Cold War civil rights: race and the image of American democracy 9780691095134, 9780691016610, 9781400839889

Table of contents :
Frontmatter
List of Illustrations (page xi)
INTRODUCTION (page 3)
CHAPTER 1 Coming to Terms with Cold War Civil Rights (page 18)
CHAPTER 2 Telling Stories about Race and Democracy (page 47)
CHAPTER 3 Fighting the Cold War with Civil Rights Reform (page 79)
CHAPTER 4 Holding the Line in Little Rock (page 115)
CHAPTER 5 Losing Control in Camelot (page 152)
CHAPTER 6 Shifting the Focus of America's Image Abroad (page 203)
CONCLUSION (page 249)
Notes (page 255)
Acknowledgments (page 311)
Index (page 317)

Citation preview

COLD WAR

CIVIL RIGHTS

POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA SERIES EDITORS

William Chafe, Gary Gerstle, and Linda Gordon

A list of titles in the series appears at the back of the book

RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY

Mary L. Dudziak

PRINCETON UNIVERSTY PRESS | PRINCETON AND OXFORD

COPYRIGHT © 2000 BY PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS PUBLISHED BY PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS, 41 WILLIAM STREET, PRINCETON, NEW JERSEY 08540

IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS, 3 MARKET PLACE, WOODSTOCK, OXFORDSHIRE OX20 1SY ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

SECOND PRINTING, AND FIRST PAPERBACK PRINTING, 2002 PAPERBACK ISBN 0-691-09513-2 THE LIBRARY OF CONGRESS HAS CATALOGED THE CLOTH EDITION OF THIS BOOK AS FOLLOWS DUDZIAK, MARY L., 1956COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS : RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY / MARY L. DUDZIAK. PCM. —— (POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN [TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA) INCLUDES BIBLIOGRAPHICAL REFERENCES AND INDEX. ISBN 0-691-01661-5 (alk. paper) 1. UNITED STATES-RACE RELATIONS-POLITICAL ASPECTS. 2. AFRO-AMERICANS-CIVIL RIGHTS-HISTORY-20TH CENTURY. 3. AFRO-AMERICANS-LEGAL STATUS, LAWS, ETC.-HISTORY-— 20TH CENTURY. 4. RACISM—POLITICAL ASPECTS—UNITED STATES—-HISTORY—20TH CENTURY. 5. UNITED STATES—

POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT-1945-1989. 6. DEMOCRACYUNITED STATES—HISTORY—20TH CENTURY. 7. COLD WARSOCIAL ASPECTS—UNITED STATES. I. TITLE. II. SERIES.

E185.61 .D85 2000 323.1'196073'09045—DC21 00-038515 BRITISH LIBRARY CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA IS AVAILABLE

THIS BOOK HAS BEEN COMPOSED IN GARAMOND PRINTED ON ACID-FREE PAPER. ce www. pup. princeton.edu

PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

10987 Parts of this manuscript previously appeared in a different form in the following articles, and are republished with permission: “Desegregation as a Cold War Imperative,” Stanford Law Review 41 (November 1988): 61-120;

“Josephine Baker, Racial Protest and the Cold War,” Journal of American History 81 (September 1994): 543-570; “The Little Rock Crisis and Foreign Affairs: Race, Resistance and the Image of American Democracy,” Southern California Law Review 70 (September 1997): 1641-1716.

ISBN-13: 978-0-691-095 13-4

ISBN-10: 0-691-09513-2

‘To Alicia

BLANK PAGE.

Abused and scorned though we may be as a people, our destiny is tied up in the destiny of America. MARTIN LUTHER KING JR.

MARCH 31, 1968

| BLANK PAGE

Contents

List of Illustrations xi INTRODUCTION 3 CHAPTER 1 Coming to Terms with Cold

War Civil Rights 18

CHAPTER 2 Telling Stories about Race

and Democracy 47

CHAPTER 3 Fighting the Cold War with Civil

Rights Reform 79

CHAPTER 4 Holding the Line in Little Rock 115

CHAPTER 5 Losing Control in Camelot 152 CHAPTER 6 Shifting the Focus of America’s

Image Abroad 203

CONCLUSION 249

Notes 255 Acknowledgments 311 Index 317

BLANK PAGE

Illustrations

National Association of Colored Women delegates picket the

White House, July 1946. UPI/CORBIS-BETTMANN. 21 , Funeral services for two lynching victims, Monroe, Georgia,

July 25, 1946. UPI/CORBIS-BETTMANN. 22 An integrated New York classroom, as portrayed in “The Negro in American Life,” a United States Information Agency pamphlet distributed in the 1950s. Chester Bowles Papers,

Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University. 54 Neighbors in an integrated housing project, as portrayed in “The Negro in American Life,” a United States Information Agency pamphlet distributed in the 1950s. Chester Bowles

Papers, Manuscripts and Archives, Yale University. 55 William Patterson, Paul Robeson, and Robeson’s attorney, James Wright, leaving a federal courthouse after an unsuccessful hearing challenging the denial of Robeson’s passport, August

16, 1955. UPI/CORBIS-BETTMANN. 71

Josephine Baker protesting outside a Havana, Cuba, radio

station, February 15, 1953. UPI/CORBIS-BETTMANN. 72 President Harry S. Truman receiving the report of his President's Committee on Civil Rights, October 29, 1947. UPI/

CORBIS-BETTMANN. 97 Segregated from his white classmates, George McLaurin attends the University of Oklahoma School of Education, October 16,

1946. UPI/CORBIS-BETTMANN. D8

Democrat-Gazette. 122 “Careful, the Walls Have Ears,” September 11, 1957, Arkansas

Tribune. 123

“Right into Their Hands,” September 11, 1957. Oakland

The 101% Airborne Division escorts nine African American

students into Central High School in Little Rock, Arkansas,

September 25, 1957. UPI/CORBIS-BETTMANN. 129 President John F. Kennedy and Nigerian Prime Minister Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa at the White House following talks,

July 27, 1961. UPI/CORBIS-BETTMANN. 160 Freedom Rider James Zwerg recovers from injuries in a Montgomery, Alabama, hospital, May 21, 1961. UPI/CORBIS-

BETTMANN. 161

Firefighters bear down on civil rights demonstrators in Birmingham, Alabama, May 3, 1963. UPI/CORBIS-

BETTMANN. | 176 African Heads of State convene for the first meeting of the Organization of African Unity, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, May 23,

1963. UPI/CORBIS-BETTMANN. 177

More than 200,000 participate in the March on Washington,

August 28, 1963. UPI/CORBIS-BETTMANN. | 195 A Soviet political cartoon portrays American racial segregation,

August 24, 1963. UPI/CORBIS-BETTMANN. | 196 Martin Luther King Jr. receives the Nobel Peace Prize,

December 10, 1964. UPI/CORBIS-BETTMANN. 227 Malcolm X holds a-press conference upon his return from

Africa, November 24, 1964. UPI/CORBIS-BETTMANN. 228 Michigan National Guardsmen push back African American protesters during rioting in Detroit, Michigan, July 26, 1967.

UPI/CORBIS-BETTMANN. 244 Xil ILLUSTRATIONS

COLD WAR

CIVIL RIGHTS

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INTRODUCTION

All races and religions, that’s America to me. LEWIS ALLAN AND EARL ROBINSON,

“THE HOUSE | LIVE IN’ (1942)!

Jimmy Wilson’s name has not been remembered in the annals of Cold War history, but in 1958, this African American handyman was at the center of international attention. After he was sentenced to death in Alabama for stealing less than two dollars in change, Wilson’s case was thought to epitomize the harsh consequences of American racism. It brought to the surface international anxiety about the state of American race relations. Because the United States

was the presumptive leader of the free world, racism in the nation was a matter of international concern. How could American democracy be a beacon during the Cold War, and a model for those struggling against Soviet oppression, if the United States itself practiced brutal discrimination against minorities within its own borders? Jimmy Wilson’s unexpected entry into this international dilemma began on July 27, 1957. The facts of the unhappy events setting off his travails are unclear. Wilson had worked for Estelle Barker, an elderly white woman, in Marion, Alabama. He later told a Toronto

reporter that he had simply wanted to borrow money from her against his future earnings, as he had in the past. As Wilson told the

story, Barker let him into her home one evening, they had an argu-

ment, she threw some money on her bed and he took it and left. The coins would not be enough to cover the cost of his cab home. Barker told the police that his motives were more sinister. After taking the money she had dumped on her bed, she said he forced her onto the bed and unsuccessfully attempted to rape her.’ Wilson was prosecuted only for robbery, for the theft of $1.95.

Over the objections of Wilson’s attorney, Barker testified at trial about the alleged sexual assault. Wilson was quickly convicted by an all-white jury. Robbery carried a maximum penalty of death, and

the presiding judge sentenced Wilson to die in the electric chair. When the Alabama Supreme Court upheld Wilson’s sentence, news of the case spread across the nation. Because other nations followed

race in the United States with great interest, the Wilson case was soon international news.’ Headlines around the world decried this death sentence for the theft of less than two dollars. The Voice of Ethiopia thought “it is inconceivable that in this enlightened age, in a country that prides itself on its code of justice, that, for the paltry sum of $1.95, a man should forfeit his life.” An editorial in the Ghanaian Ashanti Pioneer urged that the underlying law be repealed. According to the paper, it was “the High, inescapable duty of every right thinking human

being who believes in democracy as understood and practised on

this side of the Iron Curtain to venture to bring it home to the people of Alabama.” The Jimmy Wilson story was widely publicized

in West Africa, prompting American businessmen to call the U.S. embassy in Monrovia to express their concern that Wilson’s execution would undermine “American effort to maintain sympathetic understanding [of our] principles and government” in that part of the world.’ Petitions and letters of protest poured in. Hulda Omreit of Bodo, Norway, describing herself as “a simple Norwegian housewife,” wrote a letter to the U.S. government. She wished “to express her sympathy for the Negro, Jimmy Wilson, and plead for clemency for him. It makes no difference whether he is black or white; we are all brothers under the skin.” Six members of the Israeli Parliament sent

a letter of protest. The Trades Union Congress of Ghana urged 4 INTRODUCTION

American authorities “to save not only the life of Wilson but also the good name of the United States of America from ridicule and contempt.” The Congress thought Wilson’s sentence “constitutes such a savage blow against the Negro Race that it finds no parallel in the Criminal Code of any modern State.” The Jones Town Youth Club of Jamaica was just one of the groups that held a protest in front of the U.S. consulate in Kingston. In one extreme reaction, the U.S. embassy in The Hague received calls threatening that the U.S. ambassador “would not survive” if Wilson were executed. After a story about the case appeared in Time magazine, someone in Perth, Australia, hung a black figure in effigy from the flagpole of the U.S. consulate. Above it was a sign reading “Guilty of theft of fourteen

shillings.” John Morsell, a spokesman for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP), thought that it would be “a sad blot on the nation” if Wilson were executed. The NAACP was worried about the international repercussions. According to Morsell, “We think the communists will take this and go to town with it.” Sure enough, the communist newspaper in Rome, L Unita, called Wilson’s death sentence “a new unprecedented crime by American segregationists,” while front-page stories in Prague appeared under headlines proclaiming “This is America.” Even those friendly to the United States were outraged, however. A group of Canadian judges was disturbed about the sentence and passed a reso-

lution conveying its “deep concern” to Alabama Governor James Folsom. The judges warned that “[i]f Alabama electrocutes Jimmy Wilson it will shock the conscience of the world.” From St. Paul’s Cathedral in London, Canon John Collins urged every Christian in Britain to protest the execution. The secretary of the British Labour Party thought it was unfortunate that “those who wish to criticize western liberty and democracy” had been given “such suitable ammunition for their propaganda.” Before long, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles was involved in the case. The Congress of Racial Equality (CORE) had urged Dulles to intervene, calling the Wilson case “a matter of prime concern to the foreign relations of the United States.” CORE warned that “if this execution is carried out, certainly the enemies of the INTRODUCTION 5

United States will give it world-wide publicity and thus convey a distorted picture of relations between the races in our country.” A flood of despatches about the case from U.S. embassies around the world would make Dulles’s participation inevitable.’ Secretary Dulles sent a telegram to Governor Folsom, informing him of the great international interest in the Jimmy Wilson case. Folsom did not need to be told that the world had taken an interest in Jimmy Wilson. He had received an average of a thousand letters a day about the case, many from abroad. The governor had “never seen anything like” it and was “utterly amazed” by the outpouring of international attention. He called a press conference to announce that he was “‘snowed under’ with mail from Toronto demanding clemency” for Wilson. Folsom told Dulles that he stood ready to “aid in interpreting the facts of the case to the peoples of the world.” After the Alabama Supreme Court upheld Wilson’s conviction and sentence, Governor Folsom acted with unusual haste to grant Wil-

son clemency. The reason he acted so quickly was to end what he called the “international hullabaloo.”® Jimmy Wilson’s case is one example of the international impact

of American race discrimination during the Cold War. Domestic civil rights crises would quickly become international crises. As presidents and secretaries of state from 1946 to the mid-1960s wor-

ried about the impact of race discrimination on US. prestige abroad, civil rights reform came to be seen as crucial to U.S. foreign relations.

During the Cold War years, when international perceptions of American democracy were thought to affect the nation’s ability to maintain its leadership role, and particularly to ensure that democracy would be appealing to newly independent nations in Asia and Africa, the diplomatic impact of race in America was especially stark.

The underlying question of whether the nation lived up to its own ideals had, of course, been raised before, and activists in earlier years had looked overseas for a sympathetic audience for their critique of American racism. Frederick Douglass sought support for the abolitionist movement in Great Britain, arguing that slavery was a crime against “the human family,” and so “it belongs to the whole human 6 INTRODUCTION

family to seek its suppression.” In 1893, Ida B. Wells traveled to England to generate support for the campaign against lynching. “The pulpit and the press of our own country remains silent on these continued outrages,” she explained. She hoped that support from Great Britain would in turn “arouse the public sentiment of Americans.”?

During World War I, NAACP President Morefield Story argued that since African Americans were risking their lives to make the world safe for democracy, the nation must “make America safe for Americans.” W. E. B. DuBois took these ideas overseas when world leaders convened for the Paris Peace Conference. He hoped that international cooperation in a new League of Nations would provide a forum for the vindication of racial problems at home. “[W]hat we cannot accomplish before the choked conscience of America, we have an infinitely better chance to accomplish before the organized Public Opinion of the World.”” While World War I influenced civil rights activists’ critique of American racism, it did not lead to extensive social change. The moment for broader change came after World War II, a war against a racist regime carried on by a nation with segregated military forces. During the war years the idea that a conflict inhered in American ideology and practice first gained wide currency." World War II marked a transition point in American foreign relations, American politics, and American culture. At home, the meaning ascribed to the war would help to shape what would follow. At least on an ideological level, the notion that the nation as a whole had a stake in racial equality was widespread. As Wendell L. Willkie put it, “Our very proclamations of what we are fighting for have rendered our own inequities self-evident. When we talk of freedom and opportunity for all nations the mocking paradoxes in our own society become so clear they can no longer be ignored.””” The war years became an occasion for a serious examination of what was called the “Negro problem” in America. The most detailed treatment of this issue came from Swedish sociologist Gunnar Myrdal and his team of researchers. In 1944, Myrdal published An American Dilemma: The Negro Problem and Modern Democracy. According to Myrdal, INTRODUCTION 7

[I]n this War, the principle of democracy had to be applied more explicitly to race. . . . Fascism and racism are based on a racial superiority dogma. . .and they came to power by means of racial persecution and oppression. In fighting fascism and racism, America had to stand before the whole world in favor of racial tolerance and cooperation and of racial equality.” The contradictions between racism and the ideology of democracy were, for Myrdal, a quintessentially American dilemma. Myrdal thought that all Americans shared an “American creed,” a belief in “ideals of the essential dignity of the individual human being, of the fundamental equality of all men, and of certain inalienable rights to freedom, justice and a fair opportunity.” Racism conflicted with this creed. The conflict between racist thoughts and egalitarian beliefs created tension and anxiety, leading Myrdal to emphasize that this American dilemma inured “in the heart of the American.” The American dilemma was a moral dilemma, and yet its implications stretched far beyond guilty consciences. According to Myrdal, there was a strategic reason for social change. During the war years, the American dilemma had “acquired tremendous international implications.” The “color angle to this War,” meant that “[t]he situation is actually such that any and all concessions to Negro rights in

this phase of the history of the world will repay the nation many times, while any and all injustices inflicted upon them will be extremely costly.” American might would not be determined by military strength alone. “America, for its international prestige, power, and future security, needs to demonstrate to the world that American Negroes can be satisfactorily integrated into its democracy.”” Myrdal’s concerns about the impact of American racism on the war effort were played out in Axis propaganda. Pearl Buck reported

that “Japan. . .is declaring in the Philippines, in China, in India, Malaya, and even Russia that there is no basis for hope that colored peoples can expect any justice” from the U.S. government. To prove

their point, the Japanese pointed to racism in the United States. According to Buck, Every lynching, every race riot gives joy to Japan. The discriminations of the American army and navy and the air 8 INTRODUCTION

forces against colored soldiers and sailors, the exclusion of colored labor in our defense industries and trade unions, all our social discriminations, are of the greatest aid today to our enemy in Asia, Japan. “Look at America,” Japan is saying to millions of listening ears. “Will white Americans give you equality?”’°

In spite of these concerns, African Americans serving in the military in World War II were segregated and most often relegated to service units, not combat. A. Philip Randolph and many others mobilized against such wartime race discrimination. Civil rights groups capitalized on the nation’s new focus on equality, and World War II spurred civil rights activism. The NAACP developed, for the first time, a mass membership base. As Brenda Gayle Plummer has written, during the war “[t]he NAACP internationaliz[ed] the race issue.” A 1943 NAACP report suggested that race had become “a global instead of a national or sectional issue.” The war had broadened people’s thinking “with the realization that the United States cannot win this war unless there is a drastic readjustment of racial attitudes.”””

The thinking that World War II was a war against racial and religious intolerance, and that the United States stood to gain from promoting equality at home was so widespread that Frank Sinatra even sang about it. The lesson of his short film The House I Live In was that racial and religious intolerance were “Nazi” characteristics. To be “American” was to practice equality, at least toward one’s wartime allies. This Oscar-winning film ended with Sinatra singing, “all races and religions, that’s America to me.”

As World War II drew to a close, the nation faced an uncertain future. Victory over fascism, a returned focus on the home front, the specter of a nuclear age—these joys and anxieties captured the nation. Yet more would be at stake in the postwar years. The purpose of the war would leave its victors with new obligations. And if the war was, at least in part, a battle against racism, then racial segregation and disenfranchisement seemed to belie the great sacrifices the

war had wrought.” INTRODUCTION 9

This idea was captured by a military chaplain with U.S. Marine Corps troops at the Battle of Iwo Jima during the final months of the war. When the battle was over, Rabbi Roland B. Gittelsohn stood over newly dug graves on the island and delivered a eulogy. “Here lie men who loved America,” he said. Here lie officers and men, Negroes and whites, rich and poor, together. Here no man prefers another because of his faith, or despises him because of his color... . Among these men there is no discrimination, no prejudice, no hatred. Theirs is the highest and purest democracy.

The equality these soldiers had found in death was, for Gittelsohn, at the heart of the war’s meaning. Whoever of us lifts his hand in hate against a brother, or thinks himself superior to those who happen to be in the minority, makes of this ceremony, and of the bloody sacrifice it commemorates, an empty, hollow mockery. Thus, then, do we, the living, now dedicate ourselves, to the right of Protestants, Catholics and Jews, of white men and Negroes alike, to enjoy the democracy for which all of them have paid the price.”°

There was an irony in the equality Gittelsohn found among the fallen soldiers, a point not mentioned in the chaplain’s eulogy. The military forces that fought on Iwo Jima were racially segregated.

Yet the limitations on the military’s practice of equality did not dampen Gittelsohn’s passionate argument that out of the carnage of the war came a commitment and an obligation to give democracy meaning across the divisions of race, religion and class. Too much blood has gone into this soil for us to let it lie barren. Too much pain and heartache have fertilized the earth on which we stand. We here solemnly swear: it shall not be in vain. Out of this will come, we promise, the birth of a new freedom for the sons of men everywhere.”’

The commitment to democracy had been sealed in blood. And this “democracy” was more than a political system. It was an ideol10 INTRODUCTION

ogy, a set of beliefs about the nature and moral power of the nation. What remained to be determined was the way this ideological commitment to egalitarian democracy would be put into practice in the years after the war.

Following World War II, reconversion came to domestic life as well as the workplace. A renewed embrace of domesticity fueled a baby boom and a focus on consumption. Would the desire to return to normalcy mean a renewed embrace of racial norms of segregation,

disenfranchisement, and subordination?” Paradoxically, international pressures would soon simultaneously constrain and enhance civil rights reform. The inward turn of postwar American culture would have its limits, as the nation’s political leaders soon warned that a new interna-

tional threat loomed on the horizon. By 1947, the Cold War came to dominate the American political scene. As the Truman administration cast Cold War international politics in apocalyptic terms, “McCarthyism” took hold in domestic politics. If communism was

such a serious threat world-wide, the existence of communists within the United States seemed particularly frightening. As the nation closed ranks, critics of American society often found themselves labeled as “subversive.” Civil rights groups had to walk a fine line,

making it clear that their reform efforts were meant to fill out the contours of American democracy, and not to challenge or undermine it. Organizations outside a narrowing sphere of civil rights politics found it difficult to survive the Cold War years.” Under the

strictures of Cold War politics, a broad, international critique of racial oppression was out of place. As Penny Von Eschen has written,

the narrowed scope of acceptable protest during the early years of the Cold War would not accommodate criticism of colonialism. Western European colonial powers, after all, were America’s Cold War allies. For that reason, outspoken critics of colonialism found themselves increasingly under siege.” Civil rights activists who sought to use international pressure to encourage reform in the United States also found themselves under increasing scrutiny. The strategic value of civil rights reform had given civil rights activists an important opportunity. Drawing upon INTRODUCTION 11

international interest in race in America, following the war civil rights groups would turn to the United Nations. This new international forum, dedicated to human rights, might pressure the U.S. government to protect the rights of African Americans. However, to criticize the nation before an international audience and to air the nation’s dirty laundry overseas was to reinforce the negative impact

of American racism on the nation’s standing as a world leader. It was seen, therefore, as a great breach of loyalty. As a result, just as the House Committee on Un-American Activities and the government's

loyalty security program silenced progressive voices within the United States, through passport restrictions and international negotiations the long arm of U.S. government red-baiting silenced critics

of U.S. racism overseas.” ,

In spite of the repression of the Cold War era, civil rights reform was in parta product of the Cold War. In the years following World War II, racial discrimination in the United States received increasing attention from other countries. Newspapers throughout the world carried stories about discrimination against nonwhite visiting foreign dignitaries, as well as against American blacks. At a time when

the United States hoped to reshape the postwar world in its own image, the international attention given to racial segregation was troublesome and embarrassing. The focus of American foreign policy was to promote democracy and to “contain” communism, but the international focus on U.S. racial problems meant that the image of American democracy was tarnished. The apparent contradictions between American political ideology and American practice led to particular foreign relations problems with countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. The Soviet Union capitalized on this weakness, using the race issue prominently in anti-American propaganda. U.S. government officials realized that their ability to promote democracy among peoples of color around the world was seriously hampered

by continuing racial injustice at home. In this context, efforts to promote civil rights within the United States were consistent with and important to the more central U.S. mission of fighting world communism. The need to address international criticism gave the ' federal government an incentive to promote social change at home. 12 INTRODUCTION

Yet the Cold War would frame and thereby limit the nation’s civil

rights commitment. The primacy of anticommunism in postwar American politics and culture left a very narrow space for criticism of the status quo. By silencing certain voices and by promoting a particular vision of racial justice, the Cold War led to a narrowing of acceptable civil rights discourse. The narrow boundaries of Cold War-era civil rights politics kept discussions of broad-based social change, or a linking of race and class, off the agenda. In addition,

to the extent that the nation’s commitment to social justice was motivated by a need to respond to foreign critics, civil rights reforms

that made the nation look good might be sufficient. The narrow terms of Cold War civil rights discourse and the nature of the federal government's commitment help explain the limits of social change during this period.

In addressing civil rights reform from 1946 through the mid1960s, the federal government engaged in a sustained effort to tell a particular story about race and American democracy: a story of progress, a story of the triumph of good over evil, a story of U.S. moral superiority. The lesson of this story was always that American democracy was a form of government that made the achievement of social justice possible, and that democratic change, however slow

and gradual, was superior to dictatorial imposition. The story of race in America, used to compare democracy and communism, became an important Cold War narrative. American race relations would not always stay neatly within this frame. Racial violence continued to mar the image of the United States in the 1950s, even as the United States Information Agency (USIA) heralded the Supreme Court’s ruling that school segregation violated the Constitution. During the 1960s the civil rights movement and massive resistance in the South forced the federal government to devote more attention both to racial justice in the nation and to the impact of the movement on U.S. prestige abroad. Out of this dynamic comes a rather complex story. Domestic racism and civil rights protest led to international criticism of the U.S. government. International criticism led the federal government to respond, through placating foreign critics by reframing the narrative INTRODUCTION 13

of race in America, and through promoting some level of social change. While civil rights reform in different eras has been motivated by a variety of factors, one element during the early Cold War years was the need for reform in order to make credible the government's argument about race and democracy. To explore this story, this study will take up civil rights history from a different standpoint than histories of civil rights activists and

organizations and histories of domestic civil rights politics. The events that drive this narrative are the events that captivated the world. This focus on particular events and often on prominent leaders should not be seen as an effort to privilege a top-down focus as “the” story of civil rights history. The international perspective is not a substitute for the rich body of civil rights scholarship but another dimension that sheds additional light on those important and welltold stories. Looking abroad and then at home at the impact of civil

rights on U.S. foreign affairs, we might more fully see the great impact of civil rights activists. It was only through the efforts of the

movement that the nation and the world were moved to embrace the civil rights reform that emerged from this period of American history.”°

The full story of civil rights reform in U.S. history cuts across racial groups. The U.S. policymakers in this study, however, saw American race relations through the lens of a black/white paradigm.

To them, race in America was quintessentially about “the Negro problem.” Foreign observers as well remarked that the status of “the Negro” was the paradigm for exploring race in America. Contemporary writers argue that the black/white paradigm renders other racial groups invisible. This limitation of vision affected the actors in this

story, both U.S. policymakers and the international audience to which they were reacting. As a result, this history works within that narrowed conception of American race relations—not because race in America is a black/white issue, but because this study seeks to capture the way race politics were understood at a time when “the

Negro problem” was at the center of the discourse on race in America.” It will be the task of this volume to explore the impact of Cold War foreign affairs on U.S. civil rights reform. It brings together 14 INTRODUCTION

Cold War history and civil rights history, helping us to see that federal government action on civil rights was an aspect of Cold War policymaking. Narratives of twentieth-century America have tended to treat civil rights and foreign relations as two separate categories, unrelated to each other. If developments in the history of international relations had a bearing on domestic policy, it might be as part of the background, but not as a player on the same stage. For that

reason, attention to foreign relations may seem out of place in a study of civil rights reform. Yet as the United States emerged from World War II as a world power, looked to for leadership amid ensuing Cold War fears of a new global conflagration, domestic politics and culture were profoundly affected by events overseas. They were affected as well by the way local and national actors thought domestic events would impact the Cold War balance of power. The Cold War created a constraining environment for domestic politics. It also

gave rise to new opportunities for those who could exploit Cold

“Americanism.” -

War anxieties, while yet remaining within the bounds of acceptable

Chapter 1 explores the international reaction to postwar racial violence and race discrimination. Lynching and racial segregation provoked international outrage, and by 1949 race in America was a principal Soviet propaganda theme. These developments led the Truman administration to realize that race discrimination harmed US. foreign relations. One way to respond to international criticism was to manage the way the story of American race relations was told overseas. Chapter 2 details U.S. government efforts to turn the story of race in America into a story of the superiority of democracy over communism as a system of government. The production of propaganda on U.S. race relations was one strategy. In addition, the government took steps to silence alternative voices, such as Paul Robeson’s, when they challenged the official narrative of race and American democracy. Ultimately the most effective response to foreign critics was to achieve some level of social change at home. Chapter 3 discusses Truman administration civil rights efforts, including its sustained

reliance on national security arguments in briefs in the Supreme Court cases that would overturn the constitutional basis for Jim INTRODUCTION 15

Crow. In Brown v. Board of Education (1954), the U.S. Supreme Court held that school segregation, a particular target of foreign criticism, violated the U.S. Constitution. Brown powerfully reinforced the story of race and democracy that had already been told in U.S. propaganda: American democracy enabled social change and was based on principles of justice and equality. Brown would not bring this story to closure, of course. Chapter 4 takes up the major challenge to the image of America abroad during Eisenhower’s presidency. Massive resistance to school desegregation

in Little Rock, Arkansas, threatened to undermine the narrative of race and democracy carefully told in U.S. propaganda. As Little Rock became a massive worldwide news story, and as his leadership was questioned at home and abroad, Eisenhower was forced to act. Although the crisis in Little Rock would be resolved, in later years

Little Rock remained the paradigmatic symbol of race in America and served as the reference point as Presidents Kennedy and Johnson faced civil rights crises of their own. President Kennedy hoped to put off addressing civil rights so that

civil rights initiatives would not interfere with his other domestic proposals and especially with his foreign affairs agenda. As chapter 5 illustrates, however, events in the early 1960s conspired to frustrate Kennedy’s efforts to control the place of civil rights on his overall agenda. Ambassadors from newly independent African nations came

to the United States and encountered Jim Crow. Each incident of discrimination reinforced the importance of race to U.S. relations with Africa. Sustained civil rights movement actions, and the brutality of resistance to peaceful civil rights protest, came to a head in Birmingham, Alabama, in 1963. As Bull Connor’s violent treatment of protesters became a subject of discussion among African heads of state, the diplomatic consequences of discrimination and the importance of more extensive social change were underscored.

President Kennedy’s support for a civil rights bill in 1963 was celebrated internationally. His assassination led many nations to question whether federal support for civil rights reform would continue. Foreign leaders looked to President Johnson to maintain continuity—not only in U.S. foreign affairs but also in U.S. civil rights policy. Chapter 6 details the role of civil rights in international per16 INTRODUCTION

ceptions of Johnson’s presidency. During the Johnson years the role of foreign relations in U.S. civil rights politics changed significantly.

The passage of important civil rights legislation convinced many

foreign observers that the U.S. government was behind social change. The narrative of race and democracy seemed to have more salience. Yet just as new questions surfaced about urban racial unrest,

the focus of international interest in U.S. policy shifted. As American involvement in Vietnam escalated, the Vietnam War eclipsed domestic racism as a defining feature of the American image abroad. Cold War Civil Rights traces the emergence, the development, and the decline of Cold War foreign affairs as a factor in influencing civil

rights policy by setting a U.S. history topic within the context of Cold War world history. The Cold War was a critical juncture in the twentieth century, the “American Century.” For this century, characterized by the emergence of the United States as a global power, it makes sense to ask whether the expansion of U.S. influence

and power in the world reflected on American politics and culture at home. Following the transnational path of the story of race in America, we see that the borders of U.S. history are not easily maintained. An event that is local is at the same time international. “Foreign” developments help drive domestic politics and policy. American history plays out in a transnational frame. The international context structures relationships between “domestic” actors. It influences the timing, nature, and extent of social change. This suggests that an international perspective does not simply “fil in” the story of American history, but changes its terms.”

INTRODUCTION 17

CHAPTER 1

Coming to Terms with Cold War Civil Rights

[T]he colour bar is the greatest propaganda gift any country could give the Kremlin in its

persistent bid for the affections of the coloured races of the world. OBSERVER (CEYLON, 1949)'

One shot could have killed George Dorsey, but when he and three companions were found along the banks of the Appalachee River in Georgia on July 25, 1946, their bodies were riddled with at least sixty bullets. Many white men with guns had participated in this deed. Yet the ritual that produced the deaths of two “young Negro farmhands and their wives” required more than mere killing. The privilege of taking part in the executions, the privilege of drawing blood in the name of white supremacy, was to be shared.’ George Dorsey had recently returned to Georgia after five years of service in the United States Army. His mother received his discharge

papers within days of his death. Dorsey survived the war against fascism to die in a hail of bullets on an American roadside. His crime

was to be African American, and to be in the wrong place at the wrong time.”

Dorsey died in the company of his wife, Mae Murray Dorsey, and

his friends Roger and Dorothy Malcom. Roger Malcom had been arrested after stabbing a white man during a fight. Bailed out by a wealthy white farmer, J. Loy Harrison, the Malcoms and the Dorseys

took a ride from Harrison, who told them he wanted them to work his fields. When Harrison’s car came upon a wooden bridge over the Appalachee River, he noticed a car on the far side, blocking the way. Another car drove up from behind, and Harrison reported: “One of the men came out, put a shotgun against the back of my head and said, ‘All of you put ’em up.’ ”* Someone pointed at Roger Malcom, saying, “There's the man we want.” But both Malcom and George Dorsey were bound with ropes “expert like,” and dragged from the car. It appeared that the women would be spared. Then one woman began “cussing like everything and called out one of the men’s name whom she evidently recognized.” The leader of the group stopped and said, “Hold everything.” He picked four men, telling them, “Go back and get them.” The women were then pulled, shrieking, from the car. Harrison was asked, “You recognize anybody here?” He answered “No,” the same

answer he would give investigators later when asked whether he could identify participants in this crime.’ The Dorseys and the Malcoms were lined up. Harrison could hear the mob’s leader say “ “One, two, three,’ and then boom. He did that three times. There were three volleys.” Shots were fired after the four had fallen. “It looked like it was a rehearsed affair,” the head

of the Georgia Bureau of Investigation would later say. When the sheriff came upon the scene later that day, “the upper parts of the bodies were scarcely recognizable because of the mass of bullet holes.” As one reporter later put it, “nothing in the undertaker’s art could put back the faces of Roger Malcom or Mae Dorsey.”® This crime was, in some ways, unremarkable. Its pattern was familiar: African American man detained by police, then released, then killed with companions by a white mob. So many had met gruesome deaths in this way that what distinguished the Monroe killings was not their brutality. It was the attention bestowed upon them.’ COMING TO TERMS WITH CIVIL RIGHTS 19

So many hundreds of letters and telegrams protesting the Monroe

murders poured in to the U.S. Justice Department that attorney general Tom Clark held a press conference to answer them. “These crimes,” the attorney general said, “are an affront to decent Americanism. Only due process of law sustains our claim to orderly selfgovernment.” Clark called upon “all our citizens to repudiate mob rule and to assist the authorities to bring these criminals to justice. The lives and liberties of none of us are safe when forces of terror operate outside the laws of God and man.” To some, the lynching of a black veteran was part of a chilling postwar turn in American race relations. According to Oliver Harrington, former war correspondent for the Pittsburgh Courier, “The Georgia lynchings were only part of the highly organized conspiracy to “put the returned Negro veteran in his place.’ ”* While the investigation into the murders was stymied, demonstrators marched in front of the White House. This horrible crime was not a burden for Georgia alone to bear. The nation as a whole had a stake in its resolution. As fifty members of the National Associ-

ation of Colored Women marched in front of the White House, their picket signs spoke to the nation’s role in achieving racial justice. “America, our home, let it be known that lynching must cease,” proclaimed one. “Where Is Democracy?” asked another. The press in other nations asked the same question, as this incident was widely

covered overseas. The Monroe lynching was the lead story in an __ article on “Position of Negroes in the USA” in the Soviet publication

Trud. The August 1946 story mentioned the incident as just one example of “the increasing frequency of terroristic acts against negroes” in the United States. The U.S. embassy in Moscow found this story to be “representative of the frequent Soviet press comment on the question of Negro discrimination in the United States.”’

In Monroe, in spite of offers of thousands of dollars of reward money for identifying those involved in the killings, a tight-lipped white community protected its own. Meanwhile relatives stayed away from the funeral they had carefully prepared for George Dorsey and Dorothy Malcom, his sister, out of fear of more violence.” Two days after the killings, Senator William EF Knowland, Repub-

lican of California, introduced an account of the events into the

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Joseph ne Baker holds a one-woman protest outside a mavan |

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station, Februa 95 nN American cism in Latin , When | America the entertain she i ntraccriticiz n nditions _ placed i

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h it calle ur : ican 5onurgcabled wha Cc Cfiivi ”act ir entl the i rican activity, : r Cc artmen rmation er. © Sta C forado background wahte NOW nts,state recent ;: can b uotes tromq : ess | cellatio ns oO (citeand Colombia,

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| in reru -_ appeafra ¥ Cfrl | p ~ Ccg|1c ’had Vapers CITIZENSNIp. givenive up her U.S. . e ae ] Cl

can erican new icizing Baker, an ersona a | di the fact that she a S inc u n d the fact that information supp Baker had been married

three times (it was actually four), and that two of her husbands were white.” Embassy officers then contacted Goar Mestre, who owned the theater where Baker was scheduled to perform, and local newspapers. As the U.S. embassy reported it, embassy personnel informally outlined to Mr. Mestre and to certain newspaper people that Miss Baker had given statements to the Argentine press highly uncomplimentary to the United States. The idea was planted discreetly that Miss Baker might use the Cuban

, press, particularly its communistic elements, as a further sounding board for her accusations of the mistreatment of Negroes in the United States.”

Baker did not arrive in Cuba in time for her scheduled performances but sent a wire requesting a later date. Rather than being rescheduled, her performances were canceled. As Mestre explained, “[W]e know that Josephine Baker has terrific drawing power, but we can't keep adjusting our business to her.” As an embassy officer put it, Baker’s tardiness “may well have provided her Habana em-

ployers with just the legal loophole they needed to ‘get out from under’ a ticklish situation.”

. Baker showed up in Havana anyway. She blamed American influence for her contract cancellations, claiming that Teatro América had canceled a scheduled performance because the theater was afraid of losing its U.S. film franchise. Though Baker’s other engagements

in Havana had been canceled, an advertising agency scheduled a February 11 appearance for her on a popular television show. The agency did not seek approval from Goar Mestre, who was also the president of the television station, however, and Mestre ordered his doorman to bar Baker from entering the television studio. When she arrived on February 11 for an afternoon rehearsal, she was not allowed to enter. As the U.S. embassy reported it, “[A]damant, Miss Baker, costume over her arm, stood outside the gate from 3:00 p.m. to 9:30 p.m. in an apparent effort to elicit sympathy. ‘Cabaret Rega-

lias’ went on the air without her.””” |

After much effort, Baker finally was able to arrange an appearance in Cuba. On February 16, she opened a one-week run at the Teatro RACE AND DEMOCRACY 73

Campoamor, described in an embassy despatch as “a down-at-the heels theater which last year was a burlesque house.” The embassy reported that “there was no indication she . . . used the Campoamor stage for political purposes.” Baker was warned not to. At 4:30 the afternoon after her opening, Baker was taken into custody by the Cuban military police. They filed no charges against her, but they interrogated her for three hours about her political and social views. The military police reported that “the questioning was in response to a suggestion by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation that

Miss Baker might be an active Communist.” Baker was photographed and fingerprinted. The military police asked her to sign a stenographic report of her interrogation, but she refused. She later wrote in an autobiography that the statement would have had her admit to “being paid by Moscow and indulging in subversive activities.” When she was fingerprinted, “the word ‘Communist’ was marked beneath my picture.” As the embassy put it, Baker was warned to “stick to her art and refrain from any voicing of political views at the Campoamor.” She was released in time for her evening appearance.”®

Baker’s visit to Cuba had far less of an artistic and political impact than she would have liked. After she left the country, the American embassy in Cuba concluded that “Miss Baker’s visit to Cuba must be considered of little value to her cause.” The embassy also felt that

Baker had done little harm. “All in all, Miss Baker’s influence on Cuban Negroes may well be appraised as negligible. The Negro press ignored her, and Negro societies made no fuss over her.” The embassy reported that a Cuban newspaper editor “explained to an Embassy officer that the attitude of the Cuban Negro toward the United States has changed radically in the last few years and that the Cuban Negro is now aware that real progress is being made in the United States toward the elimination of racial discrimination.”” After her visit to Cuba, Baker planned to appear in Haiti. This created a more delicate problem for the State Department because Haiti was a black country. In anticipation of her visit, Mauclair Zéphyrin, Haitian minister of the presidency and acting minister for foreign relations, telephoned the American chargé d'affaires. Zéphyrin expressed the fear that Baker might use her visit to create 74. CHAPTER TWO

trouble between the United States and Haiti, and he wanted to know

the chargé’s views on the subject. At this point the chargé told Zéphyrin that “he did not see how he could restrict Miss Baker’s freedom of speech nor how he could properly comment on the advisability of the visit.” He told Zéphyrin that Josephine Baker’s visit was a problem the Haitian government would have to handle.” Minister Zéphyrin then wrote to Baker’s agent in New York, informing him that Baker “was welcome to Haiti but should clearly understand that she was not to embarrass the Haitian Government by anti-American remarks which would disturb the excellent relations between the American and Haitian Governments.” The letter notwithstanding, the U.S. embassy public affairs officer reported to

the State Department that “in spite of the good intentions of the Haitian Government,” the American embassy could “expect unpleasant and embarrassing publicity which will tend to counteract much positive effort which has been made in the past by American officials in Haiti to better relationships.” Even though the embassy was likely “to see many of its ‘friends’ brought under the spell of Miss Baker and considerable encouragement to Anti-Americanism,

it does not appear possible for the Embassy to take a firm stand against her proposed visit.”® Secretary of State John Foster Dulles would not tolerate the im-

pending damage to U.S. prestige in Haiti. Upon receiving an account of the situation, he contacted the embassy in Port-au-Prince regarding background information on Baker the department was sending to the embassy. The material contained information about Baker’s change of citizenship and the fact that, according to Dulles, “her activities have been widely denounced by prominent negroes

and by the negro press in the United States.” Dulles said that the embassy was authorized to make the information available to the Haitian acting foreign minister. Subsequent communications involving the embassy about Baker’s trip remain classified for national

security reasons. Whatever transpired, Josephine Baker’s trip to

Haiti never happened.” Clearly frustrated in her efforts to appear in Latin America and the Caribbean, Baker could not turn to the United States as an alternative market for her performances. According to a December 10, RACE AND DEMOCRACY 75

1954, FBI internal memorandum, the commissioner of the Immigration and Naturalization Service had taken a “personal interest in the case of Josephine Baker and has directed that INS obtain sufhcient information with which to order her exclusion from the U.S.” The INS requested that FBI files be reviewed to ensure that “all pertinent derogatory information” had been forwarded to the INS. On January 21, 1955, the New York Herald Tribune reported that Josephine Baker was detained by the INS at a New York airport where she had stopped en route from Paris to Mexico City. She was held for four hours before being allowed to depart. The INS gave no explanation for its actions. Baker’s literal exclusion from the United States capped government efforts to exclude her from the discourse on race relations in America. Although the FBI ultimately concluded that Josephine Baker was not “pro-communist,” but, in their words, “pro-Negro,” they continued to pass derogatory information about her to the State Department and other agencies for several years. Josephine Baker’s saga is, in some ways, simply a global counter-

part to the red-baiting that was so pervasive within U.S. borders during the early Cold War years. More can be drawn, however, from this particular episode and other efforts to manage the impact of African Americans overseas. The degree of effort put into quiet-

ing this cultural figure underscores the importance to Cold War international politics of maintaining control over the narrative of race and American democracy. As other nations seized on stories of

U.S. race discrimination, they questioned how the United States could argue that its form of government was a model for the world when American democracy accommodated racial oppression. The persistence of racial problems in the United States meant that race had to be addressed. The legacy of discrimination could not be denied, so through carefully prepared propaganda and through coaching well-chosen speakers, the USIA and embassy personnel tried to manage the narrative of race and democracy. By acknowledging past problems and emphasizing reforms, the story of race in America was told as a story of progress. Because American democracy was the site for this progress, it was argued democracy was a 76 CHAPTER TWO

model of government that enabled peaceful social change. The world was focused on race in America, and so the story of American

race relations became an important Cold War narrative. The U.S.

government did its best to turn a liability into an advantage. A history of oppression became a narrative of progress toward the inevitable goal of greater social justice. The image of America projected in The Negro in American Life, the classic example of the narrative of race and democracy, would be hard to sustain in the face of criticism by Paul Robeson, William Patterson, Josephine Baker, and others perceived to be more authentic voices on the topic of American racial justice. For that reason, silencing Robeson, Patterson, Baker, and other critics can be seen as

part of the broader effort to safeguard the image of America, and maintain control over the narrative of race and democracy.

In spite of U.S. efforts to tell a progressive story about race in America, the counternarrative of racial oppression continued to make headlines. The news took its toll. The impact of race on foreign relations greatly troubled Chester Bowles as he neared the end of his first tenure as U.S. ambassador to India. Bowles stressed the importance of race to foreign relations in a 1952 speech at Yale University.

A year, a month, or even a week in Asia is enough to convince any perceptive American that the colored peoples of Asia and Africa, who total two-thirds of the world’s population, seldom think about the United States without considering the limitations under which our 13 million Negroes are living.

Bowles believed that most Asians and Africans were “convinced that, solely because of their color, many Americans are denied a full share in the life of the richest nation on earth, and in their ears this convic-

tion gives our claim to world leadership a distinctly hollow ring.” Bowles asked his audience, “[C]an any of us say they are wrong?”™ Chester Bowles believed that more was required than information programs. American society ultimately had to change. “A great maRACE AND DEMOCRACY 77

jority of Americans now accept the idea that discrimination is wrong and must be ended,” he argued. “The remaining differences are over the timing and the method.” Yet Bowles questioned how much time

remained. “Since the end of World War II our country, somewhat reluctantly, has advanced to the center of the world stage... . With such leadership the world comes to know more about us, both good and bad.”®

“How much does all our talk of democracy mean, if we do not practice it at home?” Bowles asked. “How can the colored peoples of Asia be sure we are sincere in our interest in them if we do not respect the equality of our colored people at home?” It would be easier to answer these questions “if we have a better answer from home. I can think of no single thing that would be more helpful to us in Asia than the achievement of racial harmony in America.” This

issue was of such importance, Bowles would later write, that “of one thing I am certain. I have not exaggerated. It is impossible to exaggerate.”

78 CHAPTER TWO

CHAPTER 3

Fighting the Cold War with Civil Rights Reform

It is in the context of the present world struggle between freedom and tyranny that the problem of race discrimination must be viewed. BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES AS AMICUS CURIAE, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION (FILED 1952)'

American embassies scattered throughout the world tried to do their part to salvage the tarnished image of American democracy. They

used the tools available to them: speakers and news stories that would cast American difficulties in the best light possible. Meanwhile, in Washington, the Truman administration could take more affirmative, less reactive steps. President Truman and his aides sought change in the domestic policies and practices that fueled international outrage. In 1947, Truman’s President’s Committee on Civil Rights issued a report that highlighted the foreign affairs consequences of race discrimination. The committee’s report, 7o Secure These Rights, argued that there were three reasons why civil rights abuses in the United States should be redressed: a moral reason—discrimination was morally wrong; an economic reason—discrimination harmed

the economy; and an international reason—discrimination damaged U.S. foreign relations. According to the report, Our foreign policy is designed to make the United States an enormous, positive influence for peace and progress throughout the world. We have tried to let nothing, not even extreme political differences between ourselves and foreign nations, stand in the way of this goal. But our domestic civil rights shortcomings are a serious obstacle.

The committee stressed that “we cannot escape the fact that our civil rights record has been an issue in world politics. The world’s press and radio are full of it.” Countries with “competing philosophies” had stressed and distorted American problems. “They have

tried to prove our democracy an empty fraud, and our nation a consistent oppressor of underprivileged people.” To support this argument, the committee report quoted a letter from Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson to the chairman of the Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC). According to Acheson, [T]he existence of discrimination against minority groups in this country has an adverse effect upon our relations with other countries. We are reminded over and over by some foreign newspapers and spokesmen, that our treatment of various minorities leaves much to be desired. . . . Frequently we find it next to impossible to formulate a satisfactory answer to our critics in other countries. An atmosphere of suspicion and resentment in a country over the way a minority is being treated in the United States is a formidable obstacle to the development of mutual understanding and trust between the two countries. We will have better international relations when these reasons for suspicion and resentment have been removed. Because he thought it was “quite obvious” that race discrimination interfered with foreign relations, Acheson wrote that the State Department had “good reason to hope for the continued and increased 80 CHAPTER THREE

effectiveness of public and private efforts to do away with these discriminations.”° Why was the acting secretary of state advocating civil rights reform? Perhaps State Department officials argued that race discrimination harmed foreign relations simply because they thought that argument would be useful to civil rights reform at home, not because they thought there was any substance to it. Perhaps Acheson was seeking to further a domestic civil rights agenda, not to protect U.S. foreign policy interests. The State Department’s preoccupation with American race discrimination during the early Cold War years and the volume of diplomatic cable traffic on the issue would seem to

belie that point. More importantly, it was simply not Dean Acheson’s job to focus on purely domestic matters. As a State Department official, he was charged with furthering American foreign policy interests, not domestic policy. Acheson’s own philosophy was that moral imperatives should not drive foreign policy, so it would be ironic if he used his position at the State Department to further views about the morality of racial practices at home. For these reasons, it is unlikely that Dean Acheson, along with other American diplomats, was a closet civil rights activist crafting an argument, for the purpose of furthering a social change agenda at home, that race discrimination harmed U.S. foreign relations.’ The President’s Committee on Civil Rights took the impact of race discrimination on U.S. foreign relations very seriously. The committee report stressed, however, that “the international reason tor accing to secure our civil rights now is not to win the approval

of our totalitarian critics.... [T]o them our civil rights record is only a convenient weapon with which to attack us.” Instead, “we are more concerned with the good opinion of the peoples of the world.” Maintaining U.S. prestige abroad would help safeguard democracy in other lands.

Our achievements in building and maintaining a state dedicated to the fundamentals of freedom have already served as a guide for those seeking the best road from chaos to liberty and prosperity. But it is not indelibly written that democracy will encompass the world. We are convinced that our way of

CIVILRIGHTS REFORM 81 |

life—the free way of life—holds a promise of hope for all people. We have what is perhaps the greatest responsibility ever placed upon a people to keep this promise alive. Only still greater achievements will do it.

The consequences were stark, for the future was uncertain. The committee emphasized that “the United States is not so strong, the final triumph of the democratic ideal is not so inevitable that we can ignore what the world thinks of us or our record.” President ‘Iruman, trying to lead the free world through the dan-

gers of the Cold War, made this message his own. The president repeatedly emphasized the importance of civil rights to U.S. foreign affairs. On February 2, 1948, he delivered a special message to Congress, outlining several civil rights initiatives. Truman told Congress

that the “position of the United States in the world today” made civil rights “especially urgent.” According to the president, “The peoples of the world are faced with the choice of freedom or enslave-

ment.” The United States was promoting human rights with the goal of preserving world peace. The nation had to protect civil rights at home to be effective and to strengthen the nation. “We know that

our democracy is not perfect,” he said, but democracy offered “a fuller, freer happier life” than totalitarianism.

If we wish to inspire the peoples of the world whose freedom is in jeopardy, if we wish to restore hope to those who have already lost their civil liberties, if we wish to fulfill the promise that is ours, we must correct the remaining imperfections in our practice of democracy.° Truman urged Congress to enact civil rights laws that would establish a permanent civil rights commission, outlaw lynching, and protect the right to vote, among other proposals. Congress did not pass civil rights legislation while Truman was in office, however. Truman’s relations with Congress were sufficiently strained that he did not have great success with any of his domestic legislative proposals. On civil rights, his prospects were particularly bleak because of the hold of Southern Democrats on key Senate committee chairmanships. Truman had greater latitude to act on civil rights when

82 CHAPTER THREE |

he could act alone. For that reason his greatest civil rights accomplishments were things within executive power: the issuance of executive orders and the involvement of the Justice Department in landmark desegregation litigation.’

One of President Truman’s most important civil rights accomplishments was initiating desegregation of the armed services. Discrimination and segregation in the military were particularly galling to people of color who risked their lives to protect the nation yet were not treated equally even during their military service. When troops

traveled to foreign lands, other nations were directly exposed to American racial practices. During World War II, U.S. segregation followed American troops overseas, creating an awkward situation for their foreign hosts. In September 1942, Winston Churchill was asked in the House of Commons to politely ask U.S. military authorities in Britain “to instruct their men that the colour bar is not the custom in this country and that its non-observance by British troops or civilians should be regarded with equanimity.” The British government was unable to avoid responding to this problem. Although conflict arose when some British residents encouraged a code of conduct reminiscent of the mores of the American South, Christopher Thorne has written that “a greater danger appeared to lie in the very warmth of the welcome which many people were ready to give to these soldiers—a response which threatened to conflict with the patterns of behaviour and expectations brought over with them by white Americans.” The warm welcome created resentment on the part of white American troops. The British had their own race issues, particularly their hold on colonial subjects. Yet because of their “growing material dependence on the U.S.A. and the perceived need to retain her cooperation after victory,” the British found themselves unable to respond to criticism of empire by pointing out racism in Alabama.° NAACP executive secretary Walter White thought it was “perilous” to transport American racism overseas during the war. “I have seen bewilderment in the eyes of brown, yellow and black peoples in the Pacific at the manifestations of race prejudice by some American whites, not only against American Negro servicemen but against CIVIL RIGHTS REFORM 83

the natives whose aid we need vow in winning the war, and whose friendship we will need after the war if we are to have peace.” Racism gave the enemy an effective propaganda weapon, White argued.

The Japanese eagerly capitalize on these incidents and on race riots, lynchings and segregation in the United States. They utilize the anti-Negro rantings of congressmen like Rankin and of senators like Bilbo in filibustering against a Fair Employment Practices Committee. In Guam I saw a poster which has been put up all over the Island during the Japanese occupation which read, “Fight on to Asia with Asia’s own. Drive out the imperialist, aggressive American. The sole purpose of the white peoples of the earth is to exploit colored

people.”

White warned that “[n]one can yet tell how deep such roots have sunk into the thinking of the one billion colored peoples of the Pacific, Asia and Africa who constitute with colored peoples in other

parts of the world two-thirds of the earth’s population.” Waging the Cold War would require military strength. Military preparedness would be one line of defense against Soviet aggression. Although the armed forces were the nation’s physical line of defense

against Soviet aggression, they were also a source of the nation’s moral failure, for American forces in the postwar years continued to

be segregated. | Racial segregation in the armed forces came under fire in the report of Truman’s President’s Committee on Civil Rights. There was strong sentiment on the part of the committee that segregation in the armed services should be eliminated as quickly as possible. Committee member James Carey spoke of the “paradox of massing an army in World War II to fight for the Four Freedoms, and in engaging in that work they segregate people on the basis of race.” Channing Tobias insisted that the committee call for immediate desegregation, rather than gradualism. “Segregation is wrong wherever it exists,” he argued, “but when our Government holds up before its citizens the Constitution, with the Bill of Rights, saying to every man that he is a citizen and appealing to him for loyalty in peace 84. CHAPTER THREE

and war on that basis, then I don’t think we have any right to permit the pattern that has grown up in any section of the country to dominate the national policy.”"” In spite of this sentiment, A. Philip Randolph was concerned that a proposed Universal Military Training Program would continue to perpetuate patterns of segregation in the armed services. On December 28, 1947, he wrote to President Truman protesting the proposal

as “a great threat to Negro youth and the internal stability of our

nation. Segregation becomes all the more important when the United States should be assuming moral leadership in the world.” Randolph threatened that African Americans would refuse to serve in a Jim Crow army. “Negro youth will have no alternative but to resist a law, the inevitable consequences of which would be to expose them to un-American brutality so familiar during the last war.” Ac-

cording to Randolph, “So long as the American government attempts to sponsor any program of Jim Crow, its aspiration to moral leadership in the world will be seriously impaired.”" This sentiment would come, as well, from ordinary citizens. Mr. and Mrs. Irvin Dagen wrote President Truman urging him to “use all the power you have to abolish ... undemocratic segregation of ANY kind” in the armed services. “We feel that one of the most effective, firm, and noticeable ways in which we can show the rest of the world we believe in democracy is to practice such a virtue... at home. We believe this will still Russian propaganda against us for this gross injustice in this country.””” On February 2, 1948, in his special message to Congress on civil

rights, President Truman announced that he had “instructed the Secretary of Defense to take steps to have the remaining instances of discrimination in the armed services eliminated as rapidly as possible.” Truman called for reinstitution of the draft in March 1948, but the legislation passed by Congress did not address segregation,

and the army intended to continue it. Randolph organized the Committee Against Jim Crow in Military Service to pressure President Truman to act. If Truman did not desegregate the military, the committee would “work in the big East Coast cities on behalf of a

campaign of civil disobedience, nonregistration and noninduction.” On March 22, 1948, at a meeting with the president at the CIVIL RIGHTS REFORM 85

White House, Randolph warned Truman that “Negroes would not shoulder a gun to fight for democracy abroad while they were denied democracy here.” He reiterated his call for civil disobedience later that month in testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee.” Then, on July 26, 1948, Truman issued Executive Order 9981. The order stated that it was “essential that there be maintained in the armed services of the United States the highest standards of democracy, with equality of treatment and opportunity for all those who serve in our country’s defense.” Under the order, it was “the policy of the President that there shall be equality of treatment and opportunity in the armed services without regard to race, color, religion or national origin.” This policy was to be implemented “as rapidly as possible, having due regard to the time required to effectuate any necessary changes without impairing efficiency or morale.” The order did not specifically mention desegregation, however, and provided no deadline by which “equality” should be accomplished.”

The timing of Truman’s order—in the middle of the 1948 election campaign—lends support to the argument of many historians that a principal motive behind the action was political. The order came shortly after the Democratic Party convention. The Democrats adopted a strong civil rights party platform; prompting southern Democrats to walk out and form their own Dixiecrat Party. The departure of the Dixiecrats meant that Truman would have to look elsewhere for electoral support. This reinforced the importance of the black vote to his campaign. In light of political motives, Bernard Nalty suggests that the order resulted from “a marriage of politics and principle,” as Truman stood to gain politically from an action that, Nalty believes, Truman thought was morally right.” In an effort to maintain as broad a political base as possible, Truman was silent on civil rights for much of the campaign to avoid alienating critics of his civil rights stance. When he appeared in Harlem on October 29—the first major presidential candidate who had done so—Truman emphasized his accomplishments. The president told the crowd that when Congress had not enacted civil rights legislation, he had turned to executive orders. His actions served the need for equality and also safeguarded democracy. “Today the democratic 86 CHAPTER THREE

way of life is being challenged all over the world. Democracy’s answer to the challenge of totalitarianism is its promise of equal rights

and equal opportunities for all mankind.” Maintaining a hold on the black vote as well as other critical constituencies, Truman went on to win the 1948 election by the narrowest of margins.'® Publicly and privately, the president persistently stressed the im-

portance of civil rights reform to the nation’s Cold War foreign relations. Michael Sherry has written that “[c]ivil rights leaders, and Truman himself on occasion, did also invoke morality and justice,

but national security was the dominant rationale” for civil rights reform. It was also “the most persistent.” While domestic politics and principle surely played a role in Truman’s decision to desegregate the military, safeguarding the nation’s overseas image, an important theme throughout Truman’s presidency, was also a critical factor."”

In spite of the desegregation order, racism in the armed forces continued to be an issue. Congressman Jacob Javits of New York drew attention to the problem on January 12, 1950, by calling for a congressional investigation. According to Javits, race discrimination continued, and “[n]othing could be more useful . . . to the Commu-

nist propagandists in the “cold war.’” Javits had been to Europe, where he had been repeatedly questioned about American racial practices in many areas, including the military. He reported that “[t]he Communist propagandists in Western Germany and Western Europe seek to build up the alleged evils and to magnify them, but there is enough to them to damage us seriously in the cold war.” In Asia and Africa the problem was “even worse.” The “fall” of China exacerbated this crisis, for now China was another source of antiAmerican propaganda. As Javits put it, “With Communist China as

a propaganda base, segregation and discrimination on grounds of race, creed or color in the United States can be used to win tens of millions to the Communist cause.” The problem of discrimination had become, at least in part, “a question . . . relative to the foreign policy of the United States.” A turn in the Cold War finally led to meaningful racial integration

in the army. In June 1950 North Korean troops invaded South Korea. Hoping to contain communism, Iruman sent U.S. troops to CIVIL RIGHTS REFORM 87

Korea to attempt to push back North Korean forces. The war would

ultimately expand into an unsuccessful effort to liberate North Korea. This long and bloody “police action” required a substantial

commitment of U.S. troops. When American units needed reinforcements, American commanders came to realize that attempts to maintain segregation were interfering with military objectives. It was

ultimately the imperatives of wartime that led military leaders to assign reinforcements without regard to race."” Equality in service meant equality in death. The casualties of the Korean War would achieve the democracy at last that Chaplain Git-

tlesohn had imagined on Iwo Jima during World War II. “White men and Negroes alike, Protestants, Catholics and Jews,” their guns held the line at the Cold War’s periphery. These integrated troops fulfilled the promise of U.S. propaganda. Their bodies held the line in the battle for the hearts and minds of the people of the world.

Congress took up the issue of the effect of discrimination on U.S. foreign relations, but with less success. When legislation to create a permanent Fair Employment Practices Commission to combat race discrimination in employment under federal defense contracts was before the Senate in May 1950, Democratic Senator William Benton of Connecticut argued that the bill was essential to national security. Benton spoke with authority, since he had previously served as assistant secretary of state in charge of public affairs. In that capac-

ity, he said that it had been his “unhappy responsibility to study how Communist propaganda twisted and distorted our civil-rights problems in the channels of world communication.” As an American delegate to UNESCO, he “saw how our unsolved civil rights problems hampered our efforts and our prestige in reaching out— gropingly as it were—for the hearts and the minds of men.” It was not only “Sovietized” minds and the minds of Asians and Africans

that Americans could not reach, but Europeans and Central and South Americans as well.”° Benton argued that civil rights problems had “enormous but little understood worldwide impact.” He cautioned that “it can be a great

and tragic mistake for us if we underestimate this weakness of ours

in this highly dangerous world. ... It is impossible to exaggerate 88 CHAPTER THREE

how sensitive other countries are to the question of civil rights in America, and how much single instances of discrimination are magnified in their eyes.”” Senator Richard B. Russell of Georgia responded that he was confused by Benton’s argument. He did not understand why the Senate “should pass the bill because of the Communists’ propagandizing a state of affairs that does not exist in this country.” On the one hand, senators were urged to support the Marshall Plan because commu-

nists opposed it. “Now we are told that we must pass the FEPC

| bill because the Communists are in favor of it. That is somewhat confusing.” Benton argued that passage of the FEPC legislation would be a great blow to communist propaganda, and that failure to pass it would be exploited by the communists as evidence of American racial prejudice. Russell then countered that the communist Daily Worker “has claimed credit for originating the whole idea

of the FEPC legislation, and has supported it constantly since the , first day it was introduced in this body.” While Benton tried to focus on the issue of Soviet propaganda and its effectiveness, Russell

remained unconvinced. His position was “that we cannot believe anything which comes out of Russia and that any of us who believes anything that comes from Russia is very foolish.””

Senator Russell turned the Cold War argument on its head. In a political and cultural climate steeped in anticommunism, arguing that civil rights reform would be a capitulation to communists, who themselves must clearly be pursuing ulterior motives to undermine American society, proved to be a very effective strategy. Anticommunism was more important to Congress than civil rights. For that reason, casting a red taint on a civil rights bill was an effective way

to derail it. |

Benton’s argument did not seem to go very far with the rest of the Senate. When he finally yielded the floor, a quorum call revealed that only twenty-two members, less than a quorum, had heard him out. The FEPC legislation ultimately failed to pass. Representative

Vito Marcantonio, the bill’s chief sponsor in the House, assailed the Democrats, the Republicans, and the President, arguing that “everybody wants civil rights as an issue but not as a law.” New York

Times columnist Arthur Krock blamed President Truman for this CIVIL RIGHTS REFORM 89

defeat, arguing that in failing to push the Democratic leadership in the House to bring the legislation up for a vote, Truman preserved the issue of civil rights as a 1950 campaign issue without accomplishing civil rights reform. Even if he had been a more active supporter of civil rights legislation, however, Truman might not have had much success in getting his programs through Congress.” Desegregation of the military is often thought of as Truman’s principal civil rights accomplishment. Of great significance as well, however, was the Truman administration’s participation in the landmark desegregation cases leading up to Brown v. Board of Education. Al-

though Brown itself was decided in 1954, when Dwight D. Eisenhower was president, it was Truman’s Justice Department that initiated the government’s participation in the legal battle to overcome Jim Crow. The Justice Department’s most important brief in Brown itself was filed in December 1952, during the last weeks of Truman’s

presidency. The decision to participate in these cases was made at the highest levels of the Truman administration, at times involving the president himself.” In amicus curiae, or “friend of the court,” briefs in civil rights cases, the Iruman administration stressed to the Supreme Court the international implications of race discrimination and at times

focused on the negative impact on U.S. foreign relations that a prosegregation decision might have.” In terms of its consequences for American prestige, a Court decision rendering segregation unconstitutional was potentially of the greatest symbolic value. Change

emanating from a Supreme Court interpretation of the Constitution , would show that the principle of racial equality was already there in the governing document of American democracy. This would show that, as Gunnar Myrdal had suggested, it was a principle waiting to be realized as Americans perfected their practice of democracy. The Truman administration’s involvement in high-profile desegregation cases was a new practice. The United States was not a plaintiff

or defendant in these cases. The Justice Department filed amicus curiae briefs to inform the Court of important interests at stake beyond those presented by the parties to the cases. Previously, the Justice

Department had filed amicus briefs only in cases where the United 90 CHAPTER THREE

States had a concrete interest at stake. The cases leading up to Brown v. Board of Education did not involve a concrete federal interest. Instead, the federal government was interested in the abstract concept of justice at stake in these cases, and in the well-being of the plaintiffs. Why was the Justice Department filing briefs to vindicate the interests of one of the parties? In brief after brief, the Justice Department argued that crucial national interests were also implicated. The segregation challenged in these cases damaged U.S. prestige abroad and threatened U.S. foreign relations. In the context of heightened Cold War tensions, the stakes in these cases were very high.”® The Truman Justice Department began its participation as amicus curiae in civil rights cases with a restrictive covenant case, Shelley v. Kraemer. In Shelley, whites sold residential property to African Americans in violation of a covenant among landowners prohibiting sales to nonwhites. State supreme courts in Missouri and Michigan had ruled that the covenants were enforceable. The question in Shelley was whether judicial enforcement of the covenants constituted

“state action” violating the Fourteenth Amendment rights of the African Americans who purchased the property. The Justice Department argued that state court action was “state action” and therefore that when state courts enforced racially restrictive covenants they violated the Fourteenth Amendment.” According to Solicitor General Philip Perlman, the Justice Department brief filed in the restrictive covenant cases was “the first instance in which the Government had intervened in a case to which it was not a party and in which its sole purpose was the vindication of rights guaranteed by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.” In previous civil rights cases, the solicitor general participated when the

litigation involved a federal agency and when the question in the case concerned the supremacy of federal law. A different sort of federal interest was involved in the restrictive covenant cases. According to Perlman, racially restrictive covenants hampered the federal gov-

ernment “in doing its duty in the fields of public health, housing, home finance, and in the conduct of foreign affairs.” The brief for the United States in Shelley v. Kraemer relied on the State Department’s view that “the United States has been embarrassed in the conduct of foreign relations by acts of discrimination taking place in CIVIL RIGHTS REFORM 91

this country.” To support this argument, the brief quoted at length from the Dean Acheson letter relied on in To Secure These Rights.”

Although not addressing the international implications of the case, the Supreme Court agreed with the result sought by the Justice Department. The Court ruled that enforcement of restrictive covenants in state courts constituted state action violating the rights of

African Americans to equal protection of the laws. Private agreements to exclude African Americans from housing were therefore not enforceable by state courts. The Shelley decision was celebrated by civil rights supporters in the U.S. and abroad. The decision was heralded by an Indian newspaper as “another victory in the battle for civil rights that is now going on in America.””

In 1949 the Justice Department filed a brief in Henderson v. United States, a case about segregation in railroad dining cars. Because the legal foundation for Jim Crow, Plessy v. Ferguson, was also

a case about railroad segregation, Henderson held the potential to overturn this icon of racial oppression. In Henderson, the Justice Department took a position contrary to the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) regarding the validity of segregation under the Interstate Commerce Act’s equal treatment requirement. The ICC had ruled that the Southern Railway Company’s practice of provid-

ing separate seating behind a curtain in dining cars for African American passengers did not violate the statute. The Justice Department’s position on appeal was, first, that dining car segregation

was unlawful under the Interstate Commerce Act, and, second, that if it was authorized, this segregation violated the Fourteenth Amendment.” As in Shelley, the government argued that the case had implications for U.S. foreign relations. The Henderson brief elaborated more fully on the problem. The Justice Department told the Court of the “frequent and caustic” foreign press coverage of U.S. race discrimination. The brief bolstered its argument with examples from Soviet publications and critical statements about U.S. race discrimination made in United Nations proceedings. It quoted from recent statements made by representatives of other governments in a United Nations subcommittee meeting that “typify the manner in which 92 CHAPTER THREE

racial discrimination in this country is turned against us in the international field.” For example, a representative of the Soviet Union had commented, “Guided by the principles of the United Nations Charter, the General Assembly must condemn the policy and practice of racial discrimination in the United States and any other countries of the American continent where such a policy was being exercised.” Similarly, the representative from Poland “did not . . . believe

that the United States Government had the least intention to conform to the recommendations which would be made by the United Nations with regard to the improvement of living conditions of the coloured population of that country.” In one example of the foreign press, the brief quoted an article from The Bolshevik that claimed that

the theory and practice of racial discrimination against the negroes in America is known to the whole world. The poison of racial hatred has become so strong in post-war America that matters go to unbelievable lengths; for example a Negress injured in a road accident could not be taken to a neighbouring hospital since this hospital was only for “whites.”

A story in the Soviet Literary Gazette titled “The Tragedy of Coloured America,” stated, It is a country within a country. Coloured America is not allowed to mix with the other white America, it exists within it like the yolk in the white of an egg. Or, to be more exact, like a gigantic ghetto. The walls of this ghetto are invisible but they are nonetheless indestructible. They are placed within cities where the Negroes live in special quarters, in buses where the Negroes are assigned only the back seats, in hairdressers where they have special chairs.”

Through its reliance on United Nations statements and the Soviet press, the Henderson brief hammered home the point that racial segregation hampered the U.S. government’s fight against world communism.

There was another turf upon which the battle for democracy waged: the home front. The Henderson brief raised the specter of CIVIL RIGHTS REFORM — 93

African American radicalism. “The apparent hypocrisy of a society professing equality but practicing segregation and other forms of racial discrimination furnishes justification and reason for the latent urge to rebel, and frequently leads to lasting bitterness or total rejection of the American creed and system of government.” However, the brief emphasized that African American protest was not tied to the Communist Party. The brief drew from the testimony of baseball player Jackie Robinson, who had appeared before the House Committee on Un-American Activities. Robinson testified: Just because Communists kick up a big fuss over racial discrimination when it suits their purposes, a lot of people try to pretend that the whole issue is a creation of Communist imagination. But they are not fooling anyone with this kind of pretense, and talk about “Communists stirring up Negroes to protest,” only makes present misunderstanding worse than ever. Negroes were stirred up long before there was a Communist Party, and they'll stay stirred up long after the party has disappeared—unless Jim Crow has disappeared by then as well.”

The clear implication was that while African American protest was not directly tied to communism, racial injustice added to discontent among African Americans and, if not remedied, could lead them to reject American democracy. Equality was a safeguard against domestic subversion. Racial segregation threatened the government’s ability to maintain its role as a leader of the free world and to govern peacefully at home. In Henderson, the Supreme Court ruled that railroad dining car segregation violated the Interstate Commerce Act because it was unequal treatment. Since segregation violated a federal statute, the

Court did not need to decide whether segregation in interstate travel was unconstitutional and whether Plessy v. Ferguson should be overturned.* In the same year as the Henderson case, the Justice Department participated for the first time in cases challenging school segregation. The department argued that McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Education and Sweatt v. Painter were of “great importance” 94 CHAPTER THREE

to the nation because “they test the vitality and strength of the democratic ideals to which the United States is dedicated.” In McLaurin, the University of Oklahoma had admitted an African American stu-

dent, G. W. McLaurin, to its graduate program in education after he successfully challenged Oklahoma’s segregation statutes in federal

district court, but McLaurin was segregated within the university. He was assigned to a separate table in the library, a separate row in the classroom, and a separate table in the cafeteria. The NAACP argued that this different treatment on the basis of race violated the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Sweatt involved a challenge to racial segregation at the University of Texas Law School. Heman Marion Sweatt was denied admission to the law

school because he was African American. When a state trial court found that the university’s action violated the Fourteenth Amendment, the state responded by quickly opening a separate black law school. There were great differences between the schools in libraries,

faculties, and other resources. The question before the Supreme Court was whether the legal education provided at the black school was equal to that provided to whites at the University of Texas.” The U.S. brief in Sweatt and McLaurin stressed again that race discrimination was “the greatest unsolved task for American democracy.” This time the Justice Department urged the Supreme Court to consider the foreign policy repercussions the Court’s ruling in the cases might have. The Court is here asked to place the seal of constitutional approval upon an undisguised species of racial discrimination. If the imprimatur of constitutionality should be put on such a denial of equality, one would expect the foes of democracy to exploit such an action for their own purposes. The ideals embodied in our Bill of Rights would be ridiculed as empty words, devoid of any real substance.

The consequences of such a ruling would be stark, extending far beyond the cases, and affecting the American way of life.

It is in the context of a world in which freedom and equality must become living realities, if the democratic way of life is to survive, that the issues in these cases should be viewed. In CIVIL RIGHTS REFORM 95

these times, when even the foundations of our free institutions are not altogether secure, it is especially important that it again be unequivocally affirmed that the Constitution of the United States, like the Declaration of Independence and the other great state papers in American history, places no limitation, express or implied, on the principle of the equality of all men before the law. The brief then noted again the specific foreign policy implications of U.S. race discrimination that the Justice Department had previously outlined in the Henderson brief.*°

In Sweatt and McLaurin, the Supreme Court again sided with the Justice Department and the NAACP. In important rulings that significantly eroded the separate-but-equal doctrine, the Court found that segregation at the University of Texas Law School and the University of Oklahoma School of Education denied the African

American plaintiffs equal treatment. The Court found that the plaintiffs’ very isolation from white students meant that the education provided to them was unequal. Isolating them from white classmates denied Heman Sweatt and G. W. McLaurin the equality guaranteed them by the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court, however, declined to reconsider directly the constitutionality of segregation

itself.°” |

Segregation in the District of Columbia was an issue in the next series of crucial desegregation cases before the Court. While racial

discrimination in southern states and throughout the nation had been the subject of foreign criticism, segregation in the District of Columbia was particularly embarrassing and was often a special focus

of international attention. If segregation only existed in particular areas of the country, it would have been easier for the federal govern-

ment to characterize it as a regional phenomenon, as something at odds with generally accepted American practices. As long as the seat of the federal government was segregated, however, any claims that segregation was not a widespread national practice seemed hollow. The District of Columbia was “the window through which the world looks into our house.” If the United States were to clean up its international image, Washington was the place to begin.* 96 CHAPTER THREE

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The president’s concerns about the impact of these incidents on the Vienna talks were echoed in the London Daily Telegraph. “It is a pity that the Russians and Chinese in their endless efforts to foster hatred of America, who have made great play with the disturbances at Little Rock, should have another opportunity on the eve of the President’s meeting with Khrushchev.” Other papers thought that Kennedy had displayed courage in intervening in Alabama, and in the words of the London Daily Express, had “proven to an anxious world that the Kennedy brothers are as ready to defend the ideals of individual liberty within the borders of the United States as they are

to act outside. ... On the eve of perhaps the most vital personal confrontation in post-war history ... between President Kennedy and Mr. Khrushchev, that is an incalculable contribution not only to American prestige but to Western unity.”” Ultimately, the Kennedy administration handled the crisis in a manner that helped minimize mob violence and negative headlines, but without protecting federal rights. Following negotiations between the administration and Mississippi's governor, when the Freedom Ride arrived in Jackson, Mississippi, on May 24, police officers

were on hand and kept the peace. The officers directed the riders from the bus, through the waiting rooms, and into paddy wagons. The riders were arrested, convicted of breach of the peace, and sentenced to sixty-seven-day jail terms. The federal government did not intervene.” The Freedom Rides provided an early and dramatic example for the Kennedy administration of the way that civil rights movement activities, coupled with violent southern white reaction, created civil rights crises that demanded federal government attention. President Kennedy could not fully define the place of civil rights in his administration’s overall agenda. He could not control the nature and timing of the issues. Civil rights crises would periodically demand the

president’s attention and concern. Because federal rights were at stake, because law and order demanded it, because it had an impact on his image as a national leader, because it harmed U.S. prestige abroad, Kennedy would find himself increasingly involved in civil rights. 162 CHAPTER FIVE

As Kennedy’s first year in office drew to a close, the administration took stock of its accomplishments. Achievements on the civil rights front were included on a draft list of “Major Foreign Policy Measures Taken by the Kennedy Administration.” The administration’s foreign policy activity including encouraging “the orderly evolution of desegregation in the United States. This has had a favorable effect overseas. Progress in the fields of civil rights and education have been noteworthy.”” It was clear that the Kennedy administration's foreign affairs objectives would be enhanced by civil rights reform. In September 1962, the University of Mississippi in Oxford handed the Kennedy administration a civil rights crisis that would resonate even more forcefully overseas then the Freedom Rides had done. James Meredith, a resident of Mississippi, applied to the university and was rejected solely because he was African American. Meredith

sued the university, and in June 1962 the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that Meredith’s exclusion was unconstitutional. After

the U.S. Supreme Court declined to review the case, Mississippi Governor Ross Barnett responded that the state would “not surrender to the evil and illegal forces of tyranny.” Ultimately, with Barnett

recalcitrant and mobs on campus protesting Meredith, Kennedy ~ sent in federal marshals. Through the night of September 30, a battle raged between troops and demonstrators. Two people were killed, including a French reporter, and hundreds were wounded: ° The next morning, with troops in control of the campus, Meredith ~

was registered.” |

The violence in Oxford and the federal role in managing the crisis

were widely followed overseas. Although dramatic racial conflict harmed the nation’s image abroad, the Meredith incident, like Little Rock before it, also provided an opportunity for demonstrating the federal government’s resolve. In England, the Manchester Guardian noted that “[iJn the world outside Mississippi’s long night has already done serious damage to America’s name.” Yet along with many

international commentators, the Guardian believed that the federal government's role was “proof that the killers and rioters are not a LOSING CONTROL IN CAMELOT 163

portent but a remnant.” In Sweden, the Stockhoms-Tidningen thought that “[t]here is hardly to be found a corresponding example in the world of a Government so powerfully protecting the rights of a minority. In the midst of tragedy, this is a victory for American democracy and for the ideas upon which it rests.” In contrast, how-

ever, a survey of university students in Bogota reported that the crisis damaged U.S. prestige abroad and undermined the president’s standing.” Even in Africa, many critics of the United States found reasons to praise Kennedy’s actions. The USIA reported the “[n]oteworthy

... fact that some African sources exemplified by Sudan, Ghana, and Libya, often critical of the United States in the past and particularly so when racial incidents occur, have not in this case launched attacks on America but have instead praised the federal action.” In Nigeria, Kenya, and Ethiopia, newspapers had “displayed considerable understanding of the difficulties faced by the American government with this problem.” In Kenya, the Daily Nation thought that “the words “Little Rock’ and ‘Oxford, Mississippi’ should be considered... as a vindication of American democracy.” According to the paper, “In each case we have seen the federal authorities, working through the channel of the decisions of the Supreme Court, pursuing honestly and fearlessly a policy aimed at eradicating the taint of racialism from American life.” The coverage in some African newspapers, however, was searing. The Moroccan La Nation saw Meredith as “a symbol as he enters the university between a double hedge of armed soldiers. Let us wish that his name remains that of the last American to be wounded in heart and flesh because he is a Negro.” The local press in Katanga argued that “[t]he United States is incapable of establishing a multiracial society in their own country” and

suggested that it was time to consider sending a United Nations delegation “to the United States to protect the rights of black American citizens.”*°

The former governor general of India was impressed by President Kennedy’s handling of the Mississippi crisis. He told U.S. Ambassador Chester Bowles that “as far as he knows this is the first time in

the history of the world that any nation has ever demonstrated so

164 CHAPTER FIVE ,

_ dramatically its respect for law. Where else, he asked, could we ex-

pect to see a government throw thousands of men and huge resources behind the application of a single individual to enter a uni- |

versity because the law said he had a right to be there.” Such reactions convinced Bowles that the United States had now dramatized that racial discrimination was illegal and that the federal government was committed to opposing it. Bowles believed that the Meredith situation could be “a turning point not only in our struggle against segregation in this country, but in our efforts to make the people of Asia, Africa and Latin America understand what we are trying to do.”* The international impact was not lost on members of the administration. As Arthur Schlesinger put it, President Kennedy’s action had a profound effect around the world, most of all in Africa. As the delegate from Upper Volta put it in the UN General Assembly, segregation unquestionably existed in the United States, but what is important is that the Government of the United States did not make an in-

stitution of this. It does not praise the policy. On the con- | trary, it energetically fights it. For one small Negro to go to school, it threatens governors and judges with prison . . . it sends troops to occupy the University of Mississippi. In Schlesinger’s view, the administration’s actions in Mississippi had

concrete foreign relations benefits. “Three weeks after Oxford, Sékou Touré and Ben Bella were prepared to deny refueling facilities to Soviet planes bound for Cuba during the missile crisis.” The lesson was clear. The nation’s world leadership and security were enhanced by efforts to secure civil rights at home.”

Although federal action at the University of Mississippi was widely praised, the overall impact of this crisis remained troubling. Assessing worldwide press coverage, the USIA noted that the restrained editorial comment was “overshadowed by the massive news reporting on the incident. Despite the factual nature of news coverage based primarily on Western wire services, the vivid portrayal in news reports and wire photos of the more sensational aspects of the LOSING CONTROL IN CAMELOT 165

incident—such as rioting and bloodshed—may well have left a more lasting impression of the less palatable aspects of the racial situation

in the U.S.” Moderate editorial comment could not overcome visceral news reporting on the actual events. The USIA’s concerns bore themselves out in a subsequent 1962 report, which found that “[r]a-

cial prejudice is the chief blemish on the image of the American people abroad, even among the majority of citizens of non-Commu-

nist nations who hold the United States in high esteem.” USIA reports detailing the widespread international media coverage of the Mississippi crisis crossed the president’s desk, and he was

concerned about Mississippi's impact on the U.S. image abroad. Kennedy had been critical of Eisenhower’s handling of the Little Rock crisis. As Richard Reeves put it, he had hoped “there would be no photo opportunities on his watch that would embarrass the United States all over the world.” In the aftermath of the Mississippi

crisis, Kennedy wondered how Mississippi compared with Little Rock. How did the world react to his administration’s handling of the crisis, compared to the reaction to Eisenhower’s action in Little Rock? The USIA responded with a detailed report on the international reaction to the crisis at Ole Miss. The lessons to be drawn from it were clear. Definitive federal action in civil rights crises would have a positive effect on the nation’s image abroad. A more passive civil rights stance might serve the president’s interest in not

alienating the South before the 1964 election and in keeping his other legislative priorities from getting sidetracked by a congtessional battle over civil rights. An active posture, however, would better serve U.S. foreign affairs.” If things remained quiet, this trade-off could be avoided, at least for a time. With the Mississippi crisis over, the Kennedy administration might have hoped for a breathing spell. Yet as long as discrimi-

nation and disenfranchisement plagued the nation, the image of democracy would be at risk. And the rank and file of the civil rights

movement did not shy away from protest actions out of fear of harming the nation’s image abroad. Instead, the movement questioned the truth of American rhetoric. As protest actions met with violent resistance, the movement kept the gaze of the international media focused on race in America. 166 CHAPTER FIVE

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A particularly awkward and persistent problem for the administration was discrimination against black foreign diplomats. Troubling incidents occurred with increasing frequency as UN delegates from newly independent nations came to the United States. Dean Rusk recalled one incident: Early in the Kennedy years a black delegate to the United Nations landed in Miami on his way to New York. When the passengers disembarked for lunch, the white passengers were taken to the airport restaurant; the black delegate received a folding canvas stool in a corner of the hangar and a sandwich wrapped with waxed paper. He then flew on to New York, where our delegation asked for his vote on human rights issues.” Rusk believed that incidents like this were “a severe barrier to cordial relations with many foreign states.” The State Department Protocol

Office tried to handle difficulties faced by foreign diplomats, but Rusk quickly discovered that the problems were deep-seated and “depended on racial progress throughout Washington and indeed the entire country. We could not expect an African diplomat to gain privileges and services denied black Americans. Nor could we expect him to display his diplomatic passport every time he wanted to eat or get a haircut.” For these reasons, as well as, Rusk said, “the simple rightness of the cause,” the State Department worked on antisegregation efforts, throwing “its full weight behind the Civil Rights Acts

of 1964 and 1965, and especially legislation dealing with public accommodations.”°*°

A source of particular concern was Maryland’s Highway 40, the route taken by many diplomats on the drive from the United Na-

tions in New York City to the nation’s capital. Time after time, when African diplomats stopped for a bite to eat, they were refused service at Maryland restaurants. Such incidents upset the diplomats and often generated a hostile press reaction in their home country.

The implications of discrimination for U.S. relations with these countries concerned Kennedy administration staffers. As Chester Bowles remarked, LOSING CONTROL IN CAMELOT 167

Now you have some 20 new nations in Africa. You have, of course, all the new nations of Asia. The UN has grown from 50 nations in the last few years to a hundred. They are all coming to the United States because the UN is here and because they look on this as a country of great promise. ... And they come here and, of course, some of them get into all kinds of difficulties with some of our own ways of doing things. And they go home, a lot of them, pretty upset individuals.” Upon hearing of these incidents, President Kennedy’s initial reaction was that African ambassadors shouldn’t be driving on Highway 40. They should fly. “It’s a hell of a road,” he said. “I used to drive it years ago, but why would anybody want to drive it today when you can fly? Tell these ambassadors I wouldn’t think of driving from New York to Washington. Tell them to fly!” According to Harris Wofford, Kennedy’s reaction led State Department officials to wonder whether the president was behind their efforts to end discrimination on Route 40. Still, as Carl M. Brauer notes, because Kennedy “wanted to improve America’s image in the Third World and because he had served as chairman of a Senate subcommittee on Africa, Kennedy came to office disposed to be especially sensitive to this problem.””°

The seriousness of the problem required a systematic response. The administration established a new program within the State Department Protocol Office. The Office of Special Protocol Services, and its director Pedro Sanjuan, worked on long-term solutions to the problem of race discrimination against foreign diplomats. While Sanjuan was charged with handling the vast array of difficulties foreign diplomats encountered throughout the country, a particular focus of his work was Route 40. When a bill prohibiting discrimination in public accommodations was introduced in the Maryland state legislature, Sanjuan testified in favor of the bill on behalf of the Department of State. Federal government involvement in state legislative action would seem to be a great breach of federalism. Sanjuan acknowledged that some people might wonder “why the Department of State is interested in what may appear to some to be an internal matter within the State of Maryland.” He recast his 168 CHAPTER FIVE

appearance as “a request by the Department of State for the assistance of the State of Maryland in insuring the success of the foreign policy of the United States.” The State Department strongly sup-

ported the bill because it would “eliminate a source of embarrassment that greatly damages our relations with not only the neutral nations of the world, but many nations which are stoutly with us in the fight for freedom.” The importance of civil rights to U.S. foreign

relations seemed to take precedence over the usual boundaries between state and federal authority.” Sanjuan drew an analogy between this request for assistance and the U.S. government’s appeal to private industry to help by building better weapons during World War II. This time the war was a Cold War, and the weapons required were different. “GIVE US THE

WEAPONS TO CONDUCT THIS WAR OF HUMAN DIGNITY,” he urged. “The fight for decency against Communism is everyone’s war in America.” After an initial setback, the Maryland public accommodations bill was passed by the state legislature in January 1963.”

The impact of race in America on international politics came toa head in the spring of 1963 in Birmingham, Alabama. On May 3, more than a thousand African American children and teenagers embarked on a civil rights march. Birmingham’s jails were already filled with protesters, so it was Police Commissioner Eugene “Bull” Connor’s objective to deter the demonstrators without arresting them. To do that, he used fire hoses. The strength of the city’s high-pressure hoses knocked down protesters. Water guns were backed up by police dogs that lunged at demonstrators.*! The police tactics did not deter Birmingham’s determined civil rights movement, but they had a profound impact that Connor may

not have contemplated. Dramatic photographs in newspapers throughout the country captured the nation’s attention, focusing concern on the need for civil rights reform. News coverage throughout the world underscored international concerns about racial injustice in America.” On May 14, 1963, the USIA reported that the Soviet Union had

“stepped up its propaganda on Birmingham over the weekend to LOSING CONTROL IN CAMELOT 169

campaign proportions, devoting about one fifth of its radio output to the subject.” This propaganda was more extensive than during the Meredith dispute. In most other countries, with the exception of African nations, “coverage has been unexpectedly moderate and factual, except in the Communist and leftist press.” Nevertheless, “the damaging pictures of dogs and fire hoses have been extremely widely used.” In Lagos, Nigeria, for example, “substantial improvement over [the] past two years in Nigerian public understanding of progress in U.S. race relations is being rapidly eroded by reports, photographs and TV coverage from Alabama. Growing adverse local reactions [are] in marked contrast [to the] situation at [the] time [of the] Meredith case when [the] strong stand [of the] Federal Govern-

ment [was] widely understood and applauded.” In Kenya, police dogs and fire hoses were featured on television, and front page news-

paper stories featured headlines such as: “Riots Flare in U.S. South—Infants Sent to Jail.” The nation also took a “heavy beating in Ghana over Birmingham.” The U.S. embassy in Accra reported that the United States had “definitely lost ground” due to the crisis.”

When trouble began in Birmingham, as John Walton Cotman put it, initially “President Kennedy did not take the lead in promoting civil rights” in that city. “Prior to May 3rd the President made no discernable attempt to confront the clear pattern of Bill of Rights violations, systematic abuse of police authority and police brutality... . President Kennedy was cautious and conservative,” Cotman argues, “only acting when forced to by political crisis.”“ Following the May 3 demonstrations, Kennedy called a meeting of his top advisors. According to Burke Marshall, the reason for the meeting was that Birmingham “was a matter of national and international concern at the time because of the mass of demonstrations.” The administration was under pressure to take action, yet the course of federal involvement was unclear. As Marshall remem-

bered it, “the pictures of the police dogs and fire hoses going throughout the country stirred the feelings of every Negro in the country, most whites in the country, and I suppose particularly col-

ored persons throughout the world. And all of that emotion was directed at President Kennedy. “Why didn’t he do something?’ ” The 170 CHAPTER FIVE

concern about Birmingham’s impact led the administration to play a key role in resolving the crisis. Kennedy dispatched Marshall to the city, and Marshall helped manage negotiations that led to an agreement between the SCLC, the local government, and the business community. Under the pact, steps would be taken to desegregate facilities in large department stores, redress employment discrimination, and release jailed civil rights demonstrators.” Yet once Birmingham had focused the world’s attention on racial brutality in America, resolving problems on the local level would not fully resolve the crisis. As with so many civil rights crises in the 1960s, Birmingham required a global, as well as a local, response. In Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the diplomatic consequences of discrimination reached a particularly dramatic level. African leaders had gathered in that city for an historic moment of an entirely different kind. On May 22, 1963, Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia convened the Conference of African Heads of States and Governments. Gathered together were heads of state and other representatives of all but two independent African nations.*° This was a moment, Selassie told the assembled leaders, “without parallel in history.” We stand today on the stage of world affairs, before the audience of world opinion. . . . Africa is today in mid-course, in transition from the Africa of Yesterday to the Africa of Tomorrow. ... [he task on which we have embarked—the making of Africa—will not wait. We must act to shape and mould the future and leave our imprint on events as they pass into history.*”

The task before this body was to chart the future of African politics. Out of the meeting would come the Organization of African Unity. It was Selassie’s hope that this gathering, and the foundation it laid,

would ultimately bear fruit in the formation of a unified Africa, operating as a political body like the United States of America or the Soviet Union.” Over the next few days, African leaders worked together to produce a series of resolutions embodying their common goals and aspirations. As they did so, the focus of their deliberations strayed far LOSING CONTROL IN CAMELOT 171

from the shores of Africa. These heads of state believed that their own

interests were implicated in a dramatic conflict many miles away. The news of Birmingham was fresh in the minds of African leaders as they gathered in Addis Ababa. On the second day of the conference, Prime Minister Milton Obote of Uganda released an open

letter to President Kennedy protesting the treatment of African American demonstrators in Birmingham. The Negroes who, even while the conference was in session, have been subjected to the most inhuman treatment, who have been blasted with fire hoses cranked up to such pressure that the water could strip bark off trees, at whom the police have deliberately set snarling dogs, are our own kith and kin. The only offences which these people have committed are that they are black and that they have demanded the right to be free and to hold their heads up as equal citizens of the United States.” These matters were relevant to African leaders, for “the tasks before

us of effecting closer union of African states both in the political and economic fields necessarily include the emancipation of the peo-

ple of dark races, and ... colonialism and race discrimination are one of the fundamental issues for the future of our civilization.” Obote believed that “[n]othing is more paradoxical than that these events should take place in the United States and at a time when that country is anxious to project its image before the world screen as the archtype of democracy and the champion of freedom.” Africans, who had “borne the white-man’s burden for . . . centuries, . . . feel that our own freedom and independence would be a mere sham if our black brethren elsewhere in Africa and in the United States still remain in political, social and economic bondage.” Obote told President Kennedy that “the eyes and ears of the world are concentrated on events in Alabama and it is the duty of the free world and

more so of the countries that hold themselves up as the leaders of that free world to see that all of their citizens, regardless of the colour of their skin, are free.””° According to the U. S. embassy in Addis Ababa, the idea for this critique of the United States came from an “American Negro black 172 CHAPTER FIVE

Muslim representative, resident [of] Cairo,” who had “been very active in lobbying among journalists and delegates to [the] conference against racial discrimination in [the] US.” Accordingly, this episode may be an example of the increasing effectiveness of African American efforts to use international pressure as leverage for social change at home.”’ African leaders engaged in a lengthy discussion of Birmingham and debated the proper way to express concern over the incidents in their joint resolutions. The Reuters news agency reported that, in its original form, a resolution on Birmingham had said “it “could lead to a break in relations’ between the United States and African countries.” According to reports, some delegations objected, “and in the

end all agreed on substitution [of] the word ‘deterioration’ for ‘break.’ ” According to Agence France-Presse, some delegates suggested that other nations be “black-listed” as well. “It was then realized that the resolution would lose its value if it mentioned a long list of states.” The result was a milder resolution that mentioned only the United States. The French wire service called it a “well-balanced plan adopted after long debate,” and a “painful compromise.”” In its final version, the resolution indicated that the conference:

Expresses the deep concern aroused in all African peoples and governments by the measures of racial discrimination taken against communities of African origin living outside the continent and particularly in the United States of America. Expresses an appreciation for the efforts of the Federal Government of the United States of America to put an end to these intolerable mal-practices which are likely seriously to deteriorate relations between the African peoples and governments on the one hand and the people and government of the United States of America on the other.”

The State Department’s reaction was that the resolution on discrimination was “appreciably better from our standpoint, than the preliminary proposal.” According to a State Department memorandum for the White House, U.S. Ambassador to Ethiopia Edward M. Korry thought it was “as good an outcome as possible.” The adoption of the watered-down version “was a remarkable tribute to LOSING CONTROL IN CAMELOT 173

the United States Government, considering the depth of African feeling about the Alabama incidents.” This achievement was “tangi-

ble evidence of the international impact of local incidents, and in the context of our African relations reinforces the wisdom of Federal policy.” From the State Department’s perspective, the federal government’s role in resolving the Birmingham crisis had concrete and beneficial effects on U.S. foreign relations. This perspective was reinforced in post—Addis Ababa correspondence with African leaders.

For example, President Nyerere of Tanganyika wrote to Kennedy that he “appreciated your efforts in connection with the reinvigo-

rated demand by the Negro Citizens of America for full equal rights.” Nyerere had confidence that Kennedy would “find a solution which gives justice to all American citizens. In doing so you will be making a great contribution to the cause of non-racialism throughout the world.”™ There was another reason for the turnabout in Addis Ababa. Pres-

ident Youlou of the Congo had written to Kennedy on the eve of the conference. Knowing that Birmingham would be on the minds of participants in the meeting, Youlou noted that “[c]lertainly you can measure better than anyone else the repercussions which the events in Birmingham are having in Africa.” However, Youlou would not support a reaction to Birmingham at Addis Ababa. He had argued against UN intervention in his own country, and he

believed that problems in Africa could be solved without the involvement of those outside the continent. “This is the same argument I shall give to those who would like to see me take a position on the events in Alabama,” Youlou wrote. “I believe that the American Negroes are Americans, and that, at the present stage of your difhculties, they do not yet have any aspiration for national independence. It is your government that either will or will not be able to keep them in the United States, or else make foreigners of them.

But it is, first of all, among Americans that the solution must be sought.” President Kennedy’s response to Youlou after the conference noted his pleasure that the resolution on discrimination in the United States mentioned the progress made by the government to abolish segregation. He also indicated that he appreciated Youlou’s “concern that any intervention in African affairs by non-Africans

174 CHAPTER FIVE ,

might encourage a counterreaction involving the United States’ own

affairs.” Each nation, it was clear, had an interest in handling its domestic matters on its own.”? Now that the Congo was independent, that nation’s leaders shared with Kennedy an interest in national sovereignty. The desire to avoid foreign interference in their own domestic difficulties led some African leaders to soften their criticism of the United States. A crisis was averted in Addis Ababa. No “break” in United States— African relations was contemplated. Yet following the meeting much

work remained to be done. Secretary of State Dean Rusk sent a circular on race and foreign relations to all American diplomatic and

consular posts. Rusk emphasized that the Kennedy administration was “keenly aware of [the] impact of [the] domestic race problem on [the] US image overseas and on achievement [of] US foreign policy objectives.” Rusk felt that “[t]here should be no illusions as to [the] seriousness of [the] situation.” Foreign reaction to race in the U.S. was a “source of great concern. Evidence from all parts of [the] world indicates that racial incidents have produced extremely negative reactions.” The reaction of African heads of state at Addis Ababa was just one example illustrating the “depth of emotional feeling” throughout the world. Such incidents suggested that “we have a certain amount of time before our racial problem will impinge even more seriously upon our policies and objectives.”” “Under these circumstances,” Rusk continued, “we recognize there is no effective substitute for decisive action on [the] part of [the] United States Government. This will include [a] special Presidential message to Congress today, Administration-backed legislation, and [a] continued series of positive Federal actions throughout

[the] country.“ Rusk’s concerns were emphasized in a June 1963 speech by USIA Deputy Director Donald Wilson to the Women’s National Democratic Club in Washington. According to Wilson, Birmingham “opened a new era in race relations.” Due to the efforts of the civil rights movement, international attention given to U.S. race relations would be sustained. “We are no longer coping with isolated incidents. Where the span between a Little Rock and an Oxford could be marked by months and years, now we are witLOSING CONTROL IN CAMELOT 175

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