Cold War and Decolonisation: Australia's Policy towards Britain's End of Empire in Southeast Asia 9814722197, 9789814722193

Table of contents :
Cover Page
Book
Front Matter
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements
List of Abbreviations
List of Key Policymakers
Introduction
CHAPTER ONE Australia’s Road to Malaya
CHAPTER TWO Colonial Malaya and Singapore
CHAPTER THREE Malaya’s Road to Independence
CHAPTER FOUR The Singapore Conundrum
CHAPTER FIVE Coping with Uncertainty, 1956–57
CHAPTER SIX Dealing with the PAP, 1958–60
CHAPTER SEVEN Greater Malaysia, 1961
CHAPTER EIGHT Greater Malaysia, 1962–63
CHAPTER NINE Epilogue
Conclusion
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

Cold War and Decolonisation

Cold War and Decolonisation Australia’s Policy towards Britain’s End of Empire in Southeast Asia

Andrea Benvenuti

© 2017 Andrea Benvenuti Published by : NUS Press National University of Singapore AS3-01-02, 3 Arts Link Singapore 117569 Fax: (65) 6774-0652 E-mail: [email protected] Website: http://nuspress.nus.edu.sg ISBN: 978-981-4722-19-3 (Paper) All rights reserved. This book, or parts thereof, may not be reproduced in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or any information storage and retrieval system now known or to be invented, without written permission from the Publisher. National Library Board, Singapore Cataloguing in Publication Data Name(s): Benvenuti, Andrea, 1967– Title: Cold war and decolonisation: Australia’s policy towards Britain’s end of empire in Southeast Asia / Andrea Benvenuti. Other title(s): Australia’s policy towards Britain’s end of empire in Southeast Asia Description: Singapore: NUS Press, [2017] Identifier(s): OCN 959875655 — ISBN 978-981-4722-19-3 (paperback) Subject(s): LCSH: Decolonization -- Southeast Asia -- History -- 20th century |  Postcolonialism -- Southeast Asia | Nationalism -- Southeast Asia | Singapore --  History -- Autonomy and independence movements | Singapore -- Politics and government -- 1945‒1963 | Malaya -- History -- Autonomy and independence movements | Malaya -- Politics and government -- 20th century | Australia --  Military policy | Australia -- Military relations  Classification: DDC 355.031094 -- dc23 Cover image : The late Mr Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore’s first Prime Minister, with the Prime Minister of Australia, Sir Robert Menzies during a visit to Parliament House, Canberra. Mr Lee visited Australia at the invitation of the Minister of External Affairs, Mr Paul Hasluck in 1965. (Image courtesy of the National Archives of Australia: A1501, A5571/7) Printed by: Markono Print Media Pte Ltd

To my wife, Karla

Contents

Acknowledgements

ix

List of Abbreviations

xi

List of Key Policymakers

xiii

Introduction

1

Chapter 1 Australia’s Road to Malaya

13

Chapter 2 Colonial Malaya and Singapore

28

Chapter 3 Malaya’s Road to Independence

43

Chapter 4 The Singapore Conundrum, April 1955–May 1956

70

Chapter 5 Coping with Uncertainty, 1956–57

117

Chapter 6 Dealing with the PAP, 1958–60

153

Chapter 7 Greater Malaysia, 1961

188

Chapter 8 Greater Malaysia, 1962–63

214

Chapter 9 Epilogue

242

Conclusion

259

Bibliography

269

Index

283 vii

Acknowledgements

I

wish to thank the National Archives of Australia (NAA) for granting me a one-year Margaret George Award, which allowed me to carry out extensive archival research in Canberra. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank the NAA’s Senior Reference Officer, Carolyn Connor, for attending to all my queries regarding government files most promptly and skilfully. Without the NAA’s financial and administrative support, this book might not have seen the light of day. I am also indebted to the School of Social Sciences at the University of New South Wales for providing further financial support to complete archival work in the British and American national archives. I would also like to express my gratitude to Dr Moreen Dee of the Historical Publications and Research Unit, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, for all her guidance and support throughout the course of this project. Dr Dee is an authority on Australia’s role in the Indonesian–Malaysian Konfrontasi; her ideas greatly helped me shape this book’s two final chapters. It goes without saying that I am alone responsible for any errors or omissions. Finally, very special thanks go to my wife, Karla, whose love, companionship and enthusiasm made this journey all the more pleasurable. I would like to dedicate this book to her.

ix

List of Abbreviations

ACOS AMDA ANZAM ANZUS BDCC(FE) BS CAB CO CRO CSR DC DEA DEFE DOD DO EEC FAD FCO FO FRUS JIC JPS MCA MCP Memcon MIC

Australian Chiefs of Staff Committee Anglo-Malayan (subsequently Malaysian) Defence Agreement Australian, New Zealand, and Malayan Area Australia, New Zealand, United States British Defence Co-ordination Committee, Far East Barisan Sosialis (Socialist Front) Cabinet Office documents (Britain) Colonial Office documents/Colonial Office (Britain) Commonwealth Relations Office (Britain) Commonwealth Strategic Reserve Defence Committee (Australia) Department of External Affairs (Australia) Ministry of Defence documents (Britain) Department of Defence (Australia) Dominions Office and Commonwealth Relations Office documents (Britain) European Economic Community Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee (Australia) Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Britain) Foreign Office documents/Foreign Office (Britain) Foreign Relations of the United States Joint Intelligence Committee (Australia and Britain) Joint Planning Staff (Australia) Malayan Chinese Association Malayan Communist Party Memorandum of conversation Malayan Indian Congress xi

xii  LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

MOD MSC NAA NARA NLA PAP PMD PREM RAAF RAN RG SEATO SDP SLF SLP SMU SPA SPP SSP UKCOS UKNA UMNO US USSR

Ministry of Defence (Britain) Malaysian Solidarity Convention National Archives of Australia National Archive Record Administration National Library of Australia People’s Action Party Prime Minister’s Department (Australia) Prime Minister’s Office documents (Britain) Royal Australian Air Force Royal Australian Navy Record Group South East Asia Treaty Organisation Singapore Democratic Party Singapore Labour Front Singapore Labour Party Singapore Malay Union Singapore People’s Alliance Singapore Progressive Party Singapore Socialist Party United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff National Archives of the United Kingdom United Malays National Organisation United States of America Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

List of Key Policymakers

AUSTRALIA Barwick, Garfield

Minister for External Affairs (1961–64)

Borthwick, A.H.

First Secretary, Australian Commission, Singapore (1955–57); (Acting) Commissioner for Singapore, Brunei, Sarawak and North Borneo, Singapore (1957)

Brown, Allen Stanley

Secretary, PMD (1949–59)

Bunting, John

Deputy Secretary, PMD (1955–58); Secretary, PMD (1959–68)

Burton, John

Secretary, DEA (1947–50)

Casey, Richard

Minister for External Affairs (1951–60)

Chifley, Joseph Benedict (“Ben”)

Prime Minister and Treasurer (1945–49)

Critchley, Thomas Kingston

Acting Commissioner, Malaya (1951–52); Head, Pacific and Americas Branch, DEA (1954–55); Commissioner, Malaya (1955–57); High Commissioner to Malaya (1957–63); High Commissioner to Malaysia (1963–65)

Curtin, John

Prime Minister (1941–45)

Eastman, Allan James

Assistant Secretary, Joint Intelligence Committee (1958–61); Acting First Assistant Secretary, Division I, DEA (1961–62); Senior External Affairs Representative, London (1962–65) xiii

xiv  LIST OF KEY POLICYMAKERS

Evatt, Herbert Vere

Attorney-General and Minister for External Affairs (1941–49); Deputy Prime Minister (1946–49); Leader of the Opposition (1951–60)

Gorton, John Grey

Prime Minister (1968–71)

Griffith, Allan Thomas

PMD (1952–82); Assistant Secretary, PMD (1964–69)

Harry, Ralph Lindsay

Commissioner, Singapore (1956–57); seconded to Defence Department (1957–60)

Hasluck, Paul

Minister for External Affairs (1964–69)

Hicks, Edwin

Secretary, DOD (1956–68)

Holt, Harold

Prime Minister (1966–67)

Jockel, Gordon Albert

Commissioner for Singapore, Brunei, Sarawak and North Borneo, Singapore (1960–63); Assistant Secretary, DEA (1963–64)

Massey, Claude

Political Liaison Officer to the United Kingdom Special Commission for South-East Asia in Malaya, Singapore and Commissioner to Malaya, Singapore (1946–50)

McBride, Philip

Minister for Defence (1950–58)

McIntyre, Laurence

Acting Commissioner, Malaya (1952–54); Senior External Affairs Representative, London (1954–57)

McNicol, David Williamson

Commissioner for Singapore, Brunei, Sarawak and North Borneo, Singapore (1957–60)

Menzies, Robert Gordon

Prime Minister (1949–66); Minister for External Affairs (1960–61)

Plimsoll, James

Assistant Secretary, UN Division, DEA (1953–59)

LIST OF KEY POLICYMAKERS  xv

Pritchett, William Beal

Deputy High Commissioner to Malaysia (1963–65); High Commissioner, Singapore (1965–67)

Quinn, John Paul

Assistant Secretary, South and Southeast Asia Branch, DEA (1954–55); Assistant Secretary, Defence Liaison Branch (1955–57)

Shann, K.C.O. (“Mick”)

Ambassador to Indonesia (1962–66)

Spender, Percy Claude

Minister for External Affairs and External Territories (1949–51); Ambassador to the US (1951–58)

Tange, Arthur

Assistant Secretary, DEA (1950–53); Minister, Australian Embassy Washington (1953–54); Secretary, DEA (1954–64)

Waller, John Keith

First Assistant Secretary, DEA (1962–64)

Watt, Alan

Ambassador to the USSR (1949–50); Secretary, DEA (1950–54); Commissioner for Malaya, Singapore (1954–56); Ambassador to Japan (1956–60)

Woolcott, Richard

First Secretary, Kuala Lumpur (1961–63); Acting Commissioner, Singapore (1963); Deputy High Commissioner, Malaysia/ Singapore (1963–64)

BRITAIN Alexander, Harold Rupert Leofric George (Earl Alexander of Tunis)

Minister of Defence (1952–54)

Attlee, Clement

Prime Minister (1945–51)

Black, Robert

Governor of Singapore (1955–57)

Bourdillon, H.T.

Deputy High Commissioner, Singapore (1959–61)

Brook, Norman

Cabinet Secretary (1947–62)

xvi  LIST OF KEY POLICYMAKERS

Butler, R.A.

Chancellor of the Exchequer (1951–55); Home Secretary (1957–62); Deputy Prime Minister (1962–63)

Carrington, Lord

High Commissioner to Australia (1956–59)

Churchill, Winston

Leader of the Opposition (1945–51); Prime Minister (1951–55) and Minister of Defence (1951–52)

Cobbold, Lord

Chairman, Malaysia Commission of Enquiry (1962)

Douglas-Hamilton, Nigel (Earl of Selkirk)

Commissioner for Singapore and Commissioner-General for Southeast Asia, Singapore (1959–63)

Douglas-Home, Alec (Earl of Home)

Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations (1955–60); Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (1960–63); Prime Minister (1963–64)

Eden, Anthony

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and Deputy Prime Minister (1951–55); Prime Minister (1955–57)

Garner, Saville

Assistant Under-Secretary, CRO (1948– 51); Deputy Permanent Under-Secretary, CRO (1953–56); Permanent UnderSecretary of State, CRO (1962–66)

Golds, Anthony

Head, Far East and Pacific Department, Commonwealth Relations Office (1962–64)

Goode, William

Governor of Singapore (1958–59); Governor of North Borneo (1960–63)

Head, Lord Anthony

High Commissioner to Malaysia (1963–66)

Lansdowne, Lord George

Minister of State for Colonial Affairs, 1962–64; Minister of State for Commonwealth Relations (1963–64)

LIST OF KEY POLICYMAKERS  xvii

Lennox-Boyd, Alan

Secretary of State for the Colonies (1954–59)

Lloyd, Selwyn

Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (1955–60); Chancellor of the Exchequer (1960–62)

MacDonald, Malcolm

Governor-General, Malaya (1946–48); Commissioner-General for Southeast Asia (1948–55)

MacGillivray, David

Deputy High Commissioner, Malaya (1952–54); High Commissioner, Malaya (1954–57)

MacKintosh, Angus

Assistant Secretary and Head of South East Asia Department (Far Eastern Department from 1954), CO (1953–56); Deputy Commissioner-General for Southeast Asia (1956–60)

Macleod, Iain

Secretary of State for the Colonies (1959–61)

Macmillan, Harold

Minister of Defence (1954–55); Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs (1955); Chancellor of Exchequer (1955–57); Prime Minister (1957–63)

Martin, John

Assistant Under-Secretary of State; CO (1945); supervising Far Eastern Department, CO (1954–56); Deputy Under-Secretary of State, CO (1956–65)

Moore, Philip

Deputy Commissioner, Singapore (1961–63); Deputy High Commissioner, Singapore (1963–65)

Nicoll, John

Governor of Singapore (1952–55)

Oliver, William

High Commissioner to Australia (1959–65)

Ormsby-Gore, David

Ambassador to the United States (1961–65)

xviii  LIST OF KEY POLICYMAKERS

Salisbury, Lord

Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations (1952); Lord President of the Council (1952–57); Leader of the House of Lords (1957)

Sandys, Duncan

Minister of Defence (1957–59); Minister of Aviation (1959–60); Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations (1960–64); Secretary of State for the Colonies (1962–64)

Scott, Robert

Commissioner-General for Southeast Asia (1955–59)

Templer, Gerald

High Commissioner and Director of Operations, Malaya (1952–54); Chief of Imperial General Staff (1955–58)

Torneycroft, Peter

Minister of Defence (1962–64)

Tory, Geofroy

Deputy High Commissioner, Canberra (1954–57); High Commissioner to Malaya (1957–63)

Trend, Burke

Secretary to the Cabinet (1963–73)

Wilson, Harold

Prime Minister (1964–70)

Zulueta, Philip de

Private Secretary to the Prime Minister (1955–64)

INDONESIA Subandrio

Minister of Foreign Affairs (1957–66)

Sukarno

President (1949–67); Prime Minister and Armed Forces Supreme Commander (1958–66)

MALAYA/MALAYSIA Abdul Rahman Putra, Tunku Chief Minister (1955–57); Prime Minister, Malaya (1957–63) and Malaysia (1963–70); Minister of External Affairs, Malaya (1957–63) and Malaysia (1963–70)

LIST OF KEY POLICYMAKERS  xix

Abdul Razak bin Hussain, Tun

Deputy Prime Minister, Malaya (1957– 63) and Malaysia (1963–70); Minister for Defence, Malaya (1957–63) and Malaysia (1963–70); Minister for Rural Development, Malaya (1959–63) and Malaysia (1963–69)

Chin Peng (real name Ong Boon Hua)

Secretary General, Malayan Communist Party (1947–); Leader of MRLA (later MNLA and Malayan People’s Army) (1948–)

Ghazali Shafie, Muhammad

Permanent Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs (1958–70)

Onn bin Jaafar, Dato

Mentri Besar, Johor (1946–50); Member of the Federal Legislative Council (1948–55); Member of the Federal Executive Council (1948–55)

Tan Cheng Lock

Founder-member and President of MCA (1948–58)

Tan Siew Sin

Minister of Finance (1959–74)

NEW ZEALAND Holland, Sidney

Prime Minister (1949–57)

Holyoake, Keith

Prime Minister (1960–72); Minister of External/Foreign Affairs (1960–72)

PHILIPPINES Macapagal, Diosdado

Vice-President (1957–61); President (1961–65)

Palaez, Emmanuel

Secretary of Foreign Affairs (1962–63); Vice-President (1962–65)

SINGAPORE Goh Keng Swee

Minister for Finance (1959–65)

Lee Kuan Yew

Prime Minister (1959–90)

xx  LIST OF KEY POLICYMAKERS

Lim Yew Hock

Chief Minister (1956–59)

Marshall, David

Chief Minister (1955–56)

Toh Chin Chye

Deputy Prime Minister (1959–68); Chairman, PAP (1954–81)

UNITED STATES Dulles, John Foster

Secretary of State (1953–59)

Eisenhower, Dwight

President (1953–61)

Kennedy, John

President (1961–63)

Truman, Harry

President (1945–53)

Introduction

Whilst on the one hand they are genuinely anxious that countries in South-East Asia should emerge from their colonial status yet on the other they are fearful for their own security when that happens. William Oliver to Duncan Sandys, 8 April 19641

O

n 1 April 1955 Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies announced that Cabinet would despatch Australian defence forces to Malaya as part of a British-led Commonwealth Strategic Reserve (CSR).2 It was a momentous decision, for Australia was about to enter its longest overseas military commitment. Since its election in December 1949, Menzies’s Liberal-Country Party Coalition government had paid increasing attention to Southeast Asia. Concerns over the spread of communist influence in the region had underscored the importance of forward defence as a deterrent against further communist encroachments and highlighted the value of Malaya and Singapore as forward bases. Menzies himself emphasised this point in his April announcement, by reminding Australians that their nation’s “existence as a free country” would be in peril “if the Communists overran South-East Asia, subverted Indonesia and stood at the very threshold of our northern door”. Hence the struggle against communism would have to “be carried on as far as possible from our own soil”.3 However, being a small power, Australia could hardly make an appreciable contribution to Southeast

1

UKNA, DEFE 11/245, Oliver to Sandys, despatch 5, 8 Apr. 1963. NAA, A4968, 25/26/14 part 3, Australian Military Aid: Statement by Menzies, 1 Apr. 1955. 3 Ibid. 2

1

2  COLD WAR AND DECOLONISATION

Asia’s stability of without the support of its key allies, the United States (US) and Britain.4 Of the two, the former held the greatest promise in Australian eyes. A rising economic and military giant, the US was the only Western power capable of holding back international communism. Initially, the primary concern of Harry Truman’s Democratic administration (1945–53) had been the containment of Soviet influence in Europe. However, following the establishment of a communist regime in China in October 1949 and the outbreak of the Korean War in June 1950, it rapidly elevated Southeast Asia as the next line of defence against communism. Alarmed at the prospect of a war-torn and poverty-stricken Southeast Asia falling prey to communist penetration, it concluded that this area was not only next on the agenda of Sino-Soviet expansionism, but also at the crucial juncture of various strands of its emerging containment strategy.5 However, for all its growing focus on Southeast Asia, Washington remained reluctant to enter long-term and burdensome military commitments. President Truman had little appetite for a major Southeast Asian defence role and so had his Republican successor, President Dwight Eisenhower (1953–61). Although, with the establishment of the Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO) in 1954, the latter took a more energetic approach to Southeast Asian communism and was prepared to assist in the build-up of local SEATO defence forces, his administration remained unwilling to deploy American troops on the Southeast Asian mainland.6 Moreover, as the Australians had already found out in the wake of the 1951 ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, United States) Treaty, Washington continued to be 4 Andrea Benvenuti, Anglo-Australian Relations and the “Turn to Europe”, 1961–1972 (New York: Boydell and Brewer, 2008), pp. 46–8. 5 Robert McMahon, “The United States in an Era of Decolonisation, 1945–1965”, in The Transformation of Southeast Asia: International Perspectives on Decolonisation, ed. Marc Frey, Ronald W. Pruessen and Tan Tai Yong (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2004), p. 217; Andrew Rotter, “The Big Canvass: The United States, Southeast Asia and the World, 1948–1950”, PhD Diss. (Stanford, CA: Stanford University, 1981), pp. 2–3 and 8. 6 Damien Fenton, “SEATO and the Defence of Southeast Asia, 1955–65”, PhD Diss. (Sydney: University of New South Wales, 2006), pp. 118–9. For Eisenhower’s policy towards Southeast Asia see Robert McMahon, The Limits of Empire: The United States and Southeast Asia since World War II (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), pp. 42–104.

INTRODUCTION  3

unenthusiastic about close policy coordination and strategic planning with its Western allies in Southeast Asia.7 Although the fall of Singapore in 1942 had “broken a spell” in Anglo-Australian relations and “never again could dominion leaders blithely confide their strategic defence to the imperial centre”,8 persisting uncertainties over the role and reliability of the US in Southeast Asia led post-war Australian governments to strengthen defence ties with Britain. In Southeast Asia, London retained control over the Federation of Malaya, the crown colony of Singapore, the Borneo territories of Sarawak and North Borneo, and the protectorate of Brunei, but only Malaya and Singapore were of critical significance to the pursuit of Britain’s global interests, as will be discussed in Chapter 1. Singapore was Britain’s largest military base and the focal point of its defence system in the Far East while Malaya was key to British plans to hold Southeast Asia and the recipient of significant British troops. In the early 1950s, Britain stationed some 20 battalions there against the local communist insurgency.9 The presence of large British forces in Southeast Asia made Britain an indispensable strategic partner, for they symbolised London’s continuing interest in the defence of one of its old dominions and provided a deterrent against communist encroachments in an area of growing strategic importance to Australia.10 Not surprisingly, both post-war Labor and Coalition governments sought greater Commonwealth defence collaboration to secure a continuing British involvement in Australia’s neighbourhood and to harness British power in the pursuit of Australian regional interests. In this respect, Australia’s Malayan commitment served both to underpin such a close collaboration and to fulfil Australia’s shift towards forward defence. Significantly, however, the despatch of Australian naval, ground and air troops to Malaya was also to provide, through SEATO, a strategic “link-up” between the Commonwealth military contingent in Malaya

7 David Lee, “Australia and Allied Strategy in the Far East, 1952–1957”, Journal of Strategic Studies 16, 4 (1993): 512–27. 8 John Darwin, The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World-System, 1830–1970 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), p. 548. 9 NAA, A1838, 3022/2/9 part 1, Malaya: Statement by Colonel Chapman, undated; Karl Hack, Defence and Decolonisation in Southeast Asia 1941–1968 (London: Curzon Press, 2001), p. 124. 10 Benvenuti, Anglo-Australian Relations, pp. 22–3.

4  COLD WAR AND DECOLONISATION

and American forces in Southeast Asia.11 Under the terms of the Manila Treaty, both Australian and British forces within the CSR could be deployed outside Malaya in American-led SEATO operations in Southeast Asia. Australia saw SEATO as an important means of combining the sizeable military capabilities of the US with those of Britain for the sake of regional security.12 But as the first Australian troops reached Penang in northwest Malaya in late 1955, Menzies’s Cold War plans were thrown off balance by the sudden acceleration of decolonisation in Southeast Asia. At the war’s end, Britain’s attempts to reassert control over an Asian empire shaken by nationalist turbulence (India) and by Japanese’s sweeping wartime conquests (Burma, Malaya, Singapore) had been met with resistance. In India, growing Hindu-Muslim tensions and unrelenting Congress demands for independence had resulted in a rapid transfer of power in 1947. In 1948, Burma had also been written off as ungovernable. In the Middle East, Britain’s “clients were in open revolt”.13 Uncertainty had also reigned over the future of the Britain’s Southeast Asian imperium. Here, London had been confronted with what T.N. Harper and Christopher Bayly vividly described as “a myriad of mutinies against old patterns of authority” and was forced to deal with political movements willing to challenge British colonial rule.14 Yet, for all this turbulence at the imperial periphery, policymakers in London had been in no mood to preside over the dissolution of Britain’s imperial system. In the early post-war years, both Labour and Conservative administrations were determined to hang on to it, formally, if possible, or informally if no other alternative existed. Labour, in particular, proved remarkably conservative when decolonisation overlapped with Britain’s defence interests.15 Most policymakers viewed the British imperial system as a vital element of Britain’s world power and established a close linkage between its preservation and the continuation of Britain’s great power ambitions.16 Moreover, they considered the preservation of 11

Ibid., pp. 47–8. Ibid., p. 47. 13 Darwin, Empire Project, pp. 533, 537–8. 14 Christopher Bayly and T.N. Harper, Forgotten Wars: The End of Britain’s Asian Empire (London: Allen Lane, 2007), p. 516. 15 Hack, Defence and Decolonisation, p. 21. 16 Darwin, Empire Project, pp. 528–9, 560–2. 12

INTRODUCTION  5

imperial economic connections vital to Britain’s post-war recovery.17 Hence notwithstanding its undisputable historical importance and great symbolism, the liquidation of the British Raj was not treated in London as “the first step in the dissolution of the Empire”.18 Nor was the end of British rule in Burma, Ceylon and Palestine tantamount to imperial abdication. True, Britain’s imperial system had been weakened by turmoil at its Asian end but it had not collapsed and, in Southeast Asia, nationalism had not yet provided a strong glue to bring Britain’s opponents together.19 The development of nationalism in Britain’s Southeast Asian territories in the early Cold War years will be discussed in Chapter 2. By 1955, however, there were plenty of signs that nationalism was rearing its head in British Southeast Asia too. The Alliance’s sweeping victory in the 1955 Malayan election and the mounting political turmoil in Singapore cast significant doubts on Britain’s ability to hold these two territories. As chapters 4, 5 and 6 will document, it was in Singapore where the awakening of nationalist sentiment posed the greatest challenge to British regional (and global) interests. The introduction of a new Constitution and the extension of voting rights to a much larger section of the local population produced a surprising result in the April 1955 election. The eminently moderate forces, which had hitherto been the mainstay of the island’s political system, were almost entirely wiped out. The election brought to the fore two left-leaning political parties — the Singapore Labour Front (SLP) and the People’s Action Party (PAP)  —  which vied for the loyalty and support of an increasingly radicalised and anti-colonial Chinese-educated electorate. Of the two, it was the PAP, with a strong pro-communist faction in its ranks, which presented the greatest challenge to British rule. Despite the SLP’s victory in the 1955 election and its ability win full internal selfgovernment from the British in 1957, the party’s moderate socialism, restrained anti-colonialism and lack of grassroots support were no match to the PAP’s reformist zeal, its seemingly intransigent radicalism and

17

Ibid., p. 529. William Roger Louis, “The Dissolution of the British Empire”, in The Oxford History of the British Empire: The Twentieth Century, ed. Judith Brown and William Roger Louis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 329. 19 Darwin, Empire Project, p. 539. 18

6  COLD WAR AND DECOLONISATION

vocal anti-colonialism. The PAP’s landslide victory in the subsequent election of 1959 sealed the fate of the SLF (by then merged into the Singapore People’s Alliance or SPA) and, for a while, it appeared to have irremediably harmed the political prospects of Singapore’s more restrained nationalist forces. Understandably, the PAP’s triumph generated considerable anxiety locally and internationally. So widespread were doubts about the party leadership’s ability to stand up to its radicals that the PAP’s ascent to power was seen as a prelude to the emergence of a communist-controlled Singapore. In brief, communist and nationalist pressures appeared to combine to form an alarmingly subversive mix that threatened to eradicate British power from Southeast Asia and precipitate Singapore’s descent into communism. Given the island’s strategic importance, concerns grew in London about its long-term future and the impact that Singapore’s drift to the Left might have on Britain’s ability to play a regional role. As chapters 6 and 7 will show, Lee’s PAP government turned out to be not only much less radical but also much less hostile to Western interests than initially expected — coming, in fact, to view a continuing British involvement in Singapore as a necessary insurance against communism. Yet, in the late 1950s, as the pressure for a rapid advance towards self-government mounted in Singapore, such British presence stood perilously close to its demise, even though no one in London was yet prepared to let the island go. Transition to independence was also the coveted prize nationalist forces were striving to gain in neighbouring Malaya. As will be discussed in Chapter 2, the Malayan Emergency gradually persuaded the British to grant the territory greater self-government. If, at the war’s end, they still regarded Malayan independence as the end point in a long process of colonial nurturing, the Emergency impressed upon them the importance of a more rapid constitutional transition as a means of undermining local communism and taking the sting out of emerging Malay nationalism. Independence, in other words, came to be seen in British circles as the price to pay to achieve political cooperation with the non-communist elements within Malaya’s colonial society and to avoid repeating the same mistakes that the Dutch and French had made elsewhere in Southeast Asia. In the early 1950s, therefore, London introduced greater political reforms on the assumption that full selfgovernment would not come to Malaya until the next decade. However, as Chapter 3 will show, the Alliance’s electoral victory in 1955 upset these calculations, forcing London to consider a markedly faster time-

INTRODUCTION  7

table. Considering the Alliance government and his leader Tunku Abdul Rahman reassuringly anti-communist, the British rapidly settled for early independence on condition that their defence interests (and those of Australia and New Zealand) be adequately protected. London’s success in smoothing the rough edges of local nationalism could not hide the fact that a lasting British military presence in Malaya was intimately dependent upon the ability of the Tunku and his closest associates to remain in power. With Singapore in turmoil, the last thing the British wanted was a neutralist Malaya opposed to a Commonwealth regional presence. Yet, while concerns that the Alliance leadership might one day be replaced by less friendly political elites never wholly disappeared, it was the fate of Singapore that most exercised the minds of Western policymakers. Unsurprisingly, therefore, this book devotes significant attention to the vexed question of the island’s political future. Developments in Britain’s Southeast Asian territories raised significant problems for the Menzies government too. The apparently intractable question of Singapore exacerbated Australian concerns that Malaya might be moving too fast towards independence, that it might be imposing restrictions on the use of Commonwealth forces on its soil and that, one day, it might turn to neutralism. No matter how dispassionately Australian policymakers tried to weigh up different possible scenarios, they could not but feel downcast about the island’s future. As the central chapters of this book will indicate, Singapore’s political evolution would remain a significant concern for Australian ministers and officials for well over a decade. To alarm them was not only what they saw as the worst-case scenario — namely, an increasingly radicalised island gradually drifting into communism. Almost equally distressing was another possible outcome — a prolonged state of turmoil resulting from a continuing struggle between Singapore’s radicals and moderates. Protracted unrest would, in fact, make it tough for Britain and Australia to discharge their respective defence roles in Southeast Asia. Last, but no less important, was a third scenario whereby, even without necessarily going communist, Singapore could still become increasingly neutralist. Should this happen, Britain’s ability to use its military base would be restricted and Commonwealth participation in SEATO undermined. As Australian policymakers were painfully aware, Britain’s end of empire in Singapore could indeed turn into a messy affair, the outcome of which could be the end of London’s role in Southeast Asia and the collapse of Canberra’s forward defence strategy.

8  COLD WAR AND DECOLONISATION

In the end, as chapters 7 and 8 will show, the pressure to accommodate nationalist demands and prevent Singapore from becoming a Cuba of the Southern Seas coalesced to produce the “Greater Malaysia” plan. The decision made by the Macmillan government in 1961 to support Greater Malaysia (that is, the merger of Malaya, Singapore, Brunei, North Borneo and Sarawak into an independent federation) was an attempt to relieve such pressure. In British eyes, Greater Malaysia had quite a few attractive traits — not least the fact that it would provide the small and underdeveloped Borneo territories with a viable path to independence and relieve Britain’s regional burden by transferring responsibility for them (and Singapore) to the future federation. Yet, Greater Malaysia’s most alluring attraction lay in the prospect of neutralising Singapore’s radical politics by anchoring the island to a solidly anti-communist, post-colonial state. The Australian response was ambivalent and the Coalition government, faced with such a complex issue, trod carefully, at least initially. In August 1961 ministers broadly endorsed Greater Malaysia, but they did not conceal their concerns over several of its aspects, finding it especially hard to reconcile themselves with the plan’s defence implications. Like their British counterparts, they saw Greater Malaysia as the best available opportunity to solve, once and for all, the dilemma of Singapore. From their standpoint, Britain could not maintain the status quo indefinitely there and the longer the island remained under colonial tutelage, the greater the odds were of political power passing into unwelcome hands. Inconveniently, the Indonesian decision in 1963 to pursue a policy of Konfrontasi (Confrontation) against Greater Malaysia added a serious complication to the already complicated process of welding Malaya and Britain’s four remaining territories together, thus threatening to disrupt its establishment. As Konfrontasi took a turn for the worse, Australian policy was caught in an increasingly difficult balancing act between Canberra’s desire not to undermine its relations with Jakarta and its resolve to support Greater Malaysia and its close ally, Britain. This dimension will be examined in chapters 8 and 9. Britain’s end of empire in Southeast Asia between 1955 and 1963 and its significance in Australia’s post-war foreign and defence policies are therefore the central themes of this work. The book not only assesses the impact of London’s redefinition of its imperial role in Malaya and Singapore on Australia’s political and strategic interests in Cold War Asia, it also examines how the Menzies government perceived, and

INTRODUCTION  9

responded to, London’s attempts to balance its desire to uphold British regional influence with growing pressures to reduce imperial commitments in an age of rapid decolonisation and enduring Cold War tensions. In other words, it intends to explore the nexus between Cold War and decolonisation in Southeast Asia and how this impinged on the changing nature of Anglo-Australian relations as well as of Australia’s engagement with Asia in the two decades following the Second World War. As we shall see, this nexus encompasses important subthemes, including Britain’s declining role in international affairs, the rise of Southeast Asian nationalism and the containment of regional communism. As the Bibliography at the end of this book will attest, a large body of scholarly work now exists on the evolution of British colonial policy in Southeast Asia and its implications for  —  and interactions with  —  London’s regional diplomacy and defence policy. Also substantial is the literature on the decolonisation of Malaya and Singapore, and the emergence of nationalism there. In contrast, the story of Australian policy towards Britain’s end of empire in Southeast Asia, and of its impact on both Australia’s regional policy and Anglo-Australian relations still awaits to be written. Although this book shows that Britain’s “return” to Southeast Asia was far from being a negligible factor in shaping Australia’s regional policy, studies on post-war Australian foreign and defence policy have insufficiently discussed the impact of such a “factor” on Australia’s regional engagement and post-war alliances. Britain’s decline as a global and imperial power in the 1950s has barely registered a blip in the large and ever-growing literature on Australian foreign relations and has generally been treated as a familiar historical trend — perhaps all too familiar to warrant scrutiny. This is not to say, of course, that historians have totally neglected the impact of Britain’s regional policies on Australia and the latter’s response to British initiatives. Chris Waters, David Lowe and Peter Edwards, for instance, have all dealt with Australian reactions to the outbreak of the Malayan Emergency in the early years of the Cold War.20 With Gregory Pemberton, Edwards has also provided a thorough 20

Chris Waters, The Empire Fractures: Anglo-Australian Conflict in the 1940s (Melbourne: Australian Scholarly Publishing, 1995), pp. 177–80; Peter Edwards, “The Australian Commitment to the Malayan Emergency, 1948–50”, Australian Historical Studies 22, 89 (1987): 604–16; David Lowe, Menzies and the “Great World Struggle”: Australia’s Cold War 1948–1954 (Sydney: UNSW Press, 1999), pp. 28–9.

10  COLD WAR AND DECOLONISATION

account of the Coalition government’s decision in 1955 to commit Australian troops to the CSR in Malaya.21 As for the question of AngloAustralian strategic planning and political coordination in Cold War Asia, this has been examined by several authors, including David Lee, David Horner and Hiroyuki Umetsu.22 Two excellent works by David Goldsworthy and Moreen Dee have recently provided a long awaited but only preliminary examination of Australian responses to Britain’s end of empire in Southeast Asia.23 Goldsworthy has not only devoted some attention to the defence implications of Britain’s decolonisation in Malaya and Singapore on Australia’s regional defence interests, but has also given some indication of the depth of Australian uneasiness at Britain’s long-term regional plans.24 For her part, Dee has dealt with the consequences of the establishment of Greater Malaysia for Australia’s relations with Indonesia. By relying on diplomatic documents released over the past two decades, both Goldsworthy and Dee complement and add new, important light to the pioneering work done, in the early 1960s, by Peter Boyce on Australian diplomacy towards Malaya and Singapore.25 While most valuable, these contributions only capture one aspect of the problem at hand. And where, as in the case of Goldsworthy 21

Peter Edwards with Gregory Pemberton, Crises and Commitments: The Politics and Diplomacy of Australia’s Involvement in Southeast Asian Conflicts, 1948–1965 (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1992), pp. 162–73. 22 Lee, “Allied Strategy”, pp. 511–38; David Horner, Defence Supremo: Sir Frederick Shedden and the Making of Australian Defence Policy (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 2000); Hiroyuki Umetsu, “The Origins of the British Commonwealth Strategic Reserve: The UK Proposal to Revitalise ANZAM and the Increased Australian Defence Commitment to Malaya”, Australian Journal of Politics and History 50, 4 (2004): 509–25. 23 David Goldsworthy, Losing the Blanket: Australia and the End of Britain’s Empire (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2002); Moreen Dee, “In Australia’s Own Interests: Australian Foreign Policy during Confrontation 1963–1966”, PhD Diss. (Armidale, New South Wales: University of New England, 2000). This author has also provided a preliminary examination to Australian responses to Britain’s end of empire in Southeast Asia. See for instance Benvenuti, Anglo-Australian Relations, pp. 48–55 and “Australia, the ‘Marshall Experiment’ and the Decolonisation of Singapore, 1955–56”, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 43, 2 (2012): 257–79. 24 Goldsworthy, Losing the Blanket, pp. 158 and 143–4. 25 Peter Boyce, “Twenty-One Years of Australian Diplomacy in Malaya”, Journal of Southeast Asian History 4, 2 (1963): 65–100.

INTRODUCTION  11

and Dee, they discuss the impact of Britain’s end of empire on AngloAustralian relations and/or Australian interests in Southeast Asia, they are too brief to provide an exhaustive picture (Goldsworthy) or too focussed on Australia’s responses to Konfrontasi (Dee). On the whole, therefore, these contributions do not fully explain how Britain’s imperial sunset in Southeast Asia played out in the early years of the Cold War, how it influenced Australian policies towards Britain’s regional presence and how it shaped Australia’s approach to its neighbouring (and decolonising) region. This book, however, is different in that it provides the first detailed attempt to answer these important questions. In doing so, it hopes to make a significant contribution to the study of Australian foreign and defence policies in an age of intense Cold War rivalry and rapidly decolonising Southeast Asia. However, by charting Australia’s role in the unfolding of the global Cold War and the contraction of British regional power, this book also makes two further contributions. First, it is a contribution to another dimension of Anglo-Australian relations in the post-1945 era. In Australian contemporary political discourse and the existing literature on Australia’s post-war external relations, the Menzies era is often viewed as an age of passive reliance on Britain. For too many scholars, Menzies’s return to power in December 1949 ushered in an era of reflexive and unthinking compliance with London’s policy positions. But as this book shows, Menzies was “far from being Downing Street’s doormat”.26 While staunch supporters of the British connection, Menzies and his ministers never lost sight of their country’s national interests. Australia’s support for British policies in Southeast Asia was always cautious and conditional. For instance, British calls on Australia to lessen London’s regional burden by taking on a greater politicomilitary role in Southeast Asia always fell well short of Whitehall’s requirements and ambitions. Even the commitment of Australian troops to the CSR was a small one if one considers the importance accorded to Southeast Asia in Australia’s post-war calculations. Furthermore, Australia’s wary approach to the decolonisation of British Southeast Asia, far from signalling an uncritical stance towards British colonialism, revealed a strong desire not to be too closely associated with it. Mindful of

26

I am grateful to John Darwin for this expression. See Darwin, Empire Project, p. 549.

12  COLD WAR AND DECOLONISATION

Australia’s growing role in Southeast Asia, the Menzies government was eager to avoid projecting an imperialist image. Second, this book also makes a contribution to the area of AustraliaAsian relations in the early post-1945 era. More specifically, it explains the Menzies government’s attitude towards the end of European empires in Asia. Much of the current literature on Australia’s engagement with Asia is critical of Menzies’s approach to decolonisation.27 But, as this book demonstrates, these characterisations of the Coalition government’s attitude towards Britain’s end of empire in Southeast Asia misread the prudential concerns that underpinned Menzies’s foreign policy.28 The Coalition government was certainly not enthusiastic about the prospect of an early transfer of power in Malaya and Singapore. Yet, its attitude to decolonisation was not as negative and backward-looking as its critics argue.29 As this book suggests, Canberra was not adverse, in principle, to the gradual transfer of power in British Southeast Asia. Rather, it just tried to ensure, quite pragmatically, that this process would not produce outcomes contrary to Australia’s regional security interests. The Coalition government was not alone in wishing for a gradual process of decolonisation in British Southeast Asia. As the following chapters will reveal, most of Australia’s Asian neighbours shared similar security concerns and privately supported a gradual transfer of power. Moreover, gradualism was also the mode of change favoured by various groups within those territories themselves. As ever, decolonisation was a complex phenomenon, which defies easy generalisations. And so was, in many ways, the Menzies government’s approach to it.

27

This point is further elaborated in Andrea Benvenuti and David Martin Jones, “Myth and Misrepresentation in Australian Foreign Policy: Menzies and Engagement with Asia”, Journal of Cold War Studies 13, 4 (2011): 57–9; see also Benvenuti, “Marshall Experiment”, p. 278. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid.

CHAPTER ONE

Australia’s Road to Malaya

H

ow, in the early 1950s, Australia found itself increasingly drawn, politically and militarily, into Malaya and Singapore is the story of this chapter. It is a story that goes back to the dark days of 1942 when, following Japan’s blitzkrieg through Southeast Asia, both Malaya and Singapore fell into Japanese hands. The fall of Singapore, the supposedly impregnable bastion of British power in East Asia upon which both Britain’s imperial strategy east of Suez and Australia’s defence policy to its north had been premised during the interwar years, raised significant alarm in Canberra. With the 8th AIF division held captive in Malaya and three more divisions deployed in the Middle East, Australia appeared defenceless.1 Although a Japanese invasion of Australia never materialised, the fall of Singapore left an indelible mark on the minds of Australian elites and public — a mark that would colour their perceptions of Southeast Asia once the Second World War was over. In the crucible of war, Australians learned two important lessons about Singapore and Malaya. The first was that the Malayan region constituted no geographical barrier between Australia and Asia; after the war, this change in Australian perceptions about Southeast Asia reinforced this region’s importance as a forward base for the defence of Australia. The second lesson was that, notwithstanding Australian complaints about London’s limited appreciation for Canberra’s wartime defence interests, Anglo-Australian defence cooperation in Asia was still essential to secure

1

Peter Dennis and Jeffrey Grey, A Military History of Australia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 171–2. 13

14  COLD WAR AND DECOLONISATION

Australian regional goals. For all his calls for closer Australian-American defence ties “free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom”, Labor Prime Minister John Curtin (1941–45) had little doubt that Australia would continue to be dependent upon British support to achieve order and stability to its north.2 This sense of geostrategic vulnerability and Canberra’s continuing dependence on Britain ensured that Singapore and Malaya would continue to play a significant role in Australian post-war foreign and defence policies. At the war’s end, the restoration of British authority in Malaya and Singapore was welcomed in Canberra as a “sign that the British meant to stay”.3 In mid-1947 two strategic appreciations by the Australian Chiefs of Staff Committee (ACOS) and the Joint Planning Staff (JPS) promptly recognised the significant strategic importance that both Malaya and Singapore had for Australia and the wider British Commonwealth.4 Moreover, Australia’s inability to secure a greater American commitment to the security of the Western Pacific and its close bonds with Britain had pushed Curtin’s successor, Joseph Benedict (“Ben”) Chifley, to renew Australian efforts to achieve greater Commonwealth defence cooperation in Asia.5 Such cooperation, however, was premised on the assumption that London would still play a significant political and military role in Southeast Asia. For their part, British policymakers continued to place significant emphasis on the political, economic and strategic value of Singapore and Malaya. As Britain emerged from the ashes of the Second World War, Clement Attlee’s Labour government (1945–51) viewed a continuing presence in Southeast Asia as key to the restoration of British influence east of Suez.6 As Chapter 2 will show, to achieve this overarching aim, the British Labour government set about plans for the

2

James Curran, “‘An Organic Part of the Whole Structure’: John Curtin’s Empire”, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 37, 1 (2009): 51–75. 3 John Darwin, “Was there a Fourth British Empire?” in The British Empire in the 1950s: Retreat or Revival?, ed. Martin Lynn (New York: Palgrave, 2006), p. 24. 4 ACOS cited in NAA, A5954, 1908/9, Minute by the Defence Committee at a meeting held on 18 Nov. 1947; NAA, A5954, 1908/9, JPC Report 39/1947, 24 July 1947. 5 Hack, Defence and Decolonisation, pp. 75–6. 6 A.J. Stockwell, “British Imperial Policy and Decolonization in Malaya, 1942–52”, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 13, 1 (1984): 68–87.

AUSTRALIA’S ROAD TO MALAYA  15

political and constitutional reordering of Malaya and Singapore, and the creation of “a new, more defensible ‘Dominion of Southeast Asia’”.7 The reasons for this were economic as well as political and military. As historians have aptly pointed out, the economics of empire was no doubt compelling.8 By 1941, Malaya had become, through its exports of tin and rubber, the British Empire’s dollar arsenal.9 This was a position that Malaya with Singapore held well into the early Cold War period  —  and to such an extent that, by the early 1950s, they had turned into “one of the crutches of a convalescent British economy”.10 Moreover, before the Second World War, Singapore’s role as an entrepôt port had also provided British business with profitable opportunities in trade, transport and financial services and there was no reason to assume that this would not be again the case once Southeast Asian economies overcame the economic and social dislocation caused by the war.11 On the politico-military side, the case for continuing British interest in Malaya and Singapore also appeared compelling. With India lost, Attlee increasingly came to consider them instrumental in safeguarding Britain’s Asian empire, upholding its great power status in the wider world and strengthening those key political relationships (with the US and the British Commonwealth, for instance) upon which such world role was ever more dependent.12 In this context, it is significant that after the war the Singapore base was upgraded from a “single naval dockyard” to “the headquarters and chief depot for all British land, sea and air forces East of Suez”.13 Moreover, a continuing British presence in Southeast Asia also served a more specific, but no less important, purpose: by bolstering links with its Far Eastern dominions, London was hopeful that such presence would reassure them about Britain’s commitment to their defence and make it easier to secure Australasian

7

Hack, Defence and Decolonisation, p. 49. James Hartley Pullé, “The Management of Political Change: British Colonial Policy towards Singapore, 1942–54”, PhD Diss. (London: University of London, 1991), p. 12. 9 Hack, Defence and Decolonisation, pp. 22 and 24. 10 Darwin, Empire Project, p. 543. 11 Pullé, “Colonial Policy”, p. 12. 12 Darwin, Empire Project, pp. 560–1 and 573. 13 Pullé, “Colonial Policy”, pp. 13–4. 8

16  COLD WAR AND DECOLONISATION

burden-sharing. With Labour keen on reducing the costs of Britain’s presence east of Suez in an era of acute economic stringency, Commonwealth cooperation was ever so crucial if Britain’s claims to world power status were to be fulfilled.14 Hence it is no surprise that Attlee sought to establish a centrally coordinated system of Commonwealth defence, for such a system was intended to harness the resources and military strength of the outlying parts of the Commonwealth in support of British global and regional interests.15 Chifley’s Labor government saw great merit in closer Commonwealth defence cooperation and reciprocated British diplomatic avances.16 In 1948, it agreed to undertake planning responsibility in a vast area that included the Australian and New Zealand homelands, and Britain’s Southeast Asian territories, along with the adjacent sea areas.17 Known as ANZAM (Australian, New Zealand and Malayan Area), these arrangements were formally endorsed by the Australian government in 1950.18 By signing up to ANZAM, Canberra saw its role of Commonwealth principal in its region recognised.19 While keen on strengthening its defence ties with Britain, the Chifley government was also determined to ensure that its participation in Commonwealth planning would not be taken to imply an obligation, on Australia’s part, to commit resources to Malaya, Singapore and the British Borneo territories.20 When Australasian and British met in Melbourne in 1949 to elaborate Commonwealth war plans for the ANZAM region, Chifley was insistent that final decisions on specific commitments be made at the political, not the military, level.21

14

Darwin, Empire Project, p. 548. Francine McKenzie, “In the National Interest: Dominions’ Support for Britain and the Commonwealth after the Second World War”, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 34, 4 (2006): 566. 16 David Lee, Search for Security: The Political Economy of Australia’s Postwar Foreign and Defence Policy (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1995), p. 76. 17 Hack, Defence and Decolonisation, p. 76. 18 Ibid. 19 Ibid. 20 UKNA, CAB 21/9030, D(52)48, 3 Dec. 1952. 21 Christopher Waters, “War, Decolonisation and Post-war Security”, in Facing North: A Century of Australian Engagement with Asia: Volume 1: 1901 to the 1970s, ed. David Goldsworthy (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2001), p. 120. 15

AUSTRALIA’S ROAD TO MALAYA  17

Labor’s reluctance to be drawn into Southeast Asia became evident in 1948 when London informally sounded Canberra out about a possible Australian military contribution to the Malayan Emergency. In midJune 1948, the British had declared a state of emergency in response to a wave of killings by members of the Malayan Communist Party (MCP) against rubber estate managers around the country. In July, the Attlee Cabinet had decided to take further repressive measures by banning the MCP and despatching troop reinforcements to Malaya.22 So began a 12-year-long armed conflict between the British and the MCP. In June 1948, Evatt conveyed to London Australia’s “great concern” for the evolving situation in Malaya and even hinted at the possibility of an Australian troop contribution.23 In the end, however, the Chifley government’s response was far from forthcoming. While willing to meet British requests for arms and ammunitions, the Australian Cabinet had no intention of providing troops.24 Whereas British policymakers stressed the communist character of the Malayan insurgency and readily assumed that Moscow was behind it, Chifley insisted that unrest in Malaya had less to do with a Soviet-inspired attempt to subvert Malaya than with the nationalist aspirations of the local population and the difficult economic conditions in which post-war Malaya found itself.25 The Australian Labor government, therefore, “called for a focus on conciliation rather than just coercion”.26 For all its support for greater Commonwealth collaboration, it was evident that Chifley’s Australia remained “less than whole-hearted in its support of British defence initiatives”.27

The Menzies Government and the Decision to Commit Australian Forces to Malaya The arrival of Robert Menzies at the Lodge in December 1949 was to bring a perceptible change in Australia’s approach to Commonwealth 22

A.J. Stockwell, ed., Malaya, vol. 2 (London: HMSO, 1995), docs 160–1. Neville Meaney, “Australia, the Great Powers and the Coming of the Cold War”, Australian Journal of Politics and History 38, 3 (1992): 328. 24 Edwards, “Malayan Emergency”, pp. 607–8. 25 Ibid., p. 609; Waters, Empire Fractures, pp. 177–8. 26 Hack, Defence and Decolonisation, p. 78. 27 Edwards with Pemberton, Crises and Commitments, p. 13. 23

18  COLD WAR AND DECOLONISATION

defence cooperation in Southeast Asia. In opposition, the Coalition had criticised Chifley’s attitude towards Malaya.28 Once in power, it gradually adopted a more robust approach to the Cold War and offered a more vigorous backing to Britain’s Cold War policies. In April 1950, Menzies publicly indicated that his government would take a positive attitude towards any British request for help in Malaya.29 As the British struggled to bring the Emergency under control, the Coalition government became increasingly concerned about the future of the territory. Throughout 1949, the Australian Commission for Malaya had relayed to Canberra the difficulties the British were encountering in overcoming the communist insurgency.30 In February 1950 Australian Commissioner Claude Massey called for a more robust Australian contribution to Malaya, and Southeast Asia more generally. In emphasising the strategic significance of Malaya and Singapore, Massey minced no words, arguing that were Malaya lost, all would be lost in Southeast Asia. With the Coalition under growing pressure from sections of the local press to adopt a sympathetic attitude towards the beleaguered British, an Australian contribution now appeared increasingly likely.31 When, however, on 2 May 1950, Cabinet met to discuss the British request for assistance, no decision was reached. Ministers recognised that “Australia’s interest in keeping Malaya free of Communist control was … at least as great as that of the United Kingdom”. Australia and New Zealand, they explained, “were the only two British countries to which Malaya was vital” for, if the latter were to go communist, Indonesia would follow suit. Hence, Australia must “accept [its] responsibilities in this area and not restrict [its] efforts to advice and talk”. Ministers appreciated Britain’s military overstretch and expressed willingness to help in Malaya, perhaps by way of supplying a transport squadron of Dakotas and a few Lincoln bombers. Yet, no concrete promises were made and Cabinet did not go beyond agreeing to inform London that Australia was “giving its request the most sympathetic consideration”. Various were the reasons for this caution. Ministers

28

Ibid., p. 59. UKNA, PREM 8/1174, Mal. C. (50) 2nd mtg, 24 May 1950; Edwards with Pemberton, Crises and Commitments, p. 89. 30 Ibid., p. 86. 31 Ibid. 29

AUSTRALIA’S ROAD TO MALAYA  19

wondered, for instance, whether the British authorities in Malaya were really “in a position to handle adequately the situation”. They were also concerned that once the British request for limited assistance was met, Australia would be asked to do more and “for a lengthy period”. Moreover, they wanted to avoid the impression that by making a military contribution to Malaya, the government was “committing Australia to a militaristic policy in the area” for this might, in turn, undermine Australian chances to negotiate successfully a regional economic pact that had been proposed at Colombo.32 The decision to commit Australian armed forces to Malaya, therefore, did not come until the end of May. On 31 May, Menzies announced the despatch of a squadron of Dakotas transport aircraft for supply dropping and general transport services after he had set out in the House of Representatives, the day before, the rationale for an Australian contribution.33 On 30 May, he argued that the British position in Malaya was “serious” and that Australia had a vital interest in the stability of this territory owing to its strategic and geographical importance. It was essential to Australia’s security that the situation in Malaya “be cleared up as soon as possible”. Menzies interpreted the developments in the Malayan peninsula as “part of a global pattern of Imperialistic Communist aggression”. The insurgents were “in no way related to any true national or nationalistic movement”, but they were “directly associated with communistic activities in other Asiatic countries”. Unlike Chifley, he saw the insurgency as being instigated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, whose attention was now decidedly turning to Asia.34 Hence, to resist communist subversion, Australia was also ready to play its part in offering assistance for the region’s economic stabilisation. For Menzies it was vital that regional economies be made viable as underdevelopment provided fertile ground for communist unrest. The solution, however, was economic as much as political and military: while important, Western economic assistance

32

NAA, A4949, C171, Cabinet – Tuesday, 2 May 1950; Cabinet submission 97, 2 May 1950. 33 NAA, A1209, 1957/4513, Statement by Menzies to the House of Representatives, 31 May 1950; Edwards, “Malayan Emergency”, pp. 613–4. 34 For Menzies’s address on 30 May see NAA, A1209, 1957/4513, Menzies to Harrison, cablegram 2441, 30 May 1950.

20  COLD WAR AND DECOLONISATION

could only work if accompanied by improvements in the internal security conditions of individual regional states.35 The question of the Lincoln heavy bombers remained unresolved. The sudden outbreak of the Korean War on 25 June 1950, however, was to settle it by dispelling the government’s last reservations. On 27 June, the Australian Cabinet agreed to deploy a squadron of six Lincoln bombers to Malaya without any further delay.36 Recognising that the outbreak of hostilities in the Korean peninsula was “only one phase of Russian aggression”, ministers agreed that Australia’s primary purpose in the light of deepening Cold War tensions in the Far East should be to oppose communism in Malaya.37 Two days later, Menzies publicly explained the Cabinet decision by emphasising the linkage between the North Korean invasion and communist unrest in Malaya and Indo-China. He argued that whereas Korea was primarily a problem for the great powers to solve, Australia had a much closer interest in Malaya where the perpetuation of British authority was crucial to Australian security. As a result, with the despatch of a squadron of bombers, the government intended to show that the British Commonwealth stood united in its response to international communism.38

From Malaya to Malaya Although Menzies continued to indicate that he would be willing to come forward with whatever assistance he could — in September 1950 Canberra provided further assistance in the guise of 2,000 Owen guns —  Australian involvement in Malaya remained small and circumscribed.39 In the end, no ground troops were dispatched. In October 1950, the ACOS informed the Defence Committee (DC) that the Australian defence forces had nothing to spare in those areas of personnel and equipment that would be most useful to the British in Malaya.40 London would have to wait five more years before the first Australian ground

35

UKNA, CO 537/6331, Canberra to CRO, telegram 390, 31 May 1950. NAA, A4949, C171, Memorandum for P.A. McBride: Aid to Malaya, 30 June 1950. 37 Edwards with Pemberton, Crises and Commitments, p. 97. 38 Ibid. 39 Ibid., pp. 100–1. 40 Ibid., pp. 101–2. 36

AUSTRALIA’S ROAD TO MALAYA  21

contingent reached north Malaya. And when the decision to deploy Australian ground forces was finally made in 1955, this was not so much in response to the continuing communist insurgency in Malaya, but rather to a complex combination of political, strategic and diplomatic factors. One factor was the increasing risk of communist subversion in Southeast Asia. In 1953, the Menzies government became acutely concerned about the deterioration of the French position in Indo-China.41 In London, Winston Churchill’s new Conservative administration (1951–55) shared similar worries. Were Indo-China to fall into communist hands, British plans to defend Malaya on the Kra Isthmus in southern Thailand would need reinforcements.42 In mid-1953 the United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff (UKCOS) believed that Australia could and should make a contribution to the defence of north Malaya. On 23 June 1953, in seeking an Australian commitment, the British Minister of Defence, Lord Alexander, conveyed to Menzies the British desire “to see the Commonwealth taking the lead in the formation of such a Reserve, the logical location of which would be Malaya”.43 A second factor was London’s attempt to reduce an onerous overseas defence burden. In late 1951 Malaya was still costing £56 million a year.44 In what was destined to become a recurrent leitmotif  in post-war British defence policy, the Churchill government tried to set defence spending on a more sustainable path to ensure that Britain’s major power status could be maintained at a more affordable cost.45 In October 1952, Chancellor of the Exchequer Rab Butler reminded Cabinet that the country’s defence programme was well beyond its means.46 Even the Foreign Office (FO), traditionally averse to any step that could potentially undermine British influence abroad, had conceded so much. In June 1952, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden admitted that the only solution was to find ways in which overseas commitments could be “reduced, or shared with others, or transferred to other shoulders” 41

Hack, Defence and Decolonisation, p. 80. Ibid., p. 81. 43 UKNA, DEFE 13/58, Alexander to Menzies 29 June 1953. 44 Hack, Defence and Decolonisation, p. 124. 45 David Goldsworthy, ed., The Conservative Government and the End of Empire, 1951–57, vol. 1 (London: HMSO, 1994), p. xxv. 46 UKNA, CAB 129/55, C(52)320, 3 Oct. 1952. 42

22  COLD WAR AND DECOLONISATION

without significantly harming Britain’s world position. In Southeast Asia, the remedy lay in “committing the United States and Australia and New Zealand to the defence of Malaya and Indo-China”.47 Apart from their desire to achieve greater burden-sharing, the British had a further reason for drawing Australia more deeply into Malaya. Throughout 1952, London had sought to gain entry into ANZUS and had vigorously lobbied Canberra, Washington and Wellington for direct or indirect representation in the ANZUS Council deliberations.48 British démarches, however, were rebuffed by the three ANZUS powers.49 Hence, by the end of 1952, London had reluctantly concluded that it was pointless to insist on demands for association. Yet, determined to prevent both Canberra and Wellington being drawn too closely into the American orbit, Churchill pressed the two Pacific dominions for a major review of ANZAM.50 In December 1952, he handed Menzies and his New Zealand counterpart, Sidney Holland, a paper (“The Future of ANZAM”) calling for the strengthening of ANZAM. In doing so, the British sought to encourage greater Australasian participation in Malaya’s external defence and to diminish the significance of ANZUS.51 The Australian response was cautiously positive despite senior Department of External Affairs (DEA) officials harbouring some suspicions about British intentions. DEA Secretary Alan Watt viewed the strengthening of ANZAM as an attempt to “reduce the value of the Australasian-American alliance”. Yet, he also recognised that “if the basic objective of the British proposal is to hold Malaya”, it would be hard for Australia to “reasonably refuse any offer to collaborate with the British”.52 Thus, DEA officials recommended that the government renew and strengthen its partnership with London to fend off British pressure for entry into ANZUS and preserve the latter’s integrity. Heeding External Affairs’ advice, Menzies reassured Churchill of Australian 47

UKNA, CAB 129/53, C(52)202, 18 June 1952. Umetsu, “Strategic Reserve”, p. 514. For London’s efforts see W.D. McIntyre, Background to the ANZUS Pact: Policymaking, Strategy and Diplomacy, 1945–55 (Christchurch: Canterbury University Press, 1995), pp. 352–67. 49 Lowe, World Struggle, p. 155; Umetsu, “Strategic Reserve”, p. 515. 50 Ibid., pp. 516–7; Lee, “Allied Strategy”, p. 515. 51 UKNA, CAB 21/9030, D(52)48, 3 Dec. 1952; Umetsu, “Strategic Reserve”, p. 517. 52 Alan Watt cited in ibid., p. 518. 48

AUSTRALIA’S ROAD TO MALAYA  23

support for his ANZAM proposal. Menzies viewed the strengthening of ANZAM as an opportunity to bolster Commonwealth collaboration in the Far East and a means of achieving greater planning coordination between Australia’s major allies.53 But, as the Australian government well understood, the strengthening of ANZAM, coupled with the establishment of a strategic reserve in Malaya, was also the price that Australia would have to pay for a continuing and effective British presence in Southeast Asia.54 Despite Australia’s positive response, it was not until late 1953 that significant progress was made. In September of that year, British and Australasian defence planners agreed to strengthen ANZAM along the lines outlined in Churchill’s December proposal.55 Then, in October 1953, following his Melbourne talks with the Australian DC and the New Zealand Chiefs of Staff, the British Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Field-Marshal John Harding, secured an Australasian informal agreement “to assuming wider operational responsibility and obligation in the defence of Malaya”.56 In Melbourne, a broad agreement was also reached on the composition of the Commonwealth strategic reserve. Australia would commit ground (one battalion), air (one bomber squadron and a fighter squadron with the possible addition of two extra RAAF [Royal Australian Air Force] fighter squadrons) and naval forces (one destroyer or frigate plus the occasional visit of an Australian aircraft carrier).57 As a result, the planning and operational responsibility for the external defence of Malaya would now rest upon a joint Commonwealth effort.58 The outcome of Melbourne defence talks was enshrined in the so-called Harding plan, which now awaited ministerial approval. The British government expeditiously endorsed it in January 1954, but Canberra (and Wellington) delayed ratification until 1955.59 In 1954, 53

NAA, A5954, 1424/1, Minutes of a Meeting held at 10 Downing Street, 12 Dec. 1952; Menzies to Fadden, Casey and McBride, cablegram 4910, 13 Dec. 1952; Umetsu, “Strategic Reserve”, p. 519. 54 Ibid., p. 522. 55 Ibid., p. 523. 56 Ibid. 57 Ibid. 58 Ibid., p. 524. 59 For the British approval see UKNA, CO 968/458, MOD to GHQ Far East Land Forces, COSSEA 945, 21 Jan. 1954.

24  COLD WAR AND DECOLONISATION

the Menzies government became even more preoccupied with the deterioration of the West’s position in Southeast Asia.60 During the spring of 1954 the Indo-China crisis had come to a head, with the French suffering a fatal defeat at Dien Bien Phu. In these circumstances, the Australian government chose to await Washington’s response to the worsening of the Indo-Chinese crisis before endorsing the Harding plan. Canberra, in particular, was eager to find out whether the US would be ready to take the lead in creating a Western-oriented security system in Southeast Asia.61 In August, the Eisenhower administration, after failing to secure British and Australian support for military intervention in Indo-China, decided to draw the line against further communist expansion in the region by promoting a new Southeast Asian defensive alliance.62 For the Coalition government the establishment of SEATO in September 1954 was somewhat of an anticlimax for, in the end, it did not provide the level of coordination of Allied military planning Australia had hoped to achieve.63 Hence, with Washington unwilling to turn SEATO into an effective body for the coordination of Western strategy in Southeast Asia, Canberra went ahead with ANZAM. On 31 March Cabinet finally agreed to the despatch of Australian forces to the Malayan region as part of the newly formed Commonwealth Strategic Reserve.64 Then, on 15 June 1955, Menzies confirmed that Australian troops would be made available for use in counterinsurgency operations provided that they were not used to quell civilian 60

Umetsu, “Strategic Reserve”, p. 324; Edward and Pemberton, Crises and Commitments, p. 163. 61 Lee, Search for Security, p. 123. 62 For Washington’s “united action” in Indo-China see for instance Gregory Pemberton, “Australia, the United States and the Indochina Crisis of 1954”, Diplomatic History 13, 1 (1989): 45–6; Kevin Ruane, “Refusing to Pay the Price: British Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Victory in Vietnam, 1952–1954”, English Historical Review 110, 435 (1995): 70–92. On SEATO see Roger Dingman, “John Foster Dulles and the Creation of the South-East Asia Treaty Organization in 1954”, International History Review 11, 3 (1989): 457–77. 63 Lee, Search for Security, pp. 126–7. 64 UKNA, DO 35/6033, Canberra to CRO, telegram 296, 31 Mar. 1955. The Australian contribution to the CSR included one infantry battalion, two destroyers (already in Malaya) or frigates and two squadron fighters, one squadron bomber (already in Malaya and stationed at Tengah in Singapore) and one airfield construction squadron. See UKNA, DO 35/6057, Contributions to Strategic Reserve, undated.

AUSTRALIA’S ROAD TO MALAYA  25

disturbances or involved in any other internal matter of Malaya and Singapore.65 He also announced that the Australian battalion would be deployed in Penang.66 In making this announcement, Menzies expressed his desire to see Malaya achieve self-government as soon as practicable and to help its people rid themselves of the communist guerrillas who were seeking to wreck the territory’s economic life and delay the grant of independence.67 By stressing this point, he was keen on dispelling any impression that Australian troops were being sent to Malaya “either to ensure an extension of the colonial relationship with the United Kingdom or as a first step to a new colonial relationship with Australia”.68 The decision to commit troops to the defence of Malaya raised, however, some delicate political and strategic questions for the Australian government. One key problem was the nature of the American strategic role in Southeast Asia. Significant uncertainty remained in Canberra over the extent to which Washington was prepared to coordinate military planning with its allies. But misgivings also existed over the Eisenhower administration’s willingness to accept Malaya as a forward base for SEATO-based operations and to provide American equipment to its allies in the region.69 A further problem was the question of Britain’s commitment to the defence of Malaya. Doubts about Britain’s ability to properly defend Malaya in the event of a global war weighed heavily on Australian minds. Some ministers were apprehensive about the prospect of Australian forces being “expendable” in war unless Canberra secured a firm guarantee from the US. Their underlying concern was that, in the event of a global war, Britain would concentrate its efforts in Europe at the expense of the Far East.70 Defence Minister

65

UKNA, DO 35/6057, Canberra to CRO, telegram 583, 15 June 1955; see also Edwards with Pemberton, Crises and Commitments, pp. 174–5. 66 UKNA, DO 35/6057, Canberra to CRO, telegram 583, 15 June 1955. 67 Ibid. 68 NAA, A5954, 1466/2, Bearing of Local Political Conditions in Malaya and Singapore on Decision to Station Australian Troops and Choice of Location of These Forces, Attachment 11, 8 June 1955. 69 Hack, Defence and Decolonisation, p. 183. 70 UKNA, DO 35/6034, Tory to Home, FE 63/14 13 June 1955; Clark to Garner, 26 May 1955; Tory to Clark, 2 June 1955; CO 968/458, Canberra to CRO, telegram 494, 21 May 1955.

26  COLD WAR AND DECOLONISATION

Philip McBride was said to be particularly mistrustful of British intentions, believing that “the United Kingdom had no genuine intention of fighting out in Malaya if war should come”.71 Given the complexity of the issues involved, it is not surprising that the Menzies government’s decision to commit Australian forces to the CSR came at the end of a long and elaborate diplomatic process. As the British High Commission in Canberra pointed out to the Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO) in June 1955, “the length of time which has elapsed between the submission of these recommendations [Melbourne Report] and their acceptance by the Australian Government is a measure of the magnitude of the departure from Australian tradition which they represent”.72 It was indeed a historic decision. By committing to shoulder a larger share of the British Commonwealth’s regional burden, Australia was not only embarking on its longest overseas military commitment, but it was also becoming more deeply involved in Southeast Asia. As this chapter has shown, the decision was not simply in response to Canberra’s rising concerns about Southeast Asian security and its growing realisation that greater Allied coordination was needed to contain communism. The “Malayan commitment” was also seen in Canberra as a means of buttressing Britain’s position in Southeast Asia and ensuring that London would remain committed to an area of rapidly increasing strategic importance for Canberra. As the newly appointed DEA Secretary Arthur Tange reminded Foreign Minister Richard Casey in January 1955, “we might hear rumbles of a change back to a policy of abandoning Malaya unless we show that the Government here is willing to address itself seriously to the kind of defence effort required for its retention”.73 Australia’s commitment to the CRS, however, came at a time of rapid and profound change in the Malayan peninsula. Nationalism, so far relatively quiescent, was gathering strength. Between 1952 and 1955 Malaya had been making important progress towards self-government. Although the pace of decolonisation appeared somewhat slower in Singapore than Malaya, the former was also experiencing a significant nationalist awakening. In Malaya, the British Conservative government

71

UKNA, DO 35/6034, Tory to Clark, 2 June 1955. UKNA, DO 35/6034, Tory to Home, FE 63/14, 13 June 1955. 73 NAA, A1838, TS383/5/2 part 1, Tange to Casey, 5 Jan. 1955.

72

AUSTRALIA’S ROAD TO MALAYA  27

was determined to avoid a prolonged and costly anti-communist military campaign, and, as a consequence, came to the conclusion that the Emergency could only be brought to a close with the collaboration of the local anti-communist elites. To gain such a support, Britain, however, was compelled to commit itself to rapid colonial change. In Singapore, London was more reluctant to move rapidly given the island’s strategic significance as the pivot of British power east of Suez. Yet, even there, it was forced to go further than it was initially inclined to do. As a result, Malaya and Singapore soon came to pose what Goldsworthy has called “a late-colonial problem”.74 As British ministers themselves recognised, Britain’s “declared policy of bringing about the independence of Malaya in due course” was at odds with its “strategic aim of building up the strength of Commonwealth forces in Malaya as a focal point of the defence of South-East Asia”.75 For the Australian government, which had hitherto envisioned this process as extending over a number of years, this was a seriously complicating factor. It is, therefore, to Britain’s end of empire in Malaya and Singapore that we now turn our attention.

74 75

Goldsworthy, Conservative Government, p. xxxvi. Defence Committee cited in ibid.

CHAPTER TWO

Colonial Malaya and Singapore

A

t the war’s end, in contrast to British India, French Indo-China or the Dutch East Indies, where opposition to colonialism ran strong, nationalism in Malaya and Singapore was still in its infancy. In both territories, the reimposition of British rule had been met with no violent resistance; in fact, after three long years of unforgiving Japanese occupation, the peoples of Malaya and Singapore had welcomed the return of their former colonial masters.1 As this chapter explains, the British government was under less pressure to decolonise and, quite unsurprisingly, viewed independence as a long-term process. Between the mid-1940s and the early 1950s, British colonial policy in Southeast Asia thus continued to contemplate the establishment of a successor state “with stable, cross-communal politics, capable of sustaining and not sapping Commonwealth power”.2 By envisaging a programme of gradual constitutional reforms, London intended not only to remain in control of the decolonisation process in its Southeast Asian territories, but also to keep the moderate local elites onside and, in so doing, to perpetuate its regional influence once independence was granted. In the early 1950s, London was, on the whole, confident that it would have enough time to weld the different ethnic communities of British Malaya together into a unified multi-ethnic post-colonial state, friendly to British regional interests.3 Yet, as this chapter also shows, the long 1 C.M. Turnbull, A History of Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1989), p. 228. 2 Hack, Defence and Decolonisation, p. 132. 3 Ibid.

28

COLONIAL MALAYA AND SINGAPORE  29

process of decolonisation envisaged by British policymakers proved increasingly unrealistic once London introduced political reforms and widened representation in local political institutions.

British Malaya During the interwar years, relative prosperity and political quiescence in Malaya and Singapore had convinced the British that they could remain in control of their Southeast Asian possessions for the indefinite future.4 Nationalist movements were not absent in pre-war Malaya, but they enjoyed no significant popular support.5 Moreover, entrenched communal differences between Malays, Chinese and Indians appeared to militate against the emergence of a strong local nationalist movement. Under little pressure to change, British officials focused on developing the colonial economy and introducing much needed administrative reforms.6 With its Straits Settlements and nine protected Malay States, British Malaya presented a fragmented administrative picture. The Second World War, however, pushed policymakers in London to reassess colonial policy in Malaya. Nation-building and administrative reforms now acquired unprecedented urgency.7 Japan’s swift military advances through Southeast Asia dealt a serious blow to British prestige and raised serious doubts about the effectiveness of Britain’s complex colonial arrangements in the Malay Archipelago.8 The passivity of the local populations and the lack of cohesion among the different ethnic groups were seen as a significant weakness in the aftermath of the Singapore disaster.9 Thus, almost soon after the fall of Singapore, Colonial Office (CO) officials concluded that a new political arrangement was

4

Stockwell, “Imperial Policy”, p. 68. Simon C. Smith, “The Rise, Decline and Survival of the Malay Rulers during the Colonial Period, 1874–1957”, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 22, 1 (1994): 98 6 A.J. Stockwell, “Imperialism and Nationalism in South-East Asia”, Oxford History of the British Empire, ed. Judith Brown and William Roger Louis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 471. 7 Stockwell, “Imperial Policy”, p. 68. 8 Albert Lau, The Malayan Union Controversy 1942–48 (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1991), pp. 28–30. 9 Hack, Defence and Decolonisation, p. 45. 5

30  COLD WAR AND DECOLONISATION

needed for the region and rapidly came up with a plan — the Malayan Union scheme — that was a radical departure from the past.10 Its main features were the creation of a unitary Malayan state (comprising all nine Malay states plus Penang and Malacca but without Singapore and the Borneo protectorates) under a strong central administration and the introduction of a common citizenship for all (Chinese, Indians and Malays) with the view to creating a multiracial (and hopefully more cohesive) society. Moreover, the plan proposed to do away with the sovereignty of the Malay rulers, the autonomy of their states and the special position of the Malays. It also contemplated greater coordination at the political level through the appointment of a Governor-General, whose task would be to coordinate policy in Britain’s now streamlined Southeast Asian empire.11 More importantly, while “it envisaged unprecedented direct rule in the short term”, the Malayan Union plan also “committed Britain to Malayan self-determination in the long term”.12 Progress towards self-government would be gradual and its pace would be determined by Britain’s own programme of state- and nationbuilding.13 Nation- and state-building, in turn, aimed at preparing Malaya for self-government without threatening Britain’s economic and military interests in the region.14 In British eyes, these reforms were clearly aimed at putting Britain’s future position in Southeast Asia on a stronger ground.15 Churchill’s War Cabinet approved the Malayan Union scheme in May 1944, but it fell on his successor, Clement Attlee, to implement it.16 However, such British attempts to foster racial cooperation soon foundered on heightened Malay fears of losing their privileged position within a multiracial and potentially more democratic Malaya. Faced with strong Malay opposition, the British buckled. On 1 February

10

A.J. Stockwell, “Colonial Planning during World War II: The Case of Malaya”, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 2, 3 (1974): 242–3 and 337–340; Lau, Malayan Union, pp. 34–40 and 42–4. 11 Stockwell, Malaya, vol. 1, p. liv. 12 Ibid., p. lvi. 13 Ronald Hyam, Britain’s Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonisation 1918–1968 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 156. 14 Stockwell, “Imperial Policy”, p. 78. 15 Hack, Defence and Decolonisation, p. 48. 16 Lau, Malayan Union, pp. 79–82.

COLONIAL MALAYA AND SINGAPORE  31

1948, the Malayan Union was replaced by the Malayan Federation.17 This latter scheme restored the Malay rulers’ sovereignty in their states while maintaining a strong central government under a British High Commissioner.18 The concept of a common citizenship as a prerequisite for a truly multiracial Malaya was watered down and more restrictive rules on granting citizenship to non-Malays were introduced.19 Predictably, given its pro-Malay leanings, this new scheme drew opposition from non-Malays.20 The British, however, stood firm. While, in the end, the decision to shelve the Malayan Union for a new Federation was a blow to their initial intentions, they managed to retain some important aspects of the original plan.21

British Policymaking and Post-war Malaya Hence, if, in the aftermath of the Malayan Union fiasco, the British were forced to alter their tactics, their attachment to the principles of the Malayan Union remained unchanged with self-government continuing to be their ultimate aim. In contemplating elections to various councils “as soon as circumstances and local conditions would permit”, the Federation Agreement reaffirmed the British government’s commitment to self-government.22 Also unchanged, however, remained the assumption that constitutional advance in the Malayan peninsula would be a long-drawn-out affair. According to Stockwell, in 1948 the British Labour government still envisaged a 25-year-long transition process.23 Such perception was no doubt fostered by the still inchoate, and essentially moderate, nature of local nationalism. The latter had indeed received a significant boost from the Malayan Union episode. So strong, in fact, was the opposition to the scheme among Malays that Malay nationalism emerged as an organised political force.24 To channel 17

Stockwell, Malaya, vol. 1, p. lv. Hack, Defence and Decolonisation, p. 48. 19 Ibid. 20 T.N. Harper, The End of Empire and the Making of Malaya (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), pp. 89–92. 21 Hack, Defence and Decolonisation, pp. 48–9. 22 Stockwell, Malaya, vol. 1, p. lxxxiv; NAA, A1838, 410/1/1 part 1, Constitutions of the Far Eastern Dependencies, 22 July 1950. 23 Stockwell, “Imperial Policy”, p. 72. 24 Turnbull, Malaysia, Singapore, p. 234. 18

32  COLD WAR AND DECOLONISATION

Malay discontent against the Malayan Union, Dato Onn bin Jaafar, a Johor aristocrat, established the United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) in 1946.25 As a result, Malay nationalism “matured almost overnight” with UMNO branches rapidly opening in major centres, and mass demonstrations and boycotts being staged across the country.26 Yet, while it is undeniable that the Malayan Union crisis was to have a long-lasting impact on the future of post-war Malaya, its short-term effects were less far-reaching. For a start, the two major forces in Malay society — the Malay rulers and UMNO — shared no great commonality of interests beyond their opposition to the Malayan Union scheme and, therefore, theirs was no more than a short-lived alignment of convenience. Not only were the sultans reluctant to recognise UMNO’s views as representing the majority of Malay opinion, but UMNO was also unprepared to hand over the leadership of the Malays to the sultans.27 What is more, neither the sultans nor UMNO wanted an early end to British rule as they both regarded a continuing British presence as an insurance against the Chinese.28 The outbreak of the Malayan Emergency in mid-1948 reinforced, at least for a little while, these British perceptions of a slow constitutional advance. The need to defeat the communist insurgents became the Attlee government’s primary task in Malaya. Fearing that the territory could become a second Palestine, Labour sent immediate military reinforcements.29 By early 1949, it had deployed 40,000 troops in Malaya and Singapore.30 With constitutional advance seen as conditional upon the restoration of law and order, London put constitutional questions momentarily on hold.31 Soon enough, however, British officials began to revise their assumptions. No longer was Malayan independence viewed as the result of a remarkably lengthy process of nurturing. 25

Albert Lau, “Malayan Union Citizenship: Constitutional Change and Controversy in Malaya, 1942–48”, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 20, 2 (1989): 229–30. 26 Turnbull, Malaysia, Singapore, p. 234; Albert Lau, A Moment of Anguish: Singapore in Malaysia and the Politics of Disengagement (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1998), p. 4. 27 Smith, “Decline and Survival”, p. 100. 28 Lau, Moment of Anguish, p. 4. 29 Louis, “Dissolution of the British Empire”, p. 337. 30 Stockwell, Malaya, vol. 2, doc. 167. 31 A.J. Stockwell, “Insurgency and Decolonisation during the Malayan Emergency”, Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 25, 1 (1987): 76.

COLONIAL MALAYA AND SINGAPORE  33

In August 1950, British Commissioner-General for Southeast Asia Malcolm MacDonald told a visiting American Joint Staff Defence Survey Mission that the transfer of power in Malaya “was more likely in 10 to 15 years”.32 Now British policymakers began increasingly to see constitutional progress in Malaya as a means of undermining the potential appeal of communism and winning friends in a rapidly changing Asia.33 In planning to give local elites greater political autonomy and introduce a modicum of democratic politics, the British intended to undermine the MCP’s claim to legitimacy of its violent campaign for self-government.34 The British view was that while, on the one hand, it would be tragic to lose Malaya as rapidly as India or Burma, on the other, it would no doubt be foolish to cling to it in the same manner as the French did in Indo-China or the Dutch tried to do in Indonesia.35 They knew that a new generation of Asian nationalist leaders was closely watching their actions in Malaya.36 It “was a mental revolution”, Stockwell argued, and “with India out of the empire and safely in the Commonwealth, Britain had breached the psychological barrier to the transfer of power which the Dutch and French found so agonizing to surmount”.37 By mid-1950, the Labour government had no doubt broken that barrier and now recognised the need for a swifter constitutional advance in Malaya. In practice, however, it still regarded the end of the Emergency and the closer integration of Malaya’s ethnic communities as preconditions for substantial concessions.38 In 1950–51, moreover, plans for political progress were eclipsed by Britain’s difficulty in breaking the back of the communist insurgency and overcoming communal divergences. The Korean War, by heightening Western fears of further communist advances in Southeast Asia, acted as a further brake

32

Stockwell, “Imperial Policy”, pp. 72–3. Ibid., pp. 73–4. 34 James Milton Fernando, “The Emergence of the Alliance and the Making of Malaya’s Independence Constitution, 1948–57”, Ph.D. Diss. (London: University of London, 1995), p. 23. 35 Stockwell, “Imperial Policy”, p. 74. 36 Ibid. 37 Ibid., p. 84. 38 Frank Heinlein, British Government Policy and Decolonisation 1945–1963: Scrutinising the Official Mind (London: Frank Cass, 2002), p. 53. 33

34  COLD WAR AND DECOLONISATION

on constitutional progress.39 Only very slowly did the Attlee administration introduce political reforms.40 At the end of 1951 Churchill replaced Attlee at 10 Downing Street. Despite a seemingly lukewarm approach to decolonisation, the new Conservative government endorsed plans for political advancement set in train by its predecessor.41 In February 1952, the first municipal elections were held in Kuala Lumpur and, in December 1952, new High Commissioner Gerald Templer tentatively set the timetable for independence for 1960 (at the very earliest).42 While recognising that “no real desire” for independence existed as yet among Malaya’s ethnic communities, he admitted that nationalist sentiment was bound to grow and that Britain should attempt to control it.43 The CO concurred.44 Indeed, during 1953, as the British made significant inroads in their struggle against the communist insurgency and the security situation in Malaya improved, internal pressure for a faster constitutional advance picked up.45 After a period of internal dissension, UMNO had rebuilt under a new leader, Tunku Abdul Rahman.46 Initially dismissed as lightweight, the Tunku was to prove robustly anti-communist and moderately pro-British. A reliable politician, he would command the support of the majority of the Malays and the other ethnic groups, and also gain the confidence of the Malay Rulers.47 Although he reaffirmed

39

Stockwell, Malaya, vol. 1, p. lxviii; Hack, Defence and Decolonisation, pp. 87–8. Stockwell, Malaya, vol. 2, doc. 227. 41 Harper, Making of Malaya, p. 310; Stockwell, “Imperial Policy”, p. 83; Hyam, Declining Empire, pp. 168–70 and 198. 42 Stockwell, “Imperial Policy”, p. 83; Harper, Making of Malaya, p. 310. 43 Goldsworthy, Conservative Government, vol. 2, doc. 344; Heinlein, British Policy, p. 109. 44 Ibid. 45 For the security situation in Malaya see NAA, A5954, 2292/5, Furlonger to Tange, memorandum 1746, 4 Dec. 1954; McIntyre to Casey, ministerial despatch 1/54, 24 Feb. 1954. 46 Harper, Making of Malaya, pp. 319–23. 47 A.J. Stockwell, “Abdul Rahman, Tunku (1902–1990)”, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography [henceforth ODNB ] (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), online edn, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/39072 [accessed 1 Mar. 2011]; Philip Murphy, Alan Lennox-Boyd: A Biography (London: I.B. Tauris, 1999), pp. 130–1; Lee Kuan Yew, The Singapore Story: Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish, 1998), p. 223. 40

COLONIAL MALAYA AND SINGAPORE  35

the party’s identity as the defender of Malay interests and remained opposed to the idea of a “Malayan” Malaya, the Tunku struck a constructive working relationship with the Malayan Chinese Association (MCA). Established by Tan Cheng Lock in 1949, the MCA was an anti-communist party for the Malayan-domiciled Chinese and was predominantly made up of upper-class British-educated Chinese.48 In 1952, the MCA and UMNO joined forces to contest Kuala Lumpur’s municipal elections.49 Their resounding victory persuaded them to extend their electoral collaboration nationwide.50 Between 1952 and 1954 the so-called Alliance would win most of the seats contested in town council, municipal, state and settlement elections.51 This series of elections was to be “a turning point” in the evolution of both UMNO and the MCA for it transformed them into the only two credible forces capable of taking over the reins of government from the British.52 London had set collaboration among Malaya’s ethnic groups as one of the preconditions for granting independence to the territory. The fact that despite their deep mutual suspicions and entrenched communalism, the MCA and UMNO were prepared to collaborate  —  in 1954 the Alliance was joined by the Malayan Indian Congress (MIC), a party representing the nearly one million Indians living in the Federation —  indicated that the major Malayan parties were now committed to achieving independence on the basis of an alliance of communal organisations.53 Confident that the British could no longer stall Malayan independence, the Alliance began to demand greater self-government.54 In late August 1953, it called for federal elections by 1954 as the “first step towards the attainment of a sovereign Malayan State within the

48

NAA, A1838, 411/1/2/1 part 1, Annual Report for 1949 on Malaya, Singapore and the British Territories in Borneo, 24 Feb. 1950; NARA, RG 59, Decimfil 56-59, Box 4027, 797.00/11-2557, Kuala Lumpur to Department of State, dispatch 185, 25 Nov. 1957. 49 NAA, A4231, 1952/Singapore, Truscott to Casey, MD 6/52, 14 Mar. 1952. 50 Ibid. 51 Economist, 25 June 1955, p. 1139. 52 Richard Stubbs, “The United Malays National Organization, the Malayan Chinese Association, and the Early Years of the Malayan Emergency, 1948–1955”, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 10, 1 (1979): 82–3 and 85–6. 53 Turnbull, Malaysia, Singapore, p. 243. 54 Stockwell, Malaya, vol. 1, p. lxxii; Hyam, Declining Empire, pp. 198–9.

36  COLD WAR AND DECOLONISATION

British Commonwealth”.55 Although it failed to accomplish this timetable, the Alliance was able to secure two significant results — a British commitment to hold the first federal election in 1955 and an agreement to have the majority of seats in the Legislative Council filled by elected representatives.56 The Alliance’s demands initially generated anxiety not only among British policymakers but also within Malaya itself — and namely among Malaya’s nine sultans. The latter remained opposed to political reforms that undermined Malay special rights and the continuation of their power. For their part, the British fretted that by meeting the Alliance’s demands in full, they would risk relinquishing the political initiative to the local nationalists.57 It was to avoid this outcome that Templer and his successor, Donald MacGillivray, agreed to such constitutional reforms. These British calculations, however, were only part of the story, for constitutional concessions were also driven by wider Cold War considerations, especially concerns over the worsening French position in Indo-China and its possible knock-on effect on the rest of Southeast Asia. Drawing no comfort from French actions, British policymakers concluded that, to stand a chance of success, the containment of communism could not simply rely on military means, but “it had to enjoy the active support of the local population”.58 In other words, if Britain wanted to keep moderate local elites onside, it had to introduce greater self-government even at the cost of a deterioration in the administration of its former territory.59 Harper’s claim that by 1953, “the principle of self-government had been conceded at a stroke” is an overstatement.60 It had, after all, been conceded before. However, what was now clear was that London was considering a faster transfer of power. And there was little doubt that once self-government was encouraged, it would

55

Times of India, 23 Aug. 1955; Stockwell, Malaya, vol. 1, pp. lxxii–lxxiii. Hack, Defence and Decolonisation, p. 134. 57 Stockwell, Malaya, vol. 1, p. lxxii; NAA, A1838, 3020/10/1 part 1, Federation of Malaya and Singapore: Minister’s brief, undated. For the attitude of the sultans see NAA, A4231, 1951/Singapore, Truscott to DEA Secretary, departmental despatch 12/51, 12 Apr. 1951. 58 Heinlein, British Policy, p. 109. 59 Ibid. 60 Harper, Making of Malaya, p. 310. 56

COLONIAL MALAYA AND SINGAPORE  37

gain a momentum of its own and “became self-perpetuating”.61 That is precisely what happened after 1952.

Post-war Singapore Intended to be only temporary, the separation of Singapore from the rest of Malaya was to last until 1963 when, as we shall see, the island finally joined Malaysia. As mentioned above, by 1944 the British government had concluded that the success of the Malayan Union scheme hinged crucially on the acquiescence of the Malay sultans and that their consent would not be forthcoming unless Singapore were excluded from the proposed Union. With its largely non-Malay population, Singapore threatened to undermine traditional Malay’s dominance on the peninsula.62 As a result, in late 1945 the colony was first placed under a British military administration and then, in April 1946, it was transferred to a civilian one, headed by a governor (Sir Franklin Gimson).63 Two years later, the Attlee government introduced a constitution, which provided for the election of a limited number of legislative councillors.64 As in the case of Malaya, London anticipated only a slow advance towards self-government for Singapore.65 The latter’s strategic and political importance as a focal point of British power in Asia militated against hasty imperial retrenchment and made it imperative that the island remained safely under British rule. The introduction of a new constitution in April 1948 was preceded by the elections for the new Legislative Council on 20 March 1948. If, as Albert Lau has noted, Governor Gimson had hoped that the proposed elections would generate popular interest in the constitutional

61

Peter Lowe, Contending with Nationalism and Communism: British Policy towards Southeast Asia, 1945–65 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009), p. 49. 62 For the British government and the Singapore question in 1943–44 see Lau, Malayan Union, pp. 44–59 and 79–82. 63 C.M. Turnbull, A History of Modern Singapore, 1819–2005 (Singapore: NUS Press, 2009), p. 238. 64 Lau, Malayan Union, p. 261; Yeo Kim Wah, Political Development in Singapore 1945–1955 (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1973), pp. 54–5; Kevin Tan, “A Short Legal and Constitutional History of Singapore”, in The Singapore Legal System, ed. Kevin Tan (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1999), p. 41. 65 Pullé, “Colonial Policy”, p. 269.

38  COLD WAR AND DECOLONISATION

future of Singapore, he was to be let down.66 Out of an eligible electorate of roughly 200,000 persons, only 22,395 registered.67 Of these registered voters, only 63 per cent turned up to vote.68 Voters’ apathy played a significant role in such low turnout and indifference derived from the lack of real political alternatives as well as from the fact that so little seemed to be at stake.69 Predictably enough, the Singapore Progressive Party (SPP) won three seats with the remaining three going to independents.70 Led by C.C. Tan, a London-trained lawyer, the SPP was an interracial party whose majority of members were Englisheducated and could neither speak nor read Chinese. The Progressives represented the professional and clerical classes, were politically conservative, stood for free enterprise, favoured collaboration with the British authorities and stood for a policy of gradual progress towards selfgovernment.71 Hence, as the 1940s drew to a close, Singapore appeared “poised for steady if unspectacular constitutional and social reforms”.72 By mid1948, the MCP seemed to have lost its hold over the labour movement and its influence on Singaporean politics also appeared on the wane.73 Since the end of the war, the MCP had played an active behind-thescenes role in Singapore politics, trying to take advantage of Singaporeans’ discontent at the dire economic conditions in which they found themselves.74 It had, by and large, managed to control the labour

66

Lau, Malayan Union, p. 262. John Drysdale, Singapore: Struggle for Success (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish, 2009), p. 27. 68 Lau, Malayan Union, p. 262. 69 S.R. Joey Long, Safe for Decolonization: The Eisenhower Administration, Britain, and Singapore (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2011), p. 22. 70 Yeo, Political Development, p. 265. 71 NAA, A5954, 2292/5, Singapore despatch 1, 19 Mar. 1955; UKNA, CO 1030/ 924, Note on the Political Parties in Singapore, undated; CO 1030/239, Statement of the Political Parties Likely to take part in the Elections to the Legislative Assembly, Singapore 1955, 30 Nov. 1954. 72 Turnbull, Modern Singapore, p. 239. 73 Ibid., p. 240. For the MCP’s influence on Singapore’s labour movement see NAA, A4231, 1947/Singapore, JIC(46), 4/1, The Chinese Factor in the Problem of the Security and Defence of South East Asia, undated. 74 NAA, A1838, 410/1/1 part 1, Background Paper on Malaya and Borneo, 14 July 1947. 67

COLONIAL MALAYA AND SINGAPORE  39

movement and infiltrate radical organisations such as the Malayan Democratic Union.75 However, with the outbreak of a communist insurgency in Malaya, Emergency regulations were also extended to Singapore. The MCP, and those radical political groups which had been politically linked to it, were either proscribed or disbanded.76 In the early phase of the Emergency, the British cracked down heavily on anyone suspected of radical left-wing sympathies and thus arrested several left-wing radicals.77 Yet, in spite of what the Australian Commission in Singapore described as the “vigorous” efforts made by the colonial authorities to “stamp out” communism, communist penetration remained a concern throughout the early 1950s.78 As the mission reported to Canberra in 1954, while Singapore was “too small” and police pressure “too constant” for open insurrection, the MCP’s influence was still “powerful”. Despite being driven underground, the communists still actively sought to recruit among workers and secondary school students.79 In 1954, Australian estimates put MCP membership in Singapore at about 2,000 although the Commission also admitted that the number of fellow travellers and sympathisers was “much larger”.80 While, therefore, the security situation remained outwardly calm, Western diplomatic circles remained apprehensive that, given the opportunity, the MCP “could become a serious threat to the Colony’s administration”.81

75

Turnbull, Modern Singapore, pp. 239–40. For an analysis of the MCP’s activities in Singapore in 1945–50 see Richard Clutterbuck, Conflict and Violence in Singapore and Malaysia, 1945–1983 (Singapore: Graham Brash, 1984), pp. 45–74. 76 NAA, A1838, 413/2/5/2 part 2, Massey to Burton, departmental despatch 8/49, 16 Mar. 1949; A6537, SEATS 3A, Annex 1 to the Report on the Malayan Situation as on 31 July 1948. 77 NAA, A1838, 3022/2/1 part 1, Critchley to DEA Secretary, memorandum 25/5/ 2/5/A, 25 July 1952.; Turnbull, Malaysia, Singapore, pp. 240–1; NAA, A4231, 1949/Singapore, Singapore to DEA, departmental despatch 8/49, 16 Mar. 1949. 78 NAA, A5954, 2292/5, Singapore memorandum 622, 23 June 1953. 79 NAA, A5954, 2292/5, O’Connor to Tange, memorandum 1436, 13 Oct. 1954; Singapore memorandum 622, 23 June 1953; McIntyre to Casey, ministerial despatch 1/54, 24 Feb. 1954; NAA, A5954, 2292/4, Furlonger to Casey, ministerial despatch 4/54, 28 May 1954. 80 NAA, A5954, 2292/5, O’Connor to Tange, memorandum 1436, 13 Oct. 1954. Here it is worth noting that the overall MCP’s strength in Malaya in 1954 was estimated at around 4,000–5,000 insurgents. 81 NAA, A5954, 2292/5, O’Connor to Tange, memorandum 1436, 13 Oct. 1954.

40  COLD WAR AND DECOLONISATION

With the British government preoccupied with the communist insurrection in Malaya and constantly on the alert for fear of communist subversion in Singapore, constitutional change in the island stalled between 1948 and 1953.82 However, the growing demands for greater self-government, made by the UMNO-MCA Alliance across the causeway, encouraged the SPP to campaign for a slightly faster devolution of power.83 Despite the SPP’s occasional verbal attacks against British colonialism, the British were hardly troubled by the party’s demands and, in fact, continued to see Tan and his associates “as a reliable group in whose hands the transition to stable self-government could be made in an orderly and peaceful fashion”.84 Apart from its modest demands, the SPP also favoured a continuing British military presence in Southeast Asia as a guarantee against communist activity in Malaya (and Singapore). In March 1954 the SPP’s Secretary, John Ede, called for a greater Australian involvement in the defence of Southeast Asia.85 However, the reasonableness of the SPP’s demands and the relatively composed nature of Singapore’s political contest under colonial rule (the product, of course, of strict Emergency regulations, which severely restricted political activity) were deceiving. Under the surface, anti-British resentment and social discontent were, in fact, simmering.86 Far from lulled into a false sense of security from Singapore’s apparent calm, the colonial authorities clearly appreciated the need to prevent smouldering discontent from morphing into more dangerous forms of social unrest or “flowing along underground channels into a mass movement under Communist control”.87 Thus, they promptly began to consider further constitutional reforms to minimise the risk of growing domestic anti-British resentment. As new British Governor John Nicoll put it, constitutional reforms inevitably “involved an element of calculated risk”, but the risk was “one which in the circumstances should be

82

Yeo, Political Development, p. 56. NAA, A5954, 2292/5, Singapore despatch no. 1, 19 Mar. 1955; Tan, “Constitutional History of Singapore”, p. 42; Turnbull, Modern Singapore, p. 243. 84 Ibid. On SPP’s verbal attacks see Long, Safe for Decolonization, p. 23. 85 NAA, A5954, 2292/5, Charles Lee to Tange, memorandum 373, 6 Mar. 1954. 86 Turnbull, Modern Singapore, p. 245; Long, Safe for Decolonization, pp. 23–4. 87 Ibid., pp. 27–8; Pullé, “Colonial Policy”, p. 20.

83

COLONIAL MALAYA AND SINGAPORE  41

accepted”.88 In 1953, therefore, Nicoll encouraged the SPP to formulate plans for greater self-government.89 In October 1953 he appointed a multiracial commission, headed by a retired British diplomat, Sir George Rendel, to conduct a comprehensive review of the 1948 Constitution.90 Published in February 1954 and endorsed with some minimal changes by the Churchill government in April 1954, Rendel’s recommendations were enshrined in a new constitutional document scheduled to come into force in 1955 after the elections for a new Legislative Assembly were held.91 The new Constitution was an appreciable step forward, despite falling short of granting full self-government. It introduced the principle of responsible government by accepting the transfer of power from the governor to locally elected ministers in a Council of Ministers responsible to a Legislative Assembly. Presided over by the governor, the new Council of Ministers was to assume responsibility for government policy in all fields except defence, external affairs and internal security, which safely remained in British hands. In addition, the governor retained his traditional “reserve powers”, thanks to which he could suspend the Constitution and restore direct British rule if the circumstances required.92 As for the Legislative Assembly, this body would have a total of 32 members, but 25 of them would be popularly elected.93 These constitutional changes were accompanied by a significant extension of the electoral franchise.94

88

UKNA, CO 1030/80, Nicoll to Lyttelton, despatch 349, 11 Mar. 1954. Nicoll had replaced Gimson in early 1952. 89 Turnbull, Modern Singapore, p. 244. 90 UKNA, CO 1030/80, intel 102, 5 May 1954; Tan, “Constitutional History of Singapore”, p. 42. 91 UKNA, CAB 128/27, CC(54)29th mtg, 15 Apr. 1954; CAB 129/67, C(54)142, 14 Apr. 1954; CO 1030/80, CRO to various Commonwealth posts, savingram 51, 6 May 1954. 92 UKNA, CO 1030/80, intel 102, 5 May 1954; NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 2, Singapore Constitution, undated. 93 UKNA, CO 1030/80, intel 102, 5 May 1954; Clutterbuck, Conflict and Violence, p. 101. 94 UKNA, CO 1030/80, intel 102, 5 May 1954; NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 6, Singapore, Dec. 1957; NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 1, Singapore Elections, undated (circa Apr. 1955); Yeo, Political Development, p. 259.

42  COLD WAR AND DECOLONISATION

The new Constitution was tailored to favour the colony’s moderate forces, such as the SPP.95 Yet, if the British hoped that by introducing greater self-government and allowing for increased political participation they could defuse internal discontent and remain in control of the pace of constitutional progress, they had significantly underestimated the extent of local resentment towards colonial rule and were in for some rude awakening.96 Not only did the broadening of the electoral suffrage draw a greater number of Chinese to politics by significantly changing the social composition of the electoral roll,97 the fact that the Rendel Constitution handed over noticeable powers to locally elected politicians also generated keen popular interest in the island’s constitutional future.98 Unwittingly, if not altogether unexpectedly, these reforms facilitated the emergence of new political forces that would soon challenge colonial rule through the mobilisation of the local masses. While the British had hitherto been generally successful in setting the pace of political change in the colony, from 1955 they would be much less able to do so. As Chapter 4 will reveal, the political initiative, as a result of the 1955 election, would pass to a new generation of leaders who were less susceptible of accepting imperial tutelage.99 After a long lull, Singapore, like Malaya, was now about to enter a new phase of its political development. How Australia viewed, and responded to, the raising tempo of decolonisation in Malaya and Singapore is the focus of the following chapters. Initially it was Malaya, rather than Singapore, that received the greatest attention in Canberra.

95

James Low, “Kept in Position: The Labour Front-Alliance Government of Chief Minister David Marshall in Singapore, April 1955–June 1956”, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 35, 1 (2004): 44; Turnbull, Singapore, pp. 260–2. 96 Turnbull, Modern Singapore, p. 245; Long, Safe for Decolonization, pp. 23–4. 97 Yeo, Political Development, p. 259. 98 Ibid., p. 258. 99 Ibid., p. 270.

CHAPTER THREE

Malaya’s Road to Independence

G

iven the importance that both the Chifley and Menzies governments attached to a continuing British presence in Southeast Asia, developments in Malaya and Singapore inevitably drew close Australian attention. Australian interest in these two territories, of course, was not simply a consequence of the outbreak of a communist insurgency in Malaya and the threat that this posed to regional stability and Commonwealth defence. It was also aroused by questions concerning the two territories’ political future and, more specifically, their progress towards self-government and ultimately independence. Australian policymakers were familiar with British statements of policy regarding constitutional development in Malaya and Singapore. They were also aware of the powerful rise of nationalism across Asia and its long-term disruptive effects on European colonial rule in the region. A long External Affairs brief for Cabinet noted in December 1949 that although the movement towards independence had “proceeded more quickly in some countries than others”, nationalism was, nonetheless, a “widespread and genuine popular” phenomenon in Southeast Asia. DEA officials freely recognised that European rule there would not continue indefinitely. Nationalism was a force to be reckoned with and “even if it were desirable it would not be possible to halt [its] progress”. The DEA’s view was that “[o]ur proper and indeed only enlightened course is to understand its nature and meaning and to adjust our policies to take account of it”.1 Inevitably, as Massey told Chifley in December 1

NAA, A1838, 381/3/1/2 part 1, Australian Policy in South-East Asia: DEA brief for Cabinet, Dec. 1949. 43

44  COLD WAR AND DECOLONISATION

1948, “some day the question will arise of granting independence to Malaya”.2 Yet, in the years immediately following the Second World War, the question of transfer of power in Britain’s Southeast Asian territories did not seem to be an imminent one in Australian eyes. It was “rarely [a] fit [subject] for parliamentary debate, editorial comment or armchair rumination”.3 As frequent diplomatic reports and despatches originating from the Australian Commission for Malaya in Singapore clearly pointed out, neither Malaya nor Singapore was ready for independence. Even less so appeared to be North Borneo and Sarawak, which were invariably described as economically and socially backward as well as politically quiescent. As for Singapore, Massey noted how no real opposition to British rule existed in the colony at the turn of the 1940s.4 The majority of the population remained “politically backward” and its leaders “politically immature”.5 What is more, nationalist sentiment, while on the rise, remained, on the whole, subdued in an island where, owing to its multi-ethnic outlook, “personal and sectional interests”, “not national ones”, were bound to “be predominant”.6 Thus, while Massey favoured some degree of self-government for Singapore, he concluded that limited reforms were “perhaps as much it [Singapore] can afford to take at the present”.7 Of particular concern to the Commission was the prospect that, without continuing British presence, Singapore might one day be drawn closer to an increasingly assertive and “imperialist-minded” China.8 In a city where nearly 80 per cent of the population was ethnic Chinese, Chinese race patriotism was seen as a latent force ready to be exploited by a resurgent China keen on reasserting its influence across Southeast Asia. In the short term, with China mired in civil war and the British still in Singapore, the chance

2

NAA, A1838, 413/3/6/1/1, Massey to Chifley, MD 7/48, 8 Dec. 1948. Boyce, “Diplomacy in Malaya”, p. 67. 4 NAA, A1838, 411/1/2/1 part 1, Annual Report for 1949 in Malaya, Singapore and the Borneo Territories, 24 Feb. 1950. 5 NAA, A5494, 2292/2, Singapore to DEA, DD 15/48, 12 Feb. 1948. 6 NAA, A1838, 413/2/5/2 part 2, Massey to Burton, DD 13/49, undated; A5494, 2292/2, Singapore to DEA, DD 15/48, 12 Feb. 1948. 7 Ibid. 8 NAA, A4231, 1947/Singapore, Massey to Chifley, MD 2/47, 20 Oct. 1947. 3

MALAYA’S ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE  45

of this happening was insignificant.9 Yet, with the decisive advance (and eventually victory) of Mao’s communist forces in the second half of 1948, both the Commission in Singapore and External Affairs in Canberra became increasingly alarmed at the prospect of what Massey called China’s “Trojan-horse strategy” — that is, the attempt to expand communist influence in Southeast Asia through Beijing’s reliance on local overseas Chinese communities.10 As will become apparent in the following chapters, the risk of Singapore gravitating in China’s orbit would remain a recurrent concern for Australian (and Western) policymakers throughout the 1950s and early 1960s. The prospect of rapid advance towards full self-government appeared no brighter in Malaya. In early 1949 the Commission in Singapore could confidently report back to Canberra that “the conditions for [the] transfer of political power from the United Kingdom to a soundly based Nationalism movement in Malaya were as far away as ever”.11 Not only was nationalism of the kind displayed in India, Burma and Indonesia “almost wholly absent”, but the local population was described as “generally speaking, politically backward”.12 The Commission, of course, recognised that in arousing significant opposition among Malays, the Malayan Union scheme had awakened their political consciousness and forced them into “much greater political activity than hitherto”.13 Yet, even then, UMNO could hardly be regarded as a militant nationalist party with an uncompromising agenda for radical political change. As Massey pointed out to Evatt in 1947, UMNO was “more concerned with the position of the Malays in relation to other communities than with self-government and civil liberties”.14 More importantly, local opposition to the Malayan Union scheme, far from signalling a coalescing

9

Ibid. NAA, A4231, 1949/Singapore, Massey to Burton, DD 25/49, 16 Aug. 1949; A1838, 381/3/1/1 part 1, Australian External Policy: paper by Stuart, Jan. 1950; A621, S753, Australia and South-East Asia, 13 Nov. 1949. 11 NAA, A1838, 411/1/2/1 part 1, Annual Report for 1949 on Malaya, Singapore and the Borneo States, 24 Feb. 1950. 12 NAA, A1838, 413/3/6/1/1, memorandum: enclosure to MD 7/48, 8 Dec. 1948; A1838, 410/1/1 part 1, Australian Commissioner for Malaya to Evatt, CM Despatch 36/47, 14 July 1947. 13 NAA, A5954, 2292/2, Singapore to DEA, DD 11/48, 2 Feb. 1948. 14 NAA, A1838, 413/2/1/4, Massey to Evatt, CM despatch 21/47, 9 May 1947. 10

46  COLD WAR AND DECOLONISATION

of nationalist forces against British rule, appeared to be no more than a spontaneous and short-lived outpouring of discontent at London’s constitutional engineering and post-war Malaya’s depressed economic conditions. Massey did not deny that political developments in India, the Dutch East Indies, Burma and French Indo-China “also contribute[d] to the undercurrent of restlessness” among the peoples of Malaya. He, however, downplayed the role of nationalism in the Malayan Union controversy, emphasising, instead, the latter’s transitory character and its limited appeal to the vast majority of Malayans.15 That said, another important factor militated against Malaya’s rapid transition to full self-government. Like their British counterparts, Australian officials were aware that if the very reassertion of Malay communal identity in the aftermath of the ill-fated Malayan Union experiment could conceivably trigger growing demands for self-rule, it could also act as a brake on the territory’s constitutional progress. With the potential to fan the ugly flame of communalism, Malay nationalism could rock the shaky foundations of Malayan society and hence pose a significant obstacle to Malaya’s advance towards independence. Significant divisions beset Malaya’s colonial society in the years following the end of the war. The most notable one was, of course, the communal gulf dividing Malaya’s constituent ethnic groups — and, in particular, the Malays and Chinese. As Massey put it to Chifley in December 1948, “the cleavage” existing between the Malays and the Chinese was “such as to make any establishment of a plural state in Malaya almost impossible”.16 So concerned was Massey about the increasing antagonism between the two communities that he alerted Canberra to the fact that if ethnic animosities continued to grow, “the logical conclusion must be the appearance of a communal problem here, comparable perhaps with that of Palestine”.17 The implications of such a dire scenario were evident: Malaya could plunge into serious racial strife if it were granted self-government prematurely. It was to avoid Malaya’s descent into anarchy that, despite all their differences, both communities shared one common unifying trait — the reluctance to forsake the protection

15

Ibid. NAA, A1838, 413/3/6/1/1, Massey to Chifley, MD 7/48, 8 Dec. 1948. 17 NAA, A1838, 413/3/6/1/1, memorandum: enclosure to MD 7/48, 8 Dec. 1948. 16

MALAYA’S ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE  47

granted by the continuing presence of a European colonial power. As new Acting Commissioner for Malaya T.K. (“Tom”) Critchley remarked in 1952: the Malays fearing complete submergence by the more energetic Chinese have traditionally relied on British protection and this has checked any impatience to see the British go. For their part the majority of the Chinese have been content to live under a stable Government which has let them free to maintain as a community their dominance in commerce and industry and as individuals to seek a comparatively good standard of life.18

To put it differently, independence was a gamble that few on each side of the communal divide were prepared to take.19 In Australian eyes the communal question was therefore not only damningly complex but also seemingly “intractable”, as Critchley sought to impress upon Menzies’s Coalition government in October 1952.20 For the Acting Commissioner, the problem was not just “an absence of a common ground or otherwise, on which communities might meet”, but also the “serious lack of sufficiently influential community leaders capable of bridging the gap between races”.21 Hence it was no surprise that even in the aftermath of the MCA and UMNO’s initial attempts to form an electoral alliance, Canberra remained extremely sceptical about Malaya’s ability to become, one day, a functioning independent state. As late as 1952 an External Affairs paper continued to cast serious doubts about Malaya’s political future, arguing that “so long as the three main racial groups maintain their separate interests and loyalties … there can be little prospect for political development to a point where the British can transfer powers of self-government with confidence in the outcome”.22 To a certain extent, Australian pessimism reflected not only British

18

NAA, A1838, 3022/2/1 part 1, Critchley to DEA Secretary, memorandum 25/2/5/A, 25 July 1952. 19 Francis G. Carnell, “Communalism and Communism in Malaya”, Pacific Affairs 26, 2 (1953): 102. 20 NAA, A4231, 1952/Singapore, Critchley to Casey, MD 21/52, 30 Oct. 1952. 21 Ibid. 22 NAA, A1838, 3022/2/1 part 1, British Territories in South East Asia, 17 Mar. 1952.

48  COLD WAR AND DECOLONISATION

views on the capacity of Malayan society to pull together, but also the prevailing sentiment within Malaya itself. Malay and Chinese leaders appeared themselves doubtful about their country’s prospects as a viable nation, let alone a self-governing state. In 1949, the Commission reported that the MCA leader Tan Cheng Lock “[made] no secret of the fact that he regards the aim of turning the Chinese into Malayans as a chimera”.23 Likewise, at the other end of the communal divide, Tunku Abdul Rahman was initially dismissive of the very concept of “Malaya” and sought to “reassert the party’s identity as the vanguard of communal interest.24 Even Dato Onn bin Jaafar — who, from being the champion of the Malay revolt against the Malayan Union scheme and its supposedly permissive citizenship rules favouring the Chinese, had turned himself into a supporter of racial harmony in Malaya —  remained deeply suspicious of the Chinese and could only foresee a slow advance towards independence.25 Was there a way out of the communal impasse? In 1952, Critchley offered the view that only with the implementation of a truly national education policy based on the teaching of English, could Malaya achieve a smooth transition to dominion status. Critchley, however, gloomily admitted that, in practice, there was little sign of this happening as the colonial authorities were reluctant to upset sectional interests.26 Hence, doubts remained whether a peaceful transfer of power in Malaya could be accomplished in the foreseeable future. Four years earlier, faced with the same dilemma, Massey had advanced a controversial proposition. In a series of despatches and memoranda sent to Chifley and Evatt throughout the second half of 1948, he had suggested that, were its advice sought by London, Canberra should consider recommending “a greater discrimination … in favour of the Malays, with the ultimate goal of creating a Malay-governed peninsula”.27 While recognising that

23

NAA, A4231, 1950/Singapore, Annual Report on Malaya, Singapore and the Borneo Territories, 24 Feb. 1950. 24 Harper, Making of Malaya, p. 322. 25 NAA, A1838, 3026/2/1 part 1, interview with Onn, 23 July 1953. 26 NAA, A4231, 1952/Singapore, Critchley to Casey, MD 21/52, 30 Oct. 1952. 27 NAA, A6537, SEATS 3A, Massey to Chifley, 30 July 1948; A1838, 413/3/6/1/1, memorandum: enclosure to MD 7/48, 8 Dec. 1948; A4231, 1948/Singapore, Massey to Evatt, despatch 3/48, 15 May 1948.

MALAYA’S ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE  49

a “‘Malayan’ political solution” was “undoubtedly the most desirable one”, he regarded it as fundamentally unachievable.28 Hence, between the remaining two alternatives — a Chinese-controlled Malaya or a ruling Malay nation — he favoured the latter. Unfortunately for Massey, his advice fell on deaf ears. DEA Secretary John Burton dismissed it as “very silly opinion”. In any case, the Australian government had no intention of interfering with the conduct of British colonial policy in Southeast Asia.29 Massey’s pro-Malay bias no doubt reflected his profound pessimism about the prospect of achieving a “Malayan solution”, but also betrayed a grave concern about the ongoing communist insurgency in Malaya. Unlike his Labor masters, Massey had little doubt about the communist nature of the insurgency and was, as mentioned above, also mistrustful of the Chinese, their commitment to Malaya and their ability to make a contribution to defeating the insurgency.30 Hence, as he told Evatt in July 1948, Australian interests were “bound up … with the less advanced and less politically conscious Malays”.31 Yet, Massey’s solution had one major shortcoming: any attempt to favour the Malays over other ethnic groups would make it harder to lessen communal tensions and rally Chinese support for the British counter-insurgency campaign. Realising the futility of his position, Massey eventually veered away from it. In February 1950, in one of his last despatches to Canberra from Singapore, he advised the incoming Coalition government that while in Malaya Australia had to “observe a self-denying ordinance politically, because it is a dependency of another Commonwealth country and because it is our aim to maintain a United Kingdom power and prestige largely derived from the United Kingdom position in Malaya”, it was to be hoped that London “will in time be brought to share our preference for a Malayan solution to the Malayan problem”.32

28

NAA, A1838, 413/3/6/1/1, memorandum: enclosure to MD 7/48, 8 Dec. 1948. Burton’s handwritten annotation in NAA, A6537, SEATS 3A, Moodie to Burton, 22 Sept. 1948. 30 Edwards with Pemberton, Crises and Commitments, pp. 35–6. 31 Pamela Andre and Sue Langford, ed., Australia and the World: The Commonwealth, Asia and the Pacific. Documents 1948–49 (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1998), doc. 198. 32 NAA, A1838, 411/1/2/1 part 1, Annual Report for 1949 on Malaya, Singapore and the Borneo States, 24 Feb. 1950. 29

50  COLD WAR AND DECOLONISATION

Indeed, a Malayan solution was also London’s preferred option despite its concessions to Malay nationalism. Initiatives were certainly taken by the British authorities in Malaya to bridge the communal divide. In January 1949, for instance, MacDonald gathered Malay and Chinese leaders in Penang to consider means of easing communal tensions.33 British support for the creation of the MCA also reflected the colonial authorities” desire “to provide focus for loyal Chinese aspirations” as well as to dispel Malay perceptions of alleged Chinese disloyalty to Malaya.34 Attempts to review the rules on citizenship were also to be seen in this context.35 Yet, fostering harmonious relations between Malaya’s ethnic groups clearly required time and it was not without political costs, as the British recognised.36 In the early 1950s, a solution to Malaya’s communal problem remained, therefore, a distant proposition and it is no wonder that Menzies’s Coalition government still favoured the retention of a British presence in Malaya. Not unreasonably, Canberra viewed London’s role of arbiter between diverse communities, its efforts at nation-building as well as its attempts to maintain law and order in a fractured society, as the only realistic course of action in the context of Malaya’s internal divisions. No less distant also appeared the end of the Emergency, which had remained a constant Australian concern throughout the early 1950s. In October 1951, Critchley reported to Canberra that the situation on the ground was deteriorating.37 Despite an overall improvement in security situation in Malaya during 1952, progress was excruciatingly slow. It remained to be seen whether an increase in insurgents’ casualties, detentions and surrenders was an indication that the British were indeed beginning to break the back of the insurgency; or whether, instead, they were attributable to a change in communist tactics — that is, as Critchley put it, “a reduction in terrorist activity in favour of concentration on the subversion of the masses by more subtle means”.38

33

Stockwell, Malaya, vol. 1, p. lxviii and vol. 2, p. 88. Ibid., vol. 2, docs 171–2. 35 See for instance NAA, A1838, 3022/2/1 part 1, Critchley to DEA Secretary, 25/5/2/5/A, 25 July 1952. 36 Stockwell, Malaya, vol. 2, doc. 172. 37 NAA, A1838, TS383/5/2 part 1, Critchley to DEA Secretary, memorandum 842, 22 Oct. 1951. 38 NAA, A4231, 1952/Singapore, Critchley to Casey, MD 22/52, 30 Oct. 1952. 34

MALAYA’S ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE  51

Critchley was inclined to believe that the latter was the case, warning Canberra that the communist insurgents had no lack of recruits and that their number seemed to remain more or less constant at around 6,000.39 Progress or not, it was Critchley’s view that “[t]here can be no question of independence for Malaya until the Malayan Communist Party has been reduced to a nuisance value at worst”.40 As long as there was little sign of this happening, Australian caution towards Malaya’s constitutional advance appeared more than justified. With UMNO and the MCA able to tone down their communalism, and with the overall improvement in the security situation, the pace of political reform gathered momentum in Malaya. As mentioned in Chapter 2, in 1953 the Alliance began to clamour for self-government and the following year London agreed to hold Malaya’s first federal election in 1955. Yet, notwithstanding the Alliance’s show of strength, in mid-1954 Australian diplomats in Singapore still regarded Malaya’s transition to independence as likely to proceed at a relatively leisurely pace.41 In Canberra, External Affairs officials were not so sure. In October 1954, the DEA recognised that constitutional changes in both Malaya and Singapore were bound “to carry both territories a long way towards self rule”. “We can look forward to welcoming a fully independent Malayan nation into the Commonwealth, if not within the next year or so, at least within the near future”, DEA officials predicted.42 In January 1955, the department argued that: [c]onstitutional changes in 1955 will give both [Malaya and Singapore] virtual self-government over a wide range of internal affairs, and the introduction of elected majorities in both parliamentary assemblies will make the governing authority open to a much more direct form of popular pressure than hitherto — pressure which will be hard for it to ignore over any long period.43 39

Ibid. NAA, A1838, 3022/2/1 part 1, Critchley to DEA Secretary, memo 25/5/2/5/A, 25 July 1952. 41 NAA, A1838, 3026/2/1 part 1, Connor to DEA Secretary, memorandum 960, 13 July 1954. 42 NAA, A1838, 3022/11/51 part 1, Self-government for Malaya: United Kingdom Intentions, 27 Oct. 1954. 43 NAA, A1838, TS383/5/2 part 1, Malaya and Singapore: An Appreciation of the Present Situation and an Assessment of Likely Developments during 1955, 1 Feb. 1955. 40

52  COLD WAR AND DECOLONISATION

According to DEA officials, London could “hardly be expected greatly to accelerate the movement towards independence of a territory whose dollar earnings approach those of the United Kingdom itself and whose rubber alone is the biggest single dollar earner of the sterling area”. At the same time, however, they knew that the British would “not stand in the way of a genuine movement towards a viable independence, and important steps towards this target are projected for the current year”. Hence, in the months to come, the question as to whether local leaders would maintain an overall friendly attitude towards Western interests was to gain an increasing relevance for Australia. While arguing that Malayan political elites were increasingly conscious of Malaya’s dependence on a close and continuing relationship with Britain, External Affairs officials nonetheless recognised the existence of important factors threatening to pull Malaya away from a pro-Western orientation. Among these, they enumerated a growing anti-colonialist sentiment, the attractiveness of neutralism, the pro-Indonesian tendencies of some Malays and the reluctance of several Chinese to take a stand against communist China. On balance, the DEA admitted that there was no certainty that Malayan leaders would maintain a pro-West outlook although it was their hope that “enlightened self-interest will lead them in this direction”.44

The 1955 Election and the Speeding Up of Decolonisation in Malaya Events were to prove DEA officials right. Although their concerns about the future orientation of Malayan political elites remained largely unfounded, they were nonetheless correct in sensing that the pace of change in Malaya was gathering momentum. The catalyst for such change was provided by Malaya’s first federal election. Held on 27 July 1955, the election was to have a significant impact on territory’s advance towards self-government. It resulted in a landslide victory for the UMNO/MCA/MIC Alliance, which won 51 of the 52 elected seats in the new Federal Legislative Council.45 Taking into account the nominated (and therefore unelected) seats, the Alliance could muster the

44 45

Ibid. NAA, A1838, 682/2 part 21, Malaya, undated.

MALAYA’S ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE  53

support of 71 out 98 members of the new assembly.46 Although an Alliance victory was expected, the British authorities were surprised by the extent of it.47 So were the Australians.48 The appeal of the Alliance’s political platform centred on demands for a swift transfer of power (“Independence in Four Years”), the strength and efficiency of its party machine and the organisational weaknesses of its rivals, all of which contributed to its securing a strong popular mandate and enabled it to establish itself as the only credible nationalist force in Malaya.49 Moreover, the election of 15 Chinese and 2 Indian candidates by a largely Malay electorate made it possible for the Alliance to argue that it was genuinely committed to the principle of multiracialism.50 This aspect was not without significant political implications: while under no illusion that communal harmony had blossomed in Malaya, the British were bound to feel reasonably reassured by the Alliance’s responsible attitude to racial cooperation. One of the obstacles to Malaya’s swift transition to self-government was fast disappearing. The Tunku was appointed Malaya’s first Chief Minister. Hot on the heels of his electoral triumph and influenced by the vocally anticolonial attitude of Singapore’s political leaders (see Chapter 4), he announced that he would begin talks on independence with LennoxBoyd during the Colonial Secretary’s visit to Malaya and Singapore in August–September 1955. He made it clear that the Alliance had now the mandate to press for independence.51 In line with his electoral pledges, he now demanded self-government in two years and independence in four. By self-government, he meant the abolition of the High Commissioner’s reserve powers, control of the internal government including defence and a fully elected Legislative Assembly.52

46

NAA, A1838, 3020/10/1 part 1, Federation of Malaya and Singapore: Minister’s brief, undated. 47 NAA, A1838, 3026/2/1 part 1, Watt to Casey and Tange, cablegram 558, 19 July 1955. 48 NAA, A1838, 3026/2/1 part 1, Watt to DEA, cablegram 581, 28 July 1955. 49 Stockwell, Malaya, vol. 3, docs 361–2 and vol. 1, p. lxxv. 50 Ibid., vol. 1, pp. lxxiv–lxxv; NAA, A1838, 3026/2/1 part 1, Elections in the Federation, 4 Aug. 1955. 51 Stockwell, Malaya, vol. 3, doc. 359. 52 Straits Times, 30 July1955; NAA, A1838, TS383/5/2 part 1, Malaya, undated.

54  COLD WAR AND DECOLONISATION

Given the extent of the Alliance’s victory, all signs were that the British would not stand in the Tunku’s way. Indicative of London’s probable attitude was a CO memorandum that Lennox-Boyd discussed with his Cabinet colleagues on the eve of the election. In it, the Colonial Secretary advocated a flexible approach to Malayan demands for self-government. Assuming, quite correctly, that pressure for independence would mount after the election, Lennox-Boyd wanted to secure vital British interests before such pressure could get out of hand. What he had in mind was a relatively straightforward bargain: Britain would agree to a further devolution of power in return for the retention of its military bases on Malayan soil. He warned Cabinet that to leave matters unresolved until “Malay nationalism has gathered momentum or until the Emergency … is no longer a present threat to the security of Malaya” was to “prejudice the satisfactory outcome of negotiations in regard to British bases and the fundamental issue of responsibility for external and internal defence”. Cabinet endorsed Lennox-Boyd’s memorandum with the proviso that efforts should be made to safeguard British financial and commercial interests in the Federation, strengthen the latter’s links with Singapore, and keep Australia and other SEATO allies in the loop about Malaya’s constitutional progress.53 With this brief in hand, Lennox-Boyd travelled to Southeast Asia in August 1955. When he reached Kuala Lumpur, he found the Tunku in a conciliatory frame of mind. While determined to seek control over internal security, the Malayan leader conceded that, at the current stage of Malaya’s political evolution, it made sense “to leave all matters affecting external defence to Her Majesty’s Government”.54 Lennox-Boyd indicated that he was “not unsympathetic” to Malayan demands, but insisted that issues such as responsibility for external defence, internal security and finance should be settled first.55 He thus proposed that both the British and Malayan representatives should meet to discuss constitutional issues at a future conference to be held in London in early 1956.56 The conference would establish working parties to examine 53

UKNA, CAB 128/29, CC(55)25th mtg, 21 July 1955; CAB 129/76, CP(55)81, 20 July 1955. 54 UKNA, CO 1030/70, Rahman to Lennox-Boyd, 22 Aug. 1955. 55 UKNA, CO 1030/70, Lennox-Boyd to Rahman, 27 Aug. 1955. 56 UKNA, CO 1030/70, memcon, Lennox-Boyd and Malay Rulers (6 pm), 23 Aug. 1955; Lennox-Boyd to Rahman, 27 Aug. 1955.

MALAYA’S ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE  55

external defence, internal security and finance. A satisfactory agreement on these three issues would open the way for discussion on wider constitutional issues. Despite the Colonial Secretary’s caution, by the time he left Malaya in early September, one thing was clear: London would not obstruct Malaya’s transition to independence. As the head of the CO’s Southeast Asia Department, Angus MacKintosh, told the Australian High Commission in London in October 1955, the Alliance was clearly Britain’s “best bet” and to frustrate its aims was to risk bolstering communalism in Malaya. Moreover, if it wished to secure a satisfactory defence agreement, London had to be prepared “to agree unreservedly to go forward with preparations for a new constitution” and, ultimately, to grant independence. A defence agreement, he added, “may not prove easy to achieve in the best circumstances; it is likely to be impossible without the goodwill of the Malayans”.57 With Australia about to send ground forces to Malaya, London was nonetheless keen to reassure Canberra that British defence strategy in Southeast Asia was not out of sync with its colonial policy and that progress towards self-government would not be rushed. In early August 1955, the CRO instructed Acting High Commissioner Geofroy Tory to pass on to the DEA a statement by Anthony Eden, Churchill’s successor at 10 Downing Street, and a CO memorandum reiterating Britain’s commitment to a gradual devolution of power in Malaya.58 In reporting back to London, Tory reassured the CRO that Australian ministers “know of our determination not to grant self-government unless our long term defence position is guaranteed, and to talk the politicians into a sensible realisation of what is good for them”. He nonetheless conceded that “there may still be some apprehension lest mounting political pressure should in the event leave us no alternative to modifying this policy”.59 And yet, this was precisely the point. In the summer of 1955, all signs seemed to suggest that local politics would significantly affect the pace of change. Aware of the problem, in late August the DEA instructed the Commission in Singapore to approach the visiting Lennox-Boyd. The aim was to impress upon him Australia’s 57

NAA, A1209, 1957/4226, London to DEA, savingram 200, 22 Nov. 1955. NAA, A1838, 3022/10/4 part 3, memcon, Plimsoll and Tory, 3 Aug. 1955; A1838, 3022/11/51 part 1, UK Aims in Malaya, and Means by which they might Be Achieved, with Special Reference to Defence, undated. 59 UKNA, DO 35/6058, Tory to Crombie, 8 Aug. 1955. 58

56  COLD WAR AND DECOLONISATION

“special position” in Malaya in the light of its decision to station forces in that country and to remind him of the need for Britain to keep Australian interests in mind in current and future discussions with the Alliance and the Malay rulers.60 These concerns notwithstanding, both the Singapore Commission and the DEA regarded the Alliance leadership favourably. For a while now, Australian officials in Singapore had had confirmation of the essentially moderate character of the Alliance’s nationalism. In reporting to Canberra on the Alliance’s attitude to the serious rioting that had engulfed Singapore in May 1955 (see Chapter 4), the Commission had noticed a sense of apprehension in UMNO and MCA ranks over the growing influence of radical and “Chinese chauvinist” elements within the colony’s trade unions, middle schools and PAP, and the deleterious impact that such radical brand of nationalism could have on race relations in Malaya should it spill over to the Federation.61 Like their British counterparts, Australian ministers and officials gradually came to view the Tunku as a moderate nationalist they could trust. Although all official interactions with local leaders were somewhat restricted by the fact that London retained the sole control over Malaya’s external relations, contacts between the Tunku and the Australian Commission intensified during the second half of 1955 and were destined to grow even further in the months and years to come. In October 1955, Canberra decided to open up a new diplomatic mission in Kuala Lumpur in recognition of Malaya’s increasing political significance. The man appointed to become Australia’s first Commissioner to Malaya was Critchley, by now an old “Malaya hand”. Critchley, who would take up his post in December 1955, was to remain in Kuala Lumpur until 1965, during which time he would forge a close relationship with Tunku Abdul Rahman and other Alliance leaders. As a result of these increasing contacts, the Australian government was able to take the measure of the Tunku. When he met him in late October 1955, Casey described the new Chief Minister as an “intelligent” man — in fact, a “much more considerable individual” than he had initially anticipated — 

60

NAA, A816, 19/321/30, Plimsoll to Singapore, memorandum 1285, 24 Aug. 1955. 61 NAA, A1838, 3026/2/1 part 1, Hamilton to DEA, 26 May 1955.

MALAYA’S ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE  57

“with a political sense” and “some powers of leadership”.62 Casey was said to be “impressed by his personality and political astuteness”.63 In keeping with these initial reactions, the Australian approach remained cautiously forthcoming. A departmental note written in early October was revealing in this respect. “In view of the strong desire for selfgovernment in Malaya”, the note read, Australia “should leave no doubt that this continues to be our policy. In private discussions with Malayan leaders and with the United Kingdom officials it may, however, be necessary to point out the difficulties which could arise from too a rapid advance [sic] to self-government”.64 For their part, the British were certainly awake to the risks inherent in such rapid transition. Indeed, the need to proceed cautiously was again impressed upon them by the Tunku’s decision on 8 September to offer an amnesty to those communist insurgents willing to surrender. The MCP had initially asked for talks in mid-1955, but the British colonial authorities had rebuffed its overtures with the support of the main Malayan parties.65 The idea of offering an amnesty as a means of ending the Emergency, however, had remained an important plank of the Alliance’s electoral platform.66 In fact, according to Hack, it was one of the reasons for the “popular enthusiasm which swept it [the Alliance] to victory.67 “The policy”, Hack noted, “had touched a chord in a people tired of endless curfews and restrictions”.68 The MCP immediately seized this opportunity to propose new talks and the Tunku agreed to meet communist leader Chin Peng.69 The Eden Government (1955–57) followed developments in Malaya with concern and sought to dissuade him from this course of action.70 London feared that, in an effort to secure early independence by bringing the Emergency to a

62

NAA, A816, 19/321/30, Casey to Menzies and Tange, cable 829, 25 Oct. 1955. NAA, A1838, TS383/5/2 part 1, memcon, Tange and Lt General Bourne, 24 Oct. 1955. 64 NAA, A1838, 3020/10/1 part 1, Upton to Minister, 1 Nov. 1955. 65 NAA, A1838, 302/10/4 part 3, Watt to Casey and Tange, cablegram 502, 24 June 1950; Singapore to DEA, cablegram 504, 24 June 1955. 66 Stockwell, Malaya, vol. 3, doc. 350; Hack, Defence and Decolonisation, p. 222. 67 Ibid. 68 Ibid. 69 Ibid. 70 Stockwell, Malaya, vol. 3, docs 373–82. 63

58  COLD WAR AND DECOLONISATION

rapid conclusion (the British had hitherto made the grant of independence conditional upon a positive ending to the Emergency), he would make dangerous concessions to the MCP.71 To clear the ground from any misunderstanding and keep the Alliance onside, London instructed MacGillivray to tell the Tunku that it no longer regarded the continuance of the Emergency as an obstacle to self-government.72 In the end, British concerns turned out to be overblown. On 28–29 December the Tunku, accompanied by David Marshall, met Chin Peng at Baling in North Malaya, but the meeting produced no result, with the MCP leader returning to the jungle to fight another day.73 Impressed by the Tunku’s firmness in dealing with Chin Peng, the British were now persuaded that they could trust the Malayan Chief Minister. As Harper has correctly observed, Baling not only “strengthened the Alliance’s hand in constitutional negotiations, but “greatly eased Tunku Abdul Rahman into the role of statesman”.74

Australian Policy in the Lead-up to the London Constitutional Conference on Malaya With his prestige strengthened, the Tunku left for London on New Year’s Day 1956. His delegation consisted of four Alliance members (including himself) and four representatives of the rulers.75 Although the Alliance Council had agreed on 31 December to call for a faster transfer of power — “independence by 31st August [1957] if possible” —  the Alliance government had not yet devised a clear negotiating strategy ahead of the Anglo-Malayan constitutional conference.76 Preoccupied

71

For these concerns see UKNA, PREM 11/1307, Scott to Eden, telegram 140, 23 Oct. 1955. 72 NAA, A5954, 1402/3, Recent Developments in Malaya and Singapore, 11 Jan. 1956. 73 Hack, Defence and Decolonisation, p. 222. On the Baling talks see Stockwell, Malaya, vol. 3, docs 381–2, 384–6 and 391. 74 Harper, Making of Malaya, p. 347. 75 Stockwell, Malaya, vol. 3, p. 226. 76 UKNA, CO 1030/70, MacGillivray to Martin, telegram 15, 9 Jan. 1956; NAA, A5954, 1402/3, London to DEA, cablegram 66, 10 Jan. 1956; NARA, RG 59, CDF, box 4027, 797.00/11-2557, Kuala Lumpur to State Department, despatch 185, 25 Nov. 1957.

MALAYA’S ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE  59

with their first budget and with the Baling talks, the Tunku and his ministers had had neither the time to formulate their demands in detail nor to work out the implications of such claims.77 They would do so aboard of the MV Asia on their way to Karachi. One thing, however, was clear from the outset: as the Tunku had already warned London (and Canberra), unless the British were willing to compromise, he would walk out of the London talks and resign thereafter.78 This was a warning that the British could hardly ignore for, if the Alliance stood down, they would be faced with the unenviable prospect of resorting to direct rule.79 With the Malayan delegation on high seas, the British government began to finalise its approach to the forthcoming conference. Although Lennox-Boyd and the CO were somewhat uncertain as to the nature of the Malayan delegation’s opening bid, they remained convinced that the government should not be obstructive.80 In Kuala Lumpur, MacGillivray concurred with this approach, adding that were its demands not met, the Alliance might not offer full collaboration in the continuing campaign against the communist insurgents.81 Lennox Boyd’s plan, therefore, was to propose a two-stage timetable: full internal self-government by 31 August 1957 followed by independence by 1959. Until then, external affairs and external defence would remain London’s responsibility. As he told the Cabinet’s Colonial Policy Committee (CPC), this would, among other things, “allow time for the careful preparation of a defence agreement designed to have effect from the date of full self-government”. At the forthcoming conference, he would confine himself to securing a preliminary understanding whereby both sides would commit to negotiating a future defence agreement “providing for our right to maintain the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve in the Federation, for the facilities which that will require and

77

UKNA, CO 1030/75, MacGillivray to MacKintosh, 29 Dec. 1955; NAA, A5954, 1402/3, London to DEA, cablegram 67, 11 Jan. 1956. 78 NAA, A816, 14/301/682, Critchley to DEA, cablegram 941, 31 Dec. 1955. 79 On this point see NAA, A1838, TS383/5/2 part 2, Critchley to Tange, memorandum KL 89/56, 26 Jan. 1956. 80 UKNA, CAB 129/79, CP(56)12, 14 Jan. 1956; PREM 11/1320, Lennox-Boyd to Eden, PM(56)3, 5 Jan 1956; Stockwell, Malaya, vol. 3, doc. 392. 81 UKNA, CO 1030/70, MacGillivray to Lennox-Boyd, telegram 15, 9 Jan. 1956.

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for arrangements ensuring that our forces will be able to function effectively in the event of war”. These arrangements, he added, ought to “allow for the participation, both in force and in planning, of Australia and New Zealand”.82 On 12 January, chaired by Eden, the CPC broadly endorsed Lennox-Boyd’s approach.83 Reassured by the Tunku’s moderate outlook, senior British ministers were prepared to go a long way in accommodating his requests. On meeting the Malayan delegation before the conference, John Martin of the CO made British intentions clear. To Tun Abdul Razak, who had asked him whether the British government was “going to make things difficult for us”, Martin replied: “No, we are going to give it to you on a golden platter”.84 With the British stand on Malaya’s constitutional advance shifting markedly, the new Menzies Cabinet met on 16 January 1956 to assess the potential repercussions of such a shift on Australian regional interests. Before them, ministers had a submission prepared for Casey by his department. In it, Casey agreed with the Defence Committee’s view that any Anglo-Malayan defence agreement should allow for the retention of Commonwealth troops on Malayan soil and their reinforcement in the event of a war.85 He also accepted the DC’s advice that it would not be necessary for Australia to be associated formally with an AngloMalayan defence agreement. By not being a formal party to such an agreement, Australia “would enjoy greater freedom of action”. “This”, Casey pointed out, “would not simply apply to the defence field, but also to colonial issues per se”. Since self-government was destined to be “the centre of the fiercest controversy between the United Kingdom and the local people”, Australian interests would be best served if Australia “were in an independent position able to express views to both parties on what we think of policies at any particular time”. This, of course, meant that the government should keep a close eye on British policy in Malaya and Singapore, and register its views with the British authorities. Casey argued that Australia had the right to do so “not merely by

82

UKNA, CAB 129/79, CP(56)12, 14 Jan. 1956. UKNA, CAB 129/79, CP(56)12, 14 Jan. 1956; Stockwell, Malaya, vol. 3, doc. 394. 84 Razak and Martin cited in ibid., doc. 392. 85 NAA, A4926, 1, Cabinet submission 2, 11 Jan. 1956. For the DC’s views see NAA, A5954, 1402/3, Minute by the Defence Committee at a meeting held on 15 Dec. 1955. 83

MALAYA’S ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE  61

geography, but by the fact that the United Kingdom has asked Australia to assume in war the major role for the defence of Malaya and Singapore”. Casey acknowledged the fact that “there is considerable evidence that the Foreign Office and the Commissioner-General in South-East Asia want to be forthcoming but that the Colonial Office retains its traditional inhibitions about sharing any of the responsibilities of the United Kingdom while fighting a retreat against demands for selfgovernment”.86 Given the fact that he had been briefed by Australian Commissioner in Singapore Alan Watt, who had frequently complained about the allegedly reticent attitude of CO officials in Singapore and Malaya, Casey’s criticism of the CO was not altogether surprising. Nor was it entirely warranted, given Lennox-Boyd’s proposals for Malaya’s faster transition to independence.87 In line with departmental views, Casey argued that while the question of a continuing Commonwealth presence in Malaya remained of paramount importance, Australia should refrain from looking at the Malayan question from a purely defence angle. Canberra should not merely consider how best to secure the legal right for Australian (and Commonwealth) forces to move in and out of Malaya once the latter had obtained independence, but should also weigh up a number of wider political considerations. His concern was that “policies applied in the time remaining before [Malaya and Singapore] become selfgoverning [should be] such as to produce a friendly, stable society willing to cooperate with Australia and other countries in defending the area against aggression”.88 As he put it, “the defence significance to Australia of Malaya (and of Singapore, too) will be determined by considerations more fundamental than any defence agreement which the present leaders and hereditary rulers may agree to in 1956”. The tempo of nationalism was mounting rapidly in Malaya and “there may now be no alternative but to take the risks involved in making the concessions required by nationalist feeling”. Without saying it explicitly, Casey doubted that a detailed defence agreement should be a precondition for further constitutional advance. In his view, no defence agreement would be “worth much unless it is generally acceptable to the

86

NAA, A4926, 1, Cabinet submission 2, 11 Jan. 1956. On Watt’s views on the CO see for instance NAA, A1209, 1955/4226, A.S. Brown: Note for the File, 6 Jan. 1956. 88 NAA, A4926, 1, Cabinet submission 2, 11 Jan. 1956. 87

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present Malayan leaders, and make sufficient concession to nationalist sentiment to give them room for manoeuvre with public opinion”.89 He, therefore, sought Cabinet approval for the text of a telegram to be sent to Eden under Menzies’s name. The telegram was quite indicative of the DEA’s attitude. The draft telegram spoke of the need to make every effort to secure “workable and durable arrangements”, but also pointed out that the Federation’s constitutional advance could not be arrested and that common Anglo-Australian interests would “be best served by a generous and sympathetic approach to Malayan nationalist aspiration”. In practice, the draft telegram stated that it could “prove less risky to accept an agreement covering minimum essential requirements than to insist on a comprehensive agreement at a stage when Malayan leaders still lack [a] full understanding of defence realities”.90 Unfortunately for Casey, his colleagues were not prepared to go that far.91 Casey, whose influence within the party was said to be in decline and who lacked a close rapport with Menzies and was generally an unimpressive performer in Cabinet, was invited to make significant changes to his original draft telegram.92 Australian senior ministers found the DEA’s line too soft on defence and made it clear that independence should be made conditional upon the successful conclusion of a defence agreement which would “give the British Commonwealth some right to be in Malaya for the purpose of defence from external aggression”.93 When Cabinet resumed, ministers approved a stiffer text, stating that the Australian government “would think it most undesirable to discuss with the Malayan leaders a firm or even possible time for the assumption of full sovereignty and independence before efforts have

89

Ibid. NAA, A4926, 1, Draft Telegram Recommended in Cabinet submission 2, Menzies to Eden attached to ibid. 91 NAA, A4926, 1, Cabinet decision 4, 16 Jan. 1956. 92 NAA, A4926, 1, File Note to Cabinet decision 4, 23 Jan. 1956. For the final draft see Menzies to Eden, draft attached to Cabinet decision 4, 16 Jan. 1956. On Casey see W.J. Hudson, “Richard Gavin Gardiner Casey”, Australian Dictionary of Biography [henceforth ADB] (Canberra: Australian National University), online edn, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/casey-richard-gavin-gardiner-9706/text17135 [accessed 5 June 2010]; see also A.W. Martin, Robert Menzies: A Life, vol. 2, 1944–1978 (Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1999), p. 302. 93 NAA, A4926, 1, File Note to Decision no. 4, 23 Jan. 1956. 90

MALAYA’S ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE  63

been made to conclude an effective defence agreement”.94 According to Cabinet, the defence of Malaya was not only essential to the defence of Australia, but also important to non-communist Asian nations. In talks with the Malayan leaders, therefore, the British government should seek to obtain a contractual right to station Commonwealth forces in Malaya and Singapore and to reinforce them in response to communist aggression or in the event of a war. The British timetable — full internal self-government by 31 August 1957 and full independence in August 1959 — “profoundly” affected the Australian defence position. This was the reason Australia was “naturally” and “especially interested in the prospect, rate, and conditions of the advance of the two territories to self-government”. The government wanted to be kept in close touch and “might seek closer association at a later state” with Anglo-Malayan talks and future agreements. Cabinet also encouraged London “to take early steps to give Malayan and Singaporean leaders an appreciation of the potentialities of communist aggression in South East Asia and the risk they will run if they turn their backs on collective security arrangements”. Senior ministers hoped that Malaya would soon join SEATO, but were troubled by “appreciable currents in Malaya running counter to future Malayan association with S.E.A.T.O”. They were also concerned that Tunku Abdul “Rahman and his [m]inisters have at no stage unequivocally declared themselves in favour of the strategic reserve role which is the primary reason for Australian troops being in Malaya”.95 Sent to Eden on 17 January 1956, Menzies’s message did not elicit an immediate reply from the British Prime Minister. When it finally came on 23 January, it was hardly the kind of response that the Australian Cabinet had wished to receive.96 While sounding firm on the question of Singapore’s self-government (see Chapter 4), Eden was less reassuring on the nature of a Malayan settlement. In principle, he agreed with Menzies on the merit of making a successful negotiation of an Anglo-Malayan defence agreement “a necessary precondition to any discussion of the timing for the grant of self-government”. In practice,

94

NAA, A4926, 1, Menzies to Eden, draft attached to Cabinet decision 4, 16 Jan. 1956. 95 Ibid. 96 NAA, A816, 14/301/682, Menzies to Eden, cablegram 97, 17 Jan. 1956.

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though, this was not what his government had in mind. As the implementation of any defence agreement rested, ultimately, upon Malayan goodwill, Eden argued that Commonwealth interests could be best achieved by an independent Malaya “ungrudgingly cooperating with us”. Without saying so explicitly, he indicated that London would be prepared to meet Malaya’s demands for a faster transition to independence provided that the Malayans accepted a broad formula recognising, in principle, Britain’s right to maintain forces (including the CSR) and facilities in Malaya in fulfilment of its Commonwealth and international obligations. If Britain, Eden argued, was able to secure “a firm commitment of this kind”, “we shall have achieved all that is essential at this stage”. This, he concluded, would give the British government plenty of time to negotiate a detailed defence agreement between now and the date of independence. To mollify Australian sensibilities, he told Menzies that the omens for a broad understanding on defence were good. Not only was the Malayan delegation inclined to meet Britain’s defence requirements but they had, in fact, taken the initiative in proposing a defence agreement.97 Eden’s message, however, was unlikely to reassure Canberra. Only three days before this was despatched, the DEA had sought to reiterate Australian concerns strongly by urging its External Affairs Senior Officer in London to impress upon British officials the need not to “discuss a firm or even possible time for assumption of full sovereignty and independence until efforts have been made to conclude an effective defence agreement”.98

The London Constitutional Conference and its Outcome The London Constitutional Conference opened on 18 January and lasted until 6 February 1956. Conducted in an atmosphere of goodwill, the conference achieved significant results. Its principal outcomes were an agreement to make 31 August 1957 the “target” date for independence and a formula for the maintenance of a British (and Commonwealth) military presence in Malaya. On the issue of self-government, the two delegations agreed to set up a constitutional commission with

97

UKNA, PREM 11/1307, Eden to Menzies, 23 Jan. 1955; see also Benvenuti, “Marshall Experiment”, pp. 266–7. 98 NAA, A816, 14/301/682, DEA to London, cablegram 133, 20 Jan. 1956.

MALAYA’S ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE  65

the brief to draft a new constitution for an independent Malaya. With members drawn from various Commonwealth nations (namely Britain, Australia, Canada, India and Pakistan), the commission was expected to begin work in June 1956 under the chairmanship of Lord Reid.99 The grant of independence was made conditional on the commission having accomplished its task. Although the expectation was that it would achieve this by August 1957, both delegations were privately sceptical that the commission would be able to do so on time, thus making unavoidable the postponing of independence beyond the target date.100 An agreement was also reached on the interim period during which Britain was expected to retain full control of external affairs and external defence while internal security would become a Malayan prerogative.101 As for the complex defence question, during this transitional period the British agreed to consult with the Malayan government on defence matters and, to this end, an essentially consultative body, the External Defence Council, would be set up and this would include Malayan ministers as well. More importantly, both delegations agreed to establish a working party under the chairmanship of Robert Scott, the Commissioner-General for Southeast Asia, with the aim of drafting a formal defence treaty between two countries. Australia and New Zealand would be invited to send observers.102 The terms of reference explicitly referred to Britain’s right to maintain, on Malayan soil, those forces (including the CSR) and facilities required for “the fulfilment of Commonwealth and international obligations” as well as of its undertaking “to assist [the Malayan government] in the external defence of its territory”.103 The Australian government judged the outcome of the constitutional conference in London with mixed feelings. In a submission to

99

UKNA, CAB 129/79, CP(56)47, 21 Feb. 1956. Ibid. 101 However, as long as the Emergency went on, the operational command of the police and the Federation’s armed forces would remain with the (British) Director of Operations. 102 Scott had replaced MacDonald in Oct. 1955. 103 UKNA, CAB 129/79, CP(56)47, 21 Feb. 1956. The British government approved the Conference’s conclusion on 22 February 1956. UKNA, CAB 128/30, CM(56)16th mtg, 22 Feb. 1956. 100

66  COLD WAR AND DECOLONISATION

Cabinet, Casey noted that Malayan independence was now “considerably closer than we would have desired — or than the United Kingdom previously led us to believe”. In his view, Australia had no other option but to accept its outcome, “which largely presents us with an accomplished fact”. As for the defence aspects, Casey argued that there was nonetheless some “ground for satisfaction”: after all, the Malayan delegation had endorsed a broad formula for Commonwealth defence cooperation, which included a specific reference to the CSR. Yet, as he warned his colleagues, until a firm defence arrangement covering Commonwealth defence interests had been concluded and fully accepted by the future Malayan Parliament, Australia needed to remain vigilant about developments in Malaya. To worry Casey were some neutralist rumblings with the ruling Alliance. In the Tunku’s ministerial team there was a group who clearly favoured neutralism and opposed Malaya’s involvement in Western defence arrangements.104 Casey was concerned that the influence of this group could grow and that, upon his return to Malaya, the Tunku would be under pressure to adopt a less positive attitude towards defence cooperation with the Commonwealth. Hence, Casey advised his colleagues that the government would need to keep in close touch with the activities of the Anglo-Malayan working party on defence to make sure that Australia’s interests would be adequately safeguarded.105 The Australian attitude was nicely summed up by Tange in a meeting with New Zealand Prime Minister Sidney Holland. In explaining Cabinet policy, he told Holland that: We, for our part, had had misgivings about the United Kingdom intention to give the Malayans a date for self-government without first getting a defence agreement. We felt in Australia that the United Kingdom had the possibility of doing some bargaining and would have been free to let off the brakes if heat began to generate.106

As it turned out, the negotiation of a defence agreement was harder to achieve than the British had initially envisaged. Meetings of the AngloMalayan Working Party on defence, with Scott in the chair and the 104

NAA, A1838, TS383/5/2 part 2, Malayan Constitutional Development, 6 Feb. 1956; NAA, A1209, 1957/5828, Malaya, undated. 105 NAA, A1838, TS383/5/2 part 2, Malayan Constitutional Development, 6 Feb. 1956. 106 NAA, A5954, 1403/3, memcon, Tange and Holland, 6 Feb. 1956.

MALAYA’S ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE  67

Tunku leading the Malayan delegation, would drag on until March 1957.107 The final agreement, with which Australia and New Zealand eventually associated themselves, would only be signed in October 1957.108 As Australian officials had anticipated in the aftermath of the London conference, the Tunku, for all his goodwill and pro-Western orientation, would find it hard to resist domestic criticism and neutralist pressure against the proposed Anglo-Malayan defence agreement (AMDA).109 As Hack has noted, he and his closest associates could not afford to give “the impression of exchanging political for military dependency”.110 As a result, during 1956, the Alliance government moved to introduce various caveats and restrictions to the draft treaty to secure its acceptance within Malaya.111 More specifically, it sought to restrict Britain’s freedom of action over the use of its military facilities on Malayan soil and to shun any commitment that might, one day, force Malaya to assist Britain in military operations across Southeast Asia.112 Moreover, in June 1956, the Tunku declared that not only would Malaya stay out of SEATO, but also that British troops deployed in the country could not be used in SEATO operations. Significantly, he also announced that Malaya would adhere to the spirit of Bandung, where, a year earlier, 29 Afro-Asian states had condemned bloc politics and embraced peaceful coexistence.113 In the end, the final treaty produced a mutually satisfactory compromise between London’s desire to have unrestricted access to its bases and Kuala Lumpur’s resolve to have its sovereign rights safeguarded. While AMDA recognised Britain’s right to use its bases for the “fulfilment of Commonwealth and international

107

Hack, Defence and Decolonisation, p. 227. Australia and New Zealand associated themselves with AMDA in Apr. 1959. NAA, A1838, 3027/10/10/3, Heydon to Acting Minister, 6 Nov. 1959. 108 Ibid. 109 For Australian misgivings about the Tunku’s ability to deliver on defence in the light of domestic neutralist sentiment see for instance NAA, A5954, 1403/3, Watt to DEA, cablegram 96, 6 Feb. 1956; Tange to Shedden, 9 Mar. 1956. 110 Hack, Defence and Decolonisation, p. 227. 111 NAA, A1838, 682/21 part 5, DEA to London, cablegram 1111, 29 May 1956; A4926, vol. 10, Cabinet submission 226, 20 June 1956; A1838, TS682/21, part 6, McIntyre to Tange, memo 1217, 27 Dec. 1956. 112 NAA, A4926, vol. 10, Cabinet submission 226, 20 June 1956; Hack, Defence and Decolonisation, p. 227. 113 Ibid.

68  COLD WAR AND DECOLONISATION

obligations”, London was nonetheless required to secure Kuala Lumpur’s consent before committing British forces in the Federation to military operations outside Malaya.114 For the Menzies government, Malayan demands were an unwelcome complication for, if accepted, they would limit both Britain’s and Australia’s capacity to send reinforcements to Southeast Asia and to be effective participants in SEATO.115 This is why, throughout 1956, Canberra would repeatedly express its dissatisfaction with the terms emerging from the workings of the Anglo-Malayan Working Party on defence.116 And this is why it also hinted at the possibility of reappraising Australia’s defence role in Malaya and Singapore.117 In the end, nothing came of it. The political capital invested in the Malayan commitment worked against disengagement.118 In June 1957, Cabinet agreed to keep Australian forces in Malaya even after the latter’s forthcoming independence.119 To be sure, the Tunku’s unambiguous proWestern orientation and his steady leadership went some way towards assuaging Australian concerns about the future of a Commonwealth military presence in Malaya.120 In an official visit to Australia in late 1959, the Tunku spoke warmly of Australia’s military commitment to Malayan security — a contribution, he said, that was “a source of comfort to us”.121 As Edwards and Pemberton have remarked, the Tunku’s pro-Commonwealth and anti-communist comments “clearly delighted his hosts, even though he confirmed that Malaya would not join SEATO, because of popular opinion had been influenced by the opposition of India and Indonesia to the treaty organisation”.122

114

NAA, A1838, 3027/10/10/3, Heydon to Acting Minister, 6 Nov. 1959. See for instance NAA, A4926, vol. 10, Cabinet submission 226, 20 June 1956. 116 See for instance NAA, A1838, TS383/5/2 part 2, memcon, Casey and McIntosh, 22 May 1956. 117 Hack, Defence and Decolonisation, p. 246. 118 Ibid. 119 NAA, A4926, vol. 28, Cabinet decision 811, 11 June 1956. Cabinet did, however, say that the position of Australian forces in Malaya would be kept under review. 120 NAA, A1838, 3027/10/10/3, Notes on the Federation of Malaya, undated. 121 The Tunku cited in NAA, A1838, 3027/10/10/3, Australian Broadcasting Commission. Guest of Honour: Tunku Abdul Rahman, 8 Nov. 1959; Edwards with Pemberton, Crises and Commitments, p. 189. 122 Ibid., p. 190. 115

MALAYA’S ROAD TO INDEPENDENCE  69

Yet, in 1956, for all the uncertainty surrounding Malaya’s cooperation, the future of an effective Commonwealth military presence in Southeast Asia did not exclusively hinge on the course of Malaya’s domestic politics and the attitude that the-soon-to-be-independent Federation was to adopt vis-à-vis a Western military presence on its soil.123 It went well beyond that and, as the next chapters will make plain, it came to be closely, and perilously, entangled with internal political developments in Singapore. As the Australian government debated the role of Malaya in Western security arrangements, the political future of Singapore and the pace of the latter’s progress towards self-government assumed growing strategic and political prominence. This was unavoidable. In contrast to Malaya’s gentlemanly and moderate upper-class politics, the nationalist movement in Singapore was more radical, more vociferous, more volatile and potentially hostile to the West’s regional interests in Southeast Asia, threatening to undermine Britain’s regional role and Commonwealth/SEATO security arrangements. The island’s political and strategic significance was not lost on ministers and officials in Canberra. As the Australian DC put it with unmistakable clarity in March 1956, the bases in Malaya were only “subsidiary to the main bases in Singapore”, whose availability was “essential to the successful defence of Malaya”. While the retention of Singapore “would continue to be of great strategic importance in the overall defence of South East Asia” even in the event of Malaya going neutralist, the converse was hardly the case. The DC’s view was that “no naval base comparable with Singapore could be established in Malaya and its loss would, therefore, be irreparable”.124 Once again, therefore, Australian attitudes towards decolonisation in British Southeast Asia were going to be guided by strong (if understandable) defence concerns. And, once again, the Australian government wondered whether British colonial policy was not perhaps “outstripping” London’s regional defence strategy.125 The link between decolonisation and defence could not have been stronger. 123

For Australian concerns over Malaya’s drift to neutralism see for instance NAA, A1838, TS682/21 part 6, Critchley to Tange, memo 424/56, 26 Apr. 1956. 124 NAA, A1838, TS383/5/2 part 2, Future Defence Arrangements with Malaya and Singapore: Report by the Defence Committee, 20 Mar. 1956; see also Benvenuti, “Marshall Experiment”, p. 270. 125 UKNA, DO 35/6036, War Plan in Malaya and Singapore (Australian and New Zealand Doubts), Annex to JP(55)168(A), undated.

CHAPTER FOUR

The Singapore Conundrum (April 1955–May 1956)

I

f the Alliance’s triumph at the July poll handed the British a tough challenge, Singapore’s election in the spring of 1955 confronted them with an even tougher one. Like in Malaya, experimentation with colonial democracy in Singapore upset their plans for a leisurely transfer of power and forced them to consider a faster timetable. Yet, unlike Malaya’s, Singapore’s election raised two major issues — ones that made the island’s constitutional advance fraught with greater difficulties. The first was the sudden demise of the moderate local forces and the negative impact that such change was likely to have on Britain’s ability to retain influence in Singapore. The second was the surge in electoral support for those left-wing and even radical political forces that called for a more or less rapid end to British rule. Of particular concern to the British and their closest regional allies was the apparently increasing influence of communism within Singapore’s radical Left and the threat that such influence posed to London’s plans for the colony’s future and Britain’s regional role. In Singapore, in brief, the stage was set for a troubled transition to self-government. How to maintain Singapore firmly anchored to the West under these circumstances became one of the major issues in British and Australian foreign policies in Southeast Asia between the mid-1950s and the early 1960s. This chapter thus charts Australian (and British) responses to the acceleration of decolonisation in Singapore and the seemingly intractable problems that this threw up for Western policy in Southeast Asia. 70

THE SINGAPORE CONUNDRUM  71

The April 1955 Election and its Implications Held on 2 April 1955, the Singapore election came as a rude awakening to British policymakers in both London and the colony. Against all their expectations, the SPP was nearly decimated, winning only four of the 25 elected seats in a 32-seat-strong Legislative Assembly.1 Its leader, C.C. Tan, was embarrassingly defeated in his constituency of Cairnhill.2 Perceived as being too close to the colonial regime, the Progressives paid dearly for their gradualism and for a damaging split that had occurred in the moderate camp just before the election, following the establishment of a new Democratic Party (the SDP, eventually, secured two seats). The election’s winner was the Singapore Labour Front, a party established in 1954 from a merger between two former Labour groups, the Singapore Socialist Party (SSP) and the Singapore Labour Party (SLP). Led by David Marshall, the SLF ran on a middle-of-the-road socialist platform and stood for Singapore’s closer association with Malaya. Moreover, it supported the introduction of a Singaporean citizenship with a view to fostering a sense of loyalty to Singapore among the alien domiciled Chinese, the Malayanisation of the civil service and a transition to full internal self-government within the Assembly fouryear term.3 Despite its lack of real grassroots support and an almost non-existent party machine, the SLF scored a remarkable result, ending up with a surprising tally of ten seats (or 27 per cent of the overall vote).4 Thanks to the SLF’s unexpected electoral performance and the backing of both the UMNO-MCA-SMU Alliance (three seats) and five unelected members, Marshall was able to form a government, but his coalition only commanded a small majority (four seats), which made it dependent on continuing British support and a divided opposition.5 Thrown from relative obscurity into the international limelight, the new

1

UKNA, CO 1030/924, Note on the Political Parties in Singapore, undated. NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 1, Singapore to DEA, cablegram 265, 4 Apr. 1955. 3 UKNA, CO 1030/239, Statement of the Political Parties Likely to Take Part in the Elections to the Legislative Assembly, Singapore 1955, 30 Nov. 1954; CO 1030/290, Black to Lennox-Boyd, despatch 46, 26 Sept. 1955. 4 Ibid.; UKNA, DO 35/6289, Constitutional Progress in the Federation of Malaya and Singapore. 5 Benvenuti, “Marshall Experiment”, p. 261. On 6 April, however, the Singapore Malay Union (SMU) withdrew its support. 2

72  COLD WAR AND DECOLONISATION

Chief Minister was to preside over one of the most turbulent periods in recent Singaporean history. Born in Singapore to a Sephardi Jewish merchant from Baghdad, Marshall was a successful criminal defence lawyer with a passion for politics. In 1949, he had joined the Progressives only to become increasingly irritated by their gradualist approach to constitutional reforms. Having resigned from the SPP in December 1952, in April 1954 he moved to establish the SSP in association with Lim Yew Hock and Francis Thomas, two former leaders of the SLP. When, subsequently, the SSP and SLP were merged into the new Labour Front, Marshall became its leader.6 Described as flamboyant, “impetuous, impatient, and quick tempered”, he loved the centre-stage but was politically inexperienced. A genuine nationalist, Marshall was determined to free Singapore gradually from colonialism.7 His catchphrase was merdeka, an objective that, at least initially, he envisaged achieving gradually over a period of ten years.8 Farther on the left of the political spectrum stood the People’s Action Party (PAP) with three seats.9 Established in November 1954, the PAP was strongly critical of British rule, championed full independence within a united Malaya and opposed the Rendel Constitution, which it regarded as a colonial relic.10 It also advocated rapid Malayanisation, the repeal of the Emergency regulations, industrialisation and greater freedom for the trade unions.11 Despite a well-organised party machine and a disciplined following, the PAP was an uneasy alliance between a group of English-educated socialists and an extreme left-wing faction with communist or pro-communist leanings.12 The latter was led by a baby-faced, yet shrewd and charismatic, radical trade unionist, Lim Chin Siong.13 Born in Singapore in 1933, Lim was supported by

6

Albert Lau, “Marshall, David Saul”, ODNB, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/ article/60350 [accessed 5 May 2010]; NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 1, Borthwick to Tange, memorandum 628, 13 Apr. 1955. 7 Turnbull, Modern Singapore, p. 262; Lee, Singapore Story, p. 197. 8 UKNA, DEFE 11/123, BDCC(FE) (55)152nd mtg, 27 July 1955. 9 Benvenuti, “Marshall Experiment”, p. 261. 10 Ibid. 11 UKNA, CO 1030/239, Statement of the Political Parties Likely to Take Part in the Elections to the Legislative Assembly, Singapore 1955, 30 Nov. 1954. 12 Benvenuti, “Marshall Experiment”, p. 261. 13 Lee, Singapore Story, p. 186.

THE SINGAPORE CONUNDRUM  73

left-wing intellectuals from the University of Malaya Socialist Club (Devan Nair, S. Woodhull, Sinnathamby Rajaratnam and James Puthucheary) and radical trade unionists (Fong Swee Suan).14 Although he always rejected accusations of being a communist, his militant faction was nonetheless suspected of having close ties with the MCP, for which it represented a convenient cover for its activities.15 Its strength lay in the radicalised “Middle Road Group” (so named after the location of its headquarters), which controlled several trade unions in both the private and public sector.16 Initially the PAP’s left-wing faction had opposed, contesting the elections on the ground that, if the party entered the electoral fray, it would implicitly confer legitimacy to the Rendel Constitution and thus be compelled to make it work. On this issue, it was the party’s more moderate wing, led by Lee Kuan Yew, who would, in the end, carry the day with the decision to contest four seats.17 Lee was the PAP’s general secretary. Born in 1923 of middle-class Straits Chinese parents, he was a young lawyer who, upon completing his law degree at Cambridge in 1950, had returned to Singapore and become a legal adviser to the trade union movement, and university and Chinese middle-school students.18 Aloof in manner, Lee was a cold realist and wily political operator. He was also a tough nationalist (in 1963 the then British Colonial Secretary Duncan Sandys would remark that political blackmail and brinkmanship were his modus operandi), but no communist.19 In the 1951 election for the Legislative Council, he had campaigned for the Progressives but, like Marshall, he grew impatient with their accommodating attitude towards colonialism.

14

UKNA, CO 1030/290, Black to Lennox-Boyd, despatch 46, 26 Sept. 1955. On the links between the MCP and the PAP’s radical left-wing see C.C. Chin, “The United Front Strategy of the Malayan Communist Party in Singapore, 1950s–1960s”, in Path Not Taken: Political Pluralism in Post-War Singapore, ed. Michael Barr and Carl Trocki (Singapore: National University Press, 2008), pp. 62–6; C.C. Chin and Karl Hack, ed., Dialogues with Chin Peng: New Light on the Malayan Communist Party (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2004), pp. 186–202. For Lim Chin Siong see Tan Jing Quee and K.S. Jomo, ed., Comet in Our Sky: Lim Chin Siong in History (Selangor: Insan, 2001). 16 Benvenuti, “Marshall Experiment”, p. 261. 17 UKNA, CO 1030/316, PAP Supplement 1 to Singapore P.I.J. 1955, undated. 18 Ibid., Turnbull, Modern Singapore, pp. 250–1. 19 Sandys cited in UKNA, PREM 11/4350, Sandys to Macmillan, telegram SOSLON 109, 5 Sept. 1963; Benvenuti, “Marshall Experiment”, p. 261. 15

74  COLD WAR AND DECOLONISATION

Unsurprisingly, he came to the conclusion that Singapore’s future no longer belonged to the English-speaking “Straits Chinese” and their political incarnation, the SPP, but to those who favoured a faster transition to independence and could rely on the support of the colony’s Chinese-educated majority.20 To put into action his plans for creating a political force that could command such support, he needed the cooperation of those who came to be identified with the PAP’s radical left-wing faction.21 Lee, however, suffered two distinct disadvantages over Lim Chin Siong and other PAP left-wingers. While a skilled orator himself, Lee spoke some Mandarin but no Hokkien (the Hokkiens were Singapore’s largest Chinese community): this limited his appeal to the Chinese-speaking masses, thus making it hard for him to compete with Lim and other Chinese orators.22 What was probably worse, he and his more moderate English-speaking group had no grassroots support. He therefore felt that he had little option than to team up with Lim and the other radical leaders of the labour movement, who enjoyed much greater popularity among the masses.23 Aware of this, he was, at least initially, inclined to make radical noises and ambiguous pronouncements. Anyone, he said at some point in 1955, “who wants to carry the Chinese-speaking people with him, cannot afford to be antiCommunist”.24 Asked, on another occasion, which between communism and colonialism he preferred, Lee responded that he would choose the former over the latter.25 Despite subsequent attempts to qualify this statement, Lee maintained, at least for a while, such a studied ambiguity about his true political colours that the American diplomatic mission in Singapore tended to view him as a “card-carrying” or secret communist.26 The British were less categorical: in early 1956 Director of the Special Branch A. Blades told American Consul General in Singapore Elbridge Durbrow that while it was difficult to give any concrete evidence that

20

Turnbull, Modern Singapore, p. 250. Clutterbuck, Conflict and Violence, p. 104. 22 Lee, Singapore Story, p. 186. 23 Benvenuti, “Marshall Experiment”, p. 262. 24 Turnbull, Modern Singapore, p. 262. 25 UKNA, CO 1030/366, MacDonald to FO, savingram 31, 6 June 1955. 26 NARA, RG 59, CDF, box 3261, 746F.00/2-656, memcon, Durbrow and Black, 3 Feb. 1956. 21

THE SINGAPORE CONUNDRUM  75

Lee was a communist, he was nonetheless convinced that he was essentially an “ambitious opportunist”.27

Marshall in Power With a slight majority in the Assembly and under pressure from the PAP to prove his nationalist credentials, Marshall had no easy task ahead of him and, to survive politically, he sought to avoid being closely associated with the colonial regime. He was not anti-British per se.28 Nor was he against a continuing British presence on the island, which he regarded as essential to Britain’s role in Asia.29 Yet, his difficult position and his anti-colonial beliefs led him to refuse to play, as he once put it, “the oxen who pull the colonial cart”.30 Unsurprisingly, he showed a growing propensity to castigate British colonial rule. Moreover, in an attempt to appeal to an increasingly radicalised electorate and consolidate his political position, he began to put pressure on London to change the Rendel Constitution — which he described as the “scraggy hand of death clutching at the brink of progress”.31 Accordingly, on 22 April, the Governor’s speech at the inaugural meeting of the Legislative Assembly set out the Marshall government’s plans to achieve complete internal self-government and merger with Malaya within four years.32 In July, Marshall urged new British Governor Robert Black to interpret the Constitution more liberally by ensuring greater government representation in the Legislative Assembly and by strengthening the role of the Chief Minister.33 He told Black that neither Britain nor his government could “afford slow progress in Singapore”, arguing that “the tempo was fast, and must be sustained if we were to hold

27

NARA, RG 59, CDF, box 3261, 746F.00/3-1656, memcon, Durbrow and Blades, 15 Mar. 1956. 28 UKNA, PREM 11/1307, Scott to Eden, telegram 141, 23 Oct. 1955. 29 Times, 19 Aug. 1955; UKNA, DEFE 11/123, BDCC(FE)(56)167th mtg, 1 Mar. 1956. 30 Daily Telegraph (Sydney), 6 Feb. 1956; Albert Lau, “The Colonial Office and the Singapore Merdeka Mission”, Journal of South Seas Society 49 (1994): 104–5. 31 Ibid., p. 105; Guardian, 25 July 1955; Benvenuti, “Marshall Experiment”, p. 262. 32 NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 2, Singapore to DEA, savingram 3, 23 Apr. 1955. 33 UKNA, PREM 11/1307, Black to Lennox-Boyd, telegrams 61 (12 July 1955), 63 (11 July 1955) and 71 (18 July 1955). Black had replaced Nicoll in June 1955.

76  COLD WAR AND DECOLONISATION

our position against Communists”.34 He threatened to resign if Black rejected what he considered a mere reinterpretation of the Constitution “made in the spirit of encouraging self-government and effective rule”.35 The Governor’s refusal to accept all his demands transformed a relatively minor constitutional issue into a major political crisis.36 On 25 July, standing behind Marshall, the Legislative Assembly passed a resolution calling for the immediate grant of self-government.37 Only Lennox-Boyd’s direct intervention restored calm. Having secured Cabinet’s support for limited concessions — British ministers, while loath to give the impression that Britain was “in full retreat” in Singapore, had no intention of letting the crisis spin out of control  —  Lennox-Boyd went a long way to meet Marshall’s demands. He agreed to hold talks in London in 1956 with a representative delegation from Singapore “to consider the situation in the light of a year’s working of the Constitution”.38 On the latter issue, Marshall had privately told LennoxBoyd that his aim at the future constitutional talks was to secure control over internal security and, in so doing, attain full internal selfgovernment in 1959.39 By wresting some concessions from the British, Marshall scored a significant personal victory and his prestige soared as a result.40 But worryingly for the Chief Minister, the climate of persistent political uncertainty that gripped the island cast doubt on the reality of his victory. Marshall’s constitutional tug-of-war had occurred amidst growing rioting and political intimidation. In April and June 1955 Singapore had experienced several strikes, which were thought to be the work of

34

UKNA, PREM 11/1307, Black to Lennox-Boyd, telegram 72, 19 July 1955. UKNA, PREM 11/1307, Black to Lennox-Boyd, telegrams 61 (11 July 1955), 63 (12 July 1955), 71 (18 July 1955) and 72 (19 July 1955). 36 Benvenuti, “Marshall Experiment”, p. 262. For Black’s response see UKNA, PREM 11/1307, Black to Lennox-Boyd, telegram 75, 20 July 1955. 37 UKNA, DO 35/6289, Black to Lennox-Boyd, telegram 348, 25 July 1955. 38 For Cabinet’s support for concessions see UKNA, CAB 128/29, CM(56)28th mtg, 15 Aug. 1955 and CAB 195/14, CM28(55), 15 Aug. 1955; PREM 11/1307, Eden to Lennox-Boyd, telegram 97, 15 Aug. 1955; PREM 11/1306, Lennox-Boyd to Eden, telegram 98, 16 Aug. 1955. 39 UKNA, PREM 11/1307, Lennox-Boyd to Hopkinson, telegram 141, 4 Aug. 1955. 40 Guardian, 19 Aug. 1955; Low, “Kept in Position”, p. 53. 35

THE SINGAPORE CONUNDRUM  77

the PAP’s radicals and agitators linked to the MCP. Since the election, the MCP had carried on infiltrating political, educational and labour groups to take advantage of the island’s unsettled political situation.41 The largest of such strikes took place at the Singapore Harbour Board and Hock Lee Amalgamated Bus Company.42 Disturbances quickly widened to the colony’s Chinese middle (that is, high) schools, with students taking to the streets in a show of solidarity with the strikers.43 Conscious of the difficult economic conditions in which Singapore’s working class lived, Marshall initially abstained from employing the strong tactics that Black’s predecessor, John Nicoll, had demanded.44 Keen to create a more liberal and equitable Singapore but mindful of his precarious political position, he wanted “to avoid the use of force by the police” at least until public opinion was “fully satisfied that this is the only course of action”.45 Allowing the police to use force to break up strikes would have played straight into the hands of PAP and be tantamount to political suicide.46 In mid-May, however, the government lost control of the situation.47 In a series of violent clashes between the police and the strikers four men were killed, including the United Press’s American correspondent for Southeast Asia, Gene Symonds.48 Law and order were promptly restored, but if Marshall hoped for a reprieve, he was soon to be disappointed. Throughout the rest of 1955, labour unrest remained endemic.49 In British eyes, Marshall’s cautious approach cast doubt on his ability to curb the apparent rise of communist-inspired radicalism. Yet, throughout the summer of 1955, his popularity among Singaporeans remained high as a result of his handling of the July–August constitutional crisis. At least for a moment, the government’s new-found prestige

41

Lau, Moment of Anguish, pp. 8–9; Chin, “United Front Strategy”, p. 63; Benvenuti, “Marshall Experiment”, p. 263. 42 Ibid. 43 Ibid. 44 Ibid. On Nicoll’s demands see CO 1030/235, Nicoll to MacKintosh, 16 May 1955. 45 UKNA, CO 968/458, Nicoll to Lennox-Boyd, telegram 15, 7 May 1955. 46 UKNA, DEFE 11/123, BDCC(FE)142nd mtg, 4 May 1955. 47 Benvenuti, “Marshall Experiment”, p. 263. 48 UKNA, CO 1030/366, Nicoll to Lennox-Boyd, telegram 245, 14 May 1955. 49 Benvenuti, “Marshall Experiment”, p. 263.

78  COLD WAR AND DECOLONISATION

also seemed to brighten its chances of long-term political survival: in October some politicians, including the SPP itself, were rumoured to be considering joining the SLF-Alliance coalition.50 Alas, hopes that the Marshall administration could steady itself and provide effective government were short-lived. In early November, Marshall’s credibility was to suffer a significant setback when, as a result of two SLF assemblymen crossing the floor to sit with the Opposition, he was deprived of a working majority in the Legislative Assembly.51 To bolster his precarious position, Marshall decided to play the anti-colonial card by stepping up pressure for a faster transition to full internal self-government.52 In early December, accompanied by two of his ministers (Lim Yew Hock and Inche Abdul Hamid), he flew to London for informal consultations with Lennox-Boyd. On his way to England Marshall stopped over in Ceylon and India where, as a self-appointed advocate of Singapore’s selfgovernment, he sought to rally Asian opinion behind him. In Colombo, he openly condemned British colonialism, claiming in a Radio Ceylon broadcast that Singaporeans could “no longer stomach being political, economic and social slaves”. He warned that if their aspirations were thwarted, there would be chaos in Singapore and this might well play into the hand of the communists.53 In India, he issued a similar warning.54 In both Asian capitals, Marshall received sympathetic hearings but was cautioned against forsaking British protection.55 Back in Singapore, however, his conduct drew significant criticism and was dismissed as embarrassing self-promotion. The vice-chairman of the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce probably spoke for many when he observed that “it looks like Marshallism on the rampage”.56

50

Low, “Kept in Position”, pp. 54–5. Ibid. 52 Benvenuti, “Marshall Experiment”, pp. 263–4; UKNA, CO 1030/81, Constitutional Development in Singapore: Brief for the Secretary of State to Use in Discussions with Marshall, Dec. 1955. 53 Straits Times, 5 Jan. 1955; Chan Heng Chee, A Sensation of Independence: A Political Biography of David Marshall (Singapore and New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), p. 173. 54 Ibid. 55 UKNA, DO 35/6289, India: Visit of the Chief Minister of Singapore, CON 353/40/1, 11 Jan. 1956; Colombo to Home, despatch 63, 9 Dec. 1955. 56 Chan, Sensation of Independence, p. 173; Straits Times, 7 Dec. 1955. 51

THE SINGAPORE CONUNDRUM  79

On his arrival in London on 9 December, Marshall showed greater restraint, but, in his discussions with the Colonial Secretary, he made clear that he would demand complete internal self-government by the spring of 1957 at the constitutional conference scheduled for April 1956 in London.57 More importantly, he called for a new and “positive” approach to Singapore’s constitutional advance.58 By that, he meant that Singapore should be granted “dominion status” on condition that it would return control over external affairs and defence immediately to Britain. The symbolism inherent in this plan was evident. By seeking some kind of dominion status, he wished to demonstrate that Singapore was no longer a colony.59 Yet, for all his anti-colonial rhetoric and bluster, Marshall was careful not to do away entirely with a British presence on the island. He still saw “security in [the] maintenance of a British connection” and had no intention of seeing Singapore gravitate towards China.60 Hence his suggestion that London be allowed to resume complete control over internal security should the threat of a communist takeover materialise.61 On his way back from London, Marshall called at Karachi in Pakistan where local leaders, while expressing “sympathy for aspirations of the people of Singapore”, threw cold water on the idea of the colony’s rapid transition to independence. In fact, they went further than that, arguing that “no State which could not defend itself could aspire to full independence” and that “Dominion status barring defence” was clearly “a logical absurdity”.62 While inherently moderate, Marshall’s demands posed, nonetheless, a significant challenge to British rule, thus forcing the Eden government to consider carefully how to tackle him.63 Despite his anti-colonialist rhetoric and a somewhat mercurial personality  —  Lennox-Boyd once described him as an “emotional, vain and cocksure” “prima donna” — 

57

UKNA, CO 1030/81, Discussion between the Secretary of State for the Colonies and Ministers from Singapore during December 1955, undated. 58 Ibid. 59 For the idea of a hybrid dominion status see Sunday Times, 4 Dec. 1955. 60 UKNA, PREM 11/1307, Scott to Eden, telegram 141, 23 Oct. 1955. 61 UKNA, CO 1030/81, Discussion between the Secretary of State for the Colonies and Ministers from Singapore during December 1955, undated. 62 UKNA, DO 35/6289, Symon to Laithwaite, 23 Dec. 1955. 63 Benvenuti, “Marshall Experiment”, p. 264.

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they considered Marshall to be solidly anti-communist.64 As the CO told the Australian High Commission in London in November 1955, “temperamental and inexperienced as he was”, Marshall “was by far the best prospect in sight and above all he had firmly nailed his colours to the anti-Communist mast”.65 In Singapore both Black and MacDonald subscribed to this assessment, arguing that there was “no alternative to Marshall at the present” and hence “a way should be found to keep Marshall in power”.66 Lennox-Boyd concurred.67 Indeed, despite Eden’s evident dislike of what he regarded as Marshall’s blackmailing tactics,68 British ministers and officials attempted, throughout the second half of 1955, to bolster his position by meeting some of his requests. They worried that unless they did so he would step down; a fresh election would then have to be called and this could well bring in a procommunist PAP administration likely to reject British rule.69 In that event, Britain would have to suspend the Constitution and reintroduce direct rule backed up by large military forces. On the other hand, some policymakers, including Eden and recently appointed CommissionerGeneral for Southeast Asia Robert Scott (Scott had replaced MacDonald in October 1955), wondered whether making concessions to Marshall would not do more bad than good, given that he was unlikely to stay in office for much longer. In that case, not only would any major constitutional concession to Marshall do nothing to avert his downfall, but, more ominously, it might be exploited by a future PAP government

64

For Lennox-Boyd’s view of Marshall see UKNA, PREM 11/1307, Lennox-Boyd to Hopkinson, telegrams 139 and 140, 4 Aug. 1955. On Marshall’s anti-communism see CAB128/28, CM(55)37th mtg, 25 Oct. 1955; PREM 11/1307, Scott to Eden telegram 141, 23 Oct. 1955; PREM 11/1307, Singapore Political Situation, FED150/63/01, 23 Jan. 1956. 65 NAA, A1209, 1957/4226, London to DEA, savingram 200, 22 Nov. 1955. 66 NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 2, Singapore to the New Zealand Minister of External Affairs, cablegram 14, 27 July 1955; NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 2, Watt to DEA, cablegram 573, 26 July 1955. 67 See for instance UKNA, PREM 11/1307, Lennox-Boyd to Eden, telegram 140, 4 Aug. 1955. 68 See Eden’s handwritten comments to UKNA, PREM 11/1307, Constitutional Crisis: Memorandum by the Minister of State for Colonial Affairs, Aug. 1955. 69 UKNA, DO 35/6289, CRO to Canberra and Wellington, telegram 197, 19 Aug. 1955; Benvenuti, “Marshall Experiment”, p. 264.

THE SINGAPORE CONUNDRUM  81

to pursue its radical political aims.70 American and Australian representatives in Singapore noted that some British officials there were so downcast about Singapore’s future that they felt that a “brake” should be applied to constitutional development.71 Either way, the colony appeared to be in for considerable uncertainty and turbulence.72

Canberra Takes the Measure of Marshall With Singapore now entering a delicate phase of its political evolution, the Coalition government took an increasingly active interest in its future. To assess developments on the island, it had appointed one of its most senior diplomats, Alan Watt. A former DEA secretary (1950– 54), Watt enjoyed a close relationship with Casey, who, in 1953, had created the position of Commissioner in Southeast Asia expressly for him.73 A strong advocate of regional engagement, Casey believed in Australia’s urgent need to enhance its regional presence.74 Because of its strategic position at the heart of Southeast Asia, Singapore was to have a special place in Casey’s plans to strengthen such a presence. When Watt arrived in Singapore in early 1954, his responsibilities were to include not only the representation of Australian interests in Singapore, Malaya and the Borneo territories but also the coordination of the Australian missions in Southeast Asia.75 Watt, who would remain in Singapore until March 1956, was to experience one of the most challenging times in Singapore’s post-1945 history. With the Singapore election out of the way, the government sought to take the measure of the new Chief Minister. In May, Casey instructed Watt to call on Marshall to convey Australia’s desire for 70

Ibid.; Murphy, Lennox-Boyd, pp. 134–5. For Scott’s views see UKNA, FO 371/ 123212, D1052/4/G, Scott to Lennox-Boyd, 18 Feb. 1956 and PREM 11/1307, Scott to Eden, 8 Mar. 1956. For Eden’s pessimism on Singapore see de Zulueta to Johnston, 23 Dec. 1955 and De L’Isle and Dudley to Eden, 15 Dec. 1955. 71 NAA, A1838, 682/21 part 1, Eastman to Tange, memorandum 2415, 10 Dec. 1955. 72 Benvenuti, “Marshall Experiment”, p. 264. 73 Garry Woodard, “Watt, Sir Alan Stewart”, ADB, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/ watt-sir-alan-stewart-15844/text27043 [accessed 10 Feb. 2011]. 74 Alan Watt, The Evolution of Australian Foreign Policy, 1938–1965 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 144–5. 75 Benvenuti, “Marshall Experiment”, p. 268.

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cordial relations and its intention to make a continuing contribution to Singapore’s economic development through the Colombo Plan.76 In sending his instructions, Casey explained that it was Australia’s “deliberate policy to try to develop understandings against the day when our relationship will be that of two nations with common interests and every reason to cooperate in harmony and confidence”.77 In advocating this policy of engagement, the DEA was mindful of Singapore’s dependent status and appreciated the need to tread cautiously lest Australia give the impression of interfering in British colonial affairs.78 Yet, as Casey and his officials readily recognised, with Australia’s growing defence role in Southeast Asia, and both Malaya and Singapore likely to gain independence in a not so distant future, it was essential that the government “establish the friendliest possible informal contacts and relations with local political leaders”.79 With the May meeting, therefore, Watt began a series of encounters with Marshall and the impression he received from them was, overall, positive.80 In August, he could report to Casey that he had established a “pretty close” relationship with the Chief Minister.81 Watt was not unsympathetic to Marshall and appreciated his political difficulties. In late July, he cabled the DEA that despite his “impetuosity” and “lack of governmental experience”, he was the only politician “with sufficient ability and personality to lead Singapore towards effective self-government”.82 True, his handling of law and order had not been not beyond reproach, but, for all the criticism levelled at him by the Singapore English-speaking press, his government had, on the whole, steered a sensible course during the April–May strikes.83 As for his role in the July–August constitutional crisis, Watt did not

76

NAA, A1838, 3022/10/1 part 1, Casey to Watt, cablegram 489, 18 May 1955. For Australian assistance to Singapore under the Colombo Plan see Boyce, “Diplomacy in Malaya”, pp. 87–8. 77 NAA, A1838, 3022/10/1 part 1, Casey to Watt, cablegram 489, 18 May 1955. 78 NAA, A1838, 3022/10/1 part 1, Federation of Malaya and Singapore: Minister’s Brief, undated. 79 Ibid. Emphasis in the original. 80 NAA, A1838, 3022/10/1 part 1, Watt to Casey, cablegram 400, 27 May 1955. 81 NAA, A1838, 3022/10/1 part 1, Watt to Casey, 6 Aug. 1955. 82 NAA, A1838, 3024/1/2 part 1, Watt to DEA, cablegram 562, 21 July 1955. 83 NAA, A4231, 1955, Watt to Casey, MD 2/55, 25 May 1955.

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judge Marshall’s behaviour unreasonable, noting instead that it was “understandable” that he “should resent having to accept criticism of his party’s action when in his opinion he has not sufficient power to govern”.84 Watt could relate to some of Marshall’s criticism of British colonialism: since his arrival in Singapore he had found the local “imperial-colonial atmosphere”  —  and attitudes such as “father knows best”  —  “unpleasant and irritating”. Had he born there  —  he would recall years later — he “would have been working for [the] removal of the imperial umbrella in the shortest practicable time”.85 Watt’s hope was that, over time, Marshall could steady his government and “settle down to deal with the serious industrial, commercial and educational problems” besetting Singapore.86 Yet, as time wore on, he grew sceptical of Marshall’s ability to navigate through the treacherous shoals of Singapore’s late colonial politics. His loss of a working majority in the Legislative Assembly in November 1955 reinforced Australian perceptions that the Marshall experiment was destined to be short-lived. In December, Acting Commissioner Alan Eastman reported to Canberra that Marshall, the only acceptable option and the West’s best bet, was unlikely “to survive the next election” and that the PAP, the only other apparent alternative, was too unpalatable to even consider.87 Eastman’s initial meetings with Lee Kuan Yew in October and November 1955 had not been reassuring. While inclined to believe that Lee was no communist, he viewed him as an elusive figure, whose real attitude to communism remained equivocal and whose grip on his party dubious.88 In these circumstances, Eastman wondered whether Marshall’s chances of survival could not be improved by strengthening the SLF’s party organisation, bolstering the moderate trade unions and

84

NAA, A1838, 3024/1/2 part 1, Watt to DEA, cablegram 562, 21 July 1955; A1838, 3024/2/1 part 2, Watt to DEA, savingram 8, 22 July 1955. 85 Alan Watt, Australian Diplomat: Memoirs of Sir Alan Watt (Sydney: Angus & Robertson, 1972), p. 229; Goldsworthy, Losing the Blanket, pp. 36–7; NAA, A4231, 1955, Watt to Casey, MD 7/55, 1 Oct. 1955. 86 NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 2, Watt to DEA, cablegram 623, 18 Aug. 1955; A1838, 3024/1/2 part 1, Watt to DEA, cablegram 562, 21 July 1955. 87 NAA, A1838, 682/21 part 1, Eastman to Tange, memorandum 2415, 10 Dec. 1955. 88 NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 3, Eastman to Tange, memorandum 2089, 8 Nov. 1955.

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acceding to his constitutional demands. After all, Marshall’s calls for self-government by 1957 were “the lowest common denominator of the policies of all the major political groups in Singapore”. Rejection of these demands, Eastman warned, would “precipitate a major political crisis” that “could easily lead to serious public disorder”. On the other hand, their acceptance “would, with luck, allow two years for “something to turn up” and there would be the possibility that, with good management, something could be made to turn up”.89 Whether or not “something could be made to turn up” remained to be seen. For the time being the Australian government wrestled with one further concern — the impact of local instability on Britain’s ability to use its military installations effectively in Commonwealth and SEATO operations across Southeast Asia. The problem was not one of easy solution for instability in Singapore, as Australian policymakers came quickly to realise, could take different shapes and forms. One possible scenario — and this was, without a doubt, the worst one — was Singapore’s transition to independence under a PAP (or PAP-dominated) administration. In this event, such a government was likely to end Britain’s military presence on the island. Yet other possibilities existed, which, while less radical, were no less unpleasant. A PAP (or PAPdominated) government could, for instance, foment widespread (and prolonged) disturbances to press for political concessions. If that occurred, the effectiveness of the British military installations on the island, and especially the naval base, would be seriously undermined. To overcome this problem, London could theoretically dismiss the government, call an election and hope that the ballot box would produce a more moderate political majority. In the interim, London was likely to resort to repression. Yet, the chance of a moderate alternative materialising in an increasingly volatile environment appeared slim. Far more probable, it seemed, was the emergence of an unpalatable political outfit that would force London to reimpose direct rule and resort to outright repression. But even so, what were the chances of restoring law and order? And, more importantly, at what cost? As Watt had pointed out to Canberra following the May riots, even if the police and British troops were able to restore law and order, they could certainly not

89

NAA, A1838, 682/21 part 1, Eastman to Tange, memorandum 2415, 10 Dec. 1955.

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“force trade unionists or other employees to continue to carry out their work” on the bases. Without sounding alarmist, he reminded Canberra that as serious unrest could be “instigated in Singapore at almost any time”, one was “forced to reconsider the question whether Singapore can be regarded as a secure, operative base in which there is an effective labour force”.90 The defence implications of a potentially messy transition to selfgovernment were very much at the back of ministers’ minds when they briefly examined the Singapore question in mid-January 1956. As mentioned in Chapter 3, ministers had gathered in Canberra to discuss Australia’s attitude towards Malaya’s constitutional advance in the light of the imminent Anglo-Malayan talks. In the message that Cabinet sent to Eden to caution him against any rushed transfer of power in Malaya, Menzies only fleetingly referred to the colony’s awkward political situation, yet it was evident, from the tone of the despatch, how much it troubled him and his colleagues. He told Eden that Singapore raised, in some ways, problems even “more difficult — in the longer term at least — than those of the Federation”. This being the case, no defence arrangement for Malaya should be considered independently from the future of Singapore. Much was at stake. The very future of Commonwealth defence in Southeast Asia seemed “to depend upon the attitude of the Singapore Government”.91 Menzies did not have to spell it out to Eden — the import of his words would not have been lost on the British prime minister — but it was clear what weighed heavily on his mind: what would happen, for instance, to the Commonwealth’s defence position in Southeast Asia if no adequate agreement could be reached with Malaya and the Federation’s planned transfer of power went ahead in the face of growing instability and/or increasing demands for independence in Singapore? On Singapore, at least, Eden sounded firm: he and his ministers understood that defence arrangements for Malaya and Singapore could “not be considered in isolation from each other” and had “no intention of allowing our hand to be forced in Singapore by anything that we may agree to in regard to Malaya”.92

90

NAA, A4231, 1955, Watt to Casey, MD 2/55, 25 May 1955. NAA, A1838, TS383/5/2 part 2, Menzies to Eden, draft attached to Cabinet Decision no. 4, 16 Jan. 1956; DEA to London, cablegram 97, 17 Jan. 1956. 92 UKNA, PREM 11/1307, Eden to Menzies, 23 Jan. 1955; Benvenuti, “Marshall Experiment”, p. 267. 91

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This could well be the case, but, as Australian policymakers were soon to find out, the concessions made by the British to the Malayans at the London conference would only reinforce Marshall’s resolve to pursue his idea of “dominion status” for Singapore. With Marshall seemingly intent on asking more than they appeared prepared to give, what would the British do? Would they be willing to pay a higher price to keep Marshall in power and help him consolidate his domestic position? Or would they put the brakes on his demands for further power devolution? It is to this apparent dilemma that both Australian and British policymakers turned their attention in the few months left before the start of another crucial constitutional conference in London in April 1956.

Australia and Singapore’s Constitutional Progress Although, in early 1956, Singapore’s political scene appeared less tense than in mid-1955, this was deceptive.93 The danger “of political violence and civil unrest remained palpable”.94 Concerns that communist subversion of the labour movement and the Chinese middle schools continued unabated were widespread. In early February, Governor Black revealed to the US Consul General that he was “very perturbed” by the “growing” subversion in the colony, indicating that further action would be needed against it.95 In late March the British Defence Coordination Committee, Far East (BDCC(FE)) alerted London that as subversion was “gaining ground”, it needed greater resources and better intelligence to deal with it.96 These fears were shared by American officials in Washington and Singapore.97 In late January, Durbrow had warned the State Department of growing “Communist subversion and strength”.98 Officials in the State Department were distressed. Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Walter Robertson argued that 93

Ibid. Ibid. 95 NARA, RG 59, CDF, box 3261, 746F.00/2-656, memcon, Durbrow and Black, 3 Feb. 1956. 96 UKNA, PREM 11/1307, BDCC(FE) to UKCOS, SEACOS 62, 19 Mar. 1956; DEFE 11/123, BDCC(FE)16th mtg, 19 Mar. 1956. 97 Long, Safe for Decolonization, pp. 28–38. 98 NARA, RG 59, CDF, box 3261, 746F.00/1-2556, Singapore to State Department, congentel 720, 25 Jan. 1956. 94

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“[u]nless [the British] are persuaded to take more vigorous action to counter subversion, we fear that political and economic stability will be undermined within twelve months”.99 So nervous were the Americans about Singapore that Secretary of State John Foster Dulles raised American concerns with Foreign Secretary Selwyn Lloyd during the latter’s visit to Washington from 31 January–1 February 1956.100 Believing that London was not doing enough to combat subversion, the Eisenhower administration cautiously proposed greater Anglo-American collaboration in counter-subversion plans to prod the British to take more comprehensive action.101 But, as Western concerns about Singapore grew, Marshall’s ability to survive in office was increasingly called into question. “The problems he [Marshall] has to face”, a distinctly more downcast Watt warned Casey in January, “are so intractable that it is difficult to be optimistic enough to believe that he will succeed in solving them”. The picture he painted was a gloomy one: Marshall’s support in the Legislative Assembly was “slender” and his appeal among the electorate “even less impressive”. Watt put Marshall’s chances of remaining in power at no more than two years. But then, what? Here Watt had very little reassurance to offer. No decent political alternative to Marshall was in sight, despite the news that the Progressives and the Democrats were merging into a new Liberal-Socialist party.102 The fact that Tan Lark Sye and other rich Chinese businesspeople with allegedly close links to Beijing were said to be behind this initiative provided little reassurance.103 As Watt gloomily noted, if the Progressives were prepared to work with 99

NARA, RG 59, CDF, box 3261, 746F.00/1-2756, Robertson to Hoover Jr, 27 Jan. 1956. 100 FRUS, 1955–57, vol. 22, Southeast Asia (Washington: Department of State, 1990), doc. 451. 101 Long, Safe for Decolonization, pp. 38–45. 102 NAA, A1209, 1957/4313 part 1, Watt to Casey, MD 1/56, 21 Jan. 1956; UKNA, CO 1030/291, Black to Lennox-Boyd, saving 9, 17 Jan. 1956. The new party was formally launched in early February 1955. 103 NAA, A1209, 1957/4313 part 1, Watt to Casey, MD 1/56, 21 Jan. 1956; NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 3, Political Developments in Singapore, undated. In January there had been rumours of frequent contacts between Tan Lark Sye and Lim Chin Siong. See UKNA, CO 1030/291, Black to Lennox-Boyd, saving 9, 17 Jan. 1956. Tan Lark Sye was also said to have links with the Overseas Chinese Affairs Commission in Beijing. See NARA, RG 59, CDF, box 3261, 746F.00/2-656, memcon, Durbrow and Black, 3 Feb. 1956.

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them, then “the future of Singapore looked “black indeed”.104 Although these concerns were to prove unfounded (the Liberal-Socialist Party would turn out to be a moderate political force), he was concerned that this new party might, at some stage, form an alliance with the PAP in the belief that Singapore’s “best future lay in coming to terms with Communism”.105 As for the prospect of an internal split within the PAP, there was yet no substance to rumours that Lee might ditch his party’s radical Left and join forces with Marshall’s SLF. London, therefore, was confronted with a serious predicament which Watt summed up as follows: would the British government be inclined, at the constitutional talks scheduled for April: to yield to Mr. Marshall’s demands for substantial self-government in order to help keep him in office – only, perhaps, to find that within a few months of his return to Singapore, he is no longer in office but has been replaced by some leader and party far less satisfactory from a British point of view? 106

All in all, Watt favoured keeping Marshall in power, but wondered how reliable he would really be. In his December talks with LennoxBoyd, he had no doubt cut a “most reasonable” figure, but, Watt argued, Marshall in London was “not quite the same than Marshall in Singapore” where the harsh realities of his position pushed him to be less accommodating. How seriously, then, should his “reasonableness” towards a continuing British military presence be interpreted? As Watt was ready to recognise, the protection of Commonwealth interests in Singapore might, in the end, well hinge on Britain’s resolve to suspend the Constitution and impose “Governor’s rule”. Yet, it remained to be seen whether London would be prepared to incur international reprobation and deal energetically with the surge in violence that would be most likely to follow the resumption of direct rule. Needless to say, Watt appeared sceptical on this count.107 Watt’s superiors shared his sombre mood. At the end of February, Casey and DEA Assistant Secretary James Plimsoll called at Singapore for a brief overnight stopover on their way to Karachi where they were 104

NAA, A1209, 1957/4313 part 1, Watt to Casey, MD 1/56, 21 Jan. 1956. NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 3, Political Developments in Singapore, undated. 106 NAA, A1209, 1957/4313 part 1, Watt to Casey, MD 1/56, 21 Jan. 1956. 107 Ibid. 105

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due to attend a SEATO ministerial meeting on 6 March. Despite arriving at Kallang Airport in the late afternoon of 28 February, Casey was able to squeeze in a late-night meeting with Black and Scott. The picture the two British officials painted to Casey was unsurprisingly grim: unless London met Marshall’s demands on internal security, he would resign; his resignation would touch off a stream of disturbances, possibly even large-scale ones; in all likelihood the Governor would then have to suspend the Constitution, reinstate direct rule and put down trouble with violence. These actions would have serious international repercussions. As Casey wrote to Menzies after the meeting, the choice facing London was an unenviable one — between the “virtual loss of the economic and defence potential of Singapore” and the reintroduction of direct rule. Understandably, Casey was not pleased with what he heard. This, he told Menzies, was “an unpleasant story”; the whole Singapore situation was a “wreck”. “Being wise after the event”, he went on to say, “I believe United Kingdom Government may be held to be responsible for having launched Singapore and Malaya on the road to independence too abruptly and without adequate preparation and education of individual and political parties”.108 Plimsoll, too, was “surprised at the reality and urgency of the problem of Singapore”.109 In a forthright cable to his departmental head, he told Tange that his brief visit had impressed upon him the “strength of the case” not only “against giving independence to Singapore”, but also “against making any substantial concessions to Marshall at the London talks in April”. He warned that if Singapore were to become independent now, there would be a “real danger of its becoming Communist very soon. Effects of this would be grave politically for Malaya, Indonesia and elsewhere in the Far East”. “To avoid this”, Plimsoll wrote, “it might be worth hanging on to Singapore even if strikes and civil resistance were to make it valueless militarily”. Under no circumstance, therefore, should early independence be granted to Singapore at the forthcoming London conference. Whatever the British decided to do, it was imperative that they retain, at least, the “control of defence and external relations and some rights to intervene to maintain law and

108

NAA, A1209, 1957/4313 part 1, Casey to Menzies, Spicer and Tange, cablegram 47, 29 Feb. 1956. 109 NAA, A1838, 3024/10/1/1 part 1, Watt to Tange, 29 Feb. 1956.

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order”. That said, London should also be careful to “avoid rejecting independence as the ultimate aim for the people of Singapore” for the “refusal of substantial concessions to Marshall may very well of course be followed by considerable unrest in Singapore which would require additional British forces”.110 The tone and substance of Plimsoll’s candid cable raised a few eyebrows within the Australian Commission in Singapore.111 Watt found Plimsoll’s cable a “little tough”. He immediately wrote to Tange, advising that before taking any firm position on the constitutional question Australia ought to consider various “possible solutions”, including acceptance of Singaporean responsibility for internal security and support for both Malayan-Singaporean talks on merger and “some form of coalition” between the SLF and the Liberal-Socialists. Watt recognised that none of these solutions was entirely satisfactory, but, as he conceded with disarming frankness, he, like everyone else, was “feeling his way towards some positive policy to suggest for Singapore”.112 At any rate, he urged the government to keep two other factors well in mind if it decided to ask London to delay the grant of full internal selfgovernment. The first was Marshall’s likely reaction: if he concluded that Canberra was “placing obstacles in his way”, he could turn his frustration against Australia and charge that the latter’s objections were “based on racial grounds”.113 Watt hoped that no one in Australia underestimated the possibility of such “flat attack” on Australia.114 The second point he wished Canberra to consider was the British attitude. As Watt explained, Canberra could scarcely urge London to agree to a freeze on further devolution of power unless it was prepared, in principle, to authorise the use of Australian troops in quelling internal disturbances in Singapore. In saying this, he did not seek, he claimed, to suggest that Singapore “be promised independence at the April talks”; he only wished to restate the “complexity and delicacy of the problem — 

110

NAA, A1209, 1957/4313 part 1, Plimsoll to Tange, cablegram 154, 29 Feb. 1956, Benvenuti, “Marshall Experiment”, p. 268. 111 See NAA, A1838, 3024/10/1/1 part 1, Woodard to Watt, 29 Feb. 1956; Borthwick to Watt, 29 Feb. 1956. 112 NAA, A1838, 3024/10/1/1 part 1, Watt to Tange, 29 Feb. 1956. 113 NAA, A1209, 1957/4313 part 1, Watt to DEA, cablegram 155, 29 Feb. 1956. 114 NAA, A1838, 3024/10/1/1 part 1 Watt to Tange, 29 Feb. 1956.

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not least for Australia”. On the contrary, he continued to hold the view that “the sole proposal which makes military and economic sense is to attach Singapore to the Federation”.115 Like the British, Australian policymakers were well aware of the significant strategic and economic complementarity existing between the two territories.116 Because of it, they, too, viewed merger as largely desirable. Yet, important as such complementarity might have been, there was a further factor that made merger all the more appealing to them. As the External Affairs Representative in London, Laurence McIntyre, put it to Canberra in early March, merger could “make Singapore more manageable by diffusing its instability along with its separate identity in larger and potentially more stable political unit”.117 Achieving this, however, would not be easy. The catch lay in the Federation’s attitude. From Kuala Lumpur Critchley threw cold water on Australian hopes for early progress, warning Canberra that he did not foresee “any likelihood of union between the Federation and Singapore in the next year or two”.118 The idea of a closer association, or even union, between Malaya and Singapore was not a novel one — indeed, it had been a long-term aim of British colonial policy. It had already been mooted by British officials when they made preparations for the post-war reoccupation of Malaya and, since then, it had remained a near article of faith among them. From the late 1940s local leaders had been encouraged, under MacDonald’s leadership, to discuss such eventuality.119 Progress, however, had been very slow and ultimately disappointing. Cognisant of these realities, the Churchill government had concluded in 1954 that while British policy favoured “a closer association or union between the two territories”, “the form and timing of such association are matters which the Governments and the peoples of

115

NAA, A1209, 1957/4313 part 1, Watt to DEA, cablegram 155, 29 Feb. 1956. NAA, A1838, 3024/10/1/1 part 1, Notes for the Minister’s Visit to Singapore, Mar. 1956. 117 NAA, A1209, 1957/4313 part 1, McIntyre to DEA, cablegram 645, 9 Mar. 1956; Benvenuti, “Marshall Experiment”, p. 269. 118 NAA, A1838, TS696/6/1 part 1, Critchley to Tange, memorandum 228/56, 1 Mar. 1956. 119 A.J. Stockwell, “Malaya: The Making of a Grand Design”, Asian Affairs 34, 3 (2003): 228. 116

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the two territories should work out for themselves”.120 In other words, merger remained no more than an elusive long-term aim. In January 1955, the Tunku had made this clear when he declared that merger was still a distant proposition and had reiterated this view in the aftermath of the Alliance’s electoral victory in July.121 In 1955–56, he saw three major problems arising from closer association with Singapore. In the short term, his most pressing concern was to ensure that Malaya achieved independence by the target date of 31 August 1957. However, before Malaya could do so, a variety of complex political, constitutional and financial arrangements needed to be put in place and the Alliance government was already running against time to ensure that the target date be met as planned. In this respect, talks on merger would be an unwelcome complication and would inevitably slow down Malaya’s transition to independence. Yet, there was also a second  —  and more substantial  —  reason for the Tunku to be apprehensive about merger. This was the inclusion of almost a million Chinese from Singapore into an enlarged Federation, which, by delivering an overall Chinese majority, would undermine Malay political dominance.122 Moreover, already wary of Malaya’s Chinese minority, he doubted that Singapore’s predominantly Chinese population, with its cultural orientation towards China, could ever develop a pan-Malayan identity.123 Third, merger also fuelled Malayan concerns over a recrudescence of communist-inspired violence in peninsular Malaya. Suspicious of the loyalties of the Singapore Chinese, the Tunku was nervous that the incorporation of an increasingly radicalised island might help revive the MCP’s flagging fortunes.124 Finally, his reluctance to see Malaya merged with Singapore

120

UKNA, DO 35/6289, Constitutional Progress in the Federation of Malaya and in Singapore, 22 Sept. 1955. 121 Lau, Moment of Anguish, pp. 10–1, Benvenuti, “Marshall Experiment”, p. 269; NAA, A1838, 3026/2/1 part 1, Watt to Casey, cablegram 605, 10 Aug. 1955; Watt to DEA, cablegram 600, 6 Aug. 1955. 122 NAA, A1838, 3026/2/1 part 1, Watt to Casey, cablegram 605, 10 Aug. 1955; Watt to DEA, cablegram 600, 6 Aug. 1955; Benvenuti, “Marshall Experiment”, p. 269. 123 UKNA, CO 1030/979, Tory to Pritchard, 18 Apr. 1961; Tan Tai Yong, Creating “Greater Malaysia”: Decolonization and the Politics of Merger (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2008), p. 50. 124 Benvenuti, “Marshall Experiment”, p. 269; NAA, A1838, 3024/1/2 part 1, Eastman to Tange, memo 2543, 30 Dec. 1955.

THE SINGAPORE CONUNDRUM  93

was also driven by his mistrust of Marshall  —  a man, he once said, “who talks himself into a state of spiritual intoxication and imagines that when a foolish mob applauds him he has solved the problem”.125 In early 1956, however, he gave, at least, the impression that he did not irrevocably oppose closer association with Singapore, but that, in fact, he saw it as a possible remedy to the colony’s deteriorating situation.126 On 26 December 1955 he told a UMNO convention that Singapore and the Borneo territories could join the Federation as a member state if they so wished.127 Although the comparison between Singapore and the politically backward Borneo territories was hardly calculated to appeal to Marshall, his statement seemed to indicate some flexibility on his part.128 A month later, he again raised the prospect of Singapore’s absorption into Malaya, arguing that this would enable the Federation to tackle communist subversion there.129 The arrangement he had in mind for Singapore was that of an autonomous state in the Federation on the same basis as the former Straits Settlements of Malacca and Penang.130 Then, in March 1956, following Marshall’s comments that he was ready to discuss merger, he replied that Singapore “could hardly expect to be granted independence on its own” and that he [Marshall] should “limit his London objective to selfgovernment”. If Singapore, he added, “wanted independence it could do this by joining the Federation later”.131 The Tunku’s message was loud and clear: it would be the Malays — not the British or Marshall —  who would determine the pace of, and the conditions for, closer association between the two territories. All this notwithstanding there were some hopes in Canberra that, if not immediately, he would, at least, be willing to discuss merger at a later stage — possibly not much after the grant of independence to Malaya. Yet, the trouble with this timetable

125

NAA, A1838, TS682/21 part 6, Critchley to Tange, memorandum 1626/56, 23 Nov. 1955. 126 Benvenuti, “Marshall Experiment”, p. 270. 127 NAA, A1838, 682/2 part 21, Malaya, undated; A1838, 3024/1/2 part 1, Eastman to Tange, memo 2543, 30 Dec. 1955. 128 NAA, A1838, 682/2 part 21, Malaya, undated. 129 The Tunku cited in Lau, Moment of Anguish, p. 11; NAA, A1209, 1961/794 part 1, Harry to Secretary DEA, memo 1098, 25 May 1956. 130 NAA, A816, 19/321/46, Australian Commission Report for 1956, 31 Dec. 1956. 131 NAA, A1209, 1957/4313 part 1, Kuala Lumpur to DEA, cablegram 38, 7 Mar. 1956; Benvenuti, “Marshall Experiment”, p. 270.

94  COLD WAR AND DECOLONISATION

was that only a few months later, in January 1957, he would declare that he was not prepared to allow a merger to go ahead.132 To explain the hardening of his position, the Tunku argued that “Singapore could clearly never agree to enter a Federation in which Malay was the national language, Islam the national religion and a Malay ruler the Paramount Head of State”.133 In doing so, he clearly intended to kill any speculation about the prospect of a merger in the near future.

The Menzies Government Formulates its Policy As Australian officials mulled over Singapore’s future, Marshall began to make insistent demands (and make them publicly) for (conditional) “independence” and “dominion status”. In this, he was encouraged by Malaya’s success in winning significant constitutional concessions in London in January 1956.134 With his government’s survival still hanging in the balance (rumours in January that it might suffer further defections were followed by failed attempts to boost its numbers in the Assembly by forming a coalition with the Liberal-Socialists) and with the PAP campaigning energetically to increase its appeal among the Chinese masses, Marshall could hardly allow the Tunku to beat him at his own game and upstage his nationalist credentials.135 Nor could he expose himself to the charge of being a British stooge for, in an atmosphere of heightened nationalist passions, this would mean a premature end to his political career. Unsurprisingly, therefore, Marshall felt that only significant progress at the April constitutional conference could save his political skin despite running the risk, as he put it, of ending up as “a Kerensky who is going to London to get all the concessions he can from the British, merely to permit the Communists more

132

Ibid. NAA, A816, 19/321/46, Federation of Malaya, undated. 134 NARA, RG 59, CDF, box 3261, 746F.00/3-956, memcon, Scott and Feld, 3 Mar. 1956. 135 On these rumours see UKNA, CO 1030/291, Black to Lennox-Boyd, saving 9, 17 Jan. 1956. On the failure to form a coalition government between the SLF and the Liberal-Socialists see NARA, RG 59, CDF, box 3261, 746F.00/2-2256, Durbrow to Dulles, telegram 824, 22 Feb. 1956; 746F.00/3-656, Singapore to Dulles, telegram 865, 6 Mar. 1956. On the PAP see UKNA, CO 1030/291, Black to Lennox-Boyd, saving 39, 24 Feb. 1956. 133

THE SINGAPORE CONUNDRUM  95

easily to take over in the future”.136 In brief, political opportunism and ideological beliefs forced him to up the ante. On 29 January the SLF General Council passed a resolution seeking independence within the Commonwealth from 1957 but conceding that control of external affairs and defence should remain in British hands.137 Reiterated at regular intervals during the following weeks, such demands would form the centrepiece of the Singapore delegation’s negotiating position at the April conference. The kind of deal the SLF had in mind was a convoluted one: it envisaged independence in principle, followed by a provision allowing external affairs (except trade) and external defence to remain a British responsibility. It was a compromise not only between the SLF’s legitimate political aspirations and its prudential concerns about the colony’s security but also between what it thought realistically achievable and politically desirable. It certainly represented a departure from Marshall’s initial demands for complete internal self-government by 1959. Albeit couched in moderate terms, the SLF’s demands were more radical than they actually appeared to be, for, once independence was conceded in principle, London would have little control over Singapore’s constitutional progress (any Singapore government could later refuse to cede back external affairs and defence to Britain). It was hardly surprising, then, that, in early April, a CO official expressed concerns to the Australian High Commission in London that the “Singapore bid keeps on rising”.138 In the circumstances, framing an Australian response was no easy task. Not only was the nature of the Singapore problem unlikely to lend itself to easy solutions, but British thinking also remained fluid, with uncertainty reigning over British plans (see next section). Unsurprisingly, Australian officials were apprehensive of London’s intentions. A brief prepared for Casey in advance of his return visit to Singapore in mid-March 1956 (Casey was due to visit Singapore and Malaya on his way back from the Karachi SEATO meeting) warned that, in considering British intentions, Canberra should remember that London

136

NARA, RG 59, CDF, box 3261, 746F.00/4-1656, memcon, Durbrow and Marshall, 11 Apr. 1956. On Marshall’s thinking see box 3261, 746F.00/4-2156, Barbour to Dulles, telegram 4796, 21 Apr. 1956. 137 NAA, A1838, 3024/10/1/1 part 1, Singapore to DEA, cablegram 74, 30 Jan. 1956. 138 NAA, A1209, 1957/4313 part 1, London to DEA, cablegram 930, 10 Apr. 1956.

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“before or even until a fairly late stage of the recent Conference on Malaya, intended to go considerably less far in meeting Malayan demands than they later did”.139 Australian suspicions seemed to be borne out when, on 9 March, a high-ranking CO official told McIntyre that while current British thinking remained opposed to conceding full internal self-government, political realities on the ground might force London to go further than originally planned. Naturally, McIntyre found these comments far from reassuring, clearly detecting some degree of wavering in the CO official’s thinking. He immediately wrote to the DEA that while he “found prognostication difficult”, his guess was that, in the end, London would “make substantial concessions” to Marshall on internal security in the hope that he “can hold on and perhaps even consolidate his position”. For McIntyre, if the British concluded that “they must be prepared to give way to Marshall”, it would then be difficult “to hold them back”, “unless we were to accompany our pressure with an offer of support in putting down civil disturbance which presumably we would be unwilling to do”.140 This was hardly the kind of assessment that Canberra hoped to hear. When Casey, accompanied by Plimsoll, returned to Singapore on 13 March, he decided to probe Scott and Black further. While in Karachi, both Casey and Plimsoll had been negatively impressed by Scott’s pessimistic remarks on Singapore’s future.141 The two Australians found his pessimism at odds with the CO’s ostensibly more positive view of the colony’s situation. That the Australians were apprehensive of the CO attitude was evident by the tone of a conversation that Plimsoll had with the American Consul in Singapore, William Anderson, on 14 March. Plimsoll told Anderson that this CO attitude “irritated” Australian officials; he complained that the CO’s claims that the situation in Singapore, while awkward, was improving were simply “hog wash”. In fact, it was “serious and not improving”. The usually softspoken and mild-mannered Plimsoll went further. His frustration was barely concealed. Singapore, he said, was politically “rotten to the core”. This was “largely due to (a) a major miscalculation by the UK in

139

NAA, A1838, 3024/10/1/1 part 1, Notes for Minister’s Visit to Singapore, Mar. 1956, undated. 140 NAA, A1209, 1957/4313 part 1, McIntyre to DEA, cablegram 645, 9 Mar. 1956. 141 NARA, RG59, CDF, box 3261, 746F.0073-2056, Singapore to State Department, despatch 439, 20 Mar. 1956.

THE SINGAPORE CONUNDRUM  97

materially over-estimating the political strength of their ‘friends’ in the old Progressive Party, and (b) either a lack of information concerning the extent of communist subversion in Singapore or an unwillingness to take the required counteraction”. He “personally believed the UK should not transfer additional governing power to an elected government in Singapore at this time and feels the Government of India would subtly encourage the UK to slow down the transfer of power process if Singapore were discussed privately and frankly at a high level as a Commonwealth problem”.142 Australian concerns seemed to find some justification when Casey, Plimsoll and Watt finally met Scott and Black on 14 March. When Casey asked Scott whether McIntyre’s prognostication that the CO might in the end decide to accommodate Marshall, the CommissionerGeneral candidly replied that he was “in general agreement with McIntyre’s assessment of the situation” although he “hoped very much” that his government would make no significant concession to Marshall.143 Governor Black hardly sounded more reassuring. He told the Australian party that he “did not go as far as Sir Robert Scott in feeling that the time might have come to call a halt [to the devolution of power in Singapore]”. He was no doubt “aware of the serious consequences of giving still more self-government to Singapore”. Yet, he recognised that “the consequences of refusing to go any further were also very unpleasant”. Casey and Plimsoll must have found these remarks somewhat disconcerting for Black later claimed that he “never knew what emergency might blow up [in Singapore]. He could conceivably have to invoke Governor’s Rule this afternoon”.144 Alarmed by the pessimistic picture painted by the two British officials and apprehensive of the CO attitude, the DEA immediately approached the CRO to seek further clarification. It also requested an urgent Cabinet meeting to consider Australia’s position in the light of emerging concerns over Singapore’s internal situation.145

142

NARA, RG59, CDF, box 3261, 746F.0073-2056, memcon, Plimsoll, Eastman and Anderson, 14 Mar. 1956. 143 NAA, A1838, 3024/10/1/1 part 1, memcon, Casey, Watt, Plimsoll and Scott, 14 Mar. 1956. 144 Ibid. 145 NAA, A1209, 1957/4313 part 1, Spicer to Menzies, undated; DEA to London, cablegram 538, 15 Mar. 1956.

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With Cabinet due to meet on 23 March and before leaving for his next diplomatic posting in Tokyo at the end of March, Watt felt that the time had come to express firm views on the sort of approach that Canberra might want to pursue in relation to Singapore. Ever so cautious a diplomat — Menzies described him a “belt and braces” man146 —  he had, until now, essentially sought to familiarise his superiors with the intricacies of Singaporean politics and the risks involved in any course of action. On 16 and 20 March he filed two reports to Casey, each outlining the case for a flexible approach to Marshall’s demands. The case for granting a substantial degree of self-government to Singapore, he conceded, was “much weaker than the case in respect of the Federation of Malaya” and the dangers of doing so much greater. Despite this he was inclined to accept  —  if only “somewhat reluctantly” and “after considerable hesitation” — that, on balance, accepting Marshall’s demands carried a lesser risk than resisting them. In Watt’s view, if Marshall resigned following a negative result at the April conference, the most likely scenario would be either new elections or the reimposition of Governor’s rule. Neither scenario would accord with Australian interests. In the event of new elections, every political party would campaign for independence. It was impossible to foresee which party would gain the most from playing the nationalist card, but it was clear to Watt that any party returned to power would claim at least as much as Marshall was expected to demand in London (with the PAP undoubtedly asking more). In that eventuality, London would come under increasing pressure to make further concessions and reverse the tough policy that had led to Marshall’s resignation in the first place. If, however, there were to be no new elections and Governor’s rule were to be reintroduced immediately, all political parties would be strongly critical of British actions. In all likelihood, the communist and procommunist elements in Singapore would seize on this opportunity to launch a campaign of violence by exploiting front organisations such as the PAP. Widespread disturbances could be suppressed, but at what cost? And how practicable was it to run Singapore without the present Chief Minister? What sort of Singapore could be held by “sitting on bayonets”? Watt also noted that “the most important aspect of such

146

Woodard, “Watt, Sir Alan Stewart (1901–1988)”.

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state of affairs is that there would be no visible point of recovery to start the constitutional process once again”. Things, of course, could go wrong even if London met Marshall’s requests. Watt, however, felt that if, in the end, Singapore had to be held by force, it would be better to do so “as a result of breakdown in the working of a Liberal Constitutional policy with a local political party actually in power at the time”. The use of force, in other words, would be “much easier” to justify before world opinion if an elected government proved incapable of maintaining law and order after it had been granted control over internal security. Watt’s long-term answer to the Singapore conundrum remained a merger with Malaya. In the shorter term, however, his preferred solution was one in which Britain retained control over external affairs and defence while the Singapore government took over internal security, provided that London secured Marshall’s commitment to implement measures needed to allow him to maintain law and order. Watt was vague on the specifics but cautiously added that even if Marshall did agree to honour that commitment, a formula might have to be found “to give the United Kingdom the right of ‘re-entry’ if the situation in Singapore does in fact get out of hand”. If, however, Marshall refused to take the necessary steps to maintain law and order, then control of internal security should not be relinquished, and Britain and Australia should be prepared to “face the risk of his resignation”.147 Yet, as he warned External Affairs in another cable despatched on the eve of the 23 March Cabinet meeting, before reaching this point, Canberra should keep well in mind the “difficulty of advising [the] United Kingdom to carry out policy which may lead to Marshall’s resignation, unless at the same time Australia is prepared to offer assistance, if necessary[,] in putting down disorder”. Providing assistance to the British, however, would not be without significant political risks. As the departing Commissioner pointed out, the “use of “White Australian” troops to suppress disorder is a far more difficult operation in Asia than the use of British forces and could substantially embarrass our friendly relations with Asian countries including Singapore and Malaya”.148

147

NAA, A1838, 3024/10/1/1 part 1, Singapore: Submission for the Minister by Watt, 16 Mar. 1956; Watt to Casey and Tange, cablegram 224, 20 Mar. 1956. 148 NAA, A1209, 1957/4313 part 1, Singapore to DEA, cablegram 233, 22 Mar. 1956.

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Much of Watt’s advice found its way into a Cabinet submission that External Affairs put before ministers on 23 March when they gathered to discuss the Singapore problem. If ministers needed any further reminding of Singapore’s fluid and potentially combustible internal situation, the incidents that had taken place at the end of “merdeka week” only a few days earlier, no doubt provided such a reminder. On 18 March, Marshall’s attempts to convince a visiting British parliamentary delegation of the strength of local nationalist feeling ended in an embarrassing fiasco when a mass rally at the old Kallang Airport turned violent, with sections of the crowd attacking the police with merdeka banners, bottles and sticks and the latter responding with baton charges. The visiting British MPs were rushed away by the police.149 While there was no evidence that the disorders were the result of a premeditated plot by communist or pro-communist elements, the incident underscored not only the risks inherent in a climate of whipped-up anticolonial passions (the PAP, incidentally, had played a prominent role in stirring up those passions), but also the potential for race-related clashes (the Singapore’s Malay community was said to have “recoiled” against attacks by Chinese demonstrators on Malay policemen). Inevitably, the merdeka week contributed to raising fresh doubts about the advisability of meeting Marshall’s demands. Yet, despite betraying some deep anxiety about the local situation, the DEA submission rejected any facile conclusion. In it Casey argued, quite predictably, that political instability made self-rule for Singapore a much more difficult proposition than for Malaya. The likelihood that any concession made to Marshall might, in due course, be exploited by a successor government of dubious credentials was “real” enough. Accommodating Marshall, therefore, presented considerable dangers, yet the risks involved in a tough British line were no less significant. Unless he obtained what he wanted, he would resign. His resignation would lead to unrest and open the way to communist influence. The only realistic solution to Singapore’s woes lay in a merger with Malaya. The Tunku was not “enthusiastic” about it, but he did not “contest it”. For now, nothing should be done “to make such union more difficult or even impossible”.150

149

UKNA, CO 1030/240, Singapore Local Intelligence Committee  –  Report for the Period 17–29 Mar. 1956. 150 NAA, A4940, C1524, Cabinet submission 92, 21 Mar. 1956.

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In all this, Australia had the opportunity to affect the formulation of British policy “at a relatively early stage”. In doing so, Cabinet should acknowledge that it was “clearly impracticable” for London to avoid all concessions. Clearly heeding Watt’s advice, Casey also warned his colleagues against playing a leading role in resisting Marshall’s demands. All things considered, Casey favoured a moderate course of action. What he envisaged was the grant of full internal self-government with the exception of defence, foreign affairs and internal security. In this latter area, however, London should agree to devolve increasing authority to the Singaporeans, beginning with “some administrative direction” of the police and “responsibility for recruiting and organising an adequate local force”. In any event, the British government should retain its right to suspend the Constitution and reimpose direct rule, should the elected government prove incapable of maintaining order. That said, London should also be ready to consider further devolution of power at a future conference to be held in the second half of 1957. Casey hoped that, by then, the Tunku would be willing to consider closer association with Singapore and discussions to this end “should take place as soon as practicable” after the grant of Malayan independence in August 1957.151 All in all, the External Affairs submission tried to steer a cautious course between two opposing dangers — that London might decide to be either too accommodating or too tough with Marshall. Similarly, it was also an attempt to strike a balance between the need to bolster the position of Singapore’s moderates by acceding to some of their demands for greater self-government and the government’s firmly held belief that a viable Western defence strategy in Southeast Asia still required a continuing British presence on the island.152 Last but not least, the DEA’s approach outlined by Casey was clearly aimed at buying time until the day the Federation was ready to discuss, in earnest, closer association with Singapore. Far from resisting Singapore’s transition to self-rule, the DEA was prepared to acquiesce to it as long as the island could be kept firmly anchored to the West. This approach, however, was not without potential drawbacks, as Casey himself had recognised

151

Ibid.; Benvenuti, “Marshall Experiment”, pp. 271–2. See for instance NAA, A5954, 1403/4, Future Defence Arrangements with Malaya and Singapore: Report by the Defence Committee, 20 Mar. 1956.

152

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in the submission. It rested on two rather questionable preconditions —  a (hopefully) more forthcoming Malayan attitude towards merger and the ability of Singapore’s moderates to stay in power long enough to see such merger through. Unfortunately, there was no certainty that the Marshall government would be able to do so, and even if it did, there was no telling whether Malaya would indeed wish to go ahead with merger once it achieved independence. Similar concerns were echoed in a note to the External Affairs submission prepared by the Prime Minister’s Department (PMD). Drafted by Maurice Timbs, an Assistant Secretary in the PMD’s Cabinet Division, the document accepted most of Casey’s recommendations (and, above all, the notion that merger was “perhaps the only way” in which the military security of the Malayan region could be “guaranteed”), but it was more cautious in its conclusions, believing that, at this stage, the government should not urge London to commit to discussing further devolution of power in areas such as internal security, external affairs and defence at a future constitutional conference to be held in 1957.153 Until the colony’s future was clearer, it would be too unsafe to devolve further power to the elected local government. Unlike Malaya, Singapore had “no armed forces to support the civil power”. The only forces available to restore law and order in the event of major disturbances were Commonwealth troops and “no country”, Timbs argued, “would willingly place itself in the position of accepting the odium of employing troops in civil disturbances unless it was also able to decide when and whether troops would be employed”. In conclusion, Timbs advised the ministers to wait for the Eden government to reveal its negotiating hand before making their position known. If the ministers moved before the British did, Australia would risk being exposed to the charge that the British “have adopted a particular policy at our suggestions and therefore we should help them give effect to it”. As Timbs put it, if the British were allowed to say that “they had accepted our advice …  154 would they not be equally entitled to ask for Australian troops?”  In spite of being generally keener than External Affairs to stress the

153 154

NAA, A4940, C1524, Notes on Cabinet submission 92, undated. Ibid.; Benvenuti, “Marshall Experiment”, p. 273.

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significance of close Anglo-Australian relations, the PMD had no wish to see Australian troops become involved in Singapore in support of the colonial power.155 While still awaiting an indication of British intentions, ministers avoided reaching any firm conclusion, but agreed to let Menzies and Casey decide when and in what form a message should be despatched to Eden.156 Eventually, London’s much awaited clarifications arrived on 24 March and bore Lord Home’s signature.157 In his message, the Commonwealth Secretary tried to sound reassuring. Despite indicating that Cabinet had not yet decided on the line to take at the April conference, Home made clear that the British government ruled out outright independence for Singapore. The colony was simply too small to stand on its own and its emancipation from colonial rule could only come through a merger with Malaya. This development, however, could “not be forced” and, until the time was ripe for it, the island was to remain under British tutelage. Accordingly, British policy was “to retain sufficient degree of control to prevent seizure of power by Communist elements in Singapore during the interim period before closer association with the Federation of Malaya is agreed”. “This”, Home argued, was “necessary not only to secure stable conditions on which the Colony of Singapore depends for its livelihood but also to safeguard our defence interests in the Singapore base”. Within these limits, the British government was prepared to consider a “greater degree of internal self-government” and accept, in principle, the removal of all appointed members from the Executive Council and Legislative Assembly, an increase in the latter’s size and the abandonment of the word “colony” to describe Singapore’s constitutional status. He hoped that these concessions would be enough to meet Marshall’s aspirations. In any case, Britain was not willing to accommodate Marshall at all cost, nor was it prepared to “buy time by conceding anything vital to the security of Singapore and our bases there”. If Marshall’s resignation led to serious

155

Ibid. NAA, A4940, C1524, Cabinet decision 107, 23 Mar. 1956; A1209, 1957/4313 part 1, Brown to Menzies, 27 Mar. 1956. 157 NAA, A1209, 1957/4313 part 1, London to Menzies, cablegram 795, 23 Mar. 1956. 156

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unrest, Britain would be ready to ride the storm by suspending the Constitution. “Consideration”, he said, had “already been given to providing means to deal with any serious disorders”.158 Lord Home’s clarifications were reasonably well received in Canberra. In a note to the Prime Minister, PMD Secretary Allen Brown remarked with satisfaction that British and Australian views on Singapore were broadly similar. Hence, in conveying Australian ministerial thinking to the British, Brown thought a very brief reply would suffice, arguing that “that in a problem so difficult as this one we should [not] try to teach anyone to suck eggs”.159 Menzies, however, saw things somewhat differently. Far from perfunctory, his reply to Eden on 27 March was a detailed expression of Australian ministerial views on the sort of deal that Australia wished to see emerge from the April conference. In it, Menzies incorporated Casey’s arguments (and recommendations) for a moderately helpful approach to Marshall, envisaging a two-stage solution with both long-term and short-term elements. As for the first, Marshall should be told that: while the United Kingdom accepts the principle of self-government for Singapore it considers that the conception of Singapore as a city state with a separate political, economic and military entity is not realistic. The aim should therefore be the integration with the Federation of Malaya and discussions to this end might take place as soon as practicable after Malaya attains independence.

Menzies did not conceal that there were “obvious arguments” for and against Singapore’s integration with Malaya, but the Australian government felt that, all things considered, the arguments in favour of integration “should prevail”. With this objective in mind, no arrangements on citizenship, franchise and nationality should be made at the forthcoming London conference that would make the “eventual integration of these two territories more difficult”. To stress the importance of this point, and to emphasise the urgency with which Australia treated the idea of merger, he made it clear that he did not use the word “integration” as “a term of art, but rather as indicating some organic association between

158 159

Ibid. NAA, A1209, 1957/4313 part 1, Brown to Menzies, 27 Mar. 1956.

THE SINGAPORE CONUNDRUM  105

Singapore and the Malayan Federation”. In the interim (and this was really the short-term element of the plan), however, some concessions to Marshall would have to be considered. His demands for greater selfgovernment such as a fully elected Legislative Assembly and the “extension of the field of authority” of elected ministers could, for instance, be met. So could some degree of Singaporean control over internal security. In addition, London could commit to holding a further constitutional conference on Singapore’s future once Malaya had secured independence. Menzies hoped that a policy along these lines might “give Marshall enough to take home so that his resignation could be avoided”. To this end, Menzies concluded, London may want to consider seeking “the support of Nehru and other Asian leaders in bringing Marshall to a policy of moderation and realism”.160 Home’s message should have reassured the Australians, but it failed to do so. In early and mid-April, the DEA remained nervous about the outcome of the forthcoming Anglo-Singaporean constitutional conference. What worried External Affairs was not simply the news that, on 6 April, Singapore’s Legislative Assembly had endorsed a resolution instructing an all-party delegation led by Marshall to seek independence within the Commonwealth. Although the Liberal-Socialists favoured safeguards enabling Commonwealth forces to restore law and order in the event of major disturbances, both the SLF and PAP demanded full control of internal security, thus signalling that there appeared to be little flexibility in the Singapore delegation’s position.161 Also worrying were the signs, as Percy Spender reported from Washington, that the lines seemed to be “crossed” between the British and American governments on the situation in Singapore (and Malaya).162 The Australian Ambassador was apparently concerned that British reluctance to consult with the Americans might be attributable to the fact that London was really considering making concessions that went beyond what Washington and Canberra regarded as acceptable.163 On 4 April, Spender broached the issue of Singapore (and Malaya) at the highest

160

NAA, NAA, 1956. 162 NAA, 163 NAA, 161

A1209, 1957/4313 part 1, DEA to London, cablegram 616, 27 Mar. 1956. A1838, 3024/10/1/1 part 1, Singapore to DEA, cablegram 253, 6 Apr. A5954, 1403/4, Spender to DEA, savingram 97, 26 Mar. 1956. A1209, 1957/4313 part 2, Beveridge to Timbs, 7 May 1956.

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level with Dulles. As he suspected, there had been neither high-level Anglo-American consultations, nor attempts to coordinate policy in the Malayan peninsula. More importantly, he learned that the Eisenhower administration, like his government, had been “concerned for some time about the sensitive and difficult problem of Singapore”.164 In fact, as the Australian Commission in Singapore had already reported to Canberra, the Americans had taken “a somewhat alarmist view of any Communist activity” in Singapore and were “notoriously impatient of the British technique of ‘muddling through’”.165 Quite revealingly, Spender told Dulles that, for all their assurances, the British might find it quite difficult to resist Singapore demands for independence. After all, he observed, at the recent Anglo-Malayan constitutional conference, “Rahman got all he wanted by 1957 whereas many people had thought date for independence might be later”. Australia, he curiously claimed, “had no clear idea how the UK should proceed”, but felt it should consult with the US “to determine to what extent the two governments could work together on this problem”. Dulles wasted no time reassuring Spender.166 He certainly shared Spender’s view that London should not rush into making far-reaching concessions. “We should”, the Secretary of State said, “not turn Singapore loose until we are pretty sure we can keep the Communists out”. If Singapore went communist, instability could spread to neighbouring Malaya and Indonesia. The administration had seriously considered taking the question up with the British but it had so far desisted from doing so, lest it be seen as meddling in British colonial affairs. However, he agreed with Spender that “a high-level approach to the UK” would be desirable and that this “might take the form of a joint effort on the part of the US and Australia”. He, therefore, suggested that, given its strong interest in Southeast Asia, Australia

164

NAA, A1209, 1957/4313 part 1, Spender to DEA, cablegram 331, 4 Apr. 1956; Washington to DEA, savingram 107, 5 Apr. 1956; NARA, RG 59, CDF, box 3261, 746F.00/4-456, memcon, Dulles and Spender, 4 Apr. 1956. 165 NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 3, Eastman to Tange, memorandum 166, 21 Jan. 1956. 166 NAA, A1209, 1957/4313 part 1, Spender to DEA, cablegram 331, 4 Apr. 1956; Washington to DEA, savingram 107, 5 Apr. 1956; NARA, RG 59, CDF, box 3261, 746F.00/4-456, memcon, Dulles and Spender, 4 Apr. 1956.

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take the lead in sounding out the British on the desirability of highlevel Anglo-American talks.167 The Australians needed no further prompting. In mid-April Casey instructed McIntyre to impress on the British Australia’s desire to see greater Anglo-American coordination on Singapore (and Malaya). While Australia had no desire, Casey told McIntyre, “to get out of step with United Kingdom in dealing with the Americans on this subject”, the US had a clear long-term interest in the security of the Malayan peninsula and, hence, “the groundwork should be laid now for promoting constructive association between the Federation-and-Singapore and the United States”. As he made it plain in a personal message to Foreign Secretary Lloyd a few days later: [T]he simple fact is that we cannot leave them out of account in anything of consequence that happens in this general part of the world – as they have such great military forces in this general area – many times more than the rest of us put together. In addition great Naval Bases do not grow on every tree – and if there is any chance of the usefulness of the Singapore Naval Base being diminished in the future (and I would believe that there is every such possibility), then I would believe that the United States should know as much as we all know about it – and what the future may hold.168

Although he kept quiet on this, Casey might have had a further reason for wishing to keep the Americans in the loop: with Canberra still apprehensive that London might go too far in accommodating Marshall, American arguments might well help stiffen British spines.169 When McIntyre approached senior British officials, he found them sympathetic

167

NAA, A1209, 1957/4313 part 1, Washington to DEA, cablegram 331, 4 Apr. 1956; Washington to DEA, savingram 107, 5 Apr. 1956; NARA, RG 59, CDF, box 3261, 746F.00/4-456, memcon, Dulles and Spender, 4 Apr. 1956; Andrea Benvenuti, “The Eisenhower Administration and the Decolonization of Singapore”, Review of Safe for Decolonization: The Eisenhower Administration, Britain, and Singapore, by S.R. Joey Long, Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 2011, Diplomatic History 37, 1 (2013): 182. 168 NAA, A1838, 3024/10/1/1 part 1, Casey to Lloyd, 18 Apr. 1956. 169 NAA, A1209, 1957/4313 part 1, Casey to McIntyre, cablegram 723, 12 Apr. 1956.

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to the idea of closer consultation with the Americans. Saville Garner of the CRO told McIntyre that he “was preaching to the converted”. Even the representative of the CO, a department traditionally averse to discussing colonial policy with Britain’s partners, appeared “receptive”.170 Yet, as it became soon apparent to the Americans, the British had no intention of engaging in wide-ranging discussions with them.171

The April 1956 Constitutional Conference and its Aftermath In truth, Australian (and American) anxieties over London’s approach to the negotiations with the Singaporean delegation were somewhat overblown. As the Australian government assessed the state of the play in Singapore and weighed up its options, British ministers and officials were coming to similar conclusions.172 Unsurprisingly, therefore, when Lennox-Boyd met his ministerial colleagues on 17 April to finalise Britain’s negotiating position in the lead-up to the Anglo-Singaporean constitutional conference, his views were broadly in line with Australian ones. As he told Cabinet, he, like the Governor of Singapore, readily recognised that Singapore had “all the elements of another ‘Cyprus’” and that a refusal to meet Marshall’s demands “could quickly lead to a ‘Saigon’ situation in the Island with our scattered facilities the targets for strikes and sabotage and our own people living behind barbed wire”. He shared Black’s concerns that Britain might also “well incur the odium of the neighbouring Asian States”.173 He was also well aware that communism would “be at work in fertile soil under any repressive form of government”. As he had pointed out on previous occasions, he conceded that Britain could not “but recognise that over the last ten years Asian nationalism has created such pressures that it would be idle to think we could control them at will”. Yet, as he hastened to remind his colleagues, the government had “to take grave account of the importance of Singapore as part of the defence system of the free world

170

NAA, A1209, 1957/4313 part 1, McIntyre to Casey, cablegram 971, 13 Apr. 1956. 171 Long, Safe for Decolonization, pp. 43–5. 172 UKNA, CAB 128/30, CM(56)25th mtg, 27 Mar. 1956; CAB 129/80, CP(56) 85, 23 Mar. 1956; CAB 128/30, CM(56)29th mtg, 17 Apr. 1956; CAB 129/80, CP(56)97, 14 Apr. 1956; see also Benvenuti, “Marshall Experiment”, pp. 273–4. 173 UKNA, CAB 129/80, CP(56)97, 14 Apr. 1956. For Black’s views see PREM 11/1307, Black to Lennox-Boyd, telegram 93, 19 Mar. 1956.

THE SINGAPORE CONUNDRUM  109

and as the logistic base for Commonwealth troops in the Federation of Malaya”. “Not only”, he argued, had Britain an obligation “to ensure that Singapore does not become a prey to the Communist advance in Asia, and to see that its incomparable facilities are available for the defence of the free world”. It also had “a responsibility towards Australia and New Zealand”. Southeast Asia was “the front line of their defence and I think we would have their support and that of the American in refusing a complete handover”. On these grounds, he concluded, Britain could not grant independence at his stage despite the evident risks inherent in such course of action. With that in mind, the British government should nonetheless “go a long way in what we offer to the [Singapore] delegation” so that if there were a break at the forthcoming talks, Britain would be better able to counter domestic and international criticism.174 In an earlier paper submitted to Cabinet on 27 March, he had emphatically dismissed the idea of a fully independent Singapore as “a delusion” for, with its large population and no resources, the colony stood no chance of becoming a viable independent state. Merger with the Federation remained the best long-term solution for Singapore “unless we are prepared to see it become an independent Chinese outpost at the strategic heart of South-East Asia”.175 Eden, who had been “impressed” by Scott’s arguments that too rapid a devolution of power would irremediably erode Britain’s regional defence position, concurred that Britain could “not relax control over internal security” and was supportive of Lennox-Boyd’s position.176 So was Cabinet. Senior ministers broadly agreed to a package of proposals that would provide the basis for negotiations with Marshall. Chief among these proposals was an agreement to change the title of Singapore from colony to “state” or “free city”, to replace the office of “governor” with that of “high commissioner” and to abolish the nominated and ex-officio members of the Council of Ministers and the Legislative Assembly (and in the Legislative Assembly the number elected members would be increased from 25 to 50).177 In addition, Britain

174

UKNA, CAB 129/80, CP(56)97, 14 Apr. 1956. UKNA, CAB 129/80, CP(56)85, 23 Mar. 1956. 176 UKNA, CAB 195/14, CM 25(56), 27 Mar. 1956. For Scott’s arguments see PREM 11/1307, Scott to Eden, 8 Mar. 1956. 177 UKNA, CAB 129/80, CP(56)97, 14 Apr. 1956; CAB 128/30, CM(56)27th mtg, 17 Apr. 1956. 175

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would retain control over defence and foreign affairs (but trade relations with foreign countries would be delegated, as much as possible, to the Singapore government). More importantly, in the controversial area of internal security, police matters would be transferred to the portfolio of the Chief Minister. The new high commissioner, however, would retain reserve powers and, in the event of an emergency, the ultimate control over the use of troops and police; local ministers would be associated with it through an advisory defence council under the chairmanship of the new high commissioner.178 Crucially, however, Cabinet demanded that these proposals on internal security be “stiffened up” by granting the new high commissioner the right to “veto any proposals affecting internal security which, in his opinion, would prejudice the defence interests of the United Kingdom or other Commonwealth Governments or to require such action to be taken relating to internal security as seemed to him to be necessary to safeguard those interests”.179 Whitehall officials knew that this would be a hard sell. As Eden’s Cabinet Secretary Norman Brook told his prime minister, “[t]his is a pretty tough proposal. I do not see how we can possibly ask for more. And I should imagine that Mr. Marshall will be unable to accept it”.180 As to be expected, Lennox-Boyd’s proposals, while conceding more than the British would have been prepared to accept only a few months earlier, were destined to fall short of Marshall’s expectations. In a memorandum sent to the British government just before the opening of the London conference on 23 April 1956, the Chief Minister made a strong case for the grant of independence (“full self-government”, as he called it) within the Commonwealth. In it, Marshall rejected the argument that Singapore should be denied independence on grounds of sheer size: at present, the memorandum read, there were seven UN members with a population smaller than that of Singapore. No less than 16 of them had annual revenues smaller than Singapore’s. Singaporeans, the memorandum went on, were no less “competent to govern themselves than the people of the mainland [Malaya]”, nor was the threat

178

Ibid.; UKNA, CAB 129/80, CP(56)97, 14 Apr. 1956. UKNA, PREM 11/1802, Brook to Eden, 17 Apr. 1956; CAB 128/30, CM(56)27th mtg, 17 Apr. 1956. 180 UKNA, PREM 11/1802, CRO to Canberra, telegram 713, 17 Apr. 1956; CAB 128/30, CM(56)27th mtg, 17 Apr. 1956. 179

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to internal security more serious in the colony than in the Federation. And yet, in Malaya the British had agreed to “make every effort to bring about full self-government and independence within the Commonwealth by the 1st of August 1957”. Independence was “at least as necessary in Singapore as it is in the Federation” if communist subversion was to be defeated. Lastly, the memorandum claimed that British defence interests in Singapore should be no impediment to the grant of independence. Concerns that these interests would be undermined by a transfer of power were groundless. If anything, it was the very continuation of colonial rule that would prevent Britain taking full advantage of Singapore’s strategic position.181 After having set out the general principles, Marshall’s memorandum also laid down, in detail, the list of demands that the Singapore allparty delegation intended to make. If further proof were ever needed that Marshall had Malaya’s rapid constitutional advance very much in mind when he began agitating for greater self-government, the memorandum no doubt provided it. The memorandum not only sought independence from 1 April 1957 (roughly four months earlier than Malaya’s own target date) but further demanded that responsibility for relations between Britain and Singapore be transferred from the CO to the CRO. As expected, it still envisaged British “guidance” in external affairs (except commerce and trade) and control over defence. Britain would also be granted the right to maintain forces in Singapore.182 Responsibility for internal security, however, would pass to the Singapore government, with Britain retaining the right to suspend the Constitution as a last resort. A new Defence Council, with equal British and Singaporean representation, would be set up to “demarcate” responsibilities between defence and internal security.183 In the event of a major emergency the Singapore government would be entitled to appeal to it for military assistance to maintain or restore law and order, and, in such circumstances, Commonwealth forces would be expected to be placed at the service of the Singapore government. Less controversially, Marshall’s

181

UKNA, CAB 129/80, CP(56)97, 14 Apr. 1956. Under this memorandum, other Commonwealth nations could be allowed to station troops in Singapore subject to the approval of the local government. 183 Such a “demarcation” would need the Singapore government’s consent. 182

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memorandum also demanded the appointment of a governor-general representing the Queen, the replacement of the governor with a different diplomatic officer as Her Majesty government’s representative in Singapore and a fully elected Legislative Assembly with its membership increased from 25 to 50 members. Provision for a Singapore citizenship should also be introduced. Lastly, the document made also clear that nothing should be done to undermine the prospect of a merger between Malaya and Singapore.184 With both parties showing little willingness to shift on the crucial issues of independence and internal security, negotiations in London proceeded slowly. Throughout the talks, Marshall refused to concede the point that the governor (or high commissioner)’s reserve powers would need to go beyond the mere right to suspend the Constitution.185 Following British objections, on 1 May, Marshall put forward a revised proposal, whose main concessions were acceptance of British “control” over (instead of “guidance” in) external affairs, the establishment of a Defence and Security Council for a strictly transitional period of no more than six years and a somewhat less stricter interpretation of Britain’s reserve powers: under these new terms, the British government would be allowed to suspend the Constitution if and when it deemed this necessary, provided that internal security had so deteriorated as to threaten the effectiveness of its defence installations on the island or the Singapore government had acted in contravention of the Constitution.186 Predictably enough, on 3 May, British senior ministers found this proposal no more palatable than the previous one because, while it marginally extended the scope of Britain’s reserve powers, it made their exercise (and ultimately, Britain’s control over internal security) conditional upon a strict time limit of no more than six years. On internal security, ministers also agreed with Lennox-Boyd that the British high commissioner (formerly governor) must “have reserve powers to take either executive action or legislative action  …  before a situation arose in which he had to use the ultimate sanction of suspending the whole

184

UKNA, CAB 129/80, CP(56)97, 14 Apr. 1956. NAA, A1209, 1957/4313 part 2, Singapore Constitutional Conference, undated. 186 UKNA, DO 35/9871, Memorandum of the Singapore Delegation on the Statement of the Secretary of State and in Amplification of the Draft Independence Bill (Appendix 6), attachment to Singapore Constitutional Conference, Cmd. 9777.

185

THE SINGAPORE CONUNDRUM  113

constitution”. “We can’t”, Eden argued, summing up the discussion on internal security, “accept … [a position] in which we have no power to intervene save in emergency: surely we [could] convince them that we don’t want always to have to use hammer to crack nuts”. Cabinet discussion also revealed lingering doubts, among some ministers, about the wisdom of pressing now for merger between Malaya and Singapore. Lastly, ministers objected to the delegation’s insistence on the word “independence”. In winding up Cabinet discussion, ministers agreed to make a “firm stand” on both internal security and independence, making it clear that unless the Singapore delegation were prepared to concede on these points, the talks should be called off.187 With the constitutional conference now hanging in the balance, the ball was back in Marshall’s court. Initially, his negotiating stance showed signs of further softening, yet it soon became apparent that he was as far as ever from recognising Britain’s right to intervene in Singapore short of an emergency.188 With no agreement in sight, the constitutional talks broke down on 15 May. An eleventh-hour attempt made by Marshall on 16 May to salvage the talks by accepting greater British reserve powers (provided they were subject to the approval of the House of Commons) proved unsuccessful.189 On the evening of 17 May Marshall complained that “a great opportunity had been lost: an opportunity to make friends with the people of Asia” and then announced his intention to resign upon his return to Singapore.190 International reactions were relatively subdued. If the Asian press was generally critical of London’s handling of the Singapore question, India and other non-communist governments across the region privately

187

UKNA, CAB 128/30, CM(56)33rd mtg, 3 May 1956; CAB 195/14, CM(33)56, 3 May 1956. 188 UKNA, 128/30, CM(56)35th mtg, 10 May 1956; CAB 195/14, CM(35)56, 10 May 1956; UKNA, DO 35/9871, Memorandum of the Singapore Delegation on the Statement of the Secretary of State and in Amplification of the Draft Independence Bill (Appendix 9), attachment to Singapore Constitutional Conference, Cmd. 9777. 189 UKNA, CAB 128/30, CM(56) 37th mtg, 17 May 1956; NAA, A1209, 1957/4313 part 3, Developments since the Failure of the Singapore Constitutional Talks in London, undated. 190 Times, 17 May 1956.

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showed significant understanding.191 Already in the spring of 1956, the British, well aware of Indian influence and prestige in Southeast Asia, had put out feelers to ascertain the Indian government’s likely reaction to an eventual breakdown. They reassuringly concluded that “India was lying low, and was unlikely to be difficult, except perhaps for one of two people like Krishna Menon”.192 Prime Minister Nehru was said to be satisfied with the way in which the British were handling constitutional matters in Malaya and Singapore, and had already let it be known that “while he had a great respect for Mr. Marshall’s capacity and earnestness”, he regarded him as “impulsive and politically inexperienced”.193 Concerned with what it regarded as the “high degree of Chinese Communist subversion” in the colony and the “basic instability” of Singapore’s elected government, New Delhi was opposed to a rapid transfer of power. In explaining his government’s position to the American diplomatic mission in Singapore, Indian Commissioner R.K. Tandon claimed that Singapore’s independence could only come about through a merger with Malaya, adding, quite revealingly, that the strategic interests of India and SEATO might in fact “coincide in Singapore to the extent that Singapore should not be allowed to fall under Communist control”.194 In Pakistan Prime Minister Chaudhri Mohamad Ali told the Australian High Commission that he and his colleagues had not been impressed by Marshall and that his government would have viewed with concern any decision, on the part of Britain, to relinquish all responsibility for internal security to the Singapore government.195 In Sri Lanka, the new left-wing government of S.W.R.D.

191

Benvenuti, “Marshall Experiment”, p. 276; NAA, A1945, 248/10/3, DEA to all posts, savingram 10, 21 June 1956; A1838, TS696/6/1 part 2, Manila to DEA, cablegram 87, 18 June 1956; A1945, 248/10/3, Delhi to DEA, cablegram 118, 29 May 1956; A1209, 1957/4313 part 3, Delhi to DEA, cablegram 101, 17 May 1956; Colombo to DEA, cablegram 128, 19 May 1956; Saigon to DEA, savingram 48, 19 May 1956; A1838, 169/11/108, Karachi to Tange, memorandum 560/56, 25 May 1956. 192 NAA, A1838, 3024/10/1/1 part 1, Plimsoll to Tange, memo JP  –  A/1, 3 Mar. 1956. 193 NAA, A1838, 169/11/108, Delhi to DEA, savingram 14, 6 Mar. 1956. 194 NARA, RG 59, CDF, box 3261, 746F.00/7-556, Singapore to State Department, telegram 8, 5 July 1956; memcon, Tandon and Anderson, 28 June 1956. 195 NAA, A1838, 169/11/108, Karachi to Tange, memorandum 560/56, 25 May 1956.

THE SINGAPORE CONUNDRUM  115

Bandaranaike publicly supported Britain’s negotiating stance despite its already evident neutralist leanings following his announcement in April 1956 that the British would have to vacate their Ceylonese naval and air bases at Trincomalee and Katunayake.196 No more forthcoming towards Marshall were Singapore’s neighbours, Indonesia and Malaya. In Jakarta, Singapore’s independence drew little apparent interest, with the Indonesian embassy in Canberra, nonetheless, betraying “concern about the growth of Communism in Singapore”.197 In Kuala Lumpur reactions were also subdued. 198 Critchley had already prognosticated that an eventual failure of Marshall’s merdeka mission “would be received quietly in the Federation”. “Most Malays”, he said, “would not be greatly concerned and a good many would even be pleased”.199 When the talks finally collapsed, his predictions proved right. On 16 May the Tunku sent Lennox-Boyd a sympathetic note, reassuring him that “the fact that you were doing your best to prevent a breakdown was evident to us here”.200 In public, the Menzies government supported the CO’s conduct at the constitutional conference.201 British policy, however, came in for some criticism from the Labor Opposition. On 16 May, ALP leader Herbert Evatt told Parliament that the British promise of selfgovernment was meaningless without Britain relinquishing control over internal security. He questioned claims that Marshall would not be able to maintain law and order in the colony and condemned the CO’s handling of the negotiations, arguing that “such niggardly approach” was “a danger not only to Singapore but to the whole British Commonwealth”. During question time on 6 June, he then sought to turn the spotlight on the Australian government by asking Casey whether it

196

NAA, A1209, 1957/4313 part 3, Colombo to DEA, cablegram 128, 19 May 1956. 197 NAA, A1945, 248/10/3, DEA to all posts, savingram 10, 21 June 1956; Benvenuti, “Marshall Experiment”, p. 276. 198 Ibid. 199 NAA, A1838, 3024/10/1/1 part 1, Critchley to Tange, memorandum 341/56, 4 Apr. 1956. 200 UKNA, PREM 11/1802, McGillivray to Lennox-Boyd, telegram 322, 16 May 1956. 201 NAA, A1838, TS696/6/1 part 2, DEA to various posts, unnumbered cablegram, 17 May 1956; Benvenuti, “Marshall Experiment”, p. 276.

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was true that Canberra had put pressure on the British to turn down Marshall’s proposals.202 Refusing a parliamentary debate, Casey replied laconically that the government “took a balanced[,] sympathetic view of the aspirations of Mr. Marshall and his Government”.203 In the end, however, notwithstanding Evatt’s attempts to embarrass the government, the British had come to their independent conclusions: despite their genuine concerns that Marshall’s resignation might spark off widespread disturbances in Singapore, his political survival was simply not worth any price, especially if such price meant relinquishing control over internal security. Rather than seeing this happen, the Eden government let the talks founder. British actions were broadly in line with Australian policy. Throughout the crucial weeks leading to the conference, the Coalition government had sought to ensure that London refrained from a stance that would be either too tough or too accommodating towards Marshall. Like the British, the Australians viewed an independent Singapore as a political incongruity in the current political circumstances and believed that the only plausible long-term solution was its merger with Malaya. On this particular point, Canberra appeared not only keener but also readier than London to consider early action. Australia, wrote a PMD official in early May, “would be prepared to take a chance” and “press for an early merger”.204 Yet, neither the prospect of a rapid merger nor an immediate solution to Singapore’s internal problems was at hand. In the short run, the only possible course of action in Singapore was one of wait and see. More than ever, Western policy in the Malayan peninsula seemed prey to local developments. In the aftermath of the London talks, much appeared to hinge on the repercussions of Marshall’s likely resignation as well as the Singapore moderates’ ability to stay in position. In the months to come, the contours of Western policy were likely to be defined by the interplay of these factors.

202

NARA, RG 59, CDF, box 3261, 746F.00/5-1856, Canberra to State Department, despatch 464, 18 May 1956; box 3261, 746F.00/6-1556, Canberra to State Department, despatch 525, 15 June 1956; NAA, A1209, 1957/4313 part 2, Bunting to Craig, at sea, cablegram ex245, 11 June 1956; UKNA, DO 35/9871, Canberra to CRO, telegram 639, 16 May 1956; Sydney Morning Herald, 17 May 1956. 203 NAA, A1209, 1957/4313 part 3, Bunting to Craig, cablegram ex245, 11 June 1956. 204 NAA, A1209, 1957/4313 part 2, Beveridge to Timbs, 7 May 1956.

CHAPTER FIVE

Coping with Uncertainty, 1956–57

W

estern concerns that an adverse outcome in London might spark off widespread riots in Singapore proved unfounded. The news that the conference had broken down was received calmly in the colony. “It is almost as if ”, The Times reported, “Singapore, whether or not she wants new powers, did not expect to get them this time”.1 Malays and Indians were even said to be “delighted” at the conference’s failure.2 Governor Black reported to London that the breakdown had “left an atmosphere considerably calmer than it had been before the Talks had started”.3 Among the reasons he cited for this apparent calm were the hardening of Malay opinion in favour of a slower progress towards selfgovernment, the disunity within the all-party delegation, the deployment of extra troops in Singapore in support of law and order, and the concentration of Singapore’s Chinese commercial classes on the citizenship issue.4 On 6 June 1956, upon his return to Singapore, Marshall sought to defend his tactics by condemning Britain’s apparent “want of good faith”. Before the Legislative Assembly, he complained that wherever they maintained military bases — be it Cyprus, Ceylon, Singapore or Aden — the British had adopted a negative attitude towards colonial

1

Times, 18 May 1956. NAA, A1209, 1957/4313 part 3, Harry to DEA, cablegram 315, 18 May 1956. 3 UKNA, DO 35/9873, CRO to Canberra, savingram 196, 25 July 1956. 4 Ibid. 2

117

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emancipation. He also criticised Australia for its seeming “haste” in rallying behind London.5 However, he charitably glossed over the differences within the Singapore delegation itself.6 In the ensuing debate, there was little support for his efforts to reopen the negotiations as soon as possible.7 As a result, he resigned on 7 June and was replaced by Lim Yew Hock. Unlike Marshall, who had limited political experience, the new SLF leader was a seasoned politician and trade unionist: he had had several years of experience as a nominated member of previous assemblies and had been a member of the Rendel Commission, which had drafted the new Constitution.8 Of humble origins, Lim was invariably described as unassuming, relaxed and pragmatic although, at times, he could also be “as tough as tanned leather”.9 CO officials portrayed him as “the complete antithesis of Marshall”: where the latter was “vain” and “theatrical”, the former was considered “modest” and “self-effacing”.10 Like Marshall, the new Chief Minister was an anti-communist, but, unlike his predecessor, he intended to deal with the communist threat effectively. Politically, however, Lim was confronted with the same problem that had beset Marshall: he led a weak coalition government, whose political prospects remained deeply uncertain. Initially, he could only count on the support of 11 of the 25 elected members in the

5

NAA, A1945, 248/10/3, Singapore to DEA, cablegram 343, 6 June 1956. In midJuly, Marshall spoke to Watt, now Australian Ambassador in Tokyo, of his “conviction that United Kingdom attitude towards Singapore at the London talks was due primarily to Australian influence”. See NAA, A1209, 1957/4313 part 3, Watt to DEA, cablegram 232, 19 July 1956. 6 NAA, A1945, 248/10/3, Singapore to DEA, cablegram 343, 6 June 1956. 7 NAA, A1945, 248/10/3, Developments since the Failure of the Singapore Constitutional Talks in London, July 1956. For Marshall’s attempt to revive the talks see NAA, A1945, 248/10/3, Singapore: Memorandum by the CRO, 25 May 1956. 8 Albert Lau, “Lim Yew Hock”, ODNB, http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/93428 [accessed on 5 May 2010] and “Marshall, David Saul”, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), online edn, http:// www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/60350 [accessed 5 May 2010]; Dennis Bloodworth, The Tiger and the Trojan Horse (Singapore: Marshall Cavendish, 2005), p. 141. 9 Ibid.; NARA, RG 59, CDF, box 3261, 746F.00/7-2056, Durbrow to Dulles, telegram 78, 20 July 1956; Turnbull, Modern Singapore, p. 266. 10 UKNA, CO 1030/235 CA(56)25, Visit of the Chief Minister of Singapore: Memorandum by the Secretary of State for the Colonies (draft), undated.

COPING WITH UNCERTAINTY  119

Legislative Assembly.11 This meant that, without the non-elected assemblymen (that is, three ex-officio British officials) siding with the government, Lim’s political survival depended on the opposition remaining divided.12 At first, therefore, he moved cautiously, announcing, amongst other things, that he would not return to London until all parties in the Assembly agreed on a united negotiating position. The change of leadership within the SLF-Alliance government was cautiously welcomed by the Australian Commission. In early July, it informed Canberra that Lim’s approach represented a significant departure from Marshall’s dramatic style of government. His key aims, the Commission said, were essentially to restore confidence, maintain stability and reassure the British that he was capable of dealing effectively with communist subversion. To this end, the new government was already taking steps to raise a locally recruited regular battalion and had announced plans for the establishment of a Labour Front Committee to tackle internal subversion. In emphasising the new Chief Minister’s inherently moderate character, the Commission also conveyed to the DEA his assurances that he would not adopt a “doctrinaire attitude” to self-government.13 However, if Lim’s initial steps were reassuringly positive, his political mettle remained largely untested. Until he proved capable of dealing with Singapore’s internal situation, he was unlikely to receive an unequivocal endorsement from Western capitals. The DEA attitude was quite emblematic in this respect. In sending guidance to Ralf Harry, Australia’s new Commissioner in Singapore, the DEA clearly favoured caution. Harry was instructed to tell Lim that while hopeful that a mutually satisfactory constitutional formula could be found between the British and Singaporean governments, Australia still regarded Britain’s current position as offering “a fair and reasonable basis” for such a settlement. In conveying this message, Harry was told to avoid giving the impression that Australia was willing to act as a go-between between the two governments. “In fact”, the DEA pointed out, “we would prefer not to enter into any detailed discussions as to how a settlement might be achieved — at any rate until the situation in

11

NAA, A1838, 3024/10/1/1 part 4, Notes on Singapore, 25 Oct. 1956. Times, 9 June 1956; NAA, A1209, 1957/4313 part 3, Singapore Political Situation, 30 July 1956. 13 NAA, A1838, 3024/1/2 part 2, Singapore to DEA, savingram 8, 4 July 1956. 12

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Singapore becomes clearer”. Ever so careful not to trample on British and local sensibilities, the DEA indicated that Australia wished to prevent “frequency of consultation” between the Commission and the Singapore government being construed as implying that the latter was negotiating the island’s constitutional future with Australia as well as with Britain.14 Last, although External Affairs approved of Lim’s attempts to build up Singapore’s defences, Harry was to avoid any suggestion that “the creation of a Singapore battalion would make it unnecessary for the United Kingdom to retain some powers over internal security”.15 When he finally met Lim on 11 June, Harry kept closely to his brief, expressing Canberra’s desire for progress in the stalled constitutional negotiations while reiterating Australian support for the British negotiating stance as it had emerged from the London talks. For his part, Lim did not press the issue. He confined himself to saying that Australia was a “friendly” nation and that he hoped Canberra “would be helpful”.16 Australian caution, however, was not exclusively directed at Lim, but at the British as well. Throughout the summer of 1956 concerns resurfaced in Canberra that London might be tempted to “go too far” in accommodating Lim in an effort to strengthen his internal position. The DEA was adamant that whatever the British decided to do in the field of internal security, they should not compromise their right to intervene in Singapore “so that action can be taken to forestall the development of situations rather than rely upon last minute interventions”. DEA officials appreciated that British proposals needed some “recasting” in order “to make them more attractive to Lim Yew Hock”, yet they did not see how, in the current circumstances, London could “safely” make “any further concessions on matters of substance”.17 This was no doubt a difficult balancing act and how it could be achieved remained unclear. For the time being, the DEA had little to offer in terms of constructive solutions. It was left to the British and Singaporean governments to find a way out of the political impasse.

14

NAA, A1945, 248/10/3, DEA to Singapore, cablegram 571, 8 June 1956. Ibid. 16 NAA, A1945, 248/10/3, Singapore to DEA, savingram 7, 11 June 1956; A1838, 3024/10/1/1 part 3, memcon, Harry and Lim, 11 June 1956. 17 NAA, A1945, 248/10/3, DEA to London, cablegram 1610, 18 July 1956. 15

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Lim’s First Visit to London (July–August 1956) As the summer wore on, Lim sought to strengthen his position. In mid-July, he travelled to Kuala Lumpur with the dual aim of bolstering his nationalist credentials at home and seeking support for his demands for full internal self-government. Key to his plan was the rather clever idea of seeking greater Malayan involvement in the management of Singapore’s internal security through the establishment of a joint AngloSingaporean body of equal representation but with a chairman appointed by the Federation government. By allowing the Federation to cast a decisive vote in Singapore’s internal security matters, Lim hoped to achieve two things: first, to reassure the British that they would never be overruled by a radical Singaporean government in this critical area (here he correctly viewed Malayan and British interests as being largely coincidental); and second, to build a case for further constitutional concessions once he had succeeded in winning British confidence and established himself as the acceptable face of Singapore’s nationalism. In his talks with the Federation government, Lim secured the Tunku’s cautious support for this proposal (and for his efforts to revive the constitutional talks) but failed to get Malaya’s firm commitment to merger.18 Loath to see the distrusted Marshall regain office or Lee’s PAP seize power, the Federation government was inclined to “take a hand in shoring up the Labour Front Government”.19 As Minister of Education Tun Razak told the American Consulate-General in Kuala Lumpur, the Federation was “caught on the horns of a dilemma”. On the one hand, it could not agree to a merger with Singapore given the latter’s overwhelming Chinese population — at least, not until independence was achieved and preferential treatment for the Malays within the Federation firmly established. On the other, it could not stand idly by and let Singapore slide further to the Left: with the PAP likely to take over in Singapore, Malaya would end up with “a Red China across the Causeway”.20 Given the Tunku’s reluctance to discuss merger, it remained unclear how the Federation proposed to solve such a

18

NARA, RG 59, CDF, box 3261, 746F.00/7-1356, Kuala Lumpur to State Department, telegram 14, 13 July 1956. 19 Razak quoted in ibid. 20 Ibid.

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conundrum; for the time being, its preferred solution appeared to lie in recognising the need for a Malayan role in the island’s security and in continuing to prop up Lim politically. Tentative and inadequate though this approach might be, this was how far the Tunku and his ministers were prepared to go. After Kuala Lumpur, Lim flew to Britain where he met LennoxBoyd. In their two meetings on 24 and 31 July, the two men took the measure of each other. Lim strove to establish himself as a reliable nationalist with whom the British could do business whereas LennoxBoyd sought to convey London’s readiness to support the new government provided it came to grips with domestic radicalism. The Colonial Secretary bluntly urged him to be “tough” with the radical Singapore Chinese Middle-School Students’ Union (SCMSSU) and other subversive groups, adding, quite significantly, that what Lim did “during the next few crucial months in this field was bound to influence me and my colleagues in our eventual decision” to hold fresh constitutional talks. For his part, Lim recognised the need to take action against subversion but sought to make the adoption of repressive measures against the SCMSSU dependent upon an unequivocal British commitment to further devolution of power. Unswayed, Lennox-Boyd did not back down: he wanted, first, to see signs of Lim’s determination to crack down on left-wing radicalism. Lim sounded conciliatory and reassuring. He made it clear that he knew “what to do and how to do it. I don’t suppose you would approve of the means”. In response, Lennox-Boyd remarked that he “had a fairly supple conscience in this field”.21 Lim’s willingness to compromise became even more apparent when the two men moved to cover constitutional issues. Keen on differentiating himself from Marshall, Lim stated that external affairs and external defence should remain a British responsibility and that “he did not much mind what arrangements were made in connection with them”. He made it clear that he did not seek an “independent” Singapore. His final aim was merger with Malaya even though, he conceded, there was little prospect of this happening for at least a decade. In the interim, he said he would seek a few small but important concessions. One would be the appointment of a locally born governor-general. Painting perhaps

21

UKNA, DO 35/9872, minute by Lennox-Boyd, 25 July 1956.

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too rosy a picture, he argued that “a Malayan in Government House would be a symbol of emancipation which would entirely satisfy the masses”. Singaporeans, he went on, would then “feel that they were in fact running their own affairs and had all they needed”. As a result, anti-British feeling would disappear, British ascendancy in Singapore “could last for a considerable period” and Britain’s tenure over its military installations would be “safe”. “Anything less than this”, he warned, “would mean that Singapore politicians were about to persist in an ‘anti-Colonial’ line and our enemies could pursue their anti-European agitation”. His second request would be in the field of internal security. Here Lim illustrated his plans for the creation of a Defence and Security Council now apparently to be made up of three Singaporean representatives, two British and one Malayan, with the British High Commissioner (in place of the Governor) in the chair with a casting vote (but not an original vote). He justified this demand by arguing that since both Malaya and Britain shared a common interest in the preservation of internal security in Singapore, “the fact that any decision would turn on the Federation representative voting with the U.K. representatives should give us all we want while enabling Singapore Ministers to accept the decision of the Council with good grace and without making themselves liable to charges of being ‘imperialistic stooges’”. Unsurprisingly, Lennox-Boyd was “impressed by cogency with which Lim Yew Hock argued the case for a Security Council” and, while non-committal, he pledged that the British government “would think hard about [Lim’s] propositions”.22 On his return home, Lim made a similar point to Casey when the latter called at Singapore on 13 August on his way to London for a conference on the Suez Canal crisis. Lim argued that he was more interested in improving the economic well-being of Singaporeans than in pursuing independence. That said, he expressed hope that Australia might use its influence to persuade the British to accept his idea of a local governor-general. As to be expected, Casey avoided being drawn into a commitment, but took the opportunity to reassure Lim that

22

UKNA, DO 35/9872, Johnston to Black, 3 Aug. 1956. The implication of this proposal was that Britain could be outvoted if the Malayan representative did not side with his British counterparts.

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Australia had not pressured the Eden administration “to refuse concessions which the United Kingdom would otherwise have granted”. For his part, Lim paid tribute to the contribution made by Australia to Singapore through the Colombo Plan and expressed regret for the criticism that Marshall had levelled at the Australian government in the aftermath of the London conference. As regards Singapore’s political situation, Lim appeared relatively confident about his chances of surviving a forthcoming confidence vote in the Assembly. More importantly, he reassured Casey about his ability to maintain internal stability in the face of communist subversion. He revealed that once he secured the vote of confidence, he would “take vigorous action against the Communists”, adding that once he had done so, he “would then be in a position to go to London and negotiate Singapore’s further constitutional advance”.23 “The proposals Lim discussed with you in Singapore”, the DEA commented in a cable sent to Casey right before his London meeting with Lennox-Boyd, “go a good deal further than anything we have yet contemplated as being acceptable”. Drafted by Plimsoll, the cable articulated the DEA’s latest thinking on Singapore’s constitutional advance. Casting doubts on the advisability of meeting Lim’s demands, the DEA despatch threw cold water on the idea of a locally born governorgeneral, claiming that such an appointment would inevitably result in the concomitant diminution in the British high commissioner’s prestige. More problematically, it could not only generate “endless possibilities of conflict” between the two offices, but it would also “make a strong impact on ordinary Chinese who might well take it as a sure sign of approaching British withdrawal”. In a Singapore where the mere appearance of power was itself power, the Chinese population would “only support a moderate line if they believe they will be safe in doing so”; hence it was “essential that they should be encouraged to believe that the British will in fact stay long enough to protect them from the Communists”. As for Lim’s Defence and Security Council, the cable emphasised the importance of Britain retaining a majority vote within

23

NAA, A1838, 3024/10/1/1 part 4, memcon, Casey, Tange and Lim, afternoon meeting, 13 Aug. 1956; memcon, Casey, Tange and Lim, dinner conversation, 13 Aug. 1956.

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the Council itself on the grounds that it would otherwise be difficult for London to “exercise authority in internal security” in the event of a disagreement between the British and Singaporean authorities. “Whether or not Lim’s proposals were workable in practice”, the despatch concluded, “would depend in the final resort on the continuance in office of a government genuinely prepared to cooperate with the U.K. It is however too early to be certain about this prospect”. The departmental view was that Australia might, in the meanwhile, wish to convey to the British its present reservations about Lim’s proposals and impress on them “the need to be reasonably satisfied that any concessions made would be likely to be inherited by a Government disposed to cooperate with the U.K”.24 In the event, the cable did not reach London until after the meeting with the Colonial Secretary had taken place. When Casey met Lennox-Boyd, he avoided any substantive comment on Lim’s proposals, merely telling the Colonial Secretary that these issues were being examined in Canberra.25 With British policy still in flux — and perhaps also concerned at the rumours coming out of Singapore that the British had seemingly rejected Marshall’s demands owing to Australian pressure  —  Casey had a further reason to keep, at least for the time being, his cards close to his chest.26

Lim Cracks Down on the PAP’s Radicals (September–October 1956) Having staked his credibility on the adoption of swift counter-subversive measures, Lim was soon to deliver on his side of the bargain. A few days before meeting Casey, he had been handed a report by Black that painted a disturbing picture of the colony’s subversion problem. According to the report, communist elements were setting up effective front organisations at various levels of Chinese life  —  from women’s

24

NAA, A1838, 3024/10/1/1 part 4, DEA to London, cablegram 1960, 24 Aug. 1956. 25 NAA, A1838, 3024/10/1/1 part 4, McIntyre to Acting DEA Secretary, memorandum 819/56, 3 Sept. 1956. 26 For these rumours see NAA, A1838, 3024/10/1/1 part 4, memcon, Casey, Tange and Lim, dinner conversation, 13 Aug. 1956; A1209, 1957/4313 part 3, Watt to DEA, cablegram 232, 19 July 1956.

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associations to farmers in rural areas of Singapore.27 Lim, who was said to be “depressed” by the report’s findings, promised to take forceful action as soon as he secured sufficient parliamentary backing.28 He was expected to make a policy declaration in the Legislative Assembly on 29 August and then seek a vote of confidence on 6 September.29 He was sure that the Liberal Socialists and the PAP moderates would not vote his government down.30 As he told British and American officials, he was hopeful that by cracking down on radical unions and students, he would also provoke a split within the PAP and draw its more moderate wing into the government fold.31 In the summer of 1956, increasing signs of tension were reported between Lee’s right-wing faction and Lim Chin Siong’s radical Left, with the former said to be unhappy with the latter’s growing influence within the party.32 Whether, however, Lee would rise to Lim’s bait remained doubtful. In July Harry told Canberra not to hold its breath, doubting that a split within the PAP was imminent.33 Harry’s assessment was correct: as it would become increasingly evident in the months to come, Lee had no intention of ditching the PAP, preferring, instead, to pay lip service to anti-colonialism and left-wing radicalism while seeking, behind the scenes, to rein in left-wing ascendancy within his party. As expected, in early September Lim secured a vote of confidence.34 He was now ready to grasp the nettle of growing communist influence 27

NARA, RG 59, CDF, box 3261, 746F.00/7-2056, memcon, Durbrow and Black, 13 Aug. 1956. 28 Ibid. 29 Ibid. 30 NARA, RG 59, CDF, box 3261, 746F.00/9-1356, Singapore to State Department, despatch 116, 15 Sept. 1956. 31 NARA, RG 59, CDF, box 3261, 746F.00/7-2056, memcon, Anderson and Lim, 10 Aug. 1956. 32 NARA, RG 59, CDF, box 3261, 746F.00/7-2056, memcon, Durbrow and Black, 13 Aug. 1956; NAA, A1838, 3024/1/2 part 2, Harry to Tange, memo 1440, 14 July 1956. At the PAP’s annual conference on 8 July 1956 the radical Left increased its influence in the new Central Executive Committee, securing 4 of the 12 seats. See Drysdale, Singapore, pp. 150–1; Pang Cheng Lian, “The People’s Action Party, 1954–63”, Journal of Southeast Asia History 10, 1 (1969): 144. 33 NAA, A1838, 3024/1/2 part 2, Singapore to DEA, savingram 8, 4 July 1956; Harry to Tange, memorandum 1440, 14 July 1956. 34 NAA, A1838, 3024/10/1/1 part 4, Singapore to DEA, cablegram 430, 6 Sept. 1956.

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within the Chinese middle schools and the trade unions. In late September and early October 1956, he moved resolutely against communistfront organisations and individuals, by deporting several foreign-born Chinese and detaining a lesser number of locally born Chinese.35 The SCMSSU, which had played a major role in fomenting unrest since 1955, was banned together with two other communist-front organisations.36 Rejecting the government’s injunction, the SCMSSU responded by holding sit-in protests at the two largest Chinese boys’ schools.37 The government’s appeals to end the sit-ins went unheeded. On 24 October, Lim issued an ultimatum: unless students had dispersed by the evening of the following day, the government would take firm measures to reopen the schools.38 On the evening of 25 October, however, the situation got out of hand. Some students and members of the Bus Workers’ Union joined in attacks on the police near one of these two schools.39 In the early morning of 26 October, the police moved in to clear the sit-ins with tear gas.40 As a result, riots broke out in other parts of town as well.41 By midday unrest assumed serious proportions, with the widespread burning of cars as well as attacks on buildings and police.42 The killing of a Malay lorry driver by a Chinese mob also threatened to spark Sino-Malay clashes.43 Lim’s response was forceful. On the night of 26 October, the police raided the headquarters of various radical trade unions and arrested their leading members, including Fong Swee Suan, Devan Nair, James Puthucheary, S. Woodhull

35

UKNA, DO 35/9872, Scott to FO, telegram 546, 29 Oct. 1956; CO 1030/241, Monthly Intelligence Report 3, 15 Oct. 1956. 36 UKNA, CO 1030/187, Black to Lennox-Boyd, telegrams 452 (19 Sept. 1956) and 465 (29 Sept. 1956). 37 UKNA, DO 35/9872, Scott to FO, telegram 546, 29 Oct. 1956. 38 UKNA, CO 1030/187, Black to Lennox-Boyd, telegram 265, 25 Oct. 1956. 39 UKNA, CO 1030/187, Black to Lennox-Boyd, telegram 504, 25 Oct. 1956; NARA, RG 59, CDF, box 3621, 746F.00/90-2656, Durbrow to Dulles, despatch 422, 26 Oct. 1956. 40 UKNA, CO 1030/187, Black to Lennox-Boyd, telegram 506, 26 Oct. 1956. 41 UKNA, CO 1030/187, Scott to FO, telegram 546, 29 Oct. 1956; Black to Lennox-Boyd, telegrams 507 and 509, 26 Oct. 1956. 42 UKNA, DO 35/9872, Black to Lennox-Boyd, telegram 522, 31 Oct. 1956; CO 1030/187, Black to Lennox-Boyd, telegram 509, 26 Oct. 1956. 43 UKNA, CO 1030/241, Monthly Intelligence Report 4, 10 Dec. 1956.

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and Lim Chin Siong.44 They had taken an active part in the riots, openly inciting the crowds.45 The police were forced to open fire on rioters on a number of occasions.46 Eleven rioters were killed.47 Islandwide curfews were imposed.48 British troops were brought in from the Federation.49 In addition, the Federation government sent police reinforcement from Johor.50 By the end of 27 October, the situation was fully under control. Lim’s firm response had important political implications. In the short term, “Operation Liberation” (as his crackdown on radicals became known) strengthened his position at home and raised his credibility abroad. Lim’s measures were generally well-received within the Legislative Assembly despite the inevitable taunts from the PAP and the radical unions that he was a colonial stooge.51 The government could also count on the fact that most Singaporeans preferred stability to unrest, thus somewhat offsetting signs of discontent amongst Chinese speakers at the government’s handling of the middle schools question.52 More importantly, the arrest of the PAP’s most prominent radical figures gave Lim a chance to consolidate his power and destabilise the SLF’s main rival. Yet, alongside these substantial short-term advantages, Lim’s show of strength also presented significant long-term disadvantages. Intended as a calculated bet, it was, in fact, a risky political gamble with the potential to backfire. Recurrent taunts that he was bent on attacking Chinese culture, that he was anti-labour or, even worse, that he was an agent of British colonialism, could only do Lim’s nationalist credentials much harm over time and erode the SLF’s

44

UKNA, DO 35/9872, Black to Lennox-Boyd, telegram 522, 31 Oct. 1956; CO 1030/187, Black to Lennox-Boyd, telegram 511, 27 Oct. 1956. 45 Drysdale, Singapore, p. 157. 46 UKNA, DO 35/9872, Black to Lennox-Boyd, telegram 522, 31 Oct. 1956. 47 Ibid. 48 UKNA, CO 1030/187, Black to Lennox-Boyd, telegram 511, 27 Oct. 1956. 49 UKNA, CO 1030/187, GHQ FARELF to War Office, despatch GO/2026, 26 Oct. 1956. 50 NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 4, Harry to Tange, memorandum 2103, 29 Oct. 1956. 51 NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 4, Harry to Tange, memorandum 2220, Nov. 1956. 52 Ibid.; Drysdale, Singapore, p. 158.

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significant support among the Chinese electorate.53 What is more, Lim’s repressive measures could also (and indeed would) give Lee a muchneeded breathing space to strengthen his party leadership and present himself as the progressive face of Singaporean nationalism.54 No sooner had Lim moved against the PAP’s radicals than Lee seized his good fortune and took full advantage of Lim’s repressive measures. Following the arrest of three members (Lim Ching Siong, Chia Ek Tian and Devan Nair) of the Central Executive Committee (CEC) — the PAP’s highest decision-making body — Lee moved immediately to strengthen his position within the CEC by co-opting two moderates.55 At the same time, while he was said to have privately congratulated the government for its courage in taking on the PAP’s radicals, in public he attacked the Chief Minister for trying to crush Chinese culture and acting in the interest of the old colonial power.56 In late 1956, however, despite the inherent weakness of his long-term political position, Lim appeared in full control of the situation. Unlike Marshall, he had been able to restore a modicum of tranquillity in Singapore and was now in a stronger position to negotiate a political deal with the British. Abroad, Western chanceries naturally applauded his firmness in dealing with pro-communist subversion. In Washington, Dulles praised Lim for his “astute courageous acts”.57 In Canberra, Casey said to be “impressed” by Lim’s “courage” and, in the midst of the crisis, sent him a message of support.58 The Australian government also let him know that it would be prepared to extend sanctuary to his wife and children should their lives be under threat in Singapore.59 In London Lennox-

53

This point is discussed in NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 4, Foreign Affairs Committee: Departmental Address on Development in Singapore, 30 Oct. 1956. 54 NARA, RG 59, CDF, box 3262, 746F.00/8-2057, Singapore to State Department, despatch 65, 20 Aug. 1957. 55 Ibid. 56 NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 4, Furlonger to Singapore, memorandum 1814, 21 Dec. 1956; Harry to Tange, memorandum 2220, 13 Nov. 1956. 57 Dulles cited in Long, Safe for Decolonization, p. 55. 58 NAA, A1838, 3024/10/1/1 part 4, DEA to Singapore, cablegram 745, 27 Sept. 1956; UKNA, DO 35/9872, Note of discussion on Singapore after meeting between the Colonial Secretary, Casey and the New Zealand High Commissioner on Christmas Island, 2 Nov. 1956. 59 Ibid.

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Boyd and his officials were equally impressed.60 Patently, British misgivings that Lim might “go off the rails” and find excuses to delay action proved unfounded.61 Equally unfounded were concerns that he might simply put up a show to deceive London into making greater concessions or that he might fall under Marshall’s spell again.62 In the autumn of 1956, reassured by Lim’s show of strength, the CO concluded that he had “worked his passage” and had now earned a right to ask for constitutional concessions.63 While the political situation on the island remained unpredictable, Lim had now provided sufficient evidence that he was fully committed to eradicating subversion and that, unlike Marshall, he was a safe pair of hands. Accordingly, the CO was now inclined to give him what it had so far refused to Marshall —  full internal self-government. Moreover, it was prepared to compromise on Lim’s demands for a locally born governor-general and a Malayan appointee to the prospective Internal Security Council. Other Whitehall overseas departments were also ready to compromise. While they would have preferred things to remain as they were, both the CRO and the Ministry of Defence (MOD) recognised the need for flexibility.64

Towards a New Round of Constitutional Talks Having kept his side of the bargain, Lim was now ready to cash in on it. On 5 November he announced that he would go to London in December to discuss arrangements for a new round of constitutional

60

NAA, A1209, 1957/4313 part 3, London to DEA, savingram 160, 28 Nov. 1956; London to DEA, savingram 140, 23 Oct. 1956; Murphy, Lennox-Boyd, p. 176. 61 UKNA, CO 1030/241, Monthly Intelligence Report 1, 8 Aug. 1956. 62 NAA, A1838, 3024/10/1/1 part 4, Singapore to DEA, cablegram 543, 15 Nov. 1956; London to DEA, savingram 160, 28 Nov. 1956. 63 NAA, A1838, 3024/10/1/1 part 4, London to DEA, savingram 160, 28 Nov. 1956; UKNA, FO 1091/44, Memorandum on the Course to be Followed in Future Constitutional Negotiations attached to Black to Johnston, 8 Oct. 1956; DO 35/9873, Singapore Constitutional Development: Memorandum by the Colonial Secretary, undated. 64 UKNA, DO 35/9873, Extract from COS(56)130, 6 Dec. 1956; Morland to Melville, 28 Nov. 1956; Maclennan to Melville, 29 Nov. 1956; Draft Brief for Secretary of State: Singapore Constitutional Development, undated. For MOD’s views see file DEFE 7/504.

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talks.65 In light of his impending visit, senior British ministers met in early December to consider how the government should handle talks with the Chief Minister. The CO’s position contained no surprises: in the memorandum he placed before his colleagues, Lennox-Boyd called for an approach that would go a long way to meet Lim’s demands. The Colonial Secretary asserted that Lim had “given evidence of his determination to tackle Communist subversion”; there was now “a new situation and atmosphere in Singapore compared to that prevailing when the April Conference was held with Mr. Marshall”. On the strength of Lim’s performance, it would now be “very dangerous”, Lennox-Boyd argued, “to allow this second conference to break down”, claiming that “the issues on which it would break down would command little sympathy in this country and the consequences would be far-reaching and possibly violent”. In his view, the arguments in favour of reaching a political settlement with Lim were “massive”. He reminded his colleagues that “the tide of nationalism” was running “with immense strength” throughout Southeast Asia and “the independence won in India, Burma, Indo-China, Indonesia, and now promised to Malaya, makes the stream run all the stronger in Singapore”. If, he warned, Britain failed to meet Singapore’s legitimate aspirations, “the forces of nationalism will become willingly or unwillingly the tool and ally of Communism”. However, if the concern that communism might be feeding on thwarted nationalist ambitions was uppermost in LennoxBoyd’s thoughts, another factor  —  perhaps more subtle yet no less important  —  also preyed on his mind: the symbolic significance that Britain’s friends and foes would attach to constitutional development in Singapore. In the aftermath of the Suez fiasco, London’s actions in Singapore would be seen across Asia as the litmus test of what LennoxBoyd described as “the fundamental integrity and liberality” of British colonial policy in the age of decolonisation.66 Having outlined the major considerations that should guide government policy in Singapore, Lennox-Boyd moved to clinch the argument by reminding Cabinet of the colony’s political realities. “There are

65

NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 4, Text of a Speech made by Lim Yew Hock to the Legislative Assembly on Monday, 5 November. 66 UKNA, CAB 129/84, CA(36)56, 30 Nov. 1956.

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now no political elements in Singapore”, he said, “who would back a continuance of the status quo”. Even the conservative elements  —  the moderate, well-to-do middle class Chinese represented by the Liberal Socialist Party — were fully committed to merdeka. Hence the dangers for Britain in refusing Lim’s demands were all too obvious. Rehearsing a by-now-standard CO argument, he said that if the talks failed, Britain would be left with no local allies. This meant, among other things, that no present or future Singapore administration would accept to govern under the present Constitution; and with the programme of Malayanisation well underway, Britain’s “ability to govern the Colony directly with any sort of local acquiescence must be seriously questioned”.67 Britain’s options, therefore, were limited. Only a settlement with Lim offered the best hope to secure Britain’s major objectives, namely to prevent Singapore being taken over by communists, to ensure it remained an effective military base in Southeast Asia and to preserve its character as a key international port and centre of economic activity. In practice, the kind of settlement Lennox-Boyd had now in mind centred on the acceptance of Lim’s proposal for a locally born governorgeneral and on an agreement to relinquish the British right to intervene in the internal affairs of Singapore save for the prerogative of suspending the Constitution in an emergency. On this last issue, the CO also made agreement conditional on the acceptance of a few additional points. These were the establishment of two advisory bodies (the Internal Security Council and the External and Defence Council), continued access to the Special Branch and its intelligence, a say in the appointment of key police officers and, last, an assurance that Britain would continue to enjoy freedom of action on its military bases.68 Senior ministers in the Cabinet’s Colonial Affairs Committee broadly agreed with Lennox-Boyd’s line but sought further clarification on internal security and the governor-general issue.69 When the full Cabinet met on 11 December to hear the Colonial Secretary’s explanations, his arguments were met with some degree of scepticism.70 The

67

Ibid. The term “Malayanisation” referred to the replacement of “expatriates” with locally born civil servants. 68 Ibid. 69 UKNA, CAB 21/4352, G.M.W. to Butler, 10 Dec. 1956. 70 For these clarifications see UKNA, CAB 129/84, CP(56)277, 8 Dec. 1956.

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Lord President of the Council, the Marquess of Salisbury, argued that the government should not rush into an agreement with Lim without fully considering the implications of surrendering control over internal security. Minister for Housing and Local Government Duncan Sandys was also sceptical, wondering whether the naval base should not be treated as an enclave and entirely excluded from the scope of an agreement with the Singaporeans. Lennox-Boyd countered that this would be “the worst course of all”, maintaining that creating such an enclave might, one day, lead to Singapore withdrawing from the Commonwealth. Never one to be easily deterred, Sandys further told LennoxBoyd to avoid making any pledge on a future union between Singapore and Malaya. As Chair (Eden was absent), Lord Privy Seal Rab Butler argued that ministers should be given a further opportunity to examine the Singapore constitutional issues (and especially the question of the governor-general) before committing to any course of action. Cabinet, therefore, instructed Lennox-Boyd to talk to Lim without commitment and then to report back to his colleagues.71

The Australian Response With the British swiftly reassessing their Singapore policy, the DEA also took stock of the state of the play and sought to chart Australia’s course of action in the event of fresh constitutional talks. In an internal paper prepared for Casey in November 1956, External Affairs officials reiterated the view that “the limit of safety in concessions to the Singapore leaders was reached at the London Conference”. In making this point, they did not deny that, since June, Lim had provided “steady and moderate leadership” and had taken “firm action to maintain internal security in Singapore”. Although his political prospects remained “uncertain”, there was now “hope that he will be able to win sufficient moderate support to keep him in office”. On the face of it, therefore, it seemed to be in Britain’s interest “to go some distance in meeting his present demands”. Yet, as they had noted earlier, there were problems with Lim’s demands. One obvious problem was the appointment of a Malayan representative to the proposed Security and Defence Council.

71

UKNA, CAB 128/30, CM(56)98th mtg, 11 Dec. 956; CAB 195/15, CM98(56), 11 Dec. 1956.

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Even leaving aside the fact that the Tunku was not very excited about such idea, it would “be risky to assume that that any Asian (even a Malay) on the Council would always support the U.K. on important security questions”. If Malaya, for instance, refused to join SEATO, it “might well disagree with U.K. on internal security”. But even if the Federation government wished to support the British on a particular proposal, it might be unable to do so because of domestic opinion.72 In fact, as Tange would point out a few weeks later, it was “entirely unlikely” that the Malayan representative would side with the colonial power on issues that the Federation’s public opinion was bound to interpret as British attempts to override the Singapore government’s will.73 Furthermore, it was important not to play down the significance of the ever-present communal factor in Singapore’s internal politics for “if the Federation nominee were a Malay he might well be unduly guided by anti-Chinese prejudices; and vice-versa if he were a Chinese”.74 Hence, Australia should caution Britain against granting Singapore further control over internal security unless the Security and Defence Council was to remain a purely advisory body with equal Anglo-Singaporean representation; the future high commissioner was able to “issue directions in the field of internal security”; and Britain retained the right to suspend the Constitution. As DEA officials justifiably pointed out: [i]n general, we have to accept the principle that internal security can be more effectively maintained by the indigenous authorities rather than a colonial authority  –  but only if the former have the will and ability to do so. Lim Yew Hock has begun well. But we do not know to what extent he, and more probably his followers, are taking a strong line against subversion in order to strengthen their case for being given the powers they are seeking from the U.K.; once the powers are conceded, it is possible that the Singapore authorities may relax. Moreover, we do not know whether Lim will win the next elections.

72

Emphasis in the original. See NAA, A1838, 3024/10/1/1 part 4, Quinn to Harry, 15 Nov. 1956. For the Tunku’s views see A1838, 3024/10/1/1 part 4, Critchley to Tange, memorandum 1255/56, 21 Sept. 1956 73 See Tange’s handwritten comments to Casey (8 January 1957) on the margins of NAA, A1838, 3024/10/1/1 part 4, Furlonger to Quinn, 28 Dec. 1956. 74 Emphasis in the original. NAA, A1838, 3024/10/1/1 part 4, Quinn to Harry, 15 Nov. 1956.

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Given the uncertainty, DEA officials hoped that the British would not share their plans with Lim at least until both London and Canberra were in a better position to judge how effectively he was tackling subversion. With Lim expected to visit London in the very near future, they conceded that this might not be easy to do and that the British might find it unavoidable to indicate how far they would go to accommodate him. Australia’s preference was for postponing any offer of a final settlement  —  and thus keeping current arrangements in place  —  until Lim fully proved his political mettle. As for the other contentious issue (that is, the appointment of a locally born governor-general), officials reiterated the view that such an appointment might open the way to endless tensions between him and the future British high commissioner. How, in these circumstances, the high commissioner would be able to carry out his reserve powers, it was difficult to envisage. Hence, it would probably make more sense to “take a firm stand on this issue now than to create a situation which will generate future constitutional frictions and discord”. More problematically, such an appointment would send out all the wrong signals for it would inevitably be interpreted “as a sign that the withdrawal of British power was imminent”. “Many Chinese”, they claimed, “who would prefer to support moderate policies would then be afraid to do so because of reprisals which might follow if the Communists gained control in Singapore”. Last, DEA officials also stressed the importance of “close liaison or consultation on defence and security matters” between the Federation and Singapore.75 Although the prospect of a swift merger was out of the question (public and government opinion in the Federation was hardening against it), External Affairs had not yet given up hope on the development of closer links between the two territories.76 With Malaya soon to become independent, greater defence coordination was needed if the Commonwealth’s regional defence posture was to remain effective. If officials in Canberra were inclined to reserve judgement on Lim, preferring to move cautiously on the issue of Singapore’s constitutional progress, the Australian Commissioner in Singapore saw significant

75

Ibid. For the hardening of Malayan views on merger see NAA, A1838, 3024/10/1/1 part 4, Harry to Casey, memorandum MD 11/56, 31 Dec. 1956.

76

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risks in such a timid approach. In a cable sent to Canberra in midNovember, Harry drew attention to the fact that the SLF-Alliance ministers were firmly behind Lim and that the government was “fully committed” to eliminating subversion. What is more, Lim appeared “confident that if he achieves [a] settlement with the United Kingdom he will be returned to power with increased support”. Of course, he added, no one could ever be sure that the SLF would win the next election, but what was “fairly certain” was that if there is not a reasonable settlement before August [1957], the Labour Front will resign. The Governor is unlikely to find yet another Labour Front Chief Minister and the Liberal Socialists could hardly carry on. Black would have no alternative but to hold fresh elections. At the best, the resulting Government would renew the same demands. At the worst the P.A.P. would boycott the elections and organise direct action claiming that negotiation with the Colonial Office is useless. This would inevitably lead to Governor’s rule.

While Harry did not suggest any specific course of action, the weight of his analysis leaned clearly towards making concessions to Lim. In this context, he argued that if the British now regarded the power to suspend the Constitution as a sufficient safeguard to protect their interests in Singapore, Australia “should not press them to insist that the United Kingdom Representative retain the power to issue directions in the field of internal security. Nor, I submit, should we urge the United States to use its influence in the direction”.77 In mid-December, with the British now finalising their attitude towards Lim’s constitutional demands, Harry returned to the same themes, once again warning against too cautious an approach. He again reminded the DEA that a British refusal to give ground on internal security would “unite most elements in Singapore for Merdeka and against the United Kingdom”. If, instead, Lim came back from London with broad agreement on full internal self-government, his position would be strengthened. He could then negotiate a merger with the Liberal Socialists and broaden his political base. Harry recommended

77

Emphasis in the original. NAA, A1838, 3024/10/1/1 part 4, Harry to Casey, cablegram 543, 15 Nov. 1956.

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not to press the British “to insist on the illusory reserve power to legislate on internal security”. After all, as he reminded External Affairs, “the reserve power to legislate and to take action on internal security, short of suspension of the Constitution, has in practice not been exercised since the Rendel Constitution became operative. Decisions have been made by the Council of Ministers with the Governor and the Chief Secretary acting by persuasion only”. Overall, he felt that the British line was well-conceived and advised the government to support it.78 External Affairs’ advice to Cabinet was more circumspect.79 When senior ministers met in Canberra on 14 December to review the Singapore question, Casey read out the text of a very cautious note to be handed to Lord Carrington, the British High Commissioner in Canberra. Drafted by his officials, the note conveyed Australia’s reluctant endorsement of the British plan of action. It stated that if Britain had “reached the view that the time has come when more would be lost than gained by holding out against Singapore’s demands”, Australia was in no “position to dissent from such a view”. Even so, the government could not but view the future of Singapore as being “less assured than if [internal] security remained under United Kingdom control” and would need to “take this into account in our general strategic thinking concerning the South East Asian area”. Australia did recognise Lim’s “courage” and “determination” in handling Singapore’s security problems and fully appreciated that, given the way in which “the idea of Merdeka has gripped the local population, Mr. Lim cannot postpone bringing the issue to decision”. Nonetheless, as the note frankly admitted, Australia would have wished the Lim government to “have had more time to consolidate its position and to develop its capacity … to cope with its responsibilities before the question of full self-government was raised”. “Our fear”, the note revealed, was that “a successor government, weaker in resolution, or with left-wing tendencies, could allow the situation to slip beyond control. Therefore we would regard the hand-over of security responsibilities at the forthcoming talks as being attended by a real risk even if this risk is carefully calculated”. On the merit of Lim’s specific demands, Australia was prepared to accept British

78

NAA, A1209, 1957/4313 part 3, Singapore to DEA, cablegram 580, 12 Dec. 1956. 79 NAA, A1838, 3024/10/1/1 part 4, Quinn to Casey, 13 Dec. 1956.

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proposals to relinquish further control over internal security provided Britain’s right to suspend the Constitution remained unaffected. It also “appreciated the political arguments” in favour of the appointment of “a locally acceptable Asian” as the Queen’s representative in Singapore, but recommended that this appointment be “postponed for as long as possible”. Australia was concerned that such an appointment might be interpreted in Singapore as “a prelude to a further withdrawal of British influence”, thus having an adverse impact on Singapore’s moderates who might now fail to cooperate for fear of being “exposed to extremist reprisals later”.80 In the discussion, ministers recognised that London envisaged concessions “greater than had been considered desirable at an earlier stage”, but decided that Australia should not disagree with the plan of action proposed by the British government.81 Cabinet, therefore, approved the DEA note subject to minor amendments.82 Despite their continuing anxieties over Singapore’s situation, Australian ministers and senior officials had concluded that further devolution of power was no longer avoidable. In explaining External Affairs’ attitude, Acting Assistant Secretary J.P. Quinn told McIntyre in London that if the British had made up their mind on the transfer of internal security to the Singapore government, there was little Australia could do. The government was neither “willing” nor “able” to press the British to “hold on”. Three major factors seemed to weigh heavily on officials’ minds. The first was political opportunity. As Quinn pointed out, if, at any rate, the British were going to make concessions, then they might as well choose “the right moment to do it” so that they would “get maximum credit for them”.83 With a new election planned for mid-1957 (upon Marshall’s insistence, Lim had committed himself to holding a fresh election by August 1957), it made sense to give Singapore’s moderates a boost and to enhance their electoral chances. Hence, “the general feeling” was that “we are bound to give Lim and his people a real chance to get Singapore’s house in order” and, to make

80

NAA, A1838, 3024/10/1/1 part 4, DEA to London, cablegram 2965, 14 Dec. 1956. 81 NAA, A4940, C1524, Cabinet decision 593, 14 Dec. 1956. 82 For the final draft see NAA, A1209, 1957/4313 part 3, Brown to Carrington, 18 Dec. 1956. 83 NAA, A1838, 3024/10/1/1 part 4, Quinn to McIntyre, 19 Dec. 1956.

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this possible, the next constitutional conference scheduled for March 1957 “must be successful”. The second factor was the risks inherent in resisting constitutional change. As London’s refusal to make concessions could well lead to renewed disorders, the British would be forced to use military force to restore order. In that event, Australia might well be asked to help. “I do not think”, Quinn conjectured, “we would relish the idea of contributing to these forces”.84 Lingering Australian edginess about being drawn into Singapore’s colonial affairs was not difficult to understand, especially in light of some occasional remarks made by British officials. Already twice during the course of 1956 Scott had hinted at the possibility of Britain having to seek Commonwealth help in holding Singapore should the situation worsen.85 Last, Australia wished neither to be seen as supporting European colonialism nor to be accused of sabotaging Singapore’s constitutional advance. It had, therefore, no intention of letting London exploit Australian misgivings over further constitutional concessions as a pretext for delaying those very concessions. As Quinn revealed to McIntyre, the DEA was disturbed at suggestions which reached us both through Marshall and Lim that the U.K. had held out previously against Singapore demands because of Australian pressure. Our belief is that during Marshall’s tenure of office it also suited the United Kingdom not to hand over internal security. We have not made any comment on this to the United Kingdom High Commission as we believe there is no point in going back over old ground. Having now been told that we agree, the United Kingdom will, we hope, not convey to the Singaporeans that our agreement is reluctant.

There was, however, a major drawback in accommodating Lim’s demands for further internal self-government. “If the Singapore moderates fail”, Quinn argued, “we shall have to do a lot of careful thinking about the strategic structure in South East Asia”.86 Intended simply

84

Ibid. NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 4, Singapore, Brief for the Secretary: London visit 1956, undated; A1838, 3024/10/1/1 part 3, McIntyre to Tange, memorandum 678/56, 26 July 1956. 86 NAA, A1838, 3024/10/1/1 part 4, Quinn to McIntyre, 19 Dec. 1956. 85

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to state the obvious — that in the event of Britain no longer being in control of internal security Australia would do well to make provision for Singapore’s reduced strategic value in its defence planning — these External Affairs views somewhat rattled the British High Commission in Canberra, raising concerns that Australia might soon review its military commitment to Malaya. When Carrington found out that the very same point had been made in the Australian Cabinet’s note handed to him, he immediately approached the PMD for clarification. He told Allen Brown that such a remark could mean only one thing: that Australia would — “immediately, or in the very near future” — “reconsider its strategic thinking concerning the area in the light of this”.87 Contrasting Anglo-Australian perceptions were at work here: while Australian ministers and officials worried that further devolution of power might ultimately result in a significant contraction of British regional power and influence, British policymakers were apprehensive that any such a sign of contraction might eventually be exploited in Canberra to disengage from Southeast Asia. Significantly enough, there was one notable omission in this latest review of Australian policy — the merger question. While this had had a central place in the government’s deliberations in the lead-up to the April conference, it appeared now, for all intents and purposes, to have been put on hold. Ministers and officials remained practically silent on it; Critchley did raise it in mid-December if only to suggest, though, that Australia “would be ill-advised to encourage a merger which could only bring instability or an unfriendly Government in Malaya”.88 The truth was that, in late 1956, the prospects for closer integration between Malaya and Singapore had taken a turn for the worse again, with the political situation in the Federation being hardly conducive to merger. With the target date for independence set for August 1957, the Alliance government was only too aware that the London agreement required immediate action in several critical fields, including the drafting of a new Constitution. This issue, however, turned out to be quite a divisive

87

NAA, A1209, 1957/4313 part 3, Note for File: A.S. Brown, 20 Dec. 1956. NAA, A1838, 3024/10/1/1 part 4, Critchely to Tange, memorandum 1773/56, 15 Dec. 1956.

88

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one, stirring strong political passions across the Malayan communal divide and even threatening, as Harper has noted, to tear the Alliance apart.89 Tensions over the question of citizenship rights (and how these should be dealt with in a new Constitution), language and Malay privileges mounted rapidly and erupted with force in the second part of 1956.90 In the end, a split within the Alliance “was avoided largely on the plea that disunity would delay independence”.91 But tensions within the ruling coalition continued to simmer, with the Tunku accused of being too overbearing and too eager to appease non-Malay and British interests.92 By the end of 1956, resentment towards him was palpable “at all levels of UMNO”.93 Clearly concerned by these developments, the Tunku declared that he was considering taking “a few months off ” to focus on UMNO’s affairs in the hope that, by restoring unity within UMNO ranks, he could ensure that “his party will continue to support the Alliance in accordance with his views”.94 Given that political stability in Malaya appeared to hinge so much on the Alliance’s capacity to stay united, intra-coalition rows over constitutional issues cast a dark shadow on the Federation’s ability to function as a viable state once independence had been granted. The problem was a straightforward one: if the Alliance and its ethnic constituencies could barely withstand the tensions generated by the constitutional debate, what would happen to Malaya once the political incentive to stay together in the quest for merdeka had vanished in the aftermath of independence? Moreover, how could merger with Singapore ever be possible? In this context, it was hardly surprising that in January 1957 the Tunku emphatically ruled this out.95 For Western policymakers, the question of Singapore was nowhere near a satisfactory solution.

89 Harper, Making of Malaya, p. 352; Norman Parmer, “Constitutional Change in Malaya’s Plural Society”, Far Eastern Survey 26, 10 (1957): 148. 90 Ibid.; Stockwell, Malaya, vol. 1, p. lxxviii. 91 Ibid. 92 Harper, Making of Malaya, p. 353. 93 Ibid. 94 NAA, A816, 19/321/46, Federation of Malaya, undated. 95 NAA, A1838, 3024/10/1/1 part 4, Critchley to Tange, memorandum 135, 19 Jan. 1956.

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Lim’s Second Trip to London (December 1956) and the March 1957 Constitutional Talks Lim arrived in London on 10 December. During his two-week-long English visit, Lim and Lennox-Boyd rapidly settled the date of the next constitutional conference (March 1957) and agreed that negotiations start “from the basis of those matters on which agreement had been reached” in London the previous spring.96 As expected, Lim reiterated his demands for the appointment of a locally born governor-general and the creation of an Internal Security Council (ISC) with executive powers (and not simply with an advisory role as the British would have wished). He made it clear that the governor-general would be no more than a figurehead with no reserve powers to suspend the Constitution.97 On internal security, Lim reiterated his willingness to accept London’s right to suspend the Constitution in an emergency, but he stuck to his guns on the ISC question.98 On external defence and external affairs, he maintained that they should remain a British responsibility (with the exception of trade and cultural relations, which should be delegated to Singapore ministers). Crucially, Lim made it clear that he wanted “to leave the control and operation of the defence bases in Singapore entirely in the hands of the United Kingdom Government”. He said that “one of the advantages of the settlement he sought would be that the United Kingdom’s right to the bases would not be dependent on a treaty or agreement which might later be denounced”, but enshrined

96

These included the introduction of Singapore citizenship, a change in the title of Singapore and the retention of Britain’s right to suspend the Constitution. See UKNA, CO 1030/444, Visit by Lim Yew Hock to London in December 1956. 97 Ibid. 98 NAA, A1209, 1957/4313 part 3, McIntyre to DEA, cablegram 3419, 18 Dec. 1956. He made it clear that it should be composed of three Singapore ministers, one Malayan and two UK representatives. The British representative would chair the ISC and have a casting vote. In Lim’s view, the Council’s composition meant that it could not take decisions contrary to the wishes of Singapore ministers unless the British and Malayan representatives were in agreement. According to Lim, the ISC’s decisions should be binding on the Singapore Cabinet. Moreover, while internal security would be responsibility of the Singaporean government, the ISC would have “a watching brief on the Internal Security situation”. See UKNA, CO 1030/444, Visit by Lim Yew Hock to London in December 1956.

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in a new constitutional text. In response, Lennox-Boyd indicated that Lim’s “proposals in general offered the possibility of agreement at the Conference next March”.99 Before committing in principle to any of Lim’s proposals, Lennox-Boyd had sought his colleagues’ approval, once again reiterating to them the need for flexibility.100 Although he failed to win wholehearted support for his policy (ministers still felt that further consideration should be given to the question of a locally born governor-general), Cabinet nonetheless instructed him to reassure Lim that the government’s attitude would be sympathetic.101 For his part, Lim was satisfied with his visit’s outcome. Upon his return to Singapore, he let Harry understand that the new round of constitutional talks in March would be completed rapidly and successfully.102 His confidence was not misplaced. With both the Singapore and British governments willing to bridge the remaining gap between their respective positions, the March 1957 constitutional conference now appeared little more than a formality.103 When the British Cabinet —  now chaired by Harold Macmillan, who had replaced Eden on 10 January following the latter’s sudden resignation  —  met on 4 March to re-examine the question of an Asian head of state for Singapore, it gave Lennox-Boyd the go-ahead to negotiate a constitutional agreement based on a slightly revised CO proposal.104 For its part, on 5 March 1957, the Singapore Legislative Assembly passed, with an overwhelming majority, a motion demanding full internal self-government and setting out in detail the terms that the Singapore all-party delegation would seek to secure at the forthcoming talks.105 All the political parties represented in the Assembly expressed support for merger at the earliest

99

Ibid. UKNA, CAB 120/30, CM(56)104th mtg, 20 Dec. 1956. 101 Ibid.; UKNA, CAB 195/15, CM104(56), 20 Dec. 1956. 102 NAA, A1838, 3024/10/1/1 part 4, Harry to Tange, memorandum 215, 28 Jan. 1956. 103 Hack, Defence and Decolonisation, p. 241. 104 UKNA, CAB 128/31, CC(57)15th mtg, 4 Mar. 1957. For the CO’s revised proposal see CAB 129/85, C(57)48, 28 Feb. 1957. 105 See the 5 Mar. 1957 entry in Singapore Legislative Assembly, “Debates: Official Report”, vol. 2, no. 20 (Singapore: Legislative Assembly, 1956–57). For the Singapore delegation’s terms see NAA, A1838, 3024/1/2 part 2, Harry to Tange, memo 440, 5 Mar. 1957. 100

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possible moment, but, quite significantly, they all recognised that an independent Singapore “would be something of an absurdity”.106 The second Anglo-Singaporean constitutional conference opened on 11 March 1957 and lasted a month. The only significant disagreement between the two governments was over the ISC role in demarcating responsibilities in the areas of internal security and external defence. While the British government sought to retain a veto power over the matters upon which the ISC might be allowed a vote, the Singapore delegation argued that accepting such a provision would be tantamount to “Colonial subordination”. It therefore insisted that the matter be left to the ISC to decide whether the dispute was over internal security (a Singapore responsibility over which the ISC would have jurisdiction) or external defence (a British responsibility over which the ISC would have no jurisdiction).107 In return, it proposed to accept a more stringent enforcement regime in fulfilment of its obligations.108 The delegation’s demands were in line with its overall attitude throughout the conference — an attitude that betrayed a strong prudential concern over the colony’s internal situation. Notwithstanding its resolve to achieve greater self-government, the delegation (and Lee Kuan Yew was no exception) showed no intention of seeing Singapore’s colonial links with Britain entirely severed. Quite the contrary, it sought to ensure that effective mechanisms be put in place to allow Britain to retain a modicum of control over Singapore in the event of communist subversion gaining ground.109 As a result, when the British Cabinet finally agreed to meet the delegation’s objections on 26 March, the road was paved for a successful outcome.110 According to the final agreement, Singapore was to receive a new Constitution granting full internal self-government while Britain

106

Ibid. UKNA, CAB 128/31, CC(57)27th mtg, 28 Mar. 1957; CAB 129/85, CC(57)78, 26 Mar. 1957; Hack, Defence and Decolonisation, p. 241. 108 If the Singapore government failed to meet its obligations in the field of internal security or external defence, Britain could require the new head of state to issue a decree having the force of law to ensure that these obligations be met. See UKNA, CAB 129/85, CC(57)78, 26 Mar. 1957. 109 Hack, Defence and Decolonisation, p. 241. 110 UKNA, CAB 128/31, CC(57)27th mtg, 28 Mar. 1957. 107

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was to retain responsibility for external affairs and defence, as well as full control of its military installations.111 Moreover, while the Singapore government would become responsible for internal security, Britain would still maintain the right to suspend the Constitution in an emergency. The much discussed ISC would be set up to decide where the authority lay in those borderline cases with both an internal and external affairs dimension, and to provide for consultation and exchange of information on law and order.112 Agreement was also reached on the establishment of a purely consultative Inter-Governmental Committee (IGC) to facilitate discussion on defence and external issues. Singapore would be known as the State of Singapore. The ex-officio and nominated members of the Legislative Assembly would be abolished and the number of elected assemblymen increased to 51. The title of Chief Minister would be changed to that of Prime Minister and within the Council of Ministers, the posts of ex-officio members (Chief Secretary, Financial Secretary and Attorney-General) would be abolished.113 The office of Governor would also be abolished. In its place, the Queen’s representative in Singapore would be a Malayan-born person under the title of Yang di-Pertuan Negara (head of state). The British government would be represented in Singapore by a Commissioner, who would have the power to suspend the Constitution. Provisions were also made to prevent persons known to have been involved in subversive activities from participating in the election of the first Legislative Assembly under the new Constitution.114 At the final plenary session, the Singapore delegation expressed opposition to “this departure from normal democratic

111

Britain, however, would delegate responsibility for trade, commercial and cultural relations. 112 The ISC would consist of three Singapore representatives, three British representatives, including the Commissioner, and one Malayan minister. The British Commissioner would be the Council’s chairman. Its decisions would be binding for all parties and if the Singapore government refused to implement them, the Commissioner would be empowered to ask the Yang di-Pertuan Negara to ensure that they be carried out. 113 The Governor would no longer chair the Council of Ministers. 114 For the full details of the 1957 constitutional agreement see UKNA, CO 1030/ 257, Report of the Singapore Constitutional Conference in March and April 1957, 11 Apr. 1957.

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practice and protested at the unilateral imposition of this condition”.115 However, in separate meetings with Lennox-Boyd, both Lee and Lim privately urged the Colonial Secretary to incorporate a clause in the new Constitution banning those involved in subversive activities from standing for election to the new Assembly. They warned him that unless London were willing to do so, its efforts to rein in subversion would be wasted. Both Lee and Lim made the point that “to take such action themselves by legislation in Singapore would be so damaging to them politically as to jeopardise the chances of the moderates continuing to hold power”. They would of course “have to make mild disapproving noises for public consumption”, but Britain could “get away with it”. And so could they.116 For his part, Lennox-Boyd was happy to oblige with the proviso that the delegation’s public criticism would not be excessive.117 As he explained to Macmillan, “we have to take the gloves off when we are fighting the utterly unscrupulous forces of Communism”.118

The Constitutional Talks’ Aftermath The results of the second Anglo-Singaporean constitutional conference failed to arouse popular enthusiasm in Singapore. In contrast to the euphoria that had gripped the island in the lead-up to Marshall’s merdeka mission, the mood was rather subdued.119 When the Legislative Assembly debated the conference’s outcome at the end of April 1957, all political parties endorsed the constitutional deal. Predictably, both Lim and Lee condemned the clause on subversion, but this did not prevent them endorsing the London package.120 Lee, who, on arrival 115

UKNA, CO 1030/508, CSC(57)15 mtg, 10 Apr. 1957; CO 1030/511, CO to Black, telegram 88, 11 Apr. 1957. 116 UKNA, PREM 11/1802, Lennox-Boyd to Macmillan, PM(57)18, 5 Apr. 1957; PREM 11/2659, Lennox-Boyd to Macmillan, PM(58)13, 30 Apr. 1958; CO 1030/ 651, Black to Johnston, 22 Jan. 1957 and 24 Jan. 1957. Lee’s version of the story is somewhat different. See Lee, Singapore Story, pp. 258–9. 117 Ibid., p. 258; Hack, Defence and Decolonisation, p. 242. 118 UKNA, PREM 11/1802, Lennox-Boyd to Macmillan, PM(57)18, 5 Apr. 1957. 119 Dreysdale, Singapore, p. 169. 120 UKNA, CO 1030/651, OAG Singapore to Lennox-Boyd, telegram 81, 29 Apr. 1957; OAG Singapore to Lennox-Boyd, telegram 84, 2 May 1957; Black to LennoxBoyd, telegram 85, 4 May 1957.

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in Singapore, had spoken of tiga suku merdeka (three-quarters independence), gave a detailed explanation of how and why the concessions secured by the delegation were an improvement on the offer made to Marshall a year before. Recognising that the London agreement was only a “half-way house” to merger with Malaya, he claimed that Singapore’s independence could only come as part of such a merger.121 Only Marshall, who had resigned from the SLF in mid-April 1957, spoke passionately against the constitutional package.122 Following the Assembly’s approval, the stage was now set for the rapid transformation of Singapore into a self-governing territory. The British and Singapore governments could now work to put the London agreement into legal language. A new round of talks was scheduled for early 1958 to approve the final text of the new Constitution.123 In Canberra, the conference outcome generated some cautious optimism. On 11 April, Casey, despite earlier misgivings, hailed the talks as a balanced compromise between the Singaporeans’ legitimate desire for independence and Britain’s worldwide responsibilities; he congratulated both governments for the “spirit of accommodation and realism” they had shown during the negotiations.124 From Singapore Harry painted a moderately rosy picture, reporting that the Assembly’s overwhelming support for the delegation’s achievements was likely to strengthen Lim’s domestic position, thus making the prospect of his government lasting at least until the next election a distinct possibility.125 In this respect, Harry argued, Marshall’s decision to give up his parliamentary seat in late April had already given the SLF a boost.126 What is more, rumours that Lee was on a collision course with his party’s radicals raised hopes of an alliance or merger between Lim’s SLF and Lee’s supporters again.127 In the weeks following the conference, collaboration behind

121

NARA, RG 59, CDF, Box 3262, 746F.00/5-2257, Singapore to State Department, despatch 516, 22 May 1957; Lee, Singapore Story, p. 261. 122 UKNA, CO 1030/651, OAG Singapore to Lennox-Boyd, telegrams 81 (29 Apr. 1957) and 84 (2 May 1957). 123 UKNA, CO 1030/512, Singapore, 10 June 1958. 124 NAA, A1838, 3024/1/2 part 3, DEA to Singapore, cablegram 306, 11 Apr. 1957. 125 NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 5, Harry to Tange, memorandum 892, 29 Apr. 1957. 126 NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 5, Harry to DEA, savingram 3, 18 May 1957. For Marshall’s resignation see NARA, RG 59, CDF, Box 3262, 746F.00/5-2257, Singapore to State Department, despatch 516, 22 May 1957. 127 NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 5, Harry to DEA, savingram 3, 18 May 1957.

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the scenes between Lim and Lee had continued, as the two leaders’ attempts to coordinate a common strategy to wrong-foot Marshall in the Assembly debate of late April had demonstrated.128 Significantly, in July, Lim told the American Consulate that he was holding frequent meetings with Lee to coordinate strategy against the PAP’s subversives and the union movement.129 To what extent Harry was aware of this degree of collaboration between the two leaders remains uncertain, yet since mid-1956 rumours of a political understanding (merger or electoral alliance between the SLF and the PAP) had been rife in Singapore. Harry’s hunch was that the next general election might indeed witness interesting political realignments and, most significantly, “the emergence of a predominantly Chinese party or group of parties as the major political force”, whose leanings would be “non-Communist and possibly actively anti-Communist”. If that were indeed to be the case, then the focus of Singapore’s political parties was “likely to be on efforts to secure a merger with the Federation rather than on the elimination of the British and a separate independence for Singapore”. Harry was, of course, aware that in the volatile politics of Singapore, predictions could always prove wrong, yet he felt confident enough to rule out, at least for the time being, “an alignment, political as distinct from economic and cultural, of Singapore with Peking during the five years immediately ahead”.130 Doubts about Lim’s long-term political prospects briefly resurfaced in the summer of 1957, following the SLF’s poor showing in the Tanjong Pagar and Cairnhill by-elections.131 With the loss of Cairnhill (a constituency held by the SLF until Marshall resigned in April), the Lim government saw its position as a minority government further

128

See NARA, RG 59, CDF, box 3262, 746F.00/5-357, memcon, Lim, Collins and Holdridge, 21 Apr. 1957; 746F.00/5-2257, Singapore to State Department, despatch 517, 22 May 1957. 129 NARA, RG 59, CDF, box 3262, 746F.00/7-1657, Singapore to State Department, despatch 25, 16. July 1957; memcon, Lim, Holdridge, Collins and Cottrell, 10 July 1957. 130 NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 5, Harry to DEA, savingram 3, 18 May 1957. 131 NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 5, Harry to Tange, memorandum 892, 29 Apr. 1957; Harry to Tange, memorandum 1149, 8 June 1957; Harry to Tange, memorandum 1351, 6 July 1957.

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entrenched.132 Of particular concern to Western observers — especially American ones — were the SLF’s lack of internal unity (and funds), and its apparent inability to cash in electorally on Lim’s success in London and to shed its “colonialist” and “anti-Labour” image.133 Soon, however, Australian hopes that Singapore could come good received a renewed boost in the late summer of 1957 when Lim decided, once again, to take on the radicals in the PAP and the labour movement. In August 1957 simmering tensions within the party had finally come to the fore, resulting in a showdown between the moderates and the procommunists.134 At the PAP’s annual general meeting held on 4 August, the pro-communist faction succeeded in having six of its delegates elected to the party’s highest decision-making body. While failing to secure an overall majority, the radical Left had clearly reasserted its influence on the party.135 On 13 August Lee and the other moderates refused to accept key positions on the CEC.136 All policy-making party offices were taken by the pro-communists and radical left-wingers, with Tan Chong Kin and T.T. Rajah becoming Chairman and General Secretary respectively.137 C.C. Chin has argued that although some of the leftist members of the newly elected CEC were associated with the MCP, their quest for power had not been directed, let alone sanctioned, by the MCP itself.138 Suddenly, however, as the PAP’s moderate and

132

NARA, RG 59, CDF, box 3262, 746F.00/7-157, Cottrell to Dulles, telegram 177, 1 July 1957. 133 NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 5, Harry to Tange, memorandum 1351, 6 July 1957. On the results of the two by-elections see also NARA, RG 59, CDF, box 3262, 746F.00/7-2357, Singapore to State Department, despatch 33, 23 July 1957. 134 NARA, RG 59, CDF, box 3262, 746F.00/8-2657, Singapore to State Department, despatch 84, 26 Aug. 1957. On these simmering tensions see for instance NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 5, Borthwick to Tange, memorandum 1489, 27 July 1957. 135 NARA, RG 59, CDF, box 3262, 746F.00/8-2057, Singapore to State Department, despatch 65, 20 Aug. 1957; NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 5, Borthwick to Tange, memorandum 1588, 10 Aug. 1957. 136 NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 5, DEA to Washington, savingram 84, 22 Aug. 1957; Borthwick to Tange, memorandum 1623, 17 Aug. 1957. 137 NARA, RG 59, CDF, box 3262, 746F.00/8-1457, Cottrell to Dulles, despatch 159, 14 Aug. 1957; 746F.00/8-2057, Singapore to State Department, despatch 65, 20 Aug. 1957. 138 Chin, “United Front”, pp. 65–6.

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pro-communist factions seemed destined to an uneasy cohabitation, Lim once again intervened to pull Lee’s chestnuts out of the fire. On the night of 22 and 23 August, the Chief Minister launched another sweep against the “second-string Communist leadership” and several of its followers. Five members of the new CEC’s pro-communist leadership, several prominent radical figures of the PAP branch organisations and trade union movement, and five staff members (including the managing director) of the pro-communist Sin Pao newspaper were arrested.139 On 25 September, the government also arrested 40 middleschool students.140 Lim’s crackdown gave Lee the opportunity to reassert his control over the CEC and the party as a whole. In late October 1957, he and his moderate associates moved to introduce changes to the party’s Constitution with the view to strengthening their control over the party branches and thus reducing, at least temporarily, the threat of a challenge to their authority from the radical left-wing faction.141 Harry welcomed Lim’s action. In what was to be one of his last dispatches from Singapore  —  he was shortly to return to Australia to head Australia’s overseas intelligence agency, the recently established Australian Security Intelligence Service  —  Harry praised Lim for the “energy and courage” with which he had taken on Singapore’s extreme Left without resorting to “unnecessarily repressive measures”.142 He informed Canberra that the communist-front organisations’ capacity to “propagate their views and to organise in any but the most clandestine way” was now “severely hampered”. As for the PAP, “the prospect of its capture by the communists” had “receded”. Australia, he said, “could be moderately optimistic” about Singapore for, in the short term at least, its stability appeared “reasonably assured”. Singapore’s democratic

139

NARA, RG 59, CDF, box 3262, 746F.00/8-2057, Cottrell to Dulles, despatch 206, 24 Aug. 1957; 746F.00/8-2657, Singapore to State Department, despatch 84, 26 Aug. 1957; 746F.00/8-2957, Singapore to State Department, despatch 89, 29 Aug. 1957. 140 NARA, RG 59, CDF, box 3262, 746F.00/9-3057, Singapore to State Department, despatch 135, 30 Sept. 1957; 746F.00/9-2657, Peterson to Dulles, despatch 342, 26 Sept. 1957. 141 NARA, RG 59, CDF, box 3262, 746F.00/10-3157, Singapore to State Department, despatch 198, 31 Oct. 1957. 142 NAA, A4231, 1957, Harry to Casey, ministerial despatch 6/57, 14 Sept. 1956; Ralph Harry, The North was Always Near (Brisbane: Griffith University, 1994), p. 27.

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forces could “now look forward, without apprehension or violence”, to the next general election (then expected to take place in mid-1958).143 Harry was hopeful that, notwithstanding the SLF’s weak party machine and its chronic lack of funds, Lim’s political skills would allow him to secure a workable majority at the next election, perhaps by attracting splinter groups from other parties, PAP included. He was far from pessimistic on this point, viewing the PAP’s internal struggles as likely to hasten some sort of association between Lee’s moderate wing and the SLF. Looking ahead into Singapore’s near future, Lim also expected the new Constitution to usher in a period of stability “in which a responsible party will assume government and cooperate, probably for a few years with the United Kingdom and Western interests generally, from enlightened self-interest”. Merger with Malaya remained Singapore’s best long-term solution, but this was unlikely to materialise in the next five or, perhaps, even ten years. That said, Harry did not believe that Canberra “should be unduly alarmed” at the possibility of an independent Singapore outside Malaya. After all, “the attractive force of Chinese communism would be tempered by the practical necessities of a commercial community whose principal trading ties were with the West”. If anything, the major danger in the long term was a significant deterioration in Singapore’s economic outlook which could provide a fertile ground for left-wing radicalism. With a rapidly expanding population and limited capacity for developing a local industry able to absorb its growing workforce, Singapore’s economic future looked far from assured.144 In Canberra, the DEA was markedly less optimistic. In a paper drafted after Lim’s August police swoop, External Affairs officials recognised that in the past 12 months there had been an “improvement in the internal situation” thanks to Lim’s “firm action against communist subversion”, but contended that Singapore’s long-term prospects still gave “cause for concern”. What caused alarm was not simply the significant uncertainty surrounding Singapore’s economic outlook (in this they concurred with Harry), but also the threat of communist subversion. The fact that Lim had resorted to two major police swoops in

143 144

NAA, A4231, 1957, Harry to Casey, ministerial despatch 6/57, 14 Sept. 1957. Ibid.

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less than 12 months was testament to “the extent of the Communist danger in Singapore”. These problems were further compounded by the new constitutional arrangements that Lennox-Boyd had negotiated with the Singaporeans. While conceding that constitutional concessions were unavoidable if Lim were “not to be discredited”, DEA officials nonetheless reiterated the view that, in the long term, the security of Singapore was “now less assured”. London had successfully retained the right to the continued use of its defence installations, but whether it would be able to exercise this right effectively remained to be seen. Ultimately, much would depend on the evolution of the colony’s political situation and, most importantly, on the outcome of the next general election. Whereas officials expected a government led by the SLF to provide “reasonable stability for several years, with communist activities largely confined to underground penetration”, they regarded a PAP administration (or a “similarly-inclined government”) as likely to “challenge the continuance of United Kingdom defence responsibilities in Singapore” and make it difficult for London to play an effective regional role.145 Only time, of course, would tell which of these two alternatives was more likely to prevail. However, as the City Council elections held in late December were to show, Australian policymakers would not have to wait too long to find out the answer.

145

NAA, A1838, 3024/1/7 part 1, An Assessment of the Present Situation and the Future Outlook in Singapore, 30 Aug. 1957.

CHAPTER SIX

Dealing with the PAP, 1958–60

T

he City Council election held on 21 December 1957 rekindled concerns about Singapore’s future. It was an unambiguous victory for the PAP and a serious setback for the SLF. Of the 14 seats contested, the PAP won 13 whereas the SLF secured only 4 out of 16.1 The Liberal Socialists fared even worse, winning only 7 seats out of 32.2 With the first general election under the new Constitution planned for late 1958 or early 1959, the PAP was now tipped to win it comfortably and perhaps even to secure an overall parliamentary majority. As a result of its strong electoral showing, the PAP formed a minority executive and, for the first time in its brief history, it found itself in a position of administrative responsibility.3 The intensely anti-colonial (but not communist) PAP treasurer, Ong Eng Guan, was elected mayor. A trained accountant with a degree from the University of Melbourne, Ong was a political maverick close to the PAP right-wing faction. With a reputation for powerful oratory and demagoguery, he promised to exploit his new political platform to stir anti-colonial sentiment and demand the end of British rule.4 For British and Australian policymakers, the omens could hardly be less auspicious. 1 UKNA, CO 1030/713, Governor of Singapore to Lennox-Boyd, savingram 116, 27 Dec. 1957. The SLF’s coalition partner, UMNO, only secured two seats. 2 Ibid. 3 Drysdale, Singapore, p. 188. 4 Turnbull, Modern Singapore, p. 269.

153

154  COLD WAR AND DECOLONISATION

Yet, what most distressed Western observers in the election’s aftermath was not so much the PAP’s anti-colonial invectives and histrionics, but its strong electoral showing coupled with the poor performance of Singapore’s moderate parties. With the PAP destined to emerge as the colony’s dominant force, doubts instantly resurfaced over Lee’s ability to control his party. Notwithstanding the dramatic reassertion of Lee’s authority over the party machine, the PAP’s political fortunes continued to be perilously tied up with those of the radical and pro-communist Left. Following Lim’s second police sweep, the radicals had swiftly regrouped, reviving their infiltration of PAP branches and getting six of their own elected as City Council members.5 Although they were now likely   —   in the estimation of the new Governor, William Goode  —  to lie low lest Lim crack down on them again, they remained a force to be reckoned with, ready to regain the upper hand once conditions permitted.6 In these circumstances, Lee’s attempts to court the radical vote for electoral gain remained a game as risky as ever. How long could he and his associates do such a courting without paying a high price for it? With Singapore soon bound to gain full internal self-government, the question of its future gained, therefore, renewed urgency, generating a lively debate among Western policymakers. In Whitehall opinions differed as to whether Britain could work with a PAP government led by Lee. In general, CO officials, while disappointed at the poor electoral showing of the SLF and the Liberal Socialists, took the eventuality of a PAP victory at the next general election with some equanimity. In contrast to their pre-election assumptions, they now considered the PAP’s rise to power almost inevitable, but tended to see Lee as an anticommunist and were relatively hopeful that the responsibilities of office would have a sobering effect on him and his associates. Such cautious optimism was not shared by MOD officials, who remained sceptical about Lee’s ability to hold in check the pro-communist elements in his party.7 Differences of opinion also existed among British officials 5

UKNA, CO 1030/713, Goode to Lennox-Boyd, telegram 10, 22 Jan. 1958. For Goode’s views see ibid. 7 NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 6, London to DEA, savingram ex 28, 15 Jan. 1958; UKNA, DEFE 11/125, BDCC(FE)217 mtg, 5 Feb. 1958; NARA, RG 59, CDF, box 3262, 746F.00/1-1658, London to State Department, despatch 4173, 16 Jan. 1958; 746F.00/1-2158, London to State Department, despatch 2502, 21 Jan. 1958. 6

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in Singapore.8 Black was moderately optimistic. For the departing governor, a PAP government would be “tougher, more nationalistic and more difficult to handle”, but Lee was an anti-communist who would try to make the Constitution work: Britain’s position would be more difficult, but not impossible. As ever, the crucial question remained whether, in the end, Lee would be able to stand up to the PAP’s extreme left wing.9 Black’s successor, William Goode, held similar views.10 Less optimistic, on the other hand, were Scott, the three Commandersin-Chief (Far East) and the Joint Intelligence Committee (Far East). They all laid longer odds against the PAP’s willingness to collaborate.11 The JIC (FE)’s assessment, in particular, was that the PAP “would work to produce a clash with the United Kingdom interests”.12 The prospect of Singapore under PAP rule raised similar concerns in Australia. Quite predictably, the DEA’s initial reaction was that the PAP’s electoral triumph had “improved considerably” its chances of carrying the next general election, thus raising the spectre of growing political instability on the island. With the infiltration of the party by pro-communist elements set to continue, it remained uncertain whether the current leadership would be able to retain control of the CEC. What is more, the SLF’s trouncing at the municipal election had weakened Lim, making it increasingly difficult for him to take further repressive action against the PAP’s radicals.13 The DEA’s preliminary conclusion was that the only plausible alternative to a PAP government would be an alliance between the SLF and the Liberal Socialists.14 Macmillan’s arrival in Australia on 28 January 1958 provided the opportunity for senior Australian ministers to review the Singapore 8 NARA, RG 59, CDF, box 3262, 746F.00/3-1858, Singapore to State Department, despatch 446, 18 Mar. 1956. 9 NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 6, London to DEA, savingram ex 28, 15 Jan. 1958. 10 UKNA, FO 1091/88, Goode to Lennox-Boyd, 31 Jan. 1958; DEFE 11/125, BDCC(FE)217 mtg, 30 Jan. 1958. 11 NARA, RG 59, CDF, box 3262, 746F.00/1-2158, Singapore to State Department, despatch 339, 21 Jan. 1958; UKNA, DEFE 11/125, BDCC(FE)217 mtg, 30 Jan. 1958; NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 6, London to DEA, savingram 6, 21 Feb. 1958. 12 UKNA, DEFE 11/125, BDCC(FE)217 mtg, 30 Jan. 1958. 13 NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 6, DEA to Washington, savingram 4, 4 Jan. 1958. 14 NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 6, DEA to London (draft despatch, not sent), 22 Jan. 1958.

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situation at the highest political level. The chief aim of Macmillan’s visit to Australia, the first made by a British prime minister in office, was to take stock of the state of Anglo-Australian relations and clear up a number of bilateral issues which had been awaiting a decision for several months — namely, the (British) proposal to strengthen ANZAM and to station permanently Commonwealth ground forces at Malacca.15 With regard to Singapore, his task was twofold: to reassure the Australians about the direction of British colonial policy and to reiterate London’s determination to hold its military bases in Southeast Asia. In a brief prepared for him before his talks with the Australian ministers, the UKCOS spoke of Singapore as being “absolutely vital to [Britain’s] whole position in the Far East”.16 Ahead of the talks, Australian views on Singapore were further developed in a short DEA memorandum drafted by Tange. In it, the DEA Secretary made it clear that London should “go no further in the transfer of authority in Singapore”. Australian resistance to further concessions, he argued, was not motivated by the government’s faith in Singapore’s continuing strategic usefulness: quite the contrary, Australia was not at all “impressed with the defence value of Singapore” in the event of internal unrest. Rather, Australian lack of enthusiasm for further devolution stemmed from two different considerations: first, that Australia doubted that greater self-government ahead of merger with Malaya would be “consistent with efforts to keep Malaya in the antiCommunist camp”; second, that Singapore should “never be set loose to gravitate to Peking and become an outpost for Communist political and military influence in South-East Asia”. For Tange, the implications were clear: “if Communism takes hold internally in Singapore, the United Kingdom may have to use force. We hope they will feel that they have a responsibility to do so if necessary.” 17 The British, after all, were not likely to “face adverse international reactions of the kind that

15

For these proposals see NAA, A4940, C1962 part 1, Future of ANZAM, 9 Jan. 1958 and UKNA, CAB 21/3152, Memorandum by the UK Government to build a Cantonment at Malacca for the Commonwealth Strategic Brigade, 3 Feb. 1958. 16 UKNA, DO 35/8834, COS(58)2, Brief for the Prime Minister’s Tour of the Far East: Note by the Chiefs of Staff, 1 Jan. 1958. 17 NAA, A1209, 1958/5040, Australia’s External Policies: Broad Themes for Presentation to Mr. Macmillan: Note by Arthur Tange, 29 Jan. 1958.

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would arise in other colonial situations” for there was “no great love for the Chinese amongst the Afro-Asians”.18 A few days later, similar points were made in another DEA brief drafted for the ministerial consideration. In it, officials advised ministers to convey their concern to Macmillan over Singapore’s growing drift to the left and to express their desire “to be consulted about any action Britain might take regarding the future of Singapore”. More specifically, ministers would want to know whether London would “maintain the capacity to stand its ground in Singapore (to the point of suspending the Constitution) should serious opposition to the proposed constitution develop”.19 When Singapore finally came up between Macmillan and the Australian ministers, the British leader stuck to his brief, making it clear that Britain had no intention of allowing “Communist control” of the island and would thus “be willing, if necessary, to assume direct government under its reserve powers”.20 When Casey asked him whether it might not be wise — given the prospect of a PAP victory at the next election — to postpone the vote altogether (rather than to suspend the Constitution), Macmillan quickly moved to allay Australian concerns. He replied that, in that eventuality, a postponement might indeed be “best”. In any case, he said, Britain’s commitment not to abandon Singapore was unequivocal: should the internal situation get out of hand following Lim’s departure, the Constitution would indeed have to be suspended. The Americans, Macmillan noted reassuringly, would be on the same side on this. In a further attempt to strike a reassuring note, he added that that there was probably “no need to fear the worst”. In Singapore, in fact, there were “good signs as well as bad” and “there might be no requirement to suspend the constitution”. However, were Britain forced to reintroduce direct rule, Macmillan was confident that law and order would be easier to maintain in Singapore than in Cyprus. For his part, Casey conveyed the Australian view that whatever London decided to do, “no further concession in constitutional matters would be

18

Ibid. Emphasis is in the original. NAA, A1209, 1958/5040, Discussions between UK Prime Minister and Australian Ministers, 11 Feb. 1958; South and South East Asia: Brief for Australian Ministers, 10 Feb. 1958. 20 NAA, A1838, TS691/8, memcon, Macmillan and Australian ministers, 30 Jan. 1958. 19

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given to Singapore”.21 In the end, Macmillan’s words had a seemingly reassuring effect on Menzies and his ministers. At the end of the talks, the Australians were said to be relieved by Macmillan’s promise to take drastic action to safeguard Britain’s position in Singapore.22

The DEA Reassesses the Singapore Situation In early February 1958, with Macmillan still in Australia, the DEA initiated a more thorough reappraisal of the Singapore question. In a long paper pertinently titled “The Future of Singapore”, External Affairs officials examined Australia’s policy options in the event of a PAP victory at the impending general election. Rather gloomily, they concluded that long-term political and economic trends in Singapore appeared to favour the emergence of “a left-wing Peking-orientated Government”. Such a government would be expected to reduce further, or even eliminate, British authority in Singapore. In that event, Britain would be confronted with a dilemma  —  to grant independence or face unrest. In the latter case, London would have to suspend the Constitution. However, as DEA officials were painfully aware, doing so would not be without significant risks: even if the British successfully restored law and order, they might in fact still be faced with a climate of enduring (or creeping) hostility. This, in turn, might threaten the viability of their military installations. As the paper acknowledged, military bases located in foreign territory and dependent on an indigenous workforce were “almost untenable in the face of widespread civil hostility”. The Suez Canal base area was a good example. In 1954, nearly 100,000 British troops were still required to protect the base itself before they were eventually withdrawn following the October 1954 Suez Canal base agreement between Britain and Nasser’s Egypt.23 Such strain on British

21

NAA, A4940, C1962 part 2, memcon, Macmillan, Menzies, McEwen, Casey and McBride, 11 Feb. 1958. 22 UKNA, DO 35/9874, Pritchard to James, 18 Feb. 1956. 23 NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 6, Future Status of Singapore, 22 Jan. 1958. In July 1954, the Financial Times put the total number of British troops deployed in the Canal Zone at approximately 73,000. See Financial Times, 28 July 1954. For the Anglo-Egyptian agreement see Charles Selak Jr, “The Suez Canal Base Agreement of 1954”, The American Journal of International Law 49, 4 (1955): 487–505.

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resources was unlikely to be tolerated again. For this reason, DEA officials had reservations about London’s ability (or even willingness) to maintain its position in Singapore by force. At any rate, they wondered whether the retention of the Singapore base through the reimposition of colonial rule would really be in Australia’s interest given the probable negative reactions in Asia and elsewhere.24 In their view, Australia’s interest clearly lay in the maintenance of a British presence in Singapore for as long as possible and “without prejudicing Singapore’s future attitude to the Commonwealth”. The omens, however, were far from encouraging. Hence Australia should plan ahead for the possibility of a British withdrawal from Singapore — and, perhaps, even from Southeast Asia — in a not-too-distant future. As it was, the 1957 Constitutional Agreement represented already “a contraction of United Kingdom power in South East Asia”.25 Confronted with the likely emergence of an independent but unfriendly Singapore, and the long-term prospect of British disengagement from Southeast Asia, DEA officials made some tentative proposals designed to give the government a much-needed political compass to deal with these significant challenges. In the short term, they argued, the government should consider encouraging closer links between the SLF and the Liberal Socialists to improve their chances of winning the next general election. However, should a moderate front fail to materialise and the next election produce a PAP’s majority, attempts ought to be made to develop links with the more moderate elements within the PAP. Courting Lee would by no means be the ultimate solution to the Singapore conundrum: there was, in fact, no guarantee that the PAP’s leadership would be able to hold power for long and, in any case, Lee could not be trusted to “take firm action against subversion”. Yet, courting the PAP’s moderates might help gain the necessary breathing space to bring about a merger with Malaya. As officials contended, merger remained the only plausible long-term solution, provided, of course, that Malaya remained stable and anti-communist. Merger between Malaya and Singapore could also be the first nucleus of a wider federation enlarged to the British Borneo. If established, this larger

24 25

NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 6, Future Status of Singapore, 22 Jan. 1958. Ibid.

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federation could provide “an arc of British influence across the South China Sea”. Officials, however, made it clear that merger between Malaya and Singapore should not come at all costs: were the former to slide towards communism or its communal situation worsen, merger should be shelved. Faced with an unstable Malaya or an unfriendly Singapore, Australia ought, then, to reassess its options — whether, for instance, to urge the British “to weld the Borneo territories into a [Bornean] federation and to build up base installations there or whether to abandon bases in South East Asia altogether and develop base in Northern Australia”. Although this last scenario was undoubtedly radical, DEA officials were not a priori against it: quite the contrary, they recognised that it might be in Australia’s interest “to prepare in advance for the possibility of the transfer of United Kingdom base facilities from Singapore to Australia, as the stage may be reached in the not too distant future when the effective use of the Singapore base may be impaired”. For the time being, however, they reiterated the view that it would be to Australia’s advantage if Britain held Singapore for as long as possible. To this end, the government should perhaps “consider supporting the Singapore dockyard” if the British were to become reluctant, for purely economic reasons, to maintain a military presence in Singapore at its present levels.26 The future of Singapore and the ideas contained in the DEA’s draft paper were discussed at a gathering of Australian heads of mission in Southeast Asia. Held in Singapore from 26 February to 4 March 1958, the meeting was attended by Plimsoll and Casey. The participants agreed that the retention of Singapore was “essential” for British and Commonwealth interests in the area. Its loss would have a significant impact on Australia’s security as it would remove a crucial factor in the defence of Australia’s near north, weaken SEATO and unsettle Allied defence planning in the Far East. Moreover, it would hurt Australia’s regional economic interests as well as affect Malaya negatively. Senior Australian diplomats, therefore, strongly favoured the continuation in power of the present government and recommended that Western policy “be directed to this end”.27 Accordingly, they considered various

26

Ibid. NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 6, Meeting of Heads of Australian Missions in South East Asia, 1958: Consensus of Opinion on Main Issues, undated.

27

DEALING WITH THE PAP  161

forms of support that Australia and its Western allies might want to consider to improve Lim’s prospects of remaining in power — from financial assistance to promote the SLF’s electoral campaigns to measures aimed at strengthening its organisation.28 That said, they also indicated that “if a party, which was not prepared to work the new Constitution, came to power in Singapore the United Kingdom should be encouraged to suspend the Constitution”. In such event, a contribution from Australia might well be necessary not only “to maintain the fabric of Government through the provision of technical and other experts”, but also “to assist in the maintenance of order in Singapore, including possibly the provision of forces”.29 Despite DEA officials’ apparent inclination to see a greater Australian involvement in Singapore, ministers were not yet ready to travel down that path. In this, Australian policy continued to differ perceptibly from that of the Americans. As mentioned earlier, since 1955 the Eisenhower administration had become increasingly sceptical about London’s ability to control the situation, viewing British attempts to thwart the growing appeal of communism and nationalism through greater self-government as likely to lead to Britain’s premature ejection. This, the administration believed, should not be allowed to happen for the loss of Singapore would represent a serious setback for US containment in Southeast Asia. For this reason, Washington had decided to take matters into its hands by shoring up the position of moderate nationalists. Accordingly, American officials in Singapore had begun to resort to a variety of political, psychological and covert measures to encourage Singaporeans to adopt a more pro-Western outlook and resist the appeal of communism.30 The Menzies government certainly shared some of Washington’s misgivings about the course of British policy in Singapore. In February 1958, David McNicol, the new Australian

28

NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 6, Borthwick to Cutts, 27 Mar. 1958. Richard Woolcott has claimed that they also considered the possibility of a clandestine votebuying exercise to improve Lim’s electoral prospects. Nothing, however, came of it. See Richard Woolcott, The Hot Seat: Reflections on Diplomacy from Stalin’s Death to the Bali Bombings (Sydney: HarperCollins, 2003), pp. 36–7. 29 NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 6, Meeting of Heads of Australian Missions in South East Asia, 1958: Consensus of Opinion on Main Issues, undated. 30 Long, Safe for Decolonisation, p. xi.

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Commissioner in Singapore, had expressed his concern not only about “a tendency amongst some of the British here to let things sort themselves out and then make the best of the existing situation”, but also about the lack of British “drive and enthusiasm to advise and assist moderate elements to remain in power”.31 Crucially, however, the Australian government was careful not to interfere with the British handling of the colony’s internal affairs. The reason was essentially twofold: Canberra wished to avoid becoming closely associated, in Asian eyes, with British rule in Southeast Asia while also seeking to avert a situation where any attempt to become more actively involved in Singapore would open the door to British demands for greater burdensharing. As in 1956, the Coalition government, notwithstanding its support for a continuing British presence, had no intention of being drawn into Singaporean politics. On the other hand, with the PAP tipped to win the next general election, Canberra’s circumspection did not prevent Australian officials from seeking to gauge the party leadership’s intentions. In early 1958 McNicol met Lee twice. In February, he found him exuding confidence in PAP’s electoral prospects, but disappointingly evasive about the question of communist influence within the party’s ranks. While describing the PAP as anti-communist, Lee gave no detail on how he intended to keep the pro-communists in check. Somewhat contradictorily, he claimed that although China’s emergence as a major Asian power had not had much influence on the local Chinese, it was nonetheless dangerous for Singaporean parties to pursue an anti-Peking line.32 Lee was no more reassuring when he met McNicol, again, a month later. Although he spoke of the need to defeat communism and recognised the role played by SEATO in deterring communist expansionism, Lee failed to explain how he would cope with communist pressure if his party triumphed at the next election. Instead, he told McNicol that communism was on the rise in Southeast Asia. This, he said, was because communist movements were dedicated, patient and persevering —  quite unlike non-communist forces who “never seemed to be able to

31

NAA, A1838, 3024/11/51 part 1, Singapore to DEA, savingram 6, 21 Feb. 1958. NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 6, McNicol to Tange, memorandum 262, 6 Feb. 1958.

32

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organize themselves sufficiently or to work hard enough”. He claimed that if it were legal in Singapore, “the Communist Party would probably win 50 per cent of the votes”. In his view, the British had shown foresight in granting Singapore self-government “because otherwise people like Lee himself would probably have found themselves by now in the Communist Party”. Ultimately, however, only force could keep communism in check. In the case of Singapore, the greatest deterrent against a communist takeover was the threat of the use of force by Britain and the Federation of Malaya.33 A little more reassuring were PAP President Toh Chin Chye and Mayor (and PAP Treasurer) Ong Eng Guan. Toh told the Australian Commission that while it would not run Singapore for the “benefit of a Colonial power”, the PAP would still honour the new Constitution and make it work.34 Ong made a similar point, arguing that, because of the importance attached by the party leadership to both merger with Malaya and Singapore’s economic development, the PAP “would not follow extreme policies in regard to the implementation of the constitutional agreement and the use of the [British] bases”.35 Yet, despite these signs of moderation, McNicol remained sceptical about Lee’s ability to rein in the party’s extreme Left.36 In August, following a further conversation with Lee during which the PAP leader had apparently sought to reassure him about his anti-communist credentials, McNicol wrote to Canberra that: [Q]uite frankly, I do not know whether he is anti or non Communist but my guess is that at heart he could be so described. However I think that if he saw Communism making great gains in Asia, he would quickly jump on the other side of the fence or leave the country.37

33

NAA, 1958. 34 NAA, 1958. 35 NAA, 1958. 36 NAA, 1958. 37 NAA,

A1838, 3024/2/1 part 6, memcon, Plimsoll, McNicol and Lee, 3 Mar. A1838, 3024/2/1 part 6, memcon, Woolcott and Toh Chin Chye, 4 Mar. A1838, 3024/2/1 part 6, memcon, Woolcott and Ong Eng Guan, 25 Feb. A1838, 3024/2/1 part 6, McNicol to Tange, memorandum 699, 11 Apr. A1838, 3024/2/1 part 7, memcon, McNicol and Lee, 4 Aug. 1958.

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Lee and the PAP, however, were not McNicol’s only preoccupations. He was also concerned about the future of the Lim government. His initial cautious optimism appeared to have given way to a more pessimistic appraisal of the SLF’s performance.38 In April, he painted a remarkably gloomy picture of Lim’s prospects of retaining power after the election (now expected to be held between late 1958 and mid1959). He warned Canberra that the government’s political agenda was unlikely to win the SLF many votes, for elections in Singapore were won not by “policy or bold and imaginative programmes” but “personalities and efficient party organizations. The [present] government is sadly lacking in both of these.” 39 The SLF was “politically close to the rocks”, its future “bleak”. It had a serious image problem, being generally seen as too closely associated with British interests. The SLF leadership had done little to address the party’s shortcomings. Nor were there signs of an SLF “energetic campaign” to contest the forthcoming June 1958 Rural Council elections, whose outcome was expected to set the tone for the subsequent, and much more important, general election. This, in McNicol’s view, was bad news for if the SLF polled poorly in them, the majority of Singaporeans would conclude that “the writing was on the wall” for the SLF and would thus get onto the PAP’s bandwagon. As he had earlier pointed out, an electoral alliance (or even a merger) between the SLF and the Liberal Socialists was unlikely to provide a credible alternative to the PAP for it would be seen as a right-wing cartel with little appeal among Singapore’s increasingly left-leaning electorate. Much more promising, in his view, would be a partnership between the SLF and Lee’s moderates. However, the odds of Lee breaking up his party for the sake of joining forces with the SLF were remote, especially if, as expected, the PAP were to be successful at the Rural Council elections.40

38

In February 1958, McNicol told Tange that if Lim overhauled the SLF’s administrative machine and improved the party’s popular appeal, he could do well at the next general election. See McNicol NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 6, McNicol to the Secretary DEA, memorandum 325, 14 Feb. 1958. 39 NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 6, McNicol to Tange, memorandum 664, 11 Apr. 1958. 40 Ibid. For McNicol’s earlier doubts about the political value of an electoral alliance between SLF and the Liberal Socialists see NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 6, McNicol to the Secretary DEA, memorandum 325, 14 Feb. 1958.

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Australian Concerns about Britain’s Ability to Stay in Singapore In mid-1958, these anxieties were again compounded by lingering concerns about British attitudes towards political developments in Singapore. Despite British protestations to the contrary, Australian policymakers remained ambivalent about London’s assurances that it would hold Singapore come what it may. External Affairs, in particular, was inclined to question not only London’s resolve to suspend the Constitution and “maintain strong forces” on the island in the event of widespread unrest but also its ability to “operate the base effectively in the face of local opposition”.41 To some extent, this pessimism was due to Canberra’s enduring bleak assessment of Singapore’s future. While now generally prepared to concede that Lee was no communist, DEA officials continued to doubt that he would be able to prevent the PAP’s radical Left seizing control of the party with the result that Britain’s position in Singapore would be progressively eroded as communist influence inevitably increased.42 Yet, such pessimism was also fed by occasional comments made by British officials in Singapore. In various conversations with them, Australian officials had gained the distinct impression that London would be most reluctant to revoke the Constitution. Neither Black nor Goode had appeared averse to questioning both the feasibility and desirability of such a step.43 In early 1958, Scott had spoken to McNicol of significant divergence of opinion amongst British officials in Singapore. Whereas the JIC and the BDCC (FE) felt that London would have little option but to suspend the Constitution in the event of a communist-controlled PAP government, Goode rejected this conclusion, viewing, instead, a Lee administration as likely to be cooperative. Somewhat cynically, Scott told McNicol that, faced with such different readings, London “would come down on neither side”. In his view, two major factors militated against London’s direct intervention: first, Britain was unlikely to “be

41

NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 7, Situation in Singapore, 25 Aug. 1958; DEA to Washington, cablegram 1507, 1 Oct. 1958. 42 Ibid. 43 NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 7, memcon, McNicol and Goode, 5 Aug. 1958; A1838, 3024/2/1 part 6, memcon, Black, Tange and Borthwick, 31 Oct. 1957.

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confronted with an unambiguously Communist or pro-Communist Government” that would openly challenge its residual authority and second, British public opinion would probably react negatively to any suspension of the Constitution.44 Given the tenor of these comments, it was only a matter of time before Australian concerns found their way to Singapore and London. In mid-October 1958, Carrington informed both Scott and the CRO of a recent conversation he had had with McNicol while the latter was back in Australia for consultations with the DEA. To Carrington’s consternation, McNicol had made no secret of his scepticism about Britain’s willingness to suspend the Constitution. Asked by Carrington how he had come to such conclusion, McNicol replied that his views were shared by “many other British in the colony”. Carrington admitted being “very disturbed at this conversation”, adding that: for the last ten years the Australians have been extremely suspicious of our position in the Far East and set very great store by the retention of the Singapore bases. Recently they have been reassured by … the categorical assurances given to them by the Prime Minister when he was here that if it were necessary we should not hesitate to suspend the Constitution.

So concerned was the British High Commissioner to dispel any insinuation of British insincerity that he took the matter up with Tange and the new PMD Secretary, John Bunting. Complaining that McNicol “had completely misread the situation”, he told Tange that his government “had every intention” of suspending the Constitution if this became unavoidable.45 Both Bunting and Tange sought to downplay the significance of McNicol’s words. Bunting ascribed his comments to McNicol’s “love for the limelight” whereas Tange regarded them as “indicative perhaps of our family relationship which permitted views of this kind to be aired whereas with other countries they would be

44

NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 7, Opinions on the Likelihood of the UK Government Suspending the Singapore Constitution, 31 Oct. 1958. 45 NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 7, memcon, Carrington and Tange, 15 Oct. 1958; Loveday to McNicol, 21 Oct. 1958; UKNA, FO 1091/83, Carrington to Scott, 16 Oct. 1958.

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kept unrevealed”.46 Tange, however, told Carrington that while the Australian government accepted Macmillan’s assurances, some officials in Canberra wondered whether a future Labour administration would be as equally committed to suspending the Constitution. Australia was, of course, in no position to disagree with the decision to grant substantial authority to Singapore, but continued to put store by London’s ultimate power to revoke the Constitution.47 When McNicol’s comments reached Scott in Singapore, the Commissioner-General was scathing towards him and the Australians, more generally. As he told Carrington: breezy, cheerful, and popular as he is [McNicol] is sometimes slapdash and careless in his judgment and every now and then makes a bad mistake. As you say, the Australians have for years been extremely suspicious of our intentions. Some of them seem ready to accept any statement that seems to confirm their suspicions. There is not much more that we can do to dispel these suspicions, beyond going on giving them assurances which they do not credit.48

When he finally met McNicol in Singapore, Scott wasted no time expressing his annoyance at his remarks. He reminded McNicol that while it would indeed be a tough decision to make, the British government “would not hesitate to suspend the Constitution” should the circumstances demand it. The fact that contingency plans were already in place was, in Scott’s view, “conclusive proof that London “meant business”. Under instruction to avoid “any imputation of bad faith on the part of the United Kingdom”, McNicol ate the humble pie. He reassured Scott that his government accepted British assurances and that his personal views “had no standing at all”. He considered the incident closed.49 Privately, however, McNicol was unrepentant, telling

46

Ibid.; NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 7, memcon, Carrington and Tange, 15 Oct. 1958. 47 Ibid. 48 UKNA, FO 1091/83, Scott to Carrington, 23 Oct. 1958. 49 NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 7, McNicol to Tange, memorandum 2131, 31 Oct. 1958; Loveday to McNicol, 21 Oct. 1958; UKNA, FO 1091/83, Scott to Carrington, 23 Oct. 1958.

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Tange that “in any event the existence of [contingency] plans is not a guarantee of action”.50 Whether London would be willing, or indeed able, to adopt these contingency plans remained uncertain. In any case, Australian officials continued to be sceptical. In October 1958, the Defence Committee, while reluctant to question British assurances, concluded that Britain’s position in Singapore “could be eroded to such an extent that the Singapore base could not be used at will  –  indeed, the possibility of ultimate political or military withdrawal from Singapore within a few years cannot be excluded”.51 Within the DEA, similar views continued to be heard. In November, Richard Woolcott of the Southeast Asia Section warned that “whatever their [British] intentions now, the U.K. will probably not have the capacity or the will at the time to suspend the Constitution and maintain their position by force if necessary”.52 One way of dealing with this potential problem was, as DEA officials had pointed out in October 1958, “to consider an alternative base to demonstrate [the] Western presence and bolster other countries in the area. [The] Most suitable site for [the] development of alternative facilities would seem to be North Borneo”.53 Another possible option was “to encourage them [the British] to remain in the face of whatever opposition they may encounter, but this inevitably meant that Australia “would presumably have to be prepared to do so publicly and to offer some form of assistance to the United Kingdom”.54 This, however, remained, for the time being, mere brainstorming. As sources within the CRO seemed to confirm, the British had given no serious thought to alternative defence arrangements in the area  —  be it Borneo or Australia. The cost of redeploying British forces away from Singapore was said to be enormous and, unless forced to do so by circumstances, no British government would consider such deployment.55 As for any

50

NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 7, McNicol to Tange, memorandum 2131, 31 Oct. 1958. 51 NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 7, Loveday to McNicol, 21 Oct. 1958. 52 NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 7, Singapore memorandum 2131: note by Woolcott, 6 Nov. 1958. Emphasis is in the original. 53 NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 7, DEA to Washington, cablegram 1507, 1 Oct. 1958. 54 NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 7, Situation in Singapore, 25 Aug. 1958. 55 NAA, A1838, 3024/11/51 part 1, London to DEA, cablegram 760, 8 Oct. 1958.

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eventual Australian assistance, this was far too premature. Without a plan B, both Australia and Britain were clearly hostage to the internal dynamics of Singapore politics.

Singapore’s Domestic Situation and the May 1959 Election With the general election finally scheduled for 30 May 1959, the moderates’ chances to remain in power appeared increasingly slim. Despite Lim’s success in securing full internal self-government (in 1958 he had returned to London to finalise the terms of the constitutional agreement) and introducing important domestic reforms, his position remained weak. His crackdown on radical left-wingers, while restoring some degree of domestic stability, had exposed him to charges of being undemocratic, anti-labour, anti-Chinese culture and — even more damningly  —  a British lackey. His attempts to persuade Lee to break away from the PAP and join a new moderate political grouping had also fallen through.56 More generally, his moderatism had failed to impress the majority of the Chinese-speaking electorate and his appeal amongst them remained limited.57 The SLF’s defeat in the Kallang City Council by-election of 26 July 1958 was symptomatic of Lim’s difficulty in making inroads among the Chinese working-class voters. Despite fielding a Chinese candidate in a Chinese constituency, the SLF was comfortably beaten by the PAP’s Malay candidate.58 Attempts made by Lim in the second half of 1958 to shore up political support for his government and boost its electoral chances by establishing a new political party  —  the Singapore People’s Alliance (SPA)  —  were undermined by a political scandal that hit the government in the lead-up to

56

NARA, RG 59, CDF, box 3263, 746F.00/7-158, Singapore to State Department, despatch 4, 1 July 1958; 746F.00/7-158, memcon, Lim and Peterson, 26 June 1958. For Lim’s return to London see Turnbull, Modern Singapore, p. 266. His reforms included the Malayanisation of the public service, the establishment of a special Singaporean citizenship and the introduction of the principle of multilingualism. 57 NARA, RG 59, CDF, box 3262, 746F.00/8-2957, Singapore to State Department, despatch 89, 29 Aug. 1957; 746F.00/4-2458, Singapore to State Department, despatch 518, 24 Apr. 1985. 58 NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 7, Singapore to DEA, cablegram 309, 28 July 1958.

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the mid-1959 general election.59 Moreover, the moderates’ inability to set aside their personal differences and work to form a common front against the PAP made it difficult for them to stem Lee’s momentum. Lim’s last-minute attempts to negotiate an electoral alliance with other moderate forces were in vain. A nine-man committee formed by the SPA, Liberal Socialists, UMNO and MCA to canvass the possibility of fielding a single moderate candidate in each constituency produced no agreement.60 As a result, on the eve of the 30 May general election, Lim’s residual hopes of avoiding defeat remained pinned on enduring fears of PAP radicalism among a significant section of the Singapore population. At the other end of the political spectrum, Lee was, quite predictably, in a bullish mood. With his opponents in disarray, he appeared “more confident than ever of securing an outright majority in the Assembly”.61 Despite rumours of internal stresses within his party, Lee had every reason to be upbeat.62 The PAP’s strident electoral propaganda provoked disquiet amongst Singapore’s English-educated middle class but did no harm to Lee’s electoral appeal amongst the Chinese-speaking community.63 The PAP’s political rallies continued to be well-attended and its candidates enjoyed considerable popularity among the mass of Chinese speakers.64 Dressed in open-necked white shirts and white linen trousers to project an image of honesty and competence, the PAP’s candidates promised a clean and efficient government. They also advocated the need for racial harmony, pledged to secure full independence through a merger with Malaya and were committed to improving Singapore’s economic outlook by transforming the island from a trading 59

The SPA was established in Nov. 1958. With Lim as Chairman, the new party included elements from the SLF, the Liberal Socialist Party and the Workers’ Party. See UKNA, CO 1030/651, Goode to Lennox-Boyd, telegram 183, 13 Nov. 1958; Goode to Lennox-Boyd, 21 Nov. 1958. For the so-called Chew Swee Kee affair see Long, Safe for Decolonization, pp. 162–4. 60 NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 7, DEA to Washington, savingram 154, 30 Apr. 1959; McNicol to Tange, memorandum 825, 28 Apr. 1959; McNicol to Tange, memoranda 725 (10 Apr. 1959) and 778 (17 Apr. 1959). 61 UKNA, CO 1030/652, Goode to Lennox-Boyd, 25 Apr. 1959. 62 Ibid. 63 For Lee’s aggressive campaign see UKNA, CO 1030/652, Goode to Lennox-Boyd, telegrams 94 (20 May 1959) and 97 (21 May 1959). 64 UKNA, CO 1030/652, Goode to Lennox-Boyd, 25 Apr. 1959.

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to an industrial society.65 Concerns, of course, remained whether Lee and the moderate wing of the PAP would be able to keep the procommunists at bay once the responsibilities of office forced them into unpopular decisions. These concerns, however, belonged more to the British authorities, European expatriate and Malay communities and the English-educated Chinese population than the Chinese working class. With Lim Chin Siong and other leading radicals still in gaol, Lee seemed, at least momentarily, in control of the party and ready to be swept into power. The 30 May 1959 general election was a resounding victory for the PAP, which secured 43 seats out of 51.66 This result was testimony to the PAP’s superior organisation, drive and public presentation.67 The moderates paid dearly for their constant quarrelling and failure to agree on a single common candidate in crucial constituencies.68 Of the 51 seats available, the PAP’s opponents won only eight. Four went to SPA, three to the Alliance and one to an independent. The Liberal Socialists gained no seat at all.69 Given these numbers, Lim had no other option than to resign on 1 June. The new Constitution was introduced on 3 June and Lee was sworn in as Prime Minister of Singapore on 5 June. Singapore had now a fully elected Legislative Assembly and a government with a strong majority. As expected, the PAP’s overwhelming electoral victory sent shivers through the spines of most conservatives, businessmen and property owners, especially expatriates, who viewed the PAP’s rise to power as a prelude to irresponsible government and communism. European clubs on the island expected to be closed down, the price of properties fell, capital flew out of Singapore and several foreign firms relocated to the safer Kuala Lumpur.70 The PAP was, of

65

Turnbull, Modern Singapore, p. 271; UKNA, CO 1030/652, Goode to LennoxBoyd, 12 June 1959 and 26 June 1959. 66 UKNA, CO 1030/652, Goode to Lennox-Boyd, telegram 110, 31 May 1959; Goode to Lennox-Boyd, 12 June 1959. 67 Ibid. 68 Ibid. 69 UKNA, CO 1030/652, Goode to Lennox-Boyd, telegram 110, 31 May 1959; NAA, A4231, 1959/Singapore, McNicol to Casey, MD 2/59, 1 June 1959. 70 Turnbull, Modern Singapore, p. 272; Economist, 11 June 1960; Guardian, 26 June 1959; Times, 2 June 1960; UKNA, CO 1030/1149, Selkirk to Macleod, 19 May 1961.

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course, to blame for this. In the lead-up to the election, it had not only threatened to “deal with” anti-PAP groups once in power, but had also mounted a strong campaign against Singapore’s English press, and had often made anti-European and anti-white remarks.71 Widespread pessimism within the business community did not bode well for the economic future of Singapore, which was still largely reliant upon expatriate investment.72 The weeks following the elections appeared to reinforce this pessimism despite Lee’s public utterances that the PAP stood for responsible government and was committed to fighting communism.73 Once again, Lee and his party were to blame for this darkening mood, for they had not only persisted in their attacks against Western culture but had also continued to excoriate Singapore’s English-educated middle class for its alleged privileges. More worryingly, Lee had embroiled himself in risky political manoeuvrings, which cast serious doubts on his resolve to fight communism.74 In the election’s aftermath, Lee had refused to take office until the Governor agreed to free Lim Chin Siong and seven other PAP radicals, who were still awaiting trial in Changi for subversive activities.75 Upon their release, he had appointed a few of them to junior ministerial posts in the new administration. Yet, under the surface, the situation was not as serious as it appeared. Whereas in public Lee still cultivated an anti-British and left-wing image to bolster his popularity amongst the Chinese-speaking masses, in private he was much more restrained. Two episodes were particularly telling of Lee’s attitude. Just before election day, Lee had confided to Goode that his radical oratory was no more than an expedient to whip up last-minute electoral fervour and would not be “indicative of the behaviour of the

71

UKNA, CO 1030/652, Goode to Lennox-Boyd, telegram 97, 21 May 1959; NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 8, Cooper to Tange, memo 1021, 29 May 1959; McNicol to Tange, memo 979, 23 May 1959. 72 Turnbull, Modern Singapore, p. 272. 73 UKNA, PREM 11/2659, Perth to Lennox-Boyd, telegram 123, 27 May 1959; Perth to Macmillan, 28 May 1959; Goode to Lennox-Boyd, telegram 111, 1 June 1959; CO 1030/652, Goode to Lennox-Boyd, despatch 7, 26 June 1959. 74 UKNA, CO 1030/656, JIC(FE) (59)93 Final, The Outlook in Singapore up to the End of 1960, attached to COS(59)237, 28 Sept. 1959; Turnbull, Modern Singapore, p. 273. 75 UKNA, PREM 11/2659, Perth to Lennox-Boyd, telegram 123, 27 May 1959.

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party in and when in office”.76 More importantly, he had quietly moved to ensure that the pro-communists within his party would be in no position to challenge his authority. To do so, he had masterminded the re-election of the party’s CEC for two more years before they could be released from gaol on 4 June.77 It is true that he had subsequently appointed Lim Chin Siong and three other detainees as political secretaries, but these were minor ministerial positions within ministries of secondary importance.78 From the second half of 1959, small but significant signs appeared to confirm the PAP government’s fundamental moderatism. In September, it showed a cooperative attitude to the visits of Western warships despite earlier British and Australian concerns that it might raise problems to such visits.79 More in general, it displayed significant restraint in regard to the British and Commonwealth military presence in Singapore.80 Then, further appeasing signals came in autumn. In early November, Lee invited Commonwealth representatives to the Istana Negara (formerly Government House) with the seeming intent of showing that the PAP, despite its rhetoric, was not hostile to Western interests.81 A few days later, he and Finance Minister Goh Keng Swee moved to mend fences with the Singapore-based European business community.82 Quite revealing of Lee’s new-found moderatism was also his decision to accept a senior British security adviser as the temporary head of Singapore’s Special Branch.83

76

Ibid. Turnbull, Modern Singapore, pp. 271–2; Clutterbuck, Conflict and Violence, p. 151. Lim Chin Siong, Devan Nair, James Puthucheary, Fong Swee Suan, S. Woodhull and Chan Chiau Thor were among the eight detainees. See Pang, “People’s Action Party”, p. 147. 78 Turnbull, Modern Singapore, pp. 271–2. UKNA, DO 35/9869, Goode to LennoxBoyd, FED 111/2/01, 30 July 1956. 79 NAA, A1945, 248/10/6, Shann to Tange, memorandum 891, 24 Aug. 1059; McNicol to Tange, memoranda 1804 (2 Oct. 1959), 1256 (11 July 1959), 1402 (1 Aug. 1959) and 1351 (23 July 1959); FRUS, 1958-60, vol. 16, East Asia-Pacific Region; Cambodia; Laos (Washington: Department of State, 1992), doc. 51. 80 UKNA, CO 1030/1149, Selkirk to Macleod, despatch 176, 19 May 1961. 81 NAA, A1945, 248/10/6, Singapore to DEA, savingram 10, 9 Nov. 1959. 82 NAA, A1945, 248/10/6, Singapore to DEA, savingram 16, 30 Nov. 1959. 83 NAA, A1945, 248/10/6, London to DEA, savingram ex 503, 1 Dec. 1959. 77

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In contrast to the widespread pessimism bordering on alarmism that had characterised international reactions to Singaporean developments in the lead-up to the May election, the advent of a new PAP government was now received with greater equanimity. In Kuala Lumpur, the Alliance government had taken the PAP victory “calmly”. The Federation ministers regarded Lee as a non-communist who was determined to rein in the left-wing faction of his party. If they had doubts about him, these centred not so much on his resolve to keep the pro-communists in check, but on his ability to do so. Moreover, while still opposed to merger, they recognised the need to give Lee “as much encouragement and support” as they could for “a lack of warmth from the Federation would drive Lee Kuan Yew and his associates further left”.84 Like their Malayan counterparts, British policymakers also felt more optimistic about Lee’s ability to steer a moderate political course. In Singapore Goode accepted the PAP’s ascent to power with calmness.85 Since his appointment as Governor in December 1957, he had strongly advocated “the policy of working with the PAP”.86 Having had ample opportunities to take the measure of Lee, Goode was inclined to trust his sincerity and moderatism. He described the PAP government’s overall attitude towards communism as “fundamentally sound” despite its penchant to “act and speak in a way which may seem equivocal towards Communism and Communist China”.87 “It is hard”, Goode told the CO, “to recognise in all this the extremist P.A.P. of the last four years”.88 In London CO officials were relieved. “It is gratifying to read your judgement of Lee Kuan Yew’s growing maturity”, Assistant Under-Secretary Eugene Melville told Goode.89 “We all expected much worse”, he confessed.90 For Lennox-Boyd, it was now time to recognise that the PAP “offers the best hope in the long term

84

NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 8, Critchley to Tange, undated. Following the introduction of the new Constitution, the office of Governor was abolished. The new British representative in Singapore was now called High Commissioner. For six months Goode also held the office of Yang-di-Pertuan Negara. 86 UKNA, CO 1030/652, Wallace to Melville, 26 Oct. 1959. 87 UKNA, CO 1030/652, Goode to Macleod, 23 Nov. 1959. 88 UKNA, CO 1030/652, Goode to Lennox-Boyd, 7 Sept. 1959. 89 UKNA, CO 1030/652, Melville to Goode, 27 Oct. 1959. 90 UKNA, CO 1030/652, Handwritten note by Melville. 85

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of dealing with Chinese Chauvinism, Communism and Singapore’s economic problems, or, to quote Mr. Lee Kuan Yew, that the P.A.P. is really our best ally”.91 In Singapore, Scott was less sanguine. He did not question Lee’s anti-communism, but, in his last despatch from Singapore before returning to Britain, he warned Macmillan that the PAP leadership went “dangerously far in borrowing Communist techniques to wean support away from Communism”. “Sometimes, I wonder”, Scott added, “whether Lee is the leader or the tool. He seeks to escape from the tiger by mounting on its back”. In his view, London should give Lee a “full and fair trial” — it had no other option, after all — but should also bear in mind that the Lee experiment was destined to end sooner or later.92 Scott’s persistent pessimism was in part shared by the military and intelligence authorities in Singapore. In September 1959 the BDCC(FE), of which Scott was the chairman, approved a troubling intelligence assessment by Joint Intelligence Committee (Far East) on Singapore’s political outlook up to the end of 1960. According to the JIC(FE), Lee’s leadership, while relatively secure for the time being, would come under renewed threat in the long term. Unless he succeeded in improving Singapore’s economic outlook and lifting living standards, the PAP’s extremists would exploit the resulting discontent to overthrow him. They were already building support within the labour movement. In brief, the threat of communist subversion remained serious.93

The Australian Response to the May Election Australian reactions, while moderately optimistic, still betrayed a certain degree of anxiety. This was inevitable. In Australia, the May election had been “preceded by a flurry of grave speculation from several newspapers and politicians” about a possible PAP victory.94 Post-election

91

UKNA, CO 1030/652, Lennox-Boyd to Goode, 15 Sept. 1959. Macmillan agreed with this view. UKNA, CO 1030/1148, Macmillan to Selkirk, 17 Mar. 1960. 92 UKNA, PREM 11/2661, Scott to Macmillan, 13 Nov. 1959. 93 UKNA, CO 1030/656, JIC(FE) (59)93 Final, Outlook in Singapore up to the End of 1960, attached to DCC(FE) (59)261, 22 Sept. 1959. 94 Boyce, “Australian Diplomacy in Malaya”, p. 85.

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press reports still relayed that anxiety.95 On the whole, Australian policymakers held mixed views on the implications of the PAP’s electoral triumph. From London, new Australian Senior External Affairs Officer Keith (“Mick”) Shann cautioned Canberra against the CO’s rather rosy assessment. Australia, he said, should not forget “London’s well-known capacity to make the best of a bad job”.96 Officials in the DEA, however, needed no reminding of Singapore’s precarious situation and remained fairly sceptical about Lee and the PAP. In a paper drafted soon after the May election, Woolcott rehearsed the long-held departmental views of the PAP. Far from sharing the CO’s optimism, he highlighted the problems faced by Britain in dealing with a left-wing, anti-Western, Chinese-oriented and communist-penetrated government, keen on achieving full independence and limiting the strategic role played by Singapore in Western defence planning. Woolcott did not deny that that the present leadership was relatively moderate in outlook, but worried that the party might fall into communist hands. In the short term, he felt reasonably reassured that the PAP would work the Constitution and refrain from precipitate action. Three factors were likely to influence the party’s attitude in this respect: the desire to secure merger with Malaya, the need to foster domestic economic growth and the awareness that Singapore’s economic survival at present depended upon a continuing British military presence (the island’s defence installations provided work for one-sixth of the local labour force).97 Yet, Woolcott also believed that the PAP, despite its initial restraint, would eventually reveal its true colours and go ahead with its long-term goal of eradicating British influence through a merger with Malaya. With this in mind, Australia should pay close attention to four major outcomes. The first would be the gradual erosion of British power in Singapore, perhaps not so much by a series of blatant challenges to British interests, but rather by “gradual pin-pricking and pressure”. The second would be Singapore’s growing orientation towards communist China and its increasing drift towards left-wing radicalism. This, in turn, would have an adverse impact on the security of Malaya and

95

Ibid., p. 86. NAA, A1945, 248/10/6, Shann to DEA, savingram ex. 296, 26 June 1959. 97 NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 8, Implications of a PAP Government in Singapore, undated. 96

DEALING WITH THE PAP  177

undercut London’s ability to rely on its Singapore base in fulfilment of its Far Eastern commitments. The third would be London’s growing reluctance to intervene in Singaporean affairs. Despite its often stated resolve to hold Singapore at any price — even at the cost of revoking the Constitution — Britain was likely, in the long run, to have neither the ability nor the resolve to do so. Finally, the last but no less important outcome would be Britain’s wholesale withdrawal from Southeast Asia. According to Woolcott, this would entail: a major change in the defence planning in Asia of the free world, [would] weaken the security structure of SEATO and remove an at present important factor in Australia’s northern defences. It seems unlikely that the United Kingdom would be prepared at this stage to reproduce its present Singapore facilities in the Borneo territories. Apart from the massive expenditure involved the Borneo territories themselves will not remain indefinitely immune from the same anticolonial pressure at present prevalent in Singapore. Whether or not the United Kingdom would be prepared to remove its bases to Australia, which seems to present the only other alternative, would also appear questionable. The United Kingdom could well use ANZUS as an excuse for not doing so.98

In Singapore, McNicol, quite in contrast to his pre-election pessimism, appeared now noticeably less nervous about the PAP’s rule.99 In reporting to Canberra on the election’s outcome, he described the new administration as “young, energetic” and not without some talent in its ranks. He argued that “provided they remain true to their professed ideals and stated policies, the P.A.P. Government should provide Singapore with a responsible and efficient administration”. To be sure, given its strong anti-colonial rhetoric, it was “bound to irritate and at times offend Western interests which have operated here for so many years under conditions of privilege”. Yet, given goodwill on both sides, the PAP was likely to stick to the Constitution. Nor, he thought, should Australia be unduly concerned about its avowed neutralism. For political and economic reasons the PAP was likely to put the question

98

Ibid. For his earlier pessimism see NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 7, memcon, Goode and McNicol, 23 Jan. 1959; McNicol to Plimsoll, 25 Feb. 1959.

99

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of the Singapore bases “into cold storage” for the foreseeable future — at least until a merger with Malaya had become a tangible political prospect. He was confident that if Australia were sensitive to the aspirations of Singapore’s nationalist leadership and appreciated the difficult political and economic environment within which they operated, it could “achieve and maintain good relations with the new Government”.100 Indeed, as he pointed out in a later brief prepared for Menzies, “it was in the Western interest that [Lee] should receive support” for if he failed, there would be “no satisfactory alternative”.101 McNicol was well aware of the daunting political and economic challenges facing the new administration. On the political side, the threat of communist subversion remained as real as ever. While unlikely “to challenge Lee’s political leadership for the next two years”, the PAP extremists would no doubt “endeavour to re-assert their influence in the trade unions where they once commanded considerable support”. Whether the current PAP leadership had “the courage and resolution to take effective action to meet such a challenge” remained to be seen. On the economic side, challenges were no less awkward. Singapore faced an uncertain economic future with an employment problem “of enormous proportion”. On its own, traditional entrepôt trade was no longer enough to create the jobs needed to absorb the island’s rapidly growing workforce.102 With no natural resources, Singapore needed to industrialise rapidly to meet the demands of its growing population and maintain current living standards. However, unless it restored confidence in the island’s political future, the new leadership would find it hard to attract the much needed foreign capital for industrialisation.103 In Canberra ministers and senior officials were, on the whole, moderately optimistic. While Casey still held reservations about Lee (in October he told the Americans that the political outlook in Singapore continued to be “not pleasant”), Tange sounded decidedly more hopeful. In early June, he told Dutch Ambassador Lovink that he was not as pessimistic as before on the future of Singapore. In his view, the PAP government would neither jeopardise Singapore’s economic future

100

NAA, A4231, 1959/Singapore, McNicol to Casey, MD1/59, 12 June 1959. NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 8, Notes on Singapore, 29 June 1959. 102 NAA, A4231, 1959/Singapore, McNicol to Casey, MD1/59, 12 June 1959. 103 Ibid. 101

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nor alienate the Federation, upon whose goodwill it relied to secure merger.104 Menzies also appeared reasonably optimistic. He had met Lee and his ministers in Singapore shortly after the general election and had received a positive impression. He felt that despite their young age (the average was roughly 38 years), they were “not to be underestimated”: not only did they come across as incorruptible and competent, but they would also “do their best to produce good government”. Lee, in particular, stood out as “a man of ability” and “high intellectual capacity”. Menzies was confident that, while socialist, Lee and his ministers were not “violently Left Wing” and that, “barring some economic calamity”, the PAP leadership “would restrain Communism” in Singapore. In Menzies’s view, two factors militated against the PAP government drifting to the extreme Left: one was the government’s reliance on foreign capital to foster domestic growth, the other its avowed support for merger with Malaya.105 Menzies’s favourable assessment of the PAP government was borne out, in the following months, by the increasing moderation and selfrestraint with which it conducted itself. As 1959 drew to a close, the worst Western fears about the PAP had not materialised and Western governments could afford to feel a little less edgy about Singapore. Even the Americans, who had until then held serious misgivings about Lee’s anti-communist credentials, now felt more reassured. In October Dulles told Casey that the US and his allies “should try to work with the new [Singapore] Prime Minister”.106 This prevailing mood of cautious optimism was now increasingly reflected in the Australian Commission’s political reporting from Singapore. In March 1960, McNicol confirmed in a brief for Menzies that the new government “had acted, in the main, with correctness in respect of its powers under the Constitution”. Despite its neutralist and anti-colonial rhetoric, it had “done nothing to impair or erode the position of the United Kingdom in respect of the Bases” and was “well content that the United Kingdom

104

NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 8, memcon, Tange and Lovink, 10 June 1959. On Casey’s reservations see FRUS, 1958–60, vol. 16, doc. 51. 105 NAA, A1838, 189/10/1 part 2, Cabinet decision 359 (M), 13 July 1959; A1209, 1959/254, Press Conference given by Menzies at Parliament House, Canberra, 9 July 1959. 106 FRUS, 1958–60, vol. 16, doc. 51.

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should carry out its defence responsibilities” in Singapore. In the economic field, it had embraced free enterprise and capitalism, and had managed “to create an atmosphere of confidence” among the foreign business community.107 In a nutshell, as McNicol told the new British Commissioner, Lord Selkirk, in April 1960, Britain’s position in Singapore “was much more favourable than might have been expected 10 months ago”.108 The change in the Australian Commissioner’s views on Singapore under the new PAP regime could scarcely be more noticeable.

Lee’s Domestic Position Slides In mid-1960, as Western governments felt increasingly reassured about the anti-communist character of the PAP administration, Lee’s internal position began to weaken. Despite its much vaunted reformist zeal and electoral promises, his government had very little to show for itself at the end of its first year in office. It had indeed proved hard-working and honest, but minimal or no progress was registered in important areas such housing, social services and industrial development.109 Unemployment remained high and a wave of industrial disputes hit the city-state from April to December 1960.110 While no doubt prompted by a growing level of popular frustration at the lack of appreciable economic progress, the strikes signalled a resurgence of extreme left-wing militancy. In July 1960 Lee privately expressed concern to the British colonial authorities over growing communist activity within the labour movement and, in early August, he spoke out openly in the Legislative Assembly against the threat posed by the pro-communists within his party.111 While not yet blatantly opposed to the government’s policies,

107

NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 8, Draft Notes for the Prime Minister’s Brief, 25 Mar. 1960. 108 NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 8, Singapore to DEA, savingram 12, 21 Apr. 1960. 109 UKNA, DO 35/9869, Selkirk to Macleod, despatch 156, 20 May 1960; NAA, A1945, 248/10/6, McNicol to DEA, savingram 25, 9 July 1960. 110 UKNA, CO 1030/1148, Selkirk to Macleod, despatches 263 (2 Sept. 1960), 306 (18 Oct. 1960) and 361 (Dec. 1960). 111 NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 9, memcon, Moore and Ryan, 9 Aug. 1960; McNicol to Tange, memorandum 1375, 9 Sept. 1960; McNicol to DEA, savingram 30, 6 Aug. 1960; McNicol to DEA, savingram 29, 29 July 1960.

DEALING WITH THE PAP  181

they were growing increasingly restless with the PAP leadership’s moderatism.112 Throughout 1960, they had used the trade unions to continue building their power base with the view to displacing, one day, the PAP’s current leadership.113 Predictably, the latter’s countermoves, centred on tightening governmental control over the labour movement, were met with opposition by the group of extreme left-wing unions led by Lim Chin Siong and Fong Swee Suan.114 With a large majority in the Assembly, Lee’s parliamentary position remained unassailable. Yet the omens were far from encouraging as Lee’s grip on the party began to look less than assured. The government’s problems on the economic and labour front were compounded by the decision, in July 1960, to expel from the party the popular Ong Eng Guan along with two other PAP assemblymen who had sided with him.115 Ong had rapidly risen in popularity within the PAP thanks to his ability to attract the party’s rank and file with his raucously leftist and anti-colonial agenda.116 Appointed to the important Ministry of National Development in June 1959, Ong, however, had failed to impress and was held largely responsible for the government’s disappointing performance in areas such as industrial development and housing which fell under his portfolio.117 In October 1959, Lee had stripped him of his ministerial responsibilities for public utilities, public works and housing and then, between December 1959 and January 1960, the party journal, Petir, had launched a series of blistering attacks against him.118 When, in June 1960, the Hong Lim branch (Hong

112

UKNA, CO 1030/1148; Selkirk to Macleod, despatch 361, Dec. 1960; NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 9, Trade Unions and the Government in Singapore: note by Ryan, 3 Mar. 1961. 113 Ibid. 114 UKNA, CO 1030/1148, Selkirk to Macleod, despatches 263 (2 Sept. 1960), 306 (18 Oct. 1960) and 361 (Dec. 1960); CO 1030/1149, Selkirk to Macleod, 19 May 1961. 115 UKNA, CO 1030/1148, Acting UK Commissioner to Macleod, telegram 284, 16 July 1960. 116 UKNA, CO 1030/702, Goode to Lennox-Boyd, savingram 116, 27 Dec. 1957; Turnbull, Modern Singapore, p. 277. 117 Ibid.; UKNA, CO 1030/1148, OAG Singapore to Macleod, telegram 245, 21 June 1960; Selkirk to Macleod, despatch 263, 2 Sept. 1960. 118 Ibid.

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Lim was Ong’s electoral constituency) submitted to the PAP conference 16 resolutions critical of the government’s policies and methods, the CEC accused Ong of disloyalty and suspended him from cabinet and party.119 In response, Ong stuck to the 16 resolutions (he actually added five more points), dismissing as “childish” the charges moved against him by what he now scornfully described as the “ruling clique”.120 Piqued, the PAP’s leadership expelled him from the party on 28 July 1960 and then launched a virulent campaign against him in the leadup to the Hong Lim by-election, scheduled for late April 1961.121 Ong’s decision, on 29 December 1960, to relinquish his seat in the Legislative Assembly to fight the government and to prove the popularity of his anti-colonial platform, had made a by-election inevitable.122 The disgraced PAP assemblyman campaigned on an anti-colonial ticket, demanding full independence for Singapore, and sought to exploit popular grievances against the government by condemning its authoritarian attitude and failure to secure tangible benefits for the general population.123 The whole Ong affair turned out to be a serious embarrassment for the government. When voters turned up to the ballot box on 15 April they dealt a harsh blow to Lee, voting overwhelmingly in Ong’s favour.124 Ong’s victory was largely a personal one, but it shook the government’s confidence for it not only exposed the existing gap between the middle-class PAP leadership and the Hong Lim’s working class electorate but, even more worryingly, it also revealed how low the government’s stocks had plunged since 1959.125 Embarrassing as it was, the Hong Lim by-election did not immediately threaten to bring down the government. Lee’s position was still relatively secure yet it was undeniable that, with Lee’s popularity at its

119

NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 9, McNicol to DEA, savingram 21, 24 June 1960. UKNA, CO 1030/1148, Selkirk to Macleod, memorandum 263, 2 Sept. 1960; NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 9, McNicol to DEA, savingram 27, 15 July 1960; Times, 26 July 1960. 121 NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 9, McNicol to DEA, savingram 29, 29 July 1960. 122 Times, 30 Dec. 1960; NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 9, Jockel to Tange, memorandum 82, 17 Jan. 1961. 123 UKNA, CO 1030/1149 Extract from UK Commission Report, Apr. 1961. 124 UKNA, CO 1030/1149, Selkirk to Macleod, telegram 135, 2 May 1961. 125 NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 9, Jockel to Tange, memorandum 624, 3 May 1961; Hong Lim By-Election, undated. 120

DEALING WITH THE PAP  183

lowest ebb and the radical Left ready to rear its head, the government’s long-term survival looked increasingly uncertain. In March 1961, Selkirk had already warned the CO that, despite an atmosphere of deceiving calmness, Singapore remained “the scene of a continuous struggle for power which is no less dangerous and no less implacable because it is being carried on entirely or almost entirely under the surface”.126 He described Lee as “showing unmistakable signs of agitation” and becoming “increasingly apprehensive” about “his ability to maintain its own position”.127 As two anti-colonial rallies in January and February 1961 had made it plain, the radical Left was not simply content to challenge the government on the industrial relations front, but was also on the lookout for opportunities to outmanoeuvre the party’s moderates on anti-colonial and constitutional issues.128 Since mid-1960 the procommunists had been increasingly critical of the government’s acceptance of the 1958 Constitution, demanding the abolition of its most controversial provisions, namely the ISC.129 In the lead-up to the Hong Lim by-election, while careful not to confront the government openly, they had seemed eager to distance themselves from the party’s moderates. Lim Chin Siong renewed calls for an all-out anti-colonial struggle against the British and Fong Swee Suan played up the question of Singapore’s independence in contrast to the PAP’s avowed policy of supporting merger with the Federation.130 Lee’s serious difficulties in holding the radical Left in check finally came to the fore in the lead-up to another by-election scheduled for 15 July 1961. In early June, Lim Chin Siong and other five prominent radical union leaders openly defied Lee’s authority. They issued a statement calling for “genuine full internal self-government” and the release of radical political prisoners, making their support for the PAP candidate in the forthcoming Anson by-election conditional upon the party’s

126

UKNA, CO 1030/1149, Selkirk to Macleod, despatch 109, 24 Mar. 1961. Ibid. 128 For the anti-colonial rallies see UKNA, CO 1030/1149, Memorandum of the Visit of Dr Ferhat Abbas and the Repercussions of Events in Congo, May 1961; Selkirk to Macleod, despatch 109, 24 Mar. 1961. 129 Chin, “United Front”, p. 70; UKNA, CO 1030/1149, Selkirk to Macleod, despatch 176, 19 May 1961. 130 NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 9, Jockel to Tange, memorandum 600, 26 Apr. 1961; UKNA, CO 1030/1149, Selkirk to Macleod, telegram 135, 2 May 1961. 127

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acceptance of a genuine anti-colonial agenda.131 They were soon backed by 42 trade unions and 8 PAP assemblymen in open disagreement with the party’s leadership.132 Under pressure, the latter announced that it was prepared to seek a review of the 1958 Constitution at the next round of Anglo-Singaporean constitutional talks planned for 1963. However, it made no concessions on the question of Singapore’s independence, making it clear that complete self-determination could only be achieved through merger with Malaya or a wider Malayan federation.133 Having rejected the radicals’ demands, Lee was now playing for high stakes: not only was he determined to meet the radical Left’s challenge head-on, but he also sought to inject momentum into the merger issue by urging both the British and Malayan governments to hurry.134 In mid-April Lee had travelled to Kuala Lumpur to plead the case for a Singapore-Malayan union, telling Malayan ministers that, without merger, his political survival was in danger.135 However, while Lee was uncompromisingly pushing for merger, the Left had poured cold water on it, fearing that, with internal security passing into the hands of the staunchly anti-communist Kuala Lumpur government, they would now face an Asian leadership less fearful than the British to crack down on local radicals.136 Consequently, on the eve of the

131

NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 10, Jockel to Tange, memorandum 897, 17 June 1961; DEA to various posts, 19 July 1961. Twenty-six persons were still held in detention as a result of Lim’s crackdowns on Singapore’s radicals. See UKNA, CO 1030/1149, Acting UK Commissioner to Macleod, telegram 239, 3 July 1961. Apart from Lim Ching Siong, the other five were S.T. Bani, Fong Swee Suan, S. Woodhull, James Puthucheary and Jamit Singh. 132 UKNA, CO 1030/1149, Acting UK Commissioner to Macleod, telegram 259, 14 July 1961; NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 10, Jockel to Tange, memorandum 1053, 14 July 1961. 133 Straits Times, 10 June 1961; NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 10, DEA to various posts, 28 June 1961. 134 Ibid. 135 Matthew Jones, Conflict and Confrontation in South East Asia 1961–1965: Britain, the United States, Indonesia and the Creation of Malaysia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), p. 65. 136 On Lee’s attitude towards merger see NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 10, Jockel to Tange, memorandum 1048, 14 July 1961. For the radical Left’s attitude see NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 10, Jockel to Tange, memoranda 939 (undated) and 1053 (14 July 1961); Turnbull, Modern Singapore, p. 278.

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election, the Left withdrew its support for the PAP candidate. It voted, instead, for the chairman of the Workers’ Party, David Marshall, who had run his campaign on a strong anti-colonial ticket, demanding, amongst other things, full independence for Singapore (with or without Malaya) and the withdrawal of British forces from the island.137 On 15 July, Marshall defeated the PAP candidate by a narrow margin.138 This, however, was enough to produce an inevitable showdown between the PAP’s moderates and the radicals. The showdown came on 20 July when 13 members of the PAP’s left-wing faction abstained from voting a motion of confidence in support of the government.139 Following the parliamentary debate, Lee expelled the 13 dissidents from the party together with a number of party officials.140 These moved to form a new party, the Barisan Sosialis or Socialist Front (BS) at the end of July. The split threatened to destroy the PAP. Thirty-five of the 51 party branch committees immediately resigned. Several branches disappeared, including Lee’s own branch in Tanjong Pagar. Eleven branches were left with less than 25 members. The PAP lost the majority of its party workers and a considerable number of supporters.141 According to C.M. Turnbull, only 20 per cent of the PAP former members renewed their membership in 1962.142 Lee’s parliamentary position was no less precarious. The government’s overall majority was now reduced to just one seat. Although the opposition was likely to remain divided, Lee’s survival hung by a thread. His government was now exposed to motions of no confidence and further defections. Most commentators predicted that the BS would secure an outright majority at the next general election, which would have to

137

NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 10, Jockel to Tange, memorandum 897, 17 June 1961; DEA to various posts, 19 July 1961; Turnbull, Modern Singapore, p. 278. 138 UKNA, CO 1030/1149, Selkirk to Macleod, savingram 249, 17 July 1961. 139 NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 10, Jockel to Tange, memorandum 1133, 29 July 1961. 140 UKNA, CO 1030/1149, Brief for the Secretary of State: Singapore Political Situation, 1 Aug. 1961. 141 Turnbull, Modern Singapore, p. 279. According to Bellows, nearly 70 per cent of the PAP cadres left the party to join the BS. Bellows, “Singapore Party System”, p. 131. 142 Ibid.

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be held before mid-1964.143 All of sudden, the otherwise self-assured Lee looked badly shaken. British officials found him in a “jittery” and “overwrought” state of mind.144 When Selkirk met him after the Anson by-election, Lee told the High Commissioner that if he failed to get merger, his political future would be sealed.145 He would not be able to hold the position for much longer — possibly until December or January at the latest. He would then have to call a general election, which he was certain of losing and from which a pro-communist government was likely to emerge. In a remarkable demonstration of his cunning Lee indicated that, to prevent his political opponents from coming to power, he would have to “create a situation in which the U.K. Commissioner would be forced to suspend the Constitution”. “This”, he said, could be done “either by the Singapore Government inviting a Russian trade mission to Singapore thus forcing a constitutional crisis or by instigating riots and disorder requiring the intervention of British troops”.146 However, before resorting to drastic measures, he would “seek to apply maximum pressure on the Tengku to give some undertaking within the next three months in regard to merger”. In the meantime, he would have to prorogue the Legislative Assembly for three months to buttress his internal position. More importantly, he would have to set the remaining left-wing detainees free — a stratagem that, given British and Malayan likely opposition to the release, would allow him to maintain his left-wing and anti-colonial credentials intact while preventing the extreme Left from gaining further ground.147 Quite predictably, the British authorities strongly disapproved of his tactics, warning him that they “could not be party to a public deception in regard to the detainees”.148 “I do not know”, Selkirk complained to the new Colonial Secretary, Iain Macleod, “what a psychologist would make of him but he seemed to me to be a bully who was frightened

143

Matthew Jones, “Creating Malaysia: Singapore Security, the Borneo Territories, and the Contours of British Policy, 1961–63”, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 28, 2 (2000): 88. 144 UKNA, CO 1030/1149, memcon, Selkirk and Lee, 25 July 1961. 145 UKNA, CO 1030/1149, Moore to Selkirk, 28 July 1961. 146 Ibid. 147 Ibid. 148 UKNA, CO 1030/1149, Selkirk to Macleod, telegram 265, 17 July 1961.

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and still wanted to pretend he could bully other people”.149 Yet, despite his tough-talking, cunning brinkmanship and reckless scheming, Lee remained Britain’s best and only option in Singapore. And with Lee’s political survival on the line, the British government was now under pressure to find a workable political solution to Singapore’s worsening situation. Although Selkirk had pledged to Lim Chin Siong and his associates that London would abide by the Constitution and be prepared to work with a BS government, this was clearly not the solution the British envisaged.150 They, in fact, would rather avoid this situation if at all possible. Not unsurprisingly, therefore, Selkirk had privately been urging London to consider Malaya’s merger with Singapore and Britain’s Borneo territories.151 As the following chapter will show, a promising opening in this respect had been provided by the Tunku’s sudden announcement in late May 1961 that Malaya was now ready to accept merger with Singapore as part of a larger Southeast Asian federation, which would also include the British Borneo territories. Albeit cautiously at the start, ministers in London gradually came to see the creation of a “Greater Malaysia” as the only possible solution to the seemingly intractable Singapore conundrum and lent support to it. And as British ministers and officials set about to redraw the contours of Britain’s Southeast Asian imperium, Australian policymakers were soon forced to face up to the radical reshaping of the political geography of Southeast Asia and to review Australian policy towards Malaya and Singapore. Australia had hitherto watched the unfolding of the Singapore imbroglio from the sidelines, careful not to be too closely drawn into the affairs of a British territory. Yet, as the following two chapters will make plain, Australian would be increasingly drawn into the postcolonial settlement envisaged by London for Malaya and Singapore. And as the Greater Malaysia plan moved gradually towards completion throughout 1961–63, the Australian government would be called into making a strong commitment to it. A new phase in Australia’s relations with Malaya and Singapore was therefore about to begin.

149

UKNA, CO 1030/1149, memcon, Selkirk and Lee, 25 July 1961. Macleod had replaced Lennox-Boyd at the CO after the Oct. 1959 British general election. 150 For Selkirk’s meeting with Lim Ching Siong see UKNA CO 1030/1149, Note of a Meeting at Eden Hall, at 4.30 p.m. on Tuesday, 18 July 1961. 151 For Selkirk’s support for a wider Malayan federation, see Chapter 7.

C H A P T E R S E V E N 

Greater Malaysia, 1961

I

n the late spring and early summer of 1961, with Lee’s political survival hanging by a thread, the Federation government began to reassess its policy towards Singapore. As seen earlier, since 1955 the Tunku had become increasingly unsympathetic to the idea of merger and had rebuffed attempts by David Marshall and Lim Yew Hock to make some headway with it. Calls by Lee in 1959–60 for a common market between Malaya and Singapore had met no better fate.1 The Tunku had become ever more perturbed by the emergence of vociferous left-wing radicalism in Singapore, and, regarding the island as a hotbed of pro-communist militancy, he wanted to have as little as possible to do with it, despite his occasional references to a wider association between the Federation and Britain’s remaining Southeast Asian dependencies.2 He feared, quite understandably, that merger might radicalise the Federation’s domestic politics and thus threaten Malaya’s very stability. Other issues, however, also preyed on his mind. He worried, for instance, that, with merger accomplished, the PAP might develop into a pan-Malayan organisation and challenge the UMNO’s political ascendancy.3 Moreover, he was sceptical that closer association

1

On the Common Market idea see Tan, Greater Malaysia, pp. 134–5. On the Tunku’s concerns about Singapore see UKNA, PREM 11/3418, DouglasHome to Foreign Secretary, 21 June 1960; Lord Perth’s note of talks with the Tunku, 10 June 1960. 3 UKNA, DO 169/27, Brown to Le Bailly, 13 July 1961; Stockwell, “Making of a Grand Design”, p. 232. 2

188

GREATER MALAYSIA, 1961  189

with Singapore would serve Malaya’s best economic interests.4 Last but not least, he remained ever so aware that, by altering Malaya’s ethnic balance, merger would end Malay supremacy in the Federation and undermine his leadership of the Malay community.5 In brief, had he had any choice in the matter, he would have continued to keep Singapore at arm’s length and quite happily relied on a continuing, if residual, British presence in the island. He clearly counted on the British (and perhaps even the Americans) to never allow a pro-communist government to gain power in Singapore.6 Thus, notwithstanding Lee’s urgent calls for merger, it was not until his domestic position became increasingly precarious that the Tunku began to soften his position.7 In an address to the Singapore Press Club on 27 May 1961, he took his audience by surprise by suggesting, almost casually, that “sooner or later [Malaya] should have an understanding with Britain and the peoples of the territories of Singapore, Borneo, Brunei and Sarawak”.8 As concerns grew in Kuala Lumpur that neither Britain nor the PAP government would use coercion to stem the rise of Singapore’s radical Left, the Tunku and his senior ministers concluded that the Federation could no longer hold off merger.9 In their view, the British would not stay in Singapore forever and would, sooner or later, grant independence to the island.10 Hence “[u]nless”, as the Tunku put it, “he accepted responsibility for Singapore it would degenerate into Communism and would become a bridgehead of the

4 Tan, Greater Malaysia, p. 51; UKNA, DO 169/27, Brown to Le Bailly, 17 July 1961. 5 Ibid.; Stockwell, “Grand Design”, p. 232. 6 UKNA, CO 1039/979, Selkirk to Macleod, 10 May 1961; PREM 11/3418, Kuala Lumpur to CRO, telegram 382, 26 May 1961. 7 UKNA, CO 1030/979, Moore to Selkirk, 7 Apr. 1961; Grand Design: Note of a Talk with R.G.K. Thompson on 10 May 1961. For Lee’s diplomatic pressure see PREM 11/3418, Kuala Lumpur to CRO, telegram 382, 26 May 1961; CO 1030/979, Selkirk to Macleod, 4 May 1961 and 15 May 1961; DO 169/27, Brown to Le Bailly, 17 July 1961. 8 UKNA, PREM 11/3418, Kuala Lumpur to CRO, savingram 101A, 31 May 1961. 9 UKNA, DO 169/27, Meeting on the Grand Design, R1042/14/61, 26 June 1961; PREM 11/3422, Background to the Greater Malaysia Plan, FE 34/3E, 20 Oct. 1961. 10 NAA, A1838, TS696/17/1 part 2, Discussions with Malayan Leaders, 24 Nov. 1961.

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Communist powers on the Federation’s doorstep”.11 Following the dramatic Anson by-election, the Malayan leadership threw earlier caution to the wind and embraced the idea of a political association between Malaya, Singapore and the Borneo territories. For Kuala Lumpur, the inclusion of Brunei, North Borneo and Sarawak in a Greater Malaysia was the conditio sine qua non for accepting responsibility for Singapore as these territories would provide a makeweight to neutralise the Chinese majority in the combined territories of Malaya and Singapore.12 On 23 August, the Tunku and Lee met in Kuala Lumpur and agreed, in principle, on Singapore’s inclusion into a wider Federation. According to the terms of the deal, Malaya was expected to assume responsibility for the island’s external defence, foreign affairs and internal security while Singapore would retain its local autonomy, especially in areas such as education and labour.13 The Tunku, however, made it clear that the merger’s implementation would be held off until he had received a firm assurance from London that the Borneo territories would join the new Federation.14 In October, the Malayan Cabinet agreed to press for merger by June 1962 and the Malayan Parliament endorsed the Greater Malaysia concept.15 In November Lee and the Tunku formalised the terms of merger between Malaya and Singapore.16 The key factor now for the Federation government was that “however dangerous Singapore might be inside the Federation of Malaya, it could be even more dangerous outside it”.17 In this context, the Borneo territories were “the necessary sugar to sweeten the pill of Singapore”.18 In London, the Macmillan administration responded positively, but cautiously, to the Greater Malaysia concept. As it may be remembered, a closer association between Britain’s Southeast Asian territories had 11

UKNA, PREM 11/3418, Tory to Pritchard, 5 Aug. 1961. NAA, A1838, TS696/17/1 part 1, Critchley to Tange, memo 653, 3 June 1961. 13 UKNA, DO 169/28, Singapore to CO, telegram 452, 25 Oct. 1961. 14 UKNA, PREM 11/3418, Kuala Lumpur to CRO, telegram 631, 25 Aug. 1961; DO 169/28, Kuala Lumpur to CRO, telegram 632, 25 Aug. 1961; Rahman to Macmillan, 4 Sept. 1961. 15 UKNA, DO 169/28, Kuala Lumpur to CRO, savingram 180, 25 Oct. 1961; DO 169/30, Kuala Lumpur to CRO, telegram 790, 19 Oct. 1961. 16 UKNA, DO 169/247, Memorandum Setting out Heads of Agreement for a Merger between Malaya and Singapore, 15 Nov. 1961. 17 Lau, Moment of Anguish, p. 13. 18 UKNA, DO 169/27, Brown to Le Bailly, 17 July 1961. 12

GREATER MALAYSIA, 1961  191

long been a British aim. Yet, during the 1950s, such association had never become a practical reality and, while British officials from time to time floated the idea of a Greater Malaysia as a way of reorganising Britain’s Southeast Asian imperium in preparation for self-government, successive governments in London never forced the issue.19 Instead, ministers “preferred to await local initiatives and, in the meantime, to foster what they called ‘natural developments’”.20 Hence, when, in June 1960, the Tunku indicated that he might be open to the idea of a Greater Malaysia even though this “would give him a great number of headaches”, the Macmillan government, on the whole, interpreted the Malayan démarche as a tantalising development, but remained noncommittal.21 British policymakers wondered how serious the Tunku was about including Singapore into a wider Federation and doubted whether the Borneo territories were prepared to accept association with Malaya.22 Only the Sultanate of Brunei had a Malay majority while Malays were in the minority in North Borneo and Sarawak.23 “All this seems rather doubtful but I suppose it is worth considering”, remarked Macmillan.24 For officials at the FO, Greater Malaysia would provide an “excellent solution for Singapore” on condition that Malaya would not “be allowed to pick up all the plums [the Borneo territories] leaving [Britain] to deal with the thistles [Singapore]”.25 Macleod and the CO were far more cautious. In principle, Greater Malaysia could well provide a satisfactory solution to the constitutional future of Singapore and the three Borneo territories while, at the same time, allowing Britain to reduce its internal security responsibilities in the area. Yet, the whole concept was not without significant shortcomings. None of the three Borneo territories, for instance, had “shown any interest in a closer 19

A.J. Stockwell, ed., Malaysia (London: TSO, 2004), pp. xxxvii–xxxix. Stockwell, “Grand Design”, p. 228. 21 UKNA, PREM 11/3418, Douglas-Home to Foreign Secretary, 21 June 1960; Lord Perth’s note of talks with the Tunku, 10 June 1960; Stockwell, Malaysia, p. xl. 22 In 1957–58 the British had sought to gauge popular interest in the idea of territorial integration among Borneans, only to find out that the local response was anything but enthusiastic. Ibid., pp. xxxviii–xxxix. 23 UKNA, CAB 134/1949, GM(61)3, 25 Sept. 1961. 24 Macmillan cited in Jones, Conflict and Confrontation, p. 63. 25 Warner and Wilford cited in Peter Busch, All the Way with JFK? Britain, the US, and the Vietnam War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 14. 20

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association with Malaya”. Nor was there any certainty that the Tunku would accept Singapore’s inclusion; and Greater Malaysia could well end Britain’s constitutional right to the base in Singapore (and military facilities in North Borneo). The CO’s view was that the government “should go slowly”, confining itself to a position of “benevolent neutrality”.26 Senior ministers agreed. In July 1960, the Colonial Policy Committee instructed Selkirk to sound out local opinion in the Borneo territories and encourage the Tunku to consider closer economic cooperation with Singapore as a preliminary step towards a union.27 British caution did not disappear overnight. In April 1961, the CPC gave its “tentative blessing” to Greater Malaysia “as the ultimate aim of policy”, but accepted Selkirk (and the CO)’s recommendation that progress towards this goal “be gradual and adjusted to the rate of political evolution in the Borneo Territories”. Before embarking on a full merger, priority was to be given to “the strengthening of the existing links between North Borneo and Sarawak”. To avoid the impression that London was trying to foist Greater Malaysia on the parties concerned, no public announcement was to be made until local opinion explicitly supported the scheme. Senior ministers decided, therefore, to review the matter again once further consultations were held with local authorities in Malaya, Singapore and Borneo. Before reaching a final decision, the CPC also agreed to consult Australia and New Zealand given their significant interests in the region.28 Senior British ministers “were reluctant to run the risk of pressing ahead with [merger] until they had were [sic] assured that it had significant support and a reasonable chance of success”.29 Not even the Tunku’s decision in mid-1961 to come out strongly in favour of Greater Malaysia shook off London’s attitude of benevolent neutrality. In fact, London’s reaction was neither “triumphant” nor “enthusiastic”.30 Notwithstanding Selkirk’s repeated calls on London

26

UKNA, CAB 134/1559, CPC(60)17, 15 July 1960. UKNA, CAB 134/1559, CPC(60)20, 28 July 1960. 28 UKNA, CAB 134/1560, CPC(61)4th mtg, 18 Apr. 1961; CPC(61)9, 14 Apr. 1961; CO 1030/979, MacLeod to Selkirk, telegram 28, 21 Apr. 1961; PREM 11/3418, CO Note for the Prime Minister for his Meeting with Lord Selkirk, 6 July 1961. 29 Stockwell, Malaysia, p. xli. 30 Ibid., p. xlii. 27

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for the “desirability of making our minds up quickly about the Grand Design”, policymakers in London were in no hurry.31 While informing the Tunku that Britain regarded his support for Greater Malaysia as “a most constructive initiative”, they remained unconvinced by two aspects of his merger plan — namely the modalities of the merger itself and the question of the British military installations in Singapore.32 In a memorandum sent to Macmillan on 26 June 1961, the Tunku had indicated a two-stage merger whereby the Borneo territories would be rapidly brought into the Federation as additional units enjoying the same rights and privileges as the other states forming Malaya, with Singapore coming in at a later stage as an autonomous entity.33 He also suggested that, while these installations could be maintained as bases for Commonwealth defence, they “would no longer be at the disposal of SEATO” following Singapore’s entry into the Federation.34 These ideas posed two major problems to the British. First, the whole scheme could well collapse in acrimony if Malaya intended to bulldoze the Borneo territories into Greater Malaysia without properly consulting the local populations and offering them a degree of autonomy.35 Second, the Malayan proposal placed undue restrictions on Britain’s use of its military facilities, thereby limiting severely British strategic policy in Southeast Asia and threatening to undermine Britain’s all too important defence collaboration with the United States and its Australasian allies.36

31

On Selkirk’s pressure see UKNA, CO 1030/979, Wallace to Melville, 2 June 1961; PREM 11/3418, Selkirk to Macleod, 27 June 1961; PREM 11/3418, Selkirk to Macmillan, 27 June 1961. On British desire to move slowly see UKNA, CO 1030/979, Macleod to Goode, telegram 104, 3 June 1961. 32 UKNA, PREM 11/3418, CRO to Kuala Lumpur, telegram 1014, 5 June 1961. 33 For the Malayan memorandum see UKNA, PREM 11/3418, Rahman to Macmillan, 26 June 1961. 34 Ibid. 35 Jones, Conflict and Confrontation, pp. 66–7. 36 UKNA, PREM 11/3418, Selkirk to Macmillan, 27 June 1961; David Easter, Britain and Confrontation with Indonesia, 1960–66 (London: Tauris, 2004), pp. 7–8. The Federation had never agreed to the use of British bases on its soil for SEATO operations. However, it had privately accepted that Commonwealth forces in Malaya could be deployed in SEATO operations provided they were re-routed through Singapore or Borneo and held there for a specified period of time (“quarantine agreement”). The Tunku’s proposal threatened to make the quarantine agreement unworkable. On this point see UKNA, CAB 134/1949, GM(61)4, 22 Sept. 1961.

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Worried that Greater Malaysia could end Britain’s right to the unrestricted use of the Singapore base, the UKCOS had recommended that the government use every bargaining counter at its disposal to obtain the best terms possible.37 In his response, therefore, Macmillan told the Tunku that unless Britain was reassured on both counts, it could not commit to Greater Malaysia. And while promising a rapid examination of the Tunku’s ideas, Macmillan cautioned him against any course of action that could “cast doubt on the maintenance of British defence capabilities in the area” at a time of considerable instability or “give the impression that we are deciding on their [the Borneo territories] future without regard for their wishes”.38

Australian Initial Responses to the Greater Malaysia Plan As London sought to grapple with the complexities of Greater Malaysia, the Australian government began to debate the implications of the Tunku’s initiative and what its response should be. Although ministers had, in the spring of 1956, expressed broad support for Singapore’s merger with Malaya, they had so far given no thought to the creation of a wider Malayan federation.39 Officials, on the other hand, had expressed, on more than one occasion, support for a closer association between the Borneo territories as the first step towards independence or incorporation into the Malayan Federation.40 However, even they had not gone much beyond a general examination of the issues involved. As long as the Tunku continued to oppose Malaya’s merger with Singapore, Australian ministers and officials clearly regarded Greater Malaysia as mere wishful thinking. However, with both the Tunku and Lee now strongly urging London to endorse the concept, the stage was set for a far-reaching reordering of Southeast Asian political and strategic realities. In these circumstances, it did not take Australian policymakers long to visualise Greater Malaysia’s transformative impact on regional politics and Australian regional interests.

37

UKNA, DO 169/27, COS(61)50th mtg, 3 Aug. 1961; JP(61)57 (Revised Final), 17 July 1961; DO 169/28, COS(61)259, 8 Aug. 1961. 38 UKNA, PREM 11/3418, Macmillan to Rahman, 3 Aug. 1961. 39 NAA, A1838, TS696/17/1 part 1, Tange to Menzies, 30 Aug. 1961. 40 NAA, A1945, 162/4/2, Woolcott to Tange, 21 Sept. 1961.

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In the late summer of 1961, with Lee still fighting for his political survival and the Tunku demanding rapid progress, the Coalition government moved swiftly to define its position. On 25 July 1961, the ACOS examined the impact that the rapid reorganisation of British Southeast Asia might have on the Commonwealth’s regional defence position. Quite unsurprisingly, given the emphasis its Joint Planning Staff had placed on the risks involved in such undertaking (with the worst case scenario even contemplating an early British withdrawal and a resultant increase in Australia’s overall regional defence responsibilities), the Chiefs expressed only qualified support for the plan.41 In their view, Greater Malaysia was “consistent” with the central aim of Australian defence strategy — the containment of regional communism — provided it retained a pro-Western orientation. Laying across Australia’s lines of communication with Southeast Asia, rich in important strategic materials, such as rubber, tin and oil, and with “a well-developed base structure”, Greater Malaysia was of “considerable strategic importance” to Australia. Yet, like their British counterparts, the ACOS felt that any geopolitical benefit deriving from the establishment of a non-communist post-colonial federation was tempered by the uncertainty surrounding the future of the Commonwealth bases there. The ACOS was concerned that while likely to continue — at least in the short term — to be reliant on Western support for their external defence, Malaya, Singapore and the Borneo states would be reluctant to accept a Commonwealth military presence once merger was accomplished.42 The Chiefs were particularly exercised by the fact that the Malayan government had made it known that the Commonwealth military installations on the island would “no longer be at the disposal of SEATO” following Singapore’s merger with Malaya.43 Such a denial, if carried out, would make it impossible for Commonwealth forces stationed in the new federation to be redeployed in SEATO military operations across Southeast Asia without Kuala Lumpur’s consent. Consequently, the existing “quarantine”

41

NAA, A1838, TS696/17/1 part 1, Closer Association of the Federation of Malaya, Singapore and the Borneo Territories: Report by the Joint Planning Staff. 42 NAA, A4940, C3389, Closer Association of the Federation of Malaya, Singapore and Borneo Territories: Views of the Chief of Staff Committee, 24 July 1961; A1838, TS696/17/1 part 1, ACOS meeting 48/1961, 25 July 1961. 43 UKNA, PREM 11/3418, Rahman to Macmillan, 26 June 1961.

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arrangements, which enabled Commonwealth forces in independent Malaya to be routed through Singapore on their way out for SEATO military operations, would no longer be workable. This would impose unacceptable political restrictions on the CSR.44 The ACOS concluded that, if Commonwealth forces were unable to fulfil their primary role as support to SEATO regional defence operations, “it would be necessary to consider alternative arrangements for the location of our [Australian] elements of the Strategic Reserve”. Alternative arrangements, however, were bound to be expensive and politically complex to negotiate. Hence, before relocating Commonwealth forces elsewhere, the ACOS recommended that every effort be made to negotiate “the best possible terms” for the continued stationing of the CSR. However, “if terms no better and no worse than the existing Malayan Defence Agreement could be obtained, it would probably still “be advantageous to continue stationing forces in the area despite uncertainty as to use of bases” on condition that the CSR could be withdrawn when required for SEATO purposes.45 The political aspects of Greater Malaysia were examined in early August by External Affairs in a lengthy Cabinet submission prepared for Menzies, who, since February 1960, had been holding the External Affairs portfolio while continuing to serve as Prime Minister. Preliminary departmental advice had been broadly supportive of the concept, with both Tange in Canberra and Critchley in Kuala Lumpur emphasising the positive consequences that would flow from it for regional stability.46 In the submission, which bore Tange’s strong imprint, DEA officials did not play down the practical difficulties inherent in welding largely different territories into a complex federal arrangement. On the contrary, DEA officials emphasised the uncertain nature of the project, remarking that it remained to be seen whether Greater Malaysia could ever be achieved. Nor did they conceal the political risks involved in merging a predominantly Chinese Singapore into a wider political unit. In their view, there were two major risks: one was the spread of

44

NAA, A4940, C3389, Closer Association of the Federation of Malaya, Singapore and Borneo Territories: Views of the Chief of Staff Committee, 24 July 1961. 45 Ibid.; A1838, TS696/17/1 part 1, ACOS meeting 48/1961, 25 July 1961. 46 NAA, A1838, TS696/17/1 part 1, Critchley to Tange, memos 653 (3 June 1961) and 813 (14 July 1961); Tange to Menzies, 30 June 1961.

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Singapore’s radicalism to Malaya and the Borneo territories; the other was the outbreak of serious racial tensions between Malays and Chinese  — tensions that would inevitably lead to the disintegration of the new federation. Political considerations apart, officials in the DEA were also mindful of the important strategic implications of Greater Malaysia for Australia. They shared the ACOS’s concerns that it might not prove possible to secure Australia’s minimum requirements for the Strategic Reserve and that without them, the CSR would, in all probability, have to be relocated elsewhere.47 On the other hand, officials warned that “the longer it takes to achieve Greater Malaysia the less promising will be the prospects of obtaining an agreement meeting Australian minimum requirements”. All in all, the DEA’s attitude was more positive than that of the ACOS. Despite its shortcomings, Greater Malaysia presented “significant” advantages as it offered not only a decent prospect of stability to the Borneo territories but, more importantly, the better chance of holding back the pro-communists in Singapore and preventing them from moving into close association with communist China.48 In fact, no other solution to the long-standing problem of Singapore seemed in sight. As the DEA officials readily acknowledged, Britain could not “maintain indefinitely the status quo in Singapore”. Pressure for the termination of colonial rule was mounting once again. The Anson by-election, fought on the question of Singapore’s future constitutional status, was a clear indication of that. The DEA officials recognised that, with a wafer-thin majority, Lee was now under increasing pressure to make progress on merger and, unless some progress was made, he would lose power to the pro-communists. With the Constitution due for review in 1963, the pro-communists were likely to press for outright independence. However, even if Lee survived, he would be under pressure to end British rule in order not to be upstaged by them. To bolster his position, Lee had already publicly committed to “the total eradication of colonialism” through merger with Malaya at the next constitutional review. Neither scenario would be appealing to the British: London would be faced with the prospect of either granting

47 48

NAA, A4940, C3389, Cabinet submission 1304, 11 Aug. 1961. Ibid.

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independence to a Singapore under communist control or relinquishing authority to a weak Lee administration destined, sooner or later, to be displaced by the extremists. The British, of course, could always refuse independence, but this would come at a significant political cost. Whatever its political complexion, the Singapore government would feel compelled to resign in protest, Britain would then have to resume direct rule, unrest would probably ensue and London would have no other option than to restore law and order by force. Resumption of direct colonial rule would be very unpopular internationally, with the Afro-Asian bloc likely to take up the cause of Singapore’s independence at the United Nations. Faced with increasing pressure to decolonise, Britain would eventually throw in the towel. According to the DEA, the whole pattern of post-war British colonial policy indicated that no British government would “withstand these pressures indefinitely”. Reluctance to retain Singapore at all costs would be further reinforced by the combination of three concomitant factors: Britain’s desire to reduce its regional burden, its resolve to join the European Economic Community (EEC), and the recognition that the growth of radicalism in Singapore could jeopardise Britain’s long-term commercial and financial interests in Southeast Asia. On the other hand, DEA officials recognised that the continuance of British rule in the face of growing left-wing agitation was not in Australia’s long-term interest either. “The longer Singapore’s colonial status is maintained”, the submission argued, “the greater the likelihood of political power there passing to the extremists”. The only way out of the impasse was either the inclusion of Singapore into a wider political unit or its outright independence. This second alternative, however, presented significant drawbacks: an independent Singapore would “be governed by radical Chinese” seeking close association with the mainland and thus become an “effective” base for the subversion of Malaya and the wider Southeast Asian area. Hence, the only plausible solution was Singapore’s merger with Malaya or a larger post-colonial federation including the Borneo territories. Given the rather conservative nature of the Malayan political scene, the balance of forces within the new federation “would tend to be more moderate than in Singapore”. Malayan insistence on Singapore having “a less than proportionate  …  share of political power” in any merger would, no doubt, help. In addition, the central government of an enlarged federation would feel less constrained to take action against

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communist subversion than any conceivable government in Singapore. Last, but no less importantly, Singapore’s incorporation into a larger unit would probably foster the island’s economic development, lift its living standards and, in so doing, undermine the appeal of left-wing radicalism amongst the Chinese-speaking working class. Thus, the submission concluded, it was in Australia’s best interest to support Greater Malaysia provided that the Malayan and Singapore governments maintained their present anti-communist outlook; the central government of the future federation was able to exert “adequate control” on Singapore’s internal security; steps were taken to secure popular support for the scheme in the Borneo territories; and Australian defence requirements were “safeguarded to the fullest extent possible”.49 When the Australian Cabinet finally met on 16 August 1961, ministers broadly endorsed the DEA submission. They, however, made it clear that, given the uncertainties still surrounding Greater Malaysia, their support was, for the time being, no more than an “on balance” position.50 They also rejected the recommendation that the government take “opportunities of influencing the terms of negotiations through consultation with the United Kingdom and Malaya”, stressing instead the importance for Australia of “avoid[ing] any special initiative or advocacy one way or the other”.51 Australia, moreover, should avoid taking “public position which might embarrass the governments concerned, or, in the future Australia itself, e.g. by supporting one government against the other in contentious issues”. In other words, ministers felt that Australia “should not stick its neck out on a plan which might not in the end prove to be negotiable”.52 Faced with such a complex issue, they decided to tread carefully.53 At the end of August, Menzies conveyed to Macmillan his Cabinet’s qualified support for Greater Malaysia.54

49

Ibid. NAA, A4940, C3389, Cabinet decision 1543 (HOC), 16 Aug. 1961. 51 Ibid.; NAA, A4940, C3389, Cabinet submission 1304, 11 Aug. 1961. 52 David Lee, “The Origins of the Menzies Government’s Policy on Indonesia’s Confrontation of Malaysia”, in Menzies in War and Peace, ed. Frank Cain (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1997), p. 77. 53 NAA, A4940, C3389, Cabinet decision 1543 (HOC), 16 Aug. 1961. 54 NAA, A1209, 1961/794 part 1, Menzies to Macmillan, 28 Aug. 1961. 50

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Greater Malaysia Gathers Momentum Kuala Lumpur’s pressure for rapid progress on Greater Malaysia, combined with growing concerns over Lee’s political future, soon forced the Macmillan government to adopt a more forthcoming attitude. In September 1961, both the Tunku and Selkirk urged London to consider a crash programme for the establishment of Greater Malaysia.55 From Singapore, Selkirk sent out dire warnings that, unless progress were made on this issue, Lee would fall within months.56 In Kuala Lumpur, the Tunku was growing increasingly impatient with what he saw as Macmillan’s procrastination.57 While he understood London’s desire to consult local opinion and secure some safeguards for the Borneo territories, the Tunku found it hard to believe that the British could not swing the locals behind Greater Malaysia if so they wished.58 He worried that, by procrastinating, the British were “simply using him to pull the Singapore chestnut out of the fire” while continuing “to stall on the transfer of the Borneo territories”.59 On 2 October he told Lee that if he “could not get what he wanted from H.M.G. on the Borneo territories he would see to it that merger between Singapore and the Federation eventually foundered on the defence question”.60 On 3 October, Macmillan was forced to write to the Tunku in soothing tones, reassuring him of London’s willingness to discuss “the best means to prepare the ground” in the Borneo territories for a smooth

55

UKNA, PREM 11/3418, Selkirk to Macleod, 16 Sept. 1961; PREM 11/3418, Kuala Lumpur to CRO, telegram 669, 14 Sept. 1961; Rahman to Macmillan, 4 Sept. 1961; PREM 11/3422, Kuala Lumpur to CRO, telegrams 705 (26 Sept. 1961) and 715 (28 Sept. 1961); CO 1030/982, Selkirk to Macleod, 24 Aug. 1961; DO 169/28, Kuala Lumpur to CRO, telegram 651, 7 Sept. 1961; DO 169/29, Selkirk to Macleod, 16 Sept. 1961. 56 UKNA, PREM 11/3418, Selkirk to Macleod, 16 Sept. 1961; DO 169/29, Selkirk to CO, telegram 44, 23 Sept. 1961. 57 UKNA, PREM 11/3418, Rahman to Macmillan, 4 Sept. 1961; PREM 11/3422, Singapore to CO, telegram 400, 27 Sept. 1961; Kuala Lumpur to CRO, telegram 716, 28 Sept. 1961; Kuala Lumpur to Sarawak, telegram 718, 29 Nov. 1961. 58 UKNA, PREM 11/3418, Kuala Lumpur to CRO, telegrams 651 and 652, 7 Sept. 1961; PREM 11/3422, Kuala Lumpur to CRO, telegram 705, 26 Sept. 1961. 59 UKNA, PREM 11/3422, Singapore to CO, telegram 400, 27 Sept. 1961; Kuala Lumpur to CRO, telegram 715, 28 Sept. 1961. 60 UKNA, PREM 11/3422, Moore to Macleod, telegram 406, 2 Oct. 1961.

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transfer of power.61 For his part, the Tunku met some British concerns by replying that the transfer of sovereignty over the Borneo territories should take place simultaneously with a merger with Singapore.62 In mid-October Menzies wrote to Macmillan that he “completely agreed” with his handling of the Tunku. In his view, any attempt by Britain or Malaya to allow wider political considerations to override the principle of self-determination in Borneo could harm the prospect of achieving a viable Greater Malaysia. He, therefore, disapproved of the Tunku’s penchant for “crash tactics”, adding that “consultation with the Borneo Territories must … precede any commitments in respect of transfer of sovereignty”.63 In late August the Prime Minister’s Department had advised Cabinet to exert considerable caution over Borneo’s closer association with Malaya. “We are not sure”, the PMD told ministers, “that the political movements in the Borneo Territories have been adequately assessed”. Moreover, “the desire of the Borneo Territories to move slowly” clashed with “the requirements of Singapore to move fast” and this could “cause real problems”.64 Australian caution was timely. While urging Macmillan to adopt a more forthcoming attitude, the Federation had informally sought to enlist Australian support. In late September the influential Permanent Secretary of the Malayan Ministry of External Affairs, Muhammad Ghazali Shaphie, had discreetly conveyed to the Australian High Commission in Kuala Lumpur Malaya’s desire to see Australia play a more active role in the Greater Malaysia diplomatic process. It would be helpful, he told the High Commission, if Australia could impress on the British “the importance of promoting the Malaysia concept in [the] Borneo territories and [the] urgency of creating conditions for their joining the Federation”.65 However, despite the High Commission’s suggestion that Australia would “be prepared to consider making representations to the United Kingdom” for the sake of finding a solution to

61

UKNA, PREM 11/3422, Macmillan to Rahman, 3 Oct. 1961. UKNA, PREM 11/3422, Kuala Lumpur to CRO, telegram 746, 8 Oct. 1961. 63 UKNA, DO 169/30, Canberra to CRO, telegram 925, 14 Oct. 1961; NAA, A1209, 1961/1318 part 1, Griffith to Menzies, 16 Oct. 1961. 64 NAA, A4940, C3389, Notes on Cabinet submission 1304, 16 Aug. 1961. 65 NAA, A1209, 1961/1318 part 1, Kuala Lumpur to DEA, cablegram 283, 21 Sept. 1961. 62

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the Singapore problem, Canberra demurred.66 Menzies had no intention of meddling in a complex colonial issue, nor did he wish to see the Borneo territories bulldozed into Greater Malaysia without necessary safeguards. He did not heed Tange’s suggestion that the British could perhaps do more “to influence the Borneo territories in favour of speedy merger into Greater Malaysia and to accelerate the necessary consultations”.67 In November Menzies told Tange that in his forthcoming talks with Malayan ministers, he [Tange] should “listen but not talk”.68 With the unresolved problem of Singapore hanging over their heads, neither London nor Kuala Lumpur could allow Greater Malaysia to founder. On 10 October, therefore, the British Cabinet preliminarily agreed that, on balance, British regional defence interests would be best served by Greater Malaysia rather than an independent Singapore.69 Then, on 25 October, senior ministers endorsed the Greater Malaysia (Official) Committee’s recommendation that Britain aim for “the earliest possible achievement of Greater Malaysia”.70 They also decided that in the forthcoming talks with the Tunku, scheduled for late November, the government “should adopt a favourable attitude towards the principle of Greater Malaysia but avoid giving the impression that she [Britain] was prepared to implement it at any cost”.71 London’s more forthcoming attitude did not arise simply from Malayan pressure (or in reaction to developments in Singapore) but also from a growing awareness, among senior ministers and officials, of the need to reduce Britain’s defence burden overseas. As Macmillan’s Private Secretary, Philip de Zulueta, had put it succinctly in June 1961, Greater Malaysia “looks like perhaps giving us a dignified way of

66

NAA, A1945, 162/4/2, Woolcott to Tange, 21 Sept. 1961. NAA, TS696/17/1 part 1, Tange to Menzies, 16 Oct. 1961. 68 NAA, A1838, TS696/17/1 part 2, note by Eastman, 10 Nov. 1961. 69 UKNA, CAB 128/35, CC(61)55th mtg, 10 Oct. 1961. 70 UKNA, CAB 134/1949, GM(61)11 (Final), 20 Oct. 1961; PREM 11/3422, Brook to Macmillan, 24 Oct. 1961. 71 Ronald Hyam and William Roger Louis, ed., The Conservative Government and the End of Empire 1957–1964, vol. 1 (London: HMSO, 2000), docs 263–4; UKNA, PREM 11/3422, Brook to Macmillan, 8 Nov. 1961; Easter, Britain and Confrontation, p. 19. 67

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reducing our Far East commitments”.72 In the same month, increasingly concerned at Britain’s worsening balance of payments, the new Chancellor of the Exchequer Selwyn Lloyd had called for significant cuts in defence spending, warning his colleagues that the government might have to consider a significant contraction in Far Eastern commitments.73 In August, ministers had already instructed Cabinet Secretary Norman Brook to search for savings outside Europe. Brook did not take long to conclude that Greater Malaysia offered an excellent opportunity to reduce Britain’s burden in Asia. He estimated that “if Britain could withdraw the eight major units in Singapore allocated to internal security and two major units from Hong Kong, she could save £22 million”.74 Macmillan agreed. He saw Greater Malaysia as a way of reducing Britain’s defence spending and its military burden in Asia.75 So did most of his Cabinet colleagues. In discussing the merits of Greater Malaysia, senior ministers concurred in the 25 October meeting that it would be “very desirable”, in the short term, to “be able to reduce our heavy commitment to maintain internal security in Singapore”, adding that: if that responsibility passed to the Tunku, he could be expected to find it much easier than it would be for us to take and sustain repressive measures … On these grounds the achievement of Greater Malaysia  –  if we assumed that it would relieve us of responsibility for internal security – would be most welcome.76

Greater Malaysia and Australian Defence Concerns Sensing that his support for Greater Malaysia could all too easily be interpreted in Canberra and other Western capitals as a pretext for significantly scaling down Britain’s military presence in Southeast Asia, Macmillan sought to ward off Allied criticism. In mid-October, he told

72

UKNA, PREM 11/3418, de Zulueta to Macmillan, 29 June 1961. Jones, Conflict and Confrontation, p. 74; Easter, Britain and Confrontation, p. 13. 74 Ibid., p. 14. 75 Ibid., p. 16; Jones, Conflict and Confrontation, p. 74. 76 Hyam and Louis, Conservative Government, docs 263–4; Easter, Britain and Confrontation, pp. 17–8. 73

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Selkirk, a strong proponent of retrenchment from the Far East, that Britain “must not give them [Australia and New Zealand] any cause to blame us for leaving them precipitately in the lurch”.77 On 20 October, therefore, he sought to reassure Menzies that in the forthcoming November talks with the Tunku, he intended to impress upon the Malayan leader the need for Britain and its Australasian partners to retain the military facilities required for Commonwealth forces to carry out their defence obligations to SEATO and Malaya under AMDA. However, while assuring Menzies of Britain’s abiding interest in Southeast Asia, Macmillan introduced som important caveats. He argued, for instance, that Britain “should not defer a realistic examination of the long term position”. He spoke of an “acute” manpower problem and the need for “substantial” defence savings. He revealed that the establishment of Greater Malaysia would inevitably “lead to a reduction in our existing land forces”. He then went further, arguing that in the age of decolonisation it would be increasingly difficult to maintain the full use of Britain’s bases outside Europe. In the Far East, in particular, British tenure of the Singapore base looked uncertain, whether or not Greater Malaysia could be successfully established.78 If Macmillan’s aim was to dispel Australian misgivings about London’s resolve to retain full access to the Singapore base and to allay concerns over the long-term trends in British defence policy, he clearly did not pull it off. His message to Menzies generated significant alarm in Canberra. Menzies’s trusted adviser, John Bunting, was particularly troubled by it, warning his Prime Minister that: Macmillan’s message … virtually foreshadows a United Kingdom rundown in South East Asia. The time-scales for such a review and other details are not given but we cannot take his hint too lightly. He indicates that the desire to make manpower and money savings will be an important influence in the United Kingdom decisions.79

77

Macmillan quoted in John Subritzky, Confronting Sukarno: British, American, Australian and New Zealand Diplomacy in the Malaysian-Indonesian Confrontation 1961–5 (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), p. 29. 78 UKNA, PREM 11/3422, Macmillan to Menzies, 20 Oct. 1961. 79 NAA, A1209, A1961/1318 part 1, Bunting to Menzies, 1 Nov. 1961.

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So concerned was Bunting that, in early November 1961, he urged the Australian DC to conduct a detailed study of the likely impact of Macmillan’s defence policy on the Commonwealth military position in Southeast Asia.80 He conceded that Macmillan’s message was by no means the first intimation that London was contemplating a far-reaching policy review. In fact, the British had already raised it in a general way in May 1960 when Macmillan had discussed with Menzies and other Commonwealth leaders the conclusions of a British official paper called “Study of Future Policy (1960–1970)”.81 But, now, Bunting argued, Macmillan was at it once again and, even more disturbingly, some of the major themes in the “Future Policy” paper were “emerging in a Prime Minister to Prime Minister document”. Macmillan’s message had, therefore, “to be regarded as notice or confirmation of an intention to reduce the effort in the Far East”. “We ought”, Bunting cautioned, “not just pigeonhole such a message”.82 While acknowledging that he did not make much progress with the DC, Bunting felt that he had probably succeeded in impressing on its members the need for reappraisal of Australia’s politico-military interest in the Malayan area. On 8 November, the DC agreed to review Australia’s defence position in Malaya and Singapore once the outcomes of a study currently being undertaken by the UKCOS on Britain’s long-term global strategy were known.83 While privately voiced, these concerns did not go unnoticed in British circles. In discussions with senior Australian officials, the British High Commission in Canberra could sense “an underlying fear that in our negotiations with [the] Tunku we shall fail to drive as hard a bargain as they would consider it within the realm of practical politics to achieve”. “In this”, the High Commission told the CRO, the Australians “are influenced by their suspicion that we shall seek progressively in the years ahead to disengage ourselves from the Far Eastern

80

NAA, A1209, 1961/1318 part 1, Note for the File: DC Agendum no. 90/1961, 8 Nov. 1961. 81 Benvenuti, Anglo-Australian Relations, p. 49. 82 NAA, A1209, 1961/1318 part 1, DC meeting 103/1961, 8 Nov. 1961; Note for the File: DC Agendum no. 90/1961, 8 Nov. 1961. 83 Ibid.

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theatre”.84 “In some quarters”, it further noted, there is an “inclination to believe, not perhaps entirely without justification, that we would, if it suited our purpose, pull out of the area without adequate consideration of the interest of our allies”.85 The High Commission, therefore, informally urged Australian senior officials to avoid taking initiatives, which might “hamper us in negotiations with the Tunku” and reminded them that neither Britain nor Australia could “afford to be seen to be obstructing achievement of Greater Malaysia”.86 British officials appeared to be concerned that Australia might decide to press the Malayan government to give assurances that Singapore would remain available for SEATO purposes. In his reply to Macmillan on 2 November, Menzies dispelled these apprehensions. He, however, still wished to know how London would approach the defence question with Kuala Lumpur — and, in particular, what terms it intended to propose to the Tunku, what minimum conditions it regarded as acceptable and what fallback position it had in mind should the negotiations with the Malayan delegation come unstuck.87 Throughout October Australian officials had sought to get a better sense of British thinking, but with British ministers and officials still struggling to reach consensus on several aspects of Greater Malaysia, very little had transpired from Whitehall.88 From the little that had emerged, Australians had, however, gathered the troubling impression that the British were less preoccupied with the SEATO dimension than other aspects of the plan.89 Menzies reinstated, therefore, the importance of Singapore in Commonwealth strategic calculations and the need for Britain and its partners to have unrestricted access to the base “in all necessary defence activities”, SEATO included. On the question of Britain’s long-term regional role, he reserved his

84

UKNA, CO 1030/986, Canberra to CRO, telegram 980, 3 Nov. 1961. UKNA, DO 169/235, Larmour to Ormerod, 14 Dec. 1961. 86 UKNA, CO 1030/986, Canberra to CRO, telegram 980, 3 Nov. 1961. 87 UKNA, DO 169/30, Canberra to CRO, telegram 975, 2 Nov. 1961. 88 For Australian attempts to gauge British intentions see for instance NAA, A1838, TS696/17/1 part 1, Tange to Menzies, undated; DEA to London, cablegrams 3021 (6 Oct. 1961) and 5127 (24 Oct. 1961); A1209, 1961/1318 part 1, London to DEA, cablegrams 4861 (6 Oct. 1961) and 5035 (18 Oct. 1961). 89 NAA, A1838, TS696/17/1 part 1, Tange to Menzies, undated. 85

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position. He simply stated that Australia would maintain an “active concern” in the progress of the defence review in London and would, at some stage, want to discuss the future of a Western presence in Southeast Asia in quadripartite consultations with the British, Americans and New Zealanders.90 On receiving Menzies’s message, Macmillan’s Private Secretary de Zulueta told the Prime Minister that the Australian “is disturbed and inclined to be critical”.91 Macmillan, therefore, sought to reassure Menzies that his intention was to “put our case [to the Malayans] for our requirements on defence facilities as strongly as we can”, but significantly avoided giving any precise detail on how he intended to do so. Unsurprisingly, Macmillan’s remarks drew a rather stiff reply from Menzies. Clearly annoyed at Macmillan’s persistent evasiveness, he re-emphasised the need to prevent the Commonwealth position in Singapore being “whittled down” and urged Macmillan to stand out as “firmly” and “strongly” as possible for the retention of the present defence rights in Singapore. He understood that, notwithstanding London’s best efforts, this might not be achievable and made it clear that, in any case, he did not want Greater Malaysia to founder on the question of base rights in Singapore. Even so, he stated that it would be “with great reluctance” that Australia would accept some restrictions in Singapore. In that event, he would, at least, hope that the final terms would be no worse than those contained in AMDA and that Commonwealth troops in Singapore could still take part in SEATO exercises (even though not in SEATO war operations). Yet, he concluded, “I do not look to any reduction in terms”.92 Menzies’s remarks closely reflected the emerging consensus in Canberra. In early November, the DC had met to assess further the defence implications of Greater Malaysia and reach a common policy position in the lead-up to the Anglo-Malayan talks.93 The DC agreed

90

UKNA, DO 169/30, Canberra to CRO, telegram 975, 2 Nov. 1961. UKNA, PREM 11/3422, de Zulueta to Macmillan, 2 Nov. 1961. 92 UKNA, PREM 11/3422, Canberra to CRO, telegrams 1003 (10 Nov. 1961) and 996 (9 Nov. 1961). 93 NAA, A1209, 1961/1318, Joint Planning Committee (henceforth JPC) Report 74/61, 6 Nov. 1961; A1945, 1962/4/3, Notes on DC Agendum 90/61 Supplement 1, 8 Nov. 1961; Hicks to Townley, 9 Nov. 1961. 91

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that the loss or denial of the Singapore base, without the provision of alternative forward facilities outside the future federation, would amount to the “virtual elimination” of the Commonwealth’s ability to deploy troops effectively across Southeast Asia and would weaken the West’s overall strategic position and influence in the region. Unless Britain and its Commonwealth partners had more or less unimpeded access to the Singapore base, Australia could not maintain its forward military posture. The Committee broadly agreed with a paper produced by the Joint Planning Committee (JPC), which examined the effect of restrictions being placed upon the free movement of Commonwealth forces in and out of the Singapore base.94 The paper found that the denial of Singapore for SEATO use, while not significantly affecting RAN operations, would create serious problems for the army and the airforce unless alternative facilities could be found in Thailand or the Philippines. However, as the JPC readily admitted, relocation, even when possible, might present considerable difficulties: it would involve large capital outlays and would hardly be a permanent solution for, sooner or later, Australia’s tenure over these facilities would be exposed to the same pressure as in Malaya.95 Given these problems, the DC concluded that, even with some limitations in place, the retention of the Singapore base would be far preferable to a situation in which Australian forces would have to be withdrawn to Australia or relocated elsewhere in the region. Despite not rating highly London’s chances of maintaining unfettered access to the Singapore base, the DC still believed that London should do its utmost to secure the best possible terms. In the end, however, the Committee was prepared to accept some limitations. It concluded that even if it only proved possible to obtain conditions that were “no better and no worse” than those contained in the current AMDA, “it would still be advantageous to continue stationing Australian forces in the region” provided “a suitable undertaking could be secured covering participation in SEATO exercises”.96

94

NAA, A1209, 1961/1318 part 1, JPC Report 74/61, 6 Nov. 1961; A1945, 1962/ 4/3, Notes on DC Agendum 90/61 Supplement 1, 8 Nov. 1961; Hicks to Townley, 9 Nov. 1961. 95 NAA, A1209, 1961/1318 part 1, JPC Report 74/61, 6 Nov. 1961. 96 NAA, A1209, 1961/1318 part 1, DC meeting 103/1961, 8 Nov. 1961.

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In November, while assessing the implications of Greater Malaysia for Australian defence interests, senior officials also reached a preliminary decision on another important issue — that of Australia’s association with a defence agreement with the future federation. As will be recalled from Chapter 3, Australia was not a party to the AMDA, having only associated itself with it. On 9 November DEA Assistant Secretary Allan Eastman told Tange that neither the British nor the Malayans would want Australian and New Zealand representatives involved in London; in any case, it would be too late now to push for participation. What worried Eastman the most was that Australasian participation in the initial talks could expose both Canberra and Wellington to severe Malayan and Singaporean criticism should negotiations break down.97 In a paper prepared for interdepartmental discussion, Eastman set out the pros and cons of direct participation in the opening Anglo-Malayan talks. Unsurprisingly, the cons significantly outweighed the pros.98 Thrown into the interdepartmental mill, the paper generated more criticism. In the end, Menzies himself put paid to the idea. In a message to Macmillan on the eve of the opening of the Anglo-Malayan talk, he made it clear that Australia was “reasonably satisfied” with its status of association with AMDA and would “wish to consider very carefully” any substantial change to it.99 When they met on 23 December, senior officials in the DC agreed that Australia should avoid direct participation in any new defence agreement with the future federation unless it became apparent that direct participation would secure special terms, such as the unrestricted use of bases in Malaya and Singapore.100 In general, the DC recognised that direct participation had far more cons than pros. On the positive side of the ledger, officials could list Australia’s ability to deal directly with the Malayans and to have a direct voice in determining the tactics and the outcome of the negotiations. On the negative side, however, direct participation in a defence agreement could lead to an “increased and continuing” Australian military

97

NAA, A1838, TS696/17/1 part 2, Eastman to Tange, 9 Nov. 1961. Ibid.; NAA, A1838, TS696/17/1 part 2, Negotiations for Future Use of Malaysian Bases: Bilateral or Quadripartite Negotiations, 9 Nov. 1961. 99 NAA, A1838, TS696/17/1 part 2, Menzies to Macmillan, 18 Nov. 1961. 100 NAA, A1838, TS696/17/1 part 2, DC meeting 106/1961, 23 Nov. 1961. 98

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contribution to the Malaysian area and create the expectation that Canberra should provide greater assistance to the new federation’s armed forces. It could conceivably also embroil Australian troops in local internal disturbances and expose the government to greater criticism from local left-wing circles, which opposed the presence of foreign military bases on Malayan soil. No less importantly, it could also create problems with Indonesia. Last, it could unwittingly facilitate the very process of British military disengagement that Canberra wanted so much to avoid, with the result that Australia could be called upon to fill the gap left by the departing colonial power.101

The London Talks and Australian Attitude Despite all these concerns over defence, the Australian government remained, however, broadly supportive of Greater Malaysia. In midNovember, Menzies issued a statement timed to coincide with the arrival of the Tunku in London and intended to convey Australian public support for Greater Malaysia at a crucial juncture of the project. In it, Menzies stated that Australia was “greatly interested” in the concept, which he described as “imaginative and far-sighted”. “If it proved practicable”, he added, “it could contribute significantly to the stability and progress in an area in whose development and progress Australia was deeply interested”.102 With this in mind, Menzies and his ministers awaited the outcome of the London talks. In the end, Australian anxieties, while not entirely unmotivated, proved somewhat overblown. Having committed to the Greater Malaysia concept in late October, British ministers began to discuss the tactics that new Commonwealth Relations Secretary Duncan Sandys should pursue in his forthcoming talks with the Tunku. On 9 November they agreed to reassure the Malayan government of their backing for the inclusion of the Borneo territories in Greater Malaysia, but not without making it clear that popular support for merger in Sarawak and North Borneo must be ascertained before Greater Malaysia could go ahead.

101

NAA, A1838, TS696/17/1 part 2, JPC Report 81/61, 17 Nov. 1961. NAA, A1838, TS696/17/1 part 2, DEA to Kuala Lumpur, cablegram 450, 13 Nov. 1961.

102

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To do so, they envisaged setting up a commission of enquiry. As regards defence, ministers were determined to drive a hard bargain by “prob[ing] the Tunku very hard”. The government, they agreed, should “give no indication at this stage that we might be able to accept any derogation from our present rights in the Singapore bases”. Contrary to Australian concerns that London might only too willingly accept restrictions on the use of the Singapore base for the sake of reaching a deal with the Tunku, Macmillan told his colleagues that “in the last analysis British acceptance of the Greater Malaysia plan would be guided by “our ability or inability to obtain satisfaction of our defence requirements”. In this respect, ministers believed that London had “several useful cards to play” to persuade the Tunku to grant Britain unfettered use of the Singapore base. One card was no doubt the influence that the colonial authorities in North Borneo and Sarawak could exert on the local populations to dispel their concerns about Greater Malaysia. Another important card was Malayan reliance on a continued British military presence in Southeast Asia for its defence and for the employment opportunities that it provided locally.103 On 17 November, therefore, Macmillan was able to reassure Menzies that “we are in complete agreement with you that our objective must be to maintain intact the rights we at present enjoy in respect of Singapore”. He told Menzies that his government would “be seeking an arrangement whereby we can fully discharge our commitment under the Manila Treaty and we shall reserve our position for further discussion (and, of course, consultation with you) if the Tunku cannot meet us on this at the forthcoming talks”.104 Much to the British ministers’ surprise, the Malayan government was more malleable than London had been led to assume. When it arrived in London in late November, the Malayan delegation, led by the Tunku, was prepared to make concessions for the sake of securing a firm British commitment to Greater Malaysia.105 A preliminary agreement was, therefore, rapidly reached on the defence aspects of merger

103

UKNA, DO 169/213, Greater Malaysia: Brief for the Secretary of State, undated. NAA, A1838, TS696/17/1 part 1, Macmillan to Menzies, 16 Nov. 1961. 105 UKNA, CAB 134/1953, GMD(B)61, 1st and 2nd mtg, 20 Nov. 1961; GMD(B)61, 3rd and 4th mtg, 21 Nov. 1961; GMD(B)61, 5th and 6th mtg, 22 Nov. 1961. 104

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and the transfer of power in Borneo. On this latter issue, the Malayan delegation readily accepted the idea of a commission of enquiry on condition that its terms of reference would be framed as “to leave no doubt that full merger of the Borneo territories was intended”.106 As for Brunei, the British were prepared to accept direct negotiations between the Tunku and the Sultan.107 The Malayan delegation also showed considerable flexibility on defence. Increasingly aware that Malaya’s security hinged on holding South Vietnam and Thailand within the Western camp and that SEATO thus provided a valuable strategic umbrella against communist penetration from the north, the Tunku let it be known that Malaya had no interest in undermining Commonwealth participation in SEATO by restricting the use of the Singapore base.108 On the other hand, he made it clear that he was faced with a real problem: SEATO was unpopular in Malaya and, for this reason, his government could not appear in any way to be associated with it. He believed, however, that it should be possible to work out a “smoke-screen” that would allow the free movement of Commonwealth forces in and out of the new Federation for SEATO purposes. As a possible compromise, the Malayan delegation initially suggested that the use of the Singapore base for SEATO purposes should be covered by a secret understanding.109 When this was rejected, the delegation settled for a public declaration extending the current AMDA to Singapore and the Borneo states, but crucially allowing Britain to use its Singaporean facilities “for the purpose of assisting in the defence of Malaysia, and for Commonwealth defence and for the preservation of peace in South East Asia”.110 The British were satisfied.111 So were the Australians. With Australian ministers busy campaigning across the country in the lead-up to

106

UKNA, CAB 134/1953, GMD(B)61, 2nd mtg, 20 Nov. 1961. Ibid. 108 On this point see UKNA, CAB 134/1949, GM(61)4, 22 Sept. 1961; NAA, A1838, TS696/17/1 part 2, London to DEA, cablegram 5545, 21 Nov. 1961; Ang Cheng Guan, Southeast Asia and the Vietnam War (New York: Routledge, 2010), pp. 101. 109 UKNA, CAB 134/1953, GMD(B)61, 3rd mtg, 21 Nov. 1961. 110 UKNA, CAB 134/1953, GMD(B)61, 3rd and 4th mtg, 21 Nov. 1961; GMD(B)61, 5th mtg, 22 Nov. 1961; CAB 129/107, C(61)190, 22 Nov. 1961. 111 UKNA, CAB 128/35, CC(61)65th mtg, 23 Nov. 1961. 107

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the December election, the examination of the London Statement of Understanding was left to senior officials in Defence Committee. On 23 November the Committee unanimously recognised that this met Australian defence requirements and that, as such, it was acceptable from the Australian defence standpoint.112 On the same day, in a brief message hurriedly dictated between television interviews, a busy Menzies confirmed to Macmillan that the understanding was “as satisfactory as could have been hoped for” and implied that Australia would no doubt be associated with it in some form.113 Two days later, he publicly welcomed the agreement, adding that the Greater Malaysia concept was “a very good one” and that it would “reach full achievement as soon as possible”.114 The outcome of the London talks was also favourably received by the Australian press. Reports, in particular, reflected a sense of surprise as well as satisfaction at the favourable compromise on defence. In an editorial, the Sydney Morning Herald described the London agreement as a “truly remarkable and unexpected outcome” and gleefully noted that the need of finding an alternative base for Commonwealth forces on Australian soil no longer arose. In the Herald ’s opinion, Australian and Commonwealth forces could still rely on Singapore as a base for the pursuit of their strategic role in Southeast Asia.115 The Herald ’s enthusiasm was premature. As will become apparent in the next chapter, Greater Malaysia was to suffer a long and troubled gestation.

112

NAA, A1838, TS696/17/1 part 2, DC meeting 106/1961, 23 Nov. 1961; Nimmo to Moore, 23 Nov. 1961. 113 UKNA, CO 1030/986, Canberra to CRO, telegram 1051, 23 Nov. 1961. 114 NAA, A1209, 1961/794 part 2, Federation of Malaysia Proposal: Statement by Menzies, 25 Nov. 1961. 115 UKNA, CO 1030/986, Canberra to CRO, telegram 1052, 24 Nov. 1961.

CHAPTER EIGHT

Greater Malaysia, 1962–63

A

t the end of 1961, therefore, Greater Malaysia provided a sensible answer to a number of thorny political issues and offered a reasonable compromise between the demands of British and Australian policymakers and the needs of their Southeast Asian counterparts. By merging Singapore into a larger federal unit, the Macmillan government sought to pursue two key policy aims: first, to prevent Singapore sliding towards greater instability and second, to secure continuing tenure over (and unfettered access to) British military facilities on the island. These two goals, if realised, would, in turn, allow London to retain a role east of Suez — and to do so at a much lesser cost. The transfer of Singapore’s internal security to the Malayan government promised to relieve Britain of a burdensome undertaking in an era in which colonial rule appeared no longer tenable.1 But, quite apart from securing these objectives, Greater Malaysia had also a further merit in British eyes  —  that of neatly tidying up Britain’s remaining colonial responsibilities in the area and allowing London to divest itself of the Borneo territories, considered too small and backward to stand on their own feet. Malayan and Singaporean leaders shared some of these considerations. Increasingly concerned at Singapore’s descent into radicalism, Malaya’s Alliance government viewed Greater Malaysia as a quid pro quo for accepting responsibility for the island’s internal security. Across the Johor Strait,

1

John Subritzky, “Britain, Konfrontasi, and the End of Empire in Southeast Asia, 1961–65”, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 27, 3 (2000): 210. 214

GREATER MALAYSIA, 1962–63  215

Lee saw a close association with a wider Malayan federation as the only means of reining in the rise of Singapore’s radical Left and securing his political survival. Like their British counterparts, Australian ministers and officials saw Greater Malaysia as the best available means of solving, once and for all, the Singapore conundrum. Recognising that Britain could not maintain the status quo in Singapore indefinitely, they gave Greater Malaysia their cautious nod of approval. Concerns existed in Canberra over the future of the Borneo territories: their backwardness hardly fitted in with the Tunku’s hurried timetable, demanding, instead, a more gradual absorption into the new federation. These reservations aside, Australian policymakers saw Greater Malaysia as providing a decent prospect of stability to the Borneo territories and accepted the political case for it without much hesitation. If anything, they found it harder to reconcile themselves with the defence aspects of the scheme. As discussed earlier, they saw two main dangers arising from them. One was that the new federation might impose more or less intolerable restrictions on the use of the Singapore base for SEATO purposes, thus undermining the British Commonwealth’s ability to deploy its forces forward. The other was that Britain might exploit these same restrictions as a pretext to reduce its military burden east of Suez. As interdepartmental deliberations throughout the latter part of 1961 revealed, Australian unease over London’s regional intentions remained strong beneath the surface. The sudden announcement made by Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio in January 1963 that Indonesia would adopt a policy of Konfrontasi against the proposed federation threatened to derail the creation of Greater Malaysia. As a result, Britain was forced into making a potentially open-ended military commitment to its former colonies to resist Indonesian subversion. But while Australian concerns about Britain’s long-term role eased off (but never fully disappeared), Canberra’s support for the new federation was increasingly put to the test.

Greater Malaysia and the Emergence of Konfrontasi Following the positive conclusion of the London talks in November 1961, British anxieties over the defence aspects of Greater Malaysia lessened. After months of careful deliberation, British ministers now fully embraced the scheme. Although doubts remained over the strength

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of popular support for Greater Malaysia in the Borneo territories (in February–March 1962 an Anglo-Malayan commission of enquiry, led by Lord Cobbold, had toured North Borneo and Sarawak, detecting a noticeable lack of enthusiasm for the scheme), these concerns did not deter Macmillan from pressing ahead with the project.2 On 6 July, he secured Cabinet’s support for the formation of Greater Malaysia at the earliest possible date.3 In late July he met the Tunku in London and, after some wrangling, the two governments agreed, in principle, to establish Greater Malaysia by 31 August 1963.4 Two factors weighed heavily on Macmillan’s decision to make rapid progress on Greater Malaysia. One was the growing realisation in Whitehall that Greater Malaysia was the only way of reducing Britain’s military burden east of Suez without weakening its regional influence. The other was, as ever, the unresolved question of Singapore. During the first half of 1962, Lee’s position had deteriorated as a result of the BS’s growing agitation against the planned merger.5 In early July 1962, his predicament was made worse by the resignation of another PAP backbencher.6 With this defection, Lee was now without a majority in the Legislative Assembly.7 From Singapore, Acting Commissioner Philip Moore warned the CO that “[t]he sands are running out fast for the P.A.P.” and further defections could not be ruled out.8 In Kuala Lumpur Tory (now High Commissioner in Malaya) sounded equally alarmist. He cabled the CRO that Lee’s survival was now crucially hinging on an “early implementation of Malaysia”. He agreed with Moore that if Lee fell, all hell would break loose: the BS would seize power, Singapore would be “lost forever to Communism”, Britain would give up its defence facilities and economic assets and the Borneo territories would “be pulled about by neighbouring states with the likely long-term prospect of absorption

2

For the Cobbold Commission’s findings see UKNA, CAB 134/1950, GM(62)11, 21 June 1962; Jones, “Creating Malaysia”, pp. 93–4. 3 UKNA, CAB 128/36, CC(62)44th mtg, 5 July 1962. 4 UKNA, PREM 11/3868, Progress Report on Anglo-Malayan Talks, undated; de Zulueta to Macmillan, 27 and 30 July 1962. 5 Jones, “Creating Malaysia”, p. 91. 6 NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 1, Jockel to Tange, memo 1328, 6 July 1962. 7 UKNA, PREM 11/3867, Singapore to CO, telegram 318, 3 July 1962; Kuala Lumpur to CRO, telegram 404, 4 July 1962. 8 UKNA, PREM 11/3867, Singapore to CO, telegram 318, 3 July 1962.

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into a completely Communist Indonesia”.9 In this last respect, Filipino President Diosdado Macapagal had already laid claim to the North Borneo in June 1962.10 In British eyes, this was a further reason for hurrying up the merger.11 Throughout 1962, the Menzies government kept a careful watch on ongoing Anglo-Malayan diplomatic exchanges as well as local political developments.12 While still viewing Singapore’s political situation with concern, it was nonetheless relieved by the positive outcome of the Singapore referendum on the merger in September 1962 — a referendum that had sparked significant domestic controversy given the PAP’s questionable handling of it and the BS’s opposition to the merger agreement negotiated by Lee with the Tunku the year before.13 On the whole, Menzies’s Coalition government remained supportive of Greater Malaysia despite lingering concerns that it might, in the end, result in “a weakening of [the Australian] defence position, not only in Malaya itself but in the whole of South-East Asia”.14 In the aftermath of the Tunku’s London talks in late July 1962, the British High Commission in Canberra noted that Australian officials were in general “pleased that so much has been achieved to date without a hardening of racial attitudes or any too obvious weakening of the British guiding hand”.15 In August, the newly appointed Minister for External Affairs, Garfield Barwick, informed Parliament that Australia “was attracted by the principles underlying the Malaysia plan” and expressed hope that it would come into being “before the agreed target date”.16 A few weeks later, he told the UN General Assembly that Malaysia was “an imaginative

9

UKNA, PREM 11/3867, Kuala Lumpur to CRO, telegram 404, 4 July 1962. Easter, Britain and Confrontation, p. 24; Jones, Conflict and Confrontation, pp. 103–4. 11 Ibid.; Easter, Britain and Confrontation, p. 24. 12 Moreen Dee, ed., Australia and the Formation of Malaysia, 1961–1966 (Canberra: Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2005), pp. xxxv–xxxvi. 13 NAA, A1838, 3024/2/1 part 11, Singapore to DEA, cablegram 193, 4 Sept. 1962. For Lee’s handling of the referendum and the BS’s opposition see Jones, Conflict and Confrontation, pp. 77–8. 14 UKNA, DO 169/35, Larmour to Golds, 16 Aug. 1962. 15 Ibid. 16 NAA, A1209, 1961/792 part 2, Malaysia: Statement by the Minister for External Affairs, 3 Aug. 1962; Dee, “Australia’s Interests”, Ch. 3. 10

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and far-sighted development” that “could make and important contribution to regional stability”.17 Yet, as the emergence of a Filipino claim to North Borneo signalled some degree of regional uneasiness about Greater Malaysia, the Australian government began to show signs of hesitation. In December the British High Commission reported to the CRO that, despite Canberra’s “generally sympathetic attitude” towards the British handling of the Filipino claim, it had noticed an inclination on the part of Australian policymakers  —  and the DEA, in particular  —  to “lean backwards to preserve an appearance of independence, even aloofness, from our problems, rather than to play any directing supporting role”. “It is”, the High Commission complained, “very difficult for us to get private expressions of sympathy … translated into public expressions of support”.18 Australian hesitation, however, grew even stronger when Indonesia, so far ostensibly unconcerned by Greater Malaysia, began to display growing hostility towards it.19 Such hostility augured ill for the future of Greater Malaysia. At best, Jakarta’s attitude, coupled with Filipino antagonism, ensured that the new federation would come into being in an atmosphere of longlasting acrimony. At worst, it threatened to wreck the whole scheme. Accordingly, London’s expectations of a smooth transfer of power and its hopes of reducing Britain’s regional burden appeared increasingly unrealistic. But if Konfrontasi was likely to upset British plans, it was also bound to have profound consequences for Australia’s regional diplomacy for it risked setting Canberra’s support for Greater Malaysia on a collision course with its desire for friendly relations with its most

17

NAA, A1209, 1961/792 part 2, DEA to Kuala Lumpur, cablegram 448, 28 Sept. 1962; Dee, “Australia’s Interests”, Ch. 3. 18 UKNA, DO 169/76, Larmour to Golds, 21 Dec. 1962. In early January, however, Canberra warned Jakarta against Indonesian political interference in the Borneo territories. See NAA, A4359, 221/4/23, Barwick to Shann, 9 Jan. 1963. 19 On Indonesia’s apparent disinterest see NAA, A1209, 1963/6637 part 1, DEA to Manila, cablegram 208, 26 Mar. 1963. For the motives behind Indonesia’s increasingly confrontational attitude see Michael Leifer, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1983), pp. 77–80, 100; Subritzky, Confronting Sukarno, p. 42; J.A.C. Mackie, Konfrontasi: The Indonesia-Malaysia Dispute 1963– 1966 (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1974), p. 1.

GREATER MALAYSIA, 1962–63  219

important neighbour, Indonesia. Since the early 1960s, Australia had cautiously sought a rapprochement with Indonesia and one of its major foreign policy initiatives had been the acceptance of Jakarta’s claim to West New Guinea.20 Unsurprisingly, the strength of Indonesian opposition to a wider Malayan federation generated significant anxiety in Canberra, thus pushing the latter to reappraise its approach to Great Malaysia. Less predictably, though, it brought to the surface serious misgivings about the whole concept. All of a sudden, Australian ministers and officials found themselves caught in a delicate balancing act not only between two conflicting strands of their regional policy but also between the differing approaches of Australia’s two major Western partners towards Indonesia.21 Almost instinctively, therefore, as Indonesia’s opposition to Greater Malaysia intensified, policymakers in Canberra responded to the ensuing crisis with extreme circumspection. Differences emerged between the DEA and the Prime Minister’s Department on how to respond to Sukarno’s challenge, with the former, at least initially, more willing to give the Indonesians the benefit of the doubt and the latter understandably more suspicious of Indonesian motives.

Australia’s Doubts about Greater Malaysia (January–February 1963) With Indonesia bent on frustrating Greater Malaysia, the Macmillan government became increasingly apprehensive of Jakarta’s regional intentions. Intelligence estimates were hardly reassuring and, in January 1963, they seemed to confirm that Sukarno’s long-term aim was the establishment of a “Greater Indonesia”, which would include all the Malay speakers of Southeast Asia.22 Given such a gloomy reading of Indonesian intentions, British policymakers concluded that there was little point in accommodating Sukarno and chose instead to press ahead with the establishment of Malaysia. They calculated that, in the event

20

Stuart Doran, “Toeing the Line: Australia’s Abandonment of ‘Traditional’ West New Guinea Policy”, Journal of Pacific History 36, 1 (2001): 5–18. 21 For a good examination of the Kennedy administration’s rather “dovish” approach to Konfrontasi and London’s more “hawkish” attitude see Subritzky, Confronting Sukarno; Easter, Britain and Confrontation; Jones, Conflict and Confrontation. 22 Easter, Britain and Confrontation, pp. 29–31.

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of protracted Indonesian hostility, Greater Malaysia would be easier to defend politically once the Borneo territories had joined the new federation.23 Concerned that it would have to put up with the same degree of destabilisation that the Dutch had faced over West New Guinea, London sought to enlist American and Australian support.24 To send a warning to Jakarta that Indonesian military action or subversion in Borneo was likely to attract a robust Allied response, London called for a tripartite Allied conference for early February 1963 (initially excluded, New Zealand was eventually included thanks to Australian pressure).25 As a basis for discussion, the British circulated a brief working paper on Indonesia’s short and long-term plans in Southeast Asia. Needless to say, the FO painted Sukarno as an expansionist whose territorial ambitions were not going to be satisfied by the acquisition of West New Guinea.26 In due course, he would seek to take over the British Borneo, Portuguese East Timor and Malaya. From Malaya, Sukarno would then push on into the Philippines and then into Australian Papua New Guinea with the view to extending “its control over the whole of Melanesia and thus become a major Pacific Power”.27 In Australia, the British paper was received with a mixture of irritation and disbelief. For External Affairs, the paper was “remarkable for [the] difference in the British assessment of Indonesian intentions towards neighbouring territories from that given to us when we discussed with them in the past what might be done to deter Indonesian threats to the Dutch”.28 To the DEA, the British appeared to have done “a complete back-flip” in portraying Indonesian intentions as driven by expansionist intent.29 During the 1950s, London had consistently supported the Dutch and the Australian position on the desirability of retaining Dutch control of West New Guinea. In late 1961, however,

23

Subritzky, Confronting Sukarno, p. 43. Easter, Britain and Confrontation, p. 38. 25 Ibid.; Subritzky, Confronting Sukarno, p. 43. 26 On 15 Aug. 1962, the Netherlands agreed to the transfer of West New Guinea from Dutch to Indonesian control in 1963. 27 NAA, A1209, 1968/9055, Washington to DEA, cablegram 115, 11 Jan. 1963; Kimber to Bunting, 15 Jan. 1963. 28 NAA, A1209, 1968/9055, DEA to London, cablegram 178, 16 Jan. 1963. 29 Lee, “Indonesia’s Confrontation”, p. 78. 24

GREATER MALAYSIA, 1962–63  221

the Macmillan administration changed its attitude, no longer opposing an Indonesian takeover and downplaying Australian concerns over Indonesian expansionism.30 Understandably, External Affairs concluded that the British paper was no more than a “cockshy to draw the Americans (and ourselves)” rather than “a serious assessment” or “a true reflection of British thinking at this time”.31 The departmental view was that Australia should be careful not to be “bustled” and “sucked in” by the British.32 On 31 January senior officials persuaded Barwick to tread carefully, arguing that primary responsibility for the defence of Greater Malaysia rested with Britain. Barwick’s initial reaction had been more forthcoming towards the British with the Minister for External Affairs claiming that “the mother country has called for help and we have to respond”.33 In Jakarta, Ambassador “Mick” Shann was also quite critical of the British paper. He described it as an uncorroborated “series of assertions” that amounted to no more than “personal judgements based on selected incipient trends in Indonesian policy”.34 Not everyone, however, shared the DEA’s scepticism of London’s reading of Indonesian attitudes. Alan Griffith, Assistant Secretary and the foreign affairs adviser within the PMD, was more pessimistic about Sukarno’s foreign policy. In a note to Bunting, Griffith wondered whether Indonesian behaviour had not been somehow encouraged by Nikita Khrushchev in an attempt to expand Soviet influence in the developing world through local nationalist movements. For Griffith it was “possible that Sukarno’s expansionist dreams far out-weigh[ed] his capabilities” but Australia should nonetheless “be firm and straight at every point with the Indonesians”, while avoiding, “without real cause, to throw the whole of Indonesian sentiment into an anti-Western position”. According to Griffith, the government should also seize the opportunity provided by the quadripartite

30

Ibid.; Doran, “Toeing the Line”, pp. 7–8, 13–4. Dee, Australia and Malaysia, doc. 16; NAA, A1209, 1968/9055, DEA to Washington, cablegram 104, 17 Jan. 1963. 32 NAA, A1209, 1968/9055, Washington to DEA, cablegram 115, 11 Jan. 1963; Garry Woodard, “Best Practice in Australia’s Foreign Policy: ‘Konfrontasi’ (1963– 66)”, Australian Journal of Political Science 33, 1 (1998): 89. 33 Barwick cited in ibid. 34 Shann cited in Dee, “Australia’s Interests”, Ch. 3. 31

222  COLD WAR AND DECOLONISATION

talks to “get closer to the British on questions involving Indonesia”.35 Differences between the DEA and the PMD, however, seemed, at this stage, to be more a matter of emphasis than substance.36 It is true that on 17 January Bunting had complained with Menzies about the DEA’s cold reception of Britain’s working paper on Indonesia, yet the PMD was also anxious to avoid seeing Australia “stampeded into supporting Malaysia militarily prior to the requirement to do so”.37 In early 1963, both departments appeared to share considerable misgivings about Greater Malaysia. On 4 February, in a paper drafted by Griffith to discuss Australia’s approach to the forthcoming quadripartite talks in Washington, the PMD described Malaysia as a “struggling concept” that “may be wrong”. Noting that the British government had perhaps been a bit too eager to “whirl the Borneo territories into the Federation with a few questions asked”, the PMD claimed that the scheme should “not find uncritical acceptance”. The Tunku, the paper continued, was “diplomatically careless” in his responses to Indonesia, but Australia could “not acquiesce in Indonesian policies aimed at resolving issues by the threat of force”. However, at the quadripartite talks, the government should weigh Australian support for Greater Malaysia “most carefully” as British attempts to use the talks as a means of deterring Jakarta might involve risks for Australia and lead to an Australian military commitment to the defence of the new federation.38 External Affairs held similar views. On the same day that Griffith completed his assessment, Tange produced a detailed briefing paper for Barwick. In it, Tange argued that although Australia had never given its unqualified support to the concept of Malaysia, it regarded it as “the best solution to the problem of Singapore and the Borneo”. Yet, Indonesia’s apparent opposition to Greater Malaysia made it inevitable for the government to revisit the whole issue. For Tange, Greater Malaysia had three major advantages. First, it would enable Australia to maintain its forward deployments in Southeast Asia. Second, it would make a contribution to regional stability by reducing the chances of

35

NAA, A1209, 1968/9905, Griffith note to Bunting, 14 Jan. 1963. For a different view see Subritzky, Confronting Sukarno, pp. 46–7. 37 Bunting cited in Dee, “Australia’s Interests”, Ch. 3; NAA, A1209, 1963/6637 part 1, Griffith note to Bunting, 4 Feb. 1963. 38 NAA, A1209, 1963/6637 part 1, Quadripartite Talks on Indonesia, 4 Feb. 1963. 36

GREATER MALAYSIA, 1962–63  223

communist subversion. Third, it would facilitate “the retention of British military and political influence in the area”. With these advantages, however, also came three significant drawbacks. For a start, Tange was apprehensive of the strain that the establishment of Greater Malaysia would impose on Malaya’s administrative machine owing to a “major increase in its responsibilities”. A further concern was “the racial composition of the proposed federation”: this was “not amenable to an early solution” and could only get worse “by an extension of the Malayan policy of discrimination and repression”. Last, Tange was anxious that if it were established with no regard for Filipino and Indonesian concerns, Greater Malaysia “would have to begin its existence in the face of hostility from these two nearest neighbours”. In that event, Indonesia would “retain a continuing capacity for subversion” in all the constituent parts of the new federation. How long Indonesian opposition would last was anyone’s guess. The danger, as Tange correctly implied, was that Australia would be drawn into an open-ended commitment to defend Malaysia. Tange agreed with the British that “any Indonesian interference should be strongly resisted”. To this end, the Australian government had already agreed to a British request for the use of RAN ships in naval patrol around the coast of Borneo. However, what he disputed was the assertion that Indonesia was an expansionist power. In his view, Indonesia’s behaviour reflected its resolve to ensure that decisions affecting its regional interests would not be taken without its consent. For Tange, this was hardly surprising given that Southeast Asia’s largest and most populous state could not but “be expected to have an influence in the area”. Australia’s policy, therefore, should be firm towards the Indonesians and the Filipinos, but it should be mindful of Indonesian and Filipino concerns.39 Tange’s views echoed those of Barwick. On 1 February, Barwick had told his New Zealand counterpart, Keith Holyoake, that while Australia’s forward defence strategy was dependent upon a continuing Australian military presence in Malaya — and this “inclines us towards Malaysia and makes the Tunku’s goodwill important” — such reliance on Malaya did not mean that Australia was prepared to endorse Greater Malaysia “wholeheartedly”. The concept, he said, had “many weaknesses and although

39

NAA, A1838, 3034/7/1/1 part 2, Tange to Barwick, 4 Feb. 1963.

224  COLD WAR AND DECOLONISATION

we have publicly called it an imaginative idea we have never gone overboard in support of it”. Given Greater Malaysia’s “intrinsic weaknesses”, Australia and its partners could not afford to antagonise Indonesia and the Philippines. The problem was not that Malaysia could not be effectively defended, especially if the US offered some military support. Rather, the point was that it made little sense — and it was in no one’s interest — to create a weak post-colonial state that, from its inception, would be exposed to its neighbours’ hostility. Hence, while Indonesia should be firmly told that “acts of expansionism” would not be tolerated, Australia and its allies ought to try to lessen Jakarta and Manila’s concerns over Greater Malaysia.40 On 5 February, Barwick sought Cabinet’s approval for his approach. He made an oral presentation to Cabinet based on Tange’s briefing paper, one which, according to Garry Woodard, must have been very effective since Cabinet “gave him all he needed to have for the carriage of policy”.41 Barwick did indeed get what he wanted. At least initially, however, he must have shown some hesitation in supporting Greater Malaysia if Bunting could recall a month later that Barwick’s “tentative suggestions” that perhaps Australia was not “committed to Malaysia after all were nipped in the bud”.42 Cabinet agreed to Australia taking part in quadripartite talks on Indonesia and laid down the principles that were to guide the Australian representatives in Washington. First, Cabinet made it clear that Australia accepted Malaysia “as the best available solution of the internal problems of the territories and to maintaining the Malaysia countries [sic] as a Western aligned group”. Second, it indicated that, while regarding Malaysia as the best possible solution, Australia should seek “to avoid the prospect of the new Federation having to be supported indefinitely by the West, not only against communist Chinese influence but also against the hostility of immediate neighbours”. Third, Australian policy should “actively” seek Indonesian and Filipino “acquiescence” in the creation of the new federation and recognise that these two countries “genuinely see security

40

NAA, A1838, TS696/17/1 part 4 DEA to Wellington, cablegram 30, 2 Feb. 1963. 41 Woodard, “Best Practice”, p. 90. 42 NAA, A4949, C3389, Bunting note: Defence and External Affairs Cabinet Papers, 4 Mar. 1963.

GREATER MALAYSIA, 1962–63  225

problems in the area arising from their long term fear of the threat from China”.43 In contrast to their August 1961 decision, when they had ruled out any direct Australian involvement in the formation of Malaysia, ministers now envisaged a more active regional role for Australia.44 Fourth, as it was seeking an accommodation with Jakarta, Australia should also “make clear its disapproval of Indonesia’s campaign of subversion, infiltration, and expansion”.45 On the possible defence implications of continuing Indonesian hostility towards Greater Malaysia, ministers accepted that a worsening of the situation would almost inevitably lead to an appeal to Australia for greater military assistance. However, they maintained that the primary responsibility for action lay with Britain and agreed that any Australian military contribution would be “influenced by the extent to which and the firmness with which the United States and Britain were themselves prepared to accept commitments”.46 Not surprisingly, given Australia’s cautious attitude, the quadripartite talks held in Washington on 11–12 February were a disappointment for the British.47 The ANZUS powers were not prepared to go beyond a general declaration of political support for Greater Malaysia and had no intention of underwriting the new federation by offering military assistance in the event of escalating troubles with Indonesia. The American delegation made it clear that Greater Malaysia was a Commonwealth responsibility and, as such, the burden of its defence rested on British and Australasian shoulders. Like the Australians and the New Zealanders, the Americans strongly encouraged Britain to do more to improve its relations with Jakarta and Manila. Moreover, the three ANZUS powers were disturbed by what they saw as the Tunku’s harsh and reckless criticism of the Indonesians and

43

NAA, A4943, 632, Cabinet decision 632, 5 Feb. 1963. Woodard, “Best Practice”, p. 90. 45 NAA, A4943, 632, Cabinet decision 632, 5 Feb. 1963. On 24 February the Malayan government had warned London of an imminent Indonesian attempt to infiltrate some 3,000 men. See UKNA, CAB 128/37, CC(63), 6th mtg, 24 Jan. 1963. 46 NAA, A4943, 632, Cabinet decision 632, 5 Feb. 1963. 47 For the Washington conference see Easter, Britain and Confrontation, pp. 39–40; Subritzky, Confronting Sukarno, pp. 50–2; Jones, Conflict and Confrontation, pp. 136–8. 44

226  COLD WAR AND DECOLONISATION

exhorted the British to urge moderation on the Malayans.48 For their part, the British delegation had no great desire to make allowances for Indonesian and Filipino susceptibilities. It dismissed Jakarta’s and Manila’s grievances as spurious. Britain had already done enough to meet their misgivings and had no intention of delaying the creation of Malaysia beyond 31 August 1963. Any postponement could put the whole project at risk.49 The British government was immovable on this.

Seeking a Difficult Balance (February–March 1963) Throughout late January and February, as it urged the British to be more accommodating, the DEA had also striven to defuse tensions between Malaysia and Indonesia.50 In early February, it sent a sharp note to Critchley stressing that the Tunku should be made to “realise that small nations without the capacity to defend themselves should not lightly embark on the luxury of quarrelling with large and powerful neighbours”.51 However, while counselling restraint on the Tunku, External Affairs was also working on the Indonesians. In late January, Shann was instructed to convey to them Canberra’s concern at the

48

NAA, A5819 vol. 15, Cabinet submission 576, 26 Feb. 1963; A1838, 3034/7/1/1 part 1, Ambassadorial Discussions on Indonesia held in Washington, 11–12 Feb. 1963; UKNA, FO 371/169908, DH1071/18, Quadripartite Talks on Indonesia undated and 12 Feb. 1963; PREM 11/4182, Ormsby-Gore to FO, telegram 482, 12 Feb. 1963; FO 371/169695, D1071/21, Ormsby-Gore to FO, telegram 471, 11 Feb. 1963; D1071/23, Ormsby-Gore to FO, telegram 481, 12 Feb. 1963; FRUS, 1961–63, vol. 23, Southeast Asia (Washington: Department of State, 1994), doc. 329. 49 NAA, A5819 vol. 15, Cabinet submission 576, 26 Feb. 1963; UKNA FO 371/ 169908, DH1071/18, Ormsby-Gore to Douglas-Home 15 Feb. 1963; quadripartite talks on Indonesia, undated and 12 Feb. 1963. 50 For Australian pressure on the British see NAA, A1209, 1963/6637 part 1, DEA to Eastman, cablegram 590, 20 Feb. 1963. For attempts to defuse regional tensions see, for instance, NAA, A1838, TS696/17/1 part 4, Barwick to Critchley, cablegram 59, 25 Jan. 1963 and Barwick to Shann, cablegram 98, 25 Jan. 1963; DEA to Kuala Lumpur, cablegram 85, 5 Feb. 1963; A1209, 1963/6637 part 1, Barwick to Critchley, cablegram 125, 18 Feb. 1963; DEA to Critchley, cablegram 126, 18 Feb. 1963; DEA to Shann, cablegram 205, 18 Feb. 1963. 51 NAA, A1838, TS696/17/1 part 4, DEA to Kuala Lumpur, cablegram 85, 5 Feb. 1963.

GREATER MALAYSIA, 1962–63  227

state of Indonesian-Malayan relations and desire for restraint on both sides. Shann was also to warn Jakarta that “it would be tragic if the action of one of our friends were to clash with our friendship with another. We must of course honour our obligations and have powerful friends in ANZUS and ANZAM to enable us to do so”.52 In late February, in a further attempt to urge moderation on the Indonesians, External Affairs despatched Critchley to Jakarta for talks with Sukarno and Subandrio. Critchley, who had a close relationship with the Tunku, also knew Sukarno well and Barwick saw him as an ideal conduit between the two.53 The Indonesian response, however, was unyielding.54 Reluctantly, both Shann and Critchley were forced to conclude that with Jakarta’s objective remaining that of “subverting” the Alliance government in Malaya, no rapprochement between the two countries was possible in the foreseeable future. Yet, they argued that by seeking to assuage Sukarno’s resentment at Malayan criticism and by “continuing to plug our concern” at the deterioration of Indonesian-Malayan relations, it might be possible to persuade him to tone down his antagonism towards Greater Malaysia.55 On 6 March, Shann reiterated the same point with the proviso, though, that Australia avoided any “appearance of neutrality” in the Greater Malaysia question.56 In Canberra, despite lingering doubts about Greater Malaysia, External Affairs was also getting firmly behind it. In late February, First Assistant Secretary Keith Waller noted that notwithstanding the scheme’s shortcomings, Australia could not withdraw support now: too many Australian interests were at stake in this project. The problem, as

52

NAA, A4359, 221/4/23, Waller to Shann, 24 Jan. 1963; A1838, TS696/17/1 part 4, Shann to DEA, cablegram 74, 28 Jan. 1963. 53 NAA, A1838, TS696/17/1 part 4, Barwick to Critchley, cablegram 59, 25 Jan. 1963. For Critchley’s acquaintance with Sukarno see Dee, “Australia’s Interests”, Ch. 1. For Critchley’s close relationship with the Tunku see National Library of Australia (NLA), Oral History Collection, T.K. Critchley, bib. id. 622178. 54 NAA, A1838, TS696/17/1 part 4 Shann to DEA, cablegram 74, 28 Jan. 1963; A1209, 1963/6637 part 1, Shann to DEA, cablegram 130, 8 Feb. 1963; Dee, Australia and Malaysia, doc. 44. 55 Ibid.; NAA, A1209, 1963/6637 part 1, Shann to DEA, cablegram 154, 14 Feb. 1963. 56 NAA, A1209, 1963/6637 part 1, Shann to Tange, cablegram 224, 6 Mar. 1963.

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he put it, was that “we cannot look only at Malaysia; our strategic reserve and in fact our whole defence policy is involved. All our strategy …  is based on our forward position in South East Asia and we would be cutting our own throats if we were to pull out of Malaya”.57 Waller argued that Australia’s abandonment of its forward position in Malaya and Singapore would undermine the confidence of Australia’s regional allies such as Thailand and be met with concern by Asian neutrals, such as Burma and Cambodia. While publicly critical of Western military bases in Southeast Asia, they derived some sense of security from Australian troop deployments in the Malayan region. What is more, Australian disengagement from Malaya and Singapore would come under severe criticism from the US on which Australia was increasingly reliant for its security.58 A further but not less important reason for supporting Malaysia — a reason Waller did not mention but which was clearly present in Australian minds — was that Greater Malaysia allowed for a continuing British presence in Southeast Asia. As Barwick himself told the Foreign Affairs Committee of Parliament on 18 February, Greater Malaysia continued to be in “Australia’s best interest” because “it would keep Britain in the area from the defence angle” at a time when the Americans were still “not prepared to accept primary responsibility for Malaya’s defence”.59 On 5 March, with these considerations in mind, Barwick told Cabinet that Australia should continue to support Greater Malaysia and “accept the very real risk that thereby we may cause tension in our relations with Indonesia and that we may be required for an indefinite future to prepare militarily to assist in the defence of the new Federation”. He told his colleagues that he had carefully weighed up all the pros and cons of his suggested course of action, including the American reluctance to commit to the defence of the new federation. Yet, all things considered, it seemed “imperative” to him “that at this time we prevent and discourage Indonesian expansion”. Hence, while the government should still seek to address Indonesian (and Filipino) concerns through diplomatic channels, it should also warn Jakarta that any form of aggression against Malaysia  —  whether overt or covert  —  would not

57

NAA, A1838, 3006/4/7 part 5, Waller to Shann, 21 Feb. 1963. Ibid. 59 Dee, Australia and Malaysia, doc. 32. 58

GREATER MALAYSIA, 1962–63  229

be tolerated.60 Cabinet concurred and, on the same day, it agreed to increase defence spending as “a deterrent against possible activities by Indonesia inimical to our strategic interests” and to improve Australia’s capacity to make a military contribution to Allied operations in Southeast Asia.61 “The outcome was highly satisfactory to us”, British High Commissioner William Oliver gleefully reported to the CRO, claiming that this was yet “another instance where Sir Robert Menzies has exerted his influence in a direction helpful to Britain”.62 Since Jakarta had ramped up its criticism of Greater Malaysia, British officials in Canberra had remained critical of Australia’s “hesitant” attitude, and, more precisely, of the DEA’s desire “not to get it wrong with the Indonesians” and to lie “as low as possible” lest a commitment to any course of action set Canberra firmly against Jakarta.63 Thus, the 5 March decision, Oliver commented, was not a “foregone conclusion”. “The Australians”, he said, were “anxious … to dissociate themselves in Asian eyes from the colonial policies of others. Some, though not many, Australian officials doubt whether the Tunku is really a democrat at heart, and a few genuinely believe that the Indonesian charges that Malaysia is an example of neo-colonialism are not altogether without foundations”.64 But, perhaps even more importantly, there was: a feeling in some Australian circles, particularly in the Department of External Affairs, that the British have dreamed up Malaysia as a rather transparent, intrinsically flimsy and probably impermanent device for solving their colonial problems in Singapore and the Borneo Territories. They suspect that in the long term we will withdraw from SouthEast Asia and leave them, with New Zealand, to hold the baby.65

60

NAA, A5819 vol. 15, Cabinet submission 576, 26 Feb. 1963. When the government’s defence review came before Cabinet between late April and early May 1963, ministers agreed to increase defence spending by A£206 million over a five-year period. They also decided to raise the army’s strength to 28,000 men by mid-1965 (and after that to 33,000); to provide an escort maintenance vessel to the RAN; and to buy 40 more Mirage fighters for the RAAF. See Dee, “Australia’s Interests”, Ch. 3. 62 UKNA, DO 169/35, Oliver to Sandys, despatch 5, 19 Mar. 1963. 63 UKNA, DO 169/76, Larmour to Golds, 21 Dec. 1962. 64 UKNA, DO 169/235, Oliver to Sandys, despatch 5, 19 Mar. 1963. 65 Ibid. For British suspicions see also Dee, “Australia’s Interest”, Ch. 4. 61

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That these concerns were very much alive in Australian minds became apparent in early April when, in his talks with Macmillan and Duncan Sandys in London, Barwick sought a reaffirmation of Britain’s resolve to maintain a military presence in Southeast Asia “in significant strength”.66 In February 1963, the Conservative administration had begun to look again at ways of reining in defence spending and reducing military commitments.67 At a special Cabinet meeting at Chequers on 9 February, senior ministers, while disagreeing on which commitments to relinquish, agreed to set in train studies examining the value of the British base at Aden as well as the political and economic consequences of major reductions — or even withdrawal — from Singapore and Hong Kong.68 Although attempts to find defence savings in Southeast Asia would, by mid-1963, run up against the need to support Malaya, in early 1963 British policymakers still regarded Southeast Asia as an area in which commitments should be cut.69 It is no surprise, therefore, that ministers and officials in Canberra remained extremely sensitive to any indication that Britain’s military presence might be reduced. These concerns, of course, were aroused not only by London’s seemingly constant need to reduce its defence bill but also by its growing interest in closer relations with Western Europe.70 In October 1961, Macmillan had formally applied for EEC membership. The Coalition government had responded to British démarches with concern, arguing, among other things, that British entry was “likely to accelerate the shedding of United Kingdom commitments East of Suez”.71 It is true that, in late January 1963, France had dashed British hopes of joining the EEC by vetoing London’s application, yet Australian policymakers viewed the French veto only as a temporary setback for Britain’s European

66

Ibid.; Dee, Australia and Malaysia, doc. 62. Jones, Conflict and Confrontation, p. 144. On Britain’s constant struggle to rein in defence spending see Saki Dockrill, Britain’s Retreat from East of Suez: The Choice between Europe and the World? (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), Ch. 2. 68 Easter, Britain and Confrontation, pp. 40–1; Jones, Conflict and Confrontation, pp. 144–5. 69 For British attempts to reduce defence spending see Easter, Britain and Confrontation, pp. 40–9. 70 Benvenuti, Anglo-Australian Relations, Ch. 3. 71 NAA, A1838, TS899/1/4 part 2, Cabinet submission 1108, 5 May 1961. For Australian responses see Benvenuti, Anglo-Australian Relations, Ch. 2. 67

GREATER MALAYSIA, 1962–63  231

aspirations. As Australian defence planners would presciently recognise in August 1963, the prospect of London reaching “a full political and economic accommodation with Western Europe” by the early 1970s appeared good.72

Towards the Establishment of Greater Malaysia (March–September 1963) For the time being, however, there was going to be no reduction in British forces in Southeast Asia. On 19 June 1963 senior ministers in London agreed that, Britain’s spiralling defence spending notwithstanding, the defence commitment to Greater Malaysia precluded any military retrenchment from Southeast Asia.73 During the meeting, as indeed throughout the whole defence review, the idea that Greater Malaysia’s long-term security would perhaps be best guaranteed by a political understanding with Indonesia was again raised, but then quickly dismissed.74 The beginning of cross-border infiltrations into Sarawak by Indonesian-sponsored guerrillas in April 1963 made ministers and officials even more reluctant to seek accommodation with Jakarta.75 These infiltrations no doubt underlined Indonesia’s potential to create mischief and alerted them to the costs of a protracted tussle with Jakarta. Yet, policymakers in London continued to hold the view that Sukarno wanted to scupper Greater Malaysia and doubted that they could appease him by making concessions.76 Distrust of Sukarno’s motives apart, British ministers and officials were also concerned that, by making concessions to the Indonesians or the Filipinos, the government would expose itself to delays or obstruction. Although Lee’s internal position had eased as a result of operation “Cold Store” in early February, during which several arrests were carried out against left-wing radicals and members of the BS, time remained of the essence if Greater

72

NAA, A1838, TS691/1 part 3, DEA Policy Planning Study 1/63, 30 Aug. 1963. Jones, Conflict and Confrontation, pp. 147–8; Subritzky, Confronting Sukarno, p. 62; Easter, Britain and Confrontation, pp. 51–2. 74 Ibid., pp. 40–52; Dockrill, Britain’s Retreat, pp. 40–1. 75 On Indonesian-sponsored incursions into British Borneo see Easter, Britain and Confrontation, p. 55; Jones, Conflict and Confrontation, pp. 144, 187. 76 Ibid., p. 148. 73

232  COLD WAR AND DECOLONISATION

Malaysia was to come into being.77 In British eyes, delays could, in fact, undermine local confidence in the project and strengthen opposition to it in Malaya, Singapore and the Borneo territories. Furthermore, any deviation from the already agreed plans with the Malayans and Singaporeans, or any implicit acknowledgment that the methods used in ascertaining the popular will in the Borneo territories left to be desired, threatened to generate complications and revive disagreements among the parties involved in the project.78 Already the final negotiations between these parties were proving quite difficult to handle. London and Kuala Lumpur haggled over the amount of defence assistance Greater Malaysia should receive from Britain.79 Malaya and Brunei were seemingly unable to settle their differences over the division of revenues from future oil discoveries in the Sultanate.80 Malaya and Singapore were wrangling over the phasing in of a Malayan-Singaporean customs union as well as over Singapore’s future tax contributions to the federal budget.81 In May, the gap between the Singaporean and Malayan positions was still wide — in fact so wide that, at the end of the month, Minister of State for Colonial Affairs Lord Lansdowne flew to Kuala Lumpur in an attempt to broker an agreement between Lee and the Tunku. This was to no avail. Lansdowne’s best endeavours notwithstanding, Lee and the Tunku continued to be at loggerheads, with the latter describing Lee as a “snake”.82 On 19 June the Malayan Cabinet even issued an ultimatum to both Singapore and Brunei, setting its “final terms” on financial arrangements.83 With no agreement seemingly in sight, the British began to weigh up the implications of such a stalemate. The CRO even considered two possible scenarios  —  one envisaging the postponement of Greater Malaysia, the other the establishment of a “Little Malaysia”. Neither

77

For Operation Cold Store see Jones, “Creating Malaysia”, pp. 85–109. Jones, Conflict and Confrontation, p. 142. 79 Easter, Britain and Confrontation, p. 52. 80 A.J. Stockwell, “Britain and Brunei, 1945–1963: Imperial Retreat and Royal Ascendancy”, Modern Asian Studies 38, 4 (2004): 811–3. 81 Easter, Britain and Confrontation, p. 52; Dee, Australia and Malaysia, p. 105. 82 The Tunku cited in Easter, Britain and Confrontation, pp. 53–5. 83 NAA, A1838, 3006/10/4 part 3, Critchley to DEA, cablegram 366, 20 June 1963. 78

GREATER MALAYSIA, 1962–63  233

was without significant drawbacks. The first was likely to result in the new federation’s collapse. This, in turn, would push Malaya into seeking an accommodation with Indonesia and produce an independent Singapore at risk of falling under communist control. The Borneo territories would also gain independence, but their likely fate would be a gradual descent into an Indonesian sphere of influence. Needless to say, Britain’s presence in Southeast Asia was destined to end. As for the second scenario, this, too, carried the risk of setting Singapore loose, but, in contrast to the previous one, Britain would, at least, be able to maintain a regional presence, even if this meant defending Malaysia from an insecure base.84 Understandably, neither option appealed to Whitehall. The British, therefore, were determined to press hard for a compromise. Between 26 June and 8 July 1963 further talks were held in London, under Sandys’s chairmanship, to try to break the deadlock. The negotiations were far from easy, but Sandys’s vigorous diplomacy ensured that a final agreement was eventually signed on 9 July (Malaysia Agreement), according to which a date for the establishment of Greater Malaysia was set for 31 August. The only setback was the refusal by the Sultan of Brunei, Omar Ali Saifuddin III, to join the federation.85 His decision, however, did not prevent Greater Malaysia from going ahead.86 Policymakers in Canberra disliked the prospect of a “Little Malaysia” and worried that the Macmillan government might, in the end, decide to settle for it if the Tunku and Lee could reach no agreement. In the crucial phase of the London negotiations, on 5 July, External Affairs instructed Eastman to report immediately back to Canberra, should such a change in the British position take place. The DEA reminded Eastman that Australian “support for Malaysia as the best solution available has rested essentially on the proposition that Malaysia makes provision for the future of Singapore”. Australia, therefore, would find it difficult to accept a Malaysia which did not include Singapore.

84

UKNA, DO 169/221, Consequences of Malaysia without Singapore, undated; Easter, Britain and Confrontation, pp. 52–3. 85 Dee, Australia and Malaysia, p. 104. 86 For the London Agreements see Easter, Britain and Confrontation, p. 53. Signed on 9 July, they were formal undertakings by the signatories to take the necessary steps to establish Malaysia. See Dee, Australia and Malaysia, p. 104.

234  COLD WAR AND DECOLONISATION

“It would take”, the despatch concluded, “very persuasive arguments to cause us to alter that view, including a high degree of probability that a step by step establishment of Malaysia would lead to Singapore’s early inclusion”.87 The Australian government had so far avoided any involvement in the Malayan-Singaporean dispute. Despite Critchley’s advice to support the Malayan viewpoint in London, Barwick and the DEA had refused to be drawn into it.88 Critchley had argued that unless Kuala Lumpur secured a significant share of Singapore’s revenues, the Federation would become politically dependent on Singapore. In the long run, this state of affairs would be untenable and lead to the disintegration of the new federation.89 External Affairs was unimpressed and, in response, told Critchley that the government was reluctant to intervene in the dispute since “there were disadvantages … in taking [a] side between the two major elements in the new Federation”. All the Australian government was prepared to say to the Tunku at this stage was to express concern that “a demonstrated inability to deal with such problems [i.e. revenues and customs union] will weaken the confidence of other countries whose political support for Malaysia is essential”.90 While watching the development of the Greater Malaysia negotiations from the sideline, the Australian government had sought to encourage greater dialogue between Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines. In mid-March, Barwick held lengthy discussions with the Filipino and Indonesian authorities on the margins of the Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) conference in Manila. In the Filipino capital, Barwick endorsed Macapagal’s call for tripartite talks (which Subandrio also supported) between Malaya, Indonesian and the Philippines, but made it clear that Australia could have “no part in any endeavour to torpedo Malaysia”. Malaysia was simply “not negotiable” and the Australian Cabinet was fully behind it even if Australian support “might involve some military commitments”.91 In return,

87

NAA, A1838, 3027/2/1 part 12, DEA to Eastman, cablegram 2608, 5 July 1963. NAA, A1838, 3006/10/4 part 3, Jockel minute to Barwick, 16 May 1963. 89 Dee, Australia and Malaysia, doc. 66. 90 NAA, A1838, 3006/10/4 part 3, DEA to Kuala Lumpur, cablegram 364, 21 May 1963. 91 NAA, A1209, 1963/6637 part 1, DEA to Washington, savingram 73, 18 Mar. 1963; A1838, 3027/2/1 part 9, Cutts to DEA cablegram 181, 12 Mar. 1963. 88

GREATER MALAYSIA, 1962–63  235

Barwick secured an assurance from both Macapagal and Subandrio that, “given certain reactions from the Malayans, they would not seek to delay, amend, or torpedo the idea of Malaysia”.92 From Manila, Barwick wrote to the Tunku, encouraging him to tone down some of his public statements critical of Indonesia and to agree to talks with the Indonesians and the Filipinos.93 Barwick’s attempts to play the honest broker paid off when, following the Tunku’s agreement to the talks, officials from the three nations met on 15–22 April in Manila.94 In London, however, policymakers remained sceptical of Indonesian and Filipino intentions and were not at all keen on tripartite talks. Apart from regarding these talks as another opportunity for the Indonesians to sabotage Greater Malaysia, they felt uncomfortable with the idea that the future of British dependencies in Southeast Asia might be discussed at, and perhaps even influenced by, a tripartite meeting between Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines. In British eyes, these talks could set a precedent for others to follow elsewhere in the Empire.95 In private, therefore, British officials had mixed feelings about Barwick’s role in Manila. On the one hand, they congratulated his “skilful” diplomacy, which enabled him “to avoid offending Indonesia and the Philippines while standing firm on Malaysia”.96 This, they said, might mark the end of the “koala line” — that is, a “fussy friendliness towards all and sundry”.97 On the other, they let the Australian High Commission in London know that the British government “would not have taken the initiative itself”. However, given Barwick’s determination to encourage a tripartite dialogue, they acquiesced to it.98 Diplomatic dialogue between the three Southeast Asian nations, however, made very slow progress and it was not until early June that their representatives finally met in Manila to discuss the issues

92

NAA, A1838, 3027/2/1 part 9, Barwick to Critchley, cablegram 199, 15 Mar. 1963. 93 Barwick’s message to the Tunku can be found in NAA, A1838, 3027/2/1 part 9, Barwick to Menzies and Tange, cablegram 188, 13 Mar. 1963. 94 Easter, Britain and Confrontation, p. 42. 95 Jones, Conflict and Confrontation, p. 142; Dee, “Australia’s Interests”, Ch. 4. 96 UKNA, DO 169/235, Larmour to Golds, 29 Mar. 1963. 97 Ibid. 98 FO sources cited in Subritzky, Confronting Sukarno, p. 53.

236  COLD WAR AND DECOLONISATION

arising from Greater Malaysia. On 11 June Razak, Emmanuel Palaez and Subandrio produced the so-called Manila Accord in which they agreed to strengthen political cooperation among their three countries by endorsing the Filipino idea of a loose Malay confederation, called Maphilindo. More importantly, both Indonesia and the Philippines pledged to accept the incorporation of the Borneo territories into Greater Malaysia if an independent UN mission established that the majority of Borneans wanted merger.99 The Malayans reassured the British that no referendum would be involved, with the Tunku claiming that the Manila Accord was no more than a “face-saving” device and that he “was prepared to play along with it”.100 However, hopes that Indonesia could live with Greater Malaysia were short-lived. The signing of the Malaysia Agreement on 9 July was received with anger in Jakarta. Although the Malaysia agreement did not preclude a UN ascertainment in the British Borneo,101 on 10 July Sukarno alleged that the Tunku “had not kept this word” (that is, that Malaysia would not be formed before the will of the Borneans was ascertained). He then threatened to abstain from any further tripartite summit and called for unity among Indonesians in opposing the new federation.102 Attempts by the Malayans to assure the Indonesians that they had breached neither the word nor the spirit of the Manila Agreement were only partially successful.103 In the end, Sukarno agreed to take part in a summit, but there was no indication that Indonesian attitudes towards Greater Malaysia had softened.104 On 31 July a further tripartite meeting was held in Manila. At the summit, the Filipino and Indonesian delegations demanded a plebiscite in Borneo as a prerequisite for the formation of Greater Malaysia, but the Malayans refused to accept this. In the end,

99

Easter, Britain and Confrontation, pp. 49–50; Jones, Conflict and Confrontation, pp. 157–8. 100 The Tunku cited in ibid., p. 158. 101 NAA, A1209, 1963/6637, part 2, DEA to Jakarta, cablegram 774, 16 July 1963; Kuala Lumpur to DEA, cablegram 414, 16 July 1963. 102 NAA, A1209, 1963/6637 part 2, Jakarta to DEA, cablegram 622, 11 July 1963; Washington to DEA, cablegram 1807, 12 July 1963. 103 NAA, A1209, 1963/6637 part 2, Kuala Lumpur to DEA, cablegram 414, 16 July 1963; Critchley to DEA, cablegram 415, 16 July 1963; DEA to Critchley, cablegram 486, 18 July 1963. 104 NAA, A1209, 1963/6637 part 2, Jakarta to DEA, cablegram 685, 28 July 1963.

GREATER MALAYSIA, 1962–63  237

the meeting agreed to request UN Secretary General U Thant (or his representative) to ascertain whether the Borneans supported the concept of Greater Malaysia. The final agreement also provided for an unspecified number of Malayan, Filipino and Indonesian observers to follow the work of Laurence Michelmore’s UN team in the territories.105 No mention was made in the final communiqué of the possibility of postponing “Malaysia Day” set for 31 August. As a result, the Malayans believed that the agreement was no more than a tactful formula to spare the Indonesians and the Filipinos embarrassment, and felt reasonably confident that the UN team would pronounce in favour of Greater Malaysia.106 Yet, the procedure agreed to ascertain popular will in Borneo was full of ambiguities and, as has been suggested, the Indonesian delegation might have decided to settle for such ambiguity in the belief that it would be enough to frustrate the Greater Malaysia timetable.107 Soon enough, these ambiguities came back to bite the Malayans. Disagreements surfaced between the British government and its Indonesian and Filipino counterparts on the composition of the observer teams. A solution was finally found on 29 August, but the Indonesian and Filipino teams did not reach Borneo until 2 September, thereby missing almost a week of the Michelmore mission’s work.108 This gave cause to further Indonesian and Filipino grievances (which the two countries would later exploit to reject Malaysia).109 More importantly, the Tunku was compelled to agree to postpone Malaysia Day as U Thant let it be known that it would be materially impossible for the UN team to complete the task before mid-September.110 The British reluctantly accepted the postponement, but, in late August, Sandys flew to Kuala Lumpur to secure the Tunku’s commitment to a firm date. In an extraordinary display of his characteristically tough negotiating style, Sandys unceremoniously browbeat the Tunku into accepting the

105

Dee, Australia and Malaysia, p. 150. For the Manila (31 July–5 August) summit see Easter, Britain and Confrontation, p. 57; Jones, Conflict and Confrontation, pp. 173–81. 107 Ibid., p. 181. 108 Easter, Britain and Confrontation, pp. 59–60. 109 Ibid., p. 59; Jones, Conflict and Confrontation, p. 186. 110 Easter, Britain and Confrontation, p. 58. 106

238  COLD WAR AND DECOLONISATION

16 September as the revised date for the establishment of Malaysia.111 When, on 29 September, Kuala Lumpur made the new “Malaysia Day” public, Jakarta and Manila reacted in anger, bitterly complaining that this decision had been taken in complete disregard of the UN process of ascertainment.112 They now had a further excuse to reject the UN team’s findings. For their part, the British were conscious that setting 16 September as the new date for Malaysia Day would create problems with the Indonesians and the Filipinos. However, faced with Greater Malaysia on the verge of collapse, the British had little time for Indonesian and Filipino sensibilities. The Tunku’s decision to postpone Malaysia Day had not been well received in Singapore and the Borneo territories. The Singapore Cabinet strongly opposed such postponement and was very critical of the Tunku’s alleged appeasement of Indonesia. Singaporean ministers believed that Jakarta was not prepared to accept Malaysia and that, by caving in to Indonesian pressure, the Tunku had “damaged his prestige and Malaya’s dignity”.113 Donald Stephens and Stephen Ningkan, the Chief Ministers designate of North Borneo and Sarawak respectively, threatened to join Lee in declaring independence on 31 August, the old Malaysia Day.114 While both Stephens and Ningkan were persuaded to desist, on 31 August Lee stated that he was arrogating Britain’s constitutional reserve powers to himself (thus signalling Singapore’s de facto independence). Then, four days later, he upped the ante by threatening to declare full independence on 12 September unless he obtained a minor revision of the London agreement.115 Primarily intended to ensure that there would be no further delays in the implementation of Greater Malaysia, Lee’s manoeuvrings were also a wily attempt to improve Singapore’s terms of entry and to raise his political profile and influence in the new federation.116 As a result of Lee’s brinkmanship the

111

Ibid., pp. 60–1; Jones, Conflict and Confrontation, pp. 188–9. Ibid., Easter, Britain and Confrontation, p. 61. 113 NAA, A1209, 1963/6637 part 2, Singapore to DEA, cablegram 421, 8 Aug. 1963; UK Commissioner for Singapore to Canberra, telegram 186, 7 Aug. 1963. 114 Lau, Moment of Anguish, pp. 16–7; NAA, A1838, 3027/2/1 part 14, Singapore to DEA, cablegram 443, 20 Aug. 1963. 115 Jones, Conflict and Confrontation, pp. 187, 191–2. 116 Ibid., p. 192. 112

GREATER MALAYSIA, 1962–63  239

British were, once again, confronted with two unpleasant prospects —  having to settle for “Little Malaysia” and reinstating direct rule if Lee persisted in his plans. Fearing that Lee might opt out of Greater Malaysia, Sandys even considered plans for the suspension of the Constitution, and the arrest of Lee and other ministers.117

The Australian Response to the August Manila Conference and its Aftermath These developments generated significant alarm in Australia. Yet, despite their evident concern at Lee’s behaviour, Australian policymakers were reasonably confident that his tactics were no more than a ploy to extract last-minute concessions from the Malayans, strengthen his domestic position and cast himself as a resolute national leader on the wider Malaysian scene. In truth, they were much more apprehensive of Indonesia’s renewed hostility towards Greater Malaysia.118 It was for this reason that Barwick promptly moved to minimise the impact of Sukarno’s outburst by enlisting Thai and Filipino help in defusing a potentially dangerous situation between Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur, and by impressing upon the Tunku the need for flexibility and restraint.119 For all his troubleshooting, Barwick’s attempts to keep the “Maphilindo” framework alive did not go uncontested in Canberra and were met with strong criticism within the PMD. Distrustful of Indonesian intentions, the PMD remained sceptical of the DEA’s efforts to encourage a more cooperative Indonesian attitude. In its view, the DEA’s conciliatory tactics, far from producing a more accommodating Indonesia, gave the latter the opportunity to split the pro-Malaysia camp and frustrate the formation of the new federation. Assistant Secretary Griffith was particularly incensed at what he saw as Jakarta’s efforts to

117

Easter, Britain and Confrontation, p. 61; NAA, A1838, 3027/2/1 part 14, Singapore to DEA, cablegram 443, 20 Aug. 1963; Dee, Australia and Malaysia, doc. 108. 118 NAA, A1838, 3027/2/1 part 14, Singapore to DEA, cablegram 443, 20 Aug. 1963; Dee, Australia and Malaysia, docs 107–8. 119 NAA, A1209, 1963/6637 part 2, Barwick to Cutts, cablegram 429, 12 July 1963; Barwick to Loomes, cablegram 485, 12 July 1963. For Australian pressure on the Tunku see Dee, “Australia’s Interests”, Ch. 4.

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set itself up as “the arbiter of all diplomacy in the Malaysian area”.120 Menzies, too, was critical of External Affairs’ policy. He had so far supported Barwick’s diplomacy, but, on 8 August, he warned him against “encouraging too soft a line with Sukarno. Like all the dictators he will get what he can by threat and bluff. Each concession made to him increases his appetite”. According to Menzies, Sukarno had had a “very marked success” in Manila and, once more, he had got away with “his policy of threats”. Britain, on the other hand, had been put in a “highly embarrassing position”, with Sukarno able not only to assert Indonesia’s interest in the internal affairs of two British territories but also to delay Greater Malaysia.121 For his part, while harbouring no illusion about Indonesian intentions, Barwick did not share Menzies’s concern that Manila represented a substantial success for Sukarno and an unambiguous setback for the Tunku, nor did he accept the view that a further postponement of Greater Malaysia would deal a fatal blow to it.122 When Menzies and Barwick met a few days later to discuss the Australian position concerning the UN mission, they agreed to support London’s decision to stand firm on the composition of the Filipino and Indonesian observer teams. At the same time, however, they felt that it would be “worthwhile” to defer the establishment of Greater Malaysia until September to allow the UN mission to complete its task.123 They considered such a move essential in securing the goodwill, and, if possible, the support of the Afro-Asian world. However, they also decided that should the UN mission collapse as a result of Indonesian obstructionism, Britain could count on Australian support.124 Despite Menzies’s attempt to toughen up the DEA’s approach to Indonesia, Barwick and his department continued to avoid doing anything that could unduly provoke Jakarta. Yet, according to Moreen Dee, there was “less of an ‘appeasing’ tenor” to the DEA’s diplomatic exchanges with Jakarta in late August 1963.125 When in mid-September

120

NAA, A4940, C3389, Griffith to Bunting, 6 Aug. 1963. NAA, A6706, 61, Menzies to Barwick, 8 Aug. 1963. 122 Dee, Australia and Malaysia, p. 146. 123 NAA, A6706, 61, Menzies to Oliver, 22 Aug. 1963. 124 Ibid. 125 Dee, “Australia’s Interests”, Ch. 4. 121

GREATER MALAYSIA, 1962–63  241

Jakarta and Manila rejected the UN findings that the majority of Borneans supported merger,126 Barwick warned Sukarno that continuing hostility towards Malaysia would jeopardise Australia’s goodwill towards Indonesia.127 Barwick’s warnings, however, fell on deaf ears. On 15 September the Indonesian Cabinet refused to recognise Malaysia, a démarche soon followed by Manila’s decision to withhold recognition. On 17 September, Kuala Lumpur broke off relations with both countries. In the meantime, anti-British and anti-Malaysian sentiment in Jakarta soared, rapidly turning violent. On 16 September, an angry mob attacked and stoned the British and Malayan embassies in Jakarta. In Medan, on the island of Sumatra, the British and Malayan consulates also suffered serious damage. On 18 September the British embassy was ransacked and set on fire.128 Although the extent to which mob violence was instigated by the Indonesian government remains unclear, the latter appeared now set on a policy of Ganjang Malaysia (Crush Malaysia).129 Malaysia came into being amidst significant regional tensions and with the unenviable prospect of long-term Indonesian (and Filipino) hostility. The very scenario that Barwick and his department had painstakingly tried to avoid was now becoming a reality. Their attempts to steer Indonesian policy towards a less aggressive stance had proved unsuccessful. On 24 September, therefore, the Australian Cabinet indicated that, should the need arise, it would make a military contribution the defence of the new federation.130 After months of carefully balancing its pro-Malaysia instincts with the need not to antagonise Indonesia (and the Philippines), the Menzies government was finally stepping up its support for Malaysia.

126

Jones, Conflict and Confrontation, pp. 194–5. NAA, A1209, 1963/6637 part 3, Barwick to Menzies, cablegram 825, 14 Sept. 1963; Jakarta to DEA, cablegram 828, 16 Sept. 1963. 127 NAA, A1209, 1963/6637 part 3, Barwick to Menzies, cablegram 825, 14 Sept. 1963. 128 Jones, Conflict and Confrontation, pp. 196–9; Dee, Australia and Malaysia, p. 62; Dee, “Australia’s Interests”, Ch. 4. 129 Ibid.; Jones, Conflict and Confrontation, p. 199. 130 NAA, A4940, C1473 part 1, Cabinet decision 1040, 24 Sept. 1963.

CHAPTER NINE

Epilogue

T

he two-and-a-half years following the inauguration of Greater Malaysia in September 1963 were an eventful period for Australia’s regional policy. In mid-1964, after a few months of relative calm, Jakarta began to intensify its campaign of Ganjang Malaysia. The menacing anti-Malaysian and anti-Western rhetoric of Sukarno’s “Year of Living Dangerously” was followed by troop landings in peninsular Malaysia and greater concentration of Indonesian forces along the Indonesian-Malaysian border in Borneo. Open warfare appeared likely. With Konfrontasi taking a turn for the worse, the Australian government found itself walking an increasingly awkward tightrope between seemingly contradictory aims  —  that is, its desire to avoid irreparable damage to its relationship with Indonesia and its determination to stand by Malaysia and Britain. London’s persistent requests for increased Australian military assistance were only partially met until the commitment of Australian ground forces to operations in Borneo in February 1965. Australia’s delicate balancing act was further complicated by the growing instability in Indo-China during 1964. As policymakers in Canberra came to perceive Indo-China as the area of greatest regional concern, they were anxious not to become overcommitted to Konfrontasi. In the end, the most serious threat to Malaysia’s existence came, ironically enough, not from Indonesia, but from within Malaysia itself. The growing hostility between the PAP in Singapore and the Alliance in Kuala Lumpur destabilised the federation’s very fabric, and the constant bickering between Lee and the Tunku led to Singapore’s sudden exit in August 1965. Although it did not result in the disintegration of the Malaysian Federation, Singapore’s departure would nonetheless have a 242

EPILOGUE  243

long-term impact on Britain’s resolve to maintain a politico-military presence in Southeast Asia. A few weeks later a coup in Jakarta led to the gradual marginalisation of Sukarno and, eventually, to the end of his Guided Democracy experiment. By mid-1966, Konfrontasi was over. Australian policymakers could no doubt rejoice at the fact that the main challenge to the Malaysian region’s stability had been removed. But, as the Indonesian threat faded away, a new challenge appeared on the horizon — the disappearance of British power from Southeast Asia.

Dealing with Konfrontasi As policymakers in Canberra had feared, Malaysia came into being amidst regional tensions and unrelenting Indonesian hostility. Barwick’s attempts to steer Indonesia away from Konfrontasi proved unsuccessful. Reluctantly, the DEA came to the conclusion that, as long as Jakarta was set on destabilising Malaysia, Australia could do little to influence Indonesian policy.1 As a result, in the final months of 1963, Australia’s approach to Konfrontasi hardened. Along with its promise of military assistance, the Australian government also took a number of diplomatic steps in support of the new federation. In late September, the DEA instructed the Australian delegation in New York “to oppose firmly any challenge to Malaysian credentials in the United Nations”.2 A few days later, it advised its diplomatic missions abroad to explain to the authorities in their host countries the rationale behind Australia’s support for Malaysia’s right to exist.3 On 3 October, Barwick addressed the UN General Assembly, exhorting its members to endorse Malaysia and “welcome a decolonization which accords with the principles of the Charter”.4 With these diplomatic initiatives, External Affairs wished to reiterate Australia’s support for Malaysia and isolate Indonesia internationally.5

1

NAA, A1209, 1963/6637 part 3, DEA to Washington, cablegram 2326, 25 Sept. 1963. 2 Dee, Australia and Malaysia, doc. 115. 3 NAA, A1838, 3034/7/1 part 5, DEA to all posts, cablegram AP71, 26 Sept. 1963. 4 Dee, Australia and Malaysia, doc. 122. 5 Dee, “Australia’s Interests”, pp. 191–2.

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While in the US, Barwick also urged the Kennedy administration to show greater public support for Malaysia and adopt a less accommodating approach to Indonesia.6 The administration had so far been reluctant to do anything that could undermine its relationship with Jakarta lest a tougher Western attitude push Indonesia closer to the USSR or China.7 When the representatives of Britain, Australia, the US and New Zealand gathered in Washington in mid-October for further quadripartite discussions on Indonesia, Australia and its Commonwealth partners pressed the administration to stop current aid to Indonesia, offer assistance to Malaysia and desist in its attempts to revive tripartite talks between Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines as long as Jakarta and Manila refused recognition of the federation.8 Barwick was particularly critical of American policy as he felt that it was “encouraging Sukarno to demand a concession after another”. The Americans remained unmoved. While agreeing to postpone tripartite talks for the time being, they refused to cut off aid to Indonesia.9 Australian expressions of diplomatic support for Kuala Lumpur were backed up by some straight talking in Jakarta.10 While signalling to Jakarta that Australian patience had its limits, the Coalition government was nonetheless careful, throughout the closing months of 1963 and the first half of 1964, not to adopt too strident an attitude towards its large neighbour. Differences continued to exist between the DEA and PMD over Indonesia, with the former advocating a firm, but, on the

6

Dee, Not a Matter, p. 15; Moreen Dee, “Australia and Malaysia: Confrontation and the Politics of the 1960s”, The Sydney Papers (2006), p. 162; Lee, “Indonesia’s Confrontation”, p. 92. 7 Subritzky, Confronting Sukarno, pp. 77–8. On American policy see Jones, Conflict and Confrontation, ch. 8–9. 8 UKNA, FO 371/169909, DH1071/26G, Ormsby-Gore to FO, telegram 3202, 16 Oct. 1963; DH1071/27G, Ormsby-Gore to FO, telegram 3210, 17 Oct. 1963; DH1071/31G, Indonesia: Record of a Meeting Held in the State Department on 16 Oct. 1963. 9 UKNA, FO 371/169909, DH1071/26G, Ormsby-Gore to FO, telegram 3202, 16 Oct. 1963; DH1071/28G, Quadripartite Talks: Note by Warner, 21 Oct. 1963; FRUS, 1961–63, vol. 23, doc. 345. 10 NAA, A1209, 1963/6637 part 4, Shann to Canberra, cablegram 1143, 28 Nov. 1963; A1838, 3006/4/7 part 18, Barwick to Shann, cablegram 1477, 30 Dec. 1963; Dee, “Australia’s Interests”, pp. 194–5.

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whole unprovocative attitude, and the latter arguing that “diplomatic talk privately stated but not publicly supported” was most likely to go unheeded in Jakarta.11 Yet, despite these differences, the Coalition did not depart from its “carefully graduated response” to Indonesian subversion in Borneo in the hope that Australia could retain “some scope for exercising a deterrent role in Indonesia”.12 It was with this rationale in mind that, in mid-December 1963, senior ministers had turned down most of London’s requests for military assistance in Borneo.13 Heeding advice from their senior officials that there was “no pressing military need at present for Australian military assistance in eastern Malaysia”, ministers concluded that Australian military contributions “should not be made ahead of need” and that the best course of action was “to combine an adequate military contribution with realistic exchanges at the political level”.14 This “carefully graduated” approach to Konfrontasi was to remain the cornerstone of Australia’s policy towards Indonesia for the next two years. Accordingly, the Menzies government continued to respond cautiously, but not unconstructively, to British and Malaysian requests for further military assistance. On 28 January 1964, for instance, Cabinet agreed to make available the Australian 3 RAR battalion of the 28th Commonwealth Brigade for operations on the Thai-Malaysian border (where, despite the end of the Emergency, communist insurgents were still active, providing a nucleus for terrorist activities in Malaysia) so that British and Malaysian units could be freed for service in Sabah (previously North Borneo) and Sarawak.15 Ministers also decided to create a special fund of A£3 million to strengthen Malaysia’s military

11

NAA, A1838, 3034/10/1/ part 18, Barwick to Shann, 31 Dec. 1963; A1209, 1963/6637 part 5, Malaysian-Indonesian Diplomacy: note by Griffith, undated. 12 Dee, Australia and Malaysia, doc. 141. 13 For these British concerns and requests see Easter, Britain and Confrontation, p. 73 and Dee, Australia and Malaysia, docs 135 and 140. For the Australian response see ibid., docs 139 and 141, and NAA, A4940, C1473 part 1, Cabinet decision 3 (FAD), 19 Dec. 1963. 14 Ibid.; Dee, Australia and Malaysia, docs 139 and 141. 15 Edwards with Pemberton, Crises and Commitments, p. 287; NAA, A4940, C1473 part 1, Bunting to Menzies, 24 Jan. 1964; Cabinet decision 42, 18 Jan. 1964; Dee, Australia and Malaysia, p. 227.

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capabilities.16 Furthermore, on 17 March, Cabinet made provisions to cover the secondment of Australian service personnel to Malaysia’s armed forces and to train Malaysian defence staff in Australia.17 A month later, it approved Malaysian requests for an engineer construction unit, a light anti-aircraft battery, coastal minesweepers, helicopters, short-range transport aircraft, and troop and freight carrying flights.18 Ministers also agreed to use the Australian ground forces in the CSR against Indonesian-trained infiltrators on the Malaysian mainland (but not yet in Borneo).19 Still, they remained reluctant to commit combat forces to Borneo and, in May and June 1964, they turned down two further British requests for Australian reinforcements in Sabah and Sarawak.20 As from mid-1964, however, the Menzies government was forced to review its policy in response to Indonesia’s more aggressive behaviour. In a major speech on 17 August, Sukarno announced that 1965 would be the “Year of Living Dangerously”, thus foreshadowing an increasingly belligerent anti-Western and anti-Malaysian attitude.21 Sukarno’s hostile pronouncement came as approximately 100 Indonesian troops, alongside Malay and Chinese dissidents, were about to land by boat at Pontian on the west coast of the state of Johor with the apparent intent of carrying out acts of terrorism, sabotage as well as training locals in guerrilla warfare.22 The Pontian landing was followed by a further incursion on the night of 1 and 2 September when a small number of Indonesian paratroopers were air-dropped at Labis in northern

16

NAA, A4940, C1473 part 1, Cabinet submission 30, 24 Jan. 1964; Cabinet decision 39, 28 Jan. 1963. 17 NAA, A4940, C1473 part 1, Cabinet decision 108, 17 Mar. 1964. 18 NAA, A1945, 245/3/9, Cabinet decision 134 (FAD), 9 Apr. 1964; Dee, Not a Matter, p. 21. 19 NAA, A1945, 245/3/9, Cabinet submission 126, 8 Apr. 1965; Dee, Australia and Malaysia, doc. 179. 20 NAA, A1945, 245/3/9, Douglas-Home to Menzies, 10 Apr. 1964; A1209, 1964/ 6040 part 2, Menzies to Douglas-Home, 15 Apr. 1964; Defence Committee meeting 26/1964, 30 Apr. 1964; Dee Australia and Malaysia, docs 183 and 191. UKNA, PREM 11/4908, CRO to Canberra, telegram 1453, 23 June 1964. 21 FRUS, 1964–68, vol. 26, Indonesia, Malaysia-Singapore, Philippines (Washington: Department of State, 2000), doc. 62; Easter, Britain and Confrontation, p. 98; Edwards with Pemberton, Crises and Commitments, p. 315. 22 Ibid.; Easter, Britain and Confrontation, p. 99.

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Johor.23 More ominously, race riots (see section below) broke out in Singapore on the same day, fanned by Indonesian propaganda and instigated by pro-Indonesian Malay extremist groups.24 Although they were easily dealt with, these incidents appeared to portend an escalation in Konfrontasi. The Malaysian government declared a state of emergency and appealed to the UN Security Council.25 Britain sent reinforcements to the region and considered retaliatory measures in the event of further Indonesian raids in peninsular Malaysia.26 Western concerns about Indonesian military intentions further intensified in December following reports from British and Australian intelligence sources that Jakarta had begun to send sizeable reinforcements to Sumatra and the Indonesian Borneo.27 Throughout 1964, the Indonesians had already increased the number of combat forces in Kalimantan, but the new deployments signalled a rapid build-up. An intensification of Indonesian subversion, if not a large-scale attack, now appeared a distinct possibility.28 Faced with a major Indonesian military build-up in Kalimantan, London returned to the charge. In early January 1965, with the collaboration of the Malaysians, Harold Wilson’s newly elected Labour government renewed efforts to seek a greater Australian involvement in Konfrontasi.29 British and Malaysian pressures were successful this time. On 27 January 1965 senior Australian ministers finally agreed to commit an infantry battalion (3 RAR) and Special Air Service (SAS) squadron to military operations in the Malaysian Borneo.30 In making this commitment, they recognised that Australia might face a significant deterioration in its relationship with Indonesia, but concluded that unless successfully resisted, Indonesia’s Konfrontasi could “lead to disintegration and fragmentation in the Malaysian area”.31 Notwithstanding Commonwealth concerns that Indonesia might be about to step up its opposition to Malaysia, Jakarta avoided escalating

23

Ibid., p. 98. Lau, Moment of Anguish, pp. 195–7. 25 Subritzky, Confronting Sukarno, p. 116. 26 Ibid.; Easter, Britain and Confrontation, p. 99. 27 Ibid., p. 121; Dee, Australia and Malaysia, p. 356. 28 Ibid., doc. 234; Edwards with Pemberton, Crises and Commitments, p. 315. 29 For the Malaysian request see Dee, Australia and Malaysia, doc. 240. 30 Ibid., docs. 239 and 241. 31 31 Dee, Not a Matter, p. 29. 24

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the conflict. Indonesian incursions into the Malaysian Borneo and infiltrations against Peninsular Malaysia (and Singapore) did indeed continue, but there was no radical departure from the established pattern of Indonesia’s low-level harassment.32 As the country’s economic situation worsened and the struggle for political influence (and Sukarno’s succession) between the Partai Kommunis Indonesia and non-communist forces such as the Indonesian Army intensified, Jakarta appeared unable, or unwilling, to take its brinkmanship a step too far.33 With the Indonesian threat to Malaysia’s integrity seemingly contained, it was now the prospect of the Malaysian Federation’s sudden implosion that began to call the attention of policymakers in both Canberra and London.

Turbulence in the Federation As Indonesian hostility towards Malaysia deepened throughout 1964, severe strains started to emerge within the new federation. Lee Kuan Yew’s decision to contest the 25 April 1964 federal election had unforeseen consequences for Malaysian politics. It set in motion a vicious spiral of recrimination between the PAP in Singapore and the Alliance government in Kuala Lumpur, and generated a climate of growing communal tensions that soon threatened the new state’s very existence. Throughout 1963 relations between Malaysia’s two principal units —  Singapore and Malaya — had become increasingly uneasy, with the PAP and the UMNO-dominated Alliance squabbling over the terms and the date of the merger. The Alliance government in Kuala Lumpur had resented Lee’s recourse to brinkmanship to secure more favourable terms for the merger and had been irritated by his decision to declare Singapore’s independence unilaterally on 31 August in an effort to stiffen the Tunku’s resolve to stand up to Sukarno. For his part, Lee had regarded Malayan demands over finance, trade and taxation as an attempt to “squeeze” Singapore, and the Tunku’s decision to delay Greater Malaysia as appeasement. These frustrations notwithstanding, both the PAP and the Alliance had remained committed to the merger

32

Dee, “Australia’s Interests”, p. 265. On Indonesia’s internal situation see Adrian Vickers, A History of Modern Indonesia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), pp. 154–60.

33

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as they continued to share an overriding political goal — that of holding in check Singapore’s extreme Left. However, with the PAP’s overwhelming victory in the Singapore snap election of 21 September 1963, concerns over left-wing radicalism receded.34 The BS only gained 13 seats against the PAP’s 37 in an Assembly of 51.35 The party suffered a further setback when, in the election’s immediate aftermath, the federal government in Kuala Lumpur (which was now responsible for the island’s internal security) made a series of preventive arrests against BS supporters at Singapore’s Nanyang University.36 The most important consequence of the BS’s electoral defeat and the federal government’s crackdown on Singapore’s radical Left was the weakening of that powerful political glue that had hitherto held the Malayan and Singaporean elites together. Yet, the September 1963 election had other important, and perhaps more immediate, ramifications that would cast a long shadow on Malaysia’s federal politics in 1964, for the election consolidated the PAP’s ascendancy in Singapore and strengthened its hand against the federal government in Kuala Lumpur.37 As a result, Lee soon sought to play a greater role in national politics, initially by aiming to split the UMNO from the MCA and, then, to replace the latter in the federal coalition government.38 Once an increasingly suspicious UMNO rebuffed these attempts, the PAP decided to contest the April 1964 federal election on a pan-Malaysian platform. Although the PAP chose to field only a handful of candidates and was careful to reassure the Tunku that it did not intend to challenge the privileged position of the Malays, the Alliance saw the PAP’s participation in federal politics as an intrusion and a breach of faith. Until March 1964, the PAP leadership had maintained that it would not participate in the 1964 election.39

34

Under Operation Cold Store, launched on 2 February 1963, most of MCP cadres in Singapore and several radical left-wingers (with no association to the MCP) were arrested. According to C.C. Chin, Cold Store “all but ended the operation of the MCP in Singapore”. See Chin, “United Front”, p. 72. 35 Lau, Moment of Anguish, pp. 48–9. 36 Jones, Conflict and Confrontation, p. 201. 37 Lau, Moment of Anguish, pp. 48–9. 38 Turnbull, Modern Singapore, p. 288. 39 Ibid.

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The PAP’s foray into federal politics proved a major debacle. Only one of its nine candidates was elected.40 More fundamentally, as C.M. Turnbull has observed, Lee’s attempts to turn politics on the Malaysian mainland away from communalism towards socio-economic issues affecting all ethnic communities was seen in Kuala Lumpur as a threat to Malay ascendancy. Inevitably, they ended up awakening those very communal passions that the PAP had intended to allay.41 As a result, the relationship between the central government and Singapore steadily deteriorated.42 Tensions increased in late July 1964 when attempts by the UMNO leadership in Kuala Lumpur to exploit the discontent existing in the Singapore Malay community led to violent clashes between Malays and Chinese. More rioting took place in early September.43 Shocked by this vicious outbreak of communal violence, Lee and the Tunku agreed, in September 1964, to steer clear of sensitive issues for the next two years.44 This agreement, however, was short-lived and soon the PAP and the Alliance were jumping down each other’s throat once again. By December 1964 relations between the two had become so tense that they began to toy with the idea of constitutional “disengagement”  —  that is, the adoption of a looser constitutional arrangement between the central government and Singapore.45 Razak first mooted this idea in December 1964, soon to be followed by the Tunku’s proposal to Lee for disengagement.46 Held in high secrecy, the talks between two leaders produced a tentative outline for a new constitutional arrangement whereby the central government would retain responsibility for defence and foreign affairs while control over the island’s internal security would be, for the most part, transferred to Singapore. In return, Singapore would give up its 15 seats in the federal parliament.47

40

Lau, Moment of Anguish, pp. 119–20. Turnbull, Modern Singapore, p. 288. 42 Ibid. 43 Ibid., pp. 290–1. 44 Ibid., p. 291. 45 Lau, Moment of Anguish, pp. 217–9. 46 NAA, A1945, 248/10/16, Pritchett to DEA, cablegram 678, 10 Aug. 1965. 47 NAA, A11536, 18, Critchley to Hasluck, cablegram 417, 17 Dec. 1965; Easter, Confrontation, p. 127. 41

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In Canberra, new Minister of External Affairs Paul Hasluck was disturbed by Malaysia’s descent into instability. In mid-February 1965 he asked his department to reassess the whole situation and instructed Australian representatives in the Federation to gain greater insight into the local leaders’ thinking.48 Hasluck had been receiving some conflicting advice from Critchley and William Pritchett, the new Deputy High Commissioner in Singapore. In Kuala Lumpur, Critchley doubted that a looser federation would make relations between Singapore and the central government easier, but felt that “something had to be tried” if Malaysia were to survive. In any case, he did not believe Australia should interfere in such an incredibly delicate internal problem.49 As for Pritchett, he also considered “a modus vivendi between Singapore and Kuala Lumpur” key to the Federation’s survival, but viewed any effort to “to try to insulate Singapore by giving it special status” as unrealistic. He argued that constitutional disengagement “at best postpones an attempt to grapple with a problem … at worst creates forces favouring Singapore’s withdrawal from the Federation”. A solution, Pritchett suggested, could be Singapore’s greater representation in the central government.50 For Critchley, however, a national coalition government including both the Alliance and the PAP was a non-starter given the level of mutual mistrust. On 21 February he replied to Hasluck, suggesting that the only answer to the current political impasse was indeed constitutional disengagement.51 Hasluck was not persuaded by Critchley’s conclusions. After having staked significant political capital on Greater Malaysia, Australia could not view constitutional disengagement favourably. In cabling his instructions to Critchley and Pritchett on 24 February, Hasluck made the point that Australia could not adopt a detached attitude given its “lively and immediate” interest in the integrity of Malaysia. Accordingly, he directed the two diplomats to try to bring Malaysian leaders back to the “fundamental principles”, upon which the Federation was established, and to remind them that “a genuine multi-racial Malaysia should remain the goal subject to the necessary safeguards and balances required in

48

NAA, NAA, 50 NAA, 51 NAA, 49

A11537, 14, Hasluck to Critchley, cablegram 276, 18 Feb. 1965. A11536, 18, Critchley to Hasluck, cablegram 417, 17 Feb. 1965. A1945, 245/1/28, Pritchett to DEA, cablegram 151, 17 Feb. 1965. A11536, 18, Critchley to Hasluck, cablegram 446, 21 Feb. 1965.

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such a complex grouping”. For Hasluck, a major disengagement “would be a radical departure from the basic concept of Malaysia and would not really solve but pose anew the fundamental problem of the future of Singapore”. No less troubling, however, were the repercussions that disengagement might have on Sabah and Sarawak as they, too, might ask for similar arrangements. Singapore, therefore, “should be involved as much as practicable in the common political and constitutional framework of Malaysia in order that it be firmly anchored”. In this context, it was also essential that the central government retain control over Singapore’s internal security not only “to deter unconstitutional challenges to the Singapore government”, but also to secure continued access to the British military installations there and “to sustain foreign confidence” in the island’s economic future. Yet, in stressing the importance of these points, Hasluck urged the two diplomats to avoid the impression that Australia wanted to see the current constitutional framework kept in place for an indefinite period. Australia fully understood, Hasluck said, the “need for a process of adjustment”, but change should be limited. In the present circumstances, every effort should be made to forestall a “process of disintegration” and to avoid sending out signals to Indonesia that Konfrontasi was paying off.52 In London, the Wilson government was equally concerned about Malaysia’s future. Senior ministers were dismayed at the prospect of a break between Singapore and the rest of the Federation.53 Singapore’s separation would be a profound embarrassment for Britain: not only would it appear to give substance to Indonesian claims that the Federation was nothing more than an artificial and neo-colonial construct, but it would also make British attempts at welding diverse colonial territories together look like a misconceived and overambitious mistake. Furthermore, for a government that was intent on making significant defence savings east of Suez, separation could also prove a costly diversion: with policymakers in London uncertain whether an independent Singapore would be able to take effective control over its internal security, it was not inconceivable that this burden would fall again on

52

NAA, A11537, 14, Hasluck to Critchley and Pritchett, cablegrams 308 and 202, 24 Feb. 1965. 53 Easter, Britain and Confrontation, pp. 127–8.

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British shoulders.54 In no mood to see the Federation implode, in midFebruary the CRO instructed the British High Commissioner in Kuala Lumpur, Anthony Head, to warn the Tunku against any constitutional loosening for any such move might also carry the risk of a reappraisal of Britain’s commitment to the defence of Malaysia.55 Britain’s veiled threats, coupled with Australian diplomatic pressure, seemed to have had a sobering effect for, in early March, the Tunku ruled out disengagement, promising, instead, “to work out quietly with Lee Kuan Yew a readjustment that might reduce tensions”.56 However, the truce between the Alliance and the PAP did not last long. Relations between Lee and the Tunku remained tense. Privately the Alliance never dropped the idea of disengagement.57 Nor did Lee, for that matter. During his visit to Australia in mid-March, he remained unrepentant despite Hasluck’s warnings that constitutional disengagement would force Australia to re-think its support for Malaysia in Konfrontasi.58 Lee told Hasluck that the Malays remained opposed to a truly multiracial Malaysia.59 In mid-April, Critchley reported to Canberra that Lee, far from taking a step back, was, in fact, “deliberately playing up a sense of crisis in an endeavour to achieve disengagement on terms especially favourable to himself and the PAP”. Lee had told him that unless Singapore secured an early disengagement, “Malaysia would blow up in our faces”.60 With his calls for a looser constitutional arrangement momentarily rebuffed, Lee appeared to change tactics. In early May, representatives from the PAP and other four opposition parties from across Malaysia gathered in Singapore to establish the Malaysian Solidarity Convention (MSC).61 Calling for a “Malaysian Malaysia” solution, the PAP and its

54

For Wilson’s attempts to reduce Britain’s spiralling defence budget in his first year in office see P.L. Pham, Ending “East of Suez”: The British Decision to Withdraw from Malaysia and Singapore, 1964–68 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), pp. 15–33. 55 Easter, Britain and Confrontation, p. 128. 56 Dee, Australia and Malaysia, doc. 257. 57 NAA A1945, 248/10/16, Pritchett to DEA, cablegram 678, 10 Aug. 1965. 58 Dee, Australia and Malaysia, doc. 264. 59 Ibid. 60 Ibid., doc. 265. 61 Turnbull, Modern Singapore, p. 292.

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new allies intended to challenge what they claimed were the Alliance’s attempts to impose a “Malay Malaysia”.62 Inevitably, the formation of a mainly Chinese MSC increased the Alliance’s distrust of Lee, and further aroused those very communal passions it purported to resist. This reached a crescendo in late May when Lee was confronted with a barrage of sharp criticism from the Alliance in the federal parliament. With “an electric performance” in what was to become his last address to the Dewan Rakyat, he strongly condemned the policies of the Alliance government.63 In mid-May, the UMNO General Assembly had called for Lee and other PAP members to be arrested.64 British High Commissioner Head was so concerned about Lee’s future that he insistently sought an assurance from the Tunku that he would not be imprisoned. In response, the Tunku made it clear that he would not hesitate to put Lee under arrest if he thought it necessary.65 The crisis reached its climax in July when Goh Keng Swee and Razak held secret talks on the future of Malaysia. With the endorsement of Lee and the Tunku, they quickly agreed to Singapore’s separation from Malaysia. On 9 August, the Tunku made a statement in Parliament announcing the split.66 Singapore’s exit from the Federation had become a reality. Malaysia’s Commonwealth allies were kept in the dark. Head only learned by accident on the evening of 8 August that Singapore was separating from Malaysia.67 Despite his close personal relationship with the Tunku and other Malaysian ministers, Critchley found out from Head.68 In mid-July, however, he had alerted Canberra that “an attempt to discard Singapore is becoming increasingly probable”.69 In recalling these dramatic events nearly 30 years later, Critchley claimed that while “senior Malaysian ministers were careful not to tell [him] what their intentions were”, he was “close enough” to them to know

62

Barbara Watson Andaya and Leonard Andaya, Malaysia (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2001), p. 288. 63 Turnbull, Modern Singapore, p. 292. 64 Ibid., p. 293; Easter, Britain and Confrontation, p. 139. 65 UKNA, PREM 13/430, Head to CRO, telegram 960, 1 June 1965. 66 Turnbull, Modern Singapore, pp. 293–4. 67 UKNA, PREM 13/589, Head to CRO, telegram 1340, 8 Aug. 1965; NAA, A1945, 248/10/16, Critchley to Hasluck, cablegram 1713, 9 Aug. 1965. 68 NAA, A1945, 248/10/16, Critchley to DEA, cablegram 1710, 9 Aug. 1965. 69 NAA, A1838, 3027/2/1 part 24, Critchley to Plimsoll, memo 1187, 15 July 1965.

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that the separation “was coming”. And instead of cabling Canberra that the separation was imminent, he chose to write a lengthy memorandum somewhat downplaying the urgency of the circumstances. In doing so, Critchley sought to meet “his obligations to keep the Department informed” while hoping not to be “ordered to do something about it” as he felt that separation was unavoidable (as well as necessary).70 This is perhaps the reason the DEA, quite surprisingly, did not act upon his advice.71 When the split came, the Australian government was dismayed. On 9 August, Menzies wrote to the Tunku in a last-ditch attempt to delay his announcement. He told the Tunku that he was “deeply disturbed” by what was happening and complained about the total lack of consultation. Admitting that he was yet unclear as to what separation really entailed, Menzies argued that “nothing should be done which might prejudice irrevocably the chances of the country staying together”, adding that “even a partial disengagement would be easier to justify internationally”. Separation, he reminded the Tunku, had “great implications” for Australia as well as for Malaysia. Australia was not only concerned about the future stability of the Federation, in whose defence Australian troops had been committed, but also about the future of the military base in Singapore.72 Menzies, like Wilson, had no success with the Tunku.73 Taking stock of the situation, senior Australian ministers decided that they had no option but to acquiesce in the fait accompli. On 10 August they agreed to recognise the new State of Singapore, accepting that the only “sensible and practical” course of action, in the present circumstances, was to maintain good relations with both entities and foster, with the help of other countries, collaboration between them. Concerned at the defence implication of the break-up, they also indicated that every attempt should be made to avoid the impression that “the defence of the area against aggression would be likely to collapse”. To this end, while recognising that primary responsibility for the defence of Malaysia and Singapore lay with Britain, ministers agreed to maintain Australian

70

NLA, Critchley, bib. id. 622178. Ibid.; Dee, Not a Matter, p. 33. 72 NAA, A1945, 248/10/16, DEA to Kuala Lumpur, cablegram 1145, 9 Aug. 1965. 73 For Wilson’s attempts to have the decision delayed see UKNA, PREM 13/589, Wilson to Rahman, telegram 2021, 8 Aug. 1965. 71

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defence assistance to both countries provided the British contribution continued “undiminished”.74 The sense of the ministerial decision was conveyed by Menzies to Lee and the Tunku in two separate messages. In them Menzies put particular emphasis on defence cooperation, stressing Australia’s willingness to collaborate with both countries in association with Britain and New Zealand.75 On 11 August, he impressed on Wilson the need for the joint Anglo-Australian action to “induce in both parties a sober and realistic view of their joint need for a unified system of defence”. More importantly, he expressed hope that Britain, like Australia, would, too, maintain its defence commitments in the area.76

From the Federation’s Break-up to the British Withdrawal from Southeast Asia Soon enough, Australian hopes for a continuing British defence role in Southeast Asia turned out to be misplaced. In August, Labour ministers came to the conclusion that Britain might not be able to hold its Singapore base for more than three or four years.77 In any case, the antagonism between Singapore and Malaysia was bound to reduce the usefulness of the local British bases.78 Furthermore, with Singapore now outside the Federation, Britain’s commitment to Konfrontasi looked increasingly pointless. If Britain’s rationale for confronting Indonesian subversion was its desire to protect the integrity of a Federation in which Singapore had an important strategic role to play, the latter’s departure inevitably made policymakers wonder why Britain was still shouldering such an onerous commitment.79 Inevitably, these considerations set in motion a rapid process of retrenchment from Southeast Asia. Although the dramatic coup that

74

NAA, A4940, C4235, Cabinet decision 1121 (FAD), 10 Aug. 1965. NAA, A6706, 61, DEA to Pritchett, cablegram 864, 10 Aug. 1965 and DEA to Critchley, cablegram 1158, 11 Aug. 1965. 76 NAA, A6706, 61, Bunting to Cumming and Eastman, cablegram 4149, 11 Aug. 1965. 77 Benvenuti, Anglo-Australian Relations, p. 69. 78 Ibid. 79 Easter, Britain and Confrontation, p. 149; Pham, East of Suez, pp. 43–4. 75

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took place in Indonesia on the night of 30 September–1 October — and the resulting gradual marginalisation of Sukarno and brutal annihilation of the PKI  —  did not alter the course of British policy in the short term, in the longer run it triggered a radical reappraisal of Britain’s regional role.80 With Sukarno sidelined, Indonesian military activity almost ceased in the aftermath of the coup and relations with Malaysia rapidly improved. On 30 May 1966, the two countries agreed to end Konfrontasi.81 This provided Wilson with the long awaited opportunity to reduce Britain’s regional burden. In August 1966, the government announced the withdrawal of nearly 10,000 troops from Borneo.82 Then, in autumn, ministers agreed to set in train a new defence review which led, in April 1967, to the Cabinet’s provisional decision to pull out of Southeast Asia by the mid-1970s.83 Despite a last-minute attempt by the US and Britain’s Commonwealth partners (including Malaysia and Singapore) to dissuade London from going ahead with its radical plans, Labour ministers refused to budge.84 In January 1968, they went even further by bringing forward the date of the final withdrawal to the end of 1971.85 The events set in motion by the end of Konfrontasi also had significant implications for Australia. Whitehall’s major policy reappraisal threw Australian policymakers into a dilemma, forcing them to weigh up their options in Southeast Asia. On the one hand, concerns over the future of Britain’s role in Southeast Asia, coupled with the worsening situation in Vietnam, “accelerated the process of closer Australian-US relations”.86 Australia’s growing military involvement in Vietnam between 1965 and 1967 was, in part, driven by Canberra’s desire to secure a continuing American military presence in Southeast Asia at the time

80

For the coup see, for instance, J.D. Legge, Sukarno: A Political Biography (Singapore: Archipelago Press, 2003), pp. 430–44. 81 Dee, Australia and Malaysia, docs 365–6. 82 Benvenuti, Anglo-Australian Relations, p. 90. 83 Ibid., pp. 90–3; see also Pham, End of Suez, pp. 130–94; Dockrill, Britain’s Retreat, pp. 173–4. 84 Benvenuti, Anglo-Australian Relations, pp. 94–102. 85 UKNA, CAB 128/43, CC(68)1st mtg, 4 Jan. 1968 and CC(68)7th mtg, 15 Jan. 1968; Pham, End of Suez, pp. 213–36. 86 Gregory Pemberton, All the Way: Australia’s Road to Vietnam (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1987), p. 331.

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of growing doubts about London’s regional plans.87 On the other hand, the removal of the British defence umbrella also forced policymakers in Canberra to decide whether Australia should continue to provide a political reassurance to Malaysia and Singapore at a time when its military capabilities in Southeast Asia were becoming increasingly stretched. In late 1967, Harold Holt’s Coalition government rejected withdrawal, recognising that a continuing regional role could strengthen Australia’s regional influence and foster stability in the Malaysian region.88 What is more, a firm commitment to Malaysia and Singapore, by reassuring Washington of Canberra’s dependability as an ally, could also serve as an encouragement to the US to remain engaged in Southeast Asia at a time when American support was still essential to the pursuance of Australia’s regional interests.89 Holt’s policy was formally endorsed the year later by his successor, John Gorton.90 Despite Gorton’s lingering doubts about the desirability of Australia’s forward defence strategy, his government did not backtrack.91 In 1971 it agreed to commit Australian military forces to the Five Power Defence Arrangements, thus prolonging Australia’s politico-military involvement in Malaysia and Singapore and providing a continuing element of reassurance in Southeast Asia’s southern crescent into the immediate post-Vietnam era.92

87

For Australia’s involvement in Vietnam see Peter Edwards, Australia and the Vietnam War (Sydney: NewSouth, 2014). 88 Benvenuti, Anglo-Australian Relations, pp. 103–6. In 1967 Australian military presence in Malaysia and Singapore amounted to one infantry battalion, one field battery, a supporting signal, engineering and administrative element, two destroyers or frigates, on aircraft carrier (on annual visit of six to eight weeks), two fighter aircraft squadrons, HQ and supporting units. 89 Ibid., p. 103. 90 NAA, A1838 TS646/1/9 part 5, Australian Defence Committee, Agendum 4/ 1970, 2 Feb. 1970; A5872, 762, Cabinet decision 762, 19 Nov. 1968 and 4 Dec. 1968; A5619, C22 part 3, Cabinet decision 813, 11 Feb. 1969. 91 For Gorton’s doubts see UKNA, PREM 13/2082, Wellington to CRO, telegram 186, 29 Mar. 1968; Canberra to CRO, telegram 661, 20 May 1968; FCO 15/34, Washington to CO, telegram 1797, 9 June 1968. 92 Andrea Benvenuti and Moreen Dee, “The Five Defence Arrangements and the Reappraisal of the British and Australian Policy Interests in Southeast Asia”, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 4, 1 (2010): 101–23.

Conclusion

T

his book has sought to draw attention to the hopes and anxieties, the strategic considerations and political calculations, the interests and aims that shaped Canberra’s attitude to the decolonisation of Malaya and Singapore in the two decades following the Second World War. In so doing, it has emphasised how challenging and even troubling the adjustment to Britain’s end of empire in Southeast Asia was for the Menzies government. To Australia, Malaya and Singapore had a significant psychological and political value: psychological, because the fall of British Southeast Asia in 1942 drove home their crucial strategic importance to Australian security; political, because Malaya and Singapore also lay at the critical juncture of different strands of its post-war foreign policy  —  the pursuit of regional engagement, the quest for a stable and non-communist Southeast Asia, and the preservation of close Anglo-Australian ties. The nature of political change in these two British territories — whether peaceful or revolutionary, chaotic or orderly, rapid or slow — was likely to have a considerable impact not only on the political evolution of Southeast Asia but also on Australia’s regional role and the effectiveness of its alliance with Britain. It is not too difficult to imagine, for instance, the kind of challenges that a communist Malaya and/or Singapore would have posed to Australia’s security, its regional engagement and the durability of its defence partnership with Britain. The last thing Australian policymakers wanted was an unfriendly neighbourhood which threatened Australia’s regional interests and key international alliances. Singapore and Malaya had a crucial role to play in preventing such an outcome. Reconciling these different strands of policy and balancing often conflicting priorities was no easy task. Never simple at the best of times, such a task was made more difficult by the intersection of two 259

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major historical developments — the eclipse of Europe’s Asian empires, and the emerging Cold War between the two superpowers and their respective blocs. The interplay between the forces of nationalism and communism in post-war Southeast Asia worked to create a complex and volatile mix that was hard to control. How challenging Britain found coming to terms with nationalism and communism in its Southeast Asian territories has, I hope, been amply documented in this book. For Menzies’s Australia, of course, the difficulty was compounded by the fact that it was a minor regional player with a limited capacity to influence local political outcomes. In this respect, it is worth remembering that it was London which held responsibility for its Southeast Asian territories. This fact raised two types of issues for the Menzies government. The first was how to keep fully informed about the conduct of British colonial policy and, more generally, the political and constitutional evolution of those British territories. In the mid-1950s, Alan Watt voiced, more than once, his frustration at the CO’s reluctance to keep Australian representatives abreast of the twists and turns of British colonial policy in Southeast Asia. The second issue was how to influence British policy if Canberra deemed it desirable to do so. Given London’s wariness to discuss colonial policy even with its closest allies, the Menzies government had to tread carefully on how it approached British colonial issues. As Massey put it to his superiors in early 1950, Australia was required to “observe a self-denying ordinance politically” in British Southeast Asia.1 And to this “self-denying ordinance”, ministers and officials in Canberra carefully kept. Given these constraints, how could Australia ensure that political developments in British Southeast Asia would not be inimical to its regional interests? As regards the communist challenge, the Menzies government’s response was reasonably straightforward: in 1950, it sent a squadron of Dakota transport aircraft and Lincoln bombers to Malaya in support of British counter-insurgency operations against the local communist guerrillas. This decision was followed in 1955 by the commitment of defence forces to the CSR. By then, the Coalition had become increasingly alarmed at intensifying communist subversion in Southeast Asia and had come around to the view that it would need

1

NAA, A1838, 411/1/2/1 part 1, Annual Report for 1949 on Malaya, Singapore and the Borneo States, 24 Feb. 1950.

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to make a greater contribution to regional defence. That said, although Canberra envisaged under ANZAM planning, to commit up to three divisions to Malaya in the event of war,2 Australian military involvement remained small and circumscribed  —  so much so that British policymakers often complained about the mismatch between Canberra’s aspirations to play an important regional defence role and what they saw as Australia’s rather puny contribution to Commonwealth defence. “It must be irritating”, the British High Commission in Canberra wrote to the CRO in late 1956, “to hear so much noise coming from Canberra when there seems to be such a small Australian contribution”.3 Yet, small as this might have been, it still represented a significant shift in Australian defence policy and, as outlined in Chapter 1, it was not merely occasioned by Canberra’s mounting concerns over Southeast Asia’s deteriorating security environment and its growing awareness that only greater Allied cooperation could contain communism. This shift was also driven by the Australian desire to prop up Britain’s position in Southeast Asia and ensure that London would maintain a long-term presence there. Inevitably, given their importance in Australian calculations, these last two factors — greater Allied strategic coordination and a continuing British regional presence — were to colour Australian attitudes to Britain’s end of empire in Southeast Asia. As has been evidenced throughout this book, the fact that accelerating decolonisation might result in an early British departure from the region remained a nagging concern for Australian policymakers throughout the 1950s and early 1960s. If Cold War concerns and alliance considerations pushed Australia to play a greater regional role, accelerating decolonisation in Malaya and Singapore forced the Menzies government to think hard about how to reconcile such a role with the evolution of British colonial policy. Here the Australian response was more complex, nuanced and, ultimately, more ambivalent. As noted in Chapter 3, in the years immediately after the Second World War, Australian policymakers had not regarded the question of transfer of power in Britain’s Southeast 2

UKNA, DO 35/6033, ANZAM Planning for the Defence of Malaya and South East Asia, Mar. 1955; NAA, A4968, 25/26/14 part 2, ANZAM Planning for the Defence of Malaya: Australian Prime Minister’s Memorandum, Jan. 1955; Fenton, “SEATO”, pp. 109–11. 3 UKNA, DO 35/6036, Tory to Snelling, 19 Nov. 1956.

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Asian territories as an urgent one. None of these territories appeared yet ready for significant self-government, with the British expecting only a slow transition to independence. In this context, Australia’s policy was, in a sense, a non-policy. Like Labor, the Coalition viewed the political evolution of British Southeast Asia as a British responsibility and had no intention of interfering in its internal affairs. In general, both the Chifley and the Menzies governments were content with the still relatively dormant nature of Malayan and Singaporean nationalism. Given the growing importance of British Malaya in Australian strategic calculations, there was very little appetite in Canberra for rapid political and constitutional change in British Southeast Asia. The reason was not just strategic. It was also political for, as the Menzies government saw it, making British Southeast Asia ready (and safe) for decolonisation would take time and, most importantly, careful nurturing. Australian policymakers, by and large, subscribed to the British view that, before it could be granted, full self-government required the implementation of a gradual programme of political, social and economic reforms or, to put it differently, that Britain had a responsibility to ensure that its dependencies would be adequately prepared for independence. Malaya was a case in point. For the Coalition government, Malaya’s deep communal divisions and ongoing Emergency raised significant questions about the territory’s ability to become a viable post-colonial state and only strengthened the case for a continuing British presence as the only realistic course of action in the short and medium terms. Concerns also existed in Canberra over the Alliance’s capacity to act as a cohesive political force given the different ethnic interests that the MCA, MIC and UMNO represented. As an External Affairs political appreciation noted in early 1955, the Alliance was “a product of opportunism and expediency” and it was “doubtful whether the present cooperation will long survive when the present anti-colonial slogans, on which they [the MCA, MIC and UMNO] find common ground, need to be replaced by constructive policies”.4 But, as the tempo of nationalism picked up in both Malaya and Singapore, and faster transition to independence became a distinct possibility, the Australian attitude to their constitutional evolution 4

NAA, A1838, TS383/5/2 part 1, Malaya and Singapore: An Appreciation of the Present Situation and an Assessment of Likely Developments during 1955, 1 Feb. 1955.

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became edgier. In 1955, Menzies expressed his government’s desire to see Malaya achieve self-government as soon as practicable. However, when the question of Malayan independence came before Cabinet in January 1956, senior ministers dragged their feet and urged the Eden government not to grant Malaya independence unless it could successfully negotiate an effective defence agreement with the Alliance. In so doing, they rejected External Affairs’ initial recommendation for a more forthcoming approach. Their key concern, of course, was the future of a British regional presence as well as the viability/effectiveness of the Commonwealth bases in Southeast Asia once Malaya had become independent. That said, when the London Constitutional Conference in February 1956 agreed to make 31 August 1957 the “target” date for independence, the Menzies government, while not overly enthusiastic about it, accepted the inevitable. With Malaya’s rapidly decolonising, Singapore’s importance as a regional base was not only re-emphasised, but reinforced. Here, however, the prospect of a relatively smooth devolution of power appeared far less promising. Australian ministers and officials saw two key risks arising from Singapore’s rapid transition to independence. The first, and most important one, was that the island’s increasingly radical politics might result in Singapore’s deepening ungovernability, its growing gravitation towards communist China and, inevitably, an early British departure from Southeast Asia. Second, they shared the British view that an independent Singapore would be unable to stand on its feet. Singapore was simply too small to become a viable state. Faced with the turbulent political situation following the April 1955 election, Australian officials were privately critical of what Governor Nicoll had called, only a year earlier, a “calculated risk” in colonial democracy. From their standpoint, rather than a calculated risk, London’s experimentation with greater self-government was looking increasingly as a major miscalculation. No longer able to rely on the moderate SPP to govern Singapore, the British appeared now confronted with greater instability and subversion. It was not without irony that as Australia stepped up its commitment to the security of Malaya and Singapore, the political basis for a continuing British presence appeared decidedly weakened. Hence, the question of Singapore’s transition to independence presented a different challenge altogether and required a somewhat different approach. Outright independence was out of the question, at least in the short term. That is why the Menzies government wanted

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to see the brakes applied to Marshall’s demands in 1956 and sought to stiffen up Eden’s spine in case the British would go too far in accommodating him. For all its wariness, however, the Coalition was not alone in wanting a slower devolution of power in Singapore: in 1956, several non-communist regional governments were privately concerned at the possibility that London might decide to relinquish all responsibility for internal security to the Singapore government. In Singapore itself, ethnic minorities and well-to-do classes were reluctant to see the protective blanket provided by British rule go. After all, as elsewhere in Asia, the process of decolonisation in Singapore was not simply a straightforward struggle between European colonial authorities and local nationalist forces, but, as Michael Leifer has noted, it was characterised “by factional and ideological divisions among the ranks of the nationalists themselves”.5 In any case, as Chapter 4 has shown, Eden had no intention of giving Marshall what it had just granted to the Tunku. With Singapore throwing up an apparently insoluble challenge to Western regional interests, the Menzies government supported the idea of an early merger between Malaya and Singapore. Like London, Canberra viewed merger as the only plausible means of arresting Singapore’s descent into left-wing radicalism. In 1956, Australian ministers appeared even keener than their British counterparts on Singapore’s incorporation into Malaya. That they were willing to contemplate the island’s inclusion into a still untested and potentially fragile, postcolonial Malaya was a measure of their concern over Singapore’s political developments. Alas, with the Malayan government, at least momentarily, opposed to merger, the political conditions for its realisation were far from favourable. Even so, in mid-1956 Australian ministers still hoped that once it achieved independence in 1957, Malaya’s Alliance government would become more amenable to the idea of a MalayanSingaporean union. With merger off the agenda pending positive developments in Kuala Lumpur, Australian policymakers continued, in the meantime, to debate Singapore’s political future and assess the risks of the PAP coming to power. The period between 1956 and 1959 witnessed a considerable degree of soul-searching among policymakers for, when it came to interpreting local political developments, they had far

5

Michael Leifer, Dilemmas of Statehood in Southeast Asia (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1972), p. 3.

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more questions than answers. And these were tough questions indeed. Could the Lim government, for instance, provide a long-term and effective political alternative to Lee’s PAP? Although they did not dispute Lim’s pro-Western leanings, his intrinsic moderatism and political courage, they doubted that he would be able to provide such an alternative. Given the significant uncertainty surrounding Lim’s future, they inevitably wondered whether the rising Lee and his increasingly popular PAP could ever be trusted. Was Lee, deep down, a moderate nationalist or was he a closet communist? Were he to fit the first description, would he, then, be able to retain control of his party and stave off the challenge represented by the PAP’s influential pro-communist wing? Furthermore, was it possible to imagine a moderate nationalist rassemblement, which included both Lim and Lee? In the event, Canberra welcomed Lim as a replacement for Marshall, but it was slower than London in extending a line of political credit to the new Chief Minister. When, in December 1956, the British Cabinet agreed, in principle, to give him what it had refused to Marshall, ministers in Canberra believed that London was again going a little faster than they would have wished. They felt that Lim needed more time to consolidate his domestic position and to prove his mettle in dealing with Singapore’s security problems. Understandably, they were concerned that, unless Lim were able to curb domestic radicalism, he would soon be replaced by a more radical alternative who would exploit the constitutional concessions made to him to end a British (and Western) presence on the island. With time, Australian policymakers came to view Lim as the only acceptable choice in Singapore’s political firmament, yet they never stopped worrying about how tenuous his grip on power was. It was in this context that DEA officials appeared willing to discuss ways in which Australia could help strengthen his internal position, bolster his political appeal and improve his SLF’s weak party organisation. Unsurprisingly, nothing came of it. The Coalition still proved unwilling to move away from what Massey had called “a self-denying ordinance” in British Southeast Asia. As ever, Canberra remained reluctant to interfere in the affairs of a British territory even though, it must be said, Australian representatives wisely increased their contacts with the local nationalist elites and progressively developed greater familiarity with them. The reason for this was essentially twofold — apart from Canberra’s adherence to the general principle of non-interference in the colonial

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affairs of another power. First, Australia wished to avoid being associated too closely with British colonial policy lest its close identification with Britain complicate, if not undermine, its increasing efforts to engage with the Asian region. In a post-Bandung Asia, such identification was not bound to get Australia much kudos among its regional neighbours. Second, by refusing to interfere in British colonial affairs, the government also sought to prevent London asking Australia to do more in Southeast Asia. As officials in Canberra pointed out more than once during the mid- and late 1950s, Australia’s advocacy of a particular course of action in Singapore might prompt the British not only to demand further Australian contributions to regional defence but also to expect military assistance in putting down potential disturbances in Singapore. In Canberra, however, there was no desire to take on Britain’s regional responsibilities although, as mentioned above, DEA officials raised, from time to time, the possibility of Australia taking a more active role in propping up Singapore’s moderate nationalists in concert with the British. Once again, as this book has sought to illustrate, Australian support for British regional initiatives — be they of strategic nature or a more political character — was invariably cautious and conditional. In contrast to the widespread perception of Menzies’s Australia being too closely aligned with British aims and interests, the Coalition government was careful not to do London’s bidding and to keep its regional priorities well in mind. Australia’s continuing anxiety over Singapore’s political evolution was not difficult to understand, especially given the Lim government’s enduring weakness and the PAP’s growing appeal. However, when the PAP eventually came to power in mid-1959, its arrival was met with a surprising degree of equanimity in Canberra. Australian policymakers immediately realised that, despite his sometimes anti-Western rhetoric, Lee was far from being the radical nationalist he had led many to believe. They also understood that, like them, he had a strong interest in retaining some degree of British influence in Singapore and preventing the radicals within his party taking over the reins of government. As a result, Australian concerns over the PAP eased for a while, but not for too long. With Lee’s leadership increasingly challenged in 1961, anxieties resurfaced over Singapore’s future. This was the reason why, when the Tunku finally embraced the idea of merger, Canberra gave its cautious blessing to the Greater Malaysia project. Yet, as Chapter 7 has revealed, ministers were reluctant to stick out their neck for a scheme

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that might not come to full fruition given concerns that Singapore might end up “exporting” radicalism to Malaya and the Borneo territories, and that serious racial tensions between Malays and Chinese might break out across the future federation. Australian anxieties were not only of a political nature but also extended to the defence realm. With Singapore’s inclusion in the planned federation, more restrictions were to be expected on the use of Commonwealth forces stationed there, thus raising the prospect of their having to be relocated elsewhere. What is more, ministers and officials were also suspicious that Britain might use Greater Malaya as a pretext to disengage progressively from Southeast Asia. Perhaps not surprisingly, the Menzies government appeared now perceptibly cooler towards merger than it had been in 1956. In the end, as chapters 8 and 9 have emphasised, Indonesia’s hostility towards Greater Malaysia forced Australia into taking a more direct and visible role in the nurturing of the nascent federation. Despite some initial soul-searching occasioned by the several uncertainties still surrounding the Greater Malaysia project and Indonesia’s importance in Australia’s foreign policy calculations, the Menzies government provided valuable political and military support for the new federation. Ultimately, events in Southeast Asia did not quite turn out as policymakers in Canberra had envisaged. Greater Malaysia did survive Indonesian hostility, but almost buckled under the growing internal tensions between the Alliance government in Kuala Lumpur and the PAP in Singapore. While the separation of Singapore from Malaysia was no doubt a significant setback, it was, in the end, only a momentary disappointment. Both Malaysia and Singapore had been made safe for decolonisation with the issue of communist subversion no longer an acute concern.6 Despite some problematic features, such as the still communally-based nature of Malaysian politics and society, and the

6

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Malaysian government became once again alarmed at the resurgence of communist guerrilla activity along the Thai-Malaysian border (the so-called “Second Emergency”). Despite their nuisance value, these MCP military operations never posed a serious threat to the Federation’s security. See Karl Hack, “The Long March to Peace of the Malayan Communist Party in Southern Thailand”, in Thai South and Malay North: Ethnic Interactions on a Plural Peninsula, ed. Michael J. Montesano and Patrick Jory (Singapore: NUS Press, 2008), pp. 173–98. As for Singapore, by the late 1960s, the BS had ceased to be an active political force in Singaporean politics.

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soft authoritarianism that characterises both Malaysian and Singaporean versions of the Western liberal democratic model, the post-colonial trajectories of these two new states were overall successful and, in the case of Singapore, remarkably successful. Modern Malaysia and Singapore are both relatively prosperous and stable societies. For Australia, Europe’s imperial sunset in Asia was fraught with dangers and riddled with challenges. And, as Goldsworthy has aptly observed, no one articulated that “concern more vividly than Menzies” himself.7 In 1947 Australia’s future prime minister, then still Opposition leader, had not only asserted that India was still unprepared for independence, but had also condemned Chifley’s support for the Indonesian nationalists on the ground that that it would be “the very ecstasy of suicide” for Australia to encourage the departure of Europe’s colonial powers from Australia’s neighbouring region.8 Yet, for all his aversion to the rapid demise of a European colonial presence in Asia, the Coalition adjusted rather rapidly to the new realities of a decolonising Southeast Asia. It had to. With the rising tempo of decolonisation in British Southeast Asia and London’s concomitant desire to accommodate rather than oppose the forces of nationalism, it had no other option. Although the process of adjustment was not altogether easy for the Coalition government, it was not without success. By 1965, Australia had become a close partner of both Malaysia and Singapore. Relations between the Menzies government and both the Tunku and Lee were good. As Peter Boyce has rightly emphasised, it was somewhat ironic that the Menzies government, “who seemed temperamentally less suited to cultivate new friends in Asia than the Labour [sic] government of Chifley and Evatt accomplished in the next decade a quite remarkable relationship with Singapore–Malaysia through a combination of shrewd diplomacy and favourable circumstances”.9

7

Goldsworthy, Losing the Blanket, p. 24. Menzies cited in ibid. 9 Boyce, “Diplomacy in Malaya”, p. 71. 8

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Chapters in Edited Volumes Busch, Peter. “The Origins of Konfrontasi: Britain, the Cold War and the Creation of Malaysia, 1960–63”. In Cold War Britain 1945–1964: New Perspectives, ed. Michael Hopkins, Michael Kandiah and Gillian Staerck. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003, pp. 180–92. Chin, C.C. “The United Front Strategy of the Malayan Communist Party in Singapore, 1950s–1960s”. In Paths Not Taken: Political Pluralism in PostWar Singapore, ed. Michael Barr and Carl Trocki. Singapore: NUS Press, 2008, pp. 58–77. Darwin, John. “A Third British Empire? The Dominion Idea in Imperial Poli tics”. In The Oxford History of the British Empire: The Twentieth Century, ed. Judith Brown and William Roger Louis. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 47–64 . “Was there a Fourth British Empire?” In The British Empire in the 1950s: Retreat or Revival?, ed. Martin Lynn. New York, NY: Palgrave, 2006, pp. 16–30. Edwards, Peter. “Singapore and Malaysia, 1965”. In Australia and the End of Empires: The Impact of Decolonisation in Australia’s Near North, 1945–65, ed. David Lowe. Geelong: Deakin University Press, 1996, pp. 187–98. Fernando, Joseph Milton. “The Cold War, Malayan Decolonisation and the Making of the Federation of Malaysia”. In Southeast Asia and the Cold War, ed. Albert Lau. New York: Routledge, 2012, pp. 67–84. Goldsworthy, David. “The British Colonial Order, 1948–60”. In Australia and the End of Empires: The Impact of Decolonisation in Australia’s Near North, 1945–65, ed. David Lowe. Geelong: Deakin University Press, 1966, pp. 137–59. Hack, Karl. “The Long March to Peace of the Malayan Communist Party in Southern Thailand”. In Thai South and Malay North: Ethnic Interactions on a Plural Peninsula, ed. Michael J. Montesano and Patrick Jory. Singapore: NUS Press, 2008, pp. 173–98. Hudson, W.J. “Richard Gavin Gardiner Casey”. In Australian Dictionary of Biography. Canberra: Australian National University, online edn, http:// adb.anu.edu.au/biography/casey-richard-gavin-gardiner-9706/text17135 [accessed 5 June 2010].

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Tan, Kevin. “A Short Legal and Constitutional History of Singapore”. In The Singapore Legal System, ed. Kevin Tan. Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1999, pp. 26–67. Waters, Christopher. “Conflict with Britain in the 1940s”. In Australia and the End of Empires: The Impact of Decolonisation in Australia’s Near North, 1945–65, ed. David Lowe. Geelong: Deakin University Press, 1996, pp. 69–86. . “War, Decolonisation and Post-war Security”. In Facing North: A Cen tury of Australian Engagement with Asia: Volume 1: 1901 to the 1970s, ed. David Goldsworthy. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2001, pp. 97–133. Woodard, Garry. “Watt, Sir Alan Stewart (1901–1988)”. In Australian Dic tionary of Biography. Canberra: National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, online edn, http://adb.anu.edu.au/biography/watt-siralan-stewart-15844/text27043 [accessed 10 Feb. 2011].

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Cheah Boon-Kheng. “The Left-Wing Movement in Malaya, Singapore and Borneo in the 1960s: “An Era of Hope or Devil’s Decade”. Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 7, 4 (2006): 634–49. Chin, C.C. “Re-examining the 1948 Revolt of the Malayan Communist Party”. Kajian Malaysia 27, 1–2 (2009): 11–38. Comber, Leo. “The Origins of the Cold War in Southeast Asia: The Case of the Communist Party of Malaya (1948–1960): A Special Branch Perspec tive”. Kajian Malaysia 27, 1–2 (2009): 39–60. Curran, James. “‘An Organic Part of the Whole Structure’: John Curtin’s Empire”. Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 37, 1 (2009): 51–75. Darwin, John. “Diplomacy and Decolonisation”. Journal of Imperial and Com monwealth History 28, 3 (2000): 5–24. Dee, Moreen. “Australia and Malaysia: Confrontation and the Politics of the 1960s”. Sydney Papers 18, 2 (2006): 158–71. Dingman, Roger. “John Foster Dulles and the Creation of the South-East Asia Treaty Organization in 1954”. International History Review 11, 3 (1989): 457–77. Doran, Stuart. “Toeing the Line: Australia’s Abandonment of ‘Traditional; West New Guinea Policy”. Journal of Pacific History 36, 1 (2001): 5–18. Edwards, Peter. “The Australian Commitment to the Malayan Emergency, 1948–50”. Australian Historical Studies 22, 89 (1987): 604–16. Goldsworthy, David, “Keeping Change within Bounds: Aspects of Colonial Policy during the Churchill and Eden Governments, 1951–57”. Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 18, 1 (1990): 81–108. Gullick, John. “The Overseas Civil Service, 1837–1997. II The End of Colonial Rule in Malaya, 1946–57”. Asian Affairs 30, 3 (1999): 312–5. Hack, Karl. “‘Iron Claws on Malaya’: The Historiography of the Malayan Emergency”. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 30, 1 (1999): 99–125. . “The Malayan Emergency as Counter-Insurgency Paradigm”. Journal of Strategic Studies 32, 3 (2009): 383–414. . “The Origins of the Asian Cold War: Malaya 1948”. Journal of South east Asian Studies 40, 3 (2009): 471–96. Holland, Robert. “The Imperial Factor in British Strategies from Attlee to Macmillan, 1945–63”. Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 12, 2 (1984): 165–86. Huang, Jianli. “Positioning the Student Political Activism of Singapore: Articu lation, Contestation and Omission”. Inter-Asia Cultural Studies 7, 3 (2006): 403–30. Ishak bin Tadin. “Dato Onn and Malay Nationalism, 1946–1951”. Journal of Southeast Asian History 1, 1 (1960): 56–88.

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Jones, Matthew. “Creating Malaysia: Singapore Security, the Borneo Territories, and the Contours of British Policy, 1961–63”. Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 28, 2 (2000): 85–109. Lau, Albert. “Malayan Union Citizenship: Constitutional Change and Contro versy in Malaya, 1942–48”. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 20, 2 (1989): 216–43. . “The Colonial Office and the Singapore Merdeka Mission, 23 April to 15 May 1956”. Journal of South Seas Society 49 (1994): 104–22. Lee, David. “Australia and Allied Strategy in the Far East, 1952–1957”. Journal of Strategic Studies 16, 4 (1993): 511–38. Liow, Joseph Chinyong. “Tunku Abdul Rahman and Malay’s Relations with Indonesia, 1957–60”. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 36, 1 (2005): 87–109. Low, James. “Kept in Position: The Labour Front-Alliance Government of Chief Minister David Marshall in Singapore, April 1955–June 1956”. Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 35, 1 (2004): 41–64. McKenzie, Francine. “In the National Interest: Dominions’ Support for Britain and the Commonwealth after the Second World War”. Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 34, 4 (2006): 553–76. Meaney, Neville. “Australia, the Great Powers and the Coming of the Cold War”. Australian Journal of Politics and History 38, 3 (1992): 316–33. Pang Cheng Lian. “The People’s Action Party, 1954–63”. Journal of Southeast Asia History 10, 1 (1969): 142–54. Pemberton, Gregory. “Australia, the United States, and the Indochina Crisis of 1954”. Diplomatic History 13, 1 (1989): 45–66. Ruane, Kevin. “Refusing to Pay the Price: British Foreign Policy and the Pursuit of Victory in Vietnam, 1952–1954”. English Historical Review 110, 435 (1995): 70–92. Selak, Charles Jr. “The Suez Canal Base Agreement of 1954”. The American Journal of International Law 49, 4 (1955): 487–505. Smith, Simon C. “The Rise, Decline and Survival of the Malay Rulers during the Colonial Period, 1874–1957”. Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 22, 1 (1994): 84–108. Stockwell, A.J. “Colonial Planning during World War II: The Case of Malaya”. Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 2, 3 (1974): 333–51. . “British Imperial Policy and Decolonization in Malaya, 1942–52”. Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 13, 1 (1984): 68–87. . “Insurgency and Decolonisation during the Malayan Emergency”. Commonwealth and Comparative Politics 25, 1 (1987): 71–81. . “‘A Widespread and Long-Concocted Plot to Overthrow Government in Malaya’? The Origins of the Malayan Emergency”. Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 21, 3 (1993): 66–88.

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Kaplan, Thomas. “In the Front Line of the Cold War: Britain, Malaya and South-east Asian Security, 1948–1955”, DPhil diss. Oxford: University of Oxford, 1990. Pullé, James Hartley. “The Management of Political Change: British Colonial Policy towards Singapore, 1942–54”, PhD diss. London: University of London, 1991. Rotter, J. Andrew. “The Big Canvass: The United States, Southeast Asia and the World, 1948–1950”, PhD diss. Stanford: Stanford University, 1981.

Newspapers and Periodicals Canberra Times (Canberra) The Economist (London) The Financial Times (London) The Guardian (Manchester) The Straits Times (Singapore) The Straits Budget (Singapore The Sunday Times (London) Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney) The Times (London) The Times of India (New Delhi)

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Index

Anglo-Malayan talks, 63, 85, 207, 209 Anglo-Malayan Working Party on defence, 66, 68 Anglo-Singaporean body, of equal representation, 121 Anglo-Singaporean constitutional conference (11 March 1957), 105, 108, 144, 146, 184 anti-colonialism movement, 5–6, 126 anti-European agitation, 123 Attlee, Clement, 14–7, 30, 32, 34, 37 Australasian-American alliance, 22 Australian-Asian relations, 12 Australian-American defence ties, 14 Australian Chiefs of Staff Committee (ACOS), 14, 20, 195 Australian Commission for Malaya and Singapore (Singapore), 18, 39, 44–5, 48, 55, 56 for Malaya (Kuala Lumpur), 56 political reporting from Singapore, 179 for Singapore (Singapore), 90, 106, 119, 135, 163, 180 Australia, New Zealand, United States (ANZUS) Treaty (1951), 2–3, 22, 177, 225, 227 significance of, 22

Afro-Asian bloc, 198 Alexander, Lord, 21 Ali, Chaudhri Mohamad, 114 American Joint Staff Defence Survey Mission, 33 amnesty, to communist insurgents, 57 Anderson, William, 96 Anglo-Australian relations, 3 bilateral issues affecting, 156 during Cold War, 10 on defence cooperation in Asia, 13 on devolution of power, 140 on Malayan nationalist aspirations, 62 post-1945 era, 11 post-war foreign and defence policies, 14 regional engagement, 259 significance of, 103 on unified system of defence, 256 Anglo-Malayan commission of enquiry, 216 Anglo-Malayan constitutional conference, see London Constitutional Conference on Malaya (1956) Anglo-Malayan defence agreement (AMDA), 60, 63, 67, 204, 207, 212 on Britain’s right to use its bases, 67–8 283

284  INDEX

Australian forces, in Malaya anti-communist military campaign, 27 British request for assistance, 17–9, 223, 246 commitment to Malayan security, 68 against communist insurgency, 18 counter-insurgency operations, 24–5 defence strategy, 195 deployment of in Penang, 25 sense of security, 228 despatch of, 24 Five Power Defence Arrangements (1971), 258 ground forces, deployment of, 21 Harding plan, 23–4 infantry battalion (3 RAR), 247 lines of communication with Southeast Asia, 195 Menzies government and decision to commit, 17–20 military aircrafts, deployment of, 18–20, 260 military contribution, 19 naval deployment, 23 operations on the Thai-Malaysian border, 245 outcome of Melbourne defence talks, 23 overseas military commitment, 26 Owen guns, deployment of, 20 politico-military involvement, 258 ratification of, 23–4 and responses to the Greater Malaysia Plan, 194–9 Special Air Service (SAS), 247 supply of fighter and transport aircrafts, 18–20

Australian, New Zealand and Malayan Area (ANZAM), 16, 227, 261 Australian support for, 22–3 review of, 22 strengthening of, 22–3 Australian response, on British Singapore policy assessment of Singapore’s future, 165 on Britain’s ability to stay in Singapore, 165–9 course of action, 133 on final settlement, 135 on internal security of Singapore, 133 London Conference, 58–64, 133–41 regional defence responsibilities, 195 response to May election in Singapore, 175–80 Australian Security Intelligence Service, 150 Australia’s Malayan policies dealing with Konfrontasi, 243–8 doubts about Greater Malaysia, 219–26 response to Manila Conference, 239–41 support for Malaysia’s right to exist, 243 Australia’s military involvement in Vietnam, 257 Australia’s policy, towards Indonesia, 245

balance of payments, 203 Baling talks (1955), Bandaranaike, S.W.R.D., 114–5

INDEX  285

Bandung Conference (1955), 67 Barisan Sosialis (Socialist Front [BS]), 185 electoral defeat, 249 Barwick, Garfield, 217, 221, 224, 227–8, 230, 234–5, 239–40, 243–4 Bayly, Christopher, 4 Black, Robert, 75, 117, 125, 155, 165 Blades, A., 74 Borneo, 3, 8, 44, 81, 93, 160, 189–202, 210, 215, 222, 232, 237 Australian ground forces, 242 comparison with Singapore, 93 defence arrangements, 168, 177, 246 demand for plebiscite, 236 Filipino claim to, 218 British handling of, 218 incorporation into Greater Malaysia, 216, 236 demand for plebiscite for, 236 support for, 237 Indonesian subversion in, 245, 248 Malaya’s merger with, 187, 212 transfer of power in, 212 Boyce, Peter, 10, 268 British colonial policy aim of, 91 conduct of, 260 evolution of, 261 self-denying ordinance, 265 in Southeast Asia, 28 withdrawal from Southeast Asia, 256–8 British Commonwealth, 20, 36 ability to deploy its forces forward, 215

commitment to the defence of Malaya, 25 regional defence position, 195 British Defence Co-ordination Committee, Far East (BDCC[FE]), 86 British defence strategy, 204, see also Commonwealth defence collaboration collaboration with the United States, 193 in Southeast Asia, 55, 101 British démarches, 22, 191, 230, 241 British High Commissioner, 31, 112, 124, 137, 166, 253–4 British India, 4, 28, 45, 46, 268 British Malaya, 29–31 communal differences, 29 ethnic communities of, 28, 33 Federation Agreement, 31 Governor-General, appointment of, 30 during interwar years, 29 Malayan Union plan, 30 military reinforcements, 32 nationalist movements, 29 replacement with Malayan Federation, 31 restoration of law and order, 32 self-determination, right to, 30 Singapore disaster, 29 British military base in Singapore, 37, 159, 160 Suez Canal base, 158 transfer from Singapore to Australia, 160 British Raj, 5 British Singapore policy Australian response on, see Australian response, on British Singapore policy

286  INDEX

Colonial Policy Committee, 192 “Greater Malaysia” plan, see “Greater Malaysia” plan military installations in Singapore, 193 on Singapore-Malayan union, 184, 190–2 withdrawal from Singapore, 159, 168, 185 withdrawal from Southeast Asia, 257 British Southeast Asia, reorganisation of, 195 Brook, Norman, 110, 203 Brown, Allen, 104, 140 Brunei, 3, 8, 189–91, 212, 232 division of revenues with Malaya, 232 Sultanate of, 191, 233 Bunting, John, 166, 204–5, 221–2, 224 Burma independence, 4, 5, 33, 131 nationalism, 45 reactions to Australia’s policy in Malaya and Singapore, 228 Burton, John, 49 Butler, Rab, 21, 133

Cambodia, 228 Carrington, Lord, 137, 140, 166–7 Casey, Richard, 26, 57, 62, 66, 81–2, 89, 107, 160 criticism of the CO, 61 Ceylon, 5, 68 naval and air bases 115, 117 Changi trial, 172 Chifley, Joseph Benedict (“Ben”), 14, 43 attitude towards Malaya, 18 on communist insurgency, 19

support for the Indonesian nationalists, 268 China civil war, 44–5 emergence as a major Asian power, 162 “Trojan-horse strategy”, 45 Chin, C.C., 149 Chinese communism, 151 Chin, Peng, 57–8 Churchill, Winston, 21–2, 41, 91 War Cabinet, 30 citizenship common, 31 rights of, 141 rules on granting, 31 Cobbold, Lord, 216 Cold War, 9, 15, 260–1 Britain’s policies on, 18 Colombo Plan, 82, 124 colonial democracy, in Singapore, 70, 263 Colonial Office (CO), 29, 80, 130 Casey’s criticism of, 61 Colonial Policy Committee (CPC), 59, 192 colonial rule, termination of, 197 Colonial subordination, 144 common citizenship, concept of, 30–1 Commonwealth defence collaboration, 3, 16, 69, 193 Australia’s approach to, 17–8 against communist insurgency in Malaya, 43 importance of Singapore in, 206 Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO), 26 Commonwealth Strategic Reserve (CSR), 1, 4, 10, 23–4, 66 Australia’s commitment to, 26 Malayan Defence Agreement, 196

INDEX  287

operations across Southeast Asia, 84 political restrictions on, 196 communal tensions, 248, 250 communist insurgency, in Malaya, 18, 21 British counter-insurgency campaign, 34, 49 Malayan solution to, 49 outbreak of, 43 threat to Commonwealth defence, 43 Conference on Malaya, see London Constitutional Conference on Malaya (1956) Constitutional Agreement (1957), 159 Critchley, T.K. (“Tom”), 47–8, 50–1, 91, 227, 234, 251, 254–5 cross-border infiltrations, 231 Curtin, John, 14 Cyprus, 108, 117, 157

decolonisation, in Southeast Asia, 4, 9, 28 Australia’s approach to, 11–2, 69 British’s approach to, 34 defence concerns due to, 69 in Malaya, 52–8 process of, 29, 264 in Singapore, 264 Dee, Moreen, 10–1, 240 Defence Committee (DC), Australia, 20, 60, 168, 213 Department of External Affairs (DEA), Australia, 165, 196 approach to Indonesia, 240 on Australian involvement in Singapore, 161 balancing of Indonesian-Malayan relations, 226–31

“The Future of Singapore” paper, 158 reassessment of Singapore situation, 158–64 Department of State, United States, see State Department devolution of power, 40, 54–5, 90, 97, 101–2, 109, 122, 138, 140, 263–4 Dewan Rakyat, 254 de Zulueta, Philip, 202, 207 Dominion of Southeast Asia, 15 Dulles, John Foster, 87, 106, 129, 179 Durbrow, Elbridge, 74, 86 Dutch East Indies, 28, 46

Eastman, Alan, 83–4 East Timor, 220 Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) conference, 234 Eden, Anthony, 21, 55, 60, 62–4, 79, 85, 102–4, 109, 116, 143, 264 education policy, in Malaya, 48 Edwards, Peter, 9, 68 Egypt, 158 Eisenhower, Dwight, 2, 24–5, 87, 106, 161 employment opportunities, 211 entrepôt trade, 178 ethnic communities, of British Malaya, 28, 33–4, 250 European Economic Community (EEC), 198, 230 French veto on British membership, 230 Europe’s Asian empires, 260 Evatt, Herbert, 17, 45, 48–9, 115–6, 268

288  INDEX

Federation Agreement (BritishMalayan peninsula), 31 Five Power Defence Arrangements (1971), 258 Fong, Swee Suan, 73, 127, 181, 183 Foreign Office (FO), British, 21, 61 foreign policies in Southeast Asia, British and Australian, 70 French defeat, at Dien Bien Phu, 24 French Indo-China, 21, 28, 36, 46, 242 “The Future of Singapore” paper, 157, 158, 233, 252

Ganjang Malaysia campaign, 241, 242 Garner, Saville, 108 Gimson, Franklin, 37, 41n88 Goh, Keng Swee, 173, 254 Goldsworthy, David, 10–1, 27, 268 Goode, William, 154–5, 165, 172, 174 Gorton, John, 258 Governor-General, appointment of, 30 Greater Indonesia, establishment of, 219 “Greater Malaysia” plan and Australian defence concerns, 203–10 Australian responses to, 194–9, 218 Australia’s doubts about, 219–26 and Britain’s use of its military facilities, 193–4 British support to, 192–3, 211 Brunei, North Borneo and Sarawak, 187, 190, 192, 194 Cabinet’s support for, 216 complexities of, 194 concept of, 190–1

for creation of Greater Malaysia, 215, 231–9 DEA balancing of, 226–31 and emergence of Konfrontasi, 215–9 future of, 218 Grand Design, 193 impact on regional politics, 194 implications of, 209 Indonesia’s opposition to, 219, 225, 235 London talks and Australian attitude towards, 210–3 natural developments, 191 political aspects of, 196 political association, idea of, 190 postponement of, 232 progress on, 200–3 public support for, 210 rights and privileges of other states, 193 scheme of, 8, 187 Singapore’s inclusion into, 190–2 strategic implications for Australia, 197 strategic importance of, 195 two stages of, 193 United Nations stand on, 237 United States military support to, 224 Griffith, Alan, 221–2, 239 guerrilla warfare, 246

Hack, Karl, 57, 67 Harding, John, 23–4 Harding plan, 23–4 Harper, T.N., 4, 36, 58, 141 Harry, Ralf, 119–20, 126, 136, 143, 147–51, 150 Hasluck, Paul, 251–3 Head, Anthony, 253–4

INDEX  289

Hock Lee Amalgamated Bus Company, 77 Holland, Sidney, 22, 66 Holt, Harold, 258 Holyoake, Keith, 223 Home, Lord, 103–5 Hong Kong, 203, 230 Horner, David, 10 House of Representatives, 19

India, 46, 65, 78, 113 approach to the Singapore question, 97, 113–4 independence of, 15, 33, 131 nationalism, 45 SEATO, 68 Indo-China crisis (1954), 24 British and Australian support for military intervention, 24 French defeat, at Dien Bien Phu, 24 Indonesia anti-British and anti-Malaysian sentiment, 241, 246 Australia’s policy towards, 224, 235, 241, 245 Britain’s working paper on, 222 claim to West New Guinea, 219 confrontation with Malaysia, 242 cross-border infiltrations into Sarawak, 231 Ganjang Malaysia campaign, 242 incursions into the Malaysian Borneo, 248 Konfrontasi policy, see Konfrontasi (Confrontation), policy of Malaysia Agreement, 236 military build-up in Kalimantan, 247 opposition to Greater Malaysia, 219

disagreement with British on, 237 Partai Kommunis Indonesia, 248 relation with Malaysia, 241 struggle for political influence, 248 industrial disputes, 180 Inter-Governmental Committee (IGC), 145 Internal Security Council (ISC), Singapore, 130, 142 British veto power and, 144 demarcation of internal security and external defence, 144

Jaafar, Dato Onn bin, 32, 48 Japan invasion of Australia, 13 Southeast Asia, 13, 28–9 wartime conquests, 4 Johor Strait, 214–5 Joint Intelligence Committee (Far East), 155, 175 Joint Planning Staff (JPS), Australia, 14, 195, 208

Kennedy, John Fitzgerald, 244 Khrushchev, Nikita, 221 Konfrontasi (Confrontation), policy of, 8, 215, 242–3 Australia’s approach to, 243–8 support of Malaysia, 253 Britain’s commitment to, 256 dealing with, 243–8 Greater Malaysia and, 215–9 Korean War (1950), 2, 33 North Korean invasion, 20 Russian aggression, 20 Kra Isthmus, 21

290  INDEX

Lansdowne, Lord, 232 Lau, Albert, 37 Lee, David, 10 Lee, Kuan Yew, 83, 174, 186, 216, 238, 253, 265 Alliance’s distrust of, 254 anti-communist credentials, 179 domestic position of, 180–7 federal elections (1964), 248 leadership of, 266 on merger of Singapore with Malaysia, 189 political leadership, 178 political survival, 187, 188, 195 recourse to brinkmanship, 248 left-wing radicalism, 126, 151, 176, 188, 249, 264 resurgence of, 180 Legislative Assembly, Singapore, 41, 53, 71, 75–6, 83, 87, 103, 105, 119, 126, 128, 143, 171, 180, 186 Legislative Council, 36–7, 52, 73 leitmotif, 21 Lennox-Boyd, Alan, 53–5, 59–60, 76, 78–9, 88, 109, 122–3, 143, 152, 174 proposals for Malaya’s independence, 61 Liberal Socialist Party, 87–8, 132, 154, 159, 164, 171 Lim, Chin Siong, 72–4, 171–2, 181, 183, 187 appointment as political secretaries, 173 as replacement for Marshall, 265 Lim, Yew Hock, 72, 120, 134, 188 action against communist subversion, 124, 151 on aftermath of constitutional talks, 146–52

as agent of British colonialism, 128 August police swoop, 127–8, 151 on Australian response to British Singapore policy, 133–41 constitutional demands, 136 crackdown on rioters, 127–8 on creation of Internal Security Council (ISC), 142 domestic stability, restoration of, 169 on external defence and external affairs, 142 March 1957 constitutional talks, 142–6 nationalist credentials, 128–9 negotiation for an electoral alliance, 170 new round of constitutional talks, 130–3 Operation Liberation, 128 on PAP’s radicals, 125–30 plans for creation of Defence and Security Council, 123–5 proposal for a locally born governor-general, 132, 135, 142 prospects of remaining in power, 161 show of strength, 128, 130 success in securing full internal self-government, 169 visit to London first (July–August 1956), 121–5 second (December 1956), 142–6 vote of confidence, 124, 126 Little Malaysia, establishment of, 232–3, 239 Lloyd, Selwyn, 87, 107, 203

INDEX  291

London Constitutional Conference on Malaya (1956), 96, 106, 263 Australian policy on, 58–64, 133–41, 210–13 outcome of, 64–9 London Constitutional Conference on Singapore (1956), see Singapore London Statement of Understanding, 213 Lowe, David, 9

Macapagal, Diosdado, 217, 234–5 McBride, Philip, 26 MacDonald, Malcolm, 33, 50, 80, 91 MacGillivray, Donald, 36, 58–9 McIntyre, Laurence, 91, 96–7, 107–8, 138–9 MacKintosh, Angus, 55 Macleod, Iain, 186, 191 Macmillan, Harold, 143, 158, 201, 206, 214 defence policy on Commonwealth military position, 205 McNicol, David, 161–7, 177–80 Malayan Chinese Association (MCA), 35 British support for the creation of, 50 Malayan Communist Party (MCP), 17, 38, 51 claim to legitimacy, 33 self-government, campaign for, 33 Malayan Defence Agreement, 60, 196 Malayan Democratic Union, 39 Malayan Emergency (1948), 9, 17, 18, 58 end of, 50 outbreak of, 32 Malayan Federation break-up of, 256–8

British withdrawal from Southeast Asia, impact of, 256–8 Chinese-controlled, 49 citizenship issues, 31 Commonwealth allies, 254 economic conditions of, 46 goal of creating, 48 Indians living in, 35 Malayan-Singaporean talks on merger, 90 Malay supremacy in, 189 policy towards Singapore, 188 political reforms, 36 political solution for creation of, 49 Singapore’s withdrawal from, 251 turbulence in, 248–56 Malayan Indian Congress (MIC), 35 “Malayan” Malaya, idea of, 35 Malayan-Singaporean customs union, 232 Malayan Union, see also British Malaya Australian policy towards, 187 British policymaking and, 31–7 citizenship issues, 31 demand for independence, 46, 64 election in 1955 and decolonisation of, 52–8 External Defence Council, 65 “Greater Malaysia” plan, see “Greater Malaysia” plan independence of, 44, 55, 64–5, 93 Malayan Union plan, see Malayan Union scheme Malay discontent against, 32 merger with Borneo territories, 187, 190, 192, 194 Singapore, see SingaporeMalayan merger

292  INDEX

national education policy, 48 nationalism movement in, 28, 32, 43, 45 replacement with Malayan Federation, 31 SEATO operations, 25, 63, 67–8 self-government, transition to, 46, 54 sovereign rights, 67 transfer of power in, 48 Malayan Union scheme, 30, 32, 45 Malay revolt against, 48 success of, 37 Malay community, 100, 189–90, 250 Malaysia Agreement, 236 Malaysia Day (31 August), 237–8 Tunku’s decision to postpone, 238 “Malaysian Malaysia” solution, 253–4 Malaysian Solidarity Convention (MSC), 253 Manila Accord (1963), 236 Australian response to, 239–41 Manila Treaty (1954), 4, 211 Mao Zedong, 45 Maphilindo (Malay confederation), 236, 239 Marquess of Salisbury, 133 Marshall, David, 58, 71–2, 105, 113, 118, 125, 185, 188, 264 administration of, 78 anti-colonial beliefs, 75 Australia’s policy towards, 81–6 blackmailing tactics, 80 criticism of British colonialism, 83 in power, 75–81 on reinterpretation of the Constitution, 76 resignation of, 98

on self-government and merger with Malaya, 75 Massey, Claude, 18, 43–6, 49, 260, 265 pro-Malay bias, 49 May riots, 84 Melbourne Report (1955), 26 Melville, Eugene, 174 Menon, Krishna, 114 Menzies, Robert, 1, 47, 60, 63, 68, 196, 201, 204, 206, 210, 217, 229, 255, 263 assessment of the PAP government, 179 decision to commit Australian forces to Malaya, 17–20, 26 from Malaya to Malaya, 20–7 merdeka mission, 100, 132, 146 policy towards Singapore’s future, 94–108 strengthening of ANZAM, 23 merdeka, 72, 100, 115, 132, 136–7, 141, 146–7 Michelmore, Laurence, 237 Middle East Australia’s wartime deployment in, 13 Britain’s end of empire in, 4 Middle Road Group, 73 military aircrafts, deployment of, 18–20, 260 Ministry of Defence (MOD), 130 Moore, Philip, 216 multiracialism, principle of, 53

Nanyang University, Singapore, 249 Nasser, Gamal Abdel, 158 nationalism, issue of, 26, 56, 108 in Malayan peninsula, 28, 32, 43, 45, 262 in Singapore, 28, 121

INDEX  293

Nehru, Jawaharlal, 105, 114 Netherlands, 220n26 Nicoll, John, 40–1, 77, 263 Ningkan, Stephen, 238 non-interference, principle of, 265

Oliver, William, 229 Ong, Eng Guan, 153, 163, 181 Operation “Cold Store”, 231 Operation Liberation, 128

Pakistan, 65, 79, 114 Palaez, Emmanuel, 236 Palestine, 5, 32, 46 Papua New Guinea, 220 Partai Kommunis Indonesia (PKI), 248, 257 Pemberton, Gregory, 9–10, 68 People’s Action Party (PAP), Singapore, 5–6, 72, 84, 98, 216, 242, 248, 265 administration of, 152 annual general meeting, 149 anti-communist character of, 180 and anti-PAP groups, 172 ascendancy in Singapore, 249 Central Executive Committee (CEC), 129 City Council election, 153 communist influence, 162 electoral propaganda, 170 foray into federal politics, 250 ideals and stated policies of, 177 internal struggles, 151 leadership of, 155, 159 left-wing faction, 73 Malayan reaction to electoral victory of, 174 Menzies’s assessment of, 179 Middle Road Group, 73

motion of confidence, 185 Petir (journal), 181 political fortunes, 154 political rallies, 170 prospect of Singapore under rule of, 155 relation with UMNO-MCA Alliance, 250 rise to power, 154 tension with Lee’s right-wing faction, 125–30 victory in election (1963), 249 Western fears about, 179 Petir (journal), 181 Philippines, 224 approach to Greater Malaysia, 236 Australia’s policy towards, 224, 235, 241 relations with Malaya and Indonesia, 244 relations with Malaysia and Indonesia, 234–235 Plimsoll, James, 88–90, 96–7, 124, 160 political association, idea of, 190 Prime Minister’s Department (PMD), 102, 201 Pritchett, William, 251

Quinn, J.P., 138–9

radicalism, communist-inspired, 77 Rahman, Tunku Abdul, 34, 48, 56, 59, 63, 66, 121, 134, 188, 190, 200–1, 215 appeasement of Indonesia, 238 decision to postpone Malaysia Day, 238 proposal to Lee for

294  INDEX

disengagement, 250 Razak, Tun, 60, 121, 254 Reid, Lord, 65 Rendel Constitution, 42, 72–3, 75, 118, 137 Rendel, George, 41–2 riots in Singapore, 127–8, 250 Robertson, Walter, 86–7 Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF), 23 Russian trade mission, to Singapore, 186

Sabah, 245–6, 252 Saifuddin III, Omar Ali, 233 Sandys, Duncan, 73, 133, 210, 230, 233, 237, 239 Sarawak, 190, 210, 252 cross-border infiltrations into, 231 Scott, Robert, 65–7, 80, 97, 175 Second World War, see World War II security system in Southeast Asia, Western-oriented, 24 self-determination, right of, 30, 184, 201 self-government, 119, 130, 161 demands for, 105, 144 grant of, 63 principle of, 36, 60–1, 104 in Singapore, 103–5 Selkirk, Lord, 180, 183, 186–7, 192, 200, 204 Shann, Keith (“Mick”), 176, 221, 226–7 Shaphie, Muhammad Ghazali, 201 Singapore Anson by-election (1961), 186, 190, 197 anti-British resentment, 40 anti-Chinese stance, 162

“anti-Colonial” line, 123 anti-colonial rallies, 183 April 1955 election and its implications, 71–5 April 1956 Constitutional Conference, 108–16 association with Malaya, 71 Australian Commission in, 90, 106, 135 Australian concerns about Britain’s ability to stay in, 165–9 Australian response to the May election, 175–80 under British military administration, 37 British military installations, 84 British withdrawal from, 159 Cairnhill by-election (1957), 148 Colombo Plan, 82, 124 colonial democracy in, 70 communist-inspired radicalism, 77 constitutional and social reforms, 38 constitutional progress, 86–94 Council of Ministers, 41 DEA reassessment of, 158–64 decolonisation in, 70 on defence of Southeast Asia, 69 devolution of power, 90 domestic situation and the May 1959 election, 169–75 economic future of, 172 emergency regulations, 39 External Affairs, 101 fall of, 3, 13 growth of communism, 115 radicalism, 198 Hong Lim by-election (1961), 182–3 inclination towards China, 79

INDEX  295

independence of, 44, 79, 106, 115, 198 influence of communism within, 70 internal security, management of, 121, 252 Japanese attack on, 13 July–August constitutional crisis, 77 Legislative Assembly, 105, 119, 126, 128, 143, 171, 186 maintenance of a British presence in, 159 Malayan role in security of, 121–2 Malayan-Singaporean talks on merger, 90 Menzies government policies towards, 94–108 merdeka week, 100 military base, retention of, 159 national coalition government, 251 nationalism, issue of, 28, 121 post-war, 37–42 pro-communist militancy, 188 prospect of absorption into Malaya, 93 radicalism to Malaya and the Borneo territories, 197 responsibility for internal security, 90 risk of Chinese influence, 45 Russian trade mission to, 186 as self-governing territory, 147 self-government, demand for, 40, 103–5 separation from Malaya, 37, 254 social unrest, 40 tiga suku merdeka (three-quarters independence), 147 transfer of power, 70

Tanjong Pagar by-election (1957), 148 withdrawal from Malayan Federation, 251 Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce, 78 Singapore Chinese Middle-School Students’ Union (SCMSSU), 122, 127 Singapore Harbour Board, 77 Singapore Labour Front (SLF), 5–6, 71, 83 City Council election, 153 defeat in the Kallang City Council by-election, 169 electoral campaigns, 161 Rural Council elections, 164 Singapore-Malayan merger, 248 case for, 184, 187 referendum on, 217 talks on, 90 terms of, 190–2 two-stage plan for, 193 Singapore People’s Alliance (SPA), 6, 169 Singapore Press Club, 189 Singapore Progressive Party (SPP), 38, 40–1, 71, 74 Sino-Malay clashes, 127, 197 Sino-Soviet expansionism, agenda of, 2 Sin Pao newspaper, 150 social unrest, 40 Southeast Asia American military presence in, 257–8 Britain’s end of empire in, 8, 259, 261 British withdrawal from, 256–8 communist subversion in, 260 defence of, 27 Southeast Asian defensive alliance, 24

296  INDEX

Southeast Asian Treaty Organisation (SEATO), 2, 4, 54, 193, 195, 204, 206 and Allied defence planning in the Far East, 160 Commonwealth participation in, 7, 212 establishment of, 24 Malayan association with, 25, 63, 67–8 Malayan refusal to join, 134 military operations across Southeast Asia, 195–6 ministerial meeting, 89 operations across Southeast Asia, 84 regional defence operations, 196 role in deterring communist expansionism, 162 security structure of, 177 use of the Singapore base for, 212, 215 war operations, 207 sovereignty, transfer of, 201 Soviet Union, 19 alleged attempts to subvert Malaya, 21–2 expansionism in Asia, 2 influence in Europe, 2 influence in developing world, 221 Spender, Percy, 105–6 State Department, United States, 86 Stephens, Donald, 238 Stockwell, A.J., 31, 33 Straits Settlements of Malacca and Penang, 29, 93 Study of Future Policy (1960–70), 205 Suez Canal crisis, 123, 131, 252 military base, 158

Sukarno, President, 219–20, 227, 231, 236, 257 marginalisation of, 243 struggle for political influence, 248 “Year of Living Dangerously”, 242, 246 Sultanate of Brunei, 191 Sydney Morning Herald, 213 Tan, C.C., 38, 40, 71 Tan, Cheng Lock, 35, 48 Tan, Lark Sye, 88 Tandon, R.K., 114 Tange, Arthur, 26, 66, 89–90, 134, 156, 166–8, 178, 196, 202, 209, 222–3 Templer, Gerald, 34, 36 Thailand, defence of Southeast Asia, 21, 208, 212 Malayan Communist Party, 267 reactions to Australia’s policy in Malaya and Singapore, 228 Thomas, Francis, 72 tiga suku merdeka (three-quarters independence), 147 Timbs, Maurice, 102 Times, The, 117 Toh, Chin Chye, 163 Tory, Geofroy, 55 trade unions, 73, 83, 127, 150, 184 transfer of power, in British Southeast Asian territories, 33, 36, 44, 47, 53, 58, 70, 85, 97, 201, 212, 261–2 Truman, Harry, 2 Turnbull, C.M., 185, 250 Umetsu, Hiroyuki, 10 UMNO-MCA Alliance, 40, 141 ethnic constituencies, 141

INDEX  297

UMNO/MCA/MIC Alliance, 52–4, 56 electoral platform, 57 UMNO-MCA-SMU Alliance, 71 unemployment, issue of, 180 Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), see Soviet Union United Kingdom Chiefs of Staff (UKCOS), 21, 156, 194, 205 United Malays National Organisation (UMNO), 32, 34, 45, 93, 141, 188, 248 General Assembly, 254 United Nations, 198 General Assembly, 243 Security Council, 247 support to “Greater Malaysia” plan, 237 United States approach to the Singapore question, 86, 87, 105, 106–7, 129 defence collaboration with Britain, 193 defence of Southeast Asia, 2, 22, 24–5, 107 policy towards Greater Malaysia, 225, 244

University of Malaya Socialist Club, 73 U Thant, General, 237

Vietnam Australia’s growing involvement in, 257 defence of Southeast Asia, 212 worsening situation, 257

Waller, Keith, 227–8 Waters, Christopher, 9 Watt, Alan, 22, 61, 81, 83–4, 90, 260 Western economic assistance, to Asia, 19 West New Guinea, Jakarta’s claim to, 219–20 West’s position in Southeast Asia, 24 Wilson, Harold, 247, 252, 255–7 Woolcott, Richard, 161n28, 168, 176–7 World War II, 9, 13–5, 29, 44, 259, 261