Climate Migration Governance and the Discourse of Citizenship in India 9462655669, 9789462655669

Table of contents :
Preface
Acknowledgments
Contents
List of Figures
List of Tables
1 Introduction
1.1 Introductory Remarks
1.2 Conceptualising Climate Change Migration
1.3 Methods
1.3.1 Assam as the Study Area
1.4 Right to Have a Right
1.5 About the Book
References
2 Understanding Climate Migration Governance
2.1 Introduction
2.2 Climate-Migration Nexus
2.3 Climate Migration as a Wicked Problem
2.4 Climate Migration as an Area of Governance
2.4.1 Environmental Law Discourse on Climate Migration
2.4.2 Human Rights Discourse on Climate Migration
2.4.3 Development Discourse on Climate Migration
2.5 The Indian Paradox: The Elephant in the Room
2.5.1 Vulnerability to Climate Change
2.5.2 Multi-level Governance
2.5.3 The Question of Framing
2.6 Conclusion
References
3 Governing Displacements
3.1 Introduction
3.2 Governing Through Rights Framework
3.3 Governing Through Disaster Risk Reduction Policy
3.3.1 Governing Structures
3.3.2 Governing Disasters
3.3.3 Governing Flood Displacements
3.4 Governing Through Loss and Damage Policies
3.4.1 Compensating Losses
3.4.2 Rebuilding Shelters
3.4.3 Special Assistance for Erosion-Affected Families
3.5 Conclusion
References
4 Negotiating Climate, Citizenship, and Belonging
4.1 Introduction
4.2 Politics of Citizenship
4.2.1 Legal Determination of Citizenship in India
4.2.2 Operationalising the Rights
4.3 Politics of Relief
4.4 Means, Manners and Vulnerability
4.5 Those Who Live on the River Islands
4.6 The Question of Existence
4.7 Conclusion
References
Conclusions
Annex A District Selection and List of Interviewees
District Selection
District Vulnerability Explanation
Annex B
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

Climate Migration Governance and the Discourse of Citizenship in India

Ritumbra Manuvie

Climate Migration Governance and the Discourse of Citizenship in India

Ritumbra Manuvie

Climate Migration Governance and the Discourse of Citizenship in India

Ritumbra Manuvie University College Groningen University of Groningen Groningen, The Netherlands

ISBN 978-94-6265-566-9 ISBN 978-94-6265-567-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-567-6 Published by t.m.c. asser press, The Hague, The Netherlands www.asserpress.nl Produced and distributed for t.m.c. asser press by Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg © T.M.C. ASSER PRESS and the author 2023 No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher, with the exception of any material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. This t.m.c. asser press imprint is published by the registered company Springer-Verlag GmbH, DE, part of Springer Nature. The registered company address is: Heidelberger Platz 3, 14197 Berlin, Germany

Dedicated to The footloose people of Assam

Preface

In 2011, I was a part of the Nansen Conference inaugurated by HRH Princess MatteMarie of Norway at the Peace Palace in Oslo. The conference chairs and attendees included highly prominent diplomats, policymakers, and academics. The conference was hosted by Jonas Gahr Støre, Minister of Foreign Affairs (Norway), and Erik Solheim, Minister of the Environment and International Development (Norway), and sessions were chaired by prominent policy actors like Kristalina I. Georgieva, European Commissioner for International Cooperation, Humanitarian Aid and Crisis Response, Rajendra K. Pachauri, Chair of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), and António Guterres, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The gathering was a tribute to the humanitarianism of Fridtjof Nansen— the pioneer of the international surrogate protection for displaced persons. It was a reminder to the international community that managing displacement due to environmental change requires a humanitarian commitment towards migrant communities. The conference resulted in the Nansen Initiative—an intergovernmental consultative process led by Norway—to start a policy dialogue on climate change migration. The purpose of the initiative was to have a long-term protection measure for those displaced because of climate change, similar to functional advice under the United Nations Guiding Principles on Internally Displaced Persons (UNGP IDPs).1 During the Nansen Conference, it came as a surprise to me that the Indian government had not sent a delegation or local representation despite the nature of the conference. In the years since, the Nansen Initiative has led to several regional consultations involving governments and protection agencies with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, International Organization of Migrants, and United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change to create a Platform for Disaster Displacement. The Government of India remained absent from the discussions and the process despite the invitation to engage. India’s stance at the international climate negotiations under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) has been 1

Gemenne F, Zickgraf C, Hut E, Castillo Betancourt T (2021) Forced displacement related to the impacts of climate change and disasters. Reference Paper for the 70th Anniversary of the 1951 Refugee Convention, June 2021, UNHCR, p 16. vii

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Preface

paradoxical. Officially, India’s proclamation that it is guarding its own national interests by not excessively committing to greenhouse gas reduction2 is hostile to its own population, whom climatic change is severely affecting. This position does not recognize the huge burden of poverty, underdevelopment, and climate vulnerability of India. As the IPCC working group II on regional impacts has highlighted, while India may not be the ‘canaries of climate change’ facing an existential threat like small island states, it is, along with other South Asian nations, among the most severely affected regions of the world.3 While much has been said and written about migrations from climate hot spots in South Asia, especially Bangladesh,4 we know little about how the Government of India frames and responds to these migrations, especially in India–Bangladesh border states such as Assam where the process of migrant determination, state-making, and citizenship determination is ongoing and contested. To know these answers, I journeyed to Assam in 2016. Much of what is in this book is through what I learnt in the state—on framing, policy, and its implementation. During the last few years, much has changed around the world—climate migration is no longer a projection in future—it is happening right now. International policy on migration and international borders are becoming increasingly closed; stereotypes against minorities and migrants have escalated globally because of insinuating political propagandas, and the world is moments away from plunging into nuclear war, hunger, and climate catastrophe (in no particular order). During the last few years, much has also changed in India—the largest democracy in the world. Other than deluges, disasters, and deprivation, there has been a noticeable democratic decline5 in India, which is driven by an unprecedented rise of ultra-nationalism.6 This ultra-nationalist is reframing not just India’s position abroad,7 but also the position of Indians within its plural society. There is a reconstruction of the Hindu identity of India in its international relations. There is a simultaneous reconstruction of citizenship and belonging in India’s internal politics. State of Assam as a border state has been at the forefront of this politics, and in 2 Ghosh P (2012) Climate change debate: the rationale of India’s position. In: Handbook of Climate Change and India. Routledge, p 159. 3 Hijioka Y, Lin E, Pereira JJ, et al (2014) Asia. In: Climate Change 2014 Impacts, Adaptation, and Vulnerability Part B: Regional Aspects. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, pp 1327–1360. 4 Barkat A, Osman A, Ali Ahmed S (2020) Bangladesh and Migration Governance Framework. UN IOM, Dhaka. 5 Boese VA, Alizada N, Lundstedt M, et al (2022) Autocratization Changing Nature? Democracy Report 2022. V-Dem. University of Gothenburg, Gothenburg. 6 Kumbamu A (2021) Saffron Fascism The Conflux of Hindutva Ultra-Nationalism, Neoliberal Extractivism, and the Rise of Authoritarian Populism in Modi’s India. In: The global rise of authoritarianism in the 21st century: crisis of neoliberal globalization and the nationalist response. Routledge, New York, NY, p 165; Sajjanhar A (2022) The New Experts: Populism, Technocracy and Politics of Expertise in Contemporary India. Journal of Contemporary Asia 52:653–677, p 657; Sud N (2022) The Actual Gujarat Model: Authoritarianism, Capitalism, Hindu Nationalism and Populism in the Time of Modi. Journal of Contemporary Asia 52:102–126, p 104. 7 Huju K (2022) Saffronizing diplomacy: the Indian Foreign Service under Hindu nationalist rule. International Affairs 98:423–441, p 423.

Preface

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2019, it declined citizenship to 1.9 million people living within its boundaries.8 The act of exclusion from citizenship through a process of National Register of Citizens (NRC) was in full swing during the time of my visit, and in several ways, it was a continuum of the practice of determining doubtful voters (D-voters) from the polity of India. The process presumed illegality of any person who has moved—due to war, conflict, or climate disaster—and as a result reduced individual migrants to ‘bare life’ (not dynamic human actors adapting and migrating but ‘bare life’ which can survive without an ability to claim rights). The struggle to belong in a warming world is important as the resources and land will erode. This struggle is recognized in the case of small island and low-lying nations which are threatened by rising sea level. But for land masses and polities as humongous as India, the question of belonging in the context of changing climate is not yet interrogated. There is an assumption that the government of democratic nations are sympathetic to their poor. What I show through this book is rather a story of state stoicism. I argue that the state is neither sympathetic nor oppressive; it is in fact apathetic, and any attempts at invoking the state’s sympathy result in the state’s counter-interrogation of its relation to its people—Who are you? What is the nature of your relation to the state? Why should the state be responsible for you? And why must the state protect you? And while the state keeps asking these endless questions, I want to take a moment to reflect that it has been three years since the publication of the NRC. The people of Assam (including the ones disenfranchised) have witnessed at least three floods and a pandemic while being in limbo, with concerns over potential deportations and growing anxiety about being incarcerated into camps. For these people, several of whom are displaced because of climate disasters, their lands, their nationalities, and their ability to survive is constantly and slowly eroded in a warming world. Groningen, The Netherlands August 2022

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Sharma C (2022) National Register of Citizens Assam, India: The Tangled Logic of Documentary Evidence. Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies, p 1–13; Punathil S (2022) Precarious citizenship: detection, detention and ‘deportability’ in India. Citizenship Studies 26:55–72, p 57.

Acknowledgments

How does one tell the story of paradoxes? It has been the single most pertinent question I had to ask myself while writing this book. This book is a story of people who live on the margins of the largest democracy—margins of its polity, margins of the economic development, margins of the ecosystem, and the margins of being the holder of human rights. I was however not alone in this journey of storytelling. I was supported by guides, mentors, family, friends, and students. Wilfried Swenden, Elizabeth Bomberg, Jeevan Sharma, and Kristin Jorgenson gave constructive feedbacks during my thesis stage, which provided the fertile soil for this book; Jeanne Mifsud-Bonnici, and Marcel Brus for the inspiration to embark on this journey (once more); Rintcius for taking care of ‘rest of the world’ whenever I am writing; Anne and Maaike for comforting reinforcement that can only come from female friends; Isabella, my child, for being so utterly kind, and my students—Maise Oxalade, Lyliyann McNally, Mariya Nadeem Khan, and Manogna Matam—who thought it an interesting project and provided assistance with updating the source material used. I would also like to thank the Academic Review Copy Editing team for the efficient professional editing services. In the end, I hope I am able to tell a story of the people of Assam, their river, their land, and their resilience.

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Contents

1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 Introductory Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 Conceptualising Climate Change Migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3.1 Assam as the Study Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 Right to Have a Right . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 About the Book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1 1 4 4 7 11 13 14

2 Understanding Climate Migration Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Climate-Migration Nexus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 Climate Migration as a Wicked Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4 Climate Migration as an Area of Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.1 Environmental Law Discourse on Climate Migration . . . . . . 2.4.2 Human Rights Discourse on Climate Migration . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.3 Development Discourse on Climate Migration . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 The Indian Paradox: The Elephant in the Room . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.1 Vulnerability to Climate Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.2 Multi-level Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.3 The Question of Framing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

19 20 22 24 26 27 29 32 35 36 39 44 46 47

3 Governing Displacements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 Governing Through Rights Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 Governing Through Disaster Risk Reduction Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.1 Governing Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.2 Governing Disasters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.3 Governing Flood Displacements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

55 55 58 63 64 69 74

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Contents

3.4 Governing Through Loss and Damage Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.1 Compensating Losses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.2 Rebuilding Shelters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.3 Special Assistance for Erosion-Affected Families . . . . . . . . . 3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

79 80 82 83 89 90

4 Negotiating Climate, Citizenship, and Belonging . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 Politics of Citizenship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.1 Legal Determination of Citizenship in India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.2 Operationalising the Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 Politics of Relief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 Means, Manners and Vulnerability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5 Those Who Live on the River Islands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6 The Question of Existence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

93 93 94 95 100 103 106 108 117 119 120

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 Annex A: District Selection and List of Interviewees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 Annex B . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139 Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147 Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161

List of Figures

Fig. 2.1 Fig. 2.2 Fig. 2.3 Fig. 2.4 Fig. 3.1 Fig. 3.2 Fig. 3.3 Fig. 3.4 Fig. 3.5 Fig. 3.6 Fig. 3.7 Fig. 3.8 Fig. 3.9 Fig. 3.10 Fig. 3.11 Fig. 3.12 Fig. 4.1 Fig. 4.2 Fig. 4.3 Fig. 4.4 Fig. 4.5 Fig. 4.6 Fig. 4.7

District-wise Climate Vulnerability in Assam, 2021 . . . . . . . . . . District-wise Exposure to Disasters in Assam, 2021 . . . . . . . . . . District-wise Climate Sensitivity in Assam, 2021 . . . . . . . . . . . . District-wise Adaptive Capacity in Assam, 2021 . . . . . . . . . . . . . Organogram of Administration under MGNREGA . . . . . . . . . . . Implementation of MGNREGA in Assam (2010–2021) . . . . . . . a,b Rehab Model Village for Violence-affected Families, Bongaigaon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Water Resource Projects in India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Water Resource Measures in the North-East of India . . . . . . . . . . Functional Hierarchy under Disaster Management Act . . . . . . . . Daily Flood Report 7 July 2014 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . River Erosion in Sutar Gaon, Laharighat Revenue Circle, Morigaon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Satellite Imagery of Flood Erosion in Pictured Location A Decadal Time-scale from 1986 to 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Amount of Ex-Gratia Compensation Fixed for Disaster Victims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Distribution of Landholdings in the State of Assam (no. of holdings in each category) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Percentage-wise Distribution of Scheduled Tribe in the Brahmaputra Valley . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . List of Documentation Needed for Verification Process . . . . . . . Legislative Assembly-wise Distribution of D-voters in Assam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Excerpts from Diary Entry 20 April 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Boat Headed Towards Bashaini Char, Dhubri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The Drop-off Point on Bashaini Char, Dhubri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Newly Installed Solar Panel on a Tea-stall . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Primary School Building . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

37 38 38 39 59 60 61 66 67 70 76 79 80 81 85 89 99 102 109 110 110 111 111

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Fig. 4.8 Fig. 4.9 Fig. 4.10 Fig. 4.11 Fig. A.1 Fig. A.2 Fig. A.3 Fig. A.4 Fig. A.5 Fig. A.6 Fig. A.7 Fig. A.8 Fig. A.9

List of Figures

Madrassa (Islamic School) in a Make-shift Hutment Opposite the Primary School . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bamboo Structure Determining the India-Bangladesh Border . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Officers of Border Security Forces of India Patrolling the Riverine Border . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Decadal Difference in Number of Char-villages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Colour Legend for Aggregated Flood Hazard Maps . . . . . . . . . . . Aggregated Flood Hazard, Dhemaji . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Aggregated Flood Hazard, Jorhat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Aggregated Flood Hazard, Morigaon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Aggregated Flood Hazard, Kamrup (M) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Aggregated Flood Hazard, Chirang . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Aggregated Flood Hazard, Bongaigaon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Aggregated Flood Hazard, Goalpara . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Aggregated Flood Vulnerability Index, Dhubri . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

112 112 113 114 129 129 131 132 133 134 135 135 136

List of Tables

Table 2.1 Table 2.2 Table 3.1 Table 3.2 Table 3.3 Table 3.4 Table 4.1 Table A.1 Table A.2 Table A.3 Table A.4 Table B.1 Table B.2 Table B.3 Table B.4

Policy Formation Based on Issue Location . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Policy Intervention Based on Migration Type . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Functionality of Key Institutions During Disaster . . . . . . . . . . . . Relief Entitlement During Disaster . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Flood Damage in the State of Assam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Fixation of Funding under the National Rural Housing Scheme . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Change in Literacy and Poverty Rates in the Char Areas . . . . . . Demographic Details of the Study Districts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Elite Public Administrators Interviewed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Street-level Administrators Interviewed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . List of Group Discussions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . NC Villages in Assam, Revenue Circle-wise Data as of February 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Overview of D-voter Data . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D-voters, Voters Removed from D-list and Cases of Declared Foreigners as of 30 April 2016 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Constituency-wise Distribution of D-voters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

34 43 72 77 78 82 115 128 136 137 138 139 141 142 143

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Contents 1.1 Introductory Remarks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1.2 Conceptualising Climate Change Migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.3 Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 1.3.1 Assam as the Study Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 1.4 Right to Have a Right . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 1.5 About the Book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Abstract The chapter introduces the book by providing an overview of the primary discourse on climate-migration governance and arguing that those most effected by climate change migrations often do not have a right to have right. It is argued that despite tailored policies the sub-national state often fails to deliver protection agenda as it constantly contests the citizenship status of those who migrate. Building on the conceptualisation of Arendt ‘right to have right’ and the reading of Agamben on homo sacer it is argued that the state apparatus continually excludes those whose social and political lives are already submerged and eroded in floods. The climate migrants in Assam are devoid of their political power and deprived of their social belonging and are embodiment of a bare-life towards whom (in the mind of the state) state owes no responsibility. Keywords Climate migration · India · Assam · Hannah Arendt · Agamben · Bare-life

1.1 Introductory Remarks As early as 1990, the Inter-Governmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) identified human migration as the most threatening short-term effects of climate change on human settlements.1 Environmental migrations as a significant motivator to international environmental negotiations has dithered between the concerns of national 1

Rouviere et al. 1990, p. 5.9.

© T.M.C. ASSER PRESS and the author 2023 R. Manuvie, Returning Foreign Fighters: Responses, Legal Challenges and Ways Forward, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-567-6_1

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security,2 and human security.3 The terms like environmental refugees, environmental migrations, climate migration, etc. has attracted studies to discern the causal connection between environment and migrations—the climate-migration nexus.4 And scholarship to understand the nature of climate migration and how they should be governed has tremendously increased in the last two decades.5 The scientific community strongly agrees that climate change is impacting mobility flows and climate related disasters like drowning deltas, desertification and loss of biodiversity are leading millions of people into varied patterns of voluntary migration and forced displacement.6 It has been pointed out often that these migrations are not always the direct causal result of environmental changes but a complex manifestation of pre-existing socio-economic and political constraints that trigger mobilities. Scholars have advocated that climate migrations are a form of adaptation and failure to move can lead to scenarios of entrapment in collapsing ecosystems.7 The tethering of climate migration with the process of adaptation has been critiqued for its neoliberal roots, which obscures the need for climate change mitigation and undermines the questions of justice and humanitarianism.8 Because of the inequitable nature of climate change, some argue that the responsibility to protect climate migrants should be shared in a fair and ethical manner tied to the discourse of common but differential responsibility.9 It is emphasised that the existing laws and policy are inadequate to protect people moving in protracted refugee conditions because of climate disasters.10 Climate migration governance would require global cooperation in the form of both hard and soft legal instruments, which entail rights and responsibilities. A growing international acknowledgement of a climate and migration nexus is also reflected in international instruments like the 2016 New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants,11 the United Nations Framework Convention of Climate Change’s Paris Agreement,12 and the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM).13 2

White 2011; Myers 2002, p. 609; Homer-Dixon 1994, p. 10; O’Sullivan 2015, p. 183. Campbell 2010; Elliott 2010, p. 175; Bettini 2013, p. 63. 4 Piguet et al. 2011; Faist and Schade 2013, p. 3; Piguet 2010, p. 517; 2021. 5 Adger et al. 2008, p. 150; Foresight 2011; Warner and Afifi 2014; McLeman and Gemenne 2018. 6 See generally Ferris 2020, pp. 612–625; Cattaneo et al. 2019, p. 189. 7 Warner 2009; Black et al. 2011, p. 447; Afifi et al. 2016, p. 254; Gemenne 2013, p. 235. 8 Bettini et al. 2017, p. 348; Gonzalez 2018, p. 388. 9 Mayer 2011; Atapattu 2020, p. 86; Neef and Benge 2022, p. 94. 10 See generally Kent and Behrman 2018. 11 Paragraphs 43 and 50 adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 19 September 2016 in A/RES/71/1. Available at https://www.un.org/en/development/desa/population/migration/genera lassembly/docs/globalcompact/A_RES_71_1.pdf Accessed 10 August 2022. 12 Paragraph 14(f) adopted by United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change in FCCC/CP/2015/10/Add.1, decision 1/CP.21. Available at https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/ cop21/eng/10a01.pdf Accessed 10 August 2022. 13 Objective 2 and 5 adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 19 December 2018 in A/RES/73/195. Available at https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N18/451/99/ PDF/N1845199.pdf?OpenElement Accessed 10 August 2022. 3

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The developments in the international dialogue on climate migration governance appears to be impassive about the shifts in migrant and refugee protection at the national and sub-national levels of governance.14 This detachment from national and sub-national policies is primarily because of a disproportionate concern with the lack of international protection mechanisms which lacks critical evaluation of how the national and sub-national governments perceive, frame, and respond to climate migrants. While we know much about the literature on climate change as an issue requiring some form of governance response, we know little about the institutions that are at the forefront of responding. Climate migration governance literature is sparse and compartmentalised into pockets of international legal scholarship analysing the existing normative standards,15 and studies analysing the functional changes in international organisations.16 There is little analysis of how the national and sub-national governments at the forefront of the climate crisis frame and govern climate related mobility. This gap is regrettable as migration governance is innately local and inherently political; it involves states and sub-state actors conferring rights to (or recognising the rights of) the migrants. Through this book, I interrogate the response of the sub-national governments in India toward climate change related displacements. In doing so, I add to the limited but emerging body of research that contributes towards understanding how nations with high hydro-metrological mobility view climate migration, protect their citizens from forced displacements; protect their borders against alleged flows of climate migrants; and plan their developmental and adaptation trajectories. This book highlights that the sub-national government is intensely aware of the challenges of human mobility and forced displacement related to climate disasters. In fact, the sub-national perception of climate migrations is often more nuanced than the broad commitments at the international or even at the national level. This perception can lead to development of tailored policies to help displacement victims, but the outcomes of these policies remain limited. The book explains this limitation by examining the political and social disenfranchisement faced by the communities living in geographically vulnerable areas. It demonstrates, through evidence from the State of Assam, that the right to seek compensation, rehabilitation or resettlement is continually contested. The unrelenting reconstruction of citizenship in geographies which are at the national and climatic margins leaves little room for communities to migrate, reside, and engage in livelihoods that may improve their chances of climate adaptation. A person affected by erosion may also face erosion of their identity as citizens—the physical deterioration of the territorial spaces where a person belongs can erode their belonging as citizens. The legal documental trail that ties the citizens to their state is too fragile to survive the cascading effects of disasters. Thus, not only do the protection policies fail to deliver, the communities living in fragile areas may

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Gammeltoft-Hansen 2019. See generally, McAdam 2012; Ferris and Bergmann 2017, p. 6; Atapattu 2009, p. 607; Manou et al. 2017; Mayer and Crépeau 2017. 16 Hall 2016; Nash and Baldwin 2019. 15

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have an innate need to remain within their collapsing geographical bounds to prove their belonging and thus their citizenship.

1.2 Conceptualising Climate Change Migration In this book, I use the phrases climate change migration, climate migration, climate mobility, and displacement because of climate change or displacement because of hydro-metrological disasters interchangeably. The purpose of this book is not to establish a causal relationship between climate change and migration or to challenge any existing theories on the nature of climate migration, instead, the focus is on understanding how the bureaucratic actors governing an ecosystem with a high current vulnerability to climate change conceptualise, frame and respond to various patterns of migration that are loosely associated with changing weather patterns. Climate change migration is therefore treated as a ‘wicked problem’, which is defined and understood in multiple ways. In this book, the bureaucratic framing of migration as a result of climate change is more critical than a definitive scientific study establishing the climate change and migration linkages. This framing could be an informal internalisation of international concerns about climate migration, or even a form escapism to disperse the responsibility of massive displacement during hydrometrological disasters by blaming it on global warming. But the perception and belief that an elite officer holds regarding the role climate change plays in exacerbating migration is essential to discern the policy choices that the government may adopt. Climate migration thus means patterns of movement witnessed in the State of Assam along the Brahmaputra Valley. These movements can be adaptive or for survival; they can be cyclic, permanent, or temporary; they can be out of the state or within the state territory; they can be voluntary or forced. However, in all cases, they are intrinsically related to the morphology and flooding pattern of the Brahmaputra River.

1.3 Methods This book asks two crucial questions—first, how does the sub-national government frame and respond to climate change related migration? This perception and framing is essential to understand the choice of policies, methods and governance tools that the sub-national actors prioritise when considering complex issues like climate change migration. Climate change and migrations form a complex nexus that cannot be disentangled from a non-exhaustive list of other factors, such as unequal access to resources, gender inequality, colonial history, structural indifferences, and political

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economy.17 This entanglement makes climate migration a wicked problem for governance and creates difficulties in accepting the simplified narratives and definitive causal connections necessary for policy making.18 The elite actors of the state bureaucracy play a vital role in setting varied and differential policy agendas, which are profoundly influenced by the personal beliefs and priorities of the senior officers.19 It thus becomes necessary to understand how the elite actors in the region define and frame the problem, as their understanding of climate migration provides the setting in which the state apparatus is currently responding and will continue to respond to the climate migrants. The second question answered through this book is why is there an uneven response to people migrating because of climate change? Often, policies do not translate into implementation, and the results of welfare schemes remain skewed. Researchers have remained curious about the factors that lead to implementation gaps. In climate change research, there is a welcome growth in scholarship on implementing climate change adaptation models. These studies have critiqued the lack of concrete actions; the absence of scientific evidence; deficiencies in tailored policies; the creation of empty administrative shells and the social limits that might prevent adaptation responses in specific contexts.20 I contribute to this body of literature by inquiring into what the state does. The administrative actors in the state can draw linkages between climate change and migration—the administrators in Assam, that I interviewed, consider migration both as a means for survival which requires a humanitarian response, and also an act of confrontation through which the ‘migrant’ community confronts the ‘Assamese’ identity. Extrapolating from the public policy discourse on street-level bureaucracy extended by Lipsky, I show that the individualised delivery of benefits and services are influenced by administrator’s worldviews, values, as much as their professional experience.21 This allows them to bend the rules, or turn a blind eye depending upon the circumstance and social standing of the climate migrant. Migrants, in this sense are not worthy of undisputed state support or pity of the state—and can be “Char-dwelling, scheming, treacherous aliens, who shape-shift just like the sandy islands it occupies” I come to conclude that the simultaneous presence and absence of the state in providing care and assistance to those who migrate because of floods does not decrease their susceptibility to forced migration. In fact, the persistent presumption by the state and its actors that a person who migrates could be an ‘illegal migrant’, forces communities that are at the political, social, and geographical margins to stay within their geographical means—the state apparatus, as I show in Chap. 4, can politically annihilate them if they choose to migrate. This book builds on material gathered during fieldwork conducted over six months in eight districts of Assam in India (January–June 2016). During the study, I interacted 17

Baldwin et al. 2019, p. 287; Blitz 2011, p. 437; Black et al. 2011, p. S3. Rittel and Webber 1973, p. 165. 19 Mintrom and Norman 2009, p. 652; James and Julian 2021, p. 551; Berenschot 2010, p. 612. 20 Dupuis and Knoepfel 2013, p. 31; Biesbroek et al. 2013, p. 1119; Barnett et al. 2015, p. 5; Runhaar et al. 2018, p. 1201. 21 Lipsky 1980/2010; Tummers and Bekkers 2014, p. 527; Jagannath 2020, p. 461. 18

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with eight District Commissioners (elite officers) and shadowed them during their agenda-setting meetings, allowing me access to a wide range of schematic documents and implementation plans. The ethnographic data collected offered a rich insight into the perceptions of elite officers towards the role of climate change in flooding and the agendas they set for protecting those displaced. I conducted seven unstructured interviews with the State Secretary (highest executive authority in the State); the Chief Operating Officer of the State Disaster Management Authority, and the Chief Minister of the state. Because of the contentious nature of migration in Assam, the interviews and discussions were not always straightforward and demanded a certain level of care and discretion. In some places, the secrecy over oral information sources needed corroboration through cross-checking and field surveys which led me to conduct over twenty semi-structured discussions with mid-level and street-level bureaucratic actors (totalling 22 participants) and eight group discussions with floodaffected families (totalling 95 participants) in eight different flood and erosion-prone locations. A list of these engagements is appended in Annex A. In addition, relevant policy documents (rules and by-laws), archival data, legislative debates and court judgements were analysed. The data collected by each technique was corroborated with administrative data of program outcomes and cross-checked during the field surveys and group discussions. A data set that is new to this book (and adds to its novelty) is the constituency wide doubtful-voter (D-Voter) data which was shared by the elite administrators in the State of Assam with a tacit understanding that I will analyse it. This data contained 139,757 rows of entries specifying names, addresses, voter ID cards, gender, age, parental lineage, and citizenship status. The D-voter data represents a fraction of the 1.9 million people disenfranchised because of the National Registration of Citizenship (NRC) process while I was investigating in the field, but this data is nonetheless symbolic and symptomatic of the erosion of identities in the State of Assam. During the course of my visit, I, had the privilege to trace and meet several of these families and listen to their stories of deluge and endurance. An aggregated version of this data is presented in Annex B. The data retains the evidentiary strength it can bring in structuring the debates about citizenship and belonging in a warming world. Two interesting bodies of work on Indian state ethnography emerged at the time I was developing my ideas Nayanika Mathur’s ethnographic account of streetlevel bureaucracy in India, which evaluates the operationalisation of two ‘sophisticated’ and ‘specialised’ governmental schemes—the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Guarantee Act of 2005 and the Wildlife Protection Act of 197222 and Akhil Gupta’s book, Red Tape, which influenced my choice of studying the sub-national state.23 Both these works highlight the distinction between the ‘State life of Law’ and the ‘real life of law’. A proposition which is seemingly lost in the current debate on climate migrations, where most scholars are grappling with the idea of the absence of law and the need to form more laws. Both the books—and my own investigation in Assam—points to a reality that reminds us that laws are hostage not only to the 22 23

Mathur 2016. Gupta 2012.

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specialisation (such as assigning specific agendas) but also to the banalisation (such as everyday paper filing) of everyday practices of the state. As such, the translation and synchronisation of new legal instruments in the backdrop of the existing legal, political, and social environment determines the success of law. These works, as well as my own, start from the premise that the government in India has a genuine desire to help its citizens. But at the same time, the state is incredulous about who this citizen is. Gupta uses Agamben’s conception of homo sacer, he suggests that in practice there is a condemnation of the poor to a bare life status which can only be described through the phenomenon of “structural violence”—where the State, despite its good intentions, does not provide meaningful political and social participation to people within its boundaries. Building on the idea of a lack of internal coherence and “agencification” within administration, Gupta treats the bureaucracy as a disaggregated array of institutions that operate at different levels, in multiple locations, and with diverse agendas. Because of its disaggregated quality, the absence (or bare presence) of the state lies in a dispersed logic of responsibility, which is insufficient to govern. While the ethnographic examination of government and government institutions at a multi-level of governance is an opulent academic field, such studies have not found their way in understanding governance responses to climate migrations. As I mentioned before, amongst western scholarship there is a fixation to ‘govern’, which completely ignores that countries like India—with one of the largest pools of climate migrants—is not even a party to many such government agreements, discourses, and proposals that are put on the table.24 This book is a humble attempt in the direction of better understanding the state’s perception, its presence (or absence), and care towards geographical spaces, which are highly vulnerable to climate change.

1.3.1 Assam as the Study Area The object of this investigation is the State of Assam in India, which is a bordering state in India, sharing its international borders with the Kingdom of Bhutan on the North and the Republic of Bangladesh in the South. Assam is a complex geo-political region, known for its vulnerability to floods, environmentally motivated mobility, complex international mobility, and violence caused by unregulated mobility patterns. The region is cut through by the Brahmaputra River—a perennial body of water with an international river-basin; the river flows in a shallow basin characterised by high seismic activity, a lack of embankments, and general societal poverty. Because of the lack of a structural embankments on the Brahmaputra River, the problem of flooding is also compounded with the problem of erosion. The remote sensing data of the last hundred years indicate a growth in the total area occupied by the Brahmaputra River—expansion from 4000 km2 in 1920 to about 6000 km2 in 2008. This expansion of river has naturally come at the cost of the erosion of river banks. Satellite imagery of the region shows eroded area and 24

Ibid.

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land loss rate of up to 72.5–80 km2 /year between 1997 and 2007–08.25 It is estimated by the State Government that over 2534 villages have been eroded across the state since 1954. The erosion has been most severe in river-islands (Chars).26 The chars are fertile sedimentary deposits inside the river-streams which are occupied by farming communities. These landmasses are unstable, prone to erosion, disintegration, shifting and new formations. It is estimated that there are over 1100 notified chars in Assam which are occupied by over 2.4 million people.27 The people living on chars maintain a migratory lifestyle, moving several times across different Char villages and occupying land as a common property resource. During floods, the river islands can be completely submerged, never to emerge again. Several studies have highlighted the climate vulnerability of Assam by highlighting the impact of climate change on the flood pattern in the Brahmaputra River. In 2011, scientific interest in assessing climate vulnerability of Assam—a border state in a climate-hot-spot led to a village-level mapping, which demonstrated high to very high overall vulnerability in all districts of Assam.28 An assessment in 2021 by Mohanty and Wadhawan has showed that in the last ten years, the vulnerability of Assam to climate change has further increased.29 Assam is also a highly mobile state, with incidence of both international and internal displacements.30 There has been a constant flow of indentured labour and teagarden workers during the pre-colonial times; large-scale population displacements triggered by the Partition of India in 1947, and the Liberation war of Bangladesh in the early 1970s, and episodes of displacement fuelled by religious and linguistic violence, disasters, and floods. These migrations and displacements have shaped the society and polity of Assam, which has inclined towards ethno-nationalism in contemporary history. The state has a potent binary of people who belong—‘Assamese’, and those who do not belong—‘illegal Bangladeshi migrants’.31 Between this binary of belonging and non-belonging, life in Assam (especially for linguistic and religious minorities) is tied to an annual deluge which plunges every citizen and non-citizen towards a bare-life. While it cannot be discerned if the floods feed into political violence, there have been claims in security studies which link group-based violence to environmental distress in the State of Assam, although none of these studies actually benefit from an ethnographic examination of the state.32 As seen through the lens of vulnerability and adaptation, forced displacements or entrapments due to climate change are often a net effect of developmental delays and policy failures coupled with geographical vulnerability.33 Responses to climate change migration 25

Water Resource Department 2016. Ibid. 27 See list of NC Char villages in Annex B; Chakraborty 2011, p. 63. 28 Das 2016; Ravindranath et al. 2011, p. 384. 29 Mohanty and Wadhawan 2021. 30 Keshri and Bhagat 2012; Rajan and Bhagat 2017; Krishnan 2022; Dekaraja and Mahanta 2021. 31 Kumar 2010; Rather 2013; McDuie-Ra 2014. 32 Suhrke 1997; Swain 1996, p. 189; Reuveny 2007, p. 656. 33 McLeman and Smit 2006; Hassani-Mahmooei and Parris 2012. 26

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are accordingly understood to be a cocktail of various developmental and welfare programs aimed at reducing extreme vulnerability and allowing communities to adapt to climate change.34 In Assam there are four broad internal migration patterns are discernible, and which also correspond to policy areas within which the government of Assam has made its own governance stride. The first pattern concerns the temporary displacements which are governed through relief operations. Assam adopted its first Flood Relief Manual in 1976 to streamline the effective delivery of state assistance to people displaced during floods. The Manual prescribes the horizontal and vertical line of authority and quantifies the level of state assistance. As I discuss further in Chap. 3, every secretarial department in the state is involved in securing the supply of essential items and to indemnify losses. For example, the Department of Agriculture will help with the loss of crops; the Department of Labour welfare will provide minimum wage compensation for the duration of the flood, and Department of Animal Husbandry will be the agency providing ex gratia compensation for the loss of cattle. The planning, coordination and delivery of assistance, including provisions of temporary shelters and the determining of evacuation needs, are done by the office of Deputy Commissioners (DC) in each district. Four broad types of losses are covered for the interim relief: Loss of life, loss of a limb (causing permanent disability), loss of property (including cattle) and loss of livelihood. These losses are quantified yearly for interim relief compensation. Any person (citizen or non-citizen) identifying as a victim of the flood can report their losses to the state apparatus and initiate the process of relief delivery. Although by instituting the system of ex gratia compensation for flood loss, the state shows empathy towards those displaced, at the same time the state also manages to transfer the rehabilitation responsibility upon the disaster victims themselves. The money-grants are privately used to buy lands in nearby-areas, which are equally vulnerable, and the communities living in hazardprone areas continue to live with geographic vulnerability facing repeat episodes of displacement in their lifetimes. Second is the pattern of permanent displacement due to flood erosion. The Assam Land (Requisition and Acquisition) Act, 1964,35 provides the DC the power to requisition land for the resettlement of erosion affected families. It is unknown how many families have benefited from this law but it is known that the act of land-allocation is a contestation of traditional common-property rights held by the indigenous communities who assert their primary right to belong to the state. These allocations have in the past led to violent riots and the murdering of erosion victims. In 2013, after the Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO) mapped the extent of river-bank erosion in Brahmaputra Valley, the state adopted the Chief Minister’s Policy on Compensation to Erosion Affected Families.36 But to give effect to the policy, the state administrator 34

Leal-Arcas 2012, p. 86. Government of Assam (1964). The Assam Land (Requisition) Act, 1964. Available at https:// landrevenue.assam.gov.in/sites/default/files/swf_utility_folder/departments/revenue_com_oid_6/ menu/document/THE%20ASSAM%20LAND%20%28REQUISITION%20%26%20ACQUISI TION%29ACT%2C1964_0.pdf Accessed 1 August 2022. Sections 3 and 4, pp. 2–3. 36 Executive notification No. RGR.785/2014/06 on 12 March 2015, accessed as physical copy through Assam State Disaster Management Authority. 35

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faces a three-pronged difficulty—first, identifying the land and land-record data is a daunting task given the fragile and shifting nature of the river-islands.37 Second, the beneficiaries of the scheme needed to establish clear ownership rights, which can become fraught because of multiple possessory assertions, as I will show in this book. And finally, common property rights can make it difficult to identify suitable land for allotment. People in Assam have had a long struggle to establish rights of belonging. Much has been written about this persistent struggle which determines who is a ‘son of the soil’ and who is an outsider.38 I have argued elsewhere that for the purpose of governance the governments choose to roll-back schemes39 that may impact the local social cohesion and question of Assamese identity.40 The third pattern is the cyclic labour mobility that enables the people of Assam to diversify their livelihoods and adapt to climatic changes and disasters. Over 75% of the state population still depends on rain-fed agriculture and maintains subsistence farming as the main form of economic activity. As shown by Banerjee et al., farming households in Assam consider non-farming activities as necessary for flood risk-diversification, and often migrate to find work.41 Rural-Urban and rural-rural migration patterns are therefore a predominant phenomenon especially between the months of March to December. In Assam, like in the rest of India, one of the overarching state mechanisms guaranteeing livelihood (and diversification) is the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act of 2005 (MGNREGA). The Government of India and the Government of Assam have officially acknowledged the synergies of the MGNREGA in coping with climate crisis by enabling in situ adaptation and managing the flow of out-ward migration from Assam.42 But the ability to use welfare schemes like MGNREGA are tied to a person’s membership of the state—while the Act itself does not stipulate a distinction between citizens or noncitizens the state, through its process of documentality, it continuously challenges the status of those who seek their employment guarantee. Fourth are patterns of permanent relocation which differ from permanent displacement. Permanent relocation is a calculated move undertaken by the migrant themselves to reduce household exposure to disaster and increase economic stability. It is seen that in the rural areas, households of seasonal migrants are more prone to permanently relocate based on a household level cost-benefit analysis.43 The State of Assam does not have any coherent policy for ‘Permanent relocations’ occurring on a migrant’s own incentive. Migrants, who are recognised as Indian citizens, are free to relocate and settle in any part of India by virtue of the freedom guaranteed to all 37

According to the 2016 list of Non-cadaster (NC) villages there were around 1030 NC villages in Assam. For a district-wise break-down refer to Annex B. 38 Weiner 1978. 39 Executive order no. RGR.785/2014/Pt.II/27A dated 28 January 2016, accessed as physical copy through Assam State Disaster Management Authority. 40 Manuvie 2017. 41 Banerjee et al. 2017, 2019. 42 Ministry of Environment and Forest 2012, p. 116; 2015, p. 145. 43 Danso and Addo 2017; McHugh 1990.

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Indians under the Article 19(1)(g) of the Indian Constitution. The limited exclusion to the exercise of Article 19(1)(g), applies in territories marked for military use or reserved as forest or tribal areas, specifically by law. The State of Assam considers the guarantee of residence and settlement as an important feature promoting cultural exchange in a plural society, and the state administration is vocal about the right of the Assamese people to migrate out of Assam and settle in other parts of the country. Recent growth in populism and territoriality in India saw targeted episodes of violence against Assamese youth settled and working in other states of India, in 2014. During interviews with senior officials of Assam, it was strongly pointed out that the discrimination faced by the north-eastern youth working in metropolitan cities of Delhi and Bangalore were of high state concern. But whether the State of Assam upholds the same criteria of ‘freedom of residence and settlement’ for the people who migrate to (or within) the State of Assam is highly debatable. Several scholars have discussed the differential manner in which identity, belonging and citizenship status is constructed in the State of Assam.44 While most of this discussion reflects upon the politics of belonging, it fails to reflect upon the difficulty in belonging for those displaced because of incessant floods. Over the last year, the Assam state apparatus has silently and systematically excluded people from its citizenship, thus contesting the right of every citizen who moves. A fifth pattern which must be mentioned, although it is not central to this book, pertains to the migration flows across the international border that the State of Assam shares with the Republic of Bangladesh. Several eminent colleagues have written about these migrations as a security threat to the peripheries of India, several others have also contested the repression of Bengali ethnic minorities who have long occupied spaces in Assam. These narratives have led to a securitised framing of disaster, environment and flood related displacements as factors for resource-based conflict. I do not deny the cross-border movement, or the repression of ethnic minorities in Assam or the possibility of resource-based conflicts, but I also do not place this mobility pattern at the centre of my book. Instead, I use the binary of ‘Assamese’ and ‘non-Assamese’ to interrogate the state response towards those displaced by floods. The book is therefore about the people of Assam in their habitats—habitats which are often eroded, and their right to have rights.

1.4 Right to Have a Right In her scepticism over the right to have a right, Arendt alluded to the political-life of rights. Reflecting on the plight of German Jews, she wrote that those without citizenship have no ‘right to have rights’, since ‘no law exists for them’.45 Contextualising statelessness against the backdrop of the French Revolution, which constituted naked human life as the bearer of universal rights, she remarked how this mere existence 44 45

Weiner 1978, 1983; van Schendel 2005; Baruah 2001; Singh 1984; Kimura 2013. Arendt 1951/1973, p. 296.

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was subsumed in the qualified life of the citizen.46 What it means to be human, and consequently the bearer of “human rights”, is never a settled question. “Humanity” in this sense is a battleground on which the individual’s inclusion in this category is decided by their political recognition as citizens. In the State of Assam, the provision of state care is only available to citizens, while the status of citizenship is itself contested. The critique of citizenship has resurfaced in particular within feminist theories, class theories, and critical race theories, where citizenship is exposed as contradictory.47 The key contradictions are found in the disjuncture between the formal rightsclaims of citizens that are “guaranteed” on one hand, and the structural features of neo-liberal, colonial and patriarchal societies that prevent those guarantees from ever being realised.48 Some scholarship drawing from historical analysis finds evidence that social and symbolic boundaries trump legal designations. For example, Fox and Guglielmo, shows how, in early twentieth century America, noncitizen European immigrants were much more likely to have access to broader, more generous social benefits than black U.S. citizens or those of Mexican background, whether citizens or not, because of racialised notions of deservingness.49 Citizenship’s place in modern societies is also alluded to by highlighting advancements in human rights, which suggests that status and rights must be de-coupled. The ‘post-national’ argument to position human rights act as trump-cards, and provide dignity and equality in personhood are also perhaps some of the incentives behind proposals on climate migration governance that I analyse in Chap. 2. While theoretically this may be true, in everyday life of the state there is a continuous struggle to establish and demand thee basic human rights. Despite substantial empirical scholarship enumerating the multitude of rights given to non-citizens based on universal humanity, observers almost always acknowledge that borders can still be ‘hard’ to those without formal citizenship.50 Immigration scholars have critiqued the idea of legal status, as citizen or migrant, by arguing that the determination of citizenship itself is a source of inequality which renders people ‘categorically unequal’ in their humanity.51 It is, however, less clear whether citizenship status matters for the life chances of those living and moving within the state. It is also less clear what is owed to those who are outside the formal bounds of citizenship. I show in Chaps. 3 and 4 of this book that despite ‘Universal basic rights’ and several benevolent state-led schemes and legal guarantees, it is the ‘right to have a right’—the recognition of the formal status as a citizen of the state—which determines the humanity of a person displaced because of the warming world. This interplay of human life and political life in Assam can benefit from a reflection of Agamben’s radical reading of Arendt—the distinction between the political life of the citizen (bios) and the non-political life of the human 46

Ibid., p. 255. See for example Mann 1987; Ong 2006, p. 499; Marx 1995, p. 159; Yuval-Davis 1997, pp. 4–27. 48 Turner 2000; Mitchell and Wood 1999. 49 Fox and Guglielmo 2012. 50 Tambini 2001, p. 195; Edmunds 2012, p. 1184; Bosniak 2006; Sassen 2002. 51 Massey 2007. 47

1.5 About the Book

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(zoë).52 Agamben’s analysis of sovereignty and citizenship begins with the assertion that the sovereign power is established through imposing the legal exception, the suspension of the normal state of law, or creation of a ‘state of exception’. The law can be suspended through the application of states of emergency or through the creation of what Agamben refers to as a camp. He notes that in the ‘Camps’ the people are stripped of their rights; there is a certain suspension of the rule of law which renders the members of the camps ‘naked’—stripped of legal protections. Agamben calls the state of being stripped of legal protection ‘nuda vita’ (‘naked’ or ‘bare life’). He then invokes the ancient Roman figure of homo sacer, whose residual legal status is eradicated by the ‘sovereign ban’.53 Per Agamben, homo sacer is the mortal human individual that cannot be sacrificed, yet at the same time can be murdered with impunity. Agamben argues that homo sacer occupies a ‘zone of indistinction’ between the profane and sacred orders: both included (as subject) and excluded (as object) of the political order.54 Being bare or naked in this context means both being exposed to the violence of the state and being without the protection of the state. The process of ascribing formal rights of citizenship is a process of inclusion in the juridical order, while the delineation to homo sacer indicates the process of repression. The Sovereign, through a dual process of simultaneous inclusion and exclusion in the juridical order, is inherently repressive and controlling. Thus, the articulation between a wholly natural, biological existence (zoë) and a politically and legally enabled existence (bios) is crucial for understanding the modality of state power. The purpose of the sovereign power is the production of bare life through exclusion.55 This paradigm fitting conceptualisation of state power for the production of a ‘bare life’ explains much of what I witnessed in Assam—the state apparatus continually excludes those whose social and political lives are already submerged and eroded in deluge. Homo sacer in Assam—devoid of their political power and deprived of their social belonging—is the embodiment of bare-life—they may not be sacrificed but can be murdered with impunity.

1.5 About the Book This book is divided into three further chapters, followed by the Conclusions. In Chap. 2, I engage with the ongoing debate on climate migration to find India’s position in this debate. My investigation is not driven by a grand-theory that can be proven or achieved, but by my concern for millions of people within the boundaries of a fragile super-power. I acknowledge the absence of India from the current debate on climate migrations, owing to the Western centric nature of the discourse itself while also acknowledging India’s lack of attempts to understand its own vulnerabilities 52

Agamben 1998, 2000, 2005. Agamben 2005. 54 Ibid. 55 Agamben 1998. 53

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to the warming world. In Chap. 3, I provide a detailed description of the policies and schemes used by the State of Assam in providing support and assistance to those who move because of floods. I evaluate the performance of ‘Guarantees’ and ‘Schemes’ which are tailored to the needs of the people displaced within Assam. The chapter also considers the status of rights-claims that people can make against these guarantees of the state, thus highlighting the paradox of the rights themselves. In Chap. 4, I discuss the process of disenfranchisement and loss of citizenship that pushes vulnerable communities in Assam to continue living with their vulnerabilities before my reflections in the Conclusions. Here I propose a new discourse on climate migration—I argue that as state boundaries around the world start to shrink because of erosion, desertification, and sea-level rise, we must begin to conceive of migrations as inevitable and enriching.

References Adger WN, Eakin H, Winkels A (2008) Nested and teleconnected vulnerabilities to environmental change. Frontiers in Ecology and the Environment 7:150–157. https://doi.org/10.1890/070148 Afifi T, Milan A, Etzold B et al (2016) Human mobility in response to rainfall variability: opportunities for migration as a successful adaptation strategy in eight case studies. Migration and Development 5:254–274. https://doi.org/10.1080/21632324.2015.1022974 Agamben G (1998) Sovereign power and bare life. Stanford University Press, Stanford, California Agamben G (2000) Means without end: notes on politics. University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis Agamben G (2005) State of exception. University of Chicago Press, Chicago Arendt H (1973) The origins of totalitarianism, new edn. Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, New York Atapattu S (2009) Climate change, human rights, and forced migration: implications for international law. Wis Int’l LJ 27:607 Atapattu S (2020) Climate change and displacement: protecting ‘climate refugees’ within a framework of justice and human rights. JHRE 11:86–113. https://doi.org/10.4337/jhre.2020. 01.04 Baldwin A, Fröhlich C, Rothe D (2019) From climate migration to anthropocene mobilities: shifting the debate. Mobilities 14:289–297. https://doi.org/10.1080/17450101.2019.1620510 Banerjee S, Kniveton D, Black R et al (2017) Do Financial Remittances Build Household-Level Adaptive Capacity? A Case Study of Flood-Affected Households in India Banerjee S, Black R, Mishra A, Kniveton D (2019) Assessing vulnerability of remittance-recipient and nonrecipient households in rural communities affected by extreme weather events: Case studies from South-West China and North-East India: Vulnerability of remittance-recipient and non-recipient households. Popul Space Place 25:e2157. https://doi.org/10.1002/psp.2157 Barnett J, Evans LS, Gross C et al (2015) From barriers to limits to climate change adaptation: path dependency and the speed of change. E&S 20:art5. https://doi.org/10.5751/ES-07698-200305 Baruah S (2001) India against itself: Assam and the politics of nationality. Oxford University Press, New Delhi Berenschot W (2010) Everyday Mediation: The Politics of Public Service Delivery in Gujarat, India: Everyday Mediation: Public Service Delivery in Gujarat. Development and Change 41:883–905. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-7660.2010.01660.x Bettini G (2013) Climate Barbarians at the Gate? A critique of apocalyptic narratives on ‘climate refugees’. Geoforum 45:63–72. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2012.09.009

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Bettini G, Nash SL, Gioli G (2017) One step forward, two steps back? The fading contours of (in)justice in competing discourses on climate migration. Geogr J 183:348–358. https://doi.org/ 10.1111/geoj.12192 Biesbroek GR, Klostermann JEM, Termeer CJAM, Kabat P (2013) On the nature of barriers to climate change adaptation. Reg Environ Change 13:1119–1129. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10113013-0421-y Black R, Adger WN, Arnell NW et al (2011) The effect of environmental change on human migration. Global Environmental Change 21:S3–S11. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2011. 10.001 Blitz BK (2011) Statelessness and Environmental-Induced Displacement: Future Scenarios of Deterritorialisation, Rescue and Recovery Examined. Mobilities 6:433–450. https://doi.org/10. 1080/17450101.2011.590039 Bosniak L (2006) Varieties of citizenship. Fordham L Rev 75:2449 Campbell J (2010) Climate change and population movement in Pacific Island countries. Climate Change and Migration 29–50 Cattaneo C, Beine M, Fröhlich CJ et al (2019) Human Migration in the Era of Climate Change. Review of Environmental Economics and Policy 13:189–206. https://doi.org/10.1093/reep/ rez008 Chakraborty G (2011) From isolation to desolation: analysing social exclusion among the char dwellers of Assam. Man and Society - A Journal of North East Study 8:47–65 Danso SY, Addo IY (2017) Coping strategies of households affected by flooding: A case study of Sekondi-Takoradi Metropolis in Ghana. Urban Water Journal 14:539–545. https://doi.org/10. 1080/1573062X.2016.1176223 Das D (2016) Changing climate and its impacts on Assam, Northeast India. Bandung: Journal of the Global South 2:1–13. https://doi.org/10.1186/s40728-015-0028-4 Dekaraja D, Mahanta R (2021) Riverbank erosion and migration inter-linkage: with special focus on Assam, India. Environ Syst Res 10:6. https://doi.org/10.1186/s40068-020-00214-0 Dupuis J, Knoepfel P (2013) The Adaptation Policy Paradox: the Implementation Deficit of Policies Framed as Climate Change Adaptation. E&S 18:art31. https://doi.org/10.5751/ES-05965-180431 Edmunds J (2012) The limits of post-national citizenship: European Muslims, human rights and the hijab. Ethnic and Racial Studies 35:1181–1199. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2011.593640 Elliott L (2010) Climate Change and Displacement: Multidisciplinary Perspectives. Hart Publishing Faist T, Schade J (2013) The Climate–Migration Nexus: A Reorientation. In: Faist T, Schade J (eds) Disentangling Migration and Climate Change. Springer Netherlands, Dordrecht, pp 3–25 Ferris E (2020) Research on climate change and migration where are we and where are we going? Migration Studies 8:612–625. https://doi.org/10.1093/migration/mnaa028 Ferris E, Bergmann J (2017) Soft law, migration and climate change governance. JHRE 8:6–29. https://doi.org/10.4337/jhre.2017.01.01 Foresight U (2011) Migration and global environmental change: final project report. The Government Office for Science, London. Available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/ uploads/attachment_data/file/287717/11-1116-migrationand-global-environmentalchange.pdf Fox C, Guglielmo TA (2012) Defining America’s Racial Boundaries: Blacks, Mexicans, and European Immigrants, 1890–1945. American Journal of Sociology 118:327–379. https://doi.org/10. 1086/666383 Gammeltoft-Hansen T (2019) The Normative Impact of the Global Compact on Refugees. International Journal of Refugee Law 30:605–610. https://doi.org/10.1093/ijrl/eey061 Gemenne F (2013) Migration doesn’t have to be a failure to adapt: an escape from environmental determinism. In: Palutikof J, Boulter SL, Ash AJ et al. (eds) Climate Adaptation Futures. John Wiley & Sons, Oxford, pp 235–241 Gonzalez CG (2018) Climate Justice and Climate Displacement: Evaluating the Emerging Legal and Policy Responses. Wis Int’l LJ 36:366 Gupta A (2012) Red Tape: Bureaucracy, Structural Violence, and Poverty in India. Duke University Press, Durham

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Hall N (2016) Displacement, development, and climate change: international organizations moving beyond their mandates. Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, London/New York Hassani-Mahmooei B, Parris BW (2012) Climate change and internal migration patterns in Bangladesh: an agent-based model. Envir Dev Econ 17:763–780. https://doi.org/10.1017/S13 55770X12000290 Homer-Dixon TF (1994) Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases. The MIT Press 5–40 Jagannath HP (2020) Street-level collaboration: perception, power, and politics on the frontlines of collaboration. IJPSM 33:461–476. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJPSM-07-2019-0194 James I, Julian R (2021) Policy implementation and refugee settlement: The perceptions and experiences of street-level bureaucrats in Launceston, Tasmania. Journal of Sociology 57:522–540. https://doi.org/10.1177/1440783320931585 Kent A, Behrman S (eds) (2018) “Climate refugees”: beyond the legal impasse? Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, London/New York Keshri K, Bhagat RB (2012) Temporary and Seasonal Migration: Regional Pattern, Characteristics and Associated Factors. Economic and Political Weekly 47:81–88 Kimura M (2013) The Nellie Massacre of 1983: Agency of Rioters. SAGE Publications India Krishnan S (2022) Adaptive capacities for women’s mobility during displacement after floods and riverbank erosion in Assam, India. Climate and Development 1–14. https://doi.org/10.1080/175 65529.2022.2092052 Kumar A (2010) Illegal Bangladeshi Migration to India: Impact on Internal Security. Strategic Analysis 35:106–119. https://doi.org/10.1080/09700161.2011.530988 Leal-Arcas R (2012) Climate Migrants: Legal Options. Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences 37:86–96. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.sbspro.2012.03.277 Lipsky M (2010) Street-level bureaucracy: dilemmas of the individual in public services, 30th anniversary expanded edn. Russell Sage Foundation, New York Mann M (1987) Ruling Class Strategies and Citizenship. Sociology 21:339–354. https://doi.org/ 10.1177/0038038587021003003 Manou D, Baldwin A, Cubie D et al (eds) (2017) Climate Change. Taylor and Francis, London Manuvie R (2017) Institutional response to displacement due to chronic disasters: The art of muddling through. In: Rajan SI, Bhagat RB (eds) Climate Change, Vulnerability and Migration. Routledge India, pp 75–93 Marx AW (1995) Contested Citizenship: The Dynamics of Racial Identity and Social Movements. Int Rev of Soc His 40:159–183. https://doi.org/10.1017/S002085900011363X Massey DS (2007) Categorically unequal: the American stratification system. Russell Sage Foundation, New York Mathur N (2016) Paper tiger: law, bureaucracy and the developmental state in Himalayan India. Cambridge University Press, Delhi, India Mayer B (2011) The international legal challenges of climate-induced migration: Proposal for an international legal framework. Colo J Int’l Envtl L & Pol’y 22:357 Mayer B, Crépeau F (eds) (2017) Research handbook on climate change, migration and the law. Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, UK McAdam J (2012) Climate change, forced migration, and international law. Oxford University Press, Oxford McDuie-Ra D (2014) The India–Bangladesh Border Fence: Narratives and Political Possibilities. Journal of Borderlands Studies 29:81–94. https://doi.org/10.1080/08865655.2014.892694 McHugh KE (1990) Seasonal Migration as a Substitute for, or Precursor to, Permanent Migration. Res Aging 12:229–245. https://doi.org/10.1177/0164027590122005 McLeman RA, Gemenne F (eds) (2018) Routledge handbook of environmental displacement and migration. Routledge, London/New York, NY McLeman R, Smit B (2006) Migration as an Adaptation to Climate Change. Climatic Change 76:31–53. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10584-005-9000-7

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Ministry of Environment and Forest (2012) India Second National Communication to United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. Government of India, New Delhi Ministry of Environment and Forest (2015) India’s First Biennial Update Report to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Mintrom M, Norman P (2009) Policy Entrepreneurship and Policy Change. Policy Studies Journal 37:649–667. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1541-0072.2009.00329.x Mitchell MJ, Wood CH (1999) Ironies of Citizenship: Skin Color, Police Brutality, and the Challenge to Democracy in Brazil. Social Forces 77:1001. https://doi.org/10.2307/3005969 Mohanty A, Wadhawan S (2021) Mapping India’s Climate Vulnerability. Council on Energy, Environment and Water: A District-Level Assessment Myers N (2002) Environmental refugees: a growing phenomenon of the 21st century. Phil Trans R Soc Lond B 357:609–613. https://doi.org/10.1098/rstb.2001.0953 Nash SL, Baldwin A (2019) Negotiating migration in the context of climate change: international policy and discourse. Bristol University Press, Bristol Neef A, Benge L (2022) Shifting responsibility and denying justice: New Zealand’s contentious approach to Pacific climate mobilities. Reg Environ Change 22:94. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10 113-022-01951-x Ong A (2006) Mutations in Citizenship. Theory, Culture & Society 23:499–505. https://doi.org/10. 1177/0263276406064831 O’Sullivan TM (2015) Environmental Security is Homeland Security: Climate Disruption as the Ultimate Disaster Risk Multiplier: Environmental Security is Homeland Security. Risk, Hazards & Crisis in Public Policy 6:183–222. https://doi.org/10.1002/rhc3.12084 Piguet E (2010) Linking climate change, environmental degradation, and migration: a methodological overview. WIREs Climate Change 1:517–524. https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.54 Piguet E (2021) Linking climate change, environmental degradation, and migration: An update after 10 years. WIREs Climate Change 13:1–16. https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.746 Piguet E, Pecoud A, de Guchteneire P (2011) Migration and Climate Change: An Overview. Refugee Survey Quarterly 30:1–23. https://doi.org/10.1093/rsq/hdr006 Rajan SI, Bhagat RB (eds) (2017) Climate Change, Vulnerability and Migration, 1st edn. Routledge India Rather ZA (2013) India–Bangladesh Border Issues: Challenges and Opportunities. International Studies 50:130–144. https://doi.org/10.1177/0020881716654388 Ravindranath N, Rao S, Sharma N et al (2011) Climate change vulnerability profiles for North East India. Current Science 384–394 Reuveny R (2007) Climate change-induced migration and violent conflict. Political Geography 26:656–673. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2007.05.001 Rittel HWJ, Webber MM (1973) Dilemmas in a general theory of planning. Policy Sci 4:155–169. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01405730 Rouviere C, Williams T, Ball R et al (1990) Human settlement; the energy, transport and industrial sectors; human health; air quality; and changes in ultraviolet-B radiation. In: McG Tegart WJ, Sheldon GW, Griffiths DC (eds) Climate Change: The IPCC Impacts Assessment. Report prepared for Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change by Working Group II. Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, Australia. Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra, p 296 Runhaar H, Wilk B, Persson Å et al (2018) Mainstreaming climate adaptation: taking stock about “what works” from empirical research worldwide. Reg Environ Change 18:1201–1210. https:// doi.org/10.1007/s10113-017-1259-5 Sassen S (2002) Towards Post-National and Denationalized Citizenship. In: Isin EF, Turner BS (eds) Handbook of citizenship studies. SAGE, London/Thousand Oaks, California Singh J (1984) Assam’s Crisis of Citizenship: An Examination of Political Errors. Asian Survey 24:1056–1068 Suhrke A (1997) Environmental Degradation, Migration, and the Potential for Violent Conflict. In: Gleditsch NP (ed) Conflict and the Environment. Springer Netherlands, Dordrecht, pp 255–272

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Swain A (1996) Displacing the Conflict: Environmental Destruction in Bangladesh and Ethnic Conflict in India. Journal of Peace Research 33:189–204 Tambini D (2001) Post-national citizenship. Ethnic and Racial Studies 24:195–217. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/01419870020023418 Tummers L, Bekkers V (2014) Policy Implementation, Street-level Bureaucracy, and the Importance of Discretion. Public Management Review 16:527–547. https://doi.org/10.1080/14719037.2013. 841978 Turner BS (ed) (2000) Citizenship and social theory, reprint. Sage, London van Schendel W (2005) The Bengal borderland: beyond state and nation in South Asia. Anthem, London Warner K (2009) Migration: Climate adaptation or failure to adapt? Findings from a global comparative field study. IOP Conf Ser: Earth Environ Sci 6:562006. https://doi.org/10.1088/1755-1307/ 6/56/562006 Warner K, Afifi T (2014) Where the rain falls: Evidence from 8 countries on how vulnerable households use migration to manage the risk of rainfall variability and food insecurity. Climate and Development 6:1–17. https://doi.org/10.1080/17565529.2013.835707 Water Resource Department (2016) Flood and Erosion Problem. Government of Assam. https://wat erresources.assam.gov.in/portlets/flood-erosion-problems. Accessed 23 August 2022 Weiner M (1978) Sons of the Soil. Princeton University Press Weiner M (1983) The Political Demography of Assam’s Anti-Immigrant Movement. Population and Development Review 9:279. https://doi.org/10.2307/1973053 White G (2011) Climate Change and Migration: Security and Borders in a Warming World. OUP USA Yuval-Davis N (1997) Women, Citizenship and Difference. Feminist Review 57:4–27. https://doi. org/10.1080/014177897339632

Chapter 2

Understanding Climate Migration Governance

Contents 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Climate-Migration Nexus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Climate Migration as a Wicked Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Climate Migration as an Area of Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.1 Environmental Law Discourse on Climate Migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.2 Human Rights Discourse on Climate Migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.3 Development Discourse on Climate Migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5 The Indian Paradox: The Elephant in the Room . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.1 Vulnerability to Climate Change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.2 Multi-level Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5.3 The Question of Framing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

20 22 24 26 27 29 32 35 36 39 44 46 47

Abstract The recent growth in international discourse on climate change and migration nexus has given a necessary push towards development of regulatory policies. Despite this, India—one of the largest climate migrant hot-spot has remained absent from the discourse. The current chapter reviews the dominant normative frameworks on climate migration and locate India’s locus in the debate. It is argued that despite India’s absence from the state and international organisation led policy discourse, Indian administration (the State apparatus) is acutely aware of the impact climate change is having on migration patterns. These migrations are not constructed as a “brand new” area of regulation, but instead treated as a wicked problem which requires a combination of several existing norms and policies to respond to forced and voluntary migrations driven by climate change. Keywords Climate migration · India · Sub-national framing · Normative framework · Human security · Wicked problem

© T.M.C. ASSER PRESS and the author 2023 R. Manuvie, Climate Migration Governance and the Discourse of Citizenship in India, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-567-6_2

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2 Understanding Climate Migration Governance

2.1 Introduction From the beginning of human history, people have used migration as a response to environmental changes.1 In recent years, environmentally induced migration, particularly migration due to extreme weather events caused by a changing climate, has emerged as one of the most pressing policy issues on global political agendas.2 As has been recently highlighted in the Lancet, much of the debate on how to govern climate migration is taking place in high-income countries, whereas most global migrations due to extreme weather events occur in low-income and middle-income countries.3 Most of the climate change migration and displacements around the world are in fact internal in nature. International Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC) data on internal displacement shows that in 2021 alone 23.7 million new internal displacements were recorded worldwide due to disaster, of these more than 94% were the result of weather-related hazards.4 Much of this migration occurred in low-income and middle-income countries with India recording 4.9 million (roughly 21%) of the total weather-related disaster displacements.5 Yet, as mentioned in the Introduction of this book, India’s engagement on climate migration governance is subsumed by agendas of energy security and mitigation. To understand India’s position (and absence from the discourse), I engage with the existing literature on climate migration governance and critically evaluate India’s locus in the debate. Three broad governance areas—environmental law, human rights law, and disaster risk reduction policies—are identified. A significant amount of current international debate is driven by either national security fears, or the interrogation of climate justice. For example, Elliott has argued that the national security agenda is partly responsible for pushing climate change migration as an area for policy making.6 Boas also highlights the use of climate migration as a bargaining tool in international negotiations for seeking binding mitigation obligations.7 Scholars like Mayer, McAdam and Giovanni have avidly positioned climate migration as a human security and human rights crisis, insisting that policy responses should respect climate-justice and humanitarian obligations.8 Citing examples of the of people displaced due to sinking islands and victims of hydro-metrological disasters in global south, these scholars have proposed shared, fair, and ethical responsibility to protect climate migrants. Building from these arguments, and utilising interviews

1

McLeman and Smit 2006, p. 31; McLeman 2014. IPCC 2014, pp. 331–339; Wanders and Wada 2015, pp. 208–220; Cattaneo and Robinson 2019. 3 The Lancet 2020, p. 839. 4 IDMC (2021) Global Internal Displacement Data. https://www.internal-displacement.org/dat abase/displacement-data Accessed 29 July 2022. 5 Ibid. 6 Elliott 2010, pp. 175–190. 7 Boas 2014, p. 151. 8 Mayer 2014; McAdam 2012; Bettini et al. 2017, pp. 348–358. 2

2.1 Introduction

21

with elite-bureaucratic actors in India conducted during 2016,9 I argue that these international developments have a salient impact on national and sub-national framing of the issue in India. I also show that while the national and sub-national governments are profoundly aware of the problematic of weather related internal-displacements they do not necessarily perceive it as a stand-alone ‘crisis’ but instead insist on utilising existing policies, including rights frameworks (especially the fundamental right of freedom of movement, and the right to employment), for responding to climate migrations in the broader development and resilience paradigm. The framing by the Indian government in that sense is more akin to framing of policies on ‘wicked societal problems’, where a single solution, single definition, or single pathway of response is considered inadequate. Throughout this chapter I use climate-migration, climate displacement, environmental refugees, and several iterations of these phrases inter-changeably and purposively. My focus for this chapter is not to establish a definition for climate migration, or to confirm (or refute) the nature of climate migrations; my purpose instead is to ascertain the locus of the Indian government in the ongoing discourse on climate migration governance. The focus of this book and this chapter is the people of India, in particular the people in the State of Assam, and the several levels of government policies in India. There is a growing body of climate vulnerability assessments that confirms the vulnerability of Assam and its people to climate change; this work talks about increased frequencies and severity of floods and the lack of adaptive capacities. There is also mounting evidence, including quantitative data, of severe flooddisplacements and erosion displacements in the region of Assam.10 My discussion of a climate-migration nexus is therefore limited to highlighting the varied key patterns of climate migrations, and how they relate to different policy paradigms. Throughout this book, I will keep coming back to these patterns of migrations while discussing my own observations in Assam. For ease of reading, I have divided this chapter into four parts: Sect. 2.2 discusses the climate-migration nexus by engaging with the observational studies that are also informing the climate migration governance policy paradigms. In Sect. 2.3, I use the wicked-problem framework to determine how, for the purpose of public policy and governance, the inability to determine the precise nature of the problem is not a necessary impediment. In fact, most societal issues of modern world are wicked problems with fluid causalities, yet most government around the world continue to respond to these wicked problems through every-day administrations. In Sect. 2.4, I look at multiple governance discourses on climate migration that aim at providing differential and often complementary solutions to the issue of climate migrations. I categorise these discussions broadly under environmental law, human rights law, and development policy discourse. I critically analyse the standing of the Indian government internationally within each of these discourses. In Sect. 2.5, I engage with the vulnerability, and governance, of climate migrations

9

For complete list of interviewees, see Annex A. IDMC (2021) Global Internal Displacement Data. https://www.internal-displacement.org/dat abase/displacement-data Accessed 29 July 2022. 10

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by the national and sub-national governments in India, before concluding how the framing of climate migration is evolving in Indian policy.

2.2 Climate-Migration Nexus The recent growth in observational research emerging from human geography provides a nuanced view of climate change migration.11 These studies recognise the complex nexus between climate change and human mobility and highlight that people aggregate climate risks at the household level to adapt to climate change.12 Faist and Alscher show that families consider economic factors ahead of environmental factors in their migratory decisions13 and Foresight studies on the climate migration nexus conclude that at a household level, people choose in situ adaptation options first before choosing to migrate.14 Studies highlight several key patterns of climate migrations. Communities in geographically vulnerable areas persistently undertake cyclic labour migration to urban centres to improve their economic status.15 Households send one or more of their able-bodied members on a temporary or cyclic basis to diversify their family livelihood options while also maintaining ties with their homeland.16 In India, 20 million people migrate from disaster-prone rural areas to an urban centre every year for better livelihood opportunities and possibilities to send remittances back home.17 Such cyclic migrations assist migrant sending families to adapt to their changing environment, although it may not radically improve their living conditions.18 Well-managed cyclic migrations among communities living in seasonal flood-prone and drought-prone areas provide steady remittance funding for local adaptation.19 Migrations also help to establish and maintain a social network that is resourceful in assisting other community members to migrate in case of need.20 A second pattern of migration is mobilities caused due to sudden-onset disasters. These mobility patterns can range from voluntarily (temporarily) vacating the areas of danger, to planned (or forced) evacuations, to being displaced, or even entrapped during a sudden-onset disaster. Studies show that with events like storms, flash-floods, and wildfires, people migrate over a short distance to the nearest safe

11

Zetter and Morrissey 2014, p. 345; Warner et al. 2012; Black et al. 2008; Warner 2012; McAdam 2012. 12 Field et al. 2014; Warner and Afifi 2014, p. 4; Massey et al. 2010, p. 11. 13 Alscher 2010, p. 171. 14 Foresight 2011, p. 84. 15 Poncelet et al. 2010, p. 3; Adger 2000, p. 350; Findlay and Geddes 2011, p. 138. 16 Tumbe 2012, p. 90. 17 Deshingkar 2006, p. 89; Tumbe 2015, p. 248. 18 de Haan 2013; Tumbe 2015, p. 250. 19 Jawaid and Raza 2016, p. 50; Musah-Surugu et al. 2018, p. 178; Bendandi and Pauw 2016, p. 195. 20 Faist 2000, p. 202.

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23

areas, often choosing to stay with family and friends.21 Once the disaster recedes, people return to rebuild their lives in their place of habitual residence.22 Suddenonset disaster mobilities are usually short distance and follow an existing migration corridor. These migration corridors can also be international, especially in the case of people living in international border-regions.23 There is mounting evidence that climate migrations caused by sudden and drastic events typically lead to temporary displacement, often close to home, and can even lead to inability to move (or climate entrapments).24 Failure to move away from disasters may lead to situations of entrapment, where communities may have no other option but to remain within their collapsing ecosystem and endure cascading economic losses.25 Incidents of permanent displacements of entire households because of climate change are an option of last resort. Studies have shown that such losses prey on those who cannot adapt to the ecological and social consequences of climate change, whether because of sudden loss of land, lack of resources or other inequities.26 In regions where there are repeated disasters and a lack of governmental support for post-disasters recovery, communities are seen to engage in permanent relocation as a long-term strategy. For example, communities in New Orleans, when affected by Hurricane Katrina, saw a permanent out-migration of the most marginalised groups.27 Assessment carried out by the World Food Program in El Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras highlighted how the region’s recent adverse climate conditions have devastated harvests, leaving millions without food or work and forcing many families to emigrate elsewhere for survival.28 Geographical restriction of within country migration, or utilisation of existing cyclic migration routes also applies to patterns of permanent displacement and relocations.29 These developments over climate migrations have led to differential framings of climate change and the mobility nexus requiring a multitude of policy solutions. Highlevel policy discussions on how migrations should be governed and governments must cooperate to share the burden responsibly have led to several policy proposals.30 For example, Giannini and Docherty propose adopting a new protocol that recognises and address the specific rights of climate refugees who are displaced across international borders.31 Boas and Biermann suggest promoting a protocol through the United 21

Hugo 2008; Bardsley and Hugo 2010; Castles 2013. Do Yun and Waldorf 2016; Oliver-Smith 2009; Perch-Nielsen et al. 2008. 23 Sha 2021. 24 Laczko and Aghazarm 2009. 25 Warner and van der Geest 2013, p. 376. 26 Black et al. 2011, p. 478. 27 Hartman and Squires 2006; Tacoli 2009, p. 520. 28 WPF (2021) The dry corridor, available at https://www.wfpusa.org/the-dry-corridor-in-centralamerica/ Accessed 15 May 2022. 29 Findlay and Geddes 2011, p. 143. 30 Adger et al. 2014, p. 764; Foresight 2011, p. 123; Biermann and Boas 2010; Brindal 2007; McAdam 2009; Gibb and Ford 2012; Khan 2013. 31 Docherty and Giannini 2009, p. 350. 22

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Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), which would not only focus on the needs of climate migrants but could also draw upon rich expertise in climate risk management and adaptation strategies, thus making up an umbrella of a protection system.32 Benoit Mayer suggests the adoption of resolutions through the General Assembly of the United Nations to provide early and feasible support, especially to people inhabiting low-lying island nations.33 Several of these proposals are valid, however, most of them build on the need to define the climate migrant as an essential rights-holder. While this may be preferable to seek climate accountability and justice it does not necessarily provide public policy solutions to the people who are displaced or will soon be displaced due to climate change related disasters.

2.3 Climate Migration as a Wicked Problem In public policy, open-ended and intractable problems are called wicked problems. These are the problems where both the nature of the problem and the preferred solution lie in a fluid space, requiring continuous reconsideration. Pressman and Wildavsky argue that success in solving wicked problems is an elusive notion, as the required levels of information, goal-clarity and coordination are not achievable.34 The problem, as well as its solutions, lie in a shifty domain and the technical approaches overlook the values, perspectives and lived experiences of the stakeholders involved in the interventions.35 Climate migration is one such wicked problem whose nature and possible solutions are not conclusively known. The framing of climate migration may take different forms and despite the visual impact of disasters on human displacement, the correlation with climate change is not entirely straightforward, thus making the problem and its solutions highly elusive and goal-shifting.36 Rittel and Webber, while discussing the solution to a wicked problem, highlight that modern nations are too pluralistic to achieve a clear and agreed solution. Unlike the relatively ‘tame’ or ‘benign’ problems of science, which are definable and verifiable, the emerging issues in social science are ill-defined and interlinked and rely on political judgement and administrative perceptions. Rittel and Webber also elaborate on the idea of wicked problems more generally, and in a way that several scholars have found helpful in explaining the difficulties that arise in the areas of urban planning, social policy, and environmental, and natural resource policy.37 First, in wicked problems the definition and scope of the problem itself are contested. As has been discussed in the preceding section, the exact nature of climate change migration is highly contested. While most researchers accept that climate change induced migration is a multi-causal issue, there 32

Biermann and Boas 2010, p. 76. Mayer 2011, p. 380. 34 Pressman and Wildavsky 1984. 35 Rein 1976; Schön and Rein 1994. 36 Allen and Gould 1986, p. 21; Freeman 2000, pp. 483–491; Head 2022. 37 Rittel and Webber 1973, p. 161. 33

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25

are no scientific parameters that can determine whether the migration is forced or voluntary. Even when a person living in a fragile ecosystem migrates voluntarily, such a decision often stems from economic compulsion and a lack of resources needed for adaptation and survival. Second, wicked problems have no definitive solution. Human migration in response to environmental crisis is as natural as human migration for reasons such as exploration, tourism, or economic gains. The international dialogue on climate change migration oscillates regularly from the need to tighten economic migration policies to the need for receptive borders and more development. There is no readily available consensus on international responsibility towards climate change migrants or indeed a consensus as to in what level of administration (international, regional, national or sub-national) the policy should be framed. Third, solutions to wicked problems are not true-or-false, but good-or-bad. Unlike policies which can be measured based on quantitative indices there is no particular way to ascertain how many climate migrants could be prevented. The definition of what constitutes a climate migrant itself is contested. Even if we accept every definition or find a comprehensive inclusive one, decisions to migrate are complex and highly individualised at the micro levels. While macro inputs (like national policies incentivising labour and cross-border migrations), or meso inputs (like social capital and economic opportunities) may influence people’s decision to migrate, these inputs are also complexly tied to ideas like a sense of belonging and love for the homeland, which are individual.38 It is not possible to adopt a measurable target of how many climate change migrants must be protected or how many environmentally displaced persons consider themselves to be climate migrants. Therefore, the only plausible assessment of the policy can be in the form of a good or bad policy. Fourth, there is no immediate and no ultimate test of a solution to a wicked problem. As it is not known how many people are climate migrants or how many will be displaced in the future there is no immediate or ultimate target for the number of people needing protection. The questions that naturally arise are, how should these problems be governed? What are the factors that assist in better governance? What factors lead to a deficit in governance? If at all, are these factors readily identifiable? Typically, the solutions to wicked problems require a trade-off between competing values, flexibility, reflexivity, a multi-departmental approach, collaboration, and resource sharing for success.39 The different ways in which wicked problems are framed strongly determine their treatment, including how leaders and stakeholders mobilise values and resources to manage collective and public issues.40 For example, if they frame climate change migration as a national security issue, the relevant policy response could be to identify those groups which are a perceived threat to the national security. Competing framing from stakeholders may often create ardent delays not just in the adoption of coherent policies but also in the allocation of resources. Kaplan shows that to minimise shocks and to regularise the new policy into their behaviour seamlessly, the 38

Czaika et al. 2021, p. 15. Kooiman 1993, pp. 1–6; Durant and Legge 2006, p. 321. 40 Fischer 2003; Jerneck et al. 2011, p. 72; Schlager and Heikkila 2011, pp. 461–470. 39

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organisations try to match their problem-perception to the social and political atmosphere of a region.41 Increasingly, administration models are also becoming more receptive to democratic legitimisation by adopting a deliberative dimension to their functioning, thus recognising differential political stakes and promoting competitive pluralism amongst stakeholders.42 Bohman highlights the benefits of the free and equal participation of all stakeholders on the basis of substantial political and procedural equality, including equal opportunities to take part in deliberation, to choose the methods of decision-making, and to set the agenda.43 However, the vast differences in social, cultural, and normative perspectives may often lead to collective puzzlement and no progress.44 Such stalemate is clearly visible in the climate migration debate, where the political framing of migrants and migrations (including refugees and disaster victims) can considerably divest resources into programs which are contrary to each other. For example, states across Europe are known to support organisations supporting people fleeing war and disasters; the same states carve out a fair share of their budgets to facilitate high-sea interceptions by Frontex, and to create detention centres to house those fleeing. The same states also provide development aid to the home countries of migrants with a view to reducing migration-outflows. This nested complexity and wickedness in identifying and responding to climate migrants can only be sufficiently recognised if we move away from mono-causality towards a multi-causality paradigm on climate migrations.

2.4 Climate Migration as an Area of Governance The modalities of governing climate migration, like solutions to the wicked problem is taking shape as I write this book. Both the scholarly understanding, and the concern to govern climate migrations have taken centre stage in international relations. Three broad and simultaneously growing areas of law are clearly visible: (a) Environmental law where environmental preservation to reduce out-flows of migration and mitigate displacements is strongly asserted; (b) Human rights law which focuses on protecting the life and dignity of those who migrate; (c) Development pathways where calls for disaster risk reduction, rehabilitation and reconstruction of habitats and communities are made. These developments in law, while complimentary, have differential rightsconnotations. The human rights discourse bestows the citizen with rights against the state (government) and makes it a mandatory requirement for the state to provide protection (and recourse) to the human where their rights are threatened (or violated). Not all human rights solutions are available to people who are not citizens of a state they are displaced into, but core human rights principles must nevertheless guide all

41

Kaplan 2008, p. 744. Bohman 1998. 43 Ibid., p. 16. 44 Heclo 2010, p. 305. 42

2.4 Climate Migration as an Area of Governance

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government actions towards people in humanitarian need. Thus, the distinction of citizens and people as right-holders against the state becomes critical in this discourse. On the other hand, the developmental discourse has no specific legal expectation or rights connotation, instead it is merely a directive principle for state policies. It encourages the state to adopt a progressive development pathway with the expectation that the state would give due care and opportunities for development to people living in environmentally fragile areas. Environmental law lies somewhere in-between the hard law status of human rights and the overtly soft and malleable core of development policies.

2.4.1 Environmental Law Discourse on Climate Migration Since the 1970s, there has been a remarkable growth in the number and range of international instruments and institutions addressing environmental problems.45 Within this extensive body of international environmental law, the UNFCCC has a mandate to stabilise greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere.46 As an international environmental law treaty focused on state-to-state relations, the UNFCCC does not make any reference to displacements or migrations in the context of climate change. The purpose of the convention is primarily to set binding obligations for mitigating the adverse effects of climate change by stabilising or reducing greenhouse gas emissions.47 In the last decade, the internal mandates of the UNFCCC secretariat have expanded to take into account the need for adaptation and to facilitate good practices, technology transfer, and financial commitments for adapting to climate change.48 The UNFCCC has approached climate displacement mainly through this lens of adaptation.49 A first informal recognition of climate induced migration within the UNFCCC was in 2008,50 followed by the adoption of para 14(f) in the decisions adopted by the conference of parties in its 16th session.51 Paragraph 14(f) reads: ‘formulate measures to enhance understanding, coordination and cooperation regarding climate change-induced displacement, migration and planned relocation at the national, regional and international levels where appropriate’ (1/CP.16 para 14(f) in UNFCCC 2010).52 These developments within UNFCCC mirror the development of observational research on climate and migration nexus and formulate climate mobility as an adaptation issue.53 45

Bodansky et al. 2008. UNGA (1994) United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Article 2. 47 Kolmannskog and Trebbi 2010, p. 720. 48 Kuyper et al. 2018, p. 355. 49 Warner 2012. 50 Ibid., p. 1067. 51 UNFCCC 2010, para 14(f), p. 5. 52 Ibid. 53 Warner 2013, p. 761. 46

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Both the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (2011) and the Doha decision, which recognises climate displacements due to loss and damage, are a step-forward towards recognising the human security aspect of climate migration.54 The Doha decision eventually led to the establishment of the Warsaw International Mechanism for loss and damage in 2013 with the aim to “address the losses and damages associated with climate change impacts in developing countries that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change through institutional development, information gathering, and capacity building.”55 Although migration and displacement are not explicitly mentioned in the decision behind establishing the Warsaw International Mechanism (WIM), the Executive Committee for the Mechanism included climate-induced displacement and migration as factors to be considered when developing an adequate loss and damage framework. Through the Paris agreement, in which reference to migration and displacement was made twice,56 requests were made to WIM to establish an Internal Task Force on Displacement as part of the UNFCCC Executive Committee on Adaptation with the aim to recommend integrated approaches to avert, minimise and address displacement related to the adverse effects of climate change.57 The creation of this task force is a positive acknowledgement of the need for international cooperation to prevent, mitigate, regularise and respond to climate migrations. Several countries, particularly small island-nations and low-income countries, viewed the inclusion of migration in the UNFCCC as a positive outcome which can help create a common but differential responsibility principle under the existing framework of the convention and accord greater opportunities and assistance for the nations who are at in the thick of forced displacement, loss of territory, and slow-onset migrations due to climate change. Interestingly, as I will elaborate further in Sect. 2.4, India, despite being one of the key negotiators for climate mitigation, has not openly engaged on the issue of climate migrations but has instead focused on energy-security and need for the development of its population. It is unlikely that the UNFCCC will be able to create any direct rights for migrants, instead focusing largely on the higher-level processes of minimising and averting migration.58 As a state-led international legal instrument, UNFCCC, like much of environmental law, lacks a vertical approach between state and individuals.59 Scholars have argued that this state-led-adaptation-focused framing of climate migration, while having its merits, is an oversimplification of the complexities of migrations and does not necessarily deliver or hold potential for a rights-based approach to climate migration. Docherty and Giannini further elaborate that the UNFCCC is in fact silent on human rights, not containing any formal acknowledgement of the

54

Jakobsson 2021, p. 21. UNFCCC 2013, Decision 2/CP.19, para 1. 56 UNFCCC 2015, Article 8. 57 UNFCCC 2016, para 49. 58 Bettini et al. 2017. 59 Nishimura 2015. 55

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human rights implications of climate change.60 Thus, when examining the UNFCCC, there is no doubt that climate refugees neither fall under the notion of refugees nor under the intention of combating climate change.

2.4.2 Human Rights Discourse on Climate Migration Human rights discourse continues to provide a crucial, although somewhat elusive, framing for people moving due to climate change. Crucial, as it creates a rights-based mechanism to redress humanitarian crises, elusive as the availability of the right to have a right is complexly tied to a person’s status in a political society. In the case of climate migration, human rights discourse can provide a wide normative framework, however, the actual application of this framework is deeply and complexly tied to a person’s ability to claim a right—based on their political status as a citizen, alien, refugee, migrant, etc.61 I discuss the availability of human rights discourse in Chap. 1 and later in Chap. 4 of this book. As a matter of normative fact, all humans are entitled to certain basic human rights. These include the right to life;62 the right to adequate food;63 the right to water;64 the right to health;65 the right to shelter;66 the right to freedom of movement, amongst others.67 In the context of the human-environment relationship these rights have been well recognised since the early 1970s within both environmental law and human rights law.68 The rights guarantee, in fact, is also influential in creating a strong moral appeal for the mitigation of green-house gases and the adoption of the UNFCCC that I discussed in the preceding section. Scholars and policy leaders have used extended interpretations of human rightsbased arguments to support the need for humanitarian governance of climate change migrants. These views are growing considerably in their institutional as well as their normative forms. For example, despite the limitation of the Refugee convention in according refugee status to people displaced due to climate change,69 the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) has a growing portfolio of response programs for humanitarian crises caused by disasters.70 The UNHCR has also consistently stressed that people fleeing the adverse effects of climate change may have 60

Docherty and Giannini 2009, p. 396. Arendt 1951; Parekh 2008; Kesby 2012; Krause 2008. 62 UNGA 1966, Article 6; 1989, Article 6. 63 UNGA 1966, Article 11; 1979, Article 14. 64 Ibid. 65 UNGA 1966, Article 12. 66 UNGA 1966, Article 11. 67 UNGA 1948, Article 14; Zetter 2011; McInerney-Lankford et al. 2011. 68 UNGA 1972, para 1. 69 Williams 2008; McAdam 2009. 70 UNGA 2018. 61

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valid claims for refugee status in situations where climate change and disasters are intertwined with conflict and violence, and when the armed conflict is rooted in environmental factors.71 McAdam, in her work on complementary protection, suggests the availability of jus cogens norms, including the right to the protection and preservation of life and dignity and the principle of non-refoulment, amounts to a legal responsibility towards climate displaces.72 Rooted in human rights discourse, complementary protection provides basic protection to people in protracted refugee conditions who may not necessarily be refugees within the scope of 1951 Refugee Convention.73 Especially in case of citizens of small-island nations where a person displaced due to sea-level rise may not have a habitable nation to return to.74 At the international level, the non-refoulement principle has been used successfully to secure protection against a state expelling, returning or extraditing a person where there are substantial grounds for believing that return would endanger their life or could subject them to torture.75 Recent developments, such as the Human Rights Committee (HRC) decision of 2020 furthers this jurisprudence of non-refoulment for climate migrants. The HRC in the case of Teitiota v New Zealand held that ‘without robust national and international efforts, the effects of climate change in receiving states may expose individuals to a violation of their rights under art 6 and 7 and thereby triggering the non-refoulement obligations of sending states.’76 The case concerned a citizen from the small island state of Kiribati whom applied for asylum in New Zealand on the basis of climatic changes affecting Kiribati, which exposed him and his family to violent land disputes, a lack of fresh drinking water, an inability to sustain a livelihood (agriculture in this case) due to soil salinisation, and flooding.77 Teitiota’s claim for asylum was rejected by the New Zealand authorities, leading to circumstances of return to Kiribati. After several unsuccessful appeals, Teitiota lodged a communication with the Human Rights Committee alleging, inter alia, that the New Zealand government had violated his right to life under Article 6 of the ICCPR by returning him to Kiribati in September 2015 and as such had violated their non-refoulement obligation under international law.78 Although the HRC did not find a violation of the right to life the Committee did hold a more positive view on the right to non-refoulment, thus opening up the possibility of a complementary protection mechanism in the context of climate migrations.79

71

Ibid. McAdam 2012. 73 Williams 2008, p. 513. 74 Thornton 2018, p. 397. 75 Williams 2008, p. 514. 76 Human Rights Committee, Ioane Teitiota v. New Zealand, No. 2728/2016, Communication of 24 October 2019, para 9.11. 77 Ibid., para 2.1. 78 Ibid., para 6.1. 79 Ibid., para 9.12. 72

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While complementary protection may eventually make its way as a surrogate protection to people displaced from sinking island nations, or nations with a conflict and climate nexus there are a number of fundamental obstacles that would limit its application.80 As a starting point, as with the Refugee convention, international surrogate protection (which is not a regular migration pathway) is usually available for people whose own national governments are either persecutory or unable to protect them from well-founded fears of persecution. For environmentally displaced persons, it is usually seen that the home governments have not completely abandoned their displaced populations, instead home governments are sympathetic to the victims of disasters.81 A second inherent limitation of complementary protection is the necessity to be ‘outside the country of nationality’.82 This is perhaps a larger limitation in the context of climate migrations, as we know that the majority of displacement due to climate disasters is internal in nature.83 Scholars have argued that existing UN Guiding Principles on Internally Displaced Persons (UNGP IDP) can be used as good practice guidelines without creating a binding structure for responding to internal migrations.84 Walter Kalin argues that national governments, in their own commitment to human rights, are not absolved from their responsibility to protect people displaced within their national borders. He proposes dialogues such as the Nansen Initiative,85 which can specifically strengthen the rights of those displaced internally due to climate change.86 Despite the rights-connotations which can provide millions of displaced Indians with tangible rights, India has traditionally remained aloof from the international policy discourse on the Refugee convention 1951. The reason for India’s absence from the Refugee convention, as I have discussed elsewhere,87 has to do with the specific definition of ‘refugee’ which India has traditionally maintained, which restricts the rights of people migrating internally. The discourse surrounding internal displacement under the UNGP IDP on the other hand, shifts the unfair burden of disasters and displacements completely onto the developing nation. This choice to not engage with the Refugee convention or the UNGP IDP, and a remarkable absence from the Nansen Initiative is reflective of India’s legitimate concerns as a migrant receiving nation. Within South Asia India hosts not just environmental migrants, but also irregular migrants and asylum seekers. For example, the 1947 internal displacement of people across the India and Pakistan border continues 80

McAdam 2009, p. 16. Ni 2015, p. 339. 82 McAdam 2009. 83 Ibid. 84 Williams 2008, p. 512; Kozoll 2004; UNHRC 1998, Article 2. 85 For a discussion on the Nansen initiative, see the Preface to this monograph. 86 Kälin and Schrepfer 2012. 87 Manuvie (2019) The Print, Why India is home to millions of refugees but doesn’t have a policy for them. https://theprint.in/opinion/why-india-is-home-to-millions-of-refugees-but-doesnthave-a-policy-for-them/341301/ Accessed 9 August 2022. 81

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to be the largest mass-displacement in human history.88 Throughout the last seven decades of Indian independence, India has received millions of asylum seekers from Tibet, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and now, more recently, from Myanmar. India also continues to have open borders with Nepal and Bhutan, and a porous border with the State of Bangladesh—another climate migration hotspot. This influx of migrations along with India’s own massive internal displacement, and poverty puts a massive financial burden on the state.89 The government of India has also been critical of external pressures on India to engage on these binding discourses, especially since the external international assistance for housing millions of displacement victims over the last seven decades have been very minimal.90 Over these years, and in the face of active environmental migrations, India’s focus has primarily been on response and more recently on risk reduction.

2.4.3 Development Discourse on Climate Migration In the development discourse, disaster risk reduction (DDR) policies are wellestablished development strategies that address all forms of hazards at the grass-roots level.91 DRR is defined by the UNISDR as the concept and practice of reducing disaster risks through systematic efforts to analyse and manage the causal factors of disasters, including through reduced exposure to hazards, lessened vulnerability of people and property, wise management of land and the environment, and improved preparedness for adverse events.92

These are the practice that focus on preventing new and reducing existing disaster risk and managing residual risk, all of which contribute to strengthening resilience. DRR policies and strategies view disasters as socio-economic and political in origin rather than merely physical manifestations of environmental harms.93 DRR strategies consider the broader social, political, environmental and economic environments in which a hazard is situated.94 DRR strategies are built around a community’s ability to reduce their own disaster risk, and specifically identify those directly impacted by hazards owing to their particular vulnerabilities.95 The recognition of social variables and the development of social interpretations of disaster risk facilitates the adoption of community-based approaches where grassroots strategies are conjoined with overall policy visions to ensure effective economics and sustainable 88

Roy 2013. Cons 2012. 90 Falcone and Wangchuk 2008. 91 Wisner et al. 2012. 92 UNISDR 2009, p. 10. 93 Torry 1978a, p. 38; 1978b, p. 179; Kelman 2020. 94 Alexander 2000; Weichselgartner and Obersteiner 2002; Shaw et al. 2010, p. 4. 95 Wisner et al. 2012; Lavell et al. 2012, pp. 25–64. 89

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project outputs.96 For example, communities often self-manage disaster risks through a process of deliberative democracy at micro and macro levels.97 Increasingly, the DRR and climate adaptation discourses at a local level are conjoining due to their shared approaches and goals. Both climate adaptation actions and the DRR aim to reduce the vulnerability of communities and build resilient societies. While climate adaptation focuses on addressing uncertainty and new risks related to climate hazards, DRR roots itself in experience (indigenous knowledge and practices) to respond to existing and ensuing risks from all categories of hazards. Following the normative framing of the Hyogo Framework,98 DRR strategies at different level of governance were formed as detailed action plans outlining the roles of governments, international organizations, civil society and the scientific community, in a common system of coordination for disaster response.99 Such framings have led to tangible and efficient results while responding to disasters at global, regional and national levels. Recognising the role of detailed action-plans in disaster response, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction emphasised utilising enhanced strategies to address the underlying disaster risk factors, while fostering disaster resilience at all levels.100 The shift from an emphasis on disaster management to an increased emphasis on addressing disaster risk management draws several synergies with climate adaptation needs as well as sustainable development goals.101 While the Sendai Framework or the DRR strategies do not set any overarching rights or principles for governance of climate migration they insist on understanding disaster risk in all its dimensions of vulnerability; strengthening disaster risk governance; prioritising the promotion of public and private investment in both structural and non-structural measures; and the need to further enhance preparedness for effective response towards recovery, rehabilitation and reconstruction.102 As I will come to show in the latter part of this chapter, these strategies are widely accepted and applied by national governments in response to displacements caused by disasters, including hydro-metrological disasters that are triggered by climate change. Due to their broad framing and localised focus, these strategies are considered influential in dealing with wicked problems without the burden of definitions, setgoals and single-strategy solutions. Instead, the Sendai Framework and the DRR give appropriate guidance to national governments, international organizations, NGOs, local institutions and civil society, to develop suitable strategies to reduce the risks associated with natural hazards.103 However, as a tool providing policy guidelines, 96

Twigg 1999, p. 54; Shaw and Goda 2004, p. 20. Maskrey 2011, p. 45; IIRR 2007, p. 42. 98 UNISDR 2005. 99 Ibid., p. 21. 100 UNISDR 2015, para 134. 101 Wahlström 2015, p. 200; Kumar et al. 2016, pp. 271–291. 102 UNISDR 2015, paras 20–34. 103 Briceño 2015, pp. 202–204. 97

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the effectiveness of DRR strategies once again depends on the willingness and ability of all the relevant actors to respond, and the climate displaced person does not per se have a right to seek state protection. If a government views climate change migration as a security issue it is more likely to invest in border management practices and bipartisan agreements that explicitly target the cross-border mobility of people in the context of climate change. On the other hand, when a country views climate change induced migration as a multicausal developmental issue, the governance system acts to rationalise migration as part of the broader welfare and developmental discourse. A downside of treating mobility as part of the development discourse is that the prospect of abandoning the rights framing and shifting the burden to developing nations is high. In development discourse, there are a multitude of synergies that need to be considered and these synergies can often compete. The way in which national and sub-national actors frame the migration agenda dictates the value placed on different and often competing developmental discourses. Table 2.1 provides an overview of the issue location and policy responses that a government may adopt. At this point it is important to reiterate that the debate on climate change migration governance is at the moment restricted at an international consultative level. It is not at all clear how the sub-national governments are responding to existing climate change related migrations and how the international negotiations would in fact translate into functional administrative policies at the national and sub-national level. There is a considerable gap in the literature regarding administrative responses to those who move. There are a few recent studies that have aimed at analysing the response operationalisation and changes within the international organizations Table 2.1 Policy Formation Based on Issue Location Issue location

Explanation

Policy response

Climate migration as a security issue

Host country perceive climate change migration as a border security concern

Strengthening border protection

Migrant-sending countries see Bipartisan agreement to climate change migration as a receive migrants entered into reflection of the threat of with neighbouring countries territorial loss due to sea-level rise Climate migration as a human International migration is security issue perceived as a development deficit in home countries

Host country provide development aid to the migrant countries in a bid to reduce migrations

Internal migration is perceived Governments strategies as a development deficit development in geographically vulnerable areas in a bid to reduce instances of out-migration Source The author

2.5 The Indian Paradox: The Elephant in the Room

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such as UNHCR, International Organisation for Migration (IOM) and the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA).104 However, no such attempts are made at the local level and the public administrative perspective is mostly missing from the literature on climate change migration. While we know that the current migration system is flawed and cannot tackle the enormous problem of climate displacements, we do not know why those gaps are there. The general observation is that there is a binary relationship between ‘nonprecise’ policies and ‘non-working governments’ and thus it is necessary to create precise policies and new institutions to respond to the climate migration crisis.105 However, the creation of new norms or new institutions does not innately alter the circumstances within which the administrative apparatus of governments function. In fact, the new policies are implemented through the already existing old institutions and networks of officials which are often rigidly set in a pattern of behaviour.106 Thus, understanding the organisations and their perceptions of climate migration is a necessary first step towards achieving a positive protection outcome.

2.5 The Indian Paradox: The Elephant in the Room At this point, I would like to reflect on the Indian government’s perception of climate change and climate migration. Every year millions of people are displaced in India, primarily in the states of Assam, Bihar, and Uttar Pradesh, due to hydro-metrological disasters.107 However, unlike the neighbouring countries of Bangladesh, Maldives and Nepal, India’s participation in the academic or policy debate on climate change migration has been insignificant. The Indian government has not raised the issue of climate change migration at the UNFCCC, it has not engaged with the high-level consultative process under the Nansen Initiative,108 and it has not held any on-record conversations with either the International Organisation for Migration, the United Nations High Commission for Refugees, Office of Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs, or the International Labour Organisation.109 This absence is hard to ignore given the enormity of disaster displacements in India. I will attempt to unravel the complexity of how the Indian central government and the state government of Assam frame the issue of migration in the remainder of this chapter. I sub-divide this section 104

Hall 2016; Dellmuth et al. 2018; Nash 2018, p. 53; Jordan et al. 2018. Biermann and Boas 2008; Warner 2012. 106 Lustick et al. 2011; Givel 2010; Hughes et al. 2018. 107 IDMC (2021) Global Internal Displacement Data. https://www.internal-displacement.org/dat abase/displacement-data Accessed 29 July 2022. 108 The author was informed in an email communication with Professor Walter Kalin who chaired the Nansen Initiative that the invitation to engage in the South-Asian consultations had been sent to the Ministries in India but that no response was received. 109 These UN organisations are at the forefront of the climate change migration debate due to their experience in handling varied forms of forced and voluntary migration. I was told by senior level UNHRC official Pia Oberoi that India has not engaged with the UN on GCM either. 105

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into three broad areas: (a) the question of vulnerability with specific reference to the State of Assam (Sect. 2.5.1); (b) the multi-layered governance of climate migration (Sect. 2.5.2); and (c) the question of framing at the sub-national level of policy implementation (Sect. 2.5.3). While framing is necessary to identify the policies that the government uses, this framing can differ for different stakeholders in a multilayered governance structure who may look at a wicked problem through different lenses and compete for resources. Nevertheless, it is important to understand this framing to analyse their choices and potential pathways for solutions.

2.5.1 Vulnerability to Climate Change India is the seventh-most vulnerable country with respect to climate extremes.110 Studies have highlighted that a continued high dependence on the environment for food and livelihood activities make India particularly vulnerable to climate variability and changes. As a tropical country with frequent cyclonic disturbances and monsoonrelated events, India has witnessed more than 256 disasters in recent decades, causing more than 50 million people to displace. The data-sets on migration due to natural hazards puts India as one of the most displaced countries with on average 2.3 million displacements every year due to disasters.111 In a recent district level assessment of India by the Council on Energy, Environment and Water (CEEW), 75% of Indian districts were found to be extreme event hotspots.112 CEEW districts level vulnerability index shows that the State of Assam in India is highly exposed to climate related hydro-met disasters (floods and droughts) and has a low adaptive capacity.113 In particular, the districts of Dhemaji, Dhubri, Dibrugarh and Lakhimpur are the most vulnerable to extreme floods and have experienced an exponential increase in the frequency of flood events since 2010.114 Between 1953 and 2017 India has lost more than 466 million ha of land to flood erosion. In the State of Assam, the loss of land due to floods accounts for 7% of the total area of the State.115 My own inquiry into the State of Assam, was guided by the 2011 study by Ravindranath et al. that listed Assam as being highly vulnerable to climate change.116 The Council on Energy, Environment and Water demonstrated a similar result, in a 2021 district level analysis of climate vulnerability in India. The study confirmed the high climate vulnerability faced by districts in the State of Assam (see Fig. 2.1), due to its very

110

Eckstein et al. 2019, p. 37. IDMC (2021) Global Internal Displacement. https://www.internal-displacement.org/database/ displacement-data Accessed 29 July 2022. 112 Mohanty and Wadhawan 2021, p. 3. 113 Mohanty 2020, p. 12; Mohanty and Wadhawan 2021, p. iii. 114 Ibid. 115 Manuvie 2017. 116 Ravindranath et al. 2011. 111

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Fig. 2.1 District-wise Climate Vulnerability in Assam, 2021. Source The author; illustration, data from Mohanty and Wadhawan 2021

high exposure to climate disasters (see Fig. 2.2); and very high climate sensitivity (see Fig. 2.3); coupled with a low adaptive capacity (see Fig. 2.4). While these studies have not particularly considered migration scenarios or the vulnerability and migration nexus, several other studies demonstrate the complex environmental, social, political and economic interplay of variables impacting decisions to migrate.117 These studies highlight that climate vulnerability can not only trigger varied migration patterns, but can also lead to entrapment and inability to relocate in face of collapsing ecosystems.118 The security study uses the State of Assam as an example of a region that has experienced group-based violence due to environmental collapse.119 There is a strong political narrative that most migrations within the state are triggered by resource marginalisation and environmental degradation across the international borders leading to people from Bangladesh moving to the State of Assam.120 Those who migrate are identified as illegal settlers in India, whose status as Indian citizens is questionable. I will discuss this in more detail in Chap. 4 of this book. However, to briefly summarise here, the political and administrative elites in Assam strongly associate the term migration with the socalled ‘illegal Bangladeshi migrant’. These claims cannot be dismissed entirely as 117

Rajan and Bhagat 2017, p. 12; Watmough et al. 2013, p. 287. Watmough et al. 2016, p. 188. 119 Swain 1996, p. 189; Reuveny 2007, p. 656. 120 van Schendel 2005. 118

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Fig. 2.2 District-wise Exposure to Disasters in Assam, 2021. Source The author; illustration, data from Mohanty and Wadhawan 2021

Fig. 2.3 District-wise Climate Sensitivity in Assam, 2021. Source The author; illustration, data from Mohanty and Wadhawan 2021

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Fig. 2.4 District-wise Adaptive Capacity in Assam, 2021. Source The author; illustration, data from Mohanty and Wadhawan 2021

Bangladesh and India share one of the most significant international migration corridors. The census Data from 2011 shows that only 0.28% of Assam’s population was born in Bangladesh, though it does not provide any further information on whether those born in Bangladesh are already naturalised citizens, or if these migrations are more recent, or for what reasons.121 Internal migrations in the State of Assam, and from the State of Assam to other states within India are in themselves quite significant, independent of cross-border migrations. Yet the political narrative surrounding illegal Bangladeshi migration does impact the framing of policies on migration and displacement, as well as loss and damage, at the sub-state level.122 I will revisit this framing variation in the next section.

2.5.2 Multi-level Governance Despite India’s record of disaster induced displacement and sensitivity to climate change, climate change related migration or disaster induced displacement is not 121

Government of India (2011) Census data—D-01 Appendix: Population classified by place of birth, age and sex. State of Assam. https://censusindia.gov.in/census.website/data/census-tables Accessed 20 July 2022. 122 Interview with Deputy Commissioner Kamrup (Metropolitan) 18 February 2016, DC Office, Guwahati, Assam, India.

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directly confronted in the National Climate Change Action Plan. The plan, which was adopted in 2008, does not mention migration, displacement or mobility governance but instead lays out eight action areas with a focus on energy security and vulnerability reduction while promoting sustainable habitats and forestry management practices.123 The absence of direct reference to climate migration in the policy does not mean a complete absence of concern. Both the National and sub-national governments consider migrations and displacement to be part of its larger state practices and multi-level governance paradigm. The state in India as a starting point considers climate migrants to be dynamic actors capable of self-care, adaptation, and self-preservation. This framing is evident from both the documentary evidence and the absence of climate migration policy as well as my own interactions with the senior bureaucrats within the Government of India. When asked, how does the state view climate migrants? There was a broad affirmation that the state does not consider climate migration as a separate area of governance or policy making. Instead, the state points towards the existing wide jurisprudence of rights citing Indian judicial interpretation of the right to life and dignity. In the framing of the Indian government, the legal prescriptions apply to all persons whether displaced due to climate change or not. For example, the judicial decision in the Olga Tellis Case laid the foundation for livelihood to be considered an integral part of the right to life in India, creating a necessary obligation for the state to provide employment to its citizens.124 Similarly, the case of Francis Mullin versus Union Territory of Delhi,125 the apex court held that the right to adequate shelter was part of the right to life. The absence of a direct reference to mobility in the National Climate Action Plan is in line with the senior bureaucratic attitude that migration is a wider rights and developmental issue.126 It is widely believed that instances of rural-urban migration can be reduced through rural development and poverty alleviation programmes, providing opportunities of gainful employment and fulfilling the duty to provide adequate shelter to climate vulnerable communities. For example, while speaking to me multiple senior bureaucrats in the Ministry of Environment, and Department of Disaster Management spoke about “Targeted schemes like MGNREGA127 and IAY 128 ….these assist rural communities to overcome vulnerability to natural hazards.”129 A similar view was also seen in the State of Assam during my visit in 2016, where the state government of Assam considered displacement due to climate change as 123

Government of India 2008, p. 3. Supreme Court of India. Olga Tellis and Ors. V. Bombay Municipal Corporation & Ors. 1985 SCC (3) 545. 125 Supreme Court of India. Francis C. Mullin Versus Administrator Union Territory of Delhi 981 AIR 746 1981 SCR (2) 516. 126 Interview with Joint Secretary, Ministry of Environment and Climate Change, 27 April 2016, New Delhi, India. 127 Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act. 128 Indira Awas Yojana (National Rural Housing Mission). 129 Interview with Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi 16 April 2016, Chief Minister’s House, Dispur, Assam, India. 124

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symptomatic of the existing development deficit of the state. The then State Chief Minister, Shri Tarun Gogoi, commented We (the state) have always been aware of the vulnerability… today it is climate change, before it was water pollution… common people in the country depend on the ecosystem, even today, so if it gets affected, people get affected… we (the state) try to help within our means.130

This framing of climate migration as an issue of development deficit, was also already visible in India’s Second National Communication to UNFCCC in April 2012: the Indian government cited increased climate change related mobility as the result of the developmental deficit, and a manifestation of the existing economic vulnerability in rural areas.131 The elite actors in India framed internal migration caused by slow-onset environmental stress as a livelihood issue: initiatives such as Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, The Disaster Management Act (MGNREGA) and The Indira Awas Yojana (IAY) were seen as a larger vision guaranteeing livelihood opportunities, mitigating and managing disasters, and providing affordable housing.132 At the administrative level rules of procedure within these policies, prioritized ‘flood-victims’, ‘erosion-effected families’, ‘landless households’, etc. for implementation.133 Both the central government and the state government in India also see climate change as a matter of concern which will increase the frequency and severity of disasters in India. While there is no direct reference to climate migration in the disaster policy, the Government of India, triggered by Indian Ocean Tsunami of 2004, adopted the National Disaster Management Act to provide overarching policy guidance which will help it to respond effectively and efficiently to disasters and disaster related displacements. In the State of Assam disaster management was a critical policy issue for the former Chief Secretary of Assam. Mr. Pipersenia (Assam’s former CS) was considered to be a driving force in creating the State Disaster Management Authority and ensuring that all of the vertical and horizontal departments of Assam incorporate disaster management policies for foreseeable hazard situations.134 Under his leadership, Assam was the first State in India to have a fully functional Assam State Disaster Management Authority (ASDMA) and Disaster Management Plan (DMP). The DMP as a policy document was comprehensive in determining not just the role of central and state government but also laying down the details of efforts required from the different departments of local administration, for example the 130

Ibid. Ministry of Environment and Forest-Government of India 2012, p. 169. 132 Interview with V. Pipersenia, Chief Secretary, Government of Assam 17 February 2016, Dispur, Assam, India. 133 Interviews with Joint Secretary, Ministry of Environment and Climate Change, Joint Secretary. (Currently Chief Secretary of Assam), Department of Personnel and Training, April 2016, South Block, New Delhi, India. 134 Interviews with V. Pipersenia, Chief Secretary, Deputy Commissioner Bongaigaon, COO Assam State Disaster Management Authority various dates in February 2016, various locations in Assam, India. 131

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role of village Panchayats, and the role of the department of Animal Husbandry, etc. were laid out in detail. Furthermore, in Assam every district and sub-district also had their own plan for disaster management which are published online on the district websites.135 The government of Assam also appeared fully aware of its climate vulnerability: it was one of the first states in India to engage independent research on climate vulnerability leading to the 2011 study by Ravindranath et al. that I have mentioned in earlier section. Assam also adopted its own State Action Plan on Climate Adaptation with an ‘all hazards – all agencies approach’. This all hazard— all agency approach was already visible in the disaster management plan of the state, according to senior officials looking at climate change and related mobility under the bigger picture of adaptation and development, providing a holistic approach to the issue.136 While framing how climate migrations in India are (and should be) governed, elite actors at the central and state level of administration identified several programs relevant to different patterns of climate migrations. From the freedom of Indian citizens to move, to policies where more active state involvement is necessary, a multitude of solutions were brought to the table. This clearly indicated the willingness of the government to engage with climate migration as a wicked problem requiring holistic framing and multiple approaches. An overview of these approaches is provided in Table 2.2. One of the critical missing components in the Indian framing of climate migration at the central level was the framing of climate migration as a securitization issue. Ingrid Boas, reflecting on this absence of securitization, asserts that while the Indian government is not occupied with the concern of cross-border migration, it does consider internal climate migration an issue of human and livelihood security.137 Boas, through her work, reports that Indian officials consider the securitization of climate change migration to be a western construct. According to the Indian officials she interviewed, ‘climate migration debates in international arena are not motivated by the concern for human or migrant well-being but rather are used as a tool in the divisive politics of negotiations at the UNFCCC’, concluding that India feels cajoled into assuming binding mitigation responsibility due to its geographical proximity to potential migrant-sending nations, like Bangladesh and Maldives.138 My interview with the Joint Secretary to the Ministry of Environment (MoEF)139 and the then chief UNFCCC negotiator of India, Mr Ravi Shankar Prasad, in 2016 revealed a slight shift in direction. The MoEF in India did not framed migration to be a purely environmental issue, but rather a mix of a human security and a development 135

See for example Village level plan from Noomati Village in Dhubri. https://asdma.assam.gov. in/sites/default/files/Village_Disaster_Management_Plan_Dhubri_0.pdf Accessed 25 July 2022. 136 Interview with Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi 16 April 2016, Chief Minister’s House, Dispur, Assam, India. 137 Boas 2015. 138 Ibid. 139 MoEF is the traditionally used abbreviation for the Ministry of Environment and Forest in India. The Ministry was re-christened in 2014 to Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change to reflect the growing concern of the Indian government towards climate change.

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Table 2.2 Policy Intervention Based on Migration Type Migration

Explanatory scenarios

Voluntary adaptive migrations

Households living in Livelihood security fragile ecosystems employ various form of cyclic, and permanent migrations to diversify livelihood options

Policy intervention

Article 19 Constitution of India and MGNREG Act

Legislation

Forced displacement

Temporary relocation due to disaster used as a survival strategy

Relief

Disaster Management Act and CM Relief Fund

Permanent displacement due to loss of habitat

Compensation for loss State level policy on and damage compensation

Evacuation

Temporary assisted migration out of disaster zone for trapped population

Relief

State and central level policy on assistance

Entrapment

Households are trapped in a collapsing ecosystem with no economic resource to move out of their fragile ecosystem

Assisted and planned relocation intensive and targeted implementation of polies on livelihood security, relief and compensation

District authorities have the power to initiate the relocation process under the land laws of the state

Source The author

issue. When asked to identify the appropriate ministries that would be stakeholders in migration management, references were made to the local state governments, the Ministry of Rural Development (MoRD) and the Ministry of Defence (MoD).140 While references to local government and the MoRD was an expected response, the role of the Ministry of Defence hinted towards the beginning of a paradigm shift. For the Ministry of Defence in India, international security concerns on India-Bangladesh border were triggered by the rise of Islamic extremism in Bangladesh, and not by environmental migration.141 The focus of the India-Bangladesh relationship during this time was to develop the partnership in the Bay of Bengal and the geopolitical connection to the ASEAN region.142 While India does not treat climate migrations from Bangladesh as an environmental security concern it does view ‘irregular immigration’ from Bangladesh as a political construction which is never completely denied nor fully accepted by the Central Government of India.

140

Interview with Joint Secretary of Ministry of Environment, Ravi Shankar Prasad, 2016, New Delhi, India. 141 Ministry of Home Affairs 2018, paras 2.53, 2.72, p. 11. 142 Rana 2018, p. 559; Ali 2018, p. 529.

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2.5.3 The Question of Framing Of course, it is an issue of survival.—Deputy Commissioner, Kamrup Metro, Assam, 2016143

The diffusion of international norms into national and sub-national policy action is a well-studied phenomenon. The prominence of the phenomenon in creating regulatory regimes in the areas of international trade, environmental protection, intellectual property rights, and even human security has been documented as a significant impact of international aid and cooperation.144 The growing integration between climate change and disaster risk reduction strategies as an international norm, has led to an increased expectation that sub-national policies aimed at reducing hazard impacts would also incorporate these synergies—in other words the disaster reduction strategies would be sustainable and climate-proofed. Being a flood-prone state, disaster mitigation has always been a key and continuous issue in the state, and thus the shift to perceiving climate change as a hydrometeorological disaster was a natural phenomenon for the state actors. Unlike the Central government in India, the State government of Assam is more forthright in associating climate change with the growing trend of out-migration and intra-district migration in the state. In my discussions with the senior officers of the state secretariat and the deputy commissioners of eight districts, all of them associated climate change with the change in the monsoon rain pattern and erratic flooding. Highlighting specifically the triple flooding in the year 2012, deputy commissioner of Bongaigaon district stated, we always know that there will be an annual flood in the June – July window; however, this was unprecedented, and we were not prepared early enough to handle flooding in April…usually, April is a month when we are still working on our flood strategy….so indeed it took everyone by surprise. Similarly, the flooding in September. We had just finished our relief process when there was a new flood that no-one expected. The nature of the floods has certainly changed, and we think it is due to climate change.145

The knowledge of climate change impacting the migration patterns in the State of Assam was deeply perceptible amongst the elite actors in the state who are responsible for policy making. These views were not just echoed by the district administrative heads but were shared also within the state secretariat where the State Project Officer of the ASDMA stated, we know that climate change is affecting the people in Assam due to its impact on hydrometeorological cycles…however, if a central government functionary asks me to prove it, I will not be able to do that as we do not have data or correlation analysis… so we do not say anything. However, if you ask anyone in Assam, they would say that the monsoon flooding

143

Interview with Deputy Commissioner Kamrup (Metropolitan) 18 February 2016, DC Office, Guwahati, Assam, India. 144 Simmons et al. 2006, p. 781; Shipan and Volden 2008, p. 840. 145 Interview with Deputy Commissioner Bongaigaon 29 February 2016, Bongaigaon District Office, Assam, India.

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is more intense and wide-spread. Earlier we used to have a problem only in the river-bank regions; now the entire district gets flooded during the monsoon.146

On the other hand, the central actors, including the ones who earlier served in the state administration and are thus highly aware of the state’s problems and its dynamics with the central government, firmly believe that the state is using climate change as an excuse to cover up its past developmental deficits.147 Nevertheless, the Central, as well as the state actors, are increasingly aware of the out-migration from the State of Assam. While the centre blames it on the lack of opportunities within the state and the state government’s failure to mitigate disasters, the state government has adopted a more nuanced view. For example, multiple state government officials viewed climate migrations as not strictly forced migration, but migration out of poverty and thus more aligned to adaptive migrations. Rajesh Kumar, the Deputy Commissioner of Morigaon district, which is one of the most vulnerable districts in the state, stated, It is wrong to say that they are forced to move, yes, some influential circumstances are there, but that force is from nature and not from the state or any other entity of the state. If the lands are eroded, they have to move, it is an involuntary movement in those cases but not forced.148

Similarly, the Deputy Commissioner of Goalpara district stated that, when people do not have a job in the local area, they move to the nearby areas and Urban centres. Village economies are small, and there is not much scope for development. A lot of youths from Goalpara go to Guwahati for a job, even on a daily basis due to its proximity.149

Explaining the migration trajectory and migration reasons, the Deputy Commissioner of Dhubri District Nazirul Islam stated, normally a single youth from a family will migrate either to Guwahati or to outside of Assam. The majority of the youths from Dhubri migrate outside of Assam state to West Bengal, Delhi or Bangalore. As Dhubri is an old district and a port city it has equal opportunities like Guwahati so the youths from here will migrate outside the state instead. It works in a cycle; they will migrate just before the flood season and return during the Bihu festival. Now that the floods are more erratic the migration is also more erratic, and sometimes the youths do not come home for Bihu. However, we do not know if it is yet a pattern, we do not have a record. It is just a logical explanation.150

146

Interview with COO Assam State Disaster Management Authority 14 February 2016, Secretariat, Dispur, Assam, India. 147 Interview with Jt. Sec. Ravi Shankar Prasad, 2016; Jt. Sec. Jishnu Baruha, 2016; Retd. Addl. DIG Rajender Kumar, 2016. 148 Interview with Deputy Commissioner Morigaon, 17 February 2016, DC Office Morigaon, Assam, India. 149 Interview with Deputy Commissioner Goalpara, 3 March 2016, DC Office Goalpara, Assam, India. 150 Interview with Deputy Commissioner Dhubri 1 March 2016, Circuit House, Dhubri, Assam, India.

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The senior bureaucracy in Assam reflected an awareness of climate change, possibly due to the internalisation of the international norms. They understood that in a warming world the hydrometeorological cycles will be disturbed and crop yields will decrease. They were also fully aware that the existing problems due to the lack of development will be exacerbated, and communities will migrate out of collapsing ecosystems. In particular, due to the triple flooding in 2012 and the December monsoon in 2014, which was a changed hydro-metrological scenario in the state, the administration was already beginning to connect the dots and viewed climate change as a current problem instead of a problem for the future. Dr Angamuthu stated, earlier there was only one flood, now there are instances of multiple flooding and flooding even in what used to be dry months. If this is an effect of climate change than we are certainly facing it, and all the displacement which occurred during and because of these floods can be attributed to climate change.151

Nandita Hazarika, building a more nuanced explanation, said, we commissioned a livelihood diversification study for the state in 2012, because we are aware of our climate vulnerability and if we are unable to provide alternative means of employment to our farming communities they will migrate outside the state to generate income… farming cannot provide everything, in this state farming is only subsistence.152

Like a wicked problem, climate-change related migration is perceived by the state actors as an issue that is present but cannot be decisively pinned down for an explanation. The multitude of reasons for which people migrate, the effect of climate change on those reasons and the gap in the data in regard to understanding how exactly climate change affects migration are some critical questions in regard to which each bureaucrat has a different understanding, much like each academic working on the issue. Nevertheless, each of the state administrators agreed that climate change is somehow affecting the out-migration from the state and it is an issue that the state must deal with.

2.6 Conclusion The central government of India perceives the problem of migration to be a developmental issue and thus that is the primary direction that the sub-national state government must adopt. Despite an absence of specific framing of climate migration, I found that the state in India recognises several patterns of migrations. There is the voluntary adaptive migrant who is a dynamic actor and require minimal support from the state. The state as a paternalist entity would assume the enabling role 151

Interview with Deputy Commissioner Kamrup (Metropolitan) 16 March 2016, Circuit House, Guwahati, Assam, India. 152 Interview with COO Assam State Disaster Management Authority 14 February 2016, Secretariat, Dispur, Assam, India.

References

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and provide welfare support in case a citizen asks for it. There is the often-visible forced displacements due to floods, draughts and storms, these migrants are usually called—victim of circumstances—and the state holds a benevolent duty to protect them. There are displacements caused due to loss of land and permanent damage to place of habitation post-disaster. These “homeless or landless victims” are most in need of state assistance and must be prioritized. And finally, there are those who are trapped in their ecosystem and cannot afford to move out of their misery. These are invisible people whom the state is genuinely worried about but finds difficult to help due to multiple social, political and economic factors. In each of this framing the state uses the paradigm of wicked problem to develop schemes and programs which may help a little but might not completely solve the crisis. While these policies are not enacted explicitly for regulating climate migrations, the government, especially the sub-national government in the State of Assam, is more perceptive of role of climate change in triggering migrations. The senior bureaucracy is aware of the nested complexity of migration due to environmental constraints and is capable of identifying policies that could potentially benefit and create multiple synergies through resource ownership, resilience, adaptation and migration. However, in the event of no uniform national or state policy on climate migration, the primary burden of managing climate change mobility falls on multiple vertically and horizontally placed institutional actors in charge of developmental and disaster risk reduction programs. And while the academic scholars in the field of climate change have not yet come to evaluate the operationalization these development programs there is a rich body of work in form of bureaucratic and regional ethnographies which informs us how the developmental programs are executed in sub-national and local settings. Two very interesting body of work on Indian state ethnography emerged in the recent years. Akhil Gupta’s book Red Tape, which also somewhere influenced my own choice of studying the sub-national state looking at the poverty eradication programs in Bidoli district of the State of Uttar Pradesh.153 And Mathur’s evaluation of how two of the government’s ‘sophisticated’ and ‘specialized’ schemes—the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Guarantee Act of 2005 and the Wildlife Protection Act of 1972 are operationalised. Both these work point towards the dichotomy in the ‘State life of Law’ and the ‘real life of law’ and argues that it is ultimately the street-level translation and understanding of the new legal instrument amidst the existing legal and social environment, which will determine the success of law.154

References Adger WN (2000) Social and ecological resilience: are they related? Progress in Human Geography 24:347–364. https://doi.org/10.1191/030913200701540465 Adger WN, Pulhin JM, Barnett J et al (2014) Human security. Cambridge University Press 153 154

Gupta 2012. Mathur 2016.

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Chapter 3

Governing Displacements

Contents 3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 Governing Through Rights Framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 Governing Through Disaster Risk Reduction Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.1 Governing Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.2 Governing Disasters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3.3 Governing Flood Displacements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 Governing Through Loss and Damage Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.1 Compensating Losses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.2 Rebuilding Shelters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4.3 Special Assistance for Erosion-Affected Families . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

55 58 63 64 69 74 79 80 82 83 89 90

Abstract The present chapter provides an overview of the normative framework and institutional policies used by sub-national administrators to respond to the issue of climate migrations. By reviewing the implementation of some of the key policies like MGNREGA, National Rural Housing Scheme, and Land-erosion compensation, the chapter demonstrates that while there is a presence of tailored rights-based, developmental, and risk-reduction approaches the outcomes of these policies are limited. It is argued that such limitation comes from within the sub-national context. The state apparatus operates within the historical, political, and social contexts of local areas where these complexes can prevent maximizing the synergies of different normative frameworks—the functional life of norms is therefore circumscribed by the political and social complexes within which they operate. Keywords Assam · MGNREGA · Erosion · Rehabilitation · Climate migration · Flood-relief · Disaster risk reduction

3.1 Introduction Migrations due to chronic hydro-meteorological disasters are a significant phenomenon in the State of Assam, India. The present chapter provides an overview of the normative framework and institutional policies used for managing migration © T.M.C. ASSER PRESS and the author 2023 R. Manuvie, Climate Migration Governance and the Discourse of Citizenship in India, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-567-6_3

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and displacement caused by flood disasters at the sub-national level. Every district in Assam shows a high to very high current vulnerability to climate change primarily due to its high exposure to hydro-meteorological disasters, increased disaster sensitivity, and low adaptive capacity of the communities living in these regions.1 Due to Assam’s geographical sensitivity to floods, the communities living in Assam exhibit various patterns of migration—from cyclic labour migration used as climate adaptation strategy2 to temporary forced displacement due to annual floods,3 long-term displacement patterns caused by flood erosion, and voluntary relocations.4 The State of Assam shares an international border with the Republic of Bangladesh, which is also a ‘climate migration hot-spot’.5 Assam is intriguing for its geographical, historical, and political placement as a border state. Not only is it sensitive to climate change and climate change related migration patterns, it also has a violent political history that involves cross-border migrations and group-identity based conflicts.6 In the security studies literature on the environment and conflict nexus, Assam is highlighted as a region facing conflict due to resource constraints caused by environmentally motivated migration.7 In this chapter, I will tease out how the sub-national government in Assam responds to climate change migrations, utilizing the existing policy context. I have discussed in Chap. 2 of this monograph how the governance of climate change migration is seen as a part of the existing development and welfare agenda at a central policy level. In this chapter, I put the focus on the sub-national implementation of these policies. I look at three thematic areas—first, are the rightsbased frameworks—the rights-based frameworks provide a rights guarantee to citizens with respect to freedom of movement, right to shelter, and right to gainful employment. These rights-based approaches enable people to migrate in order to adapt or to survive. The absence of these rights can create increased vulnerability. Second, disaster risk reduction (DRR) approaches. These policies are built to mitigate forced migrations (especially sudden-onset displacements) by enhancing the structural capacity and preparedness of communities against disasters. The goal of DRR in the State of Assam is to build a general capacity to predict and mitigate disaster impact and improve societal resilience.8 And third, loss and damage policies. These

1

Mohanty and Wadhawan 2021. Rajan and Bhagat 2017, p. 12; Government of India (2011) Census data—D-02: Migrants classified by place of last residence, sex and duration of residence in place of enumeration. State of Assam. https://censusindia.gov.in/census.website/data/census-tables Accessed 20 July 2022. 3 IDMC (2021) Global Internal Displacement Data. Available at https://www.internal-displacem ent.org/database/displacement-data Accessed 20 July 2022. 4 Revenue and Disaster Management Department 2015; ASDMA 2012. 5 Hassani-Mahmooei and Parris 2012, p. 780; Mirza et al. 2003, p. 287; Maharjan et al. 2020, p. 5. 6 Aggarwal 1999; Barbora 2008, pp. 313–334; Baruah 1986, pp. 1184–1206; 2001; 2003, pp. 44–66; Darnell and Parikh 1988, pp. 263–281; Hazarika 1993. 7 Homer-Dixon 1994, pp. 5–40; Reuveny 2007, pp. 656–673; Swain 1996, pp. 189–204; Suhrke 1997, pp. 255–272. 8 Interviews COO Assam State Disaster Management Authority, V. Pipersenia, Chief Secretary, Government of Assam, February 2016, Dispur, Assam, India. 2

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policies are built to provide financial assistance and compensation to those who suffer loss and damage to their habitat (or property) due to hydro-meteorological disasters. There are at least three approaches to the implementation of any policy: the topdown approach, which relies on a strong central organisation, a clear and consistent policy objective, fully specified tasks, minimal dependency relationships and an inherent assumption that the implementing authorities will execute the task efficiently as per expectations, unless an external socioeconomic condition significantly undermines the process. In contrast, the bottom-up approach charts the implementation of policy through self-selecting clusters of organisations.9 The third approach is to tie the bottom-up, and the top-down approaches into a new administrative management model, wherein the centre constitutes the loose outline of the policy while the local actors negotiate competing details and synergies that they would like to prioritise.10 In the Indian context, policies on rural employment generation and disaster management follow the new administrative model, wherein the legal document provides a loose outline of functions and responsibilities while leaving space for the local actors to fill in the details. It was seen during this study that while senior bureaucratic officers can perceive the complexity of wicked problems, requiring a series of tasks to be achieved in a relatively harmonious routine, for the street-level actors, the designated tasks are just a routine—part of the mundane everyday administration. There is a growing body of public policy literature that has critiqued the omnipresence of senior bureaucracies (managers), expressing scepticism about the managerial rhetoric of problems and policies, and pointing at the systems’ inability to eliminate discretion and differential policy outcomes.11 I argue that the implementation of the policies in Assam is challenged by the local political narratives and world-views of those at the forefront of implementation. The world-view of Assam administrators may not always portray a person displaced due to floods favourably. In fact, owing to the strong political narrative of ‘illegal Bangladeshi migrants’, the sub-state often finds itself simultaneously contesting the status of flood victims as legitimate citizens of the state. The current chapter is a descriptive chapter and draws on an evaluation of key-schemes which are identified as having maximum synergy with climate migration governance by elite bureaucratic actors in India, such as the MGNREGA scheme and the National Rural Housing Scheme (IAY scheme/also known as Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana—PMAY). Unpublished state data is also used: for example, the list of erosion affected areas which were procured during field work undertaken during 2016. Geographical maps are generated using the Bhuvan GIS software developed by the Indian Space Research Organization and GIS portal of the Central Water Commission.

9

Marsh and Rhodes 2011; Rhodes 2007. Ibid. 11 Evans 2011, pp. 368–386; Ellis 2007, pp. 405–422. 10

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3.2 Governing Through Rights Framework The country belongs to everyone; everyone belongs to this country…… This is the janambhumi (birthland) and the karambhumi (homeland)…. people go and live wherever they can. – Chief Secretary of the State of Assam, Dispur, Assam, 2016

In a disaster-prone State, general adaptability towards known and regular episodes of disasters is seen to be very high.12 People residing in vulnerable locations circumscribe their lives and well-being around disasters and use several forms of in-suit adaptation strategies.13 The Assam State Disaster Management Authority has identified livelihood diversification as a key area of action for developing adaptation synergies and reducing flood risk.14 The Indian government has expressed several times that the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act of 2005 (MGNREGA) provides a cross-sectoral synergy with climate change adaptation, and is aimed at reducing rural-urban migration.15 The stated objectives of the MGNREGA include the creation of a guaranteed legal entitlement for poor households in rural areas.16 Under the MGNREGA, any adult from a household can demand 100 days of paid unskilled employment from the government, and such a demand must be met within 15 days. If the government fails to meet such a demand it is duty bound to pay unemployment allowances to the applicant.17 The scheme represents an explicit recognition by the government of its responsibility for ensuring the availability of adequate employment for all registered households all of the time. However, unlike other schemes, the MGNREGA does not require a specific economic threshold or demographic character for those seeking employment. It thus builds a rights-based framework through which employment can be sought as a claim against the state. In the organisational scheme for the MGNREGA (see Fig. 3.1), the village panchayats are the primary stakeholders responsible for the promotion of the scheme, the registration of workers, and the identification of the work to be undertaken. The District Collectors in the role of Chief Program Coordinators have responsibility for approving projects within their jurisdictions; authorising necessary sanctions 12

Adger 1999, pp. 249–269. Black et al. 2011, pp. 447–449; Campbell 2010, pp. 57–80. 14 ASDMA 2012. 15 Ministry of Environment and Forest (India) 2012, p. 116; 2015, p. 145. India’s 1st National Communication to UNFCCC was written in 2004, a year prior to the enactment of the MGNREG Act. In that report, the Government of India strongly identified the need to diversify rural employment and help households increase their income threshold as a strategy towards adaptation. See for example p. 93 of India’s First National Communication to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/indnc1.pdf. 16 Section 3, MGNREGA. Government of India (2005) Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act. Available at https://rural.nic.in/sites/default/files/nrega/Library/Books/1_M GNREGA_Act.pdf Accessed 15 July 2022. 17 Section 5, Ibid. 13

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State Council Central Council •Supervision

•Consultation •supervision •audit

District Commissioner •coordination •approval •audit •reporting •redressal •fiscal planning

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Intermediary Panchayat •coordination •reporting progress to CPO •allotment of fund to VPs

Village Panchayat •project identification •worker registration •release of payments

Fig. 3.1 Organogram of Administration under MGNREGA. Source Author’s illustration; adapted from (Sections 14–16) MGNREG Act

and administrative clearance; supervising and monitoring progress across the whole district; conducting periodic inspections of works in progress; and redressing the grievances of the applicants.18 The roles of the Central and State Councils are only supervisory and consultative in nature, in terms of determining the policy’s progress. Previous localised studies considering the synergies between MGNREGA and climate change vulnerability reduction in agrarian villages have reported a positive outcome and potential for reducing rural-urban distress migration.19 Similarly, the potential for a high synergy between the MGNREGA scheme and Climate Change adaptation is also found in the State of Assam.20 However, the overall impact of the scheme has remained limited so far. In poor states, the generation of livelihood under MGNREGA has remained weak due to inferior quality asset creation.21 In analysing the impact of the scheme in the State of Assam, Das concluded that the generation of jobs under the scheme is inadequate and that this has led to a general dissatisfaction amongst the rural communities surrounding the prospects of the scheme.22 Around 3.89 million households registered under the MGNREGA scheme in the State of Assam during 2010–11, which was also the base year by which all the districts of Assam were beneficiaries of the scheme.23 The highest demand for jobs was in the district of Dhemaji (52.66%) followed by in Morigaon (50.90%) and Goalpara (50.33%) districts. In the districts of Jorhat and Kamrup Metro, which are more urban than the rest of the State, the demand was low, at 35.54% and 32.73% respectively. However, across the entire state only 3.17% of households demanding employment received 100 days of guaranteed employment with the highest 100-day employment guarantee achieved in the district Dhemaji (11.12% of the households 18

Sections 14–15, Ibid. Tiwari et al. 2011, pp. 39–47; Esteves et al. 2013, pp. 94–103; Ranaware et al. 2015, pp. 53–61; Pankaj and Tankha 2010, pp. 45–55. 20 Bhattacharyya and Vauquline 2013, pp. 83–101. 21 Fraser 2015, pp. 679–694. 22 Das 2013, pp. 49–61. 23 Manuvie 2018, p. 102. 19

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Fig. 3.2 Implementation of MGNREGA in Assam (2010–2021). Source Author’s illustration, from MGNREGA open data

demanding employment were engaged) and one of the lowest in Morigaon (where only 0.84% of households demanding employment were given 100 days of work).24 In the last 10 years the demand for employment as well as the state capacity to provide employment has generally increased, however the guarantee of 100-days employment has remained abysmal (see Fig. 3.2). Some of the major challenges faced by the sub-national actors in implementing MGNREGA are erratic flood patterns, political violence, and the process of citizenship determination. For example, commenting on the decline in demand pattern early on, seven out of eight district commissioners interviewed suggested that the triple flooding during 2012 created an impossible circumstance for the work to be carried out—“there was water everywhere….where will one carry out works.”25 The flooding in the state occurred in three waves, lasting for a short duration each time. The first wave of flooding occurred in April and led to the temporary displacement of 4068 people. During this time, no relief operation was undertaken. However, the intensity of the floods increased tremendously during the second flood that occurred in June and July. Forty-three embankments and dykes were breached by the flood waters across the state, and all twenty-seven districts of the State were affected.26 The districts of Dhemaji and Jorhat were the worst hit areas. The river island Majuli was completely submerged during the floods. 2.3 million people were displaced during 24

Ibid., p. 107. Interviews with Deputy Commissioner Dhubri; Deputy Commissioner Bongaigaon, 29 February 2016, Assam, India. 26 Interview with COO Assam State Disaster Management Authority 14 February 2016, Secretariat, Dispur, Assam, India. 25

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Fig. 3.3 a, b Rehab Model Village for Violence-affected Families, Bongaigaon. Source The author

this period, and 4540 villages across 128 revenue circles were severely inundated. The third wave of flooding during the same year washed across 22 districts, affecting 2.9 million people across 2594 villages in 94 revenue circles. The image below shows the extent of the rainfall and flooding during the monsoon season of 2012.27 It is worth noting that after the June 2012 floods, severe violence broke out in the lower catchment of the Brahmaputra River in the districts of Kokrajhar, Chirang and Dhubri. Approximately 77 people were killed during this violence, and 400,000 were displaced for an indefinite amount of time.28 The situation in the state was so intense that the government deployed 13 factions of the paramilitary, a curfew, and a shoot-at-sight order within these three districts.29 The conflict and curfew led to the suspension of works conducted under the MGNREGA programme, which affected job-availability for the displaced families.30 Some of the people displaced by this violence were still living in camps during my visit to Assam in 2016. The rehabilitation camp had abysmal living conditions with no provision for water, electricity, livelihoods or schooling (see Fig. 3.3b).31 The only sign that gives away its status as a camp was a board that stated, ‘rehab model village’ (see Fig. 3.3a). Video clips of the July 2012 violence in Assam were widely circulated through social media to incite ethnic retaliation against North-Eastern youths working in several Indian cities.32 Significant instances of violence and killings occurred in the cities of Mumbai and Pune (Maharashtra State), Lucknow (Uttar Pradesh State), 27

NIDM 2013. Al Jazeera (2012) Assam violence reverberates across India. http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/ features/2012/08/201281572950685537.html Accessed 29 July 2022. 29 BBC (2012) What lies behind Assam violence? http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-189 93905 Accessed 29 July 2022. 30 Interview with Project Officer, District Disaster Management Authority, Chirang District, 28 February 2016. 31 Interview with Project Officer, District Disaster Management Authority, Bongaigaon, 29 February 2016. 32 First Post (2012) Assam riots live: Tarun Gogoi attacks national media for negative role. http://www.firstpost.com/india/assam-riots-live-tarun-gogoi-attacks-national-media-fornegative-role-391441.html Accessed 29 June 2022. 28

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Bangalore (Karnataka), Hyderabad (Andhra Pradesh) and Coimbatore (Tamil Nadu). In the city of Bangalore alone 30,000 North-Eastern youths fled to their home states during this time.33 The then Prime Minister of India, Dr Manmohan Singh, who was also a parliamentarian from the Guwahati constituency of Assam, along with the Chief Minister of Assam, Tarun Gogoi, negotiated strategies of safe-return with the Chief Minister of Karnataka.34 At the request of the Assam government, additional trains were arranged to enable north-eastern youth to return to Assam.35 The Home Minister of India ordered a blanket ban on SMS and MMS circulations in the violenceaffected states for 15 days to mitigate public incitements.36 The floods, the violence in Assam, and the violence against north-eastern youths in other states of India badly affected the MGNREGA scheme’s performance as well as the performance of all other social welfare schemes and infrastructure building projects during that year.37 The Assam violence of 2012 (like several other acts of violence in the past) was directed against ‘illegal Bangladeshi migrants’. Central government leaders like Nitin Gadhkari placed the blame squarely on the ‘Muslim illegal Bangladeshi migrants’ who enter from Assam and settle in various parts of the country.38 The violence however does not stop at these episodes. The violence in Assam, as I explained in Chap. 1, is part of a larger mobilization for identity. It is the battle ground to determine who belongs in the state and who is an illegal Bangladeshi. Identity politics subsumes all schemes and governance matters and plays a deterministic role in determining who benefits from the welfare state. At the national level, the government gave strong instructions to state officials to fulfil the Assam Accord promise and update the National Register of Citizenship (NRC) and withdraw rights conferred to alleged noncitizens.39 Despite the MGNREGA guarantee of employment to ‘every household’

33

Indian Express (2012) Pune attacks against North-East students too provoked by ‘Assam video’. http://www.indianexpress.com/news/pune-attacks-against-northeast-students-tooprovoked-by-assam-video-say-police/988047/0 Accessed 20 July 2022. 34 Interview with Chief Minister Tarun Gogoi 16 April 2016, Chief Minister’s House, Dispur, Assam India. 35 Deccan Herald (2012) Assam echoes in Mumbai. http://www.deccanherald.com/content/270900/ assam-echoes-mumbai.html Accessed 20 July 2022; Al Jazeera (2012) India’s PM promises help to riot victims. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/asia/2012/07/2012728152819365333.html Accessed 20 July 2022. 36 Times of India (2012) Cops nab gang which sent hate SMSs in Bangalore. http://articles.tim esofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-08-18/bangalore/33261420_1_smss-mobile-shop-police-officer Accessed 20 July 2022. 37 Interview with Deputy Commissioner Kamrup (M) 18 February 2016, DC office, Guwahati, Assam, India. 38 Business Standards (2012) Illegal migrants responsible for attacks on NE people: Gadkari. Available at: https://www.business-standard.com/article/economy-policy/illegal-migrants-responsiblefor-attacks-on-ne-people-gadkari-112081603012_1.html Accessed 20 July 2022. 39 Ministry of Home Affairs 2013. Physical Copy accessed through Assam Archives.

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and ‘every person’40 (not merely citizens) the job-card allotment in the state to registered households started to show variation following the event of 2012. The strong political undercurrent with respect to citizenship, and therefore right to employment, showed itself in the State of Assam from the early years of MGNREGA. When asked about this undercurrent, every person in the state administration refused to answer. However, in 2016 when the process of NRC was at its peak, the MGNREGA saw one of its largest job card deletions in the State (see data—image above). While the MGNREGA is indeed a rights-based guarantee which has synergy to provide livelihood and help households adapt to climate change, its implementation is influenced by the local political contestations surrounding who belongs to Assam and who should therefore benefit from government schemes. A second order synergy that the MGNREGA programs bring to India are in their suitability for building rural infrastructure. This involves tasks such as building dykes, constructing roads and irrigation canals, maintaining wetlands and watersheds, undertaking small structural measures for flood-control and erosion prevention. Such structural responses are necessary for mitigating vulnerability to floods.

3.3 Governing Through Disaster Risk Reduction Policy India’s first National Flood Relief Policy was created in 1954 as a response to the devastating floods followed by a massive earthquake in the State of Assam during 1950–51.41 The people of Assam can recall from memory how the 1951 earthquake permanently altered the geomorphology of the Brahmaputra River, making it a shallow basin river.42 The changed morphology is partially responsible for the river braiding and extensive flooding during the monsoon season.43 The 1954 policy was designed with three phases of action. The Immediate Phase (within two years) mandated the construction of embankments at vulnerable sites, the creation of revetments and spurs to protect towns against river erosion, and the collection of data to investigate flood patterns. The Short-term Phase (from the 3rd to the 7th year) included progress in the creation of embankments and adopting structural measures for improving drainage channels. The Long-term Phase (from the 8th to the 12th 40

Sections 2–3 MGNREGA. Government of India (2005) Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act. https://rural.nic.in/sites/default/files/nrega/Library/Books/1_MGNR EGA_Act.pdf Accessed 20 July 2022. 41 Planning Commission 1951, p. 52; Desai 1998, p. 164. 42 The fearful narrative of earthquake is potent in Assam. It was witnessed first-hand by the researcher during the field work, when a Richter 5.3 level earthquake with an epicentre across the Indian border with Myanmar shook the bhumi (land) of the circuit house in Dhemaji and the open spaces got flooded by crowds of people. My fearful neighbours insisted that I vacate the premises immediately and take safe cover with them. The night hours after that were filled with memories of the 1951 earthquake, and phone calls from my newly acquired Assamese well-wishers, like it must usually happen in Assam after every earthquake since. 43 Gilfellon et al. 2003, p. 227; Sarma 2005, p. 226; Allison 1998, p. 1269.

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year) consisted of the construction of water storage reservoirs, the building of new embankments wherever necessary, and the adoption of other long-term measures for flood control and irrigation.44 The structural focal policy has since been revised to include non-structural measures of flood zoning and early warnings, and promotion of land-use patterns that will disincentivise land ownership in flood-prone areas. All these elements of policy have also been influenced by international discourse on disaster management, borrowing implementation vocabulary from World-Bank and UNDP supported programs.

3.3.1 Governing Structures The management of floodplains under the 1954 policy was left to the state administration as river morphology and land-development policy differs on a state by state basis. However, due to the massive size of the hydro-meteorological projects, the state rely heavily upon the central government for financial assistance as well as technical guidance. The River Management Wing of the Ministry of Water Resource and Irrigation looks after the implementation of the flood management programmes throughout India except in case of the Ganga River Basin and the Brahmaputra River basin. For these two basins, specialised boards were instituted in 1972 and 1980 to provide technical expertise and financial support.45 The Brahmaputra Board, set up under the Brahmaputra Board Act of 1980, is tasked with performing functions and exercises that the central government may specify from time to time by notification in the official Gazette. Since its constitution, it has been given the task of carrying out surveys and investigations in the Brahmaputra Valley and preparing plans for the control of flooding, bank erosion, and the improvement of drainage in the Brahmaputra and Baraka valleys. The Board has also embarked on the construction of multipurpose dams in consultation with the central government. These policies are driven by the associated economic incentives and are developed with an understanding (or assumption) that the State would receive central government funding to implement projects. In the Brahmaputra basin, an estimated 4458.60 km of the embankment has been constructed since 1954.46 The structural measures undertaken by the board run alongside the additional measures undertaken by the Rashtriya Bhar Ayog (Central Flood Control Board— CFCB). The measures recommended by the CFCB are incorporated through the non-plan budgets of state and central governments. Representatives of the various departments of the state governments and central organisations directly involved in flood control measures are all stakeholders in the State Flood Control Boards. The Public Works Department (PWD) is the on-ground implementor undertaking all 44

Government of Assam Water Resource Department undated. Mukhtarov and Gerlak 2013, p. 307; National Commission on Floods (2008) https://dspace.gipe. ac.in/xmlui/handle/10973/52550. 46 Brahmaputra Board 2022, p. 126. 45

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public works related to flood control. Despite the governance apparatus, structural flood control measures in India are generally inadequate, and in the State of Assam the level of this inadequacy is alarming.47 The Central Water Commission maintains general records on projects implemented by the State and Central Government Departments. At an all-India level this includes a total of 1759 Major and Medium Irrigation Projects; 132 ERM Projects; 220 Hydro-electric Projects; 293 Powerhouses; 390 Lift Irrigation Schemes; 4608 Dams; 208 Barrages; 299 Weirs; 74 Anicuts and 4574 Reservoirs.48 A geo-visualization of the various CWC projects is generated using the query-interface map of irrigation projects including dams, reservoirs, and irrigation channels from a 2010 data set. The all India geo-visualization (Fig. 3.4) and the Assam state (Fig. 3.5) geo-visualization provides a comparative overview of structural development in the Brahmaputra Valley region. The maps depict a lack of structural development in the Brahmaputra Valley as well as the Ganges Valley. There are differences between the nature of the Brahmaputra Valley and the Ganges Valley. First, due to its morphology, the river Ganges has a deep drainage basin with mostly defined banks; this character is missing in the case of the river Brahmaputra, which, due to the 1950 earthquake in the region and a resultant shift in the tectonic plates, became a shallow basin river with an undefined course. GIS imagery from Indian Space Research Organizations’ National Remote Sensing Mission shows that the Brahmaputra is very susceptible to river course-change and bank erosion.49 Second, the Ganges, due to its ‘sacredness’, has an abundance of privately managed river-bank structures called ‘ghats’, which are an important part of the everyday rituals of the lives of the Hindu people occupying its banks. People living across the Ganges use these ghats not only for special ritualistic purposes like birth and death ceremonies, but also on an everyday basis for purification baths and daily prayers. However, the Brahmaputra is not a ‘mother river’, in fact, it is the only paternalist river in India, and no such religious sentiment or physical structure symbolic of religious practices is visible across its Banks.50 There is no fundamental sacredness, unlike the Ganges, which is the ‘life-giving mother river’. The Brahmaputra is the ‘mighty destroyer’ or a ‘stream of sorrow’ in popular colloquial narratives.51 Third, the occurrences of floods in Brahmaputra are politically inconsequential for the Central Indian government due to the relatively low population of North-East India. These circumstances have not only led to negligence in construction projects but also to a neglect in social audits of ongoing projects. 47

NDMA 2008. Manuvie 2018, p. 121. 49 National Remote Sensing Center 2011. 50 An exception to the norm is the presence of ghat at the water-side periphery of the Kamakhya Temple dedicated to the Goddess Kamakhya in Guwahati. 51 In popular culture one of the most celebrated singers of North-East India—Dr. Bhupin Hazarika— has famously alluded to the river Brahmaputra for the ‘heartless miseries across its wide border’. The song Bistirna paarore was later translated into Hindi and Brahmaputra was replaced by ‘Ganga’ (reflecting the might of the ganga-like river of the north-east). The Hindi rendition of Ganga Behti of Kyun (Ganga why do you flow?) made Bhupin Hazarika a colossal figure in mainstream music culture of India. 48

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Fig. 3.4 Water Resource Projects in India. Source The author; generated using the WRIS data 2017. Map is not to scale

Mr Victor Carpenter, the Deputy Commissioner for the Dhemaji district in Upper Assam, explained in a somewhat upfront conversation, earlier no-one knew government business, so there was huge scope of corruption. People in the department used to get a big project sanctioned before the wedding of their daughter, and they would go for a smaller project if they had to buy a car. Every project gives a moneymaking opportunity; infrastructure development projects were the cash-cows of corruption for everyone. It is a flood-prone state so half of the blame for the non-completion can be shifted to the floods straight away, and the other half can be put on the political leadership.

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Fig. 3.5 Water Resource Measures in the North-East of India. Source The author; generated using the WRIS data 2017. Map is not to scale

The Brahmaputra River board undertook initial feasibility studies for the construction of a hydel-power project, and proposed the creation of Subansari Hydropower project in 2001. The project included a dam reservoir to reduce down-stream flood damage, and hydropower generation at the border of the State of Arunachal Pradesh and the State of Assam in the district of Dhemaji. The project was to provide adequate flood control measures while also raising the electricity generation capacity of the state by 2000 MW. Fifteen years later, in 2016, the lower Subansari Dam was still under construction, despite almost 117 memorandums of understanding signed between the State and the Central government at various points to kick-start the

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halted progress. A gigantic 400% of the initial proposed monetary value was already spent on a Dam, which was practically non-existent.52 The enormous delays caused in construction are part of the existing administrative design in Assam, where the process of fiscal approval for planned work over a twelvemonth period occurs on an annual basis in the months of April/May of the preceding year. In June and July, the state and its departments are busy dealing with annual floods. During this time the local political leader uses the fear of flooding to mobilize against Dam construction. Questions such as ‘what if the dam collapses?’ are set into circulation through the media at a time when the masses are already struggling with floods. The general disaster relief and rebuilding process, dissatisfaction with the government, and political mobilization against the dam can stagnate construction works. The construction continues between October and December, and if there is no flood during this season, the state officials are able to supervise the works. From January onwards, the state again gets busy with designing regular relief progress strategies, budgeting for next year, in line with Assam government’s all disaster— all department motto. During this time officers avoid supervision of infrastructural building projects and so the overall progress and quality achieved during this time can get washed away with the floods. In the end, it is only for three months out of twelve that any real structural work happens. This delaying tactic, as one of my interviewees explained, is beneficial for everyone involved. Every year a new budget for the project provides a new opportunity to syphon off public funds. Political parties like it too, as they can bring people to protests and create a pro-Assam image while also generating party funds. It is good even for those who take part in the protest, as they get paid by the parties arranging the protest. The longer a project goes on, the easier it becomes to take money out of it: “The Gogamukh project is in that sense a golden egg laying hen. If we finish it the hen is dead.”53 While large-scale flood-control projects often tend to turn into cash-cows, the state in Assam does recognize and use the synergies within the MGNREGA scheme for delivering small-scale projects. In the cluster area of flood control works, the State of Assam had a total of 4044 ongoing projects in the year 2015–2016 with a combined value of 199.235 million rupees. Most of the projects were undertaken in the Districts of Dhemaji, Chirang and Morigaon, which are primarily rural and have an intensive river network requiring flood control measures. In contrast, in the district of Kamrup Metro, which is an urban district, the number of projects relating to flood control measures were minimal.54 Over the years, with the change of governments and the introduction of new programs like sanitation and toilet construction, the focus of MGNREGA (as well as the vocabulary of data) has changed and the state is no longer recording separate clusters of flood control works. Instead, the state recorded a total of nine hundred and sixty-eight thousand small-projects under the

52

Interviews with Deputy Commissioner Dhemaji 2016, Project Officer DDMA Dhemaji 2016. Interview with Deputy Commissioner, Dhemaji 12 April 2016, Dhemaji, Assam. 54 Manuvie 2018, p. 125. 53

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category of disaster risk reduction achieved till year 2020–21.55 A United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) study conducted in partnership with the Ministry of Rural Development found that the construction undertaken under MGNREGA in the State of Assam was sub-standard; without proper survey or design; and lacked consideration of the cost-benefit ratio.56 The projects, some of which were undertaken at the Gram Panchayat level, were found to be non-durable and technically unsound. They were often constructed under the supervision of the Junior Engineer with the authorisation of the Water Resource Department. For example, in the district of Barpeta, a single project for boulder pitching of the river, costing twenty-three lakhs INR, was undertaken by the GP under the supervision of a Junior Engineer. It was found that the construction was made without any survey, design, or costbenefit analysis. Due to the weakness of the materials used the project was unable to withstand even the normal flow of the river and got washed away prior to the flood season. Similarly, in the District of Bongaigaon, Popragaon G.P. undertook largescale cross-drainage projects with an estimated cost of Rs 1.77 crore. The survey, design and execution were found to be flawed, and the project was deemed unsustainable.57 Such flaws are inherent in works undertaken under MGNREGA as the program is built towards providing ‘unskilled’ employment. With lack of planning and effective overall strategy it is likely that such shortcomings in the design, as well as the implementation phase will continue not only reducing the disaster risk reduction and climate adaptation synergies, but in fact making the newly created assets a danger in themselves. The lack of successful structural projects in the State of Assam has led to the erosion of more than 4.27 lakh ha of land in the Brahmaputra Valley over the past five decades. The total eroded area constitutes 7.4% of the total land area of the state. The annual average loss of land is nearly 8000 ha per year across the 17 riverine districts.58 Every year the State of Assam is ravaged by floods, while there is a growing understanding that climate change is impacting flood patterns, flood and flood disasters are not new to the state.

3.3.2 Governing Disasters Relief, recovery, rehabilitation it goes in stages. However, we have only kept ourselves limited to relief so far…. The flood comes, we assist, people go back, we go back.59

55

MGNREGA Data, R6.3 Work Category Wise Analysis for FY: 2020–2021. http://mnregaweb4. nic.in/ Accessed 20 June 2022. 56 Panda and Umdor 2011. 57 Ibid., pp. 67–70. 58 Water Resource Department 2016. 59 Interview with COO Assam State Disaster Management Authority 14 February 2016, Secretariat, Dispur, Assam, India.

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The State of Assam is a relief-focused state. Following the devastating floods of 1972, 1974 and 1975, the government of Assam adopted the Assam Flood Relief Manual in 1976. The manual was aimed at streamlining the efforts of relief, demarcating the responsibility of each horizontal and vertical department in the necessary administration, and fixing the amount and duration of relief provided to each individual victim. The manual focuses on emergency situations arising out of flooding while suggesting that the same pattern of relief can also be followed in the case of other disasters including civil conflict and human-made disasters. Section 1.3 of the Manual specifies the duties and responsibilities of Deputy Commissioners with a degree of flexibility to allow them to operate according to the needs of the situation. The Manual requires each department within the State Secretariat to draw up a departmental plan for minimising damage and ensuring the supply of provisions that may be needed during flood relief (Sect. 1.6). Section 1.7 classifies the flood-affected areas into very vulnerable and vulnerable areas based on the recommendations of the Ministerial Committee on Flood Relief appointed by the Government of India through the Ministry of Irrigation and Power. In the year 2005, the Government of India enacted the Disaster Management Act to standardise disaster responses across the entire country. The act made it mandatory for every state government to set up a State Level Disaster Management Committee as a nodal organisation to strategize relief and rescue operations across the state. The Assam State Disaster Management Authority was subsequently inaugurated in 2012 (Fig. 3.6).

•Close monitoring, documentation, and preparatory activities in anticipation of a disaster •Communicate disaster intensity to district authorities L0 – PRI level •Liase with local communities of volunteers, NGOs, Governmental departments

L1 – District Level

L2 – State Level

L3- Central Level

•Deputy Commissioner act as the Chief operating officer for planning and implementation of disaster response in the whole district.

•Revenue Department as the Chief fiscal entity for budgeting disaster response •Mobilisation of specialised civil police force - SDRF - for search and evacuation operation

•Moblization of Army, airforce or the National Disaster Relief Force •Complimenting the state relief efforts through monetary support (primarily though National Disaster Relief Fund)

Fig. 3.6 Functional Hierarchy under Disaster Management Act. Source Author; illustration based on the Disaster Management Act 2005

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Although the DM Act of 2005 makes it mandatory to involve the PRIs and village bodies in the planning phase, the relief plan continues to follow the topdown approach of the 1976 Flood relief Manual and the villagers are unaware of the presence of the Assam State Disaster Management Authority or the District Disaster Management Authority.60 Most of the planning and implementing functions are concentrated in either the DC office or the State secretarial departments, while the PRIs and even the State Disaster Management Authority play only a limited coordinating role. The response is carried out through a vertical system of responsibility depending on the severity of the disaster. Following the 1976 manual, the local village bodies (Panchayats) are the first initiators of the relief response as well as the first responders to local disasters. The implementation of strategic operations like the opening of relief camps, the provision of essential food and non-food items, or the management of the evacuation process is overseen by the District Commissioner’s office.61 Assam continues to have an integrated disaster management agenda, wherein all departments are involved in responding to all the hazards.62 At the time of the field visit, the authority had physically established itself with space and personnel and was fully functional up to the district level.63 However, the mandate of ASDMA competes with the general state governance mandate under the 1976 Flood Relief Manual. While some administrators believe that the Flood Relief Manual and the Disaster Management Act are complementary and even imitate each other, the ASDMA does not have a direct involvement in disaster response, instead it acts as a coordinating body.64 An overview of some of the necessary response functions in the event of displacement and planned relocation during a disaster episode is provided in Table 3.1. Every year, between the months of October and December, the Deputy Commissioner, in consultation with the Chief Minister’s Office, the Revenue Department, the State Secretariat and organisations such as the United Nations Development Programme, reviews the flood response approach for the upcoming year. In January and February, the DC Office invites tenders from private individuals and organisations to procure the provision of relief (non-food relief). At the same time, the Block Development officer, in consultation with the Gram Panchayat and Intermediary Panchayats, survey the district to identify breaches and allocate buildings as shelter houses during a disaster. By the end of March, the tenders have been accepted, the provision for relief has been contracted out to private individuals, and buildings have been earmarked as shelter houses. The information about relief and shelters is disseminated by the PRIs 60

Group Discussion in Fafal/Nabogram, 5 April 2016, Goalpara, Assam; Group Discussion in Sutar Gaon, Laharighat circle, 20 February 2016, Morigaon, Assam 2016. 61 ASDMA 2012. 62 Ibid. 63 Interview with COO Assam State Disaster Management Authority 14 February 2016, Secretariat, Dispur, Assam, India. 64 Interview with Deputy Commissioner Kamrup (Metropolitan) 18 February 2016, DC office, Guwahati, Assam, India.

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Table 3.1 Functionality of Key Institutions During Disaster Department

Function

Panchayati Raj Institutes (village level)

• Coordinate support from line agencies to undertake response • Coordinate with line agencies/departments and ensure supply of relief materials

Deputy Commissioner and DDMA (district level)

• Conduct weekly meetings to review flood management during the flood season • On receipt of flood warning D.C will: – Send relief officers – Request SP to send police party and install temporary wireless stations – Request fire and emergency services to place State Disaster Response Force (SDRF) personnel along with rescue boats if required – Seek suggestions from the WR department in regard to evacuating people from vulnerable places • Visit the places of flood occurrence – Make prompt operational decisions – Assess the requirements for men and materials for relief – Call for coordinated aid – Ensure that services are arranged, and materials are mobilised – Supervise arrangements in evacuation centres and relief camps – Arrange to collect donations in cash and kind – Requisition the services of the officers of various departments, urban local bodies and Zilla Parishads to undertake relief works – Call for non-officials/volunteers/NYK, civil defence, red cross volunteers or members of other voluntary organisations – Secure assistance from the Army/NDRF or other central government agencies when the arrangements made by civil authorities prove to be inadequate • D.C will make arrangements to construct shelters in relief camps • Arrange sanitation and maintenance of clean lines and water supply in the relief camps • Grant gratuitous relief in cash and kind to the affected people • Arrange care of the infirm, destitute, orphans, children and expectant/nursing mothers in the relief centres • Ensure supply of cooked food only in unavoidable circumstances (continued)

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Table 3.1 (continued) Department

Function

Revenue and Disaster Management Department (state secretarial level)

• Dispatch quick response teams in high-risk prone areas for evacuation • Distribute relief materials • Restore basic services • Set up temporary shelters for the affected population • Coordinate with possible stakeholders

Finance Department (state secretarial level)

• Determine the preliminary allocation of funds for relief efforts • Mobilise resources

Home Department (state secretarial level)

• Dispatch response teams to hazard-prone locations based on the warning information • Coordinate with the State Disaster Information Centre • Facilitate evacuation • Provide resource support to conduct search and rescue operations • Maintain law and order • Relay information through emergency communication lines • Provide support to fire and emergency services to undertake swift actions

Public Works Department (roads and bridges) (secretarial level)

• • • • • •

Transport Department (secretarial level)

• Facilitate movement of emergency personnel, equipment and essential food, water and medical supplies • Move population to safe areas • Maintain and operate around the clock connectivity to all affected areas

Determine routes for mobilisation of resources Establish emergency communication network Provide equipment support to search and rescue Coordinate the supply of goods and services Establish missing road-links Clean and remove debris from communication infrastructure • Undertake emergency repair of roads/communication and buildings • Provide emergency communication links • Undertake construction of temporary structures

(continued)

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Table 3.1 (continued) Department

Function

Food and Civil Supplies Department

• Coordinate with local authorities and transport essential supplies to disaster-affected areas and shelters • Provide tailored food packets to people with special needs • Mobilise air/land/inland water transport for food and essential item supply to the inaccessible regions

Public Health and Engineering Department

• Provide immediate safe drinking water supply in disaster-affected areas, emergency shelters, relief camps and hospitals • Provide latrines/sanitary latrines in relief camps quickly

Health and Family Welfare Department (state secretarial level)

• Undertake vaccination drive/established disease prevention or mitigation protocols for the relief camps • Set-up medical relief camps from district to PHC level • Assess the availability of medical equipment and staff • Provide basic medical assistance • Activate mass casualty plan if the need arises

Source The author

and the Gaon Buda (Village headman). Any urgent task for repairing a structural breach is contracted out to the Public Works Department. The months of April and May are utilised by the designated contractors to stock up government inventories with relief items for inspection and shift them to the designated shelters after quality checks have been made.65

3.3.3 Governing Flood Displacements The end of June until the end of September is the monsoon period when the flooding occurs. The relief process begins when the water reaches the safety mark in a local area. Temporary relief for a maximum of three days is provided in the form of food items and non-food items such as gasoline, rain-sheets, and firewood for cooking. Every year, the utilisation of funds depends upon the relative intensity of the floods

65

Interviews with Deputy Commissioner Kamrup (Metropolitan); Deputy Commissioner Bongaigaon, February 2016, Assam, India.

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and the total relief expenditure.66 Unexpected structural breaches due to unsustainable construction may lead to a broader than anticipated scale of disaster, and multiple floodings, like the triple flooding of 2012, which may lead to ‘back-to-back relief operations’. The principal task of the state during the monsoon months is to stay alert to any instance of flooding, and respond to the humanitarian needs of the people; everything else, ‘especially any infrastructural work comes to a stand-still as the rains are incessant and there is water-logging everywhere.’67 A regular process of ‘incidence recording’ (IR), also known as flood situation reporting, is used throughout the state and in all of the study districts. This process, which has continued since the adoption of the Flood Relief Manual in 1976, is a sophisticated tool that is used for recording details of flooding on an everyday basis, starting from the very first day of the monsoon onset. The IR includes communication on flood-situations in a set format from every revenue circle. The water level, the incidence of damage to infrastructure, life and property, and the details of rescue, relief and support are transmitted to the district administration. The district administration compiles the report into a single file format daily, to be communicated to the State Disaster Management Authority (before 2012 the reports were sent to the Water and Irrigation Department and the Revenue Department simultaneously). ASDMA compiles a report from all of the districts to create a daily record, which is published on their website. A backlog of these reports can be found on the ASDAMA website. Since 2014 this has been accessible to the public (see for example, Fig. 3.7). This reporting pattern is utilized to create Flood Level Early Warning system— FLEWS, with the aim of assisting communities to safely evacuate areas that might be prone to flooding. The assessment for issuing a FLEW warning is made at each district headquarters and transmitted through radio channels and the use of sirens in some places. Group discussions at the river-islands revealed a complete ignorance of the warning system amongst village communities, instead the communities evacuate the river-islands based on their perception of danger during disasters. This is also a more plausible explanation for people being marooned on inundated pieces of land during every cycle of a flood disaster.68 In some cases, the State Disaster Response Force and the National Disaster Response Force are used to evacuate people, “mostly women, children or the elderly need such support. The state tries to be self-sufficient by using the civilian police or the home guard unit first before approaching the CRPF, Army or the NDRF.”69 During the process of relief, the state considers every displaced person to be capable of self-care and limits its response only to those who are either stranded or vulnerable owing to disability, age, or gender. The state provides relief packages of food and non-food items to those who are physically

66

Interview with Deputy Commissioner Goalpara, 3 March 2016, DC Office Goalpara, Assam, India. 67 Interview with Deputy Commissioner Kamrup (Metropolitan) 18 February 2016, DC office, Guwahati, Assam, India. 68 Group Discussion in Sutar Gaon 20 February 2016, Laharighat circle, Morigaon, Assam. 69 Interview with Deputy Commissioner, Dhemaji 12 April 2016, Dhemaji, Assam.

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Fig. 3.7 Daily Flood Report 7 July 2014. Source Assam State Disaster Management Authority

present in the shelters or those entrapped in difficult to evacuate locations.70 Limited assistance in the form of cash is also provided in areas where the provision of shelters and procurement has collapsed due to structural flaws. It is widely recognised that monetary assistance may not solve the problem of a lack of food resources for a stranded population. As one project officer said, “people cannot eat money during

70

Interview with Deputy Commissioner Bongaigaon 29 February 2016, Bongaigaon District Office, Assam, India.

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Table 3.2 Relief Entitlement During Disaster Item Food supply for people housed in the relief camps and shelters or where air-drops are needed

Food grains

Beneficiary

Quantity

Adult

600 g per day

Child under 12

400 g per day

Pulse

Per person

100 g per day

Salt

Per person

30 g per day

Mustard oil

Per person

30 ml per day

Gur

Per person

100 g per day

Chira

Adult

600 g per day

Child under 12

400 g per day

Cash given to families who have no food reserves and are Adult not housed in the relief camps/shelters due to unavoidable Minor circumstances (such as the absence of relief camps/shelter)

60 rupees per day

Assistance for clothing where houses have been washed away, fully damaged or severely inundated for a week

Family

1800 (one time)

Assistance for utensils where houses have been washed away, fully damaged or severely inundated for a week

Family

2000 (one time)

45 rupees per day

Source The author

floods, they still need grains.”71 Another senior officer commented that handing cash as relief shifts the burden from the state to the flood victims: “If families are unable to come to the relief camps due to harsh geographic conditions, it is absurd to expect that they can go to a marketplace to buy grains” (Table 3.2). The window of relief is however temporary—in the best-case scenarios the state plans relief for a period of three days, in the worst case scenario the three days may be extended to a 30-day period. This means that the statutory accountability of the government to provide humanitarian assistance is restricted to a maximum of 30 days unless there is a continuation of the state of emergency. In practice, the period of relief stretches from two to five days, as the affected families return to their place of habitual residence as soon as the flood water starts to recede. This quick return is motivated by a lack of shelter spaces, and the fear of losing their land to encroachers. In particular, in regions where land is held under collective community rights, and where there is no clear ownership, there are conflicting claims of possession.72 Flood relief shelters/camps are temporary arrangements in school buildings. For example, in the district of Morigaon, the District Disaster Management Plan of 2012 indicates 30 potential buildings that can be used as relief shelters, all of which are school buildings, against 265 villages which were classified as ‘very high-risk villages’. The availability of necessary shelters for the protection of people displaced due to flooding in the state is abysmal. Except in the case of the District of Goalpara, 71 72

Interview with Project Officer, DDMA, 28 February 2016, Assam. Interview with Revenue Circle Officer 18 February 2016, Assam.

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Table 3.3 Flood Damage in the State of Assam Year

Area affected (‘000 Hect.)

Crop area affected (‘000 Hect.)

Population affected (million)

Human lives lost

Cattle lost

Total damage (million INR)

2000

966

322

38.88

36

19,988

2512

2001

203

36

5.42

4

15

149

2002

118.7

298

75.5

65

4294

7805

2003

701

213

52.75

35

108

11,281

2004

236

522

12.64

495

118,772

–

2007

150.4

674

108.68

134

–

–

2008

416

314

0.29

40

8002

14,442

2010

–

147

0.25

17

3754

–

2012

Entire state

583

5.3

149

–

–

2013

–

0.71

0.08

–

181,114

–

Source Author’s calculations based on information provided by the Directorate of Economics and Statistics, Government of Assam (data from the highly devastating triple floods of 2012 is taken from National Disaster Management Authority. The data reflects the damage caused by the June and September floods only. Some of the data for all the years is not available due to discrepancy in reporting from the circle officers)

there is not even one shelter per ‘very high risk’ village in any of the districts. Given that villages marked as high risk and moderate risk are also susceptible to temporary flooding and displacement, it is apparent that the state capacity to provide relief shelters is highly inadequate, shifting the burden of relocation entirely to the displaced families. With the state having such a low capacity to structurally mitigate disasters and almost no capacity to respond to them (discussed above), it is discernible that there is annual damage, including damage to human lives. Table 3.3 provides an overview of the estimated flood damage in the state. It is evident from the annual flooding situation that there is not just public infrastructure that is lost but also people’s livelihoods, crops, land and lives. People affected due to these losses are pushed further towards climate change vulnerability. The sudden-nature of floods and the fragile nature of the river island and river banks in the Brahmaputra Valley make it difficult to predict the loss of land. There have been instances, as in the case of Morigaon specifically, where in just one season of flooding during 2012, a land area encompassing approximately 14 villages on the river bank was entirely washed away. The families who left their houses during the period of flood inundation returned to find their lands completely submerged under the Brahmaputra River.73 Similarly, in the village of Sutar gaon (Sutar Village), the displaced families returned to barren land covered with silt and sand deposition after the floods, unable to farm on their original land (see Figs. 3.8 and 3.9). With a lack 73

Interview with Revenue Circle Officer 18 February 2016, Assam.

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Fig. 3.8 River Erosion in Sutar Gaon, Laharighat Revenue Circle, Morigaon. Source The author

of timely assistance from the state, these families encroached on the wetland which was 100 m inward from the bank.

3.4 Governing Through Loss and Damage Policies The primary responsibility for providing compensation to the victims of floods, including those permanently displaced, rests with the government of the state. This is because the primary responsibility to build a flood-resilient infrastructure is also that of the state government, as per the State List II of Schedule VII to the Indian Constitution. Funding for damage compensation, restoration and rehabilitation is scattered across various departments through their regular budgetary planning. For example, the Department of Agriculture will help with the loss of crops and the Department of Labour Welfare will provide minimum wage compensation for the duration of the flood. For structural losses, the Department of Water will assist in the restoration of embankments or irrigation canals, while the Department of Rural Development will respond to housing needs. There are no pre-determined budgets for responding to loss, and every flood cycle is individually assessed through an actual estimation of the damages caused during each episode of flooding. State actors rely on previous precedents in regard to compensation allocation, using various policies from ex-gratia compensations, to utilisation of National Rural Housing Mission (IAY scheme/also known as Pradhan Mantri Awas Yojana— PMAY) for rural housing reconstruction, to policies like the Land Acquisition and Resettlement Act of 1894; the National Policy of Resettlement and Rehabilitation of 2007 (NPRR); and the Land Acquisition Act of 2013 for valuing land damaged by erosion. The compensation provided is not uniform and depends on demographic and

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3 Governing Displacements

Fig. 3.9 Satellite Imagery of Flood Erosion in Pictured Location - A Decadal Time-scale from 1986 to 2016. Source The author; screen-grab from Google Earth using Temporal Mapping Function

political circumstances. For example, a woman applicant is likely to receive a larger compensation package than a man.74 Compensation allocated in crucial constituencies or in the run-up to the state or central government elections can be higher, and quicker.75

3.4.1 Compensating Losses In the regular plan, the government indemnifies four broad types of losses through exgratia payments. These are loss of life, loss of a limb (causing permanent disability), loss of property (including cattle), and loss of livelihood. The quantification of the amount of ex-gratia payments was done for the first time in the 1980s through communication No. RGR. 120/86/70 of the Revenue Department, as an addendum to appendix 5 of the Flood Relief Manual of 1976. Since then, the loss compensation format has remained unchanged, although the quantification of payments is revised annually in line inflation and market assessment of losses. Apart from the standard 74 75

Interview with Revenue Circle officer, 31 March 2016, Dhubri District, Assam. Interview with Deputy Commissioner Dhemaji 2016.

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81

gratuitous payment, payment between 95,000 and 101,000 rupees can also be made in cases of total damage to the house depending on its geographical location. In the case of partial damage, the amount of compensation is between 5200 and 3200 rupees depending upon the consistency of the building structure. The purpose of providing relief payments is to allow households to rebuild and re-negotiate space in society in their private capacity (Fig. 3.10). The victim’s family must initiate the process of relief through an application made to the revenue circle officer in whose jurisdiction they reside. These applications are verified for duplicity and forwarded to the Deputy Commissioner’s office. The DC has full power to assess and authorise ex-gratia payments after receiving such applications. However, in each year there is a maximum amount within which the DC can make authorisations.

Fig. 3.10 Amount of Ex-Gratia Compensation Fixed for Disaster Victims. Source The author, photographed from document number MHA No. 32-7/2014-NDM-1, Assam Secretariat

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It is also a general practice for political leaders, especially the Prime Minister and the Chief Minister of the state, to sanction ex-gratia assistance to affected people from the Prime Minister’s Special Relief Fund and the Chief Minister’s Special Relief Fund respectively. There is no minimum or maximum amount that can be sanctioned through these funds, and thus such support may vary from one year to another and from one state to another. For example, the Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh announced an ex-gratia support of 2 lakh each to households in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh who had lost a family member during the 2012 floods, while 1 lakh per household was allocated to the victims of floods in the State of Assam during the same year. The granting of compensation is done under the media spotlight with political leaders from the government physically handing compensation cheques to the people whose applications have been approved by the DC for such grants.

3.4.2 Rebuilding Shelters National Rural Housing Scheme provides priority housing provision to households who have become homeless due to floods. The scheme is one of the largest housing schemes of the central government of India. It has been widely appreciated by the Assam state administrators for its ancillary benefits in the rehabilitation process. Essentially as a public housing scheme it enables Below Poverty Line (BPL) households, houseless low-income families, and those living in dilapidated houses to build or acquire housing sites with financial and technical assistance from the government. The scheme stipulates a sharing arrangement between the Centre and the State in the proportions 75–25. In case of a North-Eastern State like Assam, this budget sharing between Center and State government is 90–10. The scheme creates four categories of expenses: (a) the construction of new houses; (b) the upgrading of dilapidated houses; (c) housing sites for eligible landless; and (d) administrative Table 3.4 Fixation of Funding under the National Rural Housing Scheme Unit cost

Central and state share

(i) Plain areas

Rs. 70,000

100:00 for UTs

(ii) Hilly states and difficult areas and IAP districts

Rs. 75,000

75:25 in other cases

Item

90:10 for the NE states and Sikkim

Construction of new house

Upgradation of dilapidated kutcha Rs. 15,000 house

Same as above

House sites for eligible landless

Rs. 20,000

100:00 for UTs 50:50 in other cases

Administrative expense

4% of funds released

As in (1) above

Source Ministry of Rural Development, GoI76

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83

expenses. Table 3.4 provides details of expenditure earmarked for each housing unit within the scheme. The scheme reserves 5% of the total allocation per funding year as a contingency fund at the Central level for: (i) the rehabilitation of BPL families affected by natural calamities, (ii) the rehabilitation of BPL families affected by violence and law and order problems, (iii) the settlement of freed bonded labourers and liberated manual scavengers, (iv) the settlement of particularly vulnerable tribal groups, (v) the rehabilitation of people affected by occupational diseases, (vi) the settlement of households benefitted under The Scheduled Tribes and Other Traditional Forest Dwellers (Recognition of Forest Rights) Act, 2006, (vii) the settlement of people forced to relocate in districts along the international border, and (viii) new technology demonstration—with a focus on affordable and green technologies. Apart from the 5% reserve share, further prioritisation can be made by the state in consultation with the Zilla Parishads and Gram Panchayats on the basis of needs. The Government of Assam prioritises people who are affected by floods and flood erosion in granting benefits under this scheme. The overall auditing of the scheme is only on funds released to BPL families and state data does not specify if beneficiary families were displaced persons and erosion effected families. It is difficult to ascertain whether the scheme has any impact at all on those permanently displaced due to erosion.

3.4.3 Special Assistance for Erosion-Affected Families In 2013, the State of Assam also adopted the Chief Minister’s Policy on Compensation to Erosion Affected Families. The scheme is the first of its kind in the state (and also the nation) to acknowledge erosion as a reason for seeking compensation from the state. The CM Special Assistance Fund for Erosion Affected Families is the only scheme that has a direct synergy with loss and damage caused by disasters. However, the flaws in tenancy and ownership records led to multiple claims filed for the same piece of eroded land. In the absence of cadastral data, the government ended up rejecting much of these claims and initiated a district level survey.77 The scheme was further put on hold pending litigation in the High Court of Assam at Guwahati, wherein the validity of the scheme in identifying beneficiaries came into question. A challenge was made to the granting of compensation to households whose rights to property were already being questioned. Subsequently, the government ratified the scheme by adding two critical caveats: (a) The person seeking damage should be able to prove a clear right of ownership over the land in question, and (b) applicants 76

Framework for implementation Prime Minister Housing Scheme—Rural (earlier known as Indira Awas Yojana—IAY). The terms National Rural House Scheme, PM Housing Scheme, IAY are used interchangeably by the state administrators. Available at: https://pmayg.nic.in/netiay/Uploaded/Gui delines-English_Book_Final.pdf Accessed 10 July 2022. 77 Interview with COO Assam State Disaster Management Authority 14 February 2016, Secretariat, Dispur, Assam, India.

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or their immediate family members should not have benefited from any other state or central government scheme. The new guidelines were introduced in 2015, and since then the local bodies—PRIs and the Block Development Officers—have been asked to identify the extent of erosion and nominate beneficiaries. In 2015, two surveys were conducted at the revenue circle level by the district administrators and the Special Advisor to the Chief Minister to estimate the number of families living on the embankments who were affected by erosion. The result of these unpublished surveys was made available by the Assam State Disaster Management Authority during this research. The surveys indicate differential data and differential methodologies in the calculation of land-loss. Over the two surveys, it is estimated that between 10,153 and 18,495 families suffered from bank-erosion. Some within government feel that the numbers from both the surveys are very restrictive. The enumeration accounted only for the families who are undisputed land-owners and did not include tenant residents, landless residents or those with disputed titles. Furthermore, the surveys do not account for households that have degraded and uncultivable lands due to sheeterosion and sand-deposition.78 The people who live in these eroded and degraded land areas are now permanently displaced. Most of the land holdings in Assam are small marginal holdings that are used for subsistence agriculture (see Fig. 3.11). The State government manages the subject of property and ownership transfer under entry 18 of List II, Schedule VII of the Constitution of India. The Department of Revenue is primarily responsible for maintaining the record of land and land-use change. The basic unit of the cadastral data record is the plot, and several groups of plots are categorised as a Lot (Field), maintained by a Lot Mandal. Villages can be mapped on a single cadastre sheet consisting of a single Lot. Several villages are put together to form a pargana, which is equivalent to the block level administration supervised by Mauzadars, and several parganas form a tehsil, which is managed by a Revenue Circle Officer (Tehsildar). Several Tehsils together form a district, headed by the District Commissioner, which is a primary unit of administration in India. The registration of ownership of land is not compulsory and possession rights can be held in the form of an un-registered deed called a patta. A Patta is further classified as an annual patta or periodic patta. In the case of an annual patta, the patta holder must pay an annual revenue to maintain their possessory rights, while in the case of a periodic patta, the revenue must be paid on a 10-yearly basis. There are four general starting points for land ownership: (a) the purchase of periodic patta land, (b) hereditary transfer, (c) land grants under a government scheme to benefit landless farmers, or (d) adverse possession ownership of fallow land.79 Each of these categories is recognised under a different patta system. When a person purchases periodic patta land, the buyer gains the land as periodic patta land. In the case of hereditary transfer, the status of the land as annual or periodic patta is passed on to the successor. In the case of land grants made by the government to 78

Interview with COO Assam State Disaster Management Authority 14 February 2016, Secretariat, Dispur, Assam, India. 79 Sections 122–124 of the Assam Land Revenue Act of 1986.

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Fig. 3.11 Distribution of Landholdings in the State of Assam (no. of holdings in each category). Source The author; calculation based on the Agriculture Census of India, 2011

landless farmers, the land was granted as an annual patta land until 2014. And in case of adverse possession, the land is allotted as patta land only when the right of the possessor is established without conflict. For example, the ownership of government lands is prohibited through The Assam Land Grabbing (Prohibition) Act of 2010. Before the Act came into force, the state recognised the adverse possession rights of landless farming households over the non-reserved category of land. This meant that the possessor had the right to seek a periodic patta on a land if they had paid the amount equivalent to annual patta taxes for a continuous period of 12 years, and the possession had not been disputed by another private party or the state. The data on possession and ownership within each village is maintained by the Lot Mandal, who must update the local cadastral maps and report to the district administration any changes that might have occurred. These changes include any new possessions, changes in the existing ownership of land, and topographical changes such as erosion. Most of the land surveys in the state were done before Indian independence in 1947 and re-surveys are conducted only when the cadastral marker points are severely altered. The process of resurveying does not utilise modern technology for surveying or mapping, leading to disparities in the data. The cadastral data on ownership and possession is updated when the interested parties approach the Lot Mondal, while the data on flooding and flood erosion of lands is updated when the victims, along with the village headman, approach the district authorities to re-survey the cadastral data of the affected village. The District authorities will then direct the Lot Mandal to

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make a resurvey report. In the case where a new river island emerges and is occupied by incoming inhabitants, a new cadastral map must be made by the Lot Mandal.80 As per the data provided by the State Government, there are 1391 completely nonsurveyed villages out of which 358 are river-island villages (Chars) that are possibly newly created land areas. Close to 196,856 people inhabit the non-surveyed Chars within the study districts. The absence of knowledge about the nature of geographical existence on these land-areas seriously jeopardises the associated rights of the landowners/occupiers and downplays the claims of compensation in cases of loss of territory.81 Even in cases where the cadastral data is known, there is an admitted laxity in the performance of duty at the Lot Mandal level. The burden of ensuring that the Lot Mandal is doing his job falls upon the household that stands to lose their property rights. And the cost of inviting the Lot Mandal and providing hospitality is not always feasible for low-income families. As one Gaon Buddha explained, ‘this is the invisible cost of the system.’ The visible cost includes the documentation itself— procuring a copy of the cadastral documentation incurs the costs of transportation and copying, and losing at least one day’s worth of working hours, which is not an affordable scenario for households living below the poverty line or headed by a female member. For farmers, maintaining their property rights in a scenario where the land holdings are small and are used for subsistence agriculture alone is neither easy nor economical.82 Under the CM’s Erosion Affected Families scheme, people displaced due to flood erosion can claim state support. However, to rightfully establish a right to compensation a claimant must prove that the land in question was in existence and the person seeking compensation had an ownership or possession right over the eroded land. The question of existence and ownership of a land-mass is thus directly tied to the capacity of the state to maintain and regularly update the cadastral data. The Revenue Circle Officer, who is the officer responsible for the maintenance of the data, has the task of updating the entire data set under his jurisdiction every ten years, and submitting a report to the Deputy Commissioner, who is the only authority empowered to convert land tenures from an annual patta to a periodic patta after a thorough inspection of any contesting claims to the land, including any claim on the land from the government itself (in which scenario the annual patta can only be converted to permanent patta after 30 years of unbroken possession). Both the positions of the Revenue officer and Deputy Commissioner are rotational and subject to change every three years. Thus, the work of updating the cadastral data and regularising the land tenure may not always enjoy bureaucratic priority. This is coupled with the looming fact of disaster itself: in ten years at least ten floods would ravage these lands, submerging their residents, their properties, and the paperwork privately held as evidence of legal rights to property. 80

Interviews with Deputy Commissioner Dhubri, Deputy Commissioner Kamrup (M), Revenue Circle Officer Kamrup (M) 2016. 81 Manuvie 2018; also see Annex B for Non-Cadaster villages. 82 Group Discussion in Sutar Gaon 20 February 2016, Laharighat circle, Morigaon, Assam.

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None of the deputy commissioners interviewed during the course of this study had regularised any land patta from an annual patta to a periodic patta. The government of Assam further refused to provide statistical information on the number of households holding annual pattas and those holding periodic pattas in the state. The group discussions conducted during the study found that the majority of landowners were paying annual taxes and believed that their land rights were held in the annual patta category.83 Land held under an annual patta does not allow the possessor an ownership right, and their status as the rightful possessor is itself under constant scrutiny. As one of the Revenue Officers explained, “It is challenging to grant land; most of the time the families have occupied a reserved category land in a wetland area or a forest… you can see for yourself new families residing in the Hasil Bill area or look at areas within the Kamrup Metro…all of these areas were wetlands once; now people live here…where have they come from? Look at all the villages whose names end with NC; they have reserved forest areas. The government cannot transfer reserved areas to private ownership……. We let them stay…..most of the time…. They are poor people, they have to farm to feed their families…sometimes the younger generations forget that it was a forest or a wetland and then if there is public sympathy or court orders than we convert….but mostly people remember and it is a big political issue whether or not the conversion of land happens.”84 Until the conversion happens, the possessor has to maintain a full record of the payment of annual taxes to maintain a possessory right over the property in question. If during this time the land gets submerged or is made barren due to sheet erosion, the possessor must keep paying the revenue until such erosion is recognised, or the rights are converted to periodic patta rights so compensation for loss of land (instead of just loss of a single crop) can be sought. Once erosion is recognised, multiple claims may arise on the same piece of land. Oswin Nampuri, the Circle Officer from Kamrup Metro, explained that such claim cases are very regularly brought from the char areas, as the land and population are both floating. Narrating one of the recent cases, he said once land is eroded the Lot Mandal makes an erosion report based on which erosion victims can claim compensation generally in the form of ex-gratia payments ranging from 50,000 to 200,000 rupees. Rehabilitation land for the construction of a homestead is provided if the district can identify suitable fallow land for the purpose. It is possible that long after such compensation has been made the land may re-emerge and the original owner may try to assert their rights. It is also possible that through adverse possession some new residents might have started living on that property. The situation can be complicated further if the original owners were annual patta holders and continued to pay taxes for land that was once eroded and has now subsequently re-emerged. The whole process of identifying clean land titles with an explainable line of transfers, hereditary ownership, and possession is one of the most legally complicated areas of

83 84

Ibid.; Group Discussion in Bashani Char 20 April 2016, Dhubri, Assam. Interview with Revenue Circle Officer, 31 March 2016, Dhubri, Assam.

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adjudication. In a state like Assam, where the land itself is floating and destructible, there are additional layers of complexity.85 Some of the chars that were submerged in the Morigaon region re-emerged on the Sonitpur district boundaries. For the people occupying the chars across the Sonitpur Districts these were new chars, but the Morigaon district farmers claimed existing ownership due to the presence of debris from their previous houses. It is interesting to note that the claims of the Morigaon farmers were based on the debris of thatched houses (non-permanent structures) washed away in floods, a claim that cannot be proven by any legal standing. The Morigaon officials treated the chars as falling under the Sonitpur district jurisdiction, while recognising that some of the farmers had indeed become landless due to floods.86 The state capacity to untangle complex land titles is further intensified by the claims of indigenous tribal communities in the region, who politically channel their right to the land. The Central government has the authority to designate reserved forests and wetlands, based on its commitment under the International Convention on Conservation of Biodiversity, and the Ramsar Convention on the Protection of Wetlands.87 Through Schedule VI to the Constitution of India, the State government has foregone its authority to regulate land-use in some territorial regions that are classified as Tribal areas. These areas include the North Cachar Hills District, the Karbi Anglong District and the Bodoland Territorial Area District. The Bodoland Territorial Area lies in the Brahmaputra Valley and is constituted of four districts— Kokrajhar, Baska, Barpeta and Chirang. Within these autonomous district areas, any new acquisition of property by non-tribal people is restricted by Article 51 of the Bodoland Territorial Council Act of 2003.88 Any non-tribal person asserting a right to property (including the right to residential property) must be able to show the presence of such a right before the commencement of the BTCA of 2003. Apart from the constitutionally recognised BTCA, there are several tribal factions in Assam that are demanding a similar autonomous status. The following map (see Fig. 3.12) provides an overview of the tribal concentration in the Bhramputra Valley of Assam. The data shown on the map are aggregated at the village level and provide a good overview of the villages where the displaced non-tribal population may find social opposition (if not legislative) in acquiring land for residence. The restrictions on the availability of land due to the designation of sectors as forest, wetlands or tribal holdings makes it difficult for erosion-affected families to permanently relocate to safer areas. It also makes it difficult for the government to assign alternative land for rehabilitation to those living in fragile ecosystems.

85

Interview with Revenue Circle Officer Kamrup (M), 18 February 2016, Assam India. Interview with Project Officer DDMA, 17 February 2016, Morigaon Assam, India. 87 Damodaran 2013, pp. 85–110; Sharma and Sarma 2014, pp. 47–68. 88 Bose 2013, pp. 71–79; Mahanta and Das 2013, pp. 307–319; Datta and Sarkar 2012, pp. 153–165. 86

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Fig. 3.12 Percentage-wise Distribution of Scheduled Tribe in the Brahmaputra Valley. Source The author; generated from Bhuvan GIS platform using Census Data 2011 (village level grid data used)

3.5 Conclusion The state in Assam is aware of the nested complexity of migration due to environmental constraints and is capable of identifying policies that could potentially benefit households that are forced to migrate. The administrative system perceives migrants as dynamic actors who are surrounded by the unfortunate circumstances of poverty and resource deprivation. The administration describes the flood victims as poor helpless people who must relocate to survive, yet despite the attributed victimhood the communities are left to self-care. It is argued that the problem of governance in the state does not lie on the normative side but rather on the implementation of existing norms. This chapter provided an overview of the policies, and their limited outcomes. Even when the senior bureaucracy is sympathetic and willing to push schemes to benefit climate change migrants, the actual operationalisation of the strategies is limited by the everyday social and political complexities. The insufficiency of the results of programmes not only makes the provision of care inadequate but also regularly pushes vulnerable communities towards further marginalisation and cascading vulnerabilities. But why does the state fail to deliver? The lack of implementation has always been a matter of concern for academics and policymakers. Lipksy in his work on street-level administration has shown that the perception, worldviews, and discretion of the street-level actors are influential in determining the success of policies. Similar strands of research have also been at the heart of law and sociology discipline where researchers have interrogated the implementation of policies, and in public policy discipline where models and theories of implementation have been identified. Several of these theories—especially new age governance theories—points to the interplay between state-led and stakeholder-led implementations. This means that in scenarios where the state provides a broad mandate but let the society decide the details of how the mandate should be implemented a higher chance of success can be seen.

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These ideas are also borrowed into political thought around deliberative democracy, localization of issues etc. However, in the international debate on climate migration, the primary focus continues to be on the formation of new policy and new institutional regimes—for example adoption of Global Compact on Migration, Developments with UNFCCC, and IOM’s increased mandate on climate migration. Although these broad normative frameworks are a positive development—but this development and its lack of engagement with the operational abilities of the nations and sub-national levels of governance is problematic. In the next chapter of this book I consider the every-day working of the law and how communities negotiate their space, place and citizenship in a warming world.

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NDMA (2008) National Disaster Management Guidelines. Government of India. Available at https://www.indiawaterportal.org/sites/default/files/iwp2/National_Disaster_Manage ment_Guidelines_Management_of_Floods_National_Disaster_Management_Authority_Gov ernment_of_India_2008.pdf Accessed 9 August 2022 NIDM (2013) India Disaster Report 2012. National Institute of Disaster Management, New Delhi Panda B, Umdor S (2011) Appraisal and Impact Assessment of MGNREGS in Assam, report submitted to UNDP, Department of Economics, North Eastern Hill University, Shillong Pankaj A, Tankha R (2010) Empowerment Effects of the NREGS on Women Workers: A Study in Four States. Economic and Political Weekly 45:45–55 Planning Commission (1951) The First Five Year Plan - A Draft Outline. Government of India, New Delhi Rajan SI, Bhagat RB (eds) (2017) Climate Change, Vulnerability and Migration, 1st edn. Routledge India Ranaware K, Das U, Kulkarni A, Narayanan S (2015) MGNREGA Works and Their Impacts: A Study of Maharashtra. Economic and Political Weekly 50:53–61 Reuveny R (2007) Climate change-induced migration and violent conflict. Political Geography 26:656–673. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2007.05.001 Revenue and Disaster Management Department (2015) Disaster Management Manual. Government of Assam, Dispur, India Rhodes RAW (2007) Understanding Governance: Ten Years On. Organization Studies 28:1243– 1264. https://doi.org/10.1177/0170840607076586 Sarma JN (2005) Fluvial process and morphology of the Brahmaputra River in Assam, India. Geomorphology 70:226–256. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geomorph.2005.02.007 Sharma CK, Sarma I (2014) Issues of Conservation and Livelihood in a Forest Village of Assam. International Journal of Rural Management 10:47–68. https://doi.org/10.1177/097300521452 6502 Suhrke A (1997) Environmental Degradation, Migration, and the Potential for Violent Conflict. In: Gleditsch NP (ed) Conflict and the Environment. Springer Netherlands, Dordrecht, pp 255–272 Swain A (1996) Displacing the Conflict: Environmental Destruction in Bangladesh and Ethnic Conflict in India. Journal of Peace Research 33:189–204 Tiwari R, Somashekhar H, Parama VRR et al (2011) MGNREGA for Environmental Service Enhancement and Vulnerability Reduction: Rapid Appraisal in Chitradurga District, Karnataka. Economic and Political Weekly 46:39–47 Water Resource Department (2016) Flood and Erosion Problem. Government of Assam, Dispur, India

Chapter 4

Negotiating Climate, Citizenship, and Belonging

Contents 4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 Politics of Citizenship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.1 Legal Determination of Citizenship in India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.2 Operationalising the Rights . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 Politics of Relief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4 Means, Manners and Vulnerability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5 Those Who Live on the River Islands . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.6 The Question of Existence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Abstract The current chapter provides an analysis of the functioning of the state in Assam, it considers how the dynamics between politics, society, and law interplays to provide protection to those who have to migrate due to climate change. By analysing the everyday life of the state and the people who occupy it, the chapter provides insights into how the state apparatus manufactures doubtful-voters, doubtful-citizens, and non-citizens towards whom the state has no obligation. The chapter also considers the lives and social capital of the people that enables them (however slightly) to overcome disasters in a warming world. It is argued that the social and political construction of migrants as ‘others’ and ‘from Bangladesh’ has restricted the space for negotiating not just climate resilience but also the citizenship and belonging in the warming world. Keywords Illegal immigrations · Assam · D-voters · Flood erosion · National Registration of Citizenship · Climate migrations

4.1 Introduction The State of Assam owing to its environmental fragility, exposure to hydrometeorological disasters, and low overall adaptive capacity at the household level has

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invented both social conditions and public policy to respond to sudden-onset displacements, labour migrations, and erosion related permanent displacements. These policies, on paper, emphasises on livelihood diversification, land-allocations (for erosion effected families) and ex gratia supply of relief and relief material during time of floods. But how does the law and policy operationalise? How does it help communities in the State of Assam, who does it help, and why it fails to deliver its promised outcomes? The current chapter analyses the everyday life of state by interrogating the people and State of Assam. Since 2001 the State of Assam has been under politically stable leadership first of the Congress Party, headed by Chief Minister Tarun Gogi who remained Chief Minister of the state for three terms, and then by Bhartiya Janta Party (BJP)—which is governing the state in its second term. Both these governments have different ideological stance on who is an Indian—while for the Congress party the citizenship of India is inclusive and expanding, for BJP the citizenship of the Nation is a question of ethno-religion composition of the nation. During my field visit to Assam, Congress party still in its last days of power before the political transition. But despite Congress government’s open stance towards citizens, minorities, and migrants, the history of cross-border migration in the state had created barriers which were hard to ignore or overcome. In this chapter, I argue that the social and political construction of migrants as ‘illegal’ and ‘from Bangladesh’ has restricted the state response towards those it deems illegal. Anyone in the state using migration as a strategy to adapt, or who is forced into displacement due to flood erosion can fall into ‘illegality’. I ask a series of questions: How does the historical hostility towards ethnic and religious minorities put them in a structurally disadvantaged position that adds to their vulnerability? Does the politics of relief still have the sympathetic capacity to alleviate suffering, even for those whose rights as citizens are questionable? Does a person displaced due to a climate-change related has the right to have a right? Who is the subject of care? And finally, how does the categorisation of people as citizens or non-citizens affect the quantum of protection that the government is obligated to offer them?

4.2 Politics of Citizenship Citizenship lies at the heart of all of the conditions that govern mobility in a national context. It is the citizen alone that has the right to freedom of mobility and residence within national boundaries. The administration, by respecting this right and ensuring the free right to movement, enables communities to use migration as an adaptation strategy. Similarly, the quantum of response provided by the government to people displaced due to hydro-meteorological disasters correlates to their status as a citizen or non-citizen. The right to seek compensation for loss or damage caused to a habitat, due to climate-change related weather events, is dependent upon the recognition of a person’s right to own property in that habitat. In the current section, I examine the context of citizenship by analysing the complexity of the de jure and de facto

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citizenship rights practiced in the State of Assam. This practice of citizenship determines how the state administration does (or does not) respond to the needs of those displaced or migrating due to environmental stress.

4.2.1 Legal Determination of Citizenship in India Assam has had a complex relationship with the question of citizenship and immigration since pre-independence. Colonial expansion in the North-western frontier provinces encouraged ethnic-Bengalis to clear and settle land in the Brahmaputra Valley and take up administrative jobs, creating resentment among the indigenous Assamese population.1 The anti-immigrant sentiments which were seeded against the ‘land-hungry immigrant’ were given their own political life after the partition of India and Pakistan, when Assam fell into Indian borders, while the part of the territory occupied by Bengali-speaking Muslims became East-Pakistan. The State of Assam has since embarked on an unending process of citizenship determination. The question of who belongs to Assam and to India has influenced not just the politics of Assam but also the laws relating to citizenship in India.2 Article 5 of the Indian constitution grants Indian citizenship to every person residing in the territory of India as of 26 November 1949, provided such a person: (a) Was born in the territory of India, or (b) Has parents who were born in the territory of India, or (c) Has been ordinarily resident in the territory of India for not less than five years. Article 6 of the Constitution provides naturalisation rights to persons who migrated to the territory of India from Pakistan before the nineteenth day of July 1948 and have been ordinarily residing in India, provided that at least one parent or any of the grandparents of such a person was born in the undivided India. In the case of migration occurring after the nineteenth day of July 1948, the person seeking citizenship by naturalisation must have registered himself as present in India and must have resided in India for at least six months. These articles provided a minimum articulation and conditionality for belonging to a newly independent country with a gigantic population displacement across its borders. The framers of the Indian constitution wanted to provide an Indian identity to everyone who was found within the (unsettled and unknown) borders that separated communities which once lived together. Article 11 of the Constitution instead provided the power to the Indian Parliament to make laws about the acquisition and termination of citizenship as time may demand. Utilizing this power to reform the apparatus of citizenship determination, the Indian Parliament had legislated special legislations for the border State of Assam, including: the Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act of 1950, the Citizenship (Amendment) Act of 1985 (recently amended again in 2015), The Illegal Migration Detection (and Deportation) Act of 1985 (IMDT Act), and The Assam Accord of 1 2

Sharma 2012, p. 290. The Constituent Assembly Debate 1949 2014.

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2003. Most of this legislation is influenced by the local political discontent against Bengali speaking people who have been lamented as ‘illegal settlers’. The Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act of 1950 was enacted in response to local dis-satisfaction with cross-border migration from East-Pakistan to India (including to Assam) during partition. While the exodus of Hindus from Pakistan was greeted as a homecoming by the locals on India’s Western borders, on the Eastern borders, Assamese people bemoaned this cross-border population movement as ‘infiltration’.3 The 1950 Act provided that any person who ordinarily resided outside India and had migrated to Assam, whether before or after commencement of the Act, could be scrutinised and expelled by the government if the presence of such a person was considered detrimental to the tribes residing in Assam.4 The Act barred the application of its provisions to people fleeing East-Pakistan on grounds of civil disturbance or fear of such disturbance, while also providing judicial immunity to any officer acting under the act.5 The central government of India constituted the National Registration of Citizenship (NRC) in Assam alongside the 1951 Census of India. The purpose of the NRC was to determine the citizenship status of each person residing in each house under occupation during the time in Assam. The 1950s and 1960s were a period of legal limbo and fuzzy institutionalism in Assam: where Constitution Articles 5 and 6 created a substantive right to acquire citizenship, the Immigrant (Expulsion from Assam) Act negated that right by allowing the state the power to expel anyone it deemed unfit. The administrative scrutiny of nationality and the forced expulsion of those deemed to be non-citizens became a usual practice in the region, and police orders were issued in several places requiring citizens to carry identity documents at all times. The 1950 Act creates a certain undeclared emergency where state authorities had the power to expel, without due process, while the subject of such expulsion had no legal right to remedy. To bring a semblance of justice and due process to these proceedings Foreigners’ Tribunals were constituted during the early 1960s. Following the Bangladesh war for liberation in 1971, the displacement of people led to a significant migratory flow in India. This further led to a sweeping regional movement, the Assam Agitation, which demanded that foreigners be identified and expelled from the state.6 An electoral controversy broke out at a Mangaldoi constituency by-election in 1979, when an allegation was raised that the electoral rolls included about 45,000 names of people who were not citizens of India.7 The by-elections were cancelled. In the 1980 parliamentary elections the Chief Election Commissioner of India ordered state authorities to desist from deleting the ‘immigrant’ names from the rolls, stating that such a scrutiny should take place after the elections so as to prevent delays.8 While 3

van Schendel 2005. Section 2, The Immigrants (Expulsion from Assam) Act, 1950 Act, available at https://www.ind iacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/1674/1/A1950-10.pdf Accessed 20 July 2022. 5 Section 6, ibid. 6 Pisharoty 2019. 7 Singh 1984, p. 1062. 8 Ibid.; Murshid 2016, p. 595. 4

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these orders were in-line with the election laws in India, which only allow scrutiny of elections once they have been concluded, they resulted in extreme violence and resentment due to the central government’s alleged protection of illegal Bangladeshi migrants. The protestors boycotted elections in 12 out of 14 districts.9 The All Assam Students Union (AASU) and the All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad demanded a complete boycott of the 1983 state elections until the ‘illegal Bangladeshi immigrant’ question is solved.10 Bengali speaking people, particularly Bengali Muslims, were completely ‘othered’ from Assam’s political life and society.11 The emphasis on ethno-centric identity led to violent uprisings leading to the 1983 massacre in the village of Nellie in Assam at the hands of the Assamese and the Tiwa (an indigenous group from the area).12 Over 2000 Bengali Muslims were killed, bridges and police stations were burnt, and government officers were attacked.13 To pacify the raging Assamese youth, the central government of India signed the Assam Accord in 1983 to detect and remove illegally residing Bengali speaking people from Assam. The IMDT Act was adopted by the central government in 1985 and the Electoral Commission set out to revise the electoral rolls soon after. The Electoral Registration Officers (EROs) were asked to prepare two separate lists of names—List I with ‘the names of those persons whose linkage with the 1971 electoral roll could be established directly or through their parentage’ and List II with ‘the names of persons whose linkage with the 1971 roll was not established’. This drew a major demarcation on the question of identity and belonging within Assam society. List II, known as the D-voter (doubtful voter) list of Assam, contained everyone who the majority population of Assam did not deem fit to be part of the Assam polity. Street-level administrators (who themselves were part of the Assam agitation state-wide) were tasked to submit the whereabouts of people who they considered were doubtful. The EC issued a further directive that cases of “claims challenging election commissions’ unilateral decisions should not be treated as ordinary cases” (vide massage No 23/AS/85/8/211 dated 6.7.1985). The EC simultaneously changed the format for raising an objection taking away the element of documentality and due care. Objections against voters were accepted on plain paper and anyone against whom an objection was received were first marked a D-voter before an inquisitorial process of determining their true identity began. The ease of the procedural requirement made the process of raising an objection a political act of disenfranchisement. En masse applications were filled out by the AASU leaders against what were considered ‘Bengali minorities’.14 The person so marked as D-voter may not even know about their status change, or who raised doubts against their political citizenship of the state, or where they can go to contest such doubts. Yet the burden of proving one’s status 9

Wilson 1992, p. 255. Murshid 2016, p. 595. 11 Baruah 2012. 12 Kimura 2013, p. 72. 13 Weiner 1978; 1983, p. 281. 14 Ahmed-Zaman 2014; Siddique 2019; Ahmed 2014; Nath 2016; Gogoi 2016. 10

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as a legitimate voter and a legal citizen squarely fell on the D-voter themselves. The process of confirming citizenship required production of: (1) Citizenship Certificate, and (2) an extract from the voter list not later than 1971 (Notification no. 23/85/AS Vol IV, dated 12.7.1985). Subsequently, through correspondence No 23/AS/85/10748 dated 2.8.1985, documents like pattas (land revenue records), certificates by Gaon Buddhas (village oldman), were also added to as corroboratory but non-conclusive evidence. Over the years a mix of documents that are held in the non-conclusive category were added for constituting claims of valid citizenship. Figure 4.1 provides the present list of documentation needed for the verification process. Where the IMDT Act aimed to destabilise the citizenship status of those deemed ‘illegal Bangladeshi migrants’, who were not related through race or ethnicity to the State of Assam, the Citizenship (Amendment) Act of 1986 sought to regularise the status of these contested illegal Bangladeshi residents by providing them the right to naturalise as citizens.15 Section 6A of the Citizenship (Amendment) Act, regarding the status of citizenship in the State of Assam, states that: persons of Indian origin who came before the 1st January 1966 to Assam and who have been ordinarily resident in Assam as citizens of India; every person of Indian origin who came to Assam on or after the 1st January 1966 but before 25th March 1971 and has been residing in Assam shall register himself with the Central Government; the rule for compulsory registration also applies to any person who is detected to be a foreigner by the Foreigners’ tribunal, from the date of the order of such detection; the names of anyone who entered India after the 1st January 1966 if included in any electoral roll should be deleted from the date of registration or detection; person registered with the Central government or detected by a Foreigners’ Tribunal will have the same rights and obligations as a citizen of India (including the right to obtain a passport), but will not be entitled to political participation for ten years from the date of registration or detection.16

The response of the central government in India to the situation in Assam was not deterministic but rather an extension of its minimal conditionality for providing Indian nationality to anyone who crosses the border and wishes to naturalize. For the State of Assam such border-crossing in a region where there were no physical borders was a threat to identity and culture. Although the provisions of the law accord the right to gain citizenship to those who have immigrated to reside in the State of Assam, the moral right to belong and the political right to vote have not been accorded to certain classes of residents. Further, in a state ravaged by annual floods, it is not easy to maintain documentary evidence. It is noteworthy that during 1985 the government of Assam itself could procure the pre-1971 voter list for only 77 out of the total of 126 constituencies. Indians residing in India were never compelled to register as citizens or voters until the year 2015, when unique identification under the Adhar Scheme of the Central Government was made mandatory for every citizen (except in the State of Assam, which was at the time undergoing the re-validation of the National citizenship register). The process of determination creates limited and 15

Jayal 2013. Citizenship (Amendment) Act 1986. Available at https://www.indiacode.nic.in/bitstream/123456 789/4210/1/Citizenship_Act_1955.pdf Accessed 10 August 2022. 16

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Fig. 4.1 List of Documentation Needed for Verification Process. Source National Registration of Citizenship website, available at http://nrcassam.nic.in/admin-documents.html

differential construction of citizenship and influence the obligation that a government holds towards a person who is displaced by floods.

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4.2.2 Operationalising the Rights The rights-based framework for safe mobility away from disasters is one of the most basic guarantees that the states can offer to people. This guarantee—to move away from disaster in pursuit of protection for life and liberty is essential for human survival. As a dynamic actor capable of self-care, the climate migrant in Assam, in principle, has an uncontested freedom under Article 19(1)(d) of the Indian constitution17 to move away from a disaster and use migration as a strategy for adaptation. However, the notion of migration in the state is tainted. The mainstream political rhetoric in Assam views every migrant as an outsider irrespective of their nationality and is particularly detrimental to those who are ethnically Bengali. This ambiguity over a person’s status as a voter or a citizen has not deprived a person from exercising their right to freedom of movement or residence in any other state in India except Assam. The non-existence of documents can conveniently lead a person onto the doubtful voter list. The chances of becoming a non-citizen exponentially increase for anyone who has migrated into a new area within the state, especially when such migration is undertaken by a survivor of a flood who has lost the limited documentary evidence available to them in that flood. This point was elaborated through the field surveys and group discussions conducted in chars and river banks in the district of Morigaon, Dhubri and Goalpara. Bhasanichar, which is a 30-min boat ride from the Dhubri riverside, is a region that has faced the continuous disappearance of land-mass, including the full submergence of the river island in the 1978–1979 floods. The people who inhabited this island have taken refuge on the nearby river islands of Bagdahara, Birsing and Sutramara, amongst others. The movement across the river islands is reciprocal and deeply dependent on the social capital and camaraderie amongst the char inhabitants. The lands are held as common property resources without a requirement for tenure delimitation from the government and in most cases these lands are not adequately surveyed for cadastral purposes due to the temporary physical nature of the chars.18 Even in situations where ownership has been determined for a single person or family, the land is cultivated by several households with an understanding of shared yields.19 It was observed first hand by the author that most of the families on these Chars lacked the capacity to hold documentary evidence of their existence, let alone evidence of being a citizen and thus a rights holder. Freedom of movement for these people is a natural recourse: a human behaviour necessary for survival, and is therefore severable from their right to be a citizen of a state. Citizenship is non-material and is locally identifiable with belonging to a local community or the local area where their husbands or fathers once lived. For example, after the erosion of a part of Aminerchar, families residing in the area moved to the neighbouring Birsing Char. Twenty households from this tiny char are 17

Article 19(1)(d) Constitution of India, 1950. Interview with Deputy Commissioner Dhubri, 1 March 2016, Dhubri District Office, Assam, India. 19 Group discussions in Bashani Char and Bagdhara, 20 April 2016, Assam, India. 18

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listed as D-voters. Although 70-year-old Hajera Khatun Bewa is unaffected by such a listing, firmly believing in her right to migrate to survive. Her son, who is a legitimate voter, stated that the listing has jeopardised their right to claim compensation from the government and the mother cannot be listed on the family ration card, which had led to a decline in the resources to which they are otherwise entitled.20 Similarly, Hushanara Beghum, a former D-voter from the Dhudhnoi sub-division of the Goalpara district, who lost her household and husband, was listed as a D-voter in the new area when she arrived. She is unaware of who made the complaint against her that led to her registration on the D-voter list, but she could obtain the 1961 voter list from her birth-village where her father is listed as a legitimate voter, only if she had the means, resources, and time to go to her ancestral village.21 It takes an average of 10 years and eight thousand rupees in court proceedings to prove one’s citizenship. During that period of 10 years, those wrongly identified as D-voters are stripped of their citizenship rights and are prevented from obtaining any structural social assistance package. While several administrators of the state maintained that Dvoters are not purposely left out of the state schemes, explaining the dichotomy, the Block Development Officer from South-Salmara in Dhubri explained that the documents required to prove citizenship and legacy data are the same documents needed to gain the benefits of the schemes. The unavailability of documentation for one purpose naturally means the unavailability of the documentation for the other purpose too.22 In 2016 there were over one hundred and thirty-seven thousand D-voters in the State of Assam, 69% of whom were women. The political narrative against D-voters which depicts an apocalyptic flux of young Bengali-Muslim male migrants entering Assam illegally from Bangladesh with a systemic agenda to completely change the demography of the state by occupying one village at a time, turns out to be women from poor households, without husbands and fathers and an inability to prove their citizenship. At the senior level of the bureaucracy, the Deputy Commissioners are mostly oblivious to the content of the D-voter list. Having never inspected it themselves, seven out of eight deputy commissioners interviewed for this study authoritatively stated that D-voters are mostly young men from Bangladesh. The Deputy Commissioner of Dhemaji estimated that there were around 500 D-voters in the District with a 50–50 ratio, stating that, ‘Dhemaji is not so easy to travel to.’ Four of the Deputy Commissioners, in fact, were visibly shocked when they were told that 69% of the total D-voters are women. And the Deputy Commissioner of Goalpara continued to maintain that the majority of D-voters in his district are males, who, according to him, are occupying the areas bordering the state of Meghalaya. In a similar conversation with the sitting Chief Minister of the State, Shri Tarun Gogoi, Mr Gogoi stated, ‘the BJP makes D-voters a big political issue, and they never say that D-voters are mostly women because it goes against the political construct of the hordes of Bangladeshi men illegally migrating to India.’ Most D-voters were instead 20

Group Discussion in Birsing Char, 20 April 2016, Dhubri, Assam. Group Discussion in Dhobakura, 7 April 2016, Goalpara, Assam. 22 Interview with Revenue Circle officer, 31 March 2016, Dhubri District, Assam. 21

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Fig. 4.2 Legislative Assembly-wise Distribution of D-voters in Assam. Source Author illustration; data from D-voter list; see Annex B for data

occupying spaces and moving along the river-banks and river islands in the areas which have witnessed territorial loss (see Fig. 4.2). Identification as a D-voter restricts a person’s rights to freedom of movement and residence in several subtle ways. D-voters limit their own choice of movement to safer grounds as they are concerned that migration to remote locations may sever their legacy connection completely. The lack of social capital in any new receiving area (which is not a neighbouring village) would make it difficult for them to prove their citizenship status or even to get necessary communal support and assistance with cultivation. The fact that anyone who migrates can end up being listed on a Dvoter list strongly ties households to their place of ancestral residence due to fear that permanent or long-term movement will sever their relationship with the piece of land which determines their status as a citizen. Interestingly, this sentiment is also visible in the youth population who migrate out of the State of Assam for employment. The risk of delineating the limited proof of belonging and completely ridding oneself of citizenship is potent. These residents of Chars and river-banks are trapped in their fragile ecosystems by the thin string of documentation which confirms their position in Indian polity and democracy. From an administrative point of view, however, being a D-voter is not a ‘big problem’. For one, the number of people on the D-voting list is not sizeable in the context of the whole state. In addition, the majority of the cases on the D-voter list are dismissed by the foreigners’ tribunal as false allegations. Although the process takes an average of 10 years per case, and is expensive for people already living below the poverty line with meagre resources, the state amuses itself by the assurance that ‘ultimately the rights of the citizen do get restored’.23 Nevertheless, the practice of 23

Statement made by the Deputy Commissioner of Dhemaji, telephone conversation, April 2016.

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listing D-voters, which morphed into the practice of the re-identification of citizens, left 1.9 million people in Assam stripped of their citizenship in 2019.

4.3 Politics of Relief It is a public opinion in Assam that local businesses who are handed contracts are those with a good relationship with local Members of the Legislative Assemblies. While there is no documentary analysis of this correlation, a chance interaction that occurred at the DC office in Bongaigaon on 29 February 2016 was telling of the situation. As I sat to interview the Deputy Commissioner on his understanding of the climate migrations, a man (pseudonym Abdulla) walked in complaining that the relief stock sent to his area was of low quality and the local business who got a procurement contract was run by a man of dishonest character, only selected due to his kinship with a local political leader. The DC Bongaigaon quipped and asked him to “get lost”, adding that if he had a valid reason he (Abdulla) would have brought the complaint formally written on a piece of paper. The DC Bongaigaon turned to me, ‘there is always a competition in getting these government contracts because they think that there is hardly any audit on the quality of supplies. The contractor may promise something to the government but supply something completely sub-standard. … Everyone in the administration realises that they (prospective flood victims) are poor people, and we tend to do as much as we can to ease their situation. The distribution of relief is a humanitarian task and the Assam administration is capable of reaching even the remotest (person) in the area to distribute relief .’ While we were in the middle of this conversation, Mr. Pani Bhushan Chaudhary walked in with Mr Abdulla. The DC greeted Mr. Chaudhary and introduced me to him; the two then started to discuss the election, before reverting to the man’s complaint. Mr. Pani Bhushan Chaudhary, a leader from the Assam Gana Parishad, had been an elected MLA from the Bongaigaon district since 1985. In the legislative history of India, Mr. Chaudhary made a record when he won the elections again in 2019 for the eighth time. Mr. Chaudhary discussed the concern of Mr Abdulla with a degree of conviction that comes from being an elected representative for over 30 years. The DC obliged and asked Mr Abdulla in a tone of assurance if he could send a formal written complaint on paper, stating that then an inquiry would be made. Mr Abdulla left the office. Mr. Pani Bhushan stayed a bit longer and had a cup of Assam Black tea. After Mr Bhushan had left, Mr Abdulla returned with a complaint written in Assamese. The DC glanced at it and passed it to me (knowing full well that I cannot read Assamese script). He then reverted to Mr Abdulla and said that the complaint was not stamped: “get a (revenue) stamp fixed first.” The DC explained to me that, ‘they try to avoid such inquiries because they result in nothing and merely waste the working hours that could be utilised elsewhere. The process of

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revenue stamps or paying a nominal fee to send in a formal complaint are some of the essential barriers to prevent people from making it a ‘national pastime’.’24 Due to the nature of the relief being humanitarian assistance, people displaced due to disasters do not have a right to judicial recourse, in the case that the relief supplied is inadequate, absent or sub-standard. The accountability of the government is only limited to an administrative inquiry into the process of procuring relief supplies. There is an absence of a substantive right here, and the procedural right is available only when an administrative complaint is filed by a member of the public. The capacity of a person to file a claim is dependent upon direct and indirect influences, which include appropriate financial means at their disposal to pay the appropriate revenue stamp fee and the support of a local MLA. While there are no objective standards for the quality of supplies, the insufficiency may result in an electoral backlash. The supply contractors in Assam are crowd managers and community pleasers. They can use their clout as relief suppliers to swing the voters in favour of the party with which they associate. Mr Pani Bhushan Chaudhary, a seasoned political leader, realizes this issue. A similar anecdote that I came across a little earlier in the district of Dhemaji corroborates the state-wide political custom of relief-supply. One Mr Sunil Pegu, who was introduced by the Dhemaji District Commissioner as an entrepreneurial farmer, said that, “if supply is sub-standard people will not vote for us (the candidate he associates with).” In the aftermath of a disaster, relief contractors and suppliers often emerge as sympathetic protagonists who foster the gratitude, recognition and acclaim of the disaster victims towards particular political ends. The sympathy they bestow upon the people in need gives them power and dominion, augments their standing, garners continuity and remembrance, and most significantly, obtains the leverage they need to determine the exclusion, inclusion and flow of the people they serve. For bureaucratic actors, the role of contractors as political leaders is justifiable for these actors are “smart people” who are generally aware of when and how to file winning tenders. And if a political actor is looking to gain widespread support through the distribution of relief, they make sure that the relief material is not sub-standard. However, what if the political actors are willing to marginalise individual communities to create or fester populist views? What happens when the politically charged contractors and suppliers thrive on a narrative of othering? And what if the people in need of relief have absolutely no political participation like in the case of D-voters? From an elite bureaucratic point of view, the problem of uneven relief distribution has been resolved by making relief available only through designated shelter areas. To claim relief, a family or its representative must physically come to the designated shelter and get their relief package under the watchful supervision of a street-level administrator. It is only in extreme cases of emergency, where communities are stranded in remote areas, that the essential relief is air-dropped and the SDRF, NDRF or Army can complete a rescue evacuation operation. Anecdotes from

24

Interaction at the office of Deputy Commissioner Bongaigaon, 29 February 2016.

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the field confirm the politics and exposition of relief which tend to create a particular imagery of humanitarianism without actually providing structural support.25 There is a profound sense of dissatisfaction within the bureaucracy given its low capacity to respond to disasters. This disappointment is visible through every communication I held in the state, where officials held a genuine desire to help. From the Chief Minister of the State, Mr. Tarun Gogoi, to the street-level administrator, everyone had a sense of exasperation towards floods and the disasters it begets and the households it displaces. Nevertheless, the dissatisfaction does not translate into drastic actions in the way that relief responses are provided, but is more of an empty sympathetic view towards those displaced. The state keep on emphasizing that people have free-will and they are dynamic actors who can decide their future even when faced with imminent displacement and persistent poverty. The floods wash away every little material aspect of life that a household has gathered—it washes away their land, it washes away the documentation proving their rights over the land, and it washes away their right to be citizens. Most of the officials interviewed empathised with the disaster victims; they also reflected a myriad of mixed opinions regarding the delivery of grant-in-aid. For example, Shri Rajendra Kumar, who had retired as the Commandant General Home Guards and Director Civil Defence in the State of Assam, while speaking to me said: ‘disaster victims are often self-styled victims’ who seek ‘floods as an opportunity to seek monetary compensation packages’. He explained that the ‘government is bound to provide ex-gratia financial support to anyone who has suffered flood damage to life or property… this compulsion becomes higher in the case of media presence and social sympathy…. But most often the people who are most affected are also the ones who choose to live in flood-prone areas and engage in a calculated risk to obtain the ex-gratia support. Part of these payments is then utilised to buy cheap land in some other vulnerable region, and the whole cycle of compensation repeats.’26 While during my field visit several other officials agreed there was a prevalence of this phenomenon: using ex-gratia payments as a ‘money making opportunity’.27 However, there was also a sensitive attitude towards the humanitarian nature of these grants amid the rampant poverty of these areas. This was evident from the remark made by another bureaucrat: ‘yes, it is possible that some clever people do this, but it is not right to call these people opportunists in the real sense. They are living in chronic poverty, and this is just one of the means by which they can overcome some of their hardships.’28 The words of Mr Islam, resounded the limited sympathy of the state—the state is aware of the ‘victimhood’ and ‘chronic poverty’, it is also aware of its own limitation to provide long-term solution; and to by-pass this limitation the state kindly allows the communities to collect compensations—not because it is a matter of right—but 25

Gandhi 1981, p. 1889. Interview with Mr. Rajender Kumar Additional DIG (Retd) 23 January 2016, Gurgaon, India. 27 Interviews with Deputy Commissioner Kamrup Metro 2016, and Project Officer DDMA Chirang February–March 2016, Assam, India. 28 Interview with Deputy Commissioner Dhubri 2016. 26

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because the state is ‘pitiful’ of the situation. Thus in its absence the welfare state is still somewhat present.

4.4 Means, Manners and Vulnerability A farmer in the Majuli Island of Jorhat district commented, ‘it is good when the flood comes, I sit on my terrace and fish from the balcony, I do not even have to go anywhere, it is like a mini-vacation.’ On the same island, Bishnu Payen invited me to his family house, made of bamboo and on stilts. His wife had brewed fresh Apong and was eager to offer Assamese hospitality with a recipe of fermented fish and pork. Bishnu Payen explained that the water causes food to spoil quickly, so all of the indigenous tribes have methods to ferment and preserve food.29 In Dhubri town, some 600 km away from Majuli, the habits of the Mishing are considered primitive. Raj Kumar (a.k.a. Babula), a local boy from the Rajani Revenue circle commented: ‘have you seem them climb like a monkey up their houses, they do not even have stairs, just a bamboo pole and even old women climb so swiftly…that does not happen here in Dhubri (down-stream Brahmaputra), here people like to live in normal houses.’30 In the city of Dhubri, one of the state officials during a casual conversation said— ‘we tell people to adopt designs which will reduce their vulnerability to floods, but at times there is too much ego surrounding lifestyle. It is not like the Mishing or Hajon, have copyrighted the design for stilt houses; other tribes will not follow it because for them it is an identity issue.’31 I noticed these differences in house construction in other non-tribal districts of Morigaon, Bongaigaon, and even Chirang where houses are built on raised platforms instead of stilts. In Guwahati city, the urban dwellers are increasingly adopting raised housing architecture. New buildings, including commercial ones, increasingly used the ground floor as parking space. Dr Angamuthu, the Deputy Commissioner of the Kamrup Metro district, explained: Guwahati has the problem of urban flooding. The flood level is not high, but the water stagnates, and if you are living on the ground floor then not only is your property at risk, but you can also suffer from electrocution as a lot of the electricity network is underground, and even the overhead live wires sometimes break due to heavy winds. So, people automatically prefer living on higher floors for safety.32

While the housing styles influence the vulnerability of communities to flooding, there is not much a state can do to interfere with non-permanent physical structures, such as those built in rural areas using mud, thatch and bamboo. The national building codes are irrelevant for the communities who have no means to construct 29

At the house of Mr. Bishnu Payen in Dhubri, 14 April 2016. Casual conversation with Rajkumar April 2016. 31 Casual conversation with an officer of district Bongaingaon 2016. 32 Follow-up conversation with Deputy Commissioner Kamrup Metro by telephone May 2016. 30

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brick-walls. 89% of the households in the State of Assam are non-permanent structures made from mud, bamboo, thatch and pre-fabricated materials. While on the one hand, these non-permanent structures reduce the risk of damage to expensive building materials during flash floods, they also increase the households’ vulnerability to inundation. Nevertheless, commenting on the housing vulnerability, most elite administrators used words like smart, clever and intelligent in describing the Mishing raised-platform hutments, while the bamboo housing in rural areas was described as easily relocatable, non-expensive and flood resilient. The communities in Assam are colloquially circumscribed as being tribal (constituting scheduled tribes of the region), non-tribal Assamese (composing of those who identify themselves as successors of Ahom Kings) and migrants (those arriving from outside Assam during the colonial and post-colonial period).33 In these three categories of people, tribal peoples, including the Bodos and Mishing (which are the most significant tribes in the Brahmaputra Valley region) are the ones who are most adept at coping with their geographical vulnerability. The Ahoms, who are the nontribal Assamese and have inhabited the state since the thirteenth century, while more modern, are still well-attuned in their lifestyle and dealing with annual flooding. The migrants loosely comprise those who were brought to Assam during the early twentieth century colonial expansion, to work in the tea plantations, as well as the immigrants allegedly arriving from Bangladesh and elsewhere; they are considered the least resilient.34 However, the assumed non-resilience of those arriving in Assam during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries is a strong rhetoric that creates citizenship/migrant differentiation. And ‘otherise’ anyone who does not know how to survive a flood. There is neither any special policy to help reduce the vulnerability of those assumed to be more vulnerable nor any concern towards these migrating communities. People who migrate are quite likely to be termed outsiders who do not belong in Assam and the state, if it so wishes, can innately displaying reduced responsibility towards these people because the status of these people as citizens itself is contested. The state can ignore them without a strong backlash although more recently minority leaders in the state have been voicing concerns of the alleged ‘illegal migrants’ it often ends up in violent conflict, and the agenda is lost.35 For those living with the flood-erosion the absence of political capital or the state support does not mean all is lost. The communities have strong-ties to the land and society they inhabit, and the social capital comes to perform in several dynamic forms.

33

Bose 1989; Dikshit and Dikshit 2014. Interviews with Project Officer DDMA Dhemaji 2016; Project Officer DDMA Morigaon 2016. 35 Casual conversation with Prof. Ranjan Saikia in May 2016, Guwahati University, Assam. 34

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4.5 Those Who Live on the River Islands The people of char are always floating36

Communities occupying the floating river islands (char) in the lower and central Brahmaputra Valley live a fluid life. The char, which is pronounced ‘Shore’ (when translated from Hindu it means margins), or Chor (which on translation from Hindi means thief)—are elusive and somewhat scandalous. There is not much known about them, except that these land-masses can disappear (like thieves) and there is a wide belief that those who occupy them are also thieves. The Char(s), the Chor(s), the Shore(s) like the name is at the margins of geographical vulnerability.37 These landmasses (and the communities within them) are also on the margins of social and political existence—and all these margins intersect with the margin of a border state—Assam—which is in itself at the margins (borders) of India. The existence and life on Chars create concentric circles of limitations, boundaries, deprivation, and disappearance which is quintessentially the nature of the island as well. Why do you want to go to the Char?…It is not advisable to go there; you are a woman and the people in char are so dangerous that even our police officers avoid going there… if you persist we will send someone with you but please be really careful and do not take anything valuable with you…. The bangles you are wearing can cost you your limb…..Those people are barbaric and thieves. They will commit a crime and disappear across the borders….. it will be impossible for us to locate them. And do not, in any case, go there after sunset, the islands are dangerous spaces in the dark.

This was the standard advice I received from every senior official to whom I expressed a desire to visit the river island. My field notes on the date of my visit to char villages recall a different scenario (Fig. 4.3). The boat journey to Char included sharing a depilated boat (Fig. 4.4), and arriving at a depilated river bank (Fig. 4.5). The char itself was sparsely populated, for provisions there was one tea-stall with a solar panel (Fig. 4.6), nearby was a school (Fig. 4.7) and a Madarsa (Islamic School) (Fig. 4.8). The char communities have developed a system of social resilience due to their geographical vulnerability and governance obscurity. The people on the char treat land as a common cultivation resource and try to build self-reliance with access to food. Many households send their youth to the main-land for daily-wage work to increase their household economic status. During the floods, if a part of the char is inundated and lost to the Brahmaputra River due to erosion, the displaced families are accommodated by friends and relatives living on the same char or on nearby char. At Bhashaini char, the families suggested a trip to Bhagdora—one of the larger char that faced recent erosion—where the south-east land-mass was washed away. The char is right across the India Bangladesh border, and there are bamboo ridges 36

Casual conversation with professor Ranjan Saikia, Guwahati, April 2016. The naming convention here is a post-visit reflection and does not mean that the river islands were named Chor or Shore because of the theft, or assumed marginality. As an author this is my interpretation of these margins—readers are free to have their own.

37

4.5 Those Who Live on the River Islands

109

Fig. 4.3 Excerpts from Diary Entry 20 April 2016. Source The author

that serve as a border fence (Fig. 4.9), while also resisting the loss of sedimentary property during floods. On the way from Bhashaini to Bhagdora, the dinghy was intercepted by the Central Reserve Police Force, who wanted to know the intention of “a lady” on board a local dinghy instead of a governmental boat (see Fig. 4.10). They were confused because people from the city do not come to char for tourism or for research. After responding

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4 Negotiating Climate, Citizenship, and Belonging

Fig. 4.4 Boat Headed Towards Bashaini Char, Dhubri. Source The author

Fig. 4.5 The Drop-off Point on Bashaini Char, Dhubri. Source The author

to officers in English and showing my Indian passport our dinghy was escorted to Bhagdora. In Bhagdora, a part of the island was eroded, and the families were displaced to the other side of a narrow dyke, which also acts as a bridge. The women of the families displaced ended up as D-voters. Like Bhashaini, there are no roads on this char either, although there was a Maruti car driving around with posters of the Congress party-leader. The locals suggested that the char may have better prospects now as one of the contesting MLAs is a local. One can see the ongoing political interests in the form of a school construction and the implementation of solar panels.

4.5 Those Who Live on the River Islands

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Fig. 4.6 Newly Installed Solar Panel on a Tea-stall. Source The author

Fig. 4.7 Primary School Building. Source The author

According to the government, both the Bhashaini and Bagdhora char are fully electrified and have had village roads for the last ten years. However, the locals laughed at this proposition, gleefully, stating that the state would have known the truth only if an officer would have come to inspect the construction site. The group went on to elaborate that ‘the local MLA was given a fund ten years ago for electrification; he kept that money … only now under the solar panel scheme and looming elections are the panels being installed, and some progress is made on the school.’38

38

Group Discussion Bagdhora Chor, 20 April 2016.

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4 Negotiating Climate, Citizenship, and Belonging

Fig. 4.8 Madrassa (Islamic School) in a Make-shift Hutment Opposite the Primary School. Source The author

Fig. 4.9 Bamboo Structure Determining the India-Bangladesh Border. Source The author

Public spending on household consumption goods for electoral gains is a commonly known and well-documented phenomenon in India.39 It is very palpable that the recent scenarios of construction and energy distribution in Assam and its river island were part of the electoral strategy. It is well worth stating here that the State of Assam was under the Congress government leadership, led by Shri Tarun Gogoi at the time of my visit. However, it was perceived that the BJP would manage to achieve

39

Khemani 2003; Wade 1982; Gupta 1995; Jeffrey 2002; Scott and Seth 2013.

4.5 Those Who Live on the River Islands

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Fig. 4.10 Officers of Border Security Forces of India Patrolling the Riverine Border. Source The author

a landslide victory in the 14th State Assembly Election. And indeed, from May 2016, after 15 years, the Bhartiya Janta Party assumed governmental responsibility. Nothing during that day’s experiences on the char (or afterwards during my entire visit) was anywhere close to the narratives of ‘terrifying thieves’ that I had been warned about earlier. And one must wonder how these narratives came into being. A little archival research into the historic police records shed some light on this. There were instances of murders, dacoity and disruption of public order and the alleged criminals had absconded to the river island, making it very hard for the colonial administration to trace them.40 The records provide a detailed description of a police chase across the river and the disappearance of alleged criminals into ‘thin mist onto an unknown river island’. The elusive geography of the river islands makes them a perfect hide-out for alleged criminals and they were in fact used during the period of the Assam Agitation as terrorist hide-outs and planning spaces for the United Liberation Front of Assam militants. My retired source, Shri Rajendra Prasad, remembering his own strenuous encounters during his days as a young Indian Police Service Officer, corroborated the scandalous nature of the chars, while asking, ‘can we ever be entirely sure about the nationality or intention of these people? So many of them were militants, and some groups even operated from across the Bangladesh border.’41

40 41

Notes from the files inspected at the Assam State Archive. Follow-up conversation with Rajendra Kumar, Retd. DIG, State of Assam.

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Fig. 4.11 Decadal Difference in Number of Char-villages. Source Calculated from the SocioEconomic Survey of Char Report, Release by the Director of Char Area Development

There are documented journalistic trails of interviews with ULFA members in the hard to locate chars and difficult mountain terrain.42 Due to problems of access and a lack of geographical information, there has never been enough academic engagement with the lives of the people occupying the Indian Chars. Although ethnographic and geographic work from the Chars in Bangladesh, especially concerning vulnerability and migration due to climate change, has started to take shape.43 Interestingly, the Assam government included the Char as a specific subject requiring attention for development in its 7th Five-year plan (1983). Subsequently, a departmental unit was established in 1986. In 1996, this unit was made into a Directorate, and in 1998 the Directorate for Char Area Development was merged into the Welfare of Minorities Development. However, the only achievements that the Directorate could have boasted was socio-economic surveys of the region in 1992–93 and 2003–04. These surveys, which were the only source of official information about the Chars, have been kept away from public view by the current government. During my visit to the archive in Assam, under speculative scrutiny of the librarian I was able to note the following information. The physical presence of the number of chars in each of these districts corresponds to 1992–93 and 2002–2003 (see Fig. 4.11); the demographic data of eight districts; and a list of NC and Char villages. The figure shows that the physical presence of the number of chars in each of the districts has changed during the survey period and must have further changed during the last two decades. The data also showed a considerable increase in the number of families residing below the poverty line while there was a relative stagnation of the literacy rate from

42 43

Mahanta 2013; Kotwal 2000; Singh 2008; Gogoi and Dutta 2016. Islam 2018.

4.5 Those Who Live on the River Islands

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Table 4.1 Change in Literacy and Poverty Rates in the Char Areas District

Literacy (92–93) (%)

Kamrup

17

15

53

68

Goalpara

8

14

53

68

Bongaigaon

13

12

54

68

Dhubri

19

15

54

69

8

19

53

67

Jorhat

32

61

25

64

Dhemaji

14

16

47

71

Morigaon

Literacy (2003–04) (%)

BPL (92–93) (%)

BPL (2003–04) (%)

Source Socio-Economic Survey of Char Areas of Assam, 1992–93 and 2003–04, Directorate of Char Development, Department of Minorities Development

1992–93 to 2003–04. Table 4.1 compares the data on poverty and illiteracy in the selected study districts. The growth in poverty is indicative of the poor performance of the welfare programmes, and the change in the char areas is indicative of the lack of structural development to mitigate the silt and river bank erosion. The surveys do not provide specific data on religion and ethnicity, although this data is available through the village level census data. Given the fluctuating nature of the chars themselves, and the resource constraints, this book does not identify each char village (1144 in total for the study districts). Instead, a demographic analysis of the revenue circles with a char majority in the lower Assam was conducted. The analysis shows that the population in the revenue circles with a high char concentration are primarily Muslim. For example, in the South Salmara Revenue circle, the population of Muslims is 98%. Dhubri has 480 recorded chars, the majority of which lie in the South-Salmara Circle. In the district of Bongaigaon, the Botiamari revenue Circle and Srijangram Revenue circle both having a multiplicity of chars with a Muslim population of 69% and 66% respectively. It is worth noting here that in the district of Bongaigaon, the overall Muslim population is 50%. However, in the revenue circles, which have a multiplicity of chars, the population of Muslims is higher. Similarly, the Goalpara District has an aggregate Muslim population of 51%, while the Lakhipur Revenue Circle has a Muslim concentration of 81%. In the Upper Brahmaputra division in the District of Dhemaji, the total population of Muslims across the whole district is only 1.9%. However, in the Jonai sub-division, which has a multiplicity of river islands, this concentration is nearly 4%. The only exception to the Char population in the study area is seen in the Majuli Revenue Circle (now a district in itself), where the population is almost 100% tribal.44 The District Commissioner of Dhemaji, Mr Victor Carpenter, candidly stated: the people in the region are well adapted to living with floods… when you see the beautiful pictures of decades-old bamboo bridges hanging over the flooded river it is from this region. 44

Calculated from the Census Data 2011, Government of India.

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These living bridges are a glorifying example of local engineering and the tribal way of living. You do not find that in the lower or middle Brahmaputra Valley. You would find them in the upper-areas of Bodo-land neighbouring Bhutan where the tribal concentration is higher or in the Karbi-Anglong district area, but not in other districts.

He also explained, ‘in the last years we have seen an influx of non-tribal nonAssamese population. They are Bengali and Marwari migrants. They are economically cleverer, but their lifestyles are detrimental to the ecosystem, and thus there are clashes.’45 Answering the question, does the state try to negotiate peaceful living amongst the migrating and host community? The Deputy commissioners said: ‘no! But we try to prevent them from coming… you must have seen it is not an easy journey to travel to Dhemaji, the road… we are even thinking of barricading outside the district lines to stop and check the documentation of incoming migrants, but that is not legally possible, and there would be problems from civil society actors.’46 The Deputy commissioner himself was raised in the tribal areas of Karbi-Anglong and feels genuine regret about the loss of tribal identity and culture in the state. It is also worth mentioning here that out of all of the Deputy commissioners interviewed for this study, Mr Carpenter was the only one who viewed the protection of tribal identity as the most critical issue and genuinely believed in the threat from migrants, including those coming from other regions of India, and being culturally different to Assamese people. For Mr Carpenter, the Chars are an example of micro-cosmic ecosystems that must be protected and used for developing biodiversity reserves. He suggested a meeting with Dr Bishnu Payen, the forest man of India, who has converted an entire river island into a tropical forest. For him it is only the aboriginal tribes who can respect and revere the land to revive a barren sand-dune and convert it into a tropical reserve. In the middle Brahmaputra Valley in the district of Morigaon, the population of Muslims across the district is 52%. However, the concentration of Muslims in the Laharighat Revenue circle and Bhuragaon Revenue circle is 60% and 91% respectively. The Bhuragaon Revenue Circle also has a large population who were displaced due to the massive erosion of approximately 17 villages. In the Middle Brahmaputra Valley, there is undoubtedly a large majority of Muslim Bengali-speaking people, who are identified as ‘Miyaan’, occupying the fragile river island ecosystem. The proximity of Lower Assam to the Bangladeshi border has added to the narrative of illegal Bangladeshi immigrants. And social and political groups have consistently questioned the legitimacy of these inhabitants residing in India (Home and Political Department, Assam, 2012). The administration, on the other hand, has carefully avoided any efforts towards the development or even identification of these areas. Inhabitants of the chars are unlike those living on the mainland of Assam. Politically they are invisible and administratively they are dispensable. In particular, in Lower Assam, where the chars are mostly occupied by a Bengali-speaking Muslim 45

Interview with Deputy Commissioner Dhemaji 2016. The reference to the road was relational to my long journey of 10 h with a perplexed driver who complained about the roads the moment he saw the DC.

46

4.6 The Question of Existence

117

community, suspicion about illegal immigrants from Bangladesh or giving refuge to illegally trafficked family members from Bangladesh is strong. The residents of these islands live in obscurity with little to no livelihood options and no state support. Most households engage in community farming or work as daily wage labourers in the nearest town.

4.6 The Question of Existence It was evident on inspection of these chars that the communities living here are not a part of the government programmes that are supposed to benefit erosion affected families or flood victims. There are no MGNREGA initiatives, no Indira Awas Yojana Housing and no structural barriers to control flood damage. Regarding compensation, it was not entirely clear how many of the people have received any state help. However, it can be deduced that as the land ownership in these areas is unsecured and land-data is unsurveyed there are no registered cultivation rights against which compensation can be sought. Even in the Upper Assam areas of Jonai and Majuli, which are Scheduled Tribe areas, the land rights are held through community and cooperative ownership, which makes seeking compensation for loss of territory a complicated issue. During the group discussions, it was seen that the families residing on the river banks tended to move inwards but close to their eroded piece of land. The proximity is kept to supervise the river flow and ensure that in the case of re-emergence of the eroded land it is not acquired by someone else. This is possible only in areas where there is empty fallow land available and sufficient social capital for the displaced family. For example, the Gaon Budha of Sutar Gaon acquired land 100 metres inwards from his eroded plot without opposition, due to the social clout he exerts. In the same village, other families had to move to Dhing or interior villages of the Laharighat circle. A similar effect of social capital was seen in Bhashaini Village, where cooperative cultivation was practised, and char families displaced due to floods and erosion were given shelter by the Matbor’s family. However, social capital is not permanent when it comes to land resources, which are already scarce. It is often seen that while at first, families will accommodate the incoming erosion victims on sympathy grounds, if long-term rehabilitation is not offered elsewhere, hostility between families will arise. As Nandita Hazarika explained, ‘first they are a guest, then they are illegal settlers, it is challenging for the state to get involved in these community-dynamics.’ In the absence of land-rights, displaced families are unable to claim compensation. The only avenue left for people displaced from this ecosystem is to seek a generous ex-gratia compensation following every flood season and to get themselves prioritised under welfare schemes such as Indira Awas Yojana (IAY). To seek ex-gratia aid, it is necessary for the state to acknowledge the rights of a person as a citizen as well as a displaced flood victim, but getting recognised as a citizen is a crucial and arduous task in itself.

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During the group discussion in Dhobkura village, 13 women came forward to identify themselves as D-voters who are present on the D-voter list. Most of these women lamented the problem as being due to the ‘unavailability of documentation to prove their birth or lineage from an Indian father’, a ‘clerical mistake in writing the names’ and the tradition of giving a ‘new bride a name of her husband’s choice upon marriage’. As the process of a name change does not include a state recognised system of public declaration in the newspapers, and as women lack identity documents, it becomes challenging for them to prove their citizenship and thus claim their rights in the event of migration or displacement. Shakina Begum, a woman who was successfully able to seek a court judgement against the wrongful listing of her name on the D-voter list, spent 8 years regularly attending the Foreigners’ tribunal and spent a total of 10,000 Rupees in lawyers’ fees. Her judgement does not provide a rationale but simply states ‘she is wrongfully listed on the D-voter list and the state authorities must reinstate her voting rights.’ The judgement makes no mention of the documentary proof that led to the decision. In a similar vein, Fatima Bibi, whose name was on the 2001 voting list, but who suddenly found herself listed as a D-voter during the 2016 election drive, was disappointed that she could not vote. The reason for the listing was probably her migration from a char to a river-bank area with her two daughters after the death of her husband. She said that while the new community has integrated her and her daughter like their own, she could not show the documentation to the government officials when they asked for her identity papers. She did not have any. On the other hand, the revenue circle officer in the state of Dhubri stated: women claimants are more likely to be attended to first in the public offices. I personally don’t like watching a poor woman in my office area, so I always try to sort their problems out first. Plus in fact we have policies which make it mandatory for us to dispose cases of compensation and assistance where the claimant is a woman…even in the case of compensation for properties in joint ownership we prioritise cases where a woman is one of the co-owners and in IAY allocations the housing is always provided in the joint name of the husband and the wife.47

Despite a profound humanitarian realisation, which resulted in several affirmative policies and a Directorate for char area development, these areas have remained physically vulnerable and the occupants of these islands are socially and economically trapped due to their vulnerability. The lack of state support in these areas has created concentric circles of victimisation with climate change adding further parallel circles of entrapment, discrimination and structural persecution. The nuances regarding governance of the margins—a marginal population and the margins of the main-land—need to be studied further and these chars provide excellent starting points for this.

47

Follow-up conversation with Revenue circle officer, Dhubri District, April 2016.

4.7 Conclusion

119

4.7 Conclusion The issue of citizenship determines not only who will occupy the most vulnerable geographical areas due to their exclusion from the mainland but also if people with non-tribal identity (and thus non-belonging to the state) will even have the right to seek state assistance. These findings are unsettling at several levels. First, any instance of migration in the state is complexly tied to the political construction of ‘illegal Bangladeshi migrants’. Therefore, the host society tends to look at the migrants as non-citizen aliens. The host-migrant relational complexity is politically debilitating in situations where the migrants do not have existing social capital or where they have lost their own land to river erosion, thus becoming long-term or permanent migrants. This relational complexity is intensified through the parameters of gender, age, religion and race. Secondly, there is structural indifference towards the issue of depriving migrants of their citizenship. The Constitution of India creates an affirmative obligation to provide enabling circumstances where migration within the country can be undertaken without discrimination or fear of being annihilated from political citizenship during the process. This obligation is exceedingly crucial in vulnerable geographical areas prone to annual disasters, as one’s inability to migrate outside of a vulnerable area decreases one’s ability to adapt to the changing climate circumstances. However, the state neglects this obligation not just by delaying structural development but also by creating barriers to be recognised as a citizen, thus withdrawing the constitutional right of freedom of movement. Third, there is a continuous tussle in terms of passing the burden from one linear level to another or across departments of the governance apparatus. For example, the election officers in the field candidly spoke about how the courts and the judicial magistrates in the foreigners’ tribunal have a duty to determine the status of people alleged to be foreigners, restricting their own role to that of a clerical nature, bereft of the power to make a judicial review of the situation. In the process, responsibility is passed across a horizontal line of administration. Similarly, at the middle management level of block development officers, and the higher management level of the Deputy Commissioner, the practice of enumerating D-voters is a ‘secondary business that needs to be dealt with due to the peculiar political condition of Assam’. Therefore, despite the presence of an enabling right that guarantees freedom of migration from geographically vulnerable locations, the functioning of that right is critically constricted in the State of Assam. Thus, although theoretically one may say that people migrating due to climate change are dynamic independent actors capable of deciding their own destiny, this construction of ‘dynamic independent actors’ is undoubtedly an exaggeration in a society that is structurally indifferent to those who are at the threshold of climate change-related disasters.

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References Ahmed R (2014) Anxiety, violence and the postcolonial state: Understanding the “anti-Bangladeshi” rage in Assam, India. Perceptions: Journal of International Affairs 19:55–70 Ahmed-Zaman SZ (2014) Deportation movement, creation of ‘D’ voters and problems of NRC updation in Assam. In: Proceedings of the Indian History Congress. JSTOR, pp 1293–1300 Baruah AK (2012) Chauvinism in Assamese Society and the Bengali elite in Assam. NEHU, India Bose M (1989) Social History of Assam: Being a Study of the Origins of Ethnic Identity and Social Tension During the British Period, 1905–1947. Concept Publishing Company Dikshit KR, Dikshit JK (2014) North-east India: Land, people and economy. Springer Gandhi KK (1981) Politics of Flood Relief vs Flood Control. Economic and Political Weekly 1889–1891 Gogoi D (2016) Unheeded hinterland. Identity and sovereignty in Northeast India. Routledge India, London Gogoi D, Dutta U (2016) Between state and the insurgents: Violation of human rights in Assam. In: Unheeded Hinterland. Routledge India, pp 179–199 Gupta A (1995) Blurred boundaries: the discourse of corruption, the culture of politics, and the imagined state. American Ethnologist 22:375–402 Islam MR (2018) Climate change, natural disasters and socioeconomic livelihood vulnerabilities: migration decision among the char land people in Bangladesh. Social Indicators Research 136:575–593 Jayal NG (2013) Citizenship and its discontents: an Indian history. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass Jeffrey C (2002) Caste, class, and clientelism: a political economy of everyday corruption in rural North India. Economic Geography 78:21–41 Khemani S (2003) Partisan politics and intergovernmental transfers in India. World Bank Publications Kimura M (2013) The Nellie Massacre of 1983: Agency of Rioters. SAGE Publications India Kotwal D (2000) Dynamics of unending violence in Assam. Strategic Analysis 24:603–615 Mahanta NG (2013) Confronting the State: ULFA’s quest for sovereignty. SAGE Publications India Murshid N (2016) Assam and the Foreigner Within. Asian Survey 56:581–604. https://doi.org/10. 1525/as.2016.56.3.581 Nath MK (2016) Communal Politics in Assam: Growth of AIUDF since 2016. Economic and Political Weekly 88–93 Pisharoty SB (2019) Assam: the accord, the discord. Penguin Random House India Scott A, Seth P (2013) The political economy of electricity distribution in developing countries. Overseas Development Institute Sharma CK (2012) The immigration issue in Assam and conflicts around it. Asian Ethnicity 13:287– 309. https://doi.org/10.1080/14631369.2012.676235 Siddique N (2019) Discourse of doubt. Economic & Political Weekly 54:25 Singh J (1984) Assam’s Crisis of Citizenship: An Examination of Political Errors. Asian Survey 24:1056–1068 Singh G (2008) Illegal migration, insurgency, and the political economy of Assam The Constituent Assembly of India (2014) Debates, Vol IX, 11th August 1949, 6th reprint. Lok Sabha Secretariat, New Delhi, pp. 365–390. Available at https://eparlib.nic.in/bitstream/123456 789/763011/1/cad_11-08-1949.pdf#search=Citizenship%20Constituent%20Assembly%20D raft%20Making%20Debates Accessed 19 July 2022 van Schendel W (2005) The Bengal borderland: beyond state and nation in South Asia. Anthem, London Wade R (1982) The system of administrative and political corruption: Canal irrigation in South India. The Journal of Development Studies 18:287–328

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Conclusions

Citizenship is a position from where one can exercise their political participation and seek equality; it is also a methodology through which the state determines who benefits from its policies and programs. While on the one hand citizenship provides a basis for having legal rights, on the other hand it also determines who would be given the right to have a right in a particular society. Every year, between the months of April and July, the state orchestra comes to play its well-rehearsed musical of relief delivery over a mandatory period of three days, which routinely stretches to a week. Necessary assistance, including food supplies, household goods, blankets and tarpaulins are provided to everyone housed in the temporary camps or stranded in the water. After the flood in the Brahmaputra recedes, the victims of flood-displacement also leave the tapered security of the camp-sites to resurrect their lives from the remains of whatever is left of their houses and belongings. But the scenarios of displacements, migration and entrapment emerge from where the disaster ends. Those who are already engaged in cyclic migration may choose not to live with annual insecurity but instead relocate permanently to areas with better livelihoods and geographic security. Those who are displaced may not be able to return to their original place of residence due to flood-erosion and the submergence of their existing lands. Those who do return may find their lands, houses and belongings wholly submerged under the river—never to be recovered. Some occupy the temporary camps or vacant lands in the hope that the government will be kind and not push them and their children out. But for anyone who seeks compensation from the government, either for the loss of property or the loss of land, the government asks: “Who are you? What is the nature of your relation to the state? Why should the state be responsible for you? And why must the state protect you?” Despite a strong concern and tailored local policies to rehabilitate victims of hydro-meteorological disasters, the state is limited in its own construction of what a citizen and a migrant is. And more importantly, how to sieve an internally displaced migrant from the assumed ‘flow of illegal Bangladeshi immigrants’. The State in Assam regularly deploys its concern for the victims of disasters while also simultaneously contesting the citizenship status of disaster migrants. By creating noncitizenship in the victims of disaster, the state incessantly absolves itself from the © T.M.C. ASSER PRESS and the author 2023 R. Manuvie, Climate Migration Governance and the Discourse of Citizenship in India, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-567-6

123

124

Conclusions

responsibility to protect. Instead, the responsibility is replaced with pity-making— where the state as an empathetic bystander understands the misfortune but refuses to interfere. The problem of climate change migration is inherently complex. There are differential definitions and attitudes towards the role that climate change plays in influencing migration. This had led to a multiplicity of interpretations, perceptions and responses in regard to effective climate change governance at several levels. The research on the governance work on climate migration falls within a futurist ‘what ought to be’ paradigm, despite the strong scientific consensus regarding adaptive and survival migration because of climate change. Scholars have not developed a generalisable account of how governments tend to respond to wicked issues and why the solutions provided are non-uniform and inadequate despite the chronic nature of environmentally affected migration. At the beginning of my work, I believed that climate change migration requires new policy agendas and legal paraphernalia. My journey through Assam strongly suggests, however, that it is not the absence of laws or tailored polices, but rather deliberate omissions and methodical neglect by state institutions that lead to inadequate responses to climate change migrants. The elite bureaucratic actors in the state increasingly consider climate change as a reason for the changing flood patterns, which in turn has exacerbated out-migration and internal displacement in the state. There is an undeniable presence of eliteperception and visible institutional changes that have occurred over the last ten years. These include the establishment of functional Disaster Management Authorities, the adoption of a Flood Early Warning system, the study of geographical vulnerability and current social vulnerability to climate change, the analysis of livelihood diversification options and estimations of the flood erosion levels and number of displaced households in every district of the state. The State of Assam benefits from a small mitigation responsibility, a functional district level disaster management institution, and the utilisation of GIS mapping techniques to map its flood-vulnerability. The state has shown a progressive awareness of the climate change and migration nexus at the secretariat level. The state officials instinctively know that the communities living in fragile areas engage in cyclic and non-permanent forms of migration to strengthen their household level resilience to climate change. This knowledge is also recognised under the State Action Plan for Climate Change and the Disaster Management Plan of the State. The State Disaster Management Plan takes an ‘all disaster-all department’ approach to hazard management. This approach includes every horizontal and vertical line of response, which are synergised through techniques like mess-mapping. The state utilises the process of mess-mapping and identifies the political and administrative bottlenecks, including departmental nexus and communication networks that need reinvigorating for more closed cooperation. However, despite the growth in tailored policies the protection of climate migrants remains uncertain and inadequate. This is because of everyday and mundane practices of the state apparatus which shape and determine policy outcomes. The everyday discretions in determining who is a citizen, and therefore who is worthy of care, trumps the rights the citizen may have. As my starting point I also made few qualified assumptions—I framed climate migration as a security issue. This was supported by the security studies literature on

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125

climate migrations and resource conflict in Assam. This assumption is pliable and can change based on the political party in power. The elite actors frame climate migration as a developmental issue, but they are fully aware of the political narrative of border security which can be used as needed. The state can associate itself to the narrative of the security crisis caused by unregulated flows of ‘environmental migrants from Bangladesh’ to hide their administrative failures: it is easier to dismiss a person as ‘illegal’ than to provide assistance to them. The state actors can also disassociate themselves from the security narrative when confronting the central apparatus of the nation for the lack of care and finances for structural development of the state. The second assumption I made based on the literature on climate migration, was that there is an absence of a normative framework for people displaced due to climate change. This, as I have argued throughout the book, is not the case. The sub-state—especially those at the front-lines of disaster and fragile geographies—have always known how to respond and where their response is lacking. It is the political and social context of law that determines the success of the response. The state has had a morbid affair with the term ‘migration’ and ‘illegal Bangladeshi migrations’, and this politically charged narrative not only acts as an active impediment to policy implementation, it also tacitly determines the world-views of the street-level administrators who come to occupy positions of power within the state. The final assumption that I held, based on the literature on household level adaptation, was the unfair and gendered burden of climate migration which falls upon women in fragile economies. I found this to be true, not only because of the migration of male family members to cities and states outside of Assam, but because women were trapped in a fragile ecosystem with an inability to migrate. This inability was both economic and political. As the international and national dialogue on climate change migration moves from humanitarian interventions to the glorification of migrants as dynamic actors who use migration as an adaptation strategy, I have interrogated the political sub-text and marginalisation which confirms that the communities most vulnerable to climate change cannot simply walk away from their vulnerabilities. Instead, there are ghettos of trapped or displaced populations that are suffering from a chronic protection deficit because the state structures perceive them as ‘outsiders’. The colloquial construction of an illegal Bangladeshi immigrant: a Bengalispeaking man who wears a lungi and a skull-cap; is locally known as Miya; resides in the chars and river-banks; wears a veil of flood-victimhood; encroaches the roadsides with his disjointed bamboo hut; and who is not a ‘true Assamese’, is not entirely true. As the world warms, and our geographical spaces shrink due to sea-level rise, flood erosion and desertification, communities who are dependent on the ecosystem will use migration as a strategy to survive. In the changing global environment, forms of climate migration are inevitable. But how our systems will respond to this migration is dependent upon how the state apparatus perceives migrants. In the legal and procedural realm of the state where protection, assistance and rehabilitation are bestowed upon the victims of climate change based on their citizenship, we need to first understand what it means to be a citizen.

Annex A

District Selection and List of Interviewees

District Selection District is the smallest comprehensive unit of administration in India. A district is a consistent jurisdictional entity with supervisory and managerial power of all the revenue circles, blocks, panchayats and sadar divisions within its geographical boundary. The districts are headed by District Commissioners (also called Deputy Commissioners in some states). The District Commissioners (hereinafter DC) are members of either the State Civil Service (elevated usually towards the end of their State Civil Service career to the position of Deputy Commissioner) or they are recruited through the Indian Administrative Service (IAS) cohort and elevated in their 3rd or 4th year of service as Deputy Commissioner. The Deputy Commissioners are in charge of planning, monitoring, supervision and adjudication of developmental policies. They are also responsible for delegated decision making by framing rules, procedures, and by-laws in delivering legislative mandates. Districts are divided into Revenue Circles (for purpose of revenue collection), Developmental Blocks (for purpose of project implementation), Panchayat (to democratize decision making and implementation agenda), and Sadar (for the purpose of civil adjudication). The revenue circles, blocks and panchayats may exhibit inconsistent jurisdictional boundaries. For example two revenue circles may share certain villages under a Panchayat or Developmental Block. Or an Anchalik Panchayat can be spread across two different (at times partial) development blocks. Eight districts were selected based on criteria such as geographical vulnerability, demographic parity, religious and ethnic composition (Table A.1).

© T.M.C. ASSER PRESS and the author 2023 R. Manuvie, Climate Migration Governance and the Discourse of Citizenship in India, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-567-6

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Table A.1 Demographic Details of the Study Districtsa District

Religious composition (per cent data)

Linguistic composition

Gender distribution

Hindu

ST (%)

Primary languages

M

Muslim

Ors.

F

Dhemaji

92

5

3

47

Assamese, 51% Mishing, Bodo, Bengali

49%

Jorhat

96

2

2

13

Assamese, Hindi

51

49

Morigaon

47

53

0

14

Assamese, Bengali, Hindi, Urdu dialectical

51

49

Kamrup Metro

85

12

3

6

Assamese, Hindi, Bengali

52

48

Chirrang

67

23

10

37

Assamese, Bodo

51%

49%

Bongaigaon

49

50

1

3

Assamese, Bengali, Hindi, Bodo

51%

49%

Goalpara

34

58

8

11

Assamese, Bodo, Garo, Rabha, Bengali and Nepali

50%

50%

Dhubri

20

80

0

Bengali, Assamese, Hindi

Source The author a The revenue circle of South Salmara in Dhubri District was converted into a full district of South Salmara-Manikchar vide notification no. GAG (B) 27/2005/262 of 15th January 2016. And Majuli which was a revenue circle of Jorhat district during the time of this field work was also converted into full district on 16th August 2016 by notification no. GAG (B) 27/2005/PWI/59. However, due to administrative overlap in creation of a new district and its operationalisation the original composition was used

District Vulnerability Explanation The flood hazard atlas of Assam uses aggregated satellite data from 1998 to 2015, by extracting flood inundation imagery and layering them together to provide an aggregated image. Each layer represents maximum inundation caused in a one-year period. Based on the returning period of flood and internal variability of the flood inundation a hazard index is created which maps the whole state into five flood

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129

zones—very low intensity, low intensity, moderate, high intensity and very high intensity. Figure A.1 provides a detail of Flood hazard classification as used in the flood hazard maps 1. Dhemaji The district of Dhemaji exhibit a zone I flood ranking 46% of the total land area in the district is susceptible to frequent floods (Fig. A.2). Chang ghar (raised houses) are built on bamboo silts throughout the district as a response towards annual inundation. Traditional housing architecture of the district is known to enhance the flood resilience of the inhabitants of Dhemaji.

Fig. A.1 Colour Legend for Aggregated Flood Hazard Maps. Source Assam State Disaster Management Authority (2016), Flood Hazard Atlas

Fig. A.2 Aggregated Flood Hazard, Dhemaji. Source Assam State Disaster Management Authority (2016), Flood Hazard Atlas

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2. Jorhat The district of Jorhat is one of the oldest trading metropolis centre. The district is structurally more advanced compared to other districts of Assam, and boast a thriving education and cultural scene. Jorhat has also been home to few of the famous northeastern political thinkers, freedom fighters, poets, and artist. Majuli—the largest river Island—was until 2017 a part of Jorhat District. The district depicts high to very high flood aggregated flood hazard exposure in several villages across the north and south bank of the Brahmaputra River (see Fig. A.3). 3. Morigaon District of Morigaon is one of the most severely affected districts in Assam with 1/3rd of the total land area of the district falling into high to very high flood hazard exposure (Fig. A.4). Flood erosion in the Lahorighat Revenue Circle in the district has affected approximately 108 villages leading to a critical problem of forced displacement and unauthorized land-grabbing in the district and its surrounding regions. 4. Kamrup (M) Kamrup Metro is an Urban district hosting the Guwahati Municipal Corporation (the only designated Municipality in Assam), the state capital at Dispur, and an upcoming Smart City under the phase I of the Smart City Development Plan of the Indian Central Government. Being Urban in nature the district serves as a migrant host district for not only intra-district migrations within Assam but also for incoming migrants from neighbouring states of Arunachal, Meghalaya, Tripura and Nagaland. The flood atlas has zoned most of Kamrup Metro as falling either in high exposure or low exposure (Fig. A.5). This is mainly because of poor drainage system that is unable to cope with the incessant rain and occasional river run-off during the monsoon season. 5. Chirang Chirang is one of the few district in Assam without a very high flood vulnerability zonation. The district was selected for this study due to its geographical and political nuances. It shares a significant international border with the Kingdom of Bhutan in the north and it is part of the Bodoland Territorial Area District (BTDA) along with the districts of Baska, Udalgiri, Barpeta and Kokrajhar. The district was selected in place of Barpeta to understand the political dynamic autonomous tribal movements play in effecting the level of protection a sub-state administration can provide to migrants. The administrative tasks in Chirang is shared between Bodoland Autonomous Council and the District Commissioner’s Office. The Bodoland Autonomous Council handles the revenue and land management, while the DC office is in charge of implementing state and central government plan agendas. The district despite an elaborate system of river tributaries, does not reflect high flood hazard (see Fig. A.6) due to altitude, but instead shows high mobility motivated by the ethnic conflicts and lack of livelihood opportunities.

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Fig. A.3 Aggregated Flood Hazard, Jorhat. Source Assam State Disaster Management Authority (2016), Flood Hazard Atlas

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Annex A: District Selection and List of Interviewees

Fig. A.4 Aggregated Flood Hazard, Morigaon. Source Assam State Disaster Management Authority (2016), Flood Hazard Atlas

6. Bongaigaon Bongaigaon like Kamrup Metro and Jorhat host a large urban population due to oil refining process of Indian Oil and Bharat Petroleum Limited situated in the district, there is a wide base of refinery jobs in Bongaigaon town. The district is primarily a migrant receiving district especially for migrants arriving from Chirang district. The ethnic violence in BTAD in 2012 followed by incessant floods in the same year, led to displacement of communities from Chirang which are camped in rehabilitation shelters located in Bongaigaon district. In terms of Bongaigaon’s own flood vulnerability there are pockets of high to very high flood hazard exposure in Boitamari and Srijangram Revenue Circles (see Fig. A.7). southern and south-west region situated across the Brahmaputra River. 7. Goalpara Goalpara like Jorhat is one of the old districts with a continued political and trade significance. The district shares an inter-state border with the state of Meghalaya and witness mixed migrations motivated due to lack of employment and those motivated by ethnic conflicts from within the district and from the Kasi Garo Hill region of Meghalaya. All the revenue circles exhibit pockets of high to very high flood hazard exposure (Fig. A.8).

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133

Fig. A.5 Aggregated Flood Hazard, Kamrup (M). Source Assam State Disaster Management Authority (2016), Flood Hazard Atlas

8. Dhubri Dhubri is a historically, politically and strategically important district in Assam. In British India the district housed one of the busiest port after Calcutta, a military-use airport base (during the World War II) and a medium gauge railway line connecting north-eastern provinces to Calcutta. Post-independence Dhubri became strategically important due to its international border with East Pakistan (now Bangladesh). Historically Dhubri has received waves of in-coming migrants during partition of East and West Bengal, partition of India and later during Bangladesh Independence movement. Since 2012 the border between Dhubri and Bangladesh is completely guarded through erecting of fences, installation of flood-lights and a large presence of Central Reserve Police Force and Border Security Forces. It remains to be an important trading route between India and Bangladesh. The National Highway 31 connects the State of Assam to the rest of India via Dhubri. The only other district connecting Assam to rest of India is Kokrajhar which reals under episodes of insurgency and separatist movement, thus elevating the relative strategic importance of Dhubri. Due to a large presence of riverine islands in the lower Brahmaputra Valley the district is particularly vulnerable to floods. Especially the revenue circle of South Salmara

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Fig. A.6 Aggregated Flood Hazard, Chirang. Source Assam State Disaster Management Authority (2016), Flood Hazard Atlas

and Manikchar (now reconstituted into a new district) show heightened susceptibility to flood and flood erosion. There are 202 villages classified as falling in the high to very high flood vulnerability zone (see Fig. A.9). Majority of these villages are riverine islands (char villages). The peak flood inundation map reveals complete submergence of both north and south-banks while also highlighting the presence of few large river islands which continue to survive due to their elevation. Dhubri also allegedly continue to experience international human trafficking and illegal migrations due to a riverine border with Bangladesh which remains to be unfenced. The relatively high Muslim and Bengali speaking population of the district further strengthen the narrative of illegal migration flows (Tables A.2, A.3 and A.4).

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135

Fig. A.7 Aggregated Flood Hazard, Bongaigaon. Source Assam State Disaster Management Authority (2016), Flood Hazard Atlas

Fig. A.8 Aggregated Flood Hazard, Goalpara. Source Assam State Disaster Management Authority (2016), Flood Hazard Atlas

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Annex A: District Selection and List of Interviewees

Fig. A.9 Aggregated Flood Vulnerability Index, Dhubria . Source Assam State Disaster Management Authority (2016), Flood Hazard Atlas. a The map depicts the newly demitted Dhubri district, minus the South-Salmara revenue circle Table A.2 Elite Public Administrators Interviewed Name

Designation

No./type of interviews

Tarun Gogoi

Chief Minister of Assam

16 April 2016, Dispur, Assam

V. K. Piepersenia

Chief Secretary

16 February 2016, Dispur, Assam

Dr M Angamuthu

Deputy Commissioner, Kamrup M

18 February 2016, Guwahati, Assam; followed by multiple clarifications through phone calls

Rajesh Kumar

Deputy Commissioner, Morigaon

17 February 2016

Vishal Solanki

Deputy Commissioner, Jorhat

20 February 2016

Victor Carpenter

Deputy Commissioner, Dhemaji

23 February 2016, 12 April 2016, Dhemaji, Guwahati

VKV Srinivasan

Deputy Commissioner, Goalpara

3 March 2016, Goalpara

AK Majumdar

Deputy Commissioner, Chirang

28 February 2016

Nazirul Islam

Deputy Commissioner, Dhubri

1 March 2016, clarifications through phone calls (continued)

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Table A.2 (continued) Name

Designation

No./type of interviews

Sushil Kumar Pegu

Deputy Commissioner, Bongaigaon

29 February 2016, Bongaigaon

Nandita Hazarika

Chief Project Officer, ASDMA

14 February 2016, Dispur Secretariat

Jishnu Barua

Joint Secretary (on Deputation from 25 April 2016, New Delhi Assam Cadre) clarifications through phone calls

Ravi Shankar Prasad

Joint Secretary, Ministry of Environment (on Deputation)

27 April 2016, New Delhi

Rajender Kumar

Additional Deputy Inspector General (recently retired at the time of interview)

23 January 2016, Gurgaon

Source The author Table A.3 Street-level Administrators Interviewed Official

District

Ms. Minakshi Das

Morigaon

17 February 2016

Project Officer, District Disaster Management Authority

Jorhat

20 February 2016

Project Officer, District Disaster Management Authority

Dhemaji

14 April 2016

Project Officer, District Disaster Management Authority

Chirang

28 February 2016

Project Officer, District Disaster Management Authority

Bongaigaon

29 February 2016

Project Officer, District Disaster Management Authority

Dhubri

2 March 2016, Dhubri

Revenue Circle Officer

Dhubri District

31 March 2016, Dhubri

Revenue Circle Officer

Kamrup (M)

18 February 2016

Election Officer

Dhemaji District

13 April 2016

Block Development Officer

Dhemaji District

13 April 2016

Source The author

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Annex A: District Selection and List of Interviewees

Table A.4 List of Group Discussionsa Group discussion

Date

Remark

Sutar Gaon, Laharighat group discussion

20 February 2016

10 people, led by village headman who was incidentally present at the time

Fafal/Naborgam GD (Goalpara District)

5 April 2016

10 people group. Village headman from either of the villages not available

Asudhubhi GD, Goalpara

6 April 2016

15 people group. The discussions were cut short due to an election-related disturbance on the nearby village road

Kaura Gram (Dhobakaura), Jaleshwar Village, Goalpara

7 April 2016

20 people. Mother of the local BJP candidate led the discussions A separate discussion with NRC officers was held in the adjoining NRC office

Bhashani Char, Dhubri

20 April 2016

10 people group led by the village headman

Bagdhora Char, Dhubri

20 April 2016

10 people group. The discussions were interrupted by the BSF personnel

Relief Camp GD, Bongaigaon

1 March 2016

12 people group, represented by the PO, Disaster Management Unit Bongaigaon

Dhemaji farmer group discussion

14 April 2016

8 people group engaged in farming and allied activities

Source The author a Other than these I also drew upon chance encounters and informal conversations with the people of Assam during my visit

Annex B

See Tables B.1, B.2, B.3 and B.4.

Table B.1 NC Villages in Assam, Revenue Circle-wise Data as of February 2016

Name of circle

No of NC villages

Total year in km2

Morangi

1

0.05

Sarupathar

7

7.22

Bokakhat

6

9.76

Baijan

1

36.35

Matia

1

0.26

Akhipur

30

14.23

Barkhetri

2

7.29

12

25.26

Sapekhati

1

22.87

Sivasagar

3

6.16

Amuguri

2

1.61

Nazira

2

3.65

Mahmora

1

1.34

Chabua

2

0.74

Tengakhat

10

6.93

Naharkatia

5

0.80

Dimou

(continued) © T.M.C. ASSER PRESS and the author 2023 R. Manuvie, Climate Migration Governance and the Discourse of Citizenship in India, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-567-6

139

140 Table B.1 (continued)

Annex B Name of circle

No of NC villages

Total year in km2

5

0.88

10

4.33

Niambazar

3

8.81

Patharkandi

2

1.29

R. K. Nagar

10

4.24

Bongaigaon

7

0.79

Boitamari

3

1.85

Dhubri

4

11.96

Tingkhong Moran

3

0.00

21

46.31

Morigaon

1

0.06

Baghbar

13

141.48

Kaagachia

12

26.03

Chenga

25

228.33

Katichera

15

21.63

3

3.61

Kaiabor

10

6.22

Rupahi

2

0.64

Anka

8

35.68

Raha

1

0.75

Kampur

6

16.91

Dabaka

1

3.35

Majui

32

65.44

Teok

2

2.22

Titabar

9

25.05

Jorhat West

2

5.48

Mariani

1

4.69

Sonai

1

0.10

Katigorah

13

9.37

Sichar

Biasipara South Samara

Lala

41

6.39

Udharbond

3

0.98

Tinsukia

1

0.37

47

43.80

5

46.10

33

60.78

Margherita Sadiya Doomdooma

(continued)

Annex B Table B.1 (continued)

141 Total year in km2

Name of circle

No of NC villages

Narayanpur

11

7.57

Kadam

32

72.50

8

17.53

Bihpuria North Akhimpur

54

20.67

Subansiri

40

149.47

Dhakuakhana

39

112.77

Tezpur

1

1.71

Chariduar

1

0.67

Biswanath

3

3.22

Heem

3

2.02

Gohpur

2

0.82

Mangadai

21

61.69

Sipajhar

6

103.64

Dagaon

6

149.26

Chaygaon

9

5.46

Nagarbera

6

19.07

Boko

35

56.81

Chamaria

11

20.20

Goroimari

1

0.51

Paasbari

22

16.18

Guwahati

4

1.89

Dispur

7

24.59

Azara

5

6.03

Chandrapur

6

3.05

Sonapur

54

51.09

Dhemaji

11

10.04

Sissiborgaon

88

107.14

Gogamukh

37

150.89

Jonai

66

40.63

Source The author Table B.2 Overview of D-voter Data

Total listed entries of D-voters

139,757

Unique entries

138,327

Entries with unique voter IDs

137,508

Entries where voter ID cards are used more than once Source Author calculation, based on D-Voter List (2016)

217

142

Annex B

Table B.3 D-voters, Voters Removed from D-list and Cases of Declared Foreigners as of 30 April 2016 District

Total number of D-voters Total

Male

Removed

Female

Cases listed as foreigners Total

Male

Female

Dhubri

11.875

3.210

8.665

185

73

21

52

Goalpara

10.389

3.056

7.333

481

1.694

663

1.031

Morigaon

5.433

2.466

2.967

68

4.793

2.457

2.336

Kamrup M

4.743

2.250

2.493

80

151

86

65

Dhemaji

4.367

2.093

2.274

30

104

56

48

Bongaigaon

1.247

674

573

22

35

27

8

Chirang

233

75

158

–

3

2

1

Jorhat

17

11

6

–

3.864

3.105

759

Sonitpur

24.538

9.835

14.703

55

1.191

147

1.044

Barpeta

22.477

7.543

14.934

517

643

282

361

Nagaon

15.255

5.444

9.811

54

3.785

1.937

1.848

Udalguri

10.169

4.732

5.437

236

535

236

299

Cachar

5.847

2.672

3.175

190

3.376

2.699

677

Darrang

5.324

1.872

3.452

69

697

338

359

Baska

2.757

1.068

1.689

–

99

54

45

Karimganj

2.619

728

1.891

–

1.466

510

956

Tinsukhia

2.512

1.245

1.267

25

1.425

928

497

Goalaghat

2.429

1.131

1.298

–

135

83

52

Lakhimpur

2.304

979

1.325

11

747

465

282

Kamrup Rural

1.596

443

1.153

27

414

216

198

Kokrajhar

1.073

467

606

15

237

117

120

Karbi Anglong

1.041

458

583

46

2.866

1.894

972

Dibrugarh

774

418

356

7

3.753

3.155

598

Nalbari

631

325

306

7

591

296

295

Hailakandi

102

90

12

31

127

106

21

Dima Haso

5

4

1

–

6

5

1

Sivasagar

–

–

–

–

2.985

2.689

296

Total

139.757

53.289

86.468

2.156

35.795

22.574

13.221

Source Author calculation, based on D-Voter List (2016)

Annex B Table B.4 Constituency-wise Distribution of D-voters

143 Constituency

Total

Men

Women

Tamulpur

2676

1010

1666

56

42

14

Barama (ST) Chapaguri (ST) Sorbhog Gen Bhabanipur Gen

21

14

7

7258

2531

4727

932

317

615

18

7

11

Barpeta Gen

1272

579

693

Jania

6164

2189

3975

Baghbar Gen

3253

860

2393

Sarukhetri Gen

1766

527

1239

Chenga Gen

1727

500

1227

Bongaigaon Gen

309

134

175

Bijni Gen

211

149

62

Abhayapuri North Gen

312

183

129

Abhayapuri South (SC)

415

208

207

Silchar Gen

812

454

358

Sonai Gen

318

140

178

Patacharkuchi Gen

Dholai (SC)

1036

440

596

Udharbond Gen

981

427

554

Lakhipur Gen

382

263

119

845

337

508

Katigora

1467

608

859

Sidli (ST)

215

71

144

Kalaigaon Gen

834

333

501

Sipajhar Gen

612

278

334

Mangaldoi (SC)

1055

392

663

Dalgaon Gen

2796

860

1936

Dhemaji (ST)

752

374

378

3615

1719

1896

Mankachar Gen

835

163

672

Salmara Southgen

810

150

660

Dhubri Gen

1816

493

1323

Gauripur Gen

3074

915

2159

Golakganj Gen

3180

746

2434

Bilasipara West Gen

1136

361

775

Bilasipara East

965

370

595

Moran Gen

122

60

Barkhola Gen

Jonai (ST)

62 (continued)

144 Table B.4 (continued)

Annex B Constituency

Total

Men

Women

308

169

139

Lahowal Gen

6

6

0

Duliajan Gen

Dibrugarh Gen

199

113

86

Tingkhong Gen

13

3

10

Naharkatia Gen

93

49

44

Chabua Gen

33

18

15

Haflong (ST)

5

4

1

Dudhnai

2475

944

1531

Goalpara East Gen

2000

737

1263

Goalpara West

2244

587

1657

Jaleswar Gen

3073

618

2455

Bokakhat Gen

252

141

111

Sarupathar Gen

1085

467

618

Golaghat Gen

617

295

322

Khumtai

250

113

137

2

2

0

11

7

4

Dergaon (SC) Majuli (ST) Mariani Gen

4

2

2

Jalukbari Gen

81

37

44

2619

1206

1413

Guwahati East

232

101

131

Guwahati West

1806

904

902

164

67

97

1137

234

903

16

5

11

130

63

67

Kamalpur Gen

35

20

15

Rangia Gen

56

28

28

Howraghat (ST)

503

171

332

Diphu (ST)

249

Dispur

Boko (SC) Chaygaon Gen Palasbari Gen Hajo Gen

524

275

Baithalangso (ST)

14

12

2

Ratabari (SC)

44

23

21 214

Patharkandi Gen

301

87

Karimganj Northgen

66

24

42

Karimganj Southgen

1709

449

1260

Badarpur Gen

481

137

344

Gossaigaon Gen

433

194

239 (continued)

Annex B Table B.4 (continued)

145 Constituency

Total

Men

Women

Kokrajhar West (ST)

342

145

197

Kokrajhar East (ST)

298

128

170

Bihpuria Gen

211

109

102

Naoboicha Gen

796

340

456

Lakhimpur Gen

155

68

87

Dhakuakhana

1142

462

680

Raha (SC)

1845

702

1143

Dhing Gen

3130

1079

2051

Batadroba Gen

1616

528

1088

Nowgong Gen

594

238

356

Barhampur Gen

309

151

158

2060

770

1290

413

242

171

Rupohihat

1909

410

1499

Samaguri

1569

550

1019

Kaliabor

1451

602

849

Jamunamukh

357

171

186

Nalbari

338

172

166

Barkhetri Gen

184

99

85

Dharmapur Gen

109

54

55

Hojai Gen Lumding Gen

1

1

0

Dhekiajuli

5736

2352

3384

Barchalla Gen

5430

1962

3468

Tezpur Gen

4190

1537

2653

Rangapara Gen

2498

913

1585

Sootea Gen

2038

932

1106

Biswanath Gen

1055

440

615

Behali Gen

1471

674

797

Gohpur Gen

1894

915

979

Tinsukia Gen

480

240

240

Digboi Gen

365

183

182

1139

561

578

450

212

238

39

31

8

Panery Gen

3954

1968

1986

Udalguri (ST)

2137

1006

1131

Majbat Gen

4018

1698

2320

Mahmara Gen

Margherita Gen Doom Dooma Gen Sadiya

(continued)

146 Table B.4 (continued)

Annex B Constituency

Total

Men

Women

Jagiroad (SC)

4101

1843

2258

Marigaon Gen

811

401

410

Laharighat Gen

521

222

299

Hailakandi Gen

23

20

3

Katlicherra Gen

36

32

4

Algapur Gen

43

38

5

Source Author calculation, based on D-Voter List (2016)

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Index

A Adaptability, 58 Adequate shelter, 40 Agamben, 1, 7, 12, 13 Agencification, 7 All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad, 97 All Assam Students Union, 97 All disaster-all department, 124 Anti-immigrant sentiments, 95 Arendt, Hannah, 1, 11, 12 ASDMA, 56, 58, 71, 75 Assam Accord, 95, 97 Assam agitation, 96, 97, 113 Assam State Disaster Management Authority, 41, 44–46 B Bare life, 1, 7, 8, 13 Bengali minorities, 97 Bengali-Muslim, 97, 101 Bodoland Territorial Council, 88 Brahmaputra Board, 64 C Char, 86–88, 100–102, 108–111, 113–118 Citizenship, 1, 3, 4, 6, 11–14, 123, 125 Climate justice, 20 Climate migration hot-spot, 56 Climate migration nexus, 2, 22 CM Special Assistance Fund, 83 Complementary protection, 30, 31 Cross-border migrations, 25, 39, 42 Cross-sectoral synergy, 58 Cyclic labour mobility, 10

Cyclic migrations, 22, 23

D De facto, 94 De jure, 94 Designated shelter, 104 Determination of citizenship, 95 Development deficit, 34, 41 Directorate for Char Area Development, 114, 118 Disaster Management Act, 70, 71 Disaster risk reduction, 20, 26, 32, 33, 44, 47 Documentary evidence, 98, 100 D-voter, 6

E Electoral roll, 96–98 Electoral strategy, 112 Environmental law, 20, 21, 26–29 Erosion-affected families, 83, 86, 88 Exclusion from citizenshi, ix

F Failure to adapt, 2 Flood-affected families, 6 Flood control measures, 64, 65, 67, 68 Flood erosion, 36 Flood Level Early Warning system, 75 Flood Relief, 63, 70, 71, 75, 77, 80 Flood zoning, 64

© T.M.C. ASSER PRESS and the author 2023 R. Manuvie, Climate Migration Governance and the Discourse of Citizenship in India, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-94-6265-567-6

161

162 H Homo sacer, 1, 7, 13 Human rights, 12 Human rights discourse, 26, 29, 30 Human security, 2, 20, 28, 34, 42, 44 Hydro-meteorological disasters, 55–57 Hydropower project, 67 Hyogo Framework, 33

I Illegal Bangladeshi immigrant, 57, 62, 123, 125 Illegality, 94 Illegal migrant, 37, 39 Illegal settlers, 96, 117 IMDT Act, 95, 97, 98 Incidence recording, 75 India-Bangladesh border, 43 Indira Awas Yojana, 117, 118 Internal displacements, 20, 21, 31, 32, 35, 36 International security concerns, 43 International surrogate protection, 31 Involuntary movement, 45

L Legal documental trail, 3 Livelihood, 22, 30, 36, 40–43 Livelihood diversification, 46 Loss and damage, 56, 57, 79, 83 Lot Mandal, 84–87

M Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act, 40, 41 Mangaldoi, 96 Mauzadars, 84 MGNREGA, 10, 55, 57–63, 68, 69 Mishing, 106, 107 Monetary assistance, 76 Monetary compensation, 105 Mono-causality, 26 Morigaon, 100, 106, 107, 115, 116 Multi-causality, 26 Multiple flooding, 46 Muslim, 95, 115, 116

Index N Nansen Initiative, vii National Climate Change Action Plan, 40 National Disaster Response Force, 75 Nationality, 96, 98, 100, 113 National Register of Citizens, ix National Registration of Citizenship, 6 National Rural Housing Mission, 79 Naturalisation rights, 95 Nellie massacre, 97 New administrative model, 57 1961 voter list, 101 Non-permanent structures, 107 Non-refoulement, 30

P Patta, 84–87 Permanent displacements, 23, 43 Political constraints, 2 Preparedness, 56

R Raised housing, 106 Refugee Convention, 29–31 Relief contractors, 104 Relief delivery, 123 Relief shelters, 77, 78 Resilience, 21, 32, 33, 47 Rights-based approaches, 56 Right to have a right, 11, 12 Rural housing reconstruction, 79

S Sendai Framework, 33 Social resilience, 108 Son of the soil, 10 Sovereign ban, 13 Structural capacity, 56 Structural measures, 63, 64 Structural violence, 7 Sub-national framing, 21 Sudden-onset disasters, 22, 23

T Tailored local policies, 123 Temporary relief, 74

Index

163

U UNFCCC, 24, 27–29, 35, 41, 42

Vulnerable, 105, 107, 118, 119

V Voluntary migration, 2 Vulnerability and migration nexus, 37 Vulnerability index, 36

W Warsaw International Mechanism, 28 Wicked problem, 19, 21, 24–26, 33, 36, 42, 46, 47