Climate Change and Renewable Energy: How to End the Climate Crisis [1st ed.] 9783030154233, 9783030154240, 3030154238

Table of contents :
Preface......Page 6
Contents......Page 10
Abbreviations and Symbols......Page 17
List of Figures......Page 20
List of Tables......Page 27
Introduction......Page 29
Heat Waves......Page 30
Natural Disasters......Page 34
Trends in Climate-Related Disasters......Page 36
A World on Fire......Page 39
Sea Ice......Page 44
Glaciers......Page 46
Ice Sheets......Page 47
Coral Reefs and Oceans......Page 50
Acidification......Page 53
Deoxygenation......Page 54
Plastic Pollution......Page 55
Outdoor Air Pollution......Page 60
Household Air Pollution......Page 64
Air Pollution and Children......Page 65
Water Pollution......Page 67
In Sickness and in Health......Page 68
Pesticides......Page 70
Biodiversity......Page 71
The Sixth Extinction?......Page 73
The Big Picture......Page 76
Conclusion......Page 78
Introduction......Page 86
In the Greenhouse......Page 87
In the Beginning......Page 89
The Greenhouse Gases......Page 91
Black Carbon......Page 94
Drought and Floods......Page 95
East Africa—The Drought Years......Page 97
Ethiopia......Page 98
California......Page 99
Floods......Page 100
Food Insecurity......Page 103
Access......Page 104
Stability......Page 105
Locusts......Page 106
The Warming Soils......Page 107
Permafrost Soils......Page 108
The Rising Seas......Page 109
Storm Surge......Page 110
Species on the Move......Page 117
Climate Change and Conflict......Page 119
Climate Change and Poverty......Page 122
Climate-Driven Migration......Page 123
Too Hot to Handle......Page 126
The IPCC......Page 127
Conclusion......Page 129
Introduction......Page 136
Fast Carbon......Page 137
The Temperature Connection......Page 139
Land Use Change......Page 141
Methane......Page 143
In the Ocean......Page 145
On the Land......Page 146
Two Degrees of Heat......Page 149
An Agreement in Paris......Page 152
Mind the Gap......Page 153
Negative Emission Technologies......Page 155
Keep It in the Ground......Page 161
Conclusion......Page 164
Introduction......Page 169
Coal......Page 170
The Miners and the Mines......Page 171
Preparing the Coal......Page 173
Generating Electricity......Page 176
Mercury......Page 179
The Minamata Convention......Page 181
Petroleum......Page 182
Offshore Disasters......Page 185
The Macondo Well Disaster......Page 188
Oil Refineries......Page 189
Oil Sands......Page 192
Cyclic Steam Stimulation......Page 194
Petcoke......Page 196
Hydraulic Fracturing......Page 197
Water Usage......Page 199
Methane Emissions......Page 202
Gathering the Gas......Page 205
Railway Carbon......Page 208
The Pipeline Wars......Page 213
Standing Rock......Page 214
Canada’s Pipelines......Page 215
Climate Justice......Page 221
The Cost of Carbon......Page 225
Conclusion......Page 228
Introduction......Page 239
Wind and Water......Page 240
Leading the Way......Page 241
Global Energy Production......Page 243
The Key Sectors......Page 245
The Power Sector......Page 246
Can Coal Come Clean?......Page 248
Transport......Page 250
Public Transport......Page 254
Marine and Aviation......Page 255
Shipping......Page 256
Case Study: Sweden......Page 258
Residential and Tertiary......Page 259
Going Electric......Page 260
Solar Thermal......Page 262
Geothermal Heating......Page 264
Carbon Capture and Storage......Page 265
Rural Electrification......Page 267
Minigrids......Page 268
Tanzania......Page 270
Haiti......Page 273
Solar Home Systems......Page 275
The Economics of Minigrids......Page 277
Energy Efficiency......Page 280
Industry......Page 281
Buildings......Page 283
Transport......Page 285
Strategies for Improving Energy Efficiency......Page 287
Conclusion......Page 288
Introduction......Page 296
Wind Power......Page 297
How It Works......Page 299
Capacity Factor......Page 301
Windspeed Distribution......Page 302
Wind Resources......Page 305
Levelized Cost of Electricity (LCOE)......Page 307
Environmental Impacts......Page 310
Birds and Bats......Page 311
Solar Photovoltaic Energy......Page 312
Photovoltaic Technology......Page 316
Distributed Solar Energy......Page 319
Community Shared Solar......Page 321
Onsite Energy Storage......Page 322
Levelized Cost of PV Electricity......Page 324
Concentrating Solar Power......Page 325
Regional Trends......Page 328
Pumped Storage......Page 329
Greenhouse Gas Emissions......Page 330
Environmental Impacts......Page 331
Biomass Energy......Page 333
Biofuels......Page 335
Advanced biofuels......Page 336
Biogas......Page 337
Geothermal Energy......Page 338
How It Works......Page 340
Geothermal Direct Use......Page 341
Nuclear Power......Page 342
Energy Storage......Page 344
Behind the Meter......Page 346
Comparing the Costs......Page 347
Conclusion......Page 349
Introduction......Page 357
Carbon Pricing......Page 358
Tax, Cap or Trade?......Page 360
The Global Overview......Page 362
Carbon Revenues......Page 364
The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative......Page 367
Quebec Cap-and-Trade System for Emission Allowances......Page 374
Carbon Revenues......Page 376
British Columbia......Page 377
California......Page 380
Fossil Fuel Subsidies......Page 383
One Hundred Percent Clean?......Page 386
Petrochemicals......Page 388
Metallurgical Coal......Page 390
Conclusion......Page 391
Introduction......Page 397
Manufacturing Doubt......Page 398
Detection and Concern......Page 399
Research, and More Research......Page 401
The Decades of Denial......Page 404
ExxonMobil’s Denial Campaign......Page 407
Mixing the Message......Page 409
Getting Personal......Page 411
The Thomas Karl Affair......Page 414
The Balancing Act......Page 417
SLAPPing Them Around......Page 419
Prepping the Kids......Page 422
Regulatory Capture......Page 425
Expunging the Record......Page 429
Big Oil, Big Pockets......Page 430
Sunblock......Page 431
Fuelling US Forward......Page 434
Denying the Science......Page 436
Conclusion......Page 438
Introduction......Page 445
The IPCC Special Report......Page 446
Small Island Developing States......Page 447
Business as Usual......Page 448
On the Wrong Track......Page 449
Can We Trust the IPCC Reports?......Page 452
Risky Business......Page 453
The Fat Tail Problem......Page 454
Permafrost Carbon Emissions......Page 455
Arctic Sea Ice......Page 457
Antarctic Ice Sheet......Page 458
Sea Level Rise......Page 459
Settling the Argument......Page 461
Action Not Words......Page 462
A Framework for Climate Action......Page 464
Strategic Objectives......Page 465
Non-state Actors......Page 478
Divestment......Page 479
In the Streets......Page 481
Extinction Rebellion......Page 482
L’union Fait La Force......Page 484
Make Your Vote Count......Page 489
Conclusion......Page 490
Annex......Page 492
Glossary......Page 500
Index......Page 527

Citation preview

Climate Change and Renewable Energy How to End the Climate Crisis Martin J. Bush

Climate Change and Renewable Energy

Martin J. Bush

Climate Change and Renewable Energy How to End the Climate Crisis

Martin J. Bush Markham, ON, Canada

ISBN 978-3-030-15423-3 ISBN 978-3-030-15424-0  (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15424-0 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2020 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover credit: © Marina Lohrbach_shutterstock.com This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

This book is dedicated to all the young people of the world who have found themselves to be living on a planet in serious existential trouble. Never before in the history of planet Earth has a single species, in this case homo sapiens, been so dangerously and mindlessly destructive to the point where its selfish actions threaten to trigger a sixth extinction. There is still time to save most of humanity—but only if there is forceful and rapid international action to curb global heating and slowly and eventually reverse the worsening impacts of the changing climate. For Michael, Corry, Sonny, Zaina, Johnny and Aida, growing up in the thick of the worsening climate crisis, their future welfare and well-being is uncertain and fraught with danger. My hope is that this book will make a small contribution to the groundswell of global action as a younger generation of vocal activists force moribund politicians to finally take stronger and more effective measures to bring the climate crisis to an end.

Preface

Many excellent books have been written about global heating and climate change. Even more about renewable sources of energy; but far fewer about how these inexhaustible sources of clean energy are the key to slowing and eventually halting the emissions of the carbon gases that are driving the planet towards a dangerously warmer state. In this book I show how these climate change-related dimensions are linked and interrelated. I explain how inexhaustible supplies of renewable energy can replace coal, oil and natural gas; how the transport sector will become electrified; and how all new buildings will soon be super energy-­ efficient and powered by electricity from renewable sources of energy. The fly in the ointment—and it’s a very big fly—are the fossil fuel and petrochemical companies and their allies in government agencies who are working night and day to try and block the transition to clean renewable energy. It’s obvious to most people that the planet is in serious trouble. Although the climate deniers and contrarians are trying hard to convince us that global heating is not happening and that the climate is not changing (or if it is, it’s not because of what we humans are doing), the scientific evidence for a warming planet caused by the emissions of greenhouse gases from human industry and energy use is now indisputable. Anyone who reads up on the subject and consults the mainstream scientific journals can easily separate fact from fiction. From north pole to south, the planet has entered an era of unprecedented disruption and deterioration—at least since homo sapiens first walked the Earth. The most visible and obvious signs are the stronger and more destructive hurricanes and cyclones, the insufferable heatwaves, the increased vii

viii      Preface

frequency of floods that displace thousands sometimes millions of people, the melting glaciers, and the massively destructive wildfires. But behind the scenes, in the undergrowth of the forests and deep in the oceans, the natural world is struggling to survive. While many urban communities, at least in the wealthy industrialised countries, can mostly handle the extreme weather and the wildfires, the loss of biodiversity and the extinction of numerous species of all types of animals, especially insects, is inevitably going to cause widespread disruption of agriculture, fisheries, and the services provided by natural ecosystems everywhere around the world. There is no technical fix for extinction. People will flee from lands parched by continuous drought and so scorched by heat that agriculture is almost impossible. The first signs of a regional migration out of the areas of the world most afflicted by drought, floods, and heatwaves are already becoming clear. The links between climate change, migration, and conflict are increasingly being examined and confirmed. In order to understand why global heating is happening and how it causes the climate to change, it is necessary to grasp some of the basics of climate science. This book explains them in terms that everyone can understand. Then we look more closely at the fossil fuel industries. We count the miners dying from black lung disease, the tailings pond disasters, the mercury emissions, and the coal train fatal accidents. The roll call of disasters for the oil industry is worse: the offshore oil rig explosions and marine pollution; the tanker collisions and oil spills; the pipeline fractures and fires; and the oil train accidents and explosions, are a continual litany of catastrophic disasters. Then there’s fracking and the biggest environmental mess of all: the Canadian tar sands. Huge solar photovoltaic arrays and megawatt scale wind farms are now generating electricity at the same scale as fossil fuel power plants, and at a fraction of the cost. The levelized cost of electricity from solar energy and wind power is now below that of electricity generated by conventional coal, oil and natural gas. Market forces and investor self-interest will eventually side-line the fossil fuels—except where politicians in the pocket of the oil companies and petrochemical conglomerates try to block this inevitable transition. This book takes an eye-opening look into the shadowy, darkmoney world of regulatory capture, SLAPP suits, ad hominem attacks on climate scientists, and how the oil companies are prepping your children for a fossil fuel future. Most of the 190-plus countries that signed up to the 2015 Paris Agreement are gradually reducing their emissions of greenhouse gases—or

Preface     ix

say they plan to. But three major scientific reports published in late 2018 and early 2019 documented the dangers of moving forward so slowly. Those studies showed that we are not on course to keep global warming to below 2 ℃ above pre-industrial era levels. Not even close. Is it possible to limit global warming to less than 2 ℃ and keep the extreme weather and the impacts of climate change-driven disasters within manageable bounds? That’s the wrong question. Of course it’s possible. But is it likely? It all depends how rapidly and forcefully governments take action to drive the transition to clean and inexhaustible sources of renewable energy that have zero emissions of greenhouse gases. This book shows how this transition can be accomplished. Climate scientists are highly trained specialists: meteorologists, atmospheric physicists and chemists, cryosphere experts, glaciologists, biologists, ecologists, foresters, and agronomists. Not to mention all the mathematicians modelling the climate and the statisticians analysing the data. I was trained as a chemical engineer, but never worked in the petrochemical industry. Instead, I used my engineering training to work first on renewable energy technologies and then, after working in several developing countries, to shift to natural resources management, and then finally to climate change adaptation and management. I also have done something that very few climate scientists have experienced. I have actually lived in many of the countries that will suffer the most from climate change: Haiti, Trinidad and Tobago, Mali, Guinea, Madagascar, Egypt, Sudan and Djibouti. I have worked for years at a time in these countries, and seen how vulnerable the populations are to drought, floods, and extreme weather. I have also worked for shorter periods in Ethiopia, Uganda and Bangladesh. But the most exposed and vulnerable countries are the small island developing states: the SIDS. Many of the low-lying islands like Tuvalu, the Maldives, Kiribati, and the Marshall Islands will gradually become uninhabitable as sea levels rise and hurricanes and cyclones drive storm-surge waves hundreds of metres inland, polluting ground water resources, destroying crops, and sweeping away homes and livestock. There is little hope that all of these beautiful islands will survive. In the Caribbean, the islands will be increasingly devastated by stronger more destructive hurricanes, like Hurricane Dorian which smashed into the Bahamas in September 2019. The focus in this book is on the big picture. The climate scientists and other specialists are doing a brilliant job documenting and reporting how the world’s ecosystems, its biodiversity, and the global environment are changing and deteriorating. But sometimes the specialists can’t see the wood

x      Preface

for the trees. To employ another analogy, climate scientists are providing us with carefully measured pieces of a huge global jigsaw puzzle. This book explains how these pieces all fit together and shows that what comes into focus is the stark reality of life-threatening climate change on a global scale. In 2019, it was generally accepted that global climate change was now a global climate crisis. Several countries, including the UK, have declared a climate emergency. The book concludes with an analysis that shows how we can all individually take action and pressure politicians and policymakers to make real changes that will reduce emissions of greenhouse gases, accelerate the transition to renewable sources of energy, electrify the transport sector, capture carbon from industrial pollution, and gradually curtail global heating and lessen the destructive impacts of the changing climate. The climate crisis can be brought to an end—but only if strong and game-changing action is taken by governments around the globe. We have the tools: the renewable energy technologies that will shut down the emissions of greenhouse gases, drive out the smog from urban air, and improve the health of millions of urban families are well known, less costly, and easily available. What is lacking is forceful action by the people we have elected to represent us and to govern in our best interests. This has to change. Markham, ON, Canada

Martin J. Bush

Contents

1 A Planet in Peril 1 Introduction 1 Heat Waves 2 Natural Disasters 6 Trends in Climate-Related Disasters 8 A World on Fire 11 The Big Melt 16 Sea Ice 16 Glaciers 18 Ice Sheets 19 Permafrost 22 Coral Reefs and Oceans 22 Acidification 25 Deoxygenation 26 Plastic Pollution 27 Air Pollution 32 Outdoor Air Pollution 32 Household Air Pollution 36 Air Pollution and Children 37 Water Pollution 39 In Sickness and in Health 40 Pesticides 42 Biodiversity 43

xi

xii      Contents

The Sixth Extinction? 45 The Big Picture 48 Conclusion 50 2 The Overheated Earth 59 Introduction 59 In the Greenhouse 60 In the Beginning 62 The Greenhouse Gases 64 Black Carbon 67 Drought and Floods 68 East Africa—The Drought Years 70 Ethiopia 71 California 72 South Africa 73 Floods 73 Food Insecurity 76 Availability 77 Access 77 Utilization 78 Stability 78 Locusts 79 The Warming Soils 80 Permafrost Soils 81 The Rising Seas 82 Storm Surge 83 Species on the Move 90 Climate Change and Conflict 92 Climate Change and Poverty 95 Climate-Driven Migration 96 Too Hot to Handle 99 The IPCC 100 Conclusion 102 3 The Carbon Cycle 109 Introduction 109 Fast Carbon 110 The Temperature Connection 112 Land Use Change 114

Contents     xiii

Methane 116 Enlarging the Sinks 118 In the Ocean 118 On the Land 119 Dialling It Down 122 Two Degrees of Heat 122 An Agreement in Paris 125 Mind the Gap 126 Negative Emission Technologies 128 Keep It in the Ground 134 Conclusion 137 4 Carbon Chaos 143 Introduction 143 Coal 144 The Miners and the Mines 145 Preparing the Coal 147 Generating Electricity 150 Mercury 153 The Minamata Convention 155 Petroleum 156 Offshore Disasters 159 The Macondo Well Disaster 162 Oil Refineries 163 Oil Sands 166 Steam Assisted Gravity Drainage 168 Cyclic Steam Stimulation 168 Petcoke 170 Hydraulic Fracturing 171 Water Usage 173 Methane Emissions 176 Gathering the Gas 179 Railway Carbon 182 The Pipeline Wars 187 Standing Rock 188 Canada’s Pipelines 189 Take the Train 195 Climate Justice 195 The Cost of Carbon 199 Conclusion 202

xiv      Contents

5 Coming Clean 213 Introduction 213 Wind and Water 214 Leading the Way 215 Global Energy Production 217 The Key Sectors 219 The Power Sector 220 Can Coal Come Clean? 222 Transport 224 Public Transport 228 Marine and Aviation 229 Shipping 230 Case Study: Sweden 232 Aviation 233 Residential and Tertiary 233 Going Electric 234 Solar Thermal 236 Geothermal Heating 238 Industry 239 Carbon Capture and Storage 239 Rural Electrification 241 Minigrids 242 Tanzania 244 Haiti 247 Solar Home Systems 249 The Economics of Minigrids 251 Energy Efficiency 254 Industry 255 Buildings 257 Transport 259 Strategies for Improving Energy Efficiency 261 Conclusion 262 6 Getting Technical 271 Introduction 271 Wind Power 272 The Twenty-First Century 274 How It Works 274 Capacity Factor 276

Contents     xv

Windspeed Distribution 277 Wind Resources 280 Levelized Cost of Electricity (LCOE) 282 Environmental Impacts 285 Solar Photovoltaic Energy 287 Photovoltaic Technology 291 Distributed Solar Energy 294 Levelized Cost of PV Electricity 299 Concentrating Solar Power 300 Hydropower 303 Regional Trends 303 Pumped Storage 304 Greenhouse Gas Emissions 305 Environmental Impacts 306 Biomass Energy 308 Biofuels 310 Advanced biofuels 311 Biogas 312 Geothermal Energy 313 How It Works 315 Geothermal Direct Use 316 Nuclear Power 317 Energy Storage 319 Behind the Meter 321 Comparing the Costs 322 Conclusion 324 7 Pricing Down Carbon 333 Introduction 333 Dialling It Down 334 Carbon Pricing 334 Tax, Cap or Trade? 336 The Global Overview 338 Carbon Revenues 340 The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 343 Quebec Cap-and-Trade System for Emission Allowances 350 Carbon Revenues 352 British Columbia 353 California 356

xvi      Contents

Fossil Fuel Subsidies 359 One Hundred Percent Clean? 362 Petrochemicals 364 Metallurgical Coal 366 Cement Production 367 Conclusion 367 8 Denial and Deception 373 Introduction 373 Manufacturing Doubt 374 Detection and Concern 375 Research, and More Research 377 The Decades of Denial 380 ExxonMobil’s Denial Campaign 383 Mixing the Message 385 Getting Personal 387 The Thomas Karl Affair 390 The Balancing Act 393 SLAPPing Them Around 395 Prepping the Kids 398 Regulatory Capture 401 Expunging the Record 405 Big Oil, Big Pockets 406 Sunblock 407 Fuelling US Forward 410 Denying the Science 412 Conclusion 414 9 How to End the Climate Crisis 421 Introduction 421 The IPCC Special Report 422 The Carbon Budget 423 Small Island Developing States 423 Business as Usual 424 On the Wrong Track 425 Can We Trust the IPCC Reports? 428 Risky Business 429 The Fat Tail Problem 430 Permafrost Carbon Emissions 431

Contents     xvii

Arctic Sea Ice 433 The Greenland Ice Sheet 434 Antarctic Ice Sheet 434 Sea Level Rise 435 Settling the Argument 437 Action Not Words 438 A Framework for Climate Action 440 Strategic Objectives 441 Non-state Actors 454 Divestment 455 In the Streets 457 Extinction Rebellion 458 Greta Thunberg 460 L’union Fait La Force 460 Make Your Vote Count 465 Conclusion 466 Annex 468 Glossary 477 Index 505

Abbreviations and Symbols

AIMS Africa, Indian Ocean, Mediterranean and South China Sea: A group of the SIDS ALEC American Legislative Exchange Council AR5 5th Assessment Report of the IPCC bbl Barrel, equal to 42 US gallons (about 159 liters) BECCS Bioenergy with carbon capture and storage CC Climate change CCS Carbon capture and storage CDC Centers for Disease Control (USA) CDR Carbon dioxide removal CH4 Methane CO2 Carbon dioxide COP Conference of the Parties (to the UNFCCC) CSA Climate smart agriculture DA Designated authority DAC Direct air capture EBA Ecosystem-based adaptation EEI Edison Electric Institute EEZ Economic exclusion zone ENSO El nino southern oscillation EPA Environmental Protection Agency (US) ESM Earth system models EVI Economic vulnerability index GCC Global Climate Coalition GCF Green Climate Fund GDP Gross domestic product GHG Greenhouse gases (principally CO2, methane, and nitrous oxide) xix

xx      Abbreviations and Symbols

GIS Geographic information system GMST Global mean surface temperature Gt Gigatonne (1 billion tonnes) GtC Gigaton of carbon GtCO2 Gigatonne of carbon dioxide GtCO2e Gigatonne of carbon dioxide equivalent (includes other greenhouse gases) GW Gigawatt (1 billion watts) GWh Gigawatthour (1 billion watthours) G$ Billion dollars (USD) ha Hectare. 10,000 square metres, equal to 4048 acres HDR Human development report IFPRI International Food Policy Research Institute INDC Intended nationally determined contribution IPCC Intergovernmental panel on climate change IPP Independent power producer IUCN International union for the conservation of nature kWp Kilowatt peak LDC Least developed country LED Light emitting diode MENA Middle East and North Africa MPA Marine protected area MSL Mean sea level MtCO2 Million tonnes of CO2 MtCO2e Million tonnes of eqivalent CO2 MUD Manufacturing uncertainty and doubt MW Megawatt (1 million watts) MWh Megawatthour (1 million watthours) MWp Peak megawatt (of a PV array) NAS National Academy of Science NASA National Aeronautical and Space Agency (USA) NDC Nationally determined contribution (to the Paris Agreement Targets) NEB National Energy Board (Canada) NET Negative emission technology NHC National Hurricane Centre (USA) NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (USA) pH A measure of acidity. A pH of 7 is neutral. A lower value is more acidic PNG Papua New Guinea PPA Power purchase agreement ppb Parts per billion ppm Parts per million

Abbreviations and Symbols     xxi

PV Photovoltaic solar energy RCP Representative concentration pathway RET Renewable energy technology RF Radiative forcing SIDS Small Island Developing State SLAPP Strategic lawsuit against public participation SST Sea surface temperature t/yr Tonnes per year UNDESA United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs UNEP United Nations Environment Program UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change WHO World Health Organisation WMO World Meteorological Organisation XR Extinction Rebellion

List of Figures

Fig. 1.1 Ratio of record highs to record lows in the USA (Source US Global Change Research Program 2017) 5 Fig. 1.2 Number of deaths per disaster type (Source Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters: Poverty & death: Disaster mortality 1996–2015 ) 7 Fig. 1.3 Number of climate-related disasters occurring each year since 1960 (Emergency events database, EM-DAT. Universite Catholique de Louvain. Accessed at: http://emdat.be/database in July 2017) (Source Emergency events database. Université Catholique de Louvain) 10 Fig. 1.4 Calls for assistance to the US Federal Emergency Management Agency 1997–2016 (Source US Environmental Defense Fund) 12 Fig. 1.5 Cars racing to escape the flames engulfing Fort McMurray in May 2016 13 Fig. 1.6 Wildfires blazing in Portugal in October 2017 14 Fig. 1.7 Human and lightning-ignited annual large forest fires (a); and shrub and grassland fires (b) on lands in the western US. The horizontal lines indicate 10-year averages (Source Westerling, A.L.R.: “Increasing western US forest wildfire activity: Sensitivity to changes in the timing of spring.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 371 [2016]: 20150178) 15 Fig. 1.8 Average monthly Arctic sea ice extent. August 1979–2017 (see the US National Snow and Ice Data Center website. Accessed at: https://nsidc.org/arcticseaicenews/2017/09/ the-end-of-summer-nears/) (Source US National Snow and Ice Data Center) 17 xxiii

xxiv      List of Figures

Fig. 1.9 Antarctic November sea-ice extent 1978–2018 (Source US National Snow and Ice Data Center) 18 Fig. 1.10 Glacier Bay National Park and Reserve’s White Thunder ridge—Then and now (Source US National Snow and Ice Data Center, state of the cryosphere) 19 Fig. 1.11 Annual mass balance of reference glaciers (see the WMO Report No. 1233. Statement on the State of the Global Climate in 2018 ) (Source World Meteorological Organisation, Statement on the State of the Global Climate in 2018 ) 20 Fig. 1.12 Mass balance trends for four major ice sheets (Source US National Snow and Ice Data Center) 21 Fig. 1.13 A ‘drunken forest’ in Alaska—caused by thawing permafrost (Source US National Snow and Ice Data Center) 23 Fig. 1.14 Coral bleaching (left) and coral dying (right) at Lizard Island (Source The Ocean Agency) 24 Fig. 1.15 Coral reef in Haiti destroyed by overfishing (A typical former coral reef at La Gonave in Haiti overfished to the point where it has become an algal dominated reef with a few stubs of coral surviving but no fish) (Source Reef Check) 25 Fig. 1.16 Impact of dissolved oxygen (DO) levels on marine organisms (see Dead zones and climate zones. Accessed at: http://www.vims.edu/research/topics/dead_zones/impacts/ index.php) (Source Virginia Institute of Marine Science) 28 Fig. 1.17 Plastic waste inputs into the ocean in 2010 (Source Jambeck Research Group) 29 Fig. 1.18 Remains of an albatross that had ingested plastic waste (Source Science Magazine) 30 Fig. 1.19 Mean concentrations of particulate matter (PM10) in 40 cities for the period 2011–2015 (Source World Health Organisation) 33 Fig. 1.20 Comparison of growth areas and declining emissions in the USA, 1980–2017 (Our nation’s air: https://gispub.epa.gov/ air/trendsreport/2017/#home) (Source US Environmental Protection Agency) 35 Fig. 1.21 Charcoal market in Haiti—Just outside Port-au Prince in 2013 (Source Author’s collection) 37 Fig. 1.22 Prevalence of undernourishment in the world and absolute numbers in millions (Source FAO, State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2018 ) 42 Fig. 2.1 Global temperature anomalies over land and over ocean (Source NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies) 61 Fig. 2.2 Global ocean heat content (0–2000 m) (Source National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration) 62

List of Figures     xxv

Fig. 2.3 Global mean energy budget of the Earth under present day conditions (Source Institute for Atmospheric and Climate Science ETH Zurich) 63 Fig. 2.4 The Keeling curve—Atmospheric concentrations of CO2 measured at Mauna Loa observatory (Source Scripps Institution of Oceanography) 65 Fig. 2.5 Global atmospheric levels of methane (left) and nitrous oxide (right) (Source WMO Statement on the State of the Global Climate in 2018) 66 Fig. 2.6 Number of people affected by drought since 1990 (Graph from the EM-DAT database) (Source Centre of Research for the Epidemiology of Disasters, Université Catholique de Louvain) 69 Fig. 2.7 Number of people affected by floods between 1900–2015 (The graph is from the EM-DAT database) (Source Centre of Research for the Epidemiology of Disasters, Université Catholique de Louvain) 74 Fig. 2.8 Storm surge and storm tide (Source US National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration) 84 Fig. 2.9 The price of food and social unrest in 40 countries (Source FAO. The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2017 ) 93 Fig. 2.10 Annual mean growth rates of CO2 at Mauna Loa Observatory (Source US National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration) 99 Fig. 3.1 Global anthropogenic CO2 emissions 2008–2017 (see the Global Carbon Budget 2018 Report. Accessed at: http://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget/17/files/ GCP_CarbonBudget_2018.pdf ) (Source Global Carbon Project) 111 Fig. 3.2 The sources and sinks of anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions (see the Global Carbon Budget 2018 Report. http://www.globalcarbonproject.org/carbonbudget/17/files/ GCP_CarbonBudget_2018.pdf ) (Source Global Carbon Project) 112 Fig. 3.3 Global emissions of CO2 from fossil fuel use (see the Global Carbon Budget 2018 Report. http://www.globalcarbonproject. org/carbonbudget/17/files/GCP_CarbonBudget_2018.pdf ) (Source Global Carbon Project) 113 Fig. 3.4 The correlation between global temperature and atmospheric CO2 (Source Climate Central) 113 Fig. 3.5 Global annual emissions from fossil carbon and land-use change (Source Global Carbon Project) 115

xxvi      List of Figures

Fig. 3.6 Global emissions of CO2 by country 1960–2017 (Source Global Carbon Project) 115 Fig. 3.7 Estimated global anthropogenic methane emissions by source (Source Global Methane Initiative) 117 Fig. 3.8 Trends lines for ocean and terrestrial sinks since 1960 (Source Global Carbon Project) 121 Fig. 3.9 Emissions gaps in meeting the Paris Agreement’s goals (Source Carbon Action Tracker) 127 Fig. 3.10 Potential sectoral emission reductions by 2030 (see The Emissions Gap Report 2017. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). Available at: https://www.unenvironment.org/resources/emissions-gap-report) (Source United Nations Environment Program) 128 Fig. 4.1 The village of Aberfan just after the 1966 disaster (Source Public domain) 149 Fig. 4.2 The mercury cycle (Source Physicians for Social Responsibility [USA]) 155 Fig. 4.3 Number of pipeline incidents from 1999 to 2018 (Source US Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration [See the US Pipeline and hazardous materials safety administration website: https://hip.phmsa.dot.gov/ analyticsSOAP/saw.dll?Portalpages]) 159 Fig. 4.4 Number of incidents reported to the NEB in Canada (Source National Energy Board, Canada) 160 Fig. 4.5 The Deepwater Horizon oil rig on fire in the Gulf of Mexico (Source US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board) 163 Fig. 4.6 Emissions of CO2 from the extraction and processing of crude oil (Source Pembina Institute, Canada) 169 Fig. 4.7 Schematic of shale gas well (Source Canadian Society for Unconventional Resources) 172 Fig. 4.8 Greenhouse gas emissions from shale gas compared to other fuels (Source Robert Howarth, Cornell University) 179 Fig. 4.9 Canada’s pipeline infrastructure in 2014 (Source Natural Resources Canada) 181 Fig. 4.10 Oil train derailment and fire in Mosier, Oregon, USA (Source Paloma Ayala) 185 Fig. 4.11 The Lac Megantic scene after the July 2013 accident (Source Transportation Safety Board of Canada) 186 Fig. 4.12 External costs per technology for electricity technologies, US¢/kWh (Source European Commission) 201 Fig. 5.1 Estimated renewable energy share of total final energy consumption in 2016 (REN21. Renewables 2018 Global Status Report) (Source REN21) 217

List of Figures     xxvii

Fig. 5.2 European greenhouse gas emission reductions projected through to 2050 (Source European Commission) Fig. 5.3 Estimated renewable energy share of global electricity production end-2017 (Source REN21 Global Status Report) Fig. 5.4 Global Passenger Electric Vehicle Market (including PHEVs), 2012–2017 (Source REN21 Global Status Report) Fig. 5.5 Tonnes of black carbon emissions per ship per year in 2015 (Source International Council on Clean Transportation) Fig. 5.6 Small distributed capacity investments by country in 2016 and growth on 2015 (Source Frankfurt School) Fig. 5.7 Drake Landing Solar Community heating system (see the Drake Landing website at https://dlsc.ca/how.htm) (Source Drake Landing Solar Community) Fig. 5.8 Distribution of mini-grids in Tanzania by installed capacity and energy, source, 2016 (Source World Resources Institute) Fig. 5.9 Average additional monthly income generated by the solar home systems (Source Off-Grid Solar Energy Industry) Fig. 6.1 Wind power global capacity and annual additions from 2007 to 2017, gigawatts (Source REN21 Renewables 2018 Global Status Report) Fig. 6.2 Principal elements of a large wind turbine (Source U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy) Fig. 6.3 Power curve for a Vestas V80 2 MW turbine (Source Wind Power Program) Fig. 6.4 Histogram of hourly windspeeds at Plymouth, UK (Source Wind Power Program) Fig. 6.5 Global weighted average capacity factors for new onshore and offshore wind turbines (Source International Renewable Energy Agency) Fig. 6.6 Wind energy resources map of North America and Europe (Source Wind Atlas) Fig. 6.7 World’s largest offshore windfarms in 2018 (see the September 2018 Guardian article: World’s largest offshore windfarm opens off Cumbrian coast. Accessed at: https://www.theguardian. com/environment/2018/sep/06/worlds-largest-offshorewindfarm-opens-cumbrian-coast-walney-extension-brexit) (Source Wikipedia) Fig. 6.8 Global weighted average levelized cost of electricity for onshore wind projects 1983–2017 (Source International Renewable Energy Agency)

219 221 225 231 235 238 245 251 275 275 276 278 279 281

283 284

xxviii      List of Figures

Fig. 6.9 Solar PV global capacity and annual additions from 2007 to 2017 (Source REN21 Renewables 2018 Global Status Report) Fig. 6.10 Energy output from the PVGIS model for a 6kWp photovoltaic system in Miami, Florida (Source Photovoltaic Geographic Information System) Fig. 6.11 Output data for a 30 MWp photovoltaic system in Djibouti, East Africa (Source Photovoltaic Geographic Information System) Fig. 6.12 Three models of community and shared solar energy (Source US Department of Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy) Fig. 6.13 Basic components of a PV + energy storage system (Source Florida Solar Energy Center) Fig. 6.14 SunShot targets for levelized costs of PV electricity in US cents/ kWh (Source US Department of Energy, Sunshot Initiative) Fig. 6.15 The two main solar concentrating power concepts (Source US Department of Energy) Fig. 6.16 Geothermal power capacity and additions, top ten countries and rest of the world in 2017 (see Renewables 2018 Global Status Report) (Source REN21 Global Status Report) Fig. 7.1 How a carbon tax reduces emissions (Source Ecofiscal, Canada) Fig. 7.2 How a cap and trade system reduces emissions (Source Ecofiscal Canada) Fig. 7.3 Carbon prices below $25tCO2e (State and trends of carbon emissions 2018 ) (Source World Bank Group) Fig. 7.4 Disbursement of carbon revenues by the RGGI states (Source Inside Climate News) Fig. 7.5 How Quebec’s cap-and-trade system works (Source Le Quebec en action verte) Fig. 7.6 Disbursements budgeted for Quebec’s carbon revenues, 2013–2020 (Source Le Quebec en action verte) Fig. 7.7 Trends in California’s GDP, population, and GHG emissions since 2000 (Source California Air Resources Board) Fig. 7.8 Trends in California GHG emissions by sector 2000–2016 (Source California Air Resources Board) Fig. 7.9 Fossil fuel consumption subsidies, 2017 (billion dollars) (International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook: Fossilfuel subsidies. Accessed at: https://www.iea.org/weo/energysubsidies/) (Source International Energy Agency) Fig. 7.10 Energy sources in the 100% clean energy scenario for the USA (Source Energy and Environmental Sciences) Fig. 8.1 Average temperatures in the Northern Hemisphere over the last 1000 years (Source Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change)

288 293 293 296 298 300 301 314 337 337 339 347 351 353 357 358

360 363 388

List of Figures     xxix

Fig. 8.2 Global mean surface temperature anomalies relative to the 1961–1990 mean (see Climate Change 2013. The IPCC 5th Assessment Report WG1. Available at: https://www.ipcc.ch/site/assets/uploads/2018/02/WG1AR5_ all_final.pdf ) (Source Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change) Fig. 9.1 Average annual global primary energy demand growth by fuel, 2011–2018 (Source International Energy Agency) Fig. 9.2 Comparison of countries’ commitment to meeting the Paris Agreement targets (Source Climate Action Tracker) Fig. 9.3 Probability of global warming for atmospheric CO2 equivalent concentrations of 700 ppm (Source Climate Shock) Fig. 9.4 Emission gaps and 1990 emission level as 2030 target (Source Carbon Action Tracker) Fig. 9.5 Logical framework for a transition to a net zero greenhouse gas economy by 2050 (The seven strategic objectives and much of the text is based on the EU publication: A clean planet for all )

390 425 428 432 439 441

List of Tables

Table 1.1 Occurrence and mortality of the five top types of disaster over the last two decades 9 Table 1.2 Top ten countries ranked by quantity of mismanaged plastic waste in 2010, million tons 29 Table 2.1 Storm surges recorded in the USA and the Caribbean this century 85 Table 2.2 Number of people living at less than 1 m above sea level 87 Table 2.3 Percentage of populations living less than 1 m above sea level 88 Table 2.4 Conflict, climate-related shocks, and food insecurity in 2016 94 Table 3.1 Emissions of CO2 from fossil fuel combustion in the USA in 2017 114 Table 3.2 The top ten emitters of carbon dioxide in 2018 116 Table 3.3 US methane emissions in 2017 118 Table 3.4 Cost, global potential, and limiting factors for a range of negative emissions technologies 133 Table 3.5 CO2 produced by combustion of total world fossil fuel reserves 137 Table 4.1 Health effects of air pollutants from coal-fired power plants 151 Table 4.2 The worst oil tanker accidents since 1967 158 Table 4.3 The worst offshore oil rig disasters 160 Table 4.4 Major Canadian pipeline initiatives during the last decade 190 Table 5.1 Renewable energy indicators 2014–2017 218 Table 5.2 Relative performance of coal-fired generation technologies in South East Asia 223 Table 5.3 The competitiveness of electrification options 252 Table 5.4 Cost of electricity from electrification options 253 Table 6.1 Annual energy output for a 2 MW Vestas offshore wind turbine 279 Table 6.2 Largest operational onshore windfarms 282 xxxi

xxxii      List of Tables

Table 6.3 Common human-caused threats to birds in North America 287 Table 6.4 The largest solar photovoltaic power plants (300 MW or greater) 290 Table 6.5 Top 10 countries for installed hydropower capacity 304 Table 6.6 Median life-cycle carbon emissions 306 Table 7.1 Disbursement of carbon revenues 2013/2014 341 Table 7.2 Key issues and enabling measures supporting carbon pricing 342 Table 7.3 Allocation of carbon revenues among RGGI states, 2015–2017 346 Table 7.4 Energy-related emissions of CO2 in the RGGI states, MtCO2 348 Table 7.5 Total caps of emissions units granted 352 Table 7.6 Quebec’s actual emissions of greenhouse gases 352 Table 7.7 Emissions per capita for Canada, British Columbia, Quebec, and Ontario 1990–2017 355 Table 7.8 Global fossil fuel subsidies, million USD (2017) 361 Table 7.9 Hydrocarbon gas liquids, uses and products 365 Table 8.1 Contributions to the defeat of Initiative 1631 406 Table 9.1 Top ten CO2 emitting countries in 2018, MtCO2 426

1 A Planet in Peril

Introduction The news in the summer of 2017 was all about the hurricanes in the Caribbean (three of which ripped into the US causing extensive damage), the earthquakes in Iran, Iraq, and Mexico, and disastrous, flooding in India, Nepal, Pakistan and Bangladesh that drowned over a thousand people and displaced millions more. In 2018, the roll call of natural disasters continued: stifling heatwaves in Australia, numerous destructive wildfires along the west coast of America and Canada, and more devastating hurricanes tearing into the Caribbean islands and the USA. Then in early 2019, the monster cyclone Idai barrelled into Mozambique killing at least 1000 people and leaving almost half a million homeless. Are these disasters becoming more frequent, and are they somehow related to climate change? Or do they always happen every 10 or 20 years, and so the disasters of the last few years are just a normal run of horrible weather: storms, heatwaves, and floods. And earthquakes? They have been devastating cities and destroying lives since the beginning of recorded time. But then most people have read that scientists and meteorologists are saying that global temperatures are now increasing year after year. After 2015, which was a record-breaking year, 2016 was hotter still and then so was 2017. The five hottest years on record have all occurred since 2010. Is this just part of a normal cycle of temperature variations that sometimes go up

© The Author(s) 2020 M. J. Bush, Climate Change and Renewable Energy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15424-0_1

1

2     M. J. Bush

and then eventually come down? Maybe this has all happened before and we will all soon be back to normal? In this chapter we want to examine the evidence that the climate appears to be permanently changing. We will look at all the signs that the Earth is suffering from a multitude of stresses and forces that are making life dangerous and miserable not just for people in almost all countries around the world, but for most of the ecosystems and animal species on the planet. Something is seriously wrong. That’s why the title of this chapter is ‘A planet in peril’: because something out there is having a malign influence on what was once a beautiful and healthy planet.

Heat Waves Although there is no standard definition of a heat wave, it’s a phenomenon that everyone understands. We all have a general sense of what the term means. It’s not just that it’s hotter than normal for the time of year: the heat keeps going for several days, the temperature hardly falls overnight, and for most people, the hot weather is close to unbearable. When some people actually die of heatstroke and exhaustion during this period, there is no disputing the term. It’s a heatwave.1 Heatwaves have been around for a long time: they are not events that have suddenly appeared since scientists started worrying about climate change and global heating. The first well-documented case may be the extreme heat that settled over London in 1858. The River Thames at the time was little more than a massive and foul sewer carrying the human waste of more than two million people slowly out to sea. Since the river is tidal in central London—most of the filth came back in again. The smell was bad enough in the winter, but in the summer heat of 1858 the stench was intolerable. Since drinking water came from ground water sources outside the city but also contaminated by human waste, cholera was a constant threat. The abominable stench from the River Thames in the mid-nineteenth century finally resulted in government action to build a sewerage system that still operates today. There is a lesson to be learned from this event in Britain (which is not the obvious one that seemingly only catastrophic events lead to any real government action); it is that heat waves make all the other environmental problems and health issues that are present at the time much, much worse. Heat waves occurred regularly throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Among the most well-documented heat waves in the

1  A Planet in Peril     3

United States are those that occurred in 1980 (St. Louis and Kansas City, Missouri), 1995 (Chicago, Illinois), and 1999 (Cincinnati, Ohio; Philadelphia, Pennsylvania; and Chicago, Illinois). The highest death rates in these heat waves occurred in people over 65 years of age.2 But since the year 2000, there have been some extreme events. In 2003, a record heat wave over western Europe resulted in the deaths of as many as 70,000 people, mostly in Italy and France. The young, the sick, and the elderly were most affected. Some estimates run as high as 80,000 deaths. For the period 2000–2106, at least 136,000 fatalities were recorded in Europe due to heat-related health complications, which represents more than 87% of all disaster-related deaths in that region.3 In July 2006, heat waves again suffocated Europe and North America— where over 200 people died in the US. Temperatures in South Dakota reached 54 °C; in California the heat rose to 50 °C. A year later, Europe again experienced sustained temperatures over 45 °C. This pattern has continued every year since. The most extreme recent event is reckoned to be the Russian heat wave of July 2010—when thousands of people died: the exact number is unknown. Scores of people reportedly drowned while swimming drunk.4 In the summer of 2011, a heatwave in Texas produced temperatures over 45 °C. The associated drought and record wildfires cost an estimated $12 billion.5 2015 was an extreme year for heatwaves. In Egypt temperatures reached 45 °C—over 60 people died. This was followed by extreme temperatures in Iran which were reported as a heat index of 73 °C! Then Pakistan was scorched in June by 49 °C heat that left 1200 dead; almost 2000 were hospitalized for dehydration and heat stroke. The month before in India, over 2500 people succumbed to the overpowering heat. In 2016, the hot weather continued its assault. In southern Africa at the beginning of the year an extreme heatwave set in—exacerbated by the continuing drought. Many places broke records in early January—records that had been set only weeks earlier in late 2015. The first week of January 2016, the temperature reached 42 °C in Pretoria and almost 39 °C in Johannesburg, both of which were 3 °C or more above previous records. Extreme heat also suffocated South and South-East Asia in April and May 2016 prior to the start of the summer monsoon. The extreme heat was centred on Thailand, where a national record of 44.6 °C was set at Mae Hong Son in April. Several records were broken in Malaysia in March and April, and in May temperatures rose to 51 °C in Phalodi—the highest temperature ever recorded for India.

4     M. J. Bush

In the Middle East and northern Africa, temperatures were at record highs. The highest temperature was recorded at Mitribah in Kuwait in July 2016 where the mercury hit 54 °C which, if confirmed, would be the highest temperature on record for Asia. The same month, temperatures rose to 54 °C in Basra, Iraq and 53 °C in Dehloran, Iran.6 In early August 2016, a heat wave in Europe dubbed ‘Lucifer’ caused several deaths. As sweltering heat settled across western Europe, temperatures rose to 38 °C in Italy, 40 °C in France, and 44 °C in Spain.7 In the same year, several countries, including Mexico and India, reported record high temperatures while many other countries observed near record highs. A weeklong heat waves at the end of April over the northern and eastern Indian peninsular, with temperatures over 44 °C, contributed to a water crisis for 330 million people and caused 300 fatalities.8 The intense heat continued into 2018. Although many countries have taken steps to better protect vulnerable people against extreme temperatures, 70 people died in Quebec, Canada, and more than 80 died in Japan. There were prolonged periods of high temperatures in the UK, France, Alaska, mainland USA, Scandinavia, Morocco, and the Arabian Peninsula.9 In January 2019, as this book was being finished, Australia was in the grip of yet another ferocious heatwave—once again breaking all records. So are heatwaves getting hotter? Are they becoming more frequent? The answer to both questions appears to be, Yes. Over the last several decades, there has been an increasing number of high-humidity heat waves—characterized by the persistence of extremely high night-time temperatures. The combination of high humidity and high temperatures at night can have fatal consequences for the elderly. Extreme heat events are now responsible for more deaths annually than hurricanes, tornadoes, floods and earthquakes combined.10 Across the globe, extremely warm nights that used to come once in 20 years now occur every ten years. And extremely hot summers (those substantially above the historical average) are now occurring across a larger swathe of the planet’s land area—as much as ten times larger than the period 1951–1980.11 One indication of the changing climate can be deduced by comparing the number of record lows with the number of record highs. In the US about 60 years ago, the number of new record high temperatures recorded across the country was roughly equal to the number of record lows: a sign of the natural variability of weather patterns but nothing to suggest that the climate was changing. But since the beginning of this century, the number of new record highs recorded each year has been twice the number of new record lows. The number of new highs has surpassed the number

1  A Planet in Peril     5

of new lows in 15 of the last 20 years, with 2012 and 2016 being particularly extreme (ratios of seven and five, respectively). Figure 1.1 illustrates the observed trend in the US since the 1930s.12 So heat waves are becoming hotter. And although Fig. 1.1 shows the trend for the USA, there is no reason not to suppose that these data signal a global trend. Extreme temperatures have killed at over 165,000 people in the last 20 years. In India alone, more than 22,000 people died in heatwaves between 1992 and 2005.13 During the last 10 years, heatwaves have overtaken flooding to become the third highest cause of global disaster mortality. The incidence of extreme temperature also increased: rising to 219 events over the period 2006–2015, up from 177 the previous decade.14 In spite of the recent record-breaking temperatures, the number of deaths from heat waves has fallen since 2005, mainly due to lower mortality in Western Europe—where health impact-based weather forecasting was introduced following the 2003 heatwave, an example followed by several countries including India. However, the global numbers for deaths due to heatwaves are considered to be substantially under-reported. While in Western Europe, public awareness may have increased and there is now much better medical support, middle-income and developing countries in the tropics for the most part have not adopted these measures. In North America, increasing access to air-conditioned spaces and greater awareness of the risks, has tended to reduce the number of fatalities resulting from heat waves over the last few years. But this form of adaptation, which depends on access to reliable electrical power, cannot be replicated

Fig. 1.1  Ratio of record highs to record lows in the USA (Source US Global Change Research Program 2017)

6     M. J. Bush

everywhere. Across Asia, in the developing world, and everywhere families cannot afford air-conditioning, the impact of heat waves is deadly. In African and Asian villages without electricity there is no respite: the young, the elderly and those who because of illness are unable to cope with the heat, will die in greater numbers. In the Middle East: across Iraq and Iran and over the Persian Gulf, summer temperatures are now regularly hitting 50 °C or higher. The wealthy take refuge in the air-conditioned malls, cooled to less than half that temperature by electrical power generated by natural gas. But the region is home to a third of the world’s refugees, hundreds of thousands of whom live in tent cities. For these unfortunates, there is no escape from the insufferable heat.

Natural Disasters Earthquakes, floods and drought are scourges the world has known since biblical times. They are still called ‘natural’ disasters—suggesting that they are simply part and parcel of life on planet Earth. But times are changing, and what was perhaps ‘natural’ a century ago no longer seems quite so natural now. The 20-year period from 1996 to 2015 saw just over 7000 disasters recorded by the database maintained by the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), based at the Catholic University of Louvain in Brussels, Belgium.15 While the frequency of geophysical disasters such as earthquakes, tsunamis, and volcanic eruptions, remained about the same, there was a sustained increase in climate- and weather-related events: floods, storms, and particularly heatwaves. In total, the number of weather- and climate-related disasters has more than doubled over the past forty years, accounting for over 6000 events in the 20-year period 1996–2015, up from just over 3000 in the period 19761995. The average mortality for all types of natural disasters increased to 69,800 per year in the decade 2006–2015, up from 64,900 between 1996 and 2005. These numbers reflect the impacts of two ‘mega disasters’ during the last decade: cyclone Nargis in 2008 and the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. The previous decade saw just one mega disaster: the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami.16 Figure 1.2 shows the number of deaths registered for the six most deadly types of disaster.17 In terms of disaster mortality, the CRED data recorded almost 750,000 deaths from earthquakes in the past 20 years, with 357,000 lives lost

1  A Planet in Peril     7

Fig. 1.2  Number of deaths per disaster type (Source Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters: Poverty & death: Disaster mortality 1996–2015 )

between 2006 and 2015—the majority in the horrific earthquake that devastated Port-au-Prince, Haiti in 2010. In the previous decade (1996–2005), earthquakes claimed almost 392,000 lives—a period which included the fatalities caused by the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. In fact, tsunamis are 16 times more deadly than terrestrial earthquakes in terms of the proportion of victims killed. This makes tsunamis the most deadly hazard on the planet. What is also striking is that storm-related deaths more than doubled during the 10-year periods shown in Fig. 1.2—even though the number of storms decreased. Although relatively small in number, the number of deaths due to drought increased by a factor of almost 10. This is significant because drought is a disaster where the number of victims greatly exceeds the number of deaths. So a 10-fold increase in deaths implies an enormous increase in the number of people affected by drought—people that are often forced to move away from drought-stricken regions and effectively become climate refugees. Although the number and intensity of heatwaves increased, heatwave mortality has declined—due primarily to better preparedness and heat-stress

8     M. J. Bush

management. However, it is generally accepted that heat-related deaths in developing countries are substantially under-reported.

Trends in Climate-Related Disasters The number of storms resulting in fatalities has slightly declined on a decadal basis over the past 20 years—a decline that may be explained by the El Nino of 2014–2015 which reduced the occurrence of Atlantic hurricanes. By contrast, the number of fatalities has increased significantly. Storms appear to be getting stronger: fatalities jumped from an average of 64 deaths per event in 1996–2005 to 180 in 2006–2015. In the period 2006–2015, heatwaves overtook flooding to become the third highest cause of global disaster mortality. The number of extreme temperature events also increased, rising to 219 events in 2006–2015 up from 177 the previous decade. The occurrence of floods increased from 1368 to 1672 over the decadal periods. However, there were fewer fatalities per event suggesting that better disaster risk management for floods is having an impact. In contrast, the number of droughts decreased slightly, but mortality increased massively. Table 1.1 shows the numbers as reported by the CRED.18 Discounting the earthquake mortalities, climate-related mortalities have increased by a third over the two decades shown in Table 1.1. Figure 1.3 shows time series data for the occurrence of storms, floods and droughts taken from the EM-DAT database—which unfortunately does not show data for the annual incidence of heatwaves. However, what is clear is that the number of climate-related disasters, excluding heatwaves, has increased enormously over the last 60 years. Although the long-term incidence of drought is approximately constant, the mortality associated with each event has increased substantially—as shown in Table 1.1. This suggests that droughts are becoming longer, more intense, or covering a larger area (or all of the above)—characteristics that are not captured by just counting a drought as a single event. Have climate-related disasters levelled out over the last ten years? The apparent flatline trend in Fig. 1.3 is created by the large spike in flood and storm events during the years 2005–2007—which then drops back to the long-term trend line for the previous decades producing a short period during which the trend line is flat. It is always a mistake to judge a trend based on a short period of time when the event being assessed is inherently variable over a period just as long.

1996–2005 Occurrence 391,529 65,430 87,082 93,113 2118 639,272 247,743

Mortality 248 966 219 1672 164

2006–2015 Occurrence 357,092 173,695 78,787 56,948 20,177 686,699 329,607

Mortality

−17 −5 24 22 −12

Change (%) Occurrence

Source Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters. Poverty & death: Disaster mortality 1996–2015

Earthquakes 299 Storms 1019 Heatwaves 177 Floods 1368 Droughts 186 Total mortalities  Climate-related mortalities 

Disaster

Table 1.1  Occurrence and mortality of the five top types of disaster over the last two decades

−9 +165 −10 −39 +853 +7 +33

Mortality

1  A Planet in Peril     9

10     M. J. Bush

Fig. 1.3  Number of climate-related disasters occurring each year since 1960 (Emergency events database, EM-DAT. Universite Catholique de Louvain. Accessed at: http://emdat.be/database in July 2017) (Source Emergency events database. Université Catholique de Louvain)

In 2017, there were 318 natural disasters resulting in 9500 deaths and over 96 million people displaced or otherwise affected. The human impact was much lower than the last 10-year average, where events with extremely high mortality occurred: such as the 2010 earthquake in Haiti (over 225,000 deaths) and the 2008 Nargis cyclone in Myanmar which killed over 138,000 people. Nearly 60% of people affected by disasters in 2017 were affected by floods, while 85% of economic damage was due to storms. India was hit hardest with almost 2300 deaths and 22.5 million people affected mostly by floods and storms. Sierra Leone experienced a disastrous mudslide that killed 502 people and left 600 more missing. Hurricanes Irma and Maria caused extensive damage to small islands in the Caribbean, particularly Puerto Rico where the death toll, originally estimated at less than 100, was later raised to nearly 3000. In Mauritania, 88% of population was affected by drought.19 In terms of economic losses, 2017 was the second costliest year with losses estimated at $314 billion—mainly due to the three hurricanes (Harvey, Irma, and Maria) that devastated the Caribbean islands and caused extensive damage in the US.20 In 2018, there were 315 recorded disasters—almost the same number as the year before, but they were more destructive, killing 11,800 people. Overall, floods have affected more people than any other type of disaster in the twenty-first century and 2018 was no exception. In Somalia, 700,000 people were affected by flooding, while in Nigeria nearly 2 million people

1  A Planet in Peril     11

were displaced. The August flash flood in India’s Kerala’s state affected over 23 million people. Two destructive hurricanes tore into the US, while in Asia, China, India, Japan, and the Philippines were all hit hard by multiple storms. Three east and central pacific hurricanes reached category 5 intensity in 2018: Lane, Walaka and Willa. Lane dumped 1312 mm of rain on Hawaii during a 96 h period—the highest storm rainfall on record for a Hawaiian tropical cyclone and second for the US after Harvey in 2017. Storms were the most costly type of disaster in 2018, primarily due to hurricanes Florence and Michael, and typhoon Jebi. Drought impacted 3 million people in Kenya and almost the same number in Afghanistan. In Central America, drought affect 2.5 million people in Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, and Nicaragua—driving increased migration from those countries. Across the world, the trend of devastating wildfires continued from 2017 into 2018. The Attica fire in Greece killed 100 people, making it the deadliest wildfire in Europe since records began in 1900, while in the US, the Camp Fire killed 88 people and was the costliest on record.21 The numbers suggest an emerging trend: that although the mortality due to natural disasters may be declining, but the economic impact is escalating. This might be because some types of disasters—particularly storms and wildfires, are becomes more intense and destructive, but at the same time, people are becoming better able to escape the danger or withstand the force of the event. In the USA, the Environmental Defense Fund (EDF) had the good idea of checking in with the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). They took a look at how many calls for help FEMA had to respond to over the last few years. The results are shown in Fig. 1.4.22 The trend is clear. Even though the period 2012-2016 suggests a downward trend, the longer term trend is upwards. And when the graph is updated to include the data from 2017—when four hurricanes tore into the US (including Puerto Rico), the number of counties calling FEMA for help is sure to increase dramatically.

A World on Fire The Canadian wildfire season in 2015 began early and ended late. In that year, almost 5000 fires burned through 3.25 million hectares of woodland— four times the 25-year average. In British Colombia, the months of May

12     M. J. Bush

Fig. 1.4  Calls for assistance to the US Federal Emergency Management Agency 1997– 2016 (Source US Environmental Defense Fund)

and June were close to being the driest months on record, and this weather was clearly amplifying the rampant fires. The thick and pungent smoke from the flames left thousands of residents gasping for air through surgical masks. Further east across the prairies in Saskatchewan, uncontrollable fires prompted what was, up until that time, the largest evacuation in Canada’s history—more than 13,000 people fled the flames.23 But 2015 was merely a prelude to the 2016 fire the Canadians called the Beast. The spring of 2016 was the driest ever recorded at Fort McMurray, Alberta, and the second warmest on record. Weeks of warm dry weather created a bone-dry forest floor—the perfect conditions for a firestorm. On May 1 the fire ignited, and blustery winds quickly blew it out of control. Within two days the fire had doubled in size, jumped highways and the Athabasca River and was burning its way towards downtown Fort McMurray. The town’s 88,000 residents scrambled to leave—a mass exodus of unprecedented scale for Canada. By May 4, the wildfire was so large it could be seen from space. It burned through an area the size of Prince Edward Island, destroyed 2400 homes and other buildings, scorched 18,600 vehicles and left the town a smouldering ash-covered ruin. It was the costliest catastrophe in Canadian history: total damages reached $4 billion in insured losses and billions more in lost business, infrastructure and uninsured losses.24 What made the wildfire so dramatic was the speed with which it spread into the town of Fort McMurray. Many residents were caught by surprise and had to flee the city driving through a wall of flame. The photo

1  A Planet in Peril     13

Fig. 1.5  Cars racing to escape the flames engulfing Fort McMurray in May 2016

in Fig. 1.5, taken from inside a car approaching what looks like a raging inferno, captures the terrifying experience many residents endured as they fled the city to escape the encircling flames. If anything the year 2017 was worse. By the month of August, the province of British Columbia was in a state of emergency as 138 wildfires burned across the province, and metro Vancouver was covered in a thick layer of smoke. This was British Columbia’s worst fire season in history.25 At the same time in California, wildfires burned across thousands of hectares of land fuelled by scorching temperatures that were breaking heat and fire records across the region. At least 15 cities registered record-breaking heat and the state experienced its hottest summer on record. San Francisco hit 41 °C the first week of September 2017, breaking its previous record by 1.7 °C. At one point, over 80 large fires were blazing across 600,000 hectares from Colorado to California and north to Washington state. Seattle and Vancouver were shrouded in a smoky fog.26 Then in early December 2017, yet another fire ignited—60 miles northwest of Los Angeles. Dubbed the Thomas Fire and whipped up by Santa Ana winds, it burned for a month and became the largest fire in California history—scorching over 114,000 hectares and destroying 1063 structures. Fifty thousand people were evacuated from in and around Ventura county.

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Fig. 1.6  Wildfires blazing in Portugal in October 2017

In October 2017, huge wildfires burned across Portugal. At least 37 people died in the fires—fuelled by temperatures of 34 °C and strong winds. Figure 1.6 gives an idea of the scale of the fires. In 2018, California was once again in flames. In August, the Mendocino Complex fire became the largest in California history.27 Then in November, the Camp Fire broke out and incinerated an area of more than 62,000 hectares, destroying 18,800 structures in its path and killing 88 people. The wildfire almost completely destroyed the town of Paradise. The years 2015–2017 were some of the hottest years on record, and the extremely hot summers were certainly a factor in fuelling these huge wildfires. But in the forests along the western US, fires have been increasing in intensity since the mid-1980s. Figure 1.7 shows that the frequency of large forest wildfires has continued to increase with each decade since the 1970s. The area burned in these fires has also continued to increase—so the fires are getting larger. Most of the increase is due to wildfires ignited by lightning. Less than 12% of the trend in large forest fires is due to fires ignited by humans.28 There are two things to note about the numbers shown in Fig. 1.7: first, although there is a large degree of variability, the ten-year averages show a steady and unmistakable upward trend. Second, lightning is becoming the dominant source of ignition for these wildfire in western USA. This was not

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Fig. 1.7  Human and lightning-ignited annual large forest fires (a); and shrub and grassland fires (b) on lands in the western US. The horizontal lines indicate 10-year averages (Source Westerling, A.L.R.: “Increasing western US forest wildfire activity: Sensitivity to changes in the timing of spring.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B 371 [2016]: 20150178)

the case in the 1970s, but lightning-ignited wildfires have become increasingly predominant over the last 30 years. This is an alarming trend: there is evidence that the frequency of lightning strikes increases as the climate gets warmer.29 Lightning-caused fires have risen between 2 and 5% per year for the last four decades. As thunderstorms intensify and become more frequent, fires are increasingly occurring in the boreal forests and even on the permafrost tundra. Warmer temperatures generate more thunderstorms which in turn bring more lightning and greater fire risk.30 In August 2017, a large wildfire was burning in Greenland only 40 miles from the ice sheet, and in a place so remote that no-one noticed it until satellites spotted the smoke at the end of July. Small fires are not unknown in Greenland during the summer, but for such a large blaze to burn for so long was unusual. Scientists at the University of Technology in Delft in the Netherlands said that 2017 was by far the worst year for wildfires in Greenland since records began in 2000.31 It is not known what caused the fire in the tundra of western Greenland, but the summer of 2017 was a particularly dry summer. Are wildfires growing in number and intensity across the world? The data are mixed, but for most regions the trend is actually downward. A 2017

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research article that examined multiple satellite data sets found that global burned area has declined by about 24% over the last 18 years. But these data cover all fires, not just wildfires, including those deliberately set by farmers to burn crop residues or to clear away forests to open up the land for agriculture. The global trend for wildfires, as opposed to fires deliberately set, is unclear.32 But in North America, the trend is unmistakably upwards.

The Big Melt What’s called the cryosphere includes sea ice, ice sheets, ice shelves, glaciers, and permafrost—frozen ground. These frigid formations hold an enormous amount of frozen water. If they were all to melt away, the resulting global sea level rise would be catastrophic. The good news is that even if melting is taking place—it’s slow. But is there any evidence that this is, in fact, happening?

Sea Ice Sea ice is frozen seawater that floats on the ocean surface. Covering millions of square kilometres at both ends of the planet, sea ice freezes over and then melts away with the polar seasons, choreographing the seasonal rhythms of human activity and ecosystem habitats. In the Arctic, some sea ice persists year after year, whereas in the Southern Ocean or Antarctic, sea ice is more seasonal—melting completely away and reforming annually. While both Arctic and Antarctic ice are vitally important for the habitats of land and marine mammals, sea ice in the Arctic appears to play a more crucial role in influencing the climate.33 The Arctic and the Antarctic are quite different. Up north, the Arctic is pretty much all sea ice—meaning that most of it is floating on water. There is very little land. When this ice melts, sea level is unaffected. The Antarctic on the other hand is a huge land mass that is covered by ice formed from snowfall—an ice sheet. There is some floating sea ice around the perimeter of the land, but the vast majority of Antarctic ice is on land. Sea ice thickness, its spatial extent, and the fraction of open water within the ice pack can vary rapidly in response to changing weather and climate. Sea ice typically covers about 14–16 million km2 in late winter in the Arctic and 17–20 million km2 in the Antarctic Southern Ocean. On average, the seasonal decrease is much larger in the Antarctic, with only about 2–4 million km2 remaining at the end of summer, compared to about 7 million km2 remaining in the Arctic.

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In the Arctic, the extent of sea ice has been declining. Since 1979, winter Arctic ice extent has decreased by about 3% per decade.34 In 2016, the extent of sea ice was well below average and was at record low levels for many months of the year. The maximum extent of the ice— which usually occurs in the first few months of the year in the Northern hemisphere, was the lowest ever recorded in the satellite record (which goes back almost 40 years). Figure 1.8 shows August levels of sea ice extent in the Arctic from 1979 to 2017. The trend in the Arctic is unmistakable. While Arctic sea ice was setting record lows, Antarctic sea ice was setting record highs. In September 2014, Antarctic sea ice expanded to over 20 million km2—the highest sea ice extent in the satellite record. Still in the Antarctic, in 2016 the sea-ice extent was close to the long-term average for the first eight months of the year, reaching a seasonal maximum of just over 18 million km2 at the end of August. This was the earliest seasonal maximum on record. This was then followed by an exceptionally rapid spring melt, resulting in a November mean extent of 14.5 million km2—by far the lowest on record. The reasons for the rapid collapse of the Antarctic sea ice in late 2016 are not completely understood. Clearly much more research is needed—if only because the Antarctic ice sheets hold truly massive, almost incomprehensible amounts of water.

Fig. 1.8  Average monthly Arctic sea ice extent. August 1979–2017 (see the US National Snow and Ice Data Center website. Accessed at: https://nsidc.org/arcticseaicenews/2017/09/the-end-of-summer-nears/) (Source US National Snow and Ice Data Center)

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Fig. 1.9  Antarctic November sea-ice extent 1978–2018 (Source US National Snow and Ice Data Center)

Figure 1.9 shows the percentage change in the extent of Antarctic November sea ice from 1978 to 2018.35 The long term trendline is flat—although the last five years are showing a downward trend. However, in November 2016, sea ice extent was at record lows at both ends of the planet. After having been 1–2 million km2 below the long term average for most of the year, global sea-ice extent dropped more than 4 million km2 below average in that month—an event unprecedented in the satellite record.36 The hydrodynamics and thermodynamics of the Antarctic cryosphere are complex, and scientists are working to understand why the sea ice trend at the south pole is relatively flat when, at the north pole, sea ice extent continues to decline.37

Glaciers While the extent of sea ice at the poles shows contrasting trends, this is not the case for the thousands of glaciers that are found across all the continents except Australia. Glaciers interest scientists because they are constantly on the move. Continuous mass balance records have been kept for about 40 glaciers since the early 1960s. These data show that in most regions of the world, glaciers are shrinking in size. From 1961 to 2005, the thickness of many small glaciers decreased by about 12 meters or the equivalent of 9000 cubic kilometres of water.38 A study of observational data sets from the World Glacier Monitoring Service (WGMS) concluded that “rates of early 21st century mass loss are without precedent on a global scale, at least for the time period observed and probably also for recorded history. ”

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Fig. 1.10  Glacier Bay National Park and Reserve’s White Thunder ridge—Then and now (Source US National Snow and Ice Data Center, state of the cryosphere)

Because glaciers are shrinking so quickly, there are many really striking ‘before and after’ photos in the public record. When it comes to melting glaciers: a picture really is worth a thousand words. Figure 1.10 shows the Glacier Bay National Park and Reserve’s White Thunder Ridge as seen on August 13, 1941 (left) and August 31, 2004 (right). The Muir Glacier has retreated out of the field of view, while the Riggs Glacier has thinned and retreated significantly, and dense new vegetation has appeared. The Muir Glacier was more than 2000 feet thick in 1941.39 Glaciers gain mass from snowfall and lose mass as ice melts from its leading edge. If this mass balance is positive, the glacier gains mass, if the balance is negative the glacier is losing mass and retreating. Figure 1.11 shows this balance for 41 reference glaciers tracked by scientists since 1980. The overall balance since 1989 is clearly negative—meaning the glaciers are retreating. The rate at which these glaciers are retreating also appears to be increasing. This is a global phenomenon. Almost everywhere around the world, glaciers are melting.40

Ice Sheets Just like glaciers, an ice sheet forms through the accumulation of snowfall— when snowfall exceeds the annual snow melt. Over thousands of years, the layers of snow build up, become compacted, and can form a sheet of ice several thousand meters thick, and hundreds of kilometres wide. If the ice field covers more than 50,000 km2, it is defined as an ice sheet. Although ice sheets covered much of the northern hemisphere during the

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Fig. 1.11  Annual mass balance of reference glaciers (see the WMO Report No. 1233. Statement on the State of the Global Climate in 2018 ) (Source World Meteorological Organisation, Statement on the State of the Global Climate in 2018 )

last ice ages, the planet now has just two major ice sheets: one on Greenland, the other on Antarctica. The Greenland ice sheet is the smaller of the two: covering about 1.7 million km2. In contrast, the area of the Antarctic ice sheet is enormous—almost 14 million km2. That is more than one and a half times the area of the continental USA. As the ice sheet gets thicker from snowfall, its weight increases—to the point where the ice sheet begins to deform and to flow slowly outwards. Ice sheets flow outward from their centres, where they are generally thickest, and push outwards until they encounter ocean water, or where the climate is warm enough to melt the ice faster than its rate of flow. Together the two formations on Greenland and Antarctica hold 99% of the world’s freshwater. If the Greenland ice sheet melted away completely, global sea levels would rise about 7 meters. If the Antarctic ice sheet were to melt, sea levels would rise at least another 50 meters.41 Because ice sheets hold so much ice and have the potential to raise global sea levels so dramatically, measuring the mass balance of the ice sheets and tracking these changes is an area of intense scientific study. Particularly for the Antarctic where, as noted above, the geophysics and hydrodynamics of ice sheet behaviour are not yet fully understood. The science is complex and sophisticated: satellite radar, altimetry mapping, and gravimetric sensing using NASA’s GRACE satellites have been

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employed together with more conventional land-based mass balance calculations. The data, while not perfectly aligned, clearly agree on the long term trends. A study in 2012 combined satellite altimetry, interferometry, and gravimetric data to examine ice sheet mass balances. The study found reasonable agreement between the different satellite methods and estimated the mass balance changes between 1992 and 2011 as shown in Fig. 1.12.42 So except for the East Antarctica ice sheet, which appears relatively stable and has gained a small amount of mass over the last few years, the other ice sheets are losing mass. The overall mass balance for Antarctica is still negative because the West Antarctica sheet and the Antarctic peninsula are both losing mass. But the Greenland ice sheet is melting at an unprecedented

Fig. 1.12  Mass balance trends for four major ice sheets (Source US National Snow and Ice Data Center)

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rate. In early 2018, NASA reported that the ice sheet was melting at a rate of 286 billion tonnes a year.43

Permafrost Permafrost, or permanently frozen ground, is soil, sediment, or rock that remains at 0 °C for at least two years. Despite its name, permafrost is characterized more by its instability than by its permanence. What’s called the ‘active layer thickness’ or ALT, is the layer that thaws and freezes over the seasonal cycle—and it gets larger in warmer conditions. Permafrost has warmed over the past 2–3 decades and is continuing to warm across the circumpolar north.44 Field observations indicate that permafrost warmed by up to 6 °C during the twentieth century. Observations on Svalbard (a Norwegian island close to the Arctic circle) detected record permafrost warming during the winter of 2005–2006—apparently resulting from spring temperatures as much as 12 °C above the 1961–1990 average.45 Approximately 55% of northern hemisphere’s land surface is covered by seasonally frozen ground—which can stay frozen for several months at high latitudes and high elevations. But when warming permafrost thaws for longer periods, the effects can be startling. Trees that have fallen over because of permafrost melting are sometimes referred to as ‘drunken forests’ (Fig. 1.13). Where large-scale thawing of ground ice has occurred, the landscape can be transformed through mudslides and the formation of flat-bottomed valleys and melt ponds, which can dramatically alter the landscape.46

Coral Reefs and Oceans Coral reefs are one of the most productive and biologically rich ecosystems that exist anywhere on Earth. They are the essential habitat for roughly a quarter of all known marine species: including fish, sponges, urchins, crustaceans, and molluscs. They also provide essential ecosystem services for several hundred million people living in coastal communities across the world. The livelihoods of many coastal communities in developing countries depend on the fish that congregate and thrive among coral reefs. These livelihoods are now threatened by the deteriorating status of the world’s reefs. In 2011, the World Resources Institute revisited their work conducted in 2005 surveying the status of, and threats to, the world’s coral reefs. The Institute reported their key findings as follows.47

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Fig. 1.13  A ‘drunken forest’ in Alaska—caused by thawing permafrost (Source US National Snow and Ice Data Center)

• More than 60% of the world’s reefs are under immediate and direct threat from one or more local sources—such as overfishing and destructive fishing, coastal development, watershed-based pollution, or marine-based pollution and damage. • Of local pressures on coral reefs, overfishing—including destructive fishing is the most pervasive immediate threat, affecting more than 55% of the world’s reefs. Coastal development and watershed-based pollution each threaten about 25% of reefs. Marine-based pollution and damage from ships is widespread—threatening about 10% of reefs. • Approximately 75% of the world’s coral reefs are rated as threatened when local threats are combined with thermal stress, which reflects the recent impacts of rising ocean temperatures, linked to the widespread weakening and mortality of corals due to mass coral bleaching. Warmer waters frequently result in coral bleaching. When seawater is too warm, corals will expel the algae (zooxanthellae) living in their tissues— causing the coral to turn completely white. When a coral bleaches it is not dead, and coral can survive a bleaching event if temperatures moderate. But

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if temperatures remain elevated and if other stresses continue to impact the reef, the coral will eventually die. Coral bleaching is one of the clearest indicators of thermal stress on a reef ecosystem. In 1998, a huge spike in sea surface temperatures killed 16% of the corals on reefs around the world. Triggered by the El Nino of that year, it was declared the first major global bleaching event. The second global bleaching event in 2010 was once again caused by an El Nino event. The third global bleaching event struck in October 2015 and became the longest and the most destructive on record up to that point in time. The El Nino of 2015 was once again the principal agent of the damage caused to the coral. Figure 1.14 shows a before and after photo of coral bleaching (left) and coral dying (right) at Lizard Island on the Great Barrier Reef off the coast of Australia in May 2016.48 The bleaching of the Great Barrier Reef continued into 2017—the first time that bleaching had occurred in consecutive years. Since it takes corals at least a decade to recover, mass bleaching events that occur every couple of years are likely to eventually kill the coral.49 Overfishing can also fatally damage a coral reef. When overfishing is combined with higher seawater temperatures, corals have little chance of recovering (Fig. 1.15).

Fig. 1.14  Coral bleaching (left) and coral dying (right) at Lizard Island (Source The Ocean Agency)

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Fig. 1.15  Coral reef in Haiti destroyed by overfishing (A typical former coral reef at La Gonave in Haiti overfished to the point where it has become an algal dominated reef with a few stubs of coral surviving but no fish) (Source Reef Check)

Haiti is an extreme example of the impact of overfishing on the marine environment. For instance, Reef Check surveys conducted in 2014 showed that the reefs of Haiti are the most overfished and destabilized in the world. Many reefs in Haiti resemble marine ghost towns—with algal dominated reefs and only a few tiny fish.50

Acidification The chemistry of ocean water is changing—in ways that may have a fatal impact on many marine species of crustaceans. Ocean acidification causes a variety of chemical changes in seawater. Carbon dioxide in the atmosphere dissolves in water to form carbonic acid. Over the last 150 years, ocean surface waters have become 30% more acidic as they have absorbed large amounts of CO2 from the atmosphere. Since the preindustrial period, the oceans have absorbed most of the CO2 emitted into the atmosphere—absorption that is still continuing.

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When carbon dioxide is absorbed by seawater, chemical reactions occur that reduce the saturation state of biologically important calcium carbonate minerals which are the building blocks of the skeletons and shells of many marine organisms. In areas where shellfish thrive, the water is supersaturated with respect to calcium carbonate minerals. This allows the shellfish to develop and grow. Ocean acidification can have a dramatic effect on some calcifying species including oysters, clams, sea urchins, corals, and calcareous plankton. In recent years, there have been near total failures of developing oysters in both aquaculture facilities and natural ecosystems on the west coast of the US. These larval oyster failures appear to be correlated with naturally occurring upwelling events that bring low-pH (i.e. acidic) waters undersaturated in aragonite (a carbonate mineral) to nearshore environments.51

Deoxygenation Oxygen is essential for nearly all life in the ocean: from microbes to whales. But what has become increasingly evident over the last several years is that climate-induced oxygen loss (deoxygenation) associated with ocean warming is occurring in all regions around the globe. Where dissolved oxygen levels drop to almost zero (hypoxia) marine species cannot survive. The area affected is called a ‘dead zone’. Global ocean deoxygenation is a direct effect of increasing ocean temperatures. Ocean warming reduces the solubility of oxygen (warmer water holds less oxygen) and changes the physical mixing by upwelling and circulation of oxygen in the oceans. Warmer waters also increase the metabolism of marine creatures—increasing their need for oxygen. The increased temperature of the oceans is estimated to account for about 15% of global oxygen loss, although changes in temperature and oxygen are not uniform throughout the oceans. Warming also directly influences thermal and salinity stratification, the melting of ice, and changes in precipitation. More pronounced stratification also leads to reduced mixing of oxygen into the ocean interior.52 Coastal zones can be strongly impacted due to agricultural runoff and the nutrients, primarily nitrogen and phosphorus, that enter coastal waters and fertilize blooms of algae. When the algae die, they sink to the bottom and decompose—a process that consumes dissolved oxygen from the surrounding waters. If stratification of the water column prevents mixing or dissolution of atmospheric oxygen into these waters, they will remain deficient in oxygen.

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Studies by the Virginia Institute of Marine Sciences show that the number of dead zones has approximately doubled each decade since the 1960s. Many ecosystems experience a progression in which periodic hypoxic events becomes seasonal and then, if nutrients continue to increase, persistent. The planet’s largest dead zone, which is in the Baltic Sea, experiences hypoxia all year long. Chesapeake Bay, in the US, experiences seasonal summertime hypoxia through much of its main channel. Compared to land animals, marine organisms have much more difficulty extracting oxygen from water. Depending on its temperature and salinity, water contains 20–40 times less oxygen by volume than air. The gas diffuses much more slowly through water than air, so even small decreases in dissolved oxygen can have a serious negative impact on marine animals.53 The concentration of dissolved oxygen in ocean water is typically between 7 and 8 milligrams per litre (mg/l), if concentrations fall below 4 mg/l, organisms will begin to react to the stress. If they are able, they will move out of the area, migrating to zones with higher levels of oxygen. Waters with less than 0.2 mg/l are called anoxic and are unable to support any forms of life that respire oxygen. Waters with no measurable dissolved oxygen are hypoxic. Figure 1.16 illustrates how low levels of oxygen have a significant impact on marine organisms. Studies show that hypoxic waters have expanded by 4.5 million km2 at a depth of 200 meters, with widespread loss of oxygen in the Southern Ocean, Western Pacific, and North Atlantic. Overall, oxygen declines have been greater in coastal ocean than in the open ocean and are often greater inshore than offshore.54 In the many areas where dissolved oxygen is declining, high natural variability makes it difficult to identify causes, impacts and trends. What is clear though, is that the increasing deoxygenation of the oceans is yet another, potentially serious, environmental problem.

Plastic Pollution The amount of plastic waste produced by the world’s more than 6 billion people is enormous—around 300 million tons a year. If most of this plastic was recycled the environmental impact would perhaps be manageable. But it’s not. A small but significant portion of this plastic debris finishes up in the oceans where it increasingly has a fatal impact on both marine species and seabirds.

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Fig. 1.16  Impact of dissolved oxygen (DO) levels on marine organisms (see Dead zones and climate zones. Accessed at: http://www.vims.edu/research/topics/dead_ zones/impacts/index.php) (Source Virginia Institute of Marine Science)

A study reported in Science magazine estimated that in 2010, 275 million tonnes (Mt) of plastic waste was produced by 192 coastal countries. Of this amount, somewhere between 4.8 to 12.7 Mt entered the oceans.55 Figure 1.17 shows the estimated amount of plastic waste washing from the land into the ocean in 2010.56 Estimated quantities of mismanaged plastic waste (meaning plastic waste that would probably end up in the sea) are shown for the countries which are the worst offenders in Table 1.2.

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Fig. 1.17  Plastic waste inputs into the ocean in 2010 (Source Jambeck Research Group) Table 1.2  Top ten countries ranked by quantity of mismanaged plastic waste in 2010, million tons Rank

Country

Mismanaged plastic waste Mt/year

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

China Indonesia Philippines Vietnam Sri Lanka Thailand Egypt Malaysia Nigeria Bangladesh

8.82 3.22 1.88 1.83 1.59 1.03 0.97 0.94 0.84 0.79

Source Jambeck Research Group

China tops the list and is the worst offender by far. Followed by Indonesia and several other Asian countries. Egypt and Nigeria also make the top 10. The table shows absolute amounts in million tons, so coastal countries with large populations will tend to show up at the top of the list. The US is outside the top 10, but just makes the top 20. Canada and the European countries are not in the top twenty.

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There is now so much plastic floating in some parts of the ocean, especially in the five large ocean gyres known as ‘garbage patches’, that each square kilometre of surface water holds almost 600,000 pieces of plastic and other debris. Not all trash floats, plastic bags hang around just below the surface, and much of the trash, including microplastic debris, slowly sinks to the bottom where it eventually settles into deep-sea sediments.57 The largest garbage patch is the Great Pacific Garbage Patch which is floating off the coast of California. It covers about 1.6 million km2—three times the size of France. Containing about 1.8 trillion pieces of plastic, the weight of the trash is estimated at about 80,000 tonnes—roughly the weight of 500 jumbo jets.58 Plastic pollution in the oceans is now a major and global concern. The plastic eventually breaks down into smaller pieces that may be ingested by both marine species and seabirds. The internet is full of images of dead fish and seabirds cut open to show all the pieces of plastic in their stomachs. Figure 1.18 shows the remains of an albatross that had ingested an extraordinary assortment of pieces of plastic waste.59 In early 2018, a 6-ton juvenile Sperm Whale washed up on the beach near Cabo de Palos in Southern Spain. In its digestive tract were plastic bags, raffia sacks, ropes, pieces of nets and even a plastic jerry can. The experts who examined the whale said it

Fig. 1.18  Remains of an albatross that had ingested plastic waste (Source Science Magazine)

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was likely that the whale was unable to expel the trash causing it to die from peritonitis—an infection of the abdomen.60 In October 2018, the New York Times reported on an effort to save a young hawksbill turtle rescued from being tangled up in fishing gear off the east coast of Kenya, near Watamu. The hawksbill turtle is a critically endangered species. This one weighed only 3 kg—much less than normal. An X-ray exam showed the turtle’s intestines were clogged with plastic. Although cared for by an NGO called Local Ocean, the turtle died after a few months. A post-mortem exam revealed shards of pink, white and blue plastic, and tangles of blue and grey string in its stomach.61 A few weeks later in November 2018, a dead whale washed ashore in Eastern Indonesia. In its stomach conservation officials found almost 6 kg of plastic waste including 115 plastic cups, four plastic bottles, 25 plastic bags, 2 flip-flops, a nylon sac and more than 10,000 other assorted pieces of plastic.62 The risk to marine species and seabirds is increasing because the amount of plastic debris being dumped into the oceans is rising almost exponentially each year.63 To make matters worse, research conducted in 2017, seemed to indicate that some fish mistake plastic debris for food.64 This may be because plastic debris is getting smaller. Microplastic particles now pollute most of the oceans. They have been found in some of the most remote and uncharted areas. Samples taken from the middle of the South Indian Ocean—one of the most remote regions on the planet— showed microplastic particles at a relatively high volume. The highest levels of microplastic were around Europe’s north Atlantic and Mediterranean coasts. High levels were also recorded off the coast of Cape Town and Australia.65 A 2016 study on just a single catchment area in northern England revealed shocking results. The highest levels of microplastic pollution were found in rivers near Manchester. The River Tame had more than 500,000 microplastic particles per square meter in the top 10 cm of riverbed—the highest levels ever recorded world-wide.66 Moreover, plastic waste is stifling coral reefs. In 2017, scientists assessed the influence of disease on 124,000 reef-building corals from 159 reefs in the Asia-Pacific region. The likelihood of disease increases from 4 to 89% when corals are in contact with plastic. It was estimated that 11.1 billion plastic items are entangled on coral reefs across the Asia-Pacific region, and that this number is increasing every year.67

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Air Pollution Pollution is the greatest environmental cause of disease and premature death. Diseases caused by pollution were responsible for an estimated 9 million premature deaths in 2105—that’s 16% of all deaths worldwide. A number that is three times more than deaths from AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria combined. In the most severely affected countries, pollution is responsible for more than one death in four.68 Globally, with smoking on the decline, air pollution now causes more deaths annually than tobacco.69 Pollution is now a substantial global problem that endangers the health of millions, degrades the Earth’s ecosystems, undermines the economic security of nations, and is responsible for an enormous global burden of disease, disability, and premature death. It is associated with a much wider range of diseases than was previously recognized. Air pollution is now understood to be an important causative agent of many non-communicable diseases including asthma, cancer, neurodevelopmental disorders, and birth defects in children; and heart disease, stroke, chronic obstructive pulmonary disease and cancer in adults.70 Pollution is directly linked to the combustion of carbon fuels: fossil fuel combustion in high-income and middle-income countries and the burning of biomass in low-income countries accounts for 85% of airborne particulate pollution and for almost all pollution related to sulphur emissions and nitrogen oxides. In many part of the world pollution is getting worse. Household air and water pollution, the forms of pollution associated with poverty and traditional lifestyles in many developing countries, are slowly declining as cleaner technologies for cooking and lighting are adopted. However, ambient air pollution, chemical pollution, and soil pollution—the forms of pollution produced by industry, mining, power generation, mechanized agriculture and vehicles—are all on the rise with the most marked increases in rapidly developing and industrializing low-income and middle-income countries.71

Outdoor Air Pollution In 2016 the World Health Organisation published a comprehensive report that assessed the level of exposure and the burden of disease resulting from outside (ambient) air pollution—meaning the quality of the air we breathe outside the home and moving around in towns and cities around the globe.72 Data was collected from almost 3000 cities and towns with a mean

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size of about 540,000 people. This represents about 1.6 billion people or 43% of the global urban population. The survey looked at levels of only one type of pollution, particulate matter (PM), which is generally a good indicator of overall air quality. Particulate matter is a noxious pollutant which is responsible for a wide variety of medical conditions that may result in premature death. There is in fact no safe level of particulate matter—no threshold has been identified below which no damage to health is observed. The WHO Air Quality Guidelines therefore recommend achieving the lowest concentrations of PM possible. For the most dangerous type of particulate matter: the very fine particles referred to as PM2.5, the guideline values recommended by World Health Organisation are as follows: • Annual mean: 10 micrograms per cubic meter of air (10 µg/m3) • 24-hour mean: 25 µg/m3 For PM10 particulate matter, slightly less dangerous, the guidelines value for the annual mean is 20 µg/m3. Figure 1.19 shows annual mean concentrations of PM10 measured in 40 cities around the world.73 Toronto, Madrid, Sydney and Auckland look like they just about meet the recommended limit of 20 µg/m3). None of the other cities are in compliance, and several cities in the eastern Mediterranean region and south east Asia are way over the limit by a factor of 10 or more.

Fig. 1.19  Mean concentrations of particulate matter (PM10) in 40 cities for the period 2011–2015 (Source World Health Organisation)

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In terms of population numbers, fully 84% of the assessed populations exposed to PM10 or PM2.5 are breathing in air that fails to meet the Air Quality Guideline values cited above. That is roughly 1.3 billion people. The number of deaths caused by ambient air, chemical, and soil pollution—the forms of pollution associated with modern industrial and urban development—are increasing. Deaths attributable to PM2.5 air pollution is estimated to have risen from 3.5 million in 1990 to 4.2 million in 2015—a 20% increase. Among the world’s 10 most populous countries in 2015, the largest increases in numbers of pollution-related deaths were recorded in India and Bangladesh.74 The worst cities for air pollution are in India. In 2018, nine of the world’s top ten cities for PM2.5 pollution were in that country. Kanpur was the worst: recording PM2.5 levels at a whopping 173 µg per cubic metre.75 The WHO air pollution assessment only looked at particulate matter. But in densely populated urban areas with lots of diesel cars moving around (in many European cities for example), levels of a pollutant called nitrogen dioxide, are increasingly becoming a serious concern. In London and Paris, the average daytime nitrogen dioxide hourly concentrations are routinely higher than WHO guidelines.76 In the USA, the Clean Air Act requires the Environmental Protection Agency to set national ambient air quality standards for six specific pollutants: • Carbon monoxide • Lead • Nitrogen dioxide • Ozone • Particulate matter • Sulphur dioxide The US has made significant progress in reducing the emissions of the most hazardous atmospheric pollutants. And this in spite of solid economic growth over the last 45 year period: as shown in Fig. 1.20. But aggregate annual national statistics smooth out the data and mask the large local and day-to-day variations. A 2019 report by the American Lung Association paints a far less rosy picture than the one perhaps airbrushed by the EPA. According to the ALA: • Many cities across the US experienced an increased number of days with when particle pollution (often called ‘soot’) rose to record-breaking levels.

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Fig. 1.20  Comparison of growth areas and declining emissions in the USA, 1980– 2017 (Our nation’s air: https://gispub.epa.gov/air/trendsreport/2017/#home) (Source US Environmental Protection Agency)

More cities suffered from a greater number of days when ground-level ozone (aka ‘smog’) reached unhealthy levels. • The number of people exposed to unhealthy air in 2017 increased to 141 million, up from 134 million in 2016 and 125 million in 2015. However, these numbers are down from those measured in 2014—when an estimated 166 million people were exposed to unhealthy air. • More than 20 million people live in 12 US counties with unhealthy levels of ozone, short-term and year-round particle pollution.77 Meanwhile, over in London, England, a report issued in October 2017 by Transport for London (TFL) shocked many people living in the city. The TFL agency measured levels of PM2.5—the most dangerous of the particulate matter pollutants, across the metropolis. It found that “all Londoners are exposed to concentrations higher than WHO air quality guidelines”. On the outskirts of London, where about 6% of the population live, PM2.5 levels were just slightly more than the guideline limit (which is that the annual mean concentration should not exceed 10 micrograms per cubic meter). More centrally, almost 8 million Londoners—nearly 95% of the capital’s population—live in areas of London that exceed the guideline limit by 50% or more.78 In fact, across the UK, most urban areas have illegal ­levels of air pollution.

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Household Air Pollution A third of the world’s population uses solid fuel derived from plant material (biomass) or coal for cooking, heating or lighting. These fuels are often burned in an open fire or a simple stove, often inside the home. The stoves are inefficient and the incomplete combustion results in large amounts of smoke and noxious gases that have a serious health impact. Cooking consumes most solid fuel worldwide. The sources of fuel vary considerably: with coal used predominantly in China, but wood and charcoal are more common in Africa and India. Animal dung is used in pastoralist communities, particularly those at high altitudes (e.g. Nepal and Afghanistan) or in savannahs where wood is rare (e.g. Kenya and Ethiopia). Fuel deprived communities often burn domestic rubbish and plant residues such as straw and maize husks, whereas urban communities more commonly burn charcoal or kerosene. Lighting can also result in substantial pollution inside the home. Smoky unvented wicks in simple lamps that burn kerosene and ordinary candles can result in substantial black carbon smoke. Heating needs are highly variable by latitude, altitude and season. In cold climates (e.g. Nepal and North India) ventilation may be deliberately minimized to conserve energy, resulting in extremely toxic levels of household air pollution for a substantial part of the year. Poor urban people in Africa often bring a simple cooking stove indoors to keep their sleeping area warm at night. In most cultures, women have a leading role in domestic cooking, with men perhaps cooking when at work or away from home. In the typical domestic context, women experience several periods of intense exposure to cooking smoke each day. Young children and infants often carried on the woman’s back or placed nearby to sleep are also exposed to these short very high levels of smoke. There is particular concern when young children are exposed to smoke because data suggest that smoke exposure during this development phase is particularly detrimental to their health. Socioeconomic status is a major predictor of exposure to household air pollution. Poverty, disease, and the use of solid fuel are inextricably linked because poverty is a risk factor for disease in all communities across the globe. Poorer people use easily available fuels and inefficient stoves because these are generally less expensive. Propane and liquid petroleum gas (LPG) burn much more cleanly with almost no smoke but are too expensive for many households in developing countries. But cheaper fuels such as charcoal, wood, dung, and crop residues, produce highly toxic emissions.

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Fig. 1.21  Charcoal market in Haiti—Just outside Port-au Prince in 2013 (Source Author’s collection)

Globally, indoor air pollution is declining—thanks to huge efforts by several international donors to improve the efficiency of charcoal stoves and to promote a shift to cleaner fuels—such as liquified petroleum gas (LPG). Figure 1.21 shows a charcoal market just outside Port-au-Prince in 2013. The simple charcoal stoves used in Haiti are also sold in this market (you can see them stacked up just above the red Digicel umbrellas). It’s not hard to understand how cooking with charcoal on simple but very inefficient stoves leads to high levels of smoke and airborne particulates in the kitchens and homes of poor Haitian families.

Air Pollution and Children Air pollution is directly linked with diseases and infections that kill about 650,000 children under the age of five every year. Almost one million children die from pneumonia each year, and more than half of these deaths are directly related to air pollution—which is strongly correlated with respiratory conditions such as pneumonia, bronchitis and asthma.

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As countries industrialize and urbanize, energy use tends to increase. If that energy comes from coal and carbon fuels then outside air pollution can substantially worsen. Children are especially sensitive to air-borne pollutants. The cell layer on the inside of the respiratory tract is more permeable in children, and their respiratory airways are smaller than an adult’s. Infections are more likely to cause blockages. Children also breathe twice as fast, inhaling more air per unit of body weight compared to adults. The lung capacity of children living in a polluted environment can be reduced by 20%—similar to growing up in a house with second-hand cigarette smoke. Air pollution can also exacerbate underlying health issues that prevent children for going to school, and there is emerging evidence that air pollution can disrupt physical and cognitive development. Left untreated some health complications related to air pollution can endure for a lifetime. Studies have also shown that people who were exposed to chronic air pollution as children tend to have respiratory problems later in life.79 It should come as no surprise that poor children are most at risk, and that globally, air pollution affects children in low- and middle income countries more severely. Asia currently accounts for most of the deaths attributable to air pollution. However, in Africa, increasing industrial production, urbanization and traffic is driving a rapid rise in outside air pollution. Lower-income areas are often highly exposed to environmental pollutants such as waste and air pollution. Factories and industrial activity are often more common near low-income areas, and there is often less capacity to manage household and industrial waste. This can result in burning trash including plastics, rubber and electronics, creating toxic air-borne chemicals which are highly detrimental to children. And poor families are much less likely to have the resources to provide effective ventilation, or air conditioning to protect themselves from harmful air. World-wide over 1 billion children live in homes where solid fuels are used for cooking and heating. While outdoor air pollution tends to be worse in poor urban communities, indoor air pollution is worse in rural communities where biomass fuels (wood, charcoal, peat, and dung) are more frequently used in cooking and heating. For instance, about 80% of rural families in India use biomass fuels simply because they are less expensive and readily available. The poorer the family, the more likely it is to use less expensive but more polluting biomass fuels. Being poor also means that access to health care is much more limited. When a child lacks good nutrition or does not have access to clean water, ­adequate sanitation and hygiene, respiratory infections such as pneumonia are

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much more common and potentially more deadly. A body’s defences require good overall health. A lack of access to healthcare not only prevents treatment but can also mean that conditions go undiagnosed in the first place.80

Water Pollution The level of pollution in the world’s rivers and lakes varies considerably. In the majority of developed countries, the quality of the water has improved significantly. There are localized exceptions to this rule (think Flint, Michigan). However, in the developing world, the situation is still deeply concerning. According to 2016 report by the UN Environment Programme (UNEP), water pollution has worsened since the 1990s in the majority of rivers in Latin America, Africa and Asia.81 Severe pathogen pollution is estimated to affect about a quarter of river stretches in Latin America, somewhere between 10 and 25% of African rivers, and about a third of Asian river stretches. Factoring in the fraction of rural population that is likely to come into contact with these water courses, it is estimated that between 8 and 25 million people are at risk in Latin America, 32–164 million in Africa, and 31–134 million in Asia. The numbers are evidently approximate—reflecting the lack of data on the extent of water pollution in developing countries. But the scale is alarming: the number of people exposed to this form of pollution is in the millions. Concentrations of faecal coliform bacteria (FCB) have increased between 1990 and 2010 in almost two thirds of all rivers in Latin America, Africa and Asia, and along about a quarter of their length. A large part of the increase in FCB pollution is thought to be due to the expansion of sewer systems that discharge untreated wastewater into surface waters. While improved sanitation in urban areas brings huge health benefits, discharging the sewage and wastewater into the nearest river simply shifts the environmental problem elsewhere, and relocates the risk factor of unimproved sanitation from urban to downstream rural communities. What is needed are wastewater treatment facilities that can treat the sewage, stabilize it, render it non-toxic, and ideally recycle the wastewater as water for irrigation and agricultural production. Women and children are at higher risk than men from this form of water pollution because women in riverine communities often wash clothes in the river and collect water for cooking and drinking. Children play in the river and are often tasked (particularly girls) with bringing water to the house.

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Organic pollution is caused by the release of large quantities of organic waste materials into surface waters—rivers and lakes. The decomposition of these wastes often leads to a reduction in the dissolved oxygen level in the water which, like a dead zone in the ocean, may kill fish and other aquatic fauna. Inland capture fisheries are an important source of protein for rural communities in developing countries—providing employment for over 20 million fishers. Almost all of these livelihoods depend on small-scale fisheries exploited by relatively poor people with over half the workforce being women. In 2010, severe organic pollution was estimated to affect up to one in ten of river stretches in Latin America, one in seven in Africa and one in six in Asia. Organic pollution is getting worse: between 1990 and 2010 pollution increased in almost two-thirds of all rivers in Latin America, Africa and Asia.82 The UNEP report ends on a positive note, stressing that although water pollution is serious and getting worse in Africa, Latin America and Asia, the majority of rivers on these three continents are still in good shape, and that there are clear opportunities for reducing further pollution and restoring the rivers that are of concern.83 But serious and concerted action will be required to reverse the present downward trend.

In Sickness and in Health Although this chapter is primarily focused on the ailing health of planet Earth, it would be obtuse not to take a quick look at the health of the dominant species in the Anthropocene Age. Are people living longer? Are they in robust health? What about the children? Globally, life expectancy has been improving at a rate of more than 3 years per decade since 1950s, with the exception of the 1990s—when progress stalled in Africa because of the rising HIV epidemic and faltered in Europe because of increased mortality in many ex-Soviet countries following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Life expectancy improved rapidly in most regions from 2000 onwards, and overall there was a global increase of 5.9 years in life expectancy between 2000 and 2015, with an even larger increase of 9.4 years recorded in WHO’s Africa region. Improvements in outcomes for all major causes of deaths have contributed to these substantial gains. The gap between African life expectancy and European LE has narrowed by 4.9 years since the year 2000.84

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This impressive increase in life expectancy across the globe and particularly in low and middle income countries is the result of a sustained programme of investment and support for health programs by United Nations agencies and by large non-governmental organizations that have often received substantial financial support from wealthy donors and philanthropic organizations. It is one of the outstanding technology success stories of the last century. But a 2018 report issued by several UN agencies casts a sombre shadow over these numbers. The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World is an annual report. Since about 2010, the number of undernourished people in the world had been decreasing—from about 900 million in 2000 to 784 million in 2015. That trend now appears to have been reversed. In 2016 the number of chronically undernourished people rose to 804 million and the figure for 2017 is estimated to be as high as 821 million. The food security situation has worsened in parts of Africa, and in SouthEast and Western Asia. The worst deteriorations have been observed most often, perhaps unsurprisingly, in situations of conflict—but conflict that is often compounded by droughts or floods. Over the past ten years the number of violent conflicts around the world has increased significantly—and rural communities are generally the hardest hit. Conflict drives greater food insecurity—fuelling violence leading to more conflict. Figure 1.22 shows that the number of undernourished people has been on the rise since 2015—reaching an estimated 821 million in 2017. The prevalence (i.e. the percentage) of undernourished people has also risen.85 Recent estimate show that despite significant population growth the share of undernourished people in the world decreased from 14.7% in 2000 to 10.6% in 2015. However, the rate of decline has slowed significantly—coming to a virtual halt between 2014 and 2016, and rising in 2017 to an estimated 10.9%, almost the level it was in 2013. Globally, the prevalence of anaemia in women and obesity in adults is increasing. More than one in eight adults in the world is obese and one in three women of reproductive age is anaemic—a statistic that the FAO describes as shameful.86 What about children? Can they look forward to a long and healthy life? According to the latest estimates for 2017, 151 million children under five years of age across the world suffer from unnaturally slow growth. Called stunting, children are too short for their age, a condition which is a reflection of a chronic state of undernutrition. When children are stunted before the age of two, they are at a higher risk of illness and more likely

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Fig. 1.22  Prevalence of undernourishment in the world and absolute numbers in millions (Source FAO, State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2018 )

than well-nourished children to develop poor cognitive skills and learning disabilities in later childhood and adolescence. If widespread, stunting can undermine the economic development of entire communities. The prevalence of stunting is highest in Africa, Southern Asia and Oceania (excluding Australia and New Zealand) where more than 30% of children under five are too short for their age. As a percentage, stunting has been slowly declining. But in Africa, the decline has not kept pace with the increase in population so the number of stunted children has actually increased—although the vast majority of stunted children are found in Asia. Childhood wasting: being too thin for one’s height is another scourge. It is generally caused by low birth weight, inadequate diet, poor care practices, and infections. In 2017, wasting affected 50 million children under five with two regions, Asia and Oceania, seeing almost 1 in 10 affected compared to just one in a hundred in Latin America and the Caribbean. Most of the burden is concentrated in Asia, with seven out of ten afflicted children living in this region.87

Pesticides A UN report in 2017 looked at the use of pesticides in the context of the right to food. The report states that pesticides are responsible for an

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estimated 200,000 acute poisoning deaths a year, 99% of which occur in developing countries—even though these countries account for only about a quarter of worldwide pesticide usage.88 In some countries, pesticide poisoning exceeds fatalities from infectious diseases—a shocking situation.89 Tragic accidents involving poisoning include an accident in Peru in 1999, where 24 schoolchildren died following the consumption of the highly toxic pesticide parathion—which had been packaged so that it was mistaken for milk powder. Other cases include the deaths of 23 children in India in 2013 after consuming a meal contaminated with the highly toxic pesticide monocrotophos; the poisoning of 39 preschool children in China in 2014 from the consumption of food containing residues of pesticide; and the death of 11 children in Bangladesh in 2015 after eating fruit laced with pesticide chemicals.90 All these deaths from pesticide poisoning involved children.

Biodiversity Finally we look at biodiversity—because all of the factors described above in this chapter are having a dangerously harmful impact on the Earth’s biodiversity. We share this planet with a huge assortment of wonderful and amazing creatures. For the most part, we have treated them appallingly badly: destroying their habitat, polluting their waters, poisoning them with industrial effluents, pesticides and toxic chemicals; and hunting and killing the larger animals—often to the point of extinction. This callous brutality still continues: the killing of elephants for their tusks, and rhinos for their horns has never stopped. A report in 2016 found over 300 mammal species are threatened by hunting including primates, ungulates, bats, marsupials, rodents, and carnivores. The primary reason for hunting and trapping these animals is to acquire meat for human consumption, and this occurs almost entirely in developing countries across Africa, South America and particularly Southeast Asia. Animals are also hunted for their body parts for traditional medicine, live animals for the pet trade, and the ornamental use of body parts.91 Bush meat is now traded internationally and can even be found in New York.92 The threats to global biodiversity are not only due to the changing climate: in fact climate change, a much more recent phenomenon, is at least for the moment less severe than the other pressures driving many species towards extinction.93 These include:

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Habitat loss and degradation: Caused by unsustainable agriculture, logging, roads, residential and commercial development, energy production and mining, the fragmentation, degradation, and despoliation of a species habitat (including water courses for fish) has an immediate detrimental impact. The clearing of forests for palm oil plantations in Asia, and for beef production in South America continues to have a major impact on biodiversity in those regions. Overexploitation: Unsustainable hunting, fishing, poaching and harvesting can drive species to the point of no-return. Indirect overexploitation occurs when non-target species are killed unintentionally (as bycatch for instance). Pollution: Predominantly a threat in the marine environment: oil spills, agricultural runoff, and the huge amounts of plastic trash in the oceans have a noxious and often fatal impact on fish and marine mammals. Pesticides continue to have a severe impact on essential pollinator species such as bees. Invasive species and disease: Invasive species compete for food and habitat and can both prey on native species and bring diseases not previously in the environment that decimate indigenous populations. But climate change is an emerging and potentially existential threat for huge numbers of species already exposed to the risks described above. Rising temperatures will induce many species to shift their range and to move to areas where the climate is more suitable. Butterflies, for instance, appear to be moving towards the poles in several countries. But for many species this form of adaptation will not be possible. Species that inhabit the polar regions for instance, like the polar bear in the Arctic, have nowhere else to go. The future is bleak for this iconic species. Changes in sea level are an obvious threat to species that live on low-lying islands or which inhabit low-elevation coastal zones. In what is believed to be the first instance of an extinction caused solely by human-induced climate change, a small rodent called the Bramble Cay melomys—an animal that lived on a small island in the eastern Torres Strait of the Great Barrier Reef, disappeared from the island in 2016. The melomys was already hugely vulnerable: it had the most isolated and restricted range of any Australian mammal. It is estimated that the area of the cay above high tide decreased from 4 ha in 1998 to 2.5 ha in 2014. In addition, over the last ten years, 97% of the rodents’ habitat was destroyed by severe weather compounded by sea level rise.94

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The World Wildlife Fund (WWF) publishes an annual report called the Living Planet Report. The 2016 edition paints a very sombre picture of life on Earth and its prospects.95

The Sixth Extinction? Palaeontologists define mass extinctions as events characterized by the loss of the majority of species in a relatively short geological time period. Mass extinctions have occurred five times in the past 4–500 million years. The continual loss of biodiversity, diminution of species’ populations, and the number of actual extinctions of species now underway in the twenty-first century has been called the sixth extinction. In the past, extinctions took place over long geological periods of time—often millions of years. What is astonishing about the present era is that the continuing process of incremental extinctions is taking place within an extremely short period of time. And the driving force behind this transition is exceptional: never before has a single species, Homo sapiens, had such a destructive impact on the planet. In fact, the previous extinctions were all caused by the planet’s changing climate. The difference is that the changes were caused by events over which the species present at the time had no control. A massive hit from a large meteor ended the reign of the dinosaurs. The planet’s natural long-term climate variability produced ice-ages so severe that few animals and plants could survive. In the past few years, scientists have tried to compare current rates of species extinctions with the rate at which species became extinct over the preceding millennia—referred to as the ‘background rate’. The background rate is conservatively estimated to be somewhere between 0.1 and 1 extinctions per 10,000 species per 100 years.96 Modern extinction rates have increased sharply over the last 200 years, and the rates now are much higher than the background rate. Moreover, the pace of extinctions appears to be increasing.97 As an example, only nine vertebrate extinctions would have been expected since 1900 if the background rate had continued for all vertebrates; however, the data show that 477 species became extinct—53 times higher than the number expected. These species include 69 mammal species, 80 bird species, 24 reptiles, 146 amphibians, and 158 species of fish.98 Further research has examined not just the rate of species’ extinctions, but the disappearance of populations of individual species—since clearly the

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disappearance of species populations is a precursor to the extinction of the entire species. In 2016, a paper published in the proceedings of the American National Academy of Sciences sounded the alarm in stark terms. Based on a sample of 27,600 terrestrial vertebrate species, and a more detailed analysis of 177 mammal species, the authors highlight the extremely high degree of population decay in vertebrates, even in species not considered to be of any concern.99 Their conclusion is that “Earth is experiencing a huge episode of population decline and extirpation which will have negative cascading consequences on ecosystem functioning and services vital to sustaining civilization.” They go on to state: Dwindling population sizes and range shrinkages amount to a massive anthropogenic erosion of biodiversity and of the ecosystem services essential to civilization. This “biological annihilation” underlines the seriousness for humanity of Earth’s ongoing sixth mass extinction event.

It’s not just vertebrate species that are threatened with extinction. In October 2017, data gathered by amateur entomologists in 63 nature reserves across Germany revealed a huge decline in the number of insects present in these protected environments. The annual average fell by 76% over the 27 year period, and the summer peak—normally when insects are most numerous—showed a reduction of 82%. Working tirelessly behind the scenes, insects are an essential part of the Earth’s complex of ecosystems. A decline of this magnitude is a sign of serious problems. The cause of the decline is unclear—although the destruction of wild areas and the widespread use of pesticides are considered to be the most likely contributing factors.100 More evidence for the decline in arthropod populations was published in 2018 by scientists checking on the health of a rainforest ecosystem in Puerto Rico. Arthropods include insects, spiders, and centipedes, and the abundance of all these small invertebrate animals was found to have substantially declined in the Luquillo rainforest, part of the El Yunque National Forest in the north-eastern part of the island. Arthropods comprise more than twothirds of all terrestrial species and are critically important for the health and well-being of the Earth’s ecosystems. Scientists speculate that tropical species that have evolved in regions where there are no pronounced seasonal variations in temperature, like the tropics, are more sensitive to increasing global temperatures. Consequently, even small increments in temperature,

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particularly maximum temperature, can precipitate sharp decreases in abundance. These predictions have been verified in a variety of tropical reptiles, amphibians and invertebrates. Between 1978 (when the area was first studied) and 2015, maximum temperatures as recorded in the field station have risen by 2 °C. The impact on the population of arthropods has been severe. Samples collected from the ground and from the canopy of the forest were said to be “indicative of a collapse in forest arthropods.”101 This sharp fall in arthropod abundance has had a knock-on effect on the food chain, with insectivore lizards, frogs, and birds all showing a decline in numbers—in what the authors call “a classic bottom-up cascade.”102 The collapse in the abundance of arthropods was not found to be related to extreme climate events—like hurricanes. While the initial damage from hurricane Hugo in 1989 was devastating, the Luquillo forest vegetation recovered quickly with 70% of trees producing new leaves after only seven weeks, and after hurricane George in 1998, insect populations recovered in less than a year. Checking on damage after hurricane Maria in 2017, researchers found many locations well on the way to recovery after just two months. However, as global warming continues to intensify, the frequency and intensity of hurricanes impacting Puerto Rico are expected to increase, along with the intensity of droughts, and increases in maximum temperature—conditions that collectively may well overwhelm the resilience of the rainforest ecosystem.103 In 2019, another shocking report made headlines around the world. Published by the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES), the report on global biodiversity presented the work of more than 400 experts who had laboured for 3 years to bring together the latest assessment of the deteriorating condition of the planet’s natural environment and its biodiversity.104 The report charts the accelerating impacts of global heating, climate change, and mankind’s destructive impact on the natural environment. It foresees a grim future for over a million of the planet’s species. This warning follows hot on the heels of a Canadian government assessment that forecasts that Canada will warm twice as fast as the global average, and the sombre 2018 IPCC report that meticulously laid out the evidence that even keeping global warming to 1.5 °C will result in widespread social and economic disruption as climate-driven natural disasters increasingly bludgeon the planet.105 The stark conclusion of the scientists is that human actions threaten more species with global extinction than ever before. An average of about 25% of

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animal and plant species are threatened, suggesting that around 1 million species face extinction within a matter of decades unless action is taken to reduce the intensity of the main drivers of biodiversity loss. The problem is not only climate change—which is judged to be the third most destructive influence on the biosphere. The main culprit is the way mankind has radically changed and destroyed the natural landscape. Seventy-five percent of the land surface has been significantly altered, 66% of the of the oceans are experiencing increasing cumulative impacts, and over 85% of wetlands have been lost. Across much of the tropics, 32 million hectares of primary or recovering forests were cut down between 2010 and 2015—an area half the size of France. In the oceans, half of coral cover on coral reefs has been lost. The average abundance of terrestrial species in most major biomes has fallen by at least 20 per cent—a decline that appears to be accelerating. Population sizes of wild vertebrate species have tended to decline over the last 50 years on land, in freshwater and in the sea. Global trends in insect population are not known accurately but rapid declines have been well documented in certain regions. Researchers in 2017, warned of an “ecological Armageddon” after measuring a dramatic plunge in insect numbers across Germany. Using malaise traps to capture flying insects in 63 nature reserves, and measuring the weight of the captured insects, the data showed a decrease of 76% over a 27 year period, and a startling drop of 82% in the summer—when insect abundance would normally reach its peak. The rate of global change during the last 50 years is unprecedented in human history. The most destructive drivers of these global changes are in land and sea use, direct exploitation of organisms, climate change, pollution, and the invasion of alien species. All are caused directly and indirectly by the way we mine the planet’s natural resources without a second thought, pump polluting chemicals into the air, and dump our trash onto the land and into the oceans.106

The Big Picture This chapter has covered a lot of ground. Let’s just take a step back and recap what we now know: • Heatwaves are becoming more intense. They are not killing more ­people—because government agencies have got better at warning communities and providing assistance to those who are most vulnerable. But

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the trend is upward, and the forecast is for hotter and more frequent ­heatwave events; • Natural disasters are more frequent and more damaging: floods are more frequent, hurricanes and cyclones more intense, and both are more destructive; • Wildfires are becoming more frequent. They are larger and more widespread. Higher average temperatures and more intense heatwaves are likely to produce more fires. So the prediction is for larger and more destructive wildfires; • Glaciers are melting; Arctic sea ice is declining; and the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets are melting faster than previously predicted; • The oceans are in bad shape. They are becoming more acidic; dead zones are multiplying; enormous garbage patches filled with trash are now found in all the oceans. Plastic waste is killing fish and seabirds; • Coral reefs are bleaching out because of rising seawater temperatures. Many are unlikely to survive. Millions of rural fishers in developing countries will lose one of their principal livelihoods. • Air pollution kills several million people every year including over half a million children. Air quality does not appear to be getting any worse. But there is little evidence that it is getting any better. And the death toll is already huge. • There are close to half a billion undernourished people in the world and the situation appears to be worsening. Childhood wasting and stunting affects over a 100 million children worldwide. • The pollution of rivers in Latin America, Africa and Asia is worsening— threatening the health of millions of rural communities that rely on rivers and lakes for drinking water; • Across the planet, biodiversity is showing signs of alarming stress. Many species have become extinct; more will follow. Many experts believe that a 6th extinction is already underway. The majority of scientists that study the global climate are certain that most of the problems that are afflicting the planet can be explained by the changes that have been observed in the Earth’s climate. The warning signs have been there for some time: the first alarms were sounded back in the 1960s. But at that time the evidence that the climate was changing was unconvincing. Scientists knew that levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere were increasing every year, and many of them believed that this spelled trouble. But not all scientists agreed. After all, carbon dioxide is a natural part of the environment and, moreover, is essential for photosynthesis and for the growth

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of plants. How could the slowly increasing concentrations of this essential life-giving gas possibly cause a problem? It seemed highly unlikely, impossible even. But since the turn of the century, the signs of an increasingly disturbed climate have become impossible to ignore.

Conclusion What the majority of climate scientists now believe is that most of the problems written about in this chapter are either directly caused, or indirectly accelerated, by the fact that the planet is getting warmer. Not the trash in the oceans and the polluted air and rivers—that’s just humankind in the Anthropocene Age continuing to treat the natural environment as a huge trash can of unlimited capacity. But the violent weather, droughts and floods, wildfires, heatwaves, bleached-out coral, acidic seawater, food insecurity, and melting glaciers and ice sheets, are all driven, either totally or in part, by the fact that the Earth is warming. It’s not an illusion; it’s not a hypothesis. It’s a scientific fact based on solid incontrovertible evidence. So how did we get in this much trouble? Who’s to blame? The Climate Science Special Report published by the US Global Change Research Program in 2017 states unequivocally107: It is extremely likely that human activities, especially emissions of greenhouse gases, are the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century. For the warming over the last century, there is no convincing alternative explanation supported by the extent of the observational evidence.

The words ‘extremely likely’ are code. They mean that the probability that human activities have been the dominant cause of global warming is between 95 and 100%. In Chapter 2 we will examine in more detail this global warming trend and look more closely at the greenhouse gases which are believed to be the dominant cause of global heating. And then, in subsequent chapters, we will look for solutions to this global problem.

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Notes 1.

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

10. 11. 12.

One definition of a heatwave is: A marked unusual period of hot weather (Max, Min and daily average) over a region persisting for at least two consecutive days during the hot period of the year based on local climatological conditions, with thermal conditions recorded above given thresholds. But there are other definitions that are more statistical. See Analyses of the effects of global change on human health and welfare and human systems. US Climate Change Science Program: Synthesis and Assessment Product 4.6. Washington, DC. September 2008. See Heatwaves and health. CRED Crunch. Issue No. 46. Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED), Université catholique de Louvain, Brussels, Belgium. December 2016. See Worst heatwaves in history: Timeline. Accessed at: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/northamerica/usa/8653974/Worstheatwaves-in-history-timeline.html. See Heat waves and climate change: A science update from climate communication. Accessed at: https://www.climatecommunication.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Heat_Waves_and_Climate_Change.pdf. WMO statement on the state of the global climate in 2016. WMO-No. 1189. World Meteorological Organisation. Geneva, Switzerland. See Deadly heat wave, nicknamed ‘Lucifer’ engulfs Europe. Accessed at: https://thinkprogress.org/europe-a-heat-wave-named-lucifer/? See State of the climate in 2016, a 2017 report by the American Meteorological Society. See This summer’s heat waves could be the strongest climate signal yet. Accessed at: https://insideclimatenews.org/news/27072018/summer2018-hear-wave-wildfires-climate-change-evidence-crops-floodingdeaths-records-broken. See the article by Lugber, G., and McGeehin, M.: “Climate change and extreme heat.” The American Journal of Preventive Medicine 35 (5) (2008): 429–435. See Heat waves and climate change: A science update from climate communication. Accessed at: https://www.climatecommunication.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/06/Heat_Waves_and_Climate_Change.pdf. See the report of the US Global Change Research Program (USGCRP): Climate Science Special Report—Fourth National Climate Assessment, 470 pp, Volume I [eds. D.J. Wuebbles, D.W. Fahey, K.A. Hibbard, D.J. Dokken, B.C. Stewart, and T.K. Maycock]. U.S. Global Change Research Program, Washington, DC, USA. 2017. Available at: https:// www.globalchange.gov/nca4.

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13. 14.

15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

23. 24. 25.

26.

27. 28.

29.

See Death toll climbs in Karachi heatwave. Accessed at: https://www. thheguardian.com/world/2018/may/22/death-toll-climbs-in-karachiheatwave. See the 2016 report from the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED): Poverty & death: Disaster mortality 1996–2015. Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters, Université catholique de Louvain, Brussels, Belgium. Available at: https://www. cred.be/poverty-death-disaster-mortality-0. Ibid. A megadisaster is defined as a single event which kills more than 100,000 people. See the Poverty & death report from CRED cited above. See the report Poverty & death, Op. cit. See CRED Crunch No. 50. Accessed at: https://www.preventionweb. net/publications/view/57791. Ibid. CRED Crunch No. 54. Accessed at: https://www.glunis.com/BE/ Brussels/982611265115548/CRED. See New data shows changing disaster trends—And why Congress should take note. Accessed at: https://www.edf.org/blog/2017/09/13/new-data-shows-changing-disaster-trends-and-why-congress-should-take-note# comment-2507. See the website of the Canadian Meteorological and Oceanographic Society. Accessed at: http://www.cmos.ca/site/top_ten?a=2015#Forest. See the Canadian Meteorological and Oceanographic Society (CMOS) website for the year 2016. See the article: “B.C. wildfires map 2017: Current location of wildfires around the province.” Accessed at: http://globalnews.ca/news/3585284/ b-c-wildfires-map-2017-current-location-of-wildfires-around-the-province/. See the article: “Potent mix of record heat and dryness fuels wildfires across the West.” Accessed at: https://insideclimatenews.org/ news/05092017/west-wildfires-california-canada-forests-record-heatclimate-change. See Mendocino Complex fire now largest in California history. Accessed at: http://latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-In-california-wildfire-danger-level-20180806-story.html. The figure is from the article by Leroy Westerling. Cited as: Westerling, A.L.R.: “Increasing western US forest wildfire activity: Sensitivity to changes in the timing of spring.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society B Biological Sciences 371 (2016): 20150178. One study asserts that for every degree Celsius of warming, lightning strikes are estimated to increase 12% according to research published

1  A Planet in Peril     53

30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39.

40. 41. 42. 43. 44.

in the journal Science in 2014. See Lightning-caused fire rise in Arctic as the region warms. The trend could worsen significantly in the future if tree cover spreads northward. Accessed at: https://www. scientificamerican.com/article/lightning-caused-fires-rise-in-arctic-asthe-region-warms/. See the article in Science: “Fires rise in Arctic as ‘lightning follows the warming’.” Accessed at: https://www.eenews.net/stories/1060056631. See the article: “Ice and fire: Large blaze burns in Greenland for two weeks.” Accessed at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/aug/20/ ice-and-fire-large-blaze-burns-in-greenland-for-two-weeks/. See the article published in Science cited as: Andela, N., Morton, D.C., Giglio, L., Chen, Y. et al. “A human-driven decline in global burned area.” Science 356 (2017): 1356–1362. National Snow and Ice Data Center: State of the cryosphere. SOTC: Sea ice. Accessed from: http://nsidc.org/cryopshere/sotc/sea_ice.html. October 2017. World Meteorological Organisation: WMO statement on the state of the global climate in 2016. Ibid. WMO: Statement on the state of the global climate in 2016. See Global warming is melting Antarctic ice from below. Accessed at: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/climate-consensus-97-percent/2018/may/09/global-warming-is-melting-antarctic-ice-from-below. National Snow and Ice Data Center: State of the cryosphere. SOTC: Mountain glaciers. Accessed from: http://nsidc.org/cryopshere/sotc/glacier_balance.html. October 2017. National Snow and Ice Data Center: State of the cryosphere. SOTC: Mountain glaciers. Accessed from: http://nsidc.org/cryopshere/sotc/ glacier_balance.html. 2004 USGS photo by B.F. Molnia; 1941 photo by W.O. Field. See Repeat Photography of Glaciers in the Glacier Photograph Collection. Ibid. National Snow and Ice Data Center: State of the cryosphere. SOTC: Ice sheets. Accessed from: http://nsidc.org/cryopshere/sotc/ice_sheets.html. October 2017. See the National Snow and Ice Data Center Report at: www.nsidc.org/ cryosphere/sotc/ice_sheets.html. See the NASA website. Sea level change: Observations from space. Accessed at: https://sealevel.nasa.gov “State of the climate in 2015.” Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society 97 (8).

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45. National Snow and Ice Data Center: State of the cryosphere. SOTC: Permafrost and frozen ground. Accessed from: http://nsidc.org/cryopshere/ sotc/ice_sheets.html. October 2017. 46. The photo is from the NSIDC Report: The state of the cryosphere. SOTC: Permafrost and frozen ground. Cited above. 47. See the book: Burke, L., Reytar, K., Spalding, M., Perry A. Reefs at risk revisited. World Resources Institute, Washington, DC. 2011. 48. Images reprinted from: http://www.globalcoralbleaching.org/#images. See also In the Seychelles, coral reefs face change threat. Accessed at: https://www. apnews.com/94c7b0e2d2b84473b306a665c73bd207/In-the-Seychelles,coral-reefs-face-climate-change-threatmate. 49. See Great Barrier Reef hit by bleaching for the second year in a row. Accessed at:  http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/04/10/523254085/ great-barrier-reef-hit-by-bleaching-for-the-second-year-in-a-row. 50. See the website for Reef Check International and their international programs 51. See http://emdat.be/emdat_db/. Access to the database must be requested and approved. 52. See Ocean changes—Warming, stratification, circulation, acidification and deoxygenation, in Climate Science Special Report: A Sustained Assessment Activity of the US Global Change Research Program (eds. D.J. Wuebbles, D.W. Fahey, K.A. Hibbard, D.J. Dokken, et al.). US Global Change Research Program, Washington, DC, USA. 2017. 53. See Dead zones and climate zones. Accessed at: http://www.vims.edu/ research/topics/dead_zones/impacts/index.php. 54. Ibid. 55. Jambeck, J.R., Geyer, R., Wilcox, C., Siegler, T.R., et al. “Plastic waste inputs from land into the ocean.” Science 347 (6223) (2015): 768–771. 56. The graphic is from the Jambeck Research Group, see https://jambeck. engr.uga.edu/landplasticinput. 57. Woodall, L.C., Sanchez-Vidal, A., Canals, M., Paterson, G.I.j, et al. The deep sea is a major sink for microplastic debris, see http://rsos.royalsocietypublishing.org/content/1/4/140317. 58. See Great Pacific garbage patch is now twice the size of Texas. Accessed at: https://www.ecowatch.com/great-pacific-garbage-patch-texas-2551330463. html? 59. See these two articles “Nearly every seabird may be eating plastic by 2025.” http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2015/08/nearly-every-seabird-may-beeating-plastic-2050, and “Fish mistaking plastic debris in ocean for food study finds.” https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/aug/16/ fish-confusing-plastic-debris-in-ocean-for-food-study-finds. See also Plastic threatens to swamp the planet. Accessed at: https://www.ecowatch.com/plastic-pollution-oceans-2538009649.html.

1  A Planet in Peril     55

60. See Death by plastic: 64 lb of trash in whale’s digestive system. Accessed at: https://www.ecowatch.com/sperm-whale-plastic-death-2558644554.html. 61. New York Times. “Rescuing sea turtles from the fishing net.” The New York Times International, Weekend 27–28 October 2018. 62. See Dead whale had 115 plastic cups, 2 flip-flops in its stomach. Accessed at: https://www.nationalobserver.com/2018/11/20/news/dead-whale-had115-plastic-cups-2-flip-flops-its-stomach/. 63. See this article: Wilcox, C., Van Sebille, E., Hardesty, B.D.: “Threat of plastic pollution to seabirds is global, pervasive and increasing.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 112 (38) (2015): 11,899–11,904. 22 September 2015. Also this website piece: Nearly every seabird may be eating plastic by 2025. Accessed at: http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2015/08/ nearly-every-seabird-may-be-eating-plastic-2050. 64. Savoca, M.S., Tyson, C.W., McGill, M., and Slager, C.J.: “Odours from marine plastic debris induce food search behaviours in a forage fish.” Proceedings of the Royal Society. 16 August 2017. 65. See Microplastics pollute most remote and uncharted areas of the oceans. Accessed at: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/feb/12/ microplastics-pollute-most-remote-and-uncharted-areas-of-the-ocean. See also Mountains and mountains of plastic: Life on Cambodias’ polluted coast. Accessed at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/apr/25/mountainsand-mountains-of-plastic-life-on-cambodias-polluted-coast?CMP= twt_a-environment_b-gdneco. 66. See Microplastic pollution in oceans is far worse than feared, say scientists. Accessed at: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/mar/12/ microplastic-pollution-in-oceans-is-far-greater-than-thought-say-scientists. 67. Lamb, J.B., Willis, B.L., Firoenza, E.A., Couch, C.S., et al. “Plastic waste associated with disease on coral reefs.” Science 359 (6374) (2018): 460–462. 68. The Lancet Commission on pollution and health. 69. See Air pollution is the ‘new tobacco’ warns WHO head. Accessed at: https:// www.theguardian.com/environemnt/2018/oct/27/air-pollution-is-thenew-tobacco-warns-who-head/. 70. Lancet Commission on pollution and health. Op. cit. 71. Lancet Commission on pollution and health. Op. cit. 72. Ambient air pollution: A global assessment of exposure and burden of disease. World Health Organisation. Geneva, Switzerland. 2016. 73. Graph is from the 2016 WHO report cited above: Ambient air pollution: A global assessment of exposure and burden of disease. 74. Lancet Commission on pollution and health. Op. cit. 75. See Air pollution is the ‘new tobacco’ warns WHO head. Accessed at: https:// www.theguardian.com/environemnt/2018/oct/27/air-pollution-isthe-new-tobacco-warns-who-head/.

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76. Breathtaking: Air quality indices make pollution seem less bad than it is. Accessed at: https://www.economist.com/news/science-and-technology/ 21702743-air-quality-indices-make-pollution-seem-less-bad-it-breathtaking. 77. See the report: State of the air 2019. American Lung Association, Chicago, Illinois, USA. Accessed at: www.stateoftheair.org. 78. See PM2.5 concentrations and exposure in London, a report issued by Transport for London. See also Revealed: every Londoner breathing dangerous levels of toxic air particle. Accessed at: https://www.theguardian. com/environment/2017/oct/04/revealed-every-londoner-breathing-dangerous-levels-of-toxic-air-particle. 79. See “Air pollution is the ‘new tobacco’, warns WHO head.” The Guardian. Accessed at: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/oct/27/airpollution-is-the-new-tobacco-warns-who-head. 80. The data and information discussed in this section on air pollution and children are taken from the 2016 UNICEF report: Clear the air for children: The impact of air pollution on children, which is available online. 81. UNEP 2016. A snapshot of the world’s water quality: Towards a global assessment. United Nations Environment Program, Nairobi, Kenya. 82. Data is from the UNEP report #49. 83. UNEP 2016. Op. cit. 84. World Health Statistics 2016: Monitoring health for the SDGs: Sustainable Development Goals. World Health Organization, Geneva, Switzerland. 85. The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2018: Building Resilience for Peace and Food Security. FAO, IFAD, UNICEF, WFP and WHO. 2018. 86. Ibid. 87. Ibid. 88. UN General assembly. Human Rights Council. Report of the Special Rapporteur on the right to food. Report A/HRC/34/48. 24 January 2017. 89. See the article in the The Lancet: Michael Eddleston, “Pesticide poisoning in the developing world—A minimum pesticide list.” The Lancet 360 (9340) (2002): 1163–1167. Referenced in the UN report—Note 55. 90. The information is reported in the UN document: Note 55. 91. Ripple, W.J, Abernethy, K., Betts, M.G., Chapron, G., et al. “Bushmeat hunting and extinction risk to the world’s mammals.” Royal Society Open Science 3: 160498. http://dx.doi.org/10.1098/rsos.160498. 92. Smuggled bushmeat is Ebola’s backdoor to America. Accessed at: http://www.newsweek.com/2014/08/29/smuggled-bushmeat-ebolas-back-door-america-265668.html. 93. WWW 2016. Living Planet report 2016—Risk and resilience in a new era. WWF International, Gland, Switzerland.

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94. First mammal species goes extinct due to climate change. Accessed at: http://news.nationalgeographic.com/2016/06/first-mammal-extinctclimate-change-bramble-cay-melomys/. See also A national disgrace’: Australia’s extinction crisis is unfolding in plain sight. Accessed at: https:// www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/feb/13/a-national-disgrace-australias-extinction-crisis-is-unfolding-in-plain-sight? 95. WWW 2016. Living Planet report 2016—Risk and resilience in a new era. WWF International, Gland, Switzerland. 96. Ceballos, G., Ehrlich, P.R., Barnosky, A.D., Garcia, A., et al. “Accelerated modern human-induced species losses: Entering the sixth mass extinction.” Science Advances. 19 June 2015. 97. WWW 2016. Living Planet report 2016—Risk and resilience in a new era. WWF International, Gland, Switzerland. 98. Ceballos G., Ehrlich P.R., Barnosky A.D., Garcia A., et al.: “Accelerated modern human-induced species losses: Entering the sixth mass extinction.” Science Advances. 19 June 2015. 99. Ceballos, G., Ehrlich, P.R., and Dizzo, R.: “Biological annihilation via the ongoing sixth mass extinction signaled by vertebrate population losses and declines.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 114 (30). 25 July 2017. Washington, DC, USA. 100. See the article: More than 75 percent decline over 27 years in total flying insect biomass in protected areas. Accessed at: http://journals.plos.org/ plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0185809. 101. Lister, B.C., and Garcia, A.: Climate-driven declines in arthropod abundance restructure a rainforest food web. Accessed at: www.pnas.org/cgi/ doi/10.1073/pnas.1722477115. 102. Ibid. 103. Ibid. 104. The summary for policymakers of the IPBES report can be found here. Accessed at: https://www.eaere.org/policy/ecosystems-biodiversity/ ipbes-2019-global-assessment-report-on-biodiversity-and-ecosystem-services/ 105. Ibid. 106. Ibid. 107. See the US Global Change Research Program: Climate Science Special Report. Fourth National Climate Assessment | Volume I. Op. cit. Page 10.

2 The Overheated Earth

Introduction Not all the problems discussed in Chapter 1 can be attributed to the fact that the Earth is warming. But worsening heatwaves, storms, droughts, floods, and wildfires; melting glaciers; and bleaching coral are all directly accelerated by higher global temperatures. Other problems are impacted less directly: air pollution, for instance, is much more deadly during a heatwave. Biodiversity, while predominantly threatened by a multitude of humandriven activities including the loss of habitat for thousands of species, is further stressed by the warming climate. The pollution of rivers and lakes, and the trash-filled oceans have little to do with the changing climate. But to be scaled back and reduced to a minimum, these problems require the same forceful intervention by environmentally aware communities, intelligent and knowledgeable governance, and strong leadership that is needed to tackle the inexorable rise in global temperatures. In Chapter 1, we have deliberately avoided talking too much about ­climate change—preferring the facts to speak for themselves. But in this chapter we look at why the evidence for a warming planet is irrefutable and the impact inescapable. We are living in a warmer world. One that is already dangerously overheated. In 2019, scientists and environmentalists were increasingly talking about a climate crisis, rather than just climate change. And the occurrence of global warming was more frequently being described as global heating. Clearly, the climate situation is getting worse, not better. © The Author(s) 2020 M. J. Bush, Climate Change and Renewable Energy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15424-0_2

59

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In the Greenhouse First a question: Are we absolutely certain that the Earth is getting warmer? Are we sure that it’s not just due to sunspots or solar flares, or a wobble in the Earth’s orbit around the sun? What about the Milankovitch cycle? And what if all these variables that could potentially warm up the planet just happen to be taking place at the same time? It certainly seems as if the Earth is getting warmer. Every year since 2015 the meteorologists have been telling us that the year just over was the hottest ever recorded, and that the present year is on track to be hotter still. The World Meteorological Organisation’s report on the state of the global climate in 2018 was clear: The year 2018 was the fourth warmest on record and the four years, 2015–2018 were the top four warmest years in the global temperature record. Over the Arctic, annual average temperature anomalies (meaning deviations from the long term average) exceeded 2 °C and even 3 °C in several places. This was slightly lower than 2016, but still exceptionally high compared to the long-term average.1 For Europe as a whole, 2018 was one of the three warmest years on record. Other areas of notable warmth included the south-western US, eastern parts of Australia, and New Zealand, where it was the second warmest year on record.2 It was 2016 that was actually the warmest year during this period— including in several high-latitude locations, particularly along the Russian Federation coast, in Alaska, and far north Canada. In the high Arctic, temperatures were significantly above average values—with Svalbard airport in Norway (right up against the Arctic circle) recording average temperatures a huge 6.5 °C above the baseline value.3 Figure 2.1 is from NASA’s Goddard Institute for Space Studies (GISS) and shows the global trend in land surface air temperatures and sea surface water temperatures since 1880.4 Although there are periods when warming slows, the trend since about 1970 is inexorably upwards. More alarmingly, the rate of increase in the warming trend since 2010 has increased substantially. You can see a definite uptick in the curves after about 2010. The global sea surface temperature trend so far for the twenty-first century is estimate at 0.16 °C per decade—a significantly higher figure than the longer term 1950–2016 trend of 0.10 °C per decade.5 The rate of energy increase in the climate system is the most fundamental metric that defines the rate of global climate change. More than 90% of

2  The Overheated Earth     61 >ĂŶĚƐƵƌĨĂĐĞĂŝƌ ƚĞŵƉĞƌĂƚƵƌĞƐ;ƌĞĚͿ

^ĞĂƐƵƌĨĂĐĞǁĂƚĞƌ ƚĞŵƉĞƌĂƚƵƌĞ ;ďůƵĞͿ

Fig. 2.1  Global temperature anomalies over land and over ocean (Source NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies)

the Earth’s energy imbalance goes into heating the oceans. So tracking ocean temperatures and calculating the changes in ocean heat content (OHC) is where you look first if you want to understand more about global warming. The temperature of a substance is an indication of its energy content, and the energy absorbed and held in the oceans is orders of magnitude greater than the energy content of the atmosphere. Water is about a thousand times heavier than air, and it takes almost four times as much energy to raise the temperature of a kilogram of water by 1 °C than it does to raise the temperature of a kilogram of air by the same amount. How much water is in the oceans? About 1.35 billion billion tons. So raising the temperature of this mass of ocean water by just 0.6 °C requires a truly phenomenal amount of energy. Only when you consider the increasing heat content of the oceans, do you start to get an idea of the massive amount of energy that is being absorbed by the planet. Figure 2.2 from NOAA shows global ocean heat content data since 1957. For the last 50 years, the long-term trend has been strongly positive.6 The year 2018 set new records for ocean heat content in the upper 700 metres, exceeding previous records set in 2017.7 So what’s causing this seemingly inexorable rise in global temperatures?

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Fig. 2.2  Global ocean heat content (0–2000 m) (Source National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration)

As we noted in Chapter 1, the Climate Science Special Report, published in 2017 by the US Global Change Research Program, is very clear on this question. It states: This assessment concludes, based on extensive evidence, that it is extremely likely that human activities, especially emissions of greenhouse gases, are the dominant cause of the observed warming since the mid-20th century. For the warming over the last century, there is no convincing alternative explanation supported by the extent of the observational evidence.8

The boldface text is in the original text—which suggests that the scientists who authored the report wanted to make it absolutely clear that they believe that human activities, especially the emissions of greenhouse gases, are causing global warming.

In the Beginning The discovery of global warming is a fascinating tale of scientific endeavour, insight, and perseverance that starts way back in the early nineteenth century. Curiously, the aim at that time in the scientific community was to understand more about the ice ages. Could another one occur again?

2  The Overheated Earth     63

Beginning with work by Joseph Fourier in the 1820s, scientists had s­peculated that gases in the atmosphere might trap the heat received from the sun. An amateur English scientist, David Tyndall, working out of his makeshift laboratory, identified several gases that absorbed radiant heat. He discovered that the most important of these were water vapour and carbon dioxide.9 Fast forward a century and a half and scientists with much more accurate and sensitive equipment, and a new understanding of the chemical isotopes of carbon, were gradually unravelling the complexity of the carbon cycle. They understood the role of atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2) in absorbing the radiation of heat from the planet—which is keeping the planet comfortably warmer than it would be if the atmosphere was completely transparent to this outgoing radiation. This is the so-called ­greenhouse effect. Figure 2.3 shows how it all works.10 It looks complicated—and it is. But the numbers are not as important as the concept. On the left-hand side, in yellow, is the incoming solar energy striking the top of the atmosphere (TOA) with an intensity of 340 Watts per square meter. This level of solar energy is pretty much constant. A bit less than half of this energy

Fig. 2.3  Global mean energy budget of the Earth under present day conditions (Source Institute for Atmospheric and Climate Science ETH Zurich)

64     M. J. Bush

reaches the surface of the Earth (where it is shown as ‘solar absorbed surface’). This energy warms the surface. But the Earth, since it is a warm body, emits its own thermal radiation (on the right in orange) but at a much longer wavelength than the incoming radiation from the sun. A fraction of this longwave radiation is absorbed by the greenhouse gases (including water vapour and carbon dioxide)—which warms the atmosphere and which, in turn, radiates part of this energy back down to the surface. This radiative energy is shown on the right as ‘thermal down surface’. The net result of these energy flows is tucked away in the bottom left corner. There is an imbalance: more energy is coming into the surface of the Earth than is leaving. Result? The Earth is warming up. It has to—there is more energy coming in than going out. And let’s not confuse a warming climate with only warmer weather. It still gets cold in the winter in the northern hemisphere. There’s plenty of snow. At the same time, in the southern hemisphere summer, it is hot. Very hot. In January 2018, while it was freezing in North America, South Africa was in the grip of an intense drought; Cape Town was running out of water; New Zealand was sweltering under a heat wave and in Australia, temperatures of 46 °C killed thousands of flying foxes and volunteers were hosing down heat-stressed koalas.11

The Greenhouse Gases So what are the gases in this greenhouse? Although water vapour is a significant absorber of infrared radiation, research has shown that it is carbon dioxide which has a much stronger influence on the global energy budget. It’s been called the control knob: turn it up and the Earth gets warmer; dial it down and the planet cools.12 In 1953, a post-doctoral student called Charles Keeling began working at Caltech in California on the chemistry of carbonates in surface waters, and their equilibria with limestone and CO2 in the air. To investigate the chemistry of these compounds and their interactions with CO2, Keeling had to measure CO2 extracted from the air as well as in acidified samples of water. What he found was intriguing. The air contained more CO2 at night than during the day—a consistent diurnal variation. In the afternoon, concentrations were relatively stable at about 310 parts per million (ppm). The early results of this research led to a larger research program intended to measure concentrations of atmospheric CO2 more widely around

2  The Overheated Earth     65

Fig. 2.4  The Keeling curve—Atmospheric concentrations of CO2 measured at Mauna Loa observatory (Source Scripps Institution of Oceanography)

the globe. Four monitoring points around the world were proposed but only one, at Mauna Loa in Hawaii, was able to measure CO2 concentrations almost without interruption. In March 1958, CO2 was measured at 313 ppm. More surprising still, as the daily measurements were carefully recorded over the course of the year, was a marked seasonal variation in CO2 concentrations as the gas was absorbed for plant growth during the spring and summer months and returned to the atmosphere during the winter that followed. As Keeling continued to monitor CO2 concentrations and report his results, the now famous saw-tooth graph of increasing atmospheric CO2 concentrations began to take shape.13 Its current version is shown in Fig. 2.4.14 What is immediately obvious is that the concentrations of CO2 in the atmosphere are increasing and have been increasing continuously since measurements began in 1958. Although it is a little hard to detect, the rate of increase is also higher now than it was a few years ago. So there is no sign yet that the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has started to level off. Concentrations of CO2 are still climbing—just the way they have done, year after year, for the past 60 years. The graph shows concentrations of CO2 were at about 415 ppm in May 2019—100 ppm more than when Keeling first started his measurements in 1958. So why are atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide rising and where is this carbon dioxide coming from?

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It’s being produced by the burning of fossil fuels: coal, oil, and natural gas. And scientists can prove it. An isotope of carbon, carbon-14, is created by cosmic rays in the upper atmosphere. More of the isotope was created by nuclear weapons tests in the 1950s. The isotope decays very slowly—over thousands of years. However, the carbon in coal and oil is so old that it completely lacks the radioactive isotope. Therefore the emissions of carbon dioxide from burning fossil fuels adds only plain old carbon to the atmosphere. In 1955, the chemist Hans Seuss conducted an analysis of wood from trees grown over the last century, reporting that the newer the wood, the greater the ratio of plain carbon to carbon-14—meaning that the amount of plain carbon in the atmosphere was increasing. The only plausible source of this carbon was the burning of fossil fuels: coal and oil.15 Although carbon dioxide is the principal actor, he is by no means alone on the stage. There are two other actors of note: methane and nitrous oxide. And three with minor roles: HFCs, PFCs, and sulphur hexafluoride (SF6).16 Carbon dioxide, methane, and nitrous oxide together account for more than 80% of the warming effect of the greenhouse gases—so in this book we are going to focus on these three gases.17 Methane is emitted from a variety of sources: both natural sources such as wetlands, volcanoes, permafrost soils and wildfires; and anthropogenic sources: principally enteric fermentation by livestock (cows), the oil and gas industry, and landfills. Methane is discussed in more detail in Chapter 3. Like carbon dioxide, levels of both methane and nitrous oxide are increasing in the atmosphere (Fig. 2.5). Although the concentrations are very low

Fig. 2.5  Global atmospheric levels of methane (left) and nitrous oxide (right) (Source WMO Statement on the State of the Global Climate in 2018)

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(measured in parts per billion ), these are powerful greenhouse gases. The Global Warming Potential (GWP) of methane and nitrous oxide is respectively 2518 and 298 times the value of carbon dioxide.19 Carbon dioxide concentrations have increased by almost 50% from 278 ppm in about 1750, to about 415 ppm in 2019. During the same period the concentration of nitrous oxide increased more slowly—but the levels of methane in the atmosphere more than tripled. The current concentrations of these three gases exceed any levels measured in the last 800,000 years—the period covered by the ice cores. The rate of increase of the three gases during the last century is also unprecedented.20

Black Carbon It sounds like a character out of a horror movie—and in some respects it is. Black carbon (BC) is a form of carbon that is formed primarily in open flames and in engines burning diesel fuel. When emitted into the atmosphere it has several unusual properties. It strongly absorbs visible light— warming in the process, and it is extremely stable with very low chemical reactivity in the air. It is not a gas: rather like the general term soot, it exists as an aggregate of very small particles—often visible in the black exhaust fumes of large diesel trucks. Black carbon is therefore not included among the greenhouse gases—even though it has a significant effect on global warming. The strong absorption of light at all visible wavelengths is the distinguishing characteristic that has raised interest in studies of atmospheric physics and chemistry. No other substance with such strong light absorption is present in the atmosphere in significant quantities. Black carbon is emitted in a variety of combustion processes and is widely present in the atmosphere. It has a unique and important role in the Earth’s climate system because it absorbs solar radiation, influences cloud processes, and alters the melting of snow and ice cover. The material is removed within days from the atmosphere by deposition– either directly deposited or washed out by rainfall or snow. But while it is in the atmosphere, black carbon has a strong influence on atmospheric processes: recent studies now rank black carbon in second place behind carbon dioxide, and ahead of methane, in terms of global warming.21

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Sources whose emissions are rich in black carbon can be grouped into a small number of categories—diesel engines, industry, residential solid fuel, and open burning. The largest global source is the open burning of forests and savannas. The amount of carbon emitted varies according to the geographic region. Residential solid fuels, for example: coal, wood and charcoal, contribute 60–80% of Asian and African emissions; while diesel engines contribute about 70% of emissions in Europe, North America and Latin America. Residential coal is a significant source of black carbon in China, the former USSR and a few Eastern European countries. These categories represent about 90% of black carbon emissions. Other black-carbon-rich sources include emissions from aviation, shipping, and the flaring of hydrocarbon gases, which together account for about 9%, the remaining 1% is from sources with low emission levels.22 Fossil-fuel fired power plants are not major sources of black carbon because the combustion of the carbon fuels is better controlled, and there is normally adequate amounts of air to ensure complete combustion. Power plants produce carbon dioxide rather than black carbon.

Drought and Floods It’s perhaps no surprise that a warming planet will lead to more intense and more frequent drought. Drought affects Africa more than any other continent, with the record showing 136 droughts across Africa between 1995 and 2015. Of this number, more than half were in East Africa alone. Drought exacts a high human toll in terms of hunger, poverty, and the perpetuation of under-development. It causes widespread damage to crops, loss of livestock, water shortages and outbreaks of epidemic diseases. Some droughts last for years, causing extensive and long-lasting economic decline as well as displacing large sections of the population. Consecutive failures of seasonal rains in east Africa in 2005, for example, led to food insecurity for at least 11 million people. In total the CRED database recorded more than one billion people affected by drought in the period 1995–2015. That is more than a quarter of all people affected by all types of weather-related disasters worldwide—even though drought accounted for less than 5% of all natural hazards.23

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Fig. 2.6  Number of people affected by drought since 1990 (Graph from the EM-DAT database) (Source Centre of Research for the Epidemiology of Disasters, Université Catholique de Louvain)

Drought is a disaster that has huge human impact—but few deaths are directly attributed to drought. People die later—from malnutrition, disease, displacement and conflict. The number of droughts occurring each year hasn’t changed much over the last couple of decades—but the impact, in terms of the number of people affected, has been increasing dramatically, as Fig. 2.6. This graph shown in Fig. 2.6 peaks at around 380,000 people affected in 2014–2015, and clearly shows that droughts have become much more intense—or much longer. More probably it is the latter, because short droughts can often be tolerated and coped with by farmers and pastoralists. But when drought continues for more than a year the impact is generally catastrophic. The total area affected by drought in 2016 was among the largest in the post-1950 record. For each month, at least 12% of global land surface experienced severe drought conditions, the longest such stretch in the record. In north-eastern Brazil, drought conditions occurred for the 5th consecutive year, making this the longest drought on record for this region.24 Excessive heat and drought continued into 2018. Temperatures were well above average and rainfall well below average from April onward in much of northern and western Europe. Denmark had its hottest summer and driest May to July on record, and Norway and Finland their hottest July months. This culminated in a prolonged heatwave in late July and early August, which

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included numerous record high temperatures north of the Arctic circle, and record long runs of warm temperatures. In eastern Australia there was significant drought in 2018. Over the Murray–Darling Basin, the rainfall for January was the lowest since 1902. Central Australia was even drier than usual, with Alice Springs going a record 160 days without rain.25

East Africa—The Drought Years Over the past decade East Africa has experienced a number of particularly severe droughts—occurring almost every year since 2005. Along with the increased frequency, the severity of the droughts and the impact on human populations have also intensified. The drought that lasted from mid-2011 to mid-2012 was the region’s worst for 60 years. But while that crisis affected over 12 million people, the most recent drought that began in 2016 has greatly increased the number of people suffering from food insecurity and malnutrition. In August 2016, 24 million people—twice as many as in 2015—were facing critical food insecurity. According to UNICEF, in 2017 more than 1 million children were acutely malnourished and over 5 million children were in danger. The drought contributed to outbreaks of yellow fever, malaria, cholera and measles. Ethiopia, Kenya and Somalia have been hardest hit by extensive crop failures and livestock deaths but other countries in the wider region have also been badly affected. In South Sudan, the drought, coupled with an ongoing armed conflict, has pushed the country close to disaster. In February 2017, the UN declared famine in parts of South Sudan where 100,000 people face starvation and around 1 million people are classified as being on the brink of famine, one in seven people have been forced to flee their homes through the combined impacts of conflict and drought.26 Exacerbated by a brutal conflict, the drought, food scarcity and spiralling food prices have led to massive migration across borders as well as internal displacement. According to the UN there were 4.4 million refugees and asylum seekers and an additional 3 million internally displaced people across East Africa in July 2017. The forecasts are grim. A 2017 UN assessment predicted that the drought will intensify, that food prices will continue to rise, that there is a risk of escalating violence in South Sudan, and that the humanitarian situation in many East African countries will deteriorate. Across the Horn of Africa and

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further south, the region faces the likelihood of below-normal to near-normal rainfall leading to poor harvests and shortages of water.27

Ethiopia Between 2000 and 2017, six drought episodes have been registered in Ethiopia, with the latest two—in 2011 and 2016/17 devastating pastoral and agropastoral livelihoods. Herders’ continued reliance on natural rainfed pasture in the face of a host of factors that are accelerating the scarcity of these resources has meant that livelihoods are less and less able to cope with shocks like drought. Droughts are happening at shorter intervals with no time for the recovery of pasture in the rangelands. Flash floods—that usually happen at the end of drought episodes—then wash away the natural seed reserve in the soil, denuding vast areas of rangeland. The extent of invasive species is estimated to extend over 1 million hectares in the four major pastoral ecosystems of Ethiopia, implying that this expanse of land is no longer available for grazing. Added to this is the loss of prime dry-season grazing reserves close to major river systems due to various state and private investments and projects.28 In 2016, the October rains failed in southern and south-eastern Ethiopia. In the most affected areas, the cumulative rainfall totals during the season were less that 25% of the average. This followed the already erratic performance of the main 2016 rains and continued into 2017. The ongoing drought has been dubbed “the most severe drought ever” owing to its intensity, duration, and extent. In the three pastoral ecosystems covering four regions of Somali, Borena in Oromia, SNNPR29 and Afar regions, nine continuous dry months have been recorded up to mid-2017, and the amount of rain received in the preceding months was insufficient to make any meaningful impact.30 The failed rains have caused abnormal migrations, deteriorating livestock body conditions and weakened immune systems among livestock, resulting in increasing cases of opportunistic diseases and internal and external parasites among animals and further pushing up mortality rates. Milk production in cattle declined by as much as 80%, while significant losses were recorded in camels and goats raising serious concerns over already high malnutrition rates—given the close link between milk availability and human nutrition in pastoral communities.

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It is estimated that between November 2016 and April 2017, more than 1.5 million livestock perished in southern and south-eastern areas, representing an economic loss of over $350 million. Extreme coping mechanisms— such as reducing the number and size of meals, selling remaining productive assets, and in an increasing number of cases—destitution and displacement owing to the complete loss of livestock assets—have been observed throughout the affected areas.31 As Ethiopia continued to struggle with the effects of drought in the pastoral lowlands, a formidable enemy has appeared on the scene. An exotic and invasive pest called the Fall Army worm, is spreading through the region at an alarming rate. The worm, which is known to affect over 80 species of plants, prefers maize—Ethiopia’s leading cereal in terms of production. The worm has affected over 50,000 hectares in 144 districts in three of the major maize-growing regional states: Gambella, Oromia and SNNPR.32

California Meanwhile, over on the other side of the world, a different scenario was playing out. California’s drought which started in 2012 and continued for about five years was successfully managed by the State. A well-organized media campaign persuaded people to reduce their water use, and all nonessential use was prohibited. Such a vigorous and intense media campaign requires a lot of money and other resources, but California is the wealthiest State in the US with a GDP which, if it were a country, would place the State among the top 10 countries ranked by this metric. So almost everyone in California managed to survive the drought— including the huge mechanized agricultural industry. The drought was made worse by prolonged and unusually high temperatures along the west coast of the US. The California drought didn’t cause a huge amount of damage in terms of lives lost or people displaced. But the constant summer heat waves created conditions that sparked hundreds of intense and deadly wildfires. In 2017, more than 11,000 wildfires flared up along the coast of California making that year the worst year for fires since 2015—another record year. The fires raced through the coastal forests driven by fierce Diablo winds— hot and dry. The fires moved so fast they caught many residents by surprise—particularly at night; many families escaping only in the nick of time. Over 30 people were killed by the fires.

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Ironically, good rainfall during the previous winter encouraged the strong growth of vegetation over the cooler winter season—which then dried out in the fierce summer heat and provided the fuel for the rampant fires. The wildfires also brought unprecedented levels of air pollution—a potentially deadly hazard for many older residents and children suffering from asthma.33

South Africa In February 2018, Africa’s top tourist destination was in the grip of the worst drought on record. Water levels in its six main supply dams had plummeted to less than one third normal levels—down from more than 90% four years earlier. The Theewaterskloof Dam, one of Cape Town’s six main dams had dwindled to 10% of its capacity. Restrictions on water consumption were unprecedented. High-income families slashed their consumption by 80%; lower income families by 40%. After city resident were limited to just over 13 gallons a day, any household that exceeded the limit had a water restriction device attached to its pipes by the authorities. Showers are quick—with a bucket in the tub to catch some of the water: for flushing the toilet. Airport washrooms offered hand sanitizers instead of tap water—which cannot be used for any purpose outside the house. Builders use recycled or bore water for cement. Some restaurants abandoned pasta and boiled vegetables, while others switched to paper tablecloths and napkins, and reused ice bucket water for mopping floors. A drought this severe has never occurred before in the 100 year record. Scientists at the University of Cape Town estimated it at a 1 in 400-year event.34 The city is building three small temporary desalination plants but is also drilling hundreds of bore holes. That’s an understandable response, but groundwater resources need to be replenished by rainfall. Eventually the water level in the boreholes drops and the wells run dry.35

Floods Since 1995, floods have accounted for almost half of all weather-related disasters. They also have a huge impact—displacing hundreds of thousands of people and resulting in many deaths. Even so, twice as many people are affected by drought than floods. Over the period 1995–2015, the CRED

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Fig. 2.7  Number of people affected by floods between 1900–2015 (The graph is from the EM-DAT database) (Source Centre of Research for the Epidemiology of Disasters, Université Catholique de Louvain)

database recorded 2.3 billion people affected by drought; 1.1 billion affected by floods. Both the number of floods and their impact has been rising, increasing to an average of 171 floods annually over the period 2005–2014 compared to an average of 127 floods per year in the previous decade.36 The number of people affected is shown in Fig. 2.7. Comparing Figs. 2.6 and 2.7, the coincidence of the impacts of floods and droughts is striking. Can droughts cause floods, or might floods cause droughts? That seems odd. More likely it is evidence of the extreme variability of local weather patterns caused by the changing climate. The predictable pattern of dry seasons and rainy seasons—on which rainfed agriculture has depended on for several thousand years, has been largely disrupted in many countries. Now, a yearlong drought is likely to be followed by devastating floods—which in turn may be followed by another drought. For example, on 20 February 2017, after a 5-year drought, some parts of California received nearly twice as much rain in a single deluge as normally falls in the preceding five months. In 2018, flooding affected Kenya and Somalia which had previously been suffering from severe drought, as well as Ethiopia and parts of Tanzania.37 Just like droughts, floods strike Africa and Asia more than other continents, but pose an increasing danger elsewhere. In South America, over half a million people were affected by floods on average each year between 1995

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and 2004. By the following decade, that number had risen to an average of 2.2 million annually: four times as many. The death toll from flooding has also been rising in many parts of the world. In 2007, floods killed 3000 people in India and Bangladesh. Then in 2010, flooding killed 2100 people in Pakistan and another 1900 in China, while in 2013 close to 6500 people died because of flooding in India. In 2017 the disasters continued. As the western media focused on the flooding in Texas after hurricane Harvey, a far worse tragedy was unfolding in Asia. After weeks of unusually strong monsoon rains pounded India, Bangladesh and Nepal, the death toll was already close to 1200. The Red Cross estimated that as many as 14 million people were displaced in India; seven million in Bangladesh and 1.5 million in Nepal. Half the state of Uttar Pradesh, home to over 200 million people, was under water. The floodwaters in Mumbai (with a population six times greater than Houston’s) was five feet deep.38 The following year in August, the Indian state of Kerala suffered major flooding as a result of persistent heavy monsoon rains. Rainfall that month was almost twice the long term average. Over a million people were displaced and five times than number affected in some way. There was disastrous flooding in Japan in June and July; in Nigeria in September; and in parts of the middle East in October and November. Although many of the most disastrous floods have been in Asia, Europe is not immune to the risk. A 2018 study found that the British Isles have some of the worst flood projections, with half of UK cities likely experiencing a 50% increase in peak river flows. Elsewhere in Europe, the capitals worst hit by flooding will be Dublin, Helsinki, Riga, Vilnius and Zagreb.39 The nature of disastrous flooding has also changed: with flash floods, and riverine and coastal flooding increasingly frequent. In addition, urbanization has significantly increased flood runoff, while recurrent flooding of agricultural land in Asia has exacted a heavy toll in terms of lost production, food insecurity and rural under-nutrition. In rural India, children in households exposed to recurrent flooding are more likely to be stunted and underweight compared to children in non-flooded villages. Children exposed to floods in their first year of life also suffered the highest levels of chronic malnutrition due to lost agricultural production and interrupted food supplies. Many of the impacts of floods are preventable—since flooding can be reduced through simple technologies such as dams and dykes. But these measure are hugely expensive if they are built to withstand the force of intense hurricanes and cyclones.

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Food Insecurity In Chapter 1 we noted that the number of undernourished people in the world has been rising since 2014—reversing a downward trend that had been observed during the previous decade. Is this reversal related in any way to how the climate is changing? Many scientists believe that it is. Climate change is profoundly impacting the conditions in which agricultural activities are conducted. When climatic conditions change, even slightly and even in a direction that might seem favourable to growth, plants will be affected: some will become less productive or even disappear. Global food production is vulnerable to many climate-related threats: Reduced yields: The productivity of crops and livestock including milk yields generally declines at higher temperatures and drought-related stress. Agriculture may shift to higher latitudes where soil and nutrients may be less suitable for producing crops, leaving lower latitude areas less productive. Planting and Harvesting: Changing seasonal rainfall patterns and more severe precipitation events—and related flooding—may delay planting, interrupt harvesting, and decimate production. More Pests:  Insect and plant pests may thrive in greater numbers if cold winters no longer keep them in check. New pests may invade as temperatures and levels of humidity change. Risks to Fisheries: Higher ocean temperatures will cause changes in the abundance and range of fish and other commercial marine species. Coral reefs, the breeding ground and refuge for many species of fish, are threatened by higher water temperatures. Extreme Weather:  Storms, floods, and wildfires can lead to huge losses of crops and livestock, and the destruction of buildings and infrastructure that are essential for the commerce of agricultural produce.40 Food insecurity is less likely to be problematic if four criteria are satisfied: • Food is available and in sufficient quantity, appropriate quality, and supplied though domestic production or imports • Individuals have access to adequate resources for acquiring appropriate foods for a nutritious diet • The utilization of food through adequate diet, clean water, ­sanitation and healthcare enables individuals to reach a state of nutritional ­well-being where all physiological needs are met

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• Stability—where households have access to adequate food at affordable prices at all times. Each of these dimensions of food security is threatened by the changing climate.

Availability Yields are expected to be negatively impacted more in tropical regions than in higher latitudes and impacts are more severe with increased warming— and many of the regions where crop yields are expected to decrease are also areas that are already experiencing food insecurity. With global consumption projected at over 730 million tonnes in 2017/18, wheat is by far the most significant single crop in terms of human consumption. Declining production will have far-reaching impacts in countries where it is the foundation of food security, and where options to import the cereal are limited. The increase in global temperatures between 1980 and 2008 resulted in an average reduction in global wheat yields of 5.5%.41 A 2016 study that employed three different modelling techniques found that a global increase in warming of 1 °C would lead to a worldwide decline in wheat yields of between 4 and 6%.42 The same study found that yields would decline in the US, China, India and France, and that warmer regions would experience the largest losses. Rice is especially sensitive to higher temperatures: yields could decline by as much as 90% if temperatures increase from 27 to 32 °C, and yields in rain-fed but drought-prone areas have been reduced by 17–40% in severe drought years. In Africa, recurring drought affects about 80% of lowland rainfed rice production. The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) has forecast that by 2050, yield losses could reach between 10 and 15%, and that rice prices may increase by between 32 and 37% as a result of climate change.43

Access According to the World Bank, in 2015 at least 800 million people in the world lived in extreme poverty, and of those at least 70% live in rural areas, most of them depending wholly or in part on agriculture for their livelihoods. Roughly 500 million smallholder farms in the developing world are

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supporting almost 2 billion people, and in Asia and sub-Saharan Africa these small farms produce about 80% of the food consumed. In regions with high food insecurity and inequality, the increased frequency of droughts will severely impact poorer households, and may disproportionately affect women, given their vulnerability and restricted access to resources. Climate change is a huge risk for indigenous peoples who depend on the environment and its biodiversity for their food security and nutrition—especially those living in areas where significant climate change impacts are expected to occur in mountain regions, the Pacific islands, coastal and other low-lying areas, and in the Arctic.

Utilization Climate change will impact the livelihoods and income of small-scale food producers—and through price increases and volatility, the livelihoods of poorer families who are net food buyers. These families are likely to respond by reducing their food consumption in terms of both quantity and quality. They are also likely to reduce expenditures on healthcare—which also has potential impacts on nutrition. Climate change has an impact on food safety—particularly on the incidence and prevalence of food-borne diseases. Rising temperatures will encourage the spread of the organism responsible for producing the toxin that causes ciguatera fish poisoning—which occurs in tropical regions and is the most common non-bacterial food-borne illness associated with the consumption of fish. Increasing rates of Ciguatera have been observed in the lesser Antilles, and on islands in the Pacific: Tuvalu, Kiribati, the Cook Islands, and Vanuatu.44

Stability The variability of the climate and the increased incidence and intensity of extreme weather will directly affect the other three dimensions of food security: availability, access, and utilization. The irregularity of income of people depending on agriculture for their livelihoods as well as food price increases and their volatility, will reduce peoples’ access to food. Droughts and heatwaves are estimated to have decreased the global harvest of cereals—including rice, wheat, and maize—by up to 10% between 1964 and 2007. Drought is one of the key factors for agricultural failure and the increase in intensity, frequency and duration of droughts caused by

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climate change will cause devastating losses in crop yields in many areas of the world. In recent years, nearly a quarter of the total damage and loss from climate-related disasters in developing countries has been in the agricultural sector. Higher temperatures, drought, and extreme weather are not the only threats to agriculture. Climate change will intensify the impact of pests— as they arrive earlier in the season, spread to new geographic regions, and survive longer into winter months. One of these pests, known since biblical times, is infamous for its ­devastating impact on local agriculture.

Locusts The changes in temperature, rainfall, and wind patterns associated with climate change are expected to have a dramatic effect on the Desert Locust in Africa—the most dangerous and destructive of all migratory pests. The greatest impacts will be caused by warmer temperatures and increased rainfall in desert areas extending from West Africa to the Horn of Africa, the Arabian Peninsular and southwest Asia. Warmer temperatures will cause the insect to mature sooner, leading to an overall shorter lifecycle—allowing seasonal breeding during the winter along the Red Sea coastal plains and in the Horn of Africa. Coupled with a general increase in precipitation or more frequent extreme high rainfall events, locust numbers could increase much more rapidly than at present, leading to a greater risk of outbreaks that if uncontrolled could develop into devastating plagues. Increased frequency of El Nino et La Nina events will allow the breeding of locusts during the winter in the Horn of Africa and during the summer in the Sahel of West Africa. Any changes in wind circulation could allow locust adults and swarms to reach previously unaffected areas to the north, south and east of their present habitat—which stretches from West Africa to India and includes the Sahara and the deserts of the Near East and Southwest Asia.45 Overall, climate change is expected to have a negative impact on food security and nutrition. Through its effects on agro-ecosystems, it impacts agricultural production, the people depending on this production, and ultimately consumers through increased price volatility. The worst affected are the poorest populations, whose livelihoods depend on agriculture, and who are therefore the people most exposed and vulnerable to the impacts of the changing climate.

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The Warming Soils Very large quantities of carbon are locked away in soils: somewhere between 3000 and 4000 billion tonnes (Gt)—about the same order of magnitude as fossil fuel reserves. So this is a source of carbon that needs to be kept firmly in its place—in the ground. Scientists are still unsure how global warming will affect the stability of this huge carbon reservoir. But a landmark study being conducted at Harvard University in Massachusetts may offer a clue. Soil scientists have been studying artificially heated plots of soil in a forest near Harvard for over 25 years. Since 1991, scientists at the 1200 ha site near Petersham, Massachusetts have been tracking CO2 emissions from 18 test plots of forest soil heated to 5 °C above ambient temperatures. The results were published in the journal Science in October 2017. The emissions of carbon dioxide increased—but not as expected. There were four phases of soil organic matter decay and carbon dioxide emission to the atmosphere, with periods of substantial soil carbon loss alternating with periods of no detectable change. During the first ten years there was a significant increase in carbon released from the plots, then a period of about seven years when nothing much seemed to be happening. Then the emissions of carbon resumed once again. The explanation is thought to be the way soil microorganisms adapt to the changes in the form of carbon accessible to the microbial community. Since the experiments began in 1991, the upper 60 cm of soil lost about 17% of its carbon. While the loss of carbon from warming soils is slow, the scientists writing in Science concluded by stating: Our results support projections of a long-term, self-reinforcing carbon feedback from mid-latitude forests to the climate system as the world warms.46 The concern is that the world is facing a classic and potentially catastrophic positive feedback mechanism: as the temperature of the soils slowly increases, additional carbon is released to the atmosphere by microbial decomposition of soil organic matter. This raises atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide—which has the effect of raising temperature still higher. The circular process reinforces itself and atmospheric temperatures continue to climb. Once started, there is no way to stop it: a nightmare scenario.

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Permafrost Soils Very large amounts of carbon are stored at higher latitudes in permafrost soils and methane-containing ice called methane hydrates or clathrates, especially offshore in ocean sediments. Because of their sheer size, these carbon stocks have the potential to strongly affect the planet’s climate should they ever be released to the atmosphere. More than 1500 billion tonnes of carbon are thought to be stored in the permafrost soils beneath the Arctic tundra. Permafrost on land, and in ocean shelves, contain large amounts of organic carbon—which must be thawed and decomposed by microbes before it can be released as carbon dioxide. In waterlogged soils, where oxygen is limited, microbial action will also produce methane. On land permafrost is overlain by a surface active layer which thaws during summer and forms part of the tundra ecosystem. If spring and summer temperatures are warmer than average, the active layer (called the active layer thickness or ALT) will increase making more carbon available for microbial decomposition. However, warmer summers would also result in greater uptake of carbon dioxide by Arctic vegetation through photosynthesis. That means that the net carbon balance in the Arctic is unpredictable: it could be either a net source or a net sink of carbon, and this balance could vary both regionally and over short periods of time. Hydrological conditions during the summer thaw are also important. The melting of ground ice may create pools of water and lakes where the lack of oxygen will induce the production of methane. The complexity of Arctic landscapes under climate change means that the effects of warming temperatures are uncertain, but the release of methane in lakes in Alaska has already be observed.47 Given enough oxygen, the decomposition of organic matter in soil is accompanied by heat produced by microbes which, during summer, might stimulate further thawing of the permafrost. Depending on the carbon and ice content of the permafrost and the hydrology, this mechanism could ­trigger relatively fast local permafrost degradation.48 Methane hydrates are another form of frozen carbon, occurring in deep permafrost soils, ocean shelves, shelf slopes and deeper ocean bottom ­sediments. They consist of methane and water molecule clusters which are only stable under specific conditions of temperature and pressure.

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Any warming of permafrost soils ocean waters and sediments and/or changes in pressure could destabilize the hydrates, releasing methane to the ocean. During larger more sporadic releases, a fraction of the methane might be outgassed to the atmosphere. Air temperatures in the Arctic have risen faster than anywhere else on the planet. Average temperatures in the permafrost have increased by over 5 °C since the 1980s.49 In 2016, permafrost temperatures were the highest on record at the majority of Arctic observation sites.50 In some places this has pushed the temperature above freezing, meaning that soils that may have been frozen for thousands of years begin to decompose and release their carbon. A study in 2017 published data from NOAA’s Barrow station in Alaska that found that tundra ecosystems were a net source of carbon dioxide to the atmosphere annually, with especially high rates of respiration during early winter (October through December). Long term records from the station suggest that CO2 emission rates from North Slope tundra have increased during the October to December period by 73% since 1975. The rates of emission correlate with higher summer temperatures—supporting the view that that rising temperatures have made Arctic ecosystems a net source of CO2.51 More alarming is the fact that Arctic permafrost holds in place substantial amounts of old, geologic methane in subsurface reservoirs. As the permafrost thaws, it may open up pathways for the methane to migrate to the surface. A study conducted in the Mackenzie Delta in 2016 found that where the permafrost was discontinuous, emissions of methane were 13 times greater than the emissions typically measured from methanogenic bacteria in the soil.52

The Rising Seas Sea levels are increasing in all the oceans. Slowly but surely, global mean sea levels are rising each year. Globally, sea level has risen by about 20 cm since the start of the ­twentieth century—due mostly to the expansion of the warming ocean water, and the melting of glaciers and the ice sheets—which add more water to the mix. Some regions are experiencing greater sea level rise than others. The tropical western Pacific has seen some of the highest rising sea-level rates over the period 1993–2015—which was a significant factor in the enormous devastation in parts of the Philippines when typhoon Haiyan drove forward a massive storm surge in November 2013.53

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So how high will the oceans rise, and when does this all happen? It depends. This is the way the US Climate Science Special Report sees it: Human caused climate change has made a substantial contribution to global mean sea level rise (GMSL) since 1900, contributing to a rate of rise that is greater than during any preceding century in at least 2800 years. Relative to the year 2000, GMSL is very likely to rise by 9-18 cm by 2030, 15-38 cm by 2050, and 30 – 130 cm by 2100.

The range of values is due both to the inherent uncertainty of the climate models used to make these forecasts, and to the fact that a lot depends on by how much we can reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases, primarily carbon dioxide, that are causing the warming that is creating the problem.54 A 2017 report by the US National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) looked at the latest sea level rise projections and came up with some updated numbers—much larger than the forecasts made in the Climate Science Special Report. Factoring in the latest information concerning the melting of the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets, NOAA found that there is evidence to support a physically plausible GMSL rise for the year 2100 in the range of 2.0–2.7 m—double previous estimates. NOAA recommended that agencies use an upper bound of 2.5 m and a lower bound of 0.3 m as the basis for local and regional planning.55 But there are significant local differences. Along regions of the NE Atlantic coast of the US (from Virginia northward into Canada), relative sea level rise is projected to be 0.3–0.5 m greater that the global average under all the scenarios evaluated by the study. While the uncertainty is confusing and annoying, the more logical reaction should be alarm. Because the upper limits of the numerous estimates that are being generated by the climate models and the satellite data are all entirely possible outcomes. Not only that, recent satellite data seems to show that the rate of sea level rise is actually increasing.56

Storm Surge If the oceans remained calm and tranquil, sea level rise, being just 1–2 cm a year, would not pose much of an immediate threat to coastal zones or small islands. There would be time to take the necessary measures to protect coastal communities and infrastructure. But that’s not the way it works.

84     M. J. Bush

The oceans are in constant motion: pushed and pulled by the lunar-driven tides and constantly stirred by shifting winds. When powerful storms drive waves to heights of several meters above normal levels, and when this coincides with high tides, storms cause massive damage. Storm surge is an abnormal rise of water generated by a storm, over and above the normal height of the regular tides. The term ‘storm tide’ is defined as the sea water level rise due to the combination of storm surge and normal tide, as depicted in Fig. 2.8. This rise in storm-driven sea level can cause extensive flooding in coastal areas. The storm surge can travel several miles inland, especially along bays, rivers, and estuaries, resulting in substantial loss of life and widespread destruction. Flooding is historically the leading cause of hurricane related deaths in the USA. Storm surges can easily reach 5 meters. Table 2.1 shows some of the more destructive hurricanes and storm surges recorded in the USA during the last 10 years. For small low-lying islands, just one large wave that comes ashore and inundates the coastal interior is enough to kill crops and contaminate drinking water. Even though the storm surge of hurricane Maria at Puerto Rico was recorded as just 1–2 meters, a measuring buoy out to sea off Fajardo on the east coast of the island registered a wave of 7 meters.57

Fig. 2.8  Storm surge and storm tide (Source US National Oceanographic and Atmospheric Administration)

Hurricane Michael made landfall as an unprecedented high-end Category 4 hurricane on the Florida Panhandle region with maximum sustained wind speeds of 155 mph. The storm caused catastrophic damage to coastal towns from wind and storm surge. The widespread damage spread well inland as Hurricane Michael remained at hurricane strength into southwest Georgia. One of the hardest hit locations was from Mexico Beach to Indian Pass where 3–5 metres of peak storm surge inundation was observed. In addition, wave action caused even higher surges and this resulted in waves destroying the second story of multiple buildings in Mexico Beach Hurricane Florence caused severe damage in the Carolinas in September, primarily as a result of freshwater flooding. Florence dropped almost a metre of rain in Elizabethtown, North Carolina, becoming the wettest tropical cyclone recorded in the Carolinas. The storm originated from a strong tropical wave that emerged off the west coast of Africa in late August. On September 14, Florence made landfall in the US just south of Wrightsville Beach, North Carolina, and slowly moved inland. The widespread flooding badly affected North Carolina’s agricultural industry. An estimated 3.4 million chickens and turkeys, and 5500 hogs died in flooded farms. Dozens of farms remained isolated with animals unable to be fed. Piles of manure stored at these farms were swept into swollen rivers, and about a dozen pits holding animal waste were damaged by the flooding and debris. Almost 19,000 m3 of partially treated wastewater spilled into the Cape Fear River after a treatment plant lost power; and over 1500 m3 of coal ash from the closed Sutton Power Station near Wilmington was also swept into the river. The H. F. Lee power plant in Goldsboro flooded to the point where their three ponds were completely underwater and began releasing coal ash into the Neuse River Hurricane Maria formed from an African easterly wave that moved across the tropical Atlantic Ocean in mid-September 2017. The hurricane gradually intensified and became the 8th hurricane of the 2017 Atlantic hurricane season with 75 mph maximum sustained winds. Maria continued to gain strength—going from a category 1 to a dangerous category 5 hurricane. Maria first made landfall in Dominica, savaging that island, and then ripped into the U.S. Virgin Islands and Puerto Rico. The storm produced extremely heavy rainfall that led to catastrophic flooding and flash flooding, especially across the northern half of Puerto Rico. Even though hurricane force winds started to diminish once the system moved offshore, tropical storm force winds continued well into the evening and overnight hours across mainland Puerto Ricoa Hurricane Irma began as a tropical wave off the coast of Africa. The wave became a tropical storm on August 30, and then rapidly intensified—reaching major hurricane status, Category 3, on August 31. Heading west, Irma ploughed through several islands in the Caribbean, devastating Barbuda. The hurricane then made two landfall in Florida on September 10, one in the Keys and another one near Marco Island. Irma is one of only five hurricanes that have reached maximum sustained wind speeds of 185 mph or greater, and then maintained those winds for 37 hours, the longest on record. Irma also tied the Cuba Hurricane of 1932 for the longest lifetime as a Category 5 in the Atlantic Basin

Michael (2018)

Irma (2017)

Maria (2017)

Florence (2018)

Details

Storm (Year)

Table 2.1  Storm surges recorded in the USA and the Caribbean this century Storm surge

3–4 meters

(continued)

About 1–2 meters at Puerto Rico

Minimal

3–5 metres

2  The Overheated Earth     85

Harvey started as a typical weak August tropical storm that affected the Lesser Antilles and dissipated over the central Caribbean Sea. However, after re-forming over the Bay of Campeche, Harvey rapidly intensified into a category 4 hurricane (on the Saffir Simpson Hurricane Wind Scale) before making landfall along the middle Texas coast. The storm then stalled, with its centre over or near the Texas coast for four days, dropping historic amounts of rainfall of more than 60 inches over south-eastern Texas—the largest rainfall ever recorded for a single event in the mainland US. The rains caused catastrophic flooding, and Harvey is the second-most costly hurricane in U.S. history behind Katrina (2005). At least 68 people died from the direct effects of the storm in Texas, the largest number of direct deaths from a tropical cyclone in that state since 1919b Hurricane Matthew, which pummelled Jamaica, Haiti, Cuba and the Bahamas in October 2016 generated a storm surge of between 3 and 5 meters approaching the Bahamas. It passed along the Florida east coast without making landfall but caused substantial flooding in many areas along the eastern shoreline In January 2016, a hurricane named Alex formed in the northern Atlantic—an unusual event for that time of the year. Although not an especially fierce storm, it reportedly produced a storm surge of 18 meters. A red alert was issued for five of the Azores’ nine islands. It was noted at the time that sea water temperatures were about 2 °C higher than normal Second only to Hurricane Katrina in terms of the damage wrought in the US, ‘Superstorm Sandy’ ripped into Jamaica where it caused J$9.7 billion or 0.8% of 2011 GDP in direct and indirect damage. In Cuba, there was extensive coastal flooding and destruction inland, destroying some 15,000 homes, killing 11, and causing $2 billion (2012 USD) in damages. Sandy also caused two deaths and damage estimated at $700 million (2012 USD) in the Bahamas The Category 2 hurricane made landfall near Galveston, Texas, leaving a trail of death and destruction. It is estimated that flooding and mud slides killed 74 people in Haiti and two in the Dominican Republic, compounding the problems caused by Fay, Gustav, and Hanna. The Turks and Caicos Islands and the south-eastern Bahamas sustained widespread damage to property. Seven deaths were reported in Cuba

Harvey (2017)

bSee

www.weather.gov/sju/maria2017 The National Hurricane Center website. Accessed at: https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL092017_Harvey.pdf Source US National Hurricane Center, Miami

aSee

Ike (2008)

Sandy (2012)

Alex (2016)

Matthew (2016)

Details

Storm (Year)

Table 2.1 (continued) Storm surge

5–7 meters

4–5 meters

18 meters

3–5 meters

2–4 meters

86     M. J. Bush

2  The Overheated Earth     87 Table 2.2  Number of people living at less than 1 m above sea level Country

Population at LECZ ĂŶĚƵƐĞ ĐŚĂŶŐĞ

Fig. 3.5  Global annual emissions from fossil carbon and land-use change (Source Global Carbon Project)

ƵŶŬĞƌƐ ZĞƐƚŽĨ ŶŽŶͲK ZƵƐƐŝĂ /ŶĚŝĂ ŚŝŶĂ

ZĞƐƚŽĨK :ĂƉĂŶ KƵƌŽƉĞ h^

Fig. 3.6  Global emissions of CO2 by country 1960–2017 (Source Global Carbon Project)

Back in 1960, emissions of CO2 were dominated by the USA and OECD Europe. India hardly shows up, and China is only a minor player behind Russia. Fast forward to 2018 and things have changed dramatically. Emissions now are dominated by China; and India’s emissions are substantial— larger than Japan and the Russian Federation. US emissions have gradually declined over the last ten years, as have the emissions in Europe. You can see on Fig. 3.6 that total emissions just about levelled out from 2014 to 2016 but, as Fig. 3.3 shows, they were once again on the rise in 2017 and 2018.

116     M. J. Bush Table 3.2  The top ten emitters of carbon dioxide in 2018a Country/region 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

China USA India Russian Federation Japan Germany South Korea Iran Saudi Arabia Canada

Total CO2 emissions 2018 Emissions GtCO2

% of global total

% change 2017–2018

9.420 5.018 2.481 1.551 1.150 0.717 0.696 0.656 0.571 0.555

28.0 14.9 7.4 4.6 3.4 2.1 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.6

2.2 2.6 7.0 4.2 −2.0 −4.8 2.8 5.5 −3.4 0.1

aThe

data are from BP Statistical Review of World Energy, 68th edition 2019 Source BP Statistical Review of World Energy

Figure 3.6 shows how CO2 emissions are now dominated by China, Europe and the US, but it leaves out several big-hitters. Table 3.2 shows the CO2 top ten in 2018. Only three countries reduced their emissions over the period 2017–2018: Japan, Germany, and Saudi Arabia. Seven countries increased their emissions over the same period, led by India and Iran. India’s strong growth in emissions reflects the government’s policy to provide power to the millions of people with no access to electricity. Rural electrification is a top priority for many countries in Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa—although the provision of electricity should always be based on minigrids powered by photovoltaic energy, not grid-connected electricity powered by fossil fuels.

Methane Methane may play second fiddle to its heavier big brother: carbon dioxide, but the gas punches above its weight when it comes to raising atmospheric temperatures. Over a 20-year period, methane is over 85 times as powerful as carbon dioxide in contributing to global warming. That means a little goes a long way. Globally, the principal sources of methane are enteric fermentation (mostly from cattle), the oil and gas sector, municipal solid waste landfills, coal mining, rice cultivation, and wastewater treatment. Figure 3.7 shows the relative amounts of the major categories of anthropogenic methane emissions. The other sources in this mix includes methane from biomass, mobile sources, manure management, and other agricultural sources.7

3  The Carbon Cycle     117 KƚŚĞƌƐŽƵƌĐĞƐ

ŶƚĞƌŝĐ &ĞƌŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶ

tĂƐƚĞǁĂƚĞƌ ƚƌĞĂƚŵĞŶƚ ZŝĐĞĐƵůƚŝǀĂƚŝŽŶ ŽĂůŵŝŶŝŶŐ

KŝůĂŶĚŐĂƐ DƵŶŝĐŝƉĂůƐŽůŝĚ ǁĂƐƚĞ

Fig. 3.7  Estimated global anthropogenic methane Global Methane Initiative)

emissions by source (Source

There are also significant natural sources of methane: particularly from wetlands and warming permafrost soils; smaller sources include termites, oceans, sediments, volcanoes, and wildfires. Globally, emissions of methane are running at roughly 800 million tonnes a year—a much smaller quantity than emissions of carbon dioxide. But because methane is a much stronger greenhouse gas than carbon dioxide, in terms of global warming this amount of methane is equivalent to approximately 16% of the total global warming effect. Anthropogenic emissions of methane from the US in 2016 totalled about 657 million tonnes of CO2 equivalent. The main sectors are shown in Table 3.3.8 One point to note is that if natural gas systems are combined with petroleum systems, the oil and gas industry in the US is the largest source of emissions of methane. Adding in the emissions from abandoned oil and gas wells and abandoned coal mines would raise the total from the fossil fuels industries by an additional 13.3 MtCO2e. On the other hand, if enteric fermentation is combined with manure management, the agricultural sector would be in first place. Once in the atmosphere, methane reacts with air-borne molecules (particularly the hydroxyl radical) and is eventually converted to other compounds (including water vapour—which is also a strong greenhouse gas). The atmosphere is therefore the primary sink for the gas, although a small fraction of atmospheric methane is absorbed by the soil. Methane concentrations in the air began to increase rapidly around 2007 and are now growing much more strongly (see Fig. 2.5). During the period

118     M. J. Bush Table 3.3  US methane emissions in 2017 Methane source

MtCO2e

Enteric fermentation (livestock) Natural gas systems Landfills (municipal solid waste) Manure management Coal mining Petroleum systems Wastewater treatment Rice cultivation Stationary combustion Abandoned oil and gas wells Abandoned underground coal mines Mobile combustion Composting Petrochemical production Field burning of agricultural residues Total

175.4 165.6 107.7 61.7 55.7 37.7 14.2 11.3 7.8 6.9 6.4 3.2 2.2 0.3 0.2 656.3

Source US Environmental Protection Agency

2014–2017, CH4 levels increased by about 9 ppb annually—almost 20 times faster than the rate of increase at the turn of the century.9 What prompted this surge in emissions of the gas is not yet well understood. The production of fossil fuels: natural gas and coal may have played a part; but more likely, according to some researchers is agriculture—where the FAO estimates that global livestock operations expanded from 1.3 billion head of cattle in 1994 to 1.5 billion in 2014. The cultivation of wetland rice, another important source of methane, also increased over the period.10

Enlarging the Sinks Another way to bring down levels of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere and thus global temperatures is to ramp up the absorptive capacity of the terrestrial and ocean sinks. Is this possible?

In the Ocean The oceans are an enormous reservoir of carbon. But the physical and chemical processes that drive the absorption and desorption of carbon dioxide across the gas–liquid interface of the atmosphere and the sea are impossible to regulate. As atmospheric concentrations of CO2 have increased, the rate

3  The Carbon Cycle     119

of absorption of the gas by surface water has also increased—as one would expect. But the rate of absorption is far less than the rate at which CO2 is being released into the atmosphere by fossil fuel powered electricity generation and industry. In addition, the ocean is far from being the ideal sink for CO2. It’s becoming more acidic, and this poses serious problems for many marine shellfish species and ocean biodiversity. There are some novel ideas about how we might increase the ability of the oceans to absorb more carbon without increasing acidity. One proposal would add iron to some of the world’s oceans—particularly the Southern Ocean and the equatorial Pacific, that currently have relatively low levels of the element. The idea is that this would fertilize the growth of algae which would then in principle absorb huge amount of carbon dioxide through photosynthesis. But messing with ocean biochemistry on a large scale is always high-risk—and it’s far from being the best option, particularly when there are much better and safer alternatives.

On the Land The terrestrial sink for carbon dioxide relies primarily on the world’s forests. In 1990 the world had 4128 million hectares (Mha) of forest. By 2015 this area had decreased to 4000 Mha—an annual rate of loss of 0.13% over the period.11 Forest area has increased in temperate regions in recent years, and there has been relatively little change in the boreal and subtropical climatic regions. The largest loss of forest area has occurred in the tropics, particularly in South America and Africa. The expansion of agriculture is the cause of about 80% of deforestation worldwide, However, there are major differences between geographic regions, and important distinctions between large-scale commercial agriculture and subsistence agriculture as drivers of deforestation. A 2012 analysis of data from 46 tropical and sub-tropical countries representing about 78% of forest area in those regions revealed that large-scale commercial agriculture was the most prevalent driver of deforestation— accounting for 40% of the loss. Local subsistence agriculture accounted for 33% of the loss, urban expansion for 10% and mining for 7%.12 In South-east Asia, palm oil plantations supplying the food industry have replaced substantial areas of natural forest. In Malaysia, palm oil plantations increased from 2.4 to 4.2 million hectares (Mha) from 1990 to 2005, destroying at least 1 Mha of natural forest over this period. In Indonesia,

120     M. J. Bush

the area of palm oil plantations more than tripled in 10 years: increasing from 1.7 to 6.1 Mha between 1990 and 2000, resulting in the clearing of an estimated 1.7 to 3.0 Mha of forest.13 Small-scale agriculture is the main cause of deforestation in Africa— where many poor households particularly in sub-Saharan Africa have cleared forest lands to grow food. Large-scale commercial agriculture on the other hand, accounts for only one third of deforestation in Africa. A study of deforestation in seven South American countries showed how deforestation has been mainly driven by the expansion of pasture for cattle ranching. Over 70% of deforestation in these countries between 1990 and 2005 was the result of an increased demand for pasture. A further 14% of the loss was due to increased demand for cropland. Pasture expansion caused at least one-third of forest loss in all countries except Peru—where smallholder cropland expansion was a more dominant driver. In Argentina, the expansion of pasture was responsible for nearly 45% of forest loss, although deforestation for agriculture destroyed almost as much. In Brazil, more than 80% of deforestation during the same period was ­associated with the conversion of forest to pasture land.14 However, an article published in Geophysical Research Letters in 2015 contended that deforestation in the tropics was much worse that the numbers the FAO was reporting. The researchers found accelerated deforestation in 34 tropical countries that covered most the world’s tropical forests. They estimated there was a 63% acceleration in net deforestation in the humid tropics from the 1990s to the 2000s with the loss of forest cover peaking in 2005.15 In Australia, deforestation looks even worse: a report in early 2018 characterized the situation as a ‘full-blown land-clearing crisis’—as 3 million hectares of untouched forest were slated for destruction driven by the booming livestock industry.16 Although the area of forests worldwide continues to decline, the increasing concentrations of carbon dioxide in the air has a positive effect on growth. In North America, the warming temperatures have extended the growing season by several days, and the fertilization effect of higher CO2 levels improves the efficiency of water utilization by trees and plants. There are constraints however on this potential advantage, as increased plant growth also requires water and nitrogen—both of which may be limited. Higher temperatures also stress plants. They need water to survive and water-stressed plants are more susceptible to fire and insects. Rising temperatures are lengthening the growing season in many­ northern and mid-latitude forests. In the US, trees in the eastern half of the country are leafing out earlier in the spring and dropping their leaves later.

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Fig. 3.8  Trends lines for ocean and terrestrial sinks since 1960 (Source Global Carbon Project)

The increased carbon uptake has outpaced a simultaneous increase in CO2 released into the atmosphere by respiration. Overall, eastern forests in the US are acting as sinks. However, in the northern boreal forests of the US and Canada, which are primarily evergreen species, studies found an overall decrease in carbon uptake, despite an extended growing season.17 The Global Carbon Budget report’s estimate of the terrestrial carbon sink shows large annual variations around the most recent decadal mean of 11.6 Gt/yr of CO2. In contrast with the ocean sink, which is relatively invariant and slowly increasing, the terrestrial sink’s large annual variations reflect the influence of a multitude of climate- and weather-related factors that strongly influence regional and annual patterns of plant growth. Figure 3.8 shows the contrasting trends. So are the world’s forests still a sink for atmospheric CO2? An article in Science in September 2017 asserted that tropical forests were a net c­arbon source (not a sink) based on above-ground measurements of gain and loss. Examining 12 years of satellite data that directly measured net annual changes in the above-ground carbon density of tropical vegetation, the scientists calculated that the world’s tropical forests are now a net carbon source—emitting 0.425 Gt of carbon a year. The net release of carbon is due to deforestation and from reductions in carbon density within standing ­forests due to degradation and other forms of disturbance.18 The study found that in Africa and the Americas, most of the carbon loss was due to small-scale degradation and disturbance from selective logging and fires; while in Asia—where there is widespread deforestation for palm oil production—less than half was a result of degradation and disturbance.19 The sustainable management of the world’s forest resources is an absolute global priority. There is little hope of bringing down atmospheric CO2 concentrations from their present levels if the planet’s forests are slowly becoming a source of carbon.

122     M. J. Bush

Dialling It Down In order to reduce atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide and reduce global warming either we reduce emissions or we enhance the sinks—or ­ideally both at the same time. We have no realistic way of increasing the ability of the oceans to absorb more CO2—there is some outside-the-box thinking, but most scientists believe that all these ideas—like ocean iron fertilization (many of which are illegal under international law), carry substantial risks.20 Reducing emissions from land-use change and forestry is certainly, at least in principle, a feasible option. But the frequency of wildfires is on the rise and given the warming temperatures and increasing frequency of drought, it’s not a safe bet that emissions from land use change can be substantially reduced. In addition, these emissions are much smaller than the emissions from fossil fuels and industry, so even reducing them to zero doesn’t solve the problem. That leaves us with three options: – dramatically reducing emissions from the combustion of fossil fuels and from industry, – substantially increasing the area of sustainably managed forests, – directly removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. We will look at this last option, called Negative Emission Technologies (NETs), a little later in this chapter. We now have two key questions: by how much should emissions of carbon dioxide and the other greenhouse gases be reduced? And how urgent is this action—meaning when do these steps need to be taken? These questions are all linked to projections about the future temperature of the planet. How hot can the Earth get before it gets too hot to handle?

Two Degrees of Heat How hot is too hot? It’s not an easy question to answer—particularly when you don’t know exactly what impact the temperature increase will have on the Earth’s ecosystems, biodiversity and humanity. One way to approach an answer is to go back in time and to look how hot the planet has been in the past—and to try and figure out whether the climate at that time would have been even remotely supportable.

3  The Carbon Cycle     123

In the 1970s, William Nordhaus, a professor of economics at Yale University, proposed a tentative answer to this question: observing that if temperatures rose more than 2 °C or 3 °C above the average global temperature at that time, the Earth’s climate would exceed the range which was estimated to have occurred over the last several thousand years. In 1998, James Hansen, one of the early pioneers of climate change analysis working at NASA in the US, warned in his testimony to the US Congress that the Earth was warmer than ever before, that emissions of carbon dioxide were responsible, and that rising temperatures would very ­probably lead to extreme weather and a changing climate. However, Hansen did not propose a limit to global temperature increases—arguing more on the need to control emissions. The Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) was the first agency to define a limit—citing two “absolute temperature targets”: the lower one of 1 °C was already close to being exceeded; the upper limit of 2 °C was proposed as an attainable target.21 The question of global warming was very much on the agenda at the UN Conference on Environment and Development (the ‘Earth’ summit), held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. One of the principal outcomes of that conference: the Framework Convention on Climate Change, the UNFCCC, is now the principal legal instrument that regulates and coordinates global action aimed at reducing the increasingly damaging impacts of global warming and climate change. The objective of the Convention was stated as: …to achieve…stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.

The Convention entered into force on 21 March 1994. There are 197 ­parties to the convention—all independent countries, except for the European Union.22 The UNFCCC forged an impressive consensus around a global objective but did not set out any limits or targets for global warming. However, in 1996, the European Council of Environment Ministers issued a declaration that global average temperatures should not exceed 2 °C above pre-industrial level—the first time that a firm temperature limit was agreed upon and announced by an international agency. The Kyoto protocol, which was adopted in Kyoto, Japan, in December 1997, and which entered into force in 2005, set internationally binding

124     M. J. Bush

emission reduction targets for the parties to the UNFCCC agreement but did not offer an opinion on the 2 °C limit. The rules for the implementation of the Protocol were adopted at the 7th meeting of the Conference of the Parties (COP) in 2001 (called the Marrakesh Accords). Its first commitment period started in 2008 and ended in 2012. During this period, 37 industrialized countries and the European Community committed to reducing their greenhouse gas emissions by an average of 5% below 1990 levels. The Doha amendment to the Protocol further strengthened the terms of the agreement. The amendment defined a second commitment period from 2013 to 2020, during which parties to the convention committed to reducing GHG emission by at least 18% below 1990 levels. However, the USA, which signed the treaty in 1998, never ratified the agreement—the only signatory to the Protocol which failed to ratify it. In 2011, Canada, Japan and Russia stated that they would not commit to the amended Kyoto targets, and Canada finally withdrew from the protocol in December 2012.23 The reality is that despite strong initial support from the international community, the Kyoto Protocol ultimately failed to generate significant reductions in greenhouse gas emissions on a global scale. The protocol failed to obtain emission reduction commitments from some of the world’s largest GHG emitters—including the US, China, Brazil, and India.24 At the 17th Conference of Parties (COP17) in 2011, the parties to the UNFCCC created the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action (known as the ADP). The ADP was charged with developing a new UNFCCC protocol or instrument with legal force which would be applicable to all the parties. Rather than relying on a top-down approach, as the Kyoto protocol had done, the ADP asked all member Parties to create voluntary emission reduction targets that were not only achievable, but which reflected the ­party’s own policies and priorities. These targets, called Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs), were not legally binding—which perhaps made their formulation by governments easier to initiate and fi ­ nalize. Moreover, there was no standard definition of what was to be included in the INDCs, a feature that allowed Parties to formulate mitigation and adaptation strategies that were more closely aligned with their national ­ development plans and priorities. Parties were asked to submit their INDCs well in advance of the proposed 21st Conference of Parties planned for Paris in December 2015. By the time of the meeting of COP21, 197 countries had submitted their INDCs.

3  The Carbon Cycle     125

An Agreement in Paris The Paris Agreement was adopted in December 2015. The aim of the agreement is to strengthen the global response to the threat of climate change “in the context of sustainable development and efforts to eradicate poverty”, by a) Holding the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit the temperature increase to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels, recognizing that this would significantly reduce the risk and impact of climate change; b) Increasing the ability to adapt to the adverse impacts of climate change and foster climate resilience and low greenhouse gas emissions development, in a manner that does not threaten food production; and c) Making finance flows consistent with a pathway towards low greenhouse gas emissions and climate resilient development.25

The Agreement also offered some advice about how this objective might be achieved. Article 4 states: In order to achieve the long-term temperature goal… Parties aim to reach global peaking of greenhouse gas emissions as soon as possible…and to undertake rapid reductions thereafter in accordance with best available science, so as to achieve a balance between anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in the second half of the century…

So net zero emissions of greenhouse gases are to be achieved sometime between 2050 and 2100—which is not a very precise directive; but the intention is clear: peaking of emissions is to occur as soon as possible, and rapid reductions are to follow. The Paris Agreement entered into force on 4 November 2016, thirty days after the date on which more than 55 Parties to the Convention, accounting in total for at least an estimated 55% of the total global greenhouse gas emissions, had submitted their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession. In ratifying the agreement, countries that are parties to the Agreement commit to implementing their INDCs. The INDCs then become NDCs: Nationally Determined Contributions—which are legally binding under the terms of the Agreement. The NDCs for each country are recorded in a registry managed by the Climate Change secretariat.

126     M. J. Bush

As of April 1, 2018, 195 Parties had signed the agreement and 175— representing 87% of global GHG emissions—had deposited their instruments of ratification. The Paris Agreement requires all ratifying Parties to communicate an NDC. Most Parties’ first NDC are their original submitted INDCs, with only 11 Parties having an NDC which differs from their INDC. In most cases modifications were minor, although some countries raised the level of their intended reductions. It is noteworthy that 88 Parties mention carbon pricing in their NDCs representing 56% of global GHG emissions.26

Mind the Gap The Paris Agreement stipulated that participating countries should aim to reach the peak of their emissions ‘as soon as possible’. And although several countries have managed this: most notably the countries of the European Union and the USA (see Fig. 3.6), globally, emissions have continued to rise. The reality is that in 2018, two years after the Agreement entered into force, emissions of CO2 and the other greenhouses gases are still increasing. Worse, when analysts model the aggregate impact of all the countries’ Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to reducing greenhouse gas emissions, it falls way short of what is required if the Paris Agreement temperature targets are not to be exceeded. An annual publication by the United Nations Environment Programme examines what action needs to be taken in order to bring emissions of greenhouse gases down in line with the Paris targets. Called the Emissions Gap Report, the document focuses attention on the ‘gap’ between present projections of greenhouse gas emissions, and the reductions required if the UNFCCC targets of 1.5 °C and 2 °C of global warming are to be met.27 Figure 3.9 shows the size of the ‘gap’ for the two temperature targets: 1.5 °C and 2 °C. The range of the gap results from the inherent uncertainties associated with countries’ NDCs.28 The emissions gap forecast for 2030, even if all the NDCs are fully implemented (which is highly unlikely), is estimated at between 15 and 18 GtCO2e if the world is to stay within the 2 °C limit, and between 26 and 29 GtCO2e in order to stay within the 1.5 °C limit.29

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3  The Carbon Cycle     127

Fig. 3.9  Emissions gaps in meeting the Paris Agreement’s goals (Source Carbon Action Tracker)

So between now (in 2019) and 2030, much stronger action must be taken to dramatically curtail the emission of greenhouse gases. Can these gaps be closed between now and 2030? The 2017 UNEP Emissions Gap Report examined a wide range of ­technological changes and improvements that would lead to reductions in emissions of greenhouse gases. The focus was on the energy sector—where a transition to electrical power generation based on renewable sources of energy is essential. Without this transition, there is almost no chance of global temperature increases being held under 2 °C. In association with this transition to renewable energy, there must be substantial gains in energy efficiency—in industry, transport, and the built environment. In the transport sector, gains in efficiency together with the transition to electric vehicles, already underway in 2018, will make a huge contribution to reducing emissions of CO2 and other greenhouse gases. In principle, reforestation, afforestation, and changes in agricultural practice, could also play an important role. But changes to these sectors are much more difficult to initiate and sustain. So the four key sectors where forceful action needs to be taken are energy, industry, transport, and buildings.

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Fig. 3.10  Potential sectoral emission reductions by 2030 (see The Emissions Gap Report 2017. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). Available at: https:// www.unenvironment.org/resources/emissions-gap-report) (Source United Nations Environment Program)

Figure 3.10, taken from the Emissions Gap 2017 report, shows the potential emission reductions that could be achieved from the four key sectors, together with forestry and agriculture. These projections to 2030 come with substantial uncertainties. But once again, the precision of the estimation is not as important as the embedded information it carries in terms of policy. The message is clear: if global warming is to be kept under 2 °C, there needs to be substantial and immediate reductions in the emissions of greenhouse gases from these four key sectors: energy, industry, transport and buildings. If progress can also be made in sustainably managing the world’s forests, and in accelerating the more widespread adoption of conservation agriculture, the increase in carbon naturally sequestered by biomass, and the reduction in emissions from the soil, will be an additional and potential significant co-benefit.

Negative Emission Technologies Assuming that global emissions of CO2 level off around 2020 and then start to decline, it still seems unlikely, given present trends and most countries’ only modest programs to curtail their emissions under the Paris Agreement, that atmospheric levels of greenhouse gases are going to fall fast enough to keep global warming under 2 °C.30

3  The Carbon Cycle     129

Is there a way to remove carbon dioxide directly from the atmosphere? We already know of two natural sinks: the land sink (biomass and soil), and the oceans, which together are absorbing about 20 Gt of CO2 each year—as shown by the global carbon budget of Fig. 3.1. Scientists and engineers have been looking into the possibility of directly removing carbon dioxide from the atmosphere for at least a decade. Called Negative Emissions Technologies (NETs), six of them are currently under investigation31; they are: • Afforestation and reforestation • Land management to increase soil organic carbon • Bioenergy production with carbon capture and storage/sequestration (BECCS) • Enhanced weathering • Direct air capture and carbon storage (DACCS) • Ocean iron fertilization This is an area of study replete with acronyms: in addition to BECCS and DACCS, we are also going to run into: – CDR Carbon dioxide removal – CCS Carbon capture and storage (or sequestration—both are used) – CCUS Carbon capture, utilisation, and storage – OIF Ocean iron fertilization Afforestation and reforestation: All living plants and trees absorb carbon dioxide from the air as they grow. In trees, the carbon is locked into the wood and roots. Protecting the world’s forests and increasing their area would result in significant amounts of carbon being taken out of the atmosphere. Estimates range from 1.1 to 1.3 Gt of carbon per year. But very large areas of land would be required—creating potential conflicts with agriculture—and as we have seen earlier, in the global conflict between forest lands and the expansion of agriculture (both commercial and subsistence), the forests are on the losing side. The changing climate is also a threat for forests. Rising global temperatures and frequent drought conditions increase the risk of wildfires—which are becoming more likely in many areas of the world. Hurricanes and cyclones also cause immense damage to forests. Hurricane Maria devastated the El Yunque National Forest in Puerto Rico,32 and Hurricane Katrina caused massive damage to forests on the US Gulf Coast.33 Trees that are

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blown over by hurricane-force winds will die, decay, and release carbon back to the atmosphere—negating the positive impact of their previous absorption of carbon dioxide from the air. The world’s forests absolutely need to be better protected and managed— not just because they are repositories of large quantities of carbon, but also because they are the natural habitat of millions of creatures that are struggling to survive. The protection of biodiversity is the most compelling argument for the protection of the world’s forests. But as a mechanism to counteract and possibly negate rising carbon emissions, they will play a limited, but still important role. Land management to increase soil organic carbon: The amount of organic carbon sequestered in the soil could potentially be significantly increased by conservation agriculture techniques. However, conservation agriculture is not yet extensively practiced worldwide, and the amount of organic carbon that could potentially be sequestered and locked away in the soil is probably limited—given the difficulty of managing and sustaining conservation agriculture on a global scale. Bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS): There is a great deal of interest in the BECCS concept. The idea is to manage either fast-growing energy crops (perennial grasses, for instance), or increased ­forest biomass production, and to use this biomass as a source of fuel to generate electricity in conventional power plants. The carbon in the biomass would be released as carbon dioxide during combustion, but the gas would be extracted from the flue gas of the power plant and stored—either underground or in deep water deposits. The technology consists of two separate components: the production of large quantities of biomass feedstock, and viable and reliable carbon storage technologies. The intermediate step—the extraction of carbon dioxide from the power plant flue gas stream is proven technology and straightforward to deploy. The widespread deployment of BECCS power production will require large areas of land to grow the biomass fuel—which must also be cut, gathered, transported, and processed before being delivered to the power plant. Bioenergy production at the required scale may therefore have significant environmental and social impacts.34 Chapter 6 looks into this question in more detail. Enhanced weathering: The idea is that geochemical processes that naturally absorb carbon dioxide at slow rates can be brought into play at an enhanced rate of absorption. One technique involves spreading finely ground mineral silicate rock over large areas of land, as is already done in some instances to reduce soil acidity for agriculture.

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The concept seems unrealistic: it would require the mining, processing, transport, and deployment of large quantities of minerals, and the land area required for the spreading or burying the necessary amount of crushed rock would be enormous. Not to mention the cost. In addition, all mining operations have major environmental impacts—including the tailings from the mining operation. Direct air capture and carbon storage: DACCS technology would rely on the same carbon storage CCS technology employed by BECCS—a technology that has promising potential. But extracting the carbon dioxide directly from the atmosphere—where its concentration is a tiny 0.04%— takes a lot of energy and is likely to be expensive. Removing CO2 from a flue gas is a well-established chemical process technology. The first commercial DACCS installation started up in Switzerland in 2017.35 It employed a solid adsorption technology and removed 900 tonnes of CO2 a year from the atmosphere. Smaller more experimental systems are in operation in Canada, the US, and Europe. Ocean iron fertilization: Planktonic algae and other microscopic plants absorb CO2 and by photosynthesis build organic matter. A fraction of this organic material eventually sinks and is sequestered in deep ocean ­deposits. The idea is to enhance this process by adding iron as a nutrient to the water. The concept has actually been tested—illegally—off the west coast of Canada in 2012. An American businessman dumped around 100 tons of iron sulphate into the Pacific Ocean as part of a geoengineering scheme in July 2012— creating, as predicted, an artificial plankton bloom as large as 10,000 km2. The release of the iron compound took place about 200 nautical miles west of the islands of Haida Gwaii, one of the world’s richest ecosystems, where one of the villages was apparently persuaded to agree to the experiment after being told that it was a ‘salmon enhancement project’.36 However, the ocean fertilization concept carries substantial risks to the marine environment: for example, ecological impacts on the marine food chain and fisheries, and downstream effects on nutrient supply and dynamics are very difficult to predict and potentially damaging. Although the CDR technologies are all unproven at anything like the scale required to substantially reduce global levels of atmospheric carbon dioxide, NETs are assumed by the IPCC scenarios to be operational by about 2030—if the 2 °C limit is not to be exceeded. The crucial role of NETs can be seen in the IPCC scenario database where of the 400 scenarios that have a 50% chance or better of achieving no more than 2 °C warming,

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more than three quarters of them assume the large-scale deployment of some form of NETs. In October 2018, the US National Academies of Science weighed in on this question with a report that reviewed the status of NETs and proposed a research agenda that aims to expedite their development and implementation. The report looked at five of the six NETs discussed above (not ocean fertilisation) and added one more: ‘coastal blue carbon’. This is the development of land use and management practices that increase the carbon stored in living plants or sediments in mangroves, tidal marshes, seagrass beds, and other tidal or salt-water wetlands. These concepts are sometimes called “blue carbon” even though they refer to coastal ecosystems instead of the open ocean.37 The NAS report drew several interesting conclusions about the potential of NETs. The most salient of which are summarised below: • If the goals for climate and economic growth are to be achieved, NETs will likely need to play a large role in mitigating climate change by removing approximately 10 GtCO2 per year by 2050 and about 20 GtCO2/yr by 2100. • Four NETs are ready for large-scale deployment: afforestation/ reforestation, changes in forests management, uptake and storage by agricultural soils, and biomass energy with carbon capture and storage. • Current NETs with direct costs that do not exceed $100/tCO2 can be safely scaled up to capture and store substantial amounts of carbon, but significantly less than 10 GtCO2. In other words, several NETs could in principle be scaled up and deployed at the present time but, with current technology, their contribution to capturing and sequestering atmospheric CO2 will not be enough to limit global warming to less than 2 °C. Table 3.4 summarizes the NAS assessment of the current status of NETs and their potential impact, and current limiting factors. The technology with the greatest potential is biomass energy with carbon capture and storage. The big question though is how to reserve and manage the very large areas of land required for the growth and harvesting of the biomass feedstock. The NAS report estimates that between 30 million and 43 million hectares of land are required per GtCO2/yr of negative emissions. So for a removal rate of 10 GtCO2/yr—the order of magnitude necessary if global warming is to be kept below 2 °C, the land area required would be somewhere between 300 million and 430 million hectares. This area is 40% of global cropland.38

Low: $0–$20

Low: $0–$20

Low: $0–$20

Low to medium: $100

Medium to high

Coastal blue carbon

Afforestation and reforestation

Forest management

Agricultural practices to enhance soil carbon storage

Biomass energy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS)

Direct air capture (DAC)

Carbon mineralization

Unknown

?

3.5–5.2

3

1.5

1

0.13

• Available land given coastal development and land use • Understanding of future rates with sea level rise and coastal management • Available land—given needs for food and fibre production and for biodiversity • Inability to fully implement forestry management practices • Demand for wood limits feasible reduction in harvest rate, though some forest management activities would not impact fibre supplies • Limited per hectare rates of carbon uptake by existing agricultural practices • Inability to fully implement soil conservation practices • Cost • Availability of biomass, given needs for food and fibre production and for biodiversity • Inability to fully capture waste biomass • Fundamental understanding • Cost is greater than economic demand • Practical barriers to pace of scale up • Fundamental understanding, especially of feedbacks between carbon mineralization and permeability for in situ methods

Global potential Primary current limiting factors rate of CO2 removal (GtCO2/yr)

adapted from NAS report on negative emissions technologies and reliable sequestration: a research agenda. Washington DC, 2018 Source US National Academy of Sciences

aTable

Estimated cost ($/tCO2)

Negative emissions technology

Table 3.4  Cost, global potential, and limiting factors for a range of negative emissions technologiesa

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In reality, there is no silver bullet. It is more likely that some combination of the NETs described above will be developed and implemented. This is one area of technology development where more research is clearly needed.

Keep It in the Ground The model of the fast carbon cycle shown in Fig. 3.1 and the fact that the carbon sinks are approximately constant over decade-scale periods, means that there is an almost linear relationship between cumulative emissions of carbon dioxide and increasing global temperatures. So when proposing a maximum allowable global temperature increase of 1.5 °C or 2 °C over pre-industrial levels, it’s possible to estimate how much more carbon dioxide can be emitted into the atmosphere before these temperature limits are reached. It’s called the carbon budget. The carbon budget is the amount of carbon dioxide the world can emit while still having a reasonably good chance of limiting global temperature rise to 2 °C above pre-industrial levels.39 Figuring out the carbon budget from now until the end of the century has required running several thousand computer simulations of the global climate system and comparing the results from dozens of computer models developed by agencies specializing in climate science. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) ran the numbers a few years ago and reported their results in the 5th Assessment Report published in 2014. This is the way the IPCC summarized their findings: Multi-model results show that limiting total human-induced warming …to less than 2°C relative to the period 1861-1880 with a probability of  >  66% would require total CO2 emission from all anthropogenic sources since 1870 to be limited to about 2900 GtCO2…. About 1900 GtCO2 were emitted by 2011, leaving about 1000 GtCO2 to be consistent with this temperature goal. Estimated total fossil carbon reserves exceed this remaining amount by a factor of 4 to 7 with resources much larger still.40

It’s this last sentence that should get our attention. We need to also note that the budget of about 1000 GtCO2 was for the period starting in 2011. Since emissions since then have averaged about 33 GtCO2 a year, the available carbon budget at the end of 2018 was closer to 770 GtCO2.

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More recent data was presented in the IPCC Special Report: Global Warming of 1.5 °C. The report reiterated once again that constraining global warming requires limiting cumulative emissions of CO2 in order to stay within the carbon budget. By the end of 2017, anthropogenic CO2 emissions since the preindustrial period were estimated to have reduced the total carbon budget for 1.5 °C by approximately 2200 GtCO2. The report estimated the remaining carbon budget to be about 570 GtCO2 for a 66% probability of limiting global warming to 1.5 °C. Since the associated remaining budget was being depleted by emissions of about 34 GtCO2 per year in 2018, these more recent estimates imply that if emissions are not reduced, global warming could rise to 1.5 °C above preindustrial levels within 16 years—sometime around 2033 or just after. When methane and black carbon are factored in, the carbon budget could be substantially reduced. In addition, methane from permafrost thawing and methane release from wetlands could reduce the budget even further. Every year British Petroleum publishes a report called the BP Statistical Review of World Energy. It is one of the principal sources of information for scientists and policymakers who want to know more about the production and consumption of coal, oil, and natural gas in individual countries and worldwide. The report also provides detailed information on fossil fuels reserves that are being exploited, or which could be, by the fossil fuel companies that have access to them. In the 2018 edition of the review, global totals of proved fossil fuel reserves were estimated as follows: Fossil fuel

Total proved reserves at end 2018a

Oil Natural gas Anthracite and bituminous coal Sub-bituminous and lignite

1729.7 billion barrels 6951.8 trillion cubic feet 734.9 billion tonnes 319.9 billion tonnes

aSee

the BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2019 Source BP Statistical Review of World Energy

Total proved reserves are defined in the BP publication as the ­quantities that geological and engineering information indicate with reasonable certainty can be recovered in the future from known reservoirs under existing economic and operating conditions. Reserves are much smaller than ‘resources’—which are the quantities of fossil fuels that are known to exist, but which are not necessarily recoverable under present economic conditions.

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Burning these fossil fuel reserves to produce energy—either by generating electrical power or used in internal combustion engines to power vehicles— will obviously produce considerable amounts of carbon dioxide. Given the aim of the global community to limit global warming to ‘well below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels’, as specified in the 2015 Paris Agreement, and knowing that this objective requires limiting the emissions of carbon d ­ ioxide from 2018 onward to between 600 and 700 GtCO2, the fundamental question is: Can all this oil, natural gas, and coal be burned without driving global temperatures a lot higher than they are now, and way above the 2 °C limit set under the Paris Agreement? The short answer is no. They can’t. The amount of carbon dioxide which would be produced if all global fossil fuel reserves were used as fuel, based on the fossil fuel reserves listed above, is shown in Table 3.5. Clearly, given the limit of 600–700 GtCO2 if the 2 °C target is going to be achieved, not all the world’s reserves of fossil fuels can be burned as fuel. This stark reality has given rise to the movement ‘Keep it in the ground!’— which lobbies governments and fossil fuel companies to prevent companies from exploring for additional reserves of fossil fuels: What’s the point when the world already has too much of them? But there are a couple of things to note: 1. It is the reserves of coal, not so much oil and natural gas, that are excessive. Only a small fraction of the world’s reserves of coal can be used as fuel if global warming is to be constrained to 2 °C. Most coal reserves should stay in the ground. Coal is also the dirtiest fuel with the most corrosive and health-damaging emissions. There are compelling arguments for completely phasing out coal as a source of energy and closing most of the mines. 2. There are already sufficient reserves of oil and natural gas available for the production of electricity and for fuelling the transport sector. If oil companies continue to explore for additional reserves, they are deliberately ignoring the global temperature limits imposed by the Paris Agreement. It makes no sense for national governments to sign up to the Paris Agreement while at the same time, state-owned and investor-owned companies under their jurisdiction continue to explore for additional reserves of oil and gas. The oil companies continue to invest very substantial amounts of money in their exploration programs—and there are few indications that this obsessive

3  The Carbon Cycle     137 Table 3.5 CO2 produced by combustion of total world fossil fuel reserves Fossil fuels—global reserves

Emission factors CO2 per unita

Oil 371.4 kg CO2/bbl Natural gas 53.4 kg CO2/thousand cu ft Anthracite and bituminous coal 2530.5 kg CO2/tonne Sub-bituminous coal and lignite 1509.0 kg CO2/tonne Total CO2 produced by the total combustion of global reserves

GtCO2 642 371 1860 483 3356 GtCO2

aThe

emission factors in this table are taken from the paper by Heede, Richard and Oreskes, Naomi: “Potential emissions of CO2 and methane from proved reserves of fossil fuels: An alternative analysis”. Global Environmental Change 36 (2016): 12–20 Source Oreskes and Heede

search for more oil and gas reserves has ceased or diminished since the Paris Agreement came into force in 2016. The blatant disregard of climate science and the goals of the Paris Agreement by many oil companies and associated industries has led to a worldwide campaign to persuade academic, religious, and financial institutions to withdraw any investments they may have in these industries. This is discussed further in Chapter 9.

Conclusion This chapter has reviewed the structure of the carbon cycle: the sources and the sinks and examined the way in which emissions of carbon dioxide are driving up the concentrations of the gas in the atmosphere. The principal source of carbon dioxide is the combustion of fossil fuels, mainly coal but also natural gas, for the generation of electricity. Emissions from industry, and the combustion of gasoline and diesel fuel in automobiles also produce significant quantities of CO2. The 2015 Paris Agreement, forged under the auspices of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), aims to keep global warming below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels, and ideally below 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels. However, the emission reduction commitments made by countries as part of their proposed committments submitted to the Paris Agreement secretariat are insufficient, and much stronger international action is required if these targets are to be achieved. Negative Emission Technologies may help to achieve the Paris Agreement targets but the most interesting of them—bioenergy production with carbon capture and storage (BECCS), requires that very substantial areas of land

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be allocated for this sole objective. This may not be a realistic proposition. However, carbon capture and storage is a developing technology that holds significant promise for reducing carbon emissions from industry. The remaining carbon budget: the amount of carbon dioxide that can be emitted into the atmosphere if global warming is to be kept within 1.5 °C, is now only about 570 billion tonnes. At present emission rates, the budget will be used up within about 16 years. The proven reserves of oil, natural gas, and coal cannot all be exploited if the Paris Agreement target of no more than 2 °C of global warming is to be achieved. The continued exploration by the oil companies for even more petroleum resources is incompatible with the global community’s determination to reduce global warming and to find a way to end the climate crisis. The key to reducing the world’s reliance on fossil fuels is to strongly and rapidly facilitate a global transition to clean sources of energy. Photovoltaic energy, hydropower, and wind power unlock the inexhaustible resources of zero-emission energy. Nuclear power is also a clean source of energy and is likely to play an important role in generating electricity for at least another decade. But before we look at these renewable sources of energy in more detail, we should examine a little more closely the fossil fuels upon which the world has relied for so long. The truth is that while these fuels have provided essential power to industrial nations, developing countries, and emerging economies, they have also had a massively destructive impact on the natural environment. The next chapter shines a light on the huge environmental and human costs of the world’s addiction to fossil fuels.

Notes



1. See the NASA website: The carbon cycle. Accessed at: https://www.earthobservatory.nasa.gov/features/CarbonCycle. 2. See Climate central. Accessed at: http://www.climatecentral.org/gallery/ graphics/co2-and-rising-global-temperatures. 3. See Table ES-2 in the EPA Report Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse gas emissions and sinks 1990–2017. Environmental Protection Agency Report EPA 430-R-19-001. Accessed at: https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/ files/2019-04/documents/us-ghg-inventory-2019-main-text.pdf. 4. Emissions from US territories, shown in Table ES-2 of the EPA Report as 0.041 Gt/yr, are not included in Table 3.1 5. At the end of 2017 it was reported that vehicle emissions in the USA had overtaken emissions from power generation for the first time. See Vehicles are now America’s biggest CO2 source but EPA is tearing up regulations.

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Accessed at: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/jan/01/ vehicles-climate-change-emissions-trump-administration/. 6. See Global carbon budget 2017, Op. cit. 7. Global Methane Initiative. Global methane emissions and mitigation opportunities. Accessed at: https://www.globalmethane.org/documents/analysis_ fs_en.pdf. 8. Table ES-2 in the EPA Report Inventory of U.S. Greenhouse gas emissions and sinks 1990–2015. Environmental Protection Agency Report EPA 430-P-17-001. 9. See Surge in methane emissions threatens efforts to slow climate change. Accessed at: https://phys.org/news/2016-12-surge-methane-emissionsthreatens-efforts.html. Also see Very strong atmospheric methane growth in the 4 years 2014–2017: Implications for the Paris Agreement. Accessed at: https://agupubs.onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1029/2018GB006009. 10. Ibid. 11. See the FAO Report: Global forest resources assessment 2015, 2nd edition. FAO 2016. 12. See The state of the world’s forests: Forests and agriculture: Land-use challenges and opportunities. FAO 2016. 13. Idem. 14. Idem. 15. See Kim, D.H., Sexton, J.O., and Townshend, J.R.: “Accelerated deforestation in the humid tropics from the 1990s to the 2000s”. Geophysical Research Letters 42 (9) (16 May 2015): 3495–3501. 16. See Global deforestation hotspot: 3m hectares of Australian forest to be lost in 15 years. Accessed at: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/ mar/05/global-deforestation-hotspot-3m-hectares-of-australian-forest-tobe-lost-in-15-years. 17. See the article on the NOAA website: In response to warming, eastern forests inhaling more carbon dioxide than they’re exhaling. Accessed at: https://www. climate.gov/print/261731. 18. See the article in Science: Tropical forests are a net carbon source based on aboveground measurements of gain and loss, authored by A. Baccini and others in Science, 28 September 2017. The net loss was given precisely as 425.2 ± 92.0 Tg C/yr—which converts to 0.4252 Gt C/yr. 19. See Death by 1000 cuts: Why the forest carbon sink is disappearing. Accessed at: https://insideclimatenews.org/news/28092017/tropical-forest-loggingfires-carbon-sink-climate-change-study. 20. See World’s biggest geoengineering experiment ‘violates’ UN rules. Accessed at: https://www.theguardian.com/envronment/2012/oct/15/pacific-iron-fertilisation-geoengineering and Canadian government knew of plans to dump iron into the Pacific. Accessed at: https://www.theguardian.com/ environment/2012/oct/17/canada-geoengineering-pacific.

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21. See Limiting warming to no more than two degrees has become the de facto target for global climate policy. Accessed at: https://www.carbonbrief.org/ two-degrees-the-history-of-climate-changes-speed-limit. 22. See https://unfccc.int/essential_background/convention/items/6036.php. 23. See the Wikipedia article at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kyoto_ Protocol#Non-ratification_by_the_US. 24. See From Kyoto to Paris: How bottom-up regulation could revitalize the UNFCC. Accessed at: https://jelpblog.wordpress.com/2015/11/28/ from-kyoto-to-paris/. 25. The text of the agreement is available at: http://unfccc.int/files/essential_ background/convention/application/pdf/english_paris_agreement.pdf. 26. See State and trends of carbon pricing 2018. World Bank and Ecofys 2018. Available at: http://hdl.handle.net/10986/29687. 27. See the report from Climate Action Tracker. Accessed at: https://climateactiontracker.org/global/cat-emissions-gap/. 28. Note that the graph in Fig. 3.9 shows emissions in units of carbon dioxide equivalent—meaning that the global warming effects of methane and the other greenhouse gases have been factored in. 29. Note that the latest Emissions Gap Report 2018 published by UNEP has slightly different estimates for the extent of the gaps. The gap is a little smaller for the 2 °C limit (between 13 and 15 GtCO2e), but slightly larger for the 1.5 °C limit (between 29 and 32 GtCO2e). This means that the lower limit of 1.5 °C of warming will be harder to achieve, and most analysts believe that keeping global warming below 1.5 °C is now impossible. 30. See The Climate Action Tracker 2017. Accessed at: http://climateactiontracker.org/assets/publications/briefing_papers/CAT_2017-11-15_ Improvement-in-warming-outlook.pdf. 31. See Negative emission technologies: What role in meeting Paris Agreement targets? European Academies Science Advisory Council, EASAC Policy Report 35. 2018. 32. See Forests protect the climate: A future with more storms would mean trouble. Accessed at: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/07/climate/forests-stormsclimate-chnage.html. 33. See Chambers, J.Q., Fisher, J.I., Zeng, H., Chapman, E.L., et al.: “Hurricane Katrina’s carbon footprint on US Gulf coast forests”. Science 318 (16 November 2017): 1107. Accessed at: http://science.sciencemag.org/content/318/5853/1107?sid=a159ca86-a564-41b7-af3b8177de549eff. 34. See Negative emission technologies: What role in meeting Paris Agreement targets? Op. cit. 35. See Negative emission technologies. Op. cit.

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36. See World’s biggest geoengineering experiment ‘violates’ UN rules. Accessed at: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2012/oct/15/pacific-iron-fertilisation-geoengineering. Also Canadian government ‘new of plans to dump iron into the Pacific’. Accessed at: https://www.theguardian.com/ environment/2012/oct/17/canada-geoengineering-pacific. 37. National Academies of Science: Negative emissions technologies and reliable sequestration: a research agenda. Washington, DC. 2018. 38. Table adapted from NAS report on negative emissions technologies. Op. cit. 39. ‘Reasonably good’ means better than a 66% chance. Two out of three. And a one in three chance of failure. 40. IPCC 5th Assessment Report. Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report, p. 63.

4 Carbon Chaos

Introduction There is no question that the harnessing of carbon-based fossil fuels has enabled the Earth’s dominant species, homo sapiens, not just to inherit the Earth, but to dominate it in ways unimaginable even a century ago. Without plentiful supplies of coal, oil, and natural gas, there is no way the planet could have managed to support the almost 8 billion people who now call it home. Not that all of them are in great shape. But up until a few decades ago, economic prospects for the populations of most countries, at least those not involved in armed conflict, were pretty good. Harnessing the world’s plentiful sources of fossil fuel energy has made that happen. In developing countries, access to modern forms of energy has helped lift millions of people out of poverty. When fossil fuels are burned—either to generate electricity or to power all the forms of transport that keep the global economy moving—we are essentially burning trees, plants, and other forms of biomass that died and decayed hundreds of millions of years ago. Compressed and compacted into coal or transformed by heat and pressure into carbon-rich petroleum, all the carbon in those trees and plants, and all the other chemical elements naturally found in biomass, like sulphur, are released into the atmosphere as gases when the fuel is burned. Carbon dioxide is the principal pollutant from this combustion, but other gases like sulphur dioxide, and volatile compounds (such as benzene), are also driven into © The Author(s) 2020 M. J. Bush, Climate Change and Renewable Energy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15424-0_4

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the air by the heat of combustion. Since combustion requires air, which is mostly nitrogen, nitrogen oxide gases are also present in the exhaust fumes of vehicles and the smokestacks of power plants. But combustion is never perfect. There is always smoke. Composed of minute particles of carbon, ash, and traces of other elements found in the carbon fuel, what is called particulate matter or just plain particulates is dangerous stuff. When breathed in, it gets into the lungs and causes a host of respiratory problems—particularly for children. We looked at this problem in general terms in Chapter 1. In this chapter we will examine the pollution and the environmental impacts caused by the combustion of fossil fuels in more detail, as well as documenting the other environmental impacts that are unavoidable when fossil fuels are the main source of energy. We will also look at the external costs associated with fossil fuels. These are the costs that the polluter never pays. And along the way we will document all the horrendous accidents and catastrophes caused by the need to constantly move enormous quantities of highly flammable hydrocarbon liquids and gases across North America and around the world in pipelines, tank cars, coal trains, and super-tankers.

Coal The use of coal as a fuel is often associated with the industrial revolution of 18th century Britain, but coal was an important source of energy even in Roman times. A century before the industrial revolution, many cities in England were dependent on coal for heating and for artisanal manufacturing. Air pollution was already a huge problem in the capital. In 1656, the English poet Sir William Davenport published a tract that complained about the ‘canopy of smoke’ that covered the city of London. He even wrote a song that included the lines1: London is smother’d with sulph’rous fumes Still she wears a black-hood and cloak Of sea-coal smoak…

The problem of air pollution in the capital was not really tackled until the mid-twentieth century—after the ‘Great Smog’ of 1952 killed several thousand people. So for at least 300 years, the air pollution caused by the burning of coal in London was atrocious.

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Coal is still a major source of primary energy—it was only knocked into 2nd place by oil in the mid-twentieth century. Although its use as a fuel is declining in North America and Europe, it is increasing in Asia, and the production of coal is not expected to peak until after well after 2020. In 2017, about 30% of global primary energy production was being supplied by coal. All mining operations are inherently dangerous. The list of catastrophic coal mine disasters that have occurred over the last 200 years is long and horrendous—but coal mining today is a lot safer. Even so, coal mining leads US industries in fatal injuries: the 2007 fatality rate in coal mining was almost 25 per 100,000 workers—more than six times greater than all private industry. In the US, employees in coal mining are more likely to be killed or to incur a non-fatal injury or illness, and their injuries are more likely to be severe, than workers in private industry as a whole.2 But the situation has improved since then: in 2017, fatalities among US coal miners had dropped to 18 per 100,000 workers. But it’s still a dangerous job.3

The Miners and the Mines Progressive massive fibrosis (PMF) is an advanced, debilitating, and lethal form of coal workers’ pneumoconiosis. It is known as black lung disease, which gives you an idea of what it does to a miner’s lungs. Breathing in coal mine dust is the sole cause of PMF in working coal miners. There is no cure. One would think that, at least in the US with all the awareness of environmental issues and worker’s safety, that an occupational hazard of this type would have been eradicated by now. In fact, the disease was almost eliminated 20 years ago with a reported prevalence of just 0.33% among active underground workers with at least 25 years of mining tenure. Since that time, the incidence of the disease has risen substantially. For example, the Coal Workers Health Surveillance Program (CWHSP) reported in 2012 that the incidence of the disease in Kentucky, Virginia, and West Virginia had increased by a factor of ten.4 The disease seems to be becoming more prevalent and more serious in the US. A report released in February 2018, presented the results of surveys conducted at three clinics serving coal miners in Virginia, Kentucky, and West Virginia. A total of 416 cases of black lung disease were identified. Scientists have speculated that the increased incidence of the disease could be linked to the shift towards mining thinner coal seams that require cutting into the

146     M. J. Bush

surrounding rock. Silica dust from pulverized rock may damage lungs faster that coal dust alone.5 A few months later in July 2018, the US National Institute for Occupational safety and Health (NIOSH) reported that as many as one in five miners in central Appalachia suffer black lung disease, the highest rate in 25 years. Nationwide the condition now afflicts one in ten of miners, an increase of 3% since 2012.6 Black lung disease is found everywhere that coal is mined. There are reports from Australia and the UK that document the same condition. The disease cannot be eradicated. As long as miners go underground and breathe in coal dust-laden air they will be exposed to the disease. In countries where mining is poorly regulated the prevalence of the disease can rise to astronomical levels. In China in 2013, the government’s National Health and Family Planning Commission reported that there were 750,000 people suffering from black lung disease.7 It’s not just the miners who suffer. China, for example, has the largest number of premature deaths attributable to outdoor air pollution related to particulate matter—more than 1 million; followed by India with 620,000. In both cases, particulate emissions from coal combustion are reportedly a key underlying factor.8 The mining of coal has a massive and often irreversible impact on the environment. A form of surface mining called mountaintop removal, or MTR, involves stripping all trees from a mountaintop and blasting away the top of the mountain with explosives. The resulting thousands of tons of debris is generally dumped into adjacent valleys, burying watercourses, totally disrupting watersheds, and often permanently changing the biodiversity of the area. In the US, in Appalachia alone, coalfields cover 48,000 km2 of mountaintops and valleys, displacing forests and polluting or burying more than 5% of the region’s streams.9 Drainage from coal mines is acidic, laced with heavy metals, and an environmental nightmare. In the US, it has been described as one of the worst environmental problems facing the mining industry.10 Acid mine drainage (AMD) is the acidic water produced when rock containing sulphide minerals, particularly iron pyrites, comes into contact with water and oxygen. The chemistry is complex, but the result is that downstream watercourses are turned red, orange and yellow by the accumulating concentrations of ferrous compounds. The acidity of the water also dissolves other minerals from the rock: zinc, copper, arsenic, cadmium and lead. Left untreated the problem can last for centuries: some Roman mines in Britain still produce acidic drainage.11

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Preparing the Coal Before it is transported to power plants, coal is generally cleaned up to remove soil and other rock fragments. The preparation includes crushing the coal and removing extraneous non-coal materials. If the coal is high in sulphur or other impurities, it is washed with a water or immersed in a chemical bath to remove inorganic sulphur in the coal. The process requires the application of complex chemicals, large quantities of water, and produces a thick slurry waste that may contain arsenic and mercury—which are both common in mined rock. This liquid waste is generally stored in huge surface impoundments, sometimes called tailing ponds, to prevent the pollution of local rivers and streams. While generally safe, they occasionally fail. Catastrophically. In Inez, Kentucky, three coal mines owned by Martin County Coal Corporation fed coal into a preparation plant on conveyor belts through underground mine workings. Waste coal slurry from the plant was pumped into a 29 hectare tailing pond called the Big Branch impoundment. The dam held back over 2 billion gallons of slurry. In October 2000, the dam failed, releasing about 300 million gallons of coal waste slurry into local streams, flooding stream banks to a depth of five feet. About 120 km of rivers and streams turned black, killing fish, and polluting the river water along the Tug Fork of the Big Sandy River, and some of its tributaries. Like all coal mine tailing ponds, the slurry contained detectable levels of arsenic, mercury, lead, copper and chromium. Martin County Coal eventually paid out over $6 million in penalties and damages.12 In 1972, the most destructive flood in West Virginia’s history occurred when a coal waste impounding structure collapsed on the Buffalo Creek tributary of Middle Fork. The failure released 132 million gallons of water. As a result of the flood, 125 people were killed, 1100 were injured and more than 4000 were left homeless.13 While the regulations in the US and Canada are now much stricter, accidents still happen. In January 2018, it was reported that Duke Energy, one of the largest electricity companies in the US will pay an $84,000 penalty and work to stop potentially toxic waste from three North Carolina coal-burning plants from leaking into groundwater and nearby rivers. Two dozen leaky spots were detected at coal ash pits before 2015. Duke Energy acknowledged that the leaks into the Catawba and Broad rivers were from unlined earthen holding basins at the power plants. Groundwater in the vicinity may have been polluted, and Duke Energy has been providing

148     M. J. Bush

hundreds of homes using wells within a half-mile of its coal plants with bottled water as a precaution. In January 2018, it was reported that some families had been using bottled water for over two and a half years.14 Canada has experienced similar dam failures at coal mines. On the night of Halloween 2013, an estimated 264 million gallons of waste coal slurry spilled out of a broken earth berm at the Obed Mountain mine near Hinton, Alberta. The burst contaminated 25 km of the Athabasca river. Ten municipalities were warned not to withdraw water from the river and to keep livestock away from the tainted water.15 But these impoundment and tailing pond failures pale in comparison to the disaster at the Mount Polley mine in the remote Caribou region of British Columbia in western Canada. When the dam failed in August 2014, it released 3.9 billion gallons of thick toxic slurry containing lead, copper, and mercury, into nearby Hazeltine Creek, Polley Lake, and Quesnel Lake. The environmental impact was catastrophic. The Mount Polley mine was not a coal mine. Imperial Metals was mining for gold and silver. But the approach is exactly the same for the mining of coal: the toxic slurry waste resulting from the processing and washing of coal or rock cannot be released into the environment—it has to be held in impoundments and tailing ponds. Even though dam and dike failures are infrequent, they still happen.16 It is worth noting that a report on the cause of the breach by an expert review panel found that the “dominant contribution to the failure resides in the design.” The construction of the dam did not follow the proposed design.17 Design problems have also been a frequent problem in the US. In 2013, the Washington Post reported that several tailing ponds at coal mines in West Virginia had been found to have defective walls because of poor construction. Tests of the density of these impoundment walls showed flaws in all seven sites surveyed, with only 16 field tests meeting the required standards out of 73 conducted. That report noted that there were as many as 596 coal slurry impoundments in 21 states, of which 114 were in West Virginia.18 Apart from the slurry waste from the preparation process, solid wastes are generated in coal mines in substantial quantities. The piles of waste can be huge and since they contain coal dust and fragments of coal, they are prone to combust spontaneously. In the UK they are called coal slag heaps and were a dominant feature of the mining towns in Wales and the North of England when coal was a major industry in the last century. The Aberfan tragedy is still remembered. The Welsh mining village lies at the bottom of a small valley. The Merthyr Vale coal mine, the mainstay

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Fig. 4.1  The village of Aberfan just after the 1966 disaster (Source Public domain)

of the local economy, was higher up the hill—where the colossal slag heaps dominated the skyline (Fig. 4.1). Mining in Aberfan started in 1869. Initially the waste was dumped in tips on the slope adjacent to the colliery. But as the volume of waste material increased, new tips were created on the slopes higher up the hillside. By 1966, seven tips had been constructed. Tip number 7, the one that failed, held about 230,000 cubic metres of mine waste and had reached a height of 40 meters. Just after 9 a.m., on October 21, 1966, after several days of rain, about half of the slag heap slid away, and over 100,000 m3 of mud and coal mine waste cascaded down onto the village below. The mud and ­rubble roared down the valley, crashed through a row of small houses, and crushed the Pantglas junior school—where about 120 young children had just come into their classrooms. The slag heap slide killed 144 people: 116 children aged 7 to 10; six adults in the school including 5 teachers, and 22 people who were in the houses that were destroyed.19 It was an appalling tragedy.

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Generating Electricity In 2017, the world production of coal was about 7.3 billion tonnes—over 40% of which was mined in China (which imported even more). India and the USA each produced about 10% of the total. Not all coal goes into power production. A substantial fraction is used for the manufacture of steel and cement and other industrial and residential applications. In 2017, Canada produced 61 million tonnes of coal, of which 56% was metallurgical coal used for steel-making, and 44% was thermal coal used for generating electricity.20 When coal is burned in a power plant to generate the steam that powers the turbines, the resulting mix of flue gases is a toxic cocktail of gas-phase chemical compounds and particulates. The main constituent is carbon dioxide—a gas which has little direct impact on human health, although it is the chief culprit when it comes to global heating. But the other constituent gases have a noxious impact. Table 4.1, adapted from a report published by Physicians for Social Responsibility, summarizes the health effects of the major power plant pollutants.21 The PSR report lists coal’s contribution to major health impacts as follows22: Asthma. Nitrogen oxides, ozone, and particulate matter are all implicated in the prevalence of the disease. The most vulnerable are children and adults. Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD). Emphysema with chronic obstructive bronchitis permanently narrows airways. In the US, COPD is the 4th leading cause of death. Smokers are most vulnerable. NOx and particulate matter are implicated. Infant mortality. NOx and particulates are implicated in the deaths of infants less than 1 year old. Almost a quarter may have had respiratory causes. Lung cancer. Leading cause of cancer mortality in US among both men and women. The disease is exacerbated by air pollution caused by particulate matter. Acute myocardial infarction. Particulate matter is implicated in the disease Coronary heart disease. CHD is a leading cause of death in the US and air pollution is known to negatively impact cardiovascular health. Ischemic stroke. NOx, particulate matter and sulphur dioxide are all implicated in the prevalence of ischemic stroke.

SO2 is a corrosive invisible gas formed from the sulphur in coal. It reacts with water vapor in the air to form sulphuric acid—acid rain

A mixture of tiny solid particles (soot) and sulphuric acid droplets. PM is a complex mix of carbon and other toxic elements

A mix of nitrogen oxides, NOx, is produced by high combustion temperatures. The gases react in the presence of sunlight to form ozone smog Invisible and highly corrosive, ozone is produced when nitrogen oxides react with other pollutants in the presence of sunlight

Particulate matter (PM)

Nitrogen oxides

Source Physicians for Social Responsibility (USA)

Ozone

Description

Name

Sulphur dioxide Coughing, wheezing, shortness of breath, nasal congestion and inflammation. Worsens asthma. The gas can destabilize heart rhythms. It may cause low birth weight and an increased risk of infant death PM crosses the lung into the bloodstream resulting in inflammation of the cardiac system—a root cause of cardiac disease including heart attack and stroke leading to premature death. PM exposure is linked to low birth weight, premature birth, chronic airway obstruction and sudden infant death NOx decreases lung function and is associated with respiratory disease in children. Converts to ozone and acidic PM particles in the atmosphere Rapid shallow breathing, airway irritation, coughing, wheezing, shortness of breath. Worsens asthma. May be related to premature birth, cardiac birth defects, low birth weight, and stunted lung growth

Health impact

Table 4.1  Health effects of air pollutants from coal-fired power plants

Children, elderly people with asthma or other respiratory disease

Elderly, children, people with asthma

Elderly, children, people with asthma

Children and adults with asthma or other respiratory disease

Most vulnerable population

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The problem is not confined to North America. Analysis of coal-fired power plants in Europe found that their 2013 emissions caused almost 23,000 deaths, tens of thousands of illnesses from heart disease to bronchitis and over 60 billion euros in health costs. This is the cost of pollution that the polluter never pays. The worst offender is Poland, followed by Germany, Romania, Bulgaria and the UK.23 A report in 2017 confirmed that coal-fired power plants in Europe were responsible for the largest releases of carbon dioxide, sulphur dioxide, and nitrogen oxides to the environment.24 Apart from the air pollution, there’s the ash. You can’t burn coal without producing ash. Coal ash is the waste that is left behind after coal is combusted in a coalfired power plant. It includes fly ash, captured from smokestack effluents, and coarser ash from the furnaces. The ash typically contains a slew of heavy metals including arsenic, lead, mercury, cadmium, chromium and selenium—all metals that are extremely toxic. Coal ash from power plants is generally dumped either into dry landfills or into wet surface impoundments. In the US, there are approximately 2000 coal ash dump sites across the country. In 2007, roughly 140 million tons of coal ash was generated annually from power plants. Coal ash is the second largest industrial waste stream in the US—second only to mine wastes.25 Wet ash ponds are just as liable to fail as the impoundments and tailing ponds at the coal mines themselves. The most notorious incident occurred in December 2008 when an earthen wall holding back a large coal ash disposal pond at the coal-fired power plant in Kingston, Tennessee, failed catastrophically. The 16 hectare pond spilled more than 1 billion gallons of coal ash slurry into the adjacent river valley, covering about 1200 hectares of land with a thick, viscous, toxic sludge. The spill destroyed three homes, damaged several others, and contaminated the Emory and Clinch rivers. When the EPA tested water samples after the spill, they found toxic heavy metals including arsenic—which they measured at 149 times the allowable standard for drinking water. The water also contained lead, thallium, ­barium, cadmium, chromium, mercury and nickel.26 It took workers a year to clean up the mess—during which time they could not avoid breathing in the toxic coal ash dust. Coal ash dust is highly toxic—many of those workers subsequently became ill. The contaminated area was finally designated a Superfund site by the US Environmental Protection Agency.27

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Under a 2015 US EPA coal ash rule, all US electric generating utilities were required to analyse groundwater pollution at each of their operating coal ash dumps by the end of January 2018 and publish their results one month later. Initial results show that a majority of the coal ash pits are leaking polluted water into groundwater.28 But there’s one other dangerous pollutant that is widespread in the environment, present in the human tissue of practically every man and woman on the planet, and whose toxic neurological effects are mainly due to the burning of coal.

Mercury Elemental mercury and mercury compounds occur naturally in geologic hydrocarbons including coal, natural gas, gas condensates, and crude oil. Coal contains trace amounts of mercury in the form of mercuric sulphate (HgS—known as cinnabar29). When the coal is burned, it is released into the environment as mercury vapor.30 Mercury is extremely toxic. It is considered by the World Health Organisation as one of the top ten chemicals or groups of chemicals of major public health concern. Mercury moves around the world in three key ways. First, it is actively traded as a global commodity, often for uses like artisanal and small-scale gold mining—where substantial mercury releases into the environment are routine. Second, airborne mercury, carried in the air pollution caused by the combustion of coal, is dissipated over very wide areas before being deposited on land and on water. Third, once mercury enters a river or ocean, natural bacteria can absorb it and convert it to a more toxic form: methylmercury. Methylmercury accumulates in fish and shellfish. Large predatory fish are more likely to have high levels of mercury as a result of eating smaller fish that have acquired mercury through the ingestion of plankton. Predatory fish at the top of the aquatic food chain may accumulate levels of methylmercury as high as 1 part per million. The mercury ‘bio-accumulates’ as it moves up the food chain. It also gets more concentrated—so larger predatory fish have higher concentrations of mercury in their tissue than smaller fish further down the food chain. Global emissions are running at somewhere between 5000 and 8000 tonnes a year—the exact figure seems to be unclear. Although emissions from coal fired power plants have declined in North America and many

154     M. J. Bush

western European countries due to much-improved emission control technologies, globally, emission are on the rise. In 2018, UN agencies reported that global emissions had risen 20% between 2010 and 2015.31 In the US, mercury emissions in 2014 were about 55 tons, with coal-fired units responsible for about 42% of the total.32 That figure may be declining as coal fired power plants are gradually shut down—but the story is different in Poland. A Polish newspaper reported in June 2018 that emissions of mercury from coal power plants had jumped a whopping 87% in just one year. European data showed that that mercury pollution from the giant Belchatow power plant in central Poland was 18 times higher in 2016 than in the previous year.33 Airborne mercury is a global traveller. Once in the air it can remain for up to a year and travel long distances. In Canada, 97% of mercury deposited on Canadian landscapes, roughly 47 tonnes a year, comes from other countries—mainly from Asia. The highest rate of deposition is in the Canadian Arctic—where almost 9 tonnes/year of airborne mercury settles each year— where it is gradually absorbed into natural ecosystems, marine environments—and fish.34 Two groups of people are more sensitive to the effects of mercury. Foetuses are most susceptible to the adverse developmental effects of the element. Methylmercury exposure in the womb can result from the mother’s consumption of fish and shellfish. It can adversely affect a baby’s growing brain and nervous system. The primary health effect of methylmercury is impaired neurological development. Cognitive thinking, memory, attention, language, and fine motor and visual spatial skills may be affected in children who were exposed to methylmercury as foetuses.35 The second group is people who are regularly exposed to high levels of mercury—such as populations that rely on subsistence fishing. According to the World Health Organisation, among selected subsistence fishing populations, between 1.5 and 17 in 1000 children showed cognitive impairment and mild mental retardation caused by the consumption of fish containing mercury. These children were in populations in Brazil, Canada, China, Columbia, and Greenland.36 Figure 4.2 shows how mercury moves through the environment and eventually into the human body.37 In the US, a nationwide study of blood samples in 1999–2000 showed that more than 15% of women of childbearing age had blood mercury levels that would cause them to give birth to children with mercury levels exceeding the EPA’s maximum acceptable dose for the element. This dose was established to limit the number of children with mercury-related neurological and developmental impairments. Researchers have estimated that as

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Fig. 4.2  The mercury cycle (Source Physicians for Social Responsibility [USA])

many as 630,000 children are born in the US each year with blood mercury levels high enough to impair performance on neurodevelopmental tests and cause lifelong loss of intelligence.38

The Minamata Convention The Minamata Convention on Mercury entered in force in 2017. Signed by 128 countries and ratified by 100 countries and the European Union, the Convention takes its name from the most severe mercury poisoning disaster in history, which came to light in Minamata, Japan, in May 1956, after sustained dumping of industrial wastewaters into Minamata Bay, beginning in the 1930s. Local villagers who ate fish and shellfish from the bay started suffering convulsions, psychosis, loss of consciousness and coma. In all, thousands of people were certified as having directly suffered from mercury poisoning, now known as Minamata disease. Both Canada and the US are signatories to the convention.

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The convention requires parties to apply best available technology to curb mercury emissions from new fossil-fuel power plants. Coal-fired power plants are the worst offenders in terms of mercury emissions. However, the convention does not apply to existing coal-fired power plants, which are likely to have older equipment and higher pollution levels. And in spite of the rapid penetration of utility-scale solar power and wind energy, globally, coal is still the predominant fuel for power generation. Moreover, the Minamata convention does not set any limit on the number of new coal-fired power plant that a party can construct. Even with best available technology, mercury emissions from coal-fired power plants are not completely eliminated, which means that emissions of mercury are likely to rise even when control technology is installed—as long as coal continues to be used to generate electricity. In November 2018, as the second meeting of the Conference of Parties was getting underway in Geneva, it was reported that global emissions of mercury had risen by 20% from 2010 to 2015. An estimated 15 million miners are exposed to mercury through its use in artisanal and small-scale gold mining in over 70 countries.39 Mercury vapour can be removed from coal fired power plants using a variety of pollution control technologies—but not completely. The mercury that is removed is then deposited in the solid waste products from the power plant. Impoundments, slag heaps, tailing ponds, and tips are never permanent repositories of toxic pollutants. Once coal is mined and burned, one way or another, the mercury will find its way into the environment—and eventually into the food chain.

Petroleum Coal may have fuelled the industrial revolution, but the steam engine was a heavy and inefficient machine that mostly powered stationary engines. Only very large forms of transport: railway locomotives and ships could support the heavy boilers and the reciprocating machinery on a platform that could actually move and carry passengers. And you had to bring your own coal. Passengers arriving at Paddington railway station in London in the mid-nineteenth century would exit the station and hail a cab pulled by a horse. Or maybe an omnibus—a horse-drawn carriage that seated about 20 passengers. In 1900, there were over 11,000 hansom cabs on the streets of London, and several thousand horse-drawn omnibuses each needing the services of 12 horses a day. About 50,000 horses were transporting people

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around the city. New York had even more horses than London—100,000 of them, producing over 1000 tons of manure a day.40 This was the age of horsepower. But all that changed with the invention of the internal combustion engine. Its adoption was swift, and the subsequent growth of the a­ utomobile industry was phenomenal. In America, registrations for automobiles rose from 8000 in 1900 to 902,000 in 1912.41 By 1918 half of all cars in America were Ford Model Ts. And they all ran on gasoline. Oil was also powering ships—led in part by the British Navy, which famously converted their warships from coal to oil in 1912 under Winston Churchill when he was First Lord of the Admiralty. The age of petroleum was well and truly underway. But fossil fuels all have one enormous and damaging drawback. They have to be conveyed from where they are found and brought to the surface, to where they are processed and then distributed for sale and use. This is especially true in the case of oil and natural gas where a huge seemingly chaotic network of pipes and pipelines moves oil, petroleum products, and natural gas across countries and continents around the globe. This is in stark contrast to renewable energy where, if it’s not on your rooftop like solar photovoltaic energy, it’s generating electricity in a place where that power is brought to you by a distribution network linked to high-voltage electrical transmission lines. These transmission lines can be very long and extensive, but unlike oil and gas pipelines, oil trains, and supertankers, they don’t leak, spill, crash, sink, or explode. Electricity is certainly dangerous—but its transmission doesn’t foul and pollute the environment, and if it’s generated from renewable sources of energy, its use for power has the game-changing advantage that it doesn’t produce greenhouses gases. Moving large quantities of oil, natural gas, and petroleum products across countries and around the globe is inherently risky. It is simply impossible to avoid accidents. Some accidents are minor—small quantities of petroleum products or natural gas that leak slowly from a pipeline; others are large, spectacular, and often catastrophic. Petroleum also has more moving parts than coal. There is first the production of crude oil, which if offshore is dangerous work and where there have been a number of horrific accidents and monumental spills. The Deepwater Horizon drilling platform explosion in 2010 that allowed 210 million gallons of crude oil to pour into the Gulf of Mexico 66 km from the Louisiana coast being the largest of them.

158     M. J. Bush Table 4.2  The worst oil tanker accidents since 1967 Tanker name

Year of accident

Location

Quantity oil spilled (tonnes)

Atlantic Empress ABT Summer Castillo de Bellver Amoco Cadiz Haven Sanchi Odyssey Torrey Canyon Sea Star Exxon Valdez

1979 1991 1983 1978 1991 2018 1988 1967 1972 1989

287,000 260,000 252,000 227,000 144,000 136,000 132,000 119,000 115,000 104,000

Irenes Serenade

1980

Trinidad, Caribbean Angola South Africa France, Brittany Mediterranean East China Sea Atlantic Canada British Isles Iran, Gul of Oman Prince William Sound, Alaska Greece, Pylos

100,000

Source Wikipedia

Then there is the conveyance of the crude oil to a refinery where, if an oil train is employed, there have been several horrendous accidents—the catastrophic derailment and explosion in 2015 at Lac Megantic in Quebec in which 47 people were killed, being by far the worst. If the oil is transported by sea in oil tankers, the risks are low, but the impact of an accident is usually catastrophic. The worst disasters of tankers that broke apart and discharged over 100,000 tonnes of oil and petroleum products into the sea are shown in Table 4.2. These are just the big ones. During the last 60 years there have been at least 83 serious tanker accidents and shipwrecks that have spilled around 2.26 million tonnes of oil and petroleum liquids into the oceans.42 On the north American mainland, Canada and the US are crisscrossed with an extensive network of pipelines that carry large quantities of liquid petroleum products including crude oil and refined products such as gasoline, diesel fuel, and natural gas liquids. The US has the world’s largest pipeline network: more than 320,000 km of pipelines carrying liquids, over 480,000 km of gas transmission lines, and more than 3.3 million km of gas distribution pipelines. Pipelines ought to be a lot safer than tankers and trains, but accidents still happen—it’s inherent in a fossil fuel supply system that needs to constantly move large quantities of flammable liquids and gases under pressure and over long distances. Figure 4.3 shows the number of pipeline incidents that occurred in the US from 1997 to 2016. Since 2002, when for some reason the number of accidents almost doubled, pipeline incidents have been running at almost 600 a year.

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Fig. 4.3  Number of pipeline incidents from 1999 to 2018 (Source US Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration [See the US Pipeline and hazardous materials safety administration website: https://hip.phmsa.dot.gov/analyticsSOAP/saw. dll?Portalpages])

Tucked away in the data for the year 2010 is the largest inland oil spill in US history. The spill occurred when a pipeline managed by the Canadian energy firm Enbridge carrying diluted bitumen from the Alberta tar sands ruptured, sending over 800,000 gallons of ‘dilbit’ into the Kalamazoo River near the town of Marshall, Indiana. The heavy oil spill flowed for 17 hours before Enbridge finally shut down the pipeline. The diluted bitumen contaminated 40 miles of the river, fouling over 4000 acres of riverside land. In 2016, the cost of the clean-up of the contaminated stretch of the Kalamazoo river was estimated at $1.21 billion.43 Canadian pipelines appear to be somewhat safer than US pipelines (although the network is smaller). Figure 4.4 shows the number of incidents reported to Canada’s National Energy Board (NEB). The 10-year average is 108 incidents a year.44 Some major Canadian pipelines seem particularly prone to spills. For instance, from 1961 to 2013, 81 oil spills from the Trans Mountain Pipeline were reported to the NEB. Data obtained in 2013 on the number of pipeline incidents regulated by the province of Alberta (and so not reported to the NEB) found that there were over 28,000 crude oil spills from 1975 to 2012—roughly two spills a day over 37 years.45

Offshore Disasters The Deepwater Horizon explosion, catastrophic fire, and subsequent leak of millions of gallons of crude oil into the Gulf of Mexico 80 km from the

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Louisiana coast was just the most spectacular and disastrous of recent offshore oil rig accidents. There have been many more. Table 4.3 lists some of the more recent accidents.46

Fig. 4.4  Number of incidents reported to the NEB in Canada (Source National Energy Board, Canada)

Table 4.3  The worst offshore oil rig disasters 1969

1979

1979

1980

1982

In January 1969, Union Oil began drilling a fifth well on their Platform A about five miles off the coast of Santa Barbara, California. On January 28, the well blew, leaking oil and gas. Then a second blowout occurred on February 24. Clean up efforts were rudimentary at the time, and the pollution of California’s coastline was severe Mexico’s Pemex was working on the Ixtox I, an exploratory well 62 miles off the coast of Campeche when on June 3 the well blew spewing 30,000 barrels of oil into the gulf each day. The spill was not contained until March 1980 The Bohai 2 oil rig was being towed in the Gulf of Bohai off the coast of China in November when a storm damaged the rig and it capsized and sank. Of the 76 crewmembers, 72 died in the accident In March 1980, a severe storm and high seas capsized the Alexander L. Kiellend semi-submersible drilling rig in the North Sea. One hundred and twenty three of the 212 men on board were killed Mobil Oil’s Ocean Ranger semi-submersible drilling rig was drilling 166 miles off the coast of Newfoundland when it was hit by a violent storm early on February 15. The crew abandoned the rig, but several lifeboats malfunctioned. The rig finally sank, and 84 crewmembers drowned (continued)

4  Carbon Chaos     161 Table 4.3  (continued) 1983

1984

1988 1988

1989

2001

2005

2007

2009

2010

2010

2012

2015 2015

In October, the Glomar Java Sea drilling ship operating in the South China Sea was capsized and wrecked by tropical storm Lex. Among the 81 crew, there were no survivors Petrobas’ Enchova drilling platform operating in the Campos basin near Rio de Janeiro experienced a blowout followed by an explosion on August 16. During the evacuation of the platform, 42 workers died In April, the same platform suffered a gas blowout. The gas ignited, and the resulting fire burned for 31 days. This time there were no casualties Piper Alpha was one of the largest offshore platforms in the UK—at one time producing 300,000 barrels a day of crude oil and gas. On July 6, a gas leak from one of the condensate pipes ignited causing several explosions on the rig. The entire platform was destroyed in the resulting fire—which took three weeks to control; 167 people lost their lives. In terms of fatalities, the loss of the Piper Alpha was the worst offshore oil rig disaster in history In November 1989, typhoon Gay battered the Seacrest drilling ship operating in the Gulf of Thailand. The ship capsized and eventually sank killing 91 of the 97 crewmembers Petrobas’ P-36 oil drilling platform experienced back-to-back explosions that killed 11 of the 175 workers. The platform started to list and then eventually sank five days later In July of that year, a support vessel crashed into the Mumbai High North platform causing an explosion and huge fire. The platform was destroyed and 22 of the 384 workers on board were killed On October 23, the Usumacinta Jack-up was positioned alongside the Kab101 platform when a storm caused damage that leaked oil and gas which soon ignited. Twenty-two workers were killed Seadrill’s West Atlas rig in the Timor Sea began leaking oil in August of that year. All the workers were evacuated but the oil slick spread over 2300 square miles of ocean. The leak was not plugged for months In April, a blowout occurred on BPs huge rig, the Deepwater Horizon, operating off the coast of Louisiana in the Gulf of Mexico. The platform burned for 36 h before sinking. Eleven crewmembers died and many more were seriously injured. Over the next three months, about 4 million barrels of crude oil spewed into the sea. Environmental damage was massive, widespread, and long lasting. BP eventually paid damages of close to 20 billion dollars Also in the Gulf of Mexico and just a few months later, Mariner Energy’s Vermillion Oil Rig 380 exploded and burned. All the crewmembers were rescued Operating just six miles off the coast Nigeria, Chevron Nigeria’s rig experienced an explosion and fire in January 2012. Several crewmembers were killed. The environmental impact was never fully investigated or reported Another Petrobas oil rig exploded off the Brazilian coast—killing five workers and injuring more than 25 others A fire broke out in a subsea pipeline of the Gunashli oil field in Azerbaijan that quickly spread to multiple wells. Ten workers were killed, 20 were missing, and nine were seriously injured

Source Offshore Technology

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The Macondo Well Disaster On April 20, 2010, operations were underway on the Deepwater Horizon drilling rig which was stationed about 80 km from the coast of Louisiana in the Gulf of Mexico. BP was the main operator and lease holder responsible for the design of the well; Transocean was the drilling contractor that owned and operated the platform. On the day of the accident, the crew was completing temporary abandonment of the well so it could be left in a safe condition until a production unit could return later to extract the oil and gas. The abandonment work was supposed to plug the well. But a cement barrier intended to seal the oil and gas had not been correctly installed at the bottom of the well. Personnel misinterpreted the results of a test to assess the integrity of the cement plug, leading them to believe that the well had been properly sealed. It was not. The crew started to remove drilling mud from the well in preparation for the installation of an additional cement barrier. At the base of the well on the seabed was a blowout preventer, called the BOP. The BOP was designed to shut and close the well automatically in the event of a blowout. Removing the drilling mud after the pressure test allowed oil and gas to flow past the failed cement barrier up to the rig. This flow continued for almost an hour and was not immediately detected by the crew. The BOP did not activate. Eventually, the oil and gas blew out onto the rig. The crew acted immediately to manually close the blowout preventer. But oil and gas had already flowed past the BOP and continued to gush onto the rig, finally igniting and then exploding. An automatic emergency response system designed to shear drill pipe passing through the BOP and seal the well did not activate successfully. Eleven crewmembers were killed by the explosions and 17 more were seriously injured. The fire was catastrophic, and after burning fiercely for 36 hours the drilling rig toppled over and sank. Figure 4.5 captures the catastrophic scale of the explosion and fire.47 The oil spill was the largest offshore spill in US history. Unconstrained by the blowout protector, crude oil continued to flow from the well for 87 days before the well was finally closed. Over 130 million gallons of crude oil spewed into the waters of the Gulf of Mexico fouling 1300 miles of shoreline along five states.48 The northern Gulf coast is home to 22 species of marine mammals, including manatees in coastal seagrasses, and dolphins and whales in estuarine, nearshore, and offshore habitats—all of which were contaminated with oil. The disaster contributed to the largest and longest marine mammal

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Fig. 4.5  The Deepwater Horizon oil rig on fire in the Gulf of Mexico (Source US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board)

mortality event ever recorded in the Gulf of Mexico. For instance, ­bottlenose dolphins exhibited reduced survival and reproductive success in the years following the spill, leading to a 50% decline in the population.49

Oil Refineries One part of the petroleum supply system that doesn’t always get looked at closely is the oil refinery itself—which is a complex petrochemical plant processing large quantities of crude oil. Accidents are infrequent in large petrochemical plants, but oil refineries produce considerable amounts of air pollution and toxic waste. Large petrochemical plants and oil refineries process liquid and gas-phase hydrocarbons at high temperatures and pressures. Leaks are inevitable—and frequent. In the US, Canada, and Europe, oil refineries are strictly regulated, but it is technically impossible to reduce emissions to zero. In the USA, in 2015 the petroleum industry, primarily the refineries, released more toxic emissions than the electric utilities sector.50

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A typical refinery generates approximately 10–15 gallons of wastewater for every barrel of oil processed. This wastewater is treated on site so that the final effluent meets regulatory standards. But removing the solids and suspended material from wastewater produces a secondary solid waste stream. Slurry waste from refineries include tank bottoms, slop oil, spent catalysts, filter cake from water treatment, and numerous other solid or sludge wastes.51 There is no other place to put them but in a holding pond on site. But it’s the air pollution that most affects communities close to the refineries. In 2015, there were reportedly 142 large refineries in the US and about 6 million people living within 3 miles of them.52 The main compounds released to the air from refineries are called Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs)—consisting mostly of benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene, and xylene—all of which are considered to be carcinogenic to some degree, particularly benzene. Then there is particulate matter, nitrogen oxides, carbon monoxide, hydrogen sulphide, and sulphur dioxide—all of which are noxious air pollutants with a significant impact on human health. Every refinery has a different emissions profile so precise data on individual refinery emissions are hard to come by. In Canada, the 17 refineries operating in 2013 reportedly emitted on average 430 tonnes of VOCs. But one refinery, the 130,000 bbl./day Co-op refinery in Regina released 4229 tonnes of VOCs in the same year—almost 10 times more than the average.53 In recent years there has been an increasing focus on environmental justice—the recognition that the health impacts of the pollution produced by chemical and petrochemical plants fall disproportionately on poor communities—which, in the USA, are very often communities of colour. As an example, take the case of the city of Port Arthur in Texas. The city is home to two large oil refineries: the Motiva refinery in the northeast (the largest oil refinery in America), and the Valero refinery to the west, with a combined throughput capacity of more than 900,000 bbl./day. The Valero refinery borders west Port Arthur, a predominantly Afro-American community with several complexes of low-income public housing that are located right on the refinery fence. Like all oil refineries, the petrochemical plant pollutes the air with emissions of carcinogenic VOCs such as benzene; as well as carbon monoxide and sulphur dioxide. The EPA ranks Jefferson county among the worst nationally for emissions known to cause cancer, birth defects, and reproductive disorders—and Port Arthur is near the top of the list of offending cities.54 The Manchester neighbourhood adjacent to the

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Valero refinery has been called the most polluted community in the entire US.55 It is notoriously hard to prove cause (pollution) and effect (health impacts) in these circumstances. But anyone who has been in the vicinity of an oil refinery knows the smell. There’s no mistaking it. The smell comes from the vaporous organic chemicals tinged with a dash of sulphur; the burning sensation in the nose and throat comes from the sulphur dioxide; and the asthma attack is triggered by the ozone. Although oil refinery fires and explosions are infrequent, when they occur, they are often catastrophic. In June 2019, a fire broke out in the Philadelphia Energy Solutions Refining Complex, a large crude oil refinery on the east coast of the US. The resulting explosions sent a fireball high into the night sky and rocked buildings for miles around. Four people were injured but all survived. This was reportedly the second fire in the refinery that year.56 Refinery fires always produce large emissions of a toxic slew of hydrocarbon vapours, black carbon, and VOCs. These emissions may be of short duration, but nearby communities are hugely exposed to the health impacts of these chemicals. In the case of the Philadelphia explosions, an alkylation unit using hydrofluoric acid was destroyed. This chemical is extremely toxic and corrosive and was almost certainly released as hydrogen fluoride gas during and after the explosion. It’s not just the combustion of coal that releases mercury into the atmosphere and into the food chain. Although petroleum contains less mercury than coal, it is still a fossil fuel, and all fossil fuels contain mercury. Perhaps unsurprisingly, petrochemical plants like oil refineries may have serious technical difficulties when disrupted by extreme weather. In August 2017, Hurricane Harvey flooded several chemical plants and oil refineries in the Houston area, and as the refineries shut down or went to a standby status, one result was the emergency release of excess amounts of gaseous hydrocarbons as engineers struggled to cope with the situation. As the operation switched to a circulation mode, the Motiva refinery was forced to flare hydrocarbon gases that could not be stored.57 At about the same time, the Arkema chemical plant in Crosby lost power and could not continue to refrigerate highly flammable chemicals that eventually exploded and caused a fire that burned for days. The town of Crosby was evacuated because of the risk of further explosions, and because the smoke from the fire was extremely toxic—as it always is from any fire in a chemical plant or oil refinery.

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During the same storm, the ExxonMobil refinery in Baytown was damaged and reportedly released pollutants, and two storage tanks holding crude oil burst into flames outside of Port Arthur after lightning struck the Karbuhn Oil Company facility.58 Over in Manchester, the Valero refinery leaked benzene and other volatile hydrocarbons into the air when a storage tank’s roof failed. According to one report, the power was out and the weather was sweltering hot, so many residents kept their windows and doors open increasing their exposure to the carcinogenic vapours.59 In Galena Park, a tank farm run by Magellan Midstream Partners was initially reported to the Coast Guard as having leaked 42,000 gallons of gasoline. Eleven days later, Magellan reported that the leak was 10 times larger: the amount of gasoline spilled was closer to 460,000 gallons.60 None of these incidents in the Houston area was considered by the authorities to be particularly severe, and all were finally brought under control. But these events highlight the fact that large chemical plants and oil refineries are highly vulnerable to extreme weather. Everyone knew that Hurricane Harvey was coming. Torrential rain had been forecast and preparations made. But shutting down an oil refinery is complicated. It was unavoidable that some hydrocarbon liquids and gases would need to be released into the environment. But by far the worst damage to petrochemical plants and oil refineries was caused by Hurricane Katrina in 2005. This hurricane was the most destructive natural disaster in US history. The hurricane caused at least ten oil spills from refineries and other petrochemical plants, releasing the same quantity of oil as some of the worst oil spills in US history. In total, more than 7.4 million gallons of oil and petroleum poured into local waterways.61

Oil Sands Canada’s oil sands resources exist in three major deposits in Alberta: Athabasca, Cold Lake, and Peace River. The oil sands are the third largest oil reserves in the world after Venezuela and Saudi Arabia: in 2016 the remaining proven reserves were estimated at 165.4 billion barrels. That’s more than three times the total proven oil reserves located in the USA. The oil sands underlie about 142,000 km2 of land, but only about 3% of this area, roughly 4800 km2 can be mined—the remaining oil sands are too

4  Carbon Chaos     167

deep. Production in 2016 was running at about 2.5 million barrels a day,62 and expected to rise to 3 million barrels a day before the end of 2018.63 The oil sands are a naturally occurring mixture of sand, clay or other minerals, water and bitumen—a heavy and extremely viscous oil which is more like tar. The Athabasca deposit, the largest, is mined from the surface. Most other bitumen is produced in situ—meaning drilling down to the bitumen, treating it to reduce its viscosity, and then pumping it up to the surface. Surface mining results in very substantial amounts of tailings. In a real sense, this form of oil sands extraction is more like a coal mine that an oil drilling platform. The mammoth size of the oil sands tailing ponds exceeds the size of any other tailing ponds or impoundments anywhere on the planet. The largest impoundment—the Mildred Lake settling basin, is reportedly the world’s largest dam in terms of the volume of material used for its construction. In 2017, there were 20 oil sands tailing ponds in northern Alberta holding approximately 340 billion gallons of toxic wastewater.64 The total area of tailing ponds in 2017 was estimated as 220 square kilometres.65 The ponds hold water, clay, sand and residual bitumen. The sand slowly settles and the surface water evaporates, but the layer in between, called the Mature Fine Tailings (MTF), is like a gel. It stays put and resists drying—for decades. It can take more than 30 years for the MTF layer to solidify sufficiently for the land to be restored.66 Every year, an estimated 200,000 birds land in the vicinity of the oil sands mining areas including the tailing ponds. In 2009, 1600 ducks died after landing on a Syncrude tailing pond—leading to a record fine of $3 million. So to scare away the birds, the companies deck out the tailing ponds with bird cannons, equipment that produces radar-activated shrieks that mimic attacking falcons, and scarecrows perched above the surface. The oil sands companies are required by law to restore the land after they move out—a requirement that is estimated to cost as much as $130 billion. The companies are now trying out a least-cost clean-up approach called water capping. The tailings slurry is pumped into a mined-out pit and covered with fresh water from a nearby river or reservoir. The idea is that the toxic tailings settle to the bottom of the newly created lake, and over time it becomes a healthy ecosystem capable of supporting fish, aquatic plants and wildlife. That’s the plan.

168     M. J. Bush

Water capping is relatively cheap—which is why it is favoured by the oil sands companies. Since 2016 four companies have informed the Alberta Energy Regulator (AER) that they intend to use water capping—despite the fact that the AER has not yet approved the technology. Eight water-capped lakes storing tailings have been proposed. Some scientists regard the concept as a fantasy, while others say that water capping may at least stabilise the tailing and make them less hazardous to birds and other wildlife—but this may take years, and no-one is really sure if the technique is going to work.67 None of these lakes is going to be leak proof. Seepage is slow but continuous and will eventually contaminate groundwater. Findings from a 2014 study by Environment Canada scientists indicated that oilsands-tainted groundwater was likely reaching the Athabasca river. The impact on the livelihoods of local indigenous communities has been severe. A member of the Fort McMurray First Nation is quoted as saying “We used to eat fish all the time, but nobody does that anymore”. Trappers are afraid to eat the animals they catch, fearing that the wildlife may have drunk contaminated water.68

Steam Assisted Gravity Drainage The in situ SAGD process was developed in the 1980s at a time when directional drilling technology was becoming employed in north America. In an SAGD installation, two horizontal wells are drilled in the oil sands, one very near the bottom of the formation and the other about five meters above it. These wells are typically drilled in groups from a central pad and can extend horizontally for up 1000 meters in any direction. In each well pair, steam is injected into the upper well and the heated bitumen will start to drain downwards to the lower well where it is pumped to the surface. SAGD has high production rates and recovers more than 60% of the oil in place. Most major Canadian companies now have SAGD projects in production or under development.

Cyclic Steam Stimulation This cyclic procedure, often called “huff-and-puff” has been employed by Imperial Oil at Cold Lake since the 1980s. The well is put through cycles of steam injection, soak, and production. First steam is injected into a well at a temperature of about 340 °C for a period of months. Then the well

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is allowed to sit to permit the heat to ‘soak’ into the formation. After this phase, the hot oil is pumped out of the well for a period of months. Once the production rate falls off, the well is put through another cycle of injection soak and production. The CSS method is capable of achieving recovery rates of around 20 to 25%.69 There is also a solvent process—where hydrocarbon solvents are injected into the upper well to dilute the bitumen and allow it to flow down to the lower well. In situ production has the significant advantage that the waste tailings stream is smaller than with surface mining. But in 2016, fully half of the oil sands production was from surface mining—which requires huge tailing ponds. Apart from the solvent process, the in situ production processes that allows deeper deposits of oil to be pumped to the surface require steam— which is generated by burning natural gas. The amount of greenhouse gases produced during the extraction and processing of the bitumen is therefore substantially greater than emissions from more conventional oil production. Figure 4.6 shows the CO2 emissions associated with the extraction and processing of several types of crude oil produced in North America.70 But it’s not only greenhouse gases are emitted from the oil sands sites. A 2016 study led by Environment Canada found that the: “evaporation and atmospheric oxidation of low-volatility organic vapours from the mined oil sands material is directly responsible for the majority of the observed secondary organic aerosol mass. The resultant production rates of 45–84 tonnes per day make the oil sands one of the largest sources of anthropogenic secondary organic aerosols in North America.”71 ŵŝƐƐŝŽŶŝŶƚĞŶƐŝƚLJ͕ŬŐKϮͬďĂƌƌĞů ĂŶĂĚĂŽŝůƐĂŶĚƐ h^ůĂƐŬĂEŽƌƚŚ^ůŽƉĞ h^ĂŬŬĞŶ;ǁŝƚŚŇĂƌŝŶŐͿ DĞdžŝĐŽĂŶƚĂƌĞůů hƐdĞdžĂƐĂŐůĞ&ŽƌĚůĂĐŬK/>ŽŶĞ h^ĂŬŬĞŶ;ŶŽŇĂƌŝŶŐͿ Ϭ

ϱϬ

ϭϬϬ

ϭϱϬ

ϮϬϬ

Fig. 4.6  Emissions of CO2 from the extraction and processing of crude oil (Source Pembina Institute, Canada)

170     M. J. Bush

Oil sands are of course a fossil fuel, and where there’s fossil fuels there’s always mercury. A study in 2014 measured mercury in the spring-time snowpack in the region of the oil sands. The authors concluded: Total mercury loads were predominantly particulate-bound… and increased with proximity to major developments. Methylmercury loads increased in a similar fashion…suggesting that oil sands developments are a direct source of methylmercury to local landscapes and water bodies.72

Petcoke In May 2013, media outlets around Detroit, Michigan, began publishing articles about large piles of petroleum coke stored along the Detroit riverfront. Called petcoke, it is a black solid composed mainly of carbon with traces of sulphur, metals, and non-volatile organic compounds. The coke piled up in Detroit was a by-product of the nearby Marathon refinery—which was processing heavy crude oils derived in part from Canadian oil sands. The large piles of black coke, which were clearly visible from across the river in Windsor, Ontario, triggered local concerns over the potential impact of the material on human health. Petcoke is a by-product of the refining of heavy oils and bitumen. High in carbon but low in hydrogen, it is the final product of thermal decomposition in the condensation process in hydrocarbon cracking. It has commercial value because, being mainly carbon, it has a higher heating value than coal, and is marketed as a fuel or as catalyst coke. Many US oil refineries have installed coking equipment in order to take advantage of increased supplies of heavy crude oil from the Athabasca oil sands.73 Petcoke is priced at a discount with respect to coal on commercial markets, and so replaces coal in many industrial applications. However, petcoke produces more carbon dioxide than coal when burned. In terms of CO2 emissions, it’s a dirtier fuel than coal. So to recap. The exploitation of the Alberta oil sands: – requires huge tailing ponds, including the largest in North America – generates the highest greenhouse gas emissions per barrel of oil – is responsible for one of the largest sources of organic aerosols in North America – leads to widespread local methylmercury pollution—a well-known neurotoxin.

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The massive environmental impact caused by the exploitation and development of the Alberta oil sands is quite unlike anything else on the planet.

Hydraulic Fracturing Natural gas is increasingly being produced by a technology called hydraulic fracturing, or fracking. The technology is particularly widespread in the USA and Canada where very large quantities of natural gas from shale formations are now produced using this technology. Approximately 1 million wells have been hydraulically fractured since the technique was first developed in the late 1940s.74 In 2016, roughly three-quarters of a million wells were producing natural gas in Canada and the USA—about 200,000 in Canada and 550,000 in the USA. Not all these wells would have been fracked. But increasingly, natural gas is being produced from shale and ‘tight’ reservoirs that require hydraulic fracking to release the gas.75 Shale gas has been produced for decades from geological formations with natural fractures that allowed economic recovery from shallow vertical wells producing at low rates over a long period of time. But improvements in technology and higher gas prices have enabled the large-scale production of much deeper shale gas reservoirs. Fracking in shale formations was pioneered in the Texas Barnett Shale in the late 1990s when two different technologies: horizontal drilling and multi-stage hydraulic fracturing were combined. The gas well is drilled vertically from the surface and is then bent or kicked at a certain depth to penetrate the shale gas layer horizontally. This allows the wellbore to intersect a much greater part of the reservoir as well as a greater number of existing natural fractures. The horizontal part of the well varies in length but may extend out to as much as 3 km from the wellhead. Multi-stage fracturing involves injecting a fluid: usually water plus chemicals and proppants (which ‘prop open’ the fractures) at extremely high pressure into a shale formation in a number of places (stages) along the wellbore. This fractures the rock and creates a network of open fractures through which the gas can flow and be collected. Figure 4.7 shows a schematic of a shale gas well, illustrating the various geological strata through which a well is drilled, and the relative depth at which hydraulic fracturing occurs. Lateral sections (the horizontal part of

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Fig. 4.7  Schematic of shale gas well (Source Canadian Society for Unconventional Resources)

the well) are generally much longer than shown. The inset shows the casings (the steel tubing) that are inserted into the well and cemented into place.76 Horizontal drilling and multi-stage hydraulic fracturing are not new or unique to shale gas development. Horizontal drilling has been used in Canada since the 1980s, primarily to increase heavy oil production, and hydraulic fracturing has been used extensively since the 1950s. What is new is the combination of these technologies: the use of greater amounts of water, sand and chemicals; and the higher injection rates and pressures employed to fracture a much larger volume of rock.

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The scale of the development is also what differentiates shale gas development from conventional gas production. Although both conventional and shale gas development require the construction of well pads, work camps, roads, and pipelines—shale gas development requires more of these activities. Even with multi-well pads, shale gas development will generally lead to more pads being built and more wells being drilled than would be needed to produce the same volume of gas from conventional gas reserves in high-permeability reservoirs.77 Natural gas burns more cleanly than coal or fuel oil. But hydraulic fracturing, like all fossil fuel exploration, mining, and production systems, has a very substantial environmental impact. First, there is the environmental impact of hydraulic fracturing on surface and groundwater resources due to pollution by wastewater, the chemicals used in the injection process, and gas leakage from the wells. Secondly, there are significant emissions of methane from the wellhead and gas processing sites; and thirdly, the localized collection and pumping of the gas to its processing site (the ‘gathering’ pipeline network) carries substantial risks.

Water Usage The hydraulic fracturing water cycle can be broken out into five distinct stages78: • Water acquisition: the withdrawal of groundwater or surface water to make hydraulic fracturing fluids; • Chemical mixing: the mixing of the base fluid (generally water), proppant, and chemicals at the well site to create the fracking fluids; • Well injection: the high-pressure injection of fracking fluids into the gas-bearing targeted rock formation; • Produced water handling: the on-site collection and handling of water that returns to surface after fracking, and the transportation of produced water for disposal or reuse; • Wastewater disposal and reuse: the disposal and reuse of the liquid waste streams from the well site. Hydraulic fracturing requires large quantities of water. Some wells in the US use as much as 7 million gallons per fracture. In British Columbia, fracturing can reportedly require as much as 25 million gallons.79 Providing

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this amount of water to a wellsite requires hundreds of trips by diesel-engine tanker trucks transporting water to the site. In the US, each day more than two billion gallons of water and fracking fluids are injected under high pressure into the ground to facilitate the extraction of oil and gas via fracking or, after the fracking is finished, to flush the extracted wastewater down more than 187,500 disposal wells across the US that accept oil and gas waste.80 In principle, a lot of this water could be reused, but the proportion of water used in fracking that comes from reused wastewater appears to be low. The EPA report states that the median percentage of the injected fluid volume that comes from reused wastewater was only 5% between 2008 and 2014. The impact on local water resources of this level of withdrawal for fracking purposes obviously depends on the local situation. The EPA report identifies one area in the US: Mountrail County in North Dakota, where the annual average water use by over 500 wells was about 36% of the total water use in 2010. The withdrawal of water for hydraulic fracturing is a consumptive use of water since some if it will remain in the shale gas formation and not flow back to the surface. Water use is large compared to conventional gas production but small relative to the production of conventional oil and to the production of oil from the oil sands.81 However, the absolute quantities of water withdrawn are often less important than the times and rates at which water is extracted. Fracking uses a lot of water over a short period of time—several days. If several fracking operations take place sequentially, as they would in a multi-well pad, or concurrently on different pads, the demand could exceed the local unallocated supply for that period. Based on the US average of 5 million gallons per well, a well pad with eight wells could use some 40 million gallons of water within two to three months.82 A 2018 study of high-volume water withdrawals for fracking in Arkansas, found that the permitted 12-hour withdrawal volumes exceeded median streamflow at half of the sites monitored in June 2017 when stream flows were low.83 But it is the mix of chemicals that are an essential part of the hydraulic fracturing process that is most alarming. The US Environmental Protection Agency identified over 1000 chemicals that were reported to have been used in fracking fluids between 2005 and 2013. A single well will use anywhere from 4 to 28 chemical additives in a fracking operation. Three chemicals: methanol, hydrotreated light petroleum distillates, and hydrochloric acid were used in 65% of the wells reporting to the Fracfocus database. These chemicals are transported to the well site and stored on site until they are mixed with the base fluid and proppant and pumped down the

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production well. While the quantities added to the fracking fluid are small, the amounts stored at the well site are not. Thousands of gallons of chemical additives can be stored on site for use during the fracking process.84 The chemicals are stored in multiple closed containers and pumped around the site in hoses and tubing. Spills and leaks are inevitable. The EPA reported 151 spills of fracking fluid or additives in 11 states between 2006 and 2012. The mean quantity of fluid released was only 420 gallons, but the largest spill was over 19,000 gallons. Thirteen of these spills polluted local surface waters. In Pennsylvania, between 2008 and 2013, 10 spills of over 400 gallons that polluted surface waters were documented. The spills ranged from 3400 gallons to one which was over 224,000 gallons.85 During fracking, a well is subjected to very high pressures. The fracking fluid is pumped into the well until the targeted rock formation fractures— the pressure then decreases. Pressures can range from 2000 psi to 12,000 psi. The well casing, cement, and other well components must be able to withstand these pressures so that the fracking fluid can flow to the targeted rock formation without leaking. Older wells that are fracked may not be able to withstand the fluid pressure. Older wells may also be fracked at shallower depths, where cement around the casing may be inadequate or missing. There have been several documented failures of this type. In one case, the fracking of an inadequately cemented well in Bainbridge Township, Ohio, contributed to the flow of methane into local drinking water resources. In another case, an inner string of casing burst during fracking of an oil well near Killdeer, North Dakota, resulting in a release of fracking fluids and formation fluids that polluted a groundwater resource.86 In rural areas where homes rely on private wells for water, fracking operations pose a particularly high risk. Pennsylvania regulators have confirmed at least 260 instances of private well contamination from fracking operations since 2005. Independent journalists exploring the issue have documented over 2300 complaints of pollution of private wells in 17 of the 40 Pennsylvania counties where fracking has taken place.87 The integrity of the well is paramount. Mechanical integrity failures have allowed gases or liquids to move to underground drinking water resources. Fracking has even occurred within underground drinking water resources—which obviously rapidly contaminates drinking water wells in the vicinity.88 After hydraulic fracturing, the injection pressure applied to the well is released and the direction of flow reverses, causing fluid to flow out of the well. The fluid that initially returns to the surface after fracking is mostly

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fracking fluid and is sometimes called ‘flowback’. The fluid that returns to the surface during gas production is similar in composition to the fluid naturally occurring in the targeted rock formation and is typically called ‘produced water’. Produced water is extremely toxic. It has been found to contain: • Naturally-occurring organic compounds including benzene, toluene, ethylbenzene, xylenes, oil and grease; • Naturally occurring radioactive materials including radium; • Metals including barium, manganese, iron and strontium; • Sodium, magnesium and calcium salts (chlorides, bromides, and sulphates); • Hydraulic fracturing chemicals, additives, and their derivatives.89 Produced water is usually stored in lined surface ponds or tanks before being either treated, used to fracture another well, or reinjected into a deep saline formation or, in the US, reinjected into a Class II disposal well. Lined ponds, even when built with double liners, are rarely free from flaws and can be expected to eventually leak.90 Spills of produced water have been reported right across the US—ranging from 1300 to 3800 litres (the median values of several datasets). However, much larger spills have occurred. In North Dakota there were 12 spills greater than 21,000 gallons and, in 2015, one huge spill of almost 3 million gallons. Many of the reported produced water spills contaminated surface water resources: the EPA reported that 13 of 225 spills polluted local creeks, ponds, or wetlands. One spill contaminated ground water. A report from California showed that between 2009 and 2014, 18% of spills impacted waterways. In yet another incident, pits holding flowback fluids overflowed in Kentucky in 2007, contaminating the Acorn Fork Creek.91 Produced water cannot be treated in typical municipal wastewater treatment plants because the high salinity disrupts the activated sludge process. In addition, the naturally occurring radioactive elements brought to the surface in the produced water may be absorbed by the sludge or simply flow through the treatment plant and be discharged into the receiving waters. Hence, deep-well injection is generally the industry’s preferred option when the geology allows for this method of disposal.

Methane Emissions Shale gas is mainly methane—which is a powerful greenhouse gas; much more powerful than carbon dioxide in contributing to climate change and a warming planet.

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In contrast to CO2, which can linger in the atmosphere for decades, methane breaks down fairly quickly—within 9 to 10 years. However, the impact of CO2 on climate change has generally been measured over a period of a 100 years. This is the convention which has been adopted by the IPCC—and which has been followed by many climate scientists. If the same timeframe of 100 years is used for estimating the impact of methane, the gas would be considered to be about 25 times stronger than CO2 in inducing global warming. However, if a more realistic timeframe is used for methane—a shorter period which reflects its actual lifetime in the atmosphere, the impact of methane on global warming would be calculated as being much stronger: about 86 times as strong as CO2. This is important because the climate impact of methane as a greenhouse gas is measured in units of CO2 equivalent—written as CO2e or CO2eq. The smaller emission factor tends to minimize the impact of methane as a greenhouse gas. Moreover, methane is constantly accumulating in the atmosphere as Fig. 2.5 shows. The global warming potential (GWP) of methane should be set at the upper level—a level that recognizes its substantial contribution to the global warming effects of atmospheric greenhouse gases.92 Natural gas is being touted as a clean fuel—and it is certainly cleaner than coal in terms of its emissions of carbon dioxide when fuelling a power plant to generate electricity. Natural gas also produces much less particulate air pollution, lower levels of nitrogen oxides (which can lead to the ground level ozone), and less sulphur dioxide than coal. Emissions of vapor-phase mercury are also insignificant—if the mercury is removed during up-stream processing. In other words, natural gas burns relatively cleanly. But petroleum and gas processing systems can release substantial ­quantities of methane into the atmosphere. If hydraulic fracturing and the production and processing of shale gas release significant quantities of methane, the advantages of natural gas over coal quickly disappear. Both methane and carbon dioxide are potentially released during fracking when: • Emissions of methane and carbon dioxide occur during drilling and well completion, mostly due to venting and flaring; • Emissions occur from plays where the gas contains significant amounts of carbon dioxide that has to be removed before the gas can be brought to market;

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• Fugitive emissions occur during production, processing, gathering, and transport to market; • Emissions occur from well seeps after abandonment of the well. These are the emissions from an operational fracking well. But just setting up the well pad and installing all the heavy equipment is an energy intensive undertaking. Most of the drilling, pumping, and hydraulic fracturing is driven by diesel engines. The carbon dioxide and other pollutants produced by these diesel engines are seldom counted.93 There have been many attempts to accurately measure methane emissions from hydraulically fractured shale gas sites. The results are variable, inconsistent, and often contradictory. This may be because methane leaks from frack sites are likely to be sporadic, intermittent, and to some extent unpredictable. Surveys conducted at different times of the year and at different stages of the fracking process cycle will give different results. In addition, airborne releases are difficult to attribute to a specific site. There is, however, absolutely no doubt that the hydraulic fracking of shale produces significant emissions of methane—a powerful greenhouse gas. Both satellite and ground measurements have shown that methane emissions from the US are responsible for between 30 and 60% of the upsurge in global atmospheric methane concentrations. Most of this excess methane represents fugitive emissions from American oil and gas operations. Moreover, the widely touted claim that the US fracking boom has contributed to declines in carbon dioxide emissions in the US has been contradicted by research showing that almost all of the reductions in CO2 emissions between 2007 and 2009 were the result of economic recession rather than coal-to-gas fuel switching.94 The situation is no better in Canada. In October 2017, a team of researchers measured regional airborne methane and ethane emissions from the Alberta oil and gas fields in Canada. They compared their results to emissions report by the industries themselves and found large discrepancies. Much more methane was being released than reported—mostly from fugitive leaks that were not being measured at all or from episodes of unreported venting.95 A detailed peer-reviewed study in 2015 by Robert Howarth at Cornell University concluded that when methane emissions from shale gas production were accounted for, shale gas is not quite the clean fuel many proponents claim. Yes it burns cleaner. But the upstream production processes—starting with drilling the well—leak a powerful greenhouse gas into the atmosphere: methane.

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Fig. 4.8  Greenhouse gas emissions from shale gas compared to other fuels (Source Robert Howarth, Cornell University)

Figure 4.8 shows the greenhouse gas emissions of shale gas, conventional natural gas, oil and coal in units of grams per unit of heat produced. The darker section indicates direct and indirect emission of carbon dioxide. The lighter section shows methane emissions in equivalent amounts of CO2 using a GWP of 86.96 Figure 4.8 clearly shows that greenhouse gas emissions for shale gas production and combustion are higher than for conventional natural gas, diesel fuel, and even coal. The difference is due to the release of methane during the production, gathering, and processing of the shale gas.

Gathering the Gas There is an additional source of fugitive methane that is not counted in the analysis of the emissions from the fracking well site. Raw natural gas commonly exists in mixtures with other hydrocarbons— ethane, propane, butane, and pentanes. It may also contain water vapor, hydrogen sulphide, carbon dioxide, helium, nitrogen, and other compounds. These compounds must be removed by processing the raw gas in order to produce the higher-quality gas provided to the consumer.

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While some of the needed processing can be accomplished at or near the well head, the final processing of natural gas generally takes places at a processing plant. The extracted natural gas is transported to these processing plants through a network of gathering pipelines, which are small diameter, lower pressure pipes. A complex gathering system can consist of thousands of miles of pipes. In 2017, there were reportedly over 380,000 km of onshore gathering pipelines in the US.97 In Canada, the gathering pipeline network consisted of about 250,000 km of lines in 2014.98 Who regulates this system of gathering pipelines? In the US, apparently no-one. However, the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration is said to be working on it. In their 2017 brochure “Gathering Pipelines FAQs”, the PHMSA writes: PHMSA is currently considering regulating these gathering pipelines. The lines being put into service in the various shale plays like Marcellus, Utica, Barnett and Bakken are generally of much larger diameter and operating at a higher pressure than traditional rural gas gathering pipelines, increasing the concern for safety of the environment and the people near operations.99

In Canada, where the gathering, feeder, and transmission pipeline infrastructure stretches to more than 375,000 km, the NEB regulated only about 73,000 km of pipelines in 2014. And most if not all of those regulated ­pipelines would have been the large-diameter transmission lines—not the smaller-diameter but more extensive gathering pipelines. Figure 4.9 shows the different components of Canada’s pipeline infrastructure.100 Apart from the inevitable small leaks of fugitive methane from the pipes, flanges and valves, gas pipelines accidents, when they occur, are often catastrophic—because the gas is so explosive. When a poorly maintained natural gas distribution pipeline exploded in San Bruno, California in 2010, eight people died and 38 homes were destroyed. In 2012, a 10-inch natural gas gathering pipeline exploded near Alice, Texas. Luckily, there were no injuries.101 Perhaps the most spectacular disaster occurred in Massachusetts in 2018 when over-pressurized natural gas lines caused multiple explosions and fires in 70 homes in the towns of Lawrence, Andover, and North Andover, on the evening of September 13. One resident was killed and 10 others injured. Local news dispatches from the scene show homes bursting into flames with little warning.102

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Fig. 4.9  Canada’s pipeline infrastructure in 2014 (Source Natural Resources Canada)

With the rapid expansion of shale gas fracking sites in the US and Canada, the network of unregulated gathering pipelines spreading out from the frack sites can be expected to increase just as rapidly. It’s also worth noting that because the natural gas has not yet been fully processed, the gas in the gathering pipelines is odourless—the odorizing agent that are obligatory in household gas so that leaks can be more easily detected has not yet been added. If there is a leak, the invisible and odourless gas cannot be detected unless the hissing leak can be heard—or until it explodes. The largest methane leak in US history occurred in 2015 when the Aliso Canyon storage facility in southern California released more than 100,000 metric tons of methane into the air of the San Fernando valley over a fourmonth period in October 2015. The plume of gas was visible from space. More than 8000 families in the vicinity were evacuated and relocated; thousands were sickened, and two public schools were closed. The cause of the blowout was determined to be a cracked well casing and the lack of a shut-off valve.103 The most detailed study of the health and environmental impacts of hydraulic fracking is the 2018 report by the Concerned Health Professionals of New York and Physicians for Social Responsibility—a hugely detailed study of all the problems associated with fracking, the conclusions of the physicians are damning: Altogether, findings to date from scientific, medical, and journalistic investigations combine to demonstrate that fracking poses significant threats to air, water, health, public safety, climate stability, seismic stability, community cohesion and long-term economic vitality.104

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A technology potentially this harmful would only be acceptable if substantial and over-riding socio-economic benefits were to be derived from its deployment—and if this technology was the only way to achieve them. But that is most definitely not the case.

Railway Carbon Pipelines are costly to build, and their approval and construction nearly always creates conflict with communities that are frequently fiercely opposed to pipelines running across land and waterways that would be catastrophically affected by spills of oil or the release of natural gas. The technical and legal difficulties involved in constructing pipelines, the length of time involved, and the huge cost, has induced many fossil fuel companies to move fossil fuels by train. The tracks are already laid—only the coal cars and the tanker cars have to be procured, coupled up, and readied for operation. Coal in North America is conveyed in uncovered rail cars. It’s hardly surprising that during transport substantial amounts of coal dust and fragments are swept off the surface of the coal. Each car in a coal train may lose between 250 and 800 kg of coal dust over the course of its journey, according to a study by the Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway. This means a typical 125-car coal train could release over 100 tonnes of dust in a single trip. And coal dust, just like coal, contains traces of heavy metals and of course the ubiquitous neurotoxin: mercury. Chemical surfactants sprayed onto the coal reduce the amount of coal dust lost from the cars—but they are also potentially a contaminant of surface water and soil. Coal dust has an unusual characteristic as it settles on the rail ballast— the crushed rock that anchors the crossties and the steel rails themselves. The coal dust clogs the spaces in the rail ballast and turns it into a solid tar-like substance when wet. This effect apparently decreases the stability of the track, and this has led to some spectacular derailments. In 2012, there were seven coal train derailments in the US. In July 2012, three coal trains derailed in the same week.105 On the July 4, 2012, 31 rail cars laden with coal derailed in the Chicago suburb of Northwood. The cars toppled onto a road bridge that collapsed—killing two people traveling in a car passing underneath.106 Just a few weeks later, on 21 August 2012, an eastbound CSX coal train derailed the first 21 cars while crossing the railroad bridge over Main Street

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in Ellicott City, Maryland. The train consisted of two locomotives and 80 loaded coal cars weighing almost 10,000 tons. Seven of the derailed cars fell into a public parking area that was below and north of the tracks. The remainder of the derailed cars overturned and spilled coal along the north side of the tracks. Two women who just happened to be walking under the bridge at the time were killed.107 More recently in 2014, four coal train derailments were reported by the US Safety Transportation Board. On January 17, a CSX coal train derailed in Dunnellon, Florida; two days later a Union Pacific coal train derailed near Caledonia, Wisconsin; on January 31, a Norfolk Southern coal train derailed near Jewell Ridge, Virginia; and on May 1, a CSX coal train derailed in Bowie, Maryland.108 Canada’s rail network is the third largest worldwide and transports the fourth largest volume of goods. Canadian railways move about 70% of the country’s surface goods (including 40% of its exports) and carry over 70 million people. In 2015, 1200 rail accidents were reported to the Canadian Transport Safety Board, a 3% decrease from the 2014 total of 1238 but an 8% increase from the 2010 to 2014 average of 1115. Approximately one third of the trains involved in rail accidents in 2015 were freight trains. Not all these freight train accidents were coal trains—the statistics do not break out the details. But it’s a reasonable assumption, given the huge amount of coal that moves by rail in Canada, that many of these approximately 400 freight train accidents involved coal trains.109 Apart from the accidents, moving coal by train always spreads coal dust that pollutes the air, and which has a health impact on communities living near the tracks. You can’t move coal around without creating coal dust. Coal trains also produce emissions from the diesel locomotives—sometimes 2 or 3 coupled in a single train—that are a significant source of air pollution. But the worst-case scenarios are reserved for the oil trains. The transport of oil by train developed around 2010 as a way of avoiding congested pipelines and moving crude oil from the Bakken field to refineries on the US Gulf coast. Since then the practice has taken off—both in the US and in Canada. Oil trains have several advantages over pipelines: flexibility, relatively low investment and permitting costs, and a relatively short lead time. North American rail shipments of crude oil and petroleum products have been increasing rapidly. US crude oil carloads went from less than 10,000

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in 2008 to about 400,000 in 2013. The volume of crude oil shipped by rail that year was estimated at about 680,000 bbl./day—which was about 10% of US crude oil production. Canadian crude and petroleum products rail shipments also increased strongly—up 150% from 2009 to 2012. Rail shipments of crude and petroleum represented 5% and 9% of total rail shipments in the US and Canada respectively in 2012.110 Increasing volumes of crude oil transported by rail raises serious concerns about safety. A review conducted by the International Energy Agency found that there are more accidents with rail cars than pipelines—but that the quantities of oil spilled are smaller. In other words, in terms of barrel-miles of oil transported, trains have more accidents but pipelines spills are larger. In fact, the risk of a train accident is six times higher than that of a pipeline—but pipelines spill three times as much oil.111 What these numbers don’t tell you though, is that oil train accidents are not about the spills. They are about the fires and catastrophic explosions. In June 2016 a unit train carrying crude oil on the Union Pacific line derailed near Mosier, Oregon, USA. Fourteen cars of the 96-car train derailed; four caught fire and burned explosively. The train was carrying crude oil from the Bakken field from Eastport, Idaho to Tacoma, Washington through the Columbia River Gorge. Crude oil from the Bakken field is more volatile than most crudes and is therefore more likely to explosively ignite in the case of an accident. Figure 4.10 shows the scene just after the accident. The extraordinary length of the train is evident—as is the proximity of the railway to nearby houses.112 No-one was injured; but given how close the accident was to the town’s residences and to a road bridge—this was a lucky escape. Crude oil from the Bakken field was also the cargo in an oil train accident and conflagration in November 2013, when a 90-car train carrying 2.9 million gallons of Bakken crude from Amory, Mississippi, to a refinery in Walnut Hill, Florida derailed and exploded in Aliceville, Alabama. Twenty cars full of oil and two of the three locomotives jumped the tracks. At least 11 of the railcars at one point were aflame.113 Just a couple of weeks before this accident, in October, a Canadian National oil train derailed in Alberta, Canada. Thirteen of the cars carrying crude oil and liquified petroleum gas jumped the tracks. One LPG car exploded and three others burst in flame. Residents were evacuated from the nearby town of Gainford. It was reportedly the third CN derailment in as many weeks.114

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Fig. 4.10  Oil train derailment and fire in Mosier, Oregon, USA (Source Paloma Ayala)

Just a few weeks later, on December 30, 2013, a train collision in Casselton, North Dakota, 20 miles outside of Fargo, forced the evacuation of half the town’s residents after 400,000 gallons of oil spilled and 18 oil cars exploded into flame.115 In Canada the same year, by far the most catastrophic oil train accident occurred in Lac Megantic, Quebec. On the evening of July 5, 2013, at about 11 p.m., a Montreal, Maine & Atlantic (MMA) train arrived at Nantes, Quebec, carrying 2 million gallons of crude oil in 72 tank cars. The oil had come from the Bakken field in North Dakota and was bound for Saint John, New Brunswick. After arriving in Nantes, the locomotive engineer parked the train on a descending gradient on the main track—a replacement engineer was scheduled to take over the train the next morning. The engineer had applied hand brakes on all five locomotives and two other cars and shut down all but the lead locomotive. Railway rules require that hand brakes alone, without the action of air brakes, be capable of holding a train stationary. That night, however, the locomotive air brakes were left on, meaning that the train was being held by a combination of hand brakes and air brakes. This error would not have proved disastrous—except that the lead ­locomotive had mechanical problems which led to a small fire igniting in the

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turbocharger of the diesel engine. This fire was quickly extinguished, but the electric circuits of the lead locomotive were shut down as a precaution by the local firefighters called to the scene. Without electricity, the compressor powering the air brakes stopped. The air brakes were on—but with the compressor turned off, the air brakes slowly lost their braking power. The hand brakes could not hold the train on the inclined track. At about 1 am, the train slowly began to move. It picked up speed as it rolled downhill towards Lac Megantic, seven miles away—reaching a top speed of 65 mph. Fifteen minutes later, the train derailed near the centre of the town Almost all of the 63 derailed tank cars were damaged, and many were ripped apart. About 6 million litres of oil were spilled, and almost immediately many of the damaged cars exploded. Much of the downtown core of the town was destroyed. Forty-seven people were killed, and 2000 people were forced from their homes.116 Figure 4.11 shows the accident scene a short while after the fire was extinguished. As a result of the accident, the MMA railroad company went bankrupt— unable to pay the estimated $180 million in damages and penalties likely to be imposed. Canadian regulators subsequently discovered that that the company carried only $25 million in liability insurance.117 In 2018, it was reported that new rail tracks would be laid bypassing the town. The construction will cost $133 million. Several other towns in

Fig. 4.11  The Lac Megantic scene after the July 2013 accident (Source Transportation Safety Board of Canada)

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Canada are pressing to have freight trains rerouted around their centres. But laying new train tracks is expensive. In Saskatoon, where the ­government wants to relocate Canadian Pacific tracks, the cost could reach almost $600 million.118 In Canada, the oil-train accidents continued—although not as catastrophically as the disaster in Lac Megantic. Trains operated by Canadian National derailed along main lines 57 times in 2014—up 73% from 2013. At least 27 of the domestic derailments were caused by track problems.119 On March 7, 2015, a CN oil train loaded with crude oil was heading east near Gogama, Ontario. It was equipped with two locomotives hauling 94 tank cars—over 6000 feet long and weighing 14,355 tons. At 2.42 in the morning while traveling at 43 mph, the automatic braking system was activated. The crew looked back to see a fireball about 700 feet behind the locomotives. Thirty-nine of the 94 cars had derailed. The engineers detached the locomotives and the first five cars still on the rails and pulled clear. The fire burned for 3 days and destroyed 700 feet of track. No-one was injured.120 On 22 June 2018, a train carrying Canadian crude oil derailed in Iowa releasing an estimate 230,000 gallons of oil into a flooded river. About 30 of the tank cars ended up in the water; about half of them leaked even though they were the new stronger DOT-117R tank cars.121 Again no-one was injured and the oil did not ignite. But the risk of catastrophic accidents when oil is conveyed by train is clearly significant.122

The Pipeline Wars There are essentially two reasons why new pipelines are opposed by many communities and environmental groups. The first reason, and the most common one, is the simple fact that pipelines, particularly oil pipelines and those carrying diluted bitumen, pose a real threat to the environment and to the communities whose livelihoods depend on local and regional ecosystems and the services those ecosystems provide. Although accidents are not frequent, they are certainly not rare. We have seen that the number of pipeline incidents in the US and Canada is shockingly high, so clearly this means of transporting hydrocarbon liquids and gases under pressure and over long distances carries significant risks—both to the environment and to the communities who live close to the pipelines.

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The second reason is linked to the concern about climate change and the international agreement forged in Paris in 2015 to try and limit global warming to no more than 2 °C above pre-industrial levels.123 In order for this target to be achieved, the consumption of fossil fuels has to be substantially reduced, and the deployment of inexhaustible renewable energy technologies dramatically increased. Ramping up the capacity of the oil and natural gas supply and distribution system by building new pipelines or expanding existing ones therefore runs counter to international efforts to achieve the Paris Agreement targets and curb global warming. Effectively, it just intensifies the global climate crisis.

Standing Rock The fiercest conflict occurred in North Dakota in 2016 where the Standing Rock Sioux Tribe strongly opposed the construction of the Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL)—a pipeline that carries oil from the Bakken oil fields in western North Dakota to southern Illinois. One curious aspect is that the pipeline was rerouted near the Standing Rock Sioux Reservation after the original route close to the state capital Bismarck was rejected due to it reportedly being deemed too risky for the city’s water supplies.124 However, this report is disputed, and the more likely reason that the route was changed appears to be that the Bismarck route would have been 17 km longer with more road crossings, and waterbody and wetland crossings. The Bismarck route also would have crossed an area considered by federal pipeline regulators as a “high consequence area,” which is an area deemed to have the most significant adverse consequences in the event of a pipeline spill.125 The pipeline now runs beneath the Missouri and Mississippi Rivers as well as under part of Lake Oahe near the Standing Rock Indian Reservation—presumably an area of lower “consequence” in the event of a spill. Many of the Standing Rock tribe believe that the pipeline poses a serious threat to the region’s clean water and to sacred ancient burial grounds. In April 2016, Standing Rock Sioux elder LaDonna Brave Bull Allard and several grandchildren established a camp as a centre for spiritual resistance to the pipeline. Over the summer of 2016, the camp grew to thousands of people and drew widespread national and international attention. The conflict between protesters, police and construction workers grew increasingly confrontational and violent. In September 2016, construction workers bulldozed a section of land the tribe had identified as sacred

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ground, and when protesters entered the area security workers brought in dogs which attacked several protesters and a horse. The incident was filmed and viewed by several million people on YouTube and other social media. The following month, armed soldiers and police with riot gear and military equipment cleared an encampment that was directly in the pipeline’s path, and in November 2016, police used water cannon on protesters in freezing weather—an aggressive response that drew widespread condemnation.126 In December 2016, under the Obama administration, the US Army Corps of Engineers was denied an easement for the construction of the pipeline under the Missouri river pending an environmental impact assessment of this part of the route. However, a few months later, newly-elected President Trump issued an executive order which authorised the Army Corps of Engineers to proceed, and which cancelled the call for an environmental impact assessment. The pipeline was finally completed in April 2017 and oil was flowing a month later. During the year-long protest, almost 300 people were injured and over 480 arrested.

Canada’s Pipelines It should come as no surprise that the Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP), an industry association, is convinced that connecting western Canada’s crude oil supplies to global markets is an absolute priority and firmly in the national interest. Over the last decade, several pipelines across Canada have been proposed by the petroleum industry. The status of the largest of them is shown in Table 4.4.127 Enbridge Northern Gateway. The proposal submitted by Canadian company Enbridge was for a twin pipeline: one carrying imported natural gas condensate from the BC coast east to the oil sands area in Alberta; the other carrying diluted bitumen west towards the BC coast at Kitimat. Many First Nations groups, several BC municipalities, and environmental groups opposed the project because of the environmental risks associated with the transport of diluted bitumen. In December 2010, 66 First Nations bands in British Columbia signed the Save the Fraser Declaration opposing the project, and 40 more groups signed on later. Local communities and First Nations groups in British Columbia were certainly aware of the major spill of diluted bitumen from an Enbridge pipeline into the Kalamazoo River in 2010—a spill that proved extremely difficult and costly to clean up. The proposal was approved by the Canadian federal government in 2014 subject to 209 conditions. However, upon taking office in 2015, Prime

Enbridge Line 3 Replacement

TransCanada Energy East

Trans Mountain Expansion Project

4600 km from Alberta to New Brunswick in eastern Canada 1660 km from Hardisty, Alberta to Superior, Wisconsin 370,000 bbl./day

1,100,000 bbl./day

Additional capacity

Length and Route

525,000 bbl./day (dilbit) 1177 km from Bruderheim, Alberta to Kitimat, British Columbia 1150 km from Edmonton, 590,000 bbl./day Alberta to the BC coast at Burnaby

Proposed pipeline

Enbridge Northern Gateway

Table 4.4  Major Canadian pipeline initiatives during the last decade Potential markets

Eastern Canada, US East Coast, Europe, Africa and Asia Central and eastern Canada, US Midwest and Gulf coast

Asia and California

Asia and California

Status (2018)

(continued)

Approved with 157 conditions by federal government but denied by courts pending more consultation with First Nations peoples. Approved once again in early 2019 with 156 conditions Application to the NEB withdrawn by TransCanada in 2017 The Canadian part of the pipeline was approved by federal government in 2016 with 89 conditions. In June 2019 there were continuing legal problems in the US courtsa

Application dismissed by the Federal Government in 2016

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Length and Route

Additional capacity 830,000 bbl./day

Potential markets Status (2018)

Heavy oil refineries along Executive order to allow construction Gulf Coast to proceed signed by President Trump in March 2017 but vacated by a federal judge in November 2018. A revised environmental impact assessment was submitted but legal problems in the US continue. Construction on the Canadian section is planned for mid 2019

Inside Climate News. 2 more tar sands oil pipelines run into trouble in the Midwest. Accessed at: https://insideclimatenews.org/ news/06062019/tar-sands-oil-pipeline-court-ruling-spill-risk-minnesota-michigan-enbridge-canada-climate-change Source Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers

aSee

TransCanada Keystone XL 1897 km from Hardisty, Alberta to Steele City, Nebraska

Proposed pipeline

Table 4.4  (continued)

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Minister Justin Trudeau imposed a ban on tanker traffic along the northeast coast of British Columbia effectively halting the project. In November 2016, the Federal Government directed Canada’s NEB to dismiss the Northern Gateway application.128 Trans Mountain Expansion Project. The original Trans Mountain Pipeline was built in 1953 and is still operational. It runs for 1150 km from Strathcona County near Edmonton, Alberta, to the coastal town of Burnaby in British Columbia. The expansion project is essentially a twinning of the original pipeline—which will almost triple its capacity from its present level of 300,000 bbl./day to 890,000 bbl./day. The proposal was approved by the Government of Canada in November 2016 after a 29-month review by the NEB. On January 2017, the British Columbia Environmental Office issued an environmental assessment certificate approving the pipeline. However, the expansion of the pipeline has faced fierce opposition from Indigenous groups and environmentalists—particularly in British Columbia. The conflicting views have also incited a bad-tempered spat between the provincial governments of Alberta and British Columbia—which disagree over the risks involved and the necessity of the expansion. In May 2018, the Government of Canada agreed to purchase the pipeline from Kinder Morgan in order to ensure that the project moves ahead. Canada’s Finance Minister is quoted as saying at the time: “It must be built; it will be built. ”129 However, in August 2018, the Canadian Federal Court of Appeal issued a decision cancelling the approval of the project. According to the Court, the NEB unjustifiably defined the scope of the project not to include projectrelated tanker traffic—the increased level of which is likely to have an adverse impact on the endangered Southern resident killer whales that frequent the coastal environment. The Federal Court of Appeal also judged that the Government of Canada failed in its duty to adequately consult Indigenous peoples.130 In February 2019, the Canadian NEB completed the reconsideration process and, in spite of the risks involved, found the project to be “in the public interest”.131 The number of protests declined pending the result of these consultative procedures, but when construction eventually resumes, it is certain that opposition to the pipeline will flare up once again. TransCanada Energy East. The Energy East pipeline was to deliver diluted bitumen from Western Canada and Northwest US to delivery points and refineries in New Brunswick and potentially Quebec. The project was announced in 2013. About 3000 km of existing natural gas line was to be

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converted to carrying diluted bitumen, and an additional 1600 km of line was to be constructed—making this pipeline the longest in Canada when completed. The proposed route crossed the territory of 180 Indigenous groups most of which were opposed to the pipeline. In August 2017, Canada’s NEB announced it would consider upstream and downstream greenhouse gas emissions in determining whether the Energy East pipeline was in the national interest. TransCanada then asked the NEB to put its regulatory review hearings on hold while it reviewed the decision to include an assessment of the pipeline’s impact on greenhouse gases. TransCanada subsequently withdrew its application to the NEB to construct the pipeline.132 Enbridge Line 3 replacement. Enbridge’s aging Line 3 pipeline runs for 1660 km across Canada from Hardisty, Alberta to Gretna, Manitoba, and then in the US from the Minnesota border to Superior, Wisconsin. Enbridge has stated that the pipeline is deteriorating and needs to be replaced. Current capacity is 390,000 bbl./day, but the new 36-inch ­pipeline will restore the pipeline to its former capacity of 760,000 bbl./day. Construction began in 2017. The original 34-inch pipeline will be deactivated and left in place, which Enbridge says causes less damage than removing it.133 There were only limited protests against the replacement pipeline in Canada. However, in the US, opposition has been more intense. Minnesota regulators approved their part of the pipeline in June 2018, sparking an angry reaction from Ojibwe band members present at the hearing. Opponents to the pipeline argue that the pipeline risks spills in fragile areas in northern Minnesota, including where American Indians harvest wild rice. Ojibwe Indians, or Anishinaabe, consider wild rice sacred and central to their culture. Winona LaDuke, founder of Honour the Earth, said at the time that opponents would use every regulatory means possible to stop the project, including mass protests if necessary.134 TransCanada Keystone XL. The Keystone pipeline system has been operating in Canada and the US since 2010. It was constructed in several phases: the first part of the line ran 3456 km south east from Hardisty, Alberta, to Steele City, Nebraska, then east across Missouri to the Wood River refinery and the Patoka Oil Terminal in Illinois. It has a capacity of 590,000 bbl./day. The second phase runs for 468 km south from Steele City to Cushing, Oklahoma, and has a capacity of 700,000 bbl./day. Finally, the third phase of 784 km extended the southern line from Cushing to refineries in Port Arthur in Texas. It has a capacity of 700,000 bbl./day.

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The Keystone XL (meaning export limited) is a proposed new line from Hardisty, Alberta, to Steele City, Illinois, that runs more directly between the two cities and has a higher capacity: 830,000 bbl./day pumped through a larger diameter, 36-inch, pipe. It will carry crude oil from western Canada and pick up lighter oil from the Bakken field in Montana along the route. The application by TransCanada was filed in September 2008. The route of the pipeline on the US side runs through Montana, South Dakota, and Nebraska. The KXL has been controversial from the start: both because of its original route through fragile landscapes like the Sandhills in Nebraska and its passage over the Ogallala aquifer, and also because it was viewed as being contrary to efforts to reduce global warming. In 2010, the No Tar Sands Oil campaign was launched in the US, sponsored by a variety of the most active and well-known US environmental organisations. Protests against Keystone XL have been widespread. In August 2011, over 1000 protesters were arrested outside the White House in Washington, DC. In November that year, several thousand protesters formed a human chain around the White House in an effort to convince President Obama to block the project. The largest protest took place in February 2013 when 35,000 to 50,000 protesters attended a rally in Washington DC organised by The Sierra Club and 350.org. Simultaneous protests were organised in other cities across the US, Canada, and Europe. Then in 2014, about 1000 protesters marched from Georgetown University to the White House to protest the pipeline. Almost 400 people were arrested after tying themselves to the White House fence.135 Apart from the continuing protests in the streets and around the White House, legal challenges to the pipeline and to President Trump’s approval have continued to stall the completion of the line. In 2017, the Indigenous Environment Network sued the Trump Administration claiming that it had erred by relying on an outdated analysis of the pipeline’s environmental impacts. In November 2018 a federal judge ruled in favour of the plaintiffs on several issues, vacated the 2017 approval decision, and ordered the State Department to revise the 2014 Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). The additional analysis is to include a supposedly “hard look” at the effects of current oil prices, potential increases in greenhouse gas emissions, possible damage to cultural resources and new data on oil spills—which were underestimated in the 2014 EIS.136 The construction of new petroleum pipelines has become a battleground where the different sides in the global warming controversy increasingly meet head on and clash. Increased pipeline capacity inevitably leads to more production of oil, gas and petroleum products. That, after all, is the purpose

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of building new pipelines: getting greater quantities of the product to markets. But the increased production and processing inevitably leads to greater emissions of carbon dioxide and methane from the upstream drilling, gathering, processing operations, and refineries.

Take the Train As the construction of new pipelines is stalled and delayed by protests and legal challenges, the oil industry has started to move more oil by train. This mode of conveyance has a higher risk of accidents, so the stakes involved in ramping up the supply of oil and petroleum products are becoming higher. We noted in this chapter that oil trains have more accidents than pipelines, but that pipeline spills are larger. But whereas the environmental impacts of a pipeline rupture and spill are predominantly on surface water resources, ecosystems, and the livelihoods of local communities (which is bad enough!), an oil train accident can result in a catastrophic fire and explosions that can potentially kill and injure dozens if not hundreds of people—as the oil train accidents at Lac Megantic, Quebec, and Mosier, Oregon, have clearly shown.137 Undaunted by the risks involved, the premier of Alberta announced in November 2018, that the provincial government planned to purchase as many as 7000 rail cars in order to meet its goal of moving 120,000 bbl. a day of diluted bitumen to the west coast of Canada. The province will also purchase 80 locomotives with each train pulling 100–120 tank cars.138

Climate Justice Global heating raises important questions concerning justice and human rights. Although climate change affects everyone, it disproportionately impacts those who have contributed least to it and who are very often the least able to counteract its harmful effects. By contrast, the main contributors to climate change—those with the largest carbon footprint, living and working in the world’s wealthiest regions—are most able to cope with and withstand its most extreme impacts. This fundamental justice concern is exacerbated by the fact that climate change will strain the ability of many states, especially the poorest ones, to uphold their human rights obligations. Climate change therefore poses a substantial obstacle to the continued progress in improving human rights, which translates directly into a worsening

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of the existing inequities that afflict a world already riven with inequalities, poverty and conflict.139 Climate change justice has been defined as: To ensure communities, individuals and governments have substantive legal and procedural rights relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy and sustainable environment, and the means to take measures within their national legislative and judicial systems and, where necessary, at international levels to mitigate sources of climate change and provide for adaptation to its effects in a manner that respects human rights.140

Environmental law is necessarily central to the goal of achieving climate change justice. On the domestic front, a growing number of countries have integrated carbon pricing mechanisms into their national climate policies. Regional arrangements have also been established to combat climate change with the leading example being the programme of regulations and policy targets set within the European Union including its Emissions Trading Scheme. Concerning international law, in addition to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Kyoto protocol, there are a number of other treaties and several widely-held principles that are of relevance to climate change. In addition to the principle of ‘common but differentiated responsibilities’ (embedded throughout the UNFCCC text and the 2015 Paris Agreement), there is the ‘no-harm’ principle, the ‘precautionary principle’ and the principle of sustainable development. The progressive acceptance of these principles marks a long-term trend in international law. However, there is little evidence that international law, on its own, has developed to the point where it might provide a firm basis for limiting the degree to which states may release harmful greenhouse gases into the environment.141 International human rights law may provide an avenue for individual and communities to seek redress for harms caused by global warming and climate change. There is little doubt that climate change affects people’s human rights directly. Rights to life, health, food, shelter and water are all adversely affected by the harmful impacts of climate change. These effects can be characterised as ‘rights violations’ because climate change is a preventable manmade phenomenon. Nevertheless it is not easy as a matter of law to make a direct causal connection between those emitting excessive greenhouse gases and those suffering the consequences. The law is not designed for this purpose and challenging questions related to causality and standing arise.

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Possible opportunities for redress may include class actions, targeting major groups of emitters, or holding public officials responsible for failures of due diligence. Another possible approach may be the development of ‘environmental rights’ now recognised in a number of national constitutions.142 In a similar vein, the suit brought against the US federal government by 21 young plaintiffs in the US District Court in Oregon in 2015 alleges that the US Government’s actions helped to cause climate change, violating the youngest generations’ constitutional right to life, liberty, and property, and failed to protect essential public trust resources—including the atmosphere, which is regarded as an asset in that trust because of its importance in the viability of every natural system. The concept of Atmospheric Trust Litigation argues that a government elected by the people has a duty to protect the natural systems required for those peoples’ survival.143 At the time of writing in late 2018, the defendant (the US government) had asked for a stay of the case—which had been granted by US Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts. The Oregon District Court then vacated the case pending a decision from the high court. Where a jurisdiction has enacted legislation mandating a reduction in greenhouse gas emissions or other measures to mitigate global warming, if those measures are not subsequently fulfilled by state agencies, a lawsuit may be an effective strategy in holding policymakers to account. In a case brought by four plaintiffs in the US state of Massachusetts, that state’s Supreme Judicial Court found in favour of the plaintiffs and against the Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (DEP). The court found that the DEP was not complying with its legal obligations to reduce the State’s greenhouse gas emissions and ordered the agency to “promulgate regulations that address…greenhouse gas emissions, impose a limit on emissions that may be released…and set limits that decline on an annual basis.” The legal obligation in question is defined in Massachusetts’s Global Warming Solutions Act (GWSA) which was signed into law in 2008, and which created the framework for reducing the state’s GHG emissions by 25% compared to 1990 levels by 2020, and by 80% by 2050.144 This suggests an approach in jurisdictions where opposition political parties in favour of climate change action outnumber an incumbent party which is doing little to curb emissions. Once legislation mandating emission cuts or other regulatory measure has been passed, it offers the opportunity for individuals and environmental groups to sue the government if action on climate change continues to be stalled. In Canada, the courts have generally been unsympathetic to this form of legal action. In 2007, Friends of the Earth Canada sought a declaration that

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the government’s climate change plan failed to comply with a federal law: the Kyoto Protocol Implementation Act (KPIA). The KPIA was passed in June 2007 by a coalition of opposition parties. It required the government to file a climate change plan with a view to meeting Canada’s obligation as a signatory to the Kyoto Protocol. The government, which had opposed the legislation, filed a plan that effectively admitted that it could not and would not comply with these obligations. Friends of the Earth sued. In dismissing the case, the court held that the provisions of the KPIA, taken together, “were so policy-laden, permissive and subject to parliamentary consultation and review, that they did not evince a legislative intention to impose absolute, justiciable compliance obligations upon the government.”145 The court ruled that the legislation itself was not justiciable—meaning that it is not a question the courts can settle or resolve. The decision was upheld on appeal, with the effect of removing any domestic legal requirement for Canada to adhere to the Kyoto protocol.146 In 2005, Imperial Oil applied to the Alberta Energy and Utilities Board for approval to develop and mine the Kearl Oil Sands—a large deposit of bitumen located about 70 km north of Fort McMurray in Alberta. Because the KOS project would potentially cause harm to fish, an environmental assessment under the Canadian Environmental Assessment Act was obligatory. Given the magnitude of the potential impacts, the federal government referred the environmental assessment to a joint environment assessment panel consisting of three members. The Joint Panel issued its 116-page report in February 2007. The report concluded that: “the KOS project is not likely to result in significant adverse environmental effects, provided that the recommendations and mitigation measures proposed by the Joint Panel are implemented.” In March 2007, four environmental groups filed a Notice of Application of judicial review of the Joint Panel’s report. Several alleged flaws were cited in the Notice of Application but the essential concern was that the mitigation measures were insufficient, and that the panel should have reasonably concluded that the project would cause significant adverse environmental effects. This would leave the government to make the final decision of whether to approve the decision regardless of its environmental impacts. The Kearl Oil Sands development was projected to produce around 4.6 million tonnes a year of carbon dioxide. Both the province of Alberta and the Joint Panel found these emissions reasonable and that human health impacts for the application were negligible.147 What these lawsuits demonstrate is that the courts in Canada tend to go along with accepted practice and the status quo. Since the mining of the oil

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sands has been continuing for decades, the review panel saw no reason to block a development which was essentially business as usual. Since accounting for the external costs associated with the emissions of greenhouse gases has never been part of the calculus, it was not taken into account this time either. Environmental assessment in Canada is weak and flawed because it is so subjective. It may involve a great deal of talk and consultation, but the result essentially reflects the mindset of the people engaged to conduct the assessment. These are generally engineers and scientists who are working in the industry. They are not going to seriously question whether another oil sands mining project is necessary when the oil and gas industry is loudly forecasting huge demand for oil and natural gas in China, India and south-east Asia for the foreseeable future. And of course mining the oil sands can make lots of money. For the people working in the oil and gas industry, that’s really the only bottom line.

The Cost of Carbon The cost of cleaning up after all the pipeline, coal train, oil train, and tanker accidents is enormous—often running into hundreds of millions of dollars. But these numbers are relatively small compared to the estimated costs of providing health care for people impacted by the air pollution caused by coal-fired power plants, the gas processing and oil refining industries, and the urban smog caused by millions of automobiles burning gasoline and diesel fuels. The health costs associated with the production and consumption of fossil fuels are almost never borne by the companies and industries that cause the problem. For the most part, these costs are paid by national governments using funds raised by taxation. It’s not the polluter who pays. Economists are increasingly looking at the aggregate environmental costs of using fossil fuels over the complete life-cycle of the fuel. For instance, in the case of coal, each stage of the life-cycle of the fuel— extraction, transport, processing, and combustion—generates waste that creates multiple hazards for human health and the environment. The cost of the damage caused by these hazards are not paid by the coal industry. They are referred to as ‘externalities’ or external costs. The classic example is that of a private owner of a coal power plant paying for coal, labour, and other inputs and charging for the energy sold, but not bearing a cost for the damages to health and nature caused by the air

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pollution the power plant emits. These costs are borne by society as a whole, so that the outcomes for private and social welfare differ.148 A study of the US coal industry in 2011 estimated the external cost of the fuel cycle as somewhere between a third to over one-half of a trillion dollars each year. In that report, accounting for the damages associated with the use of coal conservatively doubles or even triples the price of electricity generated from coal.149 A more detailed study of the external costs of energy was conducted by the European Commission in 2014. Eighteen impact categories were identified and quantified. The top five were: • • • • •

Climate change Particulate matter Human toxicity Agricultural land occupation Depletion of energy resources

Other categories included ozone depletion, terrestrial acidification, marine eutrophication, ecotoxicity (3 types), water depletion, metal depletion, photochemical oxidant formation, ionizing radiation (from nuclear power plants), and natural land transformation. The impact of the life cycle of 13 types of energy production were quantified and monetized. Figure 4.12 shows the external costs associated with the production of electricity for several different technologies.150 What is immediately clear from the data shown in Fig. 4.12 is that the external costs of the four fossil fuel-powered electricity power plants (the first four bars on the left), are higher than nuclear power, and substantially more than the eight types of renewable energy shown on the graph. This is because the emissions of greenhouse gases from fossil fuel production and combustion contribute substantially to global warming and hugely costly climate change impacts. The cost to society of these emission can be quantified—at least approximately. If the external costs of coal fired power generation were fully internalized the cost of electricity generated from coal would approximately double. This is the same value as the external cost estimated by the US study cited earlier—although at the lower end of that estimate. And the fact that the US study calculated a higher external cost for coal fired plants seems plausible given that European regulatory controls are generally stricter and that a carbon tax is already in force—which has the result of internalizing a fraction of the external cost.

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Fig. 4.12  External costs per technology for electricity technologies, US¢/kWh (Source European Commission)

Figure 4.12 shows that wind energy and hydropower have the ­lowest external costs. Solar photovoltaic energy has external costs of about 2¢/kWh—much higher than wind energy, which seems surprising—but the authors of this report caution that this maybe an overestimate because of the ‘high rate of technological development’ at the time the survey was conducted.151 This evaluation of the external costs of energy production only substantiates what we already know. Fossil fuels have a huge environmental impact, a massive carbon footprint, and harm people’s health everywhere they are produced and burned as fuel. One final point concerns the methodology employed to evaluate these external costs. It does not account for all the accidents that occur every year due to the mining, drilling, processing, transport, and combustion of fossil fuels. None of the pipeline spills, natural gas explosions, oil rig disasters, oil tanker fires, tailing pond failures, oil refinery accidents, and coal train and oil train derailments are included in the analysis. So when you consider the sheer magnitude and extent of the damage caused by the use fossil fuels, you have to ask yourself the question: Surely there’s a better way of providing energy and power to the world?

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Conclusion In this chapter we have documented the substantial environmental impacts caused by the exploitation of fossil fuels for the production of electricity, and for producing the fuels that power the transport sector and provide energy to industry and the built environment. Coal is the fuel that has the greatest environmental and health impacts. For the miners, black lung disease comes with the job. The mining, cleaning and processing of coal requires huge tailing ponds that have polluted ground water and which sometimes have failed catastrophically. Moving coal by train generates substantial quantities of harmful coal dust, and there have been frequent accidents. Coal-fired power plants produce large emissions of greenhouse gases, particulate matter, and mercury—a potent neurotoxin that finds its way into the food chain and raises blood concentrations in communities that consume relatively large amounts of fish. This is particularly a problem for the Indigenous communities of Northern Canada. Oil, petroleum products, and natural gas are conveyed around North America in a sprawling network of pipelines that frequently break, leak, and spill, often contaminating major rivers and watercourses. Oil trains have derailed, caught fire and exploded. Oil tankers sink, and oil rigs have leaked millions of gallons of oil into the oceans, fouling coastlines and killing wildlife on numerous occasions. This chapter has also shown that the exploitation of the oil sands in Alberta, Canada, is one of the most polluting industries found anywhere on Earth—producing significant emissions of carbon dioxide, methane, and volatile chemicals, and requiring some of the largest tailing ponds in North America. Finally, if the external costs associated with fossil fuels are fully accounted for, it is clear that all the sources of renewable energy: solar, wind, hydropower, biomass, and geothermal energy generate electricity at substantially lower cost. We ended this chapter with a question. Surely there’s a better way of providing energy and power? And of course there is. In the next chapter we look at the renewable sources of energy. Solar energy and wind power are available everywhere and are inexhaustible sources of power. Hydropower can be affected by fluctuating rainfall and drought conditions which may reduce its output, but for the moment it remains the renewable energy technology that globally delivers the greatest amount of dependable power.

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Notes 1. See the brilliant book by Parker, Geoffrey: Global crisis: War, climate change, & catastrophe in the seventeenth century. Yale University Press, New Haven, CT. 2013. 2. See the US Bureau of Labor Statistics Fact sheet | coal mining | April 2010. Injuries, illnesses and fatalities in the coal mining industry. Accessed at: https://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/osh/os/osar0012.htm. 3. See statistics from the US Mine Safety and Health Administration. Accessed at: https://arlweb.msha.gov/stats/centurystats/coalstats.asp. 4. See the article in the American Journal of Respiratory and Critical Care Medicine: “Resurgence of debilitating and entirely preventable respiratory disease among working coal miners”. AJRCCM 190 (6) (15 September 2014). 5. See New black lung epidemic emerging in coal country. Accessed at: https:// www.ecowatch.com/black-lung-epidemic-2538494787.html. Also Black lung study finds biggest cluster ever of fatal coal miners’ disease. Accessed at: https://www.npr.org/2018/02/06/583456129/black-lung-biggest-clusterever-of-fatal-coal-miners-disease. 6. See Congress is giving the coal industry a break, and sick miners may pay the price. Accessed at: https://nymag.com/intelligence/2018/12/coal-congressblack-lung-fund.html. 7. See Coal miners suffering from black lung disease fight for compensation. Accessed at: http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/907788.shtml. 8. See the Report: Energy and Air Pollution. World Energy Outlook special Report. International Energy Agency 2016, p. 35. 9. See the article by the Union of Concerned Scientists: How coal works. Accessed at: https://www.ucsusa.org/clean-energy/all-about-coal/how-coalworks#.WlecoKinHIU. 10. See Technical document: Acid mine drainage prediction. US Environmental Protection Agency, Office of Solid Waste, Washington, DC. 1994. 11. See Acid mine drainage—A legacy of an industrial past. Accessed at: https://eic.rsc.org/feature/acid-mine-drainage-a-legacy-of-an-industrialpast/2020087.article. 12. See The Inez coal tailing dam failure (Kentucky, USA). Accessed at: http:// wise-uranium.org/mdafin.html. 13. Coal waste impoundments: Risks, responses and alternatives. National Academy of Sciences, Washington, DC. 14. See This is a first: Duke Energy agrees to pay $84K penalty for coal ash leaks. Accessed at: http://www.greensboro.com/news/local_news/this-isa-first-duke-energy-agrees-to-pay-k/article_e5feb62d-618b-5fb0-a28457b9f6c5ccdf.html.

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15. See Did Canada just have the largest coal slurry spill in its history? Accessed at: https://www.ecowatch.com/did-canada-just-have-thelargest-coal-slurryspill-in-its-history-1881814153.html. 16. See Ponds are the biggest environmental disaster you’ve never heard of. Accessed at: https://news.vice.com/article/tailing-ponds-are-the-biggest-environmental-disaster-youve-never-heard-ofTailing and Tailing pond spill: What happens to effluent over time. Accessed at: http://www.cbc.ca/news/ canada/british-columbia/tailing-pond-spill-what-happens-to-effluentover-time-1.2729751. 17. See Report on Mount Polley tailing storage facility breach. Accessed at:  https://www.mountpolleyreviewpanel/default/files/report/Reporton MountPolleyTailingStorageFacilityBreach.pdf. The breach was avoidable. The report stated bluntly: “Had the downstream slope in recent years been flattened to 2.0 horizontal to 1.0 vertical, as proposed in the original design, failure would have been avoided” (emphasis added). 18. See Many coal sludge impoundments have weak walls, federal study says. Accessed at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/ many-coal-sludge-impoundments-have-weak-walls-federal-studysays/2013/04/24/76c5be2a-acf9-11e2-a8b9-2a63d75b5459_story.html? utm_term=.0ffb1d75a7a3. 19. See Remembering Aberfan. Institute of Hazard, Risk and Resilience blog, Durham University UK. http://ihrrblog.org/2011/10/21/rememberingaberfan/. 20. See Natural Resources Canada: Coal facts. Accessed at: https://www.nrcan. gc.ca/energy/facts/coal/20071. 21. See Coal’s assault on human health. A Report from Physicians for Social Responsibility. 2009. Accessed at: http://www.psr.org/resources/coals-assault-on-human-health.html. 22. See Coal’s assault on human health, pp. x, xi. Op. cit. 23. See Report: Germany Suffers More Coal-Linked Deaths Than Rest of EU. Accessed at: https://www.euractiv.com/section/health-consumers/news/ report-germany-suffers-more-coal-linked-deaths-than-rest-of-eu/. 24. See Coal-fired power plants remain top industrial polluters in Europe. Accessed at: https://www.eea.europa.eu/highlights/coal-fired-power-plantsremain. 25. See Coal ash: The toxic threat to our health and environment. Physicians for Social Responsibility and Earth Justice. 2010. http://www.psr.org/environment-and-health/code-black/coal-ash-toxic-and-leaking.html. 26. Ibid. 27. See https://www.publicintegrity.org/2016/07/20/19962/former-cleanupworkers-blame-illnesses-toxic-coal-ash-exposures/.

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28. See New industry data confirms toxics are polluting groundwater at coal ash sites. Accessed at: https://earthjustice.org/news/press/2018/new-industrydata-confirms-toxics-are-polluting-groundwater-at-coal-ash-dumps. 29. Hg is the chemical symbol for mercury. The symbol comes from the Latin name Hydrargyrum—meaning liquid silver. 30. See Mercury in petroleum and natural gas: estimation of emissions from production, processing and combustion. EPA Report EPA-600/R-01-066. September 2001. 31. See Countries meet to address mercury as global emissions rise by 20%. Accessed at:  https://www.thegef.org/news/countries-meet-address-mercury-globalemissions-rise-20. 32. See the EPA website: https://www.epa.gov/mercury/basic-informationabout-mercury#airemissions. 33. See Poland’s coal-related mercury emissions revised upwards, significantly. Accessed at: https://ieefa.org/plands-coal-related-mercury-emissionsrevised-upward-significantly/. 34. See the report on mercury from the Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment (CCME). Accessed at: https://www.ccme.ca/en/resources/ air/mercury.html. 35. See the World Health Organisation fact sheet: Mercury and health. Updated March 2017. Accessed at: http://www.who.int/mediacentre/ factsheets/fs361/en/. 36. See the WHO Fact sheet: Mercury and health. Ibid. 37. The chart is from Physicians for Social Responsibility Report. Op. cit. 38. The data are from the Physicians for Social Responsibility Report. Op. cit. 39. See Countries meet to address mercury as global emissions rise by 20%. Accessed at: https://www.unenvironment.org/news-and-stories/pressrelease/countries-meet-address-mercury-global-emissions-rise. 40. See http://www.historic-uk.com/HistoryUK/HistoryofBritain/Great-HorseManure-Crisis-of-1894/. 41. See The Prize by Daniel Yergin. Free Press. 1991, p. 64. 42. See the Wikipedia entry at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_oil_ spills/. 43. See New price tag for Kalamazoo River oil spill cleanup: Enbridge says $1.21 billion. Accessed at: http://www.mlive.com/news/grand-rapids/ index.ssf/2014/11/2010_oil_spill_cost_enbridge_1.html. 44. See National Energy Board. Accessed at: https://www.neb-one.gc.ca/sftnvrnmnt/sft/dshbrd/dshbrd-eng.html. 45. See The biggest oil pipeline spills in Canadian history. Accessed at: https:// activehistory.ca/2015/07/the-biggest-oil-pipeline-spills-in-canadianhistory/.

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46. See The world’s worst offshore oil rig disasters. Accessed at: https://www. offshore-technology.com/features/feature-the-worlds-deadliest-offshoreoil-rig-disasters-4149812/ and Major offshore accidents of the 20th and 21st century. Accessed at: https://www.arnolditkin.com/practice-areas/ oil-rig-explosions/major-oil-rig-diasassters. 47. The description of the incident and the image in Fig. 4.5 are taken from the Investigation report and executive summary of the incident issued by the US Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board. Available at: http://www.csb.gov/assets/1/7/Overview_-_Final.pdf. 48. See the National Ocean Service Report: Deepwater Horizon oil spill. Accessed at: https://oceanservice.noaa.gov/news/apr17/dwh-protected-species.html. 49. See the National Ocean Report, ibid. 50. See the EPA toxic release Inventory (TRI) website: https://www.epa.gov/ trinationalanalysis/comparing-industry-sector-2015-tri-national-analysis. 51. EPA-600/R-01-066. Op. cit., p. 17. 52. See EPA cracks down on oil refinery pollution. Accessed at: http://thehill. com/policy/energy-environment/255299-epa-cracks-down-on-oil-refinerypollution. 53. See Co-op refinery VOC emissions 10x higher than average of other refineries. Accessed at: http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/saskatchewan/coo-op-refinery-voc-emissions-10x-higher-than-average-of-other-refineies-1.3122876. 54. See Fumes across the fence-line: The health impacts of air pollution from oil & gas facilities on African American communities, a report by the Clean Air Task Force. November 2017. 55. See City in a swamp: Houston’s flood problems are only getting worse. Accessed at: https://inisideclimatenews.org/news/22012018/houstonflood-plain-development-hurricane-harvey-reservoirs-overflow. 56. See Massive fire breaks out at Philadelphia oil refinery. Accessed at: https:// washingtonpost.com/nation/2019/06/21/philadelphia-oil-refinery-fire/. 57. See Motiva shuts Port Arthur Texas refinery due to flooding. Accessed at: https://www.cnbc.com/2017/08/30/motiva-shuts-port-arthur-texas-refinery-due-to-flooding.html/. 58. See Harvey shines a spotlight on a high-risk area of chemical plants in Texas. Accessed at: https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/sep/01/ harvey-shines-a-spotlight-on-a-high-risk-area-of-chemical-plants-in-texas. 59. See City in a swamp: Houston’s flood problems are only getting worse. Accessed at: https://insideclimatenews.org/news/22012018/houston-floodplain-development-hurricane-harvey-reservoirs-overflow and https://projets.propublica.org/graphics/harvey-manchester. 60. See Hurricane Harvey’s toxic impact deeper than public told. Accessed at: https://apnews.com/e0ceae76d5894734b0041210a902218d/HurricaneHarvey’s-toxic-impact-deeper-than-public-told.

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61. See the report on hurricane Katrina issued by the White House. Accessed at: https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/reports/katrina-lessonslearned/chapterr1.html. 62. See Alberta energy: Facts and statistics. Accessed at: http://www.energy. alberta.ca/OilSands/791.asp. 63. See Alberta Oil Sands Industry Quarterly Report. Winter 2017. Available at: www.albertacanada.com/business/statistics/oil-sands-quarterly.aspx. 64. See the report by the Pembina Institute: Tailing ponds: The worst is yet to come. Accessed at: http://www.pembina.org/blog/real-ghg-trend-oilsands. 65. See Environmental impacts of oil sands development in Alberta. Accessed at: http://www.resilience.org/stories/2009-09-22/environmental-impactsoil-sands-development-alberta. Also http://calgaryherald.com/business/ energy/tailing-ponds-a-critical-part-of-albertas-oilsands-legacy, which gives the area of the tailing ponds as 220 km2. 66. See the book by the former CEO of Suncor, Rick George: Sun rise: Suncor, the oil sands and the future of energy. HarperCollins. 2012. 67. See the INSIGHT article in the Toronto Star on 24 November 2018. Penny wise and pound foolish. 68. Ibid. 69. See Oil sands technology. https://sunshineoilsands.com/?page=oilsands-technology. Accessed 26 January 2018. 70. The graph is taken from: The real GHG trend: Oilsands among the most carbon intensive crudes in North America. Accessed at: http://www.pembina. org/blog/real-ghg-trend-oilsands. 71. See Oil sands operations as a large source of secondary organic aerosols. Accessed at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/303509842_Oil_ sands_operations_as_a_large_source_of_secondary_organic_aerosols, and also: Alberta’s oilsands industry is a huge source of harmful air pollution, study says. Accessed at: http://www.cbc.ca/news/technology/oilsandssoas-1.3599074. 72. Kirk, J.L., Muir, D., Gleason, A., Wang, X. et al.: “Atmospheric deposition of mercury and methylmercury to landscapes and waterbodies of the Athabasca oil sands region”. Environmental Science and Technology 48 (13) (2014): 7374–7383. Available at: https://pubs.acs.org/doi/pdf/10.1021/ es500986r. 73. See Andrews, A., and Lattanzio, R.K.: Petroleum coke: Industry and environmental issues. Congressional Research Service. October 2013. 74. See the EPA Report: Hydraulic fracturing for oil and gas: Impacts from the hydraulic fracturing water cycle on drinking water resources in the United States. US Environmental Protection Agency, EPA-600-R-16-236ES. December 2016.

208     M. J. Bush

75. For Canada, see What you need to know about fracking in Canada. Accessed at: https://www.desmog.ca/2017/04/06/what-is-fracking-in-canada. For USA see https://www.eia.gov/dnav/ng/ng_prod_wells_s1_a.htm. 76. The diagram is from the factsheet Hydraulic Fracturing issued by the Canadian Society for Unconventional Resources (CSUR). Available at: http://www.csur.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/HydFrac_v3.pdf. 77. Ibid., p. 39. 78. See the EPA Report. Op. cit., p. 7. 79. See what you need to know about fracking in Canada. Accessed at: https:// www.desmog.ca/2017/04/06/what-is-fracking-in-Canada. 80. See the report by Concerned Health Professionals of New York & Physicians for Social Responsibility. Compendium of scientific, medical, and media findings demonstrating risks and harms of fracking (unconventional gas and oil extraction), 5th edition. March 2018. Available at: http://concernedhealthny.org/compendium/. 81. See the CCA Report: Environmental impacts of shale gas extraction in Canada. Council of Canadian Academies, Ottawa, Canada, 2014, p. 90. 82. Ibid., p. 92. 83. Entrekin, S., Trainor, A., Saiers, J., Patterson, L., et al.: Water stress from high-volume hydraulic fracturing potentially threatens aquatic biodiversity and ecosystem services in Arkansas, United States. Environmental Science and Technology. 31 January 2018. 84. See the EPA Report. Op. cit., p. 18. 85. See the EPA Report. Op. cit., p. 20. 86. See the EAP Report. Op. cit., p. 26. 87. See Fracking by the numbers: The damage to our water, land and climate from a decade of dirty drilling. Environment America and the Frontier Group. 88. See the EPA Report, p. 29. 89. EPA Report, p. 29. 90. CCA Report, p. 93. 91. These data are from the EPA Report, p. 31. 92. See Science News. EPA underestimates methane emissions. Accessed at: https://www.sciencenews.org/article/epa-underestimates-methane-emissions. This issue is also discussed in the CHPNY&PSR compendium report on pp. 178 and 181. Op. cit. 93. See Fracking the future: How unconventional gas threatens our water, health and climate. DeSmogBlog Society of British Columbia. 2010. 94. See the Compendium report by CHPNY&PSR. Op. cit. Accessed at: http://concernedhealthny.org/compendium/. 95. See “Comparison of airborne measurements and inventory estimates of methane emissions in the Alberta upstream oil and gas sector”. Environmental Science and Technology 51 (21) (2017): 13008–13017.

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96. Howarth, R.: “Methane emissions and climatic warming risk from hydraulic fracturing and shale gas development: implications for policy”. Energy and Emission Control Technologies 3 (2015): 45–54. 97. See Gathering pipelines FAQs. Accessed at: https://www.phmsa.dot.gov/ faqs/gathering-pipelines-faqs. Updated 8 May 2017. 98. See Natural Resources Canada brochure: Pipelines across Canada. Accessed at: https://www.nrcan.gc.ca/sites/www.nrcan.gc.ca/files/energy/files/pdf/ 14-0277-%20PS_pipelines_across_canada_e.pdf. 99. See the PHMSA brochure: Gathering pipelines FAQs (updated 8 May 2017). 100. See Pipelines across Canada. Op. cit. 101. See Boom in unregulated natural gas pipelines posing new risks. Accessed at: https://insideclimatenews.org/news/20130926/boom-unregulated-naturalgas-pipelines-posing-new-risks. 102. See Explosions from gas utility lines kill 1, injure 10 in Massachusetts. Accessed at: https://www.utilitydive.com/news/explosions-from-gas-utilitylines-kill-1-injure-10-in-massachusetts/532397/. 103. Reported in the Compendium Report by CHPNY&PSR. Op. cit. Accessed at: http://concernedhealthny.org/compendium/. 104. See the conclusion of the Compendium Report by CHPNY&PSR. Op. cit. Accessed at: http://concernedhealthny.org/compendium/ 105. See Coal derailments lead to tragedy. Accessed at: https://blog.nwf. org/201207/going-off-the-rails-on-a-crazy-coal-train. 106. See Coal derailments lead to tragedy. Op. cit. 107. See the NTSB Accident Report. Accessed at: https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/RAB1407.pdf. 108. See Railway accidents in the United States 2011 through June 2014. Accessed at: https://www.stb.gov/Ect1/ecorrespondence.nsf/UNID/ 0FB2B0AFB471952285257DB3001F22F3/$file/Railway+Accidents+ in+the+United+States.pdf. 109. See the Canadian Transportation Safety Board website: http://tsb.gc.ca/ eng/rail/index.asp. 110. See the International Energy Report: Medium-Term Oil Market Report 2013. 111. See the IEA Report, p. 134. 112. See Oil train derails in Columbia River Gorge, rally calls for ban on ‘Bomb trains’. Accessed at: https://www.ecowatch.com/oil-train-derails-in-columbia-river-gorge-rally-calls-for-ban-on-bomb–1891163987.html. 113. See Train carrying crude oil derails in Pickens County causing explosions and fire, no injuries reported. Accessed at: http://blog.al.com/tuscaloosa/2013/11/train_carrying_crude_oil_derai.html.

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114. See Train carrying oil, liquid petroleum gas derails in Alberta. Accessed at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-cnrailway-derailment/train-carrying-oil-liquid-petroleum-gas-derails-in-alberta-idUSBRE99I04820131019. 115. See 2013 was a record year for oil-train accidents, and insurers are wary. Accessed at: https://www.alternet.org/environment/2013-was-record-yearoil-train-accidents-and-insurers-are-wary. 116. See Lac-Megantic runaway train and derailment investigation summary. Transportation Safety Board of Canada. Accessed at: http://www.tsb.gc.ca/ eng/rapports-reports/rail/2013/r13d0054/r13d0054-r-es.asp. 117. See 2013 was a record year for oil-train accidents, and insurers are wary. Accessed at: https://www.alternet.org/environment/2013-was-record-yearoil-train-accidents-and-insurers-are-wary. 118. See Toronto Star. Lac Megantic relocating railway line. 11 May 2018. 119. See Canadian National Railways derailment numbers soared 73% before recent crashes. Accessed at: http://business.financialpost.com/transportation/canadian-national-railways-derailment-numbers-soared-73-before-recent-crashes. 120. See the Transportation Safety Board of Canada News release: Derailment and fire of second Canadian national crude oil train near Gogama, Ontario. Accessed at: http://www.tsb.gc.ca/mediass-media/communiques/rail/2015/ r15h0021-20150317.asp. 121. DeSmogBlog. Derailed oil train spills 230,000 gallons of tar sands in flooded Iowa river. Accessed at: https://www.desmogblog. com/2018/06/25/oil-train-derailment-doon-iowa-bnsf-230000-gallons-oilflooded-river. 121. DeSmogBlog. Oil-by-rail rises once again as safety rules disappear. Accessed at: https://www.desmogblog.com/2018/10/17/safety-rules-rollbacksecond-oil-train-boom-rail-industry? 122. At the time of writing in late 2018, most climate scientists believe that the stricter target of limiting global warming to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels can no longer be achieved. Global emissions of greenhouse gases increased in 2017 and look certain to rise again in 2018. Even achieving the 2 °C target without overshoot looks unlikely, and technologies to remove CO2 from the atmosphere are still in their infancy. 123. See Bismarck residents got the Dakota Access Pipeline moved without a fight. Accessed at: https://www.pri.org/stories/2016-12-01/bismarckresidents-got-dakota-access-pipeline-moved-without-fight. 124. See DAPL routed through standing rock after Bismark residents said no? Accessed at: https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/dapl-routed-throughstanding-rock-after-bismarck-residents-said-no/. 125. See the Wikipedia article: Dakota Access Pipeline Protests. Accessed at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dakota_Access_Pipeline_protests/.

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127. CAPP. Crude oil forecast, markets and transportation. Accessed at: https:// www.capp.ca/pub;ication-and-statistics/publications/303440. 128. See Line 3 Replacement Program and Northern Gateway Decisions Statement. Accessed at: http://www.enbridge.com/media-center/media-statements/ government-of-canada-pipelinedecisions/. 129. See Kinder Morgan pipeline: Canadian government to buy project for $4.5bn. Accessed at: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/may/29/ canada-kinder-morgan-pipeline-trans-mountain. 130. See the Federal Court of Appeals decision. Available at: https://decisions. fca-caf.gc.ca/fca-caf/decisions/en/item/343511/index.do. 131. See the Trans Mountain Corporation website: https://www.transmountain. com/project-overview. 132. See TransCanada cancels Energy East Oilsands pipeline. Accessed at: https://www.desmogblog.com/2017/10/05/transcanada-cancels-energyeast-oilsands-pipeline. 133. See the Enbridge news release at: http://www.enbridge.com/ projects-and-infrastructure/projects/line-3-replacement-program-canada. 134. See Minnesota regulators approve Enbridge Line 3 project. Accessed at: https://www.cbc.ca/news/business/enbridge-minnesota-line-3-1.4726894. 135. See the excellent Wikipedia article at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ Keystone_Pipeline, from which most of the information on the Keystome XL pipeline is taken. 136. See the article in High Country News: A judge just dealt a potentially fatal blow to KeystoneXL. Accessed at: https://www.hcn.org/articles/ oil-a-judge-just-dealt-a-potentially-fatal-blow-to-keystone-xl/. 137. See the text and photos in Chapter 3. 138. See Alberta plans to buy 7000 rail cars to ease ‘crisi’ in oil price differentials. Accessed at: https://business.financialpost.com/pmn/business-pmn/ alberta-plans-to-buy-7000-railcars-to-ease-crisis-in-oil-price-differentials. 139. This perspective is taken directly from the excellent report by the International Bar Association: Achieving justice and human rights in an era of climate disruption. Available at: https://www.ibanet.org/ PresidentialTaskForceClimateChangeJustice2014Report.aspx. 140. Ibid. 141. Ibid. 142. Ibid. 143. See The US supreme court slows children’s climate lawsuit—For now. Accessed at: https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2018/10/22/the-us-supreme-courtslows-childrens-climate-lawsuit-for-now/#6bd4e5aa297e. Also The supreme court is about to decide if the children’s climate lawsuit can proceed. Accessed at: https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2018/10/23/18010582/ childrens-climate-lawsuit-supreme-court.

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144. See Children win another climate change legal case in Mass supreme court. Accessed at: https://www.forbes.com/sites/jamesconca/2016/05/19/ children-win-another-climate-change-legal-case-in-mass-supremecourt/#1b14c5e75822. 145. Quoted in the report by the International Bar Association. Op. cit. 146. See Canada wriggles off the hook for violating Kyoto law. Accessed at: https://foecanada.org/en/2008/10/canada-wriggles-off-the-hook-forviolating-kyoto-law/. 147. Joint Panel Report. EUB Decision 2007-013. Accessed at: https://www. aer.ca/documents/decisions/2007/2007-013.pdf. 148. This explanation is given in the report: Subsidies and costs of EU energy. Final Report. 149. See Coal’s hidden costs top $345 billion in U.S.-study. Accessed at: https:// www.reuters.com/article/usa-coal-study/coals-hidden-costs-top-345-billion-in-u-s-study-idUSN1628366220110216. 150. See the European Commission Report: Subsidies and costs of EU energy. Final Report. European Commission. November 2014. 151. See the EU Report. Ibid., p. 37, Figure 3–8 and notes. Accessed at: https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/edmonton/obed-mountain-minefine-athabasca-spill-1.4154792.

5 Coming Clean

Introduction At the end of Chapter 4 we asked the question: Surely there’s a better way of providing energy and power to the world? In this chapter, we answer that question with a resounding: Yes there is! Solar energy, wind power, geothermal heat, and hydraulic energy have been used in one form or another since the beginning of recorded history. England’s Domes Day book dates from the eleventh Century and recorded the number of mills powered by water in towns across the country. But you can go back to the Romans, and before that to the Egyptians and the Chinese to find examples of ways in which the power of water and the wind was used to drive simple machines. Hot springs were popular in Roman times. Now, geothermal energy is used to generate electricity at utility-scale in the US and Iceland, and on a smaller scale in many other countries. District heating using geothermal hot water has found wide application across Europe. Huge megawatt-scale solar photovoltaic installations, and enormous wind turbines now generate enough power to light hundreds of thousands of homes. An energy revolution is underway. In this chapter we look at these technologies and discover how these sources of inexhaustible renewable energy, none of which produce emissions of greenhouse gases, can provide nearly all of the global demand for energy—and at less cost.

© The Author(s) 2020 M. J. Bush, Climate Change and Renewable Energy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15424-0_5

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Wind and Water Wind and water at first powered mechanical machines made mainly from wood. But with the invention of electricity and its rapid evolution into a source of power for industrial machinery in the nineteenth century, it wasn’t long before the flow of water was channelled and harnessed to generate electricity. The first recorded hydroelectric machine was built was in England in 1878—when a small turbine and generator produced electricity to light a single electric bulb. But the idea rapidly caught on. Just three years later there were hydroelectric plants installed in Grand Rapids, New York and Niagara Falls in the US, and in Ottawa, Canada. Then in 1895, the world’s largest hydroelectric plant at that time: the Edward Dean Adams power plant, started operating at Niagara Falls.1 At about the same time, the first electricity-generating wind turbine was erected in Scotland by James Blyth and used to light his home. In 1887, a large wind turbine was built in Cleveland, Ohio, by Charles Brush. It drove a 12 kilowatt generator. Electricity generated from solar energy and wind power didn’t really take off until the twentieth century. In rural America and Canada in the 1930s, kilowatt-scale wind electric turbines were commonplace—until electrification programs brought centrally-generated electricity to rural farms in the 1960s.2 Experimentally, wind turbines got bigger. The first megawatt-scale turbine was the Smith-Putnam machine erected on Grandpa’s Knob in Vermont in 1941. The first wind farm, albeit with smaller turbines, was erected in Altamont Pass in California in the early 1980s. Solar photovoltaic electricity was a late starter compared to wind and water—but is now one of the most widely deployed forms of renewable energy. After years of steady cost decline, renewable power technologies are now an increasingly competitive way to meet global energy needs. In particular, the decline in electricity costs for utility-scale solar photovoltaic (PV) projects has been huge. Solar PV technology is now competing head-to head with conventional power sources—and doing so without financial support. Three main cost reduction drivers have emerged for renewable energy: improvements in technology, competitive procurement, and a large base of experienced international project developers. Electricity from renewable sources of energy will soon be consistently cheaper than energy from fossil fuels. Well before 2020, all the renewable

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power generation technologies that are now in commercial use will fall within fossil-fuel cost range, with most at the lower end and undercutting all fossil fuels. The outlook for solar and wind electricity costs to 2020, based on the latest auction and project-level cost data, projects the lowest costs yet seen for these modular technologies. Decreasing electricity costs from renewables as a whole, and the low costs from the best solar PV and onshore wind projects represents a real paradigm shift in the competitiveness of different power generation options.3

Leading the Way A number of countries have moved strongly forward to facilitate a transition to a low-carbon and even a zero-carbon economy. A first and absolutely essential step is to phase out coal-fired power plants. The Netherlands, the United Kingdom, Finland, France, Italy, and Portugal all have committed to closing their coal plants in the coming decade. The movement called Europe Beyond Coal is working hard to facilitate this transition—in association with the Sierra Club’s Beyond Coal campaign.4 In November 2017, a group of 27 national, provincial, state, and city governments launched the Powering Past Coal Alliance, committing to phasing out coal power by 2030. By early 2018, over 60 government organizations had signed up.5 Across the USA, over 50 cities, five counties and one state have adopted 100% clean energy goals. Five cities have already met this target: Aspen, Burlington, Greensburg KS, Rock Port MO, and Kodiak Island AK. These five cities generate 100% of their energy from renewable energy sources. Numerous other US cities have made commitments to cut carbon and address the threat of climate change through initiatives like the ‘Compact of Mayors’, ‘We Are Still In’, or by establishing their own Climate Action Plan.6 Universities and schools are powering up on solar energy. In 2019, the University of Hawaii, Maui College will be one of the first campuses in the US to generate all of its energy from on-site photovoltaic electricity coupled with battery storage. The entire university network will be 100% renewable by 2035 and the state has committed to be 100% on renewables by 2045. The Ready for 100 association, initiated by the US Sierra Club, has issued guidelines for this transition: climate action plans and energy action plans.7 Another initiative being promoted by the Sierra Club is Mayors for 100% clean energy—190 mayors have signed up to a future of 100% clean and renewable energy.8

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Then there’s RE 100—a collaborative, global initiative uniting more than 120 influential businesses committed to consuming 100% renewable electricity and working to increase the demand and delivery of renewable energy. At the COP 22 meeting in Marrakesh in 2016, representatives from 47 of the world’s most disadvantaged nations pledged to generate all their future energy needs from renewable energy. Members of the Climate Vulnerable Forum (CVF) issued a statement on the last day of the Marrakesh meeting. Dubbed the Marrakesh Vision, the nations pledged that they will “strive to meet 100% domestic renewable energy production as rapidly as possible, while working to end energy poverty and protect water and food security. ”9 In 2018, the Balearic Islands’ government launched a plan to eliminate greenhouse gas emissions by 2050. New diesel cars are to be taken off the road in Ibiza, Majorca, Menorca and Formenta from 2025, a year in which all street lights are to be replaced by LEDs. Solar panels are to be installed on all buildings with roofs larger than 1000 square metres—which includes car parks, hospitals, supermarkets and sports stadiums. Gasoline and diesel vehicles are to be totally eliminated, and all car hire fleets on the islands will be electric.10 Over the course of 2016, 117 countries submitted their first Nationally Determined Contributions (NDC) under the Paris Agreement, and 55 of these countries featured renewable energy targets.11 During the same year, the Australian Capital Territory added a new commitment and several other large cities—such as Calgary, Tokyo, Cape Town and New York set significant targets for the transition to renewable energy.12 Copenhagen went one step further. As part of the city’s aim to become carbon-neutral by 2025, Copenhagen requires that all flat roofs be planted with vegetation.13 Many cities plan to simply ban gasoline and diesel vehicles from the city centre. Building on international agreement to phase out fossil fuel subsidies— such as the 2009 commitments by the Group of Twenty (G20) and by AsiaPacific Economic Cooperation (APEC)—by the end of 2016 more than 50 countries had committed to stop subsidising fossil fuels. Subsidy reforms were instituted in Angola, Brazil, Dominican Republic, Egypt, Gabon, India, Iran, Kuwait, Nigeria, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Thailand, Trinidad & Tobago, Tunisian, Ukraine, Venezuela, and Zambia. However, fossil fuel subsidies are still substantially higher than the subsidies for renewable sources of energy.14 So there is a high-profile groundswell of initiatives aimed at reducing countries’ and cities’ dependence on fossil fuels and transitioning towards a low carbon economy. But the pace of change has to pick up substantially.

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Global Energy Production The year 2017 saw a continuing fall in the price of photovoltaic energy and wind power, and a continued interest in energy storage—one of the keys to the more rapid adoption of renewable power technologies. Globally, primary energy demand has grown by an annual average of around 1.8% since 2011, although the rate of growth has slowed in the last few years. Growth has been more rapid in developing countries and emerging economies—whereas in many developed countries demand has slowed or even declined. In North America and western Europe, coal production is declining as many countries commit to phasing out coal for electricity generation. But several countries—most notably China and India, continue to increase coal production for generating electricity.15 Figure 5.1 shows the share of renewable energy in global final energy consumption in 2016. Figure 5.1 shows that renewable sources of energy provides a significant fraction, more than 18%, of the energy consumed worldwide. If we look at only modern renewables—excluding the wood and charcoal traditionally used for cooking in many developing countries, the fraction falls to just over 10%. But this is still more than four times larger than the contribution of nuclear power. However, the share of fossil fuels in final energy consumption has actually been increasing since 2014 when it was 78.3%. Table 5.1 shows the increase in the deployment of renewable energy over the period 2014–2017. Solar photovoltaic and wind power are the technologies leading the rapid penetration of renewable sources of energy into global electrical power production.

Fig. 5.1  Estimated renewable energy share of total final energy consumption in 2016 (REN21. Renewables 2018 Global Status Report) (Source REN21)

218     M. J. Bush Table 5.1  Renewable energy indicators 2014–2017 Renewable energy technology

2014

2015

2016

2017

% change 2014–2017

Power capacity GW Renewable power (including hydro) Renewable energy (not including hydro) Hydropowera Bio-power Geothermal Solar photovoltaic Concentrating solar thermal Wind power

1701 665

1856 785

2017 921

2195 1081

29.0 62.6

1036 101 12.9 177 4.3 370

1071 106 13 228 4.7 433

1095 112 12.1 303 4.8 487

1114 122 12.8 402 4.9 539

7.5 20.8 −0.8 127.1 14.0 45.7

Heat GW thermal Solar hot water

409

436

456

472

15.4

Transport—billion litres Ethanol production Biodiesel production

94.5 30.4

98.3 30.1

103 30.8

106 31

12.2 2.0

The data are from the Renewables Global Status Report for 2016, 2017 and 2018. There are some slight differences in the data reported in the different reports aThis figure does not include pumped storage facilities. The figure for installed capacity reported by the International Hydropower Association for 2017 is 1267 GW— including pumped storage capacity. See Chapter 6 Source REN21 Global Status Report

Hydropower continues to dominate the renewable energy technologies in terms of installed capacity, but this source of energy is growing only slowly. In contrast, solar photovoltaic and wind power are catching up rapidly. Concentrating solar thermal power (the ‘power tower’ concept), is still a developing technology—but one with considerable potential—particularly when combined with thermal storage. Geothermal is a technology with enormous potential at megawatt scale— but is hampered by high upfront costs and investment risks. Nevertheless, there are installations operating successfully—notably in the US, Philippines, and Indonesia, and development work is continuing elsewhere. But as Table 5.1 shows, installed capacity has not changed materially over the last four years. New investment in renewable power and fuels (not counting large hydro over 50 MW) exceeded $200 billion annually for the eighth year running. Investments in renewable power capacity including hydropower, was three times the investment in fossil fuel generating capacity and more than double the investment in fossil fuel and nuclear power generation combined. The principal focus was solar photovoltaic energy, which increased its lead over wind power in 2017. Moreover, investment in small-scale solar PV registered significant growth—rising 15% to $49 billion.16

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The Key Sectors The European Commission has set out a roadmap that charts how the European Union plans to transition towards a low-carbon economy. The Commission estimates that by 2050, emissions of greenhouse gases will have to be reduced by 80% compared to 1990 values if the Paris Agreement limits of 1.5–2 °C are to be achieved. The milestones along the way are set as: • A 40% reduction by 2030 • A 60% reduction by 2040. Can this unprecedented reduction in greenhouse gas emissions be achieved by transitioning to renewable energy? Figure 5.2 shows how this substantial reduction in European emissions is to be achieved.17 What this roadmap projects is that the power sector should be almost fully decarbonized by 2050—by mandating and incentivizing an almost total transition to renewable energy. The power sector has the greatest potential for cutting emissions. It can virtually eliminate CO2 emissions by 2050. In parallel, electricity is expected to replace fossil fuels both in transport and heating. Electricity will come from renewable resources: wind, solar, hydropower and biomass, or other clean energy sources like nuclear power. Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is also expected to play a role in reducing emissions.

Fig. 5.2  European greenhouse gas emission reductions projected through to 2050 (Source European Commission)

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By 2050, emissions from transport are forecast to be reduced by 60% below 1990 levels. In the short-term, greater fuel efficiency for gasoline and diesel engines is an essential part of transport policy. But over the mid- to longer-term, plug-in hybrids and electric vehicles will produce steeper emission reductions. Both policies can be pursued in tandem as the transition to electrified vehicles gradually becomes the dominant mode of transport. Biofuels are expected to be increasingly used in aviation and in long-distance haulage where electric powertrains may not be practical or economic. In this European scenario, emissions from residences and office buildings are substantially reduced—by about 90% in 2050. This is to be achieved by incorporating energy-efficient heating and cooling technology in new buildings, refurbishing older buildings to improve energy efficiency, and substituting electricity and renewables for fossil fuels in heating, cooling and cooking. In the industrial sector, energy intensive industries are expected to cut emissions by more than 80% by 2050—by using more efficient technologies and also by more widespread employment of CCS in industries where reductions are more difficult for technical reasons—such as steel-making and cement production. Emissions from agriculture are forecast to decrease more modestly—and the share of agriculture in EU’s total emissions is expected to rise to about a third by 2050.18

The Power Sector In 2017, renewable power generating capacity recorded its largest ever annual increase—rising almost 9% above 2016 levels. Overall, renewable energy accounted for an estimated 70% of net additions to global power capacity in 2017, due in large part to the increasing cost-competitiveness of photovoltaic energy and wind power. Solar PV led the way—accounting for nearly 55% of newly installed renewable power capacity in 2017. More new solar PV was installed than net additions of fossil fuels and nuclear power combined.19 The International Energy Agency (IEA) proclaimed that it was the start of “a new era for solar power”.20 Figure 5.3 breaks out the types of renewable energy that contributed to this electrical power production at the end of 2017. Globally, most electrical power continues to be generated in coal-fired power plants, but as noted earlier in this chapter, several countries have

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Fig. 5.3  Estimated renewable energy share of global electricity production end-2017 (Source REN21 Global Status Report)

committed to phasing out coal—although not always right away; 2030 is often cited as the deadline for the collective shutdown. Hydropower remains the predominant renewable power technology— out-muscling the other renewables because of the numerous large-scale hydropower plants operating around the world. But there is mounting concern that this technology is vulnerable to the fluctuating precipitation and increased variability that the changing climate will have on rainfall patterns and river flows. Compared to wind and solar, hydropower capacity has increased only modestly over the last couple of years. At the end of 2017, the top five countries for total installed renewable electric power capacity were China, the USA, Brazil, Germany and India. If large hydropower is set aside, the top five countries would be China, the US, Germany, India and Japan—all countries with significant solar and wind power capacity. China alone is responsible for over 40% of global renewable energy capacity growth—a policy which is driven in part by serious concerns about air pollution. The country is ahead of schedule—exceeding its 2020 solar PV target in 2016 and expecting to surpass its wind target in 2019. In 2018, China represented half of global solar PV demand, while Chinese companies account for about 60% of total annual PV cell manufacturing capacity. The spectacular growth in wind and PV power is being driven by recordlow auction prices for electricity production—as low as $30/MWh (equivalent to 3 US cents per kilowatthour) on the international market. These contract prices, structured as power purchase agreements (PPAs), are increasingly below the cost of power from new gas and high-efficiency coal power plants.

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A case in point are the offers made by several international consortia bidding in February 2018 to construct a 300 MW photovoltaic power plant in Sakaka, Saudi Arabia. At least five of the offers were below 3 cents/ kWh—those made by French energy group Engie, Japanese companies JGC Corporation and Mitsubishi, Total (France) and the Saudi energy group ACWA. Saudi Arabia’s Renewable Energy Project Development Office (REPCO) awarded the contract to ACWA—which signed a 25-year Power Purchase Agreement in March 2017.21 In 2018, the USA was the second-largest growth market for renewables— in spite of the uncertainties created by tax reforms, NAFTA negotiations, and import duties imposed by the Trump administration. The main economic drivers remained strong for new onshore wind and solar installations such as multi-year federal tax incentives combined with renewable portfolio standards as well as state-level policies for distributed solar PV systems.22 The third major player on the global renewable energy stage is India. By 2022, the country is expected to more double its current renewable electricity capacity, and the rate of growth of renewable energy will be greater than the European Union. Recent auctions for solar energy have yielded prices lower than coal tariffs—for the moment by far the predominant fuel source for electricity generation in India.

Can Coal Come Clean? Coal-fired electrical power generation technology has definitely improved. High-efficiency low-emission (HELE) coal-fired power plants are being proposed as a climate-friendly technology that can substantially reduce emissions of carbon dioxide. The greater efficiency is achieved because the power plants operate at much higher temperatures—at above 700 °C where steam becomes super-critical and has quite different physical and thermodynamic properties compared to steam at lower temperatures. The higher thermal efficiency means that the power plant uses less coal—which leads to lower emissions of carbon dioxide and the other pollutants found in the flue gases of coal-fired power plants. Table 5.2 from a coal industry publication shows the relative performance of a proposed 1 GW HELE coal power plant in South East Asia. Table 5.2 shows that a supercritical HELE power plant could reduce CO2 emissions by about 22%—which is a significant improvement. But this benefit comes at a substantial price: capital costs increase by 40%, from $1.05 to $1.47 billion per megawatt of installed capacity.

5  Coming Clean     223 Table 5.2  Relative performance of coal-fired generation technologies in South East Asia Technology

Capital cost (M$/ MW)

Conventional 1.05 Subcritical Supercritical 1.26 Ultra 1.47 supercritical

Net thermal Emission Capital cost Annual emisrate (tCO2/ for 1 GW plant sions at 85% efficiency (%) ($million) MWh) load factor (MtCO2) 32

1.04

1047

7.73

36 39

0.88 0.81

1256 1465

6.54 6.06

See the report from World Coal: The case for coal: The power of high efficiency coal reducing emissions while delivering economic development and reliable energy. https://www.worldcoal.org/sites/default/files/resources_files/The%20Power%20of%20 high%20efficiency%20coal%20-%20WCA%20-%200316.pdf Source World Coal

The coal industry argues that CCS technology could further reduce emissions by removing CO2 directly from the flue gases—which is true. But all this advanced technology gets to be expensive, and CCS technology has yet to be proven at large scale. In addition, this analysis ignores the rest of the coal fuel cycle: the mining operations, the tailings ponds, the coal trains, the coal ash retention ponds, and the emissions of mercury and other pollutants—all the parts of coal’s life cycle that have serious negative and costly impacts on the environment and on human health. The truth is that natural gas—a cleaner fuel, and renewable energy (cleaner still), have a substantial economic advantage over coal-fired power plants. But politics often plays a dominate role in governments’ energy policy decision-making. Take the case of Poland. In 2018, Poland was Europe’s largest coal producer, and the fossil fuel continues to dominate the energy mix in Poland—accounting for a huge 80% of electricity production. The country is investing in new mines including those producing lignite—the lowest quality coal. The Polish government’s strong commitment to coal has little to do with economics. The coal industry has a long and proud tradition in Poland. Miners parade in traditional uniforms at state events. They enjoy salaries and pensions higher than the national average. They are also highly organized, politically influential, and mobilize rapidly and effectively to ensure that the mines are kept open and that coal is the principal fuel for power generation.

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The government is also keenly aware of issues around energy security. The country does not want to be dependent on Russian supplies of natural gas, and domestic supplies of coal are abundant, predictable and secure. Supplies of liquified natural gas are increasing: Poland is diversifying its suppliers, but the fuel is intended to reduce the country’s reliance on Russia rather than to substitute for coal. This situation evidently creates a political problem for the European Union—which is strongly committed to phasing out coal and transitioning to renewable energy.23

Transport Worldwide, the transportation of goods and people by road, rail, ships and airplanes, accounts for roughly a quarter of greenhouse gas emissions— about the same as the electrical power sector. If vehicles could be powered by electricity generated by renewable energy or nuclear power, and if other technologies like fuel cells or hydrogen could also power zero-emission vehicles (ZEVs), the global reduction in greenhouse gases could potentially be huge. Electric vehicles have been around for decades. But it is only with the increasing concern about the global warming effects of carbon dioxide emitted from internal combustion engines that the call for a global transition towards ZEVs has grown louder and (literally) gained more traction. At the Paris Conference of Parties meeting in December 2015, a declaration was issued specifically focusing on the electrification of the transport sector. Titled the Paris Declaration on Electro-Mobility and Climate Change & Call to Action, the declaration stressed the link between ZEVs and the “low-carbon production of electricity and hydrogen, implemented in conjunction with broader sustainable transport principles.”24 Citing modeling work undertaken by the IEA, the Declaration called for the electrification of rail transport, and for at least 20% of all road transport vehicles to be electrically powered by 2030—if global warming is to be limited to 2 °C or less. This scenario foresees more than 100 million electric vehicles on the roads in 2030, and more than 400 million two- and three-wheelers (up from about 250 million operating today—mainly in China).25 Considering that there are only about 3 million electric vehicles on the roads at the present time (2018) this scenario envisaged by the IEA and

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endorsed by the UNFCCC at the 2015 COP meeting in Paris implies an almost explosive growth in the sale of electric vehicles. Is it a realistic scenario? In 2015, for the first time in history, there were more than 1 million electric vehicles on the road. In early 2018, the number of electric and plug-in hybrids had already soared to 3 million.26 Figure 5.4 shows the trend in EVs sold worldwide at the end of 2017. The rapid growth in the number of electric vehicles in operation since 2010 has been phenomenal. The market is dominated by China and the US, followed by Japan and the Netherlands. However, in the Nordic region—Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden, the stock of EVs has been expanding steadily since 2010 and by the end of 2017 it had reached almost 250,000 cars, about 8% of the global total of electric vehicles. Per capita, the Nordic region has one of the highest levels of EV penetration in the world.27 Norway is leading the way—in 2015 electric vehicles had an impressive 23% of market share. Three years later more than half of new car sales were for battery electric or hybrid cars, and all-electric cars made up 31% of the market.28 In Germany by the end of 2017, Deutche Post DHL had 5000 StreetScooter electric vehicles operating entirely on renewable electricity for the company’s urban postal delivery service. According to DHL, the EV’s

Fig. 5.4  Global Passenger Electric Vehicle Market (including PHEVs), 2012–2017 (Source REN21 Global Status Report)

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maintenance costs are 60–80% less than similar conventional vehicles, and the use of renewable electricity reduces the company’s CO2 emissions by 16,000 tonnes a year, contributing to DHL’s commitment to achieve netzero emissions by 2050.29 In Latin America there is strong interest in electric vehicles. Cities in Columbia, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Uruguay and Costa Rica have all committed to increasing EV’s market share and electrifying public transport. The region has some of the cleanest electricity in the world. In 2016, over 50% of electricity was generated by renewable sources of energy, so switching to electric vehicles brings immediate benefits in terms of cutting back emissions of carbon and improving air quality in urban areas.30 China overtook the USA in 2015 and is now the largest market for electric vehicles (EVs). China is also home to the highest global deployment of electric scooters and electric buses. The country has seen a phenomenal growth in the production and use of electric scooters and motorcycles largely because of restrictions on conventional 2-wheelers in towns and cities in order to reduce air pollution. In 2017, the country had over 250 million electric 2-wheelers on the road, and more than 300,000 electric buses.31 The rapid growth in the deployment of electric vehicles is certain to continue. The Electric Vehicle Initiative (EVI), a multi-government policy forum established in 2009 under the Clean Energy Ministerial, has a goal of a global deployment of 20 million zero emission vehicles on the road by 2020.32 The state of California alone is aiming for 5 million zero emission vehicles operating by 2030.33 Although less bullish than these projections, a 2018 forecast by Bloomberg New Energy Finance (BNEF) projected sales of electric vehicles increasing from 1.1 million in 2017 to around 11 million in 2025, reaching 30 million in 2030. China is expected to lead this transition with almost 50% of the global EV market in 2025. The market penetration of electric buses will be even more dramatic as their cost drops below conventional municipal buses.34 In China, the numbers are going through the roof. In July 2018, it was reported that for the five-month period from January to May, the production and sales of electric vehicles reached 328,000 units—increases of 123% and 142% respectively compared to the previous year. China expects to achieve more than 1 million units in both production and sales of EVs in 2018.35 In 2017, a coalition of global corporations, including Unilever, IKEA, and DHL launched a global campaign to accelerate the transition to electric vehicles and away from gasoline and diesel-powered transportation. Since

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more than half of the cars on the road belong to companies, the new coalition, called EV100, could potentially have a major impact on the pace at which the change to electric vehicles takes place. Germany’s Deutche Post DHL Group, a global delivery company, purchased EV startup StreetScooter to build its own electric delivery can service. European power plant operator Vattenfall plans to replace its 3500 strong car fleet with plug-in EVs over the next five years. New York City plans to convert all 5700 of its public buses to an all-electric fleet by 2040.36 The projections keep climbing exponentially. In May 2019, the IEA was predicting 250 million electric vehicles on the road by 2030!37 Other companies involved in EV100 include Chinese webservice giant Baidu, retailer Metro AG, Heathrow Airport and Hewlett Packard.38 Governments have used a wide variety of financial incentives to encourage the shift from gasoline and diesel vehicles to ZEVs—mainly battery electric vehicles and plug-in hybrids. These incentives include: EV purchase incentives • Rebates at registration and sale • Sales tax and VAT exemptions • Tax credits EV use and circulation incentives • • • •

Circulation tax exemptions Waivers on fees: toll roads, congestion charges, parking, ferries Electricity supply reductions and exemptions Tax credits for company cars

Waivers on access restrictions • Access to bus lanes • Access to HOV lanes • Access to restricted traffic zones. These incentives are often coupled with dissuasive measures aimed at reducing the emissions of conventional vehicles: regulations limiting tailpipe emissions and stricter fuel efficiency standards. In addition, a number of European cities plan to completely ban gasoline and diesel vehicles because of concerns about air pollution. In 2018, Paris, the English city of Oxford, as well as the whole of the Netherlands announced separate proposals to

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phase out gasoline and diesel vehicles.39 Britain intends to ban all new gasoline and diesel vehicles by 2040.40 But the lack of charging points in the UK has been cited as a barrier to the rapid uptake of electric vehicles.41 These financial and fiscal incentives are having a positive impact on the global market penetration of electric vehicles. But as the cost of batteries fall and economies of scale kick in, electric vehicles will increasing become competitive with conventional vehicles even without the subsidies. A 2017 study found that battery EVs were already the cheapest option in the UK, the US and Japan. Studies show that the lower cost of maintenance and fuel brings down the annual cost of battery electric vehicles to below that of diesel- and gasoline-engine cars in the UK. Battery electric vehicles are also less expensive to own and operate compared to hybrids and plug-in hybrids in Japan, Texas and California.42 One of the keys to the rapid deployment of electric vehicles, apart from the numerous incentives, is the rapidly declining cost of the batteries— which are a major cost component of all electric vehicles. Battery packs (often called the ESS or Energy Storage System), have been dropping rapidly in price—falling nearly 80% since 2010.43 By displacing the internal combustion engine (ICE), electric and other zero emission vehicles deliver immediate benefits in terms of urban air quality—a hazard that is becoming increasingly dangerous in cities in China, India and even in Europe. But substantial greenhouse gas reductions can only be realised if the power plants generating the electricity are powered by renewable energy or nuclear power—not fossil fuels. There is therefore a powerful synergy between renewable energy power plants and electric vehicles. Acting in tandem, the potential for substantial game-changing reductions in global emissions of greenhouse gases is huge.

Public Transport One attractive option that is available to cities that have serious air pollution problems caused by gasoline and diesel vehicles is to strongly promote the deployment of electric buses. Converting city transit buses to electric is a definite win-win situation if the source of electricity is predominantly renewable energy. Diesel exhaust from buses pose a serious health risk. The vehicles mainly run in areas where there are lots of people, including in the more densely crowded areas of cities, on the busiest roads and often close to schools. Buses circulate almost continuously and make several trips each day.

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The message is getting out. In April 2018, New York City announced it will convert its public bus system to an all-electric fleet by 2040. Not to be outdone, Los Angeles has committed to transitioning its entire bus fleet to electricity by 2030. Other US cities are piloting electric buses: Seattle, Washington DC, Chicago, Portland, Albuquerque, to name a few. In Canada, Edmonton has committed to electric buses and Montreal is expected to follow suit.44 Toronto has committed to purchasing 30 electric buses by 2019, and the whole fleet is to go electric by 2040.45 The range anxiety issue can more easily be allayed in larger vehicles—like trucks and buses—that can carry much larger energy storage systems. A case in point is a Proterra 40-foot bus that broke records in 2018 by running over 1600 km in the US on a single charge. Other manufacturers are taking a stake in what is rapidly becoming a substantial global market. Chinese automaker BYD will manufacture electric buses and trucks in its Lancaster, California, facility. Volvo has a new 7900 series battery electric bus (BEB) on the market. In 2017, Hyundai unveiled a BEB with a range of 180 miles. Volkswagen in Europe and Tata in India are also manufacturing BEBs. A good place to start is with school buses. These buses in the US and Canada carry millions of children to school and back every weekday. Replacing all of America’s school buses with electric buses would avoid more that 5 million tonnes of greenhouse gas emissions. This reduction is twice as much as would be saved by converting all the US transit buses to electric power.46 There are serious health risks associated with diesel school buses running in and of schools and with children standing in proximity to the exhaust gases. Although electric buses cost more to purchase, their lifetime costs are less. The operating costs of electric buses are less than half the cost of conventional diesel buses. Each electric school bus in service is estimated to save districts nearly $2000 a year in fuel and $4400 in reduced maintenance costs compared to diesel school buses.47

Marine and Aviation Marine shipping and aviation are also significant producers of carbon dioxide. Many ships burn heavy fuel oil—one of the worst fuels imaginable in terms of carbon emissions. Aircraft produce significant amount of CO2 emissions, and as international travel and tourism continues to rise, so too do the emissions produced by international aviation.

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The substitution of alternative fuels in ships and aircraft is technically possible, but little progress has been made so far—mainly because of a lack of regulatory oversight, but also because alternate fuels are more expensive and there is therefore little incentive for commercial operators of ships and aircraft to switch to fuels with a lower carbon footprint.

Shipping In 2018, international shipping was responsible for about 900 million tonnes a year of carbon dioxide—which puts shipping right up there with Germany in terms of emissions of greenhouse gases. If international shipping were a country it would be in 8th place in the world’s top ten of highest emitters of carbon dioxide. Essentially unregulated at the present time,48 emissions from shipping are projected to rise to 1090 Mt of CO2 by 2035 and to roughly double again by 2050 unless shipping is regulated and controlled much more effectively.49 In addition to the greenhouse gases, the heavy fuel oil burned by the majority of oceangoing vessels in their low-speed diesel engines produce a slew of other pollutants—including black carbon. This pollutant, which is not covered by the Kyoto Protocol or the Paris Agreement, is now recognized as having a strong influence on global warming and climate change. Technically black carbon is not a gas, and so it is not classified as a greenhouse gas. But its greenhouse warming effect is substantial—even perhaps exceeding the global warming impact of methane. There is more about the global warming potential of black carbon in Chapter 2. The widespread use of residual fuels in international shipping exacerbates the problem because ships using residual fuel oil emit more black carbon than if they operated on cleaner distillate fuels. Shipping emitted about 67,000 tonnes of black carbon in 2015. Larger ships are responsible for most of these emissions. Container ships, bulk carriers and oil tankers together emitted 60% of BC emissions. But cruise ships are the worst offender—each ship emitting three times more than container ships and about six times more than oil tankers. However, container ships emit more black carbon than any other class of ship simply because there are more of them.50 Figure 5.5 graphically depicts the relative emissions of black carbon among the different types of shipping.51

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Fig. 5.5  Tonnes of black carbon emissions per ship per year in 2015 (Source International Council on Clean Transportation)

On average, one cruise ship emits as much black carbon as over 4000 heavy duty trucks clocking 100,000 km a year. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) which regulates international shipping, has been discussing how to control greenhouse gas emissions from oceangoing vessels for more than 20 years. Under the UNFCCC Kyoto protocol, the IMO was assigned responsibility to limit GHG emissions from international shipping, which fall outside of national borders. But it wasn’t until 2011 with the passage of the Energy Efficiency Design Index that the IMO adopted its first mandatory requirements for GHG emissions from oceangoing vessels. However, in 2015, reduction targets for international shipping and international aviation were not included in the Paris Agreement. In April 2018, the IMO held the 72nd meeting of the Marine Environment Protection Committee—which adopted a resolution codifying an initial greenhouse gas strategy for international shipping. This was the first global climate framework for shipping that included quantitative GHG reduction targets through to 2050, and a list of candidate policy measures to help achieve these targets. The GHG reduction targets set by the IMO include: • At least a 40% reduction in carbon intensity (defined as CO2 emissions per unit of transport work) by 2030, and pursuing efforts towards a 70% reduction by 2050, both compared to 2008 levels.

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• To peak GHG emissions from international shipping as soon as possible and to reduce total annual GHG emissions by at least 50% by 2050 compared to 2008 levels while pursuing efforts towards phasing them out consistent with the Paris Agreement temperature goals. • A new phase of the Energy Efficiency Design Index to be reviewed within the Marine Environment Protection Committee.52 According to the International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT), achieving these targets will “require near-term policies to significantly improve the fuel efficiency of the global fleet, and to promote the development and deployment of low-and zero-carbon fuels and propulsion technologies.”53 But what is lacking in these proposals is any reference to black carbon emissions. Since BC technically is not a greenhouse gas, it is not specifically covered by proposals to reduce GHGs. Moreover, the metric carbon intensity is defined only in terms of emissions of CO2 related to transport work (ton-mile of travel or a similar metric). So emissions of black carbon may not actually change. Just before the IMO meeting in April 2018, the International Transport Forum published a report examining how maritime transport might transition to zero-carbon shipping by 2035.54 Several alternative fuels for shipping were evaluated including advanced biofuels, liquified natural gas, hydrogen, ammonia, methanol, wind power, fuel cells, electric-hybrid propulsion, solar photovoltaic, and nuclear propulsion. Wind power and photovoltaics are not at present technically viable for oceangoing shipping. But powering smaller coastal vessels and ferries with low-carbon fuels and electricity is feasible. For examples of how this might be achieved, we take a look at Sweden— which has taken the global lead on decarbonizing maritime transport.

Case Study: Sweden The Swedish Shipowners Association is aiming for zero CO2 emissions by 2050—an ambitious but feasible target. The Scandinavian country is among the first with a significant number of LNG-powered ships, ship-to-ship LNG supply ships, electric ships, and methanol-powered vessels. • The company Erik Thun AB operates an LNG-powered ocean-going dry cargo vessel. • Viking Lines operates the world’s largest LNG-powered passenger ferry between Stockholm and Turku in Finland. • Green City Ferries operates an electric ferry between Stockholm and Movitz.

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• HH Ferries operates two electric ferries between Helsingborg in Sweden ad Helsingor in Denmark—a 4 km route. The ferries are the largest 100% electric-powered car and passenger ferries in the world. Both are hybrid diesel-electric ships with the diesel as a back up to the electric motors. The lithium batteries can be charged in under 10 minutes. • Stena Line is the first shipping company to use methanol as fuel—converting a large passenger and car ferry operating between Gothenburg and Kiel in Germany. None of these ships are directly powered by solar or wind. The electric ships are powered by electricity from batteries that are charged at the end of their journey. But if the national grid is running mostly on hydropower—which is the case in Sweden, effectively this is zero- or low-emission shipping powered for the most part by renewable energy.55 Not just the ships, but the ports are also going electric. In the US, the port of San Diego is switching to electric powered forklifts and other dockyard vehicles. Ships in port turn off their auxiliary engines and plug into the power system to reduce pollution.56

Aviation Electric planes transporting large numbers of passengers over long distances are not impossible—but seem highly unlikely with today’s technology—or even tomorrow’s. But we already have drones capable of carrying a passenger or two over short distances, so maybe the future of electric aviation isn’t so far off. In the meantime, airplane engines can be converted to run on biofuels, and while this is not a zero emission option, it is certainly a better alternative in terms of net carbon emissions compared to today’s petroleum distillate jet fuels.57

Residential and Tertiary The principal use of fossil fuels in residences and in commercial buildings is for heating and cooling—services which can both be provided by electricity. To take advantage of electricity generated from renewable resources of energy, the residential and tertiary sectors should be electrified—just like the road-based transportation sector. So the first step in reducing the emission of greenhouse gases from the residential sector is to phase out the fossil fuels used for space heating: natural gas, heating oil, and wood, and to switch everything over to electricity— from renewable sources of energy, of course.

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Going Electric In the developed world and in the cities of developing countries, just about all functional buildings that accommodate people for at least part of the day are connected to an electrical power supply of some kind. Most of that electricity is supplied by an electrical distribution system connected to a large and extensive power grid. But this model of generating and distributing electricity is slowly changing. In North America and Europe, increasing numbers of homes and residences have installed solar photovoltaic systems to provide part or all of the electricity consumed in the home. The majority of these homes are still connected to the grid. At night, and when the solar system is not generating enough power, electricity is supplied by the grid. In the USA, there are now more than a million homes and residences that generate part or all of their electricity from solar (PV) panels.58 In Germany, the number of distributed (meaning small) PV systems was estimated at 1.6 million at the end of 2017.59 In Japan and Italy, the installation of residential PV systems has also shown strong growth over recent years. In 2016, almost $40 billion was invested into predominantly rooftop and small ground-mounted solar PV systems of less than 1 MW. This was a decline of 28% on the previous year’s outlay of $55.5 billion and well below the peak of the German and Italian PV boom years of 2011 and 2012.60 Although investment in small distributed PV was down in 2016 compared to the year before, the amount of residential and commercial capacity was about the same—at approximately 20 GW. The drop in investment was partly due to lower PV system costs in certain key markets—which enabled developers to install more capacity for the same amount of money. For instance, American PV installers SolarCity, SunRun and Vivint all dropped their prices in 2016, while in Australia and Germany prices remained largely constant.61 Although PV investments in China are larger than all other countries, the US leads the field in terms of small distributed capacity—which are PV systems installed on homes, offices and small businesses. Figure 5.6 shows the investments in billion dollars for small distributed PV systems for the top ten countries over the period 2015 to 2016.62 The slowing down of investment in Japan and the UK is noticeable, as is the striking acceleration of investment in India—albeit from a much smaller base. The cost of residential PV systems is falling due to the continuing decline in the price of solar photovoltaic panels. If this trend continues as expected, then the transition to 100% solar powered homes and businesses

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Fig. 5.6  Small distributed capacity investments by country in 2016 and growth on 2015 (Source Frankfurt School)

is certain to accelerate—as long as there is an enabling financial and policy environment. In this context it is interesting to note the legislation passed in California in 2018. This state will become the first to require solar PV panels on most new homes. The mandate applies to all new homes, condos, and apartment buildings up to three floors tall that obtain building permits in 2020. The plan will not require the homes to reach net zero energy status, but homeowners who install a battery, like a Tesla Powerwall, will get an exemption that allows them to further reduce the size of the solar array.63 In promulgating the new building standards, the California Energy Commission (CEC) also recognized the importance of energy storage (i.e. batteries) in reducing a residence’s energy demand so that the residence has almost no impact on the grid. Roof top solar without storage can cause stability problems when excessive amounts of distributed power are being fed to the grid.64 Open for Business Several high profile businesses and commercial operations in the US and Europe are now running entirely on solar energy. These showcase installations play an important role in raising public awareness about photovoltaic electricity, because they visibly demonstrate the ability of photovoltaic systems to power large business operations that are household names. Top companies are investing in PV power in record numbers. 2017 was the 3rd largest year for installations by America’s companies—with

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325 MW of installed capacity. Installations are also getting larger—as prices fall or perhaps as companies are motivated by seeing competitors go solar. The average system size for business installations since 2008 has risen from 250 kW to over 440 kW in 2017, while installed system prices have fallen by a whopping 73% since 2010. Supermarket chains Target and Walmart lead the field: in 2017 Target had 422 PV installations across the country, while Walmart was not far behind with 371 systems in operation.65 Schools Follow Suit Schools are ideal buildings to be powered by solar photovoltaic electricity. Their energy demand peaks during the day when photovoltaic power output is highest, and they usually have lots of available roof space, and parking areas where PV canopies can provide useful shade and protection. Any vacant adjacent land can also be used to add more capacity. On the weekends, this excess power can be supplied to the grid and generate revenue for the school. In the US, there are several thousand photovoltaic systems installed on K-12 schools across the country. A 2014 report documented that 3752 K-12 schools in the US had installed PV systems—meaning that almost 3 million students were attending schools powered in part by solar energy. PV systems also make economic sense: the report found that the electricity generated in one year by these schools saved a combined $77.8 million per year in utility bills—an average of almost $21,000 per year per school. California leads with 963 schools powered by solar energy in 2014—with a total installed capacity of 217 MW. In second place is New Jersey with 379 schools generating a total of 91 MW.66 The province of Ontario, Canada, has also taken advantage of generous feed-in-tariffs offered by the provincial government. In the Toronto area, 301 schools had installed PV systems in mid-2018.67 Photovoltaic systems powering schools offer a unique opportunity to involve school children in the science of solar energy. It’s a solar energy laboratory right there in the school.

Solar Thermal Although electricity can power space heating through heat pump systems, providing hot water is an essential service not just for residences and offices but also for industry. Solar thermal energy can be a cost-effective option. The amount of direct heat provided by solar energy worldwide is substantial. There were approximately 108 million solar thermal systems in

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operation across the globe at the end of 2015—mostly domestic hot water systems (63%), but also larger systems attached to multiple-unit housing, hotels, hospitals, and schools (28%). The remaining applications were for swimming pool heating (6%) and a few much larger systems for district heating, industrial applications, and solar cooling. The trend in the application of solar thermal technology is interesting. The data show that the smaller domestic systems are losing market share; conversely the number of larger solar thermal systems is increasing—even though it is only about 3% of the market. In several European countries, large-scale solar thermal plants connected to local or district heating grids have been in use since the early 1980s. In recent years, China has installed a number of large scale systems for district heating. By the end of 2016, there were about 300 solar thermal systems larger than 300 kWth68 (which implies about 500 m2 of solar collectors) connected to heating networks, and 18 systems connected to cooling networks. In 2016, 37 large systems were constructed—up from 21 the year before. Of these, 31 were all in one country: Denmark—primarily for district heating, including the world’s largest solar thermal installation in Silkeborg. This system has a large array of flat plate solar panels with a total area of over 156,000 m2 and can produce 100 MW of thermal power. The system works in parallel with an efficient combined-cycle gas plant and a system of heat pumps. So the system is not 100% renewable energy, but it is definitely low-carbon compared to a conventional fossil-fuel system. Moreover, the electricity supply comes from wind power.69 Denmark is also home to the 2nd largest solar thermal system in the city of Vojens. This is about half the size of the Silkeborg system, but it still delivers about 60% of the thermal energy demand of 2000 households in the city. In Canada, the Drake Landing Solar Community uses a 1.5 MWth centralized solar thermal plant connected to a seasonal borehole thermal storage to supply more than 90% of the energy needs for space heating of 52 energy efficient single family homes. Figure 5.7 shows the configuration of the solar collectors—800 of which are on the detached community garage. The Drake Landing solar installation uses an underground borehole system to store summer heat. In summer, the heated water is pumped through the borehole thermal energy storage system. The BTES consists of 144 boreholes that run 37 metres below the ground and cover an area of 35 metres in diameter. The heat is transferred to the surrounding earth which can reach 80 °C by

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Fig. 5.7  Drake Landing Solar Community heating system (see the Drake Landing website at https://dlsc.ca/how.htm) (Source Drake Landing Solar Community)

the end of the summer. To retain the heat, the energy storage is covered with sand, thermal insulation, a waterproof membrane, clay, and landscaping materials. Backup heating, if it’s needed, is provided by a natural gas system.

Geothermal Heating A renewable energy technology that can be directly tapped for residential and district heating is geothermal energy. Since the amount of thermal energy that can be extracted is often substantial, heating a district using geothermal energy is often the most efficient and cost-effective option. There are more than 250 geothermal district heating (geoDH) systems operating in Europe. Measured by thermal power output, Iceland is by far the most important country. But in terms of the number of operating systems, France and Germany are the leading countries.70 Where geothermal resources are insufficient, heat pumps can be employed in tandem to raise water temperatures. Geothermal energy can also be used to provide cooling—using absorption chillers, which require a source of heat to power the absorption cycle. Geothermal district heating and cooling requires electricity to power the pumps and compressors that are part of the equipment, and for the controllers that operate them. So as we have noted before, geothermal technology only is only carbon free if the electricity that keeps it running is generated from renewable resources.

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Industry Industry is a major source of greenhouse gases. In the US, about 15% of CO2 emissions is produced by the combustion of fossil fuels in this sector. But heavy industries such iron and steel, and the production of cement, petrochemicals, lime, and ammonia, and the incineration of waste produce significant amounts of CO2. Electrical power to industry can be provided from renewable sources, but where natural gas is burned for steam generation and process heat, the options for using renewable sources of energy may be limited. In these circumstances, CCS technologies may be the only way to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide. Industrial societies will always produce emissions of greenhouse gases. It is impossible to eliminate them entirely. The challenge is to manage these emissions so that they are as low as possible. There are natural sinks—the forests and the oceans—that absorb carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. But emissions of methane will always be a serious problem. As the production and consumption of fossil fuels powers down and is reduced to applications where solar energy cannot cost-effectively provide the service, fiscal instruments like carbon pricing that penalize the emission of carbon dioxide and methane will be essential. This policy, if strictly enforced, will lead to improvements in efficiency and innovations that keep emissions to a minimum. Lighter manufacturing industries that use only electricity (with perhaps some natural gas for heating) can switch entirely to solar photovoltaic power. A number of high profile manufacturing companies have made the transition over the last few years: Apple, Google, and Tesla—to name some of the most well-known members of the group.

Carbon Capture and Storage Carbon capture and storage technologies are developing rapidly. Their major advantage is that they can be used to capture and permanently store carbon dioxide produced by heavy industry. These are high-temperature, process heat applications where solar energy is not technically feasible and where electrical heating would probably not be cost-effective. When combined with biomass energy, CCS has been proposed as a way of absorbing carbon dioxide directly from the atmosphere and storing it

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safely underground. But this concept, known as BECCS, has several serious drawbacks—as noted in Chapter 3. There are several small-scale CCS projects operating in North America and Europe. One of the first was the Boundary Dam 3 project in Saskatchewan, Canada. Carbon dioxide is absorbed from the flue gases of Unit 3 of the power plant and pumped 66 km to the Weyburn Enhanced Oil Recovery Project where the CO2 is primarily used for enhanced oil recovery (EOR)—although a part of the output is pumped underground and stored.71 Using CO2 for EOR is a well-known technology that has been used at many oil production sites in North America. As a mechanism to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases it obviously has serious flaws—since the additional oil produced will generate more carbon dioxide when burned as fuel—thus negating the reduced emissions of the capture process. Carbon dioxide also dissolves in crude oil and so a fraction of the gas will be brought to the surface with the oil and released into the atmosphere when the pressure is reduced. The net effect of the carbon capture with EOR is unlikely to be close to zero. Moreover, it is not evident that CO2 used in EOR situations remains underground—since it is not being pumped into reservoirs specifically selected because of their ability to permanently contain the gas. In Canada, the Quest CCS project near Fort Saskatchewan in Alberta is designed to capture and store 1 million tonnes (Mt) of carbon dioxide a year. The CO2 is taken from Shells’ Scotford Upgrader which was opened in 2003 to process bitumen from the oil sands mines of the Athabasca Oil Sands Project (AOSP). The CCS project began operation in 2015 and cuts emissions from the bitumen upgrader by one third. The upgrader processes the bitumen to Syncrude by reacting the bitumen with hydrogen produced from methane. Carbon dioxide is a waste stream from this chemical process and was generally vented to the atmosphere.72 The captured CO2 is dehydrated and compressed into liquid form before being transported 60 km to a storage site in Fort Saskatchewan. The liquid CO2 is injected down three injection wells into the porous rock formation called the Basal Cambrian Sands for permanent storage 2 km underground. The most ambitious CCS project, and a possible blueprint for use of the CCS technology in removing large quantities of CO2 from the emissions of heavy industry, is the Teesside Collective project in the UK. The Tees Valley Process Industry cluster is one of the largest industrial areas in England, consisting of a diverse group of chemicals, petrochemicals, steel and energy companies. Teesside is one of the most carbon-intensive

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areas in the UK. Four industries are planned for the first phase of the CCS network: a blast furnace and steel works at Redcar; GrowHow’s Teesside operations at Haverton Hill—which include the production of ammonia, nitric acid, carbon dioxide and fertilizer plants; BOC Linde’s steam reformer operation producing hydrogen; and Latte Chemical UK’s plant producing PET resin pellets. The total CO2 production from the four plants is about 3 million tonnes of CO2 a year. Two locations in the North Sea are being considered as permanent storage sites for the captured carbon dioxide. The first is the Captain Aquifer which is situated about 430 km northeast of Teesside; the second is the Bunter Aquifer which lies about 150 km south east of the Tees. At the time of writing the UK government had not yet made a decision which of these aquifers will be used.73

Rural Electrification Over a billion people around the world live without access to clean forms of energy. Providing electricity to these families and households has been a priority for the international development agencies for decades. In some regions, there has been good progress—particularly now that one of the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals (#7) is to provide access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all people. In 2016, the number of people without access to electricity had fallen to just over a billion—down from over 1.6 billion in 2000. Substantial progress has been made in Asia, where the number of people lacking electricity fell by more than half from 2000 to 2016. However, in sub-Saharan Africa, progress has been much more uneven, and there are still more people without electricity in 2016 (588 million) than there were in 2000 (518 million).74 However, since 2012, the pace of rural electrification in sub-Saharan Africa has nearly tripled compared to the previous periods. East Africa in particular has made significant progress: the number of people without access has decreased by 14% since 2012. In spite of this effort, more than half of the population remain without access to electricity, making the region the largest concentration of people in the world without electricity. Of the 35 countries where more than half the population do not have electricity, 32 are African (the other three are Haiti, North Korea and the Solomon Islands).75 And yet the solution is literally staring us in the face: solar energy can easily provide electricity to all the countries where that energy is lacking.

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The communities that have no access to electricity are nearly always located in rural villages that are far from the country’s national grid. Extending the national grid out to rural villages is expensive. In most developing countries, villagers use very little electricity, at least at first, and so from the perspective of the national electricity company or service provider, building out the grid and connecting rural households is not an economic proposition—especially if the village is small and households are dispersed. Among all the options to provide electricity for rural communities, this option is the most expensive for national or regional governments—which is why so many rural communities remain without electricity. Nevertheless, as a matter of national policy, some governments have committed to providing electricity to all their population and have provided the necessary funds to extend the main power grid out to rural communities. In this case, substantial government subsidies will generally be necessary in order to keep the power transmission and distribution system up and running. However, access to electricity brings substantial economic benefit to rural communities and significant regional economic development will almost certainly follow when villages are connected to a reliable source of electricity. Aside from extending the national transmission system, there are two principal options when providing electricity to households in a village located far from the grid. The first is to build a local electricity distribution system where electricity which is generated on-site is distributed locally to several hundred customers. In effect, the system is set up like a small-scale grid, and so is generally referred to as a ‘mini-grid’. The second option is to install a small photovoltaic panel on each home and connect it directly to lights, a cell phone charger, and a couple of appliances. Each home has its own PV panel and there is no interconnection or distribution of electricity. These small individual systems are called Solar Home Systems (SHS).

Minigrids Minigrids are localized power networks usually without the infrastructure to transmit electricity outside of their service area. In the past, minigrids were nearly always powered by diesel generators or, less frequently, by small-scale hydropower. But increasingly mini-grids are being powered by solar photovoltaic electricity or wind turbines. If the main source of power is renewable energy, the minigrid will usually have a diesel generator or a bank of batteries to provide backup power. Some minigrids have both—allowing the diesel generator to run less often and saving on fuel.

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The economics of minigrids improve considerably if there are one or more ‘anchor’ loads on the system. These could be be public service institutions (for example: hospitals, clinics, schools, a police station or army post), or industrial and commercial facilities like a cell phone tower or an artisanal business. Mini-grids can be scaled up to meet rising demand, and they should always be designed so as to be technically compatible with the main grid—which in many cases will eventually be extended out into more rural areas.76 Since 2010, dozens of minigrid startups have appeared on the scene in Africa and India to take advantage of declining photovoltaic and energy storage costs. Manufacturers producing smart meters, software, and innovative payment technology have also made rapid progress. Minigrids are now seen as a key part of the energy access solution. For instance, the African Development Bank’s $60 million Sustainable Energy Fund for Africa (SEFA) is primarily focused on the promotion of minigrids; the Scaling-Up Renewable Energy Program (SREP) has dedicated tens of millions of dollars to minigrids in Africa; and the UK’s DFID agency has allocated £75 million to its Green Mini-Grids Africa Program.77 Minigrids have several significant advantages compared to solar home systems: • Minigrids can deliver more power and so can support larger commercial and light-industry loads. • They have lower costs per unit of electricity delivered compared to solar home systems. • They deliver standard alternating current (AC) electricity, and so households and businesses can operate regular appliances such as televisions, refrigerators, water pumps, and small electrical machinery like mills, grinders, circular saws, electric drills, and welding equipment. On the other hand, minigrids are more complex and more difficult to manage. Although smart meters and pay-as-you-go systems ensure much better financial management and less risk, the inverters, charge controller, power lines, and batteries require regular supervision and maintenance. At least one full-time technician needs to be onsite. The upfront capital cost of a minigrid system is substantial. The batteries in particular are often a problem in tropical climates because in a hot environment their lifetime can be reduced to just a few years—and they are expensive to replace. We will look at two case studies which provide contrasting business models: Tanzania and Haiti.

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Tanzania Over 60% of the population of Tanzania, about 37 million people, have no access to electricity. In rural areas, the percentage is even higher: over 90% of the rural population has no access to electrical power. The electrification of the country began with the installation of diesel powered mini-grids in the capital Dar es Salaam, and in the towns of Dodoma, Tabora, and Kingoma over a century ago. Hydropower was increasingly harnessed: a hydroelectric minigrid was constructed in Loliondo in 1928, and in the 1950s, the Pangani Falls hydropower project brought electricity to a small number of local townships.78 In the 1970s, minigrids were extended to Dar es Salaam and other towns to form the first national grid—which now connects about three-quarters of regional townships. However, in 2015, only 3000 of 15,000 villages had been connected.79 After independence in 1961, the government built diesel-powered minigrids in many rural areas as part of a policy to electrify isolated regional and district townships and to promote industrialization. Industries like mining (diamonds, gold, and lead), and agricultural processing (cotton, coconuts, and tea) often distributed electricity to nearby communities by installing minigrids. In 2016, Tanzania had more than 109 minigrids providing electricity to about 184,000 customers. Sixteen of these mini-grids were connected to the national grid; the remaining 93 systems were operating as isolated systems with no link to the grid. Not all the power is delivered to local customers— some is sold to the national utility: the Tanzania Electric Supply Company (TANESCO).80 Hydropower is the most common source of the electricity delivered by the minigrids: 49 minigrids derive their energy from hydropower. Nineteen systems are powered by fossil fuels and these minigrids are larger systems generating more power and connected to more customers than the hydropower minigrids. The country also has 25 biomass powered minigrids, and 13 solar photovoltaic mini-grids—the latter being mostly small donorfunded community-owned demonstration projects. The larger mini-grids with a capacity between 1 and 10 MW are powered by fossil fuels, biomass or hydropower. The solar photovoltaics systems are all under 100 kWp. Figure 5.8 shows how the energy source varies according to the size of the mini-grid for 109 systems installed in the country.81 In terms of power, fossil fuels (mainly diesel, but also gasoline and natural gas) dominate with an installed capacity of 72.7 MW; biomass generates 51.7 MW; and hydropower 32.9 MW. Solar photovoltaic systems generate only 2.3 MW—less than 1% of the total installed capacity.

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Fig. 5.8  Distribution of mini-grids in Tanzania by installed capacity and energy, source, 2016 (Source World Resources Institute)

Diesel mini-rids are often preferred because they are less expensive to procure, have short lead times, are modular, easy to site and to relocate. Local vendors can be found throughout the country, and there is an ample inventory of spare parts in large cities. Many technicians know how to operate and maintain diesel engines because they are used in grain mills and vegetable oil mills. However, diesel generators are expensive to run, require regular maintenance, and have shorter lifetimes than hydropower and solar photovoltaic minigrids. Minigrids running on biomass have existed in Tanzania since colonial times—typically in industries like sugar refining (burning the bagasse), and in wood-based industries like the Tanganyika Wattle Company. These industries generate MW-scale power often as combined heat and power plants. The smaller biomass minigrids include gasifiers, biogas plants, and engines running on Jatropha oil. In 2008, the government of Tanzania introduced the small power producers (SPP) framework. An SPP was defined as a generating facility under 10 MW producing power from renewable or fossil sources, cogeneration, or a hybrid system. The SPP established feed-in-tariffs for minigrids injecting electricity into the national grid—an initiative which has encouraged several dozen private companies to build and commission minigrids over the last decade. Since the SPP legislation was enacted, 52 minigrids were commissioned between 2008 and 2016 with a nameplate capacity of 67 MW. Only seven of these minigrids systems were powered by diesel fuel, so there has been a definite shift towards renewable energy: hydropower

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(9 mini-grids), biomass (20), and solar photovoltaic (13). Three minigrids were hybrid systems—combining a renewable energy technology with a diesel generator backup.82 Comparing the different mini-grid technologies, the experience in Tanzania can be summarized as follows: • Hydropower minigrids are most common, but fossil fuel and biomass systems dominate in terms of installed capacity. Hydropower minigrids are smaller and most of them are run-of-the-river installations. They are expensive to build but long-lived and relatively inexpensive to operate. • Diesel and natural gas plants are large and relatively inexpensive to install, but they need frequent maintenance and spare parts that are not readily available in rural areas. • Most biomass plants are commercially owned units powering wood or sugar mills and supplying other users close by. They are moderately inexpensive to build and maintain, but fuel supply and preparation can be challenging. • Solar minigrids remain mostly at the demonstration stage.83 In 2015, the national utility regulator, EWURA, revised the SPP framework allowing for two forms of contracts: a renewable energy feed-in tariff (REFITs) for small hydro and biomass projects, and a competitive bidding procedure for wind and solar projects. The same tariff structure applies to all minigrids, whether or not they are injecting power into the main grid. Payments by TANESCO are now made in hard currency—an advantage for minigrid developers.84 The institutional, policy, and regulatory framework for the energy sector in Tanzania has been reformed since the passing of the 2008 Electricity Act. Specific initiatives encourage private participation in small power production and distribution. As a result, the number and installed capacity of minigrids in the country has doubled since 2008. Minigrid owners and operators in Tanzania include the national utility, private commercial entities, faith-based organisations and communities. Fossil fuel mini-grids owned and operated by the national utility, TANESCO, all operate on the utility model where the same tariffs apply to all customers. Private entities sell power to both TANESCO and to retail customers. Community-based models have experienced mixed success with management, service delivery, and revenue collection. Community ownership and participation in project development and operations appears to be a key factor for sustainability.

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Larger privately-owned minigrids that are grid-connected experience difficulties with delayed payments for bulk sales to the national utility. Household customes pay on time, but retail tarrifs need to be high to cover long-term costs. Operation and maintenance costs of rural minigrids run by TANESCO are high, but the utility is allowed to charge only a low ‘lifeline’ tarrif to rural customeres. The lifeline tarrif is cross-subsidized by tarrifs to larger users but they too fail to fully reflect costs. Lastly, mini-grids owned by faith-based organizations have operated for many years but are usually not financially self-sufficient.85 There are fundamental weaknesses in all minigrid projects. They stem from the fact that minigrids are capital intensive projects with substantial initial costs providing a service to mostly low-income customers. They are therefore inherently risky. This characteristic means that it is often difficult for a developer to obtain financing from commercial sources. If the minigrid project is eventually financed, it is by no means certain that a developer will be able to cover his investment and recurrent costs from revenue generated by his customers who are paying for the service. Commercial sources of funding consider rural electrification risky because of a variety of factors: including unproven technology, and the low and variable incomes of many rural consumers. Energy access companies that have raised significant finance are typically foreign owned or managed, and have the connections and the resources to raise capital on the global market. Banks are often unwilling to lend to developers that cannot provide a strong track record of capacity, collateral, and other commercial requirements for rural electrification. Financial support to small power providers (SPPs) though the Tanzania Energy Development and Access Project (TEDAP) and the Rural Energy Fund (REF) has financed the completion or initiation of 17 minigrid projets since 2008. Using financing facilities outside the SPP framework, donors have funded another 35 minigrids. Nonetheless, public and private sector funding for rural electrification in Tanzania remains inadequate, but financial mechanisms have stimulated investor activity and led to further commitments of funds from development partners.

Haiti Haiti has one of the lowest electricity connection rates in the world, with less than 40% of the population connected. Many of the households that have access to electricity are tapping into the distribution system

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illegally—which means that the national power company, Electricité d’Haiti, never covers its costs and requires substantial support from the Government of Haiti in order to keep the country’s inadequate and overloaded distribution system functioning for at least part of the time. Few areas in Haiti, even in the capital Port-au-Prince, have reliable electrical power. Families that can afford it will install a bank of 4 or 8 deep-cycle 6-volt batteries that are charged by an inverter whenever electricity is available, and which provide power to the house when the grid goes down. But since an inverter-battery system is often insufficient—if the grid power goes off for several days for instance, a backup diesel generator is also required. This level of investment is impossible for the majority of Haitian families—and also for many small businesses, so the lack of a reliable electricity supply system has a huge negative impact on commerce, the provision of government services, and economic development in general. Many rural areas in Haiti are far from any electricity distribution system and so families have no choice but to rely on kerosene lamps for lighting. Kerosene is not cheap in rural areas, and so poor families are paying out a significant fraction of their income on inadequate and poor quality lighting. Kerosene lighting is also a major health hazard: the sooty, carbon-rich, vapours given off by the lamps are noxious and harmful for the lungs— particularly those of young children. In the town of Les Anglais in south-west Haiti, a PV-hybrid system provides power to homes and businesses. Set up in 2012 by EarthSpark International, a US-based non-profit organization, it is in many respects a conventional PV-hybrid system—but with several innovative features. The Les Anglais minigrid serves over 2000 customers—both households and local businesses. A 93-kilowatt PV array generates electricity that is distributed by the minigrid installed by EarthSpark. A bank of batteries provides 400 kWh of electrical storage, and a small 30 kW diesel generator provides backup power if the solar energy is inadequate. The system is designed to reliably provide electricity 24/7 to its customers. The backup generator is only used occasionally: over the 6-month period September 2015 to March 2016, it ran for a total of only 90 hours.86 One of the problems of managing a minigrid system in a rural area is that families newly-connected to the electricity service may have difficulty managing the amount of electricity they consume, and then have to pay for. If they are unfamiliar with how electricity is used and charged, they may be presented with a bill they cannot pay. Disconnecting customers from the service because they cannot afford to pay for their electricity is not a solution over the longer term because the economics of the service improves as

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more paying customers connect to the grid. The smart meters installed by EarthSpark help solve this problem by requiring households to prepay their power consumption. This approach is familiar to Haitian families accustomed to buying kerosene for lighting, charcoal for cooking, and top-up cards for their cell phone service. In effect, you pay in advance for what you need. EarthSpark’s smart electricity meters were developed to meet the special needs of minigrid operators in expanding access to electricity to new customers. Other innovative features include time-of-use pricing: which enables EarthSpark to charge a lower price for electricity during the middle of the day when energy costs are lower because power is drawn from the PV system. Moreover, the consumption of power across the minigrid can be monitord remotely at the household level. The data can be used to manage the load, to educate the community on energy efficiency, and to detect and evaluate technical problems immediately they arise. EarthSpark plans to install 80 more minigrid PV-diesel hybrid systems in Haiti before 2020. The Les Anglais system in Haiti is a good example of applying modern technology to a vexing development problem: how to bring electrical power to the rural areas of poor countries. Because of the development of increasingly affordable and reliable renewable energy technologies coupled with smart meters and control systems, it is no longer necessary to think in terms of extending transmission and distribution systems. PV-hybrid minigrids offer a practical and cost-effective alternative. Unfortunately, hurricane Matthew, a category-5 cyclone, ripped into southwest Haiti in early October 2016 and badly damaged the photovoltaic array. It is a lesson that needs to be learned as storms in the Caribbean become more intense: PV systems and wind power installations need to be able to withstand hurricane force winds. But building stronger PV array mountings and support structures does not solve the larger problem: many of the homes connected to the minigrid were destroyed by the storm.87

Solar Home Systems A major challenge with rural electrification is that the majority of households are low-income families. Finding a business model that enables the service provider to cover its costs is a major concern. An innovative approach is to employ a pay-as-you-go arrangement where payments are made via a mobile phone. If payments are not made on time, the solar home system can be shut down by an offsite manager connected

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remotely to the system. One innovative company promoting this approach is M-Kopa Solar. Based in Nairobi, M-Kopa Solar has connected more than 600,000 homes in Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania since the company launched in 2012. These are small photovoltaic systems—but providing electric lighting to households that were using kerosene lamps is a huge step forward for families that had no access to electricity. Kerosene lamps provide only poor quality lighting; moreover they cause hazardous indoor air pollution and are a fire hazard— yet hundreds of thousands of low-income families in Africa and Asia have no alternative but to use them. Kerosene is also expensive. According to a 2014 survey, an average off-grid household in Kenya spends about 75¢ a day on energy, or $272 a year—$164 on kerosene, $36 on charging their mobile phone, and $72 on batteries. M-Kopa estimates a customer saves about $750 over the first four years by installing to its basic solar kit.88 The basic package is the M-KOPA 5 solar home system.89 It consists of: • • • • • • •

1 8-W solar panel 1 Rechargeable FM/USB radio 1 M-KOPA 5 control unit with lithium battery 4 bright 1.2 Watt LED bulbs 1 5-in-1 phone charge cable 1 Custom charge cable 1 Rechargeable LED torch.

Customers pay a deposit of about $35 to obtain the system. They then pay the equivalent of about $0.50 a day for a year—which is when they own the system. These payments are made through M-Pesa—the mobile phonebased money transfer system. A more expensive package is available that includes a flat screen digital TV and a TV antenna. Although these SHS are small—it’s their small size that makes them affordable for poor families. There is ample evidence that households that have just a few watts of power from a solar home system soon start a small business or find other ways to generate an income using the electricity. In early 2018, a study of 2300 pay-as-you-go solar energy users in five East African countries clearly showed the positive economic impacts on low-income families that SHS can produce.90 These small solar energy systems open up a wide range of small-scale business opportunities that bring substantial benefits to rural households. In addition, the positive health effects of no longer using kerosene lamps is a substantial co-benefit. The study outlined its 10 key findings as follows:

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Fig. 5.9  Average additional monthly income generated by the solar home systems (Source Off-Grid Solar Energy Industry)

• 58% of households undertake more economic activities thanks to their solar home system • 36% of households generate additional income once they purchase an SHS • Households on average create an additional income of $35 per month • 44% of customers can spend more time at work • 11% of customers started a new business • In 7% of households, owning an SHS enabled someone to get a new job • 89% of customers report that they use their phone more since using their SHS • 91% of customers report they feel safer with off-grid solar • 915 report their health has improved since buying the SHS • 84% of customers say children have more time to do their homework. Figure 5.9 shows the average additional monthly income generated by the economic activities unlocked by the installation of a solar home system. Customers combining two or more of these economic activities created the largest increase in income: on average $53 per month.91 The most popular new businesses were reported as: charging mobile phones for a fee; opening a small shop or stall, and opening a bar-restaurant.

The Economics of Minigrids The competitiveness of a minigrid depends on its cost relative to the cost of alternative ways of providing electricity to rural households: extending the national grid and installing SHS. Table 5.3 summarizes the relative advantages and disadvantages of the three alternative electrification options.92

252     M. J. Bush Table 5.3  The competitiveness of electrification options Option

Advantage

Grid • L ow cost per unit of energy due to connection large economies of scale

Minigrid system

Solar home system

• Compared to solar home systems, the cost of electricity is lower • More power is available for larger loads • More productive use of the energy is possible • High reliability • No interconnection lines • High reliability • No operation or maintenance costs

Disadvantage •G  rid extension is very expensive as distance increases •O  ften the central power generation is unreliable with frequent outages •C  ompared to solar home systems, the capital cost is much higher •T  he operation and maintenance of the minigrid requires at least one fulltime staff • Only powers very low loads • Cannot support productive loads

Source Rocky Mountain Institute

The principal advantage of connecting to the main power grid is that electricity is much less expensive for the customer. But the power utility faces substantial costs for extending the transmission line to villages that may be widely spaced, and installing distribution cables and connections to customers many of which may be low-income families consuming small amounts of energy. Solar home systems have high generation costs per unit of electricity (typically several dollars per kWh) but avoid the cost of distribution lines, metering, and theft. Between these two approaches are minigrids, the competitiveness of which depends on a wide array of interelated factors. In contrast to the costs associated with grid extension and SHS, minigrids are more complex and require at least one fulltime technician to be present to monitor the operation of the system and to ensure its maintenance. An evaluation of the levelized cost of electricity provided by these alternative technologies for a typical village of 500 households in sub-Saharan Africa was conducted by the Rocky Mountain Institute in 2017. The results are shown in Table 5.4, where electricity usage for a household is assumed to average 5kWh/month, there are no productive loads, and the cost of capital is set at 15%.93 These costs are variable and highly site specific, and determining the least cost option for a given village depends on a careful examination and evaluation of all the factors that influence the levelized cost. One factor to note is that solar-diesel minigrids produce lower cost electricity than solar-battery minigrids. The difference in cost is not huge, but

5  Coming Clean     253 Table 5.4  Cost of electricity from electrification options Technical option

Levelized cost of electricity ($/kWh)

Grid connection Solar-diesel minigrid Solar-battery minigrid Solar home system Solar lantern

$0.30–$3.00 depending on the distance to the village $1.60 $1.70 $3.20 >$7.00

Source Rocky Mountain Institute

in many cases, the cost of power from a photovoltaic system with a diesel backup is the least cost option. In 2017, RMI’s finding was that sizing purely solar-battery minigrids for peak load while planning for high reliability was significantly more expensive than sizing minigrids that use a diesel generation component.94 But there are other factors to take into account. Diesel generators obviously require fuel—which may require someone in the village to travel a considerable distance to obtain. A diesel engine also needs regular maintenance by a mechanic and spare parts that may not be easily available. On the other hand, the batteries of a solar-battery system are expensive, and in a hot tropical climate their lifetime may only be a few years. They then need to be replaced and this expense must be planned for from the beginning of the operation of the minigrid. Storage and fuel costs also vary in response to the requirement for high reliability—such as telecom towers, where minigrid operators may need to run the diesel generator while using the batteries as an uninterruptable power source. In less demanding settings, batteries can act as the night time supply and curtailments are acceptable to keep storage costs down. Minigrids generally rely on lead-acid batteries, but the declining cost of ­lithium-ion batteries is making these batteries a more common form of ­storage, and may soon improve the competitiveness of solar-diesel-battery and solar-battery minigrids against solar-diesel systems.95 Solar Home Systems may function as a useful first step for households that may eventually hook up to a minigrid or to the main power grid. A household that purchases a solar home system no longer needs to purchase kerosene on a regular basis—which is a significant expense for a typical low-income rural family without access to electricity. Once the home system is paid for (after a year for the M-Kopa system), the family has slightly more disposable income, and if a connection to a minigrid is available that could provide more power for a productive use that generates a revenue or for more appliances like a refrigerator. The household may choose to also

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connect to the minigrid. The solar home system can still be used for charging mobile phones and provide some of the lighting, but connection to a minigrid provides greater flexibility and more power. There is no reason why the two systems could not be operational in the same house.

Energy Efficiency Energy is not something that should be wasted. Solar energy is free: but capturing it and using it requires equipment, materials, manpower and machinery—all of which costs money. With wind power, the machinery involved is even more capital intensive. If the energy has to be stored—either as heat or as electricity, the cost of renewable energy quickly escalates. It is still less costly than fossil fuel alternatives—but that doesn’t mean it should use it negligently. The global picture at first sight looks encouraging. Since 2010, the amount of primary energy required to generate a unit of economic output— measured as gross domestic product or GDP, declined at an average rate of 2.1% annually. This is better than previous decades when the reduction was averaging about 1.3%. But there are very substantial differences among countries and regions. Efficiency improvements in China—a 5.2% reduction in 2016, have had a considerable impact. Without China, global energy intensity would have improved by only 1.1% in 2016.96 Energy intensity improved by 2.9% in the US and by 1.3% in the European Union. Japan and India both posted gains. In a few countries, Brazil for example, energy intensity has actually increased—but in the case of Brazil, this is because the country’s GDP has declined significantly since 2014. Changes in a country’s energy intensity are influenced by improvements in energy efficiency as well as changes in economic structure—such as the shift away from energy intensive industries towards less intensive service sectors. A decline in energy intensity is therefore not solely the result of gains in energy efficiency. However, there is evidence that energy use has peaked in many advanced economies. Twenty-two IEA member countries have already reached their historic peak. In the majority of countries, this peak occurred between 2005 and 2010. Total energy demand for OECD97 countries as a whole peaked in 2007.98 In these countries, although national populations have been slowly rising, improvements in energy efficiency and structural changes have more

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than offset the increase in demographic numbers and per capita energy use has been falling. Outside of the OECD countries, the story is different. Primary energy demand in non-OECD countries has been rising rapidly since the year 2000, and although energy intensity, measured as energy demand per unit of GPD, has declined, the demand for energy has been rising strongly— which is normal in emerging economies. But it’s a reminder that declining energy intensity doesn’t necessarily mean declining emissions of greenhouse gases—and as we have noted in Chapter 3, global emissions of carbon dioxide ticked up again in 2017 (see Fig. 3.3). Moreover, atmospheric concentrations of CO2 (which directly causes global warming) are still increasing steadily (see Fig. 2.4). Globally, energy efficiency improved 13% between 2000 and 2016. Without this improvement, global final energy use in 2016 would have been 12% higher—equivalent to adding the annual final energy use of the European Union to the global energy market. Energy savings from efficiency improvements in the IEA member countries made up nearly half of the global total, equivalent to the current energy use of Germany, France, and the UK combined.99 Efficiency gains vary. Eight of the top ten countries that show the largest improvement in efficiency since 2000 are European. The difference in improvement rates before and after 2008 highlights the impact of policy developments, particularly in China, where the influence of the 11th and 12th Five-year plans is seen in a 16% improvement in the efficiency effect since 2008. Although efficiency gains in the US have been slower than China and several European countries over recent years, improvements commenced long before 2000—particularly fuel economy standards—which are a major driver of efficiency improvements in the transport sector.100

Industry Industrial energy intensity—measured as final energy consumption per unit of gross value added, has been improving in the manufacturing sectors (including heavy industry) since the year 2000. The greatest improvements have been in the IEA member countries—less so in the emerging economies. In the IEA countries, energy intensity has improved in all major industry sub-sectors, although there are substantial differences among the sectors.

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For basic metals, which includes iron, steel and aluminium manufacturing, final energy use dropped by 10% and energy intensity was 15% lower. Energy intensity fell by 20% in non-metallic minerals, which includes cement production, and by 14% in the paper and printing industries. There was less variation in the food, beverage and tobacco subsector where energy intensity dropped by 8% between 2000 and 2016. Energy intensity improvements were largest in the chemicals and vehicles subsector. This may reflect technological improvements such as automation and the use of industrial robots, as well as strong demand particularly for plastics and vehicles. Generally, vehicle manufacturing is the largest user of industrial robots, which improve the sector’s energy productivity through the greater automation of production. In 2015, the global supply of industrial robots was 50% higher in the vehicle manufacturing industry than in the second largest sector—electronic manufacturing. Industrial robots are also used in the metals and chemicals manufacturing sub-sectors.101 Making more stuff with less energy not only saves money (because energy is never free), it also reduces emissions of greenhouse gases, because industry is never going to run entirely on renewable energy. So improvements in energy intensity are important from a climate change perspective. Energy Management Systems An energy management system creates a structure to monitor energy consumption and improve energy efficiency in an industrial or commercial firm. The implementation of energy management systems is a key element of industrial energy efficiency policy in many countries. For example, the ISO 50001 Energy Management Systems standard provides a structured framework to manage energy enabling an organisation to raise energy efficiency, reduce costs, and improve energy performance. The ISO 50001 standard has been available since 2011. It is based on Plan-Do-Check-Act (PDCA) cycle which requires an organization to do the following: • Conduct an energy review—analyse data, identify areas of significant energy use and areas for energy performance improvement • Establish an energy baseline • Establish energy objectives and targets that are measurable and have timelines for achievement • Establish an action plan to achieve energy objectives and targets • Implement the action plan • Check performance • Monitor, document and report all of the above.

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Canada was the first country in the world to adopt the ISO standard as their energy management systems standard: this is CAN/CSA-ISO 50001.102 The total number of ISO 50001 certificates has grown from 459 in 2011 to 11,985 in 2015. Europe has the largest number of certificates among European countries, with 85% of the total. Germany dominates—with almost 6000 certificates issued up to 2015, principally because of tax incentives provided to certified companies.103

Buildings According to the IEA in 2017, the building sector is not on track to achieve global climate targets, although progress is being made. The amount of energy used by buildings has been slowly increasing: rising 4% from 2010 to 2016. Although energy efficiency has been improving, it has been outpaced by the upward trend in total floor area—which correlates closely with energy use. On the other hand, building-related GHG emissions have declined: peaking at around 9.5 GtCO2e in 2013 and then decreasing to 9.0 GtCO2e in 2016, in spite of the increased floor area. A combination of both building envelope and equipment policies is critical for the transition to energy efficient, and eventually to zero energy, buildings. Highly efficient building envelopes enable the best use of efficient heating and cooling equipment such as low temperature waste heat, district heating, heat pumps, and rooftop photovoltaic systems. Because energy efficient homes are slightly more expensive, and heat pumps are more expensive than gas-fired furnaces and electric baseboard heaters, improvements in building envelope and HVAC equipment efficiency needs to be mandated through building codes, and if necessary incentivised through tax breaks. In the US, California, once again, is leading the way with the latest 2016 Building Energy Conservation Code, while in Chicago, Energy Benchmarking is the foundation of that city’s strategy for reducing carbon emissions from large buildings. Emissions from the properties subject to the energy benchmarking ordinance represent 20% of citywide carbon emissions, and since 2015 the median carbon emissions per square foot for reporting buildings has fallen by 91%.104 In Europe, commercial and residential building consume about 40% of primary energy and are responsible for about a quarter of greenhouse gas emissions. European energy policy foresees a substantial reduction of energy

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consumption in buildings by 2020. The Energy Performance of Building Directive (EPBD) states that Member States shall ensure that that new buildings occupied and owned by public authorities shall be ‘nearly zero energy buildings’, (nZEBs) by the end of 2018, and that all new buildings are nZEBs by the end of 2020. An nZEB is a building with very high energy performance where the nearly zero or very low amount of energy required should be extensively covered by renewable sources produced on-site or nearby.105 The precise definition of a ‘nearly zero energy building’ has been left up to the governments of the EU Member States—a decision which may reflect the divergence of views concerning the pace at which governments intend to transition to renewable sources of energy. Inside the building envelope, substantial energy savings can be made with more efficient equipment and smart technologies. The IEA Energy Efficient End-Use Equipment Technology Collaborative Programme (IEA 4E-TCP) has reported savings of between 16 and 26% over the last decade for major household appliances—including switching from halogen to LED lighting. The programme estimates that the market for efficient lighting will continue to grow and that 90% of all indoor lighting will be CFLs and LEDs by 2022 due to a combination of improved policy and decreasing costs.106 In general, more energy can be saved by switching from one type of technology to another, rather than trying to improve the efficiency of existing equipment. For example, heat pumps enable energy savings of 60–85% compared to instantaneous and storage water heaters. Japan’s Top Runner programme and Australia’s white certificate schemes have enabled the water heating markets in both countries to have increasing sales of highly efficient heat pumps. Heat pumps are increasingly recognized as one of the best options for reducing building energy requirements. Recent technical advances enable heat pumps to work effectively in cold climate and at outside air temperatures down to −25 °C. Cold climate heat pumps could shift a substantial part of global heating use away from less efficient electric and gas heating systems in colder climates—like Canada for instance. In district heating systems, large scale heat pumps are an increasingly cost-effective way to meet both energy efficiency targets and countries’ emissions reduction targets. This is leading to new approaches to policy, such as the European heating and cooling strategy.107 In conclusion, buildings will increasingly become all-electric—with all services: heating, cooling, lighting, appliances, and communications being

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provided by highly efficient equipment. To reduce emissions of greenhouse gases, the electrical power consumed by buildings must be sourced from renewable energy—either from grid-connected electrical power generated from wind or solar, or from rooftop or minigrid photovoltaic systems. Smart and Well-Connected The exponential growth in connected devices is a technological trend that promises substantial improvements in the way energy is managed and used. Their market penetration is growing rapidly. One estimate is that at least four billion household connected devices were already installed worldwide at the end of 2016. Simple devices have been around for decades: the programmable thermostat for instance. But ‘smart’ devices now include washing machines, dish washers, refrigerators and water heaters that figure out the optimum time to operate according to the cost and timing of electrical power provided by the grid. Although saving money is the main objective, switching lights off when a sensor detects an empty room, and which turns down the heating or cooling units when a home or building is vacant clearly saves energy. The downside is that being smart takes energy. Power consumption by connected devices includes the energy used by the network infrastructure (routers, switches, and data centers), the energy used by the connected device to monitor and process information from the sensors, and the energy needed to maintain the device’s connection to the wider network—called network standby. This network standby is often a connected device’s largest draw on power. The installation of smart meters is growing rapidly—to around 570 million units in 2016. For the all -electric home, smart meters enable customers and smart devices to adjust energy use in response to changes in energy prices in real time. They are also increasingly important in the management of photovoltaic minigrids in developing countries—where they control the provision of electricity to homes using very little electricity, but where its careful management, including pre-payment programs, are essential.

Transport Transport accounted for 28% of global final energy consumption in 2016, of which about three quarters was for road transport. This energy was almost entirely from petroleum products—since the number of electric vehicles, although rising rapidly, is still less than 0.2% of the total number of vehicles on the road worldwide.

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Improvements in vehicle efficiency is therefore a priority because they translate directly into reduced emissions of greenhouse gases—and reduced levels of air pollution in urban environments. Ten years ago, only four governments had introduced mandatory emission or fuel economy standards for light duty vehicles (LDVs). In 2016, that number had risen to 10: Brazil, Canada, China, the European Union, India, Japan, Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Korea and the US—all countries in the top 15 global vehicle markets. Almost 80% of new LDVs sold globally are subject to some kind of fuel economy standard.108 The LDV group includes cars, sports utility vehicles (SUVs), light trucks, and pickups. Although efficiency standards for LDVs have been introduced and enforced in many countries, standards for heavy duty vehicles (HDVs) are lagging. Between 2010 and 2015, the amount of goods transported by trucks grew by 65% and truck sales increased by 60%. This increase drove HDV fuel demand up by 50%. Yet only 16% of HDV stock was covered by efficiency standards in 2016.109 For LDVs, meaning cars and light trucks, there are diverging trends. Although the growth of electric and zero emission vehicles continues strongly, EVs and ZEVs are still vastly outnumbered by gas- and diesel-powered vehicles—both on the road and in terms of new registrations. Moreover, light trucks, pickups, and SUVs are gaining popularity over smaller passenger cars. Their share of all major markets grew in 2016. China’s light truck market share grew by more than a quarter from 2014 to 2016 and is close to 50% of the LDV market. Light truck’s share of the LDV sales is highest in Canada and the US, where it is almost double the share of the major European markets. LDV sales in the European market changed only marginally between 2010 and 2015, but in the US, sales rose from 11 million to more than 16 million during the same period.110 When it comes to vehicle fuel efficiency, it’s all about government policy. In Europe, strict fuel economy standards coupled with substantial taxes on gasoline and diesel fuel have led to a widespread preference for smaller more efficient vehicles. At the other end of the scale, in the US and Canada, less stringent standards and only modest taxes on fuel (although they are higher in Canada), have had little effect in inducing a shift towards more energy efficient vehicles. That may change if the standards proposed in 2012 during the Obama administration are fully implemented. The proposed CAFE standard will lead to significant fuel efficiency improvements by 2025. However, at the time of writing, the Trump administration is considering rolling back the proposed standards.

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Strengthening fuel economy standards ought to be a win-win situation for the LDV-buying public. More efficient engines mean less fuel purchased for a given journey, and lower emissions means less air pollution in the urban environment—an impact that has measurable health benefits.

Strategies for Improving Energy Efficiency The American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy (ACEEE) publishes an annual report that assesses all 51 US states in terms of their performance in improving energy efficiency and gives each one a score. California regularly tops the list—although in 2017 it slid down a notch coming in second after Massachusetts. But California is the only state to have held a spot among the top five in all 11 years the scorecard has been published.111 The ACEEE evaluates the performance of the US states in six categories of energy efficiency: • • • • • •

Utility and public benefits programs and policies Transportation policies Building energy efficiency policies Combined heat and power State government initiatives Appliance efficiency standards.

After reviewing the American states’ policies to improve the efficiency of energy use each year for the last decade, the ACEEE is in a position to make some pertinent and useful recommendations for both US states and Canadian provinces seeking to improve energy efficiency in their jurisdictions.112 1. Establish and fund an Energy Efficiency Resource Standard (EERS) or similar energy savings target. These policies set specific energy savings targets that utilities or independent program administrators must meet through customer energy efficiency programs and market transformation. 2. Adopt policies to encourage and strengthen utility programs designed for low-income customers and work with utilities and regulators to recognize the nonenergy benefits of such programs. States and public utility commissions can include goals specific to the low-income sector either within an EERS or as a stand-alone minimum acceptable threshold.

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3. Adopt updated and stricter building energy codes, improve building compliance, and enable efficiency program administrators to be involved in code support. Mandatory building codes are one way to ensure a minimum level of energy efficiency for new residential and commercial buildings. In addition, model codes are only as effective as their level of implementation so improved compliance activities are increasingly important. 4. Adopt tailpipe emission standards and set qualitative targets for reducing vehicle-miles-travelled. A comprehensive approach to transportation energy efficiency must address both individual vehicles and the transportation system as a whole. 5. Treat cost-effective and efficient combined heat and power (CHP) as an energy efficiency resource equivalent to other forms of energy efficiency. Combined heat and power should be treated as an eligible technology in the EERS or Renewable Portfolio Standard. If this is done, total energy savings target levels should be increased to take into account CHP’s potential. 6. Expand and highlight efforts such as funding for energy efficiency incentive programs, benchmarking requirements for government building energy use, and investments in energy-efficiency-related R&D centers. Government initiatives complement the existing landscape of utility programs, leveraging resources from the government’s public and private sectors to generate energy and cost savings that benefit taxpayers and consumers. Local government agencies have many opportunities to lead by example including by reducing energy use in public buildings and vehicle fleets and by enabling the market for energy service companies that finance and deliver energy-saving projects. 7. Explore and promote innovative financing mechanisms to leverage private capital and lower the up-front costs of energy efficiency measures. Utilities may offer some form of on-bill financing program to finance energy efficiency in homes and buildings, and governments can help by passing legislation, increasing stakeholder awareness, and removing the legal barriers to the implementation of these financing programs.

Conclusion This chapter has explored the pathways to a low carbon global economy by transitioning to renewable energy technologies such as large-scale solar photovoltaic energy and utility-scale wind power. Other technologies such as

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geothermal district heating also have great potential, while hydropower continues to generate substantial and reliable electrical power worldwide. The immediate priority areas of action are the power sector and transportation. The generation of electricity using solar and wind energy is less expensive than coal-fired power plants and is even competitive with power from natural gas in many locations. Furthermore, the cost of renewable energy systems continues to fall—which is not the case for the fossil fuels. Led by China, the electrification of the world’s transportation systems is well underway, and although the number of electric vehicles (EVs) on the roads is still relatively small, the rate at which EVs are moving into the global market is phenomenal. Small-scale solar photovoltaic energy is also the key to providing electricity to the hundreds of millions of rural families without electricity in Africa and Asia, where lighting and sometimes cooking is still done using dirty kerosene fuels that pollute the air in the home and sicken the children. Electricity is also the key to unlocking the immense transformative potential of rural economies. At the same time, increasing the efficiency of using energy is paramount. This is particularly important in the built environment where net-zeroenergy buildings are technically feasible and economically viable. Europe is taking the lead on facilitating this transition in the built environment. The European Commission has set out an ambitious plan to transition to a low carbon economy that will reduce emissions of greenhouse gases by 80% in 2050 compared to 1990 levels. Other countries, starting with Canada and the USA, should follow suit. In the next chapter we delve more deeply into how renewable energy technologies are designed and deployed, and how they can totally replace fossil fuels. This is the clean energy revolution.

Notes 1. See A brief history of hydropower. Accessed at: https://www.hydropower. org/a-brief-history-of-hydropower. 2. See the Wikipedia article Wind turbine. Accessed at: https://en.wikipedia. org/wiki/Wind_turbine. 3. See Renewable Power Generation Costs in 2017. International Renewable Energy Agency (IRENA) 2017. Available at: http://irena.org/ publications/2018/Jan/Renewable-power-generation-costs-in-2017.

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4. Sierra club press release: https://www.sierraclub.org/press-release/2017/11/ new-coalition-aims-take-europe-beyond-coal. 5. REN21. Renewables 2018 Global Status Report, p. 30. 6. See 100% Commitments in Cities, Counties & States. Sierra Club. Accessed at: https://www.sierrraclub.org/ready-for-100/commitments. 7. Ibid. 8. See Mayors for clean energy. Accessed at: https://sierraclub.org/ ready-for-100/mayors-for-clean-energy. 9. See World’s poorest countries to aim for 100% green energy. Accessed at: www.bbc.com/news/science-environment-38028130. 10. See Baleriacs launch pioneering plan to phase out emissions. Accessed at: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/feb/15/baleriacs-launchpioneering-plan-to-phase-out-emissions. 11. Renewables 2017 Global Status Report. REN21, p. 26. 12. Ibid., p. 26. 13. See How do you build a healthy city? Copenhagen reveals its secrets. Accessed at: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/feb/11/ how-build-healthy-city-copenhagen-reveals-its-secrets-happiness. 14. REN21, p. 29. 15. Including Japan—which unveiled plans in 2017 to build 45 new coal fired power plants using ‘high efficiency low emissions’ technology fuelled by high quality black coal imported from Australia. See http://www.abc.net. au/news/rural/2017-01-31/japan-coal-power-plants/8224302. 16. Renewables 2018 Global Status Report, p. 24. 17. See the European Commission article: 2050 low carbon economy. Accessed at: https://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/strategies/2050_en. 18. See the European Commission article. Ibid. 19. Renewables 2018 Global Status Report. Op. cit. 20. See Renewables 2017: Analysis and Forecasts to 2022. Market Report Series. Executive Summary. International Energy Agency. Accessed at: https://www.iea.org/Textbase/npsum/renew2017MRSsum.pdf. 21. See From oil to solar: Saudi Arabia plots a shift to renewables. Accessed at: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/05/business/enery-environment/ suaidi-arabia-solar-renewables.html. Also Saudi Arabia shortlists bidders for first solar power project. Accessed at: https://www.thenational. ae/business/energy/saudi-arabia-shortlists-bidders-for-solar-power-project-1.693483, and also ACWA wins Saudi Arabia’s 300 MW solar tender. Accessed at: https://www.pv-magazine.com/2018/02/06/acwa-wins-saudiarabias-400-mw-solar-tender/. 22. See Renewables 2017: Solar leads the charge…. Op. cit. 23. See Explaining Poland’s coal paradox. Accessed at: https://www.forbes.com/ sites/thebakersinstitute/2018/03/28/explaining-polands-coal-paradox/2/.

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24. See Paris declaration on electro-mobility and climate change & call to action. Accessed at: http://newsroom.unfccc.int/media/521376/paris-electro-mobility-declaration.pdf. 25. Ibid. 26. See Electric and plug-in hybrid cars whiz past 3m mark worldwide. Accessed at: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/dec/25/ electric-and-plug-in-hybrids-cars-3m-worldwide. 27. See Nordic EV outlook 2018. International Energy Agency. Available at: https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/Nordic EVOutlook2018.pdf. 28. See In Norway, Electric and Hybrid Cars Outsell Conventional Models. Accessed at: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/04/business/energy-environment/ norway-electric-hybrid-cars.html and also Electric cars on course to be the new normal in Norway. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-02/ electric-cars-on-course-to-be-the-new-normal-in-norway. 29. Renewables 2018 Global Status Report. Op. cit. 30. See Why electric vehicles are gathering speed in Latin America. Accessed at: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/28/opinion/electric-vehicles-latin-america.html. 31. See Global EV Outlook 2016, IEA. Op. cit. 32. See the CEM website at: http://www.cleanenergyministerial.org/aboutclean-energy-ministerial. 33. See California governor pushes for 5 million zero-emission cars. Accessed at: https://www.apnews.com/, https://www.usnews.com/news/best-states/ california/articles/2018-01-26/california-governor-pushes-for-5-million-zero-emission-cars. 34. See the BNEF article: E-buses to surge even faster than EVs as conventional vehicles fade. Accessed at: https://about.bnef.com/blog/e-busessurge-even-faster-evs-conventional-vehicles-fade/. 35. See EV sales in China are 142% higher than same time last year. Accessed at: https://www.renewableeneregyworld.com/articles/2018/07/ev-sales-inchina-are-142-percent-higher-than-same-time-last-year.html. 36. See New York City aims for all-electric bus fleet by 2040. Accessed at: https:// insideclimatenews.org/news/26042018/nyc-air-pollution-electric-bus-publictransportation-mta-clean-technology. 37. See IEA predicts 250 million EVs on the road by 2030. Accessed at: https://cleantechnica.com/2019/05/30/iea-predicts-250-million-evs-onthe-road-by-2030/. 38. See 10 giant companies commit to electric vehicles sending auto industry a message. Accessed at: https://insideclimatenews.org/news/19092017/ electric-cars-ev100-coalition-charging-fleet-ikea-dhl.

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39. See Two European cities and a whole country join movement to outlaw gas guzzlers. Accessed at: https://www.ecowatch.com/europe-gasoline-vehicles-2495953780.html. 40. See World’s largest battery and rapid-charge network launches to accelerate EV adoption. Accessed at: https://www.ecowatch.com/renewable-energy-network-london-2571350395.html. 41. See Electric cars: Charge points could be requirement in new build homes. Accessed at: https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-44759150. 42. See the 2015 paper by Kate Palmer and colleagues: “The total cost of ownership and market share for hybrid and electric vehicles”. Applied Energy 209 (2018): 108–119. Accessed at: https://reader.elsevier.com/ reader/sd/9EC392FC00DB56E4A69D5AF68A9983A1E6E40B0519F28C3A2B7D706C0F08001B01C40592A2A82DA317925E4A984FE9D9See also Electric cars already cheaper to own and run than petrol or diesel-study. Accessed at: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/ dec/01/electric-cars-already-cheaper-to-own-and-run-than-petrolor-diesel-study. 43. See Electric vehicle battery cost dropped 80% in 6 years down to $227/ kWh—Tesla claims to be below $190/kWh. Accessed at: https://electrek. co/2017/01/30/electric-vehicle-battery-cost-dropped-80-6-years-227kwhtesla-190kwh/. 44. See Electric buses are coming, and they’re going to help fix 4 big urban problems. Accessed at: https://www.vox.com/energy-and-environment/2017/ 10/24/16519364/electric-buses. 45. See TTC plans to buy fist electric buses, targets emission-free fleet by 2040. Accessed at: https://www.thestar.com/news/gta/transportation/2017/11/08/ ttc-plans-to-buy-first-electric-buses-targets-emissions-free-fleet-by2040.html. 46. See Electric buses: Clean transportation for healthier neighborhoods and cleaner air. Available at: https://uspirg.org/reports/usp/elecctric-buses-clean-transportation-healthier-neighborhoods-and-cleaner-air/. 47. Ibid. 48. The ‘present time’ in this book refers to 2018. 49. See the report by the International Transport Forum: Decarbonizing maritime transport: pathways to zero-carbon shipping by 2035. Available at: https://www.itf-oecd.org/decarbonising-maritime-transport. 50. See the ICCT report on black carbon emissions and fuel use. Op. cit. 51. See the report by the International Council on Clean Transportation: Black carbon emissions and fuel use in global shipping 2015. Accessed at: https://www.theicct.org/publications/black-carbon-emissions-globalshipping-2015.

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52. See the International Maritime Organization’s Initial Greenhouse gas strategy. Accessed at: https://www.theicct.org/publications/IMO-initialGHG-strategy. Also UN body adopts climate change strategy for shipping. Accessed at: http://www.imo.org/en/MediaCentre/PressBriefings/Pages/ 06GHGinitialstrategy.aspx. 53. See the International Maritime Organization’s Initial Greenhouse gas strategy. Accessed at: https://www.theicct.org/publications/IMO-initial-GHGstrategy. 54. See Decarbonising maritime transport: Pathways to zero-carbon shipping by 2035. Op. cit. 55. See Decarbonising maritime transport: The case of Sweden. https://www. itf-oecd.org/decarbonising-maritime-transport-sweden/. 56. See Ports go electric in drive to decarbonize and cut pollution. Accessed at: https://insideclimatenews.org/news/07072017/california-ports-electricvehicles-air-quality-redcue-emissions. 57. See the article in Wikipedia which is a good overview of the environmental impact of aviation. Environmental impact of aviation. Accessed at: https:// en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Environmental_impact_of_aviation. 58. See The US solar market is now 1 million installations strong. Accessed at: https://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/the-u-s-solar-marketnow-one-million-installations-strong#gs.9Dau5Ew. 59. See Recent facts about photovoltaics in Germany. Fraunhofer ISE. Accessed at: https://www.ise.fraunhofer.de/content/dam/ise/en/documents/publications/studies/recent-facts-about-photovoltaics-in-germany. pdf. 60. Global trends in renewable energy investment 2017. Frankfurt School FS-UNEP Collaborating Centre, 2017. 61. Ibid. 62. Ibid. 63. See California set to require solar on most new homes. Accessed at: https:// www.ecowatch.com/california-solar-homes-2566690235.html?. 64. See Why California’s new home solar requirement includes batteries and not zero net energy. Accessed at: https://www.renewableenergyworld.com/ugc/ articles/2018/05/17/why-californias-new-home-solar-requirement-includes-batteries-and-not-zero-net-energy.html?. 65. Solar Energy Industries Association 2018: Solar means business. Accessed at: www.seia.org/solarmeansbiz. 66. See the Report: Brighter future: a study on solar in US schools. Available at: https://www.thesolarfoundation.org/brighter-future-a-study-on-solar-inus-schools/. 67. See http://www.tdsb.on.ca/About-Us/Facility-Services/Solar-Schools-Project. 68. The abbreviation ‘th’ means ‘thermal’, and denotes power in the form of heat, as opposed to electricity.

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69. Solar heat worldwide. Op. cit. 70. Developing geothermal district heating in Europe. Accessed at: https://ec.europa.eu/energy/intelligent/projects/sites/iee-projects/files/projects/documents/geodh_final_publishable_results_oriented_report.pdf. 71. Boundary dam reference. 72. See Quest carbon capture and storage project Alberta. Available at: https:// www.hydrocarbons-technology.com/projects/quest-carbon-captureand-storage-project-alberta/. 73. See Blueprint for industrial CCS in the UK. Available at: https://teessidecollective.co.uk/teesside-collective-blueprint-for-industrial-ccs-in-the-uk. 74. The data are from the IEA Report Energy Access Outlook 2017. Available at: https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/pubication/WEO2017 SpecialReport_EnergyAccesOutlook.pdf. 75. See the World Bank data. Available at: http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/3.7. 76. See the IEA Report: Energy Access Outlook 2017: From poverty to prosperity. Available at: https://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publications/WSEO2017SpecialReport_EnergyAccessOutlook.pdf. 77. See Energy within reach: Growing the minigrid market in Sub-Saharan Africa. Available at: https://www.rmi.org/insight/energy-within-reach/. 78. See the Report: Accelerating mini-grid deployment in sub-Saharan Africa: Lessons from Tanzania. Available at: https://wri.org/sites/default/files/accelerating-mini-grid-deployment-sub-saharan-africa_1.pdf. 79. See the Status of Implementation of Rural Energy Projects in Tanzania, press release, Rural Energy Agency, July 28, 2015. 80. See the report: Accelerating mini-grid deployment in sub-Saharan Africa: Lessons from Tanzania. Available at: https://wri.org/sites/default/files/accelerating-mini-grid-deployment-sub-saharan-africa_1.pdf. 81. Ibid. 82. Ibid. 83. Ibid. 84. See Small power producers (SPP) framework. Accessed at: http://www.iea. org/policiesandmeasures/pams/unitedrepublicoftanzania/name-154661-en. php. 85. See Accelerating mini-grid deployment in sub-Saharan Africa. Op. cit. 86. EarthSpark communication. 87. See the Report: Solar under storm. https://www.rmi.org/wp-content/ uploads/2018/06/Islands_SolarUnderStorm_Report_digitalJune122018. pdf. 88. See the solar company making a profit on poor Africans. Accessed at: https:// www.bloomberg.com/features/2015-mkopa-solar-in-africa/. 89. See the M-Kopa website: www.m-kopa.com. 90. The countries were Kenya, Mozambique, Rwanda, Tanzania, and Uganda. The survey if 2300 households was conducted in the spring of 2018.

5  Coming Clean     269

91. See Powering opportunity: The economic impact of off-grid solar. Available at: https://www.gogla.org/powering-opportunity-the-economic-impact-ofoff-grid-solar. 92. See Energy within reach: growing the minigrid market in Sub-Saharan Africa. Op. cit. 93. Ibid. 94. Ibid. 95. Ibid. 96. See the International Energy Agency (IEA) Report: Energy efficiency 2017. Available at: https://www.iea.org/efficiency/. 97. See the glossary for a list of the OECD countries. 98. Energy efficiency 2017. Op. cit., p. 17 99. Energy efficiency 2017. Op. cit., p. 20. 100. Energy efficiency 2017. Op. cit., p. 22. 101. Energy efficiency 2017. Op. cit., p. 68. 102. See the reports from Natural Resources Canada. Available at: http://www. nrcan.gc.ca/energy/efficiency/industry/cipec5379. 103. Energy efficiency 2017. Op. cit., p. 75. 104. See 2017 Chicago Energy Benchmarking Report. Available at: www. CityofChicago.org/EnergyBenchmarking. 105. See the Factsheet: Nearly zero energy building definitions across Europe. Accessed at: http://bpie.eu/uploads/lib/document/attachment/128/BPIE_ factsheet_nZEB_definitions_across_Europe.pdf. 106. Energy efficiency 2017. Op. cit., p. 80. 107. Energy efficiency 2017. Op. cit., p. 80. 108. See the report by the International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT): Light-duty vehicle greenhouse gas and fuel economy standards, 2017 global update. Accessed at: https://www.theicct.org/sites/default/files/publications/2017-Global-LDV-Standards-Update_ICCT-Report_23062017_ vF.pdf. 109. Energy efficiency 2017. Op. cit., p. 82. 110. Energy efficiency 2017. Op. cit., p. 85. 111. See the 2017 state energy efficiency scorecard, published by the American Council for an Energy Efficient Economy (ACEEE). Available at: https:// aceee.org/sites/default/files/publications/researchreports/u1710.pdf. 112. These recommendations are taken from the ACEEE report referenced above.

6 Getting Technical

Introduction Although renewable energy accounts for only about 20% of global primary energy, it is rapidly gaining ground. We saw in Chapter 5 that the growth of wind power and solar photovoltaic electricity is an order of magnitude greater than the other energy technologies—although hydropower continues to generate much more power than wind or solar simply because large hydroelectric power plants have been generating electricity in many countries for decades. As the demand for electricity and electrical power ramps up in the emerging economies, and as the need to provide electricity in rural villages in Africa and Asia becomes a higher priority, it is solar photovoltaic technologies that are increasingly providing the much-needed energy. In this chapter we look more closely how the renewable energy technologies: wind, solar, hydropower, geothermal, and biofuels, are being employed around the world, and particularly in emerging economies. Wind turbines and solar photovoltaic installations are now fully cost-competitive with fossil fuel power—and even with electricity generated by natural gas. Moreover, wind power and solar energy have zero emissions of carbon dioxide and methane—the principal greenhouse gases. They are technologies that don’t require any pipelines, oil tankers, or coal trains in order to deliver energy to cities. Renewable energy technologies are the safest and cleanest power technologies available—with almost zero environmental impact.

© The Author(s) 2020 M. J. Bush, Climate Change and Renewable Energy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15424-0_6

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Wind Power Wind power is one of the oldest energy technologies. The first wind-driven devices are recorded in what was then Persia in the seventh century— although the Chinese may have invented similar devices several centuries earlier. The first machines, called panemones, were primitive devices consisting of a vertical rotating shaft turning a mill stone. The shaft was positioned inside a circular wall with an opening facing the prevailing wind. Attached to the shaft were paddles that caught the wind on one side of the shaft facing the opening—turning the shaft. Lifting water and grinding grain were the earliest forms of work driven by the wind—applications that continued for over a thousand years. In Asia and China in the tenth century, windmills were being used for irrigation and drainage. By the thirteenth century the machines were widely available in Europe. In low-lying Holland the machines were extensively employed to pump water from the coastal polders. The Dutch refined wind technology in several ways. They invented a rudimentary aerofoil; they created the spoiler and the air brake; and they improved the overall efficiency of the machines. The first windmills in America copied the European models. But by the middle of the nineteenth century Daniel Halladay has begun to experiment with the design that eventually developed into the familiar multi-bladed water pumping machine still to be seen across the rural North American landscape. In August 1854, Halladay patented the first commercially viable windmill—Halladay’s Self-Governing Windmill. Halladay had been approached to work on the design by a local businessman, John Burnham. Burnham was involved in the pump business and understood that if a reliable source of power could be found to bring ground water to the surface, he could significantly increase his sales. Halladay’s design allowed a windmill to automatically turn to face changing wind directions, and it regulated and maintained a uniform speed by changing the pitch of the fan blades—without human intervention. In July of 1854, the New-York Tribune, described Halladay’s new windmill with its self-furling ‘sails’1: “the wind wheel is ten feet, and it has been in operation for six months without a hand being touched to it to regulate the sails.” The article went on to detail the unique design stating that the windmill would stand still during a storm with high winds, the edge of the sail wings facing into the wind, and as the storm died down the wings would

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gradually resume their position to catch the breeze. The windmill had also successfully drawn water from a well 28 feet deep, moving it more than 100 feet to a small reservoir in the upper part of a barn. The cost of this newfangled invention was only $50—but with the cost of the pumps and pipes running to an additional $25. Halladay quickly formed the Halladay Windmill Company of Ellington, eventually moving the firm to South Coventry in Connecticut, and manufacturing in that town until 1863. Burnham then persuaded Halladay to move the business to Batavia, Illinois—closer to the expanding Midwestern market and the growing number of water-thirsty locomotives powering across the country on an expanding network of railroads. Halladay’s US Wind Engine and Pump Company’s products sold in the thousands to this market, where wind power made it significantly easier to provide water for crop irrigation and livestock. Over the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth century, more than six million multibladed water-pumping windmills are estimated to have been erected in North America. They were also among the first machines to be mass-produced. Factories in the US and Germany exported them to South America, Africa, Australia, Japan and to nearly all the European countries.2 Although several million water-pumping windmills were in operation during the early part of the twentieth century, it was the development and evolution of the airplane wing and propeller that stimulated the development of the modern high-speed machines. And it was quickly recognized that the high rotational speeds were ideal for driving an electrical generator. In the early 1920s, innovators were using aircraft propellers to build simple wind turbines to charge batteries that powered electric lights and the first electric appliances and radios. In the 1930s, small wind machines that generated electricity came onto the north American market. Between 1930 and 1960 thousands of wind powered turbines were sold and installed in many countries. But production in the US slowed in the 1960s after the Rural Electrification Administration succeeded in providing American farms and rural homes with inexpensive electricity generated by a distant coal-fired power plant linked to a transmission system. By 1957, the Jacobs Wind Company in the US had sold over 30,000 wind turbines worldwide. Larger experimental wind turbines followed. In 1957, Johannes Juul in Denmark built a machine with three 24-meter blades that generated 200 kilowatts (kW) of electrical power.

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The energy crisis in the 1970s triggered an intense interest in wind power in the US. More sophisticated science was brought to bear on the design and construction of the rotors, and in 1981, the first US wind farm started up in California at Altamont Pass. But before that, a 2-megawatt (MW) machine had been constructed in Denmark, and the Danish company, Vestas, started production—soon followed by other Danish manufacturers. In the 1980s, the first offshore machines were installed near the coast of Denmark; and by 1990 there were 46 windfarms generating power across the USA.

The Twenty-First Century By the turn of the twenty-first century, total installed wind power capacity had reached 17,400 MW—which almost doubled two years later. And then doubled again—reaching more than 59,000 MW in 2005.3 Twelve years later, in 2017, the global installed capacity for wind power had surged to nearly 539 GW (i.e. 539,000 MW). China leads in terms of new installations, followed by Germany and the US, with India passing Brazil to rank fourth. Other countries in the top ten were France, Turkey, the Netherlands, the UK and Canada.4 On a per capita basis, Denmark, Sweden, Germany, Ireland and Portugal would be the top five countries. Wind power has now become the least-cost option for new power generating capacity in an increasing number of markets. At least, thirteen countries (mostly European but including Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Uruguay), now generate more than 10% of their electricity from wind.5 Figure 6.1 shows wind power global capacity and annual additions between 2007 and 2016.

How It Works In principle, it’s simple enough. The wind turns the turbine blades—usually three of them. The blades are attached to a drive shaft running through a gear box that increases the rotational speed, and the gears connect to a generator that produces electricity. A modern megawatt-scale turbine is a sophisticated machine. The variable-pitch aerofoil blades are computer-controlled to extract the maximum amount of energy from the wind, and the machine is constantly monitored remotely to produce maximum performance, and to ensure that there are no problems with the gearbox and generator. Figure 6.2 shows the main elements of a modern wind turbine.6

6  Getting Technical     275

Fig. 6.1  Wind power global capacity and annual additions from 2007 to 2017, gigawatts (Source REN21 Renewables 2018 Global Status Report)

Fig. 6.2  Principal elements of a large wind turbine (Source U.S. Department of Energy’s Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy)

The amount of power produced by a wind turbine obviously depends on how hard the wind blows. But it also depends on the characteristics of the machine. All wind turbines have a characteristic power curve that

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Fig. 6.3  Power curve for a Vestas V80 2 MW turbine (Source Wind Power Program)

shows how much power the turbine will produce at different windspeeds. For example, Fig. 6.3 shows the power curve for a Vestas V80 2 MW wind turbine.7 The cut-in speed is the windspeed at which the blades begins to turn and the machine starts to produce electrical power. In this case, the Vestas V800 starts to generate power when the windspeed is about 3 meters/second (m/s). As the windspeed increases, the turbine produces more power until, at its rated power speed of 14 m/s, the machine is producing its full rated output—which in this case is 2000 kW. If the windspeed increases above the machine’s rated power speed, the output remains constant until the windspeed becomes excessive—in which case the turbine shuts down. Called the cut-out speed, for the Vestas V800 this occurs at a windspeed of 25 m/s—which would be reckoned gale-force winds on the Beaufort scale.

Capacity Factor The capacity factor of a power technology is a measure of how much electricity a power plant actually produces compared to how much it would produce if it operated at full rated capacity 100% of the time. For fossil fuel-powered plants capacity factors are high—often above 80%. But for solar and wind energy, their power output is intermittent, and capacity factors are lower. A wind turbine can never operate at its rated power 100% of the time, because for a significant period, the windspeeds

6  Getting Technical     277

at the site will be outside the range of windspeeds at which the turbine produces full power. In addition, the physics of air flowing through a turbine limit the absolute maximum efficiency to just under 60%. This is critically important because it means that a wind turbine rated at 2 MW can never produce an amount of electricity equal to 2 MW × 8760 hours a year = 17,520 MWh/year. It’s physically impossible given the variability of the wind regime and the physics of the air flow through the turbine blades. The capacity factors for solar photovoltaic energy and wind power will always be low compared to fossil fuel-powered technologies and nuclear energy. But the cost of energy produced by a technology is not only determined by its capacity factor. Solar and wind energy technologies have zero fuel costs. This is the crucial factor in the calculation of the cost of energy produced by renewable energy technologies compared to power generated from coal, oil, and natural gas—a calculation which shows that electricity from wind turbines in good locations is now less costly than electricity from fossil fuels including natural gas. And most importantly, there are no emissions of carbon dioxide, methane, and the other greenhouse gases—a factor that should be a game-changer even if the cost of electrical power came out to be about the same.

Windspeed Distribution It’s obvious to everyone that the wind is highly variable. Wind speeds vary over not only the space of a few seconds, but also between night and day, and throughout the seasons. Moreover, knowing the average or mean windspeed at a particular place isn’t good enough to accurately calculate the power output of a specific wind turbine that is located at the site. For this, we need to know the windspeed distribution. Wind speeds at a site proposed for a wind turbine need to be measured for at least a year (and preferably two or three) in order to get an idea of the wind speeds at the site and their variability over time. Windspeeds can be measured by an anemometer, recorded, and graphed as a histogram—plotting the time the wind blows for every increment of speed between zero and say 25 m/s. Figure 6.4 shows a windspeed distribution for an actual site in the UK, recorded hourly over the period 2005–2007. In this observatory, the windspeed was measured in knots. The mean windspeed is 10.2 knots equal to 5.25 m/s, but the distribution of wind speeds is not symmetrical about the mean. It is skewed towards

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Fig. 6.4  Histogram of hourly windspeeds at Plymouth, UK (Source Wind Power Program)

the right. The most frequently occurring wind speed is around 5 knots or 2.6 m/s.8 To estimate the average power from a wind turbine over a period of time, it is necessary take a wind turbine power curve, like the one shown in Fig. 6.3, and multiply the power at every increment of wind speed by the fraction of time the wind is blowing at that speed. In practice, this is calculated by employing a computer model of the wind turbine’s performance and the wind speed distribution. To formulate the model, the windspeed distribution has to be approximated by a mathematical formula—a probability distribution function. We will not go into the mathematics here, except to note that software packages are available (like the WindPower program) that compute the energy produced by a wind turbine installed at a site with a specified windspeed probability distribution. For instance, the estimated output from the 2 MW Vestas offshore wind turbine calculated by the WindPower program is shown in Table 6.1.9 So for a site where the mean windspeed is measured at 7 m/s (generally the minimum mean windspeed needed for a reasonably good wind power site), the 2 MW Vestas turbine would generate about 5672 MWh of electricity—assuming no losses in power transmission. The machine’s capacity factor at this site is estimated to be about 32%.

6  Getting Technical     279 Table 6.1  Annual energy output for a 2 MW Vestas offshore wind turbine Mean windspeed (m/s)

Energy output (kWh/yr)

Capacity factor (%)

5.0 6.0 7.0 8.0 9.0 10.0

2,855,846 4,285,160 5,672,087 6,909,340 7,939,894 8,739,939

16.3 24.5 32.4 39.4 45.3 49.9

Source Wind Power Program

KīƐŚŽƌĞ

KŶƐŚŽƌĞǁŝŶĚ

Fig. 6.5  Global weighted average capacity factors for new onshore and offshore wind turbines (Source International Renewable Energy Agency)

If cost data are available, the levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) from this turbine can then be calculated. As wind turbines have become larger and more technically advanced, capacity factors have been trending upwards. This has been driven by not only by the increase in the average hub height, turbine rating, and rotor diameter, but also by the trends in resource quality in new projects. Figure 6.5 shows global weighted average capacity factors for new onshore and offshore wind power capacity additions by year of commissioning from 1983 to 2017.10 Figure 6.5 shows that for onshore wind energy, capacity factors for new turbines are approaching 30%. For offshore wind turbines, capacity factors are higher—over 40%. In both cases, the trend continues to be upwards—a

280     M. J. Bush

sign of the continuing technical advances being made in the design and operation of these machines. There are significant regional variations, however. Capacity factors for onshore wind turbines are highest in the US: over 40%, driven not only by technology improvements but also the trend towards the location of projects in areas with the best resources.11 Capacity factors are useful for making quick estimates of wind farm power outputs and for cross checking manufacturers claims of superior performance. Let’s say we are looking at a new 20 MW offshore wind farm off the coast of the UK. Approximately how much electricity would you expect that wind farm to produce in a typical year? Offshore wind turbines are now showing capacity factors of more than 40%. Taking this number as a ballpark figure, we would estimate the output as 0.4 × 20  MW × 8760  hours/year = 70,080 MWh/year. A more accurate calculation would be based on the wind turbine’s power curve and the site’s windspeed probability distribution as discussed above. For a large windfarm the calculation is complex—because wind speed patterns and the windfarm’s power output are affected by the precise location of each turbine, and this needs to be modelled mathematically in order to obtain an accurate estimate of the windfarm’s energy output over the course of the year. Wind turbines are becoming larger and more efficient. In March 2018, General Electric (GE) unveiled a plan to develop the largest and most powerful offshore wind turbine to date. Called the Haliade-X, the nacelle of this mammoth machine will stand 260 meters above the waves. Its three 107-meter-long blades will drive a generator producing 12 MW of electricity at its rated output—enough power for about 16,000 homes. Although not yet in service (planned for 2021), GE estimates the turbine’s capacity factor at an impressive 63%—which is a good bit higher than offshore wind turbines currently in operation.12

Wind Resources The excellent Wind Atlas website shows mean windspeeds for regions across the globe in considerable detail. Figure 6.6 shows a screenshot from the website. The mean wind speed for a site is available at three different heights: 50, 100 and 200 meters. As a first cut, if one assumes a typical windspeed distribution for the indicated mean windspeed, it is possible to estimate the power output of any turbine if the power curve is known. Even if only the

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Fig. 6.6  Wind energy resources map of North America and Europe (Source Wind Atlas)

rated power and the rated windspeed for the turbine are known, it is still possible to make a reasonably good estimate of the energy produced by the turbine for a given location.13 Figure 6.6 shows that on the east coast of North America from Virginia northward up to Newfoundland and Labrador, wind resources are excellent. The Great Lakes also look good; so too does the east coast of James Bay and Hudson Bay. Some of the best wind resources are along the coastal areas of the Irish and North Seas. Scotland, Scandinavia, and Iceland have some of the best wind regimes.14 Across the mid-west of the US, wind resources are also good. In 2017, oil-rich Texas alone added 2.3 GW of wind power capacity, for a year-end total of 22.6 GW. If the Lonestar state were a country, it would rank sixth worldwide for cumulative wind power capacity. Wind power accounted for nearly 15% of electricity generation in the state during 2017. Utility-scale wind power accounted for more than 15% of annual generation in eight additional states, more than 30% in four states (including Iowa, at 36.9%) and 6.3% of total US electricity generation.15 Not surprisingly, wind farms are being built and operated in areas with the best wind resources. Table 6.2 shows the world’s largest wind farms operating in 2017, with a capacity greater than 500 MW. The windfarm at Gansu in China is planned for a huge 20,000 MW total capacity, but reportedly has operational problems linked to a lack of demand for electricity in the region and the transmission of this amount of intermittent power.16

282     M. J. Bush Table 6.2  Largest operational onshore windfarmsa Wind farm

Capacity (MW) Country

State/province

Gansu Wind Farm Alta Wind Energy Center Muppandal Wind Farm Jaisalmer Wind Park Shepherds Flat Wind Farm Roscoe Wind Farm Horse Hollow Wind Energy Center Capricorn Ridge Wind farm Fantanele-Cogealac Wind Farm

7965 1548 1500 1064 845 781.5 735.5 662.5 600

China USA India India USA USA USA USA Romania

Fowler Ridge Wind Farm Sweetwater Wind Farm Cedar Creek Wind Farm Whitelee Wind farm Buffalo Gap Wind Farm Dabancheng Wind farm Meadow Lake Wind farm

599.8 585.3 551 539 523.3 500 500

USA USA USA UK USA China USA

Gansu California Tamil Nadu Rajasthan Oregon Texas Texas Texas Fantanele and Cogealac Indiana Texas Colorado Renfrewshire Texas Xinjiang Indiana

aThe

list is from Wikipedia—which has a more comprehensive list. See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_onshore_wind_farms Source Wikipedia

Offshore windfarms tend to be smaller. The largest in 2017 was the London Array with a capacity of 630 MW. Only six offshore wind farms are above 500 MW—four of which are in UK waters. However, this disparity is changing. Much larger offshore wind farms are in the works—nearly all of them planned for European waters.17 In 2018, the 660 MW Walney Extension Offshore Wind Farm was powered up in the Irish Sea, approximately 19 km from the coast of Cumbria in the UK, and close to the original 367 MW Walney Offshore Wind Farm. The Walney Extension wind turbines will generate enough electricity to power more than 460,000 homes. Figure 6.7 shows the world’s largest offshore windfarms.

Levelized Cost of Electricity (LCOE) The LCOE from a wind power project is a function of the cost of installation, the quality of the wind resource, the technical characteristics of the wind turbines, operation and maintenance costs, the cost of capital, and the economic life of the project. The LCOE therefore largely depends on four factors:

6  Getting Technical     283

Fig. 6.7  World’s largest offshore windfarms in 2018 (see the September 2018 Guardian article: World’s largest offshore windfarm opens off Cumbrian coast. Accessed at: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/sep/06/worlds-largestoffshore-windfarm-opens-cumbrian-coast-walney-extension-brexit) (Source Wikipedia)

• Capacity factor. This is the result of the interplay of several variables, among which are the characteristics of the wind energy resource, the technical characteristics of the turbine, and its operational availability. • Total installed cost. The cost of the turbine is generally the largest cost item. Offshore projects have higher installation and operation and maintenance (O&M) costs. • Operation and maintenance. There are both fixed and variable costs associated with the operation and maintenance of the turbines and their ancillary equipment. O&M can represent 20–25% of the LCOE. • Cost of capital. The weighted cost of capital (WACC) is a major factor in the calculation of the LCOE. During the period 1983 to 2016, the LCOE of onshore wind energy dropped by an average of 15% for each doubling of installed capacity. Figure 6.8 shows the evolution of the LCOE of onshore wind projects between 1983 and 2017. The global weighted average value declined from USD 0.40/kWh in 1983 to USD 0.06/kWh in 2017.18 Moreover, the trend is still downward—and this is expected to continue as turbine designs improve, machines get larger and more efficient, and economies of scale continue to exert a downward impact on costs. The LCOE of offshore wind projects is higher—but is also trending downwards. From 2010 to 2016, the global weighted average of offshore wind decreased from USD 0.17 to USD 0.14/kWh. This was made possible by improved technology that has allowed higher capacity factors that

284     M. J. Bush

Fig. 6.8  Global weighted average levelized cost of electricity for onshore wind projects 1983–2017 (Source International Renewable Energy Agency)

have more than offset the increase in installed costs because of the larger and heavier machines. The prices awarded in auctions in 2016 and 2017 for projects coming online by 2020–2022 range from USD 0.10/kWh to as low as USD 0.06/kWh.19 The technology is rapidly evolving. In the US, wind farms are being ‘repowered’ as technology upgrades increase their energy production. As the largest windfarms are getting older, their owners are starting to ‘repower’ them with more efficient generators, new electronics, and longer lighter blades. In 2017, the US wind industry completed 15 repowering projects totalling 2136 MW. The upgrades extend the life of the projects without having to build a new windfarm. Since the infrastructure and power purchase agreements (PPA) are already in place, the increased energy output produces greater revenues from the same location.20 In Europe, repowering has become a billion-dollar industry. While most repowering involves the replacement of old turbines with fewer, larger, and more efficient and reliable machines, some operators are switching even relatively new machines for upgraded turbines and software improvements.21 European wind power is rapidly gaining ground over nuclear energy. Although Britain has eight operating nuclear plants, over the first three months of 2018, UK residents received more electricity from wind power than from nuclear energy—the first time that wind had overtaken nuclear in the UK. One of the reasons reported for this increase in production was due

6  Getting Technical     285

to a new transmission line between Scotland and north Wales that opened in December 2017. This allowed wind turbines to keep generating electricity, whereas in the past their output might have been curtailed once the grid they fed into became unable to accept more power.22 This is a point worth noting—solar and wind energy, because of their intermittency—may require upgraded electrical transmission systems that can handle their characteristic unpredictability and variability. But technical advances and the falling costs of utility-scale storage batteries are increasingly solving the problem of intermittency.

Environmental Impacts There are essentially three types of environmental impact associated with the installation and operation of large wind turbines: noise, aesthetics, and wildlife mortality. Wind turbines make noise, and for many people noise is bothersome and if loud enough, definitely annoying and stressful. A comprehensive study of the noise issues and health impacts of wind turbines was conducted by Health Canada in 2014. The study focused on over 1500 families living within 600 meters of a wind turbine in Ontario and Prince Edward Island. The researchers investigated the prevalence of health effects or health indicators among people exposed to wind turbine noise (WTN) using both self-reported and objectively measured health outcomes. They also looked at low frequency noise and infrasound from wind turbines to see if there was an adverse community reaction. The study could not find any statistical correlation between turbine noise and sleep disturbance, illness, stress and quality of life. However, in some cases, wind turbines clearly annoy people that are too close to them. There was a statistical correlation between WTN and annoyance linked to noise, shadow flicker, blinking lights and visual impact. In all cases, as expected, annoyance got worse with increasing exposure to noise levels. Community annoyance fell significantly at distances between 1 and 2 km from the turbines. Communities on Prince Edward Island living within 550 meters of a wind turbine were recorded as being ‘highly annoyed’. Interestingly, annoyance was significantly lower among 110 participants who received personal benefit from the installation of the turbines: either rent, payment or other indirect benefits of having wind turbines in the area—such as some form of community improvement.23

286     M. J. Bush

The takeaway from the Health Canada study is perhaps the obvious one that large machines with long rotating blades that make a noise can be annoying if you live too close to them. But it helps if you gain from their presence. But clearly, wind turbines should not be located too close to communities. A rule of thumb would be that 1 km is the minimum, but 2 km is better. Offshore wind projects would seem to have a definite advantage in this respect. Noise is clearly an issue in other jurisdictions as well: in June 2018, a judge in Minnesota recommended that the Freeborn Wind Farm be denied an operating permit, saying the southern Minnesota project failed to show it could meet state noise standards.24 Aesthetically, some people just don’t like wind turbines. Whether by themselves on a hillside, grouped into a windfarm on land, or out to sea on the horizon, many people object to their presence and see wind turbines as an unattractive blot on the landscape. An eyesore. This objection may diminish as the turbines are located farther away from the observer’s viewpoint, but one suspects that some people are just never going to like wind turbines intruding on the landscape even if they are at a considerable distance. This is the NIMBY syndrome: Not In My Back Yard. But if you want electricity, the technology has to be in someone’s back yard. Generating megawatt-scale electrical power to light and heat hundreds of thousands of homes requires lots of big, noisy, machinery and infrastructure. It can’t go underground. But if the electricity is generated by wind, all that machinery can go out to sea—which is more than fossil fuels and nuclear energy can do.

Birds and Bats Wind turbines are big machines and the tip of the long rotating blades is moving extremely fast. It is undeniable that wind turbines kill birds and flying mammals such as bats. But how big of a problem is it really? The US Fish and Wildlife Service has looked into this question and estimated the level of threat to birds from several human activities. Table 6.3 shows their assessment—necessarily approximate but nonetheless instructive. It’s clear that wind turbines are not the main problem. Even oil pits kill more birds than wind turbines. But cats have a lot to answer for.25 What about bats?

6  Getting Technical     287 Table 6.3  Common human-caused threats to birds in North America Rank

Hazard

Type

Median/average (million kills/year)

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

Cats Collision Collision Poison Collision Collision Electrocutions Oil pits Collision

Predation Building glass Vehicle – Electrical lines Communication towers – Suffocation and drowning Wind turbines

2400 303 200 72 25 6.5 5.4 0.75 0.174

Source US Fish and Wildlife Service

Unfortunately, wind turbines can kill lots of bats—perhaps as many as a million every year in the US. Bats tend to congregate around tall trees and it is thought they mistake the turbines for trees. The fragile animals are frequently struck by the blades, but they can also be killed by the large and sudden changes in pressure caused by the swirling air. Since bats only fly in relatively light winds—when turbines are not producing much power, one proposed solution is to raise the cut-in speed of turbines in areas where bats fly from 3 or 4 m/s up to 6 m/s. A study by Bat Conservation International in 2010 showed that higher cut-in speeds reduced bat mortality by up to 90%.26 If wind turbines kill a bat species that is listed as an endangered, the US Fish and Wildlife Service could order wind turbine operators to raise the turbine’s cut-in speed—which would reduce the wind farms’ power output and revenue and certainly push up the LCOE. Windfarms positioned several kilometres out to sea presumably would not kill any bats—so this is another argument in favour of offshore wind.

Solar Photovoltaic Energy Compared to the other sources of renewable energy, photovoltaic electricity was a late starter. Although the photoelectric effect had been studied since the late nineteenth century, it wasn’t until 1954, in the Bell Labs in the US, that the first functional solar cell was produced. At first very expensive, the technology only started to become commercialized in the late 1950s—mainly for satellites that needed low levels of power for long periods of time. In 1958, Vanguard I & II, Explorer III, and

288     M. J. Bush

ŶŶƵĂůĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶƐ

Fig. 6.9  Solar PV global capacity and annual additions from 2007 to 2017 (Source REN21 Renewables 2018 Global Status Report)

Sputnik-3 satellites were launched—each powered by solar PV arrays. In 1959, Explorer VI was launched with an array of 9600 cells. Terrestrial applications were few and far between because photovoltaic cells were expensive. Communication systems in isolated areas was an early niche market. In 1962, Bell Labs launched Telstar—the first telecommunication satellite. A year later, Japan installed a 212-Watt PV array on a lighthouse—the world’s largest array at that time.27 Since that time the pace of photovoltaic power deployment has been fast and furious. In 2017, 98 gigawatts (that’s 98,000 megawatts) of solar photovoltaic capacity was added worldwide—equivalent to the installation of more than 40,000 solar panels every hour.28 By the end of that year, global solar PV capacity totalled just over 400 GW. Figure 6.9 charts the exponential increase in PV installed capacity worldwide from 2007 to 2017. China once again leads the way, followed by the US, Japan, India and Turkey—together these five countries accounted for about 84% of additional capacity. While China dominates both the use and the manufacturing of solar PV, emerging markets on all continents have begun to contribute significantly to global growth. By the end of 2017, 29 countries had more than 1 GW installed. Per capita, the leaders are Germany, Japan, Italy, Belgium and Australia.

6  Getting Technical     289

In the US, solar PV was the country’s leading source of new generating capacity in 2017. More than 10 GW of capacity was brought online for a total of 51 GW. California led the field for capacity added (5.2 GW), followed by North Carolina (1 GW) and Florida (0.4 GW). Photovoltaic technology and applications exist at many levels: from residential kilowatt-scale systems up to centralized gigawatt-scale installations operated by utilities managing transmission and distribution networks providing electricity to millions of customers. The degree of penetration of residential systems depends strongly on the incentives provided by governments, and other factors such as the cost of electricity from the utility, and the cost and availability of financing. Where Feed-in-tariffs (FITs) are a financially attractive option, households can be quick to take advantage of the policy. However, in many countries, FITs have been scaled back, and although net metering is available in many jurisdictions, this policy has not been as influential as feed-in-tariffs in inducing households to install residential photovoltaic systems. In Germany, the solar-plus-storage market is growing rapidly as consumers shift from FITs to self-consumption. The share of newly installed residential systems paired with storage rose 14% in 2014 to more than 50% in 2016, when that country represented about 80% of Europe’s home energy storage market. Australia’s market has also been predominantly residential. By late 2017 almost 1.8 million rooftop solar PV installations (residential and commercial) were operating in that country. In addition to Australia, Germany and Japan, interest in solar-plus-storage is picking up in other developed countries (e.g. France, Italy, and the UK) for on- and off-grid systems where incentives are persuasive and the option is financially attractive.29 Although demand is rising rapidly for off-grid solar PV in Africa and other regions, grid-connected systems continue to account for the majority of existing and new installations. In terms of the fraction of added capacity, decentralized rooftop grid-connected systems have been declining—particularly with the transition from FITs and net metering to self-consumption— although it ticked up slightly in 2017. Centralized large scale projects by contrast have comprised a rising share of annual installations—particularly in emerging markets, and now represent the majority of annual installations.30 Floating PV installations are also growing in number and scale. Since 2015, more than 100 plants have started up, floating on hydropower reservoirs, industrial water sites, aquaculture ponds, and other areas of water. The benefits of floating PV modules include increased efficiency (because the

290     M. J. Bush Table 6.4  The largest solar photovoltaic power plants (300 MW or greater)a Name

Country

Capacity (MWp)

Size (km2)

Tengger Desert Solar Park Kurnool Ultra Mega Solar Park Datong Solar Power Top Runner Longyangxia Dam Solar Park Bhadla Solar Park Kamuthi Solar Power Project Pavagada Solar Park Solar Star (I and II) Topaz Solar Farm Copper Mountain Solar Facility Desert Sunlight Solar Farm Golmud Solar Park Mesquite Solar Project Yanchi Solar Park Charanka Solar Park Springbok Solar Farm Enel Green Power Mexico Cestas Solar Park Stateline Solar

China India China China India India India USA USA USA USA China USA China India USA Mexico France USA

1547 1000 1000 850 746 648 600 747 550 552 550 500 400 380 345 328 310 300 300

43 24 – 23 40 10 53 13 25 – 16 23 – – 20 12 2.5 6.8

aSee

the Wikipedia article at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_photovoltaic_ power_stations#World’s_largest_photovoltaic_power_stations Source Wikipedia

modules are cooler) and reduced evaporation from the reservoirs. Japan leads in terms of the number of installations due in part to the country’s FIT policy combined with limited roof and ground space. Other countries with projects include China, India, South Korea and Brazil.31 Megawatt-scale photovoltaic power plants are getting larger—particularly where there is plenty of both sunshine and available land. Table 6.4 lists the world’s largest solar photovoltaic power plants with a capacity of 300 MW or greater. Perhaps sensing the end of the road for their formerly free-flowing oil, Saudi Arabia is diversifying its energy resources and exploiting the solar energy it has in abundance. The country’s first solar project is planned to be a 300 MW installation at Sakaka in north-western Saudi Arabia. The contract was awarded in 2018 to the Saudi energy group, ACWA, whose bid came in at under US 3 ¢/kWh. The 300 MW plant is expected to involve a total private sector capital investment of about $300 million and create 400 jobs.32 Clearly, Saudi Arabia is thinking big. In early 2018 it was reported that Saudi Arabia and Japan’s SoftBank Group Corp. had signed a memorandum of understanding to build a 200 Gigawatt (that’s 200,000 MW) photovoltaic power plant.

6  Getting Technical     291

If built, the PV power plant would almost triple Saudi Arabia’s electricity generation capacity, which stood at 77 GW in 2016. About two thirds of that amount is generated by natural gas, with the rest coming from oil. The gigantic PV project, which includes both power generation and module and equipment manufacturing, will create as many as 100,000 jobs, and is expected to shave $40 billion off conventional power costs. The development will reach its maximum capacity by 2030 and cost close to $1 billion per Gigawatt. The deal is just the latest in a number of record-breaking announcements from Saudi Arabia—a country that is planning to massively scale up its access to renewable energy.33

Photovoltaic Technology A typical silicon photovoltaic (PV) cell is composed of a layer of phosphorus-doped (N-type) silicon on top of a thicker layer of boron-doped (P-type) silicon. An electrical field is created near the top surface of the cell where these two materials are in contact—called the P-N junction. When sunlight strikes the surface of the PV cell this electrical field generates light-stimulated electrons, resulting in a flow of current when the solar cell is connected to an electrical load. A typical silicon PV cell produces only about 0.5–0.6 volts DC under open-circuit, no-load conditions. The current and power of a PV cell depends on its efficiency and surface area and is proportional to the intensity of sunlight striking the surface of the cell. Under peak sunlight conditions a typical commercial PV cell with a surface area of 160 cm2 will produce about 2 Watts of power.34 Photovoltaic cells are connected in series and parallel circuits to produce higher voltages, currents and power levels. The PV cells are assembled into modules (solar panels), which for large installations, are then interconnected into an array—which may consist of thousands of individual panels. The performance of PV modules and arrays are generally rated according to their maximum DC power output under standard conditions—which approximates the maximum insolation possible on the surface of the Earth. PV panels are rated according to the maximum power they will produce under these conditions. For example, a PV panel rated as being 200 peak watts (written as 200 Wp) will produce 200 watts of direct current (DC) power under the maximum level of sunshine possible. Since a PV panel in a fixed position will not receive this level of insolation for more than an hour or so a day (if it is perfectly oriented perpendicular to the sun’s rays), the average power output of a PV array is a lot less than its rated power.

292     M. J. Bush

The capacity factor of a PV system is obviously low since for at least half the time the module is not producing any power (at night), and even during the day it reaches its peak power only for a few hours around midday. So how much energy does a solar panel actually produce? Although in most places the sun shines for at least 12 hours a day, only for about 4 or 5 hours will the PV panel be producing at close to its rated output. For instance, a 100-peak-watt panel (100 Wp) will produce about 400 Watthours of electricity when installed at a site with average insolation. In a sunnier location, you should get about 500 Wh of energy from the same system. This is a just a rule-of-thumb—but it enables you to make a quick estimate of the energy produced by an array of PV panels. Let’s say you are thinking of installing a 6000 Wp (6 kilowatts peak) PV system on the roof of your house in Florida. Florida is pretty sunny, so let’s reckon that we get on average 4.5 hours × 6  kW = 27 kWh of electricity a day from the modules. That’s 9855 kWh of electricity a year—which gives you a first cut at roughly the amount of electricity you might get out of your system. It’s a ballpark figure. But it might be good enough for you to decide whether or not to go ahead with a more detailed evaluation of the economics of the proposal. For an accurate evaluation of the output from a PV system we need to run a detailed simulation of the insolation at the proposed site over the course of a year. These data need to be modelled together with the energy losses associated with the equipment necessary for the operation of the system—particularly the inverters which convert direct current (DC) electricity to alternating current (AC), and the batteries (if these are included). One of the best (and free) PV evaluation tools is the Photovoltaic Geographical Information System (PVGIS) developed and supported by the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission. It’s available at this site: http://re.jrc.ec.europa.eu/pvg_tools/en/tools.html. Running the simulation for a site in Miami with a 6kWp photovoltaic installation, the model produces the output shown in Fig. 6.10. The model takes into account all the system losses and calculates the monthly energy output from the PV panels—assumed to be optimally set up at a slope of 26 degrees and an azimuth of −7 degrees (oriented slightly to the south east). The monthly energy output varies between about 700 kWh in September to just over 900 kWh in March. The total energy output for the year is estimated as 9400 kWh—about 5% less than our quick calculation based on the rule-of-thumb method. PVGIS can be used to model the performance of much larger photovoltaic systems—even utility-scale PV power plants can be simulated by the

6  Getting Technical     293

Fig. 6.10  Energy output from the PVGIS model for a 6kWp photovoltaic system in Miami, Florida (Source Photovoltaic Geographic Information System)

Fig. 6.11  Output data for a 30 MWp photovoltaic system in Djibouti, East Africa (Source Photovoltaic Geographic Information System)

software, which will also calculate the levelized cost of the electricity produced by the power plant. Take the example of a 30 MWp photovoltaic power plant to be installed in Djibouti in east Africa. The capital cost of the system is estimated at about $60 million. If we run this simulation for a site at Grand Bara in Djibouti, we get the results shown in Fig. 6.11. If the interest on capital is set at 5% p.a. and assuming a 30 year lifetime, the levelized cost of energy is calculated as 9¢/kWh.35 That is pretty good for Djibouti—where electricity is hugely expensive.

294     M. J. Bush

Distributed Solar Energy One of the most useful characteristics of photovoltaic energy is the extraordinary range of the services that PV energy can provide—everything from a tiny cell producing a fraction of a watt for a pocket calculator, to arrays of thousands of PV modules generating megawatts of power. In between these extremes is an application that has the potential to completely change the way electricity is provided and used by residences, communities, commerce, and industry. In 2017, the US solar market installed 10.6 GW of PV capacity. This was 30% less than the record-breaking year before, but in line with the upward trend in PV installations that has been rising exponentially for the last decade. About 60% of this capacity was for utility-scale PV power plants; the other 40% was for distributed solar. This segment covers both residential rooftop systems and non-residential systems—the latter fraction including community-based PV systems and PV systems installed on commercial buildings.36 The installation of thousands of small solar PV systems on residences and commercial buildings has largely been driven by governments’ determination to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases on both sides of the supply-demand equation. So in western Europe, megawatt-scale PV and wind power is replacing coal-fired and nuclear power plants, while at the same time strong financial incentives have been provided in order to induce households, businesses and communities to install kilowatt-scale PV systems to reduce the aggregate demand for electricity from the centralized distribution system. In Europe, this policy was pioneered by Germany which introduced Feedin-Tariffs (FITs) to encourage the use of new energy technologies including photovoltaic energy in 2001. FITs provide a revenue to any renewable energy installation, including residential solar, that feeds electricity into the grid. At first set close to 50 cents/kWh, a level than induced hundreds of thousands of households in Germany to install rooftop PV systems, the tariff has been progressively reduced—to around 15 cents/kWh, which is where it stood in 2018. In Ontario, Canada, the FIT program for PV electricity started in 2009 and offered extraordinarily high FIT rates to rooftop and ground-mounted PV installations. Rates varied between 44.3 and 80.2 ¢/kWh37 with the upper rate applicable for rooftop installations less than 10 kW. In addition, homeowners enjoyed the exceptional security of a 20-year contract!38

6  Getting Technical     295

Perhaps unsurprisingly, the cost of this generous program was excessive, and Ontario’s FIT program was eventually discontinued. The inducements and incentives for homeowners and communities to install small-scale photovoltaic systems on rooftops or adjacent spaces has been extremely successful where it has been instituted and supported by national and regional governments. There are two principal incentive mechanisms: net energy metering and feed-in-tariffs—although additional financial incentives such as rebates, discounts, tax breaks and other benefits are often included in the programs. Net energy metering is an arrangement where the excess electricity produced by a roof-mounted (or adjacent) PV system (the amount of energy not required by the building itself ), is fed back into the grid. In effect, the electricity meter runs backwards and the utility’s client—the home or business owner—is only charged for the difference between the amount of electricity he or she consumes and the amount injected into the grid. How the calculation is figured out varies; different power companies have different arrangements, and there are generally limits on how much electricity can be fed back into the grid. Feed in-tariffs, as discussed briefly above, require the residence or building to have two electricity meters—one to measure the electricity supplied by the grid (at night for example), and one to measure the electricity produced by the PV system and fed to the grid during the day. The home or business owner will have to deal with two electricity tariffs: one for incoming electricity from the grid, and the other for electricity injected into the grid by the PV system. Both of these tariffs may vary according to the time of day. Power Purchase Agreements (PPA) are also common. This is a contractual agreement between a utility and the owner of a solar photovoltaic system, where the utility agrees to purchase electricity from the PV system for a fixed price per kWh over a specified period of time. In the US at the end of 2017, of the nine states that generated more than 1000 MW of solar PV electricity, three have more than half of that power output from distributed PV systems. All three states are in the NE: New Jersey, Massachusetts, and New York—where an impressive 87% of total solar electricity generation is from distributed sources. Yet the north-east region of the US has only modest solar resources. They key to the growth of distributed energy systems in this region is policy: in recent years the three states have expanded policies such as net metering and PPAs that are favourable to distributed generation. It’s a reminder that solar energy can be economically viable even in regions with only average levels of insolation.39

296     M. J. Bush

In California, which has a lot better sunshine and much more utility-scale PV power, distributed solar accounts for about 40% of installed PV capacity. This percentage will soon ramp up considerably: in 2018, the state passed a landmark solar homes rule that mandates distributed solar on all new home construction starting in 2020.

Community Shared Solar As distributed solar energy becomes more widespread, people are exploring new ways of using photovoltaic electricity. Not everyone is able to install panels on their roof due to unsuitable or insufficient roof space, living in a multi-unit condo building, or simply renting. However, there are some alternative business models are that are developing—like community solar and shared solar. These business arrangements make it possible for people to invest in solar energy together. Shared solar falls under the community solar rubric allowing multiple participants to benefit directly from the energy produced by a single solar photovoltaic array. Shared solar participants typically benefit by owning or leasing a portion of a system or by purchasing kilowatt-hour blocks of renewable energy generation. Figure 6.12 shows schematically the three most common arrangements.40 By aggregating customer demand, shared solar programs can reduce the financial and technical barriers to investing in residential solar energy. Instead of acting alone to purchase PV panels and hiring professionals to complete individual site assessments, shared solar programs divide these costs among all of the participants. Investments are even safe for those who may eventually move—their share of solar can be transferred to a new home within the same utility service area or sold to someone else.41

ŽŵŵƵŶŝƚLJŐƌŽƵƉƉƵƌĐŚĂƐŝŶŐ

KĨĨƐŝƚĞƐŚĂƌĞĚƐŽůĂƌ

KŶƐŝƚĞƐŚĂƌĞĚƐŽůĂƌŝŶĂŵƵůƚŝͲƵŶŝƚ ďƵŝůĚŝŶŐ

Fig. 6.12  Three models of community and shared solar energy (Source US Department of Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy)

6  Getting Technical     297

Most onsite solar energy installations use net metering to account for the value of the electricity produced when the PV system produces more energy that is needed by the participants. Net metering allows customers to be credited for this excess electricity in the grid, usually in the form of kWh credits during a given period. The electricity meter runs backwards, and customers purchase fewer units of electricity from the utility, so the electricity produced from the PV system is effectively valued at the retail price of power.42

Onsite Energy Storage As the cost of batteries continues to fall, there is increasing interest in adding energy storage to distributed energy systems—which for solar photovoltaic power means residential and community shared solar including businesses and commerce. One reason for this interest is the notable increase in extreme weather events that have impacted north America over the last few years—especially in 2017. Severe weather is now the leading cause of power outages in the region. For a solar system to provide electricity during a utility power outage, it must be designed to function as a stand-alone system that can isolate itself from the grid, continue to generate power and provide energy to the building, and also store excess electricity for later use. For safety reasons, operating standards require that grid-connected solar PV systems automatically disconnect from the grid during a power outage. This is because most conventional rooftop PV systems are not designed to function as both a grid-connected and a stand-alone system. Instead they disconnect from the grid and completely cease power production during an outage. Figure 6.13 shows the basic components of a solar PV system with energy storage.43 Installing solar PV technology in conjunction with energy storage allows a solar PV system to provide power when the grid is down—in effect, it functions as a stand-alone system. Batteries are the most commonly used storage technology for small distributed solar PV applications, although other types of energy storage systems (ESS) may be used for larger utility-scale systems. Batteries are linked to the PV panels though an inverter which automatically selects between charging the batteries, providing electricity to the onsite load, or feeding electricity into the grid. So it’s a more sophisticated piece of power conditioning equipment than the simple inverter used in a PV system that has no energy storage capacity. The inverter monitors the onsite load, the grid

298     M. J. Bush

Fig. 6.13  Basic components of a PV + energy storage system (Source Florida Solar Energy Center)

status, the state of charge of the batteries, and the power being generated by the PV system. The principal barrier to the deployment of energy storage in distributed energy systems has been the cost of the batteries, but costs have been falling for the last decade. Lower battery prices, increased demand for backup power, and uncertainty surrounding the future cost of electricity from the grid are all factors stimulating interest in distributed energy systems with storage. Residential PV systems with storage can generate benefits for grid operators. Storage can add value through: • Demand side management to shave peaks in the load on the utility system • Improved power quality by smoothing the variable output of a PV system • Providing power to critical facility during an outage • An increased ability to integrate higher levels of distributed energy systems into the grid system • Ancillary grid services such as voltage control.44 In order to provide these functions and services, distributed energy systems with storage require very smart controls and meters. The ability of a distributed energy system to operate as a standalone system in the event of a major outage means the building has

6  Getting Technical     299

considerable value to communities and local agencies in the aftermath of extreme weather. For instance, Florida’s SunSmart Schools and Emergency Shelters Program has installed 115 solar PV systems with storage at Florida’s schools to create emergency shelters.45 The basic system in Florida schools consists of: • • • • • •

10 kW photovoltaic system on a ground mounted array (about 100 m2) 48 kWh battery backup energy storage 3-phase building electricity Utility grid-connected Net metering power Data monitoring

Using schools as emergency shelters is a strategy that should be adopted by island governments in the Caribbean and the Pacific. All islands have schools and kitting them out with a solar PV system with energy storage is relatively inexpensive and a potential life-saver during a major hurricane. Schools can also be used to store essential supplies (water and food) for local communities in the aftermath of hurricanes and cyclones. Community based PV systems can also be designed and built with energy storage. With the ability to run as a stand-alone system in the event of an outage—‘islanded’ from the grid, the energy storage capacity enables the community to have electricity while other residences and buildings are without power.

Levelized Cost of PV Electricity Rapid declines in installed costs and increased efficiency have dramatically improved the economic competitiveness of photovoltaic power. The global weighted average LCOE of utility-scale PV plants is estimated to have fallen by over 70% between 2010 and 2017—from about $0.36 to $0.10/kWh. LCOE costs vary by country. The Italian market experienced the largest LCOE reduction driven both by reductions in the cost of modules and a fall in the balance of systems (BOS) costs. In the US, these costs are higher, but excellent solar resources mean than that the LCOE of utility-scale projects in the US is not significantly higher than other markets. The LCOE of residential systems has also fallen at a rapid pace. In Germany, costs fell from $0.55/kWh in 2007 to $0.15/kWh in 2017. Data from India, China,

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Fig. 6.14  SunShot targets for levelized costs of PV electricity in US cents/kWh (Source US Department of Energy, Sunshot Initiative)

Australia and Spain—which all have higher insolation than Germany— show that lower LCOE costs can be achieved even if installed costs are sometimes higher. In these countries, the LCOE fell to between $0.08 and $0.12/kWh at the beginning of 2017.46 In the US, the SunShot Program is funding research and development intended to bring energy costs from PV systems down to as low as 3 ¢/kWh by 2030. Figure 6.14 outlines the goals of the program for residential, commercial and utility-scale PV systems.47 Progress towards these targets has been impressive. In September 2017, the US DOE announced that the SunShot program had met the 2020 utility-scale target of 6¢/kWh three years earlier than expected—so a new target of 3¢/kWh was set for 2030.48

Concentrating Solar Power Concentrating solar power (CSP) comes in two main forms—defined by the technologies employed to concentrate sunlight. The most spectacular version is where a large field of reflecting mirrors (heliostats) focuses sunlight on a cylindrical receiver mounted on a tower in the centre of the area of mirrors. In full sunshine, the receiver atop the tower is brilliantly illuminated (and extremely hot) and is visible from a long distance. Dubbed a ‘power tower’,

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the technology was first employed at scale at Barstow in California in the late 1970s. The second variant is called a parabolic trough, or linear trough system. It consists of lines of multiple linear parabolic mirrors that focus sunlight onto a pipe running along the focal axis of the mirrors. The pipe contains a heat transfer fluid which conveys heat to a secondary thermal circuit that generates steam which drives a turbine and generator. Other forms of CSP systems are the linear Fresnel lens technology, and dish systems where a parabolic dish focuses sunlight onto a small heat engine that generates electricity. However, the power tower and the linear trough systems are the most common arrangement and for the moment the most economically viable of the four technologies. An important difference between CSP and photovoltaic systems is that CSP technology only captures direct insolation. Unlike PV systems which can generate power from diffuse solar radiation—even when its cloudy, CSP technology is only feasible in regions which have an abundance of direct insolation. Figure 6.15 shows schematically the how the power tower and linear trough plants operate. It should be noted that the power tower concept schematic shown in Fig. 6.15 (which is from the US Department of Energy) does not show any thermal energy storage—which is considered essential for the economic viability of all CSP systems. In 2017, CSP registered an additional 100 MW of capacity coming online, bringing global installed capacity to around 4.9 GW. Table 5.1 shows that while there is considerable interest in this technology, its installation as a mainstream utility-scale power technology is advancing only slowly. Nevertheless, its ability to provide dispatchable and baseload power—when

dŚĞµƉŽǁĞƌƚŽǁĞƌ¶ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ

dŚĞµůŝŶĞĂƌƚƌŽƵŐŚ¶ ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚ

Fig. 6.15  The two main solar concentrating power concepts (Source US Department of Energy)

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thermal energy storage is part of the plant—is a huge advantage compared to more variable sources of renewable power like wind and photovoltaics. In the US, two large-scale power tower plants were operating in 2017. In California’s Mojave Desert, the Ivanpah solar electric plant—the largest in north America has 173,500 heliostats focusing sunlight on three towers. At full power, the plant is capable of generating 392 MW of electricity. In Nevada, the Crescent Dunes solar energy plant generates 110 MW from a field of 10,347 heliostats.49 In 2017, for the second year running, South Africa led the market in new addition. That country was the only one to bring new capacity online, commissioning the 100 MW Xina Solar One plant—which has 5.5 hours of thermal energy storage. An estimated 13 GWh of thermal energy storage—based almost entirely on molten salts—was operational in CSP plants at the end of 2017. The majority of CSP plants under construction will incorporate some form of thermal energy storage—which continues to be viewed as essential to the competitiveness of the technology. Parabolic trough and power tower systems dominate the market with 0.9 GW of trough systems and 0.8 GW of tower systems under construction at the end of 2017. China’s CSP market is also gathering speed—the government announcing 20 new projects of all types: parabolic trough, power tower, and Fresnel lens systems, with a combined capacity of 1 GW. Five plants totalling 300 MW are slated to be operational before the end of 2018. Other countries building CSP plants include India, Morocco, Israel, Saudi Arabia, Chile, and Australia.50 The largest plant under construction is a 700 MW CSP plant in the Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum Solar Park in the United Arab Emirates—which has both a 200-metre power tower and a large field of parabolic trough collectors. Spain remains the global leader in existing CSP capacity with 2.3 GW operational at the end of 2017. The US is in second place with just over 1.7 GW of installed capacity. These two countries account for over 80% of global CSP power production.51 While power from CSP plants is currently more expensive than wind or photovoltaics, there is widespread confidence that costs can be brought down, and that this advantage—when coupled with the technology’s ability to provide dispatchable and baseload electricity—will eventually make CSP a mainstream renewable energy technology (but only where there is abundant direct insolation). One US projection sees the LCOE for CSP plants

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falling to $0.06/kWh by the end of 2020—without subsidies—which would make CSP a very attractive solar power technology.52

Hydropower Hydroelectric power, or hydropower as it’s generally called, is the dominant source of renewable energy used to produce electricity—accounting for almost two thirds of the electricity generated from all renewable sources of energy worldwide. However, global additions to capacity in 2017 were a modest 21.9 GW—a lot less than the additional capacity registered by solar and wind—as Table 5.1 shows. The top ten countries for installed hydroelectric power capacity are shown in Table 6.5.53 Together these countries account for 68% of the global total installed hydropower capacity. The East Asia and Pacific region added the most capacity in 2017—mainly as a result of the 9.1 GW brought online by China. Next in line was Brazil (+3.4 GW), India (+1.9 GW), Portugal (+1.1 GW) and Angola (+1.0 GW).54

Regional Trends In North and Central America, the increase in hydropower capacity was modest compared to the other regions—but a notable feature was the increased focus on pumped storage projects. About 510 MW of new capacity was brought online in 2017, about a quarter of which was pumped storage. In Canada, major storage projects under construction include the Keeyask plant in Manitoba, Site C in British Columbia (1100 MW), Muskrat Falls in Newfoundland and Labrador, and Romain-4 in Quebec. In the US, 140 MW of capacity was added through retrofits to existing facilities. 139 MW of pumped storage capacity was added at the Northfield Mountain Unit in Massachusetts and the Ludington plant in Michigan. In the Dominican Republic, work was underway on a small 10.7 MW installation at Hatillo on the Rio Yuna. In South America, over 4 GW of capacity was added in 2017. In Brazil, although 3.38 GW was added, the country decommissioned several large installations from its 1-year pipeline of projects—reportedly in favour of pursuing more decentralized renewable energy.55

304     M. J. Bush Table 6.5  Top 10 countries for installed hydropower capacity Rank 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Country

Hydropower capacity (GW)

China USA Brazil Canada Japan India Russian Federation Norway Turkey France

341 103 100 81 50 49 48 32 27 26

Source International Hydropower Association

The continent with the largest untapped potential for hydropower is Africa. Development is slow but steady. Only 1.9 GW of capacity was added. Angola commissioned power generation units for the 2 GW Lauca hydropower plant, and a second power plant at Cambambe. Cote d’Ivoire commissioned the 275 MW Soubre plant; in Sudan the Upper Atbara and Seitt dam project was completed; while across in Zimbabwe, the first unit of the Kariba South extension project was commissioned. Hydropower is the largest source of renewable energy in Europe—and an additional 2.3 GW of capacity came online in 2017. About half of this capacity was pumped storage. For instance, Portugal commissioned two pumped storage projects: Foz Tua (263 MW) and Frades II (780 MW).56 Over 3.2 GW of capacity was added in 2017 in central and SE Asia, with over half of this capacity commissioned in India—including the 1.2 GW Teesta II project in the north-east state of Sikkim. Other hydropower projects were commissioned in Russia, Iran, Georgia and Nepal. In East Asia and the Pacific region, the narrative is all about China. Over 90% of the total added capacity of 9.8 GW was commissioned in that country—which increased its total installed capacity to 341 GW. Australia announced plans to expand the 4.1 GW Snowy Mountains Scheme—a pumped storage installation that links two large dams and which would effectively operate as a giant 2 GW battery. Smaller projects are underway in Vietnam, Cambodia, and Papua New Guinea.

Pumped Storage The energy storage capability of hydropower installations has always been a crucial component of modern energy infrastructure. Hydropower reservoirs can

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store energy by reducing output when other sources of power are available, or alternatively, pumped storage can directly absorb surplus power from the grid. The growing penetration of variable renewable energy (mainly wind and solar) is raising interest in pumped storage capacity—due to its ability to absorb excess power generated by wind and solar, and to avoid curtailment of wind farm power when the grid is overloaded. Global pumped storage capacity rose by more than 3 GW in 2017 for a year-end total of 153 GW. New capacity was installed in China, Portugal, and Switzerland.57 In China, two large pumped storage plants were completed in 2017. The five remaining reversible turbine generators of the Liyang facility were operational by the end of 2017 for a total of 1.5 GW of pumping capacity. China also completed the first of 300 MW of a 1.2 GW storage plant in Shenzhen City—the country’ first large scale pumped storage facility too be built within an urban environment.58 Also in 2017, Portugal’s 780 MW Frades II and the 263 MW Foz Tua pumped storage plants both came online. The larger Frades II plant has two variable-speed turbines—which respond faster to voltage variations on the grid. Many projects in Europe are now incorporating variable speed turbines for flexibility, and a wider operating range—characteristics useful for accommodating increased levels of variable renewable energy.59 Scotland is the location of over 90% of the UK’s hydropower. Two of the UK’s four pumped storage hydro facilities are located in Scotland. The Cruachan installation is located within the 1126 meter high Ben Cruachan mountain on the shore of Loch Awe, and the Foyers installation is on the shore of Loch Ness. The two sites have a generating capacity of 440 MW and 300 MW respectively.

Greenhouse Gas Emissions Does hydropower produce greenhouse gases? It seems unlikely if you just consider the electrical power generation—where no fuel is burned and there are no emissions. But large reservoirs of water that have inundated extensive areas of land can potentially produce emissions of methane. The question has always been: how much? A 2014 article in Scientific American claimed that global methane emissions from hydropower reservoirs could be about the same as methane emissions from burning fossil fuels— somewhere around 100 million tonnes a year. If that estimate is correct, then utility-scale hydropower plants requiring large reservoirs and pumped storage installations are very significant sources of methane which, as we noted in Chapter 3, is a strong greenhouse gas.60

306     M. J. Bush Table 6.6  Median life-cycle carbon emissions

Energy source

gCO2e/kWh

Coal Gas Solar PV (utility scale) Hydropower Wind offshore Nuclear Wind onshore

820 490 48 18.5 12 12 11

Source International Hydropower Association

Attempting to answer this question more precisely, in 2017 the International Hydropower Association (IHA) conducted a study of 498 reservoirs worldwide. The study measured emissions from hydropower reservoirs in boreal, temperate, subtropical and tropical climates in more than 50 countries. The results of the study showed a very large range of values: from less than 1 gram of GHG emissions per kWh of energy output to as much as 1000 g per kWh. For reference, Table 6.6 shows the median values for GHG emissions for several sources of energy.61 The value shown for hydropower in Table 6.5 is the median value—which means that half the measured values were below 18.5—and half were above. But the majority of installations, 84% of reservoirs, showed emissions of less than 100 gCO2e/kWh. The IHA study confirms what we knew—that hydropower can produce significant emissions of greenhouse gases—but at a level that is, on average, considerably less than fossil fuel power plants. The range of values however is very large—which means that some hydropower plants around the world emit just as much greenhouse gases as natural gas and coal-fired power plants.

Environmental Impacts Flooding large areas of land frequently comes with very considerable environmental, social, and economic impacts. Large dams are notorious for creating long-lasting conflicts, and sparking protests from the communities that are displaced, and by people whose livelihoods are disrupted by the flooded land. Where a river runs through several countries—like the Nile, constructing a large dam upstream—like the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam the Ethiopian government is building on the Blue Nile—can also create serious international disagreements: Egypt is legitimately worried that the flow of the River Nile will be disrupted and diminished, and that this will cause

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social and economic problems for farmers dependent on the river for irrigation—particularly in the Nile delta.62 The Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam project is huge. When completed it will have an installed capacity of 6450 MW and will be the largest hydropower plant in Africa. It will flood about 1700 km2 of forested land and displace about 20,000 people. Writing in the 2018 Hydropower Status Report, the Ethiopian Minister of Water, Irrigation and Electricity, Seleshi Bekele, stated: By 2025, electricity access is expected to reach 100 percent in both rural and urban areas of Ethiopia. To attain this, electrification enables the provision of affordable electricity to poor households who are forced to use fuelwood to meet their energy needs.63

But massive hydropower projects are not the solution to providing electricity to rural communities. The cost of the transmission and distribution of centrally generated electricity to poor villagers is nearly always totally uneconomic. Only distributed systems—like photovoltaic minigrid systems—can realistically provide power to dispersed rural communities in a country as large as Ethiopia. Closer to home in North America, the Site C hydroelectric plant in British Columbia, Canada, continues to be hugely controversial. The Site C dam is a large earth-fill dam on the Peace River near Fort St. John in northwest British Columbia. The plant has a rated capacity of 1100 MW and will cost at least $9 billion CAD. The dam will flood about 93 km2 of land. It is due for completion in 2020. The project has generated considerable opposition because of the flooding of a large area of agricultural land, the lack of support from First Nations groups and local landowners, the high cost of the project compared to alternatives, and its environmental impact. Two Treaty 8 First Nations and local landowners made legal challenges to the dam; these were eventually dismissed by a Federal Court of Appeal. In an unprecedented move, 250 Canadian scholars as well as the President of the Royal Society of Canada wrote to the Canadian government in May 2016 expressing their concerns about the approval procedures and the environmental assessment process. However, the Federal government refused to review the approval of the project, and in December 2017, the Premier of British Columbia decided finally to authorize the completion of the project.64

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But what is evident is that practically all large hydroelectric projects create conflicts that can seriously delay construction and substantially increase costs. The number of people displaced by large dams can run into the hundreds of thousands.65 Cost overruns on large hydropower projects are the norm—not the exception. Hydropower used to be the only renewable energy technology capable of generating megawatt levels of power—apart from nuclear energy. But that is no longer the case. Utility-scale photovoltaic power plants, CSP systems, and offshore and onshore wind farms are capable of generating almost as much power—at less cost, with quicker completion (months not years), and with much less social, cultural, and environmental impact and disruption.

Biomass Energy The traditional use of biomass for cooking involves burning wood or charcoal in simple cookstoves. In many countries (such as Haiti), and in the villages of many others (such as India) this is still the principal form of cooking for the majority of the population. However, cooking with wood and charcoal (or worse with dung and agricultural residues) brings severe health impacts caused by the smoke produced by the stoves and the fact that cooking often takes place in the home where children are present or nearby. In most countries where biomass is used for cooking, there are national programs intended to promote the introduction of cleaner fuels for cooking—either bottled LPG gas or electricity. In spite of these programs, the global consumption of traditional biomass fuels has been increasing slowly—as population increases have outpaced the introduction of more modern fuels for cooking. Modern bioenergy includes wood pellets used as fuel in power plants, liquid fuels used in the transport sector, and fuel gases containing methane produced from organic waste. One important aspect to consider at the outset is that biofuels contain carbon. When burned to produce heat or used as fuel in an engine, they produce emissions of carbon dioxide just like fossil fuels. In fact, wood ­pellet-burning power plant emit more carbon dioxide per unit of electricity produced than coal. Their advantage, compared to fossil fuels, lies in the fact that the carbon produced during combustion is carbon that was absorbed by the biomass when it was growing. Many people therefore consider biofuels to be ‘carbon neutral’—meaning that when used as fuel, they do not produce additional amounts of carbon. They simply return to the atmosphere what they had previously removed.

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However, this view is simplistic. Several detailed and careful studies have shown that when the full life-cycle of the biomass fuel is taken into account, including land use changes and the emissions produced by harvesting and transporting the fuel to a power plant, biomass fuels actually result in the generation of additional amounts of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases. The use of wood as a fuel in any large scale application is not carbon neutral. A very detailed analysis of using forest biomass for power generation was conducted in Massachusetts in 2010. Noting that forest biomass generally emits more greenhouse gases than fossil fuels per unit of energy produced, the study confirmed that over time, the re-growth of the harvested forest eventually removes this excess carbon from the atmosphere. Dubbing this excess the ‘carbon debt’, the analysis showed that after several years, biomass begins to yield carbon dividends in the form of greenhouse gas emissions that are lower than would have occurred if fossil fuels had been used to produce the same amount of energy. But getting to this point takes time. If forest biomass is used as a fuel to replace oil for combined heat and power (CHP), it takes about five years before there is a net benefit in terms of reduced emissions. But if forest biomass replaces a coal-fired plant, it can take as long as 21 years before there is a net benefit. Looking ahead 40 years to 2050, the report calculates that the replacement of oil-fired thermal/CHP capacity with biomass thermal/CHP would fully offset the carbon debt and lower greenhouse gas levels compared to what would have been the case if fossil fuels had been used over the same period—approximately 25% lower. For biomass replacement of coal-fired plants, the net cumulative emissions in 2050 are approximately the same but replacing a gas-fuelled plant with forest biomass would not yield any benefit at all—emissions would be substantially higher with a biomass fuelled plant.66 The concept of carbon neutrality was again called into question in 2018 when the European Academies Science Advisory Council (EASAC) issued a press release strongly cautioning that bioenergy from forests is not always carbon neutral and may in fact increase carbon emissions. The EASAC scientists noted that carbon neutrality involves a ‘payback’ period (the time taken for forests to reabsorb the CO2 emitted during biomass combustion), which ranges from decades to hundreds of years—depending on the type of biomass and what happens to the forest and land area after harvesting.67 Notwithstanding the fact that wood pellet fuel is not carbon neutral, the global production and trade of pellets used for power production and heating has continued to expand—with production reaching close to 30 million tonnes in 2017. About half this amount was used for residential and

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commercial heating—most notably in Europe, and about half used for power generation. Europe is the major market for this use—especially the United Kingdom which alone used 7.5 Mt of wood pellets for power generation in 2017. The Drax power plant is the world’s largest biomass-pellet-based electricity generator. Three coal-fired units with a combined capacity of 1.9 GW were converted to biomass pellets. The power plant ensured its supplies of fuel by opening a plant in Louisiana, USA, that can produce 45,000 tonnes of wood pellets annually.68 In 2018, substantial amounts of wood pellets were being exported from the southeast US to Europe. In North Carolina, the wood fuel industry was logging about 200 km2 of forest a year to meet the demand in Europe.69 The USA is the world’s main producer and exporter of wood pellets. In 2017, the US had the capacity to produce over 10 million tonnes (Mt) of pellets annually. Actual production was 5.3 Mt of which 4.7 Mt was exported to Europe. Other major producers and exports of wood pellets are Canada and Latvia.70 Municipal solid waste (MSW) is potentially an important fuel. If left to decay in a landfill the waste will produce significant amounts of ­methane—so burning MSW as fuel for electricity of heat production is an approach that has several advantages in terms of both waste management and reducing emissions of carbon. In China, producing energy from waste is widely employed as an alternative to landfill, and waste-to-energy plants are also starting to be developed in other parts of Asia and in Africa. In Ethiopia, construction began in 2017 on a waste-to-energy plant that will process 1400 tonnes/day of municipal waste from Addis Ababa. The plant is expected to produce 185 GWh of electricity a year—enough to meet the demand of a quarter of Addis’ households. And in Chonburi, Thailand, a waste-to-energy plant under construction in 2017 will process 100,000 tonnes of waste a year and generate over 8 MW of electrical power.71

Biofuels The production and consumption of liquid biofuels is mainly concentrated in the USA, Brazil, and Europe. The US and Brazil are by far the largest producers of biofuels, followed by Germany, Argentina, China and Indonesia. The main biofuels are ethanol, biodiesel (fatty acid methyl ester or FAME fuels), and fuels produced by treating animal and vegetable oils and fats with hydrogen (called hydrotreated vegetable oil, HVO, and hydrotreated esters and fatty acids called HEFA).

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About two thirds of biofuels is ethanol; 29% was FAME biodiesel; and 6% was HVO/HEFA fuels. The use of biomethane as a transport fuel, while growing rapidly, contributed less than 1% of the biofuel total.72 The US and Brazil are the main ethanol producers—most of which is used in their countries. In the US, 90% of the ethanol is produced from maize and blended with gasoline in a 10% mixture called E10 gasoline. In Brazil, ethanol is produced from sugar cane. China, Canada and Thailand also produce ethanol. Since biofuels also produce emissions of carbon when combusted in an engine, there is a continuing debate about the degree to which biofuels are actually carbon neutral. And when ethanol is produced from maize—as it is in the US and Canada, a further controversy centres on the ‘food versus fuel’ dilemma.

Advanced biofuels The term advanced biofuel or second-generation biofuel refers to fuels that are not derived from biomass sources that could be used as food or animal feed—such as maize. The main types of advanced biofuels are: • Ethanol derived from cellulose, hemicellulose, or lignin. • Ethanol derived from waste material, including crop residue, other vegetative waste material, animal waste, and food waste and yard waste. • Biomass-based diesel. • Butanol or other alcohols produced through the conversion of organic matter from renewable biomass. • Other fuel derived from cellulosic biomass. The aim is to produce fuels that demonstrate improved life-cycle carbon savings compared to biofuels produced from sugar, starch, and oils, as well as fuels with less impact on land use—for example fuels from waste and residues. Some advanced biofuels (known as ‘drop in biofuels’) can replace fossil fuels directly in transport systems including aviation, or for blending in high proportions with conventional fuels. The problem with advanced biofuels produced using chemical processes is that the production requires considerable amounts of energy that itself produces greenhouse gases. There are also exhaust gases when the biofuel is combusted in an engine. And to this must be added the emissions produced in collecting, transporting and processing the feedstock materials. If carbon capture and storage technology can be integrated into biofuel production, life-cycle emissions of carbon would be substantially reduced.

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But as of 2018, only a limited number of large-scale projects have demonstrated the technical viability of this technology. Where electric forms of transport are feasible, this is by far the best option—always assuming that the electricity is generated from renewable sources of energy. But for aviation and international marine transport, biofuels may be the only viable, low-carbon option at the present time. In this regard, several airlines have experimented with the use of biofuels for long-haul flights. Virgin Australia and Qantas have powered planes with biofuels—the latter signing a long-term supply contract with Agrisoma (France) to supply fuels based on carinata oil seed. And Hainan Airlines has made a trans-Pacific flight from Beijing to Chicago using biofuel derived from waste cooking oil. For maritime transport, the use of biofuels to power ships has also been demonstrated. For instance, following initiatives by the US Navy, the Australian Navy has reportedly been trialling biofuels in its fleet. On the railroads, trials are also underway. In the Netherlands, Arriva is supplying 16 new trains fuelled with biodiesel, and Indian Railways is experimenting with the use of biodiesel, compressed biogas and ethanol to power its trains.73 In conclusion, this brief section has only skimmed the surface of biofuel technology. However, it should be recognized that while biofuels do not in principle inject additional fossil fuel carbon into the global carbon cycle, their production and transportation certainly require energy inputs from conventional fossil fuels. The life cycle emissions of biofuels may be less than fossil fuels, but they are far from being zero.

Biogas Biogas is a mixture of methane and carbon dioxide produced by the anaerobic digestion of organic materials—including food waste, sewage, manure, animal dung, and plants gown specifically for the purpose. Small biogas systems have been used in Asia for decades and were pioneered in China where tens of millions of small household systems have been constructed over the last 50 years, running on animal waste and even human night soil. There are also several million small biogas plants operating in India. Small biogas plants generate a gas that can be used for cooking—thus avoiding cutting down trees for fuel and the noxious air pollution caused by burning wood, charcoal and dung in the home. Globally, as many as 50 million biogas cookstoves are estimated to have been installed at the end of 2016, with about 126 million people using biogas for cooking mainly in China

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and India. The use of biogas for cooking is growing elsewhere in Asia—in Bangladesh, Cambodia, Indonesia and Nepal; and also in sub Saharan Africa—Ethiopia, Kenya, and Tanzania. The Africa Biogas Partnership Programme has promoted more than 58,000 biogas plants—installed in Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda since 2009.74 However, there is increasing interest in larger-scale systems—particularly in biogas produced from feedlots, landfills, and food processing operations where substantial amounts of biogas can be produced. Biogas can be upgraded to biomethane (often called renewable natural gas) by removing the carbon dioxide and other gases, enabling the gas to be more easily used for transport or for injection directly into natural gas pipelines. Applications vary. In the US and Sweden, biomethane is used mainly for transport, while in the United Kingdom it is used mainly as a pipeline gas. More than 500 biomethane production facilities now exist in Europe. For food processing factories that produce biodegradable waste that must be disposed of correctly, it makes economic sense to produce biogas from the waste and to use the fuel in the factory to produce heat or steam for the processing of the food. For instance, the Swedish beer manufacturer Carlsberg converted its brewery in Falkenberg, Sweden to 100% biogas in 2017. Not all this biogas is produced in the brewery—most of it is piped in from local energy supplier Orsted AB.75

Geothermal Energy As a source of heat and hot water, geothermal energy has been around for millennia. The first hot springs and health spas date back to Roman times or perhaps even before. As a source of high temperature heat that can be harnessed to generate electrical power, the technology is more recent. The first recorded use of geothermal steam was in 1904 in Larderello, Italy, when a steam vent was harnessed to a simple turbine and generator generating enough electricity to light four light bulbs. In 1911, the world’s first commercial geothermal power plant was constructed on the same site. For more than 45 years there was little further development until, in 1958, the Wairakei geothermal power plant started operation in New Zealand. Two years later, Pacific Gas and Electric, PG&E, started up the first geothermal power plant at The Geysers in northern California. The Geysers now consists of an interlinked network of geothermal plants that in total generate more than 700 MW.

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Fig. 6.16  Geothermal power capacity and additions, top ten countries and rest of the world in 2017 (see Renewables 2018 Global Status Report) (Source REN21 Global Status Report)

Geothermal resources can provide both heat and electrical power. In spite of its inherent advantages, the global development of the technology is growing only slowly. Table 5.1 shows that installed capacity worldwide has stayed almost flat at around 13 GW since 2014—that’s only a fraction of the total global installed renewable energy capacity—which was over 2200 GW in 2018. Nevertheless, there is continuing interest in the technology because once up and running, the fuel is free. But operation and maintenance costs can be substantial. In 2017, Indonesia and Turkey continued to lead in terms of new installations, and the two countries accounted for most of capacity additions during that year. Other countries adding capacity were Chile Iceland, Honduras, Mexico, the US, Japan, Portugal and Hungary. However, the US remains the global leader in terms of geothermal power output. Figure 6.16 shows the rated power in 2016, and added capacity in 2017 for the top ten geothermal power countries. Although the US leads the field in terms of capacity, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Turkey are heavily invested in the technology. In May 2018, it was reported that the Sarulla geothermal plant in Indonesia had reached full capacity, with all three 110 MW units up and running.76

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Ethiopia is also the target of some serious money invested in geothermal energy. Reykjavik Geothermal, an Icelandic company, is working on two geothermal projects in the east African country. Planned to come online in 2025, they will reportedly generate over 1000 MW in total power.77 Iceland is famous for its geothermal resources. The country derives over a quarter of its electricity from geothermal energy and has over 700 MW of installed geothermal power capacity—much of which provides cogeneration heat for district water and space heating.

How It Works There are basically three ways that electricity can be generated from a high temperature geothermal resource. If the well produces dry steam, it can directly drive a turbine and generator. Dry steam power plants are the simplest design. The steam is fed directly to a turbine where it generates electricity; the steam is then condensed and the condensate injected back under ground to replenish the aquifer producing the steam. At the Geysers in California, after the first 30 years of operation, the steam supply was becoming depleted and power generation was reduced. The solution was to reinject the condensed steam back into the reservoir.78 If the geothermal resource is liquid phase, hot brines are brought to the surface—either under their own pressure or by a variety of techniques that force the hot liquids to the surface. If hot brine under pressure is the geothermal resource, steam can be produced from the brine in a flash separator. The steam powers a turbine, and the condensate and water from the flash separator are reinjected into the geothermal aquifer. The third technology is more complex. Called a binary cycle system, it uses the geothermal brine to heat a secondary fluid that boils at a lower temperature than the temperature of the geothermal brine. The pressurized vapor can power a turbine and generator before being condensed and returned to the evaporator as a liquid in a closed loop system. The geothermal brine, now several degrees cooler, is reinjected into the geothermal aquifer. Binary cycle systems permit lower temperature geothermal sources to be exploited—down to about 150 °C. Other configurations are possible. Hybrid power plants allow for the integration of several generating technologies. In Hawaii, the Puna flash/binary combined cycle system is designed to optimize both flash and binary cycle technologies.79

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Like all renewable energy technologies, geothermal power can be built and operated on a small scale. In 2017, a 4 MW binary cycle plant came online on the Portuguese island of Terceira in the Azores. Although small, the plant provides 10% of the island’s electricity. Hungary’s first geothermal plant—a 3 MW plant at Turawell, produces both electrical power and heat. Several islands in the Caribbean have geothermal potential: Dominica, Montserrat, and the Grenadine islands in the Caribbean are volcanic islands with probable geothermal resources. But the technology is capital intensive and complex. In Djibouti for example, where geothermal resources are reckoned to be exceptionally good, the technology has been studied for over 30 years. Test wells have been drilled, drilled again, then drilled elsewhere. The results are promising and the economics look good—on paper. But donors are wary of investing in a technology with high upfront costs, long lead times, complex engineering, and uncertain environmental impacts. In 2015 the Green Climate Fund approved a program called: Sustainable Energy Facility for the Eastern Caribbean, which supports the development and exploitation of potential geothermal sites on Dominica, Grenada, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, and Saint Vincent and the Grenadines. It remains to be seen whether geothermal energy at these sites will be possible but given the high cost of electricity on these islands, there is a good chance that electricity generation from geothermal energy will prove to be an economic proposition. This funding was supplemented in late 2017, when the European Union provided $14 million in grants to support geothermal development in the eastern Caribbean. Exploratory drilling on the island of Nevis was underway in late 2017.80 The big question for geothermal power generation is whether it can compete with utility-scale solar photovoltaic plants and megawatt wind farms. Power from solar and wind is already less expensive than geothermal electricity, and the cost of electricity from solar and wind is expected to continue to fall—whereas geothermal costs almost certainly will not. But if geothermal energy is exploited for both power generation and district heating, the economics look a lot more favourable.

Geothermal Direct Use For several decades, geothermal heat from the Dogger aquifer has provided district heating to the Paris metropolitan area. At least four district

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heating systems in the Paris area expanded their geothermal capacity during 2017.81 Space heating and district heating is one of the largest and fastest growing sectors for the direct use of geothermal heat, although swimming pools and other public baths may still be the single largest end-use category. Other uses of direct heating include domestic hot water supply, greenhouse heating, industrial process heat, aquaculture, snow melting, and agricultural drying.82 And Iceland is reportedly considering using geothermal heat and power to grow fresh vegetables close to the Arctic Circle. China is the most significant user of direct geothermal heat, followed by Turkey, Iceland, Japan, Hungary, the US and New Zealand. Together these seven countries account for three quarters of direct geothermal use.83 The term ‘geothermal energy’ generally refers to exploiting high temperature geologic resources that are several hundred meters underground. When the earth near the surface is used as a thermal reservoir—for ground-based heat pumps or for storing seasonal heat for several months at a time (like the Drake Landing installation in Alberta, Canada), these technologies are not usually filed under the ‘geothermal energy’ rubric—even though they are in a sense geothermal systems.

Nuclear Power Nuclear power has always been controversial. Proclaimed at first as one of the cheapest sources of energy, the electricity was going to be “too cheap to meter”.84 However, the risks inherent in nuclear power technology soon became apparent. The first recorded accident was in Canada in 1952 at the NRX reactor in Chalk River, Ontario. Since then there have been over 100 accidents worldwide among both civilian and military reactors. The worst accident was in Chernobyl, Ukraine in 1986. A sudden surge in power during a reactor system test resulted in an explosion and fire that destroyed one of the reactors. Massive amounts of radiation escaped and spread across the western Soviet Union and Europe. Over 200,000 people had to be relocated from their homes.85 Within three months, 31 people were dead of radiation sickness. It is estimated that a further 4000 died later from the widespread radioactivity. It is believed that the area surrounding the reactor core will not be safe for human habitation for at least another 20,000 years.86 The most recent disaster occurred in Japan when an earthquake and tsunami struck the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear power plant in March 2011.

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The earthquake destroyed the external electrical supply to the power plant. The back-up generators immediately powered up but were then swamped by the tsunami wave which reached twice the height the plant was designed to withstand. With no cooling system in operation, three reactor buildings eventually exploded and fuel in the reactor cores melted—the worst case scenario. The release of radiation was enormous. A wide area around the plant was contaminated and half a million people were evacuated.87 The probability of a catastrophic accident at a nuclear power plant is extremely low. But the consequences of an accident can be catastrophic. Society has always had difficulty in deciding whether to approve and implement projects that bring substantial economic benefits but which carry a risk of catastrophic failure—even if the probability of failure is estimated to be extremely low. Governments have mostly chosen to proceed in these instances—willing to accept the risk, and often persuaded by proponents with a vested interest who argue that safety procedures are state-of-the-art and can cope effectively with any foreseeable eventuality. The problem with this logic is that in many cases, it is the incompetent actions of the plant engineers, operators, and technicians—not the equipment and technology— that is the root cause of the combined malfunctions and failures that lead to disaster. But the risks with nuclear power lie not just in the inherent possibility of catastrophic accidents. The storage of spent fuel rods and other radioactive waste materials from nuclear plants is another serious problem. Then there is the cost of decommissioning nuclear power plants at the end of their life. Because of the intense radioactivity, this process can take decades and cost hundreds of millions of dollars. The third strike against nuclear power is the link with nuclear weapons. Examining this question is outside the scope of this book, but the fact that the possibility that the technology can be used to surreptitiously and illegally produce enriched uranium or plutonium for atomic weapons ought to be enough just by itself to force a global moratorium on nuclear power.88 The inherent risks associated with nuclear power had led some government to close down their nuclear power programs. Germany has committed to closing its plants by 2022; France—once a world leader in nuclear power technology—is phasing them out; and in Japan most nuclear power plants are closed following the Fukushima disaster. In other jurisdictions, the plants currently operating will continue to generate power through their planned lifetime, but no new plants are planned for construction. However, new nuclear power plants continue to be built in China and several other countries. In the US, many nuclear power plants have

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closed—but in 2018, construction was underway on two new reactors in the state of Georgia. The two half-finished Vogtle nuclear reactors—$10 billion over-budget and five years late—will finally cost about $25 billion.89 In the UK, the proposal to build Hinckley Point C is hugely controversial. Said to be the world’s most expensive power plant, it is Britain’s first new nuclear power reactor since 1995 and will cost twice as much as the phenomenally expensive 2012 Olympic Games in London—an eye-watering 30 billion dollars. With projects of this magnitude, scale, and cost—politics, propaganda, horse-trading, and plain old bribery and corruption are all part of the play. Considering the much less expensive renewable energy alternatives, Hinckley Point C makes absolutely no economic sense—but is apparently still going ahead.90 One factor to take into account is that many nuclear power plants are built on the coast so that sea water can be used for cooling. This makes them especially susceptible to extreme weather and storms that drive high storm surges of water onto coastal areas. The textbook example of this possibility is the 2011 Fukushima accident mentioned above. To protect Hinckley Point C, a concrete seawall 12.5 meters high and 900 meters long is being built to protect the installation. But many experts are not convinced that a defensive wall even that high will protect the power plant in the future—as sea levels continue to rise and storms intensify.91

Energy Storage One of the problems with renewable energy is that the main contenders and the cheapest options—wind and solar—are intermittent. This means that their power output is variable and to some extent unpredictable. This inherent flaw has led many fossil-fuel defenders to argue that renewable energy will always need substantial backup from natural gas power plants, and that the cost of the backup system should be included in the assessment of solar and wind—essentially rendering them more expensive compared to fossil-fuel alternatives. But when utility-scale photovoltaic energy and wind power are combined with energy storage systems (ESS—aka batteries) the picture changes radically. When Bloomberg NEF published its New Energy Outlook in June 2018, one key message was emphatic: “Wind and solar are set to surge to almost ’50 by 50’—50% of world generation by 2050 - on the back of precipitous reductions in cost and the advent of cheaper and cheaper batteries that

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will enable electricity to be stored and discharged to meet shifts in demand and supply ”.92 The cost of wind power, utility-scale PV, and megawatt-level ESS are falling dramatically. Cheap renewable energy and batteries fundamentally reshape the electricity system—as the cheap batteries enable solar power plants and wind farms to produce power when the wind isn’t blowing and the sun isn’t shining. Most importantly, utility scale batteries produce dispatchable power. Utility-scale batteries are the key to unlocking the enormous potential of renewable energy. The Bloomberg report calls this combination the PV, wind and batteries trifecta—meaning a 1-2-3 winning combination.93 Utility scale Lithium-ion batteries are becoming larger, less expensive, and more reliable. The largest system may be Tesla’s 100 MW Li-ion battery in South Australia.94 In the US in February 2018, Arizona Public Service (APS) announced that it would install a 50 MW/135 MWh battery to help shift the output of a 65 MW solar farm to deliver power in the evening— when solar energy drops off. This initiative is part of APS’s plan to add up to 500 MW of energy storage to its system over the next 15 years. APS notes that “these batteries will bring more clean energy to APS customers when they need it most, by storing an abundance of mid-day solar and redistributing it at peak times of customer usage later in the day ”.95 In May 2018, Tucson Electric Power signed a deal for 100 MW of solar and a 120 MWh battery system for less than 4.5 cents/kWh over 20 years.96 Not to be outdone, Pacific Gas and Electric, a Californian utility, requested approval in June 2018 for four energy storage projects totalling 2270 MWh—one of which would come in at 300 MW/1200 MWh which, once operational, will be the largest battery energy storage system in the world. These battery storage systems are being built to avoid the need to keep three Calpine gas-fired plants running as ‘reliability must-run’ resources and to shore up congestion issues in the region.97 In Puerto Rico, the government issued a request for proposals in early 2018 for 10 20-MW/20 MWh battery energy storage systems (BESS) to be integrated into the national power grid. If necessary, the 10 systems will be able to expand to 40 MW/160 MWh capacity.98 With MW-scale energy storage systems coupled up, wind farms and photovoltaic power plants are no longer intermittent. They will generate dispatchable electrical power. Batteries also are faster than natural gas peaker plants to respond to changes in demand on the grid that can trigger variations in frequency.

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Behind the Meter Battery energy storage systems provide an essential function at several points and at different scales between where power is generated and where the electricity is consumed. For wind farms, utility scale BESS smooths out the inherent variability of wind power; whereas for solar, the BESS enables the power output from large photovoltaic fields to be shifted to the evening hours when demand for electricity peaks. In buildings, smaller battery systems coupled to rooftop solar smooth out the demand profile and allow electricity to be fed back to the grid if excess energy is available. Even without rooftop solar, batteries may be cost-effective because they enable a residence to take power from the grid when tariffs are low—keeping ­consumption at high tariff hours to a minimum. In May 2018, the California Energy Commission voted unanimously to update the state’s building code to require rooftop solar panels on all new apartment buildings and condo construction starting on January 1, 2020.99 Batteries are not mandatory, but in the US, they qualify for the Solar Investment Tax Credit (ITC)—and California has been providing incentives for home batteries since 2001.100 Whether it makes sense to install batteries in a residence with solar panels depends on the economics. But there are advantages for both the homeowner and the utility. If necessary, homeowners can top up their batteries at night when tariffs are lower; and the utility has customers with a much flatter and more predictable demand profile. Batteries can also feed electricity back into the grid. By 2030, according to the Bloomberg analysis, the configuration of many systems is characterized by photovoltaic energy that meets daytime demand, and batteries that absorb excess generation and discharge at high value, low renewables times, particularly in the evening.101 Severe weather is now the leading cause of power outages in north America, and when the grid crashes, batteries can provide backup power for residential and commercial users, and for essential services like clinics and health centres. In Florida they know a thing or two about extreme weather. The SunSmart Emergency Shelter Program has installed solar PV systems with battery storage in well over 100 schools to create emergency shelters throughout the state.102 In Australia, distributed solar with battery storage has becomes cheaper than electricity from the grid in several regions. In 2017, an estimated 40% of new rooftop solar installations included energy storage, mostly in the

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residential sector.103 Interest is also rising in the US with some developers predicting a fourfold increase in residential energy storage in 2018—most of it tied to rooftop solar.104 The management of energy at the point of consumption is becoming a lot smarter. Smart meters can switch on home appliances at night when tariffs are low (including charging an electric vehicle), or feed battery power back to the grid where feed-in-tariffs are applicable. Linked to thermostats, lights and appliances, residences and offices can keep energy consumption to a minimum—and batteries ensure that when electricity is needed from the grid, it is taken at times when tariffs are low.

Comparing the Costs In most parts of the world, renewable energy is now the lowest-cost source of new power generation. Onshore wind and solar photovoltaic are set by 2020 to consistently offer a less expensive source of new electricity than the least cost fossil fuel alternative, without financial assistance. Expectations about future cost reductions are once again being continually beaten by lower values as new data becomes available. Moreover, new solar photovoltaic and onshore wind are expected to increasingly cost less than the marginal operating cost of existing coal-fired power plants.105 The metric most commonly used to compare the cost of energy technologies is the levelized cost of energy or LCOE. The LCOE takes into account the expected energy output of the power technology, the capital and operating costs, the cost of borrowing money, and the present value of future revenue streams and expenditures. However, for each technology there is a range of values—reflecting the variation of most of the cost elements with the geographic location of the technology. In addition, published values do not take into account the external costs associated with the air pollution and greenhouse gas emissions of fossil fuels—particularly coal. For intermittent renewables such as solar and wind, it is reasonable to factor in the cost of BESS that enable these power technologies to compete on the same basis as dispatchable systems. There are essentially two key points to bear in mind: First, utility scale solar energy and onshore wind power technologies are now fully cost-competitive with coal and natural gas even when BESS costs are

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factored in for renewables, and the external costs of fossil fuel technologies are ignored. Second, costs are falling, and are expected to continue to fall, for solar, wind, and BESS—whereas the cost of fossil fuel power technologies is forecast to remain constant or even to increase as emission controls becomes stricter and carbon capture technologies become mandatory. The second point is the most important—because it underscores the fact that the transition to renewable energy is not a short-term phenomenon induced by an anomalous period of abnormally low costs for solar energy and wind power. The LCOE differential between renewable energy systems and fossil fuel power plants is increasing every year. The cost of photovoltaic panels has been falling exponentially for the last 40 years—made possible by a combination of technology innovation, economies of scale, and manufacturing experience. This decline is expected to continue. In parallel, the cost of other key components such as inverters is also falling. The capital expenditure of photovoltaic plants is projected to drop by 50% over the period to 2035.106 As an example of how the cost of photovoltaic energy is falling faster than policymakers can plan for, consider the SunShot program in the US referred to earlier. In 2011, the US Department of Energy launched the SunShot Initiative with the aim of reducing the total cost of solar energy by 75%— thus making it cost competitive at large scale with conventional energy technologies by the end of the decade. The target was to get PV electricity down to 6 cents a kilowatt-hour by 2020. In 2017, the SunShot program announced it had met this target already and set a new 2020 target of 3 cents per kWh.107 In 2018, that price has already been beaten: in Nevada a bid for grid scale PV power came in at 2.3 cents/kWh.108 Wind turbine prices have fallen by a third since 2010, while at the same time they have become more powerful, and capacity factors are rising. Larger rotors, greater hub heights (where wind are stronger), more advanced controls, and innovative technology have all contributed to lower costs and greater power output. Onshore wind power is now one of the least expensive sources of utility scale power. At the same time the price of batteries has been falling dramatically— largely due to economies of scale as manufacturing capacity and output has risen sharply. Lithium-ion battery prices fell from $1000/kWh in 2010 to $209/kWh in 2017. This downward trend in price is forecast to continue as manufacturing capacity is expected to triple between 2018 and 2021.109

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In 2018, Bloomberg New Energy published the LCOE for each power technology taking into account construction, equipment, operation, maintenance, and financing costs. The benchmark global LCOE for onshore wind was $55/MWh, while the equivalent for non-tracking solar PV was $70/MWh—both these values are 17% down from the previous 12 months. Offshore wind came in at $118/MWh. BNEF’s analysis showed particularly low levelized costs of electricity for onshore wind in India, Brazil, Sweden, and Australia; and low costs for photovoltaics in Chile, India, Australia and Jordan.110 Taking India as an example, the analysis showed that the benchmark LCOE for onshore wind was just $39/MWh, and for utility scale PV it was only slightly higher—at $41/MWh. By comparison. Coal comes in at $68/ MWh and combined cycle gas at $93/MWh. Wind-plus-batteries and solar-plus-batteries in India show a wide range of costs: $34–$208/MWh for wind and $47–$308/MWh for solar depending on the characteristics of the project. But once again, costs are falling fast.111

Conclusion In this chapter, we have looked in more detail at the principal renewable energy technologies: wind power, solar photovoltaic energy, hydropower, geothermal energy, and biofuels. All have the game-changing advantage that they produce zero, or very low, emissions of carbon dioxide and methane. Their rapid deployment is therefore one of the most important keys to curbing global warming and reducing the threats posed by the climate crisis. The principal disadvantage with solar energy and wind power is their inherent intermittency and unpredictability—which means that the electricity that they generate cannot be dispatched at levels and at times when it is most needed. However, this significant technical problem has now been solved by advancements in large-scale battery storage systems that can store electricity and instantly dispatch megawatt levels of electrical power when needed. Rooftop photovoltaic systems with battery storage are growing in popularity. When coupled to smart meters that manage household appliances (including charging an electric vehicle), the demand for electricity from the grid is less variable and less costly for the power companies. The cost of electricity from solar photovoltaic systems and wind power is at record lows—and still falling. So too is the cost of batteries, which are now an essential component of all renewable energy systems. The transition

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to a low carbon world is well underway. But emissions of greenhouse gases continue to rise. The question now is this: How can the world accelerate this fundamental shift to clean, low carbon, renewable and inexhaustible sources of energy? The most effective way to reduce emissions of carbon dioxide and methane produced by the continued widespread use of fossil fuels is to put a price on carbon—which is the element in these gases that are the principal cause of global warming and the intensifying climate crisis. This approach has been used in many countries and it has been shown to work. In the next chapter, we look more closely at carbon pricing—one of the most effective and powerful tools in in the emission reduction toolbox.

Notes 1. The rotor blades on the early machines were called sails. 2. See the History of wind turbines by Zachary Shahan. Available at: http:// windenergyfoundation.org/about-wind-energy/history/. 3. All the numbers and historical information are from the History of wind turbines, op. cit. 4. See Renewables 2017 Global Status Report. Renewable Energy Policy Network for the 21st Century (REN21). Available at: http://www.ren21. net/gsr-2017/. 5. REN21. Renewables 2018 Global Status Report. 6. See https://www.energy.gov/eere/wind/how-do-wind-turbines-work. 7. WindPower Program Basic Concepts. Accessed at: www.wind-power-program.com. 8. Ibid. 9. The table is from the WindPower program computer run for the 2 MW Vestas offshore turbine. 10. See Renewable Power Generation Costs in 2017, IRENA 2018. Available at: http://irena.org/publications/2018/Jan/Renewable-power-generationcosts-in-2017. 11. Renewable Power Generation Costs in 2017. Op. cit. 12. See GE announces Haliade-X, the world’s most powerful offshore wind turbine. Available at: https://www.genewsroom.com/press-releases/ge-announces-haliade-x-worlds-most-powerful-offshore-wind-turbine-284260. 13. See the Wind Atlas website at: https://globalwindatlas.info. 14. Ibid. 15. REN21. Renewables 2018 Global Status Report. Op. cit.

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16. See It can power a small nation. But this wind farm in China Is mostly idle. Accessed at: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/15/world/asia/china-gansu-wind-farm.html. 17. See the Wikipedia article at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_ offshore_wind_farms. 18. Renewable Power Generation Costs in 2017. Op. cit. 19. Renewable Power Generation Costs in 2017. Op. cit. 20. See Aging wind farms are repowering with longer blades, more efficient turbines. Available at: https://insideclimatenews.org/news/27032018/windpower-blades-capacity-clean-energy-technology-jobs-ge-siemens-leeward-midamerican-repowering. 21. REN 21. Renewables 2018 Global Status Report. Op. cit. 22. Wind power overtakes nuclear for first time in UK across a quarter. Accessed at: https://www.renewableenergyworld.com/articles/pt/2018/05/ wind-power-overtakes-nuclear-for-first-time-in-uk-across-a-quarter.html?. 23. See the study by Health Canada. Accessed at: https://www.canada.ca/en/ health-canada/services/environmental-workplace-health/noise/wind-turbine-noise/wind-turbine-noise-health-study-summary-results.html. 24. See Judge’s ruling against Minnesota wind farm causes alarm for advocates. Accessed at: http://www.startribune.com/judge-s-ruling-against-minnesota-wind-farm-causes-alarm-for-advocates/485312391/. 25. See The impact of free-ranging domestic cats on the wild life of the United States. Accessed at: https://www.nature.com/articles/ncomms2380. The estimated body count for birds killed by cats is between 1.3 and 4.0 billion birds each year—just in the US. Also see the US Fish and wildlife Service report: Threats to birds. Accessed at: https://www.fws.gov/birds/bird-enthusiasts/threats-to-birds.php. 26. See Wind turbines kill more than 600,000 bats a year. What should we do? Accessed at: https://www.popsci.com/blog-network/eek-squad/wind-turbines-kill-more-600000-bats-year-what-should-we-do. Also Bat killings by wind energy turbines continue. Accessed at: https://www.scientificamerican. com/article/bat-killings-by-wind-energy-turbines-continue/. 27. See The history of solar. US Department of Energy/Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy. Accessed at: https://www1.eere.energy.gov/solar/pdfs/ solar_timeline.pdf. 28. REN21. Renewables 2018 Global Status Report. Op. cit. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid. 32. See ACWA wins Saudi Arabia’s 300 MW solar tender. Accessed at: https:// www.pv-magazine.com/2018/02/06/acwa-wins-saudi-arabias-300-mw-solar-tender/. Also From oil to solar: Saudi Arabia plots a shift to renewables.

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33. 34. 35.

36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51.

Accessed at: https://www.nytimes.com/2018/02/05/business/energy-environment/saudi-arabia-solar-renewables.html. See Saudis, SoftBank plan world’s largest solar project. Accessed at: https:// www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-03-28/saudi-arabia-softbankink-deal-on-200-billion-solar-project. See Florida Solar Energy Center website: http://www.fsec.ucf.edu/en/consumer/solar_electricity/basics/index.htm. This is the result of a simulation run on the PVGIS website with the input data as shown in the text. What is surprising is the optimal azimuth— which is angled significantly to the south-east. The levelized cost of electricity is estimated as 9¢/kWh. See US solar market insight, 2017 year in review. Available at: https://www. greentechmedia.com/research/repoirt/us-solar-market-insight-2017-yearin-review#gs.zct2qTU. These values are in Canadian dollars. See Solar electricity handbook 2017 edition. Accessed at: http://solarelectricityhandbook.com/canada-feed-in-tariff.html. See The state(s) of distributed solar—Where are the biggest gains? Accessed at: https://www.renewablenergyworld.com/ugc/articles/2018/05/29/thestates-of-distributed-solar--2017-upgate.html. Community and shared solar. Department of Energy, Office of Energy Efficiency & Renewable Energy. Available at: https://www.energy.gov/eere/ solar/community-and-shared-solar. Community and shared solar. Ibid. See A guide to community shared solar: Utility, private, and nonprofit project development. Available at: https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy12osti/54570.pdf. The diagram is from the Florida Solar Energy Center webinar notes. Available at: https://www.cleanegroup.org/wp-content/uploads/ESTAPwebinar-slides-10.24.17.pdf. See Distributed solar PV for electricity system resiliency. National Renewable Energy Laboratory. Available at: https://www.nrel.gov/docs/ fy15osti/62631.pdf. See the FSEC information. Accessed at: https://www.cleanegroup.org/ wp-content/uploads/ESTAP-webinar-slides-10.24.17.pdf. Renewable power generation costs, IRENA 2017. Op. cit. See the Sunshot Initiative website at: https://www.energy.gov/eere/solar/ sunshot-initiative. Ibid. See Power tower system concentrating solar power basics. Accessed at: https://www.energy.gov/eere/solar/articles/power-tower-systemconcentrating-solar-power-basics. See Renewables 2018 Global Status Report. Op. cit. Renewable 2018 Global Status Report. Op. cit.

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52. Renewables 2018 Global Status Report. Op. cit. 53. See the Hydropower Status Report 2018. International Hydropower Association. Available at: https://www.hydropower.org/publications/2018hydropower-status-report. 54. Hydropower Status Report 2018. Op. cit. 55. Hydropower Status Report 2018. Op. cit., p. 12. 56. Hydropower Status Report 2018. Op. cit. 57. Renewables 2018 Global Status Report. Op. cit. 58. Ibid. 59. Renewables 2018 Global Status Report. Op. cit. 60. See Methane emissions may swell from behind dams. Accessed at: https://scientificamerican.com/article/methane-emissions-may-swellfrom-behind-dams/. 61. Hydropower Status Report 2018. Op. cit. 62. See Egypt’s rice farmers see rough times downstream of new Nile mega-dam. Accessed at: https://www.yahoo.com/news/egypts-rice-farmers-see-roughtimes-downstream-nile-1603341997.html. 63. Ibid. 64. See the Wikipedia article: Site C dam. Also the letter from the President of the Royal Society of Canada. Available at: https://rsc-src.ca/sites/default/ files/pdf/PM_Trudeau_19.05.2016.pdf. 65. The record is held by China’s Three Gorges dam which reportedly displaced as many as 1.2 million people. See https://www.theguardiancom/ environment/blog/2015/jan/12/12-dams-that-changed-the-world-hooversardar-sarovar-three-gorges. 66. The biomass sustainability and carbon policy study by the Manomet Center for Conservation Sciences is available at: https://www.manomet. org/wp-content/uploads/old-files/Manomet_Biomass_Report_Full_ June2010.pdf. 67. See the press release issued by the European Academies Science Advisory Council, and the commentary on forest bioenergy and carbon neutrality issued on the same day. Available at: https://easac.eu/fileadmin/PDF_s/ reports_statements/Carbon_Neutrality/EASAC_Press_Release_on_ Carbon_Neutrality_15_June_2018.pdf. 68. Renewables 2018 Global Status Report 2018. Op. cit. 69. See Burning wood as renewable energy threatens Europe’s climate goals. Accessed at: https://insideclimatenews.org/news/21062018/forest-biomass-renewable-energy-paris-climate-change-emissions-logging-wood-pellets-electricity/. 70. Ibid. 71. Renewables 2018 Global Status Report. Op. cit. 72. Ibid. 73. Ibid.

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74. Ibid. 75. See Carlsberg launches carbon neutral brewery in Sweden. Accessed at: https://www.beveragedaily.com/Article/2017/11/27/Carlsberg-launchescarbon-neutral-brewery-in-Sweden. 76. See Sarulla geothermal plant I Indonesia reaches full capacity. Accessed at: https://www.renewableenergyworld.com/articles/2018/05/sarulla-geothermal-plant-in-indonesia-reaches-full-capacity.html/. 77. See Ethiopian geothermal is private equity’s next $4-billion bet. Accessed at: https://www.renewableenergyworkd.com/articles/2018/ethiopian-geothermal-is-private-equity-s-next-4-billion.bet.html. 78. See the Wikipedia article: Geothermal Power. Accessed at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Geothermal_power/. 79. See the Geothermal Energy Association’s website. Accessed at: http://www. geo-energy.org/basics.aspx. 80. See Renewables 2018 Global Status Report. Op. cit. 81. See Renewables 2018 Global Status Report. Op. cit. 82. Ibid. 83. Ibid. 84. See “Too cheap to meter”: A history of the phrase. Accessed at: https:// public-blo.nrc-gateway.gov/gov/2016/06/03/too-cheap-to-meter-a-historyof-the-phrase/. 85. See the article by the Union of Concerned Scientists: A brief history of nuclear accidents worldwide. Accessed at: https://www.ucsusa.org/nucleapower/nuclear-power-accidents/history-nuclear-accidents#.Wzp3b9JKjIU. 86. See Chernobyl: History of a tragedy by Serhii Plokhy review—Death of the Soviet dream. Accessed at: https://www.theguardian.com/books/2018/ may/20/chernobyl-history-of-a-tragedy-serhii-plokhy-review-death-of-thesoviet-dream. 87. See a brief history of nuclear accidents worldwide. Op. cit. 88. See the article by Physicians for Social Responsibility: Dirty, dangerous, and expensive: The truth about nuclear power. Accessed at: https:// www.psr.org/blog/resource/durty-dangeros-and-expensive-the-truthabout-nuclear-power/. 89. See Betraying ratepayers and clean energy future, Georgia panel approves Vogtle nuclear reactors. Accessed at: https://www.ecowatch.com/vogtle-nuclear-plant-2519385301.html. 90. See Hinckley Point: The ‘dreadful deal’ behind the world’s most expensive power plant. Accessed at: https://www.theguardian.com/news/2017/ dec/21/hinkley-point-c-dreadful-deal-behind-worlds-most-expenivepower-plant/. And see also Nuclear plans should be rethought after fall in offshore windfarm costs. Accessed at: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2017/sep/11/huge-boost-renewable-power-offshore-windfarmcosts-fall-record-low.

330     M. J. Bush

91. See As shorelines creep inland and storms worsen, nuclear reactors around the world face new challenges. Accessed at: https://ensia.com/features/ coast-nuclear/. 92. See Bloomberg NEF’s New Energy Outlook Overview. Accessed at: https://about.bnef.com/new-energy-outlook/. 93. See Bloomberg NEF’s New Energy Outlook Overview. Accessed at: https://about.bnef.com/new-energy-outlook/. 94. See Tesla’s enormous battery in Australia just weeks old, is already responding to outages in ‘record’ time. Accessed at: https://www.washingtonpost. com/news/the-switch-wp/2017/12/26/teslas-enormous-battery-in-australia-just-weeks-old-is-already-responding-to-outages-in-record-time/. 95. See APS seeks partner to bring customers more clean energy using batteries. Accessed at: https://www.aps.com/en/ourcompany/news/latestnews/ Pages/aps-seeks-partners-to-bring-customers-more-clean-energy-using-batteries.aspx. 96. See APS to install 50 MW, 135 MWH solar-shifting battery. Accessed at: https://www.utilitydive.com/news/aps-to-install-50-mw-135-mwh-solarshifting-battery/516850/. 97. See PG&E to replace 3 gas plants with world’s biggest battery projects. Accessed at: https://www.utilitydive.com/news/pge-to-replace-3-gas-plantswith-worlds-biggest-battery-project/526991/. 98. See Elon Musk’s unprecedented solar + storage vision for Puerto Rico moves forward. Accessed at: https://pv-magazie-usa.com/2018/06/28/ elon-musks-unprecedented-solarstorage-vision-for-puerto-rico-moves-forward/. 99. See https://www.energymanagertoday.com/california-building-code-solar0176469/. 100. See California home battery rebate: Self-Generation Incentive program (SGIP) explained. Accessed at: https://news.energysage.com/ california-energy-storage-incentives-sgip-explained/. 101. See the Bloomberg New Energy Outlook Overview cited above. 102. See the Florida Solar Energy Center information. Accessed at: https:// www.cleanegroup.org/wp-content/uploads/ESTAP-webinar-slides10.24.17.pdf. 103. The numbers are from the Renewables 2018 Global Status Report. Available at: http://www.ren21.net/status-of-renewables/global-statusreport/. 104. See Residential storage faces sunny prospects this year. Accessed at: https://www.utilitydive.com/news/residential-storage-faces-sunnyprospects-this-year/520966/. 105. See the IREA 2019 report Renewable power generation costs in 2018. Accessed at: https://www.irena.org/publications/2019/May/Renewablepower-generation-costs-in-2018.

6  Getting Technical     331

106. See Bloomberg New Energy Outlook Overview. Op. cit. 107. See SunShot mission outlined. Accessed at: https://www.energy.gov/eere/ solar/sunshot-initiative. 108. See Nevada’s 2.3 cent bid beats Arizona’s record—Low solar PPA price. Accessed at: https://www.greentecchmedia.com/article/read/nevada-beatarizona-record-low-solar-ppa-price#gs.Z_KdHk4. 109. Bloomberg New Energy Overview. Op. cit. 110. Ibid. 111. Ibid.

7 Pricing Down Carbon

Introduction There is now indisputable evidence that the climate is changing because of the emission of greenhouse gases from the combustion of fossil fuels: coal, oil, and natural gas. Although there are several natural sources of some of these carbon gases, most of the emissions are coming from electrical power generation using coal or natural gas, from the combustion of gasoline and diesel fuel in cars and trucks, and from the natural gas and other fuels used for space heating and water heating in commercial buildings and homes. If the principle that ‘the polluter pays’ is rigorously applied, then the emissions of carbon dioxide and methane should be taxed at their source or at the point where people use the fuels that produce the emissions. This approach is favoured by most economists and is now applied in over 45 countries in the form of a carbon tax or a cap-and-trade arrangement. However, countries have adopted different policies when it comes to the disbursement of the substantial carbon revenues that governments receive from setting a price on carbon. In this chapter we will look at how effective these carbon pricing policies have been in the US, Canada, and Europe. We also examine the feasibility of policies that aim to power the world’s countries 100% on renewable sources of energy, and whether we can really power a modern industrial economy without fossil fuels.

© The Author(s) 2020 M. J. Bush, Climate Change and Renewable Energy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15424-0_7

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Dialling It Down There are essentially three approaches to reducing emissions of carbon dioxide and methane. The first one, favoured by economists, is to impose a levy of some kind on these emissions. If polluting the environment incurs costs for the polluter because of charges they are forced to pay that are proportional to the level of their emissions, most industries will find a way to reduce them. At the same time, if the cost of goods and services that rely heavily on fossil fuels (like refuelling your car) increases, then consumers will gradually shift to less carbon-intensive modes of transport and purchase goods that have a smaller carbon ‘footprint’. The second approach is for regulators to set standards, performance targets, or emissions limits and to impose a financial penalty–a fine—if the standards are not met or the limits on emissions are exceeded. This approach works well in some circumstances: improving the fuel efficiency of vehicles, setting stringent building codes, or stopping the constant pollution of a river with toxic industrial waste. The third approach is to incentivise industries to transition to a more efficient or less polluting system of production, and to encourage consumers to switch to less polluting modes of transport by subsidizing zero- or low-emission alternative technologies to the point where they are the least-cost option. The cost of shifting to the less polluting option may be subsidized if it is potentially a barrier to making the transition. All these policies are being implemented in different ways and to different degrees in many countries around the world. Over 180 countries signed up and ratified the 2015 Paris Agreement under which they agreed to substantially reduce their emissions of greenhouse gases before 2050, and many of them have imposed, or plan to impose, a price on carbon.

Carbon Pricing On the first day of the 21st meeting of the Conference of Parties (COP21) of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), held in Paris at the end of November 2015, an international coalition of governments and strategic partners was formed with the aim of coordinating action on reducing emissions of greenhouse gases by setting a price on carbon. Called the Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition, one of its first actions was to establish a High-Level Commission with the aim of exploring and evaluating the carbon-pricing options that would induce the change in

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behaviours needed to keep global average temperatures to below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels.1 The High-Level Commission issued its report in May 2017.2 It summarized its findings as follows: 1. Tackling climate change is an urgent and fundamental challenge; 2. A well-designed carbon price is an indispensable part of a strategy for reducing emissions; 3. Achieving the Paris objective will require all countries to implement climate policy packages; 4. Explicit carbon-pricing instruments can raise revenue efficiently because they help overcome a key market failure: the climate externality; 5. Carbon pricing by itself may not be sufficient to induce change at the pace and on the scale required for the Paris target to be met and may need to be complemented by other well-designed policies tackling various market and government failures as well as other imperfections. The most important conclusion in this report is that a well-designed carbon price is indispensable if the Paris targets are to be attained. At the same time, the report clearly recognized that other complementary policies may be required. It states: These policies could include investing in public transportation infrastructure and urban planning; laying the groundwork for renewable-based power generation; introducing or raising energy efficiency standards, adapting city design, and land and forest management; investing in relevant R&D initiatives; and developing financial devices to reduce the risk-weighted capital costs of low-carbon technologies and projects.3

What these observations by some of the world’s best economists underscore is that although carbon pricing is regarded as indispensable, complementary policies that focus more directly on reducing emissions of greenhouse gases may also play an important role in meeting the Paris Agreement targets. Although several countries and sub-national jurisdictions introduced carbon pricing schemes decades ago, the concept has increasingly gained traction over the last few years. At the One Planet Summit in December 2017, on the second anniversary of the adoption of the Paris Agreement, leaders of governments, businesses and international organizations reaffirmed their commitment to accelerate global efforts to fight climate change and to strongly support carbon pricing at regional and national levels.4

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Tax, Cap or Trade? Two main policy options are available for introducing and maintaining a price on carbon. One option involves setting a price through a tax or levy on greenhouse gas emissions or the carbon content of fossil fuels. The second major option, known as cap-and-trade, limits the total allowable volume of emissions over a specific period of time (the cap) from a specified set of sources, and allows emitting industries to trade their emission rights. If a cap-and-trade system functions well and emissions decline, greenhouse gas (GHG) pollution will be reduced each year by a predictable amount—but the price at which the emission rights trade will be uncertain. This means that the price of carbon in a cap-and-trade scheme can be hard to predict, and the level of government revenues from such a scheme is uncertain. On the other hand, a carbon tax requires industry to pay for every ton of GHG released into the atmosphere, usually at a fixed price. Carbon taxes are generally easier to administer than cap-and-trade because they involve neither a market-based trading system (which has to be set up and managed), nor require the enforcement of rules to prevent market manipulation. Moreover, a carbon tax can be added to existing taxes, and industries producing emissions can predict their liabilities reasonably well. However, although a carbon tax provides certainty about the price (and therefore government revenues), there is less certainty about the level of reductions that will be achieved. The question of which carbon pricing mechanism is optimal continues to be debated by economists, policy analysts and political scientists. Some argue for a direct carbon tax, while other advocate cap-and-trade, while a third group has argued that the two policies are functionally equivalent— meaning that a cap-and-trade system can be designed to essentially mimic a carbon tax and vice versa.5 Figure 7.1 illustrates schematically how a carbon tax works. There are two industries emitting the same amount of carbon pollution. When a carbon tax is imposed, each industry has a strong financial incentive to reduce its emissions. The cost of reducing carbon emissions is higher for industry A than for Industry B, so Industry A reduces emissions only to the point where it makes more sense to pay the tax on its remaining emissions. For industry B, it is less expensive to reduce emissions—so it cuts back further, but still pays tax on the lower level of emissions which would cost more to reduce than paying the tax.6

7  Pricing Down Carbon     337

ŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƐ ƌĞĚƵĐĞĚďLJ ƚĂŬŝŶŐĂĐƚŝŽŶƐ ƚŚĂƚĐŽƐƚůĞƐƐ ƚŚĂŶƚŚĞƉƌŝĐĞŽĨ ĐĂƌďŽŶ ZĞŵĂŝŶŝŶŐ ĞŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƐŽŶ ǁŚŝĐŚĞŵŝƚƚĞƌƐ ƉĂLJƚŚĞĐĂƌďŽŶ ƚĂdž

Fig. 7.1  How a carbon tax reduces emissions (Source Ecofiscal, Canada)

ŵŝƐƐŝŽŶƐƌĞĚƵĐĞĚďLJƚĂŬŝŶŐ ĂĐƟŽŶƐƚŚĂƚĐŽƐƚůĞƐƐƚŚĂŶ ƚŚĞƉƌŝĐĞŽĨĐĂƌďŽŶ WĞƌŵŝƚƐďƌŽƵŐŚƚ ĨƌŽŵ ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚĂƵĐƟŽŶ WĞƌŵŝƚƐďŽƵŐŚƚĨƌŽŵ ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌĞŵŝƩĞƌ WĞƌŵŝƚƐƐŽůĚƚŽĂŶŽƚŚĞƌ ĞŵŝƩĞƌ

Fig. 7.2  How a cap and trade system reduces emissions (Source Ecofiscal Canada)

Each industry can decide what is its best option. This flexibility of when and how to reduce emissions, and to what level, means that the total costs to the economy are lower than they would be under a regulatory system that simply required both industries to use specific technologies or achieve a specified level of emissions performance.7 A cap and trade system is more complicated. Figure 7.2 shows schematically how a cap and trade system operates. Government policy establishes a maximum allowable level of greenhouse gas emissions which is less than present emission levels—this is the cap on emissions. Allowances or permits are issued to industries and they are allowed to emit carbon only up to the level of those permits. Industries and businesses can either reduce their emissions in line with the cap or buy

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additional permits if they decide not to reduce their emissions—but they have to purchase those permits at the market price. Industries that reduce their emissions below their allowance are permitted to sell their allowances at the market rate, and the supply and demand for allowances determines the market price of carbon. A cap and trade system is therefore more flexible than a carbon tax scheme—but more complicated to set up and to administer. Over time, governments rachet down the cap, and the number of allowances available on the market is reduced. The price of purchasing an allowance therefore rises—providing an additional financial incentive for industries to take steps to reduce their emissions.

The Global Overview In mid-2018, 45 national and 25 subnational jurisdictions had implemented schemes to put a price on carbon. These initiatives cover about 11 billion tonnes of carbon dioxide equivalent (11 GtCO2e), which is about 20% of global GHG emissions. The Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition has set a target of 25% of GHG emissions covered by 2020.8 Carbon prices vary substantially—from less than $1/tCO2e (in Mexico, Poland and Ukraine) to a maximum of $139/tCO2e levied in Sweden. Roughly half of the emissions covered are at prices less than $10/tCO2e. Overall, most carbon prices are judged to be a lot lower than those needed to achieve the Paris Agreement targets.9 In order to reach those targets, the price of carbon needs to be somewhere in the range of $40–$80/tCO2e—a price much higher than those being applied across the globe in mid-2018. However, carbon prices are on the rise. Most initiatives saw an increase in 2018. One substantial change was the growth in the European Allowance (EUA) price from $7/tCO2e to $20/tCO2e—almost three times the level of the previous year.10 In addition, tax rates increased in France where the carbon tax rate rose from $38/tCO2 to $55/tCO2, while the Swiss carbon tax rate rose from $88/tCO2e to $101/tCO2e. Only eight countries and one jurisdiction has carbon prices above $25/tCO2e. In descending order these are: Sweden, Switzerland, Liechtenstein, Finland, Norway, France, Iceland, Denmark, and the Canadian province of British Columbia.11 At the bottom end of the scale, 25 countries have a price on carbon below $25/tCO2e. Figure 7.3 shows this group of countries and subnational jurisdictions.

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Fig. 7.3  Carbon prices below $25tCO2e (State and trends of carbon emissions 2018 ) (Source World Bank Group)

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Carbon Revenues In 2017, governments raised over $30 billion in carbon pricing revenues from allowance auctions, direct payments to meet compliance obligations, and carbon tax receipts. This revenue represents a 50% increase compared to 2016 receipts. Part of this substantial increase was due to auction revenues from the (then) newly launched emission trading scheme in Ontario, Canada, and income from new carbon taxes in Alberta, Canada; Chile, and Colombia. Other sources included a larger number of allowances bought at auctions in California combined with higher auction sale prices, the increase in the European EUA price, and the carbon tax rate hike in France.12 However, there is an important difference between the two methods of setting a price on carbon: much more revenue is generated from carbon tax policies than from cap-and-trade schemes.13 Carbon revenues are generally disbursed in three different ways: 1. Green spending, where revenues are invested in energy efficiency measures and renewable energy initiatives, as well as programs intended to reduce greenhouse gas emissions related to agriculture and forestry, landfill management, electric and other zero emission vehicles, and mass transit. 2. General funds, where governments disburse carbon revenues on programs unrelated to emissions reductions or adaptation to climate change impacts 3. Revenue recycling, where carbon revenues are directly returned to some part of the population through individual or business tax cuts or rebates in order to offset the negative impacts of higher energy costs.

How governments spend their carbon revenues differs quite markedly. Table 7.1 shows data from 2013/2014 for several major jurisdictions.14 Several countries and jurisdictions invested all their carbon pricing revenues in green initiatives: among them Quebec, France and Japan. At the other end of the scale, British Columbia recycled all revenue back to households and businesses—even adding in a bit more for good measure. Iceland directed all carbon revenue into general funds. The case of Australia is instructive. In 2014, that country’s carbon tax had the world’s largest overall pool of revenues ($8.8 billion) but also the largest per capita burden of any tax ($391 annually). The carbon price was set at $30 per tonne of CO2, but this reasonable price, coupled with the country’s

80 45 49 100 90 15 0 30 0 0 100 100 0

$4640 $1034 $447 $100 $92 $8790 $3680 $1580 $1530 $1100 $452 $490 $30

Annual revenue Green spend(millions) ing (%)

1 50 40 85 0 0 0 100

20 4 32 0 10

53 50 30 0 102 0 0 0

0 55 12 0 0

General funds Revenue recy(%) cling (%)

that the data are from 2013 or FY 2013/2014 and so are to some extent out of date, although the revenue disbursement policies may still be applicable. Percentages do not always add up to 100% because the spending categories are not comprehensive, and annual revenue budgeting may not match annual revenue Source Science Direct

aNote

European Union Emissions Trading System Phase III California AB 32 Cap and Trade System Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (USA) Quebec cap-and-trade system for emission allowances Alberta Greenhouse Gas Reduction Program Carbon tax systems Australia carbon pricing mechanism (cancelled) Sweden carbon dioxide tax Norway carbon dioxide tax United Kingdom carbon floor price British Columbia carbon tax shift France domestic consumption tax on carbon dioxide Japan tax for climate change mitigation Iceland carbon tax on carbon of fossil origin

Cap-and-trade systems

Carbon pricing system

Table 7.1  Disbursement of carbon revenues 2013/2014a

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high coal-fired greenhouse gas emission intensity, together with an overnight launch of the scheme and the fact that carbon taxes generated revenue from the full range of emissions, meant that Australia’s carbon tax system resulted in an economic shock greater than other similar carbon pricing systems. Even though more than half the revenue was earmarked for recycling, the tax was unpopular. Repealing the carbon tax was therefore a major element of the opposition party’s campaign platform and the tax was eventually cancelled.15 The turmoil in Australia over carbon pricing continued into 2018. In August, prime minister Malcolm Turnbull was forced out of office after proposing “modest emission targets” for the country’s energy sector—which is heavily dependent on coal. Australia is one of the world’s top coal exporters, accounting for almost 40% of global exports.16 The Australian experience underscores the political difficulty of introducing carbon pricing in some jurisdictions unless careful attention is paid to how it is introduced, its revenue-sharing policy, and its packaging and marketing. In British Columbia, Canada, there was political opposition to the carbon tax, but because it was revenue-neutral, with all the revenue recycled, efforts by opposition political parties to cancel the tax failed. Table 7.2  Key issues and enabling measures supporting carbon pricing Key issues

Enabling measures

1. Ensure equitable distribution of costs • Targeted support for affected industry and support businesses and firms and compensation for firms and workers • Cash transfers for households and consumers • Investments that foster structural change in energy and infrastructure 2. Alleviate the effect of unilateral • Impose carbon tariffs and border carbon policies like carbon leakage adjustments • Support affected industries such as trade-exposed industries 3. Build and strengthen public support • Reduce income taxes • Showcase climate projects and low carbon investments • Provide information and communication about impacts and benefits • Ensure appropriate timing and sequencing of implementation actions • Consider carefully the wording and framing of the policy Source UN Environment Programme

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In a similar vein, the emissions trading scheme operating in Ontario, Canada, in collaboration with Quebec and California, was cancelled in 2018 when the provincial government changed hands. Justifying the cancellation of the program, the new provincial Environment Minister, Rod Phillips, stated: “We’re sending a clear message: Ontario’s carbon-tax era is over. It’s a punishing, regressive tax that forces low- and middle-income families to pay more ”.17 One result of the cancelation of the cap-and trade program was that the province’s $377 million (CAD) Green Ontario Fund—which supported energy efficiency measures and promoted electric vehicles–was immediately closed down. These examples underscore the reality that public support for carbon pricing is often limited, in part because politicians have failed to communicate a clear narrative on how and why setting a price on carbon would benefit consumers and the local economy. The key issues are shown in Table 7.2 along with several proposed measures to address them.18

The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) cap-and-trade system covers nine eastern states in the USA: Maine, Vermont, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, Maryland and Delaware. Launched in 2009, it was the first carbon-trading scheme developed and implemented in the US, and the second (after British Columbia, Canada) in North America. It is a major carbon pricing initiative. The current group of RGGI states account for more than one-eighth of the population of the US and more than one-seventh of America’s gross national product. However, it should be noted that the RGGI only covers fossil-fuelled electric power plants with a capacity of 25 MW or greater.19 In 2009, when the RGGI program started, these sources accounted for less than a third of the CO2 emissions generated by the nine participating states.20 A comprehensive review of the program’s performance over the period 2015–2017 showed that the RGGI was working successfully: not only cutting greenhouse gas emissions but also boosting the regional economy and creating jobs. The analysis also found that the RGGI cap-and-trade system had not undermined the reliability of the power grid and, most importantly, had not led to a net increase in household electricity bills.21

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In 2009, the first credits issued to participating industries and power plants totalled 188 million tons of carbon dioxide. The cap was progressively lowered and stood at 84.3 million tons in 2017. Since 2000, emissions of CO2 have fallen by almost two-thirds—which is an impressive achievement.22 It is interesting to note, however, that emissions of carbon dioxide were falling even before the RGGI went into effect in 2009. This decline perhaps was due to the 2008 financial crisis, and in many US states emissions ticked back up after this period. This did not happen in the RGGI states and the continuing decline in CO2 emissions after 2010 is almost certainly the result of the cap-and-trade scheme. Over the period 2015–2017, auctions for emission allowances under the RGGI program generated approximately $901 million. The RGGI states disburse this money in different ways—but among essentially eight types of economic activities. 1. Energy efficiency. Investments in this category are judged to have the most rapid economic impact by reducing the demand for electricity and natural gas for heating and reducing household payments for electricity and fuels. Investments stimulate businesses offering energy-efficiency audits, upgrades to inefficient equipment, residential retrofits, and the installation of energy efficient appliances. The growth of the energy-efficiency sector creates jobs and has a state-wide positive economic impact. 2. Clean technology R&D. This category covers grants and investments to support research focused on developing new technologies aimed at reducing GHG emissions—for example: clean technologies, alternative transportation, and carbon capture and storage. 3. Direct bill assistance. Carbon pricing increases the cost of electricity for households and businesses. This can be a serious financial burden for low-income families. Many states have introduced rebates, payment credits, and other means to reduce bills paid by consumers, especially for low-income families. This is sometimes called recycling carbon revenues. 4. Greenhouse gas programs. The GHG reduction programs include a variety of expenditures aimed at reducing GHG emissions—for example grants for CO2 emissions reduction technologies, direct investment in ‘green’ start-up companies; efforts to reduce vehicle-miles travelled; climate change adaptation measures; investments in existing fossil-fuel fired power plants to make them cleaner or more efficient. 5. Program administration. This category includes the costs associated with the administration of a state’s CO2 budget trading program and/or related consumer benefit programs.

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6. Renewable energy. Grants and investments in utility-scale wind power and solar photovoltaic systems displace power generated from fossil fuels. Distributed energy systems—like solar photovoltaic installations on residences and businesses, reduce the demand for electricity, lower utility bills, and create significant state-wide jobs and employment. 7. Education, outreach, and job training. This includes funds for programs to educate business and residential consumers about ways to increase energy efficiency and reduce consumption. It includes financial support for training workers in new skills: energy audits, installing energy efficient equipment, distributed energy systems, and providing energy efficiency measures. 8. General funds. Some states allocate a small part of carbon revenues to budgets unrelated to energy or climate change. Table 7.3 shows the ways in which the nine RGGI states allocated funds during the third compliance period from 2015 to 2017. It is noteworthy that the nine states opted for very different investment strategies. Vermont disbursed nearly all revenues on energy efficiency measures and nothing on direct billing assistance. Conversely, New Hampshire directed almost 80% of its revenues towards providing assistance for consumers facing higher utility charges, and less than 20% on energy efficiency measures. It is also worth noting that only three of the RGGI states diverted a small fraction of their carbon revenues into general funds. Overall, the amount of revenue than was diverted into general funds was less than 1%. So 99% of revenues were directed towards programs aimed at further reducing emissions of greenhouse gases. The exception is the support for direct billing assistance—which does not directly induce or encourage a reduction in GHG emissions. It may in fact have the opposite effect—as it tends to weaken the price signal intended to change consumer behaviours. However, this may be a policy intended to ensure that a carbon pricing initiative is not vulnerable to cancelation by political parties ideologically opposed to what they will often condemn as an unwarranted ‘tax’. Overall, just over half the RGGI carbon revenues were spent on energy efficiency measures. Figure 7.4 shows the disbursement breakdown for the RGGI program as a whole. The category ‘other disbursements’ includes GHG programs; clean technology R&D; education, outreach and job training; and general funds.23 We should recall that the RGGI cap-and-trade program only covers fossil-fuel power plants over 25 MW capacity. The RGGI was specifically aimed

53.3 77.3 64.4 19.2 37.3 94.9 55.7 62.1 31.4

Source Analysis Group

Connecticut Maine Massachusetts New Hampshire Rhode Island Vermont New York Delaware Maryland

– 0.5 5.1 – 1.0 – 5.7 – 0.1

– 16.8 – 78.9 32.1 – – 3.7 39.4

Energy effi- Clean technol- Direct bill ciency (%) ogy, R&D (%) assistance (%) – – 16.3 – 0.3 – 0.7 0.2 7.9

GHG programs (%)

Table 7.3  Allocation of carbon revenues among RGGI states, 2015–2017

5.2 4.1 6.9 2.0 11.8 5.1 7.2 10.6 9.6

Program admin. (%) 32.5 – 7.3 – 17.1 – 25.4 22.6 10.2

Renewable energy (%) – – – – 0.3 – 5.3 – 1.4

9.0 1.3 – – – – – 0.8 –

Education, General outreach, & job funds (%) training (%)

346     M. J. Bush

7  Pricing Down Carbon     347

WƌŽŐƌĂŵ ĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶϳй ŝƌĞĐƚďŝůůŝŶŐ ĂƐƐŝƐƚĂŶĐĞϭϯй

KƚŚĞƌĚŝƐďƵƌƐĞŵĞŶƚƐ ϭϬй

ŶĞƌŐLJ ĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐLJϱϮй

ZĞŶĞǁĂďůĞĞŶĞƌŐLJ ŝŶǀĞƐƚŵĞŶƚƐϭϴй

Fig. 7.4  Disbursement of carbon revenues by the RGGI states (Source Inside Climate News)

at reducing emissions from larger power plants, and within that narrow mandate the program has been extremely successful—reducing emissions from these power plants by almost half from 2009 to 2017 and having a substantial positive economic impact. But what about the other sources of greenhouse gases in these nine states? The US Energy Information Administration has published data on energyrelated carbon dioxide emissions for all the US states. Energy-related CO2 emissions includes the combustion of coal, petroleum, and natural gas within a state to produce electricity, to transport people or goods, to operate industrial processes, and to directly fuel equipment in residential and commercial buildings. Table 7.4 shows energy-related emissions from the nine RGGI states for the period 2009–2016 in million tonnes CO2.24 Overall, there was a decrease of 5.6% in energy-related emissions over the eight-year period. All the states except Delaware saw their emissions of energy-related carbon dioxide fall. The review of the RGGI program by the economists of the Analysis Group offered the following observations and conclusions. • The RGGI program continued to generate substantial economic benefits for the states while reducing CO2 emissions. The program led to approximately $1.4 billion in economic value added as a result of program implementation in the 2015–2017 period—providing empirical evidence that

35.9 18.4 70.3 17.1 11.3 6.2 173.9 12.0 70.5 415.6

36.2 18.1 71.8 16.6 11 5.9 174.5 11.8 69.1 415

2010

Source US Energy Information Administration

Connecticut Maine Massachusetts New Hampshire Rhode Island Vermont New York Delaware Maryland Totals, MtCO2

2009 34.9 17.6 68 16.2 11 5.8 164.9 12.9 64.4 395.7

2011 34.1 15.9 61.7 14.6 10.5 5.5 161.5 13.9 59.9 377.6

2012

Table 7.4  Energy-related emissions of CO2 in the RGGI states, MtCO2

34.9 16.6 65.6 14.3 10.2 5.8 162.7 13.6 59.2 382.9

2013 35.1 16.5 63.7 14.9 10.6 5.9 170.1 13.3 61.3 391.5

2014 36.5 16.8 65.6 15.1 10.9 6.1 168.3 13.4 59.5 392.2

2015

34.3 16.5 64.2 13.8 9.8 6.0 163.7 13.3 57.6 392.2

2016

−4.5 −10.3 −8.7 −19.3 −13.3 −3.2 −5.9 10.8 −18.3 −5.6

% change 2009–2016

348     M. J. Bush

7  Pricing Down Carbon     349

carbon-control programs for the power sector can provide positive economic outcomes. • RGGI’s third compliance period led to overall job increases amounting to over 14,500 new job-years over the study period, with each of the nine states experiencing net job-year additions. Examples include workers who perform efficiency audits and who install energy efficiency measures in residences and commercial buildings, and staff performing training on energy issues. • The experience of the RGGI states demonstrates that states can collaborate successfully in developing programs to control CO2 emissions, and that market-based CO2 allowance programs—when combined with statedriven centralized auction of CO2 allowances and with local reinvestment of auction proceeds—can help states meet emission-reduction targets while generating positive economic benefits. • How allowance proceeds are used affects their economic impacts. Use of auction proceeds to invest in energy efficiency produces the biggest economic bang per buck in terms of net positive benefits to consumers and to the economy.25 The last point deserves more emphasis. It highlights the fact that ­carbon pricing schemes—whether carbon taxes or cap-and-trade systems, are much more effective in reducing emissions of greenhouse gases, when the revenues from the scheme are invested in programs that directly target the reduction of emissions. When structured and managed in this manner, carbon pricing works in two complementary ways: (1) by introducing price signals that induce less carbon-intensive activity, cleaner technology, and lower emissions from power plants and industry, and (2) by providing funds for programs focused on energy efficiency and renewable energy that directly reduce emissions. Furthermore, these investments funded by carbon revenues can have a substantial positive economic impact on the local and regional economy in terms of employment, new business opportunities, outreach and training. The RGGI program is well on the way to achieving its objectives—insofar as those objectives are limited to only reducing emissions from fossil-fuel fired power plants. But since the program has limited coverage, its impact on the totality of sources of carbon dioxide emissions has so far been modest— at least up until 2016. And it would be interesting to know more about why emissions increased in the state of Delaware?

350     M. J. Bush

Quebec Cap-and-Trade System for Emission Allowances Quebec’s cap-and-trade system presents an interesting contrast to the RGGI because Quebec’s power plants generate electricity almost entirely from renewable energy—predominantly hydropower. So whereas the RGGI objective is to reduce emissions from power plants, Quebec’s goal is to reduce emissions from transportation, industry, and the built environment. In 2009, these three sectors accounted for 85% of the provinces’ emissions of greenhouse gases—the largest of these being transportation.26 The other notable difference is that Quebec invests almost all of its carbon revenues into ‘green’ programs, and none at all into direct bill assistance. The program started in 2013 when Quebec joined the Western Climate Initiative’s carbon market. A year later, on 1 January 2014, Quebec linked its system with California’s—creating the largest carbon market in North America. It was the first in the world to be operated by subnational jurisdictions in different countries. The program is intended to be a flexible market mechanism to induce a carbon cost in business decision-making and to facilitate low-cost GHG emission reductions while encouraging the implementation of clean technologies. All businesses that emit 25,000 tonnes or more of carbon dioxide equivalent a year are subject to the cap-and-trade system. For the first compliance period in 2013/14 (phase I), only the industrial and electricity sector were included in the system. During subsequent compliance periods, fossil fuel distributors were included in the program.27 But the coverage is not 100%: only 85% of industries that emit greenhouse gases are covered by the program. In the Quebec cap-and-trade system, there are three types of emission allowance—all of which are fully interchangeable with California’s allowances. 1. Emission units distributed free of change, auctioned off or sold by mutual agreement by the government 2. Offset credits stemming from GHG emission reductions in sectors not subject to the cap-and-trade system 3. Credits for early reductions. Emitters and participants in the cap-andtrade system must each have an account in the tracking system in which their emission allowances are held.28 Figure 7.5 shows schematically how the system works. With emissions capped, an industry that exceeds the cap (industry A) must purchase

7  Pricing Down Carbon     351

Fig. 7.5  How Quebec’s cap-and-trade system works (Source Le Quebec en action verte)

allowances from the carbon market in order to be in compliance. Industry B has taken steps to reduce its emissions, and now has allowances available that it can sell to the carbon market.29 As in all cap-and-trade systems, the cap on emissions is reduced each year in line with the emission targets set by the jurisdiction. Quebec has set a goal similar to the target set by the European Union, with the aim of reducing greenhouse gas emissions by 20% over the period 1990–2020—with the goal of getting at least an 80% reduction from 1990 levels by 2050. Table 7.5 shows the emission caps proposed through to 2020.30 The cap in 2030 will be set at 44.14 MtCO2e.31 To put these caps in ­perspective, Quebec’s actual emissions up to 2016 are shown in Table 7.6. Reducing 1990 emissions by 20% by 2020 would imply a target of 69 MtCO2e. So the 2020 cap has been set at less than the target—which may reflect the fact that only 85% of industries are regulated by the program, and that some energy-intensive industries subject to international competition receive a portion of free allowances. These include aluminium, lime, cement, chemical and petrochemicals, metallurgy, mining and pelletizing, pulp and paper, and petroleum refining.32 Table 7.6 shows that emissions of greenhouse gases in 2014 were about 9% down on 1990 levels but since that time have been essentially flat. It’s clear that Quebec is not going to reach its 2020 target.

352     M. J. Bush Table 7.5  Total caps of emissions units granted

Table 7.6 Quebec’s actual emissions of greenhouse gasesa

Year

Emission cap, MtCO2e

2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020

23.20 23.20 65.30 63.19 61.08 58.96 58.85 54.74

Year

MtCO2e

1990 2005 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017

86 86 82 80 80 78 78 78 78

aNational inventory report 1990–2017: Greenhouse gas sources and sinks in Canada. Environment and climate change Canada 2019. Accessed at: http://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2019/eccc/En814-1-2017-eng.pdf

Carbon Revenues Quebec has budgeted for revenues of approximately $2665 million (CAD) over the 8-year period from 2013 to 2020: so the province is expecting to receive revenues averaging about $330 million a year over this period. Over 80% of carbon revenues generated by the cap-and-trade program is invested in measures to increase energy efficiency—predominantly in the transport sector where public transport employing hybrid or electric buses is allocated more than half of the total budget. Figure 7.6 shows the budget for the disbursement of carbon revenues for the period 2013–2020.33 More than 70% of the budget for energy efficiency shown in Fig. 7.6 is for a single budget line: The promotion of public transport and alternative means of transport by improving the supply and by developing the infrastructure and enabling sustainable choices.34 There are no indications that Quebec’s successfully operating carbon pricing mechanism is having a negative impact on its economy. The province’s

7  Pricing Down Carbon     353

ůĞĂŶ ƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐLJ͕ ZΘ͕ϰй ','ƉƌŽŐƌĂŵƐ͕ ϳй

ĚƵĐĂƚŝŽŶ͕ ŽƵƚƌĞĂĐŚΘũŽď ƚƌĂŝŶŝŶŐ͕ϱй

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ŶĞƌŐLJĞĨĨŝĐŝĞŶĐLJ ŝŶĐůƵĚŝŶŐƉƵďůŝĐ ƚƌĂŶƐƉŽƌƚĂŶĚŝƚƐ ŝŶĨƌĂƐƚƌƵĐƚƵƌĞ͕ϴϭй

Fig. 7.6  Disbursements budgeted for Quebec’s carbon revenues, 2013–2020 (Source Le Quebec en action verte)

GDP grew 3.1% in 2017. Although this was slightly less than the national average of 3.3%, it was still the province’s strongest rate of growth since 2000 and more than twice that of 2016. Among the ten Canadian provinces, Quebec recorded the 4th highest GDP growth rate. Quebec’s manufacturing output rose 3.7% in 2017 with growth in 15 of 19 subsectors. There were significant increases in food manufacturing, plastics and rubber products, fabricated metal products and machinery manufacturing.35 Unemployment rates also fell: declining from 7.6% in 2013 to 6.1% in 2017—less than the national average of 6.3%.36 Quebec’s per capita GHG emissions also dropped significantly: declining from 11.4 t/CO2e to 9.4 t/CO2e per capita from 2005 to 2017. The latter number is less than half the Canadian national average in 2017 of 19.5 t/CO2e per capita and is less than Ontario’s and British Columbia’s figures of 11.2 and 12.5 t/CO2e respectively. 37

British Columbia The Canadian province of British Columbia introduced a carbon tax in 2008. It applies to the purchase or use of all fossil fuels within the province and covers about 70% of the province’s greenhouse gas emissions. The goal is to reduce emissions to 80% below 2007 levels by 2050.

354     M. J. Bush

In 2008, the carbon tax was set at $10 per tonne of CO2 equivalent emissions–increasing by $5 each year up to $30 a tonne in 2012. In 2008, the tax raised pump prices on gasoline and diesel by 2.34 and 2.69 cents per litre respectively.38 In April 2018, the carbon tax was raised to $35/ tCO2e—a figure that is projected to increase pump prices by 7.78 and 8.95 cents/litre for gasoline and diesel fuel respectively. The tax will again increase in $5 annual increments rising to $50/tCO2e in 2050.39 One unique characteristic of the BC carbon tax is that it is designed to be revenue-neutral. Revenue collected from the carbon tax must, by law, be recycled into the economy in the form of tax cuts. Carbon revenues cannot be used to fund government programs. Personal income and corporate income tax rates were reduced from 2008 onwards, and low-income families are compensated for the higher fuel prices through a refundable tax credit.40 The carbon tax in British Columbia has been hailed by several analysts and organizations as an outstanding success. For instance, in 2015, two leading environmental economists stated that “British Columbia has given the world perhaps the closest example of an economist’s textbook prescription for the use of a carbon tax to reduce emissions ”.41 But a closer look at the data—particularly the GHG emissions data reported by the Canadian government in early 2018 in its National Inventory Report—paints a very different picture. The relevant data are set out in Table 7.7—which also shows data for Quebec and Ontario for comparison. The odd formatting of the years in Table 7.6 follows the format of Canada’s National Inventory Report.42 The first thing to notice is that emissions of greenhouse gases in British Columbia over the most recent period have actually increased. From 2011 to 2017, emissions rose by 4.6%. Only if the reference point is taken as 2005, is there a slight fall in emissions. But if the British Columbia carbon tax program is working so successfully–as its many proponents often proclaim, there should absolutely be an overall downward trend in emissions over the seven year period through to 2017 (which is the latest year for which emissions data are available). For Canada as a whole, over the period 2011–2017 emissions also increased—but to a lesser degree than British Columbia. In contrast to British Columbia, GHG emissions in both Quebec and Ontario declined over all three periods (from 1990, 2005 and 2011). Over the period 2011–2017, emissions fell by 4.5% in Quebec and by 7.8% in Ontario—while in British Columbia as noted above, they actually rose. And while emissions per capita fell by 5.0% over this period in British Columbia, they declined more rapidly in Quebec and Ontario: by 8.2% and 13.6% respectively.

Source National Inventory Report Canada

GHG emissions MtCO2e Population, millions Emissions per capita, tCO2e British Columbia GHG emissions MtCO2e Population, millions Emissions per capita, tCO2e Quebec GHG emissions MtCO2e Population, millions Emissions per capita, tCO2e Ontario GHG emissions MtCO2e Population, millions Emissions per capita, tCO2e

Canada (all provinces and territories) 730 32.242 22.7 63 4.196 14.8 86 7.581 11.4 204 12.583 16.3

52 3.292 15.5 86 6.997 12.4 180 10.296 17.4

2005

602 27.691 21.8

1990

172.5 13.264 13

81.7 8.003 10.2

59.3 4.5 13.2

700 34.343 20.4

2011

169 13.414 12.6

80 8.056 9.8

60 4.546 13.3

711 34.751 20.3

2012

168 13.556 12.4

80 8.151 9.5

61 4.59 13.3

722 35.152 20.4

2013

Table 7.7  Emissions per capita for Canada, British Columbia, Quebec, and Ontario 1990–2017

166 13.68 12.1

78 8.211 9.5

60 4.646 13

723 35.535 20.1

2014

165 13.79 11.8

78 8.255 9.5

59 4.695 12.7

722 35.833 19.9

2015

162 13.977 11.5

78 8.322 9.3

61 4.758 12.6

708 36.265 19.4

2016

159 14.154 11.2

78 8.33 9.4

62 4.946 12.5

716 36.713 19.5

2017

7  Pricing Down Carbon     355

356     M. J. Bush

The data also show the dubious value of analysing carbon tax or cap-andtrade performance in terms of per capita emissions. As the data for British Columbia demonstrate, per capital rates can fall even when emissions are rising—simply because the population is increasing at a faster rate than emissions. The poor performance of British Columbia’s carbon tax program has prompted that province’s government to try a different approach. In April 2018, the carbon tax was raised to $35 per tonne of CO2 equivalent emissions—a tax rate that will rise each year by $5 a tonne until it reaches $50 a tonne in 2021. The carbon tax scheme is still revenue-neutral—with the new revenues being used to provide carbon tax relief, protect affordability, and maintain industry competitiveness. However, carbon revenues will also be used to encourage new “green initiatives”.43 In 2018, the province committed to taking ‘sector-specific action’ to reduce emissions and build a more resilient, low-carbon economy.44 So British Columbia appears to be moving away from a strictly revenue-neutral carbon pricing system to an approach that recognizes that complementary policies focused on energy efficiency and renewable energy are essential if greenhouse gas emissions are to be substantially reduced.

California California’s cap-and-trade program began its compliance obligation scheme on 1 January 2013. The state’s program is the fourth largest in the world, after the cap-and-trade programs of the European Union, South Korea, and the Chinese province of Guangdong. The goal is to reduce the emission of greenhouse gases to 1990 levels by 2020, and then to reduce them further by 40% by 2030. The cap-and-trade program applies to large electric power plants, large industrial plants, and fuel distributors of natural gas and petroleum—and covers approximately 450 sources responsible for 85% of the state’s greenhouse gas emissions. Smaller industries emitting less than 25,000 tCO2e a year are exempt. Emissions of greenhouse gases have been falling since 2007. In 2016 GHG emissions were 429 MtCO2e which is already below the state’s target set for 2020—which is the 1990 level of about 431 MtCO2e. At the same time, California’s economy is vigorously healthy: Its GDP grew 3.1% in 2017—the 6th highest among American states. In 2015, California had the highest GDP growth of 4.6%, and the state has been among the top six performing states in terms of GDP since 2012.45

7  Pricing Down Carbon     357

Fig. 7.7  Trends in California’s GDP, population, and GHG emissions since 2000 (Source California Air Resources Board)

California’s progress in reducing emissions has been good since 2007— which was well before the cap-and-trade program was introduced. Figure 7.7 shows the most important metrics.46 What is clearly evident from Fig. 7.7 is not just the declining level of emissions, but the reduction in the carbon intensity of the economy. California’s GHG emissions per unit of GDP dropped by about 35% over the period from 2000 to 2016—a remarkable achievement. How did the state of California manage to produce these emission reductions in an economy larger than Canada’s? Figure 7.8 shows the level of emission of the big three sources of emissions: Transportation, electric power, and industry. The largest source of emissions is transportation and although emissions in 2016 were down compared to 2007, more recently, emissions have been rising again. But it’s the electric power sector where the reductions have been substantial: the sector cut emissions by more than 70 MtCO2e between 2008 and 2016. It’s not hard to see why. The decline in emissions is driven primarily by the large increase in renewable energy resources as a result of California’s Renewable Portfolio Standard (first enacted in 2002), and since 2013 by the cap-and-trade program. Higher energy efficiency standards have kept electricity consumption from increasing despite a growing population and steady economic growth as shown in Fig. 7.7. In addition, the energy intensity of imported electricity has been declining steadily over time as California imports a greater share of renewable power and divests from long term coal-fired electricity contracts.

358     M. J. Bush

Fig. 7.8  Trends in California GHG emissions by sector 2000–2016 (Source California Air Resources Board)

In 2016, 46% of total electricity generation came from zero carbon, clean energy sources—which include solar, wind, hydropower and nuclear. Electric power emissions dropped by 15 MtCO2e from 2015 to 2016 due to increased supplies of renewable energy including a 33% growth in solar generation in 2016, and a drop in coal-fired electricity imports with the termination of long term coal contracts. Rooftop photovoltaic power generation was five times the level it was in 2011. Wind power ramped up through 2013 but has remained relatively constant since that time.47 California is not sitting back and relaxing. Not with wildfires, drought, and heat waves seemingly intensifying each year. In 2018, Senate Bill 100 was approved—legislation that mandates that California will be powered 100% by clean energy by 2045. Clean energy includes nuclear power–so strictly speaking this is not 100% renewable, but it is carbon free. Although California is not the first US state to commit to 100% clean energy (Hawaii was the first in 2015), California is the world’s fifth largest economy, and so its commitment has global significance. It is the largest jurisdiction in the world to move towards 100% clean energy.48 The benchmarks on this pathway to 100% zero-carbon energy are set by California’s Renewables Portfolio Standard (RPS) which requires investorowned utilities, publicly owned utilities, electric service providers, and

7  Pricing Down Carbon     359

community choice aggregators to increase procurement from eligible renewable energy resources to 33% of total procurement by 2020, and to 50% of total procurement by 2030.49 The state has also introduced measures to manage energy demand as well as supply. In 2018, the California Energy Commission amended the state’s building code to require that new single-family residences and low-rise multi-family buildings have rooftop photovoltaic systems installed during construction. It’s worth noting that although California’s residential electricity tariffs are relatively high, the average home electricity bill is no higher than many other states—because of improvements in energy efficiency in the building envelope, home appliances, and residential heating systems.50 To recap, it is clear from these case studies in the US and Canada that pricing carbon through a tax or cap-and-trade scheme provides price signals that induce changes in industry practice and consumer behaviour–which lead to lower consumption of fossil fuels and reduced emissions of greenhouse gases. But pricing carbon is far from being the only tool available. There is plenty of experience with carbon pricing programs in North America and Europe that demonstrates that complementary programs that improve energy efficiency through appliance standards and building codes, induce utility-scale switching to renewable energy (including as a priority phasing out coal), incentivize the purchase of electric vehicles, build out public transport infrastructure, and encourage a less energy intensive life-style, also have a substantial, and often much more rapid, impact on greenhouse gas emissions.

Fossil Fuel Subsidies Reducing fossil fuel subsidies should also be an essential part of a carbon pricing policy. In effect, these subsidies act as a negative emissions price— discouraging investments in clean energy and energy efficiency, tilting the balance in favour of carbon-intensive fuels and making it more difficult for renewable energy and energy efficient equipment to compete. Subsidizing fossil fuels is a ‘perverse subsidy’—making greenhouse gas emissions worse, not better. Energy subsidies damage the environment, causing more premature deaths through local air pollution, exacerbating congestion and other adverse side effects of vehicle use, and increasing atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations. Fossil fuel subsidies impose substantial fiscal costs, which need to be financed by some combination of higher public debt, higher tax

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Not all the SIDS are islands: Belize, Guyana, and Suriname are also included. While Singapore seems incongruous, the republic includes several dozen smaller islands that are vulnerable to climate change impacts Smart energy system   An

energy system that aims to optimise the overall efficiency and balance of a range of interconnected energy technologies and processes, both electrical and non-electrical (including heat, gas and fuels). This is achieved through dynamic demand- and supply-side management; enhanced monitoring of electrical, thermal and fuel-based system assets; control and optimisation of consumer equipment, appliances and services; and better integration of distributed energy Smart grid   Electrical grid that uses information and communications technology to co-ordinate the needs and capabilities of the generators, grid operators, end-users and electricity market stakeholders in a system, with the aim of operating all parts as efficiently as possible, minimising costs and environmental impacts and maximising system reliability, resilience and stability Smart inverter   An inverter with software that is capable of rapid, bidirectional communications, which utilities can control remotely Solar collector   A device used for converting solar energy to thermal energy (heat), typically used for domestic water heating but also for space heating, industrial process heat or to drive thermal cooling machines. Evacuated tube and flat plate collectors that operate with water or a water/glycol mixture as the heat-transfer medium are the most common solar thermal collectors used worldwide Solar cooker  A cooking device for household and institutional applications, that converts sunlight to heat that is retained for cooking. There are five types of solar cookers, box cookers, panel cookers, parabolic cookers, evacuated tube cookers and trough cookers Solar home system   A stand-alone system composed of a relatively low-power photovoltaic module, a battery and sometimes a charge controller, that can power small electric devices and provide modest amounts of electricity to homes for

Glossary    501

lighting, communication and appliances, usually in rural or remote regions that are not connected to the electricity grid Solar photovoltaics   A technology used for converting light into electricity. Solar PV cells are constructed from semiconducting materials that use sunlight to separate electrons from atoms to create an electric current. Modules are formed by interconnecting individual cells Solar-plus-storage   A hybrid technology of solar photovoltaic arrays coupled with battery storage. Other types of renewable energy-plus-storage plants also exist Solar water heater   A system consisting of a solar collector, storage tank, water pipes and other components. There are two types of solar water heaters, pumped solar water heaters use mechanical pumps to circulate a heat transfer fluid through the collector loop (active systems), whereas thermosyphon solar water heaters make use of buoyancy forces caused by natural convection (passive systems) Storage battery   A type of battery that can be charged by passing an electric current through it. A lithium-ion battery uses a liquid lithium-based material for one of its electrodes. A lead-acid battery uses plates made of pure lead or lead oxide for the electrodes and sulphuric acid for the electrolyte Storm surge   The temporary increase, at a particular locality, in the height of the sea due to hurricanes, cyclones, and storms. The storm surge is defined as being the excess above the level expected from the tidal variation alone at that time and place Subsidy   A government measure that artificially reduces the price that consumers pay for energy or that reduces the production cost Supercritical   A type of power plant where the steam that drives the turbines is at a temperature and pressure above critical point of water. The very high operating temperatures and pressures increase the thermal efficiency of the power plant— but also its cost Sustainable development   Development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs Sustainable livelihood   Livelihood that endures over time and is resilient to the impacts of various types of shocks including climatic and economic. System dynamics model   A model which decomposes a complex social or behavioural system into its constituent components and then integrates them into a whole that can be easily visualized and simulated Target   An official commitment, plan or goal set by a government (at the local, state, national or regional level) to achieve a certain amount of renewable energy or energy efficiency by a future date. Targets may be backed by specific compliance mechanisms or policy support measures. Some targets are legislated, while others are set by regulatory agencies, ministries or public officials Tendering (also called auction/reverse auction or tender)   A procurement mechanism by which renewable energy supply or capacity is competitively solicited from sellers, who offer bids at the lowest price that they would be willing to accept. Bids may be evaluated on both price and non-price factors

502     Glossary Thermal energy storage   Technology

that allows the transfer and storage of thermal energy. See Molten salt Thermal expansion   In connection with sea level, this refers to the increase in volume (and decrease in density) that results from warming water. A warming of the ocean leads to an expansion of the ocean volume and hence an increase in sea level Tipping element   Subsystems of the Earth system that are at least subcontinental in scale and can be switched—under certain circumstances—into a qualitatively different state by small perturbations Tipping point   A level of change in system properties beyond which a system reorganizes, often abruptly, and does not return to the initial state even if the drivers of the change are reduced or eliminated. For the climate system, it refers to a critical threshold when global or regional climate changes rapidly from one stable state to a different state, and where the new state may create greatly increased environmental hazards. The change is almost certainly irreversible Transmission grid  The portion of the electrical supply distribution network that carries bulk electricity, generally over long distances, from power plants to substations, where voltage is stepped down for further distribution. High-voltage transmission lines can carry electricity between regional grids in order to balance supply and demand Uncertainty   A state of incomplete knowledge that can result from a lack of information or from disagreement about what is known or even knowable. It may have many types of sources, from imprecision in the data to ambiguously defined concepts or terminology, or uncertain projections of human behaviour. Uncertainty can be created by disinformation campaigns intended to prevent concerted action on climate change Unconditional NDCs   Nationally Determined Contributions (to the Paris Agreement targets) proposed by countries without conditions attached Variable renewable energy (VRE)   A renewable energy source that fluctuates within a relatively short time frame, such as wind and solar power, which vary within daily, hourly and even sub-hourly time frames. By contrast, resources and technologies that are variable on an annual or seasonal basis due to environmental changes, such as hydropower (due to changes in rainfall) and thermal power plants (due to changes in temperature of ambient air and cooling water), do not fall into this category Vehicle fuel standard   A rule specifying the minimum fuel economy of automobiles Voltage and frequency control   The process of maintaining grid voltage and frequency stable within a narrow band through management of system resources Vulnerability   The propensity or predisposition to be adversely affected. Vulnerability encompasses a variety of concepts and elements including sensitivity or susceptibility to harm and lack of capacity to cope and adapt Watt   A unit of power that measures the rate of energy conversion or transfer. A kilowatt is equal to 1 thousand watts (kW); a megawatt to 1 million watts (MW).

Glossary    503

One billion watts is a gigawatt, GW. A megawatt-electrical (MWe) is used to refer to electric power, whereas a megawatt-thermal (MWth) refers to thermal/ heat energy produced. Power is the rate at which energy is consumed or generated Watthour   A unit of energy abbreviated as Wh. It is equal to the amount of energy which is consumed by 1 watt of power delivered over a period of 1 hour. It generally refers to electricity but can refer to thermal energy—in which case it may be written as Whth. The common unit of a kilowatthour (kWh) is one thousand watthours. One million watthours is a megawatthour (MWh) Weather   The day-to-day variation in temperature, precipitation, sunshine, cloudiness, and wind. Seasonal differences may also be referred to as ‘winter’ or ‘summer’ weather. However, measurable longer-term trends over decadal periods are due to changes in climate

Index

A

Aberfan tragedy 148 Access to electricity 241 Acidic drainage 146 Acidification 25 Acidity 119 Acid mine drainage (AMD) 146 Active layer 81 Active layer thickness (ALT) 22, 81 Acute myocardial infarction 150 Adaptation 44 Addis Ababa 310 Advanced biofuels 232, 311 Afforestation/reforestation 127, 132, 133 Africa 36, 39 Africa Biogas Partnership Programme 313 African Development Bank 243 Agriculture 220 Airborne mercury 154 Air pollution 32, 34, 37, 38, 49, 73, 144, 146, 221, 226, 228 Alberta Energy and Utilities Board 198 Alberta Energy Regulator (AER) 168 Alberta oil and gas fields 178 Alex 86

Alexandria 89 Alice, Texas 180 Aliceville, Alabama 184 Aliso Canyon 181 Allard, LaDonna Brave Bull 188 Allowance auctions 340 Allowances or permits 337 Altamont Pass 214 Amendment 1 409 American Council for an EnergyEfficient Economy (ACEEE) 261 American Council for Capital Formation Center for Policy Research 385 American Electric Power 378 American Enterprise Institute 385 American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) 398, 407, 412 American Lung Association 34 American Petroleum Institute 376, 381, 402 Americans for Prosperity 408 American Tradition Institute 389 Ammonia 232 Anaerobic digestion 312 Anemometer 277

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2020 M. J. Bush, Climate Change and Renewable Energy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15424-0

505

506     Index

Animal dung 36 Anishinaabe 193 Antarctic 16 Antarctica 20, 422 Antarctic ice sheet 434 Anthracite and bituminous coal 135 Anthropocene Age 40 Anti-electric vehicle groups 411 Apple 239 Aquaculture 26 Aquatic food chain 153 Arab Spring 93 Aragonite 26 Arctic 16, 17, 60, 78, 82 Arctic Ocean 433 Arctic permafrost 82 Arctic sea ice 433 Arctic sea ice extent 17 Arctic tundra 81 Arizona Public Service (APS) 320, 408 Arkema chemical plant 165 Army Corps of Engineers 189 Arsenic 147, 152 Arthropod abundance 47 Arthropod populations 46 Artificial plankton bloom 131 Asia 39 Asthma 37, 150 Athabasca 166 Athabasca deposit 167 Athabasca Oil Sands Project (AOSP) 240 Athabasca River 12 Atmospheric Trust Litigation 197 Auction prices 221 Automobile industry 157 Aviation 233 B

Background rate 45 Bakken 184, 185 Bakken field 183 Bakken oil fields 188

Balearic Islands 216 Baltic Sea 27 Bangkok 88 Bangladesh 34, 75 Banktrack 397 Barbuda 85 Barstow 301 Barton, Joe 388 Basal Cambrian Sands 240 Basic components of a PV + energy storage system 298 Basic oxygen furnaces 366 Bat Conservation International 287 Bates, John 392, 393 Bats 286 Batteries 243, 319, 320 Battery Electric Bus (BEB) 229 Battery electric vehicles (BEVs) 227, 228, 363 Battery energy storage system 320 Battery packs 228 Behind the meter 321 Belchatow power plant 154 Bell Labs 287 Bell, Myron 403 Benzene 143, 164, 176 Beyond Coal 215 Big Sandy River 147 Bike lanes 463 Binary cycle system 315 Biodiesel 310, 312 Biodiversity 43, 49, 130 Bioenergy 130 Bioenergy production with carbon capture 129 Bioenergy with Carbon Capture and Storage (BECCS) 130, 132, 133 Biofuels 220, 233, 310 Biogas 312, 313 Biological annihilation 46 Biomass 36, 143 Biomass energy 132, 239, 308 Biomass feedstock 130 Biomass fuels 38

Index    507

Biomass powered minigrids 244 Biomethane 313 Birds and bats 286 Bismarck 188 Bitumen 167 Black carbon 36, 67, 135, 230, 232 Black carbon emissions 231 Black lung disease 145, 146 Blood mercury levels 154, 155 Bloomberg, Michael 407 Blue carbon 132 Blue Nile 306 Blyth, James 214 Bohai 2 oil rig 160 Borehole thermal energy storage 237 Borehole thermal storage 237 Boston 89 Boundary Dam 3 240 BP 162 Bradley, Raymond 388 Bramble Cay melomys 44 Brazil 69 British Columbia 11, 13, 192, 307, 353 British Columbia Environmental Office 192 British Navy 157 British Petroleum 135 Bronchitis 37 Brush, Charles 214 Buffalo Creek 147 Building codes 334, 462 Building energy codes 262 Building Energy Conservation Code 257 Buildings 257 Bulk carriers 230 Bunter Aquifer 241 Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway 182 Bush meat 43 Butanol 311 Butterflies 44

C

CAFE standard 260 Calcium carbonate 26 Caledonia, Wisconsin 183 California 13, 30, 72, 356 California drought 72 California Energy Commission (CEC) 235, 321, 359 California’s cap-and-trade program 356 Campaign of misinformation 387 Camp Fire 14 Canada 124 Canada’s National Inventory Report 354 Canada’s pipelines 189 Canadian Association of Petroleum Producers (CAPP) 189 Canadian Environmental Assessment Act 198 Canadian Mackenzie Delta 432 Canadian oil sands 170 Canadian Pacific 187 Canadian pipelines 159 Canadian railways 183 Canadian Transport Safety Board 183 CAN/CSA-ISO 50001 257 Capacity factor 276 Cap-and-trade 336 Cap-and-trade program 352 Cap-and-trade schemes 367 Cap-and-trade systems 337, 338, 341 Cape Town 73 Cap on emissions 337 Captain Aquifer 241 Carbon 109 Carbon-14 66 Carbon budget 134, 138, 423 Carbon Capture and Storage (CCS) 129, 138, 219, 223, 239, 311 Carbon Capture, Utilisation, and Storage (CCUS) 129 Carbon capture with enhanced oil recovery 240

508     Index

Carbon cycle 63, 109 Carbon dioxide 49, 63, 64, 66, 67, 99, 102, 110, 112, 116, 122, 136, 334 Carbon Dioxide Removal (CDR) 129 The carbon dioxide theory of climate change 376 Carbon fuels 32 Carbon mineralization 133 Carbon monoxide 34 Carbon neutral 308 Carbon price 334, 335, 338 Carbon-pricing instruments 335 Carbon Pricing Leadership Coalition 334, 338 Carbon pricing revenues 340 Carbon revenues 340, 352 Carbon revenues among RGGI 346 Carbon storage 130 Carbon tax 200, 336, 367, 406 Carbon tax rate 338 Carbon tax receipts 340 Carbon tax reduces emissions 337 Carbon tax systems 341 Car efficiency standards 412 Casselton, North Dakota 185 Catawba and Broad rivers 147 Cato Institute 385 Cats 287 Cattle ranching 120 Cellulosic biomass 311 Cement industry 367 Cement production 367 Center for Transforming Education 398 Central America’s Dry Corridor 97 Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters (CRED) 6 Chalk River 317 Charcoal 36 Charcoal stoves 37 Charging points 228 Cheatgrass 92

Chemical additives 175 Chernobyl 317 Chesapeake Bay 27 Childhood wasting 42 Children 37, 38 China 29, 36, 75, 87 Cholera 70 Chronic Obstructive Pulmonary Disease (COPD) 150 Churchill, Winston 157 Ciguatera 78 Cinnabar 153 Clathrates 81 Clean Air Act 34 Clean Energy Ministerial 226 Clean technology R&D 344 Clear Skies Initiatives 402 Climate change 44, 78, 92, 95, 97 Climate change assessments 430 Climate change justice 196 Climate Change Science Program 402 Climate denial front organisations 385 Climate-driven migration 96 Climate externality 335 Climate Science Special Report 50, 83 Climate Shock: The Economic Consequences of a Hotter Planet 431 Climate variability 97 Climate Vulnerable Forum (CVF) 216 CO2 and spaceship Earth 378 Coal 36, 143, 144, 202 Coal ash 152 Coal ash dumps 153 Coal ash dump sites 152 Coal ash dust 152 Coal ash retention ponds 223 Coal ash slurry 152 Coal cars 182 Coal dust 182 Coalfields 146 Coal-fired electrical power generation 222 Coal-fired generation technologies 223

Index    509

Coal-fired power plants 202, 215, 220, 223 Coal fuel cycle 223 Coal mine disasters 145 Coal mine dust 145 Coal miners 145 Coal mine tailing ponds 147 Coal mining 145 Coal reserves 136 Coal slag heaps 148 Coal train 182 Coal train derailments 182 Coal waste 147 Coal waste slurry 147 Coal Workers Health Surveillance Program (CWHSP) 145 Coastal blue carbon 132, 133 Coastal communities 22 Coastal zones 26 Coke oven emissions 366 Coking ovens 366 Coking process 366 Cold climate heat pumps 258 Cold Lake 166, 168 Columbia River Gorge 184 Combined heat and power (CHP) 262 Combustion 144 Commercial agriculture 119 Committee for a Constructive Tomorrow 385 Community action 460 Community and shared solar energy 296 Community based PV systems 299 Community shared solar 296 Compact of Mayors 215 Comparing the costs 322 Competitive Enterprise Institute 403 Competitiveness of electrification options 252 Complementary policies 367 Complementary programs 359 Computer models 377 Concentrating solar concepts 301

Concentrating solar power (CSP) 300, 301 Concerned Health Professionals of New York 181 Conference of Parties (COP21) 334 Conflicts 41, 92 Connected devices 259 Conservation agriculture 130, 463 Consumer Energy Alliance (CEA) 408 Consumers for Smart Solar 409 Container ships 230 Control knob 64 Cook Islands 78 Cooney, Philip A. 402 Co-op refinery 164 COP21 124 Copenhagen 216 Copenhagen Climate Change Conference 389 Coral bleaching 23, 24 Coral reefs 22, 31, 49 Coronary heart disease (CHD) 150 Cost of electricity from electrification option 253 Cost of the batteries 298 Council on Environmental Quality 402 Crescent Dunes solar energy plant 302 Crop failures 70 Crop pests 91 Crosby 165 Crude oil 157 Crude oil transported by rail 184 Cruise ships 230 Cryosphere 16 Cuba 86 Cuccinelli, Ken 389 Cyclic steam stimulation 168 Cyclones 49 D

Daily Mail 393 Dakota Access Pipeline (DAPL) 188, 397

510     Index

Dar es Salaam 244 Dead zone 26, 27, 40 Decarbonizing maritime transport 232 Declaration of Rebellion 459 Deepwater Horizon 157, 159, 161–163 Deforestation 119, 120 Demand charges 409 Denmark 237 Deoxygenation 26 Derailments 182 Desalination plants 73 Desert Locust 79 Destructive fishing 23 Deutche Post DHL 225, 227 Diamondback moths 91 Diesel engines 68 Diesel exhaust from buses 228 Dilbit 159 Direct air capture (DAC) 129, 133 Direct Air Capture and Carbon Storage (DACCS) 131 Direct bill assistance 344 Direct insolation 301 Dirty secrets of electric cars 411 Disaster risk management 8 Disasters, climate-related 10 Disasters, natural 6 Disbursement of carbon revenues 341, 347 Disbursements budgeted for Quebec’s carbon revenues 353 Dispatchable electrical power 320 Dispatchable power 320 Dissolved oxygen 27 Distributed energy systems 297 Distributed solar energy 294 Distributed solar PV 297 Distribution of mini-grids in Tanzania 245 District heating 237 District heating systems 258 Dogger aquifer 316 Domes Day book 213 Domestic hot water systems 237

Dominica 85 Drake Landing 237 Drake Landing Solar Community 237, 238 Drax power plant 310 Drop in biofuels 311 Drought 6, 9, 41, 68–72, 78, 92, 93, 95, 96 Drunken forests 22 Dry Corridor 97 Dry steam power plants 315 Duke Energy 147 Dunnellon, Florida 183 E

E10 gasoline 311 Earth First 397 Earthquake 6, 7, 9 Earth’s energy imbalance 61 EarthSpark 249 EarthSpark International 248 Earth System Science Center 387 East Africa 70 East Antarctica 21 East Island 424 East Siberian Arctic Shelf 433 Economics of minigrids 251 Economists 334 Ecosystems 46 Edison Electric Institute 376, 379, 381, 382, 407 Education, outreach, and job training 345 Edward Dean Adams power plant 214 Effects of mercury 154 Efficient lighting 258 Egypt 29, 87 Electrical transmission lines 157 Electric arc furnaces 363 Electric aviation 233 Electric buses 226, 228, 229, 462 Electric ferry 232 Electric home 259

Index    511

Electricité d’Haiti 248 Electricity 219 Electricity for rural communities 242 Electric planes 233 Electric powered forklifts 233 Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI) 377–379 Electric scooters 226 Electric tractors 463 Electric trukcs 229 Electric Vehicle Initiative (EVI) 226 Electric Vehicles (EVs) 220, 224, 226, 259 Elephants 43 Ellicott City, Maryland 183 El Nino 24, 79, 94 El Paso Electric 408 El Yunque National Forest 46 Emission factors 137 Emission rights 336 Emissions from shipping 230 Emissions gap forecast 126 Emissions Gap Report 126, 127 Emissions of carbon dioxide 112 Emissions of CO2 from the extraction and processing of crude oil 169 Emissions of methane 364 Emissions trading scheme 343 Emperor butterfly 91 Employment 349 Enabling measures supporting carbon pricing 342 Enbridge 159 Enbridge Line 3 193 Enbridge Line 3 Replacement 190 Enbridge Northern Gateway 189, 190 Enchova 161 Energy and Environmental Legal Institute (E&E Legal) 389 Energy Benchmarking 257 Energy efficiency 220, 254–256, 344, 349, 362 Energy Efficiency Design Index 231

Energy efficiency incentive programs 262 Energy efficiency measures 262 Energy Efficiency Resource Standard (EERS) 261 Energy efficiency standards 335, 357 Energy efficient vehicles 260 Energy independence 378 Energy intensity 254 Energy intensity improvements 256 Energy management systems 256 Energy Performance of Building Directive (EPBD) 258 Energy policy decision-making 223 Energy-related emissions of CO2 348 Energy service companies 262 Energy Star rated appliances 461 Energy storage 319 Energy Storage Systems (ESS) 228, 297, 319 Energy subsidies 359, 362 Energy use in public buildings 262 Enhanced oil recovery (EOR) 240 Enhanced weathering 130 Environmental costs 199 Environmental Data & Governance Initiative 405 Environmental impacts 144, 202, 285 Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) 194 Environmental justice 164 Environmental law 196 Environmental Protection Agency 34 Erasure of scientific material 405 Esieh Lake 433 Ethanol 310 Ethiopia 70–72, 92 Ethylbenzene 164 European Academies Science Advisory Council (EASAC) 309 European Allowance (EUA) 338 European Commission 200 European EUA price 340

512     Index

European greenhouse gas emission reductions 219 European heating and cooling strategy 258 European Union 196 European wind power 284 Europe Beyond Coal 215 EV100 227 EV purchase incentives 227 EV use and circulation incentives 227 Executive Intelligence Review 380 Expansion of agriculture 129 Exploration 136 Expunging the record 405 External costs 144, 199, 200, 202 External costs of coal 200 External costs of energy 201 External costs per technology 201 Externalities 199 Extinction 44 Extinction rates 45 Extinction Rebellion 458 Extreme temperatures 5 Extreme weather 76, 92 Extreme weather events 297 Exxon 379 ExxonMobil 384, 398, 402, 408 ExxonMobil refinery 166 ExxonMobil’s denial campaign 383 F

Faecal Coliform Bacteria (FCB) 39 The Fairness Doctrine 394 Fall Army worm 72 Famine 96 Fast carbon 110 Fast carbon cycle 109 Fatty acid methyl ester (FAME) fuels 310 Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 11 Feed-in-tariffs (FITs) 289, 294, 295

Final energy consumption 217 First assessment report 101 Fish and shellfish 153, 154 Fish containing mercury 154 Fisheries 40, 76 Fish species 90 Flaring 68 Flash floods 75 Floating PV 289 Floods 6, 9, 49, 68, 73, 74 Florida Power and Light 379 Florida’s SunSmart Schools and Emergency Shelters Program 299 Flowback 176 Flue gases 150 Fly ash 152 Food assistance 92 Food insecurity 75, 76, 78, 94, 96, 97 Food labelling 463 Food price hikes 93 Food prices 70, 93 Food riots 93 Food safety 78 Food security 41, 79 Food versus fuel 311 Ford Model Ts 157 Forest area 119 Forest management 133 Forests 119 Forest soil 80 Forest wildfires 14 Fort McMurray 12 Fossil fuel combustion 32, 113, 114 Fossil fuel consumption subsidies 360 Fossil fuel-powered electricity 200 Fossil fuel reserves 80, 135–137 Fossil fuels 66, 143, 144, 202, 217 Fossil fuels - global reserves 137 Fossil fuel subsidies 359, 368 Fourier, Joseph 63 Fourth assessment report 101 Fracking 171 Fracking fluids 173–175

Index    513

Fracking process cycle 178 Framework Convention on Climate Change 123 Freeborn Wind Farm 286 Freight train accidents 183 Fresnel lens 301 Friends of the Earth Canada 197 Fuel economy standards 260 Fuel efficiency of vehicles 334 Fueling US Forward (FUSF) 411 Fugitive leaks 178 Fukushima Dai-ichi nuclear power plant 317 G

G20 countries 361 Galena Park 166 Garbage patches 30 Gas pipelines accidents 180 Gas unlocked by fracking 366 Gates, Bill 407 Gathering pipelines 180 Gathering the gas 179 General funds 340, 345 Geologic methane 82, 432 George C. Marshall Institute 381 Geothermal 218 Geothermal aquifer 315 Geothermal brine 315 Geothermal direct use 316 geothermal District Heating (geoDH) 238 Geothermal district heating and cooling 238 Geothermal energy 313 Geothermal heat and power 317 Geothermal heating 238 Geothermal potential 316 Geothermal power capacity 314 Geothermal resources 238, 314 Geysers 313, 315 GHG emissions 353

Glacier Bay National Park 19 Glaciers 16, 18, 19, 49 Gleick, Peter 405 Global annual emissions 115 Global anthropogenic 111 Global anthropogenic methane 117 Global average temperature 125 Global carbon budget 110, 121 Global Carbon Project 110 Global Change Research Program 50 Global Climate Coalition (GCC) 381 Global Climate Science Team (GCST) 383 Global emissions of CO2 113, 115 Global energy intensity 254 Global energy production 217 Global fossil fuel subsidies 361 Global GHG emissions 338 Global livestock 118 Global mean energy budget 63 Global Mean Sea Level (GMSL) rise 83 Global sea surface temperature 60 Global temperatures 99 Global warming 50, 62, 122, 136, 137 Global Warming Potential (GWP) 67, 177 Global weighted average capacity factors 279 Glomar Java Sea 161 Goddard Institute for Space Studies 380 Gogama, Ontario 187 Google 239 Government Accountability Office 404 GRACE satellites 20 Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam 306 Grandpa’s Knob 214 Great Barrier Reef 24 Great Pacific Garbage Patch 30 Great Smog 144 Green Climate Fund 316 Greenhouse 60, 102 Greenhouse effect 63

514     Index

Greenhouse gas emissions 224 Greenhouse gas emissions from shale gas 179 Greenhouse gases 62, 64, 128, 169, 200 Greenhouse gas programs 344 Greenland 15, 20, 88 Greenland glaciers 434 Greenland ice sheet 21, 422, 434 Green Mini-Grids Africa Program 243 Greenpeace 397 Green spending 340 Grid-connected solar PV systems 297 Ground-based heat pumps 317 Group of Twenty (G20) 216 Guatemala 97 Gulf of Mexico 157 H

Habitat 43 Habitat loss 44 Haida Gwaii 131 Haiti 7, 25, 37, 247 Haliade-X 280 Halladay, Daniel 272 Halladay’s Self-Governing Windmill 272 Halladay Windmill Company of Ellington 273 Hansen, James 123, 380 Hansom cabs 156 Harvard 80 Harvey 86 Hawaii 362 Hawaiian monk seals 424 Hawksbill turtle 31 Hazeltine Creek 148 Health 40 Healthcare 78 Health costs 199 Heartland Institute 385, 398, 400 HEAT GW thermal 218 Heat pumps 238, 258, 363, 461

Heat pump systems 236 Heatwaves 2, 7, 9, 48, 78 Heavy fuel oil 229, 230 HELE coal power 222 High-Efficiency Low-Emission (HELE) coal-fired power plants 222 High-Level Commission 334 Hinckley Point C 319 Hockey stick 388 Holland 272 Honour the Earth 193 Hooker, Joseph 394 Horizontal drilling 172 Hornig, Donald 376 Horn of Africa 70 Horsepower 157 House Committee on Science, Space and Technology 391 Household air pollution 36 Household connected devices 259 Household electricity bills 343 Howarth, Robert 178 Hughes, Malcolm 388 Human-caused threats to birds 287 Human rights 196 Hurricane Florence 85 Hurricane Harvey 75, 89, 165, 166 Hurricane Hugo 47 Hurricane Irma 85 Hurricane Katrina 129, 166 Hurricane Maria 47, 85, 129 Hurricane Matthew 86 Hurricane Michael 85 Hurricanes 8, 49 Hurricane Walaka 424 Huxley, Thomas 394 Hybrid species 90 Hydraulic fracturing 171, 173 Hydraulic fracturing chemicals 176 Hydraulic fracturing water 173 Hydrocarbon gas liquids (HGLs) 364, 365 Hydrocarbon liquids and gases 364 Hydrocarbons 364

Index    515

Hydroelectric minigrid 244 Hydroelectric power 303, 407 Hydrogen 232 Hydrogen fuel cells (HFCs) 66, 363 Hydrogen sulphide 164, 179 Hydropower 201, 218, 221, 303 Hydropower capacity 221 Hydropower minigrids 244 Hydropower reservoirs 304 Hydrotreated esters and fatty acids (HEFA) 310 Hydrotreated vegetable oil (HVO) 310 Hypoxia 26, 27 Hypoxic waters 27 I

Ibiza 216 Ice field 19 Iceland 238 Ice sheets 16, 19, 100 Ice shelves 16 Idea Channel 399 IEA Energy Efficient End-Use Equipment Technology Collaborative Programme (IEA 4E-TCP) 258 Imperial Metals 148 Imperial Oil 168, 198 Improving energy efficiency 261 Income generated by the solar home systems 251 India 34, 75, 222 Indiana Energy Association 408 Indian Railways 312 Indigenous communities 168 Indigenous Environment Network 194 Indigenous peoples 78 Indonesia 29 Industrial effluents 43 Industrial energy intensity 255 Industrial revolution 144 Industrial robots 256

Industrial sector 220 Industry 239, 255 Inez, Kentucky 147 Infant mortality 150 Informed Council on the Environment (ICE) 382 Initiative 1631 406 Insects 46, 91 Inside Climate News 387 Installed hydropower capacity 304 Integrated Assessment Models (IAM) 430 Intended Nationally Determined Contributions (INDCs) 124, 125 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) 100, 134, 380 Intermittency 285 Internal Combustion Engine (ICE) 157, 224, 228 International aviation 229 International Council on Clean Transportation (ICCT) 232 International Cryosphere Climate Initiative (ICCI) 434 International Hydropower Association 306 International Maritime Organization (IMO) 231 International Policy Network 385 International Transport Forum 232 Invasive species 44, 71, 92 Inverter 297 IPCC reports 428 IPCC’s 5th Assessment Report (AR5) 429 IPCC Special Report 135, 422 IPCC Summary for Policymakers 435 Ischemic stroke 150 ISO 50001 Energy Management Systems 256 Ivanpah solar electric plant 302 Ixtox I 160

516     Index J

Jacobson, Mark 362 Jacobs Wind Company 273 Jamaica 86 Justice and human rights 195 Juul, Johannes 273 K

Kalamazoo River 159, 189 Kanpur 34 Karbuhn Oil Company 166 Karl, Thomas 390 Katrina 86 Kearl Oil Sands 198 Keeling, Charles 64, 375 Keep it in the ground 136, 423 Kenya 70 Kerosene 36 Kerosene lamps 248, 250 Keystone XL 194 Kinder Morgan 192 Kingston, Tennessee 152 Kiribati 78, 424 Koch Brothers 385, 389, 408, 410, 411 Koch industries 406, 410, 411 Kyoto protocol 123, 124, 196, 198, 231, 383 Kyoto Protocol Implementation Act (KPIA) 198 Kyoto targets 124 L

Lac Megantic (Quebec) 158, 185, 186 LaDuke, Winona 193 Lake Oahe 188 Lancaster, Justin 396 Land management 130 Land sink 129 Land use change 101, 114 Land-use emissions 114 La Nina 79

Larderello 313 Largest solar photovoltaic power plants 290 Larouche, Lyndon 380 LCOE differential 323 League of Conservation Voters 407 Leishmaniasis 91 Les Anglais 248 Les Anglais minigrid 248 Levelized Cost of Electricity (LCOE) 279, 282, 322 Levelized cost of electricity for onshore wind projects 284 Levelized cost of PV electricity 299 Life expectancy 40 Lighting 36 Lightning 14 Lightning-ignited wildfires 15 Lignite 223 Linear trough 301 Liquid biofuels 310 Liquid Petroleum Gas (LPG) 36 Liquified natural gas 232 Lithium-ion batteries 320 Lizard Island 24 LNG-powered ocean-going dry cargo vessel 232 LNG-powered passenger ferry 232 Locusts 79 Loliondo 244 London 34, 35 London Array 282 Long-term jobs 363 Los Angeles 229 Low carbon economy 367 Low Elevation Coastal Zones (LECZ) 44, 87 Low-volatility organic vapours 169 Lucifer 4 Lung cancer 150 Luquillo rainforest 46

Index    517 M

Macondo well disaster 162 Magellan Midstream Partners 166 Major Canadian pipeline initiatives 190 Major ice sheets 21 Malaria 70, 91 Maldives 88 Malnutrition 75, 94, 98 Management of photovoltaic minigrids 259 Mann, Michael 387 Manufacturing doubt 374, 375 Manufacturing uncertainty 375 Marathon Petroleum 412 Marathon refinery 170 Marcellus shale 366 Marine and aviation 229 Marine Environment Protection Committee 231 Marine species 91 Market manipulation 336 Market penetration of electric vehicles 228 Market price of carbon 338 Marrakesh Accords 124 Marrakesh Vision 216 Marshall Islands 88, 424 Martin County Coal Corporation 147 Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection (DEP) 197 Massachusetts’s Global Warming Solutions Act (GWSA) 197 Mass extinctions 45 Mature Fine Tailings 167 Mauna Loa 65 Mauna Loa observatory 99, 375 Mayors for 100% clean energy 215 Measles 70 Mediterranean 90 Megawatt-scale PV and wind power 294 Megawatt-scale turbine 274

Mekong delta 96 Mendocino Complex fire 14 Mercuric sulphate 153 Mercury 147, 152, 153, 156, 165, 170, 177, 202, 223, 402 Mercury cycle 155 Mercury emissions 154, 156 Mercury vapour 156 Merthyr Vale coal mine 148 Metallurgical coal 366 Methane 66, 67, 82, 102, 116, 135, 178, 334 Methane emissions 176, 178 Methane hydrates 81, 433 Methane leak 181 Methanol 232, 233 Methylmercury 153, 154, 170 Miami 88, 89 Microbial action 81 Microbial decomposition 80 Microplastic particles 31 Migration 70, 97 Mildred Lake settling basin 167 Minamata Bay 155 The Minamata Convention 155 Minamata disease 155 Minigrids 242, 246 Mixing the message 385 M-KOPA 5 solar home system 250 M-Kopa Solar 250 Modern bioenergy 308 Mohammed bin Rashid Al Mouktoum Solar Park 302 Molten salts 302 Mosier, Oregon 184 Motiva refinery 164, 165 Mountaintop removal 146 Mount Polley 148 M-Pesa 250 Muir Glacier 19 Mumbai 75 Municipal and local government action 455

518     Index

Municipal solid waste (MSW) 310 Murray Energy Corporation 397 MW-scale energy storage systems 320 N

Nargis (cyclone) 6 NASA 22 National Academy of Sciences (NAS) 364, 378 National Center for Science Education 399 National Climate Act 378 National Climate Program 378 National Coal Association 381, 382 National Energy Board (NEB) 159, 180, 192, 193 National Institute of Environmental Health and Sciences 405 Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) 125, 126, 137, 216 National Science Teachers Association (NSTA) 384, 399 Natural disasters 92 Natural gas 135, 171, 177, 223 Natural gas liquids (NGLs) 364, 366 The Nature Conservancy 407 nearly zero energy buildings, (nZEBs) 258 Negative emissions price 359 Negative Emission Technologies (NETs) 128, 132, 133, 137 Nepal 36 Net energy metering 295 Netherlands 87 Net metering 289 Network standby 259 Net zero emissions 125 Nevada Energy 408 New Hampshire 345 New Orleans 89 New York 88, 90, 229 Niagara Falls 214

Nigeria 29 Nile delta 89 Nitrogen dioxide 34 Nitrogen oxide 144, 151, 177 Nitrous oxide 66, 67 Nongovernmental International Panel on Climate Change (NIPCC) 399 Nordhaus, William 123 North Atlantic 27 Northern Mariana Islands 424 North Sea 88 North Slope of Alaska 432 Norway 225 No Tar Sands Oil 194 NRX reactor 317 Nuclear power 200, 219, 317 Nuclear power programs 318 Nuclear weapons 318 Nutrition 79 O

Obed Mountain 148 Ocean acidification 25 Ocean and terrestrial sinks 121 Ocean fertilization 131 Ocean Heat Content (OHC) 61, 62 Ocean iron fertilization 122, 129, 131 Ocean Ranger 160 Ocean sediments 81 Ocean sink 121 Ocean temperatures 61 Ocean warming 26 Offshore disasters 159 Offshore oil rig disasters 160 Offshore permafrost melt 433 Offshore wind farms 282 Ogallala aquifer 194 Ohio Oil and Gas Energy Education Program (OOGEEP) 400 Oil 135 Oil by train 195

Index    519

Oil carloads 183 Oil companies 374 Oil embargo 377 Oil refineries 163 Oil sands 166, 170, 202 Oil sands extraction 167 Oil sands tailing ponds 167 Oilsands-tainted groundwater 168 Oil tanker accidents 158 Oil tankers 230 Oil trains 183 Ojibwe band 193 Ojibwe Indians 193 Oklahoma Energy Resources Board (OERB) 400 Omnibuses 156 One Planet Summit 335 Onshore wind 222 Onshore windfarms 282 Onshore wind power 323 Onsite energy storage 297 Ontario’s carbon-tax era 343 Open for business 235 Organic aerosols 169 Organic pollution 40 Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 377 The Origin of the Species 394 Osaka 89 Outdoor air pollution 32 Overfishing 23–25 Oxygen 26 Oysters 26 Ozone 151 P

Pacific Gas and Electric 320 Pacific islands 78 Paddington railway station 156 Pakistan 75 Palm oil 119

Panemones 272 Pangani Falls hydropower project 244 Pantglas junior school 149 Parabolic trough 301 Paradise 14 Parasites 91 Paris 34 Paris Agreement 125, 126, 136, 137, 216, 219 Paris Agreement targets 338 Paris Declaration on Electro-Mobility and Climate Change & Call to Action 224 Particulate matter (PM) 33, 34, 144, 146, 151, 164 Pay-as-you-go 243, 249 Peace River 166, 307 Permafrost 16, 22 Permafrost carbon emissions 431 Permafrost soils 81, 422, 431, 432 Permafrost temperatures 82 Permafrost thawing 135, 432 Perverse subsidy 359 Pesticides 42 Pests 76 Petcoke 170 Petrochemical companies 366 Petrochemical industries 364 Petrochemicals 364 Petroleum 143, 156 Petroleum coke 170 Petro Pete’s Big Bad Dream 400 PFCs 66 Phasing out the use of coal 367 Photoelectric effect 287 Photovoltaic electricity 235 Photovoltaic system in Miami 293 Photovoltaic systems installed on K-12 schools 236 Photovoltaic technology 289, 291 Physicians for Social Responsibility 150, 181

520     Index

Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration 180 Piper Alpha 161 Planes with biofuels 312 Plass, Gilbert 376 Plastic pollution 27, 30 Plastics 364 Plastic trash 44 Plastic waste 28, 29 Plug-in electric vehicles 410 Plug-in hybrids 220, 227 Pneumonia 37 Poaching 44 Poisoning 43 Poland 154, 223 Polar bear 44 Pollution 44 Population decay 46 Port Arthur 164 Port-au-Prince 37 Portugal 14 Positive feedback 80 Post-tax energy subsidies 361 Poverty 95 Power capacity GW 218 Power curve for a Vestas V80 276 Power grid 234 Powering Past Coal Alliance 215 Power outage 297 Power Purchase Agreements (PPAs) 221, 284, 295 Power sector 220 Power tower 300, 301 Price of food 93 Price on carbon 338, 367 Primary energy 145, 254 Primary energy demand 217, 255 Principal elements of a large wind turbine 275 Probability of global warming 432 Process heat 239 Processing of natural gas 364 Produced water 173, 176

Production of coal 150 Program administration 344 Progressive massive fibrosis (PMF) 145 Project Independence 377 Propane 36 Proppant 173 Proterra 40-foot bus 229 Pruitt, Scott 404 Public transport 228, 462 Puerto Rico 46, 47, 84 Pumped storage 304 Pumped storage capacity 303 Pumped storage hydro 305 Pumped storage projects 303 Puna flash/binary combined cycle system 315 PV-hybrid minigrids 249 PV-hybrid system 248 PV system costs 234 Q

Qantas 312 Quebec Cap-and-Trade system 350 Quebec’s actual emissions 351 Quebec’s cap-and-trade system 351 Quest CCS 240 R

Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) 396 Radium 176 Rail accidents 183 Rail cars 182 Rail shipments 184 Railway carbon 182 Railway locomotives 156 Rainfall patterns 76, 221 Rainfed agriculture 71, 74 RE 100 216 Ready for 100 215 Rebellion Day 459

Index    521

Record highs 4 Record lows 4 Reduced yields 76 Reducing fossil fuel subsidies 359 Reef Check 25 Refugee 70, 92, 95 Refugee Convention 97 Regenerative agriculture 463 Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 343, 406 Regulatory capture 401 Remaining carbon budget 135 Renewable energy 200, 223, 320, 345, 349 Renewable energy capacity growth 221 Renewable energy indicators 218 Renewable energy share of global electricity production 221 of total final energy consumption 217 Renewable Portfolio Standard 357 Renewable power generating capacity 220 Repowering 284 Reserves of coal 136 Reserves of oil and gas 136 Reserves of oil, natural gas, and coal 138 Residences and office buildings 220 Residential and tertiary 233 Residential photovoltaic systems 234, 289 Residential roof-mounted photovoltaic systems 407 Residential rooftop systems 294 Residential solid fuel 68 Residual fuels 230 Resolute Forest Products 397 Respiratory problems 38 Revelle, Roger 376, 395 Revenue recycling 340 Reykjavik Geothermal 315 RGGI cap-and-trade program 345

Rhinos 43 Rice 77 Riggs Glacier 19 Rio de Janeiro 89 Risk of a train accident 184 River Tame 31 Rocky Mountain Institute 252 Rocky Mountain Power 408 Rooftop and small ground-mounted solar PV systems 234 Rooftop solar 289, 321 Rotor diameter 279 Rural electrification 241, 249 Rural Electrification Administration 273 Russian supplies of natural gas 224 S

Sakaka, Saudi Arabia 222 Saltwater intrusion 96, 423 San Bruno, California 180 San Diego 233 San Francisco 13 Santa Ana winds 13 Santa Barbara 160 Sarulla geothermal plant 314 Saskatchewan 12 Saudi Arabia 290 Save the Fraser Declaration 189 Scaling-Up Renewable Energy Program (SREP) 243 School buses 229 Schools 236 Schools powered by solar energy 236 Science Advisory Committee 376 Science Explorer website 405 Science teachers 398 Scientific Certainty Argumentation Method (SCAM) 387 Scotford Upgrader 240 Scripps Institution of Oceanography 375

522     Index

Seacrest drilling ship 161 Sea ice 16 Sea ice extent 17, 18, 434 Sea level rise 16, 83, 96, 422, 435, 436 Sea levels 82 Second assessment report 101 Sewage 39 Shale formations 171 Shale gas 171, 172 Shale gas fracking 181 Shale gas production 178 Shale gas sites 178 Shale gas well 172 Shanghai 88 Shenzhen 88 Shipping 68, 230 Sickness 40 Silica dust 146 Silkeborg 237 Site C hydroelectric plant 307 Sixth extinction 45 Sixth mass extinction 46 Slag heaps 156 Slurry waste 148 Small biogas plants 312 Small distributed capacity 235 Small distributed PV 234 Small island developing states 422, 423 Small islands nations 362 Small-scale gold mining 156 Small-scale hydropower 242 Smart meters 243, 249, 324 Smith, Lamar 391, 393 Smith-Putnam machine 214 Smoke 36 Social unrest 93 Soil carbon 80 Soil carbon storage 133 Soil organic carbon 130 Soil organic matter 80 SolarCity 234 Solar cooling 237 Solar-diesel minigrids 252 Solar energy 63

Solar Home Systems 242, 249, 253 Solar Investment Tax Credit (ITC) 321 Solar photovoltaic 214, 217, 220 Solar photovoltaic capacity 288 Solar photovoltaic electricity 271 Solar photovoltaic energy 157, 201, 287 Solar photovoltaic mini-grids 244 Solar photovoltaic panels 234 Solar photovoltaic power 239 Solar photovoltaic systems 234 Solar-plus-batteries 324 Solar-plus-storage market 289 Solar PV global capacity 288 Solar rate class 409 Solar thermal 236 Solar thermal energy 236 Solar thermal technology 237 Solar use fees 409 Solar water heaters 363 Somalia 70, 92 Sources and sinks 112 South Africa 73 Southern Ocean 27 Southern resident killer whales 192 South Indian Ocean 31 South Sudan 70 Special Message to Congress 376 Special report on global warming 102 Spent fuel rods 318 Sputnik-3 satellites 288 Stand-alone system 297 Standing Rock 188 Standing Rock Sioux Reservation 188 Standing Rock Sioux Tribe 188 Stanford Research Institute 376 Starvation 70 Steam assisted gravity drainage 168 Steam engine 156 Steel industry 366, 367 Steel-making 367 Stern, Sir Nicolas 429 Stockholm Environment Institute (SEI) 123

Index    523

Storms 8, 9 Storm surge 83 Storm tide 84 Strategic Defense Initiative 381 Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP) 395 Strategic Petroleum Reserve 378 StreetScooter 227 Stunted children 41, 42 Stunting 49 Sub-bituminous and lignite 135 Subsea permafrost 433 Subsistence agriculture 119 Suess, Hans 66 Sulphur 143 Sulphur dioxide 34, 143, 151, 164 Sulphur Hexafluoride (SF6) 66 SunRun 234 SunShot Initiative 323 SunShot program 300, 323 SunShot targets for levelized costs of PV electricity 300 The SunSmart Emergency Shelter Program 321 Supercritical HELE power plant 222 Superfund site 152 Superstorm Sandy 86 Sustainable Energy Facility for the Eastern Caribbean 316 Sustainable Energy Fund for Africa (SEFA) 243 Svalbard 22, 60 Sweden 232 Swedish Shipowners Association 232 Swiss carbon tax 338 Syncrude 240 Syncrude tailing pond 167 T

Tailing ponds 147, 148, 156 Tailpipe emission standards 262 Taliks 433 Tanker accidents 158

Tanzania 244 Tanzania Electric Supply Company (TANESCO) 244, 247 Tanzania Energy Development and Access Project (TEDAP) 247 Target 236 Tax, cap or trade 336 Teesside Collective project 240 Tees Valley Process Industry cluster 240 Telstar 288 Temperature anomalies 61 Temperature limit 123 Terrestrial carbon sink 121 Terrestrial sink 119 Tesla 239 Tesla Powerwall 235 Tesla’s 100 MW Li-ion battery 320 Texas 86 Texas Barnett Shale 171 Theewaterskloof Dam 73 Thermal efficiency 461, 462 Thermal energy storage 301, 302 Third assessment report 101 Thomas Fire 13 Time of use rates 409 Tokelau 88 Tokyo 88 Toluene 164 Too cheap to meter 317 Top Runner programme 258 Top ten CO2 emitting countries 426 Toronto 229, 236 Total energy demand 254 Total installed renewable electric power 221 Toxic chemicals 43 Toxic waste 147 TransCanada Energy East 190, 192 TransCanada Keystone XL 191, 193 Transition to renewable energy 462 Transmission systems 285 Trans Mountain Expansion Project 190, 192 Trans Mountain Pipeline 159

524     Index

Transocean 162 Transport 224, 259 Transport for London (TFL) 35 Transport policy 220 Transport sector 136 Treaty 8 First Nations 307 Trends in California’s GDP, population, and GHG emissions 357, 358 Trump, Donald 381 Tsunami 6, 7 Tucson Electric Power 320 Tundra 82 Turbine rating 279 Tuvalu 78, 88, 424 Tyndall, David 63 Typhoon Haiyan 82

Vanguard I & II 287 Vanuatu 78, 424 Vector-borne diseases 91 Vermillion Oil Rig 380 161 Vermont 345 Vertebrate extinctions 45 Vestas 274 Vestas V800 276 Virgin Australia 312 Vivint 234 Vogtle nuclear reactors 319 Vojens 237 Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs) 164 W

U

UN Conference on Environment and Development 123 Undernourished people 41 Undernourishment 42 Union of Concerned Scientists 411 United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) 39, 100, 126, 380 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 137, 196, 334, 381 University of East Anglia Climatic Research Unit 389 University of Hawaii 215 UN’s Sustainable Development Goals 241 US Fish and Wildlife Service 287 US geological Survey 405, 436 US petrochemical industry 364 Utility-scale PV power plants 294 V

Valero refinery 164 Vancouver 13

Wagner, Gernot 431 Wairakei 313 Walmart 236 Walney Extension Offshore Wind Farm 282 Walney Offshore Wind Farm 282 Warming soils 80 Wasdell, David 429 Waste coal slurry 148 Waste-to-energy plants 310 Wastewater 39 Wasting 49 Water capping 167 Water pollution 39 Water-pumping windmills 273 Water vapour 63, 64 We Are Still In 215 Weitzman, Martin 431 Well contamination 175 West Antarctica 21 Western Climate Initiative 350 Western Pacific 27 Wet ash ponds 152 Wetlands 66, 135 Weyburn Enhanced Oil Recovery Project 240 Wheat 77

Index    525

Wheat yields 77 White Thunder Ridge 19 WHO Air Quality Guidelines 33 Wildfires 11, 14, 16, 49, 72, 114, 129 Wind Atlas website 280 Wind energy 201 Wind energy resources map of North America 281 Wind farm power 305 Windmills 272 Wind-plus-batteries 324 Wind power 217, 271, 272 Wind powered turbines 273 Wind power global capacity 275 WindPower program 278 Wind resources 280 Windspeed distribution 277 Windspeed probability distribution 278 Wind speeds 277 Wind turbine noise (WTN) 285 Wind turbine prices 323 Wood pellet fuel 309 Wood pellets 310 Wood pellets for power generation 310

Working groups 100 World Glacier Monitoring Service (WGMS) 18 World Health Organisation (WHO) 32 World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) 100, 380 World Resources Institute 22 World Wildlife Fund (WWF) 45 World’s largest offshore windfarms 283 X

Xina Solar One 302 Xylene 164 Y

Yellow fever 70 Z

Zebra mussels 92 Zooxanthellae 23