaborative Theme: Conservatism, Pluralism, and Place-Based Urban Policy in Central Dandenong, Melbourne. Journal of Urban Affairs, 42, 125–142. Jacobs, B. (2016). Donald Trump Links Mexico Border Wall Plan to Israel’s ‘successful’ Separation Barrier. The Guardian. Lawlor, E., Nicholls, J., & Neitzert, E. (2009). Seven Principles for Measuring What Matters. New Economics Foundation. Lowe, T. (2013). New Development: The Paradox of Outcomes – The More We Measure, the Less We Understand. Public Money & Management, 33, 213–216. Margetts, H., & Naumann, A. (2017). Government as a Platform: What Can Estonia Show the World? Oxford Internet Institute. Mayes, R. (2015). A Social Licence to Operate: Corporate Social Responsibility, Local Communities and the Constitution of Global Production Networks. Global Networks, 15, S109–S128. Nicolini, D., Mengis, J., & Swan, J. (2012). Understanding the Role of Objects in Cross-Disciplinary Collaboration. Organization Science, 23, 612–629. O’Reilly, T. (2010). Government as a Platform. In D. Lathrop & L. Ruma (Eds.), Open Government: Collaboration, Transparency, and Participation in Practice. O’Reilly Media. Oswick, C., & Robertson, M. (2009). Boundary Objects Reconsidered: From Bridges and Anchors to Barricades and Mazes. Journal of Change Management, 9(2), 179–193. Pomeroy, A. (2007). Changing the Culture of Contracting: Funding for Outcomes. Social Policy Journal of New Zealand, 158–169.

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Prno, J., & Scott Slocombe, D. (2012). Exploring the Origins of ‘Social License to Operate’ in the Mining Sector: Perspectives from Governance and Sustainability Theories. Resources Policy, 37, 346–357. Skelcher, C., & Sullivan, H. (2008). Theory-Driven Approaches to Analysing Collaborative Performance. Public Management Review, 10, 751–771. Star, S. L. (2010). This Is Not a Boundary Object: Reflections on the Origin of a Concept. Science, Technology, & Human Values, 35, 601–617. Star, S. L., & Griesemer, J. R. (1989). Institutional Ecology, ‘Translations’ and Boundary Objects: Amateurs and Professionals in Berkeley’s Museum of Vertebrate Zoology, 1907–39. Social Studies in Science, 19, 387–342. Stiglitz, J. E., Fitoussi, J.-P. & Durand, M. (2018). Beyond GDP. OECD Stone, D. (1988). Policy Paradox: The Art of Political Decision Making. W. W. Norton and Company. Swan, J., Bresnen, M., Newell, S., & Robertson, M. (2007). The Object of Knowledge: The Role of Objects in Biomedical Innovation. Human Relations, 60, 1809–1837. Thomas, R., Hardy, C., & Sargent, L. (2007). Artifacts in Interactions: The Production and Politics of Boundary Objects. AIM Research Working Paper Series, ISSN 1744-0009. Van Thiel, S., & Leeuw, F.  L. (2002). The Performance Paradox in the Public Sector. Public Performance & Management Review, 25, 267–281. Williams, P., & Sullivan, H. (2009a). Faces of Integration. International Journal of Integrated Care, 9.4 Williams, P., & Sullivan, H. (2009b). Getting Collaboration to Work in Wales. Lessons from the NHS and Partners. National Leadership and Innovation Agency for Healthcare (NLIAH). Zachry, M. (2008). An Interview with Susan Leigh Star. Technical Communication Quarterly, 17, 435–454.

CHAPTER 9

Practice, Agency, and Collaboration

Introduction The word collaboration implies action, and action taken by a number of actors with some shared purpose. Action is required in all aspects of collaboration, for example, to enact a decision to collaborate, to develop the shape and form of collaboration, to implement the agreed collaborative actions, and to make judgements about progress and adapt or change where necessary. Deciding what action to take and how, then, to act involves actors and agency. What is it that actors do? How do they do it? What else is involved? And what is ‘doing’? What comprises activity, specifically activity to support collaboration and to realise its desired ends? Practice provides a way of answering these questions. It exemplifies the interactions between actors, agency, and their environments that produce particular kinds of purposeful action. Informed by expertise ‘practice’ describes the demonstration of a particular kind and level of skill and craft. The presence of ethical and emotional commitments can encourage ‘practice’ as the repetition of actions in the hope of becoming better at them. Practice is also composed of practices. Practising a craft requires the completion of multiple sanctioned actions (practices) at a particular level of competence, gained through repetition. Paying attention to practice and practices in collaboration is essential to understand the shape and significance of interactions, between individuals, or between human and non-human actants. This chapter will explore how © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 H. Sullivan, Collaboration and Public Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-09585-6_9

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practices are constituted and their representation in the political, material, cultural, and spatial domains. It will identify practices that sustain or undermine collaboration and consider the ways in which collaboration can be improved through practice, that is, through repetition of practices. The ‘turn to practice’ is evident in a range of social science disciplines with an increasing number of ‘practice theories’ offering frameworks for analysing what practice is and how it can be understood in practice as it were. The chapter begins with a discussion of practice theories and definitions and identifies and justifies the use of a particular approach in relation to collaboration. It then draws on empirical examples of public policy to delineate practices and to assess their constitution in different policy arenas from the local to the global. It works through different examples of practice to explore how practice, identity, and performance interact and inform each other, and the implications of this for future public policy collaboration.

What Is Practice? The scholarly enthusiasm for studying practice has generated a multiplicity of theories and approaches, mostly distinct and occasionally divergent. Several contributors to this field conceive of practice and practices in ways that resonate with collaboration and agency—the focus of this book. They share an interest in the recurrent activities that support identification with a way of working and sometimes embody it and which have a specific concern with the human action involved. These will provide the basis for this chapter. Feldman and Worline (2016) provide a useful starting point for the discussion of practice theory by identifying three key principles: Practice theory rests on (1) the consequentiality of everyday actions in producing the structural contours of social life, (2) the relationality of mutual constitution, and (3) a questioning of the presumption of separateness indicated by dichotomies or dualisms in favour of a presumption of dualities, which are inseparable in practice. (p. 310)

The consequentiality of everyday actions highlights how a practice-­ based approach ‘describes the important features of the world we inhabit as something that is routinely made and re-made in practice using tools, discourse, and our bodies’ (Niccolini, 2012, p.  2 cited  in Feldman &

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Worline, 2016, p. 307). In the context of collaboration, it encourages us to consider whether and how existing practices support or limit collaboration, the practices that might prove more productive in facilitating collaboration, and how to develop and embed these. The idea of practice as embodied references the importance of actors’ agency in making and remaking the world. Embodied practice expresses the expertise of actors but specifically highlights ‘embodied capacities such as know-how, skills, tacit understanding, and dispositions’ (Schatzki, 2001, p. 11). The ‘relationality of mutual constitution’ points to the importance of interdependence as a precursor to and product of collaboration. It also emphasises that practice is more than the actions of individuals. Rather practice is embodied, present in, and expressed through the situated agency of collaborative actors, so, ‘…individual interests and social norms can only be separated analytically; in practice, they are always in relation to one another, a mutually constituted duality’ (Feldman & Worline, 2016, p. 309, emphasis in original). In collaboration practices are the product of and sustained by collaboration. They are enacted by actors but always in interaction with others, and always subject to adjustment. They are collective entities (Barnes in Schatzki et al., 2001). Lastly the identification of dualities rather than dichotomies offers a way of thinking differently about apparently opposing forces, for example, agency/structure, or stability/change. This is particularly relevant for understanding collaboration as it enables a more context relevant and nuanced explanation of how collaborations emerge, evolve, and operate, and sees ‘stability as an active accomplishment’ as much as change (Feldman & Worline, p. 309). Practice features in each of the domains of collaboration. The material domain offers the most obvious association; what collaboration does comprises practice and practices. Importantly as social practices, they are dynamic, their repetition essential for the reproduction of our social world but also adapting through practice. This work of refinement is aptly defined ‘répétitions sans répé-titions’ (repetition without repetitions) by Béguin and Clot (2004, p. 59). Of course, practice and practices are enacted in pursuit of collaborative purpose, which connects them to the political domain of collaboration. Of greater significance is the relation between practice(s) and the cultural domain of collaboration. This is the locus of meaning for actors engaged in collaboration. Social practices can generate affirmation for actors’

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identity as well as their performance. Gherardi refers to ‘the criteria of aesthetic evaluation of work performance (the aesthetic pleasure produced by a job well done)’ (2015, p.  17). This highlights one dimension of meaning, but there are others including the sense of belonging that may be generated by actors’ shared social practices in collaboration (see Chap. 7, for further discussion of meaning and emotions). Practice is the dynamic product of the mutual constitution of actors’ agency and social norms but as Gherardi indicates an actor’s ‘knowing how’ is inherently also ‘feeling and sensing how’. This keeps the individual in constant relation to others and the social world and allows us to consider the individual acts of ‘knowing’ and ‘sensing’ as mutually constitutive collaboration. Reckwitz (2002) encapsulates this by describing social practices as ‘routines: routines of moving the body, of understanding and wanting, of using things, interconnected in a practice’ (p. 255). This focus on the body offers an interesting way of thinking about the spatial domain of collaboration, that is, the shape that collaboration takes. For Schatzki (2001, p. 8) ‘the body is the meeting points both of mind and activity and of individual activity and social manifold’. Bodies manifest collaboration through their practised interactions and routines (a la Reckwitz). This may be the individual body, the body in relation to other bodies, and/or non-human actants such as objects and/or texts. Mialet’s (2019) study of individuals living with Type 1 diabetes illustrates the ways in which bodies rely on collaboration with machines, humans, and animals to function or ‘manage’, and how these interactions change the space of collaboration. She says, The boundary between what belongs to the patient and her surroundings is constantly negotiated, and we assist in a very interesting “exchange of properties” (Mialet, 2012) or slippages between all the actors (and their practices) that are implicated in the “supposed” management of diabetes…. (Emphasis added) (p. 379)

The shape of collaboration is then dynamic, changing over time, the past informing the present and the present shaping the future. Niccolini describes this in terms of practice ‘performances made durable by being inscribed in human bodies and minds, objects and texts, and knotted together in such a way that the result of one performance becomes the resource for another’ (Niccolini 2012, p. 2 quoted in Feldman & Worline, 2016, p. 307).

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Public Policy and Practice Though the roots of practice theory/ies are in a range of disciplines including sociology and philosophy, much of the recent work in the ‘turn to practice’ is based in organisation and management scholarship. A great deal of this is extremely relevant and useful to our discussion but it sits somewhat to the side of public policy concerns. Critical policy scholars have attempted to fill that gap with contributions on policy as practice, and practice in political systems. The work of Freeman, Griggs, and Boaz is particularly helpful here not least because of their determination to add empirical weight to conceptual analyses. They describe practices as, ‘specific configurations of action, norms and knowledge’, actions which are ‘both social and material’ in that their meaning is ‘socially derived: practices are very often carried out with others, and by reference to norms and standards that others, both participant and non-­ participant, will recognise’ (Freeman et al., 2011, p. 128). This definition is consistent with those used this far in the chapter but with a public policy focus. This is uniquely evident in the way Freeman et al. argue for public policy to be regarded as practice.

Public Policy as Practice Conceiving of public policy as practice becomes easier when we think of the language, we use in relation to it; we ‘make’ public policy. It is something that is active, constituted from the interactions of minds, bodies, objects, and contexts. The acts of policy planning, meetings, writing, consultation, negotiation, conflict resolution, decision-making, and communication contribute to public policy as practice but are also composed of practices: routines and actions that are familiar and allow adaptation through their repetition. Understood in this way public policymaking becomes less static in our imaginaries; rather it is ongoing, subject to change through design and application. Its authorship is present in all those who encounter and enact it, not just those whose job is designated as ‘policy maker’. Of course, public policy practice is not just about acts of creation; it also includes the development and application of tools and instruments to support policy in practice, and to enable judgement of policies. These may take a range of forms and the selection of a specific instrument will be informed by prevailing ideas about how to govern and manage. For

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example, the growth of performance management in public policy and administration is a feature of the NPM, with its promotion of the ethos of competition, marketisation, and assessment. The performance management regimes that emerged reflected this ethos and operated with a range of practices that endorsed it. The dominance of these practices is evidenced in their routinisation—they are embodied ‘actions, norms and knowledge’. But they may also be a source of frustration and resistance to actors who do not share the ideational basis of performance management. The practices of public policy such as meeting, drafting, negotiating, and deciding are common regardless of the setting, whether it be the World Health Organization, Asian Development Bank, or national or local government. The content of these practices, their ideational foundation, and their significance may vary depending on context, but the practices will each be present. An important distinction between policymaking (which can occur in any organisation or setting regardless of sector) and public policymaking is the centrality of the political process. This is experienced in different ways in extra-governmental institutions such as the WHO compared to government public or civil service systems. However, it is integral to the policy that is made and practised. And it is the source of the ideational foundations for public policy practice and practices. Pritzlaff and Nullmeir’s (2011) work illuminates this interrelation by drawing attention to the work of ‘political practices’ in government. They describe ‘political practices’ as ‘sequences of interactions that consist of proposals, acceptances and an act of confirmation and lead to the establishment of collective bindingness’ in decisions. Their empirical analysis of German state committee processes concludes that these political practices ‘rest on a structure of almost microscopic practices … that interconnect and reinforce’ them (pp. 149–150). These sub-political practices work to convert perspectives from the individual ‘I’ to the collective ‘we’. They do this in part by creating a relational structure that connects different positions and potential options, in turn establishing ‘common ground’ between actors. Examples of sub-political practices include translation, repair, re-narration, and self-authorisation (p. 145). These contributions offer helpful ways of thinking about practice and practices in public policy that are also relevant to collaboration. This will be explored next.

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Collaboration and Practice Collaboration can be analysed as practice, in the same way as the foregoing discussion of public policy. It is active and dynamic, focused on making change and in so doing being changed—including learning through practice (practising collaboration). The practices of collaboration can themselves be analysed. These are the routinised interactions that constitute collaboration. Some of these practices are present only in collaboration, while others are observable in public policy more broadly but have a specific inflection in the context of collaboration. Focusing analysis on what might be characterised as ‘sub-collaborative practices’ provides insight on how the ‘we’ of collaboration is supported and reinforced. Together these collaborative practices generate ‘new realities’ in and for public policy. The idea of practice creating ‘new realities’ comes from Orlikowski and Scott (2015) who focus on the work of Barad (2007) and agential realism to explore practice. Through their empirical studies of technology, they emphasise the combination of materialisation and performativity to create new realities. Discourse and matter are entangled in practice, not distinct but constituted together. Their empirical example is in the private sector—the story of TripAdvisor and how it has transformed the process of hotel review. The ‘new reality’ here is both the power of the online platform to shape hotel reputations and the creation of a new ‘empowered customer’. Other developments including AirBnB and Uber provide similar examples of new collaborative practice generating new economies, new subjects, and new challenges for public policy regulation. It is of course arguable how collaborative some of these new ventures are, but they do exemplify an intensification of co-production and ‘collaborative consumption’ (Botsman & Rogers, 2010). Orlikowski and Scott’s (2015) work focuses on ‘new realities’ as the products of radical and disruptive change. However, I want to use the idea to explore how collaborative practice and practices create ‘new realities’ in less immediate and dramatic, but arguably no less significant ways. Co-production Collaboration is aligned with several different but related developments that create new realities in the economy, political arena, and society. Co-production, the sharing economy, and collaborative consumption emphasise the dualism of endeavours that attempt to work with some

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form of mutuality. These latter examples of collaborative practice are not necessarily associated with public policy and public provision, but their governance and regulatory implications will impact future public policy (see Martin, 2016). Co-production is the form of collaborative practice most closely with public services and became a common element in public policy discourses in the 2000s. However, co-production is well established in public policy and public service delivery. Fundamentally it reflects the work we do as users of services to ensure that they function as they should, such as taking medication at the right time and in the right way. This kind of co-­ production can appear very simple. However, the practices associated with it reveal its complexity. Mol’s (2008) study of diabetes clinics and self-care affords insights into this complexity. Her exploration of the nature of care in the context of chronic conditions emphasises the interactive and relational nature of care activities. ‘[C]are activities move between doctors, nurses, machines, drugs, needles and so on, while patients have a lot to do as well. They have to eat and drink, inject, measure and/or engage in exercise. They care’ (p. 28, my emphasis). Time is a central feature of care, the caring practices involve ‘many hands’ working together over time and in ways that attend, adapt and change, and are accountable to each other. Care only ends when the patient dies. The practices of attending, adaptation, and accountability are evident in Mol’s reconstruction of a key practice in care—the consultation. Consultation is not debate. Good conversations in a consulting room do not take the shape of confrontation between arguments, but are marked by an exchange of experiences, knowledge, suggestions, words of comfort. How have things been lately? What might be done differently and how might it be done? How do we adjust all the relevant elements in a patient’s daily life to each other in the best possible way? (p. 76)

In these relationships effective care requires practice. What works at one point will fail at another; this is inevitable and expected and leads to adaptation, improvisation, or the adoption of an entirely different care pathway. Failure precedes learning. Mol’s examples of attention, adaption, accountability care [and neglect?] are useful for exploring other forms of co-production in policy and services. These include the ways in which individuals from different

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organisations act together to produce new goods and services, and how users or beneficiaries of policy or services become more involved in the design and delivery of services and in some cases, policy, and shaping them to reflect their own desires or experiences.  o-producing New Services C One of the most well-known examples of co-production in public services, popular in a range of countries, is personal budgeting. This promises to afford individual service users of health and social care services (usually) greater control over available resources so that packages of care or services can be determined by users. Different countries use different approaches to achieving these ‘new realities’, but all identify a changed relationship between users and professionals, characterised by collaboration, as integral to success. This changed relationship relies on the constitution and activation of new subjects including the individual budget holder, responsible for their own care and in some cases for employing carers, and the professional as steward, responsible for the appropriate use of public funds and policy outcomes. These new subject positions are in turn predicated on the recognition and acceptance by professionals of service users as ‘experts’ in their own lives and needs, of the necessary attention being paid to service users (and where appropriate their carers) in the process of determining personal budgets, and of new accountability relationships being established. Realising recognition, acceptance, attention, and accountability demands the development and application of practices that activate each and are adopted by all those involved. One of the most ambitious programs of co-production is the Australian National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) introduced in 2013  in response to persistent criticisms of the existing system of supports for disabled people as operating in the interests of professionals not users, providing fragmented service delivery due to the multiple levels of funding and provision at local, state, and commonwealth. The NDIS promised to prioritise user ‘choice and control’ and the development of a system of care that was equitable and efficient (Fig. 9.1). The Act establishing the NDIS—the National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 2013—gives effect to Australia’s obligations under the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (New York on 13

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The NDIS is Australia’s first national Scheme for people with disability. It provides funding directly to individuals.

About 4.3 million Australians have a disability. Over five years, the National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS) will provide more than $22 billion in funding a year to an estimated 500,000 Australians who have permanent and significant disability. For many people, it will be the first time they receive the disability support they need.

The NDIS can provide all people with disability with information and connections to services in their communities such as doctors, sporting clubs, support groups, libraries and schools, as well as information about what support is provided by each state and territory government.

NDIS - What does it mean? National: The NDIS is being introduced progressively across all states and territories.

Disability: The NDIS provides support to eligible people with intellectual, physical, sensory, cognitive and psychosocial disability. Early intervention supports can also be provided for eligible people with disability or children with developmental delay.

Insurance: The NDIS gives all Australians peace of mind if they, their child or loved one is born with or acquires a permanent and significant disability, they will get the support they need. Scheme: The NDIS is not a welfare system. The NDIS is designed to help people get the support they need so their skills and independence improve over time.

Fig. 9.1  Australia’s National Disability Insurance Scheme. (Sources: https:// www.ndis.gov.au/understanding Accessed 30 March 2022; https://www.ndis. gov.au/participants/your-­rights-­and-­responsibilities#your-­rights Accessed 30 March 2022)

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Your rights You have the right to: choose who delivers your supports and how they do this. You do not have to use just one provider for all your supports not use a provider if you feel they may put their business interests ahead of your needs know about any perceived or actual conflict of interest a provider might have not feel pressured to buy services or supports you don’t want or need pay for supports at a fair and reasonable rate. You should not be charged more than the amount listed in the NDIS price guide decide what personal information you give to a provider so that they can deliver supports and services.

Fig. 9.1  (continued)

December 2006 (2008) ATS 12).1 This rights-based approach is at the heart of the original ethos of the NDIS underpinning the focus on user choice and control (Fig. 9.2). The NDIS began as a pilot operating in a specific number of areas testing and adapting systems, processes, and practices before rolling them out nationwide. The stated aim was to learn through practice. An early account of service users’ experiences (Warr et al., 2017) highlighted the importance of practices in realising the ambitions of choice and control for users. These were not necessarily complicated practices, for example, service users reflected on being ‘in control’ by referencing professionals’ ability to ‘listen’,

1

 Australian Government (2013) National Disability Insurance Scheme Act 4.

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‘The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) applies human rights specifically to the context of people with disabilities and reflects the need for respect for their inherent dignity, individual autonomy (including the freedom to make one’s own choices and the independence of the person), the need for them to be able to participate fully and effectively and be included in society, the need for respect for difference and acceptance of people with disabilities as part of human diversity and providing them with opportunities to be actively involved in decision-making processes about policies and program directly concerning them’.

Fig. 9.2  Rights-based approach to the NDIS. (Source: Warr et al. (2017, p. 8)) [I sit there and think], ‘Are you listening?’ One of the biggest problems I have: ‘Are you really listening to me?’ There was a meeting with the woman that I had in there and she had this young fellow that was training. When we finished I pulled him aside and I said, ‘I can give you one big tip that’s going to help you right through this whole training process and working with families. Listen to the carers. If you go off with your own ideas, it is going to fail.’ (…) That’s probably a struggle most families have. We’re just not listened to. We do know our child pretty well. (2017, p. 37)

Service users were also acutely aware of the way in which existing practices could limit their exercise of ‘choice’. Philosophically I still think [offering people choice is] the right approach, but a lot of families of people with disabilities didn’t really seem to know actually what they wanted to do because they’re not practiced at making choices, or making real choices. They’re practiced at making choices from what’s available, but not necessarily saying I don’t like anything that you’ve got available for me, this is what I want ‘cause that’s what will make a difference to my quality of life. (2017, p. 27)

Here the issue is both the lack of practice users have in making choices but also the level of awareness about what might be possible. This is compounded by professionals denying access to choices they regard as inappropriate or not available under the rules.

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Co-producing Policy Co-production in policy design acknowledges the limits of existing policies and services and aims to go beyond what is known to create something entirely different. Blume’s (2016) account of his work with Lambeth Council in London in the early 2010s illustrates the role of practices in collaborative policy design. In a context of economic austerity with sustained reductions in funding to local government, Lambeth Council re-­ styled itself a ‘Cooperative Council’—an institution that would practise participatory democracy and develop a ‘participatory civic economy’. Its plan ‘Sharing Power: A new settlement between citizens and the state’ outlined what was termed a dramatic departure from ‘business as usual’ local government (Lambeth Council, 2011). Blume emphasises the necessity of adopting new practices to ‘shake things up’ and help find a new model; practices that privileged ‘business as unusual’ in pursuit of a new reality (p. 96) (Fig. 9.3). This included working with a ‘strengths-based approach’ rather than a deficit model of service users, and publics, and developing new spaces for its operation (McKnight & Kretzmann, 1993). Durose and Richardson (2016) draw on the experiences of Blume and many others to develop what they term the ‘grammar’ of coproduction in policy design. These ‘institutional practices employed in pursuit of a vision’ comprise ‘reciprocal and reflexive relationships between different actors; [an] incomplete approach allowing policy design to be affected in use; iteration, involving experimentation and learning-by-doing’ (p. 43). But what prompts the shift from social practices to institutions particularly in a context where creative co-production is likely to be challenged as it tries to connect with established practices of decision-making elsewhere? This will be explored below.

New Governance Practices Collaboration embodies ways of practising governance that create new realities. What I mean by this is that collaboration can generate new spaces for action, new organisational forms, and new roles for actors. These developments may be inclusive or exclusive of state and non-state actors, depending upon the political purposes being followed. In work with colleagues I explored changing urban governance in European cities, and the spaces, forms, and agency it took (Skelcher et al., 2013). We identified emergent governance practices as ‘proto-­institutions’. Proto-institutions are practices that have a degree of

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‘Building on the day-today realities and aspirations of the local community, to define and deliver the future they wanted for their community’

‘Business as Unusual’ was a local council’s attempt to reconnect with local residents in ways that would foster ‘co-operative’ conversations. The ‘Work Shop’ – a month long pop-up shop on the local High Street provided the physical and cultural space for these conversations.

The Work Shop offered a range of activities some hosted by the council, others by public sector, voluntary and community organisations. It also created opportunities for more informal engagement such as inviting passers-by in ‘for a cup of tea and a chat’ and offering them ‘inspirational examples of what can be achieved through collaboration, and space to capture people’s ideas for how things might be changed for the better’.

‘The Work Shop was an experiment in ‘the art of the possible’ and an attempt to test a new way of working with citizens that can be applied to other parts of the organisation’. The aim was to work iteratively – trying and failing and adapting. New ideas and projects were developed by and with local people drawing and building on the existing resources of both communities and council. The project worked with a Trade School2, to encourage the sharing of local skills between community members.

Fig. 9.3  ‘Business as Unusual’ in London Borough of Lambeth. (Source: Adapted from Blume (2016, pp. 96–97). Trade School was a global movement of alternative self-organised schools that ran on barter from 2009 to 2019 http:// tradeschool.coop/ )

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‘stickiness…determined by the capacity of a form of agency to present a solution to problems for which existing institutions are poorly fitted, and in so doing to draw on socially legitimate ideas’ (Skelcher et  al., 2013, pp. 41–42)

Neighbourhood revitalisation programs are a constant feature of urban policy; the combination of place, space, and proximity to local communities affords an opportunity to explore the emergence of new governance practices that may develop their own ‘stickiness’ over time. These practices combine a focus on citizens or communities with the drawing in of private and public resources through new proto-­institutions— neighbourhood partnerships. They may be connected via city governance to wider national policy programs, but they retain a varying degree of independence. The shape and nature of the programs is influenced by traditions of governance, city trajectories, and the political milieu. But the common practice is to develop some kind of neighbourhood governance that is ‘partnership’ based. Partnerships as proto-institutions are sticky in that their designs are ‘loosely coupled with the traditions of representative city government’ (p. 69). Importantly they enable the limitations of the existing institutional arrangements to be addressed by complementing not replacing those institutions. Our examination of neighbourhood governance practices in Birmingham, Copenhagen, and Rotterdam illustrates the different trajectories of these ‘proto-institutions’ (see Table 9.1). They offer variation in shape and purpose but are consistent in their positioning with respect to the authority and accountability of formal political institutions. But what happens when complementarity is insufficient? And when institutionally led collaboration reproduces dominant power relationships? Is there any value in being and remaining on the outside or ‘on the edge’? This is explored next.

Creating Space at the Edge Newman (2012) explores the issue of borders and borderwork in the context of her study of women ‘working the spaces of power’ in the UK to achieve social and political change. She is impatient with conventional explanations that rely on binary narratives of heroic achievement or incorporation and instead draws on the experiences of a wide range of women in public policy activism over several decades to draw out a more nuanced

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Table 9.1  Neighbourhood partnerships as ‘proto institutions’ in Birmingham, Copenhagen, and Rotterdam Birmingham Ideas about governance

Representative democracy supplemented by participation; extensive use of contracting-out for delivery of services; large number of arm’s length bodies/ partnerships Ideas about Neighbourhood policy policy is focus for action designed to solve interconnected urban problems and to enhance property market Institutional Historically legacy developmental city government: dominance of public providers fractured by contracting-out and growth of partnerships between local government and public service agencies, business, not for profits, and citizens Emerging Extensive development practices of multi-agency boards and participative forums; increased discretion of officials with arm’s length political steering

Copenhagen

Rotterdam

Representative and associative democracy; primacy of local government and state provision; limited engagement with contracting-out and arm’s length delivery

Representative democracy supplemented by participation extending beyond elites; primacy of politicians limits capacity of participation to shape decisions Neighbourhoods focus for action designed to solve interconnected urban problems and to release resource from social housing companies Strong norms of representative government and primacy of politicians; elite bargaining; role of executive politicians embedded; city government, a force for progress/leading the way

Neighbourhood policy is focus for action designed to solve interconnected urban problems

Strong norms of local self-government and citizen participation through sports associations and other civil society organisations; public provision valued; political coalitions leads to quasi-independent portfolios in city government Limited; elections of immigrant members of integration board; some devolution of authority to front-line officials

Devolution to sub-municipal councils; local project offices for revitalisation schemes; attempts to build collaborative governance; use of arm’s length expertise to enhance policy delivery (continued)

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Table 9.1 (continued)

Comments

Birmingham

Copenhagen

Rotterdam

Ideational context and gradual mainstreaming of emerging practices facilitates development of further forms of hybrid governance and embedding of proto-institutions; growth of direct and stakeholder democracy, but decision-making concentrated on elite actors from government, business, and not-for-profit sector; city government officials remain nodal actors in development of new practices, which are at arm’s length to elected politicians

Limited ideational and institutional space for new practices to emerge; some experiments in hybrid governance but largely within prevailing archetype of representative and associative governance

Willingness to try forms of hybrid governance but typically with strong connections to key city politicians

Adapted from Skelcher et al. (2013, pp. 152–53)

story. The participants’ experiences of borders, or boundaries, or edges were similarly wide-ranging covering the boundaries of class, race, sexuality, and geography; the boundaries demarcating professions, organisations, and sectors; the borders of appropriate and inappropriate behaviour; and the boundaries between public and private, political, and personal. Participants’ stories described overcoming or breaching boundaries, as well as securing them, recounted the benefits and perils of ‘insider’ and ‘outsider’ statuses, and the practices that sustained them ‘on the edge’. For Newman ‘borderwork’ or ‘edgework’ is critical as it generates political spaces for change. These spaces may be within, between, or across existing bodies, or they may be liminal spaces that transcend existing formations. Individuals may adopt different roles—boundary spanners, boundary brokers, boundary crossers, boundary creators, each embodying practices including networking, alliance building, piecing together resources, negotiating, and translating/interpreting.

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Newman’s discussion of the work of ‘translation’ demonstrates both its significance as a practice and the micro practices it contains within it. Translation emerges in her research as ‘a practice discourse… a way in which women described what they did… The work of Carole, Tricia and others evokes a sense of translation as an active, agentic process, requiring the labour of summoning, mobilising, assembling, and then—most importantly—that of combining elements into new configurations’ (p.  147). The focus is on how interactions between human and non-human actants in ‘local and particular settings’ are transformative of each and productive of new practices, and ‘new possibilities of public action and political agency’ (p.  147). Here translation is the collaborative practice, but its practice comprises important micro-practices—summoning, mobilising, assembling, recombining. Working in this way, on or at ‘the border or the edge’, is exacting for those involved. It demands the expenditure of considerable effort and expertise to enable collaboration whilst at the same time acknowledging and navigating the institutionalised power relations that animate encounters between people, organisations, and ideas. The requirement to ‘face both ways’ and attempt to reconcile often competing views of how things should be done can be felt deeply and personally by individuals and be the cause of considerable stress. This draws attention to the work individuals need to do on themselves to sustain their engagement in collaborative work. Newman calls this ‘self work’ and suggests authenticity, integrity, and accountability as essential. Regardless of individuals’ resilience the tension they experience working at the edge can often result in workers spending limited time in these border spaces, before succumbing to what Katz (2005) terms the ‘seductions of belonging’ (cited in Newman p. 135) and returning to a more established institution. Institutionalised power relations are also evident in other ‘edge spaces’ such as the ‘borderlands’ between jurisdictions. These are most commonly the spaces that denote the often-overlapping separation between countries or states, but the term is also used in other contexts, for example, between nature and culture, mind and body. In the territorial context borderlands are where ‘different versions of federalism, centralization or decentralization bump up against one another’ but where other institutionalised power relations have smooth passage. According to Staudt ‘[O]ne commonality shared near virtually all borders is transcendent male privilege: gender imbalance in governance and gender injustices, including a

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tolerance of violence against women and for lower valuations of their labour’ (2008, p. 236). Her analysis of the murders of girls and women in the US-Mexico borderlands acknowledges the appeal of ‘global governance’ in the resolution of problems posed by globalisation, neoliberalism, and migration, but argues instead for a focus on ‘the local’, that is, the borderland itself, as an appropriate site of action and engagement with national and international governance. While this analysis moves the ‘borderlands’ from the edge to the centre of analysis (Baud & Van Schenden, 1997), the gendered imbalance of power remains. This focus on ‘borderlands’ contrasts with the reorientation of much public policy work to ‘the global’ level and the emergence of what Ruggie (2004) terms a ‘global public domain’. He argues that the intermittent convergence of ‘world civic politics’ with ‘private governance’ coupled with the acknowledgement of significant global public policy concerns, for example, HIV/AIDS, climate change, free trade have supported the emergence of a new global public domain. This domain is ‘…an institutionalized arena of discourse, contestation, and action… constituted by interactions among non-state actors as well as states [which] permits the direct expression and pursuit of a variety of human interests, not merely those mediated (filtered, interpreted, promoted) by states’ (Ruggie, 2004, p. 519). The practice of enacting a ‘global public domain’ is facilitated by the development of digital technologies that ease interaction between diverse actors. The next section considers these new spaces of digital collaboration and the practices associated with them.

Digitally Enabled Practices Diplomats are key actors in international or global public policy arenas. However, they now share the global stage with a multiplicity of other actors, whose expertise and cooperation is required to progress policy priorities. Cooper et al. describe it thus, ‘Four decades ago Raymond Aron argued that ‘the ambassador and the soldier live and symbolize international relations which, insofar as they are inter-state relations, concern diplomacy and war’.14 Today, alongside the hordes of national diplomats and soldiers, the international lawyer, the multinational merchant, the cross-border financier, the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF) technocrat, the UN peacekeeper, the World Health Organization (WHO) health official, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspector, ‘Eurocrats’ and officials of other regional

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organizations, and the humanitarian worker jostle for space on the increasingly congested stage of international diplomacy. (Cooper et al., 2013, p. 7)

Public diplomacy then demands collaboration with some or all of the many new actors identified in pursuit of co-creating new realities. Digital technology provides a means of doing so and has been embraced by national governments and international institutions in their attempts to enact public diplomacy in new ways often in relation to old problems. Collaborating and co-creating in this way demands attention to enabling practices. This is explored drawing on the example of the Prevention of Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative (PSVI). Rape and sexual violence in conflict is ubiquitous, acknowledged by the global community, but not acted on. In 2013 the then British Foreign Secretary, William Hague, in conjunction with UNHCR special envoy Angelina Jolie, launched the PSVI. The aim was to bring perpetrators to justice and provide survivors with necessary support. Following a UN Resolution, a Global Summit to End Sexual Violence in Conflict in London in June 2014 brought 125 country delegations, NGOs, survivors, and activists together with UK embassies worldwide to generate global support for the Initiative. The organisers enlisted experts in digital creativity to help participants develop new solutions through a #DiploHack that ran for three days as part of the Summit (Fig. 9.4). #DiploHack is an initiative ‘that combines the specific know-how and skill sets of diplomats, social entrepreneurs, tech developers and designers, along with that of journalists, academics, NGOs and businesses to “hack” traditional diplomatic problems in start-up style groups’ (Axell, 2016). Initiated in 2012 by the Dutch and Swedish governments, #DiploHack has been used across a range of issues and countries to generate new approaches to seemingly intractable problems. A key characteristic of #DiploHack is the requirement that stakeholders from very different backgrounds position themselves outside their ‘comfort zones’ and deliberately engage with others in pursuit of innovative solutions to policy challenges. The emphasis is on engaging in a ‘start-up’ way with technology developers leading the design process. Doing this involves engaging in a set of practices designed to encourage interaction, creativity, and practical applications. The description of #DiploHack illustrates some of these practices. Central to this is the creation of a collaborative environment, one that is safe for experimentation and failure. The practices used include welcoming, listening, defining, and codifying, playfulness, reiteration, perspective shifting (Fig. 9.5).

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‘As part of the Fringe at the Global Summit to End Sexual Violence in Conflict, the FCO worked with the Dutch Embassy in London, MakeSense and Chayn to host an End Sexual Violence in Conflict “Hackathon”. The “diplohack” brought together developers from across the world alongside diplomats, experts on sexual violence in conflict and NGO representatives to produce technology solutions supporting the 4 aims of the summit: To improve investigations/documentation of sexual violence in conflict. To provide greater support and assistance and reparation for survivors, including child survivors, of sexual violence. To ensure sexual and gender based violence responses and the promotion of gender equality are fully integrated in all peace and security efforts, including security and justice sector reform; and To improve international strategic co-ordination.

Over 3 days, participants generated ideas for the most useful solutions and then worked in six small teams to turn those ideas into prototypes. They then presented the ideas to a highprofile judging panel.

The judges selected “The Promise” as their winning choice, a proposed application to help sexual violence survivors of the Syrian conflict find assistance and protection. An online vote selected “Seekr” as the “people’s choice”, a proposed database to help NGOs find missing people drawing on facial recognition. The two entries will receive seed funding from the Dutch government allowing them to be developed further. All the solutions developed at the hackathon will also be available under an open license for NGOs and Charities’.

Fig. 9.4  #DiploHack and  The Prevention of Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative PSVI. (Source: Foreign and Commonwealth Office, 2014. https:// www.gov.uk/government/news/end-­sexual-­violence-­in-­conflict-­hack accessed 6 May 2020)

#Diplohack ‘It all begins with IDEATION in a WORKSHOP: We gather key actors in a room and listen to the challenges they face.

Through the magic of Imagineering, the most compelling (and solvable) issues are described, aligned and engraved into the “hack protocol”. This will serve as a gentle guide to hint the “hackers” of what is in dire need of resolution.

A few days down the road, the DIPLOHACK itself begins: On a lovely Friday evening, a presentation takes place, a few key figures say a few key words and we begin with laughs and icebreakers, culminating into a warm-up, 15-minute hackathon. Once the crowd gets a feel of what is there to come, Pitch Street opens up.

To encourage all to pitch is a goal of great importance. 50 people, 60 seconds and a microphone is all you have, to convince us your idea rocks.

Once the pitchers come to end, we put their “babies” on a wall and every “hacker” gets 3 votes to cast for a “baby” they would raise. A thousand options. Only 10 get chosen.

Now recruitment starts. 10 idea owners look to build a team passionate, diverse and strong. The search is tough but often fruitful. 30 longest minutes later, teams are gathered, placed and work begins.

After 54 dense hours of ups, downs, sweat and brain ache, on the eve of Sunday, the Lion Cage cracks open.

Fig. 9.5  #DiploHack practices. (Source: Axell (2016, emphasis in original). https://okfn.se/2016/05/13/open-­k nowledge-­s weden-­p artners-­u p-­t o-­ support-­diplohack-­stockholm-­2016/ Accessed 30 March 2022)

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5 short and painful minutes is what you have, to teamfully present your labor’s fruit and face 5 Lions, trained expertly to pick apart your pitch in seconds. 5 more minutes Q&A and you’ve concluded.

Lions listen with a hungry patience, take a note or two, and once all teams are good and done a council is formed – decisions made, winners chosen, feedback given and poof! Beer, tears, chit-chat and reflection is how all ends’.

Fig. 9.5  (continued)

Practising Conflict Conflict is an inevitable feature of collaboration. Conflict may be the cause that collaboration is required to respond to, as in the example of PSVI above. However, conflict is also part of the process of collaboration, experienced variously as dissonance, difference, and/or dispute. Learning how to practise conflict in collaboration is essential if productive outcomes are to be achieved. I use the term ‘practising conflict’ deliberately in place of the more commonly used ‘managing conflict’. This is because the latter suggests a distance between the actor and the conflict and implies that conflict is something to be contained. By contrast ‘practising conflict’ locates the action with and between actors as part of the collaborative relationship. It also acknowledges that conflict may be necessary, and indeed may need to be done well, for collaboration to be effective. This is not a call for violence but rather a recognition that collaboration too often seeks to side-step conflict and so limits its own possibilities. ‘Practising conflict’ is of course context-specific, what might be acceptable in one culture may be unacceptable in another. When conflict requires cross-­ cultural collaboration, these differences are amplified, and new practices are needed. Practising conflict in collaboration requires knowing what can be named as an area of conflict, and indeed if it can be described as a conflict. That naming will be contingent on the level of trust between collaborators and whether and how that trust is represented, for example, if there is a formal protocol for identifying and bringing conflict to the collaboration.

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Negotiation is integral to conflict practice, and this requires a preparedness to ‘hear’ the point of dispute, a level of empathy, an appreciation of what the ‘other’ can agree to, and what you are prepared to compromise on, or relinquish. Negotiation may be accompanied by mediation, involving either a partner to the collaboration adopting this role or the engagement of an external party. Reframing the conflict to open other avenues of possibility is a key function. These elements of conflict practice are remarkably similar whether the collaboration is global or local, and both require diplomats to be involved, though in the case of the former they are likely to be ‘professional diplomats’. But despite this, conflict practice is hard and frequently unsuccessful. So in some public policy areas considerable effort is put into developing the capacity to prevent conflicts arising. One example relates to the collaborative governance of transboundary river governance. The UN predicts that two-thirds of the world’s population will experience water stress by 2025. About 263 international river basins created by transboundary rivers account for 60% of global freshwater flow and provide home to 40% of the world’s population. The shared nature of transboundary waters means they are a source of contention and cooperation. A joint study by Oregon State and the University of Oregon (Wolf et al., 2003) found the number of acute violent conflicts over water totals 37 between 1948 and 2000 (the vast majority in the Middle East), while approximately 295 international water agreements have been negotiated and signed. This suggests that the prospects of conflict over water encourage cooperation to avoid scarcity and promote sustainability. A key question is whether this position still holds in contexts where climate change is causing serious damage and/or where rapid industrial development is taking place, such as the Mekong River Basin (MacQuarrie et al., 2008). Coming to these agreements and acting on them presupposes a level of institutional capacity—a key factor that scholars refer to in the context of transboundary water management, for example, Bakker (2009). But what exists before that institutional capacity is built? In the context of Mekong, Eugene Black, one of the first presidents of the World Bank in 1949, declared, ‘The most important aspect of the development of the Mekong Basin is to provide a means for inhibiting violence in the region, and evoking among riparian countries a sense of what is possible if they cultivate the habit of working together’ (Black, 1969). This focus on ‘habits’ takes us back into the discussion above of the development of new governance practices in urban areas in the context of

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revitalisation or migration. ‘Habits’ or practices can support the development of proto-institutions and the building of institutional capacity. On 5 April 1995 the Governments of Cambodia, Lao PDR, Thailand, and Vietnam made an Agreement on the Cooperation for the Sustainable Development of the Mekong River Basin. A core element of the Agreement and the subsequent strategic plans was a commitment to institutional capacity building. For example, the MRC Strategic Plan 2006–2010 cited the need to build institutional capacity to ‘to identify potential transboundary issues for negotiation, mediation and conflict prevention, and develop mediation and conflict management capacity’. Arguably the success of this capacity building can be seen in the Strategic Plan 2016–2020, which begins with a declaration from the Chair of the MR Council, Unlike the past, this MRC Strategic Plan, together with the four National Indicative Plans of MRC Member Countries, represents a collective MRC response to address the strategic priorities and actions set forth in the updated IWRM-based Mekong Basin Development Strategy (BDS), and the institutional recommendations in the Roadmap for Decentralisation. (2016, p. viii)

There are some circumstances where division is so entrenched that collaboration and practising conflict appear at best naïve and at worst destructive. Conflict between peoples is the most obvious example. In such circumstances collaboration might be represented through an entirely different practice, for example, the Israeli and Palestinian teachers’ initiative to ‘co-write the history’ of their holy place. Acutely aware that the histories contained in Israeli and Palestinian textbooks offer very different accounts of the same events a group of teachers aimed to develop a resource that would help to ‘disarm’ the teaching of the history of the Middle East. They generated a ‘dual narrative’—a text that sets separate narratives alongside each other so that readers can see both together and identify where they differ and where they are the same. The aim was to generate empathy and understanding amongst school-children by aligning the different perspectives and encouraging readers to see both together. The book offers a new way of practising learning, requiring attention to competing interpretations at the same time, and through the practice of attending closely and empathically to these narratives, and seeks to create new practices of encounter between Israelis and Palestinians (Adwan et al., 2012).

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Practices of Collaboration All collaborations comprise practices that support and sustain them and importantly enable them to operate with legitimacy in public policy contexts. The ‘practice turn’ in academic scholarship encourages the examination of core public policy practices, many of which are also core to collaboration and public policy though with some distinctive features. I don’t propose to provide an exhaustive account of the different collaborative practices, many of which are already discussed above. My intention here is to focus on those practices that appear to be most important to supporting or conversely frustrating collaboration. Drawing Boundaries The relationship between boundaries and collaboration in public policy is an example of mutual constitution. The presence of boundaries—of interalia, geography, organisation, and politics—makes collaboration necessary and possible, while the act of collaboration in turn relies on and (re) produces boundaries. Papanastasiou (2017) regards boundary drawing work as a key feature of the practices of public policy. ‘Deciding whose expertise to call on, assigning a task to one particular set of actors instead of another, labelling knowledge as relevant or authoritative, are all examples of typical practices of boundary-work which take place when actors are confronted with the challenges of “doing policy”’ (p. 88). Boundary drawing is dynamic, enacted through actors’ practices of imagining, articulating, negotiating, and contesting the construction of their social worlds. These constructs then have important consequences for collaboration. Boundary drawing is located in the material domain of collaboration, but as an action it is informed by the political and cultural domains and has implications for the spatial domain. Making Meetings Meetings provide an excellent illustration of how social practices align with the different domains of collaboration in public policy settings. Meetings are essential to the public policy process and collaborative endeavours invariably feature meetings as ways of bringing actors together and pursuing collaborative action.

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Meetings are a social practice and so are located in the material domain of what collaborations do. However, meetings also take particular forms or shapes which aligns them to the spatial domain. The force of meetings as action and the quality of their form are contingent on their purpose (political domain) and meaning (cultural domain), though the influence of each will vary. The practices actors engage in in meetings are similarly influenced, designed to support and enhance the collaboration or to undermine or deflect it. Meetings are contextually contingent; a meeting of senior public service leaders will look and feel different from a meeting of grass-roots activists or even from another meeting of senior public servants from a different country. The dressing, placing, and moderation of actors’ bodies will vary in ways considered appropriate to those contexts. Collaboration requires these different bodies and meeting types to come together, and this creates difficulties as bodies may struggle to adapt and develop practices that are appropriate and effective. Meetings also illustrate the importance of mind/body interconnection in collaboration. Physical presence at a meeting cannot be read as active engagement in collaboration unless there is mindful engagement too. Rather a passive physical presence may indicate resistance to collaboration and the use of the meeting to prevent action through inaction or passivity. Being Accountable Securing accountability is one of the most significant challenges facing collaborators for public policy. This is partly a structural problem; accountability in public governance is often rooted in systems of representative bureaucracy where hierarchy and ‘line-management’ facilitate its operation. Collaboration complicates this relationship as it introduces multiple actors into decision-making and delivery, including those from the private and not-for-profit sectors, with different accountability traditions. Thompson (1980) described this as the ‘problem of many hands’, where the presence of multiple actors reduces transparency and clarity over who is accountable. Collaboration also challenges the sufficiency of hierarchical or vertical accountability, leading to demands for the institution of horizontal accountability, that is, accountability between peers in the collaboration. This is as much about agency as structure as peer-to-peer accountability

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may be inscribed in rules, for example, through the design of governance codes for the collaboration but is embodied in practice through actors’ interactions and the integrity associated with them. Translating and Interpreting Translation and interpretation are essential practices in collaboration because of the need to adapt and readapt meanings from one context to another. This includes moving into the collaborative context as well as moving back and forth between the collaborative context and the respective actors’ ‘home’ contexts. These practices are clearly evident in the world of diplomacy in institutions such as the EU or ASEAN. However, they are present in all collaborations and can have a profound effect on collaborative action as they represent ‘a space of possibility because the practice of translation is rarely a simple act…it is a selective and active process in which meanings are interpreted and reinterpreted to make them fit their new context’ (Clarke et al., 2015, p. 35). This suggests that the role of translator or interpreter is one that demands a level of expertise that includes but goes beyond linguistic capability, though that should not be underestimated in public policy contexts where professional, organisational, and political traditions generate ways of speaking that are distinctive and often exclusive (and excluding). In addition, what is required is a capacity to know and understand the perspective of ‘the other’ in the process of meaning making. Histories of encounters between indigenous peoples and foreigners provide an important illustration of what is at stake, such as this account of interpreting between Canadian Indians and representatives of the French Court, Interpreters ‘had a deep understanding of the native way of thinking and demonstrated that true communication is achieved not at the superficial level of words, but rather through genuine interaction with the cultural, religious, economic and social institutions of a community. The understanding of others hinges more on what they are than on what they say. (Delile, 2009, p. 363)

What this means in the context of practices of collaboration is the need for an alertness to, acknowledgement of, and learning about that which is considered ‘other’ particularly in the context of cross-cultural collaborations (Bice & Coates, 2022).

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Conclusion The work of collaboration is done through practice and practices. Collaborative practice and the practices of collaboration will continue to evolve as public policy evolves. Practice links identity and performance. In so doing it draws together human agency as an expression of expertise, ethics, and emotion into relation with non-human actants such as objects in the context of prevailing social norms. Artificial Intelligence, introduced in this chapter, is likely to become dominant soon and impact on both identity and performance to reshape what collaborative practice looks like and what it can achieve. It may be prosaic, but it is worth restating that effective collaboration requires practice. Individual actors need requisite skills and knowledge to enter into collaboration and acquiring sufficient of these necessitates practice and experience. Some scholars of collaboration emphasise the ‘craft’ of collaboration, by which is meant the possibility of acquiring the capacity to be able to collaborate, and well, with the necessity of practice. How practice and practices link to identity and performance and the implications for a future ‘collaborative self’ is considered in the final chapter. Acknowledgements  Thanks to Professor Helen Dickinson and Dr Sue Olney for permission to reproduce material from the 2017 Report, Choice, Control and the NDIS Service Users’ Perspectives on Having Choice and Control in the New National Disability Insurance Scheme.

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McKnight, J., & Kretzman, J. (1993). Building Communities from the Inside Out: A Path Toward Finding and Mobilizing A Community’s Assets. ACTA Publications. Mekong River Council (2016). MRC Strategic Plan 2016–2020. Mekong River Commission. Mialet, H. (2012). Hawking Incorporated: The Anthropology of the Knowing Subject. University of Chicago Press. Mialet, H. (2019). Becoming the Other: The Body in Translation. In The Routledge Handbook of Language and Science (pp. 375–384). Routledge. p. 379. Mol, A. (2008). The Logic of Care: Health and the Problem of Patient Choice. Routledge. Newman, J. (2012). Working the Spaces of Power. Activism Neoliberalism and Gendered Labour. Bloomsbury. Nicolini, D. (2012). Practice Theory, Work and Organization: An Introduction. Oxford University Press. Orlikowski, W. J., & Scott, S. V. (2015). Exploring Material-Discursive Practices. Journal of Management Studies, 52(5), 697–705. Papanastasiou, N. (2017). Practices of Boundary-Work in the Collaboration Between Principals and Private Sponsors in England’s Academy Schools. Journal of Education Policy, 32, 82–99. Pritzlaff, T., & Nullmeier, F. (2011). Capturing Practice. Evidence & Policy: A Journal of Research, Debate and Practice, 7(2), 137–154. Reckwitz, A. (2002). Toward a Theory of Social Practices: A Development in Culturalist Theorizing. European Journal of Social Theory, 5(2), 243–263. Ruggie, J. G. (2004). Reconstituting the Global Public Domain – Issues, Actors, and Practices. European Journal of International Relations, 10, 499–531. Schatzki, T. (2001). Introduction: Practice Theory. In T. R. Schatzki, K. Knorr-­ Cetina, & E. Von Savigny (Eds.), The Practice Turn in Contemporary Theory (Vol. 44). Routledge. Skelcher, C., Sullivan, H., & Jeffares, S. (2013). Hybrid Governance in European Cities: Neighbourhood, Migration and Democracy. Palgrave Macmillan. Staudt, K. (2008). Gender, Governance, and Globalization at Borders: Femicide at the US Mexico Border. In S. M. Rai & G. Waylen (Eds.), Global Governance. Palgrave Macmillan. Thompson, D. F. (1980). Moral Responsibility of Public Officials: The Problem of Many Hands. American Political Science Review, 74, 905–915. Warr, D., Dickinson, H., Olney, S., Hargrave, J., Karanikolas, A., Kasidis, V., Katsikis, G., Ozge, J., Peters, D., Wheeler, J., & Wilcox, M. (2017). Choice, Control and the NDIS Service Users’ Perspectives on Having Choice and Control in the New National Disability Insurance Scheme. Melbourne Equity Institute. Wolf, A. T., Yoffe, S. B., & Giordano, M. (2003). International Waters: Identifying Basins at Risk. Water Policy, 5, 29–60.

CHAPTER 10

Conclusion: Prospects and Possibilities for Public Policy Collaboration

Introduction Collaboration is a part of public policy life. Valorised by some, vilified by others, collaboration nonetheless persists, its presence evident across time and space. This book has attempted to understand collaboration’s appeal despite the many difficulties and limitations associated with it in public policy. It has done so by proposing an analytical framework that illuminates the multiple domains in which collaboration makes and accrues meaning—the political (what collaboration is for), the material (what collaboration does), the cultural (what collaboration means), and the spatial (what form collaboration takes)—and treating each domain as of equal importance. Integral to this account is a focus on actors, principally human actors, and their situated agency. This reflects the refrain, often repeated, that collaboration is all about ‘people’. Quite what that can mean in different collaborative circumstances has been the focus of the book, through an exploration of identity and performance in situated agency in the context of different elements of public policy: ideas, rules, ethics, expertise, emotions, objects, and practices. The book has tried to distinguish between claims of collaboration as a ‘good thing’ in and of itself, and collaboration as a necessary means to achieving otherwise unlikely goals. Both are valid claims depending on the circumstances, but they are different claims, with different affects. The © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 H. Sullivan, Collaboration and Public Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-09585-6_10

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book has also attempted to demonstrate the validity and utility of the analytical framework to collaborations across sectors, scales, and cultures, illustrating also what can be learned from a broader and more inclusive understanding of what public policy is. This concluding chapter will consider the prospects for future public policy collaboration, examine how the analytical framework might help in navigating the future, and consider the implications for human actors— with a specific proposition about the importance of cultivating a collaborative self.

The Future for Public Policy Collaboration The Introduction proposed three challenges associated with what I call the collaborative conundrum, that is, forces that at one and the same time require but also resist public policy collaboration. The challenges are the challenge of collective action problems, the challenge of ‘publicness’, and the challenge of a public policy in flux. These challenges are returned to here as the basis for considering the prospects for public policy collaboration. The Challenge of Collective Action Problems Over the course of the life of writing this book—well over a decade—the challenge of collective action problems has become more acute, certainly in the case of anthropogenic climate change, and the fate of displaced peoples. Policy predictions about the impact of populations that are older, or indeed younger, remain largely unattended to, and the prevailing political environment seems too often misaligned to act on the collaborative imperative. For example, COVID presented the most significant global threat since the GFC of 2008 but the G20 has not been able to mount the same kind of response as in 2009. Rather political leaders make claims about ‘sovereign capability’, populist impulses lay bare the inequities of neoliberal globalisation, and market-based collaborations fray under stress. These claims challenge (often explicitly) the conditions of interdependence, hybridity, and diversity that have dominated contemporary governance for decades. As I indicated in the book’s Introduction, these conditions are not immutable. However, the potency of the above narrative claims belies an absence of alternatives to collaboration to address the challenges public policymakers face. It also ignores the complexity and

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subtlety of contemporary governance. As this book has demonstrated collaboration functions in and around nation-states as well as between them, these relationships may confound new national narratives. The Challenge of ‘Publicness’ While more and more of our lives appear to be lived in public, thanks to social media, the idea of what it means to be a public has withered, partly because of the promotion of individualism by social media and the politics of consumption, and partly because of the nature of ‘publics’ that now jostle for space in the digital as well as physical public square. Social solidarity that exists and persists across difference seems more difficult to secure and sustain. The Black Lives Matter and #MeToo movements were able to build broad public support at least for a time, but for many other publics solidarity is sourced and sustained by their separateness. COVID encouraged a sense of social solidarity but also exacerbated the fault lines between publics, amplifying both the attachments many have to public institutions, and the resistance others feel to them. The design and implementation of future public policy will continue to require collaboration with publics, including in co-production and in the application of AI to policy and service delivery. However, the fragmented and fractured nature of policy publics will demand greater effort on the part of policymakers and make collaboration harder to secure. The Challenge of Public Policy in Flux Arguably, public policy has experienced something of a renaissance due to COVID. Policymakers have intervened in the economy and society on a scope and scale not seen since the GFC. Not all interventions have been successful, indeed some have failed with devastating consequences, and the frailties of post-NPM public policy systems have been exposed, but the potential of public policy to make a significant difference to lives and livelihoods is evident. Just as in the immediate aftermath of the GFC, some scholars and analysts insisted on the need and indeed opportunity for radical change, in that case the end of neoliberalism and global capitalism, so too COVID has prompted calls for us to rethink our attachment to ways of organising that are no longer fit for purpose. This includes public policy and administration scholars. Post the GFC they focused attention on the need and

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potential for reforming global institutions, including significant regulatory reform of financial services and systems. In the GFC and COVID they returned to issues of crisis and the role of public administration in managing through different stages of crisis. In the third year of COVID-19, scholars are turning their attention to what else we should be looking at—how to think about a ‘new normal’ and what that might involve. In an article co-authored by editors of some of public administration’s leading journals, reference was made to ‘a shift in public-sector values away from efficiency and effectiveness and toward a paradigm that highlights equity’ (McDonald et al., 2022, p. 1). This shift if it happens promises a significant break with the legacy of NPM.  It will also alter the conditions for collaboration. There are other debates and developments in public policy and administration that will continue to be influential. One concerns the capacity of public policy and administration to account for traditions and contexts outside dominant Western perspectives, as well as bridging between different sub-disciplines such as development, or global public administration. This book has taken an expansive perspective deliberately to illuminate how much can be learned about public policy and collaboration as a result. Another longstanding debate concerns the ‘science’ in public policy and administration. In both academia and practice public policy is presently oriented towards being more scientific, for example, academic journals are more focused on publishing and promoting articles demonstrating particular methodological rigour, while policy practitioners are increasingly concerned with the application of particular scientific methods to test policy, such as randomised control trials. Both these developments could interact with McDonald et al.’s proposal for a new equity focused paradigm, albeit in different ways.

Preparing for the Future: Using the Analytical Framework While we cannot know the future, we can be better prepared for it. This requires action in relation to public policy priorities, and in relation to our own capability (see next section). Apprehending public policy priorities means attending to policymakers’ suite of choices, and the values associated with them. The choices made, and the values they represent that will ‘bring the future into the present’ (Barbalet, 1996), by promoting some options and closing off others.

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In the context of decisions about public policy collaboration preparing for the future involves applying a critical gaze to prevailing or novel ideas, to the potential and limits of existing and proposed rules, to the ethical basis of the suite of choices, to the engagement with expertise, to the emotional consequence of choices, to the work done by objects in relation to choices and values, and to the practices that support and enact those decisions. Undertaking this analysis in the context of the four collaborative domains will afford insight into questions of collaborative purpose, activity, meaning, and shape. The analytical framework that shapes this book is not designed to be a predictive tool, but what I hope this book has demonstrated is the framework’s utility as an aide to understanding public policy collaboration based on a more rounded comprehension of what is going on in any collaborative relationship. This is achieved by attending to the interplay between actors, collaborative domains, and public policy elements. Judgements made on the nature and consequences of this interplay can contribute to better preparation of actors for future collaboration. Below I consider what that might look like via the persona of ‘the collaborative self’.

The Collaborative Self The idea of ‘the collaborative self’ emerged from my attempts to unpack agency in collaboration understood as the force with which actors can act on a situation, the sense of identity that gives shape to that force, and the performances that represent it (Sullivan, 2015). Identity and performance interact and inform each other in and through collaboration. Identity is not given and fixed, rather the processes and practices of collaboration unsettle established identities. They may threaten to disrupt them, act to reinforce them, or even constitute new identities, professionally, politically, and institutionally. Identities are informed by the seven public policy elements discussed in this book and also find expression in them. Performance emphasises the importance of enacting a set of skills, and behaviours in a given context, it suggests the fulfilment of a role in accordance with appropriate standards or objectives, and it also highlights the relational nature of collaboration; any individual performance is always shaped by the performance of others as well as the context. The ‘collaborative self’ then may be myriad and dynamic, informed by the past, interpretive of the present, and generative of that which is ‘not

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yet’ (Ahmed, 2004, p. 92) Actors attempt to bring into being a version of themselves that is in keeping with their espoused motivations and intentions, but is always shaped by what the past (theirs and those of their partners) has made possible. The ‘collaborative self’ may be defensive and resistant, sceptical, and indifferent, open and accepting; it may be reluctant or enthusiastic, and it may be any or all of these in different collaborative contexts. Examples of a collaborative self are present throughout the book. They include suggestions for what might make productive performances as well as examples of destructive performances. They do not constitute recipes to be followed but rather lists of ingredients that may be used, combined, or avoided depending on the circumstance. This is important as idealised representations of collaborative selves incorporate both effective and affective dimensions (reason and emotion) but in so doing valorise a set of ‘positive’ capabilities, dispositions, and emotions. This limits our understanding of what happens in collaborative situations marked by conflict or ‘negative’ emotions, and risks narrowing the possibilities for learning. My purpose in writing this book was to enable a greater understanding of the travails and delights of collaboration, focusing on the contribution of human actors. In concluding I want to highlight a vital, though possibly overlooked, conclusion from the encyclopaedic research on collaboration, that is, the importance of human endeavour in collaborative action. Endeavour encapsulates the persistent and often frustrating effort required to collaborate, coupled with an acknowledgement that in some cases there may be no resolution to the public policy challenge at hand. Collaboration in these circumstances may be the least worst option available, and actors’ endeavour a reflection of the determination to act in pursuit of public purpose.

References Ahmed, S. (2004). The Cultural Politics of Emotion. Routledge. Barbalet, J.  M. (1996). Social Emotions: Confidence, Trust and Loyalty. International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy, 16, 75–96. Mcdonald III, B. D., Hall, J. L., O’Flynn, J., & Van Thiel, S. (2022). The Future of Public Administration Research: An Editor’s Perspective. Public Administration, n/a, 1–13. Sullivan, H. (2015). Performing a Collaborative Self. In D. Alexander & J. Lewis (Eds.), Making Policy Decisions: Expertise, Skills and Experience. Routledge.

Index

A Abbot, K., 83 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples ‘Elders’ as experts, 132 (see also First Nations) Accountability, 9, 10, 32, 79, 84, 113, 114, 122, 196, 222, 223, 229, 232, 241 Actors ‘active citizens,’ 137 actor-ecology, 86 and agency, 4 being ‘an ethical actor,’ 115 blocked agency, 174 (see also Boundary spanners) citizens, 60, 147, 229 civil society, 123, 202, 230 communities, 21, 119, 120, 168, 202, 229 digital creatives, 234 diplomats, 233 and efficacy, 30 and emotional claim-making, 170

emotional resources, 180–182 experts, 131 (see also Experts) identity of, 4, 60, 86, 141, 146, 202 institutional, 79, 139 institutional entrepreneurs, 7, 74 lay people, 147 multinational companies, 203 ‘new radicals,’ 7 philanthropists, 24 policy analyst, 50, 135 ‘policy commissioners,’ 142 policy entrepreneurs, 52 and political identity, 64 private sector, 11, 21, 76, 77, 79, 83, 112, 113, 119, 161, 202 ‘public persons,’ 103 and ‘scale craft,’ 38 ‘self work,’ 232 service users, 26, 60, 223, 225, 227 ‘situated agents,’ 14 and social practices, 217 transnational activists, 83 treatment activists-HIV/AIDS, 132

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 H. Sullivan, Collaboration and Public Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-09585-6

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INDEX

Adwan, S., 239 Affect, 4, 6, 31, 36, 41, 103, 106, 146, 157–159, 164, 168, 169, 172, 176, 178, 181, 247, 252 Africa, 120 Agency definition, 34 Ahmed, S., 108, 169, 252 Alvinius, A., 180 Anderson, K., 160 Andrews, C.J., 160 Argentina, 134 Artificial Intelligence, 119, 143, 243 Asian Development Bank, 220 Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and rules, 93 Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), 20, 61, 242 rules of the ‘ASEAN way,’ 82 Athens, 24 Austerity, 23, 27 Australia, 11, 28, 49, 54, 84, 87, 101, 109, 112, 114, 115, 118, 120, 121, 132, 139, 197, 202, 223, 224 Axell, M., 234 B Baker, A., 86 Baker, K., 204 Bakker, M.H.N., 238 Baltimore, 24 Barad, K, 190, 221 Barbalet, J.M, 159, 250 Barcelona, 24 Barnes, B., 217 Barnes, M., 40, 60, 80, 93, 103, 145 Barnett, A., 85 Bason, C., 66 Bate, S.P., 141 Baud, M., 233

Beard, M., 121 Beaven, S., 149 Béguin, P., 217 Béland, D., 51 Bennett, J., 189 Berlant, L., 198 Beyene, T., 181 Bhattacharjee, P., 116 Bice, S., 11, 149, 202, 242 Birmingham, 229 Black, E., 238 Blanco, I., 57 Blume, T., 227 Blunkett, D., 143 Boaz, A., 12, 219 Bodies, 35, 159, 216, 218, 219, 241 Bodin, Ö., 149 Borderlands and structural power-relations, 232 US-Mexico murders of women and girls, 233 Borderwork and translation, 232 and women, 229 Botsman, R., 221 Boundaries, 75 actors use of, 136 blurring, 10 breaching, 231 Boundary infrastructures, 203 Boundary objects, 15, 42 description, 200 identity and performance, 210 and neighbourhood revitalisation, 210 and power relations, 203 taxonomy, 201 Boundary spanners, 75, 79, 180 emotional well-being, 180 ‘emotion management strategies,’ 180 roles and competencies, 150–152

 INDEX 

Bowker, G. C., 203 The Brackenbridge Declaration and collaborative conduct, 80 Bradford, C.I., 176 Bradley, J., 57 Bransden, T., 145 Brazil, 95, 130 Brescoll, V.L., 162 Broad, E., 119 Brown, W., 191 Brunton, C., 181 Brunton, M., 173 C Cambodia, 239 Canterbury Earthquakes, 149 Cardiff, 116 Carlisle, P., 137 Catlaw, T.J., 107 Child protection and collaborative capacity, 109 and ethics of collaboration, 109 Chronic Condition Management Program emotional satisfaction, 171 Clarke, J., 10, 242 Clement, G., 103, 107 Climate Change collaborating in response to, 54–56 as an idea, 53–54 Kyoto Protocol, 55 Local Agenda 21, 56 Paris Agreement and Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs), 55 Closing the Gap, 121 ‘Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Peoples’ critique, 121 and Council of Australian Governments, 121 Refresh, 122 Clot, Y., 217

255

Coate, J., 11 Coates, H., 242 Co-design, 66, 120 Coglianese, C., 84 Co-governance influence of, 26–27 Cohen, S., 120 Collaboration ‘actors’ emotional attachment to, 170 anti-political, 62 appeal of, 3 arguments against, 1 arguments for, 1 and conflict, 182–183, 237–239 and contemporary governance, 2 and crisis, 22–24 as cultural performance, 29, 35 definition of, 5 and democracy, 84 development of, 20–22 domains of, 3–4, 13 and efficacy, 29 and endeavour, 151 forms of, 1 human actors and agency in, 4–5 and multiple ethical positions, 105 and performance, 4 as post-political, 23, 62 and public policy elements, 5 scale of, 1 scope of, 2 and ‘the third way,’ 22 unsettling emotions, 178 usefulness of term, 5 as consensus; emotional claim-­ making, 169 Collaborative conundrum challenge of a public policy in flux, 11–13 challenge of collective action problems, 8–9 challenge of ‘publicness,’ 9–11 description of, 8–13

256 

INDEX

Collaborative performance, 80 Collaborative self, 42, 243, 251, 252 Collaborator (perj.), 168 Collective action problem definition, 8 Conflict and actors identity, 174 and ‘adversarial legitimacy,’ 64 and creativity, 182 and disagreement, 63, 134 and emotions, 182 and negotiation, 238 and power-relations, 63, 92, 93 practice of politics, 63 practicing, 237–239 productive and unproductive, 64 and trust, 183 and unbridgeable differences, 182 Conflict commodities, see The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme Conflict resolution and peacebuilding actors, emotion and affect, 172 emotional claim-making, 168 emotional proficiency, 180 International Non-Governmental Organisations, 172 Northern Ireland, 168 Connell, D., 88 Connell, J., 145 Connolly, W., 36, 106, 178 Contemporary governance diversity, 8 hybridity, 7–8 interdependence, 6–7 Cook, A., 197 Cook, C., 173 Cook, L., 109 Cook, S., 181 Cooper, A.F., 85, 233 Copenhagen, 229 Co-production, 28, 39, 51, 120, 144, 145, 221–227, 249

Court, J., 12 CoVAX, 123, 131 COVID-19, 2, 9–11, 13, 26, 27, 85, 114, 123 and collaboration, 2, 130 emotional claim-making, 166 experts and expertise, 130–131 Co-writing history, 239 Israelis and Palestinians, 239 new way of practicing learning, 239 Cox, R.H., 51 Creative Collaboration, 65 Cross-cultural collaboration, 121–123 Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples, 121 and ‘commonsense’ practice, 174 and ethical learning, 122 and ethics, 121–123 First Nations, Canada, 122 in health care teams, 173 and moral emotions, 173 and social justice ethics, 121 Crouch, C., 7, 74 Cultural domain of collaboration and ASEAN, 61, 82 The Brackenridge Declaration, 81 and climate change, 55 and conflict resolution and peacebuilding, 172 and efficacy, 35 and ethical agency, 106 and expertise, 152 and experts, 138 and global financial regulation, 86 and Local Strategic Partnerships, 78 and practice, 217 and Public-Private Partnerships, 77 and urban revitalisation/ regeneration, 198 and watershed management, 87 description, 35–36 Kantianism, 104

 INDEX 

New York Declaration on Addressing Large Movements of Refugees and Migrants, 194 protecting expertise and experts, 140 The Responsibility to Protect, 112 virtuism, 104 D Davenport, C., 204 Davidson, P.J., 82 Davies, M., 61 De la Rey, C., 179 De Long, D. W., 137 Decentered governance, 74 Delile, J., 242 Denmark, 21, 66 Depoliticisation, 32, 62–63 Diabetes and co-produced care practices, 222 Dickinson, H., 29, 30, 35, 36, 60, 148, 200 Dinur, A., 137 #DiploHack, 234 co-creation, 234 practices, 236 and The Prevention of Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative (PSVI), 235 Discourses and agency, 59 of collaboration, 60, 62, 63 constituting collaborative identities, 60–61 constituting collaborative spaces, 61–62 definition, 59 discursive policy approach, 50 discursive registers of emotion, 161 Discursive institutionalism, 50 Diversity, 8 Doyle, J., 84

257

Dr. Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, 166 Dublin, 24 Durnova, A., 161, 163, 165 Durose, C., 227 Dwivedi, O.P., 21 E Education, 140 Einfeld, C., 202, 203 Emerson, K., 51 Emotional engagement empathy, 180–182 and ‘the other,’ 181 ‘receptive listening,’ 181 sitting with difference, 181–182 Emotions, 15, 41 actors and agency, 163 and affect, 159, 164, 181 appropriate and inappropriate, 162 appropriate and inappropriate conduct, 172 and Behavioural insights, 161 and boundaries, 164 defining, 158, 159 discursive registers, 161, 163, 165, 166, 168 doing emotional work, 176–183 emotional intelligence, 162 emotional labour, 162 the emotional lives of collaboration, 170–176 emotional states, 158 joy and satisfaction, 171–172 moral emotions, 173 not admitted, 172–173 as policy tools, 161 and Positive psychology, 161 and power, 161 public emotions, 162, 165 and public policy, 159–163 and rational decision-making, 160

258 

INDEX

Emotions (cont.) the and the socio-cultural context, 161 and time, 164 ‘ugly feelings,’ 174, 179, 181 unspoken emotional work, 179 and the ‘visceral domain,’ 178 Emre, M., 162 Epstein, S., 132 Estonia, 208 See also Government as a platform Ethical practice, 106, 173 and the body, 106, 241 collaborative capacity and capability, 109, 122 and emotion, 103, 105–107 and ethical attachments, 115 as ethical learning, 108 law enforcement and public health, 116 ‘living ethics,’ 124 and micro-practices, 107 Ethics, 14, 40 collaborating ethically, 114–123 in collaboration, 103–108 and competing professional identities, 115 consequentialism, 101, 104, 105 and critiques of collaboration, 109 cross-cultural ethics, 102 data and privacy, 116–119 and desire, 107 ethics of care, 103, 107 ‘ethics of the local,’ 106 and inclusive public conduct, 103 Kantianism, 101, 104, 105 and morality, 99, 101, 108 of non-policy making, 110 and New Public Management, 101 and ‘the public imaginary,’ 102, 123 and public morality, 101, 108 and public policy, 101–103

question of ethical collaboration, 103–114 and situated agents, 102 social justice ethics, 101, 105, 121 and time, 112 and values, 99, 101, 104, 105, 114 virtuism, 101, 104, 105 ‘what works’ as an ethical justification, 114 European Union (EU), 20, 22, 48, 242 Evans, K., 34 Evidence-based policy making (EBPM) and expertise, 134–136 and the scientific method, 134 and a variety of ways of knowing, 135 Expertise, 14, 41 for collaboration, 147–150 collaboration to protect expertise and experts, 139–140 as craft, 152 cultural competence, 149–150 and embedded knowledge, 137 experts and agency, 131–133 and identity, 138 identity and agency, 132 vs. ideology, 129 and invested knowledge, 137 and judgement, 134 and knowledges, 131; transformation for collaboration, 138 and lay or lived experience, 133 lay or service-user, 132 learning from practice, 134 and localised knowledge, 137 new knowledge from non-­ experts, 144–147 as performance, 138 political sensitivity, 148–149 and public policy, 131–136 and skills, 138

 INDEX 

technical, 131 in tension with collaboration, 136 traditional, 132 Experts and boundaries, 136 boundary spanners, 152 collusion, 139 and evidence, 141 and ‘non-experts,’ 146 policy experts, 133 policy/political advisers, 134 status, 131 system experts, 133 F Fahey, L., 137 Fauci, A., 133 Feldman, M.R., 218 Feldman, M.S., 216, 217 First Nations Australia, 88, 139 Canada, 122 Fischer, F., 49, 50 Fisher, A., 28 Fitzpatrick, T., 101, 104 Flanagan, O., 102 Florence, C., 116 Fong, A., 201 Food, see Objects, multi-­ functional objects Forrer, J., 114 Foucault, 50 France, 188 Freeman, R., 42, 219 Friedmann, J., 58 Friend, M.P., 109 G G20, 22, 85, 174, 248 G20 London Summit Gordon Brown, 176

259

intimacy and agency, 176 space and emotion, 176 Gains, F., 75 Gal, U., 201, 207 General Statue of the Civil Servants (Statut Général des Fonctionnaires), 188 Germany, 220 Gherardi, S., 218 Gibson-Graham, J.K., 106 Gilligan, C., 107 Gjaltema, J., 32 Global Financial Crisis (GFC), 12, 22, 85 Globalisation influence of, 25–26 Global North, 74, 120 Global South, 21, 85, 120 Goh, E., 61 Goleman, D., 162 Goodin, R.E., 135 Goodwin, S., 162 Governance re-scaling, 26 Government as a platform as boundary object, 207 Grafton, R.D., 88 Greenhalgh, T., 142 Greisemer, J.R., 208 Greve, C., 76 Griesemer, J.R., 200–204, 207 Griffiths, E., 101 Griggs, S., 4, 74, 219 Gross, J., 7 Guy, M.E., 162 H Haass, R., 85 Habermas, J., 50 Haidt, J., 173 Hajer, M., 74 Hall, D., 104

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INDEX

Hamington, M., 103 Hardt, M., 159 Hardy, C., 137 Hardy, S.D., 88 Harte, D., 120 Hattie, J., 140 Haufler, V., 82 Head, B., 12 Health and social care integration and identity objects, 195 Heckler, S., 171 Hellowell, M., 113 Henderson, B., 35 Henderson, H., 198 Henricson, C., 102 Heywood, S., 176 HIV/AIDS, 115, 132 Hocking, B., 28 Hodge, G., 76, 84 Holland, 234 Homelessness, 165 hooks, b, 38 Horning, A., 168, 181 Howarth, D., 59 Hulme, M., 53 Hunter, S., 181 Hybridity, 7 and agency, 74 global hybrid institutions, 83 Hydén, G., 21 I Ideas, 14, 39–40 as ‘coalition magnets,’ 51 collaboration as an idea, 58–64 collaboration as a source of ideas, 58–64 and collaboration in policy studies, 51–52 and discourse, 59 and policy studies, 49–51 and public policy, 48–49

as a source of collaboration, 52–58 and the spatial domain, 56–58 Identity, 80 challenge of ethical collaboration, 114 and the cultural domain, 36 and ethics, 106 and practice, 218 India, 9, 21, 30, 95 Indonesia, 143 Inkpen, A.C., 137 Innovation, 66 Institutional prisons and agency, 93 and rules, 93 Integration, 195, 206 International trade, 82 Interpretivism, 49, 50 Israel, 190, 239 J Jacobs, B., 190 Japan, 21, 188 Jasanoff, S., 131 Jeffares, S., 53, 59 Johansson, P., 172, 181, 183 John-Steiner, V., 64 Jones, P., 120 Jonsen, A.R., 133 Jordan, G.M., 107 Jupp, E., 159 K Kahler, M., 95 Katz, B., 57 Katz, C., 232 Kettles, see Objects, identity objects The Kimberley Process Certification Scheme and rules, 82

 INDEX 

Kobie, N., 119 Koontz, T.M., 88 Korea, 21, 30, 188 Kretzmann, J.P., 227 Kubisch, A., 145 L Laclau, E., 63, 64 Lambeth Council— Cooperative Council co-producing policy, 227 Lao PDR, 239 Lauriano, L.A., 134 Lawlor, E., 196 Leach, W.D., 84 Leeuw, F.L., 196 Leicester, 24 Lepine, E., 103, 151 Liao, R., 95 Linn, J.F., 176 Localism, 57 The ‘locality’ as boundary object, 206 Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs), 77–79 and agency, 79 as an institutional actor, 79 and rules, 77 Lombard, M., 58, 67 Lowe, T., 197 Lowndes, V., 73, 75, 145 Lupton, D., 158 Lyon, M.L., 159 M Macintyre, A., 102 MacQuarrie, P.R., 238 Mafia, 6, 100 March, J.G., 74 Margetts, H., 208 Martin, C., 222

261

Massey, D., 37 Material domain of collaboration The Brackenridge Declaration, 81 and climate change, 55 conflict resolution and peacebuilding, 172 and cross-cultural health care teams, 174 and the ethics of care, 108 and expertise, 152 and Local Strategic Partnerships, 79 and MindLab, 66 New York Declaration on Addressing Large Movements of Refugees and Migrants, 192, 194 outcomes based approaches, 196 performing expertise, 138 and practice, 217 and Public-Private Partnerships, 76 The Responsibility to Protect, 112 and urban revitalisation/ regeneration, 57, 198 virtuism, 104 and watershed management, 87 Matthews, P., 120 Mayes, R., 203 McDermont, M., 120 McDonald, B.D., 250 McGinn, M.K., 124 McKay, S., 179 McKenzie, J., 29, 35 McKnight, J.L., 227 Meier, K.J., 162 Meisler, G., 162 Mekong River Basin, 238 practising conflict, 239 Melbourne, 24 hotel quarantine failure, 11, 131 Melissen, J., 28 Merriam, A., 149 Mexico, 58, 66, 190 Mialet, H., 218

262 

INDEX

Michaud, J., 115 Middle East, 85 Miller, D.C., 103 MindLab, 66 Mishra, D.S., 21 Mol, A., 222 Monbiot, G., 113 Montreal, 24 Morality, see Ethics Morrison, T., 58 Mouffe, C., 63, 64 The Murray-Darling Basin, 87 and actors agency over rule choice, 92 The Basin Plan, 88 and European settlement, 88 and First Nations peoples, 88, 92 The Murray-Darling Basin Authority, 88 The National Cultural Flows Research Project, 93 rules and collaboration, 88 The Water Act 2007, 88 N Nabatchi, T., 51 Nantes, 24 National Disability Insurance Scheme (NDIS), 223 co-producing services, 223–226 practices of choice and control, 225 rights-based approach, 225 Naumann, A., 208 Neighbourhood committee blocked agency, 174 and expertise, 147 ‘ugly feelings,’ 174 Neiman, S., 49 Nesta, 7 Netherlands, 21

New Public Management (NPM), 24, 25, 49, 51, 65, 220 influence on collaboration, 24–25 New York Declaration on refugees and migrants, 192 as a policy object, 192 as a symbolic object, 194 New Zealand, 49, 80, 109, 130, 149, 173, 188, 197 Newman, J., 10, 102, 123, 145, 229, 231, 232 Ngai, S., 174 NHS ‘Collaboratives,’ 141 Niccolini, D., 216, 218 Nicolini, D., 200 Nohrstedt, D., 149 Northern Ireland, 164, 168, 181 Norval, A., 63–64 Nowak, J., 57 Nullmeir, F., 220 Nussbaum, M., 162, 163, 165 Nutley, S.M., 135 O Objects, 15, 42 and agency, 189 collaboration as an object, 197–200 everyday objects, 194 and identity, 188 identity and performance, 208 identity objects, 194–196 multi-functional objects, 197–198 ‘an object of desire,’ 198 performance objects, 196–197 policy object, 192–194 in public policy, 187–191 relational properties, 189, 191 at work in collaboration, 191–198 O’Brien, D., 120 O’Flynn, J., 101

 INDEX 

O’Leary, R., 81 Oliver, K., 12 Olsen, J.P., 74 Olson, M., 8 O’Reilly, T., 207 Orlikowski, W.J., 221 Ostrom, E., 73, 145 Oswick, C., 203 Outcomes as performance objects, 196 P Painter, M., 134 Palestine, 239 Palmer, I., 137 Papanastasiou, N., 38, 240 The Paris Agreement as boundary object, 203–204 Parks, R., 145 Partners ending Homelessness emotional claim-making, 165 People’s Republic of China (PRC), 21, 27, 30, 48, 72, 118, 130, 143, 188 and rules, 93 social credit system, 118 Performance and practice, 218 public policy craft, 152 Phillips, N., 86 Pieterse, J.N., 75 Piquemal, N., 122 Place-making, 56–58 Policy Commission (University of Birmingham), 142, 146 Political domain of collaboration The Brackenridge Declaration, 80 and climate change, 54 conflict resolution and peacebuilding, 172 consequentialism, 104

263

description, 32–33 and discourses, 59 and expertise, 152 Kantianism, 104 and Local Strategic Partnerships, 78 New York Declaration on refugees and migrants, 192, 194 outcomes based approaches, 196 and power relations, 33 and practice, 217 protecting expertise and experts, 140 and Public-Private Partnerships, 76 The Responsibility to Protect, 112 rules for inclusion, 80 and urban revitalisation/ regeneration, 57, 198 and watershed management, 87 Pollock, A., 113 Pomeroy, A., 197 Powell, N., 27 Power and actor capture, 83 and actor-ecology, 86 and borderwork, 232 and ethical agency, 100, 105 and ethical collaboration in/with communities, 119–120 and expertise, 136 and the ‘politics of empathy,’ 182 and the practice of politics, 63 and publics, 61 regulatory capture, 85 role of, 6 structural power and ethical learning, 108 structural power and First Nations Peoples, 93 structural power and social justice ethics, 105

264 

INDEX

Practices, 15, 42 being accountable, 241–242 and the body, 218 borderland as a site of, 233 and conflict, 237–239 co-production as practice, 221–227 digital enabled, 234 drawing boundaries, 240 edgework, 229–233 interpretation, 242 learning, 225 making meetings, 240–241 new governance practices, 227–229 ‘political practices,’ 220 proto-institutions, 227, 230–231 of public policy, 220; as practice, 219–220 ‘subpolitical practices,’ 220 translation, 232, 242 The Prevention of Sexual Violence in Conflict Initiative (PSVI), 234 Prior, L., 133 Pritzlaff, T., 220 Private Finance Initiative (PFI) ethics of collaboration, 113 (see also Public-Private Partnerships) Prno, J., 202 Public policy changing scope and scale, 11 crises and collaboration, 12 critical Policy Studies, 219 evidence-based policy making, 12 ‘in flux,’ 12 ‘high modernism,’ 12 loss of faith in, 12 and policy sciences, 12 Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) and agency, 77 definition, 76 and rule conflict, 84 and rules, 76 Publics, 61, 120, 133, 227 defining, 10

and emotional competence, 161 formations of, 9 ideas about, 10 lived experience of, 133 public versus private, 10 and rules, 79–80 as service users, 103, 145, 225 Pykett, J., 143 R Rancière, J., 63 Rawls, J., 101 Ray, T., 137 Realism, 49 Reckwitz, A., 218 Repoliticisation, 63–64 The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) and collaborative capacity, 110 ethical claims for, 110 and ethics of collaboration, 110 Richardson, L., 227 Rifkin, J., 28 Rittel, H.W.J., 52 Roberts, G., 141 Roberts, M., 73 Robertson, M., 203 Robison, R., 179, 183 Rochester, J.M., 110 Rogers, R., 221 Rosenberg, P.M., 182 Rotterdam, 229 Ruggie, J.G., 233 Rulemaking and agency, 80 Rules, 14, 40 and agency, 73–75 and conflict, 93 conflicting, 83–84 constraining collaboration, 95 crises and rule-making, 85 as enablers of collaboration, 75–80 and gender, 75

 INDEX 

for inclusion, 79–80 and institutional theory, 73 involving citizens in rulemaking, 79 and policy studies, 73–74 for private benefit, 84–85 and public policy, 72–75 to regulate conduct, 82–83 relationship between collaborative rules and pre-existing rules, 86 responding to rule incongruence, 93 and structural power, 87–95 and time, 87–95 Russell, A., 171 Russell, J., 142 Russia, 95 Rwanda, 130 S Salazar-Morales, D. A., 134 Sanderson, I., 135 Sarra, C., 121 Scale and the spatial domain, 38 Schatzki, T., 217, 218 Schein, E.H., 137 Schmidt, V., 50 Schofield, T., 162 Schön, D.A., 39 Schwartz-Shea, P., 50 Scotland, 196 Scott, S.V., 221 Scott, W.R., 74 Seligman, M., 161 Sennett, R., 26, 30 Shaver, P.R., 159 Shaw, E., 114 Singapore, 66, 118 Situated agency definition, 4 and emotional work, 179 and gender, 75 and the material domain, 35

265

Situated agents and ethics, 102, 103, 106 Skelcher, C.K., 1, 39, 48, 74, 145, 150, 196, 227, 229, 231 Slocombe, S.D., 202 Smith, I., 145 Smith, R., 110 Smith, S.J., 160 Snidal, D, 83 Social Impact Bonds, 25 Social licence to operate (SLO), 201 as boundary object, 201–203 Solidum, R.D., 82 South Africa, 49, 95, 179 South China Sea, 93 Spatial domain of collaboration The Brackenridge Declaration, 81 and climate change, 55, 56 and cross-cultural health care teams, 174 description, 36–39 and discourses, 61 and expertise, 152 expertise and boundaries, 136 G20 London Summit, 176 and global financial regulation, 86 and Local Strategic Partnerships, 78 and MindLab, 66 New York Declaration on refugees and migrants, 194 and place-shaping, 37 and practice, 218 and Public-Private Partnerships, 76 The Responsibility to Protect, 112 rules for inclusion, 80 social justice ethics, 105 social licence to operate (SLO), 203 and Type 1 diabetes, 218 and urban revitalisation/ regeneration, 56–58, 198 and watershed management, 87

266 

INDEX

Star, S.L., 189, 200–204, 207, 208 Staudt, K., 232 Stern, C.S., 35 Stewart, M., 135, 146 Stiglitz, J., 196 Stone, C., 57 Stone, D., 50 Structure definition, 34 Stryker, J., 133 Sullivan, H., 1, 11, 35, 36, 39, 40, 59, 60, 62–64, 79, 80, 94, 103, 104, 114, 135, 142, 145–148, 150, 151, 170, 182, 183, 194–196, 206, 251 Sustainable Social Services for Wales: A Framework for Action, 29 Sutcliffe, S., 12 Swan, J., 192 Sweden, 130, 149, 234 T Taiwan, 130 Tanzania, 21 Taylor, S., 166 Thailand, 239 Theories of practice, 216–218 Theory of Change, 146 Thoit, P.A., 159 Thomas, R., 201, 203 Thompson, D.F., 241 Thomson, N., 115 Tobacco control partnership agency and design, 171 Treaty of Waitangi (Tiriti o Waitangi), 188 Turner, J., 120 Type 1 diabetes and practice, 218

U UK Coalition, 62, 170 Programme for Government, 23 United Kingdom (UK), 7, 10, 12, 22, 27, 60, 65, 80, 84, 101, 109, 112, 119, 120, 130, 135, 143, 160, 161, 176, 188, 195, 229, 234 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, 54 United States of America (USA), 12, 22, 48, 57, 65, 66, 101, 130, 142, 144, 165, 189, 190, 233 UK New Labour, 62, 77, 170 UK pit closure program 1980s emotional content, 160 Urban governance, 24 Urban regimes, 57 Urban revitalisation/ regeneration, 56–58 and boundary objects, 210 branding, 57 informal settlements, ‘colonias populares,’ 58 neighbourhood, 145 and new governance practices, 231 people-centered, 58 and the political domain, 57 Revitalising Central Dandenong, 197 and the spatial domain, 57 V Valentine, G., 38 van der Wal, Z., 148 van Dijk, A.J., 115 Van Schenden, W., 233

 INDEX 

van Thiel, S., 196 Vietnam, 27, 72, 134, 239 Vigoda-Gadot, E., 162 Violence against female sex workers addressing unethical police conduct, 116 developing ethical practice, 116 human rights and ethical collaboration, 116 identity and agency, 116 W Wales, 29, 171, 182, 206 Walls and identity, 191 as objects in public policy, 190 Warr, D., 226 Wasta, 85 Water, see The Murray-Darling Basin Watershed management First Nations, Australia, 88 and rule conflict, 84 and rules, 87 rules and collaboration, 88 (see also The Murray-Darling Basin)

267

Weart, S.R., 53 Webber, M.M., 52 Weiss, C., 145 Weiss, T.G., 110 Westminster system, 49 Wetherell, M., 158 Wettenhall, R., 21 Wicked problems, 9, 51, 52, 54, 67 Wildavsky, A., 135 Williams, P., 38, 75, 104, 150, 151, 182, 194, 195, 206 Wolf, A.T., 238 World Health Organisation, 100, 166, 220 Worline, M., 216–218 Y Yanow, D., 50 Yemen, 115 Young, I.M., 103 Young people, 146–147 Z Zachry, M., 201