Climate change literacy and education 9780841232051, 0841232059, 9780841232068, 0841232067, 9780841232327, 0841232326, 9780841232297

Table of contents :
Content: Preface 1. Climate Change Literacy and Education: History and Project Overview 2. Establishing a Pathway to Student Engagement in the Climate Change Discussion 3. Climate Science Education - Hope for Our Future 4. Science of the Anthropocene 5. Space Technologies Paired with Terrestrial Technology 6. Living Oceans 7. Climate Change, Protests, and Youth Movements: The Personal Side of Policy 8. A Change in Our Climate Perspective 9. Climate Change Politics in Canada Editors' Biographies Indexes

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Climate Change Literacy and Education Social Justice, Energy, Economics, and the Paris Agreement Volume 2

ACS SYMPOSIUM SERIES 1254

Climate Change Literacy and Education Social Justice, Energy, Economics, and the Paris Agreement Volume 2 Keith E. Peterman, Editor York College of Pennsylvania York, Pennsylvania

Gregory P. Foy, Editor York College of Pennsylvania York, Pennsylvania

Matthew R. Cordes, Editor Writing Works, Ltd. Lehighton, Pennsylvania

Sponsored by the ACS Division of Chemical Education

American Chemical Society, Washington, DC Distributed in print by Oxford University Press

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Peterman, Keith E., editor. | Foy, Gregory P., editor. | Cordes, Matthew R., editor. | American Chemical Society. Division of Chemical Education. Title: Climate change literacy and education / Keith E. Peterman, editor (York College of Pennsylvania, York, Pennsylvania), Gregory P. Foy, editor (York College of Pennsylvania, York, Pennsylvania), Matthew R. Cordes, editor (Writing Works, Ltd., Lehighton, Pennsylvania) ; sponsored by the ACS Division of Chemical Education. Description: Washington, DC : American Chemical Society, [2017]- | Series: ACS symposium series ; 1247, 1254 | Includes bibliographical references and index. Contents: volume 1. The science and perspectives from the global stage -- volume 2. Social justice, energy, economics, and the Paris agreement Identifiers: LCCN 2017045512 (print) | LCCN 2017048554 (ebook) | ISBN 9780841232051 (ebook, v.1) | ISBN 9780841232297 (ebook, v.2) | ISBN 9780841232068 (v. 1) | ISBN 9780841232327 (v. 2) Subjects: LCSH: Climate change mitigation--International cooperation. | Greenhouse gas mitigation--International cooperation. Classification: LCC QC902.9 (ebook) | LCC QC902.9 .C57 2017 (print) | DDC 363.738/746--dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2017045512

The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48n1984. Copyright © 2017 American Chemical Society Distributed in print by Oxford University Press All Rights Reserved. Reprographic copying beyond that permitted by Sections 107 or 108 of the U.S. Copyright Act is allowed for internal use only, provided that a per-chapter fee of $40.25 plus $0.75 per page is paid to the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc., 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Republication or reproduction for sale of pages in this book is permitted only under license from ACS. Direct these and other permission requests to ACS Copyright Office, Publications Division, 1155 16th Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20036. The citation of trade names and/or names of manufacturers in this publication is not to be construed as an endorsement or as approval by ACS of the commercial products or services referenced herein; nor should the mere reference herein to any drawing, specification, chemical process, or other data be regarded as a license or as a conveyance of any right or permission to the holder, reader, or any other person or corporation, to manufacture, reproduce, use, or sell any patented invention or copyrighted work that may in any way be related thereto. Registered names, trademarks, etc., used in this publication, even without specific indication thereof, are not to be considered unprotected by law. PRINTED IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Foreword The ACS Symposium Series was first published in 1974 to provide a mechanism for publishing symposia quickly in book form. The purpose of the series is to publish timely, comprehensive books developed from the ACS sponsored symposia based on current scientific research. Occasionally, books are developed from symposia sponsored by other organizations when the topic is of keen interest to the chemistry audience. Before agreeing to publish a book, the proposed table of contents is reviewed for appropriate and comprehensive coverage and for interest to the audience. Some papers may be excluded to better focus the book; others may be added to provide comprehensiveness. When appropriate, overview or introductory chapters are added. Drafts of chapters are peer-reviewed prior to final acceptance or rejection, and manuscripts are prepared in camera-ready format. As a rule, only original research papers and original review papers are included in the volumes. Verbatim reproductions of previous published papers are not accepted.

ACS Books Department

Contents Preface .............................................................................................................................. ix 1.

Vulnerability and the Voice of Indigenous Peoples through the Lens of Climate Change Policy ............................................................................................. 1 Jill Leaness

2.

False Solutions: REDD’s Impact on Indigenous Communities ......................... 13 Prakriti Shrestha

3.

Climate Change: Global Inequalities and Poverty ............................................. 25 Christopher Tonnu Jackson

4.

Race and Climate Change ..................................................................................... 41 Gregory A. Margida

5.

From a Commitment in Doha to an Emissions Pledge in Paris ......................... 49 Parker D. McCrary

6.

What About a Price on Carbon? .......................................................................... 63 Jessica McDonald

7.

Global Implementation of Renewable Energy .................................................... 81 Barry Hartweg

8.

Confronting a Global Crisis on a Local Level: The Power of the Public in Fighting Climate Change ...................................................................................... 91 Margaret J. Williams

9.

How to Re-Energize Our Electric Grid for the Future of the Planet ................ 99 Jessica McDonald

10. It Is Better To Light a Candle Than To Curse the Darkness ............................ 111 Keith E. Peterman, Gregory P. Foy, and Matthew R. Cordes Editors’ Biographies .................................................................................................... 125

Indexes Author Index ................................................................................................................ 129 Subject Index ................................................................................................................ 131

vii

Preface This book is the second volume in the Climate Science Literacy and Education series, which is written to promote climate science literacy and education among college and university students, young adults, educators, policymakers, and the general public. Our ACS Climate Change Public Policy Statement recommends that “The U.S. Government should promote climate science literacy and education for citizens and policymakers about climate change impacts to help empower citizens and local and regional governments to make informed decisions and preparations to help protect homes, businesses, and communities against adverse impacts.” With the exception of the concluding chapter, all chapters are authored by students who have represented the ACS as UN-accredited “Observers” at the annual United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) Conferences of Parties (COPs) at COP18 in Doha, Qatar (2012), COP19 in Warsaw, Poland (2013), COP20 in Lima, Peru (2014), and COP21 in Paris, France (2015). These student authors have directly engaged the global community, ranging from heads of state and leaders within indigenous communities to youth and everyday citizens. Chapters in this volume address issues of social and economic justice, the energy crisis and mitigation strategies, public policy, and the Paris Agreement, which was the result of COP21 in 2015. The book cover photos, meanwhile, juxtapose the towering significance of the Paris Agreement with multiple not-tobe-crossed red lines of climate justice. Citizens from around the globe held a Red-Line climate action at the conclusion of COP21 where the Paris Agreement was adopted. We wish to acknowledge and thank Tony Noce (ACS CEI Chair) for championing this project, Ray Garant (ACS Assistant Director for Public Policy) for his advice and tireless organization of functions and activities, Carl Maxwell (ACS Manager of Energy and Environment Policy) for UN accreditation logistics and arranging informative, off-the-record meetings with federal agencies and staffers on Capitol Hill, Joan Coyle (ACS Lead Communications Officer) for media outreach coaching, and Diane Husic (Dean of the School of Natural and Health Sciences at Moravian College) for serving as a faculty mentor for the ACS students during week one of the annual COP. We also offer special thanks to Laura Pence (former CEI Chair), under whose leadership this project was launched, and to Rachael Bishop (former Manager of ACS Public Policy Communications) for initiating media training sessions for the ACS COP students at ACS National Headquarters in Washington, DC. This project would not have been possible without the financial support and faculty mentoring by the numerous colleges and universities that have sponsored ix

their students’ participation in this project, as well as the support of parents and family.

Keith E. Peterman Professor of Chemistry, York College of Pennsylvania York, Pennsylvania 17403, United States 717-815-1334 (office) (telephone) 717-825-1716 (cell) (telephone) [email protected] (e-mail)

Gregory P. Foy Associate Professor of Chemistry, York College of Pennsylvania York, Pennsylvania 17403, United States 717-815-1523 (office) (telephone) 717-968-0870 (cell) (telephone) [email protected] (e-mail)

Matthew R. Cordes Principal Writer, Writing Works, Ltd. Lehighton, Pennsylvania 18235, United States 570-556-8832 (cell) (telephone) [email protected] (e-mail)

x

Chapter 1

Vulnerability and the Voice of Indigenous Peoples through the Lens of Climate Change Policy Jill Leaness* University of Idaho, 875 Perimeter Drive, Moscow, Idaho 83844, United States *E-mail: [email protected].

While the first COP took place in 1995, it was not until 1998 that Indigenous peoples began participating, and not until 2001 that Indigenous Peoples Organizations (IPO) were considered a constituency. Meanwhile, even as participation in the UNFCCC grows, Indigenous peoples are routinely left out of global agreements including the Kyoto Protocol and Cancun Agreement, and only mentioned in non-binding sections of the Paris Agreement. However, this has not, and will not stop Indigenous peoples from taking a stand against climate change.

The Journey Begins I could suddenly feel the ants crawling up my legs, the sharp pinches as they bit me. I looked down and noticed that I was standing directly on top of an anthill. Oddly enough, this would happen to me multiple times throughout my 27-month stay in Panama. This marked the beginning of my journey to the island of Ustupo, and, in a way, the beginning of my journey into a career in climate justice. Ustupo, a town comprising of multiple islands off the coast of Panama, is home to an Indigenous group, the Guna Yala (sometimes spelled Kuna Yala). While serving as a Peace Corps volunteer in Panama, I was given the opportunity to travel to the Comarca (the equivalent of a reservation in the United States) Guna Yala to celebrate the Guna Revolution. In February of 1925, the Guna Yala fought against the Panamanian government to obtain their independence and become an autonomous territory. To remember this historic event, Guna Yala living on Ustupo reenacted the events of the day. © 2017 American Chemical Society

The morning began with a parade through the village; everyone wore red to commemorate the blood that was shed during the battle. The parade ended in the center of the town and was followed by reanactments. Actors outfitted as the Panamanian colonial police demanded the Indigenous stop wearing their traditional attires and stop practicing their culture. The actors dressed as the Indigenous Guna Yala fought back against the police. As the reenactment continued, I could feel the happiness and joy emanating from the re-enactors and observers alike. The Guna Yala are extremely proud of their triumph, and as they re-enacted the day, it was impossible not to become immersed in their history. However, the Guna Yala’s future is uncertain. Within the next 20 to 30 years, this reenactment may not be able to take place on the Guna Yala’s ancestral home. Sea level rise is an all-too-real threat for these small islands (1). The Comarca Guna Yala, with their rich history and more than 45,000 Indigenous inhabitants, are at a risk of disappearing as the sea level rises, and they are already experiencing some of the impacts of climate change. In 2008, storms caused nearly every island in the archipelago to flood, ruining many traditional wood and straw houses, killing crops, and damaging buildings. The island residents have already begun discussing relocating to lands the Indigenous group owns on the mainland of Panama (2). The more disturbing issue is that the Guna Yala is not the only Indigenous community that is experiencing the impacts of climate change or being faced with losing ancestral lands and the culture that is entwined with them. Indigenous communities across the globe—many considered to be sovereign nations—are battling with difficult circumstances forced upon them by the realities of climate change. Yet, Indigenous peoples are some of the most negligible contributors to greenhouse gas emissions. In addition, historically, Indigenous peoples have been given very little voice during international climate change negotiations, or at the international level in general.

Defining Indigenous One of the many difficulties Indigenous peoples face at the international level is an ambiguous understanding of the term “Indigenous.” The United Nations (UN) has never officially adopted a definition of the term. Instead, the UN has a system for identifying Indigenous peoples that revolves around self-identification. Generally, Indigenous peoples are identified by the UN as having “self identification as Indigenous peoples at the individual level and accept by the community as their member, historical continuity with pre-colonial and/or pre-settler societies, strong link to territories and surrounding natural resources, distinct social, economic or political systems, distinct language, culture and beliefs, form non-dominant groups of society, and resolve to maintain and reproduce their ancestral environments and systems as distinctive peoples and communities.” While Indigenous is a generic term, in various countries different terms are used including tribes, first peoples/nations, aboriginals, etc. (3).

2

The Journey Continues Flash forward to December 2015; I am no longer standing in the middle of the jungle being attacked by ants. Instead I am outfitted in professional attire, staring up at the Eiffel Tower. I’m in Paris for a reason similar to the one that compelled me to work in the jungle of Panama—a desire to learn more about Indigenous peoples, their history, their culture, and what role they will play in the historic climate change negotiations that are about to take place in Paris. After serving as a Peace Corps volunteer, I returned to the United States and decided to commit my studies to learning more about Indigenous peoples and climate change. At the center of my masters research, I undertook the challenge and privilege of working with a Native American tribe in the Pacific Northwest, studying how climate change was impacting their community and how the tribe could use their own, traditional knowledge to adapt. Focusing on a subspecies of cutthroat trout that is being gravely impacted by climate change, I worked with fish biologists and tribal members to devise a culturally approproriate climate change management plan (4). Just as I was beginning this research, I was given the opportunity to attend the 21st Conference of Parties (COP 21) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) as a student delegate for the American Chemical Society. Attending COP 21 would be the perfect way to combine what I had learned and witnessed in the Comarca Guna Yala of Panama, with what I was learning in the Pacific Northwest of the United States. I was excited to attend the conference and hear more from and about Indigenous communities spanning the globe. Armed with my NGO observer badge, I had access to areas where the general public was not permitted. I was surprised to discover that while sovereign countries had their pavilions in the blue zone (the area not open to the general public), the Indigenous Pavilion was relegated to the public green zone, the area where NGOs and other organizations had their booths. This arrangement presented me with a question: when most Indigenous peoples from across the globe are considered to be part of sovereign nations, why aren’t they treated like other nations in critical discussions directly impacting their peoples by the United Nations? To better understand the placement of the Indigenous Pavilion, it was important to learn more about the history of Indigenous Participation within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC).

History of Indigenous Participation at the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change Indigenous NGOs, as well as some native governments, began attending the COP in 1998 in Buenos Aires, which was the 4th Conference of the Parties. In 2003, Indigenous peoples demanded that they be represented in the UNFCCC in the form of a working group. It wasn’t until 2008, after the passing of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (the Declaration) that this working group was formed (5). The UN adopted the Declaration on September 13, 2007. It was actually completely written by 1994, however, opposition from the United States and its 3

allies caused a delay in approval. Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the United States, referred to as the CANZUS group, opposed the Declaration, because it lacked a definition for Indigenous peoples. CANZUS also felt threatened by the concept of self-determination, fearing it threatened their national borders. In the end, 143 UN members, each representing a different state, voted in favor of the Declaration, while four members voted against it. The four nations that opposed the Declaration were the CANZUS group. As of 2010, each of the nations that opposed the Declaration have, to a degree, changed their original stance and have given “vague endorsements” in favor of it (6). The Declaration “covers the full range of property, civil, political, economic, social, cultural, religious, and environmental rights of Indigenous peoples.” Drawing from international human rights law, the Declaration creates “minimum standards for protecting the survival, dignity, and well-being of Indigenous peoples” (7) and functions within the Human Rights Treaty System. Under The Declaration, although never officially defined, the term Indigenous refers to people who have “long-standing, land-based cultures of a local environment, describing in detail their composite rights, which are intergenerational and closely related to land and culture.” This definition implies that Indigenous people have the right of self-determination, they are entitled to live in their traditional manner, and have a right to cultural survival, even if they do not have political status (8). In March of 2008, the Human Rights Council adopted resolution 7/23, the first-ever resolution acknowledging a relationship between climate change and human rights. This resolution requested that the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights “conduct a detailed study on human rights and climate change.” One year after the adoption of resolution 7/23, the Council adopted resolution 10/4. 10/4 acknowledges that climate change has both direct and indirect effects on the ability of people to enjoy human rights, specifically referencing the impact that climate change has on the human rights of already vulnerable populations (9). However, the resolution does not explicitly state that climate change violates human rights law (10). In April of 2009, the Indigenous Peoples Global Summit on Climate Change was held in Anchorage, Alaska. Present at this conference were representatives of Indigenous people from the Arctic, North America, Asia, the Pacific, Latin America, Africa, the Caribbean, and Russia. In a paper entitled “The Anchorage Declaration,” the representatives explain that “the inherent and fundamental human rights and status of Indigenous Peoples, affirmed in the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, must be fully recognized and respected in all decision-making processes and activities related to climate change.” They continue, asserting that when their lands, territories, environment and natural resources are being affected, the Indigenous people should, under the Declaration, have the right of self determination of Indigenous Peoples. Their final demand, in the form of “Calls for Action” is that the UNFCCC’s principles “reflect the spirit and the minimum standards contained in [the Declaration].” The “Calls for Action” include reducing emissions across the globe, recognition of the importance of using traditional knowledge for climate change adaptations, support for performing climate change assessments, the creation of “formal structures and mechanisms” (including meetings, briefings etc.), the abandonment 4

of adaptation techniques that could harm Indigenous Peoples’ rights (such as nuclear energy, dams, etc), funding, risk insurance and recognition of fundamental human rights. The list of fourteen “Calls for Action” elaborates on many of the concerns Indigenous people across the globe have in relation to the effect of climate change on their livelihood (11). A few months after the creation of the Anchorage Declaration, in September of 2009, there was an International Indigenous People’s Forum on Climate Change (IIPFCC) held in Bangkok, Thailand. The end result of this meeting was the creation of a Policy Paper on Climate Change. Similar to the Anchorage Declaration, this paper contains a list of assertions, regarding the rights of Indigenous peoples in respect to climate change (12). Each year after, the IIPFCC wrote proposals to the UNFCCC listing their demands. In November of 2014, the IIPFCC wrote a list of demands in preparation for COP 20 in Lima, Peru and COP 21 in Paris, France. First on their list of demands was “recognition of a human rights-based approach which respects Indigenous peoples’ rights in climate-change agreements and related actions,” followed by “respect of Indigenous peoples’ rights to lands, territories and resources,” “recognition of, and respect for, Indigenous traditional knowledge and the role of Indigenous peoples in adaptation and mitigation,” “recognition of Indigenous peoples’ community-based monitoring and information systems,” “respect Indigenous peoples’ rights to full and effective participation in all climate change actions and UNFCCC institutions,” and “ensure Indigenous peoples’ direct access to finance and capacity building (13).” One year later, in November of 2015, the IIPFCC narrowed their demands to four in preparation for COP 21 in Paris and in the creation of a global climate change agreement. The four demands included “respect for human rights of Indigenous peoples in climate change policies and actions,” “recognize peoples’ traditional knowledge and positive contributions to climate adaptation, mitigation and respect Indigenous peoples’ traditional livelihoods,” “ensure full and effective participation of Indigenous peoples including women and youth in climate change-related processes and programs at local, national, regional and international levels,” and “ensure direct access to climate finance for Indigenous peoples from developed and developing countries.” (14). Along with demands at international negotiations, the other path Indigenous peoples recently began exploring to bring attention to their plight and to give themselves a visible presence in the UNFCCC, is hosting a pavilion at the COPs. This was the same pavilion that I was slightly disappointed to see relgated to the Green Zone, rather than standing alongside the representative country pavilions in the Blue Zone. The first Indigenous Peoples’ Pavilion occurred at COP 20 in Lima, Peru. The pavilion at COP 21 in Paris was only the second time the International Indigenous Peoples’ Forum had been awarded such a space. And while their space was in the Green Zone, it was the largest space awarded to any group in that zone. The pavilion was financially supported by the government of Norway and the COP Presidency of France. Throughout the two weeks of COP 21 the Indigenous Peoples’ Pavilion hosted over 80 different events, representing more than 300 different Indigenous communities from around the world. Even though the pavilion was not in the more prestigious Blue Zone, it still garnered 5

attention from high profile politicians, including presidents and prime ministers (15).

COP 21 Peruvian Palm Oil It was in the Indigenous Peoples’ Pavilion that I had the privilege of meeting Hilaria Supa Humán, a Peruvian congresswoman who represents Indigenous communities and is Indigenous herself. She and I were attending the same presentation, led by Peruvian Indigenous activist Robert Guimaraes Vasquez that focused on the problem palm oil companies are creating for Indigenous peoples in Peru. While his example was very specific, he touched on a number of shared issues concerning Indigenous peoples across the globe, many of which the Indigenous people were petitioning to include in the Paris Agreement. Guimaraes Vasquez pointed out that while many Indigenous Peruvians do not have a college education, this does not mean they are not knowledgeable. Indigenous Peruvians, like many Indigenous peoples, have extensive knowledge about the forest and environment where they live. This knowledge is passed down from generation to generation and instills a sense of identity within the Indigenous peoples. This knowledge that Guimaraes Vasquez spoke about is generally referred to as Traditional Knowledge, or more specifically, as Traditional Ecological Knowledge. Indigenous peoples have long standing ties to the earth and environment, however, in Peru the federal government does not legally recognize most Indigenous community territories, just small pieces of land. According to Guimaraes Vasquez, there are over 1,200 communities in Peru waiting a title on all or part of their territory, which means that over 20 million hectares of land—land where Indigenous community reside—is vulnerable to “land grabs.” Currently, one of the biggest threats to Indigenous lands in Peru is the palm oil companies. Guimaraes Vasquez explained that there are around 25 companies linked to palm oil operating in Peru. These companies come into Indigenous areas with large machines that deforest and destroy the entire area. The once pristine forests, the homeland of Indigenous peoples, are being turned into deserts. As of 2013 palm oil production is responsible for nearly 10% of annual deforestation occurring in Peru, and is projected to to increase rapidly (16). According to Guimaraes Vasquez, not only is the land being impacted, but potable water is as well. The companies use the rivers to transport wood, degrading the quality of water that many Indigenous peoples rely on for drinking. Guimaraes Vasquez explained that while publicly the Peruvian government is calling for an end to deforestation, the Indigenous people are not seeing any action at the local level. Instead, Indigenous peoples have been mobilizing community groups. In response to the opposition of community groups, the palm oil companies have filed lawsuits against the group leaders. Guimaraes Vasquez discussed how one extremely vocal opposition leader was forced to leave the area and go into hiding after his life was threatened. But even death threats have not stopped the local groups from fighting back to protect their ancestral lands. The 6

community groups have submitted formal complaints to the government and are planning to take legal action on the local, national, and international levels. Meanwhile, some of the Indigenous communities in Peru are hoping to take advantage of a native resource, rosewood, to both protect their forests and bring in income. Rosewood oil is a high-value product, and the Indigenous people in the area have found a British company willing to purchase the product, but if palm oil companies continue to come in and clear-cut their forests, all of the rosewood trees will be gone. The problems that Guimaraes Vasquez spoke of relate directly to one of the demands that the IIPFCC made coming into COP 20, “respect of Indigenous peoples’ rights to lands, territories and resources”. They also speak to the more all-encompassing demand the IIPFCC asked for coming into COP 21, “recognize peoples’ traditional knowledge and positive contributions to climate adaptation, mitigation and respect Indigenous peoples’ traditional livelihoods” (14). Indigenous peoples have the ability to protect and maintain the forests, but not if they do not have the legal rights to their lands. The problems Guimaraes Vasquez and his people are facing in Peru are similar to problems most Indigenous peoples are facing. Indigenous Youth Groups Indigenous peoples in Peru are not the only Indigenous group taking a stand against climate change. Another presentation that took place in the Indigenous Peoples’ Pavilion featured youth Indigenous environmental activists from Panama and Bolivia. I had the opportunity to speak with Lupita Omi Casama, who is part of a youth Indigenous organization called “Clima y Juventud,” (“Climate and Youth”). Casama is a member of the Embera-Wounaan Indigenous group of Panama. She has been volunteering with Clima y Juventud for two years. Along with about 50 other Indigenous youth, she fights to end deforestation. Similar to the story Guimaraes Vasquez told about the palm oil companies, Casama explained that the youth are fighting against outside companies coming into their ancestral lands and clear cutting the entire forest. The youth are organizing tree plantings and creating videos to increase awareness about the connection between deforestation and climate change. They have also been using social media to engage and communicate the problems facing their communities with other youth across Panama and throughout the world. Casama believes that youth must step up and protect their ancestral lands, because “if we don’t do this, who will help us? We are the future.” Casama explained that while Indigenous people are the minority, they do have the solution to climate change; respect for the forests and their ancestral lands. But if Indigenous peoples do not have rights over their own lands, it is difficult for them to prevent what is happening. The presenters in the Indigenous Peoples’ Pavilion spoke with both despair and hope in their voices. While Indigenous peoples are feeling the impacts of climate change, they are not willing to sit back and watch it happen. Activists like Guimaraes Vasquez and Casama are taking action. They are spreading the word in their local areas, as well working to educate the global community through 7

presentations like the ones they gave at COP 21. Indigenous peoples had hope that the Paris Agreement would be a step in the right direction, helping them to better protect their territories, and to better help themselves and the world prepare for and adapt to climate change.

Paris Agreement Even with the Indigenous peoples’ demands, and their well attended Pavilion at COP 21, the Paris Agreement still desregards their rights and livlihood. Indigenous leaders have written multiple articles, blog posts, and an official statement, expressing how the Paris Agreement marginalizes Indigenous communities around the world. While Indigenous peoples are mentioned in the Paris Agreement, the only references occur in nonbinding portions of the text. The first mention of Indigenous peoples can be found very early on in the document, in the preamble. The line reads, “Parties should, when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote, and consider their respective obligations on human rights, the right to health, the rights of Indigenous peoples, local communities, migrants, children, persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations and the right to development, as well as gender equality, empowerment of women and intergenerational equity” (17). Not only is this non-binding because of the location of the statement (in the preamble), it is also non-binding due to the wording, which encourages action using the word “should”. Only statements that follow the word “shall” are considered legally binding and require that countries adhere to what is written in the document. Indigenous peoples appear to be both encouraged and disappointed by their inclusion in the Paris Agreement. A statement released on December 12, 2016 by the IIPFCC explains their excitement and concern, reiterating the three messages they wanted the UNFCCC to take into consideration. The first message stated that “it is essential that the rights of Indigenous peoples be recognized, protected and respected within a broad human rights framework.” However, while there is mention of this in the preamble, Indigenous peoples wanted this point to be made in the operative section of the agreement (18). The second message that Indigenous peoples wanted to be included in the agreement was to keep the temperature goal “no more than 1.5 degrees Celsius”(18). During COP 21, there were multiple marches throughout the Green and the Blue Zones, with participants from small island nations and Indigenous peoples demanding the UNFCCC include a temperature goal of less than 1.5 degrees Celsius increase. Signs read “1.5 to stay alive.” To the disappointment of these groups, the Paris Agreement stated that the goal is “holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2 degrees C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5 degrees C above pre-industrial levels.” (17) For island nations like the Guna Yala, “pursuing” a 1.5 degree C goal will not be good enough. The third, and final message the IIPFCC had for the UNFCCC was to include “recognition, respect for, and use of our traditional knowledge, with our free, 8

prior, and informed consent.” Once again, while this provision was included in the Paris Agreement, it included the qualification “where appropriate.” Indigenous peoples felt that this provision should be applied throughout the entirety of the Paris Agreement and should not include the provision “where appropriate” (18). An article published by Cultural Survival further expressed Indigenous peoples’ disappointment in the Paris Agreement. In the early drafts of the Paris Agreement, the protection of Indigenous rights was included in Article 2.2. However, the European Union, Norway and the United States, who are often criticized for their lack of support of Indigenous rights, forced the removal of the protection of Indigenous rights from the main text of the Paris Agreement. Instead, Indigenous rights were mentioned in the preamble of the Paris Agreement, a section of the text that is nonbinding. The UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues Chair, Megan Davis, explained that the Paris Agreement only asks states to “consider their human rights obligations” when it should tell them to comply (19). From the Indigenous peoples’ viewpoint, the largest problem with the agreement remains the use of “should” vs “shall”. Where Indigenous rights are mentioned in the preamble, language stating it “should” respect Indigenous rights, does not make it legally binding (19).

It’s Not Over While the Paris Agreement was not necessarily the perfect document, it is still a major step in the right direction toward achieving the inclusion of Indigenous rights, a fact that Indigenous peoples acknowledge. However, it does not adequately reflect the rights of Indigenous peoples across the world. What will the Indigenous Guna Yala do if the sea engulfs their ancestral homeland? How will Guimaraes Vasquez and the Indigenous Peruvians stop deforestation if they do not have the titles to their land? Indigenous peoples continue their battle. Youth groups like Clima y Juventud are fighting back; they are raising awareness and speaking out on behalf of their people. The IIPFCC produced a statement immediately after the Paris Agreement was signed, explaining their disappointment. The main things I observed in my experiences in Panama, my research with a tribe in the Pacific Northwest, and my time in Paris, were the resiliency and determination of Indigenous peoples. They will continue to fight back and will be leaders in the movement to reduce and eventually end man-made climate change. Climate change is not a problem that will wait to effect Indigenous peoples in 20 years. It is a problem they are dealing with currently. From the impending flooding of the Guna Yala lands in Panama to the reduction of cutthroat trout in the northwest United States to the deforestation in Peru, these threats are current and real. The exclusion of Indigenous peoples from the binding sections of the Paris Agreement is disappointing given their role as stakeholders and how immediately it affects some of the Indigenous community but it is not stopping Indigenous peoples from seeking solutions that will affect the survival of their culture and even their land. 9

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Davenport, C. Rising Seas. The New York Times. http://www.nytimes.com/ interactive/2014/03/27/world/climate-rising-seas.html?_r=2 (accessed Aug. 27, 2016). Braun, D. M. Will a UN Climate-Change Solution Help Kuna Yala? National Geographic. http://voices.nationalgeographic.com/2010/12/08/ will_a_un_climate-change_solution_help_kuna_yala/ (accessed Aug. 27, 2016). Who Are Indigenous Peoples? United Nations Fact Sheet. http:/ /www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/5session_factsheet1.pdf (accessed Aug. 18, 2016). Leaness, J. Incorporating Traditional Ecological Knowledge in Current and Future Management Plans: Coeur d’Alene and Westslope Cutthroat Trout. M.S. Thesis, Univesity of Idaho, Moscow, ID, May 2016. Grossman, Z. Indigenous Responses to the International Climate Change Framework. In Asserting Native Resilience: Pacific Rim Indigenous Nations Face the Climate Crisis; Grossman, Z., Parker, A., Eds.; Oregon State University Press: Corvallis, OR, 2009; pp 109−124. Meyer, W. H. Indigenous Rights, Global Governance, and State Sovereignty. Human Rights Review 2012, 13, 327–347. Echo-Hawk, W. R. In the Light of Justice: The Rise of Human Rights in Native America and the UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples; Fulcrum Publishing: Golden, CO. 2013; p 4. Tsosie, R. Climate Change and Indigenous Peoples: Comparative Models of Sovereignty. Tulane Environmental Law Journal. 2013, 26, 239–257. Alton, D. K.; Shelton, D. Environmental Protection and Human Rights: Online Case Studies. Human Rights & Environment Case Studies. 2011, 1–52. Knox, J. H. Linking Human Rights and Climate Change at the United Nations. Havard Environmental Law Review 2009, 33, 477–495. IPGSCC, The Anchorage Declaration. In Asserting Native Resilience: Pacific Rim Indigenous Nations Face the Climate Crisis; Grossman, Z., Parker, A., Eds.; Oregon State University Press: Corvallis, OR, 2009; pp 24−26. International Indigenous Peoples Forum on Climate Change (IIPFCC) Policy Paper on Climate Change. In Asserting Native Resilience: Pacific Rim Indigenous Nations Face the Climate Crisis; Grossman, Z., Parker, A., Eds.; Oregon State University Press, Corvallis, OR, 2009; pp 26−34. International Indigenous Peoples’ Forum on Climate Change (IIPFCC) Executive Summary of Indigenous Peoples’ Proposals to the UNFCCC COP 20 and COP 21, 2014. http://www.iwgia.org/images/stories/int-processeseng/UNFCCC/ExecutiveSummaryIPpositionFINAL.pdf (accessed Aug. 28, 2016). Intermational Indigenous Peoples Forum on Climate Change (IIPCFCC) Our Proposals to Governments, 2015. http://static1.squarespace.com/ 10

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11

Chapter 2

False Solutions: REDD’s Impact on Indigenous Communities Prakriti Shrestha* Grinnell College, 1115 8th Ave., Box 4631, Grinnell, Iowa 50112, United States *E-mail: [email protected].

Growing up in Nepal has made me acutely aware that developing countries are especially vulnerable to climate change, despite contributing relatively little to global greenhouse gas emissions. Developing nations lack financial and technological capital to deal with the detrimental effects of climate change. At COP21, I focused on the role of developed nations, that are contributing most to anthropogenic climate change, in helping developing nations mitigate and adapt to climate change. United Nations Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) program has been discussed as the best solution for climate change mitigation in developing countries. While REDD+ was originally designed to involve and benefit forest communities, there have been negative consequences on local and Indigenous communities. It has been called into question who actually benefits from this program, whether it is an effective wide-scale mitigation measure, and is thus called a ‘false solution’ by many climate justice activists.

COP21 as a Pathway to Climate Justice The climate talks in Paris (COP21) brought the climate justice framework to the forefront of my mind. There are variable definitions of climate justice, but the following definition comes closest to describing climate justice the way I personally experience it:

© 2017 American Chemical Society

“Climate justice links human rights and development to achieve a humancentered approach, safeguarding the rights of the most vulnerable people and sharing the burdens of climate change and its impacts equitably and fairly (1).” This concept seems fairly simple to grasp, but as I learned from the climate talks in Paris, it is among the hardest principles to execute. While climate change is seen as a threat to the entire world, it is important to understand that this global issue is adversely affecting some communities at an alarmingly faster rate and with more intensity than other communities. Unfortunately, the most adversely affected communities also face other challenges such as lack of representation in positions of power, as well as a lack of financial and social capital. This divide results in the creation of solutions to climate change that seem effective at the surface, but may be detrimental to certain groups of people. Through my many conversations with youth leaders, Indigenous rights groups, and peers from around the world, I realized that one thing I could do as a student observer at this historically important convention was to spread these unheard voices as far as possible. Their opinions and real life experiences are not sufficiently explained through annual UN progress reports. In this chapter, I will focus on a proposed solution to climate change, Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (REDD+), that has received a large amount of funding and international support (2). REDD+ has also been deemed a “false solution” by many climate justice activists and Indigenous groups who directly face the consequences of implementing this program. Before I explain what the REDD+ program is, I want to clarify what I mean by a false solution. For me, a false solution is a solution that does not tackle the direct cause of the problem; instead, the solution acts as a temporary fix and further, adversely affects certain disadvantaged groups. In this chapter, I will discuss the straightforward problem of deforestation, its contribution to climate change, strengths and weaknesses of a deforestation prevention program like REDD+, and its impact on surrounding forest-dependent and Indigenous communities. Additionally, I will discuss REDD+ as a systemically propagated program that allows businesses to continue business-as-usual while claiming that their activities are eco-friendly. The fact that the REDD+ program was formed clearly indicates the importance of protecting forests to combat climate change. To understand exactly why deforestation is important in combatting climate change, I will now discuss the impact of deforestation on the environment.

Deforestation: How Bad Is It? According to Greenpeace, 300 billion tons of carbon, 40 times the annual greenhouse gas emissions from fossil fuels, is stored in trees (3). It should come as no surprise that tropical deforestation and forest degradation are major contributors to the concentration of carbon in the atmosphere. Furthermore, unlike industrialized countries where the burning of fossil fuels makes up the largest 14

source of emissions, the primary source of carbon emissions from developing countries is in fact deforestation (4). Unfortunately, deforestation is occurring at an alarming rate. While forests still cover about 30% of the world’s land area, about 36 football fields worth of trees are lost every minute, and an estimated 18 million acres (7.3 million hectares) of forest are lost each year globally (3). In other words, swaths of forest the size of Panama are lost every year (5). In the last two decades, Afghanistan has lost more than 70% of its forests throughout the country (6). Since the last century, Indonesia has lost at least 15.79 million hectares of forest land (3).

What Are the Drivers of Deforestation? Given the abundance of scientific research revealing the severely negative consequences of deforestation, why does the world continue to lose more and more of its forests every day in such an aggressive manner? The leading cause of deforestation is commercial and industrial-scale agriculture (6). In South America, Africa and Southeast Asia, 13 million hectares are converted from forest to agricultural land per year (6). Farmers clear forests to provide more room for planting crops or grazing livestock. Additionally, logging operations, which provide the world’s wood and paper products, also contribute to deforestation. According to Rainforest Action Network, the United States comprises less than 5% of the world’s population, yet it consumes more than 30% of the world’s paper (6). The roads and infrastructure used by loggers only further the destruction of forests (5). Urbanization is another major cause of deforestation, as are mining and forest fires (6). Common methods of deforestation intensify the problems caused by the loss of trees and thus create a damaging cycle of deforestation and exploitation of natural forest resources. For example, burning trees and clear cutting, which refers to cutting down large swaths of land at once, leaves the land completely barren. A forestry expert quoted by the Natural Resources Defense Council describes clear cutting as “an ecological trauma that has no precedent in nature except for a major volcanic eruption (3).” Another method is slash-and-burn agriculture, which entails cutting down a patch of trees, burning the trees, and growing crops on the land. This method seems to be favored, because the ash from the burned trees provides some nourishment for the plants, and the fire renders the land weed free. However, when the soil is no longer nutrient rich, and when weeds begin to reappear after years of use, the farmers move on to a new patch of land and begin the process again (6).

Main Consequences of Deforestation Deforestation has many negative effects on the environment. The most dramatic impact is a loss of habitat for millions of species. Seventy percent of Earth’s land animals and plants live in forests, and many cannot survive the deforestation that destroys their habitats (5). Deforestation does not only increase the concentration of carbon; it also changes the concentration of water vapor in 15

the atmosphere. For example, trees help perpetuate the water cycle by returning water vapor back into the atmosphere, and without trees, many former forest lands can quickly become barren deserts (5). According to a study published by the National Academy of Sciences, deforestation has decreased global vapor flows from land by 4% (3). Even this slight change can disrupt natural weather patterns and change current climate models (3). Additionally, greenhouse warming may lead to further deforestation by moving the optimal temperature and precipitation zones for many tree species northward, subsequently increasing the severity of windstorms and wildfires, and expanding the range of pests and diseases (5). The release of carbon from these dying forests would not only reinforce the greenhouse effect, but also damage trees and crops due to the depletion of the ozone layer and increased incidence of ultraviolet radiation (7). Fewer forests means larger amounts of greenhouse gases entering the atmosphere—and increased speed and severity of global warming (3). Realizing the severity of the consequences of deforestation, and recognizing that the main source of emissions in developing countries is the loss of forests, the UNFCCC recommended the creation of the REDD+ program.

REDD+ Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) has been discussed in the UNFCCC climate negotiations since 2005 as a mechanism to mitigate global climate change (8). It is a global initiative that aims to reward developing countries or private parties for conserving their forests, by providing direct funding, providing emissions credits that could be traded on a carbon market, or combining both types of payments to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases (9). REDD can be described as a two-tier payment system: payments are first transferred from international donors to national-level organizations, namely national governments (9). These payments are conditional on the implementation of policies that help reduce emissions. Thereafter, national-level organizations are accountable for distributing these payments to sub-national organizations such as forest communities, or local governments that helped lower emissions (9). Since its inception, REDD has evolved into REDD+ to include interventions such as conservation and the sustainable management of forests, as well as the enhancement of forest carbon stocks through tree plantations and afforestation (10). REDD+ also emphasizes that long-term estimations of emission and removals should be done on a land basis instead of an activity basis, since land-based approaches more accurately reflect the land’s true effect on the environment (11). Additionally, REDD+ aims to recognize the inclusion of the rights of Indigenous Peoples, new social and environmental safeguards, and concepts around financial mechanisms and equitable distribution of funds (9). In the context of REDD+, safeguards refer to actions that protect against potential adverse environmental and social effects of REDD+ such as loss of biodiversity, land grabbing, and loss of livelihoods (9). The initial phase of REDD+ involves preparing countries for its implementation through ‘readiness’ mechanisms. These ensure that the drivers of 16

deforestation are being tackled and that procedures and safeguards are in place to allow equitable distribution of benefits arising from REDD+ (11). Most countries are in this phase now, though many have pushed ahead to adopt national REDD+ strategies without carrying out rigorous assessments of deforestation drivers. In addition to the lack of proper assessments of deforestation drivers, readiness actions have also tended to focus on measuring carbon and forest cover changes, without adequate attention to governance and rights issues (11). REDD+ is less likely to be successful if the readiness mechanisms do not focus on targeting major deforestation drivers and protecting vulnerable communities. At the surface level, the concept of compensating countries, forest communities, and locals involved in limiting deforestation sounds like a fair and fool-proof solution to combat climate change. However, climate justice activists from all over the world have been pleading the international community to recognize the downfalls of the REDD+ program. Activists claim that REDD+, contrary to UN reporting, is destroying biodiversity, allowing large-scale industries to continue polluting by creating carbon markets, undermining the traditional knowledge and land rights of Indigenous peoples, and ultimately upholding the capitalist structure of profitization over the needs of forest dependent communities. Furthermore, REDD+ demands transparency from all national parties but seems to have little control over how monetary rewards and other safeguards are equitably distributed among all stakeholders. It is unclear how REDD+ expects countries to fully uphold its principles of transparency and accountability when each country deals with national and local level corruption differently or has different policies regarding Indigenous land rights. In this context, it is interesting to deconstruct why the people who are most vulnerable to climate change are vehemently opposing an internationally approved program that aims to mitigate climate change and promises to compensate them fairly when implementing this program. This discordance raises the question, why are supposed benefactors of REDD+ resistant to this program?

Voices against REDD+ at COP21 The Paris Agreement of December 2015 encourages countries “…to take action to implement and support, including through results-based payments…activities relating to reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation” (Article 5) as a key policy instrument in climate change mitigation (12). REDD+ was a hot topic in the climate negotiations, both within the negotiations involving state delegates as well as outside the official negotiations, as numerous Indigenous climate justice activists presented their views on REDD+. It is uncertain how much of their concerns were heard at COP21, as the Indigenous Peoples’ Pavilion, where most of these presentations took place, was not located in the same section as the official negotiations. I spent a lot of my time at the Indigenous Peoples’ Pavilion and had the opportunity to learn about Indigenous views on REDD+ as a false solution. While each of the representatives presented different outlooks and stories on the impact of REDD+ on their communities, Indigenous peoples had a common message: they wanted 17

their voices to be heard and their traditional knowledge to be recognized as a viable tool in combatting climate change. Indigenous peoples recognize that until they are seen as assets in the climate change mitigation process, they can face eviction from their own homes, their livelihoods can be threatened, and they can be left with no form of support from any national or international players. You might be wondering, why are Indigenous peoples even important in the broader scale of climate change mitigation? We cannot discuss REDD+ as a viable mechanism for climate change mitigation without discussing the role of Indigenous peoples because most of the world’s forests are on Indigenous peoples’ land. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), around 1.6 billion people, including 60 million Indigenous people, are completely dependent on forests as a source of livelihoods, food, medicines and building materials (13). A study presented at COP21’s Global Landscapes Forum showed that Indigenous people oversee around a fifth of the world’s carbon stock, in the form of tropical forests (14). Altogether, 168 billion tonnes of carbon are stored on Indigenous lands, which is around three times the world’s annual emissions (14). Even though most Indigenous communities have been residing in and protecting certain forest areas for centuries, they often do not have a formal land title. As a result, many people have already been forcibly and even violently ejected from their ancestral territories (16). For example, Bassey, Alternative Nobel Prize Laureate, former Executive Director of ERA/Friends of the Earth Nigeria, observed that in Africa, REDD+ is emerging as a “new form of colonialism, economic subjugation and a driver of land grabs (15, 16).” Since 2007, the government of Kenya has been forcing 15,000 Sengwer Indigenous peoples from their ancestral homes in the Embobut forest and the Cherangany hills in preparation for REDD+ (17). The government’s justification for the eviction is that the indigenous Sengwer are responsible for the accelerating degradation of the forest (17). Similarly, official studies and analyses of deforestation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) tend to blame forest peoples for forest loss without paying adequate attention to industrial and economic causes linked to road building, illegal logging, mining, commercial agriculture and urban expansion (18). As a result, the national REDD+ strategy is unjustly skewed towards limiting local livelihood activities, without adequate protections for sustainable traditional livelihood practices (18). There are less extreme cases of land grabbing where the government does not completely remove forest dependent communities from their homes, but does try to regain control of the forests. This generally happens through military force or by interfering with the livelihoods of Indigenous peoples and cutting them off from essential resources from the forests. Some people may argue that having centralized or state-controlled forests is beneficial in reaching the overall goal of conserving forests, but practiced forest conservation experts in my home country of Nepal will tell you otherwise. A more decentralized mode of forest governance (i.e., community forestry) has taken root since the early 1980s (19). Nepal’s community forestry program represents one of the world’s most extensive, successful, and widely studied systems of community-based forest management, involving over 16,000 forest user groups managing approximately one quarter of Nepal’s total forest area (19, 20). Due to its strong policies and institutions for community-based forest management, some consider Nepal to 18

have an institutional advantage for implementing REDD+. However, while community Forestry has successfully reforested much of Nepal, it faces a reinvigorated government challenge to land tenure under REDD+ (19). If the financial value of forests goes up, REDD+ payments may incentivize the government and private companies to take advantage of current land tenure laws and seek larger soil carbon payments. The fact that REDD+ commodifies forest carbon—and thus creates carbon markets that encourage carbon trading rather than limiting activities that increase greenhouse gas emissions—is an important factor in drawing in opposition from climate justice activists. Commodifying forest carbon is also inherently inequitable, since it discriminates against people, especially women who contribute significantly to forest management, but will no longer have free access to the forest resources they need to raise and care for their families (20). Women gather fuelwood, and non-wood forest products for food, medicine, and fodder, and often cannot afford to purchase alternative resources. By cutting off free access to forest resources, REDD+ could increase workloads for women without appropriately scaled compensation, displace them from forests, deny them a fair share of benefits, or leave them out of consultations and capacity-building activities (21). REDD+ is based on the notion that reductions in emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries can be achieved at a lower cost than reductions in emissions from industrial sources in developed countries. REDD+ is supported globally because it is much easier to restrict activities of forest-dependent communities that do not engage in large scale deforestation than it is to dismantle the capitalistic structure of society. Thus, there is an economic imperative to minimize the cost of forest carbon offsets under REDD+ (20). In this way, REDD+ allows many industrialized nations and corporations to continue carrying out their harmful activities under the pretense of being environmentally friendly. This contradiction renders REDD+ an ineffective solution to climate change. For example, while Nepal is considered to be a strong site for the implementation of REDD+ due to the success of its community forestry program, Nepal has a much smaller area of forest and a much lower rate of deforestation as compared to Indonesia and Brazil which suffer high risks of deforestation from industrial timber harvesting and other large-scale commercial land uses. Any successes in small, lower-risk countries like Nepal, which contributes less than 0.1%, to global emissions are laudable, of course, but are also relatively insignificant. It is more important for larger developing countries with greater rates of deforestation, such as Brazil, or larger developed nations with greater greenhouse gas emissions due to industrial activities, to halt their activities simultaneously. Thus, REDD+ allows many industrialized nations and corporations to continue carrying out their harmful activities under the pretense of being environmentally friendly Observing and experiencing the program’s shortcomings, climate justice activists argue that REDD+ and carbon trading are mechanisms that allow high-polluting companies and governments to purchase carbon credits in order to continue business-as-usual rather than reducing their emissions at source, with the excuse that somewhere else there is a “forest” that, in theory, will “offset” their emissions (21). Furthermore, REDD+’s approach to reducing carbon emissions 19

permits the planting of mass-scale commercial forests or monocultures on the condition that the corporations involved ensure that the new forests contain equal amounts of carbon to the previous forest, thereby, balancing out their carbon emissions (22). Although planting commercial forests may balance carbon emissions, native forests are home to a variety of species, some of which are becoming endangered and cannot be restored by planting commercial forests (23). Millions of hectares of forests in the world, especially in developing countries, are being substituted by monocultures plantations under that slogan of “planted forests (23).” These industrial tree plantations have quadrupled in developing countries in the last two decades, so that today there are 60 billion hectares of monoculture plantations (22). In addition, commercial forests often displace Indigenous people from their ancestral lands. Indigenous people are displaced largely by force or coercion and are often left with no alternative sources for their daily needs for natural forest resources, including fuel and food (24). This scarcity of resources leads to competition within and between different communities and may contribute to conflicts in that region. REDD+ also allows ‘leakages,’ where deforestation activities are merely removed from their original site to an area of forest adjacent to an area sectioned off for conservation. For example, in Bolivia, when loggers were forced off one area of land sectioned for conservation, the logging companies simply bought new areas of land elsewhere (24). Thus, the program does not help in tackling the root causes of illegal logging, which include logging without a license or in conservation areas, harvesting in excess of quotas, processing logs without a license, tax avoidance, or exporting wood without paying the required duties (24). Leakages also occur at a smaller scale when, much like large corporations who simply move operations to unprotected forests, forest-dependent communities acquire resources from different, unprotected forests. The REDD+ program allows leakages by interfering with the livelihoods, as well as daily needs, of forestdependent communities and failing to provide them with an alternative source of sustenance. Therefore, in Nepal, the REDD pilot (REDDp) program is trying to prevent leakages by providing alternative resources such as cooking stoves and biogas plants to affected households (14). It is unclear how many of these alternative resources reach the people who need it the most in the case of Nepal. Research done in the eastern rainforest of Madagascar has demonstrated that a protected area and a REDD+ project are failing to even compensate forest dwellers most affected by new restrictions imposed on their traditional livelihoods (24). Ideally, compensation is supposed to reach the people most negatively impacted by conservation. However, Mahesh Poudyal and Julia Jones from Bangor University found that the compensation has disproportionately reached those more easily accessible, are more financially sound, and have positions of authority locally (25). REDD+ would potentially bring millions of dollars to Nepalese forest users, but fair compensation and equitable distribution may not be reached despite $30 billion pledged by the international community to implement REDD+ programs (11). In the REDDp pilot project, if payments were based purely on carbon increment rates at a rate of US$10/tCO2, each community forest user group (CFUG) would receive US$245 on average per year. This is not sufficient to offset the costs of implementing the REDD+ program and ensuring participation 20

of all stakeholders (22). To maximize carbon benefits, CFUGs have sacrificed the amount of resources they extract from forests and the number of animals grazing in the forest. These sacrifices lead to a loss in livelihoods and make it difficult to carry out daily activities. Thus, the cost of the reduced access to resources could be high. Therefore, in this situation, REDDp may not be the appropriate avenue for funding. This is a significant finding and leads us to one of the most important issues related to REDD+: Who has a say in the design and implementation of REDD+ programs? Stakeholder participation is one of the underlying principles of REDD+. In the case of Nepal, important stakeholders, such as community forest users and Indigenous peoples, were left out of early talks on REDD+ (14). Forest-dependent communities and marginalized groups have had few opportunities to provide their input on REDD+ policies, since meetings are often closed or held in prohibitively-distant Kathmandu (14). Only a small proportion of REDD+ workshops included groups such as Indigenous people, women, and a socially marginalized group in the Hindu Caste system, Dalits (14). In addition to the lack of participation of Indigenous and marginalized groups in REDD+ planning, the government has sometimes fabricated Indigenous viewpoints. According to one Indigenous activist in Nepal, the government “just pick[ed] up [stakeholders] from the street and then s[aid] ‘these are Indigenous people’ (14).” Without stakeholder engagement, there is likely to be inequitable distribution of financial and natural resources, and the REDD+ program is less likely to succeed in the long run. According to Soumitra Ghosh, a climate justice activist from India, REDD+ “helps perpetuate the myth that capitalist production/accumulation can be continued ad infinitum in an environmentally sustainable manner (22).” This statement reflects the core value that climate justice encompasses. Without dismantling the unsustainable consumerism and commodification of natural resources, REDD+ (or any other forestry and conservation program) is going to be unsuccessful in its efforts to prevent deforestation or even to offset emissions from other sources. It is not possible to respect the needs of Indigenous peoples and forest-dependent communities while allowing large corporations to continue activities that are detrimental to the environment. REDD+ does not directly tackle the main driver of deforestation, which is mass consumerism and global focus on financial growth. REDD+ forces communities that have typically attempted to sustainably manage their forest resources to leave their homes and to leave their lifestyles behind to make room for more business as usual. It is simply unjust and ineffective to ask people who have contributed the least to climate change to make the biggest changes in their lives.

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19. Bushley, B. R.; Khatri, D. B. REDD+: Reversing, Reinforcing or Reconfiguring Decentralized Forest Governance in Nepal; Forest Action, 2011; Discussion Paper 11; p 3. 20. REDD-Monitor. REDD: An Introduction. http://www.redd-monitor.org/ redd-an-introduction/(accessed Aug. 28,2016). 21. Setyowati, A. Ensuring that women benefit from REDD+. Unasylva 2012, 63 (1), 239. 22. Carbon Trade Watch. Carbon Trading: How It Works and Why It Fails. http://www.carbontradewatch.org/publications/carbon-trading-how-itworks-and-why-it-fails.html (accessed Aug. 28,2016). 23. Carbon Trade Watch. Paths beyond Paris: Movements, Actions and Solidarity Towards Climate Justice, 2015. http://www.carbontradewatch.org/articles/paths-beyond-paris-movementsaction-and-solidarity-towards-climate-justice.html (accessed 2017). 24. Brentnall, H. U.N.-REDD Program Criticized for Negative Impact on Indigenous Communities. https://www.newsrecord.co/u-n-redd-programcriticized-for-negative-impact-on-indigenous-communities/ (accessed Sept. 12, 2016). 25. Poudyal, M.; Ramamonjisoa, B. S.; Hockley, N.; Rakotonarivo, O. S.; Gibbons, J. M.; Mandimbiniaina, R.; Rasoamanana, A.; Jones, J. P. Can REDD+ Social Safeguards Reach the ‘Right’ People? Lessons from Madagascar. Global Environmental Change 2016, 37, 31–42.

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Chapter 3

Climate Change: Global Inequalities and Poverty Christopher Tonnu Jackson* St. Edward’s University, 3001 S. Congress Ave., Austin, Texas 78704, United States *E-mail: [email protected].

Research indicates a direct correlation between climate change and global poverty. It is also widely accepted that although climate change is primarily the result of developed nations, it is the poorest countries that are expected to suffer the most from its effects. This is a key issue for the UNFCCC, and moving forward, climate change policy will have to take these inequalities into account. This chapter will explore the relationship between climate change policy and sustainable development that addresses global inequities.

Introduction Over the course of this book, previous chapters have explored the history of international climate change, as well as a broad spectrum of its political, ecological, and social implications. However, a complete history of anthropogenic climate change cannot be told without acknowledging its effects on the most vulnerable, poverty-stricken populations of the world. Why does it matter that we talk about climate change in the context of rich and poor nations? Because it is naïve to say that past actions are irrelevant to the future, especially when climate change is a global issue that has historically been caused primarily by only a few developed nations. It is naïve to think that this small group of industrialized countries (including the United States) should contribute to climate change mitigation in an equivalent manner to developing countries such as India, whose citizens produce only 3% of global greenhouse-gas (GHG) emissions (1). For this reason, the conversation on climate change, its causes, effects, and mitigation techniques, must take these inequities into account as we move forward. © 2017 American Chemical Society

According to Gallup’s 2016 environment poll, 64% of U.S. adults are now worried a “great deal” or “fair amount” about global warming, with a record 65% attributing warming primarily to human activities (2). These poll results come several months after the pivotal Paris Agreement taking place at COP21, the 21st Conference of Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). In an unprecedented consensus of the participating 195 countries, on December 12, 2015, the Paris Agreement set global standards to reduce greenhouse gas emissions and limit global temperature rise to well below 2 °C. While the Paris agreement represents a significant milestone in combating climate change, the Nationally Detemined Contributions (NDCs) outlined in it fail to meet the 2 °C benchmark necessary to prevent catastrophic and irreversible climate change. Furthermore, there are several areas in which it falls short, particularly in regards to the social impacts of climate change on poverty. The UNFCCC synthesis report in advance of COP21 noted that several countries’ Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) highlighted the link between addressing climate change and development priorities such as social and economic development and poverty eradication (3). While some critics might argue that the resources devoted to combat climate change might be better spent on other social services, many parties’ NDCs in fact noted several social co-benefits of addressing climate change, including improvements in air quality, human health, and job creation in adaptation and mitigation procedures—particularly in agriculture and forestry (3). To put these ideas into context, consider the following. Developing countries suffer 99% of the casualties (deaths) attributable to climate change. At the same time, the 50 least-developed countries of the world account for only 1% of worldwide greenhouse gas emissions attributable to climate change (4). This gross discrepancy cannot simply be ignored as we develop climate change solutions moving forward. In it’s 4th Assessment Report, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) stated that climate change would have an adverse impact on people’s health, safety and livelihoods, with the “poorest people in the poorest countries expected to suffer first and foremost” (5). This chapter will provide a broad overview of the interrelationship between global climate change and poverty, including how a spectrum of attitudes regarding climate change can be directly correlated to risk factors in different countries. Moving forward, we can then explore the potential of developing countries to adapt to and mitigate climate change, with a focus on renewable energy as a potential solution. Finally, Asia will be used as a model for closer examination, highlighting case studies of China and Bangladesh to present specific challenges and successes in both climate change and poverty alleviation.

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Poverty Before holistically addressing techniques to combat climate change, it is first necessary to recognize the important social implications of wealth and resource disparities on a global scale. In 2015, the World Bank reported that for the first time ever the percentage of the global population living in extreme poverty (measured as US $1.90 a day) was set to fall below 10% (6). Other studies have confirmed that the United Nations Millennium Development Goal of halving world poverty will have been reached five years early (7). Global poverty levels have continually and significantly declined in the past century, from 44% in 1981 to 12.7% in 2012, according to data from the World Bank. However, at higher poverty lines (such as US $3.10 a day), progress has been much slower. Likewise, while poverty rates have declined in all regions of the world, progress has been uneven. In 2012 about 77.8% of the world’s “extremely poor” lived in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa (8). In recent years, we have begun to realize the detrimental effects of climate change in the crusade against global poverty. Jim Yong Kim, the World Bank Group President, went so far as to say that “We will never end poverty if we don’t tackle climate change.” Erratic and more extreme weather patterns, including, but not limited to rising sea levels, tropical cyclones, heat waves, and flooding, are having significant effects on human welfare, particularly in rural populations. According to the World Bank, climate change is likely to reduce agricultural productivity, especially in tropical regions. Because many poorer countries have a greater dependence on agriculture and climate-sensitive natural resources, the increase in climate variability, including more frequent and erratic weather extremes, will only exacerbate existing conditions of poverty in these developing countries (7). Research has shown that those living below or just above the poverty line are at the greatest risk from climate change due to three factors: exposure, sensitivity, and adaptive capacity. Exposure measures the degree of climate stress upon a particular group, including extreme weather events and the effect of climate change on factors such as populations, resources, and property. Sensitivity measures the degree to which a system will be affected by or respond to climate stimuli. This can be altered by socio-economic changes such as new crop varieties that are more or less sensitive to climate change. Finally, adaptive capacity refers to the ability of a system to adjust to climate change, taking advantage of opportunities and coping with consequences. Factors that contribute to adaptive capacity include wealth, technology, education, institutions, information, infrastructure, and social capital, as well as cultural flexibility. It is also important to note that adaptation can reduce sensitivity, while mitigation can reduce exposure to climate change (9, 10). Impoverished communities, which are typically rural and isolated, do not have sufficient financial and technical capacities to manage the risks associated with climate change (7). Those living in poverty often have greater environmental and health risks as a result of highly, densely populated living areas, proximity to industrial sites, limited access to clean water and sewage treatment, traffic congestion contributing to air pollution, and a lack of access to other basic services (9). 27

Figure 1. Climate Change Vulnerability Index, 2015. Reproduced with permission from reference (11).

Each year, Maplecroft, a global risks advisory firm, releases a global ranking calculating the vulnerability of 170 countries to the impacts of climate change over the next thirty years. The 2015 Climate Change Vulnerability Index (CCVI), depicted in Figure 1, was produced using data from 1995-2014. Of the 10 most affected countries during this time period, nine were developing countries in the low income or lower-middle income country group. While most of these countries are located on the African continent, there are two Asian countries, Bangladesh and the Philippines, ranked first and eighth most vulnerable, respectively (11, 12). It is important to note that Africa and South Asia are also home to the vast majority of the world’s poor population, as previously shown. Later we will more closely examine Bangladesh and the role that it and other smaller, economically weaker countries play in global climate change.

Attitudes Towards Climate Change Taking into account the uneven distribution of the damaging effects of climate change, it is of value to note the similarly uneven distribution of attitudes towards climate change around the world. As depicted in Figure 2, a recent study by the Pew Research Center showed a significant correlation between the level of climate change concern and the carbon dioxide emissions per capita among 40 countries surveyed. Countries with higher carbon dioxide emissions, particularly the United States, had a very low climate change concern score. On the other hand, countries with lower carbon dioxide emissions, comprised mainly of countries in Africa and 28

Asia, tended to have a higher climate change concern score (13). Furthermore, these countries with higher scores also tend to be developing countries who are at greater risk from the negative repercussions of climate change. Within the United States, with its disproportionately low level of concern, it is necessary to more closely examine the wide variance in attitudes regarding climate change. In 2016, the Yale Project on Climate Change Communication conducted an audience segmentation analysis examining global warming’s “Six Americas,” six unique audiences within the American public that respond to the issue of climate change differently. As depicted in Figure 3, these six audiences, ordered from most concerned about climate change to least concerned, are alarmed (17%), concerned (28%), cautious (27%), disengaged (7%), doubtful (11%) and dismissive (10%) (14).

Figure 2. Pew Research Center Global Attitudes Survey, 2015. Reproduced with permission from reference (13). These and other, similar studies illustrate the wide variance in climate change concern internationally and even within a single country such as the United States. This is important because levels of climate change concern can be directly correlated to the willingness and amount of action being taken to address the problem. Overall, over the past decade, there has been little change, with significant declines in concern in several key economies (such as China). However, as previously shown, in developing countries there have been significant increases in concern consistent with the greater risks faced by these countries (14, 15). Moving forward, these are the countries that must be prepared and given the resources to adapt and survive in the new world of drastic climate change. 29

Figure 3. Yale Project on Climate Change Communication’s “Six Americas,” 2016. Reproduced with permission from reference (14).

Adaptation and Mitigation The extent to which climate change will impact poverty, both throughout Asia and across the world, is directly tied to the ability of populations both to adapt to and mitigate its effects. There are several factors that can impact the ability of a society to successfully adapt. These include autonomous adaptation, such as the ability to freely migrate or switch occupations, policy-induced adaptation, typically through government action, the distribution of resources, such as land and labor, and the role of rural households as consumers and producers of food (7). A primary mechanism by which the UNFCCC has proposed to support climate change adaptation and mitigation projects is the Green Climate Fund, first established at COP15 in 2009. The Green Climate Fund is one mechanism by which the global goal of raising $100 billion by 2020 is to be met. As of December 2016, 43 governments had contributed $10.3 billion (16). Other mitigation programs, including REDD+ and carbon taxing, which are addressed in other chapters, have seen limited success. At COP21, while the focus of negotiations remained primarily on financial mechanisms for adaptation and mitigation, the meeting also served as an avenue for the exchange of skills and ideas between governments, NGOs, and other interest groups. During a panel hosted by the U.S. State Department, city leaders from around the world, including Copenhagen, Denmark and U.S. cities Oakland, California, and Kotzebue, Alaska, shared their experience and best practices for adaptation and mitigation strategies at the city level. This is especially significant, as 50% of the world population currently lives in cities, and this is expected to rise to 67% by 2100. In addition, cities are an ideal testing ground for new practices and adaptation strategies. As highlighted by panelist Maija Lukin, a councilwoman in Kotzebue, cities and local leaders can’t always wait for funding or direction from the international or even national level to combat climate change. In the case of Kotzebue, a small coastal city with a population of 30

just over 3,000, coastal erosion, diminishing sea ice, and a lack of food security all prompted immediate local action. After petitioning for support from the state and national government, the community secured funding for the Shore Avenue Project, which made significant improvements to mitigate coastal erosion and prevented the city from being swallowed by the ocean. While the problems Kotzebue faces are challenging, it is by no means a poverty-stricken city by global standards. However, it does represent an extremely remote area that is disproportionally affected by climate change, like many poor countries around the world. Kotzebue’s initiatives to adapt and mitigate climate change in their own community represent the work taking place in other areas around the world. As each community faces their own challenges, particularly in poorer areas, national and international policy must support local initiatives by allowing as much flexibility as possible. The UNFCC has traditionally addressed issues of adaptation and mitigation in developing countries through the Warsaw Internaitonal Mechanism for Loss and Damage, first established at COP19 in 2013. At the Paris climate talks, developing countries, particularly small island developing states and least developed countries, fought strongly to include significant discussion of loss and damage in the Paris Agreement. While establishing consistent funding remains a challenge, small projects such as one funded through through the Africa Solidarity Trust Fund have found success. Farmers in six African island nations (Cabo Verde, Comoros, Guinea-Bissau, Mauritius, Sao Tome and Principe, and Seychelles) are benefitting from a $1.5 million initiative on training and knowledge exchanges on producing and marketing nutritious, easy-to-grow, climate-smart food. In addition to increasing the countries’ agricultural capacities, the project also aims to reduce issues of malnutrition and poverty in the region. By combining global support and local iniatives, this project presents a framework to prepare developing nations to adapt and mitigate the realities of climate change while simultaneously addressing longstanding issues of inequality and poverty (17).

Renewable Energy One mechanism of adaptation and mitigation that will be extremely important in combatting climate change and offsetting future greenhouse gas emissions is renewable energy. Energy is also an essential component of economic development and poverty alleviation, as highlighted in the United Nations Millennium Development Goals. In order to effectively balance these goals of ending energy poverty and promoting sustainable development, renewable energy must be employed (18). For the past few decades in developing countries, the energy needs of poor people have been largely met through petroleum-based liquid fuels and extensions of the electric grid, fueled primarily by fossil fuels and hydropower. This is primarily due to government subsidies and the widespread global availability of these resources, as well as the depletion of more traditional fuel sources like firewood. While this has sufficed in more developed areas, it still leaves out people in remote areas, or even urban slums, due to high costs or lack of access. 31

It is also important to note that most of the fossil fuels and technologies used by these developing countries are imported. Of the 47 poorest countries in 2004, 38 were net importers of oil, and 25 imported all of their oil (18). The argument for renewable energy is supported by real-world experience. In rural areas, traditional electricity grid extensions are simply not practical or economical. Studies by the International Energy Agency have shown that renewable energy technologies in developing countries, while reducing carbon dioxide emissions at the same rate as in developed countries, actually have a lower associated cost due to their cost-competitiveness in decentralized energy areas. These technologies can also extend reliable energy access to the approximately 1.5 billion people in rural, developing areas without traditional grid access (19). Projects in many developing countries have shown that renewables can directly contribute to poverty alleviation by providing necessary energy for businesses and jobs. Furthermore, renewable technologies can make indirect contributions to alleviate poverty and increase the standard of living by providing energy for activities such as cooking, heating, and lighting. This, in turn, contributes to increased education, decreased health risks, and other positive benefits in local communities (18). An argument against renewable energy sources in developed countries is that they are not continuously available and are subject to variable weather conditions (no wind, sun, etc.). However, it is important to note that people using traditional energy sources in developing countries are often already faced with unreliable energy delivery systems where daily outages are common, so this argument against renewable energy is less relevant in poor countries. Still, in the future it will be necessary to improve energy storage and distribution practices worldwide to alleviate some of these problems. In order for renewable energy to be effectively employed, especially in developing countries, it is first necessary to switch subsidies from fossil fuels to renewable technologies. In particular, in order to maximize the benefits for local communities, programs should focus on small, off-grid projects in rural, underdeveloped areas. Furthermore, as previously emphasized for all adaptation and mitigation practices, it is necessary to exchange not only financial capital, but also technology information in order to accelerate the spread of renewable energy technologies, particularly in developing countries where this knowledge may be limited or nonexistent. Therefore, significant time and financial investments need to be made specifically for this technology development, transfer, and education (19).

Asia While climate change is clearly a global problem requiring global solutions, it can be useful to focus on specific regions in order to form a better assessment of concrete actions that can be taken to mitigate climate change at a regional or local level. Asia is a key area of interest for climate change researchers and policymakers, due to its recent rapid industrialization and growth. In addition, the geographical location of many Asian countries, particularly island and coastal 32

nations, make them especially at risk from global climate change (12). As previously stated, data from the World Bank shows that the uneven progress in global poverty decline has significant regional components (8). Asia is a key player in international climate change negotiations and has played a critical role in the COP meetings over the past twenty years. At COP15 in Copenhagen, Asian countries—China in particular—were largely blamed for the failure to reach a significant treaty. Through a series of backroom deals, conducted away from the media spotlight, China purposefully undermined the negotiations. For example, it was China’s representative who insisted on removing the industrialized country targets, previously set as an 80% cut by 2050. Collaborating at times with India (another developing Asian country), China successfully removed most of the binding language of the agreement, including a 2020 peaking year in global emissions and a long-term target of 50% emissions cuts by 2050. By doing so, China, with an economy strongly dependent on cheap coal at the time, was able to negotiate a deal that did not limit its economic growth while simultaneously placing the blame on the United States. This is not to say that climate change was not an issue for China at the time. Rather, they recognized the issue, but instead chose to prioritize growth and becoming an international superpower (with significant negotiating power) (20). Since 2009, and in part as a result of their actions at Copenhagen, climate change has become a much more serious issue for Asian countries. In recent years, China, India, Japan, and Korea have consistently ranked in the top ten countries for carbon dioxide emissions per capita, with China recently surpassing even the United States. At the same time, these countries began to feel the effects of increased emissions. In China, rampant air pollution has forced city shutdowns as air pollution contributed to more than 670,000 deaths in 2012. Importantly, even other, less-developed countries in Asia have also felt negative repercussions. For example, in the Philippines, Typhoon Haiyan in 2013 offered a preview of the increase in natural disasters that the highly vulnerable nation can expect as a result of climate change (21). On a more optimistic note, the primary concern of Asian countries in 2009, that cutting emissions was synonymous with cutting their growth potential, no longer holds true. India has rapidly expanded its use of solar, and China is leading the world in employing renewable energy technologies. Peaking emissions is no longer a burden, but rather an opportunity, particularly for businesses, to ensure greater energy security, affordable supplies, and recognized leadership internationally (21). At COP21, the Philippines took on a new leadership role as a large Asian developing nation. As the chair of the Climate Vulnerable Forum, a coalition of 43 countries pushing for the inclusion of the 1.5°C goal as opposed to the 2°C, the Philippines was critical in advocating for language of loss and damages to assist countries unable to adapt to climate change. Thanks to their leadership, the Climate Vulnerable Forum, and in particular the Small Island Developing States (SIDS) of the Pacific Ocean, played a much more prominent role at COP21 than at any previous meetings (21). It is outside the scope of this chapter to address each of the unique challenges that both poverty and climate change pose in different countries around the world 33

(or even in Asia alone). However, the following two case studies, of China and Bangladesh respectively, offer insight into two very different Asian countries. While relatively close geographically, they have contributed to—and been affected by—climate change in very different ways. This provides interesting perspectives on how we can address climate change moving forward so that countries on both ends of the spectrum benefit.

Case Study: China It is impossible to discuss climate change in Asia, or even the world, without recognizing the significant and growing role of China as both a contributor and policy leader. Adding further complications to this topic is the contentious, and at times contradictory, positions of the Chinese government regarding the importance of climate change and their willingness to make the necessary mitigating changes. In per capita emissions, the latest data from the World Bank (2013) shows that the United States far exceeds China (16.4 to 7.6 metric tons per capita). However, in 2011, China surpassed the United States in total carbon dioxide emissions from the consumption of energy (i.e. fossil fuel burning). Since then, China’s carbon emissions have increased rapidly alongside its economic development and population growth. Compared to its 2.7 metric tons CO2 per capita in 2000, China emitted 6.71 metric tons CO2 per capita in 2011 (22). In 2014, China was responsible for 27% of global emissions, and its per capita emissions surpassed those of all the 28 European Union member states combined (23, 24). It is no secret that China has benefitted significantly from its use of “dirty” carbon energy sources, including a significant amount of coal. From 1980 to 2006, China’s GDP grew by 9.5% per year, powered largely (67%) by energy produced from its large coal reserves. At one point in 2006, China was opening as many as two additional coal-fired power plants each week, and today it remains the largest consumer of coal in the world. However, to its credit, China’s CO2 emissions, while continuing to grow, have increased by only 5.4% per year. As a result, their carbon intensity (carbon emission per unit of GDP) decreased over that time period, as shown in Figure 4. An important reason for this was a government emphasis on energy efficiency, driven by the large population and limited resources of the country (24). The government’s push for cleaner energy sources was in part influenced by international pressures. China was a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol in 2007, but as a developing nation, it was not required to reduce its emissions. However, since then, pressure from within the country has also risen, especially as Chinese citizens have begun to feel the effects of dirty energy production firsthand, particularly in their air and water. In January 2013, the smog in Beijing contained a concentration of hazardous particles 40 times the level deemed safe by the World Health Organization (WHO). In 2015, severe air pollution resulted in shutdowns of schools, traffic, and manufacturing. In addition, water contamination and overuse, as a result of industry pollution and negligent farming practices, have led to shortages in about two-thirds of China’s cities (25). 34

Figure 4. CO2 emissions and carbon intensity for China from 1980 to 2006. Reproduced with permission from reference (24).

After passing the United States as the world’s largest emitter in 2007, China issued its first Climate Change Program. This was followed by a national carbontrading scheme in 2008 that promoted investments in carbon capture systems. In 2010, for the first time, China led the United States and all other major countries in green energy markets, with private investments of $34.6 billion in 2009 (26). With significant growth in wind, solar, nuclear power, and cleaner coal technology, China’s carbon dioxide emissions are expected to peak around 2030 (27). This is in accordance with China’s pledge at COP21, but emissions may peak earlier, depending on new policy and implementation. The problem remains that thus far, China’s attempts to mitigate its own contribution to climate change, while important first steps, are insufficient. China has a mixed record, rapidly undergoing significant economic and industrial growth, utilizing both “dirty” and (more recently) clean energy sources to do so. It now faces the negative repercussions of its actions and can serve as an example for other developing countries, that they may emulate the best, clean practices for economic growth.

Case Study: Bangladesh While much attention was focused on Asia’s emerging world leaders, China and India, smaller Asian countries still made their voices heard, both in the negotiations and in other venues at COP21. A prime example of this was Bangladesh, which in 2015 was ranked as the country most vulnerable to climate change in Maplecroft’s Climate Change Vulnerability Index (11). As a country that is already facing the negative effects of climate change and has consequently been forced to make significant changes, Bangladesh offers a unique perspective on techniques of adaptation. Representing Bangladesh, Dr. Saleemul Huq spoke at COP21 about the best practices his country has adopted as they adapt to climate change. A significant problem that Bangladesh faces as a coastal country is sea level rise, which has led to other problems such as soil salinity, river siltation, and erosion. Because 35

Bangladesh is primarily an agricultural society, these ecological changes have significant social ramifications. These include an increased vulnerability to natural disasters, migration, and changes in land use. For example, because of the increased soil and water salinity in regions where people used to grow rice, farmers have been forced to switch to more saline-resistant strains. At the same time, in order to offset some of their losses and make the best of the situation, some farmers now cultivate rice-shrimp in the same areas as rice, creating another source of food and income. Bangladesh also represents a unique approach to adaptation that places emphasis on both industrial development and the preservation of a rural lifestyle. While Bangladesh is a largely agricultural country, its capital city, Dhaka, ranks among the top 20 cities globally in exposure to extreme climate. Most residents in the region have migrated to the city and are economically poor, working as unskilled laborers. As a result of rising land and housing prices, this group, making up almost 30-40% of the population, has been forced into squatter settlements. In these high-density settlements, 91% of structures are comprised of corrugated iron (CI) sheets, which gain and radiate more heat than other building materials. These high heat-gaining and emitting materials, which allow little airflow for ventilation, exacerbate the exposure of residents to the significant direct and indirect impact of temperature variability (9). This example demonstrates how the urban development of high-density housing as a result of economic poverty creates conditions that can exacerbate the hazardous effects of climate change. In their analysis of this region, Jabeen and Guy emphasize the need for “fluidity,” implying flexibility towards a variety of technological solutions for local challenges. Studies have shown that traditional adaptation planning has focused on regulatory frameworks and “design formulas” that rarely fulfill the needs and preferences of a particular community. With a more fluid model, more suitable to the unprecedented climate reality of the future, sustainable development must rely on alternative pathways rather than fixed ones (9). An example of this kind of flexibility in sustainable development is Bangladesh’s implementation of renewable energy over the past several years. In 2007, an estimated 40% of the country’s population had no access to electricity. Recognizing this issue, with support from the World Bank, the government introduced the solar home systems (SHS) project to provide electricity to households with no grid access. Since 2009, more than 50,000 systems have been added per month, reaching 3 million households in 2014, with projections of 6 million households by 2017. Thanks to the SHS program, the Bangladeshi government is working towards universal electricity access by 2021, just a decade since the project was first proposed (28). This success serves as a positive example of climate change adaptation and mitigation practices that simultaneously improve a country’s standard of living, particularly among its poorest citizens. Both the struggles and successes of Bangladesh offer valuable lessons for similar developing countries adapting to and mitigating climate change. Obviously, identical practices will not work in every country around the world, which presents the need for specific, tailored strategies that take into account the resources and voices of local communities. However, consistent international 36

support from organizations such as the World Bank will remain a key component of successful adaptation and mitigation projects across local and national platforms.

Conclusion In summary, climate change is a global problem largely due to the actions of developed nations. However, it is the poorest people in poorer, developing nations who are expected to suffer the most from its negative impacts. This can be seen most prominently in Asia, where many of the countries most susceptible to climate change are located, including Bangladesh and the Philippines. At the same time, Asian countries such as China and India have seen rampant growth in the past decade using both renewable and non-renewable energy sources. As a result, these emerging world powers, as well as smaller countries in Asia, have taken on greater leadership roles and made their voices heard at international meetings such as the annual UNFCCC COPs. Adaptation and mitigation practices have had both successes and shortcomings, as seen in the examples of China and Bangladesh. Future work must take into account the drastic differences in geography, culture, and economic inequalities among developing nations when considering global policy solutions. Furthermore, there must be an exchange not only of financial capital, but also ideas, leadership, and new technologies in order to simultaneously address issues of both climate change and poverty worldwide.

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20. Lynas, M. How Do I Know China Wrecked the Copenhagen Deal? I Was in the Room. The Guardian, Dec. 22, 2009. https://www.theguardian.com/ environment/2009/dec/22/copenhagen-climate-change-mark-lynas (accessed May 5, 2016). 21. Coca, N. The COP21 Deal: What Does It Mean for Asia? The Diplomat, Dec. 18, 2015. http://thediplomat.com/2015/12/the-cop21-deal-what-doesit-mean-for-asia/ (accessed May 5, 2016). 22. CO2 Emissions (metric tons per capita). The World Bank, World Bank Group. http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/EN.ATM.CO2E.PC (accessed Aug. 28, 2016). 23. Chadha, M. China’s Per Capita Emissions Have Exceeded Those Of Europe. CleanTechnica, Sustainable Enterprises Media, Inc., Sept. 23, 2014. https://cleantechnica.com/2014/09/23/chinas-per-capita-emissionsexceeded-europe/ (accessed Aug. 28, 2016). 24. Zeng, N.; Ding, Y.; Pan, J.; Wang, H.; Gregg, J. Climate Change − The Chinese Challenge. Science 2008, 319 (5864), 730–731. 25. Albert, E.; Xu, B. China’s Environmental Crisis. Council on Foreign Relations, Council on Foreign Relations, Jan. 18, 2016. http://www.cfr.org/ china/chinas-environmental-crisis/p12608 (accessed Aug. 28, 2016). 26. Friedman, L. China Leads Major Countries with $34.6 Billion Invested in Clean Technology. The New York Times, Mar. 25, 2010. http:// www.nytimes.com/cwire/2010/03/25/25climatewire-china-leads-majorcountries-with-346-billion-15729.html?pagewanted=all (accessed Aug. 28, 2016). 27. Zhou, N.; Fridley, D.; McNeil, M.; Zheng, N.; Ke, J.; Levine, M. China’s Energy and Carbon Emissions Outlook to 2050. Report LBNL-4472E, Ernest Orlando Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory, Apr. 2011. https://china.lbl.gov/sites/all/files/lbl-4472e-energy-2050april-2011.pdf (accessed Aug. 28, 2016).. 28. Bangladesh Solar Program To Reach 13 Million More People. Energy Matters, Nov. 6, 2014. http://www.energymatters.com.au/renewable-news/ bangladesh-solar-em4578/ (accessed May 5, 2016).

39

Chapter 4

Race and Climate Change Gregory A. Margida* Grinnell College, 2590 3rd St., Apt. F, San Francisco, California 94107, United States *E-mail: [email protected].

Climate change must be approached as an issue of race as well. The negative effects of climate change are primarily felt in countries that are majority people of color, especially black and brown people, despite the fact that most of the planet’s CO2 emissions come from China, the United States, and Russia. Further, people of color are more likely to be exposed to industrial pollution. Although people of color have historically organized for change regarding environmental racism, there has been little progress made, and little has been done to include them more directly in discussions regarding climate change legislation.

Faces with the Names Throughout college, I always saw climate change as an abstract issue. I cared about the environment. I cared about conserving water, fighting deforestation, and decreasing pollution. I knew I was supposed to recycle and turn the water off while brushing my teeth, and I tried to support renewable energy. But for me, the actual issue of climate change was always about saving trees and protecting the earth. It wasn’t until my visit to COP21, when I finally got to attach faces to the climate change statistics I had read so much about. After this realization, my time at COP21 became quickly focused on the people affected, rather than the actual effect itself. This time allowed me to see climate change as the humanitarian issue it really is. In everything I study, I always remain cognizant of the racial issues involved. My background and experiences in race relations have taught me to evaluate how people of color are treated and represented in every situation. It didn’t take me long at COP21 before I realized how much race has to do with climate change. © 2017 American Chemical Society

One-Point-Five To Stay Alive During my first day at the COP, I walked outside of one of the large exhibition halls and came across a small protest forming. “One-point-five to stay alive!” was the resounding chant from the group. This slogan refers to the controversy over whether or not the goal of climate solutions should be to limit global temperature increase to 1.5 or 2°C (1). While 2° is the benchmark most commonly suggested across members of the United Nations, a temperature increase of more than 1.5° would actually leave many small island nations submerged by sea level rise. 1.5 is the mark needed to keep these island nations above water, and thus, alive (2). COP21 turned out a great product for our Earth’s future that we now know as the Paris Agreement (3). However, lack of inclusion of the 1.5° benchmark created skepticism of how helpful the Paris Agreement will be for minorities. The text of the Paris Agreement includes a mention of the benchmark, but merely in the sense of a whimsical goal with no real intention of being reached. In other words, a pat-on-the-back for the 1.5 advocates. The issue with this is not that the United Nations accepted lower standards for carbon emissions, but that, once again, communities of people of color have been talked down to lesser treatment than they deserve. Yes, climate change is an issue of race. Of course, as an amateur race relations enthusiast, I can connect most issues to race. But climate change is more blatantly related to race than expected. The 1.5 issue presents race very clearly, as most of the countries threatened by a global temperature increase of more than 1.5° are majority people of color. Take, for example, the island of Grenada: it is in danger of sea level rise, 99.6% people of color, and still at the mercy of white leaders (4). Grenada has already been hit hard by climate change (5). Global temperature rise to date has altered weather patterns, specifically the water cycle. I had a chance to talk with Trevor Thompson of Grenada’s Ministry of the Environment, who told me that more frequent droughts and floods have ravaged the nation’s crops and infrastructure (6). This has caused major setbacks to their economy, in addition to putting lives at risk every day. Still, changes to the water cycles are the least of the worries on the mind of Grenada’s citizens. Mr. Thompson told me that with a global temperature increase of 1.5° or greater, sea level rise would be so great that the entire island of Grenada would be submerged beneath the water (7). This would leave its 100,000 citizens homeless and forced into evacuation. This is a common theme across island nations. I attended a panel discussing climate resilience in Pacific Island nations and found the discussion did not revolve around if they would need to evacuate, but rather what their plans were for evacuation and how soon they would be implemented (8).

Climate Racism Times like these cause me to check my privilege. Here in the United States, we are fortunate enough to not have to know what a climate refugee is. However, island nations across the globe are putting together plans for when their citizens 42

become displaced due to that feared 1.5° global temperature increase—the same 1.5° that protestors pleaded against at COP21, the same 1.5° that was included on only a minimal level in the Paris Agreement (9). This is a solid example of climate racism, the needs of people of color being minimized or neglected in our search for climate solutions. So many lives are contingent upon keeping the global temperature increase under 1.5°C, and nearly all of those lives are people of color. Granted, according to NOAA administrator Kathryn Sullivan, that this is a nearly impossible task, our shortcomings to fully recognize 1.5° as the official “red line” of temperature increase highlights our minimization of the lives of people of color (10). The twist on climate racism is that it harms people of color most but is caused almost exclusively by white people. The reason I use “almost” as a modifier is because China is the global leader in carbon emissions and is not majority white. According to the World Bank, just short of 50% of the planet’s carbon emissions come from China, the United States, and Russia (11). However, the effects of climate change, as we all know, are not contained within the boundaries of the country where carbon is emitted. In fact, almost the opposite is true. Carbon emissions contribute to sea level rise and, as established earlier, this disproportionately affects island nations and people of color. Further, many developing countries across Africa and Central and South America are hit hard by changes in their water cycle due to climate change. Droughts and floods alike become more frequent, more severe, and less predictable (12). This contributes to food scarcity as it becomes harder to grow and sustain crops (13). Tropical storms and cyclones caused by climate change leave wreckage in these countries as they often do not have the infrastructure to withstand the increased intensity and frequency (14). I spoke with a group of representatives from Ethiopia who explained to me how serious climate disasters are to Ethiopian citizens. “Homes are destroyed. People die,” one delegate told me plainly (15). The effects of climate change are greater than just economic ones—they are issues of life and death for entire villages. In Ghana, similar effects are taking place with an additional twist; warmer, wetter climates have created a more favorable environment for mosquitoes, which puts citizens in greater danger of Malaria (16). When it comes down to looking at who emits versus who gets hit, the numbers are very lopsided in terms of race, and this trend continues in terms of who is concerned about climate change. It was obvious to me, through my observations at COP21, that people of color are very visible in climate protests. The 1.5° protest (the protest responsible for sparking my interest in race and climate change) was racially diverse and majority people of color.

Black Lives Matter and Climate Change During my final day at the COP, I was surprised when I found myself in the middle of a Black Lives Matter protest. I quickly noticed that the protesters’ chants of “We can’t breathe!” were being used in a different sense: one that suggests a more subtle grip society has on black lives. I talked with some of the protesters 43

and found out that the majority of them were college and graduate students from the Historically Black Colleges and Universities (HBCU) climate consortium, a program that specifically focuses on the racial aspects of climate change and is led by the biggest name in the field, Dr. Robert Bullard, Dean of the Mickey Leland Center for Environmental Justice and Sustainability at Texas Southern University. The program’s focus is to educate young people on the racial inequalities of climate change and to help be a voice for the cause (17). “[Black Lives Matter] is larger than police shootings,” Payton Wilkins, a student at Dillard University and a participant in the consortium, explained to me after the protest. The HBCU climate consortium broadcasts their message that black lives are treated with less respect with regard to climate change, and that Black Lives Matter should not be limited to police brutality. Representation of people of color is more than just anecdotal. A 2014 poll found that more than 70% of Latino-Americans and nearly 60% of African-Americans are concerned about climate change. Meanwhile, less that 50% of white Americans are concerned. Latino and African-Americans alike are about twice as likely to fear that they will be affected by climate change (18). Even within political parties, we see that since 2009, a greater percentage of non-white democrats think of climate change as a top political priority than white democrats. Considering politics only makes the racial disparity in climate apathy greater. The United States has countless politicians who, along with their supporters, deny that climate change even exists. Some delegates from Cameroon had a good laugh when I told them this, but I assured them that climate deniers not only exist, they are plentiful. Whether climate denial is due to ignorance or choice, apathy toward climate change is apathy toward the people affected.

A Prince’s Effort To Promote Climate Literacy One of the people I was most fortunate to meet at COP21 was Prince Obi Goodluck, a prime example of someone who works every day to improve climate literacy. Prince Obi, a delegate of Nigeria, is the founder and CEO of Global Alert for Defense of Youth and the Less Privileged, an NGO that starts tree planting clubs for children in Nigeria’s hard-to-reach, riverine communities (19). Each time Prince Obi ventures into these communities he puts himself in danger. The communities he serves are high in crime and poverty, and his visits, as a politically interested member of a higher class, are not always welcomed by everyone. However, Prince Obi’s intentions are pure: the tree-planting clubs his organization starts teach young people about climate change and the importance of taking care of the earth. Not only do the trees bring shade and clean air to the community, but the work inspires a feeling of responsibility for the environment in each of these children and teaches them how environmental decisions we make affect our planet and all of its people.

44

Environmental Racism A big part of the reason people are apathetic regarding climate change is that it is easier to deny what we have not yet experienced firsthand. Though the effects of climate change are difficult to notice throughout most of the United States, environmental racism is very prevalent. Regarding environmental inequalities, Dr. Bullard says “Racism trumps class. Even middle-class African Americans are more likely to live in more polluted neighborhoods” (20). Environmental hazards have become a major avenue of racism in the United States. As pointed out by an AJ+ video titled “Environmental Racism Explained,” the Flint, Michigan water crisis is the most prominent example of this. More than 100,000 residents in Flint—a city with a 57% black population—were poisoned by lead in their drinking water. Residents protested the dangerous water for more than a year, but their voices were ignored and their health suffered. The Flint water crisis made headlines, but it was not an isolated incident. Black neighborhoods are a common target for industrial pollution, and this trend appears to be based on race rather than class. Black Americans making US$50K-$60K per year are more likely to live in polluted neighborhoods than white Americans making $10k per year. This pollution has great public health implications on the affected communities. A section of the Mississippi River in Louisiana has even earned the nickname “Cancer Alley” (20). This 85-mile stretch between Baton Rouge and New Orleans is home to over 200 petrochemical plants. Consequently, high rates of cancer have been reported in the region’s majority black population. Cancer Alley residents have been organizing to demand industrial regulations to make their communities safer from pollution, but with little media attention and no legislative progress (21). This is a trend I have noticed in many similar situations—community organizing by the affected communities with little to no success. Not only do communities of color suffer the most from climate change effects caused by majority white communities, but when they protest for change, they are ignored. Dr. Spencer Thomas, Ambassador and Special Envoy for Multilateral Environmental Agreements in Grenada, shared some important words during a panel on coastal reliance that stuck with me: “There is no room for tokenism in climate change decisions” (22). Essentially, we know who is affected by climate change. Why minimize the representation of the identities affected most? History has demonstrated that people of color are willing to protest current environmental legislation and be advocates for progress on climate solutions. The next step is to create avenues for them to get appropriate representation at the table. A common mantra when dealing with decision-making regarding minorities is “nothing about us without us.” This is something that needs to be taken seriously regarding climate solutions. We know that people of color are disproportionately affected by the climate change. Thus, people of color cannot only be included in climate discussions on a tokenistic basis. We know that there is no shortage of voices willing to represent these communities. It is time to hear these voices and make sure that climate decisions going forward are representative of the people they impact most. 45

Conclusion Perhaps part of the reason climate change becomes an abstraction for so many white Americans is because the victims are people that don’t look like them. It is typically harder to be passionate about things to which we cannot relate. Since the worst effects of climate change occur far away in communities we don’t identify with, it makes it easier to ignore the issue. This is a notion that needs to be recognized and fought, and it can only be done by including people of color in climate change discussions. The best way to do this is to make it happen the same way it happened to me: stop making climate change an abstraction, a hypothetical. For so many of us here in the United States, climate change feels so distant because it is merely a future threat and not something that we have felt yet. The key is to put a “face to the name.” Climate change is already affecting a lot of the planet, and for me to properly understand this, I had to meet some of the people affected and hear their stories. I realize not everyone will have this opportunity, but for those who do, we need to share the stories that we hear, along with the facts that we know, to make climate change an issue that can seem real to everyone.

References 1.

This information was collected from personal experiences at COP21 in Paris, France, December 2015. The argument of 1.5 degrees versus 2 degrees Celsius was a common motif throughout the conference. 2. Cuomo, C. J. Climate change, vulnerability, and responsibility. Hypatia 2011, 26, 690–714. 3. Rogelj, J.; Den Elzen, M.; Höhne, N.; Fransen, T.; Fekete, H.; Winkler, H.; Meinshausen, M. Paris Agreement climate proposals need a boost to keep warming well below 2 C. Nature 2016, 534, 631–639. 4. United Nations. Demographic Yearbook, 2016. http://unstats.un.org/unsd/ demographic/products/dyb/dyb2.htm#2001 (accessed October 2016). 5. Information gathered from personal conversations with members of the Grenada delegation at COP21. 6. Information gathered from a personal conversation with Trevor Thompson of Grenada’s Ministry of Agriculture, Lands, Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment. 7. Information gathered from a personal conversation with Trevor Thompson of Grenada’s Ministry of Agriculture, Lands, Forestry, Fisheries and the Environment. 8. Information gathered from a panel at COP21 I attended regarding climate resilience in the Pacific Ocean. 9. Information gathered from a panel at COP21 I attended regarding climate resilience in the Pacific Ocean. 10. Information gathered from a personal conversation with NOAA Administrator Kathryn Sullivan at COP21. 11. Union of Concerned Scientists. Each Country’s Share of CO2 Emissions, 2014. http://www.ucsusa.org/global_warming/science_and_impacts/ 46

12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

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science/each-countrys-share-of-co2.html#.WA1kQJMrJsM (accessed October 2016). Information gathered from personal conversations with delegates at COP21. World Food Programme. How Climate Change Affects Hunger, 2016. https:/ /www.wfp.org/climate-change (accessed October 2016). Information gathered from personal conversations with delegates at COP21. Information gathered from personal conversations with delegates of Ethiopia at COP21. Information gathered from personal conversations with delegates of Ghana at COP21. Information gathered from personal conversations with members of the HBCU climate consortium at COP21. Aleem, Z. Mic Policy. New Poll Finds Something Surprising about Race and Climate Change, December 2, 2014. https://mic.com/articles/ 105120/new-poll-finds-something-surprising-about-race-and-climatechange#.NNB2y6Aeh (accessed October 2016). Margida, G. Chemical and Engineering News. Meet a Prince Who Is Teaching Nigerians about Climate Change, 2015. http://cop21.cenmag.org/ meet-a-prince-who-is-pushing-nigerians-to-learn-more-about-climatechange/ (accessed October 2016). Mendy, C. Environmental Justice Education Initiatives: The Deep South Center for Environmental Justice at Xavier University. Race, Poverty & the Environment, June 27−28, 1996. http://www.jstor.org/stable/ 41554247(accessed 2016). AJ+. Environmental Racism Explained, 2016. https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=TrbeuJRPM0o (accessed September 2016). Information gathered while attending a Coastal Resilience forum with The Ambassador, Dr. Spencer Thomas, of Grenada at COP21.

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Chapter 5

From a Commitment in Doha to an Emissions Pledge in Paris Parker D. McCrary* School of Law, The University of Alabama, 101 Paul W. Bryant Dr., Tuscaloosa, Alabama 35401, United States *E-mail: [email protected].

Negotiators at the 18th Conference of the Parties to the UNFCCC (COP18) in Doha failed to produce a universally adopted second commitment period to the Kyoto Protocol. In response, negotiators at COP21 in Paris produced the Paris Agreement, which requires only a pledge of greenhouse gas emissions reductions. This chapter explores whether the shift from binding commitments to pledges is legally significant, and if the Paris Agreement will lead to reductions in global greenhouse gas emissions.

Introduction Occasionally, a few steps are more than the sum of their parts. The first human standing upright to walk, Martin Luther King, Jr.’s march from Selma, and Neil Armstrong’s first steps on the moon are each an example of a few steps that were far more important to human history than just someone just walking a few steps. This same phenomena happened to me in Doha. There I was, walking down the palm tree lined Al Corniche Street in the middle of the desert with hundreds of others. However, looking at the landscape you might think you were in South Beach with the amount of manicured Bermuda grass that sat between the palm trees and buildings. Above the sounds of shoes hitting the asphalt, chants could be heard. “More action, less talk!” and “we demand climate action now!” were audible as we strolled down Corniche along the Persian Gulf. These seemingly simple acts in the United States or Europe were magnified in Qatar. Qatar, a country built on oil, is not known for allowing protests, especially an environmental protest © 2017 American Chemical Society

which threatens the entire foundation upon which Qatar is built. However, to truly understand the significance of this moment, we have to travel back in time to how this movement first started.

Background Humans are extremely likely to have caused an unprecedented level of change in Earth’s climate. Earth’s atmosphere and oceans have warmed and the amount of snow and ice present on the surface of the Earth has fallen. These changes are closely associated with the rapid rise in the concentration of greenhouse gases (GHG), especially carbon dioxide (CO2), in Earth’s atmosphere. This phenomenon is known as anthropogenic climate change (1). Unfortunately, without global cooperation, a tragedy of the commons scenario will unfold. In a tragedy of the commons, no single person or nation is incentivized to keep the common area clean. Instead, each nation will maximize its economic output, while emitting as much CO2 as necessary. Since the atmosphere is a part of the common area all nations share, it can be difficult for a single country to observe its individualized impact of CO2 emissions or be incentivized to stop emitting CO2 (2). In response, representatives from around the world signed an international treaty, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) (3). The UNFCCC set a goal of stabilizing GHG emissions at levels that would prevent anthropogenic climate change through an ongoing relationship instead of a single treaty. At first, the UNFCCC encouraged nations to voluntarily submit to reductions in GHG emissions, with the reduction taking into “account their common but differentiated responsibilities” (3). Nations were divided into either Annex 1, Annex 2, and non-Annex 1 countries based on each country’s economy and historical emissions. Annex 1 parties included nations with developed economies and a history of high GHG emissions, such as the United States, the European Union, and Japan, as well as countries with economies in transition, such as Russia and Turkey. All Annex 1 countries were expected to voluntarily submit to reductions in GHG emissions. Non-Annex 1 countries were those countries with developing economies, including China, India, Brazil, and the rest of the world. Non-Annex 1 counties were not expected to submit to reductions in GHG emissions (3). Unfortunately, the UNFCCC treaty does not include specific emissions reductions for Annex 1 nations. The UNFCCC only provided a “target” to reduce emissions to a low enough level to prevent anthropogenic climate change. The signatories agreed to work towards target emissions reductions, which were the first step in a comprehensive, global strategy to prevent anthropogenic climate change (3). Each year, the annual Conference of Parties (COP) to the UNFCCC nations meet to negotiate specific aspects of the treaty. At first, the UNFCCC aimed to make reductions in GHG emissions legally binding on Annex 1 nations. At the 1997 COP3 (the third annual COP meeting), the Kyoto Protocol to the UNFCCC was introduced (4). Consistent with the principle of “common but differentiated 50

responsibilities,” only Annex 1 countries were required to reduce GHG emissions. The Kyoto Protocol required GHG emission cuts based on the 1990 emissions year. For example, the United States would be required to emit no more than 93% of its 1990 emissions levels by 2012. European countries agreed to cuts equivalent to 92% of their 1990 emissions levels. However, Russia, due to the recent fall of the Soviet Union, was permitted to emit 100% of its 1990 levels, while Australia could emit 108% by 2012 (3). The emissions reductions were to be “legally binding” upon ratification by at least 55 parties and enough Annex 1 parties to represent 55% of the 1990 CO2 emission levels (5). There were several challenges with the “legally binding” intent of the Kyoto Protocol. First, many of the “binding” cuts did not require any reductions in CO2 emissions. For example, Germany had already met its emissions reductions prior to signing the Kyoto Protocol. Second, there was no enforcement mechanism. As a result, several nations that signed the Kyoto Protocol did not remain complaint throughout the Kyoto Protocol period. Third, several Annex 1 nations either did not ratify (United States), ratified after the Kyoto Protocol went into force (Australia), or ratified, but later withdrew (Canada) (5, 6) Even with all of the shortcomings in the Kyoto Protocol, between 1990-2012, collectively, Annex 1 countries decreased GHG emissions by 10.6% based on 1990 level of emissions (7). Despite these reductions, CO2 emissions still hit a record high in 2012. China, now the largest emitter of CO2 in the world, is exempt from making any GHG emissions reductions under the Kyoto Protocol (8). In fact, none of the non-Annex 1 countries, including India and Brazil, were required to reduce GHG emissions (9). While the Annex 1 nations, in total, decreased their GHG emissions, the Kyoto Protocol excluded developing nations, such as China, which now emits as much CO2 as the United States and all of Europe combined (10). After the Kyoto Protocol entered into force in 2005, the UNFCCC’s focus shifted towards planning for what came after the Kyoto Protocol as the ratifiers of the Kyoto Protocol only committed to reduce GHG emissions during a specific period, the First Commitment Period, which only ran through 2012.

Doha Amendment – Second Commitment Period The Kyoto Protocol could only become legally binding once Annex 1 countries representing at least 55% of the 1990 CO2 emissions ratified the protocol (5). With the United States not ratifying the treaty and Australia not doing so until 2007, Russia (with 17.4% of the world’s 1990 emissions) was the treaty’s last chance to reach 55%. As of 2004 at COP 10 in Buenos Aires, only 44.2% of the 1990 emissions were represented among the ratified nations. As a result, much of the negotiations that took place from COP8 through COP10 were focused on manipulating provisions so that Russia would ratify. Finally, Russia ratified the Kyoto Protocol, which allowed the Kyoto Protocol to come into force in 2005 (11). However, the Kyoto Protocol’s commitment period was set to end in 2012, just seven years after it came into legal force. COP13 in Bali, Indonesia coincided with the release of IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report. The Fourth Assessment Report stated that “[w]arming of the 51

climate system is unequivocal” and that the warming was “very likely” due to the release of greenhouse gases by humans (1). The negotiators in Bali, while failing to secure any binding commitments, concluded, “deep cuts in global emissions will be required,” post-Kyoto and set up the Bali Action Plan to negotiate a new agreement (12). The U.S. was supportive of the Bali Action Plan despite the understanding that 2/3 of the Senate would need to approve any binding treaty (13). Optimism grew when newly elected President Obama announced that he would attend COP15 in Copenhagen. Obama outlined the U.S.’s position at the plenary session (14). First, all major economies must be involved in mitigation efforts. Second, there must be a review mechanism. Finally, the developed economies must provide financing to the “least developed and most vulnerable” countries. Unfortunately, a deal was not reached at COP15 (15). Instead, the “Copenhagen 5,” consisting of the U.S., Brazil, India, China, and South Africa, negotiated a last-minute accord in which each nation was allowed to set national emission reduction guidelines unilaterally. Europe later grudgingly approved it, but many developing nations vehemently opposed the Copenhagen Accord (16). While some developed countries praised the Copenhagen Accord, it marked a step in a different direction in the international negotiation process as the Copenhagen Accord focused on unilateral rather than multilateral action (17). In the end, Parties could only agree to “take note” of the Copenhagen Accord. In some respects, the Copenhagen Accord can be seen as a positive, as both Annex 1 parties (including the United States) and non-Annex 1 parties (such as China), pledged to substantially reduce CO2 emissions (18). At Durban in 2011, the negotiators at COP17 started to realize that a greater sense of urgency was needed. The first commitment period of Kyoto Protocol was set to end in 2012, and there was no agreement in place to govern GHGs emissions after the first commitment period despite the increasing scientific likelihood that climate change is anthropogenic (1, 19). The result of COP17 was the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (20). The Durban Platform sets out a roadmap for the implementation of new binding agreements. First, the Durban Platform detailed the need for a second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol to be developed by 2012 and extend from 2012 until 2020. Second, it called for a new protocol for GHG emission reductions to be negotiated by 2015 for the period extending beyond 2020. The Durban Platform also considered whether a maximum two-degree rise was enough, or if a lower rise in global average temperature was necessary (21). The world set its sights on Doha for COP18 to negotiate a second commitment period (22). The 2012 Doha Amendment to the Kyoto Protocol provided a new set of CO2 emissions reductions that are set to expire in 2020, a “second commitment period” to the Kyoto Protocol (23). Additionally, the negotiators at Doha “streamlined” the Durban Platform to concentrate negotiations on a new protocol to replace Kyoto by 2015 at COP21 (24). Unfortunately, four nations that previously signed the Kyoto Protocol - Canada, Japan, New Zealand, and Russia -joined the United States in opting out of the second commitment period. Only 37 nations were legally required to reduce GHG emissions (including 27 52

from the European Union). As a result, Australia was the lone nation outside of Europe that was required to reduce its GHG emissions (25). Immediately after COP18 in Doha, critics blasted the second commitment period as a failure (26). Once again, non-Annex 1 countries were not required to agree to any emissions reductions. Many countries in the European Union committed to up to a 20% reduction of the 1990 base level of greenhouse gas emissions. Australia would be required to commit to a 0.5% reduction of the 2000 base level. In addition, Annex 1 parties could pledge GHG reductions beyond the commitment amount. For example, the European Union pledged a 30% reduction (27). In order to become legally binding on signatories, 144 parties to the Kyoto Protocol must ratify the Doha Amendment. As of October, 2016, 70 countries have ratified the Doha Amendment. Importantly, only eight of the 37 nations required to reduce GHG emissions (Hungary, Italy, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Monaco, Norway, Romania, and Switzerland) have ratified (28).

Paris Agreement – First Pledge Period As COP21 in Paris approached, the ratification of the Doha Amendment by enough states to make the second commitment period legally binding seemed bleak. 2015, at COP21, was the year targeted for the development of a new protocol to go into effect in 2020, the year the Doha Amendment would expire (21). Fortunately, the negotiators started the process a year early, at COP20 in Lima, Peru, by creating a draft negotiation text to be used at COP21 (29). Throughout the year between Lima and Paris, nations submitted proposals included each nation’s Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs). These proposals detailed the steps each country was willing to undergo to mitigate climate change. The idea was that these submissions would streamline negotiations in Paris by serving as a baseline for negotiations (30). For example, the United States aimed to reduce emissions by 26-28% based on the 2005 emissions year (31). However, even with these advancements, at least two issues needed to be resolved before the United States would sign the Paris Agreement: (1) would the Nationally Determined Contribution (NDCs) be legally binding? and (2) would China and India also be providing an NDC?

Legally Binding Character of the NDCs The first negotiation hurdle leading up to COP21 was whether the new protocol would be legally binding. Even after the signing of the Paris Agreement, it is not completely clear which portions of the Agreement are meant to be legally binding (32). In fact, Article 20 of the Paris Agreement states that States may express their consent to be bound by ratification, accession, acceptance, or approval (33). However, the biggest issue was whether the parties’ NDCs would be legally binding. Essentially, the biggest question was whether the NDCs would be binding on each state under international law, such that each party was required to meet a specific emissions target (32). 53

The United States would clearly not support any binding commitments. Despite signing the Kyoto Protocol, the United States never ratified it. Then President George W. Bush argued that the Kyoto Protocol’s “common but differentiated responsibilities” pushed the bulk of the cuts to the Annex 2 parties (34). Moreover, the U.S. Senate voted 95-0 that the Kyoto Protocol should never have even been signed (35). The European Union lobbied for legally binding NDCs to match the formulation of the legally binding commitments of the Kyoto Protocol and the second commitment period from the Doha Amendment (32). For example, the Kyoto Protocol states, “[t]he Parties shall … ensure that their aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions … do not exceed their assigned amounts … inscribed in Annex B” (4). The Doha Amendment, as its name suggests, only amends the Kyoto Protocol in a few places. Here, the Doha Amendment replaces the assigned amounts from Annex B with a new table that includes the second commitment period (27). The United States, China, and India rejected requiring conduct. Instead, the United States argued for procedural requirements relating to the NDCs, which might not require ratification by the Senate. Ultimately, the final text of the Paris Agreement differs starkly from the language in the Kyoto Protocol. The Paris Agreement uses softer language. In Article 4.1, the Paris Agreement sets out the “long-term” goal of stabilizing the global temperature rise and recognizing that “peaking” will take longer for developing nations. Article 4.2 states, “Each Party shall prepare, communicate and maintain successive nationally determined contributions that it intends to achieve.” Thus, Article 4.2 requires parties to undergo the procedural hurdles to create a NDC, but the wording does not require a party to actually achieve the NDC, but only one that it “intends to achieve” (33). Article 4 goes on to provide additional requirements of parties. While states are not required to commit to a particular NDC, Article 4 provides additional guidance on how the NDC should be selected by each party. Article 4.3 states, “Each Party’s successive nationally determined contribution will represent a progression beyond the Party’s then current nationally determined contribution and reflect its highest possible ambition, reflecting its common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities, in the light of different national circumstances.” Article 4.4 continues this theme and states that developed countries “should continue taking the lead” in mitigating anthropogenic climate change (33). The closest that the Paris Agreement gets to requiring domestic mitigation is found in Article 4.2, where it states that Parties shall pursue domestic mitigation but does not tie the mitigation to a particular NDC (33). Thus, the language of the Paris Agreement requires procedural steps but not a binding emission target. A Global Response The second concern was whether the entire world would be open to reducing GHG emissions. For the United States to sign the Paris Agreement, China and India needed to be involved. China and India did not have any binding reductions in GHG emissions under the Kyoto Protocol (4). However, GHG emissions 54

have risen steadily in China and India. In 1990, the base year calculation used by the Kyoto Protocol, the United States emitted, 5,000 million tons of CO2, representing 22% of the emissions of the world. The United States was also the highest emitter of CO2 per capita of the Annex 1 nations, emitting 19.6 tons per person. China, meanwhile, emitted 2,500 million tons of CO2 that year, which was more than every other Annex 1 party other than the United States. However, China’s per capita rate of emissions was only 2.1 tons per person, which was less than every other Annex 1 country (36). China’s per capita rate of CO2 emissions, its historical emission of GHG emissions, and the classification of its economy in 1990 as “developing,” ensured that China would not be required to commit to reductions under the common, but differentiated responsibility approach the UNFCCC adopted in the original framework treaty (3). However, in the past nearly 25 years, this situation has rapidly changed. By some measures, China is now the world’s largest economy due to rapid urbanization and modernization (37). As of 2013, China, which emitted 10.3 million tons, now leads the United States, which emitted 5.3 million tons, in total CO2 emissions. In fact, the United States emissions have been reduced from a high of 5.94 million tons in 2005. Additionally, while the United States retained the title of highest CO2 emitter per capita amongst the Annex 1 countries with 16.6 tons per person, China 7.4 tons per person is not far behind emitting 7.4 tons per person. China also surpasses the European Union, which only emits 7.3 tons per person. Over the past 23 years, the United States saw a 6% increase in total CO2 emissions and a 16% decrease in per capita CO2 emissions, while China saw a 312% increase in total CO2 emissions and a 246% increase in per capital CO2 emissions (36). Thus, the Bush Administration, with unanimous support from the 105th U.S. Senate, thought that the Kyoto Protocol would be an ineffective means of lowering GHG emissions since many developing nations would dwarf the emissions of the United States (34, 35). Even the Obama Administration was unwilling to commit or pledge GHG emissions reductions without similar actions by developing nations (14). This has proven partly true, as GHG emissions have continued to rise to an unprecedented level despite binding GHG emissions reductions under the Kyoto Protocol (8). However, even before COP21, the United States and China held bilateral talks to create an agreement upon which both parties could agree. In September 2014, the two sides announced a political agreement, in which the United States “intends” to lower its emissions by at least 26% of the 2005 levels by 2030, while China will seek to peak its CO2 emissions by 2030 and get at least 20% of its energy production from non-fossil fuel sources (38). Ultimately, China, India, the United States, and 172 other countries signed the Paris Agreement, indicating their intent to ratify it (39). Parties deposited their NDCs with the UNFCCC when each Party ratified the Paris Agreement. Each country released an INDC prior to COP21, where the final negotiations for the Paris Agreement took place. China’s INDC, stating it intends to peak its CO2 emissions by 2030, closely matches its targets set during the bilateral talks with the United States (40). Similarly, the United States reiterated its goals from the bilateral political agreement with China (38). Thus, the Paris Agreement represents a global effort to mitigate anthropogenic climate change, unlike the Kyoto Protocol and the Doha Amendment. As both China and 55

India have signaled that they will contribute to the mitigation efforts, the United States decided to sign the Paris Agreement.

Ratification As discussed above, the Paris Agreement requires procedural conduct, but it does not require Parties to commit to a particular emissions target. However, for these procedural steps to be binding on the parties, they must do more than simply sign the agreement, as 175 countries did in April 2016 (39). According to Article 20, the Agreement is subject to “ratification, acceptance, or approval by States.” Article 21 further states that the Paris Agreement will enter into force once “55 Parties to the Convention accounting for … 55 percent … of the total global greenhouse gas emissions have deposited their instruments of ratification, approval or accession” (33). “Ratification” is broadly used to cover all possible ways a party may indicate its intent to be bound by international law for the obligations in the Paris Agreement. As of October 2016, 81 of the 197 parties to the UNFCCC had ratified the Paris Agreement representing greater than 55% of the global GHG emissions. As such, the Paris Agreement is set to go into force on November 4, 2016 (41). In comparison, 4 years later, the Doha Amendment has still not been entered into force. It requires 144 parties to ratify the agreement, and as of October 2016, only 70 had done so (28). At this rate, it does not appear that the Doha Amendment will ever be entered into force because very few developed countries, which contribute the largest portion of GHG emissions, have ratified or accepted the Doha Amendment. China has agreed to the Doha Amendment, but it was not required to commit to any reductions in greenhouse gas emissions (27). When signing the Paris Agreement, both China and the United States – together representing almost 40% of the global GHG emissions - pledged to “ratify” the Paris Agreement by the end of the year (42, 43). Thus, ratification by these two countries would virtually ensure that the Paris Agreement will be entered into force. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) is the leading international agreement on the law of treaties. While the United States is not a ratifier of the VCLT, it acknowledges that it contains customary law, which is binding on the United States (44). In Article 2, the VCLT defines a treaty as “an international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by international law.” Article 2 further states “‘ratification’, ‘acceptance’, ‘approval’ and ‘accession’ mean in each case the international act so named whereby a State establishes on the international plane its consent to be bound by a treaty” (45). As such, the United States must establish that it intends to be bound by the Paris Agreement under international law through consent. The fact that the Paris Agreement is not entitled a “protocol” or a “treaty” does not indicate that it is not a treaty. In fact, virtually all of the participants indicated that the Paris Agreement would be a treaty (32). The United States has several options for ratifying an international treaty: (1) approval of an Article II treaty by the Senate, (2) Submission to Congress as an 56

executive agreement, or (3) by the President alone using existing treaty authority (46). According to the treaty clause of Article II of the U.S. Constitution, “[The President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur” (47). Thus, the President could submit the Paris Agreement directly to the Senate to ratify it. However, 70% of the Republican Senators, or 38 members, have denied anthropogenic climate change even exists (48). Thus, if the Paris Agreement was introduced in the Senate this year, it would be mathematically impossible to obtain the 2/3 majority needed to ratify it. A second option would be to submit the treaty for ex post approval by a statute from the entire Congress. This option requires a statute that specifically gives President Obama the authorization to accept the international obligations required by the Paris Agreement. While this option would not require a 2/3 majority, it would still require a majority vote in both the House of Representatives and the Senate (46). Unfortunately, the Republican party holds a majority in both the House of Representatives and the Senate (49). Thus, it would be unlikely for the Paris Agreement to be accepted under this option. A third option for the acceptance of the Paris Agreement would be for the President to accept the treaty using existing treaty authority. The United States ratified the UNFCCC, or treaty document 102-38, in 1992 with a 2/3 supermajority of the Senate (50). The UNFCCC already binds the United States to undertake mitigation efforts and subsequently report on these actions (46). Specifically Article 4, binds parties to “adopt national policies and take corresponding measures on the mitigation of climate change.” Article 4.2(b) further requires parties to communicate these efforts (4). In fact, a senior State Department official specifically mentioned the UNFCCC as the source of the President’s legal authority to enter into the Paris Agreement without submitting it to the Senate for approval (51). Republican members of Congress disagree that the President has the authority to accept the Paris Agreement without the consent of 2/3 of the Senate. In fact, Rep. Mike Kelly of Pennsylvania introduced a resolution in the House of Representatives with the support of 28 other Representatives that the President should submit the Paris Agreement to the Senate for approval (52). Sen. Mike Lee of Utah introduced a similar resolution in the Senate with the support of 30 other Senators (53). Others have agreed with these members of Congress and argued that the Paris Agreement is a treaty that should be submitted to the Senate for approval prior to ratification (54). Regardless, it seems clear that President Obama will accept the Paris Agreement using existing treaty authority under the previously ratified UNFCCC treaty (55). As such, on September 3, 2016, the United States formally entered the Paris Agreement with China (56). However, the legality of the President’s move is far from certain. Many members of Congress could try to challenge this move, but it might not be possible to challenge the President’s authority if acting under existing treaty authority (46). A more likely scenario is that a future president could attempt to withdraw from the Paris Agreement. According to Article 28.1 of the Paris Agreement, a Party may not withdraw from the treaty until three 57

years after the Agreement comes into force, with a one-year waiting period. The Agreement will not enter into force until the day after it is closed for signatures (April 21, 2017) (41). Thus, the incoming president could not withdraw from the treaty until at least 2021, well after the U.S. Presidential election of 2020. In fact, President-elect Trump has vowed to “cancel” the Paris Agreement some days and offered suggestions that he may be flexibile on the United States’s contribution on other days. While Trump can’t withdraw from the Paris Agreement until 2021, he could simply not fufill the obligations of the Paris Agreement with the only penalty the loss of international credibility (57).

From Doha to Paris I arrived in Doha in December, 2012. This was the year that history would be made. The Kyoto Protocol was set to expire in 2012, and the world was set to come together in Doha at COP18 to save the planet. Naively, I felt the energy and I believed it would happen. Unfortunately, like Copenhagen, the negotiators failed to achieve a binding treaty. As discussed previously, in Doha, the goal was to create an amendment to the Kyoto Protocol that reinforced the failed strategy of legally binding the developed world to commit to reduce GHG emissions. Even to this day, the Doha Amendment has not gained enough signatures to be entered into force. It never will. Leaving Doha, I was crushed. I did not believe that the United States would ever be a part of the mitigation effort for anthropogenic climate change. A well-funded anti-climate change movement had very successfully eviscerated any bipartisanship on the issue. Fortunately, President Obama and the United States shifted to a different strategy in Copenhagen. As such, the Paris Agreement is more similar to the Copenhagen Accord than to the Doha Amendment. Although other countries, such as the European Union, initially criticized this approach, this change in strategy can be credited with making the Paris Agreement possible. By tossing out binding commitments, more parties are willing to participate. More importantly, the United States, China, and India are all willing to accept an agreement that forces them to procedurally participate in the process. Each party may not be bound to a particular number as it was in the Kyoto Protocol, but at least these three important countries are materially participating. The participation of China, India, and the United States is critical, as CO2 levels have been quickly rising despite the best efforts from the parties to the Kyoto Protocol that were actually required to decrease GHG emissions. However, for the Paris Agreement to mean anything, the United States must lead. With the current political state of the Senate, President Obama could not simply submit the treaty to the Senate for ratification. It would be quickly rejected. Instead, the Paris Agreement was carefully drafted to fall within the obligations already ratified in the UNFCCC. Thus, President Obama was able to essentially cut the Senate out of the process and accept the agreement using existing treaty obligations. 58

The United States and China officially ratifying the Paris Agreement is an historic event. It marks the beginning of a global response to anthropogenic climate change. While I believe it is too late to prevent the Earth from rising 2°C (much less 1.5°C), this agreement will prevent a global catastrophe as long as the Parties continue to operate under this agreement in good faith for decades to come.

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Chapter 6

What About a Price on Carbon? Jessica McDonald* Nicholas School of the Environment, Duke University, 450 Research Dr., Durham, North Carolina 27708, United States *E-mail: [email protected].

Carbon pricing policies can encourage deep emissions cuts, accelerate innovation in clean energy technologies, and provide incentives for the growth of a low carbon economy. This chapter makes the economic case for carbon pricing policies and outlines the use of carbon pricing in the European Union, United States, and China. This chapter also highlights the political momentum toward the use of market mechanisms to support ambitious emissions reductions as seen in the lead up to and actions following the adoption of the Paris Agreement.

We Will Get This Done I tip-toed into the conference hall. My first mission of the morning was to grab a free coffee, and with my caffeine prize in hand, I settled into my seat. The room was silently buzzing as scientists, economists, and politicians found their way to the seating area as the clock rang 9:30. I secured a seat next to two of my peers from Duke University’s Nicholas School of the Environment, as seen in Figure 1. Even though we had yet to finish our respective coffees, the early morning hour did not curb our enthusiasm. The three of us were awarded scholarships to attend the annual National Conference on Science, Policy, and the Environment in Washington, DC. The theme of the annual conference when we attended in January 2015 was “Energy and Climate Change.” Since all three of us were pursuing our Masters Degrees in Environmental Management with a focus on energy and the environment, the theme fit well with our interests. The theme also resonated with me particularly strongly, as I had recently returned from Peru where I attended the second week of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change © 2017 American Chemical Society

(UNFCCC)’s 20th Conference of the Parties (COP20). My thoughts were still reeling from the annual UN climate conference, and I was yearning for more conversation on how emissions could be mitigated from the energy sector in order to prevent dangerous levels of warming. This morning of the conference was especially exciting, because the keynote speaker we were about to hear from is a renowned leader in climate action who has spearheaded the discussion on regulating greenhouse gas emissions both domestically and internationally. The crowd fell silent as she took the stage. Her Massachusetts accent was unmistakable, her message clear and strong. Gina McCarthy, Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), spoke about her determination and strategy to regulate carbon emissions in the United States. She stated that she has no doubt that we will regulate carbon dioxide emissions, and she reiterated that we “will get this done.”

Figure 1. Left to right: Alyssa Poirrier, April Christensen, Jessica McDonald (author). National Conference on Science, Policy, and the Environment, Washington, D.C., 2015. What exactly was she referring to when she said we will get this done? Well, her speech focused on new standards in the United States that target carbon emissions from existing coal-fired power plants under the authority of the Clean Air Act. Originally released on June 2, 2014 and finalized on August 3, 2015, the ruling, called the Clean Power Plan (CPP), is an historic set of rules that, if instituted, would put the United States on a trajectory to cut carbon approximately 30% in the power sector relative to 2005 emissions (1). The room erupted in applause. My friends and I looked at one another with gleaming smiles. In short, Gina McCarthey is an environmental hero for us young professionals looking to make an impact in the energy field. Instituting the CPP rules presents a huge national climate policy opportunity. It’s the cornerstone of the United States’ climate pledge under the Paris Agreement. However, even more importantly, it also presents an enormous economic opportunity for the United States. Every successful climate policy must have these two pillars in mind: the environment and the economy. 64

“How many tons or tonnes of carbon dioxide will this policy reduce by [insert date]?” is typically trumped in policy debates by the question, “How will this policy impact the economy?” The ambitiousness of emissions reductions is limited by the perceived negative economic costs nations and businesses are willing to absorb. Well, at least that was the status quo of climate policy understanding during the 1990s and most of the early 2000s. The tide is turning with current and emerging climate technologies and growing evidence that highlights the profitability of renewable energy and low-carbon projects. Acting on climate change does not have to stymy economic growth and can result in a stronger, more resilient economy. After hearing Gina McCarthy’s speech, I thought back to my experience at the UN climate conference in Lima. I attended COP20 as one of eight student delegates for the American Chemical Society during my first year in graduate school at Duke University. During the conference, I thrived in the fast-paced, high-level policy atmosphere. I interviewed the national delegation from Madagascar, participated in several events focused on gender equality and climate change, and even spoke with the Prime Minister of Togo. I left the conference with the goal to better understand the public policies shaping the international climate discourse. From my academic coursework in graduate school, I engaged in discussions regarding the economics of natural resource management and climate change. I learned about the public policy tools we can leverage to cut emissions. There was one kind of policy that came up time and time again: carbon pricing. My support for market mechanisms as a central pillar to combat climate emissions deepened while I worked for the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) in Geneva, Switzerland as part of a Duke Program to study public policy and global environmental governance. I researched the emergence of carbon pricing policies around the globe and closely followed the discussion of markets in the development of the Paris Agreement. My work for ICTSD continued during my second year at Duke and complemented my participation in a unique annually held Practicum that teaches students about the climate negotiations and the structure of the UNFCCC. Through this Practicum, I traveled to Paris to attend COP21 as part of ICTSD’s climate negotiations team. It was our responsibility to track changes in the negotiating text, in particular references to the use of market mechanisms. While carbon pricing is not explicitly mentioned in the Paris Agreement, language referring to the use of market mechanisms to curb emissions was agreed upon on the final day of negotiations. Referred to as “cooperative approaches,” this language on markets could encourage the future linking of carbon market schemes (2). There remains a significant amount of uncertainty regarding the formation of these linked carbon markets around the globe. However, the message is clear that market mechanisms and carbon pricing are essential to implementing the new Agreement. If designed correctly, carbon pricing is a triple dividend. It’s good for people and the environment, it raises revenue efficiently, and it spurs private sector innovation needed to invest in clean and low-carbon technologies (3). 65

I support the potential of markets to provide tangible emissions reductions in a cost-effective manner, and there are a number of lessons that can be learned from countries around the world that have been experimenting with pricing systems. This chapter provides a high-level snapshot of the economic argument for establishing carbon pricing policies, reviews current carbon pricing schemes in key emitter countries, and outlines the political momentum for carbon pricing that has surfaced in recent years.

Externalities In its most skeletal form, economic theory tells us how to most efficiently price goods and services to produce an outcome that is socially optimal. One aspect of the theory teaches us about how to deal with externalities. An externality can be either positive or negative, and it occurs when an action impacts a third party that is not directly involved in an economic transaction (4). For example, when I was a student at Duke, my roommate was an avid environmentalist who walked to campus instead of driving. This is a positive externality, because her decision benefited others by reducing congestion on the roads and by reducing pollution. On the other hand, when I was late and rushing to campus, I would hop in my car and drive. My decision to drive resulted in a negative externality for society. I contributed to local air pollution and to global emissions driving climate change, pun intended. These negative externalities are one kind of market failure in the eyes of economists. As stated by economist Nicholas Stern, climate change is the “greatest market failure the world has ever seen” (5). Those who produce greenhouse gases are imposing huge costs on other people around the world and on future generations. The costs of emitting carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases are not truly reflected in the costs emitters pay. The costs are borne by society through public health costs and the costs that accrue through the impacts of climate change, including temperature and sea level rise, and the devastating effects of extreme weather events, among many others. If climate change goes unmitigated, the economic costs of inaction will reshape the global economy by reducing average global incomes approximately 23% by 2100 and widening global inequality (6). The costs of acting on climate now far outweigh the costs we will face as a global society if we fail to mitigate emissions. We must implement policies to curb emissions and we must do so quickly. In the United States, net mitigation costs could increase, on average, 40% for each decade of delay on hitting a specified climate target, according to a report released by the White House Council of Economic Advisers in 2014 (7). Thus, we need to account for the external costs of carbon in our decision-making, which can help correct the economic market failure of externalities. However, there is another economic issue with mitigating emissions and tackling climate change. We’re facing the challenges inherent to global public goods. 66

One Jurisdiction at a Time We all enjoy using the climate. The climate includes our atmosphere, biosphere, hydrosphere, geosphere, and cryosphere. However, the state of the climate is the product of everyone’s behavior. The climate is a public good, because it meets the two properties of non-rivalry and non-excludability (8). This means that consumption of a good does not reduce the quantity available to others, and it is impossible to prevent anyone from consuming the good. However, the climate falls into a particular category of a public good: a global public good. The impacts of climate change affect the entire globe and will affect generations yet to come (9). A distinguishing factor of a global public good is that it involves “stock externalities” (8). In the case of carbon dioxide emissions, every tonne of carbon dioxide emitted in the United States is equivalent to a tonne of carbon dioxide emitted elsewhere in the world, whether it be in China, Indonesia, Germany, Nigeria, or Antarctica. The colorless carbon dioxide in the atmosphere mixes and accumulates. Unbeknownst to generations before us, our atmosphere turned into a free carbon dioxide disposal site. With the growing scientific understanding of the Earth’s linked natural systems, we now know that there is a long-lasting consequence of increasing the concentration of carbon in the atmosphere. Tackling the global public goods challenge requires international collective action. Building the necessary frameworks for international collective action in order to stay within our carbon budget is a complex and multifaceted issue. Elinor Ostrom researched the issues of the global commons and collective action and won the 2009 Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences. Ostrom won the Nobel Prize for her groundbreaking research that demonstrated how common resources can be successfully managed at the local level. She is the first woman to win the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences, and she was also listed in Time Magazine as one of the world’s most influential people in 2012 – the same year she passed away (10). I recommend watching her Prize Lecture on the Nobel Prize website (10). In her paper, “A Polycentric Approach for Coping with Climate Change,” Ostrom argues that a single government unit is incapable of solving a global collective action problem like climate change because of free-rider problems (11). Free-riding occurs when an actor receives the benefits of a public good without contributing to the costs. In the case of international climate action, countries have the incentive to rely on others mitigation actions. For instance, when the United States pays for new technologies to cut carbon emissions, the benefit of these actions is global. Thus, other countries are less inclined to cut their own emissions, because they can “free-ride” off of the United States’ emissions cuts. Free-riding is problematic in these instances where the costs are concentrated and the benefits disperse (12). In order to overcome the free-rider challenge, Ostrom recommends a multi-tiered approach to governance with interlinked actions at the local, regional, and national levels (11). This layered approach to climate action would build commitment and trust between actors through a comprehensive monitoring and information-sharing framework. The challenge of how best to establish these linkages with a robust monitoring system has not yet been solved, 67

but I believe that Ostrom’s vision for a polycentric, joint-policy cooperative approach to climate governance is slowly coming to fruition. At the international level, the Paris Agreement sets forth a framework for countries to submit national climate action plans. These plans link international climate goals to bottom-up climate and energy policy approaches in 190 countries (13). As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the Agreement also establishes a hook for the use of cooperative approaches among jurisdictions, including through the use of “internationally transferred mitigation outcomes,” ITMOs for short (14). The definition of what actions can be counted as ITMOs is still under consideration by the UN. Nonetheless, this is a compelling sign for the more than 90 developed and developing countries that indicated plans to use international, regional, or national carbon pricing mechanisms for mitigating greenhouse gas emissions (15). It may take a decade or more before substantial cooperative approaches with carbon pricing systems are established. However, we need to take this step by step. The first step is for jurisdictions to create carbon pricing policies. The momentum towards carbon pricing can be seen in recent statistics released by the World Bank. According to the World Bank’s “Carbon Pricing Watch 2016” report, in 2016 approximately 40 national jurisdictions and more than 20 cities, states, and regions—together representing almost a quarter of global greenhouse gas emissions—are putting a price on carbon (16). Furthermore, the number of carbon pricing instruments already implemented or scheduled for implementation has nearly doubled since 2012 (17). Polluter Pays Principle Pricing carbon is a policy mechanism that corrects the carbon externality market failure by shifting the burden of the damages of climate change back to those who are responsible. The benefits of carbon pricing are twofold. For governments, carbon pricing is an economically driven mechanism to achieve emissions reductions while also generating revenue (18). Businesses, on the other hand, use an internal carbon price to identify the impacts on their operations under a mandatory carbon price. This allows a business to identify opportunities to mitigate risks in a future carbon-priced world. The topic of carbon pricing thus brings together two groups of stakeholders—the private sector and national/subnational governments—that have spoken in favor of climate action but have rarely historically worked together. Putting a price on carbon effectively ties together economic self-interest and the interests of our planet. Polluters can decide for themselves if they want to stop their polluting actions, pay for measures to reduce emissions, or continue polluting and pay for it (19). To Cap or Tax There are two common instruments used to price carbon. Firstly, a carbon tax directly puts a price on carbon. This tax can be defined by a tax rate on greenhouse gas emissions or even a tax rate on the carbon content of certain fuels—particularly 68

carbon-heavy fuels like coal and oil. It is important to note that a carbon tax does not guarantee a certain quantity of emissions reductions. The second popular instrument for carbon pricing is an emissions trading system (ETS). These systems are also referred to as cap-and-trade systems, and they set a cap on the total level of greenhouse gas emissions permitted. Industries with low emissions have the flexibility to sell their extra allowances to the larger emitters. This creates a market price for carbon through the buying and selling of allowances. Any company that does not fulfill their compliance obligations under the ETS is typically penalized by a regulator. The benefit of an ETS is that it is more likely to ensure that the aggregate required emissions reductions occur. The similarities of a carbon tax versus an ETS outweigh their differences, as both a well-designed carbon tax and ETS incentivize industries to invest in measures that result in cost-effective emissions reductions (20). The stringency of both instruments is critical, and thus the success of either a carbon tax or ETS boils down to its design. Policymakers and economists have not settled all questions regarding carbon pricing instruments, but the message now is louder than ever that the use of these tools is essential to raising the global ambition of emissions reductions. As World Bank Group President Jim Yong Kim said in April 2016, “The most direct and certain path to reduce carbon emissions is to put a price on them, so that carbon pollution becomes an operating cost, and incentives are created to push forward with greener technologies and solutions” (21).

Carbon Pricing Around the World European Union: Getting the Price Right The EU established the world’s first major emissions trading system (EU ETS) in 2005 and is currently the world’s largest carbon market. The EU ETS operates in 31 countries (all 28 EU countries, as well as Iceland, Liechtenstein, and Norway) using a cap-and-trade system. It covers around 45% of the EU’s greenhouse gas emissions and limits emissions from more than 11,000 energy-intense industries including power stations and industrial plants (22). It also covers airline emissions when a flight takes off in the region and lands in another country included under the scheme. The success of emissions reductions under the EU ETS is critical in order for the EU to reach its emissions reduction target to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by at least 40% domestically by 2030 from 1990 levels (23). The system was executed in several phases in order to allow for flexibility as the EU experimented with the design of the system. The EU ETS is currently in the middle of its third phase, which started in 2013 and will remain in place until 2020 (24). Due to the design of the EU ETS in the first two phases and the 2008 recession, the EU ETS is facing challenges with an oversupply of allowances and credits for emissions reductions that, at times, even exceeded total emissions. Thus, since the price of carbon is set by the market, the price of the allowances has been historically lower than anticipated (25). This means that there is not a strong incentive for businesses to reduce their emissions. 69

The design of phase three is considerably different from the rules in the first two phases in the attempt to raise the low carbon price set by the market. For instance, there is now a single, EU-wide cap on the number of emissions allowances. Each allowance gives the holder the right to emit either one tonne of carbon dioxide, or the equivalent amount of two more powerful gases including nitrous oxide (N2O) or perfluorocarbons (PFCs). In 2013, the cap for emissions from installations was set at approximately 2 billion allowances. This cap then decreases each year by a linear factor of 1.74% of the average total number of allowances issued each year from 2008-2012. According to the European Commission, this equates to a reduction of 38,264,246 allowances each year. Ultimately, this means that the number of allowances, and thus the level of emissions from businesses covered in the scheme, will be 21% lower in 2020 than in 2005 (26). However, even with this annually decreasing cap, emissions are not decreasing at a rate sufficient enough for the EU to reach its climate target. In 2014, the EU proposed a new mechanism to handle the surplus of allowances in the ETS in order to increase the carbon price and incentivize greater mitigation actions. The mechanism, called the Market Stability Reserve (MSR), will remove excess emissions allowances based on a set of “trigger” thresholds and place them into a reserve, and thus out of the market (27). The mechanism will also be equipped to feed allowances back into the system when there are too few. This new element of the EU ETS will be operational by 2019 (28). Moreover, in 2015, the European Commission presented a legislative proposal to revise the EU ETS design for its fourth phase starting in 2021. One central element of the reform is to increase the annual linear reduction of allowances by 2.2%, compared to the current 1.74% (29). The reform also outlines new rules for the allocation of free allowances to high-emitting industries in order to combat concerns regarding carbon leakage. Carbon leakage occurs when industries move to another country that has less stringent greenhouse gas regulations, thus impacting the competitiveness of European industries. These concerns are addressed in the reforms, and these structural changes to the EU ETS will be considered in the plenary in February 2017 (30). However, after more than a year of negotiations, EU member state environment ministers failed to find common ground on the reform in December 2016 (31). The EU ETS has certainly experienced some growing pains. However, the lessons learned by the EU ETS can be incorporated into the design of other emissions trading schemes. The creation of the MSR and the reforms to the EU ETS will help to ensure greater emissions reductions as the emissions cap decreases and the carbon price, hopefully, increases. China: Building from Pilots In 2017, China may surpass the EU and establish the world’s largest ETS. It is predicted that China’s ETS could set a cap twice the size of the EU’s—that would be approximately 4 billion allowances (32). President Xi first announced the possibility of a national ETS in September 2015. China’s State Council must approve the plans. In December 2016, China’s State Council reportedly approved 70

an overall cap on carbon emissions for 7,000 companies covered under the emerging scheme (33). The design of the national ETS has not been finalized, but a notice circulated in January 2016 outlines the possible sectors and subsectors that will be covered by this scheme. These sectors include power, petrochemicals, chemicals, iron and steel, non-ferrous metals, building production and materials, pulp and paper, and aviation (34). This announcement builds on the several years of emissions trading experience in China since the creation of seven ETS pilot systems in 2011. The seven pilots cover a total of five cities and two provinces. Since the end of July 2015, some 57 million tonnes of carbon have been traded under the pilots (32). Each pilot was designed and managed at the local level, which means that each was operating under a variety of rules for a number of design elements including the overall emissions reduction target, the sectors covered, and how allowances were distributed, among others. Since each pilot was run individually, the result was seven different carbon prices (35). While it is certainly going to be challenging, the national ETS will harmonize the rules between all regions. This is a significant step forward for the world’s largest emitter to utilize market mechanisms to reduce domestic emissions. A national ETS is one of several policies China will put in place in order to meet its Paris pledge to reduce carbon emissions intensity by 60 to 65 percent by 2030 (36). China’s announcement on its national ETS was part of the U.S. and China’s Joint Presidential Statement on Climate Change made in 2015. In the statement, the United States also called attention to its historic plan to reduce emissions from the power sector: the Clean Power Plan (37). United States: Trading Ready If the Clean Power Plan (CPP) is implemented in the U.S., all states will have to comply with carbon dioxide emissions regulations in the power sector for already existing coal-fired power plants. This is, in the words of Barack Obama, the “biggest step” the United States has ever taken to reduce carbon pollution (38). In 2015, carbon dioxide emissions from the power sector in the United States were responsible for 37% of total U.S. energy-related emissions (39). The rules rely on the 1970 Clean Air Act, which requires the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to reduce air pollution that harms public health. Carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases were deemed by the EPA in a 2009 ruling to be a danger to both public health and welfare for current and future generations (40). An in-depth analysis of the CPP shows that emissions of fine particulates and ozone pollution from power plants, including sulfur dioxide and nitrogen oxides, will decrease substantially under the ruling. The estimated health benefits are enormous. According to the EPA, the CPP could prevent up to 3,600 deaths, 1,700 heart attacks, 90,000 asthma attacks, and 300,000 missed work and school days per year by 2030. Together, these carry a value ranging from $12 billion to $34 billion (41, 42). Most importantly, the 47 states under the ruling have a menu of climate actions to choose from in order to meet their targets. Emissions reductions targets differ across states, because each state has a unique electricity-generation mix 71

(43). States can invest in renewable energy, nuclear energy, increase the efficiency of energy production, implement energy-efficiency programs, and even join together in multi-state or regional agreements to find the lowest-cost options for achieving emissions reductions. The option even exists for states to implement emissions-trading programs. The rule is scheduled to take effect in 2022 and would ensure that the power sector reduces climate pollution 32% below 2005 emissions levels by 2030 (44). The outlook for renewable energy under the ruling is extremely positive. It is expected that the rule will contribute to a national electricity mix containing 28% renewable energy by 2030 (45). All states must submit an action plan outlining their “best system of emission reductions (BSER),” and if a state does not submit a plan, then a federal plan will automatically be put in place. The federal plan contains the same elements that state plans are required to include (46). The EPA is also working on creating model trading rules for states in order to make it easy for states and power plants to engage in emissions trading. The ruling stated that states should submit their final plans by September 2016, or an initial plan with a request for an extension until no later than September 2018 (44). Unfortunately, as of August 2016, the CPP remained deadlocked in the court system. While the benefits of the CPP outweigh the costs, many states are fighting back against the ruling and fighting hard. Nearly half of all states, 24 total, are suing the EPA in the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. These states include Texas, Alabama, New Jersey, West Virgina, and Wyoming, among others (47). They claim that the federal government does not have the authority to regulate states’ carbon emissions under the Clean Air Act, and thus, they deem the ruling unconstitutional. It is no surprise that these states also have the strong support of the coal industry and some electric utilities. In late January 2016, the D.C. Circuit denied the stay motions, which was a good sign for the continuation of the CPP ruling. However, in February 2016, those suing took the motion to the Supreme Court even though the lower court had not yet ruled on the legal merits of the case. Shockingly, the Supreme Court issued a 5-4 order in which it stayed the implementation of the CPP (48). This means the Supreme Court hit pause on the CPP until the lower courts—in this case the D.C. Circuit—determine the rules validity. Some observers suggested that this ruling hinted at a majority of the court doubting whether the EPA has the authority to impose the CPP under the Clean Air Act. The case was heard by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit in late September 2016 (49). A decision by the court is expected to take months. However, the losing side can then take the decision back to review by the Supreme Court (50). This then adds in an additional element of nail-biting uncertainty. Days after this Supreme Court ruling in February, Justice Scalia passed away. His seat has not been filled due to unprecedented pushback from Republicans in the Senate against Obama’s nominated judge (51). If the Supreme Court hears the case with eight justices and there is a 4-4 decision, then the case would revert to the decision of the lower court (52). It is extremely likely that whomever loses in the D.C. Circuit ruling will appeal back 72

to the Supreme Court. Looking ahead to 2017, the seat will be filled by President Donald Trump’s administration. It is in the best interests of our health and planet for there to be a ninth justice on the Court who understands the science of climate change and the urgency with which we must act.

Momentum for Carbon Pricing Momentum for, and interest in, carbon pricing has risen exponentially since 2014. The EU, China, and the U.S. are only three of the almost 40 national jurisdictions that are implementing or planning to implement carbon policies that leverage markets to price carbon and decrease emissions (16). When I went to Lima for the UN Climate Conference, I was expecting to hear political announcements in support of carbon pricing and the use of market mechanisms to catalyze clean energy markets. I was optimistic because of the news from the UN Climate Summit held in New York City in September 2014. During the COP, there were several strong declarations from government leaders and the private sector in support of carbon pricing policies. For instance, 74 national governments, 11 regional governments, and more than 1,000 businesses and investors signaled their support for putting a price on carbon (53). Furthermore, during the summit, government and business leaders decided to form a landmark Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition (CPLC). While the topic of carbon pricing did not rise to the surface during the Lima negotiations, it was a central point of the discussions leading up to and during the Paris Climate Summit in 2015. Coalition Launch In 2015, carbon pricing was elevated to the international discussion in the lead up to COP21 in Paris. This level of government support for market mechanisms was reflected in an announcement made by the World Bank Group and International Monetary Fund (IMF) with the support of the Organisation of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in October 2015. The World Bank Group and the IMF established a Carbon Pricing Panel to spur political discussion around carbon pricing. The members of the Panel are viewed as global leaders in establishing and implementing carbon pricing policies. Members of the panel included political leaders from Germany, Chile, France, Ethiopia, Philippines, Mexico, California, and Rio de Janeiro (54). These leaders called on others to join them to increase the weight of government voices calling for carbon pricing. The panel is one of two central pillars of the World Bank Group’s strategy to enhance and accelerate carbon pricing worldwide. The other pillar is the CPLC, which was first announced in 2014 and launched on the opening day of the Paris Climate Summit. During the launch, the Coalition had the support of 21 governments and more than 90 strategic partners from the private sector and civil society (55). The governments supporting the CPLC during the launch at COP21 are outlined in Table 1. 73

Table 1. Government Support for Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition Government Supporters at COP21 Alberta

Belgium

British Colombia

California

Canada

Chile

Ethiopia

France

Germany

Italy

Kazakhstan

Mexico

Morocco

Netherlands

Norway

Switzerland

Norway

Ontario

Quebec

Spain

Sweden

The goal of the coalition is to help advance effective and well-designed carbon pricing systems around the world. The work plan of the coalition was also released during the launch, and it outlines three main objectives of the coalition that will enable the establishment of strong, well-designed carbon markets for national and sub-national governments around the world. Firstly, the coalition aims to help government and business leaders build the evidence base for implementing successful carbon pricing schemes. This means capturing best practices and lessons from partners such as EU countries that have experience with the EU ETS. Secondly, the coalition aims to mobilize ambitious private sector support. Lastly, it establishes a framework for constructive dialogue between countries. These Leadership Dialogues are expected to take place in Chile, Mexico, Germany, and India (56). This knowledge and best practices sharing platform is what governments need to develop comprehensive and successful policies. Link to Business Similarly to governments, carbon pricing is a high priority for businesses. The Carbon Disclosure Project (CDP) found that 435 companies from around the globe reported using an internal price on carbon in 2015. This number was only reported as 150 in 2014. Even more shocking is that 1000+ companies are now disclosing to their stakeholders that they are pricing, or plan to price in the next two years, their carbon emissions in order to understand the risks to operations due to climate change (57). On July 15, 2016, the largest number of companies, almost 20, joined the CPLC at the same time. All of the companies that recently joined are Canadian businesses (58). Raising the Bar The use, or planned use, of carbon pricing policies is increasing worldwide, and the Paris Agreement embraces the use of cooperative approaches that encourage the linking of market approaches across jurisdictions. This signals to a future where carbon pricing could be an integrated and integral part of our global fight to combat climate change. Since 2015, four new carbon pricing initiatives have been implemented or are scheduled for implementation, as identified by the World Bank Group. The Republic of Korea, British Columbia, and Australia introduced emissions trading 74

schemes. Portugal created a carbon tax that entered into force covering all energy products in non-EU ETS sectors. Furthermore, Canada has made significant strides in carbon pricing. In the near future, more than 85% of Canadians will live in jurisdictions with an existing or planned carbon pricing system (59). However, more action is required. Despite the current momentum towards pricing carbon, only 12% of greenhouse gas emissions are currently covered by carbon prices. That is why the High Level Panel on Carbon Pricing released a vision statement on April 21, 2016—the same day the Paris Agreement was first unveiled for signatures. The vision statement outlines a carbon pricing goal to double the percentage of emissions covered by explicit carbon prices to 25% by 2020 and to 50% before 2030 (60). Three pathways were identified to reach these targets including: 1. Broadening carbon pricing in jurisdictions and sectors; 2. Deepening carbon pricing by increasing ambition in places it already exists; and 3. Enhancing cooperation by both facilitating and promoting the alignment of carbon pricing programs (59). The process of establishing jurisdictional carbon pricing mechanisms that encourage true emissions cuts, accelerate innovation in clean technology, provide incentives for the growth of the green economy, and minimize carbon-leakage or competitiveness concerns is going to take trial and error. The good news is that governments are already learning from those who acted first to create markets that reflect the true cost of carbon on society. If we can build on this carbon pricing momentum then I, too, believe that we will get this done.

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Chapter 7

Global Implementation of Renewable Energy Barry Hartweg* Baylor University, 1301 University Parks Dr., Waco, Texas 76798, United States *E-mail: [email protected].

Effort is being made to use renewable energy in place of fossil fuels on an international level. The Conference of Parties meetings have helped set a framework to encourage renewable energy use. Every country will need to have a customized approach in order to effectively implement renewable energy internationally. Industrialized nations such as the European Union, oil-exporting countries such as Saudi Arabia, and developing nations such as Cambodia all need different methods in order to phase out fossil fuels.

Introduction The largest source of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is from our energy supply, which produces 26% of global GHG emissions (1). Transitioning to renewable energy is one of the most viable options we have to curb our GHG emissions from the energy sector; however, the task of implementing renewable energy on a global scale is much easier said than done. I had the amazing opportunity to travel to the 20th Conference of Parties (COP20) for the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in Lima, Peru in December 2014. The COP20 consisted of negotiations among delegates from all Parties to the UNFCCC, specficially focusing on forming the anticipated Paris Agreement that would be signed at the following COP21 in Paris. At the conference, if one solely focused on the negotiation among Party delegates, it would be easy to be discouraged by the lack of progress. However, the conference was so much more than detailed neogiations. From the daily “Fossil of the Day” presentation, animated protests, and the impassioned speakers, it was clear that there was a global interest in combatting climate change. © 2017 American Chemical Society

My main focus at the COP20 was to learn about current efforts to implement renewable energy. I attended talks from a variety of Parties, such as Japan, Indonesia, the European Union (EU), various African nations, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), and Peru, among others. I spoke with many people from a diverse range of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and governmental institutions. These organizations and Parties both discussed how they are working to incorporate the use of renewable energy sources on a global scale, thereby reducing global GHG emissions. These discussions alongside my participation in the COP20 led me to conclude that there is no “one size fits all” solution to promote global adoption of renewable energy. The various discusions gave me a greater appreciation of how complex the switch to renewable energy will be. Developing nations such as India, Cambodia, Indonesia, Peru, and Rwanda are focused on more basic needs such as providing clean water, expanding power grids to reach rural areas, improving healthcare, etc. It is particularly difficult for these countries to focus their efforts and money on developing renewable energy projects. On the other hand, industrialized nations like the United States, the EU, Japan, and Canada are in a much better position financially to make a transition to renewable energy, but they still have unique challenges of their own as they work to successfully phase out fossil fuels.

Kyoto Protocol The Kyoto Protocol highlights the difference between industrialized and developing nations by completely separating their responsibilities for reducing carbon emissions. This treaty uses the convention’s designation of the Parties to help assign emission reduction targets. The designations are Annex I, Annex II, Non-Annex I, and Least-Developed Countries (LDCs). Annex I Parties are made up of industrialized nations that were a part of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), and countries with economies in transition (EIT Parties) such as the Russian Federation and Eastern European countries. Annex II includes the OECD members but excludes the EIT Parties. Non-Annex I and LDCs are mostly developing nations. The Kyoto Protocol legally binds the Annex I and Annex II Parties to GHG emission reduction targets. Annex II Parties are required to give financial aid to help developing countries reduce their GHGs, while Annex I Parties are not required to financially aid developing nations. Non-Annex I and LDCs are not bound to any GHG emission reduction targets (2). A total of 192 Parties ratified the Kyoto Protocol, with the United States as the most the most notable Party in a small number of Parties to abstain. The first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol started in 2008 and ended in 2012. Under this commitment period, industrialized Parties commited to reduce their GHG emissions by an average of 4% below their 1990 GHG emission levels. For these Parties, the protocol was quite successful as they surpassed their emission reduction targets by 24%. Unfortunately, it was not successful in reducing GHG emissions globally (3). Just before the first commitment period was over, the Doha Amendment was adopted in 2012, which provids a second commitment period 82

that started in 2013 and ends in 2020. Currently, 74 Parties have ratified this amendment to the Kyoto Protocol (4). While the Kyoto Protocol has been instrumental in taking steps towards a low carbon future, ultimately it has failed to reduce GHG emissions on a global scale in the first commitment period. This failure is largely due to the division of emission reduction resposnibilities. It is reasonable that industrialized Parties should have the most ambitious GHG reduction targets, as they have the financial and technological resources to achieve these goals. Moreover, industrialized nations are more primed to provide aid to developing nations that cannot allocate their own resources toward renewable energy projects. Unfortunately, GHG emission data proves that developing nations should also be held accountable for the emission reduction effort. According to the World Resources Institute, five out of the top ten worst GHG-emitting countries between 1990 and 2011 are considered Non-Annex I Parties by the Kyoto Protocol. These five countries alone made 30% of the global GHG emissions during that time period (5). It has been largely recognized that developing nations need to be held accountable for their GHG emission. This realization led to the Paris agreement, a new international agreement that addresses climate change mitigation and adaption.

Paris Agreement One of the main goals of the Paris Agreement is to hold the warming of the planet “well below” 2°C above the global average temperature. Other important goals include peaking GHG emissions as soon as possible and achieving net-zero emissions in the second half of the century. The Paris Agreement requires climate change mitigation efforts of all Parties, instead of holding only Annex I and Annex II countries to reduce GHG emissions, as the Kyoto Protocol does. Each party must submit intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs) that identify their reduction targets and their plans to reach that goal. These INDCs must be revised at least once every five years to ensure ambitious emission reduction targets (6). Compared to the Kyoto Protocol, the Paris Agreement is more focused on the process of determining targets and holding Parties accountable, as opposed to achieving strict quantified emission reduction goals. This attribute of change promotes global responsibility of mitigating climate change, while simultaneously allowing Parties the freedom to develop their own goals that suit their unique situtations politically, geographically, economically, etc.

Industrialized Nations The EU has been quite successful in terms of their GHG emission reduction. In 2014, the GHG emissions for the collective 28 EU countries (EU-28) were reduced to 22.9% below their 1990 levels, which has already surpassed their 2020 goal to reduce their GHG emissions to 20% below their 1990 levels (7). In order to continue to achieve such a high level of success, the EU has set up clear goals for renewable energy use, national action plans for each country, and mechanisms to allow cooperation among EU countries. 83

In 2009, the EU published the Renewable Energy Directive with the binding goal of producing 20% of their energy from renewable sources by 2020 and at least 27% by 2030 (8). These targets permit flexibility for countries as there are not strict targets for what source of renewable energy is to be used or how much emission reduction needs to come from each country. This freedom allows for each country to leverage resources most efficient for them. For instance, Spain has a high potential for solar energy, especially in the southern part of the country, while Denmark has a high potential for wind energy due to the strong winds from the North Sea (9). Through the Renewable Energy Directive, each country is required to submit a renewable energy national action plan. These plans include detailed targets for various energy sectors, a list of the different renewable technologies planned to be used, policies to be used to achieve their target, and any anticipated coordination with other countries, such as joint projects. Requiring the submission of these plans is essential, as it forces each country to develop concrete and realistic ideas for how they can implement renewable energy into their energy mix. There is no requirement for exactly how much each country must contribute, as long as the EU as a whole has at least 20% of its energy supply produced by renewables by 2020. For example, Malta is a small, fairly isolated island nation with limited access to renewable resources, so it makes sense that they would only plan to have renewables contribute 10% of their energy consumption by 2020. Whereas Sweden, for example, is already quite progressive and fairly wealthy with renewable resources, and they will help make up the difference by planning to produce 59% of their energy from renewable sources by 2020 (10). Those countries that choose to contribute more than their share can compensate for those countries that cannot without making substantial sacrifices. The mechanisms set up by the Renewable Energy Directive also permits cooperation and coordination to permit the transfer of renewable resources from resource-rich countries to resource-poor countries. These mechanisms include statistical transfers of renewable energy, joint renewable energy projects, and joint renewable energy support schemes. A statistical transfer allows countries to deduct an amount of renewable energy from their progress and add it to another country’s progress for their renewable energy target. Through this transfer, no energy is physically exchanged; this encourages countries to exceed their target to receive payment. Joint projects encourage the EU countries to work together to develop and implement a renewable energy project, enabling each participating country to earn renewable energy credits to help meet their target. Joint support schemes let EU countries co-develop renewable energy incentive policies such as a common feed-in tariff, a common quota, or a certificate trading regime (11). These mechanisms are a great way to encourage the development of new renewable energy projects. This cooperation is especially helpful for countries who lack the renewable and/or financial resources to develop. There is a lot to learn from the EU-28 with regard to implementing renewables and ultimately reducing GHG emissions, as they have already achieved a high level of success. A coherent plan is in place that requires nations to submit detailed action plans for how they plan to implement renewable energy into their energy mix without requiring each nation to achieve a pre-determined percentage 84

of renewable energy. The plan gives each country the ability to determine how ambitious to be and what types of renewable energy to use. The Renewable Energy Directive also provides the opportunity for countries to collaborate with other countries, allowing ambitious countries to aid those countries that may have difficulty in achieving their targets alone.

GCC Countries While at COP20, I took a particular interest with the GCC countries, which include Middle Eastern countries like Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, etc. A majority of their talks pertained to energy issues faced within the area. In addition to talking about renewable energy projects, I found it interesting to observe how countries are working to mitigate climate change when their main source of revenue is from oil and gas. In particular, I was impressed with current efforts to construct a solar panel research, development, and manufacturing complex in Saudi Arabia. Under the UNFCCC, all of the GCC countries are listed as Non-Annex I Parties, meaning they are not legally bound to any GHG emission reduction targets under the Kyoto Protocol. Between 1990 and 2008, CO2 emissions in Saudi Arabia from fossil fuels rose by over 200% and continue to rise (12, 13). Under the Kyoto Protocol, Saudi Arabia’s efforts to mitigate climate change have been largely inadequate. Days after the Paris Agreement was opened for signing Saudi Arabia announced a plan called Vision 2030. This plan covers a wide spectrum of issues, but one of the main goals is to grow Saudi Arabia’s economy by “investing for the long-term.” Vision 2030 sets out to diversify Saudi Arabia’s economy beyond oil and gas, which includes the development of its renewable energy sector (14, 15). Through Vision 2030, Saudi Arabia plans to raise their share of non-oil exports from 16% of their GDP to 50% by investing in a variety of different industries, including retail and mining. This effort to diversify is encouraging, as it shows they are beginning to recognize that an economy based on oil is neither sustainable for the planet nor their economy. However, this does not mean that Saudi Arabia seeks to slow down the production of oil and gas. In fact, the Vision 2030 plan claims that Saudi Arabia will double their gas production and build a new gas distribution network (16). One particularly exciting project is Saudi Arabia’s plan to develop a stronger renewable energy market, in which their goal is to be a center for research, development, and manufacturing of renewable energy. Due to Saudi Arabia’s large resources of raw input materials for renewable projects (e.g. silica and petrochemicals), they plan to localize production of materials for these projects. Their goal is to generate 9.5 GW of renewable power (roughly 10% of their energy mix) by 2030. While at first glance this may seem like an ambitious target, it will only make a fairly small dent in their energy mix, as Saudi Arabia’s energy consumption is expected to triple by 2030, Saudi Arabia’s Energy Minister, Khalid Al-Falih, has said “Our energy mix has shifted more toward gas, so the need for high targets from renewable sources isn’t there anymore. The previous target of 50% from renewable sources was an initial target and it was built on 85

high oil prices.” Al-Falih continues, “Gas currently makes up around 50% of the energy mix in Saudi Arabia, and we have an ambition to see this grow to 70% in the future (17).” It is reasonable that the plan for Saudi Arabia would be influenced by the oil market, but such a drastic drop in mitigation efforts is quite extreme. Saudi Arabia has signed and ratified the Paris Agreement as of November 2016. They have not set a specific GHG emission reduction target and have submitted an “actions only” mitigation contribution with the actions that are largely set out by the Vision 2030 plan (18). It seems that Saudi Arabia is choosing not to be near as ambitious in their mitigation plan as they could be, putting their economic growth first and foremost and leaving sustainability and climate change mitigation far from their top priorities. It is encouraging to see Saudi Arabia, the world’s leading exporter of oil, making moves towards a cleaner future. With the announcement of Vision 2030, they have shown that they are looking to drastically increase their non-oil exports. It also shows that they are planning to develop their renewable energy sector. These steps are an essential recognition that oil is not a sustainable resource, but there is still a lot of room for improvement and a more ambitious renewable energy plan. Even with these anticipated changes, Saudi Arabia’s CO2 emissions are likely to continue to drastically increase with the expected increase in energy consumption.

Developing Nations For the 2015-2016 school year, I had the opportunity to teach science for middle and high school students in Phnom Penh, Cambodia. While I consider myself a fairly environmentally conscious person, it was difficult to be too worried about Cambodia’s GHG emissions and their mitigation efforts. Virtually everywhere I travelled within the country, I witnessed large families living in structures that could barely be even considered shacks. I lived in the capital and the largest city in Cambodia, where access to electricity and water was not an issue—outside of the ridiculously high prices for electricity, that is. I paid almost four times what I currently pay in Texas. While, a short tuk-tuk ride away from the center of the city made it very apparent that the vast majority of the country did not live this way. Outside of Cambodia’s larger cities/towns, access to electricity is limited. Phnom Penh uses 90% of Cambodia’s total electricity consumption, even though the city only accounts for roughly 10% of the country’s population (19). Needless to say, it is understandable that for developing nations in similar situations expensive renewable energy projects are not their top priority. However, through the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement, there are still methods that will help countries like Cambodia develop in a more sustainable way. Prior to my time at COP20, I did not know much about the specific mechanisms that the Kyoto Protocol set up to aid parties so that all of their GHG emission reductions did not have to come from domestic projects. These mechanisms could count towards their GHG emission reduction targets, while simultaneously funding the development of carbon reducing projects in 86

developing nations. One commonly used mechanism was the clean development mechanism (CDM). The CDM allows Annex II Parties to implement an emission-reduction project in developing countries, which can earn the Annex II Parties emission-reduction credits that can count towards reaching their target (20). At COP20, I visited a side event from Japan where they discussed a mechanism developed to aid other countries called the joint credit mechanism (JCM). This mechanism helps to achieve Japan’s reduction target as well as earn the partner country GHG reduction units (21). They had representatives from a handful of the countries that Japan had helped come speak about the JCM project developed in their country. There was a speaker from Mongolia who discussed the project that helped them develop cost-effective and energy-efficient water boilers in Mongolian homes. Another speaker from Cambodia talked about a feasibility project to determine if developing electric powered tuk-tuks would be a cost-effective form of carbon-emission reduction in their country. It is difficult for developing nations to allocate resources to fund GHG emission reducing projects, which is part of why these CDM and JCM-type projects are invaluable. It is estimated that leading up to 2012, CDM projects helped to remove as much as 1 billion tons of GHG emissions (22). These mechanisms demonstrated an amazing aspect of the UNFCCC that can allow countries to earn credit for reducing their GHG emissions, while aiding developing nations in a practical and sustainable way. While CDM projects will be a major player for emission reduction in developing countries like Cambodia, it is also important for them to have a plan of their own to develop sustainably. In terms of Cambodia’s energy supply, they face two major problems, which include their dependence on foreign-supplied energy and their limited access to electricity in rural areas. Currently, more than 50% of Cambodia’s electricity is imported from neighboring countries, and most of that which is generated locally comes from imported fuel (23). This dependence on foreign energy sources has resulted in extremely high electricity prices, especially in the rural areas that have limited access to electricity. The larger cities account for the vast majority of the country’s electricity consumption, while only making up roughly 15% of the population. 85% of the population lives in rural areas, yet only 15% of this rural population has access to electricity. Developing electricity services for this rural population is one of Cambodia’s main goals. They have developed a plan called the Rural Electrification Plan that aims to accomplish this task. The major goals of this plan include having 100% of villages with electricity access by 2020 and 70% of rural households with electricity access by 2030. The remaining 30% of households fall under a different plan called the Renewable Energy Development Program, which will rely largely on solar applications to provide energy to remote regions of Cambodia. While the major focus of the Rural Electrification Plan is to expand Cambodia’s electricity grid, the plan does take into consideration the development of renewable energy. There are other plans, such as the Renewable Electricity Action Plan (REAP), that focus more on the development on renewable energy. REAP seeks to have 5% (or 6 MW) of new electricity generation come from small-scale hydropower (23). Cambodia is rich with potential for renewable energy, especially hydropower, biomass, and solar energy, making renewable energy a great option for Cambodia. 87

Renewable energy would greatly reduce their dependence on foreign-supplied energy sources. It also would help to make electricity available in remote areas, as they could use the resources available in the immediate area to generate electricity. As of this writing, Cambodia has signed the Paris Agreement but has yet to ratify the agreement. They have submitted a conditional INDC, proposing to reduce their emissions by 27% their expected business-as-usual emissions (18). One possible way to create more ambitious emission reduction goals among developing nations would be to develop plans similar to the EU’s Renewable Energy Directive. Nations within a given region could aid each other in one overall emission reduction target among all nations involved. This would allow nations to benefit off of each other’s natural resources, especially in nations where resources for renewable energy are scarce. For example, nations that are members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) like Cambodia, the Philippines, Singapore, etc. could set an overall emission reduction target of 10% below typical emissions among all members of ASEAN. More wealthy nations like Singapore would be more likely to set ambitious goals that are higher than the 10%, allowing other nations involved to benefit. Developing nations face a difficult set of challenges. Their primary focus is advancing as nations in order to create better lives for their citizens, but there is a strong pressure to develop in a sustainable manner. CDM-type projects are a great opportunity for industrialized nations to earn credit towards their GHG emission reduction targets while spurring sustainable development in developing nations. Each country has a unique set of obstacles, which is why it is crucial for all developing nations to lay out a plan for their own development. Not all nations will be able to set extremely ambitious goals with regards to GHG emission reductions, but taking GHG emission reduction into consideration is an important stepping stone in creating a low-carbon future.

Conclusion Replacing fossil fuels with clean, renewable resources is not a simple task with a “one-size-fits-all” solution, but the Kyoto Protocol and Paris Agreement have set up a great framework to make this feat more achievable. These treaties have made it commonplace for countries, even countries as poor as Cambodia, to develop plans for renewable energy. The EU has released an ambitious plan, which allows EU nations to work together in accomplishing the overall emission-reduction target for the EU. Their goal is to have 20% of their energy come from renewable resources, and they have already achieved 22.9%. Industrialized and developing nations alike can look at the EU’s plan as a model, as it encourages nations to work together to utilize the unique resources available in each country to achieve ambitious emission-reduction targets. It is encouraging to see countries whose economies are dependent on oil exporting, like Saudi Arabia, working towards developing sustainably. While these plans are largely influenced by the oil market, they are still looking to expand their exports beyond oil and to implement renewable energy into their energy mix. The CDM-type mechanisms that have been set up by the Kyoto Protocol will be instrumental 88

in the growth of renewable energy in developing nations. These projects help industrialized nations earn emission reduction credits while encouraging sustainability in developing nations. It is also important for developing nations to set out their own plans for advancing renewable energy. Cambodia has modest plans to develop renewable energy, but naturally, their main focus is expanding the electricity grid to parts of the country without access to electricity. Overall, it is promising to see nations making strides to develop and implement renewable energy on a global scale. However, these strides are by no means perfect nor complete. In order to successfully phase out fossil fuels, a much greater level of ambition is needed. Through international coordination, there is hope to successfully curb our GHG emissions and mitigate climate change.

References Global Greenhouse Gas Emissions Data, EPA. https://www3.epa.gov/ climatechange/test/climatechange/ghgemissions/global.html (accessed Oct. 29, 2016). 2. Parties & Observers. http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/items/ 2704.php (accessed Oct. 26, 2016). 3. Ex-Post Evaluation of the Kyoto Protocol: Four Key Lessons for the 2015 Paris Agreement, Climate Report, http://www.cdcclimat.com/IMG/pdf/ 14-05_climate_report_no44_-_analysis_of_the_kp-2.pdf (accessed Dec, 6, 2016). 4. Status of the Doha Amendment, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/doha_amendment/items/ 7362.php (accessed Dec. 6, 2016). 5. 6 Graphs Explain the World’s Top 10 Emitters, World Resources Institute. http://www.wri.org/blog/2014/11/6-graphs-explain-world%E2%80%99stop-10-emitters (accessed Oct. 26, 2016). 6. The Paris Agreement Summary, Climate Focus. http://www.climatefocus.com/sites/default/files/ 20151228%20COP%2021%20briefing%20FIN.pdf (accessed Oct. 29, 2016). 7. Greenhouse Gas Emission Statistics, Statistics Explained. http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/ Greenhouse_gas_emission_statistics (accessed Oct. 26, 2016). 8. Renewable Energy, Energy, European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/ energy/en/topics/renewable-energy (accessed Oct. 26, 2016). 9. Renewable Energy Resources, Library, Index, Global Energy Network Institute, GENI is the highest priority objective of the World Game. http://www.geni.org/globalenergy/library/renewable-energy-resources/ world/europe/solar-europe/index.shtml (accessed Oct. 26, 2016). 10. National Action Plans, Energy, European Commission. https://ec.europa.eu/ energy/node/71 (accessed Oct. 26, 2016). 1.

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11. Cooperation Mechanisms, Energy, European Commission. https:/ /ec.europa.eu/energy/en/topics/renewable-energy/renewable-energydirective/cooperation-mechanisms (accessed Oct. 26, 2016). 12. Saudi Arabia Fossil Fuel CO2 Emissions, Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center. http://cdiac.ornl.gov/trends/emis/tre_sau.html (accessed Oct. 29, 2016). 13. Saudi Arabia, Climate Action Tracker. http://climateactiontracker.org/ countries/saudiarabia.html (accessed Oct. 26, 2016). 14. United Nations Treaty Collection. https://treaties.un.org/ (accessed Oct. 26, 2016). 15. Saudi Vision 2030. http://vision2030.gov.sa/en (accessed Oct. 26, 2016). 16. Investing for the Long-Term, Saudi Vision 2030. http://vision2030.gov.sa/en/ node/6 (accessed Oct. 26, 2016). 17. Saudi Arabia Scales Back Renewable Energy Goal to Favor Gas, Bloomberg. http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-06-07/saudi-arabia-scalesback-renewable-energy-target-to-favor-gas (accessed Oct. 29, 2016). 18. CAIT Climate Data Explorer, World Resources Institute. http://cait.wri.org/ indc/#/ (accessed Dec. 6, 2016). 19. Energy, Open Development Cambodia. https:// opendevelopmentcambodia.net/topics/energy#current-status (accessed Oct. 29, 2016). 20. Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/ mechanisms/clean_development_mechanism/items/2718.php (accessed Oct. 26, 2016). 21. Background, The Joint Crediting Mechanism. http://gec.jp/jcm/about/ index.html (accessed Oct. 29, 2016). 22. What Is the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM)?, The Guardian. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2011/jul/26/clean-developmentmechanism (accessed Oct. 29, 2016). 23. Rural Electrification by Renewable Energy in Cambodia, Energy Development Department. https://ec.europa.eu/energy/ intelligent/projects/sites/iee-projects/files/projects/documents/ cap_redeo_rural_electrification_by_re_in_cambodia.pdf (accessed Oct. 29, 2016).

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Chapter 8

Confronting a Global Crisis on a Local Level: The Power of the Public in Fighting Climate Change Margaret J. Williams* IDEXX Laboratories, Inc., Westbrook, Maine 04092, United States *E-mail: [email protected].

In the two decades of climate negotiations preceding the Paris agreement, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) struggled to come to timely, concrete commitments necessary to curb global average warming. To the frustration of early advocates of immediate action, the negotiations between the 195 parties of the convention have been slow and cumbersome. However, local policies and initiatives, some of which are showcased at the conventions, have shown significant promise in adaptation and mitigation. Many of the technologies and strategies the UNFCCC has identified as means to fight climate change are already being explored and implemented in response not just to climate change, but also to environmental health concerns, recent isolated, extreme weather events, and increasing demand for innovative, efficient energy technologies. Yet there is also much more work to be done. This chapter will focus on a few examples of smaller-scale efforts spearheaded by local and state governments, communities and non-governmental organizations, and the importance of consumer demands and an informed public in taking more swift action against climate change.

© 2017 American Chemical Society

Introduction: Shifting Our Perception of the Power Structure The UNFCCC was created in 1992 in response to the looming threat increasing emission of greenhouse gases (GHGs) would have on civilization. In the 24 years it has taken to achieve the legally binding Paris agreement, we have already locked ourselves into warming above the original targets. Although this global treaty is hugely important to keep the most responsible nations accountable, and it gives a framework of goals against which we can assess our progress, the convention does little to actually affect change. The assembly does not have the power to stop the extraction of tar sands or shut down coal-fired power plants. This power is relegated to the nations that have pledged to their emissions targets. As one of the largest emitters of GHGs, the United States has a great responsibility and potential for addressing climate change. Yet if we pay any mind to the actions taken by our federal legislators, we see over and over that these issues are quickly framed as partisan battles pitting economy against environment, and the fossil fuel industry typically wins. It is not difficult to see how our culture is so addicted to the fossil fuel industry. The developed world is what it is today because of the use of fossil fuels. Cheap energy replaced human labor and built our modern economy, so to switch to alternative fuels will require much more than convening a distant body of ambassadors. We live in an age where corporate interests have incredible influence over governance in this world, and it is going to take an enormous movement from average people to assume responsibility and attempt drastic emissions reductions and proactive adaptation solutions. Optimistic reliance on the UNFCCC as the solution to climate change will not be adequate. The grandiose global assembly may gain attention for the momentous, headline-worthy treaties, but it also has required a cumbersome amount of negotiation, as just one nation can invalidate years of back-and-forth concessions. And in the face of exhaustively crafted agreements, United States political leaders constantly douse high expectations for our commitment because of self-serving political reasons rather than concern for the planet. Taking an alternative look at the power structure may embolden us to meet the expectations the world has for our country. In less high-profile arenas like local town halls and neighborhood communities, politics are much different, and responses can be more swift. If there is enough public awareness about an issue that affects all residents, lobbyists who represent corporate energy interests are obvious outsiders and may have lesser sway on the electorate. Cooperation is more easily achieved in smaller assemblies with fewer stakeholders. Additionally, communities prove to be a more receptive audience to issues that directly impact the resilience and quality of life in a given area. Exploiting these strengths, people all over the country have mobilized to change our path as a nation. United States policy is seldom proactive and preventative; it seems to be mostly reactionary. Because of this pattern, many federal legislative changes arise from movements that have worked their way up from communities and then through state legislation. We most recently have seen this happen with raising the minimum wage and the acceptance of gay marriage. The advancement of a cause progresses from activists to support by local lawmakers to city policies to state 92

ballot referendums and supportive Supreme Court rulings. Usually only then do these causes have enough momentum and publicity to hold federal priority. But even without Congressional attention, these smaller-scale actions are making an impact.

Non-Profits That Foster a Movement Grassroots and non-profit organizations have been encouraging public awareness and action on climate change since before it was a political debate. Groups like Sierra Club, the Union of Concerned Scientists, and the National Audubon Society ask supporters to write to their legislators to reflect that climate action is a priority. A notable force in public activism has been 350.org, started by Bill McKibben at Middlebury College. McKibben started as a journalist and author of the first book on climate change for a general audience, The End of Nature, which warned the public about the impending implications of our uncontrolled release of gases into the atmosphere. Eventually, he started an organization of supporters to influence proactive federal legislation (1). This group has inspired many people around the world to join in protesting further investment in fossil fuel infrastructure. By carrying out acts of civil disobedience outside of the White House, McKibben and 350.org helped put the world’s eyes on President Obama before his decision to deny the development of the Keystone XL Pipeline. 350.org also reintroduced a unique tool that has enabled individuals and institutions alike to make a statement against supporting fossil fuels. This tool, known as divestment, has become a very popular tactic against the petroleum industry’s influence on our economy. Originally a strategy that American universities employed to end financial support to South African businesses during that country’s embrace of apartheid, divestment is the withdrawal of money from the stocks and bonds of unethical companies. It is a strategy that is increasingly successful with young people who feel disenchanted by a lack of representation in global and national politics. Many college campuses have successfully petitioned their boards of trustees to divest, and many cities across the world have followed suit. According to Go Fossil Free, 595 institutions, including faith-based organizations, foundations, government organizations, colleges and universities, and pension funds have committed to divestment for an approximate value of $3.4 trillion (2). If you are concerned about the future, divestment offers a channel through which you may put your money where your mouth is, so to speak.

How Local Government Collaboration Can Circumvent Federal Inaction Many municipalities across the country have realized they are already seeing effects from an unpredictable climate, and that it makes good economic sense to plan for this threat rather than rebuild after an extreme weather event. In 2010, four counties in Florida acted against the beliefs held by the state’s congressional and gubernatorial leaders and created the Southeast Regional Climate Change 93

Compact, providing support and collaboration across the region to craft mitigation and adaptation strategies. The compact drafted a climate action plan, which includes infrastructure planning and improvements “that reduce risk and future economic losses.” They argue in their report of adaptation action feasibility that without the oversight of this sort of committee to keep climate resilience in mind, infrastructure retrofit projects could be conducted using outdated approaches and technology (3). Coastal Florida’s infrastructure and homes are vulnerable to increasingly intense hurricanes and flooding as sea level and temperatures rise—a reality that hits close to home for many Floridians who cannot afford to wait for federal politicians to settle a senseless debate. This self-motivated organization has taken the needs of its people as a priority over political gridlock and has found support in their neighbors to work around the national inaction. Other agencies have also recognized the effectiveness of regional approaches to climate solutions. As Steve Nicholas of the Institute for Sustainable Communities noted, an important takeaway from President Obama’s State, Local and Tribal Leaders Task Force on Climate Preparedness and Resilience is that existing, emerging and not-yet realized regional organizations are deserving of more active relationships with the federal government. This is because they “have developed partnerships and programs that cater to unique regional attributes, natural systems, policy frameworks, governance structures and political realities.” In contrast to top-down governance, change is always easier from the inside once those who will be most affected realize the urgency and importance of their individual responsibility (4). Another great example of a regional collaboration that recognized the advantage of local approaches to change is in scenic Mount Desert Island (MDI), Maine. Concerned citizens organized and developed A Climate to Thrive (ACTT) (5). Committed to building their island economy with energy and food independence in mind, this unifying group of four towns and 17 villages created six committees to regularly discuss solutions and implementation for alternative energy, building efficiency, food systems, public policy, transportation and zero waste. They have recognized that not only does this work create a healthier and more sustainable environment, but it also builds a stronger community. Committed to a vision of 100% energy independence by 2030, they are gathering data on local energy consumption, identifying locations for solar farms, and working with schools and homeowners to develop projects encouraging decentralized, alternative, and local energy solutions. Residents of MDI were motivated to set an inspirational goal of energy independence in 15 years because of the urgency of the targets set by the COP21 Paris Agreement and their own interest in sustainability. But there is a strong financial case for switching to renewable energies, as they have learned from recent activities in Hollis, New Hampshire. Within a primarily a politically conservative town, the Hollis energy committee made a similar pledge to alternative energy and has installed solar panels and wood pellet boilers at all municipal and school buildings, saving them $120,000 per year (6). Homeowners there are also installing their own solar panels, and the Hollis School Board members are spearheading a community solar farm that will provide power to a wood-chip fired district heating system. The placement of solar arrays on public buildings has an educational aspect as 94

well, helping inform residents about the cost savings and emissions reductions that they can feel positive about. Public awareness-building efforts like this have helped spread the word, and community solar farms are being organized across the country, allowing people to pool their resources and benefit from a cleaner fuel technology.

Examples of Reframing the Argument: Resilience over Environmentalism The success of a grassroots campaign depends on whether the public in that area can identify with the immediate issue. It may help to get a sense of where our emissions are coming from in order to strategize a successful movement. For example, some localities are looking toward agriculture as a common ground for identifying ways to combat climate change. According to the EPA, 24% of GHG emissions in the United States in 2010 came from land use practices (forestry, agriculture and other) (7). To confront this source of emissions, we may be able to simply perceive food production differently so that we don’t strictly see it as this large-scale necessity for solving world hunger. Both soil and plant matter have an incredible capability for sequestering atmospheric carbon, but using our dominant worldview, many proponents of development and progress do not prioritize or even understand this potential. Our industrial food system requires irrigation, soildepleting tillage and monoculture, heavy use of petroleum-based fertilizers and pesticides, concentrated animal feeding operations that treat methane-releasing manure as waste instead of a resource, and transcontinental transportation and refrigeration of food. This system can only thrive with the use of cheap energy, making our mainstream food system completely dependent on—and vulnerable to—the availability of oil. As consumers, the American public can choose to shop locally, which can have a great influence on how our food is produced and therefore the quantity of emissions we are paying for. Eat Local movements in the U.S., which have gained in popularity in the last decade, confront not only the health and economic benefits of eating organic, local foods, but also the reality that large-scale agriculture contributes enormously to GHG emissions. Important work is being done in small towns to protect our right to locally produced and accessible food. For example, 16 towns in the state of Maine so far have passed food sovereignty ordinances that allow residents to produce, sell, purchase and consume local foods if they so choose (8). Often challenged by federal agencies with the concern about food safety, Maine townspeople are making a statement that will promote regional interdependence and resilient communities into the future, and have ignited the conversation in other towns and cities. However symbolic this may be, news like this can spread and empower others to think critically about how climate change may impact their food sources and our power to respond locally. Like the grassroots town ordinance movement, Food Solutions New England, a recent multi-state collaborative, is also advocating that we secede from a centralized food and energy structure. A group of researchers and policymakers in New England, they have come together to assess current vulnerabilities and compile recommendations for a trajectory toward a food-secure future in their 95

New England Food Vision (9). The report encourages regional collaboration in pursuit of producing 50% of the food we eat in New England and to ensure that food is accessible to everyone. It lays out an ambitious goal that will require increased legislative support and funding for protecting land and empowering small farmers and fishermen. Also realizing our food sourcing potential, increasing numbers of homeowners with small amounts of land are growing their own food and joining with one another to experiment with regenerative gardening practices to sequester carbon through soil building.

Creating the Tools To Empower Each Other All of these demonstrations of practical climate solutions have become models for other areas to adopt similar practices. Learning from each other, we can target our approaches and build from these successes. This work can tie us together and make our communities stronger, giving us the strength we will need when future climate extremes stress our survival. Although national policy and partisan debate gets most of the media attention, many places have long since moved past the debate and have realized sometimes we are better able to serve our communities than our lawmakers in Washington, DC. Working from the bottom-up is a very effective way to achieve goals that can compound into a real positive movement. As many people working within corporate structures will tell you, decisions made by distant superiors are not nearly as welcome as solutions that have been brainstormed, suggested, and revised by those actually doing the daily work. Once people realize that their quality of life is at risk and being affected by climate change, the response will be much more universal and committed. A lesson can also be learned from transcending the buzzwords that have caused so much contention and appealing to people with practical arguments of resilience and independence. Rather than framing climate initiatives in an environmental light, it makes good economic sense to plan for future climate variability. The terms “climate change” and “global warming” have unfortunately become political and polarizing in this country, and as long as the illusion of a debate can be sustained, the United States Congress cannot be expected to be aggressive in its mitigation policies. As Nordhaus et al. argue in Climate Pragmatism, alternative arguments can be used to pass climate-related bills, such as popular demand for alternative energy, energy efficiency, energy security/ independence from foreign countries, environmental health, and natural disaster preparedness (10). Of course, all of this promotion of local-level action is not to say that response on the federal level is not important. In fact, it is crucial for Congress to provide sufficient funding to support all of the initiatives mentioned and introduce legislation that may help our transition to renewable energy sources from subsidized fossil fuels. The shift will begin when the scientific consensus is recognized as irreputable fact, and motivation for that change will have to come from constituents who demand leaders that stand up to the industry. As for the UN climate talks, at the very least they help us understand the urgency for action and 96

that our gas guzzling has global consequences. The convention helps reinforce to Americans that the world is watching us, expecting us to take responsibility for our consumption and to be a leader in transitioning to an alternative-energy economy. Ultimately, we cannot expect that simply because we’ve signed an international treaty on climate change that the government will take care of the details. It is up to us to make a commitment of action to ourselves, our communities, and the next generations. Although it is easy to feel helpless in a fight against such a complex global issue, collaboration on the smallest scale empowers us to raise our voices and connect to other regions fighting the same fight. It is an uphill battle, but we have numerous tools at our disposal; the hardest part should be deciding where to start.

Acknowledgments The views and opinions expressed in this chapter are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of Idexx Laboratories, Inc.

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2. 3.

4.

5. 6.

7.

8.

Social Movements and Climate Change, June 17, 2013. Environment@Harvard, Harvard University Center for the Environment. http://environment.harvard.edu/news/huce-headlines/social-movementsand-climate-change (accessed Oct. 30, 2016). Go Fossil Free. http://gofossilfree.org/commitments/ (accessed Oct. 30, 2016). Miami-Dade Sea Level Rise Task Force. Adaptation Action Areas: Feasibility Assessment, September 2015. http://www.miamidade.gov/ mayor-memo/284999-Final-Status-Report-Response-Multiple-ResolutionsPertaining-to-Recommendations-Sea-Level-Task-Force.pdf (accessed Oct. 30, 2016). Nicholas, S. Regionalism: A Pragmatic Approach to Climate Change. Institute for Sustainable Communities, November 14, 2014. http:// www.iscvt.org/regionalism-pragmatic-approach-climate-change/ (accessed Oct. 20, 2016). A Climate to Thrive. http://www.aclimatetothrive.org/ (accessed Oct. 30, 2016). New England Grassroots Environment Fund. Working Toward a ZeroCarbon Solution in Hollis, NH, March 18, 2016. https://grassrootsfund.org/ stories/feature-stories/working-toward-a-zero-carbon-Solution-in-hollis-nh (accessed Oct. 30, 2016). Sources of Greenhouse Gas Emissions. Environmental Protection Agency. https://www.epa.gov/ghgemissions/sources-greenhouse-gasemissions#land-use-and-forestry (accessed Oct. 30, 2016). Bayly, J. Maine Towns Declare Food Sovereignty, Claim ‘Home Rule’ Trumps State, Federal Regulations. Bangor Daily News, March 9, 2016. 97

http://bangordailynews.com/2016/03/07/homestead/maine-towns-declarefood-sovereignty-claim-home-rule-trumps-state-federal-regulations/ (accessed Oct. 30, 2016). 9. Donahue, B; Anderson, M; Beal, A; Berlin, L; Burke, J; Kelly, T; Lapping, M; Libby, R; Ramer, H. A New England Food Vision; Food Solutions New England, University of New Hampshire: Durham, NH, 2014. http://www.foodsolutionsne.org/new-england-food-vision (accessed Oct. 20, 2016). 10. Nordhaus, T; Rayner, S; Hayward, S; Shellenberger, M; Pielke, R.; Sarewitz, D; Jenkins, J; Atkinson, R; Green, C. Climate Pragmatism, July 25, 2011. The Breakthrough Institute. http://thebreakthrough.org/archive/ climate_pragmatism_innovation (accessed Oct. 30, 2016).

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Chapter 9

How to Re-Energize Our Electric Grid for the Future of the Planet Jessica McDonald* Nicholas School of the Environment, Duke University, 450 Research Dr., Durham, North Carolina 27708, United States *E-mail: [email protected].

It is nearly universally understood that fossil fuels must be phased out of the global energy mix by the end of the century if we hope to avoid the worst impacts of climate change. There is enormous potential for renewable energy in the electricity sector, and in some cases, wind and solar have become price-competitive with traditional fossil fuel generation. This chapter highlights current market trends and future opportunities for renewable energy as countries look to meet their Nationally Determined Contributions under the Paris Agreement.

Instantaneous Demand We were already more than 15 miles into our hike. The soft sunlight was peaking through the forest cover, which was beginning to thin as we gained elevation. One...two…ten…twenty…the number of switchbacks continued to rise, taunting my tired legs. I stopped as we hit switchback number 30, and I took a deep inhale to steady my racing heart. The air felt thin. We were close. An hour later, the forest trail straightened and we were surrounded by the mountains of the Northern Cascades. I threw off my 65-liter Sierra Nevada pack and spun around in circles to take advantage of the 360-degree view. Glacier Peak captured my attention (Figure 1). We camped in view of the volcano, and we were already on the trail when we saw the sun peering over the mountaintops the next morning.

© 2017 American Chemical Society

Figure 1. Glacier Peak, Northern Cascades, Washington State, 2016.

Sixteen miles later and I’m situated in the passenger seat of my friend’s car racing back into civilization. Going “off the grid” is my favorite kind of vacation, however, I return from every trip with a revived appreciation for some modern amenities: hot shower, cup of espresso, and the ability to turn on the lights and read after dark. Okay, maybe those aren’t considered today’s “modern” amenities with the rise of technologies like Amazon Echo and Virtual Reality, but when I return from a multi-day hiking trip, I’m reminded of my dependence on electricity for almost every aspect of my daily routine. I flip up my light switch. The lights turn on. When I’m home, I never doubt the outcome of this perceived simple action. Our demand for electricity is met instantaneously. Think about it. How incredible is that?! Our electric grid is this reliable and extraordinarily complex machine that powers our homes, businesses, and electric cars. However, our grid is going to face some challenges in the near future if we are to transform to low-carbon generation. Approximately 67% of our electricity comes from burning coal and natural gas. In 2014, electricity production contributed to 30% of greenhouse gas emissions in the United States (1). Due to climate change, air pollution concerns and significant improvements in renewable energy technologies, the Energy Information Administration (EIA) predicts the share of energy generation from renewables and nuclear energy in North America is expected to rise to 45% in 2025 (2). This analysis by the EIA gives clout to the latest trilateral clean energy and climate agreement target set by the United States, Mexico, and Canada to reach 50% of electricity generation from clean energy sources by 2025 (3). The United States, Mexico, and Canada are not the only countries to set a regional renewable energy target. The Caribbean Community (CARICOM) has set a regional goal of 47% renewables in the power sector by 2027, and the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has set a target for a share of renewable energy in the region’s overall electricity mix to 10% in 2020 and 19% in 2030 (4, 5). 100

When you add these regional targets to the subnational and national policy landscape, the holistic picture of clean energy targets and greenhouse gas reduction commitments turns into a jigsaw puzzle where everyone is questioning the overall, cumulative greenhouse gas reductions. Nevertheless, the ultimate objective is clear through the multi-layered climate policy landscape: phase out fossil fuels before the end of the century. This phase-out of fossil fuels by 2100 was also supported by the leaders of the G7 economies in June 2015 (6). In the power sector, this is going to require innovation and the creation of a new status quo of how we generate, transmit, distribute, use, and measure electricity. We have a grid in the United States that was built for a time of fossil fuel generation in a centralized generation system. The integration of solar and wind technologies is going to transform our infrastructure due to the variability of renewables and the transition from centralized to more distributed generation. We must understand the challenges we face as we look to meet our climate goals while ensuring the lights always stay on. We must also remember that building a flexible, efficient, and responsive grid for those who currently do not have access to electricity is a critical piece of the puzzle. Globally, there are an estimated 1.2 billion people without access to electricity, which is nearly 17% of the global population (7). More than 95% of people living without electricity are located in Sub-Saharan Africa and developing Asia. In recent decades, hundreds of millions of people have gained access to electricity, with the majority of those people living in China and India (8). Electrifying rural communities and cities that currently lack power is central to enable economic empowerment and to raise standards of living. This challenge of meeting energy access needs while ensuring the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions is one of the central challenges we face as a global community looking to meet targets set forth under the Paris Agreement and the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals.

Renewable Energy in the Paris Agreement In addition to the regional renewable energy targets mentioned previously, countries have submitted national climate action plans under the Paris Agreement. These plans are called Nationally Determined Contributions, NDCs for short, and they are fascinating due to their individual uniqueness. They all vary in length, scope, level of detail, and substance. I’ve been able to witness the creation and transformation of NDCs in the past two years through my involvement with the American Chemical Society (ACS) and the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Attending the UNFCCC’s 20th Conference of the Parties (COP20) as a delegate for the ACS in Lima, Peru in 2014 transformed my perspective of international action on climate change. I was thrilled to attend the COP with an incredible group of peers, pictured in Figure 2.

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Figure 2. Left to right: , Shelby Barianna, Kowan O’Keefe, Jessica McDonald (author), Nina Diklich, Kaitlyn Teppert. COP20 Lima, Peru. 2015. It was at this COP that countries decided on the framework of voluntary, bottom-up climate plans as a part of the new international climate agreement. As we participated in the negotiations as observers, we spent hours talking about solutions to our climate change challenges with those participating as part of country delegations, international organizations, and universities. It was through these conversations, and my Masters courses at Duke University, that I began to take a systems approach to our energy challenge. As a Master of Environmental Management student studying energy and the environment at the Nicholas School of the Environment, I began to understand the constraints and opportunities present within our existing energy systems. This understanding and approach is very different from the values and opinions I held as an environmental science major at the University of Pittsburgh. While at Pitt, I learned the science of our climate system. I felt an urgency to address the issue of climate change as quickly as possible. It seemed to me that the solution was apparent: produce more electricity with renewable generation. I was reading and learning about the impacts of climate change, and I was listening solely to the science. The science tells us that we need to act as quickly as possible to avert the worst impacts of climate change. However, looking at the climate change challenge only through the lens of climate science is comparable to jumping out of an airplane with a backpack but missing a parachute. Understanding the science is not enough. Connecting the science to policies and technologies is the parachute that will help us find economically sound and ambitious solutions. 102

This is the systems approach I brought with me when I attended the 21st Conference of the Parties (COP21) in Paris in 2015. During COP21, I worked for an international NGO called the International Centre for Trade and Sustainable Development (ICTSD) to track changes in the negotiating text. Before attending the COP, I worked for ICTSD as a consultant researching and writing reports on the development of countries’ NDCs. This is where my fascination with NDCs began. With each and every new country NDC submission, I started recognizing trends and gaps in countries’ communicated actions. These observations were put to use when I started working for the Department of Energy and their Office of International Affairs. I was able to take my interest in NDCs and translate it into the creation of a database that organized some countries’ NDC actions into energy-related sectors, including energy supply, energy demand, and transportation, to name a few. The number of communicated renewable energy actions in NDCs is astounding. For example, Morocco would like to reach over 50% of installed electricity production capacity from renewable sources by 2025, Chile set a goal to have 45% of all electric generation capacity installed between 2014 and 2025 to be generated from cleaner energy sources, and Malawi set a goal to install 20,000 solar PV systems (9–11). Thirty-one of the 33 country NDCs I evaluated mentioned renewable energy as a means to reach the countries specified climate goals. On the other hand, only 12 countries explicitly mentioned evaluating or improving grid efficiency and grid technologies. Through a systems lens, this is problematic! The integration of renewable energy requires a systems approach through the evaluation of the grid in order to overcome barriers associated with high-penetrations of solar and wind.

Next Generation of Renewables This stark increase in the amount of renewable generation needed to meet countries climate objectives has drawn the attention of several international organizations including the International Energy Agency (IEA). In 2016, the IEA coined the term that there is a “next generation” phase of renewables deployment on the horizon. This next phase will mark a time in our history where wind and solar PV technologies are mature and economically affordable (12). Many of the barriers that once stood in the way of renewables are quickly being overcome. Cost According to Bloomberg New Energy Finance, investments in renewable energy broke record trends in 2015. China spent $111 billion on clean energy infrastructure in 2015, 17% more than in 2014. This is more than the U.S. and Europe combined (13). In fact, funding in renewables worldwide is outpacing fossil fuels 2 to 1 (14). This is due in part to falling prices of these technologies. On-shore wind and crystalline silicon photovoltaics are two of the most widespread renewable technologies used today, and both had reduced costs 103

in 2015. Impressively, the cost of solar has fallen to 1/150th of its level in the 1970s (14). The price of solar fell for residential, commercial, and large scale PV from 2007 to 2013, with the sharpest decline in cost for large-scale projects (15). Onshore wind projects are consistently delivering electricity for $ 0.04/kwh to $0.09/kwh. This is within the same range as new fossil fuel capacity (16). Declining costs are leading to increased generation from renewable sources. In the United States, the increase in solar generation is mostly from utilities, and GTM Research estimates that 16 Gigawatts of solar will be installed in the U.S. in 2016 (17). Globally, 50 Gigawatts were added to the grid in 2015, with Italy, the United States, Japan, China, and Germany hosting the largest installed capacity (18). The generation of these two renewable technologies is large enough to influence when coal and natural gas plants are kept running. This could lower fossil fuel plants capacity factors (19). A capacity factor is the percentage of a power plant’s maximum potential that is achieved over time. A plant’s capacity factor depends on several operating principles, including seasonal demand and maintenance (20). Historically, fossil fuel plants have had high and predictable capacity factors, for example, the average natural gas plant may produce about 70% of its full potential. This high capacity factor is taken into account when investors and operators calculate the fixed costs of the plant. With more renewable generation, the traditional base-load plants, including coal and natural gas plants, will likely be used less (19). Some reports conclude that fossil fuel plants are becoming more expensive per unit of power produced and the profits less predictable (21). This is in part due to how a plant’s operating cost depends on how much electricity the plant produces, and this cost required to produce each MW of electricity is referred to as “marginal cost” (22). The marginal cost for renewable energy is very low, because there are no fuel costs for solar and wind power. The sun and wind provide free power, and the only costs are the capital costs and operating costs of the plant. This is a reinforcing cycle for renewable energy (19). Variability The central challenge that arises from the use of more solar and wind is the inherent variability of these sources. Simply put, the sun does not always shine and the wind does not always blow, and the amount generated by these sources varies by time of day, season, and geographic location. Thus, solar and wind resources have high inherent resource variability and limited predictability – which is why they’re often referred to as Variable Renewable Energy (VRE). When the percentage of VRE on the grid is between 5-10%, the variability of supply can be managed relatively easily without significant investment (12). We can see from the renewable energy targets mentioned above that the integration of renewables is going to be much higher than 10%! Thus, additional investments in the flexibility of the power system are required to balance the increased levels of uncertainty while keeping the lights on and costs down. In addition to flexibility, power operators also need to adopt new operational strategies and policymakers need to put in place policies and 104

regulations that support VRE. For example, operators are strengthening their ability for advanced renewable energy forecasting and on the economic side, policymakers are evaluating reforms to electricity pricing (23). The integration of renewables is unique to each system, and there are several strategies that can be adopted into power systems. Firstly, technologies can focus on the supply side and focus on generation technologies that can be quickly ramped up and down. Secondly, on the demand side, smart-grid technologies and efficiency improvements can more readily align supply with demand. Lastly, storage can work with both supply and demand to quickly fill the gap between VRE generation and demand (12).

Ramping Up, Storage, Smart Grids Most fossil fuel plants were designed in the United States to operate at a consistent, high-level to provide base-load generation. Nuclear and coal plants are known for being among the least flexible forms of electricity generation. While coal and nuclear generators can take more than 12 hours to ramp up, some gas combustion technologies can start-up in minutes (24). This means that natural gas generation can quickly fill in the generation supply gap when there is a significant and fast change in electricity generated from solar and wind. There are limitations to the flexibility of these systems, which can be complemented by energy storage. The preferred technologies for energy storage include pumped hydro, compressed air storage, and multiple battery technologies (25). With storage, system operators can save the excess energy created by solar and wind and release the energy when demand is high or supply is low. The current market for the storage industry is limited, despite the large potential of scaling-up storage in the future. The prices of batteries are still either too expensive or not durable enough to remain a worthwhile investment. In the first quarter of 2016, just over 18 megawatts (MW) and 21 MwH of storage were deployed (26). Demand response measures allow consumers to play a significant role in the balance of electricity on the grid. Demand response involves consumers, either residential, commercial, or industrial users, reducing or shifting their electricity usage during peak electricity periods (27). With renewables, demand response can be utilized when there is a surge in wind or solar power. This is oftentimes motivated by a financial incentive provided by the utility, and thus can save consumers money. This can be achieved through the installation of control equipment that manages electricity use based on price signals from grid operators. One aspect of this is the introduction of two-way communications for measuring and controlling energy usage. These “smart-grid” technologies, such as two-way thermostats in residential homes, can allow customers to sign up to demand-response programs and opt-in to reduce power from smart devices, such as iPhones and tablets (28). Several countries have already started utilizing the technologies and policies that are best suited to their unique power systems, leading the way in the renewable energy transition. 105

Renewables Are Forging Ahead While I was at COP21, I heard Ramon Mendez, Uruguay’s head of climate policy, speak about how Uruguay transformed its energy system to reach 94.5% of its electricity from renewable energy in under a decade. I didn’t realize that countries had reached this percentage of renewable energy in the electricity mix! Overall, biomass, solar power, wind, and hydropower account for 55% of the country’s overall energy mix, including transport fuel. For comparison, the global average is 12% (29). Uruguay hasn’t imported energy for three years, and now exports to other countries in the region including Argentina. In 2008, the government launched an energy policy that started Uruguay down this low-carbon generation path. The model adopted includes three key factors regarding Uruguay’s unique utility model and resources: 1. Credibility for foreign long-term investments 2. Bountiful natural resources with wind, solar, and biomass and 3. Public companies with strong relationships with the private sector. For instance, the state utility guarantees foreign investors a fixed price for two decades, guaranteeing a profit for firms with wind farms low maintenance costs and small staff. The new direction relied on one central overarching principle: strong decision making with policy certainty (30). While this model is not replicable in all countries, Uruguay remains a case study of the possibilities of renewables in the electricity mix. Other countries, like Scotland, have witnessed the power of renewables this past year. For example, high winds in Scotland on one day in August 2016 were strong enough for the countries’ wind turbines to power the equivalent of all of Scotland’s electricity needs for the day. Many environmentalists are hoping that this milestone will motivate the Scottish government to forge ahead with a more ambitious renewable energy target when the draft energy strategy is created (31).

Decentralized Systems Centralized grid systems prove economically prohibitive for millions of people living in remote and rural areas in developing and emerging economies. There is no uniform definition for what encompasses energy access, but two classifications have been widely accepted 1) metrics related to electricity and 2) metrics relating to the use of solid or traditional fuels for cooking. Distributed renewable systems (DRE) are another path forward for providing energy access to the approximately 1.2 billion people living without access to electricity. DRE systems in the form of small-scale community and residential solar PV, stand-alone lighting systems, wind, biodiesel generators, and micro and pico-hyrdo stations for electricity generation are a few examples of DRE technologies. These technologies can provide electrification for power, cooking, and heating and cooling. In recent years, DRE has benefited from decreasing system sizes, improved system costs, and enhanced affordability linked to efficient appliances (32). Efficient appliances are critical to energy access because increased efficiency increases the affordability of the energy services provided by lighting, cooling, and cooking technologies (33). 106

Clean Energy Ministerial The challenges that we face as a global community in reaching our clean energy targets and mitigating climate change requires the acceleration of clean energy markets, political leadership, and the sharing of best practices for policies and financing mechanisms. Outside of the UNFCCC framework, there are other international forums that are actively bringing governments together to mobilize knowledge and resources for increasing energy efficiency, transforming power systems, and expanding energy access. The Clean Energy Ministerial (CEM) was announced in 2009 after the UNFCCC stalled in negotiations in Copenhagen. This voluntary forum brings together 24 countries and the European Commission, including all major economies, to improve and expand the deployment of clean energy technologies. With a combination of technical expertise, private sector participation, and high-level policy dialogue, the CEM is a forum through which countries can gain the knowledge and capacity needed to reach their domestic energy and climate goals. Through initiatives such as the 21st Century Power Partnership (21CPP), Super Efficient Appliances and Equipment Deployment (SEAD), the International Smart Grid Action Network (ISGAN), and the Global Lighting and Energy Access Partnership (Global LEAP), the CEM is filling a vital niche in the international policy dialogue on how we’re going to transition to a clean energy economy. This platform for knowledge sharing and technical assistance in clean energy technologies and policies supplements the targets set forth under the UNFCCC negotiations. My experience as a delegate for ACS two years ago at COP20 directed my career towards international climate policy. In 2017, the 8th Clean Energy Ministerial will be held in Beijing in early June. Reaching the targets set forth for 2030 and 2050 is going to take a systems approach, and I look forward to seeing the transformation of our energy systems in my lifetime.

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28. GreenBiz. What Do You Need to Know about Demand Response? April 2014. https://www.greenbiz.com/blog/2014/04/29/greenbiz-101-what-doyou-need-know-about-demand-response (accessed October 14, 2016). 29. Fortune. Uruguay: This Country Gets Nearly All Its Electricity from Clean Energy, December 7, 2015. http://fortune.com/2015/12/07/uruguayrenewable-energy/ (accessed October 14, 2016). 30. The Guardian. Uruguay Makes Dramatic Shift to Nearly 95% Clean Energy, December 2015. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/dec/03/ uruguay-makes-dramatic-shift-to-nearly-95-clean-energy (accessed October 14, 2016). 31. The Guardian. Scotland Completely Powered by Wind Turbines for Day, August 2016. https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2016/aug/ 11/scotland-completely-powered-by-wind-turbines-for-a-day (accessed October 15, 2016). 32. REN21. Renewables 2016: Global Status Report. 33. Efficiency for Access. http://www.efficiency4access.org (accessed October 14, 2016).

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Chapter 10

It Is Better To Light a Candle Than To Curse the Darkness Keith E. Peterman,*,1 Gregory P. Foy,1 and Matthew R. Cordes2 1Department

of Physical Sciences, York College of Pennsylvania, York, Pennsylvania 17403, United States 2Writing Works, Ltd., Lehighton, Pennsylvania 18235, United States *E-mail: [email protected].

This concluding chapter offers reflections on the personal COP journey experienced by each of the three coeditors of this book. While we face daunting challenges in addressing the global climate crisis, efforts toward climate literacy is recognized as a significant action in confronting the issue. The ACS-sponsored climate change literacy program and this book will help inform society of our moral and ethical obligation to act now for future generations. Action offers hope.

It Is Better To Light a Candle Than To Curse the Darkness According to the ancient proverb, “it is better to light a candle than to curse the darkness.” This book is a collection of the thoughts, recollections, and reflections of those who have devoted considerable time and energy to pursuing the light despite occasional moments of darkness.

© 2017 American Chemical Society

Reflections on an Unfinished COP Journey – Greg Foy As we wait for the start of the second week of COP22, I am trying to put into words the feelings and lessons that have been gleaned throughout this project. The overwhelming feeling throughout has been one of hope. When our project first began at the December 2010 COP16 in Cancun, we witnessed that hope first-hand as COP16 President Patricia Espinosa brought the crowd of delegates, NGOs, and others that had packed the auditorium beyond capacity to their feet in thunderous applause for the unification felt from her leadership throughout COP16 (1). Espinosa’s continuing leadership in the ensuing years was recognized with her appointment in May 2016 to serve as Executive Secretary to the UNFCCC (2). Now, on the eve of the second week of COP22, I feel as though a soaking wet blanket has been thrown over that hope by the recent U.S. elections. The overarching goal of climate science literacy, however, cannot be thwarted by ideological politicians. This reflection is not just about two points in time, but a journey that began in 2010 when the ACS was making plans to celebrate the then-upcoming International Year of Chemistry (IYC 2011). The celebration was scheduled to last throughout 2011. Planning commenced at the Spring 2010 ACS National Meeting in San Francisco. I did not get in on the ground floor in San Francisco, but very shortly afterward Keith Peterman asked me to join him as co-chair of the national ad hoc committee charged with Incorporating Sustainability into the International Year of Chemistry (3). This committee was launched at a Sustainability Engagement Event (SEE) in San Francisco that focused on including the ACS in the IYC2011 celebration. The journey really began when we formed a plan to expose students to the issues surrounding climate change by getting them front row seats at the epicenter of international climate negotiations. The project proposal was developed throughout the summer of 2010 and proposed that fall at the National ACS Meeting in Boston. Keith and I presented the proposal to the Committee on Environmental Improvement (CEI), where it was met with strong support. To the best of our knowledge, this project remains as the only ACS’s enduring legacy from IYC 2011, and as such, to say that this project has exceeded our expectations is an extreme understatement (4). Boston was the start of a journey that has had numerous stops at the ACS National Headquarters in Washington D.C., seven COPs on three different continents, and multiple ACS meetings from Dallas to San Diego, with multiple symposia and an ever-growing number of speakers. There have been a number of COPs that really have altered the complexion of the global fight against climate change. COP16 was the starting point of the project, and having never experienced the negotiations on the international stage, the students and I had no idea of what to expect. My veteran colleague, Keith, having attended COP15 the previous year, kept describing it as a fifteen-ring circus with all fifteen rings constantly hosting an act. We found out quickly that Keith’s description was extremely accurate—it was impossible to understand everything. We learned to make a plan but be very flexible. My impression of that first COP was one of awe; the intelligence and dedication of the leadership was 112

incredible. We attended multiple press conferences with Christiana Figueres, the then-UNFCCC Executive Secretary and Chief Negotiator for the UN. Figueres’ calm demeanor, pleasant tone, and continuously positive attitude were infectious. UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon was also a regular at press conferences, and I can say without a doubt that Ban is the most impressive, thoughtful, kind, and ethereal man that I have ever encountered. But COP16 was Patricia Espinosa’s shining moment. As the president of the COP, she managed to establish, promote, and portray an aura of inclusiveness that permeated the negotiations. Everyone that we spoke to sang her praises, and at the closing plenary session, she received a standing ovation that lasted at least five minutes. The delegates, NGOs, press, and other observers were not joining the ovation out of a sense of duty, but from genuine, heartfelt appreciation. The intervening COPs were speckled with special moments—the tremendous feeling of community and culture in Durban, South Africa (2011 COP17) and the strange, almost sterile feel in Doha, Qatar (2012 COP18). We wondered at the choice of venue for COP18, and then were struck again the next year at the choice of Warsaw (2013 COP19). Both seemed quite out of place given their significant production and use of fossil fuels; Qatar as the largest per capita greenhouse gas producer on the planet, while Poland (dubbed “Coal-land” at COP19) is one of the world’s major coal users and producers. The choice of Warsaw became even more peculiar when it was announced that the World Coal Council was meeting at the same time. The meeting location seemed to get back to a more reasonable spot with the 2014 COP20 in Lima, Peru. With this COP, there was a feeling that the attendees and civil society were reengaging. Keith and I took part in the largest climate change march in the southern hemisphere with an estimated 15,000 people marching through the streets of Lima calling for action, and this seemed to invigorate the negotiations (5). All signs were pointing toward tremendous advances in Paris. The energy leading up to Paris was palpable. With massive climate demonstrations around the world and Secretary General Ban calling for a summit at the UN in New York, the world was taking notice. There was promise of action in the air. In the previous five years that we had been involved, nothing came close to the expectations for Paris. Then came the terrorist bombings just two weeks before the opening of the COP. The City of Lights was rocked with chaos, destruction, senseless injury, and loss of life. The overwhelming feelings of sorrow for the victims and rage against the perpetrators turned to thoughts of what this would mean for the people of the world who were fighting to save the earth and its people from the devastating impacts of climate change before it was too late. The people of France, and especially the citizens of Paris, stood strong and proud as their President and the Secretary General announced that COP21 would take place. The 2015 COP21 lived up to expectations, producing an Agreement that all countries could support using their Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) to keep global temperature rise below two degrees centigrade (6, 7). The city of Paris also lived up to expectations as the most exceptional host city that we have encountered during this journey. 113

Paris lit a flame that continued to grow throughout the year leading to the 2016 COP22 in Marrakech, Morocco. INDCs (“Intended” commitments) became NDCs as countries around the globe formally submitted their Nationally Determined Contributions. President Obama and President Xi of China jointly announced the U.S. and Chinese commitments to reducing global emissions, a move that led to a cascade of commitments from more than 55 countries representing more than 55% of emissions by October 5—a result nobody had expected to occur so quickly (8). This meant that the Paris Agreement would enter into force the day before the start of COP22 (9). We had assumed that the Paris Agreement would not likely enter into force until Earth Day 2017! The excitement that started in Paris grew dramatically in the ensuing months. COP22 was dubbed the “COP of Action,” and Marrakech seemed headed for grand success. Then the U.S. election of November 8, 2016 took place. In an outcome that shocked the world, our country elected a President who will be the only head-ofstate in the world who denies the human contribution to climate change (10). I had not yet left for COP22 by November 8, but I felt shock, devastation, and frankly unease at the thought of travelling to Northern Africa. When I finally did arrive at COP22 in Marrakech, there was a somber feeling permeating the entire official venue. Once we were identified as Americans, the immediate reaction was shock at our choice of President and questions as to how such an event had taken place. One of my colleagues was asked “Why does America hate Muslims?” We had very few answers. On Tuesday of the second week, we were fortunate to be able to attend a talk by U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry (11). The room was one of three press conference rooms in the Blue Zone, and the guard at the entrance told us that it had 380 seats. Since we were among the first few in line, we had no worries about getting in, but as the time grew nearer, the line grew rapidly, and we wondered whether everyone would be able to attend. By the time the U.S. delegation began to enter, the room was packed well beyond seating capacity. It was difficult to see if there was even any aisle space left. When Secretary Kerry entered, the standing ovation was emotional and heartfelt. I am not a seasoned veteran of the press, but I have attended seven COPs as a member of the press, and I have never witnessed a standing ovation at the beginning of a briefing. Secretary Kerry proceeded to deliver a message of hope and action. I felt like it lifted the giant wet blanket off of the negotiations. His message, that the reduction of fossil fuels and the rise of renewable energy sources has already turned the corner in terms of investment, and that the U.S. clean energy economy will not be stopped, provided the much-needed force to turn the COP of action into one of true hope and action! I actually had to leave before the end of Kerry’s talk to start a web chat with some students, but Keith was able to stay and reported that the standing ovation at the end of the briefing was even more impressive than the start! We are at a critical juncture in the fight against climate change. The world is moving forward with climate action, as is the U.S. clean energy economy. There 114

is still, however, a tremendous amount of uncertainty about what our government will do.

COP Reflections – Matt Cordes When my oldest son was five, he watched me one Sunday morning as I returned my DVD copy of Al Gore’s An Inconvenient Truth to its case. Being full of questions, he asked what the movie was. I told him it was a big-person movie, and I said he probably wouldn’t like it. His next question, whether or not the movie was scary, gave me pause. Even though the film manages to include a certain measure of hope, it is an unvarnished look at the subject of climate change. For those like my son, his siblings, and others born after the dawn of the new millennium—a generation facing the potential for lives more influenced by climate change than my own—the issue is a scary one indeed. At the time, I wrestled with just how to tell him this. How could I lay on those small shoulders the fact that the world faced a crisis with the potential to unweave the very fabric of peace and prosperity we have come to take for granted? Worse yet, how could I tell him the world was already seeing storms increase in number and severity, as low-lying island nations struggled with the reality that rising seas threatened their very existence? At least, how could I tell him that without also being able to offer the parents’ classic bromide that “but you don’t need to worry about that”? The truth was that he did need to worry. He still does; we all do. So the next logical question is what are we doing about it? That day I was not yet aware of the efforts of the UNFCCC and the annual COPs. I knew of the Kyoto Protocol, of course, but it would be four years before I connected with Keith Peterman and traveled to Copenhagen for the much-anticipated COP15. Although we departed from “Hopenhagen” without much in the way of progress, those were to be my first steps on this continuing journey. The intervening years between Copenhagen and Marrakech—punctuated most notably by the euphoric success of COP21 in Paris—offered some confidence that we are making progress in our efforts to reduce the effects and eventual impacts of climate change. As I finalized travel plans to Morocco in the fall of 2016, it seemed this truly would be the “COP of Action.” Indeed, the momentum created in Paris carried over to COP22. In order for the Paris Agreement to take effect, it required ratification by no fewer than 55 countries that together represented at least 55% of global climate emissions (12). We passed that milestone on November 4, 2016, marking the first time that such a sweeping number of governments have agreed to binding limits to combat the rise in global temperatures (13). As the agreement entered into effect, UNFCCC Executive Secretary Patricia Espinosa, and Moroccan Foreign Minister Salaheddine Mezouar issued a joint statement. It read in part that “…humanity will look back on 4 November 2016 as 115

the day that countries of the world shut the door on inevitable climate disaster and set off with determination towards a sustainable future” (13). The stage was set. Morocco would mark an important pivot from the hard work of forging an international agreement, to the even harder work of executing the plan laid out in Paris. The pivot, it turned out, was not the one we expected. Instead, it came in the form of a presidential election result that sent shock waves across the country and around the world. Perhaps nowhere were these waves felt more acutely than at Bab Ighli, the official venue for COP22. I arrived at Marrakesh Menara airport just six days after the election, and I’m sure I was not alone in my misgivings about the future of the COP process. King Mohammed VI of Morocco had welcomed the attendees to “…the land of dialogue and coexistence,” but judging from the mood I’d left back home, this might be the last time we would experience either of those things for some time to come (14). Donald Trump is many things, but a believer in the science of climate change is not one of them. He has famously called global warming a hoax “created by and for the Chinese in order to make U.S. manufacturing non-competitive” (15). As he contemplates the fastest means to remove the U.S. from the Paris Agreement, though, one thing is clear—withdrawal will not mean the death of the agreement. If we cede leadership on this issue as part of an attempt to revitalize our reliance on coal and other fossil fuels, the world will simply move on without us: •

•

•

•

France has announced plans to decommission all of its coal power plants by 2023 (16). Already a leading exporter of electricity (due in large part to low generation costs), France sees revenue exceeding €3 billion per year as a result of its renewable focus (17); The UK (which met more than half of its energy needs through renewable means in the summer of 2016) has similar plans to shutter all coal-fired power plants by 2025 (18); Germany’s coalition government has agreed on a climate change action plan that will reduce greenhouse gas emissions by as much as 95% by 2050 (19). Among the world’s primary industrial nations, Germany is an established leader, drawing roughly 27% of its electricity from renewables in 2016—an increase of 300% over the last decade and more than twice what the United States gets today (20); and China has unveiled a proposal for a $50 trillion global electricity network linking existing and future solar farms, wind turbines and electricity plants in Asia, Europe, Africa and the Americas, with the expressed purpose of fighting pollution and the effects of climate change (21).

The progress is by no means limited to the world’s developed economies, either. In an effort to show their own commitment to dealing with global warming, the 47 members of the Climate Vulnerable Forum (CVF), which includes Tuvalu, Ethiopia, Costa Rica, and others, issued a promise in Marrakech to fully green their economies between 2030 and 2050. 116

This plan, called the Marrakech Vision, promises that the members will “strive to meet 100% domestic renewable energy production as rapidly as possible, while working to end energy poverty and protect water and food security, taking into consideration national circumstances” (22). Costa Rica is years ahead of even this ambitious goal, having announced that more than 98% of its energy in 2016 came from a mix of hydroelectric, geothermal, wind, biomass, and solar generation methods (23). The loss of any sort of credibility on the global climate stage, however, will put us at risk of damaging our economic competitiveness. Both Mexico’s Undersecretary for Environmental Policy and Planning, and French Presidential candidate Nicolas Sarkozy have said carbon tariffs against the United States are an option for us,” (24, 25). The pace of innovation and investment related to clean energy is staggering. No longer are emission-free energy sources economically questionable—unsubsidized solar is becoming cheaper than wind and outcompetes coal and natural gas on a larger scale (26). Thierry Lepercq, Head of Research, Technology and Innovation at the French energy company Engie SA, has even said that he sees potential for the cost of solar energy in the most favorable climates to fall below $0.01 per kilowatt hour by 2025 (27). Meanwhile, software-titan-turned-philanthropist Bill Gates has announced the creation of the $1 billion Breakthrough Energy Ventures fund, aimed at commercializing new technologies for power generation and storage, transportation, and system efficiency, among others (28). Moreover, as then-UN Secretary General Ban Ki-moon stated in Morocco, “We have no right to gamble with the fate of future generations” (29). The COP process is an established, effective hedge against precisely the kinds of threats that can be presented by a lone demagogue. As the parties gather again in Bonn for COP23, they will reaffirm this fact, and the ACS student representatives will be on hand to play their ongoing, vital part in the process (30).

Reflections by Keith Peterman Earth Day 2016 Earth Day 2016 was especially poignant for me. From the global to the personal, a number of events served as reminders of times past and hope for our future. On the global scale, world leaders gathered at the UN in New York to sign the Paris Agreement. The 175 signatory nations represented the largest number of countries ever to sign an international agreement on a single day; it clearly turned our global economic ship in a new direction toward a low-carbon energy future (31). My personal context relates to the global theme for Earth Day 2016: Trees for the Earth (32). In conjunction with the Earth Day theme and opening of the Paris Agreement for signatories, the UN proposed a worldwide challenge to plant 7.8 billion trees by 2020 (33). This number represents the projected population—one tree for every man, woman, and child—who will be alive in 2020. 117

In keeping with the Earth Day theme, and in support of nations around the globe signing on to the Paris Agreement, chemistry majors at my home institution, York College of Pennsylvania, decided to get their hands dirty. They planted nine trees on our campus—five dogwoods, three redbuds, and a red oak (34). Watching these students remove the sod and dig into the earth gave me a great sense of hope for the future of our planet. As the students were giving new life to our campus, my oldest daughter was in labor with her third child in Florida. By early evening, she delivered an Earth Day baby girl. The red oak, which I donated to this project, is officially named “Annette” after my Earth Day granddaughter. This tree, along with the eight others planted on Earth Day 2016, equal the number of my grandchildren. Just 7,799,999,991 more trees to go.

Paris to Marrakech This reflection is written in part as I sit with my co-editors Greg and Matt at the COP22 venue in Marrakech, Morocco. I’m touched by conflicting emotions of melancholy and hope. We are in Marrakech for the November 2016 COP22 (35). Marrakech is a gritty, bustling commercial hub situated on a plateau and surrounded by the snow-capped Atlas Mountains. While the city basks under clear, blue, sunny skies, COP22 negotiators labor under a dark cloud of uncertainty due to the outcome of the recent U.S. Presidential elections. During the run up to the election, PresidentElect Donald Trump proclaimed that he would withdraw from the Paris Agreement on day one of his presidency. Matt, Greg, and I also participated in the December 2015 COP21 in Paris, where 196 parties to the UNFCCC forged a long-awaited global agreement to address climate change (36). COP22 in Marrakech serves as the first meeting of Parties to the Paris Agreement—called CMA1—which will establish the Paris Agreement governing body with authority over all administrative, procedural, operational, and substantive matters. November 2016 may turn out to be a true turning point in the global climate change story, or it may ultimately go down in history as a month of infamy. The Paris Agreement entered into force on November 4, 2016. COP22, dubbed “The COP of Action,” opened just three days later on November 7. The very next day, the outcome of the U.S. election shocked the world as a minority of American voters were able to elect Donald Trump under the U.S. Electoral College system. Trump is a climate change denier who has declared the very existence of climate change a hoax “created by and for the Chinese to make U.S. manufacturing less competitive.” Here in Marrakech, China’s vice foreign minister, Liu Zhenmin, pointedly countered Trump’s claim, stating, “If you look at the history of climate change negotiations, actually it was initiated by the IPCC with the support of the Republicans during the Reagan and senior Bush administration during the late 1980s (37).” Once inaugurated, Trump will stand as the only head of state who denies the science of climate change (10). 118

As of this writing, Trump is surrounding himself with self-proclaimed climate skeptics. He appears to be tapping fossil fuel barons and anti-environmental regulation industrialists to stack senior positions within his administration. At the opening of the High-Level Segment of COP22, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon counseled, “countries have strongly supported the [Paris] Agreement, because they realize their own national interest is best secured by pursuing the common good.” As this book goes to press, the question remains: will Trump’s inner circle heed Ban’s warning that “no country, however resourceful or powerful, is immune from the impacts of climate change” (38)? In a compelling speech during week two of COP22 in Marrakech, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said, “For those in power in all parts of the world, including my own, who may be confronted with decisions about which road to take at this critical juncture, I ask you, on behalf of billions of people around the world: Don’t take my word for it. Don’t take just the existence of this COP as the stamp of approval for it. I ask you to see for yourselves. Do your own due diligence before making irrevocable choices (11).” It is my hope that this book, written by youth working to promote climate literacy, will fall into the hands of business decision makers and those who have influence over public policy whose due diligence will help to inform our path forward. Living in the Anthropocene The Holocene came to an end in the mid-20th Century. All of human history developed during this geological Epoch—all, that is, except that defined by my lifetime. The Holocene describes the 11,700-year epoch since the last major ice age. In general, the Holocene has been a relatively warm period, with the exception of minor deviations like the “The Little Ice Age” between 1200 and 1700 A.D. The “Age of Man” has witnessed the rise and fall of civilizations, the evolution of written language, and towering achievements in knowledge and technology. Throughout the Holocene, our planet also experienced slow, adverse impacts as humans grew in number and began to exploit Earth’s seemingly limitless resources. We began leaving discernable traces on Earth’s stratigraphic record. Then, about the time I was born, something happened. Substantial, globally synchronous changes to our planet intensified the “Great Acceleration of the mid-20th Century”. This “Great Acceleration” marked the beginning of the Anthropocene Epoch, and closed the door on the Holocene (39). I was born just after World War II, in 1947. My birth coincides approximately with the ‘golden spike’—the global signal that coincides with the change from the Holocene to the Anthropocene. Although there are multiple potential ‘signals’ in the recent strata, plutonium fallout from nuclear tests is the currently favored signal. My life has been lived entirely in the Anthropocene Epoch. My generation and all generations since have levied an outsized, planet-scale impact on this habitable rock we call Earth. The Anthropocene is but a thin smear on the timeline of geological epochs. It promises to be one with enormous challenges, as well as extraordinary opportunities. 119

It is not my intent to write a “doom-and-gloom” conclusion in this book. I have hope for humanity and future generations. I hope that readers will join me in demanding that our policymakers make decisions informed by the science, not merely those based on rigid beliefs while wearing ideological blinders.

Hope As we rode the bus to the official venue on the last day of COP22, ACS student representative Hannah Melton—a senior at Johns Hopkins University—told me that she had hope and felt energized by the Conference. She said that older participants interacted with respect and were genuinely interested in what she had to say. She recognized the somber mood of uncertainty created by the election, but she also sensed a passing of the torch. Aging policymakers will soon be gone, and her generation will take a seat at the negotiating table. With any luck, her generation will not be encumbered by climate change skeptics. I, too, have hope. Hannah, the student authors of chapters in this book, and future policymakers from her generation will be making decisions for my Earth Day granddaughter Annette, my other eight grandchildren, children around the globe, and those not yet born. Pope Francis admonishes, “We receive this world as an inheritance from past generations, but also as a loan for future generations, to whom we will have to return it (40).” It is my hope that the students engaged in this ACS-sponsored climate change literacy program and this book help inform you and others of our moral and ethical obligation to act now for future generations.

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Editors’ Biographies Keith E. Peterman Dr. Keith Peterman is a Professor of Chemistry at York College of Pennsylvania. He is a member of the ACS Committee on Environmental Improvement. He has served as a Fulbright Scholar in Germany and in Russia, a National Academy of Sciences Scholar in Poland, a Research Fellow at the Naval Research Laboratory in Washington, DC, and as a visiting professor in China and New Zealand. He writes a blog hosted by the York Daily Record and is a contributing member of the Huffington Post blog team. He participates in the UN climate conferences as an accredited member of the press.

Gregory P. Foy Dr. Gregory P. Foy is an Associate Professor of Chemistry at York College of Pennsylvania. He is the Chemistry Program Coordinator, and his research interests are focused on Environmental Chemistry. He is a member of the ACS Committee on Meetings and Expositions. Since the International Year of Chemistry 2011, he has shepherded more than 50 college students to attend the yearly United Nations climate change meetings. He writes a blog hosted by the York Daily Record and is a contributing member of the Huffington Post blog team and attends the COPs as an accredited member of the press.

Matthew R. Cordes Matt Cordes is the Founder and Principal Writer at WritingWorks. Since 2005 he has worked with more than 250 commercial and nonprofit clients in the northeastern U.S. to provide writing, research, and business development consulting. With several clients working in the renewable energy space, (primarily solar photovoltaics and biodigestion), Matt focuses on topics of climate and energy in many of his writing efforts. He has participated in several UN climate conferences and written extensively on the topic of climate change.

© 2017 American Chemical Society

Indexes

Author Index Cordes, M., ix, 111 Foy, G., ix, 111 Hartweg, B., 81 Jackson, C., 25 Leaness, J., 1 Margida, G., 41

McCrary, P., 49 McDonald, J., 63, 99 Peterman, K., ix, 111 Shrestha, P., 13 Williams, M., 91

129

Subject Index C Carbon, price carbon pricing China, 70 European Union, 69 United States, 71 carbon pricing, momentum carbon pricing leadership coalition, government support, 74t coalition launch, 73 establishing jurisdictional carbon pricing mechanisms, process, 75 link to business, 74 raising the bar, 74 we will get this done, 63 cap or tax, 68 emissions reductions, 65 externalities, 66 one jurisdiction at a time, 67 Poirrier, Alyssa, National Conference on Science, Policy, and the Environment, 64f polluter pays principle, 68 Climate change adaptation and mitigation, 30 Asia, 32 attitudes towards climate change, 28 Pew Research Center Global Attitudes Survey, 29f Yale project, 30f Bangladesh, case study, 35 sustainable development, Bangladesh, 36 China, case study, 34 China, CO2 emissions and carbon intensity, 35f poverty, 27 Climate Change Vulnerability Index, 28f renewable energy, 31

Barianna, Shelby, COP20 Lima, Peru, 102f renewables, next generation cost, 103 decentralized systems, 106 ramping up, storage, smart grids, 105 renewables are forging ahead, 106 variability, 104

F Fighting climate change, power of the public empower each other, creating the tools, 96 environmentalism, resilience, 95 local government collaboration, 93 regional collaboration, 94 non-profits that foster a movement, 93

I Indigenous peoples, climate change policy COP 21 indigenous youth groups, 7 Peruvian palm oil, 6 defining indigenous, 2 it’s not over, 9 journey begins, 1 journey continues, 3 Paris Agreement, 8 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, history of indigenous participation, 3 declaration, the, 4 International Indigenous People’s Forum on Climate Change (IIPFCC), 5

E

P

Electric grid, re-energize clean energy ministerial, 107 instantaneous demand, 99 Glacier Peak, 100f Paris Agreement, renewable energy, 101

Paris Agreement background, 50 Doha amendment, 51 from Doha to Paris, 58 first pledge period, 53 global response, 54

131

NDCs, legally binding character, 53 ratification, 56 Personal COP journey Cordes, Matt, COP reflections, 115 Foy, Greg, unfinished COP journey, 112 it is better to light a candle than to curse the darkness, 111 Peterman, Keith, reflections Earth Day 2016, 117 hope, 120 living in the Anthropocene, 119 Paris to Marrakech, 118

R Race and climate change Black Lives Matter, 43 climate racism, 42 environmental racism, 45

faces with the names, 41 one-point-five to stay alive, 42 promote climate literacy, Prince’s effort, 44 REDD’s impact on indigenous communities, COP21, voices against REDD+, 17 deforestation, 14 deforestation, drivers, 15 deforestation, main consequences, 15 pathway to climate justice, COP21, 13 REDD+, 16 Renewable energy, global implementation developing nations, 86 GCC countries, 85 industrialized nations, 83 Renewable Energy Directive, 84 Kyoto Protocol, 82 Paris Agreement, 83

132