Clientelistic Warfare: Paramilitaries and The State in Colombia 9781787073654, 9781787076075, 9781787076082

Table of contents :
Acknowledgments
Introduction
Chapter 1 - The state-paramilitary relationship puzzle
Chapter 2 - Democracy, clientelism, violence
Chapter 3 - The Colombian war
Chapter 4 - Paramilitary structures
Chapter 5 - Trajectories and crises
Chapter 6 - The paramilitaries, the army and the police
Chapter 7 - Informational labyrinths
Chapter 8 - Paramilitaries in politics: friends, factions and murderers
Chapter 9 - Building the state from below? The take-over of the health system
Cahpter 10 - The dynamics of coercive dispossession
Conclusions
Bibliography
Index

Citation preview

Clientelistic Warfare

Clientelistic Warfare Paramilitaries and the State in Colombia (1982-2007)

Francisco Gutiérrez-Sanín

~:¡

t'\l'ril"'

h : 'í!'l

¡', \,

PETER LANG Oxford • Bern • Berlin • Bruxelles • New York. Wien

ri r~I\:lf' r l'\ . Accessed 2.SJune 2018. See also, Center for systemic Peace (2014). 1he Polity Project, Poliry IV DataSet . Accessed 2.6June 2.018. 1he same can be said abour another relevant index, Freedom house, .

The state-paramilitary relationship puzzle endowed by a maddeningvariation,

both longitudinal

and territorial. Some

paramilitary groups were no more than simple death squads, while others were large structures that had overwhelming influence over regional affairs. Some created their own political movernenrs, others concentrated punitive actions. And so on. This broad and sticky variation

is actually an important

on their source of

knowledge for the analyst, because it provides a myriad of cases within the main case (the Colombian paramilitaries). Thus, the student of Colombian paramilitaries

can count upon both within and cross case variation

(Yin

003, Gerring 2007). But variation is also: a. frequently analytically relevant, and b. essentially problematic me paramilitaries

for any analysis of the relationship

between

and the state. One would like to produce assertions of the

rype: "Ihe link of the Colombian

state to the paramilitaries

and y'. But assertions of this type beg immediately

was of type x

the following question:

ror how many concrete paramilitaries does it hold? Of course, variation is not always relevant. If some powerful units cover me main of the country, understanding worked may be enough.

how those paramilitary

If me main paramilitary

Godzillas

units that covered the

majority of the country acted in x or y fashion, compatible with my propo.tion, this may be enough. The advantage of this approach focusing only on a very small number of units is that it allows for detailed documentaion. The problem is that it eschews the larger picture. The hope of getting ch picture at some point by the mindless accumulation of even very good case studies is not well founded: each case study has its own idiosyncratic merhods and foci, so it is not clear how to put thern together and use thern :o answer general analytical questions. This has created yet another kind chizophrenia in the field, this time academic, in which we b.nd on the one hand impressive propositions

about the paramilitary

supported

by

atively thin documentation, and on the other rich and deep descriptions ich are however lacking in analyticalleverage. 1 tried to address this problem in three ways: 1move throughout the book at no less than three levels of analysis, which can be called macro, mesa and micro (drawing on Kalyvas, 2006). At the macro level we find institutional

designs and debates, which necessarily

CHAPTER

1

involve the concerned actors, are public and can be followed up by systematic historical narrative (Mahoney not generallywork

2014). Institutions

certainly do

as their architects would want, because they neces-

sarily produce side-effects and strategic adaptations. But at the same time institutions being the design of the formal rules of the polirical game (North

1990) rhey involve big bets. And thus when institutions

are debated or put into question, at some point or the other relevant actors explicitly reveal their interests, by way of voice, expressed loyalties and/or action (Hirschman

1970). 1he follow up of the 'conílictual

dynamics of institutions' (Skocpol 1984: 89) is central for my analysis of Colombian paramilitaries. 1he institutionalization of the self-defenses in the 1960s, and of security co-operatives evidences not only of the engagement

in the 1990S, are powerful

of the state with the creation of

'a' paramilitary project, but also of the bent that pararnilitarisrn had in Colombia from the beginning (instead of'a' project, the creation of several regionally grounded groups, by demand). 1he fact that the United States decided to create a 'certífication' program first regarding the war on drugs and later regarding human rights (Chapter 2) reveals that in effect the Colombian paramilitary experience was surrounded by global constraints and sovereignty crises. 1he way in which neoliberal reforms of the health sector allowed for its paramilitary takeover in some regions of the country - and the speciíic form that that takeover adopted, grounded as it was in the new institutional designs - shows how indirect rule and paramilitary expansion and empowerment fed into each other (Chapter 9). 1he historical trajectory of the country and its relationship with indirect rule and clientelisrn are also indispensable developed.

to understand

the context in which the paramilitaries

At the mesa level, we find organizations of these have be en systematically

and coalitions.

disregarded

Both

for years by the

civil war Iiterature, though its recent 'organizational turn' has the promise to overcome such lacunae. But until relatively recently it has adopted

two unwarranted

armed

are identical

groups

assumptions.

(Gutiérrez

2008).

First, all non-state Organizations

do

not count, because groups are machines that optimize singlemindedly some utiliry function, like capturing rents (Collier and

The state-paramilitary relationship puzzle Hoeffier

2004)

or controlling

territory

(Kalyvas 2006). In reality,

organizations diverge strongly. This matters, because the way in which they diverge structures the interests and behaviors of relevant actors. For example, they can open or not windows for opportunistic

(self-

regarding, Wood 2009) violence by individual combatants, or they can provide differential access to key goods to specific sectors of the population. Crucially, organizational structures create speciíic tradeoffs for each group and, in the case of the Colombian

paramilitaries,

are an indispensable explanatory link in the understanding of why they suffered endemic social impasses. The second assumption is that the space ofcivilians' or 'comrnunities' is undifferentiated According

to this view, the 'comrnunities'

state armed groups are an assortment

and unstructured.

that are overcome by non-

of individuals, who face incen-

tives and take decisions and who live in a social space that lacks any theoretically relevant structure. In the case of me Colombian paramilitaries, this radical atomism is particularly implausible. By institutional design, the Colombian

pararnilitaries expressed in different forms class,

faction and network dynamics, which more otten than not was made explicit by themselves and by their allies and supporters. This, by the way, is also observed at the macro level, as some nne recent works have highlighted (for example Grajales 2017). The most relevant regional paramilitary experiences enjoyed the support (which was at least semipublic) of rural elites, state officials, politicians and all kinds of wellplaced brokers. When general Rito Alejo del Río - a supporter of the Urabá paramilitaries - was condemned for this, he received, in 1999, a tribute in his honor [homenaje de desagravio] cited by the banana growers association, civilian authorities (by then Antioquia governor Álvaro Uribe) and army and police officers.12 This is only an anecdote, but - as will be seen throughout

this book - much more the rule than

the exception: there was no social vacuum around the paramilitaries, no neat differentiation between thern and their (highly structured) 'cornmunities. The assumption that the Colombian paramilitaries operated

I2

in an undifferentiated

and unstructured

The Urabá banana workers trade union also participated. tion of rhis, see Ortiz and Dombois 20I6.

civilian space runs

For an excellent explana-

CHAPTER 1

contrary to all the evidence we have as to how the paramilitaries were created, how they expanded, and how they set up their territorial control. Note that incorporating into the analysis the structure of the social space upon which the paramilitary operated has two additional implications. First, it forces the analyst to look at the relationship regional coalitions supporters,

between

and paramilitary

units, that is, between sponsors,

allies and constituencies,

on the one hand, and organiza-

tions or networks of specialists in violence, on the other. 1will suggest immediarely below that without doing so it is difficult, perhaps impossible, to capture the true dimensions of the social impasses triggered by the paramilitary growth, and more generally to pass some basic tests of plausibility. Second, it highlights me centrality of the region-central state nexus, both conceptually

(it resides at the heart of the notion of indirect

rule) and empirically. Some important pieces (notably Romero 2003) have already shown how the paramilitaries addressed, from the beginning, thernes related to the region-central

state nexus. However, this

observation has triggered debate, as other authors have argued that the Colombian paramilitarism was not on!:yabout regional reactions against progressive policies advanced by the central state. Ciro (2014) offers an outstanding example: the Convivir, security co-operatives which alter 1994 became a fundamental tool for the paramilitary activiry and expansion (we will see thern in action throughout the book), were created by the national state and applauded by national agencies and leaderships, while a substantial part of the governors rejected thern. Of course, some governors became key supporters of the Convivir, such as the, by then, governor of Antioquia and larer president, Álvaro Uribe, But the issue goes well beyond this casuistic. My proposition does not identify regional power structures as the 'Íocus of evil' 1he Colombian paramilitary experience is not located at some speciíic territoriallevel,

but at the indirect rule

nexus between regions and central decision makers. From the beginning the Colombian paramilitaries by institutional design were created and promoted by the army or some other armed bureaucracy, which provided support to specific regional actors who were demanding the provision of violence to meet their security concerns. But not every regional demand was taken care of; the only ones that were processed were those that matched with rhe logic of the counter-insurgent

war. So typically

The state-paramilitary relationship puzzle

33

the regional demand that counted and could be institutionally processed carne from rural elites, regional notables and their politicians

(and as

I show throughout, not infrequendy these roles merged into a single individual). This connective tissue between region and national state is where the Colombian paramilitary experience lived, so to speak. and throughout the book I discuss how was it 'paramilitarized'. I do not reduce macro and meso levels to the micro, individual one; but I certainly also consider it in detail. My analysis is populated by individuals who evaluated incentives, many of them material, and took decisions accordingly. Individual Though

norms were extraordinarily

(but see for example Medina

norms also count - even here. thin in the paramilitary

from time to time. We find for example some policemen denouncing

world

2009), they appear in a relevant form and soldiers

the collusion of their agencies with the paramilitaries,

even

while being aware that this would entail enormous costs, Hundreds of politicians - not a11from the left - were assassinated because at some point or another, and for different reasons (some of thern very rnundane) also opposed the designs of the paramilitaries,

or of a powerful

paramilitary leader. However, the main methodological point here is that individuals who interacted with, or belonged to, the paramilitaries lived in a social world with overlapping structures, so even the analysis of their rational behavior - in the narrowest,

technical sense - has to

be informed by those structures, lest we miss the basic rules of the game

they were playing. b. I navigated through

a substantial

part of the paramilitary

experience,

counting upon the corpora and the tools for massive queries described in the introduction. Having access to massive documentation, and the tools to treat it in a systematic fashion, allowed me to fi11several fundamental gaps and document pararrulitaries

variation and commonalities

and of their relationship

within the

with the state.

The way in which massive sources can be used in support

of a

proposition may be ca11ed'triangulation' or 'informal updating'. Though triangulation of methods has gone out of favor for good reasons (see for example Beach and Pedersen 2013), triangulation of evidence maintains its power to evaluate the plausibility of a proposition. 1he

1-

CHAPTER

34

1

more independent sources conbrming the proposition, the better. If instead two contradictory pieces of evidence are found, this has to be reported

and analyzed.

(Beach and Pedersen mechanism."

Tbis is analogous

to Bayesian

2013), except that it is not governed

updating by a formal

Of course, this stillleaves several problems unresolved. Since even these massive datasets (textual or not) are convenience samples, several biases can pop up in the analysis. 1here is also the danger of making rough adjustments (given thar the updating mechanism is informal this is likely), or of cherry picking, taking on board only such evidences as favors the analyst's own ideas. I dampened these sources of bias in three ways. First, throughout the book I document

cases that seem to not match my analysis well when-

ever I bnd thern. Second, I treat in detail what may be called 'critical cases' (Woodside 2010). As Beach and Pedersen (2013: 131) say 'not all evidence is created equal' (see also Woodside 20 10 ). Evidence which has high conbrmatory

and/or

discontirrnatory

power (Beach and Pedersen

provides successive tests for a hypothesis 1975), is better. Speciíically, following

13

2013), and

at several points in time (Lijphart

my analysis is continuously

informed

by the

types of critical case:

-+

Historically relevant and large cases. Despite all rheir variation, the Colombian paramilitaries developed around a handful of key historical experiences. ACDEGAM in Puerto Boyacá in rhe 19805, and then the Urabá paramilitaries created and managed by the Castaño brothers in the 19905, were extremely influential during their respective periods, and a pole of attraction for all Colombian paramilitaries. Of course, there were many other importanr units, but no proposition that does not apply to ACDEGAM or the Urabá people deserves to be seriously considered. Something analogous can be said about the polirical system or the army from the perspective of the state.

-+

Most favorable cases. Some cases dcvelop in the best conditions for a theory or a proposition, and rhen it is necessary to see if, in effect it has rhe expectcd explanarory leverage for thern. If it does nor, the theory faces serious problems. For example, Colombia seemed to be a prototypical example of'greedy war, yet

Though 1 do not discard that it could be created.

The state-paramilitary

-+

-+

-+

relationship puzzle

3S

some fundamental characteristics of it were lefi unexplained by Collier's famous dichotomy (Cutiérrez 2.005). For rhe purposes of this book, the extraordinarily messy Colombian political system seems to be the best possible laboratory for social impasses and collective action problems. If the central proposition that 1 have advanced here holds, then one would expect to find that rhe inception of me paramilitaries in rhe Colombian polirical system boosted those problerns, and gave thern a murderous slant. As seen during several chaptcrs, this in effect is what happened. Most unfavorable cases. On the contrary, some cases may constitute in principie particulady tough tests. In case the rheory still works 01' has predictive power for them, rhis allows che building of strong a fortiori arguments (if ir holds here, it can probably hold elsewhere). For example, the army is a prototypical example ofhierarchical and well-strucrured bureaucracy. In Colombia, it had the means, the organizational skills, the ideology, and during a long period also the institutional mandate, to support in some way or another the selfdefenses. It did so massively. 1he military also expected ro have the self-defenses under rheir control. 1his is foundational. A I963 military manual, for exarnple, asserts thar 'a network of self-defense un its [juntas de autodeftnsa l, controllcd by the military command, represents a powerful instrument for rhe defense of rhe nation. Its organization, rhus, will be under military control at every mornent' (Cinep 2004: I9). At orher critical junctures, representatives of the Colombian security establishment produced similar staternents. Accordingly, one would expect to observe a very intimate but institutional and bureaucratized relationship between rhe arl11yand rhe paramilitaries, relatively free of social impasses. As is shown in Chapter 6, this was not what happcned: social impasses also proliferated in rhe interface between the armed bureaucracies of the state and the paramilitaries, corroborating the main proposition of this book. Potential outliers, Despite the fact that there is already massive documentation about the Colombian paramilitaries, there are still significant gaps: for example, paramilitaries that acted in very small towns, and whose trajecrory has not yet fallen under the radar of investigators. By their very nature, rhese gaps are likely not to be random but systematic. At different points 1discuss what might have happened with these outliers. New vantage points. Last but not least, SOl11e cases or aspects of the narrative can throw new light onto rhe srare-paramilitary relationship and validate (or not) me main proposition of this book. An important exarnple here is the police. lhe police have rarely merited a systematic discussion in the analyses of Colombian paramilitarisrn - and more generally of state formation. However, the police have many fundamental differences with respect to thc army, and its relationship with thc paramilitaries was governed by orhcr dynamics.

CHAPTER

At some points I also use quantitative important

tools to substantiate

1

further

links in the general argumento For example, I show that it is

probable that the majority of paramilitary and bust cycles (Chapter

units went through boom

s), and that despite their homicidal penchant

the paramilitaries did NOT cut down substantially political competition (which matches very well with the qualitative evidence I present, and in effect is quite important phenomenon; Chapter 8).

to understand

the specificity of the

In sum, given the data and the tools I have, I can take into my analysis much more paramilitary

variation

that has previously

been

considered in the literature. 1his assertion is subject to two important caveats. First, I am very far from having a relatively detailed understanding of al! paramilitary

units - not even all the large ones. For example, for

the important and very violent Bloque Mineros" I have only secondary documentation. And while almost all chapters try to take on board the full range of paramilitary

variation, some of thern end up zooming into

specific units and processes. Second, and in relation to this, not every type ofvariation

is relevant. Variation that counts for my analysis ought

to have some bearing on the stare-paramilitary relationship. I capture here the following sources of variation: organizational characteristics, territorial groundedness, and variation regarding key interfaces with the state (arrny, police, political system, civilian bureaucracies). Actually, a contribution

of chis book - or so I hope - is to show that at least some

variation in effect counts, and does so substantially:

it is not reasonable

to try to understand the relationship between the Colombian state and the paramilitaries as if the latter were a unitary, homogeneous force.

Mechanisms and plausibility tests 1he third challenge was to substantiate value of the proposition.

14-

Verdad Abierta

the plausibiliry

and explanatory

To do this 1 deployed two strategies. In all the

(2012). 'Los tentáculos del Bloque Mineros: Verdad Abierta, 28 June . Accessed 3 July 2018.

The state-paramilitary relationship puzzle

37

chapters, 1 have discussed and analyzed the speciíic mechanisms

- at the

macro, mesa and micro levels - that linked indirect rule both with the specihc paramilitary 'solution' adopted in Colombia and with the social impasses associated with it (on mechanisms, see Finkel and Strauss 2012)0 So for example when looking at the takeover of the health system by the paramilitaries of the Bloque Norte (Northern Bloc, Chapter 9) 1show how certain institutional

reforms opened the doors to the paramilitaries,

only through already existing structures of political interrnediarion,

but

which

put both politicians and paramilitaries in the face of difficult situations. 1reinforce this with plausibility tests. The so-called 'negative degrees ofliberty'

curse - the researcher has more variables than individuals - has

been highlighted

as asource of problems for small N studies (Graeff 2012)0

But if the researcher has 'many cases within cases' - as here - the curse is less damning.

On the other hand, the interconnectedness

processes can in itself offer the researcher numerous of freedom'

to test his or her proposition

(Campbell

of historical

additional

'degrees

1976, George and

Bennett 20°5)0 That is, since phenomenon/outcome A is interrelared with phenomena B, C, 000Z, my explanation of A may imply verifiable predictions about B, C and 000 Z (inasmuch as what happens with A has a bearing on B and C)o Thus, 1can test my proposition not only against A, but also against B, C and 000and 'Z: Since

1 am speaking here about the relationship between the para-

militaries and the Colombian

state, and 1 issue a characterization

ofit, this

has direct implications over the paramilitaries, over the state, and over the relationship between the former and the latter, This materializes in a small et of testable predictions: a. Specijicity and identity, Despite all their variation, the Colombian paramilitaries will have some commonalities

- apart from the definitional

ones -like their relative autonomy, their instability, and their tendency to suffer social impasses,

b, Extreme points ofthe trajectory, The paramilitaries appeared as a statesponsored project, and demobilized in the midst of severe social impasses. The paramilitaries, in effect, had both a - formal - start and an end. Though they had several predecessors, they appeared between the second half of the 1970S and the early 1980so They demobilized

CHAPTER

between

2002

and

2007.

1

Good explanations of their link with the state

should match not only their trajectory

in general, but also their birth

and demise (at least in the specific form they adopted between I982 and 2007).

1here are so me good accounts of their birth - though even here

there are still many pending issues - but somehow sutprisingly their demobilization has hardly provoked analytical artenrion". But it actually represents a genuine challenge. Why should the paramilitaries to demobilize?

want

1hey were at the peak of their power, they were eating

up increasing chunks of the political system, and they had open sympathies for the president who won the 2002 elections. 1hat president, on the other hand, had a far-right program,

and during his governor-

ship of the department of Antioquia (I995-I997) had promoted the security co-operatives that allowed the paramilitaries to operate in the open. He has been accused permanendy

of trying to favor thern. But

why then did he want thern out ofbusiness imperfect nature of the paramilitary

in me first place? 1he very

demobilization

does not explain

away this puzzle. Yes, many members of different paramilitary units returned to violent activity, But a substantial portion of the leaders lost lives, liberty and properties, as well as their regional power base, during the demobilization process." To decide to demobilize was not for thern a free gesture wirh only marginal bets, Nor do es the argument that they simply miscalculated hold. As 1show in Chapter 5 especially, at the moment

of demobilization

me paramilitaries

were already in a

situation of deep disarray, precisely because of the social impasses and sovereignty crises triggered by their activiry,

15 16

With the important exception of Daly (2016), while analyzing pararnilitary remobilization. See for examplc Cepeda, 1. (2009). 'Los asesinatos de desmovilizados', El Espectador, 8 August . Accessed 25 June 2018. El Heraldo (20II). 'Asesinatos de ex AUC se han centrado en la Región Caribe: El Heraldo, 22 july . Accessed 26 June 2018.

The state-paramilitary relationship puzzle c. Democracy. According

39

to the core proposition

of rhis book, the brutal

paramilitary offensive would not destroy Polity democracy, because competitive politics sat well with the nature and workings of Colombian paramilitarism. This in principIe

does not sound terribly intuitive.

size - given current theories on democracy

One could hypothe-

- that both Polity and Tiliy

democracies should at least in the long run tend to imply each other, In the other direction, one could expect that at some point rhe tightening link between the paramilitaries, on the one hand, and the state and the political system, on the other, would destabilize between good Polity and catastrophic happen. In point of fact, the countrywent democratic

the comfortable

coexistence

Tiliy democracy. Well, this did not through a genuine and significant

opening - the 1991 Constitution

- while it was sinking into

a murderous mess of which the paramilitaries were a protagonist. So here Colombia exhibits yet another schizophrenia. There does not seem to be a clear link between institutionally and competition,

hxed rights of political participation

and citizen protections.

This can be seen through very

concrete and specific questions: why did Polity democracy not block the growth of the paramilitaries?

The paramilitaries

were killing and operat-

ing in the open. They were supported by extrernisrs, certainly, but these were in minority during the bulk of the period discussed here. In reality, rhe key institutions that empowered and promoted the paramilitaries were developed by rather conventional centrist politicians. Why didn't me paramilitaries

oppose systematically Polity democracy?

hardly evcr engaged in activities related to toppling ment."

The existence of an independent

In effect, they

the civilian govern-

judiciary and uncensored

indeed was felt by thern as a cosdy and threatening

constraint

press

- a feeling

expressed not only verbally, but also through the assassination of members of the press and the judiciary, sometimes in spectacular events (CNRR _010). But on the other hand they explicidy endorsed democracy - yes: Polity democracy - and even, as 1 document

here, some of thern were able

1he crisis ofPresident Ernesto Samper (1994-1998) may represent the only - rather marginal- exception (see Chapters 2 and 8).

CHAPTER

to translate the principles of the 1991 Constitution their own politícal purposes (Chapter 8).

1

into the language of

Any explanation of the relationship between the paramilitaries and the state has to account for this strange outcome: that Polity democracy did not even provide Ron's 'savage restraint, paramilitaries

but at the same time that the

- who were more than aware of the dangers of an independ-

ent judiciary and an uncensored Polity democracy.

press - did not try to smother

I show through the course Conclusions, that the proposition

of several chapters, and then in the I advance here passes these basic plau-

sibility tests while other alternative propositions example, explains well why the paramilitary

openly

fail. My proposition,

demobilization

for

process took

place: the political costs of their activity had become too high, given the social impasses and sovereignty issues they provoked. For other propositions, on the contrary, the paramilitary demobilization is shrouded in a cloud of mystery. rf they were only greedy or striving for territorial control, or only expressing state homicidal proclivities, they had no reason to demobilize. 1hey were doing very well in all these regards, and as noted above were at the height of their power. But this takes me direcdy to the relevant literature.

The proposition in the context of relevant literatures

1his book falls within all three types of case study categories described by Beach and Pedersen (2013): theory building, theory testing, and explanation of outcomes. Where is the proposition context of the most relevant literatures?

advanced herein placed in the

Reading the paramilitary trajectory 1he Colombian paramilítaries

literature

on its armed conflict and in particular

is already large and sophisticated.

on the

A number of classical case

Thestate-paramilitary relationship puzzle

41

studies have powerfully illustrated the sources of the paramilitary regional power: linkage with armed and civilian bureaucracies of the state, elite (especially rural) activism and support,

networking

with political fac-

rions (Medina 1990, Uribe de Hincapié 1997, Salinas and Zarama 2012, among others]. Other works have highlighted how the Colombian war could funnel clientelistic dynamics. Andrés Peñate (1998) characterized the ELN guerrilla as an exemplar of'armed ticular department,

clientelism, because in a par-

Arauca, it was deeply involved in small-time exchanges

of resources for favors. But his focus was rather on how a guerrilla legitimized its regional presence. Fernán González (2006) and his team, apart from analyzing and incessandy studying the workings of indirect rule in Colombia,

have shown how deep the regional rearrangements

by the counter-insurgent

prompted

war were (González (ed.) 2012). Teófilo Vásquez

and others (20II) looked at the paramilitaries from the point of view of their relationship with clientelistic Dons [gamonales]. Other authors have discussed the complex ways in which decentralization

transformed

the

dynamics of war. 1his is potentially relevant to the present argument, as decentralization introduced substantial changes in the workings of clientelisrn (Gutiérrez 2007 ).18 Romero and Claudia López, a key figure in the spotting of the 2007 'parapolítica' scandal, described the (very tíghc) networks that tied the late paramilitary

to the political system (Romero (ed.)

2007 ).1he same was done by Medina (1990) and by Gutiérrez and Barón (2006) with respect to the early paramilitary. and stare-paramilitary

1hough intra-pararnilitary

conflicts have been documented,

sometimes very

powerfully (Serrano 2009, Cívico 2009), their analytical implications have not been taken on board until now, save by those authors who would want to show that the paramilitaries were in essence independent from the state (Ramírez et al. 2005). And a classic of the Íiterature on the Colombian political system, Leal and Dávila (1990)' illustrated how political brokers empowered paramilitaries but at the same time put them at their service. 1he protagonist

18

of the study, the clientelistic patron Tiberio Villarreal,

See also Eaton (2.006), which describes the way in which decentralization allows non state armed actors to combine rheír violcnt activity and participate in elections. We will see plenty of that in this book.

CHAPTER

showed that he understood

perfecdy

well his position

1

when he exclaimed

'1 am an intermediary

between the government and the people' (1990: 171). Leal and Dávila show how Tiberio used 'his' paramilitaries not only to hit and rivals within the political

system.

1hese are key insighrs, despite the fact that the book's theoretical

subversion

but also his competitors

frame-

work strongly discounts

collective action problems within the Colombian

political system and the pararnilitaries, and between one and the other, Romero (2003) picks up in his fundamental contribution a classical theme of state formation,

claiming that the Colombian

created by actors that opposed the 'retormism'

paramilitaries

were

associated with different peace

processes launched by successive presidents in the 1982-2002 period.1hree main actors - the army, regional elites, and narco-traíhckers that had be come large landowners extant regional

(Romero

2003: 17) - felt that such reformism

arrangements.

1his tension

threatened

gave origin to a 'polarization

between regional elites and leaders at the central state' (Romero 2003: 18). Certainly, one can easily imagine mechanisms such as the one spotted by Ron (2000) - nationalleaders global constraints

felt, in a much more urgent fashion, the brunt of

- that would underlie such tension. Carroll (20Il), in her

turn, shows how this struggle against regional and local political openings was activated in different municipalities, with its murderous consequences against the Unión Patriótica and other opposition parties. Valencia (2007) and others have pushed the point further, claiming (based on E. L. Gibson 2005) that the paramilitaries ence 'subnational

installed

aurhoritarianisrns.

in the territories

under their influ-

1his set of propositions

identifies a key

issue for the understanding of the Colombian paramilitaries: their relation with democracy, and in particular with the 'real existing democracy' within which they operated. It works well with respect to the initial stages of the paramilitary. It also identifies explicirly a putative set of components of the paramilitary

regional coalitions - for example, regional incumbents

intent on

defending the regional status quo. Duncan (2006) also depicted paramilitary 'warlords'

as a basically autonomous

reaction

of the periphery

against the

central state, based on illicit economies. He showed that the paramilitary were intimately linked to narco-traffickers and illicit economies. He also identiíied between

- though

without

paramilitarism

of the paramilitary to have changed

making it the focus of his analysis - the link

and clientelism,

and explicidy said that the entry

into already established them.

clienrelístic

1would take exception,

though,

networks

ought

with his rather

The state-paramilitary relatíonshíp puzzle optimistic

characterization

43

of the degree of coherence

build-up of what he calls the paramilitary degree to which they could co-ordinate which 1return in several chapters.

armies, and correspondingly territorial

1he failure of the central state to domesticate mate monopoly

may be depicted

and organizational

governance,

the

a theme to

violence and enforce its legiti-

in terms of state weakness (a concept also

used to study theLa Violencia period, see for example Oquist 1978 and Pécaut 1987)' 1he concept has provoked much debate. A criticism more or less in vogue leveled against the theory of'weakness' - based on an intuition that 'weakness' is merely being clever, because by acting 'weakly' the state allows economic

elites to do what theywanted

to in the first place (Launay-Gama

and González 2010) - does not seem very convincing. 1here are many types of elites (national and regional, economic and political), and their different interests need not be magically alígned. Not all weakness is cunning weakness. Weakness

should

also not necessarily

be interpreted

me 'lack of power and ability to do something;" [Q

do.

as impotence:

that you actually wanted

1show here rhat it is not rhe case that the Colornbian

state tried to

fight the paramilitaries, but could not (the claim of many Colombian state ofhcials, and also of some scholars). 1 discuss such claim in specific contexts throughout me book (see for example Chapter 6). Indeed, the privatization ofviolence in itselfis not necessarily a symptom of weakness as impotence, it is part of a transitional

moment:

part of state building processes (for me Colombian by González

if

in many contexts private violence formed case, see interesting works

2011 and Torres 2007). But weakness can take other meanings,

apart from these, The term can be used to denote

indirect

rule (which

1

believe is the basic sense in which Pécaut (1987) uses it).lt can also connote simply lack of territorial presence. Is this type of weakness associated in some form with paramilitarism?

lt is not so easy to answer this apparently

simple

question: as we will see throughout this book, the paramilitaries flourished equally well in territories with scant and with substantial state presence." For these and other reasons, 1 avoid here the use of the weakness terminology.

19

20

Impotence (n.d.).ln Dictionary.com, . Accessed 25 June 2018. 1his could also be looked at quantitatively. For example, using departmental GDP per capita (the data at the municipallevel was not produced), it is clear that during

CHAPTER

44

1

My proposition contributes ro this analyticallandscape in the following way. First, I pick up the tension between territorial elites and the central state, but push it in a more relational direction. I do nor assume that state sponsorship and relative autonomy of the paramilitary are mutually contradictory. 1he evidence (or lack of ir) of sponsorship by the state and the evidence (or lack ofit) of paramilitary

autonomy should be treated separately

because, among other things, regional elites and the central state struggled and at the same time collaborated continuously (like in Blok's srory on the Mafia, 1986).211hey had done so in the past, through long established mechanisms of indirect rule that the highly fractious Colombian personnel knew by heart (Gutiérrez

2014). 1hese mechanisms

political were used

to create, sponsor and administer the paramilitaries. But the co-ordination of such a complex nerwork of cunning politicians and turbulent a tall order, especially for the unwieldy Colombian state.

thugs was

In the same direction, I put at the center of my analysis social impasses and the deep sovereignty crisis triggered by the paramilitary. 1hough intraparamilitary and state-paramilitary in the journalistic,

wrangling have certainly been reported

juridical and academic literatures, the very fact that it

rook place in large proportions has not entered the analysis in any signiíicant formo I develop here a broader understanding of social impasses, showing that they took not only a 'vertical' but also a 'horizontal'

(within

regional coalitions and networks, and sometimes between coalitions and specialists in violence) formo I exhibir the concrete mechanisms which this prompted

through

deep changes and major conflicts within paramili-

tarized coalitions. I show how and why these conflicts cannot be taken as

21

the Colombian war some of the most violent departrnenrs were also the most prosperous and rhe best endowed with public goods. Of course, GDP per capita does not translate mechanically into state presence (of which thc country is actually a very good example), bur up to today no clear-cut correlation between state presence and conflict indicators has been found. And this, for good reasons: the Colombian conflict was not only related with state absence, but also with speciíic forms of state presence (Gutiérrez, 2014-). Bur of course 1 am establishing no happy-go-lucky analogy between the Mafia and rhe Colombian paramilitaries. The analogy is not between the phenornena, but between the ways of conccptualizing rhern.

Tbe state-paramilitary relationship puzzle

4S

symptoms oflack of sponsorship by the state, but rather as the expression of me nature of such sponsorship.

Regarding the sovereignty crisis, it has

been, for the study of the paramilitaries, something like the unseen elephant in the room. Drawingon basic insights by Skocpol (2015), Ron (2002) and orhers, 1show he re how the paramilitarization

of the territorial reach of

me state could only be processed through very turbulent regional coalitíons, a circumstance me architecture

of Colombian

and narcotized

which shook the very foundation

of

sovereignry,

Other alternative characterizations The Colombian pararnilitaries have be en depicted as an expression of state terrorism, and of course this contains more than a grain of truth. The basic argument that supports it has been oudined in a very assertive way by William Avilés (2006) and Raphael (20IO). The Colombian state - the argument goes - had to outsource the worst of its violence, otherwise it would pay high costs in terms oflegitimacy

(internally

and externally).

1hus, it developed a tool that permitted it to maintain plausible deniability vis-a-vis the worst violations ofhuman rights that it committed in me course of the counter-insurgent

war. This argument has the merit of

Bagging the costs of violence - an extremely important

reference point

for the understanding of repressive dynamics (see Ron 2005 and Kalyvas _006). And many state agents did in effect ask the paramilitary to do their dirty work. On the other hand, the proposition

glosses over the ongoing

ocial conílicts and impasses that affected the paramilitary-state

interac-

non, does not take on board the different targets of paramilitaryviolence, and fails to explain the permanent

conflicts that many paramilitary

units

had with different state agencies (Chapters 4 and 5). lt also does not pass me plausibility tests discussed above. The Colornbian paramilitaries have also been depicted as the expresion of the neoliberal offensive. Scholars that adhere to this perspective have found that neoliberal presidents and authorities were complicit with the paramilitaries, that economic elites allowed thern to operate or at least tolerated them, that the paramilitaries acted in favor of wealth concentration

CHAPTER 1

and directed their violence against social movements and leaders, and that neoliberal openings and paramilitary

activism coincided at many critical

moments (Hristov 2014). Each and every one of these assertions is true. At the same time, the idea that the paramilitaries embodied a neoliberal offensive do es not match a lot of evidence about the paramilitaries their social supports. The development

and

and rapid growth of rhe paramili-

tary throughout the country precedes by almost ten years the country's neoliberal reforms. It also does not explain why the Colombian phenomenon diverges in so many respects from the trajectories of other countries. The proposition thus lacks comparative specíficity. Why was Colombian paramilitarism

so large, so fractured, so willing to confront parts of the state

at critical junctures? In the other direction, there have been many neoliberalisms in many parts of the world, with divergent ourcomes. Actually, in some place s neoliberal restructurings

are clearly associated with peace

processes (Wood 2001 and 2002), and it is difficult to glean any systematic association between neoliberal reforms and violence indicators worldwide (Baquero 2010). And the relationship of many Latin American counterinsurgencies with neoliberal changes is rather complex. Certainly, Colombia is not ranked among the most extreme neoliberal transformations in the continent. In Perú, where a radical neoliberal program was actually implemented, the pararnilitary

Rondas Campesinas

were significant actors in

the war before the advent of neoliberalism, but were tighdy under the control of the authorities, had a completely different class character than in Colombia

(Starn et al. 1996), and did not incur the massive and geno-

cidal human rights violations of which the Colornbian paramilitary are guilty. In some countries the formation of milicias can certainly be traced back to neoliberal

transformations

(the main case probably being Cate

D'Ivoire: see Banégas, Toh and Kouman only be understood

aíter institutional

2010),

but then such impact can

change prompted

by neoliberal

reforms is taken on board. Indeed, in Colombia neoliberal reforms at some point opened yawning windows of opportunity for the paramilitary, as I show through the takeover of the health sector in Chapter 9. But rhese outcornes are not over-determined

by global dynamics, but rather tend

to vary from place to place depending and institutional arrays.

on specific constellations

of forces

Tbe state-paramilitary relationship puzzle

47

Mazzei (2009) builds an extrernely compelling comparative rheory about the origin of paramilitarism in Latin Arnerica according to which Latin American paramilitarism is supported by a tripod: the army, a closed political systemand economic elites." These three actors react when they are challenged with political openings and/or social reforms. When discussing me Colombian case, she reports - as many authors do not - the endemic Íactionalism of Colombian parties. But for her theory to hold she has to abide by the characterization of the Colombian political system as closed. But in which sense closed? Certainly, not closed in comparison to the ?Olitical systems ofEl Salvador and México which she describes so well." fact, according to Polity criteria the Colombian regime was during the 1980s and 1990Smuch more open than that of almost any orher country in Latin America (at least). 1 return to these issues in the next chapter. The ~roblem is relevant both for the characterization of critical periods (for example, the National Front), of the incetives for the elites to get involved in paramilitary set-ups, and for the understanding of the relationship of ~e paramilitaries with the political system. Mazzei's contribution remains earlyrelevant for the analysisof Colombian paramilitaries, and her underding of the Colombian political system is certainly much more nuanced :han that of the scores of papers and books which have characterized it closed or stricdy 'oligarchical'. But a more detailed discussion of their hls with different state agencies, elites and politicians, and of the place o political regime in the analysis of paramilitarism, is needed.

Civil war literature noted above, this book is populated by different social actors, which hlllggle and bargain in a structured socialspacein which the state acts - and

Gutiérrez and Barón (2006) found an analogous of tripod underlying eady paramilitary structures: catde ranchers, narcos, and Army officers. See, Putzel and Di John (20I2).lnstead, Colombia has much poorer results in terms of land redistribution than those countries. "Not aIl good things come together" (Purzel and Di John, 2012.).

48

CHAPTER 1

matters. This goes against the fundamental tenets of what during decades has been the mainstream theoretical framework of the civil war literature, at least since the issuing of the famous Collier and associates 'greed and grievance' dichotomy (Collier and Hoeffier 2.004). Based on this dichotomy and on other rationalistic and atomistic frameworks, mainstream theories erased from the analysis of civil war any consideration

of statehood,

as well

as of social structures or conflict, save perhaps erhnic conflict (Cramer and Richards

201 1).

War was an act of economic crirninality writ large, or at least

a self-referential operation, which created its own self-contained

dynamics.

Certainly, as will be seen throughout this book, the Colombian paramilitaries were extraordinarily rapacious. The problem is not the irrelevance of'greed' or territory in war in general, but rather the way in which 'greed' is socially and institutionally

structured

or noto 1 hope to show again that this

very greedy war which 1 am describing and analyzing cannot be understood as a simple market-like transaction The Colombian

ofindividual

appetites (Cramer

2.002).

paramilitaries were rapacious, bur rapacious in a structured

manner; and this structure was provided both by themselves and by their environment. And as Korfhas already long since asserted (2.005), the forces that participate in a civil war can be at the same time greedy and political. This is the case of the Colombian only their self-referential

paramilitaries,

interests

these also entered into the equation,

who were expressing not

as specialists in violence - although complicating

everything

- but also

the demands and strategies coming from powerful social actors and state agencies (the following chapters return to this issue; see also Romero

2003,

Duncan 2006 and Salinas and Zarama 2012). Of course, the agenda has advanced significantly since the 'economicist paradigm' fell into 'distress' (Ron 2.005). The recognition that social conílicts are somehow related to civil war has made a comeback (Edward 2010,

Cederman

conceptualized

et al.

2010,

Stewart

2010).

Staniland

(2012

and

2014)

and powerfully illustrated the sheer embeddedness

wars. The 'organizational turn' (Gutiérrez and Wood of war has also yielded significant contributions.

2.017)

has

of civil

in the analysis

1expect to contribute here in four interrelated directions. The first one is to show the consequences of understanding

that civil wars - at least rhose

in which there is not an utter and catastrophic breakdown of statehood - do

Thestate-paramilitary relationship puzzle not take place in an institutional rutions count for signi6cant

49

vacuum. The important

idea that insti-

civil war outcomes can already be found in

me literature (Peña et al. 2017, Vargas and Uribe 2017). Here I try to show in detail how a particular form of statehood - indirect rule - counts. My narrative suggests that no basic outcome regarding me paramilitaries can be properiy understood without taking into account the institutions that zave them birth, because those provided thern not only the rules of the ame, but also the very language through which they could formulate their demands and build their operational platforms. From the beginning, for example, the Colombian paramilitary expressed, in a rather straightforward manner, core demands and concerns by some legal and illegal economic elites. But these demands were seldom processed nationally - in terms of class - but regionally - in territorial

coalition

rion and operation of the paramilitaries

terms - because the crea-

was legally fixed (or tolerated to

operate illegally, depending on the period) in precisely those terms. Also zlobal dynamics appear in a pristine fashion during the narrative - I will be speaking in many ways about the tensions between two global wars - but me paramilitaries cannot be understood as the unprocessed expression of memo Global dynamics are siíted by institutions, coalitions and networks, producing differential outcomes. In the same vein, the second one is to exhibir a concrete case in which war and politics cannot be disentangled.

I am under the impression that

for too long - at least two decades - the political science understanding of civil wars was under the spell of theories whose main ultimate implication was that politics did not matter. It did not matter because war was an atornistic, market-like event, and/or because 'communities' unstructured compartments

were self-contained

neady separared from 'armed groups', who only

expressed their own interests (fixed by the rnarket or by the dynamics of war itself). However, the clientelistic warfare I consider here was political in many senses, narrow and broad. Ir was political in the narrow sense: many of the actions, killings and massacres committed

by the paramilitaries

had

me explicit objective of guaranteeing an appointment of a hospital manager for a friendly politician, or winning an election in a town, or supporting me social and political advancement

of a powerful cattle ranchero But it

was also political in the broad sense. When, at the end of their saga, the

so

CHAPTER 1

paramilitaries started to promote regional agreements that proposed the 'refounding of the nation' - in a non-dictatorial and essentially competítive sense, by the way - they were not only expressing a concrete aspiration but also synthesizing

an experience of many years. 1 will show that rhey

expressed and formulated from the very beginning demands of concrete social groups and networks, as well as of party factions; and through thern renegotiated

regional arrangements.

Quite intuitively,

were critically con cerned with this renegotiation,

narco-traffickers

because it allowed thern

to achieve at least a semi-legal power base to operate in their territories (Duncan

2006). But this narco activity had major political implications,

including triggering a sovereignry crisis. This illustrates that concepts such as sovereignty cannot be depoliticized without riskinglosing the core of the relevant civil war dynamics under study. Since all this took place under a

Polity democracy, 1 would hope that the book also sheds some light about how 'really existing' democracies may work during civil wars (on rhis see Staniland

2014).

Third, neither did the counter-insurgent unstructured

space. The paramilitaries

war take place in a socially

interacted

with local societies,

indeed, but these were structured by class and institution (and their respective interactionsj.The paramilitaries were created and sponsored by specific social sectors, and attacked others, But the cast of allies and targets sornetimes changed, under the influence of both endogenous factors (once again narco-trafiickers

and exogenous

are an obvious example of this, and

once again there are many other important

ones). Naturally, the pararnili-

taries were also opposed and resisted, although delve into the issue too deeply in this book.

given my focus 1 will not

Last but not least, 1 want to show specifically how organization counted in the paramilitary clientelistic warfare. 1 take issue with visions that look at the paramilitaries as a coherent project, with high co-ordination capaciry and clear-cut hierarchical structure. What relatively recent journalistic, juridical and academic output has shown - and what the available empirical evidence corroborates once and again - is that paramilitary hierarchies and monitoring systems were weak, decision making processes fuzzy, and co-ordinarion bersome networking

problems appalling. The very complex and cum-

that characterized

the paramilitary

cloud underlies

Tbe state-paramilitary relationship puzzle all of the social impasses that hounded me paramilitaries

structured

SI it until the end. The ways in which

their action created specific rules and incen-

rives which in turn not only disorganized but also transformed

extant regional arrangements,

the patterns ofviolence against civilians in ways that

could not be imagined or predicted if organizational taken into account.

dimensions were not

State and war literature The idea that statehood and war feed into each other is quite obviously at me core of the sociology of the state. According to Tilly's famous motto, 'the state made war, and war made the state' (1975). The sentence has been repeated a million times, and nuanced (Tarrow 2015, López 2013, Tuong 2010) and purportedly refuted, another million. However, we are still far from having considered all of its implications. For one, there is quite a bit of endogeneity

he re, because 'indirect rule' is also a war strategy: in gen-

eral (Tilly 1975, Mann 1984) and in the Colombian case. But how does indirect rule work during war? Are there different types of indirect rule? What are the transit routes between them? AlI this remains as in a cloud in me relevant literarure, This book tries to contribute to the understanding of the speciíic forms indirect rule takes, and to offer insights about how they work and change. And all this takes me back to methodological

considerations.

1 rnake

an argurnent throughout in favor of analysis that is historical and endowed with a high level of granularity. Both characteristics are, and should be, interrelated.

1 am increasingly wary of ahistorical

renderings of political

violence, and in this book 1 have striven to go direcdy in the other direcnon. History not only provides the rules and the world of meaning under which the actors played, it is also the only source of relevant evidence through which long-terrn political experience can be interpreted tallized in meaningful assumptions and auxiliary propositions.

and crys-

The neatest

- certainly not the only - example 1 find in this book is the way in which me Colombian political system is, and has been, interpreted. Has it been closed, and then what does that mean? Or is it sornething else? Each reading

52.

CHAPTER

will generate different assumptions stream interpretation

and interpretations.

1

By far the main-

is the first one, but it happens to not match a mass

of significant evidence

(1 come back to this throughout the book). But if

history is much more than mere context, institutions

are a fundamental

reference point for any reasonable readingofviolence.1his goes well beyond the prescription that 'institutions count': it is necessary to know which institutions count, when and why. And for this there is already no general prescription; the 'counting' or not of speciíic designs is heavily grounded in historical trajectory and institutional

detail. 1hroughout

the book we

will see that sometimes without taking into account the fine print of some spcciíic state institutions or paramilitary organizational mechanisms it is very difficult to understand the underlying dynamics of violence and the outcomes they are related to.

Conclusion

In this book 1describe how the Colombian

paramilitaries

provided the

actions to contain and fight back subversion that key state agencies, and social national and regional actors, were requesting and how, while doing so, created their own forms of governance (Arjona 2016, Arjona, Kasfir and Mampilly 2015) which could, in principie, be read as an effort to consolidate regional and local status quos (Romero 2003)' But while doing so they deeply altered thern, on the one hand induding narco-rrafíickers in their territorial coalitions

(which put into question the relation of Colombia

with the United Statcs), and on the other by destabilizing existing arrangements, taking sides in old coníiicts and creating new ones, creating new elites, etc, 1his triggered major social impasses that deeply affected public order, put into critical contradiction recognition by other states and the territorial reach of the Colombian state, and affected core components of the pararnilitary territorial coalition, 1 will exhibir throughout the book the indirect rule mechanisms that linked the state to the paramilitaries, and the ways in which they triggered major social impasses.

1will also discuss

Thestate-paramilitary relationship puzzle

S3

how and why the main proposition advanced here passes the key plausibiliry tests, while other readings of the paramilitary do noto Flagging social impasses is an analytical tool, but it do es not provide a moral alibi to anybody. The social traps analyzed here are the product of speciíic decisions, for which individuals and social actors should be held responsible. Though this book is dedicated to the analysis of the paramilirary phenomenon, 1 would hope that it also serves to highlight the costs of the Colombian paramilitary 'soluríon, to undermine some comfortable common places about it, and to advance the understanding of under which conditions, the already very long cycle of Colombian privatization of violence might be stopped.

CHAPTER

2.

Democracy, clientelism, violence

Introduction

1his chapter sets the stage for the rest of the book. It discusses the relevant historical context, describes the key institutional settings within which the Colombian

paramilitaries

developed, and sketches the main part of their

trajectory. While doing so, it highlights some of the problems of standard explanations of Colombia's long experience with political and social violene e, and illustrates how this experience was grounded rather on regional forces aided and abetted by brokers who could deliver the crucial 'tic-in' with well-placed decision makers in the country's capital.

1 begin discussing the Colombian combination ofPolity democracy and endemic violence, a therne at the heart of the Íiterature on the counay (the classic reference being here Pécaut 1987), and the ways in which it fostered diverse forms of privatization

of violence prior to the start of the

counter-insurgent cycle. 1he section stops at the beginning of the 1980s, .ust when the self-defenses had already begun to operate. In section two 1 rocus on one particular and extremely revealing example, which shows how even aíter a relative pacification in the 1960s, armed bandits could network with the security agencies of the state, politicians and regional notables to create and maintain territorial power and control. 1hese mechanisms of indirect rule were the cradle of the paramilitary experience proper. 1he third section presents the paramilitary trajecrory, and the instituional and political context within which it developed. 1he institution

of

self-deíenses was created in the 1960s, but only began to be used by several

S6

CHAPTER 2

actors in the late 1970S and early 1980s. Symptomatically, institutionalized

as a private provider

demand, sponsored

ofviolence

by the army and other bureaucracies.

of violence on demand

entailed

heterogeneity

self-defenses were

and security on regional Bur privatization

of regional experiences

by

designo This in turn opened a wide window of opportunity for the entry into the self-defenses of narco-traíiickers. Ostensible narco presence plus extreme violence and unruliness but only for a short period: security co-operatives to expand

and network

led to me illegalization

of the self-defenses,

it was not long before a new institution

- provided

the paramilitaries

-

broad opportunities

with legal actors. Thus, the paramilitaries

were

legal or semi-legal during more than half the duration of their bloody saga. In the conclusions, I stress that standard narratives about Colombia as a closed, essentially non-competitive

or stricdy olígarchic politícal system,

or as a polity governed by winner take-all rules (Oquist 1978), simply do not match the facts. Much more relevant to understanding the paramilitaries were institutions democracy

ofindirect

and the privatization

rule, based on the coexistence

ofPolity

of violence, which actually fostered bitter

competition.

1he context

A competitive polity: Basic data and chronology Colombia

had - from the mid-nineteenth

(Gutiérrez

20°7)

- a bipartisan

polirical

century

until at least 2002

system. Liberal

(or reds) and

Conservative (blues) captured by far the buIk of the vote due to both energetic proselytizing and deeply rooted political identities (Pécaut 1987)' Aíter a very traumatic period of Conservative rule, that culminated in a bloody civil war between 1898 and 19° 1 - la Guerra de losMil Días (Sánchezand Aguilera 2001) - and the loss of a very important

part of Colombian

terri-

tory - Panama in 1903 - elites ofboth parties tried to achieve some kind of agreerrient thar would allow rhern to interact peacefully and avoid further

Democracy, clientelism,

violence

57

disgraces. Such agreement was in effect reached via the 1910 Constitutional reiorrn, which founded anew a cornperitive polity, and gave Liberals a place in the political system, although as a junior partner in the administration of the Republic (Gutiérrez 2017). The reform also endowed the municipalities and departments

- the basic subnational

administrative

units in

1910 (and still today) - with crucial powers, including the appointments of the personnel to their police bodies. The Conservatives remained in power until 1930, when a split within their ranks allowed a unified Liberal ticket to win. The Liberals tried to produce social, institutional and political reforms while not alienating the Conservatives as co-administrators

of the republic. For example, they

gave the Conservatives an assortment ofkey ministries (Gutiérrez 2017 ).1 But these efforts failed, as Conservatives took an increasingly radical turno Soon violence erupted in different regions of the country. The fact that by then there were at least four types of police bodies - national, departmental, municipal and fiscal - and that all of thern were undisciplined, linked to party factions and frequendy unpredictable, did not help to calm inter-party tensions. Intra-party conílict was endemic as well. By the early 1940s, the Liberal regime had fallen into full disarray, under the weight of a brutal Conservative opposition and its own contradictions. In 1946, ir was payback time for the Conservatives:

a united blue party beat the

divided reds and returned in power. As in 1930, this alternation in power - if considered as an isolated event - was basically peaceful. Furthermore, Mariano Ospina - the Conservative president elect, who had an impeccable moderate tion - incorporated,

reputa-

as the Liberals had in 1930, the other party into his

uovernment, giving it many key positions in his cabinet and access to power at the departmental and municipallevels. This, however, did not stop a dizzying increase in violence against the Liberals, In the meantime, lett-wing Liberalleader,

a

Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, was making strides (Braun

Ministries ofWar, Education and Treasury. See, Restrepo, G. (2004). 'Febrero 9 de 1930
El fin de la hegemonía: Semana, 30 May . Accessed 9 July 2.018.

CHAPTER

58

2.

1987). 1hough he finished third in the 1946 competition, he soon obtained the upper hand within the Liberal party and craíied an offensive against governmental

violence and for the reconquest of power. However, he was

assassinated on 9 April 1948. His slaying triggered a wave of massive interparty violence, in effect a 'non-declared civil war' (Lleras 1999), known in as La Violencia, which

the country's every-day parlance and historiography lasted until the early 1960s. 1he Conservatives

fought back the waves of popular pro test and vio-

lent mobilization against the assassination of Gaitán (Sánchez 1983) by white-hot repression, and the massive resort to privatized violence, frequently networkingwith

the police or the army. Particularly hideous were

subnational police bodies christened chulavitas - a toponym for the town fram which they took the main of their personnel-

which networked with

Conservative party structures to attack Liberal people and towns (Guzmán, Fals and Umaña 20I6).1he

Conservatives also rejected judicial checks and

balances - replacing a bipartisan Supreme Court with a hand-picked

blue

one - established press censorship, and closed the congress in 1949. For all practical effects, Colombia was no more a competitive polity. In the meantime,

armed resistance in the country-side

- and not only Liberal,

as radicalized peasants started to pick up communist

and socialist motives

(Franco 1994) - raged. 1he disarray caused by the brutal repressive policies enacted by successive Conservative governments, rogether with the growth and radicalization ofLiberal guerrillas, prampted general Gustavo Rojas Pinilla to stage a coup in 1953.He was also probably incited by Mariano Ospina, who at the time had been antagonized by the ruling conservatives (headed by the far right Laureano Gómez) as too soít on Liberals. Rojas was a Conservative ofhcer, but he promised to temper repression and pramote peace, so at the beginning he was supported

also by Liberals. Several guerrillas accepted

the amnesty he offered.' However, he soon showed that he wanted to stay in power indefinitely. Given this, Liberals and Conservatives agreed upon a braad agenda, which included kicking out Rojas and creating a regime of

2.

And so me of thern were killed.

Democracy, clienselism, violence

S9

bounded and regulated competition (along the lines of what me literature calls consociational regimes, see Liphart 1969). 1hey were successful in their efforts, which gave origin to the National Front (NF, 1958-1974; see Hartlyn's study on the period, 1973)' 1he NF was, at the same time, a developmental program, a political agreement, and a peace pact (Gutiérrez 2007)' Irs peace dimensions included preventing any resurgence of Liberal-Conservative violence, while dealing with demobilized

guerrillas. Doing one and the other at the same time was, by

no means a trivial accomplishment, and involved mobilizing significant political, financia!, social and intellectual resources (Karl2017). Ir ended me subnational police bodies in 1959 (Gutiérrez 2015)' It fought against bandits operating in the name of the parties in government. It tried to modernize both the police and the army, and to separate thern from party and factional bickering (Karl2017). It also, in fact, made an explicit effort ro take private violence into its fold, with mixed success. At any rate, the Liberal-Conservative contemporary

violence gradually fizzled out; it had cost according to

calculations nearly 200,000 lives (Oquist 1978, Fals, Umaña

and Guzmán 1962) in a country of 9 million inhabitanrs, However, at the same time and as in many other countries in Latin America (Wickham-Crowley

1992) Colombia witnessed me creation of a

host ofMarxist guerrillas.1heir sources ofinspiration were variegated, ranging from me heritage of La Violencia to me Cuban revolution. 1he main ones were the FARC (somewhat loosely associated to the pro-Soviet Communist party), the EPL (Maoist}, and the ELN (pro-Cuban, Table

1:

Some of the main Colombian

see Table 1).3

guerrilla groups

Name

Origin

Ideology

Demobilization

FUERZAS ARMADAS REVOLUCIONARIAS DE COLOMBIA FARC

27/0S/I964

Ini tially associared with the pro-Soviet variant ofMarxism, then Marxist and Bolivarian

24/11/2016

I

(Continued) These characterizations of the guerrillas' ideology are, of course, very coarse and I use rhern only as a nrst approximarion.

60

CHAPTER

2

Table 1: (Continued) Name

Origin

Ideology

Demobilization

EJÉRCITO DE LIBERACIÓN NACIONAL ELN

o4/07h964

Initially pro-Cuban and heavily influenced by rhe ideas of Che Guevara. Also influenced by rhe Liberation 1heology

Started peace conversations on February 20 I 7- ongoing.

EJÉRCITO POPULAR DE LIBERACIÓN EPL

17/07h96S

Created by a splinrer group of the Communist party, Maoist until 1982, then adopted a more idiosyncratic ideology

9S% of rhe group demobilized in 1991, asmall EPL mili tia in the departmcnr of North Samander still in activity

MOVIMIENTO 19 DE ABRIL M-19

19/04h970

Nationalist

08/03lr990

MOVIMIENTO ARMADO QUINTIN LAMEMAQL

OS/Olh98S

Indigenous sclfdefense, acted only in Cauca and other dcpartmenrs

Demobilized

in

1991

Note: Semana (2000). 'La suerte de! ERP: Semana, 2.7 March Accessed

1

1June 20 18.

Villarraga, A. (w.d.) Ejército Popular de Liberación. Bogotá: CNMH

.

Accessed 11 June 2.018.

The new guerrillas were relatively small. What would become the FARC was a peasant self-defense influenced by communist by confronting

the government

cadres that made a splash

with relative success in the municipality

of Marquetalia." However, alter its creation, the FARC had ups and downs (Arenas 2OI5, Marulanda

4

I973, Trujillo 2OI'») and led a relatively marginal

Semana (1999). 'Marquetalia 3S años después', Semana, 18 June . Accessed 4June 2018.

Democracy, clientelism,

violence

life. It had no more than 800 fighters in 1978 (Ferro and Uribe 2002). The ELN was involved in an 'imaginary war' following Broderick's (1987: 16) spot-on definition. Ir was marginal, territorially (Vélez 2000), socially and politically. By 1973 it had 250 members (Harnecker 1988), but then it was destroyed during the Operation Anorí. Finally, the EPL, initially inspired by the Maoist ideology, appeared in 1968; in contrast to the other two, its relevance throughout the period was more regional than national. On the other hand, the country underwent tion (Londoño

a period of intense social rnobiliza-

2011). Since the NF had launched

two waves of agrarian

reform (1961 and 1968) as part of its developmental program, peasants mobilized and organized in order to gain access to land. In several regions large landowners responded by arming thugs against thern (Escobar 1987, Zamosc 1992, Machuca 2016). Apparently, these landowners did not use the figure ofself-detenses," which had been created by President Valencia (1962-1966) anddeveloped by Carlos Lleras (1966-1970) under the aegis of the United States promoted national security ideology. The relevant decrees and laws (1965 Decree 3398, Law 48 of 1968,1978 Decree 1923) allowed the government to mobilize the entire population, and the army to support the civilians that decided to defend thernselves from 'a' threat (that is, 'the' subversive threat) and to transferweapons

to thern. Simultaneously,

other

small print institutional designs that allowed for violent repressive activi ties based on networkingwith civilians were adopted by the army. These more under-the-table counter-insurgent institutions were promoted through different United

States missions, as in other Latin American

countries

(Restrepo 1989, Rempe 1999 and 2002, McSherry 2009), and crystallized in army manuals and internal documents (see Chapter 6). After the end of the NF restrictions gradually dismantled,

on political competition

were

but at the same time guerrillas grew in strength

and power. A new denomination specialized in high-impact

appeared: the nationalist

urban actions (Villamizar

M-19, which

1995). By the end

Probably because they were already very well connected with politicians and rhe armed agencies of the state, Furtherrnore, there is a time lag between rhe creation of some institutions and the momem in which they start to have effects.

CHAPTER 2

of the 1970S, the FARC adopted the transcendental decision of allowing coca crops in the territories under its influence (Ferro and Uribe 2-Ó02-). In effect, Colombia had become part of the global markets in illicit substances, first as an intermediary and then as a producer (Henderson z.crz.). 1he country had certainly had experience with organized crime before, but mainly related to emeralds - a market in which Colombia was, and is, a main player (Gutiérrez and Barón 2008). Colombians instead were relatively late entrants into the global drug rnarkets (Gootenberg 2016). But when they did enter they became major actors as well. Colombia

was also

an important marihuana producer by the 1970s, and the foremost global coca producer in the mid-ro Sos (Roch 2014); it also was a key player in the control of export routes. 1he guerrillas were probably already expandingwhen

they got involved

in the coca economy. By the late 1970S they had already discovered kidnapping, which they eventually took to 'industrial' proportions (CNMH 2-013).6However, since the scale of the rents associated to illicit drugactivities was so extraordinary, it allowed the guerrillas to operate on a completely new scale in the 1980s. At the same time, narco elites blossomed and rapidly merged with already established ones. 1hey also penetrated very rapidly and massively into the Colombian political system. 1he United Srates, which had declared

narco-trafficking

(Mabry (ed.) 1989), arrn-twistcd

as a problem

the Colombian

an extradition treaty in 1979 (Matthiessen the Colombian congress in 1980.7

6

7

of national

government

security

into signing

2000) which was approved by

See, El Tiempo (1997). 'Colombia, cabeza mundial de la industria del secuestro: El Tiempo, 10July . Accessed 5 June 2018. See also, Semana (1994). 'Yo fui el creador de los PEPES', Semana, 27 June . Accessed sJune 2018. US Senate: Senator Patrick Leahy ofVermont. (2018). 'Human Rights: US Senate, w.d. . Accessed 5 June 2018.

CHAPTER

Figure

1:

Municipalities

of me Urabá region

Note: Guríérrcz, F. (2.018). Map ofUrabá

Region.

_

Democracy, clientelism, violence

rhat were putting heavy pressure on him. These forces probably carne to a rapid understanding that it was much more profitable to maintain Samper in power and extraer whatever they could from him than to dethrone him. For example, the United States pushed forward a police reform and promoted the name of Rosso José Serrano as police Director in 1995, to try (O cut down the enormous influence the Cali cartel had acquired within rhat agency.lndeed, the Cali cartel figureheads were finally jailed in 1995, and the main ones were eventually extradited. Ir was within this context that Samper made operational an extremely consequential institutional reforrn.? the creation of the security co-operatives, known informally and in a rather Orwellian fashion as Conuioir," which allowed private agents to bear arms and communication

devices to

provide information to the armed forces. The Convivir, or some analogous solution, had been vociferously requested by some associations of producers - mainly, but not only, by the National Cattle Rancher Association and the banana producers association; others rapidly joined _49 and leaders of the security sector (Castro 2009, Gutiérrez 2014; see also Cinep -003, Rugeles 2013, Grajales 2017). As theywere created, the Convivirwere security co-operatives led and created by private agents, which would coordinate actions and information with the army and other state agencies. The founders of a Convivir had to demonstrate

to the state that they had

50

enough resources to sustain it. Though an important pan of the underlying narrative that supported these demands was the claim that the Convivir and the paramilitary

were substitutes,

and that therefore promoting

the

Convivir would rein in private violence, what happened immediately atter

47 48 49

vo

Picking up a 1993 initiative by President Gaviria. 1he Convivirwere created by Dccrees 535of 1993 and 356 of 1994. El Tiempo (1997). 'Así nacieron Las Convivir', El Tiempo, 14 July . Accessed 5June 2018.

84

CHAPTER

the co-operatives

2

were created was exacdy the contrary: the Convivir rapexpansion.51

idly became a tool of massive paramilitary

Why? The Convivir co-operatives were regulated by yet a new agency, born in 1993 - the Superintendencia de Seguridad y Vigilancia (SSV) _52 and dependent upon the Defense Ministry. Furrhermore, the first manager of the Superintendencia was Herman Arias, son ofJosé Manuel Arias Carrizosa, who had been justice minister and leader of the banana producers association in Urabá. Both institutional teed a state of virtual non-regulation

design and appointment

guara n-

for the Convivir. The paramilitary

took

over the Convivirvery rapidly under the Arias and SSV watch. Additionally, some governors, like Álvaro Uribe - himself a large land owner and cattle rancher _53energetically backed the paramilitarized Convivir. Uribe had appointed

a right-wing

extremist as the Antioquia

Department

secretary, Pedro Juan Moreno,

and from such position

Convivir he could co-ordinate

the initiatives of paramilitarized

security

and through

the

security

cooperatives, prívate sector and security agencies. This was especially true for regions such as Urabá, where the paramilitary were extremely powerfuI and war was raging. For example, the Papagayo Convivir - in reality, a super-co-operarive,

as it co-ordinated

by a 3 cents per box ofbananas

other, srnaller, Convivir - was funded

exported, as agreed upon by the producers

association (Salinas and Zarama 2012).54The commander

SI

52

53 54

of the arrny's 17th

VerdadAbierta (2013). 'Las Convivir, motor de la guerra paramilitar, VerdadAbierta, 31October . Accessed SJuIy 2017. See also, Semana (2016). 'Las Convivir', Semana, 12 March . Accessed 11August 2017. Semana (2010). 'Preguntas para Rafael Pardo sobre Las Convivir: Semana, 19 April . Accessed 5June 2018. Rutas del Conflicto (w.d.). Masacre de Comuna 7: Acerca del grupo armado, Rutas del conflicto, w.d. . Accessed 5June 2018. Tribunal Superior de Bogotá, Sala de Justicia y Paz (21 de septiembre de 2015). Audiencia de Imputación de Cargos Integrantes del Bloque Central Bolívar. Magistrada Uldi Teresa Jiménez.

CHAPTER

94

2

Conclusions

Colombia has exhíbited a long-term coexistence between Polity dernocracy and violence. Ir is NOT in the least evident that the country had a closed political system; actually, vis-a-vis Latin American standards, it has been quite open. Since the 1910 Constitutional energetic poli tic al competition,

reform Colombia enjoyed

checks and balances, and an uncensored

press. The 1949-1957 period is an exception,

but it has to be divided

into two subperiods: 1949-1953, which was characterized by outright Conservative repression, and Rojas, 1953-1957 dictablanda. Furthermore, the country experienced a substantial democratization with the 1991 Constitution.

lhis is an exceptionally democratic trajectory for any Latin

American country. On the other hand, Colombia has been extremelyviolent - much more so than its neighbors and Latin American peers. This includes even some of the terrorist dictatorships of the 1970s. A substantial part of this violence has been negotiated through indirect rule and the networking between state agencies, powerful regional actors, armed associations and politicians able to provide a 'Bogotá tic-in. Ir is this that offers the Colornbian, and particularly the pararnilitary, experience a 'family air' with the 'indirecr' mechanisms and processes described by Mann (1984 and 1994), Tilly (Castañeda and Schneider 2017) and Blok (200I). Figure 3 presents a telling visualization" of the Colombian coexistence ofPolity democracy and violence (see also Gutiérrez, 20I4). It maps the evolution of the Polityand the Political Terror Scale76 scores for Colombia

from 1976 to 20I4. The

first index is the canonical measure of the type of institutional which Colombia excels - at least given its level of development

75

76

design in - and the

Polity IV (w.d.). Polity IV: Individual Country Regime Trends, 1946-2.013, Polity IV Project: Monty G. Marshall, Director. Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2.013 . Accessed 22 ]une 2018. 1he Polirical Terror Scale (2.018).PTS Data Table. . Accessed 22]une 2.018.

Democracy, clienrelism, violence

9S

second is a measure of state (or state-sponsored) violence against civilians." Colornbian Polity scores are quite good; the PTS instead adequately pictures a horror story (basically, extremely high levels of state terrorism throughout the war, with an improvement at the end). Note also that democracy and srate-sponsored violence apparendy did not undermine each other, and that the PTS grew savagely in periods of democratization.

2

-

PTS

-

Polity

1

19S0

2000

2010

Figure 3: Polity democracy and state terrorism in Colombia (1976-2016)

This historical and institutional context was the cradle of the Colombian elf-defenses. These sprang directly from state decision and sponsorship. Institutionally, the figure was created in the 1960s, as part of the 'national ecuriry' global policy. Self-defenses provided violence and security by territorially grounded demand, and were activated by regional notables and rural elites who had contacts with the arrny, politicians and civilian bureaucracies. The link of Colombia with the global markets of illicit

,

I have rransformed me sca!es so mar Poliry and PTS sca!es have me same [ange (berween zero and five). For Poliry scores, me higher the better; for PTS, me higher me worse. That is, a five in Polity is the maximum of democracy; a five in PTS is the maximum of política! terror. Note how Colombia scores high consistcntly in both regards.lhere are PTS scores-írom 1976. See, Political State Repon (1976-2.016). In Polity IV Projcct: Monry G. Marshall, Director. Política! Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 18002.013 . Acces z May 2.018. Castaño, V. (w.d.). 'La Historia de las Autodefensas Campesinas de Córdoba y Uraba, VerdadAbierta (w.d.), retrieved 2.0February 2010 from . Accessed 8 July 2018. Flórez, J. (2015). 'Las cinco facetas de Salvatore Mancuso, El Espectador, I Jut . Accessed 9 July 2.018. Semana (2.005). 'Habla Vicente Castaño; Semana, 6 May liticians.42

--.:

Tribunal Superior de Bogotá, Sala de Justicia y Paz (r3 de mayo de 20IO). Diligencia de Indagatoria del sindicado Adriano de Jesús Torres Hernández. Cuaderno original no 3, Expediente 2013-0°4°3, Folios 17S-177, p. 1. Which allowed a much more stablc cxpansion than the one attempted by the ACCU. According to a worker ofSeverini, he was told by him 'these are the self-defenses, they come to help us, 1 was who askedJorge 40 to send them here, ifyou tell somebody abour this they know where your family is. 1 need rhat you collaborate with rhem, that you inform them abour the bad guys, rhose who cooperate with me guerrilla, the bad people of this zone ..: Unidad Nacional de Derechos Humanos y DIH, Seccional Barranquilla (20 de febrero de 2009). Diligencia de Declaración que rinde el señor Guriérrez Cantillo Jorge Luis. Cuaderno original no s' Expediente 2010-00009, Folios 61-7S, p. 3· Fiscal de ciudad de Montería (13 de mayo de 2010). Diligencia de Indagatoria de Adriano de Jesús Torres Hernández. Cuaderno original no 3, Expediente 2013-°°4°3, Folios 93-97Sala de Conocimiento de Justicia y Paz Integrada de Barranquilla (Atlántico) (22 de abril de 201S). Audiencia concentrada de formulación y aceptación de cargos del Frente Pivijay. In this case me witness is a police sub-officer. Fiscal 22 de la Unidad Nacional de Derechos Humanos y D. 1. H de Barranquilla (Atlántico) (26 de marzo de 2010). Diligencia de Declaración de Javier Sánchéz Arce. Cuaderno original no 2, Expediente 2°13-00403, Folios 291-293, p. 1. Fiscal de ciudad de Montería (13 de mayo de 2010). Diligencia de Indagatoria de Adriano de Jesús Torres Hernández. Cuaderno original no 3, Expediente 2013-0°4°3,

Folios 93-97.

CHAPTER S

However, just before its demobilization

the Frente had fallen into

deep problems. Why? It had begun to prey upon the very cattle ranchers that had supported

it. Ir had also deeply destabilized

order," To understand

the phenomenon

the municipal public

we need only to invoke two fac-

tors: land and organization. Land was hugely important for the Frente. Ir ente red the town thanks to cattle ranchers who lent their estates for it to operate upon," which made the Frente basically untouchable vis-a-vis the police. Ir became involved in rnassive land purchases," as ACD EGAM and ACCU

had done. And a substantial part of its activity was to accurnulate

land through violence. Ir also took over land not only for the Front itself but also for Jorge 40, for Severini, and for Severinis srnall dique of local large cattle ranchers." On the other hand, the Frente Pivijay pararnilitaries were a very loose network, which frequendy took orders from Severini and other influential cattle ranchers; they also received side payrnents frorn thern. Under these conditions,

the Frente had no notion of discipline, and

becarne a personalistic tool for both Severini and Jorge 40. Since the unit was at the service of individuals, one of whose main objectives was land and cartle accurnulation,

they attacked not only poli ti-

cal but also high-yield targets. And rhese were other large ranchers. So by 2003, Severini was ordering the killing ofhis peers to take their properti and livesrock."

43 44

4S

46

47

Which explains rhe depressed comment by the police station commander. Fiscal 22 de la Unidad Nacional de Derechos Humanos y D. 1. H de Barranquilla (2.:: de abril de 2009). Diligencia de Declaración Fredys Jesus Altamar Escobar. Cuadernc original no s' Expediente 2010-00009, Folios 273-277. Informe CTI (Il de diciembre de 2002). Informe no 212 Sección de informacióy análisis sobre Hernán Giraldo. Cuaderno original no 1, Expediente 2OIl-OOOSFolios 83-112. ElEspectador (2009). 'Apadrinados de '40: a la cárceI:ElEspectador, 17 May . Accessed 11July 2017. Informe Comité Interinstitucional Fiscalia, Dijin de Santa Marta (20 de octubre 2004). Informe de Fiscalía-Dijin sobre las AUe. Cuaderno copia no 10, Expediente 2006-00066, Folios 101-127. See, HOY Diario del Magdalena (2010). 'En segun . día de versión libre 'Rafael: 'Caballo: 'Roberto' y 'Ocravio' confesaron autoría de I_

Trajectories and crises 1here are many reports about this actívity." For example Rubén Padilla assassinated

by the Frente; then, his more than

colen and transferred

to an intermediary,

400

head of cattle were

who finaliy delivered

thern to

e Pivijay mayor (who, as seen above, was also a large cattlerancher and :mportant member of the Frente nerworkj.Y The majority of the victims daimed

as well that there were many more unreported

cases. For example,

~ victim asserted that 'the majority of the people who purchase ing ki11ed to take over the animals,""

cattle were

Ranchers not in the Severini dique could also be victimized if they - 11behind in the payment of their quota for the Frente. As other civil:0

s, they could be accused ofbeing evict thern and dispossess them."

artacks against large cattle ranchers

co11aborators with subversion, so as 1he anger and brurality involved in was no less than in other cases. Aíier

hlling Octavio Ropaín Lobo, an ex-mayor ofPivijay and also large cattle rancher, the Frente stole his cattle, agrarian machinery and automobiles.

8

49

So

SI

asesinatos: Diario deLMagdaLena, 1July . Accessed II July 2017. Sala de Conocimiento de Justicia y Paz Integrada de Barranquilla (Atlántico) (22 de abril de 2.015).Audiencia concentrada de formulación y aceptación de cargos del Frente Pivijay. See also, No reporta lugar de expedición (w.d.). Formato Información Desplazados de Gerardo Rafael Orozco Hincapié. Cuaderno principal original no 11, Expediente 2.009-00044, Folios II2.-II6. See also, Fiscal 8 Especializado de la Unidad Nacional de Derechos Humanos en instalaciones del CTr (2.4 de junio de 2005). Diligencia de Declaración de José Alfonso Crespo Osio. Barranquilla (Atlántico) Cuaderno copia no 18,Expediente 2006-00066, Folios 82.-85. Fiscal Decimo de la estructura de Apoyo a la Unidad Nacional de Fiscalías contra el Terrorismo (2.7de Febrero de 2009). Diligencia de Declaración de Rubén Darío Padilla de la Rosa. Barranquilla (Atlántico) Cuaderno principal original no 9, Expediente 2009-00044, Folios 238-2.41. Despacho de Unidad Nacional de Fiscalías (2.1de octubre de 2002). Diligencia de Declaración de Miryam del Socorro Pertuz dentro del radicado 747. Bogotá, Cuaderno copia no 7, Expediente 2005-0012.1, Folios 39-57, p. 5. See, CTr (17 de octubre de 2008). Oficio de Fernando Antonio Jaraba Pacheco. Chibolo (Magdalena), Expediente 2009-00044, Folios 85-86. Informe Comité Interinstitucional Fiscalía, Dijin de Santa Marta (20 de octubre de 2004). Informe de Fiscalia-Dijin sobre las AUC. Cuaderno copia no 10,Expediente 2.006-00066, Folios 10I-U7.

CHAPTER

They apparently

tortured

him before the assassination,

from his face and chest." cotrafficking.53 as welL

removing

the skin

Severini might have also been involved

Jorge 4054 was accused ofbeing

5

in nar-

a major narco-trafíicker

Stability at last?

The ACMM trajectory appears to be substantially different from the pre .. ous examples. On the one hand, the coalition on which it based its governance was different. the demobilization Indeed,

On the other, it had not fallen into a deep crisis before process.

Ramón

of ACD EGAM,

Isaza learnt from experience."

After the destructio

~

Isaza was able to build his group under new rules, Inste

of aspiring to total control,

as ACDEGAM,

fiefdom in which he coexisted

Isaza sought to build a stable

with other actors. He did not tolerate an

shadow of independent popular organization, but on the other hand h allowed mayors and other state officials a real degree of latitude in ter of going on with their business, as long as they did not jeopardize security, Isaza also established

a more distant

the army and the police. Indeed, interaction

52,

was, though,

relationship

they collaborated

ACM __

with respect

permanently."

Thi;

much more discreet, in the case of the army, anc

Ibid.

53

Ibíd,

54

Extradited, and presentIy in a US prison. Tribunal Superior de Bogotá, Sala de Justicia y Paz (2,9 de febrero de 2,016). Scnr Priorizada contra de Ramón María Isaza Arango, Luis Eduardo Zuluaga Ar Oliverio Isaza Gómez, Walter Ochoa Guisao y de Jhon Fredy Gallo Bedoya, . grantes de las Autodefensas Campesinas del Magdalena Medio - ACMM. Tribunal Superior de Bogotá, Sala de Justicia y Paz (31 de octubre de 2,0•• Continuación de la diligencia de audiencia de control de legalidad de los c =contra los señores postulados Ramón María Isaza, Walter Ocho a Guisao, Oli Isaza Gómez, Luis Eduardo Zuluaga Arcila y Jhon Fredy Gallo Bedoya.

55

56

Trajectories and crises in the case of the police it was actually punctuated Isaza claimed that the police was permeated

by open conílict, as

by delinquents," prone to

rreachery, and in general not trustworthy." 1he same can be said about the relationship

that the ACMM

estab-

lished in its territory with the economic elites. 1he quota these elites paid more resembled an extortion, or a mandatory payment, than a sponsorhipo Furthermore, though Isaza regulady reported issues with discipline," which in effect were a major problern for ACMM, by comparison with the paramilitary

norm the ACMM

was a rather tightly knit network whose

decision making lay by far and large within its bounds. And its members were mainly specialists in violence. AlI this, of course, should not be exaggerated. 1he ACMM maintained rrong links with both the army and the police throughout; certainly, it ould not have developed its murderous

activity and/or

maintained

its

rerritorial control without collaborating with them. Mayors could operate autonomously in certain fields, and Isaza did not meddle too much in electoral politics," but there were key decision-making areas which were reserved to the paramilitary; furthermore, as will be seen in Chapter 8, mayors had to adopt new functions to co-ordinate their actions both with rheir constituencies and with the paramilitaries. And the ACMM governance indeed played into the hands of the economic elites, in at least two enses. On the one hand, preventing the entry of guerrillas remained a fundamental elite concern. On the other, elites still had privileged access (O

-9 60

paramilitary

security and violence, if only because they could pay more

Tribunal Superior de Bogotá, Sala de Justicia y Paz (6 de junio de 2007). Diligencia de versión libre del postulado Ramón María Isaza Arango. Many paramilitaries shared rhis opinion. See Chapter 7. Tribunal Superior de Bogotá, Sala de Justicia y Paz (6 de junio de 2007). Diligencia de versión libre del postulado Ramón María Isaza Arango. Tribunal Superior de Bogotá, Sala de Justicia y Paz (25 de noviembre de 2013). Continuación de la Diligencia de Control de legalidad de los postulados Ramón María Isaza, Walter Ochoa Guisao, Oliverio Isaza Gómez, Luis Eduardo Zuluaga Arcila y Jhon Fredy Gallo Bedoya.

166

S

CHAPTER

than any other actor. But the paramilitary also took their cues regarding who was killable, and they regularly rner regional producers associations to discuss who fell into this category."

These targets were invariably assas-

. d or dilsappeare d.62 sinate Nevertheless,

the point

that remains

is that by establishing

dis-

tance and becoming more autonomous, a process that can be called preatorianization," the ACMM was able to avoid the boom and busr cycle. Certainly, since he was stricrIy localistic and did not aspire to expansion, Isaza did not need to establish any strong and explicit relationship with narco-traítickers.

This was not a completely isolated case. Neighborina

Botalón, though probably more open to businesses with narcos, followed a similar path, and he continuously emphasized the objective of cultivating long-term and stable governance. This, however, was not a magic formula to avoid fundamental impasses. The more autonomous was the diíiiculry

and localistic

socia,

the group, the greate-

in aligning the interests of the different supporters

o:

the paramilítary projects, both vertically and horizontally. Isaza suffer endemic tensions with the police; he also lacked a hold over the regiona, political system, which made other paramilitary fiefdoms so power The praetorian experience involved distinct costs for Isaza and the lik

T

Botalón was one of the few paramilitary that at the end was hounded the army colonel that operated in his region. In all these situations, pro tion from above was distincdy

weaker. In Lebrija the early paramilitari

began to steal and kill opportunistically,

61

62 63

--

so the elites became afraid

Tribunal Superior de Bogotá, Sala de Justicia y Paz (21 de enero de 2014). Audi de Patrones de macro-criminalidad. Imputados Ramón María Isaza Arango, Oehoa Guisao, Luis Eduardo Zuluaga Arcila, John Fredy Gallo Bedoya y O . Isaza Gómez. See also the Chapter 6. Akin to the posr-dernobilizarion groups that operate today. By the term a process by which specialists in violence obtain autonomy vis-a-vis po civilian actors, including the capacity of using violenee against them in moments,

-

-r.:zjectories and crises

rzanizcd a meeting with the army colonel of the region to ask him to :rict the group.64

_ random sample of trajectories

~ previous sections 1 controlled for variation through cases chosen with different analytical criteria. Here 1control for variation through a random sample of a list of municipalities with paramilitary presence from 1998 to - e demobilization periodo The Íist of municipalities comes from a coding exercise made by CEDE (the research center of the Universidad de los An des economy faculty), oriented rowards identifying municipalities with zuerrilla and/or paramilitary presence in rhe late 1990S.65 After creating random list of 30 rnunicipaliries coded as with paramilitary presence y CEDE, 1 checked with press and other sources to identify specifically which units were acting in the town. This exercise does not solve all potential problems in the analysis of paramilitary trajecrories. The CEDE list may be imperfect.1n particular, it may still suffer from a large unit bias (with me presence of smaller groups falling below the radar). Besides, 1cover only late paramili taries. Even then, looking at units or subunits operating in randomly chosen municipalities . an important complement to the previous analyses. Focusing on cases not picked because of their irnportance or theoretical relevance, but on rhese units, should dampen some of me potential main biases 1may incur. As seen in Table 4, the sample contains the following units: ACCU / AUC and or Bloque Bananero, Bloque Metro, Bloque Norte, Bloque Central Bolívar, Aurodefensas Campesinas de Meta y de Vichada, Casanare, Bloque Élmer Cárdenas, and Autodefensas del Sur del Magdalena. Of these, rwo are already well known by uso1 already described the boom and bust rrajectory of the Urabá paramilitaries (this includes Bloque Bananero) and

64 65

Later other pararnilitaries, more under rhe control ofkey actors, would take overo Acevedo and Bornacelly 2014.

168

CHAPTER

S

of the paramilitary federation. Even more dramatic, as we have seen, is the Bloque Metro example. Table 4: Lisr of municipalities Blocs

Departamento

Municipalities

ACCU/AUC

Antioquia, Bolívar

Caicedo, Montecristo

Bananero

Antioquia, Córdoba

La Ceja, Tierralta

Metro

Antioquia

San Carlos, San Vicente, San José de la Montaña

Norte

Cesar, Bolívar, Magdalena, Guajira, Córdoba

San Diego; Villanueva, María La Baja; Sabanas de San Ángel, Sabanalarga, Ariguaní, Chivolo; Barrancas, Maicao; Tierralta

BCB

Bolívar, Cesar, Santander, Cundinamarca, Risaralda, Valle

Arenal, San Pablo, Tiquisio, San Martín de Loba, Sirnití, Chimichagua; Rionegro; El Cocuy; La Virginia; YOtoCO

Aurodefensas del Meta y Vichada

Meta

Puerto López

Élmer Cárdenas

Chocó

Unguía, Acandí

Autodefcnsas del Sur del Magdalena

Magdalena

Santa Ana

I

Note: VerdadAbierta (2008). Bloque Elmer Cárdenas de Urabá, Verdad Abierta, 1S Octubre, verdadab ierra.corn/bloq ue-elmer -cardenas-de-uraba/ > . Salas de Justicia y Paz, Tribunales Superiores de Bogotá, Barranquilla Relatoria de Sala de Justicia y Paz de Bogotá. Consolidado

chttps.Z /

y MedeIlín (20 17).

a 2 de mayo de 2017. . Verdad Abierta (2009). 'Aurodefensas Campesinas de! meta y Vchada, Verdad Abierta, 3 febrero .

Misión de Observación Electoral (w.d.) Monografía del Departamento . Ríos.]. (2017). 'Un laboratorio y la desaparición

de guerra en Antioquia:

de las guerrillas', UNISCI

rnedia/www/pag-o Rutas del Conflicto

Dcsmitificando

de Córdoba,

1997 a 2007.

la victoria pararnilitar

Journal, 44, 9-37 . (w.d.). 'Masacre de la Ceja: .

I

-:-r.:zjectories and crises

ádadAbierta

(2.01 1). 'La pelea por La Guajira que nunca acabó: VerdadAbierta,

19 abril,

rrps: / /verdadabicrta.com/ la -pclca -por-la-guajira -q ue- nunca -acabo / > . ras del Conflícco (w.d.). 'Masacre de Maicao', . ?masacre= 101 _ !.isión de Observación

Electoral (w.d.) Monografíadcl

rrpsr/ /moe.org.co/home/

doc/ moe_ mrc/CD/PDF

Departamento

de Córdoba,

1997 a 2.007.

/ cesar.pdf>.

¿ Espectador (2.0 11). 'Bandas criminales operan en 347 municipios', El Espectador, 17 Noviembre chrrpsi/ /webcache.googleusercontent.com/ search ?q=cache: 39-8hEocSOYJ: hrrps:/ /www. despecrador.com/noricias/temadeldia/bandas-criminales-operan-347-municipios-articulo-116S2.+&cd=3&hl=es&ct=clnk&gl=co>. s, J. (2.017). 'Un laboratorio de guerra en Antioquia: la desaparición

de las guerrillas', UNlSCl

edia/www/pag-91876/UNlSCIDP44-IRIOS.pdf>. 'os, J. (2.017). 'Un laboratorio de guerra en Antioquia: la desaparición

Desmitificando

la victoria paramilitar

Journal, 44, 9- 37 . de guerra en Antioquia:

de las guerrillas: UNlSCl]ournal,

media/www/pag-o r 876/UNlSCIDP44Observatorio del Programa presidencial

Desmirificando

la victoria paramílitar

44, 9-37 . de Derechos Humanos

y DIH (2.004) Panorama. Actual

Bolívar. Bogotá: Presidencia de la República. Jádad Abierta (2.008). Bloque Elmer Cárdenas de Urabá, Verdad Abierta, 15 Octubre,

. E Tiempo (2.015). 'San José (Antioquia), el 'pueblito' que lleva una década sin violencia', El Tiempo, 1 febrero, .

Semana (2.006). 'Un tema del que no se habla en Sama Marta, Semana, 2.0Noviembre, www.sernana.corn/on-Iínc/

articulo/ un-tema-del-no-habla

-santa-rnarta/S

Misión de Observación Electoral (w.d.) Monografía del Departamento

. del Cesar, 1997 a 2.007.

. Rutas del Conflicto (w.d.) 'Masacre de Caicedo', .

The Bloque Noroccidental was a heterogeneous and very short-lived assortment of members of the Bloque Héroes de Granada - a Eully criminalized bloc led by the narco Don Berna - and the Bloque Metro." The

66

Its leader, aka Memín, created a post-dernobilization group called Águilas Negras (Black Eagles). See, Observatorio del Programa Presidencial de Derechos Humanos y DlH (2.006). Panorama actual del Occidente Antioqueño. Bogotá: Vicepresidencia de la República . Accessed II July 2017. VerdadAbierta (2008). 'Bloque Elmer Cárdenas de Urabá, VerdadAbierta, 14 October . Accessed II J 2017.

Trejectories and crises

173

First, 1examined the most relevant and important paramilitary units. This includes the experience of the national federation, and the Puerto Boyacá and Urabá fiefdoms in the 1980s and 1990S, respectively. Second, 1studied least likely cases: those in which we should observe stable paramilitary domination, and instead we find crisis, massive violence against civilians, and disarray (Frente Pivijay). Third, referencewas made to casesthat diverge, at least relatively, from the predicted rrajectory, such as me Ramón Isaza lf-defenses. Fourth and last, a randomly chosen - to dampen large unit and other biases - sample oflate paramilitary units was examined. Thcse es may not cover the whole of the paramilitary diversiry,but they provide a good approximation. Together they show a consistent trend: very few paramilitary units were able to escape the boom and bust cycles created by rheir narcotization, internal bickering and opportunistic violence, which made them a target in the war on drugs and critically undermined their legitimacy vis-a-visthe United States and some national decision rnakers." For the paramilitary to work, it was necessary that they co-ordinate their activiry among thernselves, and with some key state agencies. Bur for the paramilitary to exist, they had to match a myriad of local and regional demands, and to respond both to their interests and to the system ofincenaves of the organization that had been ser up in that particular territory. To align all these interests was a tall order, and frequendy proved to be impossible. There may be exceptions, but this was the main trend and the basic paramilitary experience, over time (it captures the main units in me 1980S, the 1990S and until the end) and space (federation, expansion, and me experience of, at least, the late paramilitarism). Where did the boom and bust cycles come from? 'Ihey can be undertood within the context of the way the paramilitaries were organized and the constraints under which they operated. The organizational cornrnonalities of the paramilitaries allowed for a wide amount of latitude regarding opportunistic violence. The paramilitaries were summoned by different sectors of the economic (particularly agrarian) elites, not only on anti-subversive grounds but with the expectation that they would be

Even assuming that the latter were cornpletcly cynical and self-regarding, and operated exclusively on rhe ground of self-interest.

CHAPTER

174

good, in general, for business. But if and when the paramilitaries

S

began to

serve only specific individuals - which, by organizational design, happened relatively frequently - then they had strong incentives to attack those very elites, as they were the most high-yield

targets. Even when this scenario

did not take place, the paramilitary group could take a praetorian turn, which - despite being functional to some of the elites - carne at the cost of sustained extortion and a fair degree of risk and uncertainty, some of the intra-systemic

components

of the paramilitary

extremely localistic, and instead of supporting 1he increasing narcotization

Furthermore, coalition were

expansion, they opposed it.

of the paramilitaries

also played a funda-

mental role in pararnilitary interne cine conflict, crises and boom and bust cyeles. Against the folk rheories according to which the paramilitaries were initially 'good' and then lost their path - theories, as seen above, shared by paramilitaries

such as Carlos Castaño

and Doble Cero - economic

criminals had a role from the beginning inside the pararnilitary (Chapters

2

and

coalition

4). However, a simple mechanism - the increasing financial

demands of war and expansion, coupled with the dramatic inefhciency of the main of the intra-systemic elites that participated regularly in regional paramilitary coalitions - tended to transform the narco-trafhckers into the protagonists

of the respective unit and this became a fundamental

bilizing force, given the conditions

upon which Colombian

desta-

sovereignrv

was based in the periodo Under the 1982-2007 conditions, in effect, narcotized coalitions coulc not be incoporated explicitly to any national coalition, Once again: fro the beginning we observe alliances and interactions of the Colornbiar; state - and also the United States - with narcos, the promotion of links with some criminals against others, etc. However, coalitions that were narcotized above a threshold could simply not be accepted by the Colombi state as a proper interlocutor to whom to delegate territorial control. B then the paramilitaries were Iett in a deep impasse. 1hey could not gro and expand based only on the economies of the intra-systemic member their coalition. But if they grew and expanded, this would set them ag . not only Colombian 1he advancement

national decision makers, but also the United Stares,

of the narcos also triggered violent tensions within

between different paramilitary

units, The paramilitaries

competed agairz

-:-rajectories and crises

175

each other for territorial control, and aíter the narcos accumulated sufiicient power they had the resources, incentives and proclivities to punish :hose who opposed their presence. Both dimensions interacted, as the unraveling of intra-systernic oalitions, or me autonomization of the paramilitaries aíter a successful inception in a territory, opened the door for unexpected trengthened

outcomes and

the power of the narcos within the paramilitary.

AlI in all, the situation was the following. 1he paramilitaries were a orce that tried to co-ordinate intra-systemic and illegal elites on an antisubversive platform and through the private provision of security and violence. However, in the process of doing so they fell into disarray, and disorganized the territorial arrangements they operated upon, because rhey fractured alliances and networks in many ways. 1hey did so first, by rriggering intractable contradictions

around sovereignty. Secondly, they

broke down coalitions and created severe principal-agent issues through incentives for opportunistic violence. 1hird, by weakening the horizontal (within a single territoriallevel) or vertical (across territorial levels) alignment of interests they needed in order to co-ordinate their different ponsors. 1hese social impasses generally expressed thernselves in boom and bust cycles.

HAPTER

6

ilie paramilitaries, the army and the police

~ troduction

- . chapter isdedicated to the relationship between the army and police .ch in Colombia are grouped, together with other armed bureaucracies, der a single heading, Fuerza Pública (FP) - and the paramilitaries. Four academic theories have been issued to describe and explain this - ationship. The hrst one holds that the paramilitaries were an illegal and cotized force, which had the capacity ofbuying off some FP members, ur that the institution as a whole remained spotless (the rotten apples eory: see for example Torrijos 2015)' This, by the way,is also the explana::on issued by the majority of state ofhcials themselves (Ronderos 2015).1 .: ccording to the second theory, the paramilitaries were an instrument of e state used to implement its terroristic policy while endowing itself with gleaf of'plausible deniability' (Raphael aoro, Medina and Téllez 1994). -=neorigins of the pro-paramilitary orientation of the Colombian FP were • e Unired States doctrine of national security,promoted throughout Latín _-unericaduring the Cold War. The rhird theory highlights the fact that the amilitaries also interacted with narco-traffickers, which frequendy put - em at odds with the state (Ramírez et al. 2005). The fourth theory stresses at the collusion/ connivance between the state and the paramilitaries processed through the intermediation of regional intcrests (Uprimny and Vargas 1990, Leal and Dávila 1991, Reyes 1991 and 1997, González,

See also, Caracol.com (2.007). 'El comandante del Ejército se defiende de los señalamientos del Ángeles Times; Caracol Radio, 26 March . Accessed !O August 2017. Tribunal Superior de Bogotá, Sala de Justicia y Paz (25 de septiembre 2015). Audiencia Concentrada y Priorizada Bloque Central Bolívar. Proceso que se adelanta contra 285 Postulados ajusticia y Paz exintegrantes del BCB.

Tbe paramilitaries,

the army and the police

Similar anti-paramilitary characters can be found in the police; possibly more than in the army. Even then, this count is also depressingly low. Symptomatically, theír denunciations were rarely if ever taken into account by the police leadership; the majority were harassed and marginalized aíter they made their indictrnents." is the most successful paramilitary-FP police between

among

interaction 2012

Even General

and

those leading - he eventually

2015 -

corroborates

Palomino,

whose trajectory

figures that openly opposed made it to the head of the this. He was not friendly

to the paramilitaries that committed a massive massacre in the town of Macayepo." But he was removed from his station - as the politician (Álvaro García Romero) that was organizing the massacre called President Pastrana and asked him to transfer such an uncomfortable officer (see Chapter 8).28 A soldier convicted of collaboration

with the paramilitaries

concluded

me following in aJyP session: 'A high percentage (of soldiers) lent thernelves to obtaining results through an alliance with the self-defenses. This is not an isolated case, it is not as though

they singled me out, because I

was one of the first singled out in all the country, as a bandit, as a rat (sorry for the word),

(I suffered)

the dishonor

of a delinquent

... I defiled the

red beret of the special forces, I was a rotten apple. No, there were several rotten apples that lent ourselves to that. You are right, Mrs Magistrate,

this

was systemic, and appeared in all the brigades, in all the battalions, in a11 me companies at a nationallevel. Not everybody in the army lent himself

Semana Video (2.014). 'El principal testimonio que enredó a Santiago Uribc, Semana, 27 January . Accessed 14July 2.017.See also, Coronel, D. (2.014). 'El Presidente Uribe me dio contratos para callarrnc, Semana, 1 February . Accessed 14 July 2.017. León, J. (2.012). 'Arranca la Carrera por la sucesión del General Naranjo: La Silla Yácía, 19 April . Accessed 14 July 2.017. See also, Semana (2002). 'Coincidencias Macabras, Semana, z june . Accessed 19August 2017-See also, VerdadAbíerta (2010) 'Condenan a 40 años a Álvaro 'el Gordo' Gardá, Verdad Abierta, 23 February . Accessed 8 July 2017.

CHAPTER 6

for all rhis, but it did happen was systematic.?"

The paramilitary

of the paramilitaries,

than has been reported.

they were created and sponsored a paramilitary

regions ... Ir

perspective

The perspective complex

in several units ... in different

on the other hand, is somewhat

They have asserted

more

time and again thar

by the army. '1 have said, Úber Bánquez

leader from the Atlantic

Coast states sternly, 'that the self-

defenses never acted alone, they ... counted upon the complicity of the army and the police'." Another prominent paramilitary, Rodrigo Pérez Álzate, dedared that 'it is a secret to nobody that paramilitarism was born within army brigades and battalions, especially in the Magdalena Medio region.?' Other

important

leaders have produced

The paramilitaries

utterances

of the same effect.

were also fully aware that countingupon

lusion was for thern their most important

army col-

asset. The units that were biz

and strong enough to have written statutes explicitly prohibited fightina against the arrny," a rule that certainly covered neither the police nor civilian bureaucracies,

29

30

31

32

which were the targets of spectacular

attacks (especiallv

Tribunal Superior de Bogotá, Sala de Justicia y Paz (23 de septiembre 2015). Audiencia Concentrada y Priorizada Bloque Central Bolívar. Proceso que se adelanta contra 2. Postulados ajusticia y Paz exintegrantes del BCB, p. 3. See also Rojas and Benavides, 2017. Literally 'fuerza pública'. See, Tribunal Superior de Bogotá, Sala de Justicia y Paz (27 de abril de 2010). Diligencia de Legalización de Cargos a los postulados Úber Bánquez Martínez y Edward Cobos Téllez, p. 36. Tribunal Superior de Bogotá, Sala de Justicia y Paz (6 de Octubre de 2015). Audiencia Concentrada para Imputación de Cargos contra postulados del Bloque Central Bolívar, p. !O. Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (1998). Estatuto de Constitución y Régimen Disciplinario. [s.n.] AUe. See also, Aranguren 2001 and VerdadAbierta (2012. _ 'Paramilitares y autoridades delinquieron de la mano en Nariño' Verdad Abierta, 31 August . Accessed 14 July 2017.

The paramilitaries,

the army and the police

the judiciary, see La Rochela massacre (CNRR 20 10 )).33 Even on the few occasions in which they, in fact, carne under tire by the military, rhe paramilitaries generally chose not to respond.Y The friendly attitude of the paramilitaries towards the army was inspired, though, by much more than the understanding of the instrumental value ofhaving it as an ally. Many pararnilitaries carne actually from the army and the poi ice - see the section on mechanisms - and had a deep seated identity relationship with them. The link with the national agencies that embodied legality and law and order was as well a fundamental source of paramilitary legitimacy. To be legitimized by army sponsorship, tolerance or collusion was key to holding together several regional paramilitary coalitions constituted by heterogeneous intra-systemic and criminal (narco-traffickers) actors. The same can be said about local authorities, for whom the behavior of the army and the police was not only a necessary reference point - without their support they could not even dream of opposing any non-state armed group in their rerritories - but also a public signal about what could or could not be done. The legitimizing effect of the alliance with the FP did not operate only at the regional coalition level. For the rank and Iile the sense of being aligned with legality and thus substantially reducing risk was crucial, among other things because the incentives that the paramilitaries offered attracted a followership intent on material gains (Weinstein 2007) and not enormously interested in facing the tire power of the army. '1 ldi: the self-defenses, says a member of the ACCU, 'in February 13 this year ... 1surrendered, because 1 demanded my retirement and they did not want to grant it to me, and there was already a war against the government, and we had the order of attacking the police, the army, the fiscalía, so 1 decided to Ieave.?"

33

34 3S

See also Ramón lsaza Tribunal Superior de Bogotá, Sala de Justicia y Paz (2 de mayo del 2007). Diligencia de versión libre del postulado Ramón María Isaza Arango, miembro y representante de las Autodcfensas Campesinas del Magdalena Medio. Carlos Castaño, claimed that troopers werc only allowed to answer army fire in extremis. This matches well me known evidence. See, Aranguren 2001. Fiscalía adscrita a la Unidad Nacional de Derechos Humanos de Medellín (26 de febrero de 1998). Diligencia de Indagatoria de Francisco Enrique Villalba.lnformes Policía Judicial, Anexo 11.Expediente 2007-0118-08, Folio: 126-131, p. 2.

CHAPTER

6

On the other hand, the paramilitaries were created to support the army and the police, but precisely on the grounds that these agencies had shortcomings in sustaining a successful anti -subversive war. In some of the main paramilitary ideological documents this awareness was transformed into a discourse

against

under the influence

the national

state and its neglect

of the pararnilitary."

Some paramilitary

of the regions commanders

openly criticized the way in which the state security agencies operated. For example, according to Rodrigo Pérez Alzate, 'their operational ineptitude was unbelievable

... a lieutenant

in the region was afraid of patrolling

lest

a soldier of his was killed, because then this would affect his Cv, and he would be made responsible, so this was very uneven ... 1he unevenness between the activiry of a regular and an irregular force fighting each other is enormous,

a civilian with the outlook

of a common

civilian puts a bomb

and kills you. Al! this started to feed the relationship between the police, and the self-defense groups.'37 So the foundational the relationship

were that the paramilitaries

the army, terms of

could effectively do what the

military could not - in effect an outsourcing motive - because they were not bound by institutional restraint. In this sense, the pararnilitaries considered themselves superior to the army. 1he paramilitary feelings towards the police seem to have been much more mixed. Certainly, Colombian policemen were much less protecte from paramilitary attacks than soldiers," not only because not hitting them was not a clearly established not live in barracks, separated

formal rule, but also because policemen from the population;

di¿

thus, they were easier

to track down in case the paramilitary decided to prey on thern. Uni such as Ramón Isazas ACMM, which had a good working relationshi with the police, did not shrink from violent showdowns

36 37

38 39

El Tiempo

with them'" (see

(2004). 'Paras: 120 minutos en el Congreso'. El Tiempo, 29 July, pp. : and a. Interview with Rodrigo Pérez Álzate, alias '[ulián Bolívar' (10 de noviembre de 201' Medellín, p. 9. Although occasionally we find paramilitaries attacking and cven assassinating soldiers, Tribunal Superior de Bogotá, Sala de Justicia y Paz (29 de febrero de 2016). Semen' Proferida a Ramón María Isaza Arango, alias 'Moncho, 'El Viejo' o 'Munrra',

Tbe paramilitaries,

the army and the police

193

next section). Other paramilitaries considered the police untrustworthy and corrupt; 40 these were not isolated opinions, and as will be seen in the next section they did not appear by chanceo The shadows of doubt eventualiy covered the military, as well, at least in some regions. Recapitulating his experience

as a leader, a prominent

paramilitary

like Diego Vecino

ould invoke a 'saying' (maybe among the paramilitaries according to which he olicernen'."

'did not believe in friendships

he spoke withr ) of soldiers

or

The arrny and the police, and the differential interaction with rhe paramilitaries

Army>

police and the state

Does it make sense - in view of the evidence of large-scale collusion and onnivance with the paramilitaries both in the police and the army - to con.der as analytically significant the differences between both agencies? The recent literarure on the police has focused precisely on non-differentiation don the 'militarization'

of the police (Balko 2006), a trend from which

Colombia certainly has not escaped (Jiménez and Turizo 2OII). And as Centeno (2014) has shown, in Latin American states the functional and organizational

differentiation

between armies and police is weak. Ir might

oe even weaker in Colombia, where the police are highly militarized, and

.eo -!

Eduardo Zuluaga Arcila, alias 'Macgyver', Oliverio Isaza Gómez, alias 'Rubén' o 'terror'; Walter Ochoa Guisao Alias, 'el gurre' y de Jhon Fredy Gallo Bedoya, alias 'pájaro' o 'hernán. Magistrada Ponente Uldi 'Teresa Jiménez López. El Tiempo (2.001). 'Policía y Paras chocan por Niche;EI Tiempo, 17January . Accessed 12.August 2.017. Tribunal Superior de Bogotá, Sala de Justicia y Paz (8 de septiembre de 2.009). Audiencia de Legalización de Cargos a postulados Úber Bánquez Martínez y Edward Cobos Téllez, p. 9.

CHAPTER 6

194 belonging to the MOD. Moreover, in Colombia involved in the counter-insurgent war.

the police were heavily

Despite this, there are theoretical and empirical grounds to ask if meaningful differences between army and police remain. Armies are forces oriented to defending or expanding the territory of a given political authority, which are designed, equipped and trained to wield big means ofviolence (Giustozzi 2009). The so-called bellicist theories of the state have found a proper, and fundamental, place for armies in the explanations of differential trajectories of state building: states made war, and war made the states, in

Tilly's concise conclusion (1975). Several authors have indeed made the case that this mechanism applies only to Europe in certain historical periodo Bur Centeno (2014) actually used Til1y's perspective to analyze Latin American state weakness, and showed that states in the subcontinent

did not make

war, thus did not gather taxes, and were focused more on the internal enem.· (subversion) than on fighting against their neighbors. In the absence of the constructive

mechanism

found by Til1y, Latin American states became ar

the same time highly ineffective and repressive. The army adopted the role of a political police. However, as Kurtz (2013) has highlighted, Centeno' theory does not capture variation regarding state building within Latin American states, which is broad. Neither do es it take on board the fact thar the relationship between army and state is mediated by the political regime. Indeed, the adoption

by the army of the role of a political police, under

the aegis of the national securiry doctrine, was associated with a massive breakdown of democracy throughout the continent. Bur in Colombia the army waged its counter-insurgent

war under civilian control.

The police is an armed body oriented towards the preservation of social/public order on an everyday basis." In contrast to the army - in charge of territorial

integrity and of dealingwith

existential threats to the

state - the police enforce the laws and basic rules of the game established

42

Corte Constitucional (27 de enero de 1994). Sentencia no C-024/ 94: Policía Judicial, concepto. Policía Judicial, funciones. . Accessed 5 May 2018.

Theparamilitaries, tbe army and the police

195

by the state'". Here sovereignty appears in the guise of the management of order. In fact, in Europe the very notion of policing was contemporaneous - and intimately related - with the birth of a complex continental state-systern (Liang 1992). Considering that both institutions are armed bodies at the core of the modern notion of sovereignty, the army and the police also exhibir striking and 'structural'

- in the sense that they result direcdy from the

main function each performs - differences. The army wields big means of violence, whereas the police normally have much more modest fire power. The army is national and highly centralized. In many countries, including Colombia (Gutiérrez 2014), policemen have instead been historically embedded in tighrly connected local networks administered by politicians. The army is highly hierarchical, and highly regulated by a minute grid of rules. The police, by its very nature, allows a broad degree of discretion regardingwhich level bureaucrats, characteristics

rules to enforce and how (Lipsky 2010). 'Street

according to Lipsky, make policy on the ay. 'Certain

of the jobs of street-level bureaucrats

make it difficult, if

not impossible, to severely reduce discretion. They involve complex tasks for which elaboration of rules, guidelines, or instructions cannot circumscribe the alternatives' (Lipsky 2010: 15). The army generally is insulated from direct political contestation, while the police - as the guardian of order, linked to local politicians and a not-so hierarchical body - is ernbedded in every day political controversy. The status of the police regarding its placement in the territorial structure of the Colombian state is moot; as seen in Chapter 2, according to the 1991 Constitution responsible both to their hierarchical

policemen were

superiors and to the mayors of the

municipalities where they operated. As being more direcdy linked to active politicians, the Colombian police are certainly much less insulated from political contestation than the army. And the Colombian police show all me traits of street-level bureaucrats, crucially including discretion.

43

This is directly related to the FP-paramilitary interface. According to at leasr some Colombian army officers, the paramiliraries were not a rhrear to rhe state, so rhey were a criminal phenomenon, to be dealr with exclusively by the police (Mazzei 9:

200

II7)·

6

CHAPTER

The origins: The army and the operational dimensions ofthe national security doctrine 1he 'civilian oursourcing' of anti-subversive activities - based on the United States craíted doctrine of national security - had already be en decided in the early 1960s, and had as an objective 'to attract civilians with literacy, health and public works task forces, and take away the popular support fram armed rebel organizations 1his sounds like a conventional

... (and obtain) support' for the military. enough 'hearts and minds program'. Bur

in the early 1960s we already find army plans to organize the population terms of self-defense, seeking the support

and participation

in

of 'individu-

als ofboth sexes who have military training or experience' and to supply thern with weapons, ammunition, food, transport and communication equipment (Cinep 2003b: 1). AlI this was promoted and reinforced by the Yarborough mission - coming fram Special Warfare Center of Fort Bragg, a top-Ievel U.S. military academy - which established that 'a team must be created right now to select civilian and military personnel, so that it can be trained in clandestine

repressive operations,

should they be

necessary in the future. 1his rnust support the development of a civilian military structure that may become important in case the Colombian security situation dereriorates

even more. Such structure will be important

to

press forward changes that we know will be necessary, to put in movemem counter-agents

and counter-propaganda

sabotage and paramilitary of communism.

and, if necessary, to implemem

terrorist actions against recognized supporter

1he United

States must support

this (Cinep 2003C, see

also CHCV 2015)' So here we are facing another major counterinsurgem policy, take the water away fram the fish, with its terroristic components, its targeting of civilians, and its involvement of civilians in war as combatants." 1his logic was enshrined operationally

in several Colombia s army manuals

and other documents. For exarnple, a 1987 counterinsurgent manual stat that 'the insurgents can be classified in two main groups: the population and the armed graup (proper)'

44

Which, as ir is worthwhile Humanitarian Law.

(Cinep 2003C).

to remember, goes dírectly against International

Theparamilitaries, the army and tbe police

197

1he doctrine of national security made the creation of self-defenses a fundamental

strategy for Colombian

counter-insurgency

operations, legiti-

mized thern from the point of view of strategic national objectives, and allowed thern to operate against both humanitarian and Colornbian law. By me 1980s, the Colombian armywas deeply permeated by the national security doctrine in a quite sinister variation (see for example Landazábal 1988 and 1990). It was programmatically

anti-subversive, as no other Colombian

tate agency was, it was taking the brunt of the war, and had a strong stake in winning the war militarily and not mainly by political means, which is the point ofRomero (2003).45 Indeed, some officers held the 'stab in the back' theory, according to which righteous military leaders had been betrayed by corrupt and unreliable politicians who agreed to peace processes with ubversives precisely when the war was about to be won (Landazábal 1983 and 1985). However, as Leal (2003 and 2OII) has shown, the doctrine of national security had its ups and downs and was interpreted

differentially

during the period covered in this book: it did not always had a front seat in the policy discussions of the Colombian security establishment. By the 1990S, senior officers were taking their ideas pragmatically from different ources, depending on national and global constraints, though some core notions of the national securiry doctrine were never overcome.

J1aintaining social order in paramilitary jiifdoms The three key words to understand

the relationship

of the paramilitaries

with the police are variation, public order, and discretion. 1hese three words in turn also synthesize the speciíicities of the police-paramilitary interface vis-a-vis the army-paramilitary

interface.

As happens with many of the relationships discussed in this book, variation regarding the way in which police and paramilitaries interacted was institutionally fixed. Mayors were the heads of municipal public order, which meant that active politicians had immediate incidence in the way in

~)

Richani (1997) claims rhar addirionally waging rhe war allowed the highesr cadres to have access to economic gains.

CHAPTER

which they operated. In those places where paramilitaries

6

achieved nearly

total control, it was highly probable that the police became simply a cog in the paramilitarized public ordcr.Y This involved processing information, putting subversives and offenders under control, and defending property rights: what public order is about. Only that in the paramilitarized public order the information was funneled to the self-defenses - almost always with Iethal purposes preferentially

- the protection

to the paramilitary

of property

coalition,

rights was provided

and supposed

deviants and

subversive were assassinated. 1hus, for example, policemen gathered information about civilians and transferred it to the paramilitaries (Chapter 7). 1hey provided violent support to the paramilitaries when they dispossessed peasants from their land (Chapter 10).47 Paramilitaries and the police also launched homicidal attacks against civilian targets in - 'perfect coordination' - according to a paramilitary Chapter 8).48

(this includes local authorities,

see also

On the other hand, the protection of public order and the fight against criminaliry could put policemen at odds with paramilitaries, 1he anti-narcotics police regulady clashed with thern 49 also even in some their solidly

46

47

1hough they are at least some reponed cases of policemcn condcmning at least passive!y - that is, without taking any further actions - the paramilitaries when thev went above a threshold of violence. See, Fiscalía General de la Nación (u de mayo de 2007). Declaración de Richard Antonio Montealegre. Cuaderno original no 1, Expediente 2.010-00009, Folios 2.58-2.77. Fiscalía 1" especializada de conocimiento de la unidad de asuntos humanitarios de la ciudad de Santa Mana (14 de abril de 2010). Diligencia de declaración de Alexander Javier Madarriaga de Ávila. Cuaderno Anexo no 20, Expediente 2.013-00169, Folios: 2.2.1-2.2.3·

48

49

1hey indeed could also protect the paramilitaries with strategic invisibility, See, Tribunal Superior de Bogotá (2.1 de Agosto de 2013). Declaración Superior de Bogotá, Sala de Justicia y Paz. Declaración de postulados Guillermo Pérez Alzate e Iván Roberto Duque. See also, Ariguaní al Día (w.d.). Policía de El Difícil concertó crimen de! ex alcalde Andrés Palmera Anaya, Ariguaní al día, w.d. . Accessed 2. June 2018. Fiscal 2.7 Especializado de la Unidad Nacional de Derechos Humanos y DIH (5 de septiembre de 2005). Declaración de Liliana Arboleda. Expediente 2013-00033

Theparamilitaries, the army and the police

199

established paramilitary fiefdoms. This could have serious consequences; at least one major intra-paramilitary war (Giraldo against the Bloque Norte) was caused by the assassination of anti-narcotics policemen who, rogether with a D EA agent, were sniffing around." This also applies to other illegal economies that were strategic for me paramilitaries, as me draining of oil pipes. At the same time, the discretionary capacity of the policemen - as individuals, not as a strategic unit or agency-level decision - of seeing or not the paramilitaries aUowed the former to sell their blindness, sometimes very weU. Because of mis, the relarionship between policemen and paramilitaries was much more mediared by payments, but also by the exchange of favors. For many paramiliraries, this made the policemen vulnerable to be boughr offby some of their adversaries, including not only subversives but also narco-trafíickers. Ramón Isaza, for one, believed rhat in the early 1990Sthe police ofhis territories were put at the service ofPablo Escobar and the Medellín cartel." Thus, they entertained deep doubts about the oyalty and behavior of the police, much more than with the army. A good example of all this is precisely the interaction that the police held with the Autodefensas Campesinas del Magdalena Medio (ACMM) of Ramón Isaza. As seen in previous chapters, Isaza built fram the 1990S on a sui generis control of a territory which in the 1980s had already been der the aegis of ACDEGAM. Isaza would not have been able to do it wirhout counting with the police. The police paramilitary collaboration zies were very thick. The paramilitaries requested frequent police sup?Ort for several operations (rypically including social cleansing). But me

so

Folios 266-275. See also, Fiscal 27 Especializado de la Unidad Nacional de Derechos Humanos y D IH (5 de septiembre de 2005). Declaración de Jaider Linan. Expediente 2013-00033, Folios 276-279. Juzgado Único Penal del Circuito Especializado de Santa Marta (28 de enero de 2002). Relación de eventos violentos del mes de enero en Santa Marta. Expediente 2008-00075, Folios 129-132, Informe DNCTI-DI-SIA-C8. El Espectador (2012). 'Ramón Isaza dio nuevos detalles de la guerra en contra de Pablo Escobar: El Espectador, 4 November . Accessed 15July 2017.

CHAPTER

200

police in turn also asked help from the paramilitaries paramilitarized)

socialorder.

6

to maintain (a highly

For example, aíter capturing several times

a delinquent - typically tagged by the paramilitaries as subversive - and seeing that he was always released, a policeman from the town of Argelia requested the people ofIsaza to kill him." In other towns different policemen could give to the paramilitaries lists of suspicious people to be killed. Socialleaders could make part of such lists. 53 The exchange of information also included the planning of massacres." And of course the police could simply ignore the presence of the paramilitaries unhindered."

This became a nice source ofincome

and allow thern to act for some policemen."

At the same time, Isaza stated that the paramilitaries in the underground.

Contrary

from time to time the ACMM

had to remain

to their standard experience with the army, paramilitaries

ended fighting openly with

the police, even in the course of anti-subversive sallies." Narco-trafficking played a role in many of these tensions. Isaza claims to have helped the

52

S3

54

SS

56

57

Diligencia de Versión Libre Ramón María Isaza Arango. Fiscalía General de la Nación. Fiscal segundo de la Unidad Nacional de Fiscalía la para la Justicia y la Paz. 7 Junio 2007. Segunda Sesión Audiencia de Concentrada de Formulación y Legalización de cargos. Amodefensas Campesinas del Magdalena Medio. Sala de Justicia y Paz. Tribunal Superior de Bogotá. Magistrado ponente Dr Eduardo Castellanos Roso. Radicado 20°782855. 14 Noviembre 2012. Segunda Sesión Diligencia de Versión Libre Ramón María Isaza Arango. Fiscalía General de la Nación. Fiscal segundo de la Unidad Nacional de Fiscalía la para la Justicia y la Paz. 30 Abril 2007. Segunda Sesión Tribunal Superior de Bogotá. Sala de Justicia y Paz (7 de junio de 2007). Diligencia de versión libre del postulado Ramón María Isaza Arango. Duque. C. (2OII). 'Grupos paramilitares también financiaron a la policía secreta colombiana: Colectivo de abogados José Alvear, 26 August < https://www.colectivodeabogados.org/Grupos-paramilitares-tambien>. Accessed 28 June 2018. See also, El Tiempo (2008). '$700 millones pagaban autodefensas a policías por informes de inteligencia. revela Mancuso. Ez' Tiempo. 20 November . Accessed 28 June 2018. 1 found no analogous episode with the army. Tribunal Superior de Bogotá, Sala de Justicia y Paz (30 de abril de 2007). Diligencia de versión libre del postulado Ramón María Isaza Arango.

Theparamilitaries, the army and the police

201

police free itself from the claws ofPablo

Escobar, who, as seen in previous

chapters, declared a war against the state and launched sive against the police (including of the force). Isaza and ACMM policemen

payments members

were in the payroll of different

a murderous

for every assassinated member believed, however, that many narco-trafiickers

ously in their own payroll and in the narco-trafhckers'}, they would use their discretion

offen-

(or simultane-

so they feared that

to double cross thern or at least black-mail

thern, This fear appears in the accounts of many other paramilitaries

as well.

Below the agency level relationships

Enabling and constraining political context The relationship between the security agencies of the state and me paramilitaries could develop more or less openly as seen in The rotten apples theory of this chapter, but within bounds. leaders wanted to have the military

Indeed, all major political forces and on their side so they were not enthu-

siastic about meddling with the paramilitary problem. to appease them, because before 2002 all governments instability, and were regularly launching which were deplored ion making problems

They also needed suffered endemic

peace initiatives with the guerrillas

by the army. The solution

they found to their deci-

was to obtain military suppon,

or at least tolerance,

rhrough widespread concessions by the political system in exchange for their rolerance to peace initiatives. However, some important remained beyond the control rhe international cornmuniry, inasmuch

as it was independent

rhe media, national-global

-8

sources of pressure

of the Colombian securiry establishment: especially the United States, the judiciary,

(human

of the political

system, some sectors of

rights defenders,

socialleaders,

etc.)."

And these were the sources of protection for scores ofhuman rights defenders. Both the judiciary and the press that acted with independence paid a dear price for it. See, Guerrero 2010, Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica 2015.

CHAPTER 6

202

During the Uribe administrations (2002-2010) this changed, because the executive did have the latitude and the political muscle to discipline the military, but such discipline was oriented exclusively towards the demand for anti-subversive results. AlI this blocked the democratic mechanisms that may well have exposed the collusion/ connivance between the FP and the paramilitaries, but at the same time constrained those interactions. 1he situation of the police was somewhat different. also had the capacity to block, or at least limit substantially,

Certainly, they civilian control.

But by their very nature they were much more related to national and local politics, and their large-scale scandals of involvement made thern more vulnerable

with narco-trafficking

vis-a-vis the United States. Actually, the police

reform under Samper was direcdy sponsored

by the United States, and the

police director of the period was also chosen in negotiation with the United States. 1his further complicated their relationship with the paramilitaries (Camacho 2000).59 In this context, agency level developed of relationship.

dynamic

FP-paramilitary

and flourished.

relationships

1 highlight

1he first two are individual:

selective incentives

vidual biography. 1he other one are power structures coalitions.

Let us consider

each mechanism

below the

here three such types and indi-

associated to regional

briefly.

Selective incentives 1he fact that the paramilitaries allowed for individual access to rents (Chapter 4) was a permanent source of income for corrupt state officials. Many units paid a salary of sorts to soldiers and policemen. not so rnodest."

1he fees were

1hey could also pay thern for speciíic actions. But side

payments from the paramilitary to members of the security agencies of the state did not always obey an organizationallogic. 1he paramilitary leader

S9 60

El Tiempo

(1994). 'Barrida en la cúpula de F. A.: El Tiempo, 2.3 Novernber . Accessed 9 July 2.018. Fiscal z.z, de la UNAT y Estructura de Apoyo Parapolítica (2.4 de febrero de 2.OIl). Declaración de Manuel Agustín Perea Bolaños. Santa Marta, Cuaderno Copias no 6, Radicado 02.65 SIJUF, Expediente 2.013-00169, Folios 2.07-2.14.

Theparamilitaries, the army and tbe police

203

Codazzi was also engaged in thefi:, and paid a lieutenant a substantial figure to protect the stash where he had hidden the stolen goodS.61 The very growth of the paramilitary undertaking also was a source of rents for both policemen and soldiers. They could receive a cut from the percentages they obtained from contracts, but also be used to collect those percentages from absent-minded contractors who forgot to pay their fees.62 Illegal businesses, naturally, were an unending source of riches for all the members of me involved network: this includes, prominendy, narco-trafficking, but also draining oil pipelines and contrabando For example, the Bloque Norte boss Jorge 40 described how the policemen were 'delighted' every time they saw a paramilitary contraband transport, because this meant money for thern." Sometimes the paramilitaries had to circumvent institutional design to establish a stable collaboration with the army or the police. Since me year 199064 policemen (especially officers with some aurhority) were rotated on a regular basis, precisely to prevent that they established a good relationship with illegal actors or their regional sponsors. 65'Ihis prompted me paramilitaries to search for contacts among the rank and file who were exposed to much less rotation. 'Ihrough this device rhey obrained the information they needed."

61

62

63

64 65

66

Unidad Nacional de Derechos Humanos (2. de agosto de 2006). Declaración de Manuel Dionicio Valdez Marbello. Barranquilla, Cuaderno Original no 31, radicado 935, Expediente 2006-00066, Folios 191-193. Fiscal delegado ante los Jueces Penales del Circuito Especializado, adscrito Unidad de Derechos Humanos y DIH, despacho 28 (26 de noviembre de 2007). Declaración de Willinton Javier Sánchez Naranjo sobre sindicados Héctor German Buítrago, Ubaldin Vallejo Martínez, José Mauricio Jiménez. Yopal, Cuaderno de Copias no 2, Radicado 2009-0117, Folios 105-108. Magistrada Auxiliar de la Corte Suprema de Justicia, Luz Adriana Camargo Garzón (28 de febrero de 2007). Declaración de Rodrigo Tovar Pupo. Itagüí (Antioquia) Cuaderno Principal Copias no 4, Expediente 2009-00044, Folios 161-202. Decreto 12.13de 1990. Por el cual se reforma el Estatuto del Personal de Agentes de la Policía Nacional. Presidencia de la República, Decreto Número 1791 de 2000, por el cual se modifican las normas de carrera del Personal de Oficiales, Nivel Ejecutivo, Suboficiales y Agentes de la Policía Nacional. Capítulo V, Artículo 42. Tribunal Superior de Bogotá, Sala de Justicia y Paz (8 de julio de 2009). Continuación Diligencia de Legalización de Cargos del postulado Úber Bánquez Martínez.

2.04

CHAPTER

However, as seen above institutional vided focal points for co-operation

6

design more oíien than not pro-

between the security agencies of the

state and the pararnilitaries. The most sinister example of this are the false positives. The MOD made of the body count of subversives the basis for the provision

of incentives. For the rank and file, these incentives could

be rather small: honorable

mentions,

a couple of holidays, and perhaps a

monetary pittance. For officers, standing out in the body count could mean promotion and career advancernent'" together with other perks (funding to participate in an international course, see Human Rights Watch 2.015). The M O D directive triggered a homicidal race. Note that here we are nor dealing with bribes - which oiled the relationship with the police - but rather with institutionally opportunistic

provided incentives, which however introduced

and greedy motives into the relationship

between the army

and the paramilitary.

Biography According ommended

to a paramilitary

rank and file, 'at the end of 1988 a friend rec-

me with some active army officers, they gave me economic

support ... then they recommended me with a bunch of people who were in charge of recruiting people for the organization ... .'68 This was not unusual in the least. Hundreds,

perhaps thousands,

of FP members passed to

the pararniliraries who - as seen in previous chapters - were in search of specialists in violence, be they guerrillas, policemen or soldiers. Biography was also a fundamental

link between the securiry agencies of the state and

the paramilitaries.

67

68

A powerful motivational force, as the behavior of perpetrators in orher contexts suggests, Lewy 2017. Fiscalía 22 de la Unidad Nacional contra el Terrorismo adscrita a Estructura de Apoyo de la Parapolítica (27 de junio de 201 1). Diligencia de indagatoria de Zeider Alfonso Caballero Yepes. Bogotá, Cuaderno Original no 13, Expediente 2013-00169, Folios 177-196, p. 2.

Theparamilitaries, the army and the police Many FP members paid better;

this would

2°5

moved to the paramilitaries be the intersection

simply because they

between

greed and biogra-

phy. But there were also many other motives to become a paramilitary, well beyond greed. One of the main ones was vengeance. The police were hit hard by the guerrillas - much, much more than the army (Gutiérrez 2.006) - because it had less nre power, and was the direct target for so me of the most important towns (Aguilera

forms of guerrilla violence, such as the taking over of

2.016). This experience

of massive and bloody confronta-

tion may have been a good substitute for more ideological motives in terms of anti-subversive orientation. Also, both soldiers and policemen could have suffered as civilians from guerrilla attacks, or seen how their relatives were victimized 69

them. 'Ihey

by the guerrillas.

So they wanted

to settle accounts

with

could initially join the army or the police, and aíter nnding

that they did not offer a good enough the paramilitaries.

oudet to vent their anger, move to

Ir must be remembered

that thousands

of people had

been evicted, extorted and kidnapped by the guerrillas, so this was not such an uncommon motive. Anger was likely to induce disciplinary offences. 1hose who joined

the paramilitaries

put themselves

beyond

the limits of

judicial! disciplinary action. Army and police rogues thus found that moving from the state to the paramilitaries was a good option. In the paramilitaries their skills were appreciated, they could evade punishment, much more lax, and their unruly behavior was empathized applied to roguish retired ofíicers and sub-officers, me paramilitaries

- and/or

discipline was with. This also

who sympathized

with

simply got paid by them. Even if they did not

join thern - for reasons of age - they could provide them with invaluable intelligence

and brokerage

In effect, the military rnilitary did not interrupt

vis-a-vis active members

of the force.

and police personnel'" who moved to the paraintercourse with their brothers in arms. They

were also generally well received at the brigades and police stations, where they spoke enthusiastically of their experience, gathered information and

69

,o

Tribunal Superior de Bogotá, Sala de Justicia y Paz (6 de Octubre de 2.015). Audiencia Concentrada para Imputación de Cargos contra postulados del Bloque Central Bolívar. 1he paramilitary also counted upon hundreds of ex-guerrillas.

CHAPTER

206

6

sometimes put forward business propositions. A leader of the Bloque Tolima who had also been a soldier recalls that 'many of my ex-cornrades joined rhe self-defenses, and that is why there was a link of friendship with them. While 1 was in the army 1 came to know members of the Tolima Bloc, because they had retired

[eran retirados]. For example Daniel"

and

sergeant Arias, they had worked with the Army and visited us at the Brigade, even Elias" was an army informant'.

He goes on to report that as an active

member of the army he did not support the Bloque Tolima, bur maintained a friendly relationship with Daniel and Elias. Afi:er he became a paramilitary he was also well received, He obtained

'we had this family bond'

'a lot of information'

[lazofamiliar].

during his visits."

Class and territorially based coalitions The weapons

and military

supplies for the building

of self-defenses

were

delivered to people who were trustworrhy and comfortable in their regions, that is, the standard clients of the security policies and agencies of the state. Large landowners and other rural rich figured prominently among this cast of characters. Certainly, many of the interactions between soldiers and paramilitaries were mediated by the rural elites thernselves." The promotion of the self-defenses did not operate upon an undifferentiated 'civilian space', it appeared

within

regional

power structures

networks of which the security agencies 'civilian-rnilitary actions', at the beginning

71 72 73

74

and pre-existing

of the state formed parto The of all the process, were set up

Eventually the head of me Bloc. A1so during a period head of the Tolima Bloc. Auditorio de Versiones de la Unidad Nacional para la Justicia y la Paz de Ibagué, Tolima (17 de febrero de 2010). Rad. 110016000253-2006-80323. Diligencia de versión libre, segunda fase del postulado Atanael Matajujdios Buitrago. alias 'Juancho', p. 2 Stone, H., and McDermott,J., and Dudley, S. (w.d.). 'Élites y crimen organizado en Colombia: InSight Crime. Centro de Investigación de Crimen Organizado. . Accessed 5 July 2017.

Tbe paramilitaries,

the army and the po/ice

2°7

through large landowners, who in turn paid peasants to defend the region Irom subversive incursions, all happening under army sponsorship.75lhe 'legal self-defenses' - as seen in Chapter 2 with Ramón Isaza and his 'documented' ranchers - and the security co-operatives in the 1990S adopted an analogous formo For example, Diego Vecino recalls: '1 was a frequent visitor of the Brigades, both in Montería and Corozal, as a cattle rancher.?" He also remembers that the relationship of the Bloque Norte with me army (also with the judiciary) was administered by'Salvatore' [Mancuso], a cattle rancher himself. He was in charge of these 'high level relationships ... with some generals and other high ranking oflicers.' Vecino was also aware that Cadena - a pararnilitary leader who operated untouched during a long period in the Montes de María region J7 did the same with 'his' military and policemen. 78 All these paramilitary leaders provided crucial contacts for obtaining the key Bogotá approval and support (see Gutiérrez and Vargas 2016, Salinas and Zarama 20n).79lhis was not limited to large units: small ones were also created by networks that involved civilians and members of the armed bureaucracies."

7S

76

77 7S

79

So

See the case of Córdoba in Romero 2.003. See also, Verdad Abierta (2.012). 'En su origen, paras fueron promovidos por e! Ejército, Verdad Abierta, 2.0 September . Accessed 12 August 2017. Tribunal Superior de Bogotá, Sala de Justicia y Paz (S de septiembre de 2.009). Audiencia de Legalización de Cargos a postulados Úber Bánquez Martínez y Edward Cobos Téllez, p. 27. Who symptomatically was eventually killed by competing paramilitaries. Tribunal Superior de Bogotá, Sala de Justicia y Paz (S de septiembre de 2.009). Audiencia de Legalización de Cargos a postulados Úber Bánquez Martínez y Edward Cobos Téllez, p. 33-34. For the Bloque Norte there is also massive evidence abour this. See for example Juzgado Único Penal de! Circuito Especializado de Santa Marta (22 de noviembre de 2000). Declaraciones de varios testigos sobre despojo de tierras en e! municipio de Chibolo. INF O RME XVIII -2 DE JULI O que contiene 6 documentos transcritos pertenecientes al expediente 2006-00066. There are many additional examples. Fiscalía General de la Nación, Unidad Nacional de Derechos Humanos y Derecho Internacional Humanitario (24 de octubre de

CHAPTER 6

208

Class alignments

had a direct expression at the operationallevel, violent

for

example at the moment

of implementing

maintainingparamilitary

social orders. For example, the governor ofSucre

actions or building/

aligned 'the army, the police, and the DAS: so that 50 paramilitaries by Mancuso

in a punitive

expedition

sent

against the town of Pichilín could

kill the population unhindered." Though he re the ptotagonist is a politician - himself a member of the rural elites - according to Rodrigo Pérez Alzate if the rural rich and the security agencies of the state were aligned, even the local authorities ity in the department municipal

became redundant.

of Antioquia)

administration,

'In Yarumal (a municipal-

we did nor have contacts with the

there was really never a contacto But with the

FP [con lafuerza pública] we necessarily had to have a coordination with thern, 1 even had a person ... exclusively dedicated to that, to the coordination with police, arrny, if the fiscalía was there with the fiscalía [CTI] ... also with landowners created.?" But white-hot be come operational.

[propietarios] who joined the Convivir that we

violence was not necessary

for class alignments

to

Their role started at very mundane levels, which once

again predated rhe appearance and development of the paramilitaries, but was taken by them to a wholly new level. For example, the rural elites paid and funded some basic aspects of the military and police activity, giving a purely private character to their everyday activity, "Ihe army operated

[hacía presencia] in the mining zone, and we provided thern with fuel and they requested also other types of support [otras ayudas]. We gave it to thern because they were the people in charge of protecting

81

82 83

83

US:

For

2003). Resolución de Situación Jurídica de sindicados Carlos Mercado Escopert, Antonio Cervantes Orozco y Tomas Gregorio Freyle Guillén. Bogotá, Cuaderno Copias no 7, Sumario 747b undh-dih, Expediente 2005-00121, Folios 191-206. Fiscalía 17 Unidad Derechos Humanos (5 de junio de 1997). Informes de Policía Judicial no 341778 de los Sindicados Eleonora María Pineda Arcila, Jorge Luis Feris y otros. Radicado 150,Anexo rr, Expediente: 2007-0Il8-8, Folios 57 a 65. Interview with Rodrigo Pérez Alzate, alias Julián Bolívar (!O de noviembre de 2001). Medellín, p. 7. Fiscal 32 Delegado ante Jueces de Circuito Especializado de Barranquilla (23 de noviembre de 2005). Diligencia de Ampliación de Indagatoria de Florentino de Jesús Olarre Loaiza. Cuaderno Copias no 15,Expediente 2008-00046, Folios 84-88, p. 3.

eparamilitaries, the army and the po/ice

2°9

licemen, the deference due to the rural rich and the regional big-shors appeared as a fully naturalized framework, as the Íatter were the incarna·on oflocal order, According to one policeman, for example, when being igned to a region under the influence and de facto control of an emerald Don, he found delightedly that the boss [elpatrón] had the police under . protection and threw a major party on Police-Day and other relevant olidays." Less radically, the policemen who arrived ro the regions had to in ert thernselves for operational reasons into the networks conformed by zhe security policy clients. What does one do when arriving to a region? Generate an agenda with different groups to become familiar with rhe issues and searching for solurion alrernarives, for example if rhere are production guilds then you try to organize a meetingwith their leaders and look at the issues to make a diagnosis and a work plan. People from the banks, right?, pcople belonging to the guild of cattle ranchers, because in many places cattle rustling, and rhc robbery of estates, we have that, so you look for strategies and you see also how we organize the communíry, So these are, say, the first activities of me commanders when arriving to a region, and must be implernenred conrínuously"

_\11the above factors interacted. See the following citation, with its mix of QTeed,class alignment and ideology: 'Even more: the (army) captain was invited to Mancuso's hacienda, there they gave him to eat, they prepared a whole cow for him [le mataron una vaca], then they gave him a radio and a cell phone and money, 1 myself put our frequency in his radio, and now the captain spoke with our commanders ... .'86 More horrific and even more telling is the reason for which many paramilitary units decided to disappear their victims - and dismember their bodies, to dispose of thern in a common grave or by throwing the remains to a river - instead ofkilling rhern openly. lt deserves to be noted that in some municipalities the ubstitution ofhomicides for disappearances was done as a personal favor

4

lnterview with a Mayor of the National Entrevista PA 1,p. 7.

Police (28 July 2013). Transcripción

de

5

Ibid.

6

Seccional CTI de Santa Marta (Magdalena) (12 de marzo de 2005). Diligencia de declaración de Eduardo José Jiménez Serna. cuaderno original no 1, Expediente 2006-00066, Folios 94-112., p. 3. .

6

CHAPTER

210

to a particularly ing and/or

liked ofíicer, or as an expression of some sort of nerwork-

individualistic

interaction.

On

IS

June

2000,

two civilians,

Rebolledo and Ordóñez, who were traveling by car between two towns, were intercepted by armed men who declared that they were guerrilla members. But this capture, in fact, had been ordered by the paramilitary commander John Freddy Almario, aka Coco. Apparently, the victims were chosen by Coco at random. After releasing one of the victims - probably to allow him to report about the purported taries disappeared

perpetrators

- the paramili-

and assassinated the other, One of the consequences

of

the event was that the position of a lieutenant and a sergeant favorable to the paramilitary was substantially improved, and that the 'the relations (of the self-defenses) with the Army improved to the point that the illegal organization' could expand to new areas. Despite the fact that public killings had beneficial effects for the paramilitaries -like terrorizing and demoralizing civilians - these were offset by the negative impact that sky-rocketinghomicide rates could have on the CV of police or army offlcers (Gutiérrez Wood

2017).

and

At the end, this change in the pattern of violence against civil-

ians had been adopted en rnasse by very important

paramilitary

units, like

the Ramón Isaza ACMM87 and the huge Bloque Central Bolívar (where according to a member, it was a customary practice to not inconvenience the FP).88 But why would homicides be costly or "inconvenient"

for the paramili-

taries? Mainly because of the constraints established by the political regime and the architecture of Colombian sovereignry, which forced politician and bureaucrats

87

88

to have an eye over violence indicators.

Tribunal Superior de Bogotá, Sala de Justicia y Paz (29 de febrero de 2016). Sentencia Proferida a Ramón María Isaza Arango, alias 'Moncho, 'El Viejo' o 'Munrra', Luis Eduardo Zuluaga Arcila, alias 'Macgyver', Oliverio Isaza Gómez, alias 'Rubén' o 'terror'; Walter Ochoa Guisao Alias, 'el gurre' y de Jhon Fredy Gallo Bcdoya, alias 'pájaro' o 'hernán' Magistrada Ponente Uldi Teresa Jiménez López, p. 618. Tribunal Superior de Bogotá (21 de Agosto de 2013). Declaración Superior de Bogotá. Sala de Justicia y Paz. Declaración de postulados Guillermo Pérez Álzate e Iván Roberto Duque. Sce also, Tribunal Superior de Bogotá, Sala de Justicia y Paz (6 de abril de 2016). Audiencia concentrada de Iván Roberto Duque y 284 postulados.

Theparamilitaries, the army and the police

2II

Social impasses

1he collusion and connivance of the army and the police with the pararnilitaries triggered persistent social impasses. At the same time, the differences between both agencies regarding institutional design and type of relationship with the paramilitaries guaranteed that those impasses developed in different directions. 1he army-paramilitary interface was increasingly strained as the pressures from the international community to show some kind of activity against the latter mounted. These pressures had two implications. On the one hand, at the individual level, army officers had incentives to present results against the paramilitaries

in order to advance their careers. Of

course, this was mediated by the willingness of their superiors to stomach a confrontation that for many army high-level cadres was undesirable. But the fact that the incentives were there remained, creating fear and mis trust among the involved parties. On the other hand, the increasing danger that ome army members would turn their weapons against the paramilitaries induced the latter to pay some officers to maintain In the case of the arrny, ideological-institutional

their allegiance.

commitment

carne first,

but when it began to weaken, it had to be lubricated with individual side payments. These did not work perfectly well, as they triggered a typical prisoners dilemma: havingofficers on the payroll was good, but couldn't they receive me money and at the same time attack the paramilitary

whenever it was

convenient to advance their career? A spectacular example of this possibiliry took place in 2.002, when Doble Cero thought that he had nothing to fear from the military that operated in Segovia, because he had thern in his hands." However, a Segovia sub-officer intercepted a paramilitary truck at an army checkpoint

and mowed down its passengers. Apparently, he was

ettling accounts with some paramilitaries

9

with whom he had problems,

León.]. (2004) 'Las traiciones de Segovii,EIMalpensante, 57.. Accessed 13 JuIy 2017.

CHAPTER 6

212

but at the same time the killing allowed him to exhibir tangible results in the struggle against the paramilitaries. The 'descent' in the scale of relationships

from institutional

to indi-

vidual also badly damaged state legitimacy, discipline and (ar least some feared) the very anti-subversive orientation that was at the core of the armyparamilitary interaction. Thefolse positives episode shows this eloquently. In principIe, the MOD directive incentivized subversives: making promotions count performance.

However, the individualized

soldiers and paramilitaries a bustling,

the physical elimination

and recognitions

depended relationship

of

upon body between

quickly turned rhis system of incentives into

if macabre, cottage industry of people and corpse trafficking.

Sometimes the paramilitary members:"? sometimes

requested that the army kiU irs most unrul

they lent the soldiers bodies of people they had

assassinated to present thern as dead subversives; sometimes soldiers and paramilitaries coUaborated together to hunt down purported deviants, or simply vulnerable youngsters that were in the wrong place in the wrong time. In all cases, the victims were exhibited as combat casualties. Scandal followed, as politicians, civilian bureaucrats and the relatives of the victims - which included some soldiers _91 started to ask questions. For the arrny's national and internationallegitimacy,

the episode was a major blow.

The endemic paramilitary factionalism was also an issue. The arm apparently took sides at least in some of the intra-paramilitary wars, putting its weight behind the Urabá people against their rival s (for the south of the country, see Serrano 2009 ).92 But then this might have loosened

90 91

92

Tribunal Superior de Bogotá, Sala de Justicia y Paz (19 de julio de 2013). Audiencia pública de control formal y material de cargos postulado Guillermo Pérez Alzate. Semana (2013). 'La historia inédita de los falsos positivos'. Semana, 7 June . Accessed 14July 2017. See also, Monsalve, R. (2016). 'Hay 2.308 'falsos positivos' en la impunidad: El Colombiano, 7 February . Accessed 14July 2017. VerdadAbierta (20 1S). 'Veinte años de una guerra sin límites en Urabá', Verdad Abierta, 30 Septernber . Accessed 14July 2017. El Espectador (2013). '¿Quién es Hernán Giraldor, El Espectador, 13May . El Espectador

2 February .

I2 June . Accessed 25 May 2018. El País (2.0 12) 'Los panos regionales de la parapolírica, El País, 12 June . Accesscd 25 May 20 18. El Tiempo (2.008). 'Cuatro alcaldes actuales de Urabá firmaron pacto con las Auc, asegura testigo de la 'parapolítica", El Tiempo, 22 May .

Accessed 25 May 2018.

than 60 congress mernbers,':" 16 governors (López and Sevillano 2008) and many, many mayors, municipal councilors and members of rhe departmental assemblies. Fourrh and last, the paramilitaries used fraud and violence to impose their candidates, especially for crucial elections. In Magdalena and Cesar

102

VerdadAbierta verdadabierta.com/

(2013). 'De la curul a la cárcel:

VerdadAbierta,

de-la -curul-a -la-carcel/ > . Accessed

29 August

20 J une 201 8.

iego Vecino - the two leaders of the Bloque Héroes Montes de María that onged to the Bloque Norte - started for motives associated with poli~ .ng. 1he bulk of the Bloque Norte backed Diego Vecino, and Cadena d all his politicians, inc1uding some prominent ones, were killed.l311he

c-

":9

-o

-¡

Informe DAS (10 de diciembre de 2.008). Carta dirigida al Fiscal General dda Nación, Mario Iguarán que contiene testimonio de Luz Rodríguez. Bogotá, Cuaderno principal Copia no 8, Expediente 2.009-00044, Folios 152-169. Related in reality to rhe co-ordination, rationalization and relative centralization of kickbacks. Ir is difficult to evaluate its real effect. Corte Suprema de Justicia, Sala de Casación Penal (2.0 de junio de 2.012). Acta aprobada no 233. Sentencia contra el ex Gobernador de Bolívar, Libardo Simancas Torres. Corte Suprema de Justicia, Sala de Casación Penal (23 de febrero de 2.010). Acta aprobada no 56. Sentencia contra el ex Senador Álvaro Alfonso García Romero.

CHAPTER 8

very powerful

and traditional

the Cesar department

clientelistic

family Gnecco Cerchar from

was eventually crushed by Jorge 40 and some of its

members kidnapped or even killed (Zúñiga 2007: 309); this was a systematic and planned operacion.Y The Gnecco Cerchar were enemies of other polirical dans with better paramilitary connections, and this brought their fall.133Jorge 40 got a disliking for Miguel Pinedo Vidal - who was actually a parapolítico, and was supported by other paramilitaries like Hernán Giraldo - and branded him a 'centralist': he prohibited voting for him in the vast regions under his intluence.':" Some politicians, when threarened by a paramilitary,

searched protection

by other paramilitaries,

could trigger violent dashes. Co-ordinating electoral activities and the distribution

and this

of rents - some

of the new functions assumed by the paramilitaries - proved to be a tough nut to crack. 1he milking of the municipalities opened a Pandora box of endless bickering,13S because in the process of splitting the goodies distributional conflicts necessarily arose. 1he same can be said about the assignment of electoral districts and of positions in electoral lists, which put at odds politicians and paramilitaries, 136paramilitaries with each other'" and of course para políticos with each other, 1here was an underlying problem of trust that paramilitaries never overcome with their politicians. Paramilitaries

132. 133

134 135

136

137

could

generally considered

Corre Suprema de Justicia, Sala de Casación Penal (18 de marzo de 2.010). Acta aprobada no 84. Sentencia contra el ex Senador Álvaro Araújo Castro. Corte Suprema de Justicia, Sala de Casación Penal (5 de mayo de 2.010). Acta aprobada no 137. Sentencia a Hernando Molina Araújo. See also, Corte Suprema de Justicia, Sala de Casación Penal (18 de marzo de 2.010). Acta aprobada no 84. Sentencia contra el ex Senador Álvaro Araújo Castro. Corte Suprema de Justicia, Sala de Casación Penal (1 de febrero de 2.012.). Acta aprobada no 2.1.Sentencia contra el ex Senador Jorge Pinedo Vida!' Corte Suprema de Justicia, Sala de Casación Penal (8 de febrero de 2.012.). Acta aprobada no 31. Sentencia contra ex Congresistas José María Imbeth Bcrmúdez, Jorge Luis Feris Chadid y el ex Gobernador de Córdoba Jesús María López Gómez. Corre Suprema de Justicia, Sala de Casación Penal (12. de mayo de 2.010). Acta aprobada no 152.. Sentencia contra el ex Senador de la República, Jorge de Jesús Castro Pacheco. Corte Suprema de Justicia, Sala de Casación Penal (31 de mayo de 2.012.). Acta aprobada no 2.13. Sentencia contra el ex Senador Mario Salomón Náder Muskus.

Paramilitaries in politics: Friends,jactions and murderers policicíans untrustworthy,

sometimes even when they were their own can-

.dates. This characterization

might have been based on objective evidence.

On the one hand, the hyper-fragmented Colombian politics had evolved zowards a situation in which mutual defection was the dominant strategy Gutiérrez

2007). On the other, the entry of the paramilitaries

into the

oolitical system might have changed to the worse the characteristics political personneL

of the

For example, it could have made it more risk prone.

1hat is, the paramilitary

entry into the political system could have had an

adverse selection effect: the type of people who did collaborate

with the

? itions were in the hands of another paramilitary unit with which it was odds.145And paramilitaries also double-crossed politicians all the time. --=orexample, the mayor ofRoncesvalles decided to paya monthly quota to zhe paramilitaries on the condition that they did not enter the town, but a paramilitary cadre of the Bloque Tolima reports, the Bloque received

also, Corte Suprema de Justicia, Sala de Casación Penal (15 de junio de 2OIl). Acta aprobada no 200. Sentencia Anticipada de Carlos Reinaldo Higuera Escalante y Carlos Julio Galvis Anaya. Fiscalía General de la Nación, Sala de Justicia y Paz (16 de agosto de 2OIl). Diligencia de Confesión del sindicado Noel Suarez Hernández; see also Chapter 6. 144 Fiscalía General de la Nación, PolidaJudicial (31 de marzo de 2014). Diligencia de versión libre del postulado Daniel Arias Garda, alias Osama. Bucaramanga, OT no 1585-2014, Informe no 68-Il20233, p. 38-40. Of course, Báez also did not kcep his promise. 145 Flórez, M. (2014). 'El exterminio político en el Cesar', El Espectador, 16 December . Accessed 10 August 2017. Sec also, VerdadAbierta (2014). 'Guerra entre paramilitares por el 'Iolima, VerdadAbierta, 3 February . Accessed 10 August 2017. LB

286

CHAPTER

the money and tried to do it anyway.':" A more standard behavior by me paramilitaries

was simply promising their support to different candidates,

and then waiting to see how they sorted out the situation.':" AlI in all, despite having access to massive selective incentives coercion,

the paramilitaries

had difficulties

cementing

dependable

an ríes

with the politicians under their influence. Many paramilitary bosses were bitterly aware of this.148According to Rafael García, 'this (the parapolitic network within which he acted, that is, United Province) was not a union, but an amalgamation of interests.'149 The ability of this amalgamation to sort out its issues had hard limits. Personnel bottlenecks

para política were frequent, because Colombian characterized

in the world o~

polirics has always been

by long queues for scarce goods and services, and because the

paramilitaries included yet more people into the political games. Political bosses wanted their share of the cake, and did not trust their local operativ : conflicts over precedence

between hierarchical

and territoriallevels

decides what, who has the right to what) were frequent, bilized political pacts."? The paramilitary

(who

and this desta-

could not do without

political

intermediation - and did not have the skills and the personnel to dispo of the old political establishment. To add insult to injury, 'ir was they [me politicians] who administered [within United Province] all their mane uvering, alliances and activities,"?'

1hey eventually failed because of poor co-ordination with the army. See, Auditorio de Versiones de la Satélite de la Unidad Nacional para la Justicia y la Paz de Ibague. Tolima (s de mayo de 2010). Diligencia de Versión Libre del Postulado Arnulfo Rico Tafur, alias La Zorra, Primera fase. 147 Corte Suprema de Justicia, Sala de Casación Penal (31 de marzo de 2OIl). Acta aprobada no 109. Sentencia anticipada contra el ex Congresista José María Conde Romero. 148 For rhe Alemán see, Corre Suprema de Justicia, Sala de Casación Penal (6 de marro de 2013). Acta aprobada no 69. Sentencia contra el ex Representante a la Cámara, Etanislao Ortiz Lara. 149 Corte Suprema de Justicia (22 de noviembre de 2006). Diligencia de Declaración de Rafael Enrique García Torres por el Delito de homicidio agravado. Bogotá, Cuaderno no 2, Expediente 20I4-00I4S, Folios 230-269, p. 26. ISO Ibid. ISI Corte Suprema de Justicia, Magisrrada Auxiliar de Medellín (1 de marzo de 200 ). Diligencia de continuación de la declaración de Rodrigo Tovar Pupo, P.29. 146

I

Paramilitaries in politics: Friends,jactions and murderers

The paramilitaries and competitive politics

Homicidal and competitive The underlying factor behind the social impasse s that riddled the relationhip between paramilitaries and politicians was competition. The paramilitaries were not able or willing to substantially smother political competition even at the height of me ir power. Despite enthusiastic assertions like those of Ernesto Báez - 'norhing can take place [no se mueve una hoja] in the South ofBolívar withour our consent' - 'all candidates received votes during me 1998,

2002

and

2006

ro a tough negotiation upon the distribution

elections.!"

The Chivolo paceS3 boiled down

between political factions that eventually agreed of spoils (including pork, time allotted to each

faction in the congress, and bureaucracy).'?" candidates

was the result of pushing

me realm of paramilitary-organized

The anointment

clienrelistic

competition

of single down to

assemblies, not of eliminating

it. As

was seen above, some of the most famous and infamous parapolítica pacts included a mechanism

to probe the preferences of the attendants

to the

meeting, or even called an explicit voting; in other cases, me meeting was followed by a consultation tour with municipal politicians and activists. This was the case of the Caramelo Pact,155whose members even marked

152.

l S3

IS4

ISS

Corte Suprema de Justicia, Sala de Casación Penal (IS de septiembre de 2.010). Acta aprobada no 2.93. Sentencia contra el ex Representante a la Cámara, Miguel Ángel Rangel Sosa, p. 2.S. Equipo Nizkor (2.000). 'Texto Original íntegro del Pacto de Chivolo, EquipoNizkor, 2.8 Septernber, . Accessed I7 July 2.017. Carta dirigida a Sigifredo Espinosa de Amigos del Cambio en el Magdalena (2. de agosto de 2008). Carta de Investigación Rodrigo Roncallo, Cuaderno Principal Copias no 4. Expediente 2.009-00044. Folios 8-14. See also, CTI Dirección Seccional Barranquilla (2.7 de enero de 2.009). Entrevista de Demetrio Luis Acosta Santodomingo. Cuaderno Principal no 9. Expediente 2.009-0004. Folios 2.33-2.37. Corte Suprema de Justicia. Sala de Casación Penal (2.7 de julio de 2.OII). Acta aprobada no 2.60. Sentencia contra los ex Congresistas Edgar Eulises Torres Murillo y Odín Horacio Sánchez Montes de Oca.

288

CHAPTER

their distance with the Ralito Pact, highlighting that the Íatter was 'disturbing' because it 'put at risk the libertarian exercise of dernocracy'Pt The overlap of the centrifugal dynamics both within the pararnilitaries and the political system, plus me side-effects of the transformations provoke by the intervention

of the paramilitaries

in polirical life, were permanen

catalysts of cornpetition. Additionally, the horizon ofimagination

of me paramilitaries remained

within elections and electioneering. Even Jorge 40 - maybe the pararnilitarv leader that imposed more single candidates in his territories - maintaine several non-negligible forms of political competition. He actually claime . that 'the self-defense state did not impose any candidate on any corporation (in reference to municipal

councils or departmental

assemblies) ...

AlI parties and political trends made-up part of our solidary cornrnuna; capital, and acted autonomously in politics,"?" 1he paramilitaries were homicidal force - actually terrorists, in the basic meaning of the word - b at the same time stood hrmly on the ground of clientelistic and cornpetiti ~ political intercourse,

1his actually seems to be true also for paramilitar=

politics in the national arena as well. Certainly, we lack evidence regarcing the attitudes

and values of the whole of the paramilitary

experien

regarding the political regime. Many of the paramilitary units, especiill. early ones - for example death squads - lacked a political voice. So ir . hard to know what notions, if any, they had about the desirable politi regime. 1he big undertakings, though, had enough strength to attract or intellectuals, and thus their position is already relativelywell documem in the 1980s were actually prolific: rh Puerto Rojo, and produced books that became -

1he Puerto Boyacá paramilitaries had their mouthpiece,

156

157

Corte Suprema de Justicia, Sala de Casación Penal (8 de febrero de 2.012.).. aprobada no 31. Sentencia contra ex Congresistas José María Imberh Bermú . Jorge Luis Feris Chadid y el ex Gobernador de Córdoba Jesús María López Góma.. Orher Bloque Norte paramilitaries also claimed to allow all politicians to com (lilce Tijeras, 312.44(2.4-07-13). Corte Suprema de Justicia, Sala de Casación P (2.4 de Julio de 2.013). Acta aprobada no 2.36. Sentencia contra el ex Senador República, Fuad Emilio Rapag Matar. As we have seen, what they meant by . that politicians could continue to operate as long as they remained within the ha of rhe acceptable for rhe paramilitary. #

Paramilitaries

in politics: Friends,foctions

and murderers

references for the paramilitary world, such as Quiñones Nova (1990). It is hard to find in these any kind of laudatory reference to authoritarian. m. To the contrary, they developed the main of their rhetoric in terms of defense of dernocracy.!" 1he same can be said about the foundational ~\UC text, "Ihe third actor' (Aranguren 2.001). Other paramilitary output, as well as the discourse of the paramilitaries themselves in JyP, are devoid of any significant authoritarian reference point. As seen above, the Ralito ?act even invokes the 1991 Constitution.!" 1he reader may want to raise a fundamental objection: to talk is cheap, ?-lfties and groups should be measured by what they do. 1hough ideology oes fundamentally count in politics and war (Gutiérrez and Wood 2.014), ors should be judged also by their deeds, not only by their words. Bur me ?-lfamilitary actions are no more eloquendy dictatorial than their discourse. me 2S years considered here, there is only one event in which we have some . d of evidence that the paramilitary showed interest in something akin to coup, and by incitation of intra-systernic actors: in 1997 and 1998, when of people were scrambling to find a way out to me Samper narco-crisis. ~~ parently, some leaders sent feelers to Castaño, and even imagined thar he could participate in a cabal to oust Samper (Aranguren 2001; Chapter 2). - art from this, we do not have a single regime-change initiative that 'olved the paramilitary or a public defense of dictatorship by thern.i'"

Competition

and para política

-::owever, in many of their pacts the paramilitaries chose single candi~ res. As seen above, they also used white hot violence and 'massive fraud'

-

=

The works of an inrra-systemic leader líke Belisario Betancur's Minister ofDefense, Gral. Landazábal Reyes, were much more overdy authoritarian than those of the contemporary paramilitaries. See, Landazábal ro Sf and 1990. Semana (2007) 'Texto del "Acuerdo de Raliro'" Semana, 19 January . Accessed 17 July 2017.

Though Carlos Castaño wem as far as praising Laureano Gómez, the extrernist Conservative who fueled La Violencia with his virulem discourse, as a role model.

CHAPTER

to impose their politicians. authoritarianisms,

Thus the claim that they set-up 'subnational

that is, that they closed the polity at the municipal an

departmentallevels, sounds highly plausible (Valencia and Romero 200inspired in Gibson 2005).161 Certainly, Gibson's and Valencia-Romero point - that in some regions the political system of democratic countri can suffer brutal perturbations - is strongly corroborated, and not refute¿ by the Colombian paramilitary experience. But here I am specifically interested in electoral competition. Did the paramilitaries block political cornpetition? Up to which point? lf the answer were 'yes' and 'very much', this would imply a significant departure from a core part of the proposition = have advanced in this chapter: that the paramilitaries remained within the limits of clientelistic and competitive politics, although introducing innovations. On the other hand, if despite the extraordinary displayed by the paramilitaries

levels of violen

against politicians and citizens cornpetirion

was not significantly quelled, then this is indirect but powerful evidence in favor of such proposition. How could the issue be settled? Let us choose two electoral arenas in which the paramilitaries,

as seen above, were very active: senate and Íow

house. We know thar the paramilitaries

launched

their political

macro-

projects in 1997. This was the same year of entry of the Bloque Norte ir: the Magdalena department.i'" Bloque Norte political macro-projects and or significant activity persisted until2006ho07.163 The standard indicator in political science that measures concentration (or dispersion) of th political system is the effective number of parties (ENP).164 Since thi .

161

162

163 164

Ir is necessary to explain here that Gibson was speaking of a different coun . (Argentina) and context, and the concept was used as analogy for the Colombi= paramilitary experience. Certainly, they were preceded by other paramilitaries, bur rhis does not rnake a big difference for this particular discussion - we know that the predecessors of Bloque Norte tended to allow cornpetirion. Though some lasted more, like Por una Urabá Grande. Effective Number of Parties: 'Measuring how many parties, weighted accordínz to size, are in a party system in a given election, rhe effective number of (electoral parliamenrary) parties is calculated employing rhe following formulae: ENEP=I/2:vi2, ENPP=¡/2:s¡2

Paramilitaries in politics: Friends,foctions and murderers . ply a number,

it can be averaged across rnunicipalities.i"

nave all we need to take a hrst stab at evaluating

of large paramilitary electoral

competition.

dynamics

With this we

quantitatively

the impact

political projects, and/ or paramilitary presence, on Let us start with a couple of visualizations of the

of rhe department

ofMagdalena

in comparison

to the country

a whole (Figures 7 and 8, which depict the ENP for each year/rype of election). While there is a downward trend in both Magdalena and the ountry for the presidency

(which

1 in dude simply as a reference point),

e Magdalena and national graphics show an ENP increase for the senate and the lower house (a bit higher in Magdalena for the senate, a bit higher in rhe country epartment

for the lower house).

where the pararnilitaries

In other terms, regarding achieved probably

ENP, the

the maximum

of

zheir political power shows no obvious difference with respect to the coun:ry as a whole.':" Nor there is clear-cut ENP difference between munici~ties where the paramilitaries were present and those where they were or. Figure 9 shows how the senate ENP evolved for municipalities with ~amilitaries zaunicipality

as compared to rnunicipalities without, In both types of the electoral dispersion grew substanríally!" (actually a li ttle

with paramilitaries). wer house (Figure 10).

more in municipalities

1he same can be said of the

where vil si is the proportion of votes/ seats of the ith party (sec Laakso and Taagepera, 1979; Casal Bértoa, 2013: 401-402).' In Party Systerns and Government Observatory (w.d.). . Accessed 21 June 2018. 65 Thc data could also be pooled for the department and then evaluated wirh the ENP formula - the result does not change. 6 Please note rhar the fact that the paramilitary organized a massive fraud in Magdalena in subnational elections in 2003 and probably in other elections and years does not matter much here: the fraud was actually intended to favor specific candidates, so it should have pushed down the Effective Number ofParties. Stated in other terrns, even aíter fraud rhe Magdalena ENP refused to fall. - An ENP betwecn 3 or 4 can be high or low, depending on the size of rhe municipality: the majority are small, so the ENP here should be considered quite high. On electoral hyper-fragmentation in Colombia, see Gutiérrez 20°4.

CHAPTER

Mean ENP in Magdalena 1994-2006 --7hree

elections

//,ft

,, 3'

,/~/

Presidency

,/

2'

,

,

"

Senate Lower House

"

l'

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

Figure 7: ENP Note: Elaborated

2006

1

by the author (2018).

Mean ENP Colombia 1994 -2006 -- Three elections

Presidency Senate Lower House

1996

1998

2000

2002

2004

Figure 8: ENP Note: Elaborated

2006

2

by the author (2018).

lf we abandon descriptive statistics and we regress the Magdalena E:t\TP (in reality the logarithm of that figure, see Appendix) on the paramilitarv presence variable and durnrnies for each electoral year, we get analogous results. (Table 6). The variable of pararnilitary presence is statistically non-significant (and the coefficients positive, which means an increase ir: dispersion; note that the interaction terrn between year and paramilitary presence for 1998 is negative bur not signiíicant). For the presidency, we

'aramilitaries in politics: Friends, foctions and murderers

Mean ENP Senate 1994-2006

1996

1998

--

With and Wilhout

2002

200U

293

2004

-

SentteWith

-

SentteWithout

2006

Figure 9: ENP 3 by me aurhor (2018).

Note: Elaborated

Mean ENP Low er Hous« 1994 -2006

1996

1998

2000 Figure Note: Elaborated

--

2002

Wilh and Wíthout

2004

-

LH-With

-

LH-Withoot

2006

ENP 4 by me author (2018).

10:

bserve a non-signifieant reduetion is dispersion for 2.006; indeed, disperion for presidential eleetions was diminishing at the nationallevel (see Fizure 8).ln both houses the year 2002 dummy variable marks a statistieally ifieant deerease in dispersion (but with a relatively small coctficicnt}, lit in 2.006 party fragmentation bounees back to its old levels (Table 6). lf we abandon the department of Magdalena and consider in genal if the effeetive number of parties was significantly different in the

CHAPTER

294 Table 6: Regression Magdalena Presidency

Senate

House of Rcpresenrarives

Intercepr

0,71'

oAI'

0,50'

(0,°5)

(0,07 )

(0,°7 )

Paramilitary Presence

0,2.4

0,16

0,16

(0,13)

(0,18)

(0,18)

1

0,89'

-0,02

I¡

(0,07 )

(o, r r )

(o, r

1:

0,36'

-0,2.7'

-0,35'

l'

(0,13)

(0,18)

(0,18)

1.

-0,2.7

0,81'

0,73

l.

(o, I 3)

(0,18)

(0,18)

1.

-0,2.3

-0,19

-0,16

(0,15)

(0,2.2.)

(0,2.2.)

DI998

0,02

D2.oo2.

D2.006

Paramilitary presence and DI 998

*

I I

i)

1

I

Paramilitary presence and D2.002.

1 1

I

Paramilitary presence and D2.006

1

N

104

104

104

1

Ale

-2.1,71

48,71

49,85

I

Note: The coefficiems marked with an asterisk are significant ar me 0.0 s leve!. The numbers in parenrhesís below the coefficiems are me standard deviations of rhe respective coefficiem. N is number of munícípalíry/year points.

rnunicipalities

where paramilitaries

were present and where they were

not we get basically the same result (Table 7)' In none of the three de tions considered here, the paramilitary presence had a significant ea; _ over the effective number

of parties.

The dummy variables for ea -

year almost always mark a significant increase in the effective number of parties. 1he interaction between paramilitary presence and year almost always non-significant, has a positive

coefficient

increased electoral rnethods).

except for the lower house in

2006,

- that is, in that year paramilitary

dispersion

(see Appendix

whi -

presen

;

for details on data anc

Paramilitaries in politics: Friends,foetions and murderers

295

Table 7: Regression - national sample I

Presidency

Senate

House of Rcprescntatives

0,63'

0,84

0,77'

(0,02)

(0,Q2)

0,06

0,05

-0,07

(0,03 )

(0,05)

(0,05 )

0,13 •

0,17'

0,04

(0,01)

(0,02)

(0,Q2)

0,15'

0,24'

0,32'

(0,01)

(0,02)

(0,02)

-0,01

0,27'

0,35

(0,01)

(0,02)

(0,02)

-0,05

-0,07

0,03

(0,04)

(0,07)

(0,07 )

-0,07

-0,08

0,03

(0,04)

(0,06)

(0,06)

-0,03

0,04

0,16'

-0,04

(0,06)

(0,06)

N

3686

3686

3686

Ale

171,94

3625

3660,3

Intercept

(o.o Paramilitary Presence

DI998

D2002

D2006

Paramilitary presence and D 1998

Paramilitary presence and D2002

Paramilitary presence and D2006

i)

_ Iote: 1he coefficients marked with an asterisk are significant at the o.oy leve!. The numbers in parenthcsis below the coefficienrs are the standard deviations of the respective coefíicient. N is the numbcr of rnunicípaliry/year

points.

Of course, this exercise ought to be nuanced, reíined and expanded in veral directions. But the results are pretty stable. AlI in all, the effect of rhe presence of the paramilitaries

on electoral competition

was negligible

in the context of a national runaway party hyper-fragmentation.

lhere was

nothing even close by the paramilitaries to promoting a wholesale elirnination of competition in me all-important congress elections. lhe drive cowards eliminating cornpetition,

which indeed existed in several paramili-

Glfy units, was more or less offset by social impasses and the competitive ethos which many paramilitaries nearly annulling each other,

shared, centripetal

and centrifugal forces

CHAPTER

8

Conclusions

Political brokerage was indispensable for the paramilitaries from the beginning, as it provided the proverbial Bogotá tie-in, as well as key contacts and skills. However, as they grew, pararnilitaries increasingly relied on poliricians. 1he increasing involvement of the paramilitaries

in direcdy political

activities pursued different objectives. 1he para política did not express a clear-cut rebellion against peace: note that even theNo al Despeje movernenr was demanding basically that the peace process included the paramilitaries and accepted their terms, not that it did not take place. Parapolítica wasn't simply trying to maintain entry of the paramilitaries

existing power structures, either, 1he massive into the political system was intended to pre-

serve many of its power structures and procedures, transformed

thern. Some major paramilitary

respect to traditional

but at the same rime

units indeed innovated with

clientelístic politicians. At least in Magdalena, thej

even tried to set-up a comprehensive co-ordination

of the political system.

1hey mobilized their constituencies at critical junctures. 1hey transformed statehood. 1hey parroted the participatory and anti-centralist discourse associated with the letter and spirit of the 1991 Constitution. They cho e winners, and excluded some players brutally from the game - includinz very well established politicians and networks. And so on. The paramilitaries were not conventional authoritarians either, Despite their highly murderous

nature, and in contrast

to many of their Latín

American peers, the Colombian paramilítaries almost never indulged in authoritarian adventures, and maintained in the territories under their control - sometimes willingly, sometimes not - a fair degree of political competition.

They never showed a significant will to change the basic tules

of the game of the polity, or the political regime. True, some paramilitarr units in effect tried to close radically the political system with single candidates, though falling short from a wholesale elimination competition.

But this was an option among many. Actually, when seen

in an aggregated manner, the paramilitary fragmentation

of political

did not even cut down party

significandy. In part, this is due to the fact that some of

thern did not want to do so - they wanted instead to co-opt and absorb

Paramilitaries in politics: Friends,foctions and murderers

297

ro have access to (and take proht from) the region-nation intermediation that only established politicians could produce. In part, and despite their use of savage violence against politicians of different brands, the pararnilitaries also could not do so - factionalism was too strong, social impasses roo intractable and politico-administrative tO

skills too important,

be able to produce anything beyond an 'amalgamation Prima facie, the stable coexistence of paramilitaries

for thern

of interests. with competitive

politics should be considered utterly surprising. It is noto It constitutes

a

core aspect of the type of warfare that the paramilitaries were waging. By institutional design, they appeared, developed, and grew in the interface between the central state drive to consolidate and expand its territorial reach in the rnidst of a counter-insurgent

war and regional demands for

the private provision of security. As the power of the paramilitaries grew, they and their politicíans strengthened and expanded the menu of services and the network of friendships involved in this intercourse. It was there, in the relationship between nation and territory, where the paramilitaries and their politicians could reside and thrive, But if the regional-nationallink constituted

the core of the pararnili-

rary-politician partnership, it was also a highly contested terrain, marked by ferocious competition, between and among thern, and punctuated by regular bouts of violence. Even at the very apex of their power - military and political - the paramilitaries

were unable to tame the brutal social

impasses that marked their relationship política was as hounded

with politicians.

In effect, para-

by social impasses as other domains of pararnili-

rary activity I have considered

in this book - probably more, due to the

hyper-fragmentation of the Colombian political system, which at the local level expressed itself as a maddening proliferation of mutually hostile factions. Social impasses became increasingly intractable

as the importance

of politicians in paramilitary coalitions grew, and as major paramilitary units tried to establish their own intermediation role within the political stem in the territories

under their influence. Problems of trust, intor-

mation, adverse selection, overcrowding, and overlapping layers of factionalism arose. The changing power relationship between nation and regions, and the nature of paramilitary a destabilizing

roleo

territorial

coalitions, also played

CHAPTER

In the next chapter, 1 will discuss the political interaction nation

and territory

through

the lenses of institutional

betwe

reform

anc

policy: the takeover of the health system by United Province and orh paramilitaries.

Appendix

The data for the regression come fram the following sources: a. Paramilitary

presence, as coded by CEDE,

from the Observatorio

de Derechos

adjusted by data corninz

Humanos

de la Vicepresiden

de la República ( ) and the Observatorio de Restitución Derechos de Propiedad Agraria ( ). b. Effective number of parties, based on data fram the Colombian electo authorities and on the classic Laakso and Taagepera (1979) formula.. c. For more details, see Gutiérrez, MarÍn and Acuña (2014). The chapter presents a simple least squares regression, where each poic; represents a municipality /year pair. Since the data were found to be strong: non-normal, they are normalized by taking the logarithm of the effec . number of parties, and then a lognormal

regression is made.l'" Instead

z

setting up a panel, 1 made dummy variables for each electoral year, because since some municipalities were created and others disappeared in the peri (and others have missing data) too many municipalities

would be lost

m--

a panel. The results are displayed in Tables 6 and 7 in the chapter. Obviously, this exercise can be criticized because it somehow is eo paring apples with pears. What happens if the regression is controlled variables like population, homicide, infant mortaliry, and transferen

168 The results with orher distributions, like the Gamma distribution, are basi identical.

:r

Paramilitaries

in politics: Friends,foetions

from the central government quasi-experimental

and murderers

299

to the municipaliry

technique,

called Propensity

r'?" Using a powerful Score Matching

(Leite

compared rnunicipalities with paramilitary presence with similar ones (wirh respect to the above variables) without paramilitary presence. 2016),1

1 did not discuss these more sophisticated

regressions in the chapter,

because the balance between the treatment and control groups was less than perfect in what is known in the relevant literature as 'Table l' (see Table

8) - in other terms, the indicators of crucial potentially

covariates of treatment

and control did not converge.':"

relevant

So instead of a

matching exercise, for the national regression (that is, Table 7) 1 made a less rigorous and more informal randomization: a sample of municipalíries/ year with and withour paramilitary non, infant mortality

presence, bur controlling

and transferences

for popula-

from the national state (Sistema

General de Participaciones) to try to make both samples (rnunicipalities with and without pararnilitaries) somewhat similar. A formal propensity score matchingyields analogous results, but would require a much heavier technical apparatus.1t must be noted as well that in Table 6 (the Magdalena department

regression) there are no coefficients for paramilitary

presence

and interactions in years 2002 and 2006, because in both of thern all the municipalities counted with paramilitary presence.

Table 8: Propensity scores and comparison berwcen treatrnenr (municipalities with paramilitary presence) and control (municipalities without paramilitary presence) before and atter pairing Before pairing

After pairing

With

Standardízed

Linea base Variables

W/o params 3488

678

Homicides

17·46

Infant Morraliry Population Transferences SGP

With

Standardized

difference

W/o params 3008

678

difference

6S·36

1S-44

112·73

6S·36

-1 S.27

27.30

23.56

-24·54

20.85

23·S6

17.81

28167

88203

14·37

HS7

14429 15·33

SGP: Transference from the center to subnational

1060S 3 88203 -4.27 66so

14429 9·79

units (Sistema General de Participaciones)

169 From the Sistema General de Participaciones. 170 Which describes the improvement in rhe match. See Gant, 2017.

CHAPTER

9

Building the state from below? The take-over of the health system

Introduction

We saw in the previous chapter why and how the paramilitaries were interacting with local and regional politicians, aided and abetted by the 'Bogotá tie. 'and the support .are paramilitaries

ofkey state national agencies. But there is still more. The were acting upon a state that had undergone

fundamental

rransformarions, related in so me way or another to neoliberal programs and :o state modernization efforts. 1 will show in this chapter how these insti:urional changes were favorable to state-agency paramilitary take-over, but - me same time that they did not alleviate social impasses associated with amilitary

political

activiry, Increased

control

by the paramilitaries

did

or imply srnooth control. This fits well with the claim of the last chapter, cording to which the insertion

of the paramilitaries

in the political system

clientelistic and competitive, but at the same time develops it, showing ow paramilitary municipal and departmental control unfolded and devel!Xd during the institutional aad liberalization.

changes associated with state modernization

The sequence 1 present here is as follows:

The paramilitaries

were growing,

expanding

rial control more sophisticated. In the meantime, state modernization

reforms

which favored the paramilitary take-over and positions at the subnationallevel. -

The paramilitaries

and making their territowere being enacted,

of different

state agencies

took full profit of these new institutional

arnbits

(using, of course, the other sources of power they had already accumulated) through politicians and specialists.

CHAPTER

3°2

d. But this process of take-over triggered ever new social impasses. The paramilitary power, under the most favorable conditions (vigoro expansion, support by national agencies, nearly full control) stopped being competitive and clientelistic.

nev

1will focus here on the take-over of the health system by the Bloque NOITI: (BN),l paying special attention ro the Magdalena department. As alwavs, 1face the problem of variation. Some paramilitaries did not delve so massively into the health-system seen in a moment,

take-over as the BN - although,

as will be

the need and the incentives were there for all of therc

- and others did it in a different rnanner.' But, as was seen in the previous chapter, the BN is interesting because it was one of the most poweríu, paramilitary

units, and in Magdalena'

in any other place. Addirionally,

it carne closest to total control thaz;

the notions of state and state-buildinz

held by the BN are telling regarding how they thought work, and which role they attributed intermediaries

the state shoul

to regional coalirions and politi

within it.

The chapter proceeds in the following order. 1he nrst section is de cated to the health reform in the context of decentralization. 1his provid the institutional contexto 1he second part deepens the analysis of me mair; characteristics

ofBN self-defense state building, especially in the depare-

ment ofMagdalena.

1his provides the regional/municipal

contexto 1h

third part is dedicated to the paramilitary takeover of the health system (based on ro the institutional designs described in part one). 1 then sho

2

Although occasionally referring to other units. lhere is evidence thar in other deparrments the paramilitaries involved in massive operations of capture of the heal-system as well. Verdad Abierta (2012). 'El libreto de la parapolítica según Mancuso, "El Alemán y "Jorge 40'''. Verdad Abierta, 1 November . Acces 21 August 2017. ElEspectador (2016). 'Capturas por la alianza entre paramilitares y la clase política en Magdalena, ElEspectador, 17 October . Accessed 2.1August 2017.

Building

the state from below? The take-over

of the

heaLth system

that despite the huge power accumulated by the BN, it still had to deal with involved social impasses. In the condusions, 1return to the key role of local politicians, and return to the social impasses and changes in the structure of the state triggered by paramilitary co-governance.

Basic institutions

1he Colombian health reform can be fully understood only in the context of decentralization. Ir is dear that decentralization in Colombia has been a long-standing demand, and that it cannot be reasonably portrayed as a product of a neo liberal cabal. Colombia was the last country in the Andean region to arrive at the popular election of mayors (1988) and governors (1992).4 At the same time, the form that that decentralization took changed me trajectory of the counrry's territorial demands, as these had traditionally been placed at the departmentallevel, while the decentralization process started in the 1980s labored under a strong municipal bias. Why did Colombia arrive so late to the granting of rights to its citizens in the election of their subnational officials? For the center, to be able to exert the right of appointing governors and mayors was too important a card for holding rogether the Colornbian clientelistic/ democratic polity to allow it to be easily surrendered.

1here was an equilibrium

of sorts in

me fact that the center had control over key formal powers (appointments and budgets), and local actors were in charge of territorial

4

governance,

These dates correspond to the period where rhey started to be elected, not to the moment in which the reform was approved. (Acto Legislativo 01 del 9 de enero de 1986; Constitución de la República de Colombia de 1991). See, El Nuevo Siglo (2013) '25 años de la primera elección de alcaldes; ElNuevo Siglo, 14 March . Accessed 18July 2017.El Tiempo (1991). 'Gobernadores y Alcaldes, tres años de Mandato', El Tiempo, 2 July . Accessed 21August 2017.

which gave thern substantive decision-making critical areas, veto powers."

elbow room and, in

However, during the late 1970S and early 1980s this equilibri changed under the weight of a non-intuitive confluence ofhistorical d} ics (Gutiérrez 2010). 1he new equilibrium, which constituted yet a furC.::r turn of the screw in favor of local actors, had already begun to be in tionalized in 1983 and was eventually crystallized in the 1991 Constiru (and developed in further reforms). 1hree main dimensions consti the Colombian

decentralization

process. 1he first was political, wirh --

popular election of mayors and governors, and the devolution

of a

of powers to mayors and also partially to governors. 1he second was (Banco de la República 1995)' Fiscal decentralization

had begun eaL_

the 1980s, and received broad treatment in the 1991 Constitution.

Ir -

only granted mayors new attributions regarding contracting but also ated (Artide 315)the National Royalties Fund [Fondo Nacional de Reg. transferring to the municipalities

•

massive financial resources arising

the mining sector. 1he third dimension was the municipalization

of --

provision of state services. Ir would now be the mayors who would deli these services, thanks to an increasing percentage of the national bu being allotted to the municipalities through the transference of ear-rn funds for education mild re-centralization

6

and health. During the first Uribe administrati

-

took place." Uribe actually tried to re-nego - -

Which were used quite consciously and strategically. For example, a typical propase:. the opposition to the agrarian reform in the early I960s was to avoid national de . regarding agrarian property, and transfer strategic decision making to regional and actors. For example, governors were given the power to distribute wastelands [b see junta Directiva del Instituto Colombiano de la Reforma Agraria. (18 de en 1962.).Bogotá, Acta no 1,pp. 1-7. Biblioteca Luis Ángel Arango, Archivo Carlos Restrepo, Sección, Caja 2.,Docwnento 61U-6164, Carpeta 2.,Folios 159-165. According to critics, it's strongest instruments were the Consejos Cornuni and the Legislative Act no OIl 2.006 ofRecorrc de Tranferencias' (the cutba fiscal transfers to subnational units). AlI chis found a place in the governm Development Plan 2.007-2.0IO. See, León.], (2.0Il). 'La reforma de regalías: la r tralización del poder más drástica en décadas: La Silla vacía, 16 December . Accessed 8 ]uly 2.OI8.

Building

the state ftom

below? The take-ouer of the health system

me constitutionally nxed increasing percentages of the budget that went to the municipalities, But this particular agenda did not advance very far (Velásquez 2009, Sánchez and Chacón 2006, Castro 2007). lt is within this context of municipal decentralization that the health system reform - a typical piece of doctrinal neoliberallegislation - took place. The reform was imagined as a process of de- bureaucratization, fully compatible

with 'rnunicipalist'

decentralization,

devolving power to locali-

ties and communities,

under the principie

institutional

carne with Law 100 of 1990.7lhe

change

on the characterization

of the Colombian

that 'small is beautiful' public-held

The great

Law was based system as highly

corrupt and inefl1cient, and marked by low coverage rates (Esguerra 1996, Arbeláez 2007). Accordingly it developed an institutional battery, oriented rowards the increase in the efliciency of the provision of the service through a combination of privatization, the replacement ofbureaucratic by rnarket mechanisms,

and the empowerment

of civil society,"

The new health system was thus based on four main principies." First, me system, and subsidies, were focused on demand, rather than supply. There were two regimes: the subsidized regime (which covered nearly o percent of me poorest sector of me population)

° percent

and the taxed regime (with

coverage). Second, the breaking of the state monopoly

and the

creation of a competitive market system fed by private initiative. Previously, 'me structure of the provision of the service depended stricdy on the public hospitals'. Aíter the passage ofLaw 100, private entrepreneurs could initiate rheir own undertakings, in alliance (or not) with public actors. The new prívate or mixed economy nrms - in the Law 100 parlance EPS _lO in turn subcontracted

the services to their ros ter of affiliates. In this case, decen-

rralization went hand in hand wi th massive subcontracting (Restrepo 2014). Third, flexibility. A whole new system of intermediation entities was eated to provide for that flexibility. A fundamental

9

part of the system

1he description that follows relies on Gutiérrcz (2.010). 1he reform actually did improve coverage, see Abel and Lloyd-Sherlock (2.001). 1he lawwas subject to several changes, and to alot oflegal finessing, bur 1 focus here on rhe main trends. Empresas Promotoras de Salud, Enterprises for the Promotion of Health. The EPS are only administrative entities, they do nor provide actual medical services.

CHAPTE

were the ARS,l1 which in turn could be an EPS, an equalization (Caja de Compensación),

or other entities. "Ihe ARS were intermediari

between the state and the direct, specialized, providers of the service, as hospitals, health centers, etc. 1hese - the EPS _12 did not necessari. have a previously allocated budget, but were paid by the ARS when th provided services to the subsidized clients." Fourth, municipally fixed . society participation. Among the entities that could contract with the AR: were health co-operatives and neighborhood associations. 1he mem of the system could choose the ARS with which they wanted to assooate. National oversight existed, but it was very weak. 1he main budge decisions regarding the ARS were made by mayors - and the municipali; received a contribution for each citizen enrolled in the subsidized regime, which in turn were enrolled in an ARS. 1hese were the basic rules of the game. Law during the two Uribe administrations

IOO

carne under discus i -

(Arias 2014, Gómez 2005). BU( .

main provisions did not change."

1he self-defense state

In Magdalena, domination

which was perhaps

the department

where paramiliraz

achieved its peak, the bulk of the subnational authorities en

up in the BN paws. We already saw that the BN divided the departm into subregions, where each front and paramilitary leadership had its o

II 12 13

14

Administradoras de Régimen Subsidiado, Administrarors of rhc Subsidized Re . Instituciones Prestado ras de Salud, Health Delivering Institutions. Quintana, S. (2002) 'El acceso a los servicios de salud en Colombia', ReliefJr 31 March . Accessed 18 July 2017. Under Santos (2010-2018) there were reforms, for example, the difference bern subsidized and non-subsidized regime was eliminated in 201!. The bulk of the 0peGtional principIes of the health sysrern created by rhe Law 100 are still at large, and therne constitutes roday a major objcct of conrcstation. See, Ley 1438, por medio la cual se reforma el Sistema General de Seguridad Social en Salud y se dictan o disposiciones. Bogotá, 19 de enero de 20I!.

Building the state ftom

below? The take-over of'tbe health system

candidates. Results that could not be obtained by violence and threat - which were exercised implacably - or by agreernents with politicians, were fabricated through rnassive frauds.15 By 2003, the takeover of the departrnent was nearly complete. Trino Luna was elected governor of the departrnent in that year, as a sole candidate imposed by the paramilitaries; in at Íeast 13 municipalities" the pararnilitaries had their own mayors. They could also count upon scores of council members. They also elected ar least two members of congress, 17 and - according to the plausible claim ofRafael García _18 influenced substantially the 2002 presidential election. According to what was established in Chapter 8, this takeover of .Yfagdalenaand other subnational authorities was conceived by the late BN aspart of a much broader plan ofbuilding me 'self-detense statc, which would replace the 'guerrilla state' and serve to mobilize and change the absent and neglectful formal state. The BN theory was the following. Alter me eviction of the guerrillas carne a period of activities of 'defense and ontrol' 'Our territories began a new dynamic, which we called the building of protective communal self-defense capital [acumulado de solidaridad comunitaria], which was the only way of building popular sovereignty as rhe basis for the self-defense state. Here a new dynamic started ... a social, a political dynamic, political in the sense that those who would take care

"

Semana (2.006). "Los elegidos" por los paras'. Semana, 2.5November . Accessed 20 July 2017. By 8 July 2018, there were 8,69S,848 registered victims and still counting. Corte Suprema de Justicia (22 de enero de 2004) Sentencia T-02.S-04. Magistrado ponente Manuel José Cepeda Espinosa. According to Movimiento de Víctimas (w.d.): !O million Hc; Acción Social (1999-2010): 6,S million Hc; Comisión de Seguimiento de Política Pública sobre Desplazamiento Forzado (2010): 6,6 million Hc; Sindicato del INCORA (w.d.): 4,9 million Hc; Programa Mundial de Alimentos (2001): 4 million Hc; Contraloría

CHAPTER

!O

I 700000

1 •.•• SOOOOO

¡

I

I

300000

, I 200000 1 100000

o

Figure rr: Displacernent Note: VerdadAbierta

in Colombia

(2012) Estadísticas de Desplazamiento.

www.verdadabiena.com/com

ponen t/ con tenr/ anide/ zamiento>.

VerdadAbierta,

173-estadisticas/

S February, _ Accessed 23 July 2017.

The dynamics of coercive dispossession

337

(Foweraker 1981).20 In Colombia the reach of the state was based on the territorial control by recognizable landed elites which merged into poli tical networks. AlI this posed serious challenges to national agencies which tried to deflate demographic and social pressures over lands through access and redistribution programs." In the face of the absolute precariousness of state held information on ruralland together with the coexistence of a peasantry with weak rirles and well-connected landed elites, they had to navigate a complex political economy of assignment of property rights, which was resolved by conditioning them, In other words, whenever the state tried to grant peasants accessto land, it did it under conditions, lest other actors obtained entry to the program by portraying themsclves as peasants." For example, during the 1994 'market reforrn, credits to buy land were given to claimants with the condition that they did not abandon their newly acquired property for more than a period of three months (to guarantee that they were indeed peasants). We will see below how this opened the door to egregious rnethods to dispossess. These institutional characteristics (political assignment of property rights; very high land tenure inequality combined with formal inequality; barriers to access for the poorest, which included information due to complexity and delays related to the sluggishness of the judicial apparatus; open and contested agrarian frontier; weak or inexistent rneasurement instruments; widespread informality) interacted with each other in multiple and varied ways. And, together, they generated the following outcomes:

20 21 2.2

Some of these rnilitaries were populisrs, others simply were intent on security issues. By far and large, mainly the former. Afear thar was not in the least unsubstantiated, as scandals like the Agroingreso Seguro programs shows. See, Las 2 Orillas (2014). 'Los subsidios de Agro Ingreso Seguro: ¿cruce de favores?', Las 2 Orillas, 2.1JuIy . Accessed 23July 2017. Rugeles, G. (2016). 'Los favores a empresarios financiado res de Uribe que le cobraron a Andrés Felipe Arias', Las 2 Orillas, 30 August . Accessed 23July 2017.

CHAPTER

IO

a. Insecurity over property - especially but not only peasant property. The contest for access to land became particularlyvirulent during major productive

transformations

related to global markets. Some authors

(Molano 2015) identify three rwentieth-century

waves of colonization

and subsequent expropriation of settlers at the hands oflandowners: cattle ranching, coffee, and coca." AlI of these were marked by permanent conflict over land and the dispossession of peasants. 1he other side of this coin was the development

of a standard

technology of dispossession that was already common knowledge to the relevant actors during the National Front, and perhaps before. This technology of dispossession involved three types of power and skills:

-+

The use of poli tic al influence through friends and followers, to be able to push forward the application to acquire rights over specitic

-+

properties. The use of force, to be able to demonstrate stable occupation, and

-+

erties of people who have been targeted for dispossession. The use oflegal expertise, to be able to navigate through the nuances

to rhrearen, evict or kill resisting peasants, and to disrupt the prop-

and complexities of the very involved land property assignment system, to respond to evenruallegal contestation, to obtain titles for economic and other uses.

and to be able

1his technology was certainly not open to everybody. Contacts, access to privately provided coercion, sophisticated lawyers and the like, are not so easily found. But it was also competitive. For one, diíferent factions of mutually hostile political operators had access to it and to the resources it demanded. And new aspirants could use it when empowered by certain historically contingent juncrures. For example, during La Violencia already absentee owners were prevented from visiting their coffee haciendas

in the department

of

Quindío by roaming bandits; this made the administrators and middlemen, who were better connected locally and more used to the

23

1hen carne rnining, which also changed significantly land tenancy structures.

The dynamics 01 coercive dispossession

339

direct and operational implementation ofviolence, the protagonists coercive land accumulation (Ortiz 1985).

of

b. Thus, the insecurity of property rights was associated with personal insecurity - which once again was worse for certain particularly vulnerable elites, but could also affect a wide range of actors. García and Espinosa and rural-urban

(2013) report that there is a sharp territorial

divide in Colombia

regarding the provision of basic

state services. As seen above, this deficit starts with negligible land taxation and provision of public goods to territorial peripheries. In other words, the fact that the Colombian state did not develop instruments to measure and extract income from rural properties

was related to a

deficit in the provision of security - not necessarily or only as part of a neglect of the territories by the center, but as a result of mutually reinforcing institutions

and incentives. The point is neady illustrated by a

report by police colonel César Augusto Tello during the period of the National Front, where it is asserted that cattle rusdingwas widespread in the South of the country, but that cattle ranchers were afraid of informing how many head of cattle had been stolen from them, because of the potential fiscal consequences. As a 'parallel phenomenon', reported Colonel Tello, ranchers also inflated the number of cattle that had be en stolen from thern, to evade taxes." Something similar can be said about large properties held by narco-traffickers - or simply by traditional elite s that had accepted interaction with narcos -: even taking into account all the accomplices that they could possibly obtain within the police or the army by means ofbribes and contacts, to demand security from the state constituted a distinct risk. They needed security, but demanding public security was at least problematic. These examples involve two economies that together cover a substantial part of the Colombian territory, but they additionalIy rest on a major policy issue: the problem of providingpublic

24

goods within the context

Ministerio de Gobierno, Secretaria general (w.d.) Informe del Coronel Cesar Augusto Tello sobre hurto y robo de ganado. Archivo General de la Nación, Fondo Abigetato Caja 45, Carpeta 4, Agrupación 1, Folio 3.

/

CHAPTER

10

of the expansion of the agrarian frontier (LeGrand 1988). 1his problem appears also in pristine fashion in the 1960s, with the tension between redistribution Colombia

and colonization

that characterized

- and in many other Latin American

public debates in countries

- during

the 1960s. As redistribution eventually waned, and colonization programmed or spontaneous - became the alternative to resolving social and demographic

pressures on land in the country's Andean socio-eco-

nomic core, thousands of people moved toward new terrirories (for an excellent case study of this process, see Ramírez 1996; also Torres 2OII). Save in the key coffee colonization wave, which had important social and institutional specificities (Palacios 2002), public goods were not provided to the new regions, given the nature of the Colombian political system: they were sparsely populated, and not terribly significant electorally. 1he basic take-away is that large-scale productive transformations

took

place in territories where access to public goods was precarious, and some important rural elites had either few possibilities of obtaining a stable stream of state-provided security or strong incentives to avoid it (or both). In this context, rural elites rapidly became part of what amounted to a protracted class feudo 1hey had accumulated land by processes which by design were unclear and contestable, and headed highly inefíicienr and personalized economic exploitations, and so were the object of odium by hundreds of neighbors and workers (on the dynamics of personalized rural labor, see Barrington Moore (1993)). 1hey acted upon huge but rarely protected expanses ofland, so they were vulnerable. They procured for themselves public goods that nobody else had, including privatized forms of security, whether it be by buying off agents or units of the security agencies of the state, or be it by arming their own men. And this in turn fed into long cultivated hatreds. It is not surprising, therefore, that at the beginning of the counter-insurgent war the vulnerability of these elites radically worsened. 1hey were regularly charged a quota (eloquen tly called vacuna, vaccine, in everyday parlance)

by different

guerrillas.

Kidnapping

began to increase sharply in the early 1980s, and rapidly transformed into an 'industry. Qualitative evidence suggests that among the most affected sectors were some speciíic types of big landowners and local and regional guerrilla

mobilization,

politicians.

1his fed direcdy

as seen in previous

chapters.

into antiThen

came

The dynamics of coercive dispossession

341

narco-traffickers. They, too, were vulnerable, inasmuch as for thern resorting openly and legally to state security could entail significant costs. They were of course an extremely attractive target financially, and had started to buy land en masse." c. High levels of criminalization of land ownership, associated to poisoned social and political conflicts. Land ownership was highly crirninalized, because it was not taxed or 'observed' by the state, so any kind of activities, legal and illegal, could be developed there. These lands were - and are - an ideal asset for money laundering, as they were hardly remitting taxes and official controls could easily be circumvented. So all the incentives were there for narco-traffickers to invest massively in land (Reyes 2009)' We already saw in Chapter 3 that cattle ranchers thernselves assessed thar Colombia was witnessing the emergence of a new class of narco-ranchers, Certainly, other illegal or semi-legal actors were engaged in large-scale land purchases as wellemerald bosses are a good exam ple (as seen in previous chapters, Víctor Carranza, who surrounded himselfby his own paramilitaries, is one of thern}." Being steeply unequal, having no credible third party to rely upon, and increasingly populated by actors rhat had the skills, opportunities and willingness to resort to violence when challenged," the Colombian

2.S 26

27

Not bychance the two pioneers of paramilitarism are ACDEGAM in Puerto Boyacá and narco funded MAS. Emerald exploitation is a legal, but highly criminalized, economic activity. See for example Cepeda 2012. See also, Rendón, O. (2016). 'Las tierras acumuladas ilegalmente por Carranza, en el Meta, son de nuevo del Estado: El Colombiano, 9 Novernber . Accessed 28 June 2.018. Colonel Tello, in the report cited above, asserted rhat ranchers were 'the most conservative elerncnr ... of our sociery, and that 'in repeared opportunities they saw rhe worker a socio-econornic and cultural enemy.' Ministerio de Gobierno, Secretaria general (w.d.) Informe del Coronel Cesar Augusto Tello sobre hurto y robo de ganado. Archivo General de la Nación, Fondo Abigetato Caja 4S, Carpeta 4, Agrupacion 1, folios 6 and 16.

-----------------------

CHAPTER

342

IO

country-side became an epicenter of venomous conflicts. The life and properties of owners, small, medium and large, could be targeted successfully, because many actors had both the incentives and the possibiliti es of doing so: a dramatic

scarcity of public goods and the presence

of publicly provided security, contested property rights, and the open possibility of accumulating assets through a technology that required only access to force, contacts an epicenter

oflocallife,

specialists.

it also brought

skills. And since land was

with itself contacts

From the early 1980s, large landowners

had become kidnapped

and juridical

an object of local hatreds on a massive scale (CNMH

and legal

- many of whom

or covetousness

- began to be

20I3); in parallel, socialleader

became the victims ofhomicidal repression (see for example Machuca 2016, tracking the evolution of ANUC). Since the technology to take over rural assets was not extremely dispossession

was competitive

cornplex,

and provided

the whole process a sustained

demand

of for

protection. What form did this demand take ? First, by establishing links wi th the security agencies of the state, and so me times funding some of their operations or facilities (see Chapter 6).28 Secondly, by proposing the escalation of different punishments for relevant crimes. For exarnple, the request for the establishment increased

radically

of the death penalty for kidnappina

in the 1980s. Third, through

the privatization

oi

security, which in turn implied two actions: applying pressure to establish institutional designs that allowed for it (through the figures alreadv discussed in this book: selt-defenses, Convivir, germanderies, etc.), anc the actual contracting

of private providers

of security (Chapter

in the context of war, both the need for and the possibility and using private security apparatuses

increased

2). Bu

of creating

significandy.

It is not surprising, thus, to find that from its inception the paramilitaries are related to the pravision of security for vulnerable landed elires,

28

El Tiempo (1991). 'Ejércitos privados dominan una gran parte de Colombia. El Tiempe 21July . Acce 24 July 2017. Semana (2006). 'Ejércitos privados en la mira, Semana, 26 Februarc, . Accessed 24 July 2017.

The dynamics 01coercive dispossession

343

These elites were a core part of the pararnilitary coalition, But of course, 'demand, 'suppIy' and 'coalition formation' met each other and crystallized only aíter a process that could take les s or more time. In the department of Magdalena, the gang Los Chamizos began its operations in 1988, extortingvendors at the departmental capital's municipal market in exchange for securiry, The Chamizos ing with Hernán hinterland,

Giraldo,"

rhen started network-

who owned properties

and became a vendor

within

the city's

of security to the rurallandown-

ers, already upset by guerrilla kidnappings and vacunas," In Tolima, the entry of the Tolima Bloc 'relied upon the collaboration of large landowners, politicians, cattle ranchers, rice producers, who paid for security, because they were objects of kidnappings and homicides 000 then comes the connection with the cattle ranchers and the most well off people.?' In Sucre, a major landowner and cattle rancher 'started a civilian armed resistance, as leader of the owners of different properties, with the objective of defending his interests and confronting

those

who threatened thern or thought differendy from thern. These are the foundations of me Autodefensas Campesinas del Sur del Cesar." Also in Sucre an early gang called 'Enmascarados

de Colosó Sucre' (People in

Masks from Colosó Sucre), 'a private security group developed actions

29 30

31

32

1hey Iiterally irnported him into their territory. Fiscalía General de la Nación (2013)0Informe Fiscalía: Reseña histórica, Incursión en el departamento del Magdalena. De acuerdo a testimonios de sindicados: Dago Alberto Alfonso Maldonado, Norberto Quiroga Poveda y otros. Cuaderno 3, Expediente 2013-00348, Folios 189-2030 Auditorio de Versiones de la Satélite de la Unidad Nacional para la Justicia y la Paz de Ibagué, 'Iolirna. (8 de Julio de 2010)0 Diligencia de Versión libre, primera fase, del postulado Jhon Eider Valderrama Chacón, alias 'Andrés' VerdadAbierta (2010)0 "Paras" contaron cómo se crearon las Autodefensas del Sur del Cesar: VerdadAbierta, 1December oAccessed 24 July 2017; Verdad Abierta (201S) 'El sur del Cesar, un territorio en eterna disputa: Verdad Abierta, 7 October, oAccessed 24 July 20170See, Colombia Nunca Más (wodo)o'El Sur del Cesar: entre la acumulación de la tierra y el monocultivo de la palma, Informe Zona 50 oAccessed 24 July 20170

CHAPTER

344

10

oriented towards nghting back not only the actions by me guerrilla but also by delinquency, cattle rusding .. , aíter carne the "Mano Negra"

(Black Hand) ... these groups were hit-men, confrontation

with the guerrillas'33

It was upon this landscape organized

not oriented rowards a but towards selling protection.

that Chepe

group, and eventually

Barrera could build his more

become part of the AUC.34 As seen

in previous chapters, the vigorous paramilitary was requested in a whole set of municipalities that perceived

that they needed

noted that this protection

private

expansion on the 1990S by the same rural elites

security." It deserves to be

was offered against all sources of contesta-

tion for land property, which prominendy induded (Machuca 2016). 'In the municipality ofGuachucal

social movements (Nariño) ... many

large landowners offered money (to the paramilitaries). In return, the self-defenses offered security to these people, and of course what they requested

was that their lands not be invaded.?"

Fincas

It is this institutional trality oflarge militaries,

and social contexr which explains the enormous

estates in the Colombian

counter-insurgent

large estates were obviously not merely legal economic

has been asserred that narcos and paramilitaries

33

34 35

36

cen-

war. For paraassets. It

craved the socio-economic

Tribunal Superior de Bogotá, Sala de]usticia y Paz (14 de julio de 2.009). Audiencia de imputación de cargos postulados Úber Enrique Bánquez Martínez y Edward Cobos Tellez, p. 6. Ibid. Also Fiscalía General de la Nación, Sala de]usticia y Paz, seccional Itagüí (Antioquia) (13 y 14 de febrero de 2.014). Diligencia de versión libre colectiva de los postulados ex integrantes del Bloque Central Bolívar, Arturo Torres Pineda, alias 'don Carlos'; Rodrigo Pérez Alzate, alias ']ulian Bolívar': Iván Roberto Duque Gaviria, alias 'Ernesto Báez, ]ose Arnulfo Rayo Bustos y Oscar Leonardo Momealegre. Tribunal Superior de Bogotá, Sala de Justicia y Paz (16 de agosto de 2013). Audiencia de Guillermo Perez Alzare, p. 27.

The dynamics ofcoercive dispossession

34S

status of traditional elites, with their cattle and their fine horses. Though the argument merits refinernent," it sounds plausible. On the other hand, even if this cultural yearning for land had not been present, the political economy ofland rights made large estates a focal point for the activity of Colombian armed actors whose identity merged with those of legal and illegal rural elites. First, owning large states was a political asset. For one, it was a fundamental source of both legitimacy and legality. As large landowners, the paramilitaries couId become providers of goods and favors and thus an object of deference. Critically - in a country affected traditionally by double-digit unemployment, - they could offer jobs, with many perks for those who collaborated with the paramilitary project. Having fincas gave access to a basically dependent workforce that could be pur to use militarily in at least two senses. First, as cannon-fodder for the unit. We have seen already that mobilizing workers from large estates was the starting point for ACDEGAM. Additionally, people on the payroll oflarge landowners cum paramilitaries could become a privileged source of information, because they were permanendy in the territory, knew co-workers and neighbors, and could easily identify the unwarranted presence of strangers. Workerinformants indeed became a fundamental source of intelligence for many units." Late paramilitaries that relied mainly on full-time mernbership, used finca/hacienda workers especially in this second sense. Specific paramilitary units went so far as ro redistribute land (always on a provisory/conditional basis). For example, the finca Las Tangas was eventually given to a mix of ex-paramilitaries and demobilized members

37

38

Since property rights over land had the characteristics described above, in many regions the 'tradicional' elires were cornposcd by a complex mix of established rich and upstarts. Unidad Nacional de Derechos Humanos y Derecho Internacional Humanitario, seccional Barranquilla (18 de noviembre 2008). Diligencia de ampliación de indagatoria rendida por Norberto Quiroga Poveda. Expediente 2009-00°47, Folios 198-2.04. See a1so,Unidad Nacional de Derechos Humanos y Derecho Internacional Humanitario, seccional Valledupar (2.2.de abril de 2009). Diligencia de indagatoria rendida por Gabriel Á1varezPérez. Cuaderno no. 2.,Expediente 2009-00047, Folios 2.13-2.19.

CHAPTER

10

of the EPL guerrilla, only to be seized back through force and coercion by a military NGO headed by a sister in law of Carlos Castaño." Other paramilitaries forcefully evicted purported subversive constituencies, gave the lands instead to peasants who they considered trustworrhy,"

ano

As landowners, the paramilitaries were entitled to interact openly with the security agencies of the state. In the majority of units, as seen in prevíous chapters, a substantial part of the leadership carne from rural elites, but their contacts were only local. 1hat is why a common expansion strategy of the paramilitaries was to buy land before entering a region. 1his is what ACDEGAM did when it began its expansion into Urabá. Montañez and other leaders of the Bloque Central Bolívar did the same in the Sou of Bolívar.41 Institutions such as the legal self-defenses and the Convivir allowed for an open merger of pararnilitary

and state provided

securirv,

Legalization and expansion were inextricably linked because they allowe for very powerful strategies of territorial control. In effect, in many regio large estates provided

a convergence

point of the sociability for not onlv

economic but also political and intellectual elites (municipal scholar notaries, priests, etc.) and middle rank civilian and armed bureaucrats. A::. the same time, the very operation

39

40

41

ofbuilding

a legal facade to be able ro

Sala de Justicia y Paz. Tribunal Superior de Bogotá. Proceso que se adelanta contra 2.85Postulados ajusticia y Paz exintegrantes del BCB (10 de septiembre de 2.OIS' p. 2.. See, Semana (2.013). 'Sor Teresa, la última de un clan siniestro', Semana; 12.Ocrobcr . Accessed 2.4July 2.017. Interview wirh Líder de victimas Vereda La Pola - Chivolo (Magdalena) (17 de marzo de 2.016). Chivolo, Magdalena. Archivo 160317 _OOI.ln the case of]orge 40, see Vicepresidencia de la República (w.d.). Dinámica, reciente confrontación armada en la Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta. Bogotá: Observatorio del Programa Presidencia' de los Derechos Humanos y DIH. . Accessed 10 July 2.017. Fiscalía General de la Nación, Sala de Justicia y Paz, seccional Itagüí (Antioquía) (1 y 14 de febrero de 2.014). Continuación de Diligencia de versión libre colectiva de los postulados ex integrantes del Bloque Central Bolívar, Arturo Torres Pineda, alias 'do. Carlos'; Rodrigo Pérez Alzate, alias 'Julian Bolívar': Iván Roberto Duque Gaviria.. alias 'Ernesto Báez, Jose Arnulfo Rayo Bustos y Oscar Leonardo Montealegre.

The dynamics ofcoercive dispossession

347

claim property over state activated networks could be instrumental for other operations (among thern seizing more land through violence). Fincas also had multiple military uses. They were training places (for example, these training centers operated in large estates: Acuarela, Brasil, La 35, La 39, Matarredonda, Pantano de Vargas).42Certainly, the blocs that set up training schools did it on fincas. This allowed thern to thoroughly train their people, over several weeks and even months. Fincas were also probably the most used rest/ residence places. At least for many units probably the majority - fincas were for the paramilitaries what camps were for the FARC. People were tortured and killed in fincas. In Monte Santo (near the municipality of Pivijay), and within five minutes of a finca called San Carlos, aka Rafael had his base. '(The paramilitaries) established camps in the Monte Santo finca, with the permission (of its owner). There they took people to kill them,"" Fincas were places where civilians, as well as mayors, council members, etc., were summoned to respond for their acts; or where people were kidnapped." For ACDEGAM and its paramilitary

42

43

44

Fiscalía General de la Nación, seccional Magdalena (no registra fecha). Informe Fiscalía sobre Aurodefensas de Pivijay. Cuaderno original no 1, Expediente 201300171, Folios 61-69. See, Sala de Justicia y Paz de Medellin (28 de junio de 2008). Diligencia de versión libre del postulado Rodrigo Pérez Alzatc, Oscar Leonardo Montealegre, José Arnulfo Rayo Busto. A1so see, Auditorio de versiones de la Satélite de la Unidad Nacional para la Justicia y la Paz de Ibagué, Tolima (20 de marzo de 2013). Diligencia de versión libre de Juan Carlos Daza Aguirre; and Auditorio de Versiones de la Satélite de la Dirección Nacional de Fiscalías Especializadas de Justicia Transicional de Ibagué, Tolima (4 de Agosto de 2013). Versión libre conjunta de integrantes Bloque Tolirna, incluido José A1beito García Zambrano; and Auditorio de versiones de la Satélite de la Unidad Nacional para la Justicia y la Paz de Ibagué, Tolima (6 de mayo de 2010). Diligencia de versión libre postulado Arnulfo Rico Tafur. Fiscalía General de la Nación, seccional Magdalena (no registra fecha). Informe Fiscalía sobre Autodefensas de Pivijay. Cuaderno original no 1, Expediente 201300171, Folios 61-69, p. 7. Unidad Nacional de Derechos Humanos y Derecho Internacional Humanitario, seccional Barranquilla ÜO de septiembre de 2005). Declaración del señor Antonio Miguel Rivera Escolar, Expediente 2010-00021, Folios sin determinar.

CHAPTER 10

successors in the 1990s, rhe use of fincas as sites for abduction ment was widespread." were disrnernbered

Many of me victims ofhomicides

and punish-

or disappearances

and thrown to a river aíter being killed, but others were

buried. This transformed so me fincas into mass graves.46 Fincas were places where other important violent actions (homicides massacres) were planned, and pravided a springboard

for the launching of

massacres and other military operations. Once again, this was the case righ( fram the beginning

(see for example the role of the famous and infamous

finca Las Tangas, fram where Fidel Castaño launched successive massacres) and remained so until the bitter end (see for example CNMH 2014).4Fincas, of course, also served as caches for laboratories, landing strips, and weapons," and as they hardly paid taxes and were almost uonbservable by rhe state they were ideal assets for money laundering. Fincas were also key negotiation

places, and it is not by chance thar

they were among the typical places where the late para política accords were signed (Finca La 06 [Pacto de Ralito]: Finca La 15 [Pacto del Magdalena] Finca La Lorena [Pacto de La Lorena]).

Since many of the attendees

o

those meetings were aware of the other uses of the finca where they were discussingpolitical matters (torture center, mass grave, etc.) the intimidation effect was clear, and the paramilitaries knew it. In this sense, fincas

45 46

47

48

Tribunal Superior de Bogotá, Sala de Justicia y Paz (20 de octubre de 2015). Audiencia de imputación de cargos en Proceso que se adelanta contra 285 exintegrantes del BCB. El Tiempo (2006) 'Las otras fincas del horror: El Tiempo, 22 August . Accessed 24 July 2O!7-See,n Tiempo (2007). 'Las fosas que han ocultado al menos 20 años de horror: El Tiempo, 2April . Accessec 24 July 2017. Also see rhe testimony ofhow to plan massacres in Fiscalía General de laN~ción (1 de junio de 1997). Radicado IS0, Diligencia de Ampliación de Declaración rendida por un testigo cuya identidad reservada es identificado con el Código 001. Bogora, Informe Policía Judicial Radicado no IS0, Anexo I1, Expediente: 2007-01I8-0 Folios 83. Giraldo, C; and Eusse,]. (2009). 'Fincas 'paras: otro capítulo del terror:EI Colombiano; 10 October . Accessed 25July 2017.

:he dynamics 01 coercive dispossession

re not 'neutral' negotiation oower by the paramilitary.

349

places, but exhibitions

in thernselves of raw

As conventional economic theories would have it, fincas were also a . dow into me world of formal credit. For example, Tuto Castro, a large downer who joined a paramilitary unit aíter which he subsequently cumulated land through violent means up to demobilization and beyond, +as generously funded by credit to promote

the sowing of timber-yielding

~ cies, as well as by credit to promote oil palmo He also received suppon ~m Cormagdalena, a regional public corporation." The same can be said o the paramilitary

leader El Alemán

(see Vargas 2.016) and of Cadena,

=ho apparently got funds from a governmental _ ational Program of Agrarian Reactivation)."?

program

called PRAN

rganizational designs

But paramilitary organizational structures also play an important pan in e explanation both of the magnitude and the modalities of coercive dis.?Ossession during me Colombian .esigns are relevant here.

-9

war. Three paramilitary

organizational

El Pilón (20I2.). "Tuco Castro habría recibido millonarios subsidios por tierras desalojadas: El Pilón, 15 Ocrobcr, . Accessed 25July 2OI7.See also, Verdad Abierta (2013). 'La caída de un señor de las tierras'. VerdadAbierta, 14 March, . Accessed 25July 2017. El Informador (20II). 'Cayó "El 'Iuto" Castro, uno de los principales testaferros de "Jorge 40": El Informador, II October . Accessed 25July 20I7. Fiscalia 2" delegada ante Jueces Oenales del Circuito Especializado, Sincelejo (Sucre) (no registra fecha). Radicado 61220. Diligencia de Declaración de sindicados Rodrigo Pelufo, Nelson Stamp, Edwar Ricardo Ayala, Otoniel de Jesús Ocampo, Ana Miguelina Blanco, Iván Ricardo Palomino, José Blanco Gómez, Santander Rojano, John Mario Torres. Cuaderno de copias no 3.

CHAPTER

350

First, as seen throughout

IO

this book, paramilitaries gave access to goods

and rents to both their leadership and their rank and file. This included land. "The person to whom 1 responded - says a worker ofJorge 40 - had a lot of land [bastantes tierras por ahí] and they (the paramilitaries)

also

gave lands to me and 1 sold thern. They gave it to me ... together with 20 cows. The same to aka Tolernaida,"! Second, the paramilitaries could also transfer land to their constituencies, allies and clients. Third, they could dispute for land and territory, whenever they incurred in what Doble Cero called (Chapters 5 and 6) the 'semi-feudal' distribution of one and the other, These three organizational important

characteristics

determined

in turn two

traits of pararnilitary violent dispossession. On the one hand,

a very high proportion of it had an individual/opportunistic component, oriented towards the personal enrichment of specific paramilitary leaders and members, as well as of their core supporters. Thus, networks of friends and politicians rapidly became very active in the capture and distribution of the spoils ofland grabbing activities. On the other hand, and in consequence,

for many units land became a focal point of their

violent activity.

lhe process of violent land accumulation

Variation Land dispossession and cross-sectional

was also marked by variation, (Gutiérrez and Vargas

2017).

both longitudinal

Longitudinal

shows how much the violent paramilitary land accumulation

51

variation

owed to the

Interview with ex Miembro del Bloque Norte de las AUC y Desmovilizado en Proceso de Reintegración. (27 de octubre de 2015). ACR-EI Difícil-Municipio AriguaníMagdalena. p. 6.

The dynamics ofcoercive dispossession

351

institutional designs and longstanding conflicts and traditions described in previous sections (see Peña et al. 20 17). Perhaps the best way to evaluate this blend of change and continuiry regarding potentially violent conílicts over land is through a concrete case. The Hacienda Bellacruz, in the south of the department of Cesar on the Adantic coast, is an enormous estate (more than 22,000 hectares) assembled by Alberto Marulanda Grillo - a Liberal merchant from the department of Caldas, in the Andean part of the country - who, atier escaping La Violencia, was able to build a new life as an agriculturalist. He accumulated land through a combination of purchase, appropriation of baldíos, and eviction pressures on his neighbors. He destroyed their improvements and fences, drove his cattle onto their lands, cut their access to services, etc." An official of the newlycreated INCORA (Colombian lnstitute for Agrarian Reform by its acronym in Spanish) spoke accurately about Marulanda Grillo's 'lust to expand.YIn 1962 Marulanda began to be challenged by the peasants whose land he had taken. The previous year an agrarian reform program had been launched. INCORA took some initial steps to expropriate part ofBellacruz. The decision, though, was taken only on paper. The enormous operational delays incurred by INCORA - to

52.

53

See, Amnistía Internacional (1997). Hacienda Bellacruz: Tierra, Violencia y Fuerza Militar. Índice Al: AMR2.3/06/97/s.Amnistíalnternacional, 2.3June . Accessed 2.8August 2.017.VerdadAbierta (w.d.). 'Las tensiones por la Bellacruz, Verdad Abierta, w.d. . Accessed 2.5 July 2.017· Interview with Líder en proceso de reclamación de tierras de Bellacruz, Departamento del Cesar (w.d.) Bellacruz, Cesar. See, Semana (2.001). 'El caso Marulanda, Semana. 2.0 August, . Accessed 2.5July 2.017. See also, Verdad Abierta (2.014). 'La historia sin fin de La Bellacruz, Verdad Abierta, 2.0 November . Accessed 2.5July 2.017.

352.

CHAPTER 10

plan a visit to the contested land could take literally years - S4 added to the alignment of mayors, police and army in favor of the Marulanda family an alignment which was expressed through the continuous

harassrnent of

peasants, destruction of their improvements, etc. - prevented any progress. Alberto Marulanda was very well connected, and his son became Minister ofDevelopment

when Virgilio Barco won the presidency

in 1986. He

eventuaUy stepped down (in part because of the BeUacruz conflicts which had by that time taken on scandalous proportions),

and alter negotiating

with the peasants agreed to seU the land to INCORA.

To sell he had to

allow IN CO RA to value the land. The appraisal showed that a significant part ofBellacruz (more than 1,000 hectares) was constituted by illegally appropriated baldíos, but another part was purchased by INCORA and distributed

among peasants.

The entente

between

the Marulandas

and the peasants was fragile,

however, as the former still aspired to regain their land and to block any further INCORA operation, Enter the paramilitary.ln 1995, apparently by invitation of Carlos' brother, Francisco, the paramilitary unit of Juancho Prada attacked the peasants, beating them up and destroying and burning me ir houses. Massive displacement followed. There was no attempt whatsoever from the security agencies of the state (there was a military battalion, Batallón Héroes de Corea, stationed three kilometers from Bellacruz) to defend the peasants. In the meantime, Carlos Marulanda had returned to government - this time as the Colornbian representative for human rights to the European Union, which more than a joke seems a statement _55 and had good reasons to try to avoid the scandal, so once again negociations with the peasants who had a claim to part ofBellacruz ensued. The

54

55

Verdad Abierta (2.0II). 'Las trampas de Bellacruz, Verdad Abierta, 28 July . Accessed 25July 2017. See also, El Pilón (2.016). 'Los Marulanda, MF y la conexión española: El Pilón, 1: May . Access • 25July 2.017.El Tiempo (1999). 'Intensa búsqueda de Marulandá, El Tiempo, 18januar=

. Accessed 25Jut 2017.

The dynamics ofcoercive dispossession negotiations

- mediated

by INCORA

peasants, but as soon as they returned

353

- were relatively favorable to the to their properties

they began to

be assassinated (30 were killed in 1996 alone). Members of the European parliament denounced the situation, so the government sought a solurion, but in vain." Francisco Marulanda

was jailed for the events; Carlos

remained a fugitive for nearly three years, but was eventually absolved by a Fiscal (Luis Carlos Osorio) who had been consistendy accused ofbeing favorable towards the paramilitary." The Bellacruz opportunities

narrative

illustrates

that, although

and incentives for dispossession

the institutional

were there all along, the

magnitude and modalities of dispossession depended on shifting alliances of tate-regional actors and on the Íimits to the use of force by private security providers. This fabric of alliances and region-state changed signiíicanrly with war. Cross-country

connections

was what

variation regarding dispossession was also very signifi-

canto Not all the paramilitary units were engaged in massive dispossession. Some units abstained for the obvious, basically mechanical, reasons: they were too small and held toO little influence to be able to implement a relarively complex operation such as the appropriation ofland. They lacked the people, skills and contacts. In addition, units led or heavily influenced by narco-traffickers not necessarily had the incentives to become involved in the operation (there are rather few evidences of narco coercive land accumulation, and they are weak, see Gutiérrez and Vargas 2016, though the South of the country may be an exception). Narco-traffickers were ofcourse not above plundering

and stealing, but at least in some regions rhey had

strong incentives to purchase the land (for the purpose of money laundering) rather than to take it directly. Units that gradually became praetorian guards were also rarely involved in massive land grabbing. The ACMM rhe self-detenses ofBotalón

56

57

and

are good examples of this: ir is possible to find a

lhe peasants were offered a place to live in the departrnent of Cundinamarca, bur the governor opposed the measure fiercely. lhe authorities apparently did not consider the option of defending the peasants from the paramilitaries, Bellacruz was evenrually sold to rhe Brazilian entrepreneur Germán Efromovich, a global actor; it remains conrested land.

CHAPTER

354

10

couple of events in which they proíited from the massive displacement that they generated

through

their violent activities, but land accumu-

lation was very far from being among their core objectives. And small groups set up by one or another member of rural elites could accumulate land coercively, but they had hard, mechanical, limits to what they could effect. It was major units, where intra-systemic elites participated in an organic fashion - lending their hand to the implementation

of massive

operations and regional governance projects through guilds, associations or simply politico-economic

networks - which were the protagonists

large-scale land dispossession during the counter-insurgent

of

war (Gutiérrez

and Vargas, 2016).

Dispossession in the Magdalena department: Protagonists and mechanisms 1he land-dispossession pushed forward by the Bloque Norte in the department ofMagdalena

is a case in point. Before the entry of the Bloque Norte

several paramilitary

units operated, and some were extremely violent in

different senses (some committing frequent homicides, others cornmitting frequent rape, etc.): however, it was only under the Bloque Norte' territorial control that massive violent land dispossession began to take place. In the south of the department, where aka Cadena headed a relativelv small-

though extremely violent - undertaking,

dispossession took place

at a smaller scale. 1he Bloque Norte had the connections,

the nrepower

the skills and the incentives to implement dispossession, which its predecessors and peers lacked. 1he very networks created or activated around land dispossession explain how each of these dimensions operated. Salvatore Mancuso was the nrst Bloque Norte leader, but as his activities drove him to the apex of the paramilitary

federation he delegated control of the Bloc to Jorge 40

because ofhis contacts and influences in his own department (Cesar) and the Caribbean Coast. As 40 extended his dominions, he himself started to select people of influence, putting thern at the head of key operations includingland

accumulation. Tuto Castro was one of thern. He became the

main perpetrator

of coercive dispossession in Magdalena, and though he

Tbe dynamics 01 coercive dispossession

formally belonged to the paramilitary operated in municipalities

355

he rarely carried a gun. Instead, he

where he was sure to have access to land through

his political and social networks. His brother, Jorge Castro Pacheco longtime politician, municipal councilor and mayor of the municipality of Chibolo, later senator and mernber of the party Colombia Viva (created to support Uribe, and thus a member of the national political coalition) participated in Tuto's land dispossession activities. Some of the lands taken by Tuto finally ended in Jorge's hands. Their sister, Carmen Cecilia Castro Pacheco,"

another politician,

was elected between

2001

and

2003

mayor

of the municipality of Ariguaní. The notary of that rnunicipality, Armando Rafael Andrade Palacio, also had relatives in departmental politics," and had funded Jorge Castro's political campaigns,"" Trino Luna, as the sole paramilitary 20°3-2006

candidate

for the election of governor ofMagdalena

for the

period, carne from a major political (Liberal Party) and cattle

ranching family, which had been hit hard by kidnapping. During his term as governor, he opened all the doors for the paramilitaries, but at the same time did business for himself, working with the paramilitary

58

59

60

leader Don

VerdadAbierta (2013). 'La caída de un señor de las tierras: VerdadAbierta, 14 March . Accessed 25 July 2017. Consejo de Estado Sala de lo Contencioso Administrativo. (I1 de julio de 2015). Radicado no 2012-00055 Se señala la inhabilidad del Diputado del Magdalena, señor Oscar José Andrade Palacio, para ser elegido como tal teniendo en cuenta su vinculo con el notario Armando Rafael Andrade Palacio de quien es hermano. See, El Heraldo (20Il). 'Se inician pesquisas contra testaferros de tierras expropiadas por "Jorge 40": El Heraldo, 20 February . Accessed 26 July 2017. Ariguani al Día (w.d.). 'Notario de Ariguani asegura que no autorizó escrituras que favorecieron a paramilitares:Ariguaní al Día, w.d. . Accessed 26 July 2017. Corte Suprema de Justicia, Sala de Casación Penal (12 de mayo de 2010). Acta número 152. Sentencia contra Jorge de Jesús Castro Pacheco, ex senador de la República, acusado del delito de concierto para delinquir agravado.

CHAPTER

Antonio to take over state wastelands mining project. 61

lO

which would be the site of a huge

Other Magdalena department land-accumulators may have been less prominent, but they were invariably well connected. Saúl Severini, who we have seen heading red-hot paramilitary violence in Pivijay and neighboring municípalities, had relatives and peers'" who were, or had been, mernbers of Congress, mayors, municipal councilors, cattle rancher guild figures, and notaries. Jorge Salah, elected mayor of Salamina by popular vote in 1994, was a 'rich landowner of estates that surrounded

and cattle rancher rhe municipality

... owner of the rnajority

and of other fincas in neigh-

boring municipalities, a member of the board of Milk Producers of the Adantic Coast, and was political heir of his brother, who was a member of the departmental Assembly ofMagdalena, Yudex E. Salah'.63 Note that the majority

of these characters

did not belong to the pararnilitary,

least did not participate in paramilitary armed operations; prominent mernbers of the pararnilitary coalition.

or at

they were simply

The Magdalena dispossession also shows in a pristine fashion the skills and resources needed to implement massive dispossession within the context of the type of institutions The department

that regulate property

had been the epicenrer

of peasant

rights in Colombia. social mobilization

in

the aítermath of the 1968 agrarian reform (Zamosc 1992, Machuca 2016) and rnultiple parcels oflands had be en transferred first to INCORA and later to peasants. force. Hundreds

61

62.

63

To retrieve thern, the paramilitary coalition could use of civilians were kiUed because they refused to sell or

Semana (2006) 'Algo huele mal en Palermo'. Semana, 8 March . Accessed 2.6July 2017. Seguimiento.co (w.d.). 'La "fotografía" del poder en el centro del Magdalena', Seguimiento.com, w.d. . Accessed 28 August 2017. Amnistía Internacional (2005). Losparamilitares enMedellín: ¿desmovilizacióno legalización? 1 Scprernber . Accessed 10luly 2017. Amnistía Internacional Colombia (2003) Documento infonnativo de Amnistía Inter-

nacional sobre la República de Colombia para el Comité contra la Tortura de la ONU. Bogotá: Al INDEX: AMR 23/066/2003 . Accessed 13luly 2017. Amnesty International (2008). 'Colombia: Ex jefe del ejército debe ser investigado por violaciones de derechos humanos: Amnesty Internacional: public statement,

Bibliography

422

5 November . Accessed 5 May 2018. Ariguaní al Día (w.d.). 'Policía de El Difícil concertó crimen del ex alcalde Andrés Palmera Anaya, Ariguaní al día, w.d. . Accessed 8 July 2.018.

-version-de-viccnte-

Cepeda, L (2.009). 'Los asesinatos

de desmovilizados', El Espectador, . Accessed 25 June 2.018.

Chaparro,

y Urabá,

(w.d.), retrieved 2.0 February 2.010 from . Cinep (2.003b). 'Doctrina Contrainsurgente

Accessed 8 July 2.017. del Estado Colombiano y la población

civil: Noche y Niebla: Deuda con la Humanidad, Colombia IgSS-2oo3

Paramili-

. Accessed 3]uly 2018. Dinero (2017). 'Bananeros aceptan que financiaron las 'Convivir' pero niegan nexos con los paras: Dinero, 2 March . Accessed

s]une 2018. Doblecero, Rodrigo (2001). 'Porque estamos perdiendo la Guerra: un punto de vista',

Conozca el pensamiento

de Doblecero, 4 November

spirit.com/ archive/ 2006/06/29/ Accessed 23]une 2018. Dollar/web

.

(2018). 'Listado por días del Dólar Histórico del Año 20IS en Colombia'

Dollar/web, 20 September

Accessed 20 September 2018.

Duncan, G. (2016). '¿Qué son las Bacrim?' El Pais, 16 April .

Accessed

s]uly 2017. Duque, C. (2011). 'Grupos paramilitares también financiaron ala policía secreta colombiana', Colectivo de abogados José Alvear, 26 August < https://www.colectivodeabogados.org/Grupos-paramilitares-tambien>. Accessed 28 ]une 2018. Durán, D. (2008). 'El hombre del número 13',El Espectador, 11May .

Accessed 14 ]uly 2017. Durán, D. (20 13). 'Así fue la génesis del paramilitarismo'. El Espectador, 27]uly . Accessed 7 ]uly 2017. Durán, N. (2017). 'La Comunidad

de Paz de San]osé de Apartadó: 20 años de resist-

encia', El Espectador Colombia 2020,23 March . Accessed 10 August 2017. Echandía, C. (20 13). Narcotrájico: Génesis de losparamilitares y herencia de bandas crimi-

nales. Bogotá: Fundación Ideas para la Paz, Serie Informes NOI9. . Accessed 8 ]uly 2017. Ejército Nacional (w.d.). 'Comandante del Batallón Sucre, de Chiquinquirá, rechaza sindicación sobre paramilitarismo', Ejército Nacional, Histórico de Informes y

Bibliography Recomendados

.

el "Hacker de la Fiscalía", El Espectador, 2 October

. Accessed 12 July 2017. El Espectador (2012). 'Ramón Isaza dio nuevos detalles de la guerra en contra Pablo Escobar', El Espectador,

4 November

de

. Accessed 15July 2017.

-contra -de-pab-

BibLiography ELEspectador(2013). '¿Quién es Hernán Giraldo?:ELEspectador, elespectador.com/

noticias/judicial!

27 ]uly 2017. EL Espectador (2014). 'Muchos bunal Superior', noticias/judicial/

13May . Accessed

de las AUC se rearmaron:

Tri-

EL Espectador, 31 October

. Accessed S]uly 2017.

ELEspectador (201S). 'Yidis Medina, la mujer que tumbó a tres alfiles uribistas',ELEspectador, IS April . Accessed 23 ]uly 2013.

El Espectador (20IS). 'Las andanzas judiciales de alias "Ernesto Bácz", El Espectador, 2 May . Accessed 12July 2017. El Espectador (20IS). '"Recibimos un sistema de salud robado por los paramilitares": Santos', EL Espectador, 29 July .

Accessed 19 July 2017.

El Espectador (20IS)' 'La ley delos "paras" y el "conejo" de los parapolíticos', EL Espectador, 12 October .

Accessed 20 June 2018. 4 May judicial! clan-usuga -n unca -tendra-

El Espectador (2016). 'Clan Úsuga nunca tendrá cstatus político:ELEspectador, . Accessed SJuly 2017. EL Espectador (2016). 'Los Grupos Armados Organizados, la amenaza que cambia de nombre: EL Espectador, 7 May . Accessed II August 2017. EL Espectador (2016). 'Capturas por la alianza entre pararnilitares y la clase política en Magdalena'. noticias/judicial! ticulo-660788>.

EL Espectador, 17 October capturas-alianza-en

· 2018.

Tiempo, 3 March . Accessed 5June 2018.

El Tiempo (1997). 'Las Convivir le responden a Mazarrasa, El Tiempo, 1August . 2018.

Accessed 21 June

El Tiempo (1997). 'Convivir o no Convivir', El Tiempo, 27 August .

Accessed 28 June 2018.

El Tiempo (1997). 'Las Convivir', El Tiempo, 9 September

.

Accessed 2.5July 2017.

El Tiempo (2000). 'La Estrategia Paramilitar, El Tiempo, 10 September .

Accessed 8 July 2017.

El Tiempo (2001). 'Policía y Paras chocan por Niche',EI Tiempo, 17January .

Accessed 12August

2017-

El Tiempo (2001). 'Paramilitares asesinaron a policías: El Tiempo, 12.October .

Accessed 28July 20I7.

El Tiempo (2002). 'Cronología del proceso de paz entre Gobierno y Farc', El Tiempo, 21February Accessed 30 August 2017. El Tiempo (2002). 'Castaño crea movimiento',

El Tiempo, 20 July .

Accessed II May 2018.

.

Bibliography

43°

El Tiempo (2003). 'Soplan vientos de guerra en las filas paramilitares'

El Tiempo,

26 May, . Accessed 2 May 2018. El Tiempo (2004). 'Asesinan a alcalde de Santo Tomás: El Tiempo, 30 April, .Accessed

8July 2018.

El Tiempo (2004). 'Quiénes son los jefes paras', El Tiempo, 1July .

Accessed 8 July 2017.

El Tiempo (2005). 'Gobierno desmoviliza a jefe para captura', El Tiempo, 20 February . Accessed

12July 2017. El Tiempo (2005). 'Ejército se tomó santuario paramilitar:EI Tiempo, 19April . Accessed 14July 2017. El Tiempo (2006) 'Las otras fincas del horror, El Tiempo, 22 August . Accessed 24 July 2017.

El Tiempo (2007). 'Atribuyen muerte de dueño del Envigado FC a pugna entre paramilitares: El Tiempo, 13March .

Accessed II July 2017.

El Tiempo (2007). 'Las fosas que han ocultado al menos 20 años de horror: El Tiempo, 24 April . Accessed 24 July 2017. El Tiempo (2007). 'Carlos Castaño mandó asesinar a su hermano Fidel, asegura jefe paramilitar "Ernesto Báez''', El Tiempo, 25 April .

Accessed 10July 2017.

El Tiempo (2007). 'Jefe paramilitar "Ernesto Báez" pidió votar por político que fue clave en Ecopetrol y el Senado', El Tiempo, 22 June .

Accessed 20 June 2018.

El Tiempo (2007). 'Corte Dividida por las Convivir: El Tiempo, 29 October, 2.3July 2.017. Giraldo, C. (2.009). 'Las contradicciones www.semana.com/nacion/

>

. Accessed

de Castaño: Semana, 19 December

articulo/las-contradicciones-castano/

·

Accessed 9 July 2.017. Giraldo, C¿ and Eusse.], (2.009). 'Fincas "paras': otro capítulo del terror', El Colombi-

ano, !O October .

Accessed 2.SJuly 2.017.

Bibliography

433

Giraldo, J. (2000). 'San José de Apartadó, Comunidad

de Paz: Desde losMárgenes, June

. Accessed lO August 2017. Gleditsch, K., and Ruggeri, A. (2007). 'Political opportunity structures, democracy, and civil war', Paper prepared for presentation at me 6th SGIR Pan-European International

Relations Conference,

Turin 12-1S September . Accessed 8 July 2018. Guillén, G., and Reyes, G. (2009). 'La verdad escabrosa de los falsos positivos'. Published in TbeMiami Herald, but reproduced by Equipo Nizkor, 13June . Accessed 13July 2017. Gutiérrez, E. (2006). 'Por qué la Corte le cree a Pitirri el testigo que puso a temblar a los políticos de Sucre. Semana, 21 November . Accessed 8 July 2017. Gutiérrez, F., and Peña, A. (2009). 'Force and Ambiguity:

Evaluating sources for

cross-national research. 1he case of military interventions'. CrisisStates Research Center, Working Papers no SO, . Accessed 24 August 2017. Human Rights Watch (1993). "Ihe Mobile Brigades'. Political Violenceand Counterinsurgency. In Colombia. HRW, . Accessed 8 July 2017. Human Rights Watch (1996). 'Colombias Killer Networks: 1he Military-Paramilitary Partnership

and the United States. HRW, Document

2033 . Accessed 24 August 2017. Human Rights Watch (1999). Informe Anual sobre la situación de los Derechos Humanos en el Mundo 1999: Colombia. HRW . Accessed 30 August 2017. Human Rights Watch (20 o o ). 'Los lazos que unen: Colombia y las relaciones militaresparamilirares' Bogotá: HRW, República de Colombia. . Informes del Alto Comisionado

DA CNUDH-UNHCHR.

Accessed 1July 2017.

para los Derechos Humanos (1996-2017). Informes . Accessed 9 July 2017. Jiménez, J. (2013). 'Víctor Carranza perdería lO mil hectáreas de tierra, El Espec-

tador, 12 February . Accessed 23July

2017. Johnson, K. (2013). 'Las Bacrim también son políticas: Semana, 6 May . Accessed SJuly 2017.

Bibliography

434 Kalmanovitz,

S., andLópez,

E. (2002) 'La Agricultura

en Colombia

entre 19SOy2000:

. Accessed 23 July 2017. La Razón (2017). 'Se debe reestructurar modelo de intervención a Manexka: Senadora Yasmina Pestana, La Razón, w.d. .

Accessed 30 August 20I7. La Silla Vacía (2014). "El indio" que pasa de agache', La Silla Vácía, 16 November . Accessed 19July 2017. La Silla Vacía (2016). 'Luis Camilo Osorio Isaza, Ex Fiscal general deIa Nación: La Silla

Vacia, 13July . Accessed 16 July 2017. La Silla Vacía (2016). 'Trino Luna Correa, La Silla Vácía, 13July . Accessed 19 July 2.017. Laakso, M., and Taagepera, R. (1979)' "'Effective" number of parties: a measure with application

to West Europe.

Comparative Political Studies, 12.(1), 3-27.

Las z.Orillas (2013). '¿Cuáles son los hechos que comprometerían a Uribe VéIez en el surgimiento del paramilitarisrno en Antioquia?', Las 2 Orillas, 27 October . Accessed 2.6June 2018. Las z.Orillas (2016). 'Hcrnán Giraldo el paramilitar

que manda en Santa Marta', Las

20rillas, 6 March . Accessed SJune 2.0I8. León,]. (2004). 'Las traiciones de Segovia, El Malpensante, S7 . Accessed 13July 2017. León,]. (20II). '¿Por qué nombró Uribe aJorge Noguera en el DAS?',La Silla Vacia; IS September . Accessed 16 July 2.0I7. León,]. (20II). 'La reforma de regalías: la recentralización del poder más drástica en décadas', La Silla Vácía, 16 December

. Accessed 8 July 20I8. León,]. (2012.). 'Arranca la Carrera por la sucesión del General Naranjo: La Silla Vacia; 19 April . Accessed 14 July 2017. López, C. (2007). 'La ruta de la expansión pararnilitar y la transformación

electoral

en Antioquia', Las 2 Orillas, 29 August 2013 .

Accessed 19 June 2.018.

Bibliography López,

c., and

435 Sevillano,

o. (2008).

'Balance político de la Parapolítica' Bogotá: Cor-

poración Nuevo Arco Iris, .

Accessed 20 June 2018. Lozano, P. (2002). 'El jefe paramilitar de Colombia disuelve su organización nacional', El País, 20 July . Accessed 8 July 2018. McDermott,]. (2016). 'Élites y crimen organizado en Colombia:

Crime. Centro de Investigación es.insightcrime.org/

de Crimen

investigaciones/

Organizado,

"Don Bema", InSight 9 August

berna/ >. Accessed 5 J une 2018. Mejía,]. (2007). 'Un vistazo alos años en los que el pararnilirarismo a Antioquiá,

.

Accessed 30 August 2017.

Monroy.]. (2013). 'Nuevas revelaciones sobre la muerte de Fidel Castaño', El Colombiano, 29 September .

Accessed 10 July

2017. Monsalve, R. (2016). 'Hay 2.308 "falsos positivos" en la impunidad',El 7 February

Colombiano,

. Accessed 14 July 2017. Moreno, C. (2016). 'El impuesto sobre la propiedad de la tierra. Obstáculo tunidad para la transformación

de la estructura

yopor-

agraria', El Espectador, 2 March

. Accessed 23 July 2017. Movimiento de Reconciliación (POR), and Coordinación Colombia-Europa-Estados Unidos (CCEEU) (2014). "Falsos positivos" en Colombia y el papel de la asistencia militar de Estados Unidos', 2000-2010. Bogotá: FOR, CCEEU. . 2014. Observatorio

del Conflicto

Accessed

13 July

Armado (2007). 'Los caminos de la alianza entre los para-

militares y los políticos'. Bogotá: Asdi, Corporación

Nuevo Arco Iris. Retrieved

from . Accessed 20 July 2017. O bservatorio del Programa Presidencial de Derechos Humanos y D IH (20 o 6). Pano-

rama actual del OccidenteAntioqueño. Bogotá: Vicepresidencia

de la República

. Accessed 4 July 2018.

Bibliography Oficina Internacional de Derechos Humanos-Acción Colombia (2013). 'Tierra en Colombia - Entre despojo y negocio. Presentación de la situación actual de una problemática al centro del conflicto'. Bogotá: Oidh-ac, .

Accessed 28 August

2017. Orozco, C. (2012). 'Fuimos voceros de Mancuso', El Espectador, 6 October . Pacifista (2016). 'Guerrilleros

Accessed 26 June 2018. que saltaron a las filas de los "paras"'. El riesgo de reciclar

la guerra. Pacifista, 18 May . Accessed II May 2018. Prensa Rural (2008). 'El paramilitar Salomón Feris Chadid: "El Señor de Santa Fe Ralito", Prensa Rural, 22 April . Accessed 20 June 2018. Prensa Rural (2007 ). 'La tenencia de la tierra: un problema en Colombia', Prensa Rural, 7 Decernber

. Accessed 28

June 2018. Primera División del Ejército Nacional, DIVol (20II). 'En operación coordinada entre Ejército, Fiscalía y CTI dieron captura a seis funcionarios y ex funcionarios de Incodcr,

. Accessed 4 July 2018. Semana (2009)' 'Mancuso señala a Rosso José de operar con "paras", Semana, 2 July . Accessed 8 July 2017.

Semana (2009). 'El negro Valdimir reconocerá el asesinato de 14 miembros de la UP: Semana, 8 September . Accessed 9 July 2017.

Semana (2010). 'La tragedia del Palacio de Justicia, un monumento a la impunidad: Semana, Il April .

Accessed 4 July 2017.

Semana (2010). 'Preguntas para Rafael Pardo sobre Las Convivir: Semana, 19 April . Accessed

Semana, 14 April . Accessed 4 July 2.018. Verdad Abierta (2.009). 'El hombre que creó el bloque Metro y lo exterminó', Abierta,

6 February

Verdad

. Accessed 7 July 2017. VerdadAbierta (2009). 'Autodefensas Campesinas de Casanare (ACC):

VerdadAbierta,

12 February . Accessed II July 2017. VerdadAbierta (2009) 'Condenan a dos representantes de Convivir Papagayo por nexos paras', Verdad Abierta, 8 JuIy . Accessed SJune 2018. VerdadAbierta Abierta,

(2009). "'En Puerto Boyacá la verdad está enterrada": Botalón: 4 August

Verdad

. Accessed 10 July 2017. VerdadAbierta (2009). 'Don Antonio, el hombre detrás del computador: VerdadAbierta, 14 August . Accessed 26 July 2017. VerdadAbierta (2009). "'Nos convertimos en una máquina de matar": Julían Bolívar: VerdadAbierta,

24 October

. Accessed 20 June 2018. Verdad Abierta (2.010). 'La historia detrás del "Pacto de Ralito", Verdad Abierta,

18

January 20 June 2018. Verdad Abierta (2.010). 'La conexión Bloque Norte-DAS según "Don Antonio": Verdad Abierta, 2 February .

Bibliography

445

VerdadAbierta (2010). 'Enser Rondón, el puente entrelos paras y políticos en el Meta, VerdadAbierta, 2 March . Accessed

!O

August 2017.

VerdadAbierta (2010). 'Masacre de Barranca: nuevos señalarnienros del "Panadero" a miembros de la Fuerza Pública, VerdadAbierta, !O March . Accessed 12 August 2017. VerdadAbierta (2010) 'Miembros del Ejército presentaban como "falsos positivos" a víctimas de "paras" en el Meta', VerdadAbierta, 4 May . Accessed 13July 2017. Verdad Abierta (2010). "'El Canoso" revela existencia de otro pacto entre paras y políticos en Magdalena, VerdadAbierta, 24 May . Accessed II July 2017.

VerdadAbierta (2010). 'Las batallas de Hernán Giraldo, y cómo terminó sometido a "Jorge 40"', Verdad Abierta, 20 October . Accessed

terrnino-sometido-a-jorge-a.o

!O

JuIy 2017.

VerdadAbierta (2010). "Paras" contaron cómo se crearon las Autodefensas del Sur del Cesar', Verdad Abierta, 1 December . Accessed 24 July 2017. VerdadAbierta (20lI). 'Los tentáculos II

-Ías-au todefensas-del-sur-del-

del Bloque Central

Bolívar', VerdadAbierta,

January . Accessed 14 May 2018

VerdadAbierta (2012). 'Estadísticas

de Tierras', VerdadAbierta, 5 February

. Accessed 21 August 2017.

3833-

VerdadAbierta (2012). 'La otra guerra de Pablo Escobar; VerdadAbierta, 16 February .

Accessed 9 July

2017.

Verdad Abierta (2012). 'El Diario paramilitar del Bloque Central Bolívar', Verdad Abierta, 1 March .

Accessed Il July

2017.

VerdadAbierta (2012). 'Los hermanos 3 May . Accessed 8 july 2.017. Vicepresidencia de la República (2.006). Dinámica, reciente confrontación armada en la Sierra Nevada de Santa Marta. Bogotá: Observatorio del Programa Presidencial de los Derechos Humanos y DIH. . Accessed 10 july 2.017. Zapata, M. (1966). 'Graves crímenes del DAS rural en los llanos', Vidas Silenciadas: Base de datos de víctimas silenciadas por el Estado en Colombia, 2017 . Accessed 2.3June 2018.

Newspapers

El Tiempo (1983). 'Revelan nombres de 163 personas vinculadas al MAS: Procurad uría revela nombres de comprometidos con el MAS', El Tiempo, 20 February, p. 1Aand8A. El Tiempo (2.004). 'Paras: 120 minutos en el Congreso'. El Tiempo, 29 July, pp. 1 and 4. El Tiempo (2.005). '1.419 ex 'paras' y ex guerrilleros han delatado a antiguos compañeros por dinero', El Tiempo, 19 September.

Databases

Center

for systemic Peace (2.014). The Polity Project, . Accessed 26 June 2018. Centro Nacional de Memoria Histórica www.centrodememoriahistorica.gov.co/

(2.012). Masacres micrositios/

tos.htrnl> Accessed 25 September 2018. Corporación Colectivo de Abogados (2.014). Anexo

I:

IgSO-20I2,

(w.d.) .

pos-

del Programa Presidencial

Humanos y DIH

129,132,140-144,167,172,179,

386-389

186,188,194,197,216,247,261,

Tiznados, Los 235 Tolima, Bloque 181,206,343 trade unions 24-25 Triana, Víctor Arnubio 85 Turbay Ayala,Julio Cesar 74

262,3°2,3°9,33°,333,35°-353, 37°,372,382,393

Veloza, Ever (aka HH)

275

war civil 25,27,48-5°,51,56,179,194,

UP (Unión Patriótica) 42,75 United States certification process 63-64, 145-146

counter-insurgency

61,103-104,

196-197,216

defining doctrine of national security 216 extradition 106, 157 relationship with Colombia 24-25

363,367,369,

Colombian

386-391, 393

14,23, 41, 97-102,

H5-H8, 131,154, 197, 329, 349

information 235,236 paramilirary 10, 16, 18, 25, 88-92, II4, 140, 157, 172, 185, 199, 212, 297,

382 war on drugs 24, 30, 63, 74, 77, 106, 124,144,145,173,179,371,372, 373,377,391

Sociología política para los desafíos del siglo XXI Series Editors: Karina Ansolabehere Daniel Vázquez

Vol.1 Ernesto Isunza Vera and Adrián Gurza Lavalle (eds): Controles democráticos no electorales y regímenes de rendición de cuentas en el Sur Global: México, Colombia, Brasil, China y Sudáfrica. 2018. ISBN 978-1-78707-364-7 Vo1.2 Francisco Gutiérrez-Sanín: Clientelistic Warfare: Paramilitaries and the State in Colombia (1982-2007) 2019. ISBN 978-1-78707-365-4